LENIN AND THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTION, 1917-1920

A RE-INTERPRETATION

Thesis Presented to the Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of Manitoba in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy by Jiri Fabsic, June 1974.

LENIN AND THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTION, 1917-1920

A RE-INTERPRETATION

BY

JIRI FABSIC

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Doing research for this study, the present author has visited a number of institutions, libraries, and archives of which appreciation ought to be expressed, especially to the staff of the Hoover Institution on War, Peace, and Revolution in Stanford; the New York Public Library; the Library of the British Museum; the Library of the London School of Economics; the International Institut of Social History, Amsterdam; the archives of the German Foreign Ministry in Bonn; and the Bavarian State Library in Munich. The author would also like to record his gratitude to the University of Manitoba and its Department of History which made this research possible through generous grants, as well as to Messrs. Paul Call, Michael Futrell, James Joll, Harold Shukman, Hermann Weber and Z.A. B. Zeman for their advice and criticism. Special thanks must go to the supervisor of this thesis, Prof. F.G. Stambrook for his counsel, linguistic assistance, and gentle encouragement. Prof. Stambrook also read this manuscript in its several stages and suggested various amendments. However, the sole responsibility for shortcomings and possible mistakes of the study lies exclusively with this author.

PREFACE

Centuries ago Hans Holbein the younger painted a group of well-off ambassadors placing before their feet a whitish object which appears shapeless and meaningless if looked at from the frontal perspective. It is only in an angle view that the puzzling object transforms itself into a skull and thus reveals its obvious message, namely a memento mori. One does not have to draw a far-fetched comparison to realize that even in the age of science the observer's perspective and judgement to a large extent determine the interpretation of any secular achievement, any historical event or personality. It is not otherwise in regard to the topic of this study, Lenin and the European revolution. Himself a prolific political publicist of many dimensions and by far the most translated author of all times, Lenin, his life, thought and revolutionary age have been the subjects of everlasting and diversified interest. Nevertheless overlooking various interpretations of the theme "Russia and the West" in his thought, one cannot fail to notice that the students of communism approach this topic with a preconceived frame of mind. Briefly, there obviously would be a general consensus with the contention that the Bolshevik leader and his party seized power in November 1917 believing in the inevitability if not imminency of proletarian revolution in the West, that the idea of building socialism only in Russia had not until then crossed their mind, that Lenin was subsequently caught by surprise and disillusioned by the failure of world revolution and came to re-channel international communism towards serving Soviet Russia contrary to his

previous plans and expectations.*

Attentive to but distrustful of secondary works, this author went ad fontes in his effort to re-create an authentic picture of Lenin as a statesman and his revolution. As could be expected, Lenin's own writings proved to be an essential source illuminating his personality, style, and Bolshevik policies. Unfortunately the exploitation of Lenin's writings has rarely gone beyond a mere quoting; the source as such has not been analyzed and evaluated in its full complexity. Very useful also were the works of Lenin's colleagues such as Grigori Zinoviev, Leon Trotsky, Nikolai Bukharin, or Karl Radek, as well as memoirs of Lenin's contemporaries and polemics of his adversaries. Interestingly enough, this author found the Soviet press useful beyond his expectations. In the formative years of the Soviet state such papers as Pravda and Izvestiia mirrored a wide range of Bolshevik views, interests and concerns, and their editorials reflected the prevailing tendencies in the Soviet capital. In addition a number of archives and collections in various countries have been consulted. The results have been mixed. Long hours of tedious research have been balanced by finding hitherto unexploited materials relating in some instances to crucial problems of the study.

The author has tried a diversified, critical approach to the primary sources, paying a particular attention to circumstances of their origin, their motivation, purpose, and anticipated publicity. This proved rewarding particularly in dealing with the Bolshevik documents, in which verbal

* For different variants and ramification of this conception see for example E.H. Carr's The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923, 3 vols., (the first edition in London, 1950), W.H. Chamberlin's The Russian Revolution 1917-1921, 2 vols. (London, 1935), and the works of Isaac Deutscher, Louis Fischer, Paul Miliukov, George F. Kennan, George Lichtheim, Adam Ulam and others.

radicalism often served as a cover of opportunist practice. Himself a Realpolitiker, Lenin nevertheless was in a constant search for everything that "smelled of revolution",* for revolutionary postures in the pursuit of realistic goals. As he intimated in 1916, the difference between him and the 'opportunist' Kautsky concerned more the form than the essence.** In attempt to separate the propagandist from the real as distinctly as possible, the author has examined and correlated a wide range of issues, including the thought of Lenin and his opponents, his foreign and domestic policies, as well as Soviet military policy and propaganda. This approach appears valid as Lenin, the chief policy-maker in the period of 1917-1920, was wrong in some of his premises, but had a consistent and logical mind; various aspects of his program were inseperably interwoven and logically supplemented each other.

This study presents some results of the author's research and analysis. It does not aspire to become an exhastive treatment of Lenin, the Bolshevik revolution, or the origins of international communism. Rather, the study endeavours to reconstruct Lenin's concept and strategies of the Russian and world revolutions prior to November 1917, to follow their implementation and failures during the formative years of the Soviet state, and to analyze the immediate impact of Bolshevik policies on the course of European revolutions in the period 1918-1920. Inevitably the author goes into details when necessary without relating them repeatedly

---

* See Leon Trotsky, Lenin, (New York, 1925), 132; the same, My Life, (New York, 1970), 338.

** Vladimir Ilich Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., (Moscow, 1954-),(hereafter cited as LCW), vol.23, p.18. Cf. vol.21, p.408. The English edition of Lenin's works has been invariably compared with the Russian text in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th ed., (Moscow, 1958-).

to the mainstream of the discussion or without stressing the novelty of some interim conclusions. Still, the thrust of the study runs against the commonly held view of Lenin and his perception of the West as mentioned above. The reader accustomed to draw his picture of Lenin and the Bolshevik revolution from secondary sources may find unorthodox or even unlikely some major theses presented in this study such as Lenin's pessimism regarding world revolution, his belief in the feasibility of building socialism in Russia only, as well as the interpretation of some well known aspects of the revolutionary years 1918-1920. The present writer is nevertheless reasonably sure that further research will substantiate his conclusions and throw a new light on one of the crucial phases of this century and on the ingenious simplicity of its principal actor, Lenin.

USED ABBREVIATIONS

Cheka - Chrezvychainaia komissiia (Extraordinary Commission)

ECCI - Executive Committee of the Communist International

Glavkom - Glavnokomanduiushchii (Commander-in-Chief)

KPD - Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (German Communist Party)

Narkomindel - Narodnyi komissariat po innostrannym delam (People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs)

PSI - Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)

Revvoensovet - Revoliutsionno-voennyi sovet (Revolutionary Military Council)

Sovnarkom - Sovet narodnykh komissarov (Council of People's Commissars)

SPD - Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social-Democratic Party of Germany)

USPD - Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany)

VTsIK - Vserossiiskii Tsentral'nyi Ispolnitelnyi Komitet (All-Russian Central Executive Committee [of Soviets])

CHAPTER I

LENIN'S IDEA OF REVOLUTION PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 1917

A reconstruction of Lenin's revolutionary strategy and program may seem a gratuitous task. The Bolshevik leader prior to November 1917 allegedly remained committed merely to such slogans as "Peace", "Bread" and "Land", and to some vague ideas on the working of the administration and economy.[1] In effect, however, such a view is very inaccurate. Lenin was not a political gambler considering the conquest of power the ultimate end in itself. He would endorse Wilhelm Liebknecht's maxim that, if necessary, tactics should be changed twenty-four times a day, but he abhorred improvisations and himself was a poor improviser. Long range perspectives were to him a sine qua non of a revolutionary movement and a proletarian government. As early as 1905 he charged other revolutionaries of knowing how to win victories but not knowing how to profit by them.[2] It indeed appears that Lenin between 1905 and 1917 developed a fairly clear idea of the Russian and world revolution, but had not expounded it fully in writing. This does not seem unusual as Lenin persistently worked with the element of surprise and concealment. There were aspects in his program and strategy which could not well be discussed either because of their revisionist nature or because of repercussions which their eventual disclosure would bring to the Bolsheviks in Russia and abroad.

Lenin and the West Prior to 1917

Vladimir Ilich Ulianov, better known as Lenin, was born on April 22, 1870, in the Volga town Simbirsk into a family of an ennobled, conservative school inspector. Very typically, the young Vladimir became

interested in revolutionary thought, thereby following the path of his older brother Alexander who was executed in 1887 for his part in a plot to assassinate Tsar Alexander III. From his teens on Lenin studied and admired the Russian revolutionary movement and its principal actors. The life and thought of Chernyshevsky, Herzen, Tkachev, Nechaev, and of other Russian revolutionaires became to him a source of life-long inspiration. Young Lenin himself stood very close to People's Will, the Jacobin wing of the Russian populists, which stressed the domestic roots of revolution and advocated the use of terror.[3] Besides, the young revolutionary was deeply rooted in Russian history, Russian culture, and in what might be called a Russian outlook. When he first went abroad in 1895 - to Switzerland and Paris - he "smelled of the Russian soil" (according to Axelrod). Long years of exile in Western and Central Europe (1899-1905, 1907-1917) did not wash away his Russianness. He never assimilated in the West and with the possible exception of several weeks in the winter of 1916-1917, he never intended to do so. Russia and Russian affairs remained the object of his primary interest. The Bolshevik leader, as Trotsky conceded, remained "national to a high degree".[4]

Nevertheless, in his early twenties Lenin reached the conclusion that the problems of underdeveloped and predominantly agricultural Russia could be solved only in the international context. He became a Marxist, thereby placing his hopes in industrial progress along the Western lines, in Western assistance to Russia's economic and social transformations, and in international socialist revolution. Lenin had no fear of

industrialism and the intellectual innovations of the Western world, as some populists had. Indeed, although in his writings he dealt mostly with socialist affairs, the general impact of contemporary Western thought and economic progress on him may have been greater than assumed. Lenin matured and formulated his outlook during the intellectual ferment of the fin de siècle which laid the foundations of this century. The decade between 1898 and 1908 gave birth to a number of innovating achievements, for instance in physics (Einstein's theory of special relativity), in art (a destruction of figuratism by the cubists), music (destruction of tonality by Arnold Schönberg), and in psychology and psychiatry (the introduction of the "unconscious" by Freud). In the realm of social thought Eduard Bernstein spelled out the idea of reformist socialism, thus breaking the canon of Marxist orthodoxy. It was in this atmosphere of creative change that Lenin, in 1902, came with his first major revision of Marxism, the concept of a tightly organized party of professional revolutionaries in Russia.[5] And, as will be argued below, it was apparently towards the end of this decade that he arrived at his intellectually boldest innovation, the idea of an independent Russian revolution.

Lenin was an "enfant de son age" also in his sympathies and antipathies vis-à-vis individual Western countries. Out of all foreign powers Germany was held in prewar Russia in the highest esteem for her economic and scientific achievements, organizational skill and technical know-how. Germany was also by far Russia's largest trading partner and could therefore harvest more sympathies than France, Russia's largest

creditor, or Britain, Russia's colonial rival. Politically, pro-German sympathy was strongest on the extreme Left, which considered Germany a Mecca of socialism, and on the extreme Right, which appreciated the authoritarian system of the German monarchy. As weak, although growing, as were Russian liberalism and democracy, as relatively unstable and fluctuating were sympathies in Russia prior to 1914 towards France and especially Britain. That Lenin and the Bolsheviks were a special breed of people exhibiting "equally deep animosity" towards all capitalist powers, as some Western scholars still argue,[6] is a contention worthy of hagiography.

As for Lenin, even communist scholars admit that he shared the Leftists' predilection for Germany.[7] He was brought up in accordance with German customs and learned German as his second language; the country of Goethe and Marx, its people and its intellectual and economic achievements, became for him the subject of ever-lasting interest and a link to the world. A list of the Westerners Lenin responded to would consist predominantly of German and German speaking intellectuals: Marx, Engels, Kautsky, Hilferding, Luxemburg, but also Clausewitz, the natural scientists and philosophers Mach and Avenarius, the economist Schulze-Gaevernitz, or the economist and politician Rathenau. On the other hand Lenin referred less frequently to the intellectual production of non-German speaking Westerners with the notable exception of J. A. Hobson, the British political economist known for his criticism of British imperialism.[8] Lenin's special interest in Germany is more than a historical curiosity. As will be shown, it left an immeasurable but

lasting imprint on his thought and action.

In common with most of his countrymen, Lenin showed little sympathy for France and especially for Britain, the two powers which were lagging behind Germany in terms of economic growth and efficient management, and in which socialism disappointingly failed to become victorious. Already during his first stay in London (1902-03) Lenin noted a disinterest of the British workers in a socialist movement and metaphysical disputes.[9] In his first public attack on parasitism and the corruption of the workers' movement in the West, he evidently had in mind the two principal colonial powers.[10] Later he extracted from Marx and Engels passages suggesting that industrialization had led the British workers to reformism, not to socialist revolution.[11]

In any case, when the first Russian revolution arrived in 1905, Lenin already was hesitant to lend credence to the doctrine of "permanent revolution", evolved between 1904 and 1906 by two gifted socialists, Parvus-Helphand and Trotsky. The two in fact spelled out an old idea of a double role that Russia could play in European affairs both as an <u>initiator</u> of the socialist transformations in Western Europe and as a <u>recipient</u> of the assistance of West European socialism in power. Readjusting the formula of Marx and Engels on "permanent revolution" in this sense, Parvus and Trotsky now suggested that the bourgeois Russian revolution carried out by the proletariat would kindle socialist revolution in the West and receive in turn the help necessary to initiate and complete the socialist transformation in Russia herself. The revolution would thus acquire a permanent, uninterrupted character.[12]

The doctrine was in 1905 merely a theoretical proposition. Lenin himself primarily placed his hopes not in the revolution in the West but in cooperation with a domestic ally, the Russian peasantry.[13] Only after the defeat of the Moscow uprising in December 1905, when he deemed "hopeless" the struggle of the Russian proletariat alone, and while a strike movement was growing in Central Europe in favor of the Russian revolutionaries, did he turn his attention to the West. "The European workers", he consoled himself, "will show us 'how to do it', and together with them we shall bring the socialist revolution."[14] Yet the movement in Central Europe passed its climax in January 1906 and gradually subsided. The proletariat of Western Europe responded to Europe's greatest social upheaval since the Paris Commune in an impressive but non-revolutionary and non-violent way.

The failure of the Western proletariat to rise by itself embittered the Russian revolutionaries. Even Trotsky, restating his doctrine of "permanent revolution" in 1906, conceded that the socialist parties of the West had turned conservative and become "an immediate obstacle on the road to open proletarian confrontations with the bourgeois reaction".[15] After their escape to the West, he and other Russian socialists became even more disenchanted with the <u>embourgeoisement</u> of Western workers' movement. Some of them openly voiced their misgivings with the white-collar revolutionaries of Western Europe.[16] This disillusionment was not unsubstantiated. After years of struggle the workers' parties of the West and their leaders had amalgamated with the texture of capitalist society. Although they continued to employ what G. B. Shaw called the "rhetoric

of the barricade", the undeniable material progress tempered their spirit of revolt.

The reformist and opportunist tendencies of Western socialism became blatantly obvious in 1907 at the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International.[17] This congress, the first after the 1905 revolution, also revealed a painful split within the socialist movement itself. The representatives of various socialist parties were unable to speak in unison on such major issues as colonialism and militarism. Violent controversies between the French and German delegates suggested that particularism and promotion of national interests were supplanting internationalism. The congress, as Georges Haupt has pointed out, constituted a turning point of the socialist movement.[18] Interestingly enough, it also definitely solidified the view of the West on the part of the thirty-seven year old Lenin. According to Zinoviev, the Bolshevik leader was very disillusioned with the congress dealings; indeed, Lenin himself, reporting subsequently on the congress and its achievements, for the first time struck a harsh, critical note accusing the European proletariat of opportunism and chauvinism and suggesting that these maladies stemmed from the very roots of Western parasitical society.[19] Taking his lesson, in the years following the Stuttgart congress Lenin definitely dropped the idea of 'permanent revolution', as Helphand-Parvus himself did. In search for new vistas of revolution, Lenin after 1907 turned his attention to the East, juxtaposing in a well-known article "backward Europe" and "advanced Asia".[20]

The response of the Western workers' movement to the world war confirmed Lenin's scepticism. First, the socialist parties did not live up

to their prewar avowals of anti-war actions and international solidarity. Their votes for war credits showed that the proletariat was not united above their national interests.[21] Second, the renunciation of class struggle, as manifested by the acceptance of Burgfrieden and Union Sacré by the German and French socialists respectively, showed that the major socialist parties were unwilling to transform the war into civil war in their home countries. Lenin overstated the case but was not entirely wrong when accusing the socialist parties of the West of a "flagrant betrayal of their convictions", of opportunism and chauvinism,[22] or when asserting that these parties had become "incapable of changing their course".[23] Third, the only conceivable organ of international revolution, the Zimmerwald movement, a loose association of war resistors advocating the transformation of the war into a civil war, constituted a minority in the context of the international workers' movement, with Lenin's followers representing a minority within this minority. The two Zimmerwald conferences held in 1915 and 1916 respectively, manifested that the movement was too weak and disunited to take effective action.[24] Not accidentally, Lenin, like many of his contemporaries, was convinced that the war would accelerate social and political change, but he too found world revolution in Trotsky's sense not feasible. Painful as was such an admission, Lenin nevertheless made it, albeit reluctantly, and only when it really mattered. For example, this was the crux of the argument he advanced against Trotsky in defence of defeatism.[25] Later Lenin ridiculed Trotsky for "repeating his 'original' 1905 theory" and

for refusing "to give some thought to the reasons why, in the course of years, life has been bypassing this splendid theory".[26] When Rosa Luxemburg in 1916 reiterated in her "Junius Pamphlet" the concept of world revolution as a chain reaction, initiated and led by the Western proletariat, Lenin reminded her sharply of the impotence of German revolutionaries and indicated that the European proletariat might remain "impotent, say, for twenty years".[27] The prospect of socialist revolution in the West became after 1907 too unreal for Lenin, a Realpolitiker who was accustomed to building his program not on the possible but on the actual.[28]

Lenin does not seem to have differed substantially in the assessment of the West from other Russian socialists. For example, Trotsky after the outbreak of the war still insisted that the conquest of power by the proletariat was the best means of stopping the war cataclysm, but in practical terms he advocated the slogan of a democratic peace without indemnities and annexations.[29] Trotsky realized that the Russian revolution would remain isolated and, like the Mensheviks, refused to strive for it in the conditions of war. Lenin, however, took the opposite view and started to test the grounds for revolution in one country.

A Non-Class Ally: The German Workers in Uniform

Skeptical about the effectiveness of parliamentary and non-violent means of fundamental change, Lenin considered armed struggle as the only form of revolution and the army in general as the "only force solving great historical issues". In his view, the revolutionary army and the revolutionary government were two sides of the same coin.[30] Consequently,

throughout the 1905 revolution the Bolshevik leader repeatedly urged the Russian socialists to concentrate on transforming the tsarist troops into a revolutionary army.[31] This entailed the task of winning for the revolution the Russian peasants who constituted the bulk of the tsarist troops. Yet, it turned out in 1906 that the tsarist troops not only had not joined the revolution but had become the tool of the tsarist oppression. As Trotsky later concluded, "it was on the circumscribed political intelligence of the muzhik who while in his village plundered his landlord in order to seize his land, but then, dressed in the soldier's coat, shot down the workers, that the first wave of the Russian revolution broke".[32]

Seen from this standpoint, Lenin's view did not differ substantially from that of Trotsky. Thus, when Lev Tolstoy attempted in 1909 to exonerate the Russian peasants' behaviour in the 1905 revolution, the Bolshevik leader rebuked him, writing contemptuously about the "hidebound cowardice of the 'enterprising muzhik'" which kept the village population away from the ranks of revolution. The soldiers' insurrections in 1905-06, Lenin indicated, had failed not because the officers had not participated, but because the backward peasants constituted the majority of the army.[33] Later, analyzing the "lessons of the revolution", Lenin demonstrated statistically that no more than one fourth or one fifth of the peasants had taken part in the revolutionary struggles, in contrast to the workers who had carried the burden of the struggle. "The peasants fought less persistently, more disconnectedly, with less political understanding, at times still pinning their hopes on the benevolence of our Father, the Tsar."[34]

The anarchism and political passivity of the peasants displayed during the 1905 revolution showed that the Russian peasants, as Lenin's precursor, Tkachev, had predicted several decades earlier, would not join the revolution before its victory. For all its spirit of revolt, the Russian peasantry proved unfit to effectively assist the Russian revolutionaries in their struggles against tsarism. Since the Western proletariat in 1905 also demonstrated its inability to play such a role, the events of 1905 and 1906 demonstrated beyond any doubt that the Russian revolutionaries were lacking an ally which would help them in smashing the tsarist machine.

It was indicative of his intellectual alertness that Lenin, following the 'general rehearsal' of 1905, promptly turned his attention to another means of securing the victory of revolution. As early as April 1907 he suggested that the "militant proletariat" had to draw lessons from the "intimate aspects of the activities of Marx and Engels", and indicated that the two venerated precursors had expected the revolution to spring from a war.[35]

The idea of utilizing war as a catalyst of revolution was not unknown in the socialist movement. Indeed, there was a notion among the socialists, albeit not always clearly voiced in public, that not the efforts of the revolutionary forces themselves, but rather wars between the capitalist powers triggered revolutions. While most of Lenin's socialist contemporaries nevertheless refused to calculate on war,[36] the Bolshevik leader and other young radicals had in this respect fewer scruples. Forging the idea of utilizing war for the purpose of revolu-

tion at the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International in August 1907, Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and Martov suggested that should a war break out, it was the duty of the socialists "to intervene in favour of its speedy termination and to do all in their power to utilize the economic and political crisis caused by the war to rouse the peoples and thereby to hasten the abolition of capitalist class rule".[37] The motion deviated from the established socialist code, but it was vague enough to be accepted by the congress delegates. Going a step further, the French delegate Gustav Hervé proposed at the same congress that socialists should answer every war waged by the capitalist states with strikes and uprisings. However, his motion, calling implicitly for a defeatist stand also in a defensive war, was rejected as "absurd" (Bebel) and "impossible" (Karl Liebknecht).[38] Lenin himself recognized a "living stream" in Hervé's idea: "It sometimes happens that at a new turning point of a movement, theoretical absurdities cover up some practical truth". In his view, however, Hervé failed to understand that the choice of weapons was dependent on specific circumstances created by war.[39] In other words, he found defeatism generally inapplicable. Consistent in this view, Lenin seven years later expounded defeatism as a platform of only the Russian revolution.

In the years preceding the world war the Bolshevik leader intensively followed and analyzed the international situation while remaining indifferent to the socialists' efforts to preserve peace. Just like his counterpart Martov, Lenin believed that only a major war could shake the tsarist regime and bring about a new revolution.[40] A war involving

Russia and Austria-Hungary, he wrote in 1913, during the second Balkan crisis, would be a "useful trick" for the revolution in Eastern Europe, but he doubted whether Nicolas and the Kaiser Francis Joseph "would give us such a pleasure".[41] Next year, in August 1914, the European war broke out.

In September 1914, shortly after his arrival in his Swiss exile, Lenin presented in public his defeatist formula: "From the viewpoint of the working class and the toiling masses of all the people of Russia... defeat of the tsarist monarchy and its army...would be the lesser evil by far". Thus, consistent with his previous objection to Hervé's formulation, Lenin now advanced defeatism as a means of promoting only the Russian revolution. No hint was given as to its general validity.[42]

Defeatism was not a novel phenomenon in Russian political life. Its roots can be traced back to Chernyshevsky and Herzen; during the war of 1904-05 with Japan the Russian political opposition wished for and welcomed Russian defeats.[43] In 1914, however, the opposition in Russia no longer felt itself to be "without fatherland". Even the Russian socialists now almost unanimously disapproved of defeatism because of its practical implications. As Trotsky put it, the defeat of Russia implied "decisive victories of Germany and Austria in other theatres of the war... [and] the unlimited domination of German militarism in all of Europe". The Russian revolution, born under such circumstances, so Trotsky argued, "would be a miscarriage of history".[44]

Bolshevik organizations in Russia and some of Lenin's colleagues in exile also objected to the formula of defeatism. G. Shklovsky, for

instance, argued that unless Germany was defeated, democracy in France would be destroyed. Lenin gave a characteristic reply: there would be no harm if industrially advanced Germany destroyed the backward French republic of usurpers and rentiers.[45] Others voiced their reservation to a narrow, "Russian" formulation of defeatism.[46] The slogan of Russia's defeat appeared unacceptable particularly to a small but influential group of the young party intellectuals centred around Nicholai Bukharin.[47] Facing this opposition, Lenin ultimately decided upon a verbal concession and presented to the Bolshevik conference in Berne (February-March, 1915) a resolution stating that the struggle against every belligerent government "should not falter at the possibility of that country's defeat".[48]

Thus Lenin gave defeatism a general, international connotation, even though only for tactical reasons. Consequently, when Trotsky later accused Bolshevik defeatism of "fundamental connivance with the political methodology of social patriotism", Lenin admitted that defeatism was meaningful particularly when applied to backward Russia. The Bolsheviks had advanced it, he went on, because of the reactionary character of the world war, and because they did not find "coordination and mutual aid" feasible between the revolutionary movements. In this connection he conceded that the "opportunists" who regarded a common revolutionary action against the belligerent governments as impossible might be "quite right in many respects". The proletariat of backward Russia, due to a "shameful treachery of the German and French Social-Democrats", had to accept the course of defeatism on its own.[49]

Lenin subsequently refined his arguments, accentuating the role of the war as a "locomotive of the revolution".[50] The fact that no prominent socialist or party in the West adopted a defeatist stand did not dismay him since his defeatist formula had been designed specifically for the Russian revolution. In his plan, the German "workers in uniform" were to execute the mission assigned in 1905 to the Russian peasants, and by smashing the old regime and its army help the Russian revolutionaries into the saddle. The prospect of a revolution brought in on the points of German bayonets presupposed a revision of other aspects of the Leninist strategy and program.

Phase One: The Revolution in One Country

Although Lenin throughout the war censured the national narrowness of Western labour movement and agitated for socialist internationalism, he himself also drew up his program along "national" lines. His call for Russia's defeat, advanced unilaterally in September 1914, already implied his willingness and courage to work for the Russian revolution despite the paralyzation of European socialism and even against the interest of labour parties in other countries. For this reason Lenin became to many European socialists, as the Italian socialist paper Avanti put it, a representative of an extreme course who considered the war "at best only as a preparation for the Russian revolution".[51] Even Lenin's Menshevik counterpart Martov, himself an "internationalist", argued that Bolshevik defeatism "objectively justifies the efforts of the social patriots of the opposing belligerent country, in this case Germany", and that it "carries a narrowly national character banking not

on European revolution but on revolution in one country - Russia".[52]

Was the prospect of an independent proletarian revolution in Russia unrealistic prior to 1917? Seen in retrospect, there were domestic factors which suggested that such a revolution would be feasible. First of all, Russia herself was a vast country virtually unconquerable for foreign powers; her abundance of natural resources also suggested that she would remain a sought-after trading partner regardless of her political system. The feasibility of a permanent proletarian government was also enhanced by Russia's industrial growth, remarkable especially in the years preceding the war. Drawing from this industrial expansion, a French economist for example predicted that Russia would dominate by 1950 "both in political and economic-financial affairs".[53] In 1916 Lenin too conceded that Russia, though economically still most backward, had already reached the stage of modern capitalist imperialism, notable for centralization and concentration of productive forces.[54] Thus some conditions existed in Russia for a socialization of production and for materialization of Lenin's idea of a planned, centralized economy.[55] Russia's rapid industrialization also prompted the growth of an industrial proletariat, thereby enlarging the potential base of a proletarian regime. Further, the socio-political changes in pre-war Russia undermined the stability of the tsarist regime; following the postrevolutionary lull Russian labour became again restive in 1912 and thereafter. In sum, the pre-war socio-economic developments did not make the proletarian revolution in Russia inevitable, as some authors maintain,[56] but made it possible.

Of course, the political profile of the Russian peasantry, constituting more than eighty per cent of the entire population, was of a crucial importance for the feasibility of the proletarian state in Russia. Here, ironically, the general backwardness of the peasantry, its lack of "nation-wide solidarity" (Lenin's term), and its submissiveness to the established authority became in a sense a positive asset. The political passivity of the peasants, demonstrated so clearly during the 1905 revolution, signaled that they would submit to the proletarian regime provided that their interests were observed. Building on the latter premise, Trotsky concluded that the Russian proletariat in power would be able to exercise a "great influence" over the peasantry,[57] but the "dictatorship of the proletariat" made little sense to him unless followed by socialist revolution in the West and by socialist transformations in Russia.

Lenin had already in 1905-06 contemplated a proletarian government, albeit still with doubts about the peasantry and still placing some hopes in the Western proletariat.[58] In the post-revolutionary years, however, he definitely turned away from 'permanent revolution', and yet he became much less concerned with the danger of counterrevolutionary restoration. He apparently concluded from his 1905 experience that the revolutionary government would win the peasants by nationalization and distribution of the land.[59] Consequently, Lenin came to argue with new confidence that the "victory of the bourgeois revolution in our conception is not possible as a victory of the bourgeoisie." In his view, the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" became historically necessary.[60]

At variance with Trotsky, Lenin had until 1917 been paying lipservice to the "extreme revolutionary spirit of the muzhik" and the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but the party had essentially done next to nothing to win the peasant masses. The peasants were potential allies just for their backwardness and unconsummated hunger for land. "It is only our victory in the metropolitan cities that will carry the peasants with us", Lenin quieted his colleagues in late September 1917,[61] on the eve of what he later described as a "proletarian coup d'état".[62]

It would appear that prominent socialists abroad (Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Kautsky, Rudolf Hilferding) also assumed that the Russian peasantry would not seriously jeopardize the revolutionary government. However, they were giving such a regime little chance of survival in the non-socialist world. Did Lenin believe in the feasibility of coexistence? His idea of a proletarian hegemony in Russia itself suggests that he did, and developments on the international scene also appeared to support such a possibility. It would be misleading to see this problem only through the prism of civil war and intervention which followed the Bolshevik coup in 1917.

The pre-war years were marked by an impressive growth of socialist democracy and liberalism in the West. In 1914 there existed strong and influential socialist parties in all the major countries of the European continent - France, Italy, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. In 1912 the Social Democrats became the strongest party in the country of Lenin's foremost interest, Germany. The German socialists did not conceal their

aspiration to come to power.[63] Lenin likewise anticipated that the influence of these, in his words, "bourgeois labour parties" would be increasing.[64] They were no longer revolutionary, but their positive impact on the international affairs appeared undeniable.

From Lenin's standpoint, there was good reason to assume that the principal objection against proletarian power in Russia, namely that this would provoke a Western intervention and the economic strangulation of the revolutionary regime, was invalid. The 1905 revolution had clearly demonstrated that even before the labour parties had reached the peak of their influence, the pressure of the democratic forces in the West prevented any intervention in favor of the tsarist government. Referring to this experience, Lenin and Zinoviev in their programmatical article of 1915 indicated that only solidarity of the Western proletariat with revolutionary Russia was a hard fact to build on, not the socialist revolution in the West. And unlike the students of communism, the two Bolsheviks clearly differentiated between the two categories.[65]

Indeed, the world war weakened but did not kill the spirit of pacifism, solidarity, and international cooperation. Observing contemporary trends, the leading socialist theoretician Karl Kautsky after the outbreak of the war indicated that the world might be heading towards a phase of "ultra-imperialism" in which rivalries of European powers would be solved peacefully within an united Europe. Lenin's response was typically ambiguous. On one hand he loudly declared wars as inevitable in conditions of imperialism and mocked Kautsky's "ultra-imperialism" as "ultra-nonsense".[66] On the other hand he made a similar evaluation

of the international scene and coded it in September 1914 very skillfully into a call for the establishment of "republics in Germany, Poland, Russia, and other countries" and for transformation of "all the separate states of Europe into a republican United States of Europe".[67]

The United States of Europe had long been envisioned by Marxists as an international organization of socialist states. Among Lenin's contemporaries it was Trotsky who advocated this concept as a corollary to his doctrine of "permanent revolution". Hence, some authors assume that Lenin's concept did not differ from Trotsky's.[68] However, a mere glance shows that Lenin called for a republican United States of Europe. In other words, he anticipated that the war would accelerate the integration process in Europe and bring about bourgeois democratic, anti-dynastic revolutions in the major monarchies of Europe, including Russia. Since Lenin expected after 1905 that the Russian proletariat would assume the hegemony in the next Russian revolution,[69] the corollary of his slogan is clear. Lenin expected proletarian Russia to be able to coexist with its republican neighbours in an united Europe.[70]

As in the case of defeatism, it was again Bukharin's group which resolutely rejected not only the slogan but also its underlying idea of "revolution in one country". In their view the party should not advance "minimum demands in the realm of present day foreign policy" but work for the socialist revolution in all Europe.[71] Bukharin, in direct defiance of Lenin, called for a "socialist unification of countries from below, republican socialist states of Europe".[72] Other Bolsheviks who might have accepted the idea of "revolution in one country" disapproved

of the slogan of a republican United States of Europe on account of its manifest skepticism regarding world revolution.[73] Confronted with these objections, Lenin thereafter withdrew the slogan from the Bolshevik conference in Berne (February-March 1915) with a promise to discuss it in the party organ Pravda.[74]

The discussion of the concept of a United States of Europe did not take place. Only after several months, in August 1915, did Lenin publish an article on this topic. Speaking from the political point of view, he found the slogan compatible with principles of revolutionary socialism. The advocacy of merely democratic changes in Europe, he maintained, could not weaken or obscure the prospect of socialism. The republican United States of Europe therefore was "quite invulnerable as a political slogan".[75] He nevertheless abandoned the slogan on the ground that a supra-national European organization would retard the economic growth of the "young" states.[76] According to his wartime collaborator G. Shklovsky, however, Lenin's decision was in fact motivated by other than economic reasons.[77] In any case, Lenin discarded only the idea of a United States of Europe, not the feasibility of coexistence itself.

Meanwhile the crushing defeats of the Russian armies in the summer of 1915 - Warsaw fell in August and the Central powers' troops continued advancing eastwards - paralyzed the pulse of the Russian Empire. The tsarist administration no longer seemed able to cope with the war. Even the moderate Paul Miliukov now found a revolution necessary "for patriotic reasons".[78] In anticipation of the new revolutionary upheaval in Russia, Lenin decided in his Swiss exile to provide the Bolshevik party

with some other aspects of his program and of the tactics of "revolution in one country". He absolved this self-imposed task in several articles published chiefly between August and November 1915.[79]

The key document, modestly entitled "Several Theses" was written, as its co-author Zinoviev later recalled, "in the moment when we had not the slightest doubt that Russia was on the eve of the second revolution".[80] The document referred to by Lenin as "program" envisaged the possibility of a temporary hegemony in the revolution of the non-proletarian forces; the Bolsheviks would be ready to "join a provisional revolutionary government together with the petty bourgeoisie" provided that the latter would not insist on the continuation of the war. Then, the Bolsheviks would be willing to share the government with a broad spectrum of fellow-travellers including Kerensky and "Mr. Plekhanov".[81] Lenin and Zinoviev in "Several Theses" also reiterated the three principles of the 1903 program of Russian Social Democracy, a democratic republic, confiscation of the landed estates, and the eight-hour working day; they also indicated that the impending revolution could ultimately take only the form of the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry", and that the Bolshevik hegemony in the revolution was feasible.[82] Moderate in essence but superceding the old program of 1903, "Several Theses" in a sense became a guideline for achieving a "middle class revolution in Russia"[83] - under the proletarian leadership.

In this period Lenin reiterated his wartime interpretation of the right of nations to self-determination - an interpretation which likewise betrayed his contemplation of an independent revolutionary state in Russia.

Being rather indifferent if not hostile to nationalism, the Bolshevik leader had nevertheless skillfully integrated this principle into his program. Having almost equaled self-determination and secession, during the war he came to advocate the cutting away of the Empire's peripheral provinces in the Baltic, Ukraine, Poland, etc. This position was undoubtedly double-motivated. On one hand, Lenin strove to utilize nationalism as a vehicle useful for breaking up the entire tsarist system. By the same token, he was apparently preparing a strategic "trade of space for time"[84] which he later realized at Brest-Litovsk. A belt of buffer-states between Russia and Europe, needless to say, would hamper the march of the revolution westwards but facilitate the survival of the revolutionary regime in Russia. In any case, Lenin's concept of the national question had politically a defensive and even a seclusive connotation. As has been pointed out by one analyst, it reflected Lenin's realization that the socialist revolution in the West was not imminent, and that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Eastern Europe was an independent factor.[85] Indeed Lenin himself emphatically denied the feasibility of merging the Russian revolution with the socialist revolution in Western Europe. The latter, he and Zinoviev declared in "Several Theses", remained "a special and second task", due only after the consummation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia.[86] The Bolshevik leader, as Robert V. Daniels has pointed out more recently, "looked ahead to the Russian revolution as a separate national event".[87]

Lenin's idea of an independent Russian revolution generated the oft miscomprehended dispute between him and the Left wing of the party headed

by Bukharin.[88] It appeared as if the Left Bolsheviks shared with Lenin merely a desire for the new Russian revolution born through the war. Beyond this point agreement ended. The Left Bolsheviks rejected the foreign-political aspects of Lenin's minimum program of "revolution in one country", arguing that the party was to strive directly for the socialist revolution in the West. Their opposition took various forms. In fact, Lenin claimed that the Left Bolsheviks' inability to imagine world revolution (other than as a chain reaction) stood in the background of all disputed issues, including the question of divorce.[89] On the theoretical level, Lenin and Bukharin clashed over the evaluation of imperialism,[90] and especially over the right of nations to self-determination.[91] The dissenters argued that the self-determination of nations was impossible in the epoch of imperialism. Their argument also entailed a disbelief in the feasibility of an independent revolutionary state. Moreover, the Left Bolsheviks also objected that the self-determination of nations in Europe would hamper the extension of socialist revolution throughout the continent. Without replying to the latter objection, Lenin contended that the self-determination of nations was feasible because the conflicting interests prevented the imperialists from forming an united front against the emerging states.[92] Besides, Lenin believed that, as he argued against Rosa Luxemburg, a "practical intervention is not always possible" against separate revolutions in Europe.[93]

The protracted dispute, mirrored also on a practical level,[94] did not lead to an accord. The Bolshevik leader, more optimistic than after

November 1917, persevered in his belief that revolutionary Russia would find a modus vivendi with the non-socialist world.

Phase Two: Export of the Revolution

There was no place in Leninism for Trotsky's idea of merging the Russian and European revolutions. Lenin conceived the former as a separate stage of world revolution - a violent and generation-long process leading to the global victory of socialism.[95] What role did he expect revolutionary Russia to play in this process? The answer has to begin with a historical excursus.

In March 1895, several months before his death, Engels penned one of his most controversial writings. Discussing revolutionary tactics, Engels conceded not only that the street fighting on barricades had become outdated, but that improved transportation allowing swifter moves of armies, and improved weapons, as well as other factors, "have changed very much, and everything in favor of the military". Engels' message entailed a warning that the socialists now had in standing armies a superior enemy, and that they had to avoid a direct conquest of power in the years to come.[96]

This notion, accepted by almost all Western socialists, along with other factors stimulated in the late 1890's a search for new vistas for the socialist movement. The dim prospect of a frontal assault on capitalism not only stood in the background of Bernstein's revisionism but also of Kautsky's concept of Ermattungsstrategie (wearing-out strategy), of Luxemburg's idea of the general strike, as well as of the theory of an inevitable economic collapse of imperialism, developed by Rudolf

Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg and Otto Bauer. The same notion led activists like Karl Liebknecht to work for the conquest of army from within.[97] However, none of these roads was realistic enough in conditions of peace; the socialist revolution in the West was in a similar deadlock as the Russian one.

Lenin responded to Engels' caution regarding the preponderance of the military in a way opposite to that of his socialist contemporaries. Skeptical of parliamentarism, of the general strike and of legal means of struggle, he preached violence as the supreme form of revolution. The armed struggle constituted the central point of Lenin's revolutionary strategy, and war became to him a "locomotive of history".[98] Hence, it is hardly surprising that as much as he calculated with the revolution brought to Russia by the "German workers in uniform", he in turn considered the armed assistance of the proletarian state to be the most efficient impulse to the revolution in the West.

In public, Zinoviev was more outspoken on this point and developed an extensive rationale and justification for such use of revolutionary armies. In effect, he discussed the export of the revolution on the point of a bayonet as the only process by which the socialist revolution could take place in the West.[99] Lenin appears to have been equally committed but more circumspect. He and Zinoviev touched the issue in the informal party program, "Several Theses". They declared that the task of the Russian proletariat was to consummate the minimum, bourgeois-democratic program in Russia "in order to kindle the socialist revolution in Europe".[100] In the same document but in a different context the two

Bolsheviks also indicated that the Russian proletariat would wage the revolutionary war in the process of completing the entire minimum program, but they did so for a different purpose and obscured the question of timing.[101]

Lenin himself reiterated his strategy of revolutionary war in a well-known article of August 1915. He wrote that since uneven economic and political development was an absolute law of capitalism, the victory of socialism was possible first in several or even in one capitalist country alone. After expropriating the capitalists and organizing its own socialist production,

> the victorious proletariat of that country will rise against the rest of the world - the capitalist world - attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, stirring uprisings in those countries against the capitalists and in case of need using even armed force against the exploiting classes and their states...The democratic republic...will more and more concentrate the forces of the proletariat of a given nation or nations in the struggle against states that have not yet gone over to socialism.[102]

Full socialism, Lenin professed, was impossible "without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the [politically] backward states."[103]

Some scholars still argue, perhaps not so vehemently as in the past, that the foregoing passage does not apply to Russia. In their view, Lenin could not have contemplated socialism in such a backward country.[104] In effect, however, not only Stalin and Bukharin in the twenties but also Lenin, Bukharin and particularly Zinoviev after the November coup directly or indirectly endorsed the idea of building socialism in Russia alone.[105] And they did so not out of utopian enthusiasm. As will be seen below,

Lenin gave "socialism" a new meaning which made the formula of "socialism in one country" particularly suitable to backward Russia. Analogically, the phrase "organizing its own socialist production" was in fact tantamount to the consummation of the bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia.[106] And it was after accomplishing this goal that the anonymous socialist proletariat in one country was to start revolutionary war and the Russian proletariat in "Several Theses" was to "kindle the socialist revolution in Europe". Evidently, Lenin utilized the formula of "socialism in one country" to unveil such a delicate aspect of his thinking as his concept of revolutionary war.

In 1916 Lenin restated this idea in his "Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution". Asserting again that the "extremely uneven" development of capitalism would lead to the victory of socialism in one or several countries, he wrote that this would inevitably create frictions and stir up the bourgeoisie of other countries to attempts to "crush the socialist state's victorious proletariat". The proletariat would then take up the struggle which "on our part would be a legitimate and just war...for socialism, for the liberation of other nations from the bourgeoisie". The "beautiful future" of a peaceful world of socialism could be achieved only through "fierce class struggles and class wars".[107]

By evolving the concept of the revolutionary war Lenin in his typical manner narrowed down the vague predictions of Engels, Kautsky, and Trotsky to the effect that Russia would give an impulse to the socialist revolution in the West. The Bolshevik leader proved to be an expert

strategist planning to take up the decisive battle at the optimal moment of the revolution. The proletarian Russia was to start expanding the world of socialism by its armies only after having consolidated its power and organized a strong military-economic base.[108] To what extent this view influenced Lenin's foreign policy after November 1917 will be further explored later.

The Starting Point of the Revolution

The prospect of the Russian revolution brought about by decisive defeats of Tsarism posed the Bolshevik leader with a crucial problem: the revolutionary regime would most likely "inherit" a paralyzed country incapable of further resistance to the victorious external enemy. It cannot be determined when Lenin realized this practical implication of defeatism. He appears to have been preoccupied with this problem as early as the spring of 1915 while consulting the chief work of Carl von Clausewitz, On War. The profound impact of the Prussian military thinker on Lenin has been acknowledged.[109] Indeed, there hardly was another "Westerner", besides Marx and Engels, whom Lenin appraised so positively. Now, in the spring of 1915, he was particularly responsive to Clausewitz's conclusions on the behaviour and objectives of the conqueror in the defeated country.

For instance, inspired by Clausewitz, Lenin contemplated: "To destroy Streitkraft - to conquer das Land, why? In order to break the will of the enemy and make him sign a peace".[110] In another place he exultantly endorsed Clausewitz's idea about the conqueror coming into the enemy's country not to fight but to conclude a peace. He provided

this sentence with triple sidelines and a comment: "Ha, ha, this is ultrasmart".[111] Again, alluding to Clausewitz's observation that the signing of an armistice remarkably weakens the spirit of resistance of the defeated nation, Lenin concluded that the resumption of hostilities was unlikely once a country had pulled out of the war.[112]

Lenin was not an abstract thinker. Seen in the context of his objectives, Clausewitz's observations implied that peace would be both an attractive and realistic platform of the Russian revolutionaries. If anything, Russia was a country "aspiring" to defeat, and yet virtually unconquerable. Besides, it was no secret in 1915 that the Germans were striving for a peace with Russia, either by achieving an accord with the Tsar or by knocking Russia out of the war by the policy of Revolutionierung, revolutionizing. The Bolsheviks were one of the oppositional groups approached by the Central powers' agents in the first months of the war,[113] but firm contacts were apparently not then established. To Berlin and Vienna, the course of peace by revolutionizing was only a second alternative to a peace reached between the dynasties. After the autumn of 1914 Berlin had approached the tsarist court with several peace overtures without being rebuffed with any particular vehemence. The successful German offensive in the summer of 1915, however, changed the situation. The Tsar now feared a German hegemony on the continent and resolutely refused to consider a separate peace. In Berlin, interest consequently increased in the alternative course, revolutionizing.[114]

At this moment, in August 1915, when tsarist Russia seemed on the

verge of a collapse, the Germans were reminded of the possibility of concluding peace with the Russian revolutionaries. The hint came from Helphand-Parvus who now cooperated with the Germans on "revolutionizing" Russia. It is not without interest that despite the personal dissonance between him and Lenin, motivated more by similarities than contradictions of their revolutionary strategy,[115] Parvus became an unauthorized but tacitly tolerated champion of the Bolshevik cause in Berlin. On August 10, anticipating the outbreak of revolution in Russia, Parvus visited the German Minister in Copenhagen, Brockdorff-Rantzau, to assure him that distrust of the "perfidious Albion" was so strong in Russia and the country so paralyzed that the revolutionary government could conclude a separate peace with Germany.[116]

Although it would appear that Parvus had in mind primarily the Bolshevik party under the "revolutionary Russian government", he undoubtedly made this step spontaneously. Several weeks later, however, the German Minister in Switzerland, Romberg, was able to report to Berlin that specifically the Bolsheviks were ready "to conclude peace with us in the event of the revolution being successful". Romberg received this offer through two Estonians, Keskuela and Siefeldt, who came in 1915 to handle the incipient two-way traffic of money and information between the Germans and the Bolsheviks. While Keskuela, formerly a prominent Bolshevik in Estonia, maintained close contacts with the Germans, his friend Siefeldt in 1915 joined the Bolshevik party and participated in daily discussions of Lenin's circle.[117] Only through this channel could the two Estonians have received detailed information about the Bolshevik peace program which at that time was still neither written nor published.

The Romberg report outlined the Bolshevik peace platform in several points. In the key one, the Germans were offered a peace "without any consideration for France, but on the condition that Germany renounced all annexations and war reparations". This did not preclude the "possibility of separating those states of Russia which would serve as buffer states". The Bolsheviks also indicated that they would renounce claims to Constantinople and the Dardanelles and, to buttress their offer, they reportedly promised to move Russian troops into India after the conclusion of peace.[118]

Berlin was now confronted with a dilemma - either to utilize the Bolshevik peace offer for propagandistic purposes, or to wrap it "in an aura of great secrecy". State Secretary von Jagow opted for the latter: "If this becomes public, our work in Russia would become much more difficult and the measures against the revolutionaries would be tightened".[119] Never discussed in public, the Bolshevik offer of separate peace nevertheless remained in the background of the German-Bolshevik relations until the treaty of Brest Litovsk.

Only after Berlin had received without rebuffing the offer of a separate peace did Lenin and Zinoviev in the first half of October 1916 write and publish their informal program, "Several Theses", in which they for the first time raised and linked together two crucial issues, peace and Bolshevik rule. Naturally, as the document was designed to circulate in Russia, any direct reference to separate peace was a priori precluded.[120] The Bolsheviks indicated in two crucial paragraphs of "Several Theses" that it was possible for the "party of the proletariat"

to assume the leadership in the next Russian revolution and that peace would then be their first concern.[121] A democratic and universal peace clearly was not on their mind. Although they wrote in the well-known passage that they would "propose peace to all the belligerents on the condition that freedom is given to the colonies and all the people that are dependent, oppressed and deprived of rights," they added that the existing governments of Germany, Britain, and France would not accept this condition. What would follow ? Lenin and Zinoviev gave this ambiguous answer:

> In that case we would have to prepare for and wage a revolutionary war, i.e. not only resolutely carry out the whole of our minimum program, but to work systematically to bring about an uprising among all dependent countries in Asia...and also, first and foremost, we would raise up the socialist proletariat of Europe and despite the social chauvinists.[122]

The convoluted passage may create the impression of Lenin contemplating a war against Great Powers immediately after coming to power in the "weakest link of the capitalist chain". In effect, however, the Bolshevik leader did not entertain such a suicidal idea. The reference to revolutionary war was not meant as a guide to immediate action, although the Bolsheviks painted it as such. According to the testimony of Zinoviev, he and Lenin wrote the passage in belief that they would have to postpone the waging of revolutionary war due to the devastation of Russia. For this reason, Zinoviev recalled, they used the phrase "we would have to prepare for" a revolutionary war instead of saying straight "we would wage" a revolutionary war. And, writing this shortly after the conclusion of the separate peace treaty between the Bolsheviks and the Central Powers in March 1918, Zinoviev added that the recent events had substantiated the "worst expec-

tations" he and Lenin had had in 1915 while drafting "Several Theses".[123] The peace platform, as published in "Several Theses", indeed entailed separate peace; in effect, it constituted an 'edited' version of the Bolshevik offer the Germans had received several days earlier. Apparently, Lenin assumed as soon as 1915 that the 'party of the proletariat' would be able to seize and retain power during the war if it immediately issued an appeal for a democratic, universal peace and, having it rejected by the 'imperialist' governments, would conclude a separate peace with Germany. As will be seen, Lenin clearly contemplated this ingenious scheme during the 1917 revolution and came to implement it after the October uprising.[124]

The Bolsheviks made the offer of a separate peace to Berlin at the time of their increased cooperation with the German agents in revolutionizing Russia. In 1915 and 1916 the Bolsheviks undoubtedly also received German financial aid, although only modest sums could have been involved, corresponding to the generally modest scale of their activities prior to March 1917.[125] However, it would mean a degradation of Lenin's intellect if the Bolshevik contacts with Berlin and his offer of a separate peace were mistaken for mere opportunism. Suffice it to say at this point, that his interest in Germany also stemmed from his consistent overestimation of the German military machine. Already in 1915, he considered Germany to be "the best prepared and strongest" of all the belligerents.[126] When his friend, Inessa Armand, in 1916 expressed doubts about Germany's war capabilities, Lenin answered self-confidently that a German defeat was "possible because, after all, everything is possible, but it is not real".[127] In the autumn of 1916,

obviously under the impact of fresh Russian defeats, he already anticipated Germany's "semi-victory".[128] By the turn of that year he believed to have detected a "turn in the world politics". Germany was now able to impose its will upon the enemy's camp, Lenin predicted, giving Britain and her allies a chance "to hold out for another year or two".[129] Evidently, Lenin sought contacts and planned a separate peace with what he believed was the future victor of the European war.

Lenin's hopes in the Russian revolution were shattered by the fiasco of the Russian offensive of August 1916. In the autumn of 1916 the political climate in Petrograd changed in favour of the "doves" and a prospect re-emerged of a Russo-German rapprochement along dynastic lines. Consequently, Berlin lost interest in contacts with the Russian revolutionaries. The Bolshevik cooperation with Keskuela and Siefeldt was discontinued and Lenin again came to complain about the lack of finances.[130] Moreover, he now feared that the Tsar and the Kaiser were contemplating a separate peace. Tsarism, Lenin wrote in early November 1916, had correctly recognized that its war aims were unrealistic and therefore could not but seek a separate peace. Such a course was correct not only from the dynastic standpoint but also from the "general imperialistic point of view" since it would enable Russia to emerge from the war "with increased strength". And restating the correctness of the platform of the separate peace Lenin wrote appreciatively that tsarism "knows more and sees farther than the liberals, the Plekhanovs and the Potresovs".[131] From now on Lenin was haunted by the nightmare of a separate peace between Germany and tsarist Russia, considering it a watershed

in the entire war, a sort of Aladdin's lamp serving not only the interests of Russia but also of those who took it in their hands. He attached such a strong, almost mystical influence to a separate peace that even after the outbreak of the March revolution in 1917 he feared that the Tsar might save the throne by issuing a separate peace manifesto.[132]

With the outbreak of the March revolution the "grave-like stillness" in Europe and Lenin's profound skepticism came to an end. Like the Germans, Lenin evaluated the events in Petrograd as a temporary victory of the "avowed advocates and supporters of the imperialist war with Germany" contradicting Russia's interest in peace, freedom, and bread.[133] This restored the precarious unity of interest between Berlin and the Bolsheviks, a unity which was soon mirrored in the legendary trip of Lenin and other Russian revolutionaries to Russia via Germany and Scandinavia. On April 16, 1917, Lenin arrived in Petrograd, the capital of what he himself now regarded as the "freeest country of the world".

1917: "Socialism" in One Country

After the outbreak of the 1917 revolution Lenin came out with a new political vocabulary which seemed to signal a radical departure from his previous program and perception of the world. There were two aspects in particular which caused his contemporaries and scholars to question his grasp of reality and to believe in his shocking conversion to the doctrine of "permanent revolution".[134] There was, first, the call for the "second" revolution in Russia with socialist aims, and second, the claim that the Russian revolution would then be followed by the socialist revolution in the West. Thus Lenin, in the spring of 1917, unquestionably put Bolshevism into an international perspective. However, Lenin

was a remarkably consistent man. Was his "rearming" followed by a substantive revision of his ideas? It is noteworthy that his closest collaborator Zinoviev later resolutely denied that any "rearming" had ever taken place and emphasized the continuity of the "Swiss" program throughout the 1917 revolution.[135] Zinoviev's argument of the 1920's is essentially confirmed by an analysis of Lenin's program and strategy in the revolution.

To begin in medias res, it appears that Lenin in 1917 did not change his skeptical view of the socialist revolution in the West. The Bolshevik leader, to be sure, was in 1917 making fine distinctions between (political) revolutions, implying the hegemony of a non-proletarian class, the socialist or proletarian revolution, and world revolution, which "has begun in Russia" and embraced all kinds of future political and social transformations in the world, including the national-liberation revolutions in the East. As for (political) revolutions, Lenin in 1917 viewed their arrival in Western Europe as inevitable, but this did not extend to the socialist, proletarian, revolutions, to which he continued to refer in a conditional form. Let us note - to quote pars pro toto - the way in which Lenin in one of his most coherent and "internationalist" documents in April 1917 linked these two types with the Russian revolution.

Lenin on the theme of revolutions: "To the Russian proletariat has fallen the great honour of beginning the series of revolutions which the imperialist war has made an objective inevitability... [...] The objective circumstances of the imperialist war make it certain that the

revolution will not be limited to the first stage of the Russian revolution, and that the revolution will not be limited to Russia."[136] Lenin in the same document on the socialist revolution: the proletarian revolution started in Russia "can facilitate the rise of a situation in which...the European and American socialist proletariat, could join the decisive battles."[137]

Evidently, Lenin focussed his hope on the (bourgeois democratic) revolution in Europe for which there existed ready-made forces, especially in Germany. Yet the "iron vise of the military dictatorship" in the belligerent countries made him suspect that even this revolution could be delayed. "We do not know," he argued on the eve of the November coup, "how soon our victory will be followed by temporary periods of reaction and the victory of counterrevolution - there is nothing impossible in that..."[138]

Consequently, Lenin discarded the possibility of introducing in Russia the "workers' state" which presupposed the direct state assistance of the Western proletariat, and instead retained the concept of the "commune state" implying the necessity of reaching a modus vivendi with the peasantry.[139] This perspective was reflected in the Bolshevik agrarian program which called for the nationalization and subsequent distribution of the land, thereby postponing the socialization of agriculture into an indefinite future. By the same token, Lenin denied allegations that the Bolsheviks intended to introduce socialism by "skipping out" the bourgeois democratic stage. The building of classless society required an "entire historical period".[140]

Symptomatically, Lenin's economic program was notable for the almost total absence of socialist measures and for a strong emphasis on the principles of state capitalism. He expected the proletarian regime to hold only the key positions and to control Russia's economy through the banking system. This meant that the basis of the capitalist production and distribution would remain essentially intact.[141] In effect, in 1917 he built his program on the principles of state capitalism to which he had gravitated prior to the 1917 revolution, calling specifically for the introduction of various measures already taken in Western Europe, and particularly in Germany. In proletarian Russia it would mean inter alia a "supervision over the capitalists", "iron discipline", and control over production and distribution. Lenin clearly viewed the state capitalist course as especially suited to backward Russia: "The poorer a country is in technically trained forces, and in intellectual forces in general, the more urgent it is to decree compulsory association".[142] The Bolshevik leader followed the spirit of Engels' famous comment on the leader of an extreme party who, having seized power prematurely, is compelled to carry out the program of the class for whose domination the movement is then ripe. And just here lay one of the roots of Lenin's miscomprehended "rearming": the Bolshevik leader lacked a convenient term for the process of consummating the bourgeois democratic revolution under proletarian rule. Claiming that a true Marxist must not "cling to a theory of yesterday",[143] Lenin identified the terminal point of this unprecedented process with an attractive

and up-to-date word, "socialism".

There was a logic in this revisionist step. The rapidly growing economy and the socialization of production in the West prior to 1914 blurred in socialist thinking the distinction that Marx had made between the lower and higher stage of the socialist society. To many socialists, including Karl Kautsky and Lenin himself,[144] Western Europe and North America were economically ripe for socialism or communism (both terms had the same meaning). This meant in the context of Lenin's program that the implementation by the proletariat of the bourgeois democratic revolution, involving in 1917 the elevation of Russia's economy to the "socialist" standard of the West, was tantamount to building of socialism in the economic sphere.

However, the orthodox Marxists anticipated socialist revolution to take the form of a chain reaction, and their concept of socialism rested on the assumption that following such a victory, the "inherited" socialist economy would be supplemented by a truly democratic and pacifist superstructure. On the other hand, Lenin planned a "revolution in one country" and conceived world socialist revolution "not as a single act" (as he termed the chain reaction concept) but as a prolonged and turbulent process.[145] Hence his "socialism" precluded the introduction of the pacifist and democratic superstructure attributed to full-fledged socialism. Inevitably, such key aspects of his "socialism" as the concept of political dictatorship, the strict labour control and centralization, the retention of the repressive organs of the state and the army, contradicted the orthodox socialist principles of socialist democracy,

general disarmament, pacifism, and federalism. Socialism itself, as Lenin put it somewhat timidly, became "merely state capitalist economy which is made to serve the interests of the whole people and has to that extent ceased to be the capitalist monopoly."[146]

Consequently, the Bolshevik leader was now prone to define as "socialist" the revolution in a developing country as distinct to "bourgeois" revolutions in advanced countries: "The difference between a socialist revolution and a bourgeois revolution is that in the latter case there are ready-made forms of capitalist relationships; Soviet power - the proletarian power - does not inherit such ready-made relationships."[147] Thus Lenin in 1917 for the first time revamped the word "socialism", thereby subsequently providing an inspiration for a Pleiad of national leaders throughout the underdeveloped world who would try to mobilize their countries under this attractive banner to the task of building a modern industrial society essentially in a state capitalist way.

To complete this terminological reshuffle Lenin came in 1917, to denominate the orthodox concept of socialism as a "higher stage", a "complete" or "definite" victory of socialism, as a "fully developed" or "fully victorious" socialism, and by similar terms. It is important to realize that these inconspicuous formulae in fact denoted the socialist society after the victory of "socialism in one country" in all major advanced countries. Hence, only this higher stage of socialism - in State and Revolution Lenin identified it with Marx's term "communism" - would enable the introduction of the socialist superstructure, a dissolution of the organs of repression and armies, a withering-away of the

state, and the advent of universal peace.[148]

And it was just this "final victory" of socialism which Lenin, as Stalin later did, consistently referred to as impossible to reach by proletarian Russia alone. To quote from Lenin's most "internationalist" document of April 1917, the victory of the Russian proletariat would "start" the socialist revolution but "single-handed, the Russian proletariat cannot bring the socialist revolution to a victorious conclusion".[149] On the other hand, Lenin did not make the building of his "socialism" in Russia conditional upon the state assistance of the Western proletariat. In fact, although he anticipated that the final victory of socialism and world revolution would require an "entire historical period", he maintained, outlining the party's course in building the "socialist" society; that "no power on the earth" would prevent the Bolsheviks from retaining power until such a triumph.[150]

Lenin's redefinition of socialism also puts into a conventional light his 1915 idea of socialism in one country: it essentially denoted the consummation of the bourgeois democratic revolution under the proletarian hegemony - a task latent in Leninism since 1905. In fact, it has been overlooked by scholars that it was in the same year, 1915, that Lenin made a conscious decision to employ in the next Russian revolution the call for the "second", "socialist" revolution, chiefly to justify the quest of his party for power. Thus he and Zinoviev in "Several Theses" indicated to their followers in Russia that should the "social chauvinists" seize power, the Bolshevik party would remain in opposition and would agitate "for an alliance with the international proletariat,

for the socialist revolution".[151] This was precisely what Lenin did in April 1917 when confronted with the revolutionary government of "social chauvinists".

Indicative of Lenin's consistency is the fact that in the same year, 1915, he also resolved to utilize in the next Russian revolution the myth of an imminent socialist revolution in the West. Thus, in September 1915 he set out this line of the Bolshevik propaganda: "The proletarian internationalists desire the revolution in Russia for the sake of the proletarian revolution in the West, and simultaneously with that revolution...[...] In all its propaganda and agitation, and in all working class action, our party will...preserve the slogan on the socialist revolution in the West."[152] In these two laconic sentences was squeezed a "secret weapon" to be employed with the outbreak of the Russian revolution regardless of the actual state of affairs in Western socialism. Thus, when the Russian revolution seemed imminent after the Russian defeats in the summer of 1915, Lenin became notably "optimistic", observing the "growing crisis of the proletarian socialist revolution in the West."[153] Zinoviev, who also believed that the crisis in Russia matured "as fast as after the fall of Port Arthur", now greeted the new Russian revolution as opening "the age of the proletarian world revolution".[154] It will be recalled that simultaneously with these pronouncements Lenin discarded the feasibility of coordinated revolutionary actions and continued in evolving his program of the independent Russian revolution. When it became evident that the Russian revolution would not arrive, the two Bolsheviks returned to a sober tone and Lenin again

ridiculed Trotsky's "splendid theory".[155]

Under similar circumstances Lenin launched his "secret weapon" in 1917. In the months preceding the outbreak of the revolution he became very critical about the workers' movement in the West, about the "rottenness" of the socialist parties, and later even pronounced dead the only conceivable vehicle of the international revolution, the Zimmerwald movement.[156] Once the March revolution arrived, however, he promptly advanced the slogan of the socialist revolution in the West along with the call for the socialist revolution in Russia,and throughout 1917 manipulated the issue of world revolution almost exclusively according to his domestic exigencies, raising it to justify the "no-support" attitude towards the Provisional government,[157] to rebut the accusations of striving for separate peace,[158] and even to force his followers into the coup. And already in 1917 Lenin in this respect talked two different languages, of a propagandist and of a Realpolitiker. For example, preparing the ground for the coup, Lenin in October 1917 hammered at his followers in the central organ of the party:

> Mass arrests of party leaders in free Italy, and particularly the beginning of mutinies in the German army, are indisputable symptoms that a great turning point is at hand, that we are on the eve of a world-wide revolution... [...]Doubt is out of question. We are on the threshold of a world proletarian revolution.[159]

At the same time, Lenin in the narrow circle of the Central Committee argued that the Bolshevik victory could be followed by a temporary period of reaction and the victory of counterrevolution, and in fact pleaded for the retention of the minimum program of "socialism in one country".[160]

Conceived in 1915 as a stratagem of an independent proletarian revolution in Russia, the slogans of world revolution and socialism in Russia were launched in 1917 to facilitate the Bolshevik quest for power, but Lenin himself expected them to be consummated in the distant future.

November 1917: "Chances Are a Hundred to One"

The "war and peace" issue, as has been generally acknowledged, was the chief factor determining the course and pace of the Russian revolution.[161] Indeed, if the world war was the incubator of Bolshevism it was the program of peace that, more than anything else, brought Lenin and his party from the periphery of Russia's political life into power. When the March revolution broke out, Lenin reiterated his ambiguous peace formula put forward in "Several Theses". It also appears that the question of a separate peace was again discussed between the German and Bolshevik agents before Lenin's departure from Switzerland.[162] Back in Russia, Lenin showed but little desire to make his peace formula generally known. For instance, he inserted into the April Theses only the call for fraternization on the fronts,[163] and subsequently began to dissociate himself from the idea of revolutionary war, substituting for it the flimsy contention that the workers abroad would rise against those imperialist governments which might reject the Bolshevik offer of a democratic peace without annexations and indemnities.[164] Nevertheless, it became clear in the spring of 1917 as a former prominent Bolshevik, Woytinsky, has recalled, that Lenin's peace formula paved the road towards a separate peace.[165] But the Provisional government undertook no measures to curtail the Bolshevik propaganda.

In June 1917 Lenin even took the opportunity to unveil before a large audience the reverse side of his "peace without annexations and indemnities". Addressing the first Congress of Soviets, he denied that the Bolsheviks wished for a separate peace, yet he also indicated that this would result from an appeal for a general, democratic peace. "If you propose peace without annexations now, the Germans will accept and the British will not, because the British capitalists have not lost an inch of territory but have grabbed a plenty in every part of the world."[166] Several months later, after the seizure of power, Lenin himself would make a peace appeal of this nature.

Lenin made the foregoing allusion to the feasibility of a peace with Germany when it became known that a new Russian offensive was being prepared. The Bolsheviks were uncertain about its impact; Lenin himself maintained on June 19 that "whatever its outcome may be from the military point of view", it meant politically a strengthening of "imperialist morale" and militarism.[167] Two days later the Bolsheviks decided to "stir up" the soldiers and workers by a large demonstration in Petrograd. Although the demonstration was cancelled at the last minute, the Bolsheviks now considerably increased their activity, capitalizing chiefly on the restive Petrograd garrison which resisted any transfer to the front. A series of minor confrontations culminated on July 16 and 17 in large-scale street clashes between government forces and the rioting supporters of the Bolshevik party.[168]

Following the July disturbances the Bolsheviks were denounced in public as German agents and some of them were subsequently imprisoned.

Lenin and Zinoviev evaded arrest and went into hiding; the party worked for several weeks in semi-legality.[169] Yet in contrast to Lenin's prediction, with the failure of the Russian offensive, the desire for peace rapidly gained ground in the country and the charge of complicity with Germany in fact bolstered up the Bolshevik's cause, as Trotsky later admitted.[170] In the first half of September General Kornilov made an attempt to reverse this trend and to establish a strong regime, but failed. His abortive action had just the opposite result - it further demoralized the army and consolidated the position of the only peace party, the Bolsheviks. Lenin, observing the development in Russia from the Finnish capital Helsinki, now jettisoned the slogan of the armed uprising he had adopted after the July Days, and suggested that the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries, who had refused to join a Kadet cabinet, form a socialist government responsible to the Soviets. The Bolsheviks, he indicated, would remain loyal to such a coalition provided that the Constituent Assembly was convoked and freedom of their propaganda guaranteed. Peace, Lenin hinted, was a major but not too risky goal, since the Bolshevik party would provide contacts abroad: "In all civilized countries, civilized ministers value every agreement with the proletariat in wartime...They value it very, very highly."[171]

What was the source of Lenin's confidence in the "civilized countries"? He was undoubtedly alluding to the Bolshevik contacts in Stockholm with the agents of the German government and of prominent German politicians,[172] as well as to the current situation in Germany where, following the Russian July offensive, the Burgfrieden had been

seriously shaken and the Reichstag majority adopted a resolution in favour of a general democratic peace.[173] At the time when Lenin made his compromise proposal, the peace currents in Germany were also mirrored in Berlin's sympathetic reception of the papal peace appeal to the Western powers of August 1917.[174] Lenin concluded on September 8 that in contrast to the Anglo-French camp, the "German imperialists" were ready to hold peace negotiations.[175] This fact was recognized also by some Russian bourgeois politicians such as Baron Nolde who suggested that Russia now explore the chances of a peace with Germany.[176]

On the home front, two key Soviet organizations in Petrograd and Moscow adopted, on September 13 and 22 respectively, the Bolshevik resolutions for immediate peace, land reform, and workers' control.[177] However, the situation in general was marked by a growing indifference and lack of enthusiasm of the broader masses towards politics and politicians, including the Bolsheviks.[178] Lenin, whose strategy of revolution encompassed the factor of the political passivity of the Russian masses, now evidently believed that there was no serious obstacle on the home front for the seizure and retention of power, but was still not enthusiastic about a one-party rule. In a long and well elaborated article, written about September 25, he proposed an alliance to the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries which would introduce a firm Soviet dictatorship. Again, the most urgent task, as he saw it, was to pull Russia out of the war. That he reckoned with a separate peace is evident from his arguments. In his view, the rapprochement between the Anglo-French and the German imperialism was "impossible in practice",

but Russia's offer of a just peace would have a "hundred to one chance of achieving an armistice and peace" without further bloodshed. Moreover, Lenin maintained that a punitive action of the Western powers, an intervention in Russia, "is extremely difficult to realize and is not at all dangerous to us if only because of Russia's geographical position". He concluded that civil war was inevitable unless his proposal was accepted.[179]

Lenin's evaluation of the European scene was realistic. It became clear in the autumn of 1917 that not only the colonial issue, but also the clash of interests in Europe, particularly over Alsace-Lorraine and Belgium, precluded a rapprochement between Germany and the Allies. Consequently, new bellicose trends began gradually to prevail in both belligerent camps after September 1917. This led to a curtailment of the Reichstag activity in Germany in October 1917 and to the ascendancy of Clemenceau in November 1917 with his determination to prepare France for war until a victory was won.

The prospect of new struggles on the Western front increased Germany's interest in terminating the war in the East. Coincidentally, the Kornilov putsch had generated a deep domestic crisis in Russia, and particularly the Minister in Sweden, Lucius, began to supply the German Foreign Ministry with reports on the political instability and polarization of forces in Russia. Thus Lucius reported that the Bolshevik party and peace sentiments among the Russian population were gaining strength, and that according to the "best informed circles" in Petrograd, Kerensky was leaning towards the Soviets and contemplated a separate

peace. At the same time, however, he supplied Berlin with alarming reports about Kerensky's own weakness, the Allied attempts to reconcile him with Kornilov, and about the possibility of another anti-German coup of the Russian military.[180] Russia, an unidentified informer of Lucius wrote on September 15, was facing "serious events" which "must take place at the beginning of the winter."[181]

These reports also reached the German Supreme Command and impelled General Ludendorff to step up peace efforts in the East. In the middle of September the Germans began preparations for landing on three minor islands in the Gulf of Riga, Osel, Moon, and Dagoe. The purpose of the operation, as Ludendorff later admitted, was "to make a profound impression" on those in Petrograd who had "no idea of time and space".[182] In other words, this display of the German soldiers in the Baltic belonged to the measures designed to speed up Russia's march to peace. Concurrently, Ludendorff also indicated which political force in Russia he was banking on in his peace maneouvres: in a directive of September 24 he intimated that since Kerensky had as yet not demonstrated his sincere desire for peace, it remained the German task to support the Soviets, an institution which "resists the English influence" and "stands for an early peace". After considering the lesson of the Kornilov putsch, Ludendorff pleaded for "every, even the most radical means" which would forestall the restoration of Allied and Kadet influence in Russia.[183]

It was shortly after Ludendorff declared support for the "Soviets" that Lenin abruptly changed his tactic. Without waiting for the Mensheviks' and the Social Revolutionaries' reply to his proposal of a coalition government, the Bolshevik leader in two documents written

between September 25 and 27 summoned the party to the seizure of power by an armed uprising.[184] From this time on Lenin began to insist on a classical coup d'état regardless of the lack of support in the countryside, ("It is only our victory in the metropolitan cities that will carry the peasants with us"[185]), among the Russian public, ("It would be naive to wait for a 'formal' majority for the Bolsheviks"[186]), and even in the Bolshevik Central Committee.[187] He considered waiting for the second Congress of Soviets or for the Constituent Assembly "utter idiocy or sheer treachery", but realizing too that Petrograd was not ripe for the Bolshevik uprising, he suggested starting it in Moscow, in Finland, or in the Baltic fleet, and then conquering the capital from outside.[188]

Lenin's sudden and frenzied insistence on a coup still puzzles students of the Russian revolution. Indeed, it can hardly be explained in terms of Russia's domestic developments, to which Lenin allegedly responded. This leads some scholars to interpret Lenin's about-face of September 25-27 as a psychological revulsion caused either by his brain disease or by his extended period of isolation in Finland.[189] Yet as is indicated by the circumstances of this crucial decision, by his later assessment of the situation,[190] and by Trotsky's testimony,[191] Lenin responded chiefly to the international situation or, more specifically, to the prospect of peace on the European scene. One has to bear in mind that Lenin as a practical politician realized that the longing of the Russian masses for peace alone could not terminate the war; he considered Russia's unilateral withdrawal from the war unrealizable.[192]

In late September 1917, however, he found the situation ripe to seize power and to "straight away offer to all the belligerent peoples" an immediate general peace[193] - a move he expected to produce a separate peace. It is not surprising that his decision in favour of the coup may be linked to the concurrent German peace initiative in the East.

In his first summons of September 25-27 Lenin gave essentially two reasons for a speedy conquest of power. One of them was introduced with a verbal reference to the danger of a separate peace between Germany and Britain, but it was more of a tactical justification than a motive of his decision for coup. Throughout the 1917 revolution Lenin repeatedly discounted the feasibility of the Anglo-German rapprochement and he did so, as has been seen, even in his proposal of the socialist alliance written about September 25.[194] The tactical nature of this argument is so evident that even Soviet scholars have dropped the thesis about Lenin's belief in the "Anglo-German plot" and admit that his decision for the insurrection rested on the assumption that a peace and reconciliation between Germany and the Western powers was not feasible.[195] Indeed, it is evident that Lenin utilized the formula of a "separate peace between the British and the Germans" for the purpose of conveying to his colleagues in Petrograd an urgent message, namely that "the international situation <u>right now...is in our favor</u>. To propose peace to the nations right now means to win".[196] In another summons for the uprising Lenin was even more outspoken: "The chances are a hundred to one that the Germans will grant us at least an armistice. And to secure an armistice now would in itself mean to win the whole world".[197]

This was a novel phenomenon. Lenin had hitherto referred only to Germany's general interest in peace. Thus it was by September 25, concurrently with Ludendorff's decision to lend more support to the "Soviets", that Lenin became certain of the Bolshevik opportunity to reach a peace accord with Germany and promptly resolved to seize power and issue his ambivalent peace appeal.[198]

It appears, however, that Lenin had another specific reason for making his decision of September 25-27. After the fall of Riga to the Germans on September 3, 1917, the rumour spread about the impending threat to the Russian capital itself. Reacting to it, Lenin on September 12 set up a clear tactical line: "We shall become defencists only after the transfer of power to the proletariat...Neither the capture of Riga nor the capture of Petrograd will make us defencists".[199] Thereafter, with the approaching winter, the Germans stopped all ground operations against Russia. Lenin himself made no further mention of what was becoming a dead issue. However, as has been seen, in the latter part of September the Germans started clandestine preparations for landing on three islands in the Baltic with the purpose of accelerating Russia's march to peace. And it was during the process of these preparations that Lenin suddenly took up the issue of the impending "threat to Petrograd", arguing that this was exactly what the Bolsheviks were able to avert by taking power and issuing their peace appeal.[200] Neither now nor later, however, would Lenin add a word about the concrete danger to Petrograd, and the whole issue was temporarily forgotten on the very first day of the Bolshevik regime. It appears that he viewed the German naval

presence in the Baltic precisely as the Germans had hoped, namely as a time limited catalyst of peace currents in Russia.[201] The "threat to Petrograd" was not the cause but a justification of the coup, advanced in the moment when the real danger to Petrograd was practically negligible. And Lenin was too much a realist to adopt such a patriotic posture without expecting to have it in some way substantiated by subsequent developments. It may have happened that he was informed in late September 1917 by his agents in Stockholm about the impending naval operations in the Baltic and resolved to synchronize his quest for power and peace.[202] This, and his visualization since late September 1917 of a separate peace, can also explain such strange aspects of his political behaviour as his insistence on a coup regardless of the internal situation in Russia; his call for treating the insurrection as an art - as opposed to a strictly rational approach, as well as his emphasis on the passing uniqueness of the Bolshevik political fortune (the German naval operations in the Baltic had to be discontinued with the approaching winter and besides, Kerensky too might decide to make a separate peace).[203]

Lenin's impatience mirrored the situation as he saw it in Finland. The Bolshevik Central Committee in Petrograd, however, was obviously less well informed than Lenin about the foreign political niceties and lent them less importance. Lenin's colleagues did not share his view about the immediate necessity of an uprising; they assumed that the peace currents would inevitably prevail in Russia and that peace would be concluded by a socialist coalition. Ironically, however, a part of the Russian political elite now adopted a wait-and-see attitude with the

intention of letting the Bolsheviks test the chances of peace and eventually execute the disgraceful mission of pulling the country out of the war.[204] This, as Lenin called it, "enormous vacillation" among the enemy and petty bourgeoisie even further increased his determination,[205] but it had the opposite impact on his colleagues. For instance, challenged by the socialists for not being ready to take power and carry out the Bolshevik program, the central organ of the Bolshevik party, edited by Stalin, indicated on October 11 that the party would consider only an organized united front: "We are not the party striving for power."[206] Lenin's summons for the uprising had been ignored by the Central Committee for almost a month, until October 23. Kamenev and Zinoviev disapproved of the uprising until the last days, pointing out in their famous letter that neither the majority of the Russian people nor the international proletariat was on the Bolshevik side.[207]

Lenin's putschist tactic was for a similar reason questioned by the party newcomer, Leon Trotsky. For him the "permanent revolution" remained throughout the 1917 revolution a vision which he did not wish to abandon. After his return to Russia in May 1917 he rejected a merger with the "rearmed" Bolshevik party and switched to a militant course, hoping that the Russian revolution would give a "powerful stimulus" particularly to the German revolution.[208] Following the abortive July offensive, Trotsky assumed that the revolution in Russia could be saved only by creating a solid socialist dictatorship,[209] and joined the Bolshevik party pursuing the same goal. Yet, for more than two months, Trotsky advocated not peace but armed resistance to Germany placing his

hope upon a revolutionary echo in the Central powers. It was only in the latter part of October that, visibly shaken by the disintegration of the Russian army, he accepted the Bolshevik peace slogan.[210]

In turn, Trotsky became in the autumn of 1917 one of the chief architects of the Bolshevik tactic[211] which, ignoring Lenin's summons, was directed towards a legitimate transition of power to the Soviets, and towards securing the broadest possible domestic basis. It was only after the confidential negotiations with Kerensky failed and the latter decided on lukewarm countermeasures against the Bolsheviks that the latter on November 6 and 7 took power in the Russian capital and formed a provisional revolutionary government.

Isaac Deutscher has suggested that both Lenin and Trotsky seized power believing in the maturing world revolution. In his view, "it may be wondered whether Lenin and Trotsky would have acted as they did...if they had taken a soberer view of international revolution".[212] In fact, however, the two leaders decided to take power and seek an accord with the capitalists just because they took a sober view of the West. Lenin and Trotsky concurred not on the platform of the "permanent revolution" and revolutionary war, but in their efforts to save the isolated Russian revolution by giving it peace. However, while Trotsky could in November 1917 subscribe to the view of the Montagne: "Périsse notre nom pourvu que la liberté soit sauvée", Lenin consciously crossed the Rubicon to materialize his idea of an independent Russian revolution.

CHAPTER II

A QUEST FOR PEACE AND COEXISTENCE, NOVEMBER 1917-MARCH 1918

In intellectual terms the Bolsheviks never constituted a homogeneous body. Upon coming to power, their differences flared up fully and were projected into Soviet policies. The Brest dispute within the Bolshevik party revolved around the question of peace but involved broader problems of the foreign-political orientation and strategy of the revolution. Skeptical of the revolutionary potential in the West, Lenin had adopted a defensive strategy intending to secure his government behind a "triple line of trenches"[1] and in cooperation with the German world. Peace with Central powers constituted a means of achieving these goals.

A Separate Peace: Democratic or Annexationist?

In the first weeks of the Soviet regime Lenin, now an unchallenged policy-maker, initiated a number of measures regulating various aspects of Russia's economic, political, and private life. Some of them were innovative or long overdue, others, to paraphrase Trotsky, served rather the purpose of erecting "revolutionary monuments".[2] Similarly ambivalent was Lenin's approach to the problem of peace. The "Decree on Peace", adopted on November 8, 1917, by the second Congress of Soviets called upon all the belligerent peoples and their governments immediately to start negotiations for a just peace without annexations and indemnities. As has been seen, however, Lenin expected this formula to produce a separate peace between Russia and Germany. Moreover, the document stressed that the proposal of a democratic peace was not meant as an ultimatum, and twice stated the Soviet readiness to consider any other peace terms.[3] The Decree left the door wide open for a separate, undemocratic peace with Germany.[4]

Concurrently with the renunciation of secret diplomacy in the "Decree on Peace" the Bolshevik representatives in Stockholm intensified their secret contacts with the German Legation in Sweden. Upon receiving reports on the Bolshevik intention to secure an armistice as soon as possible, Lucius on November 8 asked the German Foreign Ministry for two million marks.[5] His request was promptly granted. In turn, Lucius was able to report on November 11 that the Bolsheviks in Stockholm assumed, "obviously on the ground of previous consultations", that the Soviet government would be ready to conclude a separate peace.[6] Acting perhaps on a directive from Petrograd[7] Radek and Hanecki three days later charged Helphand-Parvus with ascertaining in Berlin the German attitude towards peace and with securing the support of the German Social Democrats for the Bolsheviks.

Meanwhile the German government had welcomed the Bolshevik coup assuming that it would lead to peace between the two countries.[8] State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry Kühlmann found it inadvisable for the Central powers to make any offer of peace but assured prominent Reichstag deputies on November 14 that "as soon as Russia suggests an armistice, directly or indirectly, she can have it at once".[9] He also requested General Ludendorff to undertake no major operations against Russia, and received an affirmative reply.[10] Parvus was assured after his arrival to Berlin of financial assistance for the Bolsheviks; in turn he indicated that the Bolsheviks were ready to make territorial concessions in the peace treaty and resume economic cooperation.[11]

The Majority Socialists, who regarded the Bolshevik coup as

"ein wahres Gottesgeschenk" (a real gift of the God),[12] asked Parvus to assure Petrograd that the common goal, a peace between Germany and Russia, could be attained by peaceful, non-revolutionary methods.[13] With a message of the Majority Socialists' sympathy to the Bolsheviks Parvus left for Stockholm.

The Bolshevik trio in Stockholm received the encouraging details of "comrade Parvus'" fact-finding mission to Berlin on November 16. They immediately let Lucius know that, in their view, a general peace was not feasible, and that the Bolsheviks were determined to conclude without delay a "peace, eventually a separate peace".[14] Thereafter the trio split: while Vorovsky stayed in Stockholm to conduct further negotiations with the Germans, his friends Radek and Hanecki promptly left for Petrograd.

Meanwhile, confronted with the rising opposition to the coup and the vacillations of his colleagues, Lenin restated on November 16 the possibility of a "coalition within the Soviets", provided that the land and peace program was further implemented: "All talk about the Bolsheviks refusing to share power...is absolutely false."[15] Upon learning the results of Parvus' mission to Berlin, however, his self-confidence noticeably increased.[16] On November 20 in a remarkably optimistic document he alluded to the possibility of including the Left Socialist Revolutionaries in the government, but did not exclude the prospect of a purely Bolshevik government - an idea which still must have appeared very unorthodox to his colleagues.[17] Lenin's government now also decided to take the first concrete step towards peace with Germany, but entrusted

its execution to the non-Bolshevik Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, General Dukhonin. He was directed on November 20 to approach the German Command on the Eastern front with the proposal of a three months' armistice.[18]

Concurrently, the Bolsheviks made a step towards what Lenin called a "complete break" with the Allies. On November 22 Pravda began the much heralded publication of the secret agreements which had been concluded among the Allies earlier in the war. This unilateral action was clearly offensive to the Allies.[19] The Bolsheviks became even more intransigent towards the Western powers upon receiving on November 27 a direct German offer of armistice talks. In a note to the Allies of November 27 Trotsky for the first time spelled out what had been widely expected, namely that the negative attitude of the Allied governments would not stop the Bolsheviks concluding a separate peace.[20] The next day the Soviet Government, Sovnarkom, reiterated the Bolshevik determination eventually to conclude a separate peace and gave the Allied governments and peoples five days to define their attitude towards peace negotiations.[21] The Bolsheviks also embarrassed the British by a stirring appeal to the peoples of the East inter alia urging the Moslem population of India "to throw off the robbers and enslavers of your countries".[22]

Meanwhile the armistice talks opened on December 2 at Brest Litovsk between the Soviets and the Quadruple Alliance consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Interrupted for a week in order formally to give the Allies time to join them, the talks were concluded

on December 15 with an armistice agreement valid for one month and thereafter until seven days' notice was given by either side.[23] The armistice prohibited the transfer of German troops to the Western front, but this clause was of little practical value.[24] Both sides also agreed to open peace negotiations within a week.

There was no unity among the Germans as to their peace terms. While the German Supreme Command demanded the attachment of Lithuania and Courland to Germany, and the establishment of a Polish state in a special relationship with Berlin, State Secretary Kühlmann advocated a more flexible formula stressing the formal right of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland to self-determination. Although the German peace delegation headed by Kühlmann left for Brest Litovsk without a guideline, the Germans were not going to commit themselves in a meaningful way to the principle of self-determination.[25]

The German annexationist designs regarding the Baltic regions and Lithuania had been noticed by the Bolsheviks prior to the November coup. Some of them, especially Lenin anticipated that those territories would indeed fall into the German orbit. Thus the "Decree on Peace" stated emphatically the Bolsheviks' readiness to consider any peace terms beyond the democratic ones.[26] This might not have been the view of the entire Bolshevik leadership, but there was obviously a general consent to secession of any nation from Russia if sanctioned in the all-national plebiscite.[27] It is noteworthy that the Bolsheviks expected the population of the Baltic regions to vote in favor of the separation from Russia.[28]

Thus, when the peace talks started on December 22, the head of the Soviet delegation Ioffe presented a guideline for a general democratic peace presupposing a free referendum for the national groups not enjoying political independence.[29] After two days the Central powers in a skillful move accepted the Bolshevik declaration as a platform of a general peace. During the following discussion, however, the Bolshevik delegation came to believe that the Central powers were also willing to observe the principle of self-determination when making peace with Russia and immediately to withdraw their troops from the occupied territories in the East.[30] This surprising but, in fact erroneous assessment, was received in Petrograd with surprise and triumphant enthusiasm. On December 26 the Sovnarkom appropriated two million rubles for the left wing of the workers' movement in all countries,[31] and the next day Pravda triumphantly reported on the German "surrender", allowing itself to urge the Allied soldiers to rise "in the interests of peace and socialism" against their governments.[32]

To clarify the misunderstanding, General Hoffmann on December 26 informally told Ioffe that, in the German view, Russian Poland, Courland, and Lithuania had already expressed their will to be separated from Russia, and that their future would be determined in bilateral talks between the representatives of these regions and the Central powers. This was a harsh awakening, but the Soviet delegation promptly adopted a more realistic stand and on December 27 proposed a simultaneous withdrawal of the Russian and the Central powers' armies from all the occupied territories in the East, followed by plebiscites.[33] This proposal

was not acceptable to the Central powers who in a declaration of December 28, indicated that the separation of Poland, Courland, and Lithuania was a fait accompli, and that the German troops there would be withdrawn only at a later date. Thus it became obvious that the Germans were determined to consolidate their positions in the East under the cover of self-determination, but in disregard of world opinion and the Bolsheviks themselves. At this point, the conference was adjourned until January 8.

By the turn of the year, the results of the Bolshevik drive for peace were very meagre. Outside Russia, the Bolshevik efforts were welcomed only in the countries of the German orbit. In the Allied and neutral countries, public opinion was strongly against Lenin and his party; and not only because of class antipathy. The Bolsheviks were regarded as reckless gamblers whose policy helped only the German military clique. For the same reason, they had become unpopular in the workers' movements of the Allied countries, even among the future communists.[34] Moreover, the Bolsheviks alienated themselves even from the German radical socialists who feared that a separate peace would prolong the war on other fronts and seriously hamper the revolutionary movement in Germany.[35] The credibility of the Bolsheviks also suffered by the revelation of their secret contacts with the German diplomats in Stockholm, as well as by their controversial conduct of peace talks in Brest-Litovsk.[36] In Russia, large segments of the public, including the socialist fellow-travellers, now viewed the Brest negotiations as a farce played according to a German scenario. Maxim Gorky, at times a Bolshevik sympathizer and Lenin's friend, in January 1918 published in his paper Novaia zhizn'

(New Life) the accusation of the German socialist Eisner that, having accepted German money, the Bolsheviks had become slaves by this heedless step.[37]

In this situation Lenin, upon receiving information about German expansionist claims, concluded that a plain drive for peace could be counter-productive, and decided on a revision of Soviet tactics. The Sovnarkom, on his initiative, adopted on December 31 several well-harmonizing measures. First, to improve the Bolshevik image at home and abroad, it was resolved to drag on peace negotiations with the Central powers, and Trotsky, a talented debater, was appointed the new head of the Soviet peace delegation.[38] The Soviet government also requested a transfer of the conference from Brest Litovsk to neutral Stockholm, but the Central powers flatly rejected this request.

Second, Lenin and the Sovnarkom decided on December 31 to step up Soviet propaganda vis-à-vis Germany. From early January the Petrograd centre for propaganda produced large quantities of various leaflets and of the paper Die Fackel (The Torch), designed for circulation among German workers and soldiers. However, it is noteworthy that now, as throughout the entire Brest period, Soviet propaganda was essentially defensive, appealing not for revolution but for assistance in making peace.[39] It is therefore not surprising that the Bolshevik materials were freely distributed in Germany and among the German soldiers at least until the rupture of the peace talks on February 10.[40]

Third, in late December 1917 the Soviets adopted a more aggressive policy towards the seceded parts of the Russian empire, particularly,

Belorussia, Estonia, and Bessarabia.[41] In early January 1918 the Red troops also began to advance in the Ukraine, which was governed by a moderate socialist government, known as Rada. They took the capital city Kiev but the action proved a political blunder since it drove the Rada into the embrace of Germany. In late January 1918, after the German expansionist aims had crystallized, the Commissar for Nationalities Stalin promulgated a new nationalities policy which in fact negated the democratic principles that the Bolsheviks had advocated so vehemently at Brest Litovsk. It denied the small nations the right to self-determination by an all-national plebiscite and subordinated the principle of self-determination to the principle of struggle for socialism.[42] Carrying out this policy, the Finnish Bolsheviks and the Russian Red guards on January 28 seized power in Helsinki and subsequently established a Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic, headed by Otto Kuusinen. The Bolsheviks however failed to get hold over the northern part of Finland and in the middle of March, after several weeks of civil war, Lenin's government decided to withdraw Russian troops and warships which had been supporting the Finnish Reds. Meanwhile the Finnish non-socialist government had signed a treaty with the Germans whose expeditionary force subsequently helped it back to power. The Red forces in Finland finally surrendered on May 9.[43] The first phase of the Soviet efforts to expand the revolution ended in a total failure.

Furthermore, Lenin's government in late December 1917 revised its policy of severing ties with the Entente powers. No offensive statements or appeals to revolution were issued in Petrograd until March 15, and

even Lenin established loose contacts with the Allied agents and representatives. The Soviet government also decided in late January to send a group of prominent Bolsheviks into Western Europe with the purpose, as Pravda stated, of "informing the governments and peoples of the Allied countries about the course of peace negotiations".[44] The mission, however, encountered suspicion and animosity both in the Allied and the German camps, and failed to produce any tangible results.[45]

Apart from instituting a new tactical line, however, Lenin proved unyielding in his quest for peace. Upon being informed about the German annexationist designs, he decided on December 31 merely to procrastinate, but not to discontinue peace negotiations. Between January 6 and 9, on Christmas vacation in Finland, he noted down several theses which betrayed his determination to accept a separate peace on the German terms.[46] Back in Petrograd, he told on January 10 the same to the French sympathizer, Captain Sadoul.[47] Obviously anticipating resistance to a separate peace, Lenin subsequently initiated and approved of several repressive measures,[48] the most important of which concerned the only Constituent Assembly in Russian history.

It appears that Lenin himself was inclined to retain the Constituent Assembly as a sort of democratic façade of the Soviet dictatorship, provided that it accepted the program of land, workers' control, and above all peace. Sanctioning the convocation of the Assembly on December 24 or 25, 1917, he again singled out the problem of peace as "particularly acute" and noted in this regard a discrepancy between the attitude of the Assembly and the "actual will of the people".[49] It may be noted

at this point that the Social Revolutionaries of various shades, who constituted the majority of the Assembly, were rather pro-Allied and their acceptance of a separate peace with Germany was unlikely. Indeed, when the Constituent Assembly convened on January 18, it approved Bolshevik domestic policies, but strongly criticized the Brest peace talks and resolved to conduct further peace negotiations and work towards a general democratic peace.[50] Lenin, ready to conclude separate peace on German terms, could consider the foregoing statement only as a challenge to his foreign policy and to Bolshevik rule itself. The Constituent Assembly was not permitted to reconvene either on January 19 or later. Thus Lenin had liquidated a rival institution but his foreign policy was about to be challenged by the Bolshevik party itself.[51]

Foreign Relations: With Whom?

The Bolshevik seizure of power and peace appeal barely stirred any echo in the Western workers' movement; Russia remained the only country of revolution. This fact surprised neither Lenin nor the moderate Bolsheviks who motivated their opposition to a single party rule precisely by this lack of the revolutionary prospect in the West. Confronted with a fait accompli, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, and other moderates gradually accepted Lenin's defensive policy and became his faithful supporters. The Left wing, whatever illusions they might entertain, after the November coup came to share much of Lenin's sober view of the contemporary Western socialism,[52] although they still considered the existence of a single proletarian regime in Russia inconceivable and continued to advocate a revolutionary policy.

Trotsky's casual remark that his task as Foreign Commissar was to "issue a few manifestos and close the shop" cannot obscure the fact that, as in the autumn of 1917, he continued to visualize anything but a speedy arrival of "permanent revolution". Consequently he conceded after the coup that the Russian revolution had "proved inadequate to shove the party on the road of the political offensive" and endorsed the policy of pursuing the Russian national interest, especially the pursuit of peace.[53] Given the subdued atmosphere in Petrograd, it is not surprising that it was just the intellectual father of "permanent revolution", Trotsky, who enunciated as early as November 22, 1917, the Soviet desire for "coexistence and cooperation of the peoples".[54]

Coexistence was also Lenin's objective, but his concept in 1917 rested on very specific and subjective premises. Unable to foresee world revolution, the Bolshevik leader anticipated that Soviet Russia would not remain neutral in the coming years. In effect, he accepted the necessity of alignments and closer relations with one belligerent camp.[55] Either Germany or Britain, he put it defensively in one of his key documents, "we cannot tear ourselves entirely free from an alignment with one or other capitalist side and will never be entirely able to do so until world capitalism has been overthrown".[56]

Out of the two powers Lenin clearly preferred Germany, the country which impressed him by its dynamism and wartime achievements. "The German imperialism", he in 1916 wrote in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, "is younger, stronger, and better organized than the British imperialism, is superior to it".[57] Moreover, Lenin was attracted to German Kriegswirtschaft, war economy, amalgamating the private

and state interests "into a single mechanism and bringing tens of millions of people within the single organization of state capitalism".[58] Since he himself advocated a similar organization for Russia, Germany became for him the source of inspiration. Several years before Stalin was to define the Soviet system as a combination of the "Russian revolutionary sweep" and "American efficiency", Lenin in 1917 declared the "Junker-capitalist state" of Germany to be a model for revolutionary Russia.[59]

Moreover, Lenin appears to have realized another fact meaningful to his own program, namely that unlike the Allied imperialism, the German capitalism was oriented more towards trade than the export of investments, and that it sought economic markets rather than a direct political influence. The German capitalism therefore seemed more cooperative than the Allied one.[60] This, and the growing influence of the German socialists in German politics suggested that even proletarian Russia could have in Germany as competent a trade partner and supplier of technical know-how as the Russian monarchy had.

Furthermore, it is obvious that the United States' entry into the war in April 1917 did not change Lenin's perception of the world and his estimation of the war. In his view, American involvement in the European conflict could be only marginal due to the "considerable freedom" and lack of the militaristic spirit in America, and due to the American-Japanese rivalry. Looking too far ahead, he assumed that the United States had entered the war only to prepare a standing army for a conflict with Japan.[61] Consequently, Lenin continued to underestimate the war

capacities of the anti-German coalition, as most of his compatriots did. In October 1917, so Kerensky later maintained, the Russian public was "at one with the Bolsheviks in regarding an Allied victory as an impossible proposition".[62]

In this atmosphere the Bolsheviks seized power and began to implement, as Lenin called it, a revolution against Kerensky, bourgeoisie, and "Anglo-French finance capital".[63] Such steps of this "revolution" as a publication of secret treaties, inflammatory appeals to the Allied nations and peoples of the East, and separate armistice and peace negotiations, deliberately insulted a belligerent camp which in Lenin's view was incapable of causing any harm to Russia, and which he did not hold in any particular esteem.

On the other hand, Lenin in the very first day of his government indicated to the future peace partner that he would welcome in the peace treaty "all clauses containing provisions for good neighbourly relations and all economic agreements".[64] Since German policy was not ideologically motivated either, Berlin responded promptly to Lenin's overtures. Within fourteen days the Bolshevik representative in Stockholm, Vorovsky, discussed with the German politicians and diplomats the problems of economic and political cooperation. The Kaiser himself spoke in late November 1917 about a new Russo-German alliance.[65] A month later, long before the separate peace was concluded, a strong German trade and naval delegation arrived in Petrograd, headed by the prominent economist Helfferich and by General von Keyserlingk.[66] It was becoming evident that Lenin utilized the peace issue as a vehicle for forging cooperation

and friendship with Germany.

Lenin's concept of foreign relations and coexistence met with the vehement disapproval of Trotsky and the Left wing of the party. In their view, peace and cooperation with Imperial Germany was harmful to the cause of international socialism, discredited the Soviet government, and offset the chances of the German revolution. In the final account, however, Trotsky and the Left Communists seem to have rejected Lenin's Brest policy for very practical reasons.

That Germany was presently the strongest belligerent was hardly doubted by anyone in the party. Unlike Lenin, however, Trotsky and the Left Communists disputed the material and human resources, the capacity of endurance, and the internal coherence of the Central powers, particularly of Austria-Hungary. This can be related to the fact that the younger and more open-minded generation of Trotsky and the Left Communists did not share Lenin's predilection for Germany and perceived the world from a broader angle. In their view it was particularly the United States which had a lot to say in the war and in the future world. Among the Left Communists such perceptive intellectuals as Karl Radek, the historian Pokrovsky and the economist Preobrazhensky openly advocated cooperation and friendship with the United States; others such as Bukharin, Kollontay, and Volodarsky either had lived in or visited the New World.[67]

As for Trotsky, those few months he had spent in the United States in the winter 1916-1917, after being deported from Spain, seem to have profoundly marked his Weltanschauung. The economic prosperity, dynamism,

and resourcefulness of the American society came to him, in his own words, as a "complete revelation".[68] He immediately began a study of American foreign trade and concluded from the impressive growth of American exports that the country would intervene in the war and play a decisive role in the post-war world.[69] A year later, during the Brest crisis, the United States' role in the war still remained to be seen, but Trotsky evidently thought and acted under the influence of his American experience.[70] Trotsky, as Ambassador Francis has aptly remarked, envisaged the outcome of the war more correctly than Lenin did.[71] In other words Trotsky and some Left Communists feared that Lenin, by his pro-German policy, might be betting on a loosing horse.[72]

In variance with Lenin, Trotsky wanted to "strengthen and develop the most friendly relations with the democracies of all countries".[73] In his search for a balanced foreign policy, Trotsky already in the fall of 1917 established good working contacts with the Allied representatives and agents in Russia, particularly with Colonel Robins from the American Red Cross. As will be seen, between February and May 1918 he repeatedly tested the Allied willingness to cooperate militarily with Soviet Russia against Germany. However, these overtures for military cooperation, unlike his search for friendship of Western powers, were not entirely serious. As he later admitted, he aimed in 1918 at giving the Allies no pretext for an eventual intervention against the Soviet regime in the future.[74] Curiously, although Trotsky and Lenin were two poles apart in terms of foreign political orientation, the former shared Lenin's view that peace was indispensable to Soviet Russia. Thereby

Trotsky diverged from the Left Communists who also rejected Lenin's "German" orientation but did not consider peace absolutely essential. In the coming infra-party dispute the anti-Leninist opposition would lack a common platform and leadership.

Although some Left Communists voiced their opposition to Lenin as early as November 1917, shortly after Lenin's government indicated its willingness to conclude a separate peace,[75] the organized opposition came into being only in January 1918, being obviously triggered particularly by the course of the Brest talks. The Brest conference reopened on January 9, 1918, definitely without the Western powers' participation. Seizing upon this fact, the German State Secretary Kühlmann declared null and void all previous statements of the Central powers regarding universal peace. The discussion, marked by the Trotsky-Kühlmann verbal duel, was now focused on the problem of the German-occupied territories in the East. In an attempt to find a plausible formula the Soviet delegation on January 12 submitted to the conference a plan which, face-saving in the Soviet view, complied to a large extent with the German platform.[76] But the Central powers' delegation had become more intransigent after the arrival in Brest Litovsk of a delegation of the Ukrainian Rada, and General Hoffmann rejected the sensible Soviet proposal. The Germans might still fear that the Soviets would break off negotiations when confronted with harsh terms. On January 16, however, the German Supreme Command received a secret report to the effect that Trotsky was inclined to accept the German peace terms, even if by declaring a state of "no war no peace".[77] Two days later, on January 18,

General Hoffmann finally dared to submit to the Bolshevik delegation a map showing a line behind which the German armies had no intention of withdrawing. The line virtually left on the German side the whole Polish, Lithuanian and Belorussian territory, and the western part of Latvia, including the capital Riga.[78] Trotsky, anything but surprised, requested another break in negotiations and left for Petrograd.

The evidence of German expansionist aims prompted a policy confrontation in the highest executive organ of the party, the Central Committee. In Lenin's view, the time had arrived for yielding to the German demands. On January 20 he wrote a broadly conceived plea for a separate peace with the Central powers.[79] He began by indicating that the socialist revolution in Russia was assured by domestic forces; the socialist transformations required a "fairly long time" but were feasible; the revolution in the West was necessary only for the "final victory" of socialism.[80] Hence, as long as it was impossible to predict the outbreak of the revolution in the West, he argued, Soviet foreign policy should be determined by the interests of the Russian revolution.[81] Approaching the problem of peace from this standpoint, Lenin asserted that the Soviet government had to sign a peace treaty immediately: "We have done everything possible and impossible to deliberately protract the negotiations," he impatiently argued after only ten days of procrastinating at Brest Litovsk.[82]

Addressing himself to the alternative road, revolutionary war, Lenin recalled that no pledge had been given to start it without considering its feasibility. "We said that in the era of imperialism a socialist

government had to prepare for and wage a revolutionary war," he wrote referring to his peace formula of 1915. A "really revolutionary war," he alluded to the same formula, "would be a war waged by a socialist republic against the bourgeois countries, with the aim...of overthrowing the bourgeoisie".[83] In the present relation of forces between Russia and Germany, however, the Soviet regime would be fighting only for the "liberation of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland". Besides, Lenin argued, revolutionary war would again tie Russia with the Allies: "Even if we did not take a single kopek from the Anglo-French, we nevertheless would be helping them...by diverting part of the German army".[84] At the same time Lenin realized that a separate peace would increase "chauvinist intoxication" in Germany and bring Soviet Russia into the German orbit but this development was in harmony with his concept of coexistence. As has been pointed out, he did not expect the Soviet state to remain neutral in the foreseeable future.

On January 21, 1918, Lenin read his "theses" on separate peace at a meeting of prominent Bolsheviks and Soviet delegates, but was rebuked. The anti-German sentiments in Russia had meanwhile been boosted by President Wilson's "fourteen points" which, sympathetic towards the Bolshevik efforts to resist the German expansionist designs, promised an Allied assistance to the Russian people.[85] In any case, most of the participants of the meeting now favored a discontinuation of the Brest talks and resumption of war against Germany.[86]

The concept of revolutionary war, advocated by Lenin's opponents, appears more realistic than Lenin himself was ready to admit and than

is assumed by some scholars.[87] The chief proponents of revolutionary war, in the Bolshevik party, the Left Communists, assumed that Germany, due to her difficult internal situation and the planned military offensive on the Western front, was unable to resume large-scale military operations against Russia. Hence, they argued that the Soviet government should and could resist an eventual German advance with a small army of volunteers and partisan units, even if it presupposed a temporary retreat eastwards and a creation of a new industrial basis in the Ural region. Some left Communists also wished for a military and material assistance of the Allies. (Stalin would materialize this idea in world war II.) In addition, the Left Communists anticipated that the resumption of hostilities would aggravate the internal situation in Austria-Hungary and help to re-establish the role of the German Reichstag. Both events would make the Central powers more willing to accept a democratic separate peace.[88]

Although the Left Communists' position was sound in principle, the advocacy of a war against Germany, presumably the strongest belligerent country, could evoke in the war-weary Russia as little enthusiasm as the call for an annexationist peace. Thus, it is not surprising that the proponents of a revolutionary war in the Central Committee always remained in a minority after January 21. When the Central Committee met on January 24, Lenin was again strongly criticized. Uritsky, for instance, argued that Lenin, as in 1915, now approached the problems only from the Russian, not international, standpoint. But the Left Communists, including Bukharin, now were in favor of dragging out the Brest negotiations, and Lenin complied with this view. The Central Committee adopted

by 12 votes to one his own motion for dragging out the peace negotiations until the ultimate acceptance of the German terms. The Central Committee also passed by 9 votes to 7 Trotsky's formula of "no war, no peace" calling for terminating the war without a formal peace treaty.[89] Trotsky and Lenin subsequently reached a "gentlemen's agreement" according to which the Soviet delegation would sign peace "under bayonets". Having thereby in essence adopted Lenin's position, Trotsky left Petrograd for Brest Litovsk late on the night of January 26.[90]

Meanwhile the Bolsheviks had experienced a tangible, though indirect, echo of their procrastinating tactic. Since the middle of January a strike movement had been spreading throughout Austria-Hungary and Germany. The strikers had raised such specific demands as an immediate and democratic peace, universal suffrage, and an improvement in living conditions. The strike movement reached impressive proportions. By January 29, when 400,000 workers struck in Berlin, Germany seemed on a verge of internal collapse.[91]

It is widely assumed that the Bolsheviks consistently misjudged and overrated the revolutionary potential in the West. The January strikes have justly been called the "biggest revolutionary movement of properly proletarian origin in the modern time".[92] How did the Bolsheviks in fact respond?

Their reaction established a precedent for their treatment of subsequent spontaneous proletarian actions abroad. The Pravda headlines from late January 1918 would suggest that they saw the socialist millenium as imminent. January 25: "The Red Flag of the Communist Revolution is

Raised in Europe". January 27: "The International Workers' Revolution is Going Forward". February 1: "The Conflagration of the World Proletarian Revolution is Spreading...The Destruction of Capitalism is Inevitable. The Sun of Socialism is Rising".[93] In public, then, the reaction was glowing and optimistic. In private, however, the Bolsheviks evaluated the strikes very soberly. In Trotsky's words, "it was our common opinion that there was no ground to believe that just this [strike] wave would sweep away the Austro-German militarism".[94] The prominent Left Communists Bukharin and Radek likewise realized the limited goals and prospect of the strike movement;[95] Lenin himself made a few uncommitted references to the strikes, avoiding any predictions.[96] Moreover, even at the climax of the strike movement, on January 29, the Soviet government became concerned with the strikers' possible defeat and its impact on Soviet security. According to a reliable eyewitness, it was argued at a Sovnarkom session of January 29 that "A failure of the strike movement would be more dangerous to the Russian revolution than no strike at all, for then General Hoffmann would have a pretext to march on Moscow and Petrograd...It was generally agreed that...pending the development of the Berlin strike, it was necessary to be prepared for the worst".[97]

The Bolshevik apprehension soon proved substantiated. On January 30 a state of siege was proclaimed in Germany and the army was mobilized against the strikers. The strike movement was liquidated within a few days. This swift victory of the German military evidently made a deep impression on the Bolsheviks and increased their respect for the German

Supreme Command.[98] From now on even the Left Communists feared a victory of the "war party" in Germany, and it was generally assumed that the abortive strike movement as a whole worked to the detriment of Soviet Russia's position.[99]

Meanwhile the Brest peace conference, reopened on January 30, reached a critical stage. Immediately after the suppression of the strike movement, the Central powers decided to make an agreement with the Ukrainian Rada as soon as possible and bring negotiations with the Bolsheviks to an end regardless of whether a peace treaty was signed or not. Ludendorff declared that should Trotsky refuse to sign a formal peace, military actions would be resumed.[100]

Lenin still hoped that the Germans would accept the fait accompli. "Nothing remains of the Kiev Rada," he wired to Trotsky as late as February 10, "and the Germans will have to recognize this fact."[101] The Germans did not. On the preceding day they signed a separate peace treaty with the Rada, thereby putting the Bolsheviks into a very precarious position. The Soviet delegation now evidently gathered that it could be presented with an ultimatum in the near future.[102] At the same time, however, the Central powers' delegates were aware of Trotsky's intention to informally terminate the war, and were not at all hostile to his idea.[103] In this situation Trotsky delivered on February 10 his famous "no war no peace" speech in which he announced that the Soviet government would demobilize the army and withdraw from the war without signing a peace.[104]

The formula "no war no peace" well expressed Trotsky's position.

He had been convinced since October 1917 that Russia needed peace and, consequently, he no longer supported the idea of revolutionary war. However, Trotsky too well realized that a separate peace in the given circumstances precipitated friendship with Germany[105] - a development which he, in contrast to Lenin, considered undesirable. Consequently, he had favored since November 1917 an informal soldiers' peace with the Central powers. Once at the conference table, he conceived the idea of "no war no peace", and took the risk of promulgating it as the official Soviet policy.

As much as Trotsky disapproved of an alignment with Germany, Lenin seems to have been afraid of Soviet Russia's neutrality and isolation, the possible consequences of the state of "no war no peace". To him, a formal peace treaty was essential. Thus, although the Central Committee on January 24 also approved the "no war no peace" platform, Lenin, as has been seen, subsequently obliged Trotsky to sign a peace when confronted with an ultimatum. This was not what Trotsky did at Brest Litovsk on February 10, and Lenin had every reason to qualify it as a break of their "gentlemen's agreement".[106] He immediately disapproved of Trotsky's action.

The formula of "no war no peace" could not only save the revolutionary appearance of the Bolsheviks but also give Berlin a free hand in the occupied territories. Pointing out this fact, State Secretary Kühlmann pleaded for accepting the fait accompli. The Kaiser and the Supreme Command, however, on February 13 resolved to terminate the armistice and resume military action.[107]

A Victory of the Bismarckian Tradition

On February 18 the Germans, followed reluctantly by Austria-Hungary, started a new advance in the East. The chief German objective was to get a hold over the Ukraine by re-establishing the Rada regime and, as Ludendorff put it, to compel the Bolsheviks by a "short but sharp blow" to sign a formal peace treaty. "For the moment," Ludendorff recalled, "no extensive operation was in contemplation".[108] If the advance put the Soviet government into a difficult position, it also was a result of Lenin's own policy. Although the possession of the army was one of Lenin's chief axioms, his government had after November 1917 been dismantling the old army while doing little for the formation of new revolutionary forces. Lenin, persistent and energetic whenever necessary, himself sidetracked the issue of defence against the external enemy,[109] but his passivity harmonized well with his chief objective. The existence of a solid revolutionary army would deprive him of a solid argument for peace with Germany.

Thus, after the German advance had started, the head of the Soviet state confronted the opposition with another "fait accompli": Soviet Russia had no dependable armed forces to resist the enemy. After a hectic day the Central Committee on February 18 yielded to his pressure and agreed on signing a peace treaty. Trotsky this time upheld Lenin's position.[110] The next day the Germans were notified about the decision.

The German advance revived the problem of the foreign political orientation. Thus Zinoviev argued in favor of a peace with Germany saying that the Bismarckian tradition of co-operation with Russia was not yet

dead in Germany. It was better, he said, referring to the Leninist policy of alliances, to gain the sympathy of one capitalist camp by capitulating to it than to let both capitalist camps unite against the "international proletariat". "We told you long ago about the possibility of taking this step," he stated in regard to a separate peace, "and all agreed with us".[111]

Meanwhile the Germans continued in an unopposed advance, leaving without answer the Bolshevik offer of peace. In Moscow Lenin on February 20 still argued against military resistance and a pro-Allied orientation, adding that such a course could be accepted only if a separate peace were "absolutely impossible" and the Bolsheviks had no other choice.[112] The next day, however, a report reached Petrograd that the German troops had landed in Finland and had suppressed the Soviet government in Helsinki. The news, which later proved false,[113] disturbed Lenin. Assuming that Germany would attempt to overthrow his government also, Lenin immediately reversed his policies. First, ending his hitherto indifferent stand towards national defence, Lenin initiated on February 21 a Sovnarkom appeal for the mobilization of all Soviet institutions, population, and resources for the purpose of defending the "socialist fatherland".[114] Second, it was undoubtedly Lenin who put forward at a Sovnarkom session the question of accepting Allied assistance. Although the coalition partner, the Left Social Revolutionaries declined to consider any foreign help, Trotsky nevertheless on the same day approached the Allied representatives, asking them what assistance their governments would give the Soviets in resisting the German advance.

The results of this action were more encouraging than might have been expected: Trotsky promptly received assurances of Allied cooperation. The French Ambassador, Noulens, a staunch anti-Bolshevik, now took the initiative and assured Trotsky of the willingness of his country to render the Soviet regime both military and financial aid. Trotsky in turn asked for a more precise statement which was presented to him the following day.[115]

Meanwhile Lenin undertook the difficult task of explaining this foreign political somersault. He wrote in Pravda on February 22 that there was a difference between Kerensky, making deal with the Anglo-American exploiters to get arms and potatoes, and the representatives of the exploited classes doing the same in return for money or timber and with the purpose of repelling the "German robber". He expressed the hope that the "German worker" would understand the difference between Kerensky's and the Bolsheviks' deals with the "Anglo-French robbers", but appeared uncertain on this point.[116]

The same day, February 22, Trotsky at a meeting of the Central Committee reported on the Allied offer of help in a war with Germany. The reaction was mixed, with the Left Communists split on this issue. In the end, however, Trotsky's resolution was adopted declaring the acceptability of the "capitalist governments'" assistance in the war provided that the full independence of Soviet foreign policy was secured. Lenin voted in absentia for taking "potatoes and arms" from Britain and France.[117] In the morning of February 23 Trotsky informed the French mission about the decision.

At the same time, however, Petrograd finally received a German reply outlining new peace terms. They were considerably more unfavourable than the original conditions of Brest Litovsk, and were accompanied with a sharp intimation that they must be accepted within forty-eight hours. At this point Lenin, being quite consistent in his preference of peace with Germany, again reversed his stand. On February 23, at a Central Committee session, he urged the acceptance of the German peace terms, maintaining that Soviet Russia would thereby gain a "breathing spell" for peaceful reconstruction. He reinforced the German ultimatum with the threat of his own resignation. Trotsky, deeply disappointed and disillusioned, reminded Lenin and his colleagues that Germany had not as yet won the war, adding that unlike in 1871, the war fortune could change in the near future: "If the French now begin to advance, the German will be different".[118] He pointed out that there was a "lot of subjectivism" in Lenin's position and, in effect, he found it as a whole erroneous. He nevertheless decided to abstain from voting. The German peace terms were accepted by the vote 7 to 4 with four abstentions.[119]

Trotsky, realizing the undesirable consequences of Lenin's platform, now renounced responsibility for foreign affairs. Lenin, who had not been enthusiastic about assigning him to the post of Foreign Commissar,[120] readily accepted his resignation, admitting that it amounted to the "change in policy". Trotsky was asked to stay in his office until the peace treaty was signed. Deeply humiliated and disappointed by the result of this personal and policy confrontation, Trotsky disappeared from the scene for some days.[121]

On March 3 the peace treaty was signed at Brest Litovsk between

Soviet Russia and the Central powers' bloc.[122] In its political clauses, all contracting parties obliged themselves to refrain from any agitation or propaganda against the government or any public and military institution of the other party, and agreed on an immediate resumption of diplomatic and consular relations, on re-establishing public and private legal relations and on the exchange of prisoners of war. The mutual payment of war indemnities was formally renounced. A provisional commercial agreement provided for a most-favoured-nation treatment, and gave the Soviet government certain unilateral privileges. On the other hand, the Soviet government was inter alia asked to evacuate the Ukraine, Finland, Estonia, and Livonia, and to refrain from any propaganda and agitation in these territories. Estonia and Livonia were to be occupied by the German police and their status determined by Austria-Hungary and Germany "in agreement with their population". By territorial cessions Russia lost vast spaces with a population of over 50 million, a third of her average crop and three quarters of her iron and coal production.[123] The Soviet government was also obligated to demobilize its army, including the recently organized units, and either keep its warships in the Russian ports or disarm them forthwith.

The Brest treaty appeared harsh and humiliating to the Russian public and to the Bolsheviks as well. It was also tantamount to a definite renunciation of revolutionary war and thus constituted a serious blow to revolutions in Germany and other countries. At the same time, however, it brought the Soviet regime diplomatic recognition by several capitalist states, and possibly peace and the cooperation of Germany, objectives

which figured very high in Lenin's list of goals. The head of the Soviet state put all his authority in support of the ratification of the treaty, arguing that the Bolsheviks would gain a "breathing spell" for the consolidation of their government.

The seventh Party Congress, hastily convened for March 6, marked Lenin's victory at the party forum. Out of his prominent opponents, only Bukharin subjected the idea of "breathing spell" to strong criticism. In his view the respite that Soviet Russia could gain was not meaningful since Germany, desperately lacking raw materials and grain, would either subjugate or strangle the Soviet regime. Bukharin pointed out that the Bolsheviks had already slipped into the German orbit, illustrating this by a clause of the Brest treaty which obliged Russia to protect the independence of Persia and Afghanistan: "It means that we are to serve as German gendarmes against the English imperialism..." And Bukharin reminded the Leninist faction that the Central powers, particularly due to the internal instability of Austria-Hungary, might not win the war, and that they therefore could try to terminate it at Russia's expense.[124] The Soviet regime, Bukharin declared on behalf of the Left Communists, should not accept the Brest treaty. Instead, it should wage a revolutionary war against Germany.

Nevertheless, Bukharin's arguments showed that the Left Communists had shifted from internationalism to Russian patriotism. Zinoviev, for instance, noted with satisfaction that the Left Communists now appeared ready to accept an undemocratic and annexationist peace if it secured Soviet Russia's existence,[125] and Lenin, commenting on Bukharin's speech,

declared that "our differences have greatly diminished".[126] In the end, the seventh Party Congress endorsed the Brest treaty by 30 votes to 12. The Leninist faction, indirectly answering Trotsky and the Left Communists, stated confidently in the final resolution that the Brest treaty was "inevitable and necessary...in view of the present alignment of forces in the world arena".[127]

Meanwhile, however, the proximity of a separate peace between Germany and Soviet Russia activated the Entente and its allies. In early March it became known that Japan seriously contemplated an intervention in the Far East, presumably to prevent the extension of the German influence into Siberia; the rumor also spread about the British plan for landing in Russia's northern ports Murmansk and Archangel.[128]

An eventual Japanese intervention in the Far East could not deter Lenin from accepting the Brest peace. "By the time they have ever reached Irkutsk," he stated at the Central Committee, "we shall be able to strengthen our socialist republic."[129] Naturally, Lenin was also interested in averting such intervention and in early March approached the American Ambassador Francis and the British unofficial representative Bruce Lockhart about this matter.[130] He was assisted by Trotsky, who now emerged from seclusion. On March 5 Trotsky indicated to Bruce Lockhart and Colonel Robins who mediated between the American Embassy and the Bolsheviks, that the Soviet government would resume the war if the Allies promised assistance and Japan refrained from intervention. Robins requested and the same day received a written statement to this effect, but it was more Lenin's than Trotsky's. Without making any commitment,

the Soviet leaders merely inquired what kind of support they could expect from the Allies and the United States in particular in the war against Germany, what steps would the Allies take to prevent the Japanese landing in Far East, and whether Britain planned a landing in Murmansk and Archangel.[131]

Evidently, the Bolsheviks were interested more in ascertaining the chances of anti-Soviet intervention than in the resumption of war on the Allied side; Lenin himself continued after March 5 to stand for the ratification of the Brest treaty and at no point alluded to the possibility of accepting the Allied help. This may also explain his response to a subsequent action of President Wilson.

Before the Soviet statement of March 5 was received in Washington, Wilson on March 11 sent a message of sympathy to the forthcoming Congress of Soviets.[132] His flowery address was read to the congress delegates on March 15 and seriously damaged the Allied cause in Russia. Briefly, Wilson at the moment when, in his words, "the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom... of the people of Russia", merely assured the Congress of his "sincere sympathy". Even worse, as an eyewitness has recalled, there was only one sentence in the message which had any meaning to the Congress delegates. It read: "The Government of the United States is unhappily not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render".[133]

Wilson's message could not but produce an effect that was the opposite of what its author had desired. It disheartened those in Russia,

including many Bolsheviks, who had hitherto banked on the American help and, by the same token, it confirmed to the Leninist faction the American inability to intervene effectively in Russia. Besides, the message was friendly enough to suggest that the United States would continue to oppose any anti-Soviet intervention. Thus Wilson unwittingly gave Lenin a "go ahead" for his policy of rapprochement with Germany and the latter now felt safe to terminate the flirtation with the Allies by a revolutionary gesture. His reply to Wilson, approved by the Congress delegates, appealed over the President's head to the American people, assuring them that the "happy time is not far distant when the labouring masses of all bourgeois countries will throw off the yoke of capitalism and will establish a socialist order of society".[134] "We have slapped the President of the United States in the face", Zinoviev aptly characterized this insulting action,[135] which had no parallel in the Leninist faction's communications with Germany.

On March 16 the Congress of Soviets ratified the Brest treaty by 784 votes to 261. The prolonged political crisis ended in the spirit of Lenin's program of the independent Russian revolution. It was a victory of "domesticism" (accompanied by the transfer of the Soviet government from a cosmopolitan Petrograd to "Russian" Moscow), but it was also a victory for the traditional Russian cooperation with Germany. Unwilling to pursue this policy, Trotsky had meanwhile resigned from his offices, complaining bitterly about the unheard of submissiveness of the party before the enemy.[136]

Trotsky's frustration and objections to Lenin's "subjectivism" are

well understandable. There were indeed serious misconceptions inherent in Lenin's position.[137] First of all, Lenin was wrong in the spring of 1918 when assuming (a) that Soviet Russia would free herself in a meaningful way from the German and the Allied pressure, (b) that the Russian public would accept both a humiliating peace and policy of friendship with Germany and, most important, (c) that the Central powers' war prospect was fairly long and bright enough to warrant his Brest policy of a one-sided rapprochement with Berlin at cost of antagonizing the Russian public and the Western powers.[138]

In the final account it was the Brest peace that triggered a chain of events which adversely affected the Bolshevik party and Russia herself, and which left a negative imprint on Soviet Russia's foreign relations in the decades to come. Between January and March 1918 Lenin fought for and brilliantly won what proved to be a Pyrrhic victory.

MAP 1: BREST-LITOVSK SETTLEMENT, 1918



SOURCE: A.F. CHEW, AN ATLAS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY (NEW HAVEN AND LONDON, 1970)

CHAPTER III

LENIN'S PLANS ABORT, MARCH-SEPTEMBER 1918

The drive for peace and coexistence proved more difficult than Lenin might have expected. Endeavouring stubbornly to carry out his policies and avoid a new war, Lenin was being pushed since the spring of 1918 on a road which brought the entire country back into a war and forced him to give up temporarily his program.

Coexistence in Practice: March-May 1918

Lenin's policy prior to the onset of the civil war is often considered insignificant in the context of the Russian revolution. Nevertheless, just this brief phase witnessed Lenin's efforts to put into effect his program of "socialism in one country". Its theoretical relevance to the Soviet reality was reiterated in March 1918 by the re-editing of the articles which Lenin and Zinoviev wrote on this theme during their Swiss exile.[1] The Bolshevik leader also suggested on several occasions that Soviet Russia, relying on her internal resources, would build a modern industrial society along the line of state capitalism, and that this was tantamount to a building of socialism.[2] As before, he still considered the socialist revolution in the West to be expedient only for accomplishing the higher, communist stage about which he knew nothing more than Marx did in the 1870's, namely that it would be ruled by the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs".[3]

Lenin was now more specific about his intention to create a social and economic system operating "with the precision of clockwork"[4] and

about his source of inspiration. At the climax of the Brest crisis he raised the slogan "Learn from the Germans" indicating that their "discipline, organization, harmonious cooperation on the basis of modern machine industry" was worthy of imitation in Russia.[5] In effect, he endeavored to adapt to the Russian conditions the principles of the German war economy.[6] He likewise leaned towards the German authoritarian labour code, calling for such harsh measures as capital punishment to improve labour discipline, for a compulsory competition and compulsory labour service, as well as for an unpaid overtime.[7] For those on whose behalf the Bolsheviks seized power, Lenin's socialism could not but smell of toil and sweat.

By the same token, the Soviet government proved very reluctant in regard to the nationalization of the national economy and agriculture. The expropriations, mostly spontaneous in form, were criticized even by the Bolshevik economists and had not proceeded too far in this phase. Lenin himself indicated in April 1918 that the solution of the managerial and organizational problems should be given priority over the policy of expropriation, and disapproved of the Leftists' "attacks on capital".[8] The only major branches nationalized in this phase were the banks and foreign trade, but this was a matter of expediency since Lenin's government contemplated the creation of mixed companies in which both the Soviet state and the private entrepreneurs from Russia and abroad were to be involved.[9] Evidently Lenin aimed at a consolidation of the Soviet regime within the framework of the existing society. "In order to make a socialist revolution...it is not necessary immediately to abolish

classes", Lenin argued, indicating that it was the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution that really mattered.[10]

Addressing the seventh Party Congress in March 1918, Lenin declared that world revolution for the time being was "a very beautiful fairy tale", and challenged his Left opponents: "Is it proper for a serious revolutionary to believe in fairy tales?". He went on to say that in any propaganda, "in every fairy tale", there must be an element of reality. Hence, "If you tell the people that...we shall have a field revolution on a world scale, the people will say that you are deceiving them".[11] Adjusting accordingly the foreign policy and propaganda, Lenin's government following the Brest crisis considerably curtailed the revolutionizing efforts and resorted to traditional diplomatic means in its search for peace and modus vivendi with the capitalist powers. The position of Soviet Russia was nevertheless extremely difficult.

The Brest peace strained relations between Moscow and the Western powers and opened the question of their intervention in Russia. Already in March 1918 the British had landed, with Trotsky's permission, at Russia's northern port Archangel, and a month later the Japanese disembarked their first units in Vladivostok. Moscow now discontinued its verbal assaults upon the Allies and endeavored to prevent their further antagonization. Yet a further deterioration of relations with the Allies was almost inevitable from the mere fact that Lenin, having resolved the dilemma "Germany or Britain" in favor of the former, in the spring of 1918 made the Brest treaty a central point of Soviet foreign policy. This was underlined also by the appointment of Grigori Chicherin as

Trotsky's successor in the post of Foreign Commissar.[12]

Chicherin, a well-educated servant of the tsarist Foreign Ministry, quit his job in 1904, emigrated, and joined the ranks of the Mensheviks abroad. During the world war he seems to have lost belief in socialist revolution in the West and turned to the Bolsheviks, then a party known for banking on an independent Russian revolution. With his appointment to Foreign Commissar in March 1918 Chicherin became one of Lenin's closest and most loyal collaborators.[13] Two years younger than his master, Chicherin was akin to him in a cautious approach to international affairs tainted at times with a revolutionary patina, but also in his perception of the world. Like Lenin, Chicherin also was a man of anti-Western and particularly anti-British sentiments who showed sympathies for Germany and the nations of the East. To both of them, Germany was the pivotal point of Soviet foreign policy.

In the spring of 1918 their determination to cultivate relations with Germany was accentuated by external factors. The Brest peace had increased Germany's internal stability[14] and relieved additional forces for the Western front. On March 21, the Germans started the first of their offensives in the West, hoping for a decisive victory over the Allies. The Anglo-French armies were barely able to meet the onslaught and the military value of the American forces was still unknown. The public in the Allied countries and the Bolsheviks themselves followed developments on the Western front with the utmost apprehension.[15] Even worse from the Soviet point of view, the Brest treaty did not stop the German advance in the East. In early April 1918 Ludendorff dispatched

an expeditionary force to Finland to crush the Soviet regime there, and the Central powers' troops continued throughout March and April in occupying more and more territory of the Ukraine and Southern Russia (see the map No. 1). The situation on the German-Soviet demarcation line was also unstable and minor clashes occurring there threatened to spill over into a major conflict.[16] Moreover, Ludendorff barely concealed his disgust with the Bolsheviks and his intention to settle accounts with Lenin's government once the Germans gained the upper hand in the war.

Pointing out this precarious position and dim future of the Soviet state, the Left Communists in their paper Kommunist again called for resistance to Germany. In their view, a new confrontation was inevitable. Lenin, however, opted for the opposite policy of utmost caution, retreats, and observance of the Brest treaty. Thus, after March 15 the Bolsheviks, on Lenin's insistence, discontinued their military activity outside the Soviet territory, particularly in Finland and the Ukraine. The Red troops there were either disarmed or withdrawn, and Moscow imposed an embargo on anti-German actions in the Ukraine and the German-occupied territories. Trotsky reinforced the embargo by a harsh order threatening its violators with execution. Lenin himself proved anxious to come to terms with the Ukrainian and other neighbouring governments.[17] It seems that the Bolsheviks likewise felt restricted by the Brest clause which obligated them to demobilize their troops. This clause, needless to say, was untenable in the long run, and the Sovnarkom attempted to circumvent it on April 22 by decreeing compulsory military training for all citizens between the age of 18 to 40.[18] As a whole, however, Lenin's government

prior to the summer of 1918 had accomplished little in building a revolutionary army.

Curbing its revolutionizing efforts, Lenin's government also dissolved the "Department of the International Revolutionary Propaganda", organized in December 1917 chiefly for disseminating peace propaganda among the Central powers' soldiers and prisoners of war, and replaced it by a "Bureau of Foreign Political Literature" which scarcely showed any activity. Only after the outbreak of the civil war did it become involved in the anti-Allied propaganda.[19] Meanwhile the Bolsheviks had attempted to continue their propaganda among the German prisoners of war - the Brest treaty actually did not prohibit it - but after a strong German protest Trotsky on April 20 ordered a termination of this activity too. Soviet policy towards foreign sympathisers was equally cautious: following the Brest crisis these groups, recruited chiefly from the Central powers' prisoners of war, were put "on a strictly party footing" and attached to the Central Committee of the Russian communists. They remained numerically weak and their "internationalist" activity was restricted to the popularization of the Soviet regime and peace.[20]

The activities of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin under Ioffe fit well into this picture. The image of this Embassy as a Trojan Horse of Bolshevism disseminating seditious propaganda inside Germany and working deliberately for the German revolution,[21] is very inaccurate and exaggerated. Documentary evidence shows that Ioffe and his staff after their arrival in Berlin in late April 1918 implemented the policy of their government which aimed at the improvement of relations with official

Germany. In addition to his formal duties, the ambassador naturally also established contacts with a number of prominent Germans sympathetic to Russia. These included not only the German socialists but also various bourgeois politicians, industrialists, and financiers, who appreciated Ioffe's cultivated manners and matter-of-fact style.[22] Although the Soviet Embassy in Berlin and its staff were vigilantly shadowed by the Berlin police, and their communications with Moscow were controlled by the German authorities,[23] and although the Germans in June 1918 recruited a top inside informer, the Soviet Vice-Consul of monarchistic leanings, Voronov,[24] no evidence has ever been produced showing that Ioffe's activity prior to October 1918 considerably deviated from habitual diplomatic norms.[25]

In effect, the Bolsheviks could hardly risk revolutionary gestures against Germany. The Soviet government, faced on the domestic front with a breakdown of economic life, formidable unemployment and famine, and experiencing spontaneous revolts in the provinces,[26] in the spring of 1918 was also confronted with the continuing German advance into southern Russia and was exposed to a psychological pressure of Berlin. The German government, a prominent Soviet commentator complained in Pravda, behaved just like a conqueror. Its daily radio dispatches were tantamount to orders and infringed the sovereignty of the country, but the Soviet government was forced to comply with some of them.[27] Trotsky too conceded on April 21 that "since Russia is weak and exhausted, in the final result, inevitably, we could not but find ourselves under someone's foot: either German or English", but he nevertheless appealed for preserving

Soviet Russia's independence[28] and maintained contacts with the Allied representatives, testing their willingness for cooperation.

Lenin, however, was determined to pursue the policy of peace and friendship with Germany even at the cost of making new concessions and antagonizing the Allies. He went so far as to dismiss the policy of national independence as a "bourgeois line". In given conditions, he suggested, the best foreign policy was no policy at all: "When people say that we have no foreign, international policy, I say: every other policy consciously slips into playing a provocatory role".[29]

Consequently, having indicated to Berlin the Soviet readiness to consider new demands,[30] Lenin on May 6 submitted to the Central Committee a resolution calling a priori for their acceptance and for the rejection of the eventual Allied requests. His resolution was passed along with the decision to organize the defence of the Uralsk-Kuznetsk region and evacuate "everything in general"[31] to the Urals, but the continuous German advance into southern Russia soon mobilized his opponents. By May 10 a number of the party organizations adopted "Left" resolutions against the policy of further concessions to Germany.[32] The same day the prominent spokesman for the opposition, Sokolnikov, submitted to the Central Committee a heretical document stating that, since the "breathing spell" had come to an end, the party ought immediately to begin preparations for a new war against Germany and come to an agreement with the Allies regarding military cooperation.[33] Four days later, on May 14, at a stormy session of the VTsIK, all three oppositional parties, the Left and the Right Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, urged

the termination of the "breathing spell" and the resumption of war against Germany.[34] Later in the month the Right Social Revolutionaries, fearing that Russia under Bolshevik rule might lose her independence, called for the overthrow of Lenin's government and for the acceptance of Allied assistance in the war against Germany. The Right Mensheviks adopted a similar position in late May.[35]

Paradoxically, it was not Lenin's strategy of constant retreats but the mounting opposition to it that brought a change in Germany's Russian policy. Concerned with the development in Moscow, the first German Ambassador in Soviet Russia, Count Mirbach, on May 13 pleaded in Berlin for the cessation of the German advance and for providing the Bolsheviks with essential goods to maintain them in power.[36] The same day the German Foreign Ministry endorsed Mirbach's view and asked him to convey to the Soviet government "its firm intention to adhere strictly" to the Brest treaty and to "create normal friendly relations with Russia". The German government was also willing to settle those questions of mutual relations which were not absolutely clear.[37] On May 16 Mirbach and Lenin met for a long conversation. According to the Ambassador's report Lenin repeatedly expressed "the most boundless optimism in an almost overpowering way" and stressed that his enemies had no positive program and no common platform except that of anti-Bolshevism. The opposition to his policy within the party, he argued, was caused by the German non-observance of the Brest treaty and lack of progress in peace talks with Finland and the Ukraine. Mirbach further reported that Lenin was determined "to defend with the utmost tenacity" the Brest treaty and did not "insinuate

in any way that, if the present state of affairs were to last, he might be forced to turn back towards the other powers".[38]

Concurrently, Mirbach asked Berlin to provide the Bolsheviks with more money to offset a victory of pro-Allied elements in Russia. He promptly received an affirmative reply from State Secretary Kühlmann. "It is greatly in our interests that the Bolsheviks should survive," Kühlmann wired, adding that the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries were the only ones who based their policy on the Brest treaty: "As a party, Kadets are anti-German; Monarchists would also work for revision of Brest peace treaty".[39]

The Soviet and the German governments now also decided that the economic talks, discontinued on February 14, should be resumed in the near future. A Soviet memorandum, prepared for this occasion, stressed the fact that the reconstruction of the Russian economy was dependent on the "resumption of economic relations with the Central powers as well as with the Entente". The document went on to note that Soviet Russia would grant Germany concessions for the exploitation of Russia's natural resources such as gold, timber and oil, and for building railways and industry. The Soviet government wished to have a "certain share and control" in these enterprises.[40] To show the Germans "how seriously we desire business-like economic relations",[41] Lenin promptly made the memorandum available to the German Foreign Ministry.

Simultaneously, on May 14, Lenin handed to Colonel Robins a long memorandum outlining the prospect of Soviet-American trade relations. It likewise stated that the economic assistance of industrial countries

was necessary to Russia, and stressed the constructive designs of the Soviet government. The memorandum was less committing in terms of Soviet offers, leaving no doubt that Soviet Russia felt bound by the Brest treaty which granted most favored nation rights to the Central powers. It alleged, however, that Germany would not be able to utilize this opportunity.[42] Evidently, Lenin decided to play on the economic rivalries in his search for trade agreements and a modus vivendi with the capitalist world.[43]

In the latter half of May Lenin's policy seemed to be bringing positive results. Preliminary trade talks in Berlin helped the Soviet negotiators to establish contacts with a number of influential figures, including General Ludendorff whom the Soviet economist Krassin visited in early June at the Western front.[44] In Russia, American Ambassador Francis noted on May 23 that Lenin "while smoothing his followers with statement that the proletarian revolution is surely coming...tamely submits to the German tyranny",[45] but he and other American diplomats now seemed reconciled to this state of affair.[46] In late May 1918, however, the situation dramatically changed as a result of a clash between the Bolsheviks and the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia.

Following the conclusion of the Brest treaty, this small but disciplined unit, largely recruited from Austrian prisoners of war, was to leave Russia via Siberia to reinforce the anti-German front in France. The Bolsheviks, however, exposed to the German pressure and apprehensive about the rising counterrevolution in Siberia, had for two months been obstructing the Legion's move eastward.[47] Finally, on May 20 Trotsky's

Commissariat of War ordered that the Czechoslovaks be detrained and organized into labour artels or drafted into the Red Army, and subsequently issued two harsh orders demanding a total liquidation of the Legion and the transfer of its members into prisoner of war camps.[48]

It is difficult to believe that in a less tense atmosphere the Bolsheviks would have responded as they actually did. In the spring of 1918, however, Germany reached the zenith of its military power. Rosa Luxemburg, for instance, was now terrified by the prospect of a "Weltherrschaft der Dicken Berta", a German military hegemony in the world.[49] In Russia even such a reputed Westerner as Professor Miliukov lost his confidence in the Allies and in June 1918 established contacts with the German authorities in Kiev.[50] Lenin, as has been seen, and the Leninist faction as well, now called for the greatest caution and restraint in dealing with Berlin.

In any case, the declaration of war on the Legion proved to be an ill-considered step. The Czechoslovaks, determined to proceed eastwards in defiance of Lenin's government, responded by a prompt seizure of all major centres on the Middle Volga and along the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Their actions, supported by the local Russian population, encouraged the anti-Bolshevik forces and triggered the rise of a democratic counterrevolution. In June 1918 Russia entered the period of civil war and intervention which, discontinuously, lasted until the autumn of 1920.

Civil War and Intervention: A Slide into "Unleninist" Leninism

For about seven months after the November coup Lenin had persistently endeavored to adapt Russia to his image. Had he succeeded in carrying out

MAP 2: CIVIL WAR IN RUSSIA, 1918 - 1920



SOURCE: MARTIN GILBERT, RECENT HISTORY ATLAS 1860 to 1960 (LONDON, 1966)

his program, Russia would have become an authoritarian, orderly, and perhaps efficiently managed country which, as the Brest period indicated, would have lacked much of the charisma and ethos of a great revolution. Yet, although Lenin's strategy of provoking the least resistance was initially very successful and the revolution in the provinces, in Trotsky's words, was mostly "accomplished by telegraph",[51] the reality proved more complex than Lenin's schemes accounted for. If anything, Lenin was wrong when assuming that the government of peace would be seriously challenged neither by internal forces nor by the former allies, the Entente powers. It did not cross his mind prior to June 1918 that a new war might soon break out in the heart of European Russia, and that the Entente and its allies would threaten the existence of his government.[52]

The Czechoslovak mutiny and the civil war therefore caught Lenin by surprise and put him out of balance; he had not planned for such a contingency. In the summer of 1918 his program of a peaceful reconstruction lost much of its relevance. The policies which Lenin's government pursued between June 1918 and March 1921, known as war communism, accentuated and carried to the extreme such previous trends in Leninism as centralization and state regimentation of the economy and social life, or the use of bourgeois specialists. As a whole, however, the period of war communism was characteristic for desperate improvizations and measures which prior to June 1918 had met with Lenin's vehement opposition and disapproval. The latter applies particularly to the economic sphere in which the Bolsheviks in the summer of 1918 abandoned Lenin's strategy of building socialism with assistance of Russian and foreign capitalists, and opted de facto for the Left Communists' oppositional platform of the

marketless economy.[53] Thus, while Lenin had previously ruled out wholesale nationalization and encroachment into the private sector, and while in May 1918 he apparently planned new concessions to the capitalists,[55] the Bolsheviks after June 1918 took over all industries and reduced the sphere of private ownership to the narrowest possible limits. While Lenin had previously endeavored to stabilize the Russian currency, his government in the summer of 1918 switched to the policy of replacing money as a means of exchange by a system of natural economy. Consequently the banks, envisaged by Lenin as the central managing organ, were gradually dissolved in the period of war communism. The Soviet organs took over the role of the chief organizer of the national economy and became almost the sole requisitioner and distributor of agricultural and industrial products.[56] While Lenin's government had previously kept the class struggle at a low ebb and applied terror only selectively, with the outbreak of the civil war the Bolsheviks preached the class struggle and terror became in the months to come one of their chief policy instruments. The principle of gradualism and continuity was replaced in the summer of 1918 by the principle of violent change. The execution of the Tsar and his family in June 1918 was the event symbolizing this drastic reckoning with the past.

However, war communism as a whole was a pragmatic response to the economic and political exigencies, blended with an equally exigent revolutionary ethos. The Bolsheviks, who had failed to give Russia the promised peace and bread, in this way justified their demands for new material and human sacrifices. The Bolshevik propaganda and reforms introduced in

the summer of 1918 and thereafter made the classless society of equality and social justice appear as imminent, even though the prominent Bolsheviks privately admitted that nationalization and war communism could not shorten Russia's road towards such a society.[57]

Of a similar nature was another phenomenon typical for the period of war communism, the propaganda of world revolution.[58] During the "breathing spell" this theme had almost entirely vanished from Lenin's vocabulary and the Soviet press. In the middle of May, while Soviet Russia's position was improving, Lenin in a long speech on Soviet foreign policy made no mention of world revolution at all.[59] The civil war, however, isolated the Bolsheviks both geographically and politically. There seemed to be no escape from the hunger, war, and destruction. In these conditions Lenin gradually revived the slogan of world revolution which a few months previously he had labelled a fairy tale. It is not surprising that at the beginning of the civil war Lenin referred only to the inevitability of a revolt in the West. The international proletariat, he stated on June 3, "is only preparing, is only maturing for revolt, but is not yet in a position to act openly and concertedly..."[60] And again on June 4: "The events fully show that the European proletariat... is now with every month...approaching the point when the necessity for revolt will be fully realized and the revolt become inevitable".[61]

Throughout June, however, the civil war had fully flared up in Russia and the Soviet government now struggled for survival.[62] Although no major internal crisis had meanwhile occurred in the West, Lenin now came to speak very confidently of world revolution. Naturally, he was

unable to substantiate his sudden optimism by a single fact. This is what he now had to say in the role of propagandist on world revolution: June 27, 1918: "The imperialists will not be able to put an end to the war which they had started," he argued, "other classes will end it - the working class which in all countries is becoming more and more active every day, more and more angry and indignant."[63] Two days later, June 29, 1918: "We have every reason to face the future with complete assurance and absolute confidence, for it is preparing for us new allies and new victories of the socialist revolution in a number of the more advanced countries."[64]

Yet even in this desperate moment, Lenin was not carried away by illusions. Speaking as a Realpolitiker he stated in the aforementioned address of June 27 that "it is more difficult to start a revolution in West European countries" and added very soberly: "We are passing through a very severe and very painful period of transition from capitalism to socialism, a period which will inevitably be a very long one."[65]

A similar treatment of world revolution on the part of Lenin and the Bolsheviks can be detected also in other periods of mounting threat to Soviet Russia. Thus Lenin and his colleagues came to manufacture the illusion of imminent world revolution especially in the fall of 1918, when Soviet Russia seemed seriously threatened by a large-scale Allied intervention,[66] and again in the summer months of 1919 or in October of that year when the Soviet government was hard pressed by the White armies of Generals Denikin and Yudenich. For instance, in October 1919 when the Bolsheviks believed that Petrograd could not be saved, and Lenin,

himself envisaged even a surrender of Moscow and withdrawal to the Urals,[67] Pravda again hammered at its readers: WORKERS OF ALL THE WORLD, GET READY TO OVERTHROW YOUR BOURGEOIS GOVERNMENTS! DENIKIN WANTS TO OVERTHROW THE WORKERS' GOVERNMENT IN THE NAME OF THE TSARIST AUTOCRACY... THE BOURGEOIS-FEUDAL SYSTEM DIES OUT IN ALL THE WORLD. EVERYONE TO ARMS, ALL TO THE FRONT![68] Concurrently a Pravda editorial naively assured the Russians that due to the coal shortage "the psyche of the English worker has fundamentally changed. It has become revolutionary...Equally revolutionary is the psyche of the proletariat in all other countries. The bourgeoisie knows that the time of their collapse is near". The help of the Western brethren would come soon, very soon, the paper encouraged the Russians, "it is necessary to hold out the last difficult months".[69]

Analogically, it also appears that the Bolsheviks curtailed their propaganda whenever their government was out of danger. For instance, while Lenin had frequently alluded to the international revolution prior to and during the Polish advance against Russia in 1920, he ignored this theme during the subsequent Red Army counteroffensive, although just then he intended to export the revolution westward on the point of the bayonet.[70]

Generally speaking, the Bolshevik pronouncements on an approaching world revolution were inversely proportional in terms of their frequency and intensity to the fortunes of the Soviet state. The Bolsheviks in the period of war communism treated the issue of world revolution essentially as Lenin had conceived it in 1915 and advanced it in 1917, namely as a tactical and propaganda device serving primarily the domestic

objectives of the party. By depicting the socialist millenium they attempted what the other belligerents tried to achieve by more orthodox means, namely to counteract the feelings of resignation and isolation and create the illusion of solidarity and immediate victory.[71] Their alleged optimism regarding world revolution tells more about the mentality of the besieged than about their actual perception of the West. Lenin and his colleagues throughout the period of war communism continued to differentiate between the real and the imaginary.

Paradoxically, Moscow's relations with Berlin deteriorated somewhat with the rising of the anti-Bolshevik and anti-German forces in June 1918. Expecting a collapse of Lenin's government State Secretary Kühlmann in early June instructed Ambassador Mirbach cautiously to approach the non-Bolshevik groups.[72] Ludendorff strongly urged the same policy on June 9.[73] It proved within a few weeks, however, that there was no plausible alternative to Lenin and his party. In late June Mirbach compared the Soviet regime to a "dangerously ill man who...is lost in the long run", but admitted that the other groups which conceivably could cooperate with Germany, the Right-Centre consisting of the Oktobrists and the Kadets, would demand a revision of the Brest treaty, and particularly a reunification of the Ukraine with Russia.[74] Thus Berlin now dropped the idea of carrying out a coup in Moscow with the assistance of German bayonets, and Mirbach was instructed to stop working for the fall of the Bolsheviks.[75] Ludendorff upheld this course on July 2.[76]

At this point the Bolsheviks began to foster in Berlin the idea of a closer relationship with Germany. Prior to July 5 Ambassador Ioffe and the Russian economist Krassin met with a high German official of

Russian extraction, Litwin. They intimated that the Soviet government wished for a closer cooperation in the economic sphere and pleaded for a new treaty which would provide Germany with Russian grain and raw materials and facilitate Russia's trade via the Baltic countries. Such a treaty, they claimed, would pave the road for more intimate economic and political relationship between the two countries.[77] On July 7 Ioffe and Krassin expanded on this idea in a long talk with the prominent German politician and the future Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic, Gustav Stresemann. They ruled out any possibility of a Soviet-Allied rapprochement and assured Stresemann that Moscow was determined to observe the Brest peace, which they considered the basis for the Russo-German alliance. At the same time they pleaded for a new treaty from which both sides could benefit, and which would tune the Russian public towards Germany.[78] The two Bolsheviks went so far as to suggest that if the Soviet government got some measure of peace and security, it would be able to supply Germany with arms and resist any anti-German enterprise on Russian territory.[79]

Stresemann and the German Foreign Ministry's officials, impressed by the Bolshevik arguments, now became the chief proponents of a formal revision of the Brest treaty, and of a closer relationship with Soviet Russia. This trend in German politics safely survived the crisis created by the assassination in Moscow on July 6 of Ambassador Mirbach. The assassin, a Left Social Revolutionary and a Cheka member Blumkin, apparently acted upon the instruction of his party, which was now profoundly embittered by the Bolshevik submissiveness to Germany. Some authors have recently argued that Lenin and his party must have had at least some

foreknowledge of the assassination plan.[80] Although this cannot be conclusively documented it is obvious that the death of an anti-Bolshevik Ambassador was not unwelcomed in the Kremlin.[81] Since the German government and the Kaiser himself had also become dissatisfied with Mirbach's views and performance, the affair was liquidated for the time being without serious repercussions.[82]

The Bolshevik bid of early July for closer relationship with Germany may have been prompted by a rapid deterioration of Moscow's relations with the Allies. Waiting in vain for Trotsky's invitation, the Western powers resolved in June 1918 to dispatch their troops into Russia in defiance of the Soviet government. Late in the month a contingent of 4000 Allied soldiers landed at Murmansk on the Arctic Ocean and subsequently occupied some territory south of the port. At the same time the British and the Japanese landed new troops in Vladivostok.[83] Even worse from the Soviet point of view, the Allied Ambassadors refused to move to Moscow from Vologda, a town in which they had resided since February 1918. Instead, in late July they hurriedly left for Archangel, now occupied by the Allies. It was obvious that their departure precipitated a new Allied intervention.

For six previous months Lenin had justified the German orientation by arguing that Germany was a stronger and more dangerous enemy than the Allies. In late July, however, as the Bolsheviks themselves realized, the Germans were already unable to resume major military operations against Russia,[84] while the Entente and its allies now seriously threatened the Soviet regime. Moreover, the last German offensive on the Western front, begun on July 15, soon proved inconclusive. Commenting

on the Central powers' deteriorating position, Bukharin on July 26 dismissed as unlikely the prospect of a negotiated peace. He suggested that Britain and the United States were strong enough to decide the war in their favor, adding that in such a case the latter would then "dominate the world".[85] Thus, if Lenin had really pursued the Brest policy only because of the German threat, the time would now arrive to seek a reconciliation with the Allies at the expense of relations with Germany. And this was the course which Trotsky again came to insist on in late July and which Lenin was not ready to adopt. The disagreement between the two Bolshevik leaders involved other problems too and must have been profound. Trotsky, prone to understatement on such occasions, admitted in his diary having "several sharp clashes" with Lenin over "serious questions".[86] One of these confrontations obviously occurred on July 29, at a session of the Bolshevik leadership. According to a contemporary report, Trotsky there opposed Lenin's course of further retreats and pleaded for a firm policy and for a re-orientation towards the Allies.[87]

However, Lenin on the eve of a new Allied intervention, publicly assured his compatriots that "this war cannot end otherwise than by the ultimate victory of socialism"[88] and, disregarding Trotsky's advice, resolved to strive for even closer relations with Imperial Germany. After a consultation with him, Chicherin on August 1 approached the new German Ambassador Helfferich with a confidential proposal. He indicated that the Soviet government would welcome the assistance of the German and Finnish troops against the British in the Archangel region. Moscow did not wish to enter into a formal alliance with Germany, insisting

at this point merely on a parallel action of the German and Russian armies.[89] The proposal met with a favorable response. Ludendorff promised the necessary assistance on August 4, yet he demanded that his troops be permitted to occupy the railway route Narva-Petrograd-Vyborg, the naval base at Kronstadt, and to enter Petrograd itself.[90] Three days later Chicherin in a talk with the German military attaché Schubert expressed Soviet readiness to make Petrograd a joint supply basis for the operations against the British and to allow a joint occupation of the city by the German and Russian troops.[91] History could have recorded a shocking entanglement had not the coming turn in the war shattered the prospect of such intimate cooperation.[92]

Meanwhile the Soviet government suffered new setbacks. On August 2 the British had made another landing at Archangel and although the disembarked forces proved too weak immediately to undertake offensive actions, the Allies now firmly held two northern gates to European Russia. Moreover, on August 3 new Japanese and American troops landed at Vladivostok, to be followed by further Japanese units in the forthcoming months.[93] Even worse for the Bolsheviks, the turn in the world war which occurred a few days later put their struggle into a dark perspective. Lenin, unfortunately for Russia, had built his program and policy on an unspoken but quite firm belief in the lasting military, political, and economic authority of Germany on the world scene. On August 8, 1918, however, Ludendorff's armies suffered a serious defeat on the Western front which demolished the last German hopes of winning the war and signaled that the numerical and material superiority of the Western powers sooner or later would decisively determine the outcome of

the world conflict. This "Black Day" of the German armies therefore also undermined Lenin's entire concept of foreign relations and indicated that the Soviet government could expect new and even fiercer confrontation with the Western powers in the future. Consequently Lenin, who already wavered and was beset by doubts, now appears to have broken down psychologically. Thus, while in the days preceding August 8 he had written on the average one directive daily, on August 9 - when the news of the German "Black Day" reached Moscow[94] - and on the next day he produced a long series of directives and instructions[95] urging various Soviet institutions and officials particularly in the invasion areas to speed up defensive preparations. On August 9 he also gave a personal order for the mining of the Kronstadt Bay in front of Petrograd.[96] At the same time he called in an almost irrational fashion for the harshest terroristic measures against his compatriots. Thus, in his major "innovations" of August 9-10, the head of the Soviet state now urged the shooting of hostages, singled out specific groups of the population for the death penalty, and recommended for the first time execution by hanging, as distinct from shooting. As has been pointed out recently, the Red terror in fact began not after the attempt on Lenin's life on August 30, 1918, but on August 9,[97] the day after the "Black Day" of Ludendorff's armies on the Western front that shattered Lenin's vistas.

The events on the Western front showed that Lenin's opponents had been correct in their forecast of the United States' crucial role in the war and others now recognized it. Thus Pravda wrote on August 17 that the bankruptcy of German capitalism was already tangible but, the paper added, this "does not mean a general bankruptcy of imperialism.

It is logical that the United States, which asserts itself decisively on the Western front, is about to dictate the fate of the world".[98] In a backlash from the "Black Day" Lenin himself on August 20 wrote a "Letter to American Workers", a harsh, vituperative attack on the destroyer of his world, the "freshest and strongest" imperialism of the United States and the "servant of the capitalist sharks", President Wilson.[99] For the first time, however, Lenin here voiced the most profound despair and even resignation:

> "We are now...in a besieged fortress, waiting for the other detachments of the world socialist revolution to come to our relief...We know that the help from you will probably not come soon, comrade American workers ...We know that before the world revolution breaks out a number of separate revolutions may be defeated."[100]

Nevertheless Lenin also stubbornly defended his Brest policy and claimed for himself the right of entering another "agreement" with Germany if the Allied intervention went on.

When Lenin wrote these lines, a new Soviet-German agreement was becoming a fact. The German setback of August 8 even facilitated the rapprochement.[101] The Soviet government now made several major concessions while Ludendorff in turn gave his consent to the evacuation of southern Russia, demanded by Lenin's government. Ambassador Helfferich, who after his arrival in Moscow turned into a staunch opponent of the Bolsheviks, had already been recalled.[102] In any case, the treaty supplementing the Brest peace was drafted by August 10 and finally signed on August 27.[103]

The treaty obligated Germany to evacuate Belorussia, Rostov and a part of the Don region, as well as to give Soviet Russia access to the

Baltic Sea via Reval and Riga. Berlin also promised to refrain from interfering in Russia's internal affairs and from supporting the separatist movements on the Russian territory. The Soviet government in turn definitely renounced sovereignty over Estonia and Latvia. The economic clauses provided, inter alia, for coal deliveries from the Ukraine to Soviet Russia and for the Soviet export to Germany of the Baku oil and other strategic raw materials. In the financial agreement attached to the treaty the Soviet government obligated itself to pay Germany a sum of six million marks "for the loss to Germans caused by Russian measures", while the Germans de facto recognized the Soviet nationalization laws.[104]

The most intimate aspects of the Soviet-German relations were spelled out in two notes exchanged between Ioffe and the new State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry Admiral Hintze. They obliged Germany eventually to undertake action for the expulsion of Allied troops from northern Russia, as well as to assist the Soviet government in fighting the White forces. Moscow in turn agreed to the eventual use by the Germans of the Russian warships in the Black Sea for military purposes, provided that Berlin would pay "full indemnity for the services and damages" suffered by these ships while in action.[105]

The supplementary treaty of August 27 reflected the peculiar nature of the Soviet-German relations in the summer of 1918. It was an unequal deal between two unequal partners now hard pressed by the common enemy. It was an unequal deal which nevertheless contained elements of intimacy and solidarity. The treaty was welcome in Moscow, being considered a major step towards the lasting friendship between the two countries.[106]

Similar views were also expressed on the German side.[107]

This trend in the Soviet-German relations was plain enough to rouse apprehension of the German socialists.[108] In her Breslau prison Rosa Luxemburg now wrote a brilliant article, "The Russian Tragedy", a very critical but compassionate analysis of Lenin's foreign policy. She pointed out that the Brest peace was the chief cause of the split in Russian socialism and of the Bolsheviks' precarious position, a position which could result in a "grotesque 'pairing' between Lenin and Hindenburg", as she called an alliance between Red Moscow and Imperial Berlin. Such a "socialist revolution sitting on the German bayonets" would mean the "moral suicide" of the Bolsheviks and be a most frightful blow to international socialism. Yet Luxemburg admitted that in the given situation "every socialist party" in Russia would have to pursue a false tactic because the building of socialism in one country surrounded by the hostile imperialism was tantamount to the squaring of the circle.[109]

The weeks after the supplementary treaty on August 27 were indeed marked by the Soviet desire to cultivate the established relations with Berlin. This was mirrored in the Soviet press which came to comment on German affairs in almost a friendly tone.[110] Even Ludendorff's military intelligence, always very critical of the Bolsheviks, admitted on September 27 that the Soviet press now treated Germany in a "proper language".[111] The front in the West had meanwhile been stabilized and Ioffe intimated on September 18 in Berlin that Germany could hold out for two more years before being compelled to capitulate, and that the "leading circles" of both countries were increasingly convinced that Soviet Russia,

after all, would take part in the war on the German side.[112] The policy of seeking security through accommodation with Imperial Germany, persistently pursued by Lenin for ten previous months, still seemed to be bringing positive results. Late in September, the prospect of Lenin's government dramatically deteriorated as a result of developments in the Balkans.

CHAPTER IV

THE ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY PHASE: SEPTEMBER - EARLY NOVEMBER 1918

Hardly any other aspect covered by this study is so misunderstood and misinterpreted as the policy which the Bolsheviks and their followers, especially in Germany, pursued in the crucial weeks preceding the German surrender. Although it no longer appears credible that this policy caused Germany's internal collapse and revolution, as the proponents of the "stab-in-the-back" theory maintained, some scholars still assume that the Bolsheviks, their representatives, agents, and allies in the countries of the German bloc, could not but strive unreservedly for the collapse of the conservative monarchies and for revolution in Central Europe.[1] In effect, Moscow's policies in this crucial phase were much more intricate and its practical objectives vis-à-vis the Central powers just the opposite of what they are believed to have been.

Intervention or World Revolution?

Bulgaria, the weakest link in the German camp, became in the latter part of September 1918 the scene of a bizarre event. After the Allies had attacked on the Balkan front, the Bulgarian soldiers left the trenches, returned their arms and went home. In a few days the Balkan front was wide open to the Allied troops. It appeared that the Central powers were heading towards a crushing defeat and perhaps a revolution. Several months earlier the Bolsheviks might have welcomed such a prospect with relief. In the autumn of 1918, however, such a development could not but raise their apprehension. If anything, the Bolsheviks had good reasons to suspect that the impending revolution in Europe would not be

transformed into a proletarian one in the foreseeable future. Lenin in his persistent defeatist propaganda had maintained that revolution was likely in the defeated countries. Yet, in looking at the world scene in the autumn of 1918, the Bolsheviks were aware that the Entente was determined to prevent proletarian revolution in those countries. Consequently, Lenin viewed the United States, Britain, and France not as the centres of revolution but as the "throttlers and executioners of world revolution".[2]

Moreover, it was clear to the Bolsheviks that the proletarian revolution did not have a sufficient base even in the countries facing the defeat. Very illuminating is the story of Nicholai Bukharin, whom Lenin sent in May 1918 to Berlin to formally participate in economic talks with the Germans. Bukharin, who never underestimated contemporary capitalism, during his visit of the Prussian capital must have made a gloomy assessment of the German revolution. According to a subsequent German intelligence report, after his return to Russia, Bukharin at a session of the Left Communists described the German proletariat as passive, weary, very indifferent and pessimistic, and indicated that the offensive of the revolutionary forces would not suffice for the overthrow of capitalism.[3] The report was obviously well founded, since the Soviet Vice-Consul Voronov also informed the Germans about Bukharin's disbelief in the revolution in Germany.[4] Bukharin himself later voiced his pessimism in Pravda. "The European revolution," he wrote in August 1918,

> will inevitably take a much sharper form than the Russian proletarian revolution did. The resistance of the bourgeoisie will be tougher and more determined. The disciplined military caste, the officers corps, will fight the workers' to the last drop of its blood. In the final stage, the

> technical corps, the so-called intelligentsia, will be sabotaging the proletariat ten times more intensively than the Russian one.[5]

Unlike in Russia, Bukharin went on, "the intelligentsia in old capitalist countries is fully a fixed psychological type, actively hostile towards socialism before the beginning of the struggle". In conclusion he rejected the allegedly Menshevik contention that the struggle of the European proletariat would proceed "like clockwork".[6] It therefore is not surprising that from the summer of 1918 Bukharin and his friends were loyal to Lenin and came to support his course of foreign policy.

Trotsky, for his part, had anticipated that the world war could either bring about socialist revolution or "exhaust not only the resources of society but also the moral forces of the proletariat" and consume its revolutionary energy and élan.[7] In October 1918 he saw the war ending in the latter way. The workers' masses in Europe, he admitted, were "too lazy, supine, and indecisive", German socialism was split and the international workers' movement paralyzed.[8] Consequently Trotsky continued in the autumn of 1918 to devote all his energy to Soviet Russia's defence, indirectly ridiculing the Soviet propaganda of world revolution as a "policy of bluffs, superficial effects and verbal deterrence".[9]

Lenin considered a well organized and experienced proletarian party a sine qua non of the revolution. Such an avantgarde was a product of a prolonged socio-economic and political development in a particular country. In October 1918, however, there existed no such organization in the West.[10] Lenin, fairly well informed by his agents abroad,[11] was aware of this basic deficiency. Surveying the situation in the West in

October 1918, he concluded apprehensively that the "greatest misfortune and danger" was the fact that there existed no revolutionary party in Europe. In his view, the Soviet task was first to create and support the revolutionary groups abroad. Thus Lenin indicated that the international proletariat faced only the period of organizational efforts, not the proletarian revolution.[12] Moreover, Lenin and the Bolsheviks imagined the revolution breaking out only during the war or in the immediate postwar crisis.[13] The advent of peace, they assumed, could only bring the consolidation of capitalism and halt the revolution.[14]

Consequently, in his major pamphlet written on the eve of the German revolution, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, Lenin vehemently denied Kautsky's alleged contention that the Bolsheviks had based their tactics "on the expectation of a revolution in other countries by a definite date". The Bolshevik party "has never been guilty of such stupidity" as to expect the proletarian revolution "in the more or less near future".[15] The fate of world revolution was now dependent primarily on efforts of the socialist parties in the West which, however, based their tactics "on the cowardly fear of world revolution...on the narrow nationalist desire to protect one's own fatherland".[16] True, Lenin stated in October 1918 that the Bolsheviks had never been closer to world revolution and that they had never been in such a perilous situation.[17] However, while he was still unable to visualize this revolution and refused to speculate on its outbreak, the danger to Soviet Russia now appeared to him real and imminent.

As Lenin repeatedly stated after November 1917, the Soviet government had been able to sustain the foreign pressure only because the war

had prevented either camp from intervening effectively in Russia.[18] Now, however, the equilibrium of forces was drawing to an end. The impending German surrender threatened to open naval and land routes to the very heart of Russia and relieve Allied forces for a large-scale crusade against Bolshevism. Strong motive seemed to exist. Terror and class struggle by the Bolsheviks since the summer of 1918 made them outcasts in the civilized world.[19] Lenin's government also defied the Allies on numerous occasions, particularly by the annulment of foreign credits and nationalization decrees, and Lenin had unilaterally tied his regime with the losing side, the Central powers. Consequently intervention against Bolshevism could be justified both on humanitarian grounds and as an extension of the war against Germany. Actions such as the release by the U.S. State Department in September 1918 of the Sisson documents, revealing the alleged or true details of the German-Bolshevik cooperation,[20] showed that Washington was preparing grounds for such an extension of the war.

Hence the Bolsheviks immediately associated the Central powers' setback in the Balkans not with the revolution but with the prospect of Western intervention in Russia. For instance, in its first comment on the Balkan developments, Pravda concluded that the Allies "will attempt to crush German imperialism and the Russian detachment of the international revolution at the same time".[21] Prominent Bolsheviks, including Lenin, Trotsky, Sverdlov, and Radek, subsequently spelled out this threat in their analysis of the international situation.[22] This does not mean, of course, that they considered the danger equally acute and serious. Lenin belonged to the most pessimistic among them, assuming that the impending confrontation would be a total one and that the Allies would

uncompromisingly attempt to eradicate the Soviet system.[23] For about three months following the German setback in the Balkans in late September 1918 Lenin lived on the verge of resignation, and his literary production, including The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky in many respects constituted an intellectual epitaph of Bolshevism.[24]

To Trotsky the impending German defeat meant the vindication of his own predictions and warnings. Lashing, in fact, at the Leninist faction and Lenin himself, Trotsky pointed out at the VTsIK session of October 3 the crucial role of the United States in the war, and added that it was anticipated only by those who "have preserved a clear, sober political outlook and assessed the events from the standpoint of historical materialism". History, he went on "perhaps goes against our wishes but along the line we have drawn up".[25] At the same time, determined to cement the party unity, Trotsky retrospectively endorsed Lenin's Brest policy of a "breathing spell" maintaining that it had strengthened the Soviet government and put it into a better position to fight against capitalism.[26]

By irony of fate Trotsky, for years pessimistic in regard to the vitality of the proletarian revolution in Russia, now saw the immediate future of the Soviet government in a more optimistic light than Lenin himself. In contrast to Lenin, Trotsky did not believe in an irreconcilable antagonism between Soviet Russia and the Western powers. In his view, Allied hostility was rather a by-product of anti-German efforts on the part of the Allies than a reason per se.[26] This implied that with the advent of peace the danger of intervention would subside. Moreover, Trotsky assumed that a large scale intervention required several months of

preparations and did not regard the Allied threat as imminent as Lenin did.[27] Generally speaking, however, Western intervention in the autumn of 1918 became the chief concern of the Bolsheviks and the pivotal point of their domestic and foreign policies.

After the collapse of the Central powers in the Balkans, Lenin in a letter to Trotsky and Sverdlov of October 1, outlined a new tactical line which typically combined the elements of reality and fiction. In it Lenin requested the VTsIK to adopt a resolution to the effect that the international revolution was imminent, that Soviet Russia offered the German workers an alliance, grain, and military assistance, and therefore had to multiply its efforts in storing up grain and building the army. By the spring of 1919 three million Red soldiers were to be ready to assist the international workers' revolution.[28] Following another mobilizing letter of October 2,[29] the VTsIK adopted a resolution on October 3 urging the Russian workers and peasants "to redouble their struggle against the invading Allied bandits and at the same time to prepare active military assistance and food supplies for the working classes of Germany and Austria-Hungary".[30]

In Chicherin's words, the resolution of October 3 "stirred the entire world" and had a considerable impact on the subsequent events in the camp of the Central powers. Until today the resolution has been regarded either as evidence of the Bolsheviks' aggressiveness or of their unshakable revolutionary optimism and illusions.[31] Yet a brief look at Soviet military planning puts it into a very different light. Complying with the VTsIK directive of October 3, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief (Glavkom) Vatsetis on October 7 drafted a plan of Soviet military operations

for the coming months. The plan, perhaps initiated and certainly approved by the highest authorities, envisaged that Soviet efforts would be consummated in the defence of Soviet territory against intervention. Accordingly, the Southern front, defending the most likely areas of intervention, was singled out as the crucial one for the fate of Soviet Russia. As regards the Western front, the only conceivable bridgehead to Germany and Europe, the Soviets now anticipated a gradual retreat of Red troops from there eastwards to Moscow, accompanied by the destruction of all technical facilities and of the transportation system. The troops of the Western front would finally concentrate west of Moscow and make every effort to retain the capital city in Soviet hands.[32] Evidently, the famous offer of military assistance to the German proletariat was from the beginning a piece of Lenin's inventive propaganda not expected to be followed by deeds. It was designed rather for domestic consumption, that is to say, to justify to the Russian population new sacrifices and setbacks.[33]

From early October onwards Lenin's government indeed adopted a number of unpopular mobilization measures. For instance, a new conscription campaign was launched to expand the Red Army, compulsory labour was decreed for all citizens between the age of 16 and 50, and the Sovnarkom imposed a special tax on the propertied classes to meet the expenditures on defence. Concurrently, the executive power in Moscow was further centralized, and Lenin now made major foreign policy decisions before or even without the formal approval of the party. In November 1918 he became a virtual dictator after assuming the chairmanship of the newly created Council of Defence. This six-member body was designed for the

mobilization of Russia's resources for defensive purposes and exercised absolute authority over every Soviet institution and subject. It is indicative of its importance that Lenin took part in all but two of its meetings, even though the Council met 101 times between December 1, 1918, and February 27, 1920, i.e. almost once every four days.[34]

From October 1918 Lenin's government also made efforts to broaden its political base. Thus, terror and class warfare in the village were curbed and the policy of alliance with the middle peasant was substituted. The Bolsheviks also released from jail some Mensheviks and permitted their meetings. After a Menshevik appeal to the socialists of all countries to fight the Allied "crusade against revolutionary Russia", the VTsIK on November 30 legalized the Menshevik party.[35]

Concurrently with manufacturing the illusion of an imminent world revolution, the Bolsheviks also adopted measures betraying their fear of collapse. These included, for instance, the physical liquidation of such delicate witnesses as the former double-agent Malinovsky, the former tsarist officials Beletesky, Iunkovsky, and Trepov; the transfer of moneys to the West; the training of the party organizations in the invasion areas for underground activities, etc. In sum, Moscow in the autumn of 1918 reinvigorated the propaganda of world revolution but its policies on the home front responded primarily to the threat of anti-Bolshevik intervention.

The Revolution Unwelcome: Bulgaria, the Ukraine, Germany

Had not the prospect of the proletariat coming to power in the West been so dim, Moscow in the autumn of 1918 might have wished for German defeat and revolution. However, there was little doubt that a revolution in the defeated countries, especially in Germany, would bring to power

moderate socialists who, in addition to their respect for parliamentary democracy, now sought peace and reconciliation with the Western powers. "The collapse of the German imperialism", Radek argued from this standpoint in October 1918, "does not mean the victory of the German revolution, but a victory of the Allied imperialism".[36] An Allied victory and German defeat was therefore most undesirable to Moscow. "If Germany is defeated", Lenin argued, "it would be impossible to maneuvre because there would no longer be the two belligerents between which we have been maneouvring".[37] On the other hand, the Bolsheviks could only benefit from Germany's continuing resistance to the Western powers and the prolongation of the world war. It not only postponed their military confrontation with the West but also weakened both belligerent camps and aggravated their domestic problems. Moscow indeed had a good reason in the autumn of 1918 for wishing as little for the outbreak of revolution in the German bloc as for the German surrender itself.

The first German bloc country to face defeat and a revolutionary crisis was Bulgaria. The news from this country since the summer of 1918 signaled that war weariness had spread both within the army and among the civilian population. A large section of the army vowed not to fight after September 15 regardless of whether peace was concluded or not. The rumor about Bulgaria's early withdrawal from the war began to circulate in the European press despite repeated denials from Sofia. On the domestic political scene the forces were delicately balanced throughout the summer of 1918. While the democratic elements and moderate socialists called for a republic, democratic peace, and a rapprochement with the Western powers, the forces which were determined to continue the war

on the German side rallied behind King Ferdinand.[38]

What position did the Tesniaks (Narrows), the left wing of the Bulgarian socialists take? Out of all radical groupings outside Russia the Tesniaks traditionally stood closest to the Bolshevik party. Their spiritus agens and leader was the aged Dimitri Blagoev, who had for years been active in the Russian revolutionary movement. During the war he oriented the group towards the Leninist slogan of transforming the imperialist war into a civil war.[39] Until the summer of 1918 the Tesniaks, following the Bolshevik course, had taken part in anti-war activities and paid for it with arrests. In the late summer, however, they adopted new tactics. It is not clear how active a role Moscow played here. Technically, as the Bolsheviks had learned about the maturing crisis in Bulgaria since at least the middle of August,[40] there was sufficient time to convey to the Tesniaks the desirable course.[41] Besides, Blagoev himself was experienced enough to grasp the needs of the Russian revolution even without the Bolshevik hint. In any case, in the late summer the Tesniaks curbed their radicalism and ceased their anti-war pronouncements. In turn, the pressure on them eased. Some Left Tesniaks like Georgi Dimitrov who had not abandoned their anti-war stand were jailed, but the party operated fairly unhindered in September 1918.

On September 22, while the unrest in the army was rapidly mounting, the Tesniaks held a party conference and adopted a resolution regarding the international situation and the tasks of the party. It constituted a demonstrative declaration of solidarity with Soviet Russia and the Bolsheviks. The Tesniaks argued that:

> A defeat of Soviet Russia would halt entirely the revolutionary movement of the international proletariat. Therefore all sympathies of the Bulgarian and the Balkan socialist proletariat are on the side of the Soviet socialist government...The Russian revolution is not merely of a local importance...the proletarian parties struggling for the victory of socialism in Europe have to support with all their vigor the Russian revolution.[42]

Two days later the Tesniaks demonstrated their solidarity in practice. After the Bulgarian soldiers started their revolt, Stamboliiski, the leader of the radical democratic Peasant Party, approached Blagoev. His proposal was to assume a joint leadership in the uprising, overthrow King Ferdinand and the Germanophile clique, and establish a republic. Blagoev, however, struggling for years for the same goal, now bluntly rejected Stambuliiski's proposal. The Tesniaks then resolved not to participate in the uprising.[43] Thus the chance was passed of transforming a revolt into a revolution and of establishing a radical democratic republic.[44]

This puzzling inactivity has led scholars of communism to the conclusion that the Tesniaks acted in dissonance with the Bolsheviks and that Blagoev himself, to quote from a recent monograph, was an "opaque dogmatist" exhibiting hardly an "iota of Lenin's imagination".[45] Such criticism is based on the assumption that Moscow in the autumn of 1918 ardently espoused the defeat of the Central powers and the onset of revolution. However, as has been indicated above, these were not in the interests of the Bolsheviks. And it appears that the Tesniaks had adjusted their tactics accordingly. Their resolution of September 22 echoed the chief Leninist axiom of that time, namely that a total defeat of Germany was undesirable.[46] Along this line the Tesniaks also later

defended their inactivity during the September uprising. Bulgaria, they argued, was a small country and a revolution there could have been suppressed within a few days; the soldiers' mutiny in given circumstances actually worked "to the advantage of the Entente" and therefore was reactionary.[47] Evidently, their pledge of unreserved support for the Bolsheviks of September 22 was not an empty gesture. The refusal of the Tesniaks in September 1918 to make a revolution was in contradiction to Lenin's principles of revolutionary strategy and their own interests, but in complete harmony with the actual Bolshevik desire to postpone the collapse of the German bloc and Western intervention in Russia.

In no other area did Moscow's tactics become so evident as in formerly Russian territories occupied by the Central powers. As has been seen, the Bolsheviks had pursued a very cautious policy towards these territories, chiefly because of the pressure of Ludendorff's armies. However, they continued this policy even after the German situation on the Western front had deteriorated in August 1918. Moscow's course of restraining the masses from action became very unpopular, particularly in the Ukraine where the anti-German sentiment was strongest. To relieve the revolutionary élan, the Ukrainian Central Committee on September 22 accepted Lenin's proposal to form two divisions from the partisan units operating in the neutral zone between the Ukraine and Soviet Russia.[48] At the same time the Ukrainian Central Committee strictly forbade military actions against the Germans.[49]

Then came the setback of the Central powers on the Balkan front in late September. A new German advance against Russia now became out of the question. As Trotsky acknowledged, Germany "has disappeared from

the scene as a threat to us".[50] Coordinated action by the Russian and Ukrainian Red forces against the inferior German troops could lead to the liberation of Ukrainian territory and acceleration of the German revolution. Instead, the Soviets in early October in the name of world revolution demonstratively expressed their observance of the Brest treaty. "Binding the fate of the Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, the Baltic, and Finland closely to the fate of the proletarian revolution", the VTsIK declared on October 3, 1918, "we reject any idea whatever of any rapprochement with Allied imperialism for the purpose of changing the provisions of the Brest-Litovsk treaty".[51]

The Ukrainian revolutionaries however, did not have an understanding for such a policy. They passionately disapproved of the embargo on revolutionary actions. Moscow defended its policy on the flimsy ground that inactivity was beneficial to the German revolution. It was the duty of "intelligent Ukrainian communists" to be cautious and patient, Lenin argued, maintaining that Russian "interference" would harm the German revolution.[52]

In the middle of October the differences were discussed at a hastily convened congress of the Ukrainian communists held in Moscow.[53] Particularly, the problem of the two Ukrainian divisions operating the neutral zone became the subject of hot controversies. The "Muscovites", especially Trotsky and Leo Kamenev, argued that the divisions continued to violate the Brest peace and categorically demanded their dissolution and transfer to other fronts.[54] Such a step, which would relieve German troops in the East, was contested by the Ukrainians. Striking a compromise the congress decided first to send a fact-finding mission into the

neutral zone. Under heavy Bolshevik pressure the Ukrainian party also elected a new, pro-Muscovite Central Committee which included even a Georgian, Stalin. This body adopted the Bolshevik policy of revolutionary abstinence. In the latter part of October the Bolsheviks also arranged a congress of the party organizations working in the occupied territories. This congress too was held in Moscow and approved of a similar policy.[55] In sum, Moscow restrained the population of the German-occupied territories from revolutionary action until the very last days of the German resistance to the Western powers.

The Bolshevik policy towards Germany in October 1918 was similar in substance but more intricate and complex than that towards the German-occupied territories. If anything, the possibility of a German defeat made undesirable any plain cooperation with the Imperial regime. The Bolsheviks therefore voiced their interest in Germany's continuing resistance to the Western powers in a veiled and diversified form. The offer of military assistance and grain of October 3 to the "German proletariat" adequately reflected the Bolshevik position. Declaring that the German working class was "moving irresistibly towards power", and that in this process, the war between the Allies and the Central powers "may from day to day change into a struggle of imperialism against proletarian Germany", the VTsIK promised Soviet support to the revolutionary power in Germany against its "imperialist enemies".[56] The resolution, though ambiguous, was understood by the German authorities. For instance, commenting on it, Ludendorff's military intelligence concluded that to the Bolsheviks a general peace was very undesirable and that most of all, they were afraid of a German-Allied anti-Bolshevik front.[57] The German

government did not even deem it necessary to protest in Moscow against the offer of armed aid to the "German proletariat".

The resolution of October 3 established a pattern for the Soviet press, which subsequently noted and commented on all aspects of the approaching revolution in the West and particularly in Germany. Yet, concurrently with making these pronouncements, the prominent Bolsheviks confidentially stated their interest in preserving Germany's capacity to resist. On October 3, for instance, Chicherin indicated to the German Consul in Moscow, Hausschild, that Soviet Russia would benefit from Germany's internal consolidation. Expanding on this idea, Karl Radek, the head of the Central European department of the Narkomindel, declared to Hausschild that Germany was still quite strong militarily and that her internal consolidation could be accomplished by radical means. In his view, Germany's panacea consisted in establishing a firm dictatorship and a state of siege. For practical reasons Radek evidently had in mind a Right-wing dictatorship.[58] Russia, he subsequently stated to a German agent, would benefit from a German revolution only if it won at one stroke and quickly overcame the disruption caused by the struggle with the internal counter-revolution; a civil war in Germany was not in Russia's interest, and Moscow would instead prefer the "system Ludeudorff-Helfferich".[59] Other prominent Bolsheviks also hardly concealed their sympathy for the German Right which, in Bukharin's appreciative words, called "in the strongest and manly manner" for the iron hand of the military dictatorship in order to continue the war.[60]

Moscow evaluated German socialism along similar lines. Its attitude towards the Majority Socialists now remained as controversial as the

policy of the latter. After the events in Bulgaria, the Majority Socialists became proponents of a speedy and democratic peace with the Western powers. In early October they formed with the Centrists and Liberals a new coalition government, headed by Prince Max von Baden. It approached President Wilson with a proposal of open negotiations for a general peace based on his principles. The Majority Socialists also became instrumental in Germany's democratization which was considered a precondition of an accord with the Allies. At the same time, however, they carefully avoided any act which might undermine Germany's military power. In their view Germany could get an honest peace only if she remained as strong as possible. Consequently, Moscow criticized and ridiculed them for the peace initiative and democratization efforts, but refrained from assaulting them frontally.

The Bolshevik attitude towards the Independent Socialists (USPD) underwent a radical change in October 1918. The Independents, who had constituted themselves as a party in April 1917, were sincere opponents of the war and advocates of a just and democratic peace. Consequently Ioffe had cultivated contacts with this party during the Brest period. But now relations between the Independent Socialists and Moscow cooled off. In October 1918, the Independents came to earn Bolshevik scorn for their pacifism, reliance on Western democracies, alleged cowardliness, and lack of realistic foresight. Lenin himself rather unjustly attacked the prominent figure of the Independents in his pamphlet The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky.[61]

In the process of this re-evaluation Moscow also reversed its positive attitude towards the national liberation movements in Austria-Hungary.

In the autumn of 1918 the Soviet press came to report in an unfriendly tone on the national aspirations of the Poles, Yugoslavs, and particularly the Czechoslovaks. Karl Radek, himself a Pole from the Austrian part of Galicia, in October 1918, declared as fundamentally wrong the break up of the Hapsburg empire, that is to say the revolution.[62] Consequently, in giving instructions on behalf of the Bolsheviks to the German, Hungarian, Czech, and Yugoslavian communists returning home from Russia, he asked them not to imitate the "Bolshevik tactic" in the immediate future.[63] After the Dual Monarchy nevertheless disintegrated in October and early November 1918, Moscow proved very reluctant in recognizing the demise of its Brest partner.[64]

Spartakus in October 1918: A Shift Towards Patriotism

The Gruppe Internationale, better known as Spartakus, constituted itself in 1915-1916 as a group of German anti-war radicals who disapproved of the policy of Burgfrieden, (national reconciliation) as pursued during the war by the German Social Democrats. Its foremost members were Rosa Luxemburg, a brilliant socialist intellectual of Polish background, and Karl Liebknecht, the son of the co-founder of the SPD and notable anti-militarist and war-resister. Both leading Spartacists were jailed in 1916 for their anti-war propaganda and the group worked in semi-legality.[65]

Although the Spartacists and the Bolsheviks represented the extreme Left in their respective countries, they responded to two different realities and were unable to unite on a common platform prior to the autumn of 1918. The disharmony, manifested in the protracted dispute between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, turned during the war into a conflict of interest.

For instance, while Lenin called for the defeat of Russia, hoping that it would kindle the Russian revolution, Rosa Luxemburg for an analogical reason wished for the defeat of Germany. She and her colleagues also felt unhappy about the Bolshevik drive for peace, realizing that it not only discredited the Bolsheviks but also made Ludendorff's victory in the West possible and thus damaged the cause of the German revolution.[66]

Lenin's policy of concessions to Germany in the spring and summer of 1918 caused consternation among the Spartacists, but they reacted in a comradely fashion. To boost the Bolshevik morale, they initiated in the summer of 1918 a propaganda campaign in favor of Lenin's government.[67] But also in that same summer Rosa Luxemburg, annoyed by the Bolshevik policies and use of terror, wrote her famous pamphlet on the Russian revolution in which she warned the German Left against adopting these policies in Germany.[68] Nevertheless, from prison she also urged the German workers and soldiers to act and save the Soviet regime before its "moral suicide", meaning an alliance between Red Moscow and Imperial Berlin.[69]

From the summer of 1918 the relations between the Spartacists and Moscow began to improve. This was mirrored in the embargo which they imposed on any public criticism of the Bolsheviks and which worked chiefly against Rosa Luxemburg. In September 1918 she wrote another sharp critique of Bolshevik foreign policies concerning the supplementary Brest treaty, but her colleagues refused to print it in the group's organ, Spartakusbriefe.[70] Meanwhile, on September 5, Ernst Meyer, one of the Spartacist leaders working in the Soviet press agency ROSTA in Berlin, sent a letter to Lenin promising solidarity actions in the forthcoming

winter.[71]

Meyer's letter marked the incipient Sparatacist shift to the Bolshevik position. Such a development was not entirely unexpected considering the imprisonment of Luxemburg and her colleague Iogiches, the Spartacists' solidarity with Soviet Russia, and their numerical weakness and pessimism regarding the proletarian revolution in Germany.[72] In any case, after the collapse of the Balkan front, possibly on October 7, the Spartacists and some fellow-travellers held a conference which adopted a platform similar to that of the Bulgarian Tesniaks.

First, Spartakus, for the first time as a political organization, plainly professed its loyalty to Soviet Russia. The conference sent a warm message to Moscow expressing solidarity and brotherly sympathy, and pledging to prove this solidarity in deeds, not in words.[73] Furthermore, the Spartacists revised their negative attitude towards the existing government in Germany. The program they now adopted called for such measures as a political amnesty, termination of the state of siege and the cancellation of compulsory labor. It also nominally raised more substantial issues such as the expropriation of basic industries, democratisation of the army, and abolition of the death penalty, but postponed their realization into the indefinite future. The Spartacist program, radical in tone but reformist in essence, virtually amounted to a critical toleration of the existing Imperial government.[74]

Furthermore, like the Tesniaks in Bulgaria, Spartakus now adopted the view that the defeat of Germany was undesirable. This was entailed in the conference resolution stating that German defeat would mean the hegemony of the Entente of the world scene. Similarly, in an appeal to

the German population Spartakus warned that the Allied victory would even increase the exploitation of the German workers.[75] Consequently, in their resolution of October 7, the Spartacists rejected a Wilsonian peace, the League of Nations, and the pacifism of the Independent Socialists. They declared their own position in the key passage of the resolution, namely that, after the difficult war years, the "first and supreme duty" of the German masses was "not only not to fall into the back of the brothers on the front, but to assist and take up [their] struggle".[76]

Thus, using class terminology, the Spartacists in October 1918 not only rejected peace with the Western powers, but de facto also upheld the course of continuing war efforts. The conference started an amazing political metamorphosis from a war-resisting to a defence-minded organization, a metamorphosis which can only be explained by the Spartacists' willingness to harmonize their policy with Soviet interests. Indeed, Lenin, who had previously branded support of the war efforts by the socialists as the worst kind of treachery, now responded by congratulating the Spartacists for saving "the honour of German socialism".[77] Not incidentally, Karl Radek likewise welcomed their "negative approach towards pacifism".[78]

This is not to suggest that Spartakus fully adjusted to Moscow's policy, or that its members instantly accepted the new defencist course.[79] As a whole, however, the Spartacists had taken a position which was given little publicity in the postwar search for the causes of the German collapse in November 1918. Even the experts of an investigating committee of the German Reichstag merely admitted that Spartakus, in the autumn of

1918, "stood both in ideology and tactics in an irreconcilable opposition" to the Independent Socialists,[80] the party which has been held responsible for the German internal collapse in November 1918. From the Spartacists themselves Thalheimer, for instance, later vehemently dismissed as infamy the contention that the group had contributed at all to the "stabbing of the front" in November 1918.[81] Indeed, following their conference of October 1918 the Spartacists almost invariably sought the enemy "on the other side of trenches" and called for the "last and sacred struggle with a weapon in the hand", or for a "life and death struggle against the Anglo-American imperialism" in alliance with Soviet Russia.[82]

Spartakus was assisted by the Bolsheviks. After they had transferred large amounts of money to Western Europe,[83] their representatives in Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden stepped up their production and distribution of materials propagating the Soviet system. This activity was mostly approved by the German authorities. Besides, the Bolsheviks in October 1918 began to distribute in the German speaking countries materials propagating Soviet-German cooperation and German resistance to the Allies. Thus there were circulating in Germany such documents as Lenin's letter of October 2 and the VTsIK resolution of the next day, promising military assistance and grain to the German proletariat, Radek's pamphlet calling for a "single front between the Urals and the Rhine",[84] Bukharin's article summoning the German proletariat to the assistance of Soviet Russia,[85] and the above mentioned letter of Lenin to the American workers of August 1918 hinting at the possibility of an alliance between Moscow and German imperialism. Ioffe also handed over to the Spartacists some

funds to increase the circulation of their organ, Spartakusbriefe.[86]

What position did the two imprisoned leaders of Spartakus, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, take in October 1918? The former had now evidently diverged from her colleagues. First, Luxemburg, standing close to the Independent Socialists, the party to which the Spartacists nominally belonged, in October 1918 continued to oppose any prolongation of the war. Second, she was at the same time at variance with her colleagues over their attitude towards the Bolsheviks. Ernst Meyer, now a spiritus agens of Spartakus, had, in his own words, a "very lively" exchange of letters with her about the evaluation of Soviet Russia and Germany's domestic situation,[87] but Luxemburg did not change her mind. The cleavage was partly reflected also in the October issue of the Spartakusbriefe. While she condemned the idea of Durchhalten (holding out) in the war and the government's efforts to halt the maturing crisis in Germany,[88] the same issue carried the defence-minded resolution of the Spartacist conference of October 7; and another article ridiculed the Independent Socialists for banking on a democratic, negotiated peace with the Entente.[89]

The pronounced anti-war stand made Luxemburg a persona non grata to Berlin. While many of the German socialists, including Liebknecht, were released from prison or preventive custody, Luxemburg had her detention prolonged on the grounds that its original cause remained valid. Put in the words of her first detention order, it continued to be suspected that she "would effectively engage in carrying out her political ideas and aims, in particular the enforcement of peace through the incitement of the masses and in disregard of the patriotic interests".[90] Since the

Bolsheviks also did not press for her release, she and her friend, a war resister critical of the Bolsheviks, Leo Iogiches, were only liberated because of the German revolution.

There were several reasons why Karl Liebknecht in October 1918 did not share Luxemburg's view and fate. Far from being a "man without a country", as an American scholar has labelled him,[91] Liebknecht had quite strong feelings about the contemporary world. It is not surprising that his perennial conflicts with official Germany had never eroded his deep attachment to the country of Marx and Goethe. Unlike Luxemburg, he never called Germany the "most reactionary country". Such an infamous place was reserved in his mind for the United States. Since his prewar visit to the New Continent, that country had become for him a symbol of oppression and brutality.[92] On the other hand Liebknecht had genuine and lasting sympathies for Russia and the Russians. He had maintained close contacts with the Russian revolutionary émigrés, defending them in German courts, and had married a Russian teacher. Although critical of Lenin's policies during the war, Liebknecht also realized the strength and regenerative capacities of contemporary capitalism, as well as a "shocking weakness" of international socialism.[93] He therefore perceived more clearly than his German contemporaries the uniqueness, however imperfect, of the Soviet system in Russia. Having become attracted by the Bolshevik government and, being a born activist with a strong sense of solidarity, Liebknecht proved ready to listen and follow the Bolshevik calls for assistance. A failure of Soviet Russia, in his view of October 1918, would mean a "defeat of the proletariat of the whole world".[94] It was this deep commitment to the Russian revolution that divided him from Rosa

Luxemburg and, as will be seen, that dominated his thought and action until the tragic days of January 1919.

Although Liebknecht had already adopted a positive attitude towards the Soviet regime in the summer of 1918, he continued to use the traditional battle-cry "Down with the war" until late September. Following the setback of the Central powers on the Balkan front, however, this slogan vanished from his vocabulary. One may surmise that the reputed anti-militarist initiated the defence-minded platform of the Spartacist conference of October 7. As will be seen, he upheld it explicitly after his release from the prison. In any case, as early as October 7, Philip Scheidemann, the chief expert on Bolshevism among the Majority Socialists, now a State Secretary, began to urge Liebknecht's release from the prison.[95] The next day Karl Radek in Moscow did the same in a talk with the German Consul Hausschild.[96] He repeated his request in Pravda, arguing that the German masses would get their leader at the moment when they were about to "carry on their shoulders the further conduct of the war".[97] On October 10 Scheidemann again urged Liebknecht's release at a cabinet session, assuring the anxious Reich Chancellor that it would not lead to unrest among the masses. The official record of this cabinet session gives no details about Scheidemann's arguments, yet there is little doubt that he informed his colleagues about Liebknecht's "patriotical" turnabout.[98] After Scheidemann's explanation the cabinet members changed their view. One of them, for instance, argued that the imprisoned Independent Socialist Dittmann was more dangerous than Liebknecht, and the cabinet decided at the end on a total amnesty for the Spartacist.[99] But the military, still distrustful of Liebknecht because of his anti-militarist

reputation, were at first reluctant to approve his release.

In the middle of October, however, Berlin received the second of Wilson's notes which, in Scheidemann's words, had the "effect of a bombshell".[100] It indicated that the Western powers would negotiate only with a duly constitutional body and that Germany would be dealt with from a position of power. The German government regarded the note as political blackmail designed to enforce the Kaiser's abdication and to postpone peace talks until the German armies collapsed.[101]

In these circumstances, the idea of continuing the war was gaining ground in Germany. Ludendorff, who had overcome the panicky mood of the late September submitted to the German government on October 17 a plan of nationale Verteidigung, national defence, which involved the mobilization of all human and material resources coupled with the transfer of German troops from the East to the Western front. He argued that if he received reinforcements in the next four weeks, Germany would be able to hold out and gain better terms in 1919. The government thereafter resolved that another 600,000 men would be drafted in the coming weeks.[102]

Parallel with this development the eastern orientation became acute in Germany. The government was now urged by various public figures to institute a policy of "national defence" and secure Soviet Russia's cooperation.[103] The Kaiser himself pleaded after Wilson's note for establishing "trusting relations" with Russia.[104] The Spartacists promptly organized, on October 16, their first street demonstration for friendship with Soviet Russia, despite a ban on demonstrations in Berlin. A crowd of several thousand marched to the Soviet Embassy and dispersed only after the personal intervention of Soviet officials.[105] The next day, October

17, the central organ of the Majority Socialists, Vorwärts, printed the Soviet resolution of October 3, calling for a life-and-death struggle against the Allies, and remarked regretfully that "such a confidence in one's own military power can no longer be detected among the Pan-Germans".[106] The same day Ludendorff, expounding his plan of "national defence", spoke about the "necessity of a temporary political cooperation with the Bolsheviks", provided that it would not lead to the Bolshevisation of Germany.[107]

It was in this atmosphere that the German military authorities gave consent to Liebknecht's release from the jail. On October 23, twenty thousand war-weary workers and soldiers welcomed to Berlin the man who still embodied the best tradition of anti-militarism and resistance to war. They would soon change their view.

Liebknecht, Ioffe, and the Others

Concurrently with the German peace offensive, the Bolsheviks also made an attempt to prevent their isolation. Upon Lenin's initiative, Chicherin on October 24 sent a peace note to President Wilson, the statesman whom the Bolsheviks had in March 1918 "slapped in the face". A sarcastic and even insulting tone of the note showed how painful this "road to Canossa" was to the Bolsheviks. In essence, however, the note pleaded for the cessation of the Allied intervention against Soviet Russia, and indicated the Bolshevik willingness to accept Wilson's concept of international peace, including the League of Nations. Moscow in turn hinted at the possibility of granting economic and territorial concessions to the Western powers and of a repayment of French loans.[108] The derogatory language, however, made this note counter-productive. Not receiving

a reply, the Bolsheviks again came to denounce the "servant of the American imperialism", Wilson, and the League of Nations.

Concurrently with making the peace overture to Wilson, Moscow came to play on growing pro-Russian sympathies in Germany. After Wilson's note of October 14 had reduced the chances of a negotiated peace between Berlin and the Western powers, Karl Radek wrote an open letter to Scheidemann in which he hinted at the possibility of a closer Russo-German cooperation.[109] On October 22 Lenin himself implied that Soviet Russia was interested in the victory of the "war party" in Germany.[110] A few days later the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry Solf, received a letter about an "urgent" matter which, as his friend wrote, "may already be known to you". Referring to a member of the Bolshevik centre in Switzerland, Solf's friend reported that "the Bolsheviks hope that the Kaiser and the Crown Prince will not resign and that it will not come to an armistice but to a state of 'national defence'..."[111]

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks had recruited an influential collaborator in Germany, Karl Liebknecht. After his arrival in Berlin he visited the Soviet Embassy and had a long talk with Ioffe and Bukharin. The outcome pleased but hardly surprised the Russians. Immediately after the talk Bukharin wired Moscow that Liebknecht was fully at one with the Bolsheviks. Later Bukharin added that Liebknecht had approved "every point of our program and tactics".[112] Naturally, after his release Liebknecht also upheld the Spartacist program of October 7.[113] These actions meant that the renowned anti-militarist and revolutionary completed his about-face and turned temporarily into a supporter of Germany's war efforts - a seemingly shocking but not quite unexpected conversion considering his

personal profile and political ideas.[114]

Meanwhile, Wilson's third note to Berlin of October 22 clearly indicated that the Allies, because they were still confronted with the military and monarchichal authorities in Germany, demanded not negotiations for peace but surrender. This amounted almost to an appeal to revolution. The German government realized it too, but was divided as to a proper reply. At the end, a brief note was dispatched to Wilson asking for armistice conditions and Ludendorff, the personification of the German militarism, was dismissed. The Kaiser's fate was at stake too. At the same time, however, the alternative of "national defence" was now seriously contemplated in Berlin.[115]

By October 26, the domestic situation was critical. The Independents had already organized meetings and demonstrations against the anticipated proclamation of "national defence". The very same day one of their respectable organs, the Leipziger Volkszeitung, reported in detail on preparations for "national defence" and warned that should the government yield to the pressure of the military, Germany would experience a "military dictatorship more brutal than ever before". The paper also indicated that the government would decide on this crucial question on October 29.[116]

On this day, October 26, Liebknecht for the first time attended a meeting of the Obleute (Shop Stewards), a radical group representing the Berlin factory workers, loosely affiliated with the USPD. Disturbed by the recent development, the Obleute now also called for action to offset the declaration of "national defence". In this situation it was inconceivable for Liebknecht to oppose the Obleute in toto. But there already

was a precedent in the temporizing tactics set in September 1917 at the international socialist conference in Stockholm. Then, on the eve of the Bolshevik coup, when Lenin was anything but interested in a peace between the two coalitions, Karl Radek on behalf of the Bolsheviks disapproved the plan of an international mass strike to force an end to the war. Supported by the Spartacist delegate, Radek had then merely suggested the staging of mass demonstrations.[117] Similarly, Liebknecht now proposed to the Obleute only that street meetings and demonstrations be held in eight days, on November 3. This meant that the bulk of the revolutionary forces would remain inactive during the crucial phase in which the proclamation on "national defence" was anticipated. As Liebknecht still enjoyed a great deal of prestige, his proposal was accepted. The Obleute also agreed to coordinate their tactics with Spartakus.[118]

The next day, October 27, Liebknecht spoke at five mass meetings organized by the Independent Socialists. His language must have been radical since the Berlin police president subsequently recommended that investigations be opened against him for high treason. At the same time, however, Liebknecht clearly differed from the anti-war Independents. Without making this point specific, the organ of the Majority Socialists, Vorwärts, promptly commented on his performance:

> Liebknecht holds the standpoint of the Bolsheviks... [who] denounce the Independents as social traitors and cowardly lackeys. One wonders in respect to this game between Liebknecht and Independents: Who employs whom? Who is the rider and who is the horse? The Independents want to utilize the appeal of Liebknecht's name and Liebknecht uses the meetings of the Independents to propagate his ideas which are not those of the Independents.[119]

Vorwärts concluded that just at this juncture the "fullest clarity" was

desirable: "We would be glad if Liebknecht were to make his program more explicit... Under 'revolution' one can understand different things".[120] Needless to say, it is inconceivable that the paper would have encouraged Liebknecht in this way had it indeed expected him to propagate peace or revolution.

The next day, October 28, was very eventful. Wilhelm Pieck, a socialist war resister and the future head of the East German republic, who had just returned from exile in Holland, found the situation in Berlin fully ripe for revolution. He promptly visited a leading Shop Steward, Barth, and urged him to start an uprising.[121] The same day, however, Liebknecht invited Barth and the latter's friend Däumig, and sought reassurance that only meetings and demonstrations would be held on November 3. The context of his arguments suggests that Liebknecht evidently preferred a mobilization of the people from below for a "people's war" rather than a formal proclamation of "national defence", but he was not ready to combat such a declaration.[122] Barth and Däumig now refused to commit themselves to a postponement of all actions until November 3. But in the evening the relentless Spartacist managed to get his temporizing tactics approved by the representatives of the Berlin workers' council.[123]

The same day, October 28, the issue of "national defence" was discussed at the German cabinet. Two generals there asserted optimistically that the German army was able to hold out over the winter and thus provide conditions for a more acceptable peace.[124] The cabinet was favorably impressed by their reports. The War Minister promised the generals that half of 600,000 men would be drafted by early November and the Majority

Socialist Scheidemann, whose party had hitherto been skeptical about the chances of "national defence", consented to the new defensive efforts. The cabinet session ended in this spirit, but it was found inopportune to issue a formal appeal to "national defence" before Germany was presented with humiliating armistice terms.[125]

The situation now required a clarification of relations with Russia. The very same day, October 28, Ioffe met with a department head of the German Foreign Ministry, Kriege, for an important talk. It obviously started with the problem of German troops in the East and subsequently embraced other issues of mutual concern. No record has been preserved but the result must have pleased Moscow. The next day Chicherin acknowledged with a "great satisfaction" that Kriege's statement to Ioffe had done away with existing disagreements and brought nearer the prospect of mutual understanding between Soviet Russia and Germany. Referring to further unspecified German proposals Chicherin found some of them acceptable and others worthy of discussion. As a whole, the German proposals showed the "goodwill of the German government".[126] In turn, Chicherin now, on the eve of the German revolution, asked Ioffe to assure Berlin that "we have never intended not to meet any of our obligations towards the German government and that we shall continue as before to honor all the treaties signed by us provided that the German government will meet its obligations towards us".[127]

Soviet-German relations had thus noticeably improved in late October 1918. Berlin, for instance, was seriously contemplating a return of the rest of the Russian Black Sea fleet to the Bolsheviks,[128] while the latter had reversed their previous decision and proved ready to deliver the

due payment of gold.[129] On October 29 the Bolshevik organ Pravda discontinued the regular column "The Collapse of the German Imperialism" and the next day the paper struck an unusually optimistic tone. Despite the revolution in Austria-Hungary "the war has not yet ended", a Pravda editorial wrote adding that Germany "would benefit from demonstrating to her enemies that she is still capable of defending herself and that Austria still can participate in the struggle".[130]

Meanwhile, on October 29, thousands of the Berlin workers, including the revolutionary activists, were drafted into the army. Since it had become obvious that the German government had begun to organize for "national defence" and paralyze the revolutionary forces, Wilhelm Pieck, still working independently from Karl Liebknecht, arranged the printing and distribution of a leaflet summoning the Berlin workers to disobey the call to the army.[131] In the evening, however, the Spartacist Ernst Meyer took Pieck into the Soviet Embassy to consult with Ioffe and Bukharin about the "prospect of the revolutionary uprising". To Pieck's surprise, the Bolshevik reaction was mixed. While Bukharin agreed with the idea of uprising, Ioffe, in Pieck's discreet words, proved to be "more reserved".[132]

Ioffe's reluctance was understandable. No matter where his personal sympathies might have been, he realized that revolution in Berlin would end Germany's involvement in the war just at the moment when the prospect of a parallel German-Soviet resistance to the Allies seemed better than ever before. This may explain the event which occurred the next day: on October 30 a German agent, appreciated by his bosses for "invaluable service", reported excitedly to the German Minister in The Hague that his

"mother" had learned through contacts with Ioffe and the indiscretion of anarchistic agitators that "an uprising, prepared in all details, will break out in Germany unless the armistice terms are promptly accepted". The informer indicated that his "mother" in Berlin was ready to supply details and help to uncover the entire revolutionary conspiracy. The Minister recommended to Berlin that the informer's "mother", Frau "Breithaupt", be heard by a Reichstag deputy.[133]

This information on the revolutionary ferment in Berlin was correct. When the Berlin leadership of the Independent Socialists met on October 30, some participants, particularly Barth, Däumig, and Richard Müller, pleaded for an armed uprising to end the bloodshed of the war. They were opposed by Liebknecht who again called merely for meetings and demonstrations on November 3. His outdated proposal was spotted by other participants as "revolutionary calisthenics".[134]

The Spartacists were more successful with the military. Following Ludendorff's decision of October 23 to permit any party to conduct propaganda among the troops provided that it bolstered up the war efforts, the Spartacists were allowed by the Supreme Command to hold public meetings and given the opportunity to disseminate their propaganda in the barracks.[135] The military authorities now also patronized Spartakus in other ways. For instance, while they had vetoed plans of the pacifist Independent Socialists for a daily newspaper in Berlin, the Spartacists were to be given a considerable advantage of having their own paper. In effect, by early November 1918 Liebknecht and his colleagues envisioned a net of Spartacist papers across the country.[136]

Despite the Spartacist opposition to revolution, the leadership of the Obleute in the morning of November 2 met to discuss an ordre d'bataille of the uprising, worked out by a battalion commander who had placed himself at the disposal of revolution. In short, it envisaged a mass strike combined with a march of the Berlin workers in the downtown area and with occupation of all important posts. It was assumed that the Berlin garrison would join the revolution.[137] At this point Pieck, who had meanwhile been converted to the Bolshevik tactics,[138] and Liebknecht himself, did not dare to oppose the plan directly. They merely wanted the call for the uprising not to carry the names of its signatories, but were outvoted. The Independents resolved to have their names on the call for the uprising which was tentatively set for November 4.[139] The final word was to be given in the evening of the same day, November 2.

After this meeting Liebknecht, Pieck, and Ernst Meyer again visited the Soviet Embassy and informed Ioffe and Bukharin about the morning's decision to rise. Confronted with this fact, Bukharin now aligned himself with Ioffe: both Bolsheviks, according to Pieck, "resolutely opposed" the idea of an uprising and again recommended the continuation of the temporizing tactic of street demonstrations only.[140] The Soviet disinterest in the outbreak of revolution was obvious, but the Spartacists were reluctant to accept the Bolshevik advice. Only Ernst Meyer proved ready for further temporizing. Liebknecht and Pieck declared themselves committed to the morning's decision to rise on November 4.[141]

However, it was revealed at the evening deliberations of the Berlin revolutionaries that opinions about the uprising were divided.[142] The spokesmen for minor factories and the leading Independents Haase and

Dittmann disapproved of an immediate rising while the foremen of major enterprises together with Barth, Ledebour, and Däumig resolutely demanded decisive action on November 4 or 5. At this point Liebknecht seized the opportunity and came out strongly against the mass strike and uprising. He was supported by Ernst Meyer and Pieck. The Spartacists, complying with the Bolshevik advice, suggested that the Berlin revolutionaries continue the tactics of street demonstrations. Other participants of the meeting, however, considered the Spartacist proposal completely outdated and rejected it as another instance of "revolutionary calisthenics". After a lengthy dispute, in early morning of November 3, Ledebour's motion for rising on November 4 was defeated by 22 votes to 19; it was resolved to postpone the action until November 11.

Following this meeting the German authorities received for the second time in a few days, a confidential warning from the Soviet Embassy that the Independent Socialists were preparing a "major revolt".[143] Meanwhile, leaving free the prominent revolutionaries, the German authorities on November 4 arrested the planner and anticipated coordinator of military actions, Lieutenant Walz. Because his interrogators proved to be surprisingly well informed about his plan, Walz, to save his skin, provided them with more details.[144] His arrest dispirited the Berlin revolutionaries and paralyzed the preparations for the uprising.

Yet, the measures adopted after October 28 with the intent to bolster up Germany's fighting capacities had the opposite effect. On October 29 the sailors of the German Fleet in Wilhelmshaven refused to sail out to meet the British Navy in a "last battle", and the next day an infantry division, withdrawn from the east, mutinied in an effort to

prevent its transfer to the Western front. The first wave of the soldiers' unrest was hardly suppressed when, on November 3, the sailors of the German Fleet in Kiel started a new revolt which quickly spread throughout northern Germany. A surrender and revolution in Germany were now inevitable. At this point Liebknecht and the Spartacists changed their tactics and began to call for the uprising as soon as possible.[145] Yet their platonic appeals to revolution remained ineffective. The Spartacists themselves decided for the uprising virtually at the last minute, in the early hours of November 9. That day Kaiser Wilhelm abdicated and Germany was proclaimed a republic.

There were several reasons why Berlin, the traditional centre of the German revolutionary movement, remained an oasis of order in the sea of revolution until November 9. Fear of the military, the arrests, and the desire of some Independents to make the revolution only after Germany concluded an armistice, all played a part. But it was also a consequence of the Spartacists' procrastinating tactics and Liebknecht's propaganda. It was symptomatic that merely eighteen days after his triumphant reception in Berlin, Karl Liebknecht was decried at the first meeting of the Berlin Soviet on November 10 for having hindered the revolutionary élan of the masses and betrayed them by sanctimonious phrases.[146]

The Soviet Ambassador Ioffe was not to experience the revolution which he had hoped would not occur. Throughout October 1918 his activities and Soviet propaganda was repeatedly discussed by the German authorities, but no serious countermeasures were adopted.[147] In effect, the Soviet and Spartacist materials were distributed almost freely in October 1918.[148] Obviously, their nature, nurturing the spirit of Durchhalten

(holding out) in the war against the Allies, overshadowed the fear of Bolshevism. Indeed, the German authorities did not consider Bolshevism a real danger. Observing the domestic scene, not only such well informed individuals as Scheidemann but also other competent officials conceded in October 1918 that German Bolshevism was too weak to jeopardize the existing order.[149] As for the external threat, the German Supreme Command repeatedly assured the government that Soviet Russia did not constitute a military threat and was unable to answer an eventual break of diplomatic relations by war.[150] Hence, to argue that the German government shortly thereafter broke off relations with Moscow because of fear of Bolshevism[151] is, in the judgement of this writer, a distortion of historical truth. In effect, an analysis strongly suggests that Berlin resolved to sever relations with Moscow in order to facilitate the conclusion of peace with the Western powers.

When the German government on October 28 deliberated on Ioffe's activities, even though some participants were concerned with the extent of Soviet propaganda, no concrete countermeasures were decided upon. The severance of diplomatic relations was still considered to be out of the question.[152] Contemplating "national defence" Berlin, as has been seen, was still eager to come to better terms with Moscow. Shortly thereafter, however, the first wave of mutinies broke out suggesting that Germany's capitulation might be very near. In these conditions, the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia became acute. For instance, Ioffe now found that the German government rejected any negotiations with Moscow,[153] and the influential expert on Russia in the German Foreign Ministry, Nadolny, who as late as October 28 had opposed the expulsion of the Soviet

Ambassador, on October 31 resolutely demanded the breaking off of diplomatic relations.[154] He motivated this turnabout by the necessity to reach understanding and peace with the Allies. There was no trace in his arguments of a fear of Bolshevism. On the contrary, Nadolny thought that Germany should not discredit herself by maintaining contacts with the unpopular, dictatorial regime which would be extinguished anyway as soon as the war ended. Since he deemed it desirable to avoid such plain language in public, he suggested three formal motives for Ioffe's expulsion: the Bolshevik propaganda, the non-fulfilment of the Brest treaty on the part of the Bolsheviks,[155] and their failure to complete investigation of Mirbach's murder. It is noteworthy that Nadolny's superior, State Secretary Solf, also advanced similar reasons for breaking off relations with Moscow.[156]

In addition, the German authorities already had a plausible pretext for Ioffe's expulsion, being inspired by an incident which had occurred to their couriers in Petrograd. On September 24, accidentally or by design, a German diplomatic bag broke open at the Petrograd railway station and displayed its unusual contents. It contained arms and ammunition. The Soviet officials, having confiscated the remaining baggage, discovered altogether 100 revolvers and 200 rifles.[157] The Germans subsequently argued that the weapons were designed for the defence of their consulates in Petrograd and Moscow, and the incident seems to have been quickly settled. Ironically, however, the German government in turn began to consider the possibility of discrediting the Soviet regime in a similar way.[158] On October 28 at a meeting of the German government, even Scheidemann suggested that one of their diplomatic bags should be allowed

to break apart if evidence against the Bolsheviks were required.[159]

Thus, Berlin in early November had a motive and scenario for Ioffe's expulsion but still avoided taking this step. Some officials such as the German Minister in Switzerland, Romberg, warned that anti-Soviet measures would "double-cross" the Bolsheviks' "effective campaign against the Entente imperialism".[160] This was a valid point since the German government still tried to save the situation by enforcing the abdication of the Kaiser. On November 3 an "official statement" was issued on the question of Bolshevism and the Soviet Embassy in Berlin. It correctly assessed the allegations about the subversive activities of the Embassy as "partly contradicting the facts, partly very exaggerated". The Soviet government "has hitherto maintained towards us correct, loyal relations". The statement concluded with a warning that should the Soviets misuse these relations, the German government would have to reconsider the situation.[161]

The same day, however, the revolution began in northern Germany and the government had no other choice than to ask the Entente for an armistice. In new circumstances the Bolshevik propaganda for an alliance with Russia and for war against the West lost its raison d'être. The relations with the outlawed Soviet regime turned into a burden and Ioffe became persona non grata in Berlin. Consequently, at a meeting held in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, Nadolny proposed a staging of the "Petrograd" incident in Berlin[162] and the scenario was materialized without delay. In the evening of November 4 a Soviet diplomatic trunk broke apart at a Berlin railway station and the police reportedly found in it, besides chocolate, candies, and tea, also Soviet propaganda materials.

These materials, so Chicherin and Ioffe asserted, had not been put into the trunk in Moscow,[163] and their claim is supported by the fact that at least two kinds of the seized leaflets were of a German provenance. One of them was written in the Luxemburgian humanistic ethos and ran against the Bolshevik (and Spartacist) platform;[164] the other one was obviously produced at the Soviet press agency ROSTA in Berlin.[165]

Nevertheless, having a plausible case, the German government on November 5 announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Moscow, giving as reasons, Soviet propaganda and the Mirbach affair. Ordered to leave Berlin in twelve hours, Ioffe and his staff departed early on November 6 for Moscow in a special train.[166] Commenting on the expulsion, Lenin bitterly recalled the fact that the German government had tolerated the activities of the Soviet Embassy as long as it felt strong. Now, he went on, Germany lost the war and her government had broken off relations with Soviet Russia to prepare the grounds for a rapprochement with the Entente powers.[167]

The balancing of the first year of Lenin's planned revolution was very disconsolate. On the domestic front his idea of a peaceful modernization of Russia had been buried with the outbreak of the civil war, and the struggle with counterrevolution was draining most of the Bolshevik energies. In the realm of foreign relations Lenin pursued the policy of accommodation with the Central powers on the assumption that the world war would be a long one and that Germany would retain her position on the world scene. The German defeat and surrender in November 1918 also shattered this premise. Lenin's government entered the postwar era

in an almost total isolation. It was this desperate situation that pushed Lenin and the Bolsheviks into a revolutionary stance.

CHAPTER V

THE POLICY OF REVOLUTIONIZING: NOVEMBER 1918-JANUARY 1919

During the crucial weeks after the German surrender culminating in the January uprising in Germany, Moscow switched to a radical policy, combining aggressive actions and inflammable appeals to the Western proletariat to act with prophecies of the imminent world revolution. It was this phase more than any other that restored the revolutionary image of the Bolsheviks, tarnished in the Brest period. In fact, however, Lenin and his colleagues were clearly aware of the limited nature of the revolution in Germany and continued to respond to impulses similar to those of the preceding phase. To demonstrate this and the impact of the Bolshevik policy on the course of the German revolution, this chapter deals with German situation November 1918 - January 1919 in detail.

A Sword of Damocles: Intervention

The German revolution of November 9, 1918,* was welcomed in Soviet Russia without particular enthusiasm.[1] Moscow wished for a strong and eastern oriented Germany, capable of absorbing much of the Allied pressure. The revolution and surrender, however, temporarily eliminated Germany as an independent political factor on the European scene, and brought to power the Majority and the Independent Socialists who, well aware of the war weariness of the masses, were determined to reach an accord with the Western powers. The forces of the extreme Left willing

* The term "German revolution" is applied in this chapter to the events which took place in Germany between November 9, 1918, and the summer of 1919.

to lead Germany into a new struggle against Allied imperialism were still extremely weak and disorganized in this key country of European socialism. Speaking on November 8, 1918, about the international situation, Lenin conceded a "bitter truth", that world revolution was not imminent,[2] and that Soviet Russia therefore had to expect new Allied attempts to exterminate Bolshevism. In an attempt to guard against this threat, Lenin was prepared to embark on a conciliatory course. Calling for an end to the "period of declarations" against Western imperialism, of "slapping them in the face", Lenin indicated that Soviet policy would strive vigorously to avoid new confrontations.[3] Nevertheless, "we know the danger is great. It may be that fate has even heavier sacrifices in store for us", he went on and hinted that Soviet Russia might be crushed in the forthcoming conflicts.[4]

Lenin's anxiety was not entirely unfounded. The defeat of the German coalition opened the naval and land routes to European Russia. Moreover, the armistice ominously obliged Germany to delay the evacuation of German forces from the formerly Russian territories until they were replaced by the Allied troops.[5] Although there was no unity in Moscow as to whether the main Allied thrust would come through the Baltic or the Black Sea (Lenin and Trotsky expected it in the south), an intervention was considered very likely in the Soviet capital and its prospect overshadowed the outbreak of the German revolution. For instance, Pravda, in the same issue that carried the first report on the German revolution, emphasized that "all attention of the Soviet republic is directed towards the south".[6] A later Soviet editorial even candidly conceded that the German revolution might soon bring an increased danger

to Soviet Russia.[7] The apprehension of the Bolsheviks was accentuated by the fact that within a few weeks after the German surrender, the British dispatched new troops into Transcaucasia and the French, who had been planning new anti-Bolshevik operations since early October, sent their ships and troops to the Black Sea ports Sebastopol and Odessa.[8] In November 1918 the Bolsheviks were virtually surrounded by the foreign troops and forces of counterrevolution.

Moreover, the end of the war activated Lenin's political enemies. On November 16 an international conference opened at the Rumanian capital Jassy, attended by prominent anti-Bolshevik Russians and Allied representatives. The conference declared that Russia could be regenerated as a power only if the Bolshevik regime were deposed by military intervention. For this reason the Allied governments were asked for the necessary assistance. The conference also stated that the Bolshevik regime could be replaced only by a military dictatorship and designated General Denikin as the future Russian dictator.[9] At the same time the White Admiral Kolchak, de facto ruler of most of Siberia, officially recognized Russia's financial obligations and declared illegal all financial acts of Lenin's government, including the annulment of foreign credits.[10]

It was this seemingly imminent danger of an anti-Bolshevik crusade that set the Bolsheviks into motion. Immediately after Germany had capitulated they resolved to send the Red troops into the German-occupied territories. On November 11 the Sovnarkom hastily ordered that the advance into the Ukraine be started within ten days and two days later the

Brest treaty was formally abrogated. In the following months the Bolsheviks took the opportunity to establish their authority in the Ukraine before the Allied armies replaced the German troops, and to seize the Black Sea shore to prevent Allied naval operations.[11]

Despite this unexpected turn of events in the Western regions, the opinion was prevailing in Moscow that the Soviet state would not be able to cope with its numerous enemies. With the advent of peace the Bolsheviks again tried to re-open a dialogue with the Western powers. On November 8 the Congress of Soviets made a sober peace appeal to the Allies.[12] Like the previous note to President Wilson, however, this peace overture was not answered. The Bolsheviks now focused their attention on the newly proclaimed German republic, assuming that its relations with the victorious alliance could determine Soviet Russia's fate. The circumstances of the German surrender aroused certain hopes in the Bolshevik leadership. Commenting on the armistice terms imposed upon Germany, Lenin on November 8 called them "completely devastating" and hinted that they would make impossible a reconciliation between Germany and the Allies.[13] Indeed, both military and political circles in Berlin rejected an unconditional surrender,[14] while the idea of a Soviet-German rapprochement was still alive, being now propagated by the coalition partner of the Majority Socialists, the Independents.[15]

This trend was noticed in Moscow and prompted the Soviet press to speculate on the resumption of hostilities between Germany and the Entente. The "German proletariat" was again promised Russian assistance.[16] The desire to see Germany resist the Western powers almost entirely overshadowed any ideological considerations. Although power in Germany was in

the hands of "social chauvinists", Pravda now appealed to the Germans to "maintain order and discipline". "It is necessary to prevent panic, disorganization and provocation, it is a question of life and death that the victorious march of the Allied armies is halted".[17] In the same issue the Soviet expert on international affairs N. Obolensky (Osinsky), in a complete denial of Leninism, even advised the German revolutionaries not to waste time by demobilizing: "The German army, the German fortresses, the Navy - those are the weapons of the revolutionary proletariat in the near future. The German workers must at all costs retain this weapon against the armies of Allied imperialism...In Germany the Red Army can immediately cast off the shell of the Wilhelminian army".[18]

The next day, November 11, Moscow announced it would send the "German proletariat" two trains of grain,and Chicherin together with Ioffe in a very long telephone conversation with the Independent Socialist Cohn urged Ioffe's return to Berlin, intimating also that Zinoviev, Radek, and Petrov would be dispatched into Germany to organize the import of grain and propaganda among the Allied prisoners of war. More significant still was the fact that Chicherin now offered the German government of "social chauvinists" and "social patriots" a defensive alliance, a Schutz und Trutzbündnis.[19] Along this line, the Soviets, in the decree abrogating the Brest peace, also invited Germany and the disintegrated Austria-Hungary to enter a "mighty alliance of the free peoples of Russia, Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Latvia, the Baltic states, the Crimea, the Caucasus, Germany and Austria-Hungary". This bloc was to be directed against the "capitalist bondage" of the Entente powers.[20]

On November 14, in a phone conversation with the Independent Socialist Haase, now in charge of German foreign affairs, Chicherin pleaded for the cooperation of German troops with the Red Army; he also suggested to the Germans a dilatory approach to clearing the Baltic Sea of mines, claiming that, "If you in whatever form delay the passage of the English [Fleet], you will save the [Russian] revolution". In the course of this conversation, Chicherin also restated the Soviet intention to send into Germany experienced agitators to work among the Allied prisoners of war. Haase, however, retorted that propaganda among them would amount to a casus belli with the Entente and flatly rejected such actions. He promised to submit the other points to the government.[21]

The next day, November 15, Radek openly reiterated Soviet demands, including that of permitting anti-Western propaganda in Germany. Only a "clear demonstration of solidarity between the socialist republics" could stir up the workers of the Entente countries, he argued. Should the German government not respond to the Soviet suggestions, the Bolsheviks would "approach the German workers and soldiers independently in order to defend the interests of the Russian and German revolution which are identical".[22]

The Bolshevik efforts however remained without effect. Confronted with a food shortage, incapable of further resistance to the Western powers, and anticipating a demise of the Soviet regime, the German government decided to solve the dilemma popularly defined as "bread or Bolshevism" in favor of the former. Already on November 17 Haase on behalf of the German government declined the Soviet offer of grain. The next

day, at a cabinet session, the same Haase who had eight days previously demanded Ioffe's return, now favored dilatory tactics. He feared that Ioffe's readmission would lead to the Allied occupation of Germany. Luxemburg and Liebknecht reportedly also agreed with these tactics. After a lengthy discussion the German government resolved not to permit Ioffe's return, and asked Moscow to refrain from interfering into the German internal affairs.[23]

The Bolsheviks did not conceal their profound disappointment and their reasons. "Every [German] government counting on support of the masses would have...to conclude peace at any cost", Obolensky wrote in Pravda, "but the proletarian government...would fulfil the armistice conditions in such a way that the "Red" armed forces at home and in the brotherly country would be preserved as much as possible". This would be the policy of the Spartakusbund. The "Scheidemanns", however, honored the armistice so thoroughly "that the English Fleet has already entered the Baltic Sea".[24] In a pamphlet designed for the German reader Karl Radek now bluntly accused the German government of a betrayal of the working class for "not preparing for new struggles against the victorious capital of England, France, and America".[25]

The Bolsheviks' criticism of the German government soon blended with ideological undertones. First, they now came to voice in public their doubts about the proletarian revolution in the West and in Germany in particular. Thus Bukharin pointed out on November 23 that a hard time was ahead of the German revolution, since the bourgeoisie "is preparing itself to take the workers 'in an iron hand'".[26] Similarly, Karl Radek

ridiculed the Mensheviks in Pravda for their orthodox view of world revolution as a chain-reaction process in which the Russian revolution was only a prelude. He stated that, "although the proletariat of the West is better prepared for the task of building socialism, the bourgeoisie there is also better prepared for the struggle against socialism". Radek therefore rejected as scholasticism the Menshevik view of Germany as the centre of revolutionary movement, indicating that Soviet Russia continued to be a "shield of world revolution".[27] It is not surprising that Stalin went even further in his critique. He concluded from the development of West European revolutions in the fall of 1918 that "the West, with its imperialist cannibals, has become a breeding ground of darkness and slavery", adding unambiguously that "light is coming from the East".[28]

It was only after the failure to enlist Germany's cooperation against the Western powers that Moscow took an aggressive stand towards the German government. The change was indeed striking. For example, while N. Obolensky on November 10 called for "law and order" in Germany, he wrote in Pravda five days later, after the first experience with the German government, that there were "plenty of fierce struggles ahead of the German revolution".[29] The usually cautious Chicherin, after the Germans declined the offer of Soviet grain, likewise expressed hope that time would arrive when "the working Germany unfolds its revolutionary power and sticks to its solemn proclamations",[30] and the Soviet press began to summon the "German proletariat" to civil war.[31] It was at this time that Karl Radek wrote a pamphlet designed for circulation in Germany in which he urged the overthrow of the German government because of its excessive submissiveness to the Entente. Upon describing in detail the methods of

civil war, Radek cynically predicted that should it be started in Germany, the German government would be shooting at workers and Allied imperialism would obviously make the attempt to throw its troops against Germany. Having earlier discarded the possibility of the French and American workers rising soon, he now nevertheless asserted that they would do so, particularly if the German workers' republic allied itself with Soviet Russia. And Radek urged the German workers to rise to avoid the prospect of being at the end of this war more enslaved than in its onset.[32]

Thus, having failed to win the socialist coalition in Germany for the continuing resistance to the Western powers, Moscow resorted to the policy of revolutionizing. However, as circumstances suggest, it would be wrong to impute any grand design to the Bolsheviks and consider their policy a conscious step in promoting world revolution. As before, they were now responding rather to immediate pressures and exigencies of their government than to long-term objectives of the international revolution. In late 1918 they were chiefly concerned with Western intervention in Russia. Consequently, although the Bolshevik policy of revolutionizing might have aimed at stirring a civil war in Germany, Moscow viewed such a development rather as an impulse to new conflicts between Berlin and the Allies than a prelude to Liebknecht's government and world revolution. The Bolsheviks in the fall of 1918 indeed appeared to be "doing their best to embroil Germany with the Western powers", as E. H. Carr has noted,[33] but they did so not from a revolutionary enthusiasm. Their policy did not serve the interest of the German revolution, but could save Soviet Russia from Western intervention.

Yet Moscow soon realized that the socialist coalition in Germany was becoming an effective guarantor of that country's peaceful development. As Pravda bitterly conceded in December 1918, it was not for their lack of "good will" that the Allies had not as yet begun with the occupation of Germany, but because the Scheidemann government was concerned with the maintenance of order. This, Pravda added almost ruefully, was the "only reason why the Allied troops have not yet marched through the Brandenburg Tor".[34] Consequently, in the latter part of November the Bolsheviks began to undermine the socialist coalition in Germany and to discredit it in the Allied capitals. For example, on November 22 Pravda bombastically reported from a "completely reliable source" that in October 1918 Japan and Germany had concluded a treaty on spheres of interest in the Far East directed against England and America. The pact, Pravda argued, had not lost significance since Scheidemann, who had negotiated it, was now a member of the German government.[35] At the same time the Council of German workers and soldiers in Moscow threatened Berlin with publishing secret documents allegedly showing machinations of the German Embassy in Russia.[36] The prominent Latvian Bolshevik Stuchka shortly afterwards attempted in Pravda to discredit two radical members of the German government, Haase and Barth, by recalling their "Bolshevik" complexion prior to the outbreak of the revolution.[37]

In early December the Bolsheviks concluded that intervention was imminent and inevitable. On December 2 Chicherin sent an apprehensive note to the Allied powers in which he listed the signs of their determination to overthrow the Soviet regime; the British Fleet had sailed towards the Russian coast in the Baltic; Allied vessels had left

Constantinople for the Crimea and the South Ukraine; Allied troops had crossed the Bessarabian border, and German troops had been urged to stay in the occupied territories.[38] At this point Moscow barely concealed its wish for a civil war in Germany that would bring about a new German-Allied confrontation. For example, a Pravda editorial on December 4 stated that civil war would break out in Germany in the near future and assume a harsh and decisive form:

> The German revolution will step over the Kornilovshchina and march directly towards the October struggles...Everything that had occurred after October [1917] in our country in the process of several months will arrive at once, in one stream...And the external pressure on the revolution, which was sluggish and prolonged in our country, will be harsher and will come quicker.[39]

At this juncture the Bolshevik policy towards Germany now acquired a desperate connotation. On December 4 the former Soviet Ambassador in Germany, Ioffe, shocked the world with a story about secret funds and arms he had supplied to the Independent Socialists for promoting the German revolution.[40] The veracity of his broadcast was dubious. Haase, on behalf of the Independents, subsequently denied having taken any money or propaganda material from the Russians.[41] Another alleged accomplice, Barth, only admitted to accepting money from the "German imperialists".[42] But even if the allegations were true, Ioffe, a very experienced conspirator, must have been aware that such a revelation harmed the German socialist government. If nothing else, there was a fresh memory of the setback which the Bolsheviks suffered in July 1917 after their contacts with the authorities of Imperial Germany had been disclosed.

Ioffe's broadcast indeed caused an uproar on the German political scene and sowed distrust towards the Left. In the ensuing public dispute

on the theme "German revolution, Russian money", the methods and motivation of the German socialists were questioned even by serious observers.[43] However, this did not prevent Ioffe from subsequently reiterating his story and even disclosing to the public the exact amount of money he had handed over to Independent Socialist Oscar Cohn "for the promotion of the German revolution".[44] Not without justification, both socialist parties sharply denounced Ioffe's statements, and the Independents declared that Ioffe's action could only "cause troubles to the socialist movement in Germany and hamper the realization of its goals".[45]

Meanwhile, another incident had aggravated the relations between Moscow and Berlin. On November 23 the Soviets were invited to send a delegation to the first congress of the German Councils which was scheduled to open on December 16. Moscow did not answer immediately. On December 5, however, in the climax of Soviet apprehension, Lenin suddenly decided in favor of participation, and within twenty-four hours a delegation consisting of Ioffe, Radek, Bukharin, Rakovsky, Markhlevsky, and Ignatov left for Berlin.[46] That participation in the deliberations of the congress was not their chief or sole objective appears evident.[47] Karl Radek indicated on the eve of the group's departure that the arrival of Soviet representatives in Berlin constituted a challenge to the Allies, and speculated again on a united front between the Rhine and Urals.[48] Indeed, there were at least three members in the delegation whose presence in Germany was believed to aggravate Germany's relations with the Entente - Radek, renowned for his revolutionary and anti-Western propaganda; Ioffe, now considered the eminence grise of the German revolution, and Bukharin,

reputed for his revolutionary fervor and radicalism. This alone was enough to make the Germans apprehensive. As soon as the delegation reached the border station, an angry crowd of German soldiers accused it of intending to embroil Germany in a new war against the Entente,[49] and the Central Council of German soldiers in the East subsequently decided to prevent the delegation from further travel westwards. After two days of bargaining, the German government on December 9 cancelled the invitation to the congress and asked the delegation to discontinue its journey.[50]

The Bolsheviks returned to Moscow short of their most active member, Karl Radek, who, after a telephone consultation with Lenin and Sverdlov, crossed the German border under his real name Sobelsohn and continued his journey to the German capital.

Radek in Berlin, December 1918

The outbreak of the German revolution briefly accentuated the pro-Bolshevik sentiments of Spartakus. The spirit of solidarity and loyalty with Soviet Russia was displayed on November 10 in the new Spartacist organ, Die Rote Fahne (The Red Flag).[51] The Spartacists, in harmony with Moscow's early calls for "law and order" in Germany, also raised very moderate demands that did not imply the liquidation of the economic structure of capitalism. Moreover, Liebknecht himself proved willing to share the government duties with the Majority and Independent Socialists.[52]

However, the very same day, November 10, Rosa Luxemburg returned from prison, still sharply critical of Lenin's government. The Bolsheviks evidently were not enthusiastic about her re-entry into the political arena. While Liebknecht's release was welcomed by the Soviet press by

pages of greetings and congratulations (the poet Demian Bednyi even wrote a poem in his honour), Luxemburg's liberation was ominously announced in Moscow by a single sentence: "Rosa Luxemburg was released from the preventive detention". This was all that Pravda had to say.[53] Once Luxemburg was back in Berlin, the Bolsheviks obviously wanted to win her over to their position. On November 13 Chicherin asked the German Foreign Ministry to tell Luxemburg and Iogiches that two Bolsheviks of Polish background, Markhlevsky ("Karsky") and Dzerzhinsky would be speaking with them in order to "liquidate the lamentable conflicts".[54] But there is no evidence that Luxemburg or Iogiches spoke to the Bolsheviks even by phone; Markhlevsky did arrive in Berlin, but only after Luxemburg's death.

The worries of the Bolsheviks proved substantiated. Luxemburg, a subtle woman physically broken by jail, and her colleague Iogiches, a brilliant organizer, after their liberation discontinued Liebknecht's policy. On the domestic scene, Luxemburg ruled out any cooperation with the existing government and steered the course of a critical toleration of the ruling socialist coalition.[55] At the same time Luxemburg promptly changed the Spartacist policy towards the Bolsheviks. Thus while Karl Liebknecht and his colleagues as late as November 10 propagated Germany's cooperation and solidarity with Soviet Russia and demanded Ioffe's return in Berlin, a week later Luxemburg and Liebknecht de facto upheld the German government's decision not to resume normal diplomatic relations with Moscow. Rote Fahne carried this decision without a protest or comment.[56] The paper subsequently carried in the same neutral form all reports relating to Soviet Russia. Paradoxically, the Independent

Socialists' central organ Die Freiheit treated Lenin's government in a more positive way than Die Rote Fahne did.[57] Even Karl Liebknecht, for almost a month after Luxemburg's return to Berlin, made not a single reference to Russia in his public pronouncements.[58]

It is true that Luxemburg, as her communist contemporaries argued, had converged after November 10 with Lenin in some doctrinal issues, for instance in regarding the soviets as the institutional form of the proletarian revolution, distinct from a parliament.[59] As a whole, however, her revolutionary platform clearly constituted a democratic alternative to the Leninist concept of dictatorship. In her view, the Spartacists would take power only with the clear approval of the proletarian masses; the Spartacist victory stood at the end, not at the beginning of the revolution. Moreover, Luxemburg viewed the revolution as a spontaneous, autonomous process of the self-realization of the people. Revolutionary Bonapartism, the artificial stimulation of the revolution, and its importation from abroad, were aspects totally alien to her. Hence, she also attached far less importance than Liebknecht to the existence of the revolutionary centre abroad, especially if it was the Bolshevik regime, considered by many socialists as discrediting the cause of socialism, and whose days seemed numbered anyway.[60] The Spartakusbund in her view was to promote solidarity and cooperation with the workers' parties of all countries, including the Bolsheviks, but still remain an independent political organization.[61] It was natural that Luxemburg, regarding the socialist revolution as a matter for the advanced countries, also now directed her attention more to Western Europe than to the East.[62]

Luxemburg's colleagues disagreed with her attitude towards Soviet

Russia. According to her friend and secretary Mathilde Jacob, she had "constant debates" with her friends upon her return to Berlin, but failed to change their views.[63] Even the head of the Bavarian republic, Kurt Eisner, an Independent Socialist and reputed internationalist, on November 24 attempted in vain to convert Liebknecht to Luxemburg's stand. He argued that the German socialists should combine their forces and secure the victory of the revolution by cooperating with the Western powers and Western socialism, but Liebknecht resolutely rejected this Western orientation.[64]

In fact, Liebknecht after November 10 switched to a militant course which harmonized with the Bolshevik calls for solidarity actions. Upon his initiative, the Spartacists formed in November 1918 a special paramilitary organization, Der Rote Soldatenbund (The Red Soldiers' Union) the meetings of which soon turned into armed demonstrations.[65] The antimilitarist Liebknecht now began recruiting sympathizers among the men in uniform. Moreover, in contrast to Luxemburg's advocacy of peace and reconciliation between nations, Liebknecht in November 1918 began to associate his militant course and the "second revolution" with the prospect of a new military confrontation between Germany and the Western powers. The Spartacist leader was suspected by his contemporaries of wanting to embroil Germany in a renewed war against the Allies.[66] Such a development might accelerate in a certain sense, the pace of the German revolution. However, this was also precisely what Moscow called for, hoping that it would ease the Western pressure on Soviet Russia and eventually realign Germany with Russia.

Germany's internal development pushed Liebknecht and his colleagues

farther on the road of militant radicalism. Particularly the bloody clashes in Berlin between December 6 and 8, involving the government forces and the Spartacist crowd, accelerated the polarization within the camp of German socialism. On one hand, Liebknecht and the Spartacists now definitely established themselves as irresponsible troublemakers and warmongers.[67] Their popularity declined so much that Liebknecht and Luxemburg subsequently were not even elected as delegates to the congress of the German Councils. At the same time, the bloodshed in the Berlin streets embittered the radical Left and augmented its alienation from the existing government. Accusing the Majority Socialists of fratricide and high treason to socialism, the Spartacists now for the first time raised the slogan "Down with Ebert-Scheidemann".[68]

The Berlin clashes also made painfully obvious to Liebknecht and other radicals their political impotency, and turned their attention to the ally abroad. Soviet Russia began to occupy in their thought as pivotal a role as before the outbreak of the German revolution. It is noteworthy that just in the atmosphere of disillusionment generated by the Berlin bloodshed, Liebknecht on December 7 led a crowd to the Soviet Embassy and demanded Ioffe's return.[69] The next day even the Rote Fahne, which for almost a month had not made a single comment on Russia, printed an Allied declaration against the Bolsheviks with a mobilizing postscript which stated that if the Russian revolution were suppressed, the German proletariat would become the next victim of the capitalist hangmen. "If the German proletariat were to shortsightedly forget the fraternal and blood bond tying it with the Russian proletariat, the streets of gallows in southern Russia cry into its ears: You are the next. The second row

of gallows is designated for the German proletariat".[70]

The disillusionment of the radical Left was accentuated by the outcome of the first congress of the German councils which opened in Berlin on December 16. There were only ten Spartacist delegates out of 489. The Majority Socialists, being in a majority, put through a resolution conferring supreme power upon the German government until the convening of the National Assembly.[71] Germany had thereby made a decisive step towards parliamentary democracy. This fact itself dismayed the extreme Left which advocated the introduction of the Soviet system, but it also antagonized the Independent Socialists who refused to share seats in the new Central Council (Zentralrat) with the Majority Socialists. It was in this atmosphere of mounting opposition to the Majority Socialists that Lenin's envoy Karl Radek arrived in Berlin.

Karl Radek was one of the most interesting and controversial figures of international socialism in Lenin's era.[72] Born in Galicia in 1885 he subsequently became involved both in the Polish and German socialist movement and soon distinguished himself as a versatile, witty, and vitriolic journalist with an almost encyclopedic knowledge of the contemporary world. At the same time his personal integrity and moral principles were questioned even by his socialist comrades. Politically speaking, his socialist conviction did not prevent him from taking an opportunistic stand. As seen above, Radek during the war functioned as one of the intermediaries between Lenin and the German authorities. After his arrival in Russia in late 1917 he became one of the most articulate commentators and spokesmen for Soviet foreign policy. He joined the Left Communists during the Brest crisis, but was subsequently reconciled to Lenin and appointed head

of the Central European department of the Narkomindel. His knowledge of Western Europe and his fertile mind were respected by Lenin and gained him greater authority in Moscow than his office warranted.

After the Soviet delegation to Germany had been put together on December 5, Lenin had a face-to-face talk with Radek regarding his activity in Berlin. What the two men said to each other has never been fully disclosed, but Radek's recollections at least unveil the direction of the talk. According to him, Lenin showed a deep concern about Allied intervention and declared that the fate of Soviet Russia was greatly dependent upon developments in Germany. Yet both men also realized that the proletarian revolution in Germany was not imminent and agreed that it could not be artificially stimulated.[73] What was then the objective of Radek's mission to Germany? It would appear that it was well expressed in a term Radek used in this confidential talk, a diversionary maneuver.

The idea of relieving Western pressure on Soviet Russia by solidarity actions in the West, short of the conquest of power, was not unknown to Lenin's contemporaries. For instance, in the summer of 1918 it was Rosa Luxemburg herself who called the German proletariat to offset Ludendorff's pressure on the Soviet state.[74] Going along these lines, Moscow in November 1918 came to urge the Western proletariat to actions which, although doomed to failure, could tie the armies of the Western powers. Later, in March 1921, Zinoviev's Comintern provoked an uprising in Germany to divert the attention from Russia's domestic crisis culminating in the Kronstadt revolt and introduction of the NEP.[75]

The Bolshevik calls for relief actions appealed in a peculiar way

not only to the class consciousness of the masses in Germany and other defeated countries, but also to their nationalist sentiments. One of the chief proponents of this course, which provided the basis for "national Bolshevism", was Karl Radek. As has been seen, his ultimate goal in the autumn of 1918 involved Germany's new embroilment with the Allies. That he lived with this idea became obvious a year later. When the Soviet state in October 1919 reached the most critical phase of its struggle for survival, Radek, still in a German jail, contemplated an alliance with the German military to resume the war against the Allies and relieve Soviet Russia by this grandiose diversion.[76] In any case, there is every reason to assume that Radek arrived in Berlin in December 1918 to promote this policy.[77]

The bellicose platform represented by Radek was alien to Rosa Luxemburg and her colleagues such as Leo Iogiches and Paul Levi. Moreover, Luxemburg had personally held Radek in contempt for many years. When he arrived in Berlin, she is reported to have first refused to see him, rejecting emphatically any "commissar for Bolshevism" and Bolshevik tactics. Although they did meet, she treated him in a very cold manner.[78]

As could be expected, Liebknecht was more favorably disposed towards Radek and the Soviet cause. Already at their first meeting Liebknecht "warmly supported" Radek in defending the Bolshevik terror against Luxemburg's criticism.[79] Thereafter the two men met privately. Soviet Russia's position was still serious. The press agencies reported that President Wilson during his forthcoming visit to London would definitely make a decision on intervention in Russia.[80] At this point Radek could not but raise the question of anti-Western actions. According to him,

however, his partner responded soberly. "One can carry on only propaganda against the Entente," Liebknecht argued, "the masses would proscribe everyone speaking of the defence of the revolution against the Allies".[81] Radek gave no more details about this talk. Some authors nevertheless maintain that he concluded with Liebknecht a secret agreement promising the Spartacists the material and military assistance of Soviet Russia in the event of the outbreak of revolution or an uprising.[82] This seems very unlikely. However, the fact is that after this meeting, Liebknecht converged with Radek both in thought and action. First, Liebknecht now raised his voice in public against the peace to be negotiated in Paris. For example, in a speech to the Berlin workers of December 23 he denounced the Western powers for intending to strangle Germany and dismissed the "alleged humanity of Wilson".[83] Second, Liebknecht now began to call for the acceleration of "proletarian" actions in Germany, despite the lack of revolutionary prospect in the West and even though he realized that the Spartakusbund was only in its beginnings. "Naturally", he declared in the same speech,

> it would be quite wrong to believe that the revolution in the Entente countries would break out by order in the near future...at this moment we cannot expect the working men of the hostile countries to act in the revolutionary way...We alone must therefore make the first step in this direction. The faster and more decisively...we proceed in our revolution towards socialism, the faster the proletariat of the Entente will follow us.[84]

Thus, after Radek's arrival in Berlin, Liebknecht further diverged from Luxemburg who considered the time unripe for major confrontations. But he still was more than a mere executor of Moscow's policy. In his opinion, spelled out long before December 1918, abortive actions were

also beneficial to the revolutionary cause.[85] Besides, Liebknecht seems to have accepted the Bolshevik platform only in part; while Moscow wished for anti-Western activities, Liebknecht was ready to answer the Bolshevik calls rather by seeking confrontations with the domestic enemies.

The opportunity to accelerate the path of the revolution arrived unexpectedly early. On December 24 the People's Naval Division, a stronghold of the radical militants in Berlin, mutinied chiefly because of the government's hesitation to meet its financial demands. The sailors may have been instigated by the offer of money from the Spartacists.[86] In addition, Liebknecht and Wilhelm Pieck promptly intervened in their favor and mobilized the Berlin proletariat. On December 25 the crowd, stirred by Liebknecht's denunciation of Vorwärts occupied the newspaper's premises. The occupants issued a call for the overthrow of the Ebert-Scheidemann government and the bringing to power of the "strong willed" communists.[87] The Spartacist involvement was of such a nature that the Obleute, an organization which could not be accused of excessive moderation, described Liebknecht's activities as adventurism.[88]

The bizarre mutiny of the sailors not only eroded the authority of the government and encouraged the Berlin militants to similar ventures,[89] but also delivered the last blow to the coalition of the Majority and Independent Socialists, already undermined by political and personal differences. The Independents resigned from the cabinet on December 28 giving as reason the arbitrary handling of the mutiny by their SPD colleagues. Moreover, as could be expected, the Christmas clashes again increased the sympathy of the German radicals for Soviet Russia. For example, immediately after the mutiny, as after the clashes of December 6-8,

Rote Fahne broke its silence and printed two articles sympathetic toward the Bolsheviks.[90]

In the meantime, Radek began to work on the consolidation and unification of pro-Bolshevik forces in Germany. He raised among the Spartacists the question of forming a Communist party, but Iogiches declared such a step premature. Iogiches and Luxemburg had not given up hope that the Independent Socialists, a party with a mass basis, could be won for a more radical course. The Spartacist leadership nevertheless resolved on December 22 to hold on December 30 a separate conference and concurrently asked the Independents to convene a party congress before the end of December. This demand, however, was rejected by the USPD leadership. On December 24 Radek attended a conference of the "International Communists", an organization most closely akin to the Bolsheviks, and convinced them to merge with the Spartakusbund into one party.[92]

The need of a new party was not questioned when the Spartacist leadership met on December 29 to discuss the forthcoming conference. But differences arose about the name of the party and, implicitly, about the party's profile. In Luxemburg's view the German revolutionaries should not sail in Bolshevik waters but become a bridge between Russian Bolshevism and Western socialism, and thereby contribute to the emancipation of Western socialism from reformism. Both she and Iogiches therefore strongly pleaded for the name "Socialist party" as it symbolized an independent status.[93] According to one participant of the discussion, Eberlein, the other members of the Spartacist leadership emphasized the principle of solidarity and kinship with Soviet Russia, and therefore demanded that the party be named "Communist party". The "passionate

discussion" ended with the defeat of Luxemburg: the Spartacist leadership opted in favor of the name "Communist party".[94]

To some extent Luxemburg's setback foreshadowed the events of the Spartacist conference which opened in Berlin on December 30 and entered into history as the founding congress of the German Communist Party (KPD). The tone of the congress was set by Karl Radek's speech. The mere fact that a prominent Bolshevik appeared publicly in the heart of Germany was considered a challenge to the German government and the Allies. Appearing in a Russian military uniform, Radek in his address on the theme "the German and the Russian revolution and the world situation"[95] presented a modified version of the Bolshevik position towards Germany. Radek might have been aware of the incipient revision of Bolshevik foreign policy, discussed in the next section. Thus, analyzing the German revolution, by drawing a parallel between the Bolsheviks in April 1917 and the German communists in December 1918 he indirectly admitted that a proletarian revolution in Germany was not imminent.[96] Moreover, in contrast to the previous policy of the Bolsheviks, Radek now warned the German communists against the civil war, recalling its detrimental effect upon Russia's economic and political life.[97] At the same time, however, Radek continued in promoting the previous bellicose course. He did not recommend to the German communists the policy of peace which had helped the Bolsheviks into the saddle. This horse, he indicated, was being ridden in Germany by the Ebert-Scheidemann government.[98] Without suggesting an alternative policy, Radek nevertheless intimated that Moscow was not interested in peace between Germany and the Allies anyway. Such a prospect constituted "the most serious danger

to the Russian revolution".[99] Radek concluded with a face-saving theoretical proposition, namely that Germany could best defend her interests if the working class took power and joined the Russian proletariat in a common struggle against the enemy in the Urals and on the Rhine.[100]

Radek's message was more vague than his previous statements, but its thrust was obvious to his contemporaries. For example, noting his warning against civil war, the influential Vossische Zeitung concluded that the Russian propaganda "strives for drawing Germany into a new war as an ally of the Russian government".[101] The next day the same paper wrote that Berlin was for Moscow "nothing more than an advanced post in the war against the Entente". Communist rule in Germany, the paper went on, implied occupation by the Entente which was desired by Trotsky and Radek for strategic reasons: "They hope in this way to defer the Allied offensive against their centre of power and gain a new 'breathing spell'".[102] Similarly, after the German government accused Radek of attempting to incite a civil war and a war against the Entente, the Spartacist Rote Fahne felt obliged to deny half of this charge: "It is a lie that Comrade Radek appealed for civil war in Germany".[103] Evidently, Radek at the founding congress of the KPD restated the Soviet interest in channelling the energy of the German people more against the Western powers than against German imperialism.

In spite of this, Radek's speech was received with enthusiasm by the congress delegates. Stimulated by this response, Liebknecht warmly thanked Radek, calling Russia the "birthplace of the German revolution". The German proletariat, he declared, was greatly obliged to its Russian brethren.[104] The congress subsequently sent a message of sympathy to

Moscow.[105] As further dealings of the congress showed, Radek's appearance encouraged the pro-Soviet elements and influenced the outcome of the congress, although not entirely in accordance with Radek's wishes.

Generally speaking, the discussions of the congress revealed the existence of two differing views in regard to the party's strategy and tactics. It was particularly Rosa Luxemburg and Paul Levi who pleaded for a long term policy of winning the German masses for the revolutionary cause, and for utilizing all legitimate means, including the parliamentary forum.[106] Luxemburg also took a reserved stand towards the Bolsheviks. She admitted Russia's pioneering role regarding the Soviet system, but by an explicit rejection of putschism, of attempts to introduce socialism by decrees, and of political terrorism, she clearly warned against imitating the Bolshevik practices.[107] She also avoided any avowal of solidarity or ties with Soviet Russia. Above all, she indirectly but clearly rejected the Bolshevik warlike platform. Answering indirectly Radek's call for a war against the West, she stressed in her speech that "together with the interests of the revolution we have to defend also the interests of the world peace. Peace means the world revolution of the socialist proletariat".[108]

The young and radical minded delegates did not share Luxemburg's view. They instinctively feared that the revolution approached a climax and that the impending elections to the National Assembly, to be held in late January 1919, would invalidate the council idea in Germany.[109] They impatiently pressed for action and passed a resolution which urged the extreme Left not to participate in elections to the National Assembly and to prevent its convocation and activities by all means.[110]

This decision, as Arthur Rosenberg has remarked, amounted to an indirect incitement to rioting and coups d'état.[111] It was at variance with Rosa Luxemburg's program and in fact also with Radek's warning against civil war. At the same time, the radical majority of the congress felt a close bond with the Bolsheviks. Lenin rather than Luxemburg was their authority and Soviet Russia the object of admiration, a source of encouragement in the struggles to come. The anticipation of Soviet aid was inseparably intertwined in their minds with feelings of solidarity and readiness to help Soviet Russia in the struggle for survival.[112]

Coincidentally, a report came out in late December about the beginning of German-Allied cooperation against the Soviet regime. Luxemburg herself informed the congress about an anti-Bolshevik agreement between the German plenipotentiary Winnig and a British representative in Riga.[113] As could be expected, she harshly condemned this as a "betrayal of the Russian revolution" and termed the Ebert-Scheidemann government "the arch-enemy of the German proletariat".[114] Her condemnation of anti-Bolshevik activities met with a vivid response of the delegates - no other part of her or anyone's else speech received such tremendous applause. Two of her most radical critics, Frölich and Rühle, even suggested that this passage be issued as a leaflet.[115] Liebknecht, in his now customary manner promptly called for action. It did not suffice to protest against this infamy of the German government, he declared, the German proletariat "has already now the possibility to demonstrate its solidarity with the brotherly Soviet republic by deeds...This must involve the common struggle of the German proletarian soldiers in Russia against the

German and the Anglo-Allied counterrevolutionaries".[116] These words too were much applauded.

Five days later, Liebknecht involved the party in a major anti-government action, the January uprising. The causes of the uprising are mostly sought in Germany's internal crisis, particularly in a growing animosity between the ruling Majority Socialists and their critics of the Left.[117] This view, however, does not seem to fully elucidate the aggressiveness of Liebknecht and his young colleagues. As has been seen, the KPD congress considerably increased their awareness of kinship with Soviet Russia and made them alert to the Bolshevik calls for assistance.[118] The notion of the Russian revolution being in danger and in need of help in effect was one of the basic tenets of the congress.[119] The German communists also feared that intervention against Soviet Russia would be a prelude to an offensive against the German revolution.[120] It was also their determination to offset a German-Allied advance against Soviet Russia that accentuated their hostility towards the socialist government and pushed them in early January 1919 into premature action.

The Berlin Uprising, January 1919

Despite the mounting criticism of the SPD government from the Left, the bellicose tones of the founding congress of the KPD met with little understanding from other radical socialists.[121] Not only the Independents, but also the Obleute with whom Liebknecht negotiated about a merger, disagreed with the Spartacist decision not to participate in the parliamentary elections and objected to the putschist dispositions and "foolish demonstrations" of the Spartacists.[122] Both the Independent Socialists and the Obleute were disillusioned but without any intention to rise.

In early January, however, the political atmosphere in the German capital deteriorated as a result of a banal incident involving the controversial chief of the Berlin police, Emil Eichhorn. Formally an Independent Socialist, Eichhorn had been employed prior to the German revolution by the Soviet press agency ROSTA and had proved responsive to Moscow's calls for help.[123] This and his performance as the first revolutionary chief of the Berlin police made him in December 1918 suspect of continuing to work for the Bolshevik interests. After Radek's arrival in Berlin in the middle of December, Eichhorn indeed turned more radical.[124] During the Christmas clashes his police troops supported the mutinous sailors rather than the government forces, and subsequently Eichhorn urged his party colleagues to turn to the Left, that is to say, to the Spartacists.[125] The suspicion of his acting in the Bolshevik interests was strengthened by a little known incident. It was obviously in early January 1919 that government troops in Berlin arrested Karl Radek and handed him over to the Berlin police. Eichhorn, however, promptly set him free again.[126] At this point the Majority Socialists lost patience and on January 3, 1919, presented Eichhorn with a list of offences he had allegedly committed[127] and subsequently dismissed him from his post. Eichhorn demanded that his fate be decided by the executive organ of the German councils, the Zentralrat. But when this confirmed his dismissal, he refused to submit.[128]

The attempt of the Majority Socialists to oust Eichhorn activated the German Left. In the evening of January 4 both the USPD and the Spartacist leadership decided that demonstrations should be held the next day. Luxemburg on this occasion told Radek that the action would

have the character only of a protest, the Spartacists would not strive for power.[129] After the meeting, however, Radek again talked privately to Liebknecht. For almost two months the Bolsheviks and Radek personally had been summoning the German proletariat and Karl Liebknecht specifically to action, and their summons did not remain without effect. Spurred by Karl Radek, Liebknecht personally at the founding congress of the KPD had denounced the German government because of its complicity in anti-Bolshevik intervention. Now, four days later, the opportunity arrived to demonstrate his solidarity with Soviet Russia by a major anti-government action, more acceptable to him than the course of "national Bolshevism" advocated by Radek.[130] Liebknecht now even flirted with the idea of a Leftist government headed by the Independent Ledebour and backed by the Obleute.[131] This was not exactly what Radek had been proposing, but he appears also to have vacillated at this moment. In retrospect, he wrote that it was "thoroughly possible" in early January 1919 to seize power in Berlin: "Only an unarmed group of social democratic workers was protecting the government in Wilhelmstrasse. But no one gave the masses in the street a target for their struggle" he added, referring to Luxemburg's opposition to a coup.[132] Moreover, although Radek was prone to emphasizing his anti-putschist stand in his recollections, he did not do so when recalling the aforementioned talk with Liebknecht. It may be assumed that he neither pushed the Spartacist into an uprising, nor did he discourage him.

In any case, in the night of January 4 Liebknecht and Pieck, the two champions of the Soviet cause in the Spartakusbund, ignored the Spartacist decision of that day, and called at a session of the Obleute

for a frontal confrontation. "Only by a quick and resolute action", argued Pieck, "can the Berlin workers upset the government and overthrow it".[133] Although some other participants spoke in a similar vein, in the end the moderate view prevailed. The Obleute too decided only on a demonstration for the next day, January 5.[134]

The demonstration turned out to be larger than anyone had expected. The crowds, however, were waiting in vain for a signal to action. The popular leaders delivered mostly verbal attacks on the government.[135] When the Obleute and the Independents met in the evening of January 5, the course of further action was still uncertain. During the discussion, however, a report came about the occupation of the Vorwärts premises by the demonstrators. This obviously unorganized action was perceived as evidence of revolutionary élan among the Berlin workers. Moreover, Dorrenbach, one of the sailors' leaders close to Liebknecht, assured the meeting that the People's Marine Division and major parts of the Berlin garrison sided with the Obleute, and that they were ready to overthrow Ebert and Scheidemann by force. His report stirred a wave of radical declarations, but no clear concept of further actions emerged. Continuing in his, as was soon proved fictitious, description of the situation, Dorrenbach further alleged that a large force with 2000 machine guns and twenty artillery pieces was waiting at a Berlin suburb ready to march against the government.[136]

Although the veracity of the report was at once questioned, Liebknecht now seized the initiative and declared that in the given circumstances the overthrow of the Ebert-Scheidemann government was not only possible, but absolutely necessary. From this moment on the opponents

of the putsch found it, for prestige reasons too, very difficult to defend their point of view. When one of them, Richard Müller, nevertheless condemned the idea of a bid for power, he was strongly rebuked by Wilhelm Pieck.[137] In the end the Obleute resolved to continue the struggle until the government was overthrown. Ledebour, Liebknecht, and Scholze were elected chairmen of the Revolutionary Committee - a body formed to coordinate the quest for power.[138] Thus, although the fatal decision to rise was taken at a meeting of the Obleute, it was Liebknecht and Pieck, two Spartacists of pronounced pro-Bolshevik views, who pressed for such a course of action at the moment when the other leaders vacillated, and who thereby decisively influenced the outcome of the meeting.

Consequently the uprising had insufficient backing. Already the next day, January 6, the majority of the Independents and Obleute decided in favor of negotiations with the government.[139] The Revolutionary Committee, paralyzed by the disunity of its members, failed to work out a meaningful program and plan of military action. Moreover, the troops of the Berlin garrison either declared their neutrality or supported the government. It turned out later that only about one tenth of the insurgent were soldiers.[140] On January 6 Liebknecht committed himself, under curious circumstances, to the putschist decision of the previous night but otherwise he too was lacking in offensive spirit.[141] He appears to have been preoccupied with propaganda activities and with the impact of the uprising upon the Entente countries.[142] This led his contemporaries to accuse him of continuing in January 1919 his well known "revolutionary calisthenics".[143] Evidently, Liebknecht also came to consider the uprising a violent demonstration rather than a bid for power.

The Spartacist leadership on January 8 subjected Liebknecht and Pieck to harsh criticism for their activities and demanded the termination of the Spartacist involvement in the Revolutionary Committee. Liebknecht, however, found it "extremely difficult" to meet this demand.[144] The controversy reached the point when Leo Iogiches suggested that a declaration be published in Rote Fahne denying Liebknecht the right to represent the party in the Revolutionary Committee.[145] The conflict was resolved on January 10 when Liebknecht consented to breaking the ties with the Committee allegedly because of its compromises.[146] At the same time Rosa Luxemburg insisted that the Spartacists were obliged to wage a consistent struggle against the government despite the vacillations of the leadership of the uprising.[147] The Spartakusbund was assuming responsibility for the ill-conceived uprising.

Meanwhile the government, initially overtaken by the outburst of mass dissatisfaction, mobilized its forces, composed predominantly of volunteers, and started a counter-offensive.[148] The street fighting ended in the night on January 12 when the government forces reoccupied the Berlin Police Headquarters, the last stronghold of the insurgents. The next day the Independent Socialists and the Obleute terminated the general strike and summoned the workers back to work.

The time arrived in the Spartacist camp for reconsidering the uprising and the causes of its defeat. It concerned especially Karl Liebknecht who, harmonizing his tactics with the Soviet interests, had steered a militant course threatening to embroil Germany in a new war with the Western powers. This created the image of the Spartacists as Bolshevik warmongers and alienated them from the German workers and soldiers. In the

final account, it narrowed the base of the revolution. Rosa Luxemburg was well aware of this fact. For instance, in her last article analyzing the causes of the recent defeat, she indicated that the "lasting victory" of the revolution was not feasible unless the soldiers joined the revolutionary ranks.[149] (Lenin maintained much the same prior to November 1917.) Making use of Luxemburg's argument, the Spartacist Eberlein intimated at the founding congress of the Comintern that the German soldiers had turned away from Spartakus and Bolshevism because of fear of being dragged into a new war.[150] Thus the revision of the Spartacist policy following the January uprising called for overcoming the image of being bellicose agents of Bolshevism and for the restoration of the anti-war stand, as advocated by Rosa Luxemburg. It is noteworthy that just at the beginning of this process of political re-emancipation, on January 12, 1919, she instructed her young colleague Eberlein to reject in Moscow the Bolshevik plan for an immediate formation of the Third International.[151] Concerned about the contemporaries' view of the uprising being instigated by the Bolsheviks, Luxemburg and the Spartacist leadership also asked Karl Radek not to leave his apartment on the grounds that his arrest would seriously aggravate the situation.[152] It is not surprising that she also subjected the image-maker of the Spartakusbund, Karl Liebknecht, to strong criticism. She even considered further collaboration with him impossible, but did not find it opportune to voice her criticism during the uprising. She nevertheless intended to rebuke him in public as soon as the fighting was over.[153]

Since both revolutionaries shared the same hiding place in the last days of their lives, Liebknecht may not have remained immune to Luxemburg's

arguments and her personality. In his last article "In Spite of All", written on January 14, he admitted that the "fear of Bolshevism" had co-determined the collapse of the uprising, and endorsed the Luxemburgian course. The German proletariat, he wrote,

> will fight their future struggles and win their future victories relying only on themselves. The supposition that the liberation of the working class can be achieved only through efforts of the working class itself has acquired by the bitter lesson of this week a new and deeper meaning.[154]

The "road to Calvary" of the German proletariat, he concluded, therefore could be very long, perhaps too long to be completed by his generation.[155]

Liebknecht did not wish to remain silent. On January 15 he already entertained the idea of arranging public meetings for the following days.[156] It may be assumed that he would then endorse Luxemburg's position in public. However, in the evening of the same day the two Spartacists were arrested under mysterious circumstances, and subsequently murdered by nationalist officers.[157] Their tragic end marked an apex of the German revolution and definitely split the German socialist movement.

What was the Soviet perception of and response to the first "proletarian" uprising in Germany? It appears that the answer has to be related to the Bolshevik perception of intervention. Until late December 1918 Moscow had regarded Western intervention as inevitable and imminent. In the last days of the month, however, the opinion in Moscow changed. On December 29 Pravda noted a temporary failure of the interventionist plans stating that the "Allies have not given up their intentions, they have only postponed them. For this reason, we receive another breathing spell".[158] The next day the French Foreign Minister Pichon intimated in Paris that the Allied strategy vis-à-vis Russia would be that of cordon

sanitaire. "If any offensive is necessary to reduce Bolshevism," he declared at the Chamber of Deputies, "it should be executed later by Russian forces".[159] Following this declaration even Lenin, usually more sceptical than his colleagues, came to envision another breathing spell: "We can repeat much of what we did at the time of the Brest peace and much more easily".[160]

The prospect of a new respite brought into Soviet politics an element of caution. There was no more burning need for relief actions abroad. Moscow now became more attentive to the fact that such actions might be counterproductive and serve to mobilize the anti-Bolshevik "hawks" in the West. Moreover, Soviet-German relations improved in late December 1918, partly because of a crisis between Germany and Poland over territorial claims. The Germans, who had refused to comply with the armistice clause obliging them to keep their occupation forces in the East until the Allied units replaced them, continued to withdraw from formerly Russian territories, thereby enabling the weak Bolshevik forces to advance westwards. In any case, after weeks of summons to actions, Moscow in late December 1918 suddenly began to caution the German proletariat. "The supporters of the Soviet power in Germany do not have the majority as yet," Pravda warned on December 27, "Scheidemann and Ebert will obviously retain the upper hand".[161]

Meanwhile the Spartacist envoy Eduard Fuchs arrived in Moscow to confer with the Bolsheviks and with Lenin in particular. Referring to "communications from our German comrade", Pravda intimated on December 31 that a major confrontation might be on the way in Berlin. But the paper struck a new tone, warning that a bid for power could end in a bloody defeat and that even if Liebknecht seized power, the position of the

proletarian regime would be extremely difficult because of the lack of support in the countryside and the "Allied sword" hanging over Germany.[162]

The hostile reaction of the German press and government to Radek's speech at the founding congress of the KPD obviously upset Moscow. The Bolshevik leadership promptly sent a message to the Spartacists and the Austrian communists, signed by Lenin, Trotsky, Sverdlov, Stalin, and Bukharin, indicating that such developments as Soviet Russia's struggle with the intervention, the predatory policy of the socialist governments, the obstructionist policies of the "Left" and "independent" groups, and a quick mobilization of counter-revolutionary forces created an "extremely difficult situation for our common cause". The message also indicated that, in contrast to the state of "dual power" in Russia prior to November 1917, the real power in Germany rested in the hands of the bourgeoisie despite the existence of the councils. The decisive struggles would have to arrive, but in the future. The German and Austrian proletariat "will have to realize that the only way out is taking power on its own".[163]

The tenet of the message was clear. Moscow intimated that it could not render any assistance to its sympathizers abroad and warned them against attempts at coups. It is therefore not surprising that Moscow received the news about the Berlin uprising without enthusiasm. In its first report on the outbreak of fighting Pravda deemed it possible that the Spartacists "will be defeated and power will remain in the hands of Scheidemann and Ebert".[164] The Narkomindel, ignoring the new revolutionary power in Germany, continued to address diplomatic notes to the now "deposed" German government.[165]

The aforementioned Bolshevik caution against bids for power,

published on January 5, obviously reached Berlin only after the outbreak of the uprising, too late to make Radek reject this venture outright. Confronted with a fait accompli, Radek in fact attempted in the initial stage of the uprising to bolster up Liebknecht's position by encouraging the insurgents to hold out until the Red Army came to their assistance.[166] In response to Radek's propaganda, the German government made a shrewd countermove: it issued on January 9 an appeal for new volunteer formations for the protection of the German territories in the East against the Red forces.[167] There could scarcely be any other measure that hit more deeply at the security-conscious Bolsheviks. It seemed now that Radek's activities and the uprising itself would provide a reason for Germany's joining the anti-Bolshevik crusade. The same day, or on January 10, an anxious Radek wrote a letter to the Spartacist leadership in which he pointed out the forthcoming offensive of the German government and urged the cessation of fighting and a total surrender of the insurgents to the government forces.[168] The next day, January 11, the danger of a new German advance against Soviet Russia was spelled out for the first time by a Pravda editorial. "Scheidemann and Scheidemannists, frightened to death by the wave of revolutions, are contemplating plans for the last desperate struggle against the proletariat on all fronts", the paper wrote quoting the German press to the effect that Radek's activities would compel the German government to prepare military actions against the Soviets. "At the same time the French General Foch urges the Germans to advance against Russia and the gentlemen Scheidemanns do their best to honor this friendly request," Pravda concluded worriedly.[169] The chairman of the VTsIK Sverdlov subsequently sent a letter to the

communists in which he expressed concern about the "alliance between Ebert, Wilson and Foch" becoming "stronger and more open" and predicted the collapse of the uprising and the liquidation of some communists.[170]

The Bolsheviks' profound concern about the consequences of the Berlin uprising manifested itself also in an unexpected form, their policy towards Belorussia and Lithuania. After the danger of intervention had subsided in late December 1918, Lenin's government began to treat these westernmost parts of the Soviet territory as two separate entities, favoring the formation of two separate Soviet republic and two communist parties. However, immediately after the suppression of the Berlin uprising, on January 16, the Bolshevik Central Committee decided that the fourteen-day old Belorussian republic would be split so that three gubernias would merge with Soviet Russia and the two westernmost with Lithuania into a new Soviet republic. The task of the new republic was to halt Western intervention, which again appeared feasible to the Bolsheviks. In effect, Moscow now anticipated that the new buffer state would be sacrificed to the invaders.[172] Although Moscow also justified this precautionary reorganization to the local communists by citing a Polish threat, it is clear that the Bolsheviks responded chiefly to the Spartacist defeat and to the threat of anti-Soviet actions on the part of Germany.[173] Despite the resistance of the Belorussian and Lithuanian communists, Moscow in the following weeks did its best to carry out this reshuffle. At the same time the Soviet High Command turned its attention to the Western front to meet the expected attack.[174] On January 18 the Soviet Baltic Fleet was activated and five additional divisions were subsequently transferred to the Western regions from inside the country.

Trotsky himself spent several weeks there in January and February 1919, inspecting and organizing the Soviet defence against an attack which ultimately did not materialize.

Looking in retrospect at the German revolution, the Soviets repeatedly admitted that, however imperfect, it revolutionized Europe and eased the position of the Soviet republic.[175] In the heat of struggles for survival, however, the agonizing experience they had made during and after the first "proletarian" uprising in the West served as a warning against encouraging the communists in the West to seize power. The policy of a desperate revolutionizing with its twists and turns was also discontinued in early 1919 to be never re-instituted. The Bolsheviks reached the phase of making verbal revolution. Ironically, just this phase brought them unexpected gains.

CHAPTER VI

BOLSHEVISM - A "SICKNESS OF THE DEFEATED"?

It was only after the advent of peace in November 1918 that Bolshevik ideas began to take root in the West. A striking feature of this process was the early gains of Bolshevism in the countries defeated in the world war. The disillusionment with the Western powers generated by the lost war and ensuing peace negotiations; the agitation of prisoners of war repatriated from Russia; the postwar economic crisis; and perhaps also the metaphysical proclivities of the German world, were some of the factors which influenced the apparent development of Bolshevism into what Karl Radek called a "sickness of the defeated". This chapter, besides discussing the reasons for the formation of the Communist International, examines in particular the experience of the Soviet republics in Hungary and Bavaria, with the purpose of ascertaining whether or not, or to what extent, these were part of a scheme originating in Moscow.

Lenin and the Foundation of the Comintern

Although Lenin harshly criticized the Second International and the Western labour movement during the world war, his verbal attacks were not followed by actions. He not only avoided a definite break with the "social chauvinists", but did not hesitate even to collaborate with them in very crucial moments. One may recall in this connection, the cooperation between his agents and the German Majority Socialists in making the Brest peace.[1] Lenin's approach to the Zimmerwald movement, a loose grouping of the Left socialists of various countries opposing the war,

was also functional. Lenin and the Bolsheviks who constituted the Left of the movement, did not hold an undisputed authority, nor did they dominate it in the realm of doctrine and tactics.[2] In turn, Lenin exhibited no particular loyalty to the Zimmerwaldists. Already critical in 1916, after his return to Russia in April 1917, he declared the movement dead and demanded a breaking of ties with it and a creation of a new revolutionary International.[3] His critique of Zimmerwald was unduly harsh but again functional. By rejecting any international socialist authority, Lenin in fact legitimized his own independent policies. "Let us not deceive ourselves with hopes of agreements and international congresses", he justified this course in April 1917, "as long as the imperialist war is on, international intercourse is held in the iron vise of the military dictatorship...To 'wait' for international congresses or conferences is simply to betray internationalism".[4]

Consequently, when the Zimmerwaldists in the latter part of 1917 came to urge the Russian socialists against a separate peace, Lenin became hostile towards the movement. He furiously opposed Bolshevik participation in the third Zimmerwald conference in Stockholm, deliberating in September 1917 on ways of achieving a general peace.[5] On the eve of the November coup Lenin and the Bolsheviks had loosened their ties with the Zimmerwald movement and had secured freedom of action to implement their peace program. It was only in the Brest period that they re-established their contacts with the movement, utilizing it as a channel of communication with Western socialism and as a loudspeaker against intervention.[6] But still, the Bolsheviks in no way committed themselves to it. The movement died with the end of the war. Evidently Lenin and

his colleagues had little interest in an international organization they could not master.[7]

Lenin also took an opportunistic stand in the question of a new International. The Bolshevik victory in November 1917 made such an organization possible but not inevitable. Lenin was still reluctant to definitely break with the ideologically "rotten" but powerful and influential workers' parties in the West. Following the coup Lenin's government indeed entertained the idea of establishing loose contacts with broader strata of the workers' movement in Western Europe.[8] However, in early February, after the strike movement in Germany had been suppressed and the Majority Socialists had dissociated themselves from the Bolsheviks, the alleged instigators of the strikes, the Soviet government, anticipating the worst,[9] resolved to mobilize a hard core of its international supporters.

On February 6, 1918, a preliminary meeting took place in Petrograd, attended by a number of Leftists from various countries except Germany and Austria-Hungary. The participants decided to organize an international conference with the purpose of revitalizing the Zimmerwald movement. However, as Pravda wrote, only those groups and parties qualified which supported the achievements of the November revolution and the Soviet power. Recognition and support of this revolution and of the soviets were to become the criterion of the proletarian party. Without the Soviet dictatorship in Russia, Pravda wrote in the spirit of later Stalinist pronouncements, "the victory of the revolution in the West is impossible".[10] Preparations were subsequently made for the Petrograd conference, but it

never convened. The Bolsheviks, having accepted the German peace terms, came to curb the policy of revolutionizing.

For the next ten months the Bolsheviks entirely ignored the issue of a new International. Moreover, Lenin was still not intellectually prepared for imposing Bolshevik doctrines upon the Western workers' movement. It is noteworthy that since the early part of the century he had stressed that Bolshevik tactics and doctrines reflected the needs of the Russian revolution only.[11] Even after the coup he conceded that "it would be absurd to set up our revolution as the ideal for all countries".[12] This was also the view of such Western socialists as Rosa Luxemburg who considered Bolshevism a Russian brand of socialism, unfit for the West. (Karl Kautsky reportedly mocked Leninism as "Tartar socialism".) Moreover, the state capitalist course which Lenin planned to follow, appealed to a broader spectrum of moderate rather than to radical socialists in Western Europe. Such a course neither necessitated nor facilitated the formation of a communist International. It was only the Bolsheviks' turn to radical policies after the outbreak of the civil war and intervention that gave their experiment the spell of internationalism and the ethos of a great revolution. Only then did Lenin, in a polemic with Kautsky, also proclaim Bolshevism an international doctrine, adding that "Bolshevism has created the ideological and tactical foundations of a Third International, of a really proletarian and communist International".[13]

Nevertheless, the statement was not followed by deeds. When Allied intervention seemed imminent, in December 1918, the Soviets made hesitant

new attempts to organize their foreign sympathizers. Two international meetings convened in Moscow and Petrograd respectively, and appealed for assistance for Soviet Russia, but the formation of a new International was not discussed.[14] Later, when it became known that a socialist conference was being convened in Switzerland for the purpose of reviving the Second International, in an appeal of December 24 the Bolsheviks urged "the communists of all countries" to boycott the conference and invited them to rally behind the "Third Revolutionary International" which "de facto already exists".[15] However, the tone of the appeal indicates that the Bolsheviks intended only a verbal protest against the conference,[16] and the Central Committee indeed decided on no concrete step for creating a new "Third" International.

Between December 25 and 28, however, the German Spartacist Eduard Fuchs arrived in Moscow, and met with Lenin. He must have informed him about the growing polarization within German socialism, particularly about the tendency towards forming a new party Left of the Independent Socialists[17] - a development which Lenin himself regarded as a precondition of a new International. Besides, the violent clashes in Berlin between December 24 and 26 brought an element of uncertainty into the relations between Moscow and Berlin. It seemed that the Bolsheviks, regarded as instigators of the Berlin riots, definitely lost the sympathies of the Majority Socialists and of the German government. At this point the Bolsheviks took the first concrete step towards the Third International.[18]

In a directive written obviously on December 28,[19] Lenin instructed Chicherin that an international conference would have to convene as soon

as possible to arrange for the new International. He envisaged that the conference could open on February 1, either legally in Berlin or illegally in Holland. Only those parties and groups were to be invited which had recognized the Soviet system. The platform of the new International was to be worked out by Bukharin on the basis of the Bolshevik and Spartacist programs. Lenin also tentatively suggested that the International should be called "communist" instead of the traditional "social democratic" or "socialist".

On December 31 Lenin received a draft of the call for the foundation of the new International.[20] The document was subsequently sent to a number of invited parties and groups - the Spartacists ranked as the first - to be read and signed. Yet the action proved to be a failure. Most of the couriers, chiefly former prisoners of war in Russia, never delivered the appeal and disappeared with all the money they carried.[21] From those few organizations which had received the invitation, Rosa Luxemburg on behalf of the Spartacists rejected an immediate foundation of the Third International.[22]

In the middle of January 1919, however, the Spartacist uprising was suppressed and Luxemburg and Liebknecht betrayed and murdered. Moscow now feared that the Majority Socialists' government would join a new anti-Bolshevik crusade. It was at this moment when, as Lenin put it, the forces of the Second International had joined the international bourgeoisie "to crush the proletarian revolution", that he resolved to accelerate preparations for the Third International.[23] Following the death of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, however, Lenin became noticeably bolder in propounding his position. First, he resolved to issue an open

appeal for the formation of the Communist International, without the consent of the German communists and other invited organizations. On January 21, 1919, he presented his appeal to several foreign sympathizers dwelling in Russia and "after some discussion" got their approval.[24] The appeal was subsequently broadcast and printed in Pravda. Second, though Rosa Luxemburg would certainly have insisted on the equality and autonomous status of all parties involved, Lenin now intimated that the Communist International would be a tightly organized and centralized institution of the Bolshevik type. The congress, in his words,

> must establish a common fighting organ for the purpose of maintaining permanent co-ordination and systematic leadership of the movement...subordinating the interests of the movement in each country to the common interest of the international revolution.[25]

Third, while he had previously considered Berlin or Holland as a meeting place for the preliminary conference, the Leftist organizations were now secretly invited to send their representatives to Moscow. Fourth, although Lenin and the Bolsheviks had initially suggested that the new platform was worked out from both the Bolshevik and the Spartacist programs, it was Bolshevik doctrines and tactics which became a norm for the International after Luxemburg's death.[26] A mass re-edition and popularization of the Spartacist program, as initially suggested by Lenin, never took place.

Although many foreign sympathizers were residing in Russia, the congress did not convene in February 1919 as planned. The Bolsheviks may have been waiting for the outcome of two important developments. First, February 15th was tentatively set as the opening date of the Prinkipo conference in which the Bolsheviks and their Russian enemies were to

negotiate a peace settlement.[27] An agreement on such a vital issue, needless to say, would have considerably influenced Bolshevik policies. Second, the Bolsheviks were obviously waiting for the aftermath of a conference held by the centrist socialists at Berne, Switzerland, in the first half of February. Addressing itself to the Russian question, the conference upon the initiative of the Swedish socialist Branting resolved to send a fact-finding mission to Russia. Unlike other Bolsheviks, Lenin assumed that such a visit could make the prominent Western socialists more attentive to the anti-interventionist cause. Without consulting the party, he instructed Chicherin to grant Soviet consent to the mission.[28] Lenin subsequently asserted his view on the party forum, but the socialist delegation in fact never arrived in Moscow.

Meanwhile the Bolsheviks took the last steps in arranging the founding congress of the Comintern. It was obvious that the event would be very modest in scale. Although a new wave of radicalism was rising in Europe and North America, the idea of soviet dictatorship had not yet taken root there. In March 1919 no one could predict that within a decade there would be a number of large communist parties in major European countries. There existed only a few, numerically inferior, communist parties, chiefly on the territory of the former Russian Empire and in such countries defeated in the world war as Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, and Hungary.[29] There was no communist party in such crucial countries of the victorious alliance as Britain, France, or Italy, let alone the United States.

It could be expected in the given situation that the Bolsheviks would dominate the new International and impose their own policies upon other

parties. Anticipating this development, Rosa Luxemburg had instructed the German delegate Eberlein to oppose an immediate foundation of the Third International.[30] After his arrival in Moscow on February 25, 1919, the stubborn and obstinate Eberlein indeed made the substance of his mandate clear to the Soviet leadership. Neither a private talk with Lenin nor a "lively exchange of opinion" with other prominent Bolsheviks reversed his stand.[31] In the end the Bolsheviks temporarily yielded. It was resolved on March 1 that the meeting would open merely as an international conference.

On March 2, 1919, fifty-one delegates from thirty countries gathered in Moscow for the first session. Many of them were self-appointed or possessed only fictitious mandates.[32] During the first two days the delegates, including the Russians, delivered sober reports on the situation in their countries. The third day, however, the pro-Bolshevik forces went on the offensive. It was the Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen who refuted Eberlein's argument that the situation was not ripe for world revolution. He argued that the existence of the Soviet government in Russia was a sound reason for establishing a new International. The Austrian delegate Steinhardt, acting perhaps upon Radek's instruction,[33] subsequently delivered a glowing account of enormous enthusiasm for Bolshevism and the new International in Europe.[34] Although his picture was exaggerated, his words obviously made an impact upon the participants, the majority of whom had dwelled in Russia. At this moment the pro-Bolshevik delegates seized the initiative and formally submitted a proposal for the immediate foundation of the Third International.

To the irritation of the Bolsheviks the German delegate Eberlein

again objected. According to the published report, he argued that the major countries of the Western world were either not properly represented or not represented at all, and that a premature foundation of the Third International would make the organization suspect to the workers' movement in the West.[35] According to another authentic report hitherto unnoticed by scholars (quoted hereafter as Bartels' report),[36] Eberlein went even further in his objections. He had "particularly strong reservations" about the prospect of the course of communism being "determined just in such a country as Russia, in which only a tiny group of the industrial proletariat have adopted socialist ideas whereas the masses of peasants uncritically obey a few leaders". The Bolsheviks, according to the same report, found Eberlein's argument "extremely painful", but they continued their offensive.[37] In the end the Bolsheviks won approval for an immediate constitution of the Third International. Eberlein abstained from the voting, which was by acclamation. According to Bartel's report he even declared that he would further participate only as a private person. In the evening of March 5 the Communist International, known also as the Comintern, formally came into existence.

Some scholars assume that the Comintern was founded while the Bolsheviks anticipated the speedy arrival of world revolution, perhaps even within a year.[38] This assumption, however, is based on a feeble evidence, chiefly on Zinoviev's optimistic statement made during the congress with the purpose of countering Eberlein's opposition.[39] In fact, not only the prehistory of the Comintern but also the contemporary opinions of the Bolsheviks and the Comintern documents run against the aforementioned

assumption. Since the problem of the Bolsheviks' perception of the West is crucial for understanding the motivation and objectives of the Third International, they will be briefly examined here.

In November 1918 Lenin stopped making apocalyptic predictions of the incipient decline of Western society. In March 1919, discussing the party program at the Eight Party Congress, he declared that there never was a pure imperialism. Imperialism constituted merely a superstructure on the "vast subsoil of the old capitalism" which "will remain a fact for many years to come".[40] Parallel with admitting this, he also indicated that Soviet Russia would have to live with the fact that the revolution in the West would require "very many years" to become victorious.[41]

As could be expected the pragmatic Stalin in one of his rare excursions into the realm of international relations also noted the consolidation of capitalism and hinted that only "small nations", presumably on Russia's periphery, would be drawn into the sphere of revolution by the virtue of arms.[42] Stalin's adversary Trotsky addressed himself to the theme of world revolution also only marginally. In an article of April 1919, however, he drew a parallel between Russia of 1905 and the contemporary Germany, thereby indicating that he also did not expect the proletarian revolution in Germany in the near future.[43]

Bukharin, commenting on the Spartacist defeat in January 1919, restated his view that the strength of capitalism in the West would make the revolution there more painful than in Russia.[44] Talking a month later to the English radical journalist Arthur Ransome, he was even more explicit. "I think", he said, "we have entered upon a period of revolution which may last fifty years before the revolution is victorious at

least in all Europe and finally in all the world".[45] Ransome heard a similar concession also from the Pravda editor Meshcheriakov.[46]

The Bolsheviks also saw the future of the Soviet State in a sober light. The prominent Soviet politician Krestinsky told Ransome in February 1919 in respect to world revolution: "If it does not happen we know very well that we shall have to pay, and we are prepared to pay, and shall be able to pay, in concessions, in raw material..."[47] Similarly Karl Radek, unable to visualize the proletarian revolution in Germany, already in March 1919 called from his German jail for economic cooperation between revolutionary Russia and the "bourgeois" German state.[48] Shortly afterwards Lenin also admitted in an interview that world revolution could not be expected in the coming decade and that Soviet Russia would have to reconstruct her economy and transportation with German assistance.[49]

Isaac Deutscher, writing on the assumption that the Bolsheviks in the spring of 1919 expected world revolution to be the immediate task of the Comintern, has found it doubtful whether Lenin and Trotsky would have founded the International at this stage if they had a clearer perception of West European conditions.[50] In effect, however, the Bolsheviks took this step precisely because they were skeptical of revolution in the West, and on the assumption that the new International would provide support and assistance for the Soviet state. This assumption was reflected in the documents adopted by the founding congress of the Comintern.[57]

The congress delegates, with some reservation, approved of several documents. Two of them were of a theoretical nature. In "Theses on

Bourgeois Democracy and Proletarian Dictatorship" Lenin denounced bourgeois democracy and parliamentarism, and presented the Soviet system as the political goal of the proletariat in all countries.[52] The platform of the Comintern, drafted by Bukharin in cooperation with Eberlein, described in a very general fashion the proletarian strategy and postulates for the conquest of power.[53] Although of a theoretical nature, these documents mirrored the existing weakness of international communism. The platform was notable for its extreme vagueness in discussing the road to victory of the proletarian revolution, and conceded that a certain consolidation of capitalism had taken place.[54] Lenin in his document likewise indicated that international communism was still facing a period of agitation and organization.[55] The documents, Bukharin himself admitted, "have accepted the thought that the international proletariat is not on the offensive, but on the defensive".[56]

Confronted with the need of mobilizing the broadest army of supporters, the Bolsheviks were forced to shut their eyes to ideological differences and open the International to a wide spectrum of the labour movement. Bidding for mass support, Lenin in his document avoided any explicit reference to the "vanguard of the proletariat", the proletarian party, and put emphasis on soviets and the spontaneity of masses.[57] Moreover, out of eight documents adopted by the congress only one set forth a concrete program and contemplated the use of revolutionary methods. The "Appeal to the Workers of All Countries", expressing "grateful admiration" to the Russian proletariat and the Bolsheviks, presented the international proletariat with a list of concrete actions in favor of Soviet

Russia. The workers of all countries were asked to "act immediately and use all means at their disposal, if necessary, revolutionary means" to secure inter alia the cessation of foreign intervention and economic blockade; the opening of trade and diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia; the recognition of the Soviet government; and the admission of Soviet delegates to the Paris Peace Conference.[58]

Thus, although the Bolsheviks might have considered world revolution a long-term goal of the new International, their immediate and paramount aim was to create a disciplined international body supporting Soviet Russia's struggle for survival and coexistence.[59] It is noteworthy in this respect that the Communist International, established to facilitate the survival of the Soviet regime, was formally dissolved in 1943, shortly after the Stalingrad victory over Nazi Germany made the Soviet Union into a world power.

The dual purpose of the Comintern was also mirrored in the personality of its first chairman, Grigori Zinoviev. Distrustful of spontaneous revolutionary action in the West, Zinoviev propounded revolutionary war as a means of exporting the revolution to Western Europe.[60] Having developed with Lenin the idea of "socialism in one country", Zinoviev persistently defended it after November 1917, although in his own personal way. Being a man of whom Lenin reportedly remarked that "if he is not afraid, it means that there is nothing to be afraid of",[61] Zinoviev during the period of civil war and intervention balanced his anxiety and apprehension with what a colleague termed an overreadiness to "buckle on the armour of revolutionary hardness".[62] His verbal radicalism and

demagogic oratory, coupled with a cautious approach to politics, and his absolute loyalty to Lenin and his policies, qualified Zinoviev for the chairmanship of the Comintern, the organization which, in his own words, was in March 1919 nothing but a "propaganda society".

A New Quest for Peace, December 1918 - March 1919

In late November 1918, after the failure of the Soviet peace overtures, Moscow decided to approach the Allies on a more intimate basis, and sent to Stockholm a prominent "Westerner", Maxim Litvinov, as a peace pourparler. On December 4 Litvinov notified the British government of the Bolshevik readiness to meet British demands in any possible way in order to stop the intervention and achieve a recognition of the Soviet regime.[63] On December 24 he sent a lengthy telegram to President Wilson asking him too to hear the Soviet side before any course regarding intervention in Russia was decided upon.[64] Wilson and the British Prime Minister Lloyd George were impressed by the well-pointed telegram and promptly dispatched to Stockholm the American attaché in London, W. H. Buckler.

Buckler had three long interviews with Litvinov. The latter declared inter alia that the Russians realized "that in certain Western countries conditions are not favorable for a revolution of the Russian type". He went on to say that Soviet propaganda was merely a kind of defence against Allied intervention, and that it would be stopped as soon as peace was concluded. Litvinov also intimated the possibility of Soviet Russia recognizing the foreign debts.[65] Under the impact of Buckler's report, the Allied statesmen in Paris on January 21, 1919, approved Wilson's

proposal for arranging a peace conference of all Russian governments at Prinkipo Island. Three days later the Allies issued a vaguely formulated invitation to the conference to "all organized groups exercising or attempting to exercise power in any part of former Russian territory".[66]

In response to the Allied appeal the Bolsheviks assured the West that the decline of capitalism was inevitable.[67] But still, they were seriously and genuinely interested in the Prinkipo proposal. Waiting in vain for a formal invitation to the conference, Chicherin in late January requested it in Paris.[68] With no reply arriving, Lenin resolved in early February 1919 to unilaterally inform the Allies about the Bolshevik peace platform of peace. On February 4 Chicherin sent a note to the Allied governments stating the Soviet approval of the Prinkipo conference and outlining possible concessions by Lenin's government.[69] They included the recognition of foreign debts and the payment of interest with raw materials, economic concessions not conflicting with the economic and social order of Soviet Russia, cessation of propaganda in the Allied countries, and territorial concessions to the Entente and its Russian allies.

There were prominent Bolsheviks who believed that Lenin and Chicherin offered too much to the enemy.[70] As a whole, however, the prospect of peace was welcomed in Moscow and influenced Soviet politics. On the domestic front it led to the relaxation of party discipline and the growth of infra-party opposition which came to contest the centralistic tendencies in the party and army organizations.[71] Lenin himself resumed the practice of consulting the party gremia before making major decisions.

Personally, he now showed more concern for the life of his non-Bolshevik compatriots.[72] The Bolsheviks also resumed a diplomatic offensive designed to improve their image and find forces in the West favorable to the Prinkipo proposal.[73]

Paradoxically, however, the conciliatory note of February 4 created an unfavorable impression on Wilson and Lloyd George. More important, the White Russians, backed chiefly by the French government, refused to negotiate with the Bolsheviks at Prinkipo Island, placing hopes in the forthcoming Kolchak offensive against the heartland of Russia. By the middle of February 1919 the Prinkipo conference became a dead issue.[74]

In the latter part of February President Wilson and Lloyd George nevertheless decided to send to Moscow a special envoy, William C. Bullitt, an American journalist of a liberal outlook. Bullitt left Paris on February 22 and arrived in Russia on March 8.[75] After preliminary talks with Lenin, Chicherin, and Litvinov, Bullitt was on March 14 handed Lenin's plan for peace in Russia. Since the plan was very conciliatory and Lenin obviously did not wish to be openly identified with it, he formulated it as a project of an Allied peace appeal. It called inter alia for the cessation of hostilities on the entire territory of the former Russian empire and Finland, for a freeze on the transfer of troops and war material, and for a peace conference attended by the representatives of all the governments existing in the aforementioned territory. Moreover, all participating sides were to refrain from attempts to overthrow by force any of the participating governments and to grant a full amnesty to political prisoners, dissenters, and fighters in the civil war. All foreign troops were to be withdrawn from this territory immediately

after the conclusion of peace; the military assistance to the non-Soviet governments discontinued, and the blockade lifted. At the same time, however, Lenin proposed that all competing governments begin a simultaneous and reciprocal reduction of their armed forces under efficient control and supervision.[76]

The concessions offered by Lenin were far reaching. He later attempted to minimize their possible impact, but there is no reason to assume that he did not mean them seriously in 1919.[77] Unlike Trotsky, who considered the Bolsheviks to be legitimate rulers of Russia, Lenin was unable to overcome the defensive connotation of his strategy, and was genuinely interested in "trading" peace for economic and territorial concessions. Had the Western statesmen accepted his peace proposal of February 4, the Bolshevik territory would have been formally restricted to inland Russia, the anti-Bolshevik forces on the Russian territory would have gained a much needed respite, and the Soviet government would have obligated itself to demobilize its armies. In the final account the country would have been unified by non-violent means, that is to say rather by negotiations between various Russian factions than by conquest.

The Bullitt mission brought no tangible results. Although the Bolsheviks soon repulsed Kolchak, the Allied statesmen gathered in Paris were unable to agree on a coordinated Russian policy. On March 17 and 27 respectively, General Foch submitted to the Paris Peace Conference two proposals for a new international crusade against Bolshevism.[78] His plans were not accepted, but Wilson and Lloyd George now gave up their search for an accord with Soviet Russia. The Western powers now provided support

and assistance to the Russian White armies. Lenin's government avoided a major confrontation with the Western powers, but failed to gain peace. This precarious state of affairs persisted throughout 1919 and left its impact on the Soviet approach to European revolutions.

As has been seen, after the threat of intervention had subsided in late December 1918, Moscow was no longer willing to risk revolutionary offensives in the West. This fact can also be related to the fact that the continuing political and social unrest in the defeated countries and the alleged threat of Bolshevism only delayed the demobilization of the Allied armies and thereby prolonged the possibility of intervention in Russia. Ironically, however, the social and political conditions in the defeated countries had become chaotic in the first months of 1919. Germany in particular, experienced a series of local strikes and risings.[79] These mostly spontaneous actions were accompanied by the growth of a "Red Scare" in Germany and the Western world.[80] Facing this situation Moscow started the process of cooling the overheated atmosphere. First of all, Lenin himself demanded that things be arranged so "that the German traitor-socialists will not be able to say that the Bolsheviks are trying to impose their universal system...on Red Army bayonets".[81] Consequently, Moscow on February 15, 1919, renounced any intention of invading Germany. Referring to the resolution of October 3, 1918, Chicherin declared that the Soviet armed assistance would be due only if the German proletariat seized power.[82] Moreover, in January 1919 Moscow also dispatched to Germany another emissary of the Polish origin, Julian Markhlevsky ("Karski"). Upon his arrival in Germany, Markhlevsky became involved in

curbing the social and political radicalism of the German proletariat. In his pamphlets and public appearances he argued that since the bourgeoisie and the Majority Socialists had gained the upper hand in Germany, there existed no possibility either of proletarian revolution or even of socialization. He urged the German proletariat to limit its demands to control over capitalist production.[83] Such a position, needless to say, made him a tolerable visitor. With the knowledge of the Majority Socialists and of government officials Markhlevsky was spreading his reformist ideas among the restive proletariat of Germany's industrial heart, the Ruhr-Rhine region.[84]

Moscow now concurred with the German communists, led for several weeks after Luxemburg's death by her friend Leo Iogiches. Implementing Luxemburg's legacy, the German communists endeavored to restore their image of revolutionary pacifists.[85] Besides, although employing a radical language, they became anything but enthusiastic about local, spontaneous risings in various parts of Germany. From the middle of February the party was applying the brakes: "Demonstrate! Strike!", the KPD appealed to the German proletariat, "but beware of provocations. Avoid any armed uprising".[86] These tactics became obvious in early March 1919 when, following a conflict between two factions of the Berlin garrison, street fighting again broke out in the German capital between government units and the Left radicals, and the spirit of revolt quickly spread throughout the country. Although the political and territorial base of the insurgents was much broader than in the January uprising, the communists were the first to dissociate themselves from the general strike, and

from the military actions against the government and the conquest of power.[87] The general strike and the street fighting in March 1919 brought no tangible results to the German proletariat. Meanwhile, however, the communists of another defeated country were being confronted with the dilemma of power.

The Proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic

Hungary in the first months of peace had to cope with an economic crisis, unemployment, and demobilization. Above all, however, there was a problem of national identity. Following the break up of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in November 1918, the Hungarian state was faced with considerable territorial demands raised by the neighbouring states of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Austria. (See the map No. 3.) The coalition government of Count Károlyi, backed chiefly by the Social Democrats, endeavored in vain to counteract these demands by seeking an accord with the Western powers. The Allied statesmen at the Paris Peace Conference sympathized largely with Hungary's neighbours.[88]

The communist party seemed to offer a panacea for hunger, social injustice, and the threat of national humiliation. The party was founded in November 1918 by former prisoners of war in Russia such as Béla Kun, Tibor Szamuely, Jancsik, Pór, Rabinovics, Rákosi, and others.[89] Before their departure from Russia they had formally recognized the Bolshevik party as the supreme authority and submitted themselves to the "general political line of its resolutions and decisions".[90] Having at their disposal considerable Soviet funds,[91] the Hungarian communists after their return home in November 1918 began to propagate the idea of a Soviet system

MAP 3: BREAK-UP OF THE GREAT HUNGARY



and alliance with Soviet Russia as a means of asserting the national and social aspirations of the Hungarian people. At the same time the communists steered a course aggressive towards the Károlyi government, coupled with attempts of infiltrating the trade unions, the militia, and the army.

After the Bolsheviks in late December 1918 discontinued the policy of diversions and warned their allies abroad against coups, Kun and his party also revised their tactics. "Please rest assured", he wrote to Lenin on January 5, 1919, "I am taking care of business...on the Marxist basis: there is no possibility of any sort of putsch."[92] Following this assurance Kun and his colleagues came to curb their militant activities and their propaganda for the Soviet system.[93] Yet sympathies towards communism and Soviet Russia were growing in Hungary, being nurtured not only by social grievances but also by the treatment Hungary was receiving in Paris and by demands of her neighbours. As Béla Kun admitted in retrospect, the resistance to the proletarian revolution was weakening in bourgeois circles because of the expectation that Bolshevism would "organize the struggle against the imperialist peace", and the Hungarian proletariat in turn feared the "territorial mutilation of the country".[94] In any case, as early as January 1919 the mere mention of Lenin generated cheers; some of the bourgeois press even began to encourage the communist aspirations for power.[95]

In this atmosphere, the Soviet government on February 15 issued the aforementioned note indicating that Russia would assist only a Soviet Germany in its struggle with the Western powers. Ironically, this well publicized note, intended to pacify the Germans, could only boost those

in Hungary who wished for a Soviet regime there in order to gain Russia's friendship and assistance. Coincidentally, by the middle of February, Hungary experienced a deep internal crisis over the workers' representation. The spokesmen of major Budapest factories declared that they would fight a directive of a socialist minister limiting their power. The socialist ministers in turn threatened that should the directive be rejected they would resign from the government.[96] There was a distinct possibility that the government crisis would bring to power the communists, the party which claimed to represent the workers' real interests, and which was now becoming increasingly popular with the Hungarian public and the army.

The response of Béla Kun and his party is totally incomprehensible if evaluated on the assumption that the conquest of power was their immediate goal. When the crisis reached its apex on February 20, the communists organized a demonstration during which Béla Kun denounced the Social Democrats as traitors to the proletariat. After his inflammatory words the crowd moved to the social democratic daily Nepszava.[97]

Obviously it was the communists who, instead of usual verbal attacks, now started shooting and killed eight policemen and injured a number of others. There was no fatality on their side. The news of the bloodshed quickly spread and generated strong anti-communist sentiments.[98] In the evening of February 20 the Hungarian government resolved to arrest Kun and his colleagues, but the communists promptly learned of this decision.

In this situation Kun and the communist leadership made a puzzling move: the Central Committee decided on the night of February 20 that "each comrade" would stay at home and wait for the arrest squad. Although there was no doubt that this would paralyze the entire party work, no evading

of the arrest was permitted.[99] Béla Kun himself, according to his wife, faced the prospect of being imprisoned "quite optimistically".[100] In any case, the police action went smoothly. In the morning of February 21 almost the entire "general staff" of the Hungarian communist party was detained in the Budapest prisons.

Béla Kun never satisfactorily explained the reason for this surrender. It was his closest intimus and the Hungarian representative in Moscow A. Rudnyánszky who did so indirectly, in the Bolshevik organ Pravda. Commenting on the situation in Hungary, he admitted on the day of Kun's arrest that the Social Democrats were losing influence and the nation's sympathies were shifting towards the communists. The latter would now easily gain support of the crucial force in the country: "The government troops in Hungary are waiting only for the signal from the communist quarter to transform themselves into the Red army of the proletarian revolution". Yet Rudnyánszky indicated that the time had not yet arrived for giving such a signal because the proletarian regime in Hungary would be jeopardized by Rumanian and Czech troops. Only after the process of internal disruption of these troops was completed would there "be no barrier preventing the realization of the goal which has already become popular in the nation's masses".[101]

Several days later Lenin himself expressed a similar view. Addressing the founding congress of the Comintern, Lenin singled out the development in Hungary as showing the danger that "the struggle will be precipitous" and the masses would not understand "the significance of the Soviet system".[102] Hence he now declared the conquest of power conceivable

only if the institution of soviets was properly understood by the masses, if the Soviets also spread into the rural areas and if the communists won an absolute majority.[103] In view of these considerations there is good reason to assume that Kun and his colleagues on February 20, 1919, utilized, if not deliberately provoked, the bloody confrontation with the government and voluntarily went into prison in order to cool the political atmosphere in Hungary and avert their own, as they believed premature ascendancy to power.

Ironically, however, the anti-communist revulsion in Hungary lasted only one day. After the Hungarian press and particularly the largest bourgeois paper Az Est (The Evening) published melodramatic accounts of the brutal mistreatment of Kun and his colleagues in prison, public opinion in Hungary turned in favor of the communists.[104] Kun and his colleagues were not released but were granted various privileges which enabled them to establish in prison, their own secretariat for running the party affairs. Although the Hungarian workers demanded their release and the military waited, in the words of one of them, only for a wink to go Bolshevik,[105] Kun made no effort to get out of the prison, let alone to take power. There is indeed some evidence to suggest that he in fact worked to avoid any political crises that might unfold such a chain of events.[106]

The Left wing of the party, Tibor Szamuely, Revai, Bettelheim, Georg Lukács and other young intellectuals disapproved of Kun's policy of retreats. They evaded arrest on February 20 and without Kun's knowledge began preparations for an armed uprising.[107] In their view, the party

was to continue its political offensive against the Hungarian bourgeoisie and strive for a purely class dictatorship. While the Left considered compromises with other parties inadmissible, Béla Kun, formerly a Social Democrat of moderate leanings, was more inclined to middle-of-the-road solutions. On March 11, still in prison, Kun upheld the idea of coalition between the communists and the socialists, and outlined a unification platform calling for socialization measures. Significantly, he also alluded to the possibility of an alliance with Russia against the neighbouring states.[108]

Kun himself might not have realized that his proposal was soon to become a matter for serious consideration. The chain reaction leading to the proclamation of the Soviet republic in Hungary was triggered by the bourgeois paper Az Est which on March 18 and 19, carried bombastic reports on the Soviet advance westwards against Hungary's major enemy Rumania, and alleged the Bolshevik capture of Lemberg. The news was received with enthusiasm and won the frustrated nation for the "Bolshevik" orientation.[109] In this atmosphere the French Colonel Vix presented the Hungarians with an Allied note outlining a new demarcation line between Hungary and Rumania. The new line implied a further advance of Rumanian troops and imposed a corresponding retirement of the Hungarians well into their own territory.[110]

President Károlyi and the government found the Allied note totally unacceptable. Having asked for the advice of the military, the government received a recommendation urging the resumption of war in alliance with Soviet Russia.[111] At a cabinet session Károlyi himself conceded

that the pro-Western course had failed and pleaded for a "new orientation".[112] A similar view prevailed in the leadership of the Social Democrats who in the morning of March 21 informed Béla Kun of their unreserved acceptance of his unification platform of March 11.[113]

Meanwhile the Budapest workers resolutely demanded the liberation of the imprisoned communists by arms. Encouraged by this development Szamuely's group resolved to arrange an armed demonstration for March 23 to liberate the imprisoned comrades. Within a few hours the Szamuely group mobilized the workers of bigger factories and troops in all of Budapest's barracks.[114] At this moment Kun himself realized that events were carrying the communists to power in defiance of the Social Democrats. However, as he later admitted, he feared that the communists themselves would not be able to cope with the problems facing the government.[115] This will explain his behaviour on March 21 and 22. Without waiting for his liberation by the masses, Kun on March 21 readily agreed to enter a coalition government with the socialists and to merge both parties.[116] A joint declaration announced the creation of a united socialist party which was to exercise power through the workers, peasants, and soldiers' soviets. A new class army was to be created and the bourgeoisie disarmed. The declaration called for the "fullest and the most intimate alliance with the government of Soviet Russia" against the Allied imperialism.[117] The next day, March 22, Kun also proved very conciliatory in negotiations about the new soviet government. With the exception of the Foreign Ministry, reserved to him, other key posts were assigned to the Social Democrats. In the evening of March 22, the first Soviet republic in Central

Europe formally came into existence, although not from the "initiative of the revolutionary party", as Kun later conceded.[118]

Moscow and Budapest, March - early May 1919

The soviet government in Hungary inherited a number of unsettled problems of which that of territorial integrity was the most burning one. The Hungarians hoped to cope with the territorial claims of neighbouring states by leaning to Russia.[119] To stress the eastern orientation, the communist Béla Kun was assigned the post of Foreign Commissar. Moreover, when announcing to Lenin on March 22 the proclamation of the new soviet republic, Kun's colleague Ernest Pór, promptly asked for a mutual defence pact.[120]

In Moscow the news of the unexpected turn of events in Hungary was reported to the delegates of the Eighth Party Congress, who welcomed it with prolonged applause. The politicians, however, were anything but enthusiastic about the Soviet republic born under such strange circumstances. Their immediate response was also indicative of their profound distrust of spontaneous revolutionary actions abroad. Commenting on the "peculiar revolution" in Hungary, the Pravda editorial of March 26 implied that the Hungarian events constituted a link in the chain of imperialist attempts to liquidate Soviet Russia, a sort of plot forged in Paris with the purpose of dragging the "international proletariat and Soviet Russia" into a new war.[121] Other Bolsheviks also feared of consequences of the events in Hungary. For example, Lenin's closest collaborator Chicherin in a telegram to Kun of March 25 expected the Allies either to improve relations with Bolshevism or directly declare war on Soviet Russia "because of her rapprochement with the Entente's enemy, Soviet Hungary".[122]

Writing in Pravda, the foremost commentator Obolensky ("Osinsky"), noted that the Hungarian bourgeois papers unanimously accepted the Soviet government and concluded that they wanted the communists to defend every inch of the country without smashing the bourgeois state machine. The Hungarian bourgeoisie needed support of the Russian Red Army to save themselves from the Allied robbers and Béla Kun "has been appointed Commissar of Foreign Affairs with the intent of utilizing his contacts with Russia". Considering these circumstances the Hungarian communists had committed a cardinal mistake by merging with the Social Democrats, Obolensky concluded thereby implying that Kun should have stayed away from power.[123] In the same issue Pravda spelled out what was obviously the prevailing opinion in Moscow of the Hungarian events. "Although the Hungarian revolution constitutes a major success of the incipient world revolution, the immediate consequence of the Hungarian takeover will be a mounting pressure of world capital on Russia".[124]

The fear and suspicion of the events in Hungary was accentuated in Moscow by strategic considerations. The Bolsheviks might have wished for soviet republics in major European states. Hungary, however, was a small country, surrounded by hostile neighbours, and lacking material and human resources for her own defence. It was symptomatic that Lenin promptly pointed out Hungary's immense difficulties and vulnerability, and described Kun's ascendancy to power merely as a "moral victory".[125] Consequently, the proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet republic could not substantially change Lenin's defensive strategy. "Until the world revolution breaks out, until it embraces several countries and is strong enough to overcome international imperialism", so he had formulated the main axiom of Soviet

foreign policy in 1918, "it is the direct duty of the socialists who have conquered in one country (especially a backward one) not to accept battle against the giants of imperialism".[126] It is therefore not surprising that Moscow was unwilling both from principle and for practical reasons to accept any military or political obligation vis-à-vis Soviet Hungary, let alone to render her any direct military assistance.

Confronted with the Hungarian request for a military alliance, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief (Glavkom) Vatsetis on March 23 suggested to Lenin that, in order to establish a common front between Hungary and the Soviets, the Hungarian armies should move into Bucovina, in the rear of Petliura's troops advancing on Kiev.[127] In other words, the Hungarian armies were to engage in the Russian civil war. Upon Lenin's directive Vatsetis changed his plan and on March 26 proposed that the troops concentrated against Rumania be moved northwards for a campaign which would establish "direct, intimate relations with the Soviet armies of Hungary" through Galicia and Bucovina.[128] But this was only a tentative proposal which did not materialize.

Meanwhile Béla Kun approached the former Ukrainian socialist premier Vinnichenko and asked him for mediation.[129] Vinnichenko envisaged a united front of Russia, the socialist but independent republic of the Ukraine, and Hungary against the Entente, Poland and Rumania. A military alliance would provide for a free passage of troops from one socialist republic to another. Vinnichenko's proposal was promptly relayed to Moscow by the Hungarians who, according to him, were confident of Lenin's favorable response.[130] Yet Moscow never directly answered the proposal, leaving

this task to the head of the Ukrainian Soviet government Rakovsky. In his reply Rakovsky branded Vinnichenko as a typical representative of petty-bourgeois ideology.[131] The idea of the triple alliance was shelved. In late March 1919 Moscow limited its activities to verbal appeals in favor of Soviet Hungary and to cautioning Kun against attacking his neighbours.[132]

After the first consultations with Moscow Kun also renounced the idea of a formal military and political alliance with Soviet Russia;[133] likewise he began to play down the territorial issue and to stress the peaceful goals of his foreign policy.[134] It was on his initiative that the Allies dispatched to Hungary an unofficial fact-finding mission of the South African General Smuts. The General, who arrived in Budapest on April 4, presented Kun with a quid-pro-quo plan: the Allies would lift the economic blockade on Hungary and invite her delegates to Paris in exchange for the formal acceptance of the Vix note on the new demarcation line with Rumania.[135] This was a surprising turn of events indicating that the Western powers were ready to recognize the soviet government. Before Kun's response to this enticing offer is dealt with, let us examine Moscow's attitude towards the question of peace between Hungary and the Western powers.

In late March the Bolsheviks came to evaluate the events in Hungary in a more positive light. For instance, the same Obolensky who had strongly disapproved of Kun's ascendancy to power, now speculated that the German government, inspired by the Hungarian Social Democrats, was also contemplating either the transfer of power to the communists in

Count Károlyi's fashion, or a military alliance with Soviet Russia. Moreover, Obolensky also noted with relief that the "hawk" among the Allies, the French government, had not changed its policy towards Soviet Russia after the proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet republic.[136] Relieved from the fear of a Western crusade, Moscow began to appreciate the moral and psychological impact of the Hungarian Soviet republic upon the Russian population,[137] as well as Kun's performance as an intermediary between Russia and the Allies.[138] By the same token, Moscow feared that Hungary's one-sided rapprochement with the Western powers might destroy the peculiar community of the two outcast Soviet republics. The reaction to the Smuts mission on Moscow's part reflected this. On one hand Chicherin expressed fear that the Allies would "differentiate between the Hungarian and Russian Bolshevism and represent the Hungarian revolution as harmless".[139] At the same time Chicherin hinted that Moscow wished to see the Smuts mission extended also to Russia.[140]

Even so, the prospect of a modus vivendi with the Entente and her allies appealed to Béla Kun. In the afternoon of April 5, however, reportedly after a phone conversation with Lenin,[141] he rejected Smuts' plan for the double reasons that its acceptance would undermine the nationalist basis of his regime and that it would mean a break with Soviet Russia.[142] Kun made a skilful counterproposal but Smuts declined it and left immediately for Paris.

The rejection of the Smuts proposal exposed Hungary to the military action of her neighbours. By April 16, acting in the spirit of an Allied disposition, the Rumanians began advancing into Hungarian territory in

Transylvania. They were followed by the Czechoslovaks who in late April started the occupation of southern Slovakia and Ruthenia.[143] The demoralized Hungarian army was incapable of serious resistance. Soviet military assistance now became not only desirable but also possible. In the second half of April the Bolsheviks had consolidated their position with the repulse of Kolchak and the gradual disintegration of Petliura's nationalist forces in the Uktaine. The Ukrainians in Galicia, the bridgehead to Hungary, seemed to prefer the Soviets to their sworn enemy, the Poles. The Bolshevik C.-in-C. in the Ukraine, Antonov-Ovseenko, now found it feasible to establish a territorial link with Hungary and provide her with assistance.[144] The thrust westwards was even more desirable for another soviet republic had meanwhile been proclaimed in Bavaria.[145]

Lenin's government nevertheless proved unwilling to consider such a venture. It was left to Trotsky to give his authority to the official policy. "In order to repay our international debt", he declared on April 18, in the moment when the soviet republics in Hungary and Bavaria were waiting for Russian help, "we must first defeat Kolchak's troops. To assist the victorious workers in Poland, Germany, and in all Europe we must definitely and conclusively consolidate Soviet power in all territories of Russia. To the Urals! This is the slogan of the Red Army and entire Soviet country".[146] In late April Trotsky reiterated this position in a different context. Writing in Pravda on the theme "What Russia Needs", he stated plainly that "Russia needs peace and peaceful work...In order to achieve peace, we must liquidate the chief and now almost sole violator of peace - Kolchak".[147] It should be noted that by this time Kolchak's troops had been decisively beaten and had started a retreat.

Trotsky thereby spelled out the fact which was indicated by Soviet military directives,[148] namely that the Bolsheviks were giving priority to the full restoration of the Russian state before a military assistance to the soviet republics abroad.[149]

Approaching the problem of help to Kun's government from this standpoint, immediately after the start of the Rumanian advance against Hungary, Moscow tightened its control over the units which could evade its patronage - the International Brigades. Trotsky's Revvoensovet by an order of April 17 subordinated the Brigades to the Red Army authorities, gave them a new commander of Czechoslovak origin, transferred all units to Nizhnyi Novgorod in northern Russia, and made their deployment dependent upon the consent of the field staff of the Revvoensovet. These changes ensured that the International Brigades, composed to a large extent of Hungarians, would not arbitrarily attempt to assist the Hungarian Red army.[150] A few days later Béla Kun, in an appeal to the Hungarian internationalists in Soviet Russia, acknowledged their desire to return to Hungary, but urged them to stay in Russia and fight Kolchak and other Russian counterrevolutionaries. Lenin in a postscript endorsed Kun's appeal declaring that it served the interests of internationalism.[151] As Trotsky, Lenin now also camouflaged the Bolshevik motives and goals behind internationalist language and/or misrepresentation of fact.

It is not surprising that Antonov-Ovseenko was opposed in his intention of establishing a bridge to Hungary not only by his superior Vatsetis, but by Lenin himself. Since the first days of the Rumanian advance against Hungary, Lenin endeavoured to reduce the Red troops in the Ukraine as much

as possible, commanding them first against Kolchak and later, after his defeat, to southern Russia. On April 21 Glavkom Vatsetis asked Lenin a number of questions relating to the Red Army advance into Galicia, inter alia to what extent this advance was desirable from the political standpoint and what its limits should be.[152] Lenin, endeavoring to reconcile revolutionary commitment and Realpolitik answered in an ambiguous way. He conceded that the advance into Galicia and Bucovina was essential for establishing contacts with Soviet Hungary, but indicated in the same breath that such an advance was not desirable since it would interfere with the chief and most urgent task of the Ukrainian army, to give assistance to the Don front. Contacts with Soviet Hungary were to be established only by rail.[153] Lenin's view was endorsed on April 23 by the Bolshevik Politbureau and subsequently relayed to the Ukrainian command.[154] In practical terms this meant renouncing any effective help to Béla Kun since the Rumanians had cut off Hungary from Galicia and a rail connection could not be established without military backing.

Béla Kun responded to the Bolshevik policy on April 22 by sending to Lenin the unification platform of March 11 and a letter in which he asserted that the Soviet republic in Hungary, despite the "peculiar circumstances" of its birth, was an orthodox communist state. Kun was obviously soliciting Soviet help. At the same time, however, he intimated that the "critical" situation might compel him to a "Brest policy", that is to say to seek peace with the enemy. Although Moscow could not but have reservations to such a course, Kun nevertheless claimed himself the right to follow it "in the interests of world revolution".[155]

Consequently, Kun revised his policy after the Bolshevik Politbureau had on April 23 denied the Hungarians any effective assistance. First, he again emphatically dismissed the new rumor about impending Soviet help. Soviet Hungary, he declared in an interview, neither expected nor desired the assistance of Russian armies, she did not expect from Russia anything more than from other countries - the spirit of international solidarity.[156] Second, if on April 22 he promised Lenin "not to go to the Right",[157] three days later he contemplated a replacement of the Leftist cabinet members by the moderate socialists.[158] He also informed the Allies about his willingness to relax terror, cease foreign propaganda, discontinue "Bolshevik tactics", and eventually establish a transitional government in exchange for the halting of the Rumanian troops.[159]

Moscow responded promptly. On April 26 Chicherin sent a note to Budapest actually disapproving of Kun's activity. "The German and American radios", Chicherin complained, "are spreading fancy reports about Hungary, for instance that you have proposed to the Rumanians the resignation of the communist government in order to gain peace; such lies are being spread..." Chicherin, however, had very little to offer to console Kun: "The news about the constitution of the Soviet government in the Ukrainian Galicia has been confirmed, so we soon will have a direct contact with you", he assured Budapest.[160] In fact Chicherin lied. There never was such a government. Kun, however, took a similar license and replied on April 27: "That, what the German and American radios are spreading regarding our alleged offer to the Rumanians has no substance in fact".[161] Simultaneously Kun sent another message to Lenin asserting that the

unification of the Hungarian and Russian forces was a matter of life and death for Soviet Hungary, and demanded an answer within 24 hours on Vinnichenko's plan regarding the free passage of Red troops through Galicia.[162]

The same day, at variance with his message to Lenin, Kun also reiterated his intention to include moderate socialists in the government and suggested that the Constituent Assembly might be convoked too.[163] Shortly thereafter, the Hungarians also dispatched to Kiev and Moscow a special envoy to "inform" the Ukrainian Bolsheviks and Lenin about the situation in Hungary.[164] It may have been after his intervention that Moscow and Kiev dispatched two separate notes to the Rumanian government requesting a withdrawal of the Rumanian troops from Bessarabia and Bucovina.[165] The notes, demanding an early answer within 48 hours, were clearly an attempt to divert Rumanian pressure away from Hungary, but they neither threatened nor were followed by sanctions. After the deadline for the Rumanian answer expired, Antonov-Ovseenko explicitly asked for directives, but was instructed on May 4 that no action would be undertaken against Rumania.[166]

Meanwhile, acting on his own initiative, Antonov-Ovseenko engaged the controversial Cossack Ataman Grigoriev (Hryhoriiv) for action against Rumania. This happened after the Bolshevik Central Committee had expressed distrust of Grigoriev's personality and demanded the liquidation of his troops.[167] In addition to Grigoriev, only Bessarabian and Internationalist units were to be employed, and the anticipated scope of action also was rather limited. Antonov-Ovseenko planned merely a diversionary raid against

Rumania. Early in May he assured Lenin that, provided hostilities ceased on the Polish and Galician front, such an action would not prevent the Ukrainian front from meeting the demands of the Southern front.[168] The execution of the plan was subsequently paralyzed by Grigoriev's revolt. Nevertheless, on May 15 some reconaissance units crossed the River Dniester to the embarrassment of the Glavkom and the Soviet press.[169] After another raid of May 22 such actions were discontinued and the Soviets, in words of Antonov-Ovseenko, limited their relations to Rumania to "proud declarations and trifling military demonstrations".[170]

Meanwhile, with the continuing Rumanian advance, the spirit of the Hungarian government reached its lowest ebb. On May 1 the former President Károlyi found Béla Kun "stretched out on his couch in a state of complete moral collapse". "I could not get a reasonable word out of him", Károlyi recalled.[171] Although that night the government turned down the idea of forming a moderate government and of Austrian mediation in talks with the Allies, the next day Béla Kun dispatched an American professor P. M. Brown to the French and Rumanian headquarters to negotiate the halt of the Rumanian advance. However, Brown failed to get through the front line and returned to Budapest.[172]

Despite Lenin's exhortation to hold out, Kun in a desperate mood, communicated to the French General d'Esperey his willingness to resign, provided that Hungarian national aspirations and the Rumanian non-interference was guaranteed.[173] Nothing came of this message. The Hungarian government began preparations for going underground.[174] Fortunately for Béla Kun, however, the Rumanian advance halted in early May

1919. Soviet Hungary gained a respite for the consolidation and rebuilding of her armed forces. The government appeal to this effect of May 2 met with an enthusiastic response of the Budapest workers.[175] The new army was rapidly gaining strength. The crisis was overcome, but Kun's relations with Moscow also changed. In early May 1919 the Hungarian leader stopped acting as Lenin's subservient disciple, unreservedly coordinating his policy with Bolshevik interests. The Hungarian Soviet republic to him ceased to be only a means and became the goal itself. That this happened may also have been a consequence of the profound impact which the Hungarian experiment had made upon other defeated countries, particularly Germany and Austria.

The Bavarian Episode, April 1919

For several months, between November 1918 and February 1919, the basically conservative Free State of Bavaria, in southern Germany, witnessed the attempts of its leader, the Independent Socialist Kurt Eisner, to reconcile democratic and socialist forces, parliamentarism and the council system, revolution and democracy. On February 21, on the verge of his resignation, Eisner was assassinated by a young nationalist. But such problems as Bavaria's special position in the German Reich, relations between the diet and the councils, and an acute shortage of food remained unsolved.[176] In early March 1919 the Bavarian socialists reached among themselves a compromise according to which the councils were to be legalized only in an advisory capacity and the real power was reserved to the diet and the coalition government.[177] However, the compromise was of a short duration. The proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet republic in

the same month had the "effect of a bombshell" on the population of the Bavarian capital Munich.[178] It appeared that Bavaria by joining the Soviet camp would not only gain new allies against the Western powers and centralist tendencies of Berlin, but also food supplies from Hungary and Russia. These expectations were not real enough to win the Munich population for Bolshevism, but they further eroded the authority of the SPD government and made possible the temporary rule of the Left minority.

On the night on April 5 a group of radical socialists and anarchists met in Munich to discuss the proclamation of a Soviet republic. Although none of them was an orthodox communist, they regarded Soviet Russia as a natural ally in the struggle with the old world. For this reason three crucial portfolios in a new soviet government, Foreign Affairs, War, and Justice, were offered to the communists.[179] Yet, to everyone's surprise, the communists, after months of agitating for soviet system, refused to take any part in the affair. Their spokesman, Eugen Levinė, argued inter alia that the masses in other parts of Germany were not prepared for new struggles and that Bavaria was no autarkic territory that could hold out in isolation. He also maintained that cooperation with the SPD and the USPD was inadmissible.[180]

Nevertheless, two days later, in the night on April 7, a Soviet republic was proclaimed in Munich and subsequently in other areas of Bavaria. Its leading figures included the anarcho-communist poet, Erich Mühsam, the pacifist scholar Gustav Landauer, and the young playwright Ernst Toller. The soviet government announced its affiliation with the soviet republics of Russia and Hungary, and refused any cooperation with the

Berlin government. The search for a Foreign Commissar enjoying Moscow's confidence resulted in the selection of Dr. Franz Lipp, who claimed to have maintained close contacts during the war with Lenin, Radek, and other members of the Zimmerwald movement.[181]

Lenin's response to the events in Munich was cautious. Before making any comment he requested more information about the new republic.[182] Shortly thereafter Chicherin dispatched a telegram to Dr. Lipp requesting answer to a number of specific questions.[183] Obviously replying to this query, Lipp sent Moscow a bizarre telegram maintaining that the communists and Independents in Bavaria were "happily united" and enjoyed the support of the peasantry. Lipp also made it clear that the new government would seek "peace for ever" on just, democratic principles, but expressed fear that the "Prussian politicians" would endeavor to cut off Bavaria from northern Germany and discredit it in the Allied camp. He crowned his telegram by complaining that the fugitive Prime Minister Hoffmann "has taken with him the key to the ministry toilet".[184]

Lipp's unconventional performance roused doubt about his sanity.[185] Moreover, the Bavarian press promptly reported Lipp's boast of having worked in the Zimmerwald movement as a paid agent of the German General Staff and having negotiated in this capacity with Radek and other Bolsheviks.[186] Thus Lipp quickly disqualified himself and was dismissed. His colleagues did not have the opportunity to implement their social program. After only a week the leadership of the first soviet republic in Bavaria disintegrated as a result of a counterrevolutionary attempt, and the communists took over command of events in Munich.

The communist organization in the Bavarian capital was dominated by two naturalized Germans born in Russia, Max Levien, and Eugen Levinė. They were assisted by the Russian journalist Tovia Axelrod. Active participants of the 1905 revolution, all three were captivated by the revolutionary events of 1917 and by Bolshevik rule. Levinė, most energetic and vocal of them, in 1918 joined the Soviet press agency ROSTA in Berlin and obviously became closely associated with Ioffe.[187] At the same time he drifted to the extreme Left. At the founding congress of the KPD he became one of the spokesmen of the anti-parliamentarian majority, attacking Luxemburg for her criticism of Lenin's policies and determined to offset any anti-Bolshevik actions of the German government. In March 1919 he was sent to Munich to become the editor of Die Rote Fahne and spiritus agens of the local communist organization. Complying with the abstentionist course of the Berlin center and of Moscow, Levinė and the Bavarian communists refused to give their stamp of approval to the first, "pseudo-Soviet" republic of Bavaria, and supported it only informally.

On April 12, during the offensive of the pro-government troops, Levinė and his colleagues resolved to leave the scene without resistance.[188] However, it was shown during the day that there still were forces determined to defend the soviet idea. A search began for Levinė and Levien who had meanwhile taken refuge in a secret apartment.[189] Found by their colleagues and upset by their desertion, the two leaders reversed their position and on April 13 took over the command of the reorganized Soviet republic.

Undoubtedly, the premature withdrawal pushed Levinė towards adopting a revolutionary posture. Besides, an activist of Levinė's type found it difficult to remain aloof from the revolutionary élan of the rank-and-file. Was there any other reason for which Levinė took power, in a blatant defianee of the KPD policy and knowing well that the soviet republic in Bavaria could not maintain itself?[190] Karl Retzlaw, the communist Commissar of the Interior of the Bavarian Soviet republic, has given a surprising answer: Levinė and the communists were concerned in April 1919 about reports of the impending recruitment in northern Germany of 100,000 volunteers against Russia, and hoped that by taking up the struggle to divert the thrust of the Free Corps formations from Russia to Bavaria.[191]

This testimony fits well into the historical context. The idea of relief actions was still alive, and there were scarcely more devoted admirerers of the Bolshevik revolution than Levinė and his Russian-born collaborators. "The working class of Munich", they assured Moscow in their first telegram, "will place its forces at the disposal of the great historical tasks inaugurated by the heroic brethren of Russia and Hungary".[192]

Moscow seems to have conceived the Bavarian Soviet republic in a similar way, namely as a temporary shop window of communism. Lenin himself on April 27 sent a message to Munich suggesting "the most urgent and most extensive implementation" of such measures as the formation of the workers' army; disarming of the bourgeoisie and the taking of hostages from their ranks; takeover of factories, big farms, and banks; a six-hour working day with two or three hours instruction in state administration;

doubling or tripling of wages of farm labourers and unskilled workers, and the introduction of higher rations for workers.[193] Lenin's suggested measures would have disrupted the Bavarian economy, but it would be unreasonable to question his grasp of Bavarian reality. It appears that like the German communists, he was aware of the limited viability of the Soviet regime in Bavaria and wanted it to set up a communist example before being destroyed.[194]

Lenin wrote his message when the Soviet republic in Munich was already in its death throes. On April 27 the Bavarian socialists, resenting the course steered by the "Russians", and disappointed because Soviet help was not forthcoming, declined to vote confidence in an Executive Council dominated by the communists.[195] Levinė and his colleagues subsequently resigned and withdrew from the political scene. They nevertheless joined the Bavarian Red Army when the Free Corps started to advance on Munich from the north. After bitter fighting the government forces captured the city in early May 1919 and took a bloody revenge. Levinė himself was tried and executed in June 1919. Following this grim experience the socialist forces never regained influence in Bavaria. The Free State in southern Germany remained a citadel of conservatism.[196]

The events in Bavaria coincided with a political and social crisis in the entire country, heightened by the treatment which Germany was receiving at the Paris Peace Conference. In an atmosphere of rising nationalist sentiment the news came of the proclamation of the soviet republic in Hungary. Naturally, this increased the pro-Bolshevik sympathies of the German Left, particularly the Independent Socialists. On March 27

the KPD leader Paul Levi wrote somewhat jealously to Lenin that the Independents now "again cry about an alliance with Russia".[197] Yet the eastern orientation now became an enticing alternative also for bourgeois circles. As Die Freiheit noticed in early April 1919, even the Right had suddenly reversed its hostile attitude towards Bolshevism and began to flirt with the idea of a soviet Germany and an alliance with Russia. "We should not be satisfied with depicting to the Entente the mene tekel of Bolshevism on the wall", wrote a Rightist member of the National Assembly, Professor Elzbacher, but

> we have to carry out this dubious social and political change in the conviction that as soon as Germany, in addition to Russia and Hungary, will adhere to Bolshevism, the Bolshevik wave will irresistibly overflow into the Western countries...and wash away Clemenceau and Lloyd George...Of course, if Bolshevism is to save us, we must accept it quite sincerely, we must introduce the Soviet system and begin to nationalize on the largest scale and without compensation.[198]

Moscow was well aware of rising sympathies for Soviet Russia but reluctant to utilize them for the purpose of revolution. Instead the Bolsheviks began to forge a Russo-German governmental rapprochement. After the Germans had been invited to Paris to accept the peace terms, Chicherin on April 17 openly urged Berlin to listen to the nation's voice and come to peace and friendship with Soviet Russia.[199] The German government subsequently dispatched a secret emissary to Russia, a former member of the German embassy in Moscow,[200] but he failed to get into Russia. Direct contacts between the two governments were only resumed with the arrival in Berlin of the Soviet representative Kopp in early September 1919.[201]

Moscow's policy met with the understanding and support of the German

communists now led by Luxemburg's friend Paul Levi. Thus the leadership in the spring of 1919 raised the slogan of Germany's political alliance and economic relations with Soviet Russia; in its propaganda the KPD likewise assured the Germans that a Soviet military advance against Germany was out of the question.[202] At the same time the German communists went along with Lenin's policy of revolutionary abstentionism. On March 27, Levi reported to Lenin that there was a "boundless embitterment" among the masses, and that the workers "literally run out of the factories" to participate in strikes which had a partly political character. Yet Levi made it clear that the KPD considered these strikes and anti-government actions inopportune and endeavored to prevent them as much as possible.[203] As a result of this abstentionist policy Levi's leadership not only disapproved of the two soviet republics in Bavaria, but also felt unhappy about the Hungarian experiment.[204] Yet, after the German delegation in Paris was handed harsh peace terms on May 7, 1919, Germany entered into a period of heated disputes and controversies as to whether the treaty should be accepted or refused. It seemed that either course was bound to bring about profound political changes in the country.[205] In addition, the victorious powers, particularly France and Italy, now experienced postwar crises and widespread social unrest.[206]

Surveying the explosive atmosphere in the West, Zinoviev's ECCI in its manifesto predicted that "before a year has passed, the whole of Europe will be Soviet".[207] In spite of this statement, Moscow and its allies did not change their abstentionist course in any practical way. Evidently the communists were not interested in creating difficulties for the German government as long as it was resisting Entente demands.

Thus the KPD leadership continued its policy of avoiding any bid for power. Instructing its local organizations, the Berlin centre wrote on June 11 that regardless of whether the Peace Treaty was accepted or rejected, the most likely outcome of the crisis would be a military dictatorship which would maintain internal order "with an iron fist". Despite this, the KPD leadership cautioned the proletariat to "unconditionally avoid any action...which would amount to a struggle for power".[208] Later, in the climax of the crisis, the German communists made their disinterest in power known in public. "Spartakus needs no putsches", a communist leaflet of June 21 hammered at the Germans, "Spartakus at this moment needs no general uprising". The leaflet as a whole suggests that the KPD feared the repetition of the Hungarian takeover more than an uprising of its sympathizers.[209] Yet, contrary to the expectations of the KPD, the final acceptance by the Germans of the Versailles Treaty on June 23, 1919, generated neither a political convulsion nor a military dictatorship. The signing of the Treaty followed by the adoption of the Weimar constitution in fact marked the end of the German revolution.

Budapest, Vienna, and Moscow, May-July 1919

In the process of occupying southern Slovakia, Czechoslovak troops in several places crossed the demarcation line with Hungary which had been approved by the Entente. This enabled Kun's government to launch a counterattack on May 20 on the grounds of self-defence. In the first days of what proved to be a successful campaign, the Hungarian leadership sent to the Ukraine one of its most loyal members of the Bolshevik cause, Tibor Szamuely. Upon his arrival at Kiev, Szamuely had a lengthy discussion on May 23 with the Soviet military representative Podvoisky, whom

MAP 4: SOVIET ADVANCE WESTWARD AND CENTRAL EUROPE, 1919

he obviously asked for the establishment of a link with Hungary through Bucovina.[210] Although two days earlier the Soviet Ukrainian government solemnly pledged its support to the Hungarian proletariat and reiterated its adherence to a policy of "united revolutionary front with Red Hungary",[211] and despite the fact that the Soviet position in the Western Ukraine was better than ever before,[212] Szamuely accomplished little in Kiev and left for Moscow to intervene with Lenin.

Preparing the ground for Szamuely's visit, the Hungarian representative in Moscow Rudnyánszky wrote in Pravda that an alliance with Soviet Russia was a matter of life and death for Hungary. He no longer raised the demand for the assistance of the Red Army, but indicated that Kun's government now urgently needed the Hungarian volunteers who were fighting in Russia. These internationalists, he went on, now "have to carve for themselves the road to help Red Hungary and unite her with Soviet Russia".[213] Three days later, on May 26, Szamuely presented the Hungarian cause to Lenin. No details are known about this meeting. Judging by a message that Lenin subsequently sent to the Hungarian workers, he must have shared the reservations of his colleagues about Kun's policies. In his message Lenin indirectly expressed misgivings with Hungary's external expansion,[214] and urged Kun's government to focus its efforts on the consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship.[215]

More important, however, Lenin in his message did not make the slightest allusion to Soviet assistance to Hungary. This was no accident: two days after seeing Szamuely he ordered that the bulk of Ukrainian forces be transferred against Denikin and that the activities of the Western

front be reduced to a minimum. He went so far as to ask the Ukrainians for daily reports on the implementation of the directive.[216] Lenin thereby made it impossible for the Soviets to render military assistance to Hungary.

Even worse from the Hungarian point of view, Lenin in fact refused to allow the Hungarian internationalists to give direct help to their fatherland. Subsequently, he ordered that the internationalists be employed "only on the south-western direction", that is to say against Rumania.[217] This provided a guarantee that the international units would not leave the Russian soil.

Szamuely after his return to Hungary in the last days of May, dismissed any chance of Soviet military assistance in the future.[218] The Hungarians realized that the much desired Russian help was a red herring. This bitter truth could not but undermine the coherence of the ruling coalition, cemented on March 21 by the expectation of Soviet assistance. Although the Hungarian army was still advancing into Slovakia, the communists now began to lose their authority amongst their allies, the socialists and the labour leaders.[219]

It was under these conditions that a joint party and soviet congress was convened for June 12 and the communists, to enhance their authority, asked Bukharin to attend.[220] However, the Bolshevik Politbureau disapproved of Bukharin's participation and Lenin merely resolved to send Dmitri Manuilsky to Budapest as the first Soviet representative there. However, Manuilsky never arrived in Hungary. The congress in Budapest, thus not attended by any high ranking Soviet representative, confirmed the growing cleavage between the communists and the socialists. Béla Kun failed to

force through a symbolical change of the party name from "United Socialist-Communist Party" to "United Communist Party" as requested by the ECCI. The communist faction also lost in the election of the party leadership having only Béla Kun and a few of his moderate colleagues elected.[222]

Shortly thereafter the communists suffered another blow in the streets of the Austrian capital Vienna. After coming to power in March 1919, Kun and his government pursued Lenin's tactics of revolutionizing other countries as a means of self-defence.[223] Kun's interest was focussed primarily on Austria. The country was linked to Hungary not only by four centuries of common history but also by common problems confronting the defeated nations. But although the Hungarian experiment was received with sympathy by many Austrians, it produced no pro-communist convulsion. Austrian labour retained essentially reformist ideas and a belief in parliamentary democracy. It was only the communist party which, under the impact of soviet republics in Hungary and Bavaria, and provided with Hungarian propaganda, agitators, and money, came to steer a radical, adventurist course in the spring of 1919. The first major confrontation occurred on April 17 when a communist crowd stormed the parliament building and set it afire.[224] A month later Budapest complied with the repeated requests of the Austrian communists and dispatched a special emissary Dr. Ernő Bettelheim to Vienna. This young Hungarian communist later maintained that he had the mandate of Béla Kun and the Comintern, but precisely what this mandate involved is difficult to determine.[225] In any case, in late May 1919 Bettelheim began preparations for the proclamation of a Soviet republic in Vienna. His idea was to exploit the cumulative

effect of the food shortage, the disillusionment with the Western powers generated by the Paris Peace Conference, and the impact of the Hungarian victories over the Czechoslovaks; the three factors which seem to have increased the popularity of the Soviet cause and the "eastern" orientation in Austria.

It appears that Bettelheim contemplated a takeover of the Hungarian style. The dominant political force in the country, the Social Democrats, like their Hungarian counterparts, were critical of, but not hostile to Bolshevism and the soviet idea. Particularly their leading figure, the prominent theoretician and Foreign Minister Otto Bauer, in the spring of 1919 treated Soviet Hungary with benevolence.[226] Consequently, Bettelheim seems to have been planning not a direct, violent conquest of power, but rather a gradual build up of positions by mass demonstrations and public pressure on the government.[227] Banking especially on the support of the army, he and the Austrian communists resolved to synchronize the proclamation of a soviet republic with the twenty-five percent cut of the militia, demanded by the Entente for the middle of June. The decisive events were to be triggered by an armed demonstration on Sunday, June 15, and followed by such actions as the display of Hungarian units on the Austrian borders, an attack on the Slovak capital Bratislava, and by Béla Kun's offer of foodstuffs to Austria.[228]

Preparations for the takeover were carried out openly, but the organizers refrained from any attack on the ruling Social Democrats.[229] To enlarge their following the communists played on the nationalist sentiments of the Austrian troops. For instance, they stressed that it was

the "Hungarian and Russian brothers" who "have triumphed over Entente imperialism" and were now fighting "against our enslavement by the Entente bourgeoisie".[230] At the last minute, however, the Allies yielded to the Austrian government and rescinded the order concerning the reduction of the militia. At this point the Workers' Council in Vienna, dominated by the Social Democrats, disapproved of the armed demonstration and the government temporarily revoked the freedom of assembly and cancelled all leaves for the militia. Since the communists continued their preparations, the Council on June 14 denounced the planned demonstration as an unscrupulous attempt of a putsch by a "Hungarian lieutenant" Bettelheim.[231]

In these circumstances, the Austrian communists changed their mind and despite Bettelheim's opposition urged the cancellation of the demonstration. In the evening of June 14 an incident occurred resembling the voluntary surrender of Béla Kun in February 1919; one hundred and fifteen communist leaders, including the directorate of the action, were arrested under strange circumstances.[232] The Sunday of June 15 was nevertheless stormy in Vienna. Ironically, it was precisely the arrest of the communist leaders that generated an anti-government revulsion. After a bloody battle the crowd liberated the arrested leaders who, however, remained firm in their determination to prevent a bid for power, and asked their liberators to disperse. Moreover, Béla Kun after encouraging Bettelheim, made virtually no move to assist his lieutenant. The Vienna uprising ended in fiasco, badly damaging the cause of communism.[233]

Meanwhile, however, the Hungarians scored major victories against the Czechoslovaks and in the first half of June occupied large parts of

eastern and central Slovakia. On June 6 Košice, the main town of eastern Slovakia fell. The Hungarian advance embarrassed not only the Allies but also Lenin and the Bolsheviks. For instance, Pravda carried the first news of the offensive in a mere three lines as late as June 7, eighteen days after it had started.[234] Two days later Chicherin cautioned Budapest: "The Entente radios report that the Hungarian Red troops occupy territories which are not Hungarian. Should not the Slovaks be given the chance of self-determination in order to deprive Czech nationalism of their support?"[235]

Kun's reply was almost offensive in its brevity. "All preparations have been made to proclaim the Slovak Soviet Republic", he wired to Moscow. "The proclamation follows in a short time. Our nationality policy is Leninist".[236] A week later, on June 16, Soviet Hungary in Rudnyánszky's words "created her first Ukraine - the Soviet Slovakia", a satellite which demised on July 7 shortly after the withdrawal of the Hungarian army.[237]

Meanwhile, concerned with the Hungarian offensive, Clemenceau on behalf of the Entente on June 7 and 13 respectively sent two notes to Béla Kun requesting the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Hungarian troops from Slovakia in exchange for the evacuation of the Hungarian territory by Rumanians.[238] Kun decided to accept Clemenceau's ultimatum, arguing that the Hungarians had "only one duty before the world proletariat, to preserve this country of social revolution".[239]

How did Moscow respond to this development? It appears that the Bolsheviks feared Kun's energetic drive for the reconciliation with the West.[240] Upon receiving reports to this effect Lenin on June 18 advised

Kun to "make the fullest possible use of every opportunity to obtain a temporary armistice or peace", but also cautioned him against any permanent solution: "...do not trust the Entente for a moment. They are deceiving you, and are only attempting to gain time in order to be able to crush you and us".[241] Although Kun in his replies of June 18 and 19 comforted Lenin that negotiations with the Entente could lead "at best to an armistice, not to peace",[242] his peace overtures ran against the Soviet objective of keeping Hungary in the state of "no war no peace". This objective was defended in Hungary by the Left wing, especially Szamuely and Pór. They supported Kun's decision to withdraw from Slovakia but opposed Hungary's unilateral peace talks with the Entente on the ground that it was inadmissible as long as Soviet Russia was excluded from negotiations.[243]

In a certain sense, however, these differences became irrelevant. Although Hungary had completed the evacuation of Slovakia by July 1, the Rumanians did not withdraw from the Hungarian territory and on July 12 the Allies indicated that they would deal only with a Hungary disarmed according to the armistice terms.[244] At this moment Béla Kun decided to attack the Rumanians and drive them out of the Hungarian territory. It was a difficult task, considering the demoralization of the Hungarian army after the withdrawal from Slovakia. On July 14 Kun asked Chicherin for a Russian advance against Galicia: "It is a matter of life for us".[245] However, shortly thereafter an incident occurred in Budapest indicating that the Bolsheviks had already disowned Kun. The key figures were two Ukrainian officers who arrived in Budapest in June 1919, empowered by Kun's adversary and the head of the Soviet Ukrainian government, Rakovsky

to recruit Russian prisoners of war for the Red Army.[246] However, the Hungarians soon discovered that the officers were regularly supplying Rakovsky with unflattering reports on Kun's policies. Even more important, it turned out that they had also established contacts with a notorious terrorist group, the Lenin Boys, and with other Leftist elements dissatisfied with Kun. Building on this Left opposition to Kun, the Ukrainian officers in July 1919 began preparations for a putsch. They planned to depose Béla Kun, arrest prominent Social Democrats, and restore what they considered a truly proletarian dictatorship. Tibor Szamuely was envisaged as a head of this regime.

It is not certain whether Szamuely, who stood close to the Lenin Boys and other Leftist groups, had previous knowledge of this plan. In any case, it was Kun himself who on July 19 presented Szamuely with evidence of the planned putsch and ordered him to take countermeasures. Szamuely complied, and the two Ukrainian officers were subsequently executed.

Were the Bolsheviks aware of the planned putsch? There is not enough evidence for a conclusive answer. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that (a) the course followed by the Ukrainian officers harmonized well with Lenin's own recommendations to the Hungarians of late May 1919, (b) after the abortive putsch Lenin explicitly and unreservedly defended Rakovsky (and Chicherin) against Kun's bitter criticism, (c) he later recommended Kun to "take measures that I suggested to the Bavarians".[247] In other words, he again called for the radical policy of Kun's Leftist critics and the two Ukrainians. In short, it cannot be precluded that the two Ukrainian officers acted merely on their own initiative, but it

is likely that they conspired against Kun with the knowledge of Kiev and possibly also Moscow.

Meanwhile, however, the offensive against the Rumanians collapsed and the Allies declared on July 27 that there could be no peace with Hungary until Kun's regime was overthrown.[248] In the last frantic effort to save the soviet republic, Kun instructed his new Ambassador in Vienna, Böhm, to summon the Austrian communists to seize power. He also dispatched to Lenin two last-minute appeals for a Soviet offensive against Rumania.[249] Lenin answered on July 31, promising that some Hungarian prisoners of war would be sent to the Ukraine and the Rumanian front.[250] The next day, however, Kun surrendered power to a transitional government of trade union leaders which was soon replaced by the White regime of Admiral Horthy.

The Hungarian communists first conceded that the Soviet regime failed because the Russian help had not materialized and the masses lacked enthusiasm for communism.[251] However, Moscow came with a more plausible explanation, namely that the collapse of Soviet Hungary was caused by a "monstrous treachery of the social patriots", and that the merger with them, along with the nationalization of land, was the gravest error committed by the Hungarian communists.[252] This became a standard communist explanation of the Hungarian experiment, and its failure. For years to come participation in Leftist coalitions aspiring for power became a taboo for the communists. In spite of it, the collapse of the soviet republics in Bavaria and Hungary deprived communism of the aura of invincibility. The public in the defeated countries realized the futility of banking on Russian help against the Western powers, and Bolshevism lost

its almost mystical appeal.

The Bolshevik policies in the first half of 1919 were partly responsible for this development in the West. Lenin and his colleagues, to sum up briefly the complex development covered by this chapter, entered the turbulent year of 1919 with most of their energy absorbed by the civil war, skeptical of revolutionary forces in the West, and reconciled with the prospect of building proletarian Russia while surrounded by the enemies. It was in this situation that the Bolsheviks, in March 1919, initiated the foundation of the Communist International. As Bukharin conceded, it happened with the proletariat being in retreat, and Lenin expected his brainchild above all to facilitate Soviet Russia's survival in the capitalist world. The revolution was not on the list of the Comintern's proximate goals. After the danger of Western intervention had subsided, Moscow in early January 1919 switched to a cautious policy and started advising its followers in the West against uprisings and revolutions, fearing their possible backfire on Soviet security. Ironically, despite the efforts on the part of Moscow and the domestic communists, the soviet republics were proclaimed in Hungary and Bavaria. Anything but the part of a Bolshevik grand design for world conquest, these republics came into existence spontaneously and were received by Moscow with distrust, reservations and even disapproval. Under the disguise of internationalism Lenin and the Bolsheviks subsequently endeavored to impose upon Kun's government a policy dictated by the Russian interest in keeping Hungary in the state of "no war no peace". At the same time Moscow proved unwilling to provide Soviet Hungary with any meaningful assistance or accept any formal commitment towards her. Once this tactic became obvious

in late April 1919 Kun, who had started as Lenin's faithful disciple, came to pursue his own independent policies and even to ignore Russian advice. From May 1919 until the last days of Kun's government, the relations between Russia and Hungary were marked by a tension stemming from the differences in respective interests and tactics.

Never in Lenin's lifetime was the situation in the West and especially in Europe so explosive as in the spring of 1919: Germany, Austria, but also Italy and France, and a number of smaller states, experienced profound domestic crises; Soviet republics emerged in Central Europe and the Soviet idea was spreading throughout the continent. However, the Bolsheviks even now, did not reverse their policy of revolutionary abstentionism. Lacking courage and energy to capitalize on the mass discontent in the West and direct their sympathizers to assaults on the fragile political structure of postwar Europe, Lenin and his colleagues instead limited themselves to verbal prophecies of an imminent communist millenium. In the first half of 1919 the Bolsheviks and the Comintern made a shift towards the policy of making a verbal revolution.

CHAPTER VII

BOLSHEVISM INTO INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM, 1919-1920

Despite the defeats of the Soviet governments in Hungary and Bavaria, the Bolshevik ideas came in 1919 and 1920, to appeal to the workers' movement of the industrial West. The rise of international communism out of the postwar crisis confronted Lenin and the Bolsheviks with a number of problems relating to the doctrine, tactics, organization, and objectives of the movement. This chapter outlines the most important of these problems, examines the Bolshevik answer to them, and correlates the results with an analysis of communism in action.

Moscow and the Western Labour Movements, 1919

The end of the world war had not only invalidated many reservations of the Allied proletariat against the Bolsheviks, but also made it somewhat easier for Moscow to transmit its messages to the West through various channels. Lenin's government utilized this opportunity in a moderate scope and form. As was the case before Germany's defeat, the Bolshevik propaganda designed for the Allied countries remained almost entirely defensive. It did not call for a revolutionary overthrow of governments but rather for a weakening and paralyzing of the Western intervention in Russia.[1]

Ironically, it was the struggle of the Bolsheviks against counter-revolution and intervention which consolidated their regime and gained them the sympathy and admiration of Western labour. Soviet Russia seemed to be the country of social justice and economic equality in which the bourgeoisie was exposed and the workers were not exploited. This appeal

of Bolshevism, accentuated by other social and political factors, provided a fertile soil for the growth of the communist movement in the West. Communist parties, organizations or pro-communist factions came into existence during 1919 in almost all industrial countries of Europe.[2]

Of the major socialist parties of the West, the Italian was most radical. Most of the Italian socialists had strongly opposed Italy's involvement in the war on the side of the Western powers. Their pacifism caused them also to follow with sympathy the Bolshevik drive for peace with Germany. The advent of general peace seemed to vindicate their position. The Western statesmen at the Paris Peace Conference proved unwilling to recognize Italy's territorial claims. The Italian public felt cheated out of the fruits of victory and the postwar atmosphere in Italy resembled that of the defeated countries. The Italian public, and especially the socialists, harboured sympathy for Soviet Russia and her struggle with Western intervention. In March 1919, the Central Committee of the PSI, the Italian Socialist Party, voted to join the Third International, even though no Italian delegate attended its founding congress.[3] The decision established an important precedent. Throughout 1919 a number of radical parties and groups in Europe and North America followed the PSI and declared their adherence to the Communist International.[4]

Although the Western labour parties were split as to their domestic policies and their appraisal of the Bolsheviks, they were united in their opposition to intervention in Russia. Already in the first half of 1919 labour in Western Europe and North America organized a number of protest actions against the intervention; the most notable of which was a

"Hands-Off-Russia" movement in Britain, launched in January and February 1919 by radical members of the Trade Unions and the Independent Labour Party.[5]

The Bolshevik reaction to these actions was mixed. On one hand they welcomed them, but they were also afraid of their consequences. For one thing, there was a natural tendency on the part of West European radicals to transfer the struggle against intervention in Russia into a struggle for power. As the French Left-wing socialist and Trotsky's friend Pierre Monat argued in May 1919, "Our duty is very clear: to assist the Russian revolution, to support it with the use of all our power. How? By revolution".[6] That Moscow perceived with apprehension such an extension of the struggle against intervention emerges from its response to the first international action in its favor. In June 1919 the socialist parties and trade unions of Italy and France, together with the British Labour Party, decided to arrange an international strike against intervention in Russia and Hungary for July 21. Although the Bolsheviks were well aware of the mounting social unrest in Western Europe, they showed an inclination to limit the scope and goals of this action. Thus, while the Western socialists envisaged an international strike, Zinoviev's ECCI suggested on June 18 that merely an "international demonstration" be arranged against Western intervention in Russia and Hungary.[7] Other Soviet messages were marked by a similar caution.[8] On July 17, four days before the strike, Chicherin sent a note to the Western workers which was actually designated for the Allied governments.[9] Chicherin recalled the history of intervention and of the Soviet peace initiative,

and intimated that the impending strike aimed merely at stopping the Western involvement in Russian internal affairs. The note implicitly assured the Western powers that the strike was not planned as a lever for the overthrow of the existing government.

It cannot be determined whether the caution shown by Moscow tempered the élan of the strike planners. In any case, the French trade unions on July 20 cancelled the strike in exchange for Premier Clemenceau's promise to accelerate demobilization and other concessions. On July 21 there were only scattered strikes in France but none in Britain. Only the Italians responded by strikes but the action as a whole was a failure.[10] Typically, the immediate Soviet response was fear of an increased Western pressure on Russia and Hungary.[11] Zinoviev himself disclaimed any responsibility for the action and blamed the socialist parties for its failure. "The Communist International," he contended, "anxious to see what course events will take, refrained from making an appeal in connection with the strike...The political strike for the 21 July was appointed by a number of organizations and groups which form part of the Second International".[12]

The abortive strike and the subsequent collapse of the soviet republic in Hungary on August 1, 1919, again threw the Bolsheviks into isolation and accentuated their sober view of the West. Trotsky conceded that an international strike could not but fail since "the workers' organizations in the West have been disrupted by the war, their older wings have proved chauvinistic, and the younger is still quite weak".[13] Disappointed with the West, the Bolsheviks now considerably sobered their pronouncements

of world revolution and again turned their attention to Asia and national liberation movements. Lenin himself, writing about the tasks of the Comintern in July 1919, included in them revolutionary struggle for the liberation of colonies,[14] and the Narkomindel subsequently urged several Asian nationalities to ally themselves with Soviet Russia.[15] In November 1919 Lenin for the first time detailed the Bolshevik tactics in the East.[16]

Trotsky's reaction was most interesting. Although July and August 1919 were his worst months during the civil war, or just because of it, he struck a very optimistic tone in public. "We do not doubt", he wrote in an open letter to the French socialists after the collapse of Kun's regime in Hungary, "that the social revolution is imminent throughout Europe..."[17] At the same time, however, he sent a secret memorandum to the Central Committee indicating that the European revolution would be delayed for up to five years. In fact, Trotsky must have been even more skeptical: outlining an alternative policy, he proposed that the Soviet government turn its attention to the East, and build a new industrial base in the Urals along with a new military and political staff for directing the struggle in Asia. Such a staff, he argued, might soon be of much greater importance than the Executive Committee of the Communist International.[18]

It was to Trotsky's credit that a withdrawal eastwards did not materialize. After General Yudenich launched a new offensive against Petrograd in October 1919, Trotsky repulsed him and threw the rest of his units to the Estonian border. In the middle of October the Red Army had also defeated General Denikin, advancing on Moscow from the south, and subsequently drove him back to the Caucasus. By January 1920 the

counterrevolutionary armies were either smashed or confined to the peripheral provinces of the former Russian empire. Concurrently with this development the idea of anti-Bolshevik intervention lost much of its appeal in the West. The Allied governments, faced with the domestic opposition to their presence in Russia, had withdrawn by the end of 1919 most of their troops and in January 1920 lifted the blockade of Soviet Russia. The Bolsheviks became the real rulers of Russia.[19]

The decisive victories over the counterrevolution in the autumn of 1919 were accompanied by new gains for the Communist International in Western Europe. Three events were of a particular importance. In October 1919, the Italian socialists at a congress in Bologna endorsed affiliation with the Comintern, along with a new program. Since the Italian party claimed a membership of 300,000, this step justly delighted Lenin.[20] Several weeks later, at a party congress in Leipzig (November 30-December 6, 1919) the German Independent Socialists decided to leave the Second International and suggested to nineteen Leftist parties and groups in the West that negotiations be started with the Comintern for creating a new revolutionary International. The decision of the USPD, a party with almost 750,000 members, marked a turning point in the acceptance of the Communist International by the European Left.[21] It was especially the French socialists, at a stormy congress in Strasbourg, who in February 1920 decided to follow the German Independents, leave the Second International, and begin negotiations with the Third International for a final regrouping.[22]

Did the gains of communism in the West change Lenin's skeptical view

of world revolution? Lenin addressed himself to this problem in March 1920 in a speech on the first anniversary of the Communist International. He admitted that the postwar developments in the West were more complex than expected. New radical movements had taken "the most diverse forms" and a number of them in the advanced countries did not adhere "either to socialism or communism", some even continued to condemn Bolshevism.[23] Although world revolution had not materialized and there still was no major communist party in the West, even the modest beginnings of the communist movement surprised Lenin. He now conceded that the Communist International in the first year of its existence was "successful beyond all expectations, we may say boldly that at the time of its foundation no one expected such immense successes".[24]

Despite the unexpected growth of Communism in the West, Lenin remained skeptical about the prospect of revolution. He maintained that the socialist revolution could have been successful "in some of the Western countries" immediately after the war, as long as the masses were armed. After the demobilization, however the revolution in the West had a long way to go: "It now has to follow the whole path of development that we began even before the first revolution, before 1905".[25] Moreover, Lenin again intimated that revolution in the West would be feasible only under special conditions, war. As he stated, "The fall of the capitalist governments is unavoidable because everybody can see that another war like the last is inevitable if the imperialists and the bourgeoisie remain in power". In this connection Lenin singled out as inevitable the conflicts between Japan and the United States, as well as between Britain

and France.[26] In November 1919, addressing a congress of the communist organizations of the East, Lenin also restated his concept of the revolutionary war. Because the imperialists "are armed against their domestic Bolshevism" and attentive to its danger, he argued, the socialist revolution would not be an achievement of the proletariat of each country over its bourgeoisie. It would be "a struggle of all the imperialist-oppressed colonies and countries, of all dependent countries, against international imperialism".[27] While Lenin considered it self-evident that final victory, i.e. the higher stage of socialism, could be won "only by the proletariat of all advanced countries of the world", he also argued that the British, French, or German proletariat "will not be victorious without the aid of the working people of all the oppressed colonial nations".[28] Consequently, Soviet Russia would also become involved in a "still broader and more strenuous struggle...against the forces of united imperialism - of Germany, France, Britain, and the U.S.A."[29] Evidently Lenin still held the view that the proletariat of the West was unfit to make the revolution unless aided by revolutionary armies from abroad or unless another major war broke out among the capitalist powers. This continuing disbelief in the possibility of a spontaneous revolution in the West was also mirrored in the foreign policies of Lenin's government.

Communism in Action, 1919-1920: Revolution or Revolutionizing?

The end of the civil war and intervention gave the Bolsheviks an opportunity to reconsider the further course of their policies. It is indicative of their sober view of the Western workers' movement that not

only Lenin but also his former opponents within the party now desired not merely another "breathing spell" but a lasting settlement with the capitalist world. It was Karl Radek who first voiced the Soviet aspirations while in German prison. As he argued, world revolution was a prolonged process, but this did not spell death to Soviet Russia. Since the Allies had proved unable to crush her militarily, the proletarian government "does not have to depend on the immediate victory of world revolution or go down in ruins...it is possible to live in peace with the capitalist nations".[30] Soviet Russia herself would not hesitate to make territorial and economic concessions to reach peace and a modus vivendi with the Entente imperialism. At the same time Radek again pleaded for extensive trade relations between Russia and Germany as a counterweight to the Western powers.[31]

In the autumn of 1919 peace and peaceful coexistence also became a major topic among the Bolsheviks in Moscow, although they were not so outspoken as Radek.[32] For example, Lenin, addressing the Seventh Congress of Soviets, indicated on December 5, 1919, that his government would still accept the peace proposal made to Bullitt which involved Soviet territorial and economic concessions in exchange for a peace treaty with the Western powers.[33] The congress subsequently accepted a resolution proposing peace negotiations to the Western powers.[34] The Allies neither recognized Lenin's government nor consented to direct peace talks, but they advised the Baltic countries to seek an accord with Moscow. This meant that they abandoned the idea of a great indivisible Russia under the non-Bolshevik rule. In turn, Moscow had already resolved

to seek peace with the nationalist governments of Latvia and Estonia - thereby in fact abandoning, at least for the time being, any westward expansion. Moscow also began to foster trade relations with the West, again contemplating long-term economic concessions to foreign capitalists.[35] Parallel with these efforts Lenin's government made on the domestic front several concessions to its domestic critics including the abolition of the death penalty and the curtailment of the Cheka powers. Moreover, in January 1920 and after a number of Red Army units were transformed into labor detachments and deployed in industry and transportation.[36] Soviet Russia was determined to start the period of reconstruction, requiring peace and trade relations with the advanced industrial countries of the West.

It goes without saying that Bolshevik interests could not always be compatible with those of emerging Western communism.[37] While the young and impatient communist movements in the West were inclined to headlong offensives against capitalism, the Bolsheviks were more attentive to the fact that revolutionary actions in the West nurtured the "Red Scare" and hindered their search for a modus vivendi with the existing world. As Zinoviev noted in May 1919, the bellicosity of Western countries was proportional to the depth of internal crisis in each of them. For this reason the French and Italian bourgeoisie were the most hostile towards the Bolsheviks while the British and American capitalists were inclined to settle the Russian question in a more "amicable manner".[38] This notion seems to have influenced the Bolshevik stand toward revolutionary actions in Western Europe.

Two countries which experienced a deep social and economic crisis in 1919-1920 were Italy and France. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Moscow attempted to capitalize on this and encourage the proletariat of either country to rise against the government. As soon as the Bolsheviks had in the autumn of 1919 repulsed the counterrevolution and the prospect of modus vivendi re-emerged, Lenin on October 28, 1919, wrote two letters to French and Italian sympathizers. Addressing "comrade Loriot and all the French friends", he argued that in France, as in Britain, victorious capitalism had bribed the upper stratum of the proletariat, and indicated that the French communists still faced a "long struggle".[39] Lenin had good reason to be still more explicit in his letter to the Italian revolutionaries. The situation in Italy was explosive in the second half of 1919 and the Italian socialists, reaping the fruits of their opposition to the war, were gaining influence and new followers. The Soviet press repeatedly depicted Italy as on the verge of proletarian revolution.[40] But a Soviet emissary, who arrived in Italy in August 1919, limited his activity essentially to propaganda in favour of friendship and solidarity with Soviet Russia.[41] Moreover, on the eve of the parliamentary elections in Italy, Lenin himself in a letter of October 28, 1919 cautioned "comrade Serrati and all Italian communists" against taking power, asserting that Britain and France, in cooperation with the Italian bourgeoisie, might possibly attempt to "provoke" it. The time for the revolution must be chosen "internationally", he wrote. At a time when the Italian socialists had a fair chance of winning the majority of the urban proletariat, Lenin in fact raised

another stringent condition. The proper moment for revolution would arrive only after the communists won the "entire industrial and the entire rural proletariat plus the small peasants".[42]

Evidently, Lenin and his colleagues were still unwilling to risk bids for power in the West. As Karl Radek argued in a different context, an unsuccessful action not only compromised the idea of communism but could "only lead to the weakening of the movement in other countries, harming Soviet Russia and every other revolutionary centre".[43] However, as the Bulgarian example shows, the communists were unwilling to take power even if they had a fair chance of retaining it.

The Bulgarian communists, formerly known as the Tesniaks, the party absolutely loyal to the Bolsheviks, fared very well in the August 1919 elections, winning twenty percent of votes and an equal share of the parliament seats. Consequently, the leader of the Peasant Party, Stambuliski, offered them in October 1919 the formation of a radical-democratic coalition. As in September 1918, the communists once again rejected the offer, but scarcely because of the fear of "treachery" on the part of Stambuliski. As a prominent party member Vasil Kolarov later explained, the communists were afraid that the Allies would not tolerate a government including the "Bolsheviks".[44] By staying away from power the Bulgarian communists may have prevented anti-Bolshevik hysteria but once again missed the opportunity to implement their own program.

Abstentionism also marked communist behavior in 1920. In France, a dispute between the railway workers and companies in May 1920 triggered a general strike which immediately gained a political flavor. Even the

trade unions and the centrist socialists viewed it as the beginning of the long-awaited social revolution.[45] Typically, however, the bourgeois press and the French public interpreted the strike as another example of Bolshevik subversion and conspiracy. In effect, not only had Moscow made no attempt to arouse the French proletariat, but even the proto-communist organizations as the Committee for the Third International had neither taken part in the preparation of the strike nor encouraged it.[46] The French Left lost this "civic battle of the Marne" in May 1920. The defeat also brought to an end the period of postwar unrest and strikes in France.

The Italian workers' movement met a similar agonizing experience in the late summer of 1920. Since the end of August a wave of social unrest had spread from Milan and Turin across northern Italy. The workers occupied factories, elected workers' councils, formed a Red militia and began to run factories on their own. Within several days the entire industrial heart of the country was in flame. However, the movement erupted at a moment when the head of the socialist party Serrati and a number of socialist leaders were still in Russia, where they had participated in the Second Congress of the Comintern. Naturally, Serrati now insisted on a quick return of the Italian delegation home.

The Bolsheviks also realized that the atmosphere in Italy was explosive. On August 21, before the socialization movement had even begun, the ECCI assessed the situation in Italy in the following way:

> The working class in Italy is suffused with admirable unanimity. To a man, the Italian proletariat is for revolution. The Italian bourgeoisie cannot rely on its regular troops, for at the decisive moment they will

> join the insurrectionaries. The farm workers are for the revolution. Most of the peasants are for the revolution...All the prime prerequisites for a grand victorious proletarian revolution encompassing the whole people are now present in Italy.[47]

And yet, after the socialization movement had started and the Italians were preparing for their departure home, Zinoviev, Bukharin and Radek insisted that Serrati and his colleagues stay for some time in Russia and spend "a few days of relaxation together".[48] Why were the Bolsheviks so aloof to the social upheaval in Italy? An answer may be provided in a talk which Angelica Balabanoff in those days had with Lenin. Balabanoff told Lenin the obvious truth, namely that the Italian masses were closer to socialism than was the proletariat of other countries. Lenin, who had subscribed to a similar view in public, replies gravely: "Comrade Balabanoff, do you take into account that Italy has neither wheat nor coal?" (This was the kind of argument Lenin labelled in public as "philistinism".) In answer Balabanoff compared the endurance of the Italian people to that of the Russians. "Do not confuse the Russian people with other peoples", he retorted, "under the circumstances, a revolutionary upheaval in Italy might trigger a catastrophe. We do not need a second Hungary. That would be another disaster".[49] Evidently, even the mass socialization movement did not dispel Lenin's pessimism regarding the feasibility of proletarian revolution in Italy.

It cannot be determined whether Lenin managed to caution his followers in Italy during the crisis or whether they merely applied the previous tactic of revolutionary abstentionism. In any case, it is noteworthy that in September 1920 those who were later found in the Italian communist party disapproved of the course of revolution. According to an eyewitness, Angelo Tosca, even in such a stronghold of industrial radicalism

as Turin the communists not only refrained from any initiative but in fact held back the workers of the Fiat factory who had readied themselves for action.[50]

When the party leaders and the trade unionists met on September 10, still without Serrati, to decide whether to go ahead to the revolution or negotiate retreat and concessions, the later non-communists voted for revolution but the future communists, together with the trade unionist leaders, favored bargaining with Giolitti's liberal government for reforms and concessions. Following this conference, such radical "Muscovites" as Bombacci even took part in these negotiations. By the time Serrati returned from Russia in the middle of September, the socialization movement was already subsiding. It petered out into a compromise with the government in late September 1920.[51]

That the Bolshevik objectives clashed with the interest of the Italian revolution was subsequently admitted in public by Serrati himself. Soviet Russia, he wrote in a party paper, "was obliged to construct its own politics of offence and defence in the world of international and internationalistic capitalism". These politics, helpful to Soviet Russia, "may not conform to the tactical necessities of another country which finds itself in a critical period of its own as yet unerrupted revolution", he concluded immediately after the September crisis.[52] Disillusioned and frustrated, the Italian proletariat subsequently moved away from socialism; the unconsummated social wants created a breeding ground for fascism. Two years after Lenin had found socialist revolution in Italy impossible, Mussolini seized power and came to implement his own version of "social revolution".

The political climate in another major European country, Germany, was marked from mid 1919 by the incipient dispute over the war guilt and stab-in-the-back question, as well as by the opposition to the terms of the Versailles Treaty. In this process the ruling Weimar coalition of the Left-Centre and its prominent members were subjected to severe criticism and recrimination by the German conservatives, militant nationalists and the military. Since the first weeks of the German republic these forces, backed by General Ludendorff, had been contemplating an overthrow of the German government and the establishment of a military dictatorship.[53]

One group of the conspirators, especially the former section head of Ludendorff's staff, Colonel Bauer, envisaged a number of radical reforms, as well as a cooperation with the German communists and Soviet Russia against the existing government and the Versailles Treaty.[54] Another of Ludendorff's associates, and a proponent of "national Bolshevism", Baron Reibnitz, in the summer of 1919 visited Karl Radek in prison and discussed this idea with him.[55] Radek later in the year even moved into Reibnitz's apartment and there continued discussions with the German military. Colonel Bauer propounded an idea of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" built on an alliance between the proletariat and the officers. He also suggested that the officers would be ready for such a compromise and asked Radek to arrange for it. Radek, according to his recollections, retorted that only the KPD leadership and Moscow were competent to decide the matter.[56] It seems that at this point Radek still preferred an alliance with the Majority Socialists rather than with the conservative nationalists. In fact, he promptly informed the

Vorwärts editor Stampfer about the preparations for coup and hinted that the communists would consider an alliance with the Majority Socialists if the councils were re-activized. It goes without saying that such a regime would have maintained friendly relations with Soviet Russia. His proposal, however, was flatly rejected.[57] Drawing on his Berlin experience after his return to Russia, Radek stated that only two political systems were feasible "abroad" - a dictatorship of the proletariat or a military dictatorship. In fact, by now he may not have been making a clear distinction between the two.[58]

Meanwhile Colonel Bauer also approached the Soviet diplomat Victor Kopp who officially handled prisoner-of-war affairs in Germany. He pointed out the common foreign-political interest of Russia and Germany, and asked the Russians to dissuade the German extreme Left from opposing the putsch. Moscow refused to commit itself outright[59] but obviously complied with the request in the crucial moment. This arrived in March 1920.

On March 13 one of the elitist Free Corps which was about to be dissolved, the Ehrhard Brigade, marched into Berlin and occupied the key posts, thereby prompting a premature putsch. The German government, deprived of army support, fled to southern Germany. The conspirators promptly proclaimed a new government with the Prussian bureaucrat Kapp as Reich Chancellor.[60] Kapp was an old fashioned Bismarckian with some understanding of the need for social reforms but as hostile to the Left and Bolshevism as to the Versailles Treaty. Banking heavily on the support of the military, especially General Lüttwitz, the self-appointed

Reich Chancellor in his initial proclamations dissolved the National Assembly and cancelled its mandate to promulgate a constitution or to conclude peace. This step indicated his intention to renounce the Versailles Treaty. Moreover, his proclamation called for a "strong state power" in order to halt the threatening "destruction and onslaughts by bellicose Bolshevism". Indeed Kapp intended to strip the German Left of its positions and influence.[61]

There was little doubt that the proponents of "national Bolshevism" among the conspirators were in minority. The Kapp dictatorship was as detrimental to the cause of the German revolution as the Kornilov putsch in September 1917 was to the Bolsheviks. Then the Bolsheviks hastened to help Kerensky in suppressing the revolt. Analogically, Moscow in March 1920 would have had to condemn the Kapp putsch and urge the German communists to side with the "German Mensheviks", the Majority Socialists in repelling the putschists. Although Bolsheviks instantly branded the Kapp putsch as a German version of the Kornilov putsch, at the same time they celebrated the coup as a well-deserved lesson for the Majority Socialists and as the fulfilment of the Bolshevik prognoses that Germany had to choose between a military dictatorship and a proletarian revolution. There was a striking lack of concern for the German revolution. In fact, having learned that the German trade unions and their leader Karl Legien had called for a general strike against the Kapp regime, Pravda urged the German workers to greet this appeal with "disrespectful laughter"[62] and Izvestiia advised the German proletariat not to "lift a finger" in response to the strike.[63] The former Ambassador Ioffe even

wrote cynically that the Kapp putsch would prove an enormous help to the cause of revolution.[64]

Yet the Bolsheviks were not carried away by their resentment of the Majority Socialists. Explaining the Bolshevik stand, Karl Radek reasoned correctly that it was the sense of national pride and opposition to the Versailles Treaty that had driven Kapp and the military into the putsch. He therefore envisaged that the tension between Germany and France would increase and make impossible a united front of the Western powers and their allies against Soviet Russia. This would signify an "enormous improvement" of her international position.[65] Radek's argument was sound from the Russian point of view, but it also implied a total disregard for the interests of the German revolution.

Even more ominous was the fact that the leadership of the German communists, either on its own initiative or upon an advice from Moscow, also resolved, in Levi's absence, not to resist the Kapp putsch. Wrapping its position in an ideological cloak, the KPD declared somewhat regretfully that

> the revolutionary proletariat knows that it will have to fight a life-and-death struggle against the military dictatorship. But it will not raise a finger for the deceased government of the murderers of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht...The working class will take up the struggle against the military dictatorship in the proper moment and with proper means. Such a moment has not arrived as yet.[66]

However, it soon turned out that the putschists had the sympathy of neither the bourgeois circles nor the army. At this point Colonel Bauer and Radek's host von Reibnitz resolved to seek the support of the Independent Socialists and the communists, but their effort was approved

Kaicher by General Ludewich nor by the parties they approached.[67] Meanwhile the German workers had enthusiasticly responded to the call for a general strike, and the KPD leadership realized the foolishness of its stand. After Levi's intervention, the party joined the anti-putschist front. On March 17, after only four days, Kapp and his accomplices resigned and fled from Berlin.

The putsch and the ensuing strike set the German proletariat into motion. The socialist and trade unionist leaders now started negotiations for a new labour government which, however, brought no positive results. But the strike itself was transformed in several regions into the armed struggle of the workers against the government troops. Generally speaking, the March events of 1920 radicalized the German Left, and accelerated the polarization within the Independent Socialist party.[68] It could be assumed in 1920 that Soviet Russia would benefit from a military putsch, regardless whether it succeeded or failed. Going along this line, Zinoviev's unrepetant ECCI restated after the Kapp putsch that, only two forms of government were feasible in Germany - the dictatorship of the proletariat and a dictatorship of the "most reactionary and brutal bourgeoisie and generals".[69] Unfortunately Moscow was to take this view as a policy alternative rather than a warning against another self-proclaimed destroyer of the Versailles Treaty and German democracy in the years to come.

If any conclusions can be reached from the foregoing discussion of communist tactics in Western Europe's major revolutionary crises of 1919-1920, they would be as follows. First, the Bolsheviks lacked the willingness and determination to risk a revolutionary offensive in the West even

in the most favorable conditions. Second, the axiom formulated by Lenin during the Brest crisis, namely that Russian interests should determine Soviet foreign policies before the victory of world revolution,[70] was now applied in dealing with international communism regardless of interests of specific revolutions in the West. Bearing this in mind, let us proceed with an analysis of theoretical and organizational aspects of the communist movement in 1919-1920.

The Strategy of Verbal Revolution

The incipient international communism was attracted to Bolshevism more by its philosophy of action and exercise of power than by Leninist doctrines and organizational principles. Many young and radical-minded communists in the West sought an inspiration in Lenin's tactics on the road to power and in the Russian propaganda which, especially in 1918, depicted the victory of world revolution as imminent. Out of these elements a Left wing constituted itself in 1919 within the international communist movement. Being well aware of their lack of popular support, the Left Communists nevertheless believed in the feasibility of world revolution in the foreseeable future. Building on these disparate postulates, the Left Communists considered traditional means of political struggle such as parliament and trade unions to be a harmful detour in the conditions of the postwar cirses. Such individuals and groups as Sylvia Pankhurst and the Shop Stewards in Britain, Loriot and the Committee for the Third International in France, Gorter and Pannekoek in the Netherlands, Bordiga's group in Italy, or Otto Rühle, Laufenberg and Wolffheim in Germany were united in calling for direct action as a form

of struggle, and for workers' councils as a means of the conquest of power, as distinct from parliamentary assemblies.

The arguments of the Left Communists pushed Lenin into a difficult position.[71] He himself considered parliamentary abstentionism suitable for the period of revolutions. Hence, in the autumn of 1917 he vehemently pressed for the Bolshevik withdrawal from Kerensky's Pre-Parliament; for this reason he also retroactively endorsed the boycott of the Duma elections by the Bolsheviks in the 1905 revolution and declared as erroneous the Duma boycott during the subsequent advance of counterrevolution. Parliamentarism was to Lenin a means of struggle in the period of stabilized capitalism.[72]

It is indicative of Lenin's consistently sober view of the West that as early as January 1919, he considered the Spartacist decision not to participate in parliamentary elections erroneous.[73] But he did not make this painful admission in public. It was only in the high summer of 1919 that he somewhat reluctantly voiced his disapproval of parliamentary abstentionism in the existing conditions of Western Europe.[74] Zinoviev's ECCI subsequently warned all sections of the Comintern against making the renunciation of parliamentary activities a principle.[75] In October 1919 Lenin emphatically stated his disapproval of anti-parliamentarism and of opposition to trade union activities.[76]

The warnings coming from Moscow were nevertheless mostly unheeded by anarcho-syndicalist adherents of communism in such countries as Britain, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. In France the most zealous advocates of communism, such as Loriot and the Committee for the Third

International, did not participate in the parliamentary elections of November 1919. The ensuing defeat of the French socialist party further played into their hands.[77] Besides, the Left Communists diverged from Lenin in other important issues. For instance, they rejected Lenin's concept of democratic centralism and dictatorship of the party, putting emphasis on the infra-party democracy and the dictatorship of the masses. Similarly, while Lenin proclaimed the universality of the Bolshevik experience, they stressed the peculiarity of revolutionary conditions in Western Europe. The insubordination of the Left Communists was mirrored also in the realm of organization. It was in October 1919, in the climax of the civil war that Lenin, anticipating a retreat to the Urals, resolved to establish two offices in Western Europe for managing communist affairs there.[78] The decision and its execution bears signs of improvisation. The Bolsheviks dispatched a Dutch communist, Rutgers, to Holland and a Polish communist, Reich ("Thomas"), to Germany on two almost identical missions, without delimiting their powers and even without disclosing to either one the existence of the other. Moscow may have wanted to make sure that at least one centre would be established. Since both emissaries managed to set up their offices, in Amsterdam and Berlin respectively, their relations were soon marked by disputes and rivalries. The West European Secretariat in Berlin, backed by the German KPD, resisted the attempts of the West European Bureau in Amsterdam, led by the Dutch communists Wijnkoop, Rutgers and Roland-Holst, to become the Comintern's chief spokesman in the West. Having meanwhile defeated Denikin and Yudenich, Moscow came to favour a more pliant KPD and the Berlin

Secretariat against the Amsterdam Bureau which gravitated to Left Communism and showed more independence.[79] Almost ignored by the Comintern headquarters and denied of subsidies, the heretical Amsterdam Bureau was forced to curtail its activities in the spring of 1920. It was formally dissolved by the ECCI in April 1920. Its functions were transferred to the Berlin Secretariat which, however, was subsequently stripped of all independence and became a purely administrative organ of the Comintern.[80]

Heterogenous but vocal Left Communists in Germany had also diverged from Moscow's position. It was particularly the Hamburg group of Laufenberg and Wolffheim who, obviously inspired by the Bolshevik propaganda of late 1918, advocated the course of "national Bolshevism". Criticizing Germany's "senseless surrender of all positions" in the autumn of 1918, Laufenberg and Wolffheim were now proposing that the German proletariat ally itself with the German army, establish a soviet republic in the form of a military dictatorship, and wage a new war against the Western powers side by side with Soviet Russia.[81] This was roughly what the Bolsheviks themselves had propagated in the fall of 1918, when expecting Western intervention. With the failure of interventionist plans, however, Moscow in 1919 stopped this propaganda without rebuking "national Bolshevism" in public. It was only in the autumn of 1919 that Karl Radek warned the "Hamburg comrades" that communism in the Allied countries was still too weak and also that devastated Russia would not be able to provide effective assistance.[82] Subsequently, Radek addressed himself to "national Bolshevism" in a special pamphlet.[83] He rejected as "fancy illusions" those of Laufenberg's arguments which he himself had previously

used, namely that Germany in November 1918 was able to continue the war, that the Red Army was a serious threat to the Entente, and that revolution would break out in France if the German proletariat took power. Radek now argued that the situation in France was not revolutionary, that the patriotic-minded French masses would not tolerate a soviet republic in Germany, and that the German bourgeoisie itself would prefer a French occupation to the soviet system.[84] Above all, however, Radek made it clear that such a bellicose version of "national Bolshevism" ran against Moscow's search for peace, modus vivendi, and trade relations with the West. He suggested that Soviet Russia had to follow such a course because the revolution in Western Europe required decades to become victorious.[85]

In the spring of 1920 Lenin addressed himself to "national Bolshevism" and other burning problems of international communism, in one of his most impressive pamphlets, "Left-Wing" Communism - An Infantile Disorder.[86] The purpose of the pamphlet, if one may venture a generalization, was to harmonize the tactics of international communism with the interests of the Soviet government in one country, Russia. Lenin no longer desperately summoned the Western proletariat to actions regardless of consequences, as he had previously done in his pamphlet on Kautsky, nor did he again recruit supporters of the Soviet cause regardless of their background. The fact that Soviet Russia had been relieved from the main burden of the civil war and intervention marked his pamphlet. In some respects Lenin now took a sober, sensible stand free of propagandistic ballast and revolutionary rhetoric. And yet, intertwined with this trend was Lenin's pronounced effort of elevating Bolshevik doctrines and tactics

to an international norm.

Thus Lenin now almost entirely dropped the institution of soviets, advanced in the spring of 1919 as an organizational form of communism, and shifted his emphasis back to the party organization as the centre of the movement. He now maintained that a repudiation of party discipline and party principles was tantamount to "completely disarming" the proletariat.[87] As long as communism had not won on the world scene and as long as classes existed, the communist party had to remain strongly centralized and disciplined.[88] Similarly Lenin now claimed that the necessity of "absolute centralization and rigorous discipline" applied to the entire communist movement.[89]

Shielding himself with the Russian experience, Lenin also sharply rebuked the Left Communists for their refusal to work in parliaments and in trade unions. "How can one say that 'parliamentarism is politically obsolete'", he mocked the German Left, "when 'millions' and 'legions' of proletarians are not only still in favor of parliamentarism in general, but are downright 'counterrevolutionary'?"[90] And Lenin declared as obligatory participation in elections and parliamentary activities as long as parliamentarism survived. Similarly, he argued for participation in trade union activities. He admitted that it would be a difficult achievement to wrest the workers from the influence of reformist leaders, but also made this task obligatory, irrespective of specific conditions in various countries.[91]

It would appear that by raising these stringent conditions Lenin wished also to erect a barrier against communist bids for power in the

near future. That he deemed the situation unfit for the revolution emerges not only from the general tenor of his pamphlet, but also from his treatment of "national Bolshevism". Similarly to Radek, Lenin rejected the "preposterous absurdities" of "national Bolshevism" or any eventual promise on the part of the German communists to repudiate the Versailles Treaty. It took great pains to explain that even a Soviet Germany might be forced to tolerate a prolonged existence of the Versailles Treaty for the sake of world revolution. Since it was "criminal" to accept battle at a moment advantageous to the enemy, the German communists should not fall into the trap of the currently stronger Western powers and commit themselves a priori to the renunciation of the Treaty or promise outright an alliance with Soviet Russia.[92]

Commenting on Lenin's pamphlet, the Dutch Left Communist Gorter concluded that it led the movement "back into that swamp" of opportunism into which the labour leaders had previously taken socialism: "Such a book is for the revolutionary communist proletariat what Bernstein's book was for the pre-revolutionary proletariat".[93] Gorter's charge was harsh but not entirely unfounded. Lenin's disdain of the revolutionary élan of the Left Communists, his preaching of moderation, his revolutionary abstentionism and skepticism regarding the feasibility of proletarian revolution in the West, these aspects which had been implicit in his thought and action, were explicitly displayed in "Left-Wing" Communism in a coherent form. The pamphlet made obvious Lenin's move towards what some authors consider a "rightist, anti-revolutionary position".[94] It also started a systematic process of imposing the Bolshevik doctrines

upon the international communist movement. In his "Left-Wing" Communism Lenin argued from the position of the Russian statesman, not from that of the revolutionary.

Lenin's shift towards moderate policies was accompanied with a general radicalization of Western labour movement in the first postwar years. These developments facilitated a rapprochement between Moscow and the centrist elements and parties of Western socialism. In November 1919, as has been seen, the German Independent Socialists proposed that an international conference be held to arrange for a new International.[95] The ECCI in a letter of February 5, 1920, censured the USPD and analogous parties in France and Britain for their past sins. Above all, however, the ECCI implicitly rejected a multilateral conference or a reconstruction of the Comintern. Instead, the Independents were invited to separate negotiations about their party's admission to the Comintern.[96] This set up a precedent for the Bolshevik treatment of other parties and groups in the spring and summer of 1920. In April the Comintern officials negotiated separately with two Labour delegations from Britain; in June they started separate talks with delegations of the French and Italian socialist parties.[97]

Meanwhile the ECCI, obviously mobilized by the Polish attack on Soviet Russia,[98] in late April resolved to convoke the Second Congress of the Comintern. However, when the congress opened, first on July 15 in Petrograd and again on July 23 in Moscow, the Red Army was already advancing towards Warsaw. This left a deep impact on the congress delegates and especially on the Bolsheviks themselves. The latter now became

more self-confident and intransigent in dealing with the Western delegations. Lenin himself, for example, on the eve of the congress hastily revised one of his key documents, giving it a sharper tone.[99]

The questions of program and doctrine were not brought into the congress debates; and the general validity of Leninism remained unchallenged. The attention of the delegates was channeled to such tactical problems as parliamentarism; the agrarian question; the national and colonial question; the role of soviets; the role and structure of the party; and question concerning the organization of and admission requirements to the Comintern.[100]

In comparison with the first congress, there were two new tendencies. First, Lenin presented the national liberation movements as a component of world revolution. Juxtaposing in his typical way not the classes but the oppressed and the oppressing nations (identifying the latter with Britain and the United States), he urged the cooperation of the communists with the bourgeois nationalist movements in the developing countries. Despite the opposition of Asian and Western delegates (N. M. Roy and Serrati respectively), his view in the end prevailed and was endorsed by the congress.[101]

Second, Lenin and the Bolsheviks now heavily stressed the party instead of soviets as the organization of the movement. "Political power", the theses on the party role read, "cannot be seized, organized, and wielded other than by a political party".[102] The theses put emphasis on the "iron proletarian centralism" rather than on ways of implementing the proletarian revolution;[103] this was compatible with Lenin's evaluation

of Western communism in the congress documents. In his view, the communist parties in the West first had to "prove in practice" that they had "sufficient understanding and organization, contact with the exploited masses, and determination and skill...for a successful, a victorious revolution".[104] As Lenin put it in another context, "the communists' parties current task consists not in accelerating the revolution, but in intensifying the preparations of the proletariat".[105]

Furthermore, although a number of Western delegates were struck by the "Russian" outlook of Lenin, his generalization of the Russian experience, and his schematic perception of the West,[106] the Bolsheviks at the congress succeeded in establishing a firm hold over the movement and the Comintern itself. This became obvious especially in an unceremonious decision to definitely set up the headquarters of the Comintern in Moscow, and in an over-representation of the Russians in the Executive Committee. Combined with the emphasis on rigid discipline and organization, this paved the road to the eradication of any shred of autonomy and independence of the communist parties.

The famous twenty-one conditions for admission to the Communist International accepted by the Congress, well served the purpose of extending Bolshevik hegemony over the movement.[107] They included inter alia a strict centralization of all parties and affiliated organizations (Art. 1 and 12); their unconditional submission to the Comintern (Art.16); removal of centrists from all responsible posts (Art. 2, 11, and 20); a combination of legal and illegal activities (Art. 3); a systematic propaganda of communist ideas in the army, trade unions, cooperatives, rural

districts, etc. (Art. 4, 5, and 9); rejection of the peace system based on the League of Nations (Art. 6); struggle against colonialism (Art. 8); periodical purges (Art. 13); every possible support to Soviet republics in their struggle against counterrevolution (Art. 14); and adoption of the communist program and name "Communist Party" (Art. 15 and 17). Two additional conditions were the harshest. Point 20 stipulated that at least two-thirds of the memberships of the central committees and all central bodies of the affiliated parties had to be composed of those who had endorsed affiliation to the Comintern prior to the second congress. Point 21 called for the expulsion of those party members who rejected these conditions or the theses of the Comintern.

The conditions, compiled under the impact of the Red Army's march on Warsaw, seemed stringent. However, Serrati subsequently correctly pointed out that they were marked by opportunism and vagueness, typical also for other documents adopted by the Second Congress.[108] As the Dutch communist Pannekoek concluded from his congress experience, the Soviet government realized that the Western proletariat was an effective weapon for paralyzing the imperialist governments and for compelling them to negotiate. "What it [the Soviet government] needs is not a radical communist party, which prepares a thorough revolution for the future, but largely organized proletarian forces which would back Russia."[109] Indeed, the twenty-one conditions and other congress documents constituted not a guideline for revolution but rather a blank cheque to be signed as a token of loyalty to the Comintern and Moscow.

Along a similar line the Bolsheviks dealt with delegations of the mass socialist parties of Western Europe, the French and Italian socialists, and the German Independents. Approaching them separately, the Russians attempted by carrot-and-stick tactics to win the individual leaders for the communist cause and isolate the unyielding ones.[110] Their past and political profile played only a secondary role. Thus Moscow favoured Bombacci, whom Lenin called a "bearded imbecile",[111] but who had the potential of being a pawn, over the honest and dedicated but independent head of the Italian socialists, Serrati. Similarly, the Bolsheviks did not mind the past of the two French centrist leaders Cachin and Frossard as long as they proved willing to jump on the communist bandwagon, but barred the Comintern to a radical but independent grandson of Marx, Longuet,[112] and Lenin treated in friendly fashion the moderate Czech socialist Bohumír Šmeral who, as Trotsky cynically stated, had exchanged loyalty to the Hapsburg monarchy for allegiance to Bolshevism and Soviet Russia.[113]

The Second Congress of the Comintern accelerated the polarization of the forces of centrist socialism in Western Europe. In October 1920 the German Independent Socialists split at a congress in Halle, which was partly prepared by Radek and attended by Zinoviev. In December 1920, roughly one third of the 900,000 Independents merged with the less than 80,000 German communists into one Communist party.[114] In the same month the French socialists were discussing affiliation to the Comintern at a party congress at Tours. After animated debates a solid majority (3,208 votes to 1,022) voted for affiliation, but the idea of a final split was

not popular. It was the Comintern's insistence on the exclusion of Longuet that sealed the separation. The majority established itself as the French Communist Party while the rest claimed the succession of the SFIO, the French Socialist Party.[114]

The emphasis on personal loyalty marked the Bolshevik handling of the Italian affairs. Following Serrati's display of independence at the Second Congress in Moscow and his reluctance to purge the Right wing of the party, the Russians obviously began to contemplate a break with him. The intrigues of the Comintern agents, and Moscow's personal attacks on Serrati proved inefficient. He clearly enjoyed the support of the majority of the Italian socialists. Nevertheless, in January 1921 at a PSI congress in Livorno, a Comintern emissary denounced Serrati, thus giving an impetus to a split of the party. The voting revealed that only one third of the delegates favoured an unconditional affiliation to the Comintern, and the formation of a communist party. A solid majority opted for Serrati and for preserving the PSI.[116]

In 1920 and 1921 Moscow took the decisive steps in forming an army of loyal followers in the West and in establishing a firm hold over the Comintern. International communism was growing into a well-organized force, ready to strike whenever the Moscow centre deemed it necessary. But the revolution, except for a feeble attempt at it in Germany in 1923, was not on the order of the day. The revolutionary zeal of the communist movement was channelled toward endless organizational work and gradually sublimated into routine, resignation, and cynicism. Participation in parliamentary and trade unions activities, correct as these may have appeared in postwar conditions, diverted communist attention from

revolution to the parliamentary rostrum. As a Swiss communist Herzog prophetically warned in 1920, the German Social Democrats had also declared "We are going into parliament only to use this forum for revolutionary purposes", but their revolutionary activity very quickly turned to opportunism and reformism.[117] Since its beginnings, Western communism was indeed channelled by Lenin and his colleagues towards the position vacated by Social Democratic parties and aptly defined by Karl Kautsky as revolutionary but not revolution-making .

CHAPTER VIII

THE VICTORY THAT WAS RELINQUISHED: THE SOVIETS AT WAR WITH POLAND, 1920

The war with Poland in 1920, offered the Bolsheviks the opportunity of extending the frontiers of revolution westwards by means of revolutionary war. However, despite a considerable military superiority they did not carry out their revolutionary mission. What stopped them? The answer is sought mostly in various deficiencies of the Soviet military machine, particularly in the lack of cooperation between the two Soviet fronts which, skillfully utilized by the enemy, resulted in a Soviet military defeat. The "eighteenth decisive battle of the world", as Lord D'Abernon termed the Polish campaign, was allegedly won and lost in the field.[1] Less attention has hitherto been paid to the political aspects of the war and to their impact upon Soviet warfare. Hence, it is assumed that the Soviet war aims remained constant until the latter half of August, namely a total victory over Pilsudski and the sovietization of Poland, and, eventually, that the Bolsheviks contemplated more grandiose accomplishments such as an invasion of Germany, the sovietization of all of Central Europe, and the disruption of the Versailles system.[2] In fact, however, the Bolshevik political objectives were both more sober and fluent, and their impact on the Soviet conduct of the war was more pronounced than assumed. Approaching the topic from the vantage point of Clausewitz's dictum of war as a continuation of policy by other means, this chapter introduces a revisionist interpretation of the decisive phase of the war culminating in the Polish counterattack on August 16, 1920.

Moscow and Warsaw Prior to July 1920

Relations between Moscow and Warsaw following the restoration of the Polish state in November 1918, were marked by uncertainty emanating chiefly from unsettled territorial and political issues. In 1919 a series of minor clashes occurred in the disputed regions without developing into major confrontations. At the same time, Moscow and Warsaw throughout 1919, conducted a series of confidential negotiations.[3] In the context of this study the long and intimate talks which Moscow's envoy Markhlevsky held in the autumn of 1919 with Pilsudski's emissary Kossakowski merit attention. Although no formal agreement came from these talks Pilsudski, to the dismay of the Western powers, refused to intervene against the Bolsheviks during the time of their life-and-death struggle with the armies of Denikin and Yudenich.[4] This fact, as will be seen, played a significant role in the crucial phase of the 1920 war, when both sides opened a new round of secret negotiations.

However, after the decisive defeats of the White generals in the autumn of 1919, Pilsudski realized the vitality of the Soviet regime and came to view the Bolsheviks as the main threat to the realization of Polish national interests.[5] Talks between Moscow and Warsaw were discontinued and in December 1919 Polish troops resumed a local advance eastwards.[6] By the middle of December the Marshal was contemplating a major military offensive against the Bolsheviks.[7]

The Soviets soon took notice of Pilsudski's belligerent intentions. Karl Radek, returning from Germany to Russia via Poland, sent a letter to the Polish socialists on January 22, 1920, in which he expressed concern

at Polish war preparations and reiterated Soviet Russia's determination to respect Poland's independence and territorial integrity.[8] On January 28 Trotsky notified the Soviet Politbureau that Pilsudski was contemplating a resumption of hostilities.[9]

Moscow reacted promptly. On January 28, 1920, Chicherin sent a conciliatory note to Warsaw which met Poland's major claims. Moscow formally recognized Polish sovereignty and promised to stay clear of anti-Polish pacts. Warsaw was also assured of the Soviet desire to settle all problems "peacefully, by negotiations, mutual concessions and agreements".[10] In addition, the Soviets offered the Polish government considerable territorial concessions with the frontiers running about 200 miles east of the Curzon line.[11] This note opened the Soviet peace initiative which, however, accomplished very little. A month later, on February 27, Lenin decided to reinforce the Western front in the event of a possible war with Poland.[12] The time arrived for the Soviet High Command to draw the first war plans. It is noteworthy that the Soviet military did not consider an armed conflict with Poland to be of any particular danger to Soviet Russia.[13] Given this optimistic view, General Shaposhnikov worked out an operational plan which ordained an offensive role for the Red Army in a war with Poland. The war plan of March 20 and its subsequent revisions also had an offensive connotation.[14]

Although Lenin and his colleagues were aware of the Soviet military superiority, they also were deterred by the fact that the new Polish state constituted an important link in the Versailles system created under the aegis of France and Britain. Trotsky, for instance, maintained that

Warsaw had "no independent policy on her own" and defended only the interests of the Entente. A conflict with Poland would therefore amount to a war against Britain and France.[15] Consequently, although their position stiffened somewhat in March 1920,[16] the Bolsheviks remained sincerely interested in avoiding a confrontation which could otherwise be won militarily. In the final account it was this contradiction between the military and political prospect of a conflict with Poland that created uncertainty in the Bolshevik policy in the decisive weeks of the war.

After the failure of its peace initiative and parallel to its first military measures, the Soviet government in late February revived its "secret weapon", revolutionary propaganda. On February 27 - the day on which Lenin resolved to prepare for the Polish attack[17] - Pravda struck a familiar note: "If the European imperialists push Poland into the war and help her, we shall not remain without allies. The Polish proletariat will be such an ally...Communism in Poland is rapidly growing."[18] Warning of the danger of a Polish attack, Lenin in his speeches also painted Poland as being in a deep internal crisis: The chances of victory of a Soviet republic in Poland had never been as great.[19]

Undismayed by these verbal threats, Pilsudski signed a secret agreement with the Ukrainian nationalist leader Petliura, and on April 26 started his advance into the Ukraine.[20] Two days later, discussing Pilsudski's attack, the Bolshevik Central Committee declared the Polish front to be the most important one, but otherwise did not change its previous cautious policy. As Lenin subsequently stated, Soviet Russia did not have "the slightest design on Poland's independence".[21] Other Soviet pronouncements

were formulated in a similar moderate spirit.[22] It hardly could not be otherwise with the Polish offensive being entirely successful. Just as Stalin in 1941 was hesitant to prepare the Soviet people against Hitler's attack, so the Bolshevik leadership in the spring of 1920 had made only inadequate preparations for war.[23] The numerically superior Polish forces quickly penetrated into the Ukraine and occupied Kiev on May 7. As Radek had anticipated, the Polish attack stimulated a revival of Russian patriotism and enlarged the Bolshevik's basis of support at home.[24] In the middle of May the Red Army started its first counteroffensive which resulted in the first victories. Concurrently with this development, the question of war aims was apparently discussed in the Bolshevik leadership. It is noteworthy that the publicity was being given chiefly to the "doves" cautioning against possible repercussions of the war. Thus a Pravda editorial, "Poland, the Entente, and We" dismissed the possibility of a large-scale Western intervention against Soviet Russia, but warned against the bellicose mood in the neighbouring countries.[25] Taking a different stand Karl Radek argued that an influential wing in the British government was waiting for its opportunity to help Pilsudski: "If Poland is defeated", he wrote, "there always will be time to save her existence by exerting pressure on Soviet Russia."[26] Stalin made his point with a blatant clarity: "It is beyond any doubt that the campaign of the Polish gentry against the workers' and peasants' Russia is in fact a campaign of the Entente." Disagreements over Poland in the West, exchanges of diplomatic notes and anti-interventionist articles in the British press, Stalin went on, "all this hulabaloo has only one object, namely, to throw dust in the

the eyes of naive politicians and by talking about peace with Russia to cover up the...actual intervention." Stalin then added a number of facts speaking against a Soviet advance into Poland.[27]

Nevertheless, the argumentative tone of the "doves" indicates that the first military successes against the Poles in May induced some Bolsheviks, and Lenin in particular, to adopt a bolder stand. For example, Lenin from now on avoided any reference to Poland's independence. When the Central Committee on May 23 deliberated on Soviet war aims, the hitherto silent "hawks" must have asserted themselves, although not in a decisive way. The Central Committee resolved to mobilize the party and the Russian population for the purpose of crushing Poland and achieving peace before the Western powers could help the Poles.[28] Clearly the "hawkish" connotation; at the same time, however, it explicitly stated peace, not a sovietization of Poland, as the Soviet war aim. The directive of May 23 was a vague and ambiguous compromise between the "dovish" and "hawkish" trends in the Bolshevik leadership which left the door open to either course.

The subsequent war developments further encouraged the Bolsheviks to adopt a "hawkish" position. On June 9 Budenny's cavalry, supported by the South-Western front, started a new offensive. Within a few days the ancient capital of the Ukraine, Kiev, was recaptured, to the satisfaction of many patriotic Russians.[29] Parallel with the Polish retreat the news reached Moscow of strong opposition in the British Parliament to any action against Soviet Russia. The Soviet government also could not but be pleased with a British statement renouncing the ties with the last anti-Bolshevik

crusader, General Wrangel.[30] The hitherto cautious Pravda asserted on June 11, that Lloyd George "already speculates on a fiasco of the Polish-Wrangelian intervention." Pravda then struck a new tone: the Polish attack "will result in the political death of the Polish bourgeois state and in its replacement by the state of the Polish proletariat."[31] The next day Lenin, recalling the Soviet peace initiative, declared that the Soviet government would negotiate peace "not with you, the Polish landowners and bourgeois, but with the Polish workers and peasants", and called for stepping up the war effort until a "complete victory" was won.[32] The slogan "Long Live Red Soviet Poland" came into circulation and was echoed even in official declarations.[33]

Nevertheless, the campaign for Soviet Poland was not the official party line. The "doves" in the Bolshevik leadership, opposing for whatever reason the export of the revolution, had not yet surrendered.[34] It was chiefly the Soviet military breakthrough in the first half of July, and the Western response to it, that undermined their position and compelled them to a temporary capitulation.

July 11: The "Hawks" Gain the Upper Hand

A new offensive by the Red Army disrupted the enemy's defences between July 4 and 7. The battered Polish troops now retreated in disarray and confusion. On July 11 the Red Army recaptured Minsk and rapidly advanced to the Curzon line.[35] The Polish government, hitherto rejecting Great Power mediation in the conflict, now decided to seek the assistance of Britain and France. The Polish Prime Minister Grabski went to Spa to confer with the Allied statesmen, especially with Lloyd George. On July 10 he accepted a plan which, from the Polish point of view, was very harsh

and partly unacceptable. It obliged Poland to withdraw to the Curzon line and to accept it as the provisional border. The Soviet troops would halt 50 kilometers east of it and Vilna would be handed over to the Lithuanians. Poland also consented to hold peace negotiations in London and to accept the Supreme Council's decision on other specific questions. The British government in turn assured Warsaw that in case of Soviet Russia refusing an armistice and crossing the Curzon line, the Allies "would give Poland all the assistance, especially in war material...to enable the Polish people to defend their independence and national existence."[36]

The next day, July 11, a note was dispatched from Downing Street to Moscow proposing to the Soviets a composite armistice with Poland and Wrangel to be followed by peace talks between Poland and Soviet Russia, in London. In contrast to previous communications, this note, attributed to Lord Curzon, appeared "polite and even friendly in tone"[37] and, strangely enough, it did not entirely correspond to the spirit of the Spa agreement of July 10.[38]

Meanwhile the Soviet Politbureau, discussing developments on July 7, appears to have taken a harsher stand on the question of peace.[39] From now on Pravda repeatedly urged the acceleration of the offensive,[40] and Lenin suggested that the Soviet delegation in London should not be afraid of a temporary break in negotiations for the normalization of relations with Britain.[41] At this point the Curzon note reached Moscow. Its author undoubtedly wished to speed up the arrival of a just peace. However, the conciliatory tone of the note while the Red Army was advancing brought the opposite result.

Several years earlier, while shaping his strategy of revolution in his Swiss exile, Lenin had accounted for only one form of extending the camp of socialism - offensive war waged at the moment when the proletarian state became materially and military superior to its "capitalist" enemy.[42] Consistent with this view, the chief of the Soviet state, as has been seen, throughout 1919 and into 1920 exercised the utmost caution and restraint in relation to spontaneous proletarian actions in the West. Now Lenin gathered from the Curzon note that Britain was either unable or unwilling to intervene effectively in the war. This, coupled with the lukewarm stand of the French Prime Minister Millerand towards Poland convinced him that an opportunity had emerged to put his "Swiss" concept into effect.

On July 12 or 13, without waiting for the party's standpoint, Lenin impatiently wired to Trotsky's deputy Skliansky, that the "international situation, particularly Curzon's proposal" demanded a "furious acceleration" of the offensive against Poland.[43] The Red Army was still about 100 miles from the Curzon line. At this point the head of the Soviet state found support among his colleagues. It was assumed, as Trotsky later admitted, that Lenin's course "involved no danger for the existence of the Soviet republic itself."[44] On July 13 Pravda, pointing out the symptoms of a disintegration of the Polish state and Britain's troubles with Germany and with the colonies, unequivocally endorsed the export of the revolution by conquest.[45] The "doves" too now changed the tone of their arguments. Karl Radek, for instance, who had previously declared it the duty of the communists "to advocate quite definitely the independence of Poland",[46] now advised the diplomats of London and Paris "not to

trouble themselves over the issue of the Russo-Polish war" as the independence of Poland was assured by proletarian principles.[47] Stalin on July 11 still termed as "ridiculous" a march on Warsaw before Wrangel was defeated; in an interview published on July 15, however, he pointed out the "quite exceptional cordiality" with which the local population on the Polish front welcomed the Red Army, and spoke about "continuous revolts" breaking out in the rear of the Polish troops.[48] Only Trotsky, in two messages of July 13, urged the Politbureau and Chicherin to accept British mediation, pointing out that it would lead to a peace with the Entente as well.[49] However, his voice was not heard.

On July 16 the Central Committee decided, on the basis of a document by Lenin which has not been published, to reject the British offer of mediation, and ordered the Red Army to continue its advance.[50] The next day Lenin triumphantly wired to the political commissars Stalin and Smilga: "The Central Committee has accepted my proposals almost in full".[51] Nevertheless, the Central Committee obviously did not define the target of the advance and Soviet war aims. As will be seen, the pertinent resolution probably referred merely to a decisive military victory over Poland.[52] The sovietization of Poland constituted merely a wishful outcome of the Red Army offensive. The Bolsheviks again did not close the door to a peace with the "bourgeois" Polish government.[52a]

The Soviet policy after July 11 reflected the aforementioned ambivalence. On one hand, Moscow started a vigorous campaign for isolating the Poles. Thus Chicherin now rejected Curzon's offer of mediation and did not allude to the independence of Poland.[53] Trotsky also complied

with party discipline and, against his convictions, administered a rebuff to the British Foreign Secretary.[54] Lenin in a directive to the Soviet High Command ordered an energetic advance against Poland, in case of necessity even beyond the Curzon line, but warned of taking aggressive steps against Rumania, Finland, and Latvia.[55] On July 20 Glavkom Kamenev issued a corresponding directive to the commanders of the Western and South-Western fronts.[56]

At the same time, however, Moscow was very reluctant to commit itself in public to the sovietization of Poland. As the Political Department of the Red Army instructed the political agitators, "at this moment we must not say openly that we would conclude peace only with a Soviet Poland".[57] Indeed, the prominent Bolsheviks including Lenin mostly refrained from commenting on their war aims. The most serious commitment to the idea of Soviet Poland took the form of a provisional Polish Revolutionary Committee, which was established on July 30 by a group of the Polish communists obviously on their own initiative.[58]

Meanwhile, on July 22, the Polish government approached Moscow with an armistice proposal.[59] The Soviets now undoubtedly assumed that the Poles could not count on assistance from any side[60] and began to procrastinate. Chicherin relegated the matter to the Soviet High Command which in turn entrusted the conduct of armistice negotiations to Tukhachevsky, the commander of the Western front. Tukhachevsky informed the Poles on July 24 that their representatives were expected by July 30 at a specified meeting place. The delay of six days he justified on the rather flimsy ground that the hatred aroused by the conduct of the Polish troops in

Belorussia required special security precautions.[61]

On July 29 Lord Curzon sent another note to Chicherin which proposed an overall settlement of the Russian problem. He suggested that a peace conference be held in London to work out the Russo-Polish peace treaty, the peace with the border states of Soviet Russia, and the normalization of relations between Soviet Russia and the Allies.[62] The Soviet government nevertheless continued to insist on separating the peace negotiations with Poland from the trade and political talks with Britain and the Allies.[63] Chicherin later recalled regretfully the fact that the Curzon note of July 29 offered an "unheard of" prospect of a "full reconciliation with France" but, as he then added, "at that time our army was advancing..."[64]

August 5: A Decision to De-Escalate

It soon proved that the Soviets had underestimated the Western world's solidarity with Poland and the determination of the Poles to resist in their own way. In the latter part of July the Western public, including the elements favorably disposed towards Soviet Russia, took a strong stand in favour of Poland's independence.[65] The Red Army's efforts had been praised in the West as long as they served to defend Russia against the invader; the Soviet advance into Poland, however, "was daily strengthening the interventionist cause".[66] And the Polish side seemed to be deliberately playing on this card.

Some of the terms of the Spa agreement of July 10 unquestionably offended the national aspirations of the Poles.[67] On the other hand, the British government's guarantee of the Polish sovereignty and territorial integrity within her ethnic frontiers implied that Warsaw might not be

losing too much when pursuing a risky policy. Pilsudski, deliberately or subconsciously, indeed went this way. A conventional commander of the Polish army would in July 1920 undoubtedly have concentrated on the defence of the ethnic Poland and Warsaw. Pilsudski, a civilian who had turned soldier for the sake of expediency, chose the opposite course. Immediately after the British guaranteed the Polish ethnic frontier, a transfer began of the Polish troops from the north southwards.[68] "All their best troops," complained the head of the British Mission to Poland, Lord d'Abernon, one day after his arrival to Warsaw, "are being sent to the south to defend Lvov (Lemberg), leaving Warsaw unprotected. In the north they have a sick general in command who admits that he has lost his nerve."[69]

To comprehend this policy, one has to bear in mind that the border line in the ethnicly mixed south was still to be determined. "They have an idea," Lord d'Abernon found out several days later, "that the final frontier in Galicia will be determined upon the line between the armies at the precise date of the armistice. It is therefore necessary to defend with energy all territory in the south. The frontier on the north will be determined on ethnographical lines...The practical result of holding it is that the Poles expose their heart at Warsaw."[70]

Consequently, a brief look at the war map in early August 1920 showed the Red Army deep inside the ethnic Polish territory in the north and Pilsudski's forces holding the ethnicly mixed territories in the south. This signaled to the outside observer that the Poles were banking on Allied assistance and on a political, not military, ending of the war.

The changes in Poland's political life carried out in conformity with the Allied suggestions,[71] the arrival of the official Allied missions in Warsaw on July 25,[72] and the firmer Polish stand on the question of peace[73], could only confirm this impression and increase Moscow's apprehension.

It appears that even after July 11 Lenin did not fully win the party for his risky course.[74] Until early August the "doves" might have hoped that the forthcoming bilateral armistice and peace talks would clarify the situation. Yet, when the Polish delegates on August 1 arrived at the appointed meeting place, the Soviet side refused to negotiate on the ground that the Poles were not empowered to engage in peace talks. The Polish delegation, deprived of contact with its government subsequently returned to Warsaw.[75] Following this daring step the "doves" in the Bolshevik leadership raised their voices against the Polish venture. They did so in a typical way, by advancing the demand "Let us first defeat Wrangel". That the White General himself served merely as a pretext is evident from the fact that even the most consistent "Wrangel-baiter", Stalin, did not consider his well equipped but small army operating from the Crimean peninsula, to be capable of jeopardizing the Soviet regime.[76] Besides, Wrangel, compelled to halt his offensive in late June, had been inactive for more than a month.

Nevertheless, starting the "revolt", Trotsky on August 2 sent to the Politbureau members a memorandum which "in view of Wrangel's success" suggested that the front against Wrangel be recognized as "having vast significance in its own right", and proposed to entrust Stalin with

forming a separate Wrangel front. Simultaneously Trotsky intimated the desirability of de-escalating the conflict in the west. The talks with Poland were to be "carried out in such a spirit that, in case of need, a truce really can be concluded"; the peace treaties with Finland and Latvia were to be expedited and a conciliatory attitude adopted in relation to Lithuania. In his conclusion Trotsky subtly warned his colleagues that in given circumstances the Soviets would have to take measures "towards preparing for a winter campaign". This ran sharply against the widespread illusion that the war would end shortly after the conquest of Warsaw.[77]

The Politbureau on August 2 indeed entrusted Stalin with forming a separate front against Wrangel but this left unsolved the kernel of "dovish" concern, the Soviet advance into Poland. Informing Stalin of his new assignment, Lenin himself conceded that "the opinion is mounting in the Central Committee that peace with bourgeois Poland should be concluded immediately."[78] If Lenin sought Stalin's solidarity, he failed. The prudent Georgian in turn signaled his desertion back to the camp of the "doves": "I do not believe for a minute in the promises of the Glavkom [i.e. to take Warsaw by August 12], he only fools around with his promises. As regards the tendency in the Central Committee in favour of a peace with Poland, it must be pointed out that our diplomacy sometimes obstructs very effectively the results of our military successes."[79]

Stalin undoubtedly criticized the Soviet procrastinating tactics in talks with Poland and thereby also Lenin, whose command of Soviet foreign affairs was still undisputed. In answer Lenin shielded himself behind the authority of the party: "Our diplomacy is subordinated to the Central

Committee and never will deprive us of our successes unless the threat of Wrangel generates a vacillation in the Central Committee."[80] Stalin nevertheless refused to accept the assignment against Wrangel, whose alleged danger he had so emphasized, and stayed at the South-Western front.

Meanwhile the "revolt" was assuming a larger proportion. On August 4, Lenin informed Stalin that the Central Committee plenum was scheduled for the next day and asked him for an assessment of the South-Western and the Crimean fronts, adding that "political decisions of utmost importance may depend on your conclusions".[81] Consistent in his opposition to Lenin's gamble, Stalin in his reply rather exaggerated the difficulties which the Red Army was encountering on the Polish front.[82] At this point Moscow obviously received evidence of Wrangel's preparations for landing on the Kuban shore of the Azov Sea. Though the operation was bound to be minor in scale,[83] it played into the hands of the 'doves'. On August 5, the day of the plenary session, Pravda after a long pause again upheld the "dovish" standpoint. Its editorial opened with a statement that "the Crimean venture has turned into a southern danger" and warned against any delay in liquidating the White General.[84]

The same day a report from London added to Bolshevik apprehension. The abortive meeting of the Polish and Soviet delegations on August 1 had confirmed the impression in the West that the Soviets were procrastinating in order to gain the time for the conquest and sovietization of Poland.[85] Lloyd George, who had hitherto treated the Russians with some sympathy, on August 4 summoned L. Kamenev and Krassin for what he called a "straight talk". He accused Moscow of obstructing armistice negotiations at the time when the Red Army was advancing into

Poland, and declared that the British government would support Poland until her independence was secured within her ethnic frontiers. To buttress his statement, Lloyd George announced that new arms would be sent to Poland, that the British Fleet would be ready to sail into the Baltic, and that the blockade would be reimposed on Soviet Russia.[86] Kamenev promptly sent Lenin an alarming report according to which Lloyd George's statement "amounted to the announcement of military action against Soviet Russia.[87] Lenin's collaborator Chicherin termed the statement an "ultimatum" which signified a turning point in British policy towards the Soviet-Polish conflict.[88]

The Soviet response to the Polish campaign now underwent a change. The self-confident, optimistic tone characteristic for June and July gave way in August to a sober approach and a hardly disguised apprehension. For instance, Pravda published a series of alarming reports on growing Western solidarity with Poland [89] - an unerring indicator of the prevailing mood in the party leadership. Bolshevik apprehension went so far as to result in Pravda reprinting the Central Committee's directive to the party organizations in the event of Soviet territory being occupied by the enemy.[90]

In this atmosphere the Central Committee met in a plenary session on the evening of August 5. As could be expected, the military still considered the war prospects to be very good. The Revvoensovet informed the Central Committee that Warsaw could be taken by August 16 and Tukhachevsky upheld this view.[91] Contrary to what is widely assumed, however, the party leadership must have evaluated the prospects of the war

from a broader and more sober viewpoint. True, the Central Committee endorsed the Red Army's advance and approved an ambiguous formula about seeking peace by means of military victory.[92] This apparently inspired Lenin to inform Stalin that "the Central Committee did not adopt any decision that alter the established policies".[93] It appears, however, that Lenin lied. The Central Committee on August 5 reversed its position at least on one crucial point: if the Polish front had since April 1920 been considered of primary importance, the Central Committee now emphatically declared the priority of the Kuban and Wrangel fronts over the Polish front and instructed the party's Organizational bureau and the Revvoensovet to adopt "the most energetic measures" to this effect.[94]

The significance of this decision can hardly be overestimated. It indicated that on August 5 the "dovish" trend prevailed in Moscow. The Bolshevik leadership gave priority to solving Russia's domestic problems in place of external expansion and export of the revolution. What impact did this change have on Bolshevik war policy? It appears that following the Central Committee plenum of August 5, peace with "bourgeois" Poland re-emerged as Moscow's chief war aim. Thus the Soviet government now declared, after a lengthy silence about Poland's future, that it recognized her independence within her ethnic frontiers and emphasized that the Red Army's advance was purely a military operation.[95] A Pravda editorial promptly endorsed this course. Pointing to the alleged delivery of the French hydroplanes to Wrangel, it stated that the Soviet government had adopted a correct line in respect to the Soviet war aims: "We accept both peace and armistice; we want only a guarantee that the

armistice will not be misused for the strengthening of the enemy, for preparations of a new march against Soviet Russia."[96] This was a legitimate claim in view of the reports to the effect that Poland intended to utilize the armistice only as a respite before the resumption of new hostilities.[97]

Although interested in peace, Moscow did not facilitate its arrival by making sensible peace proposals. This can be related to the Soviet military superiority which induced bargaining for the best terms. Besides, Lenin, still in command of Soviet foreign policy, undoubtedly endeavored to implement the resolutions of August 5 in a "hawkish" spirit. In any case, the Soviet armistice terms, outlined by Kamenev in London on August 6, included such demands unacceptable to the Poles as an immediate partial demobilization and disarmament of the Polish armies and the handing over to Soviet Russia of supplies and ammunition sent to the Poles during the war.[98] The response in London was negative; Lloyd George declared that these terms were placing Poland "absolutely at the mercy of a foreign foe whose armies were now on its soil. We cannot ask any country to do that".[99] The British Prime Minister went on to warn Kamenev of the consequences of the overrunning of Poland by Soviet troops and suggested the prompt conclusion of an armistice.[100]

Moscow nevertheless felt uneasy with the Red Army approaching Warsaw and with peace talks stalling. On August 6 Chicherin impatiently radioed the Polish government to complain about the lack of information on Polish steps towards resuming peace negotiations.[101] At this point Chicherin was obviously unaware that his Polish counterpart Sapieha had on August 5

dispatched to Moscow a note complying with the Soviet demand for joint armistice and peace talks at Minsk.[102] Since the weak Warsaw station often had difficulties in communicating with radiostations abroad, it is likely that the note was received in Moscow only in the night of August 6-7, as the Soviets claimed. Besides, unlike in the past, Chicherin now answered in four hours, at 2.24 a.m. of August 7, and suggested that the Polish delegates appeared on the front at 9 p.m. on August 9.[103] Clearly, Moscow was interested in opening peace talks before the Red Army reached the Vistula and Warsaw. At the same time, notified about the Polish readiness to accept the Soviet demand for holding joint armistice and peace talks, Moscow dared a firmer tone. Withholding details, the unhappy L. Kamenev on August 9, presented in London more specific peace terms which included the creation of a workers' militia in Poland.[104] This proved soon to be an ill-considered step running against the Soviet interest in early peace.

The West had meanwhile been alerted by the new delay in Soviet-Polish contacts. The memory of Soviet procrastinating tactics was still very fresh and the delayed reception in Moscow of the Polish note of August 5 was interpreted as a "strong evidence" of Soviet bad faith.[105] On August 9 the French and British governments sent a joint note to Warsaw which, while urging the Poles to do their best to secure an armistice, asked them to reject any Soviet terms infringing Poland's independence, particularly the demand for disarmament.[106]

In the evening of August 9, when the Soviet plenipotentiaries arrived at the suggested meeting place, no Polish delegate was present. To the

Soviet bewilderment, it turned out the next day that a part of the Polish delegation was idle in the nearby town of Sedlec.[107] The Polish Foreign Minister Sapieha subsequently made it clear to Moscow that its terms were unacceptable and that Poland would not consider any term "violating her sovereignty by interfering in her own internal affairs".[108] The Soviet-Polish talks were again delayed, this time chiefly because of the harsh Bolshevik terms. At this point, however, the diplomatic involvement of the Allies was drawing to a close, and the war operations came to the forefront of public attention.

The Battle Which Did Not Take Place

On August 6, the day after Moscow had made its crucial decision to de-escalate the war, Pilsudski and his Chief of Staff Rozwadowski drafted a new Polish ordre d'bataille which, in harmony with the "absurd strategy", envisaged a withdrawal of the best Polish troops not to Warsaw, but into the region of the River Wieprz, about 100 miles south-east of the Polish capital. There, away from the anticipated main thrust of the Red Army, Pilsudski hoped to regroup his units and start a counterattack against Tukhachevsky's left flank on August 17.[109] The defence of Warsaw was left to secondary forces.[110]

Pilsudski's plan exposing Warsaw appeared too unorthodox to the French military mission. "Weygand's view," wrote Lord d'Abernon on August 7, "is that so long as the Soviets think they have a chance of taking Warsaw there is no hope whatever of an armistice."[111] Some Poles, however, saw the fate of their capital in a different light. As Lord d'Abernon noted on August 8, there was "a body of opinion which holds that

Warsaw ought not to be defended...and the Poles should fall farther west."[112] In any case, Pilsudski put his order into effect. The bulk of the Polish troops retreated southwards after August 6 leaving the approaches to Warsaw unprotected. How did the Soviets react on this unusual situation?

By August 8 Tukhachevsky worked out and two days later formally put into effect, a new battle order which diverted the bulk of his armies not against Warsaw but to the north of it.[113] It is assumed that this order was tantamount to a somewhat peculiar directive for the final "battle of Warsaw".[114] If this were true, Tukhachevsky's maneuver would indeed have been too time-consuming and even unnecessary: Pilsudski's tactics just invited the Red Army to march straight on Warsaw. In effect, Tukhachevsky's order itself provides no basis, directly or by inference, for the assumption that Warsaw was the target of the Red Army's advance in the days to come. Tukhachevsky, pointing to the steady retreat of the Poles, gave the order "definitely to crush the enemy and, having crossed the Vistula, to throw him to the south-west."[115] As far as Warsaw was concerned, he commanded his Third Army to prevent the enemy from retreating there, and the Sixteenth Army, which was advancing directly against the Polish capital, to "cross the Vistula north of Warsaw with its main forces on August 11".[116] Tukhachevsky's order clearly implied that a conquest of the Polish capital was not the Soviet goal - a fact which later made some authors to wonder whether he had not imitated the younger Moltke who in 1914 sought first the destruction of the French armies and left Paris to a subsequent treatment.[117] Tukhachevsky's order in fact provided for what indeed took place in the following days - the Red Army's advance into northern Poland "crowned" by crossing the Vistula

far to the north-west of Warsaw.[118]

What induced Tukhachevsky to avoid the Polish capital? He later only glossed over this important question by asserting that the conquest of Warsaw was in August 1920 an "overwhelming task" ("neposilnaia zadacha").[119] This could not have been the contemporary view of the Soviet military, including Tukhachevsky himself, who were already confident on August 5 that Warsaw could be taken in ten days.[120] Their confidence could but increase with the Polish retreat after August 6, for the Red Army's numerical superiority on the Warsaw front was overwhelming. Indeed, it appears that Tukhachevsky on August 8 (10) not only did not make an "independent decision on his part", as is widely believed,[121] but that his order in essence did not mirror military considerations at all. Tukhachevsky himself in his order of August 8 (10) did not conceal this fact. Indirectly explaining the decision to avoid Warsaw, he stated that the accepted alternative was required by the "political situation".[122]

Evidently, Tukhachevsky's conduct of the war after August 5 has to be linked to the aforementioned decision of the Central Committee to give priority to the Kuban and Wrangel fronts over the Polish one. This step logically entailed not only restricted activity against the Poles,[123] but also restricted war aims. Peace, as has been seen, re-emerged after August 5 as a paramount Soviet objective, distinct from the export of revolution. To what extent these developments influenced the overall Soviet conduct of the war will be investigated in the next section. As regards the Polish capital, Moscow in normal conditions could have benefited from its conquest by the Red Army. In August 1920, however, it

appeared that a loss of Warsaw itself would not compel the Poles to sign peace, let alone to capitulate. On the other hand, a Russian presence in Warsaw was generally considered to be a prelude to the sovietization of Poland, and therefore was opposed by the Western opinion of almost any political outlook. For example, the liberal New Statesman, sympathizing with Soviet Russia, termed an eventual Soviet occupation of Warsaw a "disaster" which had to be averted by all means.[124] The impressive "Hands-off-Russia" movement in Britain was oriented against British intervention in Russia, but its members disapproved of the sovietization of Poland.[125] On August 6 Lloyd George himself emphatically warned Kamenev of the impact which a Russian entry into Warsaw would have upon France, and declared that he would "very much like the Soviet armies to be stopped before they actually entered Warsaw."[126] Under the impact of the Red Army's unhindered march on Warsaw even the central organ of the German communists, Rote Fahne, warned that "the Entente's break with Soviet Russia would bring a new general offensive of the European counterrevolution against the world revolution."[127]

Moscow relied too heavily on the support of the Western public in keeping the Western powers out of the conflict to ignore these warnings. It must have been between August 5 and August 8 that Tukhachevsky was instructed about the "political situation" and prepared his plan for bypassing Warsaw.[128] His new order of August 8 (10) obviously was not considered a definite arrangement since Tukhachevsky on August 8 twice assured Glavkom Kamenev that, if the situation required it, he would be able "at any time" to divert the bulk of his forces southwards, which meant

against Warsaw.[129] Tukhachevsky slowed down the advance apparently waiting for a signal from the politicians.

However, developments during the crucial days of August 8 to 11 accentuated the apprehension of the Bolsheviks. Of them only Zinoviev defended the idea of exporting the revolution abroad, but his belligerency seems to have been decreasing.[130] Lenin continued to follow a "hawkish" line after August 5. Thus he now urged increased efforts against Wrangel whose defeat could dispel the doubts of the "doves" and deprive them of an argument against the Polish venture. At the same time he still pressed the cause of Soviet Poland. For this reason he evidently still wished for the conquest of Warsaw.[131] As will be seen, his voice was not heard. He also waged a vendetta against such a prominent "dove" as Karl Radek whom he managed to strip of his post of Secretary of the Comintern. By the same token he welcomed and supported the provisional Polish Revolutionary Committee, in contrast to some Soviet officials who refused to cooperate with it on the grounds that the Committee created an unfavorable impression in the West.[132]

Consistent in his belief that "class consciousness" could be brought to the masses only from outside, Lenin also proposed harsh terroristic measures involving the execution of "kulaks, priests and landowners" in the rear of the enemy.[133] However, the inflammatory appeals and terroristic class measures did not stir the Polish masses and the communists in Poland did very little to support the Soviet advance.[134] After August 11 Lenin himself began to vacillate and, even though verbally he remained a "hawk", in effect he too accepted, prior to August 16, the prospect of

ending the war by a compromise.[135]

The Bolsheviks also suspected Pilsudski and the Polish government to be delaying negotiations and in fact inviting the Red Army into Warsaw in order to directly involve the Western powers in the conflict. Indeed, although Britain on August 10 advised the Poles to accept harsh Soviet terms, the French government, concerned by the delay in armistice talks and by the continuing Soviet advance, now unilaterally recognized General Wrangel. This was a very hard-hitting move from the Soviet point of view which, as Chicherin put it, "transformed the mutiny of the former general Baron Wrangel into a question of international politics".[136] In response to these developments Trotsky on August 11 wrote and submitted to Lenin and other Bolsheviks a memorandum entitled "Theses on Peace With Poland". Trotsky's exposition of Soviet war policy deserves to be quoted more extensively. Trotsky wrote:

> Despite our splendid military situation we have done everything for a speeding up of peace talks with Poland. The sequence of facts demonstrates that Poland clearly avoids a meeting with our plenipotentiaries. Evidently, it is the policy of the Polish governing circles to force us to occupy Warsaw; this, in the opinion of the British government and all those who back it, is to create conditions favorable for the military intervention of the Entente. The provocation of the Polish government is obvious. If we stopped the pursuit of the retreating Polish troops, we would deprive ourselves of the fruits of our victory. Pursuing the Poles, we are advancing into Polish territory and are forced to occupy Warsaw. In this case the Polish government, maliciously delaying the talks, will blame us for annexationist and imperialist designs in order to create the possibility of an intervention. It is perfectly clear that the Polish government would not resort to such an hazardous provocation unless it were backed by at least one major power...France is backing Poland...The goal of France is to catch in the net not only Russia but also England, and create the impression

> among public opinion that Russia was unwilling to conclude peace...But the gentlemen conduct their game too coarsely. We are unmasking them before the working masses of all the countries.[137]

Perhaps Trotsky sincerely believed in what he wrote, perhaps he slightly exaggerated to achieve a greater effect, but the gist of his arguments was plain: the Commissar of War indicated that the conquest of Warsaw was undesirable. Lenin's reaction to this document is unknown, but his faithful collaborator Chicherin likewise accused the Poles of a "policy of provocation": they "speculate that if Warsaw were taken, the Allies would be compelled to intervene".[138] On August 12 Trotsky's memorandum was reprinted in Pravda thereby providing an explanation of Tukhachevsky's conduct of war to the Russian public.[139]

Meanwhile Thukhachevsky's ordre d'bataille was definitely put into effect on August 10. Implementing the policy of "unmasking the French gentlemen", to paraphrase Trotsky, Tukhachevsky continued to push his troops through the narrow strip of the Polish territory north of Warsaw. Only later, on August 14, did the Soviet High Command find a target for the advance and ordered him to seize supplies in the Danzig corridor.[140] The same day Trotsky's melodramatical talent generated his famous order No. 233, "Heroes forward on Warsaw", which, complaining about the Polish unwillingness to open peace talks, called the Red Army to end the Polish "fooling around" and resume the advance on Warsaw.[141] It would be a mistake to attach to this declaration any other than a demonstrative meaning. To take Warsaw, the bulk of the Tukhachevsky's forces would have to be diverted southwards or, at least, the units at the Warsaw direction fully employed. As will be seen, the Soviets took neither course. While in

February 1918 Trotsky terminated the war without concluding a peace, now he declared "war" without carrying it out. His order of August 14 was a piece of psychological warfare that well fitted into the entire picture of the war after August 5.[142]

Ironically, although the conquest of Warsaw did not figure in the revised Soviet war plan of August 8 (10), the relatively small Red Army units at the Warsaw bridgehead proved quite capable of coping with the Warsaw defences. The defence system of the Polish capital was supposed to consist of two fortification lines with the outer one extending over 40 miles. As a Polish author admits, the preparatory work began at a late date and proceeded rather slowly.[143] In August 1920, the outer line was unfinished and the inner one had not yet been built. Besides, the defensive Polish forces were unproportionally distributed: while the infantry division in the relatively unexposed southern part of the fortification line covered only a 9-miles wide front, the division in the central sector, the anticipated focus of the Soviet attack, was stretched over 20 miles.[144]

This was the situation on August 12 when the Soviet Sixteenth Army reached the outer defensive line. Tactically, it now was inconceivable to leave the troops idle. Yet a concentrated attack of the entire army could have resulted in an unwanted victory.[145] Striking a compromise the army commander in early hours of August 13 ordered only one (the 21st) division and a regiment of the 27th division to start the advance in the northern sector.[146] But still, within a few hours these units had broken through the outer defence line in what was described by a French general as a "series of small attacks",[147] and by noon occupied the town Radzymin,

only fifteen miles from Warsaw. Early in the afternoon the French General Billotte, inspecting the Polish troops, reported that "the Bolsheviks will certainly be stimulated by the proximity of the capital and by the hasty retreat of the Poles which may be called a flight...On the Polish side I have not met a higher officer or a soldier who considers the battle in front of Warsaw to be the decisive confrontation."[148]

The Soviets now could have capitalized on the breakthrough as the Polish command learned about the critical situation only late in the evening and had no immediate reserves.[149] The Soviet troops in the northern sector, facing no organized resistance, nevertheless stopped their advance. In the evening of August 13 Putna, the commander of the 27th division partly involved in the attack, called his superior army commander. Putna later recalled the essence of his message: "I explained in detail the situation and conditions in which we were compelled to fight and concluded that despite our undeniable success we would not be able to cope with our tasks and, even worse, that we could not rely on the support of the workers' and peasants' masses of Poland in the following days...Therefore I suggested a withdrawal to the River Bug."[150]

Putna was not the only one who was frightened by the possibility of entering the indifferent, if not hostile, Polish capital. Feliks Dzerzhinsky, the fearless and fearful head of the Cheka who arrived from Bialystok to supervise the Warsaw operation, wrote of his impressions at the gates of the Polish capital: "Strange feelings befall me when approaching Warsaw. It is fear that Warsaw nowadays is not what it used to be, and that we may not be welcomed in such a way as we would like.

MAP 5: WARSAW FRONT, AUGUST 1920



LEGEND:

OUTER LINE OF DEFENCE

INNER LINE OF DEFENCE (UNDEFENDED)

ADVANCE OF THE REGULAR SOVIET UNITS ON AUGUST 14TH.

MAP BASED ON LUCJAN ZELIGOWSKI'S, WOJNA W ROKU 1920 (WARSAW, 1930) pp. 123, 139

Our Warsaw, terrorized and strangulated, is silent. I do not hear its clear voice".[151] Taking his lesson, Dzerzhinsky left the Warsaw vicinity and returned to Bialystok even before Pilsudski's counteroffensive started.

Meanwhile, on August 14, the Soviet command waited until the Polish reserves had reached the northern sector of the Warsaw defence and recaptured Radzymin. Then the Red Army in a new attack retook Radzymin and smashed the fortification line in approximately one third of its entire length.* A further Soviet advance, so the Polish General Sikorski has rather understated, would have put the defenders into an "extremely difficult situation".[152] Although the Soviet patrols that day reached the Warsaw suburb of Praga and the Warsaw population expected the Red Army to enter the city in any moment, the Soviet command once again did not capitalize on the breakthrough. The Polish troops in front of Warsaw were given time to consolidate their positions and permitted to re-enter Radzymin on August 15.[153] The verb "permit" properly illustrates the situation as the advancing Polish troops barely had contact with the enemy; the Red Army had retreated without fighting.[154] The Polish capital was "saved" before Pilsudski started his counterattack and, in effect, before the Warsaw defenders fired the first shot.[155]

The Soviets and Pilsudski's Counterattack

If Warsaw alone became a taboo for the Red Army after August 5, Tukhachevsky could divert his troops either southward of Warsaw where the bulk of Pilsudski's strike force could be challenged, or to the north of the Polish capital. As has been seen, he opted for the "northern"

* See the map No. 5.

route. His decision was militarily dubious since only secondary Polish forces were concentrated north of the Polish capital. Moreover, by diverting the Western front by 45 degrees from the line of march of the South-Western front Tukhachevsky consciously created a split between the two fronts.[156] Strangely enough, it was just in this split that Pilsudski had his strike force and was preparing it for counterattack. Tukhachevsky himself never satisfactorily explained his alleged miscalculation and his subsequent indifference to Pilsudski's activity in the south. Opting for the "northern" route on August 10 he argued that his aim was to destroy the bulk of the enemy's forces and that these had withdrawn north of Warsaw.[157] This would have been a remarkably naive misjudgement. If anything, Tukhachevsky knew that the Poles had consistently been holding the best of their troops in the south.[158] Later the Soviets attempted to explain this alleged misjudgement by asserting that by August 6 the Western front possessed no operational aircraft for air surveillance, but this was not true; Soviet aeroplanes were in fact flying as far as Warsaw.[159] Moreover, Tukhachevsky's reconnaissance units must have detected the Polish moves because Glavkom Kamenev, dependent on this source of information, as early as August 8 safely concluded that the enemy had retreated southwards and suggested to Tukhachevsky that two of his four armies should be diverted there so that one of them would advance towards Deblin, a town on the edge of Pilsudski's assembly base.[160] Instead Tukhachevsky that day drafted his ordre d'bataille in which he opted for the northern route.* Kamenev still had time to intervene with the party

* For this and the subsequent Soviet moves see the map No. 6.

organs or with Trotsky's deputy Skliansky, and he indeed might have done so. Nevertheless, on August 10 he gave his young subordinate a free hand in determining the direction of the main Soviet thrust.[161] His rather unusual benevolence suggests that his proposal for diverting the Red Army southwards against Pilsudski did not enjoy the support of the politicians and Trotsky in particular. Indeed, it appears that just as the decision to avoid Warsaw had been political, so likewise was Tukhachevsky's option for the northern route and his subsequent puzzling indifference to Pilsudski's preparations for counterattack in the south.

As early as August 10 Tukhachevsky noted an increased enemy activity on the approaches to Deblin.[162] He then received direct confirmation of Polish intentions: the Red Army on August 10 captured a Polish order giving the location of Pilsudski's strike force, and the direction and the approximate date of the counterattack.[163] In contrast to what he later asserted, Tukhachevsky at the time did not question the authenticity of the order. He clearly anticipated that Pilsudski would attack in the south.[164] Pilsudski's intentions were also betrayed by another order that had fallen into the hands of the Red Army by August 12.[165] Moreover, the striking numerical superiority of the Red Army north of Warsaw (almost 4 to 1) showed beyond any doubt that the bulk of the Polish forces were at another front and that the Polish counterattack in the south should be taken seriously. Tukhachevsky nevertheless continued his thrust in the north without arranging adequate measures against Pilsudski or without requesting them. The measures Tukhachevsky contemplated, as will be seen, would not have halted Pilsudski even if

Stalin had not obstructed them. Moreover, as the Commander of the South-Western front Egorov later claimed,[166] Tukhachevsky could have offset the Polish counterattack by a prompt action of his own troops. He could have mobilized against Pilsudski the southern flank of his Sixteenth Army which by August 13 was only 25 to 40 miles from Deblin. Besides, the Polish strike force itself on the River Wieprz, consisting of six divisions, was faced according to Tukhachevsky with no less than five Soviet divisions. The bulk of these forces, the so-called Mozyr group on August 11 reached the town of Kock on the right bank of the River Wieprz, in the very heart of the forthcoming Polish counterattack.[167] The group must have noticed the concentration of the Polish troops south of the river, particularly because Deblin was its next target. If ordered to do so the group could have seriously impeded the Polish attack. Nevertheless, this group not only took no offensive countermeasures but, as will be seen, in fact made Pilsudski's goal easier.

The argument that Tukhachevsky ignored the forthcoming Polish counteroffensive because of his preoccupation with the conquest of Warsaw is invalid. As has been seen, the Polish capital became a taboo for the Red Army; Tukhachevsky in fact was idle if not frustrated after August 8. Moreover, the 27-year old commander of the Western front, an ex-lieutenant of the tsarist army, was by no means an independent decision-maker, especially not in the decisive phase of the war. Following the conclusion of the second congress of the Comintern on August 7 two prominent members of the Central Committee arrived at the Western front, Khristo Rakovsky and Karl Radek. Rakovsky after November 1917 turned into a moderate

politician who opposed Soviet expansion outside Russia; Radek during the war was one of the most consistent "doves". Both were intellectually alert and curious; able to grasp the meaning of the seized Polish orders. This applies especially to Radek who was a self-taught expert on military affairs. If they had urged measures against Pilsudski, their intervention would have been effective. In effect, however, it can be surmised from the story of Tukhachevsky's order of August 15 discussed below that the "doves", supported by Tukhachevsky's political commissar Smilga,[168] until the last moment restrained the young and ambitious commander of the Western front from taking measures against Pilsudski.

Moreover, evidence of the forthcoming Polish attack was also known to other competent military men and politicians outside the Western front who were capable of making sober judgements. For example, the veracity of the seized Polish order of August 8 was questioned neither by the South-Western front, nor by Glavkom Kamenev.[169] How did they respond to these signals? The story of the Soviet C.-in-C. Kamenev is in this respect very illustrative.

As has been seen, Kamenev on August 8 attempted to win Tukhachevsky for a sweeping strike against Pilsudski's forces in the south but failed. Subsequently Kamenev made an attempt to recruit the South-Western front for this mission. On August 11 he twice asked the commander of this front, Egorov, for a joint attack of the Soviet 12th Army and Budenny's Cavalry army westwards, that is to say against Pilsudski's assembly base.[170] Such a direct move could have effectively offset the forthcoming Polish counterattack, yet Kamenev evidently was no longer sure of

MAP 6: WAR WITH POLAND, AUGUST 1920



being "in line" and put his proposal in a very tentative way. And indeed, his suggestion alarmed Egorov and his political commissar Stalin. If Trotsky was a "dove" who, to put it crudely, intended to bring the Poles to the conference table by a massive display of the Red Army in the heart of Poland but short of major confrontations, Stalin was a "ultra-dove" who lacked Trotsky's taste for effects. During the war itself he evidently favoured a limited conquest in the ethnicly mixed territories of the south which could eventually be claimed at the peace conference.[171] He considered the Soviet advance into ethnic Poland an unnecessarily risky enterprise which could escalate the war and bring the Western powers into the conflict. In his view, Soviet Russia should seek to conclude peace as soon as possible and focus on her domestic problems.

It appears that it was this cautious stand rather than jealousy of Tukhachevsky which induced Stalin and Egorov to obstruct any direct attack against Pilsudski or any transfer of their troops westwards. In Stalin's own words, such a transfer "only holds things up and inevitably means an unnecessary, harmful hitch in affairs".[172] First of all, Stalin and Egorov did not answer Kamenev's two telegrams of August 11 requesting a strike against Pilsudski's assembly base. When questioned two days later they asserted that the telegrams had been "just now received and decoded".[173] Instead Stalin and Egorov took steps which made their own troops unavailable for an attack against Pilsudski. Thus one division of the Twelfth Army was ordered on August 13 to the south-west against the River San on the grounds that this would offset the Polish counter-attack.[174] In fact, however, this move "threatened nobody", as has been

noted recently.[175] It not only left Pilsudski's strike base untouched but actually led the Soviet troops away from it and cleared the route for Pilsudski's advance northwards.

Moreover, on August 12, in the crucial phase of the war, Egorov demanded in Moscow that Budenny's cavalry be pulled out from the war against Poland and kept in reserve against Rumania. This attempt at de-escalation was favorably received in Moscow although the opinion prevailed there that Budenny should be transferred against Wrangel. The next day Lenin himself reluctantly agreed with the transfer[176] but at this moment Tukhachevsky intervened. He asked for command over Budenny's cavalry and the Twelfth Army, not for their transfer to the Western front. His request, legitimate in view of the August 5 decision of the Central Committee, was granted after a brief dispute. But Stalin and Egorov now changed tactics and on August 14 launched Budenny's cavalry against Lvov, thus making impossible its transfer to the Western front in the near future. The next day, August 15, Tukhachevsky issued the first directive to Budenny. He too did not command the formidable cavalry to the northwest against Pilsudski's strike base but some 100 miles to the north, into the region Ustilug-Vladimir Volynskyi.[177] The implementation of this order could not put Budenny into a position to halt Pilsudski but could make him available for the Western front <u>after</u> the Poles struck. However, Tukhachevsky obviously failed to win the politicians even for this precautionary move and dispatched his order without a signature of the member of the Revolutionary Military Committee, the <u>Revkom</u>. Seizing upon this detail Budenny subsequently refused to implement the order

of his military superior.[178] - a fact indicative of Tukhachevsky's limited freedom of action.

Overlooking the events of August 11-16, one cannot escape the conclusion that despite their disputes both the "ultra-dove" Stalin, and Trotsky's "doves" at the Western front, were at one in their intention not to interfere with Pilsudski's preparations for the counterattack. Kamenev's idea of directly attacking the Polish strike base on the River Wieprz was tacitly put on the shelf by both Soviet fronts. When Pilsudski attacked, Budenny and the Twelfth Army were still on the South-Western front, thereby providing a convenient alibi for the Soviet "defeat" and withdrawal.

The Soviet Commander-in-Chief Kamenev, a non-political soldier, was prevented from doing his job, that is, from seeking a military victory over Poland, but his failure was inevitable. The Soviet military policy after August 5 was subordinated to Soviet interest in peace.[179] Since the Red Army had provided the politicians with a sound bargaining position to accomplish this paramount objective, it made little sense to risk new confrontations with Poland and eventually with the Western powers.

It seems that apart from the desire for peace, the "doves" had after August 5 another sound reason to shut their eyes to the forthcoming Polish counterattack - Pilsudski himself. In the last weeks of the Bolshevik advance into Poland, Pilsudski became, at home and abroad, a target of press attacks for his conduct of the war and for his hesitation about cooperating more closely with the Entente. His authority was declining and his further political career became greatly dependent on the outcome of the war. In these conditions, in early August, the Polish side made

a surprising, although not quite unexpected move which has barely been accounted for by scholars:[180] they sent a special envoy to Riga, the place where a Soviet delegation was negotiating peace with Latvia. Designated to open a new round of secret talks was none other than Stanislaw Kossakowski, the man who had long and intimate talks with the Soviet emissary Markhlevsky in the autumn of 1919.[181] The latter was now not in Riga, but Kossakowski found there another prominent Bolshevik of Polish extraction, Hanecki. Their first meeting took place on August 2. After they assured each other of the peaceful intentions of their respective governments and of respect for the national integrity and independence of the other side, the two emissaries turned to more specific questions. Here are some relevant excerpts from a record made by the Polish emissary.[182]

> Kossakowski: You have to realize that every step of the Red Army into our country, your every attack, gives rise to new and real resistance forces. You would be mistaken ...if you think for only a moment that if you reach and occupy Warsaw, and form there a Revkom or a local Soviet, you will get peace. You will face a new wall of resistance...
>
> Hanecki: Russia...wishes for a Poland independent in the full sense of this word, independent of any influence... Yet Poland, yielding now to the influence of the Allies, continues to hurt Russia...
>
> Kossakowski: ...Do you believe that it was the Allies... who prevented us from helping Denikin last year when we could have pushed your armies by one stroke back from Kiev and prevented you from defeating Denikin? Is not just the opposite the truth? Did not the Allies censure us bitterly for evading their protection?
>
> Hanecki: You have nevertheless turned to the Allies for assistance and put your fate in their hands not realizing that they will do with you as they have done with all the tiny states which trusted them.

> Kossakowski: ...According to your words, Russia would like to see Poland independent of any influence, and yet at the same time Russia does all that is possible to drive Poland not only into the arms of the Allies but into dependence upon them! Poland wants to be entirely free and independent in every respect, and if Russia will act properly...then Russia can be sure that Poland will follow this way...If Russia can grasp this at this important and perhaps crucial moment for the future of both countries, and if she succeeds in drawing adequate and correct conclusions when presenting her conditions or when determining the further course of affairs, if Russia does not compel Poland to seek help, there will be no obstacle on the road to peace.

Hanecki was too much of an expert negotiator to deviate from the party line which still involved a total victory in the war; however, he expressed readiness to meet Kossakowski "at any time" and asked about his means of communication with Warsaw.[183] Kossakowski indeed approached the Soviets in Riga in the following days, positively on August 5 and possibly also on August 3 and 9.[184] Though the Soviet delegation had apparently been advised against sub rosa meetings and Kossakowski received rather cool treatment, it would be wrong to underestimate the impact of the Polish move. If anything, the mission demonstrated that the Poles sincerely sought a peace without Western patronage. This certainly boosted the cause of the "doves" and helped to the victory of a peace platform on August 5.[185] In turn, once the idea of peace prevailed in Moscow, the Soviets could not but be seriously interested in the leadership and political profile of the postwar Polish state. The Soviet criterion in this respect was clear. Only a few months previously Moscow had preferred the morbidly nationalist and anti-Western clique of "Reich Chancellor" Kapp to the pro-Western German socialists and liberals.[186] For this reason alone it was the punished aggressor Pilsudski, and ardent nationalist with the revolutionary past, a crusader

against the extension of Western influence in Central and Eastern Europe, who now appeared to Moscow a lesser evil than the pro-Western National Democrats who would come to power if he were to suffer a major military defeat, and who would tie Poland more closely to Britain and France. Thus a unique situation arose in which the political orientation of postwar Poland was to a large extent conditioned by the Soviet conduct of the war.

This was also the sense of the warning which the Soviets received from Pilsudski's emissary Kossakowski as early as August 2, together with his urgings to adequately revise their war policy, and to which they obviously responded in the crucial phase of the war by avoiding major confrontations with Pilsudski. That these tactics were motivated also by a concern for his fate was hinted in public by Trotsky himself. As he wrote in his memorandum of August 11, explaining the reasons for not taking Warsaw, Soviet policy towards Poland was guided by a desire for "peace on the basis of Polish sovereignty but with a real guarantee that Poland will not become a military weapon of the French plutocracy against Soviet Russia".[187] Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that Trotsky had in mind anyone else as a real guarantor of such a Poland than the stubborn and independent Polish Marshal who was then under fire for his unwillingness to cooperate closely with Britain and France.[188]

It cannot be precluded that the peculiar unity of interests between the Bolsheviks and Pilsudski was expressed even in a more intimate way, as was alleged already in August 1920. Lloyd George himself as early as August 9 labelled Pilsudski's conduct as a "real disloyalty of a treacherous character", and Millerand attributed to the Polish leader a proclivity to negotiate with the Bolsheviks in order to keep himself in

power.[189] This suspicion was so strong that the British and French governments on August 10 made their assistance to Poland conditional upon the acceptance of demands which would tie Poland closely to the Allies and which appeared humiliating to Pilsudski personally.[190] In 1948, during the only period of Poland being relatively free of censorship, a Polish author indicated in a socialist periodical that Pilsudski's adherents were indeed preparing in August 1920 for cooperation with the Bolsheviks.[191]

No matter how intimate these contacts were, it would be wrong to consider the Soviet interest in Pilsudski and in the political orientation of postwar Poland separately from the determining factor of Soviet war policy after August 5, the wish for a de-escalation of the war and for peace. Combined together, both aspects seem to have accounted for the Soviet conduct of war in the crucial days of the war culminating in Pilsudski's counterattack on August 16. The Poles themselves had not entertained any illusions about the effect of the forthcoming counterattack. Even Pilsudski's Chief of Staff, General Rozwadowski, expected the maneouvre to be of a "secondary importance for the war".[192] His view was obviously shared by Pilsudski himself. Aware of the material shortcomings of his force, totalling only 30,000, he indicated on August 12 that the war and his own fate would be decided not by the counterattack but by the Bolshevik readiness for peace.[193] Pilsudski was also afraid of the enemy, the Mozyr group which directly faced his assembly base. However, when the Marshal struck on August 16, he did not encounter any resistance. Here is how Pilsudski himself later described his counteroffensive:

> It could hardly be called attack. I spent the whole day motoring...collecting information and general impressions. I must say that by evening all divisions had covered thirty or more kilometres towards the north. The Mozyr group, however, was a mystery...no one had come in contact with it...It was before this Apocalyptic beast that several of our divisions had been retreating. It was like a dream. There was a trap somewhere. My troops continued to advance, and still there was no enemy...The 17th August came, but brought no solution to these enigmas. I spent the whole day motoring, seeking for traces of the phantom enemy, and endeavouring to discover the traps which I feared.[194]

Pilsudski's experience can be explained only in one way: the Soviet Mozyr group had retreated before his counterattack started. It is noteworthy that the Soviets behaved similarly on the entire Western front. Thus the Red Army on the Warsaw bridgehead started a premature withdrawal on August 15 and the Soviet troops north of Warsaw were by then also moving back although the enemy, the Polish Fifth Army was, in Tukhachevsky's words, "in a monstrous and almost untenable position".[195] It appears that the Russians, gathering from the captured orders the date of the Polish counterattack, resolved to precede it by a withdrawal of the Red Army on the Western front.[196]

Continuing this peculiar tactic, Moscow utilized Pilsudski's advance for a de-escalation of the war. Thus, although Tukhachevsky was informed on August 18 by the commander of the Sixteenth Army that the Polish attack "need not be taken seriously", he immediately ordered a retreat on the entire front. Disposing of twice as many troops as the enemy, Tukhachevsky nevertheless planned a withdrawal to the ethnic line Grodno-Brest Litovsk.[197] Only now began the Soviet military "collapse" which allowed Pilsudski to advance about 150 miles in a few days. In Moscow

it was Trotsky who again seized the initiative in de-escalating. On August 17 - the Soviet side allegedly not yet aware of Pilsudski's counteroffensive - Trotsky told the Moscow Soviet that "instead of being blinded by the brilliant advance of our troops on Warsaw...we have again to concentrate on the difficult task at the Wrangel front".[198] On the party line, Trotsky also proposed a reinforcement of the Kuban front by "the maximum number of effective political workers",[199] and, in a message to Lenin, he politely but firmly refused to visit the Western front on the grounds that it would not help in consolidating the Red Army's position.[200] Trotsky was again seconded by Pravda, which in two editorials of August 18 and 19 re-emphasized the Wrangel issue.[201]

Lenin now came to challenge Trotsky and the military in writing: "If the War department of Glavkom does not turn down the capture of Warsaw it must be taken (what extra measures for this? tell me)".[202] He still opposed, at least verbally, a de-escalation: "To talk about 'speeding up' the armistice now that the enemy is advancing, is an idiocy."[203] Nevertheless, on August 18 the Soviet Politbureau, as the Central Committee had done thirteen days earlier, upon hearing the reports of Trotsky and Stalin, declared the Wrangel front to be the main front. The corresponding telegrams, sent out to the party organizations, were signed by all the Politbureau members, that means also by Lenin.[204] Lenin himself soon switched back to the moderates and became the chief proponent of a peace with Poland even at the cost of Soviet concessions.[205] Beginning August 17, peace talks were held at Minsk and later at Riga. Protracted bargaining led to the preliminary peace in October 1920 and

was in March 1921 completed by the signing of a peace treaty favourable to Poland. Soviet Russia, too, entered the period of peace.

The Polish campaign was discussed at the closed session of the Tenth Party Congress in 1921. It is unlikely that the chief actors fully admitted their "defeatist" stand, but what was said "terribly upset" Lenin, who suggested that no one - by which one should understand no politician - should be blamed personally.[206] In the following years Lenin's suggestion was adhered to until the exiled Trotsky told the fragments of the story. But still, the infallibility and prestige of the party leadership was preserved and authors, in Soviet Russia and abroad, were essentially restricted, in their search for the causes of the Soviet "defeat" in August 1920 to the errors of the military.

The consequences of Lenin's gamble on a total conquest and sovietization of Poland were considerable. The Bolsheviks realized that they had neither enough material and moral resources nor a sufficient support and sympathy of the Western public to spread the revolution westwards on the point of bayonets. Lenin himself is reported to have decided after the war with Poland that the Soviets should no longer employ troops to assist the revolution abroad, but provide material and moral aid to colonies and subcolonies in their revolutionary wars.[207] Indeed, following the war with Poland the Soviet leadership stopped any attempt at expansion westwards by force and avoided any entanglement with states belonging to an alliance system. It was only in 1939-1940, when the "concert of Europe" was disrupted, that Stalin dared a new conquest to Europe.

As for Lenin personally, the war with Poland brought about the erosion of his authority. The turning point was obviously the Central Committee plenum of August 5, which disapproved of his "hawkish" course. Subsequently, Lenin appears to have been losing his usual tenacity and his undisputed command of Soviet politics. His intervention in the realm of foreign affairs became less frequent and gave way in 1921 to "collective deliberations".[208] After the autumn of 1920 Lenin was also kept unaware of some policy decisions.[209] Sidetracked in the Bolshevik leadership, he became increasingly critical of the communist party and the Soviet bureaucracy, taking the position of an outside observer. Simultaneously his physical health began to deteriorate. In May 1922 he suffered the first of his strokes which ultimately took his life on January 21, 1924.

CONCLUSION

When this author in 1972 asked the British journalist Philips Price, an eyewitness and sympathizer with the Bolshevik revolution, whether Lenin and his colleagues in 1918 expected world revolution, he received this answer: "Young man, we did not expect it, we wished for it". This subtle distinction is symptomatic of the position which world revolution occupied in the thought of Lenin and other Bolsheviks. As did many of his socialist contemporaries, Lenin between 1907 and 1917 arrived at the conclusion that world revolution as a chain reaction process originating in and quickly embracing all major industrial countries was most unlikely. In his view world revolution, if it were to materialize, would take the form of a prolonged and violent struggle of the oppressed and have-not nations against the major capitalist countries of the West. Concurrently Lenin made his boldest and epoch-making intellectual innovation by taking the position that the Russian proletariat, should it seize power in the bourgeois revolution, would be able to retain and consolidate it without the accomplished socialist revolution in the West. His conclusion apparently rested on such premises as the political inertia of the Russian peasantry, displayed during and after the 1905 revolution; the remarkable growth of the Russian economy between 1905 and 1914 which made the country less dependent on other powers and more suitable for Lenin's centralized management; a solidarity of democratic and socialist forces in the West with revolutionary Russia, as well as on the belief that the revolutionary government could establish trade and economic relations with contemporary capitalism.

Lenin's idea of the Russian revolution was molded by the necessity of accommodation with the existing social and political forces in Russia and abroad. Consequently, his program prior to November 1917 was conspicuous for the absence of profound changes in Russia's class structure and economy. He did not advocate an immediate collectivization of agriculture, the nationalization of industries, or the abolition of classes. His methods and goals were more technocratic than ideological, involving the modernization of Russia and the elevation of her economy to the Western standard in a state capitalist way. Since there was no plausible term for this unprecedented idea of implementing the bourgeois democratic revolution by the proletariat, Lenin began to call it the socialist revolution and its final stage socialism. Thus, retaining Marxist vocabulary, Lenin by 1917 gave to socialist revolution the meaning of a revolution in a developing country and to socialism the characteristics of a bourgeois state without the traditional bourgeoisie.

Obviously inspired by the distinction that Marx had made between two stages of socialist society, Lenin now circumscribed the orthodox concept of classless socialism by such terms as "communism", the "higher stage" or a "final victory" of socialism. Being consistently skeptical of the revolutionary potential in the West, Lenin assumed that this stage could not be reached spontaneously. In his view war was necessary for smashing the foundations of the old system in the West. He envisaged that revolutionary Russia, having reached economic maturity, and supported by the oppressed Eastern nations and the Western proletariat, would gradually spread the revolution on the points of bayonets. Only after the Soviet

camp had helped the proletariat to victory in major industrial countries, would the world advance towards the classless and pacifist society free of oppression, communism.

Lenin had evolved and partly expounded his program by 1915, while expecting a new revolution in Russia as a result of her military defeats. It was also in 1915 that Lenin resolved to exploit in the next Russian revolution, chiefly for tactical and propaganda purposes, a call for the "second", socialist revolution in Russia along with the slogan of an incipient world revolution. Consequently, when the new revolution arrived in March 1917, he launched these "secret weapons", thereby creating the impression of his conversion to the doctrine of "permanent revolution". In fact, however, he remained just as skeptical of socialist revolution in the West as before and retained a realistic program of building state capitalism, or socialism, in Russia alone.

Lenin was a Bismarckian not only in cultivating the art of the possible but also in his perception of the world. Despite his power of observation he failed to grasp the growing role of the United States on the world scene; his picture of the world remained restricted essentially to Europe and his concept of foreign policy to the conventional European balance of power. In this mini-world Germany played a fairly dominant role in terms of manpower, economy, and military strength. Building on this fact, and anticipating Germany's major victories in the war, Lenin by 1915 resolved that after coming to power he would seek peace with the Central powers. This step constituted a starting point of his revolution, paving the road to cooperation and friendship with bourgeois but "real"

Germany, a country which in his thought replaced the ideal but unreal world community of socialism. It was, as Lenin believed, a passing prospect of separate peace with Germany which late in September 1917 prompted him to cross the Rubicon and insist on the armed uprising and seizure of power by the Bolshevik party alone.

It proved in the initial stage of Bolshevik rule that the reality was more complex and manifold than Lenin's schemes had accounted for. It was above all the separate peace with the Central powers and his Brest policies, stemming also from his underestimation of the Allied war capacities and of the anti-German sentiments of the Russian population, which brought about the civil war and intervention in the summer of 1918. Lenin, unprepared for such a contingency, was forced to improvise or to accept radical policies advocated by his Left opponents. The result was war communism - a very un-Leninist part of the Bolshevik revolution.

A typical aspect of this phase was the propaganda of world revolution, revived by the Bolsheviks and Lenin in particular upon the outbreak of the civil war in June 1918. An analysis confirms that Bolshevik prophecies of world revolution were inversely proportional to the domestic situation of Soviet Russia, not to the situation in the West. Thus Lenin and his colleagues in apparently conscious efforts increased the scope and intensity of "world revolution" in their propaganda whenever the Soviet position worsened; by the same token they were ready to drop the issue in better times or when it was expedient for tactical reasons. Contrary to what some scholars assume, propaganda of world revolution did not mirror the Bolsheviks' real perception of the West. World revolution constituted

almost the only source of inspiration and encouragement for the Russian population and the Bolsheviks themselves in the hardest time of the civil war, but Lenin's leadership itself considered it an illusion. For Lenin personally world revolution during the postwar years remained as it was during the Brest crisis, namely nothing more than a "very beautiful fairy-tale".* Revived in the Bolshevik propaganda with the outbreak of the civil war, "world revolution" lost its appeal and apocalyptic connotation with the decisive Soviet victories over the counterrevolution in 1919 and 1920.

The civil war and intervention reduced to a minimum the Bolshevik reserve in the realm of foreign relations. Throughout 1918 and 1919 Lenin's government was pursuing a day-to-day foreign policy with barely any overall aim except the survival of the Soviet regime. Lenin himself, caught off guard in the summer of 1918, often came to overestimate the sagacity and determination of the enemy** and over-reacted to them. This applies especially to the threat of a major Western intervention in Russia. While hailing in public an imminent world revolution in the autumn of 1918 Lenin and his colleagues endeavored to postpone and prevent the German defeat and thereby revolutions in the Central powers' bloc. They operated on the assumption that only a prolongation of the world war would postpone or offset a major anti-Bolshevik intervention. In these efforts the Soviet Ambassador Ioffe may even have supplied the Kaiser's authorities with information on the preparations for revolution in Berlin.

* LCW, vol. 27, 102.

** Trotsky in Lenin, 94, pointed out this reversed side of Lenin's aggressiveness in connection with the July 1917 accusations against the Bolsheviks.

It was not the deliberate efforts of the Bolsheviks and their German sympathizers but the German defeats and the pressure of President Wilson in particular that set in motion the German revolution of November 1918.

With the birth of the German republic the Bolsheviks first tried to win the ruling socialists, branded previously as "social-traitors" and "social-patriots", for an alliance and cooperation against the Western powers. Having failed in this, Moscow in November 1918 resorted to tactics of revolutionizing and diversional maneuvers in the defeated countries, especially in Germany. It was in this phase that the Bolsheviks partly restored their image of crusaders for world revolution. Yet, rather than expecting their inflammatory appeals to promote proletarian governments in the defeated countries, the Bolsheviks hoped that new domestic crises there would prompt the Western powers to an intervention - a development which could offset or postpone a similar intervention in Russia. Indeed, Bukharin in one of his articles made a valid point when asserting that the problem of military security constituted the revolving point of Lenin's foreign policy.*

That Soviet security and interests determined Lenin's foreign policy irrespective of the interests and possibilities of the revolutionary forces in the West became blatantly obvious in 1919 and 1920. In the aftermath of the Soviet summons for help and Radek's activity in Germany, an uprising broke out in Berlin in January 1919, to be lent a tragic

* Bukharin, Put' k sotsializmu v Rossii, 405.

dimension by a betrayal, obviously by someone close to them, of the two Spartacist leaders, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, and by their assassination on January 15, 1919. The abortive uprising nevertheless opened a period of widespread social and political unrest in the defeated countries. The Bolsheviks, however, lacked courage to capitalize on this explosive situation. As soon as the danger of an immediate major intervention had subsided in late December 1918 they ceased their desperate tactics of revolutionizing and, hoping that moderation would accelerate the demobilization of Allied armies and end the intervention in Russia, they began to caution the communists in the defeated countries against bids for power and revolutions.

Revolutionary abstentionism became in the first half of 1919 an uneasy policy. The anti-Western connotation of the previous Bolshevik propaganda found a fertile soil in the defeated countries, now confronted with humiliating peace treaties. It was out of desperation and resentment of the Western powers rather than on account of sympathy for the Bolsheviks that the public in the defeated countries came to play with the idea of alliance with Soviet Russia. Yet, in harmony with the Bolshevik tactic the communists of these countries did their best to lower their revolutionary profile throughout the crises over peace treaties. Paradoxically, this is true also for Béla Kun in Hungary who, having failed to de-escalate, formed a soviet government when confronted with the unwanted prospect of being brought to power in defiance of the Social Democrats.

Kun's takeover initially caused the Bolshevik leadership to fear its possible repercussions for Soviet security. After this fear proved largely unsubstantiated Moscow under the cloak of internationalism endeavoured to

impose upon Kun its policy of keeping Hungary away from military conflicts with her neighbours but also short of real peace. Above all, however, Lenin's government avoided any moral, political, or military commitment vis-à-vis Soviet Hungary. The Bolshevik unwillingness to render any military assistance to Kun induced him in May 1919 to pursue independent policies and caused not only frictions between Budapest and Moscow but also prompted the break-up of the Soviet coalition in Hungary.

The Hungarian experiment found a vivid echo in Germany, to the discomfort of the KPD which, like Béla Kun, was following the course of revolutionary abstentionism. On April 7, 1919, a group of anarcho-communists, inspired by Béla Kun, proclaimed a Soviet republic in the Bavarian capital Munich only to learn that the KPD denounced their action. The KPD leadership also disapproved of the second Soviet republic in Munich, organized by the local and Russian-born communists. Although the Munich communists took power in a breach of party discipline and most likely without any understanding with Moscow, their foremost but undeclared aim was to divert German volunteer troops from the East to Bavaria. The KPD continued to pursue the policy of revolutionary abstentionism during the crucial weeks of May and June 1919, when the crisis over the Versailles Treaty threatened to disrupt the fragile foundations of the German republic. Determined to avoid a repetition of the Hungarian takeover, the German communists now curbed their public activity as much as possible. Indeed, there hardly was another party in contemporary history which feared the prospect of coming to power as much as did the KPD in the spring of 1919.

In addition to the defeated countries, the victorious powers, especially Italy and France, in the spring of 1919 plunged into deep domestic crises. However, there is no evidence of Lenin or any Bolshevik leader giving their sympathizers a signal for a political offensive. As soon as the prospect of coexistence re-emerged for Soviet Russia in the autumn of 1919, Lenin explicitly warned the French and Italian sympathizers against bids for power. It was no accident that the pro-communist forces in these countries pursued radical but non-revolutionary policies, being among the first in the height of crises to apply brakes and cool the atmosphere.

Never in Lenin's lifetime was the situation in the West so fluid as in 1919 and 1920, when the foundations of the postwar world were being laid. Although world revolution in the traditional sense was not feasible, the accelerated political developments and increased social mobility in the West opened new avenues for social and political change. Lenin himself was at least partly aware of the postwar trends in the West, but proved unable or unwilling to draw adequate conclusions. Given his healthy pessimism regarding world revolution or just because of it, Lenin could and should have lent his considerable authority to and channel his followers towards social and democratic transformations in the West. Had he done so, Europe might have gone a different road than it actually took and Soviet Russia herself would have benefited from such changes.

Yet Lenin was unable to abandon his mechanistic concept of social change brought about by a sudden and total replacement of the ruling elite. Seeing no immediate opportunity for such a change in the West, he remained a rigid doctrinaire, leading international communism in terms of its self-realization into an agonizing sterility. In his Russo-centrism Lenin

directed communism in the West first towards a struggle against intervention in Russia and later, after the counterrevolution had been decisively defeated, he came systematically to organize international communism as a force assisting Soviet Russia's search for a modus vivendi with the capitalist world. It was during Lenin's lifetime and under his influence that international communism became essentially a revolutionizing but not revolution-making movement.

At the same time Lenin in his profound disbelief in spontaneity continued to regard revolutionary war as the most efficient, if not the only form of the revolution in the West. Consequently, when the tide of war turned in favour of Soviet Russia and against Poland in the summer of 1920, and the Western powers seemed unable effectively to help the latter, Lenin attempted to put into effect the idea of exporting revolution on the points of bayonets. As much as he had previously curbed any spontaneous revolutionary action abroad, he now urged an energetic thrust of the Red Army into ethnic Poland and against Warsaw hoping that this would lead to the proclamation of a Polish Soviet republic. In the beginning he was lukewarmly supported by the Bolshevik leadership. In early August 1920, however, opposition to his risky cause arose in the Central Committee, apparently prompted also by a new round of secret negotiations between Polish and Soviet emissaries in Riga, the capital of neutral Latvia. These hitherto barely known talks must have mitigated the suspicion and misunderstanding between two belligerents. On August 5 the Bolshevik Central Committee resolved to restrict Russia's war efforts against Poland. Implementing this line, the "doves" led by Trotsky refrained from capturing the Polish capital Warsaw; it appears likely that they also deliberately

ignored Pilsudski's preparations for a counteroffensive in order to save his political career and get the welcome opportunity to de-escalate the war before the Western powers could directly intervene.

The failure of the Polish campaign confirmed to Lenin that the export of revolution by conquest was not feasible before material preconditions for it existed in Russia. Nevertheless the Bolsheviks switched in 1920 to a more risky course. This shift may have been a temporary response to the cessation of the civil war and Western intervention in Russia. Thus the former opponent of adventurism Karl Radek concluded that after the "danger of putschism" had been overcome, the Comintern should steer a bolder course; the ECCI held a similar view. In March 1921 the proponents of this so called "offensive theory" staged an uprising in Germany, the primary purpose of which, as Lenin himself admitted, was to divert attention from Russia's domestic crisis, culminating in the Kronstadt revolt.*

Lenin at that time responded to the crisis by introducing the New Economic Policy, a series of measures involving the restoration of trade and economic incentives, private initiative, and concessions to Russian and foreign capitalists. It is noteworthy that these measures of state capitalism, generally interpreted as a sign of Lenin's inability to visualize world revolution, were being contemplated or introduced also prior to the summer of 1918, only to be discontinued by the civil war. Despite Lenin's return to his original ideas, there could be no return to 1917 for the Russian society. Civil war had accentuated some latent aspects of

* See Lenin's letter of April 16, 1921, to Clara Zetkin, LPSS, vol. 52, 149. Angress, 105ff., and other authors build on a somewhat simplistic assumption that any communist uprising or revolutionary effort involved a bid for power. For a more differentiated view see Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 470ff. An analysis of the March 1921 action falls beyond the scope of this study.

Leninism and changed the Soviet system. Totalitarian tendencies had increased, personal liberties were curtailed, political opposition totally liquidated, and the political violence again became a part of Russian life. Lenin and the Bolsheviks had tasted absolute power and came to enjoy it.

In the early 1960's D.F. Fleming came out with a then provocative thesis about the origins of the cold war. In his view, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were interested in peace and reconstruction of Russia more than in promoting the revolution in the West; it was the Western powers which were on the offensive and thereby became indirectly responsible for the cold war and the undemocratic trends of the Soviet political system.* The first half of this thesis appears impeccable; the thrust of evidence suggests that Lenin's government indeed meant seriously its repeatedly stated willingness to stop propaganda in exchange for the cessation of intervention and trade relations. It is very likely that Bolshevism would have been better contained both geographically and intellectually by negotiating with Lenin. At the same time, however, the Bolsheviks too were partly responsible for the sorry state of Soviet foreign affairs in the decades to come, and not only because of Lenin's aforementioned miscalculation of the war. The world in 1918 was not accustomed to the radical vocabulary of Russia's new rulers. Their prophecies of the forthcoming communist millenium, however crude and trivial, prompted the rise of the "Red Scare" in Europe and North America. Paradoxically, however, at this very time Lenin's followers in such countries as

* Denna F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, (Garden City, N.Y., 1961), p. 31f.

Hungary or Austria were taking refuge in prisons to avoid power and Moscow was frightened by such revolutionary events as the Berlin uprising of January 1919 or Béla Kun's ascendancy to power almost as much as the Western public. This absurdity might suggest that the root of the East-West schism sprang from a misunderstanding. This is only partly true. There is scattered evidence that both sides, perhaps subconsciously, anticipated Russia's growing role in the world and that the incipient power political rivalry marked their mutual attitudes. Besides, while it was Lenin and his colleagues who first started to manufacture the illusion of world revolution, the bogey of communism was subsequently nurtured and cultivated for various reasons by the Western press and politicians. The use of the "Bolshevik danger" by the Germans to gain better peace terms is illustrative in this respect, although the "Red Scare" seems to have served especially as a pretext for curbing domestic unrest and radicalism. Indeed, the Bolsheviks were after 1918 expected to remain the prophets of the communist millenium, and they continued to play this role, although not quite without reservations. Particularly Lenin from 1919 on endeavoured to cut down propaganda of world revolution, but he too shocked even such a notorious non-communist as H.G. Wells with a question about the date of the coming revolution in Europe. If anything, world revolution still constituted a raison d'être of international communism - a fact which Lenin could not overlook. It was only after his death, during the struggle for succession, that Stalin brushed aside the beautiful dream of the communist millenium to reinaugurate Lenin's doctrine of "socialism in one country" and transform international communism into a subservient tool of the Soviet state.

FOOTNOTES

1. See for example Alec Nove in L. B. Schapiro and Peter Reddaway, eds., Lenin; the Man, the Theorist, the Leader; a Reappraisal, (New York, 1967), 203f.; and Daniel Bell in The End of Ideology, (New York, 1962), 347f. Lenin himself was partly responsible for this impression by his casual remark defining his position in November 1917 by Napoleon's famous "On s'engage et puis on voit". See Louis Fischer, The Life of Lenin, (New York, 1964), (hereafter quoted as Fischer, Lenin), p44.

2. LCW, vol. 9, 176f.

3. For recent accounts of the formative years of Lenin's intellectual life see Richard Pipes, "The Origins of Bolshevism: The Intellectual Evolution of Young Lenin", in Richard Pipes, ed., Revolutionary Russia, (Garden City, N.Y., 1969); and Nikolai V. Volskii [Valentinov], The Early Years of Lenin, (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1969). For standard comprehensive studies of Lenin and his age see esp. Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution, (New York, 1948); Fischer, Lenin; and Adam B. Ulam, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, (London, 1966).

4. Leon Trotsky, Lenin, (New York, 1925), 90, Cf. Fischer, Lenin, 419. For a superb short essay on Lenin's personality by his socialist contemporary see Victor Chernov, "Lenin" in Philip E. Mosely, ed., The Soviet Union 1922-1962. A Foreign Affairs Reader, (New York, 1963), pp. 26-32. For an equally brilliant characterization of Lenin by Maxim Gorky see Thomas B. Wolfe, The Bridge and the Abyss. The Troubled Friendship of Maxim Gorky and V. I. Lenin, (New York, 1967), esp. p. 69.

5. "What Is To Be Done", in LCW, vol. 5. It is believed that Lenin was inspired to this revision by his Russian precursors, especially Tkachev. Yet, there is good reason to assume that Lenin was more influenced by the first pioneer works expounding the theory of elites such as Vilfredo Pareto's Cours d'economie politique, (1897) and Gaetano Mosca's Elementi di scienza politica, (1895). If anything, Lenin knew a special study on this topic of a Polish socialist Machajski, The Evolution of Social Democracy, (1899), which by 1900 became a subject of lively disputes among the East European socialists. (Bell, op. cit., 355f.) There was only a step from Mosca's idea of history as a sequence of elites towering by their material, moral and intellectual qualities over the majority to Lenin's concept of the elitist party as a vanguard of the new social order.

6. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence. The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67, (New York, 1968), 69n. Cf. Fischer, Lenin, 348.

7. See Arnold Reisberg, "Lenin's Beziehungen zum deutschen Geistesleben" in Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, 1970, No. 4, 547-562.

8. Lenin drew from Hobson in his Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.

9. See Nadezhda K. Krupskaia, Memories of Lenin, vol. I (New York, 1930), 72f. Lenin recalled later his frustrating experience in London to an English journalist. See Arthur Ransome, Russia in 1919 (New York, 1919), (hereafter quoted as Ransome), p. 227. There was something personal in Lenin's hatred of Britain which exceeded that of the "imperialists". For example, Lenin scornfully branded the British prisoners of war in Germany as "rogues" (svoloch) corrupted by imperialism. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th edition, (Moscow, 1967), (hereafter quoted as LPSS), vol. 49, 378.

10. See below note 19. For Lenin's attitude towards France see Robert Wohl, French Communism in the Making 1914-1924, (Stanford, Cal., 1966), (hereafter quoted as Wohl), pp. 169ff.

11. LCW, vol. 22, 283f.

12. For a comprehensive account on the "permanent revolution" see most conveniently Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, Trotsky: 1879-1921, (London, 1954), (hereafter quoted as Deutscher, The Prophet Armed), pp. 149-163. Trotsky's famous pamphlet expounding this doctrine, Itogi i perspektivy, (1906) was published in English in an abbreviated version in Our Revolution, (New York, 1918), 69-146.

13. Donald W. Treadgold, Lenin and His Rivals. The Struggle for Russia's Future, 1898-1906, (New York, 1955), 166f., and 264.

14. LCW, vol. 10, 92.

15. Trotsky, Our Revolution, 143.

16. For a harsh criticism of Western socialism after the Stuttgart congress see A.N., Sotsial-demokratia na Stuttgartskom kongresse i konferentsiia v Khristianii, (1908). Young Alexadra Kollontai provoked a stormy reaction by her book Labour in Europe (1912) in which she attacked the German socialists for their opportunism. For Trotsky's unfavorable impressions of the West European socialists see My Life, (New York, 1970), 206-212, and passim.

17. For materials relating to the Stuttgart congress see Olga Hess Gankin and H. H. Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the World War. The Origin of the Third International, (Stanford, Cal., 1940), (hereafter quoted as Gankin and Fisher), pp. 50-66. For recent summaries of the congress dealings see James Joll, The Second International 1889-1914, (New York, 1966), 133-139; and Georges Haupt, Socialism and the Great War; The Collapse of the Second International, (Oxford, 1972), 20-22.

18. Haupt, op.cit., 22.

19. LCW, vol. 13, 77.

20. Ibid., vol. 19, esp. pp. 99f.

21. This fact was promptly recognized by such prominent social scientists as Max Weber and Robert Michels.

22. Lenin's distinction between the 'labour aristocracy' and the rank-and-file was tactical in nature; it explained but did not cure the impotency of the Western labour movement as a whole. Cf. E.J. Habsbawm, Revolutionaries, (London, 1973), 128.

23. LCW, vol. 21, 256. For Lenin's more comprehensive critique of Western socialism see especially "The Collapse of the Second International", ibid., 205-259; "Socialism and War", ibid., 295-338; "Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International", ibid., 438-453; "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", vol. 22, esp. pp. 276ff.

24. For the Bolsheviks' sober evaluation of these conferences see LCW, vol. 21, 389-393; and especially Grigorii E. Zinoviev, Sochineniia, V, (Petrograd, 1925), 218-225, 250-256, and 257-273. For materials in English on tactics and dissensions of the Zimmerwald Left see Gankin and Fischer, 479-581.

25. LCW, vol. 21, 276f.

26. Ibid., 419.

27. Ibid., vol. 22, 210.

28. Lenin defended himself in this way in 1917 against accusations of ignoring the reality in Russia and the West, Ibid., vol. 24, 46.

29. David Shub, Lenin: A Biography, (Penguin Books, 1966), 159. Lenin called Trotsky's slogan of peace a "pious attitude".

30. LCW, vol. 8, 563. Also vol. 10, 151-153. Lenin's call for the abolition of army in the 1917 revolution was merely a tactical device, designed to accelerate the destruction of the old state apparatus and the arrival of peace.

31. Ibid., vol. 8, esp. pp. 369, 373f., vol. 9, 179-187.

32. Trotsky, My Life, 222.

33. LCW, vol. 15, 202-209.

34. Ibid., vol. 16, 302.

35. LCW, vol. 12, 361 and 375ff.

36. "A great European war," argued August Bebel, "would further our course more than a decade of agitation...Nevertheless, we do not desire such a frightful way of attaining our goal." Quoted in Merle Fainsod, International Socialism and the World War (Garden City, N.Y., 1969), (hereafter quoted as Fainsod), p. 28. See also Karl Kautsky, The Social Revolution, (Chicago, 1902), 97.

37. The resolution is reprinted in Gankin and Fisher, 59.

38. Internationaler Sozialisten - Kongress zu Stuttgart, (n.p., 1907), 82.

39. LCW, vol. 13, 80 and 91.

40. For Martov's appraisal of war see Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution, (New York, 1948), 588; for Lenin's view see Isaac Deutscher, Stalin, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1966), 104.

41. Leninskii sbornik, (hereafter quoted as LSb), vol. 1, 131.

42. LCW, vol. 21, 18.

43. For defeatism in Russian politics see S. V. Tiutiukin, "Leninskii lozung porazhenia 'svoego' pravitel'stva v imperialisticheskoi voine", Istoricheskie zapiski, vol. 81, (1968), (hereafter quoted as Tiutiukin), p. 103.

44. Leon Trotsky, Der Krieg und die Internationale, (Munich, 1919), 29f., Gankin and Fisher, 170. Also Shub, Lenin, 133f. The moderate socialists mostly sympathized with the Allies.

45. Shub, Lenin, 135f.

46. See Karpinsky's letter to Lenin of September 27, 1914, in LSb, vol. 11, 255-257. Also Gankin and Fisher, 146-149.

47. The oppositional platforms are reprinted in Gankin and Fisher, 187-191.

48. LCW, vol. 21, 163. Tiutiukin, 123, has also concluded that Lenin gave defeatism an international connotation chiefly for tactical reasons.

49. LCW, vol. 21, 276f.

50. Ibid., vol. 23, 330. For a documentary survey of Lenin's appraisal of the war see esp. Walter Grottian, Lenins Anleitung zum Handeln, (Cologne, 1962), (hereafter quoted as Grottian), pp. 30-32.

51. Quoted in Helmut König, Lenin und der italienische Sozialismus, 1915-1921, (Tübingen, 1967), (hereafter quoted as König), p. 17.

52. Tiutiukin, 127. Manuilsky in 1916 charged Bolshevism with "national narrowmindedness and angular crudity". Deutscher, The Prophet Armed,

234. Martov admitted that Russia's defeat would facilitate the Russian revolution but as he could not imagine a socialist revolution in the West, he did not wish to work only for the Russian revolution. Tiutiukin, 127.

53. The view of the French economist Edmund Thierry quoted in Robert H. McNeal, ed., Russia in Transition 1905-1914, (New York, 1970), 97.

54. See esp. "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", LCW, vol. 22.

55. See especially chapter III, section 1.

56. For this problem see most conveniently Arthur Mendel, "On Interpreting the Fate of Imperial Russia" in Theofanis G. Stavrou, ed., Russia Under the Last Tsar, (Minneapolis, Minn., 1969), 13-41.

57. Trotsky, My Life, 222. As Trotsky later recalled his position prior to 1917, it was "only the depth of the agrarian problem" that opened "the immediate prospect of a dictatorship in Russia". Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, vol. III, (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1957), 420.

58. See esp. his speech at the Stockholm Conference of Russian Social Democracy in April 1906, LCW, vol. 10, 279ff.

59. See "The Agrarian Program of the Social Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907", LCW, vol. 13, esp. pp.327f. Cf. L.B. Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, (London, 1960), p. 80.

60. LCW, vol. 15, 56f.

61. LCW, vol. 26, 20.

62. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 355.

63. See A.J. Ryder, The German Revolution of 1918. A Study of German Socialism in War and Revolt, (Cambridge, England, 1967) (hereafter quoted as Ryder), p. 15.

64. See for example LCW, vol. 23, 119.

65. See "Several Theses", LCW, vol. 21, 404. In another article Lenin concluded from the Western response to the 1905 revolution that proletarian Russia could count on cooperation and aid of Central European workers' movement. Ibid., 277. Similarly in the "Decree on Peace" of Nov. 8, 1917, the Bolsheviks expected the assistance of the Western proletariat in making peace, not the revolution. Ibid., vol. 26, 252.

66. LCW, vol. 22, 273ff. Cf. Ia. G. Temkin, Bernskaia konferentsiia zagranichnykh sektsii RSDRP (1915g.), (Moscow, 1961), 70ff.

67. LCW, vol. 21, 18. For Kautsky's view see especially his pamphlet Die Vereinigte Staaten Mitteleuropas, (Stuttgart, 1916).

68. See for example Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, 236ff.

69. Lenin in 1915 restated this view in "Several Theses", LCW, vol. 21, 402 Cf., ibid., 419.

70. For a similar conclusion of a contemporary Soviet scholar see Mikhail Trush, Lenin und die Aussenpolitik der UdSSR, (Frankfort/Main, 1970), (hereafter quoted as Trush), p. 14.

71 Gankin and Fisher, 219.

72. Ibid., 188. This author's emphasis.

73. In an attempt to modify the skeptical connotation of Lenin's concept, Inessa Armand, for instance, suggested that it was presented as a "possible stage in the advance toward a socialist revolution". Ibid., 178.

74. LCW, vol. 21, 158. Cf. recollections of the participants of the Bern conference, "Bernskaia konferentsiia 1915g.", Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, No. 5, (1925), esp. pp. 179-193.

75. "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe", LCW, vol. 21, 339-343.

76. In Lenin's Aesopian language it would imply "an organization of reaction to retard America's more rapid development". This could be applied to Russia as well. Ibid., 342.

77. Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, No. 5, 1925, p. 188. Shklovsky has not revealed the true motivation of Lenin's decision.

78. Pavel N. Miliukov, Bolshevism, (London, 1920), 68.

79. These articles included "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe", "The Defeat of Russia and the Revolutionary Crisis", "On the Two Lines in the Revolution", "Several Theses", and "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination".

80. Grigorii Zinoviev, Leninizm, (Moscow-Leningrad, 1925), 90.

81. LCW, vol. 21, 403. Cf. ibid., 380f.

82. Ibid., 401f.

83. Arthur Rosenberg, A History of Bolshevism, (London, 1934), 56.

84. LCW, vol. 27, 110. For the role of the right of nations to self-determination in Lenin's program see Alfred D. Low, Lenin on the Question of Nationality, (New York, 1958).

85. See also D. Boersner, The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Questions (1917-1928), (Geneva and Paris, 1957), 48. Cf. the somewhat inaccurate comment in Stanley Page, Lenin and World Revolution, (New York, 1959), (hereafter quoted as Page), p. 43.

86. LCW, vol. 21, 402.

87. Robert V. Daniels, "The Left Communists", Problems of Communism, vol. XVI, No. 6, (Nov.-Dec. 1967), 67; also Rosenberg, A History of Bolshevism, 63.

88. This point has not been made in a recent review of the controversy - see Stephen F. Cohen, "Bukharin, Lenin and the Theoretical Foundations of Bolshevism", Soviet Studies, vol. XXI, No. 4 (April, 1970), 436-457. The author's biography of Bukharin, published in 1973, could not be used for this study.

89. LCW, vol. 23, 24. The material relating to the controversy can be most conveniently consulted in Gankin and Fisher, 218-250.

90. For the dispute see the above mentioned article of Stephen F. Cohen in Soviet Studies, and Sidney Heitman, "Between Lenin and Stalin: Nikolai Bukharin", in Leopold Labedz, ed., Revisionism, (London, 1962).

91. For the group's platform see Gankin and Fisher, 219-221.

92. "A Caricature of Marxism", LCW, vol. 23, esp. pp. 44 and 52.

93. Ibid., vol. 22, 311.

94. It was especially Bukharin who in 1915 and 1916 disapproved and obstructed the Bolshevik cooperation with the German agents in Scandinavia in revolutionizing Russia. It appears that this, more than the theoretical dispute, poisoned the relations of the two Bolsheviks. For instance Krupskaia, summing up the causes of the Lenin-Bukharin controversy, stressed Bukharin's "insincerity" and related it to his apparent unwillingness to help Lenin in establishing closer contacts with Russia, (LPSS, vol. 49, 541n.). Lenin himself, complaining that Bukharin and his friends were "incapable of doing the transport work", labelled them "mean and harmful people". (Ibid., vol. 44, 227.) In this atmosphere Bukharin and his friends were arrested on a banal pretext by the Swedish police and later expelled from the country. As it was clear that they had been betrayed by someone familiar with their activity, Bukharin began to investigate the circumstances and concluded that the central figure in their arrest was Keskuela, an intermediary mediating between Lenin and the Germans. For Bukharin's investigation see Michael Futrell, Northern Underground, (London, 1963), 119ff. (hereafter quoted as Futrell)

95. LCW, vol. 21, 339f.: "The socialist revolution...should not be regarded as a single act, but as a period of turbulent political and economic upheavals, the most intense class struggle, civil war, revolutions, and counterrevolutions."

96. Engels' preface to Marx's Class Conflicts in France in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke, vol. 22 (Berlin, 1963), 509-527. Engels suggested to the German socialists electoral tactics.

97. The present author is aware of the danger of oversimplifying especially since this important issue has never been given due attention. It is noteworthy, for example, that Karl Kautsky himself envisioned no other road to power than by "rendering the military itself faithless to the rulers...We have just as little to expect from a financial crisis as from an armed uprising in producing a collapse of existing conditions". The Social Revolution, 88. For the best discussion of the intellectual ferment in the socialist movement around the turn of the century see George Lichtheim, Marxism. An historical and critical study, (London, 1961), 278ff.

98. LCW, vol. 23, 330. See also above footnotes 30 and 31.

99. See William Korey, "Zinoviev on the Problem of World Revolution 1917-27", (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, New York, 1960), p. 22.

100. LCW, vol. 21, 402.

101. Ibid., 404. The passage is discussed in the following section.

102. Ibid., 342.

103. Ibid., 342f.

104. According to R.V. Daniels, Lenin's formula "presumably" applied to the most advanced countries. Problems of Communism, XVI, No. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1967), 68n. Cf. the same author in 1960: "Stalin's case was founded on one sentence written by Lenin in his Swiss exile nine years before, taken out of context and distorted to mean something entirely unintended by its author". Robert V. Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia, (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 252.

105. See Zinoviev, Leninizm, 297ff.; Nicholai Bukharin, "Politicheskoe zaveshchanie Lenina," Put' k sotsializmu v Rossii. Izbrannye proizvedenie N.I. Bukharina, ed. by Sidney Heitman (New York, 1967), p. 402; for Stalin's arguments see his Problems of Leninism (Moscow, 1953), 116-127. For the view of Lenin, Zinoviev, and Bukharin in 1918, see chapter II, footnote 80; and chapter III, footnote 2.

106. See below, pages 40-42.

107. LCW, vol. 23, 77-87. Emphasis added. Lenin found it inopportune to publish the program. Instead he published an article merely rejecting the disarmement in the era of socialism on the ground that wars were "possible between one country in which socialism has been victorious and other, bourgeois or reactionary, countries". Ibid., 94-104. For one of the few documentary surveys of Lenin's concept of the revolutionary war see Grottian, 52ff.

108. It is noteworthy that the Left Bolsheviks disapproved of Lenin's intention to postpone the offensive until the material preconditions were created. In their view the defensive and offensive phases of the Russian revolution should merge to bring a revolutionary conflagration into Europe. Gankin and Fisher, 220. This divergency of views was to flare up during the Brest Litovsk negotiations.

109. For a detailed analysis see Werner Hahlweg, "Lenin und Clausewitz", in Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, vol. 36 (1954), pp. 30-59 and 357-387.

110. LSb., vol. 22, 400.

111. Ibid., 408.

112. Ibid., 400.

113. See Alexander Shliapnikov, Kanun semnadtsatogo goda, vol. 2 (Moscow-Petrograd, 1923), 100; Futrell, 142; Stefan T. Possony, Lenin, the Compulsive Revolutionary, (Chicago, 1964), (hereafter quoted as Possony), pp. 164ff.

114. For the German policy of revolutionizing see esp. Z.A.B. Zeman and W.B. Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution. The Life of Alexander Israel Helphand (Parvus) 1867-1924, (London, 1965), (hereafter quoted as Zeman and Scharlau), pp. 151ff; George Katkov, Russia 1917. The February Revolution, (London, 1969), 119ff; the same in Pipes, ed., Revolutionary Russia, 55ff., and Possony, 173ff. The German documents collected in Z.A.B. Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915-1918, (London, 1958), (hereafter quoted as Zeman).

115. An analysis of Parvus' pamphlets listed in the bibliography and the study of Leman and Scharlau would reveal a striking similarity of his revolutionary strategy with that of Lenin.

116. PAAA, Weltkrieg, Vermittlungsaktionen, Nr. 2 geh., Bd. 10; Zeman and Scharlau, 167f.

117. Futrell, 149. For Lenin's positive reference to Siefeldt see LCW, vol. 43, 508.

118. Romberg to the German Foreign Ministry, Sept. 30, 1915, PAAA, Russland 61, Bd. 123; Zeman, 6f. Keskuela's later claim that the promise to move the Russian troops into India might have been Romberg's fabrication (Futrell, 150) is not convincing.

119. Zeman, 8n.

120. Ignoring this fact, an American scholar has reached the curious conclusion that the Romberg-Keskuela report did not constitute a Bolshevik offer of separate peace, but merely a "prepublication summary" of Lenin's "revolutionary program" presented to the public in "Several Theses". Alfred E. Senn, The Russian Revolution in Switzerland 1914-1917, (Madison, Wisc. 1971), 63.

121. LCW, vol. 21, 403f.

122. Ibid., 404. Richard Gregor in his dissertation "Lenin's Foreign Policy, 1917-1922: Ideology or National Interest?", (University of London, 1966), p. 28, also concludes that Lenin's reference to revolutionary war this peace platform was "more symbolic than anything else".

123. Grigorii Zinoviev, Sochineniia, V, p. 11. Recalling the same phrase in January 1918 Lenin too denied any comitment to revolutionary war immediately after coming to power. LCW, vol. 26, 446. Lenin did so in accord with his concept of revolutionary war, discussed above.

124. See below pages 45ff.

125. For the literature relating to this subject see note 114.

126. LCW, vol. 21, 367.

127. LPSS, vol. 49, 348.

128. LCW, vol. 23, 53.

129. LCW, vol. 23, 177f., also p. 264.

130. See Lenin's letter to Shliapnikov, after October 3, 1916, LPSS, vol. 49, 300.

131. "A Separate Peace", LCW, vol. 23, 128-131. Also ibid., 177-180, and 262-264.

132. Ibid., 287.

133. Ibid., 288.

134. See Lichtheim, 330 and 341; Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution, 38f., and Deutscher, Stalin, 285.

135. For Zinoviev's arguments see his Leninizm, 88-121. The relevance of "Several Theses" for the October revolution is now recognized also by Soviet scholars. See T.I. Frolov et al., Nekotorye voprosy strategii i taktiki partii bol'shevikov v Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii, (Moscow, 1968), pp. 9-40.

136. LCW, vol. 23, 371.

137. Ibid., 372.

138. LCW, vol. 26, 171.

139. Ibid., vol. 24, 48f. This fact, a cornerstone of the Stalinist thesis of 'socialism in one country', has recently been noted by Jonathan Frankel, "Lenin's Doctrinal Revolution of April 1917", The Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 4, No. 2 (April 1969), 134ff. Cf. Page, 143f.

140. "The State and Revolution", LCW, vol. 25, 413; cf. vol. 24, 24.

141. "The big banks are the 'state apparatus' which we need to bring about socialism, and which we take ready-made from capitalism". LCW, vol. 26, 106. For a detailed analysis of Lenin's economic program prior to November 1917 see esp. Richard Lorenz, Anfänge der bolschewistischen Industrienpolitik, (Cologne, 1965), (hereafter quoted as Lorenz), pp. 79-84.

142. See esp. "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It", ibid., vol. 25, esp. pp. 344ff.; "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?", vol. 26, esp. pp. 108 and 110. For a comprehensive survey of the planned social measures see his revised draft of the party program, vol. 24, 466-479.

143. LCW, vol. 24, 25. Lenin here argued against the "Old Bolsheviks" who opposed calling the bourgeois democratic revolution a socialist one.

144. See for instance LCW, vol. 21, 419.

145. See footnote 95. Also LCW, vol. 22, 144.

146. Ibid., vol. 25, 358. In 1921, returning to the idea of building socialism in one country with state capitalist principles, Lenin similarly defined socialism as "Soviet power plus the electrification". Ibid., vol. 31, 516. Monty Johnstone has drawn attention to Lenin's re-definition of socialism without putting this into its broader historical context. Marty Johnstone, "Socialism in One Country", in Nicolas Krassó, ed., Trotsky. The Great Debate Renewed, (St. Louis, Missouri, 1972), 135f.

147. LCW, vol. 27, 90. Cf. vol. 33, 54; the bourgeois revolution precedes but the socialist revolution solves the problems of the first.

148. LCW, vol. 25, esp. pp. 459-474. Stalin in the 1920's seized upon this redefinition to attack Trotsky who had basically retained the old concept of socialism. As Deutscher correctly noted, the dispute over "socialism in one country" centred on a "bizarre irrelevancy". Stalin, 288. For a similar conclusion see the most recent monograph

by Richard B. Day, Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation, (Cambridge, England, 1973).

149. LCW, vol. 23, 372. Lenin's emphasis. Cf. vol. 24, 246.

150. Ibid., vol. 26, 106 and 130. Lenin, confronted with a country roughly as developed as Western Europe had been during Marx's life prior to 1870, reintroduced the latter's concept of the transitional period to socialism.

151. LCW, vol. 21, 403.

152. Ibid., 381.

153. Ibid., 379.

154. Zinoviev, Sochineniia, V, 214 and 217.

155. LCW, vol. 21, 419.

156. Ibid., vol. 23, 216 and passim, vol. 43, 614.

157. In his words, only by concluding a peace could the Russian proletariat help the revolution in the West to victory and to the "lasting peace". Ibid., vol. 24, 206.

158. Ibid., 68, 80, 88, and passim.

159. Ibid., vol. 26, 176f.

160. See footnote 140. See also Lenin's description of the paralyzed German socialism, LCW, vol. 26, 204.

161. For Lenin's view see for example LCW, vol. 26, 99; and vol. 36, 434. Cf. N. Sukhanov, Zapiski o revoliutsii, (hereafter quoted as Sukhanov), vol. VI, (Berlin-Petrograd-Moscow, 1923), p. 77; Paul Miliukov, Rossiia na perelome. Bol'shevistskii period Russkoi revoliutsii, vol. 1, (hereafter quoted as Rossiia na perelome), (Paris, 1927), p. 43; Aleksander F. Kerensky, The Kerensky Memoirs: Russia and History's Turning Point, (London, 1966), (hereafter quoted as Kerensky, Memoirs), p. 432; and Rex A. Wade, The Russian Search for Peace, February-October 1917, (Stanford, Cal., 1969), (hereafter quoted as Wade), p. 131.

162. See George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, Volume I, Russia Leaves the War, (Princeton, N.J., 1956), 226n. The Russian revolutionaries also reminded "the representatives of the German press" that a new German offensive against Russia would disturb their peace plans. The German Minister Romberg promptly communicated this to Berlin where the Chancellor had meanwhile pledged non-interference into the Russian internal affairs. Zeman, 27.

163. LCW, vol. 24, 22. At the Bolsheviks' next meeting Lenin urged the conclusion of peace with the "German brothers", regiment by regiment, company by company. W.S. Woytinsky, Stormy Passage, (New York, 1961), (hereafter quoted as Woytinsky), p. 266.

164. See "Resolution on War" adopted at the Seventh Party Conference in May 1917, LCW, vol. 24, 272f. Only on one occasion, in late May 1917, did Pravda reprint the peace program of 1915, and Lenin subsequently confirmed its continuing validity. Ibid., 393f. and 418.

165. Woytinsky, 283. Other Russian Socialists rejected the idea of separate peace. See Israel Getzler, Martov. A Political Biography of a Russian Social Democrat, (Melbourne, 1967), 149. For Lenin's feeble denials see LCW, vol. 24, 267ff.

166. LCW, vol. 25, 34f., 38, 40f. Cf. vol. 24, 517. Lenin's objective, separate peace, was implicit also in his assertion that the Allies would not be able to intervene against a Russian government of peace.

167. Ibid., vol. 25, 53.

168. Lenin flirted for a while with the idea of seizing power but ultimately rejected it as premature. The recent monograph on the Uprising by Alexander Rabinowitch, Prelude to Revolution. The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917 Uprising, (Bloomington, Ind., 1968) disappointingly fails to assess the impact of the July offensive on the Bolshevik party and the course of events.

169. The charges have been published in English in Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky, eds., The Russian Provisional Government 1917. Documents, (hereafter quoted as Browder and Kerensky), vol. III, 1364ff. For a critical and sensitive evaluation of the affair see esp. P.S. Melgunov, Zolotoi nemetskii kliuch k bol'shevitskoi revoliutsii, (Paris, 1940).

170. Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, II, 275.

171. LCW, vol. 25, 309.

172. See Gustav Mayer, Vom Journalisten zum Historiker der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, (Zurich, 1949), (hereafter quoted as Gustav Mayer), pp. 261ff. Mayer, a Swiss socialist, was an official emissary of the German government. Erzberger was represented by another agent, Hermann Goldberg. See also Zeman and Scharlau, 220.

173. The text reprinted in Browder and Kerensky, II, 1161f.

174. The papal appeal was regarded in Petrograd as an attempt to reconcile the Western powers and Germany at the cost of Russia. For the response to the appeal see Kerensky and Browder, II, 1163ff.; Wade, 126ff.; Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, (New York, 1967), (hereafter quoted as Fritz Fischer), pp. 416ff.

175. LCW, vol. 25, 268. Lenin concluded this also on the basis of a favorable German response to the third Zimmerwald conference in Stockholm, September 1917.

176. Browder and Kerensky, II, 1167f.

177. See William H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1917-1921, (New York,1963), (hereafter quoted as Chamberlin), vol. 1, 277f.

178. A long record of primary evidence could be produced contradicting the thesis that the Bolsheviks seized power in the climax of a mass upsurge. Even Trotsky, who also contributed to the creation of this legend, later admitted that in October 1917 there was "a certain depression" among the masses and that the latter "were beginning to feel disappointed even in the Bolsheviks". Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, III, 181ff.

179. LCW, vol. 26, 28ff. and 40ff. Lenin changed his mind in regard to the socialist alliance before the article appeared on Sept. 29 in the central party organ (See the discussion below). It is not without interest that Zinoviev also dismissed the feasibility of Allied intervention in Russia. "Vchem vykhod?", Rabochii put' [Pravda], Sept. 18, 1917.

180. The reports are preserved in PAAA, Generalhauptquartier, Russland Bd. 8, See also ibid., Russland 61, Bd. 134.

181. See "Bericht eines Vertrauensmannes über die Lage in Russland" of Sept. 15, 1917. PAAA Generalhauptquartier, Russland, Bd. 8. It is noteworthy that the same phrase was also being used by the Bolshevik agent in Stockholm Karl Radek, Gustav Mayer, 276-279.

182. Erich von Ludendorff, My War Memories, 1914-1918, (London, 1921), (hereafter quoted as Ludendorff), II, 487 and 506. The landing, planned for early October, was postponed allegedly due to "unfavorable winds".

183. PAAA, Generalhauptquartier, Russland, Bd. 5. On September 30 Ludendorff issued another directive for stepping up fraternization on the Eastern front and for support of peace sentiment in Russia, "Richtlinien fuer die Ostfront-Propaganda", ibid. Cf. Kühlmann's endorsement of the Bolsheviks of September 29 in Zeman, 70.

184. "The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power", and "Marxism and Insurrection", LCW, vol. 26, and 19-21, 22-27.

185. Ibid., 20.

186. Ibid., 21.

187. Confronted with the opposition of his colleagues, Lenin on October 12 tendered his resignation from the Central Committee, reserving

for himself freedom to campaign for the uprising among the rank and file of the party. It was still his "profound conviction" that waiting for the Congress of Soviets would "ruin the revolution". Ibid., 84.

188. See ibid., 69-73, 83, 146, and 180f.

189. See the views of Katkov and Geyer in R. Pipes, ed., Revolutionary Russia, (Garden City, N.J., 1969), 222. Cf. Page, 67.

190. Almost a month later, on Oct. 23, Lenin in the Central Committee assessed the internal political situation only as "working impressively" towards making the uprising imperative; the agrarian movement was "also developing in that direction", but the international situation, in his view, was "such that we should already have taken the initiative". Protokoli Tsentral'nogo Ko miteta RSDRP, Avgust 1917 - Fevral' 1918 (Moscow, 1958), (hereafter quoted as Protokoli), p. 85. In LCW, vol. 26, 188, the Russian phrase "initsiativa dolzhna byt' za nami" is inaccurately translated as "we must take the initiative".

191. In The History of the Russian Revolution, III, 128f. Trotsky also pointed out discreetly that Lenin emphasized the "international aspects" in his summons for the uprising.

192. See the Resolution on the War adopted by the 7th (April) All-Russia Party Conference: the war could not be ended "by a simple cessation of hostilities by one of the belligerents". LCW, vol. 24, 272.

193. Ibid., vol. 26, 62.

194. See above, page 49. The new central party organ Rabochii put' on Sept. 25 also concluded, in connection with the failure of the papal appeal, that "as could be expected" the hopes for a general peace had been destroyed.

195. Viacheslav S. Vasiukov, Vneshniaia politika Vremennogo pravitel'stva, (Moscow, 1966), (hereafter quoted as Vasiukov), p. 431. This means that Lenin could expect and work for a separate peace only.

196. LCW, vol. 26, 21.

197. Ibid., 25. Lenin had already stated in his proposal of a socialist coalition, written by September 25 and designed for the press, that the Russian proletariat would have "a hundred to one chance of achieving an armistice and peace". Ibid., 40. Karl Radek, certainly one of the best informed, also admitted that the Bolsheviks had decided in the autumn of 1917 to capitalize on the fact that the Central powers, unlike the Allies, were ready to negotiate for peace. Pravda, Feb. 5, 1918.

198. It has to be borne in mind that despite their contacts with Berlin, the Bolsheviks were not considered by the Germans as the only potential peace partner. Throughout the 1917 revolution, for instance, Berlin showed interest in coming to terms with the Provisional Government, and the German agents made several overtures in this direction. For one made in early August 1917 to the Russian Foreign Minister Tereshchenko, which has remained almost unnoticed, see D.R. Francis, Russia From the American Embassy, (New York, 1921), 292.

199. LCW, vol. 25, 285.

200. Ibid., vol. 26, 20. This gave the Bolsheviks the psychological advantage of a patriotic party.

201. This is supported by a letter in which Lenin exhorted his trustee Smilga to seize power quickly in Finland: "I read in the papers today," wrote Lenin on October 10, "that in two weeks the danger of the German landing will be nil. Obviously, you have very little time left for the preparations." Ibid., 70.

202. It is almost inconceivable that Lenin, then in Helsinki, would miss the opportunity to inform himself about German intentions through the Bolshevik representatives in Stockholm, Radek, Ganetsky, and Vorovsky, who maintained contacts with German Minister Lucius and Counsellor Riezler, and with the German Minister in Denmark, Brockdorff-Rantzau. It seems that the latter handled the most delicate questions, as Lucius was not noted for his caution (Lucius: 'Mon indiscretion, c'est mon charme' - quoted in Gustav Mayer, 266). Gustav Mayer, himself an intermediary between Berlin and the Bolsheviks, happened in September 1917 to meet Karl Radek travelling to Copenhagen for a talk with Brockdorff-Rantzau. Ibid., 279.

203. Kerensky himself later asserted that he negotiated in October 1917 with Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary for a separate peace without Germany's consent. Berlin, he surmised, therefore pressed Lenin to seize power before the German coalition disintegrated. Kerensky, Memoirs, 432f.

204. For evidence supporting this thesis see esp. Browder and Kerensky, III, 1735ff.; Sergei P. Melgunov, Kak bol'sheviki zakhvatili vlast'; oktiabr'skii perevorot 1917 goda, (Paris, 1953), 32ff.; V. L. Burtsev, V bor'be s bol'shevikami i nemtsa mi, (Paris, 1919), 38ff., and 47ff., and N. Sukhanov, vol. VI, passim; and vol. VII, 110ff.

205. LCW, vol. 26, 23f.

206. Editorial "Otvetstvennaia i bezotvetstvennaia politika", Rabochii put', October 11, 1917. This was a reply to the Revolutionary Socialists' organ Delo naroda. Two days later Zinoviev restated the position taken by Rabochii put'. Sochineniia, VII, 1, 416.

207. The text of the letter in James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918. Documents and Materials, (Stanford and Oxford, 1934), (hereafter quoted as Bunyan and Fisher), pp. 59-62. Kamenev's view was consistent with his previous stand; Zinoviev, however, lost courage and deserted Lenin in the moment when their program of peace, worked out jointly in Switzerland, was about to be realized.

208. Lev Trotskii, Sochineniia, III, 1 (Moscow, 1925), pp. 13-16. Cf. Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, 245f.

209. See his pamphlet "Chto zhe dalshe?", in Sochineniia, III, 1, esp. p. 252.

210. See his article "Nam nuzhden mir", ibid., III, 2, pp. 33-35, and passim. Later Trotsky quite proudly contrasted his patriotic stand of September 1917 with Lenin's defeatism. The History of the Russian Revolution, II, 316.

211. For a fairly recent analysis of Bolshevik tactics which accounts well with the thrust of this study see Robert V. Daniels, Red October: The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, (New York, 1969).

212. Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, 292f.

1. LCW, vol. 26, 170f.

2. Trotsky, My Life, 342f. For a survey of the Bolshevik measures see Chamberlin, I, 251-271.

3. LCW, vol. 26, 250 and 252. Cf. Lenin's comment ibid., 254.

4. Cf. Page 83f., and Gregor, 68f. Lenin's contemporaries in Russia and abroad expected the Bolsheviks to go for a separate peace. See for example C.Iu. Vygodskii, V.I. Lenin - rukovoditel' vneshnei politiki sovetskogo gosudarstva (1917-1923), (Leningrad, 1960), 76; Melgunov, Kak Bolsheviki zakhvatili vlast', esp. p. 60, Alexander Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, (London, 1934), 344; Zeman, 79. The editor of Lenin's works V. Rakhmetov also noted that separate peace was implicit in the "Decree on Peace". Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, No. 5 (88), 1929, p. 5.

5. PAAA, Weltkrieg, 2 geh., Bd. 51. See also Zeman, 72.

6. PAAA, Generalhauptquartier, Russland, Bd. 6. Lucius was apparently unaware of the Bolshevik offer of separate peace made in late September 1915.

7. Mr. Philips Price has related a story about a submarine which was sent from Kronstadt to Stockholm and Germany between November 8 and 20 with the purpose of ascertaining the attitude of the Central powers towards the new rulers in Petrograd. See Philips Price, My Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution, (London, 1921), (hereafter quoted as Price), pp. 176f. Interviewed by this author on June 25, 1972, Mr. Price could not recall the source of this information, but a (Russian?) submarine seems to have really been maintaining contact between the Bolsheviks in Stockholm and Petrograd already prior to November 1917. See Gustav Mayer, 263. Futrell in Northern Underground has not accounted for this channel of communication.

8. The Germans nevertheless reacted to the Bolshevik coup with an extraordinary political tact and caution. On November 8 Lucius urged Berlin, presumably upon Bolshevik request, to avoid public announcements of any amicable agreement with Russia in the German and Austrian press. State Secretary Kühlmann upheld this view. Zeman, 73f.

9. Philipp Scheidemann, Memoirs of a Social-Democrat, (London, 1929) (hereafter quoted as Scheidemann), II, 429.

10. Lersner to the Foreign Ministry, Nov. 15, 1917, PAAA, Generalhauptquartier, Russland, Bd. 6.

11. For Parvus' mission see Zeman and Scharlau, 233ff.; Karl Radek in Pravda, Nov. 21, 1917.

12. Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, (Berlin, 1966), (hereafter quoted as GDAB), vol. III, 24. For a detailed analysis of the German socialists' response to the coup see Peter Lösche, Der Bolschewismus im Urteil der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1903-1920, (Berlin, 1967), (hereafter quoted as Lösche), pp. 104-120.

13. Scheidemann, II, 431. In the following days the Majority Socialists demonstrated their "solidarity with the Russian comrades" in a number of manifestations held across the country. GDAB, III, 25.

14. Lucius to the Foreign Ministry, Nov. 16, 1917, PAAA, Generalhauptquartier, Russland, Bd. 6. The Bolsheviks also confirmed their willingness to conclude peace with Germany in a telegram to the Majority Socialists dispatched from Stockholm to Berlin through the official German diplomatic channel. Scheidemann, II, 433.

15. LCW, vol. 26, 278. John Reed reported Lenin's offer of a government post to Chernov. See his Ten Days That Shook the World, (New York, 1960), 212. For Lenin's readiness for coalition see Mark Vishnyak, Dan' proshlomu, (New York, 1954), 319.

16. Pravda, for instance, on November 18 triumphantly heralded the support of the German and Austrian socialists in big headlines. See also Pravda, Nov. 21 and 22, 1917.

17. LCW, vol. 26, 304.

18. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, (Moscow, 1958-), (hereafter quoted as DVP), vol. I, 15f. Cf. LCW, vol. 26, 311.

19. Cf. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 90. Only treaties with the Allied powers were published by the Bolsheviks. The publication of documents concerning the Central powers, promised by Trotsky, never materialized.

20. Jane Degras, Soviet Documents of Foreign Policy, vol. I, 1917-1924, (London, 1951), (hereafter quoted as SDFP, I), p. 10.

21. Ibid., 12. Cf. Trotsky's declaration of December 2, Sochinenia, III, 2, 175f.

22. DVP, I, 34f.; Degras, SDFP, I, 15-17. For the British response see Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921. Intervention and the War, (Princeton, N.Y., 1961), (hereafter quoted as Ullman, I), pp. 28ff. The Bolshevik representative Vorovsky assured Lucius that the Soviet appeals to the Allies to take part in peace negotiations and calls for revolution were meant platonically. Zeman, 100.

23. DVP, I, 47-51; John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk. The Forgotten Peace, (London, 1938), (hereafter quoted as Wheeler-Bennett). A non-Bolshevik member of the Russian delegation Fokke reports that after these easy going negotiations Ioffe and Kamenev visited German-occupied Warsaw and let themselves to be conducted by the German officers to the city's nightclubs. D.G. Fokke, "Na scene i za kulisami Brestskoi tragikomedii", in Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii, XX (Berlin, 1930), (hereafter quoted as Fokke), pp. 92f.

24. Cf. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 122 and 192; Edgar Sisson, 100 Red Days, (Yale-London-New Haven, 1931), (hereafter quoted as Sisson), 136.

25. Wheeler-Bennett, 104-111; Fritz Fischer, pp. 479ff.

26. See p. 57. Pravda also wrote on Nov. 18, 1917, that the German plans for Poland and the Baltic countries demonstrated "annexationist tendencies in the crudest form".

27. See Stalin's definition of the Soviet peace platform in LCW, vol. 26, 349f.

28. According to Pravda of Nov. 18, 1917, only the agricultural and industrial proletariat in the Baltic countries would predominantly vote against a separation from Russia, but the article warned that the Latvians could not expect Soviet Russia to wage a war for their freedom: the liberation could be accomplished only by the international revolution.

29. Degras, SDFP, I, 21f.; Wheeler-Bennett, 117f. The latter study is extremely readable but rather unreliable in interpreting the Bolshevik side of the Brest-Litovsk story.

30. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 221.

31. Degras, SDFP, I, 22.

32. Pravda, Dec. 27, 1917.

33. Degras, SDFP, I, 23; Bunyan and Fisher, 483.

34. Trotsky, particularly sensitive to the echo in the West, later admitted that after the November coup "no greetings reached us from anywhere". My Life, 344. For the initial reaction of the French and British labour see Annie Kriegel, Aux Origines du Communisme Français (1914-1920), (Paris, 1964), (hereafter quoted as Kriegel), vol. I, 171ff.; Wohl, 95ff.; Stephen R. Graubard, British Labour and the Russian Revolution 1917-1924, (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), (hereafter quoted as Graubard), pp. 44-63; and Ullman, I, 19f.

35. For the Spartacist view of separate peace see GDAB, III, 447-450; for similarly critical arguments of the Independents see Archivalische

Forschungen zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, Bd. 4, Die Auswirkungen der Grossen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution auf Deutschland, (Berlin, 1959), (hereafter quoted as Die Auswirkungen), vol. 3, 943. The Independents reportedly urged the Bolsheviks in December 1917 to drag on negotiations at Brest Litovsk. Cf. Lösche, esp. pp. 107-110.

36. Pravda itself admitted on Jan. 10, 1918, that the previous Soviet conduct of peace talks "might create impression of a dishonest policy". For a similar view of a participant of the Brest talks see Ottokar Graf Czernin, In the World War, (New York, 1920), (hereafter quoted as Czernin), pp. 221f.

37. Possony, 265. Reed noted that even the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries, always "distinguished by their sober devotion to facts", now were convinced about the Bolshevik-German complicity. Reed, 121. The prominent Bolshevik sympathizer Colonel Robins later stated that he "dealt with those men on the theory that they might be German agents, for two or three months after the November coup ". The U.S. Senate , Bolshevik Propaganda. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary, February 11, 1919, to March 10, 1919, (Washington, D.C., 1919), (hereafter quoted as Bolshevik Propaganda), p. 784. See also Francis, 185.

38. Trotsky, My Life, 363 and 369.

39. For examples see Auswirkungen, vol. 2, 846-848; vol. 3, 936-938, and 1033; Sovetsko-germanskie otnosheniia ot peregovorov v Brest-Litovske do podpisaniia Rapal'skogo dogovora, vol. I (Moscow, 1968), (hereafter quoted as SGO), pp. 166-169. E. Drahn and S. Leonhard, Unterirdische Literatur im revolutionären Deutschland während des Weltkrieges, (Berlin, 1920), (hereafter quoted as Drahn and Leonhard), pp. 143-146. Die Fackel likewise refrained from direct attacks on Berlin.

40. For instance, the German Kriegspresseamt decided only on February 11 to prohibit the import and distribution of "Bote der Russische Revolution", published by Karl Radek in Stockholm. Auswirkungen, vol. 3, 1141. In General, however, even the German military authorities evaluated the Soviet propaganda as "very weak". Ibid., vol. 2, 912.

41. For a documentary survey of the Bolshevik expansion, see Bunyan and Fisher, 460ff. and 496. Cf. Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union. Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923, (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), (hereafter quoted as Pipes), pp. 108ff., and John S. Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1920, (Princeton, J.J., 1952), (hereafter quoted as Reshetar), pp. 103ff.

42. Bunyan and Fisher, 394 and 397. The Bolsheviks again rescinded this principle in March 1918. Pipes, 109ff.

43. For the Finnish revolution 1918 see esp. Otto Kuusinen, Die Revolution in Finland, (Vienna, 1920); C. J. Smith, Finland and the Russian Revolution 1917-1922, (Athens, Georgia, 1958), 34ff.; and M. S. Svechnikov, Revoliutsiia i grazhdanskaia voina v Finlandii 1917-1918 gg., (Moscow and Leningrad, 1923).

44. Pravda, Jan. 29, 1918.

45. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 402, and Possony, 277, allege that the goal of the mission was to promote political unrest in the Allied countries, but the mere composition of the mission - it consisted of such moderate or pro-Allied Bolsheviks as L. Kamenev, Petrov, Lozov, Kollontai - and the German displeasure over the trip, speak against their contention. On February 12, 1918, Riezler reported to Berlin that the purpose of the mission was to assure the Labour Party "dass die Bolschewiki noch weiter an den gemeinsamen Zielen der internationalen Sozialdemokratie feshalten und sich den deutschen Forderungen nicht freiwillig fügen werden". PAAA, Friedensverhandlungen, Russland Politisches Nr. 1, Bd. 17, Cf. Fokke, 161.

46. LCW, vol. 36, 460-463, esp. paragraphs 20, 20 bis, 21, 22, and 41.

47. Jacques Sadoul, Notes sur la Révolution Bolshévique, (Paris, 1919), (hereafter quoted as Sadoul), pp. 190f.

48. See LPSS, vol. 35, 566ff.

49. LCW, vol. 26, 382.

50. C. K. Cumming and W. Pettit, eds., Russian-American Relations, March 1917 - March 1920, (New York, 1920), (hereafter quoted as Cumming and Pettit), pp. 75f., Bunyan and Fisher, 378f.

51. Not incidentally, Trotsky and the Left Communists disapproved of the dispersion of the Constituent Assembly. Karl Radek, for instance, in this connection blamed Lenin for not understanding the interplay between the domestic and foreign policy and pointed out that by liquidating the Constituent Assembly the Bolsheviks had undermined their own position vis-à-vis the Germans. "Pravda o Brest-Litovske" in Kommunist, No. 4, April 1918. See also Trotsky, Lenin, 105f.

52. For the view of two prominent Left Communists, Bukharin and Radek, see below page 78.

53. Leon Trotsky, The Bolsheviki and World Peace, (New York, 1918), 201f., 239. "We do not know other interests than national," Trotsky wrote in Pravda on December 4 to the armistice talks, and added somewhat abashed: "We may be wrong but, to be sure, we shall never betray our people".

54. Degras, SDFP, I, 9 and 10; cf. Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, 346f.

55. Cf. Page 93f. In an interview with Bruce Lockhart on March 2, 1918, Lenin explained that such 'compromises' were necessary 'for if capital were to unite, we should be crushed at this stage of development'. At the same time he saw no possibility of cooperating with the Allies. Bruce Lockhart, British Agent, (Garden City, N.Y., 1933), 239f. For Zinoviev's similar view see below page 82.

56. LCW, vol. 26, 445. Text compared with the Russian original in LPSS, vol. 35, 247. Analogically, Lenin ridiculed the Left Communists for advocating a war against Germany without seeking a cooperation of the Allies. LCW, vol. 27, 84.

57. Ibid., vol. 22, 290.

58. Ibid., vol. 24, 403.

59. Ibid., 53f., and vol. 25, 357f. Cf. Alec Nove, "Lenin as Economist", in Schapiro and Reddaway, 201.

60. For the supporting evidence see LCW, esp. vol. 22, 242-245, 258, 286; and vol. 39, 260 and 430.

61. Ibid., vol. 24, 417. See also vol. 27, 367f. For Lenin's false image of the United States see Grottian, 405-409. Vasiukov, 429f., also hints at Lenin's underestimation of the anti-German coalition.

62. Kerensky, Crucifixion of Liberty, 356; also M. A. Landau-Aldanov, Lenin, (New York, 1922), 159. Most of Lenin's compatriots likewise failed to recognize the future role of the United States. See Max M. Laserson, The American Impact on Russia 1784-1917, (New York, 1957), 397ff.

63. LCW, vol. 26, 52. Lenin seems to have believed in November 1917 that the Bolshevik peace move would break France's morale and make her accept peace, naturally on German terms. Ibid., vol. 26, 315f. Similarly, Lenin anticipated by the turn of 1916-17 that following Russia's separate peace treaty with Germany the latter would be able to impose her will on the Entente. LCW, vol. 23, 177f. The Austrian Foreign Minister Czernin expressed the same view in November 1917 - Czernin, 215f. In effect, however, the Bolshevik coup contributed to Clemenceau's ascendancy on November 16.

64. LCW, vol. 26, 255.

65. PAAA, Deutschland 131, geheim, Bd. 18, Bl. 119. A similar wish for an alliance was expressed also by the Russians. See Auswirkungen, vol. 2, 818 and 911.

66. Keyserlingk subsequently hinted in an interview for a Russian paper that the Germans would not occupy Petrograd unless resistance to the Bolsheviks rose. Melgunov, Zolotoi nemetskii kliuch, k bol'she vitskoi revoliutsii, 149. The talks were discontinued on February 14, 1918.

67. For Radek's positive evaluation of the United States see esp. his articles in Kommunist, No. 1 and 4, 1918, and Sisson, 100; for the view of other Left Communists see this section below.

68. Trotsky, My Life, 270.

69. Ibid.

70. For instance, in November 1917 he recalled vast quantity of war materials he had seen in the New York harbor (Sochinennia, III, 2, 160), and in the spring of 1918 he still lectured to the Russian generals and workers about the vast development of America's war industry. Sochineniia, XVII, 1, 173-178; Mikhail D. Bonch-Bruevich, From Tsarist General to Red Army Commander, (Moscow, 1966), 266.

71. Francis, 336.

72. The Brest dispute was in many respects a continuation of discussions over Russia's foreign political orientation which took place during the last weeks of the Provisional Government. Then, for instance, the Left Mensheviks of Lenin's generation, Martov and Gotz, pointing out the "extreme war weariness" of the Allies, and arguing that America could not change the war picture, were opposed by the young Foreign Minister Tereshchenko, who, like the Left Communists, stressed the internal vulnerability of the Central Powers and the prospective role of the United States. Browder and Kerensky, II, 1147f. Tereshchenko's policy of re-orienting Russia towards America was terminated by the Bolshevik coup. For a fair Soviet account of this policy see Vasiukov, esp. p. 494.

73. Degras, SDFP, I, 10.

74. See Trotsky, My Life, 381; and the same author, Lenin, 106.

75. K. I. Varlamov and N. A. Slamikhin, Razoblachenie V. I. Leninym teorii i taktiky 'levykh kommunistov', noiabr' 1917g.-1918g., (Moscow, 1964), 43ff.

76. Degras, SDFP, I, 31-33.

77. Oleh S. Fedyshyn, Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1918, (New Brunswick, N.J., 1971), (hereafter quoted as Fedyshyn), p. 68; Wheeler-Bennett, 185f. Trotsky informed Lenin to this effect and the latter, after consulting Stalin, summoned him promptly back to Petrograd. LCW, vol. 26, 427.

78. In fact Hoffmann only made more precise the position which the German delegation had held since late December 1917. Cf. Fritz Fischer, 495.

79. "Theses On the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace", LCW, vol. 26, 442-450. Lenin drew from the aforementioned notes he had made between January 6 and 9.

80. Zinoviev, the co-maker of 'socialism in one country', shortly afterwards also dismissed the objections that the industrially backward Russia had no objective conditions for implementing socialism. "Those who say it," he declared in late January 1918, "completely ignore the fact that our country has not only a backward agriculture but also almost all the necessary heavy industry and accumulated financial capital...They forget that...no Marxist has ever argued that socialist revolution must unconditionally originate in the most industrialized countries". Zinoviev, Sochineniia, VII, 2, 281. For Stalin's similar view of August 1917 see Isaac Deutscher, Stalin, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1966), 161. It is noteworthy that even Bukharin as early as 1918 assumed that "eine sozialistische Revolution in Russland nicht nur möglich, sondern auch historisch notwendig ist". N. Bukharin, Der Klassenkampf und die Revolution in Russland, (Zurich, 1918).

81. LCW, vol. 26, 443, paragraph 6.

82. Ibid., 444.

83. Ibid., 446 and 449.

84. Ibid., 445.

85. George F. Kennan in his analysis of 'fourteen points' underestimates the impact of this first and almost only Western message friendly to the Bolsheviks on the emergence of the anti-Leninist opposition. Russia Leaves the War, 258ff.

86. Trotsky, My Life, 382. No protocols have reportedly been preserved of this meeting.

87. Wheeler-Bennett, 192, for instance, has called the Left Communists' position a "policy of sheer insanity". Cf. John Erickson, "The Origins of the Red Army", in Pipes, ed., Revolutionary Russia, 306f.; also Page, 83.

88. The concept of revolutionary war has been reconstructed particularly on the basis of E. Preobrazhensky's articles in Pravda, Jan. 10 and 20, and the Left Communists' paper Kommunist, No. 1-4, (1918).

89. Protokoli, 173.

90. Trotsky in My Life, 383, tried to create impression that there was no difference between his and Lenin's position. In effect, however, the formula of 'no war no peace' called for no formal treaty at all. Cf. Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, 375.

91. See Ryder, 116-119.

92. Franz Borkenau, World Communism, (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1962), (hereafter quoted as Borkenau), p. 92.

93. Quoted by Bunyan and Fisher, 505f. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 33f., accept these pronouncements as the Bolsheviks' true view.

94. Leon Trotsky, From October to Brest-Litovsk, (New York, 1919), 92.

95. For Bukharin see Protokoli, 170; for Radek, Sisson, 324.

96. LCW, vol. 26, 493 and 511. Cf. his view in Sadoul, 190.

97. Price, 230f. Cf. also the Pravda editorial of February 3, "Razvitie revoliutsii na Zapade".

98. Trotsky, for instance, expressed his recognition of the energetic und uncompromising way in which the "German ruling class" had suppressed the strikes. From October to Brest-Litovsk, 92f. To Zinoviev the German army subsequently became "the only military force we have to reckon with". Protokoli, 203.

99. "The rising German and Austrian revolution," noted Radek ('Viator') in the first issue of Kommunist, "has given strength to the counter-revolutionary elements". Cf. his "Pis'ma iz Brest-Litovska", Pravda, Feb. 8 and 10, 1918. Preparing for the worst, the Bolsheviks after the suppression of the strike made the first attempt to rally the international supporters of the Soviet regime. See chapter VI, section 1.

100. Hertling to the Kaiser, Feb. 6, 1918. PAAA, Friedensverhandlungen, Russland Politisches Nr. 1, Bd. 15.

101. LCW, vol. 26, 517.

102. For Trotsky's expectation of the ultimatum see Kühlmann to Hertling, Feb. 8, 1918, PAAA, Friedensverhandlungen, Russland Politisches Nr. 1, Bd. 15. Cf. Radek, "Pis'ma iz Brest-Litovska", Pravda, Feb. 10 (the letter is dated Feb. 5).

103. It is not true that the Germans were completely taken aback by Trotsky's declaration, as some authors assert (e.g. Fritz Fischer, 501). Trotsky's intention was known beforehand to the German military, was anticipated by the German press and by the German delegation at Brest Litovsk as well. See Fokke, 203.

104. For the text see Degras, SDFP, I, 43-45; Pravda, Feb. 11, 1918.

105. Fokke, 145. It is noteworthy that Trotsky specifically requested the deletion from the preamble to the peace treaty of the phrase about friendship between the contracting parties.

106. Trotsky, My Life, 387. For Lenin's instant negative reaction see V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, Na boevykh postakh Febral'skoi i Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii, (Moscow, 1931), 254. As seen above, Lenin rejected an unilateral withdrawal from the war as soon as April 1917. LCW, vol. 27, 88.

107. Fritz Fischer, 501f.; Winfried Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918: von Brest-Litovsk bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges, (Vienna and Munich, 1966), (hereafter quoted as Baumgart), pp. 24-26.

108. Ludendorff, II, 539 and 558. Lenin too realized the limited scope of the German advance. Bonch-Bruevich, From Tsarist General to Red Army Officer, 245.

109. For a similar view see Possony, 266-269. Lenin himself in December 1917 planned merely an army against the internal enemy, not against the Germans, and consequently argued for the curtailment in the production of heavy weapons and heavy-calibre ammunition. See John Erickson, "The Origins of the Red Army" in Pipes, ed., Revolutionary Russia, 286-328.

110. Protokoli, 201ff.

111. Pravda, Feb. 22, 1918. On the other hand, the historian M. Pokrovsky, now a Left Communist, pleaded in Pravda on February 19 for the cooperation with the United States, stressing the American respect for the self-determination of nations in Europe and the future global role of President Wilson's country.

112. LCW, vol. 27. 27f. Cf. ibid., vol. 26, 252.

113. Ludendorff merely told the anti-Bolshevik Finns on February 21 that Germany had finally decided to intervene. Fritz Fischer, 512.

114. LCW, vol. 27, 30-33. It was exactly ten days after a demobilization decree had been issued.

115. The French plan in General Niessel, Le Triomphe des Bolchéviques et la Paix de Brest-Litovsk, (Paris, 1940), 279f. The chronology and interpretation of these events in Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 432f., and in other studies, is somewhat confused.

116. LCW, vol. 27, 36-39.

117. Protokoli, 208; LCW, vol. 44, 67.

118. Protokoli, 214.

119. Ibid., 215.

120. Lenin, apparently aware of Trotsky's foreign policy profile, had offered him the post of Commissar of the Interior and only reluctantly agreed with his assignment as Foreign Commissar. Trotsky, My Life, 340f.

121. Rumor was that Trotsky even broke down and wept. Price, 250.

122. For the text see DVP, I, 195-204; Degras, SDFP, I, 50-55.

123. For further details see Radek's analysis in James Bunyan, ed., Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia, April-December 1918, (Baltimore, 1936), (hereafter quoted as Bunyan, ed.), pp. 377f. See also the map No. 1.

124. Sed'moi ekstrennyi s'ezd RKP(b), mart 1918 goda, (Moscow, 1962), 41.

125. Zinoviev, Sochineniia, VII, 1, 522.

126. LCW, vol. 27, 111.

127. Ibid., 119. For differences regarding the data on voting see Fischer, Lenin, 219.

128. For the background of the Allied intervention see esp. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 275ff.; Ullman, I, 82ff.

129. LCW, vol. 36, 469. It appears that Lenin was ready to surrender half of Siberia and start a serious resistance at Irkutsk on the Lake Baikal. Ibid., vol. 27, 226. Cf. Trotsky's view in Foreign Relations of the United States, (hereafter quoted as FRUS), 1918 Russia, II, 114.

130. William Hard, Raymond Robins' Own Story, (New York, 1920), 137f.; Bruce Lockhart, 239ff.; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 492ff. Lenin apparently aimed at forestalling the activity of the Left Communists who on March 5 started in Pravda a campaign against the Brest treaty by overplaying the Japanese danger and by presenting it as a consequence of the Bolshevik deal with Germany. The editor-in-chief of Pravda was Bukharin.

131. For details see Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 509ff.

132. DVP, I, 208f.; Degras, SDFP, I, 56f.

133. FRUS, 1918 Russia, I, 395f. The eyewitness was Albert Rhys Williams, Journey into Revolution: Petrograd, 1917-1918, (Chicago, 1969), 266.

134. LCW, vol. 27, 171. Cf. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 513.

135. Francis, 230; Bolshevik Propaganda, 958.

136. Sed'moi ekstrennyi sezd RKP(b), 147f. Cf. Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, 398.

137. For one of the rare critiques of Lenin's Brest policy see Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, 387f. Lenin himself admitted in March 1920 committing "enough follies" in the Smolny period and singled out in this connection the Brest treaty. LCW, vol. 30, 459.

138. Lenin acted during the crisis on the assumption that the world war "will be protracted one". LCW, vol. 26, 448.

1. LCW, vol. 27, 221.

2. Ibid., 90, 127f., 161, 242, 259, 297, and passim. Later, in Oct. 1921, Lenin himself dismissed this simplistic conception. LCW, vol. 33, esp. pp. 88f.

3. Ibid., vol. 27, 147.

4. Ibid., 212.

5. Ibid., 163.

6. Cf. Neve in Schapiro and Reddaway, 203f.; Lorenz, 141-146.

7. LCW, vol. 26, 404-415; vol. 27, 218, 253, 259, and 273. Lenin advocated, for instance, the introduction of the Taylor system.

8. Ibid., 246-249. For documents on nationalization see esp. Bunyan and Fisher, 609-618.

9. Bunyan and Fisher, 622-627; cf. Chamberlin, I, 415f.

10. LCW, vol. 27, 475f.

11. Ibid., 102.

12. For Chicherin's background see Richard K. Debo, "The Making of a Bolshevik: Georgii Chicherin in England 1914-1918", Slavic Review, XXV, 1966, No. 4; Theodore H. von Laue, "G.V. Chicherin, Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1918-1930", in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., The Diplomats 1919-1939, vol. I (Princeton, N.J., 1953); Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, vol. I, (New York, 1930), preface, XIII-XIV; the same, Lenin, 274.

13. Chicherin later recalled that in the first years of the Soviet republic "sprachen wir taeglich einige Male telephonisch miteinander, und diese telephonischen Gespraeche zogen sich oft sehr in die Laenge; bei persönlichen Unterhaltung wurden oft alle Details der laufeneden diplomatischen Angelegenheiten gesprochen". N. Bukharin, et al., Lenin; Leben und Werk, (Vienna, 1924), (hereafter quoted as Bukharin, Lenin), 90f.

14. For this impact of the Brest treaty see Auswirkungen, vol. 3, documents 524, 540, 541, and 543.

15. See Trotskii, Sochineniia, XVII, 1, 173ff.; and the Left Communists' "Theses of the Current Situation" in Kommunist, Apr. 20, 1918. At that time Lenin also opened Chicherin's eyes to the "enormous importance" of France in the continental war. Bukharin, Lenin, 95.

16. See esp. Baumgart, 93ff.; Wheeler-Bennett, 325ff.

17. For details and Lenin's involvement see Svechnikov, op. cit. 73f.; Lev Trotskii, Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia (na voennoi rabote), vol. I, 266-274; V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski o grazhdanskoi voine, (hereafter quoted as Antonov-Ovseenko), vol. II, (Moscow, 1928), p. 294; Arthur E. Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine. The Second Campaign 1918-1919, (New Haven Conn., 1963), (hereafter quoted as Adams), pp. 20f.

18. Bunyan and Fisher, 572-574.

19. See the recollections of the head of this institution, Boris Reinstein, in the Communist International, vol. VI, Nos. 9-10 (1929) p. 431.

20. For a 'heroic' interpretation of Bolshevik policies in this sphere see Edward H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923, (Hammondsworth, Middlesex, 1966), (hereafter quoted as Carr), vol. III, 82-84; and Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 43f.

21. See for example Fischer, Lenin, 313f.; and Carr, III, 85f. Baumgart in his well documented study is able to substantiate the thesis about Ioffe's double role as a diplomat and agitator by Haase's toast at the Embassy 'to the International' and by quoting a contemporary meditation what a threat to Germany's integrity constituted the Red flag on the Embassy premises. Baumgart, 338f.

22. For Ioffe's own sober account of his activities in Berlin see Severnaia kommuna, Nov. 28, 1918. For a critical inside story of Ioffe's Embassy see G.A. Solomon, Sredi krasnykh vozhdei, (Paris, 1930), vol. I, part 1, esp. pp. 75ff.

23. There are six files in the German Foreign Ministry archives containing communications between Ioffe and Moscow. PAAA, Deutschland 127, No. 5, adh. 1, Mitteilungen der russischen Regierung an ihren bevollmachtigsten Vertreter in Berlin, Bd. 1-6.

24. See a confidential report of the German agent 'Walter' of June 20, 1918, PAAA, Deutschland 127 geh., Nr. 5, Bd. 2. The essence of his reports preserved in this file would make Voronov liable for treason.

25. Ioffe did publish materials on Soviet Russia, but with the permission of German authorities. Ironically, there is some evidence suggesting that the German Embassy in Moscow and the overstaffed German consulates in Moscow and Petrograd, totalling 634 and 180 respectively, were much deeply involved in undiplomatic activities and plotting. For Ioffe's activity in the weeks preceding the German revolution see the next chapter, section "Liebknecht, Ioffe, and the Others".

26. For details see Chamberlin, I, 414ff.

27. Iurii Steklov, "Iazyk pobeditelei", Pravda, April 23, 1918. Steklov, a former Menshevik, was a proponent of the pro-American orientation.

28. Trotskii, Sochineniia, XVII, 1, 214f.

29. LCW, vol. 27, 293 and 292.

30. See Chicherin's note in DVP, I, 269-271. Cf. Bunyan, ed., 114f.

31. LCW, vol. 27, 355. The evacuation to the Urals did not materialize.

32. Kommunist, No. 4, June 1918, 16-19; LSb., XI, 89.

33. LSb, XI, 79. Lenin himself held Sokolnikov in a high esteem for his conceptual thinking.

34. Bunyan, 122-125.

35. L.B. Schapiro, The Origins of the Communist Autocracy, (New York, 1965), 152f. Cf. Bunyan, 185-187.

36. PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 38, Bl. 133, Cf. Zeman, 124f. Mirbach had already pleaded for a modus vivendi with the Bolsheviks on May 11 and 12, after a talk to Karakhan and Radek. Baumgart, 163.

37. The English translation in FRUS, 1918 Russia, I, 533f. Cf. LCW, vol. 27, 381.

38. Zeman, 126f.

39. Ibid., 128f. By then the Left Socialist Revolutionaries also drifted away from the Brest peace.

40. PAAA, Deutschland 127, No. 5, adh. 1, Bd. 1.

41. LCW, vol. 44, 90.

42. DVP, I, 286-294; Cumming and Pettit, 204-212.

43. George F. Kennan has pointed out this motivation in Decision to Intervene, (Princeton, N.J., 1958), 223f.

44. Ludendorff assured Krassin that he had no intention of taking Petrograd or Moscow; all that Germany wanted was a supply of raw materials in exchange for commodities. Lubov Krassin, Leonid Krassin. His Life and Work, (London, 1929), 86-88.

45. FRUS, 1918 Russia, I, 538. The French sympathizer Sadoul now likewise noted the 'German orientation' of the Bolsheviks. Sadoul, 354.

46. See FRUS, 1918 Russia, I, 544 and 545f.

47. For the background of the conflict in English see esp. Kennan, Decision to Intervene, 136-165, 277ff.; Bunyan, 76ff.; and John F. N. Bradley, Allied Intervention in Russia, (London, 1968), 84ff.

48. Bunyan, 88f., and 91. Without informing them about this decision, Moscow requested the Czechoslovaks to surrender all their arms and rely on the "protection" of the Soviet organs.

49. Spartakusbriefe, (Berlin, 1958), 422-426. Cf. Liebknecht's anxiety in Karl Liebknecht, Gesammelte Reden und Schriften, (hereafter quoted as Liebknecht), vol. IX, (Berlin, 1958), pp. 485-487.

50. Baumgart, 136-139; Bunyan, 177-179.

51. Trotsky, Lenin, 154.

52. Lenin himself admitted this in July 1918: "The civil war...is coming from a quarter which not all of us anticipated and from which not all of us clearly realized it might come". LCW, vol. 28, 28. Later Lenin openly admitted his miscalculation. Ibid., vol. 33, 62.

53. Excerpts from the Left Communists' platform, published in Kommunist, No. 1, Apr. 20, 1918, have been translated in Bunyan and Fisher, 560-565. For the controversy in the spring of 1918 between Lenin and the Left Communists over the economic policy see Lorenz, esp. pp. 89ff., and 141ff.

55. For instance, Sadoul told Ambassador Francis on May 11 that Lenin contemplated denationalizing banks and revoking the decree of February 4, 1918; FRUS, 1918 Russia, I, 526. A German report of May 28 likewise noted Lenin's desire "sich von dem 'hysterischen Sozialismus' abzuwenden und Realpolitik ohne Rücksicht auf zeitweilige Verletzung der sozialistischen Prinzipien zu treiben". PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 39, Bl. 70-71.

56. For the main aspects of war communism see Chamberlin, II, 96ff.; and Paul Craig Roberts, "'War Communism' - a Re-examination", Slavic Review, vol. 29, No. 2, (June, 1970).

57. For Krassin's view see Miliukov, Rossiia na perelome, 144; for view of other prominent Bolsheviks see chapter VI, section 1. Lenin himself admitted in July 1918 that the transition to socialism will be "very long". LCW, vol. 27, 465.

58. In the period of the Western intervention the term "world revolution" in Bolshevik propaganda became equivalent to the proletarian revolution in the West. It is hereafter used in this sense.

59. LCW, vol. 27, 365-381.

60. Ibid., 424.

61. Ibid., 440f. Carr, III, 97, has likewise noted that world revolution "was in a certain sense the counterpart in Soviet foreign policy of war communism".

62. It was at this time that Trotsky summed up the Bolshevik position in words "we are actually dead, but there is nobody to bury us". K. von Bothmer, Mit Graf Mirbach in Moskau. Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Aktenstücke vom 19.April bis 24.August 1918, (Tübingen, 1922), (hereafter quoted as Bothmer), p. 57, Cf. Zeman, 131; and Price, 309f.

63. LCW, vol. 27, 463f.

64. Ibid., 449.

65. Ibid., 464 and 465. This author's emphasis.

66. See the next chapter for details.

67. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 165.

68. Pravda, Oct. 7, 1919.

69. Ibid.

70. See the last chapter of this study.

71. For an analysis of the world war propaganda see H. D. Lasswell, Propaganda Techniques in the World War, (New York, 1938). Cf. Jacques Ellul, Propaganda; The Formation of Men's Attitudes, (New York, 1965).

72. Baumgart, 218.

73. Zeman, 134f.

74. Ibid., 138f. Also PAAA, Deutschland 131, geheim, Bd. 18, Bl. 188-191.

75. Baumgart, 220. As Ioffe had previously suggested to Moscow, the scuttling of some Russian Black Sea warships by the Bolsheviks on June 18, indeed did not provoke a negative German reaction. For Ioffe's hint see The Trotsky Papers, 1917-1922, ed. by Jan M. Meyer, (hereafter quoted as TP), vol. I, (The Hague, 1964), p. 51.

76. PAAA, Weltkrieg 15 geh., Bd. 5, Bl. 171. See also Baumgart, 86, and 104. The outcome of the Spa Council has recently been misinterpreted in Holger H. Herwig, "German Policy in the Eastern Baltic Sea in 1918: Expansion or Anti-Bolshevik Crusade?", Slavic Review, vol. 32, No. 2 (June, 1973), 347.

77. Hans W. Gatzke, "Dokumentation zu den deutsch-russischen Beziehungen im Sommer 1918", in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol. 3 (1955), pp. 77-79. Radek likewise voiced the possibility of military cooperation with Germany during his visit to Vologda in the middle of July. Francis, 250.

78. Gatzke, op. cit., 79-83. Kühlmann wrote on July 6 about "der ausgesprochenen Schwenkung Ratsregierung zum deutschen Standpunkt". PAAA, Generalhauptquartier, Russland, 31k.

79. Gatzke, op. cit., 84. Cf. Fritz Fischer, 575f.

80. See George Katkov, "The Assassination of Count Mirbach", in Soviet Affairs, No. 3 (St. Antony's Papers, No. 12), (London, 1962), 53-93; Possony, 283f. It has turned out recently that the Bolsheviks discussed the assassination threat with Mirbach's Secretary Kurt Riezler. See Konrad H. Jarausch, "Cooperation or Intervention?: Kurt Riezler and the Failure of German Ostpolitik, 1918", in Slavic Review, vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1972), 386n.

81. Trotsky for instance noted a sign of relief in Lenin's and Sverdlov's response to Mirbach's assassination. Trotsky, Lenin, 155-157. The assassin Blumkin managed to escape, but surrendered in 1919 and was fully rehabilitated.

82. The Soviet government was requested in the middle of July to permit a battalion of German soldiers to guard the German Embassy in Moscow. Lenin, typically, rejected this request in public (LCW, vol. 27, 538-541), but accepted it subsequently in the secret. The plan did not materialize since the Embassy was transferred in August from Moscow to Pskov. For the German side of the Mirbach affair see Baumgart, 222ff.; and Jarausch, op. cit., 386ff.

83. For the diplomatic background of the intervention see Kennan, Decision to Intervene, 363ff. and 381ff.; Ullman, I, 230ff. and 258ff.

84. Georgi Chicherin, Two Years of Foreign Policy, (New York, 1920), 15. Cf. the editorial "Otstavka Kiulmanna", Pravda, July 11, 1918.

85. "Mirotvorcheskoe slovobludie", Pravda, July 26, 1918. Cf. the Pravda editorials of July 23 and July 27, 1918.

86. Leon Trotsky, Diary in Exile, 1935, (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 85.

87. Helfferich to the German Foreign Ministry, Aug. 4, 1918, PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 45, Bl. 10; Baumgart, 237f. Cf. Helfferich to the German Foreign Ministry on Trotsky, Aug. 1, 1918, PAAA, Weltkrieg 29, Bd. 2. The German journalist Paquet learned in early August about "sharp controversies" between Lenin and Trotsky. Alfons Paquet, Im kommunistischen Russland. Briefe aus Moskau, (Jena, 1919), 56.

88. LCW, vol. 28, 31.

89. Karl Helfferich, Der Weltkrieg, III (Berlin, 1919), 466f.; Bothmer, 117; Chicherin in Bukharin, Lenin, 93.

90. Baumgart, 109.

91. Ibid., 108, note 67.

92. Moscow after August 8 continued to urge cooperation with the Germans provided that Petrograd was not occupied. The Bolsheviks suggested a parallel action of the German and Russian troops against Murmansk and Archangel under the command of the German Field Marshal von Mackensen, but Ludendorff apparently was not keen, after the German defeat of August 8, to fight the Allies in the Russian tundra. For details see Baumgart, 107-116. Herwig in op. cit. attributes the action an outspokenly anti-Bolshevik sense.

93. The Japanese occupation force increased to 70,000 in November 1918, but the Bolsheviks were not particularly disturbed by this fact being prone to surrender Siberia. See Gatzke, op. cit., 95.

94. A brief report and comment on the "formidable struggle" and the German defeat on the Western front appeared in Pravda, on the following day, August 10. Responding obviously to the 'Black Day' Ambassador Francis on August 9 assured confidently the 'Russian people' that the war would result in an absolute defeat of the Central powers. Cumming and Pettit, 244-246.

95. See LPSS, vol. 50, 141-146.

96. Baumgart, 112. `On August 10 Lenin also issued an appeal to the Russian subjects in France urging them to resist their inclusion into the French army and castigating those who would enlist as enemies of the revolution and republic (Pravda, August 11); on the same day the Bolsheviks also hastily staged a militant demonstration in Moscow with the participation of Sverdlov, Kamenev, Bukharin, and others. The demonstration was organized on Aug. 9. See Pravda, Aug. 10, 1918.

97. John L.H. Keep, who has recently noted this fact, attributes it to the impact of peasant risings. Bernard W. Eissenstat, ed., Lenin and Leninism. State, Law, and Society, (Lexington, Mass., 1971), (hereafter quoted as Eissenstat), p. 259.

98. Editorial "Ober-zhandarmy", Pravda, Aug. 17, 1918.

99. LCW, vol. 28, 62-75.

100. Ibid., 75 and 74.

101. There is evidence suggesting that the Left Communists and to some extent even Ioffe, continued to reject an intimate relationship with Germany which Lenin still might endeavor to achieve. See Lenin's criticism of Ioffe in LSb, XXXVI, 60; and an undated Voronov report on the Soviet mission in Berlin, PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 1. Cf. Bukharin's rejection of a formal alliance with Germany as unwise in view of the latter's declining military power, Pravda, Sept. 17, 1918.

102. Lenin, intepreting Helfferich's recall as a sign of German intention to severe diplomatic relations with the Soviet government, recalled the insufficiently cooperative Ambassador Ioffe and hastily dispatched Karl Radek to Berlin. "Ich bin ueberzeugt ," Consul Hausschild commented on Radek's mission, "dass er alle Minen springen lassen wird, um zu beweisen, dass ein Buendnis durch Dick und Duenn mit den Bolschewiki fuer beide Teile das einzige Richtige ist." PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Nr. 2, Bd. 1. Radek subsequently returned to Moscow, having been assured by Ioffe that the Germans did not contemplate a rupture of diplomatic relations. Cf. Baumgart, 289f.

103. For the text see DVP, I, 437-453; Wheeler-Bennett, 427-434.

104. Wheeler-Bennett, 439-446.

105. Ibid., 437. Ioffe's answer in PAAA, Weltkrieg Friedensverhandlungen, Russland Politisches Nr. 1, Bd. 26.

106. Baumgart, 300ff.; Price, 343.

107. Baumgart, 302f. It is noteworthy that the prominent Germans now advocated cooperation with the Bolsheviks for fairly expansionist reasons. For example, one of the most influential German politicians and the future Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic, Stresemann, expounded his view of Ostpolitik in a letter to Ludwig Stollwerck of September 6, 1918: if Germany was compelled to make peace on Allied terms "wuerden wir unsere Oststellungen wahren muessen, waehrend wir im Westen die frueher gelegten Hoffnungen zu Grabe tragen muessen. Vielleicht wendet sich das ganze Gesicht Deutschlands in Zukunft etwas mehr dem Osten zu, und wir finden dort einigen Ersatz fuer das, was auf dem Gebiete des ueberseeischen Wettbewerbe vorlaeufig fuer uns nicht zu erlangen ist." PAAA, Nachlass Stresemann. Bd. 194, H 135711. Cf. Hintze's view in his memorandum of Aug. 30, 1918, in PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 50.

108. The Majority Socialist leader Ebert (the future President of the Weimar Republic) and his colleagues, for instance, denounced the treaty as violating the principle of self-determination and accused the Bolsheviks of discrediting socialism. SGO, 600-605. Ironically, Zinoviev sharply rebuked Ebert for not voting for the supplementary treaty. Grigori Zinoviev, N. Lenin, His Life and Work, (Toronto, n.d.), 33.

109. "Die russische Tragodie", Spartakusbriefe, 453-460. Ct. Liebknecht's view in "Zur Lage der russischen Revolution", in Liebknecht, IX, 561f.

110. The German notes complaining about the "inflammatory articles" in the Russian press undoubtedly accelerated this process. Chicherin, Two Years of Foreign Policy, 23.

111. Report of the Abteilung Fremde Heere, Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, Sept. 27, 1918, PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 2. In order to foster the German orientation in Russia, the Germans in turn financed the Moscow paper "Mir" which appeared since early August 1918 in 30,000 - 50,000 copies. Hausschild to the Foreign Ministry, Sept. 12, 1918, PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 50. Cf. Bothmer, 118.

112. PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 49, Bl. 157. The German Spartacists also failed to visualize the German collapse. See "Die Pleite des Imperialismus", Spartakusbriefe, 450.

1. See the previous chapter, footnote 21; also George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, (Boston, 1961), p. 152.

2. LCW, vol. 28, 159 f. Cf. ibid., 120. Karl Radek also feared that the victory of the Entente countries would enable them to "tame the masses and then attack Germany in order to save the European capitalism and annihilate the German revolution". Krushenie germanskogo imperializma i zadachi mezhdunarodnogo rabochego klassa, (Moscow, 1918), (hereafter quoted as Krushenie), p. 35f. Cf. his Der Zusammenbruch des Imperialismus ind die Aufgaben der internationalen Arbeiterklasse, (Munich, n.d.), (hereafter quoted as Zusammenbruch), pp. 48f.

3. Report of the Politische Abteilung, Grosses Hauptquartier, July 22, 1918, PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 1.

4. Report of the German agent Walter of July 1918, PAAA, Deutschland 127 geheim, Nr. 5, Bd. 2.

5. "Repetitsiia", Pravda, Aug. 20, 1918.

6. Ibid.

7. The Bolsheviki and World Peace, 227f. Cf. Sochineniia, III, 1, 78f., and My Life, 223.

8. Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, I, 366ff. Cf. Radek's admission of October 7 that the German Bolshevism was weak. Krushenie, 34.

9. Severnaia kommuna, Dec. 24, 1918. For Stalin's emphasis on the Red army see his Works, IV, 149f. and 151-154.

10. For a brief survey of pro-Bolshevik groups and organizations see Borkenau, 88f.; and Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 89.

11. The contention that Lenin was poorly informed about the situation in the West (see for instance Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 47) is hardly tenable. The Bolshevik representatives in Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden, as well as the monitoring of Western broadcasts in Russia provided Lenin with an incomplete but still sufficient basis for making sound political decisions.

12. LCW, vol. 28, 113.

13. In retrospect Lenin maintained that the socialist revolution could have been successful in some Western countries immediately after the world war had ended, at the time when the masses were armed, and provided that the proletariat of Western Europe had not been split. Ibid., vol. 30, 417. Cf. ibid., vol. 28, 39.

14. For Chicherin's view see Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, I, preface, xii; for Bukharin's see Cohen, op. cit., 447. Radek in October 1918 likewise expected that in the near future the world

would be shaped for several decades. Krushenie, 43. For Levinė's view see PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 3.

15. LCW, vol. 28, 288.

16. Ibid., 292.

17. Ibid., 114 and 160.

18. Ibid., 154f.; and vol. 44, 149.

19. For instance, the British government suggested on August 31, in the beginning of the Red terror, that the Bolsheviks would be treated "as outlaws by the governments of all civilized nations". Ullman, I, 290.

20. The documents are reprinted in Sisson, appendix. George F. Kennan has subjected them to a critical scrutiny in The Journal of Modern History, vol. 28, No. 2 (June 1956). For the diplomatic background and preparations for the intervention see esp. Ullman, I, 296ff.; and George A. Brinkley, The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia, 1917-1921, (Notre Dame, Ind., 1966), (hereafter quoted as Brinkley), pp. 73ff.

21. "Balkanskoe ravnovesie ischezlo", Pravda, Sept. 27, 1918.

22. Radek, Krushenie, 42f.; Trotskii, Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, I, 363-365; Iakov M. Sverdlov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1960), 26 and 45.

23. For Lenin's view of intervention see LCW, vol. 28, 119, 158f., 161; and LSb., vol. 34, 47. Cf. John M. Thompson, "Lenin's Analysis of Intervention", in American Slavic and East European Review, vol. 17, No. 2 (April 1958), 151-160.

24. LCW, vol. 28, 295f., 120 and 164. For a panicky mood among the Bolsheviks see an interesting account in Bolshevik Propaganda, 203.

25. Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, I, 367f. For a similar appraisal of the United States see also Radek, Zusammenbruch, 22ff.

26. Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, I, 371.

27. See Trotsky's speeches of October 30 and November 18, 1918; Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, I, esp. pp. 375 and 395. For a similar view by Bukharin see his article "Konets imperialisticheskoi voiny i mirovaia revoliutsiia", Pravda, Nov. 24, 1918. For Rakovsky's frank assessment of intervention see PAAA, Weltkrieg 5e, Bd. 4, Bl. 139.

28. LSb., vol. 21, 252f. Lenin and Trotsky had promised assistance to the Western proletariat already in the Brest period. See LCW, vol. 27, 238; and Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, I, 28.

29. LCW, vol. 28, 101-104. In evaluating these instructions E.H. Carr seems to have misunderstood a fine distinction between Lenin's personal view and his tactical stand. Carr, III, 100.

30. Degras, SDFP, I, 112. The same day Radek predicted the formation of an "united Red front of the proletarian revolution from Volga to the Rhine" to fight the Allies. Pravda, Oct. 6, 1918. Cf. Trotskii, Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, I, 372.

31. Lazitch and Drachkovich, 42. Taking the VTsIK declaration prima facie, Ulam, in Lenin and The Bolsheviks, 446, has reached the conclusion that, in view of the Bolsheviks' military weakness, the defeat of the German communism in January 1919 "might well have been providential in saving Russian communism from a fatal adventure".

32. A.S. Bubnov, S.S. Kamenev, and R.P. Eideman, eds., Grazhdanskaia voina 1918-1921, (hereafter quoted as Bubnov, ed.), vol. III (Moscow, 1930), p. 135f.; Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR, (hereafter quoted as IzIGV), vol. I, (Moscow, 1960), pp. 364-370. In November 1918 the entire Western front disposed of only 100,000 rifles, several hundred sabres and ten [!] guns. See N.E. Kakurin and V.A. Melikov, Voina s belopoliakami 1920g., (Moscow, 1925), 7.

33. Cf. Possony, 295. Later in October the Bolsheviks mostly dropped references to the military aid and simply called for a strong army to defend Soviet Russia. Editorial "Nelzia teriat' ni minuty", Pravda, Oct. 15, 1918.

34. Bunyan, 275f.; LPSS, vol. 37, 613n. For Lenin's crucial role in the Council of Defence see Trotsky, Stalin, (London, 1947), 292.

35. Pravda, Nov. 26, 1918; Schapiro, The Origins of the Communist Autocracy, 196f. Mr. Schapiro does not offer explanation for the Bolshevik about-face.

36. Karl Radek, Die auswaertige Politik Sowjet-Russlands, (Hamburg, 1921), 25. Radek expressed here doubts whether the German revolution would be able quickly to overcome the consequences of the civil war - an argument he repeated in the following months.

37. LCW, vol. 44, 149.

38. For details see Hans R. Madol, Ferdinand von Bulgarien, (Berlin, 1931), 251ff.

39. The present discussion partly draws from monographs by Joseph Rotschild, The Communist Party of Bulgaria; Origins and Development, 1883-1936, (New York, 1959); and Mikhail A. Birman, Revoliutsionnaia situatsiia v Bolgarii v 1918-1919 gg., (Moscow, 1957).

40. Reports on the growing unrest in the Bulgarian army were reprinted in Pravda on August 15 and 24, 1918.

41. Moscow could utilize both the diplomatic channels and other emissaries. For a rather naive account by the Bulgarian S. Cherkezov, dispatched to Bulgaria by Lenin and Kollontai to "learn the situation on the spot" see Vospominaniia bolgarskikh tovarishchei o Lenine, (Moscow, 1958), 36-40.

42. Bulgarskata rabotnicheska partiia (komunisti) v rezoliutsii i resheniia na kongresite, konferentsiite i plenumite na TSK, vol. 1, 1891-1918 (Sofia, 1947), (hereafter quoted as Bulgarskata rabotnicheska partiia), pp. 427ff.

43. Birman, 110ff. Young Georgii Dimitrov urged the party to join the uprising, overthrow the monarchy and the Germanophile clique, and conclude peace, but his voice from the jail was not heard. Ibid., 120n.; and Khristo Kabakchiev, "Dimitri Blagoev i bolgarskie Tesniaki", Istorik Markist, No. 44 (1935), p. 52.

44. "Had the party then raised the slogan of peace and people's democratic republic", Dimitrov later admitted, "it would have undoubtedly united vast masses of the workers in the town and village. And the unity of action between our party and the Peasant Party would have guaranteed the success of the uprising". Georgii Dimitrov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, vol. II (Moscow, 1957), 583.

45. Rotschild, 82. Cf. Borkenau, 82 and 96f.; and Jacques Scharf, "La Révolution d'Octobre et le Mouvement Ouvrier dans les Pays Balkaniques" in Victor Fay, ed., La Révolution d'Octobre et le Mouvement Ouvrier Européen, (Paris, 1968), esp. pp. 200f.

46. "A victory of either imperialist coalition", asserted the Tesniaks' resolution on the eve of the German defeat, "would mean a continuation of economic and political slavery of the proletariat in the capitalist countries". Bulgarskata rabotnicheska partiia, I, 426.

47. Khristo Kabakchiev, "Lenin i bolgarskie Tesnyaki", Istorik Marksist, No. 35 (1934), p. 184ff. Sharply criticized by the Comintern officials, the Bulgarian communists were later exonerated for their inactivity in September 1918 both by Lenin personally and by a special commission of the Comintern. Ibid.; and Rotschild, 83.

48. Semen I. Aralov, Lenin vel nas k pobede; vospominaniia, (Moscow, 1962), 146; IzIGV, I, 640f. For an analysis of Bolshevik policies in the Ukraine see esp. Adams, pp. 21ff.

49. Instead, it was desirable to "get organized and once more to get organized". IzLGV, I, 642f.

50. Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, I, 364. According to Generals Ludendorff and Hoffmann there were only twelve German divisions in the East, unfit to offensive purposes. Moreover, in many regions the German presence had become symbolical. For instance, there was one

German soldier in Lithuania for every eighteen square kilometres. General Hoffmann anticipated that only two divisions would be left on the entire Eastern front. Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey, eds., Die Regierung des Prinzen Max von Baden, (Düsseldorf, 1962), (hereafter quoted as Matthias and Morsey), pp. 222f.

51. Degras, SDFP, I, 111.

52. LCW, vol. 28, 123.

53. For details see Adams, 22; Aralov, 148f.

54. Moscow seems to have been very anxious to dissociate itself from the divisions. On October 19 Chicherin even informed Berlin that should the "Ukrainian rebels" enter the Soviet territory, they would be disarmed and, should they resist, shot. PAAA, Weltkrieg, 5, Funksprüche Russland, Bd. 3.

55. Mikhail I. Kulichenko, Borba kommunisticheskoi partii za reshenie natsional'nogo voprosa v 1918-1920 godakh, (Kharkov, 1963), (hereafter quoted as Kulichenko), p. 32f.; Sverdlov, op. cit., III, 47.

56. Degras, SDFP, I, 112.

57. Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost on the situation in Russia, Oct. 7, 1918, PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 2. Cf. the view of the Austro-Hungarian Consul General in Moscow de Pottere in Baumgart, 406.

58. PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 51, Bl. 37f. Cf. Hausschild's report of October 8 on his talk to Karl Radek, PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 2.

59. K. Rysto (Hermann Goldberg); Bolschewisten-Spiegel, (Hamburg and Berlin, 1919), p. 5.

60. Pravda, Oct. 1, 1918. Cf. Zinoviev's appraisal of the nationalist Graf Reventlow in Severnaia kommuna, Oct. 4, 1918. Lenin too juxtaposed two camps in Germany: one favoring the continuation of the war and other "seeking an agreement with the Anglo-French bourgeoisie" against Soviet Russia. LCW, vol. 28, 128.

61. LCW, vol. 28, 229-325. For the Bolshevik comment on the USPD peace platform see the editorial "Wilson, Haase, i Karl Liebknecht", Pravda, Oct. 28, 1918.

62. Hausschild to the German Foreign Ministry on Oct. 9, 1918, PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 2. A discussion of the national democratic revolutions in the Austro-Hungarian empire leading to the foundation of succession states falls beyond the scope of this study.

63. Paul Levi, Unser Weg wider den Putschismus, (Berlin, 1921), (quoted hereafter as Levi, Unser Weg), p. 61.

64. It is noteworthy in this connection that Pravda continued to carry reports from "Austria-Hungary" until January 9, 1919.

65. For the most detailed discussion of Spartakus during the war see J.P. Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, vol. 2 (London, 1966), (hereafter quoted as Nettl), passim; and Gilbert Badia, Le Spartakism. Les Dernières Années de Rosa Luxemburg et de Karl Liebknecht 1914-1919, (Paris, 1967), (hereafter quoted as Badia), passim. For a useful outline see Ryder, 76-83.

66. Liebknecht, IX, 397f., and 485-487; Paul Frölich, Rosa Luxemburg, (London, 1940), 269; Karl Retzlaw, Spartakus. Aufstieg und Niedergang, Erinnerungen eines Parteiarbeiters, (Frankfort/Main, 1972), (hereafter quoted as Retzlaw), p. 73f.

67. For instance, Franz Mehring published in Leipziger Volkszeitung a series of articles favorable to the Bolsheviks, Clara Zetkin wrote an encouraging personal letter to Lenin, and the Spartacists produced a series of leaflets mobilizing the German workers for actions in support of Soviet Russia. For the latter see Ernst Meyer, ed., Spartakus im Kriege, (Berlin, 1927), (hereafter quoted as Meyer, Spartakus), pp. 198-205.

68. The pamphlet, published first by Paul Levi, appeared in English as The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism?, (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1961).

69. Spartakusbriefe, 453-460. Karl Liebknecht, also imprisoned, likewise urged his friends to act. See Karl Radek, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Leo Jogiches, (Hamburg, 1921), (hereafter quoted as Radek, Luxemburg), pp. 34f.

70. Ernst Meyer in Rote Fahne, January 15, 1922. Cf. Liebknecht, IX, 545; and Nettl, II, 693.

71. Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, series II, (hereafter quoted as DMGDAB), vol. 2 (Berlin, 1957), p. 195.

72. For the realization on the part of the Spartakus of its weakness and political impotence see esp. Nettl, II, 721f.; and Dzerzhinsky's letter from Berlin of October 28, 1918, in F.E. Dzerzhinskii, Dnevnik: Pis'ma k rodnym, (Moscow, 1958), 254f.

73. Drahn and Leonhard, 117f. The documents of the conference ibid., 113-118; and in GDAB, III, 76-81.

74. For a similar view see Nettl, II, 709; Walter Bartel, Die Linken in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie im Kampf gegen Militarismus und Krieg, (Berlin, 1958), 575.

75. Igor M. Krivoguz, "Spartak" i obrazovanie Kommunisticheskoi partii Germanii, (Moscow, 1962), (hereafter quoted as Krivoguz), p. 118.

76. Drahn and Leonhard, 116.

77. LCW, vol. 35, 369.

78. "Kommunisticheskaia partiia v Germanii", Pravda, Oct. 23, 1918.

79. The defencist course seems to have been disapproved not only by the Spartacist moderates (Luxemburg, Levi), but also by the radicals (Otto Rühle). The differences have not yet been analyzed by scholars of the German revolution.

80. Die Ursachen des deutschen Zusammenbruches im Jahre 1918, (Berlin, 1925-1929), (hereafter quoted as Ursachen), vol. V, p. 2; also vol. IV, pp. 98 and 124f.

81. August Thalheimer in Karl Radek, Gegen den Nationalbolschewismus!, (Hamburg, 1920), 43f., and 46f.

82. Drahn and Leonhard, 171-177; Meyer, Spartakus, 206-208, and 210f.; Auswirkungen, IV, 1616-1618, and 1681f. Drahn and Leonhard, 118f., Meyer, Spartakus, 208-210, and DMGDAB, 2, 248-250 have printed two unsigned appeals produced obviously by the Independent Socialists. In a striking contrast to the Spartacist platform of October 7 these leaflets called for peace and made no reference to the favorite issue of the Spartakusbund, the alliance with Soviet Russia.

83. In Germany the Bolshevik funds were deposited with the respectable Berlin bank Mendelssohn which had been working actively for the resumption of trade with Russia. Auswirkungen, IV, 1627; Baumgart, 352. Cf. the testimony of the former U.S. attaché in Russia W.C. Huntington in Bolshevik Propaganda, 80f. According to German sources, Angelica Balabanoff transferred large funds into Switzerland.

84. Radek's pamphlet was entitled Der Zusammenbruch des Imperialismus und die Aufgaben der internationalen Arbeiterklasse. It was a revised German translation of his speech of October 7, 1918, published as Krushenie germanskogo imperializma i zadachi mezhdunarodnogo rabochego klassa, (Moscow, 1918). For a sample of the Bolshevik propaganda circulating in Germany see PAAA, Deutschland 88, Bd. 14, Bl. 76.

85. Drahn and Leonhard, 151-158; Meyer, Spartakus, 211-220. It is symptomatic for the Bolshevik stand in the autumn of 1918 that even the former Left Communist Bukharin now no longer summoned the international proletariat to revolution but merely claimed the Soviet right "to ask for an effective help, no longer in words, but in deeds". Drahn and Leonhard, 157; Meyer, Spartakus, 220.

86. Krivoguz, 126.

87. For Meyer's tendencious recollections of his contacts with Luxemburg see Rote Fahne, Jan. 15, 1922. The best and most extensive coverage of Rosa Luxemburg's position in the autumn of 1918 is in Nettl, II, 706ff.

88. Spartakusbriefe, 469-471.

89. "Friedensbedingungen", Spartakusbriefe, 467-469. See also "Der Knoten der internationalen Lage", ibid., 461-463.

90. Quoted in a certified copy of the detention order of Feb. 22, 1918 kept in Levi Nachlass, box 123. Surprisingly, most of the arguments brought up in this and following section have not been reckoned with by the monographers of Rosa Luxemburg and the German revolution.

91. Karl W. Meyer, Karl Liebknecht: Man Without a Country, (Washington, D.C., 1957), (hereafter quoted as Meyer, Liebknecht).

92. Ibid., 34. For very interesting observations on Liebknecht's personality see especially memoirs of his socialist friend Hendrik de Man, Gegen den Strom, (Stuttgart, 1953), 106, and passim.

93. "Die Arbeiterbewegung bis hinter das Jahr 1870 zuruckgeworfen: Das ist Fazit", Liebknecht concluded in 1917. Liebknecht, IX, 340f.

94. Liebknecht's appeal to the Allied soldiers, Ibid., 586f. Cf. Pravda, Nov. 5, 1918.

95. Matthias and Morsey, 95; Auswirkungen, IV, 1590.

96. Hausschild's report of October 9, 1918, PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 2.

97. Pravda, Oct. 9, 1918. Radek pleaded also for the release of the radical Austrian socialist Friedrich Adler.

98. According to Reich Chancellor Max von Baden, Scheidemann feared that the Independents would attempt to mobilize the workers against the 'national defence' and the Majority Socialists would be unable to "cope with the storm" without the amnesty for Liebknecht. Max von Baden, Erinnerungen und Dokumente, (Stuttgart, 1968), 449.

99. Matthias and Morsey, 130.

100. Scheidemann, II, 511.

101. The German government nevertheless dispatched a conciliatory note to Wilson with the purpose of ascertaining the chances of a negotiated peace. For a detailed analysis see Klaus Schwabe, Deutsche Revolution und Wilson-Frieden. Die amerikanische und deutsche Friedensstrategie zwischen Ideologie und Machtpolitik 1918/19, (Düsseldorf, 1971), (hereafter quoted as Schwabe), pp. 118-144. Cf. Scheidemann, II, 513-515.

102. Matthias and Morsey, 220-242; Ludendorff, II, 748ff.; Scheidemann, II, 512f.; Auswirkungen, IV, 1630-1636. The idea of 'levée en masse' was raised first by Walther Rathenau in Vossische Zeitung, Oct. 7, 1918.

103. Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Nachlass Solf, No. 56; incoming letters in PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 52.

104. I. Gregory Campbell, "The Kaiser and Mitteleuropa in October 1918", in Central European History, vol. II, No. 4 (December 1969), 386.

105. DMGDAB, 2, 247.

106. Vorwärts, Oct. 17, 1918.

107. See note 102.

108. Degras, SDFP, I, 112-120. For Lenin's instruction see LPSS, vol. 50, 188-191.

109. Pravda, Oct. 19, 1918.

110. LCW, vol. 28, 121.

111. A letter of Oct. 28, 1918, PAAA, Internationale Angelegenheiten 2, Bd. 1. The Germans maintained very good relations with the member of the Bolshevik representation Dr. G. L. Shklovsky. See Romberg's letter of November 5, 1918, PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 3. Karl Radek voiced a similar wish for a strong regime in Germany to a German agent. See above, note 59. On October 26 Ioffe regretted that it was not possible to say in public that Moscow intended to support the German proletariat in the struggle with the external, not internal, enemy. PAAA, Weltkrieg 5e, Funksprüche, Bd. 4.

112. Pravda, Nov. 20, 1918. Cf. Radek, Luxemburg, 35.

113. Meyer, Liebknecht, 127.

114. Personally, the passionate antimilitarist Liebknecht was by no means a pacifist. As his friend noted, he barely concealed his pride over his years as soldier. In the words of his friend, Liebknecht had a "Zeug zu einem guten Soldaten. Mehr als einmal hat er mir mit nur halb durch Ironie verstecktem Stolz von seiner Dienstzeit als Pioneer erzählt, wobei er sogar eine Medaille erhalten hatte". De Man, op. cit., 107. Politically, Liebknecht realized that a revolution was not likely to preserve or increase the country's capacity to resist. Liebknecht, IX, 457.

115. For the German response to Wilson's note see Scheidemann, II, 520-522; and Schwabe, 195-227.

116. The article reprinted in DMGDAB, 2, 268f.

117. Georg Ledebour drew this parallel between Radek's tactics in 1917 and Liebknecht's in October 1918 in a series of articles "Die deutsche Novemberrevolution" published in Sozialistische Arbeiterzeitung in November 1931.

118. For the principal primary sources relating to the Spartacist tactics discussed in this section see Emil Barth, Aus der Werkstatt der deutschen Revolution, (Berlin, 1919), (hereafter quoted as Barth); Richard Müller, Vom Kaiserreich zur Republik, (Vienna, 1924), (hereafter quoted as Müller, Vom Kaiserreich); Wilhelm Pieck, Die Gründung der KPD. Erinnerungen an die November-Revolution, (Berlin, cca 1928), (hereafter quoted as Pieck, Die Gründung); the same, Gesammelte Reden und Schriften, (hereafter quoted as Pieck, Reden), vol. I (Berlin, 1959); and an untitled typewritten memoir of the German revolution deposited in Nachlass Levi, Bonn-Bad Godesberg. Since this memoir as a text analysis shows beyond any doubt, constitutes an uncensored version of Pieck's published recollections, it is further referred to as Pieck-Memoir.

119. Vorwärts, Oct. 29, 1918.

120. Ibid. The renowned anti-Bolshevik Stadtler likewise commented on the communist propaganda: "Der Bolschewik ist also nichts anderes als ein radical-revolutionärer Verfechter der Friedensideen...Im jetzigen Moment kennt der russische Bolschewismus nur eine Sorge: die Möglichkeit des Friedens. Radek und Lenin wissen nur zu genau, dass eine friedliche Erledigung des Weltkrieges...einerseits die bolschewistischen Weltrevolutionsträume illusorisch macht und anderseits auch den Bolschewismus als russischer Regierungsfaktor erledigt". Kreuzzeitung, Oct. 31, 1918.

121. Pieck-Memoir, 2. Barth pointed out the decision of October 26 to coordinate the Obleute's actions with the Spartakus and postpone them until November 3. Pieck suppressed this fact in the published version of his memoirs. Reden, I, 414f.

122. Such a stand, for instance, is implied by Liebknecht's entry in his diary of Oct. 28: Liebknecht "eigene Initiative fordert, zunächst, falls nichts Starkeres für möglich gehalten wird, falls die nationale Verteidigung etc. nicht kommt usw., mindestens Versammlungen mit Demonstrationen am 3.11." Liebknecht, IX, 581.

123. Illustrierte Geschichte der Novemberrevolution in Deutschland, (Berlin, 1968), (hereafter quoted as Illustrierte Geschichte), p. 203.

124. Matthias and Morsey, 400-402.

125. Ibid., 404-409.

126. DVP, I, 545.

127. Ibid.

128. Baumgart, 174; Ioffe to Chicherin, October 28, 1918, PAAA, Weltkrieg 5e, Funksprüche, Bd. 4.

129. Baumgart, 355f., and 547.

130. Pravda, Oct. 30, 1918. The same day Hausschild reported from Moscow to Berlin that "the Soviet government will avoid everything what might worsen relations with Germany since...its hope in the imminence of the German revolution has been shattered". PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 53, Bl. 30f.

131. Pieck, Reden, I, 415.

132. Pieck, Memoir, 2.

133. Rosen to the German Foreign Ministry, Oct. 30, 1918, PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 2. The mysterious 'Frau Breithappt' with contacts to Ioffe, the German revolutionaries and agents of the Imperial government could be a cover name for Frau Tony Breitscheid who worked in the press department of the Soviet Embassy, together with her husband Dr. Rudolf Breitscheid and Ioffe's mistress, a young German socialist Käthe Rauch. First the Breitscheids, themselves German socialists, prepared reports about the German workers' movement for the Embassy. Second, they were on intimate terms with Ioffe. According to a German source on Frau Breitscheid's request, Ioffe successfully intervened with the German military authorities against her husband's being drafted into the army. Third, according to the same source the German revolutionaries indeed suspected the Breitscheids to be in the secret service of the German government. (According to Rosen's informer, 'Frau Breithaupt' also was "closely watched" by the Spartacists.) For information regarding the Breitscheids see the memorandum "Die bolschewistische Propaganda in Deutschland" of Oct. 15, 1918, PAAA, Internationale Angelegenheiten, 2, Bd. 1.

134. Pieck-Memoir, 2; the same Reden, I, 415.

135. This fact comes out from Illustrierte Geschichte, 182.

136. See Ottokar Luban, "Zwei Schreiben der Spartakuszentrale an Rosa Luxemburg (Juni 1917; 5. November 1918)", in Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, XI (1971), 238-240.

137. Müller, Vom Kaiserreich, I, 138; Ursachen, V, 118 and 120; Pieck-Memoir, 3; Ledebour in Sozialistische Arbeiterzeitung, November 14, 1931.

138. It would appear that Pieck made an about face after his visit to the Soviet Embassy on October 30 and his talk with Karl Liebknecht on November 1.

139. Pieck-Memoir, 3.

140. Ibid., 4. Although there must be materials relating to this meeting in the Central Party Archives in Moscow, the essence of them has never been disclosed, see J.S. Drabkin, Die November-Revolution in Deutschland, (Berlin, 1968), (hereafter quoted as Drabkin), p. 104.

141. Pieck-Memoir, 4.

142. For the meeting see Barth, 48-50; Müller, Vom Kaiserreich, I, 138f.; Ursachen, V, 118-121; Ledebour in Sozialistische Arbeiterzeitung, November 14, 1931; Pieck, Reden, I, 417-419.

143. This time the informer was a member of the German Orient Institute Gerhard Müller. Although the report reached the German authorities on November 6, Müller must have been passed the information prior to November 5. PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 2.

144. Ledebour in Sozialistische Arbeiterzeitung, Nov. 15, 131. Pieck's story, naturally, is hostile towards Walz. Pieck-Memoir, 7, and 15f. For other mysterious denouncements see for instance Clare Casper-Derfert in Vorwärts und nichts vergessen. Erlebnisberichte aktiver Teilnehmer der Novemberrevolution 1918/19, (Berlin, 1958), pp.297f.

145. Pieck, Reden, I, 420 and 422. On November 4 Liebknecht still advised a young socialist soldier, contemplating desertion, to return to his unit. Bruno Peters in Vorwärts und nichts vergessen, 351.

146. Clare Derfert-Casper in 1918 - Erinnerungen von Veteranen der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung an die Novemberrevolution 1918-1920, (2nd ed., Berlin, 1960), p. 354.

147. Baumgart, 349ff.; Auswirkungen, IV, 1627-1630 and 1689f.

148. According to the former Spartacist Emil Franzel, Soviet propaganda was distributed freely prior to October 1918; in the last weeks of the war formal charges were laid against the distributors (Franzel was among them), but no further action was taken: Interview with Herr Franzel, Nov. 13, 1972.

149. See for instance the assessment of the Prussian Minister of the Interior in Auswirkungen, IV, 1677f.

150. Matthias and Morsey, 242; Baumgart, 357.

151. Ibid., 359.

152. Protocol of the cabinet sessions, PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 2; Auswirkungen, IV, 1689f.; Baumgart, 351-354.

153. Ioffe to Chicherin, Nov. 2, 1918; PAAA, Weltkrieg 5e, Funksprüche, Bd. 4, Bl. 112.

154. "Russisches Referat: Aufzeichnung", Oct. 31, 1918, PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 53, Bl. 37. Cf. Baumgart, 356f.

155. Nadolny alluded to the discontinuation of the gold deliveries. Meanwhile, however, Moscow expressed willingness to honour its obligations.

156. "Nachdem wir aber nunmehr unsere Politik auf den Frieden umstellen müssen", argued Solf, "frage ich mich, ob nicht der Zeitpunkt für eine Revision unserer Beziehungen zu den gegenwärtigen Machthabern in Moskau in grössere Nahe gerückt erscheint": draft of Solf's letter to Hintze of October 22, 1918, PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 52. Cf. Baumgart, 406.

157. Materials relating to the incident in PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 50.

158. The memorandum "Die bolschewistische Propaganda in Deutschland" of October 15 already suggested the following measure: "Heimliche Einsichtnahme in die Kuriersacke. Die deutschen Kuriere dürfen in der fraglichen Zeit kein uns belastendes Material mit sich führen, in der Erwartung der Represalien". PAAA, Internationale Angelegenheiten, 2, Bd. 1.

159. Auswirkungen, IV, 1691f.

160. Romberg to the German Foreign Ministry, Nov. 1, 1918, PAAA, Internationale Angelegenheiten 2, Bd. 1.

161. Vorwärts, Nov. 4, 1918.

162. Rudolf Nadolny, Mein Beitrag, (Wiesbaden, 1955), 62. Nadolny erroneously dates the meeting and incident as November 3.

163. DVP, I, 560. Chicherin argued similarly in a telephone conversation with Ioffe, PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 54, Bl. 35f.

164. "Zittert ihr Bluthunde und Volksmörder". It called for a stop of bloodshed on both sides of the trenches, for peace and fraternization of the nations. Soviet Russia was not mentioned here. The leaflet was obviously written by Paul Levi. For the list of materials allegedly found in the trunk, see PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 3.

165. For the text see Auswirkungen, IV, 1681f.

166. Ioffe, not enthusiastic about his return to Russia at all, allegedly contemplated emigration into a neutral country. PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 3.

167. LCW, vol. 28, 148f. Cf. Karl Radek, Die deutsche Revolution oder trau, schau, wem?, (Moscow, 1918), 21.

1. See for instance the first reports in Pravda of November 10 or Severnaia kommuna of November 10 and 12. The Sovnarkom, obviously upon Lenin's initiative, issued a statement on November 12 indicating that it was necessary "to maintain maximum caution in the assessment of the revolutionary movement that was taking place in Germany." See Abraham Ascher, "Russian Marxism and the German Revolution, 1917-1920", in Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, VI/VII (1966-67), (hereafter quoted as Ascher, "Russian Marxism..."), p. 407. The Dutch Marxist Hermann Gorter promptly spelled out important factors which were bound seriously to impede the path of the Western European revolutions. Severnaia kommuna, Nov. 13, 1918. In Carr, III, 104, the events which occurred in Moscow on Nov. 3 and 10 respectively, are mixed together, as if they occurred on Nov. 10.

2. LCW, vol. 28, 163. Lenin also told Philips Price that the revolution in Central Europe was developing "too slowly to provide us with any assistance" in the struggle against the intervention. Price, 345.

3. LCW, vol. 28, 155.

4. Ibid., 164.

5. For an evaluation of the Russian issue in the armistice agreements see esp. John M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace, (Princeton, N.J., 1966), (hereafter quoted as Thompson), pp. 23f.

6. G. Bittker, "Nesvoevremennye mysli", Pravda, Nov. 10, 1918. Cf. Pravda, Oct. 29, Nov. 2, 13, and 17, 1918.

7. Severnaia kommuna, Nov. 15, 1918.

8. For the diplomatic background of the intervention and actual preparations see esp. Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921, vol. II, Britain and the Russian Civil War, (Princeton, N.J., 1968), (hereafter quoted as Ullman, II), pp. 5ff., and 59ff.; and Brinkley, 75ff.

9. Brinkley, 80ff.; FRUS, Russia 1918, II, 699f.

10. FRUS, Russia 1918, III, 53.

11. Antonov-Ovseenko, II, 11ff.; Kulichenko, 48. Conceding that the march westwards had come as a surprise, Pravda on December 19 urged the Bolsheviks to shake off irresoluteness and vacillation and continue the advance. Lenin and Trotsky, however, fearing possible political and military consequences, came to follow a very cautious course. Adams, 55f. TP, I, 230.

12. DVP, I, 549 and 556; Degras, SDFP, I, 123.

13. LCW, vol. 28, 159.

14. See Charles B. Burdick and Ralph H. Lutz, eds., The Political Institutions of the German Revolution 1918-1919, (New York, 1966), (hereafter quoted as Burdick and Lutz), pp. 38-41.

15. The Berlin Council on November 10 adopted a resolution drafted by the head of the Independent Socialists Hugo Haase which called for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia and suggested that a Soviet delegation be invited to the forthcoming congress of the German councils. Ryder, 173. For the best discussion of Germany's internal politics see Wolfgang Elben, Das Problem der Kontinuität in der deutschen Revolution. Die Politik der Staatssekretare und der militarischen Fuhrung vom November 1918 biz Februar 1919, (Düsseldorf, 1965), (hereafter quoted as Elben); and Eberhard Kolb, Die Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Innenpolitik 1918-1919, (Düsseldorf, 1962), (hereafter quoted as Kolb). For an interesting survey of views and opinions of the German revolution see Gerhard P. Bassler, "The Communist Movement in the German Revolution, 1918-1919: A Problem of Historical Topology?", in Central European History, vol. VI, No. 3 (September 1973).

16. Pravda, Nov. 14, 1918; Severnaia kommuna, Nov. 12 and 15, 1918. These offers, except a radio broadcast of November 11 (see below note 23) were not directed against the ruling socialist coalition.

17. Editorial "Sovetskaia Germaniia", Pravda, Nov. 10, 1918.

18. N. Osinskii, "Da zdravstvuet germanskaia revoliutsiia", ibid. Pursuing a similar tactic, Liebknecht expressed his willingness to enter the new German government.

19. PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 54, Bl. 129. In a telephone conversation with another Independent Socialist Adolf Hoffmann, Chicherin urged the German evacuation of the occupied territories and suggested the employment of German troops against the Cossack Ataman Krasnov. DVP, I, 677.

20. Bunyan, 153-155. Cf. the Soviet appeal to the workers of Austria-Hungary, Degras, SDFP, I, 121-123. The Bolshevik suggestion resembled the German idea of Mitteleuropa.

21. Protocol of the conversation in the SPD Archives, Bonn-Bad Godesberg, Nachlass Barth, No. 12. Nadolny, then still a specialist on Russia in the German Foreign Ministry, later commented on the Haase-Chicherin conversation that "es war ohne Zweifel ein verfrüherischer Gedanke, den Krieg mit russischer Hilfe fortzusetzen". Nadolny, 66.

22. PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 55, Bl. 33. Moscow simultaneously urged Ioffe's return by diplomatic notes, DVP, I, 567-571.

23. Burdick and Lutz, 70ff.; Kolb, 155; Eduard Bernstein, Die deutsche Revolution, ihr Ursprung, ihr Verlauf und ihr Werk, (Berlin, 1921), (hereafter quoted as Bernstein), pp. 187f. The German government was

particularly annoyed by a Soviet broadcast of November 11 which urged the German people to seize power by force and establish a soviet regime under Liebknecht. Rote Fahne, Nov. 18, 1918.

24. Pravda, Nov. 17, 1918. Emphasis added.

25. Struthan [Radek], Die deutsche Revolution, 19ff.

26. Severnaia kommuna, Nov. 27, 1918. Lenin too conceded in December 1918 that the revolution in Germany and Austria did not follow the Russian course. LCW, vol. 28, 372. For the pessimistic view of the rank-and-file see Angelica Balabanoff, My Life as a Rebel, (New York and London, 1938), p. 206.

27. "To chto mensheviki ne dokazali i chto oni dolzhny dokazat'", Pravda, Nov. 28, 1918. For the Menshevik view see Ascher, "Russian Marxism...", esp.pp. 415ff.; and Getzler, 188.

28. Stalin, Works, IV, 186. See also his article "Don't Forget the East", ibid., 175-181. The Narkomindel now turned attention to Asia. DVP, I, 599.

29. Pravda, Nov. 15, 1918.

30. DVP, I, 571.

31. "The German revolution turns into a counterrevolution," wrote Pravda on November 22, "the German proletariat must act now". Cf. Pravda of Nov. 21, 1918.

32. Struthan [Radek], Die deutsche Revolution, 22ff. In other circumstances Radek, as seen above (note 27) dismissed the feasibility of world revolution in the form of a chain reaction.

33. Carr, III, 108f. As usual, Karl Radek voiced the Soviet goal in the clearest form in the latter half of November when, in a radio broadcast open to interception by anyone, he urged the German proletariat to join Soviet Russia in a holy war against the capitalist Entente. Vorwärts, Nov. 29, 1918. Barth called Radek's proposal a "stupid phrase" which badly damaged the interests of world revolution. Barth, 68.

34. Editorial "Poslednye argumenty G. Scheidemanna", Pravda, Dec. 14, 1918.

35. Pravda, Nov. 22, 1918. For the German reaction see Burdick and Lutz, 71.

36. SGO, 685-687.

37. Pravda, Nov. 24, 1918. Three days later Bukharin also depicted Liebknecht as "totally Red", in Severnaia kommuna.

38. DVP, I, 593-595. On Dec. 3 Pravda also reported on an appeal for settling accounts with the Bolsheviks which had been published in the influential London paper The Times.

39. "Pered nemetskim Oktiabrem", Pravda, Dec. 4.

40. Degras, SDFP, I, 126; Bunyan, 156.

41. Burdick and Lutz, 91 and 96.

42. Barth, 92. Ioffe apparently supplied funds to the Independents prior to October 1918, at the time when Moscow was assisting those forces in Germany promoting peace and friendship with Russia. However, in October 1918, working against the German revolution, Ioffe did not deliver the funds he had promised to Barth for promoting the revolution.

43. See for instance the clash between the State Secretary Solf and Haase, Burdick and Lutz. In a letter to Ebert of December 9 Solf expressed concern for the consequences of Ioffe's broadcast for German relations with the Allies. PAAA, Deutschland 122, Nr. 2s, Solf.

44. Degras, SDFP, I, 127f. Dr. Cohn, who had previously administered the funds for the Russian political emigres, admitted having received Bolshevik money.

45. Bernstein, 23. Similarly Vorwärts on December 20 called Ioffe's statement an "intrigue designed to blow up the state leadership by gravely discrediting its radical members". In retrospect it can be seen that Ioffe's broadcasts created a basis for the stab-in-the-back legend.

46. SGO, 691.

47. It emerges clearly from the recollections of Bukharin and Radek that the participation in the congress of the German Councils was only a prelude to their stay in Germany. Bukharin in Pravda, December 15 and 18; and Otto E. Schüddekopf, "Karl Radek in Berlin, ein Kapitel deutsch-russischen Beziehungen im Jahre 1919", in Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, vol. II (1962), (hereafter quoted as Schüddekopf, "Karl Radek..."), pp. 125-128. At about the same time Moscow dispatched Red Cross missions to various countries which, aside from their ostensible job of repatriating Russian subjects, seem to have been busy in promoting unrest and recruiting Soviet sympathizers, particularly in Poland, Hungary, and Austria. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 132.

48. Pravda, Dec. 5, 1918.

49. Schüddekopf, "Karl Radek...", 126.

50. Materials relating to the incident in PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 57. Cf. Bukharin in Pravda of Dec. 18, 1918.

51. Rote Fahne of Nov. 10 included a Spartacist appeal for the immediate reinstatement of the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, a message of sympathy to Soviet Russia, and a proposal that all meetings of councils and workers' organizations should demand the immediate return of Ioffe and the appointment of Rosa Luxemburg into the Central Council. Liebknecht had already called back the "Russian brethren" when proclaiming the socialist republic of Germany on November 9. Ibid.

52. For Liebknecht's alleged conditions see Pieck, Die Gründung, 10f. Laufenberg and Wolffheim later maintained that Liebknecht was about to accept a ministerial post but changed his mind after the intervention of Rosa Luxemburg and Leo Jogiches. Vorwärts, June 6, 1921.

53. Pravda, Nov. 14, 1918. Cf. Severnaia kommuna, Nov. 15, 1918.

54. Chicherin to the German Foreign Ministry, Nov. 13, 1918, PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 3.

55. Nettl, II, 722ff.; Badia, 185ff.

56. Rote Fahne, Nov. 24, 1918. That Luxemburg and Liebknecht consented to the procrastinating tactics is evident also from Ernst Meyer's recollection of the incident in Rote Fahne, Dec. 12, 1919.

57. Cf. Rote Fahne's uncommented report on the forthcoming "strangulation of Russia" (Nov. 23, 1918) with the attention given in Freiheit of November 15 to an appeal of the Russian government.

58. Liebknecht, IX, 593-639. This was a striking change given his attention to Soviet Russia prior to November 11. Ibid., 586f.; 588-590; 591f.; 595.

59. See esp. Adolf Varski, Rosa Luxemburg's Stellung zu den taktischen Problemen der Revolution, (Hamburg, 1922); and Klara Zetkin, Zum Rosa Luxemburgs Stellung zur Russischen Revolution, (n.p., 1922).

60. For analyses and summaries of ideological and doctrinal differences between Luxemburg and Lenin by non-communist scholars see Bertram D. Wolfe in introduction to Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism?; Nettl, II, 686-689; and a recent study of Giselher Schmidt, Spartakus. Rosa Luxemburg und Karl Liebknecht, (Frankfort/Main, 1971), 66-94.

61. For instance, it was symptomatic that Luxemburg called in the Spartacist program for contacts with "the sister parties abroad" without specifically mentioning the Bolsheviks. "Was will der Spartakusbund?", Rote Fahne, Dec. 14, 1918. The program is translated in Helmut Gruber, International Communism in the Era of Lenin, (New York, 1967), (hereafter quoted as Gruber), pp. 123-132. See esp. p. 131.

62. See for instance the Spartacist appeal "An die Proletarier aller Länder", Rote Fahne, Nov. 25, 1918. Members of the Luxemburgian wing stood close to the Independents in their hopes on the solidarity of the Western socialism. Compare also the diverging views of Levi and Liebknecht in Rote Fahne, Nov. 23, 1918.

63. Eduard Fuchs in particular impatiently awaited Luxemburg's return to Berlin in order to change her view of Russia. Mathilde Jacob, "Vom Rosa Luxemburg und ihren Freunden 1914-1919" (typescript, cca 1920), p. 92. In another manuscript Jacob recalled Luxemburg having "ständig Debatten mit den Genossen über ihre abweichende Meinung" in respect to Russia. Nachlass Levi, Bonn-Bad Godesberg, box 50.

64. Kolb, 140f.; Henriette Roland-Holst, Rosa Luxemburg: ihr Leben und Wirken, (Zurich, 1937), 189f.

65. For the Red Soldiers' Union and Liebknecht's involvement see Oeckel, 58ff.; and Geheimes Staatsarchiv Berlin, Preussisches Justizministerium: Politische Erreignisse nach der Revolution vom 9. November 1918, Bd. I (hereafter quoted as P 135/11759), Bl. 138-172.

66. See for example Müller, Vom Kaiserreich, II, 293. Price, 352; Vorwärts, Dec. 19, 1918. The Spartacist defence was ambiguous and unconvincing. See DMGDAB, 2, 550f.

67. Anton Fischer, Die Revolutionskommandatur Berlin, (n.p., n.d.), (hereafter quoted as Anton Fischer), p. 21; Müller, Vom Kaiserreich, II, 293; for the soldiers' view of Liebknecht see Vorwärts, Dec. 9, 1918. Cf. note 66.

68. Arthur Rosenberg, A History of the German Republic, (New York, 1965), 54f. The alienation had already begun in November 1918 - see Liebknecht's view in Rote Fahne, November 21. The real hostility however seems to have been generated only by the Berlin fighting of December 6 - 8. Thus Rote Fahne on December 7 attempted to make the Majority Socialists responsible for the bloodshed: "Your names have become a battle cry of the counterrevolution, a token of anarchy and fratricide, a banner of high treason to the revolution". See also Rote Fahne, Dec. 8, 1918. Luxemburg concluded on December 30 that the government's accomplishments were tantamount to the restoration of the pre-revolutionary conditions. Freiheit, Jan. 1, 1919.

69. Pieck, Die Gründung, 18.

70. Rote Fahne, Dec. 8, 1918.

71. For material relating to the congress see Burdick and Lutz, 211ff. Cf. Ryder, 177-183.

72. For Radek's background see Warren Lerner, Karl Radek, (Stanford, Cal., 1970), 2ff. and Nettl, I, passim, and II, 460.

73. Karl Radek, "November (A page of recollections)", ed. by E.H. Carr, Soviet Studies, vol. III, No. 4 (April 1951), (hereafter quoted as Radek, "November"), p. 418.

74. See page 136. This and the following paragraph partly sums up the previous discussion.

75. See the conclusion of this study.

76. Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German Communism, (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), 93. It is noteworthy that Radek is also reported to have been the instigator of the March 1920 action in Germany.

77. For a similar view see Boris Nikolaevskii, "Vneshnaia politika Moskvy" in Novyi zhurnal, No. 1 (New York, 1942), p. 243. The author however incongruously links Radek's objective of embroiling Germany in a new war against the West with Soviet Russia's alleged intention to wage a revolutionary war against Germany.

78. Ruth Fischer, op. cit., 76. Cf. Nettl, II, 747.

79. Schüddekopf, "Karl Radek...", 133.

80. Die Freiheit, Dec. 22, 1918; Die Rote Fahne, Dec. 23, 1918.

81. Schüddekopf, "Karl Radek...", 134.

82. Miliukov, Bolshevism, 137f.; Shub, 341.

83. Liebknecht, IX, 649 and 657f.

84. Ibid., 659f. At the same time Liebknecht admitted to Radek that the Spartakusbund was only in its beginnings and its road was still very long. Radek, Luxemburg, 35.

85. See his notes from prison, Liebknecht IX, 460-462.

86. After Radek's arrival in Berlin a rumor spread about Spartakus disposing of considerable Russian funds. See for instance Burdick and Lutz, 139f. The rumor was not denied by the communists - see a brief reply "Ein öffentliches Geheimnis", Rote Fahne, Dec. 22, 1918. According to Henri Guilbeaux, Radek introduced a new degree of corruption into the movement believing that there was nothing money could not buy. La Fin des Soviets, (Paris, 1937), p. 137.

87. DMGDAB, 2, 663f.

88. Pieck, Reden, I, 455f.; Ledebour in Sozialistische Arbeiterzeitung, Nov. 28, 1931.

89. For this point see Hermann Müller, Die November-Revolution, (Berlin, 1928), 255f. Cf. Vossische Zeitung, Dec. 27, 1918.

90. "Neue Erfolge der Sowjettruppen", and "Maschinengewehre gegen die russische Sowjetdelegation", Rote Fahne, Dec. 27, 1918.

91. Rote Fahne, December 23, and Freiheit, December 24, 1918. Cf. Hermann Weber, Der Gründungsparteitag der KPD; Protokoll und Materialien, (Frankfort/Main, 1969), (hereafter quoted as Weber, Gründungsparteitag), p. 32.

92. Illustrierte Geschichte, 264. Schüddekopf, "Karl Radek...", 135. Neither Luxemburg nor Iogiches wished for unification with the International Communists but Radek prepared the ground for this by skillful maneouvring and subtle pressure.

93. Hugo Eberlein, "Spartakus und die Dritte Internationale", in Internationale Pressekorrespondenz, No. 28, Feb. 29, 1924, p. 306.

94. Ibid. Cf. Weber, Gründungsparteitag, 38f. The Spartacist conference subsequently opted for the name "Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Spartakusbund)".

95. Die russische und deutsche Revolution und die Weltlage (Berlin, 1919). Reprinted in Weber, Gründungsparteitag, 67-86.

96. Die russische und deutsche Revolution, 31. Cf. Lerner, 82.

97. Ibid., 19ff.

98. Ibid., 18.

99. Ibid., 25.

100. Ibid., 29f.

101. "Radek im Spartakusbund", Vossische Zeitung, Dec. 30, 1918.

102. "Bolschewismus oder Frieden", Vossische Zeitung, Dec. 31, 1918.

103. Rote Fahne, Jan. 3, 1919. Radek later conceded he had called for the preservation of Germany's capacity to resist, that is to say for a policy "which could be accepted even by a bourgeois government". Karl Radek, Gegen den Nationalbolschewismus!, (Hamburg, 1920), 12.

104. Quoted by Freiheit, Dec. 31, 1918.

105. Rote Fahne, Dec. 31, 1918; Weber, Gründungsparteitag, 87. The message was very carefully worded, containing no promises or obligations.

106. See Levi's speech in Weber, Gründungsparteitag, 88-96; Luxemburg's speech and contributions to the congress discussion ibid., 172-200, and 99-104. Her speech appeared separately in 1919.

107. Weber, Gründungsparteitag, 103 and 109. Cf. Rosenberg, A History of the German Republic, 70.

108. Weber, Gründungsparteitag, 195; Rote Fahne, Jan. 1, 1919.

109. See for instance the mobilizing speech of Otto Rühle in Weber, Gründungsparteitag, esp. pp. 97f.

110. Ibid., 109 and 135. The resolution was adopted by 62 votes to 23.

111. Rosenberg, A History of the German Republic, 70.

112. For instance, Paul Frölich in his criticism of Luxemburg's program demanded the recognition of the fact that "the Russian revolution can be saved only by world revolution" and that "world revolution is now inevitable". Weber, Gründungsparteitag, 205.

113. Ibid., 192-195. For the German involvement in the Baltic after November 1918 see Robert G.L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany 1918-1923, (Cambridge, Mass. 1952), (hereafter quoted as Waite), pp. 97ff.

114. Weber, Gründungsparteitag, 200.

115. Ibid., 207.

116. Ibid., 223. According to another source, Liebknecht even called for "der gemeinsame Kampf des deutschen und russischen Proletariats im Waffenrock gegen den gemeinsamen Ententefeind". Vorwärts, Jan. 1, 1919.

117. See for example Eric Waldman, The Spartacist Uprising of 1919 and the Crisis of the German Socialist Movement: A Study of the Relation of Political Theory and Party Practice, (Milwaukee, 1958), (hereafter quoted as Waldman); and the recent contribution of Gerhard P. Bassler, "The Communist Movement in the German Revolution, 1919-1919: A Problem of Historical Typology?", in Central European History, vol. VI, No. 3 (Sept. 1973), pp. 258f.

118. According to Karl Radek, "die Einheit mit der russischen kommunistischen Partei und der russischen Revolution war die Grundtendenz der Stimmungen des Kongresses". Schüddekopf, "Karl Radek...", 136.

119. The present writer's interview with a participant of the congress, Rosa Frölich, March 12, 1973.

120. Rote Fahne on Jan. 1, 1919, clearly spelled out this fear: "Heute ist der Gegner die Russische Revolution; im Kampf gegen sie werden die gegenrevolutionären Streitkräfte organisiert und einexerziert. Für welches nächste Ziel? Für kein anderes als für die deutsche Revolution".

121. See for example a comment on the KPD congress in Die Freiheit, Jan. 3, 1919.

122. Weber, Gründungsparteitag, 273. The Obleute also considered the name Spartakus too discredited. Cf. Rosenberg, A History of the German

Republic, 72f. For the position of the Obleute see also Drabkin, 461-462n.

123. For instance, several weeks after he had been hired by the Soviet press agency ROSTA for a very generous salary of 1000 marks, he declared in September 1918 at a USPD conference that it was necessary to halt the offensive of the international counterrevolution against Soviet Russia; bowing before imperialism would paralyse the political future of the proletariat. For a brief sketch of Eichhorn's life see Horst Neumann, "Emil Eichhorn, das Leben eines Revolutionärs", Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, vol. 11, No. 3 (1969).

124. It was alleged that Eichhorn was stimulated by his contacts with Radek. Eichhorn himself did not directly deny press reports to this effect. Emil Eichhorn, Über die Januarerreignisse, (Berlin, 1919), (hereafter quoted as Eichhorn), p. 85.

125. Paul Hirsch, Der Weg der Sozialdemokratie zur Macht in Preussen, (Berlin 1929), (hereafter quoted as Hirsch), p. 132f. Cf. Eichhorn, 66. For other accusations see ibid., 46-55.

126. Waldemar Pabst in Deutscher Studenten-Anzeiger, (Munich), Jan. 1962.

127. Eichhorn, 64-67; Waldman, 165f.; Nettl, II, 761f. Eichhorn later conceded being questioned on January 3, 1919, about his reasons for not arresting Radek following the latter's appearance at the KPD congress. Eichhorn, 64. Some authors somewhat incongruously dismiss all charges levelled against Eichhorn as entirely unfounded; see Nettl, II, 762.

128. Burdick and Lutz, 231-234. Eichhorn's behavious may be classified as a deliberate provocation.

129. Schüddekopf, "Karl Radek...", 137. For the Spartacist deliberations on Jan. 4 see also Georg Ledebour, Der Ledebour-Prozess, (Berlin, 1919), (hereafter quoted as Ledebour-Prozess), 517. Cf. Rote Fahne, Jan. 5, 1919.

130. The thesis that Liebknecht involved the Spartacists in the January uprising because of his "proclivity for rushing headlong into ill-conceived adventures" (Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution. The Communist Bid For Power in Germany, 1921-23, Princeton, N.J., 1963, p. 32) is not plausible for the mere fact that the same Liebknecht had several weeks earlier, in October 1918, worked against the outbreak of the German revolution. His record since October 1918, as well as that of the opportunist Wilhelm Pieck, strongly supports the view held by some of his socialist associates that Liebknecht and Pieck by their "adverturous policy" in January 1919 responded to the Russian summons to actions. Bernstein, 139f.; and Karl Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht und Leo Jogiches. Ihre Bedeutung fur die Sozialdemokratie, (Berlin, 1921), 13.

131. Schüddekopf, "Karl Radek...", 137. Liebknecht might have been spurred on by the German bourgeois press which had speculated about such a government since late December (Kronen Zeitung and Berliner Neueste Nachrichten of December 27, 1918). Yet Liebknecht himself seems to have doubted the feasibility of such a Zwischenregierung.

132. Schüddekopf, "Karl Radek...", 137.

133. Pieck, Die Gründung, 25.

134. Richard Müller, Der Bürgerkrieg in Deutschland, (Berlin, 1925), (hereafter quoted as Müller, Bürgerkrieg), p. 30; Kolb, 228. Looking ahead, Liebknecht and Pieck that same night visited the People's Marine Division and conferred with one of its leaders, Dorrenbach. Geheimes Staatsarchiv Berlin, Preussisches Justizministerium: Politische Erreignisse nach der Revolution vom 9. November 1918, Bd. 2 (hereafter quoted as P 135/11760), Bl. 19 and 20.

135. Liebknecht seems to have been the most radical: he called for a violent reckoning with the Ebert-Scheidemann government. Geheimes Staatsarchiv Berlin, P 135/11759, Bl. 160.

136. For the meeting see esp. Müller, Bürgerkrieg, 33; Pieck, Die Gründung, 25; Waldman, 172ff. The next day Dorrenbach himself disappeared from the scene.

137. Müller, Bürgerkrieg, 33.

138. Illustrierte Geschichte, 275; Müller, Bürgerkrieg, 33f.

139. The Obleute, for example, voted by 51 to 10 in favor of negotiations. See Drabkin, 492. For the mediation attempts see Ledebour-Prozess, 569ff.

140. Similarly only one of every ten Spartacist fighters was a working man. Most fighters were apparently young people and the mob recruited for twenty marks a day. See an interesting analysis of the captured Spartacist fighters, of their motivation and profile in Geheimes Staatsarchiv Berlin, P 135/11759, Bl. 61ff.

141. For instance, instead of organizing a frontal attack on the government, Liebknecht required a guarantee from the captured city commander Anton Fischer that no action be undertaken against him and the People's Marine Division. Anton Fischer, Die Revolutionskommandatur Berlin, (m.p., n.d.) Cf. Ledebour-Prozess, 221.

142. Liebknecht, IX, 674. The traces of "national Bolshevism" can be found even in Rote Fahne. For instance the paper struck the following note on January 6: "Lieber mit den Bolschewisten wie als Knechte des Ententeimperialismus gegen sie".

143. H. Müller, Die November-Revolution, 252. In one of the first evaluation of the events in Berlin, Pravda on January 15 likewise wrote about a

"semi-uprising, an armed sabotage of the Scheidemann policy".

144. Pieck, Die Gründung, 26.

145. Paul Levi, Was ist Verbrechen? Die Märzaktion oder die Kritik daran? (Berlin, 1921), 33.

146. Pieck, Reden, I, 475. It is possible that Liebknecht now complied with Radek's advice to give up the struggle.

147. "Das Versagen der Führer", Rote Fahne, Jan. 11, 1919.

148. The contention that the January uprising was "carefully prepared and cunningly launched by the leaders of the counterrevolution" (Frölich, 316) is untenable. It appears however that the government lost interest in negotiations with the insurgents after its counter-offensive had started. Cf. a comment in Freiheit, Oct. 20, 1919.

149. "Die Ordnung herrscht in Berlin", Rote Fahne, Jan. 14, 1919. For the striking lack of soldiers among the insurgents see above, footnote 140.

150. This was the sense of the Eberlein-Trotsky controversy. Der I. Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale; Protokoll der Verhandlungen in Moskau vom 2. bis 19. März 1919, (Hamburg, 1921), (hereafter quoted as Der I. Kongress), pp. 16 and 47. For a similar admission by Lenin see LCW, vol. 29, 174.

151. See chapter VI, footnote 30.

152. Schüddekopf, "Karl Radek...", 137.

153. Levi, Was ist Verbrechen, 34. Cf. Ruth Fischer, 137f.

154. "Trotz Alledem", Rote Fahne, Jan. 15, 1919; also Liebknecht, IX, 678. These words immediately followed his criticism of the Independent Socialists, yet they obviously had a broader connotation.

155. Ibid.

156. Radek, Luxemburg, 35.

157. The assassination seems to have diverted attention from another serious aspect of their fate: the closest relatives of Liebknecht believed and the circumstances of the arrest of Luxemburg and Liebknecht also indicate that the two Spartacists were betrayed by someone close to them. It is noteworthy that even Wilhelm Pieck, himself alleged to be a traitor, repeatedly admitted that Luxemburg and Liebknecht had been "verraten" - a verb carrying in German a strong connotation of being betrayed from one's own ranks (as distinct to being "angezeigt", i.e. denounced by someone from outside). An analysis of this problem falls outside the scope of this study.

158. "Kak ispolzovat' vtoruiu peredyshku", Pravda, Dec. 29, 1918.

159. Cumming and Pettit, 273.

160. LPSS, vol. 38, 461. Also Rakovsky and Meshcheriakov in Pravda, January 3 and 4, 1919, respectively.

161. Pravda, Dec. 27, 1918.

162. Pravda, Dec. 31, 1918.

163. Pravda, Jan. 5, 1919. Moscow switched to a cautious policy prior to, not after, the January uprising, as some authors maintain. (Fischer, Lenin, 421.)

164. "Novaia skhvatka", Pravda, Jan. 10, 1919.

165. DVP, II, 20-22; also PAAA, Deutschland 131, Bd. 59 - telegrams of Jan. 7 and 11, 1919.

166. Telegram of the German Foreign Ministry of Jan. 7, 1919. PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Nr. 2, Bd. 1. Radek talked in a similar vein to Franz Mehring. See Gustav Mayer, 303, ad. V, 166: The view that Radek was firmly against the uprising and especially against communist participation (Nettl, II, 765) applies for the period after January 9.

167. Horst G. Linke, Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen bis Rapallo, (Cologne, 1970), 38. This appeal provided a formal basis for the emergence of the Free Corps which in the subsequent years plagued the Weimar republic.

168. Illustrierte Geschichte, 282. The letter has never been published in extenso. Radek (Schüddekopf, "Karl Radek...", 137f.) later maintained that he had written it having received information on the German government's preparations for the counteroffensive, yet this information reached him in early hours of January 8 while the letter was written a day or two later, after the widely publicized appeal to the volunteers.

169. Pravda, Jan. 11, 1919. See also "Pokhod mirovogo imperializma na Sovetskuiu Rossiiu". Ibid.

170. Rote Fahne, Feb. 11, 1919.

171. Kulichenko, 46f. and 231; Wandycz, 67-71.

172. Kulichenko, 248f. Pursuing a similar policy Moscow in April 1920 created another buffer state, the Far Eastern republic, which was in existence until November 1922. For Trotsky's arguments in favor of such a buffer state see TP, II, 51-53.

173. The Central Committee received prior to January 16, 1919, a report of its emissary Jastrzembski on his successful mission to Poland. The emissary reported inter alia that the Polish Socialist Party, very influential in Polish politics, promised that "as long as it will have influence upon the Polish government, it will not permit, regardless of any pressure, any Polish interference into the internal affairs of Soviet Russia". Z pola walki, vol. VIII, No. 4, (Warsaw, 1965), 162-166. Cf. Kulichenko, 247.

174. Direktivy Glavnogo kommandovaniia Krasnoi Armii (1917-1920); sbornik dokumentov, (Moscow, 1969), (hereafter quoted as Direktivy), p. 191; IzIGV, I, 360 and 541; Trotskii, Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, II, 1, 28f. The reinforcement of the Western front was reported also to Berlin by the German agent Barelt on Feb. 18, 1919. PAAA, Deutschland 131, adh. 3, Bd. 4.

175. This fact was recognized not only by such individuals as Trotsky or Radek but also by the Stalinist scholars. See for instance the official History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, (New York, 1939), 231. However, the 1963 edition (p. 301) is very laconic in this respect.

1. See above, page 58f. For Lenin's pragmatism in general see for example Fischer, Lenin, 54.

2. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 17. The most extensive collection of material concerning the Zimmerwald movement is in Horst Lademacher, ed., Die Zimmerwalder Bewegung, 2 vols. (The Hague, 1967).

3. LCW, vol. 24, 24, and 80ff.

4. Ibid., 82f. Cf. Lenin to Zinoviev, May 21, 1916, ibid, vol. 35, 220.

5. Ibid., vol. 25, 303. For Lenin's breaking ties with the Zimmerwaldists see also Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 20ff.

6. Gankin and Fisher, 687f.

7. Thus the Bolsheviks in December 1917 rejected the idea of an international conference in support of general peace. After Arthur Henderson nevertheless invited the Bolsheviks in January 1918 to participate in an inter-Allied conference on peace, Lenin on Feb. 6 declined the invitation. He alleged that Bolshevik participation would contradict the principle of internationalism because the conference was not to be attended by the Central powers' delegations. The very same day, however, the Bolsheviks arranged an international meeting in Petrograd at which the Central powers' socialists also did not participate. See the discussion below.

8. For this point see also Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 35.

9. See above, pp. 77f.

10. Pravda, Feb. 14, 1918. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 33-36, are in the opinion of this author out of touch with reality in discussing the motivation of the conference. For a meticulous communist analysis of the conference and its prehistory see Ruth Stoljarowa, "Lenin und die Gründung der Kommunistischen Internationale", (Ph.D. thesis, Berlin, 1969), pp. 112-117.

11. See for example What Is To Be Done, LCW, vol. 5, 452f.

12. Ibid., vol. 29, 192.

13. Ibid., vol. 28, 292f. Cf. Ibid., 116. Similarly Lenin now made the dictatorship of the proletariat obligatory also for the developed West, although previously he considered the centralization of decision-making process suitable only for developing countries.

14. Pravda, Dec. 6, 1918; The Communist International, No. I, (May, 1919), cols. 145f. Cf. Carr, III, 125.

15. Pravda, Dec. 25, 1918.

16. It is indicative that the Rote Fahne of Dec. 31 for example printed the Bolshevik appeal under the headline "Ein Protest der russischen Partei gegen die Wiedererlebung der zweiten Internationale". The appeal was subsequently ignored by the founding congress of the KPD.

17. See above page 182. The impact of German developments on Lenin's decision to create the Third International has never been fully analyzed.

18. For other possible reasons for Lenin's decision see Fainsod, 260ff.

19. LPSS, vol. 50, 227-230. Lenin asked Chicherin for an immediate answer, Chicherin's reply is dated December 28.

20. Ibid., 460-462. Cf. Ruth Stoljarowa, "Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Aufrufs 'Zum Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale' von Januar 1919", Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, No. 11, 1968, (hereafter quoted as Stoljarowa, "Zur Entstehungsgeschichte..."), pp.1398f.

21. According to the Comintern organizer Y.S. Reich ('comrade Thomas'), only three or four of the 24 couriers sent out in fact delivered their letters. Boris J. Nikolaevsky, ed., Les Premières Années de l'Internationale Communiste, (Geneva, 1965) (hereafter quoted as Nikolaevsky, Les Premières Années), p. 8.

22. Hugo Eberlein in the Communist International, vol. VI, Nos. 9-10 (1929), 436f.

23. J. Fineberg in the Communist International, Nos. 9, 10, 11, March 1929, p. 444.

24. Ibid. The text of the appeal in Degras, The Communist International 1919-1942, vol. I (1919-1922), pp. 1-5.

25. Ibid.

26. Grigori Zinoviev, "Kommunisticheskii Internatsional", Pravda, Mar. 2, 1919. Cf. Ascher, "Russian Marxism...", 409ff.

27. For the Prinkipo proposal see the following section.

28. Litvinov complained to Ransome that Chicherin had replied "within an hour of getting the telegram from Berne". Ransome, 158.

29. The only notable exception was the Communist party of the Netherlands, founded on November 19, 1918.

30. Hugo Eberlein, "The Foundation of the Comintern and the Spartakusbund", The Communist International, Nos. 9, 10, 11, (March 1929), (hereafter quoted as Eberlein, "The Foundation..."), p. 436f. Cf. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 61; and Carr, III, 128.

31. It was Iogiches who reportedly selected Eberlein as a delegate for his reputation of being "un esprit borne, voir obtus, mais obstine et tenace". Nikoleavsky, Les Premières Années, 8.

32. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 65ff., convincingly demonstrate this fact. The material of the first congress is published in Der I. Kongress.

33. Angelica Balabanoff, Impressions of Lenin, (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1964), 70. Radek's trip to Vienna following the January uprising was reported by German authorities and also by the American journalist Sisson. See Sisson, 270n.

34. Der I. Kongress, 99-105. Cf. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 80ff.

35. Der I. Kongress, 76ff. and 132-134. For an English translation see Gruber, 87ff.

36. PAAA, Internationale Angelegenheiten 2, Bd. 6. Bartel, the German Consul in Viborg, Finland, received information regarding the founding congress from an unidentified delegate returning from Russia, and reported it in early April 1919 to Berlin. The veracity of the report seems unquestionable: it contained detailed information made public by other participants of the congress only several years later.

37. It was at this moment that Zinoviev, forging the cause of the International, started depicting world revolution as imminent. Der I. Kongress, 134-136.

38. Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution, 212; Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 50, 76, and 87; Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, 452.

39. See above note 37; and Lenin's concluding remark in LCW, vol. 30, 418.

40. LCW, vol. 29, 168f. Lenin thus revised his position as expounded in 1916 in Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism.

41. LCW, vol. 29, 169, and 189.

42. Stalin, Works, IV, 240-244, and 257.

43. Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, II, 2, 253. Cf. Ascher, "Russian Marxism...", 252f.

44. Pravda, Jan. 15, 1919.

45. Ransome, 81. Ransome was a communist sympathizer in 1919.

46. Ibid., 87.

47. Ibid., 132. Rykov held a similarly sober view. Ransome concluded from his experience in Soviet Russia of February 1919 that the Soviet leaders "are thinking less about world revolution than about getting bread to Moscow". Ibid., 49.

48. Schüddekopf, "Karl Radek...", 96. Cf. Angress, 59f. For a similar view of Lenin's emissary to Germany Carl Moor see Otto-Ernst Schüddekopf, "Deutschland Zwischen Ost und West - Karl Moor und die deutsch-russischen Beziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des Jahres 1919", in Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, III (Hannover, 1963), esp. p. 263. For the position of another Lenin's emissary to Germany, Markhlevsky, see below page 219.

49. Interview with Ludovic Naudeau, Die Freiheit, May 14, 1919.

50. Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, 452.

51. According to Bartel's report not only Eberlein but also other delegates objected to the "Russianness" of the documents: "This happened particularly when the Soviet delegation submitted a declaration to the effect that the communist system in Russia was the fullest one. Although the foreign delegates were at one in the question of establishing the Soviet system, the experience they had gathered in Russia was of such a nature...that the Soviet plea met with opposition". PAAA, Internationale Angelegenheiten 2, Bd. 6.

52. Degras, The Communist International, I, 7-16.

53. Ibid., 17-24.

54. Ibid., 18f., and 23f.

55. Ibid., 16.

56. Der I. Kongress, 94. Cf. Page, 124.

57. For a still useful discussion of this remarkably un-Leninist position see David T. Cattell, "The Hungarian Revolution of 1919 and the Reorganization of the Comintern in 1920", in Journal of Central European Affairs, XI, (January-April 1951), 31f. Cf. Wohl, 172.

58. Degras, The Communist International, I, 30f.

59. Lenin himself formulated this ambivalent relationship of "world revolution" and the Soviet state in his draft of the Bolshevik party program of March 1919: the strategy of the Russian proletariat was "by employing in every way the torch of world socialist revolution lit in Russia to paralyze the attempts of the imperialist bourgeois states to intervene in the internal affairs of Russia or to unite for direct struggle and war against the socialist Soviet Republic and to carry the revolution into the most advanced countries and in general into all countries". LCW, vol. 29, 105f.

60. For a profile of Zinoviev see William Korey, "Grigori Yevseevich Zinoviev", Problems of Communism, XVI, 6, (November-December 1967), esp. pp. 54-58.

61. Quoted by Possony, 302.

62. A. Lunacharsky, Revolutionary Silhouettes, (London, 1967), 77.

63. Ullman, II, 88.

64. The text of the telegram in DVP, I, 627f.; Degras, SDFP, I, 129-132.

65. FRUS, 1919 Russia, I, 15-18. Cf. Carr, III, 118.

66. FRUS, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, (hereafter quoted as PPC), vol. III (Washington, D.C., 1943), p. 686.

67. For a typical Soviet reaction see for example Bukharin's article "A Timid 'Proposal' of the Allied Benefactors", Pravda, Jan. 25, 1919. See also John M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace, (Princeton, J.J., 1966), (hereafter quoted as Thompson), pp. 112ff.

68. DVP, II, 52, and 54f.

69. Ibid., 57-60. Excerpts in Degras, SDFP, I, 137-139.

70. See Pravda, Jan. 30, 1919; Ransome, 44, and 56-61; William C. Bullitt, The Bullitt Mission to Russia, (New York, 1919), (hereafter quoted as Bullitt), p. 52. Cf. Thompson, 118. Trotsky in particular was opposed to making concessions, and continued to crusade for an undivisible Russia.

71. Details in Schapiro, The Origins of the Communist Autocracy, 211ff. and 235ff.

72. See for instance his interventions of February 14 and 18 in LPSS, vol. 50, 255f.

73. Degras, SDFP, I, 139-145; DVP, II, 61-64, and 84-87. The Bolsheviks also tried to get their representative Karl Martens accredited in the United States, Cumming and Pettit, 329.

74. Thompson, 115-119. For opinion at the Paris Peace Conference on the Prinkipo meeting see Bernard George Noble, Policies and Opinions at Paris, 1919, (New York, 1968), (hereafter quoted as Noble), pp. 271ff.

75. The background and conditions of the mission in Bullitt, passim. Cf. Ullman, II, 136-170; and Thompson, 159f.

76. The text in DVP, II, 91-95; and Bullitt, 39-44.

77. Bullitt, 45 and 54f. For difficulties in relating this fact to the alleged Bolshevik belief in an imminent world revolution see Fischer, Lenin, 354f.; Thompson, 171f. It is indeed difficult to imagine that Lenin would have steered such a painful and humiliating course had he really anticipated world revolution in the foreseeable future.

78. Thompson, 186-192, and 203-205.

79. For a detailed account see Oeckel, 141-199.

80. In Germany the "Red Scare" was also nurtured in particular by the government authorities with the obvious purpose of alleviating the country's position at the Paris Peace Conference. See Kolb, 184ff.; Lösche, 238f.; and Bassler, 247.

81. LCW, vol. 29, 174.

82. DVP, II, 71-73. For the resolution of Oct. 3, 1918, see pp.132f. above.

83. For a summary of his pamphlets and appearances see Horst Schumacher, Sie nannten ihn Karski; das revolutionäre Wirken Julian Marchlewskis in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 1896 bis 1919, (Berlin, 1964), 160-165.

84. Ibid., 153ff.

85. See for example DMGDAB, II, 3, 143-145.

86. Ibid., 165f.

87. The communists may have had the aim of overthrowing the government (Ryder, 214), but had also no intention of taking power. As Paul Levi put it, "wir hatten jede Bedingung und Forderung vermeiden, die einen Kampf um die Macht bedeutete". Paul Levi, Generalstreik und Noske Blut-Bad in Berlin, (n.p., n.d.), p. 3. See also the appeal of the KPD leadership in Rote Fahne, Mar. 4, 1919.

88. For what is still the most detailed treatment of this topic see Francis Deák, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, (New York, 1942). See also Alfred D. Low, "Soviet Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference", in Ivan Völgyes, ed., Hungary in Revolution, 1918-19, (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1971), (hereafter quoted as Völgyes, ed.), pp. 137-157.

89. For the background and initial months of the Hungarian communist party see Rudolf L. Tökés, Béla Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic, (New York, 1967), pp. 49ff. This monograph puts a heavy emphasis on ideological aspects. Frank Eckelt, "The Rise and Fall of the Béla Kun Regime in 1919", (Ph.D. thesis, New York, 1965), (hereafter quoted as Eckelt), gives more extensive coverage to social and political aspects. See also Gabor Vermes, "The October Revolution in Hungary; From Karolyi to Kun", in Völgyes, ed., 31-60; and F. T. Zsuppán, "The Early Activities of the Hungarian Communist Party, 1918-1919", in The Slavic and East European Review, vol. 43, No. 101, (June 1965), (hereafter quoted as Zsuppán, "The Early Activities..."), pp. 314-334.

90. Tökés, 237; Ivan Völgyes, "Soviet Russia and Soviet Hungary", in Völgyes, ed., 160.

91. Völgyes in Völgyes, ed., 162n., and 163; Zsuppán, "The Early Activities...", 319f.; Laszló Szabó, Documents Secrets de la Propagande Bolchéviste, (Bern, 1920), 14.

92. Völgyes in Völgyes, ed., 163. The Bolshevik warning before coup, carried in Pravda on January 5, was reprinted in the central organ of the Hungarian communists, Voros Ujsag on January 15.

93. On February 6, 1919, a leading bourgeois paper noted with satisfaction that the idea of class struggle in Hungary had been limited only to agitation and called for further progress in national reconciliation. Béla Szanto, Klassenkämpfe und die Diktatur des Proletariats in Ungarn, (Vienna, 1920), (hereafter quoted as Szanto), p. 33. An American agent also reported from Budapest on February 10 that there was "little or no danger of a Bolshevist uprising". FRUS, PPC, XII, 392f. It was at this time that the Left opposition to Kun emerged as a result of dissatisfaction with his cautious policy.

94. Béla Kun in the Communist International, vol. VI. Nos. 11-12-13, (May 1929), 473.

95. Cécile Tormay, An Outlaw's Diary, vol. 1, (New York, 1923), (hereafter quoted as Tormay), p. 232. This is an interesting memoir showing the growing sympathy of the Hungarian nationalists for the Soviet cause. Cf. Szanto, 33.

96. Ibid., 37ff.

97. For details of this event see Tormay, 257; also A. Szelpal, Les 133 Jours de Bela Kun, (Paris, 1959), (hereafter quoted as Szelpal), p. 70.

98. For the communist defence see Szanto, 39. Szanto, 37f.; Michael Károlyi, Memoirs of Michael Károlyi, (New York, 1957), (hereafter quoted as Károlyi), p. 148.

99. Szanto, 40. This decision was allegedly intended to clear the communists of charges of complicity in the attack on Nepszava.

100. Irina Kun, Bela Kun, (Moscow, 1966), (hereafter quoted as Irina Kun), pp.91f.

101. "Nakanune vengerskoi proletarskoi revoliutsii", Pravda, Feb. 22, 1919.

102. LCW, vol. 28, 472. Another country that Lenin mentioned in this connection was Switzerland.

103. Ibid., 473.

104. Vilmos Böhm, Im Kreuzfeuer zweier Revolutionen, (Munich, 1924), (hereafter quoted as Böhm), pp. 201f.

105. Karl Kreybig, Die Entstehung der Räterepublik Ungarn, (Berlin, 1919), 6.

106. For example, the Hungarian communists requested the government to cancel the celebration of the anniversary of the 1848 revolution. Tormay, 282f.

107. Their plan, however, was revealed and published on February 27. Tökés, 149.

108. Szanto, 41-49; The Communist International, No. 2 (June, 1919), cols. 225-230.

109. Eckelt, 162; Böhm, 287.

110. Deák, 57; Thompson, 193-212. The motivation and timing of the Vix note is discussed most recently in Peter Pastor, "The Vix Mission in Hungary, 1918-1919: A Re-examination", Slavic Review, vol. 29, No. 3 (Sept. 1970), 481-498.

111. Janos Bak, "Die Discussion um die Räterepublik im Ungarn 1919", in Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, XIV, No. 4 (December 1966), 572n.

112. For the description of the crisis see Károlyi, 146ff.; Böhm, 266ff.; Szanto, 51ff.; and PPC, XII, 413-416.

113. Szanto, 52.

114. Ernö Bettelheim, Zur Krise der Kommunistischen Partei Ungarns, (Vienna, 1922), (hereafter quoted as Bettelheim), p. 7; Irina Kun, 106f.; Szelpal, 74ff.

115. Kun conceded in December 1919 that the party "could never have done the job by itself". Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 113. For Kun's anxiety to have the Social Democrats included in the government, see Böhm, 292.

116. While Kun himself had doubts about his decision, the Szamuely group rejected the merger, complaining that Kun concluded it "in half a minute". Bettelheim, 8.

117. The text in Böhm, 278.

118. Blasius Kolozsváry, [Béla Kun], Von Revolution zu Revolution, (Vienna, 1920), 36.

119. Böhm, 291 and 293.

120. Szelpal, 111; Eckelt, 327.

121. Pravda, Mar. 26, 1919.

122. Janos Bak, ed., "Aus dem Telegrammwechsel zwischen Moskau und Budapest März-August 1919", in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol. 19, No. 2 (April 1971), (hereafter quoted as Bak, "Telegrammwechsel"), p. 200.

123. Pravda, Mar. 27, 1919. Clara Zetkin in the Communist International, No. 3 (July 1919), col. 290, likewise concluded that the establishment of the Soviet republic in Hungary "will increase the fears and the rage of the propertied minorities and their advocates in all countries".

124. "Soiuzniki i Vengerskaia revoliutsiia", Pravda, Mar. 27, 1919. Cf. "Mirovoi perelom", ibid., March 28.

125. LCW, vol. 29, 224. Cf. Szelpal, 110f., for a perceptive analysis of the Bolshevik position.

126. LCW, vol. 27, 327. The present analysis runs against the widely accepted assumption of the sincerity of Bolshevik avowals to assist Soviet Hungary.

127. Direktivy, 219.

128. Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, I, 194.

129. Volodimir Vinnichenko, Vidrodzhennia natsii, III, (Kiev 1920, reprint New York, 1968), 321-326.

130. Ibid., 323.

131. Reshetar, 279.

132. In two telegrams to Kun of March 30 Chicherin voiced misgivings about an eventual Hungarian invasion of Serbia. DVP, II, 109. Cf. another telegram of Apr. 6 in Bak, "Telegrammwechsel", 205f.

133. Tökés, 142n.; Eugen Szatmari, Das rote Ungarn, (Leipzig, 1920), (hereafter quoted as Szatmari), pp. 41f.

134. Szelpal, 151f.

135. Thompson, 206ff.; Deák, 61f.; F.T. Zsuppán, "The Hungarian Soviet Republic and the British Military Representatives, April-June 1919", in The Slavonic and East European Review, XLVII, No. 108 (January 1969), (hereafter quoted as "The Hungarian Soviet Republic..."), pp. 198-218.

136. "V vodovorote", Pravda, March 30, 1919.

137. L.N. Nezhinskii, "Iz istorii Sovetsko-vengerskikh otnoshenii (mart-avgust 1919g.)", in Istoricheskie zapiski, vol. 77, 1965, (hereafter quoted as Nezhinskii), pp. 12f.

138. FRUS, PPC, XII, 426 and 441; Thompson, 208f. Moscow indeed utilized Kun's regime for such a purpose. See for example Chicherin's telegrams of April 2 and 3 in Bak, "Telegrammwechsel", 203-205.

139. Bak, "Telegrammwechsel", 204.

140. As in other telegrams open to interception, Chicherin resorted to cryptical language. Although Smuts' mission was to be limited to Hungary only, Chicherin in a telegram to Kun of April 3 referred to the mission as to "einen neuen Plan in der russischen Frage" which aimed at reconciliation with Bolshevism. Ibid.

141. Miliukov, Bolshevism, 169.

142. Böhm, 316f.; Károlyi, 159; Szelpal, 155.

143. For the political background of these operations see Deák, 78, and Peter A. Toma, "The Slovak Soviet Republic of 1919", in The American Slavic and East European Review, vol. 17, (April 1957), p. 205.

144. Antonov-Ovseenko, IV, 64. The Hungarians were expecting this assistance. See Károlyi, 159; and Pogany's interview in Miliukov, Bolshevism, 168.

145. See the next section of this study.

146. "Vesna, kotoraia reshaiet", Pravda, Apr. 18, 1919. Several days later Trotsky indicated by drawing a parallel between Russia of 1905 and Germany of 1919 that the German proletariat still had a long way to go to victory. Pravda, Apr. 23, 1919.

147. "Chto nuzhno Rossii", Pravda, April 26, 1919.

148. See for example a memorandum of the Supreme Commander of April 23, LSb, vol. 34, 118n.-120n.

149. Lenin too acted on this principle. For example he denied any effective help to Hungary, arguing that the Soviet armies on the Western front had to give maximum aid to their colleagues in southern Russia. At the same time, however, he urged the Red Army to recapture Vilna from the Poles. LPSS, vol. 35, 382. According to Price, 363, a report reached Germany that Lenin was in favour of the strategy of finishing with enemy 'at the gates' before assuming an offensive in Europe.

150. Vengerskie internatsionalisty v Oktiab'rskoi revoliutsii i grazhdanskoi voine v SSSR, vol. II, (Moscow, 1968), (hereafter quoted as Vengerskie internatsionalisty),pp. 49f. Cf. Eckelt, 335f.

151. Vengerskie internatsionalisty, II, 51-53.

152. IzIGV, I, 382. For Lenin's intervention in the dispute between Vatsetis and Antonov-Ovseenko see Adams, 256ff.

153. LCW, vol. 44, 215. Cf. Antonov-Ovseenko, IV, 67.

154. Direktivy, 226f.

155. The Communist International, No. 2 (June 1919), cols. 223f.

156. Szelpal, 176; Eckelt, 337.

157. The Communist International, No. 2 (June 1919), col. 224.

158. Böhm, 351; Zsuppán, "The Hungarian Soviet Republic...", 206f.

159. FRUS, PPC, XII, 445-447.

160. Bak, "Telegrammwechsel", 213f. There was a Ukrainian government in Galicia but not a socialist one.

161. Ibid., 214.

162. Vengerskie internatsionalisty, II, 55.

163. Zsuppán, "The Hungarian Soviet Republic...", 207. For related activities see FRUS, PPC, XII, 435f.; Szelpal, 177.

164. Nezhinskii, 7.

165. DVP, II, 152; Degras, SDFP, I, 155-157.

166. Direktivy, 231; Antonov-Ovseenko, IV, 299f. Cf. Eckelt, 347-350.

167. Antonov-Ovseenko, IV, 74, and 84.

168. Ibid., 279. Distrustful Lenin nevertheless dispatched to the Ukraine Lev Kamenev to manage the transfer of the Ukrainian troops to the Donbass. Adams, 352f.

169. Antonov-Ovseenko, IV, 280.

170. Ibid., 281.

171. Károlyi, 160.

172. Brown's report on his mission in FRUS, PPC, XII, 462-468.

173. Zsuppán, "The Hungarian Soviet Republic...", 210.

174. Böhm, 351.

175. Zsuppán, "The Hungarian Soviet Republic...", 209.

176. For political development in Bavaria after Eisner's death see Allan Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria 1918-1919: The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic, (Princeton, N.J., 1965), (hereafter quoted as Mitchell), pp. 273-303; Helmut Neubauer, München und Moskau 1918/1919, (Munich, 1958), (hereafter quoted as Neubauer), pp. 38ff.

177. Neubauer, 42.

178. Erich Mühsam, Von Eisner bis Leviné. Die Entstehung der bayerischen Räterepublik, (Berlin, 1929), (hereafter quoted as Mühsam), p. 39.

179. Ibid., 44.

180. Ibid., 47; DMGDAB, II, 3, 356; Mitchell, 308.

181. Neubauer, 55. The KPD remained in opposition and condemned the new regime as a Schein-Räte-Republik. DMGDAB, II, 3, 361.

182. LCW, vol. 44, 208.

183. Neubauer, 57.

184. Ibid., 54. Neubauer has however failed to notice that Lipp's peculiar telegram in fact constituted a reply to Chicherin's query. Cf. Mitchell, 308.

185. Lipp himself proudly diagnosed his mental state: "Mein Fall: Paranoia artificialmente generate kommt auf 200,000 Geisteskrankheiten vielleicht einmal vor". Staatsarchiv fur Oberbayern, Munich, Nr. 2131/IV, Verfahren gegen Dr. Lipp Franz wegen Hochverrats, Staatsanwaltschaft München I, 186. Memorandum of Dr. G. Kolb, ibid., M. Gerstl, Die Münchener Räte-Republik, (München, 1919), (hereafter quoted as Gerstl), p. 34.

187. For Leviné's background see esp. Neubauer, 66-68; and Paul Werner [Paul Frölich], Die bayerische Räte-Republik; Tatsachen und Kritik, (Leipzig, 1920), 21-24.

188. Frölich in Gruber, 183; Retzlaw, 155.

189. Retzlaw, 155f. The author brings here new and interesting details.

190. Mitchell, 319f., noting this fact, attributes it chiefly to Leviné's tenacity.

191. Interview with Herr Retzlaw, April 4, 1973. There is documentary evidence to the effect that Leviné indeed was giving attention to the activities of Free Corps formations in northern Germany, see Mitchell, 320.

192. Neubauer, 70.

193. LCW, vol. 29, 325.

194. For a similar view see Possony, 305. According to one of the principal actors in Munich, Paul Frölich, the communist activities "resulted in a victory and this victory had to be liquidated". For Levi's criticism of this statement see Gruber, 188.

195. Retzlaw, 167; Mitchell, 325. For the final phase of the republic see also Neubauer, 88ff.; Gerstl, 127ff.; the declarations, decrees and propaganda materials of the Bavarian Soviet republic are reprinted in DMGDAB, II, 3, 377-394.

196. For the subsequent recriminations and interpretations of the events in Bavaria see Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 107ff.

197. Paul Levi, Zwischen Spartakus und Sozialdemokratie, ed. by Charlotte Beradt, (Frankfort/Main, 1969), 20. Cf. Ryder, 218ff.

198. Die Freiheit, April 3, 1919. For the attitude of the German bourgeoisie toward National Bolshevism see O.E. Schüddekopf, Linke Leute von Rechts, (Stuttgart, 1960), 64ff.

199. DVP, II, 131-135. This policy can be traced back to March and February 1919.

200. For materials relating to this mission undertaken by a certain Heinrichson see PAAA, Deutschland 131 geh., Akten betreffend des Verhaltnisses Deutschlands zu Russland, Bd. 19.

201. A recent analysis of the German-Soviet rapprochement in 1919 in Linke, 54ff.

202. DMGDAB, II, 3, 338, and 353. This assurance was ambiguous, indicating also that no Soviet aid could be expected in Germany.

203. Levi, Zwischen Spartakus und Sozialdemokratie, 20. For the Comintern description of the situation in Germany see Degras, The Communist International, I, 51-53.

204. Levi skillfully emphasized the possible danger of such takeovers for Russia and other revolutions. See Levi in Gruber, 190. As for Soviet Hungary, the Rote Fahne consistently gave it little publicity; in early May the paper even reported in big headlines the demise of the Hungarian Soviet Republic without showing any regret.

205. For a useful survey of the disputes in Germany see Erich Eyck, A History of Weimar Republic, I, (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), (hereafter quoted as Eyck), pp. 90ff.

206. See Wohl, 136ff.; and this study, pages 286ff.

207. Degras, The Communist International, 52.

208. The KPD circular letter of June 11, 1919 in Nachlass Levi, box 19. Two days after the German delegation in Paris was handed the peace terms, on May 9, while the crisis in Germany was rapidly deepening, in which might be considered a de-escalation move, the KPD suddenly stopped publishing its central organ, Die Rote Fahne, to resume publication in December 1919. In fact, the party during the "Versailles" crisis readily went into semi-legality.

209. Nachlass Levi, box 50a. The Communist attitude differed little from that of the Independent Socialists who explicitly refused to accept government office. See Ryder, 224f. Acting in a similar spirit, the KPD made no effort to take power during the reparations crisis of 1923, though upon Moscow's directive it struck in the autumn of that year, when the situation was no longer revolutionary.

210. Nezhinskii, 17.

211. DVP, II, 86.

212. In the latter part of May Petliura's forces disintegrated and Polish troops retired behind Luck and Kovel. As a result of this the Red Army advanced westwards into Volynia. Antonov-Ovseenko, IV, 288f.

213. "Soiuz na zhizn' i na smert'", Pravda, May 23, 1919. Szamuely himself expressed a similar view in an address to the Hungarian internationalists in Kiev. Vengerskie internatsionalisty, II, 67.

214. LCW, vol. 29, 391.

215. Ibid.

216. LSb., vol. 34, 153.

217. LPSS, vol. 51, 364.

218. Nezhinskii, 17; Böhm, 387.

219. For details see Zsuppán, "The Hungarian Soviet Republic...", 213ff.

220. Tökés, 175.

221. M.I. Trush, Vheshnepoliticheskaia deiatel'nost' V.I. Lenina: 1917-20, den za dnyom, (Moscow, 1963), p. 200.

222. Böhm, 485-490; Tökés, 177ff.; Völgyes in Völgyes, ed., 167.

223. Kun himself reportedly spelled out these tactics by stating that "we should not defend Budapest here, but at Wiener Neustadt". Miliukov, Bolshevism, 172.

224. Gruber, 194; A.D. Low, "The First Austrian Republic and Soviet Hungary", in Journal of Central European Affairs, XX, No. 2, (1960), (hereafter quoted as Low, "The First Austrian Republic..."), p. 184; Gerhard Botz, "Die kommunistischen Putschversuche in Wien 1918/19", in Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur, XIV, No. 1 (1970), p. 17.

225. For a perceptive analysis of this question see Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 120f. Cf. Low, "The First Austrian Republic...", 187; Szelpal, 221. According to Szelpal it was Lenin who on May 26 suggested to Szamuely that the Hungarian communists should promote revolution in Austria instead of waiting for Soviet aid. Although this appears unlikely, it cannot be precluded that Lenin indeed encouraged the Hungarians to a bolder policy towards Austria. Such a policy constituted no immediate threat to Russia's security.

226. As Bauer explained in his instructions to the Austrian envoy in Budapest it was in Austrian interests to refrain from overthrowing the Soviet regime in Hungary: as long as Hungary was ruled by a government hostile to the Entente, Austria could benefit from it. Low, "The Austrian First Republic...", 186f. Cf. Gruber, 257f.

227. This can be inferred from his own outline of his plan in Gruber, 212ff. For a different interpretation see Botz, 17.

228. Bettelheim, 14f.; Otto Bauer, The Austrian Revolution, (New York, 1925), 106ff.; Eckelt, 312f.

229. See Bettelheim in Gruber, 214. Cf. the communist broadside of June 14, ibid., 199. It made sense that the communists later claimed that they had "never plotted any putsch". Low, "The First Austrian Republic...", 189n.

230. Gruber, 199.

231. Ibid., 201; Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 122.

232. Bettelheim later indicated that it happened upon their own request. Gruber, 208, and 217. This would mean that the Austrian communists imitated Kun's tactics of February 1919.

233. For subsequent recriminations and disputes concerning the "Vienna putsch" see Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 122ff.; Gruber, 195f., and passim.

234. "Uspekhy sovetskoi Vengrii", Pravda, June 7, 1919.

235. Bak, "Telegrammwechsel", 219. For Lenin's caution see also note 214. It undoubtedly was the same day that Chicherin transmitted to Budapest the essence of the first Entente ultimatum of June 7. Bak mistakenly assumes that this telegram (No. 818) preceded a telegram No. 813 of June 9. Bak, "Telegrammwechsel", 218f.

236. Ibid., 219.

237. "Slovatskaia Sovetskaia respublika", Pravda, July 4, 1919. For a short account in English of the Slovak Soviet Republic see the above quoted article of Peter A. Toma.

238. Deák, 93.

239. Böhm, 472. This author's emphasis. Kun's statement clearly contradicted Lenin's view of "proletarian internationalism".

240. On June 17 Pravda quoted Kun saying at the party congress that his government would gladly accept the Allied invitation to the Peace Conference and that personal contacts could bring peace closer than diplomatic means.

241. FRUS, PPC, VII, 22. Völgyes in Völgyes, ed., 166, quotes the telegram as evidence of divergencies between Lenin and Kun but seems to misunderstand the aims of both.

242. Bak, "Telegrammwechsel", 221.

243. Szelpal, 220. Szamuely's speech at the soviet congress reprinted in Tibor Szamuely, Alarm. Ausgewählte Reden und Aufsätze, (Berlin, 1959), 230-237.

244. Deák, 98-102.

245. Vengerskie internatsionalisty, II, 81.

246. For the story see Böhm, 440-441; Károlyi, 377; Szelpal, 239f.; Tökés, 198f.

247. For Kun's charges and Lenin's reply see Tökes, 202, and 203n. Lenin's reply also in LCW, vol. 44, 271.

248. FRUS, PPC, XII, 627.

249. Szelpal, 243f., and 246f.; Böhm, 506.

250. Tökés, 203n.; Szelpal, 247f.

251. For controversies relating to the Hungarian Soviet republic see Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 113ff., and 117.

252. Ibid., 114f. Moscow advanced this thesis immediately after the fall of Kun's regime. Degras, The Communist International, I, 64-65.

1. This fact was admitted even by Lenin's foe and crusader against Bolshevism, Paul Miliukov. See his Bolshevism, 189f. By the same token there is no reason to question the sincerity of Lenin's willingness to cease propaganda in exchange for the cessation of intervention in Russia.

2. For surveys of the origins of international communism see Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 202-240; Borkenau, 98ff.; and James W. Hulse, The Forming of the Communist International, (Stanford, 1964), (hereafter quoted as Hulse), pp. 53-150. For the development of communism in specific parties see esp. Kriegel, 275ff.; Walter Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in Britain 1900-21, (London, 1969), 187ff.; Graubard, 64ff.; König, 23ff.; and John M. Cammett, Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism, (Stanford, 1967), (hereafter quoted as Cammett), pp. 65ff.

3. König, 34; Carl A. Landauer, European Socialism, A History of Ideas and Movements, I, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959), (hereafter quoted as Landauer), pp. 865ff.

4. For the list of newly affiliated parties see Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 417-419.

5. Siegfried Bünger, "Die 'Hands off Russia' - Bewegung in England", in Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 1958, No. 6, 1249-1283. For an impressive anti-interventionist movement in Italy see König, 37-41.

6. Quoted by Landauer, I, 1013f.

7. Degras, The Communist International, I, 59f.

8. See for example the appeal to the workers of the Allied countries, Pravda, July 9, 1919.

9. The text in DVP, II, 208-213. For a similar interpretation of the note see König, 39f.

10. Wohl, 138; König, 39f.

11. Editorial "Put' odin", Pravda, July 24, 1919.

12. "Two Dates 21 July - 1 August", The Communist International, No. 4 (August 1919), col. 5.

13. Sochineniia, vol. 17, 2, 199.

14. LCW, vol. 29, 305. Cf. Lowe, op. cit., 73f.

15. Georgii V. Chicherin, Stati i rechi po voprosam mezhdunarodnoi politiki, (Moscow, 1961), pp. 86-98; Degras, SDFP, I, 161-167.

16. LCW, vol. 30, 151-162.

17. "Letter to the French Communists", The Communist International, No. 5 (1919), 12. For Trotsky's position see also Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, 456f.

18. TP, I, 621-627. Trotsky expressed a similar view in public. See Sochineniia, vol. 17, 2, 248, and 262f. Stalin too wrote a pessimistic letter to Lenin about the situation on the Western front. Works, IV, 282-284.

19. For the decisive military campaigns in the autumn of 1919 see Chamberlin, II, 267ff.

20. König, 51-61; LCW, vol. 30, 91f.

21. Hulse, 97-100.

22. Wohl, 154-157.

23. LCW, vol. 30, 422.

24. Ibid., 417. Cf. page 453.

25. Ibid., 418. Cf. ibid., 160f.

26. Ibid., 424.

27. Ibid., 159.

28. Ibid., 162. At the same time Lenin opposed the view of the Indian revolutionary Roy that the fate of the West depended entirely on the strength of the revolutionary movement in the East. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 389.

29. LCW., vol. 30, 151.

30. Arnold Struthan [Karl Radek], Die Entwicklung der deutschen Revolution und die Aufgaben der Kommunistischen Partei, (Stuttgart, 1919), (hereafter quoted as Struthan, Die Entwicklung), p. 91; the same, Die auswärtige Politik des Sowjet-Russlands, 37f.; the same in Pravda, Jan. 29, 1920.

31. Radek expounded this idea in Maxmillian Harden's paper Die Zukunft, Feb. 7, 1920. According to Reibnitz, his host in Berlin, Radek promised to foster Russo-German rapprochement upon his return to Russia. Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Alte Reichskanzlei, Parteien 8: Bolschewismus, Bd. 2, L 481822-24.

32. See for example N. Bukharin, "Eshche raz o mire", Pravda, Nov. 15, 1919; and the following Pravda articles: "Put' k miru", Dec. 7, 1919;

"K voprosu o mirnykh peregovorakh", Dec. 12, 1919; "Novaia era", Jan. 6, 1920; "Proryv blokady", Jan. 18, 1920. The assertion of some authors that Radek was "playing a lone hand" on the Soviet side (Carr, III, 320; also Angress, 60) is contradicted by the available evidence.

33. LCW, vol. 30, 221. Cf. ibid., 50; for the original proposal see pp. 216f. above.

34. The text ibid., 231; and Degras, SDFP, I, 176f.

35. For the Soviet peace and trade overtures towards the West see Carr, III, 161ff.

36. A survey of new Bolshevik measures on the home front is in Chamberlin, II, 291ff.

37. The disharmony of interests between the Russian and world revolution is noted for example in Kriegel, II, 591.

38. "Vistas of the Proletarian Revolution", The Communist International, No. 1, (May, 1919), cols. 45f.

39. LCW, vol. 30, 85.

40. Pravda, July 13, Aug. 8, and Aug. 13, 1919.

41. König, 47f. Cf. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 160f.

42. LCW, vol. 30, 91f. Lenin dispatched the letter despite being told by A. Balabanoff that it could be "falsely interpreted", that is to say as opportunism. Balabanoff, Impressions of Lenin, 89. Cf. König, 56.

43. Gruber, 206.

44. Birman, 202; Rotschild, 96f. According to the latter, the Bulgarian communists refused to take power being "intoxicated by their vision of the impending world revolutionary explosion" !

45. Wohl, 162ff.; Landauer, I, 1017f.

46. Wohl, 166. Many of the future communists were arrested after the outbreak of the strike.

47. The Communist International, No. 13, (1920), col. 2602. The Bolsheviks may also have dramatized to buttress their call for the split of the PSI.

48. Balabanoff, Impressions of Lenin, 91.

49. Ibid., 89f. Balabanoff gives the impression that there were other attempts on the part of Moscow to halt the revolutionary surge in Italy. Cf. König, 111.

50. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 451; Cammett, 118; Borkenau, 210.

51. Daniel L. Horowitz, The Italian Labor Movement, (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 149-153; Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 451f.

52. Gruber, 293.

53. For the political background of the Kapp putsch see Eyck, I, 129ff. and 147ff. The Kapp putsch and its background is dealt with extensively in Johannes Erger, Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch, (Düsseldorf, 1967), (hereafter quoted as Erger).

54. Erger, 98, and 105.

55. Schüddekopf, "Karl Radek...", 151ff.; Radek, "November", 418ff.

56. Radek, "November", 426.

57. Ibid., 427.

58. "'Svoe' i 'chuzhoe'", Pravda, Jan. 27, 1920. Lenin likewise stated on March 6 that there was a "need for a central authority, for dictatorship and a united will" in Germany. LCW, vol. 30, 422.

59. Erger, 105.

60. Ibid., 108ff.; Waite, 149ff.

61. Erger, 157f.

62. Pravda, Mar. 17, 1920. For the Soviet reaction see also Ascher, "Russian Marxism...", 427ff.

63. Izvestiia, Mar. 15, 1920.

64. Pravda, Mar. 16, 1920.

65. "Voennyi perevorot v Germanii", Izvestiia, Mar. 16, 1920.

66. Die Rote Fahne, Mar. 14, 1920. Radek admitted immediately after the putsch a "certain responsibility" for the political line of the German KPD. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 248.

67. Erger, 226.

68. Borkenau, 155-159; Ruth Fischer, 126ff.; DMGDAB, III, 277ff.

69. Degras, The Communist International, I, 83-85.

70. See page 74 above.

71. For Lenin and Left Communism see esp. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 241-270; Hulse, 151-169.

72. Lenin made this point clear in the spring of 1920. See LCW, vol. 31, 35f. The Hungarian Left Communist theoretician Georg Lukacz pointed out in 1920 this corollary of Lenin's tactics of 1905-07 and 1917. Hulse, 165f.

73. Eberlein in the Communist International, vol. VI, Nos. 9-10-11, (1929), p. 437.

74. See Lenin's attack on MacDonald, LCW, vol. 30, 504, and his letter to Sylvia Pankhurst, ibid., vol. 29, 561-566. As early as March 1919 Lenin had suggested that the communists should participate in trade unions activities. LCW, vol. 29, 155.

75. A circular letter of September 1, 1919, in Degras, The Communist International, I, 66-70.

76. Ibid., vol. 30, esp. pp. 58 and 61.

77. Wohl, 150-152.

78. For the story of the two offices see Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 164-193; Hulse, 152ff.; Nikolaevsky, Les Premières Années, 13ff.

79. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 188; Hulse, 164ff.; and Carr, III, 175.

80. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 196-201.

81. The idea of "national Bolshevism" expounded in Heinrich Laufenberg, Zwischen der ersten und der zweiten Revolution, (Hamburg, 1919); also Heinrich Laufenberg and Fritz Wolffheim, Revolutionärer Volkskrieg oder konterrevolutionärer Bürgerkrieg?, (Hamburg, 1920). For additional literature see Angress, 41f.

82. Struthan, Die Entwicklung, 57f.

83. Karl Radek, "Die auswärtige Politik des deutschen Kommunismus und der Hamburger nationale Bolschewismus" in Gegen den Nationalbolschewismus, (Hamburg, 1920).

84. Ibid., 13 and 16.

85. Ibid., 8f.

86. LCW, vol. 31, 21-117.

87. Ibid., 43f.

88. Ibid., 45.

89. Ibid., 24.

90. Ibid., 58. Lenin's emphasis.

91. Ibid., 59.

92. Ibid., 76f.

93. Quoted by Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 268f.

94. Fischer, Lenin, 421.

95. See above, page 263.

96. Degras, The Communist International, 75-80. Cf. Angress, 61f.

97. Carr, III, 189ff.; Hulse, 170ff.

98. Victor Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary 1901-1941, (London, 1963), 100. Kriegel, II, 607f., disputes this motivation on the erroneous assumption that the Polish attack started only in May 1920.

99. See his rectification of "Theses on the fundamental tasks of the Second Congress of the Communist International", LCW, vol. 31, 197ff. Cf. Hulse, 217.

100. The dealings and documents of the congress published in Der zweite Kongress der Kommunist. Internationale: Protokol der Verhandlungen vom 19. Juli in Potrograd und vom 23. Juli bis 7. August 1920 in Moskau, (Hamburg, 1921). The documents are also published in Degras, The Communist International, I, 109-183. For an analysis of the congress documents see Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 319-334.

101. For a concise account of the proceedings of the congress on the national question see D. Boersner, The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Questions (1917-1928), (Geneva and Paris, 1957), 78-93. Cf. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 365ff.

102. Degras, The Communist International, I, 130.

103. Ibid., 133.

104. LCW, vol. 31, 227.

105. Ibid., 189.

106. Hulse, 197; Borkenau, 191; Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 194f. and 265f.

107. The text in Degras, The Communist International, and LCW, vol. 31, 206-212.

108. König, 115. Cf. Levi, Was ist Verbrechen, 41; Gruber, 281.

109. Anton Pannekoek, Weltrevolution und kommunistische Taktik, (Vienna, 1920), 46. This interest in creating a broader basis of followers in the final account overshadowed ideological and organizational considerations

as manifested particularly in the Soviet insistence on affiliating the British ILP with the thoroughly reformist Labour Party. Hulse, 196-201.

110. For the most detailed account and further literature on the congress negotiations see Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 271-317. See also Borkenau, 188 and passim.

111. Balabanoff, Impressions of Lenin, 90f.

112. Wohl, 200f.

113. Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 288f.

114. Angress, 71-73.

115. Wohl, 197-202. Kriegel calls the Tours secession "un accident banal" and an "affaire circonstantielle", (II, 871f.).

116. For documents and commentary in English see Gruber, 277-312; see also König, 92ff.; Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 447ff.

117. Quoted in Lazitch and Drachkovitch, 339. Cf. Hulse, 221.

1. See Lord D'Abernon, The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World, (London, 1931), (hereafter quoted as D'Abernon). Thomas Fiddick has recently pointed out the "dovish" tendencies of the Soviet political leadership in August 1920 in his article "The 'Miracle of the Vistula': Soviet Policy versus Red Army Strategy", The Journal of Modern History, vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec. 1973). Besides being somewhat anticlimactic, Fiddick's discussion in view of this author suffers from two fundamental misjudgements. First, Fiddick construes a rift between the Soviet politicians and the military, giving the impression of the Soviet blunder in Poland being caused by Tukhachevsky's alleged "revolt". Second, misinterpreting a great deal of evidence, Fiddick presents also Lenin as a "dove" working along with his colleagues for the de-escalation of the war.

2. D'Abernon, 18; Possony, 309f.; Norman Davis, "The Soviet Command and the Battle of Warsaw", in Soviet Studies, XXIII, No. 4 (April, 1972), (hereafter quoted as Davis, "The Soviet Command"), p. 573; Piotr S. Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations 1917-1921, (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), (hereafter quoted as Wandycz), 229 and 285. Lenin did state that the Red Army could have destroyed the Versailles Treaty, but by this he meant merely the conquest of Poland. LCW, vol. 31, 305.

3. For details see esp. Wandycz, 118ff.

4. Ibid., 138ff.; and S.F. Naida, O nekotorykh voprosakh istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR, (Moscow, 1958), (hereafter quoted as Naida), p. 217. Pilsudski was the head of the Polish state since the middle of January, 1919.

5. In a letter to his political rival Paderewski of May 31, 1919, Pilsudski outlined the chief objective of his eastern policy as being to prevent an extension of Russian influence westwards and to propagate the "union of all nations" between Russia and Poland with Poland on the basis of a federation. Wandycz, 121.

6. Naida, 217f.

7. See a report of Sir H. Mackinder in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Series 1 (hereafter quoted as DBFP), vol. III, (London, 1949), 768-798.

8. The letter is reprinted in Arthur Leinwand, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna wobec wojny polsko-radzieckej; 1919-1920, (Warsaw, 1964), 251-256.

9. TP, II, 20f. Glavkom Sergei Kamenev confirmed the veracity of Trotsky's report. See Kakurin and Melikov, 415-417.

10. Degras, SDFP, I, 178-180; Pravda, Jan. 30, 1920.

11. Drawn by Lord Curzon in December 1919, this line was supposed to delimit the ethnic Polish boundaries in the East. For a good map of this and other border projects see Wandycz, 255.

12. LPSS, vol. 51, 146f. No details are known, but Lenin evidently anticipated the Poles to start the offensive.

13. Bubnov, III, 391f.

14. Ibid., 319; Kakurin and Melikov, 67-69.

15. TP, II, 117, 133 and 167; Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, II, 2, 93 and 102f. Cf. Stalin's similar view, Works, IV, 339 and 351.

16. This applies particularly to the abortive Soviet-Polish negotiations at Borisov in April 1920. See esp. Wandycz, 173ff.

17. See footnote 12.

18. "My i oni", Pravda, Feb. 27, 1920.

19. LCW, vol. 30, 394f., 411 and 452.

20. A major objective of Pilsudski's offensive seems to have been a change of the political regime in Moscow - a change which could facilitate the creation of buffer states between Poland and Russia. It is noteworthy that even such a good observer of Polish politics as Karl Radek interpreted Pilsudski's offensive as a preventive war. See his Die auswaertige Politik Sowjet-Russlands, 56f. Cf. Wandycz, 194.

21. LCW, vol. 31, 120.

22. DVP, II, 495, 507-509, and passim. Wandycz, 204, asserts that the emphasis on the Polish independence "was largely propagandistic" and that the Bolsheviks did so "mainly for tactical reasons", to calm the fears of the Poles.

23. P.V. Suslov, Politicheskoe obespechenie sovetsko-polskoi kampanii 1920 goda, (Moscow and Leningrad, 1930), (hereafter quoted as Suslov), pp.25ff.

24. The re-emergence of Russian patriotism brought considerable discomfort to some Bolsheviks while pleasing others. Subsequently, there was a dispute in the Soviet press whether the conflict with Poland was a class or a national war. Radek defended the latter view against Osinsky, Sokolnikov, and Solf. See Pravda, May 9, 11, 12, and passim.

25. Pravda, May 20, 1920.

26. Pravda, May 23, 1920.

27. Stalin, Works, IV, 330-340.

28. N.F. Kuzmin, Krushenie poslednego pokhoda Antanty, (Moscow, 1958), (hereafter quoted as Kuzmin), pp. 80ff.

29. Ibid., 157ff.

30. DVP- II, 566-568.

31. See the Pravda editorial of June 11, 1920. The author, obviously Bukharin, speculated on the economic cooperation of Soviet Russia, Soviet Poland and Germany against the Allies. Cf. Pravda, June 23.

32. LCW, vol. 31, esp. pp. 171, 173ff.

33. See for instance Degras, SDFP, I, 189f; Trotskii, Sochineniia, 17, 2, 421-423.

34. Wandycz, 205, makes a valid point when noting that in the early stages of the war the Bolsheviks used the idea of a revolution in Poland largely for domestic consumption.

35. Kuzmin, 199ff.

36. DBFP, VIII, 530.

37. Carroll, 112. For the text of the note see The British House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Series V, vol. 131, col. 2372-74.

38. The note of July 11 misinterpreted in Soviet favour the suggested armistice line. Radek hinted in Die auswaertige Politik, Sowjet-Russlands, 57, that Lord Curzon favoured the Bolsheviks because of his fear that the White generals would promote Russian expansion into Asia. For new aspects of the note of July 11 see Norman Davis, "Lloyd George and Poland, 1919-20", The Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 6, No. 3 (1971), (hereafter quoted as Davis, "Lloyd George..."), esp. pp. 144-146.

39. This can be inferred from Trotsky's communication of July 8, TP, II, 223.

40. Pravda, July 4, 6, 10.

41. LPSS, vol. 51, 235.

42. See Chapter I, pp. 25ff.

43. LCW, vol. 44, 403. Cf. Lenin to Stalin on July 12 or 13, LCW, vol. 31, 203f. For Lenin's general assessment of Britain's inability to intervene effectively in the war see Chicherin, Stati i rechi po voprosam mezhdunarodnoi politiki, 285; and Chicherin in Bukharin, Lenin, 98. Cf. Wandycz, 215.

44. Trotsky, Lenin, 116.

45. Editorial "Nachalo pogroma beloi Pol'shi i nashi zadachi", Pravda, July 13, 1920.

46. Karl Radek, "The Polish Question and the International", in the Communist International, Nos. 11-12 (June-July 1920), col. 2352.

47. Quoted in Carroll, 115.

48. Stalin, Works, IV, 352, 354f.

49. TP, II, 229-231, 233. Cf. Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, 463. Trotsky rejected British mediation in Soviet negotiations with Wrangel. The Soviet Glavkom Kamenev likewise favoured a halt on the ethnic frontiers. Bubnov, III, 395.

50. LPSS, vol. 51, 470.

51. LCW, vol. 31, 205.

52. See the next section.

52a. For a similar view see Fiddick, 631f.

53. Degras, SDFP, I, 194-197.

54. Trotskii, Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, II, 2, 157-161.

55. Kakurin and Melikov, 475; Bubnov, III, 395f.

56. Direktivy, 641f.; Bubnov, III, 399. It was expected that Tukhachevsky's armies would seize Warsaw without any assistance from the South-Western front which was to take Lvov. Glavkom Kamenev now believed that Tukhachevsky would be able to fulfil his task even without one of his four armies, and issued a directive indicating that Warsaw should be taken no later than August 12. Direktivy, 643f.; Kuzmin, 252.

57. Suslov, 80.

58. Wandycz, 226f. The report on the formation of the provisional Polish Revolutionary Committee is reprinted in Dokumenty i materialy po istorii sovetsko-polskikh otnoshenii, (hereafter quoted as DM SPO), vol. 3 (Moscow, 1965), 221f. This volume contains also other materials related to the Committee's activities.

59. Wandycz, 223.

60. See the view of the Soviet C.-in-C. in Direktivy, 614f.

61. DVP, III, 65. Cf. Wandycz, 223. In a response to the Polish peace initiative Lenin proposed a grandiose plan of a transfer by foot of the Soviet troops in the Caucasus through the Ukraine to Poland. LPSS, vol. 51, 244-246.

62. Titus Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic. A Study in the Diplomatic History of Europe, 1914-1920, (London, 1957), 636. Cf. Carroll, 126ff.

63. DVP, III, 61f.

64. DVP, II, 700.

65. For documentary evidence see Komarnicki, 631f.; Carroll, 160f.

66. Davis, "Lloyd George...", 147.

67. This applies particularly to the points obliging the Poles to accept the Curzon line as the eastern frontier and to hand over Vilna to the Lithuanians. Cf. Davis, "Lloyd George...", 144, 154. The recent work of Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-1920, has not been available to this author.

68. DBFP, VIII, 500.

69. D'Abernon, 35.

70. Ibid., 44f. Neither all the Polish politicians and the military, nor the members of the Allied missions in Poland were in agreement with this "absurd strategy" of Pilsudski. General Weygand in particular could not comprehend it. See D'Abernon, 44f. Relations were so tense that Pilsudski's Chief of Staff, General Rozwadowski, communicated with General Weygand in the adjacent office only by diplomatic notes. Jozef Pilsudski, Rok 1920, (London, 1940), (hereafter quoted as Pilsudski), p. 110.

71. A new Polish government of national unity headed by the popular peasant leader W. Witos was formed by July 20. Wandycz, 222.

72. The official British mission was headed by Lord d'Abernon and General Sir Percy Radcliffe, the French Committee was led by Jusserand and General Weygand.

73. The Polish government decided on July 28 to accept the armistice along the cease-fire-line but to reject any eventual Soviet demand of disarmament, interference in Poland's domestic affairs or a Polish withdrawal from the demarcation line. DM SPO, III, 212f. The day before, Lord d'Abernon noted with embarrassment that "the Prime Minister, a peasant proprietor, has gone off today to get his harvest in. Nobody thinks it extraordinary." D'Abernon, 37.

74. The central organ of the German communists, Rote Fahne, for instance, reported as early as July 20 that the "doves" opposing Lenin's policy had won by a narrow margin in the Moscow Soviet.

75. DVP, III, 78f.

76. As Stalin admitted in the climax of Wrangel's activity, there scarcely was "a reason to believe that Wrangel will succeed in breaking through the rear of our Western armies." Works, IV, 346. Fiddick in his recent study has failed to notice this aspect, although the Bolshevik policy towards Wrangel stands in the centre of his interest.

77. TP, II, 241.

78. LCW, vol.31, 264.

79. LPSS, vol. 51, 441.

80. Ibid., 248.

81. LCW, vol. 31, 265.

82. IzIGV, III, 338f.

83. The main dessant, consisting merely of seven thousand Cossacks,was liquidated by the Red Army in less than a month after landing on August 13. Chamberlin, II, 324ff. For another ominous incident -the discovery by the Soviets of an alleged French shipment of twenty-eight hydroplanes to Wrangel- see DVP, III, 80f.

84. "Ne zavtra, a segodnia", Pravda, Aug. 5, 1920.

85. Carroll, 119; Wandycz, 224.

86. DBFP, VIII, 670-680.

87. DVP, III, 81.

88. Pravda, Aug. 8, 1920; DVP, III, 93f.

89. Pravda, Aug. 6, 1920.

90. Ibid.

91. Lev Nikulin, Tukhachevskii, (Moscow, 1964), 126.

92. Kuzmin, 256f.

93. LCW, vol. 44, 410.

94. LPSS, vol. 51, 442. Cf. Naida, 225. Pravda upheld this decision on Aug. 6 - see the editorial "Plan Wrangelia".

95. Izvestia, Aug. 8, 1920. Cf. Kuzmin, 256f. L. Kamenev on August 5 informed Lloyd George in the same spirit. DVP, III, 84f.; DBFP, VIII, 684n.

96. "Nelzia medlit'", Pravda, Aug. 7, 1920.

97. The French socialist Ernest Laffond who went in late July on a mission to Warsaw and Moscow, informed the Soviet leaders on the attitudes in the Polish capital, and particularly on Daszynski's statement that the Polish government considered an armistice with Soviet Russia only as a respite before renewed fighting. Trotskii, Sochineniia, 17, 2, 430-432.

98. DBFP, VIII, 681.

99. Ibid., 682.

100. Ibid., 682-708.

101. DVP, III, 90f. Wandycz, 235ff., leaning heavily on Lenin's remark of August 11 that the delay was "arch convenient for us" seems to suggest that the Bolsheviks continued in procrastinating tactics. Yet Lenin made this remark in a brief euphoria after Britain had found the Soviet peace terms acceptable and it was a Polish temporizing that he considered as "arch convenient". Trotsky in his personal memorandum of August 11 and Lenin in a confidential directive of August 14 unequivocally blamed the Poles for a dilatory tactic.

102. Dokumenty i materialy do historii stósunkow polsko-radzieckich, (hereafter quoted as DM SPR), vol. III (Warsaw, 1964), 212f.

103. DVP, III, 91. Cf. DBFP, VIII, 723. The talks in fact began at Minsk on August 11.

104. DVP, III, 100f. Given the manifestly patriotic stand of the Polish workers, the demand for the creation of a workers' militia was a face-saving formula rather than - as has been widely assumed - an ingenuous device for the spread of Bolshevism.

105. Wandycz, 234f. Cf. DBFP, VIII, 709ff. The French Prime Minister Millerand, hitherto inactive, now came vehemently to oppose any negotiations with Soviet Russia.

106. DBFP, VIII, 754f.

107. For Chicherin's account on this incident see DVP, II, 706f., III, 130.

108. Ibid., III, 121. On August 11 Chicherin assured Warsaw that the work of the Polish delegation would not be obstructed and that the Soviet government was ready to start negotiations "at any moment": "We have no intentions directed against Poland's freedom, independence and sovereignty." DVP, III, 117.

109. Pilsudski, 115ff.

110. Pilsudski rejected a proposal of General Rozwadowski to concentrate the strike force only 40 miles south of Warsaw on the ground that the enemy there would be superior to the Poles. Ibid., 118. Apart from other factors, Pilsudski's plan in fact was not such a gamble

as assumed: the Polish Marshal had known since late July that the Soviet command was planning an advance only to the River Vistula. See DMSPO, III, 198f.

111. D'Abernon, 63.

112. Ibid., 66.

113. For the text of this order see IzIGV, III, 347f. The order was dated August 10, though Tukhachevsky later dated it August 8, Mikhail Tukhachevskii, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, vol. I (Moscow, 1964), (hereafter quoted as Tukhachevskii), p. 157. The difference of two days suggest that the order was worked out by August 8 and formally put into effect on August 10.

114. John Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Military Political History, 1918-1941, (London, 1962), (hereafter quoted as Erickson), p. 96; Fuller, 354; Davis, 575, even assumes that the conquest of Warsaw remained "due" for August 12.

115. IzIGV, III, 347.

116. Ibid., 348. This author's emphasis. Putna, 109, concedes that the thrust to the north of Warsaw caused serious difficulties to the Sixteenth Army, spread over the entire Warsaw front.

117. For a comparative study critical of Tukhachevsky see particularly Vladimir Melikov, Marna - 1919 goda. Visla - 1920 goda. Smirna - 1922 goda, (Moscow, 1928), (hereafter quoted as Melikov).

118. Fiddick, 627n., ignoring this fact, asserts that a Soviet directive to avoid Warsaw, to which Pilsudski referred in his memoirs (pp.119f.), has never been published by the Soviets.

119. Tukhachevskii, I, 155.

120. See footnote 91.

121. Erickson, 94. Cf. Fiddick, 628.

122. IzIGV, III, 348.

123. Wandycz, 241, made this point in connection with a similar decision of the Politbureau of August 18.

124. Quoted in Komarnicki, 632.

125. The Council of Action approached the Soviet delegation in London on August 11 with a document expressing the hope that the Polish people would not be deprived of the right freely to determine its destiny. Pravda, August 17, 1920. Cf. L.J. MacFarlane, "Hands Off Russia: British Labour and the Russo-Polish War, 1920", in Past and Present, No. 38 (Dec. 1967), 126-152.

126. DBFP, VIII, 690.

127. "Vor der Entscheidung", Rote Fahne, Aug. 10, 1920. On August 3 Rote Fahne warned Soviet Russia against a blind imitation of the policy of conquest pursued by "Wilhelminian Germany".

128. The fact that Tukhachevsky on August 5 asked the Central Committee for the transfer of Budenny's cavalry to the West suggests that he did so while facing the task of diverting his troops to the north of Warsaw. It is noteworthy that Rote Fahne as early as August 7 in an article entitled "Zwischen Rhein und Weichsel", indirectly denied any Soviet intention of taking Warsaw.

129. Melikov, 255f.

130. Rote Fahne reprinted a report to this effect on August 13.

131. As Lenin stated in a telegram to Stalin of August 7, "Generally, a lot depends on Warsaw and its fate." LCW, vol. 44, 410.

132. For details see Wandycz, 228f. It is noteworthy that while the appeal of the Committee was signed "Provisional Revolutionary Government of Poland", Pravda referred to a "Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Poland". Pravda, Aug. 18, 1920 (author's emphasis). LPSS, vol. 51, 248.

133. TP, II, 279. Lenin suggested a reward of 100.000 rubles for each man hanged.

134. In an interesting letter to Dzerzhinskii's wife, the Polish communist Adam Warski explained this by the fear that the Soviet advance would provoke an outburst of chauvinism and lead to a deterioration of the position of the Polish party. DMSPR, III, 495-497.

135. While on August 11 Lenin still found the Polish delays "arch convenient", three days later he was already anxious to dispel from the Soviets the stigma of temporizers and outlined to the head of the Soviet peace delegation a realistic peace platform acceptable to the Poles. Lenin: "That we have roused the workers - this is already no small gain." LCW, vol. 44, 415f.

136. DVP, III, 131.

137. Trotskii, Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, II, 2, 164f. Cf. My Life, 457: "Lenin fixed his mind on carrying the war to an end, up to the entry into Warsaw. To this I was resolutely opposed." Fiddick in his article grossly exaggerates Lenin's "dovishness" (pp.634ff.).

138. DVP, III, 122.

139. "Provokatsiia francuzskikh kapitalistov", Pravda, Aug. 12, 1920.

140. Direktivy, 655.

141. Pravda, Aug. 15, 1920.

142. Similarly, the Soviets began to transmit en clair their alleged orders for a "final" attack, warning the Poles that "one blow more means the end of the Polish venture". For the text see Boleslaw Waligora, Boj na przedmosciu Warszawy w sierpniu 1920R., (Warsaw, 1934), (hereafter quoted as Waligora), p. 338. Cf. J.F.C. Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the World, vol. III (London, 1957), 354.

143. General Lucjan Zeligowski, Wojna w roke 1920. Wspomnienia i rozwazania, (Warsaw, 1930), (hereafter quoted as Zeligowski), p. 111. Zeligowski demonstrates that Waligora in his study Fortyfikacja Przedmoscia Warszawy exaggerated the Polish preparedness.

144. Zeligowski, 114f.

145. Cf. Waligora, 429f.; V. Putna, K Visle i obratno, (Moscow, 1927), (hereafter quoted as Putna), p. 122; D'Abernon, 81.

146. According to Waligora, 285, the division was ordered to reach the Vistula; Putna, 115, maintains that the division attacked in the direction of the Warsaw suburb Praga.

147. Report of the French General Billotte, Waligora, 283.

148. Ibid., 284. Cf. Wincenty Witos, Moje wspomnienia, (hereafter quoted as Witos), vol. II (Paris, 1964), pp. 299f.

149. Waligora, 324.

150. Putna, 120.

151. Dzerzhinskii, Dnevnik: Pis'ma k rodnym, (Moscow, 1958), pp. 258f. In a letter of August 15 Dzerzhinsky reported to Lenin that in Warsaw "one demands a withdrawal of the White forces without struggle" and asked him to turn attention to the "open German frontiers"! Izbrannye proizvedeniia, vol. I (Moscow, 1957), p. 296f.

152. Władysław Sikorski, Nad Wisła i Wkra, (London, 1941), 130f. Cf. Waligora, 429f.

153. Général Camon, La Maneouvre Liberatrice du Maréchal Pilsudski contre les Bolchéviks, Août 1920 , (Paris, 1949), 56.

154. Waligora, 340.

155. Cf. Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, I, 270: "No military move by Pilsudski...can alone account for the precipitate retreat of the Red forces from the immediate vicinity of Warsaw."

156. Tukhachevsky issued his order although warned by Glavkom Kamenev that he could not rely on an immediate assistance of the South-Western front. Direktivy, 649. Cf. Erickson, 97; Davis, "The Soviet Command", 578.

157. Direktivy, 651.

158. Pilsudski himself has pointed this out; Pilsudski, 109.

159. I. Stepanov [Skvorcov], With the Red Army in Bourgeois Poland, (Moscow, 1920), 23.

160. Direktivy, 647-649, and 650f. The commander of the 27th Division, Putna, suggested a thrust in this direction. Putna, 106.

161. Direktivy, 652.

162. Melikov, 233. The passage has not been printed in Direktivy.

163. N. Kuzmin, "Ob odnoi nevypolnenoi direktive glavkoma", in Voenno istoricheskii zhurnal, 1962, No. 9 (hereafter quoted as "Kuzmin in VIZH"), p. 59, dates the seizure of the order on August 9. The order is reprinted in Melikov, 454.

164. See Direktivy, 653f.; Melikov, 451.

165. A. Egorov, Lvov - Varshava. Vzaimodeistvie frontov, (Moscow and Leningrad, 1929), (hereafter quoted as Egorov), p. 177.

166. Ibid., 176.

167. IzIGV, III, 349.

168. Smilga, previously a "hawk" who considered the fate of Warsaw to be sealed, in this decisive phase of the war in words of a Soviet author "committed serious errors". Kuzmin in VIZh, 55.

169. For Glavkom's view see Direktivy, 653; for the opinion of the South-Western front see S.M. Budennyi, Proidenny put', vol. II (Moscow, 1965), (hereafter quoted as Budenny), pp. 289ff.; Naida, 225; and Egorov, 97.

170. IzIGV, III, 349. Kamenev clearly aimed at offsetting the Polish counterattack. See Direktivy, 618.

171. For information regarding Stalin's concept of the war see Egorov, esp. p. 23f.; 143ff.; Stalin, Works, IV, passim. Cf. Davis, "The Soviet Command", 578.

172. Naida, 226. Cf. Erickson, 98.

173. For Budenny's story see esp. Kuzmin in VIZh, 49-66; Budennyi, II, 303ff.; Naida, 226ff.; Erickson, 97f. Trotsky's account in Stalin, 328ff., is partisan.

174. Melikov, 455.

175. Davis, "The Soviet Command", 576.

176. LCW, vol. 44, 414. Fiddick, 639, confuses the chronology and sense of these events.

177. Budennyi, II, 318f.

178. Ibid.; also Kuzmin in VIZh, 64.

179. Fiddick has reached a similar conclusion upon alanyzing the Soviet decision to reinforce the Crimean front at the expense of the Polish front. Fiddick, 642.

180. Wandycz, for instance, has failed to mention these talks in his comprehensive study Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917-1921, pp. 232ff.

181. See page 293 above.

182. Archiwum Akt Nowych, (Warsaw), Kancelaria Cywilna Naczelnika Panstwa, (hereafter quoted as AAN, Kancelaria), sig. 147, pp. 176-184. The report has also been printed in Jozef Sieradzki, Bialowieza i Mikaszewicze, (Warsaw, 1959), 101-116. A brief Soviet version of the encounter appeared in DMSPR, III, 276.

183. AAN, Kancelaria, sig. 147, p. 182; and Sieradzki, 114f.

184. AAN, Kancelaria. sig. 147. pp. 183f.; and Sieradzki, 65-67. Kossakowski met the secretary of the Soviet peace delegation,

185. There is fragmentary evidence that the Riga talks and the prospect of Pilsudski being ousted from political life was discussed by August 5 in the Bolshevik leadership. See Dzerzhinskii's letter to Lenin of August 6, 1920; Izbrannye proizvedeniia, I, 294.

186. See pages 273ff. above.

187. Trotskii, Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, II, 2, 165.

188. Acting in a similar spirit the Polish communists in May 1926 supported Pilsudski in his coup which established a dictatorial regime in Poland.

189. DBFP, VIII, 734. A report on Polish willingness to cooperate with the Bolsheviks was even reprinted in Pravda, Aug. 18, 1920.

190. Ibid., 754f. Having received them, Pilsudski immediately tendered his resignation which was not accepted. Witos, II, 290-292.

191. Henryk Jablonski, "Wojna polsko-nadziecka 1919-1920", in Przegląd Socjalistyczny, Nos. 7-8 (1948), p. 29. In any case, it is very likely that Pilsudski had a certain knowledge of the Bolshevik plans. See Jan Kowalewski, "Na czym polegal 'nonsens strategiczny' kampani 1920R.", in Dziennik polski i dziennik zołnierza, (London), 15 Aug. 1955, p. 2.

192. Witos, II, 296.

193. Ibid., 291.

194. Pilsudski, 126f. Quoted in D'Abernon, 145f.

195. D'Abernon, 160.

196. This comes out also from the Glavkom-Tukhachevsky conversations of Aug. 13 and 15, in Direktivy, 656f. The military experts held a similar view in August 1920. See Fiddick, 641.

197. Tukhachevskii, I, 163ff. Cf. D'Abernon, 162ff. Lloyd George, like D'Abernon not impressedby the Polish "victory", subsequently concluded that "if Russia wanted to crush Poland she could do so". Davis, "Lloyd George...", 151.

198. Trotskii, Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia, II, 2, 190.

199. TP, II, 253.

200. Ibid., 257.

201. "Vnimanie", August 18; "Mezhdunarodnyi proletar'skii front", August 19, 1920.

202. LCW, vol. 44, 416.

203. Ibid.

204. LPSS, vol. 51, 446 and 468.

205. Ibid., 266f.; passim. Khristo Kabakchiev has recalled that in August 1920 Lenin in a conversation with him "showed no excitement" about the Soviet retreat and gave only an evasive reply to the question whether the Bulgarian communists could rely upon Soviet military and political assistance in the internal crisis. Vospominaniia o Vladimire Iliche Lenine, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1956-1960), vol. 2, 531. Cf. Lenin's famous assessment of the Soviet "defeat" in Clara Zetkin, Reminiscences on Lenin, (New York, 1934), 18f.

206. Trotsky, Stalin, 329.

207. Thus Trotsky to Chiang-Kai-shek in 1923. See Chiang-Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, (New York, 1957), 21f.

208. See Chicherin in Bukharin, Lenin, 99.

209. For the beginning of this process in the autumn of 1920 see LPSS, vol. 51, 260 and 292f. It is noteworthy in this context that Stalin himself later held Lenin in a low esteem as an expert on military affairs. See Stalin's letter in Aralov, 3.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(A) UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

(i) Britain

Library of the London School of Economics and Political Science, London

- Burtsev Papers

(ii) Germany

Archiv der Sozialdemokratie, Bonn-Bad Godesberg

- Nachlass Emil Barth
- Nachlass Paul Levi

Bundesarchiv Koblenz

- Alte Reichskanzlei, Parteien 8: Akte betreffend: Kommunistische Partei, Spartakus, Bolschewismus, 1919-1932, Bd. 1-5
- Nachlass Max Bauer
- Nachlass Wilhelm Solf

Geheimes Staatsarchiv Berlin

- Preussisches Justizministerium: Politische Erreignisse nach der Revolution vom 9 November 1918, Bd. 1, 1918-1919 (P 135/11759), and Bd. 2, 1919 (P 135/11760).

Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PAAA), Bonn

- Deutschland Nr.88, Akten betreffend Verfassung des deutschen Reichs, Bd. 13 and 14.
- Deutschland 122, Nr. 2 s, Staatssekretär Solf, Bd. 1; Nr. 2 u, Staatssekretär Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau, Bd. 1.
- Deutschland 127 geheim, Nr.5, Die russische Botschaft in Berlin, Bd. 2.
- Deutschland 127, Nr.5, adh.1, Mitteilungen der russischen Regierung an ihren bevollmächtigten Vertreter in Berlin, Bd. 1-6.

- Deutschland 131, Akten betreffend: das Verhältnis Deutschlands zu Russland, Bd. 49-59.

- Deutschland 131, adh.3, Nr.2, Akten betreffend der russischen Bolschewisten Karl Radek (Sobelsohn), Bd. 1 and 2.

- Deutschland 131, adh.3, Akten betreffend: die russische deutschfeindliche Propaganda, Bd.1-4.

- Deutschland 131 geheim, Akten betreffend: das Verhältnis Deutschlands zu Russland, Bd.18 and 19.

- Russland 61, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten Russlands, Bd. 136-183.

- Internationale Angelegenheiten 2, Akten betreffend: der Bolschewismus, Bd.1-10.

- Weltkrieg, Friedensverhandlung, Russland Politisches Nr.1, Akten betreffend: Fridensverhandlungen mit Russland in Brest-Litovsk, Bd.1-26.

- Weltkrieg 2 geheim, Friedensstimmungen und Aktionen zur Vermittlung des Friedens, Bd.47-51.

- Weltkrieg Nr.5e Ru, Funksprüche Russland, Bd.1-4.

- Weltkrieg, Nr.11c geheim, Unternehmungen and Aufwiegelungen gegen unsere Feinde in Russland, besonders in Finland und den Ostseeprovinzen, Bd.22.

- Weltkrieg 29, Druck der Entente auf Russland, Bd.1-3.

- Grosses Hauptquartier, Akten betreffend: Allgemeine Lage, Russland, Bd.1-10.

- Gesandschaft Stockholm, Russland, Akten betreffend: -Bolschewiki und Regierungsmehrheit 1917; -Bolschewismus, 1918-1920.

- Nachlass Stresemann, Bd.194-196.

Staatsarchiv für Oberbayern, Munich

- Staatsanwaltschaft München I, Nr.2106- Verfahren gegen Eugen Levinè-Niessen wegen Hochverrates, 1919; Nr.2131/I-III, Verfarhen gegen Mühsam Erich und Genossen wegen Hochverrats; Nr.2131/IV, Verfarhen gegen Dr. Lipp Franz wegen Hochverrats.

(iii) United States

Hoover Institution on War, Peace, and Revolution, Stanford, California

- Arkhives of the Russian Embassy in Paris (Maklakoff Arkhives)
- Nikolaevsky Arkhives

State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin

- Alexander Gumberg, Papers, 1904-39
- Witt Clinton de Poole, Papers 1918-1952
- Raymond Robins, Papers, 1878-1951

(B) PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS AND OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

- Die Auswirkungen der Grossen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution auf Deutschland, ed. by Leo Stern, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1959).
- BAK, Janos M., ed., "Aus dem Telegrammwechsel zwischen Moskau und Budapest Marz-August 1919", Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol.19, 2 (April 1971).
- BROWDER, Robert P. and KERENSKY, Alexander F., eds., The Russian Provisional Government 1917. Documents, 3 vols. (Stanford, Cal., 1961).
- BUBNOV, A.S., KAMENEV, S.S., EIDEMANN, R.P., And TUKHACHEVSKII, N.M., eds., Grazhdanskaia voina 1918-1921, 3 vols., (Moscow, 1928-1930).
- Bulgarskata rabotnicheska partiia (komunisti) v rezoliutsii i resheniia na kongressite, konferentsiite i plenumite na TSK. Ed. by Raiko K. Karakolov, vol.I, 1891-1918 (Sofia, 1947).
- BUNYAN, James, ed., Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia, April-December 1918. Documents and Materials, (Baltimore, 1936).
- BUNYAN, James, and FISHER, H.H., The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918. Documents and Materials, (Stanford and Oxford, 1934).
- CHUGAEV, D.A., ed., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii nakanune Oktiabr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstaniia (1-24 oktiabria 1917g.), (Moscow, 1962).
- CUMMING, C.K., and PETTIT, Walter, eds., Russian-American Relations. March 1917-March 1920. Documents and Papers, (New York, 1920).

- DEGRAS, Jane, ed., The Communist International 1919-1943, Documents, vol.I, 1919-1922, (London, 1956).

- the same, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, vol.I, 1919-1924, (London, 1951).

- Direktivy Glavnogo kommandovaniia Krasnoi Armii (1917-1920), (Moscow, 1969).

- Documents on British Foreign Policy 1918-1945, ed. by E.L. Woodward and R. Butler, Series 1, 18 vols., (London, 1947-1972).

- Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, Reihe II, 3 vols., (Berlin, 1957-1958).

- Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol.I and II, (Moscow, 1958 and 1959).

- Dokumenty i materialy po istorii sovetsko- polskikh otnoshenii, 6 vols., (Moscow, 1963-1967).

- Dokumenty i materialy do historii stósunkow polsko-radzieckich, vol.3, (Warsaw, 1964).

- GANKIN, Olga Hess, and FISHER, H.H., The Bolsheviks and the World War, The Origins of the Third International, (Stanford, 1940).

- GATZKE, Hans. W., "Zu den deutsch-russischen Beziehungen im Sommer 1918", in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol.3 (1955).

- Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR, sbornik dokumentov i materialov, 1918-1922, 3 vols., (Moscow, 1960-1961).

- LADEMACHER, Horst, ed., Die Zimmerwalder Bewegung. Protokolle und Korrespondenz, 2 vols. (The Hague, 1967).

- MATTHIAS, Erich, and MORSEY, Rudolf, Die Regierung des Prinzen Max von Baden, (Düsseldorf, 1962).

- Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States

  - The Paris Peace Conference 1919, 13 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1943-1947).

  - 1918 Russia, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1931-1933).

  - 1919 Russia, (Washington, 1937).

- Sovetsko-germanskie otnosheniia ot peregovorov v Brest-Litovske do podpisaniia Rapal'skogo dogovora, vol.I, 1917-1918gg. (Moscow, 1968).

- Vengerskie internatsionalisty v Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii i grazhdanskoi voine v SSSR, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1968).

(C) PUBLISHED PROTOCOLS

- The British House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Series V, vol. 131, cols. 2372-74.

- BURDICK, Charles B., and LUTZ, Ralph E., eds., The Political Institutions of the German Revolution 1918-1919, (New York, 1966).

- THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL, Der I. Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale, Protokoll der Verhandlungen in Moskau vom 2 bis 19 März 1919, (Hamburg, 1921).

- _____, Der zweite Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale: Protokoll der Verhandlungen vom 19. Juli in Petrograd und vom 23. Juli bis 7. August 1920 in Moskau, (Hamburg, 1921).

- THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, Sed'moi ekstrennyi s'ezd RKP(B), mart 1918 goda; stenograficheskii otchet, (Moscow, 1962).

- Vos'moi s'ezd RKP(b), mart 1919g.: protokoly, (Moscow, 1959).

- Protokoli Tsentral'nogo Komiteta RSDRP, Avgust 1917-Fevral' 1918, (Moscow, 1958).

- WEBER, Hermann, ed., Der Gründungsparteitag der KPD; Protokoll und Materialien, (Frankfort/Main, 1969).

(D) COLLECTED WORKS, DIARIES, MEMOIRS, AND EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS

- Lord D'Abernon, The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World, (London, 1931).

- A.K., Komu nuzhna voina?, (n.p., 1916).

- AKSELROD, I., et al., Voina. Sbornik statei, (Paris, 1915).

- A.N., Sotsial'-demokratiia na Shtuttgartskom kongrese i konferentsiia v Khristianii, (n.p., 1908).

- ANNENKOV, Y., "Vospominaniia o Lenine", Novyi zhurnal, 65, (New York, 1965), 125-150.

- ANTONOV-OVSEENKO, V.A., Zapiski o grazhdanskoi voine, 4 vols., (Moscow and Leningrad, 1924-1933).

- ARALOV, Semen I., Lenin vel nas k pobede; vospominaniia, (Moscow, 1962).

- ASHMEAD-BARTLETT, Ellis, The Tragedy of Central Europe, (London, 1923).

- BADEN, Max Prinz von, Erinnerungen und Dokumente. Ed. by Golo Mann and Andreas Burckhardt, (Stuttgart, 1968).

- BALABANOFF, Angelica, Impressions of Lenin, (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1964).

- the same, My Life as a Rebel, (New York - London, 1938).

- BARTH, Emil, Aus der Werkstatt der deutschen Revolution, (Berlin, 1919).

- BAUER, Otto, The Austrian Revolution, (New York, 1925).

- BECKMANN, Ewald, ed., Der Dolchstossprozess in München von 19. Oktober bis 20. November 1925, (Munich, 1925).

- BERNSTEIN, Eduard, Die deutsche Revolution, ihr Ursprung, ihr Verlauf und ihr Werk, (Berlin, 1921).

- BÖHM, Vilmos, Im Kreuzfeuer zweier Revolutionen, (Munich, 1924).

- BONCH-BRUEVICH, Vladimir D., Na boevykh postakh Fevral'skoi i Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii, (Moscow, 1931).

- BONCH-BRUEVICH, Mikhail D., From Tsarist General to Red Army Commander, (Moscow, 1966).

- BOTHMER, K. von, Mit Graf Mirbach in Moskau. Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Aktenstücke vom 19. April bis 24. August 1918, (Tübingen 1922).

- BRANDL, Franz, Kaiser, Politiker und Menschen, (Leipzig and Vienna, 1936).

- BUDENNYI,S.M., Proidenny put', 2 vols. (Moscow, 1965).

- BUKHARIN, N.I., Der Klassenkampf und die Revolution in Russland, (Zurich, 1918).

- the same, Programme of the World Revolution, (New York, 1920).

- the same, Put' k sotsializmu v Rossii. Izbrannye proizvedeniia N.I.Bukharina, ed. by Sidney Heitman, (New York, 1967).

- the same et al., Lenin; Leben und Werk, (Vienna, 1924).

- the same and PREOBRAZHENSKY, E., The ABC of Communism, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1970).

- BULLITT, William C., The Bullitt Mission to Russia. Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, September 1919, (New York, 1919).

- BURTSEV, V.L., V bor'be s bol'shevikami i nemtsami, (Paris, 1919).

- the same, Prestupleniia i nakazanie bol'shevikov, (Paris, 1938).

- CHERNOV, Victor M., "Lenin", in Philip E. Mosely, ed., The Soviet Union 1922-1962. A Foreign Affairs Reader, (New York, 1963), 26-32.

- the same, Pered burei; vospominaniia, (New York, 1953).

- CHIANG KAI-SHEK, Soviet Russia in China, (New York, 1957).

- CHICHERIN, Georgii V., Stat'i i rechi po voprosam mezhdunarodnoi politiki, (Moscow, 1961).

- the same, Two Years of Foreign Policy, (New York, 1920).

- CZERNIN, Ottokar Graf, In the World War, (New York, 1920).

- DEGOT, Vladimir, V svobodnom podpol'e - vospominaniia o podpol'noi rabote za granitsei v 1919-1921 godakh, (Moscow and Petrograd, 1923).

- DIMITROV, Georgi, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1957).

- DRAHN, E., and LEONHARD, S., Unterirdische Literatur im revolutionären Deutschland während des Weltkrieges, (Berlin, 1920).

- DZERZHINSKII, F.E., Dnevnik: Pis'ma k rodnym, (Moscow, 1958).

- the same, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1957).

- EBERLEIN, Hugo, "Spartakus und die Dritte Internationale", Internationale Pressekorrespondenz, No. 28, Feb. 29, 1924.

- the same, "The Foundation of the Comintern and the Spartakusbund", in The Communist International, vol. VI, Nos. 9-10-11 (1929), 436-442.

- EGOROV, A., L'vov - Varshava. Vzaimodeistvie frontov, (Moscow and Leningrad, 1929).

- EICHHORN, Emil, Über die Januarereignisse, (Berlin, 1919).

- 1919. Erinnerungen von Veteranen der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung an die Novemberrevolution 1918-1920, (Berlin, 1960).

- FINEBERG, J., "The Formation of the Communist International", The Communist International, vol.VI, Nos. 9-10 (1929), 443-445.

- FISCHER, Anton, Die Revolutionskommandatur Berlin, (n.p., n.d.).

- FISCHER, Ruth, Stalin and German Communism, (Cambridge, Mass., 1948).

- FOKKE, D.G., "Na stsene i za kulisami Brestskoi tragikomedii", Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii, XX (Berlin, 1930), 5-207.

- FOTIEVA, L.A., Pages from Lenin's Life, (Moscow, 1960).

- FRANCIS, D.R., Russia from the American Embassy, (New York, 1921).

- GERSTL, M., Die Münchener Räte-Republik, (Munich, 1919).

- GLOBIG, Fritz, ...aber verbunden sind wir mächtig, (Berlin, 1958).

- GOLDMAN, Emma, My Disillusionment in Russia, (Garden City, New York, 1923).

- GROTEWOHL, Otto, Dreissig Jahre später; die Novemberrevolution und die Lehren der Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, (Berlin, 1951).

- HARD, William, Raymond Robins' Own Story, (New York, 1920).

- HEILMANN, Ernst, Die Noskegarde, (Berlin, n.d.).

- HILGER, Gustav, and Meyer, Alfred G., The Incompatible Allies. A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations 1918-1941, (New York, 1953).

- IGER, Artur, Spartakustage. Aus Berlins Bolschweistenzeit, (Berlin, n.d.).

- Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Stuttgart, (n.p., 1907).

- JACOB, Mathilde, "Vom Rosa Luxemburg und ihren Freunden 1914-1919", (a typescript deposited in the Hoover Institution on War, Peace, and Revolution, Stanford).

- JASTRZEMBSKI, Wincenty, "Doklad V.Ja. Jastrzembskogo o rezultatakh poezdki v Pol'shu", in Z pola walki, vol.VIII, No.4 (32), (Warsaw, 1965), 161-166.

- KABAKCHIEV, Khristo, "Lenin i bolgarskie Tesniaki", Istorik Marksist, No.35 (1934), 173-188.

- the same, "Dimitri Blagoev i bolgarskie Tesniaki", Istorik Marxist, No.44 (1935), 31-57.

- KAMENEV, Sergei S., Zapiski o grazhdanskoi voine i voennom stroitel'stve, (Moscow, 1963).

- KARL, Josef, Die Schreckenherrschaft in München und Spartakus im bayerischen Oberland, (Munich, 1919).

- KÁROLYI, Michael, Memoires of Michael Károlyi; Faith without Illusion, (New York, 1957).

- KAUTSKY, Karl, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1964).

- the same, The Labour Revolution, (London, 1925).

- the same, The Road to Power, (Chicago, 1909).

- the same, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht und Leo Jogiches. Ihre Bedeutung fur die Sozialdemokratie, (Berlin, 1921).

- the same, Die Vereinigten Staaten Mitteleuropas, (Stuttgart, 1916).

- KERENSKY, Alexander F., The Kerensky Memoirs: Russia and History's Turning Point, (London, 1966).

- the same, The Crucifixion of Liberty, (London, 1934).

- Kommunist. Sbornik levykh kommunistov, (Geneve, 1915).

- KOWALEWSKI, Jan, "Na czym polegal 'nonsens strategiczny' kampanii 1920 R.", in Dziennik polski i dziennik zołnierza, (London), Aug. 15, 1955.

- KRASSIN, Lubov, Leonid Krassin. His Life and Work, (London, 1929).

- KREYBIG, Karl, Die Entstehung der Räterepublik Ungarn, (Berlin, 1919).

- KRUPSKAIA, Nadezhda K., Memories of Lenin, 2 vols. (New York, 1930).

- KUN, Béla, "The Anniversary of the Proletarian Revolution in Hungary", The Communist International, vol.VI, Nos. 11-12-13 (May, 1929), 470-477.

- the same, Dokumente der Einheit; die Vorgeschichte des Zusammenschlusses der Sozialdemokraten und den Kommunisten, (Budapest, 1919).

- the same, O Vengerskoi Sovetskoi respublike (Izbrannye stat'i i rechi), (Moscow, 1966).

- KOLOZSVÁRY, Blasius [KUN, Béla], Von Revolution zu Revolution, (Vienna, 1920).

- KUN, Irina, Bela Kun (vospominaniia), (Moscow, 1966).

- KUUSINEN, Otto W., Die Revolution in Finland. Eine Selbstkritik, (Vienna, 1920).

- LAUFENBERG, Heinrich, Zwischen der ersten und der sweiten Revolution, (Hamburg, 1919).

- the same and WOLFFHEIM, Fritz, Revolutionärer Volkskrieg oder konterrevolutionärer Bürgerkrieg?, (Hamburg, n.d.).

- LEDEBOUR, Georg, Der Ledebour-Prozess, (Berlin, 1919).

- the same, Die deutsche Novemberrevolution, a series of articles in Sozialistische Arbeiterzeitung, November-December 1931.

- LENIN, Vladimir Ilich, Collected Works, 4th ed., 42 vols. (Moscow, 1954-1968).

- the same, Leninskii sbornik, 36 vols. (Moscow, 1924-1959).

- the same, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th ed., 55 vols. (Moscow, 1958-1970).

- Lenin v 1917 godu. Vospominaniia, (Moscow, 1967).

- Vospominaniia bolgarskikh tovarishchei o Lenine, (Moscow, 1958).

- Vospominaniia o Vladimire Il'iche Lenine, 5 vols. (Moscow, 1969-1970).

- LEVI, Paul, Zwischen Spartakus und Sozialdemokratie. Schriften, Aufsätze, Reden, und Briefe, ed. by Charlotte Beradt, (Frankfort/Main, 1969).

- LEVI, Paul, Generalstreik und Noske-Blut-Bad in Berlin, (Berlin, 1919).

- the same, Unser Weg wider den Putschismus, (Berlin, 2nd ed., 1921).

- the same, Was ist das Verbrechen? Die Märzaktion oder die Kritik daran?, (Berlin, 1921).

- LIEBKNECHT, Karl, Briefe aus dem Felde, aus der Untersuchungshaft und aus dem Zuchthaus, (Berlin, 1920).

- the same, Gesammelte Reden und Schriften, 9 vols. (Berlin, 1958).

- LOCKHART, Sir Robert Hamilton Bruce, British Agent, (Garden City, New York, 1933).

- LUDENDORFF, Erich von, My War Memories, 1914-1918, 2 vols. (London, 1921).

- LUNACHARSKY, A., Revolutionary Silhouettes, (London, 1967).

- LUXEMBURG, Rosa, Politische Schriften, ed. by Ossip K. Flechtheim (Frankfort/Main, 1966-1968).

- the same, The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism?, ed. by Bertram D. Wolfe, (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1961).

- De MAN, Hendrik, Gegen den Strom, (Stuttgart, 1953).

- MARKHLEVSKY, J., Was ist Bolchewismus?, (Moscow, 1919).

- the same, "What Will Become of Germany", The Communist International, No. 5 (Sept. 1919) 17-22.

- MARX, Karl, and ENGELS, Friedrich, Werke, 39 vols. (Berlin, (1959-1968).

- MAYER, Gustav, Vom Journalisten zum Historiker der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, (Zurich, 1949).

- MEYER, Ernst, ed., Spartakus im Kriege, (Berlin, 1927).

- MÜHSAM, Erich, Von Eisner bis Levinè. Die Entstehung der bayerischen Räterepublik, (Berlin, 1929).

- MÜLLER, Hermann, Die November-Revolution, (Berlin, 1928).

- MÜLLER, Richard, Vom Kaiserreich zur Republik, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1924-25).

- the same, Der Bürgerkrieg in Deutschland, (Berlin, 1925).

- NADOLNY, Rudolf, Mein Beitrag, (Wiesbaden, 1955).

- NECK, Rudolf, ed., Österreich im Jahre 1918. Berichte und Dokumente, (Vienna, 1968).

- NIESSEL, General, Le Triomphe des Bolchéviks et la Paix de Brest-Litovsk. Souvenirs 1917-1918, (Paris, 1940).

- NIKOLAEVSKY, Boris J., ed., Les Premières Années de l'Internationale Communiste, (Geneve, 1965).

- NIKITINE, B.V., The Fatal Years. Fresh Relevations on a Chapter of Underground History, (London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, 1938).

- NOSKE, Gustav, Von Kiel bis Kapp, (Berlin, 1920).

- OUDENDYK, William J., Ways and By-Ways in Diplomacy, (London, 1939).

- PANNEKOEK, Anton, Weltrevolution und kommunistische Taktik, (Vienna, 1920).

- PAQUET, Alfons, Im kommunistischen Russland. Briefe aus Moskau, (Jena, 1919).

- PARVUS [HELPHAND, Alexander], V chem my raskhodimsia? Otvet Leninu na ego stati v 'Proletarii', (Geneva, 1905).

- the same, Im Kampf um die Wahrheit, (Berlin, 1918).

- the same, Pravda glaza kolet!, (Stockholm, 1918).

- the same, Die soziale Bilanz des Krieges, (Berlin, 1917).

- PETERS, "Vospominaniia o rabote v VChK v pervyi god revoliutsii", in Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, 33 (Oct. 1924), 5-32.

- PIECK, Wilhelm, Gesammelte Reden und Schriften, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1959-1960).

- the same, un untitled memoir (typescript) deposited in Nachlass Levi, Bonn-Bad Godesberg.

- the same, Die Gründung der KPD. Erinnerungen an die November-Revolution, (Berlin, cca 1928).

- PILSUDSKI, Jozef, Rok 1920, (London, 1940).

- PRICE, Philips, My Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution, (London, 1921).

- PUTNA, V., K Visle i obratno, (Moscow, 1927).

- RADEK, Karl, Die auswärtige Politik Sowjet-Russlands, (Hamburg, 1921).

- the same, "The Bases of Soviet Foreign Policy" in Mosely, ed., The Soviet Union 1922-1962, (New York, 1963).

- the same, Gegen den Nationalbolschewismus!, (Hamburg, 1920).

- the same, Krushenie germanskogo imperializma i zadachi mezhdunarodnogo rabochego klassa, (Moscow, 1918).

- the same, "November (A page of recollections), ed. by E.H.Carr, Soviet Studies, vol.III, No.4 (April 1951), 413-428.

- the same, "The Polish Question and the International", The Communist International, Nos. 11 and 12 (June-July 1920), cols. 2337-2354.

- the same, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Leo Jogiches, (Hamburg, 1921).

- the same, Die russische und deutsche Revolution und die Weltlage ...Begrüssungsrede auf dem Gründungsparteiteg der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands am 30.Dezember 1918, nebst einem Vorwort, (Berlin, 1919).

- the same, Der Zusammenbruch des Imperialismus und die Aufgaben der internationalen Arbeiterklasse...Rede gehalten am 7.Oktober 1918 im Moskauer Sowjet-Theater, (Munich, n.d.).

- STRUTHAN, Arnold, [RADEK, Karl], Die auswärtige Politik des deutschen Kommunismus und der Hamburger nationale Bolschewismus, (n.p., n.d.).

- STRUTHAN, Arnold, [RADEK, Karl], Die deutsche Revolution oder trau, schau, wem?, (Moscow, 1918).

- RANSOME, Arthur, Russia in 1919, (New York, 1919).

- REED, John, Ten Days That Shook the World, (New York, 1960).

- REINSTEIN, Boris, "On the Road to the First Congress", The Communist International, vol.VI, Nos.9-10, (1929), pp.428-435.

- RETZLAW, Karl, Spartakus. Aufstieg und Niedergang. Erinnerungen eines Parteiarbeiters, (Frankfort/Main, 1972).

- ROBIEN, Louis de, The Diary of a Diplomat in Russia, 1917-1918, (London, 1969).

- ROLAND-HOLST, Henriette, Rosa Luxemburg; ihr Leben und Wirken, (Zurich, 1937).

- RYSTO, K. [GOLDBERG, Hermann], Bolschewisten-Spiegel, (Hamburg-Berlin, 1919).

- SADOUL, Jacques, Notes sur la Révolution Bolchévique, (Paris, 1919).

- SCHEIDEMANN, Philip, Memoirs of a Social-Democrat, 2 vols. (London, 1929).

- SCHÜDDEKOPF, O.E., "Karl Radek in Berlin, ein Kapitel deutsch-russischen Beziehungen im Jahre 1919", Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, vol.II (1962), pp. 87-166.

- SERGE, Victor, Memoirs of a Revolutionary 1901-1941, (London, 1963).

- SERGEEV, V., Tri goda v Sovetskoi Rossii, (Paris, 1921).

- SHLIAPNIKOV, A., Kanun semnadtsatogo goda, 2 vols. (3rd ed., Moscow-Petrograd, 1923).

- the same, Semadtsatyi god, 4 vols. (2nd ed., Moscow, 1925-1931).

- SHKLOVSKII, G., ed., "Bernskaia konferentsiia 1915g.", in Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, No.5 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1925), pp. 134-193.

- SIKORSKI, Władysław, Nad Wisła i Wkra, (London, 1941).

- SISSON, Edgar, 100 Red Days, (Yale-London-New Haven, 1931).

- SOLOMON, G.A., Sredi krasnykh vozhdei, 2 vols., (Paris, 1930).

- Spartakusbriefe, ed. by the Institut fur Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, (Berlin, 1958).

- STALIN, Iossif V., Works, 13 vols. (Moscow, 1952-1955).

- the same, Problems of Leninism, (Moscow, 1953).

- STASSOVA, Yelena D., Stranitsi zhizni i bor'by, (Moscow, 1957).

- STEINBERG, I.N., In the Workshop of the Revolution, (New York-Toronto, 1953).

- STEKLOV, J.M., God bor'by za sotsial'nuiu revoliutsiu (25-e oktiabria 1917g.-25-e oktiabria 1918g.), (Moscow, 1919).

- STEPANOV, [SKVORTSOV], I., With the Red Army in Bourgeois Poland, (Moscow, 1920).

- SVECHNIKOV, M.S., Revoliutsiia i gradhdanskaia voina v Finlandii 1917-1918gg. (Vospominaniia i materialy), (Moscow and Leningrad, 1923).

- SVERDLOV, Iakov M., Izbrahnye proizvedeniia, 3 vols., (Moscow, 1957-1960).

- SZABÓ, László, Documents secrets de la propaganda bolchéviste, (Berlin, 1920).

- SZAMUELY, Tibor, Alarm. Ausgewählte Reden und Aufsätze, (Berlin, 1959).

- SZATMARI, Eugen, Das rote Ungarn, (Leipzig, 1920).

- SZANTO, Béla, Klassenkämpfe und die Diktatur des Proletariats in Ungarn, (Vienna, 1920).

- TORMAY, Cécile, An Outlaw's Diary, 2 vols., (New York, 1923-1924).

- TROIANOVSKII, Al., Voina i zadachi rabochego klassa v Rossii, (Geneva, 1915).

- TROTSKY, Leon, The Bolsheviki and World Peace, (New York, 1918).

- the same, Do deviatogo ianvaria, (Geneva, 1905).

- the same, From October to Brest-Litovsk, (New York, 1919).

- the same, The History of the Russian Revolution, 3 vols., (Ann Arbor, 1957).

- the same, Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia (na voennoi rabote), 3 vols. in 5, (Moscow, 1923-1925).

- the same, Der Krieg und die Internationale, (Munich, 1919).

- the same, Lenin, (New York, 1925).

- the same, My Life. An Attempt at an Autobiography, (New York, 1970).

- the same, Our Revolution, (New York, 1918).

- the same, The Permanent Revolution, (New York, 1931).

- the same, Sochineniia, vol.1-21, incomplete, (Moscow, 1925-1927).

- the same, Stalin, (London, 1947).

- the same, The Trotsky Papers, 1917-1922, ed. by Jan M. Meijer, 2 vols. (The Hague, 1964-1971).

- the same, Trotsky's Diary in Exile, 1935, (Cambridge, Mass., 1958).

- TUKHACHEVSKII, N.M., Izbrannye proizvedeniia, vol.I, (Moscow, 1964).

- the U.S. SENATE, Bolshevik Propaganda. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Judiciary, Febr. 11, 1919, to March 10, 1919, (Washington, D.C., 1919).

- Die Ursachen des deutschen Zusammenbruchs im Jahre 1918, 12 vols., (Berlin, 1925-1929).

- VINNICHENKO, Volodimir, Vidrodzhennia natsii (Istoriia ukrainskoi revoliutsii marets 1917r.-gruden' 1919r.), 3 vols. (Kiev, 1920, fotoreprint New York, 1968).

- VISHNYAK, Mark, Dan' proshlomu, (New York, 1954).

- Vorwärts und nicht vergessen. Erlebnisberichte aktiver Teilnehmer der November-revolution 1918/19, (Berlin, 1958).

- WILLIAMS, Albert Rhys, Journey into Revolution: Petrograd, 1917-1918, (Chicago, 1969).

- WITOS, Wincenty, Moje wspomnenia, 3 vols. (Paris, 1964-1965).

- WOYTINSKY, W.S., Stormy Passage, (New York, 1961).

- ZEŁIGOWSKI, Lucjan, Wojna w roku 1920. Wspomnenia i rozwazania, (Warsaw, 1930).

- ZETKIN, Clara, Reminiscences of Lenin, (New York, 1934).

- ZINOVIEV, Grigorii, Karl Liebknecht, (Moscow, 1933).

- the same, Leninizm, (Moscow and Leningrad, 1925).

- the same, Sochineniia, vol.1-16, incomplete, (Moscow, 1923-1926).

- ZUBOV, V.P., Stradnye gody v Rossii. Vospominaniia o revoliutsii (1917-1925), (Munich, 1968).

E. SECONDARY WORKS

- ADAMS, Arthur E., Bolsheviks in the Ukraine. The Second Campaign, 1918-1919, (New Haven, Conn., 1963).

- ANGRESS, Werner T., Stillborn Revolution. The Communist Bid For Power in Germany, 1921-23, (Princeton, N.J., 1963).

- ASCHER, Abraham, Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Menshevism, (Cambridge, Mass., 1972).

- the same, "Russian Marxism and the German Revolution, 1917-1920", Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte, vol. VI/VII, (Hannover, 1966-67), 391-439.

- BADIA, Gilbert, Le Spartakisme. Les Dernières Années de Rosa Luxemburg et de Karl Liebknecht 1914-1919, (Paris, 1967).

- BAEVSKII, D., "Bor'ba Lenina protiv Bukharinskikh 'shatanii mysli'", in Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, No. 1 (96), 1930, 18-46.

- BAK, Janos, "Die Diskussion um die Räterepublik im Ungarn 1919", in Jahrbücher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, XIV, No.4 (Dec. 1966), 551-587.

- BARTEL, Walter, Die Linken in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie im Kampf gegen Militarismus und Krieg, (Berlin, 1958).

- BASSLER, Gerhard P., "The Communist Movement in the German Revolution, 1918-1919: A Problem of Historical Typology?", Central European History, vol.VI, No.3 (September 1973), 233-277.

- BASSO, Lelia, Rosa Luxemburgs Dialektik der Revolution, (Frankfurt/Main, 1969).

- BAUMGART, Winfried, Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918: von Ende Brest-Litowsk bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges, (Vienna and Munich, 1966).

- BELL, Daniel, The End of Ideology, (New York, 1962).

- BERADT, Charlotte, Paul Levi, (Frankfort/Main, 1969).

- BERDYAEV, Nicolas, The Origin of Russian Communism, (London, 1955).

- BIRKMAN, Mikhail Abramovich, Revoliutsionnaia situatsiia v Bolgarii v 1918-1919gg., (Moscow, 1957).

- BOERSNER, D., The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Questions (1917-1928), (Geneva and Paris, 1957).

- BORKENAU, Franz, World Communism, (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1962).

- BOSL, Karl, ed., Bayern im Umbruch; die Revolution von 1918, ihre Voraussetzungen, ihr Verlauf und ihre Folgen, (Munich, 1969).

- BOTZ, Gerhard, "Die kommunistischen Putschversuche in Wien 1918/19", in Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur, XIV, 1, 1970.

- BRADLEY, John F.N., Allied Intervention in Russia, (London, 1968).

- BRINKLEY, George A., The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia, 1917-1921, (Notre Dame, Ind., 1966).

- BÜNGER, Siegfried, "Die 'Hands-off Russia' - Bewegung in England", in Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswissenschaft, 1958, No. 6, 1249-1283.

- CAMMETT, John M., Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of the Italian Communism, (Stanford, 1967).

- CAMON, General, La Manoeuvre Liberatrice du Maréchal Pilsudski Contre les Bolchéviks Août 1920, (Paris, 1929).

- CAMPBELL, F. Gregory, "The Kaiser and Mitteleuropa in October 1918", Central European History, vol.II, No.4 (December 1969), 376-386.

- CARR, Edward H., The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923, 3 vols. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1966).

- the same, German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars 1919-1939, (London, 1952).

- CARROLL, Malcolm E., Soviet Communism and Western Opinion 1919-1921, (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1965).

- CARSTEN, F.L. Revolution in Central Europe, 1918-1919, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972).

- CATTELL, David T., "The Hungarian Revolution of 1919 and the Reorganization of the Comintern in 1920", Journal of Central European Affairs, XI (January-April 1951).

- CHAMBERLIN, William H., The Russian Revolution 1917-1921, 2 vols., (New York, 1963).

- CHUBARIAN, Alexander O., Brestskii mir, (Moscow, 1964).

- CIOŁKOSZ, Adam, Roza Luksemburg a revolucja rosyjska, (Paris, 1961).

- COHEN, Stephen F., "Bukharin, Lenin and the Theoretical Foundations of Bolshevism", Soviet Studies, vol. XXI, No.4 (April 1970), 436-457.

- CRAIG, Gordon A., and GILBERT, Felix, eds., The Diplomats 1919-1939, vol. I, (Princeton, N.J., 1953).

- DANIELS, Robert V., The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia, (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).

- the same, "The Left Communists", Problems of Communism, vol. XVI, No. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1967), 62-70.

- the same, Red October: The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, (New York, 1969)

- DAVIS, Norman, "The Soviet Command and the Battle of Warsaw", Soviet Studies, XXIII, No.4 (April 1972), 573-585.

- the same, "Lloyd George and Poland, 1919-20", The Journal of Contemporary History, vol.6, No.3, 1971, pp. 132-154.

- DAY, Richard B., Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation, (Cambridge, England, 1973).

- DEÁK, Francis, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, (New York, 1942).

- DEBO, Richard K., "The Making of a Bolshevik: Georgii Chicherin in England 1914-1918", Slavic Review, XXV, No. 4, 1966, 651-662.

- DEUTSCHER, Isaac, The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1919-1921, (London, 1954).

- the same, Stalin, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1966).

- DRABKIN, J.S., Die November-Revolution in Deutschland, (Berlin, 1968).

- DRACHKOVITCH, Milorad M. and LAZITCH, Branko, The Comintern: Historical highlights. Essays, recollections, documents, (New York, 1966).

- EISSENSTAT, Bernard W., ed., Lenin and Leninism. State, Law, and Society, (Lexington, Mass., 1971).

- ELBEN, Wolfgang, Das Problem der Kontinuität in der deutschen Revolution. Die Politik der Staatssekretäre und der militärischen Führung vom November 1918 bis Februar 1919, (Düsseldorf, 1965)

- ELLUL, Jacques, Propaganda; the Formation of Men's Attitudes, (New York, 1965).

- ERGER, Johannes, Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch, (Düsseldorf, 1967).

- ERICKSON, John, The Soviet High Command; A Military Political History, 1918-1941, (London, 1962).

- EYCK, Erich, A History of Weimar Republic, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1962-1963).

- FAINSOD, Merlè, International Socialism and the World War, (Garden City, New York, 1969).

- FAY, Victor, ed., La Révolution d'Octobre et le Mouvement Ouvrier Européen, (Paris, 1968).

- FEDYSHYN, Oleh S., Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1918, (New Brunswick, N.J., 1971).

- FIDDICK, Thomas, "The 'Miracle of the Vistula': Soviet Policy versus Red Army Strategy", The Journal of Modern History, vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec. 1973), 626-643.

- FILENE, Peter G., Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933, (Cambridge, Mass., 1967).

- FISCHER, Alexander, Russische Sozialdemokratie und bewaffneter Aufstand, (Wiesbaden, 1967).

- FISCHER, Fritz, Germany's Aims in the First World War, (New York, 1967).

- FISCHER, Louis, The Soviets in World Affairs, 2 vols. (New York, 1930).

- the same, The Life of Lenin, (New York, 1964).

- FLECHTHEIM, Ossip Kurt, Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik, (Frankfort/Main, 1969).

- FLEMING, Denna Frank, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, 2 vols., (Garden City, New York, 1961).

- FORSTER, Kent, The Failures of Peace. The Search For a Negotiated Peace During the First World War, (Philadelphia, 1941).

- FRAIMAN, A.L., Revoliutsionnaia zashchita Petrograda v fevrale-marte 1918g., (Moscow and Leningrad, 1964).

- FRANKEL, Jonathan, "Lenin's Doctrinal Revolution of April 1917", The Journal of Contemporary History, vol.4, No.2 (April 1969), 117-142.

- FREUND, Gerald, Unholy Alliance. Russia-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin, (London, 1957).

- FRÖLICH, Paul, Rosa Luxemburg, (London, 1940).

- FROLOV, Iu.I., and others, Nekotorye voprosy strategii i taktiki partii bol'shevikov v Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii, (Moscow, 1968).

- FULLER, J.F.C., The Decisive Battles of the World, vol. 3, (London, 1957).

- FUTRELL, Michael, Northern Underground. Episodes of Russian Revolutionary Transport and Communications Through Scandinavia and Finland, (London, 1963).

- GAY, Peter, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism; Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx, (New York, 1952).

- Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, 8 vols. (Berlin, 1966).

- GETZLER, Israel, Martov. A Political Biography of a Russian Social Democrat, (Melbourne University Press, 1967).

- GOURFINKEL, Nina, Lenin, (New York and London, 1961).

- GRAUBARD, Stephen R., British Labour and the Russian Revolution 1917-1924, (Cambridge, Mass., 1956).

- GROTTIAN, Walter, Lenins Anleitung zum Handeln, (Cologne and Opladen, 1962).

- GRUBER, Helmut, International Communism in the Era of Lenin. A Documentary History, (Greenwich, Conn., 1967).

- GUILBEAUX, Henri, La Fin des Soviets, (Paris, 1937).

- the same, Lenine n'etait pas Communiste, (Paris, 1937).

- HAHLWEG, Werner, "Lenin und Clausewitz", Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, XXXVI (1954), pp. 30-59, and 357-387.

- the same, Lenins Rückkehr nach Russland 1917. Die deutschen Akten, (Leiden, 1957).

- HAUPT, Georges, Socialism and the Great War; the Collapse of the Second International, (Oxford, 1972).

- HELFFERICH, Karl, Der Weltkrieg, 3 vols., (Berlin, 1919).

- HERWIG, Holger H., "German Policy in the Eastern Baltic Sea in 1918: Expansion of Anti-Bolshevik Crusade?", Slavic Review, vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1973), 339-357.

- HILL, Christopher, Lenin and the Russian Revolution, (London, 1947).

- HOROWITZ, Daniel L., The Italian Labor Movement, (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).

- HULSE, James W., The Forming of the Communist International, (Standord, Cal., 1964).

- Illustriette Geschichte der Novemberrevolution in Deutschland, (Berlin, 1968).

- JABLONSKI, Henryk, "Wojna polsko-radziecka 1919-1920", Przegląd Socjalistyczny, Nos. 7-8, (1948).

- JARAUSCH, Konrad H., "Cooperation or Intervention?: Kurt Riezler and the Failure of German Ostpolitik, 1918", Slavic Review, vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1972), 386-398.

- JÁSZI, Oszkar, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary, (London, 1924).

- JOLL, James, The Second International 1889-1914, (New York, 1966).

- KAKURIN, N.E., and MELIKOV, V.A., Voina s belopoliakami 1920g., (Moscow, 1925).

- KATKOV, George, "The Assassination of Count Mirbach", Soviet Affairs, No. 3 (St. Antony's Papers, No. 12), (London, 1962), pp. 53-93.

- the same, Russia 1917; the February Revolution, (London, 1967).

- KENNAN, George F., Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, (Boston, 1961).

- the same, "The Sisson Documents", The Journal of Modern History, XXVIII, No. 2, (June 1956).

- the same, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, vol. 1 - Russia Leaves the War, (Princeton, N.J., 1956); vol. 2, Decision to Intervene, (Princeton, N.J., 1958).

- KHRISTOV, Khristo, Revoljucionnata kriza v Bulgarija prez 1918-1919, (Sofia, 1957).

- KIRSCHNER, Béla, "Der Rücktritt der Räteregierung und die Bildung der Gewerkschaftsregierung und das Echo in Transdanubien", Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestiensis, VII (Budapest 1965), 147-177.

- KOLB, Eberhard, Die Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Innenpolitik 1918-1919, (Düsseldorf, 1962).

- KOMARNICKI, Titus, Rebirth of the Polish Republic. A Study in the Diplomatic History of Europe, 1914-1920, (London, 1957).

- KÖNIG, Helmut, Lenin und der italienische Sozialismus, 1915-1921; ein Beitrag zur Gründungsgeschichte der Kommunistischen Internationale, (Tübingen, 1967).

- KOREY, William, "Grigori Yevseevich Zinoviev", Problems of Communism, vol. XVI, No. 6, (Nov.-Dec. 1967), pp. 51-61.

- KRASSÓ, Nicolas, ed., Trotsky. The Great Debate Renewed, (St. Louis, Missouri, 1972).

- KRIEGEL, Annie, Aux Origines du Communisme Français (1914-1920), 2 vols. (Paris, 1964).

- KRIVOGUZ, Igor, "Spartak" i obrazovanie Kommunisticheskoi partii Germanii, (Moscow, 1962).

- KULICHENKO, Mikhail J., Bor'ba kommunisticheskoi partii za reshenie natsional'nogo voprosa v 1818-1920 godakh, (Kharkov, 1963).

- KUZMIN, N., Krushenie poslednego pokhoda Antanty, (Moscow, 1958).

- the same, "Ob odnoi nevypolnenoi direktive glavkoma", Voenno istoricheskii zhurnal, 1962, No. 9, pp. 49-66.

- LABEDZ, Leopold, ed., Revisionism, (London, 1962).

- LANDAU-ALDANOV, M.A., Lenin, (New York, 1922).

- LANDAUER, Carl A., European Socialism. A History of Ideas and Movements, 2 vols., (Berkeley, 1959-1960).

- LASERSON, Max M., The American Impact on Russia 1784-1917, (New York, 1957).

- LASSWELL, Harold D., Propaganda Technique in the World War, (New York, 1938).

- LAZITCH, Branko, and DRACHKOVITCH, Milorad M., Lenin and the Comintern, Vol. I, (Standord, Cal., 1972).

- LEINWAND, Arthur, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna wobec wojny polsko-radzieckiej, 1919-1920, (Warsaw, 1964).

- LERNER, Warren, Karl Radek, (Stanford, Cal., 1970).

- LEVINÉ, Rosa, Sovetskaia respublika v Miunkhene, (Moscow and Leningrad, 1926).

- LEWANDOWSKI, Jozef, "O wojne 1920 roku...inaczej", Zeszyty Historyczne, No.20, (Paris, 1971), 200-204.

- LICHTHEIM, George, Marxism. An Historical and Critical Study, (London, 1961).

- LINKE, Horst Günther, Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen bis Rapallo, (Cologne, 1970).

- LORENZ, Richard, Anfänge der bolschewistischen Industrienpolitik, (Cologne, 1965).

- LÖSCHE, Peter, Der Bolschewismus in Urteil der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1903-1920, (Berlin, 1967).

- LOW, Alfred D., "The First Austrian Republic and Soviet Hungary", Journal of Central European Affairs, XX, 1960, No. 2, 174-203.

- the same, Lenin on the Question of Nationality, (New York, 1958).

- LOWE, Donald M., The Function of "China" in Marx, Lenin, and Mao, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966).

- LOWENTHAL, Richard, "Der russische Oktober als Revolution neuen Typs", in Deutschland und die russische Revolution, ed. by Helmut Neubauer, (Stuttgart, 1968).

- LUBAN, Ottokar, "Zwei Schreiben der Spartakuszentrale an Rosa Luxemburg (Juni 1917; 5. November 1918)", in Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, XI (1971), 225-240.

- MACFARLANE, L.J., "Hands Off Russia: British Labour and the Russo-Polish War, 1920", Past and Present, No. 38, Dec. 1967, 126-152.

- MACNEAL, Robert H., ed., Russia in Transition 1905-1914, (New York, 1970).

- MADOL, Hans R., Ferdinand von Bulgarien, (Berlin, 1931).

- MAYER, Arno J., Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918, (New Haven, Conn., 1959).

- the same, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking; Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles 1918-1919, (New York, 1967).

- MELGUNOV, Sergei D., Kak bol'sheviki zakhvatili vlast'; oktiabr'skii perevorot 1917 goda, (Paris, 1953).

- the same, Zolotoi nemetskii kliuch k bol'shevistskoi revoliutsii, (Paris, 1940).

- MELIKOV, Vladimir, Marna - 1914 goda. Visla - 1920 goda. Smirna - 1922 goda, (Moscow, 1928).

- MEYER, Alfred G., Communism, (New York, 1967).

- MEYER, Karl W., Karl Liebknecht: Man Without a Country, (Washington, D.C., 1957).

- MILIUKOV, Pavel N., Bolshevism, (London, 1920).

- the same, Rossia na perelome. Bol'shevistskii period Russkoi revoliutsii, vol. I, (Paris, 1927).

- MIROSHEVSKII, Vl., "Vengerskaia Sovetskaia Respublika", in Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, 11 (94), Nov. 1929, 65-86.

- MITSCHELL, Allan, Revolution in Bavaria 1918-1919: The Eisner Regime and the Soviet Republic, (Princeton, N.J., 1965).

- MURRAY, Robert K., Red Scare. A Study of National Hysteria 1919-1920, (New York, Toronto, London, 1964).

- NAIDA, S.F., O nekotorykh voprosakh istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR, (Moscow, 1958).

- NAUMANN, Horst, "Emil Eichhorn, das Leben eines Revolutionärs", in Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, vol. 11, No. 3 (1969), 483-490.

- NETTL, J.P., Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (London, 1966).

- NEUBAUER, Helmut, München und Moskau 1918-1919, (Munich, 1958).

- NEZHINSKII, L.N., "Iz istorii sovetsko-vengerskikh otnoshenii (mart-avgust 1919g.)", in Istoricheskie zapiski, vol. 77, 1965, pp. 3-22.

- NIKOLAEVSKII, Boris, "Menskeviki v period voennogo kommunizma 1918-21gg." (a typescript, deposited at Stanford, Cal.).

- NIKOLAEVSKII, Boris, "RSDRP (mensh.) za vremia s dekabria 1917 po iul' 1918g.", (a typescript deposited at Stanford, Cal.).

- the same, "vneshnaia politika Moskvy", Novyi zhurnal, No.1, (New York, 1942), pp. 230-246.

- NIKULIN, Lev, Tukhachevskii, (Moscow, 1964).

- NOBLE, George B., Policies and Opinions at Paris, 1919, (New York, 1968).

- NOLLAU, Günther, International Communism and World Revolution, (London, 1961).

- OECKEL, Heinz, Die revolutionäre Volkswehr 1918/19, (Berlin, 1968).

- PAGE, Stanley, Lenin and World Revolution, (New York, 1959).

- PAYNE, Robert, The Life and Death of Lenin, (New York, 1964).

- PIPES, Richard, The Formation of the Soviet Union. Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923, (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).

- the same, ed., Revolutionary Russia, (Garden City, N.Y., 1969).

- PLAMENATZ, John P., German Marxism and Russian Communism, (London, 1954).

- POKROVSKII, M.N., Ocherki po istorii Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii, 2 vols., (Moscow, 1927).

- POSSONY, Stefan T., Lenin. The Compulsive Revolutionary, (Chicago, 1964).

- RABINOWITCH, Alexander, Prelude to Revolution. The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917 Uprising, (Bloomington, Ind., 1968).

- RAKHMETOV, V., "K istorii ianvar'skikh tezisov Lenina 1918g.", in Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, No.5 (88), 1929, pp. 3-16.

- REISBERG, Arnold, Lenins Beziehungen zur deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, (Berlin, 1970).

- the same, "Lenins Beziehungen zum deutschen Geistesleben", in Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, 1970, No. 4, pp. 547-562.

- RESHETAR, John S., Jr., The Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1920, (Princeton, N.J., 1952).

- REVENTLOW, R., Zwischen Allierten und Bolschewiken. Arbeiterräte in Österreich 1918 bis 1923, (Vienna and Munich, 1969).

- RITTER, Gerhard A., and MILLER, Susanne, eds., Die deutsche Revolution 1918-19, (Frankfort/Main, 1968).

- ROBERTS, Paul C., "'War Communism': A Re-Examination", Slavic Review, vol. 29, No. 2, (June 1970), pp. 238-261.

- RONIMOIS, H.E., "Soviet Experiment with Communist Economy 1918-20", Canadian Slavonic Papers, II, (1957), pp. 70-85.

- ROSENBERG, Arthur, A History of Bolshevism, (London, 1934).

- the same, A History of the German Republic, (New York, 1965).

- ROSENFELD, Günther, Sowjetrussland und Deutschland 1917-1922, (Berlin, 1960).

- ROTSCHILD, Joseph, The Communist Party of Bulgaria; Origins and Development, 1883-1936, (New York, 1959).

- RYDER, A.J., The German Revolution of 1918. A Study of German Socialism in War and Revolt, (Cambridge, England, 1967).

- SCHAPIRO, L.B., The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, (London, 1960).

- the same, The Origins of the Communist Autocracy, (New York, 1965).

- the same and REDDAWAY, Peter, eds., Lenin; the Man, the Theoretist, the Leader; a Reappraisal, (New York, 1967).

- SCHÜDDEKOPF, Otto-Ernst, "Deutschland zwischen Ost und West. Karl Moor und die deutsch-russischen Beziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des Jahres 1919", in Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, III, (Hannover, 1963).

- the same, Linke Leute von Rechts; die Nationalrevolutionären Minderheiten und der Kommunismus in der Weimarer Republik, (Stuttgart, 1960).

- SCHMIDT, Giselher, Spartakus. Rosa Luxemburg und Karl Liebknecht, (Frankfort/Main, 1971).

- SCHUMACHER, Horst, Sie nannten ihn Karski; das revolutionäre Wirken Julian Marchlewskis in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 1896 bis 1919, (Berlin, 1964).

- SCHWABE, Klaus, Deutsche Revolution und Wilson-Frieden, (Düsseldorf, 1971).

- SENN, Alfred E., The Russian Revolution in Switzerland, 1914-1917, (Madison, Wisc., 1971).

- SHUB, David, Lenin, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1966).

- SHUKMAN, Harold, Lenin and the Russian Revolution, (New York, 1967).

- SIERADZKI, J., Bialowieza i Mikaszewicze, (Warsaw, 1959).

- SMITH, C.J., Finland and the Russian Revolution 1917-1922, (Athens, Georgia, 1958).

- the same, The Russian Struggle for Power, 1914-1917, (New York, 1956).

- SÖDERHJELM, Henning, The Red Insurrection in Finland in 1918: A Study Based on Documentary Evidence, (London, 1919).

- STAVROU, Theofanis G., ed., Russia under the Last Tsar, (Minneapolis, Minn., 1969).

- STOLJAROWA, Ruth, "Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Aufrufs 'Zum Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale' von Januar 1919", in Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 1968, No. 11, pp. 1381-1401.

- SUKHANOV, N., Zapiski o revoliutsii, 7 vols. (Berlin-Petrograd-Moscow, 1922-1923).

- SUSLOV, P.V., Politicheskoe obespechenie sovetsko-polskoi kampanii 1920goda, (Moscow and Leningrad, 1930).

- SZELPAL, A., Les 133 Jours de Bela Kun, (Paris, 1959).

- TEMKIN, Ia. G., Bernskaia konferentsiia zagranichnykh sektsii RSDRP (1915g.), (Moscow, 1961).

- THOMPSON, John M., "Lenin's Analysis of Intervention", American Slavic and East European Review, vol.17, No.2 (April 1918), pp. 151-160.

- the same, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace, (Princeton, N.J., 1966).

- TIUTIUKIN, S.V., "Leninskii lozung porazheniia 'svoego' pravitel'stva v imperialisticheskoi voine", in Istoricheskie zapiski, 81, 1968, pp. 101-131.

- TÖKÉS, Rudolf L., Béla Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic, (New York, 1967).

- TOMA, Peter A., "The Slovak Soviet Republic of 1919", American Slavic and East European Review, XVII (April 1958), 203-215.

- TREADGOLD, Donald W., Lenin and His Rivals. The Struggle for Russia's Future, 1898-1906, (New York, 1955).

- TRUSH, Mikhail, Lenin und die Aussenpolitik der UdSSR, (Frankfort/Main, 1970).

- ULAM, Adam B., Lenin and the Bolsheviks, (London, 1966).

- the same, Expansion and Coexistence, The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-67, (New York, 1968).

- ULLMAN, Richard H., Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921. Intervention and the War, (Princeton, N.J., 1961).

- the same, Britain and the Russian Civil War, (Princeton, N.J., 1968).

- VARLAMOV, K.I., and SLAMIKHIN, N.A., Razoblachenie V.I. Leninym teorii i taktiky 'levykh kommunistov', noiabr' 1917g.-1918g., (Moscow, 1964).

- VARSKI, Adolf, Rosa Luxemburgs Stellung zu den taktischen Problemen der Revolution, (Hamburg, 1922).

- VASIUKOV, V.S., Vneshniaia politika Vremennogo Pravitel'stva, (Moscow, 1966).

- VÖLGYES, Ivan, ed., Hungary in Revolution, 1918-19, (Lincoln, Neb., 1971).

- VOLSKII, Nikolai V., The Early Years of Lenin, (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1969).

- VON LAUE, Theodore H., Why Lenin? Why Stalin? A Reappraisal of the Russian Revolution, 1900-1930, (Philadelphia-New York, 1964).

- VYGODSKII, C. Iu., V.I. Lenin -rukovoditel' vneshnei politiki sovetskogo gosudarstva (1917-1923), (Leningrad, 1960).

- WADE, Rex A., The Russian Search for Peace; February-October 1917, (Stanford, Cal., 1969).

- WAITE, Robert G.L., Vanguard of Nazism: the Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany 1918-1923, (Cambridge, Mass., 1952).

- WALDMAN, Eric, The Spartacist Uprising of 1919 and the Crisis of the German Socialist Movement, (Milwaukee, 1958).

- WALIGORA, Boleslaw, Boj na przedmosciu Warszawy w sierpniu 1920R., (Warsaw, 1934).

- WANDYCZ, Piotr S., Soviet-Polish Relations 1917-1921, (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).

- WEBER, Hermann, Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus. Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republik, (Frankfort/Main, 1969).

- WERNER, Paul, [FRÖLICH, Paul], Die bayerische Rate-Republik: Tatsachen und Kritik, (Leipzig, 1920).

- WHEELER-BENNETT, John M., Brest-Litovsk, The Forgotten Peace, (London, 1938).

- WOHL, Robert, French Communism in the Making 1914-1924, (Standord, 1966).

- WOHLGEMUTH, Heinz, Die Entstehung der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands 1914 bis 1918, (Berlin, 1968).

- WOLFE, Bertram D., Three Who Made a Revolution, (New York, 1948).

- the same, "The Influence of Early Military Decisions on the National Structure of the Soviet Union", American Slavic and East European Review, vol. IX, No. 3, (1950), pp. 169-179.

- ZEMAN, Z.A.B., ed., Germany and the Revolution in Russia: 1915-1918, (London, 1958).

- the same and SCHARLAU, W.B., The Merchant of Revolution. The Life of Alexander Israel Helphand (Parvus) 1867-1924, (London, 1965).

- ZETKIN, Clara, Zum Rosa Luxemburgs Stellung zur Russischen Revolution, (n.p., 1922).

- ZSUPPÁN, Ferenc T., "The Early Activities of the Hungarian Communist Party, 1918-1919", The Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 43, No. 101, (June 1965), pp. 314-334.

- the same, "The Hungarian Soviet Republic and the British Military Representatives April-June, 1919", The Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 47, No. 108 (Jan. 1969), pp. 198-218.

(F) DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS

- ECKELT, Frank, "The Rise and Fall of the Béla Kun Regime in 1919", (New York University, 1965).

- GREGOR, Richard, "Lenin's Foreign Policy, 1917-1922: Ideology or National Interest?", (University of London, 1966).

- GYULA, Jósza, "Ungarn und die ungarischer Bolschewiken auf dem Weg zur Räterepublik im Spiegel der Pravda und der Sowjetischen Historiographie", (Innsbruck, 1952).

- KOREY, William, "Zinoviev on the problem of world revolution 1919-27, (Columbia University, New York, 1960).

- STOLJAROWA, Ruth, "W.I. Lenin und die Gründung der Kommunistsichen Internationale", (Humboldt Universität, Berlin, 1969).

(G) MORE OFTEN CONSULTED NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

- The Communist International (Moscow and London)
- Die Freiheit (Berlin)
- Izvestiia (Petrograd and Moscow)
- Kommunist (Petrograd and Moscow)
- Krasnyi arkhiv (Moscow)
- Pravda (Petrograd and Moscow)
- Proletarskaia revoliutsiia (Moscow)
- Die Rote Fahne (Berlin)
- Severnaia kommuna (Petrograd)
- Vorwärts (Berlin)

(H) INTERVIEWS

- Max Frenzel, November 13, 1972
- Rosi Frölich, March 12, 1973
- Philips Price, June 25, 1972
- Karl Retzlaw, April 4, 1973
- Erich Wollenberg, November 17, 1972