THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IN MALAYA: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN A PLURAL SOCIETY

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ABSTRACT

The Chinese have been present in Malaya for nearly two hundred years. During this period they have, on the one hand, maintained various sorts of relationships with China; and on the other hand, they have adapted themselves to other peoples in Malaya. The objective of this thesis is to describe and analyze the social change that has occurred among the Chinese as a result of adaptation to the social environment of Malaya.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since their migration to Malaya in the last century the Chinese, have on the one hand, maintained various sorts of relationships with China; on the other hand, they have adapted themselves to other peoples in the region: the British, the Japanese and the Malays. This thesis is a study of the changes which have occurred in the Chinese community as a result of adaptation to the social environment of Malaya.

The Setting

The term "Malaya" in this thesis is taken both for its geographical and political sense. It comprises the nine Malay States, Malacca, Penang and Singapore (Fig. 1). The nine Malay States are Johore, Pahang, Negri Sembilan, Selangor, Perak, Kelantan, Tregganu, Kedah and Perlis. Traditionally, each was largely under the control of an individual Sultan. They were made protectorates under treaties made with Great Britain between 1874 and 1914. The four States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang were constituted a federation in 1895 and known as the



Fig. 1--Political Divisions of Malaya
(International Bank 1955: Map 6)

Fig. 2--Southeast Asia
(Purcell 1951: "at end")

Federated Malay States. The other five States were known as Unfederated Malay States.

The Straits settlements were comprised of Penang (with Province Wellesley on the mainland) Malacca and Singapore, and administered as Crown Colonies by the British Government. The Settlement of Penang was founded in 1786 and Singapore, in 1826. Malacca was transferred by the Dutch to the British in 1824 and was made a part of the Straits Settlements in 1826.

Malaya was under Japanese occupation from 1941 to 1945. In 1945 the Sultans of the nine States agreed to transfer their sovereignty to the British Crown and form a unitary state. The Malayan Union was created and included the former Federated and Unfederated Malay States and the Settlements of Penang and Malacca. Singapore remained outside the Union as a Crown Colony. The Federation came into being in 1948 with new constitutions and covered the same territories as the Union. In 1955 both the Federation and Singapore attained some measure of self-government from the British Government. In 1957 the Federation was declared an independent state. In 1959 Singapore attained full independence except in areas of foreign policy and defence. In 1963 the Federation of Malaysia came into being, comprising the former Federation of Malaya and Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah (Fig. 2). In 1965 Singapore

separated from Malaysia and became a fully independent country.

Most of the Chinese in Nanyang[1] came from the Provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien (Fig. 2). Why did they go overseas? The obvious answer is that they went to seek their fortunes; the movement was not designed to build permanent communities abroad. It was apparently an unplanned result of the growth of population in China and the opportunity for travel offered by proximity to the sea and trading vessels.

In China the pressure of population upon land appeared to be the greatest in Fukien and Kwangtung. This was partly because of the small amount of cultivable land; in Fukien only 11% and in Kwangtung only 7% of the total area was arable (Tien 1953: 4). Kwangtung and Fukien had long been importers of food-stuffs from the neighbouring provinces.

Poverty and overpopulation explain only the motive of emigrating; they do not explain the connection with the Nanyang. There have been similar migrations from other parts of China to other regions. From Northern China people

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[1] "Southseas": the common Chinese expression for all the territories of Southeast Asia to which Chinese emigrated, including Malaya.

have moved to Korea; from Southwestern, to Burma. Apparently geographical proximity and historical factors determine to a large extent the place of emigration.

Knowledge of the countries of the Nanyang existed in the ports of Kwangtung and Fukien from a very early period. Already in the Tang Dynasty (618-907 A. D.) and Sung Dynasty (960-1278 A. D.) there were official superintendents of merchant shipping at Canton in Kwangtung and Chienchou in Fukien. The Chu Fan Ji, written in the 13th Century, describes the Nanyang trade in some detail. European traders, when they came to China, usually went to the ports of Kwangtung and Fukien, and information about opportunities overseas naturally came in there (ibid).

Therefore, when emigration started in the 19th Century the Kwangtung and Fukien people were naturally led to Nanyang. It is a well-known fact that Chinese immigrants who speak the same dialect or come from the same place in China tend to group together. Once migration from Kwangtung and Fukien to Nanyang started, it tended to draw people from these two Provinces continuously. The result was a preponderance of Kwangtung and Fukien people in Nanyang.

Emigration was by no means easy. Until some years after the Opium War (1840-42), the Chinese Imperial Governments regarded any Chinese who left China as committing a capital offence. Only towards the end of the 19th Century

did the Imperial Government itself have a representative abroad. The Chinese who ventured overseas did so at their own risk, and had to rely on themselves and their own power of organization to protect their interests. Only in 1899 were the governors of the native provinces of the emigrated Chinese ordered to protect the Chinese returning from abroad. The earlier attitude of the Chinese Imperial Government towards the overseas Chinese might be seen in Emperor Chien Lung's (1736-96) words, when he was told of the Batavia Massacre on October 10th, 1740 in which ten thousand Chinese were said to have been killed by the Dutch in Java. The Emperor said, "The court had nothing to do with the deserters of the Heavenly Dynasty, who would even leave the ancestral home and graveyards in order to seek for wealth abroad". (Tsui 1965: 141).[1]

To the legal difficulties were added physical dangers. Travel by junk in the last century was hazardous. The voyage from Amoy to Singapore took between twenty and thirty days. On board of these junks scurvy was rife and the death rate high. Even in this century travelling in the overcrowded steamers that run between China and Singapore is by no means a pleasant experience.

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[1]The writer is responsible for the translations of all Chinese texts in this thesis.

Table 1 shows the position of the Chinese in the communal composition in Malaya from 1921 to 1957.

TABLE 1

COMMUNAL COMPOSITION IN MALAYA (1921-57)

		Malays %	Chinese		Others %	Total*
			Numbers*	%		
1921	Peninsula	54.0	917.2	29.4	16.6	2,906
	Singapore	12.9	315.8	75.2	11.9	420
1931	Peninsula	49.2	1,283	33.9	16.9	3,787
	Singapore	11.8	418.7	74.9	13.3	559
1947	Peninsula	49.5	1,885	38.4	12.1	4,908
	Singapore	12.3	738.0	78.6	9.1	939
1957	Peninsula	49.8	2,503	37.2	13.0	6,729
	Singapore	13.4	1,068	73.9	12.7	1,446

*In thousands
(McGee 1964: 68).

The Chinese population owed its increases to the large number of immigrants that came in yearly from China. This was shown, for example, in the period between 1921 and 1931 when there was a 4.5% increase of Chinese in the communal

composition of the Malay Peninsula. The Second World War put a stop to the immigration from China. Since 1949 immigration from China has been very restricted.

In the period between 1947 and 1957 the percentage of Chinese population increase was actually below that of the Malays. In the Federation this was due in part to substantial migration of Chinese to Singapore and to outside countries. It might also be partly attributed to a trend of fertility decline in urban centres which appeared to have continued, at least in Singapore, between 1947 and 1957 (Table 2)

TABLE 2

PATTERNS OF FERTILITY, MORTALITY AND NATURAL INCREASE IN SINGAPORE 1947-57

	Crude Birth Rate per 1000		Crude Death Rate per 1000		Natural Increase per 1000	
	1947	1957	1947	1957	1947	1957
Malays	48.1	47.3	17.8	10.0	30.3	37.3
Chinese	46.1	42.4	12.8	7.1	33.3	35.3

(McGee 1964: 78).

The Chinese population in Malaya is largely localized along the western belt of Malaya. The density of the Chinese

population elsewhere in Malaya is very low -- less than twenty-five Chinese per square mile. Within the Western belt are three main areas of Chinese concentration where densities are over 200 per square mile. These are: (1) the entire area of the State of Penang, and Province Wellesley which from early days have been a focal point for Chinese settlement; (2) the Kinta Valley with its large Chinese population engaged in tin-mining and, to a lesser extent, rubber cultivation; and (3) the district of Kuala Lumpur which forms part of the Klang Valley, again, with an economy based on tin and rubber. The fourth area of Chinese concentration is Singapore (Ooi 1963: 154). See Fig. 3 .

The main contrast between the distribution of the Chinese and Malay populations is the concentration of the Chinese in urban centres and the indigenous groups in the rural areas. The Chinese form over 50 per cent of the population in almost all the large urban centres. The Malays, on the other hand, are notably located in the rice-growing areas of Kedah and Kelantan (Table 3).



Fig. 3--Density of the Chinese Population in Malaya
(Ooi 1963: 153; International Bank 1955: Map 6)

TABLE 3

COMMUNAL COMPOSITION OF THE URBAN POPULATION
(IN THOUSANDS)

	Malays	Chinese	Others	Totals
Territory				
Malay Peninsula				
1947	275	812	215	1,301
1957	604	1,704	360	2,680
% Increase	119.6	109.8	67.4	104.3
Singapore				
1947	73	537	70	680
1957	101	710	102	912
% Increase	38.3	32.2	45.7	34.1

(Hamzah-Sendut 1964: 89)

Structure of the Text

Several monographs of community studies on the Southeast Asian Chinese were published in the 1950's. Based on fieldwork, these studies analyzed in detail certain aspects of the social structure of the Chinese community in various locations. Because the present study is based on library research, its level of abstraction is necessarily more general than that of the published monographs. It is therefore broader in scope, both areally and temporally, than it would be if based primarily on fieldwork. This makes it possible to take a holistic view of the pattern of change that has occurred in the Chinese community in the country of Malaya over a time period of more than 150 years, a scope that would be impossible if detail such as that contained in published monographs is to be maintained.

Furnivall (1956: 304), British administrator, observed in the colonial societies in Southeast Asia before the Pacific War groups of different "races" living side by side in economic symbiosis and mutual avoidance. He described such societies as plural in contrast to the relatively monolithic societies found among primitive and modern industrial societies. A plural society owes its existence to a government formed by an external group and lacks a "common social will": "all the members of all sections have material

interests in common, but most see that on many points their material interests are opposed" (ibid.p308). According to Furnivall's concept, an operational method of identifying the limit of a society is the political boundary as defined by a central government. Such a concept is ascribed in this thesis and Malaya is conceived as a society, since it had been under a central government until 1965.

The term "national society" describes a society under an independent central government formed by the local people, and a society in which nationhood is consciously fostered. In this thesis Independent Malaya is conceived as constituting a national society. The qualification of membership in a society is simply the physical presence of a person in that society. He may be oriented to more than one society at any given moment, he is a member of only one society at a time. Therefore, citizenship in the legal sense is not the test of membership in a society; i.e., any Chinese residing in Malaya is a member of the Malayan society (Levy 1952: 125).

The justification of speaking of the "Chinese community" and treating it as a social system lies in the fact that in spite of internal differences, and with a few exceptions, the Chinese interact much more intimately with one another than with other peoples in Malaya. The term "community" corresponds to what Smith (1965: 109) calls in his study of plural

societies, the "cultural and social section", which he designates as that section of the society having "its own relatively exclusive way of life, with its own distinctive systems of action, ideas and values, and social relations". In this thesis, "community" in no way implies a local group, a village or a town.

Three major stages of social changes are distinguished: (1) the Pioneering Period (from early 19th Century to 1911), (2) the Transitional Period (from 1911 to 1957), and (3) the Post-independence Period (from 1957 to present). The specific criteria by which these periods are defined will be discussed in the appropriate places in the text. At the present, it should be noted that in any analysis of social change three stages may be conceived, namely: the initial period, the transitional period and the resultant period. The initial period designates the beginning of change and the resultant period designates the social conditions at the completion of change. The transitional period designates the conditions in between these two stages. These stages are set up only relative to each other and their divisions depend on how the writer wishes to state his problem under study. Synchronic study can be made of each stage and a comparison of the three synchronic studies will bring out the changes and continuity of the society or community during the time range chosen (Levy 1952: 74-5).

The material under study in this thesis is considered in terms of four analytic categories: (1) economy, (2) social organizations, (3) education, and (4) kinship. Each of the three stages set up will be considered in terms of the four categories of analysis. Each of the latter, in turn, will be studied in terms of (1) the internal situation of the Chinese community, (2) the relationship with other peoples in Malaya, and (3) the relationship with China.

In any study of immigrant community the relationship between the immigrants and the country of their origin should be studied. This is particularly so in the case of the Chinese community in Malaya, since the majority of them were born and spent part of their lives in China -- in other words, the recruitment of members into the Chinese community was more by immigration from China than by sexual reproduction. To study the change taking place in the Malayan Chinese community, one must also study the changes taking place in China.

CHAPTER II

THE PIONEERING PERIOD: EARLY 19th CENTURY - 1911

Introduction

This period traced to the early Nineteenth Century when the Chinese began to migrate in large numbers to Malaya under the patronage of the British administrators and merchants. The British needed the Chinese labourers for clearing the jungles in Malaya and working in the plantations and tin-mines.

Information about this period is somewhat lacking. However, the Chinese community in Malaya could be conceived as a transplanted segment of the traditional society in China. It was subject to modification by the fact of migration and by the pioneering conditions in Malaya. Writers on pioneering societies describe their societies as "beyond the outer limits of military and political power of organized states", and as involving "distance and isolation" (Wyman and Kroeber 1957: xiii). Such were the conditions of much of the Chinese community in Malaya. A. E. Coope, British administrator, said: "One must take off one's hat to the Chinese pioneers, who though strangers in a strange land, made their way up the green tunnels of the little far-off

rivers and braving the dangers of their situation, which, if not really great, did exist and were all the more horrific for being largely unknown, carved prosperity out of the jungle with the indomitable pertinency and industry of their race"[1] (as quoted by Purcell 1948: 100).

In a frontier community one would expect to find some services and some specialized occupations lacking, and that the Jack-of-all-trades were thus needed and important. A formal education and scholarly attainment were of little advantage, even though learning was much revered in the parent society. In discussing occupation, therefore, one must not forget that a person might be engaged in several occupations at the same time.

In a frontier community the population usually consisted predominantly of men. Hazards of travel discourage the migration of women, children and old people. In the discussion of the kinship system, the extremely unbalanced sex-ratio in the Chinese community will be shown. Information on the age-composition in the community is not available, but it probably lies predominantly between 20 and 35.

One other characteristic of the Chinese population in this period was its unsettled and migratory nature. In 1865 a total of 17,439 Chinese arrived at Singapore from China,

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[1]From A. E. Coope: The Kangchu System in Johore in _Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch_ XIV; part iii (Dec. 1936), 249.

while a total of 3,252 departed from Singapore for China. In 1891 a total of 144,264 arrived from China at Singapore, while a total of 144,129 departed for China (Freedman 1957: 25). The unbalanced sex ratio and the migratory nature of the population contributed towards the low percentage of locally-born in the Chinese population. In 1891, 11% of the Chinese population were Malayan-born, while in 1901, 20% (*ibid.*).

One last characteristic about this period was the fact that China maintained an isolation policy and regarded the emigrants as deserters of the country. There were no attempts, on the part of China, to influence or protect the interests of overseas Chinese; and on the part of the Malayan Chinese, China was of low esteem and anti-Manchu sentiment was prevalent. This period ended with the 1911 Revolution in China, when Chinese Government began to exert her influence on the overseas Chinese and when the pioneering conditions in the Chinese community had largely disappeared.

Economy

Relationship With Other Communities

Maunier, 1932, a French sociologist who specialized on colonies, distinguished three kinds of objectives in colonization: (1) political, (2) theological and (3) economical. He observed that the last objective predominated in the Nineteenth Century. One aspect of a colonial economy was "the export to the colonies of the mother-country's produce [sic] ; the import into the mother-country of the produce of the colonies" (Lorimer, translator, 1949: 23). However, the more important aspect of colonial economy centred on "exploitation or....profitable development (*la mise en valeur*)". This referred to "the means of greatly increasing our resource and our prosperity by the methodical and systematic development of the soil and subsoil....Profitable agriculture and industrial development are now our major preoccupations" (*ibid*. pp24f).

What Maunier wrote about colonial economies in general could well be applied to the British establishment of the Straits Settlements in Malaya. When the British founded the Settlement of Penang in 1786 they had the objective of planting spices to compete with the monopoly of the Dutch. For labour, the British looked to the people of China. In a letter to the Governor of Calcutta, the Founder of the Penang

Settlement, Captain Light, wrote: "The Chinese are the only people of the east from whom a revenue may be raised without expense and extraordinary efforts of the government" (Purcell, 1948: 39).

In order to encourage the labourers in China coming to the British Colonies, the British Government signed a convention with the Chinese Imperial Government in 1860 whereby Chinese subjects were permitted to emigrate and work in the British colonies. Again in 1904 agreements were reached between the two governments to supervise indentured migration jointly and these were framed in London as the "Emigration Convention of Chinese Labour in the British Colonies and Protectorates" (Ee 1961: 44). From 1896 onwards, Chinese migration to the Straits Settlements occurred on a tremendous scale (<u>ibid</u>., p58). The Chinese immigrants provided the much-needed labour power to the Colonies.

In Malaya "profitable development" was not confined to the "development of the soil and subsoil", for it was extended to the exploitation of the wealth of another community. The British administrators and traders found that the Chinese labourers were the principal consumers of the opium and gambling farms from which the Straits Government drew much of its revenue. Imported from India, opium was sold in bulk by the British Administrators to Chinese merchants

who applied for the right to retail it. This monopoly accounted for 59% of the governmental revenue in 1904 and although measures of control were introduced in 1910, the sale of opium provided the Straits Government with a revenue until the outbreak of the Pacific War (Cheng 1961: 63). Table 4 shows the opium revenue and its percentage in the total revenue of the Straits Settlements.

TABLE 4

OPIUM REVENUE AND ITS PERCENTAGE IN THE TOTAL REVENUE OF THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS

Year	Opium Revenue	Total Revenue	Percentage Opium Revenue To Total
1875	694,505	1,538,854	45.1
1880	1,338,720	2,361,300	56.7
1885	1,593,600	3,508,074	45.5
1890	2,227,951	4,269,125	52.2
1895	1,800,000	4,048,359	44.5
1900	2,318,400	5,386,556	43.0
1905	5,346,000	11,657,423	45.8
1910	3,357,970	9,336,327	28.0

(*Ibid*., p. 63).

Since the Straits Government came to identify its revenue with those of the Chinese opium farmers in the Settlements, these farmers had to be protected. To this end three methods were employed: (1) Legislation was passed to set out rules for the transportation, retail and consumption

of opium and spirits to the advantage of the farmer.
(2) Whenever farmers put in claims for reductions in rent owing to heavy losses, the Government would invariably comply with the claim. To cancel the farms and call for fresh tenders would lead to an interruption of the opium sales, and the ruin of the small investors in the old farm, and the probability of new tenders might reduce the rent of the new farm. (3) The third method of securing maximum revenue from opium was by regulating the selling price so that it could be sold to the highest price that the Chinese labourers could effort (ibid.,pp64-5).

Writing about Burma and Netherlands India, Furnivall (1944, 1956) was right in seeing the plural society as a result of the extension of commerce and trade, creating a market situation of a new type in which those participating did not share a common set of values. The market society, therefore, lacked the common set of values which existed in the capitalist societies in Europe. And to a much greater extent than in European markets, people in the colonial plural societies were inclined to seek their own self-interest and to exploit others, particularly if the others were from another community.

Exploitation between communities was seldom one-sided. The economic position of the Chinese in Malaya depended a great deal on the British control of the Malay

States. The British intervened in the internal strife among the Malay sultans and chiefs and also the fighting among the Chinese secret societies in 1873 and brought about stability to the Malay Peninsula. The British authorities encouraged (or permitted) the people to develop along *laissez faire* lines. In an atmosphere with everyone making a satisfactory living, it was not surprising that politics were relegated to the background and the question of "indigenousness" which plagued the Malayan society in later periods did not arise.

There was plenty of land for expansion. The Malays and the Chinese did not compete for the same jobs. The divergence of economic interests among the ethnic communities also meant that their settlements were physically separated. The Chinese were largely drawn to the sea coasts and along what was known as the tin and rubber belt of western Malaya, between the west coast and the Main Range. The Malays continued to cultivate paddy in the river valleys and along the coasts.

People living in a plural society in its frontier conditions often had to deal with the authorities of different communities. Besides dealing with the British authorities, the Chinese tin miners and planters, as they ventured into the inland of the Malay Peninsula, had to pay royalties to Malay leaders of different sorts. Noteworthy were the

kanchu who controlled the rivers with armed stockades and who made every boat that passed pay tax or toll on its cargo. Those who could satisfy the _kanchu_ were allowed to form settlements, each along some named river, for the planting of pepper and gambier. The Malay rulers also received a great sum of royalties from the Chinese tin-miners. On occasions the Malay chiefs also took sides in the fighting between the Chinese secret societies. This was usually done with economic objective. The Mentri Besar of Larut, for example, by supporting first one society and then the other, made a profit estimated at $276,000 per year before the British intervention in 1873 (Comber 1959: 158).

Internal Situation

Since the objective of the Chinese in going overseas was to seek their fortunes and not to build permanent communities, one would expect wealth prestige to be more emphasized in the overseas communities than in the homeland. This was indeed the case. In the traditional society the social scale was in the order of (1) scholar, (2) official, (3) farmer, (4) labourer and (5) merchant. The merchant was always at the bottom of the scale however rich he might be. In order to build any sort of prestige, a successful merchant had to establish some kind of kinship relation, affinal or fictitious, with the intellectuals, or else to educate his children. But in the "market society" of

Malaya wealth prestige seemed to permeate almost every aspect of the Chinese community. The merchant and the rich were at the top of the social scale, while scholarship became much less emphasized. This fact will be shown in various places in this thesis. In this section the occupations and economic activities in the Chinese community will be discussed.

The important occupations of the Chinese community were: pepper, gambier and sugar planting, vegetable gardening, tin-mining and commercial activities of different kinds (opium farming, petty shopkeeping, etc.). The Chinese took a large share in the planting of peppers and gambier in Penang and Singapore. According to Purcell (1948: 89) the Chinese planters were "unscrupulous" in exploiting the land: they never manured the land as they did in China. By 1840 as the cultivable land for peppers and gambier in Singapore became exhausted, the Chinese began to cross the strait to the mainland part of the Malay Peninsula (ibid). According to the same author the Chinese had been cultivating sugar long before the British came to Malaya: patches of sugar plantation were found in the mangrove jungle in Batu Kawin and in the area of "Province of Wellesley" in the 17th Century (ibid., p. 51).

Although the Chinese had been cultivating rice in their homeland, rice was not a popular crop with them in

Malaya. Its cultivation on the Peninsula was at best a risky business because of the unfavourable climate, which is more suitable to the growing of tree crops than of annuals, the lack of water control over wide areas and the depredations of pests and diseases. Crop failure was common (Ooi 1963: 222). Besides the ecological factor the greater demand for gambier, pepper and sugar in the colonial economy was also conducive to the unpopularity of rice cultivation among the Chinese.

In the tin industry of Malaya the Chinese were the earliest pioneers. According to Jackson (1963: 106) the Chinese were working in the Kinta Valley as early as the beginning of the 18th Century. The important centres of tin-mining during this period were the Malacca territory and the nearby Lukut and Sugai Ujong, and the Taiping and Kamunting areas of the State of Perak.

In the second half of the 19th Century in the economic grouping of the Chinese community a division line might be drawn between the new arrival and those who had already established themselves in Malaya. The new arrivals from China were usually indentured labourers. Their passage from China were paid by the local Chinese business men who needed labourers. On arrival they would be bound to work for the employers for one year. In turn a new-comer would receive lodging and some clothing from the employers. The

new-comer might also receive $3 to $6 as pocket money. At the end of the first year, the new-comer became an ordinary labourer and, if he worked in a tin-mine he might leave for other employment as he wished, or he would receive a salary of $31 to $42 per month together with food and lodging if he chose to continue (ibid., p. 109).

A new-comer who wanted to start a pepper plantation needed capital. In this case he approached a financier, usually a businessman of his dialect group, and asked for advancement for building a house and for buying agricultural implements, a subsidy of $2 per month and above all a piece of land where he could cultivate. To pay for all these the cultivator gave all the produce of his plantation to the financier. At the end of the third year the plantation was divided into two halves, the labourer taking one half and the financier the other half. Again, after another three years, the financier would lease his half of the plantation to the cultivator for five years. The rent was paid in produce at the rate of 30 piculs[1] a year, the total produce being about 56 piculs a year (Purcell 1949: 45). In the case of tin-mining the labourer might have to give one-tenth of the gross produce of the mines, in addition to a fixed

[1] A Chinese weight unit equal to 133 lbs.

rate of interest to the financier (Jackson 1963: 109).

By the end of the 19th Century, because of the settled conditions of the country resulting from British rule and the opening up of the country by road construction, the indentured labourers in the tin-mines were able to run away. Absconding in practice became easy. In order to keep the labourers the employer began to employ the labourers on piece-work or day wages. By 1910 indentured labours had disappeared (ibid.,pp.112-13).

Relationship With China

Remittance to the homeland is a common behaviour among emigrants in general. The International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments Year Book (1947: 119) reported that some countries such as Greece and Italy, received a large part of the national income from the personal remittances of emigrants. Wittka (1956: 51) in his study of the Irish in the United States described the large remittances made by the Irish to their homeland over time.

Remittance by Malayan Chinese to their families in the homeland was not an overseas invention. Chinese living in other parts of China had long been sending money back to their native places. When fame and wealth came to a Chinese, his first thought was to share his success with his relatives. His glory was their glory, and his success was more meaningful if it could be shown in his native place. The ideal of an

overseas Chinese was to see himself back to his native place where he could glorify his relatives and ancestors, for example, by giving a theatrical performance at the village temple together with a luxurious banquet and fire-crackers, buying farm lands, building new houses and perhaps marrying a concubine.

However, such an ideal was seldom realized. During his sojourn overseas, money was sent little by little to maintain his family in China. The Chinese in Malaya had made remittance to China even well before the Opium War. This is indicated by Captain Light in his letter "probably addressed to the Governor General of Bengal" on 25th January, 1794: "The Chinese are indefatigable in the pursuit of money. They don't wait until they have acquired a large fortune to return to their native country but send annually a part of their profits to their families. This is so general that a poor labourer will work with double labour to acquire two or three dollars to remit to China....Sometimes they send their boys to China to complete their education" (Purcell 1948: 41).

In this letter one gathers that although emigration was ideally a capital offence in China, there was in fact a certain amount of traffic in and out of China. This was consistent with the fact that there had been a great deal of corruption in the Chinese officialdom and one could

easily clear the port authorities through bribery. Remittance from overseas could then be made through these returning overseas Chinese.

When postal services and banks did not exist, the usual method of remittance was for each group of people to select one reliable person from among their members who might be trusted with carrying the money to China. There developed the system of "travelling merchant": "Men whose two-fold occupation was to do...business for themselves on the one hand, and to render...services, such as taking back money and correspondence, and bringing out relatives, for their clients" in Malaya or other parts of Nanyang, on the other (Tien 1953: 84). Many grocery shops in Malaya were engaged in this kind of business, and when a fair amount of money had accumulated, an employee or relatives might be sent home with the money.

Quite unlike the Chinese governments in the later period, the Imperial Government was not interested in the wealth of the overseas Chinese. They were, after all, "the deserters of the Heavenly Dynasty" who had left the ancestors' shrines only to look for wealth abroad. The economic aspect of the relationships between the Chinese in Malaya and those in China was really an expression of the kinship system rather than of anything else.

Social Organizations

Internal Situation

The most important social organization of the Chinese in Malaya in this period were the secret societies. Every Chinese immigrant at the beginning of the 19th Century was said to belong to one secret society or another. Even as late as 1896, the year following the promulgation of the order-in-council for the suppression of secret societies, the British Assistant Protector of Chinese for Kinta said that 70% of the Chinese in Malaya were still secret society members (Comber 1959: 229).

The secret societies in Malaya identified themselves as branches of the Triad Societies in Southern China; thus they named themselves as Hai Shan, Yi Hsin, etc. as the secret societies did in China. The rituals,[1] consisting of repetition of solemn oaths aiming at the creation of a sworn brotherhood, as practised in Malaya, were similar to those in Southern China. The secret societies both in Malaya and China were similar in being anti-Manchu. However, there was no evidence that the secret societies in Malaya were connected with those in Southern China at the organizational level.

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[1]Described by Comber (1957: 8-11).

Furthermore, unlike their counterparts in China, which were outlawed and necessarily secret, the Triad Societies in Malaya were regarded by the British authorities until 1896 as lawful political constituents in the Chinese community and were exploited as means of indirect rules over the Chinese Community. Therefore, the secret societies in Malaya were not really secret except in a ritual sense. Their membership and leadership were largely known to the British authorities and some Malay chiefs. Moreover, they were closed groupings.

The following factors contributed to the flourishing and the in-group solidarity of the secret societies in Malaya: (1) The secret society leaders were often principals in the importation of indentured labourers from China. Once they were in Malaya, the labourers had no choice but to belong to one secret society or another. The poverty-stricken new arrivals without kinsmen or protectors could easily side with a discipline which relied not only on force but also on a sworn brotherhood and ritual sanctions. The secret societies provided the immigrants with organized groups in which they could find assistance when they were in need. (2) The power of the secret society leaders was further increased when they were given the status of Capitan China by the British authorities in accordance with the "indirect-rule" policy. This will be elaborated upon in the next

section.

Lastly, (3) the in-group solidarity of the secret societies was related to the traditional Chinese attitude towards a central government. The Chinese showed little interest in the central government and even little desire to identify themselves with its officials. Apart from taxation, military service and sometimes public work such as water control projects, there had never been close contact of any kind between the common people and their government. "Heaven is high and the emperor is far away": this Chinese proverb speaks fully of the common people's aloof attitude. The result of this was that local organizations such as crafts, occupational guilds and village councils were designed to be independent of central government control. Hsu's (1955: 175) findings in South Village may be served as an illustration. There were two types of local organizations: the government-sponsored and the locally-sponsored. On the surface each type was clearly defined in its functions. However, in reality they worked together. Since the personnel in both organizations was drawn from among local people whose kinship, social and economic ties were centred in the village, the two groups inevitably shared a common outlook: to protect the interests of the village against central government encroachment. For example, if the central government imposed a levy,the heads of both organizations

would come together and decide how much of it the villagers could afford to pay and how they could avoid paying as much as had been asked. Even if secret societies had not existed, the Chinese immigrants, with their attitude towards a central government, would probably still have formed local organizations under some other name in order to evade governmental encroachment. Since the secret societies in Malaya were not really secret, they were in actual fact quite similar to the local organizations in rural China. However, the rituals of the Triad Societies were vested in the secret societies in Malaya and therefore they were identified as such.

In the division of the secret society groupings in Malaya, dialect played a prominent part. For example, the Hai Shan group in the tin-mine centres in Kinta consisted mostly of Cantonese, but in Penang, the Hai Shan group consisted mostly of Hakka and Chaochou people. As registered in 1809 in Singapore the Yi Hsin group consisted of nine societies. Five of them were apparently single-dialect organizations: Fukien, Chaochou, Hainanese, Cantonese and Hakka. These five societies accounted for about a half of the registered and subscribing members. The other half of the Yi Hsin membership distributed over four societies were probably each heterogeneous in dialects (Comber 1959: 234). One reason accounting for this dialect

heterogeneity is this: some societies exercised territorial jurisdiction, so that a man's residence brought him within the sphere of control of a particular society (Freedman 1960: 37). Also, since a secret society leader was often a principal in the importation of indentured labourers for tin mines and plantations, the labourers that arrived in Malaya had no choice but to belong to that particular society. In conclusion, it may be said that the secret societies came into existence in the frontier conditions of Malaya as a means both of insulating the Chinese from outside interference and of maintaining the relations between the segments of a comparatively enclosed Chinese community.

Relationship With Other Communities

Although the secret societies were not really secret, they were definitely closed to the British administrators and other ethnic communities in Malaya. Furthermore, when the British authorities abandoned their indirect-rule policy and decided to outlaw the secret societies in 1896, they became actually secret. History provided a similar example. When the Dutch began their control over west Borneo in the 19th Century there had for long existed independent Chinese local groups which were referred to in the literature as *kongsi*. Only the Langfong *Kongsi* survived the Dutch conquest of 1854 and the Dutch allowed its own chief to rule until 1884. When the Dutch assumed control of the

Kongsi, secret societies emerged. They had not been known to the Dutch before. (Freedman 1960: 45-7)

Indirect rule was necessary in Malaya at a time when the British found themselves unable to establish an administrative system by which the Chinese could be brought under control by orthodox governmental means. Captain Light, the Founder of the Penang Settlement said: "The object of the British in the first place was to attract the Chinese to the new settlement of Penang so that it might profit by their industry; and to interfere with them as little as possible". In that the Chinese wished to be "tried and governed under their own laws..." Captain Light "committed the administration of each community to a headman or Capitan" who was generally a secret society leader. This institution since then became the agent between the British authority and the Chinese, first in the Strait Settlements and later in the Malay States (Buxbaum 1966: 625). Under this form of indirect rule, the only legal rules and mechanism applied to the Chinese were of their own choice and devising.

The institution of "Capitan China" was particularly necessary when the British central authority was far away in India and exercised remote control over the Straits Settlements. Furthermore, few of the British officials had any knowledge about the Chinese language and society.

While there were 70,000 Chinese in Singapore in 1857, there was only one member of the British administration in Singapore qualified in the Chinese language in 1877. (Comber 1959: 150).

Incidently, the institution of "Capitan China", although in many aspects very different, in effect involved a role similar to that of the gentry in China. Without either the training or the experience of the scholar gentry of traditional China, the "Capitans" nevertheless assumed positions of leadership in local groupings on the basis of their economic positions, affiliation with the local organizations -- in this case the secret societies and local welfare services -- and links with officialdom.

Relationship With China

Although the aim of the Triads in Malaya, like their counterparts in China, was avowedly to "overthrow the Manchu and restore the Ming Dynasty" they did not actually extend their activities to the China homeland. At best, only lip service was paid to this anti-Manchu objective. On the part of the Imperial Government of China the members of the Triads in Malaya were as dangerous as those in China. Therefore, if Triad members from Malaya fell into the hand of the Imperial Government they would be executed. However, this would happen only if the British authority in Malaya deported them to China. Apart from this, there seemed to

be little or no interactions between the secret societies in Malaya and China in any way.

Education

Internal Situation

Although the Chinese came from a society in which education was emphasized and scholarship highly valued, in Malaya for the kinds of economic activities in which the Chinese engaged a formal education was unnecessary, except in a rudimentary form. In China the short-cut to bring wealth and fame to one's family was to pass the Civic Examinations held yearly in the capital and thereby attain a position in the bureaucracy. However, in the alien political system of a British colony the only road to eminence was the road of economic success. The Chinese in Malaya had to amass wealth through trade, shopkeeping, mining and cultivating. And once he had sufficient wealth, he had no fear that his lack of education would prevent him either from exploiting his economic position fully or from reaping the social benefits of economic success. Wealth could be invested in relations with the British administrators (which required no education) and with humbler Chinese coolies who could be controlled by a mixture of thuggery and protection.

In most of the Chinese settlements traditional schools of a rudimentary form were opened up. Like those in rural China these schools were housed in temples, family

shrines, clubs, guilds or private homes. The teacher usually combined his profession with that of fortune teller or geomantic diviner, letter writer and poster writer. In fact, anybody who could read and write could become a teacher.

The text-books used in these schools were those of the traditional schools. A child started with Trimetrical Classics, Century of Surnames, and after this, he began the Millenary Classics. This was followed by the Odes For Children, and this book was supplemented by the Cannons of Filial Piety. Then came the Four Books. As expected not many, children or adults, in Malaya could finish all these books.

In the traditional schools the methods of teaching emphasized memorization. A pupil was considered to have learned a chapter when he could recite it to his teacher. If the pupil could memorize the text, he was thought to have understood it also. However, many critics of the traditional schools pointed out that pupils could actually understand very little of it, firstly, because of the disparity of the literary language and the colloquial language, and secondly, because of the highly abstract nature of the texts. In Malaya, the classic studies in these schools were supplemented with training in the use of the abacus and in letter writing. The whole purpose of providing a child with education was to

make him understand the teachings of the ancient sages and able to read and write and do simple calculations that prepared him for doing business (Nanyang Siang Pau, July 24th 1966a: 17).

In a plural society, a child very often had to choose between attending Western or vernacular schools. McCully (1966: 44) recorded the fact that as early as 1833 some Indian parents instructed their children that, although Sanskrit literature contained all that was really valuable, yet "for secular purposes, for gaining a livelihood, a knowledge of the English language was absolutely necessary". In Malaya, English education was established in the Straits Settlements by the end of the 19th Century. The oldest of these schools were the Penang Free Schools and the Raffle's College in Singapore. To many Chinese in Malaya the whole objective of sending their children to the English school was to prepare them to acquire a job, usually clerical, later in life. As one could become a clerk after Standard IV, not many desired to stay at school after this standard. By 1900 it was recorded that only some 200 in the whole of Malaya were receiving a secondary education in English schools, and practically all these were in the predominantly Chinese Straits Settlements (Furnivall 1943: 32). However, English education became more and more popular among the Chinese. To put it crudely, if Mencius and Confucius

taught them how to live a good life, the English language was to them a profitable acquisition. At the same time there was an economic demand in the British administration and enterprise for the product of English schools, and so they increased rapidly in numbers and in size.

Relationship With Other Communities

There was no evidence that the Chinese in Malaya attended Malay schools in any significant numbers. Apparently the primary reason was that Malay was not a language of prestige and was not needed to find a good job. Moslem teaching in the Malay schools did not seem to be a reason for deterring the Chinese from attending, if one judges from the fact that Chinese parents never hesitated in sending children to Western missionary schools even though they knew fully well that their children could be converted.

Since the British administrators resorted to "indirect rule", they were not interested in the Chinese traditional schools. Only when the revolutionaries and reformists from China became active in the Chinese schools at the beginning of the 20th Century did the British administrators begin to pay some attention to the Chinese schools; but until then the Chinese schools were harmless and insignificant to the British administrators.

Relationship With China

There was no significant relationship between Imperial China and the Chinese in Malaya with respect to education. However, as shown in Light's letter in 1794 (p. 30), some Chinese children did go to China for education. Also in Hwang (1965)'s survey of the biographies of Capitans China dated from 1786, one of them went to China in 1873 to sit for the Civic Examination in Peking and was awarded the degree of Ching Shih and accordingly given a position in the officialdom (p. 20). Apparently he was one of the very few Chinese in Malaya who ever did so.

Around the middle of the 19th Century, China met with one military defeat after another. Some Chinese argued that if China was to survive, it must accept the Western learning. The Governor-General of Kwantung-Kwangsi and Hupeh-Hunan, Chang Chi-tung, advocated a policy of synthesizing Confucianism with Western technology and methods which he expressed in a slogan: "Chinese learning for fundamental principles, Western learning for practical applications". To this group of people Western technology was a source of strength, while Western republicanism and ideology were dangerous. Although neither Western technology nor ideology had found their place in the Chinese society at large, some modern type schools with science and mathematic subjects began to appear. In 1905 the ancient

Civic Examination system was abolished. The modern type of schools was introduced to the Malayan Chinese by the Imperial Commissioner of China and by the reformists and revolutionaries at the beginning of the 20th Century.

Kinship

Internal Situation

Because of the highly unbalanced sex ratio there could be no normal family life developed among the Chinese in Malaya. A family life was a matter belonging to the homeland, where many of them had left their wives and children. However, there were also people who married in China and married again in Malaya. Since the Chinese and Malayan wives rarely confronted each other, problems of their relative status hardly arose. Some immigrants who managed to amass wealth engaged in plural marriages. But an ordinary person was more likely without a wife and children. The figures in Table 5 explain this situation.

Yet kinship did enter to some extent in the field of extra-familial organization: people of like agnatic descent and from the small locality in China and people bearing the same surname clustered together. The members of a formal surname group (clan) might be limited to men coming from a particular area of Fukien or Kwangtung or sharing a common dialect. However, the range of recruitment of such a group varied with the buildings of alliances and internal disputes. Surname (clan) organizations were not a prominent feature of the Chinese community until the suppression of the secret societies in 1896. The secret societies played a great part

in the network of social relationships of the Chinese (Freedman 1962: 70-3).

TABLE 5

SEX RATIO OF THE CHINESE POPULATION IN SINGAPORE

Year	Total Chinese	Male Chinese	Female Chinese	Sex Ratio (Females per 1000 males)
1824	3,317	2,956	361	122
1834	10,767	9,944	823	83
1849	27,988	25,749	2,239	89
1860	50,043	46,795	3,248	69
1871	50,098	46,631	7,467	160
1881	86,766	72,571	14,195	196
1891	121,098	100,446	21,462	214
1901	164,041	130,367	33,674	258
1911	219,577	161,648	57,929	356
1921	317,491	215,918	101,575	469
1931	421,821	263,191	158,630	602

(Based on Freedman 1957: 25).

Relationships With Other Communities and With China

Discussions on these aspects of kinship are included with those of the Transitional Period because of the little amount of data available pertaining to the Pioneering Period.

Summary

The Chinese migrated from China to Malaya as a result of the trade movements in the 19th Century. The Chinese provided the much needed labour for developing the British colonies, and constituted the principal consumers of opium which provided the Straits Governments with a revenue. The Chinese benefited by the political stability brought about by the British control over Malaya, and the British policy of free enterprise. There was little interaction between the Malays and the Chinese because they were largely physically separated.

In the frontier conditions of Malaya, the Chinese lacked such specialized occupations as already existed in their homeland. They were mostly engaged in spice and sugar cultivation, tin-mining and trades. Because of the unbalanced sex-ratio family life hardly existed. The secret societies flourished because they managed to protect the new arrivals and to establish a focus of loyalty in an alien society. There was little interaction between Imperial China and the Malayan Chinese.

CHAPTER III

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD: 1911-1957

Introduction

This period began on the eve of the Chinese Revolution in 1911. This date is significant because it marked the beginning of modern China, which became actively influential among the Malayan Chinese. From China Western ideologies such as nationalism, democracy and socialism were introduced to the Chinese in Malaya through the China-based political organizations and Chinese schools. On the part of the Malayan Chinese, China was given high prestige and the Revolution and the Anti-Japanese war in China were actively supported.

This date is also significant in the fact that by now the British had consolidated her control over Malaya. They no longer resorted to the indirect-rule method and such an institution as "China Capitan" was abolished. They brought stability to the country and under the colonial free-enterprise policy the Chinese gained control of much of the country's economy.

The Pacific War and the Japanese Occupation (1941--5) of Malaya were important causal factors in many of the changes that occurred in this period. Firstly, they stopped migration and political influence from China. Under the Japanese persecution the Chinese in Malaya were forced to defend themselves. This was important in bringing about the change in orientation from China towards Malaya. Secondly, the Chinese guerrilla force organized during the war laid down the foundation of the Communist "armed struggle" in the post-War years. Thirdly, the Japanese Occupation was an eye-opener for the indigeneous people in Malaya. They saw how the apparently all-powerful Westerners were humiliated by the Japanese militarists. This certainly had an important effect in rousing their nationalism and speeding up the Independence movements. The Chinese, if they were to maintain their vested interests in Malaya, must convince the Malays, who had assumed more and more political power in Malaya, that they were loyal to Malaya. At the same time, with the removing of colonial power, the Chinese could no longer function in a free-enterprise economy. The Transitional Period, then, ended with the 1957 Independence, when the Chinese in Malaya no longer maintained relationship with China and when the colonial administration ended.

Hand in hand with the shift in orientation from China to Malaya was the increasing percentage of locally-born

Chinese as shown in Table 6:

TABLE 6

PERCENTAGES OF LOCALLY-BORN CHINESE IN SINGAPORE

Years	Percentages of locally-born Chinese in Singapore
1911	20
1921	25
1931	36
1947	60

(Freedman 1957: 25).

Again, one should note that the War years constituted the critical point at which the Chinese population in Malaya became more Malayan-born than Chinese-born.

Related to the increase of locally-born Chinese were the tendencies towards a balanced sex-ratio and a more stablized population. In 1947 the sex-ratio had increased to 882 females per 1000 males in Singapore from 469 in 1931 (ibid.). Before the Pacific War the Chinese population was highly migratory. In 1937 a total of 402,563 Chinese entered Malaya, while a total of 222,061 left; in 1939, 160,448

entered while 146,109 left. In the 1950's the Chinese population was stabilized in the sense that few immigrants entered and few Malayan Chinese left except temporarily (*ibid.*, p. 23).

Economy

Internal Situation

Table 7, page 54, shows the occupational grouping of gainfully occupied Chinese in the Federation and Singapore in 1947. Agriculture was the most important occupation in every state in the Peninsula except Penang. More than half of the gainfully employed Chinese men in Johore, Penang and Negri Sembilan were agriculturists. Gambier and pepper cultivation had become an unimportant occupation for the Chinese as demand became low for these products. The most important agriculturists were the rubber planters. The Chinese estate population in 1947 was 114,422 out of a total estate population of 412,330. Chinese planters were, for the most part, small holders by comparison with the large European rubber estates (Skinner 1950: 31--41). In 1932 the Chinese in the Straits Settlements and F.M.S.[1] owned 12.5% of the total of the estates of over 100 acres as compared with 84% owned by Europeans (Purcell 1948: 241). In 1954 of the total 1,920,000 acres of rubber plantations in Malaya 14% belonged to the Chinese planters, 84% belonged to the European planters; of those plantations with over 1,000 acres 92% belonged to the Europeans and 16%, to the Chinese; of the 52 plantations with

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[1] Federated Malay States.

TABLE 7

THE OCCUPATIONAL GROUPING OF GAINFULLY OCCUPIED CHINESE IN MALAYA

Occupations	Federation	Singapore
Agriculture		
Rubber cultivation	23.4	.7
Paddy cultivation	6.2	
Other agricultural occupations	16.8	7.6
Total	46.8	8.3
Commercial & financial	14.4	20.3
Manufacturing, etc.	12.9	21.4
Personal service	7.5	14.6
Mining & Quarrying	4.3	.3
Transport & communications	3.3	11.8
Clerical, etc. occupations	2.9	8.2
Fishing	2.5	1.2
Personal occupations	1.8	2.4
Public administration and defence	.1	.3
Other & indeterminate occupations	3.9	11.2
Total	100%	100%

(International Bank 1955: 12--3)

over 5,000 acres 48 belonged to the Europeans and 4 to the Chinese (Sing Chew Jit Poh Oct. 7th. 1966: 4).

The Chinese also engaged in pineapple production, an important cash crop confined mainly to Johore, Selangor and Perak. The pineapple canning industry associated with pineapple growing was also largely a Chinese enterprise. It ranked third in the Malayan export industries (Ginsberg and Roberts 1958: 264).

Paddy cultivation remained a very unpopular occupation among the Chinese. However, on two occasions they were forced to turn to the countryside for food-growing. The first occasion was the Great Depression when many of the unemployed Chinese turned to cultivating plots on the fringes of estates, mining areas on Government land, and on the Malay Reservations and forest reserves. The second occasion was the Second World War. Malaya had always relied on rice imported from Thailand and the war reduced immensely this import, causing general food shortage in the country. Many Chinese took up paddy cultivation on the fringes of jungle.

One important innovation in this period was the modern banks, which did much to popularize the use of current accounts among the Chinese merchants and shopkeepers. Circumstances favoured the development of local Chinese banks to meet the needs of Chinese businessmen. There were few Chinese businessmen who could speak English, and although the British

banks had compradores[1] to serve as a bridge between the management and the local Chinese businessmen, there was not much understanding and personal relationship between the bankers and the clients. Besides the Chinese businessmen did not often appreciate the formalities of banking procedures, such as signing proper documents, depositing adequate securities and observing official hours (S. Y. Lee 1966: 90).

The Chinese banks had the following characteristics:- (1) The sponsors and directors of the Chinese banks were prominent merchants, principally in rubber and tin-mines. (2) They were different from the Chinese traditional remittance houses (which will be dealt with). They accepted deposits, provided loans and advances, financed trade bills and transacted foreign exchange business along the lines of modern commercial banks. (3) In these banks not only the directors, officers, and management, but also the depositors and customers were mainly drawn from the same dialect group. (4) Policies on loans and advances to customers were based on good faith arising from personal relationship rather than on property or other securities for the loans. This type of personal guarantee or trust would not be regarded as a sound banking principle by Western standard. As there were no central bank regulations to supervise the activities of the commercial banks, the credit policy was entirely at the discretion of the individual banks (ibid., p. 90).

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[1] i. e. Chinese go-betweens.

Alongside the banks were the Chinese traditional remittance houses which had been in existence in China and the different parts of Nanyang. Remittance houses were run by men of the same dialect group and often of the same locality of origin in China and clan. They provided their clients with such personal services as writing letters for the illiterate and telling home news to their clients, and the like. In spite of the competition of the more efficient services of banks and post offices, these remittance houses continued to exist (Tien 1955: 84).

According to the Annual Report of Nanyang Chinese Exchange and Remittance Association, Singapore (1947: 2, 11, 95--104) the total number of remittance houses in the Federation was about 1,500. In Singapore there were 146 remittance houses distributed among the dialect group as follows: Fukienese 61, Chaochou 45, Hainanese 33, Cantonese and Hakka (combined shops) 7 (as quoted by Tien 1953: 53).

Although mining was in fifth place in terms of the total number of Chinese gainfully employed in Malaya, it was the fourth most important Chinese occupation in Perak and Selangor, and of considerable importance in Pahang, Negri Sembilan and Trengganu. In both European and Chinese mines Hakka and Cantonese clearly predominated. Most of the tin-mines were Chinese owned, but they were small in size as compared with the European-owned mines. In consequence the

production of the latter was about five to eight times above the former (Skinner 1950: 42). In 1954 Malaya produced 135,400 tons of tin: 60% of this came from the 600 Chinese-owned mines and 40% of these came from the 108 European-owned mines (Sing Chew Jit Poh Oct. 7th. 1966: 4).

Relationship With Other Communities

(a) The British

The development of the Chinese economy in Malaya was to a great extent directly related to the British colonial policy. It encouraged the local people to develop a cash crop economy even at the negligence of the subsistence crop. Since there was a great demand for sugar, pepper and gambier the Chinese took to the cultivation of these crops in the 19th. century. At the beginning of the 20th century the British introduced rubber into Malaya and among the local peoples, the Chinese, took up rubber cultivation. There were some Malay Reservations in the country, especially on the eastern part of the Peninsula; however, outside these Reservations people were able to develop their own economy in the atmosphere of laissez faire. In consequence, the Chinese were able to assume an important position in the country's economy as a whole.

The British policy was partly related to the unpopularity of paddy cultivation among the Chinese. As this

policy reserved all potential paddy land for the Malays. Only in 1939 did the Government announce that, in view of the dangerous position of the country with regard to food supplies, the Malay monopoly of paddy planting was to be broken and that other communities would be allowed to take up new paddy land. But in order to safeguard Malay interests short leases were issued, and occupancy by non-Malays was to be confined to newly opened paddy land only. Still these conditions were not sufficient to lead many Chinese to take up paddy cultivation (Ooi 1963: 227).

In a plural society the division of labour was frequently along communal lines. British business in Malaya was of large scale and usually had good overseas connections. As a result the British were able to control much of the export and import trade of Malaya. In 1950 the total Malayan import trade was valued at $3,800,000, and of this 60% went through the British firms (Sing Chew Jit Poh Oct. 7th. 1966: 4). From these firms the goods were distributed to the many smaller Chinese firms and shops. At the first decade of the Century the Chinese banks relied much upon the British banks for foreign exchange transactions as the Chinese did not know how to conduct arbitrage in the foreign markets nor did they have the connections in overseas markets to do so. In turn, of course, the British banks had to rely on the Chinese banks to collect deposits from the Chinese community

(S. Y. Lee 1966: 87).

The fact that the British business was of large scale complemented the Chinese business pattern. For example, a pre-requisite for successful British dredging and hydraulic mining was the aquisition of large areas of land so that the machinery could be kept at work continuously for long periods, while hydraulic mines also required locations near sources of cheap water power. There were many areas that did not fulfil these conditions, and these were taken up by the Chinese, who placed their trust in human labour (Ooi 1961: 359). At this juncture it might be interesting to note figures of hired labourers in both Chinese and European mines: in 1954, 22,000 Chinese employed on 600 Chinese-owned mines were producing 60% of Malaya's output; 40% was produced by 81 dredges of European tin mines employing 12,000 persons (Ginsberg and Roberts 1958: 263; Sing Chew Jit Poh Oct. 7th. 1966: 4).

(b) The Japanese[1]

The Japanese militarists were the conquorers and the enemies of the Chinese people. Immediately after the occupation of Malaya the Japanese did their best to exploit the wealth of the Chinese in order to subsidize the Pacific War. While the Japanese merchants began to monopolize the import

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[1]Information on the relationship between the Japanese and the Chinese was lacking, and has to be relied mostly on one author.

and export business and to take over the best tin-mines, iron works and other factories, the military authorities demanded a "gift" of $50,000,000 from the Chinese community in 1942 (Purcell 1948: 254). In the same year the officially sanctioned gambling farms began to spread to all major cities. These gambling farms were entirely designed for the Chinese; they used Chinese language and Chinese games of gambling in their operations. The most important method to exploit the wealth of the Malayan people was to issue a huge amount of money. After January 1943 the Japanese currency in Malaya omitted the serial number, because the authorities had lost count of the currency issued. The result was inflation: in December 1941 white rice cost 6 cents a catty[1] and by 1945 it cost $75 (ibid., p. 255).

(c) The Malays[2]

Since most of the Malay people are rural dwellers, the interactions between the Malays and the Chinese are in the rural economy, the best known example being the middleman facilities provided by the Chinese to the Malay fishermen. The Malay fishermen cannot both catch the fish and attend to the transport and marketing of their catch. A system has

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[1]A Chinese weight unit equal to 1.3 lb.

[2]This description still applies today.

evolved whereby the fisherman sells his catch to a Chinese fish dealer who arranges the transport and market of the catch through other hands. The fisherman is seldom paid in full for his fish when it is taken from him. He is given advance payment and then has to wait for the balance. Meanwhile he may have to borrow money from the dealer over the lean periods, and soon finds himself in perpetual debt. The Chinese dealer, on the other hand, safeguards the fisherman to a certain extent. He must pay the fisherman for the fish and he stands to lose if the market is bad. He advances money to the fisherman with little hope of getting a full return, and he takes on the problem of packing and transporting the fish to market (Y. L. Lee 1962: 193). The Chinese role in the middleman facilities are famous in other parts of Southeast Asia, but in Malaya, in terms of the economy of the Chinese community as a whole, this role seems to be less important.

Relationship With China

Remittance made by overseas Chinese had always been a good source of foreign exchange for China. Most of the time remittances were made to relatives; on occasions remittances were made towards flood and famine relief; and in the 1930's large sum of money was remitted towards the war effort in China.

Tien (1953: 83) in his monograph on the Chinese in

Sarawak wrote that it was difficult to estimate the total amount of remittances made before the war for the various purposes. They were remitted in a variety of ways, and only those which passed through the banks could be accounted for. Even estimates based on bank returns varied greatly. Tien quoted one writer as indicating that "the total of annual overseas remittance during the "thirties" was variously estimated at U.S. $150 million." The same writer made the point that it was impossible to deal with the different types of remittances: they must be lumped together.

The China Handbook: 1937-45 (Chinese Ministry of Information 1947: 33) attempted to deal with the war contribution separately: "By the end of 1944, a total of $738,341,331 had been received directly by the Ministry of Finance from the overseas Chinese as their contribution towards the war." It added that "besides the overseas Chinese contribute heavily in the purchasing of Chinese bonds, war planes, trucks, medical supplies and other materials".

However, remittances made after Second World War could safely assumed to be family remittances. In between 1947 and 1949 the following remittances were made by the Chinese in Malaya as family remittances (Table 8, page 64). The decline in figures could be related to the civil war in some ways. Freedman (1957: 74) contended that the figures which were official were not maximum because "some business remittances,

which fall outside the scope of the figures must include some remittances of a family nature". In Malaya each remitting person was limited by law to $45 per month.

TABLE 8

MALAYAN CHINESE REMITTANCES TO CHINA (1947--9)

Year	Singapore	Federation
1947	M$ 16,988,060[1]	M$ 5,957,074
1948	10,228,011	5,860,797
1949	2,596,683	2,129,460

(Freedman 1957: 74).

Freedman also indicated that according to the 1947 Social Survey 40% of the Chinese immigrant wage earners were in the habit of sending money home to China and only "a small number" of locally-born Chinese made such remittances (ibid.). As will be indicated on p. 133 even the immigrants only supported their immediate relatives. Therefore, their children in Malaya, never having seen their relatives in China, would not be expected to make remittances to China. If the remittances were entirely of a family nature then as more and more of the Chinese in Malaya were locally-born, the figures should decline. Logically speaking as kinship

[1]Malayan dollar

ties between the Chinese in Malaya and their brethern in China became severed family remittances should stop entirely.

Social Organizations

Internal Situation

(a) Traditional Associations

After the suppression of the secret societies in Malaya in 1896, the Chinese traditional associations or guilds began to spread to all parts of Malaya wherever there were Chinese living. These associations were not an overseas invention. In China fellow provincials living in a strange part of the country grouped together to form guilds. Travellers, merchants and, in the case of the capital, examination-taking students would call on these guilds on their arrivals. These guilds gave their fellow provincials a measure of social insurance.

There were about 1,500 associations in Singapore registered or exempted from registration under the Societies Ordinance in between 1948 and 1950. More than half of them were exclusively Chinese and they were called sports clubs, musical and dramatic clubs, old boys' associations, business and professional associations, women's organizations, religious bodies, mutual aid clubs, and clan and territorial associations. Registered under different legislation in Singapore were trade unions and co-operative societies. Clan and territorial associations together numbered about 250

(Freedman 1954: 93).

The associations cannot be discovered from a mere survey of the governmental registration of these associations or by the ways they call themselves. Many associations which claim to be charitable or recreational can actually be described as dialect associations in the sense that they tend to draw their membership from the same dialect group. The structural significance of these associations can only be discovered by examining their membership and functions (Tien 1953: 10 f).

In many of these associations in Malaya, dialect, locality of origin in China, clan and occupation are very often the decisive factors for recruitment of membership although this may not be the objective of the constitution of the association concerned. Chinese who speak the same dialect tend to group together. A Chinese who comes as an immigrant makes his first contacts with others who not only speak his dialect but also came from his locality. According to Tien (1953: 17) many of the members of these associations are members of the same clan: ie., they bear the same surname, and they may even be related to one another by genealogical relationships.

In Malaya dialect groupsings and occupations often coincide to some extent. For example, the Hainanese are a

prominent group of people in the coffee-shop business: the Hakka and the Cantonese are prominent among the tin-mine workers. In the various associations although some members regard the associations as sources of assistance, financial or otherwise, in the event of death or marriage, the general activities are not related to dialect or clan matters *per se* but to the economic interests of the occupation which is engaged by the great majority of the members. In other words, the various associations very often have some economic objectives for their existence.

According to Freedman (1957: 95) the most active members of the associations were essentially status-seekers. By contributing generously in the various activities of the associations they acquired the prestige of philanthropist and office-holder. Before 1957, British and Malay Sultans conferred honours and offices on this group of people, because of their generous contributions towards the building of hospitals, schools and the like.

These active members or "status seekers" played an important part in the maintenance of Chinese education in Malaya. One of the largest territorial associations in Malaya, the Fukien Association of Singapore, maintained six Chinese high schools and primary schools and contributed heavily towards the establishment of Nanyang University, the first overseas Chinese university. It was that group of

people who made the greatest contributions. A few of them were actually half-literate, but they were made members or even chairman of school management committees because of the financial contributions they made to the schools. Wealth did breed prestige in a commercial society.

(b) The Kuomintang and its Forerunner

The first form of political organization set up by revolutionaries from China was named Tung Meng Hui. In the 1920's this political organization was disguised in the forms of "reading rooms", "private schools" and "night schools" in Malaya in order to avoid the attention of the British authority. The alleged objective of these organizations were always educational. In actual fact they were centres where political ideologies could be propagated, and meetings for party members could be held. If the British authorities became attracted by the activities in these organizations, the party members quickly curtailed political activities within the premises and claimed that they were only reading societies. On such occasions political meetings would be held in some other inconspicuous places (P'ng 1961: 7--8).

The ultimate objective of the Tung Meng Hui was to win the support of the Chinese in Malaya either in terms of money or manpower. One noteworthy example was the big drive for funds to finance the 1911 uprising in Canton, which

brought from Malaya a total of $47,906.67. Furthermore a number of young men left for China to take an active part. In October 1911 two hundred volunteers left from Singapore for China in the space of two weeks. Earlier about five hundred from Penang and the Federated Malay States had left for the revolution in China. Of the famous "Seventy-two Martyrs" of the Canton Uprising, fourteen were from Malaya (*ibid*., p. 8). It is by no means an accident that Sun Yat Sen, the Founder of the Chinese Republic, called the overseas Chinese the "mother of the Chinese Revolution".

The Kuomintang came into being in China in 1912, and in the same year the first branch was formed in Singapore. This was followed by other branches, and in all, thirty branches were known to have registered in Malaya. In addition to the registered lodges, there also existed non-registered branches (*ibid*., p. 12).

The main role of the Kuomintang branches in Malaya was to keep the local Chinese united and in close touch with China. They served as the spokesmen of the overseas Chinese whenever the latter had suggestions to make to the Chinese Government, and conversely, they related instructions from the homeland to the Chinese in Malaya. In a way they duplicated the work of the Chinese Consul in Malaya. However, the Consul was in charge of official matters and only the Consul had dealings with the British authorities in Malaya. At

intervals Kuomintang emissaries would be sent to Malaya to study the conditions there or to seek contributions towards China's national development and war efforts.

The activities of the Kuomintang branches included the initiation and organization of important Chinese national events such as the observations of the National Day, the anniversaries of Canton Uprising, Sun Yat Sen's birthday etc.. All these activities served to re-kindle the spirit of patriotism. The Kuomintang also continued the Reading Rooms initiated by the Tung Meng Hui. These Reading Rooms served to keep the members in touch with the happenings in China and to spread the current political ideologies (ibid., p. 13).

As a China-based political party, the movements of the Kuomintang in Malaya were actually in step with those in China. On the formation of the Chinese Republic the revolutionaries in Malaya began to urge or forced their fellow Chinese to remove the queues. Between 1913 and 1916 China was reconverted into an empire by the war lords; and in the 1920's the National Army from Canton launched the "Northern Expedition" in an endeavor to unite China. The Kuomintang Branches in Malaya closely followed these events, circulated propaganda, and raised funds to support these undertakings in China.

After conquering the warlords in Northern China, the Kuomintang formed alliances with the Chinese Communist Party and the USSR, and the Kuomintang political ideology became

strongly Marxian. In Malaya, Kuomintang labour organizations began to appear under the name of "mutual benefit associations" (Purcell 1948: 214). The literature that was circulated among the members of these associations and that was brought to the attention of the government authorities was strongly anti-British, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist. The purging of the Kuomintang in China in 1927 of its Communist elements had its repercussions in Malaya also. In Malaya the Marxist elements in the Kuomintang Branches split off into organizations of their own, such as the Modern Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang of China, the Communist Youth Party, and the Southseas Labour Union (ibid., p. 215).

Considering the existing form of commercialized community of the Chinese in Malaya one would not expect the Kuomintang membership in Malaya to be widespread. This was indeed the case. Only about one Chinese in 200 was a member. Indeed there was little incentive or rallying point to join in political activities. "Sweep the snow in front of the door and do not worry about the frost on other's roof", as the Chinese proverb goes.

However, when the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937 there was a great surge of nationalism, and the Kuomintang won greater support from the Chinese community in Malaya. The Kuomintang played a part in organizing boycotts of Japanese goods and in the drive for relief funds among

Chinese guilds and associations as well as Chinese schools. Between 1932 and 1933 there was an increase of thirty-six sub-branches in Malaya (P'ng 1961: 32). In 1933 there were a total of 12,346 members in Malaya, representing 11.8% of total overseas members at the time. This was the largest political organization in Malaya before the War (ibid., p. 34).

In 1949 the British Government formally recognized the People's Republic of China. In Malaya the Kuomintang was denied its exemption from registration granted in 1931 and as the Party did not seek registration it was proscribed forthwith. Kuomintang has henceforth ceased to exist in Malaya, and with this China's influence over the Malayan Chinese was reduced immensely.

(c) The Malayan Communist Party (MCP)

The formation of the MCP was closely related to the activities of the Communist Party in China. In 1924 the Chinese Communists began to form study-groups in the Kuomintang branches in Malaya, in schools and in the traditional associations. In 1928 after the break between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang a Southeast Asian regional-wide Communist Party was formed under the guidance of the Comintern in Shanghai. Several organizations were formed as adjuncts to the main Party, such as the Communist Youth Party and the Southseas Labour Union mentioned previously.

In 1930 the Nanyang Communist Party was dissolved in Malaya to be replaced by the MCP, and the Southseas Labour Union was replaced by the Malayan Federation of Labour. The move was to extend Communist activities to other ethnic communities in Malaya; however, it met with little success (Ginsburg and Roberts 1958: 457--8).

After the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935, the MCP re-organized itself to facilitate the establishment and control of various front groups. The most effective of these was the General Labour Union, which became an important device for the Party's agitation for revolution. In 1936 and 1937 the Party working through the Union, was able to set in motion a series of strikes and to demand an increase of labour wages to match with the rises in rubber and tin prices. Strikes spread from Butu Arang coal mines to the Kinta Valley tin-mines and shifted to the Perak Hydro-Electric Station and then to the Selangor tin-mines. This series of strikes implanted an attitude among the Malayan (Chinese in particular) workers which was unique at that time in most of Asia. Although many of them had lost their savings, many of them did learn the value of group action and strong organization. The foundation was laid for the subsequent development of labour unionism in Malaya (Pye 1956: 59--61).

In the 1930's a number of events served to encourage the growth of the Party. The first such event was the outbreak

of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. When the Communist Party of China called for united action against the Japanese, the MCP shifted its emphasis from unionism to nationalistic appeals to the Malayan Chinese to give support to China. Collaborating with the antagonistic Kuomintang, the MCP threw its organizational strength behind the effort to raise funds for the war in China. The MCP supplemented the collection system of the Kuomintang by introducing a front organization named "The Anti-enemy Backing-up Society" (AEBUS).

With the experience it had developed through directing the General Labour Union, the MCP rapidly made the AEBUS the most effective organization in the Chinese community. The Kuomintang organized China Relief Fund remained the chief collector of contributions because of its prestige gained in representing the world-wide overseas Chinese, but its management was unable to stage the dramatic campaign drives which characterized the activities of the AEBUS. Tours were made by propaganda teams which performed nationalistic dramas and introduced nationalistic songs to Chinese groups throughout Malaya. Speakers were sent to Chinese schools to make propaganda of the resistance occurring in China. The work of the AEBUS made the Communists acceptable to the Chinese community (ibid., pp. 63--4).

Where the Japanese attack on China had made it possible for the MCP to extend its activities among the

Chinese in Malaya, it was the Japanese invasion of Malaya that made it possible for MCP to become the dominant political organization in the Chinese community. Once the Japanese occupied Malaya the MCP set about establishing a guerrilla force, called the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). The defeat of Japan in 1945 produced a temporary political vacuum in Malaya. The MPAJA, estimated as consisting of 7,000 men, moved out of the jungle and engaged in quasi-governmental activities (ibid., p. 66).

When the British were in control of Malaya again, after the MPAJA was disbanded, the MCP created new front groups that were adjusted to the post-war conditions. It was in the field of labour organization that the MCP again manifested its greatest ability. During the immediate post-war period, unemployment was high; labourers moved freely about the country seeking employment wherever estates, mines or other industries were being restored to operation. Although the General Trade Union was unable to provide jobs for all those it recruited, the workers began to look upon their union membership as an essential pre-requisite to employment (ibid., p. 75).

To ensure that the Union remained under its influence regardless of any steps that the government might take, the MCP developed a system of control at two levels. First, there was the level of open leadership of the Union. Although they

were Party members, such union leaders were to avoid Party meetings and any activities that the public would regard as Communist. They were to give the appearance of being concerned with the interests of the Union only and to operate within the law.

The second level of control was that of the underground Party workers in the Union. They were full-time Party members but held no offices in the Union. The open leaders were allegedly not to know about their identities. Their duties were to recruit new members for both the Union and the Party, and under order from the Party, to present motions and suggestions to the Union. By means of the last method, the open leadership could announce a policy as being based on popular demand. The underground workers also supplied the Party with intelligence, on the basis of which the Party would formulate its tactics and strategy in union movements (ibid., p. 76).

Having decided that the social conditions in Malaya were ready for "armed struggle" against British colonialism, the Party organized the "Malayan Races' Liberation Army" (MRLA). As a guerrilla force the MRLA failed. Although its attack on the British Army, such as on its supply and communication lines, was annoying, it had no military significance. At best it could strike against civilian or small isolated groups of the Security Forces. Furthermore the

MRLA was unable to mobilize the Chinese population to any significant extent. When the programmes of resettlement began in 1950, the MRLA was isolated from the 600,000 Chinese "squatters" who lived in scattered and isolated homes along the edges of the jungle, and who formed the mainstay of the MRLA in terms of material supply and manpower.

During the period of "armed struggle" the MCP continued its political infiltration and underground activities in the labour unions, schools and political parties. On the political front the MCP objective was to maximize the desires for neutrality and non-involvement with the Government sponsored programmes among the local people. Following the 1957 independence the MCP Secretary declared in the local newspaper that in view of independence achieved, the Party was to stop its "armed struggle". Apparently, for the time being the Party would rely more on political infiltration in order to achieve its eventual "seizure of power" in the country. As an indication of the scale of "armed struggle", the presentation of casualty figures is justified: from 1948 to 1960, 13,509 Communists were killed or surrendered, and 4,425 members of the Security Forces, and 4,668 civilians were killed or wounded. Over 90% of the Communist and civilian losses were Chinese (Tregonning 1965: 34f; Pye 1956: 109).

As a conclusion to the growth of Communism in Malaya,

the relevance of Marxist theories in a plural society setting will be briefly discussed. When Marx and Engels formulated their theories on capitalism, they based their studies on the 19th century industrial societies (which fall within the categories of culturally heterogenous societies in contrast to the plural societies as conceived in this thesis. Cf. Conclusion chapter). Marx revealed the fundamental economic and class contradictions of capitalism and its development in the industrial societies: the growing centralization and concentration of production, the monopoly of production in the hands of small group of giant capitalists.

However, Marx produced little or nothing that was ever to be used by the revolutions in the "colonies and semi-colonies" in Asia. It fell to Lenin in his book Imperialism (1916) to reveal the peculiar features of international capitalism or imperialism. Contradictions were observed between the various imperialist powers; between the rulers and the ruled; between the emergent native capitalist class and the imperialists; between the native capitalists and the remnant feudal class; between peasants and the emergent proletariat , on the one hand, and the local and foreign capitalists and landowners, on the other.

The contradictions between the ethnic communities, which exist in nearly all colonies in Southeast Asia, remain

to be emphasized. Mao Tse-tung (1967: 91)[1] said, "If in any process there are a number of contradictions, one of them must be the principal contradiction playing the leading and decisive role, while the rest occupy a secondary and subordinate position. Therefore, in studying any complex process in which there are two or more contradictions, we must devote every effort to finding its principal contradiction. Once this principal contradiction is grasped, all problem is readily solved." In the plural societies the principal contradiction is that between the communities. This contradiction is to be resolved, not to be exploited in-so-far the Marxists are concerned. There are also contradictions within each community, and between the colonists and the local communities. These contradictions are to be exploited, not to be resolved. But they are only secondary. The problem for the Marxists is how to transform these secondary contradictions into the principal one and to exploit it to the full advantage of the proletarian revolution. In the final analysis, this transformation consists of the process of uniting the proletariat in each community (the Chinese tin-mining workers, plantation workers, Malay peasants, Indian highway workers) to rise against the class enemies: the Chinese capitalists, the British and Japanese

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[1]First publication in 1937.

imperialists and the Malay feudal lords, and to resolve the communal alignments in the society eventually. In other words, unity between the communities can be forged by making common enemies. Apparently, at least for the present, this transformation is an impossible task. The history of MCP shows that the Party can only work in the Chinese community and has left the Malay community almost untouched. To the Malay community the MCP is at best largely a Chinese party. Communal alignment has proved to be the greatest obstacle to the MCP movement.

(d) The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA)

The Federation of Malaya[1] came into being in 1948. The new Federal Constitution severely limited the citizenship rights of the Chinese by making eligible for citizenship only those whose parents had been born in Malaya or had themselves been continually resident for fifteen years, and who spoke English or Malay. The new Constitution also restored the Malay Sultans to their former powers, and to the Malay people their former position vis-a-vis the other ethnic communities, especially to their predominance in government.

It was under these conditions that the MCA was formed. From the time the MCA was organized it attempted to perform

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[1]Still a dependency of Britain.

two functions: on the one hand it attempted to ensure the Chinese that the Association was the guardian of their rights and defender of their interests, and on the other hand, it had to convince the Malay community that it was wholly committed to the ideal of a united Malayan nation and was to be trusted to help in the building of it (Roff 1965: 42).

During the first two years after its formation, the MCA appeared as a social welfare and political organization. It assisted the Federation Government in the prosecution of the campaign against the MCP, and it alleviated the hardship experienced by those Chinese squatters who had been resettled in the "New Villages". When the Government called for Chinese volunteers for military and police duty, the MCA assisted in the recruitment drive, and from the proceeds of a regular lottery it organized, the Association was able to provide some sort of financial aid to the resettled squatters in the "New Villages".

With the holding of local elections, the MCA began to identify itself as a political organization from 1952 onwards. In 1952 the MCA, in alliance with the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) contested the Kuala Lumpur municipal elections, the first elections ever held in Malaya (*ibid.*, pp. 43--4). As a political party, the MCA made one of its tasks the encouragement of all eligible Chinese to take the necessary steps to become citizens. At the same time, the

MCA strove to change the new Constitution. In 1952 the campaign bore fruit, and a constitutional amendment was passed admitting an estimated 55% of Chinese to Federal citizenship. All these potential citizens were also potential MCA supporters; but their support could not be assumed and had to be won (ibid., p. 46).

In the 1956 London Talk on Independence, the Alliance partners presented a united front to the British Colonial Office. The four basic issues were the following: (1) Islam was to be declared the state religion; (2) Malay was to be declared the National Language; (3) Special privileges were to be ensured to the Malays; (4) jus soli[1] was recommended as the basic principle for determining citizenship and nationality. On the first three issues, the MCA deferred to the views of the UMNO, and only the last represented a victory for its own view (ibid., p. 48).

The reactions from the Chinese organizations and press on the third issue were strong, claiming that this would render the Chinese second class citizens. A group of guild leaders made personal representations to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London on the matter. Even within the Association itself, disputes broke out on the issues of citizenship, language, education and the allocation of seats

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[1] A rule that determines the citizenship of a child by the place of its birth (Webster Dictionary 1967: 1228).

to the constituent parties of the Alliance before elections. Some members charged that MCA had sold the "cultural heritage" of the Chinese for the sake of a measure of political influence.

Relationship With Other Communities

(a) The British

The relationship between the Kuomintang, as a China-based political organization in Malaya, and the British was closely related to the relationship between Britain and China. The primary objective of the British in keeping a constant diplomatic relationship with China is often said to be their interest in the Chinese market. The British objective, however, will not be discussed here. It is sufficient to say that no matter which government came into being in China in the twentieth century, Britain almost always recognized the new regime promptly, and these actions affected the relationship between the British authorities and the Kuomintang Branches in Malaya. When the British were on friendly terms with the Imperial Government of China, the British suppressed any open activities of the revolutinnary organization such as the Tung Meng Hui, and ordered the active leaders to leave the country.

In 1911 the Chinese Republic came into being, but

was short-lived because China was reconverted into an empire by the warlords in 1913. In Malaya the British authorities took action against some Kuomintang lodges because they openly condemned the newly established Imperial Regime with whom the British were again on friendly terms. During the early 1920's events in China involved British actions which aroused strong anti-British movements. For example, the shooting incident in Shanghai May 30th., 1925 involving British police and Chinese workers was declared the National Humiliation Day by the National Government. The British were branded as the enemies of the Chinese and were boycotted.

This had repercussions in Malaya. The Kuomintang Branches stepped up their anti-Imperial campaign, and many more night schools were opened, where political propaganda and ideologies could be preached. In 1930 the British Government negotiated with the National Government of China and reached agreement that the Kuomintang in Malaya would be legalized and the Chinese in Malaya could become members on the conditions that the Party in China did not seek to control the members in Malaya. The Societies Ordinances in all parts of Malaya were accordingly amended to accomodate the Kuomintang as a society outside Malaya and therefore exempted from registration (P'ng 1961: 29). When the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937 the British were generally sympathetic to the Chinese, and the China Relief Fund was

allowed to be collected freely in Malaya. In 1949 Britain promptly established diplomatic relationship with the People's Republic of China and in Malaya, the Kuomintang Branches were proscribed and disbanded.

The MCP group of Chinese were hostile to the British authorities. There should be no mistake about this. Even during the War the MCP was planning how to establish the "Malayan People's Republic" on the event of a victory against the Japanese and the return of the British. On the part of the British, one move they took to check the Communist "armed struggle" was to throw their support in the 1950's to the Malayan nationalists, which included the MCA. By leaving a stable society to the nationalist rule the British were attempting to safeguard their economic investment in Malaya in the post-Independence period.

Many in the Chinese community were not interested in politics as such. They were not interested in the struggle waged against the British because of their activities in China, nor were they interested in the "class struggle" and the "seizure of power" from the British authorities. Many Chinese accepted the British rule without questions and with contentedness.

In the face of common enemies the social distance between the British and the Chinese was reduced to a minimum and they sometimes co-operated in a comradely manner. Besides

working for the China Relief Fund, the Chinese community also subscribed £375,000 for the people of London during the Battle of Britain (Purcell 1948: 245). During the Japanese invasion the Chinese did everything they could to assist the British cause. The Chinese participated actively in the defence services which the Government organized. Men and women were ready blood donors to the blood transfusion service. Purcell (1948: 264) wrote, "There are numerous stories...of the assistance given by Chinese squatters and coolies to our troops at the risk of their lives; there was never a case of a European refugee asking for assistance in the shape of food or money or active help and being refused". When the British came back after the war, in Singapore "the welcome given to the British Services -- Navy, Army and Air Force -- was tumulous and entirely genuine....The British soldiers, sailors and air-men walking through the streets were cheered and feted". "The liberated prisoners-of-war and internees...paid the warmest tribute to the bravery and devotion of the Asiatics, the Chinese in particular, who had risked their lives on numberless occasions to bring food comforts to the camps and who had kept the inmates in touch with happenings outside."

(b) The Japanese

Art and literature are often described as mirrors of

the society to which the creative individual belongs. A translation of a poem that appeared at the break of the Sino-Japanese War expresses the attitude of the Chinese community towards the Japanese:-

> The days of war
> Are coming near;
> Residents of Malaya,
> Be ready for war.
>
> "The Co-prosperity Sphere."
> Have you heard of this slogen?
> Who shouted it?
> The Eastern Barbarians.
>
> Who are those people:
> Lizard, gekoo, centipede?
> Have they not eaten one-half of the beautiful
> hibiscus leaf?[1]
>
> We are men.
> We are not cattle.
> Whosoever suppress us, enslave us,
> will be repelled, destroyed.
>
> Our home is within the four seas;
> We are master of our land.
> Those born here, migrated from elsewhere,
> All the same--
> Give your strength to strengthen Malaya:
> And shed your blood to protect Malaya.
>
> Arise,
> Residents of Malaya.
> In tune with the battles of the neighbouring country
> Play a rebirth song of a weak nation in Asia.

(As it appeared in a Chinese newspaper 25th. February, 1941 as cited by Fang Hsiu 1965: 233). In response to the propaganda there was, between 1937 and 1941, a sudden flourishing of literary work in the Chinese community. The following titles

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[1] i.e., China.

are typical of those that appeared in this period "The Story of the Pacific", "Japanese Goods", "The Diary of a Merchant", "My Experience in Censoring the Enemies", "The Secrecy of a Collaborating Merchant"....In most of this war literature, both leftist and nationalist thoughts were expressed (*ibid*., pp. 234--5).

What were the actions taken by the Japanese against the Chinese during the occupation? From the evidence given at the war crime trials in 1947, five thousand Chinese were executed in a series of purges. According to Purcell (1951: 368) those Chinese who were singled out for execution were (1) all those who had had anything to do with the China Relief Fund; (2) rich men who, presumably, had given generously to the Relief Fund; (3) newspaper men, schoolmasters and high school students; (4) Hainanese whom the Japanese recognized as the most active dialect group in the MCP; (5) the newcomers to Malaya who supposedly had left China because they disliked the Japanese there; (6) men with tattoo-marks who were supposedly all secret society members; (7) volunteers and all those who had taken an active part in the defence service; (8) government servants and men such as "Justice of Peace" and members of the Legislative Council who were likely to be pro-British.

After the War the Chinese traditional organizations were active in pressing the government to settle the "blood

debt" with Japan. The "blood debt" problem was aggravated in 1966 when the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, passed a resolution that unless the "blood debt" was settled within six months, the purchase of Japanese merchandise would be stopped throughout the entire territory of Malaysia and Singapore and all trades with Japan would be stopped. In 1967 Japan and the Malaysian Government reached agreement on the "blood debt". In this agreement Japan was to provide Malaysia with two new ocean-going ships; to establish a semi-official shipping company in Malaysia with a grant of Yen 3,000 million; to donate two 10,000 ton freighters and to establish other commercial co-operations in compensation for "World War II atrocities committed by the Japanese against the Malaysian Chinese" (Takita 1967: 527).

(c) The Malays

The rise of Malay nationalism was related with the presence of immigrant communities, especially the Chinese, in Malaya. By the 1930's the Malays became aware of the political and economic pressures from the Chinese communities. Any signs of encroachment by the Government or the Chinese community brought a quick response. The medium of political expression, however, was still the newspaper, while the Malay members in the Legislative Councils were not backed by political parties. Between 1937 and 1939 there sprang up

large numbers of Malay political parties which had the common objectives for the furtherance of Malay interests, and loyalty to the Sultans and the British Government. The formation of these political parties was given impetus by another: the emergent nationalism in Asia, which took the forms of anti-Japanese goods carried out by the Chinese in Malaya, and of anti-colonialism in India and Indonesia (Soenarno 1960: 17--9).

In 1926 a group of Malay intelligentsia took a divergent political course from the majority of the Malay political parties by being sympathetic to the Indonesian Communist insurrection, and condemning the Malay Sultans for their co-operation with the British authorities. Some of the members of the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM)[1] formally established in 1937, were at the same time active members of the predominantly Chinese MCP. After some 150 of its leaders were arrested by the authorities in 1940, the KMM went underground. Some more KMM members joined the MCP and the others joined the Japanese Fifth-column presently operating in Malaya (ibid., p. 24).

After the Occupation in 1942 the KMM won recognition from the Japanese authorities who needed co-operation from the Malays. Some of the former KMM leaders were put in

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[1]The Union of Malay Youths.

command of a Japanese sponsored organization, Pembela Tanak Ayer (PETA)[1]. Through its underground network PETA established contact with the MCP and MPAJA and waited for the opportunity to give the Japanese the final blow. After the fall of Japan in 1945 the PETA and MPAJA leaders agreed that the MPAJA would maintain order in the country before the arrival of the British troops and that the British would "give a democratic government to the people of Malaya as soon as the Allies have disarmed the Japanese army and peace is established". The militant ideology of the KMM nevertheless was apparently unacceptable to the majority of the Malay people, because it went too far against the established Malay tradition of respect and loyalty towards the instituted government (*ibid*., p. 26).

In 1948 the new Federal Constitution and the MCP insurrection became sources of conflict between the Chinese and the Malay communities. The Constitution proved unacceptable to the Chinese. The Malays, under the leadership of UMNO, rallied to the help of the Federal Government because they looked upon the Communist insurrection as a danger to their country and religion. In demanding recognition of their contribution in the fight against the MCP, the Malay leaders urged the Government to execute a pro-Malay

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[1]Avengers of the Country.

policy as provided within the new Constitution, and to deport immediately those Chinese suspected of being "Communist sympathizers" (Tadin 1960: 79).

The Chinese and the Malays apparently co-operated more extensively in the Alliance Party than in any other parties. The Alliance, as has been shown previously, was first formed in 1952. In the 1955 Federal election the Alliance was joined by the Malayan Indian Congress Party, which, representing a minority ethnic group, was content to be a junior partner. Although the Alliance of the three parties was to form a united front representing the three communities in Malaya to build a united Malayan nation, each constituent party still had to work along communal lines. Where an electorate was predominantly Malays, the UMNO would provide a candidate; where an electorate was predominantly Chinese, MCA would provide a candidate and so forth. The Alliance leadership was convinced, and rightly so, that voting in most cases would run along communal lines. Since its formation there had been constant adjustment and compromise between Alliance partners and the necessity for each to make certain sacrifices in the interests of the whole. Nevertheless, the MCA had to accommodate itself to a greater extent than UMNO did (Roff,1965: 45). This was clearly seen in the issues presented to the British Colonial Office in the 1956 London Talk, and in the issues of educational and

official language which caused the MCA to lose the support of many Chinese voters.

Relationship With China

One trend of the development of the Chinese social organizations in Malaya was the gradual shifting of their orientation from China to Malaya. The underlying factors were the increasing number of Malayan-born Chinese, the separation of political ties with China during the Pacific War and after the formation of the People's Republic of China, and the pressure of the emerging Malay nationalism.

The Tung Meng Hui and the Kuomintang were thoroughly oriented towards China. To the revolutionaries, the Malayan Chinese were a source of manpower and wealth for their revolutionary cause. Revolutionary ideologies which were traceable from western societies could be readily inseminated among the Chinese overseas because of their contact with the outside world. Furthermore, the government authorities made no attempt to eliminate the revolutionary organizations although they kept them under close scrutiny. For this reason, revolutionary propaganda was more successful overseas than in China. Although the overseas Chinese could not <u>initiate</u> a revolution in China, they could <u>support</u> a revolution there.

The Kuomintang was frequently charged with a tendency

to regard Malaya as province ripe for annexation to China. However, it must be recognized that the Kuomintang was only interested in the wealth that the Chinese in Malaya might contribute towards China, and not in the territory itself. The Kuomintang wanted the Chinese abroad to remain Chinese and to maintain ties with their country of origin. However, the Kuomintang was not interested in arousing the Chinese in Malaya against their local government. In the first place China herself before the Second World War was facing internal strife and external aggression. It is difficult to imagine a nation which was hardly able to stand on her own feet could entertain the objective of annexing territories overseas.[1]

Although the formation of MCP was to a certain extent related to the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern in Shanghai, and although the MCP was first accepted by the Malayan Chinese community at large because of its Chinese nationalist appeal, the MCP from the Second World War onwards became thoroughly oriented towards Malaya. This might be seen in the nine-point "Anti-Japanese programme of the MCP" passed by the Central Executive Committee at the Third Session in 1943. One salient point was: "establish a National Organization composed of representatives universally elected

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[1]This argument is not meant to disprove completely the charge against the Kuomintang. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to make an argument to this effect.

from the different nationalities to govern and protect our motherland. Improve civilians' living conditions...to build up Malaya as a harmonious, free, and felicitious country." Internationally, the MCP wished to "combine with China and Russia and support the struggles for independence of the oppressed nations in the Far East" (As quoted by Purcell 1948: 261). Malaya, not China, was the motherland and the focus of allegiance.

In 1949 with the formation of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese in Malaya could not maintain any kind of political relationship with China. At the same time, two-thirds of the Chinese in Malaya were locally-born. These factors, along with the pressure of growing Malay nationalism, led the Chinese in Malaya to become progressively more oriented towards Malaya. MCA, as the largest political organization in the Chinese community and as one of the ruling parties of the Federation of Malaya, could not be identified with China politically in any manner, if it was to be accepted by other communities in Malaya as well.

Education

Relationship With China

Until 1949 Chinese school education in Malaya was largely based on the educational system in the Chinese Republic; therefore the relationship between China and the Chinese community in Malaya in the aspect of education will be discussed first. In China the greatest stumbling block to the development of a democratic form of education was the disparity between the "literal language" or wen yen, and the "spoken language" or pai hua. The former had been used traditionally in formal documents and scholarly writings; the latter had never been accepted by the literati. Yet, if China was to provide a popularized education to her proletariat, the pai hua had to be elevated to the rank of a literary medium in schools and in the media of mass communication such as newspapers and other types of publications. The pai hua movement culminated in the "May 4th Demonstration" in 1919 by the university students in Peking. In 1920 pai hua was accepted by the Ministry of Education as the medium of instruction is schools. The form of pai hua used was known as kuo yu or National Language based on the dialect spoken in Peking.

The National Government, as has been shown previously,

had sought to maintain close ties with the overseas Chinese. To this end the National Government took great interest in the education of overseas Chinese. As early as 1912 the government established a certain Chi Nan Bureau in Fukien, the native place of many Chinese in Malaya, to promote overseas education and industrial investments from overseas Chinese. In 1924 an Overseas Affairs Bureau was established for the purpose of helping overseas Chinese returning to study in China (P'ng 1961: 22). The interest in overseas Chinese education was intensified towards the end of the 1920's and from then on, teachers who were members of Kuomintang were sent to Malaya to staff Chinese schools. The text books used were written and printed in China, and through the text books and teachers, "The Three Principles of People", a form of nationalism, was inculcated in the pupils. Kuo Yu was also adopted in the Chinese schools in Malaya.

Until the first overseas Chinese university was formed in Singapore in 1954, China was the only country where the graduates of Chinese high schools in Malaya could seek a higher education. These graduates were not qualified to apply for the institutes of higher learning in Malaya. In China the Malayan Chinese attended the universities, normal schools and colleges of various kinds. Although they would be barred permanently from Malaya, there were still students going to study in China after the formation of the People's

Republic of China. The nationalism that had been instilled in the pre-war period was still bearing fruit in the 1950's.

Internal Situation

In the 1920's there was a rapid increase of Chinese schools in Malaya. In one aspect this might be related to the increase of Chinese population in Malaya as a whole: from 917,200 in 1921 to 1,701,700 in 1931. There was also an increase of school-age persons; this might be reflected in the increase of locally-born Chinese: this increased from 25% in 1921 to 36% in 1931 in Singapore. In addition to the population factor there was an increased identification with modern China on the part of the Chinese community in Malaya. This has been shown to some extent previously and will be discussed again in the final chapter in this thesis. Lastly, consideration should be given also to the traditional Chinese reverence for learning, however little it might still exist, now that the conditions in the Malayan society became more settled and livelihood became improved.

The Chinese curriculum, largely based on that in China, provided for both primary and secondary education. In addition, kindergarten often preceded the primary course of six years. The secondary school course was also six years; the first three comprised "junior middle school" and the final three years "senior middle school". Some senior middle

schools offered two-year teacher-teaching courses known as "senior normal" classes. However, not many Chinese schools offered secondary courses. In 1953 there were 1,214 Chinese schools. Of these forty-seven provided secondary school courses, but only nine of these included senior middle as well as junior middle school (International Bank 1955: 452). It will be noted that there was a sharp decrease from one school year to another in the figures given below on Chinese school enrollments by school years in 1953; and that relatively few completed the three secondary years of the junior middle schools, and the number completing the full six-year secondary school was extremely small.

TABLE 9

CHINESE SCHOOLS ENROLLMENT BY SCHOOL YEARS IN THE FEDERATION IN 1953

School Year	Primary		Secondary	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1	64,949	29.6	6,765	45.6
2	51,732	23.6	4,562	30.6
3	41,126	18.8	2,321	15.6
4	28,622	13.1	653	4.4
5	20,620	9.4	373	2.5
6	12,244	5.5	166	1.3
Total	219,293	100.0	14,840	100.0

(ibid.)

TABLE 10

CHINESE SECONDARY SCHOOLS ENROLLMENT IN SINGAPORE IN 1953

School Year	Number	Percentage
1	3,132	41.8
2	2,032	27.2
3	1,196	15.9
4	612	8.3
5	249	3.3
6	249	3.3
Total	7,470	99.8

(*ibid*., p. 511).

Premature school leaving was not unique among the Chinese schools; the same phenomena happened in English, Malay and Tamil schools in Malaya (*ibid*., pp. 447, 450, 508). This was attributed to the large number of low-income families, free education being confined to the Malay schools, and to the fact that secondary education was not readily available in the rural areas and in the smaller towns (*ibid*., pp. 490f).

Chinese school buildings varied from the most modern type to the small private school in a converted private house with little or no provision for sports or outdoor activities.

As compared with governmental schools the facilities in most of the Chinese schools were inadequate. Only a few Chinese schools had well-equipped science laboratories.

As the curriculum was largely based on that of China, the teaching of English language in the Chinese schools was inadequate to meet the demand of the Malayan society at large. In the pre-war period only two to three hours a week were given to the teaching of English and this only started with Primary III (Nanyang Siang Pau July 24th. 1966a: 17). In the post-war period the teaching of English was greatly stressed and the hours of English teaching was increased to seven hours per week.

In most Chinese schools there were "student self-government associations" modelled after those in China. Through such organizations the students learned to maintain self-discipline and order during recess periods, run the school library, put up wall paper, organize sports and keep the school compound tidy and so on. On occasions, these "student self-government associations" became involved in politics and the target of criticism by the English and Malay press in particular.

There was considerable student unrest in this period. In 1931 strikes were organized by three large schools in Singapore (Purcell 1948: 231). After the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War, the students were the most active elements in

anti-Japanese demonstrations, propaganda work and fund-raising. In 1955, Chinese high school students in Singapore demonstrated in front of the British Governor's House demanding the exemption from the newly enforced national service. They clashed with the police and forty-eight students were arrested. In 1957 student unrest spread in the Federation. Strikes, demonstrations and clashes with police occurred in most of the larger Chinese schools including the missionary schools. As a result of this movement three Chinese schools in Penang and five schools in Ipoh were temporarily closed. The factors which led to the student unrest were the 1957 Education Ordinance which required that all governmental examinations be written in English only and all the over-age students be expelled from governmental-aided schools (Sung 1958: 33--4). Furnivall (1944, 1956) stressed the lacking of "social will" (which can be interpreted as meaning "a common set of values") in a plural society; M. G. Smith (1965) stressed the use of coercive force in the maintaining of the integrity of such a society. The history of student unrest in Malaya illustrates fully their contentions.

Of the 1,214 Chinese schools in the Federation in 1953, three were government schools; 846, government-aided; 53, public corporations operated and 312, unaided private (International Bank 1955: 453). Detailed descriptions of these four types of schools in terms of management and finance

are not available. However, generally speaking other than the three government schools and a few missionary schools, the other Chinese schools had to rely mostly or totally on private subscriptions in the Chinese community and on school fees. Even in the government-aided schools the grants-in-aids did not cover more than a fraction of total school expenses. In a Chinese school the management and financial responsibilities fell on a school board which was generally composed of leaders [or "status-seekers" as Freeman (1957) would say] of the dialect and district associations and chambers of commerce. The school board members were often important contributors towards school finances. A few large schools might have business investments such as rubber plantations which helped to meet school expenses. A dialect or district association might maintain one or more schools by itself; this has been illustrated in the discussion of social organizations. In 1951 and 1952, large sums of money were raised by the MCA for the Chinese schools in the "new villages" in which 600,000 Chinese squatters were resettled. These discussions on Chinese school managements are conducive to the evidence that the Chinese community, lacking substantial political power, relied on its economic strength to maintain its identities as Chinese and in its position vis-a-vis the other communities.

There were 71,800 children enrolled in primary and

secondary schools in Singapore in 1941, but the Government bore the main financial burden for only the 23,300 who attended English and Malay schools. It made only a small annual contribution -- $6 to 7 per pupil -- for another 11,200 children who attended government-aided Chinese schools. More than half of all the pupils were in private or non-aided schools, mainly Chinese schools supported by private subscriptions and school fees (International Bank 1955: 502). This state of conditions was maintained in the postwar period until Singapore attained self-government in 1955. Table 11, page 106, shows the grants-in-aids per pupil in English and Chinese schools respectively.

In the Federation in 1953 in a total enrollment of 102,666 in government and government-aided English schools, Chinese numbered as high as 52,484 or 51% of the total (International Bank 1955: 445). Most English schools were located in urban areas and had large Chinese enrollments since the Chinese population was heavily concentrated in cities and towns. In Singapore the percentage of Chinese enrollment in English schools in 1953 was 79.4% (*ibid*., p. 506). Tables 12 and 13 and Figures 4 and 5 show the enrollments in Chinese and English schools in Singapore and the Federation.

TABLE 11

GRANTS-IN-AIDS PER PUPIL IN ENGLISH AND CHINESE SCHOOLS RESPECTIVELY IN SINGAPORE

Year	English	Chinese
1949	$154.30	$ 9.98
1950	168.57	8.54
1951	216.05	31.57
1952	224.94	26.88
1953	227.14	34.22
1954	212.28	45.66
1955	220.25	61.41
1956	229.64	81.17
1957	229.23	117.39
1958	261.00	137.36

(Chu 1961: 41).

TABLE 12

TOTAL ENROLLMENTS IN CHINESE AND ENGLISH SCHOOLS IN SINGAPORE

Year	Singapore Total	Chinese Schools		English Schools	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1941		37,000		27,000	
1948		65,371		38,251	
1949	120,498	68,373	56.24	42,948	34.81
1950	143,015	76,200	53.28	49,521	33.09
1951	150,514	77,314	51.35	55,024	36.56
1952	157,419	75,365	49.14	63,086	40.08
1953	171,311	79,934	46.66	70,823	41.34
1954	186,199	82,035	44.05	84,062	45.09
1955	212,237	94,667	44.61	96,658	45.68
1956	244,957	108,654	44.36	111,920	45.29
1957	272,592	117,374	43.34	126,633	46.45

(Chu 1961: 41).

TABLE 13

TOTAL ENROLLMENTS IN CHINESE AND ENGLISH PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN THE FEDERATION

Year	Federation Total*	Chinese		English	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1947	448,230	180,999	40.38	61,059	13.62
1948	489,357	179,851	36.75	67,827	13.86
1949	581,684	198,126	34.06	72,906	12.53
1950	597,450	210,336	35.20	82,946	13.88
1951	615,999	199,414	32.37	92,072	14.94
1952	653,672	213,683	32.69	91,604	14.94
1953	715,267	236,041	33.00	97,864	13.68

* All schools excluding Malay religious schools.

(International Bank 1955: 463).



Note: 1958 is included to facilitate discussion on p. 154

Fig. 4--Graphs showing English and Chinese Schools Enrollment in Singapore



Fig. 5--Graphs Showing Primary Enrollments in Chinese and English Schools in the Federation

Figure 4, page 109, shows that the percentage of Chinese school enrollment in the Singapore total was dropping steadily and the percentage of the English school enrollment was increasing at roughly a corresponding rate from 1945 to 1957. Figure 4 indicates the fact that the Chinese children were shifting gradually from Chinese to English schools during this period. Figure 5, page 110, shows that the percentage of Chinese primary school enrollment in the Federation dropped from 40.38 in 1947 to 33.00 in 1953 while that of the English schools maintained roughly the same level during the same period. However, if the secondary enrollment had been taken into account in Figure 5, the two curves might have approximated those in Figure 4, since there was an increasing number of Chinese children switching from English to Chinese schools as they reached the secondary school level.

The cause of the decrease in the percentage of enrollment in the Chinese schools after the Pacific War might be attributed to the fact that unionist and leftist schools were closed down during the Emergency; however, the effect would be only temporary if this was the sole causal factor. To explain the major causal factor one must refer to the instructions given by Indian parents to their children about the relevance of Sanskrit literature and English language. In Malaya because of Chinese nationalism there were throughout this period more Chinese attending Chinese schools than

English schools in spite of all the advantages that the latter enjoyed. Moreover, a knowledge of English and a certificate from an English school were necessary for governmental jobs and other professional positions, and for admission into institutes of higher learning in Malaya. Above all, English was a language of prestige. In spite of Chinese nationalism, which tended to keep the Chinese as Chinese in terms of culture, more and more Chinese parents sent their children to English schools. Even those people who were most vocal in supporting Chinese school education could not refrain from sending their children to English schools. They, too, were subject to the prevalent tendency in the choosing of an educational system that, in the final analysis, would bring about a greater economic return.

In the English school, a pupil took eleven years to finish his primary and secondary education. If he had to finish pre-university class he had to spend two more years after his secondary school. The English school curriculum was as oriented towards Britain as the Chinese schools were towards China. In an English school a local child, be he Chinese or Indian or Malay, would recite Wordsworth's lines on the daffodils, never having seen any, sail up the Thames, accompany Bonnie Prince Charlie through Scottish burns and braes, and pay for imaginary purchases in guineas, pounds, shillings and pence. The difficulty was that the local

children could not identify themselves or their immediate surroundings as interesting, valuable, or potentially creative.

The English schools had one characteristic that the Chinese schools lacked. This was the fact that children of different communities had close contact with each other and were able to learn and play together, and communicate with each other in a common language. Some people regarded the English schools contributing greatly to the communal harmony in Malaya. In sociological language: the communal alignment in a plural society is seldom complete, and the English schools represent one area where people from different communities can interact intimately and in a friendly manner.

Relationship With Other Communities

Furnivall (1956: 308) said, "A plural society is a business rather than a family concern, and the social will linking the sections does not extend beyond their common business interests". Although the British and the Chinese could complement each other in economy, with respect to education there were a lot of conflicts between the two communities. Furnivall (1956: 295) also said that, "The rule of law is a foundation stone of western freedom....But this is true only where the law is an expression of social will; in a tropical dependency it expresses the will of the

colonial power...." This was again true in Malaya. The governmental authorities sought to control Chinese schools through legislation, and introduced a system of grants-in-aids to Chinese schools. To the Chinese community, the authorities were attempting to destroy their "cultural heritage".

In 1920 a legislation was passed in Singapore to control teachers and schools, and a scheme of grants-in-aids was introduced for the first time to the Chinese schools (Purcell 1948: 29). The response from the Chinese community was immediate and representatives were sent to see the authorities. Not only was their protests ineffectual but their representatives were also repatriated to China (Chu 1961: 41). The legislation was clearly aimed at the Kuomintang activities in schools and the insurging Chinese nationalism.

In the post-war period two major educational reports affected Chinese education. The first of these was the Barnes Report on Malay education in 1952. The Committee for this Report consisted of nine Malay members and five British members, but no Chinese or Indians. The Committee recommended the establishment of an inter-communal primary school in which Malay and English be made the media of instruction. Attendance at these schools was to be made compulsory for children of school age irrespective of their communal origin. The Chinese schools were to be replaced by these "national

schools" once they came into existence (Purcell 1956: 59).

The second educational report was the "Fenn-Wu Report on Chinese Education" released by the Federation Government in 1951. The Fenn-Wu Report remarked,

> There can be no justification for turning Malaya into cock pit of aggressive cultures. The people of Malaya will have to learn to understand and appreciate their cultural differences....To most Chinese in Malaya, Malayanization is anathema, in view of the absence of a society which can be called "Malayan". A new culture can come only from the natural merging of diverse cultural elements for generations. In the process, elements which do not command appreciation disappear....Yet the term "Malayan" must be used, for it expresses a desirable goal....What came to pass in Switzerland may or may not come to pass in Malaya.
>
> (Purcell 1956: 60).

The Fenn-Wu Report held that Chinese schools could not be eliminated until the Chinese themselves decided that they were not needed, which would happen only if there was a satisfactory alternative. That might never come, because it was possible that Chinese schools would form an integral part of any educational programme of the future Malayan nation. The Report recommended the Chinese schools be reformed with the aim of a "Malayan nation" in view. There was no real advantage for Chinese "culture" in maintaining the forms, the methods or the content of schools in China. Foreign politics in any form should be eliminated from Chinese schools, and text-books appropriate for Malayan use should be produced. While impressed by the degree to which Malayan Chinese not only accepted the need for English but actually insisted on

learning it, the Mission contended that the teaching of English in Chinese schools was, with the exception of the text books employed, wholly inadequate. The Mission recommended that three languages be used in the Chinese schools: namely Chinese, English and Malay; and that the standard of English be raised with the ultimate aim of using English as the medium of instruction in subjects other than Chinese language and literature in all Chinese secondary schools (Chu 1961: 41; Purcell 1956: 60).

As seen in the opinions expressed by Chinese press and association leaders, the reactions from the Chinese community on the first educational report -- the Barnes Report -- were strong. Presently the Alliance Government agreed that, as the Fenn-Wu Report pointed out, the "national schools" system was an impractical solution. By 1955, the introduction of the "national school" as a solution of Malayan education problems was indefinitely deferred. While the Chinese community was satisfied with the place given by the Fenn-Wu Report to Chinese schools in Malaya, many asked whether or not teaching three languages in the primary schools was possible.

To show the opinions expressed by the more vocal part of the Chinese community excerpts from two editorials in Nanyang Siang Pau, the Chinese newspaper with the largest circulation in Malaya, are now cited:-

> When the British open up a school they insist on having beautiful school buildings, perfect school facilities and highly qualified teachers. If these conditions are not fulfilled, the British would rather see thousands of children out of school. In Malaya the British impose all kinds of regulations and restrictions on the existing schools. The British authorities, for example, insist that a classroom must be limited to 40 pupils only, as if the criterion of admitting pupils were the area of school building....Did the famous educators in history, for example, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle of Greece and Confucius and Mencius of China insist on having beautiful school buildings before they could start teaching? Nowadays the professors and students of Tagore University in India sit on the floor during lecture. Do these people insist on observing rigid regulations and rules? The trouble with the British tradition is that it puts too much stress on principles and neglects the necessities (September 22nd 1955: 1).

The second editorial:

> Every report on education has made Chinese education an imaginary enemy and a target of criticism. Why is the ruling class of the Federation so suspicious and afraid of Chinese education?
> ....There is no place for you in politics and you are deprived of the privilege of citizens....They fear that you may become strong if you are weak now; on the other hand, if you are strong now, remembering that you were once the Monoglian strongmen, they maintain that the "yellow peril" is coming again....Though your allegiance is to Malaya and you look upon it as your first homeland, they would not trust that you will keep your outlook unchanged in the course of time....The Chinese education in Malaya is now facing the "Last Lesson" (Nov. 8th. 1954: 1).

To the Chinese the Government authorities were systematically attempting to change the Chinese schools into English schools and day by day the Chinese were facing "The Last Lesson"[1] which the French peasants once experienced on the eve of Prussian occupation.

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[1]A story appeared in a Chinese primary school text book.

Kinship

Internal Situation

In the discussion of Chinese kinship system only those aspects which are most relevant to the problem of change will be dealt with. The clan, marriage, the role of kinship in the social structure as a whole, and the concept of filial piety will be discussed in that order in this section.

In the traditional Chinese society all those who bore the same surname were regarded as being patrilineally related. This bond united all those using the same Chinese character for their surname, regardless what part of China they came. The surname group was strictly exogamous until the 1920's, and remained so to a great extent, particularly in the rural area of China, until 1949. This surname group, known as tsu, could be said to be the widest clan group. The term "clanship" described a relationship based upon largely fictitious common unilineal descent. A tsu was comprised of all male descendants of clan members. Daughters were also regarded as belonging to their father's clan, but a woman's membership was not regarded the same quality as men's. Women took no part in clan ceremnnies, for example.

The surname group was subject to segmentation into numberless local groups. These local clans, often occupying

a single village or groups of villages, had an organized structure, and under the leadership of a recognized head, whose jural authority over all members was often very strong. The local clan usually possessed clan lands, on which the ancestral tomb, the symbol of clan solidarity, was found. The local clan also maintained an ancestral hall which formed the education centre for the children of the local clan, and the organization of mutual help among the clan members. The local clan was usually composed of several genealogically related segments, frequently termed _fang_. Members of a _fang_ could always trace their common descent, and the _fang_ might therefore be called a lineage (Tien 1953: 23).[1]

In Malaya the surname group as a whole takes the place of the local clan in traditional China. In this respect it is necessary to recall an important characteristic of Chinese migration. The Chinese immigrants in Malaya are made up of bits and pieces of various localized lineages (_fang_). Normally, the overseas samples of a particular lineage do not group themselves in such a fashion as to reproduce the home organization on a small scale. To the immigrants, the ancestral village may remain the seat of the lineage; the overseas people are members of _that_ lineage, and not a branch of it in Malaya. However, the Malayan-born Chinese are not

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[1]Apparently this kinship structure no longer exists in China since 1949.

concerned with their lineage origin.

In Malaya, Chinese bearing the same surname regard themselves as a single group, and frequently behave much as a local clan group in traditional China, joining together, for example, in the ritual demonstration of local clanship -- the annual sweeping of a mock ancestral tomb. However, the clan group in Malaya is not a land holding group, and it maintains no ancestral hall. Its leadership is essentially informal.

In the traditional society, the meaning of matrimony was not understood in terms of the two spouses alone. Marriage created a bond between two lineages. The exchange of women took place as long as the two lineages was not in a state of hostility. There, was, in the traditional Chinese society, an interest in a particular union by the whole lineage. Nothing similar happens in Malaya. There, the marriage of a son or a daughter is of major concern only to parents and the other members of the household. This individualization of marriage must therefore be seen as an aspect of the changed structure of the overseas kinship grouping.

The rule of surname exogamy remains very marked in the Malayan Chinese community. The divergent cases on intra-surname marriages are still rare. In the traditional society, cross-cousin marriage, especially the matrilateral variety, was looked upon with favour. A man might take any of three kinds of cousin to be his wife: his mother's sister's

daughter or his parallel cousin, his mother's brother's daughter and his father's sister's daughter. These were all his biao. Of these, the mother's brother's daughter was preferred. In Malaya, however, such cross-cousin preferential marriage hardly appears. There, marriages represent in each case the creation of a link with people who until then were considered unrelated (Freedman 1957: 107).

In the traditional society, "concubinage", common among the gentry, was a system in which the wife was mistress of a household which also included her husband's other spouses. The secondary wives were socially, maritally and domestically subordinate to the primary wife. In Singapore, too, according to Freedman (1957: 120), "concubinage" is common among the rich. However, the spouses are not kept in the same household. The passing of co-residential polygny has blurred the definition of secondary wives. In the traditional society if a woman accepted a second wife for her husband, there could be no doubt about the new woman's inferior status in the household. The secondary wives in Singapore, however, very often come to enjoy an equal or even higher position than that of the primary wife. The traditional distinction between the gentleman's daughter who became a primary wife, and a woman of lower social class who was made a secondary wife could not be readily maintained in Singapore, where there is no such clear distinction between social strata. Besides the above

factor, the local law also tends to elevate the position of the secondary wife to the position of the primary wife in judging their economic rights to property inheritance. This matter will be dealt with in the next section.

Kinship is important in the Malayan Chinese economic organizations. Chinese tend to personalize their economic relations and conduct their business between individuals rather than between persons acting in narrowly defined roles as in the large Western firms. However, this does not mean that Chinese co-operating in commerce or industry are always members of one family, extracting favours merely because they are kinsmen. Often, Chinese do show favour to friends, neighbours, classmates and people from the same place of origin in China. Placing economic trust in individuals with whom there is some prior relationship leads to the preferrential employment of kinsmen and friends (Freedman 1957: 88).

One characteristic of the Chinese economic corporations composed of kinsmen is their instability. In the Malayan Chinese community there is still strong evidence of a rapid rise and fall in family fortunes. This is related to a large extent to the fragmentation of a man's estate in the case of intestacy. In the traditional society, the eldest son might be given an extra-share when he was charged with the perpetuation of the ancestral cult by looking after the tablets of the ancestors. In Malaya the legal system

has had even a greater effect on the fragmentation of property in case of intestacy. There, the widows (both primary and secondary wives) are alloted a share, and all sons and daughters have been given equal rights in the remaining portion (ibid., pp. 89f).

The pluralism of the Malayan society is often reflected in the microcosm of brothers and sisters. Even at this level the dichotomy between English and Chinese schools erects barriers which are not always foreseen. Quite apart from the divergence in general outlook which springs from such differences in education, secondary Chinese education and secondary English education often lead to different sorts of careers. Higher education and civil service are closed to those with only a Chinese education, for example. Such differences should not be over-emphasized, though, since only a handful of people are able to seek admission into university, and few Chinese can seek positions in civil service, which is mainly a Malay occupation.

The differentiation which is seen at work among Chinese siblings is greater as one moves out of the kinship group. A rich man who lives in a comfortable house has little to do with a cousin whose economic position is less substantial. However, formal occasions tend to call together those who are related in kinship. Lunar New Year visitings, marriages and deaths normally produce contacts which are

otherwise inhibited in daily life.

Filial piety, designated by the Chinese word "hsiao", means love, veneration, and respect for one's parents. Towards the living, it requires obedience, politeness, attentiveness and care in the old age of parents. Upon the death of a parent, it requires the observance of the rituals of ancestor worship. Towards the parents and departed ancestors it prescribes these further obligations: to preserve one's body as an instrument for the perpetuating of the family line; to defend and uphold the reputation of the whole family; to increase the family fortunes as much as possible; and to provide a number of male heirs to the family. However, Confucius demanded that filial piety was not mere cold formal fulfillment of obligations, but must also include an attitude of warmth.

For centuries Chinese were both entertained and instructed by some tales known as "The Twenty-four Examples of Filial Piety." These stories were illustrated in paintings, dramatized on stage, and recited by story tellers in tea-houses. One of these stories tells how a man at the age of seventy made his parents happy by putting on his gaily coloured child's clothes and playing with toys. Another tells how a man cut a piece of flesh from his arm and boiled it in the pot with his father's medicine, thinking that the soup would help his father to recover from a lengthy illness.

In a third story a man lay naked on a frozen river thinking that this action would move Heaven to give him some fish that his mother liked to eat.

Ideally, filial piety was supposed to be freely accepted attitude. In practice, however, filial piety involving respectful behaviour, obedience and attentiveness often had to be imposed by stern discipline. The relationship between son and father was one of formality and rigidity. Discipline was such that the positive aspects of filial piety were often reduced to a minimum. Perhaps this was what led the leader of the Reform Movement of 1898 and scholar, Kang Yu-wei, to publish his severe criticism of the traditional Chinese family system. He said that while the Chinese often talked about filial piety, it really existed in name only. "In my village hardly one out of 100 provides for his mother". The people were not to be blamed because they were too poor. But if the poor were unfilial by necessity, the rich were unfilial of their own volition. As for large joint families, "they present a harmonious picture from the outside, but inside there is an unescapable and overwhelming atmosphere of hatred"[1] (Lang 1946: 111).

One of the leaders of the May 4th Movement, Hu Shih

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[1] Quoted from Ta-tung Shu (The Book of Great Unity) in which Kang summarized his social criticism (Shanghai, 1922) p. 255.

said, "The Chinese family of old times rarely, if ever, possessed the virtues which have sometimes been attributed to it or read into it". The much-idealized virtue of filial piety simply did not exist: "In those rare cases where it was consciously cultivated, the price paid for it was nothing short of intense suppression resulting in mental and physical agony"[1] (ibid., p. 112). This view of filial piety is certainly exaggerated, but it certainly suggests that traditional families in China very often failed to inseminate the kind of filial piety which tradition idealized.

In Malaya some Chinese are still governed by filial piety in the sense that children are expected to be subservient to parents, for example, in matters like choosing a spouse. At the same time, reactions from some Chinese towards filial piety are still strong. These may be seen in the correspondence between a Chinese girl and the newspaper councillor in a Chinese paper with one of the largest circulations in Malaya. The girl wrote that her mother had urged her to marry a boy whom she disliked. "For the sake of filial piety and for the sake of harmony in the family, I wish to obey my mother. But I cannot bear to think of my life after my marriage...." The councillor replied: "Must children show filial piety to parents simply because they

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[1]Quoted from The Chinese Renaissance (Chicago, 1934), p. 108.

have reared the children? Your mother's tear has blinded your thinking. You have been poisoned by the concept of filial piety of the feudal society....Your mother is ignorant and her thinking is feudalistic. If you reject this marriage you must reject also all kinds of feudalistic thinking in yourself....Tell your mother that by loving you in such fashion she is in effect doing you harm....You have to conquor all these difficulties before thinking of harmony in the family...." (Sing Chew Jit Poh Jan. 10th. 1967: 11). Perhaps it is significant that plays like Family, Peking Man and Thunderstorm written in the 1920's in China and well-known for their attack on traditional family systems were enacted again and again in Singapore.

According to Freedman's (1957: 59) findings in Singapore, filial piety, to many Chinese, does not mean "exaggerated deference to parents, a falling-off from which demand would result in serious reprisals". It signifies politeness to parents, and basically is concerned with care of elders in their old age.

Malayan Chinese do not usually play with their children or achieve with them an intimacy through games and story-telling. However, there is no prescribed social distance between a father and his children. They may pay deference to their father by not sitting in his presence, when strangers are about and by observing other marks of

respect. They are not kept from him and from developing the kind of emotional attachment of what is thought of "affection" in the Western society (*ibid.*).

In the traditional society even an adult was never emancipated from the control of his parents. However, this does not often occur in Malaya. Even when the children stay at home, under the nominal authority of their parents, their passing into adulthood and economic independence means that they are free from parental control (*ibid.*, p. 61). The trend in the father-son relation seems to be coming closer to the ideal of genuine love and respect free of compulsion. A filial son nowadays not only supports his parents but does it with a happy countenance, just as the ancient sages wished.

Relationship With Other Communities

In the discussion of the relationship between the communities in a plural society in the aspect of kinship, one obvious area for consideration is intermarriage. In some Latin American countries, for example, one result of plantation slavery was extensive miscegenation and acculturation of the Negro slaves by the White dominant minorities. "Inter-racial concubinage" might be "unequal and exploitative" (Berghe 1963: 425), but it was an intimate relationship between the communities. In Malaya the communities apparently

are more exclusive. There is no evidence to suggest that intermarriages have ever taken place except in a sporadic fashion. Occasionally, a Chinese man may become a moslim and take a Malay wife; and Malay men may marry Chinese women converts. Intermarriages among Chinese Christians are slightly more frequent; in other words intermarriages with Eurasians and Indians are more frequent among the Chinese than with the Malays. This fact may be brought out with some of the figures that Freedman collected in 1957 which are now reproduced here:

TABLE 14

CHRISTIAN MARRIAGES INVOLVING CHINESE REGISTERED IN SINGAPORE

Year	No. of Christian Marriages, Chinese with Chinese	No. of Marriages Chinese with Non-Chinese
1941	223	17
1943	226	18
1945	140	12
1947	212	28
1948	225	25

TABLE 15

CIVIL MARRIAGES INVOLVING CHINESE
REGISTERED IN SINGAPORE

Year	No. of Marriages, Chinese with Chinese	No. of Marriages, Chinese with Non-Chinese
1941	247	12
1943	821	13
1945	369	8
1947	286	40
1948	329	25

(Freedman 1957: 159).

In the discussion of communal relationship in a plural society the questions of law and government are inevitably involved. One factor that affects the Chinese kinship system is the local Chinese family laws formulated by British jurists. Chinese polygamy exists still because it has been fully legalized until the present. However, there are some deviations from the traditional Chinese family laws in these in local laws, particularly on the issues of the status of secondary wives and of the adoption of children.

The traditional ideological justification for taking

a secondary wife was to provide heirs for posterity. But she was of lower status than the primary wife. The courts in Malaya, however, tend to elevate the position of the secondary wife to that of the primary wife. To the Malayan law courts these secondary wives are entitled to the same share in the estate of the deceased husband as the primary wife. These decisions have helped indirectly to promote the frequency of such relationships (i.e., secondary wives) by offering substantial financial inducement (Buxbaum 1966: 630--35).

In the traditional Chinese law adoption was a means, upon failure of male issue, to provide someone support in his old age, to continue the lineage and to maintain the sacrifice to the ancestral spirits. In that the ancestors were thought not to accept sacrifices from other than related individuals, adoption of persons of a different surname for purposes of inheritance and thus for conducting sacrifices was strictly prohibited. However, in Malaya the situation is affected by the passage of legislation and the refusal by the courts to recognize the traditional forms of adoption. The passing of the Children Ordinance in Singapore (1939) was interpreted as prohibiting adopted sons from sharing in the estate of a Chinese intestate, unless they had been adopted under the provisions of the Ordinance. Because of the expense, and general lack of relationship to the legal organs there was little resorting to the use of the Ordinance on the part of

the Chinese community (ibid., pp. 636f).

Relationship With China

Kinship ties between the Chinese in Malaya and the people in their native places are essentially confined to the immigrant generation and the critical break with relatives in China comes with the change-over to the first-born in Malaya. The Malayan-born Chinese may go to China for a sight-seeing tour or to attend universities or other reasons; but they rarely go there because of their relatives in the native places. With the severing of kinship ties remittance from among the locally-born Chinese to China should also stop.

Even in the immigrant generation the very fact of migration itself narrows the range of intimate family relationships and leads the immigrants to concentrate on a kind of irreducible minimum. To the Chinese immigrants in Malaya his family in China would certainly not include all the extended family relatives. Remittances to China by the immigrants reflects the small area of primary responsibility. The immigrants, if they support anybody in China, support their wives, children, parents, paternal grandfathers, brothers, unmarried sisters and the widows and orphans of their brothers (Freedman 1957: 75).

Summary

In most fields of urban economic activities, the Malayan Chinese predominated, and their most important occupations were cash-crop cultivations. Their traditional associations were basically dialectic, territorial and clan groups, and were widespread. The China-based political organizations functioned to secure the support of the Malayan Chinese for the revolution, war effort and national development in China. The MCP, though professing militant international Communism, managed to function among the Chinese alone, and failed to reach out to the Malays. The MCA was the first constitutional party which attempted to integrate the Chinese community into the emerging national society of Malaya. The Chinese regarded Chinese school education as an important means to keep their identities as Chinese. Moreover, more and more children switched from Chinese to English schools.

The British and Chinese were apparently good partners in economy, but conflicts existed between the two communities in politics and education. The relationship between the Japanese and the Chinese was characterized with bitter animosity, mass executions and economic exploitation. The interactions between the Malays and the Chinese were largely confined to the rural area; moreover, when national development began their confronting issues were brought to the national level.

CHAPTER IV

THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD: 1957-

Introduction

This period is distinctive in that it is a period of national development, beginning in 1957 and continuing to the present. From a structural point of view, the plural nature of Malaya is more marked today than ever before. The confrontations between the Chinese and the Malay communities had always been more or less confined to the local context, but now they are extended to a nation-wide scale. The concept of "community" must also be viewed and understood in the context of a national society.

In the process of communal struggle the problem of majority arises. This has been well described by the Royal Commission of Bilingualism and Biculturalism of Canada (1965: 137f) on the conflicts between the French and English-speaking Canadians: "Some English-speaking citizens before the Commission invoked the "law of the majority" as though they were brandishing a threatening weapon; some French-speaking

people, who had complained bitterly of the consequences of this "law", expressed the desire to make use of it to their own advantage in a more or less independent Quebec". The Commission urged the Canadian citizens to think of national integrity before invoking such a "law". The fact is that it has been made use of in many plural societies. In Malaya, the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, the restriction of Singaporean citizens to run political campaign on the mainland part of Malaya, and the forced separation of Singapore in 1965 had been seen as a series of manoeuvres on the part of the Malay political elites to maintain a Malay majority in Malaysia. "With one stroke of pen, we get rid of one million Chinese", a Malay high ranking officer said on the separation of Singapore.

New nations emerging from colonial status, as in all developing countries, entertain the aspiration to be independant, to attain national status, social order and material progress. Unfortunately, the national boundaries of these countries were drawn by former colonial powers, and the scope of these boundaries often varies with the political and military power of the colonial powers. Often the colonial powers brought in an alien group from another part of the world, such as the Chinese in Malaya, and the Negroes and Indians in the West Indies. In the final analysis the basic units of these new nations are the various communities with

different social norms and languages. In India Nehru reported:

> The enquiry has been in some ways an eye-opener for us. the work of 60 years of the Indian National Congress was standing before us, face to face with centuries-old India of narrow loyalties, petty jealousies and ignorant prejudices engaged in mortal conflict and we were simply horrified to see how thin was the ice upon which we were skating. Some of the ablest men in the country came before us and confidently and emphatically stated that language in this country stood for and represented culture, race, history, individuality, and finally a sub-nation (Harrison 1956: 621).

Perhaps, communal ties are too harsh a reality for the national leaders to face or to understand. Language, the most obvious symbol of a community, does stand for "culture, race, history, individuality,...a sub-nation" or even a nation as 'community' comes to be realized as structural entity on a nation-wide scale. Call them what you like: "narrow", "petty" and "ignorant", such communal "loyalties" and "jealousies" exist. In this chapter it will be shown that much of the political activities and controversies in Malaya revolve about the issues of official languages and the media of instruction in schools.

In this chapter the section on kinship is omitted, because everything that can be said has been said in the previous chapter. Any major change in the kinship system is unlikely to have occurred since 1957. Relationship with China in the aspects of economy, social organizations and education is also omitted because at least on the organizational level, no relationship exists.

Economy

Internal Situation

The distribution of occupations among the Chinese in the Federation has remained more or less the same as it was in the Transitional Period. This is shown by comparing the 1947 and 1957 Census Reports, Table 16, page 138.

Relationship With Other Communities

Before 1957, the interaction between the Chinese and the Malays in the aspects of economy were confined to the rural areas: in the fishing grounds where the Chinese played the role of middle-men and the Malays, the role of fishers; in the rubber plantations where the Malays might rent their plots of rubber estate to the Chinese....But after 1957 the interactions between the two peoples have been extended to national economic development programmes and to the rights of enterprise by citizens.

This extension of confrontation between the two communities to the national scale has been the consequence of attempts to integrate the Malays and the non-Malays to form a Malayan nation, and of the emergence of the Malay political elite. In the Federation it is taken for granted that the Malays provide the standard of loyalty, and the

TABLE 16

PERCENTAGE OCCUPATIONAL GROUPING OF GAINFULLY CHINESE IN THE FEDERATION IN 1947 AND 1957

Occupations	1957	1947
Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting & Fishing	13.1 } 40.3	25.5 } 48.9
Estate Agriculture	27.2	23.4
Commerce	16.5	14.4
Services	14.2	12.3
Manufacturing	12.6	12.9
Mining and Quarrying	5.2	4.3
Building and Construction	4.2	
Transportation, Storage and Communications	3.8	3.3
Electricity, Gas and Water	0.4	
Unspecified or Inadequately Defined	1.2	3.9
Looking for Jobs	1.6	

(Tilman 1964: 23; International Bank 1955: 12).

Chinese are being exhorted to conform to their examples. The national constitutions safeguard the positions of the Malays by special privileges - land reservations, quotas of scholarships, business permits and licenses and positions in the public and civil services.

One focus of attention in the development of Malayan economy has been given to the welfare of the Malay rural dwellers. These people constitute the peasant sector of the Malayan rural economy, comprising the very small agricultural holdings producing rubber, copra, and rice and coastal fishing. Since 1957 these Malay peasants form the majority of the voters in the rural electorates, while the political power of the rural Chinese and Indians is relatively small and that of the Europeans is virtually nil. Therefore, on the part of the Government any programme of economic development should manifestly be to the advantage of the Malay peasants, even if this means that the advantage to the national economy as a whole will be less than it otherwise could have been. The focus of attention on the interest of Malay peasants can be seen clearly in the Second Five Year Plan (1961-1965) which stressed governmental investment on development projects for the peasant agricultural sector, amenities, roads, schools and health services for the rural areas (Fisk 1963: 163).

In the urban areas the Government has placed its hope

for greater Malay participation in commerce and industry on an expanding economy in which new opportunities are specifically created or reserved for the Malays. For example, an exclusively Malay investment firm, the Sharihat Permodalam Kebangsaan, was initiated by the Government and had large blocks of much sought shares reserved for its purchase (Kahin 1964: 351).

The Malayan Chinese are convinced that they are discriminated against in every sector where Governmental influence is important. Although they can take no action against this division, there are ways to evade the laws. A Chinese capitalist may do the financing, while he seeks a Malay friend to act as a liason with the Government. In this way a Chinese can get access to enterprises which are legally reserved for the Malays. Nevertheless, according to Kahin (1964: 351), this situation seldom arises in Malaya in contrast to some neighbouring countries. If it does arise, then it is part of the pattern of dichotomy of Chinese capitalists and Malay political elite, so characteristic of Independent Malaya. In his study of the Chinese in Semarang, Willmott (1959: 155) described an analogous condition:

> A more difficult economic situation and the very great increase in Governmental regulations and controls since the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 have had the effect...of bringing about a significant change: the inclusion of Indonesian merchants in these trade organizations....In most cases, however, the association of Chinese and Indonesian business men had been encouraged by more practical considerations of mutual benefit. The Chinese bring to such organizations

greater economic strength and more business experience, while Indonesians assure favourable treatment from government agencies. This treatment of division of responsibility is symbolized in the almost universal custom of electing Indonesian chairman and Chinese treasurers.

With the present dichotomy of social structure in Malaya a similar kind of association of Chinese and Malay business men could have happened there too, although such information is not available. At the present this dichotomy is very apparent in the Governmental organizations: in the Cabinet the prime minister, minister of defence, minister of communication, etc. are all Malays, while the minister of finance, minister of commerce and trade are Chinese. It is also hardly a coincidence that in the Malaysian Trade Mission to U.S.S.R. in 1966, the president was a Malay and the members were exclusively Chinese.

In Singapore there is no problem of "sons of the soil" or _bumi putera_. Practically the whole population is composed of immigrants. Therefore the Chinese-capitalist and Malay-political-elite dichotomy does not arise.

Social Organizations

Internal Situation

In this period the China-based political organizations have completely disappeared. The MCP has remained underground. Its political strategy consists mainly of infiltrating into the various constitutional political parties, trade unions and student groups. The Chinese traditional associations have acted as pressure groups, particularly in such issues as official languages and the media of instructions in schools. In this section those political parties with exclusive or overwhelmingly Chinese membership will be presented.

(a) MCA

The MCA has remained the largest political party in the Chinese community and the member party of the ruling Alliance. However, its position representing the Chinese community has been seriously challenged by the "democratic socialist" parties formed after the Independence in 1957. The extent to which the MCA is supported by the Chinese may be evaluated in the Federal elections. The results of the Federal elections in 1955 were not particularly indicative of the support that the MCA had in the Chinese community, since comparatively few Chinese were entitled to vote, and

the hope of independence for Malaya by 31st. Aug. 1957 assured the Alliance overwhelming support from all communities. However, by 1959 domestic issues of communal significance had become of more immediate concern, and a marked fall in support for the Alliance from the Chinese was evident. The Alliance won 74 of the 104 parliamentary seats but its percentage of the total votes was only 51.8. The MCA candidates contested thirty seats but won only 17 of these (Ratnum 1960: 342). Many votes were lost to independent and "democratic socialist" party candidates who opposed the Alliance educational policy in particular. The results in this election did reflect to a certain extent the disquiet of the Chinese community on the matter.

An analysis of the 1959 and 1964 Federal elections shows that MCA candidates had on the whole done well in the electorates with a sizable Malay voters. In predominantly Chinese constituencies, MCA had generally been defeated by the opposition left parties. In Singapore the MCA was completely anihilated by the People's Action Party (PAP). Apparently the MCA has less firm hold on Chinese support than the UMNO on Malays. The MCA ability to conduct a national-wide political campaign lies mainly in its alliance with the UMNO.

(b) The Opposition Parties in the Federation

These parties have capitalized on the Chinese dissatisfaction with the MCA. Ideally, they claim to be non-communal; in actual fact the membership of the individual parties are overwhelmingly Chinese. They are more or less confined to the predominantly Chinese constituencies in their political campaigns (<u>ibid</u>., p. 337).

The People's Progressive Party. Although the two top leaders and members of parliament of the parties are of Ceylonese origin, the membership and cadres are overwhelmingly Chinese. The Party is exclusively restricted to the heavily Chinese area of Perak. As seen in the Party's 1959 election manifesto, the four most important items in its platform are:- (1) the recognition of Chinese and Tamil as official languages, while accepting Malay as the national language; (2) the retrospective application of the principle of its <u>jus soli</u> in citizenship; (3) the abolition of the "special position" of the Malays; and (4) the amendment of education laws so as to give equal treatment to all communities (<u>ibid</u>., p. 340). These items coincide exactly with the demands of most Chinese in Malaya.

The Labour Party. Ideally the Party ideology is based on class lines and non-communal. The Party relies on the support of the Chinese urban dwellers in Selangor and Penang. In 1958 the Party united with the Partie Ra'ayat,

a Malay left wing radical nationalist party, to form the Socialist Front. This alliance was an effort to bring the Chinese urban workers and the Malay peasants together for a common political front. Such united front, like the Alliance Party, was inter-communal and not non-communal, as the Socialist Front claimed. In the 1959 Federal election the Socialist Front won eight seats in Parliament; however, in the 1964 election it won only two seats (Maryanov: 1967, 103). The Socialist Front received support from the Chinese urban dwellers but made no impact on the rural Malay voters. Apparently it was not sufficient for the Socialist Front to have a programme based on economic policies alone; some stand would have to be taken on the essential "communal issues". The Socialist Front received attacks from sections of both the Malay and the Chinese communities. The need to make a clear stand on "communal issues" had on occasions led to frictions between the two member parties, which culminated in the break in 1965.

The United Democratic Party (UDP). This party, too, claims to be non-communal. However, its leadership, composed of businessmen, and membership are chiefly Chinese. Its political activities are confined to the heavily Chinese area of the State of Penang. As a result of the 1964 election, it won one parliamentary seat (_ibid_.).

(c) The Political Parties in Singapore

The people in Singapore first took part in a state-wide election in 1955. In this election the party structure of the running parties were limited to a group of notables, and the criteria of membership in these parties were wealth, prestige and educational level, in the later instance an English medium education, preferrably culminating in a British university degree. The principal campaign techniques were candidate visitation, assistance by friends or paid workers, all dependent on the prestige and the affluence of the candidates (Bellows 1967: 127--8).

The People's Action Party (PAP), formed in 1954, emerged as the only party with supporters who had mass organizational skills after 1959. The cadres of the PAP were trade unionists and student leaders of the Chinese middle schools. These were the people with roots in the masses, and as the Chinese educated came, for the first time in the 1959 election to make up a majority of the electorate, it was these people who could deliver an election victory. From its founding, both the radical faction and the moderate faction regarded themselves as using the other. Certainly without the latter the Party could not have won the mass following as it did in the late 1950's; without the former faction the Party probably had been proscribed by the British authorities. When the break came in July 1961 about 70% of the PAP

cadres left to join the soon-to-form Barisan Socialist Party.

The PAP is avowedly non-communal ideally. However, when Singapore was part of the Malaysian Federation, PAP, like other political parties in Malaysia, employed communal appeals in its political tactics, although these appeals were couched very carefully. For example, in a 1965 by-election in Singapore the PAP stressed its opposition to the Malaysian Central Government's intention to close down the Bank of China. Besides illustrating the PAP's willingness to stand up against the Central Government, it had strong Chinese communal overtones in a nearly 100% Chinese constituency (Bellows 1967: 134). When the PAP extended its political activities to the mainland part of Malaya it had to rely on the urban Chinese for support. However, this could only come about at the expense of the MCA and for this reason the MCA regarded the PAP as its arch enemy. In 1967 the membership of the PAP was 15,000 and the cadres were about 400 (ibid., p. 130). It is the second largest political party, after MCA, with a largely Chinese membership in Malaya. Since 1959 PAP has been the ruling party in Singapore.

Relationship With Other Communities

In Independent Malaya communal considerations continue to be politically relevant. Although the Alliance is an inter-communal front, its member parties are communally based;

other parties, though professing a non-communal orientation, have a communal appearance in terms of their membership and political tactics. The 1959 Federal election results give full indications of communal divisions in Malayan political politics. The Alliance won all the seats in Kedah, Perlis, Pahang and Johore where there is a sizable Malay population, and lost 14 of the 16 seats in Kelantan and Trengganu with a predominantly Malay population. The Pan-Malay Islamic Party, which openly emphasized its Malay communal outlook, won all its thirteen seats in Kelantan and Trengganu; the PPP won all its four seats in the predominantly Chinese area in Perak; the Socialist Front won its eight seats in the predominantly Chinese areas of Penang and Selangor. A corollary of this communal division is that since the Chinese and Malay populations are to some extent localized, political parties inevitably show some kinds of regional basis of popularity.

The interactions between MCA and UMNO in their formation of the Alliance epitomize to a certain extent the interactions between the Malays and Chinese in their formation of the Malayan nation. While the Alliance national leadership continues to foster intercommunal goals, candidates and officials of the member parties espouse in varying degrees communal support. Self-interest often stands in the way of maximizing the Alliance's support, a fact most evident in the type of bargaining which accompanies the selection of

candidates at each election time. In the 1959 Federal elections, the Alliance was to publish its manifesto and select its candidates. The MCA leadership demanded that forty of the candidates nominated by the Alliance should be MCA men out of the total candidates of 107,[1] and that the Chinese language as a medium for instruction and examination should be fully recognized in the schools. The MCA leadership threatened that if its demands were not satisfied, MCA would quit the Alliance and contest the elections by itself. The UMNO replied that unless the MCA withdrew its demands, the Alliance would contest without it. Although the MCA chose to stay within the Alliance, a sizable proportion of the MCA leaders felt so strongly about the issue of Chinese education that they resigned to contest election as independent candidates (Roff 1965: 51).

The communal confrontation between the Malays and the Chinese was reflected in the relationship between Singapore and the mainland Malaya. When Singapore decided to extend its political activities to the mainland, the UMNO regarded the action not only as a challenge to the existing Alliance but as a Chinese challenge to the governing system whereby a Malay ruling group enjoyed an entrenched political dominance. When PAP attempted to replace the MCA as the

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[1]which is also the total parliamentary seats.

Chinese wing of the Alliance and made the appeal to the urban Chinese voters, the PAP approach tended to confirm the Malay believe that PAP was essentially a Chinese communal party. However, considerations must also be given to the fact that the tension between Singapore and the mainland Malaya was not entirely of communal origin: the socialism which the PAP professed had little appeal for the UMNO which made little secret of its protection of Malay traditional interests and of its advocacy of private enterprise. The UMNO much preferred the capitalistic MCA as partner.

Education

Internal Situation

After 1957 Chinese education in mainland Malaya and in Singapore has followed different paths of development. In mainland Malaya the Chinese schools have been largely incorporated into the Malayan national educational system. This has been effectively brought about through regulations and schemes of grants-in-aid. In 1958 most Chinese schools had chosen to accept the scheme of grants-in-aid laid down by the 1957 education regulations; consequently, they were converted into the National-type Schools. These have the same kind of curriculum as the National Schools, the major difference being the media of instruction. The latter use Malay as the main medium of instruction, while the former, as in the case of Chinese schools, use Chinese, Malay and English as the media of instruction.

In addition to the fact that a new language, Malay, has been added to the Chinese primary curriculum, the teaching of English has been greatly emphasized. Table 17 shows the amount of time given to the teaching of languages in the Chinese primary schools in the early Post-Independence Years:

TABLE 17

TIME-TABLE FOR LANGUAGE-TEACHING IN CHINESE PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN THE FEDERATION IN THE EARLY POST-INDEPENDENCE YEARS

Grade	1 & 2*	3	4	5 & 6
Malay	120 min.	120 min.	135 min.	180 min./week
English	120	120	135	180
Chinese	420	420	420	390

* Either Malay or English was taught only.

(Sung 1958: 33).

In 1962 a further change in the Chinese school curriculum was made. In the high schools, except Chinese literature and language text-books, all others must be written in Malay and English. The governmental policy is to make Malay the sole medium of instruction eventually in all National-type secondary schools.

Some secondary schools did not accept the schemes of grants-in-aid in 1958 and so belong to the Independent Type Schools. Some school boards converted only part of the school into the National-type Schools. In this case the same school buildings house two schools. That part of the school

receiving grants-in-aids, for example, is called Nanyang National-type Secondary School; and the other part of the school receiving no grants-in-aids from the Government is called Nanyang Independent Type Secondary School. In other words, school children in the same school buildings are under different administrations and different curricula.

In the Independant-type Schools the medium of instruction remains to be Chinese. However, like the National-type, the Independent Type Schools have to teach Malay and English besides Chinese, and when students take part in the Government Examinations they have to write in English or Malay.

There has been a great deal of communal disquiet on the loss of Chinese as the medium of instruction in secondary schools. Many Chinese leaders attribute this to Chinese language not being instituted as an official language in Malaysia, and consequently mass rallies and signature collectings had been conducted since 1962 to press the Government to institute Chinese as an official language.

In Singapore Chinese has been instituted as one of the four official languages since 1959. This together with the fact that the Chinese-educated has rapidly assumed political power has safeguarded the Chinese language as the medium of instruction in Chinese schools. In Singapore not only the Chinese schools receive equal treatments from the

Government but more and more governmental Chinese schools are being opened up.

As in mainland Malaya the Chinese schools in Singapore have been incorporated into the state-wide education system. In the Chinese primary school only English is taught as the second language, while in the high school both English and Malay are taught as the second languages. The press in Singapore has reported that steps are taken to teach history and geography in Chinese in English schools, and to teach science and mathematics in English in Chinese schools. These steps are taken to minimize the differences between the English and Chinese schools by making the students thoroughly bilingual.

The exact data on the Chinese school enrollment after 1959 are not available. In 1958 out of a Singapore total of 302,542, 192,155 enrolled in Chinese schools which was 42.69% of the total, while 143,733 enrolled in English schools which was 47.51% of the total (Chu 1961: 41). As shown in Figure 4 (page 109) the rate of dropping in the Chinese schools and the rate of rising in the English schools were almost constant between 1956 and 1958. One may predict, therefore, that the percentage of enrollment in Chinese schools would continue to drop for some years after 1959, while that in the English school would continue to rise. The Chinese press also gave this indication. Nevertheless,

after 1965 conditions have apparently changed. In 1966 and 1967 the traditional associations sponsored a "Mother-tongue Education Propaganda Month" Campaign urging parents in Singapore to send their children to schools with their mother-tongue as the medium of instruction. As reported in the press the enrollments in the Chinese schools in 1966 and 1967 had increased immensely over the previous years. Chinese education in Singapore had apparently attained the position which many Chinese leaders had been longing for, so that the president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce Education Committee was able to say at the closing ceremony of the "Mother-tongue Education Propaganda Month":

> ....In the colonial past the English schools enjoy all kinds of privileges, and the English school graduates could always find better jobs. For these reasons parents sent their children to English schools. But now...we are under an elected government and Chinese is made one of the four official languages....We should forsake our old ideas and accept the new realities by sending our children to the Chinese schools. To maintain our mother-tongue is our first and foremost duty....(Nanyang Siang Pau Oct. 24th. 1966b: 10).

Apparently, Singapore would become more and more a Malayan Chinese State.

Relationship With Other Communities

Apparently, both the Malay and Chinese leaders agree to develop a national education programme which inculcates nationalism and allegiance towards Malaya among the children

of the various communities in Malaya. However, the two peoples conflict on the issue of media of instruction in schools. The Chinese insist that the Chinese language should be retained as the main medium of instruction in Chinese schools, and that a national education can be built on the basis of multilingualism, an example provided by Switzerland. On the other hand, the Malays contend that since they themselves provide the standard of loyalty, the Malay language must eventually be used as the sole medium of instruction in all schools.

In order to realize their aims the Malays have pressed the Government to adopt the Malay language as the only official language in mainland Malaya by 1967, and launched various campaigns to make Malay a commonly used language in Malaya. For example, the Selangor State Government launched a "National Language Month" Campaign in 1966 and spent $40,000 for it; the Mentri Bezar of Selangor urged the Central Government to "dub all foreign films shown in the country in the National Language"; furthermore the Selangor State Government regards it a crime for any civil servants in the State Government who do not conduct the governmental operations in Malay (Straits Times Aug. 9th. 1966: 4).

However, at the present, conditions in Malaya are such that it is impossible to replace English and Chinese completely as the media of instruction. As the Malaysian Prime Minister has said, "However much we like to introduce

our National Language of this country, the fact remains that the qualification to higher education still has to be through the English medium of instruction....Our National Language had not been used during the British period; or rather it had been neglected; and it takes time to put things right..." (Far Eastern Economic Review Dec. 22nd. 1966: 12).

In the colonial past the Chinese rarely attended Malay schools and whatever Malay they spoke, it was the Bazaar Malay.[1] Nevertheless, after the 1957 Independence they began to learn Malay, probably, out of sheer necessity. Adult evening classes teaching Malay have been set up; Malay public speech competitions are conducted by Chinese and English schools; the Chinese press devote a quarter of a page daily for Malay self-taught.

The greatest difference between the Malay National schools and the National-type Chinese schools is in the primary school programme. This difference, however, becomes smaller towards the higher grades, and there is practically no difference in the final year of secondary schools, when the pupils in both types of schools sit for the same governmental examinations. The only difference, perhaps, lies in the fact that the Chinese high school graduates know three languages and the Malay high school graduates have a better command of the Malay language than the ordinary Chinese high school graduates.

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[1]A pidgin Malay.

Summary

The Malays are in control of the governmental machineries. Particular attention has been given to the welfare of the Malays in the development of Malayan economy. In politics the issue of education has formed a major factor in winning the votes of Chinese voters. The Malayan political parties have a communal appearance in terms of their membership and tactics. The Chinese schools in Singapore and the Malay Peninsula have been incorporated into the respective national educational system. Whereas in Singapore the Chinese have accepted the prevailing conditions in Chinese education, in the Malay Peninsula, there has been communal disquiet over the loss of Chinese language as the medium of instruction in Chinese high schools.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Internal Situation

(a) The Pioneering Period

The Chinese community in Malay may be conceived as having gone through three stages of social change. In the Pioneering Period people began to migrate from China as a result of trade movements in the 19th century. In the frontier conditions of Malaya they were Jacks-of-all-trades and lacked such specialized occupations as existed in traditional China. They were largely engaged in the spice and sugar plantations, tin-mines and commercial activities. In a population composed predominantly of men, family life hardly existed. The Secret Societies flourished: they protected the new arrivals and established a focus of loyalty in a foreign land.

(b) The Transitional Period

The frontier conditions of Chinese community disappeared when more contacts were made with China and when

the colonial society became well established. In Malaya rice cultivation was an unpopular occupation among the Chinese immigrants, although they had been largely rice-cultivators in Southern China. Cash crop cultivations were first among Chinese occupations. The Malayan Chinese also predominated in almost all fields of the urban economic activities. The internal structure of their business was usually characterized by small-scale operations, diversity, familistic personnel and ownership patterns, and informal organization.

Of all the social organizations the traditional type proved to be most widespread and persistent. Although they were registered under a great variety of names, in the final analysis, they were basically associations of dialectic, territorial and clan groups. As compared with the traditional social organizations, the Kuomintang and its forerunners, the Malayan Communist Party and the Malayan Chinese Association may be termed modern social organizations. Modernization as such has not been the critical issue in this thesis. What is at stake is the fact that social change in the Malayan Chinese community followed the process of modernization in China. However, the major contrasts between the above modern social organizations and the traditional type should be noted: (1) In the modern organizations, territorial origins, dialects and clans do not form the conditions for the recruiting of membership. Hence, the solidarity of the organization

does not depend on these qualities. (2) The value of modern social organizations stresses on a national outlook. The use of the National Language, in the case of the Chinese community, is the most obvious example of such an outlook. (3) The solidarity of modern organization is forged on an organization ideology, such as nationalism, socialism or Marxism, in the forms of policy statements. (4) These ideologies are of Western origin: the resulting struggle differs from the Chinese traditional belief of harmony; the stress on public life differs from the traditional love of privacy; collectivism differs from the traditional beliefs in familism.

While modernization is observed as one trend, the change from the orientation towards China to the orientation towards Malaya is observed as another trend. This change in national orientation forms a continuum over time. The traditional associations cannot fit into this continuum, because their activities do not concern the national society, China or Malaya. Their functioning on the basis of Chinese traditional culture does not qualify them to be China-centred any more than the MCA's using the Chinese language qualifies MCA to be China centred. Returning to the stated continuum, one finds that at the earlier end was the Tung Meng Hui which was to secure the support of the Chinese in Malaya for the revolution in China. At the same end was also the Kuomintang, which operated to keep the Chinese in Malaya loyal to China

and to secure their support, mainly financial, towards the national development and war effort in China. At the middle of the continuum was the MCP, which was formed as a result of the activities of the Communist Party of China, and which during the Pacific War began to direct its objectives entirely towards Malaya. The MCA, at the later end of the continuum was the first political party which attempted to integrate the Chinese into the emerging national society of Malaya within the constitutional framework.

One aspect about Chinese education in this period is modernization. Thus, the policy of education was to provide a democratic education to the mass so as to socialize it into the national society--China; the spoken language had replaced the literal language; the curriculum was designed on the basis of a nationalistic ideology--the Three Principles of the People. The more important aspects about Chinese education, however, are the fact that Chinese nationalism was inculcated through education, and the fact that the Chinese had apparently kept their traditional reverence towards learning. These, perhaps, explain the demonstrations, campaigns and the angry criticisms of the government in Chinese newspapers. There was also a pragmatic aspect in the Chinese attitude towards education, which attributed to the decline of Chinese school enrollments and the increase in English school enrollments.

(c) The Post-Independence Period

A Canadian professor wrote about the French-speaking Canadians: "Because they are a conquored people and a minority, French-Canadians have always been chiefly concerned with group rights. Their public philosophy might be called Rousseauian: the expression of a "general will" to survive" (Cook 1965: 3f). This "general will" is also that of the minorities in other plural societies. In Malaya the Chinese see education as the means "to survive" as Chinese. They have lost the right of using Chinese language as the medium of instruction in Chinese high schools in Malaysia, and they are struggling to keep the Chinese language in primary schools. To them the experience of "last lesson"[1] is imminent, and they are a "conquored people". Even in Singapore, where they form the majority, there are still traces of a "garrison mentality"--to draw the analogy with the people in Quebec again--from the long struggle for the right of education in the mother tongue in the colonial past and during the merger with Malaysia. Witness the yearly "Mother Tongue Education Month" campaign!

In politics the issue of education had formed a major factor in winning the votes of Chinese voters. Because the MCA had to accomodate UMNO, its political partner, it lost

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[1]Cf. p. 117.

seats to those parties which met the demand of the Chinese voters on the issue of education. However, the parties which catered for the support of Chinese voters had the appearance of regional parties and had no hope of winning a national election.

Kinship

The discussion of kinship is least fitted in the framework of presentation of this thesis. This is due at least in part to the criteria by which the three stages of social change have been set. Chinese kinship plays a role in economy and in the formation of some of the traditional associations. However, kinship is not concerned with political organizations, education and some aspects of economy. These are closely related to national orientations and national development, which are important criteria by which the stages of social change are defined. The governments concerned in this thesis tend to control or actively interfere in the last three mentioned aspects of social structure and leave kinship relatively free to its own development.

The important factors that concern kinship change are: (1) The population structure. As shown in the Pioneering Period family life could hardly exist for most people in a community with a highly unbalanced sex-ratio.

(2) The fact of migration. Sahlins and Service (1960: 51) in their study of "cultural adaptation" stated, "Movements into and adaptation to particular environments in culture... sometimes result in simplifications, the sacrifice of specialized parts that are vital in other environments". One aspect of kinship is one such simplification. In Malaya only the wide clan groups exist and remain effectively exogamous. The local clan groups, as the landholding groups, were vital in the rural economy in China. In Malaya they lost this function; in any case, they disappeared as the village groups disappeared. (3) The governmental regulations. The local law courts have apparently given due regards to the Chinese traditional family laws. Nevertheless governmental regulations that deviate from the traditional laws tend to affect the position of the secondary wives and the adoption of children. On the whole there is little change in the Chinese kinship system in comparison with the other aspects of social structure.

Relationship With China

Willmott (1960: 344f) in his study of Semarang Chinese maintains that the prestige of A in the eyes of B may be assumed when all or most of the following conditions are found:

1. B frequently copies A, that is, adopts attitudes or behavior patterns characteristic of A.

2. B copies things from A for which there are no external rewards, no obvious advantages.

3. B is dependent upon A; A is more powerful or dominant or is indispensable to B's welfare or status.

4. A's techniques for achieving various goals are more efficient than B's.

5. A is a source of regular rewards and gratifications for B.

6. B is emotionally attached for A.

7. B expresses high respect or esteem for A.

8. B shows concern for acceptance by A.

9. A sets certain standards of behavior and attitude for B.

Willmott's (1960: 345) analysis shows that modern China and the west, but not Indonesia, had acquired high prestige in the Chinese community in Semarang. There was evidence for the prestige of modern China in all nine categories of prestige indicators. Willmott, furthermore, made the following comparisons: the prestige of the Dutch might be compared to that of authoritarian parents, whereas the prestige of modern China had been more like that of "an idealized hero".

Returning to the discussion of the Chinese in Malaya one finds that Imperial China was low in all these prestige indicators. In terms of Willmott's analogy, the authoritarian parents who show no affection and only harsh treatments are usually rejected by the child. To the Imperial

Government the overseas Chinese were "the deserters of the Heavenly Dynasty", and among the Chinese in Malaya there prevailed anti-Manchu sentiments.

Modern China was entirely different. Among the Malayan Chinese there was evidence for the prestige of modern China in all indicators, except (3) and (4). China was weak in (3)--"B is dependent upon A; A is more powerful or dominant or is indispensable to B's welfare or status". China did not give protection to the Chinese in Malaya, and during the War the Chinese in Malaya actually had their guerrilla force fighting against their persecutors. (4)--"A's techniques for achieving various goals are more efficient than B's"--does not seem to be relevant to the discussion of the relationship between China and the overseas Chinese. Generally speaking, from an utilitarian point of view there were no obvious advantage of copying things from China on the parts of the Malayan Chinese. However, China was itself "a source of regular rewards and gratifications" for the Chinese in Malaya. What may be said about the Semarang Chinese may also be said about the Malayan Chinese: "China had been like an idealized hero".

Relationship With the British

With regard to the British the evidence for prestige

was high in (3)--"B is dependent upon A; A is more powerful or dominant or is indispensable to B's welfare or status"--and in (4)--"A's techniques for achieving various goals are more efficient than B's". But the evidence for prestige of the British was not as high as China in the other indicators. To the Chinese in Malaya the prestige of the British lay in the economic and political power they held. Social distance was nearly always maintained between the two peoples. At the best, the British were to the Chinese the "authoritative parents" as Willmott (1960: 344f) termed it.

There was little identification between the two peoples in terms of ideology, social organizations and educations (except in the English school system). Since the British administrators were not concerned with integrating the different communities in Malaya, alien-oriented schools and social organizations were allowed to function in Malaya. Thus the China-based political organizations and educational systems freely existed in the Chinese community. The British were concerned only with maintaining social order and protecting their own interests in Malaya and China.

However, from the perspective of history the British-Chinese economic relationship was mutually rewarding. The Malayan Chinese benefited from the British in the following ways: (1) Because of the British trade movements in the 19th century and under the patronage of the British the

Chinese were able to migrate from the congested homeland to Malaya where they could exploit the natural resources. (2) The Chinese benefited from the colonial economic framework which the British had established: for example, the emphasis on cash-crop cultivation, the import and export business which the British had conducted and above all the policy of free enterprise. (3) The British political control brought stability to Malaya at the beginning of the Century, so that people could concentrate on making a satisfactory living.

The British benefited from the Chinese in the following ways: (1) their supplying of labour in clearing jungle, in plantations of various kinds and in tin-mines; (2) their acting as collecting and distributing agents for the British export and import firms; (3) their being a good market for British goods, for example, for opium in the 19th century.

Relationship With the Japanese

There have been conflicts between the Chinese and other communities in Malaya; nevertheless only between the Japanese and the Chinese was the relationship one of enmity. The actions taken by the Japanese militarists against the Chinese were characterized with mass persecutions and wealth exploitation. On the part of the Chinese community there had

been a constant demand for the payment of "blood debt" from Japan after the War. Willmott's prestige indicator is irrelevant in this discussion.

The Japanese invasion changed the social alignments in the Malayan society. Within the Chinese community there was an intensification of nationalism; and the MCP co-operated with the antagonistic Kuomintang. Between the British and the Chinese the social distance was reduced to a minimum. These facts are conducive to the evidence that external hostility promotes in-group solidarity.

The Japanese invasion changed the national orientation of the Chinese community in the following ways: (1) The War isolated the Chinese community from the influence of China. (2) The War stopped immigrations from China, resulting in a higher proportion of locally-born in the Chinese population. (3) The Japanese victory over the British resulted in a change of attitude among the indigenous people towards Western colonial power, which tended to promote independent movements after the War. This in turn exerted pressure on the Chinese community to change its national orientation, if the community was to be accepted by the emerging indigenous political elite. Although the Japanese presence in Malaya was brief, its effects on the Malayan society were far-reaching.

Relationship With the Malays and the National Development of Malaya

With regard to the Malays and their culture the evidence for prestige was low in all of Willmott's (1960: 344f) indicators before 1957. After 1957 the situation apparently is changing from one in which they enjoyed little, if any at all, prestige in the Malayan Chinese eyes to one in which they may be in a position to attain prestige. Now that they have assumed political power, the Malays are at least strong in (3)--"B is dependent upon A; A is more powerful or dominant or is indispensable to B's welfare or status". The problem of the national development in Malaya is to establish identifications between the two communities. Before such identification occurs, there can be no evidence for prestige of one community in another in most of Willmott's indicators.

Before 1957 there were little interactions between the two communities. At the rivers, tin mines and plantations, the Chinese paid the Malay chiefs tolls, taxes and royalties. The Chinese middle men associated with the Malay fishermen in the fishing grounds; and the Chinese tenants with the land owners of rubber plantations. The Sultans conferred some titles to the Chinese business men for their philanthropic acts. However, the divergence of economic interests of the two communities meant that they were

largely physically separated. The Chinese were largely urban dwellers and the Malays rural dwellers; and in terms of the distribution of population in the country as a whole, the Chinese were largely concentrated on the West coast and the Malays on the east coast. The Chinese social organizations did not concern the Malays, and only MCP attempted to recruit members from the Malay community. In education the Chinese did not attend the Malay schools, because English, not Malay, was the language of prestige in Malaya.

Towards 1957 national development began. The Chinese who had been apathetic to the local politics found themselves struggling for the rights of citizenship and the maintainence of their inherent culture in the face of encroaching national social orders. The confrontations between the two communities were now extended from the local to the nation-wide scale.

As it moves towards nationhood, each ethnic community tends to orientate to a pattern of change on the basis of the communal social norm (Geertz 1964: 155). When one community assumes political power, it tends to extend its social norm to that of the national society. The other communities are then exhorted to conform to that social norm. Consequently in a plural society an alleged social consensus refers to nothing more than that of the dominant community; the existence of a shared social norm is not evident.

In all nation states there are ties to class, party, business union, profession etc. But conflicts among such groups seldom challenge the integrity of nationhood. They may overthrow a government, but they do not threaten to undermine the nation itself, because they have no alternate concept of what their nation is and of what its scope of reference is. On the other hand, in a plural society communal unrest and discontent strive into the national framework, threatening separatism, or merger, a redrawing of the limits of the national state, and a new definition of the national domain. They want not only Tengku Abdul Rahmah's or Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's head, they want Malaya's, Malaysia's or Singapore's (Geertz 63: 111).

In Malaya, Singapore had left the Federation of Malaysia; however, many Chinese in Singapore and in the mainland part of Malaya aspire to unite into one country again so as to assume greater political power than they presently have. Many Malays aspire to form a merger with Indonesia, so that together with the Indonesians they can form a clear-cut majority over the non-Malays. Because national boundaries and communal boundaries do not coincide, the inter-state and intra-state communal frameworks become very complicated.

In the conflict between the Malay majority and the Chinese minority, the aspirations of the latter are pitted

against the vested interests and values of the former. Out of this conflict there arise, on the one hand, legal, political, economic, and social barriers set up by the Malay majority to maintain its position and consolidate its advantages. Thus Malay privileges were written into the new constitutions without provision of review; the Malay privileges regarding land, civil service and certain types of licenses and scholarship are safeguarded constitutionally as permanent.

The focus of attention of the Second Five Year Plan in Malaysia was on the interest of the Malay peasants; in the urban areas work opportunities are created specifically for Malay investments. The use of the Malay language is enforced in governmental bureaucracies and schools by legislation and by propaganda. On the other hand, various kinds of adaptive reactions on the part of the Chinese minority are set up aiming at minimizing or overcoming its disadvantages. Apparently the Chinese have taken advantage of their experience in commerce and trade and they have been able to fill the positions as delegates to trade missions, ministers of commerce, finance etc. In election campaigns, of course, they vote for the political parties which meet their demands in such vital issues as education and official language. In education, they converted only part of their schools into the national-types and maintain the other parts of schools as the Independent types so as to maintain Chinese as the medium of

instruction in the latter. They also conducted campaigns to demand the adoption of four official languages in Malaysia and the right of education in mother tongues.

Plural societies are distinguished from those modern-societies which are culturally heterogeneous in many ways. In the latter are contained ethnic minorities, who may be immigrants bringing a distinctive culture into the society, or who may remain distinctive groups through rule of descent and endogamy. They may be distinctive from the majority of the population by their phenotypical appearance. They may show some variations from the general cultural patterns, such as food habits, family structure, marriage rituals among the Italians and Irish in the United States. The minorities, if they retain their own languages, also speak the language of the society. There may also be localized groups which result from differentiation that has occurred during national development, for example, the local group arising from specialization in production. However, the above cultural differences are quite compatible with the inclusive social order, either because groups which practise variant cultures are numerically and hence politically weak, or because they are different within a common idiom of a permitted range. In short, these groups have shared the broad cultural patterns of the people who form the dominant segment of the society, and the host of specialities and diversities within the

society has left the basic social order untouched (Smith 1965: 15; Steward 1955: 47--8).

There are historical examples which point to the fact that what is called a plural society is often an earlier stage of a culturally heterogeneous society with ethnic groups and minorities. The development of Brazil provides an example. Brazil is now a culturally heterogeneous society, but in the middle of the 16th. century there were three communities, each with a distinctive social norm and language: the Portuguese colonials, the domesticated Indians and the mamelucoes (Portuguese and Indian offspring). At the same time African slaves were imported, mainly from West Africa, and they continued to arrive over the 17th., 18th. and 19th. centuries. These slaves at least in the first generations differed culturally from the above stated communities. By the 20th. century 61.7% of the population is classified as white and the rest as mostly mixed ancestry. Moreover, all Brazilians speak Portuguese and have developed a culture based largely on Portuguese heritage; Brazil has become a culturally heterogeneous country like the United States (Encyclopaedia Britanica 1963a: 119--121).

Guatemala is a plural society. More than one half of its population is Indian and most of the remainder is composed of Ladinos. The two groups are distinguished by speech, dress and community membership. Gradually the Indians, particularly

in the cities, have become "ladinoized" and have come to share more and more in the basic social norm of the Ladinos. How long will Guatemala remain a plural society (Encyclopaedia Britanica 1963b: 940)?

However, what came to pass in Brazil and Guatemala may or may not come to pass in Malaya. The plural feature in the Latin American countries seems to be less marked than in Malaya: the much more frequent intermarriage among the different communities in the former give evidence to this fact. Based on the present conditions in Malaya one may speculate that Singapore will remain a plural society, at least in terms of languages. There the four languages are protected constitutionally. In Malaysia future development is less certain. One critical issue is whether or not the Chinese language will remain the medium of instruction in the Chinese primary schools. If it will not remain, then most of the Chinese will probably come to speak Malay as their mother tongue in the course of time, and the communal boundaries in Malaysia will subsequently become more and more flexible. If Chinese language remains the medium of instruction, then Malaysia will remain a multi-lingual society, though not in a constitutional sense. In any case, if the present conditions continue Malay will emerge as the common language among the different communities in both Malaysia and Singapore. This, together with the nationalism fostered in

schools and the common school curriculum, will promote some kind of mutual identification among the different communities. This identification, in the course of time, may become sufficient to enable the different communities to associate with each other and act together as one people and one nation.

In a plural society it is certainly valid to treat an ethnic community as a unit for study. However, it must be born in mind that such communal alignment is seldom complete. There are cleavages in the community to weaken such alignment: for example, the dialectic and territorial divisions in the case of the Malayan Chinese community. There are other cleavages which cross-cut the communities; these are mainly economic classes which hold status in a hierarchical position in the society. In Malaya, divisions along class lines are apparently weak. Witness how political parties which work along class lines failed in general elections! There are also groupings which arise from localized conditions and involve people of different ethnic origins. For example, the Malay and Chinese fishermen living in the same village may associate more with one another than with their communities at large. Educational institutions like the English schools, which already existed in the colonial past, also produce social groupings which cross-cut the communities. Admittedly, divisions which cross-cut the communities have not been fully explored in this thesis.

In the final analysis, the integrity of such a society is often maintained through the use of coercive force or governmental regulations, and an alleged social consensus refers to nothing more than that of the dominant community. The plural feature in the economy is manifested in the division of labour along communal lines, and in the reservation of certain exploitations for a dominant community. In politics, although parties claim to be non-communal, they are basically communal in terms of the structure of membership and political tactics. Political controversies frequently revolve about the issues of official language and the media of instruction in schools. On the part of the local people, a pragmatic view towards education attributes to the decline of enrollment in the vernacular schools and the increase in the Western schools. To-day the social structure of the Chinese community is largely based on elements drawn from traditional and modern China and the Western society.

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