

THE EIGHTEEN NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE AND AFTER:  
THE ROLE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE CANADIAN DELEGATIONS

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A Thesis  
Presented to  
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research  
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Master of Arts

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by  
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


TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .....	1
Chapter	
I    CANADIAN DISARMAMENT POLICY: 1920 - 1962 .....	5
II   THE CANADIAN DELEGATION'S THREE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS .....	31
III  THE ISSUE ENVIRONMENT: DEBATING FIELD .....	57
IV   CANADIAN PARTICIPATION .....	85
V    CONCLUSIONS ON THE CONFERENCES AND CANADIAN EXPERIENCES .....	112
APPENDICES .....	
A    IMPORTANT DATES .....	142
B    CANADIAN MEMBERS .....	148
SOURCES CITED .....	150

## INTRODUCTION

One of the world's oldest and newest problems is that of armed conflict. It is an old problem as conflict has existed as long as mankind; and it is a new problem for man has now invented weapons capable of destroying enemies, allies and self with very little effort.

Canada is the only nation that was involved with the "groundwork" of nuclear explosives that has not developed nuclear weapons. Since the time Canadian scientists worked with their British and American counterparts to manufacture the first nuclear explosive, Canada has been active in international organizations and forums in efforts to control nuclear energy and eliminate nuclear weapons. Today Canada is participating in the

longest and most successful disarmament conference - the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which was originally named the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. Canadian policies and contributions to this major international disarmament organization, since its creation in 1962, will be investigated by focusing on the behaviour of its delegations to the Conferences.

Canada is in a very vulnerable geographical position between the two strongest nuclear nations. As Howard Green, then Minister of External Affairs, stated in Parliament, January 24, 1963, "If there is a nuclear war, we are in for it." <sup>1</sup> If American missiles are successful in attacking the Soviet Union, then their first and second stages fall on Canadian soil. If Russian missiles reach the United States, then Canada's southern borders suffer from direct hits and through fallout. In the event that either American or Soviet missiles are intercepted, the interception is most likely to be over Canadian territory and, likewise, if either nation's missiles fall short of their targets, it is Canada who will suffer. In his January 24 speech, Mr. Green also explained that Canada urged a Comprehensive Test Ban for "This nation is in one

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<sup>1</sup> Howard Green, "External Affairs in Parliament," External Affairs, XV (February, 1963), 95.

one of the worst fallout areas in the world, the temperate zone." <sup>2</sup> He concluded that no one knows the end result of the contamination for not all of the radioactive fallout has yet settled.

It is clear that Canada cannot escape severe damage in any nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, any treaty or agreement on disarmament or arms control adds to Canada's security. A Defence White Paper prepared in 1971 stressed Canada's need to get results in disarmament talks. The only direct military threat Canada faces externally, it said, is that of a large-scale nuclear attack on North America. "Regardless of the circumstances leading up to such an attack, logically, for geographical reasons if for no other, we must plan on the basis that we shall be gravely affected."<sup>3</sup>

Lt.-Gen. E. L. M. Burns, former head of the Canadian disarmament delegation, stated, in reference to the White Paper that

The booklet goes on to state: 'Canada should not rest content to see the major nuclear powers determine exclusively the pace of progress or

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<sup>2</sup> Green, op. cit., 65.

<sup>3</sup> Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence In The Seventies (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), p. 25.

lack of it in the field of arms control.'  
... We should do this 'persistently and  
imaginatively in the contexts of the  
United States consultations with Canada  
and its other NATO allies;' also in the  
Conference of the Committee on  
Disarmament in Geneva, and in the United  
Nations in New York. <sup>4</sup>

Has Canada worked persistently and imaginatively in Geneva? To answer the question properly it is necessary to examine the evolution of Canadian attitudes and policies toward disarmament and to indicate the relationships, if any, between this evolution and the character, composition and procedures of successive Canadian delegations to the Disarmament Conferences. The investigation will endeavour to clarify the nature of the role played by Canadian personnel and will also consider the difficult issue of the impact, or effectiveness, of the Canadian activities.

In order to give full scope to these questions, the study must also cover the past history of negotiations; foreign positions that affected Canada's role; the nature of the Conferences and the issues discussed. This paper will concentrate on the actions inside, not outside, the Committees. It is obvious that events and developments elsewhere, had a major impact on arms control and disarmament issues during this period. While the larger international political context will not be ignored, the focus in this work will be narrower.

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<sup>4</sup> Quoted in "Foreign Policy for Canadians: Comments on the White Paper," Behind the Headlines, XXIX (August, 1970), 3.

CHAPTER I  
CANADIAN DISARMAMENT POLICY:  
1920 - 1962

Definitions

Before discussing disarmament and arms control negotiations in respect to Canada, it is necessary to deal with the complicated factors involved in defining disarmament.

After World War I "disarmament" meant "the reduction of the armed forces of the members of the League, and especially of the Great Powers, to the scale needed for the maintenance of domestic order." <sup>1</sup> A broader

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<sup>1</sup> Alfred Zimmern, The League of Nations and The Rule of Law 1918-1935 (London: Macmillian and Company, 1936), p. 26.

definition of disarmament, to encompass non-League members as well, was "an agreement between all the nations as to the uses to which they will put their armaments." <sup>2</sup>

Since World War II, the problem of disarmament has become complicated, not only because of newer weapons and advanced technology, but also because of linguistics. The United States, in an effort to distinguish between plans calling for reduction of arms and those calling for restricted use of weapons, introduced the term "arms control." Until 1958, "disarmament" was used by the Americans to describe any agreement or plan calling on nations to reduce or eliminate weapons, while "arms control" meant "any agreement ... to regulate some aspect of ... military capability or potential." <sup>3</sup> The Soviet Union continued to refer to all conferences and plans, even if the specific proposal did not call for elimination or even reduction of weapons, as "disarmament." Under pressure from the Soviet Union who accused the Americans of using "arms control" to hide their lack of interest in true disarmament, the Americans began in 1958 to use the terms

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<sup>2</sup> Salvador de Madariga, Disarmament (London: Oxford University Press, 1929), p. 143.

<sup>3</sup> Robert Bowie, "Basic Requirements of Arms Control," Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, ed. Donald Brennan (New York: George Braziller, 1961), p. 43.

interchangeably, so that now plans that deal with the restricted use of a specific weapon and not in its elimination, are considered disarmament advances.<sup>4</sup> In this study, the terms, as in real life, will be used interchangeably.

The question of disarmament cannot be studied or discussed as a single entity for there are many factors that contribute to the overall problem. National security is one of the most important of these factors. Since the beginning of the century, the question of security and disarmament has almost divided the nations into two distinct groups. To one, disarmament is the ultimate security. Any forces that a nation has above those needed for national order are to guard the nation if attacked, they explain. The level needed for this protection depends on the level of the forces of a nation's neighbours and enemies. If one nation reduces its forces, its neighbours will need a lower level to protect themselves. If every nation had fewer arms there would be greater security. Fear of war would decrease ; economic prosperity rise and

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<sup>4</sup> Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations For Arms Control (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1961), p. 7.

economic incentives for war would also decrease. This is the view of such states as the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth of Nations, Italy and the United States. <sup>5</sup>

France, Poland, Belgium and other states who feel more open to attack, state their willingness to disarm but explain that new armaments are a **symptom**, and not the cause, of insecurity and fear. <sup>6</sup> Here is the problem: security for disarmament or disarmament for security. The debate has been **raging** for decades. Included in this important question is the camouflage perpetrated by some nations using the term security. It is true that arms give, or at least appear to give, security and may be an effective response to perceived insecurity, but arms can also have other functions. By possessing arms a nation may be hoping to gain power in world affairs - especially if the arms are nuclear; or may be using arms technology as propaganda either to frighten other nations or to increase national pride or there may be a vested national interest in weapons development.

The problem, then, is to decide on what level security

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<sup>5</sup> F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 221.

<sup>6</sup> Loc. cit.

and disarmament are balanced. In a national setting a society can be disarmed if it has a secure, stable, predictable community structure. The normal routine must be compliance to the community's rules; and deviance, a swiftly punished unusual incident. In such a state, minimal arms can be retained with restrictions on their legitimate use. Internationally, the task becomes even greater in trying to establish a predictable community where arms can be minimal.

Besides security, disarmament is closely linked to pacific settlements, especially arbitration. Arbitration uses a third party - an arbitrator - and is a settlement method "by which parties obligate themselves in advance to carry out the decision given by the arbitrator or arbitral tribunal."<sup>7</sup> Arbitration is the link between security and disarmament whether talks lead to disarmament or security as a first result. All nations agree on the importance of arbitration and of talking problems out. It is in this way that the nations who seek security first and those who seek disarmament first, can discuss aims common to both.

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<sup>7</sup> Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro and Ann Patricia Simons, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 241.

Perhaps the greatest problem in disarmament talks is the lack of trust, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union. The struggle of East against West has been going on too long to narrow the gap between political systems and ideologies. As Howard Green put it; "When one makes a suggestion, the other immediately suspects there is something just not right about that suggestion. I think distrust and suspicion are the big hurdles to get over in the disarmament negotiations." <sup>8</sup>

The final considerations to bear in mind while discussing disarmament are the technology of the weapons themselves and the world situation. Each year, the weapons cycle is moving faster, making some weapons obsolete almost as soon as they are deployed. With the global involvement of nuclear nations, there is anxiety that even a limited conflict may escalate so that the nuclear "horror" weapons will be used. The fear of using nuclear weapons has not slowed arms manufacturing but increased it - hoping to scare off potential enemies. Once a crisis becomes real, it may be too late to do anything about the use of nuclear weapons and this fear has caused nations to be more interested in preventive disarmament. Today, too,

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<sup>8</sup> Cited in Peyton Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, Vol. XII, 1961-1963 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 264.

politics and military defence are interwoven problems in the context of disarmament. It was the episode of the American pilot Francis Gary Powers that ended the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis that led to the first disarmament agreements. The emergence of new nuclear nations, like China and India, introduce new tensions and concepts of world security and order. The point is that the world community is not stable and it is therefore difficult to get permanent agreements. What is possible today, may be impossible tomorrow and nations fear commitments that may prove to be a mistake in the future.

#### Landmarks in the development of Disarmament Conferences

Since the early 1900's disarmament has been a much discussed issue, but it was World War I that truly brought the problem to the foreground. The war "produced a fresh awareness of the horrors of war, a rather bewildered admission that modern European civilization was not immune from destructive forces of military conflict, and a distressed feeling that 'it must not happen again.'"<sup>9</sup> Among President Wilson's Allied War Aims, known as the Fourteen Points, was included, "Adequate guarantees given

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<sup>9</sup> Innis Claude Jr., Swords Into Plowshares (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 45.

and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." <sup>10</sup>

When the war finally ended, nations sought disarmament for two reasons: many, having watched the fairly obvious naval arms escalation of the United Kingdom and Germany, felt that competition in armaments was a main cause of the war. Moreover the character of the weaponry used generated public pressure against another war. Machine guns were a new horror weapon that shocked the public and armies by the brutality and damage they could cause. World War I became a trench war because machine guns were so devastating that armies could not live on the surface of battlefields. Human losses were catastrophic. "The battles of the Marne and the frontiers cost each side 500,000 casualties, a larger figure than that which represented the whole manpower of the Prussian army in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. ... [World War I] became the longest and bloodiest war of attrition in all of history." <sup>11</sup> The public wanted peace, and many, especially in the United States, supported President Wilson's desire for a League of Nations. "Every kind of agency for revealing public opinion - polls,

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<sup>10</sup> James Brown Scott, President Wilson's Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), p. 360.

<sup>11</sup> Bernard and Fawn M. Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 190.

resolutions of legislative bodies and mass meetings, speeches, editorials, letters to the press - showed that the masses were demanding some kind of League to prevent a repetition of the horrors which were still fresh in mind." <sup>12</sup>

None of the Powers had any definite policy concerning disarmament at the time of the League's inception, but all were aware of the great difficulties, both technical and political, which surrounded the matter. In the League, disarmament and security guarantees were a package covered under Article 8. <sup>13</sup> There existed, however, one large problem.

The essence of the Covenant was that States should renounce their right to be the sole judges of their armaments, and that this most dangerous of all questions, the very heart and fortress of nationalism, should be brought under international control. <sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Thomas Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal, in Thomas Bailey, Wilson and the Peacemakers (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 10.

<sup>13</sup> Article 8 reads as follows:

1. The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

2. After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

<sup>14</sup> Walters, op. cit., p. 218.

This essence was lost when so many of the powerful nations of the world, including some Great Powers, ended up outside the League. Many of the members of the organization feared to disarm for they would then be open to attack by nations outside the League which had not disarmed.

Canada's role in the talks concerning disarmament was a small one. Canada welcomed the League as a means of furthering international co-operation, and as a forum for debate and discussion, but opposed using the League as an enforcer of peace. Canadian views on Article 10<sup>15</sup> were symptomatic of its position on disarmament. At the peace talks Canada opposed this Article because it guaranteed the security of existing territories (whatever their policies); it placed unequal responsibilities upon member states; and Canada was unfairly loaded because of its immunity from aggression.<sup>16</sup> Throughout the League years, Canada opposed being forced into any action either military or economic. This policy was well expressed by Prime Minister King, who commented at the time of Canada's taking

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<sup>15</sup> Article 10 reads as follows:

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

<sup>16</sup> James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Vol. I, From the Great War to the Great Depression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 7.

part in economic sanctions against Italy, that

The Canadian Government at the same time desires to make it clear that it does not recognize any commitment binding Canada to adopt military sanctions and that no such commitment could be made without the prior approval of the Canadian Parliament. ...

In the future, as in the past, the Government will be prepared to participate in the consideration of the most effective means of advancing the aims of the League through the adjustment of specific controversies, the lessening of the rivalries, based upon exaggerated economic nationalism, the renewal of the effort to stem the rising tide of competitive armaments, and such other policies as are appropriate for a country in the geographic and economic position of the Dominion, and as will ensure unity and common consent in Canada as well as the advancement of peace abroad. <sup>17</sup>

It was because of this "no-commitment" policy that Canada opposed the 1924 Geneva Protocol on arbitration, security and disarmament. Senator Dandurand, Canadian representative, explained Canada's position by stating that Canada favoured arbitration and disarmament but was opposed to pledging automatic aid to an attacked nation. Canada felt itself outside the area of possible attack and to agree to such a proposal, it would be taking on a heavier burden than the other nations. Europe was the area

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<sup>17</sup> Cited in John W. Dafoe, "Canada, The Empire and The League," Foreign Affairs, XIV (January, 1936), 302. Underlining is mine.

in which a war might erupt so the Protocol was of concern to that area in particular. As Dandurand explained in his famous speech

May I be permitted to add that in this association of Mutual Insurance against fire, the risks assumed by the different nations are not equal? We live in a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials. A vast ocean separates us from Europe. Canada therefore believed it to be her duty to seek a precise interpretation of what appeared to her to be the indefinite obligations included in Article 10 of the Covenant.

... I recognize that the closely elaborated plan before us forms a logical and harmonious whole, corresponding to the need of Europe and designed mainly for application to that continent. 18

With a policy of "no-commitment" and an unwillingness to take part in any agreement requiring parties to aid each other if attacked, Canada could do little in efforts to achieve a disarmed world. The best summary of Canada's stand on disarmament itself, is from its opening speech at the World Disarmament Conference, which opened February 13, 1932. The Canadian delegate, Sir George Perley, expressed not only his own nation's hope for

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18 Cited in Walter A. Riddell, Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy, 1917-1939 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 464-465.

disarmament but also the means by which Canada thought disarmament might occur.

Her delegation will be proud to carry out its instructions to give any assistance within its power in the achievement of this much-to-be desired result. ...

We think further that this organization of peace can best be achieved at this time by emphasizing the prevention of conflict, rather than the punishment of aggression; by building up machinery for conciliation, rather than providing sanctions; by using the League of Nations as a channel through which international public opinion can express itself, rather than by developing it into a super-state. 19

Canada would do all she could to bring about peace; it would disarm, it would publish its military strength, if others did so. It would do all it could under Article 8 but it would never guarantee to go to war. In the House of Commons both Prime Ministers of the time, Bennett and King, voiced Canada's opposition to fighting war with war - Prime Minister Bennett spoke in

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19 Cited in Riddell, op. cit., pp. 495, 497.

1931<sup>20</sup> and Prime Minister King in 1936.<sup>21</sup>

World War II brought about a desire for a new, stronger world organization and plans were begun even before the War ended. Disarmament was not a major concern of the new organization. The League had emphasized the legal approach to prevention of war by placing specific obligations on its members, while the United Nations stressed the political approach with the effectiveness of its measures depending, in the last analysis, upon the co-operation of the major military powers.<sup>22</sup> Only two Articles in the Charter, 11 and 26, deal with disarmament. Article 11 states that the General Assembly is to consider the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments. Recommendations were to go either to the members of the Assembly, the Security Council or to

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<sup>20</sup> Bennett, July 8, 1931. "If we are to have peace we must have it by cultivating and maintaining the spirit of peace, not the spirit of war. The warlike spirit is not consistent with the maintenance of peace, and the spirit of peace is an attitude of mind that comes from continuous education." Cited in Riddell, op. cit., p. 491.

<sup>21</sup> King, June 18, 1936. "The other view [on the course the League should follow] laid emphasis upon prevention, rather than punishment, urged the peaceful remedy of greivances rather than making war upon a country resorting to war, questioned the readiness of European countries to give as well as to receive aid." Ibid., p. 582.

<sup>22</sup> Goodrich, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

both.<sup>23</sup> The Security Council, under Article 26, is to formulate a plan for disarmament with the aid of the Military Staff Committee and to submit the plan to the General Assembly.<sup>24</sup>

The differences between the United Nations and the League on disarmament are obvious. The reasons for the differences are few. Whereas the Covenant was founded after a war and many felt the arms race had started that war, the Charter was formulated during a war that many felt could have been prevented if the major Western democracies had maintained adequate military strength. The Charter placed its emphasis for peace on collective security while the Covenant stressed disarmament.<sup>25</sup> The United States and the Soviet Union felt that they, France, China and the United Kingdom, should not disarm but serve to maintain peace against an aggressor until the United Nations had the military power to do so.<sup>26</sup>

However, circumstances in the real world shifted the United Nation's emphasis of concern back to

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<sup>23</sup> Goodrich, op. cit., pp. 211-212.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 211.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 118.

<sup>26</sup> Bechoefffer, op. cit., p. 23.

disarmament. The United Nations whose Charter was signed June 26, 1945, was pushed into disarmament by the atomic bomb which was exploded July 16, 1945 in New Mexico.

The Charter had envisaged disarmament and the regulation of armaments as elements in the progressive establishment of an international security system. However, the possibility that the new weapons of mass destruction might again be used gave disarmament greater immediacy and an enhanced place in the sphere of international politics and security.<sup>27</sup>

By 1950, Russia had taken over Eastern Europe and produced its first atomic bomb. Within three years both the United States and Soviet Union had hydrogen bombs and the United Kingdom had exploded its first atomic device. The tension which accompanied and followed this firm establishment of the Soviet military and political presence in Europe contributed to the emergence of a bi-polar image of world politics with two super powers locked in a cold war. A nuclear arms race began as each nation tried to outdo what they thought the other nation was planning; to second-guess the other. Because of this nuclear arms race, disarmament took on a new meaning and a new urgency, even as the problem of global security seemed to become less tractable.

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<sup>27</sup> United Nations, The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970. (New York: United Nations Publications, 1970), p. 1. Hereafter referred to as United Nations, Disarmament.

Canada's attitude to and involvement with a world organization and disarmament had altered after the Second World War. Canada's willingness and eagerness to enter into the new multinational system was expressed by Prime Minister King in the House of Commons debates in August, 1944. In his speech he declared

Canada would do its full part by contributing to agreed security schemes whether they involved the creation of an international police force or of measures for ensuring an overwhelming preponderance of power to protect the peace. <sup>28</sup>

In the aftermath of a second, even broader, World War, the "no- ~~commitment~~" policy was no longer a realistic one. Prime Minister King expressed this more receptive attitude toward collective security while addressing the Commonwealth Prime Minister's meeting in May, 1944. He spoke of Canada's view of regional and worldwide security organizations.

We should not forget, however, that a major lesson of this war is the truth that the seas do not divide and that the peace and prosperity of the world are indivisible. It would not be wise to encourage the people of the world to return to their illusions about their ability to live in continental isolation. I am glad to see, therefore, the views expressed in these

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<sup>28</sup> F. H. Soward, Canada in World Affairs, Vol. IV, From Normandy to Paris, 1944-46 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 126.

Foreign Office papers that the world organization should be established first, and that regional associations for special purposes might develop out of the particular necessities of particular areas, and should be fitted into the overall framework of world security. <sup>29</sup>

With regard to disarmament, Canada has been very active since the beginning of the nuclear age when its scientists worked with their British and American counterparts in the development of nuclear explosives. In the beginning Canada sought mainly to place nuclear energy under international controls and later, as the number of arms increased, to reduce arms and nuclear vehicles. The reason for Canada's concern is simple. After the atomic bomb had proved itself a war weapon, "No one claimed that Canada lived in a fireproof house remote from danger as had been argued 20 years earlier." <sup>30</sup>

Since its inception, the United Nations has sponsored a number of forums involved with disarmament and nuclear energy control. In the first assembly, beginning January 10, 1946, in recognition of Canada's role as a nuclear knowledgeable nation and supplier of uranium, the

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<sup>29</sup> Cited in James Fayers, In Defence of Canada, Vol. III, Peacekeeping and Deterrence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp. 141-142.

<sup>30</sup> Soward, op. cit., p. 145.

General Assembly made Canada, along with the five major powers, a permanent member of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The AEC was to find a means of controlling atomic energy and report on its talks to the Security Council. The General Assembly also fulfilled its obligations under Article 11 by submitting to the Security Council a resolution on the principles governing the regulation and reduction of arms. <sup>31</sup>

In 1950, after having become a nuclear nation in 1949, the Soviet Union walked out of the AEC and the United Nations Commission for Conventional Arms, set up by the Security Council in 1947. <sup>32</sup> Also in 1950, a Committee of Twelve, consisting of the Security Council Members and Canada, was created to report to the General Assembly on ways to co-ordinate and perhaps consolidate the AEC and Commission for Conventional Arms. This led to the amalgamation of the two into the Disarmament Commission, created in 1952, in which the members consisted of all the members of the Security Council and Canada, when it was not

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<sup>31</sup> Goodrich, op. cit., p. 119.

<sup>32</sup> Anthony Nutting, Disarmament: An Outline of The Negotiations (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 5-6.

in the Council. 33

A sub-committee of this Commission, consisting of the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, France and Canada, was formed April 19, 1954, following a personal request from President Eisenhower, to discuss means by which all the atomic powers would contribute to an atomic stockpile of fissionable material to be used for peaceful purposes. The Committee met May 13-June 22 in London but reached no agreement. The Soviets continued to demand an unconditional prohibition of the use of atomic weapons. 34

Canada, represented by Paul Martin, helped bring the two major powers closer. On October 13, Mr. Martin tabled a draft resolution stating the main points which should be covered in a disarmament convention and referred the question back to the Disarmament Commission, with the recommendation that the five nation sub-committee be renewed. Mr. Martin then asked the other four powers to co-sponsor the resolution. France, the United Kingdom

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33 B. S. Keirstead, Canada in World Affairs, Vol. VII, September 1951 to October 1953 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 70.

34 Donald C. Masters, Canada in World Affairs, Vol. VIII, 1953 to 1955 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 190-191.

and the United States agreed but Mr. Vishinsky of the Soviet Union made four suggested revisions. The Western powers accepted two of these and after further talks with Mr. Martin, Mr. Vishinsky agreed to co-sponsor the revised draft which was tabled November 4, 1954. This was the first time since 1946 that the Soviets had joined with the Western powers in sponsoring a disarmament resolution. <sup>35</sup>

The Disarmament Commission ran into difficulties in 1957 when the Soviet Union took the position that a test ban is self-policing, for all explosions could be detected, while the Americans and British denied that all explosions were detectable and that therefore control machinery was needed. <sup>36</sup> In the General Assembly that fall, the Soviet Union launched a plan to shift discussion of disarmament to the Assembly. It proposed a resolution expanding the Disarmament Commission to include all 82 states of the Assembly and called for an expansion of the sub-committee for, "How can one expect the Sub-committee to achieve positive results when four of its five members are countries of NATO and when whole continents like Asia and Africa are not represented?" <sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Masters, op. cit., p. 193.

<sup>36</sup> Nutting, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

<sup>37</sup> Bechhoefer, op. cit., p. 424.

In a compromise effort, Canada, India, Japan, Sweden, Paraguay and Yugoslavia proposed expansion of the Disarmament Commission to 25.<sup>38</sup> When the Soviet proposal was defeated; the Soviet Union announced it no longer would take part in any further discussions in the Disarmament Commission or sub-committee.<sup>39</sup>

Throughout 1958, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom attempted to negotiate a test ban agreement. In the end, the three powers held a convention of scientists to discuss the technical possibilities of controlling a ban. The convention stated that a ban could be effectively controlled under present technology and the Soviet Union even agreed to the need for control posts for technological control over her wide areas of empty land. The Americans and the British then agreed to cease testing for one year once negotiations began on international control to end all testing, if the Soviet Union agreed to do so, and agreed to extend the ban one year if the Soviet Union did so and if talks were progressing. The talks began in Geneva that year.<sup>40</sup> Canada was involved in the talks both in July between four

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<sup>38</sup> Bechhoefer, op. cit., p. 425.

<sup>39</sup> Nutting, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

<sup>40</sup> Loc. cit.

Eastern and four Western states on the suspension of nuclear tests and in November between five Eastern and five Western nations discussing the reduction of danger of surprise attack.<sup>41</sup> That same year the General Assembly passed a resolution to expand the Disarmament Commission to include all members of the United Nations, a proposal the Soviet Union had submitted a year earlier.<sup>42</sup>

In 1959, a suggestion came forth to the Disarmament Commission that a ten nation committee, on which there would be parity between East and West, should be created to carry on disarmament talks.<sup>43</sup> Canada was invited and agreed to be a member of the organization. Eventually, a new Ten Nation Disarmament Committee (Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union), was set up. In March, 1960 negotiations were convened in Geneva, each side presenting an outline on general and complete disarmament.

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<sup>41</sup> Trevor Lloyd, Canada in World Affairs, Vol. X, 1957-1959 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 135.

<sup>42</sup> Goodrich, op. cit., p. 121.

<sup>43</sup> Richard A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs, Vol. IX, 1959 to 1961 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 242.

Disarmament talks, however, fell victim to the vicissitudes of international tension. The talks recessed due to the Summit Conference set up for the summer between the United States and the Soviet Union. <sup>44</sup> That Conference, however, was postponed and virtually cancelled, due to the U-2 affair. <sup>45</sup> President Eisenhower refused to promise Khrushchev that no other surveillance of this type would be allowed and therefore Khrushchev refused to attend the May Summit talks. <sup>46</sup>

On June 27, 1960 the Polish Chairman at the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee refused to recognize any Western delegates on his list of speakers as each member of the Warsaw Pact followed the Soviet Union in claiming that the West was not willing to negotiate and the meeting came to a halt with all five Warsaw Pact nations walking out of the Conference. The West continued the meeting. <sup>47</sup>

Eventually, in 1961, a new effort was made to create

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<sup>44</sup> Preston, op. cit., pp. 258-259.

<sup>45</sup> Francis Gary Powers, an American pilot, was shot down over Soviet territory in a photo-reconnaissance aircraft in May. Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>46</sup> Lt.-Gen. E. L. M. Burns, A Seat at The Table, (Toronto/Vancouver: Clarke, Irwin and Company Limited, 1972), p. 67. Hereafter referred to as Burns, Seat.

<sup>47</sup> Preston, op. cit., p. 260.

a more productive negotiating body which in essence reflected Soviet proposals of 1957. Andrei Gromyko and Adlai Stevenson, on December 13, announced that eight non-aligned states from South America, Europe, Africa and Asia had been added to the Ten and that a balance also had been kept between those who leaned towards the United States and those who leaned towards the Soviet Union. On December 20, the resolution passed the Assembly and added Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic to the Ten Nation Committee.<sup>48</sup> The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee was born.

Also in February of 1961, Prime Minister Diefenbaker issued, with Cabinet approval, guidelines on Canada's view of disarmament. These guidelines are still in use today. Canada's aim in this field is to increase its security by moving towards a peaceful world with arms reduced to a minimum level. Its first aim is to reduce the danger of accidental war or war caused by miscalculation or a nuclear war developing from a minor incident. Until there is progress in disarmament and until disarmament is under international control, NATO is Canada's key to security. Any disagreement in NATO would weaken the alliance and thus Canada's security, so Canada

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<sup>48</sup> Burns, Seat, op. cit., p. 103.

participates in all NATO arms discussions and reports to it willingly. Reductions in manpower and conventional arms in the first stage should balance NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. The first stage should also prevent dissemination; risks of accidental war are to be decreased and nuclear weapons reduction should begin with the reduction of nuclear-weapons carrying aircraft.

Ballistic missiles should be reduced in three stages as these are the main deterrents and neither side will be willing to abolish them completely until the last stage when good faith has been proven. The United Nations must be modified to provide effective means of keeping peace in a disarmed world and finally, the second stage of disarmament should cease the production, developing and stockpiling of chemical and biological means of war. <sup>49</sup>

With these guidelines, Lt.-Gen. E. L. M. Burns, headed for Geneva to represent Canada at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference.

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<sup>49</sup> Burns, Seat, op. cit., pp. 94-95.

CHAPTER II  
THE CANADIAN DELEGATION'S THREE  
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

Before discussing in depth the behaviour and addresses of the Canadian delegation, it is necessary to present the constraints and determinants affecting its performance. Any delegation must work within, and is affected by, at least three operational environments or settings. Firstly, the delegation must perform within the procedural framework of the conference system itself; as well as partaking in its national government's policy process on the issues involved. Finally, there is the internal structure of the delegation itself that affects how well the delegation performs. In this chapter, then,

the structure of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) itself; the process of Canadian policy formation and the internal workings of the Canadian delegations must be closely examined.

#### Conference procedural environment

The ENDC emerged from an American-Soviet agreement of November 28 and was endorsed by United Nation's General Assembly Resolution 1722 (XVI) of December 20, 1961.<sup>1</sup> There was a general expectation that the new members, the new format and the new organization might end the political deadlock. It was hoped that a fresh start with new players would alter the rules to the old game of negotiations.

The ENDC might have become a debating forum as past disarmament conferences had; only the opponents may have changed from East versus West to East versus West versus neutrals or great powers versus lesser powers. The eight new nations might split their votes also to form an East against West match as in past conferences, but with new team members. However, the newer members seemed anxious to perform and eager to end the deadlock. What

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<sup>1</sup> L. N. Kurtakov, "United Nations and Disarmament," United Nations Monthly Chronicle VII (No. 5, 1970), 57-58.

exactly did they have to overcome? Complacency. The greater military powers had given up the verbal fight and were settling for the status quo. In 1963, Dean Rusk made an enlightening comment on past Soviet-American disarmament talks.

It's gotten to the point ... where, in our conversations, we've been able to refer to the arguments by the numbers. He would make an argument -- the [Soviet] Ambassador or Foreign Minister -- and I can say: 'Well, you know our position on that. This is Argument Number Five. Shall I repeat it, or shall we save time and go on?' And they'll smile and say: 'Well, we'll perhaps go on to some other subject.' <sup>2</sup>

Here was a task for the smaller powers. Would they press for decisions or allow numbered arguments to continue? Would they demand progress or sit quietly overwhelmed by the technological vocabulary and details? France felt the latter to be the case. To the French, neutrals possessed few weapons and therefore had no "stakes" in the negotiations. Disarmament was a matter for the great military nations only <sup>3</sup> and thus France declared it

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<sup>2</sup> Cited in James Eayrs, Diplomacy and Its Discontents (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 154.

<sup>3</sup> Moreover, France had begun nuclear testing hoping to become a full nuclear power. France would be opened to constant attacks by the Committee if it continued testing while an active member of the organization. Burns, Seat, op. cit., p. 97.

would not take part in the Conference, stating that "it hoped it might be possible later on for the disarmament problem to be discussed among powers that could contribute effectively to its solution."<sup>4</sup> At that time, France's leaving could have had more of an effect on the Committee than did the Committee's expansion for, if the worst came to the worst, the neutrals would prove to be as useless as France believed them to be and the old East against West deadlock would reemerge. Now that "deadlock", if it occurred, would have favoured the Warsaw nations as the NATO ally had left the battlefield.

In the end, the general atmosphere of energetic action prevailed. The eight non-aligned countries plus Canada, sometimes called the ninth non-aligned nation, chose to fight for progress. They continually pressed the United States and the Soviet Union for clarification and refused to allow the powers to dodge or evade the matter at hand. Their eagerness forged a new type of organization whose format and procedures were much different and more productive than past disarmament conferences.

The first meeting of the ENDC was held in Geneva on

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<sup>4</sup> United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations: 1962 (New York: United Nations, 1964), p. 5. Hereafter referred to as United Nations, 1962.

March 14, 1962, only three months after the Resolution was passed in the General Assembly. The first important task was to select the chairman - a key position to the success or failure of the Conference. If the chairman is a representative of the Nato group it may be difficult to get the Warsaw nations co-operation. The same is true if the chairman belongs to the Warsaw Pact and a neutral nation may be accused of being a "lackey" or "tool" of "imperialistic America" or "communistic Russia." Any of the above situations would allow the propaganda attacks; constant delays; walk-outs and threats exercised in former disarmament debates. Canada co-sponsored the idea of joint chairmanship between the Soviet Union and the United States - an idea which had worked successfully in the Laos Conference between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. This recommendation would also overcome the greatest obstacle in any disarmament negotiation - getting the principle powers to talk openly with each other. As co-chairmen they would have to meet, discuss and arrange agendas. Also, both parties would be jointly responsible for any successes or failures so that little unfavourable propaganda could be generated from either side. The idea was acceptable to all the states involved provided the chairmanship of the meetings, not the Conference, rotated

among the members. 5

The co-chairmanship principal also meant joint American and Soviet control of the agenda, thus preventing, or at least forestalling, an all too typical debate over which topic is to be discussed. In practice, the East and West assigned each other alternating equal time using the NATO favourite subject on alternate days with the Warsaw Pact favourite one. All participating nations, however, have always been free to discuss any topic. "Nothing contained herein is intended to preclude any delegation from raising and discussing any subject or proposal in any plenary session." 6

The ENDC also endorsed the idea of two types of sessions - an effort to prevent the filibustering of any nation on a minor item or one that was impossible to achieve. Therefore, there would be plenary sessions to discuss disarmament, and a Committee of the Whole to meet in a more informal setting, without prepared speeches or the taking of minutes, to discuss collateral measures. Collateral measures are those items that aid disarmament, such as non-proliferation, use of the seabed, propaganda and outer

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5 Burns, Seat, op. cit., p. 112.

6 ENDC/1/ADD 3 of July 24, 1962, p. 1.

space.<sup>7</sup>

Membership soon became an issue. Other nations were demanding a voice in disarmament discussions and pressing for expansion of the ENDC. The result was that in 1969 the talks were enlarged in such a manner as "to ensure that geographic and political balance were maintained and ... to preserve the Committee as an effective negotiating body."<sup>8</sup> On July 3, 1969, Japan and Mongolia were added and on August 7, Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, The Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia became members. On August 26, it was decided to call the expanded organization the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD).<sup>9</sup> The eight nations were chosen by the United States and the Soviet Union to reflect the "development of the international community" since 1962; to maintain the balance between the two main military alliances; to recognize

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<sup>7</sup> Arthur H. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament: The Path of Negotiations (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966), p. 36. The rules of procedure for the Conference are not written anywhere and voting never takes place, since a consensus is all that is required for passing on an agreement to the United Nations. Speakers are called on in the order they had approached the chairman for this privilege and there is no limit to the length of speeches. Statement by Lt.-Gen. E. I. M. Burns, personal interview, May 16, 1973. Hereafter referred to as Burns, interview.

<sup>8</sup> United Nations, Disarmament, op. cit., p. 122.

<sup>9</sup> CCD/274 of October 31, 1969.

the non-aligned and to implement the principle of geographic representation.<sup>10</sup> The increased membership in 1969, however, has not ended discussion on further expansion with most nations agreeing with Canada that China, France and other military powers should be invited.

The result of the above decisions is that the ENDC and CCD represent a different and a new type of disarmament negotiation. The co-chairmanship concept; two officially different types of sessions and the presence of non-aligned - and unexperienced - states, provided a new stage and setting in which the national delegations could perform. The opening sessions were full of speculation on the roles and successes of each state, each new idea and the internal workings of the Committee.

One of the questions to be answered was the role that Canada would fulfill in the new set up. Based on its past performances Canada would bring to the Committee its experience as a compromiser and its eager desire for disarmament, but how would this role be expressed within the new organization? Or would Canada adopt a new role leaving

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<sup>10</sup> United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations: 1969 (New York: United Nations, 1971), p. 15. Hereafter referred to as United Nations, 1969.

the non-aligned to be mediators?

The Canadian delegation arrived in Geneva with three sources of guidelines - the past performances of Canada, general instructions from the Canadian government, and a knowledge of Canada's general policies on the overall question of disarmament. The latter is most important for once in the Conference the delegation must be able to elaborate, explain and extend the general instructions to cover the particular demands and dynamics of the Conference situation without committing Canada to any positions contrary to its overall policy. Among Canada's general policies, there are two that directly affect the disarmament field and thus the delegations work at the ENDC. These are: Peace through security by settlements, not war, and using the United Nations as a major international organization for solving international conflicts. Both of these interests influenced Canada's guidelines concerning disarmament as issued in 1961. <sup>11</sup>

From these guidelines and its own specific instructions for the first ENDC meeting, the Canadian delegation made it clear to the other members that it would continue its role as a compromiser and mediator.

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<sup>11</sup> See above, pp. 29-30.

On March 19, 1962, Mr. Green explained that the Committee should first seek points of near agreement as outlined in the American and Russian proposals and joint statements to date; settle these, then move on to clarify and resolve the remaining differences. "In this way, my delegation believes we can systematically move toward a comprehensive system of disarmament and complete the fulfillment of the tasks which have been given us." <sup>12</sup>

Into this conference procedural environment - co-chairmanship; two distinct session types; varying agenda and unexperienced neutral nations - came the Canadian delegation, anxious to work for results in its time honoured style as mediator.

#### Delegation's domestic controlled environment

One of the most important and most variable environments is the amount of control a national government exercises over a delegation, particularly with regards to freedom of action and policy formation. Of course a delegation may be many things - a creator, executor or mouthpiece of policy. <sup>13</sup> Over any particular issue a

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<sup>12</sup> Cited in Burns, Seat, op. cit., p. 117.

<sup>13</sup> Escott Reid, "The Conscience of the Diplomat: A Personal Testament," Queen's Quarterly, LXXXIV (Winter, 1967), 579.

delegation may be more of a creator than an executor or more of a mouthpiece than a creator, but all are involved at any one time.

Formally, in connection with disarmament policy, the Disarmament Division of the External Affairs Department serves as the middle man since policies created in Cabinet pass to the External Affairs Department and through the Division to the delegates. Delegates report to the Under-Secretary of the Department through the Division.<sup>14</sup> From the Disarmament Division reports can go up to the Under-Secretary, Minister or Cabinet; out to other divisions or out to other departments depending on how important, and what, the topic is.

The making of disarmament policy is, under the authority of Parliament and Cabinet, the joint responsibility of the Ministers of External Affairs and National Defence. There is also an Under-Secretary of External Affairs and under him, the Director General of the Bureau of Defence and Arms Control Affairs, who is just above the Disarmament Division. There is a similar structure in the National

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<sup>14</sup> Statement by Mr. Louis de Salaberry, then Director of the External Affairs Department Arms Control and Disarmament Division, personal interview, May 15, 1973. Hereafter referred to as de Salaberry.


Defence Department and these two Departments, along with the Defence Research Board, have created an inter-departmental committee on arms control under the Director General. Other working panels, composed of the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence and other interested parties, also exist to aid policy formation. The working panels are; Strategic Arms and Missiles; Comprehensive Test Ban; Seabed and Ocean Floor; Chemical and Biological Warfare and Mutual Balanced Force Reductions. Each is chaired by the Director of the Disarmament Division of the External Affairs Department. An example of other Departments' involvement is given by the Comprehensive Test Ban working panel. The group has representatives from six divisions of the External Affairs Department; three divisions of the National Defence Department; the Justice Department; the Energy, Mines and Resources Department; the Ministry of Science and Technology; the National Research Council and the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. <sup>15</sup>

The above bureaucratic apparatus may function properly and adequately in issuing general instructions to a delegation, but how does the "reality" of the day to day

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<sup>15</sup> Handout from de Salaberry.

## DISARMAMENT POLICY FORMATION



situations at a conference filter into the system? This is the point that strongly determines the usefulness of a delegation to any conference. Delegates are usually sent out "with detailed instructions representing the views of the competent ... [national] agencies and bearing the approval of the Government." <sup>16</sup> The types of instructions given are important, for the chances of influencing the great powers depends upon the soundness of the commentaries put forward, and the chances increase if a policy is found that is favourable to other powers as well. <sup>17</sup> Instructions may be so detailed that the delegation is only a robot mouthing the domestic position of its home government or there may be a general position outlined with given limits in which a delegation can execute policy or the delegation may be simply told to align itself with a particular nation or group. <sup>18</sup>

The influence of the delegation on national policies comes from many sources but the key factor which should bear a strong influence on the policy formation apparatus - the

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<sup>16</sup> Archibald Day (trans.), The Canadian Diplomat, by Marcel Cadieux (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1963), p. 68.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>18</sup> John Kaufmann, Conference Diplomacy (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1968), pp. 153-155.

delegation's reports. These reports are drawn up by one or more members and are usually seen by the head delegate, though he may delegate this authority, or part of it, to another delegate. The reports contain information concerning all meetings attended by the delegation as well as the suggested or planned steps the delegates recommend.<sup>19</sup> If the persons involved in policy formation realize that the delegation is the expert on what can and cannot be done or said, the delegation's suggested plans should weigh heavily on future policy formation and could become Department policy. However, if a delegation is not listened to in Ottawa or is considered not to be fully aware of Department plans, the "intellectuals" at home may ignore the reports and issue orders contrary to what the delegation feels is correct. At this point, it's a question of the Department officials ignoring a perceived reality and the delegation - forced to be executor and not creator - may balk. In all events, the delegates reports are crucial to policy formation and future endeavours to achieve that policy.

There is a point, however, when every delegation, even those with authority to make decisions, must again

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<sup>19</sup> Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 128.

seek approval of its national government. This need arises when votes are to be taken on a final draft.

In fact, these attempts at persuasion are a kind of game, as the persuader knows full well that he does not have to persuade the delegates in front of him, but their government at home. The delegates present at the meeting may be personally convinced of the soundness of the views brought forward, but this will only partly determine their course of action, which depends ... on the instructions they receive from their government. <sup>20</sup>

The question of delegation freedom and influence, then, is strongly attached to the control its domestic government exercises both in regards to instruction's issued and the attention given to the delegates reports. This will prove to be a very crucial factor in deciding Canada's role at the ENDC.

#### Delegation's internal environment

Along with the framework of the conference and the amount of freedom, a third factor of great importance is how well the delegation members themselves get along with each other and the skills each has to offer towards the success of the conference.

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<sup>20</sup> Peter Baehr, The Role of a National Delegation in the General Assembly (New York: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1970), pp. 46-47.

The efficiency of a delegation is enhanced by a good relationship between the head of the delegation and its members, including a sensible distribution and allocation of work. Within a conference or committee, the delegates' personal skills, tact, comprehension and amiability may become critical for the acceptance of his views or successful accomplishment of his tasks. The tasks are generally assigned at the beginning of the conference by the head of the delegation. He alone makes all final decisions but the delegation must be able to work as a team and be able to help him decide the final answers. The delegation must hold meetings, but the number varies. At the meetings, the members exchange information of previous events and discuss tactical behaviour concerning coming talks, including what their consensus should be. These meetings aim for agreement as a whole but in any conflict, the head delegate has the final say. The delegation reports and proposals which are concrete results of these meetings may be the start of new government policies, attitudes or initiatives.<sup>21</sup> Instructions are also given to the delegation before each conference session. They are generally open instructions "seeking to deal with the major issues likely to arise at

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<sup>21</sup> Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 127-128.

the conference." 22

As to how the Canadian delegation itself was organized and how it acted in terms of its national aims at the ENDC-CCD, it may be best to study the delegation under the different leadership provided by Lt.-Gen. Edison Burns, Mr. George Ignatieff and Mr. William Barton.

The Canadian delegations to the ENDC and CCD were of the most common type - the Minister of External Affairs as Head or ex officio Head of the Delegation with members from other affiliations. Usually only the Head Delegate spoke or a specialist in the field under discussion or the visiting External Affairs Minister. 23

All three men received instructions two or three times a year and all reports, though they may have been written by junior officers, were seen and signed by the Head Delegate. As for the tasks of the delegates, there was no particular division of work. When a job needed doing, it was simply assigned to someone whose background seemed appropriate. All three men had small delegations

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22 Based on personal correspondence of May 14, 1973 between the Right Honourable John Diefenbaker, and the writer. Hereafter referred to as Diefenbaker.

23 Burns, interview.

and were able to "function as a team sharing the jobs to be done as appropriate to the situation." <sup>24</sup> The groups were as informal as they were small. The size of the delegation also prevented overlapping of tasks for all could easily see the Head Delegate in his three room office. This made it possible to avoid confusion and facilitated the asking of questions. There were meetings but on an irregular basis. There was never any disagreement between delegation members and very little between delegates and the home government. <sup>25</sup>

The contrasts between the delegations arise over the status of the officer and the controls exercised over the delegation by Ottawa. The delegates were appointed and removed by the Department of External Affairs under their usual practice of posting a man for three or four years. Lt.-Gen. Burns approved of each delegate, some of whom he had known previously. He never lacked instructions for as Adviser to the Government on Disarmament, Lt.-Gen. Burns really created his own instructions. <sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Based on personal correspondence of October 25, 1973 between Mr. William H. Barton, and the writer. Hereafter referred to as Barton.

<sup>25</sup> Barton; Burns, interview and statements by Mr. George Ignatieff, personal interview, May 24, 1973. Hereafter referred to as Ignatieff.

<sup>26</sup> Burns, interview.

Mr. Ignatieff, however, as well as Mr. Barton, did not have the right to approve of his fellow delegates. They both had to go through their respective Under-Secretary for requests for neither were appointed as Adviser to the Government. Although both had to consult and receive instructions more often than Lt.-Gen. Burns, the delegations were never in a position where they lacked instructions. "The issues which come up unexpectedly are nearly always tactical or presentational rather than significant to the basic questions under negotiation - substantive issues should always be foreseen in advance."<sup>27</sup>

There does seem to have been conflict between the government and Mr. Ignatieff, however. During his interview, Mr. Ignatieff, visibly upset over not having the privileges and title that had been accorded to Lt.-Gen. Burns, explained how the government downgraded disarmament and his role in it. In 1971, Mr. Ignatieff was also appointed as the Canadian Permanent Head of the United Nations Mission in Geneva. In this role, he had to take care of other responsibilities, such as trade, the Red Cross and the International Labour Organization. Mr. Ignatieff personally saw this as a downgrading of

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<sup>27</sup> Barton; Ignatieff.

disarmament, for the dual responsibilities kept him too busy to do all he wished in the field of the disarmament. With regard to this downgrading, Mr. Ignatieff felt it reflected a lack of interest of the External Affairs Department, as well as of the Canadian citizenry, and also showed that the Canadian government felt that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were of greater importance. 28

Mr. Ignatieff's successor, Mr. Barton, also holds the dual positions and responsibilities Mr. Ignatieff once had, but is a quiet man who does not complain of the decreasing emphasis placed on disarmament. Unlike the former delegate leaders, however, Mr. Barton has little background experience in disarmament negotiations and seems to be much more dependent on instructions from the home capital than Mr. Ignatieff.

It therefore seems necessary, at this point, to examine more closely the changes that occurred in Ottawa to key personnel and government interest in and control of the ENDC-CCD delegations and to suggest why these changes have occurred and their impact in the ENDC-CCD.

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28 Ignatieff.

Downgrading Disarmament.

In the 1962 Diefenbaker Cabinet, Howard Green was External Affairs Minister. Mr. Green earned himself the nickname of "Mr. Disarmament" for his strong and zealous attitudes and actions in that area. He "put some of the best minds in his department to work on the problem, directed all of his subordinates to give it top priority, and missed no opportunity to prod other government's into taking it seriously." 29 Lt.-Gen. Burns, also strongly opposed to armament build-ups, could work easily under this Minister. Moreover, the Under-Secretary allowed Lt.-Gen. Burns to go directly to the Cabinet or to Mr. Green without reporting to him.

When the Conservative government was defeated, the Liberals replaced Mr. Green with Paul Martin. Both Mr. Martin and the Liberal government desired disarmament but there was a slight shift of emphasis on the issue. Lt.-Gen. Burns stated that

On May 1, I saw the new Prime Minister [Pearson] in London. He told me that there would be no change in disarmament policy under the Liberal government. He said they believed in the necessity for disarmament as much as the previous government, but were

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29 Peyton Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, Vol XII, 1961-1963 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 223-224.

not so optimistic about it as Howard  
[Green.]<sup>30</sup>

The Defence White Paper of 1964 also reflected the change of emphasis between the Liberal and Conservative governments over disarmament. Whereas Mr. Green and Mr. Diefenbaker placed disarmament as their first priority, "The dominant theme of this document was its emphasis on peacekeeping. ... The speeches of Paul Martin confirmed that peacekeeping was now the government's first defence priority."<sup>31</sup> Disarmament was no longer the chief aim of the Canadian External Affairs policy.

When Lt.-Gen. Burns was replaced, Mr. Ignatieff, who had expertise in the disarmament field, was not given the same freedom or title as Lt.-Gen. Burns because the Liberal party had again shifted its priorities, and the position of disarmament was again lowered. In 1970, Prime Minister Trudeau's policies were presented in "Foreign Policy for Canadians" and much controversy arose over the priorities he established. One focus of the debate "was the government's decision to relegate peace and security - the supreme foreign policy goal of all Canadian post-war

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<sup>30</sup> Burns, Seat, op. cit., pp. 171-172. Underlining is mine.

<sup>31</sup> Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 17-18.

governments - to the second tier of Canada's new policy priorities." <sup>32</sup> Disarmament, therefore, as a component of peace and security, was also "demoted" to a lower status in general policy.

Moreover, disarmament was also further affected by Canada's new military defence policy. Sovereignty remained on the top of Canada's military priorities but, in the Defence White Paper of 1971, "What was described as 'defence of Canada's sovereignty' turned out to involve merely defence of Canada's territorial jurisdiction and aid to the civil authority." <sup>33</sup> Also, the External Affairs Department was undergoing reconstruction and Mr. Ignatieff's Under-Secretary, Mr. Marcel Cadieux, refused to allow Mr. Ignatieff access to the new and more experienced External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp or to the Cabinet. Rather he insisted that Mr. Ignatieff first report to him.

It would seem then that whereas Lt.-Gen. Burns was allowed to be a creator of policy because of his extensive background in the area, Mr. Ignatieff was forced to be more of an executor despite his own wide disarmament background. Such a situation would frustrate any creative person.

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<sup>32</sup> Thordarson, op. cit., p. 195.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 205.

Mr. Barton, who also worked under Mr. Sharp and now Mr. MacEachern, must also work through his Under-Secretary and follow the instructions issued from Ottawa. There is no open conflict with the Trudeau government and it appears that Mr. Barton is happy to follow orders and not be as much of a creator or executor as Lt.-Gen. Burns and Mr. Ignatieff were. This may be due to the fact that Mr. Barton has less background in the area of disarmament than his predecessors. His environment differs from Ignatieff's in that other international committees are receiving the interest and attention from governments and the media that the ENDC and CCD once occupied. Mr. W. F. S. Beattie, who replaced Mr. Louis de Salaberry as present head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs, states that

Where in earlier years the CCD and its predecessor bodies provided the central forum for east/west negotiations on arms control and disarmament questions, the focus of attention is now on the fora of SALT, MBFR [Mutual Balanced Force Reductions] and the CSCE [Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe]. It is perhaps true therefore to say that relatively speaking, Canada gives less attention to the CCD than heretofore, but this arises simply from the fact that is a direct participant in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna and discussions of the military aspects of the CSCE in Geneva and as a member of NATO and NORAD has a direct interest in the outcome of the SALT negotiations which it follows in the North Atlantic Council. To the extent that there has been a shift in the nature of international arms control negotiations, the

Canadian governments interest and priorities have had to take this into account.<sup>34</sup>

It must be stressed that, although successive governments, especially the present government, have shifted their emphasis on disarmament, all were concerned with, interested in, and pressing for disarmament. These shifts, however, affect the men who must represent Canada at the ENDC and CCD, and so Mr. Ignatieff had to work in an environment very different than that of Lt.-Gen. Burns, and, in turn, Mr. Barton.

All of the environments discussed here - the Conference framework, the home government's control and the delegation's internal functions, all affected Canada's actions. There remains a fourth environment.- the playing field of the game - the issues discussed, which must now be described.

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<sup>34</sup> Based on personal correspondence of November 26, 1974 between Mr. W. F. S. Beattie, and the writer. Hereafter referred to as Beattie.

CHAPTER III  
THE ISSUE ENVIRONMENT:  
DEBATING FIELD

Beginnings and set-backs

No conference delegation is ever a mere international messenger service, because conferences are never merely information exchanges. Disarmament conferences, especially those which meet for prolonged periods, involving as they do the most sensitive and vulnerable issues of national security, are notorious for their politically variable atmosphere. Issues of the day, great and small, persistently pervade the deliberations. Each delegation operates within a constantly shifting set of pressures and priorities. Changes of mood and emphasis can be critical.

Appreciation of and adaptation to these bargaining dynamics becomes the requisite of skillful diplomacy. While examining the work of the ENDC-CCD this chapter will attempt to outline the major features and forces of the Canadian delegations "working" environment and analyse the skills used by the delegations to achieve their perceived goals.

When the ENDC began its work, it did not begin in a vacuum but was attempting to build on a history of uncertain successes. These 1962 meetings began more auspiciously than most, for they were building on what appeared to be an emerging superpower consensus, or at least a mutual interest in disarmament negotiations.

A procedural breakthrough occurred in 1961. After having discussed other topics such as Laos and the Berlin Wall, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament talks. Whether this document issued from negotiating fatigue, desire for agreement or desire to shift the focus of disagreement is not clear. Both states may also have been responding to pressure from allies, other countries or public opinion. Still, the statement could be used as a promising framework for further talks, as it urged general and complete disarmament, as well as ending war as a means of settling disputes. It emphasized

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Michael Wright, Disarm and Verify (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964), p. 171.

that states would have at their disposal "only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities, and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens." <sup>2</sup> After listing various measures of disarmament, the joint statement went on to explain that disarmament would be achieved by agreed stages, within specified time limits and that each step should be balanced to prevent any nation or group of nations gaining military advantage. The two powers also agreed on the necessity for "effective" internal control and means for strengthening settlements of international disputes. <sup>3</sup> Accordingly, this statement served as a guideline, when the ENDC met in Geneva in March, 1962.

The path of the Conference was not to be smooth, however. As usual, the agenda provided the first disputes. A number of items were suggested for consideration by the Committee of the Whole, many of them highly contentious. Eventually it was resolved to discuss war propaganda. Yet, even on this topic agreement proved impossible. Despite acceptance of a fairly simple declaration against war propaganda in the Committee on May 25, the Soviet Union

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<sup>2</sup> Wright, op. cit., p. 171.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., pp. 172-173.

resinded their approval in the plenary session of May 29. Mr. Zorin explained that in the light of present international activities, some of which seemed to threaten Russia, the declaration needed strengthening. <sup>4</sup>

This first setback did much to change the character and prospects of the meetings. The Committee of the Whole ceased to meet as of May 29 <sup>5</sup> and collateral measures were no longer separated from the major issues. It then became possible to "waste" time on less important topics.

#### First agreements

Some optimism was restored in July, 1962 when Mr. Zorin spoke in favour of reducing the risks of accidental war by establishing a rapid communications system between itself, the United States and the United Nations. <sup>6</sup> However no actual agreement was reached on this topic in the ENDC.

Events of 1962, however, gave disarmament related

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<sup>4</sup> The activities cited were the occupation of Thailand by American and SEATO forces; statements by President Kennedy that the United States might initiate attack on Russia, as well as numerous American books and articles that urged using nuclear weapons to solve international problems. Burns, Seat, op. cit., p. 141.

<sup>5</sup> ENDC/C1 Series.

<sup>6</sup> Burns, Seat, op. cit., p. 145.

issues a new dramatic relevance. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October illustrated, as no amount of negotiations could, the dangers and risks of nuclear diplomacy. Pushed almost to the brink of war, both of the mightiest nuclear countries showed evidence of a new willingness to settle some outstanding problems. As a result, two major agreements were concluded in 1963 - a communications link and a partial test ban. On July 20, the parties signed a memorandum, stating their willingness to proceed with the establishment of a direct telephone and teletype communication link between Moscow and Washington to reduce the risks of accidental or cataclysmic war.<sup>7</sup> Although signed outside the ENDC machinery, this agreement was based on discussions in the ENDC and is considered to be the first agreement from the Committee.

The ENDC had also been discussing the possible scope and character of a test ban for some time. A key block to agreement was inspection and verification methods especially for underground testing. The Soviet Union had regularly resisted inspection procedures which could imply infringements on sovereignty and had taken the position that national seismological equipment was

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<sup>7</sup> Burns, Seat, op. cit., pp. 175-176.

sophisticated enough to detect underground explosions.<sup>8</sup> A number of suggestions had been made. The United States and the United Kingdom first proposing a three year moratorium on underground tests below a 4.75 seismic threshold; a ban on all other testing and annual inspections of between twelve and twenty on-site inspections.<sup>9</sup> The Soviet Union would agree to a ban in air, water and in space but wanted a no-control moratorium for underground testing until a system of control was established over general and complete disarmament.<sup>10</sup> At length, on April 16, 1962, the eight non-aligned suggested that present and

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<sup>8</sup> Earthquakes and underground test explosions create waves both on the surface and through the soil. Seismic stations read these two waves and detect the quake. But signals pass through the earth on different routes, so that for the same event, signals vary by a large factor as they are received in different parts of the world. This makes an unsupervised moratorium for explosions below a certain level unrealistic for the explosion can be read above the level or below the level at different stations. Detection can be made easily but to identify the event as natural or man-made, larger seismic signals are needed. It is estimated that with the present [1966] identification technology and a world system of ten or twelve large aperture seismic arrays about 80% of natural earthquakes can be identified. That leaves 20% of quakes as either natural earthquakes or man-made explosions. Dean, op. cit., pp. 140-143.

<sup>9</sup> United Nations, Disarmament, op. cit., p. 216.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 221.

future seismographic facilities be used by non-aligned scientists, who would analyse the data to identify quakes and be "invited" to visit sites where the type of event was ambiguous. <sup>11</sup>

The strong interest in a test ban which these non-aligned nations had voiced was more successfully presented within the United Nations General Assembly, where, in 1962, the members were faced with two proposals concerning nuclear testing. Brazil and thirty-seven other states, including the ENDC non-aligned members, condemned all nuclear testing and called for January 1, 1963 as the cut-off date. The second proposal was from the United States and the United Kingdom advocating that the ENDC should agree to one of their August 27 drafts. These drafts were proposed in an effort to get agreement. The first was a Comprehensive Test Ban with on-site inspection, while the second banned tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and outer space. January 1, 1963 was also to be the cut-off date for tests. In this situation support for a total ban amounted to open disagreement with the United Kingdom and the United States. The Canadian delegation compromised between its commitment to the goal of a total ban and its concern for the good will of its NATO partners.

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<sup>11</sup> Burns, Seat, op. cit., p. 151.

by the procedural device of offering amendments to the Brazilian draft. The effect of these amendments was a proposal calling on the nuclear powers to reach agreement on ending all testing January 1, and if that agreement could not be reached by that day on underground testing, then they were to cease testing in the other three environments. The revised Brazilian resolution was passed by the General Assembly on November 3.<sup>12</sup>

In the aftermath of the Missile Crisis it was clear that proposals for a test ban would be more warmly received, even in the ENDC. By December, 1962 agreement was reached on a type of impersonal control. "Black boxes" or unmanned seismic stations were to be established in and near the borders of nuclear powers.<sup>13</sup> The parties agreed to the use of nationally manned and controlled seismic stations, the installation of automatic seismic stations in nuclear countries and surrounding areas and to a quota of on-site inspections. The numbers of these boxes remained obstacles to agreement.<sup>14</sup> At length the Conferences recessed with relief, in June and left the detailed negotiations to the

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<sup>12</sup> Burns, Seat, op. cit., pp. 154-155.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations, 1962, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>14</sup> United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations: 1963 (New York: United Nations, 1965), p. 124. Hereafter referred to as United Nations, 1963.

United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union who met in Moscow. A Partial Test Ban was signed July 25, in which these powers promised to seek means to "put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances."<sup>15</sup> The treaty banned all testing in the atmosphere, sea and outer space but left underground testing untouched.<sup>16</sup> Efforts are still being made to form a Comprehensive Test Ban.

Yet, although not a complete ban, this 1963 agreement is important for it sets limits to testing and thus reduces the amount of radioactive fallout and damage from that source. With testing banned in three of four environments, the rate of nuclear development is also slowed. But above all, the agreement showed that compromise is possible, even in this delicate issue, if the nuclear adversaries recognize a mutual interest. The extreme

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<sup>15</sup> Burns, Seat, op. cit., p. 189.

<sup>16</sup> One other problem in banning or setting an arbitrary threshold level to underground testing is decoupling. Decoupling means reducing the seismic signal by having the explosion set off in an underground cavity. In theory, 70,000 cubic meters per kiloton of yield reduces the signal by a factor of 120 and can be reduced even more if the cavity is in a hard surface, such as salt. In theory, an explosion of 2 or 3 kilotons can be set off undetected. Donald G. Brennan and Morton H. Halperin, "Policy Considerations of a Nuclear-Test Ban," Brennan (ed.), op. cit., p. 247.

situation which compelled recognition of this common interest in disarmament measures testifies to the magnitude of the obstacles to be overcome. Nonetheless this agreement appeared to break a log jam of accumulated substantive disputes and procedural distrust and opened the way for significant further advances.

For instance, consider the fate of the Outer Space Treaty to reduce the rate of nuclear development and reduce the risk of aerial attack. When Howard Green addressed the ENDC March 27, 1962, he introduced a draft to ban the orbiting or stationing in outer space of devices of mass destruction or their delivery. Mr. Green pointed out that the draft was only a suggestion to be discussed in the Committee of the Whole and that both the United States and the Soviet Union had mentioned it as an area of possible agreement.<sup>17</sup> Both nuclear powers, however, rejected the draft - mainly because it lacked verification measures.

In 1963, however, after the landmark of the test ban, a greater receptiveness on this issue appeared. In September, Mr. Gromyko of the Soviet Union, at the United Nations, stated his nation's willingness to ban the placing in orbit of objects with nuclear weapons on board. Mexico,

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<sup>17</sup> Burns, Seat, op. cit., pp. 123-124.

after consultation with the United States and the Soviet Union, submitted a draft to the ENDC which forbade the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction and the stationing of such weapons in celestial bodies or in any other manner. <sup>18</sup>

This draft then went to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and returned to the ENDC in a final draft form in 1966. After ENDC approval the treaty passed the United Nations General Assembly that same year. It entered into force October 10, 1967. <sup>19</sup>

Along with the above signed compromise treaties, three nuclear powers - the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union - also concluded a verbal agreement on still another topic. On April 20, 1963 the Soviet Union and United States announced plans to reduce fissionable <sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Burns, Seat, op. cit., p. 191.

<sup>19</sup> United Nations, Disarmament, op. cit., pp. 177-178.

<sup>20</sup> "Disarmament: Report on the Negotiations in Geneva," External Affairs, XVI (May, 1964), 207, footnote 1. Fission is the process by which atoms split into two or more smaller atoms releasing energy and this is the basis of nuclear explosions. The materials used are plutonium (Pu-239) and uranium (U-235). The critical mass, about eleven pounds, is the minimum amount of material needed for a reaction. If all the material is used before exploding, the energy released is equal to nine kilotons of TNT per pound of material used, but the bomb usually explodes before all the material is used. The Nagasaki bomb, for example, had twenty pounds of fissionable material. In theory, the energy level was 180 kilotons but only eighteen kilotons was released. Brennan, op. cit., pp. 247-248.

material production for military purposes. The next day the Russians explained that they were stopping the construction of two new large atomic reactors for production of plutonium-235, as well as transferring more fissionable material into peaceful uses. The Americans announced further reductions in a program it had already begun, in reducing the production of enriched uranium over a four year period. The overall reduction would be 20% of plutonium and 40% of enriched uranium levels.<sup>21</sup> The United Kingdom also announced plans to cease construction of reactors to produce plutonium. These were unilateral moves stemming from discussions in the ENDC. There was no agreement on inspection<sup>22</sup> but these moves meant fewer testing explosions and thus less proliferation and production of nuclear weapons.

### Non-proliferation

The missile crisis, with its frightening confrontation, had apparently been the catalyst for the willingness of the major powers to discuss - and sign - important disarmament agreements. But would these symbolically important events really pave the way for further progress? Was there hope

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<sup>21</sup> "Report of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee," United Nations Monthly Chronicle, I (No. 5, 1964), 42.

<sup>22</sup> United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations: 1964 (New York: United Nations, 1966), p. 65.

that the emerging sense of common interest which appeared to have thawed the major powers' relationship would have a lasting and facilitating effect on the work of the ENDC?

From 1965 to 1968, the ENDC was preoccupied with proposals to combat nuclear proliferation. This promised to be an area where all the nuclear powers could perceive a shared interest and common benefits in an agreement. These talks would eventually lead to the most important document of the ENDC - the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970- which attempts to prevent the creation of further nuclear powers whether by a nation or group. It is the first treaty to seriously affect other than nuclear powers.

The problem of nuclear weapons spreading to other nations was always of concern to the United States and the Soviet Union, but it became entangled with the issue of West German rearmament and of NATO demands for nuclear sharing. Successive American schemes for nuclear sharing within NATO always fell short of encouraging or allowing independent nuclear force development. The most important and nearly successful of these, referred to as a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), <sup>23</sup> was attacked by the Soviet Union as

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<sup>23</sup> Burns, Seat, op. cit., p. 174.

"masked proliferation."

The Soviet Union was especially determined that no German rearmament program included independent or shared control of nuclear weapons, whether through NATO or in direct arrangements with the United States. The Rapacki Plan for a nuclear-free Central Europe<sup>24</sup> appears to have been, in part, a response to this concern.

The attitudes of the "threshold" nuclear powers - those with the capability to develop independent programs, such as Israel, India, China and France - were not enthusiastic about an international agreement which would deny them access to the "nuclear club." Also, a number of nations were concerned about how controls would affect the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These differences of position and policy were apparent in the differing reactions to the Partial Test Ban. France and China

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<sup>24</sup> The Soviet Union also suggested a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific, based on reciprocal guarantees that China and Japan would stay non-nuclear. A Europe-Asia trade may have been envisioned. United Nations, Disarmament, op. cit., p. 257.

refused to sign and continued their plans for nuclear development.<sup>25</sup> By the time of China's successful test in September, 1964, there were now five nuclear powers and a long list of potential nuclear powers. Proliferation was already well underway.

Despite the demonstrably greater willingness of the Soviet Union and United States to discuss nuclear proliferation, it took over two years to get a common draft agreement, and another year to work out an acceptable detailed treaty.

On August 17, 1965, the United States presented its first draft to the ENDC but the treaty did not preclude the transfer of nuclear weapons into the control of a group of states as long as the transfer does not increase the total number of states and organizations with independent capability. Thus an MLF force or a United Kingdom-France - United States force were possible.<sup>26</sup>

A month later, the Soviet Union submitted a draft to the United Nations General Assembly which forbade any sharing arrangements and also forbade nuclear powers to aid

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<sup>25</sup> United Nations, Disarmament, op. cit., p. 232.

<sup>26</sup> Michael E. Sherman, Nuclear Proliferation: The Treaty and After (Lindsay, Ont.: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), p. 42.

or transmit "any kind of manufacturing, research or other information or documentation which can be employed for purposes of the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons." 27 This clearly means that the Americans would not be able to give NATO information on the use of nuclear weapons nor to distribute technical information on atomic energy for peaceful uses. 28

Discussion continued throughout 1965 and 1966 in the ENDC with the non-aligned and Italy submitting drafts calling for security guarantees in a non-proliferation agreement; a balance between nuclear and non-nuclear state obligations and plans for non-nuclear nations to renounce nuclear wars for a period of time if nuclear powers gave them security guarantees and made moves to lower their nuclear forces. 29

Eventually, the Russians and Americans modified their stands and the Soviet Union agreed to permit the continuation of NATO planning and participation based on the status quo, which would preclude the creation of an

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27 Sherman, op. cit., p. 43.

28 C. F. Barnaby (ed.). Preventing The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (London: Souvenir Press, 1969), p. 53.

29 ENDC/158 of September 15, 1965; ENDC/178 of August 19, 1966 and ENDC/157 of September 14, 1965.

MLF. <sup>30</sup> On August 24, 1967, only two months after the Chinese exploded their first hydrogen bomb, the Soviet Union and the United States submitted identical drafts to the ENDC minus articles on safeguards and inspection.

After debates in the ENDC changes were made in the draft concerning peaceful uses, <sup>31</sup> an obligation of the nuclear nations to negotiate an end to the arms race and a review conference after the treaty had been in power five years. <sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Edwin Brown Firmage, "The Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," The American Journal of International Law, LXIII (No. 4, 1969), 711.

<sup>31</sup> Under the treaty, non-nuclear powers can, under safeguards, investigate nuclear peaceful benefits but the treaty does not answer the other problems involved in peaceful explosions - mainly cost and time. For example, Panama plans a 5,000 square mile canal. If the radioactive level is set at 3.9 roentgens for local inhabitants, the level set for the Nevada test sites, 2,000 square miles [sic] would have to be evacuated and for each 500 square miles, a month lapse would be needed before reentry. That makes a total of ten months of evacuation and the nation would have to pay, not only for the nuclear device, but men to work it; men to move people in and out; men to patrol the area; its advisors and it would have to make restitution for all the inhabitants and businesses. A very expensive move. It was also thought that nuclear devices could be used for underground engineering (moving gas, oil, ores), but a December 10, 1967 test in New Mexico, showed that the gas released by an H-bomb contained too much tritium to be commercially saleable. Marvin Kalkstein, International Arrangements and Control for the Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Explosives (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Institute, 1970), pp. 15-17.

<sup>32</sup> Firmage, op. cit., pp. 732, 738.

A new treaty, submitted to the ENDC January 18, 1968 included clauses on safeguards and inspection and was presented to the General Assembly March 14. It passed in the General Assembly June 12, by 95 votes to 4 with 21 abstentions.<sup>33</sup> It came into force March 5, 1970.<sup>34</sup> Security guarantees were not in the treaty but by a June 19, 1968 Security Council Resolution, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union promised to act immediately, through the United Nations Charter, against any nation who used or threatened the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear signatory.<sup>35</sup>

Nuclear-free zones: seabed and landlocks

Another area where the two world powers could see rational arguments and where both could serve their own self-interest was an agreement on the peaceful uses of the seabed. The agreement would limit areas of deployment and reduce the chances of a nuclear sea attack. The physical character of inspection and verification requirements could easily be confined to international waters thus eliminating the kinds of national hostility which had

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<sup>33</sup> United Nations, Disarmament, op. cit., p. 298.

<sup>34</sup> CCD/282 of March 11, 1970.

<sup>35</sup> United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1968 (Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1969), pp. 440-441.

obstructed agreement on an underground testing ban. Moreover, the method of verification under the Outer Space Treaty, lent itself to this area also - all parties would have free access to all installations and structures on the seabed based on reciprocity.

Originally the Soviet Union wanted a ban to cover all military activity beyond the twelve mile coast line while the United States favoured a ban on nuclear activity only beyond a three mile limit.<sup>36</sup> A joint draft of October 7, 1969 banned beyond a twelve mile limit any activity relating to nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Efforts for verification methods included appeals to the United Nations by nations lacking submarines and special equipment needed for verification in the final revised treaty submitted to the ENDC September 1, 1970.<sup>37</sup>

The resolution passed the General Assembly December 7, 1970 by a vote of 104 to 2 with 2 abstentions<sup>38</sup> and came into force May 18, 1972 - the last agreement to come into force.

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<sup>36</sup> United Nations, 1969, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>37</sup> "Working to Stop The Arms Race," External Affairs, XXIII (January, 1971), 13.

<sup>38</sup> Peru and El Salvador opposed it as they felt it might prejudice their position in respect to their rights in adjacent seas. Burns, Seat, op. cit., pp. 230-231.

Agreements on the seabed, non-proliferation, outer space and a partial test ban set the stage for consideration of nuclear-free zones. The idea had been around for some years and proposals had, at various times, covered Central Europe, the Far East, the Mediterranean Sea, Africa and Latin America. It was felt that nuclear-free zones would decrease the chances of new nuclear powers and therefore increase the chances of a lasting peace by reducing the likelihood of accidental war by new nuclear powers. To the smaller powers, perhaps, this may have looked like a fresh dictation.

In the section on non-proliferation, it has already been stated that Russia had hoped to declare Central Europe and the Far East nuclear-free zones, but these plans had failed. There are still occasions when the possibility of a nuclear-free Central Europe are discussed but the hopes of a nuclear-free Pacific were shattered with the Chinese atomic explosions. On May 27, 1963, it was again the Soviet Union who offered to the ENDC a draft of an agreement to make the Mediterranean Sea area nuclear-free but the suggestion was rejected as being too one-sided. 39

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39 United Nations, 1963, op. cit., pp.123-124.

Discussions concerning Africa and Latin America had greater success. In December of 1960, eight African states presented a draft to the United Nations requesting that all states consider Africa a nuclear-free zone where nuclear weapons could not be tested, stored, stationed or transported. The following year six other African nations joined in sponsoring a revised draft.<sup>40</sup> The nuclear powers welcomed the African initiative but felt that they and the United Nations had no right to impose obligations on the African states with regard to the use of their own land. In May, 1963, the Summit Conference of Independent African States confirmed African desires to remain a nuclear -free zone and Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic kept the ENDC, which could only offer moral encouragement, informed of the progress of the conference. A draft resolution sponsored by twenty-eight African nations was submitted in November, 1965 to the United Nations General Assembly, where it was adopted by 105 to 0 with 3 abstentions. It called upon all states to regard Africa as a nuclear-free zone.

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<sup>40</sup> The original eight states were Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan and the United Arab Republic. The six who co-sponsored the 1961 draft were the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo and Tunisia.

The nations who signed the document creating a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, went further than those nations involved in the African treaty, for they have created an organization to supervise their agreement.<sup>41</sup> The discussions on a nuclear-free Latin America began in 1962 with a Brazilian draft to the General Assembly co-sponsored by Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador. Although the nations had varying ideas on what exactly was meant by denuclearization, an eleven state draft<sup>42</sup> resolution was presented to the United Nations in 1963 expressing the hope that the Latin American states would press forward on negotiations on the issue. Seventeen Latin American states attended a meeting in Mexico City in 1964 to establish a Preparatory Commission to prepare a preliminary draft on the denuclearization of Latin America which was prepared in 1965. By the end of 1966, a final draft had been approved, and on February 14, 1967, the Treaty of Tlateloco was signed. The Treaty came into force in June 1969 and the signatories then established the Agency for the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) which held its first session in September. By 1970, the Treaty was in force in seventeen of its twenty-two signatory states.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> United Nations, Disarmament, op. cit., pp. 330-334.

<sup>42</sup> Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay.

<sup>43</sup> United Nations, Disarmament, op. cit., pp. 334-345.

Although most of the discussions concerning nuclear-free zones took place outside the ENDC and CCD, the Conference was kept informed of talks and urged nations to pursue this worthwhile goal. Discussions to declare the Balkans as nuclear-free are being pursued in the CCD but the chances of Romania attaining that goal soon are doubtful as the offer tends to be too one-sided for American approval. 44

Chemicals, bacteria and test bans

Discussions and agreements both inside and outside the ENDC have been more arms control measures - limiting the use of and numbers of certain nuclear weapons - but the agreements have led to the first true disarmament agreement since World War II. The Biological Warfare Ban, once in force, will require signatories to actually destroy or divert to peaceful uses all bacterial agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery they presently hold, within nine months of the Treaty coming into force. 45 Although discussions concerning a ban on chemical and bacterial warfare had been conducted for years, it was not

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44 CCD/PV 559 of April 25, 1972, p. 18 and CCD/PV 574 of August 3, 1972.

45 CCD/353 of September 28, 1971, p. 2.

until 1968 that the United Kingdom presented the first draft on such a ban to the ENDC. All nations realized that the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925<sup>46</sup> needed updating.

In 1970 the United Kingdom, the United States and their allies decided to work on a draft banning biological warfare only. The reasoning was that biological weapon research was still in an early stage of development and had never been used as weapons.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, their use as a weapon was open to question as they were hard to control.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> The Geneva Protocol stemmed from discussions at the Conference for the Control of the International Trade in Arms Munitions and Implements of War, called under the aegis of the League of Nations. With regard to a ban on the uses of gases, the signatories declared that they accepted this prohibition and extended the prohibition to cover the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. There is no prohibition on producing or stockpiling of either chemical or bacterial weapons, however. Frederic J. Brown, Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraints (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 98-103.

<sup>47</sup> CCD/300 of August 6, 1970, p. 1.

<sup>48</sup> The Secretary-General's Report in 1969 on chemical and bacteriological weapons stated that, "Were these weapons [bacteriological] ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring the effects would be and how they would affect the structure of society and the environment in which we live. This overriding danger would apply as much to the country which initiated the use of these weapons as to the one which had been attacked, regardless of what protective measures it might have taken in parallel with its development of an offensive capability." United Nations, Disarmament, op. cit., p. 363.

The Soviet Union, the socialist and some non-aligned nations, who had tried since 1968 to have a treaty banning both chemical and bacteriological war, relented and on September 28, 1971 the CCD reached an agreement banning bacteriological war. Verification simply consisted on complaint procedures to the Secretary-General who would report to the Security Council.<sup>49</sup> The treaty opened for signatures in 1972 but is not yet in force.

Since 1971, discussions at the CCD have covered various areas, but the two topics in which agreement may come soonest are a chemical warfare ban and a comprehensive test ban. The difficulty with a chemical ban is verification, for chemical agents can be developed clandestinely quite easily and many agents are used in commercial industries. On July 5, 1972, Dr. Roy MacPherson of Canada suggested to the CCD that toxicity should be used to classify chemical substances and suggested means of testing, using animals, for each type of toxin.<sup>50</sup>

Since the partial test ban in 1963, the ENDC and CCD have been trying to achieve a ban on underground testing

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<sup>49</sup> CCD/353 of September 28, 1971, p. 2.

<sup>50</sup> Toxicity is "the capability of a chemical substance to produce a noxious effect upon living processes ranging to acute lethality." CCD/387 of August 24, 1972.

but there has been no success yet. There have been repeated suggestions for a moratorium on tests above a 4.75 seismic magnitude and an international "detection club" in which members would share data to coordinate findings, but even this would not always be able to distinguish an explosion from a natural earthquake.<sup>51</sup> There have been verification measures ranging from the use of impartial inspectors for on-site inspection; the placing of the burden of proving innocence on a suspected violator; to the establishment of a seven member committee of the non-aligned members and a Secretary-General representative.<sup>52</sup> A 1971 study by Canada based on thirty-three underground explosions and ninety earthquakes in Eurasia concluded that it was possible to discriminate between an earthquake and an explosion if there were at least four stations which would measure the event and allow use of their data.<sup>53</sup> Japan, Sweden and Canada met in Tokyo in June, 1972 and on July 20 presented a paper to the CCD on their discussions. The three had agreed that explosions could be distinguished from earthquakes if they were large enough and their waves

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51 "Disarmament Negotiations," External Affairs, XVII (October, 1965), 477.

52 United Nations, Disarmament, op. cit., pp. 10, 239-240; United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations: 1966 (New York: United Nations, 1968), p.6 and United Nations, 1969, op. cit., p. 5.

53 CCD/327 of June 29, 1971.

recorded. Body-wave and surface-wave magnitudes were the best means of discrimination and the three had agreed to exchange seismological data and scientific information on seismology on agreed forms and in agreed quantities. <sup>54</sup> The lack of a comprehensive test ban lay with the nuclear powers who have made no moves towards a settlement of these issues since 1963. <sup>55</sup>

### Conclusions

The success of the above agreements all appear to have been related to the stimulus to the major powers for co-operation produced by the greatest confrontation of East against West since the Second World War. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis led directly to successful agreements in 1963 between the United States and the Soviet Union on a Partial Test Ban and a Communications Link. These two agreements gave greater impetus to negotiations in those areas where the two powers began to perceive shared interests. This growing willingness of these two nations to

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<sup>54</sup> CCD/376 of July 20, 1972, pp. 1.2.

<sup>55</sup> George Ignatieff in CCD/PV 571 of July 25, 1972.

work together became known as detente. Under these years of co-operation, bilateral agreements were made in areas of economy, culture, science and even disarmament. Examples are SALT-I, SALT-II, MFBR, and CSCE. Both the Communications Link and The Partial Test Ban Agreement have been improved.

The successes of the Conference depended on whether or not the major powers would continue to share these interests and whether or not they would continue to react favourably to the mediatory role adopted by Canada and some of the non-aligned. The acceptance of conciliation in the negotiations is of the utmost importance. Canada's role as a mediator, then, needs deeper analysis.

## CHAPTER IV

### CANADIAN PARTICIPATION

Canada has long been involved in the disarmament area and has been very active in the ENDC and CCD meetings. Canadian personnel have been able to influence - that is alter to its own and other nations advantages - certain proposals presented by the major nuclear powers. This influence appears to stem from three factors. Geographically Canada is the "go-between" nation of the United States and the Soviet Union. Economics, history, culture and politics has made the United States Canada's closest friend and increasing contacts with the Soviet Union has given Canadians freer access to both major powers than perhaps any other nation. Also, since World War II, Canadian endeavors for agreement and strong desire for disarmament has won it a world-wide reputation as a nation that works hard and gets things done. The role and contributions of the Canadian delegations must then be examined carefully in order to evaluate the scope and effectiveness of Canadian efforts.

### Policy Statements

Canada's public commitment to disarmament is clearly reflected in the firm and positive policy preferences expressed by its political leaders and diplomatic personnel. While Canadian attitudes have generally resembled American or British ideals, there have also been some significant departures. The Canadian statements on the various treaties are presented here only to indicate its strong interest in and desire for progress in disarmament. Speeches alone have little influence and it is in the next section, dealing with the actions undertaken by Canada, where its contributions are more easily measured.

In 1961, Canada was pressing for renewal of the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee and agreed with the idea of expanding the talks to include geographic regions and members of the non-aligned states not represented in the negotiating group. Specifically, Mr. Green suggested that there be two nations each from Latin America, Asia and Africa.<sup>1</sup> This proposal was very close to the one finally agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union which invited eight nations from Latin America, Asia, Africa and Europe (Brazil, Mexico, Ethiopia, Nigeria, United Arab Republic, Burma, India and Sweden) but there is no sure

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<sup>1</sup> Lyon, op. cit., p. 240.

way to measure Canada's influence on this particular outcome.

When the ENDC began meetings Canada was active in all discussions, including those of the Committee of the Whole, and enthusiastically supported agreement on war propaganda as "an important first step ... to diminish the sources of international tension ... and [it] would also assist materially in the further work of the Conference."<sup>2</sup> This first agreement fell through as the Russian delegate had been ordered to oppose it in the plenary session.

Canada also took a strong position against nuclear testing. When the 1958 moratorium on atmosphere testing was broken in 1961 by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1962, Mr. Green protested and reiterated the Canadian perennial position. "Canadian policy remains the same; we are against nuclear weapons tests, ... we are against tests, period."<sup>3</sup> He also complained, as did many other international figures, that "all this testing is sheer madness; polluting the air human beings must breathe; endangering the lives of generations yet unborn; and

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<sup>2</sup> Howard Green, cited in Lyon, op. cit., p. 262.

<sup>3</sup> Cited in Ibid., p. 256.

possibly leading to the destruction of civilization." <sup>4</sup>  
The influence of this particular speech is lost as many speeches by other nations opposing testing were uttered before the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1963.

The 1964 "agreement" on fissionable material by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union was a strictly voluntary action, unlike any other formal agreement. Because it was voluntary, the decisions were made outside the ENDC and therefore, there is no easy way of measuring the influence of any non-nuclear nation on the decision. Canada had spoken often, like many other nations, on the desirability of cutting fissionable material production and the transferring of present stocks to peaceful purposes but there is no indication that Canada had any influence on either the United States or the United Kingdom announcements.

Non-proliferation, which occupied the ENDC talks for almost six years, was a topic the Canadian representatives favourably spoke for on many occasions. Talks began in 1964 and on July 23, Lt.-Gen. Burns addressed the Committee presenting Canada's attitude favouring an agreement that

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<sup>4</sup> Howard Green, "The Time and Place for Disarmament," External Affairs, XIV (August, 1962), 223.

"would contain specific provisions that no nuclear power would hand over control of nuclear weapons to any nation not possessing them." <sup>5</sup> Addressing the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1965, he also argued that non-proliferation would not work unless the nuclear powers showed their desire to end nuclear stockpiling, since it was obvious that nations which possessed the capability of producing nuclear weapons should not be expected to abstain forever from becoming nuclear powers, unless the existing nuclear powers took some concrete steps towards disarming themselves. <sup>6</sup>

Canada opposed proliferation in any form, including nuclear explosions for peaceful uses developed by non-nuclear states. Lt.-Gen. Burns stated on August 24, 1966 that

In our view the development by a non-nuclear weapon State of the capacity to conduct a nuclear explosion even though it is designed for peaceful purposes would in effect constitute proliferation, and proliferation is a development to which the Canadian Government has repeatedly declared its opposition. ... Our policy, therefore, has been and will continue to be to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes but to exclude from this activity the testing of devices for

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<sup>5</sup> Burns, Seat, op. cit., p. 203.

<sup>6</sup> Cited in "Disarmament," United Nations Monthly Chronicle, II (No. 6, 1965), 29.

nuclear explosions.<sup>7</sup>

When the non-proliferation treaty was in its final draft, Lt.-Gen. Burns, on March 13, 1968, had high praise for the joint American, Soviet and British declarations of security guarantees and for Articles IV and V which allow all states to do research into peaceful uses and which allows nuclear states to deliver nuclear explosive services for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear states without charges for research and development.<sup>8</sup> It will be shown later that Canada was active in this area and some of its ideas became part of the final Non-Proliferation Treaty which Canada signed July 23, 1968 and ratified January 8, 1969.<sup>9</sup>

Canada not only spoke out and supported the idea of the peaceful uses of the seabed but was also instrumental in forming the final agreement. After seeing the Soviet draft in 1969, Canada proposed that the treaty ban all weapons of mass destruction and all offensive conventional arms outside the twelve mile limit and that an additional

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<sup>7</sup> Cited in United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament: 1966 (Washington: The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1967), p. 595.

<sup>8</sup> ENDC/PV 378 of March 13, 1968, pp. 13-14.

<sup>9</sup> "Working to Stop The Arms Race," External Affairs, XXIII (January, 1971), 12.

two hundred miles, serving as a defensive coastal security zone, be created in which the prohibition still applied but all unprohibited activities could be conducted only by the coastal state or with its approval. Realizing the dangers of a nation breaking the treaty, the Canadian delegations led the campaign for just verification procedures which became part of Article III of the final treaty.<sup>10</sup>

As Canada's representatives consistently advocated any agreement that would limit the growth or use of nuclear weapons, it also supported any discussions on nuclear-free zones which emerged voluntarily from the nations in a geographic area. Unlike non-proliferation discussions where a large international organization worked for a common agreement whereby signatories would not become nuclear powers, the Canadian representatives felt that a nuclear-zone agreement was much more nationalistic since it concerned only a few nations who agreed amongst themselves that their geographic area would not be used for testing, storing, transporting or deploying nuclear weapons by any nation. Signing the Non-proliferation Treaty does not make a nation nuclear-free for bilateral agreements could be made to test, store, transport or deploy nuclear weapons.

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<sup>10</sup> "Arms Control and Disarmament," External Affairs, XXII (April, 1970), 113.

Canada could not, and did not, support discussions of nuclear-free zones which were initiated by Russian delegates - Central Europe, Mediterranean, Balkans - for this reason and also because the East and West balance in these areas would have been tipped in favour of the Soviet Union. It has supported the agreement on Latin America, and urges other areas, such as Africa, to declare and formalize their desires.

Canada's position on a biological warfare ban was reiterated by Mr. Ignatieff on November 24, 1970 in the CCD. The Canadian government had never owned or possessed nor ever will possess chemical or biological weapons. He went on to state that Canada would never use biological weapons unless the weapons were used on its armed forces, its population or its allies. Canada does have the right to retaliate under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, but has announced a willingness to end all reservations if a verifiable treaty were to be concluded ending the development, acquisition and use of such weapons. <sup>11</sup> Like most Western nations, Canada preferred a separate treaty on biological and chemical warfare bans since agreement would be easier to reach on a biological ban than on both. The Soviet's decision to agree with this split in 1971, meant that an

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<sup>11</sup> "Working to Stop the Arms Race," op. cit., 14.

agreement to a biological ban had a much better chance of success. The final draft was approved that same year in the CCD. The Biological Warfare Ban Treaty opened for signatures on April 10, 1972. Canada has signed and ratified the agreement in April and September, 1972 respectively. To date the Treaty has been signed by 112 states and ratified by 31. The United Kingdom, United States and Soviet Union have not ratified.<sup>12</sup>

#### Procedural efforts

Statements of position and preference are only a small part of international negotiations. However, we must examine the entire bargaining process in order to evaluate the Canadian contributions either on any one issue, or for progress toward disarmament in general.

Unfortunately, Canadian representatives could do little more than present their opinion on certain topics as they were either not involved directly with the treaty-making or because the subject was a "dead" matter. Examples of the former are agreements on nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Africa and the verbal agreement between the three nuclear powers in 1964 to reduce production of fissionable material. The issue of a ban on war propaganda

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<sup>12</sup> Beattie.

is an example of the latter, for once the Russian delegate rejected the proposed agreement, no nation was energetic enough to push forward on the issue for a final agreement. Canada's contributions, then, in these areas, were nil.

With regard to the expansion of the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee, Canada had suggested, through Mr. Green, that two nations each from Latin America, Asia and Africa be included. How much of an influence this comment had on the American and Soviet decision cannot be detected, but it seems that it may have been a minor influence or a basis of the talks, for the final agreement differed only slightly from the Canadian suggestion. There were eight, not six, nations from Latin America, Asia, Africa and Europe.

There are other areas, as well, in which Canada's delegates and officials may have been an influencing factor but in such obscure fashion, that it is impossible to measure. For example, Canada played a minor part in the Communication Link and Partial Test Ban Agreements, but its somewhat vague contribution to these treaties was really an important procedural contribution to the ENDC in general. It was at Canada's urging that a co-chairmanship of the ENDC was established and it was the co-chairmanship that had given the United States and the Soviet Union a means

and method of talking to each other. They had gained practical experience needed for bi-lateral discussions and were not forced into making the agreements lacking proper experience.

Although this procedure was really about all that Canada could contribute to the Communications Link Agreement, it could and did, continually add to the growing international pressure to end all testing. When the ENDC reconvened in 1963, after the Cuban missile crisis, the Canadian delegation continued to press urgently for a test ban. The Burns delegation made an outstanding effort to end the sticky problem of inspection. The Russians refused to have more than three on-site inspections and the Americans refused to have less than eight. On February 14, 1963, Lt.-Gen. Burns urged the powers to stop quibbling over numbers and to seek agreement on methods. On February 22, he asked the Soviet Union to give their exact requirements for a test ban so the talks would have something to work with. He also appealed to each nation to give the ENDC a draft treaty with the number of on-site inspections left blank. The Soviet Union refused his requests. <sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Lyon, op. cit., p. 273.

On March 13, 1963, Lt.-Gen. Burns presented an idea that he hoped would end this disagreement. He suggested that the United States submit to neutral scientists a sealed list of all its underground tests in recent years. The Soviet Union would submit a similar list of the data it had recorded concerning explosions conducted in the United States. If the Soviet Union had detected say 95% of the American tests, it would prove that the Soviet Union was correct in stating that it was technically possible to detect underground tests. This was a "blunt, put-up or shut-up approach ... but in a more direct and imaginative way than ever before."<sup>14</sup> The method was not adopted but did show that the Canadian delegations were weary and angry over prolonged debates on issues that could have been and should have been easily solved. How much if any influence these speeches and the experience gained by the American and Russian delegates in the Canadian initiated co-chairmanship concept, had on the final Partial Test Ban and Communication Link Agreements, is only guesswork.

There is no guesswork involved, however, in presenting the Canadian contributions on other treaties and to the ENDC-CCD progress. The Canadian position on procedural strategy, according to Mr. Green's speech of March 19, 1962

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<sup>14</sup> Lyon, op. cit., p. 276.

was that the best means to a successful agreement was to begin discussions on those areas where both powers had similar proposals. By working for agreements in areas of shared interests, agreements were more likely to be achieved. Trust and confidence needed for agreements in other areas could be built up.

This was just what the Canadian delegation attempted to do, particularly in the initial phases of discussions. There are several good examples of this. One occurred in 1962, when the Canadian delegation tabled a twenty-two page outline in May on the similarities and differences between the American and Russian drafts on General and Complete Disarmament. This outline was so thorough that it was used as a basis of discussion for many months after its adoption. It covered all items to be reduced, methods of reductions, limitation of reductions and additional measures on items such as armaments, armed forces, nuclear weapons and production of fissionable material. The outline also dealt with the uses of outer space, a reduction of military expenditures, the structure of the International Disarmament Organization, the strengthening of the United Nations for peaceful settlements and the dismantling of foreign bases. The working paper covered all these topics in all three stages and proved to be a very useful and

and informative document.<sup>15</sup> Throughout the meetings of the ENDC-CCD, the Canadian delegation tabled documents presenting the divergent American and Russian positions, detailing topics and providing working papers.<sup>16</sup>

The Canadian delegation also made a solid contribution to the final non-proliferation agreement. On July 5, 1966, in an effort to forge a compromise, they tabled a tabular comparison of the American and Russian drafts on the issue, which was used as a basis for discussion and for the formulation of the final draft.<sup>17</sup>

That same month, **Canadian** and **United Kingdom** delegates presented four provisions for a non-proliferation agreement. These were that all parties place their non-military nuclear projects under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; that the nuclear powers come to

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<sup>15</sup> ENDC/36 of May 4, 1962.

<sup>16</sup> Examples of papers comparing American and Russian positions on topics are ENDC/79 of April 3, 1963 on their disarmament plans, 1960-1963; ENDC/110 of August 16, 1963 on the reduction of the risks of war, 1958-1963. Working papers include CCD/327 of June 29, 1971 on Canadian seismographic detection studies; CCD/387 of August 24, 1972 on toxicity as a means of verification under a chemical warfare ban. Papers giving needed details included CCD/305 of August 10, 1970 on results of the returns to the Secretary-General for information on seismographic facilities. Other papers will be referred to as needed.

<sup>17</sup> ENDC/175 of July 5, 1966.

the aid of non-nuclear states, especially those not aligned to a nuclear power not a party to the treaty; that the entry into force be dependent upon ratification of a number of states capable of becoming nuclear powers in a short time (the nations mentioned were Canada, India, Israel, Japan, Sweden and West Germany); and that the treaty be of limited duration. <sup>18</sup> The Canadian government also opposed non-nuclear states developing nuclear explosives for peaceful uses but suggested that the nuclear powers act as contractors to provide at low cost the nuclear explosive devices for peaceful uses under the International Atomic Energy Agency. Finally, Canada wanted all nuclear testing to cease and production of fissionable material to end. <sup>19</sup> After lengthy discussions on this and other papers, many of the Canadian ideas were adopted; if not fully, at least in a modified form.

In the final draft, only the non-nuclear states must be subject to the Agency for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but the United States and the United Kingdom have voluntarily placed themselves under the Agency's procedures.

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<sup>18</sup> Burns, Seat, op. cit., pp. 212-213.

<sup>19</sup> The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament: 1967, (Washington: The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1968), pp. 316-318.

No security assurances are in the treaty, but, as stated earlier, the three nuclear powers in the ENDC have submitted parallel declarations on guarantees to the Security Council. It would also be difficult to implement the third suggestion, but as of December, 1972 Canada and Sweden have signed and ratified the treaty; Japan and West Germany have signed but not ratified and India and Israel do not intend to sign. In the final treaty, the agreement is to be reviewed every five years and after twenty-five years a conference is to determine if the agreement should continue indefinitely or have a limited duration.<sup>20</sup> The first review of the treaty is to take place in 1975. Canada's contribution to the treaty is important for the topic is one that many nations were earnestly working on and many had differing opinions. Through diplomatic skills and working with other nations, Canada eventually was able to see a final agreement very much like it had envisioned.

Canadian views had a major impact on the Outer Space Treaty for it was the Canadian delegation which actually started discussions on the topic. The idea of a ban on the placing of nuclear weapons in outer space had been proposed in both the American Soviet drafts on General and Complete Disarmament in 1962. So when Mr. Green spoke at the ENDC

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<sup>20</sup> Burns, Seat, op. cit., pp. 212-213.

on March 27, 1962, he picked up this point and made a concrete proposal for a draft agreement. The proposal simply stated that the nations of the ENDC

Solemnly declare that henceforth

- (a) the orbiting or stationing in outer space of devices for delivering weapons of mass destruction shall be prohibited;
- (b) they will give advance notification of launchings of space vehicles and missiles to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and, upon its establishment, to the International Disarmament Organization. <sup>21</sup>

This was one episode, however, in which Canada's mediating efforts were not fully appreciated. Due to a secretarial error, the United States was not informed of Canada's move and was taken by surprise when Mr. Green spoke. The Americans opposed the draft created by Lt.-Gen. Burns, George Ignatieff and Allan Gotlieb, because it had no verification measures; because the United States wanted to move in its own time and because it feared that Canada "was picking up the ball and running with it" without consulting NATO. <sup>22</sup> Moreover, the Russians rejected the idea as being of no value and possible hindering the drafting of a comprehensive disarmament plan. <sup>23</sup> The

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<sup>21</sup> ENDC/17 of March 28, 1962, p. 2.

<sup>22</sup> Burns, interview.

<sup>23</sup> Lyon, op. cit., p. 249.

Canadian failure to inform the United States, though committed in error, shook American confidence in Canada and in Ottawa, Parliament wanted to know why its delegates had acted without consultation. Mr. Green explained what had happened and added that his purpose at the ENDC was not to please the Americans but to represent Canada. <sup>24</sup>

Although both major powers did reject the Canadian draft, the idea of a ban was taken up by Mexico who consulted both the United States and the Soviet Union before presenting its draft to the ENDC. The draft was subsequently presented to the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and passed the General Assembly in December of 1966. The treaty opened for signatures January 27, 1967 and was in force October 10, 1967. <sup>25</sup> Canada has signed and ratified the agreement.

The issue of a biological warfare ban is another topic that Canadian delegations have spoken and worked for over the years. In 1969 the Secretary-General presented a report on the question, an investigation he undertook at the urging of the ENDC the year before, following a Canadian suggestion. On August 26, 1969, a

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<sup>24</sup> Lyon, op. cit., p. 150.

<sup>25</sup> United Nations, Disarmament, op. cit., p. 178.

working paper was presented by the Canadian delegation on a United Nations draft resolution designed to facilitate the consideration of the question. <sup>26</sup>

Canada also played an important part in the seabed issue. It was on the topic of verification of the seabed that the delegates presented a working paper in October, 1969, calling for international assistance in verification within the framework of the United Nations. <sup>27</sup> Continuous efforts for proper verification methods eventually led to the incorporation of Canadian suggestions into Article III of the Seabed Treaty. Under Article III a state that is not certain that another party is obeying the treaty, has various ways of seeking information, including an appeal to the Security Council. Under paragraph five of the article in a preliminary draft,

Verification pursuant to this Article may be taken by any State Party using its own means, or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party, or through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. <sup>29</sup>

In April of 1970, the CCD approved a final draft of the

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<sup>26</sup> ENDC/266 of August 26, 1969.

<sup>27</sup> CCD/270 of October 8, 1969.

<sup>28</sup> CCD/317 of September 3, 1970.

Seabed Treaty which included, in paragraphs four and five of Article III, verification methods suggested by Canada. 29

Basically through mediation, then, Canada has played an important part in the Non-Proliferation, the Outer Space, the Biological Warfare Ban and Seabed Treaties. Under Non-Proliferation, Canadian representatives worked with other nations to achieve set goals and though some of its aims were not achieved fully, most were in at least a modified form. The Canadian delegation worked alone on the first Outer Space draft and, though not accepted, the idea was picked up immediately by Mexico. It was Canadian initiative that led to the final treaty of that agreement. Although Canada did little work on the actual Biological Warfare Ban, it did contribute heavily towards the research needed for the draft. On the Seabed issue, the Canadian delegation pressed for and achieved fully, the article on verification that allowed nations to ask the Secretary-General for aid. It has been clearly shown by this section that the Canadian delegations at the ENDC-CCD were not idle and indeed played important parts in many of the final agreements that emerged from the Geneva discussions.

Present positions and activities

The Canadian position on the present issues have been made clear by its delegation in the present and past negotiations. Canada favours a Chemical Warfare Ban and has presented papers and held informal meetings in pursuit of an agreement on a final solution. Dr. McPherson's paper on toxicity as a means of verification is an interesting one but as yet no final draft has emerged from the Conference. As explained earlier, Dr. McPherson, Canadian, presented a paper on how to test each chemical for its amount of toxin and amount of damage caused by that toxin on a living organism as a verification means. The Soviet Union and its allies presented a draft March 28, 1972 on a chemical warfare ban based on the Biological Warfare Ban Treaty but its only means of verification was a complaint procedure which was not strong enough to get CCD approval. 30

With regard to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Canada has been more active in this area than in almost any other. Back in 1965, Lt.-Gen. Burns declared that Canada "would be prepared to play an appropriate part in any arrangements that might be agreed on for maintaining

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30 CCD/361 of March 28, 1972.

verification apparatus for a comprehensive test ban." <sup>31</sup> Moreover, Canada has been very active in studying seismology in order to expand the Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty. On May 21, 1969, the Ignatieff delegation presented abstracts on recent Canadian scientific papers on seismological research. <sup>32</sup> Mr. Ignatieff also suggested that the Secretary-General request information from the United Nations members of their seismological network and willingness to exchange data. <sup>33</sup>

Dr. Kenneth Whitham, a Canadian expert, addressed an informal meeting of the ENDC in August, 1969, on the topic of seismology. He stated that as more and more seismological data was made available, the prospects for positive identification of a quake became greater and greater even for lower yield explosions. While Dr. Whitham noted that quake data must be collected at points both near and far from the place of origin, he argued that seismological data alone would be sufficient to police a testing ban. <sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Cited in "Disarmament Negotiations," External Affairs, XVII (October, 1965), 477.

<sup>32</sup> ENDC/248 of May 21, 1969.

<sup>33</sup> ENDC/251 of May 23, 1969.

<sup>34</sup> ENDC/259 of August 14, 1969, p. 4.

In 1970, Canada presented its findings on the Secretary-General's report on seismological information from the United Nations members. There had only been 54 returns but 15 had no operational stations and 6 had decided not to give data for they felt that a voluntary form of exchange was better than a detection club. From the 33 completed forms, the Canadian scientists were not able to decide that present technological equipment alone could identify an underground test and so on-site inspection would still be needed. <sup>35</sup>

A 1971 working paper, based on Canadian research, however, concluded that tests could be identified if there were exchanges between at least four different national countries whose stations had recorded the event, and in 1972 Canada, Japan and Sweden met to form themselves into a voluntary exchange system. That summer, Canada presented and explained its latest research in seismographic identification and presented various papers on the topic in 1972 by itself, with Sweden and with Sweden and Japan. <sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> CCD/305 of August 10, 1970, pp. 2-5.

<sup>36</sup> CCD/327 of June 29, 1971; CCD/327/ADD 1 of July 7, 1971; CCD/376 of July 20, 1972. Also see above pp. 82-83.

Mediator problems

The sincerity of Canada's commitment to progress on disarmament and its role of mediator often strained relations with the United States, especially in the beginning years of the ENDC. In a testy climate misunderstandings were always possible, such as in 1962 over the outer space draft presented by Mr. Green.

1962 also witnessed another misunderstanding between the two nations in New York. Two resolutions were presented to the United Nations General Assembly on the cessation of nuclear testing; one by Brazil and the other ENDC neutrals, and the other by the United States and the United Kingdom. Canada wished to be on the side of the neutrals but realized that no agreement was possible unless both the Americans and Russians agreed about on-site inspections. As part of its mediatory role, Canada sought a compromise by circulating a memorandum expressing opposition to an unpoliced test ban but made suggestions that added up to just that. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom had been told of Canada's actions nor what the memorandum stated.<sup>37</sup> India, moreover, had misrepresented

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<sup>37</sup> The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament: 1962, Vol. II (Washington: The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1963), pp. 1002-1003.

Canada's stand by stating to the United States that Canada was going to vote with the non-aligned and against the United States and the United Kingdom.<sup>38</sup> The American government felt Canada was not acting in good faith and their delegation was told to "stop the easy exchange of confidential information on disarmament" that had become customary in dealings with their Canadian counterparts.<sup>39</sup>

Canadian representatives had offered amendments to the Brazilian proposal in hopes that the nuclear powers could then accept the Brazilian draft. The amendments condemned all tests by inserting paragraphs calling on the three major nuclear powers to meet to achieve agreement on a test ban by January 1 and if this was not possible by that date, to enter into agreements to cease testing in the atmosphere, sea and outer space with an interim ban on underground testing.<sup>40</sup> These amendments were accepted and the Brazilian proposal passed with no negative votes. Lt.-Gen. Burns handled the difficulty with the Americans by approaching Dean Rusk directly. Once Lt.-Gen. Burns was able to clarify the mistaken American understanding of

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<sup>38</sup> Burns, interview.

<sup>39</sup> Lyon, op. cit., pp. 267-268.

<sup>40</sup> The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament: 1962, op. cit., pp. 1002-1003.

Canadian actions on the Brazilian draft, the coolness dissolved and relations returned to normal. 41

The role of compromiser required delicate diplomacy and it often became difficult to be popular with both sides. In 1962, Canada had angered its southern neighbour by supposedly acting too much on its own, but the two had gradually regained confidence in each other. In 1964, it was the Russians who stated they were losing confidence in Canada for Canada was doing too little. On June 12, Mr. Zorin, head of the Soviet Union delegation, told Lt.-Gen. Burns that early in the talks Canada had come up with some useful suggestions which helped bring the East and West closer together, but Canada had not done so for some time. When Mr. Zorin was replaced by Mr. Tsarapkin, the latter reiterated the same sentiments to Lt.-Gen. Burns. Neither man was asking Canada to turn against the United States nor even to persuade the United States to take a Russian position, but rather that Canada help the talks by again suggesting areas of compromise. 42 Despite the difficulties of this position then, it is clear that the Canadian efforts to assume the role of catalyst and conciliator were recognized and their procedural value appreciated.

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41 Burns, interview.

42 Burns, Seat, op. cit., p. 203.

Summary

Canada has participated in some meaningful way in the proceedings which produced most of the disarmament agreements since 1962. Those cases where Canadian input was not significant (such as the Communications Link, Partial Test Ban and the cessation of production of fissionable material) represented essentially bilateral agreements emerging from superpower consensus. On the other hand, Canadian contribution was of great importance in disarmament agreements which emerged from the multilateral discussions of the Conferences (such as the Seabed, Outer Space and Non-Proliferation). Canada has acted as compromiser or middleman presenting tables, speeches, drafts and agreements showing the similarities and differences on an issue between the United States and Soviet Union. From these documents, Canada and others can present solutions and measure progress as differences disappear. But is this a worthwhile role for Canada and has it always performed the role adequately? These are the questions to be explored in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS ON THE CONFERENCES  
AND CANADIAN EXPERIENCES

For thirteen years, the ENDC and CCD have met to discuss the reduction and elimination of military weapons. Why? The answer lies in a statement by Walter Lippman, made prior to the opening of the Conferences.

It is so easy to write off as hopeless the coming disarmament conference, that one may ask why the British, the Soviets, and we are taking the trouble to attend it. The reason is that nuclear war would be mutually suicidal, and that therefore the nuclear powers must keep in contact, must keep talking. <sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Cited in Fred Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 44.

Talk they did, but they did more than just mouth words damning nuclear arms. Various agreements have been signed since 1962, from a Communications Link to the first real disarmament treaty banning bacterial warfare.<sup>2</sup>

I will begin with suggesting some overall conclusions about the Conferences and about Canada's activities within them, and then proceed to tackle the more challenging and speculative task of evaluating the Canadian contribution.

### The Conferences

The Conferences themselves, both the ENDC and CCD, have proved their worth. Both have presented documents to the United Nations which are now international treaties, banning certain nuclear armament buildups and providing the means to prevent a possible accidental or surprise attack on either of the most powerful nuclear nations. It is true these agreements are more arms control measures than disarmament, however, emerging as they did along with detente, they were both a reflection of the superpowers greater willingness to negotiate and a contribution to that willingness.

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<sup>2</sup> The latter is not in force yet but is endorsed by the CCD and states that all parties will dismantle all their existing apparatus and equipment, except those needed for medical or defensive purposes, that deals with bacterial warfare.

It is clear that the structure and format of the Conference did facilitate agreement. Although unusual, the idea of a joint chairmanship has proved successful. The idea was that institutional arrangements be created whereby both parties would be forced to engage in bilateral discussions on disarmament. The co-chairmanship idea "appears to have been a useful and perhaps necessary factor in opening the way to positive action." <sup>3</sup>

The size of the Conference also facilitated agreements for the job of keeping the discussions progressing and the channels of communication open. It was handled well by the ENDC. The small assembly was a convenient forum for the major powers to advance their proposals, much more so than the large United Nations body or the deadlocked Ten Nation Disarmament Committee. <sup>4</sup> The enlargement of the ENDC may have been of procedural value. In order to win approval of their positions from the neutral nations, the United States and the Soviet Union delegates must present reasonable and logical arguments without offending common standards of justice and fairness. While Western states have claimed that the presence of non-aligned nations

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<sup>3</sup> R. M. Tait, "In Defence of the Big Conference," Disarmament and Arms Control, II (Summer, 1964), 332.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., pp. 336-338.

has forced the Soviet Union to be "more reasonable" than it would be otherwise, <sup>5</sup> non-aligned participation clearly had its effects on the West as well. <sup>6</sup> This is not to say the CCD is the best possible forum for disarmament negotiations. The Conference is still lacking representation from two of the nuclear powers -- France and China -- and top conventional military powers -- West Germany. This is no mere structural deficiency, but a substantive and political problem which still remains to be resolved.

It is necessary to look briefly at the groups and coalitions among the participants as they have operated in the Conference. Three political groups existed throughout the talks -- East, West and the Non-aligned. The East and West often discuss the progress of the Conference, but, as has been shown by Canada's experience, the Western group is not a solid immovable block, acting with one voice. Far from impeding progress such sub-group meetings may facilitate the work of the Conference by eliminating minor disagreements. Agreement is never needed to reach voting arrangements as no votes are taken in the Conferences, nor is there ever a common speaker.

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<sup>5</sup> Ikle, op. cit., p. 205.

<sup>6</sup> U Thant described the eight nations as having a "moderating and catalytic influence in helping to bridge the gap between extreme positions of either side." Cited in Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 186.

Canada is, in a sense, a member of a group and a member of no group. In a formal and actual sense, Canada is one of the five Western nations and Canada works well with all of the group's members, never forgetting that NATO must also be satisfied with the Western bloc actions. The American draft on General and Comprehensive Disarmament was worked on by Canada and, as stated, Canada met often with the Western bloc powers to prepare drafts and to discuss the Conference agenda. But Canada has not allowed itself to become locked in a group with no individual voice. We have seen the delegation act against the United States by condemning American testing; acting on its own with an Outer Space Treaty and acting with members of the non-aligned bloc on seismological investigations. Canada has also won respect and trust from the Eastern bloc and this has been demonstrated in many ways. The fact that the Eastern powers were free enough to approach the Canadian delegation to continue searching for methods of compromise clearly indicates that Canada was not perceived as a NATO "puppet." Moreover, the Eastern powers actively sought continued Canadian participation when the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee was reorganized and expanded. In 1972, Poland, as organizer for the proposed World Disarmament Conference, made Canada a member of the Committee without even consulting the

government. 7

The eight, and later sixteen, non-aligned nations may be viewed as a third important group, although they were tied more by circumstances and solidarity of purpose than by political influences. Brazil termed it a "diplomatic" group, as they could sometimes work together in a common diplomatic endeavour but they could disagree on other matters. They often submitted joint memoranda but occasionally disagreed over specific proposals. 8 As has already been noted, it can be argued that this non-aligned group had a moderating effect at the ENDC and CCD.

#### Canada and conference leadership

The Canadian government, having learned from the experience in the 1920's and 1930's that action is needed to maintain peace, has abandoned the role of "no commitment" and has been involved in nuclear research and in all disarmament talks since World War II. What type of leadership has Canada provided and how effectively was it

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7 de Salaberry.

8 For instance, none backed India on her suggestion of a yearly quota of invitations for inspection under a comprehensive test ban agreement. M. Samir Ahmed, "The Role of the Neutrals in the Geneva Negotiations," Disarmament and Arms Control, I (Summer, 1963), pp. 26-27.

displayed in the ENDC and CCD?

Johan Kaufman defines effective leadership somewhat ambiguously as "taking the lead towards realizing or preventing some specific objective within the framework of an intergovernmental conference."<sup>9</sup> At the ENDC, and later at the CCD, different nations, at different times, were able to achieve exactly what they sought. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, however, are able to achieve all their objectives, though as co-chairmen they do have more leadership in the whole Conference than any other nation. Canada also pursued a number of goals: some were achieved and some were not.

It must be remembered also that Canada rarely acted alone and achieved success, at different times, by working with the United Kingdom or Sweden or Japan. Knowing who to work with and when to work alone is a sign of skill. Canada could work with the United Kingdom on a non-proliferation treaty as easily as it could with Sweden on seismographical data and Brazil on a draft to end nuclear testing.

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<sup>9</sup> Kaufmann, *op. cit.*, p. 76. How one is to define "taking the lead" is not explained. It may be best to take it as meaning leading the other nations on a particular stand as either spokesman for the group or as co-ordinator and draftsman while another nation is spokesman.

Another sign of effective leadership is being able to resolve conflicts and being able to work with groups. In these situations, one party may settle for less than its desired objectives in order to keep the talks progressing. The conflicts that arose in the ENDC and CCD were mostly conflicts on what items or what wording to use in a particular arms control measure. There were some procedural conflicts but these were easily settled. Conflicts were not resolved, fortunately, by walk-outs or closed discussions. Closed talks are actually alien to the Disarmament Conferences as it has become traditional to avoid back room discussions.

The two major powers have had parallel interests on a number of disarmament control issues, and the gap between their Conference positions has often appeared bridgeable. In this situation Canada's role as mediator or go-between often became very important. The Canadian delegation took this role very seriously, as is reflected in the many tables submitted to the Conferences outlining American and Russian proposals and concessions in order to stress areas of possible compromise. Both Mr. Zorin and Mr. Tsarapkin of the Soviet Union acknowledged Canada's role in the early talks as mediator and asked her to continue in this role. It would seem that successive Canadian delegations, under Lt.-Gen. Burns, Mr. Ignatieff and Mr. Barton, persistently

sought compromise but secured progressively fewer favourable results. According to Lt.-Gen. Burns, the positional gaps in the later years were much larger than in the early years and it took time for these gaps to come close enough that both the Soviet Union and the United States would be willing to act in concert or agree. This put a go-between in an increasingly frustrating situation.<sup>10</sup>

In the ENDC, Canadian representatives did all they could to push talks forward. The delegates made errors and alienated the United States and even disappointed the Soviet Union over particular actions taken or not taken. But the Canadian delegation always tried to do one thing -- keep the powers talking. Canada showed its interest by presenting drafts and amendments; by seeking compromise agreements and by presenting or urging new research.

Although Canada continues to do all within its power, its actual influence in the disarmament area may be weakening. Increasingly, it appears that Sweden may be emerging as the key nation with new insights and ideas to keep negotiations going. Mr. Ignatieff, supporting this idea, explained that the reason for Canada's seeming decline in influence was due to Sweden's established research

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<sup>10</sup> Burns, interview.

organization, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and its more knowledgeable and skilled men. <sup>11</sup>

### The delegations

The Canadian government was represented by a succession of delegations with differing personnel and instructions. This study has also attempted to examine the influence the character of these delegations may have had on the Conference and Canada's role in it. Overall, it has been shown that each delegation, and each delegation head, had progressively less and less autonomy in their pursuits. Their organization remained somewhat similar but perhaps the greatest difference between the delegations is demonstrated by the Burns and Ignatieff delegations. The basic difference here was the relationship of each leader to the home government.

The extent to which a negotiator is in direct touch with or can approach the sources of authority in his government--rather than the formal level of his position in the governmental hierarchy -- has a significant bearing on his effectiveness in negotiation and therefore, on the results he obtains.

Assuming that a good working relationship exists between a negotiator and the sources of authority in his government, the personal qualities of the negotiator -- his tact, energy, understanding and sensitivity, as well as his capacity to engage in informal discussion -- are of direct relevance to the

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<sup>11</sup> Ignatieff.

success or failure of a negotiation. <sup>12</sup>

Lt.-Gen. Burns was appointed the Government's Advisor on Disarmament and therefore actually formed governmental policy as he carried it out in the ENDC. He was a key figure in forming the 1961 guidelines that were and are used as a basis for disarmament talks. He had almost a free hand to move where and say what he pleased, for as Advisor, he not only formed government policy, but had direct access to the Cabinet through the Minister of External Affairs. He consulted inter-departmentally but he formed the policy. <sup>13</sup> Unfortunately, Mr. Ignatieff was denied this "free hand" and received instructions from the Disarmament Division of the External Affairs Department. His Under-Secretary, Marcel Cadieux, insisted that Mr. Ignatieff report to him and not go directly to the External Affairs Minister or Cabinet. <sup>14</sup> This upset Mr. Ignatieff and perhaps hindered his role in the talks, for he was denied the rights and privileges he felt he had a right to. If one is not happy with his role, he may not be able to do the job to the best of his ability. It is

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<sup>12</sup> Arthur Lall, Modern International Negotiations: Principals and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 33.

<sup>13</sup> Burns, interview.

<sup>14</sup> Ignatieff.

possible that Ignatieff and Canada's performance at the Conference suffered because of the poorer relationship established between the Canadian government and its Head Delegate.

As for the present delegation under Mr. Barton, it seems that instructions are even more of an influence now than under Mr. Ignatieff and Mr. Barton enjoys even less freedom. It is reported by Mr. Barton that "I have never suffered for lack of freedom to negotiate" <sup>15</sup> and later he add's that

...if the Head of the Delegation disagrees with any point of substance [in instructions from Ottawa] he can have it referred to a higher authority ... if necessary the Minister, the Prime Minister or Cabinet, for decision ... It is always open to the delegation to consult quickly with Ottawa at whatever level is necessary if a surprise problem arises, but normally good sense will tell the delegation what to do, and the Department is very good at resisting the temptation to criticize after the event. <sup>16</sup>

On the other hand, Mr. Louis de Salaberry, former head of the Disarmament Division of the External Affairs Department, states that some of the present delegates "scream if they can't act as they wish." <sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Barton.

<sup>16</sup> Barton.

<sup>17</sup> de Salaberry.

Would a delegate "scream" unless he felt he was being hindered by orders from Ottawa? It could be, reading between the lines, that Mr. Barton acted somewhat contrary to Department orders, that he "screamed" for freedom, but the Department "was" very good at resisting the temptation to criticize after the event." This speculative suggestion is presented only to indicate that the comments from Mr. Barton and Mr. de Salaberry could mean that the delegation is more dependent on instructions. In fairness, Mr. Barton's reply to a question concerning his relationship with the federal government must be presented.

There is always a vigorous exchange of ideas and views, not only between the delegations and Ottawa, but within the delegations and within the Divisions concerned in Ottawa. This is natural and desirable in order that all aspects of a certain issue are carefully considered and all opinions weighed. I am not conscious of ever having been faced with fundamental differences of opinion on an important issue in which I felt that my views were being over-ruled arbitrarily. If I were, the option would always be open to me to ask to be relieved of my responsibilities. <sup>18</sup>

Which means that, just as under Ignatieff, Ottawa, and not the Head Delegate, actually has the last word in policy.

The effects of this more restricted status on Canadian contributions to disarmament talks remains to be

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<sup>18</sup> Based on personal correspondence of December 3, 1974, between Mr. W. F. Barton, and the writer.

measured. Although every delegation creates its own working style, if Canadian delegates find themselves less free to work for compromise and concessions to stimulate and accelerate agreement, this loss of freedom will be regrettable.

A concluding analysis on the various Canadian governments emphasis on disarmament and on the major role of the delegation head at the ENDC, reveals a very interesting pattern. Roughly five different groupings of Prime Ministers, External Affairs Ministers, and ENDC-CCD Head Delegates have occurred since 1962.

In the first grouping there is Prime Minister Diefenbaker, Mr. Green and Lt.-Gen. Burns. Under Mr. Green and the Conservative government, it has been stated that disarmament was the main priority. Lt.-Gen. Burns, although designated deputy leader to the ENDC, behind Mr. Green, was also Advisor to the Government and in reality was the policy-maker. He was able to work well with Diefenbaker and Green, who had "directed all of his subordinates to give it [disarmament] top priority,"<sup>19</sup> With all three men, Diefenbaker, Green and Burns, doing all they could to push for disarmament, it is not all that surprising to find

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<sup>19</sup> Lyon, op. cit., p. 224.

that their enthusiastic actions angered the United States in 1962. Both Mr. Green's Outer Space Treaty and the Canadian amendments to the Brazilian proposal in the United Nations were undertaken by eager Canadians who failed to also be cautious about their allies concerns.

By the end of 1962, Prime Minister Pearson and Mr. Martin had replaced Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Green. Lt.-Gen. Burns remained as Advisor to the Government and was appointed leader of the delegation. He remained the chief policy-maker for the government but was now working with men who "believed in the necessity for disarmament as much as the previous government, but 'were not so optimistic about it.'" <sup>20</sup> Under the Conservative government, the top priority was disarmament but under the Liberal government, "peacekeeping was now the government's first defence priority." <sup>21</sup> So, in essence, there was a decrease on the emphasis made on disarmament, under the Pearson government, but with Lt.-Gen. Burns still acting as Advisor, the decrease was only a slight one. It should be pointed out that it was in 1964, under this second grouping, that the Soviet Union first complained that Canada was not performing

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<sup>20</sup> Burns, Seat, op. cit., p. 172.

<sup>21</sup> Thordarson, op. cit., p. 18.

as well as it had in 1962 as a mediator.

It was not until 1968 that the third grouping - Trudeau, Sharp, Ignatieff - and this grouping is significant for two reasons. Firstly, Mr. Ignatieff replaced Lt.-Gen. Burns as Head Delegate but was denied the role of Advisor. Moreover, in 1971, he became Canada's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva as well as Head Delegate. Lt.-Gen. Burns was a policy-maker and content with his role. Mr. Ignatieff became mainly the executor of government decisions and became very upset over the lack of interest of the Liberal government in disarmament. His dual position, and his lack of the same freedom that Burns had had, indicated to Mr. Ignatieff that the Trudeau government was not as enthusiastic for disarmament as the government had been. Also, in 1970, Prime Minister Trudeau relegated issues of peace and security, which included disarmament, to the second level of external policy priorities.<sup>22</sup> The following year, the defence of Canada's sovereignty was redefined as "defence of Canada's territorial jurisdiction and aid to the civil authority."<sup>23</sup> So in the third grouping there is a Liberal government which shifted the importance of disarmament downward in

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<sup>22</sup> op. cit., p. 195.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 205.

relation to other priorities, both in general external affairs and in defence matters. The ENDC delegate, who has an extensive background in disarmament, found himself frustrated as his eagerness for disarmament was not matched by his government's. He is forced to play, unhappily, the role of executor and not of policy maker. The result is a drastic drop in the overall emphasis on disarmament.

The fourth grouping occurs in 1973 when Mr. Ignatieff is replaced by Mr. Barton. The Liberal government keeps the priorities it had established earlier and Mr. Barton is not a frustrated policy-maker. He has little background in disarmament and is quite happy to be an executor of disarmament policy. Under this fourth grouping then, disarmament takes another slight plunge as there is no longer even one person who desires disarmament above all other things.

Finally, in 1974, the fifth grouping is formed consisting of Prime Minister Trudeau, Mr. Barton and Mr. Allan MacEachern, who replaces Mr. Sharp. There has been no indication from Mr. MacEachern of his position on disarmament and with the Liberal government's emphasis on other matters, it may be awhile before he presents a speech on the matter. However, it would seem that disarmament may have taken a slight step downward under the new External

Affairs Minister for the simple reason that despite the opportunity given him to present a strong position on the matter, he has said little. The opportunity that beckoned him was the Indian atomic bomb explosion. Mr. MacEachern did present a speech on the matter at the United Nations but limited himself to the issue of non-proliferation and did not mention the other problems in the disarmament area. Therefore, the emphasis on disarmament since 1962 by the Canadian government seems to be in a decreasing pattern.

When Mr. Beattie, the present head of the Disarmament Division of the External Affairs Department was questioned, he denied that Canada's interest in the CCD and disarmament has declined. Instead he noted that both NATO and Warsaw Pact nations have given decreasing prominence to the CCD.

Where in earlier years the CCD and its predecessor bodies provided the central forum for east/west negotiations on arms control and disarmament questions, the focus of attention is now of the fora of SALT, MBFR and the CSCE. It is perhaps true therefore to say that relatively speaking, Canada gives less attention to the CCD than heretofore, but this arises simply from the fact that it is a direct participant in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna and the discussion of the military aspects of the CSCE in Geneva. <sup>24</sup>

Although Mr. Beattie is correct regarding the new

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<sup>24</sup> Beattie.

international emphasis and concern in the new talks, it does not dismiss the results of this study - that disarmament is of decreasing importance to the present government. The MBFR and CSCE are important for the nations in Europe and thus, indirectly, the rest of the world, but there are important issues that involve other nations and that are more suitably discussed in the CCD. Examples are a chemical warfare ban and a comprehensive test ban. Canada's interest in these fields should not be waning for its security depends on the outcome.

#### The question of Canada's future role

It was clear, as mentioned previously, that Mr. Ignatieff was not happy with the External Affairs Department in their manner of dealing with disarmament both while he was Head and after he left Geneva. His dissatisfaction raises many interesting points and seems to be centered on the fact that External Affairs men are "birds of passage" who serve in a post only two or three years. This period is too short a time in Geneva where they must deal with expertise on complex matters of nuclear balance for which they are not equipped. The dual role of himself and Barton and the delegation's need for instructions from the Disarmament Division indicate to him a present playing down of disarmament. Unskilled External Affairs personnel must

deal with experts in the military at home and abroad who overbalance one side of the coin of security "weighing against disarmament for status quo." 25

The main failure Mr. Ignatieff attributed to Canada was its lack of sustained interest in an area in which it has a large stake. The ultimate solution is to take away the unilateral right of war-making, but in the meantime, the military balance should be kept as low as possible. Thus it seemed to him that Canada should show more, not less, interest. 26

As for Canada's domestic policy-making, Ignatieff has suggested that there be a "panel of defence in which the various interests involved (legal, economic, political, military) should be represented" for co-ordination purposes as there are "few people in Canada or elsewhere who have competence to make worthy contributions to discussions on weapons and disarmament." He concludes that Canada's delegation should be headed by a "tamed general in favour of disarmament or a good negotiator backed up with knowledgeable people and research." 27

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25 Ignatieff.

26 Ignatieff.

27 Ignatieff.

It may be wise to examine why Mr. Ignatieff alone is upset over the External Affairs Department's methods and why he feels it is not sending the best possible trained men to Geneva. Lt.-Gen. Burns, Mr. Martin and Mr. Diefenbaker, though wise and experienced men, are speaking mostly from personal experiences in the field which took place before Mr. Ignatieff became the CCD Head. As Head of the delegation, Mr. Ignatieff saw himself given fewer responsibilities and less prestige than his predecessor. Is he angry over this "discrimination", taking it merely as an insinuation that he is not as great an expert as Lt.-Gen. Burns? It may be so, but there is more. The fact that he considered his dual office as a tragic downplay of disarmament and the fact that he is campaigning for improvement in the External Affairs Department, even though he is no longer a member, seems to indicate that his criticisms flow out of a desire to see his nation do its best and not out of personal pique.

It would seem reasonable to conclude that Canada, though still a nation with influence and with men who are knowledgable and capable diplomats, has experienced an overall decline in interest and activities in the CCD. To restore its prestige Canada must again become fully concerned with disarmament, and arms control. Canada must send nuclear knowledgable men to Geneva. These men

must have free access to the Cabinet and be aided by national research. Both actions require a greater commitment to disarmament than is presently shown. The question of whether or not this is a proper role for Canada has already been answered by the government, for if Canada's hope for survival lies in preventing nuclear warfare by pressing for such agreements, <sup>28</sup> why not do so with all the energy and enthusiasm it had in 1962?

Why might it appear as if Canada has lost its forward surge and been replaced by Sweden? Perhaps, for the two reasons stated by Mr. Ignatieff. Sweden has established a Research Institute which is the envy of many nations and through research it is able to send to the Conferences men more capable, dedicated and knowledgeable in the field than does Canada.

Possible remedies for the situation consist in

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<sup>28</sup> "Canada's overriding defence objective must therefore be the prevention of nuclear war ... by working for arms control and disarmament agreements." Defence in the Seventies, op. cit., p. 6. "Canada should not rest content to see the major nuclear powers determine exclusively the pace of progress or lack of it in the field of arms control. Rather, Canada should pursue these arms-control objectives persistently and imaginatively in the contexts of the United States consultations with Canada and its other NATO allies concerning ... the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and the United Nations in New York." Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians: United Nations (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 15.

restoring the freedom Lt.-Gen. Burns had as the Head of the Delegation. Before that can be done, however, the Head must be as specialized and as knowledgeable as Burns was. This may mean extra training or rearranging the recruitment policy in the External Affairs Department or looking for a career man with a similar conscience. The remedy must also include the restoration of the office of the Head of the Delegation to an autonomous position distinct from the person of the Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva.

Perhaps the key problem in the solution proposed above is the training in the Department of the External Affairs. When one begins his career with the Department, one is trained to be a generalist and later may receive specialist training. The Department is opposed to excessive specialization for it believes that the true spirit of the profession requires a man of "varied abilities and interests who makes it his duty to apply himself to all aspects of Canadian life." <sup>29</sup> A Canadian diplomat must work as a member of a team and is moved from duty to duty as the Department sees fit. The individuals are thus required to "demonstrate a versatility not expected of officers

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<sup>29</sup> Day, op. cit., p. 68.

belonging to a larger governmental service." 30

This broad background in training and assignments has helped Canada become noted as a specialist of sorts, that is, a specialist in compromise. By insisting on a broad background the Department is able to comprehend both sides of an issue and gains experience as a mediator of quiet diplomacy. "Canadian foreign policy will be strong in the situations requiring compromise, negotiation, and mediating solutions in conflicts between other countries." 31

Marcel Cadieux, however, points out that changes may soon be required. He states that "as the service grows, as questions become more complex, and as the need for continuity becomes evident, there necessarily arise pressures which make inevitable some degree of specialization." 32 In the area of disarmament, the time for specialization is now. The questions are becoming more and more technically complex. Mr. Ignatieff warns that Canada must get experts in the field to be able to contribute profitably to the discussions. Research and training are needed to get

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<sup>30</sup> Day, op. cit., p. 113.

<sup>31</sup> R. Barry Farrell, The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Limited, 1969), p. 168.

<sup>32</sup> Cited in Day, op. cit., p. 62.

experts. Without change, Canada may continue to contribute less and less towards the talks till only the nuclear powers and nations like Sweden, with research organizations and skilled personnel, are able to comprehend all the knowledge required to make or reach agreements. To negotiate successfully "an expert knowledge of the milieu, and cordial personal relationships, can be decisive." 33

The problem, then, is to get specialists for an area who can also serve in other positions, otherwise they may be denied promotion to responsible positions in Ottawa which require a broader knowledge. Cadieux suggests that training begin as usual but at the middle period of his career, the individual be assigned an area of specialization for five, eight or even ten years. Thus, he is a specialist when needed, and is able to be a full member of the Department as well, by gaining broader knowledge before and after his specialization period. 34

Perhaps the time has come for the Department to study this proposal seriously and act swiftly to carry it out. If Canada's aim is to prevent nuclear war by pushing for arms control and disarmament measures, then it must send the best

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33 Day, op. cit., p. 32.

34 Ibid., p. 64.

men possible. This requires training and a rearranging of the Department of External Affairs posting procedures.

Canada, it seems, has had three capable leaders at the Disarmament Conferences and has had an important and effective role to play, though it never created a great public stir. The delegates worked quietly and well with all the other nations at the Conferences and helped in the formation and adoption of the treaties. Lt.-Gen. Burns had great freedom in his role and actually was the most influential person in forming governmental disarmament policy, because of his respected background and his free and unhindered relationship with a government and a Minister who shared his enthusiasm for disarmament. George Ignatieff had less freedom and only a small influence in policy formation, though he carried out and interpreted the government's policy in an effective manner. The relationship between himself and the government seemed strained though never openly hostile. Under William Barton, it seems that he has less freedom than Mr. Ignatieff though still enough not to restrict him completely in any creative efforts. It is possible that as the freedom of Canadian delegates decreased, Sweden's influence increased.

It particularly appears that the Trudeau government is not living up to its promise in 1971 to push international agreements on disarmament and arms control "persistently and

imaginatively." If Prime Minister Trudeau truly seeks to achieve Canadian security by decreasing the possibility of a nuclear attack near its borders, then much more must be done in that field, now.

#### Caveats and questions

Although the paper presents some interesting facts and suggestions, many elements affecting disarmament, the CCD and Canada's role in each, have not been dealt with in depth.

Perhaps the most serious handicap, in attempting to analyse the dynamics of the ENDC-CCD Conferences, concerns one larger question of the significance of the Conferences themselves. To put it in extreme form, the ENDC-CCD Conferences may have suffered from success. The co-chairmanship idea, so procedurally successful in the ENDC, has been carried to its logical conclusion in detente. Bilateral American-Soviet discussions, negotiations, agreements and world policing have, in a sense, made multilateral conferences obsolete. Since silence between the two super powers created the differences larger conferences were designed to resolve, perhaps it is not so surprising that as the nuclear giants begin to talk to each other the input of smaller powers is less significant. The SALT talks are one organizational expression of this new bilateral theme. As detente becomes more successful the United States and the Soviet Union no longer have much need of a mediator. Thus Canada's potential influence would necessarily decrease in

some areas. Moreover, issues that once seemed impassable are now being discussed in new forums - such as SALT, MFBR, CSCE and private bi-lateral conversations. This does not mean that the CCD is presently useless and should cease meeting, but rather that for the time being, international events have placed it in a shadow. Future events may bring it back to the spotlight.

The modified international political and organizational context necessarily affects assessments of activities within, or related to, the Conferences. For example, the study has suggested a continued decreasing emphasis on disarmament by the Canadian governments since 1962, as reflected in their relationship attitude to the ENDC-CCD delegates. Whether this represents a downgrading of disarmament, or reflects adaptations to detente dynamics, remains to be established. If disarmament is regarded by Canadian government as less important, it may simply be because disarmament in the seventies is not as important an international issue as it was in the early sixties. On the other hand, some research may suggest that a downgrading of disarmament may also be related to the personnel involved in disarmament policy formation. Varying attitudes on disarmament may be a result of different levels of experience in the field or because someone was simply looking for votes or publicity and used the topic of disarmament to gain prestige.

Ignatieff's hypothesis that Sweden is becoming a more significant actor in the international disarmament negotiations than Canada is an intriguing one. Certainly it would be useful to prove or disapprove the theory, especially as such a study would involve consideration of the relative political and technological creditability of Canada and Sweden in such forums. It may be true that Sweden has greater technologically research and more capable men than Canada in the field of disarmament but are nations as willing to listen to Sweden as they are to Canada? Why? Does Canada have greater influence because it can approach the United States easily? or because it has built up confidence in nations by its past performances?

This study has investigated some basic initial questions as to the Canadian role and contribution in international disarmament negotiations. It has also raised some very fundamental issues of the evolving significance of disarmament negotiations within of detente which can prove fruitful topics for future research.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A  
IMPORTANT DATES

- May 18 to June 29, 1899 - Tsar calls Disarmament Conference
- January 10, 1920 - League of Nations created
- November 12, 1921 to  
February 6, 1922 - Washington Naval Conference
- October 1, 1924 - Geneva Protocol presented to  
League of Nations
- March 12, 1925 - United Kingdom rejects Protocol
- June 17, 1925 - Geneva Protocol banning chemical  
warfare
- October 16, 1925 - Treaty of Locarno signed
- December 1, 1925 - Locarno Pact signed
- December 12, 1925 - Preparatory Commission for  
Disarmament Conference created
- May 17, 1926 - First meeting of the  
Preparatory Commission
- June 20 to August 4,  
1927 - Three Power Naval Conference

- February 6, 1928 - Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact
- August 27, 1928 - Canada signed above Pact
- April 22, 1930 - London Naval Treaty
- December 9, 1930 - Preparatory Commission submits Disarmament Draft Treaty to League
- February 2, 1932 - World Disarmament Conference opens
- July 23, 1932 - Germany threatens to leave Conference
- December 11, 1932 - France, United Kingdom and Italy issue statement on agreement with Germany's feelings
- October 14, 1933 - Germany leaves Conference
- June 11, 1934 - Last meeting of World Disarmament Conference
- August 14, 1941 - Atlantic Charter
- January 1, 1942 - Agreement to move British Cambridge nuclear research team to Canada
- August 21 to October 7, 1944 - Dumbarton Oaks Conference
- April 25 to June 25, 1945 - San Francisco Conference
- June 26, 1945 - United Nations Charter opened for signatures
- July 16, 1945 - US explodes first atomic bomb in New Mexico
- August 6, 1945 - US drops atomic bomb on Hiroshima
- November 8, 1945 - Canada ratifies UN Charter in New York
- November 15, 1945 - Tri-Party Declaration on Atomic Energy
- October 24, 1945 - UN Charter in force

- January 10, 1946 - UN's First Assembly
- January 24, 1946 - Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) established
- March 28, 1946 - Acheson-Lilienthal Report
- June 14, 1946 - Baruch Plan presented to AEC
- February 13, 1945 - Commission for Conventional Armaments (CCA) created
- September 23, 1949 - USSR explodes first atomic bomb
- April 27, 1950 - USSR leaves AEC and CCA
- January 11, 1952 - Disarmament Commission created
- March 14, 1952 - Disarmament Commission meets for the first time
- October 1, 1952 - UK explodes her first atomic bomb
- November 1, 1952 - US explodes hydrogen bomb
- August 20, 1953 - USSR explodes hydrogen bomb
- December 8, 1953 - Atoms for Peace Plan
- January 7, 1954 - USSR agrees to talks
- April 19, 1954 - Five-Power Sub-Committee created
- November 4, 1954 - USSR, Western powers co-sponsor draft to renew Disarmament Negotiations
- July 18, 1955 - Open Skies Plan
- May 15, 1957 - UK explodes hydrogen bomb
- July 29, 1957 - International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) created
- November 19, 1957 - USSR breaks off discussions
- July 2, 1958 - Three powers discuss test ban
- September 7, 1959 - Ten Nation Disarmament Committee (TNDC) created

- November 21, 1959 - UNGA approves of TNDC
- February 13, 1960 - France explodes atomic bomb
- March 15, 1960 - TNDC meets for first time
- May 1, 1960 - U-2 Affair
- June 27, 1960 - USSR, Eastern powers leave TNDC
- February 23, 1961 - Canada issues guidelines on Disarmament
- September 20, 1961 - Joint Declaration of Principles
- December 20, 1961 - Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) created
- March 14, 1962 - ENDC meets for the first time
- March 15, 1962 - USSR draft on General and Complete Disarmament (GCD)
- March 21, 1962 - Three Power Sub-Committee on Nuclear Test Ban created
- April 18, 1962 - US draft on GCD
- May 29, 1962 - Declaration against War Propaganda defeated
- August 27, 1962 - US, UK submit two proposals on nuclear test ban
- September 21, 1962 - Gromyko Umbrella
- October 22, 1962 - Cuban Missile Crisis
- April 5, 1963 - USSR agrees to discuss communication link with US
- June 10, 1963 - USSR agrees to discuss nuclear test ban in Moscow
- June 20, 1963 - Direct Communication Link Agreement
- August 5, 1963 - Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty
- September 20, 1963 - Space Treaty discussions begin

- April 20, 1964 - US, UK reduce fissile material production
- April 21, 1964 - USSR reduces fissile material production
- October 16, 1964 - Red China explodes atomic bomb
- August 17, 1965 - Western draft on Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
- September 24, 1965 - USSR draft on NPT
- December 14, 1966 - Treaty on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space passes UNGA
- January 27, 1967 - Above Treaty opens for signatures
- February 14, 1967 - The Treaty for the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America opens for signatures
- June 17, 1967 - Red China explodes hydrogen bomb
- August 24, 1967 - Joint draft on NPT
- October 10, 1967 - Treaty on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in force
- March 11, 1968 - NPT passes UNGA
- June 19, 1968 - Three powers promise safeguards via Security Council for NPT signatories
- July 1, 1968 - NPT signed by US, UK, USSR
- July 10, 1969 - UK draft banning biological warfare
- March 18, 1969 - USSR draft on peaceful uses of seabed
- May 22, 1969 - US draft on seabed
- July 3, 1969 - Japan and Mongolia join ENDC
- August 26, 1969 - Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) created

- October 7, 1969 - Joint draft on seabed
- November 17, 1969 - Strategic Arms Limitation Talks begin
- February 6, 1970 - Treaty for the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in force for fifteen nations
- March 5, 1970 - NPT in force
- December 7, 1970 - Seabed Treaty passes UNGA
- September 28, 1971 - Agreement on Biological Warfare Ban
- December 16, 1971 - Ban on Biological Warfare passes UNGA
- March 28, 1972 - USSR draft on chemical warfare
- May 18, 1972 - Seabed Treaty in force
- May 18, 1974 - India explodes atomic bomb

APPENDIX B  
CANADIAN MEMBERS  
ENDC/INF AND GCD/INF SERIES

DATE	PERSON AND POSITION							
REV. 1 MARCH 29, 1962	HOWARD GREEN LEADER OF DELEGATION	LT. GEN. BUJANS DEPUTY LEADER	J.E.G. HARDY COUNSELLER EX. AFF.	GROUP-CAPTAIN J.F.M. BELL. RCAP. NAT. DEF.	R.M. TAIT 2 <sup>ND</sup> SEC. EX. AFF.	A.E. GSTLIEB 2 <sup>ND</sup> SEC. EX. AFF.	C.T. STONE 3 <sup>RD</sup> SEC. EX. AFF.	
REV 2	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	A.K. LONGAIR SCIENTIFIC ADJ. NAT. DEF.
JUNE 1, 1962 REV 3	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
JULY 16, 1962 REV 4	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
AUG. 15, 1962 REV 5	"	"	"	"	"	1 <sup>ST</sup> SEC EX. AFF.	"	
SEPT. 3, 1962 REV 6	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	S.F. RAE AMBASSADOR PER. PER. TO UN IN GENOVA
NOV 26, 1962 REV 9	"	"	"	"	1 <sup>ST</sup> SEC. EX. AFF.	"	"	"
MAY 15, 1963 REV 12	PAUL MARTIN EX OFFICIAL HEAD	LEADER OF DELEGATION	P.D. LEE 3 <sup>RD</sup> SEC. EX. AFF.	"	"	"	"	"
JAN 21, 1964	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"

DATE	PERSON AND POSITION						
	PAUL MARTIN EX. OFFICIAL HEAD	LT. GEN DWYNS LEADER OF DELEGATION	P.D. LEE 3RD SEC EX. AFF.	GROUP CAPTIAN J.F.M. BELL REAR. NAT. DEP.	R.A. TAIT 1ST SEC. EX. AFF.	A.F. GONALBO 1ST SEC EX. AFF.	S.F. RAE AMBASSADOR PER. REP TO U.N IN GENEVA
REV 15	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
MARCH 10, 1964	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
REV 17	"	"	"	"	"	C.J. MARSHALL 2ND SEC EX. AFF.	"
JUNE 9, 1964	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
REV 21	"	"	2ND SEC EX. AFF.	"	"	1ST SEC. EX. AFF.	"
JULY 27, 1964	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
REV 22, CORR 1	"	"	"	"	J.P. BENSLEY 1ST SEC. PERM. MISSION TO U.N. IN GENEVA.	"	"
SEPT 2, 1965	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
REV 23	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
JAN 31, 1966	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
REV 29	"	"	L.J. WEBSTER COUNSELLOR. EX. AFF.	"	J.R. MORDEN 2ND SEC EX. AFF.	"	"
FEB 24, 1967	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
REV 30	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
MAY 19, 1967	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
REV 31 ADD 1	"	"	A. BEANIER 3RD SEC EX. AFF.	"	"	"	"
JULY 7, 1967	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
REV 32	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
SEPT 21, 1967	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
REV. 33	"	"	"	"	A.G. CAMPBELL MINISTER COUNSELLOR EX. AFF.	"	"
NOV 14, 1967	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
REV 34	"	"	2ND SEC EX. AFF.	"	"	"	"
JAN 19, 1968	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
REV 36	MITCHELL SHARP EX. OFFICIAL HEAD	"	"	"	"	"	"
JULY 18, 1968	"	GEORGE. IGNAFF LEADER OF DELEGATION	"	"	"	"	"
REV 37	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
MARCH 21, 1969	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
REV 38	"	"	"	"	R.W. CLARKE COUNSELLOR EX. AFF.	"	"
JULY 8, 1969	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
REV 40	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
OCT. 20, 1969	"	"	"	"	"	1ST SEC. EX. AFF.	"
REV 43	"	"	"	"	"	R.E. MORRE 3RD SEC EX. AFF.	"
JULY 1, 1970	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
REV 44	"	ALSO PER. REP TO U.N IN GENEVA	"	"	"	2ND SEC EX. AFF.	"
FEB 26, 1971	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
REV 51	"	WILLIAM BARTON LEADER, PER. REP. TO U.N.	"	"	"	D.R. MACPHER 3RD SEC EX. AFF.	"
FEB 27, 1973	"	"	"	"	"	"	"

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