

The University of Manitoba

THE THIRD WORLD STATES AND ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUES
AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY:
CHANGING PATTERNS OF ISSUES AND VOTING, 1967-1976

by

Julius Mlynarski

A Thesis

submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts

Department of Political Science

Winnipeg, Manitoba

June, 1979

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INTRODUCTION

This study will endeavor to analyze the changes in the character of the issues and changes in voting patterns relative to consideration of the Middle East dispute at the United Nations General Assembly 1967-1976. While the decline in Israeli support among Third World states has been suitably recognized, the reasons for this decline have not been properly assessed. While there have been attempts to explain Third World disaffection with Israel most have concentrated on a single causal factor such as Arab oil wealth, Israel's diplomatic failures or Israeli intransigence.

During the 1960's a number of studies of voting in the General Assembly appeared. These ranged from studies on bloc voting¹ to studies on the relationship between issues.²

There are three types of bloc studies and each has an inherent weakness. The first type of study attempts to measure the cohesion of a certain group. The problem is that the degree of bloc cohesion will

¹M. Margaret Ball, "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly," International Organization, February 1951; Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," American Political Science Review, December 1963; and Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge: Harvard, 1960).

²Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," American Political Science Review, September 1964, and Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

depend in part on the size of the group. The smaller the group the easier it is to be cohesive.³ The second type of study gauges the success of certain groups by counting the number of times the majority of that group votes with the majority of the Assembly. The problem with this type of study is that the larger the group the more probable that it will be in the majority.⁴ The third type of study attempts to measure power or influence by counting the number of times a group votes with another group. The problem with this type of study is the difficulty in discerning who is influencing whom, if in fact anyone is influencing at all.

The main criticism with all of these types of studies, particularly the early ones, was that the analysis of the influences on Assembly voting was incomplete.

This weakness was recognized by Hayward Alker, Jr. who attempted to alleviate this problem in his two important studies on the relationship between issues.⁶ Yet the result of this focus is not fully satisfactory either as Alker at no time delineates fully the specific variables he used nor their relative weight. Another critique is that he points out the factors which affect broad issues only. For example, at

³Lijphart, op. cit., p. 902, and John E. Mueller, Approaches to Measurement in International Relations (New York: Meredith Corporations, 1969), p. 140.

⁴Mueller, op. cit., p. 140.

⁵Alker, "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," op. cit., p. 643.

⁶Hayward Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," American Political Science Review, September 1964; and Hayward Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

one point he states that racial variables, economic development, colonial history and American military alliance all influence voting positions on self determination issues at the U.N. General Assembly. Yet he does not tell us which of these factors carry greater weight nor whether these factors influence states the same way, for example, with regard to the South African peoples as they do the self determination of the Palestinian people. If there is a disparity between the way countries vote on these two "sub issues," then it is clear that there are other factors which come into play.

In recent years there has been a dearth of secondary works dealing with the U.N. General Assembly. The area most analyzed is the voting behavior of certain groupings on Middle Eastern issues. Susan Aurelia Gitelson has done two studies related to African voting behavior in the Middle East.⁷ The first study breaks the African states down into smaller groups according to the way they have voted at the U.N. It then explains why these states fell into these groups. Unfortunately, the emphasis was on regional and internal similarities. There was no examination of external factors or the U.N. Environment. The second study is a quantitative research examining the role of aid as a determinant of votes. As one might have expected, the result of the study shows economic aid to be a determinant only for certain states and one of many determinants for most states.

⁷Susan Aurelia Gitelson, Ran Kochan and Ephraim Dubek, "Black African Voting Behavior in the United Nations on the Middle East Conflict 1967-72" in Israel and the Third World, Michael Curtis and Susan Aurelia Gitelson (ed.), Transaction Inc., New Brunswick, N.J., 1976; and Susan Aurelia Gitelson, "Unfulfilled Expectations, Israel and Arab Aid as a Political Instrument in Black African Voting Behavior," Jewish Social Studies, Spring 1976.

Joel Barromi has also done two studies dealing with Latin American voting behavior on Middle East issues at the United Nations.⁸ The first of these studies is somewhat outdated and emphasizes internal factors. The second study is the best of all the studies on voting behavior on the Middle East. Although Barromi touches upon almost all the possible determinants he does so in an haphazard way. Neither is there any attempt to classify the determinant nor is there any evaluation of the respective weight of any given determinant.

Meron Medzini has examined Asian voting patterns on Middle East issues, unfortunately in a very brief study which looked at internal and regional determinants, but ignored external determinants on Asian voting behavior.⁹

This thesis hopes to improve upon the studies and approaches mentioned heretofore. In order to do so successfully some discussion of methodological considerations is necessary.

The problem of analyzing nation-state behavior in international relations has been well chronicled.¹⁰ The major problem is that no

⁸Joel Barromi and Carlos Feldman, "Latin American Voting on Israeli issues in the U.N. General Assembly, 1947-1968," Jewish Social Studies, April 1974; and Joel Barromi, "Latin American States Conduct at the U.N. General Assembly on Issues Affecting Israel," in Israel and the Third World.

⁹Meron Medzini, "Asian Voting Patterns on the Middle East at the U.N. General Assembly," in Israel and the Third World.

¹⁰William A. Coplin and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), Analyzing International Relations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975); James E. Rosenau and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations (U.S.A.: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1971); James Rosenau, Vincent Davis and Maurice East, The Analysis of International Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1972); and Michael Haas, International Systems: A Behavioral Approach (New York: Chandler Publishing Co., 1974).

general theory of international politics exists.¹¹ As a result there are several schools of thought as to which approach to use or at least what factors are more likely to determine foreign policy behavior.¹² Most approaches emphasize one type of factor, attaching undue significance to it while ignoring other factors. Those who do not review many types of foreign policy determinants may still choose to stress one as dominant.¹³ This problem has been attacked impressively by James Rosenau.¹⁴ He argues cogently that most scholars are unaware of the extent to which they possess and apply pre-theories of foreign policy which methodologically restrict their investigations or may prejudice their outcome. He believes that the factors involved in foreign policy action are multi-dimensional and recommends that foreign policy studies recognize and use his five categories of explanatory variables in ways which permit comparison and development of common conclusions and

¹¹Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: McMillan and Co., 1962), p. 25; and Coplin and Kegley, op. cit., p. 37.

¹²Coplin and Kegley, op. cit., pp. 10-21. The main factors in determining foreign policy are: psychological and idiosyncratic, internal characteristics of nation states, economic and military and international.

¹³For example, Michael Haas in his study assessed several factors and concluded that national power capabilities were the most important determinant of foreign policy, followed by internal, political and economic conditions.

¹⁴James Rosenau, "A Pre-Theory of Foreign Policy" in Coplin and Kegley, op. cit., pp. 37-45. Following along similar lines is Kenneth Waltz (Man, the State and War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1954) who argues that explanations of international political conflict may be classified according to the level at which the chief locus of causation is found. Waltz demonstrates convincingly that theories from any one level (human nature, the state, or the system) will be incomplete.

theories. There are problems which arise in sorting explanatory variables into his five categories: Idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal and systemic. Depending on the specific governments involved, for instance, role, idiosyncratic, and governmental categories may not be neatly separable. More serious is the objection that if one attempts to analyze foreign policy behavior in terms of perceptions, the individual actors become the focus through which most of the other factors are apprehended (although retaining their independent explanatory value).

For the purposes of this thesis, determinants of foreign policy will be classified and presented in the spirit of the Rosenau scheme but with variations appropriate to the problems and states studied.

Yet coming to grips with a satisfactory approach to the study of nation-state behavior is not sufficient in this case. We must realize that since we are analyzing a specific entity (the U.N.) we must take into account the factors which affect only this specific entity. There are those who would have us believe that since the act is taking place within the U.N. environment, the interaction which takes place within this forum is the best predictor of nation-state behavior.¹⁵ On the other hand there are those who believe that U.N. actions (votes) are based on a country's national interests.¹⁶ In fact it seems on the one hand that for certain states the U.N. environment takes precedence over national interests while on the other hand some states give priority to national interests. For a great number of states a combination of all these factors affects their action in the United Nations. We can

¹⁵Russett and Alker, op. cit., p. 12.

¹⁶Ibid.

conclude, therefore, that for different states a U.N. vote means different things. It is necessary, then, to add another set of variables exclusive to the U.N. environment. These are: (a) perceived importance of the U.N. and therefore perceived importance of a vote, (b) perceived importance of a particular issue or issues being voted on, (c) the country's position or role in the U.N., (d) the influence other countries have over the said state, (e) role of the country's delegation.¹⁷

This thesis hopes to improve upon the studies and approaches mentioned heretofore. The first section of the study will descriptively analyze the issues and voting trends on all the contentious issues regarding the Middle East conflict 1967-1976. From this it will be possible to follow the changes that occurred in both issues and voting behavior. We would expect to find a greater emphasis on the Palestinian issue as we go along, particularly from the year 1973 onward. It would also be expected that as the support for the Arabs grows, the resolutions become more hostile toward Israel. Contrary to widespread belief, this study will show that each grouping will change their support at different times. Finally, it is expected that while the Arabs seemingly have secured the full support of the Third World, it is not necessarily guaranteed for the duration of the period being studied.

The second section of the study will review and assess the many factors which may account for the changes in General Assembly voting patterns described in the first part of the thesis. The focus of the thesis will be on the changing voting patterns of three regional groupings of states: Asia, Africa and Latin America. First the states

¹⁷Both (c) and (d) deal specifically with the concept of bargaining which is viewed by many as being integral to voting in the U.N.

within these groupings will be divided into three categories (pro-Israel, neutral, pro-Arab) which best characterize their position at the start of this thesis (1967). The reason for the changes in voting behavior which occurred through the rest of the study period will then be explained. It is expected that the reasons for change will be different for each of these groupings. Where there was a similarity in the determining factor it is expected that this factor influenced each particular group for different reasons. Therefore the changes that occurred in Third World U.N. voting on Middle East issues stem from many influences of varying impact.

There are limitations to the approach chosen for this thesis. In particular, while the ensuing study will account for actions by certain nation-states, the goal is to explain why certain groupings (in this case Africa, Latin America, and Asia) behaved (changed their behavior) in a certain way. As a result the conclusions will be to a large extent guilty of generalization and, of necessity, often based on speculation.

Although this thesis focuses on General Assembly voting on only one issue its attempt to account for changes in voting by so many states over a lengthy period sets an ambitious task. While limitations of space and scope will undoubtedly compromise the depth of analysis, it is hoped that the analytical framework employed will not only ensure the relative accuracy of this thesis, but also serve as a helpful guideline for further research in this particular area of study.

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

The following section will be subdivided into five parts, each representing a specific time period. There are several methods used for the compilation and organization of data. It has been decided that the best method for this study would be the use of periodization based on the changing voting trends in the U.N. This was deemed preferable to the use of periodization based on changes in the international system. Thus the periods used reflect fluctuations in the strength of pro-Arab voting.¹ Period A is 1967-1970, Period B is 1971-1972, Period C is 1973-1974, Period D is 1975 and Period E is 1976. Each part will begin with a list of the significant events which occurred during that period, thus characterizing the period and also giving us an idea of what the atmosphere was like during the General Assembly sessions. The individual resolutions² will be categorized under specific headings

¹The sole exception is the 1971-1972 period. The voting trends in 1971 fit more comfortably with the first period (1967-1970). However the changes that occurred during 1971 in the international system, and in particular the African subsystem, were so important as to warrant this single deviation.

²Only contentious issues, i.e. those with at least five negative votes will be examined. The only deviation from this will be in a situation where a comparison is to be made between similar resolutions in different years.

(i.e. Human Rights) within each time period, thus establishing an organized means of comparing and contrasting the issues and the voting. Finally, each part will conclude with a resume of the voting and issue changes and a brief explanation of why these changes occurred.

CHAPTER I

THE RESOLUTIONS AND VOTING PATTERNS OF THE 1967-70 PERIOD

Before beginning to assess the issues and voting patterns of this period, one must characterize the environment in which these resolutions took place.

This period began with the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbours, Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Although the war, aptly named the Six Day War, ended officially on June 10, the fighting never did completely cease. Egypt had lost a battle, but she was not willing to concede defeat.¹ The 1968-1970 period became known as the War of Attrition. To maintain this level of fighting weapons were necessary. Israel became more attached than ever to the United States. Egypt and the other Arab states retained their high level of dependence on the Soviet Union.

During this period the Arab states unsuccessfully attempted to gain full support of the Afro-Asian states in their struggle with Israel. Particularly frustrating were their failures in passing, condemnatory resolutions at Organization of African Unity (OAU) meetings.

¹Walter Laqueur, Confrontation: The Middle East and World Politics (New York: New York Times Books Co., 1973), p. 3.

From 1967-1970 the world was more polarized than in previous years due to American involvement in Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. These events, particularly the War in Vietnam, tended to obscure the Middle East situation. The effect of this on the United Nations General Assembly was that although the situation in the Middle East was on the agenda each year, it was never debated.²

The breakdown of East-West detente also seemed to polarize the voting on controversial Middle Eastern resolutions.

One must note that during this period several attempts at peace failed: Resolution 242 which was passed in the Security Council in November 1967 and which was rejected by the Arabs, the Rogers Plan,³ which was an American initiative which was rejected by both sides, and the Jarring Mission,⁴ which was a General Assembly initiative which was disrupted because both sides had different priorities.

The following section will assess and analyze the issues and votes of the 1967-1970 Period. It will also compare the wording of, and the voting on, the common issues of this time period (Human Rights, Self-Determination and the Situation in the Middle East).

Human Rights Resolutions 1967-1970

There was at least one human rights resolution passed every year following 1968. This is to be expected since humanitarian issues such

²The only exception to this was in 1970.

³After the first Rogers Plan, a second Plan came into effect which led to a successful cease-fire between Israel and Egypt but nothing more.

⁴Gunnar Jarring, Swedish ambassador to the USSR, was sent on this mission and designated the Secretary-General's Special Representative.

as equal rights had become a central issue in General Assembly debates. Furthermore it gave the Arabs strong ammunition to use against Israel, particularly in swaying the opinions of Third World countries who were sensitive to any type of racial repression.

On December 19, 1968, at the Twenty-third session of the U.N. General Assembly, Resolution 2443 was passed. It expressed its grave concern at the violation of human rights in Arab territories occupied by Israel and called upon Israel to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilian population inhabiting areas occupied by Israel. It also affirmed the inalienable rights of all inhabitants to return home, resume their normal life and recover their property. Finally it decided to establish a Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories. This committee was to be composed of three member states who were to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly.⁵

The reason for this resolution, particularly the establishment of a Special Committee, likely lies in Israel's rejection of a resolution passed by the Commission on Human Rights in 1968. Israel had earlier opposed human rights resolutions which referred to the Middle East on the grounds that since the question of the Middle East was under consideration by the Security Council and the General Assembly any resolution which the Human Rights Commission might adopt was ultra vires.⁶ The establishment of the new Special Committee circumvented this

⁵For the full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1968, p. 556.

⁶Ibid., p. 553.

objection and shifted discussion of human rights violations by Israel to the General Assembly under the jurisdiction of a new group which could get first hand information.⁷

The resolution was passed by a vote of 60-22 with 37 abstentions.⁸ The negative votes came primarily from two groups: the Africans, represented by Botswana, Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Swaziland and Togo, and the Latin Americans, represented by Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Peru.

There were three other reasons for these negative votes beyond the close relations which were normal between these nations and Israel. One was that the resolution was one-sided in that the Committee was established solely to investigate Israeli violations, while Israel claimed that atrocities were being perpetrated against Jews in Arab territories. Second, the resolution prejudged the question of alleged violations of human rights in occupied territories.⁹ Finally there was the question of whether this Committee had any jurisdiction, since this particular matter is under the Security Council's domain according to the U.N. Charter.

An essentially similar resolution was proposed again in 1969. On December 11, Resolution 2546 was introduced to the General Assembly.

⁷The Commission on Human Rights had used newspaper articles as evidence.

⁸The resolution was proposed by Afghanistan, Burundi, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

⁹Both Peru and Bolivia gave this as their reason for voting against the resolution. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, December, 1968, p. 127.

It reaffirmed previous resolutions relating to the violations of human rights in territories occupied by Israel, and expressed grave concern at the continuing reports of violations of human rights in these territories. The Government of Israel was called upon to desist forthwith from its reported repressive practices and policies towards the civilian population in the occupied territories.¹⁰ The text,¹¹ which was passed the same day by a vote of 52-13 with 49 abstentions, differed from the one of the previous year only in that it did not (have to) ask for the establishment of a Special Committee. Ironically, this difference in text likely caused the increased amount of abstentions. On the one hand some of the states, predominantly Latin American, now abstained because they had been opposed to the irregular (illegal) formation of the Special Committee. On the other hand some of those who had previously voted in favour had done so because they wanted a Special Committee to investigate Israeli violations. Without the recommendation to establish such a committee some of these now abstained.¹²

In 1970, at the Twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly there were for the first time two Human Rights resolutions passed dealing with the Middle East. The first followed a report by the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli practices which concluded, among other things, that Israel was pursuing policies and practices in the occupied territories which were in violation of the human rights of those

¹⁰U.N. Yearbook, 1969, pp. 514-515.

¹¹Proposed by Congo (Brazzaville), India, Guinea, Pakistan and Yugoslavia.

¹²These states were Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Nepal, Thailand and Upper Volta.

territories and that in this case the fundamental violation of human rights lay in the very fact of occupation.¹³ It was upon this report and the recommendation of this Special Committee that Resolution 2727 was based. It expressed its sincere appreciation to the Special Committee, called upon Israel to implement the Committee's recommendations, requested the Special Committee to continue its work and urged Israel to receive and cooperate with the Special Committee.¹⁴

The resolution was passed by a vote of 52-20 with 43 abstentions on December 15, 1970. The resolution was based on the reports of the Special Committee. It is clear that the additional negative votes primarily signified dissatisfaction with the Special Committee. Both the legitimacy of the Committee and the competence of its reporting were questioned. The latter was questioned because the Committee was unable to enter Israel to interview anyone in the occupied territories and because none of the members of the Committee had diplomatic relations with Israel.¹⁵ The objectivity of the Committee was therefore in question. This was verified by the comments made by several of the delegations, one of which was Canada. It could take no position on the conditions prevailing in the territories occupied by Israel because the information available was neither reliable nor complete. It also considered that the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Special Committee had been irregular.¹⁶

¹⁴For the full text of the resolutions see U.N. Yearbook, 1970, p. 523.

¹⁵The members of the Special Committee were Ceylon, Somalia, and Yugoslavia. They were chosen by Luis Alvarado of Peru on September 12, 1969.

¹⁶U.N. Yearbook, 1970, p. 525.

The second Human Rights resolution did not deal exclusively with the Middle East but could be applied to it as it affirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of people under colonial domination, called upon all governments that deny the right of self-determination to recognize that right and condemned those governments that deny the right to self-determination, especially of the peoples of southern Africa and Palestine.¹⁷

Resolution 2649 was passed on November 30, 1970 by a vote of 71-12 with 28 abstentions. In their procedural activities the Arab bloc successfully employed two devices to ensure the passing of this resolution. First, condemnations of Israel were placed within a framework of general appeal to the Third World. In other words, the strength and appeal of the rest of the resolution was such that it carried the controversial aspects with it. Second, it was proposed that these resolutions not be treated as important matters requiring a two-thirds majority.¹⁸ The breakdown of the votes gives proof that these devices, particularly the former device, worked to the Arab bloc's advantage. The African states voted almost as one in favour of the resolution.¹⁹ The Latin American states with the exception of Nicaragua abstained or voted affirmatively. Thus the sponsors were able to break down some of Israel's support by appealing to their natural disapproval of colonialism.

¹⁷For the full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1970, p. 523.

¹⁸The motion to vote on the resolution as a non-important issue was proposed by Somalia and passed by a vote of 49-45.

¹⁹Malawi voted against and Madagascar, Nigeria, Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Rwanda abstained.

The human rights resolutions of this period give insight into the efforts necessary for an anti-Israeli resolution to be passed (revisions, motions, camouflage). We also see the General Assembly split into two groups, one supporting Israel and one supporting the Arabs. The latter group has enough support to pass resolutions but not enough support to gain consensus or even a two-thirds majority. The Israeli support comes from Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Latin America, approximately half of Black Africa and a few Asian states. Arab support comes from the Warsaw Pact countries, almost all of Asia and part of Africa.

Self-Determination Resolutions 1967-1970

Another type of Arab-Israeli issue reflected in U.N. General Assembly resolutions was the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. During the 1968-70 period this issue was discussed in connection with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. There had been a refugee problem since 1948. However, because of the Six Day War the refugees, particularly the new ones, could not only play an important role in anti-Israeli propaganda, but also apply pressure for an early return of the occupied territories.

The first of these resolutions was introduced during the Twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly. The resolution reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine, drew the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation resulting from Israeli policies in the occupied territories and requested the Security Council to take effective measures to ensure the implementation of these

resolutions.²⁰

Following a motion by Somalia to consider the resolution an unimportant question,²¹ Resolution 2535B was passed on December 10, 1969 by a vote of 48-22 with 47 abstentions.²² This vote was only partly an Arab victory. A number of states objected that the terms of the draft resolution cast doubt on Israel's right to exist, that they were detrimental to the efforts to obtain implementation of the Security Council's Resolution 242, and that they would have a harmful effect on the refugees and displaced persons. In addition it was stated that the reaffirmation of the rights of the people of Palestine were ambiguous and that the proposal that the General Assembly would request the Security Council to take measures exceeded the Assembly's powers.²³

The voting pattern was similar to that of the human rights resolutions with the negative votes coming from a sizeable section of the African, Latin American and Western groups. The Africans that voted against probably did so because the resolutions cast a doubt on Israel's right to exist. The latter two groups opposed on the grounds that the resolution exceeded the Assembly's power. The abstentions came from the remainder of the aforementioned groups (with the

²⁰For the full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1969, p. 242.

²¹The motion was passed by a 50-46 with 21 abstentions.

²²The resolution was sponsored by Afghanistan, Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia and Yugoslavia.

²³U.N. Yearbook, 1969, p. 238.

exception of certain African states which voted in favour of the resolution).²⁴

Resolution 2672C introduced at the Twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly in 1970 was not only similar in wording but also followed similar procedural and voting patterns to Resolution 2535B (1969). The 1970 resolution did include one important modification which went further toward a fully Arab position. It declared that full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine "is an indispensable element in the Establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East."²⁵

The change in wording which placed emphasis on self-determination as opposed to inalienable rights was an attempt to enhance the Palestinian position in the United Nations, as well as to put the Palestinians in a position which could be easily identified with by other states, particularly the African states.²⁶

Before the voting took place, Somalia again made a motion for a simple vote. This again was carried by the narrow margin of 49-44 with 27 abstentions. Subsequently on December 8, 1970 Resolution 2672C was passed by a vote of 47-20 with 50 abstentions.

The effect of the phrase "self-determination" in Resolution 2672C was to create a dilemma for most African states. On the one hand

²⁴Only Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Tanzania and Zambia.

²⁵For the full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1970, p. 283.

²⁶Evidence of this was a speech given by the Algerian delegate before the vote. He said his delegation supported all those fighting for the principle of self-determination as set forth in the Charter, regardless of their race or religion. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, December, 1970, p. 48.

how could they vote against a concept (self-determination) which lay at the heart of their OAU Charter? On the other hand how could they justify the self-determination of a people in areas of land which were already under the sovereign control of several states (Egypt, Jordan and Israel)? The result was twenty-one African abstentions. Among them were Nigeria and Burundi, both pro-Arab states and Lesotho, Dahomey and Swaziland, three pro-Israeli states.

The additional negative votes, which made up for the African abstentions, came from the Western group. In their way of seeing things this 1970 resolution now clearly distorted the Charter principle of self-determination by applying it not to a Non-Self Governing Territory but to one or more sovereign members of the United Nations.

The self-determination resolutions were introduced for the same reasons as the Human Rights resolutions. They were an effort by the Arab bloc to upgrade the position of the Palestinians at the expense of the Israelis. The voting process and voting alignments were also similar. The Arab bloc was hampered by the fact that they were advocating the self-determination of the Palestinians over land which they wanted returned under their sovereign control. At the same time they had not recognized a specific Palestinian group which would rule these lands.

The Situation in the Middle East: Resolutions 1967-1970

The General Assembly made two attempts at reaching a political solution to the Middle East problem between 1967-1970. Both attempts were made after the Security Council had failed to reach a viable solution.

The first attempt was at the Fifth Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly which began on June 17, 1967.²⁷ After hearing the positions of several speakers, five different draft resolutions were put forth.

The first, a Soviet resolution, condemned Israeli aggression, demanded immediate withdrawal from occupied territories and requested the Security Council to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression, was put to a paragraph by paragraph vote. Since each paragraph was defeated the resolution was never voted upon as a whole.

The second, an American resolution, was not put to a vote.

A third, an Albanian resolution condemning Israeli aggression, condemning U.S. and British incitement, demanding immediate withdrawal from occupied territories and confirming that Egypt alone had the right to allow Israeli vessels through the Straits of Tiran was put to a vote. It was, however, defeated resoundly 22-71 with 27 abstentions.²⁸

A fourth was a non-aligned resolution introduced by 17 states.²⁹ In its original form, among other things it asked that Israel withdraw to positions within the General Armistice lines. The non-aligned felt they could get the necessary two-thirds vote until they discussed their proposal with the Latin American's group. The Latin American group

²⁷This session was a direct result of the Six Day War and was held at the request of the Soviet Union, despite the fact that the Security Council was still considering the issue. For full detail see Arthur Lall, The U.N. and the Middle East Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), Chapter VII.

²⁸Only Eastern bloc and Arab states voted for the resolution.

²⁹Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo, Cyprus, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia.

felt that the non-aligned draft was too one-sided.³⁰ The fact that the Latin Americans prided themselves with being impartial and judicial in their decisions, plus their historic allegiance to Israel in the U.N. led them to draw up their own resolution.³¹

The resolution urgently requested Israel to withdraw all its forces from all occupied territories, and urgently requested the parties in conflict to end the state of belligerency. It also requested the Security Council to continue examining the situation in the Middle East while working directly with the parties and relying on the presence of the U.N. to guarantee freedom of transit on the international waterways in the region, achieve an appropriate and full solution of the problem of refugees, and guarantee the territorial inviolability and political independence of the States of the region. Finally it reaffirmed the desirability of establishing an international regime for the City of Jerusalem.³²

Although the vote on this resolution was 57-43 with 20 abstentions, it was not passed because it failed to achieve the required two-thirds majority. In addition to the Latin American group (except Cuba) the resolution was supported by all the Western states

³⁰Arthur Lall, The U.N. and the Middle East Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 173.

³¹Comments on Latin America's judicial position can be found in Lall, Chapter IX and Joel Barromi's study of Latin American voting behavior shows Latin Americans supported Israel more than anyone else in 1967.

³²For the full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1967, p. 208.

(except France) and several African states.³³ It was opposed by a large group of Asian states, as well as Arab and Eastern bloc states.

The non-aligned group, realizing that they lacked enough support to pass their resolution, put a revised text to a vote on the same day as the Latin American text. The revision was put forward as a compromise to win over undecided delegates, despite the fact that several of the original signatories disagreed with the revisions.³⁴

The resolution in its revised form called upon Israel to withdraw all its forces to the positions they held prior to June 5, 1967. It also requested the Secretary-General to designate a personal representative who would assist him in securing compliance with this resolution. Finally it requested that the Security Council consider all aspects of the situation in the Middle East and seek peaceful means to the solution.³⁵

Despite the two revisions the text failed to achieve a two-thirds majority. The vote was 53-46 with 20 abstentions, with support coming from most of the Asian states, the Arab and Eastern blocs and

³³These were Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Sierra Leone, Democratic Congo Republic and Togo.

³⁴"The disparity between the wording of the draft resolution and the fundamental point of principle brought out by the Ambassador of India served to show that in the course of negotiation some countries had agreed to formulations in their draft proposals which in fact went beyond the limits of their own views," Lall, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-183.

³⁵For the full text of the resolution, see U.N. Yearbook, 1967, p. 207.

scattered African states.³⁶

The second attempt at reaching some sort of political solution to the Middle East problem was made during the Twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly in 1970.

A group of non-aligned states, frustrated by the impasse that existed in the Security Council, decided to solve the problem in the General Assembly.³⁷ They introduced a draft resolution which reaffirmed that the acquisition of territories was inadmissible, and that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories, termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders. The draft resolution also recognized that the rights of the Palestinians was an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Finally, it urged the speedy implementation of Security Council Resolution 242.³⁸

The Latin American states, as they had in 1967, opposed the non-aligned proposal. This time it was because they felt the draft

³⁶These African states were Burundi, Cameroon, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia.

³⁷These states were: Afghanistan, Burundi, Cameroon, Ceylon, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, India, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Congo, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

³⁸For the full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1970, p. 261.

resolution distorted Resolution 242.³⁹

The result was a counter-draft resolution by the Latin American group which called for the full support for Security Council Resolution 242. On November 4, 1970 the Latin American draft was defeated by a vote of 45-49 with 27 abstentions. On the same day the non-aligned proposal was passed as Resolution 2628 by a vote of 57-16 with 39 abstentions.

In 1967 at the Emergency Session the General Assembly attempted to define the general principles which would serve as the framework

³⁹Resolution 242 was passed unanimously in the Security Council on November 22, 1967. It affirmed that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both of the following principles: withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict, termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force, affirmed further the necessity (a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area, (b) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area.

Worthy of note is the Latin Americans' strong belief in this resolution largely because it embodied almost everything that their proposal of July 14, 1967 contained. Of further note are the problems with Resolution 242. Laqueur described one such problem: "However it was soon to appear the language of the resolution was to put it mildly not ambiguous, each side could read into it its own interpretation. Israel stressed the fact that Resolution 242 did not call for immediate unconditional and total withdrawal (as the Arabs maintained), and it demanded the cessation of hostile acts such as blockade and boycott. The Arabs on the other hand said, not without reason, that the resolution was to be considered as a whole, and that they would continue the blockade of Suez if Israel ignored that part of the resolution that dealt with the just settlement of the refugee problem" (Walter Laqueur, Confrontation, p. 27).

There were other problems, not the least of which was a question of priorities. Emphasizing this problem was the fact that the French translation of Resolution 242 tended to favour the Arabs, while the English version tended to put the onus on the factors favourable to Israel. To a large extent the problem with Resolution 242 led to the General Assembly initiative at the Twenty-fifth session.

which would lead to peace in the Middle East. The implications of this effort seemed to make the General Assembly more cautious than usual and the result was that no resolutions were passed. In 1970, the framework for peace had already been created (Resolution 242). However, the nations of the world were dissatisfied with slow progress toward concluding peace settlements. Resolution 2628 was an effort to give the peace initiative impetus.

Conclusions on the 1967-1970 Period

This period may be characterized as a period of moderate Arab influence. Moderate, because the pro-Arab/anti-Israeli resolutions which were passed in the General Assembly did so without a clear-cut majority, i.e. the number of negative and abstaining totalled more than the affirmative votes. Moderate because in order to pass many of these resolutions certain manipulative techniques had to be applied. Moderate because Arab efforts to undermine Israeli support through bargaining and condemnatory resolutions was a minimal success.

The voting during this period was essentially polarized. Western and Latin American states voted against pro-Arab resolutions, while Arab and Eastern bloc states supported by a large group of "non-aligned" Asian countries voted for the resolutions. The Black African states, penetrated by both systems, were split during this period.

The Latin American votes reflected an historical support of Israel. No doubt this reflected the fact that most Latin American states were still closely aligned with the United States for almost this entire period. Latin American cohesion was maintained throughout this period and provided opposition to pro-Arab positions.

Most Asian states voted with the Arabs. This was related to

their large Muslim populations, Arab strength in the General Assembly and their stronger identification with the Arab position as non-aligned. However there was a group of Asian states which because of close bilateral relations with Israel and because of pro-American leanings attempted to stay neutral.⁴⁰ For the most part these states abstained.

The African states that supported Israel in the U.N. were those that had moderate/pro-Western governments, had a Christian elite and had strong bilateral ties with Israel. The African states that supported the Arabs had radical governments and had large Muslim populations. Some states which might have supported the Arabs remained neutral because of the arrogant, domineering character of the Egyptian leader, Nasser. The African split on the Middle East question is an interesting phenomenon in view of their otherwise apparent cohesion, particularly on self-determination questions.

⁴⁰These were: Burma, Phillipines, Singapore, Thailand, Nepal, Laos and Cambodia.

CHAPTER II

THE RESOLUTIONS AND VOTING PATTERNS OF THE 1971-1972 PERIOD

Several notable events occurred during this period which altered the state of affairs in the Middle East. First of all, in Egypt Anwar Sadat succeeded Gamal Nasser as leader, following the latter's death in 1970. Sadat made it clear that he would use action rather than bellicose rhetoric to gain recognition for Egypt. Moreover in 1972 Sadat stunned the world by evicting the Soviet delegation, a country that had been Egypt's main benefactor for many years. Sadat also set a precedent by becoming the first Arab leader to publicly state that he was prepared to recognize the existence of Israel.

Other developments in the Middle East were the emergence of Colonel Qaddafi of Libya as a potent force in the region, the battle between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) and the increase in the P.L.O.'s use of terrorism against Israel.

Colonel Qaddafi had become leader of Libya in 1969. In the early 1970's he began using Libya's oil in an attempt to assume leadership of the Arab world. Bribery and coercion were used to sway African, Asian and Latin American states to the Arab side and thus upgrade Libya's prestige among Arab states.

King Hussein on the other hand was encountering problems.

Although the P.L.O. had been forcibly expelled in 1970, Jordan was still the scene of guerrilla warfare between the army and P.L.O. sympathizers. Exacerbating the situation for Hussein was the support the Palestinians had in other Arab capitals. The coup de grace occurred in 1972 when Egypt broke off diplomatic relations with Jordan.

Meanwhile the P.L.O. continued their warfare with Israel. Terrorist bombing increased in Israel and escalated to an international scale. The most notable of these terrorist acts were the Lod airport massacre of 1972 and the Munich Massacre at the Olympics in September 1972. These were supplemented by a series of skyjackings. While most of the world was revolted by such actions, they had the effect of gaining the P.L.O. much desired publicity.

There were also major changes in the world environment during the 1971-72 period. The acceptance of Mainland China as a member of the United Nations (1971) and the ensuing rapprochement between China and the United States complicated the pursuit of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States. The beginnings of tripolarity plus the American involvement in Vietnam served to weaken the United States. The United Nations, as a result, increasingly reflected the anti-Western and anti-imperialist preoccupations of the non-aligned and developing countries.

Africa, during the 1971-1972 period, began its shift into the Arab camp. This first became apparent at the 1971 OAU meeting of Heads of State. It was here that for the first time a resolution categorically condemning Israel was passed. In 1972 three African states (Chad, Uganda and Congo) broke off diplomatic relations, ostensibly because of Israel's occupation of Arab territories. The OAU meeting of 1972 again

passed a resolution condemning Israeli intransigence. At this meeting Colonel Qaddafi of Libya and Idi Amin of Uganda joined together in demanding that all the members of the OAU break off relations with Israel.

In the meantime a change in posture among Latin American states augured badly for Israel. The combination of the Nixon administration's policy of neglect toward the Latin American states, together with a number of other factors which had prevailed at one time or another over the past ten years, caused the first major split between these countries and the United States.¹ This was evidenced in the United Nations in 1971 when the Latin American states vote on the admission of China was split. A further manifestation of this American hostility was the new affiliation between certain Latin American states (Chile, Peru and Guyana) and the non-aligned states.

A meeting of non-aligned states took place in Georgetown, Guyana, in August 1972, less than two years after the last non-aligned meeting in Lusaka. This was the shortest interval between two such meetings, and an indication of things to come. It demonstrated a growing closeness among non-aligned states, something that must be viewed negatively from an Israeli standpoint, since she was ostracized by this group.

Two resolutions were passed at the Lusaka meeting which are of importance to our topic. One condemned Israel and demanded its immediate withdrawal from all occupied territories. The second condemned the tendency of great powers to monopolize or dominate United Nations decisions and reflected the growing resolve among the smaller states to halt big

¹See Frederick Hartmann's The Relations of Nations (New York: McMillan, 1967), for a more detailed analysis of the factors leading to the overt hostility between Latin America and the United States.

power dominance of the U.N. The organ which these states could most successfully use to achieve this goal was the General Assembly.

During this period there were further attempts at achieving peace in the Middle East. The Jarring Mission continued in fits and starts. First it was called off and then it was begun again. The Egyptians seemed the most amenable to the peace talks. Egypt accepted many of the Jarring proposals and also mentioned its willingness to recognize the sovereign state of Israel. The Israelis took a more intransigent stand during this time. They argued that their right to secure borders should be of the first priority. In the meantime (1972) Prime Minister Golda Meir announced that Israel would never give back the West Bank, Gaza or the Golan Heights. Israel continued as well to establish new settlements in the occupied territories.

Another peace initiative was an OAU mission sent to the Middle East in 1971. It served in conjunction with the United Nations and it was sparked by the continuing failure of the Jarring Mission. The mission consisted of four African heads of state (Senghor of Senegal, Gowon of Nigeria, Abidjo of Cameroon and Mobutu of Congo Kinasha) who visited both Israel and Egypt in November, 1971. At first the mission was seemingly satisfied with the responses of both sides. However, once their report reached the General Assembly, its content changed, acquiring a pro-Arab tone.

The relevant resolutions of this period can again be divided into three specific categories. These were: Human Rights resolutions, Self-Determination resolutions and Situation in the Middle East resolutions.

Human Rights Resolution 1971-1972

In 1971 the U.N. General Assembly passed two human rights resolutions dealing with the occupied territories. One condemned Israeli practices and the other linked Israel with other colonialist regimes.

The first resolution (2851) was again based on the recommendation of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices. The addition to the text of Special Committee recommendations was the only difference between 2851 and 2729 (1970). It asked Israel to desist from all policies and practices of annexation, to desist from establishing Israeli settlements on the occupied territories and to desist from destroying and demolishing villages, quarters and houses. Israel was also asked to refrain from: the evacuation, transfer, deportation and expulsion of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories, the denial of the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes, and collective punishment.² Thus the resolution was more specific this time around and therefore even more hostile to Israel.

On December 20, 1971 Resolution 2851 was passed by a vote of 53-20 with 46 abstentions.³ This result was almost identical to the 1970 vote of 52-20-43. There were minor changes in African and Latin American voting behavior. Among the African states Niger and Togo changed from abstentions to positive votes, Rwanda and Dahomey from negative votes to abstentions and Cameroon and Chad abstained instead of voting for the resolution. All in all a slight shift toward the Arab side occurred. This may be attributed, perhaps, to the increasingly negative

²For the full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1971, p. 195.

³It was sponsored by Mali and Mauritania only.

stand of the OAU against Israel. Among the Latin American states, Haiti, Barbados and Bolivia all voted against the resolution this time instead of abstaining and Ecuador abstained instead of voting against.

Basically the support for both sides did not change. Israel still received support from Latin American, Western and a great number of Black African states. The General Assembly's inability to arrive at a consensus can be attributed to the character of the countries which made up the Special Committee. Their impartiality, because of their relations (or lack of them) vis a vis Israel, was in question. As the Uruguayan delegate put it when explaining his country's negative vote, "the goals the Assembly sought could be effected by setting up a committee with political impartiality to which none of the parties could object."⁴

The second human rights resolution of the Twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly linked the plight of the Palestinians with other states ostensibly under colonial rule. The resolution confirmed the legality of the people's struggle for self-determination and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation, notably in southern Africa and in particular that of the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) as well as the Palestinian people, by all available means consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.⁵

Resolution 2787 was adopted on December 6, 1971 by a vote of

⁴U.N. Monthly Chronicle, December, 1971, p. 147.

⁵For full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1971, pp. 423-424.

76-10 with 33 abstentions.⁶ What is more important to this study was the separate vote asked for by Israel on the phrase "as well as of the Palestinian people." The result of that vote was 50-24 with 44 abstentions. Although the vote breakdown was unavailable, one can speculate on how the voting went. It would appear that most if not all Western states and Latin American states voted against or abstained. As well it would seem that the majority of Black African states also abstained or voted against.⁷ Even though Resolution 2787 as a whole had overwhelming support, it seems that a large number of states were apprehensive about linking the Palestinians with other "subjugated" peoples. But if they could successfully link the Palestinians in this way the Arab bloc was assured of condemning Israel even in the event that a two-thirds majority was asked for.

Up until now we have noted little variance in voting trends. This, however, changed during the Twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

The human rights resolution of 1972 was based on a report by the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices. The Committee concluded that the evidence confirmed the existence of an Israeli Government policy designed to effect radical changes in the physical character and demographic composition of several areas of the territories under its occupation by the deliberate eradication of a distinct Palestinian

⁶As recommended by the Third Committee.

⁷Since the Arab bloc, Eastern bloc and Muslim states in Africa and Asia number over 40 states alone, it leaves little room for affirmative votes from Black Africa and Latin America.

identity.⁸ Due to the harsh tones of the Committee report, the text of the 1972 resolution was more specific and condemnatory than those of previous years. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to render all necessary facilities to the Special Committee including those required for its visits to the occupied territories with a venue to investigating Israeli policies and practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. The resolution directed special attention to the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, annexation of any part of the territories occupied by Israel since June 5, 1967, archaeological "pillaging" and any interference in the freedom of worship in the holy places of the occupied territories.⁹

Israel countered that the report of the Special Committee and hence the resolution itself should be disregarded because of bias by the members of the Committee.¹⁰

Resolution 3005 was adopted by a vote of 63-10 with 49 abstentions on December 15, 1972.¹¹ The most marked change in voting behavior was among Black African states. Only one African state, Liberia, voted against the resolution in 1972 as compared to seven which had opposed

⁸For the full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1972, p. 185.

⁹This of course was added to the other operative paragraphs of Resolution 2851. For the full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1972, pp. 189-190.

¹⁰See the Israeli representatives' statement in the U.N. Yearbook, 1972, p. 187.

¹¹The sponsors were: Afghanistan, Guinea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, and Pakistan.

it in 1971.¹² As well, Cameroon, Chad and Kenya all voted in favour of Resolution 3005 compared to their abstentions on Resolution 2851 (1971). The 1972 voting behavior of the Black African states indicated an erosion in Israeli support. This could be attributed to changing attitudes (perceptions) toward Israel as well as certain pressures within the African subsystem. These changes will be analyzed in greater detail in an ensuing chapter.

A slight shift toward the Arab side was also noticeable among Latin American states. Both Honduras and Peru favoured the resolution this time and El Salvador, Paraguay, Haiti and Guatemala abstained instead of voting against the resolution. Again there are several factors that come into play and these will be discussed later.

In summary, the Human Rights resolutions of the 1971-1972 period were virtually identical to those in period 1967-1970 except that they might be considered slightly more condemning. The period nevertheless must be considered a transition period favoring the Arabs.

Self-Determination Resolutions 1971-1972

The issue of Palestinian self-determination falls within the realm of the UNWRA. A resolution was passed annually on self-determination issues at the General Assembly.

On December 6, 1971 Resolution 2792D was passed by a roll call vote of 53-23 with 43 abstentions.¹³ The resolution read in the same

¹²These states were Gambia, which voted for resolution 3005, Lesotho, Malawi and Zaire, which abstained on resolution 3005 and Madagascar and Swaziland which did not vote on resolution 3005.

¹³The sponsors were Afghanistan, Guinea, Indonesia, Mali, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, and Yugoslavia.

way as Resolution 2672C of the previous year, except for the added paragraph which "expressed the grave concern that the people of Palestine have not been permitted to enjoy their inalienable rights and to exercise their right to self-determination."¹⁴ It is not surprising then that the vote was also similar (47-20-50 in 1970). The reduced number of abstentions came largely as a result of a shift in the African bloc. Five African states changed, three voting in favour of the resolution and two voting against the resolution.¹⁵ It would seem that although most African states still were deadlocked over this controversial issue, the time was nearing when all the states would make a specific decision. From the above it also is apparent that the African states were still split into Arab and Israeli camps.

The Latin American bloc voted in much the same way as it had in 1970. Colombia and Honduras switched to negative votes from abstentions. This had balanced Paraguay's and Panama's switch from negative votes to abstentions.¹⁶

A resolution on Palestinian rights to self-determination, 2963E XXVII read identically to Resolution 2792D of 1971. However this resolution was passed on December 13, 1972 by a vote of 67-21 with 37 abstentions (compared to 53-23-43 in 1971).¹⁷ What accounted for this

¹⁴For the full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1971, p. 208.

¹⁵Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Niger voted for the resolution and Swaziland and Madagascar voted against the resolution.

¹⁶Ecuador voted against the resolution, however it did not vote at all in 1970.

¹⁷The sponsors were: Afghanistan, Guinea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, Somalia and Yugoslavia.

this change in voting? Again, one must take note of the African bloc's voting. Altogether nine African states changed from an abstention or no vote at all in 1971.¹⁸ Of these only one (Lesotho) voted against the resolution. As a result 17 states voted for Palestinian self-determination as opposed to only eight in 1971 (Madagascar switched from a negative to a positive vote). It is evident that in one year many African states for a number of reasons had come to identify more closely with the Palestinian cause. The self-determination issue therefore was consistent with the other resolutions in 1972; it marked the decline of Israeli support in Black Africa. On balance Latin America stood about the same. Haiti voted against the resolution and Peru and Guyana voted for the resolution -- the latter two staying consistent with their 1972 pro-Arab stance.

In summation the self-determination resolutions followed the same pattern as the human rights resolutions during this period. The texts were similar to the period from 1967-1970, yet at the same time these resolutions gave evidence that Israeli support, particularly among Black African states, was on the wane.

Situation in the Middle East: Resolutions 1971-1972

Due to a series of amendments and revisions this particular issue is perhaps the most interesting of the 1971-1972 period.

During the Twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly there was heated debate on the topic of the situation in the Middle East, the result of which were two draft proposals. The first of these was a 21-

¹⁸Burundi, Chad, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria and Uganda abstained in 1971, Congo, Mauritius, and Sierra Leone did not vote in 1971.

power draft revised to take into account amendments by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.¹⁹ The draft was in essence the same as Resolution 2628 of the previous year except that it (a) removed the contentious issue of the inalienable rights of Palestinians and therefore did not alter Resolution 242 as overtly; (b) thanked the OAU's mission to the Middle East; (c) praised Egypt's response to the Special Representative and urged Israel to receive him favorably.

The second proposal was by a group of Latin American states who believed that the 21-power draft could alter the balance of Resolution 242.²⁰ Their proposal was similar, but it asked to implement the Security Council Resolution as a single entity.²¹ On December 13, 1971 this Latin American draft was defeated by a vote of 18-56 with 47 abstentions. On the same day the 21-power draft was passed by a vote of 79-7 with 36 abstentions and became Resolution 2799.

There are several salient points to be drawn from the fate of this resolution. One was the compromise made by the sponsors in order to get some Western states to vote for the resolution. All six western states which requested to make amendments were permitted to do so. The sponsors were still able to get a subtle shot in against Israel by thanking Egypt for its co-operation with the Special Representative and

¹⁹The 21 powers were Afghanistan, Cameroon, Congo, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Spain, Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia. The amendments by the Western powers were unavailable.

²⁰Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti and Uruguay were the sponsors.

²¹For the full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1971, p. 1974.

coaxing (admonishing) Israel to co-operate in the same way. As a result Israel voted against the resolution. Ironically, one could not label the resolution anti-Israeli. The fact is, several Arab states abstained from the voting because the resolution was too moderate! They maintained that any political solution to the problem of Palestine that was based on Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1969 would not be practical. The Algerian representative said that the "alleged equilibrium" of the resolution rested above all, on a "flagrant injustice" to the Palestinians and "constituted a vexing and dangerous precedent for future aggression."²² The deletion of the Palestinian clause from the previous year may well have gained many new votes from moderate and pro-Israeli factions; however it had also alienated many members of the Arab bloc. One can deduce then that the Arab bloc did not have overwhelming control of the General Assembly and therefore still needed compromise resolutions to state its case.

Another important feature of this vote was the Latin American stance. For the first time we see this bloc split. First, only a small group of states were signatories of the draft resolution. Secondly, the vote on the 21-power draft revealed that nine Latin American states favoured the resolution and six voted against the resolution.²³ This is the first evidence of a split among the Latin American states in procedure and voting. One reason for this was the realization that as a bloc they had become for the most part impotent. Even had they all voted

²²U.N. Yearbook, 1971, p. 173. The Arab states abstaining were Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Yemen and Syria.

²³Voting in favour were: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago. Voting against were: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua and Uruguay.

together on their proposal it would have been defeated. A second reason for this was a new era of Latin American voting which was highlighted by greater unilateral action. The United States was not as strong a determiner of Latin American voting behavior.²⁴


On December 8, 1972 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2949.²⁵ The text was a combination of Resolutions 2799 (1971) and 2628 (1970) plus new factors. While it referred to Resolution 242 it also recognized that respect for the rights of the Palestinians was indispensable in the establishment of a just and lasting peace, deplored Israel's non-compliance with Resolution 2799, declared that changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories in contravention of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were null and void, and invited all states to avoid action in the field of aid that would constitute recognition of that occupation.²⁶

Although this text is far harsher than its predecessor, the vote on it was very similar, 87-7 with 31 abstentions compared to 79-6 with 36 abstentions. Why the similarity in vote? For one thing, the African bloc, as was seen with reference to the human rights resolutions and self-determination issue, moved toward a pro-Arab stance in 1972. Seven states (Botswana, Dahomey, Gambia, Senegal, Madagascar, Sierre Leone

²⁴The best example was the vote on the recognition of Communist China in the same year. Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago all voted in favour of recognition.

²⁵The sponsors were: Afghanistan, Chad, Congo, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

²⁶For full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1972, p. 180.



and Upper Volta) voted in favour of the resolution instead of abstaining. On the previous two issues it had been neutral and undecided African states which had switched and changed. The main reason for the change was probably a feeling that Israel needed a push to get her going in the direction of some sort of peace initiative. The representative of Zaire for instance explained its vote in this way.²⁷

Why was there not a more negative response from the Western states? One reason was that for the second consecutive year the text was revised to accommodate recommendations made by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom. After achieving certain alterations in the text the delegates of these countries overlooked other unappealing aspects of the resolution.²⁸ It is also possible that many of the Western states agreed with the argument that Israel's intransigence deserved notice.

As might be expected, the Latin American states took a more negative stand on this issue, although it was not as large a shift as one might have expected.²⁹ One can conclude that the affirmative votes from many traditional Israeli sympathizers was a result of their growing dissatisfaction with the lack of an Israeli peace initiative.

Overall it can be seen that voting on political settlement

²⁷"Zaire said it voted for the resolution because it wished the situation in the Middle East to be settled at an early date." U.N. Monthly Chronicle, December, 1972, p. 37.

²⁸The representative of Belgium in explaining his vote stated that "Belgium had supported the text because the co-sponsors had accepted the amendments proposed by his delegation." U.N. Monthly Chronicle, December, 1972, p. 37.

²⁹Bolivia voted against the resolution (abstained in 1971), Colombia voted against (voted in favour in 1971) and Venezuela abstained (voted in favour in 1971).

resolutions in 1971 and 1972 revealed some important shifts which broke previous patterns and suggested progress for pro-Arab positions.

Conclusions

The issues during the 1971-1972 period fell into three categories just as they had in the period from 1967-1970. Any changes in the resolutions made them more hostile to Israel during this period.

Voting patterns began to change in 1971-72 although the victories for Arab positions still did not amount to an anti-Israeli consensus.

The most striking change was the voting behavior of the African bloc. By 1972 most of the up to then "neutral" states had shifted into the Arab camp, thus giving the Arabs the majority of support from African states. The reasons for this change are manifold. The change in leadership in Egypt from the volatile Nasser to the level headed Sadat was one reason. This was especially so after Sadat evicted the Russians in 1972 thus making Egypt more acceptable to the conservative states in Africa. Another factor was the increased role of Libya in the African subsystem. A third factor was the increasing role the OAU was playing in the Middle East conflict. Israel was also hurt by its hard-line position which compared badly to Egypt's new moderation.

A more minor change occurred among the Latin American bloc. Certain countries such as Chile, Peru and Guyana were taking a more positive Arab stance, particularly in 1972. One reason for this was the desire of the individual members of the triumvirate to be among the leaders of the non-aligned group. These states were represented at the non-aligned meeting in Georgetown, Guyana just before the Twenty-seventh session of the United Nations, where they helped pass anti-Israeli

resolutions. Sustaining a pro-Arab stance would help retain a high status position among the non-aligned states. The erosion of U.S. influence in the Latin American subsystem was undoubtedly a major contributing factor as well. Another reason for the shift was the realization that the strength of the Latin American bloc was waning in the U.N. with the continuing increase in membership. This probably contributed to the Latin American interest in joining the non-aligned grouping.

CHAPTER III

THE RESOLUTIONS AND VOTING PATTERNS OF THE 1973-1974 PERIOD

The most important event of this period was the outbreak of the fourth Middle Eastern War between the Arab states (Egypt and Syria) and Israel. It was the longest and most costly war. It began on October 6, 1973, as Egyptian troops crossed the Suez Canal and ended on October 26 with Israeli forces on the west bank of Suez and in clear command of the approaches to Damascus.¹ The war was to have a profound effect, not only on the Middle East, but on the world as a whole.

Other developments in the Middle East included two important meetings of Arab heads of state in 1973 and one in 1974. The first, held in Algiers on December 17, passed two resolutions which concern us here. One was that the oil embargo should be used as a political weapon. The second pledged intensified co-operation with African states. In this vein the Arab states severed relations with Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia, "the white colonial masters of Africa." The second meeting was in Rabat, Morocco on October 26, 1974. It was here that the Palestine Liberation Organization was recognized as the sole representative

¹An immediate cease-fire was called for and agreed on as early as October 22; however, fighting continued in an effort to gain extra territorial advantages for the ensuing bargaining.

of the Palestinian people.

The oil embargo by the Arab states had a disastrous economic effect on most of the world. The result was rampant inflation and in some countries major recessions. The hardest hit of these states were the Western states of North America and Europe.

During this period, detente was the term used most often to describe superpower relations. Henry Kissinger became Secretary of State in 1973 and immediately called for greater co-operation between the Soviets and the United States. Discussions were beginning with regard to a SALT II agreement and both the United States and the Soviet Union were represented at Helsinki for European Security talks.

The years 1973-74 saw the dismantling of friendly relations between Israel and Black African states. Between January 1, 1973 and November 13, 1973, 24 African states severed relations with Israel. At the end of this period only Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland and Lesotho had diplomatic relations with Israel.

These moves were foreshadowed by developments of various OAU meetings during the early part of 1973. In February at a Session of Council Ministers in Addis Ababa, Israel was condemned for its refusal to withdraw from occupied territories. Furthermore, African states were asked to pledge their support for Egypt to create a solid African front. This was followed by a declaration giving full support to Egypt. In April, President Sadat, in attempt to gain solid support, emphasized that the Middle East conflict and Israeli aggression was not just against Egypt but against all of Africa.

For the first time a non-aligned meeting took place only one year after its predecessor. The Algiers meeting in September 1973 was of

major importance to the Middle East. A resolution was passed condemning Israel and demanding an immediate withdrawal. The resolution also called for countries to break off diplomatic relations with Israel and to take steps to boycott her diplomatically, economically and militarily. Of equal importance was the presence of Yassir Arafat, the P.L.O. leader. His appearance symbolized at least a tacit agreement among non-aligned states that the P.L.O. was to be recognized as the representative of the Palestinian cause.

Latin American states continued to slide over to the non-aligned camp and as a result moved closer to the Arab outlook. Mexico, Argentina, Jamaica, Ecuador and Honduras became either full members of the non-aligned or were present as observers. Venezuela moved closer to the Arabs, because of its position in OPEC and the new-found importance of oil. More and more Latin American states identified with the new North-South polarization of the world. They saw that the more powerful industrial states could be forced into concessions (oil) and with this new weapon some equalization could be made with regard to their somewhat retarded economic development.

The Security Council played a critical role in the cessation of the Yom Kippur War, more specifically the Soviet Union and the United States in conjunction with the Security Council. On October 21, 1973, Henry Kissinger, while in Moscow, joined the Russians in formulating Resolution 338, which was a call for an immediate cease-fire. From this point on the two superpowers worked together in restoring peace in the area, with the Americans, aided by Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, taking the initiative.

On November 11, 1973, Kissinger managed to get an official

cease-fire agreed upon by both sides. On December 31, 1973 the Geneva conference co-sponsored by the U.S. and the USSR began. It was attended by the foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan and Israel. (Syria refused to become involved.) On January 18 Kissinger visited Cairo and Jerusalem and persuaded Egypt and Israel to sign their initial disengagement agreements. On May 30, Syria and Israel signed their initial disengagement agreements following visits by Dr. Kissinger. These were followed by visits by Kissinger to both sides.

During this period two important developments were taking place in the U.N. In 1973, despite vetoes from three states in the Security Council, the General Assembly voted to expel South Africa, an act many considered illegal.

The other development was the expulsion of Israel from UNESCO on November 20, 1974. This followed a vote earlier in the month to exclude Israel from the European grouping (Israel was not represented in any of the five regions). During this period anti-Israeli resolutions were passed by the cultural committee of the U.N. and Israel was also suspended from the International Labour Organization. Thus attacks on Israel were heightening in intensity in other U.N. organs. The admitted Arab goal was to eliminate Israeli representation, first in the U.N. organs, and finally in the General Assembly.

This period witnessed the first major change in issues regarding the situation in the Middle East. There were still human rights resolutions and self-determination issues, however the human rights resolutions no longer linked Israel with colonial rule (this fell under the auspices of the Second Committee) and the self-determination resolution in 1974 fell under a new heading, "the Problem of Palestine." The question of

illegal acquisition of territory was dropped temporarily and new resolutions not only noting the existence of the Palestine Liberation Organization, but also justifying its leadership of the displaced Palestinians were passed.

Human Rights Resolutions 1973-1974

There was a resolution passed in 1973 and in 1974 dealing with Israeli human rights violations. As well, in 1973 and 1974 there was a resolution passed linking Israeli policy with South African apartheid policy.

Resolution 3092B condemned Israeli violations of the Geneva convention, called for Israel to desist from colonizing Arab territories, praised the Special Committee Investigating Israeli Practices and condemned Israel's refusal to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories.²

Despite the closeness in wording, Resolution 3092B was passed on December 7, 1973 by a vote of 90-7 with 27 abstentions³ compared to 63-10-49 on Resolution 3005 of 1972.⁴

The group that shifted the most was again the African bloc. Whereas 1972 was the year all the neutral African states switched to a pro-Arab stance, 1973 was the year that almost all of Israel's past supporters switched allegiance. Twelve states in all changed their

²For full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1973, pp. 233-234.

³Sponsors of 3092B were Afghanistan, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, Senegal and Uganda.

⁴The disparity is even more dramatic when compared to 1971 (53-20-46).

votes to the Arab side.⁵ What this meant was that all the Black African states voted for the resolution except for one, Malawi. African support, as was expected following the severance of diplomatic ties with Israel by almost all the African states, had reached its nadir in the General Assembly.

Equally disturbing from Israel's point of view was the erosion of Latin American support. Argentina, Ecuador and Mexico joined Peru and Honduras in voting for the resolution. All three, as we will see, had aspirations to Third World leadership.

Finally it is important to note that of the five Asian states which had stayed neutral to this point, four had decided to vote with the Arabs on this particular resolution, with only Nepal abstaining.

The annual human rights resolution in 1974 was identical to the one in 1973 with minor revisions.⁶ It was passed on November 29, 1974 by a roll call vote of 95-4 with 31 abstentions.⁷ The difference this time was the result of further defections from the Latin American bloc. Panama voted for the resolution while Costa Rica and Barbados abstained and Dominican Republic did not vote. The remainder of the positive votes came from new United Nations members (Bangladesh, Bhutan and Grenada), the rest of the states voted in the same way as the year before.

⁵These were: Botswana, Central African Republic, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Rwanda, Togo, Upper Volta and Ivory Coast.

⁶For example, the deploring of Israel's refusal to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories was placed in the preamble section of the text instead of the operative section.

⁷The sponsors were: Afghanistan, Chad, Guinea, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Phillipines and Upper Volta.

Resolution 3175 of the Twenty-eighth session affirmed the right of the Arab states and peoples whose territories are under foreign occupation to permanent sovereignty over all natural resources, and re-asserted that all measures undertaken by Israel to exploit the human and natural resources of the occupied territories were illegal. Moreover it stated that the Arab states and peoples whose territories were under Israeli occupation were entitled to restitution for looting and full compensation for the exploitation of resources in those lands. These conclusions were drawn from the general claim that such rights belonged to all states, territories and peoples under foreign occupation, colonial rule or apartheid.⁸

The resolution was passed on December 17, 1973 by a vote of 90-5 with 26 abstentions.⁹ The voting followed the trend noted in the human rights voting. All the African states favoured the resolution with the exception of Malawi. There was also strong support for the resolution among Latin American states, twelve of which (Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela) supported the resolution. This represented the largest pro-Arab vote among Latin American states on any contentious issue. Nepal was again the only Asian state to abstain.

The successful attempt to link Israel with South Africa and its apartheid policy is as important here as the vote breakdown. This was

⁸For full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1973, p. 236.

⁹The sponsors were: Afghanistan, Cameroon, Congo, Cuba, Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Somalia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

the first time the word apartheid had been linked to Israel, and it seemed to promote the idea that Israel was more than just an occupying, colonial force. The goals of this resolution would seem to have been to further damage and erode Israeli support by associating it with a distasteful regime, in this case South Africa, and to further justify attempts at establishing a Palestinian state.

Virtually the same resolution was passed in December 1974, at the Twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly¹⁰ by a roll call vote of 99-2 with 31 abstentions.¹¹

This time 15 Latin American states voted in favour of the resolution. This was the only notable change from the year before. The fact that three Latin American states were among the sponsoring states, probably accounts for this change.

Self Determination

The Twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly was the last one at which the question of Palestinian self-determination was dealt with through UNWRA resolutions.

Besides reaffirming the inalienable rights of the Palestinians and their right to self-determination, Resolution 3089D also stated that the enjoyment by the Palestine Arab refugees of their right to return to their homes and property "is indispensable for the achievement of a just settlement of the refugee problem and for the exercise by the people of

¹⁰For full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1974, p. 240.

¹¹Sponsored by 33 states, 21 of which were African. Note: For the first time a Latin American state (two in fact: Argentina and Guyana) other than Cuba were among the sponsors of an anti-Israel resolution.

Palestine of its right to self-determination."¹²

The added clause is merely another recommendation that the Palestinians cannot be ignored in any peace initiative in the Middle East. This resolution was passed on December 7, 1973 by a vote of 87-6 with 33 abstentions.¹³ Considering the similarity in the resolution (if anything, it was harsher from an Israeli viewpoint) to the past year, the final outcome signals a major shift in voting (1972 vote: 67-21-37).

The African states, as one might expect at this stage, represented the most significant change. Eleven states changed from a neutral abstention to a positive vote.¹⁴ One state, Liberia, went full circle from a negative vote to an affirmative vote and one state, Lesotho, changed from a negative vote to an abstention. The result of this was that there were no negative votes this time compared to three in 1972 (Swaziland did not vote this time around), and there were only three abstentions compared to 12 in 1972.

The Latin American states also took a more pronounced pro-Palestinian stance. Argentina, Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago voted for the resolution whereas in 1972 they had abstained. Ecuador and Honduras both went full circle (positive votes instead of negative votes). Finally, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and Uruguay

¹²For the full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1973, p. 243.

¹³The sponsors were: Afghanistan, Chad, Dahomey, Guinea, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, Senegal and Yugoslavia.

¹⁴These were: Central African Republic, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Rwanda, Togo, Upper Volta, Zaire and Ivory Coast.

all changed their positive votes to abstentions.

As for the Asian states, Thailand, Phillipines and Singapore, all voted for the resolution this time whereas in 1972 they had abstained. Nepal continued to abstain.

The biggest surprise, however, was the so-called Western bloc. Eight states, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and New Zealand changed to abstentions from dissenting votes in 1972. If one allows speculation it seems the abstentions by these states was a shift to a "safe" vote. The abstention did not signal a recognition of the resolution but at the same time showed some concessions to the Arabs. This could largely be attributed to Arab oil pressure and perhaps a feeling that Israel had instigated the October war by its intransigent stand on the Middle East situation.

The Question of Palestine Resolutions 1974

On September 11, 1974, 56 states (African, Eastern bloc, Arab bloc and Asian states) asked the Secretary-General to include a separate item on Palestine. In an explanatory memorandum accompanying their request, the signatories pointed out that the General Assembly had been continually seized by the Problem of Palestine since April 1947.

Since 1948 the Assembly had recognized and reaffirmed the right of the Palestine refugees to repatriation and since 1970 had recognized the inalienable rights (including the right of self-determination) of the People of Palestine, as had the international community in recent years. They argued that as the U.N. had, since its inception, borne an historic political and judicial responsibility regarding the problem of Palestine, it was therefore incumbent upon the General Assembly to consider the question in its true nature and proper form.¹⁵

¹⁵U.N. Yearbook, 1974, p. 219.

This request gave greater stature to the conviction that the Palestinians deserved to have their own state and deserved to participate in any peace talks. Further, the new category was introduced as the stage from which the Palestinian Liberation Organization would become a new actor in the General Assembly.

It was within this context that the self-determination resolution of 1974 was proposed. New recommendations added to this resolution were: an appeal to all states and international organizations to extend their support to the Palestinian people, the inclusion of the Question of Palestine on the U.N. General Assembly's agenda, and a request that the Secretary-General establish contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization on all matters concerning the question of Palestine.¹⁶ This resolution was passed in November by a vote of 89-8 with 37 abstentions.¹⁷

Interestingly enough, for the first time during this period a pro-Palestinian resolution lost support from the previous year. The Latin American states, which had shown a more pro-Palestinian leaning on other resolutions, did not wholeheartedly endorse this one. Chile, Honduras, Colombia and Ecuador all changed their votes. It would seem the new paragraphs, particularly the one citing the P.L.O., unbalanced the resolution enough for some states to change their views. Despite this the resolution passed by a heavy majority mostly because the Africans were almost unanimously in favour of the resolution.

¹⁶For the full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1974, p. 226.

¹⁷The resolution was sponsored by 47 African, Arab and Asian countries.

Two other resolutions were voted on under the heading, "The Question of Palestine," and both dealt directly with the P.L.O.

The first simply "considered that the Palestinian people is the principal party to the question of Palestine and invited the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in the plenary meetings."¹⁸ This would seem to be the most controversial resolution presented up to this point with regard to the Middle East. The Israelis vigorously protested:

The resolution makes a mockery of the United Nations and its charter. It would encourage international terrorism and threaten the diplomatic processes towards the settlement of the Middle East conflict.¹⁹

The rest of the U.N. members, however, did not feel the same way.

On October 14, 1974, Resolution 3210, which was sponsored by 72 powers, was passed by a vote of 105-4 with 20 abstentions.²⁰ Those states that voted against the resolution or abstained were almost exclusively Western or Latin American states. Even so, Argentina, Brazil, Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Peru, Panama and Venezuela of the Latin Americans and Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand and Sweden of the Western states voted in favour of the resolution. The trend of African positive votes, a Latin American split and no Western negative votes (except for the U.S.) was again in evidence. The

¹⁸U.N. Yearbook, 1974, p. 226.

¹⁹The speech made by the Israeli representative at the U.N., U.N. Yearbook, 1974, p. 220.

²⁰The negative votes were Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Israel and the U.S.

rationale given for voting for the resolution by most Western and Latin American states was "that their positive votes in no way prejudged the position they might adopt when the Assembly at a later date discussed the substantive issues involved."²¹

This resolution gives us the first real measure of how far the Palestinian cause had advanced. Even though much of the Assembly would never condone most of the P.L.O. activities they accepted their presence within the General Assembly. This was the result of recognition that the Palestinians were a political entity to be reckoned with, and like it or not, the P.L.O. was their representative.

The second "P.L.O. resolution" invited the P.L.O. to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly as well as all UNGA sponsored gatherings in the capacity of observer.²² On November 22, 1974, Resolution 3237 was passed by a roll call vote of 95-17 with 19 abstentions.²³

The voting trend again was identical with those discussed so far. All the African states voted in favor except for Malawi and Swaziland who abstained. The Latin American states were again split, with four voting against and seven in favour. The only deviation was a strong vote against for the first time among Western states. Twelve states in all voted against the resolution (with only Finland voting in favour). The reason given for the negative vote was "that the resolution gave the

²¹U.N. Yearbook, 1974, p. 220.

²²For full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1974, p. 227.

²³Thirty-six African and Asian states sponsored the resolution.

P.L.O. privileges which exceeded those accorded to fully independent States not members of the U.N. which had long held observer status."²⁴

The dissenting states evidently had it in mind to put their foot down here. Since inviting the P.L.O. to speak at the General Assembly was a precedent (a non-sovereign state had never been allowed to debate before), why not observer status? Clearly, the Western states realized that unless they at least made some sort of stand here, perhaps a precedent could be set by which other liberation groups claiming to represent occupied areas might be given similar status. This, as we will see, was not as far-fetched as it might have seemed at the time.

Conclusions

The keynote for the year 1973-1974 was the Palestine Liberation Organization. The UNGA treatment of Middle Eastern issues was altered to give greater emphasis to the Palestinian cause.

The anti-Israeli character of UNGA resolutions became more dramatic as Israel was linked specifically with the South African racist regime. However, this was minor in light of the almost unanimous recognition by the Assembly of Palestinian and P.L.O. rights.

Anti-Israeli procedural tactics were also in evidence. Prior to the Palestinian debate, for instance, Senegal proposed a limit of one statement per delegate during the Palestinian debate. The aim of this proposal was obviously to restrict Israel to one response instead of the approximately twenty responses she would have technically been able to have.²⁵ This proposal was passed by a vote of 75-23 with 18

²⁴U.N. Monthly Chronicle, December 1974, p. 42.

²⁵Israel would have had the right to respond after each Arab state that spoke during the debate.

abstentions.²⁶ Apparently many delegates thought the proposal was illegal or at least unfair. For example, Nicaragua said it voted against the proposal because it believed that the inalienable right of every state to reply to attacks levelled against it was being distorted and that many rights "were being taken away on the basis of mechanical majorities."²⁷ Many Western diplomats and observers made this point, in particular to the question of "mechanical majorities" in the General Assembly.²⁸ It is important to note that this "mechanical majority" becomes evident for the first time during this period. With the African states uniting solidly behind the Arabs and many of the Latin American states shifting to a pro-Arab position, the period was dominated by the Arab bloc. Not only were the number of positive votes now greater than the negative and abstaining votes put together, but resolutions which earlier did not have a clean cut majority were now being passed almost unanimously.

²⁶Opposed were all the Western states plus six Latin American states.

²⁷U.N. Yearbook, 1974, p. 222.

²⁸William Korey, "The Arab Grand Design in the U.N.," Midstream, October 1975, p. 14.

CHAPTER IV

THE RESOLUTIONS AND VOTING PATTERNS OF THE 1975 PERIOD

The most important development of this time period was the second disengagement between Israel and Egypt. On September 4, 1975 Israel and Egypt signed a pact whereby Israel would return the oil fields of Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudar. At the same time both sides agreed to refrain from the use of threat or force or naval blockade. This was a major breakthrough since Egypt implied that she was willing to make agreements on a bilateral level. Partially in response to this agreement, the Israeli government cracked down on the establishment of new settlements on the West Bank and the Sinai. At about the same time, Israel and South Africa agreed to increase co-operation and contacts, and also agreed on a scheme of joint ventures, including a new railway in Israel. This followed along a trend to strengthen Israeli/South African relationships.

In the meantime, Egypt was battling Libya for leadership in the Arab world. A major confrontation occurred when Libya demanded the expulsion of Israel from the U.N. and Egypt argued against it because of its impending agreement with Israel.

In July of 1975 an Islamic Conference was held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where it was agreed that Israel's expulsion from the United

Nations would be sought at the 1975 General Assembly. The Arabs then tried to gain the support for this at the OAU meeting of July 21 in Kampala. However, a resolution calling for Israeli expulsion was rejected there and a further resolution calling for the suspension of Israel from the U.N. was met with strong negative reactions. An Arab effort to secure a similar resolution at the Lima meeting of non-aligned states (August 25 - August 30, 1975) again was met with strong reservations.

This period also witnessed the first rift between Arab and African states, since their joint stand beginning in 1973. The Africans, apparently displeased about the lack of financial support they were receiving, complained that Arab loan funds had not been transferred to the African Development Bank as had been promised in June 1974. Furthermore, the Africans were openly threatening Arab states. For example, President Mobutu of Zaire told a visiting Arab delegation that in view of the Arab states' attitude it would not be surprising if some African states resumed their diplomatic relations with Israel.¹

The Latin American states continued to emphasize their new-found role among Third World states. Panama became a full fledged member of the non-aligned group and Brazil shifted to a more radical foreign policy. At the UNCTAD meeting at Dakar, Senegal, it was the Latin American states which proposed greater solidarity between developing states and OPEC states. In general the developing states continued to be actively engaged in the new North-South split. The resolutions dealt with recommendations for establishment of a New International Economic Order.

¹Keesing's Archives, 1975, p. 27262.

In 1975 there were further attempts by the Arabs to isolate Israel and upgrade the position of the Palestinians. It was also once again a period of changing positions within the General Assembly.

Human Rights Resolutions 1975

The Thirtieth session of the UN General Assembly passed a human rights resolution which was virtually identical with the one of the previous year.² It was passed by a vote of 87-7 with 26 abstentions in December.³

Here we see the phenomenon which was to repeat itself during this period, a resolution which garnered more negative votes than it had in the previous period. In 1974 the same resolution had been passed by a vote of 95-4 with 31 abstentions.

The difference in vote was the result of changes in the Latin American and African stances. Six states within the Latin American grouping changed their votes with the Arabs losing slightly in the exchange.⁴ For the first time since 1972 an African state, Liberia, voted against an anti-Israeli resolution. As well, the Central African Republic changed from its "automatic" favouring vote to an abstention. This change was indicative of the new trend in 1975.

But General Assembly Resolution Number 3379, which condemned Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination, was the most

²For full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1975, p. 256.

³The sponsors were: Afghanistan, Benin, the Comoros Islands, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Senegal.

⁴Costa Rica and Barbados voted against (abstained in 1974), Haiti voted against (in favour in 1974), Paraguay (voted in favour, 1974) and Bolivia (voted against, 1974) abstained and Brazil voted in favour (abstained in 1974).

controversial resolution of the 1975 period. The resolution made specific reference to condemnation of Zionism which had been endorsed by the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and their Contribution to Development and Peace, the OAU at its Kampala meeting in 1975 and the Lima Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned States.⁵

We can assume from the text that the OAU and non-aligned meetings were of major importance in deciding what issues would be brought before the General Assembly. They had served, in fact, as testing grounds for the Arab bloc and its supporters. We can also assume that the Arab sponsors may have been uncertain of the result of the vote if the references to these meetings was meant to remind African, Asian and Latin American states that they indeed had condemned Israel on these terms before and therefore should again do the same.

Some have argued that this resolution was not an end in itself but rather another step towards the final goal, Israel's expulsion from the U.N.⁶ For example, Bernard Lewis states:

For the Arabs, the aim is to delegitimize the state of Israel. The condemnation of its ideological basis for whatever reason, is an important step toward that end and together with excluding Israel from UNESCO, the ILO and other U.N. bodies, forms a kind of incantatory prefiguration of the expulsion of Israel from the U.N.⁷

⁵For the full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1975, pp. 599-600.

⁶Victor Cygielman, "On Being a Zionist," New Outlook, December, 1976, p. 16.

⁷Bernard Lewis, "The Anti-Zionist Resolution," Foreign Affairs, September, 1976.

It seems unlikely that the Arab sponsors considered the Zionist resolution as a prelude to an expulsion resolution, especially in the light of the preceding events.

For one thing, the ever important OAU had shown earlier in the year that it was split on the issue of Israel's expulsion from the U.N. Zaire for instance had declared that it would not take part in any move against Israel at the U.N. and Kenya's Vice President, Daniel Arap Moi, had also questioned the practicality of such a move.⁸

Despite Arab pressure, the non-aligned states also showed their dissatisfaction with an "expel Israel resolution" at their Lima meeting in August 1975. The resolution which was finally passed was said to be even less precise than the one reached by the OAU in Kampala.⁹

Finally, the most compelling factor involved here was Egypt's rejection of any resolution which called for the expulsion of Israel.¹⁰ Since Egypt was the most respected of the Arab states (particularly by African states) her opinion carried a great deal of weight among the non-aligned states, Arab states included. The Arabs had, as it turns out, already missed their opportunity to expel Israel (if such an opportunity had ever existed). When Egypt reached agreements with Israel on the return of certain segments of the Sinai, she had not only proven her desire to negotiate with Israel on a bilateral level, but she had also moved away from the more radical camp. Without her support any major

⁸Keesing's Archives, 1975, p. 27300.

⁹Ibid., p. 27343.

¹⁰Evidence of this was the disagreement and ensuing battle of words between Libya and Egypt on this very issue. See Keesing's Archives, p. 27300.

efforts against Israel in the General Assembly were impossible. In effect, the Zionism resolution was a compromise resolution, something the Arabs had not had to resort to since the 1971-1972 period.

This is not to say that Resolution 3379 was going to be passed unanimously. As it turned out it was a battle all the way. The first indication of the unpopularity of the resolution was a proposal to defer the resolution to another session. Significantly this proposal was made by two African states which leaned toward the Arab camp, Sierra Leone and Zambia. On October 17 the proposal was rejected by a vote of 68-45 with 16 abstentions. A further attempt to defer the vote was made by the European Community represented by Belgium. This proposal was also defeated, on November 10, by a 67-55 vote with 15 abstentions.

On November 10, 1975 Resolution 3379 was passed by a roll call vote of 72-35 with 32 abstentions.¹¹ Notwithstanding the success of the resolution some observers (particularly Israeli's supporters) felt the vote was a moral victory for Israel.¹² Much of the optimism was probably the result of the support Israel received from states which for the past three years had been voting solely with the Arab bloc.

Among these was the African grouping. Five of these states voted against the Zionism resolution (Central African Republic, Liberia, Malawi, Swaziland and Ivory Coast), thirteen others abstained.¹³ The

¹¹The sponsors were: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Cuba, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Guinea, Iraq, Jordan Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Tatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanisia, Ukrainian SSR, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

¹²Shmuel B'Ari, "The U.N. and its Resolutions," New Outlook, December, 1975.

¹³These were: Bhutan, Botswana, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta, Zaire and Zambia.

lack of popularity of this resolution among African states was epitomized by the Zambian abstention. Since 1968 Zambia, an historically pro-Arab state and a sponsor of some of the anti-Israeli resolutions, had never abstained on a Middle Eastern resolution, let alone voted against one. It was the first time since 1972 that more than one African state had voted against a Middle Eastern resolution and the first time since 1973 that there had been as many as three abstentions.

The Latin-American states remained relatively split. Mexico, Guyana, Cuba and Brazil voted for the resolution while the rest of the South American states abstained (except Uruguay which voted against).¹⁴

The Western states for the first time since 1968 voted against a resolution in concert. The Asian "neutrals" returned to that position with Burma, Nepal, Phillipines, Singapore and Thailand all abstaining.

Overall the Human Rights resolutions during the 1975 period were again constructed to further isolate Israel and condemn her in the eyes of the world. This had questionable success; in fact, it may have worked in reverse. The Zionism resolution was unpopular even among states that voted for it. One such state was Iran, whose delegate noted that Zionism has added a new element to the traditional framework of the fight against racism. The very basis of the resolution was "vague" because Zionism could be interpreted in many different ways.¹⁵ The resolution also had negative effects on pro-Arab states such as Mexico. After voting for the resolution Israel condemned Mexico and threatened

¹⁴The Central American states, plus Haiti, Barbados and the Bahamas all voted against.

¹⁵U.N. Monthly Chronicle, November, 1975, p. 33.

to boycott that country. Mexico, as we will see, subsequently neutralized its position in the Middle East.

The Human Rights resolutions indicate some dissatisfaction within the African bloc and for the first time since the October 1973 war they were not fully behind the Arabs. The Latin Americans were still split with various states vacillating and Brazil taking a more pro-Arab stance.

The Question of Palestine Resolutions 1975

For the second consecutive year there was a section dealing with the "Question of Palestine" in which two resolutions were passed. This section would probably have been more aptly called the Question of the P.L.O.

The first resolution reaffirmed the Palestinians' right to self-determination, requested the Security Council to consider and adopt the necessary resolutions and measures in order to enable the Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable rights, called for the invitation of the P.L.O. to participate in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East, held under the auspices of the U.N., and requested the Secretary-General to take all steps to secure the invitation of the P.L.O. to participate in the work of the Peace Conference on the Middle East.¹⁶

Although the P.L.O. had been accepted as an observer at the last session of the General Assembly, the Israelis still refused to negotiate with it in any way. Therefore it was necessary from an Arab viewpoint

¹⁶For full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1975, p. 248.

to justify and in fact demand P.L.O. representation at the Geneva peace conference whether the Israelis liked it or not.

On November 10, 1975 Resolution 3375 was passed by a roll call vote of 101-8 with 25 abstentions.¹⁷

The voting breakdown is interesting. From the African bloc there were only two abstentions, the rest voting in favour. From the Latin American bloc only Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua voted against while Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Panama, Mexico, Venezuela, and Peru voted in favour. Thus, despite a year which might be characterized as a switch back toward Israel, these two blocs voted solidly in favour of a pro-Palestinian resolution. What we must assume then is a genuine conviction that the Palestinians must be considered in any peace agreement -- and more importantly -- that the P.L.O., their representative, must be present and take part in any peace negotiations.

The second resolution was based largely on Resolution 3236 of the previous year for it also expressed a grave concern that no progress was being made toward Palestinian exercise of their inalienable rights. The difference was that the resolution recommended the establishment of a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People composed of twenty member states. Its role was to consider and recommend a programme of implementation designed to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their rights, and to consider suggestions and proposals on these matters.¹⁸ This resolution was another measure used to ensure that the Palestinians and the P.L.O. would be integrated into

¹⁷The resolution was sponsored by 47 Arab, Asian and African states.

¹⁸For full text of the resolution see U.N. Yearbook, 1975, p. 248.

any peace initiatives. It also served to ensure that the "Question of Palestine" would continue to be a major part of General Assembly discussion.

On November 10, 1975 Resolution 3376 was passed by a roll call vote of 93-13 with 27 abstentions. The Latin American countries continued to be split with Haiti, Costa, Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua opposing and Argentina, Panama, Peru, Guyana, Mexico and Venezuela favouring the resolution.

The African bloc also continued its dissatisfied stance, with Swaziland opposing the resolution and seven states (Ethiopia, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi and Sierra Leone) abstaining. It seems that some of these states, although they had broken diplomatic relations with Israel, still worried about Israel's right to exist. Some nations stated that they could not support the second text (Resolution 3376) because it made no mention of Israel's sovereignty or its right to secure and recognizable boundaries.¹⁹

The Western states also continued their trend of opposition to 1975 resolutions as opposed to abstentions. Ten of the Western states voted against the resolution.

While the mere existence of "The Question of Palestine" augmented the position of the Palestinians and the P.L.O., the resolutions passed therein further reinforced the Palestinian and P.L.O. role. This was particularly the case with the establishment of the Committee dealing with the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinians.

These resolutions also kept in line with the trends noted in

¹⁹U.N. Yearbook, 1975, p. 248.

1975. The Latin American vote was split but moving evermore predominantly into the Arab camp. The African group showed a movement away from the Arabs but in no way even close to the polarized situation which had existed in the 1967-1970 and 1971-1972 periods. Finally the Western states, as the resolutions of this period became harsher and more pro-Palestinian, voted negatively rather than abstain.

Situation in the Middle East Resolutions 1975

For the first time since 1972 the item "the Situation in the Middle East" was discussed. The ensuing resolution was similar to Resolution 2949 (XXVII) in that it reaffirmed that the acquisition of territory by force was inadmissible and that the Palestinians were an indispensable element in the establishment of peace in the Middle East. However, the new resolution also requested all states to desist from supplying Israel with any military or economic aid as long as it continues to occupy Arab territories and requested the Security Council to take all necessary measures for the speedy implementation of resolutions aimed at the establishment of a just and lasting peace, worked out with the participation of all parties, including the P.L.O.²⁰ The resolution attempted to extend Israel's isolation by demanding sanctions against her, and at the same time assured P.L.O. representation in any peace discussions.

On December 5, Resolution 3414 was passed by a vote of 84-17-27.²¹ The two added paragraphs accounted for the change in vote from 86-7-31. The first of the two probably played the most decisive role. It not only affected countries who decided to vote against the resolution

²⁰U.N. Yearbook, 1975, p. 237.

²¹The resolution was sponsored by 30 East European, African and Asian states.

but also states which voted in favour of the resolution. Brazil, Burma, Ivory Coast and Greece all stated that if sanctions had been voted on separately they would have abstained.

The major change from 1972 was among Western states. Ten nations (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom and the United States) voted against the resolution compared to none in 1972. This again fits into the trend of Western states voting against anti-Israeli resolutions during this period.

The African states were also more negative than 1972 albeit the change was small. Liberia voted against (abstained in 1972), Kenya abstained (in favour in 1972) and Ivory Coast voted in favour (abstained in 1972). The one negative vote and six abstentions again show a trend of a slight African movement away from the Arabs.

The Latin Americans also remained split although there was little change from 1972. Three states abstained where in 1972 they voted in favour (Jamaica, Chile and Mexico), and three states abstained whereas they voted against in 1972 (Bolivia, Uruguay and Colombia).

Conclusions

Nineteen seventy-five was to be the year of Israeli expulsion from the United Nations however certain factors (most notably the bilateral agreement between Egypt and Israel) ruined the plan before it could get out of the starting gate. As a result the issues presented in this session were similar to previous sessions. The Arab bloc continued to carry the momentum created by the P.L.O. presence at the last session by pushing through guarantees of P.L.O. representation at peace talks. The Arabs also ensured that the Palestinian cause would not be

forgotten by creating a Committee dealing with the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinians. This period saw the passage of the most serious anti-Israel resolutions to date. The results showed that the Arabs could pass virtually any resolution they wanted; but on the other hand, it also showed that many states which had "automatically" voted for the Arabs in the past would only support them to a certain point.

This period marked the return of the Western states as staunch supporters of Israel. The abstentions of previous periods turned into vocal, strongly worded rebuttals of many of the resolutions.

The African bloc showed encouraging signs of support for Israel as the solid pro-Arab bloc started to disintegrate. This was partially due to disappointments over aid and partly due to the Israeli-Egyptian peace initiative. On the other hand the Latin American states, which had been identifying more and more with the Arabs, remained split, but with the majority of their support still behind the Arab bloc.

CHAPTER V

THE RESOLUTIONS AND VOTING PATTERNS OF THE 1976 PERIOD

The two major events of this period involved Israeli actions within the African subsystem. The first was a visit by Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa to Israel in April of 1976. The visit was criticized throughout the world, but particularly in Africa. One African diplomat stated "as far as Africa was concerned, Israel was now finished."¹ Other Africans claimed that Israel had made a very grave error.

The second action was the famous "raid on Entebbe." In July Israeli troops landed at Entebbe airport in Uganda and rescued hostages taken when Palestinian guerrillas skyjacked an Air France flight. This was also condemned by the African states at their annual OAU meeting which was being held at the time of the Entebbe raid.

At the OAU meeting held in Port Louis, Mauritius, Israel was condemned for collaboration with South Africa and for aggression against Ugandan sovereignty. Israel was also condemned for aggression at the Fifth Meeting of Heads of States of the Non-Aligned held in Colombo, Sri Lanka in August. Furthermore, a request was made for all states to

¹Keesing's Archives, 1976, p. 27776.

give military and moral support to the Arab states and the P.L.O. led Palestinian people. It was also decided that measures must be taken to increase the pressure on Israel at the U.N.

The Kissinger shuttle diplomacy failed to maintain the momentum created by the Egyptian-Israeli agreement of the previous year. The Geneva Peace Talks were not a factor because the Israelis refused to sit down at the same negotiating table as the P.L.O.

During 1976 the Security Council invited the P.L.O. to its debates with the same status accorded a member state. Israel boycotted both the January and June meetings. The United States vetoed several resolutions related to the Middle East conflict including one which would have recognized the inalienable rights of the Palestinians and would have given them the right for national independence. The General Assembly was dominated by issues on South Africa and decolonization. Israel was re-admitted to UNESCO within the European region after certain states (especially the United States) had cut off their funding.

The Thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1976 followed along similar lines drawn by the previous session. The Human Rights resolutions again were evident and again sought to condemn Israel in such a way as for her to lose face. The rest of the resolutions again promoted the Palestinian cause and for the first time outlined specifically their position in the eventuality of peace.

Human Rights Resolutions 1976

This part will again chronicle two human rights resolutions. The first represents what we have come to call the annual human rights resolution. It was virtually identical to the one passed in the previous year.

Resolution 31/106 was passed in November, 1976 by a roll call

vote of 100-5 with 30 abstentions. The result was similar to the year before (87-7-26). The difference as far as the African bloc was a positive vote by Liberia instead of a negative one and a positive vote by the Central African Republic instead of an abstention. Thus, after an optimistic period (from an Israeli viewpoint) the African states again appeared to be shifting solidly behind the Arabs. There were only two changes in Latin American voting, Barbados shifted to an abstention (negative 1975) and Mexico shifted to an abstention, an indication of her "neutral" position in 1976.

The second resolution was actually one of ten resolutions dealing with apartheid in South Africa. It strongly condemned the continuing and increasing collaboration by Israel with the racist regime of South Africa as a flagrant violation of the resolutions of the United Nations and as an encouragement to the racist regime of South Africa to persist in its criminal policies and it requested the Secretary-General to disseminate widely the report of the Special Committee against apartheid in various languages in order to mobilize public opinion against the collaboration by Israel with the racist regime of South Africa.²

The latter clause gives us the main intention of the resolution. It was another effort to blacken Israel's image in the world. It also served to make Israel the scapegoat for the unsuccessful attempts of the U.N. to sanction South Africa. After all, Israel only accounted for one per cent of South Africa's trade while other African states represented 16 per cent. Further, the Arabs after losing some African support in 1975 sought to reestablish its control over a solid African bloc by

²For full text of the resolution see U.N. Monthly Chronicle, November, 1976, p. 78.

passing a resolution that neither side would ever vote against.

On November 9, 1976 Resolution 31/6E was passed by 91-20 with 28 abstentions.³ The negative votes were largely due to Israel's being singled out. For example Canada opposed the draft resolution on relations between Israel and South Africa because it did not believe that states which adopted policies different from those advocated by the General Assembly should be singled out for condemnation. Israel was not the only state which had relations with South Africa.⁴ The major objection to the resolution came from the Western states, as they were almost unanimously opposed to it (Finland abstained).

The Latin Americans continued to be "split" with three states opposing (Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala) and five voting in favour (Jamaica, Panama, Peru, Paraguay and Guyana).

The Africans voted quite solidly for the resolution with only Malawi, Swaziland and Ivory Coast abstaining. The three were not only close to Israel, but also were among the most friendly of African states in relations with South Africa.

The human rights resolutions of 1976, as might be expected, were anti-Israeli in nature. The Western states continued in the trend set in 1975 of outright opposition. The Latin Americans continued to be split, with the majority of support in the Arab camp. The Africans again were the only change as they shifted again toward the Arab camp.

Question of Palestine Resolutions 1976

The General Assembly on November 24 endorsed the recommendations

³The resolution was sponsored by 45 states.

⁴U.N. Monthly Chronicle, November, 1976, p. 40.

of the Committee on the Exercise of Inalienable Rights of the Palestinians and urged the Security Council to consider these recommendations.⁵ What this meant was that Resolution 31/20, the first of two resolutions under this heading, was accepted by the General Assembly under the sponsorship of the Committee.

In other provisions of the resolution the Assembly authorized the 20-member Committee to promote implementation of its recommendations and dissemination of information on the programme of implementation of the rights of Palestinian people, decided to distribute the report to competent U.N. bodies and urged them to take necessary action in accordance with the programme of implementation.⁶

Where this resolution differed from other such self-determination resolutions was in the third operative paragraph which reaffirmed that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established without the achievement inter alia of a just solution of the Problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right of national independence and sovereignty in Palestine.⁷ Up to this point the resolutions passed had gradually built up the case for a Palestinian state. What this resolution did was to raise the question of whether the Palestinian state was to be in occupied post-67 territory or in fact on the

⁵Recommendations in the Committee's Report included a time-table for withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories by June 1, 1977, a two stage plan for the return of the Palestinians to their homes, endorsement of their inalienable right to achieve self-determination, national independence and sovereignty, and of the participation of the P.L.O. on equal footing with other parties in all Middle East deliberations under U.N. auspices.

⁶U.N. Monthly Chronicle, November, 1976, p. 29.

⁷Ibid., p. 83.

land now known as Israel. As the New York Times put it: "This time in effect the third world majority sought to give stature and position on an issue that had been left vague and undefined."⁸ This evidently worried some states and they opposed the resolution on the grounds that it put Israel's very existence in question. On the other hand the result of the vote, 90-16 with 30 abstentions, indicates that either most states did not interpret the resolution in this way or that they did not care whether Israel existed or not -- the former being the mostly likely answer.

The Situation in the Middle East Resolutions, 1976

For the first time there were two resolutions which were passed under this heading. The first was the "acquisition of territories resolution." It was very similar to Resolution 3414 of the previous year in that it condemned Israel for its occupation territories, its measures to change those territories and its asking for sanctions against Israel. The only difference was that it called for the early resumption of the Peace Conference on the Middle East. Perhaps the mention of peace was enough to change certain countries' minds, no matter what the rest of the resolution said. In any case in early December, 1976 Resolution 31/61 was passed by a vote of 91-11 with 29 abstentions (84-17-27 in 1975).

The Western states again voted strongly against the resolution with only Belgium and Luxembourg changing to abstentions instead of negative votes. The Latin Americans continued to be split and the move this time was again towards the Arabs with Argentina and Panama switching

⁸New York Times, November 25, 1976, p. 2.

to positive votes from abstentions. The African states kept in line with their new trend of the 1976 period. Togo, Central African Republic and Gabon shifted from abstentions to positive votes and Liberia went full circle, voting in favour this time instead of against in 1975.

The second resolution requested the Secretary-General: to resume contacts with all parties to the conflict and the co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference in the Middle East and submit a report to the Security Council on the results, called for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the USSR and the USA not later than the end of March 1979.⁹

Although in previous years this resolution might have been met by stiff competition because it was not in the domain of the General Assembly and it imposed a specific deadline, in 1976 the Resolution 31/62 was passed by a vote of 122-2 (Israel and the United States) -- with eight abstentions. The desire of the international community to establish peace in the region was evident in lieu of the dismal results of any peace initiative of 1976. From an Arab standpoint the resolution was excellent. The deadline imposed, virtually forced Israel to sit down at the Conference table in Geneva. Since the conference was under the auspices of the U.N. all of the resolutions passed to date, establishing P.L.O. presence at the meeting, the return of Palestinian lands as well as an independent state would have to be considered. Finally, the conference would also downplay any bilateral attempts at peace between Israel and Egypt, which the Arab states feared the most.

⁹For full text of the resolution see U.N. Monthly Chronicle, December, 1976, p. 102.

Conclusions

Although there were resolutions which condemned the Israeli occupation and linked it with South Africa, the main issue was the Palestinians. The Arabs further ensured the participation of the P.L.O. in any peace talks and set the guidelines for a Palestinian state in the Middle East.

The only change in voting was the return of the Africans to near-solid support of the Arabs. This could be attributed to the Vorster visit to Israel, the Entebbe raid and the lack of divisive issues (such as the 1975 Zionism resolution) over which an Afro-Arab rift could develop. The Latin American states continued to be split and the Western states continued their support of Israel on controversial issues.

CONCLUSION

During the 1967-1972 resolutions which vaguely called for the self-determination and inalienable rights of the Palestinians, as well as compromise resolutions attempting to solve the confused political situation in the Middle East, were the norm. The emphasis during these periods, however, was on anti-Israeli human rights resolutions. These were facilitated by the establishment in 1968 of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices, which recommended many of the anti-Israeli resolutions.

The last three periods, 1973-1976, also contained many anti-Israeli human rights resolutions. With the Arab bloc being at peak strength these resolutions tended to be more condemning (e.g. linking Israel with apartheid policy in 1973 and Zionism equals racism in 1975). There was also an increase in the number of human rights resolutions during this period, many of which were passed with near unanimous votes. The emphasis during these three periods switched, however, to the Palestinian issue. In the 1973-1974 period the P.L.O. were recognized by the General Assembly as the leaders of the Palestinian people and given observer status at the U.N. Moreover the Palestinian issue was discussed in a new specific category called "The Question of Palestine." In the 1975 period a resolution was passed which not only called for the recognition of Palestinian rights but also called for their participation

in peace talks. As part of this resolution sanctions were recommended against Israel for its obstinate stand on the Palestinian issue and other U.N. resolutions. To ensure that the Palestinian issue remain central a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People was established. Finally in 1976, a resolution was passed which made a sovereign Palestinian state a prerequisite to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

During the 1967-1970 period and to a lesser extent during the 1971-1972 period, Arab-sponsored resolutions were passed by small majorities. Some of these resolutions had to be passed by making major concessions and also by relying on procedural tactics (simple majority votes). During the last three periods similar resolutions were passed by overwhelming majorities, as were new and even more controversial resolutions (with the exception of the "Zionism" resolution).

During the 1967-1970 period, Israel had almost unanimous support from the Western and Latin American states. She also had support from a fairly large group of African states. By the end of the 1971-1972 period, Israel's support among African states was declining. During the last three periods with the exception of 1975 Israel's support from the African states was next to nil. Israel's support from many Latin American states and Asian neutrals also waned. The factors causing this shift among Third World states will be discussed in detail in the ensuing section.

SECTION II

INTRODUCTION

This section of the thesis will attempt to explain the change in voting behavior of the African, Latin American and Asian groupings in the U.N. General Assembly on Middle East issues. It will be divided into three parts, each part representing a single grouping of states. Each part will begin by dividing the groupings into those states that were pro-Arab, neutral and pro-Israeli.¹ After this the determinants of any changes that occurred will be analyzed.²

¹In the case of the Latin American group, there will be no "neutral" category and in the case of the Asian group there will be no "pro-Israel" category.

²Russett and Alker in their "classic" General Assembly study state that "in searching for potential sources of change in the current international system it may be more profitable to concentrate on changes in perceptions of new issues, changes in the distribution of environmental influences on states and changes in the distribution of power. Without revolutionary wars, national, social, political and economic characteristics change much more slowly" (p. 283). This does not seem to be an adequate approach. For one thing, one must concentrate closely not only on changing perceptions of new issues, but of old issues as well. In other words one must watch for a new emphasis or lack of emphasis on an issue earlier deemed unimportant or extremely important, i.e. South African policy or self-determination. Second, the latter part of the quote implies that four factors (national, political, economic and social) can be given less priority. However, a change in the political position of a state can be the major determinant of change. Although the remaining factors may be less important one must still account for them equally, since these factors often determine how easily a state can be influenced by others. For example, it is integral to the study that all the states examined are developing states and that some are richer than others. Thus the interplay between all factors must be considered.

This will be done by subdividing the factors into three categories. The first category will deal with (a) leadership change which might account for altered behavior, (b) changes in the perception of states or the groups toward the two conflicting groups (Israel and the Arabs). The second category will deal with any societal changes such as change in economic relationship between the two conflicting groups and the states within the grouping examined, and also a change in role beyond the control of the government (i.e. being a non-Arab OPEC state). Finally, the third category will consider (a) systemic pressures or changes which might explain a shift in voting, (b) subsystemic pressures (i.e. OAU membership) which might explain a change in voting, (c) changes in the U.N. environment.

AFRICAN GROUPING

We have noted two distinct shifts in African voting behavior. The first is the gradual shift to a more pro-Arab stance in the 1971-1972 period which culminated in solid African support for the Arabs in the 1973-1974 period. The second is the return of some of Israel's supporters in the 1975 period. What remains is to account for these changes. This will be facilitated by subdividing the African states into three groups: strong Arab supporters, moderate supporters and strong Israeli supporters, and explaining why they fall within these categories.¹

During the 1967-1970 period ten states voted solidly with the Arab states. These were Burundi, Congo, Brazzaville, Mauritania, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Most of these states had radical or anti-Western governments (Senegal and Nigeria being the only exceptions). Senegal, Mali and Guinea all had populations which were over 50 percent Muslim. Nigeria also had a large Muslim population, besides being tied to the Arab states because of its oil producing status. Geography could have played a role only so far as Uganda and Mali were concerned. Arab economic aid was extended only

¹The membership of a state in a certain group is based on the voting behavior of that state during the period 1967-1970.

to Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal. It would seem that radical governments and large Muslim populations were the main determinants as far as this group was concerned.

During the 1967-1970 period there was a group of states which vacillated between "neutral" abstentions and favouring pro-Arab votes.² There were also other states which abstained throughout (Niger and Central African Republic) or fluctuated between negative and positive votes (Zaire, Equatorial Guinea, Chad and Mauritius). All of these states fall under the category of moderate states.

The two things that the members of this group had in common were their moderate foreign policies and their almost equal interaction between Israel and the Arab states. The reason some members of this group had a slightly more pro-Arab stance in the U.N. could have been because of Muslim populations and/or geographic proximity (Ethiopia and Kenya).

During the 1967-1970 period nine states usually voted with Israel on Middle East issues in the U.N. These states were Botswana, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Gambia, Rwanda, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi. All of these states had what might be termed pro-Western policy orientations. As well all the states had closer relations with Israel than with the Arab states.³ All were led by a Christian elite and on the whole had a less hostile outlook toward South Africa.⁴ These states can be characterized as pro-Israel.

²Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Upper Volta and Ghana.

³All of these states received Israeli technical assistance.

⁴Susan Aurelia Gitelson, "Israel's African Setback in Perspective," in Israel in the Third World, p. 316.

In proceeding to explain the changes in voting behavior that occurred from the 1967-1970 period through the 1973-1974 period, this thesis will focus in turn on several determinants of state behavior. These determinants will be divided into three sections. The first section will look at the effect of leadership changes and perceptual changes on voting behavior. The second section will look at the effect of changes in the economic relationship between individual African states and the two conflicting sides, as well as the effect of societal changes in the African states. The third section will look at the effect systemic changes, subsystemic changes and changes in the United Nations' environment.

Both change in leadership and changes in perception played a part in the changed voting behavior of certain African states. We have already noted that radical or anti-Western governments tended to favour the Arabs, therefore any change to such a form of government would lead one to expect a simultaneous shift to the Arab side. During the 1967-1973 period a change in leadership occurred in three formerly pro-Israeli states. These were Madagascar, Rwanda and Dahomey.⁵ Since all of these states became more radical with the change in leadership and since they immediately began voting with the Arabs in the U.N., it would seem that the change in leadership was a main determinant in their changed voting behavior.

⁵Philupert Tsirana was deposed in May 1972 and Madagascar reversed its pro-Western tendencies to a more Soviet oriented, pro-Arab posture. After years of voting with Israel, 1972 saw Madagascar vote in favour of all the pro-Arab resolutions. Rwanda and Dahomey both had leftist coups in 1973. They both switched to a strictly pro-Arab stance that same year.

Changing perceptions is of course a more speculatively derived variable. Throughout the 1960's Israel represented (to the Africans) an example of how a small state could develop from a national liberation movement to an industrialized society.⁶ As well the African states were impressed by Israel's ability to repress any attempts by the encircling Arab states to obliterate it. To use an overused metaphor: in African eyes, it was the valiant David (Israel) standing up to Goliath (Arab states).

The African states likely began wondering who was Goliath as early as 1967. However up until 1971 Israel's image remained unchanged largely because the leader of Egypt, the most influential Arab state in Africa, was Gamal Nasser. Nasser had waged a war of attrition with Israel from 1968 to 1970 which did alienate certain African states. As well he was not particularly well liked by many African leaders who were repulsed by his arrogant and demanding style. When he died he was replaced by Anwar Sadat and for the first time Egypt talked seriously about peace with Israel.

On February 15, 1971 the Israeli Government rejected the latest peace initiative by Dr. Gunnar Jarring, the United Nations' special representative. The same day it was announced that "Egypt has accepted the proposals of the United Nations mediator, Dr. Jarring, for a Middle East peace settlement."⁷ Furthermore, the next day it was proclaimed

⁶For example, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya once said that "Israelis have shown what a small country can do for itself through hard work and faith in destiny." Leopold Laufer, "Israel and the Third World," Political Science Quarterly, December, 1972, p. 620.

⁷The Guardian (London), February 16, 1971.

that "Egypt is now ready to recognize Israel as a sovereign state according to Mr. Muhammad el Zayyat, the Egyptian representative at the United Nations."⁸

Up to this point African states had ignored Israel's occupation of Arab territories because of the Arab states (particularly Egypt's) belligerent stand. Since the Arab states refused to accept Israel's existence and made few realistic overtures towards peace Israel's occupation could at least be rationalized. However, with the new Egyptian efforts or quasi efforts toward peace Israel could no longer use this as an excuse for its occupation. As the negotiation process continued, Israel's adamant "no bargaining" stand was characterized as intransigent. It was no longer difficult to change African perceptions of Israel from a former national liberation movement to a colonialist and imperialist power. As a result some think that the decline in Israel's support was a result of its occupation.⁹

An assertion that this perception of Israel as a colonial power was the primary reason for Israel's loss of support is questionable. It will be repudiated later. The amount of weight given to this factor, then, is speculative.¹⁰

As noted earlier, the African states had respect for Israel because she represented a small state that had developed rapidly. However as Israel developed she also became more closely related to the industrial

⁸The London Times, February 17, 1974

⁹Bernard Reich, "Israel between War and Peace," Current History, February, 1974, p. 50, and Laufer, op. cit., p. 62.

¹⁰See Jake C. Miller, "African-Israeli Relations Impact on Continental Unity," Middle East Journal, Autumn 1975, p. 401, where the President of Zaire (Mobutu) promises the return of his country's support when Israel returns the territories.

states of the world, particularly the United States. There followed a change in perception. As Gitelson puts it, "When Israel began to act more like developed countries which were competing intently for external markets its initial attraction began to wear off."¹¹ Although perceptions shifted it was obviously the radical states that were affected. Since we have noted that the radical states voted against Israel in the U.N. to start with it would be fallacious to assume that Israel's greater pro-West leanings affected the voting in the U.N. Here we see the problem of analyzing change in bilateral support along the same lines as change in U.N. voting.

Another factor in the loss of African support was the change in African perceptions of Israel's relationship with South Africa. In the early 1960's Israel consistently supported anti-apartheid resolutions in the United Nations.¹² Furthermore, Israel also withdrew the head of her diplomatic mission in Pretoria in 1962.

In 1973, however, Israel began turning overtly toward South Africa. Israel upgraded its mission to Pretoria, hosted C. P. Mulder, South Africa's minister of the interior and increased its trade. In 1975 Israel signed a joint venture with South Africa including a new railway in Israel and in the same year trade between the states increased by 25%. In 1976 Prime Minister Vorster paid a visit to Israel that was criticized in Africa.

The problem here is that the change in Israeli policy vis a vis

¹¹Susan Aurelia Gitelson, "Israel's African Setback in Perspective," in Israel in the Third World, p. 185.

¹²Israel did abstain on a resolution calling for the expulsion of South Africa from the U.N. in 1960.

South Africa was obviously related to its loss in support in the rest of Africa. Therefore the change in perception by the Africans¹³ would have occurred after they had changed their voting patterns at the U.N. This would seem to disqualify the South African link as a factor for the periods 1967-1970 through 1973-1974. However, it is likely that the perceived South African-Israeli link militated at least slightly against greater support of Israel in the 1975 period and may have facilitated the return to a solidly anti-Israeli stance by African states in period 1976.

It is now necessary to analyze the effect economic relationships and societal changes had on Africa's altered voting behavior.

For the most part African states fall under the category of developing states. Their economies can be considered backward and their resources poor. Under these conditions one might expect that individual states would formulate (change) their foreign policy orientation in response to economic gratuities. For example in the early 1960's Israel, realizing that a new era of sovereign African states was beginning to unfold, started a dramatic program of technical assistance. By mid-1962 Israel had signed technical assistance and mutual co-operation treaties with Togo, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Mali, Congo, Central African Republic, Niger, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Liberia. The assistance was in the realm of agriculture, fisheries, industry and youth training. As well, Israel supplied aid and experts in these fields and they allowed thousands of

¹³The change in perceptions were justified by certain changes in Israeli policy, however, the dimensions of the change were not so great as to cause the imagined collaboration between Israel and South Africa in such things as the Entebbe raid.

Africans to come to Israel for advanced training.¹⁴ This relationship might lead people to deduce that economic assistance was the primary reason for African support of Israel in the United Nations. As we will see this was not so.

On the other hand with the new oil wealth of the Arabs one might expect an increase in Arab aid to African states in return for such favours as U.N. votes. Some scholars are of the opinion that this was a major factor.¹⁵ This argument is weak to start with because it assumes that because both events (change of vote and change in power) occurred simultaneously, one caused the other. As we have seen, and will continue to see, there is more to the story.

For one thing, it has been proven by several studies that assistance and economic aid are at best questionable determinants of U.N. voting. Russett and Alker find in their study that trade not aid is a better indicator.¹⁶ Furthermore, Gitelson herself shows how questionable economic aid is in her analysis of the Zionist vote.¹⁷

When one examines the list of countries receiving aid from Israel in the 1960's we note certain states which never voted with Israel in the U.N. (Congo, Niger and Mali). Furthermore, when one examines the list of the largest recipients of Arab loans, one finds Ethiopia and Zaïre -- countries which in 1975 broke their tradition of supporting the Arabs.

¹⁴For more details see Samuel Decalo's "Afro-Israeli Technical Cooperation" in Israel and the Third World, pp. 81-99.

¹⁵For example, Gitelson, op. cit., Israel in the Third World, p. 162.

¹⁶See Russett and Alker, World Politics in the General Assembly, p. 232.

¹⁷See Gitelson, op. cit., "Unfulfilled Expectations." Similar findings were made by Barromi in Latin America.

As well there are several states which receive no loans at all that vote regularly with the Arabs (Congo, Mozambique, Nigeria).

It is clear that for certain states economic aid would play a greater role in influencing foreign policy. From the studies listed above it is also clear that it is difficult even to guess which states will be more susceptible. Confusing the issue even more is actually how much aid the Arabs doled out. For one thing, from the outset the Arabs stated that there would be no preferential treatment for the African states regarding oil prices. What was alluded to was an increase in aid to African states on the whole to make up for the soaring oil prices. This was to be done through the channelling of money through the African Development Fund. The Arabs delayed on this aid as long as possible. The fact is that prior to the Foreign Ministers Meeting of African and Arab states in Cairo, 1975, a number of African leaders had expressed resentment at the fact that after their government's severance of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1972-1973 the Arab states had neither compensated them for the loss of Israeli aid, nor granted them preferential price for Arab oil.¹⁸ From this the question arises: were the African states getting any more aid? Did the Arabs ever promise greater aid? The fact is the African states might have just perceived that such a situation existed. An analysis of the new-found Arab oil power and its psychological effect will follow in the next section. For the time being let it suffice to say that economics had a questionable effect on individual African states.

The examination of environmental (systemic) factors leading to a

¹⁸Keesing's Archives, p. 2762.

change in vote will be subdivided into three categories: changes in pressure from the African subsystem, changes in world power positions and changes within the United Nations itself.

When discussing subsystemic pressure one cannot ignore the Organization of African Unity. The OAU represents most African states and is usually used to gauge African opinion. Upon examining the OAU meetings during the 1967-1970 period one cannot help but note that the Arabs lacked the total support of the African states. For example in 1968 when a resolution was passed condemning Israeli occupation of captured territories there were several states which expressed their reservations.¹⁹ In 1969 and 1970 similar resolutions were also passed but again several states expressed reservations.²⁰ However in 1971, for the first time there were no reservations expressed, when the OAU passed a resolution describing the continued occupation of the Arab territories as a serious threat to the regional peace of Africa.²¹ What changes within the African subsystem could have accounted for this shift in support in the OAU (which coincides with the noticeable African shift in the U.N. in the same year)? A major factor were the new sources of influence in the African system: Amin of Uganda, Qaddafi of Libya and particularly Sadat of Egypt. Sadat's manner and style were in direct contrast to that of his predecessor Nasser and were more effective among Africans.²² He also

¹⁹On February 26, 1968 it was announced by the head of the Foreign Ministry of Ivory Coast that 15 states had expressed reservations. Keesing's Archives, p. 22991.

²⁰See Keesing's Archives, pp. 23607 and 24191.

²¹Keesing's Archives.

²²Jon Woronoff, "Africa and the Near East," New Outlook, August, 1971, p. 43.

cleverly emphasized the Israeli occupation of African soil. This had a particularly strong effect on the Africans since the issue of territorial integrity is written into the OAU charter.²³ Sadat also linked Israel with the hated Rhodesian and South African regimes.²⁴

In the meantime, Qaddafi, with the aid of his new found friend Idi Amin, was attempting to incite all the African states against Israel. Qaddafi tried not always successfully to bribe and cajole African leaders to sever relations with Israel and isolate her from the world community.²⁵

It seems Sadat had greater influence on the Africans than the radical Qaddafi. The fact is that Qaddafi could take direct credit for the disruption of relations between Israel and three African states, Burundi, Chad and Uganda, and of these three only one, Chad, ever had even a neutral stance in the United Nations. On the other hand when Qaddafi appealed to African states to support Israel's expulsion from the U.N. in 1975, Sadat refused to go along with him. The result was that a clear cut resolution dealing with expulsion failed to pass in the OAU, indicating a definite siding with Sadat. (It was the first time an anti-Israeli resolution had been questioned since 1970.)

While these leaders did, to a certain extent, influence some

²³See Gitelson in Israel and the Third World, p. 190.

²⁴Keesing's Archives, 1973, p. 25955. See, for example, his 1973 statement which claimed that the Middle East conflict constituted aggression against the whole of Africa and there was no difference between Zionist racism and that of Rhodesia and South African regimes.

²⁵Jake C. Miller, "African-Israeli Relations - Impact on Continental Unity," The Middle East Journal, Autumn 1975, p. 398. In 1972 Qaddafi supplied Uganda with military and economic aid for its struggle with Tanzania.

African states to shift by 1971, they had little effect on the strong Israeli supporters. These states were more influenced by their African neighbours in and out of the OAU.

The adamant survivors were put under extreme pressure to conform. At first they refused. "Our greatest is our faithfulness. We do not change friends everyday. Some have reasons of their own to break with Israel. As for us it is out of the question."²⁶ The pressure continued and soon (by 1973) all the African states (except Malawi) were voting against Israel in the U.N. "If others had stood with us we could have withstood the pressure," a Liberian diplomat told the Israelis, "we couldn't do it alone."²⁷ It is evident that the desire for solidarity and pressures to achieve consensus were a major determinant in the change made by several African states, particularly staunch Israeli supporters. Yet we must go further to gain fuller understanding of why this was such a major determinant during the 1973-1974 period and not earlier.

Changes in positions of power, particularly economic power, within a global context also affected the African states.

Although the oil weapon had been used previous to 1973, at no time did it work as successfully. The effect particularly on the industrial states was profound. "Italy banned exports of kerosene and gasoline, Belgium and Netherlands announced special licencing arrangements for petroleum shipments; Austria, Sweden moved in the direction of controls."²⁸ This raised a question of what if any "clout" Europe had left.

²⁶Miller, op. cit., p. 402. Statement by President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast.

²⁷African Recorder, January 1974, p. 3589.

²⁸Stanley Karnow, "From Truce to Peace," New Republic, Nov. 3, 1973, p. 19.

"It suddenly appeared that Western Europe with 40 percent of the world's gold reserves, 30 percent of its foreign trade, 20 percent of its industrial product and 10 percent of its population counted for precisely nothing in terms of political power."²⁹ Furthermore, the dependence on oil of the United States brought to question her financial stability. On the whole American power, at least on a perceived level, was reduced. In the meantime the Arab oil producers were looked upon with increasing respect.

It is difficult to prove the effect of some economic aid on a bilateral level. On the other hand some of this new found Arab oil money was promised to the African states to improve the continent on a multi-lateral level. More important than this was the perceived potential for this new Arab money. One possibility was an Afro-Arab economic alliance. Why would the Arabs want such an alliance with the Africans? The answer is that it would come naturally in return for the political alliance between the two against their common enemies (South Africa and Israel).³⁰ To achieve this goal a solid Africa was necessary, hence the pressure for all to conform. This seems to be one answer to the question of why the Africans changed their attitude toward Israel. However, it does not completely answer why they changed their votes in the U.N. To show this, one must juxtapose the changes and determinants which we have chronicled in the national and international system with those that occurred at this time in the U.N. General Assembly.

²⁹Laqueur, op. cit., p. 268.

³⁰"Yet when Africans ask for cheaper oil and development aid from the Arabs they are trying to move beyond the solidarity of a political alliance....They are saying to the Arabs, 'Let us not merely share energy.'" Mazrui, pp. 146-147.

To begin with it should be recognized that the U.N. has a distinct political environment of its own where the pressures and counterpressures are unique. This is probably never more apparent than in the Middle East situation. Since the Arab states outnumber Israel by 14 to one they have a distinct advantage when bargaining for votes not only with regard to Assembly votes, but also with regard to electing people to major positions and committees in the U.N. This often has a profound effect on other nations' behavior.³¹

The fact is, however, that the African states were still split in the late '60s even though the Arabs still had this 14 to one ratio over Israel. Since this factor did not affect the Africans other changes must have. These include a change in perception of how various issues could be dealt with successfully at the U.N.; and particularly the change in perception of how the Arabs could help the Africans in dealing with these issues.

The African states have given two issues priority within the U.N.: framework decolonization (particularly with regard to South Africa), and economic development.³²

Since the beginning of the 1960's the African states have sought to bring measures against the South African regime. Until the 1970's all that they were able to achieve was a condemnation of South African

³¹For example, the original report of the OAU mission visit to Israel and Egypt was apparently much kinder to Israel before it reached the U.N. See Susan Gitelson, "The OAU Mission and the Middle East Conflict," International Organization, Summer 1973.

³²For a detailed study see David A. Kay, "The Impact of African States on the U.N." in International Organization, 1969.

apartheid policy.³³ The African states became frustrated by their failure to achieve a solution which would be satisfactory. The frustration served to intensify their efforts and in the 1970's there was an increasing deluge of anti-South African resolutions.³⁴ The resolutions called for harsher measures against South Africa including the use of sanctions and embargoes. In 1974 South Africa was suspended from the U.N. General Assembly.

The Arab states played an important role in the successes against South Africa.³⁵ The Africans realized the role of Arab support in the U.N. not just in terms of Arab votes, but votes from other states they could influence with their newly found prestige. The price for Arab support was African support on the Israeli issue.³⁶ By trading off their own votes on Middle Eastern resolutions the African states were able to at least partially fulfill their number one priority in the U.N.³⁷

³³In the aforementioned study Kay states that "despite the general condemnation of the apartheid policies of South Africa, the organization (U.N.) has not yet moved significantly beyond its 1964 position in its confrontation with these policies which during this period have grown even more repressive." Kay, op. cit., p. 34.

³⁴Other manifestations of the South African problem were the International Year to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (1971), The Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (1973) and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.

³⁵This was vividly demonstrated in 1974. After the Security Council had vetoed a proposal to expel South Africa, Bouteflika, President of the Assembly (an Algerian) ordered that South Africa be suspended. When this move was challenged it was put to a vote. The 91-22 vote favoured the President's decision.

³⁶Gitelson, op. cit., p. 160.

³⁷South African resolutions were just one feature of the anti-colonialist crusade. There was also an increase in resolutions dealing with Rhodesia and Mozambique. As well this new coalition, in 1975, passed resolutions which set a timetable for certain states' independence (Bermuda, Virgin Islands). A decolonization committee was also established that year.

There were certain actions at the U.N. which facilitated the African transition to the Arab camp. One was the linking of Israel with South Africa in certain resolutions. The colonialist policies of Israel justified the Black African votes against her. A second event was the recognition of the P.L.O. as a political entity and representatives of the Palestinians first by the Arabs and then by the General Assembly.

The second priority of African states at the U.N. was economic development. As a developing continent, it was not surprising that the African states sought to reduce the economic disparity between the industrial states of the North and the developing states of the South. African states were represented in the Group of 77, the third world group which was established in 1964. This group's success was minimal in its early years, however the new found power of Arab oil made success more likely. The developing states now had a weapon to use against the richer more developed nations. In the mid 1970's new resolutions, striving to equalize the world economies, were passed. One such resolution was the Declaration of a New International Order, passed at the Sixth special session of the General Assembly in 1974. Thus the Arabs, the new power of the developing states, could give the Africans the means of fulfilling their second priority. One East African delegate stated, "If they (the Arabs) pick an issue, everyone has got to fall behind them, they have the oil. They have the means of our survival."³⁸

It is obvious that the Africans were aware that the Arabs could turn the oil weapon against them if they did not co-operate. Finally and most importantly the delegates' use of the words "our survival" implied

³⁸William Korey, "The Arab Grand Design in the U.N.," Midstream, October 1975, p. 27.

that the onus was on Africa to act as a single unit. Thus by making their donations to the African development fund rather than to individual states the Arabs hoped to promote a solid stance among African states. The only place where this solidarity was of prime importance was at the U.N. "No matter what the Arabs say they are tying their willingness to help black Africans to Black Africa's willingness to line up solidly with the Arabs against Israel in the Middle East."³⁹ These words ring especially true, particularly the words "line up solidly." It was for this reason that African states originally formed a solid front against Israel. It was the Arabs' demands for solidarity that forced the pro-Israeli states to succumb under pressure to something some had promised never to do.

In summarizing the effect of the various variables on the changed African voting behavior let us begin with changes in leadership. Since there were no notable leadership changes among the moderate or neutral African states it must be assumed that leadership was not a factor. On the other hand, among the group characterized as being pro-Israel, there were three states which had leadership changes. All of these changes were to more radical regimes. Since the change in leadership coincided with a change to a pro-Arab position we can assume that these were a dominant factor in the change in voting behavior.

With regard to changed perceptions it is likely that the moderate states which switched allegiance by 1972 were most affected.⁴⁰

³⁹Thomas A. Johnson, "Black Africans at the U.N.," New York Times, October 23, 1975, p. 2.

⁴⁰These states were: Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Niger, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, and Upper Volta.

Concerning economic relationships the strongest bilateral economic inducements by the Arabs occurred before the 1973 session of the General Assembly. It would seem likely that those states which switched allegiance by 1972 were more affected, although some states may have been coerced between 1972 and 1973. Of the states which did receive inducements, Chad is probably the only one in which this was the dominant determinant.⁴¹

Turning to the effect environmental changes had, let us first examine subsystem influences and change. Sadat's influence on the African subsystem certainly affected some states, particularly the more moderate ones. Subsystemic pressure in the form of the OAU, however, was the dominant factor in the change among Israel's staunchest supporters (the pro-Israel group). The pressure put on to conform and establish a "solid" Africa succeeded where other influences and determinants had failed.

With regard to systemic changes, Arab oil power did have an effect on some African states. It seems logical that only those states that changed in 1973 were affected by the new Arab strength in the world environment.

Changes in the U.N. also greatly affected most of the moderate and pro-Israeli groups. The OAU mission to the Middle East in 1971 added a new dimension of importance to the U.N. It also affected the way some states approached the Middle East question. The Africans were now an integral part of the peace initiative and as a result could no

⁴¹See Barry Rubin, "Third World Anti-Semitism," New Outlook, January 2, 1976, p. 25, and Mordechai Nahumi, "New Directions in Israel-Africa Relations," New Outlook, September, 1973, p. 16.

longer stay "neutral." Since Israel refused to implement U.N. resolutions she was considered at fault, therefore some moderates switched to the Arab side.

The special importance of the South African issue and the new Arab bargaining power in the U.N. made it a propitious time for the African states to jump on the Arab bandwagon as well. These factors also gave the majority of African states the leverage they needed to pressure the pro-Israeli states to join the pro-Arab camp.

Conclusion

One can conclude that certain states' behaviour was determined by one factor, whether it be leadership change, economic inducement or subsystemic coercion. For most, however, it would seem that it was a combination of factors which affected their behavior. On the whole, one might generalize that most of the moderate states were affected by changing perceptions in and out of the U.N., as well as by economic and to a lesser extent subsystemic influences. The rest of the states were affected to a lesser extent by changes in perceptions and economic inducements. They were affected profoundly by systemic pressures which were the direct result of changes in the United Nations.

Evaluation of the Change Between the 1973-1974 Period and the 1975 Period

Two years of solid African support for the Arabs was broken in 1975. Central African Republic, Liberia, Malawi, Swaziland and Ivory Coast all cast at least one negative vote on pro-Arab resolutions in 1975. As well, Botswana, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta and Zambia all abstained on at least one resolution, something none of these states had done since 1972.

To explain the change in voting behavior in 1975, the effect of the various determinants will again be analyzed.

A change in perceptions with regard to both the Israelis and the Arabs may have caused the shift. The Israelis certainly gained by their bilateral agreement with Egypt and return of two oilfields to Egypt. This gave at least some evidence of Israeli desire to achieve peace. By making concessions (the return of some property) Israel raised some doubts about her intransigence.

While the Israeli image may have improved the Arab image was to a certain extent tarnished. The year 1975 brought with it complaints by various members of the African group that the Arabs had not rewarded them for their support against Israel.⁴² Furthermore, the Arab funds which were to be transferred to the African Development Fund had not yet been received.⁴³ Finally the Africans perceived that the Arab states were trying to dominate at the OAU by electing an Arab president.⁴⁴

Since there were no leadership changes among those states which swung toward the Israeli camp in 1975, it must be assumed that this was not a factor. As well there were no major societal changes between 1974 and 1975 so this was also not a factor.

The 1975 period was one of reduced subsystemic pressure to form a solid stance against Israel. At the 1975 OAU meeting the Arabs called for a resolution which would recommend (demand) Israel's expulsion from the U.N. To many in the OAU this was too harsh a measure.⁴⁵ Furthermore,

⁴²Keesing's Archives, p. 27262.

⁴³Ibid., p. 26617.

⁴⁴Mazrui, op. cit., African International Relations, p. 152.

⁴⁵Keesing's Archives, p. 27300.

a split developed between Libya and Egypt over the same issue, with Egypt taking a moderate stand and opposing Israeli expulsion. The harshness of the measures and particularly the Arab split allowed some of the historically pro-Israeli African states to take a moderate stand. The pressure to form an African consensus was thus reduced.

Changing positions in the world power structure also had an effect on the African states. Although the developing states' economies were still under certain duress, they had begun to recover. With this, the power held by the Arab states was to a certain extent reduced. This was further facilitated by disagreements over oil prices among the OPEC members.

Within the U.N. there are a few reasons which might account for the sudden African switch to a more sympathetic Israeli stance. One factor might have been the successful suspension of South Africa from the U.N. the year before. The result of this was a weakening in Arab bargaining position at the U.N. since the Africans had achieved one of their goals. Tied in with the bargaining aspect it should be noted that the Israelis lobbied extremely hard at this session especially for votes on the Zionist resolution.⁴⁶

Another factor was the Arab bloc's attempt to dominate the Africans. It is possible the Africans realized that by being too cohesive in their support for the Arabs they lost much of their bargaining power and ipso facto lost much of their influence.⁴⁷

Finally the Africans were probably affected by their perception

⁴⁶Shimoni, *op. cit.*

⁴⁷Russett and Alker, *op. cit.*, p. 271, espouses the theory of how dysfunctional too much cohesion is.

of the issues brought forward. It must be deduced from the African vote that many felt the Zionism resolution of 1975 to be too severe and out of order. The number of states voting against and abstaining on the issue lifted the restraints on certain states' behavior on other resolutions. Therefore we see for the first time since 1972, negative votes on such issues as human rights and the acquisition of territories.

In summary, we may conclude that the 1975 change in African voting behavior appears to be the result of certain Arab actions (or inaction) rather than a change in position on the Middle East question. Disappointment and anger over attempted Arab domination in and out of the U.N., lack of Arab financial support, and attempted resolutions which the Africans felt did nothing but hinder the potential peace initiative in the Middle East, all made the 1975 session a protest session for the Africans.

The states which stood out against the Arabs were pro-Israeli states in the past, which had reluctantly joined the Arabs in the name of solidarity. The dissatisfaction with Arabs, plus the split in Arab ranks gave them the opportunity to behave more independently in 1975. By the 1976 session, however, the African states were again quite solidly behind the Arabs.⁴⁸

⁴⁸This was due to increased economic aid to African states by the Arabs. It was also due to the Israeli raid on Entebbe which angered the Africans because it violated African territorial rights and because it was a loss in face (it showed how weak the African military was).

LATIN AMERICAN GROUPING

The Latin American states underwent their change in voting during periods 1973-1974 and 1975. Once again we will subdivide this group, however this time into only two categories: pro-Israeli states and pro-Arab states during periods 1967-1970 and 1971-1972.¹

The pro-Israeli group includes all of the Latin American states with the exclusion of Cuba and Guyana.

There are a number of reasons why this group took a pro-Israeli stance. One factor was the closer relationship between Israel and the Latin American continent which included diplomatic relations at a high level with all of these states. Further enhancing the relationship were the carrying out of various exchanges and the establishment of certain institutions. The effect of this exemplified by the respect for Israel in the cultural field even among members of states hostile to her. The following statement made by Vergara Bravo of the Chilean Institute in 1969 illustrates this point:

We believe that the activities of Latin American-Israeli Institutes, no matter how modest, and reduced in some cases, constitute

¹Joel Barromi and Carlos Feldman in their study "Latin American Voting on Israeli issues in the UNGA 1947-1968" rate the Latin American states according to their voting. There are certain differences between Uruguay and Venezuela are concerned, thus suggesting another subdivision. However, what is important is that both these states have to be considered pro-Israeli since neither voted with the Arabs during this period (although Uruguay voted against more often).

nevertheless a significant contribution to the knowledge about Israel, no efforts are irrelevant for her definitive consolidation as a sovereign state, through a stable peace, with historical, natural and secure borders.²

Although economic relations were not of the highest order there was still a high level of technical co-operation which had been evident since the 1950's. By 1972 all countries in this group except Cuba had bilateral technical co-operation agreements with Israel.

Another factor was the Jewish community in Latin America. Most Jews in Latin America have strong ties with Israel. In societies where assimilation is strong, the reaction of many Jews is to make Israel the main expression of their Judaism. The Jewish community (in Latin America) is called the colony of Israel.³

Thus the Jewish community, despite its small size, seems to have had an impact on Latin American - Middle East policies.⁴

In much the same way as the Africans, the Latin American states had "good" perceptions of Israel. The small state success story of Israel impressed the Latin Americans. Joel Barromi's study of Latin American voting shows that these states identified with Israel and felt part of her success. "The analysis of speeches, statements, editorials

²Edy Kaufman, "Israel's Foreign Policy Implementation in Latin America," in Israel and the Third World, p. 125.

³Yorum D. Shapira, "External and Internal Influences in the Process of Latin American-Israeli Relations," in Israel and the Third World, p. 151.

⁴ibid., p. 163. In contrast Arab communities in Latin America appear to be much more assimilated than the Jewish ones. "General Peron's special emissary to Egypt, Feisal Alnefourri himself an Argentine of Syrian descent explained. With regard to the Arab colony till now nobody took interest in this affair. This is due to the fact that Arabs tend to integrate totally in their new society and regard themselves as loyal citizens.

and parliamentary debates points to the existence of another broad factor of motivation -- the belief that Israel's survival and success was in some way relevant to Latin American affairs."⁵ At the same time the Latin American states were suspicious of the Arabs, largely because of their close affiliation with the Soviet Union.

This leads to another factor which played a role in Latin American support, this area's close relationship with the United States. Both the Israelis and the Latin Americans could be considered at least until 1970 clients of the U.S. This led to similar ways of thinking and acting. One place where this manifested itself was at the United Nations.

Finally the attitude of the Latin American states toward the U.N. played a role in their support. During the 1967-1970 period the Latin American states still could form a united bloc and propose various resolutions which served as an alternative to Arab oriented resolutions. This was the case, for instance, in the 1967 Emergency Session, where the Latin American group felt that the non-aligned resolution was not fair enough. It is conceivable that the Latin American states looked upon themselves as defenders of Israeli rights.

A pair of Latin American states, Cuba and Guyana, were openly pro-Arab during the 1967-1970 period.

Castro's Marxist regime makes Cuba's position easily understandable. Cuba's anti-American stance, its leadership among non-aligned

⁵Joel Barromi and Carlos Feldman, "Latin American Voting on Israeli Issues at the UNGA, 1947-68," Jewish Social Studies, April, 1974, pp. 162-163.

⁶Joel Barromi, "Latin American States' Conduct at the U.N. General Assembly on Issues Affecting Israel," in Israel in the Third World, p. 279.

states and its close ties with the Soviet Union explains its pro-Arab stance in the United Nations General Assembly.

Guyana's radical international policies (hence a pro-Arab stance) were a result of internal problems. Due to racial unrest Guyana preferred to divert the people's attention to international arenas.

The analysis of factors leading to change in voting behavior will be subdivided into three parts, changes in leadership and perception, changes, in economic relations and societal changes, and environmental changes.

Change in leadership, an everyday happening in South America, probably played a large role in the change in voting behavior. In Argentina the Peronista victory in 1973 which led to the resumption of relations with Communist states as well as adhesion to the non-aligned camp, signalled the beginning of a pro-Arab stance in the U.N. When General Geisel became President of Brazil in 1974 he called for greater foreign investment particularly from the Arab states. The same year Brazil took a pro-Arab stance in the U.N. for the first time. Other states affected by leadership changes were Mexico where Luis Echeverria came to power in 1970 and Jamaica where Michael Manley of the left wing People's National Party came to power in March 1972.

Perhaps the best example of the effect leadership change had on a state was Chile. In September 1970 Salvador Allende was elected President. He immediately instituted a radical foreign policy which led to a pro-Arab stance in the United Nations. When the Allende government was overthrown at the end of 1973 Chile returned to a more pro-Israeli stance in the United Nations. What is apparent in these cases is that a change to a more radical form of government led to a pro-Arab stance. Yet the effect of leadership changes are not always clear cut. Peru and Bolivia are

examples which show that a change to a more radical government did not preclude support of Israel in the U.N. In Peru, the accession to power by Velasco Alvarado in 1968 led to a more radical foreign policy. Despite this, it was not until 1971 that Peru took a pro-Arab stance in the United Nations which it maintained through 1976. Evidently other factors came into play in Peru's change, however, many observers might still be inclined to state that the change in government was a major determinant in Peru's shift in voting behavior. While Peru eventually did shift to the Arab side, the Bolivian leftist juntas from 1969-1971 remained pro-Israel in the United Nations. Therefore it is impossible to generalize on the effects on leadership change, even though in most cases it appeared to be the main determinant for change.

The Latin American states, despite their original pro-Israeli stance, seemed to be affected by a change in perceptions. Their "good" image of Israel vanished and was replaced by the feeling that Israel was an intransigent, imperialist state. This was evidenced by increased attacks on the Israeli position in speeches and editorials.⁷ The Arab image benefitted from the natural sympathy for the physical and moral suffering for the losing side. However, how big a factor this change in perception was is questionable. Those states that shifted to a pro-Arab stance in the 1971-1972 period seemed to be affected more by leadership changes and anti-American feelings. While the states which shifted in the 1973-1974 period might have done so because they blamed Israel for the 1973 war, they probably were also affected by other factors which had come into play by this time.

Concerning economic relations Latin America like Africa was

⁷Barromi, op. cit., p. 285.

comprised of states which were attempting to upgrade their economic potential. As we have already noted Israel took part in a great deal of technical and economic cooperation with the Latin American states. During the 1971-1972 period and on into the ensuing periods, the Latin Americans sought to reduce their economic dependence on the United States and therefore attempted to expand their economic relations with other states. This led to an increase in trade with Israel, however it also led to greater interest in Arab trade potential. The Arabs were quick to use this to their advantage by asking for concessions. In Argentina, Economy Minister Jose Gelbard was forced to resign after complaints that having a Jewish Economy Minister was an impediment to trade relations with the Middle East.⁸ A Libyan diplomat allegedly told Uruguay's commander in chief General Hugo Chrappe Pose that Libya would supply all the oil Uruguay needs if all Jewish Cabinet members were forced to resign. Soon afterwards Finance Minister Moses Cohen, the last remaining Jew in the Cabinet, was forced out.⁹ Again, as in the case of the African states it is very difficult to assess how large a role desires for increased trade and/or assistance played. In order to get the full implications of the switch to the Arab side for economic reasons, it is again necessary to defer judgment until we examine the systemic pressures.

A second societal factor which undoubtedly played a major role with regard to Ecuador and Venezuela was that they were oil producing states. Venezuela was an original member of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and Ecuador joined later. With the formation

⁸Rubin, op. cit., p. 25.

⁹Ibid., pp. 25-26.

of an oil cartel in 1973 these states were drawn closer than ever to the Arab states.

A consideration of environmental changes must examine changes, real or perceived, in the position of the Latin American subsystem and the position of the world powers; pressures and changes within the Latin American subsystem; and change in the U.N. environment from a Latin American position.

The Latin American states have been members of the Group of 77 Developing Countries organized at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. The objective of the group was to reduce the disparity between the industrialized states and the developing states. For the most part this group has been unsuccessful. One of the reasons was the lack of unity within the group¹⁰ for which the Latin American states were initially partly responsible. They tied their aspirations to the U.S. because of their original relationship as well as their lack of identification with the Afro-Asians.¹¹

With the deterioration of U.S.-Latin American relations, some states showed a renewed interest not only in UNCTAD but also in the non-aligned group. When the third summit of non-aligned states convened in Lusaka in September 1970 there were eight Latin American states represented, all with the status of observers. Although economics was the reason for their appearance, the Latin Americans could not help but be

¹⁰See Joan Spero, The Politics of Economic Relations (New York: St. Martins Press, 1977), p. 171.

¹¹H. Jon Rosenbaum and William Tyler, "Latin American Economic Relations with the Third World," in Latin America's New Internationalism.

affected by the anti-Israeli tirades.¹² The anti-Israeli resolutions passed at this meeting might have affected the perceptions of some of the Latin American states but it did not bring them much closer to Third World sympathy and an anti-Israeli position. First, only Chile (already anti-Israeli) was to join the Third World ranks in the next three years and there was no noticeable effect on voting at the U.N. following this session.

The Third World, taking advantage of this renewed interest by the Latin Americans, held the 1971 Conference for the Group of 77 in Lima. In 1972 the UNCTAD meeting was held in Santiago, Chile, while for the first time the non-aligned summit meeting was held in a Latin American country, Guyana. These were all efforts to bring Latin America closer to the Afro-Asian states. One problem remained -- the fact that there were still no advances being made to upgrade the developing states' economic relations with the developing states. This was because the North, with all the cards stacked in their favour, refused to deal with the South.¹³

The situation, as we know, changed dramatically in 1973. The actions of October and January demonstrated that henceforth, on issues of price, the producers need not negotiate with the companies or with the consuming states; they possessed the power to dictate terms

¹²Benjamin Revlin and Jacques Fomerand, "Changing Third World Perspectives and Policies Toward Israel," in Israel in the Third World, p. 50. The following is Revlin and Fomerand's exaggerated assessment of the Lusaka meeting: "The significance of the fourth [sic] parley of non-aligned states cannot be underestimated....The Lusaka meeting gave the Arabs a considerably broadened audience whose ranks were inflated by the entree en force of Latin American states in the Third World Camp."

¹³"Perhaps most importantly, the Southern strategy has been hampered by the inability to pressure the North," Spero, op. cit., p. 171.

unilaterally.¹⁴ What this meant was that the South had the means of pressuring the North. It also encouraged similar "cartel" activities in other resources needed by the North.¹⁵ Suddenly there was greater unity among Third World States, particularly between Latin American and Afro-Asian states. These states now had something to pull together for. The new found unity was expressed in 1974 when the developing states first demanded the establishment of a new economic order, which was to include Northern support for the functioning of producer associations and second, the passing at the General Assembly a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.¹⁶

It is not surprising that Latin American states such as Peru, Panama and Argentina became Third World members in or after 1973 and that Latin American voting continued to become more pro-Arab with each passing year after 1973.

In no way was there the same subsystemic pressure exerted in Latin America as there was in Africa. The Organization of American States, formed in 1948, dealt principally with economics and regional disputes. Its involvement in international politics was minimal. Furthermore, American membership made any solid pro-Arab stance impossible and also served as a counterweight for any pro-Arab dialogue that was initiated. The expulsion of Cuba in 1962 also eliminated any radical element the OAS might have had at least until the early 1970's. This is not to say that there were no subsystemic influences. Once the

¹⁴Ibid., p. 226.

¹⁵Examples of this were: Jamaica (bauxite) and the Union of Banana Exporting Countries.

¹⁶Spero, op. cit., p. 228.

merits of being a Third World country were discovered there was a desire among certain Latin American states to become leaders of this movement. Chile assumed the early lead but when Allende was overthrown Peru took over. Soon after Mexico under Luis Echeverria sought to establish a prominent role in the Third World. One can say that subsystemic influences played a role, albeit a minor one, in the change in Latin American behavior.

The change in the U.N. environment also played a role in the Latin American shift. For one thing the balance of power within the U.N. was continually shifting to Latin America's disadvantage. When the U.N. was first established the Latin Americans represented 35.1 percent of the countries; however by 1967 the total was down to 18.2 percent.¹⁷ By the 1970's this total had been further reduced by increased membership. The Latin Americans, as a result, became more dependent on the Afro-Asian support.¹⁸ This was especially the case when the African states sided solidly with the Arabs. The Latin American states, even if they voted solidly on an issue, had little effect. Knowing this, it is conceivable that many Latin American states, rather than provoke the now powerful Arab group, decided to vote with them against Israel. The result was a fragmented group of Latin American states which as far as Middle East issues were concerned could hardly be described as a bloc.

Overall, it can be seen that a number of events occurring during a short period of time in the late '60s and early '70s set the stage for

¹⁷Barromi, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 28. "The new less influential Latin American bloc was drawn by the dynamics of the General Assembly to a working relationship with the Afro-Asian bloc and with the Arab group.

a number of Latin American states to switch to the Arab camp. The decrease in American influence in the region, combined with economic and political factors to create new leftist regimes with Anti-American sentiments and a desire to join the Third World Grouping. At the same time it was becoming clear that the Latin Americans as a unit were not the force they once had been at the United Nations. In 1973, when the Arab states assumed physical and psychological control of the Third World grouping, the Latin American states followed along. In physical terms the Arabs dominated because they could offer economic reward and put economic pressure on the developed states and at the U.N. they held the key to the election of officials and the passage of resolutions. Because of the precedent of shocking the developed states into near submission, the Arabs held a special psychological control over the Third World. They represented the weaponry to get at the developed states in creating a new Economic order.

ASIAN GROUPING

Although there was not a single negative vote among Asian states (during any period) on any anti-Israeli resolutions, it is still worthwhile to examine why this was the case. This is especially compelling since Israel is an Asian state and maintains friendly relations with many of these states.¹ At the same time we must also examine why some of the so-called neutral states in the Arab-Israeli conflict changed their votes from abstentions in the 1967-1972 periods to a more pronounced Arab stance in the 1970's.

Certain Asian states by nature have never been and probably will never be supporters of Israel. This includes those Asian states which have large Muslim populations. These are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran. With the exception of the latter two, these states have consistently rejected any attempts by Israel to establish friendly relations.² This animosity has carried over into the U.N. where these states regularly support Arab positions.

A second part of this anti-Israeli group consists of the radical

¹See Meron Medzini, "Asian Voting Patterns on the Middle East at the U.N. General Assembly," in Israel in the Third World, p. 318.

²Turkey had strong relations with Israel but needed Arab support in the Cyprus issue and Iran had good relations with Israel but cannot vote in any other way due to its Muslim population.

or Marxist states in Asia such as Mainland China and Mongolia.³ This group also had no diplomatic ties with Israel and also adopts anti-Israeli stances in the General Assembly. A third part of this group includes states with whom Israel has had diplomatic relations, but which refused to support her in the U.N. These are India and Japan. Israel originally made strong overtures toward India, recognizing her importance as a Third World leader.⁴ The main factor militating against Indian support of Israel in the U.N. is India's fear of Arab hostility in her dispute with Pakistan.⁵ Israel's relationship bilaterally with Japan has been quite good. There has been increasing trade between the two states and there exists an active Israel-Japan friendship association. Nevertheless the Japanese usually have backed the Arabs in international forums such as the U.N. This appears to be due to its great dependence on Arab oil.⁶

The neutral states during the 1967-1970 period include the Phillipines, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore and Burma. These states were the ones with the strongest bilateral relations with Israel. All of these countries received technical or military assistance from

³See Michael Brecher, "Israel and China: A Historic Missed Opportunity," in Israel in the Third World." He argues that Israel had a chance to establish close links with China but procrastinated until it was too late.

⁴See Medzini, op. cit., p. 320.

⁵"The Indian government could not go far, weighing the single state of Israel against the numerous Arab states and fearing an Arab-Pakistani rapprochement," Revlin and Fomerand, op. cit., p. 332.

⁶Japan receives 85% of its oil from the Arab states.

Israel.⁷

What can we say about the shift by the Asian states from a neutral position to a pro-Arab position in the U.N. General Assembly? To answer this we will examine leadership changes, perception change, and environmental changes. The relationship between Israel and two states (Burma and Cambodia) was affected by change in leadership. The major setback occurred in Burma and was caused by the decision of the new leader General Ne Win to freeze operations of all foreign countries. Israel was particularly affected since its friends in Burma were identified with the deposed U Nu regime.⁸ Up to this point Burma had been Israel's staunchest ally in Asia. The second example was Cambodia, where Israel's relations were based on the friendship of Prince Noredom Sihanouk. He was deposed in 1970 and replaced by a Marxist regime. It is questionable how much these changes meant at the U.N. because it was not until well after these changes in government occurred, that these states took a consistent pro-Arab position.

Another potential cause for the shift in voting behavior was a change in perceptions. For one thing Israel's ability to develop quickly and become militarily and industrially successful (particularly after 1967) probably widened the identification gap between Israel and the developing states of Asia.⁹ Fuller discussion on this factor and its

⁷For example, "In Thailand Israeli experts established a model farm near Bangkok....Experimental farms were also set up in Laos and Cambodia. In the Phillipines a certain number of Israeli experts have been provided in the fields of irrigation, soil conservation and agricultural advice," G. H. Jansen, "Zionism," Israel and Asian Nationalism, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1971, p. 286.

⁸Medzini in Midstream, op. cit., p. 207.

⁹Jansen, op. cit., p. 7.

role will be deferred until the next section.

These Asian states might also have been affected by Israel's intransigent position. Thus their perceptions of Israel as a friendly state might have been altered. However, as in the case of the Latin American states, the changes occurring among these neutral Asian states took place in 1973.¹⁰ This does not mean that change in perceptions had no effect, but it does indicate that other factors played a more certain role.

There was no evidence of the Arab states managing or even trying to usurp the superior economic relationship that Israel had with these states. There were also no societal changes which would have affected any changes in the Asian states' behavior.

With regard to environmental changes, subsystemic, systemic and changes in the U.N., all seemed to have been factors in the shift in voting behavior by the Asian states. As an Asian state Israel sought an active role in Asian affairs since her independence in 1948. In 1955 Israel wished to participate in the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung. However when the Arabs threatened to boycott the conference if Israel was represented, it was decided to exclude Israel from this forum. One must assume then that the Arab states had tremendous influence in the Asian subsystem. By 1973 the Arabs were not just a regional power but also a world power. Therefore their influence and the pressure they could put on dissenting states was stronger than ever and was certainly a factor.

¹⁰Burma shifted in 1972, Singapore, Thailand, the Phillipines and Laos in 1973 and Nepal in 1974.

Changes in the international political system appear to have been quite important. Most of these Asian states were located in South-east Asia, were pro-American and therefore were affected by the Vietnam War. When the Americans pulled out, it not only made American commitment in the region questionable but it also made these states more susceptible to external pressures. This affected their behavior.

All of these states were members of the non-aligned group which until the 1970's was impotent. With the Arab oil weapon leading the way the Group of 77 acquired a new strength that must have impressed these neutral states. After all, they were also going through the throes of development. For example, until the 1970's Thailand was greatly disappointed with UNCTAD. The reason for this was that she was a country whose principal productive capacity was devoted to primary products.¹¹ Therefore her foreign economic position was determined by the markets for such commodities which were hard to influence.¹² Thus the new strength of UNCTAD held an important key for most of these states and as a result they could not help but move closer to the Arab camp.

These factors were reinforced by the impact of changes at the U.N. itself. The Asian states, who have to gain support for an issue concerning themselves, need Arab support in the same way as the Africans or Latin Americans. They also needed Arab support to gain election to various U.N. posts. They became even more dependent on the Arabs following 1973. This might partially explain their change. More important than this, however, is the Asian attitude toward U.N. votes. Unlike the

¹¹These include fishing, mining and agriculture.

¹²Wayne Wilcox, Leo E. Rose and Gavin Boyd, Asia and the International System (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1972), p. 197.

Africans and Latin Americans, Asian states seem to have a more apathetic attitude to the U.N. Even when they abstained most of these states would rationalize their votes by saying that U.N. votes were unimportant, what was important was the bilateral relations.¹³ If one ascribes to the generalization that Asian states do not like to rock the boat, don't like being overtly independent and care very little about U.N. voting, then it is easy to understand their change in pattern.¹⁴ While there was still some support for Israel these states generally abstained. When all support switched to the Arabs, these Asian states flowed with the tide.

In attempting to assess the relative weights of the many types of factors which affected Asian voting at the U.N., several conclusions may be offered. For some states, change in leadership was a major cause for change in voting. Change in perceptions, particularly in the influence of the Third World grouping, also played an important role. It seems, however, that the pro-Arab voting pattern was at least partly a result of attitude toward U.N. voting. For the most part Asian supporters of Israel felt the resolutions to be innocuous and irrelevant as long as their relationship with Israel was unaffected. Even after they had taken a decided pro-Arab stance, these states still voted with Israel (if one believes the theory that an abstention is a pro-Israeli vote) on issues which they felt to be of valid importance, i.e. Zionism.

Having surveyed the factors which accounted for the change in voting behavior by each group, some attempt to compare the effect of

¹³Medzini, op. cit., p. 332.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 322.

these factors on each grouping is now in order. All three groupings had states which were affected by leadership changes. For the most part a change in leaders signalled the move to a pro-Arab position. The Latin American states had more numerous changes because the peak of anti-American sentiments coincided with the period studied.

Changing perceptions also affected all three groupings: Africa, Latin America and Asia. Generally the change was to a more negative perception of Israel. The African states were the most affected because of geographic proximity and their specific efforts to give the peace initiative new impetus. The Asian and Latin American grouping were less susceptible because of the distance between them and the protagonists, particularly the Latin Americans who held Israel in higher esteem than the other two groupings from the start.

The African group appears to be the one whose U.N. voting was most affected by economic and societal factors because of geographic proximity, economic inducements and Muslim populations. Economic inducements and the oil producing status of certain states also affected the Latin American group, however, the distance between them and the Arabs mitigated the effect of these factors. The U.N. voting of the Asian states was affected the least by economic relations and societal factors.

The Latin American and Asian groupings were the most affected by systemic changes. All three groups were affected by the increased influence of the Arabs in world politics. The Latin Americans and Asians, however, were more profoundly affected by the decline in American prestige and economic status. The Latin American states were also profoundly affected by the deterioration of their relations with the United States.

Subsystemic pressures played a dominant role in African behavior

because of the OAU emphasis on consensus, the presence of Arab states in the African subsystem and the occupation by Israel of what was considered part of the African subsystem. The Asian states were also affected by subsystemic pressure because the dominant states within their subsystem were Arab or pro-Arab. The least affected was the Latin American group because there was not the same pressure to conform. There were also no Arab states within the Latin American group.

The African states were greatly affected by changes at the U.N. such as new perceptions on certain issues, increased role in U.N. functions and particularly the strength of Arab bargaining. The Latin Americans were also affected by changes in the U.N. such as their split with the United States, reduction of their "bloc" strength and the increase in Arab bargaining power. Since both these groups deemed U.N. votes as being important these changes had a tremendous affect on them. While the Asian states were affected by the increase in Arab bargaining power, their apathetic position on U.N. votes reduced the importance of the U.N. environment.

After analyzing the determinants of the three groups' behavior, it is impossible to pinpoint one as being dominant. For example, a large segment of the African states studied seemed to be influenced most by subsystemic pressures while most of the Latin American states seemed to be affected by systemic changes. Even where all three groups share a common determinant it is not correct to assume that this is the key because each group could be affected in a different way or for different reasons.

What about Arab bargaining power in the U.N. because of its oil weapon? This seemed to have a great effect on all the groups. Yet it cannot be considered the dominant factor for a few reasons. First, this

power would only influence those states which had not up to this time changed their behavior. Yet we have seen that several states changed before 1973. Second, the reasons for the Arabs' ability to influence varies. The Africans could be influenced because of their new perceptions on issues, their new perception of their role in the U.N. as well as subsystemic pressures. The Latin Americans could be influenced because of their reduced role in the U.N. as well as systemic pressures. The Asians could be influenced because of their half-hearted attitude toward a U.N. vote as well as systemic and subsystemic influences.

We have noted in this study that the strengthening of Third World solidarity coincided with the rise in Arab support in the United Nations General Assembly. One might assert then, that Third World solidarity was the main reason for the Arabs' dominance in the U.N. While it may well have been a factor, the deviations which occurred preclude the possibility of Third World solidarity being the dominant factor. Despite Third World solidarity certain African states, after voting in favour of the Arabs throughout 1973 and 1974 chose to vote against the Arabs in 1975. Obviously other factors came into play. Therefore we must conclude that the rise in Arab strength in the General Assembly was certainly not monocausal.

CONCLUSION

This study has examined the changes in the character of the issues and voting related to the Middle East dispute at the United Nations General Assembly during the period 1967-1976. Most General Assembly studies have concentrated on bloc voting and issue relationships. While there is much to be learned from these studies they rarely give serious consideration to U.N. voting as an aspect of foreign policy behavior. Those that have done so, have not applied a careful methodological framework. By concentrating on a single category of issue and applying a careful methodology which gives adequate attention to external factors, this study sought to open new doors in the study of the General Assembly. This study is also of interest because it dispels, hopefully once and for all, the single dimensional explanation for the support given to the Arabs in the U.N. in the 1970's.

This study began by examining the resolutions dealt with regarding the Middle East in the General Assembly and the voting on these issues to establish whether there was a change taking place. In both cases changes were noted. With regard to the issues, it could be said that there were some textual changes. The Human Rights resolutions remained similar, although they became more hostile toward Israel as the years progressed. The same could be said of the Situation in the Middle East resolutions. The biggest changes concerned the U.N. General Assembly's treatment of the Palestinian issue. While in the 1967-1972 period

there was only one vague resolution passed annually, the 1973-1976 period specifically supported the national rights of the Palestinians. In this period the United Nations General Assembly took the position that the Palestinians and their representatives, the P.L.O., should play an integral role in any Middle East peace talks and that a Palestinian state was a prerequisite to peace in the Middle East.

The examination of the changing character of the resolutions, while giving evidence of changing issues, also serves as a gauge, in this case, of support for the Arabs. In the 1967-1970 period, moderate and compromise resolutions were common. Certain procedural tactics were also used by the Arabs. These devices were evidence of only a moderate amount of support for the Arabs since the goal of these devices was to gain support for the Arabs and isolate Israel. It was noted that the Arabs were not particularly successful in this attempt. In the 1971-1972 period these devices (compromise and tactics) were again used frequently. This indicates there was still not full support for the Arab positions, although the number of pro-Arab states increased. By the 1973-1974 through the 1975 and 1976 periods there was no evidence of compromise because the Arabs had what has been often called an "automatic majority" or, in other words, enough support to pass virtually any and all resolutions.

The analysis of the changes in group voting behavior offers some interesting insights. While the African states shifted from being a highly polarized group between 1967-1970, and to a lesser extent in the 1971-1972 period, to a solid group in 1973-1974, the Latin American states changed from a highly cohesive group from 1967-1970 to a divided group in 1973-1976. The fact that the Africans were split at all on

any type of self-determination issue is fascinating because of the great weight attached to this issue by the Africans in the United Nations. Furthermore, contrary to common assumption there were several states which shifted their votes to the Arabs well before and well after the Yom Kippur War of 1973. For example several African states changed positions to a pro-Arab stance in the 1971-1972 period. Similarly some Latin American states changes to a pro-Arab position in 1971-1972, others in 1975. Another salient point is that at no time did the changes become so profuse so as to give the Arabs the unanimous support of the Third World states. Finally the change in vote to the Arab side did not guarantee Arab support throughout the remainder of the periods. For example, some African states that had switched to a pro-Arab position switched back to a neutral or even pro-Israeli stance in 1975. As well, Chile and Mexico both switched first to a pro-Arab stance and then to a neutral and sometimes pro-Israeli position. What these shifts imply is that there were several factors affecting the voting behavior of these groups. This was confirmed in the second section of the study which attempted to explain the U.N. voting behavior of three regional groups of countries: Africa, Latin America and Asia.

Most African changes occurred during three periods, 1971-1972, 1973-1974 and 1975. The first two periods represented the switch from a neutral or pro-Israeli position to a pro-Arab position, and the last period represented a switch by a small group of African states back to a neutral or pro-Israeli position.

The African states which changed positions in the 1971-1972 period were the neutral states which up to that time had refused to choose sides. This group's behavior was most affected by changing

perceptions and changes in the U.N. environment. These perceptual changes appear to have been a direct result of the accession to power by Anwar Sadat in Egypt. His diplomatic style drew the respect of the Africans and at the same time drew attention to Israel's intransigent position which to this point in time had not been perceived because of Sadat's predecessor Gamal Nasser. Sadat was able to increase African support by pointing out that Israel occupied African soil and therefore was violating the territorial integrity of that continent. The attitude of many of the African states changed with regard to a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict in 1971. This was related to the OAU mission sent to Cairo and Tel Aviv in conjunction with the U.N. The Mission's goal was to give impetus to a new peace initiative and to the Africans this gave the Middle East conflict greater relevance.

The African states which changed positions in the 1973-1974 period were for the most part pro-Israeli. These states' behavior was affected directly by subsystemic pressure and indirectly by the rise in Arab power. For the Africans the rise in Arab power offered the opportunity of an economic and political Afro-Arab alliance. An economic alliance could be of great help to the resource-poor African states, and could be facilitated if Africa gave its full political support to the Arabs, particularly in the Middle East dispute. A solid African position internationally would increase the Africans' ability to bargain with the Arabs. Realizing this, the pro-Arab African states pressured the pro-Israeli states to join the ranks and form a solid front. The intensity of their pressure was amplified by the natural African desire to achieve consensus. The pro-Israeli states, by their own admission, were forced to succumb to this persuasion.

The states which changed their positions in 1975 were mostly the pro-Israeli states of the 1967-1972 period. They were able to switch because the subsystemic pressure to conform had been reduced by the split between Arab states in Africa (Libya and Egypt), and by the failure of the Arab states to produce the economic gratuities that they had promised the Africans. The Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement raised certain doubts about Israeli intransigence and also reduced the subsystemic pressures.

There are several important points which can be drawn from this thesis with regard to the study of African behavior in and out of the U.N. General Assembly. While most neutral states which switched votes in 1971-1972 were affected most by changing perceptions and changes in the U.N. environment, there were certain states' voting behavior which were affected most by their own different determinant(s). For example Chad switched position because of Arab economic inducements. The same could be said about the pro-Israeli group of the 1967-1970 period. While most changed in 1973 for reasons of African solidarity, there were others such as Dahomey, Madagascar and Rwanda which switched before 1973 as a result of leadership changes. These examples caution us about making generalizations about group behavior.

Another area in which an investigator must be cautious is when comparing multilateral relations to bilateral relations. It is clear that two states' diplomatic relations does not necessarily have a bearing on the support one state gives another in the U.N. General Assembly. Certain African states supported Israel at the U.N. in 1975 despite the fact that they had no diplomatic relations with Israel. Mauritius, unlike most African states, refused to break relations with

Israel until 1976 even though it voted strictly with the Arabs between 1973 and 1976.

The use of economic aid as an influential instrument would appear to be at least a questionable factor in the switch to a pro-Arab position by individual states. At the same time, when these economic inducements were made on a regional basis they were a factor.

Finally, when one is analyzing African behavior on Middle East issues, two things must be kept in mind: first, the importance of Egypt to the African subsystem. Of all the Arab states, even those within Africa, Egypt is clearly the most influential. Second, the nature of African decision making on a multilateral level calls for close examination of the unique role that the Organization of African Unity plays.

The Latin American changes in voting behavior at the U.N. General Assembly were sporadic, occurring in 1972, 1973-1974, 1975 and 1976. For the most part these were changes to a pro-Arab position and could be accounted for directly by systemic changes and changes in the U.N. environment. While American influence in Latin America was declining, the desire among Latin American states to establish more diverse foreign policies increased. This in turn led to greater interaction between the Latin American states and the Third World grouping in which the Arabs were extremely influential members. After 1973 new Arab power allowed many Latin American states to identify closely with the Third World. The result was a pro-Arab position at the U.N. Within the U.N. itself the Latin Americans during the 1967-1970 period had been a cohesive unit often opposing non-aligned resolutions which were considered too hostile towards Israel. The Latin Americans would usually offer counter-

resolutions. By the 1971-1972 period the Latin American grouping began to split apart. This could be attributed in part to their declining ability to influence decisions in the Middle East or on any other issue in the General Assembly. Their dependence on Afro-Asian support increased. Furthermore, by the 1970's the Latin American states were no longer inclined to always vote with the United States.

There are other salient features to be drawn from this thesis' analysis of Latin American behavior. While most states were affected by systemic changes and changes in the U.N. environment, certain states were affected by other foreign policy determinants. For example, Ecuador's and Venezuela's position in the U.N. was determined largely by their membership in OPEC. Furthermore many states changed positions following a change to a more radical form of government. One must be careful here, however, because what this study showed was that a shift to radical government did not mean that a pro-Arab policy ensued immediately following the change in government, or for that matter, ever ensued (Bolivia). The assessment of how large a role leadership played in determining Latin American behavior poses an interesting foreign policy question. Were the radical regimes the result of weakened American influence in Latin America, or was the decline of American influence the result of these radical regimes? If it is impossible to decide which was cause and which was effect, how can one decide which of the two factors, systemic changes or change in leadership, was the major determinant of Latin American behavior?

Finally, there are certain important points to be drawn from this thesis' analysis of Asian behavior. The Asian group switched from a neutral position in the 1967 through 1972 periods, to a pro-Arab

position in 1973-1974. The best explanation for this change seems to be the Asian states' attitude toward the U.N. The Asians felt that bilateral relations were of greater importance than multilateral relations. At the U.N. they preferred not to "make waves." With the rise in Arab power it would be easier to vote with the Arabs and explain their vote to Israel as being irrelevant.

While their attitude toward the U.N. was of major importance, certain Asian states' behavior was affected by other determinants of foreign policy. For example, change in leadership in some states led to a pro-Arab position in the U.N. Similarly, certain states were affected to a certain extent by systemic changes (the decline of American prestige and influence in the region, and a concomitant rise in influence and prestige of the Arabs) and/or subsystemic pressures (the pressure from the Arab states which dominated the Asian grouping).

It is clear, when comparing the determinants of policy behavior, that each grouping acted the way they did for different reasons. The Latin American states were affected the most by systemic changes, the African states the least. The African grouping was most affected by subsystemic pressures, the Latin American states were affected by this factor the least. All three groupings' behavior was affected by the U.N. environment, but each was affected in different ways. The Latin American states were affected by their reduced role in the U.N., and the Africans by their more prestigious position in the U.N. (particularly on Middle East issues). Role meant very little to the Asians because they attached very little importance to U.N. votes.

It has been noted that as Third World solidarity and Arab oil power increased, pro-Arab voting in the U.N. General Assembly also

became increasingly uniform. Neither of these is sufficient for explaining Arab voting behavior. This further emphasizes the conclusion that there is no simple generalization which acceptably explains the U.N. voting of the three groups of Third World countries examined. While this thesis has demonstrated the importance of the impact of the U.N. environment on voting behavior, this does not mean that factors outside the U.N. can be ignored. All variables must be accounted for in the study of foreign policy behavior because an event totally unrelated to the U.N. can shift a state's posture as surely as an event occurring within the United Nations itself. What (all) this implies is that extreme caution must be exercised when generalizing about foreign policy, particularly U.N. voting behavior. Failure to do so could produce tendentious results.

While this study has hopefully established a framework from which political scientists may approach the study of U.N. General Assembly voting behavior it is still only the beginning. This study has analyzed why many states changed to a pro-Arab position in the General Assembly. Equally interesting would be an analysis of why some states remained pro-Israel during this period. Unfortunately, the scope of this paper did not allow such an analysis. Also due to the imposing tasks set before it, this study did not explain specifically why each individual state changed its vote. Obviously more research into the elements of each state's foreign policy, as well as its attitude and behavior in the U.N., is necessary. Such a study, given a proper methodological framework, would also be of interest.

Another study which would be of value is the comparison of state behavior on Middle East issues and other issues at the U.N. during

the 1967-1976 time period to see if these states changed their voting behavior on these other issues and if these changes occurred at the same time and for the same reasons as did their change on Middle East issues.

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