



Planning for peacebuilding in contested cities:  
A needs-based analysis in Belfast and Jerusalem

by

Janice Miller

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of  
The University of Manitoba  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of

Master of City Planning

Department of City Planning  
University of Manitoba  
Winnipeg

Copyright © 2009 Janice Miller

**Buddhist Prayer for Peace**

The suffering in Cambodia has been deep.  
From this suffering comes Great Compassion.  
Great Compassion makes a Peaceful Heart.  
A Peaceful Heart makes a Peaceful Person.  
A Peaceful Person makes a Peaceful Family.  
A Peaceful Family make a Peaceful Community.  
A Peaceful Community makes a Peaceful Nation.  
And a Peaceful Nation makes a Peaceful World.  
May all beings live in Happiness and Peace.

from *Step by Step: Meditations on Wisdom and Compassion* by Maha Ghosananda

## Table of Contents

<b>List of Figures .....</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>List of Tables .....</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>List of Acronyms.....</b>	<b>vii</b>
<b>Acknowledgements.....</b>	<b>viii</b>
<b>Abstract .....</b>	<b>x</b>
<b><i>Section 1: Setting the Stage.....</i></b>	<b><i>1</i></b>
<b>Chapter 1 Introduction .....</b>	<b>3</b>
1.1 Planning for peace in the conflict cycle .....	4
1.2 Statement of Purpose .....	6
1.3 Research Questions.....	7
1.4 Significance of the Research .....	8
1.5 Objectives of the Research .....	10
1.5.1 Planning strategies for contested cities .....	10
1.5.2 Limitations.....	12
1.5.3 Biases.....	13
1.6 Thesis organization .....	14
1.7 Chapter Summary .....	15
<b>Chapter 2 Research Methods.....</b>	<b>17</b>
2.1 Description of Research Methods.....	17
2.1.1 Literature Review .....	17
2.1.2 Case Study .....	18

2.2 Data Collection.....	18
2.2.1 Primary data sources.....	19
2.2.2 Secondary data sources .....	19
2.2.3 Interview Technique.....	19
2.2.4 Sampling technique and sample size .....	20
2.3 Reliability and Validity.....	22
2.4 Ethics.....	23
2.4.1 Informed Consent .....	25
2.5 Data Analysis.....	25
2.5.1 Coding and Thematic Development.....	26
2.5.2 Coding process .....	27
2.6 Chapter Summary .....	27
<b>Chapter 3 Literature Review .....</b>	<b>29</b>
3.1 Planning theory in contested cities.....	29
3.1.1 Communicative planning theory.....	30
3.1.2 Multicultural planning theory .....	32
3.1.3 Just City approach .....	34
3.1.4 A south-eastern planning theory?.....	37
3.2 Planning and Human Needs.....	39
3.2.1 Human needs framework.....	40
3.2.2 Integral theory and human needs.....	42
3.3 Planning and peacebuilding .....	43
3.4 Polarized vs. multicultural cities .....	44

3.5 Chapter Summary .....	46
<b>Chapter 4 Research Context .....</b>	<b>49</b>
4.1 Introduction .....	49
4.2 Belfast, Northern Ireland .....	51
4.2.1 History of Northern Ireland.....	51
4.2.1.1 Early history.....	51
4.2.1.2 A Protestant state (1920-1972).....	53
4.2.1.3 The Troubles (1972-1998) .....	57
4.2.1.4 Contemporary Northern Ireland .....	59
4.2.2 The Planning System in Northern Ireland .....	61
4.2.2.1 Planning under Direct Rule.....	62
4.2.2.2 Planning under the devolved government.....	63
4.3 Jerusalem, Israel/Palestine .....	67
4.3.1 Palestine and Zionism Pre-1948.....	68
4.3.1.1 Modern Zionism .....	68
4.3.1.2 Palestinian society.....	69
4.3.1.3 The beginning of the conflict.....	70
4.3.1.4 Brief History of Israel.....	73
4.3.1.5 The Occupation .....	75
4.3.2 The Planning System in Israel.....	76
4.3.2.1 System of land ownership .....	76
4.3.2.2 Planning structure .....	77
4.3.2.3 Tools of Implementation and Control .....	81

4.4 Chapter Summary .....	84
<b>Section 2 Analysis and Results .....</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>Chapter 5 Coding process and Belfast analysis .....</b>	<b>89</b>
5.1 Belfast .....	89
5.2 Themes from Belfast .....	90
5.2.1 Subsistence.....	90
5.2.2 Protection.....	92
5.2.3 Affection.....	94
5.2.4 Understanding.....	95
5.2.5 Participation .....	97
5.2.6 Leisure .....	100
5.2.7 Creation.....	101
5.2.8 Identity and Freedom.....	104
5.3 Chapter Summary .....	108
<b>Chapter 6 Comparison between study cities and Jerusalem analysis .....</b>	<b>111</b>
6.1 Jerusalem .....	112
6.2 Themes from Jerusalem.....	113
6.2.1 Subsistence.....	114
6.2.2 Protection.....	118
6.2.3 Affection and Understanding .....	121
6.2.4 Participation .....	122
6.2.5 Leisure .....	126
6.2.6 Creation.....	127

6.2.7 Identity and Freedom.....	129
6.3 Common Themes and Differences.....	132
6.4 Chapter Summary .....	137
<b>Chapter 7 Conclusions .....</b>	<b>139</b>
7.1 Human needs, planning and peacebuilding.....	140
7.2 Cities and citizenship.....	144
7.3 Planning ethics .....	147
7.4 Biases and Limitations.....	148
7.5 Future Research Directions.....	149
<b><i>Bibliography .....</i></b>	<b><i>151</i></b>
<b><i>Appendices .....</i></b>	<b><i>159</i></b>
Appendix A - Interview framework for planners .....	159
Appendix B - Interview framework for community organizations.....	162
Appendix C – Max-Neef’s Matrix of Needs and Satisfiers.....	165
Appendix D – Belfast themes, subthemes and key findings .....	166
Appendix E – Jerusalem themes, subthemes and key findings .....	171
Appendix F – Ethics approval for research.....	174
Appendix G – Informed Consent Documents .....	175

## List of Figures

<i>Figure 1.1.</i> Graphical interpretation of the conflict cycle and human needs. ....	5
<i>Figure 1.2.</i> Hypothesis for basic guideline of a peacebuilding planning strategy. ....	11
<i>Figure 4.1.</i> Map of Ireland showing the Northern Ireland division. ....	54
<i>Figure 4.3.</i> Map of the extent of planning covered by (a) the BUA Plan and (b) the new BMAP ..	67
<i>Figure 4.4.</i> Map of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip after 1948.....	74
<i>Figure 4.5.</i> Jerusalem municipal boundaries from 1947-2000.....	78
<i>Figure 4.6.</i> Land status in East Jerusalem.....	82
<i>Figure 6.1.</i> Photo of a demolished house in East Jerusalem.....	117
<i>Figure 6.2.</i> Map of the planned security barrier around East Jerusalem. ....	119

## List of Tables

Table 2.1 Distribution of interviewee types in the Belfast interviews .....	21
Table 2.2 Distribution of interviewee types in the Jerusalem interviews .....	22
Table 4.1 Population breakdown by group in Belfast and Jerusalem.....	50
Table 4.2 Five-stage process for preparation of development plans in Northern Ireland.....	64
Table 4.3 Statistics of fatalities resulting from the al Aqsa Intifada. ....	76
Table 4.4 Israeli planning institutions and their powers .....	79
Table 4.5 2004 – 2005 Statistics on home demolitions in East and West Jerusalem.....	83
Table 6.1 Comparison of Jewish and Arab population density and building percentages .....	116
Table 7.1 Potential citizen charter of rights and responsibilities for a city.....	145

## List of Acronyms

BAT	Belfast Action Teams
BDO	Belfast Development Office
BIMKOM	Bimkom – Planners for Planning Rights
BMAP	Belfast Metropolitan Area Plan
DOENI	Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland
DOE	Department of the Environment
DRD	Department of Regional Development
DSD	Department of Social Development
ICAHD	Israeli Committee Against Housing Demolitions
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IDF	Israeli Defence Forces
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIHE	Northern Ireland Housing Executive
PA	Palestinian Authority
PASSIA	Palestine Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization

## Acknowledgements

First I would like to thank all the people who agreed to be interviewed for this research project. You were contacted by a foreign student and you all generously agreed to share your time, knowledge, and insights with me. Without your support, this project would not have been possible. I would like to individually name you, but in the interest of confidentiality, I cannot. Please accept this group thank you as an individual acknowledgement to each and every one of you.

When I decided to pursue this degree, I chose to study while continuing to work full-time. As such, I must acknowledge the support of my colleagues in Extended Education at the University of Manitoba, and more recently in Manitoba Infrastructure and Transportation. In particular, I would like to thank the three Directors to whom I reported during this journey. Dr. Lori Wallace and Dr. Cheryl McLean both exemplified their belief in Life Long Learning in supporting me. I could not have pursued a project requiring several months of travel without your support and I am very, very grateful. Lawrence Mercer, my current Director, has also generously allowed me a measure of flexibility to complete key parts of the writing. For this I am also grateful.

I would also like to acknowledge the generous financial support of Maxwell Starkman, who left a wonderful legacy to the Faculty of Architecture. The travel scholarship he established has supported this research and a number of other student projects before mine. I feel privileged to have been given this opportunity and I hope the work I have produced is worthy of the gift. I was also a recipient of the Clarence Elliot Scholarship, which allowed me to work part-time in my last term of course work and complete all the necessary course credits.

I have also been blessed with taking courses with four new intakes to the Master of City Planning. Each year I have been amazed by these groups of students and I feel that planning in Canada is in good hands as you all go forward and work your magic. Thank

you for sharing your wisdom and energy with me. In particular I would like to thank Feresteh Moradzadeh for your friendship, your kindness, and your unfailing belief that I will manage to finish.

I would like to thank my professors in City Planning. I have enjoyed every planning course I had the privilege of taking with you. Like the students you attract to the department, you are an amazingly committed group who care about your students and the subjects you teach. Thank you so much for all you have tried to teach me. I would also like to thank Yvonne Halden, Graduate Student Advisor extraordinaire. You have been so helpful over the years and I am sure I would not have succeeded without your assistance.

Second to last, I want to thank my committee. Dr. Sheri Blake, my advisor, has used the right mix of “carrot and stick” to encourage and support me. Dr. Kathleen Matheos and Michael McCandless, LL.B. have been patient and accommodating, despite their busy schedules. And Dr. Ian Wight, who is currently on sabbatical, has been a constant source of ideas and information. Thank you all so much.

Finally, I would like to thank my family and apologize for missing the births, moving days, birthdays, and showers. I will soon return to the family fold and catch-up with all of you. For my sisters Audrey and Rhonda, thanks for your help and support. For my son Scott, and his Sarah and Jessica, thank for understanding my absences. And for Darrell, you have noticed my absence and absent mindedness more than most. Thank you for keeping me fed and finishing the sentences that I did not. I am very appreciative of your support.

## Abstract

This research project is primarily a case study about planning practice and its affect on peacebuilding activities in Belfast and Jerusalem. The primary method of data collection is semi-structured interviews with planners, policymakers, and community leaders involved in peacebuilding activities in the study cities. The primary data collection is triangulated with a literature review and a number of supplementary planning documents, books, and videos on the subject matter. The data has been analyzed using the lens of fundamental human needs, as laid out by Max-Neef, who sees all human needs as equally important rather than hierarchical as some human need theories are.

Both Belfast and Jerusalem have centralized planning systems based on the British Town Planning model. Planning in both cities is frequently viewed as a contentious issue, most especially around housing issues. In both cities, one population group is characterized as “bursting” at the seams in terms of housing need, while the other population group feels endangered. Security issues are critical in both cities resulting in the building of security barriers, which ultimately change patterns of free movement in the city and affect the imagined city of both sides of the conflict. The barriers affect the ability to meet other fundamental human needs as well, such as the need for participation and understanding.

Despite the clear problems in these cities, there are some indications of success as well. Northern Ireland ran a hugely successful public consultation on the direction the citizens want the government to go in. The resounding answer was for a shared future and some planners and urban leaders have taken this to heart and are working hard to build and define shared spaces in the urban fabric. This work is happening at all levels of the community and several excellent projects have been a positive result of cross-community work aimed at building understanding. In Jerusalem several organizations and various planners are working on similar goals to empower the disadvantaged Palestinian community and instill more justice in the planning system.



## Section 1: Setting the Stage



(Previous page photo credits: J. Miller)

## Chapter 1 Introduction

Some authors consider conflicts in cities to be a microcosmic representation of the broader political issues affecting the citizens who inhabit these cities (Bollens, 1998, 1999). Urban areas can act as a flashpoint for ethnic or cultural conflict, but they also offer an opportunity to demonstrate justice towards the “other”, since an urban setting provides an opportunity for antagonistic groups to intermingle, at least on an economic level. A basis of common interests might result, leading to important further levels of interaction. This proximity of “intimate enemies” may in fact influence city leaders to more readily accept workable compromises prior to larger national peace negotiations (Bollens, 1998). There is evidence that leadership and policy matter, meaning that “policymakers at national and local levels operating amid “ancient hatreds” have a constructive role to play, if they so choose, in formulating urban and national policies accommodative of competing nationalisms” (Bollens, 1998, p. 10).

Ostensibly conflict is about the control of land and of what comes into and out of the land. Thus, conflict is also about such things as access to ports and shipping, and the flow of, and access to, fresh water (Kennedy, 2006). Planning is also concerned with the control of land, or as planners tend to term it “land use.” Conflict is almost impossible to avoid in human interactions and, consequently, urban planning should be concerned with maximizing harmonious relationships between urban dwellers. In contested environments, urban conflict frequently escalates into violence. Consequently, consideration of social planning issues, in conjunction with conventional land use planning, is an important aspect of planning in contested cities.

Social planning issues are concerned with meeting human needs. Human needs are difficult to define, as they often appear to be culturally dependent. However, Max-Neef (1992; Max-Neef, Elizalde, & Hopenhayn, 1989) defined nine fundamental human needs that he believed to be culturally independent, although how those needs are satisfied is dependent upon culture. According to Max-Neef, any fundamental human need, that is not adequately satisfied, has the potential to create a pathology. Violence is one

manifestation of pathologies resulting from unmet human needs. Planners interested in building peace in contested cities must consider how human needs are met, in order to avert violent manifestations of unmet needs. Conventional land use planning does not consider all fundamental human needs, therefore planning for peacebuilding must employ additional tools.

## **1.1 Planning for peace in the conflict cycle**

Conflict is sometimes simplified into a smooth bell curve that represents the escalation of the conflict, its culmination into violence, and its subsequent de-escalation (Creative Associates International Inc., n.d.). This bell curve has been modified in Figure 1.1, below) to help locate planning practice in the conflict cycle. Conflict escalation is a continuum that moves from harmonious interaction to violent conflict.”<sup>1</sup>Between the “peaceline” and the “conflict line” is a type of latent conflict that has not yet intensified to sustained violence, although violent skirmishes might take place.


Planning practice designed to build peace can be thought to occur primarily on the conflict de-escalation side of the bell curve, although active peacebuilding planning might also be occurring during conflict escalation, between the peace line and the conflict line. During a period of prolonged violent conflict, conventional land use planning would normally cease, but urban residents continue to require that their fundamental human needs are satisfied.

Bollens believes that the type of innovative planning required of peacebuilding during conflict and conflict escalation, will not likely start with government planners (Bollens, 1998). Institutional planners will have their attention drawn to conflict amelioration activities, and have little freedom to attend to peacebuilding techniques. Additionally, since conventional planning has been thought of as a neutral, dispassionate civic

---

<sup>1</sup> Creative Associates International Inc. (n.d.) indicates this escalation continuum includes the following stages: harmony of interests, durable peace, stable peace, unstable peace, crisis and war.

activity, planners tend to see peacebuilding as a role they do not need to play, or a role that is not a part of their professional activity. Planners do have a role to help build urban spaces that meet the fundamental human needs of the urban citizens, and these needs do not change over the cycle of violence, although what is required to satisfy those needs may change over the cycle.



(Figure credit: J. Miller)

Figure 1.1. Graphical interpretation of the conflict cycle and human needs.

“Violence cessation” is relatively easily understood to be the time when violent acts associated with ethnic or sectarian confrontations cease in an urban area. On the other hand, the “peace” is not as clearly defined. Peace is more than just a cessation of violence; urban peace speaks to a sense of urban harmony and the feeling that a variety of groups can co-habit the same urban spaces, or urban spaces in close proximity, with mutual respect and consideration of the human dignity of all. It follows then that planning for peacebuilding must be concerned with equality and justice.

Since planning affects community, planning processes may also affect community organizations engaged in activities designed to increase equality or build peace. Planners who wish to work as peacebuilders must be aware both individual planners and planning processes carry bias. These biases affect the ability of all citizens to engage

in civic life. Thus, the role of planning is pertinent to peacebuilding and must be examined in multi-cultural or multi-ethnic cities in general, and contested cities in particular.

## **1.2 Statement of Purpose**

The purpose of this research is to examine how the planning process affects the work of peacebuilding organizations attempting to bridge divisions within contested cities, in order to identify planning practices that are effective for mitigating conflict and assisting in the peacebuilding process. Planning process for the purpose of this project is defined to include all policy and activity focused on the creation of space and place in urban settings. It is not limited to specific activities of individual planners in recognition that urban planning is influenced by a wide variety of factors outside the control of individual planners.

Two conflicted cities are used as case studies. These cities are Belfast and Jerusalem. These two cities were selected because it is believed that they will provide a relatively wide glimpse of planning in contested cities. Both cities have a long history of urban conflict. In Belfast, the 450-year history of Catholic and Protestant conflict in Ulster has resulted in a physically and psychologically partitioned city. The first cease-fire, in the conflict, was announced by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), in early 1995. Although there have been periods of resumed conflict since that time, Northern Ireland has been working for over a decade attempt to normalize the situation. Thus Belfast has been progressing along the peace-process for a fairly significant amount of time.

Jerusalem on the other hand, is still embroiled in ethnic and religious conflict. While “spatial polices for ethnic containment are an all too familiar dark side of planning in Israel” (Sandercock, 1998, p.179), Sandercock also notes that in addition to the physical separation of Arab and Jewish citizens, there is also a growing divide in Jerusalem society between secular and orthodox Jewish citizens. Orthodox Jewish citizens appear to have some common desires with fundamental religious people in cities around the

globe. The need to build peace processes between secular citizens and fundamentally religious citizens is important in many cities, including multi-ethnic and multi-religious cities in Canada.

An examination of Belfast and Jerusalem provides a view of two cities positioned at different points on the conflict bell curve. Additionally, Belfast is a city with a history of conflict and distrust between groups of people with a similar ethnic and epistemological background. In Jerusalem the conflict is simultaneously religious and ethnic, exacerbated by epistemological differences. Complicating the conflict is a vocal fundamentalist minority in both the Arab and Jewish communities, resulting in public posturing that does not lend itself easily to open dialogue and compromise. The range of urban conflict faced by planning and peacebuilding organizations is very wide in these two cities. Thus an examination of Belfast and Jerusalem offers the potential of a broad understanding of the role of planning in peacebuilding.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

There is evidence that planners working in government positions do not have the freedom to initiate wide shifts in planning direction (Bollens, 1999). Therefore, non-government planners and government planners were interviewed wherever possible. In keeping with the concept that the “voices from the borderlands” may be the voices that will affect positive change in the peacebuilding process, community organizations engaged in peacebuilding activities will also be interviewed. The questions guiding this research are:

1. To what extent do planners actively engage in peacebuilding work in contested cities?
2. How do individual community organizations work towards peace and equity in conflict situations? In what ways do planning processes assist the work of peacebuilding community organizations?

3. To what extent are equity and justice considered a fundamental work ethic by individual planners, and how is this transferred into action?
4. What conflict amelioration techniques employed by planners in contested cities have the potential for international transference to a Canadian multicultural urban environment?
5. To what extent do official planning policies and decisions foster peacebuilding, equity and justice?

## **1.4 Significance of the Research**

At one time, planning was thought to be benevolent, and when plans were unsuccessful, the planning process was questioned and not the planner's values and intentions. However very often planning is not benevolent. This has been clearly demonstrated in both polarized (Yiftachel, 1995; Bollens, 1999, 1998) and multi-ethnic cities that are typically not thought of as polarized (Sandercock, 1998, 2003; Davidoff, 1965; Burundi, 2000). Since planning is often conceived by planners and the public alike, as a rational professional activity aimed at the promotion of the "public good," little attention has been given to planning's ability to promote goals of "social repression, economic retardation, or environmental degradation" (Yiftachel, 1995, p.16). Yet it is clear that planning has been used, both consciously and unconsciously, to promote all of these goals<sup>2</sup>. Bollens calls this partisan planning, a technique that chooses sides and is a regressive agent of change, and he identifies partisan planning as one of the planning techniques observed in polarized cities. Oppressive planning techniques leave a biased

---

<sup>2</sup> North American examples include: a) the practice of housing large numbers of minorities in public housing, located in low income areas with limited economic opportunities and poor quality transportation services. This demonstrates both social repression and economic retardation; b) environmental racism occurring where low-income and minority communities are subjected to high levels of toxic waste dumping.

legacy that must be counteracted in both the built and psychological structures of the city, if, and when truly just planning methodologies are employed (Bollens, 1999, p. 29).

Since planning can promote goals of justice, as well as injustice, it follows that the planning process can amplify the voices of a large number of citizens, or alternatively makes participation impossible for certain groups of citizens. Built-in inequities leave planning open to charges of injustice and this is of particular concern in cities with a multicultural or multiethnic demographic. Watson (2006) and Sandercock (2003) suggest that cities that previously have not experienced multicultural urban fractures are starting to be conscious of them as these fractures begin to widen. A number of reasons are suggested for this, including global migration, economic globalization and its uneven urban impact, increased vocalization of indigenous peoples and their struggle for self-determination, and more recently, a backlash against the political and military hegemony of the United States. The origins of this widening fracture are certainly grounded in a local context of injustice. The effect will be profound in countries like Canada, which has supported a dream of multiculturalism. "Hopes for 'colourful' and harmonious multiculturalism in cities of the West, and elsewhere, appear to be fading as divides deepen and become increasingly acrimonious" (Watson, 2002, p. 33).

Watson and Sandercock call the widening fractures in multicultural cities "deep difference." Deep difference has a direct relationship to "deeply divided societies" and polarized cities (Yiftachel, 1995; Bollens, 1998, 1999); essentially it is the same issue differing only by degrees. Bollens argues that "...differing value systems are a defining characteristic of ethnically polarized cities and also appear to be an increasing attribute of planning and resource allocation debates in North America and western European cities" (Scott Bollens, as cited in Watson, 2006: 32). Consequently, planning practices in polarized cities have particular importance to planners in western countries, in particular Canadian planners working under an official national policy of multiculturalism, as guided by the federal Canadian Multiculturalism Act (1985), and supported by multicultural legislation in many provinces. Practices, that have proven to

be effective in mitigating conflict in deeply divided societies, may be instructive for planners working with deep difference in a contemporary Canadian context.

## 1.5 Objectives of the Research

“One of the greatest challenges facing many world cities today is to facilitate the expression of ethnic and cultural diversity that enriches city life while at the same time working against the physical and psychological barriers, hostility, and violence that can paralyze and impoverish it. Conceptual and practice-based knowledge and models regarding governmental policy amidst ethnic polarization are urgently needed” (Bollens, 1999, p. 10).

There are three main objectives of this research project:


1. Attempt to identify peacebuilding strategies employed by planners in contested environments, and to locate these strategies within the framework of the three peacebuilding strategies already identified by Bollens.
2. Identify the extent of awareness of the affect of planning on the activities of peacebuilding organizations by both planners and the organizations themselves.
3. Attempt to provide a framework of peacebuilding activities that have proven to be effective during various parts of the conflict bell curve.

### 1.5.1 Planning strategies for contested cities

Bollens has identified three planning strategies employed in contested cities. These strategies, neutral, equity and resolver, are explained in more detail in the literature review. Briefly, under the **neutral** strategy, planning decisions are made based on a rational analysis of what is identified to be in the best public interest. The **equity** strategy uses equity-based criteria such as “relative size or need” to assess the best course of action in a situation (Bollens, 1998: p. 687). The **resolver** strategy focuses on outcomes as well as processes to build trust and understanding and is identified as the most likely strategy to produce long-term urban peace.

The three strategies identified by Bollens all have different strengths and weaknesses. However, it may be difficult for a planner to know the best time to employ techniques

associated with a particular strategy. The early working hypothesis of my research considered if there may be a most appropriate time to employ different techniques depending on where on the conflict bell curve the local context can be positioned, as demonstrated in Figure 1.2 below. I proposed that neutral strategies are most appropriate when the local context resides in the potential conflict range, a range that oscillates around the violent conflict line, bringing frequent urban skirmishes. Bollens points out neutral planning has a residual effect of replicating existing injustices and therefore is not sound long term planning for societies with deep inequalities. However, since this planning strategy appears to not favour any one group, it can be viewed as fair by both sides in a conflict. Therefore it is most useful in the potential conflict range, where violent conflict is always close to the surface and intergroup tensions are high (Bollens, 1999).



(Figure credit: J. Miller)

Figure 1.2. Hypothesis for basic guideline of a peacebuilding planning strategy.

When intergroup tensions appear to be increasing, planning strategies that actively attempt to reduce inequities seem to be the most useful. Inequality can be an impetus for ethnic tension feeding the partisan cause. There is also the phenomenon of the economic warrior, who is someone who joins a partisan group because they offer a salary, not because of an ideological position. These economic warriors disappear when

other economic opportunities arise. Therefore, although equity strategies are useful for building peace on both sides of the conflict curve, they are likely to have the largest impact on ameliorating conflict during the escalation phase.

When both parties to a conflict become tired of the conflict and tensions are decreasing somewhat, the fatigue may motivate the partisan sides to engage in dialogue and peacebuilding processes. This is the most appropriate time to work on resolver strategies such as collaborative techniques and Just City concepts.

The concept of the economic warrior fits, to a limited extent, Max-Neef's observation that human needs are most likely implicated in the conflict cycle. Max-Neef (1992; Max-Neef, Elizalde, & Hopenhayn, 1989) notes that when a particular need is blocked it creates an intense driver can affect the ability of other needs to be satisfied. He demonstrates this with the need for subsistence and the resulting drive that can be observed when people do not have adequate levels of food and shelter. Although subsistence is the one need that must be met, it is important to note that a complete block of any need can result in a single intense driver. "Suffice it to say, that total lack of affection, or the loss of identity, may lead people to extremes of self-destruction" (Max-Neef, 1992, p. 212).

### **1.5.2 Limitations**

The main limitations of this study are related to time and choice of interviewees, access to policy documents, and language barriers. I traveled to both study cities in the spring of 2007, staying approximately 1 month in each city. I was in Belfast in April 2007 and Jerusalem in May 2007. Several interviewees were identified and contacted prior to travelling, but most were a result of suggestions from previous interviews and contacts. While this was an effective way to access key contacts in the study cities, there is no real way to determine if these interviews represent a small cross-section of opinion or real depth and breadth in the subject matter. This has the potential of limiting the interviews to a group of people known to each other, which may skew the results. Additionally, due to the limited time in each city, the number of interviews was necessarily limited and it

is possible that the most knowledgeable people were not available during the timeframe allotted.

This research project is focused primarily on planners and community organizations involved in peacebuilding. Planners from both government and non-government organizations were interviewed, however due to the sampling technique, in Belfast more government planners were interviewed and in Jerusalem, most planners were non-governmental planners. Thus interviews with ordinary citizens affected by various planning processes were not conducted. This may limit the assessment of the effectiveness of planning processes, as community assessment of the success of a project may be very different for planners and community workers.

The final limitation is primarily directed to Jerusalem. It has proved to be difficult to get original planning policy documents in English. While an examination of the policy documents is not a fundamental part of the research, the research in Jerusalem relies heavily on what other people say, or have written about planning policy. This is also true of informational websites from either the Palestinian or Israeli side. These websites almost always have an English component. However, the English component is frequently limited. Research reports from organizations that examine human rights and planning issues in Israel and the West Bank are frequently not written in English, although they may have a short English executive summary.

### **1.5.3 Biases**

Semi-structured personal interviews are the main method of obtaining information about the perceptions and goals of both the planners and the community organizers in the study cities. For a variety of reasons, the results obtained in interviews are more likely to be affected by bias than other data collection methods. Interviews are a form of conversation, and people avoid trying to say things that might be construed as offensive in conversation (Sommer & Sommer, 2002). Additionally, the interviewer may unintentionally encourage statements that highlight particular facts and opinions. In the case of interviews between people from different countries, it is possible that the

interviewee may wish to project a particular image of their country and will therefore not answer a question exactly the same way a similar question from a local might be answered.

Perhaps the most serious potential bias of this research project is the chance that important information will be misunderstood due to an inaccurate translation of language into another cultural context. Although the Belfast interviews took place in the first language of both my participant and I, language has different meanings and metaphorical references in different local contexts. These meanings may be important to the research, but may be lost on a foreign researcher. There is the potential for an even more complex situation in Jerusalem; the common language was English and while I was comfortable with the language, several interviewees struggled to convey their complex concepts and ideas in English. Thus, bias in interpretation and analysis may inadvertently be introduced and it may be almost impossible to detect.

Umemoto (2001) has documented five challenges faced by planners working in communities in which the primary cultural background is not the same as the planner. It is reasonable to assume that a planning researcher working in cities with different cultural backgrounds might face similar challenges. Therefore, the following issues are expected to be potential challenges in this research project: “1) traversing interpretive frames embedded in culture, history, and collective memory; 2) confronting otherness in the articulation of cultural values and social identities; 3) understanding the multiple meanings of language; 4) respecting and navigating cultural protocols and social relationships; and 5) understanding the role of power in cultural translation” (Umemoto, 2001, p.19).

## **1.6 Thesis organization**

Padgett (2008) states “the amount of creative latitude in writing up a qualitative report depends on its purpose and intended audience” (p. 205). The choice in this study is to outline the research methods in Chapter 2, immediately following this introduction.

These research methods include a literature review, semi-structured interviews, and a case-study model for the research. The actual literature review is presented in Chapter 3. This defines a contested city and outlines planning theory in contested cities. This chapter also presents a human needs model advocated by Max-Neef in relation to development in Latin American countries. It is argued in the research that this human needs approach to planning has real relevance to planning in contested space and may even be a starting point for a south-eastern planning model.

Chapter 4 presents a short historical and contextual background to the study cities of Belfast and Jerusalem. Chapter 5 presents the research analysis for Belfast. Chapter 6 presents the research findings for Jerusalem and highlights some similarities and differences between the study cities. The responses to the research questions and summary conclusions follow in Chapter 7. Some potential suggestions for future research directions are also included in this final chapter.

## **1.7 Chapter Summary**

Conflict in cities can be thought to be a microcosmic representation of the broader political issues of a nation. Urban areas can act as a flashpoint for ethnic or cultural conflict, and therefore planners and urban policy leaders have a constructive role to play in formulating urban and national policies that accommodate competing nationalisms. If conflict is represented as a bell curve, the curve is centred on the point of acute conflict; urban planning normally stops during this period. It is hypothesized that planning's role in peacebuilding is most effective during the conflict escalation and de-escalation phases.

Bollens (1999) observed three types of successful planning in contested space, which are equity planning, neutral planning and resolver planning. In the most acute stages of conflict, neutral planning may be most effective to assist in ameliorating the tension. Equity planning may most useful during conflict escalation and resolver in the conflict de-escalation phase. During the entire conflict cycle, human needs, the needs of the

citizens of the city, remain the same. Max-Neef's theory of human needs indicates that these needs are constant across cultures and time, and thus they are relevant to urban planners in times of peace and in times of conflict.

## **Chapter 2 Research Methods**

### **2.1 Description of Research Methods**

This research project is a case study analysis of the effect of urban planning practice on peacebuilding activities in Belfast and Jerusalem. These two cities have experienced, and continue to experience, issues of violence and civil unrest that have an enormous impact on normal civic patterns of movement and interactions. Although planning decisions are often made based on factors other than good planning theory, in contested cities, fear of the “other” and a desire for protection have led to a planning environment that is primarily motivated by reasons unconnected to traditional planning theory. Additionally, in an emotionally charged environment, planning choices that might appear to be apolitical in many contexts, can provoke violence or increase division within an urban region already fractured by conflict. This research project attempts to identify planning activities that have had an effect, either positive or negative, on the work of community-based organizations engaged in peacebuilding activities in these contexts.

#### **2.1.1 Literature Review**

According to Taylor and Procter (2008), “a literature review is an account of what has been published on a topic by accredited scholars and researchers.” Accordingly, like many research projects, a literature review was the starting point for this research. The literature review technique is not intended to be simply a listing of relevant research, rather it should ideally be a piece of discursive prose that identifies trends and themes, and includes the relevant theory for each of those trends and themes (Taylor and Procter, 2008, Final Notes). Consequently, the literature review encompassed contemporary planning theory with implications for use in contested cities, as well as a review of a number of journal articles and books on planning in contested cities. The conflicts in Belfast and Jerusalem have much written about them, and isolating relevant materials was exceedingly challenging.

### **2.1.2 Case Study**

The second research method employed in my research is case study methodology. Case study methodology is considered appropriate for this research because the issues in Belfast and Jerusalem are complex. Case study research has the intended purpose of extracting depth and meaning in a particular context. The case study approach relies on multiple perspectives and data sources, which can be expected to provide more contextually rich and meaningful interpretations.

Case study research is more of a research model than a method of data collection. The term is used to refer to the approach, method, and product (Humpheries, 2008, p. 89; Padgett, 2008, p.33). Like all research methods, case studies have both advantages and disadvantages. “The key distinguishing feature of case study analysis is that they maintain the holistic integrity of the case” (Padgett, p. 144). Wellington and Szczerbinski (2007) list illustrative, insightful, disseminable and accessible, as other advantages that case studies ideally demonstrate. They also list several disadvantages to case study research. These include the lack of generalizability and the fact that case studies are not necessarily representative or typical. Since the intention of this research is not to generalize, rather to explore the potential of planning to impact peacebuilding activities, these disadvantages do not affect the choice of methodology, but should be kept in mind when considering the applicability of the results in other contexts.

## **2.2 Data Collection**

In this research project there are two main sources of data. Primary data sources include the original sound files and interview transcripts from 26 interviews in the study cities. Fourteen interviews were conducted in Belfast and 12 interviews were conducted in Jerusalem. Secondary data sources include films, websites, YouTube clips, and documents related to peacebuilding, planning and the study cities. It is common to combine a variety of data sources in order to obtain the contextual richness expected in case study research (Wellington & Szczerbinski, p. 79).

### **2.2.1 Primary data sources**

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with planners and/or policy makers, and key informants from community based organizations engaged in peacebuilding activities in each of the study cities. A semi-structured interview format provides some advantage for information gathering in a case study. Silverman states that the semi-structured interview is one of the main ways to generate data providing insight into a person's authentic experience (Silverman, 2006, p. 118). It allows the researcher to probe the interviewee's thoughts, values, and perceptions. It is also possible to acquire their accounts of a particular situation that they have lived through (Wellington & Szczerbinski, 2007, p. 81). When an alternative account of the same situation is acquired from another interview, or data source, the contextual richness of the case study is increased and the validity of the data is enhanced.

### **2.2.2 Secondary data sources**

Interview subjects suggested many of the secondary data source documents during the collection of the primary data. In some cases an organization or person was suggested as a resource, and in other cases a document name or an actual copy of the document was provided. Other secondary sources were found serendipitously through investigation of the suggested secondary sources, or by browsing the stacks of the libraries available to me as the researcher. Secondary data sources are included in the bibliography, along with other sources that informed parts of my research.

### **2.2.3 Interview Technique**

Two interview guides were prepared prior to the fieldwork beginning. One guide was prepared for the interviews with planners and policy makers, and a second was prepared for community organizations engaged in peace-making activities. These two guides are available in Appendix A and B. The same interview guides were used in both Belfast and Jerusalem.

The interview guides are clustered into categories of inquiry. These categories are sequenced to have the closed questions near the beginning and the most difficult questions requiring the greater introspection near the end. In this study the questions regarding justice and equality, and the interviewee's personal opinions on their own role in these areas, were the questions that finished each interview. Sequencing questions this way is supported by Wellington and Szczerbinski (p. 84). It should be noted that the exact planned sequence was rarely followed in individual interviews, although discussion of issues of justice and perceptions of the role tended to occur in the latter stages of the interview.

Wellington and Szczerbinski (2007) note that early authors have described interviews as "a conversation with a purpose" (p. 81). This is essentially the approach taken with the interviews in this research project. Although the interview framework was available to the interviewer, it was used primarily to confirm if the interviewees covered the areas of interest. A prescribed question order and question wording was not strictly adhered to. In both contexts the framework required small adjustments, but in Jerusalem it was found that the guides seemed to be less applicable to the planning context and the interviews were lead almost exclusively by the interviewee's comments.

The interview format was the same in both Belfast and Jerusalem. Interviews typically began with the interviewer briefly explaining the research purpose of the project. The interviewee was then asked to describe who they were and what their role is in the organization they were contacted through. This was the starting point for all subsequent conversation regarding their knowledge of the planning process in the local context and their experiences with peacebuilding activities.

#### **2.2.4 Sampling technique and sample size**

Planning is an intensely political activity and planning practice is often affected by decisions of politicians and policy makers who are not formally educated as planners. Consequently, the planners and policy makers were lumped together in as a single group in this study. Similarly, academics with a planning background were also

interviewed with the planner’s list of interview questions. Initially, the sampling goal was to obtain roughly equal numbers of community organizations and planners.

Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy(2006) identify a variety of sampling techniques for qualitative research projects. Additionally, they point out that a research project may start with one sampling technique and, during the course of the research, switch to another sampling technique (p. 70). This is what happened in this project.

According to Wellington and Szczerbinski (2007), there are nine types of purposeful, non-probability sampling common in qualitative research projects. A “convenience” sampling method was initially attempted prior to the fieldwork beginning. Well-known organizations and academics were identified and contacted with a request for an interview. Several initial interviews were setup in this way. However once the fieldwork began, the sampling technique switched to a combination of snowball sampling and opportunistic sampling. Wellington and Szczerbinski define opportunistic sampling as “selecting people and settings that present themselves during the fieldwork” (p. 66) and snowball sampling as “one case suggests another who suggests another (also called “ancestry” or “recommendation” sampling)” (p. 66).

Table 2.1 Distribution of interviewee types in the Belfast interviews

Interview Code	Type of Interviewee	Public Sector	Private Sector	NGO or Community
<b>Planners and Policy Makers</b>				
BPL1	Planner	√		
BPL2	Planner/policy maker	√		
BPL3	Planner	√	√	
BPL4	Planner/policy maker	√		
BPL5	Planner	√		
BPL6*	Planner	√		
BPL7	Planner/academic	√		
BPL8	Planner/academic	√		
<b>Community Workers and Peacebuilders</b>				
BCW1	Community worker			√
BCW2	Community worker			√
BCW3	Peacebuilder/academic			√
BCW4	Peacebuilder/community worker			√
BCW5	Politician	√		
BCW6	Community worker			√

(Table credit: J. Miller)

Table 2.1 (above) and Table 2.2 (below) illustrate the spread of interviews between public or private sector and NGO or community organizations. Planners with experience in more than one sector are included as both. Interview participants were never asked what their religious affiliation, or their nationalist views were, however a number of participants did self-identify. In Belfast, it is very difficult for an outsider to locate someone politically or religiously, and consequently no determination of that is included in the research. In Jerusalem, all community workers interviewed were Palestinian, with the exception of one Israeli peacebuilder. The reverse is true for planners. All planners were Israeli, with the exception of one Palestinian planner. Again, participants were not asked to self-identify, but all did. The issue of identity appears to be more salient in the discussion of Jerusalem. Consequently, this has been noted in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Distribution of interviewee types in the Jerusalem interviews

Interview	Type of Interviewee	I	P	Public Sector	Private Sector	NGO or Community
<b>Planners</b>						
JPL1	Planner	√			√	
JPL2	Planner/peacebuilder	√			√	√
JPL3	Planner/peacebuilder	√			√	√
JPL4	Planner/peacebuilder	√			√	√
JPL5	Planner/peacebuilder	√			√	√
JPL6	Planner/academic	√		√		√
JPL7	Planner		√		√	
JPL8*	Planner	√		√		
<b>Community Workers and Peacebuilders</b>						
JCW1	Community worker		√			√
JCW2	Community worker		√			√
JCW3	Community worker		√			√
JCW5	Peacebuilders	√				√

Note: In columns 3 and 4, I=Israeli and P=Palestinian

(Table credit: J. Miller)

### 2.3 Reliability and Validity

Case study methodology is “not as explicitly described as other methods, ...and thus leaves more analytic discretion to the research” (Padgett, 2008, p.34). The case studies presented here can be thought of as a mixed methods research project. The main method of data collection was a series of semi-structured interviews in the study cities. The information in the transcribed sound files was triangulated with the literature

review and the secondary data sources in an effort to increase the validity of the research findings. This form of triangulation is considered to be methodological triangulation.

Triangulation is defined by Cohen and Manion (as cited in Wellington & Szczerbinski, 2007 p. 34) as “the use of two or more methods of data collection in the study of some aspect of human behaviour.” This form of triangulation is considered to be methodological triangulation, and is used in this research to make decisions on important ideas and themes. The validity of the theme or idea is strengthened when it is supported by several research methods.

Data triangulation is another form of triangulation in qualitative research, and is seen as person triangulation and space triangulation in this research. Person triangulation was considered when deciding if a concept or idea was appearing in the data. At least two people needed to discuss an idea or concept for it to be included as research results. In the presentation of the commonalities between the two study cities, space triangulation is used. In this case, the same idea or concept is triangulated for inclusion first in the results from the study city, and then again with results from the other study city in order to be included.

Reliability is more difficult to assess for this research. There is no way to judge the level of reliability of the study participants. Statement of fact can be checked via other data sources, but interviewee’s opinions and perceptions must be accepted as reliable, in the absence of any contrary evidence. On occasion, during an interview, I considered that an interviewee might not believe a statement they professed, however these moments were few and are not considered significant in the research.

## **2.4 Ethics**

Ethical considerations should be central to the research process. Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2006) list a number of questions that they consider to be important when considering ethical aspects of qualitative research. These include:

- *What moral principals guide your research?*
- *How do ethical issues enter into your selection of a research problem?*
- *How do ethical issues affect how you conduct your research – the design of your study, your sampling procedure?*
- *What responsibility do you have to your research subjects?*
- *What ethical issues/dilemmas might come into play in deciding what research findings you publish?*
- *Will your research directly benefit those who participated in the study?*

*(Nagy Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006, p. 86)*

These are fair questions and should be contemplated in designing and reporting a research project. The moral principles of the researcher likely have the largest influence on the selection of the research problem and provide the moral guideposts during the research. In this research project, the guiding principal was an honest desire to examine contested space and find something redeeming in that context; something that might guide professional planning practice in a positive way.

Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2006) document one interviewer dilemma of “faking rapport” with interviewees to draw out “real feelings” (p. 97). A feeling of being disingenuous was not noticed during the interview process. However, in Jerusalem, some interview subjects were clearly sensitive to a negative “external opinion” to some actions by the Israeli government. When this was noticed, an effort was made to make clear to the interviewee that the purpose of the study was not to assign blame to one side of the conflict or other. Although assigning blame is not the purpose of the study, it must be stated that some facts on the ground are very unjust making it difficult to report on planning issues, in the context of Jerusalem, in an even handed manner.

The processes of the University of Manitoba Joint-Faculty Research Ethics Board (JFREB) guided the interviewer’s responsibility to the research subjects. The JFREB reviewed the research proposal to confirm that proper ethical considerations had been accounted for. Approval of this research project is included in Appendix F.

### **2.4.1 Informed Consent**

Interview subjects were provided with information on the purpose of the study and asked to sign an informed consent form prior to the interview commencing. Informed consent documents were also prepared for translators, however there was never an occasion to use these documents. Additionally, although undue duress of research subjects was not considered to be likely, a list of counseling services in each city was prepared. There was never an occasion when an interviewee appeared to require emotional support after the interview and these were never required. Copies of the informed consent documents are included in Appendix G.

There were several interviews without the informed consent process going as planned. On two occasions the form was not available during the interview. One interviewee provided verbal consent on the digital recording; the second interviewee provided email consent subsequent to the interview. Additionally, one interview was conducted by telephone because it was impossible to get a meeting with this person prior to the fieldwork ending. On that occasion, informed consent was obtained verbally and the interview was not recorded.

## **2.5 Data Analysis**

In qualitative research, the data analysis begins in the interview. Already at that stage, as a research, you are probing the areas you are interested in, and discovering ideas and knowledge that you follow-up with in subsequent interviews. The analysis continued during the transcription phase. I found that I needed to listen to the interviews several times over. To assist with that, on the second listen, I also drew concept maps on large sheets of paper to link ideas that were being discussed to the themes that were emerging in other interviews. By doing these two additional exercises, I was able to gain a better sense of the transcription before using the coding software.

### **2.5.1 Coding and Thematic Development**

Coding and thematic development is a very commonly used analytic procedure used in qualitative research, although the process of coding can vary greatly (Padgett, 2008; Nagy Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006; Wellington & Szczerbinski, 2007). Grounded theory coding was developed initially by Glaser and Strauss in the late 1960s and is generally used to refer to a process whereby the “codes” and “themes” emerge from the data and are eventually refined into a theory that is grounded in the data. Initially a grounded theory approach was used with the first few interviews that were analyzed for this project. During the transcription phase, several “sensitizing concepts” (Padgett, 2008) were identified as early potential codes; other codes emerged during the analysis of the first few interviews.

Although open coding in this manner is identified as a normal starting point for qualitative analysis, the number of codes appeared to grow exponentially and it was difficult to identify areas of particular interest from a planning perspective.

Consequently, a decision was taken early in the coding process, to examine the data with the lens of human needs, as defined by Max-Neef (1992; Max-Neef, Elizalde, & Hopenhayn, 1989). Max-Neef’s human needs framework is discussed in Section 3.2.1. Once this decision was taken, it was possible fit pre-existing codes into the human needs framework and determine redundant codes. It also became easier to isolate “doing” themes from “interacting” themes, but still identify their relationship to a fundamental human need, and to each other.

The interview transcripts were analyzed using the quantitative analysis program Atlas.ti, version 6.0.12. This program allowed me the freedom to easily manipulate coding, change code hierarchies, and to visually display the connections between ideas.

Although Atlas.ti is a powerful analysis tool, in this research it was primarily used to assist in organizing the analysis.

### **2.5.2 Coding process**

After making the decision to use a theoretical framework of human needs, the original open codes remained a part of the coding process. These codes were attached, on a theoretical level, to the broader needs based codes, however the coding continued with all the codes at the same level in one list. Additionally, although the theoretical needs based codes very broadly covered much of the material discussed in the interviews, other codes were periodically added as the coding proceeded. Additional codes were included for one of two reasons. Sometimes the needs based code was so broad that a more specific code was needed to deal with a recurring idea specific to planning, for example, “freedom of movement” and “access” were both added during the coding although both could be covered with the needs based code of “freedom”. The second reason for an additional code was to deal with an issue that was specific to the context, such as discussion of the planning of the old Girdwood Barracks site in Belfast.

When all the data had been initially coded, text that was coded in the same way was examined as a whole. These compilations by code were considered for further sub-coding. In a counter process, sub-codes were also considered for collapsing into another code. This was a back and forth process of bringing data together and breaking it apart again before the final sub-codes were decided upon. The final themes and subthemes are compiled into Appendices D and E, along with the key findings.

## **2.6 Chapter Summary**

The research project described in this chapter, attempts to identify planning activities that have had a positive or negative effect on the peacebuilding activities of community organizations in two study cities – Belfast and Jerusalem. A case study, mixed methods approach was used, including a literature review, semi-structured interviews of key informants in each city, and the examination of secondary data sources.

Primary data sources include the original sound files and interview transcripts from 26 key informant interviews in the study cities. The key informant sample was obtained

using a “convenience” sample of well-known organizations or academics in the study cities, and changed to a combination of “snowball” sampling and “opportunistic” sampling during the course of the fieldwork. Secondary data sources are included in the research to obtain the contextual richness expected in case study research.

The semi-structured interviews were conducted after obtaining informed consent from each study participant. The conduct of the interviewer and the form of the study proposal was governed by the University of Manitoba ethics guidelines, and an honest desire to contribute something of value to the field of planning, drawing from experiences of planning in contested spaces.

A case study analysis implies a research project with a certain measure of complexity and depth. To that end, the analysis phase of this research project includes a number of secondary data sources, as well as transcriptions from 26 interviews in the two study cities of Belfast, Northern Ireland and Jerusalem, Israel/Palestine. Organization of the data was an early problem encountered during data analysis, but this was alleviated to a large extent with the use of Atlas.ti, a qualitative analysis software package.

The process of coding and thematic development employed the use of Max-Neef’s human needs framework, as described in Section 3.2.1. This is considered a valid theoretical framework for the data analysis because, according to Max-Neef, human needs are universal, but satisfiers of those needs are culturally specific. Given that this research includes two cities, linked by protracted conflict, but in many other ways different from each other, the use of fundamental human needs provides a common framework for analysis and comparison.

## **Chapter 3 Literature Review**

Most contemporary planning discourse is based on assumptions of a prosperous, liberal, democratic context of application. The dominance of such planning discourse implies influence in contexts where these assumptions are not valid, such as contested cities. Application of this discourse in planning processes in contested cities does little to acknowledge the conflict. Rather, these processes are sometimes used to actively oppress and dominate the minority group. Planners working in these environments do not necessarily have the appropriate resources to combat the conflict. They may even feel that dealing with the situation is outside their role as planners. However, planners should be engaged in shaping urban space, the backdrop of daily life for local citizens. Consequently, as citizen needs shift during a conflict, planners need to be concerned with providing environments to meet those needs. At the same time, it behooves planners to recognize that the conflict is a temporary manifestation of injustice. Planning choices should not create a built environment that reinforces that injustice. This leaves planners in a position requiring constant monitoring of planning decisions for evidence of true justice and the production of a built environment that will aid peaceful interactions in urban space.

### **3.1 Planning theory in contested cities**

There are three contemporary planning theories that show promise in contested cities. Communicative planning, multicultural planning, and the Just City theories provide a planning toolkit that can be used to assist planners in decision-making and the planning process in contested environments. Additionally, although contemporary theorists might argue against the value of the scientific rational planning model, some researchers have observed the use of rational planning as a peacebuilding planning technique. It seems likely that the extent of the usefulness of any theory depends on the

local context, most especially the epistemology of the stakeholders and the location on the conflict bell curve of the current situation.

### **3.1.1 Communicative planning theory**

One contemporary planning theory that has shown promise in multi-ethnic environments is the concept of collaborative planning and consensus building. This “collaborative turn” in planning is based on communicative planning theory summarized as an interactive and interpretive process that is inherently place-based. Communication between conflicted parties is used to identify and mediate conflict and build a common understanding (Healey, 1992). According to Foster (2004), collaborative planning is useful in situations of political and social fragmentation and conflicting values.

Collaborative and communicative planning drew inspiration from Habermas’ theory of discourse. John Forester and other researchers were inspired by him, and they placed communication as the most important aspect of planning practice (Watson, 2002). The collaborative planning process is essentially interaction with stakeholders or interest groups, “communicating ideas, forming arguments, debating differences in understanding” (Watson, 2002, p. 29) and finally reaching a collective course of action. The process creates communication between diverse groups. At its best, it will leave a lasting legacy of understanding and community capacity.

There are a number of fundamental criteria for an effective collaborative planning process. The first is consensual discourse. The stakeholders in the process must be willing to participate in the collaborative process in order for all parties to air their grievances and feel they are being listened to. Thus the process is built on ideals of openness and diversity, and requires that the collaborative process be transparent to participants. Like Habermas, communicative planning theorists have faith in civil society’s ability to uphold principles of democracy. Healey (1999) states that planning “seeks ways of recovering a new participatory realization of democracy and of reconstituting a vigorous, inclusive public realm that can focus the activity of governance according to the concerns of civil society” (p. 119). While the

communicative theorists do not ignore the realities of power, they hold the belief that if the public discourse is properly managed, then it is always possible to reach a voluntary binding agreement. Central to this faith in process is the concept of universal citizenship, where differences between stakeholders can be overcome through reasoned argument and discourse.

Communication theory is primarily directed at planners, switching the focus from the planner as technical expert to the planner as facilitator. Communication theorists believe that just processes will produce just results. The focus of the planning activity is on the communicative process. Since there is an inherent belief that a consensual plan of action reached during a just process will produce just outcomes, there is little analysis of the outcomes of a planning process. "For communicative planning theorists, this has come to mean that the aim of planning is a just process, and that if the process is just, the outcome will be as well" (Watson, 2002). In terms of peacebuilding, consensus seeking processes have the benefit of building shared understandings and mutual trust. This can linger on as cultural capital that aids future peacebuilding initiatives. An example of this is documented by Foster's case study of the Peace I program in Northern Ireland. In the Peace I program, collaborative planning was successfully used to build consensus in a conflicted area (Foster, 2004). However, although there are a number of successful applications of collaborative planning, there are also recent arguments against the application of this process in all situations. According to Yiftachel (2006) there is a mismatch of communication theorists and the "stubborn realities" of planning in a south-eastern context. He defines the terms south-east and north-west loosely, recognizing there is a wide variety of planning contexts representing a continuum that defies a rigid classification. However, in general, north-western is defined as "prosperous, liberal societies, where property relations are relatively stable, and where most individuals, even members of minorities, have reasonable (though often less than desirable) personal liberties, existential security and basic welfare provision" (pp. 214-215). South-eastern, in contrast, does not have these advantages and more southern and eastern countries fall into this category than the north-western countries in North

America and Europe. Since communicative theory is based on a civil democratic ideal, Yiftachel notes that in many south-eastern contexts liberalism is “at best a sectoral agenda and mainly economic agenda; property systems are fluid; inter-group conflicts over territory inform daily practices and result in the essentialization of ‘deep’ ethnic, caste, and racial identities” (Yiftachel, 2006, p. 213). Yiftachel’s response to these stubborn realities is discussed in Section 3.1.4.

### **3.1.2 Multicultural planning theory**

The second contemporary planning theory that has relevance for peacebuilding is multicultural planning theory. Leonie Sandercock is one of the most well-known multicultural planning theorists. Multicultural planning theory can be thought of as a development of communicative planning theory, but it has its differences (Watson, 2002). Sandercock is opposed to the idea of universal citizenship. Rather she sees society as structured by the relationships between culturally different groups and the multiple identities of each person. This multiplicity is to be affirmed and promoted, not repressed. “The role of the planner is to link knowledge to action” (Watson, 2002, p.32), thus empowering marginalized groups to oppose oppression.

Sandercock’s “epistemology of multiplicity” suggests that planners need to embrace multiple ways of knowing, retaining the scientific way of knowing as just one form of knowledge (Sandercock, 1998). Six additional ways of knowing are identified and planners are encouraged to include all of them in planning education, and by extension in the participatory processes used by practicing planners. These ways of knowing – “knowing through dialogue, from experience, through gaining local knowledge of the specific and concrete, through learning to read symbolic non-verbal evidence, through contemplation, and through action planning” (p. 76) – allow a greater range of cultural participation since they imply alternative forms of citizen participation, forms that include culturally appropriate participatory processes. Echoing Sandercock, Burayidi states:

“Western modernity and its values can no longer be presented as universal in contrast to other forms of knowledge. Hence, the need to broaden our understanding of the knowledge construction process and to embrace other ways of knowing that have been marginalized in the process of modernity” (Burayidi, 2000, p. 3).

Sandercock, and other writers (Burayidi, 2000; Meyer and Reaves, 2000; Yichifel, 1995), have pointed out that planning, as we understand it today, is a child of western Enlightenment thought, and consequently is a kind of “decision-technology.” Sandercock (1998) suggests two reasons for examining the epistemology of the planning processes. The first reason is legitimacy and the second, closely tied to legitimacy, is authority. What is the source of our knowledge and how and when do we know what we know? Central to multicultural planning is the idea that all epistemologies are legitimate and are to be given equal standing. Thus, culturally defined groups should have participatory processes that are appropriate to their particular epistemology (Umemoto, 2001).

Both Sandercock and Burayidi note that cultures differ in their approach to knowing:

“Ethno-cultural groups differ in their approaches to knowing...African cultures prefer affective ways of knowing involving touching, seeing and feeling. Asian cultures...emphasize knowledge gained through striving towards transcendence. European cultures prefer knowledge and information gained through cognitive means, such as counting and measuring” (Burayidi, 2000, p.7).

[In some Native American cultures], “knowing was founded on suggestion, example, divining, drawing out, showing and storytelling” (Sandercock, 1998, p. 81).

According to Burayidi “the procedural approach to planning” should vary according to cultural groups, since various cultural groups have different “approaches to knowing” (Burayidi, 2000, p. 5). The most effective way to modify the procedural approach to planning is to modify the decision-making institutions, permitting representation of more diverse groups (Meyer and Reaves, 2000, p. 94). However, given the vast cultural differences between various segments within many urban populations, it is important to search for common ground between the populations.

Like the communicative theorists, Sandercock makes assumptions regarding the possibility of reaching consensus between groups. This assumption makes the application of the multicultural process questionable in some contested situations. The difference for multicultural planning theorists is that consensus is to be built between groups, but this consensus is still intended to affirm differences and may result in an intergroup action against the state (Watson, 2002). Sandercock argues that planners often have to position themselves outside of institutional planning in support of local communities against the state, while Healey directs her communicative planning theory primarily at institutional planners.

### **3.1.3 Just City approach**

Susan Fainstein (2000; 2005) is one of the leading theorists on the Just City concept. In the Just City concept the planner is an advocate of a program of urban justice, rather than an advocate for a particular group, as suggested in Davidoff's concept of advocacy planning (Davidoff, 1965). In the Just City model, the planner is required to ask constantly "Is this just?" Although supportive of participatory processes, the Just City theory is more concerned with results, than with process. The theory is concerned with the outcomes of spatial form and the distributive effect that form has on city life. In this, the Marxist leanings of this theory can be seen. Additionally, unlike multicultural theory, all groups are not considered to have an equal claim. With consideration of what is just, some claims would be denied for having an oppressive affect on another group.

According to Fainstein (2000), Just City theorists fall into one of two categories. The first group, radical democrats, believes in governance by civil society and that social change occurs when groups previously excluded from power exercise it. The second group, a political economy group, believes that a "persuasive vision of the Just City needs to incorporate an entrepreneurial state that not only provides welfare, but also generates increased wealth" (Fainstein, 2000, p. 468). Fainstein counts herself among the political economy group and focuses much of her discussion on this strand of the just theory concept. However Fainstein is careful to stress that the entrepreneurial state must not

take precedence over the social justice and equitable distribution of benefits. She uses Amsterdam, Holland and the Indian state of Kerala, as examples of Just locales where “private capital accumulation and a market economy” are enjoyed “while maintaining a large nonmarket sector.” In order to ensure a just environment, Fainstein notes that the citizens of Amsterdam and Kerala “possess a set of social rights, not just political rights” (Fainstein, 2000, p 471).

The Just City theorists believe that collaborative processes are vulnerable to being overtaken by vocal lobby groups, such as neo-liberals and fundamental religious groups. In fact, Fainstein believes that democracies in general have this vulnerability. She notes “democratic rule can deprive minorities of their livelihood, freedom, or self-expression” (Fainstein, 2000, p. 469). Consequently, Fainstein advocates that the “criterion for evaluating a group’s claims should not be procedural rules alone.” The evaluation “must comprise an analysis of whether realization of the group’s goals is possible and, if so, whether such realization leaves intact the principle of social justice” (Fainstein, 2000, p. 469). Watson (2006) and Campell (2006) agree that collaborative processes in planning must be tempered by “situated ethical judgement” of the outcome of the processes. Given that public processes can be overtaken by groups seeking to dominate, decision-making must include additional deliberation in order to ensure just outcomes.

Fainstein is critical of the communicative model’s attempt to “counteract a top-down form of planning by experts deploying an Enlightenment discourse” (Fainstein, 2000, p. 453) with a more qualitative and interpretive inquiry. Although the communicative model demonstrates ideals of openness and diversity, it suffers from the fault of making the planner “the central element of discussion,” with both the context and the planning outcome fading from view (Fainstein, 2000; Sandercock, 1998). More seriously, Fainstein suggests “communicative theorists avoid dealing with the classic topic of what to do when open processes produce unjust results” (p. 457). This is a particularly serious problem in environments of heightened ethnic tension with a potential for polarization.

Fainstein is closer to Sandercock's multicultural theory in recognizing that governments might not be neutral or benevolent. She directs her arguments at urban leadership existing primarily outside of government agencies (Watson, 2002). This direction is supported by Bollens who believes that just planning, in polarized environments, will initially be guided by leaders from outside the bureaucratic state. These urban leaders will confront the status quo. Their role will be to highlight the unequal outcomes of the planning policies used by state planners always asking "Is this just?" (Bollens, 1999).

When examining planning processes from a Just City perspective, one must judge on results and not just on intentions. This is the main departure of Just City theorists from collaborative planning theory. The results will demonstrate the effectiveness of the process from a justice point of view. Watson (2006) supports this view of planning and agrees that planning processes must be judged on their outcomes and should be considered "deliberative," indicating sound decision-making strategies (p. 43). Deep difference can lie between citizens of the same city, and while there might not be a universally acceptable notion of social rationality, there is a notion of social justice that is of valid concern to everyone. Thus, Watson (2006) suggests using Harvey's six propositions for social justice as a starting point for planning deliberations. Briefly, these are: 1) confront directly political and social organizations that are exploitive to labour; 2) confront the phenomenon of marginalization and search for ways to mitigate it and empower captive groups; 3) empower the oppressed to organize as groups to access political power; 4) be sensitive to issues of cultural imperialism and eliminate this attitude in public processes; 5) contain increasing levels of personal and institutional violence in a non-militarized form; and finally, 6) seek to mitigate negative effects on the environment (Watson, 2006, p. 46).

The most serious criticism of Just City theory is related to the judgment of the validity of group claims. If not all group claims are equal, who is to judge whose claims are valid and whose claims constitute oppression of another group? Campbell (2006) seeks to deal with this criticism by introducing reason and linking it to the concept of justice.

Campbell (2006) argues that practical reasoning always takes place in a specific context. In order to identify important particularities of the context, the planner must be grounded in a “universal” value system that will inform reasoned action. “Justice is not about absolutes, for planners can never fully comprehend nor control their contexts; but planning has no meaning in the absence of action, and that implies closure around a particular course of action” (p.103). She goes on to suggest that an appreciation of multiple truths does not mean an appreciation of no truths. In this idea, she is firmly placing Just City theory outside of postmodern thinking, suggesting that relative value and merit be considered carefully. “A relational understanding of justice is necessary to avoid narrow, essentialized forms of local justice” (p.103).

#### **3.1.4 A south-eastern planning theory?**

The hegemony of western culture is evident in almost all the processes used in modern planning practices, from the methodology of knowledge acquisition, to methods of reaching a decision and forms of public participation. This is not surprising since Yiftachel (1995) traces the roots of modern planning to the atrocious living conditions of the rapidly industrializing cities of Europe in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Although the western epistemology of planning may not be surprising, it can lead to some serious problems in practice when applied in multicultural environments, such as most western cities. The applicability of western epistemological theory in non-western cities is even more questionable. In a later paper, Yiftachel (2006) argues that theories that arise in “north-western” liberal democracies do not match the realities of planners in “south-eastern” cities, those cities that fall outside of the definition of prosperous, liberal democracies where “ethnicity has by and large been privatized and homeland issues have been often appeased during the recent period of “long peace and economic prosperity” (Yiftachel, 2006, p. 219). He calls for the conceptualization of new meso-level “theories that which would genuinely engage with the framing realities of various south eastern regions”(Yiftachel, 2006, p. 212).

Yiftachel's criticisms of collaborative and discursive forms of planning are not significantly different than other criticisms of these planning theories. The focus is on the planner and not on planning, which he defines as "the broader arena of publicly guided transformation of space" (Yiftachel, 2006, p. 213). According to Yiftachel (2006), this has left a void for those working in a south-eastern context where decision processes are less transparent and planning is about "facts on the ground." Although he rightly acknowledges the valuable contributions of communicative planning thought, he points out that its focus on process has left a distorted balance between the procedural and substantive aspects of planning. According to Yiftachel (2006), this is most problematic in the "stubborn realities" of the south-eastern context, where discourse may never lead to consensus and may in fact be used to legitimize planning oppression of marginalized groups. Where deep ethno-national differences exist, the legitimacy of the state is questioned by at least one side in the conflict. When the territorial objectives of each side are mutually exclusive, resolution may be impossible. Planning in a south-eastern context implies "liberalism is not a stable constitutional order, but at best a sectoral agenda and mainly economic agenda; where property systems are fluid; inter-group conflicts over territory inform daily practices and result in the essentialization of "deep" ethnic, caste, and racial identities" (Yiftachel, 2006, p. 213).

Yiftachel (2006) calls for a south-eastern perspective of planning theory that is at the forefront of devising resistance. These planning theories might then equip planners working in cities like Jerusalem, Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina), and Colombo (Sri Lanka) "with a range of strategies to contest spatial oppression, developmental inequalities, and essentialized ethnicities" (Yiftachel, 2006, p. 219). These potential new theories while grounded in a south-eastern reality will have a great deal of potential in the north-west as well. While a clear theory coming out of the south-east might not yet be evident, there are several possibilities related to community development worth considering. These are outlined in Section 3.2, below. It certainly can be argued that spatial oppression exists in most cities world wide, and the legacy of planning decisions lasts long after the decision has been made. Thus, while process is important, the reality

of the outcomes, good or bad, remains in the spatial reality of the city long after the decision making process is forgotten.

### **3.2 Planning and Human Needs**

Yiftachel (2006) calls for a south-eastern planning theory, Sandercock (2003; 1998) embraces an “epistemology of multiplicity”, while other theorists call for Just Cities and processes of discourse. It is not surprising if these conflicting theories cause questions to arise. Questions such as the following seem very justified:

1. Is there a right way to consider planning in cities undergoing deep conflict?
2. What is the most just way to approach planning, not just questioning if the actions of the planner are just?
3. Is there another way to consider planning that can embrace all these theories?
4. Are basic human needs, for which planning should ultimately provide, ethno-culturally different?

Gwendolyn Hallsmith (2003) is one writer who concerns herself both with cities and with how cities meet human needs. She illustrates how communities meet human needs by using two small cities as contrasting cases, demonstrating how both communities use a variety of systems to meet the needs of its citizens. These needs are comprised of the need for:

1. social development;
2. governance;
3. economic resources; and
4. material goods (p.13).

Although the cities she uses as case studies are in different countries, with different cultures, the needs can be essentialized to these common concepts. However, it is quite likely that in each of these cities, what would constitute meeting a need would be fundamentally different. When a citizen of Naryn, Kyrgystan speaks of housing, what is

in her mind is likely different than a citizen of Randolph, USA. However, a house will have some common features, most importantly it will physically shelter a family.

Hallsmith (2003) defines human needs “as the lack of something required to live whole human lives (p. 28).” Using this definition it is easy to recognize that the discussion of human needs should be a part of the discussion of planning in any city, but most especially in a city distressed by protracted conflict. Certainly, in situations of conflict, there is ample evidence that for a wide variety of citizens there is a lack of something required to live whole human lives. If Sandercock’s theory of multiplicity is applied here, we could say that what constitutes whole human lives is defined by a person’s epistemology and ways of knowing.

### **3.2.1 Human needs framework**

This is a concept that Manfred Max-Neef (1992; Max-Neef, Elizalde, & Hopenhayn, 1989) appears to be trying to get at in his matrix of human needs and satisfiers. Max-Neef is an economist who, in the 1980s, was trying to solve the puzzle of developmental economics in Latin America. It was clear that “north-western” economic theories were failing in Latin America and Max-Neef proposed designing an economic development system aimed at adequate satisfaction of human needs. This resulted in his proposal for Human Scale Development (1992; Max-Neef, Elizalde, & Hopenhayn, 1989).

“Such development is focused and based on the satisfaction of fundamental human needs, on the generation of growing levels of self-reliance, and on the construction of organic articulations of people with nature and technology, of global processes with local activity, of the personal with the social, of planning with autonomy, and of civil society and the state, where ‘articulation’ is taken to mean the constructions of coherent and consistent relations of balanced interdependence among given elements” (Max-Neef, 1992; p. 197).

Max-Neef (1992; Max-Neef, Elizalde, & Hopenhayn, 1989) identifies nine human needs: subsistence, protection, affection, understanding participation, creation, leisure, identity, and freedom. These needs are common to all humans and across history. Although the needs are not culturally specific, how the needs are satisfied is specific to the time in history and the cultural context. All needs are interrelated and, with the

exception of subsistence, no hierarchies exist in the theory. This is contrary to some previous theories on human needs, such as Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, which postulates that people move from material needs, to social needs, to moral or self-actualization needs in a progression. As the previous needs are met other needs present themselves (Kamenetzky, 1992). In Max-Neef's framework, any fundamental human need that is not met reveals a human poverty, with the potential to develop pathology. Examples of poverties of subsistence are insufficient income, food or shelter. Poverties of protection might be due to poor health systems or violence, and poverty of identity might be due to the imposition of alien values upon local or regional cultures, or forced migrations (Max-Neef, 1992, p. 200). These poverties, if sufficiently deficient, can manifest as pathologies, such as the political pathologies of fear, violence, and marginalization, all common enough issues in contested cities.

Human needs are considered from four different "existential" categories – being, having, doing, and interacting. A shortened form of Max-Neef's matrix of human needs is located in Appendix C. Marian Simon Rojo (2009) identifies Max-Neef's "interacting" column as the settings, or examples of spaces in the matrix. When examining human needs in public spaces, she understands these to have a spatial frame and thus most important to the work of a planner. However, when also interested in the roles that planners play in civic discourse, or peacebuilding activities, it is also necessary to focus on the "doing" column. For planners, one advantage of Max-Neef's framework is the two-fold character of needs: that of deprivation and potential (Max-Neef, 1992, p.201). Need deprivation is when a need is identified as lacking, and potential is the degree to which that deprivation will engage and mobilize people. Unmet human needs have the potential to mobilize action, which can be positive, however that action might manifest as a pathology under conditions of excessive deprivation; mobilization of a pathological nature is not likely positive for civil society.

Since fundamental needs are universal, the application of human needs in planning should be culturally neutral, as long as awareness is maintained of the cultural specifics

of the need satisfiers. Satisfiers include social practices, values and norms, spaces and political structures (Max-Neef, 1992, p. 201). Although the Human Scale Development theory was not specifically conceived for planning, many of the concepts of development are also concepts of city or regional planning. Indeed, Rojo(2009) applies the concept of human needs to her analysis of the character and quality of public space in Spain. Planning is by nature concerned with some aspects of all the nine universal human needs. Perhaps a *universal humanist approach* to planning is to incorporate human needs into a new planning model.

### **3.2.2 Integral theory and human needs**

Looking at human needs in planning is a holistic approach to planning practice. Integral theory is another holistic theory that has gained some cache in community development work, but has not been applied in spatial planning specifically. Hochachka (2005), like Max-Neef, notes that most development approaches focus on tangible aspects of community, but do not represent the entire spectrum of human needs. Hochachka describes the integral approach to community development as seeking to address both tangible and intangible human needs simultaneously. Unlike more traditional approaches to development, integral theory does not assume that intangible needs will automatically be met by meeting tangible human needs (p. 38).

“An integral approach to community development is an approach that seeks to address material needs of communities (such as food security, health care, economic stability and shelter) and also to provide opportunities for fundamental changes to take place in how individuals see themselves and their roles in the community dynamics. To do this, an integral approach to development includes the objective, intersubjective and subjective aspects of individuals and the community, a meshwork of practical solutions, interactive processes, and personal growth” (Hockachka, 2005, p. 40).

The resulting development empowers the local community and allows them to see themselves differently, in relation to each other and the wider world. Hockachka (2005) observes that human evolution always brings greater differentiation, which brings with it a possibility of greater pathology when not matched with new and equal integration.

The potential for pathology to occur in each evolutionary step links this theory to Max-Neef, but Hockachka also takes this further by noting that where pathologies exist, healing must occur to counteract them (p.52). Examples of successful integral development work include the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement in Sri Lanka, which arose in a context of intense civil violence. Thousands of villages were engaged in community development work that included contemplative collective visioning and practical action at the village level. The process addressed exterior components, such as economic security and governance, but also interior psychocultural issues such as community and family wellness and awareness and world views. According to Hockachka, shifts at this level will have a profound impact on how the society operates as a whole and this may have true implications for peacebuilding (Hockachka , 2005, p. 62).

### **3.3 Planning and peacebuilding**

Bollens (1998; 1999) identifies three urban policy and governance strategies, neutral, equity, and resolver, used in conflicted cities to advance urban peace. Neutral planning is essentially rational planning where the planner is expected to be value neutral and colour-blind. Planning decisions are made based on a rational analysis of what is identified to be in the best public interest. In Bollens words, neutral planning “employs technical criteria in allocating urban resources and services, and distances itself from issues of ethnic identity, power inequalities, and political exclusion” (Bollens, 1999, p. 21). This planning technique does not attempt to actively build peace. Rather, it attempts to neutralize conflict.

The second strategy identified by Bollens is equity planning. In equity planning, the planner recognizes that some groups may actually require remediation of past wrongs and affirmative action policies to be treated with justice in various planning situations. This type of planning is most closely aligned with advocacy planning described by Davidoff (1965). Advocacy planning suggests that positive discrimination is required to equalize the condition for all subordinate groups. Likewise, Bollens suggests that equity

planning “gives primacy to certain ethnic subgroups in the population in order to decrease historic and contemporary intergroup inequalities” (Bollens, 1999, p. 25). Equity planning uses equity-based criteria such as “relative size or need” to assess the best course of action in a situation (Bollens, 1998, p. 687).

The final planning strategy identified by Bollens is the resolver strategy, which is the most demanding strategy of the three. The resolver strategy “seeks to transcend urban-based symptoms by emphasizing solutions to the root causes of urban polarization – political imbalances, subordination, disempowerment, and threatened group identity. In this way it attempts to connect urban-peacebuilding to national peacemaking” (Bollens, 1999; p.27). This planning strategy is most closely aligned with the Just City concept, but appears to have elements of collaborative and multicultural planning theory. In the Just City model, planning must, in every situation, ask the question “What is just?” The resolver concept appears to have the same spirit as the “therapy” method described by Sandercock. According to Sandercock, the purpose of the therapy method is to “encourage the “real issues” at stake to be aired” and to create a space “where perceptions might shift, where public learning might occur, and some larger transformation take place” (Sandercock, 2003, p. 161). Bollens identifies the resolver strategy as the most likely strategy to produce long-term urban peace, however it may not be a model that can be employed in every planning situation.

### **3.4 Polarized vs. multicultural cities**

Polarization in cities exists in a variety of ways. One is the polarization based on cultural or ethnic identity, and this is the form of polarization at the root of the conflict in most contested cities. However, another form of polarization might be the polarization between rich and poor, and in both, contested cities, and multicultural cities, this divide is also strongly tied to an ethnic or cultural identity. In many western cities, there exists a growing polarization between the rich and poor, and between the urban and suburban. It might be argued that this growing polarization is between the dominant culture or dominant ethnicity and “the other.” In most western cities “the other” is not

strongly tied to a single ethnic or cultural identity. “The other” is instead anyone who does not fit comfortably in the dominant culture, either by virtue of poverty, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or a myriad of other reasons that make people feel unwelcome.

Occasionally it is possible to see the potential for conflict in multicultural cities. In discussing the Los Angeles riots of 1992, Sandercock notes that Los Angeles has, perhaps, an over-used reputation of being a “worst-case scenario of racial and ethnic conflict, social polarization and residential segregation. It is a city marked by enormous gulfs ... between rich, well-guarded suburbs and decaying and crime-plagued inner-cities; between citizens and non-citizens; between a dominant culture and minority cultures” (Sandercock, 1998, p.13). If many western cities are also becoming increasingly polarized, what is the difference between polarized cities and non-polarized cities, and more importantly, how can non-polarized cities with a high populations of “others” prevent a slide into a polarized situation?

Bollens argues that in non-polarized cities, there is a belief “by all groups that the system of governance is properly configured and capable of producing fair outcomes” (Bollens, 1999, p. 5). Although non-polarized cities can have a similar physical form to polarized cities in socio-economic and ethnic divisions, evident in the composition of neighbourhoods, in polarized cities not all groups accept the legitimacy of the government. The intrinsic mistrust by the subordinate group(s) creates a situation where even minor house-keeping policies are regarded with suspicion, the ability of the policy to produce just results for all ethnic groups is questioned, and the government itself is considered to be artificial or imposed on the minority group (Bollens, 1998, 1999).

It is fair to argue that under Bollen's definition, most western cities can be thought of as polarized. In western society there is a general low level<sup>3</sup> mistrust of authority. Many citizens do not believe their governments are honest and devoted to producing just results for all groups. So terms like polarization, deep difference and deeply divided societies, are all on the same continuum. Where a city lies on that continuum is defined by its level of oppression and deprivation visited on the "other."

### **3.5 Chapter Summary**

There are several current planning theories that show promise working in contested environments. These are communicative planning, multicultural planning, and the Just Cities theories. Communicative, consensus building practices have the benefit of building shared understanding and mutual trust, but often lack the fundamental context of civil democratic ideals in which to work in contested environments. Multicultural planning theory recognizes multiple identities and ways of knowing, and rejects the idea of universal citizenship. Recognition of the need for different processes for different cultural groups is built into a multicultural consensus building process. The Just City approach is supportive of participatory processes, but is more concerned with the resulting spatial form and the effect that form has on urban life. Recognizing that not all competing claims are justified, the Just City approach advocates "situated ethical judgement" to be applied in collaborative processes to ensure that minority rights are not trampled.

All three of these theories have some difficulty in application in contested environments. The assumptions of civil discourse in all three theories cannot be guaranteed in these environments. Additionally, all three have some level of

---

<sup>3</sup> The level of mistrust of authority in many Western cities is more along the lines of mild suspicion that authorities are not entirely equitable for all citizens. Certainly in Canada, there exists a justifiable mistrust by Aboriginal people. Westerners do not live with the expectation that they need to bribe most officials.

expectation of the ability to reach consensus. However, in many contested environments there are some issues around which consensus cannot be built, given that the combatants have mutually exclusive spatial claims on urban territory. Recognition of these “stubborn realities” in a south-eastern context has caused some planners to call for a new meso-level theory for planning. Several possible approaches to developing a meso-level theory are evident from developmental activities in the south-eastern context. Planning practice might be informed by applying Max-Neef’s human needs theory, which defines nine universal, non-cultural specific and non-hierarchical human needs. Additionally, the integral theory approach, also used in development work, shows promise for delivering practical action and deep shifts in cultural perceptions simultaneously. These two holistic approaches might be applied to planning in contested cities with positive results on peacebuilding.

Planning practice in contested cities has been studied by Bollens. He discusses three planning strategies used in radically polarized societies. These are partisan, neutral, and resolver. The partisan strategy favours one group over the others. Neutral strategies are useful for containing conflict, but do not deal with the root causes of the conflict, and thus do little to work effectively in peacebuilding. The most effective strategy, the resolver strategy, encourages a more facilitative role, attempting to engage the two sides in dialogue aimed at resolving some of the issues. The resolver strategy reliance on dialogue links it to communicative theory, multicultural planning, and the Just City approach, and also appears to leave it open to mistaken assumptions about the willingness of each side to engage in dialogue. However, if human needs are universal, then the desire to participate should also be universal, creating possibilities to open lines of communication and dialogue. The questions that are not answered in the literature review are the larger questions troubling peacebuilding activities in general. These are:

1. How is trust built in contested environments?
2. How can planners and the planning activity facilitate building trust?

3. Can a process of planning in contested environments be identified that continues to meet human needs throughout the conflict cycle, and thereby mitigate the pathologies that manifest in the conflict?

## Chapter 4 Research Context

### 4.1 Introduction

The histories of Belfast and Jerusalem are exceedingly complex and multilayered. Although the cities are vastly different in terms of location, world outlook of citizens, climate, building styles, and world importance, there are some remarkable similarities to the conflicts. Both conflicts claim a historical root, found in the mists of the past. The conflict in Belfast has roots going back to the Anglo-Norman conquest of Ireland in 1169. The conflict in Jerusalem can claim roots in biblical times with the expulsion of Jewish people from Jerusalem, along with the destruction of the Second Temple in the year 70. However, for all practical purposes, the conflict in both cities has a more recent history. In both cities the period from the late 1800s to today is of the most interest.

In both cities the majority group, feeling threatened by the minority group, instituted oppressive policies that eventually led to a popular revolt, and finally violence. As well, the majority's right to govern is questioned by the minority. In both cities, a deliberate migration of people was used to modify demographics and consolidate power, and acts of terror have been used by both sides in the conflict. Both cities have a similar population and both are relatively dense by North American standards. Belfast has a population of 277,391, with the metropolitan urban area having a population of 646,550 (Northern Ireland Census 2001, as cited in the Belfast Metropolitan Area Plan, 2004, p. 12). The average density of Belfast metropolitan area is 673 people per square kilometre, but the city of Belfast has an urban density of 2,439 people/square kilometre (Belfast City Council website, n.d., Belfast demographics). The population of Jerusalem is 706,400 and the average density of Jerusalem is 5,588 people/square kilometre (2004 Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, as cited in Foundations for Middle East Peace website, n.d., Jerusalem Statistics 2006). In comparison, Winnipeg has an urban density of 1,365

people/square kilometer and Toronto's density is 3,972 people/square kilometer<sup>4</sup>. Population breakdown by religion is included in Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1 Population breakdown by group in Belfast and Jerusalem

Jerusalem <sup>5</sup>			Belfast <sup>6</sup>		
% Jewish	% Arab	Total Population	% Protestant	% Catholic	Total Population
65% Jewish (40% in East Jerusalem)	33% Muslim 1.7% Christian	729,400	49%	47%	646,550

(Table credit: J. Miller)

Both Belfast and Jerusalem are cities that have been physically divided and walls and security barriers are a part of the urban landscape. The planning system for both cities originated in the British Town Planning system, but both systems have evolved in different ways to represent a system unique to their regions. While the planning system in Belfast, in most recent times, has been used to stabilize the conflict, the planning system in Jerusalem seems dominated by political concerns and is a point of conflict itself. However, despite planning differences, the cities are both subject to a very centralized national planning system that limits municipal powers.

---

<sup>4</sup> 2006 statistics from Statistics Canada, Community Profiles, data for urban areas, rather than the Census Metropolitan Area (CMA). Retrieved August 8, 2009 <http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/prof/92-591/index.cfm?Lang=E>.

<sup>5</sup> Jerusalem - % Jewish and % Arab data from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics [http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnaton/templ\\_shnaton\\_e.html?num\\_tab=st02\\_11x&CYear=2008](http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnaton/templ_shnaton_e.html?num_tab=st02_11x&CYear=2008). Retrieved August 9, 2009.

<sup>6</sup> Belfast - % Protestant and Catholic data from the Northern Ireland 2001 census data, as cited on the website [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/northern\\_ireland/2590023.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/2590023.stm). Retrieved August 9, 2009.

## 4.2 Belfast, Northern Ireland

### 4.2.1 History of Northern Ireland

The history of the conflict of Northern Ireland has its roots in the colonial history of Ireland, but its most recent and acute manifestation can be traced back to the late 1800s. Nevertheless, a very brief overview of the earlier history provides a basic grounding.

#### 4.2.1.1 Early history

Ireland might be considered one of the first English colonies. English rule on the island began with the Anglo-Norman invasion of 1169, after which Henry II established an area of control around Dublin. The English formalized their rule during the reign of Henry VIII, when the title of Lordship of Ireland was changed to King of Ireland by an act of the Irish parliament. Buckland (1987) notes that religious and land questions can be traced to this political period. Henry VIII confiscated large tracts of land and tried to impose Protestantism on the Gaelic Catholic residents of the island. By the early 1600s, England controlled most of Ireland, with the exception of the province of Ulster, most of which today comprises Northern Ireland.

To consolidate the power of the English crown, the “plantation of Ulster” commenced around 1607 (Buckland, 1987, p. 7). This consisted of planting Protestant settlers in Ulster. These favoured settlers were primarily Scottish Presbyterians, who were given land by the English monarch. This act displaced the indigenous Gaelic population, causing resentment between the groups and culminating in the Ulster Irish Rebellion of 1641 (Mullholland, 2002, p. 3). With the exception of a few key areas, including Belfast and Derry, most of the north came under the control of the indigenous Irish population. In the early 1650s, an English force led by Oliver Cromwell brutally defeated the Gaelic Catholics in Ulster. Large areas of land were cleared of the Gaelic population and land titles were given to Cromwell’s soldiers in lieu of pay ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cromwellian\\_conquest\\_of\\_Ireland](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cromwellian_conquest_of_Ireland), The Cromwellian Settlement Section). A new Irish rebellion followed in 1690, led by the Irish Catholic king, James II. James II was

defeated at the Battle of the Boyne in that same year, and English control over the island remained until the partition of Ireland in 1920.

During the 1700s, social and religious differences continued to divide the inhabitants of Ireland (Buckland, 1887, pp. 7-8). The Penal Laws, a series of punitive laws enacted to restrict the economic and political activities of Catholics, while continually disposing them of land, also consolidated power in the hands of the Protestant community. Consequently, Protestants held a disproportionate level of wealth, land and political power for their minority status on the island. The dispossession of Catholic lands, resulting from the Penal Laws, saw the Catholic land ownership drop to just 5% in 1776, from 60% in 1641 ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penal\\_Laws#Analysis](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penal_Laws#Analysis), from Analysis Section).

The Protestant hold on power was by no means secure as Catholic unrest was common and sometimes encouraged and supported by the Catholic Church, and other Catholic countries. The Protestants fear of the Catholic majority, and a desire to maintain their ascendancy, led to the formation of the Orange Order in 1795 (Adams, 2003). (Parades of the Orange Order have long been regarded as a symbol of oppression by the Catholic community and can still spark outrage and violent confrontations today.) The Protestant fear was well founded and another rebellion, supported by the French and led by the United Irishmen, occurred in 1798, but after several months of fighting, the rebellion was crushed.

The act of Union in 1800 united Ireland with the British parliament, but Catholics were not allowed to vote until 1829. The Great Hunger of the 1840s resulted in the death of one million Irish, while millions more emigrated. However, even these terrible social conditions did not change the Irish Catholic quest for self-determination. The 1800s saw the rebellion led by Robert Emmet (1803), the rising by Young Irelanders (1848), the Fenian Movement founding in 1858, the Fenian Rebellion and the formation of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1867 ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline\\_of\\_Irish\\_history](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_Irish_history); Adams, 2003). The “land war” began 1879, with the founding of the Land League to

reform land ownership and distribution (Adams, 2003, p. xii). By this time, Home Rule was being discussed in Westminster for Ireland, but was violently opposed by the Protestant minority who feared losing their considerable political power in the Irish Parliament.

Irish Nationalist political party, Sinn Féin, was formed in 1906, and in the 1918 British election, they won 73 out of 105 Irish seats (Adams, 2003, p. xiii). However, they refused to take their seats, and set up an Irish Parliament instead. As a result, nationalist voices were largely ineffective in the decisions made with respect to Ireland. However, the Irish Catholic armed defiance of British rule continued in the form of the Easter Rising of 1916, and the Irish War of Independence (Anglo-Irish War) fought between the IRA and the British Army for two years starting in 1919. With the civil war looming, attempts were made to provide special concessions for excluding all or part of Ulster from the jurisdiction of Irish Home Rule, in the event that it went ahead. In 1920, Ireland was partitioned by the Government of Ireland Act. Two equal Irish parliaments were created, one governing the six counties of Ulster with the largest majorities of Protestants, with its seat in Belfast, and the second governing the remaining provinces and Ulster counties, with its seat in Dublin (Buckland, 1987, p. 10). This created a Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, controlled by a devolved government that was largely unprepared for a role they had not sought. It came at “a time of sectarian tension and violence as the north became caught up in the Anglo-Irish War.

#### 4.2.1.2 A Protestant state (1920-1972)

During the first two years of the establishment of Northern Ireland, the Protestant majority was unwilling to concede civil equality to Catholics. The selection of counties for Northern Ireland was designed to retain the largest land mass and still maintain a safe Protestant majority of 66% (Buckland, 1987, p.13). The new regional government struggled between the partisan local councils and the financial control of London. It was given only limited economic powers, but had control over matters of representation, law and order, education and other social aspects of government, all of which had the

potential for causing dispute between Catholics and Protestants (Buckland, 1987, p.13). The Catholic minority was not well represented by its few elected leaders, as most refused to take up their seats and act as the official opposition in the new parliament. From a social and political perspective this period saw the rise of the nationalist sentiment in the minority Catholic community, severe deprivation in the lower classes, amongst whom the Catholic community was disproportionately represented, and increasingly civil and sectarian unrest.



(Map source: <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ireland-Capitals.PNG>, Original author: Jonto) Used with permission under GNU Free Documentation License 1.2 or later - [http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:GNU\\_Free\\_Documentation\\_License](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:GNU_Free_Documentation_License).  
*Figure 4.1.* Map of Ireland showing the Northern Ireland division.

Securing a 66% Protestant majority did not guarantee security and the urgent problem of violence appeared early in the existence of the state. The way that law and order was

established “helped determine the character of the government, giving partisan answers to crucial questions of how and by whom violence should be combated, the forces and powers to be used and the relative priorities to be given to security and political considerations” (Buckland, 1987, p.15). Early policing was assigned to a hastily formed Ulster Special Constabulary (USC), also known as the B Specials. Special Powers legislation was enacted, giving the Minister of Home Affairs the power to make any regulation he thought necessary for the maintenance of order (Adams, 2005, p. xxx). The IRA and related organizations were proscribed and over 500 people were interned in a 24-hour period in 1922. However the Special Powers legislation was not evenly applied. Rather than interning members of a Protestant murder gang, they were enrolled in the new Secret Service (Buckland, 1987, p. 16).

Proportional representation was abolished and electoral areas were modified to ensure Protestant control of local councils, including in areas with a Catholic majority (Buckland, 1987, p. 16). These patterns of governance and politics were maintained for the next 40 years, ensuring Protestant control and leaving the Catholic minority with little political power and subject to repressive laws (p. 17). The Special Powers Act gave wide deterrent powers to the USC and the newly established Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), with little accountability to parliament (p.18). The actions of these security forces soon became a contentious issue, and they remain the subject of public inquiry in Northern Ireland today.

Housing, like security issues, was a contentious issue between the two communities in Northern Ireland. Stormont<sup>7</sup> established a local housing administrative model similar to the UK model. In the early part of this period, Stormont policy appeared to be adverse to the state provision of housing (Heenan & Gray, 1997), but by mid-century the dismal housing conditions caused the government to establish the Northern Ireland Housing Trust (NIHT), to encourage building new social housing, although the management and

---

<sup>7</sup> Stormont is the seat of national government in Northern Ireland.

allocation of that housing remained the responsibility of the local council (Heenan & Gray 1997; Paris, Gray, & Muir, 2002). This period of house building improved the availability of social housing. Catholics, due to their marginalization, tended to rely on social housing to a greater extent. However, due to Protestant domination of local councils, many regions suffered from an inequitable allocation of housing to the Catholic community.

The 1960's were a period of social unrest in Northern Ireland, as they were in other parts of the world. Housing issues are frequently cited as a contributing cause of this social unrest (Heenan & Gray, 1997), but a new Catholic consciousness found expression in a civil rights movement modeled on the civil rights struggles of African-Americans in the United States. This movement did not focus on nationalist aspirations. Instead it sought to organize Catholic resentment against clear social goals such as the repeal of the Special Powers Act, the abolition of the USC, ending the gerrymandering of electoral boundaries, and the fair allocation of public housing (Buckland, 1987, p. 20). The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was established in 1967, and the first mass civil rights march took place in 1968. A march later that year in Derry (also known as Londonderry) resulted in clashes with the RUC.

Violence was common during the last years of Northern Ireland's self-rule period. This was intensified by the actions of several groups -- the Provisional IRA (PIRA), a group split from the original IRA and more committed to armed action, Unionist paramilitary organizations such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the newly formed Ulster Defence Association (UDA), with its strong ties to the British Army, and the actions of the British Army itself. Internment without trial was introduced in 1971 as a last ditch effort to contain the violence (Buckland, 1987, p.23). The British Army attacked a civil rights march in January of 1972, killing 14 people on a day that became known as Bloody Sunday. By March of 1972, the British government had suspended Stormont and imposed Direct Rule. This only seemed to increase the violence, as was demonstrated in

July of 1972 when PIRA set off 22 bombs in Belfast in a single day, an event that became known as Bloody Friday (Adams, 2003, p. xiv; Buckland, 1987, pp. 21-23).

#### 4.2.1.3 The Troubles (1972-1998)

The conflict in Northern Ireland gained and held international attention for a period of roughly 30 years, starting in the late 1960s. The Troubles<sup>8</sup> is the Northern Ireland colloquialism for three decades of sustained sectarian violence that “resulted in 3,169 people dead, 38,680 injured and 10,001 bombings (*The Guardian*, September 1, 1994 as quoted in Bollens, 1999, p. 55).” As Smith (2004) points out, the number of deaths is small, less than the number of people killed in road accidents in Britain each year. However, with a population of just 1.5 million people, this is the equivalent of 600,000 people being killed in the United States (Smith, 2004, p. 21). The majority of these deaths occurred in twos or threes, and 45% of them occurred in Belfast. Most of these deaths occurred in West and North Belfast.

Although spatial segregation in residential housing was relatively common along class and religious lines, the degree of mixing was much higher prior to the violence that characterized the The Troubles. Housing was frequently the target of violence, with letter bombs and scorched earth techniques<sup>9</sup> employed by paramilitary groups to intimidate and claim territory (Jarman, 2004). Boal describes the increased spatial segregation during The Troubles as occurring with a ratchet effect: each successive period of violence increasing the level of segregation, without relaxing again to the previous level between episodes (Boal in Peach, 1996, pp.391). In the first four years of The Troubles, an estimated 60,000 people moved from vulnerable interface areas to

---

<sup>8</sup> The Troubles are frequently identified from 1969 to the ceasefires in the mid-1990s.

<sup>9</sup> Scorched-earth techniques – when neighbourhoods were de-populated due to residents fleeing the violence, paramilitary groups would burn unoccupied housing rather than allow members of the other main group to live in the neighbourhood.

areas where their group was dominant (Bollens, 1999, p. 58). This accounts for almost 20% of the population, and a much higher proportion of the social housing population.

Due to charges of discrimination in housing, the NIHT was disbanded in 1971 and the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) was established in its place. The NIHE was established as a single purpose housing authority, taking responsibility for both the provision and the administration of social housing in Northern Ireland. As a national body, the NIHE took housing decisions out of the hands of local authorities, where power abuses appeared to be common, and placed the decision making in the hands of a national authority disassociated with local politics and prejudices (Bollens, 1999; Heenan & Gray 1997). The NIHE new build and redevelopment programs during The Troubles had a significant impact on the physical structure of the urban neighbourhoods most affected by the violence. Early NIHE statistics indicate that a full 24% of its housing stock was unfit for human habitation, but by 1999 had reduced this number to 8% (Bollens, 1999). During the massive construction and rebuilding projects that produced these improvements, the NIHE tried to deal with the most pressing needs for housing by building in areas with the highest need, regardless of the ethnic composition. Although the NIHE did not have an official policy on segregation, ethnic considerations were factored into new estate planning decisions. As policy, the NIHE would not breach the “peacelines” between the neighbourhoods, and would even build physical barriers between communities if advised to do so by agencies involved in national security (Bollens, 1999).

All of this human migration occurred against a backdrop of continued inter-community violence. Bombings, murders, and beatings were accompanied by home invasions and threats. Actions by one group of paramilitary operators would spark retaliatory actions by the other side. Republicans enjoyed a lot of support in Catholic neighbourhoods, in part because of the harsh actions of the British Army and the practice of internment without trial (Adams, 2003). The large number of interned Catholics, many who were not affiliated with PIRA, and the hunger strikers of the early 1980s, consolidated the

Catholic population sympathies toward PIRA, regardless of whether they agreed with PIRA's choice to use violence (Buckland, 1987, p. 24).

At the same time, the political process moved in fits and starts toward a peace agreement. Protestant hardliners, such as Ian Paisley and his Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) refused to even consider the inclusion of the Republican Sinn Féin in peace talks. The Social Democratic Labour Party (SLDP), while never garnering widespread political power in the Catholic community, gained a reputation for being moderate, but still managed to maintain a line of communication with both Sinn Féin and PIRA. This honest broker role proved to be instrumental in bringing Sinn Féin to the peace talk table, an important step in Northern Ireland's politics. PIRA declared a ceasefire in August of 1994 and this was followed by a similar declaration from the Unionist camp in September. Finally the Good Friday Peace Agreement (also known as the Belfast Agreement) was signed in 1998. It includes details of a power sharing agreement between unionists and republicans.

#### 4.2.1.4 Contemporary Northern Ireland

A statement from the Good Friday Agreement indicates the direction the country hopes to embark on.

“An essential aspect of the reconciliation process is the promotion of a culture of tolerance at every level of society, including initiatives to facilitate and encourage integrated education and mixed housing.” (A Shared Future, p. 9)

Housing was once a major trigger for social unrest, but housing policy is one example of the changes apparent in Northern Ireland's political culture since the Good Friday Agreement was signed. Although the cease-fire agreements reduced sectarian activity by the major paramilitary groups, the cycles of violence and intimidation did not end and the NIHE remained interested in managing conflict. However the political climate changed monumentally in the first five or six years after 1998. Wide spread public consultations, in 2003, resulted in the policy framework document, *A Shared Future*, published in 2005. The framework contains a 10-point action plan that deals directly

with housing policy, through the shared communities' action point<sup>10</sup>. The document also includes issues such as reclaiming shared space, shared education, shared workspaces, and building good relations.

Although NIHE continues to support "tenant choice," there is a shift in the policy focus to include the mandate of shared communities. To effectively provide opportunities for mixed housing, the NIHE has been required to assume a facilitative role, connecting communities with common interests to enable relationship building between the communities. They actively work as facilitators when communities wish to explore changing to mixed housing, and employ discursive and facilitative techniques to bridge barriers and build inter-community understanding and trust (Murtagh, 1999). Despite this work, more than 90% of social housing estates remained single identity in 2005 (A Shared Future, 2005, p. 29).

One of the other long-standing contentious issues is related to the RUC and its treatment of Catholic citizens before and during The Troubles. One of the outcomes of the Good Friday Agreement was the requirement for a full scale policing review ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal\\_Ulster\\_Constabulary](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Ulster_Constabulary), Patten Report Section). This review ended in 1999 and recommended a complete reorganization and renaming of the RUC. It was renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and now includes a focus on recruiting in the Catholic community to better balance the demographics of the PSNI.

There has also been a reorganization of the public sector, including planning services, and political control has been returned to a devolved parliament at Stormont. This political control has operated only intermittently, with four occasions of suspension. The longest was in 2002, which lasted almost 5 years to May 2007, when intransigent Ian

---

<sup>10</sup> The main theme of shared communities is that of integrated residential housing and the directive to housing policy is very explicit. "The housing executive is committed to promoting mixed housing where practical, desirable and safe." (A Shared Future, 2005, p. 29)

Paisley shook hands with Gerry Adams and agreed to share power with Martin McGuinness, another Sinn Féin leader.

Among all of the positive changes in Northern Ireland, one negative that might eventually threaten the stability of the new government is the widening of the class gap for both Catholics and Protestants (Boroohah, 2006; Murtagh, 2001; Jarman, 2003). This has created a dual track economy where the most vulnerable citizens become increasingly marginalized, and these citizens are most often those in areas prone to violence (Murtagh & Keaveney, 2006).

#### **4.2.2 The Planning System in Northern Ireland**

Planning in Northern Ireland has evolved largely out of the British planning model. However, due to the unstable political situation the planning system is unique in Northern Ireland. There are roughly two planning stages that are pertinent to the discussion in this research project. The first planning stage of interest is the planning system that was implemented during the period of British Direct Rule from 1972 to approximately 2002. This 30-year period was represented by a very centralized planning system with little political accountability and local control. The second period of interest is the planning system that is evolving as a result of the devolution of political power from Westminster back to Stormont. The structure of the planning system has changed to a more politically accountable system. It is still a centralized system, but planning responsibilities are now spread over three departments and ministries, allowing a little more public accountability of the process. The role of district councils has not changed at the statutory level, but at the grassroots level, local councils have taken on more responsibility in terms of local economic development (Berry, Brown, and McGreal, 2001). All planning approvals remain the responsibility of the Planning Service, housed under the DOE, but local councils would prefer some powers over development control to support their economic development initiatives.

#### 4.2.2.1 Planning under Direct Rule

Prior to Direct Rule, planning in Northern Ireland evolved against a background which did not reflect the same wider national and social issues evident in political structures of mainland UK. "In fact the planning system operated in a constrained context because of local tensions against change which planning *per se* was seen to represent" (Berry, Brown & McGreal, 2001, p. 783). Most planning responsibility was vested in local authorities at the borough, urban district and county council level. However, allegations of planning and housing abuse led to a restructuring of planning services under Direct Rule. In 1973, the Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland (DOENI) became the sole planning authority for the province and authority for social housing was also moved from local authorities to the centralized Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE). Other agencies, either within or connected to planning in Belfast during this period are the Town and Country Planning Service, the Belfast Development Office (BDO), and the Belfast Action Teams (BAT) (Bollens, 1999). Local affairs were reorganized under 26 district councils with responsibility for providing community facilities, environmental health and building control.

Under Direct Rule, the goals set for the DOENI were: 1) to strength the economy; 2) target social need; and 3) combat terrorism (Bollens, 1999). The DOENI Town and Country Planning Service (referred to as the Planning Service) was responsible for creating the statutory framework for which development took place. Authority for the Planning Service was outlined first in the Planning Order (Northern Ireland) of 1972, and subsequently in the consolidated Planning Order (Northern Ireland) of 1991. The Planning Service prepares development plans and operates from six divisional planning offices. The divisional offices were responsible for preparing the more specific local area plans. At the local level, district councils were consulted in an advisory capacity only on planning matters (Berry, Brown & McGreal, 2001; Bollens, 1999). However, appeals against DOENI decisions could be lodged with the Planning Appeals Commission, which is an independent body with the power to render a decision in a public dispute over a planning direction.

The DOENI held a unique role under Direct Rule. In Belfast, the BDO focused on redevelopment and actively promoted investment in the central city, and throughout the city using the Belfast Action Team (BAT) offices. The commercial property in the central city was a frequent target of paramilitary bombs and very few institutional investors were operating in the central city. The BDO sought to centrally locate government services, but to also revitalize by enticing retail and office buildings back to the heart of Belfast (Bollens, 1999, p. 67). An extremely successful project undertaken by the BDO was the waterfront regeneration project of Laganside. The BDO used public resources to leverage “private investment by means of supply side mechanisms such as urban development grant[s], comprehensive development schemes, environmental improvement[s], and community economic development schemes” (Berry, Brown & McGreal, 2001, p. 784). Since the central city was viewed as neutral territory, BDO investment served the additional benefit of creating shared spaces that could be enjoyed by all citizens.

The NIHE became the comprehensive housing authority in Northern Ireland under Direct Rule. The NIHE is the largest public housing authority in the UK, with direct responsibility for a full one third of Northern Ireland’s housing stock. Like the DOENI, NIHE was created to centralize services and insulate them from local biases (Bollens, 1999; Berry, Brown & McGreal, 2001). The NIHE was originally funded through the DOENI, but it was and still is, a quasi non-governmental organization. The success of the NIHE, covered in Section 4.2.1.3 above, is a remarkable achievement considering this occurred against the backdrop of The Troubles, when public housing was frequently the target of destructive attacks. Additionally, NIHE became recognized as non-partisan in the allocation and building of housing, and thus has managed to build considerable trust in both communities.

#### 4.2.2.2 Planning under the devolved government

As might be expected, the structure of government in Northern Ireland has changed substantially since the government has been devolved. Under the Good Friday

Agreement (1998), the overall number of departments has been increased to allow the formation of an Executive that was representative of all the major political parties (Berry, Brown & McGreal, 2001). This process cut across some departments, such as planning. Planning responsibilities are now shared by three departments, the Department of the Environment (DOE), the Department of Regional Development (DRD), and the Department of Social Development (DSD) (p. 785).

Table 4.2 Five-stage process for preparation of development plans in Northern Ireland.

Stage of Process	Steps of Stage	Requirement for Public Consultation
1 – Information Gathering	Research and analysis, contacting the relevant District Councils, invitation for public comment in local press.	Initial consultation with District Councils, Government Departments and Agencies and with relevant statutory and public stakeholders.
2 – Issues Paper	Publication of an Issues Paper to promote debate on the current issues that will be considered in drafting the plan.	14-week statutory consultation period where representations may be made. Consultation is run by independent body responsible for preparing a report of consultation process.
3 – Draft Plan	DOE prepares and publishes a draft plan of departmental preferred policies and plans.	8-week consultation period where public can make objections to the plan, followed by a further 8-week period where the public can view objections and respond to the objections.
4 – Independent Examination	PAC holds a public inquiry into objections to the draft plan. Objectors have the right to appear before and be heard by the PAC. PAC prepares a report for consideration by the department.	Process of independent examination is determined by the PAC.
5 – Plan Adoption	DOE considers the PAC report and may modify the plan. The plan is adopted and published along with the PAC report and a Statement of Adoption detailing decisions made with respect to the PAC report.	Notice of Adoption placed in local media.

(Table credit: J. Miller)

(Northern Ireland Planning Service website. Retrieved on August 25, 2009 from [http://www.planningni.gov.uk/index/advice/advice\\_system/advice\\_preparing\\_plans/advice\\_plans\\_stage1.htm](http://www.planningni.gov.uk/index/advice/advice_system/advice_preparing_plans/advice_plans_stage1.htm).)

Still housed under the DOE, the structure and role of the Planning Service has remained the same, as have the PAC and the roles of the district councils. The Planning Service still has responsibility for preparing Area Development Plans (process outlined in Table 4.1,


below) and Planning Control. However, responsibility for the Regional Development Strategy has been assumed by the DRD, and area plans that are developed under the DOE need to consider the Regional Development Strategy prepared by the DRD. Responsibilities for regeneration initiatives designed to facilitate the renewal of both urban and rural areas, and the oversight of the NIHE has transferred to the DSD. Technically, regeneration schemes should align with both the Area Plan and the Regional Development Strategy for the area. This requires a great deal of cooperation and collaboration between the various departments (Berry, Brown & McGreal, 2001, p. 785).

The process of plan development is similar for Regional Development Strategies and for Area Plans. Both planning activities are still governed by the Planning Order (1991). The process for the preparation of development plans is documented in Table 4.2 above. As noted in Table 4.2, public consultations are a required part of the process, but the DOE does not need to modify a development plan in response to the public input. Additionally, during the preparation stage of a development plan, the local councils are consulted, but do not hold the power to approve the plan. The DOE continues to hold the power of development plan approval and adoption, as does the DRD for Regional Development Strategies (Berry, Brown & McGreal, 2001).

The PAC has the statutory power to override a DOE decision if an appeal is lodged. Any appeals beyond the PAC are made by judicial review to the High Court. The PAC is an independent appellate body made up of commissioners appointed by the First and Deputy First Ministers. Commissioners are not civil servants, but most have been planners within the DOE in the past. At present there are 21 permanent commissioners and 18 panel commissioners. All commissioners are planners, with the exception of 1 architect and 1 lawyer. The chief commissioner is both a planner and a lawyer<sup>11</sup>.

---

<sup>11</sup> Information on the composition of the PAC was obtained from the PAC website, "The Commission" page. Retrieved on August 8, 2009 from <http://www.pacni.gov.uk/home/default.asp?pname=commission>.




(Figure credit: J. Miller)

Figure 4.2. Levels of planning control and authority in Belfast.

Berry, Brown and McGreal (2001) expressed concern regarding the ability of the three departments responsible for planning to work collaboratively, in part, because the responsibilities between the departments are not always clear-cut. For example, the responsibility for preparing the Regional Planning Policy Statement is assigned to DRD, whereas the DOE is charged with bringing forward Planning Policy Statements. The concern of Berry, Brown and McGreal is not unfounded. In 2007, the courts had to intervene to determine the DOE would be responsible for bringing forward all planning policy statements (Department of Regional Development Website, Regional planning page, n.d.). Other areas were also noted for concern by Berry, Brown and McGreal. A central component of the Regional Development Strategy is concerned with the development of the Belfast Metropolitan Area. However, the responsibility for creating the Belfast Metropolitan Area Plan (BMAP) resides with the DOE, as does the preparation of the Belfast Urban Area Plan (BUA Plan) with its focus on the city of Belfast. The resulting planning responsibilities in Belfast today are outlined in Figure 4.2

above. The physical area covered by BMAP and the BUA Plan are shown in Figure 4.3 below.



(Original map source: [http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/archive/1/12/20090317100453%21Northern\\_Ireland.png](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/archive/1/12/20090317100453%21Northern_Ireland.png), Original author: Andrein) Revised by J. Miller and used with permission under Creative Commons ShareAlike 3.0 License, available from <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>.

Figure 4.3. Map of the extent of planning covered by (a) the BUA Plan and (b) the new BMAP

### 4.3 Jerusalem, Israel/Palestine

While urban conflict in general can be considered a microcosm of a larger national conflict (Bollens, 1998), “the struggle for the holy city is a microcosm of larger global conflicts and at the same time contains within itself a seemingly interminable series of ever more petty quarrels” (Wasserstein, 2001, p. xi). By virtue of its location and mythical importance to three of the major world religions, Jerusalem is a contested city unlike any others. Standing between three continents, Jerusalem represents the confluence of western and eastern epistemologies, religion and power. There are many ways to examine the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in general and the conflict in Jerusalem in particular. Each lens used will illuminate a different layer of the power and influence in temporal fashion, related to the global stature of that power and influence.

Recorded history in this region of the world is very long. Its importance to the present day conflict is disputed by both sides, as history can support both Arab and Jewish claims to the land, depending on which period is used. While, in a minor way, this long history has bearing on today’s situation, only the last 100 years really affect the facts on

the ground today. The ancient history has bearing only in that early Jewish religious history identifies the region formerly known as Palestine, which includes modern day Israel, as the historical homeland of the Jewish people. Jewish religion states that God promised this land to the Jewish people. Consequently, when Zionist leaders began to agitate for a Jewish homeland in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, Palestine is the homeland that they identified and organized toward.

#### **4.3.1 Palestine and Zionism Pre-1948**

Zionism, a political movement that calls for the creation of a Jewish state, can be traced to Eastern Europe and anti-Semitism that was entrenched in that society in the late 1800s. At that time, most Eastern European Jews believed that the best way to stop anti-Semitism was to assimilate or to align themselves with other political movements with a focus of justice and equality (Bennis, 2007, p.174). Consequently, many Jewish leaders were active in socialist and communist political movements and their organizations. Nevertheless, pogroms against Jewish citizens were very common in Russia, causing Jewish migrations out of the region. Anti-Semitism was also evident in European cities considered to be more enlightened than Eastern European cities, and this led a small group of Jewish leaders to conclude that it was necessary to establish a Jewish state where all Jewish people could migrate to for safety.

##### 4.3.1.1 Modern Zionism

Although the earliest Zionist leaders discussed other locations such as Uganda, Theodore Herzl, often thought to be the founder of modern Zionism, linked the Zionist movement to Palestine in order to mobilize Jewish communities worldwide. He articulated his vision in his pamphlet, *The Jewish State* (Herzl, 1896). Shortly after this document was published, the First Zionist Congress met in Basle, Switzerland, and adopted a four point program for the advancement of a Jewish state<sup>12</sup>, which included

---

<sup>12</sup> The wording of the Basle Declaration is “the creation of a home for Jewish people,” but Gee (1998) indicates that it is clear that the true intention from the beginning was to establish a Jewish state (p.13).

“the promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers<sup>13</sup>” and “preparatory steps towards obtaining government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism” (Basle Declaration, 1897).

For the next 50 years the Basle Declaration guided the broad strategy of the Zionist movement and provided for the simultaneous pursuit of Zionist goals on both a practical and diplomatic level (Gee, 1998). After Basle, Zionism quickly developed an international organizational structure to fulfill the aims of the program, and the intellectual and organizational strengths of the leaders were soon evident. The Jewish National Fund (JNF) was established to buy land for Jewish use and settlement and Zionist leaders began to lobby European colonial powers for support of a Jewish home (Gee, 1998).

Although the leaders of Zionism were dispersed in various countries, which lent an international voice to Zionism, the movement itself was in fact a fairly minor political trend among Jewish people until the Second World War. Most Jewish people saw their future in terms of the countries they were already citizens of. However, after the Nazi attempt to exterminate Europe’s Jewish citizens, the Jewish majority started to support Zionism.

#### 4.3.1.2 Palestinian society

In contrast to the organizing strength of the Zionist movement, Palestine at the end of the 1800s was primarily an agrarian society. Most Palestinians lived in close-knit and

---

However, this shows the political acumen of the Zionist leaders at the time. At that time, the establishment of a Jewish state was unlikely to be popular with the rulers of Palestine, the powerful Ottoman Empire, or with the European colonial powers, which, it was hoped, would support the creation of a homeland in Palestine.

<sup>13</sup> Gee offers an alternative translation of this point, although the meaning is similar: “The purposeful advancement of the settlement of Palestine with Jewish farmers, artisans, and tradesmen” (p. 12).

insular villages, the smallest of which might be inhabited by a single *hamula*<sup>14</sup>. The *hamula* was also the main social reference point and provided its members with both economic and physical security. Clan identity and responsibility was extremely important and violent feuds would erupt between clans when disputes occurred. Collective responsibility also extended to public morality and the regulation of the behaviour of women. It was within the rights of male relatives to murder a woman subject to talk of immoral sexual behaviour, whether that talk was true or not. This was, and occasionally still is, used to weaken women's participation in the national struggle and in their struggle to gain more rights within Palestinian society (Gee, 1998, p. 21).

Class differentiation existed between *hamulas* and within them. The prominent families in powerful *hamulas* were the major landowners. They often resided in urban centres, although their wealth still depended on their agricultural lands. These prominent families also comprised the urban elites and provided leaders under the Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate, and right into the present day. Most of these leaders were born into their positions of leadership, rather than attained them by demonstrating exceptional leadership skills, as was the case within the Zionist movement.

With the exception of the major landholders, the majority of the people were peasant farmers, many of who were burdened by taxes and debt. Although Palestine was seeing increasing prosperity, the greatest beneficiaries were the larger landowners who could afford to experiment with new crops and agricultural methods.

#### 4.3.1.3 The beginning of the conflict

The first mass migrations of Jewish immigrants to Palestine started even before the Basle Declaration. The First Aliya began in 1881 and lasted approximately 20 years. Some colonies were established inland, but most were initially established in the

---

<sup>14</sup> *Hamula* is often translated as "clan"; it is a grouping of families believed to be linked by a common male ancestor (Gee, p. 20).

sparsely populated, marshy coastal plain. Confrontation began when European Jews began to settle in Palestine, as land was typically purchased from absentee landowners who evicted the local tenant farmers (Helmreich & Rosmarin, 2007; Guyatt, 1998). This led to local mistrust of the Jewish settlers. However, the earliest settlers were not Zionists and they usually formed friendships with their neighbours and frequently employed the dispossessed tenant farmers (Gee, 1998, p. 24).

This pattern changed with the Second Aliya, which started about 1904 and lasted until the First World War. The immigrants in the Second Aliya were primarily Russian Zionists who saw the employment of Arabs as an impediment to absorbing Jewish immigration. From 1881 to 1914, the Jewish population in Palestine, which was then a province of the Ottoman Empire, rose from 24,000 to 85,000 (Bose, 2007, p. 215).

During the First World War, the Zionist support of the British coupled with targeted political activism succeeded in gaining a huge victory. Britain declared support of a Jewish homeland in Palestine with the 1917 Balfour Declaration (Gee, 1998). With the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following the First World War, the British were awarded the mandate over Palestine in 1920 and Jewish immigration to Palestine increased dramatically. Arab riots in the 1920s caused Jewish immigrants to expand their defence force, the Haganah (Gee, 1998, p. 40). The Haganah was primarily concerned with the defence of Jewish people and interests, but it eventually spawned the splinter groups, the Irgun and the Stern Gang. These splinter groups were willing to employ terrorist activities to achieve the political goal of a Jewish state. A famous example of this activity is the bombing of the King David Hotel in 1946 (Bose, 2007).

Growing tension between Arabs and Jews made British Mandate Palestine an unstable place (Bose, 2007, p.217). The Wailing Wall Disturbances of 1928-1929 marked the beginning of the violent clashes between Arabs and Jews under the British Mandate in Jerusalem. By August 1929, 113 Jews and 116 Arabs had been killed in skirmishes. Although the violence against Arabs attracted support from Arab and Islamic countries, initially, the primarily Jerusalem based Arab leadership did not support violent

confrontations. The increase of Jewish immigration and global economic pressures escalated the number of violent clashes during the 1930s. In 1935, a short Arab guerrilla revolt marked the beginning of the Arab leadership's call for civil disobedience; this led to a general strike in 1936 and a rebellion in 1937-38 (Bose, 2007, pp. 220-221; Gee, 1998, p. 44).

Due to the increasing violence in British Mandate Palestine, the Peel Commission was sent to Palestine to investigate the situation in 1936. The resulting report recommended the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state, with a small area withheld for the British Mandate (Bose, 2007, p. 226). However, the British pulled back support for the Zionists in the 1939 White Paper, mindful of the broader Muslim and Arab interests in the impending war, but the Arab leadership was not politically astute enough to capitalize on the situation. During the Second World War, the Arabs made a strategic mistake of attempting to forge political links with the Nazis<sup>15</sup>(Gee, 1998, p.53).

Following the Second World War the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed a resolution to partition Palestine, this time with less favourable conditions for Palestinians than had been suggested by the Peel Commission. Approximately 44% of the total land was to be designated for Arabs (Gee, 1998, p.53; Bose, 2007, p. 227). The planned partition sparked numerous terrorist attacks perpetuated by both the Jewish and Arab populations. In March and April of 1948, approximately six weeks before the planned withdrawal date of the British forces, the conflict evolved into a war for control of territory (Bose, p. 231). Arab forces were poorly led and primarily civilian, and were no match for the Zionist Haganah. On April 9<sup>th</sup>, the infamous massacre of 250 Arab

---

<sup>15</sup> Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseneini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, lived in Germany during the Second World War and met with Adolf Hitler on several occasions. A transcript of a November 28, 1941 meeting is included in *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, edited by Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin. Prior to the war, al-Husseneini was considered a leader of the Palestinian people, but was shunned by western leaders after the war.

villagers in Deir Yassin occurred (p. 238). On April 26, the inhabitants of the large middle class Arab population of western Jerusalem were driven out. A last minute intervention, by the Jordanian Arab Legion, supported the military operations of the Palestinian Arabs. As a result, the Old City and the primarily Arab north and eastern portions of the city remained under Arab control. The city was effectively partitioned along the battle lines and remained that way until 1967.

#### **4.3.1.4 Brief History of Israel**

On May 15, 1948, Israel declared its independence, however Arab forces continued to fight through the summer and into the fall. By November 1948, Israel controlled 77% of Palestine. Although David Ben-Gurion, the first Israeli Prime Minister, did not directly order the Haganah to practice “cleansing” areas of Arab populations, scholars who have examined this period generally concur that this was the unspoken order understood by the generals (Bose, 2007, p. 236). The result was that 80% of the Arab population in what became the new state of Israel, was displaced, almost 700,000 people (Bose, p. 231). In the next three years, a new wave of Jewish immigrants, almost equal in numbers to the displaced Palestinians, flowed into Israel, including many Jewish refugees from surrounding Arab states (Helmreich & Rosmarin, 2007).

During the British Mandate, Zionist settlers in Palestine had build many of the necessary organizations of state and civic government, including the Haganah, which quickly became the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), an educational system complete with upper levels of education such as the Hebrew University, and health and social systems (Gee, 1998). They had been effectively organizing for independence for years and spent the next 20 years building a modern democratic state for Jewish citizens. The remaining Arab minority was treated as second-class citizens, although they were offered Israeli citizenship (Gee, 1998, p. 61). The displaced Arab population resided in refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Jordan and many of the camps still exist today. Administrative control of the Gaza Strip was maintained by Egypt, and Jordan maintained control of the West Bank.



(Map source: [http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Is-wb-gs-gh\\_v3.png](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Is-wb-gs-gh_v3.png), Original author: ChrisO)  
 This map was released into the public domain by the author in 2007.

Figure 4.4. Map of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip after 1948.

The Arab world was gripped by Arab nationalism in the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century and refused to accept the new Israeli state (Helmreich & Rosmarin, 2007). This led to the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the Six-Day War in 1967. During the Six-Day War, Israeli forces captured East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank and the Golan Heights from Syria (Tzedek v'Shalom, n.d.). Several weeks later, Jerusalem was declared

“united” and the municipal borders of Jerusalem were expanded from 13,000 acres to 28,000 acres, effectively annexing land from the West Bank. The population of the city increased to 267,800 (196,800 Jews and 71,000 Arabs) (Wasserstein, 2001, p. 212). Israeli forces have been an occupying force in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip since that time. Arab residents of East Jerusalem were issued Jerusalem identity cards, which allowed them to vote in municipal elections, but not state elections. Most chose not to.

#### 4.3.1.5 The Occupation

By late 1967 right-wing Zionist groups inside Israel began to pressure the government to colonize the occupied territory. A change in government in 1977 brought about a huge state sponsored settlement drive (Guyatt, 1998, p. 10), which included further eviction and displacement of Palestinians. The settlement of occupied territories is in direct contravention of the UN Security Council Resolution 242 passed in 1967, which requested that Israel return the territory it captured in the Six-Day War. The October 1973 Yom Kipper War, launched by Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq, saw several defeats of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), before they prevailed. Within Israel, this Arab offensive provided political support for a security need to maintain the occupied territories. However, Israel did relinquish control over the Sinai Peninsula in return for peace with Egypt as a result of the Camp David talks in 1978 (Helmreich & Rosmarin, 2007).

The situation in the Occupied Territories (Gaza and the West Bank) deteriorated significantly by 1987, causing the Palestinian population to mount a popular uprising, or intifada (Bose, 2007, p. 243). This was essentially a campaign of civil disobedience that most of Palestinian society participated in (Tzedek v'Shalom, n.d.). This forced the Israeli government to recognize and negotiate with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), something they had refused to do prior to this (Bose, 2007, p. 244). The resulting Oslo agreement in 1993 ended the intifada. Israel was to withdraw control from parts of the West Bank and Gaza and halt the settlements. Palestine was allowed to form the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza and parts of the West Bank in preparation for self-

government (p. 249). The agreed upon process began, but Israeli political support was weakened by the assassination of Rabin in 1995. Palestinians began to lose faith in the peace process (p. 255). Camp David talks in 2000, on final status, were rejected by the PLO. This failure of the peace process, coupled by a visit by Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount, an area known to Muslims as Al-Haram As-Sharif, triggered the second intifada, known as the al Aqsa Intifada (pp. 262-264).

This second intifada was far more violent than the first. Suicide bombers were frequently employed to target Israeli civilians. The al Aqsa intifada's many deaths (these are outlined in Table 4.3, below) resulted in a decrease of Israeli public support for the peace process. Increasingly harsh measures were implemented against the Palestinian population. Eventually, Israel decided to build a security barrier around the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This barrier is much disputed and has added greatly to the hardship of many Palestinians, who find their movement even more restricted than before.

Table 4.3 Statistics of fatalities resulting from the al Aqsa Intifada.

Statistics of Deaths between September 29, 2000 to December 26, 2008	Location	
	Occupied Territories	Israel
Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces	4791	69
Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians	45	2
Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians	237	490
Israeli security force personnel killed by Palestinians	245	90
Foreign citizens killed by Palestinians	17	37
Foreign citizens killed by Israeli security forces	10	n/a
Palestinians killed by Palestinians	593	n/a

(Statistics are from the B'Tselem website. Retrieved June 9,2009 from <http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Casualties.asp>)

### 4.3.2 The Planning System in Israel

#### 4.3.2.1 System of land ownership

Land in Israel is primarily owned, or controlled, by the state and is administered by the Israel Lands Authority. Less than 8% of land is held privately. Approximately 6.6 % was assembled for the state by the Jewish National Fund through purchase from Arabs


in pre-state Israel (Gee, 1998, p. 82). Some of the land was transferred to Israel from the British Mandate when the State of Israel was created, but much was acquired when Arabs fled the area during the 1948 war and is held under a special custodianship under Israeli law (Gee, 1998; Alterman & Hill, 1986). The 8% of privately owned land is primarily located in the large urban centres and in Arab villages and towns, where most land ownership is private (Alterman & Hill, 1986, p. 130).

Technically, the Lands Authority dispenses a long-term lease to the people who reside on the land in question. Although this land is considered to be owned by the state, and can revert back to the state, weak control over resale causes the lease-holds to function practically as freehold property (Alterman & Hill, 1986). However, the actual land ownership structure is important to the planning discussion to follow.

#### 4.3.2.2 Planning structure

Unlike some West Bank communities, the Palestinian Authority does not have any planning control in East Jerusalem. When Israel annexed East Jerusalem into the municipality of Jerusalem in 1967, East Jerusalem came under the control of Israeli planning law, which has been used as a tool of control and oppression in the Arab neighbourhoods (BIMKOM & Ir Shalem, 2005). After 1967, several more successive annexations brought the municipal boundaries to its present day boundaries as demonstrated in Figure 4.5 below.

Formal regulatory planning in Palestine began during the British Mandate period. The Town Planning Ordinance of 1921 was enacted by the British Mandate and was based on British legislation regarding housing and town planning. It was replaced by the Town Planning Ordinance of 1936, which remained in effect until 1965, and was the basis of the new Planning and Building Act enacted at that time (Alterman, 2007; Alterman & Hill, 1986). This statutory system established a three-tier planning system, consisting of a National Planning Board, 6 District Planning Commissions, and about 110 Local Planning Commissions. The powers and responsibilities of each statutory agency are outlined in the legislation, which is summarized in Table 4.4 below.



(Map source: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs <http://www.passia.org/>).  
Used with permission.

Figure 4.5. Jerusalem municipal boundaries from 1947-2000

Table 4.4 Israeli planning institutions and their powers<sup>16</sup>

Planning Structure	Planning Responsibility	Composition	Appeal of Decisions
Knesset Cabinet (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Approval of national level plans</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Politically elected representatives</li> </ul>	N/A
Minister of Interior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Statutory authority over the 6 district planning districts</li> <li>Authorized to call in any local plan for ministerial approval</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Elected representative appointed by Knesset</li> </ul>	Decisions can be appealed to courts
National Planning and Building Board (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initiates and approves national plans</li> <li>Approves district plans</li> <li>Hears certain types of appeals from local and district planning commissions</li> </ul>	Representatives of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All relevant government ministries (11) and various levels of local government</li> <li>Non-governmental environmental bodies and rural interests</li> <li>Planning and building professions</li> <li>Women's organizations, sociologist, academia, and youth</li> </ul>	Decisions can be appealed to courts
District Planning Commissions (6)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initiates and approves district plans</li> <li>Approves all local plans</li> <li>Sometimes initiates local outline plans</li> <li>Approves most types of local building permits and hears appeals on rejection</li> <li>Hears all objections to local plans</li> </ul>	Representatives of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Central-government bureaus – almost all the ministries relevant for planning</li> <li>~50% are political members</li> <li>Several representatives of local authorities</li> <li>Several professionals</li> </ul>	Some decisions can be appealed to the National Planning and Building Board and some to the courts
Local Planning Commissions (about 110)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>First, and usually crucial, clearing-house for local policies and most development initiatives</li> <li>Prepares local outline and detailed schemes and approves initially</li> <li>Gives initial approvals on privately initiated detailed schemes</li> <li>Most decisions are conditional on approval of the District Planning Commission</li> <li>Grants permits that conform and gives initial approvals on permits with variations</li> <li>Appropriates land for public uses</li> <li>Levies betterment tax</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In some areas local councils constitute the local planning commission</li> <li>In areas where the local planning area covers more than one jurisdiction, the commission is comprised of government representatives from all jurisdictions, including the central government</li> </ul>	Decisions can be appealed to the District Planning Commission

(Table credit: J. Miller)

The planning structure outlined in the Israeli Planning and Building Act is hierarchical. All plans are intended to guide decisions on building permits, which is of clear interest to

<sup>16</sup> Table 4.3 developed from Alexander, Alterman, Law Yone, 1983, p. 126 (as cited in Alterman & Hill, 1986, p. 133) and Alterman, R. (2007). *Introduction to Israel's Planning and Building Law* Retrieved August 8, 2009 from [http://www.internationalplanninglaw.com/templates/mercury.asp?page\\_id=1514&country\\_id=6&dossier\\_category\\_id=6](http://www.internationalplanninglaw.com/templates/mercury.asp?page_id=1514&country_id=6&dossier_category_id=6).

regulators as it is estimated that one quarter to one third of new building starts are illegal, or not fully legal<sup>17</sup> (Alterman & Hill, 1986, p.138). At the national level, the National Council is responsible for preparing the national outline plan, which is really a series of outline plans, for various districts. These are primarily physical land use plans and include land designations for industrial areas, transportation routes, recreation and archaeological sites. National outline plans may also encompass any planning area subject to a district plan, creating a nesting of the Israeli planning documents. National plans are not unified and can exist for single sectors, such as transportation, or parks and tourism. The only exception to the physical land use aspect of these plans is the national plan for population distribution, which is a policy plan. All national outline plans require government approval, and once approved they take precedent over other planning documents (Alterman & Hill, 1986).

District outline schemes are intended to cover an entire district. They are intended to “set the necessary details for the implementation of the national scheme in the district, and among other things, adequate conditions for the district in terms of security and employment.” (Alterman, 1986, p. 136) Thus, the district scheme is less likely to be limited to physical land use planning only. The district scheme may also include anything subject to the local outline scheme, creating a type of nesting of the three levels of planning documents. The district outline scheme is prepared by the District Planning Commission and is subject to approval from the National Planning Board (Alterman, 2007).

Local outline plans are the equivalent of municipal plans in Canada. They are required to provide the necessary conditions for the implementation of the district outline plan, and deal with the normal municipal concerns of cleanliness, safety, transportation, and

---

<sup>17</sup> Alterman’s data in this paper is primarily focused on Israel within the pre-1967 borders, however it is not clear if East Jerusalem is included in these numbers. Nevertheless, illegal building has proliferated in East Jerusalem in recent years.

sanitation. The local plan deals with normal land use issues such as setbacks, building lines, public land and utility easements. The local plan is prepared by the Local Planning Commission and is subject to approval by the District Planning Commission. More detailed local schemes are also created. They must follow the local outline scheme, and are essentially a neighbourhood planning document. They have details as specific as the location of buildings and of street furniture. Anyone with an interest in an area can prepare a detailed planning scheme, but they must be approved by both the Local and District Planning Commissions.

The planning documents are intended to guide the decision to grant a building permit. Under the Israeli Planning and Building Act, no development activity, including changes to existing structures, can take place without a building permit. To gain approval, building proposals must be consistent with the detailed plan, which exists in a nested planning scheme and must, itself, be consistent with the relevant outline plan.


Although national outline plans take precedence over other planning documents, they are not mandated by the Israeli Planning and Building Law. Both District Plans and Local Outline Plans are mandated, and both were to be completed and approved within years of the law being enacted. Most of the mandated plans, which were not already in existence, did not meet the deadline. Even today, there are some mandated plans that have not been completed.

#### 4.3.2.3 Tools of Implementation and Control

Many of tools available to Israeli regulatory authorities are common to many planning traditions around the world. These include the power to appropriate land for public purposes, the power to control subdivision of land, and the power to collect a Betterment Levy, which is similar to a development fee in Canada (Alterman & Hill, 1986). While none of these powers seem unusual, it is the extent of the power wielded that is extraordinary by western planning standards.

Local governments can expropriate up to 40% of privately owned land without any liability for compensation (BIMKOM & Ir Shalem, 2005). In addition, the state

government has almost unbounded powers of eminent domain. In addition to normal subdivision control, Israeli public planners can re-parcel land themselves, even without the landowners consent (Alterman & Hill, 1986). These powers might not seem that troubling when 92% of the land is owned by the state, but they can be viewed as a tool of oppressive control when one considers that much of the privately held land is owned by the minority Arab community.



(Map source: Foundation for Middle East Peace [http://www.fmep.org/maps/jerusalem/land-status-in-east-jerusalem-aug-1997/jerusalem\\_land\\_1997.gif/view](http://www.fmep.org/maps/jerusalem/land-status-in-east-jerusalem-aug-1997/jerusalem_land_1997.gif/view), Cartographer: Jan de Jong) Used with permission.

Figure 4.6. Land status in East Jerusalem

The legal status of planning documents can also be used as an oppressive planning tool. When an Israeli statutory plan is approved, it becomes a legally binding document. New building schemes must be in full compliance in order to get a building permit<sup>18</sup>. However, when a new statutory plan is under development, this state of affairs can, and is, used to deny permits on the grounds that the plan is not yet ready and the permit

---

<sup>18</sup> Alterman & Hill ( 1986, p. 137) states that the Local Planning Commission is empowered to grant minor variances.

must not contravene the plan (BIMKOM & Ir Shalem, 2005). As is demonstrated in Figure 4.6 above, much of East Jerusalem is designated as “green space” or open areas or is unplanned. This greatly limits where Arabs can legally build.

When discussing East Jerusalem, Margalit (2006) notes that “in practice, construction cannot take place in the greater part of the area, either due to the need for detailed planning, which for many years has been stuck in the mud, by reason of a series of planning and legal difficulties, or due to a dearth of infrastructures” (p. 41). The Planning and Building Law prohibits construction in areas with inadequate infrastructure, which in itself does not seem like an unreasonable planning regulation. However, considering the huge infrastructure deficit in Arab communities, the result is oppressive planning control on those communities.

Table 4.5 2004 – 2005 Statistics on home demolitions in East and West Jerusalem.

	2004		2005	
	West Jerusalem	East Jerusalem	West Jerusalem	East Jerusalem
Infractions recorded (% of total)	5583 (80%)	1386 (20%)	5653 (79%)	1529 (21%)
Charges brought (% of infractions)	980 (18%)	780 (56%)	1272 (22%)	857 (56%)
Admin. demolition orders (% of charges brought)	50 (5%)	216 (28%)	Approx. 40 (3%)	Approx. 40 (less than 1%)
Demolitions carried out (% of Admin demolition orders)	13 (26%)	114 (53%)	26 (Approx. 65%)	76 (Approx. 95%)

Table 4.5 is a modified version of data presented in Margalit (2006) on page 33.

When building commences without a proper building permit, Israeli regulators have the usual legislative options to stop construction. They can also demand, and the courts will usually agree, to have the non-compliant building demolished. House demolitions are a source of much outrage in the Arab communities. The seemingly unjust process used by Israeli planners and regulators is legal by Israeli planning law. It is also applied in a very discriminatory fashion. BIMKOM and Ir Shalem (2005) note that the number of building infractions was 4.5 times greater in Jewish neighbourhoods of Jerusalem, but the

number of home demolitions was 4 times higher in Arab neighbourhoods (p. 4). It is documented that non-compliant building activity in West Jerusalem<sup>19</sup> is rarely subjected to the same harsh penalty as the non-compliant buildings in East Jerusalem<sup>20</sup>. The 2004 and 2005 statistics presented in Table 4.5(above) demonstrate this.

Israeli planning regulatory authorities have a number of very powerful tools at their disposal to ensure compliance with planning regulations. Despite these tools, compliance with building controls is by no means assured and even public bodies almost routinely infringe on planning controls (Alterman & Hill, 1986, p. 138).

#### **4.4 Chapter Summary**

Northern Ireland, like Israel, has a history of conflict. Urban areas within both countries reflect the national conflicts, often at a more intensified scale. Northern Ireland is part of the island of Ireland, but still under British control. The primarily Catholic, Nationalist and Republican interests in Northern Ireland continue to agitate toward union with the Republic of Ireland, while the Unionist majority, who are primarily Protestant, wishes to remain part of the British union. In order to secure their own power, Protestants enacted oppressive policies that created great inequities between Catholic and Protestant populations. In the 1960's, Catholics began to campaign for civil rights, taking to the streets in protest of what they viewed as their oppression. Increasingly violent confrontations ensued and the situation degraded into The Troubles, a 30-year period of terrorism and conflict in Northern Ireland. The peace process, accompanied by mid-1990 ceasefires by the combatant paramilitaries, provided the space needed to reach a

---

<sup>19</sup> West Jerusalem is the area west of the 1948 Greenline (ceasefire line) and is primarily Jewish.

<sup>20</sup> East Jerusalem is the area east of the 1948 Greenline and was primarily Arab, however this area has been subject to Israeli settlement activity and large areas are now covered by Jewish neighbourhoods.

peace agreement in 1998. The decade since has seen the devolution of government back to Northern Ireland in a power-sharing agreement designed to share control between the major political parties. Part of this power-sharing necessitated the restructuring of the centralized planning system, from one government department to three, requiring greater cooperation and communication between departments.

Some similarities to the Irish conflict exist in Israel. Oppressive Israel policies have created great hardship for Arab residents of East Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories. These policies also resulted in a groundswell of opposition from the Palestinians in the form of the first Intifada. This forced the Israeli government to begin negotiations with the PLO and to agree to the creation of the PA with limited control in the West Bank and Gaza. However, the Israelis did not stop their policy of settlement in the Occupied Territories, and this coupled by other repressive policies increased the frustration level of the Palestinian people, which finally overflowed with the al Aqsa Intifada in 2000. This second Intifada was far more deadly for everyone involved. Palestinian militants began targeting civilians with suicide bombers and Israeli public support for the peace process dropped significantly. At the same time, their fear and need for security caused them to support the building of the disputed security barrier, which has an even more detrimental effect to Palestinians on the ground, and is creating international censure as a unilateral Israeli move to define the borders of the Palestinian state.

Planning in both Northern Ireland and Israel are extremely centralized, however control of the planning decisions in Northern Ireland is currently concentrated in the hands of planning professionals. Prior to centralization, local councils had planning control, which resulted in inequities between the Catholics and Protestants in areas where councils were corrupt. Most planning powers removed from the local councils and planning decisions and approvals are largely the responsibility of professional planners within the civil service. There is little public accountability in the planning process as a result, but the vagaries of current local politics do not affect good planning practice.

In contrast, the Israeli Minister of the Interior has responsibility for the District Planning Commissions and even has the power to require ministerial approval of any local plan. The National Planning and Building Board is comprised of representatives of national government ministries, some non-governmental stakeholders and only a few planning and building professionals. The same is true at the District Planning Commission level, the level that approves local plans and oversees the Local Planning Commissions. Professional planners prepare planning documents, but few planners sit on the National Board or Commissions that approve planning documents. Good planning practice is often compromised for political motives, which has exacerbated the situation in East Jerusalem by denying building permits to Arabs.



## Section 2 Analysis and Results



(Previous page photo credits: J. Miller)

## Chapter 5 Coding process and Belfast analysis

The presentation of research findings is organized into two chapters and three main sections. Section 5.2 describes the application of the coding process to the Belfast interviews and the research findings of the process. Section 6.2 describes the application of the coding process to the Jerusalem interviews. Section 6.3 attempts to draw out the common themes and differences evident from the research. The remaining sections of these two chapters are used to describe the context for the interviews (Sections 5.1 and 6.1) and to summarize the discussions (Sections 5.3 and 6.4).

### 5.1 Belfast

“Hell just froze over, there is going to be peace in Northern Ireland”  
U.S. White House aide, when told of the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 (as cited in Smith, 2002, p.1).

The interviews in Belfast took place between April 11<sup>th</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2007. This was a time of hope and optimism in Northern Ireland, evident in many of the interviews conducted for this research. Northern Ireland had just come through the first decade since the historic signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. It was a decade of relative peace in a city that had once been so very violent. Just before the interviews began, Gerry Adams and Ian Paisley made history with the simple act of shaking hands. British direct rule was about to devolve to the local legislature, Stormont. The loyalist Democratic Unionist Party, led by Ian Paisley, and Republican Sinn Finn, led by Martin McGuinness, had entered a power sharing agreement that most would have thought impossible just a few short years before. The economy was strong and cranes dotted the city skyline.

If you did not venture to the working class neighbourhoods of Belfast, you might not be faulted for thinking that Belfast had moved beyond the pain of The Troubles and was

looking forward with hope and optimism. However, it was easy to scratch the surface of the urban prosperity and find the deep fractures still existent in the city. The walls between citizens were both real and metaphorical when these interviews took place. Still, Belfast is an easy city to love, and the accomplishment of building a lasting peace in this city is certainly an example of hope for other divided cities.

## 5.2 Themes from Belfast

### 5.2.1 Subsistence

Subsistence needs are the most basic of all human needs. These needs are described by Max-Neef as the only exception to a non-hierarchical view of human needs. Examples of satisfiers of these needs are food, shelter, and work (Max-Neef, 1992; Max-Neef, Elizalde, & Hopenhayn, 1989). Since Northern Ireland is part of a developed country, the fundamental needs for food and shelter are largely met via the social safety net.

However, unemployment and under-employment remain a common problem in the most deprived areas of Belfast, such as communities like New Lodge and Tiger's Bay in North Belfast. Not surprisingly, these are also some of the areas that experienced the highest levels of conflict during The Troubles and are still considered interface areas where violence is prone to flare up.

The most common subsistence issues, as discussed by participants, were *issues centered on work and economic deprivation*. In some cases The Troubles were identified as having a real impact on the level of deprivation of a neighbourhood. The interface areas, notorious for violent confrontations, are difficult to regenerate. People, with choice, choose not to live in these areas. This leaves behind those without choice, often the most disadvantaged and the "tough nuts."

"The only people, really, who wanted to live this close to a peace line, and had options to go elsewhere on the Protestant side, were really the tough nuts" (BPL3).

Like most places in the world, areas of economic deprivation in Belfast are closely linked to low levels of educational attainment and other societal concerns, such as poor mental health, addictions and other forms of anti-social behaviour. Community development work is aimed at working on these issues. However some participants are skeptical about the effectiveness of this work.

“Because I have worked and have done this before, re-development in Ardoyne and on the Shankill, and I've seen millions and millions of pounds go into those areas and to be quite honest, it is not for the want of people on the ground working, I think that is money that hasn't made much impact, personally. I mean when I go down to Ardoyne, the streets are stinking, there is high unemployment, suicide among young people -- it is horrendous, it is scary. Young people hanging themselves outside the bloody church, you know it is awful for local people, the suffering that has been down there and still is. And that area has huge, huge inputs” (BPL4).

A number of participants suggested that the conflict has indirectly increased the economic hardship of these areas by directing community development funding into conflict remediation and cross community work, rather than into programs that might be more beneficial to the communities. Although both planners/policy makers and community leaders mentioned this, the community leaders were very frank about peacebuilding funding initiatives driving programming in their organizations.

“I think basically one of the big problems for the community sector, and perhaps for all sorts of different reasons, I don't know, but it happened over a long, long period of time, that communities have been lead by government funding, rather than needs on the ground. So if government decide, 'oh, we have a problem on the interface here, they will say here is the money to address these issues.' And groups will then go and try and get that money. Still looking around their areas, they might not say these issues are our key problems, because they might not have as big a problem in that area as down the road. But there is money there for you, so they go for it. And some of the very basic community development work on the ground is actually missing” (JPL4).

“I mean you cross the boundary between, I mean you are in an area whereby funders are trying to be policy makers and using funding to influence policy and then the people they are working with are going for the money and writing it up the way the funder wants it written up, and there is a bit of lack of a joined up approach there” (BCW1).

*Shelter* can also be included in subsistence discussions regarding Belfast, although Northern Ireland has a much stronger social housing sector than is seen in North America. Still many Catholic neighbourhoods are portrayed as “bursting” at the seams, while nearby Protestant neighbourhoods have available social housing due to a depleting population. Therefore, housing need in Belfast is primarily a result of the need for protection, than subsistence.

### **5.2.2 Protection**

Housing need is just one protection-based theme that emerged in the research. The overarching theme for protection is *the need for personal security*, which includes *housing, population mobility, perception of a safe environment*, and the *inclusion of security barriers in the urban landscape*. The second overarching concept is related to the *role of the state in protection* and the situational conflict that results when that role is not recognized by the citizens, or alternatively, abdicated by the state. Under this concept emerged themes related to *equity legislation (protection of the law), policing, and paramilitary organizations*.

In Belfast, housing issues are linked to territorial identity. Consequently, community sensitivities are strongest around social housing, where community segregation is currently approximately 95% (BPL2 Interview). Although Belfast was always relatively segregated in social housing estates, this level of segregation increased from 59% in 1969, to 89% by 1989 (Boal, 1995, p. 28). Additionally, unlike North America, where only the poorest of poor live in social housing, in Northern Ireland social housing encompassed, a wider range of economic situations, and this was especially true before the Housing Sales Schemes<sup>21</sup> programmes were instituted in the UK during the Thatcher years.

---

<sup>21</sup> The Housing Sales Scheme allows social housing tenants to purchase their homes from the NIHE. Its roots are in the Thatcher years in the 1980's, when the UK was trying to move away from the provision of social housing (Paris, Gray, & Muir, 2006).

“As a result of The Troubles in NI, we experienced approximately 60,000 people moving very quickly over a period in the early 1970s within our housing areas. So we have seen social housing areas that were relatively mixed, that became suddenly the poor areas very, very quickly” (BPL2).

This population mobility had two effects on the demographic makeup of Belfast. First, the middle class fled from the core areas of the city, and second, there were mass migrations of working class Protestants and Catholics from more mixed estates to single identity estates. This mass migration left Catholic neighbourhoods with a much higher population density, and Protestant neighbourhoods with empty houses, and both communities with a higher percentage of low income households and reduced community capacity. Although housing, or land for housing, might be available, if the territory is claimed by the community without a housing need, new social housing will not be built.

“The example I will give you is North Belfast. We have land in the Protestant community and no land in the Catholic community. There is a housing regeneration strategy there. What we do is ... we build houses ...only if there is housing need. So there is no housing need in the Protestant area, and we know that the Catholic communities will not move there, because they don't feel safe. They won't move there. We won't build there. What is the point? They would just be destroyed” (BPL2).

The need for a safe living environment resulted in mass migration during The Troubles, and continues to affect the normal patterns of population mobility in Belfast.

Community members do not wish to move “across the wall” out of fear. Despite the ceasefires and the peace agreements, the peacelines remain, several have been built since 1998, and they continue to provide the communities with a degree of comfort.

“A number of new walls and a number of existing walls have been strengthened or heightened or lengthened and so forth, and so, I think probably...we have...41 different barriers in the city, of which about half of them have been extended or new since 1994, since the ceasefires” (BCW3).

### 5.2.3 Affection

The conflict polarized Belfast, as the two communities retracted into highly segregated living spaces out of fear. From these closed living environments evolved *strong local community solidarity*, one theme that emerged under the human need of affection. Also related to affection were the themes of *intergroup solidarity* and *intergroup friendship*, both bode well for the peace process. Additionally, intergroup hostility (lack of affection) also appears in the data.

Group solidarity was a recurring theme with participants. Community segregation, along with a strong self-sufficiency in the Republican areas, where state interventions were long regarded with great suspicion, created a community where people really relied on each other and feel a great solidarity with one another.

“[After] coming through something like, what you have been through, ... your trans-generational, community ethos and community solidarity that people will be feeling for the next tens of years, because ... you lived it for 30 years, especially in North Belfast, where you had to be, sort of looking after each other” (BCW1).

Despite strong community solidarity, there was also evidence that community barriers could be crossed and intergroup solidarity could emerge. Ironically, this intergroup solidarity appeared most often in response to a planning decision that both communities objected to, such as building the Westlink, an expressway running through Belfast.

“But a number of things happened during the 70s and 80s, you had the development of the Westlink, and it is sort of a moat right around the city. Especially, the Shankill and Falls, it divided that from this sort of main city centre area. And both communities actually came together at that stage and said, look it is going to devastate our communities, and you know you actually got some cross work there” (BPL7).

Out of the cross community work, emerged some intergroup friendships that had a very positive effect on peacebuilding. Community leaders, while working on issues of common interest, developed the networks and friendships that keep intercommunity

communication lines open during periods of intergroup hostility and they provide support and sustenance to the community leaders.

“You know, contrary to what some people would have you believe, there is a real viable network there, [unclear] and community workers who actually do speak to each other, you know. [laughter]. And as I say, in South Belfast, and I am not sure if that happens across the city, but we do meet up once a month to like tell to each other and to talk about things. And it is like a real support network for us” (BCW6).

The most frequent intergroup hostilities mentioned are the, still frequent, clashes along the interface lines, random street violence such as beatings, and rock throwing and petrol bombing incidents. Several study participants mentioned that while the interface communities are usually the site of the violence, it is largely believed that incitement to violence actually comes from outside the community, or is started by youth for recreational purposes. These incidents increase during the marching season and can be mitigated to a large extent by community leaders with ready access to each other. Mobile phones are used to quickly bring rioters to the site of confrontation, but they are also used by formalized networks of community leaders who also arrive to calm the emotions of the communities. The lack of understanding of a situation fuels confrontations, and the mobile phone networks allow cross-community communication to flow quickly letting community leaders work together to counter the intercommunity hostility.

#### **5.2.4 Understanding**

The need for understanding is huge in contested environments, and the themes identified with understanding are related primarily to building cross community understanding, and building an understanding of the larger political issues and where communities fit into those changes. The human need of understanding has particular bearing for youth who are in their formative years. Youth were also identified as the frequent perpetrators, and victims, of recreational violence. Additionally, several study participants remarked that the sectarian attitudes of Belfast youth were not aligned with an understanding of the broader political issues underlying the conflict. One study

in Northern Ireland indicates that children as young as three demonstrate sectarian attitudes, so clearly cross community understanding must be built into community work (BPL7 Interview).

Primary education has historically been run by the Protestant and Catholic Churches. Consequently, natural mixing with the other community does not occur in the school system until students reach the stage of higher education. However, due to low educational achievement in the most sectarian areas, most often these youth do not continue their education. In areas such as North Belfast, where Republican and Loyalist communities are next to each other, shifting interface lines can leave schools isolated from their constituents and then the schools themselves become a contentious issue, as was seen by the Holy Cross incident in 2001. Fear of harassment on the trip to and from school can affect student performance and willingness to continue in school.

“The numbers are falling and the schools will have to be shared. And that is very scary, especially with the instance of what happened at Holy Cross. And that was a Catholic primary school in a larger protestant area. Mothers were taking their children to school, and needed a police escort to get to school. Not good for children. Not good for future generations” (BPL7).

Community groups do try to instill a level of cross community understanding in youth, and the broader community. Summer programming frequently takes young people out of Belfast during the marching season, but both policy makers and community groups expressed frustration at the short-term nature of this sort of funding.

“[It’s] a big panic every year, we need to have activities for young people. ... What the groups say every year, and this is really funny [laughs], this has been going on about 6 years, ... that first of all, could it be all year around programmed out cross community work for young people, and could it be resourced, as you can't expect the same community leaders to be doing diversionary activity, all those things; commonsensical things. And every year the area says the same thing and every year they run in and shovel this money in to be seen to be doing something around diverting young people from violence in the interface areas” (BPL4).

### 5.2.5 Participation

There appears to be lack of understanding between communities on the ground and policy makers and planners as well. There is a difference between what policy makers and planners think they are doing, and what people on the ground think they are doing. This is really an issue that speaks to the human need of participation. What are the perceptions of planners on the ground? How do communities want to be engaged in planning their city? How are they engaged now and is this effective? And, perhaps most importantly in contested cities, what can planners do to help make the work of community leaders be more effective on the ground?

Participation is discussed frequently in planning, yet is still not practised particularly well. The opportunities to satisfy the need for participation are very broad. A whole host of satisfiers, acceptable to a wide variety of citizens, can satisfy the need for participation. Major themes that fall under the human need of participation include *barriers to participation, desire to participate, community trust, community capacity building, community peacebuilding opportunities, consultative processes, women's projects, and political participation*. Finally, the *perception of the role of planning/planners* was identified as having an effect on community participation, and is included as a code in this theme.

Following the Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland's leaders went to the citizens and asked "what kind of country do you want to live in?" The response was overwhelming. Over 10,000 people participated in the consultation. Clearly the citizens of Northern Ireland are willing to participate if: they understand their role; care about the subject of the consultation; and are given an opportunity to participate. Citizens and community leaders in particular, want to be a part of the process of building a new future for Belfast.

"So we want the planners then, we want the city centre managers [unclear] to come in and see what is going on, and we want to be involved in the development and the regeneration of Belfast, because that can really be positive for this

community. But it is very difficult for us; I'm not a planner, I have no experience of planning" (BCW6).

In addition to a lack of knowledge of planning, community leaders identified a number of barriers to participation. Some of these barriers were most acute in the contested parts of the city. The development of the Belfast Metropolitan Area Plan (BMAP) (Department of the Environment, 2004) was the first major planning document to be developed for Belfast after the Good Friday Agreement. Consequently, it might be considered a seminal document in helping to chart a new course for planning this city. However, most community leaders felt that the consultations for BMAP were not inclusive. One community leader felt that large segments of her community were marginalized in the BMAP process. When asked if she felt that all community members had equal access to participate in consultations she said no, citing low literacy levels and educational attainment as reasons affecting the ability of some citizens to engage in the consultations.

Local community organizations in many communities assume the job of watching for planning applications that might affect their area and writing a response on the behalf of the community if required. The community planning education role is being done by community leaders because they see the need and assume the responsibility on behalf of their community. But many would see a community planning education role to be part of the role of a planner and some community leaders seem wary of this role stating "I am not a planner, I have no experience in planning" (BCW6).

Ideally the community workers try to increase the community's capacity during these encounters, as the need for capacity building in some Belfast neighbourhoods was brought up by various participants. In particular, many Loyalist working class neighbourhoods lack the cohesiveness and long standing community solidarity that has lead to increased capacity in Catholic communities.

All interview groups commented on how progress in intergroup community peacebuilding moves forward in Belfast. Networks are built between community

workers over time and there is a high level of trust between community leaders at the “officer” level. These leaders work, with varying degrees of success, to bring their communities along with them in intergroup activities and acceptance, though these activities are not always designated peacebuilding activities. However, every time violent incidents occur, ordinary citizens tend to pull back into the same group community solidarity and the feeling of safety they get from it. However, long term links between community workers tend to continue.

“They become the people who can provide those networks between different people and can pull people together, and I think a lot of it is taking the time to build that up. It is taking the time to build that in a way that they can sustain the ruptures that occur, the violence that occurs, that pulls things apart, it allows them to keep their connections going” (BCW3).

The links between community workers is one of the commonly mentioned intercommunity links that hold fast during escalations of violence. Another frequently mentioned link is the role of women as peace builders. While the community leaders, often women themselves, might facilitate the initial contacts between women’s peacemaking projects, the women themselves maintain the links and keep the projects going. Additionally, women are less frequently subjected to intra community intimidation and can lead in peacebuilding with less fear of reprisals in their home communities.

“So it is about trying to get them to engage on the common ground, which is their family and their children and their personal women's problems and women's issues. And what we find is if we can kind of get the women involved – it is very hard to get men on board – but if we can get the women on board with things, we find that we have no issue because the men don't want to irritate, if you like, if someone is sitting in the house and going nah, nah, nah, you kind of find that things are allowed to happen, if you like, because they don't want the irritation of the woman. [laughter] So that is the way we work as well” (BCW6).

This important role of the community workers is threatened by the struggle for funding that community groups face. Community group funding has already been discussed to some extent in the discussion of subsistence, but it also has implications for community participation and peacebuilding. Many groups mentioned the directive form of funding

that requires groups to gear programming to the funders specifications, regardless of community need. However, there are two other funding issues with implications for community peacebuilding. The lack of long-term funding requires groups to constantly struggle to get funding and limits their ability to do long-term program planning in an effective way. Secondly, the overall reduced funding levels threaten the viability of a large number of community organizations. It has been noted (BPL4) that Belfast has an unusually large number of community organizations, likely a result of inflated community need during the conflict. However, the potential loss of intercommunity networks and cross community knowledge may result in a slow down or stalling of the peace process, if community workers seek other forms of employment when their organizations fold.

### **5.2.6 Leisure**

Spaces for leisure and recreation play an important role in urban life. These are spaces that are representative of community and assist in developing a sense of belonging in the urban environment. They also provide spaces for idleness and dreaming, activities that foster creativity in citizens. Consequently, in contested environments, spaces of leisure play a very important role, but in Belfast, like so many other issues, spaces of leisure are often representative of the sectarian geography of the city. Indeed, this sectarian geography leads to two conflicting opinions regarding recreational facilities in Belfast. On one side is the *community perception that there is an inadequate level of leisure infrastructure* and on the other side is the *civil servant opinion that too many leisure facilities exist and some will need to close due to fiscal considerations*. Both opinions are true due to limited access to some facilities based on sectarian geography.

“As you know, in the city there are a number of leisure centres and swimming pools.... If you are a Protestant you can name different pools you could use. If you are a Catholic, you would name a completely different network of swimming pools that you could use, just because you tend to go to ones in ... Catholic areas. And practically all leisure centres and swimming pools are in one residential area or another, but there is a surplus of what is needed because you need to continue to provide for the sectarian geography of the city, provide enough resources to meet the sectarian needs of the city, not the actual needs. And when you get to North

Belfast, all the leisure centres in this part of the city are in Protestant areas. There are about 4 swimming pools that are in about a mile radius of the centre of this area and they are all in ... Protestant areas. So if you are Catholic in North Belfast you have to go across to The Falls to get to the swimming pool" (BCW3).

Even public parks can be a sectarian issue. Alexandra Park in North Belfast is an interface area with a peace line built down the centre of it. Any time new leisure spaces are being built, their location has the potential to create a new interface and care must be taken to consider access points which ultimately determine who will feel they belong in the space. Generally, locating recreational facilities in the city centre is considered neutral, as are activities that do not have sectarian connotations. Both of these features come together at the Odyssey, the ice hockey arena recently built in the Laganside area of central Belfast. The ability for leisure to bring understanding is noted in the film *When Hockey Came to Belfast* (Conway, 2005). This film follows the story of the friendship of a Protestant boy (Andrew) and a Catholic boy (Paul) who become friends while playing hockey.

"You go down at the Odyssey, it brings the two sides together ... for parents and children, ice hockey is definitely a safe zone, and neutral, and nobody cares what is outside that rink"(Fraticeili, Jacob, & Conway, 2005, Andrew's father speaking).

"Anywhere else in the world they're just two wee guys who met playing ice hockey and are friends. They're not doing anything unusual. It's Belfast that is not usual" (Fraticeili, Jacob, & Conway, 2005, Paul's father speaking).

### **5.2.7 Creation**

The Odyssey is an excellent example of the creative processes at work in Belfast. It demonstrates the theme of the *creation of shared spaces*, which is closely linked to a second theme of *inventing peace/imagined city*. Also included in this theme is the *creative work* of the study participants and their *perceptions of their own roles* in the peacebuilding process.

Not surprisingly, the perception of roles varied widely among the planners, policy makers and community leaders interviewed. Community leaders were often engaged in activities that helped build understanding, and by extension build peace. However, they

did not always see their role as a leadership role in the peacebuilding process. Rather, the peacebuilding activities were often an off-shoot of the core programming, but one they engaged to secure funding.

Policy makers in public sector departments with a social focus, such as housing, were most likely to see their own leadership role in peacebuilding. These were also the planners who were most likely to say they had a facilitation and mediation role in building good community relations and in encouraging citizen participation. Since the cessation of the most intense violence, these leaders have been refashioning themselves, and their organizations, to promote the *A Shared Future* (Community Relations Unit, 2005) agenda and in the process are changing their own roles from conflict mitigation to peacebuilding.

“Yes. And again I would have to say that, because I am me. [laughter] But I would say, yah, I mean, put it this way, we have been cited quite a lot in the work that we have done, the progressive work that we have done around the shared future stuff. And, you know, you talk to local key influencers and politicians and all, they will all say to you that the [Housing] Executive had a very good local knowledge of what was going on. They adapted very well, they were one of the key organizations who were able to manage the conflict and now because of their very close engagement locally, and I would say that has given us the position that we are able to drive through now, with the good relations thing. So I think we are a leader” (BPL2).

Similar views were shared by younger planners who, while trained in conventional land-use planning, were more actively engaged in the social aspects of planning.

“I think leadership and facilitative. I don't think it is just planning, more like urban managers. Because it is not just planning, especially in the context that planning is here. You have planning, you have housing managers, you even have all these different sectors, health. You know sort of the social planning that we are in theory moving towards, but in practice this is the way it has to be. Planners need to have a leadership role is a [unclear] and planning has to be involved within contested space, and the divergent needs of the community. I don't think it can just stand back and say, we are just going to take this neutral stance because the community needs are different. ... Definitely I think planners need to have more of a leadership role and that can be done by getting into the communities, like going into the area partnership boards and facilitate there, and being involved there on the ground so people actually see, not just the policy, but actually something on the ground. So they actually see how that trickles down through them” (BPL7).

Being at the beginning of a career was not the key to seeing your role with respect to peacebuilding. Young planners involved in working in land use regulation saw their role as far more regulatory and neutral. Their work was guided by the legislation and they did not identify justice as an issue they considered in their daily practice.

“I would have to say that the nature of my job was such that we weren't thinking of peacebuilding, we were thinking of community division. But we were not thinking of peacebuilding. And I think that reflects more on the fact that I was working in an agency which was seeing itself as a land use regulation body” (BPL3).

Conventional planning chose a neutral role of technical decision-making based on statutory powers and established planning policy, rather than actively attempting to intervene in the conflict. Still, several projects can be viewed as truly visionary in terms of their ability to create shared space and foster inter community engagement. The Laganside area, home to the Odyssey arena is one such shared space. It is part of a huge waterfront redevelopment project that included reclaiming a large area of mudflats resulting from daily tidal flows. The vision for the area had its genesis in the darkest days of The Troubles, but has become a lovely non-sectarian space in the city that combines mixed-use principles of living, working and playing spaces.

“It really was a vision that was coming almost from the depths of despair. And, it was clever enough and it was thinking about the waterfront as having an opportunity, but nobody was investing in Northern Ireland at that time. I am talking about the mid-eighties, and then it came to the setting up of a corporation and it ... wasn't really an organization with huge powers given to it. It was more or less an estate agency, with the capacity to acquire land and extend some monies and that” (BPL3).

This is an example of the ability to imagine peace and thus create spaces for peace to occur. The leaders who conceptualize the Laganside development were imagining new forms of civic space for Belfast. They were imagining a city that included shared public spaces, which lead to a shared sense of belonging, or a shared identity. Ensuring that the public spaces were shared was a key achievement of the Laganside development. This was done by providing a high-quality public realm with more than 30 pieces of public art. New facilities such as the Odyssey Arena and Waterfront Hall attract many

people to sporting and artistic events. Other diverse public events include outdoor concerts and water sports on the River Lagan. New living spaces and businesses were incorporated, but the development also worked closely with the surrounding communities to incorporate their needs for employment and engagement (Watson, 2007).

“That is the sort of role that Laganside came in to do ... and it has made quite a difference. I mean, it really, looking back on it now, it did that changed from being almost a dire straits, at the end of the 70s, to a sort of profound optimism at the turn of the century, you know” (BPL3).

### **5.2.8 Identity and Freedom**

Issues of identity and freedom are intrinsically linked in Belfast, but this is not unique to Belfast. Themes related to identity include creating a *shared sense of belonging*, *parochial belonging*, *territorial definition*, and *culture and tradition*. All of these impact the levels of freedom experienced by citizens of Belfast, most specifically *freedom of movement* and *freedom of access*.

Creating a shared identity is complicated in Belfast. Ongoing disputes at the interfaces continue to circumscribe the mobility of community members. This limits job opportunities for community members (subsistence) and educational (understanding) opportunities for young people, further decreasing the ability for community members to have their fundamental needs satisfied, but it does increase a sense of group solidarity (affection).

“...but your trans-generational, community ethos and community solidarity that people will be feeling for the next tens of years, because if you lived for 30 years, especially in North Belfast where you had to be, sort of looking after each other, then getting..., some people don't go beyond... I mean people joke that people don't go from North to West, or people don't go from West to North, but within North a lot of people don't want to leave the Ardoyne area to go to the New Lodge, and a lot of people don't want to leave New Lodge to go to Ardoyne<sup>22</sup>, because it

---

<sup>22</sup> Ardoyne and New Lodge are both Catholic neighbourhoods in North Belfast.

seems very comfortable within their community and they feel attached to the community, they feel part of it” (CW3).

Complicating the severity of the economic deprivation is the parochial sense of belonging in some of these neighbourhoods. Many community members have a strong sense of identity to their local neighbourhoods and rarely leave it. This parochial sense of belonging likely has a historical dimension, as well a root in the long years of conflict. At one time, especially in the Protestant working class neighbourhoods, it was possible to live your whole life in a small geographical area.

“They said, ‘I’ll never leave Ardoyne.’ I looked at them and I said, ‘Are you serious?’ They said, ‘I’ll never leave Ardoyne, why would we?’ And that is as much as they aspire to these young women who are talented and funny and, but that’s it – I’ll never leave Ardoyne”(BPL4).

“So there has never been any need before to come out of their area, you know so, it’s getting around that whole idea. Particularly with the young people, there was that many employment opportunities a couple of generations back. You know there was the mills, the brewery, there was, you know, loads of job opportunities, actually, here in Sandy Row, so people never needed to leave. You could live, work and socialize here. There was a pub on every corner. You didn’t have to go outside this little block” (BCW6).

When this localized sense of belonging is very strong, and is coupled with fear of the “other,” or fear of the unknown, the resulting imagined city is constricted to a very small spatial region. This, as already mentioned, has impact on both educational and employment opportunities, but it also has a larger impact on another fundamental need – freedom. The participants commented on two main spatial aspects of freedom in this study. The first is *freedom of access*, or the feeling of having a right to the city. The second is *freedom of moment*, which is largely related to physical movement in the city.

Although these two types of spatial freedoms are related, they are fundamentally not the same. Freedom of movement is more specific to transportation systems and physical barriers to free movement in the city. While transportation routes and physical barriers undoubtedly affect a person’s mental map of the city, freedom of access is directly associated with mental barriers to freedom of movement; thus it is directly

connected to someone's imagined city. Freedom of access modifies a person's ability to access vital services that are satisfiers for other needs, such as health clinics (protection), leisure centres and sports facilities (leisure), and as already mentioned, institutions of higher learning (understanding).

"So people who live on one side of an interface would often report that they had difficulty in accessing facilities and services that are on the other side of the interface. Or where they require traveling through territory that they consider to be territory that they feel insecure about travelling through...I think that every study showed...the people that were studied reported when presented with a list of statutory facilities, like clinics, libraries, all the things that government provides...on average there were 3 that people reported that they did not feel able to access. And that is a big issue for government, and not in the least because of their need to duplicate services and facilities. And I mean, what is a facility? The issue for me then is how does that interact with planning?" (BCW4)

There are several methods that show promise for reducing this constricted sense of access for Belfast's most segregated areas. Community workers in both nationalist and loyalist neighbourhoods identify a community leader's responsibility to increase the spatial area in a community's sense of access by promoting access to facilities in the other neighbourhoods. A community worker discussed youth summer programs his organization runs that take the youth to various facilities in the city, as well as in other parts of Northern Ireland. Unlike the first community worker, this worker believes that changes can be seen immediately in the youth. He also discusses his own responsibility as a parent to develop this sense of right to the city in his own children.

However, the sectarian issues causing the constricted sense of access are real. The fear of entering the territory of the other is based on lived experiences of intimidation.

"Well it is not physical in that you can't do it, it is somewhat psychological in that you don't feel that you can do it, but equally there is often very real reasons why you don't feel able. It is not a completely made up sense of psychological fear, in that you might well have experienced physical harassment, violence or abuse in the past, or you might know someone who has, or just – I think it affects different sections of the community in different ways. Probably younger males are the most constrained in that way and more likely to be involved in confrontation with other younger males than older people, or women or girls. But it is not exclusive to younger males." (CW3)

This sense of intimidation is not just brought about by physical intimidation. The sectarian geography of the city brings with it a lot of mental intimidation as groups mark out their territory with symbols and flags. Both nationalist and loyalist communities are known to mark the boundaries of their community with flags, emblems and murals, in a similar way that gangs in North America tag their territory. Even the kerb stones are painted in some neighbourhoods to demark territory. The resulting message is one of intimidation to someone well versed in the history and meaning of these symbols, but who also does not have a sense of belonging to the group represented by the symbols.

“At the working class level there is quite a clear territory definition; we marker our streets by painting kerb stones and hang out our flags and Protestants don't feel comfortable when the tricolour is flying and Catholics don't feel comfortable when the union jack is flying. And that is just the way it is too, and I think is the same over most of Northern Ireland. Belfast has just got it more cheek by jowl.” (BPL3)

The other area of freedom that participants delved into was related to equality and justice. To a certain extent this was in response to a question posed to them, but very often issues of equality and justice were discussed voluntarily. This was particularly common among members of the civil service.

“We have some of the tightest equality legislation in the world. And this really arose after the cease fire and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, and the Northern Ireland Act of 1998 contained a strong commitment to the principle of equality which underpins a lot of our legislation now, and all public authorities in Northern Ireland are obliged to draw up an equality scheme, which sets out how they will fulfil this act as required under the law and that is a copy of our equality scheme there. A part of the equality commitment, part of the Northern Ireland Act requires public authorities to have two responsibilities, one is to promote equality of opportunity and the second part of the legislation requires them to promote good relations among groups of different religious, political, and racial backgrounds” (BPL1).

Community leaders were more skeptical of the importance, or perhaps the affect of the equality legislation in Northern Ireland, and indeed the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. None of the community leaders indicated that they had seen any real change on the ground as a result of the legislation.

“But, it is there for a reason, we didn't have a good start off point when it came to this, and a lot of civil servants, even though they know they are there, they still have a lot to learn, in my opinion, in terms of equity. And it might be until such time as those laws are tested that we will start seeing the results of it” (CW1).

However, several community leaders did mention that their organizations worked with the Belfast City Council Good Relations Unit and received some programming money from them. It is clear by examining the Good Relations Unit website and publically available documents, that equality is at the heart of the work they do, and this was reflected in the perspective of the interviewees who are members of the Good Relations Unit.

“Our vision is for a stable, tolerant, fair and inclusive society, where individuality is respected and diversity is celebrated, in an inclusive manner” (Belfast City Council: Good Relations Unit, n.d., Vision Section).

The community leaders most often discussed equity in terms of equitable access to services and housing. In terms of planning, the focus was on equitable influence on planning decisions. The Catholic housing shortage in North Belfast was commented on by all community leaders from that part of the city, and was also discussed by peace builders and planners as well. Community leaders from this area saw lack of housing as an issue of equity. They were also honest enough to admit that it was unlikely that Catholic residents would feel safe moving into a declining population Protestant neighbourhood in order to secure housing. Additionally, most people did not see that Belfast could be a potential location for a shared housing scheme in the working class neighbourhoods served by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE). Consequently, in order to alleviate housing demand, it appears that negotiation will be required to offer up land for Catholic housing, at least in the short term.

### **5.3 Chapter Summary**

The process of coding and thematic development employed the use of Max-Neef's nine fundamental human needs of subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, leisure, creation, identity, and freedom. This is considered a valid

theoretical framework for the data analysis because, according to Max-Neef, human needs are universal, but satisfiers of those needs are culturally specific. The use of fundamental human needs provides a framework for analysis and comparison.

In Belfast, the most contested neighbourhoods tend to also be the most deprived areas of the city. Consequently, the subthemes identified for Belfast have similarities to deprived regions of any city. However, the degree to which some subthemes manifest themselves is unusual for most cities standards, and in Belfast these issues are complicated by sectarian intimidation. Sectarian intimidation is implicated in a number of subthemes, in almost all of the fundamental human needs themes. In particular, subsistence, protection, affection, and understanding are affected by sectarianism. In order to achieve a measure of safety, people moved to single identity neighbourhoods and refuse to seek employment or educational opportunities in other areas of the city. Part of this is related to a parochial identity and solidarity stemming from the “us against them” dichotomy that was so much a part of the conflict. However it also affects the ability to form and keep friendships “across the wall”, and there are a number of walls that impede free movement in the city. Some of those walls are psychological, but the end result is the same as physical walls. Both lead to a modified pattern of movement and a constricted imagined city.

Sectarian attitudes are also evident in the refusal to concede surplus urban territory from one neighbourhood to another. Territory is marked with sectarian symbols, although this has been reduced significantly in recent years. These symbols are also considered symbols of culture and identity, which make them a core human issue and removing them can be exceedingly threatening to people whose identity is localized.

Understanding between communities is limited by a lack of shared spaces, but there are several examples of the creation of new shared spaces that have proved to be successful. The genesis of these spaces is located in both the public sector, as in the case of the Laganside area of the city centre, and in the grassroots amongst community workers and peacebuilders. This creative activity is essentially a visionary exercise of

imagining a new city and is demonstrative of the best practice at both the public sector and grassroots level. These examples prove that Belfast's citizens can and want to participate if given an opportunity, and when urban leaders, including planners, see part of their role as peacebuilding, they are more likely to show leadership in this area. Some public sector planners do not see this as part of their role, and it appears that this is likely a part of their work culture. Public sector planners, who deal with the side of planning related to social issues, are more inclined to view their role as changing as the peace process progresses. These organizations are moving to a more resolver (a term used by Bollens and described in Section 3.3) format for their planning processes, further engaging the communities affected by their work.

## Chapter 6 Comparison between study cities and Jerusalem analysis

When I began this research project, I did not have any real concept of the situation that I would walk into on the ground in Belfast and Jerusalem. My working knowledge of these cities, the issues that surround them, the peace process they were working through, and their spatial arrangements, was all extremely theoretical and contained fundamental gaps.

Belfast was peaceful while I was there. The news contained only a few minor skirmishes, ones that my interview subjects might label as “recreational rioting.” I attended a peace parade and, by mistake, a paramilitary counter-peace parade. It was this experience that taught me much about the conflict. It helped to fuel my imagination of what the situation felt like for people on the ground during The Troubles. As I stood in the Milltown Cemetery, not far from the graves of Bobby Sands<sup>23</sup> and Mairéad Farrell<sup>24</sup>, a military helicopter circled overhead and I found myself surrounded by paramilitary members who had not yet called a ceasefire. The roll call of those had died was instructive in its length, as were the children who marched with their parents in full paramilitary gear. Despite this, Belfast was still familiar to me. It is a Western city, its epistemological heritage is similar to my own, and I could read the street signs, even if I had only a foggy idea of what people were saying to me.

The flight from Belfast to Jerusalem takes only a few hours, but the world you inhabit at the end of the flight is very different. If I was unprepared for Belfast, I was completely

---

<sup>23</sup> Bobby Sands was a PIRA volunteer who died on hunger strike in Long Kesh prison in 1981. The hunger strike was one method the prisoners used to regain special category status as political prisoners.

<sup>24</sup> Mairéad Farrell was a PIRA volunteer who was implicated in a bombing, interned in Armagh Goal, participated in hunger strikes, and was eventually shot by the British Army in Gibraltar.

out of my depth in Jerusalem. While the city seemed peaceful to me, I would frequently have my backpack searched when I entered grocery stores and coffee shops. To enter the downtown bus station, you had to walk through airport quality security. Soldiers holding machine guns were everywhere and, almost always, exceedingly young and bored looking. I also attended a peace rally while in Jerusalem, but in contrast to the event in Belfast, this one was small and appeared to have more soldiers in attendance than demonstrators. Israeli news frequently had images of frightened people surrounded by rubble, but I almost never knew what happened due to the language barrier. I was rarely certain that I was on the correct bus and I was frequently lost. Street signs in West Jerusalem include English, but my map spelled out the street names phonetically in Hebrew while the signs contained the street name's "meaning," for example Yafo vs. Jaffa, David Ha-Mellekh vs. King David. Most streets in East Jerusalem were not labeled at all, either on the map or with street signs, a clear indication of the lack of importance of these neighbourhoods to the Jerusalem authorities.

## 6.1 Jerusalem

*"Like a Russian doll, the struggle for the holy city is a microcosm of larger global conflicts and at the same time contains within itself a seemingly interminable series of ever more petty quarrels" (Wasserstein, 2001, p.xi).*

The interviews in Jerusalem took place in May 2007. June 2007 marked the 40<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the reunification of the city following the Israeli victory in the 1967 Six-Day War. The month was marked by a lead up to state celebrations of the unification and alternative demonstrations by peace activists.

Although official Israeli celebrations commemorate a unified city, it is clearly not. Average Jewish residents of Jerusalem rarely, or never, have cause to visit an Arab neighbourhood, and daily life will not bring that resident into an Arab neighbourhood. Arab residents do occasionally enter Jewish neighbourhoods, but as labourers or employees. Arab and Jewish neighbourhoods are served by different markets, public transportation systems and even by different taxicabs. They have different levels of

garbage pickup, different levels of infrastructure, different density of schools and hospitals, and different school systems. Even the working language of the neighbourhoods is different, with Hebrew spoken in Jewish neighbourhoods and Arabic in the Arab neighbourhoods.

By May 2007, the Road Map to Peace had been declared a failure, Israel was suffering from international and internal condemnation for the 2006 war in Lebanon, and the “Conflict of Brothers” was unfolding in Gaza and the West Bank between Fatah and Hamas. Israeli had pulled out of Gaza, but kept firm control over its borders. This resulted in continued rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel and the election of Hamas in Gaza further isolated the area when many countries, including Canada, refused to recognize the new government. The conflict appeared intractable and this was reflected in several of the interviews. However, it was possible to detect a level of hope and an expectation of change.

The people interviewed all were relatively ordinary citizens of the region, but they also represented a professional class of people on both sides of the conflict. These planners, peacebuilders, and community workers were well educated citizens. Most had travelled or studied in other countries and all were bilingual. Many were trilingual. It was possible to relate to all of them, although it was clear that their politics were varied. Unlike the radical voices presented in media sound bites, these voices of Palestinians and Israelis are all rational, thoughtful, and non-inflammatory. Without exception, they all want peace and justice to prevail in the region. Surprisingly, they almost all shared a similar vision of what that peace and justice might look like.

## **6.2 Themes from Jerusalem**

Max-Neef notes that any unmet fundamental human need reveals a human poverty. Each poverty generates a corresponding pathology. Although he does not attempt to match particular pathologies to poverties, he does discuss human potential with respect to deprivation. An unmet need is not simply a human deprivation. If that were true,

unmet needs would simply limit human existence. According to Max-Neef, an unmet need is also the impetus for human potential (Max-Neef, 1992; Max-Neef, Elizalde, & Hopenhayn, 1989). For example, an unmet need to participate can be the motivation to participatory action<sup>25</sup>.

Perhaps one way of thinking of this is Hallsmith's use of virtuous and vicious cycles. When a situation appears to be cyclical in nature and is improving continuously, a cycle is a virtuous cycle. When a cyclical situation is continuously getting worse, it is called a vicious cycle (Hallsmith, 2003, p. 75). If this is applied to human poverties, in a virtuous cycle, an unmet need may inspire human potential, or in a vicious cycle an unmet human need creates ever more dystopian pathologies. For example, an unmet need for protection might inspire the building of security barriers and more severe police crack downs, which tend to lead to a cycle of ever more anger and violence, and corresponding crackdowns. Alternatively, an unmet need for protection might lead to intercommunity dialogue and a joint economic development project from which a shared sense of belonging might arise. This reduces the acceptance of violence in both communities, and thus reduces the threat of violence and the need for protection. In turn, it opens the way for greater intercommunity engagement and it becomes a virtuous cycle.

### **6.2.1 Subsistence**

As mentioned previously, the human need for subsistence deals with issues around the fundamentals of life – food, shelter and work. In Jewish Jerusalem, these fundamental needs are largely met through individual resources or state social security systems. However, in the Arab neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem, subsistence issues related to *economic resources* and *shelter (housing) issues* are much more evident. Most Arab neighbourhoods have higher levels of unemployment, and due to the discrimination

---

<sup>25</sup> In this use, poverty is not necessarily an economic poverty, although it might be. Poverty is used by Max-Neef to encompass a broader mean more closely related to a stunted human potential.

against the community, they have narrower opportunities for employment. Of course employment affects one's ability to obtain other need satisfiers such as food and shelter. According to the 2005 poverty index, 67% of families in East Jerusalem live below the poverty line, compared to 29% among the Jewish population of the city (as cited in Margalit, 2006, p. 16). Despite larger implications of poverty, the most frequently identified issue is related to shelter. It is also clearly a flash point among Arab residents of the city.

The requirement for additional housing in Arab neighbourhoods is acute. The situation is exacerbated by a number of planning related issues including the building of the security wall, the lack of planning schemes completed and approved for Arab neighbourhoods, Israeli and municipal policies regarding the demographic balance, Israeli policies on home demolitions, and the deprivation index. The deprivation index is a term used by Margalit (2006, p. 15) to describe the difference between the equitable allocation of municipal resources based on population, land mass, or level of need, and the actual allocation of resources to Arab Jerusalem.

There are several ways to consider the level of housing need in Arab Jerusalem, as compared to Jewish Jerusalem. The average number of persons per room for Arab communities is 2 times the average for Jewish communities. More than 20% of Arabs reside in homes where the average number of people per room is 3 or greater. Less than 2% of Jewish families live in similar conditions<sup>26</sup>. Another measure of the level of housing pressure in Arab neighbourhoods can be examined in the population density of the built up areas of the neighbourhoods. Table 6.1 compares Jewish and Arab population density and building percentages. From Table 6.1 it is clear that Jewish neighbourhoods were built at a much higher residential density even though their population density is typically much lower.

---

<sup>26</sup> Data is from *The Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem 2007/2008*. Retrieved June 10, 2009 from [http://jiis.org/.upload/yearbook/2007\\_8/shnaton%20F2306.pdf](http://jiis.org/.upload/yearbook/2007_8/shnaton%20F2306.pdf).

Table 6.1 Comparison of Jewish and Arab population density<sup>27</sup> and building percentages

Arab Neighbourhood			Nearby Jewish Neighbourhood		
Neighbourhood Name	Pop. density	% allowed	Neighbourhood Name <sup>28</sup>	Pop. density	% allowed
At Tur	27	50-75 <sup>29</sup>	French Hill/Mt. Scopus	1.2	120
Al-Issawiyya	21	70	French Hill/Mt. Scopus	1.2	120
BeitHanina	15	50-75	PisgatZeev	7.4	90-120
BeitSafafa	25	50	Gilo	9.6	75%

(Data included in this table is a combination of data from Margalit (2006) p. 40 and data retrieved from *The Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem no. 8, 2006*, as cited on the PASSIA website at [http://www.passia.org/palestine\\_facts/pdf/pdf2008/Jerusalem.pdf](http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/pdf/pdf2008/Jerusalem.pdf). Retrieved June 11, 2009.)

There is a stated policy to keep the demographic balance of Jerusalem to 70% Jewish and 30% Arab and non-Jewish (Margalit, 2006, p. 60). This policy continues to be reaffirmed in municipal planning documents, although it is recognized, even in government forecasts, that this balance is likely to be 60-40 by 2020. Consequently, the planning policy in East Jerusalem has been to expropriate land from Arab owners and build Jewish neighbourhoods, while at the same time limiting legal house building in Arab neighbourhoods. Building permits are denied based on insufficient proof of ownership, insufficient neighbourhood infrastructure, lack of approved planning schemes or because the building will exceed legal planning building percentages.

“The municipality, for four years the municipality start with the government, to make for Jerusalem what we call 2020 Town Planning programme for Jerusalem. 2020. They give us 0% for the future to build, I can show you in the book. And we came and we said we are against your policy, what are you doing? The situation and the reality are different. Come and see. We are suffering here. They thought we still did choose our percentage of building. Actually all the people here built

---

<sup>27</sup> Population densities are persons/dunam. A dunam is a unit of area used in the Ottoman Empire, and still commonly used in countries that were once a part of the Ottoman Empire. 1 dunam = 1000 metres square, or 0.1 hectare.

<sup>28</sup> At Tur and Al’Isawiya (also known as Issawiyya) are on opposite sides of Mount Scopus.

<sup>29</sup> Based on interview with planner JPL7, who is working in the neighbourhood.

about 75[%], up to 90%. But they didn't wait for the municipality because they know the municipality will refuse to give them the permission for building” (JCW3).

As noted, many building permits are never even applied for in East Jerusalem.

Sometimes this is because the building owner does not have the economic resources to pay all the associated fees or it is known that the permit will be denied on the basis of insufficient infrastructure. Sometimes the lack of application for building permits is also related to issues of identity, where the building owners do not recognize the Israeli run municipality of Jerusalem as having legal authority over their neighbourhood. And indeed, while the municipality claims legal authority in issues of control, such as building permits, it does not demonstrate any moral authority to govern in East Jerusalem’s Arab neighbourhoods. Margalit (2006) demonstrates that the municipality uses just 9-12% of the municipal budget in Arab East Jerusalem, although the population is 33% of the total urban population, and the area demonstrates greater social and infrastructure need (p. 110). In the end, whatever the reason for the lack of a building permit, the actual act of building without a permit is in response to a fundamental need.



(Photo credit: J. Miller)

*Figure 6.1.* Photo of a demolished house in East Jerusalem.

“East Jerusalem residents build in disregard of any national or political struggle. They build out of necessity, out of a legitimate need to make a home for their family, with no political or ideological motivation. Illegal construction in the east of the city is devoid of political awareness and is engendered by nothing more than an essential human need” (Margalit, 2006, p. 96).

The most severe shelter needs result when a home is built without a permit and is subsequently demolished as illegal, usually with the family losing almost all their possessions in the process. When a home is demolished, an entire family is left homeless and children are traumatized by the experience. Despite the threat of becoming homeless, building without municipal authorization continues, because, as both Max-Neef and Margalit note, the need for subsistence is stronger than other human needs.


### **6.2.2 Protection**

Protection themes exacerbate the severe housing shortage in East Jerusalem and work in concert to create a vicious cycle. The *need for protection* felt by Jewish citizens has resulted in security measures that have detrimental repercussions for Arab *health and social security protection*. Further, these security measures have negative implications on the ability for Arabs to meet other fundamental human needs such as access education (understanding) and employment (subsistence). These unmet Arab needs caused a migration of people into East Jerusalem increasing housing demand.

When the anger of the occupied Palestinians spilled over into the second Intifada, the Al Aqsa Intifada, the number of Israeli civilians killed by suicide bombers increased dramatically, provoking more severe reactions by Israeli security forces, which in turn increased Palestinian anger. This vicious cycle culminated in the decision by the Israeli government to build a controversial security wall between Israel and the occupied territories. Since East Jerusalem is annexed to the municipality, it is contained on the Israeli side of the wall, effectively cutting it off from its natural Arab hinterland. This hinterland had previously served as a pressure valve for the housing demand in East Jerusalem, with many Arabs moving to nearby villages to escape crowded living conditions in Jerusalem. The close proximity of the villages allowed an easy commute to

jobs and schools in Jerusalem. However, with the wall came security checkpoints that make the commute a daily aggravation at best and impossible at worst. Consequently, many Palestinians moved into East Jerusalem, greatly increasing the housing pressure in the Arab neighbourhoods.

*Fortress Jerusalem - November 2003*



(Map source: Foundation for Middle East Peace [http://www.fmep.org/maps/jerusalem/fortress-jerusalem-nov-2003/fortress\\_jerusalem\\_nov2003.gif/view](http://www.fmep.org/maps/jerusalem/fortress-jerusalem-nov-2003/fortress_jerusalem_nov2003.gif/view), Cartographer: Jan de Jong) Used with permission.

*Figure 6.2. Map of the planned security barrier around East Jerusalem.*

Margalit (2006) notes that while the number of building infractions in East Jerusalem increased from less than 900 in 2000, to over 1,500 in 2005, the number of legal building permits issued by the city decreased from 129 in 2000, to less than 50 in 2004. These figures demonstrate that while housing pressure has mounted in East Jerusalem, it is coupled with stricter requirements for building permits that have not succeeded in decreasing the number of houses built without a permit. Almost all participants agreed that control of house building in East Jerusalem, either through discriminatory policies, such as the lower building percentages in East Jerusalem, or intransigent officials, led to an increase of illegal building and home demolitions, and to increased levels of tension and conflict.

Additionally, none of the participants in this study felt that the security barrier was effective at preventing suicide bombers, but for the average Israeli citizen, who does not go to East Jerusalem or the West Bank, they might feel that the wall is effective. Most of the length of the barrier is actually a chain link fence, but in Jerusalem it is a concrete wall.

“Because the wall is so, it’s so damaging, I don’t say horrendous, but it has such effect and ... in Jerusalem it is a wall. And the wall in Jerusalem, in some places such as Abu Dis, the wall cuts off Palestinians from Palestinians. ... I think we can design borders in such a close proximity place, in a much more environmentally friendly, person friendly way” (JCW5).

While the wall may actually be a pathological manifestation of Israeli society’s need for protection, it does offer many Israelis a feeling of peace. A British born, Israeli journalist interviewed in a film on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had this to say about the ambivalent feeling towards the security barrier in Israeli society.

“I was recently asked by some Germany journalists what I would like to do with this fence. I told them that I would like to find the largest pair of wire cutters and I would attack it. But if I did that, I would not sleep very well tonight in my bed” (Lydia Aisenberg, Journalist) (Kruvant, 2005, time: 7:06).

Although many Israelis believe the security wall is not a long-term solution to the security problem, their immediate need for protection causes them to accept something

that is inherently abhorrent to them. The security barrier also has implications for Palestinian access to health and social security protection. Most medical facilities that have traditionally served Ramallah and other West Bank communities are in East Jerusalem.

“We have two hospitals, the Victoria hospital and El Muqased. The only two main Palestinian hospitals and they serve all of East Jerusalem and the West Bank. But now a Palestinian, who wants to get medical service, should get permission to enter Jerusalem” (JCW3).

Several participants noted the importance of the Jerusalem ID card to the Arab population. Those who cannot prove their lives are centred in Jerusalem run the risk of losing their Jerusalem ID, which prevents them from claiming social security benefits in Jerusalem, leaving them without an important social safety net.

### **6.2.3 Affection and Understanding**

The security barrier also is a very obvious physical barrier to the normal human need for affection. Many Palestinians in East Jerusalem are prevented from normal interactions with friends and family inside the West Bank. This is especially troublesome when coupled with the Israeli policy of requiring a Jerusalem ID card for Palestinian residents of Jerusalem. Palestinians who are classified as residents in Jerusalem are frequently prevented from obtaining a Jerusalem ID card for a spouse from the occupied territories, and sometimes even natural children do not get Jerusalem IDs (Margalit, 2006. p. 14). The wider implications on Palestinian social interactions include access to extended family members, an important satisfier of the human need for affection.

“You know, people here are very suffering, very angry. Ah, they don't have the ... confidence, they don't believe either to the Israeli or to the Palestinian authority. People in Jerusalem, in Palestinian Jerusalem, I think they have a big suffering and the wall makes us, separates us from the West Bank. We used to visit there, to work there. Now we can't. Like we are in a gate, you know a big gate!” (JCW3).

The wall is also a barrier to greater understanding between the two communities. Peace dialogues between the communities are hampered by the barrier, which can make it difficult for groups working for peace to meet together. Building trust between groups is

complex due to a lack of fundamental understanding between the two communities, although both groups might be willing to work together. Several women's organizations have managed to maintain dialogue despite the difficulties. While women on both sides indicate they have been exposed to threats of violence because of their peace work; the risks are greater for Palestinian women due to their marginal existence.

“Women on both sides of solidarity initiatives experience anxiety about being perceived as disloyal to their own communities and may in fact experience criticism or threats from more extreme elements in their respective societies” (Powers, 2006, p. 3). “The question of personal security is one that haunts Palestinian women activists. Because the civil society boycotts any connection with Israelis, any sustained conversation with women on the other side means taking a political risk” (Powers, 2006, p. 7).

Education can often be a great promoter of understanding of complex situations. However, while education is actively promoted in Jewish Jerusalem, education in Palestinian Jerusalem is as neglected as the infrastructure. Schweitzer and Sackett (2008) indicate that there is a shortage of 1,500 classrooms in East Jerusalem and the school dropout rate is 50% for Palestinian children, compared to less than 8% for Jewish children. Despite the powerful role that women can play as peace builders, girls are more affected by the lack of adequate funding for education than boys are.

“We have two kinds of schools here. A private one – the private [ones] are sponsored by the NGOs, Christian or Muslim. And we have the schools that are sponsored by the municipality of Jerusalem, or the Minister of Education. But we have a lack of schools here. A big issue, we don't have a highschool for girls. We succeeded to build a school, a highschool for boys. Now we are trying to ... build one for girls. Now [the] girls go to school up to [the] ninth grade, and alot of them are not allowed to go to the very close high school for girls. You know that education here is separate” (JCW3).

#### **6.2.4 Participation**

Israel's top-down planning process does not lend itself well to participatory planning, but it seems clear that participation in planning is both necessary and desirable. In Jerusalem's Palestinian community, there is a tradition of land ownership that, although often ignored and abused by the state, is the key to acceptable development in the Arab

neighbourhoods. Successful planning exercises have occurred with a participatory format, both with either Israeli or Palestinian planners leading the exercise. Although, as noted above, the levels of education are low in these neighbourhoods, planners agree that communities can quickly grasp complex planning issues.

“They understood every small detail. And the whole idea is that every decision is made by the community and not by the planner. And believe me it wasn’t easy, but they had to reach their own solutions for every problem, that was the deal. And they managed to do it, so it takes more time maybe during the planning process, however when the project is realized it is very stable... So I am aware of this and I really have no clear answer, but it seems that we should try to change our actions and understand that planning is not about good or bad, but is about our ability to find a reasonable solution in relation to the community” (JPL6).

A Palestinian planner working in an East Jerusalem neighbourhood had developed a very similar process, which was described in great detail. The community had hired him to develop a plan in order to regularize unauthorized houses and to provide the community with an approved plan so future building permits could be issued. The planner worked with the director of the local community centre, and used the community centre for a series of town hall meetings. The director also worked with the community to negotiate the land and monetary settlements between community members who were donating land for public use. The most unique aspect of this process is that the entire community had an opportunity to be involved in the plan, rather than just a representative group.

“They are involved in every detail, ... [for] every program of the town planning, even the public program. Where we need to arrange to have some areas for the schools, the kindergarten, a garden, you know for the public, etc., it is also organized with them. Now we are at the place where we must decide how many schools we need, the program of the public use, we are going to decide it together and we are trying to [decide] where these are going to happen, and on whose land, and how we are going to compensate the people who will lose a lot of land. We are going to get there soon. It will be the first time it happens in this area that everybody is involved in the town planning. It is very tough for me. I don’t have to think along with a committee of 5, or a committee of 10, but I have to think with a committee of 500” (JPL7).

Although upfront participation is more time consuming for the planners, they agree that the end product is more desirable and more acceptable to the communities. None of the planners indicated that the Arab communities were unwilling to participate in the public consultations because of national interests. It does not mean that community members do not have national aspirations, but they are willing to participate in planning exercises because it is clear to them that community planning is in the best interests of their community.

The perception of planning in Arab neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem is a perception of an oppressive, convoluted process that is designed to stymie community aspirations and participation. Although local planning schemes are required by the Planning and Building Law for all jurisdictions in Israel, and although the municipality annexed the East Jerusalem neighbourhoods 30 years ago, the municipality has not completed local planning schemes for most of the eastern part of the city. A recent master planning exercise has been undertaken, but the local communities were not consulted in the master planning process. One planner, who was developing a neighbourhood planning scheme at the time, noted that she consulted with the planners involved in developing the master plan. She worked with the community and with the master planners, to ensure the community plan would work with the new master plan. However, in the end the plan was rejected because the master plan had not yet been approved. Although this planner states that most local plans in East Jerusalem are initiated by the local communities, usually because of the threat of a large number of house demolitions, it is almost impossible to get the plans approved anyway.

“For forty years we didn’t invest enough money in East Jerusalem. There is no infrastructure, there is no planning, there is no land registration and so on. There are no roads, no anything. So I mean a plan of mine was approved two weeks ago, to build 200 units in Beit Hanina. One [member of] the committee is a man who came from the Ministry of Transportation and said, ‘But there is no normal road access to your neighbourhood. So you don’t want to build 200 units without the proper access. If you do it, you are against the Palestinian who lives there.’ And he was right of course, you cannot build 200 units without the proper access. But no one gave them access for the last 40 years! So they can reject plans because there is no access, and they are not building the access. So there is no access, so they

reject plans, and they don't invest money in building the access because they don't get fees from the building permits. So we cannot break the cycle. We don't approve plans because there is no infrastructure, we cannot build infrastructure because there is no money, we cannot get money because we don't give permits, and so on. So every time they say 'Ok, but there is no sewage, how can you plan without the sewage?' So go ahead and do the sewage! But they say 'we're not doing the sewage.' So...now if you ask me, really, really, really, what I'm doing, I mean, what we are all doing for East Jerusalem is not for the benefit of East Jerusalem. We should really let the area explode and then someone would come in and make the solution" (JPL1).

Many of the planners interviewed for this study were connected to BIMKOM, an NGO established by planning professionals concerned about planning processes in Israel.

BIMKOM's website includes the following objective:

"Drawing on values such as human rights, social justice, good governance and community participation, we seek to affect system-wide change by encouraging the development of new planning policies and procedures that are more equitable and responsive to the needs of the various communities" (BIMKOM website, n.d., Background and Objectives).

Given this association, it is not surprising that the planners who participated in this study indicated that this vicious cycle of planning in Israel has altered their perception of their own role as planners. Some planners have radically altered their lives and left private practice for work with BIMKOM and a life of activism, while others have devoted considerable time to volunteer activities with BIMKOM.

Architects here cannot really do what they believe in. ... I didn't really know what can I do. It just happened that some architects and planners thought about the issue of the planning in Israel and decided to start this NGO, BIMKOM. I couldn't put it in words, like they did, but after they did it, I knew what they said was a good sum of what I felt uncomfortable [about]. ... I didn't feel good, and I didn't know why and how, but after that I understood and then I started to be a volunteer here" (JPL3)

Planners indicated that a new process for planning must be developed for Israel. One saw his role in terms of building justice into the system and educating others regarding the power structures at work in the language of planning and the planning processes. Even planners in private practice admitted the current planning system did not increase justice for many communities, although most did not identify peacebuilding as one of

their roles. One planner did, however, indicate that she had become a jaded over the years. She had been more idealistic about planning earlier in her career.

“We were very naïve. ... We thought we could separate planning from politics, that planning could really solve problems. That we could build with planning, I don’t know, try to make a better world using only planning tools. And that was my attitude when we planned in Beit Safafa” (JPL1).

### 6.2.5 Leisure

Although the need for leisure is not discussed much by the interview participants, there are references to leisure in terms of oppressive planning techniques. One community worker, who works for an NGO with a mandate of Palestinian empowerment, discussed a playground project an Arab community organized<sup>30</sup>.

“We are trying to empower ourselves and make ourselves more active. For example [we built a] playground in our neighbourhood. Our message is, we want to take responsibility for our places. ... We want the right of a playground for our children, for our neighbourhood. We built a playground through organizing ourselves through cooperating with groups, and then the local authorities started to send, for example, a demolition order” (JCW2).

The municipality should be expected to provide neighbourhood playgrounds for children, as a part of neighbourhood level plans. However, as has already been mentioned, the municipality does not seem inclined to plan for the Arab neighbourhoods of Jerusalem, and is well-known for placing roadblocks in front of plans initiated by the community. Sometimes these roadblocks are based on a tenuous link to leisure. One town planner mentioned having a plan blocked, because they did not put in bicycle lanes. While many North American planners might applaud this action, in the situation that exists in East Jerusalem, it appears to be a petty decision based on ulterior motives.

“When we come to high court they kick us out, ... the District Planner says my plan is not good. ... because I don’t have lanes for bicycles. Are they crazy? They don’t

---

<sup>30</sup> This community was not in East Jerusalem, but it was in an Arab neighbourhood.

have roads, they don't have anything, and you want to have lanes for bicycles. But my planning is not proper because I don't have places for bicycles" (JPL1).

Officially, much of East Jerusalem is kept for open public spaces, or green areas, but these are not developed as spaces of recreation or leisure.

"These areas are 'only green for the Palestinian population,' as Teddy Kollek, the former mayor of Jerusalem is quoted as having said. As long as the municipality does not decide to use the land in order to build new settlements, or to expand the existing ones, these lands are maintained as green areas, forbidding Palestinians from expanding outside the built-up areas" (Schweitzer and Sackett, 2008, section on East Jerusalem Planning ).

### **6.2.6 Creation**

A number of the planners mentioned the need for creating a new planning methodology, which would support the call from Yiftachel (2006) for a new southeastern planning methodology. One planner stated that Israeli planners are used to easy planning as over 90% of the land is state owned. Even if you leave out the "dark side of planning" that is so often in existence in Arab neighbourhoods, most planners interviewed believed that a new understanding of planning was needed.

"Maybe people just don't understand the situation on the ground. They should develop new methods of planning in order to manage to plan for this kind of village, for this kind of ownership, for this kind of plan. Because really the Israelis are used to our way of planning, which is very different. I mean planning for the Ministry of Housing in [unclear] for example. So we all own the land, we own the money. We can plan the way we want it. We can decide where the schools will be located to the best way for the neighbourhood to come out [for neighbourhood access]" (JPL1).

Planners trained in the Israeli planning system are used to having everything in their control when planning a neighbourhood. In some ways this is reminiscent of planning subdivisions in North America, where the land for the whole development is owned by the developer, giving the planner greater control over the outcome. This of course is not the condition under which planning occurs in East Jerusalem, where most of the land is privately held. Planners working in these communities indicated that grassroots, participatory planning is effective in the Arab communities.

“Now you are part of the process. You are seeing what is happening. First of all, all the ideas, the planning, they are involved 100%. ... Now for example, today I am here with the plan, they come, everyone comes, and we look at the plan. We see what is happening, and if they have any questions, anything they don't understand, I explain to them. If there is any problem with the plan, I will discuss it with them, and we will come to an agreement. [These roads carried] only carts, only donkeys at that time [when they were built]. Now there are many cars and we need to widen these roads. Widening these roads means it must be put into this plan, so that means everybody must lose 2 or 3 or 4 metres on the edge of their land. They understand that, we explain it to them and they accept it. Sometimes there are some irregularities in the road, somebody has to lose more and others have to lose less. We have to explain it to them and some kind of compensation may have to happen between them. That is none of my business, but this is their business. Maybe I have to have a say or advice, OK. So they are involved in every detail” (JPL7).

Planners who chose to discuss where the change leadership is coming from, with respect to planning, identified that change is being led from the NGOs, like BIMKOM, PASSIA<sup>31</sup>, and ICAHD<sup>32</sup>. Planners working in East Jerusalem also criticized government planners for having a more conventional outlook on planning and wanting to regularize the planning process to the more common Israeli top-down form of planning.

“He doesn't agree with planning according to the ownership and according to the needs of the people” (JPL1).

However, non-public sector planners believed that individuals within the government system could work toward change and a more just system, but they chose not to. Likely, planners in the civil service see their role as more regulatory, and guided by legislation, rather than justice. However, the one government planner interviewed did indicate that he believed that planning was about the “just and logical distribution of wealth” (JPL8). He also indicated that he felt that comprehensive planning was the best approach and

---

<sup>31</sup> PASSIA stands for Palestine Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs. Its website address is <http://www.passia.org/>.

<sup>32</sup> ICAHD stands for Israeli Committee Against Housing Demolitions. Its website address is <http://www.icahd.org/eng/>.

felt he had played a pioneer role in allowing communities in East Jerusalem to submit plans to the municipality. The criteria of these submissions are that all the neighbours agree to the land agreements, and that the village leaders agree as well. Of course, it is clear to see that it might be difficult to meet these criteria, and since the plan must be ratified by the District Committee, 50% of whom are political members, it is not clear how much real power planners have within the government planning system when faced with political opposition.

Despite these difficulties, there appears to be a participatory planning process being created by planners working in the Israel/Palestine context. Planners working with the Bedouin communities, another disadvantaged minority in Israel, and in East Jerusalem, describe similar participatory planning approaches. Both indicate that the processes have been successful. This process includes attention to community needs for housing and public space, but these planners are including the community in every step of the decision-making process. In doing so they are paying attention to the community's need for participation, but also the community's need for identity, and freedom.

A number of examples of successful community participation and support of the process of plan development exists. The problems in the planning process result when the plan needs to get Local Planning Committee and District Planning Committee approval. One planner indicated that she has had very few East Jerusalem plans approved in the last ten years.

### **6.2.7 Identity and Freedom**

Identity and freedom are intrinsically linked in Jerusalem. No matter how you self-identify, or change due to education and experience, part of your identity is linked to your birthright and that birthright has huge implications to what you are perceived to be – occupier or occupied – citizen or resident – Jewish or Arab – Israeli or Palestinian.

While these dichotomies are not necessarily two sides of the same coin, they are usually considered to be so, and you are one or the other. And in the end, identity equates to freedom, or lack thereof.

If you are an Arab in Jerusalem your freedom is limited. You are not considered a citizen of Israel, and you are not a citizen of any other internationally recognized country either. You cannot travel freely even a short distance to a family member's home in the West Bank. Your opportunities for employment and access to education, housing, transportation, leisure facilities and self-determination are limited. Your life is controlled, in almost every aspect, by Israel, but you cannot vote for the leaders of the Knesset<sup>33</sup>.

On the other hand, if you are Jewish in Jerusalem, you have the freedom to vote for your government, you have the full protection of citizenship in a democratic country, and enjoy the benefits of well planned neighbourhoods, access to education, and a wide range of job opportunities. Whether or not you agree with the occupation, you are a member of an occupying nation, censured by much of the world for human rights abuses. You are also considered a legitimate target by the more radical members of the occupied territories. This limits your freedom and threatens the satisfaction of your fundamental need for protection.

According to Max-Neef, identity and freedom are linked to a sense of belonging, differentiation, self-esteem, equal rights, and dissent, among other things. One of the planners interviewed saw the "informal building" activity in East Jerusalem as an individual and collective counter-power action against a dominant and oppressive power. In his mind, the "informal building" (JPL6) is an act of claiming an identity in the city.

"The informal housing is not a criminal act, it is a way for people to survive in the city – a way for people to claim ownership, not just land ownership, but a symbolic ownership. ... The story of Jerusalem is an ongoing endless struggle of who appropriates the city, when in fact there are two different cities" (JPL6).

---

<sup>33</sup> Knesset is the Israeli parliament.

Most planners and community workers, interviewed, believe that the Israeli policy of not investing in Arab neighbourhoods is part of the larger Israeli political objective of maintaining Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel and a systemic attempt to Judaicize East Jerusalem. By building Jewish settlements in the Eastern city and simultaneously neglecting Arab neighbourhoods, the political goal appears to be to create conditions so unpleasant that Arabs will leave the city. The symbolism of Jerusalem is important to Israelis as the messianic role plays out in both the secular and non-secular parts of Israeli society, and this is used by politicians to push forward colonial aspirations. However, as the same planner observed, political leaders appear to be forgetting that Arab communities also have sentiment, ideology, national aspirations, and attachment to place, and that “people don’t necessarily leave a house because you do not allow them to build a new kitchen” (JPL6).

A form of symbolism that plays another important role in Jerusalem’s identity politics, is the symbolism of the *imagined city*, with its accompanying *affect on freedom of access*. Several participants commented on how East Jerusalem does not figure in the Israeli imagined city. Having no need to visit the area to live and thrive in Jerusalem, coupled with a natural fear of the Arab population, due in part to the many acts of terror during the al Aqsa Intifada, Israeli citizens rarely, if ever access the eastern city. This constricted imagined city means that Israeli citizens do not have a sense of the disparity that exists between the western and eastern city. This lack of awareness allows for a great deal of injustice to occur without public objection from the Israeli majority.

“No one is talking about justice. I’ll give you an example. A client of mine ...he had a house in [East Jerusalem]...his house was going to be demolished, and I made a plan. And after the plan was approved, he added a balcony... and there was a trial... and he [was told] you should first plan and then do. ...So I am trying to make plans as the judge said, for people to first plan and then second do, and I don’t manage to do any planning. And so there is probably no justice, because there cannot be. Because you cannot manage to plan [when] you are not allowed to build” (JPL1).

The lack of daily interaction between the communities fuels a lack of understanding, and the constricted patterns of movement affect both Jewish and Palestinian citizens of

Jerusalem. Of course the security barrier has a real and physical impact on the *freedom of movement* of Palestinians, and to a smaller extent on Israelis. However, prior to the security barrier, freedom of movement for Palestinians was already greatly circumscribed by the internal checkpoints, lack of public transport into Palestinian neighbourhoods and even infrastructure that accommodated modern forms of transport.

### **6.3 Common Themes and Differences**

In terms of subsistence, there are a few commonalities between Belfast and Jerusalem. Economic need is clear in the working class neighbourhoods of Belfast, as it is in the Arab neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem. In both cities levels of deprivation are very high relative to the general population of the city. The social manifestations of this deprivation are similar in both cases. High levels of unemployment and low levels of educational achievement are two examples. Housing issues are also important issues in both cities. The demographic of one community is characterized as “bursting at the seams,” Palestinians in Jerusalem and Catholics in Belfast’s working class neighbourhoods.

Max-Neef notes that different cultures have a different expectation of what adequate housing is, and housing issues are consistent with this statement. High-rise housing in Belfast is considered to be the most undesirable housing, and indeed in the Protestant communities where there has been a demographic retraction, block towers from the 70s have been demolished. However, the block towers in the North Belfast Catholic community remains, as the housing demand is higher in those communities. In contrast in Jerusalem, the western side of the community is built to quite a high unit density overall. The unit density in East Jerusalem is much lower, originally due to the village nature of the area, but more recently due to artificial control of the natural growth of the area. The real demand and need for higher density housing exists, but it is being denied by the planning authorities.

There are also real differences in how housing need is being met in each study city. Housing need in the deprived areas of Belfast is primarily social housing and is provided through the NIHE. In contrast, very little social housing exists in East Jerusalem. The Israeli state builds very little housing for Arabs in general, and it largely uses tools provided in the planning legislation to deny Arab's the opportunity to build for their own community. Additionally, it chooses to demolish homes built without permits, rendering entire families in need of shelter.

Physical barriers between groups in conflict are common in both cities and have implications for the human needs of affection, education, participation, identity, and freedom. In Jerusalem, these barriers are checkpoints throughout the urban space and the massive separation barrier that is being built. In Belfast, the peacelines remain in the city a decade after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. In both cities the walls offer comfort to the communities they were built to protect. The main difference between the two cities lies in the last sentence. In general, peacelines in Belfast are localized and were built to separate and protect both sides at an interface, which is a localized area of conflict. The continued maintenance of the peacelines tends to be supported by both local communities. On the other hand, in Jerusalem the security wall is being built to protect just one side in the conflict, and is designed without consideration of the Palestinian communities at all. Instead of equally inconveniencing both communities, the security wall in Jerusalem cuts off the Arab part of the city from its natural hinterland, which further deprives Arabs of opportunity in housing choice, health care, education, employment, and an affectionate social life with those they love on the other side of the wall. The Jerusalem wall does serve to make many Israelis feel safer, so there is a certain measure of resigned acceptance by the Israeli public. Both forms of walls reinforce a particular sectarian identity with clear-cut territorial boundaries.

Barriers and walls are natural destroyers of intercommunity affection. As Paul's father states in *When Hockey Came to Belfast* walls "can keep them apart, but it only serves to

divide them even further than they are because you can throw a stone over a peaceline, but you can't get to know anyone over a peaceline" (Fratlicelli, Jacob, & Conway, 2005). Shared space is in short supply in Belfast, but there are number of recent projects that are going a long way to correcting that. Shared space is almost non-existent in Jerusalem. This lack of a shared belonging is fueled in both cities by separate education systems, different religious practices, and in the case of Jerusalem, a different language. Although personal friendships still occur between Palestinians and Israelis, the strong community leader network between the two distinct groups is largely missing in Jerusalem, save for some very tenuous links.

The sense of imagined city and constricted mental map were important in both contexts. In a sense they are similar, although not exactly the same. The imagined city is your personal image of the city you live in. It includes where you go as you live your daily life and all the places you access for leisure. It includes your routes to work and home, your locations of social activity and the pathways you use to get there. It may include many places you are aware of, but choose not to utilize. It is a mental map of possibility. On the other hand, a constricted map of the city will not include places that you cannot access because of a psychological or physical barrier. These places will not be included, even if you are aware of them. Additionally, a constricted map of the city will also not include places you are unaware of. It is a mental map of reality, produced by your lived experience. Consequently, when your imagined city is affected by a constricted mental map, you experience a poverty of identity and freedom.

In Jerusalem, an Israeli lack of knowledge of Palestinian neighbourhoods results in an Israeli imagined city without ordinary Palestinians in it. This has huge implications for the facts on the ground for two reasons. First, personal knowledge of Palestinians is limited and it is much easier to consider them the "other" when Israelis do not have direct knowledge to counter the biases in the mainstream media. This leads to a genuine fear and concern for personal safety and state security. The second important impact of the constricted Israeli imagined city is the affect it has on municipal decisions

in Jerusalem. Municipal responsibility can be shirked entirely, or provided in an exceedingly inequitable way, when the voices of the most powerful citizens are largely silent. The silence is not because ordinary Israeli's lack a normal sense of justice. They are largely ignorant of the true facts on the ground due to their constricted imagined city. While in theory their sense of Jerusalem includes the Eastern neighbourhoods, they do not go to those neighbourhoods and do not need to pass through them on their way anywhere else.

In Belfast the imagined city concept also exists. In the areas of conflict, citizens have a constricted imagined city due to a strong parochial identity, and lived experience of intimidation in the "other" neighbourhoods. There are many places that citizens will be unaware of due to modified patterns of movement. However the level of integration in Belfast today makes it quite unlikely that Protestants and Catholics are as ignorant of each other as they once were.

In both Belfast and Jerusalem, urban leaders are calling for changes to the planning system. Those changes need to include more community engagement in decision-making processes in both contexts. There are planners and community leaders in both cities, who are working to encourage bottom-up planning. However, in Belfast some social planners from the public sector are also on the frontlines, moving away from the top-down approach. However, there does not seem to be an official push for engagement in the public sector in Jerusalem. Conventional land use planners in both contexts see their role as primarily regulatory and guided by legislation. Community level planning education is left to planners working outside government or community leaders who have become versed in planning knowledge.

Planners in both Belfast and Jerusalem reported feeling more idealistic about planning early in their careers and that this idealism was tempered with experience. While some Israeli planners identified significant personal changes they made to accommodate their need to serve the cause of justice, others expressed a real despondency about their own work as planners in recent years. They recognized the injustice of the planning system

and appeared deeply frustrated by their inability to counter that injustice. This level of despondence was never expressed in Belfast, although planners there did not always identify justice as a consideration they factored into their daily work. Many Belfast planners expressed the need for peacebuilding and greater community engagement to be included in the planning process. However, this was expressed more as a major tweak required to the system as opposed to a damning critique of the system.

The perceptions of planning were also quite different in both cities. The face of planning presented to Arab neighbourhoods is of oppression and enforcement. Although Jewish neighbourhoods seem well planned and comfortable, a clear indication of the technical skills that exist in the Israeli planning system, annexed Palestinian neighbourhoods have not benefited from these skills or approaches. On the other hand, perceptions in Belfast were more varied. Like the planners, most community members felt that planning and planners are not consultative enough, but all had some positive experiences with the planning system. Communities in both cities indicated a desire to participate in planning discourse, but were not always aware of how that could happen.

Two issues that community leaders mentioned in both cities, is the lack of continuity in their planning service representatives and the struggle for funding. It is normal that civil service planners, trying to build careers, experience several job changes. However, it takes time to build community trust, and frequent new faces at the table impede the ability for the community to engage effectively. The scramble for funding means that community leaders have to continually assign staff to the task of finding funding sources, rather than delivering programming. Community leaders also saw a greater role for themselves as peacebuilders in Belfast, although they often identified this as a role that they assumed in order to obtain funding for other community programming activities. Planners and policy makers could aid community groups by attempting to maintain continuity in community planners and by being less prescriptive in funding allocations.

Networks of community leaders helped maintain cross-community connections during bouts of intense conflict in Belfast. This channel of communication allowed cross-community re-engagement to be more quickly established in peaceful times. These community leader networks do not seem to be well established in Jerusalem and that is likely to the detriment of the peace process. Strong intra-group solidarity impedes the development of these networks in Jerusalem. In both groups, engagement with the other side can be considered traitorous and people can experience group censure, or worse. Nevertheless, some women's groups have managed to maintain cross community connections, even through the latest intifada. This also has similarities to Belfast in that women's projects are frequently an opening salvo for cross-community engagement. Women in Belfast are also less likely than men to face intra-group criticism for these activities.

## **6.4 Chapter Summary**

The fieldwork was conducted in Jerusalem in May of 2007, just one month before the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the unification of the city. Despite this, Jerusalem is a divided city with very disparate conditions for Jewish and Palestinian inhabitants. Top down oppressive planning is combined with legal, but unjust, tools for regulation and compliance. Inadequate levels of municipal infrastructure investment have left the Arab neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem in poor condition. High levels of unemployment and low levels of educational attainment have created real issues related to subsistence. The Israeli desire for protection in the last intifada has led to the construction of the security barrier, which provides some measure of peace of mind to the Jewish population at great expense to Palestinians in terms of almost every fundamental human need.

Palestinian communities in East Jerusalem are cut off from their natural hinterland, affecting their ability to see family members. Arabs outside of the barrier have difficulty to access educational and medical facilities, and to travel to jobs on the opposite side of the barrier. Arab communities had served as a pressure valve for the housing need in

Arab East Jerusalem, but this flow is now reversed as people move back into the city to access work and other opportunities. This increased pressure for housing has led to a sharp increase in house building without a permit, which leaves families vulnerable to demolition of their home by Israeli state officials.

Participatory planning traditions are not ingrained in Jerusalem, but several planners indicated that these techniques are quite successful in East Jerusalem. Communities are interested in engaging around community issues and can quickly grasp complex planning theories when properly explained. Communities tend not to view planning and planners in a very favourable light. Community planning initiatives are frequently not approved due to discriminatory practices. This end result has created feelings of frustration and despondency in some planners. The planner's fundamental need for creation may be compromised by engaging in a planning system that is inherently unjust.

There are a number of commonalities and differences between Belfast and Jerusalem. Housing and population demographics are important issues in each context, but the housing need in East Jerusalem is resulting in a counter-power activity of building houses without an Israeli issued permit. Physical barriers restrict free access to the city. Separate transportation, education, and sites of commerce and retail restrict the imagined city for both the Jewish and Arab populations. This allows the municipal deficit in East Jerusalem to continue without public outcry. Some planners try to educate the public about the situation and work in an advocacy and educational role with respect to planning.

## Chapter 7 Conclusions

He drew a circle that shut me out  
Heretic, rebel, a thing to flout  
But love and I had the wit to win;  
We drew a circle that took him in.

-Edwin Markham

When considering the results of the research presented in this document, we must first consider some fundamental questions about the nature of cities. Why do human beings build cities in the first place? Why are we attracted to living in cities? The answers to these questions will help answer other questions more closely related to contested cities. What defines a citizen of a city, and what rights and responsibilities should a citizen expect? And of course the question for planners is what responsibilities do planners have in urban environments in general, and in contested urban environments in particular, and to whom are those responsibilities directed?

Some of these are not easy questions to answer, but if we answer the easy questions, we are lead in one possible direction for the remaining answers. Human beings build cities because they have determined that cities provide satisfiers of their fundamental human needs. We are attracted to living in cities, because they offer opportunities to satisfy fundamental needs with greater choice than non-urban environments. In addition to satisfiers of subsistence, through varied opportunities to work, greater choice in options for shelter and more wide-ranging options for food, collective environments offer protection and prospects for affection simply by being collective environments. The other human needs of understanding, participation, leisure, creation, identity, and freedom, also have the potential for more diversity in the satisfiers available to the citizens of urban environments. Of course, not all cities provide this potential to their citizens, and in contested cities, there is generally a difference in potential between the communities in disagreement.

## 7.1 Human needs, planning and peacebuilding

In Chapter 1, I proposed that urban conflict has an identifiable cycle, not unlike a bell curve. The apex of the curve is the time period when the urban conflict degrades into a situation of sustained violence. I hypothesized that it may be possible to identify portions of the violence cycle where particular planning techniques, as identified by Bollens (1999; 2002) as neutral, equity and resolver, would be most effective at mitigating the conflict. With that in mind I went to Belfast and Jerusalem curious about the planning processes used in the cities and their effect on the level of conflict and the peacebuilding activities of grassroots organizations. Although I did not initially consider the application of fundamental human needs to planning in contested environments, I found this a theoretical framework that helped enormously with my analysis.

Essentially, planners are always dealing with human needs. Cities form and are maintained because they provide some important satisfiers of many of the fundamental human needs. Consequently, planners are well positioned to identify human poverties, those human needs that are not satisfied and manifest as a poverty. It is these poverties that can eventually become a pathology that may take many forms, but violence is often one of them. All human needs are interrelated and non-hierarchical, but a total blockage of any need can create a single intense driver. "Suffice it to say, that a total lack of affection, or the loss of identity, may lead people to extremes of self-destruction" (Max-Neef, 1992, p. 212). When this blockage is applied to a large sector of society, it becomes a pathological situation at a macro-level and no longer responds to intervention at the individual level. At that point, depending on the unmet human need, the entire society might slip into violence and "we must necessarily recognize the existence of collective pathologies of frustration, for which traditional treatments have been inefficient" (Max-Neef, Elizalde, & Hopenhayn, 1989, p. 22). Urban conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast might be described in this way.

Planners have a role to play in ensuring that space for negotiation exists and that the collective pathology of frustration does not reach the point of sustained violence, since

planners, by virtue of working in the realm of human need satisfaction, are well positioned to help identify severe human poverties at the macro level. The scale of planning is at the collective or macro-level, although from a planning perspective, working with an individual neighbourhood might be viewed as micro-level planning work. However, unlike physicians or psychologists, planners do not work at the individual level. Therefore, if planning and planners attune themselves to human needs in their creative processes, their plans will be, by default, more successful. This is especially true if we consider other ideas included in Max-Neef's conceptualization of human needs. Max-Neef believes that relationships of dependence result from a top-down flow of need satisfiers, while relationships of self-reliance result from a bottom-up flow of need satisfiers. Additionally, these bottom-up flows are synergistic and have multiplying effects. However, in order for this bottom-up flow to have impact at a regional or national level, it needs to be supported and promoted. "The spontaneous activity of local groups or of isolated individuals cannot have any real impact if it is not nurtured and empowered through the action of planners and politicians" (Max-Neef, Elizalde, & Hopenhayn, 1989, p. 51).

Clearly this implies that planners can, and should, be a conduit of good ideas to the larger community. When good programmes and local projects are developed, it is part of the job of planners to support and empower those endeavours, and further, to assist in their articulation with other projects through regional and national space. Therefore, in terms of peacebuilding activities, planners and urban leaders do more than fund peacebuilding projects, they can actively promote the successful ones. There are planners in both Belfast and Jerusalem who have been thinking about this already. In Northern Ireland, recent work by NIHE includes promoting successful shared housing projects, which have already demonstrated a multiplier effect by spawning requests for other similar projects. Additionally, one planner indicated that grassroots initiatives need to be supported and successful ones should have their processes documented so other neighbourhoods could learn from a particular process if they desired. These are examples of planning work in the resolver style (see Section 3.3). Resolver planning

attempts to transcend the urban based issues by emphasizing solutions to the root problems.

In Jerusalem, BIMKOM also demonstrates activities that are intended to serve as a conduit to the larger community. One of their goals is to provide examples of alternative plans as a way of empowering communities to take control of their own planning. To that end, they have helped the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Silwan to develop a local planning scheme for presentation and approval. While their goal is to empower other groups with these examples of alternative planning, they are working in the realm of equity or advocacy planning when preparing these plans. Although gaining approval of these alternative plans remains challenging, due to the discriminatory nature of the Israeli planning system, these plans still serve a purpose. They help to build community capacity, provide a counter-argument for dismissal of building permit requests on the grounds that a local area plan does not exist, and give civil service planners a community supported resource if “official” planning begins. They also may serve an important additional function in peacebuilding. They provide a ready-made plan that will allow a community to move forward quickly when the political situation finally changes. This may assist in addressing the “Justice Gap” described below in Section 7.5, building a more stable peace.

It does appear that there are two different places in the peace process where these two planning strategies are being applied. Belfast has gone much further than Jerusalem on their peace process and is in the conflict de-escalation phase, while Jerusalem appears to be embroiled in the escalation and conflict phase. Other examples of planning processes do suggest that further examination is warranted. Conflict mediation theory suggests that conflicts have different phases and the peacebuilding techniques used in one phase are not usually the same techniques that should be used in others. Some theorists indicate that relationship-building activities can be used in the lead up to violence and in the period after a peace accord has been reached, but are not effective in the period of violence (Paffenholz, 2003). Paffenholz (2003) indicates that the role of

peacebuilding is not to prevent conflict, but to prevent the outbreak of *violent* conflict. If that is applied to planning, then the work of a planner/peacebuilder is to help prevent violent conflict, not to resolve the fundamental root causes of the historical lead up to the conflict. The work of a planner in helping to prevent violent conflict is the work of meeting human needs.

Solving the root of the conflict may not be possible, if it is conceived only in terms of autonomous nationalist land control. In that conceptual framework, the root of the conflict is “irreconcilable.” “Irreconcilable differences” is a term that is frequently used in divorce situations to describe the relationship between married couples who fundamentally want different things out of life. This is also true in conflict situations where one group wants something that is fundamentally different than the other group party to the conflict. Very often, as in the case of Belfast and Jerusalem, these differences are at a level of the human need of identity, which can be linked to self-actualization of the group. For example, the Republicans in Belfast link their identity to the Republic of Ireland and Unionists to the United Kingdom. If the only acceptable final solution for either group, is to politically associate the land mass of Northern Ireland to one state or the other, there can never be an end to the conflict between these aspirations, as they are irreconcilable. However, there can be an end to the *violent* conflict, and to a large extent that has already happened. The conflicting desires of the Republican population and the Unionist population have not changed, but the way the conflict is currently manifested, is vastly different.

Yiftachel and Yacobi (2002) offer a bi-national capital model for Jerusalem where by the city will serve as the capital for both Israel and a Palestinian state, and at the same time governed as a single city. Either state can control exit points of the city into its own autonomous region, but could not prevent access to the city from the other autonomous region. The city itself would be governed by a Capital Region Authority responsible for the overall development of the metropolitan area. The Capital Region’s assembly would be comprised of members of the local governments and would be

primarily staffed by professionals in the fields of engineering, planning, transportation and the environment. The Capital Region Authority staff would work with local municipalities who are part of the Capital Region, but are self-governing entities, to coordinate the city-wide services necessary for an integrated metropolitan area. Citizens of the city can freely choose to work, live and play in any part of the city, but will still have the right to vote and participate politically in their respective national political structures. In essence, Yiftachel and Yacobi (2002) are describing a separation of national citizenship from city citizenship, a concept that is supported by Sandercock's (1998) discussion of multiple citizenships. She references Holston (p. 188-190), who suggests that multiple citizenships could be based on local, regional and transnational affiliations, which are actually representative of modern urban experience.

## **7.2 Cities and citizenship**

This leads to the third question posed at the beginning of this chapter. What defines a citizen and what rights and responsibilities should a citizen expect? This is the crux of the matter in many contested cities. Must a citizen of a city be, by default, a citizen of the political state the city is a part of? Is a citizen someone who owns land in the city and pays municipal taxes on that land? Is a citizen simply someone who resides in that city? The answers to these questions have implications for the second part of the original question. What rights and responsibilities should a citizen expect? The fact is cities do not tend to define who their citizens are, and citizen rights and responsibilities are scattered through various by-laws, codes, and laws. Unlike states, who define citizenship and the rights of that citizen, cities are largely silent on these issues, at least in a cohesive manner such as a charter of rights.

Cities increasingly hold a disproportionate percentage of the population of most countries. Therefore, cities actually hold the key to solving unmet human needs, far more so than do political states. Fainstein (2000) notes that in "Just Cities", such as Amsterdam, The Netherlands, citizens possess a set of social rights in addition to political rights. How would the equation of a contested city change if city citizenship did

not depend on state citizenship, and if city citizens possessed a set of social rights, in addition to their political rights within the city? If those social rights were based on fundamental human needs, the potential for urban conflict to escalate into urban violence would be greatly reduced, as the social rights of citizens would ensure greater equity. Perhaps a city’s charter of citizen rights and responsibilities might look something like Table 7.1, below.

Table 7.1 Potential citizen charter of rights and responsibilities for a city

<b>Citizen Charter of Rights and Responsibilities</b>	
<b>Citizen Rights</b>	<b>Citizen Responsibilities</b>
City citizens have a right to shelter, work, and adequate food and water.	City citizens have the responsibility to promote the opportunities of other citizens to seek adequate shelter, work, and water.
City citizens have a right to health and personal security protection by city services.	City citizens have a responsibility to not threaten the personal security and health of others.
City citizens have a right to form family units and to gather and socialize in public spaces.	City citizens have a responsibility to accept diversity in public spaces and to promote a sense of belonging for all citizens.
City citizens have a right to a minimum standard of education.	City citizens have the responsibility to learn about city issues and try to understand the perspectives of others.
City citizens have a right to participate in decisions affecting the city.	City citizens have the responsibility to participate in civic affairs.
City citizens have a right to an equitable distribution of spaces of leisure and recreation.	City citizens have the responsibility to ensure that all citizens have the opportunity to access spaces of leisure and recreation.
City citizens have a right to engage in creative activities.	City citizens have a responsibility to engage in creative activities that promote the well-being of citizens.
City citizens have a right to claim their own identity.	Citizens have the responsibility to ensure their manifestations of identity do not infringe on the rights of other citizens.
City citizens have the right to free movement in the urban environment.	City citizens have the responsibility to protect free movement in the urban environment.

(Proposed Citizen’s Charter in Table 7.1 was developed by J. Miller.)

Sandercock (1998) notes Australia has already struggled with broadening the concept of citizenship. A 1995 Senate inquiry into the possibility of a system of National Citizenship Indicators began by outlining two meanings of citizenship. One is narrow and similar to our standard understanding of national, or state, citizenship. The second is “broad and social” and is summarized in four elements:

- “ 1) The quality of full membership and active participation

- 2) In a just, democratic and mutually supportive political community
  - 3) Including the individual and collective rights and responsibilities – legal, social, economic, cultural, and environmental – that go with membership
  - 4) The public and private policies and resources needed to sustain it”
- (Sandercock, 1998, p. 188).

This second meaning of citizenship bears a distinct kinship to Max-Neef’s fundamental human needs, especially the first three. The fourth element is certainly the one that will be most contentious and difficult to implement.

The discussion of rights and responsibilities leads to a discussion of the responsibilities of an urban planner. Earlier, the following question was posed. What are the responsibilities of planners in urban environments in general, and in contested urban environments in particular, and to whom are those responsibilities directed? If human beings gather in cities to better meet their fundamental human needs, then the function of the city is to serve the fundamental needs of its citizens. And if the citizens are residents of a city who also accept the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, then the responsibility of the urban planner is to the citizens of the city.

Of course, this is a utopian view of the world in which planners function. Planners plan cities, or more often, parts of cities. In many environments, civil service planners simply react to plans submitted by others, especially in development control. Arguably, the apparent master of most urban planners is the local government, but citizenship is generally understood at the national level. Local municipal government, at least in democratic countries, is comprised of politicians who are required to return periodically to their constituents and ask for a new mandate. Voting for municipal political representation is based on personal self-interest and a national understanding of citizenship. Consequently municipal government is based on these same principles. These realities impact the way that urban planning occurs and its ability to meet, equitably, the fundamental human needs that exist in the city. In contested cities, this exacerbates the tension in the city, and increases the potential for violent interactions between communities with disparate national identities and levels of unmet

fundamental needs. There is no common understanding of city citizenship or the desirability of an equitable distribution of urban resources within the municipal borders.

Planners can be left feeling helpless in the face of a power-structure based on self-interest and national identities. The planners I spoke to in the course of this research were aware of the deep inequities in their cities. Jerusalem has many beautiful neighbourhoods, clearly very skillfully planned and executed. If planners in East Jerusalem were left to plan with the community, empowered by the urban region to do so, and provided with an equitable share of the municipal resources to execute the plans, some of the worst inequities would be overcome. This would happen even more quickly if an “affirmative development fund” was established to deal with the inequities, as is suggested by Yiftachel and Yacobi (2002) in their proposal for a bi-national capital city. Israeli and Palestinian planners clearly have the technical skills to plan equitably but are not empowered to do so, and so the conflict simmers and boils, without space to cool off.

### **7.3 Planning ethics**

The frustration of planners in Jerusalem is quite clear to even the most unobservant. Planners, while working in the space of human needs, are also subject to those same self needs. Planners also require understanding, participation, freedom, and identity. As part of a creative profession, the human need for creation is often fulfilled for planners in their work. When that work is frequently blocked, the end result for the planner is shutting down of their creative outlet and poverty with respect to this fundamental need. Most of this frustration is a result of planning decisions being made by governments with a national understanding of citizenship, and planners are expected to follow the government’s desires, even if those desires are at odds with the planners understanding of urban needs. In this sense, planners are not treated in the same way that other professions are, and this is likely due to the macro-level of their work.

This is not true for physicians who work at the individual level. Not many countries with a democratic tradition would expect a doctor to allow someone to die because they did not meet the correct requirements for acceptable population demographics. Even in contested cities like Belfast and Jerusalem, hospitals and the medical system treat people on both sides of the conflict. Most people would be outraged if a democratic government decided that physicians were not allowed to offer medical service to the “out group.” Physicians take an oath to uphold human life and that oath is expected, and accepted, to take precedent over any nationalist interests of the physician. Planners should take a similar oath to uphold human dignity within the built environment and to preserve the natural heritage for the seventh generation. The seventh generation is a concept from North American indigenous societies whereby decisions are made today, while considering their impact on the seventh generation from now. If a decision pollutes the local water supply, it may not noticeably harm the current generation, but its accumulated effects on the seventh generation may be catastrophic. This idea is not without merit, at least according to Max-Neef who believes that unmet human needs erode human dignity. He advocates that we should all have a sense of responsibility at the human level.

“A sense of responsibility for the future of humanity along with transdisciplinary action are crucial. This may be our only defence. If we do not take up the challenges, we will all be accomplices in creating and maintaining sick societies” (Max-Neef, Elizalde, & Hopenhayn, 1989, p. 25).

## **7.4 Biases and Limitations**

One serious potential bias, that arose during the field work stage, is related to the sampling technique used for the two study cities. My first contacts in Belfast were made through the Belfast City Council website and the Northern Ireland state website. Since I relied heavily on the snowball method of obtaining participant contacts, I found that I was largely interviewing planners from within the civil service. The heavy skewing of the sample population to the civil service may still provide a fair representation of the planning population for the research. Northern Ireland has a very centralized planning

system. In the most contested areas, almost all the planning is completed by planners working for the DOE or the NIHE, as there is still little private investment in those areas of the city.

In Jerusalem I had a similar problem. My first contacts in Jerusalem included BIMKOM. BIMKOM volunteers and planners were generous with their time, and this led me to have a heavy reliance on planners who were associated with this single NGO organization. Again, I am not certain if my sample population skewed my results since many private planners work on projects under the direction of state planning authorities and many planners I interviewed had worked under those conditions. I also met with several planners who are not associated with BIMKOM, and on my last day in Jerusalem I was able to interview a planner who worked for the Department of the Interior. However, this last interview was conducted on the telephone and an exact transcript was not captured.

## **7.5 Future Research Directions**

In reflecting on this research project, I believe there are three main areas that I remain curious about and would like to see further research on. The first is to pursue an idea that was put forward in several interviews in Belfast, that appears to be supported by Max-Neef, Elizalde, & Hopenhayn (1989) and Hochachka (2009). This is the idea that institutions must support successful grassroots initiatives and attempt to disseminate those successes for wider implementation. Exploring the role that planning could play in this type of peacebuilding practice is, I believe, a worthwhile focus of future research; one that may prove to have potential application in non-contested and multicultural environments as well.

The second area of interest for further research involves exploring, in greater depth, the idea of appropriate planning tools in a 'south-eastern' reality. As noted by Yiftachel (2006) some, western centric planning theory does not appear to have a place in non-western, or developing nations. Planning research dealing with peacebuilding has

primarily examined planning theory and what works in contested urban spaces. However, this research projects suggests that community-based participatory processes can be successful in contested environments, even environments with a non-western epistemology. The issue remains, however, that the outcomes of these processes can still be unjust, not because the process failed in the context, but because the system is inherently unjust. The plan is produced successfully, but it is never approved, or alternatively, never implemented due to systemic injustice. This is indicative of a systemic failure of the planning system. However, this still begs the question of how individual planners can work for change and what works best. Bollens (1999) suggests that change must come from outside the system, but several planners in Jerusalem expressed the belief that planners within the government have the power to make just decisions, but choose not to. This needs to be explored further to identify if there is a space of praxis within the system, at least in this one environment, that allows planners to make just decisions in the face of an unjust system.

Just decisions are an important idea from a peacebuilding perspective and offer a third avenue for further inquiry. Lederach (1999) talks about the Justice Gap, one of three gaps commonly missing in sustainable peacebuilding processes. This is the gap between the expectation that peace processes will not only stop the direct violence, but also address the structural issues that led to the violence in the first place. When the structural issues are not changed, a gap is created between the expectation for peace and what is actually achieved. However, as noted in this research, many structural issues can be partly addressed by paying attention to the fundamental human needs for all citizens. In this, planning and urban leadership have a clear role in building spaces of interaction and equality. Therefore, the relationship between the gaps in sustainable peacebuilding and the role that planners can have in addressing this should be explored further.

## Bibliography

- Adams, G. (2003). *A farther shore: Ireland's long road to peace*. New York, Random House Trade Paperbacks.
- Alterman, R. & Hill, M. (1986). Land Use Planning in Israel. In N.N. Patricios (Ed.), *International Handbook on Land Use Planning*. pp. 119-150. New York: Greenwood Press. Retrieved June 8, 2009 from <http://alterman.technion.ac.il/admin/files/handbook.pdf>.
- Alterman, R. (2007). Introduction to Israel's Planning and Building Law. Platform of Experts in Planning Law Website, Retrieved May 29, 2009 from [http://www.internationalplanninglaw.com/templates/mercury.asp?page\\_id=1514&country\\_id=6&dossier\\_category\\_id=6](http://www.internationalplanninglaw.com/templates/mercury.asp?page_id=1514&country_id=6&dossier_category_id=6).
- Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 35(4), 216-224.
- Arthur, P. & Jeffery, K. (1996). *Northern Ireland since 1968(Second Edition)*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd.
- Aziz, N. (2006). Water and social justice. *Progressive Planning*, Fall 2006(169), 1, 7-9.
- Basle Declaration. (August 1897). The First Zionist Congress: Basle Declaration. In W. Laqueur and B. Rubin (Eds.), *The Israel-Arab Reader: A documentary history of the Middle East conflict* (pp. 9-10). New York: Penguin Books.
- Belfast City Council. (n.d.). *Good Relations Unit*. Retrieved May 29, 2009 from <http://www.belfastcity.gov.uk/goodrelations/index.asp>.
- Belfast City Council. (n.d) *Demographics*. Retrieved from May 29, 2009 from <http://www.belfastcity.gov.uk/factsandfigures/demographics.asp>.

- Bennis, P. (2007). *Understanding the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: A Primer*. Northampton Massachusetts: Olive Branch Press.
- Berry, J., Brown, L. & McGreal, S. (2001). The Planning System in Northern Ireland Post-devolution. *European Planning Studies*, 9 (6), 781-791. Retrieved June 16, 2009, from <http://www.informaworld.com.proxy2.lib.umanitoba.ca/10.1080/09654310123567>.
- BIMKOM – Planners for Planning Rights. (n.d.). Retrieved June 11, 2009 from <http://eng.bimkom.org/>.
- BIMKOM & Ir Shalem, (2005). The Planning Deadlock. Retrieved May 25, 2009 from [http://eng.bimkom.org/\\_Uploads/5PlanningDeadlock.pdf](http://eng.bimkom.org/_Uploads/5PlanningDeadlock.pdf).
- Boal, F. (1995). *Shaping a city: Belfast in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century*. Belfast, NI: The Institute of Irish Studies: The Queen's University in Belfast.
- Bollens, S. (2002). Urban planning and intergroup conflict: confronting a fractured public interest. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 68(1), 22-42.
- Bollens, S. (2000). Community development in democratic South Africa. *Community Development Journal*, 35(2), 167-180.
- Bollens, S. (1999). *Urban peace-building in divided societies: Belfast and Johannesburg*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Bollens, S. (1998). Ethnic stability and urban reconstruction: Policy dilemmas in polarized cities. *Comparative Political Studies*, 31(6), 683-713.
- Bollens, S. (1998). Urban policy in ethnically polarized societies. *International Political Science Review*, 19(2), 187-215.
- Bose, S. (2007). *Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka*. Chapter Five: Israel and Palestine. (pp. 204-289). Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

- B'Tselem website.(n.d.). Casualties. Retrieved June 12, 2009 from  
<http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Casualties.asp>.
- Buckland, P. (1987). *The Northern Ireland Question 1886-1986*. London: The Historical Association.
- Burayidi M. A. (2000). Urban planning as a multicultural canon. In M. A. Burayidi (Ed.), *Urban planning in multicultural society* (pp. 1-14). Westport, CT, USA: Praeger Publishers.
- Campbell, H. (2006). Just planning: The art of situated ethical judgment. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 26, 92-106.
- Cohn-sherbok, D. & El-Alami, D. (2002). *The Palestine-Israeli Conflict: A Beginner's Guide*. Oxford:Oneworld Publications.
- Community Relations Unit. (2005). *A shared future: Policy and strategic framework for good relations in Northern Ireland*. Belfast, NI: Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister.
- Creative Associates International Inc.(n.d.). Understanding conflict and peace. Retrieved August 9, 2009 from  
[http://www.caii.com/CAIISTaff/Dashboard\\_GIROAdminCAIISTaff/Dashboard\\_CAIAdminDatabase/resources/ghai/understanding.htm#concepts-b3](http://www.caii.com/CAIISTaff/Dashboard_GIROAdminCAIISTaff/Dashboard_CAIAdminDatabase/resources/ghai/understanding.htm#concepts-b3).
- Gee, J. R. (1998). *Unequal Conflict: The Palestinians and Israel*. Olive Branch Press, Brooklyn, New York, USA.
- Herzl, T. (1896). Theodor Herzl: The Jewish State. In W. Laqueur and B. Rubin (Eds.), *The Israel-Arab Reader: A documentary history of the Middle East conflict* (pp. 9-10). New York: Penguin Books.
- Davidoff, P. (1965). Advocacy and pluralism in planning. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 31, 595-615.

- Department of the Environment. (2004). *Belfast Metropolitan Area Plan (BMAP) 2015 – Volume 1*. Retrieved July 14, 2009 from [http://www.planningni.gov.uk/index/policy/dev\\_plans/devplans\\_az/bmap2015-vol1.pdf](http://www.planningni.gov.uk/index/policy/dev_plans/devplans_az/bmap2015-vol1.pdf).
- Department of Regional Development. (n.d.). *Regional planning*. Retrieved June 12, 2009 from <http://www.drdni.gov.uk/index.htm>.
- Department of Regional Development. (2001). *Shaping our future - The regional development strategy for Northern Ireland 2025*. Retrieved July 14, 2009 from <http://www.drdni.gov.uk/publications-details.htm?docid=308>.
- Fainstein, S. S. (2005). Cities and diversity: Should we want it? Can we plan for it? *Urban Affairs Review*, 41(1), 3-19.
- Fainstein, S. S. (2000). New directions in planning theory. *Urban Affairs Review*, 35(4), 451-478.
- Foundations for Middle East Peace. (n.d.). *Jerusalem Statistics 2006*. Retrieved June 12, 2009 from [http://fmep.org/settlement\\_info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/jerusalem-statistics-2006](http://fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/jerusalem-statistics-2006).
- Foster, F. (2004). *Collaborative Planning and Consensus-building in Northern Ireland: An Analysis of the Peace I Program District Partnerships*. (Master of City Planning Thesis, University of Manitoba, 2001).
- Fratlicelli, R. (Executive Producer), Jacob, S. (Producer), Conway, L. (Writer), & Conway, L. (Director). (2005). *When hocky came to Belfast* [DVD]. Canada: National Film Board of Canada.
- Gee, J. (1998). *Unequal conflict: The Palestinians and Israel*. New York, USA: Olive Branch Press.

- Hallsmith, G. (2003). *The key to sustainable cities: Meeting human needs, transforming community systems*. Gabriola Island, Canada: New Society Publishers.
- Healey, P. (1999). Institutional analysis, communicative planning, and shaping places. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*. 18(2). 111-121.
- Hochachka, G. (2005). *Developing Sustainability, Developing the Self: An Integral Approach to Community and International Development*. Retrieved June 12, 2009 from <http://www.drishti.ca/resources.htm>.
- Humpheries, B. (2000). *Social work research for social justice*. (R. Adams, L. Dominelli, & M. Payne) New York: Palgrave Macmillian.
- Huitt, W. (2004). Maslow's hierarchy of needs. *Educational Psychology Interactive*. Valdosta, GA: Valdosta State University. Retrieved March 28, 2009 from, <http://chiron.valdosta.edu/whuitt/col/regsys/maslow.html>.
- Khamaisi, R. & Shumueli, D. (2001). Shaping a culturally sensitive planning strategy: Mitigating the impact of Israel's proposed transnational highway on Arab Communities. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*. 21, 127-140.
- Kennedy, M. (2006) The Seventh Generation: Israel's war for water. *Progressive Planning*. Fall 2006(169), 2-6.
- Kruvant, B. (Producer), & Kruvant, B. (Director). (2005). *The right to be wrong: An unexpected journey through Israel* [DVD]. Lanham, MD: National Film Network.
- Lederach, J. (1999). The challenge of the 21<sup>st</sup> century: Justpeace. In *People building peace: 35 Inspiring stories from around the world* (pp. 27-36). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: European Centre for Conflict Prevention.
- Maoz, I. (2000). An experiment in Peace: Reconciliation-aimed workshops of Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian Youth. *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(6), 721-736.

- Manfred Max-Neef, M., Elizalde, A., & Hopenhayn, M. (1989). Human scale development: An option for the future. *Development Dialogue*, 1989(1), 5-80. Retrieved March 28, 2009 from [http://www.dhf.uu.se/pdffiler/89\\_1.pdf](http://www.dhf.uu.se/pdffiler/89_1.pdf).
- Max-Neef, M. (1992). Development and human needs. In P. Ekins & M. Max-Neef (Eds.) *Real-life economics: Understanding wealth creation* (pp. 197-213). London: Routledge.
- Meyer, P. B. & Reaves C. R. (2000). Objectives and values: Planning for multicultural groups rather than multiple constituencies. In M. Burayidi (Ed.) *Urban planning in multicultural society*. (pp. 83-99). Westport, CT, USA: Praeger Publishers.
- Moodley, K., & Adam, H. (2000). Race and nation in post-apartheid South Africa. *Current Sociology*, 48(3), 51-69.
- Nagy Hesse-Biber, S. & Leavy, P. (2006). *The practice of qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Padgett, D. (2008). *Qualitative methods in social work research* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Paris, C., Gray, P., & Muir, J. (2003). Devolving housing policy and practice in Northern Ireland 1998-2000. *Housing Studies*, 18(2), 159-175.
- Paffenholz, T. (2003). *Community based bottom-up peacebuilding: The development of the Life and Peace Institute's approach to peacebuilding and Lessons Learned from the Somalia experience (1990-2000)*. Uppsala, Sweden: Life & Peace Institute.
- Rojo, M. (2009). Public spaces in small cities in a shrinking region. Putting public interest back into the agenda. Retrieved April 18, 2009 from [http://www.tudelft.nl/live/pagina.jsp?id=1c9041e0-b544-4f45-9d8a-199ed1111944&lang=nl&binary=/doc/SimonRojo\\_totaal.pdf](http://www.tudelft.nl/live/pagina.jsp?id=1c9041e0-b544-4f45-9d8a-199ed1111944&lang=nl&binary=/doc/SimonRojo_totaal.pdf).
- Roy, A. (2006). Praxis in the time of empire. *Planning Theory*, 5(1), 7-29.

- Sandercock, L. (2003). *Cosmopolis II: Mongrel cities*. London, England: Continuum.
- Sandercock, L. (1998). *Towards Cosmopolis*. West Sussex, England: John Wiley and Sons.
- Savitch, H.V. & Garb, Y. (2006). Terror, barriers, and the changing topography of Jerusalem. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*.26, 152-173.
- Schweitzer, A & Sackett, M. ( November 2, 2008). Land and Housing Rights in al-Issawiya, Israeli Occupied East Jerusalem. Retrieved June 11, 2009  
<http://www.alternatives.ca/article4213.html?lang=en>.
- Silverman, D. (2006). *Interpreting qualitative data* (3rd ed.). London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Smith, J. (2002). *Making the Peace in Ireland*. London: Pearson Education Limited.
- Sommer, R. & Sommer, B. (2002) *A Practical Guide to Behavioral Research: Tools and Techniques*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Talen, E. (2006). Design that enables diversity: The complications of a planning ideal.*Journal of Planning Literature*, 20(3), 233-249.
- Taylor, D. & Procter, M. (2008). The literature review: A few tips on conducting it. Retrieved June 8, 2009 from <http://www.utoronto.ca/writing/litrev.html>.
- Turner, B. (2002). Cosmopolitan virtue, globalization and patriotism. *Theory, Culture and Society*, 19(1-2), 45-63.
- Qadeer, M. (1997). Pluralistic planning for multicultural cities: the Canadian practice. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 63(4), 481-494.
- Umemoto, K. (2001). Walking in another's shoes: Epistemological challenges in participatory planning. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 21(1), 17-31.

- Tzedek v'Shalom, B. (n.d.). Israeli-Arab / Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Timeline, 1967-2007. Retrieved August 20, 2009 from <http://www.fmep.org/resources/reference/timeline.html>.
- Wasserstein, B. (2001). *Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City*. London: Profile Books Ltd.
- Watson, V. (2006). Deep difference: Diversity, planning and ethics. *Planning Theory*, 5(1), 31-50.
- Watson, A. (2007). The story...so far. In A. Watson (Ed.) *Turing the tide for Belfast: Laganside Corporation 1989-2007* (pp. 6-13). Belfast: Creative NRG.
- Watson, V. (2002). The usefulness of normative planning theories in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. *Planning Theory*, 1(1), 27-52.
- Wellington, J. & Szczerbinski, M. (2007). *Research methods for the social sciences*. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
- Yiftachel, O. (2006). Re-engaging planning theory?: Towards 'south-eastern' perspectives. *Planning Theory*, 5(3), 211-222.
- Yiftachel, O. & Yacobi, H. (2002). Planning a bi-national capital: should Jerusalem remain united?. *Geoforum*, 33, 137-145.
- Yiftachel, O. (1995). The dark side of modernism: Planning as control of an ethnic minority. In S. Watson & K. Gibson (Eds.), *Postmodern cities and spaces* (pp. 216-242). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

# Appendices

## Appendix A - Interview framework for planners

The following interview framework was used to guide the face-to-face interviews with planners active in the contested cities. Both governmental and non-government affiliated planners were interviewed. The purpose of the interviews was to ascertain the ability of planners to work for peace and the affect that planners perceive they have on community organizations working for peace.

### Planning context

1. Are deep ethnic cleavages acknowledged within the legal framework of urban policy and planning? Probe: (if yes) How so?
  - a. Probe: (if yes) Is differential treatment of ethnic groups directly legislated?
  - b. Probe: (if not) Does it happen in an indirect fashion?
2. Is there ethnic-based differentiation of city and neighborhood institutions and organizations?
  - a. Probe: (if yes) Are there efforts to integrate competing ethnic groups?
3. What are the major urban manifestations of ethnic conflict?
  - a. Are some conflicts resolved through civic processes already established?
4. Is the amelioration of ethnic conflict acknowledged explicitly as an appropriate role for urban planning policy?
  - a. Probe: (if yes) How is the amelioration of ethnic conflict intended to occur?
5. To what degree do development goals and objectives differ between ethnic/racial communities?

## **Community participation**

1. What is the quality of citizen participation in the formulation of planning policy?
2. Are inter-group collaborative policy processes used?
  - a. Probe: (if yes) Are you aware of an inter-group collaborative process that was especially successful?
3. In your opinion, are all groups equally able to participate in the consultative processes? Probe: (if no) Are other methods used to reach these groups?
4. What are the characteristics of community organizations within contested urban environments?
5. Are you aware of ways that planning decisions have affected the work of community organizations?
  - a. Probe: (if yes) Was the community consulted during the planning process?
  - b. Probe: (if yes) What was the community consultation technique used?

## **Perception of role**

1. How do urban policymakers perceive the role of local policy amid larger political processes and transitions?
2. Do you perceive your role to be a leadership role with respect to peacemaking at broader political levels?
3. Do you feel that individual planners have the ability to actively work to ameliorate conflict in your working context?
4. Do you know instances where planning choices have resulted in an escalation of conflict? Probe: (if yes) Why do you think that choice was made?
5. Are planners who are actively engaged in peacebuilding planning practice evident in both governmental and non-governmental sectors? Who do you perceive to be the leaders in this area?
6. Does planning process regularly consider the impact of decisions on all resident groups within the city region? Probe: (if no) Which groups are not usually considered and why? Probe: (if yes) How?

7. In what ways are justice and equity addressed in planning activities? Do you personally consider these issues in your daily work? Probe: (if yes) How?
8. Do you have anything further to add?

## **Appendix B - Interview framework for community organizations**

Although planning clearly has long-term effects on life in urban areas, it is not clear that peacebuilding organizations recognize the affect planning has on their activities. Both peacebuilding organizations with a planning focus, and organizations involved with other peacebuilding activities were interviewed. In both cases, an attempt was made to identify the extent that planning issues are perceived to be affecting the peacebuilding work of the organization.

### **History and purpose of the organization**

1. When did your organization form and what was its original purpose?
2. Has the purpose of the organization changed over time? If so, in what ways?
3. Who are the main constituents benefiting from the activities of your organization?
  - a. Do you focus on a particular ethnicity or religious group?
  - b. Probe: (if yes) Do you also provide services to other ethnicities? Why or why not?
4. What organizational activities do you engage that have a peacebuilding affect in your city?
  - a. Do you use any collaborative or consensus building exercises during these activities?
5. What does the concept of justice mean to the work of your organization?

### **Perception of planning**

1. What is your understanding of the activity of urban planning in your city?
2. Are citizens are asked to participate in planning decisions? Probe: (if yes) In what ways do they participate?
  - a) Do you feel that all residents have equal access to participate in these ways? If not, why not?

3. Do you believe that urban planning or urban policy has affected the peacebuilding work of your organization? Probe: (if yes) In what way?
4. Are there physical/spatial aspects of your city that have an effect on peacebuilding between groups currently experiencing inter-group conflict?
  - a) Probe: (if yes) Is the affect positive or negative?
  - b) Do you know the history of the construction of those structures?
  - c) Probe: (if recent) What level of community participation went into the decisions to construct these structures?
5. What political structures affect the level of inter-group conflict?
  - a) Probe: Is this affect positive or negative? In what way?
  - b) How can citizens modify these political structures?
6. Do you ever have occasion to work with urban planners or policy makers? (if yes, use all probes)
  - a) Probe: What is the nature of the work?
  - b) Probe: What is the nature of the organization employing these planners? (level of government, ngo, consultant firm)
  - c) Probe: How would you describe your relationship with the planner? Is this relationship consistent with your feelings about the policy or plan the planner is implementing?
  - d) Probe: What techniques does/did this planner employ to build your relationship? (consensus-building? Community engagement activities?)
  - e) Probe: Do you identify with this planner in anyway? (common religion, ethnicity, belief in justice?)
  - f) Probe: Do you feel this planner's actions are just? Why?
  - g) Probe: What do you think has the greatest impact on this planner's decision-making processes?

### **Change in process**

1. Can you identify shifts in urban policy that have affected peacebuilding activities in the city?
  - a. Probe: (if yes) What do you believe to have been the impetus for this shift?
2. What activities or policies do you consider to have had the most positive effect on peacebuilding?
  - a. Who has initiated those activities? (public sector, ngos, private organizations?)

3. Are you aware of proposals for change that you believe will have a positive effect on conflict amelioration?
  - a. Probe: (if yes) Who is leading the advocacy of these policies?
  - b. Probe: Why do you think this is the change leadership?(rather than another sector of society)
  - c. Probe: What do you think is blocking the required changes? Why?
  
4. Do you have anything further to add?

## Appendix C – Max-Neef’s Matrix of Needs and Satisfiers

Max-Neef’s Matrix of Needs and Satisfiers is much more extensive than the compressed version shown here. I have included only one or two items in each column to demonstrate how I feel the needs apply to planning.

Existential categories Axiological categories	Being	Having	Doing	Interacting
Subsistence	1/ Physical and mental health	2/ Food, shelter, work	3/ Feed, procreate, rest, work	4/ Living environment, social setting
Protection	5/ Adaptability, solidarity	6/ Insurance systems, social safety net	7/ Cooperate, take care of	8/ Dwelling Living space, social environment
Affection	9/ Self-esteem, tolerance, generosity	10/ Friendships, family	11/ Share, cultivate, appreciate	12/ Spaces of privacy and togetherness
Understanding	13/ Critical conscience, receptiveness, rationality	14/ Literature, educational and communication policies	15/ Investigate, educate, analyze	16/ Settings of formative interaction, schools
Participation	17/ Adaptability, solidarity, dedication, respect	18/ Rights, duties, privileges, work	19/ Interact, dissent, agree on, express opinions	20/ Settings of participative interaction
Idleness	21/ Curiosity, receptiveness, imagination	22/ Games, spectacles, clubs, parties, peace of mind	23/ Dream, brood, give way to fantasies	24/ Spaces of closeness, free time
Creation	25/ Passion, intuition, imagination, autonomy, inventiveness, curiosity	26/ Abilities, skills, method, work	27/ Work, invent, build, design, compose, interpret	28/ Productive and feedback settings, spaces for expression, temporal freedom
Identity	29/ Sense of belonging, assertiveness	30/ Symbols, language, religion, historical memory	31/ Integrate oneself, recognize oneself, actualize oneself, grow	32/ Social rhythms, settings to which one belongs to
Freedom	33/ Autonomy, self-esteem, boldness, tolerance	34/ Equal rights	35/ Dissent, run risks, develop awareness, commit oneself	36/ Temporal/Spatial plasticity

This table is modeled on Max-Neef’s fundamental human needs. To see a more complete rendering of the table, refer to (Max-Neef, 1992. pp. 206-207).

“The column of BEING registers attributes, personal or collective, that are expressed as nouns. The column of HAVING registers institutions, norms, mechanisms, tools (not in a material sense), laws, etc., that can be expressed in one of more words. The column of DOING registers actions, personal or collective, that can be expressed as verbs. The column of INTERACTING registers locations and milieus (as times and spaces). It stands for the Spanish ESTAR or the German BEFINDER, in the sense of time and space. Since there is no corresponding word in English, INTERACTING was chosen ‘a faut de mieux’” (Max-Neef, 1992. pp. 206-207).

## Appendix D – Belfast themes, subthemes and key findings

Doing/Spatial Themes	Key Ideas
Subsistence	
Economic Issues/Employment	Issues centred on work and economic deprivation – The Troubles increased the economic deprivation of some areas by causing those with choice to move, leaving only the most disadvantaged behind. Areas of conflict are difficult to regenerate and low levels of educational attainment give citizens fewer personal resources to fight the situation. Few jobs locally and conflict contributes to fear of the unknown, causing residents to not seek work outside of their local communities.
Shelter	The need for emergency shelter to house victims of sectarian violence. Housing need as demonstrated by waiting lists. Because of sectarian identities in some neighbourhoods, excess housing is demolished because housing demand does not exist in that community and the other community fears living there. Community sensitivities are strongest around social housing issues. Housing is linked to territorial identity and survival, and consequently it is a contentious.
Protection	
Housing	Housing demand much higher in Catholic working class neighbourhoods. Perception of excess space in Protestant communities. Empty housing in Protestant neighbourhoods filled by transient or immigrant populations. Segregation is very high in working class Belfast. The mixed areas involve a young Catholic middle class and an aging Protestant working class, involving spatial mixing, but not social mixing. Housing is linked to territory and is a contentious issue.
Population mobility	Large population mobility due to sectarian violence in the 1970s. Mix communities became segregated and have remained that way. Middle class moved to neighbourhoods not caught in violence, leaving the most vulnerable and disadvantaged behind.
Equity (equal rights)	Equity legislation is viewed with pride by civil servants, but is treated by community workers with a wait and see attitude.
Safe environment	Many communities are still controlled by paramilitary organizations, which detracts from investment and decreases economic opportunities. Need for a safe environment will modify normal patterns of human mobility. Perception of safety can be tied to territorial identity. Public engagement may be less honest in communities where people feel unsafe.
Security barriers	Walls are still seen as necessary by some communities. Most leaders feel it is too soon to pull down the peacelines, even though these barriers have a negative edge effect on the surrounding communities. Wedge planning was also used to create barriers between communities.
Police/State role	Many Catholic communities view the police as the enforcement arm of an oppressive state. Considerable mistrust of the police and general feeling that police collusion was a real factor during The Troubles. Some leaders believe state role in violence must be acknowledged. Breakdown in state role and policing in neighbourhoods left a void that has been filled by paramilitary organizations.

Doing/Spatial Themes	Key Ideas
Paramilitary organizations	Republican paramilitary organizations enjoyed considerable support and legitimacy, while there was less legitimacy given to the Loyalist paramilitary organizations. Some paramilitary organizations have turned to more common types of street crime, while others have made efforts to transform into legitimate community leaders.
Affection	
Inter group friendship	Individual friendships across communities can cause community censure. Community leaders develop working relationships and friendships with leaders in the other community. These friendships tend to remain strong, even when tension between the communities increases and other engagements break down.
Intergroup solidarity	Cross-community solidarity over bread and butter issues. Often be inspired by a planning decision that both object to. Catholic solidarity with Palestinians and Loyalist solidarity with Israelis.
Parochial solidarity	Strong attachments to local community, especially in working class neighbourhoods that have come through conflicted times. Transfer of story and myth to younger generations. Strong self-sufficiency in Republican working class neighbourhood.
Intergroup hostility	Tension around interfaces continue, and are often seen to be triggered by people outside the communities or youth. Loyalist working class communities have less self-sufficiency which can trigger resentment and hostility.
Understanding	
Formal spaces of education	Many schools closed due to reduced populations in both Protestant and Catholic neighbourhoods. Schools are abandoned, or become contentious issues when neighbourhood demographics change interface lines and schools end up on the wrong side of an interface. Institutions of higher learning can be inaccessible due to physical and mental barriers that limit access and opportunity. Generally speaking, educational attainment in sectarian areas is much lower than other communities.
Community planning education	Community planning education is often left to community leaders. Community leaders do not always feel prepared for the task of engaging on planning issues. Leaders enlist the assistance of planning students, or become engaged in planning issues themselves. Planners are largely inaccessible to communities
Political analysis (sectarianism) (Youth understanding of larger political issues)	Political analysis is largely lacking in youth, and sectarian perspectives are often stronger than the perspectives of people who lived through the conflict. Youth engage in sectarian behaviour, but lack understanding of larger political issues, including the impact their behaviour can have on the peace process. Youth outside of contested areas are largely disengaged from the conflict.
Participation	
Perception of the role of planning/planners (rights/responsibilities)	Planners do not considering peacebuilding at all. Community Technical Aid does not work well with communities and is not considered a viable way for communities to engage in the planning process. Difficult to get planners to come out and talk to the communities. Communities do not think that planners consider justice and equity at all in their planning. System limits what they can do and they behave like robots, rather than trying to find a way. System is boundary focused, not idea focused. Lack of imagination and innovation. Not willing to take risks. Planners are at the mercy of developers. Community planners have been taken away because of the need to look non-partisan. Planning is just about infrastructure and transportation.

Doing/Spatial Themes	Key Ideas
Desire to participate	Citizens want to participate if: they understand their role; care about the subject of the consultation; and are given an opportunity to participate. After the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, over 10,000 people participated in the consultation that eventually led to the <i>Shared Future</i> document.
Community group funding	Lack of long-term funding programs impacts community worker's ability to plan strategically. Reduced levels of funding might threaten some community group's viability – may impact peace process due to skilled and highly networked peace workers move to other venues of employment.
Community capacity building	Working class Protestant/Loyalist communities typically do not have the same levels of community capacity as the Catholic/Republican communities. The Catholic communities are more organized; they have stronger leadership, and they are less fragmented – a community on the ascendency. Gap between the communities who have built capacity and those who have not is growing wider. More criminality in the Protestant/Loyalist communities.
Community peacebuilding opportunities	Extensive networks build between community leaders. Networks are sustained in times of violence, but communities themselves tend to disengage from peace-process during these times.
Community Trust	Community trust is built slowly overtime, in two ways. Intra-community trust, between community leaders and community members, and inter-community trust, between leaders in different communities. Inter-community trust, between community members, forms later, and appears to be the most susceptible to inter-community altercations. When acts of violence occur, community members are likely retreat, and the engagement relies on the community leaders. Interaction between statutory authorities and the communities is most effective using negotiation, rather than imposing authority. Statutory authorities, or external community workers, who have built sufficient levels of trust, can effectively work in a facilitative role as inter-community engagement works at building trust.
Barriers to participation	Low levels of literacy in some communities are a barrier to participation in the current consultation processes used in planning. Lack of understanding of the planning process. Low levels of literacy in some communities are a barrier to participation in the current consultation processes used in planning. Lack of understanding of the planning process.
Women as peace builders	Dialogue between communities continues between women's groups, even when other inter-group communication has broken down. Women will become involved in peacebuilding activities, even when the men in the community choose not to and are less likely to be harassed by community members opposed to the peace process. A young woman planner is cited as an example of a planner that is really trying to make a difference and push the boundaries.
Consultative processes	Statutory agencies and funders do not listen to community needs during consultations. High turnover of statutory agency representation due to career civil service. Communities respond to consultation if done properly. NIHE is proactive in pursuing consultative processes, but there is a general lack of consultation in planning historically in the city. Planners are frequently criticized for not proactively going out to the communities and working with them.
Political participation	Republican political leaders kept lines of communication open with the Republican paramilitary organizations, while most Unionist political parties would not engage with the paramilitaries, resulting in a political leadership that does not represent the whole

Doing/Spatial Themes		Key Ideas
		community.
Leisure		
Opportunities for social interaction (Leisure centres, community centres, sports facilities)	Communities identify leisure infrastructure as a community need, citing youth rioting as evidence. Some civil servants and planners identify an unsupportable number of leisure facilities despite community identification of infrastructure needs. Access to leisure facilities is limited by sectarian geography and perceptions of access. Communities may, in some cases, accept shared leisure space, and will likely need to in the future due to budget constraints. Opportunities for cross-community social interactions are naturally limited and have to be manufactured by programming. Leisure developments in the city centre are not viewed as sectarian.	
Green space/parks	Green space is limited in the inner city, working class, neighbourhoods. Access to new green space must be considered carefully from a sectarian perspective.	
Creation		
Perception of own role	Mediation Role	Facilitative and meditative role in bringing groups together and providing a safe environment for engagement. This might not be an entirely equitable role. Some parties excluded because they may sabotage consultative processes.
	Encourage participation	Planners tend not to see their role as one to encourage citizen participation. Community workers, and younger planners see this as part of their roles.
	Leadership in peacebuilding	Planners with responsibilities for social housing and community relations, see themselves as having a leadership role in peacebuilding. Traditional land use planners do not see this as a role they have an opportunity to fulfil, indeed due to the pressures of the conflict, community division was considered appropriate planning.
	Neutral Role	Some planners see their role as very neutral and/or regulatory. Those in areas of development control see their role strictly as enforcement of policy and ensuring quality environments.
	Other Roles	Community workers see a role of ensuring a sense of access to public space and intercommunity engagement. Policy workers see a role to mainstream good community practise and showcase it. Other roles mentioned are roles in justice and equality, regenerative role to focus attention on neglected areas, and urban management.
Shared spaces	City centre and spaces without a previous sectarian identity are more likely to be viewed as shared spaces. Spaces devoted to higher learning and the arts (Cathedral district, area surrounding Queens University) are viewed as shared spaces. Middle class spaces are diverse. Shared community development projects can become shared spaces. Sectarian symbols negatively affect sharing space. Shared housing projects can be acceptable given the right conditions and establishing positive social norms in the community. Outside threats can impact shared housing schemes in similar ways that outside threats impact interface communities. Economic factors will drive the move to more shared spaces. Grassroots driven shared spaces are more likely to be successful at the community level.	
Inventing peace/imagined city	Planners, policy makers and community leaders are creating a new image for Belfast and its neighbourhoods. Projects with vision for a new city are the projects people speak of with the most passion. Citizens are excited about playing a role in imagining a new city and inventing peace.	

Doing/Spatial Themes	Key Ideas
<b>Identity</b>	
Creating a shared sense of belonging	Urban managers try to locate new public facilities, such as the new football stadium, on sites that do not have sectarian associations. Grassroots leaders use their networks to create a safe space for intercommunity engagement, which often leads to new networking and friendships. Wider peace process is building a level of trust and shared purpose. Creating a shared sense of belonging necessitates the inclusion of paramilitary leaders as well. Credit for successful work should be highlighted and used as models for other communities.
Parochial belonging (Not used pejoratively)	Sense of belonging is localized in the most sectarian areas. Local stories become mythical and continue to exert influence of identity. In many areas, people were not required to leave their local areas to live complete lives.
Territorial definition	Flags, murals and coloured kerb stones are used to visually define territory. Visual symbols of territory affect perceptions of safety and belonging, and impact the imagined city of Belfast residents. Territorial definition influences normal patterns of urban planning.
Culture and tradition	People will often continue to send their children to schools they have connections to, even if they have moved away. Wall murals are seen as a statement of culture. Marching season is viewed as an expression of dominance by the Catholic community, and expression of culture and tradition by the Protestant community. St. Patrick's Day was a contentious issued in Belfast.
<b>Freedom</b>	
Freedom of access	Constricted imagined city. Mental barriers to freedom of movement in the city. Modifies a person's ability to access vital services that are satisfiers for other needs.
Freedom of movement	More specific to the transportation systems and physical barriers. Many walls continue to exist on interface lines and these constrict the movement of citizens. Public roads are used for wedge planning. Public transportation routes are modified to avoid travelling through both interface communities in an area, making for convoluted transportation routes.
Equity	Equality legislation obligates public authorities to draw up an equality scheme to promote equal opportunity and good relations among groups. Public authorities attach more importance to this than community groups. Community leaders mostly discuss equity in terms of equitable access to services and housing.

## Appendix E – Jerusalem themes, subthemes and key findings

Doing/Spatial Themes	Key Ideas
Subsistence	
Economic Issues/Employment	Desperate levels of poverty in Palestinian neighbourhoods. High unemployment levels. Due to complex citizenship and residency, sometimes Jerusalemites are excluded from state social supports in under both the Palestinian authority and Israel.
Shelter	Housing is a huge issue in East Jerusalem. Clear need for basic shelter in Palestinian neighbourhoods. Building permits are nearly impossible to obtain and homes built without permits are subject to demolition.
Basic Infrastructure/Service	Unequal levels of infrastructure investment and community services, including essential services such as water, roads,garbage collection and sewage systems.
Protection	
Housing	Entire Jewish neighbourhoods (settlements) are built the annexed portion of Jerusalem. Almost no new legal housing has been built for Palestinians since the occupation.
Population mobility	Security barriers have created population mobility into East Jerusalem in order not to be cut off from work and services. This further increases the level of housing need.
Safe environment	Average Israeli citizen want to feel safe and the wall helps their perception of safety. Arabs who choose to build illegally are under constant threat of a demolition order and loss of their home.
Security barriers	Costly and ineffective at providing peace and security. It has a huge social cost by cutting off Arab communities from Jerusalem.
Police/State role	Israeli society has become very militaristic. The military and the police are used to ensure dominance over Palestinians.
Affection	
Inter group friendship	Cross community friendships exist, but primarily among Palestinian elite and Israeli citizens.
Intergroup solidarity	Israeli peacebuilders demonstrate solidarity with Palestinians as a way of helping to protect them from Israeli state punishment.
Intra group solidarity/ Intergroup hostility	Palestinians demonstrate high levels of intra group solidarity. This is evident in both intifadas and in the work of Palestinian community work.
Understanding	
Formal spaces of education	Need for adequate levels of schools in East Jerusalem. No public high school for girls at all. Separate education systems are largely religious based.

Doing/Spatial Themes		Key Ideas
Community planning education		Some Palestinian community workers engage in community planning education in an effort to counteract injustice in their culture.
Participation		
Perception of the role of planning/planners (rights/responsibilities)		The planning system is oppressive and designed to control people. Individual planners can affect the peace process by offering up alternates to the current plans.
Desire to participate/consultative processes		Planners who work with communities in East Jerusalem indicated that communities are responsive to community planning engagement.
Community group funding		Arab community groups appear to be inadequately funded based on their population and the percentage of the municipal area they are responsible for. Community groups engaged in planning activities look for funding to put in their own infrastructure.
Community peacebuilding opportunities		Some organizations try to build dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis, but there is largely little interaction across communities.
Community Trust		Community organizations mentioned that planners assigned to their area changed frequently and this impacted the ability to build community trust.
Women as peace builders		Women's groups have managed to maintain connections between communities, however they face opposition, and sometimes violence, from within their own community. Some community workers discussed capacity building in women in general, due to the patriarchal Arab society.
Political participation		Arab communities largely do not participate in the Jerusalem political system as they do not wish to normalize or legitimize the Occupation.
Leisure		
Opportunities for social interaction/ Green space/parks (Community centres, sports facilities)		Public facilities of any sort are limited in East Jerusalem. Green space is a contentious issue. Much of East Jerusalem is designate "green" in planning documents prohibiting Palestinian from building legally on that land. This same land might still be expropriated from Arab owners to be used for Jewish purposes.
Creation		
Percept- ion of own role	Education and activism	Some planners felt their role included public education to the injustices that they were aware of with respect to planning and human rights. This work included preparing alternative plans, presenting facts and statistics, and highlighting injustice where ever possible.
	Encourage participat-	Public participation does not have a strong role in Israeli planning. However, some planners discussed successful participatory planning activities. Techniques used were similar between Jewish and Palestinian planners, and were very collaborative

Doing/Spatial Themes		Key Ideas
Perception of own role (cont)	ion	processes.
	Leadership in peacebuilding	Planners admitted to believing in the ability to effect positive change with planning tools early in their careers, but most did not see their role as a leadership role in peacebuilding. There were notable exceptions to this.
	Neutral Roles	Most planners did not see planning as a neutral activity in context.
Shared spaces		Arabs and Jews do not share space in Jerusalem
Imagined city		Arab East Jerusalem is not part of the imagined city of most Israelis leading to the gross injustices evident with little popular outcry.
Identity		
Creating a shared sense of belonging		No major projects that are neutral or celebrate a shared sense of the city. There are a number of major projects to explore the Jewish history of the city, but these are largely resented by the Palestinian population.
Territorial definition/ Culture and tradition		It is largely believed that Israel is trying to create facts on the ground that will Judaize East Jerusalem and define the borders of a two state solution unilaterally.
Freedom		
Freedom of access		Palestinian and Jewish Jerusalemites are
Freedom of movement		Public transportation is different for Jewish and Palestinian neighbourhoods. No free movement between communities.
Equity		Lack of equity is apparent in all facets of society. Even Arabs with Israeli citizenship do not have full rights in Israel.

## Appendix F – Ethics approval for research

 <b>UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA</b>	<b>OFFICE OF RESEARCH SERVICES</b> Office of the Vice-President (Research)	CTC Building 208 - 194 Dafoe Road Winnipeg, MB R3T 2N2 Fax (204) 269-7173 <a href="http://www.umanitoba.ca/research">www.umanitoba.ca/research</a>
--	---	--

**APPROVAL CERTIFICATE**

20 March 2007

**TO: Janice Miller** (Advisor S. Blake)  
Principal Investigator

**FROM: Wayne Taylor, Chair**   
Joint-Faculty Research Ethics Board (JFREB)

**Re: Protocol #J2007:033**  
**“Planning and Peace-building: An Evaluation of Successful  
Techniques and their Effect on the Activities of Peace-building  
Community Organizations”**

---

Please be advised that your above-referenced protocol has received human ethics approval by the **Joint-Faculty Research Ethics Board**, which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement. This approval is valid for one year only.

Any significant changes of the protocol and/or informed consent form should be reported to the Human Ethics Secretariat in advance of implementation of such changes.

**Please note:**

- if you have funds pending human ethics approval, the auditor requires that you submit a copy of this Approval Certificate to Kathryn Bartmanovich, Research Grants & Contract Services (fax 261-0325), including the Sponsor name, before your account can be opened.
- if you have received multi-year funding for this research, responsibility lies with you to apply for and obtain Renewal Approval at the expiry of the initial one-year approval; **otherwise the account will be locked.**

The Research Ethics Board requests a final report for your study (available at: [http://umanitoba.ca/research/ors/ethics/ors\\_ethics\\_human\\_REB\\_forms\\_guidelines.html](http://umanitoba.ca/research/ors/ethics/ors_ethics_human_REB_forms_guidelines.html)) in order to be in compliance with Tri-Council Guidelines.

*Bringing Research to Life*

## Appendix G – Informed Consent Documents



UNIVERSITY  
OF MANITOBA | Faculty of Architecture

Department of City Planning  
201 Russell Building  
Winnipeg, Manitoba  
Canada R3T 2N2  
Telephone (204) 474-9458  
Fax (204) 474-7532

### Consent Form for Participants

Researcher: Janice Miller, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg Canada  
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Sheri Blake, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada

*This consent form, a copy of which will be left with you for your records and reference, is only part of the process of informed consent. It should give you the basic idea of what the research is about and what your participation will involve. If you would like more detail about something mentioned here, or information not included here, you should feel free to ask. Please take the time to read this carefully and to understand any accompanying information.*

**Title of Project:** Planning and peace-building: An evaluation of successful techniques and their effect on the activities of peace-building community organizations

**Description of the Project:** This project is the research component of the Master of City Planning thesis. The student researcher is interested in the activity of planning and its affect on peace-building work in conflicted cities. The intent is to attempt to identify practical planning techniques that have a peace-building effect. It is hoped that some of the techniques identified will have an international transference and also be useful in multicultural cities in Canada.

**Communication of Research:** The research work will be communicated in a variety of ways. The student will produce a Master of City Planning Thesis to be submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies at the University of Manitoba. This thesis will be also made online through the University of Manitoba Electronic Thesis Project and via microfilm through National Library of Canada. The student will be required to present this research at a public presentation and also at an oral thesis defense University of Manitoba. It is possible the some of this research might also be presented at Canadian or International Planning Conferences, or in academic journal on planning.

**Specific Activities to be Completed by Project Participant:** The researcher will interview the participants regarding their perceptions of planning and peace-building, and their activities in peace-building roles. It is expected that this interview will take approximately 1 hour.

**Audio-Taping, Use of Data, Secure Storage and Destruction of Research Data:** The interviews will be taped on a digital recorder and will be transcribed. Such audio-recordings will be kept in a secure place, and destroyed after the thesis has been published. Your name or any other personal information will not be included in any publicly disseminated materials arising from the study. Where information occurs within a session transcript that will be included in the final project report, names and other personal information will be omitted, unless such permission has been explicitly granted.

*Your signature on this form indicates that you have understood to your satisfaction the information regarding participation in this research project and agree to be interviewed for the*

www.umanitoba.ca

project. In no way does this waive your legal rights nor release the researcher, sponsor, or involved institutions from their legal and professional responsibilities. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time, and/or refrain from answering any questions you prefer to omit, without prejudice or consequence. Your continued participation should be as informed as your initial consent, so you should feel free to ask for clarification or new information throughout your participation. At the close of this interview, you will be given a small gift of appreciation. You will be given this gift even if you choose to omit some questions, or withdraw entirely from this interview.

**CONTACT INFORMATION:**

**Researcher:** Janice Miller, Master of City Planning Student, Department of City Planning, Faculty of Architecture, University of Manitoba, 201 Russell Bldg., Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2N2; Email: Jan\_Miller@umanitoba.ca

**Advisor:** Dr. Sheri Blake, Associate Professor, Department of City Planning, Faculty of Architecture, University of Manitoba, 201 Russell Bldg., Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2N2, Telephone: (204)474-6426; Fax: 474-7532; Email: blakes@cc.umanitoba.ca

**Human Ethics Protocol #: J2007:033** This research project has been approved by the Joint Faculty Research Ethics Board (JFREB) of the University of Manitoba. If you have any concerns or complaints about this project you may contact the above-named persons or the Human Ethics Secretariat at 474-7122, or e-mail margaret\_bowman@umanitoba.ca. A copy of this consent form has been given to you to keep for your records and reference.

Thank you for participating in this project. Your cooperation and insights are very valuable, and are greatly appreciated.

I, \_\_\_\_\_, consent to the dissemination of  
[Name of Participant: *please print*]  
material provided to Janice Miller in all methods of research communication, including presentations, papers and the Master of City Planning thesis document. I understand that the information I provide will be incorporated in presentations and reports in a fashion that does identify me. I also understand that all information will be treated as confidential, stored in a private and secure place, and subsequently destroyed at the end of the research project, on or before the end of May 2012 (5 year retention period).

I agree to be interviewed with an audio recording device present. \_\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_\_ No

Translator required? \_\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_\_ No If a translator is required for this interview, I trust that \_\_\_\_\_, is translating my interview answers as  
[Name of Translator: *please print*]  
accurately as possible.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Participant Date

Name of the Researcher: Janice D. Miller

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of the Researcher Date



UNIVERSITY  
OF MANITOBA

Faculty of Architecture

Department of City Planning  
201 Russell Building  
Winnipeg, Manitoba  
Canada R3T 2N2  
Telephone (204) 474-9458  
Fax (204) 474-7532

### **Statement of Confidentiality for Translators**

Researcher: Janice Miller, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg Canada  
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Sheri Blake, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada

*This Statement of Confidentiality, a copy of which will be left with you for your records and reference, is only part of the process of informed consent. It should give you the basic idea of what the research is about and what your participation as a translator will involve. If you would like more detail about something mentioned here, or information not included here, you should feel free to ask. Please take the time to read this carefully and to understand any accompanying information.*

**Title of Project:** Planning and peace-building: An evaluation of successful techniques and their effect on the activities of peace-building community organizations

**Description of the Project:** This project is the research component of the Master of City Planning thesis. The student researcher is interested in the activity of planning and its affect on peace-building work in conflicted cities. The intent is to attempt to identify practical planning techniques that have a peace-building effect. It is hoped that some of the techniques identified will have an international transference and also be useful in multicultural cities in Canada.

**Communication of Research:** The research work will be communicated in a variety of ways. The student will produce a Master of City Planning Thesis to be submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies at the University of Manitoba. This thesis will be also made online through the University of Manitoba Electronic Thesis Project and via microfilm through National Library of Canada. The student will be required to present this research at a public presentation and also at an oral thesis defense University of Manitoba. It is possible the some of this research might also be presented at Canadian or International Planning Conferences, or in academic journal on planning.

**Specific Activities to be Completed by Translators:** The researcher will interview the participants regarding their perceptions of planning and peace-building, and their activities in peace-building roles. The translator is expected to translate the researcher's questions and the participant's answers as accurately as possible. It is expected that this interview will take approximately 1 hour.

**Audio-Taping, Use of Data, Secure Storage and Destruction of Research Data:** The interviews will be taped on a digital recorder and will be transcribed. Such audio-recordings will be kept in a secure place, and destroyed after thesis has been accepted. Your name or any other personal information will not be included in any publicly disseminated materials arising from the study. Where information occurs within a session transcript that will be included in the final project report, names and other personal information will be omitted, unless such permission has been explicitly granted.

[www.umanitoba.ca](http://www.umanitoba.ca)

Your signature on this form indicates that you have understood to your satisfaction the information regarding participation in this research project and agree to translate for the project. In no way does this waive your legal rights nor release the researcher, sponsor, or involved institutions from their legal and professional responsibilities. You are free to withdraw from your role as a translator at anytime. Your continued participation should be as informed as your initial consent, so you should feel free to ask for clarification or new information throughout your participation.

**CONTACT INFORMATION:**

**Researcher:** Janice Miller, Master of City Planning Student, Department of City Planning, Faculty of Architecture, University of Manitoba, 201 Russell Bldg., Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2N2; Email: Jan\_Miller@umanitoba.ca

**Advisor:** Dr. Sheri Blake, Associate Professor, Department of City Planning, Faculty of Architecture, University of Manitoba, 201 Russell Bldg., Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2N2, Telephone: (204)474-6426; Fax: 474-7532; Email: blakes@cc.umanitoba.ca

This research project has been approved by the Joint Faculty Research Ethics Board (JFREB) of the University of Manitoba. If you have any concerns or complaints about this project you may contact the above-named persons or the Human Ethics Secretariat at 474-7122, or e-mail margaret\_bowman@umanitoba.ca. A copy of this consent form has been given to you to keep for your records and reference.

Human Ethics Protocol #: J2007:033

Thank you for acting as a translator in this research project. Your assistance is very valuable and is greatly appreciated.

I, \_\_\_\_\_, am the translator on the project  
[Name of Participant: *please print*]

**“Planning and peace-building: An evaluation of successful techniques and their effect on the activities of peace-building community organizations”.** Janice Miller, the researcher, may use material provided during the interview I am translating in all methods of research communication, including presentations, papers and the Master of City Planning thesis document. I understand that the my role as a translator is translate between the researcher and the interviewee \_\_\_\_\_ and I will endeavor to translate as  
[Name of Participant: *please print*]  
accurately as possible. I agree to keep confidential any and all information that I learn during the course of this interview.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Translator

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

Name of the Researcher: Janice D. Miller

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of the Researcher

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date