

The Attitude of the Major German Political Parties to European
Integration from 1949 to the elections of 1953

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By R.B. Slater

There was little doubt, after 1945, that a Europe constituted of independent nation states could retain little of its past influence in world affairs. The continuing existence of separate nation states, each with its own prejudices, hatreds and conflicting interests where there should have been friendship, co-operation and a communion of interests, had been recognized as an anachronism in twentieth century life. In Germany especially, was there a desire to reorganize Europe, along both economic and cultural lines, so that all could share in the increased potential which even partial unification would create.

Since the overwhelming majority of West Germans were looking forward to a more integrated Europe, it was only natural that this sentiment was reflected in the platforms of the various political parties in Western Germany. The Christian Democratic Union and the coalition parties, which formed the government of the Federal Republic between 1949 and 1953, worked constantly to bring Germany into the new institutions which were paving the way towards a united Europe. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, who formed the official opposition, fought any inclusion of West Germany in a United States of Europe until Germany was first reunited and accorded

equal rights with her proposed partners.

The question of European integration played a major part in the federal elections in the fall of 1953 in which the electorate gave Konrad Adenauer and his Christian Democrats a clear and decisive mandate to continue their work to bring Western Germany into a united Europe.

The health of Germany and the health of Europe are one and the same, and have been the same throughout history. Germany would be the strongest member of any proposed European Community, and it is just that strength that makes her inclusion in any European federation so important. For the good of Europe and of Germany, German strength must be channeled so that it can be used only for the benefit of the entire community. It is difficult not to conclude that the power that menaced Europe for one hundred years could become the backbone of a stronger and a better Europe. Such a union of the sovereign states of Europe into a greater whole, dedicated to peace and co-operation, seems the only method of preventing any further decline of Europe towards economic ruin and disintegration.

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CHAPTER I

German Sovereignty Against the Background of European Integration

I

After the total collapse of German resistance in 1945, the principle aim of the Allies was to re-establish in Germany a democratic system of government and the will to live in peace with her neighbors. It was generally accepted that this would take a very long time, and it was customary to speak of an occupation which would last for twenty years. During this time, the principles enunciated at Potsdam were to be put into force, and German government was to be decentralized and reorganized on a democratic, local self-governing basis. Germany was to be completely demilitarized and disarmed and stripped of her mighty economic potential, especially in the heavy industries, through reparations, through dismantling, and by the reorganizing of her entire economy along the lines of decentralization. In line with Morgenthau's proposals, agricultural development was to be promoted at the expense of industry. A whole generation of Nazis and fellow travellers who had co-operated with Hitler was to be excluded from office. There was to be a lengthy period of re-education so that a new generation of Germans would be brought up under a stable democratic system and would thus be able, one day, to take over the reins of government and bring Germany back into the community of nations.

It is worthwhile re-stating thus briefly Allied policy with regard to Germany at the close of the war in order to emphasize the completeness of the about-face in policy which took place. The Potsdam Agreement,

based as it was on the theory of Four Power unanimity, failed immediately after the East-West split that followed it, and as a result, Germany was divided into two very much separated segments. The new aim of the Western Allies was to bring Germany back into the community of nations as quickly as possible and to persuade her to rearm. As for the generation which was governing Germany at the time of collapse, it was to be immediately rehabilitated and sent back to work, since the complicated machinery of a modern state with modern armed forces simply cannot afford to sacrifice a whole generation of experience and talent still in its prime. (1)

The idea of a strong and independent Germany with an army of her own was, however, naturally repugnant to Germany's neighbors, even though German strength and potential could be, if properly used, so important to Western defense. On the other hand, the existence of a neutralized and weak Germany was equally unacceptable. In such a situation the idea of a greater Europe, a Europe which would integrate into a single unit the economies, the armies and even the political organizations of the nation-states of Western Europe, fitted very nicely.

It was decided among the Western Big Three, therefore, that their policy towards Germany must be re-oriented. To this end, a communique was issued jointly by Britain, France and the United States on April 8, 1949, from Washington, which announced that they had agreed to fuse the Western zones of occupation into a single unit and replace the existing military governments with an Occupation Statute. The German Basic Law, or constitution, on which the German Parliamentary Council had been working

(1) R.S. In The World Today: The West German Political Parties and Rearmament: February 1953.

since 1948, was finally adopted in May, after the acceptance of the Allied Military Governors and its ratification by the governments of the Laender. This paved the way for a federal election, which was held in August.

Many of the restrictions of the Occupation Statute were relaxed during the next three years as the Federal Republic responded to the confidence placed in it by the Western Allies. With the entrance of Germany into the European Coal and Steel Community, and with the development of the idea for a European army, the Occupation Statute could no longer be a fair basis for German existence. Accordingly, it was replaced by the Contractual Agreements which were signed in Bonn in May of 1952. With the coming into existence of the European Defense Community, Allied occupation would be ended and West German sovereignty would be almost completely restored. On the basis of German entry into European integration, the Federal Republic was to gain its independence within the comity of the free nations of the world.

There developed, meanwhile, a clear realization among Germans that a democratic Germany within the framework of European federation was the best guarantee that the vast resources, industries and manpower of Germany would be used for the common good. The plans presented to the Germans in connection with this goal up to the summer of 1953 were attempts to achieve co-ordination in areas, such as in the coal and steel industry, where it was most realizable. This process was meant to achieve a gradual eradication, through functional organizations, of certain aspects of the sovereign powers of European nations.

II

Europe became interested in increased co-operation after it

became evident that the Second World War failed to re-establish peace or economic security in the world. The Marshall Plan helped pull Western Europe out of the economic doldrums in which she had been languishing since 1945, and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, which administered Marshall aid in Europe, gave Europe an initial push towards union by helping to develop a European concept and by organizing a fund of economic knowledge for future use. Co-operation was then able to be developed in many other schemes, including the European Payments Union, and by general agreements on such important matters as electricity, railroads, barge traffic and civil airlines. In the military field, Western Union and Nato had developed closer ties among the nations of the Atlantic community.

Although Germany had not been allowed to participate in the military organizations being built up around her, she was a participant in all of the institutions furthering economic co-operation. By the time the Council of Europe was established and the blueprints for the Schuman Plan, the Pleven Plan and political union were being drawn up, Germany was a logical prospective member of each.

The immediate predecessor of the Council of Europe was the Congress which was convened at the Hague in the spring of 1948. The resolution passed by the conference declared that:

" . . . the time has come when the European nations must transfer and merge some portion of their sovereign rights, so as to secure common political and economic action for the integration and proper development of their common resources."

In order to mobilize the thoughts of those who wished to think 'European', the Council of Europe was organized in 1949. Its two organs, the ministerial committee, consisting of the foreign ministers of each country,

and the Consultative Assembly have functioned since the first meeting at Strasbourg in August, 1949.

Two opposing groups at Strasbourg suggested plans for the accomplishment of European unity, the federalists and the functionalists. The federalists desired immediate federation, but the majority of the delegates, swayed by the strong anti-federative feeling of the British and the Scandinavians, chose the functionalist approach. Thus Europe was to work towards eventual unity by means of membership in functional institutions such as the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defence Community.

The treaty setting up the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was signed on the eighteenth of April 1951, and came into force on the twenty fifth of July, 1952. The treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) was signed on the twenty-seventh of May, 1952, and up to the time of the 1953 German elections, had been ratified only by Germany. The parties to both treaties were Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands.

Both of these communities were meant to be a basis for the future political federation of the six member states. Both organizations have supranational authorities, with wide executive functions. The Council of Ministers, whose decisions on certain questions need not be unanimous, is common to each, while the executive bodies are the High Authority in the ECSC, and the Board of Commissioners in the EDC.

These communities are thus clearly different from such inter-governmental agencies as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). Neither of

these organizations entail much loss of sovereignty, as the council of representatives in each must reach decisions by unanimous agreement, and the onus for such decisions rests on the member governments alone.

The institutions of the ECSC and the EDC are fairly similar. The treaties have set up for each organization four principal organs, (1) a Council of Ministers, an executive body, an Assembly and a Court of Justice. The Council of Ministers (six members), represents the governments of the member states, and functions as a co-ordinating body between the executive organs of each community and the policies of the member governments. The executive bodies (nine members), the High Authority in the ECSC and the Board of Commissioners in the EDC, are charged respectively with creating and maintaining the single market for coal and steel, and with the administration, organization, mobilization plans, programmes for armaments, equipment and supply of the integrated forces, and liaison with Nato. The Assembly is, in each case, drawn from the six national parliaments. In the ECSC this consists of seventy-eight members; Belgium ten, France eighteen, Italy eighteen, the German Federal Republic eighteen, the Netherlands ten and Luxemburg four. The EDC Assembly has eighty-seven members, the additional nine members being nominated by France, Italy and Germany on the basis of three each, bringing their representation to twenty-one members apiece. The ECSC Assembly reviews the work of the High Authority and considers its annual report. The functions of the EDC Assembly would be to consider the community's budget estimates and the

(1) The ECSC treaty also sets up a technical committee, called the Consultative Committee, of 30-51 members who represent producers, workers, consumers and distributors.

reports of the Board of Commissioners, and to study the constitution of a directly elected Assembly which would function eventually as one of the organs of a federal political structure. The same Court of Justice will serve both communities. (1)

The European Political Community (EPC) has been drawn up by an Ad Hoc Assembly consisting of the ECSC Assembly, enlarged by nine French, German and Italian members (three each), each co-opted from their delegation to the Council of Europe and the Consultative Assembly. This Assembly met for the first time on the fifteenth of September, 1952, and decided to set up a Constitutional Committee of twenty-six experts to draft the text of a constitution for a European Political Community. In December, 1952, the Constitutional Committee completed an interim report and submitted it to the Ad Hoc Assembly in Strasbourg one month later. The present plan, as approved by the Ad Hoc Assembly, provides that the Political Community should take over the powers of the ECSC and the EDC and any other powers, such as foreign affairs, economic questions and finance, which the member governments wish to transfer to it. The institutions of the EPC as established, would replace the corresponding institutions of the ECSC and EDC.

The draft of the EPC in its present state consists of a Court of Justice, an Economic and Social Council, a legislative body and an executive body. The legislature is bicameral, with an Assembly elected by direct universal suffrage and a Senate representing the number of states and elected by national parliaments; both chambers are to have equal powers. The executive body consists of a European Executive Council and a Council of Ministers. The former would be responsible for the general direction of the EPC, would

(1) International Survey, February 1953, pp. 13-17.

consist of a President (chosen by the Senate) an unspecified number of members appointed by him, and the President of the High Authority of the ECSC, and the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners of the EDC. The Executive Council could be overthrown by a vote of censure passed by a majority in both chambers, but the representatives of the ECSC and EDC could be replaced only as set down in the treaties of those organizations. The Council of Ministers, the same as for the ECSC and EDC, would be responsible to the six national governments for European affairs and would harmonize national policies with those of the EPC. The Economic and Social Council would act in a consultative capacity and would probably consist of representatives of employers' organizations, trade unions and other such bodies. The EPC has not yet been finally drafted, nor signed or ratified. For this reason, there has been little discussion on it in the political arenas of the six participating countries.

III

During the past two years, there has been much debate in Germany on the wisdom of West German participation in the unification of Europe, and especially on the question of rearmament. The affirmative side of the debate on integration and rearmament was led by the governing coalition, which consists of the Christian Democratic Union / Christian Socialist Union, (1) the Free Democratic Party, the German Party, and since last August, the All-German Party. The negative side of the debate was taken by the Government Opposition, which is led by the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The argument has been more a question of methods than of

(1) The CDU/CSU is one party: It bears the name CSU in Bavaria and CDU in the rest of Germany.

conflicting ideologies, however, since both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, along with the great majority of Germans, agree that the present system of independent nation states has been proven unsatisfactory and that a unified Europe must therefore be created.

The astonishing economic and political decline of Europe in the past few decades was obvious to both the Christian Democrats and the Socialists. Politically nationalism has become, in Europe at least, an anachronism; it was once a power which drew men together and served the cause of human dignity, freedom and democracy. But it is no longer a unifying force, it now tends to drive men further and further apart, and has become a battering ram which is pounding the European civilization to pieces. Economically, two world wars have converted Europe from a creditor area to a debtor area. Damage done to industrial plant, to agriculture and to dwellings must be repaired at great cost. Overseas markets have been lost to America, the invisible items of trade, investments abroad, have been used to finance both wars, and as a result, the standard of living in Europe has dropped, even under socialism, to a point far beyond what it could be. In such a situation, tariff and trade barriers can only impede recovery and hamper intra-European understanding.

Economically and politically, nationalism has become increasingly harmful to Europe, which can no longer support or defend herself under the existing system, and this nationalism has shown itself to be most harmful in the case of Franco-German rivalry. As long as the French continually remind themselves of 1870 and Bismarck, of German aggression in 1914 and 1939, of German occupation after 1940, and continue to concentrate all their efforts in securing themselves against the Germans by outside agreements

and by a policy of keeping Germany weak, they will never have the opportunity of achieving friendship with Germany. On the other hand, as long as Germany remembers the false promises of Napoleon, the French support of German particularism before 1870, Versailles with its war guilt clause and reparations, the French march into the Ruhr, and as long as they continue to accuse the French of oppression after 1945, the Germans will find it impossible to get rid of the traditional distrust of France which has its roots deep in German nationalistic feeling.

A case in point is the Saar, which now has a government of its own and an accredited French ambassador representing the French in Saarbruecken. The French insist that the Saar is economically better off tied to France and point to the fact that two-thirds of the Saar population voted in the Saar election. The Germans have asserted that the French have no right to sanction the ban on the pro-German Saar Democratic Party or to appoint a minister plenipotentiary in Saarbruecken. This, they claim, is an attempt on the part of France to wean the Saar from Germany. Here again nationalism has got out of hand in both countries and may result, ironically enough, in the establishment of another little European state at a time when attempts are being made to abolish barriers and frontiers. Furthermore, the efforts made in recent years to achieve a Franco-German understanding may be wrecked. It is to the credit of Dr. Adenauer that he appealed for 'steady nerves' in a Bundestag speech (1) and stressed that "under no circumstances must the Saar problem interfere with the efforts aimed at establishing good relations between Germany and France and thereby make more difficult the integration of Western Europe".

(1) Speech in Bundestag: May 30, 1953.

In Germany, at least, an epoch of European fratricide and of the failure of the old system of Kriegsverhuetens - laws to prevent wars - seems to have dampened any serious resurgence of nationalistic enthusiasm. The idea of a supra-national entity, that is, the integration of Europe into an economic, military and even a political unit, appeals to most Germans because it seems to present a method for healing such schisms as the Franco-German problem and for resolving the conflicts of a continent incapable of achieving an acceptable existence in its traditional divided state.

The Germans, then, were able in 1949, only four years after the end of the war, to take a stand on the question of European unification, and the position of the two principal German political parties was one of support for the European idea. Why is it that the Germans, with their record of fervent nationalism, could support such an ideal so soon after their defeat in World War III?

To begin with, there must have been a certain revulsion, amongst the intelligent Germans as they looked around them at the structural and human wreckage in 1945, and when they heard of the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis in Belsen and Buchenwald. It must have been like waking up after being drunk--a morning after the night before feeling--and swearing that it must not happen again. Never again must nationalism be allowed to run wild throughout Germany. Never again must such a story of hate and carnage be allowed to dishonour the German nation and blot her escutcheon. Such were the sentiments expressed by Federal President Heuss, Chancellor Adenauer and opposition leader Schumacher in their opening

remarks when the first Bundestag session opened in 1949. (1) To Germans with a sincere desire to prevent any return to Hitlerism, European unity probably presented, therefore, a favorable means of securing the Federal Republic to freedom and democracy.

The split of Germany into two parts must also have had considerable influence on the West German attitude towards the European idea. Although it was in all likelihood completely accidental, the line through the centre of Germany cut off from the West the agricultural lands of the East and the Protestant peoples of the East. This changed Germany from a country which had, before the war, been up to 70% self sufficient in food products to one which was very much more dependent on the rest of Europe for her food. (2) It also changed her from a predominantly Protestant nation to one which is equally divided between Catholics and Protestants. (3)

Economically then, West Germany is far more dependent on Europe than she was before the war for her food supply. And considering the devout nature of the West German Catholic, the growth in the proportion of Catholics is also important, since Germany now has far more in common with France and Italy than she had before the war and is more likely to be universalist and less likely to be nationalistic in outlook. The Federal Republic in 1949 then, was more closely tied to Europe spiritually and was more

(1) See Keesing's Archives: p. 10237.

(2) Germany Reports: 1953, pp. 136-9: The loss to the East after 1945 of agricultural acreage was 55% of the pre-war total. On the other hand, only 27% of the population remained East of the Iron Curtain.

(3) Germany Reports: 1953, pp. 290-1: Before 1939, 1/3 of all Germans were Catholic and 2/3's were Protestant. Today there are 24 million Protestants and 22 million Catholics in West Germany.

dependent upon Europe economically than the Germany of 1939. It is reasonable to assume that this situation had a direct bearing on the German interest in the European idea; it undoubtedly influenced Dr. Adenauer.

Both the CDU and the SPD have realized, therefore, that it is impossible to achieve peace and security as long as nations reserve the right to be judges in their own cases, that is, as long as the 'domain réservé' of independent states retains its sacred position in world affairs. The leaders of both parties have pointed to the past when national pride and aspiration had not yet taken shape, when all Christendom could be marshalled in a Crusade or, further back, when the vitality of the Western Empire was demonstrated by the Carolingian revival. The European civilization, with its great cultural contributions, its grandeurs of art and spirit, its creative energy and its capacity century after century to remake the face of the world, presents to most thinking Germans a challenge to transcend the limited possibilities which exist under a system of independent states. To them, they live in a community of culture and tradition crying out for unifying institutions. Germans of both the CDU and the SPD have agreed that the European's political life must come to express what his spiritual and cultural life has long expressed - wider horizons, broader vision, a supranational ideal.

CHAPTER II

The Christian Democrats Champion West German Partnership in European Union

I

The policy of the Christian Democratic party after 1949 was based on its desire to try and lead Germany back into the community of nations. In order to prove to a naturally suspicious Europe that this desire was sincere, and in order to get on with the job of rebuilding Germany and re-educate her to develop a feeling for democracy and man's basic liberties, Adenauer's party accepted the rules of the Occupation Statute as laid down by the Western Allies and trusted in the good faith of Britain, France and America to relax the more stringent restrictions as the Federal Republic showed signs of progress. In line with this determination to co-operate with the West and to place Germany on the side of the free peoples of the world, the CDU gave continuous support to the idea of unifying Europe and to the framework of institutions which have been proposed and developed to give substance to the European idea.

The CDU needed a certain amount of political courage to come out so strongly in favor of a united Europe because what every German wanted above all was the reunification of his own divided country. Indeed, the first point mentioned under Foreign Policy in the CDU's party program was a demand that a peaceful way be found to create for all Germans a common homeland, whether they lived in the East or West, that is, whether they lived under Polish, Russian or French domination. Furthermore, the CDU claimed that its policies applied to all Germany and not only to Western

Germany. This was a claim which gave substance to its demand for the reunification of all German territory under a free and democratic German government. The CDU believed, however, that such a reunion could not be achieved by Germany herself, at least not without becoming a Russian satellite, as Germany was far too weak to bargain successfully with Russia. In order to recover her lost provinces and peoples, even by peaceful methods, Germany had to be far stronger. This strength, economic, military and political, could only be achieved, the CDU insisted, by Germany's participation in the unifying institutions of a united Europe. In reply to demands among certain German factions, including the Social Democratic Party, which wanted to see Germany reunited before the Federal Republic agreed to participate in the unification of Europe, the CDU drew up a statement, during their convention in Hamburg in April of 1953, in answer to what they considered a plan for marking time until Moscow decided to be co-operative. The statement was inserted into the official party program.

It read in part:

"There is a certain danger in the policy of decentralization and of inactivity this danger has to be overcome by the willingness of the German people to fight for the preservation of peace and in defense of their freedom within the society of the free peoples of Europe. We are convinced that by this policy, the political unification of all Germany may be attained, and that this policy is unconditionally necessary to reach the highest aim of our party (i.e. German reunification). That is our answer to political opponents who claim that European union will hamper re-unification." (1)

According to the CDU then, the increasing strength of free Europe represented the best hope for a peaceful solution of the problem of German unity within the scope of a general East-West settlement affecting the entire European

(1) Hamburger Programm, Section 6, April 18-22, 1953.

area.

As a result of the debates in the Bundestag on the related problems of German reunification and German participation in a European union, the CDU was forced by the opposition to take a definite stand on such important questions as the dispute with France over the Saar Basin, the possibility of a settlement of the German problem through a Four Power conference and the necessity for co-operation with that section of Western Europe that had remained outside the six power Coal and Steel Community. The Saar problem was particularly thorny, as its settlement was so important to Franco-German understanding. Bundeskanzler Adenauer attempted to ease the tension in talks with French ministers that looked toward a European solution for the Saar. He was adamant, however, in his insistence that the Saar belonged to Germany, that France could not be allowed to exploit the basin's natural resources for her own use, and that Germany would never accept a permanent loss of the Saar and its predominantly German population to France.

Adenauer was not over enthusiastic over the possibilities of Big Four decisions on Germany. He believed that Russia was not over-anxious to make concessions to the West or especially to give up her position in Eastern Germany or Poland's position beyond the Oder-Neisse frontier. He realized that any Big Four decisions would naturally be made without German participation and he therefore feared that the Western powers might sacrifice German interests in order to achieve concessions elsewhere. Adenauer preferred to leave such discussions until a united Europe, including Germany, was strong enough to do some really hard bargaining with the Soviets. Until then, despite attacks from the Government

Opposition, it was his policy to concentrate on closer integration in the West.

In connection with his desire to speed up the establishment of unifying institutions in the West, Adenauer tried to avoid the necessity of waiting for all of Western Europe to join the unification movement. Rather than delay until the British and the Scandinavians came in too, the Christian Democrats decided to go ahead with their task of unifying Europe and to be satisfied with a promise of co-operation from the nations remaining outside the Community. The CDU wished definitely to co-operate with the rest of free Europe and to make provisions for its future entry into the closer community of six, but, contrary to the opinion of the opposition, it felt that speed was essential if a united Europe was to be created. Delay, Adenauer felt, would only engrave more deeply in the minds of Europeans objections to and conditions for its creation, harming the chances of success. Then the opportunity which had been presented to Europe would be lost until it was too late. Co-operation with the rest of Europe, and close co-operation at that, was highly desirable to the CDU as it had no wish to see an already divided Europe again split by division in the West. It felt, however, that speed was of paramount importance if the security of Europe against the Communists was to be attained and if the European idea was not to be lost.

The German government, having accepted the plans for a European Coal and Steel Community, a European Defence Community and proposals towards a European Political Community felt that Germany should receive equal rights with her five partners if the German contribution was to mean anything at all. In the midst of all the proposals for the sloughing off

of national sovereignties, the government was eager to have Germany's freedom of action restored so that she would stand as an equal partner in the councils of Europe. Then there could be no possibility that she would be discriminated against by her fellow Europeans. The CDU realized, however, that the restoration of Germany's freedom of action would have to come 'Schrift um Schritt' - step by step - and not at a single bound. The party was pleased with the progress made up to 1953. The way from the Petersberg agreement to the entrance to the councils of Europe and to the ratification of the Schuman Plan and the EDC was a way that lead from the dismantling of factories and complete subjugation to the establishment of a government, the right of foreign representation and to the ending of the state of war between Germany and the Allies. It would soon lead, the CDU hoped, to yet greater independence, the achievement of more equal rights and the ending of Allied controls.

In addition the party wanted German membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. There were fears within Germany, expressed very strongly by the Social Democratic opposition, that since the Nato commanders would have the final word on the troops organized under the European Defence Community, Germany would have no control over her own contingents or over Western strategy which intimately concerned Germany. The CDU again needed political courage to go ahead with the ratification of the EDC without any direct assurances of membership in Nato. The party decided to get the EDC going, cultivate the trust and confidence of her neighbours with whose suspicions the CDU sympathized, and hope that before long the French would agree to German membership in the North Atlantic Community. Complete equality could not be too long postponed the Christian Democrats claimed, if the German

contribution was to be most wholesome and meaningful.

This demand for greater sovereignty was based partly on the feeling that it was unfair to ask Germany to sacrifice more than the other partners in a European Community, but it was also partly based on the natural desire to re-establish Germany as a factor in European and world affairs. The CDU argued that as an independent factor, Germany could only be a danger to her own security and that of the world, since she would be in a constant position to shift suddenly to one side or the other. Germany, insisted Adenauer's party, had to find security only in connection with other states. To stand between the great powers, was to become their plaything. Isolation was therefore as impossible as was part-isolation or procrastination. The attitude of the CDU was that a German army, or a German economy, would not alone provide security for Germany if she were neutral. It would therefore have been the greatest mistake if Germany fell back on its old policy of isolation. Germany was no longer isolated, asserted the CDU, and it would have been a mistake to throw away that accomplishment. The official government magazine, Bulletin, summed up the issue when it said that Germany could only become a constructive factor and an important entity in world affairs as a member of a European community. There alone could Germany have any kind of voice in the decisions of the free world. (1)

The Government party, in looking towards a sovereign Germany and a whole Germany thus grasped at the idea of a greater Europe, a Europe, it

(1) Bulletin: August 7, 1953.

hoped, which would be founded on the bases of Christianity, democracy and socialism. (1) On these three bases, the CDU hoped that the economic, political and cultural forces, forces which were bound up in separate nation-states, would find a common ground and be united in Europe. "Our era will determine whether civilization will progress or regress . . . it can progress only through freedom, humanity and Christian thought in a united Europe. For that reason, the CDU works for the unification of Europe." (2)

II

On the basis of this stand, the CDU, as the principal coalition party in the government, brought the Federal Republic into the Organization for European Economic Co-operation in September of 1949. On July 20th of the next year, the Federal Republic became an associate member of the European Council in Strasbourg, and on May 2nd one year later, the full membership of Germany in the Council was recognized. In the meantime, in April of 1951, the German Chancellor had placed his signature upon the treaty creating the European Coal and Steel Community. In January of 1952 the Coal and Steel Community was ratified by both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The vote in the four hundred and two seat Bundestag resulted in a comfortable majority of eighty-nine. Germany thus added her consent to that of Holland and France, whose notices of ratification had already been received.

The position of Dr. Adenauer in the Bundestag debate on the

(1) Rainer Barzel: Die Deutschen Partein, p. 119.

(2) Ibid. p. 120.

Schuman Plan was explained in the Bulletin last fall. (1) The article stated that the Bundestag accepted the plan on the basis of the Basic Law. The preamble of the constitution states that Germany recognizes herself as "strongly wanting to serve the peace of the world as equal members in a United Europe". Constitutionality for acceptance of the Treaty was also found in article twenty-four which states: "The Federal Republic can by law convey sovereign rights to supranational institutions."

"I do not consider", said Dr. Adenauer, "this development of a European union necessary only because of the danger threatening from the East.

"I think it is good and desirable because it will free new creative forces now shackled by our heritage of fear and distrust. It will open the way for cultural development, for the social welfare of everyone, and for a lasting assurance of peace and freedom." (2)

The Federal Minister of Economic Affairs, Dr. Ludwig Erhard, echoed Adenauer's sentiments when he said: "The German people have only a chance of existence and a future, if they can join up - especially as regards economic questions - very closely with other nations and with other economies." (3)

The CDU supported, from the beginning, the plan to pool the German coal and steel industries with the other five powers concerned by eliminating among the six countries all barriers to the free flow of coal and steel, and in order to establish a single market for those commodities.

(1) Bulletin, October 22, 1953.

(2) Ibid: October 22, 1953.

(3) Ibid: May 14, 1953.

The CDU approved wholeheartedly of the plan to prevent restrictive practices, to give all consumers equal access to raw materials and goods produced within the area, to promote the rational development of resources and to stimulate expansion and modernization of plant. The publication of the plan and then Adenauer's signature upon it touched off a great deal of debate throughout Germany on the merits and demerits of German acceptance, especially after the Social Democratic Party announced its intention to oppose the Plan in Parliament.

In the Bundestag, the members of the CDU argued that the ground of Schuman's proposal was well chosen. Coal and steel, they said, are the basic industries of the countries concerned, not only because their products are essential to practically all other industries, but because they account for so large a percentage of the total labour force. The creation of a single market in these fundamental industries would, therefore, furnish a model and a foundation for the integration of additional segments of Western Europe's economy. (1) The idea behind the Schuman Plan was to the German government, therefore, both political and economic. It opened new perspectives for the rejuvenation of Europe which, if realized, could well bring peace and greater prosperity to Europe and the world. Future wars between the six member states would be impossible since the production of coal and steel are unconditionally necessary for modern warfare. No longer would the individual resources of the individual countries present a temptation to irresponsible or aggressive plans of selfish governments. The sense of security which would then be created would basically change

(1) Report on Germany, 6th Quarterly.

European life. That five other nations, France, Belgium, Italy, Holland and Luxemburg agreed to relinquish some of their sovereignty to a new European high authority, proved to the CDU that it was in the best interests of Germany to join such a Community, the makeup of which was so very much in line with their own attitudes on the best means of rebuilding a strong and peaceful Europe whose internal conflicts could no longer disrupt the peace of the world.

This attitude of the CDU was clearly expressed by Konrad Adenauer when he said that there was in Germany:

". . . a feeling that social and political progress had not kept pace with technological advances and that there must be a reconstruction of human relations in the international sphere, that is, in the relations among nations. In all the Western nations there developed a conviction that only co-operation in a larger framework could overcome the recurrent crises within the Western World and create security for the future.

"We believe that Germany will be a useful and reliable partner in the community of free nations now taking shape. We base our right to express this belief on the record of Germany's development since 1945 and on the work of the Bundestag and the Federal Government - accomplishments that would not have been possible in the absence of inner moral strength. . . . Germany will be a useful partner to the limit of her moral and economic powers, convictions and political aims. Suffering, working and believing, the German people have built a democratic state out of the chaos of defeat in the face of a constant and undisguised Communist threat. They will preserve and defend this state with all their power. But we want more than that. We are putting all our energies into the unification of Europe. We are proud that wherever plans are being made for Europe, the Federal Government is among the propelling forces. Germany has not only grown into the European community, she has given it spiritual fullness and material strength. We may be permitted to say that the nature and the extent of our contribution becomes apparent if one imagines our standing aside from the European Community. But Europe has also strengthened and enriched us, because the higher unity represents more than the sum of its parts. To unite Europe, distinguished by works of the spirit and of art, the cradle of the Western World, is the goal we serve." (1)

(1) Germany and Europe: in Foreign Affairs: April, 1953.

The broad arguments of the CDU continued along the lines of establishing the importance of the proposed Community. To appreciate the importance of the Plan, they said, one had to understand the interdependent nature of the coal and steel industries of Western Europe. Since some nations had a surplus of iron ore, an interchange of these materials was necessary to the industrial well being of all. Any plan which facilitated this flow of coal and steel was bound to assist producers and consumers alike, and by adding to their prosperity, to assist generally the economies of the participating countries.

The Christian Democrats insisted again and again that the Plan which was being discussed on the floor of the Bundestag could lead to similar plans for the creation of free markets for other commodities and thus Europe could achieve a status as was achieved in America, that is, the establishment of an economic unit which would allow all commodities to flow free of tariffs and trade restrictions. The CDU asked the opposition whether they did not realize after so much long and painful experience that political unity must be built on common economic interests, on a foundation of economic unity. Here was a plan which could start Europe on its way to unification, for with the achievement of economic unity, political unity could become a possibility for the first time since the Caesars.

The Government pointed to articles one and two to back up their arguments for an economic unit based on a common market, common objectives and common institutions. These articles could provide an insight into the benefits of such an organization, the benefits of economic expansion, the development of employment and of the improvement of the standard of living, through the institution of a common market in harmony with the general economy of the member states.

In greater detail, attention was drawn to the provision which insured that the common market was regularly supplied and that the needs of third countries were to be taken into account. Thus countries outside the community would not be discriminated against. The German consumers were assured that there would be equal access to the sources of production and that there would be an attempt to secure the lowest prices possible within the area. German investors were assured that the lowering of prices would not be allowed to interfere with the process of normal amortization or with the provision of fair possibilities of renumeration for capital invested.

The German producers were unhappy over the necessity of decartelization, since the Ruhr steel combines were to be split into twenty-eight companies. Steel companies were not permitted to own coal mines producing more than seventy-five percent of their needs, a formula which actually resulted in limiting the Ruhr steel companies to approximately sixteen percent of the Ruhr coal. Provision was also made for the phasing-out of the coal sales monopoly. The producers were assured, however, that conditions would be maintained within the community which would encourage enterprises to expand and improve their ability to produce, further the development of international trade, promote a policy of rational development of natural resources and promote the regular expansion and the modernization of production as well as the improvement of the quality of the goods produced. Economics minister Erhard also expressed the belief that the German basic goods industry would receive its just share when the European Community took steps to remedy the joint lack of investment capital which represented possibly a greater burden for Germany, after all the dismantling and prohibitions of reconstruction in the post-war years, than

for the other member states. Finally, the German workers were assured that under the Plan the improvement of working and living conditions of the labor force would be promoted in each of the industries concerned.

The CDU supported vigorously the abolition of all factors which were recognized to be incompatible with the idea of a common market. This included the prohibition of import and export duties and quantitative restrictions on the movement of coal and steel; discrimination among producers, consumers and buyers in such matters as concerned prices, delivery terms, transportation rates and the free choice by the buyer of his supplier; subsidies or state assistance or special charges imposed by the state; and restrictive practices tending towards the division of markets or the exploitation of the consumer. This meant that the Community would, with limited direct intervention, collect information, place financial means at the disposal of enterprises for their investments, assure the maintenance and observance of normal conditions of competition, and take necessary measures to ensure observance of the measures set forth in the Treaty.

Other points mentioned by the Government in support of the treaty were related to the economic and social provisions included in it. One of the advantages mentioned was the power of the High Authority to carry on a permanent study of markets and price tendencies, to draw up forecasts of production, consumption, imports and exports, and to encourage technical and economic research by the granting of funds for that purpose. The power of the High Authority to control production and prices in times of emergency was also supported. This included the power to establish a system of production quotas, to advise the Council to establish consumption

priorities, and to fix, after consultation with the Council, maximum and minimum prices within the common market and maximum and minimum export prices in the outside market.

The CDU also reminded their socialist opposition of the benefits to labor under the Plan. The High Authority had the power to recommend, to the government concerned, the raising of wages and of social benefits if that body deems them abnormally low. If the High Authority found that a lowering of wages was leading to a drop in the standard of living of the labor force and at the same time was being used as a means of permanent economic adjustment or as a weapon of competition by enterprises, it could address a recommendation to the enterprise or government concerned to assure the labor force of compensatory benefits to be paid by the enterprise in question. Furthermore, in an important step forward in the defeat of nationalism, the member states were bound to renounce any restriction based on nationality against the employment in the coal and steel industries of workers with the necessary qualifications as long as the worker was a national of one of the six States in the Community. In addition, there would be no discrimination in renumeration and working conditions between national workers and immigrant workers.

The principal advantages of the Coal and Steel Community then, as set out by the Christian Democrats in its defence, were that first of all it would provide an expanded and more efficient coal and steel industry by creating a larger market and by eliminating uneconomic and subsidized producers. Secondly, it would assist consumers in signatory countries by guaranteeing fair access to all suppliers through elimination of tariffs and discriminatory duties; by assuring them that they could purchase the products

at fair prices and could obtain a fair share during periods of scarcity; and by protecting them from the high prices and artificial scarcity of products which result from international cartels and monopolistic agreements between individual companies. Thirdly, it would improve the lot of the workers by creating conditions in which production could be expanded with resulting greater employment and higher wages, and a rising general standard of living; and specifically by forbidding wage cuts and discriminatory measures intended to lower the cost of production at the expense of the worker. And Fourth, it would substitute for historic rivalries a fusion of essential interests by establishing, through economic union, the foundation of a broad and independent community long divided by bloody conflicts and by so doing, would strengthen and revitalize European civilization so that it could better serve the interests of the free world.

All of these conditions, insisted the CDU, applied to Germany with particular force, as Germany was and would always be a great exporter of coal and steel. In times of economic crisis, other countries always supported the production of their own mines and mills by erecting artificial barriers against German coal and steel. As a result, economic fluctuations causing reductions in demand always affected the companies, the miners and the steel workers of the Ruhr with disproportionate severity. The Christian Democrats argued that the Schuman Plan not only provided better safeguards than had ever before been devised against such disastrous reductions of demands, but ensured that the brunt of any such reduction would be borne equally by companies in all the countries, instead of falling most heavily on the Ruhr. Conversely, in times of great demand, the Ruhr had enjoyed advantages which were not only a temptation to the German government then

in power, but also a source of distrust and resentment on the part of countries which were dependent upon German coal. The Schuman Plan, in striving to attain the most effective distribution and utilization of Western Europe's coal and steel resources under all circumstances provided, the CDU claimed, that the effects of fluctuations would be equalized between all participating countries in times of scarcity as well as in times of plenty.

Germany would benefit not only from the overall expansion of the market but particularly, and almost immediately, from the elimination of inefficient companies in the other Schuman Plan countries. The German government contended - and not without basis - that their coal and steel industry and labor were the most efficient in Europe, and therefore Germany could expect to be the principal beneficiaries of the single open market and the introduction of efficiency as a criterion for the survival and expansion of the coal and steel companies.

The production figures for hard coal and crude steel for 1950, which was the year before the Schuman Plan was initiated, would seem to bear out the claim of Germany that they had the best working industry. France, even with the Saar was far below Germany in the production of both items. (1)

(1) Report on Germany: 6th Quarterly, pp. 86-8: Figures are in Hundred Thousand metric tons.

	<u>Hard Coal</u>	<u>Crude Steel</u>
German Federal Republic	110.4	12.121
France*	66.0	10.551
Belgium	27.6	3.711
Netherlands	12.0	.480
Luxembourg	-	2.451
Italy	1.2	2.300
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	217.2	31.614
*including the Saar	15.6	1.899

The importance of the Plan to Germany was underlined by Adenauer in the Bulletin in the spring of 1953:

" . . . There is no longer any really important problem which is only a German or even only a European one. We must learn to think and act in bigger areas.

"We are not alone. We are needed in the world, but still more we need the world . . . we realize very clearly that exclusively national - political advantages, which are not concerned with the larger interdependency in which we all live, will be of no benefit to us either.

"It is a special characteristic of the world today that one can only truly serve the interests of one's country by acting in concert with the interests of others.

"We are not abandoning true national feeling by this. We should remain good Germans and can be proud of our many achievements . . . But this national feeling must not force us into material or spiritualistic borders, which prevent a true peace.

"The precept of the hour and the vital question of our epoch reads: co-operation." (1)

The most vocal participants in the debate on the Plan, besides the politicians, were Germany's newspapers. They played a definite role in

(1) Bulletin: June 4, 1953.

influencing official political opinion because of their ability to express the different attitudes in the various regions of West Germany. In support of the Government, Bavaria's Passauer Neue Presse saw the single market idea as the end of the long standing animosity between France and Germany, bringing the European countries together in common destiny. The economic union "is a real peace treaty which provides the prerequisites for the unity of Europe and the foundation for a Western defense union against the East." Frankfurt's Allgemeine Zeitung expressed the opinion that "The idea of a united Europe had passed from a state of idealistic hope to urgent necessity forced upon us by political and economic developments. From this point of view, the Schuman Plan had to be considered the first practical step in the economic field to bring about union and uniformity in Europe." The Allgemeine declared that the time for narrow-minded interests had gone and no single national state, but the whole of Europe, was at stake. Another Hessian paper, the Frankfurter Rundschau sanctioned the signing of the pact only on an economic basis on which the "European Council in Strasbourg can develop from a debating club into an effective political instrument . . ." However, "whether April 18, 1951 will be celebrated in the future as the birthday of the United States of Europe, will depend not only on the Plan's ratification by the parliaments of the member states in six months' time, but on the practical economic operation of the coal and steel union." It would be years before "the Plan can be in full operation. But as Jean Monnet said, 'to overcome the obstructing frontiers in Europe, it is necessary now to put heart and mind to realization of this plan.'"
Finally, the Munich Sueddeutsche Zeitung emphasized the importance of the German diplomats in forging European union, and the Offenbach Post

predicted that Europe would get a complete face lifting if it succeeded in fulfilling the economic and political promises of the Plan.

Germany thus joined the European Coal and Steel Community with the great aim of European unity in mind. This goal was agreed upon by all parties, (except, perhaps, for the Communist Party) though there were differences of opinion as to the methods of achieving such a unity.

The CDU defined the treaty as a first step towards agreement between Germany and France, as a cornerstone for an economic and political union of 'the Six', and as a core for a greater Europe including Scandinavia and the United Kingdom, which would be open also to the German and European eastern areas which were under Soviet domination. That was the aim that led the government parties in Bonn to vote for the Schuman Plan. This decision helped create the structure and the constitution of a truly supranational organization dedicated to the preservation of economic freedom and to the fostering of economic expansion in the coal and steel industries. Within the framework of the Schuman Plan was created a European federation in one small area, that is, within a limited economic sector.

This was just the beginning according to the CDU. Progress could not end with the Coal and Steel Community, but had to be expanded to include the whole sphere of economy. This meant the extension of unifying institutions to include goods and services, money and capital and workers and individuals. Economics Minister Erhard said that Europe should not be considered a sum of partial plans, but that the first necessary political step of a partial integration in one sector had to be followed by an organic economic union. Thus the European Community for Coal and Steel was to be

superseded by the institution of a genuine common market without national barriers, with freely convertible currencies and full freedom of action for human beings, goods and capital. That, to Erhard, was the program for the future. Only this organic unity, he believed, could provide a healthy foundation for the political union of the nations of East and West Europe.

Here, then, was the key to the next step, that of military and political unification. The Treaty of the Coal and Steel Community was for the CDU only a step towards a more comprehensive integration of Europe, since the close interconnection of the basic industries with other sections of the economic system, and supranational control over important fields of national economies raised problems which could be solved only by further integration. In the same way, difficult political problems were raised by suggestions for a European Defence Community, problems which, like those in the economic field, could be solved only through the increased integration of Europe into a tighter political unit.

III

The most controversial issue brought up in the Bundesthaus during its first four years was the treaty to establish the European Defence Community. The debate that raged over the pros and cons of the treaty was extremely bitter, and Dr. Adenauer was forced to face a barrage of questions from the opposition within Germany and from foreign sceptics outside Germany. The Chancellor was thus in the unenviable position of trying to play down foreign fears of German rearmament by reassuring other nations of Germany's good intentions. At the same time, he had to avoid at home the charge that he was sacrificing German interests by not demanding for the Federal Republic

complete equality with other nations. The same set of questions had to be answered in two different ways without offense to either questioner and without contradiction. Would the Germans stick with the West, or would they play one side against the other? Would Germany provoke a war to recover her Eastern territories? Would German militarism in politics be recreated and would the Army again become the principal school of the nation, or could civilian control over the armed forces be guaranteed? How would the German officers be selected, and could ex-officers be psychologically integrated with the West? What of the wearing of war decorations; which all bore the swastika? These and many other questions were hurled across the floor of the Bundestag and across the frontier from France.

Within the Bundestag, Dr. Adenauer had almost complete support from his own party and from the coalition. After the deflection of Dr. Heinemann, the Christian Democrat Minister of the Interior until his resignation in 1952 on the issue of rearmament, there was no serious trouble within the parliamentary ranks of the Government. The CDU, and the other coalition parties, stood firm on the demand that Germany must be rearmed, if only as a necessary evil. The war material, and the morale derived from rearmament, would be an important factor in the security of Germany-and the West - from Russia. The CDU would not admit that a third world war was inevitable, but asserted that only by negotiation based on preparedness could it be avoided.

The European Defence Community was the only means of creating this state of preparedness, argued the CDU, and was another step along the road to complete European union. Secure in the knowledge that the treaty was exclusively defensive, the Christian Democrats considered the integration of

the human and material elements of a six-nation defense force the most appropriate means of reaching the goal of securing Europe against aggression, and the means which was the quickest and most efficient. Such an integration, they argued, would certainly result in the most rational and economic use of the resources of the six participating nations as a result, especially, of the establishments of a common budget and of common armament programs.

Furthermore, the CDU insisted that military forces would be created without any detriment to spiritual and moral values, (1) since it would be a common army constituted without any discrimination among the partners, since it would accomplish a considerable weakening of national patriotisms, and since it was a new and essential step on the road to the formation of a united Europe. Here was an opportunity to accomplish at one stroke a strengthening of Europe militarily, a lightening of the bonds of common purpose, and a destruction of nationalistic hatreds and prejudices. By co-operating with Nato, the EDC might, in time, enlarge the European Community, and such an accomplishment was nothing if not moral. Despite the military advantages accruing from such a union, there were thus many other possible advantages to be secured from it.

It was from a military standpoint, however, that the treaty was primarily considered. There was still a great deal of danger from Russia and her satellites, and a capable defence force had to be organized as quickly as possible. The conception of an army with common training and weapons, a common uniform and a common allegiance was popular with the CDU

(1) In answer to attacks from Pastor Niemoeller, a German pacifist who gained fame for his opposition to Hitler, and who has insisted that all kinds of German armies were always irresponsible and immoral.

because it meant that such a defence force would be created on an efficient basis. Under a united command and tied up with Nato, the EDC could not fail to be a bulwark against any possible Soviet aggression. As Adenauer said, the Western Allies had to win the first battle for Europe if Europe was to survive, and such a victory would be the prevention of any battle at all, through a show of strength that would discourage Russia from attacking.

Herr Blank, the minister for EDC affairs, argued that German participation in a European defence system could help provide security for Germany, and that the only logical method of rearming Germany without arousing the anxiety of her neighbors was through the EDC. The German 'Kommis' - that widely known and feared militaristic state of mind which characterized the German army - had to be abolished, and it could best be abolished only through a supranational organization such as the EDC. Only through such an organization, Blank insisted, could 'Wehrdienst' be reestablished without 'Kommis', that is, could military service be re-instituted without the old spirit of militarism. Blank saw the EDC, therefore, first as a means of insuring that once the German youth was put back into uniform it would not return to the old military traditions, and secondly as a means of re-assuring Germany's neighbors that such would be the case, because the treaty provided for an international army and not merely national armies under one command.

Adenauer stated the basis of his party's stand on the European Defence Community when he said:

" . . . nationalism which has been the cause of so many catastrophes must be overcome. We must place the life of the European nation on an absolutely new basis of co-operation in great practical tasks in order to safeguard peace and make Europe once again a factor in politics and economic affairs. The EDC holds a key position in the

plans for a European integration. It is not only the essential prerequisite for peace in Europe and for protecting the growing new Europe, but it is also a touchstone for mutual confidence among the partners of this community." (1)

Along with the EDC Treaty, the Bonn Treaty was also debated. The contractual agreements formally terminating the occupation of Western Germany and restoring sovereignty to the Federal Republic were signed in Bonn on May 24, 1953, by Dr. Adenauer, Mr. Eden, M. Schuman and Mr. Acheson. The treaty comprised a series of documents which included a Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic; a Memorandum on "The Principles governing the Relationship between the Allied Kommandatura and Greater Berlin"; a Convention on "the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation"; a Convention on Finance; a Convention on the "Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic"; a Charter relating to the Arbitration Tribunal; and a Declaration by the German Federal Government on aid to Berlin.

This Treaty, which was in actuality a pre-peace treaty, liquidated the state of war between Germany and the Western Allies. The CDU agreed with the Social Democrats in that such a treaty was somewhat of a contradiction since it embraced only one half of Germany and because it was created by an alliance to which only a part of Germany could for the time being adhere. Nevertheless, the CDU accepted the Paris and Bonn Treaties on this basis in order to permit West Germany to enter the European Community so that the reunited Germany of the future would not live in isolation, dominated and encircled by the world's Great Powers.

The debate on the EDC brought out with all its force the

(1) Bulletin: October 29, 1953.

uncompromising stand of the CDU that Germany must in no case be neutral or independent in Europe. Adenauer and his party would listen to no suggestion that would leave the Federal Republic outside the Western system of defence. German inclusion was the only means of insuring that Germany would not become the plaything of the great powers and was the best method of solving the Franco-German problem.

The Soviet proposal in March 1952 for a free, independent Germany was vigorously opposed by German official opinion. The Government was suspicious, to begin with, of what exactly the Russians meant by 'freedom' and 'democracy', and feared that all Germany might become a Russian satellite. Furthermore, Adenauer realized that the Russians had made East Germany as tough a morsel to swallow as they possibly could. The newly-founded Bundesrepublik might have been thrown into considerable confusion by the sudden contact with the hard corps of fully trained and indoctrinated Bereitschaften from the East. The Soviets also mentioned nothing about the eastern territories beyond the Oder-Neisse, and the CDU refused to accept Polish hegemony there. But above all, if Germany was neutral and all occupation forces were withdrawn, Soviet forces would have to fall back only fifty miles, whereas Nato troops, and especially the Americans, would have to withdraw from Europe entirely.

Heinrich von Brentano, the Federal Republic's minister to the Council of Europe, insisted that when the EDC was in operation, Germany would achieve an equal position with the free nations of the world. "We must be willing to tie in our lot with them, especially since that is the best way to end the isolation of Germany which is a bitter inheritance of a bad past." (1) Above all, neutrality could not be considered because

(1) Entscheidung Fuer Deutschland: p. 34.

then the position of Germany would become more dangerous than ever. Germany could not become the extra little weight that might, in a moment of crisis, tip one side of the scale or the other and thus destroy the delicate balance of power. The Bundesrepublik had to choose its sides, and not wait until the tension became so great that her decision could cause a world war. He did not want Germany to be even indirectly the cause of World War III, especially when an immediate decision could assure a stronger Western united front against the Russians, and thereby further the chances of a peaceful settlement of the East - West conflict.

Naturally, Brentano added, the Germans wanted complete sovereignty, but the status quo was acceptable for the time being, thanks to the co-operation of the Western powers, until the Potsdam decision was completely reversed. The CDU favored, then, taking a chance on the sincerity of the West, and accepting the EDC before complete equal rights were accorded her. In the face of the charge that limitations on the right of complete self-determination constituted a violation of the democratic principle, and that Germany had therefore to be completely equal with her proposed partners before she accepted the idea of a united Europe, the CDU stood firm on its belief that equal rights could be better and more quickly obtained by the immediate embrace of unifying institutions. In spite of the fact, therefore, that Germany would have, at first, no membership in Nato, which controlled the EDC, and therefore in spite of the fact that Germany would have little say on the ultimate handling of her own troops, the CDU was not discouraged. It was Adenauer's belief that the Western treaty partners would not take advantage of Germany's lack of a voice in the councils of Nato, and that no important or far-reaching decisions would be taken on the disposal of German troops without consultation with the German Government. The CDU did not agree, then, with the Opposition that

Germany would be discriminated against by her brothers-in-arms.

This willingness on the part of the CDU to sacrifice was brought about by their conviction that Germany had an important part to play in the realisation of what they considered to be a great ideal. One day, the CDU asserted, it would be Germany's historical and geographical task to help re-establish spiritual and cultural ties between East and West. But this day would come, they added, only when the Kremlin changed its tactics, removed border restrictions, reduced its giant military machine, liberalized the great amount of centralization in the USSR and democratized public life. Until then, there could be no bridge, in Germany, between East and West.

Yet Germany did not have to be a battleground. Another war was not inevitable just because there was no break in the East-West split. One means of preventing that was to integrate West Germany into the Western partnership. As soon as the European Army was ready, the Russians wouldn't risk an invasion since there would be a chance that they might lose. However, when German soldiers entered the European Army, the base of the existing defence line would have to be moved east of the Rhine valley to the West-German frontier, for if the whole of Western Germany and West Berlin was not to be defended, then there could be no moral justification for the existence of German contingents. If this precondition could be assured, the Christian Democratic Party looked to the European Defence Community as a means of securing peace, saving European culture and creating a new Europe which could once again make valuable contributions to the economic, political and cultural affairs of the world.


The Christian Democratic Union could not understand the argument of the Social Democrats that all Europe and not only the 'six' had to be

included in any defense organisation before Germany agreed to join. The CDU argued that the integration of the six participating nations could not be considered a 'minor solution' to Europe's defense problems since the proposed unit contained one hundred and sixty million people. Furthermore, the Scandinavian countries and Great Britain promised to co-operate as much as they could with the EDC if it came into existence. Considering that the door would be left open for these nations to join if and when they pleased, and considering that these nations were not hostile to any military integration, the CDU could not see why their exclusion should mean that no integration should take place at all. The need for some sort of integration on a military level was evident because of the desire to include Germany and yet insure against a rebirth of German militarism. Why, then, wait until it was too late and the Russian armies were advancing into Germany? To prevent the creation of a European army with that argument was to the CDU mere bickering, and could only lead, if successful, to the dangerous weakening of western strength and common purpose.

The question also came up in the Bundeshaus on the constitutionality of the EDC treaty. The Opposition argued that since the Basic Law of the Federal Republic stated that the Federal Republic should have no military forces, the constitution would have to be changed before the EDC treaty could be ratified. The CDU, on the other hand, found constitutionality for their actions in presenting the Treaty as legislation in Article 24 of the Basic Law or Grundgesetz. This article states:

" 1) The Federation may, by legislation, transfer sovereign powers to international institutions.

2) In order to preserve peace, the Federation may join a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to those limitations of its sovereign powers which will bring about and secure



a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world.

3) For the settlement of international disputes, the Federation will join in a general, comprehensive, obligatory system of international arbitration."

On the basis of this article, the Christian Democrats claimed that they had a legal right to go ahead with their plans to ratify the EDC Treaty without first making any changes in the Constitution.

The CDU also saw West-German membership in the EDC as the best means of reuniting Germany. They did not agree, with the SPD, that reunification had to come first since close ties between West Germany and the Western Allies would provoke the Russians and prevent reunification. The Christian Democrats argued that the strategic military position of Eastern Germany alone would not allow the Russians to part with it unless the West was strong enough to bargain effectively with Russia. The importance strategically of the eastern sector was pointed out by the fact that Russia could, from the island of Ruegen and the Mecklenburg coast, overpower Denmark (as long as Sweden and Finland remained neutral) and gain an access to the Atlantic Ocean for her submarines. Should the West take possession through unification, the permanent threat to Denmark would be alleviated, and the West could be secure in the Baltic.

Furthermore, if the Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Germany were to withdraw after reunification to where the wide gauge railroad tracks of the USSR meet the narrow gauge European tracks, that is, at the edge of the Pripet marshes which is the traditional Russo-European boundary, there would be a great deal less danger of Russian attack. The need of changing over from one railroad to another would make supply problems a great deal more difficult, and would slow up any attack. In addition, with the Russians

further to the east, there would be far less pressure on Europe and the Balkans. Such strategic losses, the CDU argued, would prevent the Russians from yielding East Germany to a weak and ineffective Europe. Only by creating a stronger Germany and a stronger Europe through military integration first, could the Russians be anywhere nearly persuaded to consent to the reunification of Germany.

By alignment with the West, the CDU said, the Federal Republic secured the Bonn Conventions and the promise of the Western powers to support reunification. The fact that the Western powers promised to act in the spirit of the conventions even before they ratified them proved to the CDU that "here alone was sufficient proof that the integration of Europe and the reunification of Germany are parts of one policy and cannot be designated as alternatives. The Western powers will support German reunification at any Four Power Conference and any agreement at such a Four Power Conference will have German acquiescence." (1) Since a policy of vacillation between East and West would result in decisions of the Big Four being made without such German acquiescence, the CDU insisted that the Federal Republic must pursue European integration first, because Russia could be dealt with only by a united Europe.

In the Bundestag debates in May of 1953, when the EDC treaty was under discussion, Herr Ollenhauer of the SPD accused the CDU of right wing reaction. He said they were hiding behind the European flag the fact that social security had not yet been obtained in Germany, and that it must precede any plans for re-armament. The CDU replied that the workers in

(1) Dr. Otto Lenz: Bulletin: July 9, 1953.

Germany were well off and that conditions, moreover, were still improving. In any case, the SPD argument that communism would spread in West Germany if better economic conditions were not forthcoming were false because the German troops under the EDC would be a safeguard against any internal disturbance. (1) There could be no internal security, the CDU argued, without external security, just as the reverse was true, so it was necessary to work towards both at the same time. Since the German populace was still comparatively well-off, there was no reason to fear the cost of rearmament which Minister of Finance Fritz Schaeffer claimed would not be much more than the cost of supporting the occupation in any case. (2)

The principal need for a European Defence Community, besides security against Russia, was that it was another step towards solving the Franco-German problem on a friendly basis. For that reason, asserted the CDU, they would work towards a settlement of Franco-German problems as quickly as possible. Placing more faith in the sincerity of the French Government than the Opposition, which insisted that the Saar be returned to Germany and that the additional French protocols to the EDC be rescinded before ratification of the Treaty, the Government went ahead with their plans for ratification before complete agreement with France on these questions was reached. Adenauer defended his action by assuring the electorate during the 1953 election campaign that a settlement for the Saar could be reached, perhaps on a European basis, and that the French additional protocols were harmless since they did not alter the texts of the treaties themselves which had already been signed; they could not contradict the

(1) Hans Seehoem: Minister of Transport, in Heidelberg May 1, 1953; in Deutschland, Sozialer Rechstaat im Geeinten Europa, 1953.

(2) Fritz Schaeffer: Federal Minister of Finance.

treaties and therefore need not be feared.

At the Rome Conference (February 24-25, 1953) Dr. Adenauer expressed concern lest the additional protocols proposed by the French Government in order to meet opposition at home, would mean the elimination of German equality in the six-nation defence community. Any such change, he feared, would jeopardize the basic internationalist conception of the whole project. When the French protocols were discussed at Rome however, neither Adenauer nor the representatives of the other four treaty partners found any objection to the French amendments to articles 13 and 43. Under article 13, France wanted her overseas interests to be recognized and with that recognition she wanted the right to withdraw troops from the EDC in case of crisis in her overseas possessions, without the permission of the supreme commander. Under article 43, she wanted the right to keep the same voting ratio even if French troops are withdrawn, since the number of votes accruing to each partner depends on the number of troops each has placed under the EDC.

Dr. Adenauer's great desire to get the EDC ratified at all costs, and even to sacrifice in order to get France to accept the Treaty was, perhaps, borne out by his actions at Rome. Fearing that any further delay might kill or seriously harm the European unifying spirit, and that as a result the EDC would fail, the Bundeskanzler was prepared to go to any reasonable lengths to placate the French. If the Treaty did fail, then, it would be obvious to the world that the Federal Republic, at least, did all it could to achieve success, and that the entire blame lay with France.

On March 24th, one month after the conference at Rome, Dr. Adenauer replied to queries on his actions in Rome that his decision showed the firm desire of Germany and of all the EDC partners:

"to bring the Defence Community to life, to consider the justified wishes of all partners and to agree to them as far as is compatible

with the wording and the sense of the agreement. More than ever can we hope today that the French Parliament will ratify the treaty, now that the wishes of the French Government have been fulfilled. There is no doubt that the other four partner states will agree to the Treaty."

At the same time, Adenauer again expressed the fear of further delay in case it would hurt the chances of the EDC being ratified at all. First of all, if the EDC project collapsed, he said, the United States might revert to some sort of peripheral strategy in its anti-communist defence arrangements, which would mean the withdrawal of men from and perhaps even the slackening of aid to the continent of Europe. Europe could not fend for herself, Adenauer admitted, and therefore a maximum of co-operation with the United States had to be preserved. And secondly, without the EDC the great opportunity to achieve a real Franco-German rapprochement and a permanent community between the two might be forever lost. More important to world peace and security than twelve German divisions could ever be, Adenauer saw a French-German union as a nucleus which could create and build around it a community of nations whose military strength would reflect a moral, inner strength of purpose.

"We avow with a warm heart our desire to create an independent and free Germany which will co-operate in the peaceful development of the world because we embrace peace and now we, by ourselves, are not able to preserve it; because we desire a whole and a reunified Germany which cannot be achieved by ourself alone but only with the co-operation of good friends; because we desire freedom which certainly will be destroyed if all freedom loving people do not unite; and finally because we desire the one Europe which will be created by these treaties which are the pillars and foundation of a European community."

"We say yes because we are convinced that on the day when all the others say their yes too, and particularly on the day when not only economic and military interests lead us together but also an awareness that there is a necessity of a common future, a new epoch for our Europe will begin. Therefore we say yes without any preconditions, without any distrust and without any limitations." (1)

(1) Entscheidung Fuer Deutschland: Heinrich von Brentano, p. 35.

IV

Out of discussions within the Council of Europe developed the concept of a European Political Community. The Foreign Ministers of 'the six' met in Baden-Baden (August 6-7, 1952) and drew up a statement favoring the establishment of a community of sovereign states which would have supranational powers. Realizing that a common European economic policy and a mutually shared European defense system could only be stages on the road to a European Community, the Federal Republic of Germany participated actively in all endeavours for the creation of a European Political Community.

"The Federal Government", said Adenauer "not only regards the European Community as an essential form of future living together of the European people on the basis of law and order, it sees in this community not only the framework for its own military security and its general economic development, but it considers the European community the prerequisite for the constitution of a lasting social level which will decisively improve the living conditions of millions of people." (1)

The CDU looked on the EPC as the only logical method of preserving the legal rights and the fundamental freedoms of mankind. The development of common economic policies, common defence policies and common political institutions was the ultimate aim of the German Christian Democrats. This aim applied not only to the present six participating states, but to all free peoples who wished to join. Such a complete federation might take time, they admitted, but as more and more functional institutions were created, sovereignty would be sloughed off and Europe would be ready for complete union.

The Christian Democratic Union, therefore, staunchly supported

(1) Adenauer: Bulletin: October 29, 1953.

all efforts which lead to this concept of a political union, first with the Schuman Plan, then with the EDC and then with a federal constitution for Europe. They placed this aim before German reunification, before German equality and before many other German interests. Above all, the CDU wished to restore Germany to her rightful place of influence in the world, but within the Community of Western Europe.

"Today", Adenauer wrote before the 1953 federal elections, "many observers view the process of European integration almost exclusively from military considerations and in relation to the threat from the East. This assessment is only partly doing justice to the problem. There certainly exists a threat (210 Russian and Russian Satellite divisions). This constant threat has had its influence upon the intellectual and material forces in Europe. It would be a great mistake to assume that it was the cause of the movement of European unification.

"As a result of two world wars the economic and political situation of Europe has suffered a marked decline. In the pre-1914 world, the Europe of powerful and highly developed states led in every respect. Today it has been surpassed economically and militarily by at least two great powers, which came into being as a consequence of the unification of great areas.

"It may hurt our pride, but we have to own that none of the European states of today would by itself be able to ensure prosperity and freedom for its citizens and adequately to protect the national territory. The necessity of a unification on economic and political grounds, to which considerations of military policy must be added, is indisputable. This unification is the logical and the natural stage of development in European history. Even after an easing of the present East-West tensions it remains an imperative necessity." (1)

(1) Dr. Adenauer: Bulletin: May 21, 1953.

CHAPTER III

The Attitude of the Other Parties in the Government Coalition

The parties which have joined the CDU/CSU in the government coalition are the Frei Demokratische Partei, which stands to the right of the CDU/CSU, the Deutsche Partei, which is a little more right wing yet, and the Gesamtdeutscher Block which, as the refugee party, is a little more left wing than is the CDU/CSU union. Although the Gesamtdeutscher Block was not organized until after the 1949 elections and was hence not sitting as a party in the Bundestag, it played some part in influencing the debate on the Coal and Steel and EDC treaties through individual members who represented the party in the Bundestag; therefore its position will be considered with that of the others.

The Free Democratic Party was the largest of the smaller parties, having forty-eight members in the Bundestag after the 1953 election. The principal election arguments of the FDP pointed to a working towards German unity, European unification and international economic liberty. The Party asserted that a country which is a beggar cannot survive and therefore Europe's nations had to unite into a society of free peoples. This opinion was expressed in conjunction, however, with a strong desire for the preservance of the German national dignity within a greater Europe.

Dr. Herman Schaefer, the chairman of the party and minister without portfolio in Adenauer's cabinet, accused the SPD of pure factious opposition without giving any constructive ideas. He suggested that it was easy to criticize the EDC and Bonn treaties, which certainly were not the high point of perfection, but that it was not so easy to suggest better ideas, since the idea was sound even if the odd article might be weak. Schaefer said that he

supported the EDC treaties because they were a pre-peace treaty, they were an attempt to end the occupation and thus in fact end hostilities, and because they would create a supranational organization which would establish securely the young Republic. Contrary to Herr Ollenhauer, he felt that external security must be achieved before internal security is possible.

"If other states are protecting us, we must also contribute to our own security. Security can only be achieved by co-operation between all nations of Western Europe. This is not a hindrance to the reunification of Germany. The division of Germany has been caused not by Germany but by the split between East and West, and we must do all we can to prevent the iron curtain from becoming a Chinese wall, splitting Germany forever." (1)

But without the Coal and Steel Community and the Defence Community there would be no possibility of reuniting Germany because Germany would not be strong enough to force a Soviet diplomatic retreat.

Schaefer considered the proposals of the SPD as merely an idea to reestablish the old system of alliances, which, he said, were not sufficient to meet the problems of the day. Europe was therefore to be united through the establishment of supranational organizations. He saw the SPD fear of the financial burdens of such organizations as nonsense, asserting that the cost of EDC would be no more expensive than the costs of the occupation. Furthermore, he deplored the delay involved over constitutional arguments which he considered mere bickering. Time, said Schaefer, was all important, since the original drive and spirit behind the European idea was faltering. The danger from the East was still serious, and there was a danger that procrastination in the West would kill interest in uniting Europe.

Finally, the FDP felt that fear of German militarism and power

(1) Entscheidung Fuer Deutschland p. 36 - Speeches in the Bundestag, March 19, 1953.

politics was nonsense. Germany, they said, was not the only aggressor in the past few centuries, the Germans were no different than anyone else, and the German 'Kommis' was as much a result of external as of internal pressure. In any case, Germany should not be responsible, the party insisted in the EDC debates, for ruining the idea of a defence community. If France wanted to defeat it, that was her business, but the responsibility for the defeat of the EDC would be great, and Germany must not be saddled with it.

Before leaving the FDP, it might be of interest to note a recent split in the party. One small group of the FDP under the leadership of Dr. Middlehauve came out strongly for a 'German program' which was a document which could be interpreted as extremely anti-democratic. Two statements in the Program are worth mentioning. One demanded that: "We must dissociate ourselves from all those judgements of the victor nations which discriminate against our people and especially against our soldiery." The other: "We intend to build up a German Reich in the form of a decentralized unity State." The surprising thing is that the word 'democratic' was omitted entirely from the Program. (1)

Also interesting was the statement of Dr. Mende in the Bundestag in June of 1952:

"If by the third reading of the (Paris and Bonn) treaties the problem of former German prisoners still held in and outside of Germany has not undergone a fundamental change, some deputies of the war generation in the Coalition parties will have to withhold their approval in spite of their fundamental agreement with the foreign policy of the Federal Government."

This development was very important since Dr. Middlehauve had been attempting to incorporate ex-Nazi's and servicemen's organizations in his faction with

(1) The World Today, Feb. 1953.

the intention of creating out of the FDP a large third party to the right of the SPD and the CDU. Such a development had a definite connection with plans for European unity when the Allies were making concessions for speedy German rearmament.

The Gesamtdeutscher Block, which is the second largest of the smaller parties with a membership of twenty-seven in the new Bundestag is the party which represents, for the most part, the refugees from East Germany. Hans-Gerd Froelich, the chairman of the party, and a refugee himself, supported the policy of the Federal Government in the belief that a strong Germany, with American help, ^{Bi:1 Gen. 17} may yet be able to retrieve her lost territories. (1)

Nevertheless, the GB felt that there were certain dangers in the treaties, and it was only after consultations with the High Commission and the CDU that the party decided, reluctantly it seems, to support them. In addition, Froelich attacked the additional French protocols and expressed the fear that France intended to nullify the treaty by watering it down. Froelich insisted that in the face of this danger, all German parties must rally to the support of the EDC in order to place any blame for the failure of European unity on the French, and not on the Germans.

The main reason the GB supported the EDC, it seems, was a fear that if Europe fails to unite, the Americans might refuse to assist or to grant aid to Europe in the future. Should the Americans fall back upon a peripheral defense, then Germany and all Europe would be open to Russian aggression. That had to be prevented at all costs.

The position of the Deutsche Partei was explained by its chairman,

(1) Entscheidung Fuer Deutschland: pp. 62-64.

Dr. Hans Joachim von Merkatz during the third reading of the EDC treaties in the Bundestag. (1) He stated that the East-West split had completely changed the world situation and now that the Allies have reversed their position as to Germany from what it was at Potsdam, the German Government should jump at the chance offered by events to rebuild German strength and rid Germany of the onerous occupation.

"In our position, further negotiations are to our own disadvantage . . . If there is too much negotiation and vacillation, foreigners will get the idea that Germany is against the treaties." Above all, no more time should be lost, lest the constructive idea in Europe die through delay.

Finally, external policy had to be free from the faction of internal political conflicts. Von Merkatz believed that the future of Germany must not be sacrificed to party politics. He accused the SPD of stalling the treaties in order to use them as debating planks in the coming election, and urged that no more time be wasted in placing Germany within Western union.

(1) Entscheidung Fuer Deutschland: p. 50.

CHAPTER IV

The Social Democratic Refusal to Sanction Government Policy for Europe

I

The Sozialdemocratische Partei Deutschlands, or the SPD, was as interested in achieving the unification of Europe as was the Christian Democratic Union. The Social Democrats were as impressed as the CDU with the growth of the world community economically and technologically and they recognized the growing need to organize this world community, at least in the European area, within a closer unit. The SPD, as a party that existed before 1914, had seen the devastation of two world wars each followed by the institution of elaborate organizations for the provision of peace and security. However, the SPD had also seen that these organizations could not give the peace and security that they promised to provide because of the failure of the member states to give up one iota of their fundamental freedom of action to the organization. With the world divided once again into power camps and with technological progress far outstripping social progress, the SPD recognized national sovereignties as the main stumbling block to the genuine achievement of peace. The best means of securing Europe against further political and economic disorders, they agreed, was by the sharing of mutual interests and institutions among the European nation-states.

In spite of this acceptance of the idea of European union and of the danger of unshackled nationalism, the platform of the Social Democratic Party was far more nationalistic than that of the Christian Democratic Union. The SPD demanded the ending of Allied controls and of the occupation

before Germany was brought into any European institutions. But the SPD insisted that this relaxation of restrictions must not come only on the condition that Germany join the European Defence Community and agree to the Bonn Convention. Germany must be given an opportunity to pursue an independent policy of co-operation, though not of co-ordination, with the West.

Furthermore, the SPD demanded that Germany be reunited before there was any participation of Germany whatsoever in the economic, political and military plans devised for united Europe. And finally, it was the SPD which, outside of the extreme German nationalists, was most outspoken against French rule in the Saar. The SPD insisted that the French get out of the Saar before Germany consent to sit down at a conference table with them to discuss policies of European integration.

There seems to be one possible explanation for this stand of the Social Democratic Party which professed to be internationalistic and indeed was very internationalist before 1932. The SPD learned an important lesson from its defeat by the rising nationalism in Germany during the late twenties and early thirties, a lesson which they learned from the tactics of Adolf Hitler and his National Socialists. In their early rush to support the spirit of internationalism, the SPD forgot about the strength of nationalistic forces and sentiments within their own country. Before they were aware of the danger, this latent force had been tapped by right wing groups who used it to shift all the blame for Versailles, reparations and the loss of the war from themselves onto the government in an attempt to wreck the government and the Republic. They were extremely successful, and the SPD in the first Bonn parliament seemed to be trying very hard to make sure that they were always in touch with this force of German nationalism.

Their internationalism was their undoing before 1932 and it appears that were determined not to allow such a situation to recur.

The Social Democrats had no fundamental objection, nor did they express any fundamental opposition, to the ideals and institutions of the Schuman Plan, of the Pleven Plan or of the plan for a European Political Community. The purposes and ideals behind these proposed instruments for integrating Europe more closely into a single unit were quite in line with the broad outlook of the SPD. In the opinion of the SPD, however, the proposals of the CDU in working towards the realization of the idea of European union were unacceptable for Germany. The Schuman Plan and the European Defence treaty would prevent, they said, rather than create, a united Europe. "Europe", insisted Kurt Schumacher, "will be created only on the fundamentals of freedom and equality of all mankind and of peoples. For these aims the SPD will fight." (1)

The only means of achieving a European unification which would be genuine and truly valuable, Schumacher continued, was by a different method than that proposed by the CDU. The ideal of European unification was acceptable to Schumacher, but only after the prerequisites demanded by the Social Democratic Party were granted.

The first of these prerequisites was that the basis and precondition of all schemes, such as the Schuman Plan and the EDC, must be the general political, legal and effective equality of each and every member of the organization with all the other members who were to be its partners. This of course meant the sovereign equality of Germany with France, Italy and the Benelux nations and the termination of Allied restrictions and the Allied

(1) Foreign Affairs: April 1953. p. 12.

occupation in Germany.

Secondly, Schumacher demanded that any union of any kind be a true European union. By this he meant the inclusion in all federative schemes of the whole of Western Europe, including Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries. He refused to agree to the initial unification of what he called a "minor Europe of the clerical, conservative and cartelian capitalism." (1) Third, and in connection with this last point, an overall European planning on the basis of the particular national economies was necessary, and attempts to deliver the German basic industries to the control of capital were to be blocked. The individuals within the union were not to be the instruments of the capitalists.

Fourth, representation in all international institutions had to be accorded to the members on the basis of their individual significance and effectiveness without privileging or discriminating against any one member.

Fifth, Schumacher looked towards an international democratic parliament as the source and architect of all economic military and political decisions within Western Europe. In addition the executive board of this parliament was to be controlled by and dependent on parliament alone.

The sixth prerequisite was the preservance and development of the existing economic sources of power including the organization of the economies of the participating nations, without discrimination or protection by the means of power policy. In this way, nationalistic aims would be

(1) Ibid: p. 12.

defeated because of the inability of one government or group to secure for themselves the benefits of strong economies which would be necessary to the assertion of dictatorial powers. Seventh, Schumacher demanded that the working people bound up within any economic unit be assured equal rights of determination in the social interests, in the order, and in the leadership of the economy. In this way, the establishment of the social security of the working classes in the Federal Republic of Germany would be a prerequisite to the inclusion of the Federal Republic in any unifying schemes for Europe.

Since the inclusion of western Germany in any European defence scheme implies a question of strategy with which the Federal Republic would naturally be intimately concerned, as she would likely be the battle-ground in any future conflagration, Schumacher demanded the same amount of security for the Federal Republic as for all the other members of the defence system. This meant to Schumacher the guarantee by the Western powers in Nato of the borders of Western Germany including, of course, the boundaries of Berlin.

The final, and the most important prerequisite to German participation in European union, was to Schumacher the re-unification of Germany. He considered the position of Germany unique amongst the other powers interested in union, since it was split in two.

"The reunification of Germany is the first national problem for us and we have to require that the occupation powers create as the precondition of any European treaty the reunification of Germany by agreements or negotiations. We cannot bind ourselves to the West without realizing that the U.S.S.R. is an occupying power and that therefore we need a certain amount of freedom to determine when we should become active in securing re-unification. We must not be dependent on the proposed Western treaty partners for reunification." (1)

(1) 1953 Das Jahr der Entscheidung: p. 32.

The SPD was disappointed that from the beginning, in 1949, the party was not allowed to co-operate in formulating the external policy of the Federal Republic. The SPD refused, in 1953, to send a delegate to accompany Adenauer on his trip to Washington. Adenauer's invitation was turned down because the SPD felt that if they were to co-operate with Adenauer at that time, it would mean that they had tacitly accepted as sound his policies before 1953, which they could not do. Ollenhauer stated that a bipartisan policy was impossible as the CDU had committed themselves to certain policies with which the SPD could never agree. (1)

Although the SPD desired to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union and to pursue a settlement of the cold war through negotiations on the part of the great powers around a conference table, it also realized that the communist threat could only be met by a strong and united free world. The SPD claimed that as a workers party, it was particularly qualified in the fight against the communists. Without the SPD, they added, Western Germany would already have been sacrificed to the communist idea, since the SPD platform offered the worker a better alternative than communism in the alignment against capitalism. The SPD saved Germany from communism by taking votes from them as was not done by the French or Italian socialists. This, they claimed, was a far greater contribution to European defense than German divisions could ever be.

Thus the communist threat could be defeated only by economic strength and not by military strength. The SPD felt that it was more important to win over the working man, that the workers had to be convinced that an alliance

(1) Ibid: p. 8.

with the West was to their advantage, or they might turn to the lucrative promises of the East. The socialists felt therefore that military and financial contributions from Germany would lower the German standard of living below the minimum needed to support the people properly. Communism could be better fought by Germany with a high standard of living than with a standing army.

"The Social Democratic Party knows the mortal danger of Soviet policies to all Europe. Today the instrument of these policies is the cold war. The free world must win in this cold war because it is the only way to prevent a new world catastrophe. The rearmament of Germany as planned does not further matters; rather does it endanger the goal because it threatens to paralyse the most effective defence contribution of the Federal Republic in the cold war, namely the consolidation of the democratic powers of resistance by policies of social justice." (1)

The Social Democrats claimed that they, too, realized the danger of nationalism and that the SPD in accepting the ideals of the free world, had taken a stand against the nationalistic tendencies in Germany and in Europe. They agreed that nationalism had become anachronistic in modern Europe and asserted that only within a broader structure could the destructive force caused by self-interest be disarmed. Wider loyalties on an economic, political and cultural basis in a united Europe was the SPD's answer to nationalism.

One of the main reasons for the opposition of the SPD to the foreign policy of the CDU, according to Erich Ollenhauer, (2) was that the government had considered the question of the position of Germany in the world as one thing and the question of the reunification of Germany as

(1) Kurt Schumacher: Action Program of the SPD, p. 11.

(2) 1953 Das Jahr der Entscheidung, p. 24.

another thing. This dualism of the government meant that there could be no German initiative in the re-establishment of a unified Germany. This was true, according to Ollenhauer, because if Germany became entangled in a European union before German reunification was achieved, the initiative to bargain with Russia would be a collective one, one with which Russia might not wish to bargain. In this connection, the SPD insisted that the CDU must not rush headlong into the arms of the West because it could act for the peoples of the East as if it were already the Government of all Germany. The socialists, who expected a great majority of the votes in the East sector, had been demanding that free all German elections be held and after the Schuman Plan was ratified, they demanded that the East Germans be allowed to vote on it as soon as they were again united with Western Germany.

"German unity in freedom and peace", said Schumacher, "is the great national goal of this day as seen by the Social Democratic Party. The Party will fight against attempts to integrate any part of Germany with other nations in advance of German reunification. We count the greater community. But community to us means community first with the inhabitants of the Soviet zone of occupation and of the Saar." (1)

The basis of the SPD's attack on the European idea as pursued by the CDU then, was the fear that West German participation in these plans would hamper and defeat all efforts to reunify Germany. The SPD said that it would rather see a Four Power Conference on Germany but without any attempt by the Western Big Three to make the Soviets promise to allow Germany to be included in a Western Union. Under that sort of arrangement, said the SPD, there would be no successful conference and no reunification.

Even if the SPD stood ideologically on the side of the West, it

(1) Schumacher: Bundestag Speech, Bonn, July 28, 1952.

emphasized the importance of achieving for Germany an independent policy, that is, complete freedom to make decisions in external affairs. Even the recognition that the Western World and their successes in the fight against totalitarianism were important to Germany could not overrule the German right of free will and recognition. (1) Thus the SPD wanted an independent right to realize their own destiny - even if they realized that their destiny lay with the West. While the Christian Democrats were pushing co-ordination with the West, the Social Democrats favored co-operation. Co-operation meant for the SPD that Germany would be an independent force in Europe, in a position to be a bridge between East and West. But this could not be done if "Germany is sold in advance to the Western pact system." (2)

On the other hand, the SPD refused to support the neutralization of Germany as well as her state of political uncertainty between the East and West. (3) The SPD said that Germany must be independent, but not neutral, for by German neutrality the Soviets would gain the trump card which they had been seeking. According to the SPD, the Party recognized the necessity of a common defence of the West with German participation in the future system of defence, and since the Germans wished to defend their freedom, any thought of a neutral Germany was impossible. But the SPD added that although they supported this stand, they did not want Germany to side with one side or the other. To the SPD, apparently, no contradiction seemed to be evident in these statements.

(1) Barzal R.: Die Deutschen Parteien, p. 156.

(2) Germany in Europe: An SPD View: Carlo Schmid in Foreign Affairs, July 1952.

(3) Rainer Barzal: Die Deutschen Parteien, pp. 157-8.

Again re-emphasizing the need for a unified Europe, the SPD said that it was working towards a United States of Europe, but that Europe should be a democratic and socialistic federation of European states. The SPD wanted a socialist Germany within a socialist Europe. But a socialist Europe meant to them a Europe with equal rights for all her members. Because of the lack of equal rights for Germany in the Council of Europe, the Schuman Plan and the European Defence Community, the SPD turned thumbs down to all three organizations. Thus, although the SPD claimed it was internationalist and was convinced that the problems of all nations were interdependent, it insisted that nationalism could not be conquered by sacrificing German equality in international organizations.

An important part of the SPD's foreign policy was the belief that measures to liquidate the past and measures to help build new foundations for the coexistence of nations should be kept strictly apart. "Otherwise the political institutions which are to support the European nations in the future will be constructed out of old materials, yesterday will control tomorrow, and what was planned in good faith as new will turn out to be simply old and ominous elements in a new disguise." (1) Thus although the Schuman Plan and the EDC were represented as the nucleus of a new Europe, the SPD asked whether it could be seriously believed that institutions of this kind should be developed on the principle of how to prevent Germany by verbal prohibition or by actual discriminatory measures from damaging her neighbors or from fully developing her own economic potentialities. If so, then European institutions would be nothing but the ways and means of old power politics in new form.

(1) Germany and Europe: An SPD View: by Carlo Schmid in Foreign Affairs, July, 1952.

If the other European nations wished to base their policies on a suspicion of Germany, that was their privilege, and they could not be blamed for it. But, asserted the SPD, those who declared their intention of building a European Community on the basis of a partnership with the Germans had also to accept its conditions and consequences. The primary prerequisite would be the courage to establish political relations with Germany based on confidence. If this was too much, declared the SPD, then European projects would have to wait. All the partners in a united Europe had to share equally the burdens as well as the privileges, and it was mandatory that the organizations within the union be based on the principles of equal risks and equal opportunities.

As was mentioned above, the attitude of the SPD towards France, especially in regard to the Saar question was not too friendly. The SPD was infuriated by the setting up of an independent Saar government under M. Hoffman whom they considered to be a French puppet. The banning of the pro-German Saar Democratic Party and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Paris and Saarbruecken made the attitude of the SPD even less conciliatory. The Social Democrats declared that the actions of France concerning the Saar in 1952 were taken in total disregard of the promises made by Schuman, in a letter written to Adenauer and attached to the Coal and Steel Treaty, assuring Germany that the German acceptance of the treaty would in no way prejudice Germany's position in the Saar. (1)

See the European Defence Community Treaty, published by The Office of the U.S. Special Representative in Europe.

This was yet another reason, stated the SPD, why Germany should not have ratified the EDC treaty. Advantage would be taken of Germany under that treaty just as under the Schuman Plan. If Germany had equal rights with France, such a situation could not have arisen. France had, by her action, displayed her lack of faith in the organizations which she herself proposed.

The SPD did not agree that a European solution should be attempted in the manner that the CDU had suggested, and refused to accept the thesis of the CDU that matters would be helped by the admittance of the Saar into the Council of Europe. This merely created, to the SPD way of thinking, another small nation in Europe, a nation which would be created out of a territory that the SPD demanded be returned sine qua non to the Federal Republic before the Federal Republic got any more involved in Europeanization. Otherwise, they predicted that the Saar might become, in ten years, an abscess which could have the same fatal effects on German democracy and world peace as had Danzig before 1937.

Whether or not all of these conditions were met, the SPD would not have considered joining a European federation which did not include Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries. The SPD also cautioned against ratifying the economic and military treaties while these areas remained outside the new institutions to be created for fear of creating division in the West.

"The Social Democratic Party opposes the plans for a conservative and capitalist federation of the miniature Europe of the six Schuman Plan nations as they hamper the democratic unification and evolution of Europe. Europe must not be split in the West as well. The German Social Democratic Party will in consequence seize and support any initiative calculated to promote intimate links between Great Britain and Scandinavia and the other nations of the Continent. It pursues policies of full employment, improvement in standards of life and closer economic co-operation for Europe as a whole." (1)

(1) Action Programme Der SPD, 1952, p. 11.

The SPD warned that one of the causes of World War II was forcing Germany to sign treaties. It would be dangerous, therefore, to continue the 'Junctem' negotiations of the West, that is, the abolition of one unhappy regulation in Germany being made subject to the acceptance of a new obligation. Such agreements as the decision to halt the dismantling of German factories in return for German acceptance of the Ruhr Statute and the substitution of the occupation for EDC had to be terminated.

II

In debating against the Schuman Plan specifically, the SPD assured the government and the people of Germany that it had no fundamental objection to the idea behind the Plan, but that it could not support the Plan under the existing circumstances. The idea, they said, of eliminating economic barriers and establishing a single market throughout Europe was an admirable one. The aim of achieving Franco-German understanding and of making further wars between the two nations impossible was also admirable, since the relinquishment of national sovereignties was the only method of achieving real security. Thus the SPD declared that it was not in opposition to European unity, that it, too, realized that Europe could enrich Germany as much as Germany could enrich Europe and that political unity must be built on common economic interest developed through economic unity.

The SPD favored the steps taken by the Treaty to prohibit import and export duties and quantitative reduction on the movement of coal and steel. They supported the abolition of such forms of discrimination among consumers, buyers and producers as the fixing of prices, transportation rates and delivery terms. They welcomed the prohibition of restrictive

practices tending towards the division of markets or the exploitation of the consumer. The ability of the High Authority to carry on a permanent study of markets and price tendencies, to publish predictive data on production, consumption, imports and exports, and to furnish funds for the encouragement of technical and economic research gained approval as well. The Social Democratic opposition also lauded the powers of the Community to establish minimum and maximum prices in times of recession. Finally, they gave their wholehearted support to the thesis that the idea behind the treaty could be of great benefit to Germany and to her coal and steel industries especially, which could be placed on a more secure footing if foreign trade barriers to German production were removed.

However, the Plan as presented by the German Government to the Bundestag was unacceptable to the Social Democratic Party. To begin with, although they realized the importance for Germany of a more efficient coal and steel industry which could buy and sell coal and steel in a large area without trade impediments, the SPD did not consider that the Treaty as presented offered any such opportunities to the Federal Republic. The Treaty did not, to their way of thinking, secure the benefits that it should have secured, and moreover, it actually would hinder German recovery, discriminate against German interests and fail to provide for the workers the kind of social security which the Christian Democrats claimed it would provide.

The SPD suggested that the French had accepted the treaty creating the European Coal and Steel Community only because it presented a method for them of obtaining the coal of the Ruhr. This was a wonderful opportunity for France to secure access to the Ruhr coal deposits by corporate agreement.

France, to the SPD, was merely exploiting the position of French power and hegemony in the western half of the continent which was created by the defeat of Germany at the end of the last war.

The French had, according to the SPD, uneconomically enlarged their steel industry since 1945 through the spending of public funds in that industry and through the help of Marshall Plan aid. As a result, the French needed more coal to utilize her greatly increased steel capacity, and the coal deposits she looked to were, naturally, located in the Ruhr. What made this situation dangerous to Germany was that she had only two representatives, out of a total of nine, in the High Authority. The other seven members represented, to the Social Democrats, countries which were united in a common interest of obtaining as much coal from Germany and of producing as much steel as they could with it. The result of this, considering that the German steel industry was at an initial disadvantage as a result of the destruction during the war and the dismantling after the war could only be to seriously curtail the chances of recovery in the German steel industry. Naturally, with the other five members of the Coal and Steel Community producing enough or almost enough steel for their own needs by exploiting German resources of coal at the expense of the German steel industry, Germany, which was a great exporter of steel, would see her exports of this commodity drop seriously. Such a drop in German steel exports would have a serious effect on the German economy.

For the sake of economy and for the sake of security the other five nations in the Schuman Plan might not want either to see the Germans producing steel again or a recovery of the German steel industry, but no true community could be successful if it was based on such a feeling of ill will

and mistrust. The SPD added that it would not think of refusing Ruhr coal to France under a system which was workable and which was equitable to Germany, but they would refuse to allow France to use Ruhr coal in a way which would endanger the whole German economy.

Another objection which the SPD had to the treaty was that it perpetuated and established more securely the control of capital over the industries in question. The Schuman Plan to them was merely a super-cartel and the splitting up of the German cartels did not change the situation one iota. The capitalists still controlled the industries and it would now be more difficult than ever to protect the workers and achieve social justice within the framework of the coal and steel enterprises. Under the Plan, the industries were strengthened and the unions became impotent. With the Community acting as a great cartel, the coal and steel industries were in a position to dictate to the unions or to ignore them if they so pleased. Furthermore, the Government plan of 'mitbestimmung', that is, the plan to place union representatives in the controlling executive bodies of individual companies, was to the SPD an unsatisfactory substitute for nationalisation. Only by nationalisation could the control of capital be completely overcome and could the workers have any assurance of security. Since the Coal and Steel Community did not consist of nationalized industries, and was not constructed along socialist lines, it could not adequately give the workers the social security which was their due. For this reason too, the SPD refused to give its consent to the Schuman Plan.

The SPD also attacked the Plan as a grave obstacle to German reunification. To tie the Federal Republic in closer with the West before East Germany was recovered would be foolhardy, since it would prejudice any

negotiation which might be made in the future. Russia might bargain with Germany where it would not bargain with a European Community. Also, should Germany ever be reunified, a united Germany would have to re-accept the Plan. It would not be fair to the population of the East if they were to exchange one kind of status forced upon them for another kind of status also forced upon them. They could not be presented with a fait accompli, and therefore if and when the Eastern territories were returned, a new vote would have to be taken on the Schuman Plan.

The Plan was also for the socialists too exclusive. Economic security and strength could be achieved only by the inclusion of Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries. Any attempt to devise an economically united Europe without these nations entailed the danger of setting up different sets of interests among countries whose interests and aims had to be identical if the economic strength of Europe was to be achieved. Until these countries decided to join the Coal and Steel Community, the treaty setting up that organization should not have been ratified by the Federal Republic, for the best interests of the Federal Republic could not be properly served in such a limited union.

In their fight against the Schuman Plan, the SPD was supported very strongly by the socialist newspapers throughout Germany. In Berlin, both Der Telegraph and Der Tagesspiegel attacked the Plan on the basis that it may have been bought with concessions affecting the Saar and Eastern Germany. Dortmund's Westfaelische Rundschau accused Adenauer of signing the Treaty against the wishes of the majority of the German people and of creating a fait accompli which would be difficult to change later.

The Hannoverische Presse stated that the "will for political and

economic stabilization in Europe as intended by the Schuman Plan depends in no small measure on the moral capacity of France . . . on the honesty of France - and foremost, on its willingness to abandon a policy which is governed by the spirit of an exaggerated fear." (1) The same idea of German inequality placing her in a position of depending on the good will of France was stressed by Duesseldorf's Rhine Echo, which emphasized the great weight placed on German shoulders in making sacrifices to achieve the Plan. The paper added that it feared the Plan would not bring social security and "with social tension and unrest in this mining district (Rhine-Ruhr Area) all this fine European planning will be worthless." (2)

In short, the fear of prejudicing a reunion of Germany, the belief that the Treaty cannot achieve social justice, a distrust of the moral honesty of France and a desire for the greater participation of other nations in the Treaty were the bases of Social Democratic opposition to the Schuman Plan.

III

Whereas the Social Democrats approved of much of the Treaty for the European Coal and Steel Community, there was little about the treaty for a European Defence Community that pleased them. In the Bundestag debates during March of 1953, the members of the SPD came out very strongly against any acceptance of the EDC by the Federal Republic. It was one thing to defend German freedom, they said, but yet another thing to join such an

(1) As quoted in Information Bulletin of U.S. High Commission, June, 1951.

(2) Ibid: p. 2.

organization that the Treaty under discussion would create.

In order that they might not be misunderstood, the speakers for the SPD reassured their listeners that the German people as a whole accepted and treasured Western freedom and Western culture, for after all, Germany had made great cultural contributions to Western civilization. The preservation of this culture and of freedom had to be considered as the preconditions for the further being in this world. If these things were endangered, the SPD asserted, then they must be defended, and the SPD was willing to help defend them. There could be no hesitation in such an avowal, even if it was a hard task for the Germans, because all Germany's powers had to be concentrated on the security of its existence.

But the government, they continued, had followed an external policy without having fixed the fundamental and principle position of Germany in the beginning. The Bundeskanzler had accepted the French theory of an integration of a semi-Europe by creating a supranational authority, and now the Bundeskanzler was a prisoner of this conception. As this plan, insisted the socialists, was without success, other possibilities must be considered. Although the speakers did not enlarge upon what other possibilities they were considering, they were adamant on the point that a new alternative could be found.

Furthermore, the SPD charged that American pressure in this matter was unfair. They hinted that perhaps American idealism increased in proportion to their distance from the problem facing Europe. It was ridiculous, they said, for the Americans to threaten that, unless the treaties were accepted by the Europeans, the United States would not help defend them, or would at least reduce defense aid to Europe. The Americans

would have to realize, it was said, that there were common interests between the defence of Europe and the defence of the United States. Since the EDC was not the only means of defence possible, the government should not bow to American pressure. The SPD reiterated that it acknowledged how much the United States had done for Europe and appreciated the natural concern of America in making sure that its investments and non-pecuniary interests in Europe were safeguarded, but nevertheless American interference in such personal matters would not be tolerated.

This same stand was expressed by Herr Ollenhauer during the debate on the third reading of the Treaty in the Bundesthaus.

"For reasons of principle the SPD has been and remains in favour of German participation in a European and international system of defence, but does not consider the structure projected in the EDC treaty as a suitable foundation.

"We are of the conviction that the EDC as now planned does not add to the security of the German nation and of Western Europe against aggression. In addition it does not give the Germans the equality which in our view is the indispensable condition for co-operation among democratic nations.

"The SPD will, therefore, oppose the Treaty. We believe that co-operation in a shape which is acceptable also to Great Britain and the Scandinavian nations and associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will provide better conditions for effective security arrangements than the EDC treaty. The SPD would accordingly welcome new negotiations on this basis." (1)

Wilhelm Mellies, the deputy chairman of the SPD seconded this opinion when he said "a national army that would act in accordance with its original function, namely on its own to defend the territory of the nation, is no longer practicable." (2) But, he added, Germany has no place as yet

(1) Ollenhauer in The Bundestag: February, 1953.

(2) Mellies in the Bundestag: February, 1953.

in a European army. Germany was going through what he called a transition period, burdened with the inheritance of Nazi sins, and therefore could not expect too much trust from other European nations. Thus although Germany would eventually enter a European union, and although the place of Germany was and would be within the Western civilization, Germany was not yet ready for admittance to institutions within a united Europe, and neither were the other nations of Europe really ready to receive Germany as an equal partner within such institutions. For this reason Mellies castigated the government for going ahead and seeking ratification on the Treaty before the country was really ready for it. He ended by insisting on German-wide elections before ratification in order to determine the attitude of the German people.

As a part of the more specific attack on the treaty, the point was brought up by the SPD that even if the treaty was passed as it stood, it would provide no security for the Federal Republic. The only possible reason for raising German divisions would be to prevent the Russians from starting a war, but in order to provide a defense that could stand up against the initial assault, more troops from Nato were needed. If they would not be forthcoming, then the German divisions would be useless and would be slaughtered in the first assault. And should Germany enter the Western defense system and be attacked by an aggressive Russia, her cities would again be destroyed and her countryside again uprooted by the advancing armies. Unless the West was strong enough in Europe to dissuade all possibility of aggression, Germany could not run risks for the West. The Germans, reminded the SPD, were not interested in who would win the last battle for Europe - for by then there would be no Europe - but only in

who would win the first. Liberation for Europe after a Russian occupation might free her, but it could not revive her.

For this reason the SPD warned that the Rhine should not be the furthest Eastern limit of defence, since that would mean little to Germany. Security had to be assured for the border of the Federal Republic and for West Berlin.

During the debates on the EDC, the question of German equality naturally came up again. The SPD followed exactly the course set for them by Kurt Schumacher when he said that any mutual defence system must have "a unified European army under the authority of a European minister of defense, subject to proper European democratic control." (1) The present treaty was unacceptable, said Schumacher because of the lack of German equality. "The Federal Republic," he asserted "would under this proposal be permitted to contribute no more than a foreign legion which would serve in a mercenary capacity under alien command." (2) Germany would resent, he said, the fact that she would be expected to share the burdens of European defense without being accorded a status commensurate with the discharge of such a responsibility. The Federal Republic could not accept, he concluded, the French idea of no German rights, only divisions.

Back in the Bundestag, the SPD argued that the Generalvertrag was nothing more than a modified Occupation Statute. According to Article V of the Bonn Treaty, the three Western powers were entitled, according to their own judgement, to take such measures in Western Germany as they thought necessary to protect their armed forces if the democratic order is threatened.

(1) Kurt Schumacher: Before the Consultative Assembly, August 11, 1950.

(2) Ibid: in the same speech.

The CDU could not claim, the SPD charged, that this article did not detract from German equality and leave the way open for discriminatory tactics.

The most essential question raised in this regard was the question of equal rights derived under the military organization of the EDC. The SPD charged that, in connection with the general military-political co-operation in which the EDC was involved, that is, the tie up between the EDC and Nato, all pretensions of German equality were exposed as false, since Germany was not a part of Nato. By the Treaty under discussion, the Bundesrepublik was to bring German contingents into a community which was subordinated to a far reaching defence system to which the Bundesrepublik did not belong. Thus German troops would be subordinated to foreign powers of decision. It was irrelevant to say that it is only a matter of time until Germany entered Nato, for as Ollenhauer said, "we are not members today and we are asked to accept the EDC today." (1)

The problem was not internal democracy or equality in EDC therefore, but equality of decision power in the organization which controlled the EDC. Since the EDC was subordinate to Nato - and the SPD believed that France considered this very important - the EDC was controlled by Nato. The Atlantic Pact was the supreme maker of decisions, not the EDC, and according to the will of France, said the SPD, the Bundesrepublik would find it difficult to become a member of Nato. "We are prepared to take part in a system of European security on the basis of sovereignty and rights equal to those accorded to all other partners. The new Europe will either be a free Europe, or there will be no new Europe." (2)

(1) Ollenhauer in the Bundestag: March 17, 1953.

(2) Ollenhauer in the Bundestag: March 19, 1953.

In the Laender, the feelings of the members of the SPD were also aroused on this same point. Max Brauer, the head of the government in Hamburg and a member for Hamburg in the Bundesrat or Federal Council, spoke very strongly against accepting the Treaty. He complained that the Bundesrat and the opposition parties had not been consulted in the framing of the Treaty and that a fait accompli had been presented to both bodies. The Hamburg Senate supported the idea of a United States of Europe, he said, and realized that Germany must contribute to her own defence. But:

"....since according to the treaties the Federal Republic of Germany is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty, it and its contingents in the European Defence Community become subordinated to the strategic and tactical decisions of an organization in which the Federal Republic does not take part, and on which it has no influence. This applies also to the financial questions connected with the defense contribution. The Federal Republic of Germany runs the risk that decisions are taken by the powers of the North Atlantic Treaty, without participation by the Federal Republic of Germany, regarding the financial contribution which the Federal Republic is to make to the EDC. The Federal Republic will incidentally not enjoy rights equal to those of the other treaty powers. The absence of equal rights appears also in the so-called emergency clause. None of the other powers, on whose territory alien forces are stationed - and that applies to many European countries - has had to concede such an emergency stipulation to these alien forces. The Hamburg Senate also believes that the present formulation of the treaty makes the reunification of Germany more difficult rather than easier, and that German holdings abroad have been sacrificed in Part six, Article three of the Transition Treaty in a way and to an extent for which there is no justification. Finally the Hamburg Senate believes that the fifty years duration of the treaty should be qualified at least in the sense that a committee of experts have the possibility of entertaining amendments every five years." (1)

Thus the SPD in the Federal and Land Parliaments determined to fight the EDC on the bases of the failure of the EDC to create a strong union through the membership of free and equal nations, and the subjugation of the German partners by denying to Germany the privilege of this equality.

The SPD has also attacked the EDC on the ground that it was

(1) Max Brauer in the Bundesrat: May 15, 1953.

unconstitutional, since according to the Basic Law Germany was to have no army. Also, the constitutions of several of the Laender, such as Hesse, forbade its citizens to be soldiers. The Social Democrats insisted that the constitutions of the Federal Republic and of the necessary Laender would have to be changed if the EDC was to be considered. The SPD also accused the coalition of using its influence in Karlsruhe (the seat of the Supreme Court) to influence Bundespraesident Heuss to withdraw his application for a detailed report of the Treaty, in order to speed ratification. The CDU, said the SPD, had thus brought the two highest institutions of the Federal Republic into the quarrels of politics, institutions which should stand above such tactics.

As with the question of equal rights, so the question of German reunification was brought up again in the discussions on the EDC Treaty. The SPD ridiculed the idea that the Soviet Union would be frightened away from Eastern Germany by a strong Bundesrepublic integrated with the West. Ollenhauer insisted that the German problem was a world problem which could not be settled in Europe but only between the White House and the Kremlin. "Thus the price of German reunification should lie . . . in a new balance between West and East . . ." (1) The EDC and the Contractual Agreements made such a new balance impossible, said Ollenhauer, since Russia would never allow Eastern Germany to become an armed ally of the United States.

Western Germany was only a fragment of Germany, declared the SPD, and if Germany were unified, opinion in the whole country might be different on the EDC. Furthermore, should Western Germany alone become a part of Western union, many Germans might find that their interests as Germans and their interests as members of a larger community would clash. German soldiers

(1) Ollenhauer in the Bundestag: March 17, 1953.

would be useless, feared the SPD, if they had any such conflict of conscience.

During an exchange in the Bundestag, Ollenhauer said that the diversity between East and West would become deeper if the Bundesrepublik joined the EDC. "Besides, article seven of the Generalvertrag does not give us freedom of action in regard to German reunification."

"That is not right", Brentano shouted, "the other members of the treaty must work for German reunification according to the terms of the treaty."

"Not exactly, Herr Brentano, because such a willingness of the members of the EDC doesn't tell us how they will work and how intimately they will work and the methods they will use. The German people cannot build up its policy on the fact that from time to time, some foreign statesman will declare that they understand how important the reunification is. On that we cannot build a German policy. Nothing tenable can be gained by this for the German policy of reunion. We must have independent action to work towards German reunification ourselves, because France will not work towards it with the intensity which we can give it. Even if we have the Generalvertrag the question of German reunification will not lie any more in German hands than it does now.

". . . The Bundesregierung must look for a solution coming out of German initiative." (1)

The SPD, therefore, demanded that Germany be free to take peaceful action when it considered it necessary, in the matter of German unity. In regard to German unity, the SPD did not want Germany to remain subordinate to its treaty partners.

The SPD considered that the possibility of a solution of the German problem of reunification was not so remote as it seemed, since the death of Stalin might have had an effect on Russian policy. At any rate, the SPD thought it would do no harm to confer with the Russians before entering

(1) Ollenhauer in the Bundestag debate, March 17, 1953.

the EDC. They argued that the alpha and omega of all German policy was the recognition that the very existence of the German people depended on the maintenance of peace. The West had to accept, therefore, Germany's desire to talk with the Russians and also the profound exhaustion of the German people and their longing for peace.

Because of this exhaustion, social security for the population of the Federal Republic would have to precede military security. Only as the peoples of the Federal Republic received social assurance, said the SPD, could they acquire the necessary defence morale, without which, military potential could not be effective.

Another argument used against the Schuman Plan that recurred in the SPD attack on the EDC was the demand for a Europe built upon a broader basis. In brief again, the SPD, realizing that Great Britain and Scandinavia would not join the High Authority, wanted to find a basis of collaboration acceptable to these countries. "We prefer co-operation between the governments of Europe to the supranational conception of the EDC because it is more realistic." (1)

This brings us to an interesting plank in the SPD platform. The mention of a broader basis for a defence organization, including Britain and Scandinavia, but not without any kind of a supranational organization, would seem to suggest that what the SPD really wanted was an independent Germany, with an army of its own, tied only by a system of alliances to the rest of Western Europe. Whether this was only an attempt to get nationalist support or whether the SPD seriously considered such a solution is difficult to say, but such an idea was definitely in the minds of the Social Democrats.

(1) Ollenhauer: In the Bundestag, March 19, 1953.

In an article written for The World Today by the SPD, (1) the view was stated that Germany must have alliances, as neutrality was impossible, but not on a supranational basis.

"The Franco-German question must not be isolated, neither can it be solved by the Chinese method of binding the foot to prevent its growth. In economic potential and in population the Germans have, so to speak, bigger feet than the French, and so it would be unwise to attempt an artificial restriction of the German body if the ultimate aim is to strengthen German democracy and place it at the service of the common defence of the West. The policy of integration leads to a blind alley: it endangers democracy and weakens Europe. On the other hand, a multilateral pact of trade, friendship, and mutual assistance between all European nations would relieve Franco-German tension and satisfy France's need for security."

The argument that this sort of talk was only an attempt at a political manoeuvre might be considered borne out by Ollenhauer's speech in the Bundestag on the nineteenth of March, 1953. After insisting upon the impossibility of an integration of Western defence, Ollenhauer completely contradicted himself by the statement:

". . . a new system should therefore be arranged through an approach to the Council of Ministers . . . even under them far reaching integration in military, technical and arms production, matters within the co-operation of all participants, could be achieved . . . the European nations could integrate their forces of military and economic defense within the limits decided upon by the Council of Ministers."

If Ollenhauer was not using the EDC as a political weapon, however, then it can only be concluded that what he really wanted was German membership in an organization such as Nato, or in Nato itself, with Germany as equal and as militarily strong as its neighbors.

Ollenhauer was on a little more solid ground again when he turned in his attack on the EDC to the apparent lack of French sincerity. He began by saying that there was no hurry to ratify the EDC as France had not yet

(1) Germany and World Peace: an article in The World Today: April 1953.

ratified it and that France must be given more time to get over her fear of Germany and learn to trust the Germans as possible partners in a federated Europe. He then mentioned the Saar and, referring to recent developments there, suggested that the Saar problem was not improving enough to warrant any belief in the sincere desire of France to trust Germany, to be friendly with Germany or to join Germany in a federative union. Turning to the matter of the additional French protocols to the EDC, he asked how a European policy could work if France kept changing her policy and her attitude. How could the Bundestag be expected to ratify a treaty when an essential partner kept making important alterations? How could the Bundesrepublic ratify a treaty when it didn't even know what the final form of the treaty would be? Furthermore, he charged that the security of Germany would be endangered by the French reservation that she be allowed to withdraw forces from the EDC if she herself deemed it necessary. The EDC, he concluded, was not for France a great ideal for helping to unite Europe, but merely a selfish French instrument of security for France against the Bundesrepublik - and, Ollenhauer declared, France admitted it.

IV

In conclusion, the attitude of the Social Democratic Party to the Schuman Plan, the European Defence Community - and to the Political Community which has yet to be finally drafted - was not sympathetic. The SPD made a substantial contribution to Western defence by soundly thrashing the communists in Germany. It is to the credit of Kurt Schumacher that his party captured the votes of the working classes which, in France and Italy, gave the communists so much strength.

The SPD did not, however, favor a Europe united by the partnership of France, Italy, the Benelux nations and Western Germany. The Social Democrats felt that the French were not morally sincere about their desire for a Franco-German understanding and that the primary concern of France was still France, and not Europe. As a result, the SPD wanted a united Europe only if Germany was accorded equal rights, since the SPD feared that France would not hesitate to discriminate against the Bundesrepublik if she had the chance. For the same reason, the SPD would have felt more comfortable with France as a partner if the 'six' would have been joined by Britain and Scandanavia.

Finally, the basis of any SPD policy was the reunification of Germany. The first aim for the Social Democrats was the liberation of their brothers to the east and the return to Germany of the German territories which were administered by the Polish, the Russians and the French.

CHAPTER V

German Support for European Integration Assured

The Federal election, which was held on the tenth of September, 1953, gave Adenauer and the CDU a decisive victory. The one sided results unquestionably presented the Chancellor with a mandate to pursue his European policies for another four years.

<u>Party</u>	<u>Number of Seats in 1953</u>	<u>in 1949</u>
Christian Democratic/ Socialist Union	243 (6)*	139
Social Democratic Party	151 (11)*	131
Free Democratic Party	48 (5)*	52
All-German Block	27	-
German Party	15	17
Centre Party	3	10

The other parties contesting the election failed to get 5% of the votes each, and therefore under the new electoral law, received no seats.

The coalition partners picked up twenty-one seats, thanks to the All-German party, which elected twenty-seven members. The Social Democrats gained twenty seats; the communists elected no members. But the CDU/CSU elected two hundred and forty-three members, an increase of one hundred and four over the 1949 election. The election results proved overwhelmingly, therefore, that the West-German people stood solidly behind the policy of the Government to lead the Federal Republic of Germany into a community of European nations. Considering the importance of the inclusion of Germany in

(*) non-voting representatives from Berlin.

any plan for a European union, the mandate which Konrad Adenauer and his party received was indeed heartening to supporters of an integrated Europe the world over.

The question of the participation of the Federal Republic in European integration was by far the most discussed plank of the various party platforms in the election. The Social Democratic opposition attacked the Coal and Steel Community and the Defence Community on the grounds that such plans were only a partial and inadequate step towards European integration, would discriminate against Germany, and would constitute an obstacle to the re-unification of Germany. The CDU/CSU, on the other hand, stressed such plans as epochal steps towards European integration and Franco-German co-operation which would enhance Germany's status in the free world and provide the Federal Republic with economic and military security.

The SPD demanded, as a prerequisite to any participation of West Germany in the unifying institutions of Europe the reunification of Germany, complete sovereignty, the inclusion of Britain and Scandinavia, and internal economic stability and social security within Germany herself. The reasons given for this stand were: German inclusion in a unified Europe would destroy all chances of persuading the Russians to permit reunification; without equal rights with her treaty partners, the Federal Republic would be discriminated against in the councils of Europe; the inclusion of Britain and the Scandinavian countries was necessary to prevent a splitting of Europe in the West; and social security had to be assured within Germany first, as that was the best means of defeating communism. Although the SPD gave verbal support during the election campaign to the idea of a united Europe, the party felt that there should be no inclusion of Germany in such a union

until all these prerequisites were met. In the meantime, Europe could be strengthened by a series of alliances, including a non-aggression pact with the USSR, so that peace could be maintained while Europe worked more slowly and carefully towards integration.

The CDU/CSU defended its actions during the campaign, and attacked the SPD for failing to place the future of Germany and Europe above party politics. Adenauer and his colleagues insisted again and again that the SPD prerequisites had been met as far as was possible in the existing world situation, and that only party politics was keeping the SPD from abandoning their unalterable position of opposition to the economic, military and political communities which were being created west of the Iron Curtain.

The Christian Democrats argued, to begin with, that unification could only be achieved if Germany was strong and the West united for Russia would be willing to bargain only in the face of a free world that was united and strong. As for the immediate attainment of complete equal status and rights, Adenauer insisted that Germany could get what she wanted only by exhibiting a willingness to co-operate, and not by making demands. Such a policy as the CDU had followed, the party members pointed out, had already achieved a great measure of equality and would soon result in complete equality only if such a policy was continued. Adenauer's answer to the demand of the SPD for the inclusion of Britain and Scandinavia was that these nations were co-operating as much as they intended to co-operate, and European union must not be held up indefinitely until they were prepared to surrender their sovereignty along with the present six participating nations. "Dieses Grosseuropa ist ein Luftsenschloss", (1) said Adenauer, "This greater

(1) Bulletin: August 7, 1953.

Europe is a castle in the sky", since it was necessary to work realistically only with what materials were available and not with possibilities. And finally, the social security which the SPD was demanding as one of their prerequisites had already been assured by German participation in the CSC and EDC, since the standard of living would be raised by the CSC and since the expenditure of defence would be no more than the expenses entailed under the occupation.

The Christian Democrats, then, charged that the SPD's plan for a postponement of the unification of Europe and a system of treaties to take its place in the meantime, was not acceptable to Germany. Such a plan, without any loss of sovereignty was no more than a return to the old type of international organization which had conclusively proven itself to be unworkable. Either a Europe would be created, or the individuality of Europe would be crushed by the world's two giants; Europe must become a factor in itself if it wished to preserve its culture and its political and economic integrity against the encroachments of either Russia or America. And an independent Germany - like an independent Europe - along the lines suggested by the SPD would become, the CDU insisted, a mere plaything in the hands of the great powers, with its internal and external policy influenced and determined by developments in the policies of the great powers, policies over which Germany could have no control.

II

It cannot be denied that the participation of the Federal Republic in the unifying institutions of Europe is essential if those institutions are to be a success. Economically, militarily, culturally and politically, a unified Europe without Germany would have no meaning or *raison d'être*.

The Bundesrepublik is industrially the strongest nation on the continent of Western Europe even without the Soviet zone. Furthermore she is by far the economically strongest partner in the European Coal and Steel Community due to her supremacy in the coal and steel industries. In the coal industry, for example, the six Schuman Plan nations produced 238,820,000 metric tons of hard coal in 1952. Of this, Germany produced 123,278,000 metric tons, (1) which is more than all the others put together, and twice that of France, (2) which produced 55,363,000 metric tons.

In the steel industries of the Schuman Plan, German predominance is also marked. Of 41,808,000 metric tons of steel produced by the six countries in 1952: (3)

Germany produced	15,806,000	metric tons
France "	10,867,000	" "
Belgium "	5,000,000	" "
Italy "	3,500,000	" "
Furensburg "	3,000,000	" "
Saar "	2,300,000	" "

Of the 1,848,000 persons working in the industries of the Coal and Steel industry, 799,000, or almost half, are German. French workers number 523,000 persons. In addition, as the strongest country within the Community, the Federal Republic bears the highest share of the costs. Almost half, forty-five percent of the revenues, comes from the German side. (4)

From these figures, the importance of Germany to Europe in the economic field is obvious. Her production of coal and steel, the basic

(1) From Aachen, Ruhr, and Lower Saxony districts.

(2) Not including the Saar in the French figure.

(3) All figures from The Statesman's Year Book, 1953.

(4) Revenues are raised by a maximum assessment of one percent of the production value of all establishments in the respective industries of the six countries.

strength of her thriving economy and the development of the Deutsche-mark as one of the most solid currencies in Europe, have made her membership in the Schuman Plan the basis upon which the Plan must function.

The participation of the Bundesrepublic in any European Army is also mandatory. To begin with, if Germany is to be defended by the West in the event of a Russian attack, it is only reasonable to expect Germany to do her part in helping with that defense. Since an independent German Army would be unacceptable to the rest of the Western Allies, integration at a supranational level seems to be the only answer to the question of how to rearm Germany. There is no doubt that the old spirit of militarism must be kept under control, and the European Defense Community seems to be the best method of limiting any possible influence that the famous German 'Kommis' might have.

Strategically, Germany is important to the Allies. It is there that any war will break out if it breaks out in Europe, and the initial victory could mean a great deal. A strong defensive position west of the Elbe River with control of the island of Ruegen and the Mecklenburg coast, could give the Allies a stronger position for defense, a solid base for attack, since they would be fighting on exterior-interior lines, and control of the Baltic Sea. Allied interest in Germany as a member of EDC is well founded, since the loss of Germany would reverse these advantages.

Furthermore, the ability of the Germans to produce good soldiers, tacticians and weapons is well known, if by bitter experience. The German character, developed as it is from boyhood by the family tradition of obedience, lends itself to soldiering. German armies have always been amongst the best armies. The value of twelve German divisions to Western defense could be very great, considering this military capacity of the Germans.

Culturally too, the Federal Republic is a part of the West. In music, in philosophy, in literature and in art the German culture is a part - and a very rich part - of Western civilization. The influence of their great men, whether in the field of belles lettres or in the field of science has been universal, and their intellectual giants belong as much to Europe and the Western world as they do to Germany. It is as important to the West to incorporate Germany, as a centre of culture, into its orbit as it is to incorporate Germany as a military or economic power into a greater whole. Maintaining Germany as a peaceful and useful member of the European Community means more than economic or political safeguards, it means restoring to Germany many of the ideals and principles which she herself gave to the world. By far the most important and decisive form of co-operation is cultural co-operation, for it is through success in this field above all, that a European rapprochement can be achieved.

Finally, Germany is important to European unification in the political sphere because of its predominant position in European affairs. Franco-German rivalry can only be solved by political integration, since national feeling can be curbed only by mutual interests developed through the loss of sovereignty and the impossibility of an independent course of action. Without German participation, the European problem which caused two world wars in two generations, cannot be possibly solved.

The best means of preserving democracy in Germany is through European union. This is the best way of insuring against a return to dictatorship in a country which has little tradition of free parliamentary government. European union can only be worthwhile if it solves the problem

of the nation which is potentially the greatest in Europe and therefore of greatest value to European union. European unification can have a meaning only if Germany, with her economic and military might, and her cultural tradition, becomes politically, as well as economically and culturally, a member of the United States of Europe.

III

On this side of the ocean, most people would probably favor Adenauer's policy for Germany and Europe, that is, the integration of Europe with the Federal Republic of Germany as a part of any and all unifying institutions. In lieu of the need to strengthen Europe and to erase the existence of extreme nationalism, the attitude of the CDU towards the European union would seem to be the most sensible method available in a world as divided as is ours today. On the other hand, there are many Germans and many Europeans who, for various reasons, would rather postpone or delay any such unification. In Germany, the Social Democratic party is the leading political proponent of delaying unification, or German membership in a unified Europe, for a little while, at least.

It is to the credit of the SPD and Kurt Schumacher that the communist menace is negligible in Western Germany today. The party has given the workers of Germany an alternative to communism which they have preferred above what the KPD (Kommunistische Partie Deutschlands) has had to offer. Although the demand of the SPD for social security in Germany, before the inclusion of the Federal Republic in Europe, has probably been already met by CDU policy, by partial integration, and especially by the hard working Germans themselves, nevertheless the strongly socialist platform of the SPD has

deprived the communists of any major support from the German workmen.

Another policy of the SPD for which they deserve credit is their demand for equal rights for the Federal Republic in the councils of Europe. It is difficult to see how the Western Allies, and especially France, can expect the Germans to give up a great deal of the sovereignty they have won since the war without receiving an equal voice with her five partners in the determination of Western policy. The SPD is quite correct in assuming that a united Europe can be built only on a foundation of mutual trust and respect, and that more of this trust must be exhibited by Germany's new allies if the Federal Republic is to be a useful member in a federated Europe. It is true that Germany lost the war and that her neighbors may have good reason to distrust her. But if those same neighbors desire to create a European partnership, in which Germany cannot but be the principle partner, then they must look at the partnership as security and strength for Europe, and not only as security and strength against Germany. French hesitation and France's policy of withholding equal rights from the Federal Republic will be interpreted in the Federal Republic as a desire on the part of France to assure her hegemony in Western Europe, and at the expense of Germany. European union is to be an instrument, the SPD has insisted, for the stamping out of nationalism, not for the establishment of the nationalistic policy of one of the union's members. The demand of the SPD for complete German equality in her internal affairs and in her relationship with her European partners, including German membership in Nato, is an extremely logical demand, and a very sensible one, for as the health of Europe depends on the projected European union, so the health of the union depends upon the complete support of Germany. The natural prerequisite for such support is

an equal status for Germany.

The SPD's plan for a series of alliances to tide Europe over until the time is ripe for unification is not so commendable, however. It is not easy to understand the purpose behind the SPD intention to set up an independent Germany within a system of alliances. They know full well the confusion and tension which would be created in Franco-German and German-European relations if Germany were to have an army of her own again. Besides, there is very little that is constructive about a system of alliances; it would not crush nationalism, it would not enable Europe to provide a balance for the policies of the United States, it would make the German problem even more perplexing, it would certainly not give to Europe the peace and security her people are craving. Germany might then become too strong or remain too weak. It might remain pro Western or bargain with the East for reunification, and consequently weaken Western military strategy and European economic security. An independent and united Germany would constitute a continuing menace to world peace, because no matter how neutralized it might be, an independent Germany situated between two armed camps which would distrust and yet be forced to court German strength, could only be a potential mid century source of conflict. Such a plan would seem to be unsatisfactory in the extreme, both to the western allies and to the Germans who voted in the recent elections.

The demands of both parties for German reunification are probably more grist for the politicians' mills than they are practical possibilities. It is impossible to determine whether the disunited and weaker Europe proposed by the SPD or the stronger unified Europe supported by the CDU would be more favorable to Russia's acquiescence to a completely free Germany. The recent Berlin Conference seems to indicate that the solution to the German problem must come out of a larger East-West settlement, one that would

take place between the White House and the Kremlin, and one which Bonn could influence very little.

The foreign policies of the Christian Democratic Union are pretty well the policies of Konrad Adenauer. It is Dr. Adenauer who has led Germany from its exhausted, war-weary and devastated state completely ruled by an army occupation to the position of recovery and almost complete freedom which she has now attained. The driving spirit behind the amazing German recovery and behind the ideals of a united Europe, Herr Adenauer has provided the kind of leadership which alone could bring Germany back into the comity of nations as a healthy, strong and responsible addition to the ranks of the free nations of the world. The ex-mayor of Cologne has needed courage to accept German participation in Europe's unifying institutions without full German equality, and far sightedness to realize that such a spirit of co-operation is bound to win for Germany friends, allies and eventual full freedom of action as isolation or neutrality could never do. The Federal Chancellor has realized that as the German problem has always been a European problem, the only solution lies with a Europe, one that is united in purpose and in the institutions which give it life. Germany, Europe and the entire free world are indeed indebted to this man whose ideals and deeds have proved him to be a bigger man than most of his European colleagues, for if greatness can be measured by achievement, then the results of his short four year term give him fair claim to that title.

The CDU has realized that Germans and Europeans alike are weary of their unsettled status in the world, and that steps must be taken to prevent a repetition of the past. The CDU has recognized that no nation can determine its own fate and that only in union with others, only with a sacrifice of

ancient rights and privileges can real sovereignty be restored to Germany and to Europe. After two devastating wars, the need for sacrifice and unselfishness is clear, if there are to be any lasting guarantees for the survival of European culture and civilization.

Failure to create a European Defence Community can only result in increased German sovereignty outside the confines of a united Europe. This much the United States has already promised. But German independence could mean a new German Wehrmacht, and French and German armies would again stand face to face. Skilful diplomacy is needed to avoid the growing Europamuedigkeit (1) in official circles on the continent. Europe cannot afford renewed hostility between these two traditional enemies. Europe has come to the point where she must unite or perish, and it is to the credit of the CDU that it has striven unselfishly towards the goal of a united Europe.

Surrounded by the ruins of their own political past, the peoples of Germany and Europe desire now a unity at the level of representative institutions, one which will put an end to the hundreds of years of cumulative prides, rivalries and disasters that European particularism has unleashed. Never before has the need for unity been so pressing, never has it been so clearly the only answer to salvation. Alternatives which may compromise unification are out of date. The Christian Democrats have seen that Europe can ensure a satisfactory level of economic and cultural existence only by closer integration to begin with and then by complete unification.

The CDU has thus supported and helped sponsor such institutions for unification as the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Defence

(1) weariness with Europe.

Community, the Agricultural Pool (which has not advanced beyond the drafting stage due, mainly, to the conservatism of the farmers) and the European Political Community. Should such institutions all come into existence, there would be created in the place of six individual nations a community of some 160 million souls; a vast industrial potential; a high level of consumption and a better standard of living; and a stabilizing factor for the whole world. The new Europe would be capable of dealing with its friends and enemies on a basis of equality, instead of dependence on the former and fear of the latter.

If Europeans as a whole are asking how to preserve their prosperity, freedom and security, in Germany this discussion is especially animated because her geographical position and the post war partition of the country bring home to every individual citizen the fact that Germany must seek the solution of her problems in partnership with other nations. On her own she cannot regain her unity, attain economic prosperity, or protect the freedom of her citizens, and the integrity of her territory; in other words, she can find no security.

This realisation of the necessity of European integration stands as the chief aim of Adenauer's policy, as the foundation of the Christian Democratic party platform. That it is also the desire of the great majority of Germans in the Federal Republic is well borne out by the recent election. Here is a chance to channel German energy, thoroughness, ability and efficiency towards a great cause, for the benefit of Germany, as much as for Europe and the world. It must be a great benefit to the Germans to know that they stand on 'the right side of the fence', that they are making an important and invaluable contribution to a great movement. A moral strength derived from a noble purpose is thus the best means of erasing what has come to be known as the German

menace, and of diverting the strength of Germany towards a constructive and peaceful end, the rebuilding of Europe.

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