

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA
FACTIONALISM IN THE INDIAN COMMUNIST PARTY:
THE INFLUENCE OF THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>CHAPTER</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
I. FACTIONALISM IN COMMUNIST PARTIES.....	1- 7
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CPI: 1920 - 1933.....	8- 32
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CPI: 1933 - 1958.....	33- 67
IV. THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT.....	68- 84
V. FROM OPPOSITION TO SPLIT: THE CPI 1958 - 1964.....	85-119
VI. FURTHER FACTIONALIZATION: THE CPI 1965 - 1968.....	120-155
VII. CONCLUSION.....	156-163
BIBLIOGRAPHY - BOOKS.....	164-166
BIBLIOGRAPHY - ARTICLES.....	167-179

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-ABSTRACT-

The thesis is an examination of factionalism within the Communist Party of India between 1920 and 1968, with special emphasis upon the period 1958 - 1968. Within the 1958 - 1968 period the author links factionalism within the Communist Party of India with the differences which emerge between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China in the post-1956 period.

The thesis is set out in seven chapters. Within the first chapter the nature of communist parties is discussed. The concern centres around the nature of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, authority in communist parties and the source of legitimacy within communist parties. This chapter forms a backdrop against which factionalism in the Communist Party of India can be examined.

Chapters two and three examine the history of factionalism in the Communist Party of India from 1920 - 1958. The study of these years reveals considerable faction building within the party. It also reveals, however, that faction building was controlled due to the existence of only one source of legitimacy to which factions could appeal for support. This source was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The fourth chapter is an examination of the Sino-Soviet rift. While it does not attempt to exhaust the subject, the chapter does examine major differences between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China on the issues of de-Stalini-

zation, the road to communism, world revolutionary strategy, and inter-bloc relations. It is the author's contention that the stalemate between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China has had a major effect on faction building in the Communist Party of India.

Chapters five and six are a study of factionalism in the Communist Party of India from 1958 - 1968. Throughout these years the author identifies issues over which faction building in the Communist Party of India is directly related to Sino-Soviet differences. Of equal importance is the fact that during these years factions sought legitimizing support for their positions from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China and, in most cases, received this support. The result of this was, that with two opposing sources of legitimacy, factionalism within the Communist Party of India could no longer be controlled. With stalemate between the factions, the Communist Party of India was forced to split. The party first split into two parties, the Communist Party of India - Right and the Communist Party of India Marxist in 1964; and then into three parties, the Communist Party of India - Right, the Communist Party Marxist, and the Communist Party of India Marxist-Leninist in 1968.

The concluding chapter looks at factionalism in political parties generally, and Indian parties specifically. It tries to explain the reasons for toleration of factions within other Indian parties and the lack of such toleration within the Communist Party of India. The differences between the sources of legitimacy in other

parties and in communist parties accounts for their differences in faction building and control of factions. This difference in the source of legitimacy is then related to the Sino-Soviet rift and the factionalization and splitting of the Communist Party of India.

CHAPTER 1

FACTIONALISM IN COMMUNIST PARTIES

Any survey of the literature on Communist Parties reveals a rich and long history of factionalism. It is my intention within the body of this thesis to look at the causes of factionalism within the Communist Party of India (CPI)¹ between the years 1958 and 1968 with special reference to the Sino-Soviet Rift. To do so some theoretical background is necessary before discussing the specific Party in question.

Prior to discussing theory, it must be realized that I am limiting the thesis to one dimension of the factors which have potential for causing factionalism in the CPI. Political parties, like all institutions, fall prey to and often participate in the diverse factors present in the country in which the party exists. India has many such divisive factors - regionalism, linguistic differences, religious differences and caste - to mention only a few. As the country has been in crisis throughout the Twentieth century, all of these factors have been important and all have effected the CPI to some degree. For this reason it must be realized that, while some mention of these factors will be made, no attempt has been made to pursue them in a systematic manner.

The mainstream of Communist Parties is to be found in the ideology of Marx, Lenin and Stalin.² Due to the interdependence implied by

1. The Communist Party of India will be referred to throughout the thesis as the CPI.
2. Ideology is being defined as "... a belief system ... configuration of ideas and attitudes in which elements are bound together by some sort of constraint of functional interdependence". Joseph Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967) P. 20. I have used basic definitions and concepts developed by Nyomarkay in this first

ideology, there is an unavoidable framework for analysis which defines ultimate objectives with which one must relate. Programmes, strategies and tactics thus follow as a matter of course theoretically.

In Marxist - Leninist ideology, class conflict occupies the position of central importance. Understanding of the prevailing situation in a country therefore means understanding the specific class relationships of that country. This understanding is the central problem at any given time. Once the class relationships are defined, strategies and tactics can be set out.³

With different strategies the Party leads different groups of classes. The strategies, and the individual classes led, change from one phase of historical time to another. Thus, as an example, in Russia Lenin proposed a strategy of two phases, first leading four classes and then three classes in 1905.⁴ Lenin developed two tactics as appropriate to particular strategies. The first of these is the united front from above. The objective here is formal alliance by the Party with non-communist political organizations (including such semi-political organizations as trade unions and student organizations). Pressure is to be

chapter due to their clarity. Unlike many writers he has made a careful examination of the differences between ideological and charismatic authority extending and developing the basic concepts of Max Weber.

3. Strategy defines the nature of the struggle between classes in a society as a whole. It entails defining the long-term aims of action. In a word, it is the whole plan for winning the revolutionary war.

Tactics, on the other hand, are the plan for winning a revolutionary battle. See Joseph Stalin, Foundations of Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950) Pp. 114-115 & 117

4. See V. I. Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social Democracy", Selected Works of Lenin, Volume 1 Progress Publishing, Moscow, (1967) Pp. 458-566

exerted upon these organizations through collaboration with their leaders.

The second tactic is the united front from below. This tactic calls for exertion of pressure on other organizations from within and without. This is done by direct appeals to the organization's constituents and followers.

Decisions in Communist Parties are theoretically reached by the principle of democratic centralism as presented by Lenin in his 1906 "Tactical Platform for the Unification Congress of the PSDRS". This principle was a response to the need to create an organization which could make correct decisions in a democratic manner with a maximum of speed, efficiency, security and a minimum of friction. Such an organization is a synthesis of authority and democracy which requires the functional juxtaposition of unanimity and dissent. There appeared to Lenin to be a natural force for unanimity among Party members since the members were felt to be striving for the same goals. This unanimity would cause spontaneous self-discipline among individual members and hold the Party together in a central way. The result of this would be a maximum of control within a democratic framework. Unanimity of goals would thus lead to unanimity of decision-making.

In practice democratic centralism would allow for full discussion prior to the announcement of a decision. Once the decision was announced, however, it would have to be accepted as completely binding on all Party members. In this manner, decisions would acquire the force of law.

I am not implying here that as a result of the unanimity rule all dissenting discussion would be merely a hollow exercise. Rather,

the final unanimous decision might be a result of a compromise in points of view. During times of split opinion the unanimity rule would demand such a compromise.⁵

A major problem in the principle of democratic centralism is the assumption that there exists unanimity concerning the Party's goals. While this may be true for long-term goals such as the establishment of socialism, it can hardly be the case with short-term goals. Short-term goals continually change as a result of circumstances, and with them methods of execution and programmes must change if they are to be successful. If, however, democratic centralism means that there can be no criticism, how are these policies going to change in accordance with the new situations and goals?

A policy problem, or even an analysis of prevailing circumstances, must be considered a settled question as long as the leadership continues to consider it. Any theoretical or practical problem can therefore be debated only after the leadership has decided that it is to be debated.⁶

While this problem is serious enough on the level of a single party it is likely to arise more often and in greater complication on an international level. Consider the fact that the Communist Internationals have been composed of parties from many different countries. All of these countries may be said to have been at different places in Marx's historical development at any given time. How, with so many different circumstances, could unanimity arise on strategies, tactics and programmes? If a compromise was struck, which as Meyer points out is a possibility, it would have to be struck in only the vaguest way, thus

5. For an example of this see Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962) P. 95
6. Meyer, Leninism P. 95

leading to misunderstanding or ambivalence. Alternatively, each Party could be allowed to act according to its interpretation of its circumstances. While this might be effective at the state level, it would defeat the entire idea of a unanimous International. A final solution exists wherein the most powerful party, or bloc of parties, would determine the "correct" path. The histories of the Internationals indicate that policies have wavered between ambivalent directives which have left individual parties free to follow their own path on the one hand, and directives from powerful parties or blocs adopted as the "correct" path on the other. The principle of democratic centralism thus encounters serious practical difficulties both on the national party level and the International level. Such differences, of course, are conducive to factionalism.

Since, with its announcement, a decision acquires the force of law, any post facto criticism of the decision becomes a breach of party discipline. Such criticism constitutes a questioning of the correctness of the interpretation of the ideology by which the decision was made. Additionally, such criticism would also, ipso facto, be a challenge to the legitimacy of the party's leadership.⁷ In any party, however, there will be disagreement. Such disagreement, when it labours under a situation like the unanimity rule, eventually must lead to faction⁸ formation.

7. The authority of a party's leadership is legitimized by the leadership's interpretation of ideology. A challenge to that interpretation thus implies that the leadership is not competent to be the party's authority. See Nyomarkay, Chrisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party, P. 21
8. A faction may be defined as "... a group of people joined together to further some goal in opposition to some other group or groups within the same party". Nyomarkay, Chrisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party, P. 35

When factions arise in Communist Parties, as I have pointed out, the leader's authority and interpretation of the ideology is challenged. Thus, when a dissenting faction arises the dissenter's position must be rejected. If the dissenter's position is accepted as correct, either the party leader is displaced, or the faction must split off from the party. In the latter instance the dissenting group can no longer be called a faction.

The character of conflict within political parties is contingent upon the character of the party taken as a whole. The nature of internal party conflict and conflict resolution, is conditioned by the nature of the party's cohesive forces. In Communist Parties the focus of authority is Marxist-Leninist ideology. This being the case, in factional disputes, all factions must appeal to the ideology for legitimacy of their positions. Thus, all disputes become fundamental disputes.

Within ideologically based parties such as the GPI, the leader's authority rests on the ideology not the personal qualities of the leader:

Thus, regardless of how absolute their power may be, leaders of ideologically legitimated movements are always careful to justify their power ideologically and to appear mere instruments of the ideology. 9

Before turning to the body of the thesis, which is the notion of factionalism as it applies to the GPI and the Sino-Soviet Rift, a few words should be said about sources. The thesis is set out in seven chapters. Chapters two and three are an examination of the development

and sources of factionalism in the CPI from 1920 - 1958. Materials for these chapters come mainly from the Feltrinelli Collection, a collection of Communist International documents; Windmiller and Overstreet's Communism in India; and, from M. R. Masani's The Indian Communist Party. The years from 1920 - 1958 are important in the development of different types of factionalism and set the stage for the type of factionalism which became prevalent after 1958.

The fourth chapter deals specifically with the Sino-Soviet Rift. While it by no means exhausts the issues between the two Parties, it does deal with the main elements of difference which in turn effect the CPI.

The fifth and sixth chapters deal with factionalism during the ten year period from 1958 - 1968. These chapters are an in-depth study of the development of CPI factionalism and the influence of the Sino-Soviet Rift. Chapters five and six are written almost exclusively from CPI public documents. The documents are to be found in the Asian Recorder which is a monthly publication of all events, news articles and important documents from Asia. This volume is extremely valuable as it is the only continuous source of public documents in english of asian communist parties on a monthly, or even yearly, basis.

The final and concluding chapter seeks to do two things. First, it draws some general conclusions about the causes of faction building in Communist Parties. These are conclusions which are probably applicable to all Communist Parties. Second, it draws specific conclusions about the causes of faction building in the CPI and the input of the Sino-Soviet Rift into this process.

CHAPTER II

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CPI 1920 - 1933

Factionalism in the CPI was present even at the Party's inception during the Third International Congress, 19 July - 7 August 1920. While officially no CPI yet existed, M. N. Roy, in a debate with Lenin over the Colonial Question, laid the basis for factional disputes for the next eight years. During the Congress both Lenin and Roy submitted theses on the Colonial Question. These differed in the interpretation of the revolutionary potential accorded the Indian middle class. According to Lenin's draft:

In respect to the more backward countries and nations with prevailing feudal or patriarchal and patriarchal-peasant relations, it is necessary to bear in mind especially:
a) The necessity of all Communist parties to render assistance to the bourgeois-democratic movement; especially does this duty fall upon the workers of such countries upon which the backward nations are colonially or financially dependent. 11

Roy wanted part of this statement deleted:

...the paragraph according to which Communist Parties must assist only bourgeois-democratic liberation movements in eastern countries. The Communist International should assist exclusively the Communist Party of India, and the Communist Party of India must devote itself exclusively to the organization of the broad popular masses for the struggle for the class interests of the latter. 12

Lenin's thesis was altered replacing "bourgeois-democratic liberation movement" with "revolutionary movements of liberation". The signi-

10. Roy was an Indian Marxist-Leninist who, between 1920-28, was the leader of the CPI and interpreter of India to the Comintern.
11. SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL, PROCEEDINGS, P. 478
12. SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL: reported and interpreted by the official newspapers of Soviet Russia. (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE: WASHINGTON, D.C., GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1920) P. 43

ficance of this change for Lenin is questionable as a nationalist movement in his eyes was, by definition, bourgeois-democratic. Behind the word change lay significant differences in strategy and tactics. These differences would lead the International and the CPI down different paths. Such differences in interpretation of a nation's stage of historical development by the International on one hand, and the domestic party on the other, often leads to tensions which produce factionalism. Moreover, the International did not clearly indicate which of these theses it deemed as correct, thus, either line could be followed with a degree of legitimacy:

Both Lenin's 'theses' which aimed at the unconditional support of the struggle of all Eastern nations against Western imperialism, and Roy's 'thesis', which insisted upon the hopelessness of such a policy, were voted together by the congress. 13

The word change reflected differences in Roy's and Lenin's interpretations of India. Roy felt that there were two movements in India. The first was a nationalistic bourgeois-democratic movement seeking political independence under a bourgeois order. The second was a worker's and peasant's movement which sought liberation from the bourgeois order. Roy felt that only the latter movement was worthy of Comintern support. This support should take the form of the establishment of a Communist Party to organize the masses and build soviet republics. Implicit in this view is the assumption that India was at a highly developed historical stage rather than a feudal stage. Moreover, this analysis has as its primary focus India and the belief

13. Franz Borkenau WORLD COMMUNISM (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1962) P. 292

that the bourgeois classes were not revolutionary. Roy probably believed that an attempt to lead the peasants, workers, and bourgeoisie together would weaken the Communist Party and be a betrayal to the peasants and workers.

Lenin's analysis differed in several respects. Where Roy offered a united front from below, Lenin offered a united front from above. In the from above tactic communists would work through and lead the bourgeois-democratic movement, this movement being 'objectively' revolutionary and anti-imperialist. Lenin's analysis implies a much lower stage (eg: feudal) of historical development to India. More important is the fact that Lenin's analysis was geared towards the U.S.S.R.'s needs, not specifically India's. The tactical direction of domestic parties by the International for the purposes of meeting the U.S.S.R.'s needs has been a constant source of factionalism in domestic parties.

Throughout 1920 - 1927 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
14
(CPSU) had been trying to assess the position of Great Britain towards the U.S.S.R. Lenin and the Politbureau believed that Britain was firmly behind intervention in the Russian Civil War on the side of the White Army. In an attempt to tie Britain down "the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Comintern tried to hit back at British
15
positions in Asia...". Thus, in supporting bourgeois-democratic movements in Asia, the CPSU could tie Britain down without invoking the kind of reaction which might come from Britain if the CPSU spon-

14. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union will be referred to as the CPSU

15. Isaac Deutscher THE PROPHET ARMED: TROTSKY; 1879-1921 (New York: Vintage Books, 1954) Pp. 461-462

sored the peasant-working class movements alone. In effect, even if the CPSU wished to sponsor proletarian movements, the consideration of British reaction prevented her from doing so. The result of this was the ambivalent policy direction which ensued from the Third International Congress. Considerations of possible British reaction on the part of the CPSU lasted until 1927 at which time the British Government, which had contained a strong wing that argued for invasion of the U.S.S.R., broke relations with the U.S.S.R. Towards the end of the 1920 - 1927 period, policy considerations were also coloured by the development of the Trotsky Opposition Bloc in the CPSU. This dimension will be discussed later.

Throughout 1921 Roy was forced to clarify his position owing to a challenge to his leadership by Virendranath Chattopadhyaya. ^{16.} Chattopadhyaya, who had good connections in the Indian Congress Party, was known to adhere to the from above tactic which Lenin had suggested. He had already submitted a plan to organize Indian revolutionaries in Europe and had been invited to Moscow to discuss the plan. As a result of these discussions, the Comintern pledged to support him if he could produce a mandate signed by leading Indian revolutionaries. Chattopadhyaya was successful in obtaining this mandate and returned to Moscow in April of 1921. By this time, however, Roy had been able to convince the Russian leaders that Chattopadhyaya was a nationalist, not a communist, and as such, did not deserve their support.

During 1920 - 1921 Indian politics became increasingly radical.

16. Chattopadhyaya was head of an exile group of Marxist-Leninists from India in Berlin known as the Indian Berlin Independence Committee.

In these events Roy found confirmation of the position he had put forth at the Third International. In 1922 he restated and elaborated his position in India in Transition. Here he took argument with the idea that India's socio-economic structure was feudal. He claimed that the major political factor was the growing, well established bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie was permitted only limited economic opportunity in India's growing industrialization. This had resulted in the beginning of a political struggle against British imperialism. The rise of Indian bourgeois nationalism was paralleled, he claimed, by the rising political consciousness of the masses. The British, fearing a union of the two movements, gave political and economic concessions to the bourgeoisie to weaken its nationalism. These caused the bourgeoisie to vacillate and share in the exploitation of the masses. In this way, the bourgeoisie would see the masses as a threat and ultimately join the imperialists thus giving up their revolutionary role.

During the writing of India in Transition Roy's actions displayed the ambivalence found in the Third Comintern theses. His attempts to convince the Comintern of the correctness of his position had failed. Thus, on the one hand he worked within the Congress Party¹⁷ as if he intended to capture the organization in accordance with stated Comintern policy and Lenin's thesis. On the other hand, at Congress' 36th Annual Session he put forth an economic policy to raise the worker's and peasant's standard of living, a policy which he knew the Congress could not accept. His plan was to form an Opposition Bloc in Congress and

17. This was the major party in India which worked for the independence of the country from Great Britain.

win over liberal Congressmen. In line with this plan Roy told Congressmen that their party must show itself to be a party of landlords, middle and upper classes, or of workers and peasants. This tactic was designed to split the Congress. In the October 1922 issue of ¹⁸
Advanced Guard he advised Congress:

...the revolutionary factions believing in mass action should form an Opposition Bloc within Congress... which will eventually grow into the revolutionary party of the people destined to be the leader of the final struggle. 19

In effect Roy was trying to follow both of the Comintern's lines at the same time. By degrees, however, he started to pursue a position closer to his own beliefs at Congress' next session at Gaya.

The 37th session of Congress at Gaya promised a showdown between Congress elements who believed in non-cooperation with the British and those in Congress who opposed this view. In December, Advanced Guard laid the groundwork for aligning Congress with the workers and peasants in an article entitled "Programme for the National Congress". The programme was so sweeping that Congress could not accept it. Roy confided:

...it is a foregone conclusion that the Congress as presently constituted will not adopt this programme. And this failure of theirs will expose their true character. This will open before us the way for the call for a new party of the masses with its own leadership and own programme having for its object the capture of the Congress, the traditional organ for the nationalist struggle. 20

Roy wished to expose Congress' bourgeois leadership as reactionary to its followers and, in so doing, prove to the Comintern the correctness

18. This was the official CPI organ in 1922

19. Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller COMMUNISM IN INDIA (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960) P. 46

20. Overstreet and Windmiller, COMMUNISM IN INDIA. P. 49

of his analysis of the Indian bourgeoisie. Even with these tactics Roy was unable to change the Comintern's position at its Fourth Congress, 7 November - 3 December.

After the Fourth Congress Roy started to pursue the course he had been recommending with increasing consistency. On 15 February 1923 ²¹
Vanguard was called the "Central Organ of the Communist Party" for the first time. This issue appraised the Congress as a "bourgeois political organ". In Roy's estimation:

...the organization of the party of workers and peasants had become an indispensable necessity. The Communist Party of India is called upon by history to play this historic role. 22

Roy now saw Congress as three parties; one of reformers, one of reactionaries, and one which was the "...political expression of the working masses". This tactic could not help but come into conflict with the CPSU's need to avoid head-on confrontation with Great Britain.

In June Roy called for the establishment of a legal Communist Party and an illegal Worker's and Peasant's Party (WPP). ²³ The latter party would send representatives to, but not seek formal membership with, the Comintern. The WPP would seek a "working alliance" with bourgeois national parties during the anti-imperialist struggle. Interestingly, this strategy, which contradicted Comintern policy, was well received by Kolorov at the Third (Enlarged) Plenum of the Comintern. The Russian official sent a message to a projected WPP

21. Advanced Guard had been renamed Vanguard.

22. M. N. Roy, "The Indian National Congress", Imprecor III, (March 1923) P. 127

23. Worker's and Peasant's Parties will be abbreviated WPP.

conference on 14 June stating:

It is clear that the workers and peasants can no longer remain as adjunct to bourgeois nationalism. 24

At the same time, the plenum cited the Indian bourgeoisie as a revolutionary factor, and called for full co-operation on the part of the CPI. This ambivalence on the part of the International probably reflected two different points of view within the Russian leadership; the position of the majority on the one hand, and of the Trotski minority on the other. Russian fear of British reaction to open communist activity seems to have been justified, for in the summer of 1923, the British government all but neutralized the CPI with mass arrests which led to the Peshawar Conspiracy Trial.

Roy now found himself in direct and obvious conflict with the Comintern which, for its part, sought to bring him into line at the Fifth Plenum 17 June 1924. The pre-Congress report limited discussion of India to the tasks of the CPI. The Party was charged with restoring the national liberation movement to a revolutionary footing. A "national people's party" was to be established leading urban petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals, the poor, the revolutionary peasantry, small clerks, and advanced workers. Additionally, the CPI was to get influence over the trade unions.

As if to insure the firmness of its directives, the Comintern stated prior to the meeting that it would expand "direct contacts with national movements for emancipation". In India this would take the

24. King - Emperor vs. Nalini Bhushan DasGupta, Muhammad Shaukat Usmani, Muzaffan Ahmad, and Shripat Amrit Dange. (Allahabad, Superintendent Government Press) 1924? Exhibit No. 15, P. 32

form of direct contact with the National Congress Party. Roy countered with the argument that the Comintern should establish direct contact with the masses, not the Congress. Roy stood alone in this objection, and the final resolution called for "... the necessity for winning over the revolutionary movements" and "direct contact between the Executive²⁵ and the national emancipation movements of the Orient".

The Fifth Congress introduced a final element into the picture which would check Roy and challenge his leadership of the CPI. This was a directive to Communist Parties in imperialist countries to establish close relations with Communist Parties in their respective colonial countries. If fulfilled, this would mean close work between the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB)²⁶ and the CPI. This posed a serious threat to Roy's leadership as the CPGB followed the Comintern line strictly and had more influence in the International than did the CPI. The Fifth Congress dispelled any doubt about the Comintern's disposition to the line which Roy had been following. The report of the Congress went on to say that the Indian movement was in transition, and called on the CPI to work within the left wing of the Congress and other parties.

The CPGB acted quickly on the Fifth Congress' directive. In early 1925 it sent one of its members to India to review the situation. He reported back that no Indian Communist Party existed at all, whereupon the CPGB established an Indian Bureau staffed with Indian revolutionaries. This was followed by the calling of an Oriental Conference

25. Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, P. 71

26. The Communist Party of Great Britain will be referred to as the CPGB.

without Roy's knowledge. The Conference, which was dominated by the CPGB, put Roy on the defensive, and tensions were only settled by the intervention of the Comintern. The Comintern's Colonial Bureau outlined Roy's role to the CPGB on 25 September. The lines of authority, however, were not clearly drawn. The tensions which these activities caused were never completely dissolved, for as the trial judge at the Meerut Conspiracy Trial pointed out:

Roy definitely wanted to keep control or guidance of communist activities in India in his own hands and was inclined to criticize the efforts of the CPGB as based on insufficient understanding of the problems. This view seems to have been partially accepted by the Communist International.

27

The CPGB had taken over direction of CPI policy in order to bring it into alignment with Comintern policy. Comintern policy was predicated on the foreign policy needs of the U.S.S.R. Direction of the policy of one Communist Party by another Communist Party has been a basic cause of faction building in Communist Parties.

The differences between Roy's position and the position of the Comintern are clearly reflected in a comparison of Roy's Future of Indian Politics and R. Palme Dutt's Modern India. In Future of Indian Politics Roy continued his stand against support of the Indian nationalist movement. The bourgeois bloc, he argued, was seeking united front with the imperialists to prevent revolution. The workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie were the only revolutionaries in India. This being the case, the social basis of the national movement had

27. Meerut Sessions Court Proceedings of the Meerut Conspiracy Case. (Meerut: Saraswati Press) 1929 Pp. 69-70
28. R. Palme Dutt, an Indian by birth, is a long-standing member of the CPGB and one of the major contributors to the development of Indian Communism.

changed demanding a new class alignment. Strategically, this would be an alignment of proletariat, peasantry, petty-intellectuals and small traders.

Henceforth a new fight for national freedom in India becomes a class struggle approximating to the final struggle.

29

Tactically, to play their role, these classes must have a party of their own - the CPI. The Party would have no room for democratic allies, these would be part of a larger party which would combine all different revolutionary elements from the various classes in common struggle. Roy rejected Congress as this larger party calling for a new party minus the bourgeoisie. What was needed was a new mass party containing all ant-imperialist elements for the independence struggle.

Dutt's Modern India is in striking contrast to Roy's analysis.

Dutt did not see the entire bourgeoisie as unrevolutionary. Tactically, he felt that:

The immediate important task is to carry on the battle of clarification within both Congress and the Swaraj Party, the Left Nationalist elements should gather themselves around a popular nationalist programme. 30

Differences between Roy and the International were fast coming to a zenith. In 1927 the CPGB had sent a series of agents to India. Through their diligent work the CPI was building a head of steam. The process of CPGB agents working in India could only make the differences between the Comintern's approach and Roy's approach more glaring.

In November Roy attended the Seventh Plenum of the Comintern, 22 November - 16 December. Again Roy called for withdrawal of support

29. M. N. Roy Future of Indian Politics. (London: R. Bishop, 1926) P. 90

30. R. Palme Dutt Modern India (London: CPGB, 1927) P. 148

from the bourgeois movement, this time in the context of China. The
Chinese Communist Party (CPC) found itself in the difficult position
of trying to support a peasant revolution on the one hand, and work
co-operatively with the bourgeois Kuomintang (KMT) on the other. Roy,
joining the voices of the Trotsky Opposition Bloc in the CPSU felt:

...the Chinese Revolution had reached a critical moment
in which it must strike out a new course and a fetish
should not be made of the alliance with the Kuomintang.

The CPC, following the Comintern line, disagreed. As one of its
delegates pointed out, the Chinese

...commission is unanimous against the demand of the Russian
Opposition that the communists should leave the Kuomintang.

I have noted earlier that the Comintern at its Third Congress
passed contradictory resolutions, one to work with bourgeois movements
and the other to work without and against such movements. These two
resolutions, and the way in which they were applied, led to ambi-
valence in Comintern policy and in the policies of fraternal parties.
The Seventh Plenum marks the end of this marriage of incompatible and
contradictory policies. In the last analysis, one of the paths would
have to be dropped if the other was to succeed. At the Seventh Plenum
the weight of decision clearly came down on the side of working with
the bourgeois movements. The test case for this policy was China and
the Chinese Revolution. Of equal importance, beyond theoretical con-
siderations, was the presence of a struggle within the CPSU between

31. The Communist Party of China will be referred to as the CPC.
32. The Kuomintang will be referred to as the KMT.
33. M. N. Roy Revolution and Counter Revolution in China (Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers, 1946) P. 538n
34. Imprecor VII, January 27, 1927, P. 174
35. See page 9

the Left Opposition led by Trotsky and the dominant faction led by Stalin. The Left Opposition supported the position that communist parties should not work with bourgeois movements, while the majority supported the position that there should be such co-operation. The consideration of the struggle within the CPSU is extremely important in discussing Comintern policy and faction building. Often factions are built as a result of competing analyses of strategy and tactics within the CPSU. Thus, one faction of a Communist Party will support one analysis from one faction of the Russian Party, while a second faction will support a competing analysis.

Trotsky and the Left Opposition believed that the next Chinese movement would be peasant and proletarian in nature. If this was the case, they argued, then these events should be prepared for immediately. The dominant group in the CPSU felt that the CPC was too weak to risk rupture with the left wing of the KMT in 1927. Such a policy would even alienate some of the CPC's present supporters, especially the left wing of the KMT. In effect, Trotsky was challenging Stalin's interpretation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. In all of this Roy's position became impossible as his analysis closely paralleled Trotsky's. After the Seventh Plenum Roy was sent to China by the Comintern. This move seems calculated to remove him from the Indian scene on the one hand, and to place him squarely in the middle of the Chinese situation, a situation in which he would lose all credibility when the CPC split from the KMT and Trotsky was purged from the CPSU. In these circumstances Roy's position would be equated with Trotsky's and both would be blamed for the events in China.

While Roy was in China the CPGB took advantage of his absence to

hold a Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in Brussels. This Congress was attended by, among others, three moderate Indian trade-unionists whose ideas were known to differ from Roy's. The CPGB was now consolidating the CPSU policy position in India.

Roy returned to Moscow in August of 1927 at the height of the struggle between Trotsky and Stalin. In July, when Trotsky and Zinoviev were purged from the CPSU, Roy's position became critical. With Trotsky's position defeated Roy's position was also defeated. After leaving Moscow Roy published an article entitled "The Lessons of the Chinese Revolution"³⁶ in which he drew conclusions for the Indian scene. In this article he stated that the bourgeoisie in colonial areas were counter-revolutionary and that the only successful revolution must be agrarian in nature. In his estimation, only a working class with its own independent party (Communist) could make a successful revolution.

While events in China seemed to vindicate Roy's position, such vindication was not forthcoming due to the power struggle in the CPSU. These events indicate the degree to which Comintern policy had come to hinge on the needs, external and internal, of the CPSU rather than the objective circumstances of colonial nations. Subjugation of the policies of colonial Communist Parties to the needs of the CPSU has been a major cause of faction building in Communist Parties.

In March of 1928, with the reversal in China and the Trotsky Opposition safely out of the way, the Comintern opened up the question of

36. It is interesting to note the similarity between this article and Trotsky's Problems of the Chinese Revolution published in 1932

the bourgeoisie by the publication of an article in *Imprecor* by Eugene Varga.³⁷ Varga claimed that British policy in India in recent years was geared to slowing down Indian industrialization. The Indian bourgeoisie objected to this action, but did so by trying to improve their position in the Empire. In so doing they gave up their revolutionary role. Varga's article signals the beginning of a shift in Comintern policy.

The Varga article and the position it posited came into conflict with the April-March 1928 meeting of the Comintern's Indian Commission. Dutt had stated in June that British policy was aimed at securing "...industrialization under British control".³⁸ Dutt felt that the important question in India was the disposition towards Congress. He had specifically stated that the role of the bourgeoisie was not yet over. It was the "...task of the mass movement to exploit to the maximum the opportunities presented by bourgeois resistance..."³⁹ before the bourgeoisie turned counter-revolutionary. In their 508 page report, which served as the basis of the Sixth World Congress, the Comintern contradicted Dutt. The report stated that the Indian petty-bourgeoisie was unreliable and that the big bourgeoisie would dominate it in an effort to control the masses. The weak point of the WPP, the report claimed, was that it acted like a left wing of the Congress, not an independent party. It cautioned against the WPP becoming a substitute for the CPI, and indicated that the Comintern would soon withdraw support from the WPP.

37. Eugene Varga was a CPSU economist

38. R. Palme Dutt "Notes of the Month", Labour Monthly X Great Britain June 1928, P. 326

39. R. Palme Dutt "Notes of the Month", P. 335

Unlike earlier Congresses, the Sixth World Congress (July 17 - 1 September, 1928) was well represented by Indian delegates. These delegates either lacked a mandate or had a mandate from different sections of the WPP, thus there was much confusion over credentials. This confusion reflected the situation of confusion within the Party in India. None of the delegates had a CPI mandate.

During the Congress Bukharin set forth the Russian position during the debate on the Colonial Question. He made it clear that the bourgeoisie would not play a revolutionary role for any length of time. The main report was delivered by Otto Vilhelm Kuusiner.⁴⁰ He put forth a three class strategy and refuted Varga's argument. He claimed that the big bourgeoisie was "National reformist" while the urban petty-bourgeoisie and the intellegencia had a role to play only in the "national movement". He also criticized the WPP as drifting away from the communists and losing contact with the masses. Kuusiner's report caught the CPGB off guard and they resisted it throughout. Dutt claimed that the WPP's main feature was:

...that they are forming an independent route through which communists are finding their way to the masses. 41

Moreover, he claimed that the communists could still use the bourgeoisie towards developing mass revolution. The Indian delegation split over the analysis of the Comintern and that of the CPGB. Factionalism is often fostered by differing analyses which result from a change in policy and acceptance of that policy by all parties. In this case the CPGB, formally in step with Comintern policy, was still

40. Kuusiner was the main interpreter of the colonial situation during this and latter Congresses.

41. Overstreet and Windmiller Communism in India. P. 115

espousing the old policy while the Comintern itself had changed policy.

The New Colonial Thesis was true to Russian needs and reflected Russian experience in China. The CPSU was forced by the reversal in China to re-evaluate its Colonial Strategy in light of the failure in China and the need to support revolutionary movements abroad. At the same time the leadership now felt secure in doing this since the challenge to its legitimacy was now past. The new Thesis called for a three class strategy based on the assumption that the Indian revolution was in an agrarian phase. The declining bourgeois nationalism allowed the British to hinder industrialization, while the poor peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie were allies of the proletariat "...under the influence of active revolutionary forces"⁴². Tactically, any bloc with the bourgeoisie was to be rejected, although temporary agreement or union was permitted in anti-imperialist demonstrations. Lines between communists and petty-bourgeoisie were to be clearly drawn. At all other times the bourgeoisie (Congress) was to be criticized. Organizationally, the WPP's were to be dropped since communists could not build on the fusion of two classes. As a first task a single, illegal CPI was to be established. The Fifth Congress directive for European Communist Parties to pay attention to building up colonial Communist Parties was stressed.

Between 1928 and 1933 conflicting advice and ambivalence strangled the Indian Communist movement. In large part the conflicting advice came from the CPSU, the Comintern, the CPGB, M.N. Roy and the CPC. The CPSU and Comintern followed the same line, especially as Stalin completed the consolidation of his power in the International. The CPGB

42. Overstreet and Windmiller Communism in India. P. 119

was still giving advice on the basis of the 1920-27 Comintern policy. Roy's advice was a conflicting and contradictory mixture of all approaches, while the CPC started giving advice on the basis of its post-1927 experience.

During 1928 the CPI had put a great deal of work into the WPP's, holding the first WPP conference 21-24 December. The conference called for strengthening the organization, calling itself "...the only organization which has a correct policy and can unite and lead all the mass revolutionary forces in the country".⁴³ The existence of the party, not to mention its programme, contradicted the Sixth Congress' decisions. One CPGB member argues that this contradiction was a result of the Comintern's bureaucracy refusing to seriously accept the new line of the Sixth Congress.

Indian communists may have failed to heed Moscow's directives due to the realization of divisions within the Comintern over the strategy and tactics of the new line. They may have also been aware of the struggle in the CPSU between Stalin and the right opposition, a struggle which continued for six months. Moreover, the success of the WPP in India and the encouragement of the CPGB helped support the continued existence of the WPP. One CPGB member has commented:

This (the WPP) is a two class party... As a form of organization it was expressly condemned in the Colonial Thesis of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International... But this Worker's and Peasant's Congress, the speeches at it, and its decisions, its resolutions all give an unmistakable feeling of a real conscious mass movement for the first time in India, a real proletarian awakening. 44

43. "The Political Situation in India: Thesis of the Worker's and Peasant's Party of India". Labour Monthly XI, (Great Britain), March, 1929, p. 345

44. R. Page Arnot How Britain Rules India (London: CPGB, 1929) P. 30

On December 27-29 the WPP leaders reconstituted themselves as the CPI and met in Calcutta to discuss the new Comintern line. They decided to seek formal affiliation with the Comintern, but decided to accept the new Thesis only as a "...basis for work".⁴⁵ The new Thesis would be changed to fit Indian conditions.

The CPI met again in March of 1929 in Bombay. While the CPI was recognized as the basis of all communist work, the WPP would continue to exist. As a measure of the Party's ambivalence the first item on the agenda for the Party's next meeting was "The Danger of Having a WPP". Often factions are built as a result of directives from the International which call for a new course of action, a course of action which will undo successful activities of the domestic party. Prior to the next Party meeting, however, the government of India liquidated the WPP through mass arrests which led to the Meerut Conspiracy Trials.

Between 3-19 July 1929 the Comintern held its Tenth Plenum. By this time Stalin had consolidated his position over the right opposition. Kuusinen, speaking on India, described party weakness as due to the lack of a "...firmly enough established" party. He attacked the class basis of the WPP and criticized the lack of work amongst the peasantry. By January the new line was clearly stated in an Open Letter from the Young Communist International in Imprecor:

The National Congress...actually retards the revolutionary movement...It has long ago betrayed the masses of the Indian people and cannot lead this struggle against British imperialism... Sever your contact with the National Congress and with the League of Independence (Independence for India League)...disclose their falseness and treachery. Show them up for what they are, as assistants of British imper-

45. Meerut Sessions Judgement, P. 234

ialism. Drive the traitors, the phrasemongers, out of your ranks. 46

This directive called for a full scale attack on the National Congress and its leaders.

This new line was pursued until May of 1932. The new line claimed that Nehru, Gandhi and Congress had been rejected by the masses. All efforts were to be bent towards forming a strong, illegal CPI. This line was strongly coloured by the failure in China. So rigid was Stalin's analysis that little allowance was made for different political, economic and social conditions. Imprecor now claimed:

The Indian National Party under the direction of Gandhi is just like the Kuomintang of China. 47

The CPI now conformed with the new line in their Draft Platform which appeared in the December 1930 issue of Imprecor.

Even though the Comintern line was now clear, factionalism still continued to build in the CPI. The old guard of the party in the Meerut prison realized that the ultra-leftist policy would wreck any gains which the Party had made. Outside the prison, Party leaders were a mixture of moderates and radicals. As a result, the Bombay movement of the Party split. The Party's old guard now called on the Comintern to publish an Open Letter analysing the Party's mistakes and arbitrating the differences between the two Bombay factions. An "Open Letter to Indian Communists" appeared in the June 1932 issue of Imprecor. The letter attacked the CPI for following the Comintern's advice, but at the same time the Party was instructed to follow many different paths

46. Overstreet and Windmiller Communism in India P. 140

47. "Solidarity with the Working Masses of India" Imprecor X, (July 31, 1930) P. 666

at once. While stating that the CPI should isolate the Congress and other left reformers, the party was also told not to stand "...aside⁴⁸ from the mass movement of people against British imperialism". The contradictory advice of the Comintern reflected the different positions of the people within the International. The ultra-left policy of the International was reaping a negative return throughout Europe and Asia, but no decision had been made to change the policy at this time.

By June 1933 the Meerut prisoners had started to be released. In November they met in Calcutta to form the nucleus of the "provisional Central Committee of the CPI".

In November a second Open Letter from the Central Committee of the CPC appeared in *Imprecor*. Organizationally it followed the thoughts of the first letter. The critical difference is that the second letter showed a tempering of the ultra-leftist policy. The CPI was criticized for being sectarian, and told that the struggle against left reformers did not mean refusal to work in reformist trade-unions, or even join the Red and mass national reformist unions. The advice of the two Open Letters is a reflection of the degree to which the Indian Party had become subject to the direction of the International. Due to conflicting advice the CPI wandered aimlessly for four years.

Comintern policy from 1927 - 1933 took a radical turn to the left. This turn had at its base events within the CPSU. To a degree, many communists throughout the world had become disillusioned by the moderate tone of Comintern policy in the period from 1920-27. The Comintern used this disillusionment to help produce the radical swing to the left.

48. "Open Letter to the Indian Communists" Communist International IX (June 1, 1932) P. 347

Behind the swing to the left, however, was a struggle within the CPSU between Stalin and the Right Opposition, a struggle which went on from 1928-29. Once again foreign Communist Parties could look to two different sources for guidance within the CPSU, Stalin on the one hand and Bukharin on the other. As Stalin consolidated his position, policies which were applied in Russia were applied, by directive, in other countries. One sees parallels between the Russian policy of non-co-operation between the communists and private traders translated internationally into non-co-operation between communists and other parties. In essence, the Comintern was becoming an adjunct of Russian foreign policy rather than an International.

That automatic transmission of every movement and reflex from the Russian to all the other parties constituted the main and the most bizarre anomaly in the life of the Comintern, an anomaly which became the norm. It was because of this that an air of unreality hung over so much of the Comintern's activity. 49

In December of 1927 Stalin, who earlier had stated that Capitalism and Socialism had reached a balance which would lead to peaceful co-existence for fifteen or twenty years, now stated that the period of peaceful co-existence was past. This analysis was replaced with predictions of imperialist attack and intervention against Russia. This thesis was accepted at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern.

The Sixth Congress foresaw economic crisis in capitalist countries. This would be accompanied by revolutionary upheavals, and in the West the final offensive against capitalism would take place. As a result of this, left nationalist parties, former allies, were now seen as the most dangerous enemies of all. It was on this kind of analysis that

the Comintern pushed the ultra-leftist policies in countries like India. At the same time, the sudden and drastic switch in policy caused confusion in foreign parties and indeed in the Comintern itself.

Stalin's analysis of world events, however, seems to have been contradictory. While predicting massive revolutionary outbreaks on the one hand, he redoubled his faith in "socialism in one country", a faith based on the assumption that Russia would be isolated for a considerable time in the future. This belief was predicated on the assumption that the main political enemies of the U.S.S.R. were the victors of World War 1, especially France. Throughout the 1927-33 period Russian policy backed Germany rather than the former World War 1 allies. This allowed Russia, to a degree, to overcome the boycott imposed on her by Europe and to recover economically in the 1920's.

The backing of Germany had a second source of logic behind it. This was to prevent Entente between Germany and her former enemies, an Entente which would threaten the U.S.S.R. In one respect Stalin was buying time, time before Russia would have to enter the next war, a war which he was convinced was on the way. The longer Russia could be an observer of such a war, the stronger she would be when she had to enter it.

The years between 1920-1933 witnessed a large degree of factionalism in the CPI. One main type of factionalism grew directly out of the subjugation of the policies of the International and various communist parties to the foreign policy and internal needs of the CPSU. In these circumstances the CPI had to choose between following the needs of the CPSU at the expense of the Indian domestic situation as it related to the Party, or following its own analysis of the Indian situation at the

risk of contradicting CPSU or International policy. In these circumstances the Party constantly found itself torn between two worlds.

At other times factions of the CPI, or the entire party, found it could follow a path predicated on its own analysis of the Indian scene, by seeking doctrinal authority from one or another of the conflicting interpretations within the CPSU. This was especially true during the period when the right and left oppositions were active in the CPSU. This raises a basic question of what happens to the Communist movement when there is more than one centre of authority to which parties or their factions can appeal for doctrinal legitimacy. In this respect there is an analogy between internal conflict on fundamental policies within the CPSU and international expression of this in the form of differing interpretations and analyses by communist parties or their factions. These problems come to the fore in full force with the opening of the Sino-Soviet Rift.

This period also witnesses the evolution of the Comintern from an International to a section of Russia's foreign policy machinery. As this happened the International predicated its policies and Colonial Theses to an ever greater degree on the U.S.S.R's needs rather than to the historical stages of the countries in which it was active. The result was conflicting analysis of the Indian situation, both within the CPI and the CPSU and the International. By the late 1920's the CPI had lost the initiative in terms of analyzing India and acting on that analysis. With the setback in China on the one hand, and the consolidation of Stalin's power over both the right and left oppositions in the CPSU, Stalin could afford to allow the position of the bourgeoisie to be re-examined. As a result of the fate of the CPC in 1927 and of

Stalin's desire to defeat the right opposition, the swing to the left became a reality. This swing all but destroyed the CPI. With the Party in ruins and with its initiative lost in conflicting analyses of the Indian situation, little could be done but await direction from the source of all authority, the CPSU. This direction came in 1935.

CHAPTER III

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CPI 1933-1958

The CPI received the direction it needed in 1935 at the Seventh Comintern Congress. This came in the form of abandonment, by the international movement, of ultra-leftism, in response to the U.S.S.R.'s needs in the face of a rising fascist Germany. Colonial countries were directed to reassert anti-imperialist goals in an effort to pressure bourgeois European governments. Implied in this was a four class strategy and collaboration with bourgeois nationalist movements.

The main spokesman at the Congress was Wang Ming of the CPC. Ming argued for the use of a united front from below and above. The CPI was to strengthen itself by including four classes (working class, petty bourgeoisie, peasantry and national bourgeoisie) while at the same time penetrating the nationalist movement and appealing directly to its rank and file. Joint action with some of the nationalist leadership had to be maintained.

The Congress' resolutions were specifically in keeping with Russia's foreign policy needs. The signing of a non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland in 1934 had made Russian leaders fearful of Hitler. Stalin wished to free Russia from isolation and keep her out of war by encouraging Western resistance to Germany. Comintern policy was now bent towards resisting the threat of fascism. This directive, known as the Popular Front, was a complete reversal of former Comintern policy and could not help but cause differences in Communist Parties. The generation of such differences became clear in the "Dutt-Bradley Thesis".⁵⁰

50. Dutt and Bradley were leading CPGB members. This thesis was the CPGB's interpretation of the Seventh Congress to the CPI.

The CPI was not represented at the Seventh Congress. As a result, the CPGB acted for the CPI. Its first move was to try and unite the CPI and the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) ⁵¹ by meeting with that party's leader, Minoo R. Masani. Masani agreed that a united socialist party might be created if the CPI first dissolved itself. Entrance into the CSP would allow the CPI to work both from above and below since the CSP was part of Congress.

With this first step out of the way, the CPGB interpreted the new policy to the CPI in the "Dutt-Bradley Thesis". The thesis claimed that Congress had two wings, one of which was reactionary. It now claimed that Congress was the united front of the Indian people in the nationalist struggle.

The National Congress can play a great and foremost part in the work of realizing the Anti-Imperialist People's Front. It is even possible that the National Congress, by further transformation of its organizations and programme, may become the form of realization of the Anti-Imperialist People's Front; for it is the reality that matters, not the name. 52

By early 1936 the CSP had agreed to admit communists as members by individual application. The CPI did not act on this invitation until March, since, due to the drastic reversal in policy, the CPI did not seriously believe the "thesis". The magnitude of difference between the old and new lines led to factionalism and caused the Party to embrace the new policy slowly. Factionalism in Communist Parties is often generated by sharp reversals in policy. Like all political organizations, change occurs slowly, but due to the fact that Communist Parties have

51. The Congress Socialist Party, a socialist bloc within Congress, will be referred to as the CSP.

52. R. Palme Dutt and Ben Bradley "The Anti-Imperialist People's Front", Imprecor, XVI (February 29, 1936) P. 298

their authority based in dogma, change occurs even more slowly since new policies must be examined in light of the dogma before change is accepted.

In March P. C. Joshi, who was not identified with any of the factions, became general-secretary and ordered application for CSP membership. The result of these applications was successful infiltration of the CSP. By the end of the year, communists had captured local CSP units. In south India the CSP joint secretary, E. M. S. Namboordidipad, had become a communist and placed the Kerala and Tamilnad organizations under communist leadership. Similar events took place in Andhra and in the labour sections of Bombay.

In the next year the CSP and CPI entered into the Lucknow Agreement whereby the two parties would eventually merge. The agreement was never fulfilled due to the fact that Masani obtained a confidential CPI document explaining methods for capturing CSP units. Although the CSP made the document public, the Party had been weakened due to careful communist takeover.

Since the CSP was part of Congress, the CPI had now gained access to the larger body's organization. This success had raised a basic dilemma which was inherent in Comintern policy. The Party had been trying to unify the nationalist movement while at the same time trying to capture it. Eventually it would have to sacrifice one or the other of these thrusts favouring either a campaign against Congress' leadership or a united Congress. In this respect the CPI encountered the same problems as its European counterparts in the Popular Front. By their success the Popular Front had developed revolutionary potential, especially in France and Spain. In so doing, it struck fear into the middle classes which in turn moved more to the right. In essence, it

increased the gap between the U.S.S.R. and the West rather than reducing it. "Thus by a curious dialectical process, the Popular Fronts defeated their own purpose".⁵³ Decision for one road or the other would mean alienation of that section of the Party which was following the course to be abandoned. This, in turn, called the leader's authority into question and led to factionalism. Such was the result when the CPI decided to support Congress' backing of Gandhi's leadership at the Tripuri session in 1939. As a result P. C. Joshi came under heavy criticism from the party's left faction. The necessity to choose between contradictory goals inherent in Communist Party policy often leads to factional rifts.

The results of the Popular Front and the partition of Czechoslovakia put Russia in even greater danger. Russian leaders felt that the West was trying to unleash Germany upon her. This led to an attempt at agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, culminating in the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 - '41. Russian leaders now felt that they were safe, at least for the time being. It was expected that Poland would resist Germany for a period of time long enough for the U.S.S.R. to reduce the risk of a future German attack.

Reduced pressure on Russia allowed the CPI to again shift policy. Policy became directed towards uniting all anti-imperialist classes, and centered around the question of the CPI's relations with other parties and India's role in the war.

In 1939 Congress decided, after much hesitation, to support the war effort. This caused several left parties, which were allied with

53. Isaac Deutscher Stalin Pp. 414-415

the Congress, to split off from the organization. Indian participation in the war soon became a fait accompli when, on 3 September, the Viceroy declared India at war. This left the CPI with the choice of continuing the former alliance with Congress, or criticizing Congress for vacillation. Between 1939-'40 the CPI seemed to select the latter alternative. Thus, while the Comintern still called for anti-war work and increased influence in Congress, the CPI demanded that the war be made into a revolution. In October the CPI Politbureau stated that the task of the people was the "...revolutionary utilization of the war crisis for the achievement of National Freedom".⁵⁴ The resolution further called for an intense anti-war movement, and was followed by an Independence Manifesto in January. The Manifesto was a call to revolution.

By 1940 the CPI had broken with all other parties of the left. With this break, and because of the lessened pressure on the U.S.S.R. as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the CPI's policy swung to the left. P. C. Joshi now accused the Congress leadership of failing to lead the "explosive struggle" in India. In March the CPI published the "Proletarian Path" Statement demanding revolutionary use of the war crisis and, as a first step, "...a political general strike in major industries" and "a country-wide no-rent and no-tax action". This would lead to a higher action whose main features would be:

...storming of military and police stations by ...national militia in rural as well as urban areas, destruction of Government institutions, actual offensive against the armed forces of the Government on the most extensive scale.⁵⁵

54. P. C. Joshi "Communist Reply to Congress Working Committee's Charges", (Bombay: People's Publishing House 1945) Pp. 35-39

55. P. C. Joshi "Unmasked Parties and Politics", quoted in Sita Ram Goel Netaji and the CPI (March 1940) Pp. 9-14

This was an attempt to displace the Congress as leaders of the popular movement. The turn to the left resulted in mass CPI arrests and virtual disintegration of the Party since it had not established a sound underground movement.

In turning to the left the CPI had deviated from the Comintern's policy considerably. The CPI was acting on what it believed to be the objective conditions in India. The International, on the other hand, was putting forth a mild policy directed at buying more time for the U.S.S.R. before she became involved in the war. In May the Comintern published the CPI's "Independence Day Manifesto" abridging it and leaving out all indications of impending revolution. The same issue carried an article which further magnified CPI deviation from the Comintern line.

As Moscow came to feel more secure due to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Comintern line started to sound a more radical note on India. The CPI was charged in June 1940 with destroying the masses "...illusions of Gandhism"⁵⁶. The Comintern line now was similar to the CPI's call for changing the war into a revolution. While the party was to keep unity with Congress, it was to try and neutralize the bourgeoisie. The entire CPI swing to the left was thus vindicated.

With Comintern backing, the CPI pressed Congress even further. The Party claimed that Congress was sabotaging the national struggle. This attack was so great that it ended by splitting the All India Student Federation into two groups. The positive reception by Indians of the

56. "On Some Questions on the Work of Communist Parties in Conditions of War". Kommunisticheskii Internatsional, No. 6, (1940) P. 114 Cited in Windmiller and Overstreet, Communism in India P. 186

radical approach was due to the importance of the Hindu-Muslim question and the linguistic states question. In many respects the CPI was achieving the same positive results as the Popular Front in Europe. Thus, by March 1940 Muslims called for an independent Muslim state. In so doing they challenged the Congress' right to speak as representative of all Indians.

Thus, throughout the first half of 1940 the CPI's policy was stable, but radical. This policy was based on the progression of events in India. The rapid fall of France, however, caught the U.S.S.R. off guard as Russian leaders had supposed that France would be a battlefield for a considerable period of time. These events necessitated a re-calculation of Comintern policy in light of Russia's more weakened position. This re-calculation was complete when Germany invaded Russia. The new aim of policy was the defence of the motherland. In July and August Labour Monthly spelled out the new line. War could not be made into revolution mechanically:

Every act of the Proletarian struggle was to be subordinated to the supreme end of procuring victory of the U.S.S.R., which would mean a giant stride forward of the people's cause in every country. 57

The role of Indian communists was specifically spelled out in September. The CPI was to support Britain as long as she and Russia fought on the same side. Dutt of the CPGB told the CPI to support the war effort unconditionally.

The rapid changes in policy and events between 1939-'41 pulled the CPI in two different directions and divided it into two factions.

57. "Quaestor", "Leading the World Against Hitler", Labour Monthly, XXIII (August 1941) Pp. 361-362

One direction was dictated by international events and demanded support of the war effort. The second direction was dictated by the growing radicalism of the domestic Indian situation. These two positions were reflected in two camps within the CPI, the inner leadership of the Party (most of whom were in jail), and a loose, disorganized group led by P. C. Joshi, who were not in jail. These two groups were considering policy completely independent of each other. The results of their considerations produced two separate and antithetical sets of policies.

The inner leadership took the position that India must support Britain in the war effort. They raised the slogan "People's War". Communications from the CPGB and CPSU confirmed the correctness of this line. The faction outside of prison sided with prevailing national feelings, and put forth the position that their purpose, victory of the people over the old order in India, was larger than victory to the U.S.S.R. Thus, they still called for the war to be transformed into a revolution. The faction in prison was attacked for "...following on imperialist policy..." and "...echoing the imperialist line".⁵⁸ Between November and December the faction outside of prison learned of the conflicting party policy and that the International supported the "people's war" policy. This instance of factionalism points up the tension which Communist Parties run into when trying to lead domestic events and international events at the same time.

The "people's war" policy helped to make the CPI legal again, which improved the Party's position. Legality of the party was all the more effective since many other parties, including Congress, were declared

58. Overstreet and Windmiller Communism in India, P. 196

illegal and their leaders imprisoned. Throughout the war party policy was consistent, having two main directions. The first was the "National Unity Campaign" which sought to unite the Muslim League and the Congress by getting the latter to make political concessions to the former, while calling on Britain to re-legalize the Congress. The second direction was the "Production Campaign" which sought to encourage and throw all production behind the war effort. Interestingly, both of these campaigns were costly to the CPI since Congress opposed the war as well as the idea of a separate Muslim state. Moreover, losses of Congress support were not balanced by gains in the League. Many Indians came to feel that the CPI was collaborating with Britain against India. The result of this was that, with the end of the war, the CPI had lost popular support and was expelled from the Congress.

After World War II the CPI was directed back to its pre-war policy, but little other guidance was given. The Russian disposition towards India was well summed up by A. Dyakov, a Russian analyst:

The social and political activity of the masses in India remains at a very low level, and their degree of organization is considerably inferior to that observed in democratic countries. This being so, a political party like the National Congress, embracing comparatively limited circles, is in a position to formulate in its programme a number of propositions which have the support of considerably broader sections of the population. 59

Without international guidance the CPI entered into its first election with a platform which indicated factional differences within the party. The CPI sought a united front from below pursuing a moderate anti-imperialist strategy. There was to be a united struggle against the British, but co-operation with all bourgeois elements. Thus, only

59. A. Dyakov, "India After the War", New Times, (January 15, 1946)
P. 11

the big bourgeoisie were singled out for attack. The party was split as to support of this position. Radicals, like Ranadive and Adhikari, were uneasy with the party's position. By December of 1945 a "Left oppositon" had appeared under the leadership of Ajoy Ghosh, Ranadive and Adhikari. As the election progressed, the party's position became more militant on issues of regionalism and anti-imperialism and a separate Muslim state.

This position changed significantly in March when R. Palme Dutt of the CPGB arrived in India. Dutt advised the CPI to remain neutral on the issue of a separate Muslim state. He further urged the party to stand for unity. In sum, the entire election position was disguardd. With the failure of the British Cabinet Mission in May 1946, however, Dutt's analysis of the Indian middle class changed. He now saw a "popular upsurge" among the Indian masses. He passed this analysis on to the CPI at the Central Committee meeting of July in Bombay. Here Dutt backed the "left opposition". The resolution of the Central Committee was a mixture of the moderate position of Joshi and the radical position of the "left opposition" faction. The resolution was friendly towards, but attacked both, the League and Congress. It called for "bold and militant" action by workers and a wider, stronger peasant movement. The CPI was to "...come forward as the organizer of this new phase of the Indian revolution and lead it to victory." Thus, while the resolution called for capturing leadership in a revolutionary stage, it also qualified this approach by calling for influencing, rather than sweeping aside, the bourgeoisie. In essence, the document was a stalemate bet-

ween the party's two wings, although the left had gained in strength.

The effect of the Central Committee resolution was a loss of control by the central CPI of its local units. While the central organization followed a moderate course, local units attacked the government and sponsored rioting in many areas. In the state of Hyderabad, guerrilla warfare broke out in the Nalgonda and Warangal districts (Telengana). The moderate approach of P. C. Joshi prevailed until June 1947 as a result of the failure of both the CPGB and the CPSU to give the party guidance.

Signs in Russia indicated that a major change in policy was coming. In May 1947 Russian economists met to discuss the ideas of Eugene Varga. Varga had argued that colonial countries were becoming less dependent on their imperial masters, and that some of these countries had actually reversed the dependency. India, he felt, was an example of this trend. This position caused drastic reaction in Moscow. The Russian analysts, Dyakov and Zhukov, took issue with this interpretation. In terms of India, they claimed that Congress had become reactionary. The Congress represented, according to Zhukov, the big bourgeoisie. Congress had given into the British as a result of its fears of the masses, settling for partial independence and a share in the economic and military control of the sub-continent. Zhukov proposed an anti-imperialist strategy against feudalism, monopoly capitalism and imperialism. This would require an attack on Nehru and Congress with a united front from below directed at the petty and middle bourgeoisie. Clearly, the ideas of Dyakov and Zhukov reflected emerging CPSU Cold War policies. The aim was enlistment of Cold War support by an attack on the Indian Government.

The central question of the bourgeoisie remained unsettled. Two

different opinions on this question were offered in June 1947 at the Academy of Sciences. One was the opinion of Zhukov, the other the opinions of Dyakov and Balabushevich. The latter two felt that the Indian Government represented both the middle and big bourgeoisie. Thus, the middle bourgeoisie was also reactionary. They offered a three class strategy against capitalism, rather than Zhukov's four class strategy. Theirs was a call for a radical programme leading to revolution.

Interestingly, while it was now agreed that India was at a higher stage of revolution, no appeal was made to the Stalinist formula used in China where an agrarian revolution was the higher stage. Debate between Russian experts probably centered on the theory of "people's
61
democracy".

The theory of "people's democracy" had grown out of the East European situation and the need to tolerate bourgeois parties temporarily. It was a transitional state form with neither a proletarian nor a bourgeois government. This form used bourgeois democratic machinery with the interests of an alliance of the workers and peasants. It was directed against foreign capital (imperialism), big business (monopoly capitalism), and big landlords (feudalism), its essence was anti-imperialist.

In mid-1947 this theory was under heavy attack by the Yugoslav
62
Communist Party (YCP), which called for the more militant position of combining the bourgeois and socialist revolutions. Policy towards

61. Balabushevich had in fact cited the term "people's democracy" as the aim of Indian Communism!

62. The Yugoslav Communist Party will be referred to as the YCP.

the entire bourgeois class should have been more drastic, according to the YCP, smashing bourgeois democratic machinery and replacing it with soviet democratic machinery. In applying this position to colonial countries, the YCP was demanding an end to Russian temporising. The positions of the three major Russian theoreticians reflected the differences between the Russian and Yugoslav parties, with Dyakov and Balabushevich giving the YCP formula minus a call for violent revolution, and Zhukov giving the Russian position. Thus, the Indian and "people's democracy" debates were completely linked.

The Central Committee of the CPI met in Bombay during the debates in Russia, declaring the Mountbatten Plan a step forward and giving support to the Nehru Government. Clearly, this position was antithetical to current CPSU thinking. The position reflected genuine inputs from the Indian situation and, as a result, carried the CPI radicals. The party was unaware of the impending shift in CPSU thinking and continued to back the Government of India.

The Central Committee position was not one which brought support from the entire CPI. Shortly after independence, the party's left wing started to assert itself. Radical articles by Ranadive were reinforced by articles by the YCP. Party veterans were displeased with Joshi's moderate line and blamed it for the difficulties which they were experiencing in mass activities. These tensions were increased by the success which radical approaches had yielded in Telengana.

Reports from the initial Cominform meeting in Poland in September 1947 gave the first indication of a shift in the international line. Speeches by Zhdanov gave support to the CPI left. In his main address he claimed that the crisis in the colonial system was intensifying due

to increasing weakness in the imperialist states. The imperialists, he claimed, were trying to keep India and China in bondage politically and economically, Kardelj, of the YCP, took this reasoning further, calling for an all-out anti-capitalist strategy and merging of the democratic and socialist revolutions.

The radicals in the CPI took these reports as sanction for their position. In December 1947 the Central Committee met and the radicals challenged Joshi's leadership. As a result, Ranadive secured a majority for a new line and displaced Joshi as party leader. This change in leadership is an example of a successful challenge in which a faction uses the sanction of another Communist Party to capture the leadership of its own party. The new Central Committee resolution completely reversed Joshi's moderate line. Nehru was described as subservient to the "...Anglo-American Camp", using Zhdanov's Cold War classification of the world divided into two camps. The resolution called for a unity of workers and peasants to unseat the bourgeois leadership. An anti-imperialist focus was now in full swing.

The Russians had never settled the question of the disposition towards the bourgeoisie. They had put forth two possibilities, one that the entire bourgeoisie was reactionary, and the other that only the big bourgeoisie was reactionary. The result of this was ambivalence and failure of the CPSU to give guidance to the CPI.

On 28 December 1948 the CPI held its Second Party Congress. Ranadive used this Congress to purge the party of Joshi's supporters and to educate the members in the anti-capitalist strategy of the YCP's "people's democracy". A from below tactic was put forth and the entire bourgeoisie seen as reactionary. Bhowani Sen, leader of the Telengana

movement, gave the speech on tactics. He called for a revised nationalities policy in which workers and allies would accomplish self-determination. Revolution was needed throughout the country:

The real solution to the question is on the field of battle ...that is the way that the victorious people must march to freedom and real democracy...we must be proud to say that here at last is the force that will achieve Indian Liberation. 63

Thus the party started out on a radical approach based on the Yugoslav line, an approach which would plunge it into a crisis unequalled in its history.

When Ranadive purged Joshi's followers he all but washed the party of its chief organizational people. Additionally, his personality and approach were so authoritarian that he alienated the Politbureau members causing considerable internal opposition. Rather than revolution, the party's general pattern was "...not that of a planned and coordinated revolutionary campaign, but rather of unorganized and sporadic outbursts of desperate violence".⁶⁴

While the CPI went off in this direction, the CPSU was dropping the Yugoslav position as the basis for Cominform action. By June 1948, Yugoslavia was formally expelled from the Cominform. This action effectively ended Yugoslav guidance of the Indian communist movement. Russian authorities now sounded a cautious note on India calling for a "Democratic Front". This meant the development of a mass organization. In June Dyakov stated that India was far from a revolution. Other Russian authorities ignored the middle bourgeoisie stating that the big bourgeoisie was reactionary.

63. "Account of proceedings of the CPI's Second Congress." People's Age, Supplement VI, (March 21, 1948) P. 3.

64. Overstreet and Windmiller Communism in India, P. 280

In October 1948 Dyakov reversed his position on nationalities and on the bourgeoisie in The Indian Union And Pakistan After The Partition Of India and clarified the Russian position. National groups intended to dominate the Indian market along with the British in order to prevent the rise of rival groups. A small group controlled the government and suppressed the revolution, workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and weaker bourgeoisie of other nationalities. He was suggesting that various provincial bourgeoisies could be counted as allies in the revolutionary movement. Tactically, these bourgeoisies were progressive and the CPI should collaborate with them. The Russians sanctioned the promotion of subnational particularism against Congress. The only criticism of these ideas came from Zhukov who criticized the lack of attention paid to the agrarian aspects of the Indian revolution.

The first opposition to Ranadive was a result of his manipulation of the party machinery to secure an amendment granting wide powers to the central committee. By the amendment the central committee could "...reconstitute itself and other committees and fractions and frame new rules".⁶⁵ This Ranadive used as a weapon against dissent and lower party committees.

Two different groups opposed Ranadive's political line, the Bombay Trade Union Leaders and the South India agrarian leaders. Ajoy Ghosh, a union leader, protested that the idea of revolution in six months was impossible. S. A. Dange, another trade union leader, found Ranadive trying to expell him from his base in Bombay, but successfully resisted. Trade union leaders felt that premature violence would destroy the

65. Constitution of the Communist Party of India, (Bombay; Communist Party of India, 1948), P. 13

organizations they had built.

Although successful agrarian revolution had taken place in Telengana's Nalgonda and Warangal districts, this was not immediately exportable to other provinces such as Andhra. The Andhra communists drew on a theoretical argument against Ranadive taken from Mao Tse-tung. In June 1948 Andhra communists called Mao's "new democracy" the "guidance to India". They proposed that the entire peasantry be united under the workers for "guerrilla warfare":

the middle peasant is a firm ally in the revolution and participates in the revolution. The rich peasant who has no feudal tails can be neutralized as a class but in areas like Telengana and Rayalaseema, where feudalism is very strong, it is even possible to get sections of the rich peasantry in the struggle! (though vacillating). 66

Thus:

Our revolution in many respects differs from the classical Russian Revolution; and is to a great extent similar to that of the Chinese Revolution. The perspective is likely not that of general strikes and general rising leading to the liberation of the rural side; but the dogged resistance and prolonged civil war in the form of an agrarian revolution culminating in the capture of political power by a democratic front. 67

The Andhra communists combined the CPI's nationalist policy with Maoist anti-imperialist strategy and Maoist agrarian revolutionary tactic.

Ranadive had less success countering the Andhra dissenters due to the rising prestige of that faction's ideas. In January, February, June and July he wrote articles in Communist in an attempt to counter this opposition. In the final article he cited the main points of his

66. "Struggle for People's Democracy and Socialism - Some Questions of Strategy and Tactics", COMMUNIST II, June-July 1949, P.71
67. "Struggle for People's Democracy and Socialism - Some Questions of Strategy and Tactics", COMMUNIST II, June-July 1949, P.83

thinking and found the Russian Revolution totally valid for India. He specifically attacked the Andhra secretariat's ideas calling their four class strategy revisionism. He claimed that this secretariat did not see the rich peasant as an enemy because the secretariat itself was mainly "...rural intellectuals, sons of rich and middle peasants".⁶⁸ Finally, the article directly attacked Mao tse-tung. This attack, ironically, came on the eve of the CPC's victory. The attack may have been prompted by the knowledge, on Ranadive's part, of similar attacks in Russia, but this is not known definitely. The importance of the dispute between the factions is easily seen in Ranadive's concluding remarks on Mao:

Firstly, we must state emphatically that the Communist Party of India has accepted Marx, Engles, Lenin and Stalin as the authoritative sources of Marxism. It has not discovered new sources of Marxism beyond these. Nor for the matter of that is there any Communist Party which declares adherence to the so-called theory of new democracy alleged to be propounded by Mao and declares it to be a new addition to Marxism. Singularly enough there was no reference to this new addition to Marxism in the Conference of Nine Parties in Europe (Cominform).⁶⁹

Ranadive's policies of violence were failing, the more they failed, the more desperately he invoked the revolutionary call. He became so desperate that he hailed the Telengana movement while, at the same time criticizing its policies. The Telengana movement was itself failing. CPI opposition to Nehru forced the Telengana communists to back the local government's resistance to integration into the Indian Union. This was, however, the very government against which the uprisings has been focused! The Telengana communists and their former enemy found

68. Windmiller and Overstreet, Communism in India, P. 289

69. Windmiller and Overstreet, Communism in India, P. 291

themselves fighting a guerrilla war against advancing federal troops in September 1948. The Telengana resistance was crushed by the federal troops and its communist sections fell into disrepute. The Andhra movement also failed, and Maoist tactics discredited it. The Andhra party was shattered by opposition factions within its own secretariat. Oddly enough, as the Andhra movement fell apart, its ideas received international sanction.

While Ranadive was attacking Mao's ideas, a June 1949 Russian academicians meeting promulgated Lenin's anti-imperialist strategy and Mao's "new democracy" for all of Asia. Zhukov emphasized the similarities between the Chinese and East European theories as having the same general laws of development. The Chinese regime had proven that it had achieved the correct stage of people's democracy as it applied to the current Chinese situation.

In the struggle for People's Democracy in the colonies and semi-colonies are united not only the workers, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, the intellegentsia, but even certain sections of the middle bourgeoisie which is interested in saving itself from cut-throat foreign competition and imperialist oppression. 70

The Asian revolution must be anti-imperialist since Asia was at a lower stage of economic development than Eastern Europe.

Tactically, Zhukov sanctioned violent revolution in Asia. Such struggles as were in progress at the time he took as evidence of a "higher stage" of national liberation.

Balabushevich, in the main report on India, fully applied Chinese strategy and tactics to India. Certain of the middle bourgeoisie could be counted upon for a time in the Indian situation. He praised the

tactics of violence hailing Telengana as an example. This movement was the start of agrarian revolution which he called "the most important content" in the liberation movement. Sub-national particularism was heavily emphasized in his speech.

The new Russian line was immediately communicated to all of the Asian parties. It was discussed by Zhukov and Balabushevich in Problems of Economics. Dyakov also put forth the new line in his book Crisis of the Colonial System seeing peasant struggle as the "characteristic feature" for Indian revolution. The new policy was finally put forth by Liu Shao-chi at the November Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries meeting in Peking. Liu proposed a four class strategy of armed struggle wherever possible. He emphasized the necessity of legal activity as well as violent tactics. No CPI delegates were at the conference, which called for discussion of "concrete struggle" for each country, and thus no clear decisions were made for a CPI tactical plan.

The Chinese programme for Asia was officially sanctioned in the January 1950 issue of the Cominform's "For a Lasting Peace". The issue, however, hedged the application of Chinese strategy and tactics as applied to India. Additionally, Lui's remarks were altered. Where he suggested that all colonial and semi-colonial countries should adopt the Chinese path, the article suggested that "many" such countries should do so. Specifically, the article called on the CPI to adopt programmes from the Chinese and "other countries" for their guidance. This suggests some difference in opinion in the international communist world over whether India was in the Russian or Chinese sphere of influence. Strategically, however, the Cominform approved the four class

strategy for India, but it omitted mention of violence tactically.

Ranadive, upon appearance of the new line, admitted to errors and dogmatism swearing allegiance to the new policies. Ranadive printed his views in the CPGB journal seeking approval from R. Palme Dutt. Dutt remained silent leaving the Andhra groups as the only Indian faction sanctioned by the new line. This faction proceeded to take over the party's leadership.

In May 1950 the central committee met for the first time in two years. They used Ranadive's constitutional amendment to displace him with a new central committee, four members of which were from Andhra. G. Rajeshwar Rao, leader of the Andhra secretariat, became the new general secretary. The new central committee greeted the CPC on its twenty-ninth anniversary saying of China "...the Communist Parties in the colonial world are looking upon the Communist Party of China as their model".⁷¹ The central committee clarified its policy in a confidential letter to party members. The letter first stated that the party had been torn assunder by Ranadive's policies. It then put forth a policy aimed at armed agrarian revolution. It claimed the Cominform debates, the Peking Conference and articles by Russian theorists as the basis of its new policy, thus guaranteeing its members that the new central committee was following the correct policy. Following the Chinese lead, it then called for a "united national front" strategy including the middle bourgeoisie and rich peasants. Secondly, as an "essential point" the national liberation struggle:

...has to be waged by means of armed guerrilla warfare in

71. Communist III, July-August 1950, Pp. 1-26, cited in Overstreet and Windmiller Communism in India, P. 298

the countryside, the formation of liberation bases and liberation armies - culminating in the seizure of power all over the country. 72

The CPI quoted from a May Cominform article that listed India as amongst the countries where armed struggle was applicable. The party also called for renewed regional particularism with itself as leader. Finally, the Telengana experience was summarized and distributed as the exemplified model for all of India.

The new call to violence, although it be of a different form, further confused the CPI. International sanction and guidance was nowhere as definite as the Central Committee claimed it to be. The result was immediate inner-party opposition. Joshi, although expelled from the party, was the first to object. He proceeded to publish his opposition to the general public and to foreign Communist Parties. He attacked Rao for seeing India as revolutionary, and argued that the Chinese path could not be applied mechanically, what was needed were "parliamentary tactics".

The trade union movement in the CPI also resisted. S. A. Dange in July 1950 stated to the press that armed revolt was not in the CPI's plans. He said that such an impression is given by the "...ill planned⁷³ behaviour of some sections of the leadership of the Communist Party". He further stated that elements of policy were under debate, forcing the Politbureau to call publicly for such debate. The debate that followed was the most severe that the party had ever undergone, shattering party discipline.

In April Dange had published an analysis of the Party entitled

72. Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, P. 299
73. Crossroads I, April 7, 1950. P. 2

"Some Notes on the Roots of Our Mistakes After Calcutta". In September S. V. Ghate and Ajoy Ghosh issued a similar statement. It claimed that party membership had seriously dropped and that trade union work was all but dead, as were peasant organizations - in short that the Party was disintegrating. By fall 1950 Party Headquarters (PHQ) was the central point from which the opposition attacked. It published a critical organ called "PHQ Open Forum". Ghosh was reported to have said in a speech in the October issue that:

Today the reality is that nobody in the Indian Party can solve the crisis. It was the international comrades who pointed out our mistakes. Since we are not agreed on the interpretation, only they can help us. We must, therefore, contact the international leaders. None of us is clear what the Lasting Peace editorial means. If anybody claims he is correct, it is arrogance on his part. 74

In the same month that Ghosh wrote this, the CPGB Political Committee, after three years of indifference, reclaimed its role as touter sending a letter to the CPI Central Committee. The Rao leadership was able to conceal the letter until December when the PHQ group got a copy of it. The letter attacked Rao for failing to analyse the Indian situation and offer real proposals for party reorganization. It called on the CPI to solve its problems by full discussion, and chided the selection method for the new Central Committee. A party conference was recommended for selecting new leaders. In terms of policy, the CPI was attacked for failing to provide political leadership on issues like Korea, the peace movement and Bihar famine. Rao, it was claimed, distorted the For a Lasting Peace article. While armed insurrection was surely the path for India, it was not an immediate prospect. Fin-

74. Prabodh Chandra, "A Note on the Present Situation in Our Party". P. 9. See Overstreet and Windmiller Pp. 302-303.

ally, the party was urged to use all opportunities for legal activity, especially in light of the coming general elections in India.

Within three weeks the Central Committee met to try and develop a political programme. This meeting accomplished little, and the committee enlarged itself and elected a new Politbureau to represent all of the party's major trends.

In a new letter from R. Palme Dutt, the basic outlines of a new policy were put forth. First, the peace movement was stressed. This movement was to be mobilized against the Anglo-American Imperialist Bloc. Second, and most important, Dutt stated that Nehru's attitude was changing towards imperialist war policies, thus the attitude of international communism towards Nehru was reversed. As a third point, Dutt related the peace movement and freedom. All wars being imperialist, those for peace were also for freedom from imperialist control. The fourth point laid out tactics. A united front was to be created with leftist parties, and based on a democratic programme. It was a from above front, and should be developed in common so as to attract a majority on issues of peace and independence. Finally, he disqualified tactics of violence in the current situation.

Dutt's ideas were further developed in an interview with two people from PHQ. The Nehru government was again seen as having a progressive and reactionary wing. Nehru's following was progressive. The Indian government thus would tend to vacillate, thus popular pressure must be used to reinforce the Congress anti-imperialist wing.

In late 1950 then, "new democracy" was emphasized, but violent revolution was excluded. A four class strategy with united front tactics from above was to be used with progressive parties, and a

from below tactic in Congress.

The party now tried to reorganize and renew its ideological position in preparation for the Third Congress. In April 1951 the Politbureau drew up a "Draft Programme" and "Statement of Policy" which were circulated for party discussion. In May the Central Committee met and approved the Draft Programme. At this time Rao resigned, and Ghosh later became general secretary.

In October an All India Party Conference met. This meeting approved the Draft Programme and the Statement which became party policy. The new programme was an elaboration of Dutt's ideas appealing to peasants, proletariat, petty and middle bourgeoisie. The CPI pledged to support and protect the development of private industry against competition from abroad. Reorganization of states, the CPI argued, should take place on a linguistic basis with the nation formed in a voluntary union.

The CPI seemed less able to enunciate Dutt's foreign policy advice. The idea that a big bourgeois government (Nehru's) was a friend of peace and freedom was hard for the party to state. Thus the CPI talked of the Nehru government saying it "...essentially carries out the foreign policy of British imperialism". The party kept imperialist powers separate rather than place them under the title Anglo-American Bloc as Dutt had done. In terms of freedom, the CPI saw Britain as the main enemy, while in terms of peace the U.S. was the main enemy.

Dispute continued within the party. During 1951 conflicting views were expressed in an "open forum". In 1952 an issue of Party Letter noted that there were still dissensions in the party.

Entering the first Indian general election the Party relied on

anti-imperialism. It declared Nehru's foreign policy "not a policy of peace" since the government was tied to imperialists. This position seemed to bear fruit, for the party did best where its policies had been most violent. While this must have spurred party radicals, the international movement demanded cultivating the possibilities of the government as a peace partner. Thus, when the extended CPI plenum met at the end of 1952, it criticized the party's failure to pay attention to the peace issue. Yet, the Central Committee March 1953 meeting saw Britain as the main target and persisted in seeing Nehru's government as an imperialist collaborator. Thus, as the Third Party Congress approached, the party was unstable on questions of the Nehru government and the bourgeoisie.

The Third Congress met in Madras 27 December 1953 - 4 January 1954, with no agreement on its role in India. While the radicals had lost face between 1948 - 51 they had power in Andhra, Bombay and West Bengal making them a strong force in the party. Organizing a united front and the party's attitude towards the government were the most complicated problems. The latter question was not settled until around 1958.

The Madras Congress was torn between its national and international environments. The international situation demanded that the party follow a moderate line on the Indian government in an effort to try and turn the government's neutralism into anti-Westernism. Nationally, events seemed to argue for leftist tactics.

The Madras Congress had to develop a policy satisfactory to its left and right wings. The party's line of action depended on whether it would select the U.S. or Britain as the main enemy. One faction saw Britain as the main enemy of India and the CPI. This faction centred

in Andhra. Another faction saw the U.S. as the main threat. This latter group would opt for the party as a loyal opposition in India. While the Andhra group was numerically superior, the moderate faction had international backing and had the pressure caused by a suspected U. S. military aid programme to Pakistan. According to Ghosh, there were only two possible choices in relation to the Nehru government. The CPI could oppose the government while supporting specific acts, or criticize specific acts while co-operating with the government. The final resolution was a compromise, and the party decided to oppose the government while supporting specific acts.

Indian-U.S. relations started to falter in November 1953 when it was learned that the U.S. was considering military assistance to Pakistan. The Nehru government harshly criticized the U.S. Relations worsened when Walter S. Robertson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, was reported to have claimed that the U.S. must "dominate" Asia in the interest of peace for an indefinite period. Russia was quick to congratulate Nehru on his verbal resistance to the U.S. and, on 29 April, a trade agreement between China and India was signed concerning Tibet. In this agreement India signed her Tibetan properties over to the Chinese. On 23 May V. K. Krishna Menon and Chou En-lai started talks in Geneva culminating in Chou meeting Nehru in New Delhi on 25 June. From this meeting came the Panch Shila (Five Principles) of co-existence.

After Chou's visit New Age showed evidence that the CPI's right wing was gaining strength. P. Ramamurti, New Age's editor and a Politbureau member, cited the talks as a "change in the relationship of forces in Asia". Ramamurti gave the slogan of a "national platform for peace and freedom" in this 18 July article, again lighting the

flames of difference in the party. Ramamurti had joined the separate issues of peace and freedom, with their different meanings, into one slogan, something Ghosh had tried to avoid at Madras:

The struggle for peace and the struggle for freedom are not identical. The main edge of one is against America and of the other against the British. We should understand that the two movements are not coexistent. The peace movement is broader than the struggle for liberation. All those who participate in the struggle for liberation must come into the peace movement. But all those in the peace movement may not agree to participate in the struggle for liberation. 75

If, as Ramamurti's slogan indicated, the two movements could be linked, where then was the difference between the Nehru government and the CPI? Moreover, he saw the U.S. as the enemy of both peace and freedom which would call for the CPI to back Nehru against the U.S.

This New Age article touched off debates ending with a charge of "revisionist tendencies" being laid on the Politbureau. As a result, Ghosh left India in July for Moscow.

The CPI Central Committee met 5-11 September and accused the Politbureau of reformism. E. M. S. Namboodiripad, in his official report, said the New Age article slogan:

...is a slogan which is likely to create the impression that recent international developments have made it possible for a platform of peace and freedom to be evolved - a platform which will include the Congress organization. As such this was a wrong slogan because the Congress organization, dominated by landlords and monopolists collaborating with British imperialism, cannot stand for a consistent policy of peace, and there is no question of a platform with the Congress organization for freedom. 76

75. Ajoy Ghosh, "Tasks Before the Communist Party of India", in On The Work Of The Third Congress Of The Communist Party Of India. New Age (Weekly) I (January 4, 1954,) Pp. 23-24.
76. Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, P. 315

The left obviously had the upper hand, and the report concluded:

There is no question of abandoning the struggle against the Congress government or revising the slogan or replacing it by a Government of Democratic Unity. The task of the democratic forces, on the other hand, is to intensify this struggle. 77

Even though the Central Committee had negated Ramamurti's analysis of the trends in international communism, this analysis had been correct. In October the Cominform journal carried an article by R. Palme Dutt in which he argued that the world scene had changed since World War II. The U.S. had stepped up its efforts to dominate former European colonies. Dutt concluded that:

First, the struggle for national independence in the countries in the sphere of British imperialism is no longer only against British imperialism, but, first of all, against the direct rule of British and the growing penetration of American imperialism. Failure to recognize this new stage of the struggle can lead to the destruction and defeat of the aims of the national liberation movement, if its leadership falls into the trap of regarding the American imperialists as the rivals and enemy of the British imperialists....The fight for peace against the war drive of the imperialistic camp led by American imperialism is closely linked with the fight for national independence....There can be no separation of the fight for national independence from the fight for peace. 78

Thus, Dutt sanctioned Ramamurti's slogan calling for collaboration with Congress. When the article appeared the Politbureau called a Central Committee meeting to discuss its implications. The November meeting was called to get rejection of Dutt's thesis, but ended in stalemate and a special commission was created to reassess the new situation.

Ghosh returned to India in December and a New Age article by him

77. Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, P. 315.

78. R. Palme Dutt, "New Features in the National Liberation Struggle of Colonial and Dependent People" For A Lasting Peace, For People's Democracy. October 8, 1954. P. 6.

indicated that he had moved to the right. Ghosh asked:

Can any serious student of Indian affairs deny that the foreign policy of Pandit Nehru's Government has undergone a shift in the last five years?... (We) support this change.... 79

Ghosh now called for a policy supporting the peaceful parts of Nehru's foreign policy and a fight against "reactionary policies internally". On 7 December Ghosh specified the matter saying Nehru's internal policy did not suit the masses' interests while his foreign policy did.

During the winter of 1954-55 the situation for the CPI became more complicated. In November Nehru returned from a visit to China and, on the 28th, praised China's economic programme while attacking the CPI. At the same time he announced a coming visit by Tito to India, noting the estrangement between Yugoslavia and Russia. On the day that Tito addressed the Indian Parliament, the Nehru government introduced a resolution giving its goal as "... the creation of a socialist pattern of society". While in India, Tito backed the Congress' economic policy. Tito's visit, however, was not recorded in the communist press.

Finally, in February there was to be an election in Andhra, a CPI stronghold. Observers believed that the CPI would further its gains since the state's leadership was militant. To try and offset this possibility Congress organized well and campaigned claiming the CPI to be loyal to a foreign power. This effort paid off and Congress received 61% of the seats while the CPI received only 8%. Interestingly, on 26 January Pravda had editorially praised Nehru's foreign

79. Ajoh Ghosh, "Communist Answer to Pandit Nehru", New Age (Weekly), II, December 5, 1954. Pp. 1, 13

and domestic policies.

All of these events led to factionalism at the 17-29 March CPI Central Committee meeting which had been called to analyse the Andhra election. This meeting all but liquidated the Politbureau and seriously divided the party. The meeting cited two shortcomings leading to the defeat in Andhra. First, the party had not placed enough emphasis on "...the important part that India was playing in recent times in the international arena in favour of world peace and against imperialist war mongers." ⁸⁰ Second, the Party had failed to "...pursue correct united front tactics".

Things continued to disintegrate within the party. The special commission of November split into two factions each composing a position paper for the June Central Committee meeting. The Central Committee meeting gave a compromise resolution. While the resolution was clear on Nehru's foreign policy, it was contradictory on domestic policy. On domestic policy the party first said:

...the general attitude of the Government towards the demands of the people has been one of unconcealed hostility and of full support to the vested interests. Wherever the masses have fought against worsening conditions of life, the attempt of the Government has been to surpress them with a heavy hand. The policies of the Government have thus meant attack on the standard of life of the people and their democratic rights, interruption of production, increase in police expenditure, intensification of strife and conflict all over the country. 81

While within the same resolution, the party was told to become part of government schemes:

The tendency to keep away from schemes and projects sponsored

80. Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, P. 319

81. Communist Party in the Struggle for Peace, Democracy and National Advance. (Delhi, Communist Party of India 1955), P. 4

or run by the Government must be given up. We have to participate in them, actively and effectively combat corruption, inefficiency and bureaucratic practices, help to implement and run them in such a way that maximum benefit is secured for the people. This must become an important part of the Party and of mass organization where we work. 82

This compromise could only intensify differences. The party now had a centerist as well as a right and left wing faction. The June Central Committee meeting called for a Fourth Party Congress. Prior to the Congress, Ghosh went to Moscow a second time. A second Central Committee meeting in September resolved nothing.

The Fourth Congress was postponed until 2 February 1956 due to a state visit by Bulganin and Khrushchev. The official Russian visitors shunned the CPI.

The event of the Twentieth CPSU Congress in Moscow caused a further postponement of the CPI's Fourth Congress. The Fourth Congress was held in Palghat 19-29 April 1956. The Congress apparently had sharp debate and expressions of view. It is generally believed that Joshi offered the Congress an alternative resolution which was accepted by one third of the delegates. The final resolution bears his point of view quite heavily. Ramamurti's point of view now became orthodox. According to the resolution, "Life itself has shown how the struggles for peace and defence of national freedom ...are inseparately linked and strengthen each other". The resolution called for the CPI to act as a "...Party of Opposition in relation to the present Government". Thus, the party would follow a constitutional path. Unity with other left wing parties was called for, but forms

82. Communist Party in the Struggle for Peace, Democracy and National Advance, P. 30

83. Political Resolution. (Delhi: Communist Party of India, 1956)

84. Political Resolution, P. 24.

were left unspecified.

The resolution called for restraint on issues of linguistic states, Goa and other issues of mass unrest. The decision for moderation by the leadership led to strain in areas like Bombay where state reorganization left many unhappy and offered a field for CPI activity. Such strain was intensified by the need to build strong local units if the state level party was to be strong.

When Stalin had died in 1953, Ghosh, on the part of the Central Committee, had issued a tribute of praise to the departed Russian leader. De-Stalinization, thus, dealt the CPI a blow to its unity and prestige. The party passed a qualified resolution on De-Stalinization in March of 1956. This resolution cited Stalin's accomplishments in Russia and in the communist world. The party was forced to try and soften the blow of De-Stalinization as much as possible to keep from alienating its true believers. Events in Hungary and Poland added to the CPI's difficulties at explaining international line changes. This was magnified by the party's need to publish a stronger statement on 4 June 1956 on Stalin due to the U.S. Department of State's publication of Khrushchev's attack on Stalin.

Finally, debates on "paths to socialism" had profound effects on the CPI. The question challenged the authority of the Russian example as the sole path and the authority of Russian thinkers to be guides to other Communist Parties.

In July and August 1956 New Times (Moscow) carried Modeste Rubinstein's article on India entitled "A Non-Capitalist Path for Underdeveloped Countries". Rubinstein cited Congress' statement that it sought as a goal a "socialistic pattern of society". He commented that close co-

operation by progressive forces in India could lead to socialist development. This article was a shock to the CPI which had viewed the 1955 Congress statement as a hoax. Moreover, the CPI was being told to co-operate with Congress to this end!

Ghosh was forced in the October issue of New Age to ask:

Which class has profited most from the economic policies of the government - this is a question which any Marxist, any serious student of economics has to examine in order to determine whether the path taken by a government is the path of socialism or even of democratic planning. Unfortunately, Modeste Rubinstein does not even pose the question.⁸⁵

The implications for the CPI worried Ghosh:

What is virtually ignored in the article is the profound truth that "Whatever the form of transition to socialism, the decisive and indispensable factor is the political leadership of the working class headed by its vanguard. Without this, there can be no transition to socialism..."⁸⁶

The results of De-Stalinization and the "separate paths" discussions were basic to all communist parties and especially to the CPI. On 18 November New Age published a letter to communists by Jaya Prakash Narayan, leader of the Socialist Party in the 1930's. He asked how Stalin's crimes could have been kept secret for so long. Certainly top communists knew of these crimes far before they became public, why had they remained silent? Narayan asked if Communism could be built on lies. Ghosh replied to the letter, but the reply was lame. He admitted that idealizing everything Russian was incorrect, but would go no further. The CPI theoretical journal in December carried an article by David Cohen, one of its main contributors, entitled "Tactics or Truth".

85. Ajoh Ghosh, "On India's Path of Development". New Age, (Monthly) V, October, 1956. P. 8

86. Ajoh Ghosh, "On India's Path of Development". P. 16

Sometimes one hears otherwise clever people say: "Ah truth -yes, but from which angle: that of the capitalists or of the workers?"

But how can there be any "angle" to the truth! Those who would seek to read apologetics for capitalism into reality would have to distort the truth. Truth is on the side of the working class as it is, or there would be no Communist movement. The working class does not need to find "angles" to the truth...The cynics - and the philistines - sometimes behave rather crudely. They say: "Truth is all right, you know (e.g., for discussions etc.) but somehow or other we have got to come out on top. We shall see about the truth and all that later".

This boils down to the philosophy that you may do anything to win victory for the Communist Party, try any dirty tricks you like, the only criterion being whether you can succeed or not. If you fail, you will do "self-criticism"; if you win, then you can promise to be very truthful in the future! ...The controversy which has been shirked for so many years should at last be resolved: ends and means. I believe it is necessary to say that bad means do corrupt what were meant to be good ends. The means do determine the ends. 87

This article was shocking in its honesty.

In 1957, to the surprise of the CPI, and especially those members who believed that power could only be obtained by violence, the CPI swept the April general elections in Kerala. The state was won constitutionally and the victory strengthened the position of the party's right wing. The victory by election and the existence of right, centre and left factions in the CPI, however, exposed the party to the brunt of the basic issues which would soon emerge as a result of Sino-Soviet differences.

87. David Cohen, "Tactics or Truth", New Age (Monthly) V, December, 1956, Pp. 57-58

CHAPTER IV

THE SINO - SOVIET RIFT

The years prior to Indian independence in 1947 and through 1957, can best be viewed as formative for the CPI. While these years witness differences within the party, prolonged factionalism was almost non-existent. During the period 1920-'47 the party was subjected to tensions related to the personality of its leadership as well as to attempts to formulate policy according to domestic as opposed to international circumstances.

The early years have their importance in several respects. First, and most important, was the initial position taken by M. N. Roy in his debate with Lenin at the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920. The debate centred around the revolutionary potential of the bourgeoisie. The question of bourgeois revolutionary potential has always remained unsettled and thus has always been a source of conflict for communist parties. This question arose anew in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

The second point of importance in the early years lies in the zig-zag pattern of party policy. This pattern identified the extreme positions of policy and the leaders of these positions. In many respects the different positions are analogous to the positions of the right and left oppositions in the CPSU at an earlier date. Juxtaposed with the growing necessity of the party to follow the lead of the International, these extremes could only polarize in the 1947-'56 period. This polarization was due to the control which the U.S.S.R. manifested over the policies of other communist parties. This control was directed towards fulfilling the U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy needs and often conflicted with other communist party's domestic policy needs. The result was a constant

tendency for the CPI to have two factions, one which placed the domestic needs over those of the International's, and one which placed the International's needs over the domestic needs. The arrival of the Sino-Soviet rift finalized this factionalism by offering diverging factions within communist parties two different, and on specific points, conflicting interpretations of the world and domestic situations. Factions were thus able to select the interpretation which best suited their analysis, and turn to either the CPSU or the CPC for legitimacy of their position.

There are several important elements in the party's policies from 1947-56. First, the subjugation of the party to the needs of international communism produced divided loyalties. These loyalties, second, led to factionalism. Factionalism crystalized itself into a left opposition, a right opposition and a centrist group. It is important to note that these groups, while backing official policy, consistently fought for their point of view at every turn. This may be taken to mean that these positions were becoming rigid. If this is so, any challenge to the U.S.S.R. as the sole interpreter and leader of the communist bloc would intensify and harden these positions. The events of the Sino-Soviet rift between 1956-1960 served to do this exactly. A discussion of the rift will indicate the reasons for CPI policy changes in the 1950-1956 era as well as reasons for the crystalization of the opposition and centrist positions.

Sino-Soviet differences can be traced back to the differences between Roy and Lenin's positions at the Second Comintern Congress. More specifically, however, the 1956 Twentieth CPSU Congress provides a watershed for it set the scene for discussions of the main areas of

contention. These areas fall into three headings: de-Stalinization and intra-bloc relations; communes and the road to communism; and, global revolutionary strategy. These areas came into contention when the CPC moved drastically to the left between June and November of 1957.

In June the CPC halted the "Hundred Flowers Campaign" probably because of the massive and bitter criticism of the party during a six week period. In addition, China was in a severe economic crisis. The CPC evaluation of the situation indicated that China would not be able to rely on the U.S.S.R. to any great extent for help. The party was divided over the solution to these problems between a moderate and a radical wing. By September the radical wing of the party had gained ascendance. The new party leadership reversed both domestic and foreign policy drastically. Domestically, a cautious economic system based on the Russian model was abandoned for a frenzied system based on exploitation of the power of human labour. In intra-bloc relations, the CPC went from defenders of bloc diversity to enforcers of unity. Finally, in foreign policy the previous cautious, defensive policy was abandoned. These changes conflicted directly with the U.S.S.R.'s views stated in 1956. The essence of these changes was the demand for a bolder communist strategy by the CPC.

At the 20th CPSU Congress Khrushchev, to the surprise of world communist parties and without prior talks with them, denied Stalin's positive role. After a short silence on the matter, the CPC analysed the Stalin era in a manner that was meant to temper Khrushchev's attack. This was done to soften the attack so as to limit full scale attack on

88. John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts From the Recent Polemics (New York: Oxford Press, 1968) Pp 61-68

the communist system, to protect Mao from charges of following Stalin, to put the attack into theoretical terms and explain Stalin's mistakes, and to establish Peking as a source of doctrinal authority.

While the CPC admitted that Stalin had made mistakes, it credited him with having carried out Lenin's principles. The CPC claimed that Stalin's contributions and mistakes must be weighed together and lessons drawn from both. The purposes in so limiting the attack were to defend China's adoptions of Stalinism and to prevent domestic reaction in China itself.
90, 91

Throughout this analysis Mao's name was never mentioned. The analysis was made jointly by the CPC politbureau implying that there was no "cult of personality" in China. In defending Mao against charges of Stalinism, it was noted that all leaders make mistakes, and that other leaders could learn from Stalin's mistakes. Mistakes, the analysis claimed, were made only when the leader lost sight of his country's affairs.

Theoretically, the CPC offered Mao's "Theory of Contradictions" as a rationalization of Stalinism. According to this theory, society develops through constant contradictions, thus it was pointless to deny that contradictions exist, but it was also pointless to over-emphasize specific contradictions. The party thus offered the CPSU leaders a way out of the questions which de-Stalinization evoked. Rather than state, as Khrushchev had, that Stalin's mistakes had nothing to do with

89. John Gittings Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute Pp. 64-66

90. Donald S. Zagoria The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962) Pp. 39-65

91. David Floyd Mao Against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963) Pp. 231-235

communism but were a result of personality, the CPC was saying that differences between the leadership and led could reappear in communist countries, but such reappearances could be avoided by corrective action.

This entire discussion of the Stalin era both challenged the U.S.S.R.'s supremacy as ideological leader of the communist camp, while offering the U.S.S.R. an easy out from the whole question of the Stalin era. It sought to avoid painful questions through a theoretical interpretation of the era. The Chinese were convinced that Khrushchev's explanation would not satisfy Titoist type revisionists. Finally, the argument sought to rid the communist world of Stalinism's undesirable elements while at the same time insuring the dictatorship of communist parties. The main lesson of the Stalin era, was the stressed use of coercion and the lack of permissiveness. The CPC analysis directly opened the question of intra-bloc relations in this analysis.

The 20th Congress had opened up the forces of polycentrism by the magnitude of the questions it asked about Stalin's leadership. If a Russian leader could make mistakes of such a magnitude as those claimed by Khrushchev about Stalin, was there any longer a reason for other communist parties to assume Russian infallibility in interpreting Marxist-Leninist doctrine? (It should be remembered here that international policy had become subservient to the Russian leadership by this time in history). The questions of unity and diversity now became important as Khrushchev tried to maintain bloc unity while accommodating such parties as Yugoslavia. Discussions of "equality" among bloc parties and "separate roads to socialism" caused sweeping demands by such parties as the Yugoslav communist party.

The CPC sought a middle ground on these problems between poly-

centrism and the CPSU position that there was no need for intra-bloc change. They carried this position out by supporting Poland's demands for a freer hand in building Polish communism, a hand that could meet Poland's "special problems".⁹² The same approach was used by taking a middle ground between the CPSU and Yugoslavia. Extending the "theory of contradictions", the CPC explained that contradictions were inevitable between socialist countries and were a product of correct and incorrect ideas. While this was true these contradictions took second place to the task at hand: i.e. fighting the common enemy. Variation from the Russian model was permissible as long as it didn't depart from the "fundamentals of the Russian experience". These were Marxism-Leninism as the guide to action; seizure of power by the proletariat through revolution; post-revolutionary dictatorship for the proletariat nationalizing industry and agriculture; planned development of a socialist economy; and, firm adherence to the principles of proletarian internationalism. The main areas of diversity beyond these principles was the realm of "separate roads", but these should apply mainly to domestic not foreign policy. In sum, the CPC formula was a confederative approach to unity.⁹³

The chinese approach had at its base several considerations. First, the CPC feared disruption of international unity in the communist world. This would lessen Russian interference in bloc countries while retaining a solid front against the West. Second, dislocations in Eastern Europe would impair China's economic development. Third, the CPC believed that the de-Stalinization campaign had gone too far too fast. It felt

92. John Gittings Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute Pp. 69-72

93. Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, Pp. 39-65

that the Russian leadership was inadequate to handle the situation, and offered itself to the task. Finally, the formula that the CPC offered, if accepted, would prevent excessive Russian interference in Chinese affairs.

When the radical wing took over the CPC leadership this position reversed itself completely. The Chinese, rather than upholding diversity, now went further towards condemning revisionism than the U.S.S.R.⁹⁴ The CPC reversal started with the justification of the necessity of the U.S.S.R.'s being the head of the communist movement. Avoiding references to equality, Mao now supported Khrushchev's rejection of the Polish and Yugoslav dispositions that Moscow's position as head of the movement was diminished. The CPC also shifted its line on the applicability of the Russian experience for other bloc members. The role of national characteristics was now minimized. These new positions were an outgrowth of the CPC policy changes domestically and internationally. The left strategy which the CPC had embarked on demanded bloc unity and strength, internal bloc divisions could only weaken unity and strength. The reasons for the demand for unity and strength will become clear in the discussion of the CPC's new global strategy.

The main question of communist strategy centres on the relationship between the communist bloc and the west in terms of military, economic and political strength. Russian developments in ICBM's as well as sputnik effected both Russian and Chinese views of the communist position.⁹⁵

94. Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, Pp. 66-74

95. Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, Pp. 145-221

In 1957 and '58 Khrushchev claimed Russian superiority in ICBM's and cast doubts as to the West's military superiority. These developments led the Russians to the view that the West was deterred, and that the nature of air and naval power had changed, making it less significant. The U.S.S.R. tempered this evaluation in several ways. Russia did not feel that the world power balance had changed significantly, nor did she feel that she had military superiority. At the same time she paid tribute to Western economic potential and prowess. Nuclear weapons led the Russians to assess total war as meaning massive destruction to capitalist and socialist alike. Finally, the Russians made no estimation of the possible damage which they could inflict on the U.S. in a war, thus suggesting that they lacked confidence in their ability to launch a decisive attack on the U.S. The GPC assessment of Russian arms developments differed drastically.

China now claimed that the east wind prevailed over the west and further, that due to the east's large population, total war would mean less damage to the east than the west.⁹⁶ The east was now superior in Peking's estimation. This assessment led directly to a new GPC action programme. This programme called for a stepped-up assault on imperialism in Africa, Asia and the Mid-east. If the west tried to resist, the bloc could force it into local wars which would not escalate the struggle due to the new increase in Russian military strength. Such local wars, the GPC felt, would increase and were inevitable.

The Russian plan for action reflected its more conservative estimates of the new situation. Negotiations now became a primary factor

96. John Gittings Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute Pp. 82-83

in Russian strategy. Local wars, to the Russians, still held out a high possibility of escalation. In all of this Khrushchev envisioned running minimum risks for maximum gains. Starting from the belief that communism would inevitably win, he sought to exploit Russian military advances to avoid armed stalemate, attract neutrals, avoid western unity which might be caused by employing the new weapons, and in general make gains peacefully at minimum expense.

The Russian assessment was an outgrowth of the changes in doctrine which had been started at the 20th Congress, while the Chinese assessment was an outgrowth of the swing to the left by the CPC in 1957. The Russian position is best summed up in "Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism" which was commissioned by the 1956 Congress. This text stands as the most authoritative guide to U.S.S.R. grand strategy and makes the differences between the Russian and Chinese positions clearly.

"Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism" effectively changes much of Stalin's thinking. ⁹⁷ In the first place it demands the identity of strategy and tactics, something which neither Mao nor Stalin were willing to do. The purpose of this was to give the Party leadership maximum flexibility for new tactical approaches while at the same time protecting it against accusations of sacrificing ultimate goals for short-term tactical objectives.

Second, the text was a warning, again for the purposes of flexibility, that military and political strategy cannot be either equated nor discussed in the same terms. The political sphere, unlike the

military sphere, demanded the ability to adapt to the complexities of the modern world.

Revolutions and wars now took place in a new context. War was no longer inevitable in the capitalist era while revolutions were possible without wars. The objective conditions for revolutions were seen as the inability of the ruling classes to maintain their rule in immutable form, intense aggravation of the misfortunes of the oppressed classes, and a significant increase in mass activity. Thus, revolution is only possible in circumstances of nationwide crisis with total participation (eg - revolution by a communist party alone was not enough). The instances in which these conditions are present were left open to interpretation. As a result, the Russians did not see these conditions in the Iraqui crisis of 1958 while the CPC believed these conditions were present.

More important than the conditions for revolution was the position that peaceful revolution was possible. Khrushchev posited the belief that non-violent transition from the capitalist stage was becoming increasingly possible. This state of events offered the advantages of "radical reorganization of social life" with minimum sacrifices on the part of the proletariat and minimum destruction of the society's forces of production. As the balance of power shifted towards the east, the bourgeoisie would prefer to yield peacefully to the transition.

The Russian view envisioned a gradual revolution in the west. This would be caused by a new type of democracy which was further left than the old type, but not yet dominated by communists. As such, this new democracy might or might not evolve to socialism. The new democracy would end the menace of war, end colonialism, and nationalize proper-

ties belonging to monopolies, thus effectively restricting their power. Khrushchev felt a long period of co-existence was necessary. During this time, communists were to encourage establishment of left-wing neutralist governments, as Khrushchev had done in India by supporting Nehru, and support democratic movements to prepare the masses for the advance to communism.

The final major area of contention between the U.S.S.R. and China is the communes issue and the question of the road to communism. ⁹⁸ When the left wing took control of the CPC it initiated a drastically stepped-up domestic policy the backbone of which was the communes. The commune system in China was a response to the economic crisis in which China found itself in 1957. This programme was based on an unbending faith in the masses, and in the possibilities of mass mobilization. The CPC believed that the commune would accelerate growth to such an extent that the socialist stage would be realized ahead of time. In so doing, the entire country would take a Great Leap Forward towards communism.

The commune system proposed to function, at least in the first instance, on a free supply system "to each according to his needs". In addition, the CPC seemed to be trying to solve problems of distribution before it had solved problems of creating abundance. This entire programme was an ideological threat to the U.S.S.R. If it succeeded it would say two things about the Russians. In the first instance, it would point to the fact that the CPSU leadership had not tried hard enough in its attempts to institute communes in Russia, and that the failure to do so was the leadership's fault. In the second instance,

98. Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, Pp. 77-141

if successful, China would have proceeded further towards communism, at least in terms of the communes themselves, in a much shorter time, than Russia had in the period since the revolution of 1917. Khrushchev was vulnerable to such an attack because of his low prestige in 1957 as well as for a number of unpopular reforms which he had made in Russia. During the course of the commune programme such claims were made when referring to Mao as the greatest Marxist-Leninist of the era, claims which also stated that China had advanced further towards communism than Russia.

During the commune programme Mao raised the "Theory of Permanent Revolution". This theory meant several things. First, it stated that permanent meant uninterrupted revolution, no halfway halts in progress towards communism. This implied that Russia had made such a halt. Second, it implied that Russia's leadership had lost revolutionary zeal. In essence, the Chinese were going to build socialism in the shortest time possible.

The CPSU reacted to the commune programme in three ways and three areas; economic, ideological, and historical. Economically, it was felt that the commune programme would harm China seriously by depleting its surpluses. Ideologically, the CPSU tried to limit the CPC idea that the commune system was transferable to other countries. Historically, the CPSU drew on the Russian failure of their attempts at the commune system.

Historically the Russian experience with communes indicated that a long period of schooling was needed to prepare peasants to go to communes. The Russian commune system had been initiated in 1917 and was abandoned in 1933. In 1934 the failure of the system was attri-

buted to three things: underdeveloped technology, the shortage of products, and conditions of scarcity caused by the premature egalitarianism. Certainly China in 1957 did not have the technology, products or surpluses to support a communal system in Russia's view. In 1958 communes were ruled out because free distribution of goods presupposed an unlimited source of abundance - which didn't exist; because of differences in the economic prosperity of collective farms - which would be inevitable for some time to come; and, because the decentralization implied in the communal system was not compatible with the need for a master plan for production.

The communal issue forced doctrinal discussion about the road to socialism and its pace. At the 21st CPSU Congress Khrushchev attacked the CPC programme from a doctrinal position giving the most complete statement on the transition to communism since Stalin.⁹⁹ First, he noted that from the transition from capitalism to communism a country must pass through a capitalist stage, this stage could not be violated or bypassed. Spiritual and material prerequisites to communism were created in each stage of development leading towards communism. Second, while there are differences between socialism and communism, there is no specific dividing line between them, the latter grows out of the former. This conceded the CPC position of continuity between socialism and communism, it also meant to emphasize the progress Russia had made since 1917. Finally, the transition to communism was not a decelerated movement, rather it was a movement accelerated only on the basis of the development of material production. Thus, communism's pace

99. Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, Pp. 128-133

was measured to some extent by the economic progress of the country or the bloc. With this statement Khrushchev had charted a course between the haste of the CPC programme and the (from the CPC point of view) stagnation of the Russian programme.

To emphasize his arguments Khrushchev laid down a timetable for Russian transition. Transition would start to take place only when the U.S.S.R. had caught up to the U.S.'s per capita production which would take another ten to twelve years. At that time the U.S.S.R. would be in the first phase of transition. Next, the U.S.S.R. had to surpass the U.S., at which time they would be building the material and technical base for communism. The entire communist bloc would then make the transition "more or less" at the same time.

In all of this Khrushchev was trying to regain the doctrinal initiative and emphasize the fact that the transition to communism was gradual. Chinese silence over these formulations soon gave way to a reversion to drastic CPC claims for Chinese progress and the "new" contributions of Mao to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. In effect, the Chinese had rejected the Russian analysis.

It should be realized that all of these various strands of thought are tied together in the different approaches taken by the CPSU on the one hand, and the CPC on the other, to questions of de-Stalinization, global revolutionary strategy and the road to communism. As such, they offer two fully developed but completely different interpretations of the nature of the present era, interpretations which are fundamental in nature and basic in doctrine.

The Sino-Soviet rift on basic questions confounded the communist world and added to the confusion of many different communist parties.

This is true in at least two respects. In the first instance consider the fact that the majority of communist parties had blindly followed the U.S.S.R.'s policy directions throughout their histories, especially during the Stalin era. They followed these policies with a faith in a singularity of purpose and a correctness in interpretations. The least word from Moscow had been enough to cause complete policy change in parties like the CPI. Now, suddenly the U.S.S.R. and China were at loggerheads over the most basic of questions and both had posited the definite possibility of incorrect analysis on the part of a Russian leader, although for different reasons. Could these parties now place their faith in future analyses and policies emanating from the U.S.S.R.?

In the second place these parties watched the two giants battle it out with success in emerging as the correct and legitimate source of authority befalling neither party. Neither one of the giants was able to get total rejection of the other's position, thus both positions seemed to stand equally as valid. Moreover, both countries stood as successful examples of communist revolution. Russia was no longer the single example of the successful revolution. Under these circumstances how could other communist parties heal their factional differences which centred, as in the case of the CPI, over many of the same basic questions?

100

By 1960 the crisis, for all practical purposes, was at a stalemate. The 1960 Moscow Conference, where the Russians came out on top as far as formalizing the majority of their points on paper, really did little but signal one of many halts in the polemics which had taken place

from 1956 onwards. What has been the implications of the Sino-Soviet rift for other communist parties, and for the Indian party in specific?

I have noted earlier that extreme changes in CPI policy necessitated by changes in Russian policy needs, had factionalized the party. The party was factionalized into three groups; a right, a left and a centrist group. The position of the right was similar to that of the U.S.S.R., while the position of the left was similar to that of China. The centrist group tried to steer a middle course between the two while reminding both of the necessity of analysing the Indian situation for policy direction. During the time when the CPI had only Russia as the foremost Marxist-Leninist authority, radical changes in CPI policy were acceptable even though these changes did cause factionalism. This factionalism lay dormant due to lack of international sanction. Factions outside of the leadership of the party were active only when the single international line saw fit to sanction them but they quickly lost their active component, as in the case of the Telengana movement, when international pressure was applied. In the case of the CPI, international sanction had become the life support for activity of any specific faction. The presence of one internationally accepted source of doctrinal legitimacy thus made manouvering both possible and easy. By the same logic, however, the emergence of an opposing authority whose interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and the present historical stage had been neither accepted nor rejected led competing factions within the CPI to the conclusion that their policies were correct, regardless of whether the faction was left, right or centrist. In these cases each faction adhered to one of the two giants' interpretations. When this happened in the presence of continued non-agreement

between the U.S.S.R. and China, factionalism in the CPI could at best be no less intense than the international struggle, and at worst would split the CPI into two parties. It is the contention of this thesis that, beyond what may be regarded as traditional sources of factionalism in communist parties, the Sino-Soviet rift was directly causal in the forming and maintenance of factions in the CPI, factions which did eventually split the CPI into two, and then three different parties between 1960 and 1968. Zagoria notes that:

The split in the Indian Communist Party has been so conspicuous that it received wide publicity in the Western press. The Left, pro-Chinese faction, led by B. T. Ranadive, has its strength concentrated largely in West Bengal, Andhara and the Punjab; the Right, pro-Soviet group, led by Ajoy Ghosh and S. A. Dange, seems to hold a tenuous majority among the party rank and file. There is still a third group, led by E. M. S. Namboodirpad, which has sought to remain neutral. 101

CHAPTER V

FROM OPPOSITION TO SPLIT: THE CPI 1958 - 1964

The CPI had been moving in a rightist direction in line with CPSU policy since 1950. The more the party moved in this direction the more difficult it was to contain right-left factionalism. Faction building had been contained by appealing to doctrine as well as to the authority of current CPSU policy. The rising of factional disputes at party meetings resulted in middle-of-the-road policies avoiding major questions on the nature of Indian independence, the class character of Congress and the road to communism in India.

As long as the CPSU remained the sole international authority on Marxism-Leninism, factionalism was contained with relative ease. This was a result of the fact that factions must appeal to doctrine in order to legitimize their positions. With Moscow as the sole international authority on Marxism-Leninism, the positions of communist party factions were measured against the Russian interpretation as the source of legitimacy. Thus, when the interpretation by a communist party faction was out of step with the Russian interpretation, that faction's interpretation was judged incorrect. With the coming of the Sino-Soviet rift and the failure of either side to emerge dominant, the positions of individual factions in the CPI could not be discredited. The approach of the CPSU on the one hand, and the CPC on the other, closely paralleled the left-right factionalism in the CPI and was used by the factions to legitimize their respective positions. In these circumstances the party became highly vulnerable to faction building.

The fate of the CPI between 1958-1964 was largely determined by

two events which divided the party and plunged it into the depths of the doctrinal arguments between the CPSU and CPC. Internally, the constitutional victory of the CPI in Kerala and the displacement of that government by the Central Government raised questions of the road to communism in India and the class analysis of the Indian government and nation which reflected on the wisdom of the CPSU's "peaceful transition to communism". Externally, the Tibetan revolt, which led to the Sino-Indian Border Dispute, raised questions of inter-bloc relations and global strategy.

These two issues took place in a national context in which the Indian masses were becoming increasingly radicalized while the Congress government floundered in its economic policy and came constantly under the influence of right-wing elements. These facts made both the internal and external events more important and dangerous. I will concentrate mainly on the events in Kerala and on the Sino-Indian Border as these relate directly to the Sino-Soviet rift and its influence on factionalism in the CPI.

A month and one-half before the Fifth Congress of the CPI the party's general-secretary, Ajoh Ghosh, announced the Aims and Objectives of the party. The announcement, on 10 February, clearly indicated that the party intended to continue to follow the CPSU line as put forth at the CPSU Twentieth Congress. The aims of the CPI under its new constitution, he said, would seek the establishment of socialism by peaceful means. These means would include the development of a mass party which would work towards a majority in the Parliament. As if foreseeing conflict at the party congress, Ghosh stated that inner party discipline would be a regular feature of party life. He softened

this a bit, however, by stating that if a member of the new national executive committee disagreed with the majority view of the committee, the member would have the right to express his views before the new national council. Moreover, all efforts would be made to assess the positions of all state party units on all issues before final decisions were made unless the issue demanded immediate action. Finally, with the party becoming a mass organization, the thirty-nine-member central committee would be replaced by a one hundred and one member national council and the nine-member politbureau would be replaced by a twenty-five-member national executive committee. A secretariat would be established to run the party's day-to-day affairs and, like the executive and general secretary, it would be elected by the national

¹⁰²
council. While the change of organization within the party seems logical in terms of its expanded membership, it seems possible - especially in light of Ghosh's statement on discipline - that the bodies were re-organized and enlarged for the purpose of staffing the party with a larger number of moderates and right-wingers for the purpose of overcoming the left opposition.

The new constitution and bodies were easily passed at the 6-13 April congress at Amritsar, while the political Resolution encountered serious difficulty and was only passed after ten hours of debate. The resolution felt that there was a strong possibility of establishing "alternative democratic governments" ¹⁰³ in light of the CPI victory

102. "Aims and Objectives of the Communist Party". The Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1958, 15-21 February P.1905:
INI:Q

103. "Amritsar Congress". The Statesman & The Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1958, 19-25 April, Pp. 2008:INI:E-2013:INI:E

in Kerala. In effect, the resolution was reasserting the correctness of the CPSU peaceful transition line. This logic was carried further by the party's backing of the Indian government's foreign policy which had, in recent years, gone in the direction of non-alignment.

The Amritsar Congress marks the highwater point of the swing to the right of the CPI. "Socialism through peaceful means", the acceptance of the bourgeois definition of freedom of speech, press and association and the assurance of the "...right of Opposition Parties to function freely under a communist regime 'so long as they abided by the Constitution of the country' " ¹⁰⁴ all point to this fact. Certainly, the left wing of the party must have found these policies hard to swallow, and, in the face of them, they had forced a middle-of-the-road policy upon the party.

The wisdom of following Ghosh's line seems to have been born out ¹⁰⁵ when the CPI won the Devicolam by-election in Kerala and in the assess- ¹⁰⁶ ment of the growth of the party throughout the country. These facts, however, did not bring the party dissidents into line. In the Organizational Report Ghosh discovered that "One of the biggest shortcomings of the Party is that its ideological homogeneity has seriously weakened ¹⁰⁷ in recent years". The report further revealed that the former central committee had divided and conflicting views on the implications of the idea of peaceful transition put forth at the Twentieth CPSU

104. "Aims and Objectives of the Communist Party". P. 2008:INI:E

105. "CPI Wins Devicolam By-election". The Hindu & The Statesman. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1958, 17-23 May, P. 2054:INI:G

106. "CP Drive For Membership". Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1958, 25-31 January, P. 1871:INI:G

107. "CP's Organizational Report". Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1958. 21-27 June, P. 2107:INI:B

Congress. Interestingly, the central committee had never discussed the issue, which seems to indicate fear that such a discussion could only drive the two different groups further apart. The report criticized all party units from top to bottom for failing to maintain close contact with one another and with the people. The answer to these problems, Ghosh felt, lay in strengthening Marxist-Leninist consciousness of the party cadres by educational and theoretical materials. These points were reiterated by resolutions of the CPI national council at its 8-13 October session. Additionally, the party came to the defence of the Kerala government which, it claimed, was under attack by the National Congress. The Congress, according to the resolution, would disrespect constitutional norms in defence of vested interests.

The dual forces of the Kerala government's overthrow and the beginning of the Sino-Indian Dispute started in 1959. Together, these two elements strengthened the left wing of the CPI and opened a factional division which would never again close.

The CPI had come to power in May of 1957 by means of a constitutional election in the state of Kerala. This victory had lent power to the right wing and its line of peaceful transition to socialism. By early 1959 disruptions in that state had led the CPI to fear Congress intervention against the communist government. Realizing that the Kerala government would have to counteract these disruptions, the CPI Executive expressed the hope that the people of the state would stand by the communist government in any actions that they would have to take. The executive claimed that the opposition parties were frustrated at their failure to remove the CPI government over the past two years. This frustration had led the opposition to preaching violence

and arousing communal passions. The party claimed that the Congress, both on the state and national levels, had joined hands with reaction-
108
ary elements to put pressure on the Kerala government. The right wing of the party was well aware that a reversal in Kerala by means of central government intervention or "popular" uprising stirred by opposition parties would mean serious questioning of the official party line of peaceful transition. Moreover, it would reinforce the more radical stand of the left wing elements of the party.

In July 1959 the fears of the right wing of the CPI were confirmed and the central government of India dismissed the Kerala government. To make matters worse, immediately after the dismissal the U.S.S.R. gave India a 350 million rouble credit which, in effect, sanctioned the Indian government's domestic and foreign policies. The left resented this support to the government by the U.S.S.R., as it tended to blunt the CPI's struggle against the country's reactionary forces.

In an 8 August resolution the central executive labelled the
109
intervention in Kerala as a "partisan and deliberate act" on the part of Congress. The executive backed the state committee's decision to launch a mass campaign for uniting the masses and defending the gains of the 28 month-old ministry. Even with central intervention the executive tried to find an optimistic side to the events, stating:

The Central Executive Committee is confident that the attack of reaction will be defeated and the Indian people will

108. "CP EXECUTIVE RESOLUTION ON KERALA". The Statesman & Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol 1959, 23-29 May. P. 2673: INI:B --2674:INI:B
109. "CPI RESOLUTION ON CENTRAL INTERVENTION IN KERALA". Times of India & The Statesman. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1959, 15-21 August P. 2829:INI:A

score new triumphs in the battle for democracy and socialism. 110

This statement, coupled with a statement saying that there was no doubt that the opposition would have been defeated if it had not been for the support of Congress and Mr. Nehru, indicate that the right wing of the party was trying to avoid the obvious questions which the left wing would raise in relation to the dismissal. The fall of the Kerala government dealt a severe blow to the prestige of the policy of peaceful transition and the class analysis and support that the CPI had been giving to the Nehru government. The fact that a U.S.S.R. credit followed immediately on the heels of the dismissal only added fuel to the fire of the left wing.

On 19 October the Kerala unit, true to form, passed a resolution admitting its mistakes while in power. These mistakes, however, were attributed to "inexperience" and "carelessness" ¹¹¹ rather than to incorrect policies and measures. The Kerala unit was swallowing its pride to keep within the spirit of the central CPI's official line. That this was the case is obvious, for on 27 November a "Progressive Communist Party" was formed in the state separate from the regular unit. This new unit criticized the CPI as an anti-Marxist-Leninist, bourgeois organization. The new unit also accused the CPI of upholding the state's landlords by legislation (Federal) during the 28 months that the communists were in power. The new "party" was comprised of moderates, and claimed that the regular CPI was always subservient to

110. "CPI Resolution on Central Intervention in Kerala", P.2829:INI:A
111. "Kerala CP on its Mistakes". The Hindu. Cited in Asian Recorder,
Vol. 1959, 31 October-6 November, P. 2973:INI:G

112

either the GPSU or CPC. The regular CPI Unit in Kerala followed through with the rightist line of the central party, calling for reforms of a Parliamentary nature in its 17 December Election Manifesto. 113

While the Kerala dismissal dealt a blow to the peaceful transition line which the CPI was following, it was far overshadowed by events on the Sino-Indian Border. These events had their origin in the Tibetan Revolt and in the unsettled border between India and China. Prior to 1959 the Indo-Chinese border had been the subject of discussion between the two countries in October of 1954 when Nehru noted that Chinese maps claimed parts of India as Chinese territory. The Nehru government claimed at that time that the Chinese through Chou En-lai had stated that the maps were old and out of date, having belonged to the Kuomintang, and that the new government had not revised them yet. Four years later the Tibetan revolt raised the question of the border all over again.

With the Tibet Revolt relations between China and India started to deteriorate. Realizing that this situation could work to the advantage of rightist elements in the country, the CPI executive passed a resolution on 12 May on Sino-Indian friendship. The resolution expressed the belief that the difficulties could be easily overcome by "...strict adherence to the principles of peaceful co-existence". 114

The difficulties were seen as among friends, and the party called on

112. "Progressive CP Formed in Kerala". The Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1959, 12-18 December, P. 3057:INI:R

113. "Manifesto for Kerala Elections". The Hindu, The Hindustan Times. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1959, 26-31 December, P. 3079:INI:H

114. "CP Executive on India-China Friendship". The Statesman & Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1959, 23-29 May, Pp. 2673:INI:B - 2674:INI:B

all patriotic and national forces to defend the friendship of the two nations. In relation to Tibet, the executive stated:

What happened in the Tibetan Region of the Chinese People's Republic was a rebellion organized by a handful of serf-owners and bigoted lamas in order to block out all reforms and thus perpetuate brutal oppression and tyranny. 115

The rebellion was not a popular uprising, according to the CPI resolution, and it did not serve the interests of the Tibetan people. By its statement, the CPI had backed CPC claims to Tibet as part of China, as such India had no say in the affairs of the government in Tibet because it was an "internal problem". The resolution criticized various statements which Nehru had made on the Tibetan Revolt, but backed statements by him which reiterated India's adherence to the principles of non-alignment. The necessity of Sino-Indian friendship was emphasized in face of the organization of SEATO and the recent bi-lateral U.S.-Pakistan military pact. In essence the party leadership had taken a limited gamble, for it was trying to befriend a fellow socialist country while at the same time supporting Nehru's foreign policy. If the issue melted away quickly the party would not run the risk of inner-party as well as national criticism. If, on the other hand, matters got worse the position of the CPI would be tenuous as best.

In January Chou questioned the established border between the two countries, and in April, after the Lama Revolt was crushed and the Dalai Lama fled to India, Chou claimed 50,000 square miles of Indian territory as belonging to China. In the previous month there had been an armed clash between troops of both countries across the border. All of this compromised the CPI's position and demanded that the party

take a definitive stand.

Meeting in Calcutta on 27 September, the central executive tried to work out a statement on the dispute. Privately, the CPI had tried to restrain the CPC in letters dated 3 and 5 May supporting CPC claims generally, but condemning Chinese claims of Indian expansionism. The meeting in Calcutta, however, marks the beginning of the division of the party. At that meeting two schools of thought prevailed in the executive. The first was led by P. C. Joshi and S. A. Dange and called for acceptance of Nehru's position that the MacMahon Line was the Boundary and that minor adjustments could be made by negotiation. The second group, led by B. T. Ranadive, fully supported the CPC position both in its claim on Indian land and in denouncing the Indian position on Tibet. The result of these positions was a compromise resolution.

The resolution claimed that the incidents between the two countries had been blown out of proportion by domestic reactionaries and foreign imperialists. This being so, the differences between India and China could be settled by friendly discussions and negotiation without either party demanding prior acceptance of its claim before the discussions. ¹¹⁶ The measure of the compromise, and its lack of ease, can be noted in the resolution. The CPI claimed that it stood with the people for the territorial integrity of India, but at the same time stated that socialist China could "...never commit aggression against India just as our country has no intention of aggression

116. "Resolution on Sino-Indian Border Dispute". Hsinhua News, The Statesman & Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1959 10-16 October, P. 2940:INI:A

117
against China". This statement, directed as much to a Chinese as an Indian audience, is interesting in light of the fact that the CPI had sent no less than two notes to China, while the Indian government had exchanged eight with the Chinese. Neither of the CPI notes had been answered, while all of the Indian government's notes had been answered and the CPI kept in the dark about them.

Prior to the Calcutta meeting Ghosh had been in Moscow discussing the border difficulties. The U.S.S.R., responding to Ghosh's appeals, published a statement in the second week of September, dropping the U.S.S.R.'s neutrality on the issue and indicating to the Chinese that they could not rely on Russia for support on the border question. 118
The Tass statement called for settlement of the dispute in a spirit of friendship. In effect, the CPSU had equated Socialist China with non-socialist India. The CPSU would not support China against a peace zone state - India. For their part the Chinese never recognized India as part of the peace zone, disliked the equation of the two states as "equal" and saw the entire Tass statement as a way to please Eisenhower on the eve of the Khrushchev-Eisenhower Talks.

The Tass statement freed the CPI from having to defend Chinese border claims and actions since the CPSU no longer supported them. Khrushchev furthered the Tass statement by claiming that the Chinese were trying to test the stability of the capitalist system by use of force on the border. With this not only was the CPI entirely free from having to back the CPC claims, but the issue of the border dispute be-

117. "Resolution on Sino-Indian Border Dispute". P. 2941:INI:A

118. Mohan Ram, Indian Communism: Split Within a Split. (New Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1969) Pp. 84-86

came an element in the growing sea of differences in the Sino-Soviet rift.

The CPI's general-secretary continued to defend the CPC and call for peaceful settlement of the issue. Returning from Moscow he claimed that both the CPC and CPSU wished to see the issue settled immediately. At the same time, when asked about aggression, he tried to steer a middle-of-the-road line:

Your question assumed that there has been aggression. You know that Tamadem was occupied by India, but later this area was evacuated. Could we say that India had committed aggression at that time? I do not believe that there has been any aggression on any side... 119

Eleven days before Ghosh's statement, members of the CPI's Maharashtra unit had been forced into voting affirmative on a resolution of the Parliamentary Board of Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti, stating that the organization stood behind Nehru "in defense of the honour and territorial integrity of our great country against aggression or coercion".¹²⁰
After the vote

A prominent communist member of the Board, who did not wish to be named, told newsmen that the acceptance of the resolution by the Maharashtra communists would result in a clash between the Central Executive of the CPI and its Maharashtra Unit. 121

In light of this statement one can see that the Maharashtra Unit was coming to a parting of the ways with the central leadership, for on 14 October the state unit passed a resolution backing the Samiti Resolution.

The CPI central party was soon forced into a firmer stand on the

119. "Ghosh & Samiti on Border Issue". The Hindu, The Statesman & The Times of India Vol. 1959, 31 October - 6 November, P. 2973:INI:A
120. "Ghosh & Samiti on Border Issue", P. 2973:INI:A
121. "Ghosh & Samiti on Border Issue", P. 2973:INI:A

border situation after an armed clash between the Indians and Chinese on 21 October in the Kong-ka pass of Ladakh. This incident took place just as a CPI delegation was returning from China. Reacting strongly, the CPI secretariat said that the activity of the Chinese in that area had "no justification whatsoever".¹²² With this incident S. A. Dange, leader of the right wing, said he wanted to tell Chinese comrades "you are pursuing a wrong line on the India-China border issue".¹²³ Dange stated that the MacMahon Line should be accepted as the basis for negotiations, although he noted that he spoke for himself, not the party.

Dange's idea of accepting the MacMahon Line was passed as a resolution by the Poona unit of the party on 27 October. This was the first CPI unit to publically refute the leadership's line of rejection of prior claims as the basis of negotiation.

As a result of their statements on the Ladakh incident, Dange, the Maharashtra executive committee, and other CPI members, were censured at the 10-15 November CPI national council meeting. A resolution at this meeting officially accepted the MacMahon Line as the border between India and China. Various statements by Khrushchev, one calling the conflict a "sad and stupid story"¹²⁴ had made total backing of the Nehru government's claim possible. The backing of the MacMahon Line, however, was qualified. The resolution held that the area south of the line "is now a part of India and should remain in India".¹²⁵ Resistance to this

122. "Statement of Chinese Aggression in Ladakh". The Hindu & Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1959, 14-20 November, Pp. 2998:INI:A - 2999:INI:A
123. "Statement of Chinese Aggression in Ladakh". P. 2998:INI:A
124. Mohan Ram, Indian Communism, P. 91
125. "CP National Council Meeting". Times of India, The Statesman & The Hindustan Times. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1959, 5-11 December, Pp. 3034:INI:B - 3035:INI:B

line of thought was stiff, and forty amendments were put forth before the resolution was passed. The resolution noted that "A socialist China can never have any warlike designs on India..."¹²⁶ All charges of aggression were groundless as there was an unclear border. The resolution went on to claim that on the Western part of the border India's traditional border should be accepted as correct, but that traditional border's definition should be negotiated as to its definition. The commitment to the MacMahon Line must have angered the left wing of the party, the many proposed amendments to the resolution indicate a fierce left-right battle within the national council. The year ended with the border issue unsettled and with a divided CPI officially backing the Nehru government and siding with the CPSU against China. Essentially the party had three factions assessing Nehru and the border conflict in three different ways. Sundarayya led one faction which felt that nationally Nehru had given up to the reactionary elements in Indian society. This faction blamed India for the border problems, claiming it had caused the problems to take the population's attention off the fact that the government was retreating from progressive policies.

The second faction, led by Ghosh, felt that Nehru was resisting, if poorly, rightist pressures. While China had not committed aggression in their estimation, her attitude and maps had lent strength to Indian reactionary efforts to oust Nehru from office.

The third faction, led by S. G. Sardesai, felt that Nehru was resisting reactionaries in India alone. They felt that the Chinese had misread Nehru as the leader of Indian reaction and had caused the difficulties

on the border to try and set Nehru back on the right track.

Taken together these three factions held the CPI in a dynamic state of tension which lasted a year. Throughout 1960 no major issues arose to put the factions into pitched battle, but the calm was to be only on the surface, and broke out full force in 1961.

Any hopes that the CPI had to regain power in Kerala were washed away in the elections in 1961. An alliance of opposition parties in the state defeated the communists easily. The Kerala party, although its popular vote rose, failed to secure even one-half of its 1957 seats. These results must have been watched keenly by the CPI, with the right wing losing heart and the left wing assuring itself of the correctness of its analysis.

On the 16th of February the CPI welcomed an invitation to Chou En-lai to visit India calling for peaceful settlement of the border crisis. This welcome was followed by a statement in May that, while the talks hadn't solved the problems, they were a constructive step. The May statement welcomed the decision by the two governments to carry on the discussions on an official level. The conclusions of the Chinese, however, were slightly different. Chou stated that Nehru had made statements "not friendly to China". Moreover, People's Daily stated that there had been six points which the Chinese felt were common between the two countries, but reaction and imperialism had kept the Indian government from pursuing these.

127. See Asian Recorder Vol.1960, 20-26 February, P. 3165:INI:B

128. See Asian Recorder Vol. 1960, 5-11 March, P. 3188:INI:A

129. See Asian Recorder Vol. 1960, 7-13 May, P. 3303:INI:A

130. "CPI on Chou-Nehru Talks". The Statesman, The Hindustan Times & The Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vo.1960, 7-13 May, P. 3303:INI:A

A meeting of the national council in May agreed to hold a party congress in January of 1961 at Vijayawada in Andhra. The national council was to finalize the political resolution and annual report for the congress during mid-October. Beyond this the national council regretted that Chinese-Indian talks had not yet settled the border question, but felt that they were the correct thing to do about the situation.¹³¹

While 1960 appears to have been a quiet year for the CPI (especially when one looks at the public documents) it was actually a year of great activity in which the party tried to deal with all of its problems. The party secretariat had been unable to reach an understanding of the political situation in India at its March meeting, and passed the issue on to the executive.

After the setback in the Kerala elections two lines of thought emerged. The left, led by Ranadive and Basavapunniah, felt that the party must be strong as an alternative to the Nehru government. The rising reaction in the government, in the left's estimation, had led Nehru to compromise, resulting in a penetration of foreign capital and a shift in foreign policy towards the West. Ghosh and Dange, on the other hand, felt that the Indian economy was not in crisis and that not all foreign aid led to enslavement. This was an argument over correct tactics within the party in which the right defended the policies of the government against the reactionary elements and wanted the CPI to move closer to the government. Since the CPI was not yet

131. "CPI National Council on Chou-Nehru Talks and Summit Conference." The Statesman. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1960, 28 May - 3 June P. 3338:INI:B

aware of Sino-Soviet ideological differences, the differing attitudes of the two factions were but extensions of their thinking on the domestic situation.

The party was thus divided before the 3 April executive committee meeting. Ranadive wanted left unity against the bourgeois offensive, while Dange saw the "offensive" as nothing more than a maneuver of the bourgeoisie - a bourgeoisie which would not give up non-alignment. Joshi called for the seeking of allies among progressive congressmen, Ranadive for abandonment of the Amritsar Line, and Dange a shift to the right of the Amritsar Line.

Ghosh tried to compromise these three different lines of thought by combining Dange's economic analysis and Joshi's political analysis. This attempt, however, failed and after successive amendments by the left a resolution was passed with Ghosh remaining neutral in the voting in an effort to avoid splitting the party.

With this drift the party was coming into conflict with the Nehru government. The executive draft had called for fighting the government policy shift to the right. When the draft was placed before the national council the result was a deadlock due to ideological confusion.

When the national council met it was faced with two different documents, one the April executive draft and the other a rightist document by Sardesai, K. Damodaran and Bhowani Sen. Ghosh, under pressure from Dange, refused to move the April executive resolution which resulted in a clash which was settled by a motion to shelve the issue on the part of T. Nagi Reddy. The left, however, attacked on three issues: the fact that foreign aid had undermined India's independence; the fact that leadership of the bourgeoisie for independent capitalist develop-

ment was impossible; and, that action against the right with democratic and progressive Congressmen was impossible.

In the midst of this situation the Sino-Soviet rift broke into the open with the Red Flag publication of "Long Live Leninism". The Russians retaliated with an attack on the CPC at Bucharest. For several months the CPI, caught totally off guard, published various articles balancing out the arguments of the two sides. The different positions, however, divided the CPI ideologically. Ghosh defended the CPSU line and the left wing of the CPI went out of its way not to commit itself. The left, under Ranadive's leadership, was trying to avoid getting involved in the conflict. The party was finally forced into making some kind of decision in terms of the Sino-Soviet rift and, after several public statements, came out in support of the CPSU with the left wing of the party voting against the resolution as a minority.

The resolution itself carried forward the Amritsar analysis of the Indian government, although it blamed the government for initiating the border crisis. On the other hand, it accused the CPC of making an incorrect analysis of the Indian scene. In this last, it affirmed the Russian analysis which treated the conflict as one between two countries of the "peace camp". On the international rift itself, the party expressed fear that continuation of differences would have serious consequences for the movement and communist parties, especially in Asia and Africa. In addition, while the differences needed to be discussed, the party deplored discussion of them in public. The CPI quickly found itself in trouble over this position when the West Bengal State Council of the CPI rejected the position and the Punjab Council stayed neutral. The West Bengal Unit had received a view from the Chinese

position through Harekrishna Konar, one of its members, who had just returned from Peking and VietNam.

Having publically supported the GPSU in the international ideological dispute, the CPI was called upon to be on the international commission for the 1960 Moscow Conference. It's representative was Ajoh Ghosh. The basis of the commission's work was a letter to fraternal parties from the GPSU, a 160 page rejoinder by the GPC and the resolution of the CPI executive committee. While the CPI allowed copies of the GPSU letter to be circulated to various Party members before the Moscow Conference, the GPC letter was introduced by Konar on his return from Peking and VietNam. As a result, the CPI executive committee was divided on its brief for the coming Conference. The final brief was passed only by an enforced majority decision without a national council discussion.

In the first week of January 1961 the CPI national council met in Bombay hailing the Moscow Declaration as a "source of inspiration and guidance for our Party".¹³² Party members were called upon to study the document carefully in an effort to sharpen their understanding of Marxism-Leninism. This backing of the Russian position certainly could not have sat well with the left wing of the party, and it had the effect of alienating many party members. On 14 February a National Marxist Association was formed with the avowed purpose of wiping "the Communist Party from the soil of India" and leading "India toward true socialism under the banner of Marx and Lenin".¹³³ The appeal of this

132. "CPI National Council Meeting". Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1961, 22-28 January, P. 3745:INI:G

133. "National Marxist Association Formed". Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1961, 26 February - 4 March, P. 2823:INI:T

group was specifically addressed to Dange, Ahmed and others, hoping that they would join their organization and abandon the "anti-national character" of the CPI. In effect, this group was further right than the Ghosh leadership at the time.

The national council met again in February and upheld the traditional borders between India and China in the west and the MacMahon Line as the de facto border in the east. In its resolution on the border dispute, the party expressed regret at the deadlock in talks and called for direct negotiations between the two countries on a political basis. Direct negotiations were becoming a recurring theme as a result of compromise between the right and left wings.

In preparation for the coming national congress, the national council passed a Political Resolution. Considerably more than one third of those who voted on the Political Resolution voted against it. The Resolution, written by Ghosh and Dange, saw India as a "bourgeois democracy" which could become an "independent national democracy" through parliamentary methods. This could be accomplished, in part, by a more positive attitude on the part of the CPI in dealing with positive progressive elements, including those in Congress. This thesis called for a strategy of "broad national democratic front" of communists, Congress and other progressives. It is significant that this strategy came forth at this time, especially when it had been rejected at the Palghat Congress after intense debate. Such a strategy was paramount to a bid for a further drive to the right in CPI policy. Ghosh may

134. "Second National Council Meeting". The Statesman, The Hindustan Times, & Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1961, 19-25 March, P. 3861:INI:N

have believed that with the Moscow Declaration and international events he was now in a position to soundly defeat the left wing of the party. Whatever the case, Ghosh failed to make a clean sweep of the situation as is indicated in the analysis of the political and economic situation of the country.

The political and economic analysis was a series of compromises in which the right wing accepted elements of the left's arguments. Compromise did not satisfy the left, however, and as a result it circulated a "minority document". It was agreed that documents from both the left and right would be accepted at the coming Congress and that these would be circulated. The national council meeting was merely a warm-up for a confrontation which would drive the CPI to the brink of split at the party congress in April.

When the Sixth Congress met it faced two draft programmes and three draft political resolutions. The documents of the right wing had official standing as they had been passed by the national council. Both of the right documents took the position that the country's independence was a reality, but that the class character of the bourgeoisie eliminated the possibility of correct policies for improvement of the people's condition. The answer to this situation was a unity of democratic forces in a four class front to struggle against reactionary forces. Significantly, Congressmen were to be included in this front, which in effect sanctioned Congress as a progressive party.

The left draft challenged the basic elements of the official draft. It called on the party to provide a correct and alternative leadership uniting democratic and patriotic forces under working class leadership to establish a People's Democracy. In this, resistance and mass up-

heavals would be used against rightist policies.

Several days of debate failed to settle the situation and it was only settled in the last by the direct intervention of Mikhail Suslov, secretary of the central committee of the CPSU. Suslov's intervention, in the form of a speech, gave support to the right wing and confused moderate elements in the CPI. The upshot of his intervention was that the draft programme was put off for future debate in the national council with an agreement that the party continue to follow the now out of date Amritsar Line.

The political resolution, carrying immediate tasks, could not be put off. Here, there were three drafts, the official one of Ajoh Ghosh which had been accepted by the national council; the left draft of Ranadive which had been rejected by the national council, and a surprise draft by E. M. S. Namboodiripad. The competition of these three drafts resulted in a compromise. The official draft noted that the immediate danger was a further shift to the right of national foreign policy, aggravation and perpetuation of the Sino-Indian conflict and a change in industrial policy to the benefit of private capital. This situation had to be countered by means of a broad front of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie. While Congress was the organ of the national bourgeoisie, it was incorrect to equate it with right reaction. The problem that the party faced was that various policies were being used by the right reaction to strengthen its position, and these policies had to be fought. While much of the right reaction was inside of Congress, so were potential allies. Thus it was necessary for the CPI to make links with Congressmen and get their support.

This draft, along with the left draft, caused deadlock. The dead-

lock was overcome by an agreement to withdraw Ranadive and Namboodiripad's drafts and amend the official draft. The final draft was a limited victory for the left. It rejected a united front with Congress and called for unity with struggle. The issue of national democracy or people's democracy remained unsettled. The immediate task was a national democratic front. In the last neither the ideological nor the political differences of the CPI were settled. ¹³⁵ The left gained one other slight victory in the form of increased representation on the national council when that body was expanded from 101 to 110 members. This victory was, however, meaningless as deadlock prevented it from electing the central executive committee or the secretariat.

Suslov's role in all of this cannot be under-estimated. His intervention both tipped the forces towards supporting the right wing of the party and aided in averting a split. Moreover, the final decisions of the Congress, especially the recognition of the Congress as a progressive party, aided the U.S.S.R. in its efforts at detente with India. On the other hand, for the CPI itself, the Sixth Congress was a masterpiece of opportunism which avoided major questions and was so vague and general that the party could not act decisively on it. The decisions at the Congress only testify to the rapidity with which the party was disintegrating.

The neutralization of the party as a decision-making organization was testified to in the election of the central executive and secretariat in June. Of the twenty-five members on the executive, twelve

135. "Communist Party Congress". The Hindu, Times of India, The Statesman, The Hindustan Times, & New Age. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1961, 28 May - 3 June, Pp. 3975:INI:R - 3978:INI:R

were from the left wing, twelve from the right, with the final member
136
being Ajoy Ghosh in a position of right of centre. The crisis
which Suslov had helped the party avoid was waiting under the surface
and could and did erupt with the further developments between the
CPSU and CPC in 1962.

When the Sino-Soviet rift first became public knowledge, the CPI
had backed the Russian position in the dispute. For its part the
party's left wing had tried to avoid challenging the CPI's official
position in an effort to stay out of the dispute. The 22nd CPSU Con-
gress upset this balance within the CPI. So fierce was the denigra-
tion of Stalin and the attack on Albania that even pro-CPSU parties
were shaken. These parties would have to prove their loyalty to Mos-
cow by following her lead in degrading Stalin. Under these circum-
stances the left wing of the CPI could have isolated the right wing
if that wing had supported the CPSU at the 22nd Congress. Perhaps
realizing this, Ghosh neither accepted the degradation by joining in
speaking for the CPSU position, nor did he reject it. Before Ghosh
returned home the new assault on Stalin had set off a storm in Kerala,
Andhra and West Bengal. During this same time Ghosh had exchanged
criticisms with the CPC charging them with incursions into India and
demanding that these stop. The Chinese accused Ghosh of trailing behind
Nehru and failing to get all the facts on the recent charges.

The event of the Third general elections in India brought all the
unsettled matters of the party to the surface again after they had

136. "CP. National Council Elects It's Central Executive and Secre-
tariat. The Hindu & Hindustan Times. Cited in Asian Recorder
Vol. 1961, 16-22 July, P. 4059:INI:M

been put aside at the Sixth Congress. The issue was again a question of whom to attack - the right reaction in India or the Congress. The right wing wanted to fight reaction by looking for allies in Congress, the left wanted to attack Congress since it viewed mass unrest as a result of Congress policies. In its continued state of deadlock, the national council shelved the election review but rejected the idea of a united front with Congress while still calling for a national democratic front.

The next national council meeting again took up the question of the election review. Dange, at this meeting, was able to again have the issue shelved.

In late 1961 Ghosh refuted the CPC position on the Indian government. "India's policy is one of peace and anti-colonialism and the architect of that policy is Mr. Nehru". He accused the Chinese of totally misunderstanding the Indian position and added that if China crossed the MacMahon Line "India would be justified in taking all measures to repel them, and the Communist Party of India would support the Government".¹³⁷ Finally, Ghosh scolded the CPC leadership "Our views are...basically different from the Chinese views on India's foreign policy. We (CPI) are better judges of the Indian situation than any other Party, including the Chinese Communist Party".¹³⁸
¹³⁹

Ghosh's attack on the position of the CPC was among the last things he did before he died in January of 1962. His death put the

137. "CPI Disagrees With China On India's Foreign Policy". The Statesman & Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1962 8-14 January, P. 4358:INI:B
138. "CPI Disagrees With China On India's Foreign Policy" P. 4358: INI:B
139. "CPI Disagrees With China On India's Foreign Policy" P. 4358: INI:B

party into a position of organizational crisis. The majority of the national council wanted E.M.S. Namboodiripad as Ghosh's successor, but the right wing would agree to this only if Dange was placed in the position of chairman, a post which had to be created by amending the party's constitution. A composite secretariat was established by the same process and this balanced the party's left and right factions. This worked smoothly for five months until the Sino-Indian border war broke out. A meeting asked the secretariat to prepare documents on the ideological questions facing the communist movement, the significance of the 22nd CPSU Congress, the post-election situation in India, and a paper on the organizational problems of the party.

The central executive of the party met in late April and early July at which time the right and center elements of the party combined to outvote the left wing and endorse Khrushchev's analysis of Stalin. The resolution which the executive passed was to be put before the national council at its coming meeting in Hyderabad. If the national council accepted the resolution it would place the CPI squarely on the side of the U.S.S.R. The proposal of this resolution marked the beginning of an offensive by the party's right wing in which the left wing suffered a severe setback.

When the national council met in August the Sino-Indian border was alive with Indian and Chinese troops trying to outflank each other. After four days of debate, the national council accepted the ideological conclusions of the 22nd CPSU Congress. This conclusion was

140. "CPI National Council Session". The Times of India & The Statesman. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol 1962, 21-27 May, P.4538:INI:A
141. "CPI Endorses Khrushchev Line on Ideological Dispute". The Hindu. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol 1962, 17-23 September, P.4793:INI:D

considered an indication that the national council would fully back the position of the Nehru government on the Sino-Indian border issue. Going further, the CPI also labelled Albanian statements on the CPSU position "regrettable and unjustified",¹⁴² which was a subtle attack on the Chinese position. On the major ideological questions of the inevitability of war and peaceful coexistence, the statement said that it was a distortion to interpret these to mean that the basic Marxist-Leninist class stand must be abandoned. Rather, what these meant was that the transition to socialism could be made in a "less painful" manner.

The situation on the border continued to deteriorate and, at a meeting in October, the secretariat found itself divided over the issue. The new clashes were taking place in the eastern part of the border, which had formerly been a quiet area, and in which the MacMahon Line had been accepted generally as the border. The executive resolution accepted the Indian government position that the Chinese had violated Indian territory, and that India had a right to take the necessary defensive steps.

Behind the executive resolution was a seriously divided secretariat. Ahmed, of the right wing, had made statements holding the Chinese guilty of violations in the eastern area. The left wing wished to press for disciplinary action against him for these statements. This request, however, was not honoured because there had been no violation of the party Line. Moreover, the issue of discipline could not be pressed because four of the nine members wanted

142. "CDI Endorses Khrushchev Line on Ideological Dispute". P. 4793:
INI:D

disciplinary action, four were against it and the ninth member, Namboodiripad, was neutral. A call for action on the basis of the discussions on the border issue also resulted in stalemate. The final decision of the secretariat on the border situation in the east was passed by the national council on 1 November.¹⁴³ The border issue had been used by the right to push the divided secretariat to the right. When the resolution branded China as the aggressor, its three leftist members resigned. This push by the right was successful and the event of the arrest of leftist CPI leaders in November,¹⁴⁴ clinched control of the party by the right even in leftist strongholds.

The Russians had taken a neutral stand on the new border flare-up, probably as a result of the fact that they were tied down to their own problems in the Cuban missile crisis. Coming on 1 November, the CPI position labelling the Chinese as aggressors put pressure on the U.S.S.R. This was followed by a visit by Dange to Moscow, his visit had been preceded by a letter from the right faction of the CPI clarifying the official party stand. The push to put pressure on the CPSU to align its policy with that of the Nehru government and the official CPI Line worked, and on 12 December Khrushchev stated at the Supreme Soviet:

The areas disputed by China and India were sparsely populated and of little value to human life. The Soviet Union could not possibly entertain the thought that India wanted to start a war with China. The Soviet Union adhered to

143. "Chinese Agression, CPI Resolution On". The Hindustan Times, Times of India, The Hindu, & The Statesman. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1962, 26 November - 2 December, P. 4910:INI:A
144. "Communist Leaders Arrested". The Statesman, Hindustan Times, & Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol 1962, 3-9 December, P. 4922:INI:A

Lenin's views on boundary disputes. Its experience over 45 years proved that there was no boundary dispute which could not be solved without resorting to arms. Of course, it was good that China had unilaterally ordered a ceasefire and withdrawn its troops, but would it not have been better if the Chinese had not advanced from their original positions?

145

When the CPI executive committee and national council met in February of 1963, in the midst of intensified Sino-Soviet polemics, it had as its main business the international ideological dispute. The right wing used this meeting to isolate the left labelling them as "pro-Peking". A ten man commission appointed to write a draft on the Sino-Soviet dispute produced two drafts, one by Namboodiripad and a second by Sardesai. Namboodiripad's draft did little in terms of the Sino-Soviet dispute. It merely said that the CPI should stay out of it. Rather, it sought to review the left and right zig-zags of the CPI over the last twenty years. Sardesai's draft was of little more body, its position was unclear and it satisfied itself with attacking the Chinese on political and ideological grounds. A third draft by Dange only did a more careful job of attacking the Chinese. As a result the national council rejected all three drafts, but used Sardesai's draft, which it rewrote, to back the U.S.S.R. stand without qualifica-
146
tions in the form of an open attack on the Chinese. This action amounted to total right wing victory, or more actually subjugation, of the CPI. It effected a united front with Congress thus violating the Vijayaweda Line of 1961. In addition, it extended the differences

145. Mohan Ram, Indian Communism, P. 144

146. "CPI National Council Condemns Chinese Aggression - Other Resolutions". Times of India & The Statesman. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1963, 19-25 March, P. 5099:INI:D

in the party to include both the political line and ideological questions.

From this time on the split in the CPI became complete in all but name. In addition, it also became a subject of the international polemics. An example of this is found in the People's Daily attack on Dange of 9 March.¹⁴⁷ CPI criticism of the CPC continued throughout the year. Domestically, the party continued to push for support of the Nehru position on the border problem and against reactionaries who were using the border dispute.¹⁴⁸ At a 20 July secretariat meeting, the CPI joined the CPSU in calling on the Chinese to stop their splitting activities in the international movement. There was no doubt about the CPI position:

On the most important questions which effect the vital interests of our people - on questions of war and peace, of the role and development of the world socialist system, of the struggle against the 'personality cult', of the strategy and tactics of the world working class movement and the national liberation struggle - the position of the CPI is wholly with that of the international communist movement and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and is wholly against the erroneous views of the leadership of the CPC. 149

By the end of the year the CPI found that units of the party were fighting against the official line. The national council session in November discussed disciplinary action against the West Bengal unit for demonstrations against the line, but deferred this to a later meeting. The decision was put off because it was feared that such action

147. "A Mirror for Revisionists". Peking Review 15 March, 1963
148. "CPI National Council Session". The Statesman, Times of India, & Hindustan Times. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1963, 23-29 July, P. 5320:INI:0
149. "Sino-Soviet Ideological Dispute - CPI Support to U.S.S.R.". The Statesman. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1963, 13-19 August, P. 5353:INI:D

would split the party. The council did, however, censure A. K. Gopalan, its Lok Sabha leader, for "open and wilfull defiance and public slander of the Party".

The linking of the CPI factions with the international factions quickly developed into a crisis throughout 1960-1963. In 1964 the party came to the zenith of this crisis. In the first month of that year the executive called on all of the party members to be vigilant against steps taken by groups or individual members to split the party under the guidance of the CPC and Indonesian communist party.

On April 11 the split within the CPI became physical as well as ideological when thirty-two centrists and leftists walked out of the national council meeting. Speaking for them Jyoti Basu announced:

We are the Communist Party, we don't recognize them (supporters of Mr. Dange) as the Communist Party. We are out of it. 152

The immediate cause of the split was the issue of a series of letters from Dange to the British government in the 1920's. The walkout came when the centrists and leftists failed to secure the issue of these letters as the first item on the agenda. It was claimed that Dange had offered his services to the British during the 1920's. Behind this, however, was a parallel newspaper being run by the dissidents

150. "CPI National Council on China, Ideological Differences and Organizational Discipline". Times of India & The Statesman. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1963, 12-18 November, Pp. 5516:INI:B - 5517:INI:B
151. "CPI Calls For Opposition To Chinese Line". Times of India & The Statesman. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1964, 5-11 February, P. 5655:INI:B
152. "Split in CPI - National Council Meeting". The Statesman, Times of India, Hindustan Times. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1964, 6-12 May, Pp. 5810:INI:D - 5811:INI:D

as well as a forty-one page document which they had prepared for the seventh party congress later in the year. Debate raged between the two sections of the party over the authenticity of the Dange letters.

Acting hastily, on 14 April seven of the leftists were expelled and twenty-five council members suspended. The expulsions were later converted into suspensions.

It was not originally the intention of the thirty-two members who walked out to split the party. What was clear was that they were making a bid for the party leadership. The council exonerated Dange, but called for an investigation into the issue of the 1920's letters. In line with this, all of the CPI base units were asked to review the position of the thirty-two suspended members and then to hold state meetings assessing the state party's attitude in preparation for the party congress to be held in November. The statement of the thirty-two suspended members proposed a compromise. This compromise called for a reorganization of the party centre (secretariat, central executive committee and national council), a complete probe of the Dange letters, postponement of all disciplinary action for splitting activities until the seventh congress, and a fresh scrutiny of party membership by an agreed process and an agreed commission to examine the documents for the coming congress.

On 15 April the leftists released their draft programme. It called for a united front to replace Congress. This call was the anti-thesis of the official programme, however, the Kerala unit started working towards its end immediately. A day later the West Bengal unit of the party disowned the national council and refused to recognize the Dange leadership.

A meeting of the national council took place in June at which the draft programme of the left was discussed and rejected. The council told the left faction to dissolve its separate committees and pave the way for unity talks.

153

On 4 June members of the left group and the party secretariat met but failed to come to agreement on steps for unification. The left demanded dissolution of the present secretariat, the appointment of a joint commission to prepare for the seventh congress, and expansion of the committee investigating the Dange letters. The secretariat felt that the emphasis by the left on agreement would be in effect a minority veto. In addition they objected to the left's idea that the 1962 secretariat should be re-instated and to the idea that a joint commission should prepare a joint document for the seventh congress inasmuch as each side had already prepared documents for the Congress. The secretariat felt that all documents could be circulated, but qualified this with a demand that the left return to the national council. It was clear from this that there was no common ground for the two sides to get back together.

154

In July the left faction held a convention in Tenali in which it was concluded that there was no hope of unity. The convention passed a resolution calling on the Indian government to directly negotiate a settlement of the border dispute with China, and welcomed the Colombo initiative which emphasized this approach. The resolution

153. "CPI National Council Session In New Delhi". The Statesman, & The Hindustan Times. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1964, 1-7 July, P. 5907:INI:B

154. "CPI Unity Talks Fail". The Statesman & Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1964, 22-28 July, P. 5940:INI:I

further decided to hold a seventh congress of the centrists and left-ists charging the Dange group with "making unity talks a smoke screen behind which they could consolidate themselves as a faction and deceive a section of honest Party members who were anxious for Party unity".¹⁵⁵ The convention called on all party members to isolate the Dange group from both the communist and socialist movements.

The year ended with the left faction holding a conference in October which it labelled the seventh congress of the Communist Party of India. The resolution on political organization completely refuted the Dange line as "class collaborationist and revisionist...".¹⁵⁶ The (left) party based its programme on the Tenali Draft, accusing the government of causing economic crisis after two decades of rule in attempting to build capitalism. The slogan of "People's Democratic Front" was put forward.

On the 4th of November the Communist Party of India (right) national council met in Trivandrum. At this meeting the right was faced with the resignation of Khrushchev which, from its statements, shook its security quite a bit. This meeting decried the manner and method in which the resignation was announced.

The bald announcement...unaccompanied as it was by any appreciation of his services or even a hint of errors or other compelling reasons...heightened the concern felt everywhere. ¹⁵⁷

155. "CPI Leftist Convention In Tenali". The Hindu & The Statesman. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1964, 29 July - 4 August, Pp. 5952:INI:B - 5953:INI:B
156. "All India CPI Left Conference". Statesman & Times of India. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1964, 2-8 December, Pp. 6175:INI:C - 6176:INI:C
157. "CPI National Council Session In Trivandrum". The Hindu and The Hindustan Times. Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1964, 2-8 December, P. 6176:INI:D

Thus, just as the right had gotten free of its dissident elements and was in a position to follow the CPSU line unopposed from within, the chief exponent of that line suddenly and without explanation dropped out of sight. The long shift to the right, which had started in 1950, had come to an end with the Communist Party of India becoming involved in, as well as being an issue itself, in the international communist dispute with the result that the party split from two factions into two parties.

CHAPTER VI

FURTHER FACTIONALIZATION: THE CPI 1965 - 1968

The presence of the Sino-Soviet Rift significantly added to the pressures which ultimately split the CPI in two ways. The first of these was by offering the Party two anti-thetical interpretations of ideological questions concerning relations between Parties in the Communist bloc, strategies for world revolution, and the nature of the present era. Alone, this factor would have certainly reinforced severe factionalism in the CPI (as it did in other communist parties,) but it would not have been enough to split the Party. The second factor, that of direct counselling for split and of indirect action vis-a-vis India, when combined with the ideological questions of the Sino-Soviet Rift, led directly to the split.

With the Chinese-Indian border dispute, and later the Indo-Pakistani border dispute, the CPI was forced into taking a position either supporting or withdrawing support from the Indian government. For her part, the U.S.S.R. had been giving firm backing to India on these issues, as well as on Indian foreign policy generally. The CPI had been following the CPSU's lead which, inevitably forced CPI policy to the right. Siding with the Indian government on the border dispute, however, meant at least rejecting part of the claims of a fraternal party - the CPC. Had the border dispute levelled off initially, and the Sino-Soviet Rift remained dormant, the original CPI position of trying to support the Indian government and the CPC at the same time might have worked. The intensification of both disputes prevented this from happening.

Continuation of the border dispute and intensification of the Sino-

Soviet Rift with the Bucharest crisis and Twenty-Second CPSU Congress forced the CPI into branding China as the aggressor. The Indian situation became part of the polemics between Moscow and Peking.

Within the CPI the right and left factions became clearly identified and a centrist position slightly less clearly defined. Under normal circumstances, with one international Marxist-Leninism authority (Moscow) one of the factions would have made a challenge for the CPI leadership. This challenge would have succeeded or failed on the basis of the position and strength of the Party rank and file, as well as the direction of the single international authority. Such a challenge was, in fact, made by the left wing in terms of the leadership of S.A. Dange. Dange was able to control the challenge, but this could not defeat the challenge of the left wing. The left wing could not be completely defeated and isolated due to the direct ideological (if not other kinds) of support which it received from the CPC. Continued border disturbances forced the right wing further right and the left wing first to a neutral position and then a pro-Chinese position. Both wings were in a position in which they could "predict" the national and international consequences of actions and back their predictions with fully developed Marxist-Leninist theory either from the CPSU or the CPC. This resulted in stalemate.

The CPSU role in finally splitting the Party seems to have been of primary significance. The interjection of Mikhail Suslov at the Sixth Congress of the CPI reinforced the position of the right wing and relatively neutralized the left wing. By 1963, the right leadership believed that it had Russian backing to split the Party. The Russians seemed to be relying on CPI backing in such dividing of the

Communist World:

Up to the present time 65 Communist Parties have condemned the views and actions of the Chinese schismatics...and have expressed complete solidarity and support for the principled CPSU position in its struggle for the ideological purity of revolutionary theory and unity within communist ranks. 158

At the time that this statement was published, the right leadership of the CPI was putting increased pressure on the left wing. Mohan

Ram notes:

The CPSU leadership was perhaps unnerved at the growing leftist challenge to the Dange leadership and thought that an immediate split was the only method of carrying the majority CPI wing on its side, even if it meant the formation of a rival party by the leftists. 159

Interestingly the CPSU did not follow this procedure with other parties such as the Indonesian Party.

Finally, on the eve of the March and April meetings of the CPI central secretariat, the right faction seems to have had knowledge of the CPSU's intent to confront the GPC and force a split in the international movement. Link, a pro- U.S.S.R. publication, indicated in March that the CPI leaders believed GPC-CPSU relations were at a zenith. These events made the CPI right leadership bolder and it attempted to force a showdown. Just before the 9 April central executive committee meeting and the 10 April 1964 national council meeting, the left faction met. The secretariat viewed this meeting as "a conference of seceders from the Party, a conference to set up a new rival Communist Party". 160

For its part, the GPC too seemed intent on split. It heightened

158. "Marxism-Leninism is the Basis for the Unity of the Communist Movement". Kommunist, (18 October 1963). Cited in Mohan Ram, Indian Communism, P. 175

159. Mohan Ram, Indian Communism, P. 175

160. Link, 1 March 1964

the tension within the GPI whenever possible by increasing the border conflict. Attacks by the Chinese press and by the Chinese through D. N. Aidit, chairman on the Indonesian pro-Peking party, all worked to sever the right from the left. Finally, the GPC supplied the left wing of the GPI with documents on the border dispute through GPI
161
leftists.

When the split came the Russians had a GPI which would follow their lead without alteration. The Chinese, on the other hand, had a combination of leftists and centrists. The leftists' position was clear enough, the centrists' position, however, was unclear. This combination of leftists and centrists was unstable, as I will show, and was pressured by the GPC from 1964-1968 for the purpose of evolving a more Peking-oriented party.

With the complete break with the left wing faction, the GPI (Right)
162
held its Seventh Congress in December of 1964. The split in the Party allowed the (GPI(R) to take a completely firm position in line with the CPSU. The Political Resolution of the Congress listed the immediate tasks as settling the conflict with China "...on the basis of the Colombo Proposals or arbitration by non-aligned friendly powers". It called for settlement of the dispute with Pakistan by bilateral talks between India and Pakistan. Domestically, all democratic parties were called upon to join together for the immediate task of defeating

161. From this point on the GPI right party will be referred to as GPI(R), and the GPI left party as the GPI(M) or GPI (Marxist).

162. "GPI "Right" 7th Congress" Times of India (Bombay and New Delhi), Statesman (Calcutta), and Hindu (Madras). Cited in Asian Recorder Volume 1956, (8-14 January) Pp. 6233:INI:C - 6235:INI:C

the reactionary right. Included in such a combination was the CPI(M). The CPI(R) claimed that it was not hostile towards the Indian government, but did feel that the government had made a definite shift for the worse since Nehru's death.

In a resolution on ideology the CPI(R) staked out its position, clearly repudiating the stand of the CPC on the issues of the significance of the era, war and peace, peaceful transition to socialism, peaceful coexistence, the national liberation movement, national democracy and the unity of the world communist movement. The stand of the CPC was cited as "dogmatic, disruptive and spelling out great danger for the world communist movement"¹⁶³. Theoretically the CPC stand was said to suffer from "narrow nationalistic and even chauvinistic distortions"¹⁶⁴. The lines of the CPC's deviation were traced to China's alternative general line of June 1963 which, the CPI(R) claimed, repudiated the Moscow Declaration and the 1960 Moscow Statement. The Chinese deviation was tied into the Indian situation by noting that the application of the CPC alternative line reached its crudest point in the CPC attack on the Indian border. These attacks were followed by "open slanderous attacks against the Communist Party of India (Rightists)"¹⁶⁵ and a call to split it".

The CPI(R)'s Programme offered the perspective of national democracy as a stage on the road to socialism. The Party's path would be to reverse the growth of capitalism.

"The non-Capitalist path is a stage in which the growth of

- 163. "CPI "Right" 7th Congress," P. 6233
- 164. "CPI "Right" 7th Congress," P. 6233
- 165. "CPI "Right" 7th Congress," P. 6234

capitalism will be restricted progressively and the prerequisites created for putting the country on the road to socialism". 166

This would be done by an alliance of the working class, the peasants and the middle-class. Once this alliance had taken power, it would form a national democratic front to eliminate foreign and Indian monopoly combines, bring full land reform and extend and strengthen democracy. The formation of such a front did not mean merger of progressive parties with the Congress or formal alliance with it.

As might be expected the Party's Organizational Report called for new organizational forms to insure continuous guidance and better coordination. Organizationally "our own failure to discharge ideological, political and organizational responsibilities" ¹⁶⁷ along with CPC inspiration had led the Party to the 1964 split. The Organizational Report did not slight the necessity to recover from the split, or the effects of it:

"Nevertheless, it is not a splinter group that has gone out of our party, but an influential section led by some important leaders, though a minority. This has made it impossible for the CPI to unitedly intervene in the present serious situation in the country. Even now, if all Left Parties came together the Congress might be defeated in the Kerala mid-term elections". 168

Part of the Organizational Report was stern criticism of the CPI(R). The Party was seen as suffering from bourgeois habits and methods at the top of the organization. Meetings were not business-like and there was a "sectarian" resistance to enrolling militants as Party members. The Party also suffered from the "cult of personality":

- 166. "CPI "Right" 7th Congress", P. 6234
- 167. "CPI "Right" 7th Congress", P. 6234
- 168. "CPI "Right" 7th Congress" P. 6234

But individual leaders are demi-gods for sections of Party members in their respective areas: our party is functioning at the lowest level mostly on the basis of the leader-follower pattern; it is only in our party that changes in leadership are rarely done". 169

Interestingly, after this extensive self-criticism Dange was absolved from any guilt in terms of the "Dange Letters", which it was claimed were not authentic, and was re-elected to the post of chairman. C. Rajeshwara Rao was made party general-secretary.

While the CPI(R) Congress was making its position clear, a section of the CPI(M) made its position clear by direct action. In December 1964 the government arrested large numbers of CPI(M) members in a nationwide sweep for reasons of domestic security. These arrests were made on an individual basis. Interestingly, certain centrists like Namboodiripad were not arrested as they were classified as not dangerous. Arrests were most common in Kerala, Andhra, but also took place in Madras, Punjab and West Bengal. While the arrest of certain members by the government and failure to arrest others seems to indicate that the government was trying to divide the CPI(M) by causing internal suspicion, the pattern of arrests seems to indicate that there were some major differences between the centrists and the extreme leftists.

Along with the arrests the government seized a "Revolt" plan. The preamble to this plan (according to the government) gave an ideological programme in which peaceful and parliamentary road to socialism was dropped at the Calcutta Convention and replaced by "revolutionary

methods" and "Telengaga type revolts". The documents claimed that the major short-coming of the Telengana movement, which ended in 1951, was that it took place in an area far from a border with a socialist country. A powerful socialist neighbour near India (i.e. China) was now in a position to aid the Indian revolutionary forces. The document further stated that the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) had been let down in 1962, but that the next time that CPR troops were in India it would be a signal for "uprisings, sabotage and subversion".¹⁷¹ The government claimed that the CPI(M) was sustained by the CPC economically, politically and ideologically.

The captured documents went beyond mere attacks on the CPI(R) and the Indian government. A Bengali booklet entitled: "THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S POLICY" gave a detailed Party programme along CPC lines. The CPI(M) was to build a revolutionary Party through a dictatorship of the proletariat forming cells. The class structure was to be changed, bringing into the Party field cadres tested in methods of agitation. All revisionist leaders would be removed and the parliamentary path abandoned. All cells would be formed on a class basis for the purpose of class struggle. Link committees would be established between the cells during the transformation from a parliamentary to a revolutionary party. In essence, the documents were a call to Maoist tactics and strategy.

In the first week of February 1965 Dange, returning from Moscow,

170. "Left Communists Arrests". Statesman, (Calcutta and New Delhi); & Times of India, (Bombay). Cited in Asian Recorder, Vol. 1965, 15-21 January, Pp. 6247:INI:A - 2648:INI:A
171. "Left Communists Arrests". P. 6247

seized the arrests as a basis for an attack on the CPC and the CPI(M). By doing so he backed the government's charge that the CPI(M) was acting under Peking's inspiration. He said of the CPI(M):

"...they have divided themselves with new tendencies and groups and those who are arrested have started calling those, who were not, as another shade of modern revisionists". 172

There can be little doubt that Dange was trying to divide the CPI(M) by separating the centrists from the leftists. Dange claimed that the CPI(M) was doing the cause of communism harm, especially in following China's leadership.

"Our revolution will have its own line of development, while adhering to the general laws of Marxism-Leninism. For that we need not bow down to the 'thought' of Mao Tse-tung, however profound it may be for the Chinese people and however correct it was..." 173

In mid-February Dange continued this attack by calling on the government to follow Nehru's assurances that other languages should be given basis in law and fact while Hindi, the national language, was adopted slowly. This criticism had the effect of attacking the government's language policy and also attacking the CPI(M) policy. The CPI(M) had been held responsible, by the government, for inspiring anti-Hindi demonstrations in Madras on 10 February. 174

By mid-February the government released more information on the CPI(M) pro-Peking activities. It was claimed that the Party was preparing for subversion and violence. Harkishen Singh Surjeet, the

172. "S. A. Dange Attack on China". New Age and Statesman, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1965, 12-18 March, Pp. 6344:INI:C - 6345:INI:C

173. "S. A. Dange Attack on China"; P. 6344

174. "CPI Right Memorandum on Language Issue". Statesman and Times of India, (New Delhi); & Hindu, (Madras). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1965, 26 February - 4 March, P. 6317:INI:B

CPI(M) leader in Punjab, reportedly had "...emphasized the need to start as many secret cells in the border areas as possible in order to maintain direct links with the Chinese".¹⁷⁵ The government further noted that:

"Mr. Saukar Dayal Tewari, a member of the National Council, gave out at a party meeting that China's aim was not to gain territory but to help the CPI with arms and ammunition in the likely event of a civil conflagration in the country. This was the reason why the State committees of West Bengal and the Punjab, the two States close to the Chinese line of control, did not regard Chinese action as aggression. 176

In its assessment of the election in Kerala the CPI(R) attacked CPI(M) leader Namboodiripad for siding with the communalists to defeat Congress. The CPI(R) also attacked the government for continued President's Rule in the State, claiming that "...wherever the Congress Party is unable to secure an absolute majority, it may seek to perpetuate its hold through President's Rule".¹⁷⁷ The CPI(R) felt that it had done badly in the election because of a "totally wrong assessment of the strength of the party in Kerala".¹⁷⁸

The national council of the CPI(R) met in May and, in line with the Moscow Communique issued at the Moscow Consultative Meeting of communist parties, adopted a resolution re-iterating the need of a conference of communist parties to settle ideological difficulties.

175. "Anti-National Activities of Pro-Peking Communists". Times of India, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1965, 5-11 March, P. 6332:INI:F
176. "Anti-National Activities of Pro-Peking Communists - Government Statement". Times of India, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1965, 5-11 March, P. 6332:INI:F
177. "CPI Right Stand on Continued President's Rule in Kerala". Hindu, (Madras), & Times of India, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1965, 9-15 April, P. 6390:INI:A
178. "CPI Right Stand on Continued President's Rule in Kerala", P. 6390

The resolution said that such a conference was unavoidable as Kosygin's visit to Peking had pointed out that the CPC foresaw communist unity only in the event of a war. In preparation for a conference the national council was to circulate the ideological documents prepared at the Bombay Congress amongst the rank and file. Additionally, the Party should initiate bilateral talks with communist parties in the region.

Reviewing developments since the Bombay Congress, the council noted the need for a unity of democratic forces. "United political intervention on a national scale has become the supreme need of the hour for the defence of the vital interests of the working people".¹⁷⁹

In June a Committee held a unity conference in an attempt to overcome some of the elements which had split the Party. As an initial move it was demanded that Dange be removed as the Chairman of the CPI(R). Centrists from West Bengal stated that "Mr. Dange has become a stumbling block in the way of strengthening the endeavors of uniting the two factions", his removal "had become an urgent need in the interest of the unity of the Communist movement".¹⁸⁰ The committee welcomed the progress of the two CPIs in working to bring about United Fronts (UF) in West Bengal, Gujerat, Andhra and elsewhere. While a meeting of leaders was proposed, it was decided that the two CPIs remain separate until the rival groups unite. The committee claimed

179. "CPI Right National Council Meeting in New Delhi". Statesman and Hindustan Times, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1965, 30 April - 6 May, P. 6427:INI:B

180. "Communist Unity Committee's Conference (First) Held In Calcutta" Statesman, (Calcutta). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1965, 9-15 July, P. 6547:INI:N

that it did not wish to grow into a third communist party.

In June the CPI(R) opened another assault of the CPC. Again, it criticized the Chinese Party for sharpening the ideological split.

"At a time when the Communist and worker's parties the world over are taking practical steps to initiate, despite ideological differences, world wide action against continued U.S. imperialist aggression in Viet-Nam, the leaders of the Communist Party of China are continuing their unseemly slander campaign against brother parties, particularly against the CPSU.

Exactly when Pravda is making passionate appeals for forging unity, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party miss no opportunity of delivering their slanderous attacks on the Soviet Communist Party." 181

At the same time that the CPI(R) was attacking China it was calling for a joint front with the CPI(M) on issues of mass agitation. There had been contact between leaders of both parties for the purpose of avoiding confrontation in the upcoming elections. The CPI(R), however, set aside the idea of unity between the parties, noting that the secretariat did not feel that mass communist membership was divided into rival camps. The executive committee of the CPI(R) was going to adopt a resolution on unity with the CPI(M) in the future.

In response to the idea of possible unity, E.M.S. Namboodiripad stated that "It is impossible to think of unity now between the two parties".¹⁸² He elaborated the differences between the two parties as the reason for this. First, the two parties characterized Congress completely differently. Second, the CPI(R), in its anti-China posture,

181. "Right CPI Criticism of Chinese Party". Statesman, (Calcutta); Times of India, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1965, 9-15 July, P. 6547:INI:0

182. "E.M.S. Namboodiripad On CPI Unity". Statesman, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1965, 27 August - 2 September, P. 6631:INI:D

was "becoming the tail of the ruling Congress Party" on the question of the border dispute with China. Namboodiripad did see the possibility of unity in action, but that was all. He emphasized the importance of the international differences in the communist movement:

"Theoretically is it possible, that if for the moment we leave out discussions on international questions and confine ourselves to internal issues, there can be an agreement. 184

Namboodiripad knew that his theoretical alternative was impossible, because international questions had become of primary significance between the two CPIs. This was pointed up by an attack on Chinese support to Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir by the CPI(R) in late August and again in mid-September.

The first public indication of difficulties in the CPI(M) came in the beginning of October. At that time Z.A.Ahmad, a member of the CPI(R) secretariat said that the CPI(M) seemed to be going through a crisis. This crisis took the form of rethinking the Party's position on China, and had been caused by China's support of Pakistan which had shocked many of the CPI(M)s rank and file. Ahmad carried this statement into an attack on China which "...was pursuing policies of war-mongering, aggrandisement and incendiaryism, which only fascist countries followed".

185

Ahmad's assessment seems to have been close to events in the CPI(M). A meeting of the CPI(M)'s central committee in mid-October

183. "E.M.S.Namboodiripad on CPI Unity". P. 6631

184. "E.M.S.Namboodiripad on CPI Unity". P. 6631

185. "CPI Left Re-thinking China Policy". Hindustan Times, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1965, 22-28 October, P. 6749:INI:B

resulted in "divergencies" of approach and emphasis by different party members. A majority of the Party's top and middle leaders were "not available for collective discussions"¹⁸⁶ which indicates that they had been unable to come to a conclusion which satisfied the majority of members. The central committee argued that Jammu and Kashmir were different than other Indian states as witnessed by the number of talks between India and Pakistan on this problem. The central committee and the Party's leader, Namboodiripad, called for direct negotiations with China on the basis of recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and accomodation with China in the Aksaichin region. Kashmir should be recognized as a part of India with "special status".

Between the end of 1965 and early 1966 Prime Minister Kosygin made several moves to try and quiet the Pakistan-Indian dispute. These moves were probably aimed at restoring some kind of normalcy in the area as well as at rebuffing China which had been stirring up the dispute. These moves resulted in the Tashkent Declaration. The CPI(R) welcomed the U.S.S.R. intervention in the situation noting that the declaration called for "...renunciation of the use of all force and for solving of all disputes through peaceful means"¹⁸⁷. This settlement was a victory for both the CPSU and the CPI(R) as well as a defeat for the CPC and CPI(M).

At its January meeting the CPI(R) national council violently

186. "Left CPI View On Indo-Pakistan Conflict". New York Times, Times of London, Hindu, (Madras); Statesman, (Calcutta). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1965, 26 November - 2 December, P.6791:INI:A
187. "Right CPI View Of Tashkent Declaration". Tass, Times of India & Hindustan Times, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1966, 29 January - 4 February, P. 6898:INI:A

attacked the CPC's rejection of the U.S.S.R.'s call for united action of all communist parties in working against U.S. aggression in Viet-Nam. It was quite clear that the Chinese wished to have primary control over the Viet-Nam war within the communist camp.

"While the overwhelming majority of Communist and worker's parties are taking the stand of united action against imperialism, the principled position of restoring the unity of the world communist movement and the socialist camp, the Communist Party of China (CPC) is pursuing the path of political and organizational division, the path of splitting the Communist movement, based on its unilaterally decided general line which it put forward in June 1963. 188

On national issues the council found clear cut decisions impossible. Disagreements left the council in a position where it was unable to come up with a Political Resolution. The secretariat's draft resolution for the council meeting talked of a shift to the right by the Congress government. The problems of characterizing the government and drawing lessons from it were the main issues before the council. After a long and bitter debate it was concluded that the CPI(R) would continue its approach unchanged, even in view of the dangers which this posed. With the rejection of the secretariat's draft it was proposed that the council make a draft for the Political Resolution. When the council did this it was also rejected as it was felt that it did not reflect the members' views adequately. Strategically, the council did agree that the strategy for the next election would be a move for a left front to fight the Congress with a common programme as the basis of the front. The deadlock over the Political Resolution

188. "Right CPI National Council Meeting - New Delhi". Statesman & Times of India, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1966, 5-11 February, Pp. 6913:INI:K - 6913:INI:K

reflected a difference in the members' interpretations of the decisions of the Bombay Congress.

In February the CPI(R) carried its call for a united front of left parties further by asking the CPI(M) to join it in the mass movement setting aside ideological and political debates. Rao, CPI(R) general-secretary, said that such a united front would be of benefit to both parties. In Rao's estimation:

If both factions worked unitedly, other leftist parties would also come into the movement. Then we can actually change events and mould them. The bitterness between the factions will also be overcome. Comrades must think more in terms of going to the people and working among them than in terms of debates. Then we can unite the communist movement and unite progressive forces and show a path to our country. 189

At this time there was a report that Suslov had sent a letter to the CPI(M) directing such united action. Rao said that he had no knowledge of this letter and that it did not have the power to direct since "nobody in the international movement after the death of Stalin has been able to do such a thing as ordering us".¹⁹⁰ A CPI(R) delegation to Moscow in May seems to lend support to the CPSU's possible hopes of united action in India. A communique by the CPI(R) delegation and the CPSU stated that "The Delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union wished the Communist Party of India success in the struggle for uniting in the ranks of communists and democratic movement¹⁹¹ of the country...". At the same time, however, the communique

189. "Right CPI Appeal For Unity With Left Faction". Times of India, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1966, Pp. 6963:INI:R-6964:INI:R, 5-11 March

190. "Right CPI Appeal For Unity With Left Faction", P. 6963.

191. "CPI Delegation's Visit To U.S.S.R.". Hindustan Times & Statesman, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1966, 18-24 June, Pp. 7136:INI:F - 7137:INI:F

called for relations between fraternal parties on the basis of equality and non-interference in their internal affairs.

In May the politburo of the CPI(M) met for the first time in sixteen months. The meeting was all but insignificant with the exception of the fact that the Party put off discussion of the international ideological dispute until after the coming election. The time period between politburo meetings and the putting off of the ideological question seems to indicate fear to have open discussion of this issue for fear of dissent. This conclusion seems more certain in light of the possibility that the Party was in the midst of a discussion of its policy on China in 1965.

In preparation for the election the CPI(R) national council met in June establishing an election programme aimed at a minimum programme for united opposition to Congress. This programme would consist of a "practical alternative to Congress policies based on urgently needed radical changes in the economic structure".¹⁹² The political task of the Party was to forge a democratic unity of leftist forces. The Party was beginning to get uneasy about its position towards the government, especially in light of the newly formed Indo-U.S. Foundation which it viewed as a "gigantic instrument of massive American penetration into Indian cultural life, above all, the sphere of moulding the ideology and political outlook of adolescent youth..."¹⁹³

The CPI(M) central committee met in June passing a resolution

192. "National Council Session In Hyderabad". Hindu, (Madras); & Hindustan Times, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol.1966, 9-15 July, Pp. 7173:INI:B - 7175:INI:B

193. "National Council Session In Hyderabad," P. 7174

on the Political Situation which was full of optimism.

The period ahead is full of possibilities for making still further advances in developing the unity of the people in the struggle against the Congress Government and its class policies. 194

The Party decided to take a part in organizing mass demonstrations against government policies. The election strategy deferred discussion of the ideological correctness of either the CPSU or GPC until a later date. The main aim in the election was to reduce the Congress to a minority wherever possible. To accomplish this, the Party would make adjustments with opposition parties in an effort not to split the opposition vote. This election campaign was a far cry from the renunciation of parliamentary tactics of 1964-65. In effect the strategy was a victory for the centrists and moderates of the CPI(M). Deferment of the ideological issues, however, indicates deep differences within the party.

As if recognizing the shift in the CPI(M), the CPI(R) launched another attack on the GPC in late November. The national council called the recent GPC attack on the U.S.S.R.

a stab in the back of the world front of anti-imperialist, democratic forces, of which the socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union, is an important contingent. 195

The Party further attacked the Great Proletarian Revolution as a:

...campaign of vandalism being carried out in a socialist country" which "gives a weapon in the hands of the bour-

194. "Left CPI Central Committee Meeting in Tenali". Statesman, (New Delhi); & Hindu, (Madras). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1966, 9-15 July, P. 7175:INI:C

195. "Right CPI Criticizes Chinese Campaign Against Russia". Statesman and Hindustan Times, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1966, 17-23 December, P. 7443:INI:B

geoisie to discredit Communists and proletarian cultures and has to be repudiated. 196

The CPI(R) Election Manifesto issued in December of 1966 had as its main thrust the displacement of Congress wherever possible. The Manifesto noted that the CPI(M) had taken the CPI(R) as the main enemy. The Party nonetheless blamed the split in the Party on CPC instigation.

On the 9th of April, after the election, the CPI(M) gave a declaration on the class struggle. This declaration was the first step in the CPI(M)'s public departure from a leftist policy on class struggle. The Politburo called on the people and the constituent units of the united front to recognize the need for class struggle. Yet the limits of this struggle seem almost tame next to the Party's position in 1964-65:

Every issue from people's food to worker's livelihood will be an arena of class struggle and unless the people and the parties of the United Front recognized this truth, they will not succeed in defeating the vested interests' offensive. 197

The fact is that the CPI(M) was shaken by the defeat of the Congress at the polls. The election results saw non-Congress ministries in eight states covering half of India's population. Most of these governments were composed of a coalition of parties in which the CPI(R) and CPI(M) played a part. The CPI(M), however, had swept to the dominant position in Kerala and West Bengal.

196. "Right CPI Criticizes Chinese Campaign Against Russia".
P. 7443

197. "Left CPI Declaration on Class Struggle". Statesman, (Calcutta). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1967, 21-27 May, PP. 7711 :INI:G - 7712:INI:G

The CPI(R) seems to have been no less impressed with the success at the polls. While the national council called for careful observation of reactionary parties, it felt that its first task was to try and overthrow the Congress at the centre. It saw the non-Congress state ministries as the lever with which to do this. The Party's general-secretary, Rao, called for an intermediate aim of a non-Congress democratic coalition government at the centre as a transitional form between what presently existed and a future national democratic government.

The event of the siege of the Indian Embassy in Peking by Red Guards drew little comment from the CPI(M). In addition, the Party ignored China's first H-bomb which had recently been exploded in the air. Finally, the Party on 18 June held back its draft on ideology. All of these events point to the drift that the CPI(M) had taken to a parliamentary road. The transformation within the Party after the election is almost beyond belief. The class struggle became an excuse for participation in the parliamentary system and, for all intents and purposes, was buried:

In clear class terms, our party's participation in such governments is one specific form of class struggle to win more and more people and more and more allies for the proletariat and its allies in the struggle for the cause of People's Democracy. 198

The Kerala and West Bengal ministries became the centre of the CPI(M)'s strategy and world:

Since the fortunes of the entire party, at the present stage of development, are closely linked with the successful running of these ministries and the role our party plays in them, the whole party throughout the country will have to

be mobilized to back the agreed programmes of these two non-Congress ministries and to see that they are earnestly implemented. 199

The CPI(M) line had been so transformed that differences between it and the line of the CPI(R) can hardly be found. Both were pursuing the same basic aims and in a parliamentary manner.

Crisis was awaiting the CPI(M) just around the corner, it had been brewing for a long time, which was the reason that the Party had deferred the discussions of the ideological questions for such a long time. Internally the crisis came from the Naxalbari area of West Bengal. Members of the CPI(M) had been operating in this area for two years in defiance of the central party's directions. In that time they had been organizing a peasant movement. When the united front CPI(M) led ministry took office in West Bengal in February 1967, a meeting of the extremists came to the conclusion that a united front government would be of no advantage to them and decided to call for seizure of land and the establishment of liberated areas.

The activities of the Naxalbari rebels put the CPI(M) in an impossible position. If they crushed the rebellion they would be liable to the charge that theirs was a government exactly like any bourgeois-landlord government. Alternatively, failure to crush the rebellion would be an open invitation to the central government to dismiss the ministry. The Party made the decision to crush the rebellion; however, this made it symbolic to other extremists operating in Naxalbari as well as in Kerala, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.

Externally the CPC, which had remained relatively silent for

some time, opened an attack on the CPI(M). In April the radio in Peking begged the question of the existence of a communist party in India and concluded that there was none, "there are only certain individual communists".²⁰⁰ Just after the election, Peking Review asserted that the West Bengal and Kerala ministries, among others, were being used to contain the revolution.²⁰¹ Throughout May, June and July the CPC continued its attack on the CPI(M) and its support of the Naxalbari rebellion until it was crushed. These attacks compared the betrayal of the Naxalbari rebellion with the betrayal of the 1949-1951 Telengana rebellion.

In reaction to the situation the CPI(M) expelled thirteen of its members, all from the West Bengal unit, on the first of July. Previously the Party had expelled twenty-one members for "anti-party activities" in Calcutta, Paranas and Burdwan.

On the second of July the CPI(M) counter-attacked, stating that the CPC assessment of the Naxalbari rebellion was "...in total variance with that made by our party".²⁰²

Our party had repeatedly stated that the Naxalbari struggle is a struggle of hungry peasants for land, social justice and against eviction. It is an economic problem and should be settled as such. ²⁰³

Even as the CPI(M) was saying this the expelled members in West Bengal were setting about to establish a parallel party centre labelling the CPI(M) as a "neo-revisionist group". The objective of the parallel

200. Mohan Ram, Indian Communism. P. 224

201. Peking Review, 14 July 1967

202. "On Naxalbari". Statesman, (Calcutta); Times of India & Link, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1967, 16-22 July, Pp. 7813:INI:C - 7814:INI:C

203. "On Naxalbari", P. 7813

centre was to win over the party membership and isolate the leaders.

Peking Radio attacked the CPI(M) again on 31 July labelling the Party as revisionist. The broadcast claimed that when the peasants launched an armed struggle, the CPI(M) organized itself to weed out the revolutionary elements in its ranks. The CPC chief of staff, Yang Chang-wu, criticized the CPI(R) and CPI(M) in the same breath and then compared the Naxalbari Rebellion with reference to people's war in Viet-Nam. This attack was reiterated on 3 August by People's Daily. The article claimed that since World War II there had been a struggle between two opposing lines within the CPI.

One is the line of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought adhered to by the revolutionaries in the Party, that is, to follow the road by which the Chinese Revolution had advanced to victory, to boldly rouse the peasants to revolution, build a people's army, establish rural revolutionary bases, wage a protracted armed struggle, encircle the cities from the countryside and eventually win nation-wide victory. 204

The other line was the revisionist line currently under the leaderships of S. A. Dange and E. M. S. Namboodiripad.

The CPI(M) was finding it harder and harder to operate under the conditions it was faced with. The extremists within the Party pushed from within, and the CPC pushed from without. On 5 August the Party expelled another sixty members all from the West Bengal Unit.

The CPC's attack on the CPI(M) reached a zenith on 7 August. On that date People's Daily carried an article entitled "Let the Red Flag of Naxalbari Fly Still Higher". This article was, in effect, a call

204. "Indian Marxist Party Leaders Criticized". New China News Agency; & Patriot, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1967, 24 - 30 September, P. 7929:INI:C

for the formation of a new party of revolutionaries.

On the 24th of August the CPI(M) central committee met and passed the long awaited Statement on Ideology. The statement cited revisionism as the main threat to the world movement and said that it halted consolidation and advance of the communist movement. All points in the Statement were to be finalized by an All-India plenum on 15 January 1968. The central committee claimed that the present epoch was one of transition from capitalism to socialism and in which the socialist system was becoming a decisive factor in the development of the world. The victory of the CPC and the national liberation movements were seen as altering the international balance towards the forces of peace, democracy and socialism. The Statement criticized the CPSU peaceful transition line and held that Lenin's thesis on imperialism was still valid. This statement hardly coincides with the Party's actions in West Bengal or elsewhere.

In a central committee meeting of the CPI(M) on 26 August the Party displayed further ambivalence in its position. It roundly criticized the CPSU ideological position and totally rejected it. On the other hand, it only agreed with the CPC position broadly. The Party concluded saying that it would follow its own programmes based on its own assessment borrowing from the experience of other communist parties.

As regarded the international situation, the Party said it would follow an extra-parliamentary struggle of a non-violent type. The CPC also was criticized by the Statements. Again the Party reiterated that the Chinese had misunderstood the Naxalbari developments

and the Indian situation. The Chinese Party was criticized for backing CPI(M) extremists:

We are at a loss to understand how the comrades of the Chinese Communist Party, in utter violation of every Marxist-Leninist tenant of assessing a given political situation and tactics to be adopted are advocating armed struggle as seen in the case of the Naxalbari peasantry. This stand of theirs is neither theoretically correct nor tallies with our experience in our movement in our country. 206

On a more personal level, the central committee attacked the CPC for attacking its leaders:

Such methods strike at the very roots of fraternal relations between Communist Parties, and no party can allow its leaders to be denounced by other parties if it were to continue its independent existence. 207

In the middle of all of this, small extreme left parties started to surface. The Statesman noted that for two years, a Peking oriented political group had been active called the Tamilnad Red Flag Movement. It had mainly functioned as a tool of CPC propaganda. Its president, K. Sundaran, was a former communist party member.

The Red Flag Movement's thesis is simple; only those who believe in violent revolution are true Marxists. The Party has painted both the right and left communists with the same revisionist brush and accused them of being tools of the so-called Soviet-American clique. 208

The contradictions in the August central committee statements by the CPI(M) were picked up immediately by the CPI(R). The CPI(R) called the Statements:

...the height of opportunism when the CPI(M) leaders on

206. "CPI Marxist Central Committee Session". Hindu, (Madras); and Statesman, (Calcutta). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1967, 10-16 September, Pp. 7907:INI:M - 7098:INI:M
207. "CPI Marxist Central Committee Session", P. 7908
208. "Tamilnad Red Flad Movement". Statesman, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1967, 10-16 September, P. 7908:INI:M

the one hand extol the Chinese ideological line and pretend, on the other, to fight adventurism and left opportunism.²⁰⁹

A study of the central committee CPI(M) August statements convinced the CPI(R) that:

in 1964 the CPI was split by the Leftists, not primarily over differences on internal Indian questions, but in response to the alternative line which the Chinese leadership wanted to impose on fraternal parties and in particular to the Chinese Party's open call to split the Communist Party of India. 210

On 16 November it was announced that a third Communist Party would be formed along strictly Maoist lines. The task of this Party was to achieve "people's democratic revolution through building militant rural bases and extending them to encircle the cities".²¹¹ The conference to establish this party was attended by many expelled CPI(M) members including Charu Mazumar the theoretician of the Naxalbari movement.

By December of 1967 both the CPI(R) and CPI(M) showed growing concern with the future of the united front governments. The national council of the CPI(R) called for these ministries to stop vacillating in carrying through their policies and programmes. The Party claimed that the central government and the right reactionary parties were trying to dislodge the united front governments by starting communal riots. To counter such disruption, the Party called for left unity

209. "Communist Party Right On Left Communists Pro-China Role". Hindustan Times & Statesman, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1967 15-21 October, Pp. 7966:INI:H - 7967:INI:H
210. "Communist Party Right On Left Communists Pro-China Role" P. 7966
211. "Third Communist Party Marxist To Be Formed". Statesman, (Calcutta). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1967, 3-9 December, Pp. 8048:INI:G - 8049:INI:G

to prevent Congress from exploiting the unstable elements in the states.

On 7 December, the same day that the national council of the CPI(R) met, the CPI(M) also met. The Party warned of serious consequences which would follow further repression of the government in West Bengal. Their warning seems to have been an indication of a reassertion of the more radical elements in the Party, for on 28 December it was reported that the CPI(M) was establishing a secret party machinery at the provincial committee level.

The secret party was part of a plan to seize power by armed insurrection. The Viet-Nam war was to be the pattern for this armed insurrection and would be intensified along the Chinese and Pakistan borders. Documents seized at the time called for infiltration of the army and police which would give the Party some reliable disaffection in these forces in the event of insurrection. These infiltrators would also be a source of arms to the insurrection. Additionally, one CPI(M) leader in Uttar Pradesh also promised a supply of arms from China through Tibet. The efforts of the insurrection were to concentrate on the border with China to avoid the failure of the Telengana revolt, i.e.: "absence of contiguity with a socialist state".²¹² Finally, a link was established with Pakistani Communists through an Indo-Pakistan Coordination Committee. This link attached itself to the East Pakistan Communist Party which was pro-GPC in orientation. Shortly after this it was reported that whole sections

212. "Armed Insurrection Plan By Left Communists Link With Pakistan Communists". Hindustan Times, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1958, 22-28 January, Pp. 8136:INI:F - 8137:INI:F

of the West Bengal CPI(M) known as the Naxalbari group, had gone underground. This process had started just after the dismissal of the government of the state.

The CPI(M) was showing serious signs of factionalism by the first month of the new year. It was obvious that CPC criticism of the Party was having an effect on at least some sections of the Party. At a six day plenum general-secretary Sundarayya said that the Party was pursuing the Congress' directive of the 1964 Congress. It will be remembered that this was a more radical policy than what the Party had been pursuing in 1966-67. A large number of documents were drafted by the plenum, but these had to be circulated among the state parties before they could be made concrete and before the Party could be said to be on a firm Marxist-Leninist path. The plenum, however, stressed the correctness of the Party's participation in united front governments and stressed the need to fight left deviation in the Party.

Against the growing radical wing within the CPI(M) the CPI's Eighth Party Congress on 7 February painted a hopeful picture for the parliamentary road to socialism. Its strategy was a left-democratic coalition which would replace the Congress. The Congress concluded that:

The stability of the Parliamentary system under the exclusive control of the State Power by the national bourgeoisie, no matter which bourgeois party or parties run the government, is no longer possible. 213

213. "CPI(R) Congress Session" Statesman, (Calcutta and New Delhi); Indian Nation, Panta; & Hindustan Times, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1968, 4-10 March, Pp. 8212:INI:E - 8214:INI:E

The Party's job was to forge a democratic coalition to take over at the centre and to this end the Party decided to double its membership by 1969. To help stimulate this growth, the Party criticized itself for failing to forge "an effective all-India centre which is the first guarantee for building the party as a fighting vanguard of the working class".²¹⁴

By mid-year it was apparent that the CPI(M) was in a state of crisis. In May the Finance Minister of Assam State claimed that there was "...a desperate bid of CPI(M) leaders of the district to seek the aid of Pakistan and the Federation Government of Nagaland (rebels) to train local volunteers in subversive activities to create chaos and confusion to overthrow the present government, and form a government by CPI(M) with the secret help of the hostile nagas and Pakistan and, if necessary, China".²¹⁵ The CPI(R) noted the same trend in a 14 May statement on the political crisis in the CPI(M).

The report stated that there had been a fall in the CPI(M)'s membership in West Bengal since the emergence of the extremist group in that Party. The Party claimed that several hundred members of the CPI(M) had been expelled for being Nagalites since the beginning of the year. The origin of the most recent dissent had been the draft ideological document of the previous April. While the CPI(R) claimed that the extremists had not been able to build a large organization, they had been able to disrupt the CPI(M) on the local level.

214. "CPI(R) Congress Session" P. 8214

215. "Naga Hostile's Collusion With CPI(M)". Hindustan Times, (New Delhi); Statesman, (Calcutta); Hindu, (Madras). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1968, 22-28 April, P. 8282:INI:E

According to the CPI(R) report, many extreme leftists had broken with the CPI(M). This group was calling itself revolutionaries and had broken over the ideological issues facing the international movement and the discussions issuing therefrom at the April meeting. This group defended its position against revisionism with quotes from Enver Hoxha. The extremist groups had held a co-ordination committee in Calcutta in 1967 (November), but denied that its purpose was to form a third Communist Party.

In late May the CPI(M) took drastic action in Jammu and Kashmir dissolving all of its Party units there and expelling R. Sharaf, a central committee member in that State. Sharaf was charged with writing articles against the Party. The State units were charged with boycotting the plenum in April, with denouncing the CPI(M) as "neo-revisionist", and with seceding from the CPI(M) for the purpose of starting a new Party.

By June the Andhra CPI(M) split with the extremists following T. Nagi Reddy, a secretariat member of that state's state committee. The split followed a provincial committee session which had demanded that Reddy explain his "anti-party activities". Reddy accused the politburo of being disruptive and dictatorial and thus causing a crisis in the Party. The politburo, Reddy claimed, had forced unilateral organizational decisions on the Andhra committee, banned its report on the April plenum to the district committees, and expelled a number of Andhra's important leaders.

Having thus tried to prepare the political ground to isolate us from the Party membership, the Politburo and the Provincial Committee leadership have taken an organizational decision

to take action against us. 216

With this Reddy called on Party members to revolt against the CPI(M) leadership. The attitude of the CPI(M) leadership was obvious when on 17 June a politburo member stated that the Party would not "toe the line laid down by the Communist Party of China",²¹⁷ but would "...judge issues on the basis of our own experience and understanding of the situation".²¹⁸

The Statesman assessed the Andhra split in the following manner:

Ever since the CPI(M) Central Committee approved its ideological document at Madurai in 1967, the Marxist leadership has had to tackle bush fires of revolt in many State units. The adoption of the ideological draft at the Party plenum in Burdwan in April 1958, it was hoped, would once again restore a semblance of unity in the Marxist ranks".²¹⁹

The more militant members, however, were preparing for a showdown with the leadership. The immediate crisis leading to split had its origin in the rejection by the Andhra unit of the Madurai document in January of 1968. The leadership had tried to bury the problem by expanding the membership in Andhra where extremists were in the majority both in the state committee and secretariat. Other CPI(M) state units were starting to show the same trend.

In July the CPI(M) politburo met to try and come to some decisions regarding the defections from the Party. The politburo noted that over 12,000 members had either been expelled or left the Party. Of these 12,000, were included half of the Party's membership in

216. "Andhra CPI(M) Split In Background". Hindu, (Madras); Statesman, (Calcutta). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1968, 8-14 July, P. 8414:INI:F

217. "Andhra CPI(M) Split In Background", P. 8414

218. "Andhra CPI(M) Split In Background", P. 8414

219. "Andhra CPI(M) Split In Background", P. 8414

Andhra and 3,000 in Uttar Pradesh. The politburo stated firmly that it had no intention of changing its political line, and said of the extremists:

The truth is that they have lost all sense of faith in and loyalty to the party and its political line. No party member who has respect for the democratic verdict of the party Congress will ask for an open revolt the moment serious differences arise. 220

The co-ordinating committee of communist revolutionaries met in Andhra in early July, passing a resolution for "defence of the Telengana Movement". The reference to the 1949-51 Telengana movement was a hint at revival of the armed struggle which had ended in 1951. The resolution stated that feudal landlordism was again in control in the Telengana district and had nullified the gains of the 1949-51 struggle. The resolution ruled out any possible gains by parliamentary methods stating that Mao had shown the need to throw out both imperialists and feudal forces. T. Nagi Reddy indicated that the differences between the Andhra revolutionaries and the All-India Co-ordination Committee could be overcome, which was an indication that extremist splinter groups could get together and form a new party. The Andhra state committee gave instructions to its rank and file to intensify the ideological struggle and mobilize the people on class issues.

In late September it was reported that the Tamilnad Red Flag Movement had established a Party on Maoist lines. This "Party" was similar to three or four other "parties" which had been built out of splinter groups from the CPI(M). In October the CPI(M) central comm-

220. "Politburo Decisions On Defections". Statesman, (Calcutta; and Times of India, (New Delhi). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1968, 5-11 August, Pp. 8456:INI:C - 8457:INI:C

ittee gave its assessment of the reason for defections from the Party. The assessment indicates a slight movement to the left, perhaps in an effort to try and avoid further splinter groups.

The central committee claimed that the defections were a result of basic weaknesses in the movement in India. Moreover, they were a result of the scism in the international communist movement. The origin of the weaknesses was in the petty bourgeois nature of the character of the movement. In essence, the proletarian base of the communist movement in India had been weak. The central committee believed that "...unless a radical turn and reorientation is taken in building trade union and kisan movements",²²¹ no amount of self-criticism would improve the situation. Finally, the central committee claimed that "parliamentary illusions"²²² had reduced class and mass work to the level of trying to win elections. Two days after this analysis the CPI(M) broke relations with the CPC. Thus, the Party, which had broken with the CPSU in 1964, now severed any ties with either of the international giants, and presumably sought its own road in India independently.

Throughout October and November the extremists held small conventions trying to overcome their differences and join together. While none of these succeeded, there seems to have been some slow progress to this end. In all of these meetings Mao's strategy of armed insurrection from a rural base was stressed.

221. "CPI(M) Defections, And Reasons For". Statesman, (Calcutta). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol.1968, 28 October - 3 November, P. 8592:INI:E

222. "CPI(M) Defections, And Reasons For". P. 8592

In November some of the planning for armed insurrection seemed to come to a head with an attack on a police station in Kerala. The purpose of the attack of 300 Naxalbari Maoist extremists, according to Miss Ajitha, one of its organizers, was to cause confusion and chaos paving the way to "emancipation of the oppressed".²²³ Radio Peking cited these raids as "revolutionary actions of the people". Additionally, letters from the Chinese Embassy to one K. P. Balakrishnan discussed aid to the Kerala group. The attacks in Kerala seem to have been motivated for the purpose of discrediting the CPI(M) government of Namboodiripad. If this is true, then it seems quite possible that there was some form of CPC aid to the rebels. In itself, it is another instance of the CPC putting pressure on the CPI(M). The New China News Agency claimed that the Kerala government was "a typical obnoxious example of the parliamentary road taken by the revisionists in Indian Communist Party and the Dange renegade clique",²²⁴ thus again asserting that there was no difference between the CPI(R) and the CPI(M).

The end of 1968 saw many little extremist organizations and "parties" sprinkled throughout India. The main one of these was the All-India Co-ordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) which was comprised of the original All-India Co-ordination Committee which had met in May 1968 and the Andhra CPI(M). This enlarged group soon showed signs of falling apart when, in February

223. "Marxists Extremists' Terrorism in Kerala". Hindu, (Madras); Statesman, (Calcutta and New Delhi); Times of India, (Bombay). Cited in Asian Recorder Vol. 1968, 23-31 December, Pp. 8684: INI:E - 8686:INI:E

224. "Marxists Extremists' Terrorism in Kerala". P. 8686

of 1969, it disaffiliated itself from the Andhra Pradesh group over issues of tactical line. The differences centred around the fact that the main body felt that India was ripe for Maoist type revolution while the Andhra group did not share in this assessment.

Interestingly, the AICCCR (without the Andhra group) reversed it's previous decision to not form a party, and stated that the idea of not forming a party until

"...after all opportunist tendencies, alien trends, undesirable elements have been purged through class struggles is nothing but subjective idealism. To conceive of a party without contradictions, without the struggle between the opposites, i.e.: to think of a pure faultless party is to indulge in idealist fantasy. 225

Thus, on 22 April 1969 the Third Communist Party of India was formed, calling itself the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI ML). Basing itself on the ideas of Mao Tse-tung, the party saw the main contradiction in India as between feudalism and the peasant masses. The party separated itself from the CPI(R) and CPI(M) by its rejection of parliamentary methods. This new party does not represent all of the splinter groups from the CPI(M), and differs from the remaining splinter groups in several ways. First, it sees the contradiction of feudalism and the peasant masses as the only contradiction, while other groups see it as only the major contradiction. Second, the CPI(ML) sees guerilla warfare as the only form of struggle in the present era, they reject all forms of mass organization. This actually counters Mao's ideas, but is quite close to the ideas of Che Guevara.

Against this the Andhra groups offers an alternative Maoist

position. This group have an organization called the "Revolutionary Communist Committee". Basic among their differences with the CPI(ML) is the fact that they have a strong experience in revolution in the countryside through the Telengana struggle. They are more inclined to seek an application of Mao's theories creatively to the Indian situation. This group forsees the Indian revolution in two stages, first a "New Democratic" stage and then a "Stage of Socialist Revolution". Potentially, due to their more realistic approach, their revolutionary background, and the fact that they have given thought to both the countryside and town (unlike the CPI(ML) which has considered the countryside only) there is a strong possibility that the Andhra Committee will eventually become the fourth communist party of India, India's fourth CPI and second Maoist CPI. If this happens, it is likely to be a larger and more powerful Maoist CPI than the CPI(ML). In many respects, the advent of yet another CPI in India will be only another example of the constant faction building which has led to split and new party formation in the country.

In the final chapter I will try and draw all of the elements together to gain two different but related sets of conclusions on faction building in the Communist movement in India. One set of conclusions pertains to faction building in CP's generally, the CPI specifically, and the CPI in relation to the Sino-Soviet Rift. The second set of conclusions relates to the Indian political scene as a unique entity. While this latter set of conclusions is not a mainly determinant one, it is a factor and should not be ignored because it effects the CPIs as well as other parties, and is reflected in the distinctly State flavour which the factions in the CPIs of India display.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Factionalism seems to be a part of the life of political parties regardless of the country in which the party is located, or the political orientation of the party. The creation of factions has as its root disagreement by a section of the party with part of the party's policies. Generally, a faction supports all but a small part of the party's policies and is accommodated by the leadership due to the fact that the faction is not dangerous. The reason for lack of danger to a party by its factions, is the fact that party policy is not functionally interdependent. Lack of functional interdependence gives flexibility and allows for accommodation of different points of view on issues.

An examination of political parties in India reveals extreme factionalism within most Indian parties, especially within the National Congress which is India's main and ruling party. Even with this factionalism, the Congress has managed to be a functioning and powerful party from its birth to the present day. Several factors contribute to the party's ability to function properly with a high degree of factionalism. The first of these factors is the role of the party's leader. The leader of the Congress party functions as the party's unifier. Indian party leaders have a style of leadership which enables them to be detached from specific factions as well as from the party's formal structure. This allows the leader to be

226. See Myron Weiner Party Politics in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), Pp. 241-242

arbitrator of disputes as well as permitting him to stand as the symbol of party unity on major issues. The leader thus is compromiser, the source of articulation of party values, and source of party prestige.

In addition to the influence of the leadership over factionalism, the factions themselves show a great deal of toleration for one another. In the case of Congress, the party is facilitated in terms of keeping the factions together by the fact that it is the governing party. Factions, if they wish to be in positions of political power, are much more likely to attain these positions by being part of Congress rather than part of or an Opposition party. ²²⁷ The Congress has also developed an internal mechanism which deals with factional disputes. This mechanism operates in such a manner as to accommodate and satisfy rather than irritate factions.

A final factor which tends to unify Indian political parties is the fact that there is within parties a broad consensus on basic party policy and direction which cuts across factional lines. Thus, while there may be disagreement on certain issues, these take second place to the party's major policies and directions.

Why do most Indian parties manage to accommodate factions while the CPI cannot? The difference between most Indian parties and the CPI is in the area of the source of the party's authority. While other Indian parties have as the source of their authority either a charismatic leader or a constituency, the CPI has as its source of

227. See Myron Weiner Party Politics in India Pp. 242-245

authority an ideology. Earlier I stated that the interdependence implied by ideology creates an unavoidable framework for analysis²²⁸ defining ultimate objectives to which party members must relate. Programmes, strategies and tactics are thus also bound by this interdependence. It is this interdependence which makes communist parties intolerant of factions. Questioning of any element of CPI policy, by definition, challenges the leadership of the party and opens the entire question of the interpretation of the doctrine.

Yet factionalism seems to be inherent in communist parties. As early as the 1920's the CPSU had a right, left and centre around Bukharin, Stalin and Trotski. The international movement, even before its subjugation to Stalinism, showed the same tendency in people like Rosa Luxemburg. This tendency to develop several different factions is, of course, based on the ability of the human being to analyse the same situation from several different standpoints leading to several different conclusions, even though the same tools of analysis (Marxist-Leninist ideology) are used. Lenin foresaw this possibility and attempted to overcome it through the use of democratic centralism. Democratic centralism envisioned constant debate and analysis which would be moulded into an effective decision-making mechanism capable of making correct policy. In theory, this would have taken account of the possibility of different analyses of the right, centre and left variety. In fact, however, the mechanism did not work very well, and no solution to factionalism existed until Stalin came to power. Stalin's solution was to eliminate factions by suppression. It can be

228. See page 1.

argued, however, that although he eliminated the factions themselves, he did not eliminate the existence of their doctrinal positions. The right-left zigzags of the Stalin era can be invoked as evidence of the existence of these doctrinal positions. Thus, on the basis of communist party history, both within the CPSU and other communist parties, it seems that factionalism is inherent, at least to the same degree that it is inherent in other types of political parties. The important difference between communist parties and other parties is the fact that, due to the basis of communist authority in Marxist-Leninist doctrine, factionalism is not tolerable! Thus, communist parties are caught up in a tension between the ideal of correct, unanimous analysis and decision-making, and the impossibility of attaining this ideal.

Stalin's solution to the problem of factionalism could only endure as long as Stalin endured. A scant three years after his death, the positions of the factions which had existed in the 1920's, came forth again at the Twentieth CPSU Congress. It would be incorrect to say that all of the questions of the 1920's arose again. Rather, the continuity between the debates of the 1920's and those of the 1960's and 70's exists on major topics which have not been resolved or relegated to past history. Moreover, some of these major topics have reappeared in different contexts, such as the necessity of revolution and its relation to the existence of nuclear weapons. Still, the positions are analagous.

The breakup of the Stalinist solution, and the beginning of the

229. Isaac Deutscher "Three Currents in Communism" Studies on the Left Volume 4, Number 1, 1964 Pp. 6-8

Khrushchev era reopened all of the major important issues. Looking at the world communist movement today the analyst is faced with a dilemma. This dilemma may be phrased as follows: Is the existence of a right, centre and left position in the international communist movement something inherent in the movement itself which would have come about in all parties had they been able to exist without being influenced by other communist parties; or, is it merely a reflection of the situation within the CPSU? Both of these positions offer strong arguments.

The argument that a right, centre and left position would have evolved inherently seems to be supported by the existence of such a division within the CPSU from earliest times. Moreover, such a division seems to appear in other parties and in the international movement in general prior to the coming to power of Stalin. Finally, the fact that Lenin sought a way to overcome potential division by development of the principle of democratic centralism seems to argue that he saw this kind of factionalism as inherent.

While the above argument is compelling, it does not eliminate the possibility that much of what is happening in other communist parties and in the international movement may be a reflection of the right, centre and left within the CPSU. I have demonstrated within the thesis how communist parties became subjugated to the policy orientation of the CPSU, even when this orientation conflicted with their analysis of their own domestic situation. To the degree that these parties mirror the Russian party, it is possible that development of right, centre and left factions in other communist parties are directly related to such a division within the CPSU. From this viewpoint, it may be argued that

communist parties were caught up in the right, centre and left debates of the 1920's, suppressed these positions when Stalin suppressed them, and let them surface again when the Russian party allowed them to surface. Such a point of view would not be illogical when one considers the fact that all communist parties have looked to the Russian party as the source of correct interpretation of the doctrine and as the motherland. Deutscher argues that the years of "monolithic uniformity" have had such an effect, even when carried over into the Sino-Soviet Rift:

They still determine the character and style of the present controversy. In every one of its sectors, the Maoist, the Khrushchevite and the "Titoist" communism is at present reacting against Stalinism; but everywhere it is reacting in a Stalinist Manner... 230

In all likelihood neither of these positions is entirely correct, but elements of both probably factor into the current situation.

The important thing about the right, centre and left factional situation in international communism is the effect that it is having on communist parties throughout the world. We have seen that such faction building seems to be inherent in communist parties, whether by the course of their development or by reflection of the experience of the CPSU. The CPI throughout most of its history has displayed these three positions, often all at the same time. The fact, however, that these positions have now become legitimated has changed the complexion of the problem of factionalism completely.

During that period of history when all communist parties looked to the CPSU for guidance, factionalism was contained with relative

ease. Only that faction of the CPI which had a position corresponding to the CPSU position at the time (be it right, centre or left) was deemed legitimate. Thus, non-legitimated factional positions existed within the CPI, but these posed little danger. Each faction, in its turn, lay dormant until the CPSU position changed enough to legitimize them. With the opening of the Sino-Soviet rift the left and right factions both found that they could seek and receive legitimacy for their positions. This would not have been the case if either the Russian or Chinese position had prevailed, but the stalemate between the two giants made mutual, but contradictory legitimization possible. Factions could no longer be deterred by lack of legitimacy. The positions of the right and left factions helped to legitimize a centrist position. This centrist position is not dis-similar to the centrist position taken by other members of the international movement. It argues that neither the CPSU nor the CPC is correct, but that the correct interpretation lies somewhere in between the two. The end of monolithic communism also allows the flexibility for a centrist position.

Of equal importance to the presence of a right and left source of legitimization internationally, is the fact that both the CPSU and the CPC have appealed to other parties to support their positions. It is one thing when factions within the CPI appeal to either the CPSU or the CPC for legitimization of their positions and another when, as happened between 1958 and 1968, the two giants respond and even appeal to these factions to be used as legitimizers! The effect that this latter fact has had on the CPI has been to split the party. It can be argued that the party, due to the differences within it and within the

communist movement generally would have split anyway. But, the active support and encouragement which the CPSU and CPC have given to these factions has allowed them to exist as separate communist parties after they had split from the original CPI. In this respect the Sino-Soviet rift has had enormous consequences on factionalism within the Communist Party of India.

PREFACE TO BIBLIOGRAPHY

This Thesis has relied extensively on the use of documents from the Asian Recorder. To facilitate the reader's use of the bibliography, articles from the Asian Recorder have been listed chronologically by month and year rather than alphabetized.

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