


THE AESTHETICS OF SCHOPENHAUER AND NIETZSCHE -
A COMPARATIVE STUDY

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Philosophy
University of Manitoba

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
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September 1955



Introductory Note

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is not an interest which developed with the demands of writing a Master of Art's thesis. I doubt whether anyone would be so rash as to attempt to meet such exigencies in this way. I read and was stirred by the thought of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche long before I could understand the problems involved. It did not occur to me then, nor years after, that these two thinkers would become the subject of an academic treatment. I was repeatedly warned that Schopenhauer and Nietzsche could not lend themselves as suitable or sound subjects for an aspiring young scholar; let alone a student of philosophy.

I am deeply indebted to Dr. W. M. Sibley and Dr. K. W. Maurer for not only allowing me to work within this field, but also for their constant encouragement and guidance. Without their untiring efforts this thesis (as well as many other things, both published and unpublished) would not have been undertaken.

The discussion of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in this thesis hopes to strike a new path. Those who have known Schopenhauer as the philosopher of pessimism and Nietzsche as the philosopher of the hammer will find little about either of these things here. I have tried to capture for the reader something of the temper of the young Schopenhauer and

the young Nietzsche. In discussing Schopenhauer I have concentrated on his early, doctoral work On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This is a solid piece of scholarship and his later thought is an elaboration on a much wider scale of what he had already said in this work. My emphasis has been on the structural elements of Schopenhauer's work. If there was anything the young Schopenhauer valued it was the Beautiful, the Architectonic. He quite often went to great lengths in order to force his thought into a four-fold pattern even though a two or a three-fold division might have suited the subject matter a great deal better. This is, however, one of the foibles of Schopenhauer. Hegel's three step fox-trot was hateful to him.

With my discussion of Nietzsche I have tried to revalue and put into their right context the essays which followed the publication of his first book The Birth of Tragedy. I have devoted a great deal of space to the circumstances of the publication of this work because it marked a turning point in both the philosopher's life and his work. I have tried to show how totally immersed he was in the pre-Socratics and how the symbolism of Heraclitus and the Promethean myth juxtaposed themselves in his mind against the symbolism of the Old Testament and the Myth of the Fall of Man. These are not concepts that one readily thinks of in relation to Nietzsche. Yet they form the backbone of Nietzsche's thought patterns.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
Introductory Note	ii
I. SCHOPENHAUER'S THEORY OF ART	1
The Doctoral Thesis "On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason"	1
Schopenhauer's Metaphysic	15
The Framework of Schopenhauer's Aesthetics	30
The Hierarchy of the Arts	54
Architecture	54
Sculpture	57
Painting	59
Poetry	61
Comedy	64
Tragedy	65
Hegel's Theory of Tragedy	67
Music	71
Summary	74
II. NIETZSCHE'S THEORY OF ART	76
Language as an Approximation to Reality	76
Musical Tone as Substratum	86
The Days of Greek Tragedy	99
The Reception of <u>Die Geburt</u>	109

CHAPTER	PAGE
The Art-Impulses of Nature	117
Origin of Greek Tragedy	124
Socratism and the Death of Tragedy	130
Schopenhauer as Educator	136
III. SCHOPENHAUER AND NIETZSCHE COMPARED	140
Schopenhauer	140
Nietzsche	151
BIBLIOGRAPHY	169

CHAPTER I

SCHOPENHAUER'S THEORY OF ART

I. THE DOCTORAL THESIS "ON THE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON"

The doctoral thesis "Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde"¹ was Schopenhauer's first venture into philosophy. He seems never to have lost sight of it for he always returns to it and directs the attention of the reader to its value. He constantly warns us that a correct understanding of it is a prerequisite to the comprehension of his entire thought. Contrary to the views of many writers, the claim is entirely justified. In the Preface to the Second Edition (September, 1847) he informs us that it subsequently became the substructure for the whole of his philosophy. The work itself first appeared in 1813, when Schopenhauer was twenty-six years old. When, at the time, he showed this ambitious work to his mother, she held her nose because the title-root, she said, smelled like a pharmacy. When he had occasion to re-edit it in his sixtieth year he found little to retract.

¹The Schopenhauer edition used is that of Julius Frauenstädt's Schopenhauer Sämmtliche Werke in six volumes, published by F. A. Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1922.

The basic principle expounded in this dissertation, Schopenhauer tells us, is of fundamental importance since, in his view, it is the basis of science. The formula for the Principle of Sufficient Reason may be summed up briefly: Nothing is without a reason for its being. In a general way the principle is an expression common to several a priori notions. In reviewing philosophic thought concerning the matter, Schopenhauer comes to the conclusion that earlier writers had no clear idea of the manifold expression of the principle. The ancients, for example, did not arrive at a clear distinction between requiring a reason as the ground of a conclusion and asking for a cause for the occurrence of a real event. Recent writers, though being slightly more conscious of the above distinction, have failed to see that the Principle of Sufficient Reason has a fourfold Root.

Schopenhauer is intent upon investigating the manifold nature of the grounds of existence, for he wishes to point out that the different laws of our cognitive faculties find their common expression in the Principle of Sufficient Reason. In this treatise Schopenhauer is primarily concerned with epistemology rather than metaphysics. The distinction is an important one, for his aesthetics, which appears under "epistemology", is not strictly epistemological. We shall find that the distinction will help us in evaluating so much the better the subtle transition from epistemological

considerations to metaphysical considerations only which is made in his aesthetics. The Principle of Sufficient Reason eludes proof because in proving a judgment we bring to our aid a reason for its pronouncement, but this necessity for a reason is exactly what the Principle of Sufficient Reason expresses. Should we therefore require a proof of it, we tacitly assume the principle to be true; or to go even further, we found our demand for proof precisely upon that assumption. Should we still persist in this direction we shall find ourselves in a circle of exacting a proof of our right to exact a proof.

In a central passage, Schopenhauer explains this principle as follows:

Unser erkennendes Bewusstseyn, als "äussere und innere Sinnlichkeit (Receptivität), Verstand und Vernunft auftretend, zerfällt in Subjekt und Objekt, und enthält nichts ausserdem. Objekt für das Subjekt seyn, und unsre Vorstellung seyn, ist das Selbe. Alle unsre Vorstellungen sind Objekte des Subjekts, und alle Objekte des Subjekts sind unsre Vorstellungen. Nun aber findet sich, dass alle unsre Vorstellungen unter einander in einer gesetzmässigen und der Form nach a priori bestimmbaren Verbindung steyn, vermöge welcher nichts für sich Bestehendes und Unabhängiges, auch nichts Einzelnes und Abgerissenes, Objekt für uns werden kann. Diese Verbindung ist es, welche der Satz vom zureichenden Grund, in seiner Allgemeinheit, ausdrückt.²

This passage, which Schopenhauer himself puts into italics, contains the important categories necessary for a correct

²"Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde", Vol. I, p. 27.

understanding of his thought. We have the knowing consciousness which subdivides itself into Subject and Object, a consciousness, furthermore, for which to be Object for a Subject means nothing else than to be an "idea". Now it is the Principle of Sufficient Reason which regulates the connection between the ideas for this over-all Subject. Since according to Schopenhauer there are only four possible classes of objects (ideas) for the Subject, the Principle of Sufficient Reason which expresses their relationship must have four parts or roots. The laws regulating each class of objects are derived a priori. Schopenhauer now attempts to explain the range of each class of ideas and the root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which predominates in it.

The first class of objects open to our representative faculty, which manifests itself as Understanding and Reason, is that of intuitive, complete, empirical ideas. The form of these objects or ideas for the Subject is that of inner and outer sense; namely, Time and Space. Time and Space, however, cannot individually give us a perceptible picture of reality; therefore the empirical ideas which belong to the orderly complex of reality appear in both forms together. The intimate union of both is the condition of reality which, in a sense, grows out of them.

Time and Space become perceptible only when they are 'filled'. Now it is Matter which fills Time and Space.

Matter to Schopenhauer, however, is nothing but the union of Time and Space, and this union is achieved by the Understanding. In one sense, then, the Understanding is matter--it is Matter objectively thought. Schopenhauer explains that Matter is nothing but Causality in general, or Activity in general. Since the sole function of the Understanding is that of uniting Time and Space (making Time and Space perceptible through interaction) Causality, objectively thought, is nothing but the reflection of our Understanding. This union of Time and Space is regulated by the Principle of Sufficient Reason of Becoming, or the "Law of Causality".

The Law of Causality and Causality proper are not the same thing. The Law of Causality refers exclusively to changes. It applies only to States of bodies and never to the existence of that which undergoes all changes, namely, Matter. The Law of Causality refers specifically to the way in which bodies act, and not to mere activity in general, namely, Causality proper. The Law of Causality likewise does not touch Forces of Nature for they alone are that factor by which changes or effects become possible--they give causality causes. Forces of Nature, furthermore, do not admit of physical but only of metaphysical explanations.

Schopenhauer thus makes a distinction between the Law of Causality and Causality. Whereas the Law of Causality deals only with changes and conforms to the Principle of

Sufficient Reason of Becoming, Causality in general, or Activity in general, is pure Matter and is itself beyond the bounds of the Law of Causality. Schopenhauer subsequently develops the idea of Causality or Matter as being "Will". This distinction between the Law of Causality and Causality proper is a crucial one. Several critics of Schopenhauer have fallen into grave errors as a result of its misunderstanding or misapplication.

Understanding, however, must have some materials on which to work. The senses supply to Understanding merely the raw materials and it proceeds at once to work up this raw material into the objective view of a corporeal world, subject to regular laws, by means of the simple forms of Space, Time and Causality. Objective perception makes use of only two senses: touch and sight. These alone supply the data upon which, as its basis, Understanding constructs the objective world. What the nature of this "rohe Stoff" is we shall discover in Schopenhauer's metaphysics.

The Law of Causality is treated by Schopenhauer in three ways: as cause in the strictest sense of the word, as stimulus, and as motive. Schopenhauer bases the essential distinction between inorganic bodies, plants, and animals, upon these different manifestations of the Law of Causality, and not upon external, anatomical, or chemical distinctions.

Reason has its own individual function in much the same way as Understanding. It is important for our purposes to pause here, for Schopenhauer in his later thoughts on Art insists that Art is not a product of Reason. What is correctly known by Reason is truth or a judgment having a sufficient reason, whilst what is correctly known by Understanding is reality. With the faculty of Reason we come to the second root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, or to the second class of objects for the Subject in which this form of the principle predominates.

The faculty of Reason has a wider and a narrower function. Thinking in a narrower sense--abstract reflection by means of words--is a purely logical process and keeps strictly to its own sphere. In the wider sense of the word it touches the limit of perceptible ideas in order to arrive at an understanding of them so as to harmonize what is given by experience and grasped by perception with abstract conceptions which result from clear reflection. In thinking, therefore, we can either attain to the conception or to the rule to which a given perception belongs. In the latter function Reason makes use of the activity of the faculty of Judgment which acts as a mediator between intuitive and abstract knowledge, or between Understanding and Reason.

Even in the narrower sense thinking does not consist of merely abstract conceptions in our consciousness but

rather in the connecting or separating of two or more of these conceptions under various restrictions and modifications. Thinking consists in the formation of relations between conceptions which as a result become what Schopenhauer calls judgments. With reference to these judgments the Principle of Sufficient Reason manifests itself as that of Knowing. The principle in this new form asserts that if a judgment is to express knowledge of any kind, it must have a sufficient reason in virtue of which quality it then receives the predicate true. Truth is then the reference of a judgment to something different from itself, called its reason or ground. Now this reason or ground for the truth of judgments admits of a variety of special kinds.

A judgment may have for its reason another judgment, in which case it has logical or formal truth. Whether it has at the same time material truth as well remains an open question and depends on whether the judgment upon which it rests has material truth, or whether ultimately the whole series of judgments on which it is founded leads to a judgment which has truth or not. The basis of this form of judgment is the syllogism and syllogising is Reason's specific function.

A judgment may be founded upon an idea of the first class, upon a perception by means of the senses, on

experience. In this case it has material truth. If it is founded immediately on experience, it has empirical truth. This specific province of Reason is ruled by the faculty of Judgment which, as we have stated, is the mediator between intuitive and abstract faculties.

Thirdly, a judgment may be based on the forms of intuition which lie within Understanding and pure Sensibility. In this case the Judgment would be a synthetic a priori type. Since, however, this type of judgment has material truth already it will therefore be of a transcendental nature for it is determined precisely by that factor which determines experience itself. Propositions such as: "two straight lines do not include a space"; "matter can neither come into being or perish", serve as examples of this type of judgment.

Lastly, a judgment may be founded on the formal conditions of all thinking which are contained in the Reason. In this case its truth is "metalogical". There is a strong likeness and close connection between transcendental and metalogical truths, which shows that they spring from a common root. In the province of Reason the Principle of Sufficient Reason manifests itself chiefly as metalogical truth; in that of Understanding the Principle of Sufficient Reason manifests itself as transcendental truth. In the next form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason it will manifest itself again as transcendental truth, but in another form.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason in general is then a judgment which has a fourfold reason. That does not mean four different reasons leading contingently to the same judgment, but rather one reason presenting itself under a fourfold aspect, under a fourfold root.

In the third class of objects for the Subject Schopenhauer analyzes the formal part of complete ideas-- the intuitions given us a priori of the forms of outer and inner sense, i. e., Space and Time. What distinguishes the third class of ideas in which Space and Time are pure intuitions, from the first class in which they are sensuously perceived--perceived in an intimate union--, is Matter. Matter, as we have seen, makes Space and Time perceptible. In this third class of ideas Schopenhauer desists from considering the form of Causality (Law of Causality) as yet another object for our representative faculty for we have no consciousness of it until it is connected with what is material in our knowledge. Space and Time, on the other hand, may be considered as pure intuitions apart from their perceptibility through union for they are so constituted that all their individual parts stand in mutual relation, so that each of them conditions and is conditioned by another. In Space this relation is position, in Time it is succession. The law by which the divisions of Space and the divisions of Time determine one another

reciprocally with reference to these relations (position and succession) is what Schopenhauer calls the Principle of Sufficient Reason of Being. These relations are entirely different from all other possible relations of our ideas; neither our Understanding nor our Reason is able to grasp them by means of mere conceptions--pure intuitions a priori alone make them intelligible to us. It is quite impossible to explain clearly by means of conceptions what is meant by above and below, right and left.

For our purposes the fourth class of objects for the Subject is the most important, for it is in this class that Schopenhauer takes a step into metaphysics. This class of objects for the Subject comprises but one Object for each individual. This object is that of immediate inner sense, the Subject in volition which in turn becomes the object for the knowing Subject. Being an object of inner sense alone it therefore manifests itself only in Time and never in Space.

All knowledge presupposes Subject and Object. Even self-consciousness, Schopenhauer adds, is not absolutely simple but like our consciousness of all other things it is subdivided into what is known and into that which knows. What is known manifests itself absolutely and exclusively as Will. The Subject therefore knows itself exclusively as willing and not as knowing, for the ego which represents

ideas never can itself become an idea. In consequence there can be no knowledge of ourselves as knowing for this would imply the separation of the Subject from knowing while it nevertheless knew that knowing--which is impossible.

The Subject of knowledge can therefore never be known--it can never become object or idea. Since, however, we have not only an outer self-knowledge (in sensuous perception) but an inner one as well, and since every knowledge by its very nature presupposes a "Knower" and a "Known", what is known within us as such is not the "Knower" but the "Willer". There is thus an identity within the ego of the Knower and the Willer. Schopenhauer considers this identity to be the "Weltknoten"--the nodus of the Universe--and maintains that it is inexplicable. The identity of the two is merely immediately given. In this early treatise Schopenhauer stands silent before this "miracle κατ' ἐξοχήν" --the supreme wonder--, but in his major works he attempts an explanation of it. He shows there how the Subject and Object of this fourth class become one through the individual body which is an expression of Will.³ It is because of this very identity between Object and Subject that the inner nature of other objects can become clarified.

Whereas the Understanding is the subjective correlative

³Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Vol. II, p. 122.

to our first class of ideas; the Reason to the second class; and pure Sensibility to the third class; in this fourth class the subjective correlative is the inner sense or Self-consciousness in general. The Principle of Sufficient Reason which regulated the objects of the first class was that of the Law of Causality. The inner nature of Causality in the first class, however, always remains a mystery to us. We are inclined to attribute its activity to such things as "vital energy", "Forces of Nature", "qualities of bodies" which are only qualitates occultae. Now because motives are to inner sense what causes are to outer experience, and since motivation and causality are related, a solution to the problem of the inner nature of Causality lies open to us. We would be just as blind to our own inner experience as we are in the face of Causality were it not that our inner experience grants us an insight into the inward process. We know here that movement and action are caused by an act of the Will which is called forth by the motive. What motives accomplish for the fourth class of objects, causality accomplishes for the first class. Motivation is really causality seen from within. Thus willing, being the most direct experience we have, throws light upon every other knowledge or experience which is only mediate. The fourth class of objects for the Subject is ruled by the Principle of Sufficient Reason of Acting or the Law of Motivation.

The fourth class stands in the same relation to the first class as the Law of Motivation towards the Law of Causality. "Diese Einsicht", Schopenhauer concludes, "ist der Grundstein meiner ganzen Metaphysik".⁴

From his epistemological analysis Schopenhauer thus gradually slips into a metaphysical consideration of the nature of the driving force behind the activity of the intellect. In this fourth class of objects he sees the human mind ruled by a double master: on the one hand, human activity is seen as being ruled by a Law of Motives; and, on the other, motives are seen as merely awakening the ever-present Will which lies behind and forms the basis of the entire mental operation. Whereas Schopenhauer in his epistemology borrows heavily from Kant, in his last effort to explain the mystery behind causality he breaks sharply with him and posits as the thing-in-itself a force which (like Kant's thing-in-itself) though outside our epistemological experience and thus unknowable, yet (unlike Kant) because it is given us immediately and is therefore the most intimate possession we have, is yet possible of explanation. Schopenhauer does not work the problem out in this doctoral thesis. He picks it up again in his major work, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.

⁴"vierfache Wurzel", p. 145.

II. SCHOPENHAUER'S METAPHYSIC

Three years after the appearance of the "vierfache Wurzel" Schopenhauer produced his essay "Ueber Sehen und die Farben". This essay on Sight and Colour was an attempt to prove the correctness of the views expressed in his doctoral thesis. It is interesting to note that in so doing Schopenhauer was setting a pattern which was to last for life: to work out a problem, present it to the world and finally to act as his own favourable reviewer. A re-statement of this essay in Latin was published in 1830 under the title Theoria Colorum Physiologica. A second edition of it was not to appear till 1854 (third edition 1870). Schopenhauer's major opus, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, had been finished in 1818 and published the next year. Again Schopenhauer, the master craftsman seeking architectonic beauty,⁵ divides the work into two parts, each having two aspects. Being so proud of his achievement he wrote some verses predicting that posterity would erect a monument to him. To his publisher he wrote that the work will hereafter be the occasion and the source of a hundred other books. He also thought of having a signet ring carved with an image of the Sphinx throwing herself down into the abyss as she had

⁵In this respect it is also interesting to note that Schopenhauer accused Kant of sacrificing sense in order to achieve architectonic beauty--a fault of which Schopenhauer himself is not entirely free.

promised to do on having her riddles solved--being so certain that he had solved all the chief problems of philosophy. The first edition of Die Welt, however, was turned into waste-paper.

Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung is in part a more elegant and sombre expression of the ideas contained in his doctoral thesis with its epistemological interests, and in part, a branching out into metaphysics with the introduction of the Will. Schopenhauer tells us that his whole philosophy is intended to impart merely a single thought. He was fond of comparing his work with Thebes of the Hundred Gates--short direct roads leading to its centre from every point of its periphery. This single thought or central point to which all roads lead reveals itself, however, as "Das, was man Metaphysik, Das, was man Ethik und Das, was man Aesthetik genannt hat".⁶ These three topics are handled by Schopenhauer in four principal divisions, or four aspects of one thought. This threefold division which Schopenhauer makes is misleading. The work, as we have said, falls much more naturally into two parts--the epistemological and metaphysical--and what he calls his aesthetics and ethics belong, respectively, to epistemology and metaphysics. It is most essential for us to note that his aesthetics is expounded

⁶Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Vol. II, p. vii.

under the Second Aspect of the World as idea--epistemology.

"Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung", says Schopenhauer characteristically, in his opening sentence; and with it he intends to recall the whole of his earlier epistemological speculation. The exposition in this first book is a good deal clearer and more assured. Time and Space have now become the Conditions of Multiplicity. The phrase is an interesting one although containing no new assertion. It has an entirely different ring from the many similar ones found in the "vierfache Wurzel". The difference in tone can be accounted for by the consciousness of the metaphysical background shortly to be expounded. The world as we know it falls merely into Subject and Object. The Subject, in so far as he knows (and is not an object of knowledge) does not come under the forms of Time and Space; the Subject is rather pre-supposed by them and has consequently neither multiplicity nor unity. Any one percipient being, with the object, constitutes the whole of the World as idea, just as fully as existing millions could. Were this one Subject to disappear, then, the whole world as idea would likewise cease to be. A consciousness, however, without an object is no consciousness, therefore the Subject is just as dependent upon the world for his existence as the world is upon the Subject. Schopenhauer has thus really not altered his former position. He has merely raised the

Subject to a higher and more dignified level for he desires to prepare a more sizeable sacrifice for the Will. In his earlier work he was mainly concerned with the ideas for the Subject and although he posited the Subject there, he did not discuss the ideas of the Subject in reference to the Subject. Although in this major work Schopenhauer really starts neither with the Subject nor with the Object (the Will) but with the ideas, these ideas are nevertheless discussed in terms of the Subject. The world as idea in comparison with such a Subject thus assumes an air of unreality, assumes a merely phenomenal garb.

The Subject or the Understanding which comprehends the world as idea is to Schopenhauer an non-rational faculty. The faculty of the Understanding is completely distinguished from Reason, the faculty of knowledge, which belongs to man alone. Understanding is non-rational because the "I" under which it is subsumed is an expression of the identity of the willing as well as of the knowing self. It is this Understanding with its non-rational aspect which orders our outer experience according to the Law of Causality in the first class of objects. Because Schopenhauer now discusses his theory of knowledge in relation to the Subject he strikes a more reserved and cautious note.

The first class of objects is, however, not the only one which receives some extension in this work--the second

class in which the faculty of Reason regulates ideas according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing also undergoes a transformation. A concept or an abstract idea must end at last in a concept which has its ground in knowledge of perception. The whole world of reflection, in fact, rests on the world of perception as its ground of knowledge. Because Reason has its ground in perception it can also play a part in Art. Schopenhauer tells us that the "Verein von Phantasie und Vernunft"⁷ (itself an echo of the union of Time and Space which makes our experience possible) upon which the Platonic Idea depends is the principal subject of aesthetics.

In his essay on Kant⁸ Schopenhauer sets out to show that his conception of the thing-in-itself as Will can be interpreted within the Kantian doctrine. According to Schopenhauer, Kant did not recognize the thing-in-itself directly in the Will but he made a great step towards this knowledge in that he explained the moral significance of human action as different from and not dependent upon the laws of the phenomena, but as touching the thing-in-itself directly.

⁷Ibid., p. 48.

⁸"Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie", Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Vol. II, pp. 499-500.

Er erkannte nicht im Willen das Ding an sich; allein er that einen grossen, bahnbrechenden Schritt zu dieser Erkenntniss, indem er die unleugbare moralische Bedeutung des menschlichen Handelns als ganz verschieden und nicht abhängig von den Gesetzen der Erscheinung, noch dieser gemäss je erklärbar, sondern als etwas, welches das Ding an sich unmittelbar berühre, darstellte".

In naming the root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the fourth class of objects as the Law of Motivation or Acting, Schopenhauer indicates to us that the source and starting point of his philosophy lies in Kant. Kant used the Law of Causality in order to explain the influence of the thing-in-itself upon phenomena, but, as many critics soon realized, Kant was not entitled to do that for the Law of Causality applies only to phenomena as such and not to the thing-in-itself. Schopenhauer recognizes this error in Kant and his own derivation of the Will he achieves by means of calling in the aid of self-consciousness, which proclaims the Will as the inner nature of phenomena.

As we have seen, the content of the abstract idea lies in the ideas of perception. In the metaphysical part of his philosophy Schopenhauer seeks to discover the nature of this content in the ideas of perception. Its forms are, of course, Time, Space and Causality.

The Subject as a knowing Subject can only view the World and himself as idea. The Subject, however, tends to consider himself as individual. Furthermore, knowledge of the outside world is given him through his own individual

body, and if this body were viewed by him as merely another object to his knowing Subject, we would have no need to pause and question his feelings of individuality, for there simply would be none. However, the fact remains that the Subject does not view his own body under such conditions of impersonality. His own bodily movements are not as incomprehensible as the movements of other objects. He does not call the basis of these bodily movements "Forces of Nature". The Subject has a greater insight into his own motives and this insight constitutes the recognition of the Will lying at the basis of action. The body, according to Schopenhauer, is given in two entirely different ways to the Subject of knowledge who becomes an individual only through his identity with it. It is given as an idea in perception, just as another object among objects and subject to the laws of objects (under the Principle of Sufficient Reason) and it is given in quite a different way, as that which is immediately known to everyone--Will. Every act of one's Will is also at once and without exception a movement of one's body.

The act of Will and movement of the body are not two different things objectively known which are connected by the bond of Causality; they are, rather, one and the same thing but merely given in entirely different ways: immediately, and again in perception for the Understanding. The action

of the body is the act of the Will objectified. It is Will that has become idea. The whole of the body is the objectification of the whole of the Will, and since the whole body is the objectification of the whole Will, every impression which it receives affects the Will directly and immediately. Furthermore each part of the body is a direct correspondent of the principal desires through which the Will manifests itself. Teeth, throat and bowels are objectified hunger; the organs of generation are objectified sexual desire.

Schopenhauer has thus extended the implications of his fourth root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason until we can almost view it as a typical double aspect theory. Schopenhauer, however, is not content to let the matter stand as a double aspect theory. He has a great deal more to say concerning the relationship between the Will and its objectifications. The Will, according to Schopenhauer, is One in the sense that it is the condition of the possibility of multiplicity. There is the same amount of Will in a stone as in a man. We can only speak of the quantity of Will in reference to the phenomena of Will-to its visibility, its objectifications. All of Will is contained in the humblest of objects but in these it remains only potential. While it is in this objectification it is, however, no longer known as Will but as idea, or objectification of Will at a certain

level or grade. Strictly speaking, we cannot know the Will, only its objectifications. In these it has many grades. Therefore Schopenhauer's theory is more than a double-aspect account, for there is really only one underlying action which expresses itself in many ways.

The Forces of Nature are the lowest grades of the objectification of Will. These Forces of Nature are in themselves immediate manifestations of Will. They are outside Time and Space. When these basic objectifications of Will, break into Time and Space it is as the creation of the species that they do so. These Forces of Nature as objectification of Will, furthermore, are concerned only with the preservation of the species--the individual manifestations within the species are of little concern to it. Now whereas individual knowledge is merely concerned with the forms of the species, the interest of the Pure Subject of Knowledge lies in the Platonic Ideas which are the adequate objectification of the thing-in-itself (the Will), an objectification only one remove from the ultimate Reality.

An original Force of Nature (Platonic Idea) is thus nothing but a low grade of the objectivity of Will. A Law of Nature, on the other hand, is already the relation of the Platonic Idea (Force of Nature) to the form of its manifestation in Time, Space and Causality. It is through Time and Space that the Idea breaks into multiplicity

of phenomena. The Law of Causality determines the order according to which Ideas enter these forms of multiplicity. The Law of Causality assigns, so to speak, Time, Space and Matter to the Platonic Idea, according to the aggregate of existing Matter which is the substratum of all these phenomena.

There are thus three stages in this whole process: the Will itself, the Grades of its objectification (the Platonic Ideas) and the phenomenal objects in which it finally appears. Because it is the tendency of Will to express itself (to will) there arises the possibility of a conflict between the various Grades of Objectifications, each demanding more room for phenomenal expression. This comes about when several of the phenomena of Will in the lower grades of its objectification in unorganized nature seek under the guidance of causality to possess a given portion of Matter. From this conflict there arises the phenomenon of a higher Idea prevailing over all the less developed phenomena previously there, yet in such a way that it allows the essence of these to continue to exist in a subordinate manner. This process is only intelligible through the identity of the Will which manifests itself in all the Ideas, and which is always striving after higher objectifications.

The more developed Idea resulting from this victory

over several lower Ideas or objectivities of Will gains however an entirely new character. From the strife of the lower Ideas the higher arise, but that does not mean that the lower are entirely destroyed. The lower Ideas continue to live in subjection to the higher and still constantly strive to obtain an independent expression. This inner contradiction of the Will in its manifestations is the reason for the ceaseless internecine war of the individuals of the species, and is also the reason for the constant struggle among the natural forces. The scene and object of this conflict is Matter, or Space and Time whose combined activity under the form of Causality, is Matter. Regarded purely objectively, the whole intention of this strife is the preservation of the species. Nature is only concerned that of all her Platonic Forms (Ideas) as expressed in the species none should be lost.

The basis and core of the Universe is thus, according to Schopenhauer, irrational. This explains his antagonism to such thinkers as Hegel, Fichte and (not to the same extent) Schelling who emphasized that the core of reality was ultra-rational. The basic function of Will consists in willing or not-willing, yet in man a possibility exists for the separation of the knowing from the willing part of the organism. The human mind, although the last and the best manifestation of Will and still in the service of the Will as a means of

supporting the individual and the species, can break away from Will. Originally destined for the service of the Will it can yet in particular men deliver itself from this bondage and exist purely for itself. As such it can become the source of Art. Finally it can also react on the Will and bring about its self-surrender which is the condition of Holiness. Before we can follow Schopenhauer's account of how this is accomplished we must consider the relationship between the World as Will and the World as Idea.⁹ It is at this point that a correct understanding of Schopenhauer's aesthetics must begin.

Since the organism is merely the Will made visible, Will in itself, every affection of the organism at once and directly affects the Will, and is felt as agreeable or painful. With the heightening of sensibility in the higher development of the nervous system, the possibility arises (especially through the organs of sight and hearing) that affections are received without in themselves directly affecting the Will--without being either painful or agreeable. They thus appear in consciousness as indifferent, as merely sensations. In the brain this heightening of sensibility can reach such a high degree that even upon

⁹Throughout this thesis I am translating "Vorstellung" as "idea" and the Platonic "Idee" as "Idea" (with capital "I").

received impressions of sense a reaction takes place, which does not proceed directly from the Will, but is primarily a spontaneity of the function of the Understanding, which makes the transition from the directly perceived sensation to its cause. Since the brain at once produces the form of Space there thus arises the perception of the external object. Schopenhauer therefore regards the point at which the Understanding makes the transition from the mere sensation (upon the retina, for example, which is still a mere affection of the body and therefore of the Will) to the cause of that sensation (which it projects by means of its own form of Space, as something external and different from its own body) as the boundary between "die Welt als Wille und die Welt als Vorstellung, oder auch (als) die Geburtsstätte dieser letzteren".¹⁰

From these observations Schopenhauer deduces that the objectivity of knowledge has innumerable grades, which depend upon the energy of the intellect and upon the extent of the separation of the intellect from the Will. Highest objectivity is achieved by the genius through whose eyes the comprehension of the external world becomes so pure and objective that it sees through both the individual things and the species, directly into the Platonic Ideas. The

¹⁰Vol. II, p. 312.

condition which allows this to happen is the possession of a larger measure of intelligence than is required for the service of the Will. Upon this degree of the separation between the Will and the intellect ultimately depends the difference and the gradation of intellectual capacity.

Schopenhauer's concept of Matter allows him yet another way of expressing the intimate relationship between the World as Will and the World as Idea. Matter, as conceived by Schopenhauer, belongs both to the empirical part of our experience and to the a priori part. Matter is related to the empirical part of our knowledge because it is actually the Will made visible and yet it is also a priori in that it is really the projection of the function of the Understanding through which the visibility is accomplished. Thus in the conception of Matter both aspects of the world are united and can be viewed either as the projection of our Understanding or the manifestation of Will. Matter is consequently the peculiar foundation stone of the totality of experience.

Just as the "vierfache Wurzel" was significant for a fuller understanding of Schopenhauer's epistemology, so the essay "Ueber den Willen in der Natur" is significant for a better understanding of his metaphysics. Schopenhauer published this essay in 1836. In it he wanted to substantiate his earlier views through an examination of the physical sciences. The relationship between Will and Idea is here

expressed in slightly different terms. In knowledge (contrary to plant-life which also has wants which it seeks to satisfy but does so through its susceptibility to stimuli) the motive which presents itself as idea and the act of volition which follows from it remain distinctly separate from each other. In the mere susceptibility to stimuli found in plant-life the feeling of the stimulus cannot be distinguished from the volition it occasions. Knowledge thus presents itself as the mediator of motives--that part of the intellectual function which receives the changes from the outside upon which those in the inside must follow. The World as idea rests on the narrow margin between the external cause (motive) and the effect evoked (act of the Will). This gap in the line of reaction makes possible for the first time a distinct separation between the motive and the voluntary act, and consequently the projection of the motive onto the external world. The motive originates in the Subject but is immediately projected onto the outside world. This narrow gap between the desire and the act which breaks up for a moment the ceaseless chain reaction in the life of the Will contains the possibility for the development of an independent self-serving intellect. At this point the world takes on the appearance it has. What the intellect does and sees when it finally develops a higher level of independence is the subject of Schopenhauer's aesthetics.

III. THE FRAMEWORK OF SCHOPENHAUER'S AESTHETICS

Whereas Schopenhauer's metaphysics is concerned with the irrational basis of reality and thus accentuates the pessimistic attitude, his aesthetics shows that the world is after all not the worst possible world; for if there is an aesthetic escape open one can imagine a world where such an escape is not possible, in which case that would be the worst possible world. In his popularized essays Schopenhauer expresses the hope that since the arts have a softening effect on character it may be possible (among other things) that wars and duels will vanish from the world. His pessimism which has been in too much of a vogue, is not very convincing. Schopenhauer's work must be judged from the point of view of his aesthetics, for if we can ascribe any value at all to art such value would disappear with the disappearance of the value of life. The two are too inter-related to be spoken of under separate frames of reference.

Schopenhauer's system of aesthetics is based on the principle (or on the possibility) that an original means working towards a definite goal has the tendency to acquire independence and to become an end in itself. Within our context that means that the human mind, originally at the service of the Will, can break away and look into the abyss of its own being. It is because of this basic, primitive

notion that Schopenhauer finally commits himself to the paradox that the purpose of aesthetic contemplation is to free oneself from Will and yet its essence consists in the contemplation of Will. Schopenhauer's handling of this paradox constitutes one of the major transitions in his whole system. Before we attempt to explain this paradoxical doctrine we may justly ask: Where does the power behind the intellect come from? Critics have taken Schopenhauer to task for maintaining that the Will to live is the ultimate reality and yet that the Will is capable of denying itself. They maintain that the two are in radical conflict. The difficulty is easily resolved if we correctly understand Schopenhauer's basic assumption that the human intellect used as a means towards an end by the Will can in exceptional cases become an end in itself. By breaking away from the Will, Schopenhauer would say, it does not lose its activity--active it remains yet not for the Will but rather for its own sake. Because the intellect has a nature of its own it can continue to live through the exercise of this nature, generating and creating its own energy.

By declaring that the knowledge of art is outside the range of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and thus not concerned with the forms of phenomena but rather with the content of phenomena Schopenhauer takes a leap which we must investigate very closely. If aesthetic contemplation is

concerned with a reality which lies beyond the Principle of Sufficient Reason (beyond, that is, the realm covered by his epistemology) it must be concerned with the only remaining thing, which is Will. The Will, however, is "unknowable"; how then can aesthetics which to Schopenhauer is primarily a knowledge of "something" be concerned with the Will which is unknowable? Schopenhauer tries to get out of the difficulty by appealing to the Platonic Ideas.

The Platonic Ideas and the Kantian thing-in-itself, Schopenhauer concedes,¹¹ are not the same, but he adds, they overlap. In order to bring Kant's mode of expression nearer the Platonic we must consider Time, Space and Causality as that arrangement of our intellect by virtue of which the one being of each kind which alone really is, manifests itself to us as a multiplicity of similar beings, constantly appearing and disappearing in endless succession. The apprehension of things by means of, and in accordance with this arrangement is immanent knowledge. On the other hand, awareness of the true state of the case is transcendental knowledge which is obtained in abstracto through the criticism of pure reason. Schopenhauer now makes his own contribution (and this is where the Platonic and the Kantian views overlap) by stating that this transcendental knowledge

¹¹Ibid., Vol. 11, pp. 203-4.

can appear in exceptional cases intuitively. By re-interpreting the Kantian thing-in-itself in Platonic terms Schopenhauer actually re-adjusts the framework of his system. What he does is to discuss the aesthetic experience not merely in epistemological terms but in epistemological-metaphysical terms. The Platonic Ideas are not knowable in the sense in which ideas (objects) are known, neither are they experienced in the sense in which the Will is experienced. The Platonic Ideas rather lie in between the two, they are more than the mere forms of phenomena and not quite the thing-in-itself.

The Platonic Idea as intuitive is sharply distinguished from the universal. If a man's grasp of the universal is so deep as to be intuitive, and to apply not only to general ideas, but to an individual object by itself there arises, according to Schopenhauer, a knowledge of the Ideas, in the sense meant by Plato. This knowledge is of an aesthetic character; when it is self-active, it rises to genius, and reaches the highest degree when it becomes philosophic. When directed to the universal the intelligence may remain Will-less, while, on the contrary, the objects of the Will are situated in particular things. Yet art achieves a triumph when it can see the universal in the particular. This direction of the mind to universals is the indispensable precondition for genuine achievements in philosophy, art

and science.

Art, however, is concerned with the universal only in so far as it manifests itself in the particular, for all truth and wisdom according to Schopenhauer's epistemology lie ultimately in perception. Conceptions are the mere shadows of true knowledge and the unceasing endeavour of poetry and art in general is to enrich the conception from the perception. The work of art which is essentially perceptible and which aims at facilitating the knowledge of Ideas of the world is therefore in its fuller determinations inexhaustible. The conception is something completely determinable and therefore exhaustible. The desire to communicate such a conception by means of a work of art is a useless circumlocution. We are only perfectly satisfied by the impression of a work of art when it leaves something which, with all our thinking about it, we cannot bring to the distinctness of the conception.

The resemblance between the Idea and the conception rests on the following ground: The original and essential unity of an Idea becomes broken up into multiplicity of individual things through the perception of the knowing individual which is subject to sensuous and cerebral conditions. That unity is then restored through the reflection of the reason, yet only abstractly, as a concept, which is equal to the Idea in extension, but has assumed quite a different

form, and has thereby lost its perceptible nature.

In diesem Sinne (jedoch in keinem andern) könnte man, in der Sprache der Scholastiker, die Ideen als universalia ante rem, die Begriffe als universalia post rem bezeichnen: zwischen Beiden stehen die einzelnen Dinge, deren Erkenntniss auch das Thier hat.¹²

The Idea is thus the unity that falls into multiplicity on account of the temporal and spatial form of our intuitive apprehension; the concept, on the other hand, is the unity reconstructed out of the multiplicity by the abstraction of our reason. Just because the Idea is and remains object of perception, the artist is not conscious in the abstract of the intentions and aim of his work; not as a concept but as an Idea it floats before his mind. Therefore the artist can give no justification of what he does. He works from pure feeling, unconsciously, instinctively. Since the material of art is the Idea and the material of science is the concept, we see both occupied with something that now exists and now does not exist. Therefore both, according to Schopenhauer's interpretation, have to do with what Plato set up as the exclusive object of rational knowledge. The material of history is the particular in its particularity and contingency, which at one time is, and then exists no more. From this point of view the material of history appears to us, according to Schopenhauer, scarcely as a

¹² Ibid., Vol. 111, pp. 418-9.

worthy object for the serious consideration of the human mind. Just because the human mind is so transitory it ought to choose for its consideration what does not pass away.

We discovered in Schopenhauer's epistemology that the mind receives from the sensations the material which it works up into the ideas of perceptions. These sensations however must be neither agreeable nor disagreeable. This means that they leave the Will entirely unaffected, otherwise the sensations themselves would attract our attention and we would stop at the effect instead of passing to the cause. It is only on account of this indifference to the Will that these sensations are capable of supplying the Understanding with multifarious and distinct data. This indifference enables the subject to rise to what Schopenhauer calls the state of pure objective Will-less perception. This state is the chief constituent of the aesthetic impression.

The form under which all knowledge is possible is according to Schopenhauer the Principle of Sufficient Reason which as such is still in the service of the Will. Knowledge of this nature and under such conditions is strictly true of the Subject as long as he knows as an individual. To such a subject, under such conditions, a knowledge of the Platonic Idea is quite impossible, for these Platonic Ideas fall beyond the forms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

If knowledge of the Platonic Ideas is to be achieved, then the subject must transcend his individuality. Individuality means seeing through the indirect method of the machinery of the body and within the limits prescribed by the Will. The realization of the Idea, which is the direct and adequate objectivity of the thing-in-itself (Will not as yet objectified) can only come in exceptional moments and under exceptional circumstances. This is achieved when knowledge breaks free from the service of the Will, when the subject ceases to be merely individual and becomes the pure Will-less Subject of Knowledge. When this is achieved the subject no longer traces relations in accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, but rather rests in fixed contemplation of the object presented to it, out of its connection with all other objects. Art is thus a way of viewing things independent of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and also independent of the Will.

The intellect in the service of the Will knows only the mere relations of a thing to the Will itself and, for the sake of completeness of this knowledge, the relations of the thing to each other. Even this latter function of the intellect takes place only indirectly; it is still in the service of the Will. This indirect knowledge forms, however, the transition to the purely objective knowledge which is entirely independent of the Will. If the relations of an

object increase in number and are apprehended immediately, the peculiar and proper nature of the object appears even more distinctly, and gradually constructs itself out of mere relations, although the object is entirely different from these relations. Nevertheless in this mode of apprehension the subjection of the intellect to the Will becomes weaker. If the intellect has strength enough to gain the preponderance and to let go altogether the relations of things to the Will, in order to apprehend, in their place, the purely objective nature of a phenomenon, which expresses itself through all relations, it also forsakes along with the service of the Will, the apprehension of mere relations and thereby really also that of the individual thing as such. It has now the Platonic Idea as its Object. An Idea so apprehended is, however, not yet the essence of the thing as it is by itself, for it has still sprung from the knowledge of these mere relations; yet as a result of the sum of all relations it is the peculiar character of the thing--the complete expression of the essence which exhibits itself as an object of perception, an essence which expresses itself spontaneously whereby it determines all its relations which till then alone were known. The Idea is in this way the root of all the relations.

Form and colour, which in the apprehension of the Idea by perception are what is immediate, do not belong to the

Idea itself but are simply the medium of its expression, for strictly speaking Space is as foreign to it as Time. The Ideas do not reveal the thing-in-itself, but only the objective character of things, that is, 'phenomena'. We would not even understand this character, were it not that the inner nature of things is otherwise known to us at least obscurely and in feeling. This inner knowledge must be approached from the individual person, from his own Self-consciousness.

The goal of the artist is to reach the Platonic Ideas. This mystical aesthetic vision can only be achieved through a double "elevation". On the one hand the artist must raise himself to the position of the pure Subject of Knowledge, and on the other hand, he must raise the observed object to the level of the Platonic Idea. This principle of elevation, of "Steigerung", originally a marked Goethean idea,¹³ is indeed central to the whole of Schopenhauer's aesthetics. The business of the novelist, for example, is not to relate great events but rather to make small ones interesting, says Schopenhauer in one of his popular essays in which he has primarily this principle of "Steigerung" in mind. This tendency to regard the element of elevation as basic for aesthetic enjoyment and creativity is a major contribution

¹³I am indebted to K. W. Maurer for this Goethean concept.

to the subject of aesthetics. Schopenhauer explains the possibility of the elevation of the Subject in psychological terms, the elevation of the Object in epistemological-metaphysical terms. Actually this double form in the apprehension of beauty is accomplished together; we are merely separating them here for purposes of elucidation and critical analysis.

When we are divorced from our constant willing and seeking we reach, according to Schopenhauer, a peaceful, restful state of pure knowing. This state is necessary before knowledge of the Idea is possible. The preponderance of knowing over willing can produce this inward disposition. It consists in the forgetting of the self as an individual and the raising of the consciousness to the pure Will-less, timeless, Subject of Knowledge, independent of all relations. Together with this subjective side of aesthetic contemplation its objective correlative will appear--the Platonic Idea intuitively comprehended. The comprehension of the Idea, the entrance of it into consciousness is thus only possible by means of a change in us, which may be regarded as an act of self-denial. It consists in knowledge turning altogether away from Will and considering things as they could never concern the Will at all. Only in this way can knowledge become a pure mirror of the objective nature of things. Knowledge conditioned in this way must lie at the foundation

of every genuine work of art as its origin. The change in the Subject cannot proceed from the Will because it consists in the elimination of all volition; thus it cannot be an act of Will. It cannot even lie in our choice. It is really a mere accident. It springs from a temporary preponderance of the intellect over the Will, or considered psychobiologically, from a strong excitement of the perceptive faculty of the brain without any excitement of the desires or emotions.

Schopenhauer explains this event in another way as follows: Our consciousness has two sides; it is partly a consciousness of our selves, which is Will, and partly it is a consciousness of other things--the apprehension of other objects. The more one side comes to the fore the more the other recedes into the background. The state in which the intellect exceeds the Will is a rare and momentary one, for the intellect can only annul the Will for short periods of time. Thus, although knowledge springs from the Will and is rooted in the manifestation of the Will (which is the organism), its very purity is disturbed by this self-same Will which wishes to use it for its own purposes. We can therefore apprehend the Ideas only when we have ourselves no interest in them, for then they stand in no relation to the Will. It is for this reason that the Ideas of anything appeal to us more easily from a work of art than from



reality, for what we behold in a picture or in a poem stands outside all possibility of having any relation to our Will. In itself the intellect exists only for knowledge and appeals immediately to knowledge alone.

The apprehension of the Idea from reality, on the other hand, demands a special power of the intellect. If functioning in a high degree and for some considerable duration this belongs only to genius, which consists in the greater measure of the power of knowledge than is required for the service of the individual Will. This surplus in the case of genius becomes free and comprehends the world without reference to the Will. A double existence may consequently be attributed to everyone. As Will and therefore as individual he is only one, but as a purely objective perceiver he is the pure Subject of Knowledge in whose consciousness alone the objective world has its existence. It is this objectivity which makes one capable of being an artist, but objectivity is only possible where that intellect, separated from its root, the Will, yet moves freely and acts with the highest degree of energy.

Schopenhauer makes two very bold assertions in his philosophy of art. To him the aesthetic enjoyment of the art-work of man is qualitatively not different from the aesthetic enjoyment of the work of nature. His other assumption is that the condition of the enjoyment of

aesthetic objects is again qualitatively not different from the production of the aesthetic object. We shall return to the former, but as to the latter, Schopenhauer's justification lies in his European view of "genius". To Schopenhauer (and other European thinkers) "genius" can truly be predicated only of the artist. Excellence in mathematics, for example, does not require, or presuppose, genius.

Genius,¹⁴ according to Schopenhauer's conception, consists in the capacity for knowing independent of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, not the individual things which have their existence only in their relations, but the Ideas of such things, and of the Self being the correlative of the Idea, and thus no longer an individual, but the pure Subject of Knowledge. This faculty must exist in all men in a smaller and different degree; if not they would be just as incapable of enjoying works of art as of producing them. They would have no susceptibility for the beautiful or the sublime. These words would have no meaning for them. Schopenhauer therefore assumes that there exists in all men this power of knowing the Ideas in things, and consequently of transcending their personality momentarily. The man of genius excels the ordinary man only by possessing this kind of knowledge in a far higher degree and more continuously.

¹⁴ Ibid., Vol. 11, pp. 429-455 passim, ("Vom Genie").

The rather re-assuring corollary to this conception of genius is that no man is without at least a touch of it. Whatever we think of this conception we can hardly question its validity in the province of aesthetics since it is true that unless every man has a touch of genius the enjoyment of art would be quite impossible. The spectator can enjoy art only in so far and only to such an extent as he himself is an "artist". That does not mean he must be a practicing artist but it does mean he must have some insight into the creative process.

The artistically active genius (as opposed to the mere spectator) retains under the influence of objectivity the presence of mind which is necessary to enable him to repeat in a voluntary and intentional work what he has learned while under the sway of objectivity. This repetition is the work of art. Through this he communicates to others the Idea he has grasped. This Idea remains the same and unchanged so that aesthetic pleasure is one and the same whether it is called forth by a work of art or directly by the contemplation of nature and life. The work of art is only a means of facilitating the knowledge which is the source of this pleasure. The artist merely lets us see the world through his eyes. His gift is inborn, but his ability to lend us this gift, to let us see with his eyes is acquired, and is the technical side of art. Schopenhauer

has little to say about the technical side of art for he does not consider it of prime importance. We shall return to the problem of the medium and Schopenhauer's handling of it after we have presented Schopenhauer's conception of the elevation of the Object.

Genius has yet another instrument at its disposal. If perception were constantly bound to the real presence of things, its material would be entirely under the domain of chance. Therefore imagination is required in order to complete, arrange and give finishing touches to all those significant pictures of life. Only through imagination can genius draw nourishment from the primary source of all knowledge, which is perception. The actual objects of perception, furthermore, are always imperfect copies of the Ideas expressed in them; the man of genius requires therefore imagination in order to see things, not those which nature has actually made, but that which she endeavoured to make yet could not because of that conflict of her forms among themselves.

In the aesthetical mode of contemplation there are, however, (as we said above) two constituent and inseparable parts: the self-consciousness of the knowing person, not as an individual but as the pure Will-less Subject of Knowledge, and the knowledge of the Object, not as an individual thing but as a Platonic Idea. The condition under which both

these constituent parts is realized occurs when the Subject abandons the method of knowing what is of value to the Will and to science, namely, knowledge under the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The pleasure which is produced by the contemplation of the beautiful arises from these two constituent parts, sometimes more from one, sometimes more from the other. The knowledge of the beautiful always presupposes at once and inseparably the pure knowing Subject and the known Idea as object.

The transition to the state of pure perception takes place more easily when the objects bend themselves to it, that is, when by their manifold and yet definite and distinct form they easily become representative of their Ideas. Beauty consists precisely in this. That which raises us from the mere relations subject to the Will to aesthetic contemplation is beauty. When we say that a thing is beautiful we thereby assert that it is an object of aesthetic contemplation. This has a double meaning: it means that the sight of the thing makes us objective (that in contemplating it we are no longer conscious of ourselves as individuals but as pure Will-less Subjects of Knowledge) and it means that we recognize in the object not the particular thing but an Idea.

Since, however, every given thing may be observed in a purely objective manner and apart from all relations, and

since, on the other hand, the Will manifests itself in everything at some grade of its objectification, so that everything is an expression of an Idea, it follows that everything is also potentially or actually beautiful. One thing, however, can be more beautiful than another because it makes this pure objective contemplation easier, it lends itself to it, and even compels it. An individual thing sometimes expresses the Idea of its species in such a distinct way, has the completeness of all possible expressions of its species so united in it, that it makes the transitions from the individual thing to the Idea very easy to the beholder. At other times this possession of beauty in an object lies in the fact that the Idea itself which appeals to us in it is a high degree of the objectification of Will and therefore very significant and expressive. Man is therefore more beautiful than all other objects, and the revelation of his nature is the highest aim of art. Human form and expression, on the other hand, are the most important objects of plastic art, which is an art lower in the hierarchy of the arts, lower than poetry or drama whose main object is the unfolding of human action.

To Schopenhauer, then, that is beautiful which is able to raise us from the mere relations subject to the Will to aesthetic contemplation and thereby to elevate us to the position of the Subject of Knowledge free from the Will.

Should these very objects whose significant forms invite us to pure contemplation have a hostile relation to the human Will in general, as this Will exhibits itself in its objectification in the human body; and should these objects be opposed to it so that it is menaced by them or sinks into insignificance before their immeasurable greatness; and if, nevertheless, the beholder does not direct his attention to this eminently hostile relation to the Will, but, although perceiving and recognizing it, turns consciously away from it, forcibly detaches himself from his Will and its relations, quietly contemplates those very objects that are so terrible to the Will, comprehends only their Idea, and is thereby raised above himself, his person, his Will, and all Will--in that case he is filled with the sense of the sublime, he is in a state of spiritual exaltation, and the object producing such a state may be called "sublime". What distinguishes the sense of the sublime from that of the beautiful is that in the appreciation of beauty, pure knowledge gains the upper hand without a struggle, for the beauty of the object (that property which facilitates the knowledge of the Idea) has removed from consciousness without resistance both the Will and the knowledge of relations which is subject to it, so that what is left is the pure Subject of Knowledge without even a remembrance of Will; in the case of the sublime, on the other hand, that state of pure knowledge is only attained

by a conscious and forcible breaking away from the relations of the same object of the Will, which are recognized as unfavourable, by a free and conscious transcending of the Will and the knowledge related to it. Schopenhauer gives several examples of the sublime; the following is of particular interest to those dwellers on the "endlosen Praerien".

Versetzen wir uns in eine sehr einsame Gegend, mit unbeschränktem Horizont, unter völlig wolkenlosem Himmel, Bäume und Pflanzen in ganz unbewegter Luft, keine Thiere, keine Menschen, keine bewegte Gewässer, die tiefste Stille;--so ist solche Umgebung wie ein Aufruf zum Ernst, zur Kontemplation, mit Losreissung von allem Wollen und dessen Dürstigkeit: eben dieses aber giebt schon einer solchen, bloss einsamen und tiefruhenden Umgebung einen Anstrich des Erhabenen. Denn weil sie für den des steten Strebens und Erreichens bedürftigen Willen keine Objekte darbietet, weder günstige noch ungünstige, so bleibt nur der Zustand der reinen Kontemplation übrig, und wer dieser nicht fähig ist, wird der Leere des nichtbeschäftigten Willens, der Dual der Langeweile, mit beschämender Herabsetzung Preis gegeben. Sie giebt insofern ein Maass unseres eigenen intellektualen Werthes, für welchen überhaupt der Grad unserer Fähigkeit zum Ertragen, oder Lieben der Einsamkeit ein guter Maassstab ist. Die geschilderte Umgebung giebt also ein Beispiel des Erhabenen in niedrigen Grad, indem in ihr dem Zustand des reinen Erkennens, in seiner Ruhe und Allgenugsamkeit, als Kontrast eine Erinnerung an die Abhängigkeit des eines steten Treibens bedürftigen Willens beigemischt ist.--Dies ist die Gattung des Erhabenen, welche dem Anblick der endlosen Praerien im Innern Nord-Amerikas nachgerühmt wird.¹⁵

One would suppose that art achieved the beautiful by imitating nature, but how, Schopenhauer asks, is the artist

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 240-1.

to recognize the perfect work which is to be imitated and how is he to distinguish it from the failures, if he does not anticipate the beautiful before experience? Besides, no knowledge of the beautiful is possible purely a posteriori and from mere experience. It is always at least partly a priori although quite different in kind from the forms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason of which we are conscious a priori as well. These forms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason are concerned with the universal form of phenomena as such, as it constitutes the possibility of knowledge in general. The knowledge a priori which makes it possible to express the beautiful, is concerned not with the form but rather with the content of phenomena, not with the "How" but with the "What" of phenomena. We can anticipate nature in the creation of beauty because we ourselves are Will and this is what nature strives to express. The artist thus surpasses nature in his representation. In true genius this anticipation is accomplished by so great a degree of distinctness that he recognizes the Idea in the particular thing and understands the only half-uttered speech of nature and articulates with precision what she could only stammer forth.

Artistic creation is limited to some extent by the material it deals with and to the plane of objectification with which it is concerned. The various arts represent

the various stages of the existence of Will as viewed by pure intelligence. The arts, therefore, fall into a hierarchical arrangement. For Schopenhauer there is only one end for all the arts--the representation of the Idea. Their essential differences lie simply in the different grades of the objectification of Will to which the Ideas belong which are to be represented. It seems therefore natural for Schopenhauer to say that there is no qualitative difference in aesthetic enjoyment between the works of art and those of Nature. Both are concerned with the same content--the representation of the Ideas.

This view of art is rather one-sided for the end-product of the art-work of man is certainly more "personal" than the art-work of Nature. In the artistic process the creator stands in a more personal relationship to his creation than Schopenhauer would here allow. Schopenhauer's aesthetics is written from the point of view of the spectator (in contradistinction to Nietzsche who writes from the point of view of the artist and criticizes Schopenhauer precisely on this point). Consequently, Schopenhauer stands somewhat "outside" the creative process.

It would be wrong to claim that the aesthetics presented by Schopenhauer in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung constitutes his final verdict. In his essay "Ueber den Willen in der Natur" Schopenhauer indirectly returns to the problem

of the content of art and makes (in a long and difficult passage--Vol. IV, pp. 55-6) some important remarks which can be interpreted as a modification of his views as presented in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. If in art man completes nature's bungled attempts at beauty where, Schopenhauer asks, does our admiration for the consummate perfection and fitness for their ends in all the works of nature come from? Schopenhauer answers that at bottom it is based upon our viewing them in the same light as we do our own works. In the works of man (and this is the important point) the Will to do the work and the work are two different things. Furthermore, between the work itself and the Will to do it lies the medium of representation, which, taken by itself, is foreign to the Will; it is a medium through which the Will must pass before it realizes itself here; and, the material foreign to the will here at work, on which a form has to be forced which it resists because the material already belongs to another Will, that is, to its own Nature. Therefore this material has first to be overcome and, however deeply the artificial form may have penetrated, will always continue to resist inwardly.

It is quite different with Nature's works which are not, like our own, indirect, but direct manifestations of the Will. Here the Will acts in its primordial instinctive nature. No mediating representation separates the Will and

the work--they are one. The distinctive character of Nature's products is the identity of form and substance; that of products of art, the diversity of these two. Now (Schopenhauer would add) it is because we regard Nature's products in the light of the artistic process that we admire the perfection of Nature's own art. In reality there are few difficulties to be overcome in Nature, for matter and form are identical. Schopenhauer's answer to the main problem raised in this context (the source of our admiration for Nature) is for our purpose not immediately important, nor is the problem itself; what is significant is the proof he brings to bear on the problem. That the artist must first master the inherent properties of the material of his art is a significant point to make. The stuff of each art (stone, paint, sounds) has its own Idea and therefore it limits the artist's efforts to a great extent. Consequently, the enjoyment of a work of art done by man has an added feature, qualitatively different from that possessed by Nature's works. This added feature is the triumph of the artist over his material--the beauty contained in the handling of his materials. Schopenhauer would have expanded his theory of aesthetics in the manner above had he taken the trouble to do so for he himself makes room for such an interpretation by distinguishing the arts not only on the basis of the Ideas each aims at expressing but also on the basis of the material each art uses to attain

this expression.

IV. THE HIERARCHY OF THE ARTS

Architecture

Architecture ¹⁶ stands at the bottom of the hierarchy of the arts. When we consider architecture simply as a fine art and apart from its application to useful ends in which it serves the Will and not pure knowledge, it has no other aim than that of giving more distinctness to some of the Ideas which are the lowest grades of the objectivity of Will such as gravity and cohesion, rigidity and hardness. These are the universal properties of stone, the first, simplest and most inarticulate manifestations of Will. Yet even in these low grades of objectivity of Will there is discord. It is the conflict between gravity and rigidity which is the sole aesthetic material of architecture. Its problem is to make this conflict apparent with perfect distinctness in a multitude of different ways. Architecture solves the problem by depriving these indestructible forces of the shortest way to their satisfaction and conducting them to their resolution by a circuitous route so that the conflict is lengthened and the inexhaustible efforts of both forces become visible in different ways. The purely aesthetic aim of architecture can

¹⁶Ibid., Vol. 11, pp. 468-77.

do no more than this. Architecture could easily dispense with decoration and extraneous ornament for these things really belong to sculpture proper.

In order to understand the aesthetic satisfaction afforded by a work of architecture we must have immediate knowledge through perception of its matter as regards weight, rigidity and cohesion. No real work of architecture as a fine art can be made of wood. What speaks to us in architecture is not mere form and symmetry but rather the fundamental forces of nature, for even ruins are still beautiful.

Works of architecture have further, a special relation to light. They gain a double beauty in the full sunshine and have quite a different effect in moonlight. In the erection of a work of architecture special attention is always to be paid to the effects of light and the climate, for under good conditions architecture can follow its own aesthetic ends. The main purpose of light is to reveal more clearly the relations that exist in a piece of architecture. But it is also the function of architecture to reveal the nature of light. Light itself stands at the opposite pole to gravity and rigidity. In viewing a piece of architecture the subjective impression is the predominant one and is distinguished from drama where the aesthetic pleasure afforded lies in its objective side. Furthermore, architecture is

is distinguished from plastic art and poetry in that it does not give us a copy but the thing itself. It presents the object itself to the spectator and lets the spectator derive the Idea for himself. The artistic arrangement of water has many similarities to architecture. What architecture accomplishes for the Idea of gravity when it appears in connection with that of gravity, "hydraulics" accomplishes for the same Idea, when it is connected with fluidity and formlessness.

The idea which architecture seeks to bring to distinct perception is (to express it in yet another way) support and burden. Its fundamental law is that no burden shall be without sufficient support and no support without a suitable burden. Schopenhauer's aesthetics on the whole is in direct opposition to that of Kant which places the nature of all beauty in an apparent design without an end. Schopenhauer's aesthetics would also seem to have no place for an "art for art's sake" type of aesthetic activity.

Schopenhauer makes an essential distinction between ancient architecture and Gothic architecture. He does not deny that Gothic architecture possesses beauty but this beauty of the Gothic style is hardly of the status of ancient architecture. The pleasure in Gothic works depends for the most part upon the association of ideas and historical reminiscences and upon a feeling which is foreign to art.

Gravity and rigidity are in Gothic architecture no longer the basic theme. Only the ancient style of architecture is conceived in a purely objective spirit; the Gothic style is conceived in a more subjective spirit. If, however, in ancient architecture the particular aesthetic fundamental thought is the unfolding of the conflict between rigidity and gravity, the theme exhibited in the Gothic style is the entire overcoming and conquest of gravity by rigidity. In antique architecture the tendency and pressure is from above downwards and from below upwards; in Gothic, the latter decidedly predominates. Whereas the conflict between rigidity and gravity which is handled in the antique style is an actual and true conflict founded in nature, the overcoming of gravity as portrayed in the Gothic style, remains a mere appearance, a fiction accredited by illusion.

Sculpture

In sculpture¹⁷ beauty and grace are the principal elements. The special character of the mind appearing in emotion and passion can only be represented by the expression of the countenance and gestures which are the peculiar domain of painting. Although eyes and colour contribute much to beauty they lie outside the province of sculpture and are far more essential to character, and thus

¹⁷Ibid., Vol. 11, pp. 478-83.

to painting. Furthermore, beauty unfolds itself more completely when it is contemplated from various points of view; expression and character can only be completely comprehended from one point of view.

Because beauty and grace are the principal things in sculpture, painting can neglect it to a great extent. Painting, on the other hand, may present ugly faces and emaciated figures; sculpture demands beauty, although perhaps not always perfect beauty. It also demands strength and fulness of figure. A thin Christ upon the Cross, a dying St. Jerome wasted by age and disease is a proper subject for painting; while, on the contrary, such representation in sculpture has a repulsive effect. From this point of view sculpture seems suitable for the affirmation, painting for the negation of the Will to live. This is also why sculpture was the art of the ancients, while painting has been the predominant art of the Christian era.

Now because beauty accompanied by grace is the principal object of sculpture, it loves nakedness and allows clothing only in so far as it does not conceal the form. It makes use of drapery not as a covering but as a means of exhibiting the form. Drapery is suggestive in sculpture and not symbolical. The symbolical is outside the province of sculpture. Greek sculpture which devotes itself mainly to the perception is aesthetic; Indian sculpture which devotes

itself to the conception is merely symbolical.

Painting

The effect produced by a painting would, according to Schopenhauer's thesis, depend upon the subjects it treats of. In landscape painting where the chief element is unconscious nature the predominant impression is a subjective one--a feeling of pure knowledge or deep spiritual peace. In the painting of animal life a far higher grade of the objectification of Will is revealed and thus the objective side of the aesthetic impression comes to the front and assumes as much importance as the subjective side.

Historical painting expresses directly and for perception the Idea in which the Will reaches the highest grade of its objectivity. Whereas in animal painting the characteristic to be aimed at is the character of the species, in the representation of man, individual character is sought. No event of human life is excluded from the sphere of painting. Unlike the still higher arts, painting tries to fix the fleeting, ever-changing world in the enduring picture of a single event, which yet represents the whole. It brings time itself to a standstill. Painting thus follows the Will in its adequate objectivity, the Ideas, through all the grades in which its nature unfolds itself.

Allegories in plastic and pictorial art are nothing but hieroglyphics. Allegories originate in a conception

rather than in a perception. If an allegorical picture has artistic value, it is quite separate from, and independent of, what it accomplishes as allegory.

The painter, considered only in so far as he aims at producing the appearance of reality, achieves his ends by understanding how to separate what in seeing is the mere sensation (the effect) from the cause, the objective external world. If he has technical skill he can produce the same effect in the eye through an entirely different cause--the patches of applied paint. Painting has also an independent beauty of its own besides that of presenting the Idea, and this is produced by the mere harmony of colours, the pleasing aspects of the grouping, the happy distribution of light and shade, and the tone of the whole picture. This accompanying subordinate kind of beauty furthers the condition of pure knowing and is in painting what diction, metre and rhyme are in poetry; both are not that which is essential, but that which acts, first and immediately.

In the representation of the lower grades of the objectivity of Will, plastic and pictorial art generally surpass poetry. In the representation of man himself, poetry finds its element, an element in which no other art can compete with it, for where progress, movement and action are the main agents they cannot be represented by the plastic and pictorial arts.

Allegory has an entirely different relation to poetry than to plastic and pictorial art and although to be rejected in the latter is very serviceable to the former. In plastic and pictorial art, allegory leads away from what is perceptibly given (which is the proper object of all art) to abstract thoughts, but in poetry the relation is reversed, for what is directly given in words is the concept, and the first aim is to lead from this to the object of perception. In the arts which employ language as their medium, similes and allegories are of striking effect.

Poetry

Schopenhauer defines poetry¹⁸ as the art of bringing the imagination into play by means of words. Now it is the imagination of the reader which is the material in which poetry exhibits its pictures. As such, poetry has an advantage over the plastic and pictorial arts, for in them one picture and one form must satisfy all. Not so poetry, where types of imagination are as numerous as desire to participate. This explains to some extent why works of poetry exercise a much stronger effect than pictures and statues.

Rhythm and rhyme are striking aids to poetry. They are a means of holding our attention partly because we willingly follow the poem read, and partly because they

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 484-501.

produce in us a blind consent to what is read prior to any judgment. This gives the poem a certain emphatic power of conviction independent of reason. A happily rhymed verse by its concentration has an emphatic effect which produces the feeling that the thought expressed in the verse lay predestined and the poet has only had to find it. Even trivial thoughts receive their significance through rhythm and rhyme. Schopenhauer explains this as being due to the fact that what is given directly to the sense of hearing (mere sound of words) receives from rhythm and rhyme a certain completeness and meaning for it becomes thereby a kind of music and exists for its own sake and no longer as a mere means to an end. The sign by which one most immediately recognizes the genuine poet is the unforced flow and nature of his rhymes. His thoughts come to him in a rhymed pattern. The prosaic poet seeks the rhyme for the thought, the bungler the thought for the rhyme.

The distinction between classic and romantic poetry depends upon the fact that the former knows no other motives than those which are purely human, actual and natural; the latter considers artificial, conventional and imaginary motives as efficient. To these belong the motives which spring from Christian beliefs, chivalry, the veneration of women and "hyperphysical amorousness". Classic poetry remains true to nature and aims at untarnished truth and

precision; Romantic poetry only knows conditional truth. The two are analgous to Greek and Gothic architecture.

Just as the subjective element predominates in the lyrical poem so in drama the objective is alone and exclusively present. Between the two lies epic poetry in all its forms and modifications, from the narrative romance to the epic proper. For although it is in the main objective, yet it contains a subjective element, appearing in variously pronounced degrees. In the epic we do not lose sight of the poet to the same extent as in the drama. The end of drama in general is to show us in an example what is the nature, the essence of man. The sad or the bright side can be developed, or their transitions into each other. The common end of both drama and epic is to exhibit significant characters placed in significant situations, the extraordinary actions brought about by both. This will be most completely attained by the poet if he first introduces the characters to us in a state of peace and harmony in which merely their general temper becomes visible and allows a motive to enter which produces an action. Out of this action arises a new and stronger motive whereby in time the most passionate excitement takes the place of the originally peaceful conditions. In this turmoil of events the qualities of the characters which have hitherto remained in a slumbering condition are brought to life. Great poets transform them-

selves into each of the persons to be represented and speak out of each of them like ventriloquists; so Shakespeare and Goethe. Poets of the second rank transform the principal person to be represented into themselves: so Byron.

Comedy

Schopenhauer's theory of the ludicrous centres on the opposition between perceptible and abstract ideas. The incongruity of sensuous and abstract knowledge is the cause of laughter. Laughter is the sudden perception of the incongruity between a concept and the real objects which have been subsumed under the concept in some relation. Laughter is the tangible expression of this incongruity. All laughter is thus occasioned by a paradox, by an unexpected subsumption--whether this be expressed in words or in actions--of an object under a conception which in other respects is different from this object. The spirit of laughter is the spirit of Comedy.

The fundamental theme of most comedies is the appearance of the species, and its aims and purposes are opposed to the general interest of the individuals presented and therefore threaten to undermine their happiness. Comedy attains the end which in accordance with poetic justice satisfies the spectator when he feels that the aims and purposes of the species are to be given preference to those of the individual. Therefore at the conclusion the spectator

leaves the victorious lovers confidently as he shares with them the illusion that they have founded their own happiness, while rather they have sacrificed theirs to the choice of the species against the will and foresight of their elders.

Tragedy

The end of tragedy is the representation of the terrible side of life. In tragedy the strife of the Will with itself is completely unfolded at the highest grade of its objectivity. The complete knowledge of the nature of the world which has a quieting effect on the Will produces resignation, the surrender not merely of life, but of the very Will to live. The true sense of tragedy is the deeper insight that it is not his own individual sins that the hero atones for, but original sin, the crime of existence itself. Our pleasure in tragedy belongs not to the sense of the beautiful, but to that of the sublime. Just as in the sight of the sublime in nature we turn away from the interests of the Will, so in the tragic catastrophe the conviction becomes ever more distinct to us that life is a bad dream from which we have to awake.

Schopenhauer believes that there is only one inborn error--that we exist in order to be happy. The peculiar effect of the tragic drama lies ultimately in the fact that it undermines this inborn error by presenting in a great and striking example the vanity of human effort and the

nothingness of the whole of existence. Only Greek paganism and Islamism are entirely optimistic and therefore in the former the opposite tendency had to find expression at least in tragedy. But the Greeks were far from the Christian and Asiatic conception of the world, and although they decidedly asserted the Will were yet deeply affected by the wretchedness of existence. As the ancients show submission only to inevitable fate but no surrender of the Will to live itself, while Christian tragedy shows the surrender of the whole Will to live and the joyful forsaking of the world in the consciousness of its worthlessness and vanity, modern tragedy stands higher than that of the ancients. Shakespeare is much greater than Sophocles and in comparison with Goeth's Iphigenia, Euripides is almost crude and vulgar. The ancients had really not yet attained to the summit and goal of tragedy, nor to that view of life itself. Still, even though the ancients displayed little of the spirit of resignation in their tragic heroes themselves, the peculiar tendency and effect of tragedy remains, for it awakens that spirit in the spectator. The Greek poet presents, so to speak, the premisses and leaves the conclusion to the spectator. Fear and pity, in the excitement of which Aristotle places the ultimate end of tragedy, certainly do not in themselves belong to the agreeable sensations, therefore they cannot be the end, but only the means toward the true, tragic impression.

If the tendency and ultimate intention of tragedy lies in a turning to resignation, in a denial of the Will to live, the tendency in comedy lies in the ultimate assertion of the Will to live. Comedy, like every representation of human life, must bring before our eyes suffering and adversity, but it presents it to us as passing and resolving itself into joy. It declares that life as a whole is thoroughly good and is always amusing. Comedy is based upon an error in the judgment of life. It is good that the curtain is brought down in time, for there is still another act to be played.

Our discussion of Schopenhauer's conception of tragedy would not be complete without at least a few comparative references to the place of tragedy in Hegel's system. At a first glance the similarities to be found are rather striking. There are, however, marked divergences.

Hegel's Theory of Tragedy

According to Hegel¹⁹ the first mode in which the mind apprehends the Absolute is in immediacy--thus the Absolute manifests itself under the guise of external sense-objects. The emergence of the Absolute, or the Idea, through the veils of the sense-world is what Hegel calls beauty. To the idea of Beauty it is essential that the object should be sensuous,

¹⁹What follows is taken mainly from Hegel's Preface to Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns Verlag, 1927), Vol. 12 of Hegel Sämtliche Werke.

individual and concrete. Abstraction has no place in the world of beauty. The Beautiful object, however, addresses itself not only to the senses but also to the mind or spirit. Mere sensuous existence as such is not beautiful. It is only beautiful when the mind perceives the Idea as it shines through the object.

The sublime is distinguished from the beautiful in that it attempts to express the infinite without being able to find any sensuous medium which is adequate to express it. The truly sublime breaks and shatters every form in which we seek to enclose it. The strictly beautiful, on the contrary, consists in the way in which the Absolute finds its complete expression in a sensuous embodiment--the two sides being full and in harmonious accord.

Since the content of art is in all cases the same (Idea), the differences between the arts must reside in the sensuous medium employed. The arts are classified according to the different material media through which the Idea makes itself visible. So far the similarities between Schopenhauer and Hegel are indeed considerable. Let us, however, see what type of conclusions Hegel derives from these primary propositions.

Because the work of art is to be infinite, free and self-determined, Hegel postulates, the artist takes his subject matter from the heroic age--here characters appear

free, self-determined and independent. While art depicts its characters as subject to pain, suffering and disaster it will never exhibit them as wholly overwhelmed. The destruction of the mere physical life is shown in tragedy but not the destruction of their spiritual freedom. Universal emotions, such as love, devotion to honour are shown in tragedy to be rational and essentially justifiable. Schopenhauer would disagree on all these points.

According to Hegel, we have in dramatic poetry the divine spirit passing out of the repose of its universality into the sphere of particularity and division and therefore running into contradiction with itself. But the manifestation of the Idea, which is the raison d'être of art, is not complete until the Idea has returned into itself out of division. In the dénouement of the drama, therefore, the contradiction exemplified by the collision of forces must necessarily be resolved. The catastrophe must therefore show the divine as justifying itself. In tragedy we have the collision of two such (love, loyalty) eternal principles, each of which is in its own part, right and just. In this respect Nietzsche's theory of tragedy (that the Dionysian reveals the contradiction at the core of reality and that the Apollonian heals the wound which is thus exposed) comes a great deal closer to Hegel's theory than does Schopenhauer's even though Schopenhauer also believes that there is

contradiction within the Will itself.

The truly tragic character, according to Hegel, is one who, although a genuine individual with a wealth of subordinate traits, essentially embodies some such ethical force (love, loyalty, etc.), commits himself to it, and carries it through with uncompromising self-consistency to the end. He therefore comes into collision with other particular ethical forces. Because each is one-sided, because it negates and denies the other equally legitimate power, it comes under condemnation. What is abrogated in the tragic issue is not the ethical principle itself, argues Hegel (and Schopenhauer would disagree), but merely its false and one-sided particularity. The absolute truth, the Idea, the eternal justice, restores itself, restores its ethical substance and unity by means of the downfall of the individuality which has disturbed its repose. According to Schopenhauer, on the other hand, the representation of a great misfortune is alone essential to tragedy, and the just and innocent overtaken by calamity are tragic cases. Schopenhauer believes that there are three types of tragedy: (1) the calamity may come about through the agency of a character supremely eminent in wickedness (this is excluded by Hegel), (2) through the agency of blind Fate (unacceptable by Hegel whose Absolute is a rational Being), and (3) through the relations in which the dramatis personae stand to each other (and here, as we

have seen, there are great differences in interpretation between Hegel and Schopenhauer).

A passing reference to Hegel's conception of comedy may be justified for, strange as it may seem, Hegel's conception of comedy comes closer to Schopenhauer's conception of tragedy than does his (Hegel's) conception of tragedy itself! Hegel argues that in comedy the universal is again shown to be justified but in a different manner. Comedy justifies ethical worth by exposing the hollowness and emptiness of whatever is worthless. Either the comic character arrives at some end which is without real content, empty, and vain and which thus collapses--or, he aims at some genuinely substantive end, but his own individuality is too small a means to be used as an instrument for the attainment of such an end, so that his pretensions come to nothing. In either case the comic character fails, in the first instance because his aim is worthless, in the second because his means are insufficient.

Music

Music²⁰ stands alone in the hierarchy of the arts. All the other arts objectify the Will indirectly, only by means of the Ideas. Music however is the direct objectification and copy of the Will. Music, unlike the other arts which are mere copies of the Ideas, is the copy of the Will itself.

²⁰Op. cit., pp. 511-523.

That is why the effect of music is so much more powerful and penetrating than that of the other arts. Because music is a direct expression of Will Schopenhauer can only discuss it in terms of an analogy. Melody, he says, has a significant intentional connection from beginning to end. It records the history of the intellectually enlightened Will, its striving and satisfaction. The composition reveals the inner natures of the world and expresses the deepest wisdom in a language which reason does not understand. In the composer more than in any other artist, the man is entirely separate and distinct from the artist.

The phenomenal world and music are two different expressions of the same thing. Music as an expression of the world is in the highest degree a universal language. We could just as well call the world embodied music as embodied Will. Melody consists of two elements, the one rhythmical, the other harmonious. The former may be described as the quantitative, the latter as the qualitative element, since the first is concerned with duration, and the second with the pitch of the notes. In the writing of music the former depends upon the perpendicular, and the latter upon the horizontal lines. Purely arithmetical relations (relations of time) lie at the foundation of both; in the one case the relative duration of the notes; in the other the relative rapidity of their vibrations. The rhythmical element is

the essential one for it can produce a kind of melody of itself alone and without the other, as for example, on the drum. Complete melody requires both. Melody consists in an alternating disunion and reconciliation of rhythm and harmony, producing dissonance and consonance. A succession of merely consonant chords would be satiating, wearisome, and empty, like the languor produced by the satisfaction of all wishes. Therefore dissonance must be introduced, although they disquiet us and affect us as being almost painful, but only in order to be resolved again in consonance with proper preparation. In the whole of music there are only two fundamental chords, the dissonant chord of the seventh, and the consonant triad, to which all chords that occur can be referred. This just corresponds to the fact that for the Will there are at bottom only dissatisfaction and satisfaction, under however many forms they may present themselves. Just as there are two general fundamental moods of the mind, serenity and sadness, music too, has two general keys or "modes", the major and the minor which correspond to these, and it must be in one of the two.

Rhythm itself is in time what symmetry is in space. In the series of the arts architecture and music are the two extreme ends. They are two antipodes and this extends even to the form of their appearance, for architecture is in space alone without any connection with time, and music is in time alone, without any connection with space. From this

springs their one point of analogy; as in architecture what orders and holds together is symmetry, in music it is rhythm. Here, then, the two extremes meet. The only difference between the two is that architecture is exclusively in space while music is exclusively in time. Schopenhauer verifies the phrase that architecture is "frozen music".

Summary

To Schopenhauer the creation of the world by the Will is a lapse from which redemption must be sought. To him the artist can achieve salvation only momentarily. He achieves that by projecting both himself and the world onto another plane, another stage and viewing human existence from that elevation. It is in this sense that Schopenhauer uses the image of the stage upon the stage in Hamlet as an "objective correlative" for art--as Eliot understands the term. The saint, on the other hand, can achieve a lasting salvation. A discussion of this would lead us into Schopenhauer's ethics, which is outside our interests here. Schopenhauer's ethics is also outside the stream of Western thought since it is centred in a conception of "Consciousness" derived from Buddhist thought which in the time of Schopenhauer was slowly making an impression on Western civilization. Yet it would be wrong to think that Schopenhauer's conception of consciousness as he discusses it in terms of his ethics was identical with consciousness as conceived in his epistemology.

Schopenhauer's epistemology, metaphysics and, to a lesser extent, his aesthetics is a development out of the Kantian predicament. In his ethics Schopenhauer merely shows us the possibilities of the human mind as conceived by another cultural development.

Schopenhauer, unshaken by thirty years of public apathy to his philosophy declared: "I must die before I can be born. My burial will be my baptism". It is a re-birth of Schopenhauer that we find in Nietzsche.

CHAPTER II

NIETZSCHE'S THEORY OF ART

I. LANGUAGE AS AN APPROXIMATION TO REALITY

Nietzsche began his career as a classical scholar with the publication of two essays in the learned journal the Rheinischen Museum. One was written when Nietzsche was only twenty years old ("De Theognide Megrensi"), the other, written three years later ("De Laerti Diogenis fontibus") was published in 1867. These early attempts were of such a high quality that they are still referred to to-day. On the basis of this early work he was appointed (on the recommendation of Ritschl, whose favourite pupil Nietzsche was) to the chair of classical philology at Basel University in 1869. His inaugural lecture "Homer und die classische Philologie"¹ (published only much later in 1896), boldly treats the subject in that unacademic manner which is characteristic of the later Nietzsche. The stand Nietzsche here takes is that scholars must accept the judgment of the artist.

The numerous studies of Nietzsche tend to give a rather one-sided view of him. All too frequently they are

¹All references are to volume and page of the Musarion edition of the Gesammelte Werke.

concerned with Nietzsche's political and ethical speculations without giving sufficient emphasis to his aesthetic doctrines, which comprise roughly one-fourth of his total output and constitute the basis of his later thought. Nietzsche began his philosophical investigations with an aesthetic problem and ended his career with a solution drawn from his earlier thinking on aesthetics. Our task will be to concentrate on an analysis of his aesthetics.

Nietzsche's first published book was Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geist der Musik. It was written between 1869 and 1871. A second edition appeared in 1878 while the first was still in print. In 1886 a Preface was added to the remaining copies of both editions, and the title was changed to Die Geburt der Tragödie oder Griechentum und Pessimismus. The first edition, which was published on the last day of 1871 but dated 1872, was based on lectures which Nietzsche delivered on Greek tragedy at the University. The direction of his thought in this published work was however slightly altered in favour of Wagner's place in the history of art. On its appearance the book was severely criticized by no less a scholar than Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, a former student-friend of Nietzsche's, who destroyed its value for his generation. Nietzsche's friends Rohde and Wagner tried to counter this criticism. Nietzsche at the time did not publish any defence of his position. In the following years,

however, he developed more thoroughly in the style of Schopenhauer the basic conceptions contained in a highly intuitive approach to the problems of aesthetics. In 1873 he added the historical justification for the urgent postulates advanced in Die Geburt in an essay (published in 1896) entitled "Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen".² During the same period he also wrote some fragments which take up the argument of Die Geburt, placing it in a wider philosophical frame. Among the more important and complete ones are: "Ueber Musik und Wort" (1871)³ and "Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne".⁴ It is to these that we must turn first.

Like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche takes his epistemology from Kant. However, to a greater extent than Schopenhauer, Nietzsche tries to emphasize the "human all-too-human aspect" involved in knowing. In the essay "Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge" the human intellect is taken by Nietzsche as being transitory and purposeless. There were eternities during which this intellect did not exist, and, Nietzsche adds, there will be nothing to show that it had existed when it will have passed

²Vol. IV, pp. 149-243. Gerald Abraham (Nietzsche, p. 67) realized that this essay was written with this purpose in mind.

³Vol. III, pp. 339-355.

⁴Vol. VI, pp. 75-92.

away. According to Schopenhauer the world was just as dependent upon the Subject as the Subject was upon the world (the Object), but to Nietzsche the intellect is purely human and no one but its owner supposes that the world revolves around it. It is only the vanity of the intellect which leads it to believe that the world exists only through it. This general deceptive tendency of the intellect works havoc in the cognition of the details of life as well. Nietzsche begins by accepting Schopenhauer's view that the intellect serves to preserve the individual (is in the service of the Will) but develops the concept in accordance with his own temper by insisting that it is through its power of dissimulation that it is in the main enabled to do so. It is by dissimulation that the feeble and less robust individuals preserve themselves, since it has been denied to them to fight the battle of existence with the horns or the sharp teeth of beasts of prey.

In man the art of dissimulation has reached such an acme of perfection that Nietzsche wonders how an honest and pure impulse to truth could ever have arisen at all. Man is deeply immersed in illusions and dream-fancies. His eyes glance over the surface of things and see only their "forms", their shells. Nature has locked man up in "delusive knowledge" and through these means allowed him to preserve himself. This is strictly true, however, only when man acts

under the compulsion of necessity. When he declares peace and wishes to live a social and gregarious life he takes a step toward what may seem to be the attainment of truth. A uniformly valid and binding designation of things is invented and language arises, stating for the first time the contrast between truth and falsity and formulating for the first time the laws of truth. This is how Nietzsche conceives of truth and falsity in their ultra-moral sense. Man at this stage desires truth because of its agreeable, life-preserving consequences. This is already a higher level of truth-seeking than that found possible in an original state. Even at this higher level, however, man is still indifferent towards pure, ineffective knowledge. He is even inimical to pure truths which, he fears, may possibly prove harmful to him. The problem then arises whether these conventions of language are adequate expressions of the realities they designate.

Man deceives himself when he thinks he possesses "truth" in the absolute sense of the word. Man, even in his higher social existence, grasps at illusions instead of truth. Nietzsche proceeds to ask: What is a word? The different languages placed side by side show that with words truth or adequate expression matters little, for otherwise there would not be so many languages attempting to express the same thing. The "thing-in-itself" (pure,

ineffective truth) remains incomprehensible to the creator of language. He designates only the relations of things to each other--in Schopenhauer's terms, the relations covered by the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Nietzsche goes beyond Schopenhauer when he adds that the creator of language also designates the relations of things to man. He accepts Schopenhauer's dictum that between the Subject and the Object there is no causal relationship, but here again he goes beyond Schopenhauer when he establishes an aesthetical relationship. When we talk about trees, colours, snow and flowers, Nietzsche argues, we believe we know something about the things themselves, and yet we only possess metaphors of the things. These metaphors do not in the least correspond to the original essentials. By means of these metaphors we only express "concepts" (Begriffe) which in no way originate from the essence of things. The genesis of language did not proceed on logical grounds and the whole material in which the man of truth, the philosopher, builds does not find its origin in the realities which it designates. Only when man forgets that original world of metaphors and forgets that he is only an artistically creating subject can he achieve a measure of peace. Nietzsche does not let us forget that our relationship with reality is only an aesthetic one and that we create our own reality and illusions.

Is the formation of pure ideas any different?

Nietzsche answers: Every word becomes an idea not by serving as a reminder for the original individualized experience but by having to fit simultaneously innumerable, more or less similar, cases. Every idea originates through equating the unequal. We get to know nothing about the essential qualities of our experiences through our ideas. Nature on her part knows no forms or ideas. Nature knows only an X which is inaccessible and indefinable. What then is truth? Truth as we know it is only the sum total of relations which become poetically and rhetorically intensified. "Die Wahreiten sind Illusionen, von denen man vergessen hat, dass sie welche sind".⁵ Schopenhauer, Nietzsche might say, has a tendency to forget that truth is only an illusion, although he did realize that the knowledge which results from the Principle of Sufficient Reason is far removed from the Real.

To be truthful means, in one sense, to accept the obligations society imposes in order to exist. Through this feeling of being obliged to designate one thing as "red", another as "liar" there is aroused a moral emotion relating to truth. The words take on a moral colouring. Man constructs a "Schema" out of the mass of impressions which he receives through his senses. This "Schema" assumes the appearance of being more fixed, more general than the original

⁵Vol. VI, p. 81.

mass of impressions really are. Truth in this "Schema" means merely to use every designation with a certain amount of dexterity.

The need of the human mind which is served by the effort to know and to formulate knowledge is that of imposing Being (the image of the stable ego) on the process of Becoming. But since the ego or knowing subject is itself a process, the effort is really a falsification. In his later thought Nietzsche elaborates this basic core of his epistemological speculations and considers Will and Power as being imposed and projected out of the ego upon the World of Becoming. Thus in life there exist only unique individual relations, interpretations and evaluations. The nearest we ever get to truth is the consistent Will cleaving to the same evaluations. Now the "truths" of science which merely arise out of the "Schemata" of ideas are consequently quite worthless as an aid for reaching ultimate reality. Our impulse to create metaphors brings us much closer to ultimate reality. This latter impulse seeks for itself a new sphere of action, which is the realm of Art. In another⁶ place Nietzsche compares art and science and concludes both have this in common, that the most ordinary, everyday thing appears to them as something entirely new and attractive, as if

⁶"Homer und die classische Philologie", Vol. II, p. 6.

metamorphosed by witchcraft and now seen for the first time. "Life is worth living" is the tenet of art; "life is worth knowing" is the tenet of science. By having an invincible tendency to be deceived man is in an admirable position to be affected by art and is carried closer to the Reality of existence than is possible by means of science. The tendency for truth is for Nietzsche synonymous with the tendency to create.

Life and science, according to Nietzsche, are not possible without imaginary and false conceptions. Nietzsche arrives at this conclusion by carrying out the implications contained in Kant and Schopenhauer's philosophy. Kant had taught that the human mind contributes its share to the perception of the outer world. Schopenhauer, starting from Kant, had relegated this contribution of the human mind under the Fourfold Root and assigned its sphere of action to science. Nietzsche goes a step further and says that the same process is at work even in art (the sphere of Schopenhauer's eternal Platonic Ideas). If everything that becomes the object of cognition is only our idea and the Forms of the ideas magically produce the content, it follows that everything which consciousness represents to itself is only a delusion. Thus, over the world of reality (the noumenal world in Kant's terms and the world of Becoming in Nietzsche's) there is set up in the interests of the understanding a world of Being

(an illusory world) in which everything appears rounded off and complete. This intentional adherence to illusion in spite of the realization of its nature is a "lie" in the ultra-moral sense. Art which tries to capture the spirit of the world of Becoming is in a sense also a "lie" for it too tries to bring the process to a standstill. Lying in this sense is, however, indispensable and justified. The truths of art are nevertheless a greater approximation to the reality of existence than those of science and are therefore more justifiable. Art, furthermore, stands at a higher level than science because it makes the recognition of the illusive nature of the knowing process endurable.

Vaihinger found his own theory of fictions confirmed by Nietzsche. His chapter on Nietzsche in The Philosophy of 'As If'⁷ is the most illuminating account of one section of Nietzsche's thought that we have. Our only argument with Vaihinger is that he has stressed the "falsity" of fictions at the expense of its "truth-value" in the approximation of reality and has confused the impulse to metaphors as creative in the aesthetic sense (the sense in which Nietzsche uses it) with that of the utilitarian sense, a sense in which Vaihinger himself uses it and into which he makes Nietzsche fit. Walter Kaufmann's criticism of Vaihinger's supposed

⁷P. 82.

"misleading picture to the uninitiate"⁸ is applicable under these conditions alone. Vaihinger's own treatment of fictions is relevant to our purposes. He says of aesthetic fictions that they "serve the purpose of awakening within us certain uplifting or otherwise important feelings". Nietzsche would agree.

II. MUSICAL TONE AS SUBSTRATUM

The essay "Ueber Musik und Wort", which was written before the one just discussed, is most valuable for our purpose in that it paints in the metaphysical background to the epistemology outlined above. Nietzsche compares the relationship existing between language and music with that between language and mime. Just as mime (which is the intensified symbol of man's gestures) brings to expression the innermost meaning of music but only externally, that is, on the substratum of the human body, so language (being also in the category of bodily symbolism) achieves a similar expression out of the depths of music.

Music as a folk-phenomenon begins as a mixed form of lyricism and it must pass through several stages before it can be considered absolute music. This initial lyricism

⁸ Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, p. 104n.

is basically only an imitation of an original prototype of the union of music and lyricism to be found in the duality of language itself. By discussing the relation of music to metaphor Nietzsche hopes to fathom the essence of language itself as an approximation to Reality. Whereas in the previous essay we have noted Nietzsche's conception of language as an epistemological tool, we now turn to his consideration of language, which for him borders on metaphysics.

Through the fact of the multiplicity of languages we have seen that word and thing do not necessarily coincide with one another completely. The word, according to Nietzsche, in fact only symbolizes "conceptions" (Begriffe) and never the innermost nature of things. It is therefore only through "conceptions" and metaphorical expressions that we become familiar with the essence of things. There is no other bridge between us and things. Even Schopenhauer's "Will", according to Nietzsche's interpretation of it, when it becomes known to us is already a Begriff (a conception). There are, however, two main species within the realm of this general Begriff. The two manifest themselves to us as pleasure and displeasure sensations and accompany all other Begriffe as a never-lacking fundamental basis. This two-fold manifestation, which Nietzsche equates with Schopenhauer's "Will", has in language its own symbolic sphere. All degrees

of pleasure and displeasure sensations (both of which are expressions of the one primal cause which in itself is unfathomable) symbolize themselves in the tone of the speaker. Begriffe other than those directly related to the pleasure and displeasure basis are indicated by the "gesture symbolism" of the speaker. Since the primal cause is constant in all men, the "tonal subsoil" (which is its immediate manifestation) is common to all languages and is comprehensible beyond the differences in languages. Out of this tonal subsoil the more arbitrary gesture-symbolism is developed which in itself is not an adequate expression of the tonal subsoil. With this development now begins the diversity of languages whose multiplicity forms a text to the primal melody of the pleasure and displeasure basis.

Nietzsche considers consonants and vowels under the heading of gesture symbolism. Consonants and vowels without the fundamental tone are nothing but positions of the organs of speech, thus merely gestures. As soon, however, as the word is formed by the mouth of man, the basis of the gesture symbolism, the tonal subsoil (which is the echo of the pleasure-displeasure sensations) comes to the surface. Nietzsche speaks of the biological nature of this event in Schopenhauer's terms.

Wie sich unsre ganze Leiblichkeit zu jener ursprünglichsten Erscheinungsform, dem "Willen" verhält, sich dass consonantische-vocalische Wort zu seinem Tonfundamente.⁹

⁹Vol. III, p. 342.

Schopenhauer's dictum that the body is an expression of the Will is accepted by Nietzsche but he builds upon this foundation his own metaphysical aesthetic view through an analogy by saying that the word which is constructed from consonants and vowels stands in a similar relation to its tonal basis (the "Will"). The word, then, is the phenomenal expression of the tonal subsoil.

The original phenomenon of "Will" with its scale of pleasure-displeasure sensations attains in the development of music a much more adequate symbolic expression than is possible for it in language alone. Now the efforts of lyric poetry in its attempts to transcribe music into metaphors and to reach thereby an adequate expression are really a perversion since music itself is the most adequate expression of the tonal subsoil of the Will that we have. The metaphors which are created from music are mere "Schemata", instances of the "Will's" general contents. Nietzsche consequently raises in this context an aesthetic question of considerable import. If what he says is correct, how is it possible to release the music of a poem? How should the Apollonian (gesture symbolism) be able to create out of itself the tonal subsoil (the Dionysian substratum)? What is the relationship between lyric poetry and its setting in music, between the Apollonian and the Dionysian? Nietzsche discounts the view that it is the sentiment created by the poem

which gives birth to the setting, for he believes that it is precisely the powerful stirring-up of the pleasure-displeasure sensations which in the realm of productive art is the element which is inartistic in itself. In the spirit of Schopenhauer (though with a difference) he says that it is only its total exclusion which makes the complete self-absorption and disinterested perception of the artist possible. Feeling can thus neither be the origin of the setting nor its object (its goal) for even as object feeling is already permeated and saturated with conscious and unconscious conceptions.

This leads Nietzsche to the question of the origin of music itself. He is emphatic in stressing that its origin does not lie in "Will". "Will", however, is the object of music; it is what music tries to express. Music, on the other hand, originates in that force which also appears in the guise of the "Will" and which is beyond all individuation. To Nietzsche "Will" cannot be the ultimate essence for it is already in a state of a phenomenon (Vorstellung), being the phenomenal form of a 'Something' which is in itself inexplicable. While writing a setting to a lyric poem the musician is moved neither through the images nor through the emotional language in the text, but a musical inspiration coming from quite a different sphere chooses for itself that song-text for the purpose of an allegorical expression.

Thus there is no necessary relation between poem and music, the two worlds are strangers to each other and there is nothing more between them than a superficial alliance. The lyric poet expresses music only through the symbolic world of emotions. As a result his expression is a copy of a copy. But whilst he is in the act of transcribing music through the symbolic world of emotions, he himself is in the calm of Apollonian contemplation and is exempted from the very emotions he depicts.

When a musician takes a poem and writes a setting to it, it is not the word, not the idea, but the sound, the convincing tone which guides him. The word-content (Wortinhalt) goes down unheard in the general sea of sound. The man in a state of Dionysian excitement has no listener, for it is the nature of Dionysian art that it has no consideration for the listener--the person who would like to hear what is said. To prove his argument Nietzsche asks a rhetorical but convincing question: Can the choric songs of the ancient lyric poets, for example, have been written to be comprehended immediately by the great mass of mankind standing around watching the progress of a drama on the Greek stage? The daring and obscure intricacies of thought, the whirl of metaphors, which we, without the diversion of music and orchestration, often even with the closest attention cannot penetrate--was this whole world of miracles,

asks Nietzsche pertinently, transparent as glass to the Greek crowd?

Nietzsche feels that he can now penetrate to the essence and nature of the lyricist. He is the pure artistic man who interprets music to himself through the symbolism of metaphors and emotions. To the listener he has nothing to communicate. Now, just as the lyricist has his hymns, so the people as a whole have their folk-songs which they sing for themselves from deepest impulse, unconcerned whether the word is comprehended by those who do not join in the song. If we did not join in singing we would not even understand these folk-songs. Only for him who joins in singing, says Nietzsche, do lyric poetry and vocal music exist; the listener must stand before it as before absolute music and admit its incomprehensibility.

At this point there is a great deal of difference between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. To Schopenhauer the essence of the production and appreciation of art lies in the pure Will-less perception of Platonic Ideas. To Nietzsche Dionysian art both in its production and appreciation totally excludes the disinterested perception of Ideas. Its essence rather lies in an active participation. There is more agreement between the two thinkers on the nature of Apollonian art, but as we shall see, here too there is a wide difference in approach.

In Die Geburt¹⁰ Nietzsche asks (and the question may now perhaps be more immediately understood): How is it possible for a lyricist to be an artist? Schiller (whom Nietzsche quotes) acknowledges that as the preparatory state to the creative process of "composing" poetry he did not have before him or within him a series of pictures but rather a musical mood, which is followed by a poetical idea. This Nietzsche takes as a justification of his view of the union of the lyricist with the musician. As Dionysian artist the lyricist becomes first of all one with the Primordial Unity,¹¹ its pains and contradictions, and he produces a copy of this Primordial Unity as music. Under the sway of Apollonian influences this self-same music becomes again visible to him as a symbolic dream-picture. This, however, is a second phenomenon. The Dionysian musical enchantment engenders the Apollonian vision which finally is worked-up into tragedies and dramatic dithyrambs.

The plastic artist and the epic poet, who are to some extent related to the tragedian, are concerned only with pure contemplation. Whereas the lyric genius is conscious of a world of pictures and symbols growing out of the state

¹⁰Chapter 5, pp. 40-46, passim.

¹¹These expressions are incomprehensible outside the context of the essay discussed below, pp. 103-105.

of mystical oneness, the world of the plastic artist and epic poet deals with a realm which is purely contemplative. Nietzsche's view in this matter is thus likewise totally different from Schopenhauer's, in that Schopenhauer distinguishes the arts according to the material each treats of (according to the Idea each expresses or is able to express) while Nietzsche distinguishes them according to the force of the creative process, that is, the distance by which the artist is removed from the original spark. The major point of difference between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer is that while Schopenhauer regards art from the point of view of the spectator (and therefore according to Nietzsche misunderstands it), Nietzsche regards art from the point of view of the artist.

Returning again to the aesthetic impression made by art on the spectator we find a further difference of views between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. In Nietzsche's view we cannot have any knowledge of art, not even in Schopenhauer's sense of the word. We ourselves are given highest dignity by our significance as works of art, for only as an aesthetic phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified. We ourselves are used as pictures and artistic projections by the Primordial Unity. Our knowledge of art is thus quite illusory because as knowing subjects we are not at one and identical with the Being who as the sole author and spectator

of this world prepares what Nietzsche calls a perpetual entertainment for that Being, that is, himself. When the medieval theologian was asked what does God do, he answered that God could do no less than think about his own perfection; Nietzsche re-interprets this medieval view about the activity of the Most High and says that the Primordial Unity is concerned merely with entertaining himself. It is only in so far as the genius contained in the act of artistic production coalesces with this Primordial Artist of the world, that the artist is given an insight into the eternal essence of creation. And the spectator must do likewise, that is to say, he must join in the act. It is only in this wider context that seemingly enigmatical pronouncements in Die Geburt can be understood.

Nietzsche's remarks on the nature of the folk-song¹² in Die Geburt are now also easily comprehensible. In the folk-song (introduced into literature by Archilochus) Nietzsche sees an early union of the Apollonian and Dionysian. The Dionysian current (tonal subsoil) is always to be found as the substratum of the popular song. The popular song is the musical mirror of the world, the original melody which seeks for itself a parallel dream-phenomenon and expresses it in poetry. Melody, declares Nietzsche, is primary and

¹²Chapter 6, pp. 46-50, passim.

and universal and admits of several objectivations. Melody generates the poem of itself. In the elevating of the popular song to the level of poetry, language is strained to its utmost as it imitates music. The word or picture seeks an expression analogous to music and experiences in itself the power of music.

It is incumbent on us that we should now reconsider Nietzsche's position in relation to his epistemological and metaphysical outlook. In these early essays Nietzsche is mainly concerned with the analysis of the essence of art and not epistemology and metaphysics as such. Since in Nietzsche's view the world must be regarded as an aesthetic phenomenon, we must try to understand his point of view by means of these traditional categories. Nietzsche may not have been primarily concerned with the construction of a system, yet to comprehend him fully we must re-construct his thought processes in terms of a whole.

It is Nietzsche's cardinal tenet that 'Language' contains in itself all the components necessary for a full comprehension of the world, epistemologically and metaphysically. The 'word' contains within itself a certain relation to reality. The word as symbol, as representation or as meaning and concept, is however quite inadequate as a tool in the comprehension of reality. In its attempts to equalize, conceptualize the unequal, it by-passes the

essence and diversity of a fleeting and constantly moving substratum. How then can we capture the essence of this eternal Becoming? Nietzsche answers that words have a musical tonal subsoil. As such, words touch the soul of the Dionysian world substratum. Now poetry, which is already the image and reflection of this subsoil, is Apollonian and once removed from the eternal Existent. Words in their ordinary use can be said to be thrice removed from the essence of things. While the Apollonian itself is useful as an approach, as a bridge to the world-subsoil, should the spectator get stuck with the literal meaning of the words only and not use them as an aid to penetrate to the tonal subsoil, then such a spectator cannot participate in the reality of the Dionysian. For such a spectator, for such a listener (as Nietzsche would term it) the work and the world do not exist.

Nietzsche's view of art, however, is not as startling as it may appear at first sight. T. S. Eliot pointed out that he understood French poetry before he could understand a word of French. Examples could be multiplied but I do not think that they are necessary. Nietzsche himself has given the best proof for his thesis in his own works and we shall turn to its analysis shortly. In the realm of philosophy the matter requires a more precise elucidation. Because we cannot know reality, because we cannot know the thing-in-

itself, that does not mean that we cannot experience it. Nietzsche differs from Schopenhauer in thinking that the experience of this ineffable 'Something' is effected in terms of a blind, untamed, illogical Will. To Nietzsche the Eternal Existent is musical in nature and character and is rational.¹³ We can experience the Eternal Existent in art through sound (musical sound) and we can even experience it in ordinary life in so far as man expresses himself like an artist, and translates his experience of phenomenal existence in poetic terms.

To understand Nietzsche's position is difficult to-day because he thought in terms of Greek life and art as he understood it. We know to-day to what extent Nietzsche has broken new ground with his interpretation. The Greek tragic experience (the term 'tragic' will be defined subsequently) has been lost to us. The "tragic cheerfulness" of the Greeks has been experienced in modern times by such a sect as the Khassidic movement of Eastern Europe in the last century. In its own way this religious movement attempted to reach God (in Nietzsche's terms, the Eternal Existent) not through prayers but through song and cheerfulness.¹⁴

¹³In another place Nietzsche says (Vol. VII, p. 312) that if it is really Will that struggles for existence in animate and inanimate nature, then the musician adds, that this Will wherever it manifests itself yearns for a melodious existence.

¹⁴Cf. the author's Introduction to The Dybbuk (Winnipeg:

They tried to re-create life in terms of a musical relation to both God and everyday experience. Dramas written by exponents of this cult are not only interspersed with songs but the whole dialogue is recited in musical tones. The language of their drama is thus re-activated through music. Nietzsche's great sympathy for Judaism entailed a deep and profound understanding of its essence and 'artistic' potentialities.

III. THE DAYS OF GREEK TRAGEDY

Nietzsche's essay on the philosophy of the Greeks during the Tragic Age deals with a period of the history of the Hellenic world in which he was deeply interested. These were the writers of the Fifth and Sixth centuries. In writing the history of philosophic thought during this period Nietzsche finds that he can appreciate each phase of it. If one finds pleasure in great men, Nietzsche declares, such pleasure will be found in their great visions even though they may be erroneous. Systems have one point which is beyond criticism--the personal element and temper (Gemütsart). One can use them to form a picture of the philosopher himself. Nietzsche, nevertheless, has an ulterior motive for bringing into relief that aspect in every system which

Comet Press, 1953), pp. xiii-xxviii, passim.

is personal, for he wishes to recreate the temper of the times which saw the birth of tragedy. He wishes to describe those great men who witnessed and prepared the ground for the crucial event that is singled out in Die Geburt. Schopenhauer, too, had written a history of early Greek philosophy, but his approach was more intellectual, moved in a different direction and arrived at a different orientation. This does not mean that Schopenhauer and Nietzsche had preconceived notions to prove but rather that they found new approaches to old problems and wished to explore them as fully as possible.

Nietzsche saw that the Greeks subdued their inherently insatiable thirst for knowledge (which barbarizes just as much as the hatred of knowledge) by their regard for life. They wished to live immediately what they learned. In the early Greek masters (Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Democritus and Socrates) a high degree of urgency and interrelation exists between their thinking and their characters. The Greek masters from Thales to Socrates subjected to close scrutiny all that constitutes the peculiarly Hellenic. As the list shows, Nietzsche is concerned only with the pre-Platonic philosophers. He argues that something quite new begins with Plato and that philosophy since Plato lacks something quite essential. Nietzsche argues that while the pre-

Platonists are one-sided in their outlook, Plato is many-sided, but whereas this many-sidedness is of a philosophic hybrid-character, the pre-Platonists are pure types. In Plato's ideology are united Socratic, Pethagorean and Heraclitean elements, and for this reason it is no "typisch-reines Phaenomen".¹⁵ Furthermore, the later philosophers tend to be founders of sects and in their way seek a redemption, but only for the individuals or at best for groups of friends and disciples who are closely connected with them. Although they are unconscious of it, the activity of the older philosophers tends towards a cure and purification on a large scale. This is a most significant early idea to which Nietzsche returns later in his Also sprach Zarathustra. At this point we concur with André Gide that in this work Nietzsche is trying to produce a Gospel for humanity, a cure for a multitude. For that very reason Gide calls it "impossible".¹⁶ The very refrain "Also sprach Zarathustra" is purely biblical and reminds us of what Moses Gibory tries to do in his Bible in the Hands of Its Creators--a work in which he tries to prove his own divinity.

¹⁵Vol. IV, p. 159. The above and what follows must be read with an awareness of Nietzsche's analysis of the birth and development of tragedy. The parallel is most revealing.

¹⁶Journals, Vol. III, p. 112.

Greek philosophy begins with the proposition of Thales that water is the origin and mother-womb of all things. Nietzsche considers this proposition profound because it is born of a mystic intuition which in other terms means: Everything is one! This thought of Thales is significant in that it was meant to be taken unmythically and unallegorically. Philosophy in Thales had already freed itself from the mythopoetic view. The expression of every deep philosophical intuition by means of dialectics and scientific reflection is only a means of communication of what has been seen, but it is (as we noted above) a paltry means, and at bottom merely a metaphorical and absolutely inexact translation into a different sphere and language. When Thales therefore saw the Unity of the Existent and wished to communicate it, he spoke of water, says Nietzsche.

Anaximander was the first pessimist. To him all Becoming is a punishable emancipation from eternal Being. Anaximander realized that wherever there exist definite qualities we can anticipate with certainty the extinction of these qualities. Thus a being that possesses definite qualities and consists of them alone can never be the origin and principle of things--cannot be the "Existent". In order that Becoming may not cease, the Primordial Being must be indefinite. Primordial Being by its very indefiniteness is superior to all Becoming and for this very reason guarantees the eternity and unimpeded course of the process of Becoming.

This conception of the Primordial Being Nietzsche considers as the equivalent of the Kantian thing-in-itself. To Anaximander the Plurality which arises out of the Unity is a moral phenomenon and is not justified. It therefore expiates itself continually through destruction. Nietzsche himself, however, finds justification for Becoming through a non-moral consideration of it. He does not state it here but has already done so in his Die Geburt to which we shall turn shortly. He also re-interprets the eternal Existent as Becoming.

Heraclitus continued where Anaximander left off.

Heraclitus denied the duality of two diverse worlds. He denied Being altogether and affirmed only Becoming. Nietzsche re-interprets Heraclitus in terms of Schopenhauer by stating that the whole essence of actuality is activity. Heraclitus conceived of all Becoming as being under the form of polarity, as the divergence of a force into two qualitatively different, opposite actions striving after reunion. From the war of opposites all Becoming originated. This struggle of opposites, furthermore, is morally justified for it is bound by eternal laws which are themselves just.¹⁷ Even at this point Nietzsche quotes Schopenhauer to show that struggle is

¹⁷Nietzsche's later remarks about war which seem so enigmatical should be read in the light of this Heraclitean conception.

essential for the evolution of the higher Idea. Nietzsche remarks on the difference of tone between Schopenhauer and Heraclitus but insists on interpreting early Greek thought in Schopenhauer's terms. The world to Heraclitus is the Game of Zeus (the game of fire with itself) and world-creation, the pouring out of itself into forms of plurality. With Nietzsche this conception of the world as overflow derives its force from the old Greek proverb that "satiety gives birth to crime", gives birth to the Hybris. The world-process thus becomes to Heraclitus an act of punishment of the Hybris. The plurality arises out of a crime. The guilt is therefore shifted by Heraclitus (in contradistinction to Anaximander) to the essence of the things themselves, Being itself, and the world of Becoming, the world of individuals become exonerated from guilt. They are however condemned for ever to bear the consequences of guilt.

To the limited human being there is guilt, injustice, contradiction and suffering but to the contemplative man, to the artist who also engages in games, everything opposing converges into one harmony. To the artistic man the world-process as conceived by Heraclitus is understandable and justified for it is not wantonness¹⁸ but the

¹⁸Cf. pp. 105-7 below.

ever newly awakening impulse to play that calls into life other worlds in the same way as it calls into life works of art. Becoming to Heraclitus is thus neither evil nor injustice. The struggle of plurality is conditioned by law and justice. Antagonism and harmony must pair themselves for the procreation of the work of art which is our world. To Heraclitus (as likewise to Nietzsche whose own philosophy follows closely that of Heraclitus) the world is the beautiful, innocent play of the Aeon, a play which lies outside the moral sphere. The emphasis is not on rationality but on beauty. Nietzsche sums up Heraclitus' achievement as the "Lehre vom Gesetz im Werden und vom Spiel in der Notwendigkeit", the doctrine of the Law in the Becoming and of the Play in the Necessity.¹⁹

Nietzsche's discussion of the place of Heraclitus in the history of thought cannot be fully comprehended without relating it to Chapter 9 of Die Geburt.²⁰ Chapter 9, furthermore, is most elusive without the working out of the philosophic background in this essay on early Greek thought. The two act as commentaries to each other. We pause at this point because the concept of crime and artistic creation as expounded by Nietzsche has become a favourite modern theme

¹⁹P. 188.

²⁰Vol. III, pp. 64-72.

with modern writers, and preeminently for Thomas Mann. Nietzsche derives this juxtaposition of crime and the artist from an analysis of the Promethean myth. The Promethean myth, says Nietzsche, has the same characteristic significance for the Aryan race which the myth of the Fall of Man has for the Semitic. The presupposition of the Promethean myth is that of the transcendent value which a naive humanity attaches to fire as the true Palladium of every rising culture. That man, however, should not only receive this fire as a gift from Heaven in the form of the igniting lightning or the warming sunshine but should, on the contrary, also be able to control it at will, appeared to the reflective primitive man as crime and robbery at the expense of the divine nature. So it seemed that the best and highest that men can acquire is obtained by crime and they must in their turn take upon themselves its consequences--the flood of sufferings and sorrows which the offended celestials must inflict upon man. This myth contrasts strangely with the Semitic myth in which curiosity, seduction, wantonness (a whole series of preeminently feminine passions) were regarded as the origin of evil. Accordingly crime is understood by the Aryans to be a man, sin by the Semites a woman and the original crime is committed by man, the original sin by woman.²¹

²¹Otto Weininger's discussion of femininity and masculinity as Platonic Ideas has its origin here in Nietzsche.

For these reasons the artist, whose creative spark may likewise be considered as a crime and robbery of the divine nature, becomes in Nietzsche's mind associated with crime.²² The significant philosophic view that Nietzsche derives from this Promethean myth is the justification of human evil and thus the ethical basis for pessimistic tragedy. The original crime of active sin must ultimately be regarded as a virtue, a virtue, however, for which we must atone. We must learn to regard the essence of things, an essence at whose core there is antagonism and contradiction, tragically, or with an artistic optimism (the terms are used synonymously by Nietzsche). The contradiction at the centre is after all only the antagonism between the demands of a god and the demands of man, both of which claim the right to be on their side. The acquiescence in this knowledge (Dionysian knowledge) constitutes what Nietzsche calls tragic cheerfulness.

Returning to our account of Nietzsche's interpretation of Greek philosophy we find that Parmenides was occupied with abstractions, an interest quite "un-Greek" in the Tragic Age. Nietzsche has little to say in favour of Parmenides and Zeno. We cannot touch the heart of things or untie the knot of reality with "ideas". Parmenides

²²This does not by any means exhaust the meaning of the juxtaposition; the explanation of its complex nature would take us too far afield here.

and Zeno who believed in the truth and omnivalidity of ideas thus condemned the perceptible world as the opposite of the true and as being objectifications of the illogical and contradictory. Nietzsche in turn condemns both as un-Greek. Against the view of Parmenides, Nietzsche sets the view of Anaxagoras. He prefers the Anaxagorean derivation of the Existent (Becoming) because it does not, like Parmenides', rest on a dead, "perfect sphere" but is based on a conception of reality as eternally moving. The Anaxagorean Mind, says Nietzsche, is the mind of the artist who is a powerful genius of mechanics and architecture, creating with the simplest means the most magnificent forms but always out of that irrational arbitrariness which lies in the soul of the artist. The irrational arbitrariness is the Anaxagorean conception of chaos.

Nietzsche's account breaks off suddenly and we are left with only some notes for a continuation. Greek thought during the tragic age, Nietzsche concludes, is pessimistic or artictically optimistic. With Socrates optimism begins, but an optimism that is no longer artistic. For a fuller discussion of these terms we must turn to Nietzsche's Geburt der Tragödie itself, upon whose intellectual and historical background we have touched above. André Gide says this of Die Geburt: "Dès le premier ouvrage (la Naissance de la Tragédie), l'un des plus beaux, Nietzsche

s'affirme et se montre tel qu'il sera: tous ses futurs écrits sont là en germe."²³ The same was true of Schopenhauer's Fourfold Root.

IV. THE RECEPTION OF DIE GEBURT AND ITS IMPACT

The reception and impact of this first published book of Nietzsche's forms a most fascinating chapter in the study of Nietzsche. Whereas Goethe fixed his gaze on the centuries of Alexandrine culture, Nietzsche (as we have seen) preferred the primitive times of the Sixth century. Nietzsche urged that we must study these early days of Greek civilization because it is there that we touch the naive force and original sap of Hellenic creative power. Between the poems of Homer, which are the romance of her infancy, and the dramas of Aeschylus, which are the act of her manhood, Greece, not without prolonged effort, enters into the possession of her instincts and disciplines. Furthermore, we should seek knowledge of these times because they resemble our own. What was the response to this attempt to re-interpret the Hellenic world?

When Die Geburt appeared, it fell as an unexploded bomb on an unprepared academic field. The artists who were, ironically, closer to its import than the philologists re-

²³Morceaux Choisis, p. 175.

ceived it with great warmth. Wagner wrote as follows:²⁴

"Dear Friend,

I have never read a finer book than yours. It is all splendid! At this moment, I write to you very hurriedly because the reading has profoundly moved me, and I expect that I wait for the return of my sang-froid to re-read you methodically. I said to Cosima: After you, he it is whom I love most; and then, at a long distance, Lenbach, who has made so striking and so true a portrait of me... Adieu! Come soon to see us!

"Yours,
"R. W."

and again on the 10th of January, 1872:

"You have just published a book which is incomparable... I am constantly in need of it; between my breakfast and my working hours, it is it that sets me going; for since I have read you, I have begun again to work on my last act... "I am not yet recovered from the emotion which I experienced".

The composer H. von Bülow wrote as follows in a letter dated July 24, 1872 at Munich:

"Be so good as to think of me only as one who was genuinely edified and instructed by your magnificent book which it is to be hoped will be followed by many like it--and who is therefore deeply and respectfully grateful to you."

The reception which Nietzsche's book was given by the academic world was in many ways hostile. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, whom we have already mentioned, published a bitter attack on both the book and its author in a pamphlet entitled

²⁴The following letters are taken from D. Halevy's book: Life of Friedrich Nietzsche, pp. 120-1.

Zukunftsphilologie (Berlin: Bornträger, 1872, 32 pp.).

Wilamowitz was only 24 years old himself at the time and later in life when he became a famous philologist regretted the form his attack took, although he still held to his philological views. The very title of Wilamowitz's pamphlet was meant to ridicule Nietzsche and above all Nietzsche's efforts at setting up Wagner (who was none too popular at the time) as the ideal artist, as the continuator of the Greek tradition. Wagner himself came to the defense by publishing a paper on Die Geburt. Nietzsche, however, needed someone within the academic field to take up his side and he appeared in the person of his friend Rohde (later a famous scholar himself) who wrote an attack on Wilamowitz in a pamphlet entitled Afterphilologie (Leipzig: Fritsch, 1872, 48 pp.). Wilamowitz replied with a second instalment of Zukunftsphilologie (Berlin: Bornträger, 1873) and the matter appeared closed. Wilamowitz's attack on Rohde himself in this second reply (that Rohde was really not convinced of the cause he was espousing) was a brilliant insight, for later in life Rohde published a large volume on ancient Greek thought in which Nietzsche's name is not mentioned once.

What Nietzsche did in answer to this criticism has been made clear. Wilamowitz's pamphlets however struck deep and the effect of this attack echoes through in his later work. In Also sprach Zarathustra we read:

Als ich im Schlafe lag, da frass ein Schaf am Efeukranze meines Hauptes, --frass und sprach dazu:

"Zarathustra ist kein Gelehrter mehr".

Sprach's und ging stolz davon und stolz. Ein Kind erzählte mir's.

Gerne liege ich hier, wo die Kinder spielen, an der zerbrochnen Mauer, unter Disteln und roten Mohnblumen.

Ein Gelehrter bin ich den Kindern noch und auch den Disteln und roten Mohnblumen. Unschuldig sind sie, selbst noch in ihrer Bosheit.

Aber den Schafen bin ich's nicht mehr: so will es mein Los--geseget sei es!²⁵

Wilamowitz had proclaimed in his attack that Nietzsche was no longer fit to administer to the minds of youth. In this passage Nietzsche refers to Wilamowitz as the child who told him that. It was this manner of child (sheep) again who ate at his wreath. To such sheep of children, says Nietzsche, he no longer is a scholar but there are other children, children who are "innocent even in their wickedness" to whom Zarathustra still is a scholar.

In the much debated volume My Sister and I which was supposedly written while Nietzsche was in the sanatorium, we find a passage which has the note of authenticity.

"Somewhere in my soul there is a secret altar, hidden away among the thorny bushes of my personal vanity. With the help of red autumn leaves, plucked from the surrounding forest, I have spelled out on it the name of Wilamowitz. Every once in a while I come to this altar and offer it a sacrifice of gratitude. It is my debt not only to a sincere if somewhat unfortunate scholar, but, mostly, to the man who brought an ignominious end to my career as a Philologist."²⁶

²⁵Vol. XIII, p. 163.

²⁶P. 121.

The cluster of similar images between this passage and the one above strikes a convincing note.

J. H. Groth in a recent essay on Nietzsche has this to say in relation to this period:

Looking at the matter dispassionately after this long passage of time, it seems to me that Wilamowitz made his point in a two-fold sense: He showed that Nietzsche's offerings in the Birth of Tragedy were not Greek history and that the philosophy behind it was but a wild Wagnerian romanticism.²⁷

Groth is wrong on both counts. What we have in the Birth of Tragedy is not a "wild Wagnerian romanticism" but a metaphysic of music and drama based on Schopenhauer and entirely opposed to Wagner and all he stood for. T. M. Campbell,²⁸ whose article on the Nietzsche-Wagner relationship up to January, 1872 can be relied upon, notes that Die Geburt should be read from the point of view of Nietzsche's attempts to compromise with his conscience on the matter of Nietzsche's position to Wagner's theories. Campbell concludes: "When Nietzsche therefore wrote the final version of his Birth of Tragedy he had really given up Wagner as the chief hope of a tragic renaissance". Campbell insists that the book must be read from this new point of view. He comes to this conclusion through a close analysis of the earlier essays of Nietzsche

²⁷"Wilamowitz-Moellendorf on Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy", p. 188.

²⁸P. 577.

and shows quite conclusively that Nietzsche had diverged drastically from Wagner before he wrote his book. Wagner, Nietzsche had come to realize, had merely used music as a means for dramatic effects-- a position unacceptable to both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. If we analyze the essays which followed Die Geburt, Campbell's conclusions find their complete verification, and this may be taken as a mark of Campbell's outstanding contribution to Nietzsche criticism. Groth, on the other hand, is also wrong in his estimate of Nietzsche's contribution to the interpretation of Greek history. A competent scholar such as Cornford calls Die Geburt: "A work of profound imaginative insight, which left the scholarship of a generation toiling in the rear".²⁹ J. H. Groth would have scholarship toil for another generation.

The Wagner criticism which was contained in the attack by Wilamowitz was valuable in that it compelled Nietzsche to re-consider the question of Wagner more openly. In an essay written in 1872 entitled Homer's Weltkampf³⁰ anti-Wagnerian undertones begin to assert themselves. This is also true of the essay on the history of Greek thought in the Tragic Age

²⁹From Religion to Philosophy, p. 111.

³⁰Vol. II (pp. 369-79), p. 375.

treated above. Richard Wagner in Bayreuth³¹ (the import of which Wagner quite misunderstood) was for Nietzsche a summing up of Wagner and his farewell to him. He categorically declares here that Wagner is not the prophet of the future but merely the interpreter and glorifier of the past, a Romanticist. Wagner's position in the history of art is gradually redefined in its true outlines in Nietzsche's later writings under such headings as Der Fall Wagner (1888) and Nietzsche contra Wagner (1888).

Nietzsche's break with Wagner was primarily due to three causes. There was the difference in personality between the two which Nietzsche only slowly began to perceive. Wagner could appreciate only disciples, not compeers, and as Nietzsche slowly developed into a 'master' himself there was little room in Wagner's world to contain both. Nietzsche's reaction to this situation is clearly brought out in the essay Homer's Weltkampf. At an early stage Nietzsche had a premonition that Wagner was far removed from a Greek creative genius. Secondly, in the realm of music theory Nietzsche found that he differed greatly from Wagner. To Wagner music was merely a means for producing dramatic effects. To Nietzsche as well as to Schopenhauer, whom he follows very closely here, music was the ultimate expression. Because

³¹Vol. VII, pp. 245-333.

Wagner was always straining for dramatic effects Nietzsche dubbed him the eternal actor and as a symbol of the actor Nietzsche abhorred Wagner. This leads us to the third major point of difference--Wagner as a decadent or Romanticist. Nietzsche gradually discovered that Wagner was not at all a Dionysian artist but simply a Romantic. The difference is significant. Whereas Romantic art, Nietzsche discovered, was primarily concerned with the excitation of emotions and thus decadent throughout (or as Goethe would put it, "krank", diseased, morbid, sickly), Dionysian art was concerned with the discharge of emotion and thus "gesund", strong, healthy, powerful. Wagner with his dramatic effects, Wagner the actor, was therefore a typical decadent. Nietzsche never tires of elaborating and defining with a gradually increasing exactitude the difference between his Dionysian conception and Wagner's Romanticism. Every art and every philosophy, Nietzsche argues, may be regarded either as a cure or as a stimulant to ascending or declining life and presupposes suffering and sufferers. There are however, two kinds of sufferers: those who suffer from an overflowing vitality need Dionysian art and those who suffer from reduced vitality crave either repose or intoxication. Wagner (and Schopenhauer too, Nietzsche adds) belong to the latter category. The passage where this distinction is put in its final form runs as follows:

Jede Kunst, jede Philosophie darf als Heil--und Hilfsmittel des wachsenden oder des niedergehenden Lebens angesehen werden: sie setzen immer Leiden und Leidende voraus. Aber es giebt zweierlei Leidende, einmal die an der Ueberfülle des Lebens Leidenden, welche eine dionysische Kunst wollen und ebenso eine tragische Einsicht und Aussicht auf das Leben,--und sodann die an der Verarmung des Lebens Leidenden, die Ruhe, Stille, glattes Meer oder aber den Rausch, den Krampf, die Betäubung von Kunst und Philosophie verlangen. Die Rache am Leben selbst--die wollüstigste Art Rausch für solche Verarmte! ...Dem Doppel-Bedürfniss der Letzteren entspricht ebenso Wagner wie Schopenhauer--sie verneinen das Leben, sie verleumden es, damit sind sie meine Antipoden.³²

What Nietzsche says here of Wagner refers also to Schopenhauer but it does so only in so far as Schopenhauer is an expounder of a Christian, Buddhistic morality and not to Schopenhauer the metaphysician of music and writer on aesthetics.

V. THE ART-IMPULSES OF NATURE³³

Die Geburt der Tragödie is preceded by a foreword to Richard Wagner. In it Nietzsche assures us that art is no mere diversion, that it has something serious to contribute to the earnestness of existence. Art is the highest task and the properly metaphysical activity of this life. With Nietzsche as with Schopenhauer art assumes a metaphysical meaning. The very title ("The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music") is intended to convey that impression. The secondary title ("Hellenism and Pessimism") is unfortunate

³²Vol. XVII, pp. 284-5.

³³Chapters 1-4, pp. 21-40.

for it tends to relocate the emphasis of an early work with thoughts properly belonging to a late period. The earlier title suggests a great deal more adequately the real basis of art. Art and tragedy as an outgrowth of music, carries with it the metaphysical implications so necessary to a correct understanding of Nietzsche's aesthetics.

The science of aesthetics and its continual development, says Nietzsche, is closely bound up with the duality of the Apollonian and Dionysian just as much as procreation itself is dependent on the duality of the sexes with their perpetual conflicts and intervening reconciliations. Apollo and Dionysos were the two art-deities of the Greeks. Apollo's art was that of the shaper; Dionysos' that of the non-plastic art of music. These two art-deities are often found at variance but at the same time inciting each other (as all struggle and strife do) to new and more powerful births. The antithesis between these two art-deities is only seemingly bridged by their mutual term "Art". For a correct understanding of this "Art" we must separate in our minds its two components. It will be discovered that in the final pairing these two art-deities generated the equally Dionysian and Apollonian art-world of Attic tragedy.

In the manner of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche analyzes these two art-forces in psycho-physiological terms. He finds their counterparts in the mental states of dreaming

and drunkenness. The contrasts to be found between these two physiological states are analogous to that existing between the Apollonian and Dionysian as world-forces. In the dream-state every man finds himself the perfect artist, the eternal shaper. In the apprehension of dreams, as of plastic art generally, we take delight in the immediate apprehension of form. Together with this apprehension there is the added feeling that it is all purely appearance, that underneath and behind this reality (of life in general and plastic art in particular) another altogether different reality lies concealed. The tendency to regard men and things as mere phantoms and dream-pictures is a philosophic attitude. The man susceptible to art stands in the same relation to the reality of dreams as the philosopher to the reality of existence--both are imbued with the fleeting sensation that it is all appearance.

The cheerful acquiescence in the dream-experience was embodied by the Greeks in their Apollo. Apollo stood for measured limitation, freedom from the wilder emotions and philosophical calmness characteristic of the god of sculpture. In Schopenhauerian terms (used by Nietzsche himself) Apollo may be designated as one who has the unshaken faith in the principium individuationis, the one who has an unbounded faith in this world, the phenomenal world. Apollo is the divine image of the principium individuationis and with his

beauty he makes life possible and desirable.

Whenever man is confronted by an experience which he cannot explain through the Principle of Sufficient Reason in any of its forms, he is seized with awe; and when to this is added the blissful ecstasy that arises from within the depths of man, at the collapse of the world as principium individuationis, he is brought in touch with the Dionysian, the state of drunkenness. This Dionysian state generally emerges with the approach of spring. Under the charm of the Dionysian the covenant between man and man is again established and he who has become estranged from nature celebrates his reconciliation with her. The veil of Mâyâ is torn and a reign of cosmic harmony sets in, a reign wherein man enters into the mystery of Primordial Unity. Through song and dance he becomes a member of a higher community. He is enchanted and feels himself a god among gods and not merely as a spectator of a scene of gods as he is in the dream-state. "Der Mensch ist nicht mehr Künstler, er ist Kunstwerk geworden".³⁴ Man is no longer an artist but has become a work of art.

The Apollonian and the Dionysian (considered as artistic powers which burst forth from nature herself without the mediation of the human artist and in which her art-

³⁴P. 26.

impulses are satisfied in the most immediate and direct way) thus manifest themselves first as the pictorial world of dreams, and secondly as drunken reality which tries to destroy the individual and redeem him by a mystic Oneness. In the language of Schopenhauer they are the world as Idea and the world as Will. The main doctrine of Dionysos is the alleviation of pain through expression. What song and dance are to the reveller, the whole world of our waking life in space, time and causality is to Dionysos. Just as the first appearance or expression is not enough for the artist (he must still express it in Apollonian symbols) so likewise for Dionysos ordinary waking life is not enough, he needs a second appearance in the form of dreams. The dream is the Apollonian activity of Dionysos. The phenomenal world, in other words, is the expression of the noumenal world, the expression of Will. Thus far the only quarrel Nietzsche has with Schopenhauer lies in giving the Will a certain direction and considering it optimistically rather than pessimistically. Now concerning these two worlds or art-states of nature, every artist is either an "imitator" (an Apollonian), an artist in dreams; or a Dionysian, an artist in ecstasies. The Greeks were artists in both dreams and ecstasies and as such produced their tragedies.

What Nietzsche attempts to do in Die Geburt is to

find to what degree these art-impulses of nature were developed by the Greeks. This is how, Nietzsche claims, one is to understand the Aristotelian phrase "imitation of nature". Nietzsche wants to discover how well the Greeks could 'imitate' nature, 'imitate' these dual primal art-impulses. Nietzsche sees in Greek life and art a dualism which had passed undetected by the humanists of the Renaissance and even by the German Hellenists, Winckelmann and Goethe. It is this dualistic metaphysic which he sees worked up in the art of the Greeks.

To Nietzsche the Dionysian state is not one of extravagant sexual licentiousness. The Dionysian Greek is to be sharply distinguished from the Dionysian barbarian. When Dionysian impulses broke out in the Hellenic world they were immediately reconciled with the Delphic god. It is only under pressure of this reconciliation that the manifestation of the Dionysian power attains her artistic jubilee. Only then does the rupture of the principium individuationis become an artistic phenomenon. The Dionysian orgies of the Babylonian Sacaean can hardly be considered artistic.

To the Apollonian Greek the Dionysian was incomprehensible, as it must be when the attitude remains confined to mere observation. The Apollonian Greek, however, had a suspicion that the Dionysian was in reality not so foreign

to him, that his Apollonian consciousness only hid it from view. The folk-wisdom of the Greeks bears witness to the evil and misery of existence. How then, asks Nietzsche, is the joyous Olympian world of deities related to this widespread folk-wisdom? The Greeks, answers Nietzsche, knew and felt the horrors and terrors of existence. To be able to live at all, they had to create the shining dream-birth of the Olympian world. The terrors of existence were surmounted through the artistic middle-world of the Olympians. Through their Olympians the Greeks were able to emphasize the beauty in the terror, the joy in the suffering. Just as the gods were able to surmount their suffering so the Greeks were led to a similar path. The same impulses which called art into being, art as the complement and consummation of existence, and making life more desirable, caused also the Olympian world to arise--a world in which the Hellenic "Will" was transfigured into an image of beauty. The gods, furthermore, justified the life of man in that they themselves lived it. To the Apollonian Greek life thus became desirable. This was a triumph for the Apollonian illusion. The most important thing in the world of artistic dreaming was thus a careful preservation of this 'illusion'. It was this reflection of beauty with which the Hellenic Will faced and combated suffering. Homer is the testimony of this victory. What is commonly held to be an endowment of the Greek genius

must be understood as an achievement.

The Apollonian Greek thus recognized that his entire existence, with its beauty and moderation, rested on a hidden element of suffering which was disclosed to him by the Dionysian. The conflicts and reconciliations between these two art-deities and their opposing philosophies occurred over a long period of time. Nietzsche distinguishes four separate periods: the pre-Hellenic wherein the Dionysian spirit was rampant, the Homeric period where the Apollonian gains the upper hand, the inrush of the Dionysian from the North between the Seventh and Sixth centuries, and the dominance again of the Apollonian in Doric art and the Doric view of things. The Doric period, however, was not the end and aim of these artistic impulses. The common goal was rather Attic tragedy and dramatic dithyramb in which a union was finally achieved.

VI. ORIGIN OF GREEK TRAGEDY³⁵

Tradition informs us, says Nietzsche, that tragedy sprang from the tragic chorus and was originally only chorus and nothing else. Nietzsche rejects the explanation of the chorus as representing the ideal spectator and also that interpretation which emphasizes the role of the chorus as representing the people in contrast to the regal scene. The

³⁵ Chapters 7-8, pp. 50-64.

former has nothing to do with the purely religious beginnings of tragedy; the latter is out of keeping with the historical tradition that tragedy was originally only chorus. Schiller in his Preface to the Bride of Messina regards the chorus as a living wall which tragedy draws round herself to guard her from contact with the world of reality, thus preserving her ideal domain and poetical freedom. Nietzsche agrees. It is an ideal domain, says Nietzsche, that the chorus encircles. The satyric chorus is the spokesman of Dionysian wisdom. The spectator becomes neutralized in its presence and the gaps between man and man give way to an overwhelming feeling of Oneness which leads back to the heart of things, to the heart of nature. Tragedy gives us metaphysical comfort. It teaches that in spite of the perpetual change of phenomenon, life at bottom is indestructibly powerful and pleasurable. Tragedy saves man from longing for a Buddhistic negation of the Will, declares Nietzsche, with an eye on Schopenhauer. The effect of tragedy is primarily that of the chorus.

Elsewhere Nietzsche defines the tragic experience as that wherein the individual is consecrated to something beyond the personal. The individual must forget the terrible anxiety which death and time tend to create in him, for at any moment of his life, at any fraction of time in the whole of his span of years, something may cross his path which will amply compensate him for his struggles and privations.

This is the important sense of the tragic. In Nietzsche's words:

Der Einzelne soll zu etwas Ueberpersönlichem geweiht werden--das will die Tragödie; er soll die schreckliche Beängstigung, welche der Tod und die Zeit dem Individuum macht, verlernen: denn schon im kleinsten Augenblick, im kürzesten Atom seines Lebenslaufes kann ihm etwas Heiliges begegnen, das allen Kampf und alle Noth überschwänglich aufwiegt--das heisst tragisch gesinnt sein.³⁶

In his interpretation of the tragic Nietzsche differs sharply from both Aristotle and Schopenhauer. The essence of the tragic could not lie in the depressing emotions of fear and pity. Had Aristotle been right, tragedy would be an art unfriendly to life, it would even prove harmful to life for it is a misconception to think that by exercising these emotions of pity and fear we purge ourselves of them. To Nietzsche art is the great stimulus of life, the great intoxicant; but something which habitually excites fear and pity only disorganizes and weakens the will to life. If Schopenhauer, on the other hand, were right in thinking that tragedy taught resignation then this would presuppose an art in which art itself was denied. Tragedy would constitute a process of dissolution in which the instinct of life would destroy itself in the instinct of art. Tragedy would be a symbol of decline, which it definitely is not. It is obvious that tragedy is rather a tonic to life.

³⁶Vol. VII, p. 271.

It is interesting to note, however, that just as Schopenhauer had resorted to Hamlet in order to project his meaning of art and tragedy, Nietzsche likewise uses the image of Hamlet in order to define his meaning more sharply. His handling of the Hamlet-image is totally different from Schopenhauer's. Whereas Schopenhauer had used the stage upon the stage scene to convey the meaning of his use of elevation (elevation, that is, as an outward process), Nietzsche uses the image of the man Hamlet in order to convey the depth and essence of the tragic as an inward experience. The Dionysian man, says Nietzsche, resembles Hamlet in that both have for once seen the true nature of things and are consequently unable to act, for they realize that their action cannot change the eternal nature of things. Knowledge kills action, for action requires the veil of illusion. It is for this reason that when everyday reality rises into consciousness after the Dionysian wisdom has penetrated it, it nauseates us, an ascetic will-paralyzing mood sets in. The Hamlet predicament arises. Here, however, art approaches, and heals and saves us for life, for it alone is able to transform these nauseating reflections on the awfulness or absurdity of existence into representations through which it is possible to live. It was the satyric chorus through its Apollonian vision that saved the Dionysian man for living. The Dionysian Greek who desired ultimate truth saw himself

metamorphosed into the satyr and the public of Attic tragedy re-discovered itself in the chorus of the orchestra. The terraced structure of the Greek theatre rising in concentric arcs enabled every one to overlook the entire world of culture around him, and thus made it easy for every one to imagine himself a chorist. The chorus in its primitive stage in proto-tragedy was a self-mirroring of the Dionysian man. The satyric chorus itself was originally only a vision or re-incarnation of the Dionysian throng. In its later development the world on the stage in turn became its vision.

This whole development is re-enacted by the spectator himself. The Dionysian excitement is able to impart to a whole mass of men the artistic faculty of seeing themselves surrounded by a host of spirits with whom they know themselves to be inwardly one. This primitive function of the tragic chorus stands at the beginning of the development of the drama. While under the enchantment of the chorus the Dionysian reveller sees himself as a satyr, and as a satyr, he in turn beholds the god--that is, in his transformation he sees a new vision outside him, a vision which is the Apollonian consummation of his state. With this new vision the drama is complete. While the Dionysian insight makes phenomenal existence impossible for us, the Apollonian vision which grows out of the Dionysian state glorifies phenomenal existence, makes it desirable.

Greek tragedy is thus the Dionysian chorus unburdening

itself anew in Apollonian pictures of reality. The choric parts with which tragedy is interlaced give birth to the dialogue. Music which is not concerned with exciting any kind of feeling and is not an expression of feeling opens up a vast perspective into the inner world of the mind. Music gives birth to the Apollonian vision. The chorus as Dionysian state does not itself tend to represent the Apollonian redemption in appearance but rather tries to show the dissolution of the individual and his unification with Primordial Existence. Drama in its more developed form is the Apollonian embodiment of Dionysian perceptions and influences, is even then Dionysian throughout and is not to be confused with the epic which is merely concerned with Apollonian images alone. In tragedy the only reality is the chorus, the rest is only a vision generated by this chorus. The chorus beholds in its vision Dionysos its lord and master. It sees how he, the god, suffers and glorifies himself. The chorus itself does not act. It is a serving chorus.

Nietzsche argues that the whole Kantian philosophy, as interpreted by Schopenhauer is re-enacted on the Greek stage. If Schopenhauer and Kant have really touched the core of reality in their philosophy, then the myth which speaks of similar things brings the spectators of tragedy closer to the philosophic attitude. In the myth we have

all the elements necessary for a profound and pessimistic contemplation of the world. We have the mystery doctrine of tragedy which teaches the fundamental knowledge of the Oneness of all existing things, teaches the primal cause of evil as lying in individuation, and finally art as the ultimate hope for the destruction of this individuation and the return to Oneness. Dionysian truth takes over the entire domain of myth as symbolism of its knowledge, which it makes known partly in the public cult of tragedy and partly in the secret celebration of the dramatic mysteries, always, however, in its old mystical garb. It was the power of music which effected the transition from mere myth to drama, for it is able to invest myths with a new profound significance. The dying myths of the Greek world were seized by the new-born genius of Dionysian music and reactivated, achieving for them their most expressive form in Attic tragedy.

VII. SOCRATISM AND THE DEATH OF TRAGEDY³⁷

Greek tragedy had a fate different from that of the other arts. She died by suicide in consequence of an irreconcilable conflict. She therefore died tragically. The death of Greek tragedy left an immense void, deeply felt everywhere. It was Euripides who fought this death-struggle

³⁷ Chapters 11-15, pp. 76-106 passim.

of tragedy and created out of its ashes the new Attic Comedy. What Euripides did was to bring the spectator, the listener, upon the stage. Through him the commonplace individual forced his way from the spectator's benches to the stage itself. The mirror in which formerly only great and bold traits found their expression now showed with painful exactness the abortive lines of nature's creatures. Euripides tried to build up a new and purified form of tragedy on the basis of a non-Dionysian art. But the spectator which he brought on stage was not just an ordinary spectator. It was Euripides himself but Euripides as a thinker and not as a poet.

Euripides found that he no longer understood his great predecessors. In his search to know who else among the Greek crowd did not comprehend the old masters, he discovered Socrates. A new antithesis therefore arose, the Dionysian contra the Socratic; and the art-work of Greek tragedy was wrecked on it. This new form of drama practised by Euripides, not born of the spirit of music, was based on the dramatized epos, an Apollonian domain of art in which the tragic effect is unattainable. The peculiar effect of this type of drama was no longer dependent on the subject matter. Its charm was solely dependent on appearance and redemption through appearance. Strictly speaking Euripidean art was not even Apollonian for there was here no longer an

epic absorption in appearance. Its domain was that of cool paradoxical thought. The new Socratic aesthetic which lay at the foundation of Euripidean art was: in order to be beautiful everything must be intelligible.

The new drama of Euripides no longer engaged in the Aeschyleo-Sophoclean tendency to employ the most ingenious devices in the first scenes in order to place in the hands of the spectators all the threads requisite for the understanding of the whole. It thus no longer enabled the spectator to concentrate on the doings and sufferings of the chief persons. Identification between spectator and hero was diminished because Euripides no longer enlarged on the whole history of the previous scenes, a thing always done by Aeschylus and Sophocles. If the old tragedy was here destroyed, it was in Nietzsche's conception Socratism which destroyed it. In so far as the Socratic principle was directed merely against the Dionysian element in the old art, we must recognize in Socrates the opponent of Dionysos. But it should always be kept in mind that as a general (anti-artistic) principle aesthetic Socratism spelled the death of Tragedy.

In proclaiming the Socratic rational principle as the cause of the death of tragedy, Nietzsche divorces himself completely in his conception of tragedy from Schopenhauer, Schopenhauer, as we recall, had preferred modern tragedy to

Greek tragedy, for modern tragedy with its emphasis on characterization was better equipped to show the destruction of the Will as it manifested itself in individuals. Nietzsche prefers Greek tragedy because the masked hero represented the indefinite principle and rejected Socratism for its very tendency for differentiation, for the very reason, that is, which made Schopenhauer place modern drama above ancient.

Aesthetic Socratism does not, however, exhaust the character of Socrates. A key to the character of Socrates is for Nietzsche the surprising phenomenon of the "daimonion". Whenever Socrates' gigantic intellect began to stagger he always got a secure support in the utterances of a divine voice which spoke to him. The surprising thing in this visitation was that whenever this voice came it always dissuaded. In Socrates instinct was the critic while in ordinary men instinct is the creatively affirmative force and consciousness the critical and dissuasive. Now although Socratism bore against tragedy, the mighty character of Socrates still sufficed to force poetry itself into new and unknown channels. The Platonic dialogues (the prototype of the novel) are the result of the influence of the character of Socrates--of the dying Socrates.

In his recent book on Nietzsche W. A. Kaufmann devotes a chapter to the problem of Nietzsche's attitude to Socrates. The chapter, entitled: "Nietzsche's Admiration

of Socrates"³⁸ is rather startling in that it attempts to counteract a generation of criticism which upheld the view that Nietzsche held Socrates in contempt. Kaufmann has rendered a great service to Nietzsche criticism in re-adjusting the scales. However, he has gone too far in one sense and not far enough in another. Kaufmann realizes that a distinction must be made between Socratism and the character of Socrates when he says: "While Socrates is pictured, in the following pages, as the embodiment of that rationalism which superseded tragedy, his superhuman dignity is emphasized throughout".³⁹ But he makes a reservation in respect to the distinction between Socratism and the character of Socrates. "Some such distinction is indeed required--but its validity depends perforce on the definition of Socratism; and the view that Nietzsche merely admired the man Socrates while hating the outlook which he embodied is quite untenable".⁴⁰ He restates his point in other terms a few pages later as follows: "Now we have previously admitted that some distinction must indeed be made between Nietzsche's attitudes toward Socrates and Socratism, although it is false to say that Nietzsche abominated Socratism, if the latter is taken to mean the

³⁸Pp. 342-360 passim.

³⁹P. 344.

⁴⁰Loc. cit.

outlook which Socrates embodied."⁴¹ Kaufmann is therefore forced to make his own distinctions, which he discovers in Nietzsche's attitudes to Socrates. These distinctions are to be found in Nietzsche's "denunciations" of the epigoni of Socrates and his "respectful criticism" of Socrates' doctrines.⁴² In re-evaluating Nietzsche's attitude to Socrates Kaufmann raised a very important problem, though not the core of the problem. By upholding the view that while Nietzsche admired the man Socrates yet engaged in respectful criticism of his doctrines, and by throwing the burden on the "epigoni", that is, on the followers of Socrates, he obscures the whole issue. There is a distinction to be made here; it is between the living Socrates (the Socrates who represents the rational principle over which tragedy committed suicide) and the dying Socrates ("sterbenden Sokrates") who was always on the verge of being re-born.

What Nietzsche admired in Socrates was his ability to rise in the act of dying to the level of Greek artistic pessimism. It was in death that Socrates realized that when rationalism (science) reaches its limits it changes into art. The key to Nietzsche's admiration of Socrates lies in the

⁴¹p. 348.

⁴²p. 349.

very phrase the "dying Socrates". When Socrates was in prison, Nietzsche reminds us, there often came to him one and the same dream-apparition, which kept constantly repeating to him: "Socrates, practise music". This prompting voice of the Socratic dream-vision, Nietzsche argues, was a sign of Socrates' doubt as to the value of rationalism. It was this symbol of the dying Socrates which became the new ideal of the Greek world. It was the "daimonion" in Socrates which Nietzsche admired for it meant to Nietzsche that in Socrates the Greek tragic spirit of music had not died. Socratism without its "daimonion" which dissuades⁴³ as its substratum was to Nietzsche the principle which spelled the death of Greek tragedy.

VIII. SCHOPENHAUER AS EDUCATOR⁴⁴

We have already touched upon many points of difference between Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's aesthetic but a few final remarks are still perhaps necessary. It is general knowledge that in the essays Richard Wagner in Bayreuth and Schopenhauer als Erzieher (1874) Nietzsche was taking his

⁴³The force of this conception of 'dissuasion' which Nietzsche uses in order to penetrate to the nature of the character of Socrates cannot be fully understood without the background of the 'principle of persuasion' as used in Plato's Timaeus. Nietzsche does not mention here the Timaeus but it is quite evident that he has it in mind.

⁴⁴Vol. VII, pp. 35-136 passim.

farewell of them. What has not been commented on, however, is the manner in which this farewell was made and the differences between the two. In giving the Wagner essay the title which it bears Nietzsche meant to crystallize in a phrase what Wagner finally came to mean to him, what indeed Wagner ultimately stood for. Wagner at Bayreuth realized his greatest ambitions and triumphs but to Nietzsche it was the triumph of the actor which was realized at Bayreuth. It is this which Nietzsche meant to convey through the title he gave to the summary of his impressions on Wagner. The Schopenhauer essay understood in such a way takes on a new meaning. Although Nietzsche considers Schopenhauer to be mistaken in many ways he still remains the educator, the emancipator.

Nietzsche came to Schopenhauer by accident. He found and purchased his works from a second-hand book stall in Leipzig in 1865. The study of Schopenhauer occupied his mind for a decade, culminating in the essay we are about to consider. Schopenhauer's profound appreciation of Greek architecture stimulated Nietzsche to the study and analysis of Greek tragedy. In a letter to his friend Gersdorff (dated November 7, 1870) Nietzsche writes: "This summer I wrote an essay on the "Dionysian Weltanschauung" dealing with an aspect of Greek antiquity of which thanks to our

philosopher, we are now able to get a much closer view".⁴⁵

"Our philosopher" was young Nietzsche's constant guide and educator.

Nietzsche without Schopenhauer would be unthinkable. Although we find that Nietzsche disagrees with Schopenhauer at almost every step the starting point is always with Schopenhauer. Nietzsche's division of art into Apollonian and Dionysian grows directly from Schopenhauer's division of the world into Will and Idea. Nietzsche's conception of beauty as belonging primarily to the realm of the Apollonian and the sublime as belonging to the Dionysian is true to Schopenhauer in its outlines. Nietzsche's discussion of art in terms of the spectator and the artist has its starting point in Schopenhauer and owes its greater force and adequacy to Schopenhauer who had done all the necessary rough work and thus paved the way for greater insight. Both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer believe in the theory of elevation, in the "raising of the popular melody to a universal symbol", as Nietzsche puts it.⁴⁶ Nietzsche disagrees with Schopenhauer on the nature of Will and man's attitude to it as the latter understood it. What we find in Nietzsche is Schopenhauer's training reactivated by a different spirit but a training

⁴⁵Selected letters, p. 213.

⁴⁶"Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben", Vol. VI, p. 280.

which has not forgotten its origins. It is thus interesting to see that Nietzsche's farewell to Schopenhauer takes the form it does for it reassures us that as far as Nietzsche is concerned, Schopenhauer still remains the educator--der Erzieher.

To Nietzsche the true educators and moulders perform their function not through the addition of knowledge but rather through releasing stored-up energy to be found in the character of man. They are thus in the truest sense liberators. They liberate, that is, the creative energy inherent in the character of man and reveal to him his own inner strength. It was contact with Schopenhauer's thought and life which enabled Nietzsche to 'come of age'. It was in Schopenhauer that Nietzsche found his awakening.

CHAPTER III

SCHOPENHAUER AND NIETZSCHE COMPARED

I. SCHOPENHAUER

A present-day analysis of Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's thought is incomplete without considering the impact their work has made upon subsequent thinkers and poets. Moreover, a discussion of these effects is valuable in that it will bring into sharper relief the basic differences and similarities between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. It is also apparent that Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's work has penetrated modern consciousness to such an extent that we are forced to enquire into that aspect or aspects of their work which have been responsible for this startling event. It will be found that the source of this influence lies in Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's handling of their philosophic problems. In our presentation of Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's aesthetics we excluded this aspect of their work for the nature of their respective methods is such that they require separate treatment.

R. H. Goodale in an article entitled: "Schopenhauer and Pessimism in 19th Century English Literature", considers only Schopenhauer's pessimism as the influential factor on the literary world. Goodale, however, concludes in this article that: "A detailed study of authors shows occasional

use of Schopenhauer's ideas, at least after 1887, but fails to show that Schopenhauer greatly influenced any English author".¹ Pessimism itself was of course a wrong yard-stick to use in an investigation of Schopenhauer's influence, for although to popularizers of philosophy Schopenhauer is always "the Pessimist", pessimism is not that aspect in Schopenhauer which has left the deepest mark on subsequent thinkers. As another critic has put it: "We are driven to the paradox that while Schopenhauer will always be remembered as a pessimist, it is not this pessimism which most survives in thought."² Furthermore, Goodale speaks of the occasional use of Schopenhauer's "ideas" and not of the general temper and mood of Schopenhauer's pessimistic writings as the stimulating factor. It is unlikely that a reading of Schopenhauer's abstractions about pessimism could make a pessimist out of a non-pessimist. In this respect a mood established by a writer, whether it be Schopenhauer or any other, is more effective. What is more likely is that an artist with a pessimistic strain would find in his own personality confirmation in Schopenhauer and thus make his own pessimism more meaningful to himself. Such an influence would of course be difficult to trace. It is however only this conception of influence

¹Publications of the Modern Language Association, pp. 260-1.

²"Century of Schopenhauer" (unsigned), p. 346.

which is upheld by artists themselves as is attested by André Gide himself in his relationship to Nietzsche.

Schopenhauer's impact on modern thought has been so marked because he introduced into his work a body of hitherto neglected and overlooked facts. By introducing this new body of human experiences he anticipated and prepared the ground for many preoccupations of modern thought. Schopenhauer's penetrating analysis of human nature contributed decisively to the development of psychoanalytic theory. Furthermore, his grasp of the totality of the human situation and its minute and careful analysis influenced also, to give another example, the Romantic movement. Schopenhauer's animation of all levels of reality, his ascription of Will and activity to every level of reality in his work Über den Willen in der Natur stimulated and strengthened the Romantic element in art and literature.

Besides these general influences which reach out in various directions there are the more immediate contacts between Schopenhauer and other thinkers. The philosophy of von Hartmann takes its origin in Schopenhauer's analysis of the human intellect. As W. R. Morse states:

As Schopenhauer mainly follows Kant, so von Hartmann, but not professedly, follows Schopenhauer; yet as one begins to read von Hartmann after having read Schopenhauer, the change, not only of style, but also of method, is so abrupt that considerable progress is requisite before this discipleship is clearly seen.³

³"Schopenhauer and von Hartmann", p. 152.

Yet the "discipleship" is there. Schopenhauer's work also prepared the ground for the emergence of the Bergsonian philosophy. With Bergson the change in both style and method, however, is not as considerable as that which is found in von Hartmann. Bergson recaptures the quality of Schopenhauer's directing, vitalizing, and suggestive idea.

He preceded Bergson in dwelling on the humble, practical origins of reason, and on its incapacity, even in the end, to tell us about anything but the outside of things. His will-in-itself is not without likeness to the élan vital; and his direct form of knowledge, which penetrates reality, approaches Bergson's ideal of intuition.⁴

Such tenets as 'élan vital', 'intuition', and 'practical origins of reason' are of course propositions which neither Schopenhauer nor Bergson have managed to define in any final way. Schopenhauer's and Bergson's importance lie more in the way they both struggle with these problems than in the achievement of definite results. Schopenhauer's significance lies rather in facing up to new questions. These new questions are antagonistic to existing and well-established prejudices and stimulate the reader to a re-consideration of his own position. In responding to such thinkers as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche we do not necessarily respond to their interpretation but rather to the effect their work produces in us.

Schopenhauer (and even to a still greater extent also

⁴Op. cit., pp. 346-7.

Nietzsche) have sometimes been accused of being outside the western tradition. Yet the practice of these two men is really representative of great philosophers generally, for they tend to rejuvenate the existing patterns of thought through their very questioning of this tradition. Philosophers are not remembered for their particular doctrines but for their refusal to accept the traditional order of things and through this refusal they carry the traditional and inherited sum of knowledge a step further and a step higher. Walter Kaufmann in a recent article has touched the core of this problem:

Both Nietzsche and Rilke have sometimes been criticized for their supposed inversion of "the tradition". Nietzsche in particular has been linked with Marx and Kierkegaard, and Marx has been cited again and again as having admitted that he wanted to stand Hegel on his head. Here one finds a welcome image for what is supposed to be wrong with all these men. As it happens, however, Marx has been misquoted, and the charge against all of these men should be dismissed. Alluding to one of Hegel's images in the preface to the Phenomenology, Marx held that Hegel had stood man on his head (as if the spirit were basic) and Marx proposed to put man on his feet again. Similarly Kierkegaard believed that the Church had turned Christianity upside down, and Nietzsche thought that Christianity had turned almost everything upside down, a proposition with which Rilke agreed at least in part. Each was opposed to some particular tradition and--this is especially true of Nietzsche and Rilke--also to any attempt to seek security in a tradition. But there is no such thing as "the" tradition, except in an inclusive sense in which "the tradition" is the universe of discourse in which we place and try to understand them.⁵

⁵"Art, Tradition, and Truth", p. 9.

There exist numerous works of artists in which we become aware of Schopenhauer's Weltanschauung as their philosophical background. The similarity of Thomas Hardy's and Schopenhauer's attitudes has aroused frequent comment. Barker Fairley, Ernest Brennecke and Helen Garwood have all written upon this aspect of Schopenhauer's influence.⁶

D. M. Alexander in a paper on O'Neill's play Strange Interlude has demonstrated that O'Neill designed the play according to an intellectual pattern on the lines of Schopenhauer's philosophy. Alexander declares⁷ that so pervasive is the presence of Schopenhauer's ideology in Strange Interlude that it seems obvious to him that the play is an expression of Schopenhauer's philosophy.

In Strange Interlude O'Neill emphatically rejects reason, particularly reason as expressed through science, as a means of guiding or understanding life. All of the characters are at the mercy of irrational forces, and the chief representative of the scientific approach to life, Darrell, is the most abject victim of irrational forces in the play. All his attempts to cope with life rationally and scientifically prove disastrous, so that at the end of the play he shows himself a complete convert to irrationalism in such remarks as: "Thinking doesn't matter a damn! Life is something in one cell that doesn't need to think!" By the end of Strange Interlude, Darrell, and presumably the audience, are convinced that science is inadequate to cope with human life.⁸

⁶Goodale, pp. 252-3.

⁷"Strange Interlude and Schopenhauer", p. 227.

⁸Ibid., p. 225.

Having interpreted the play in terms of Schopenhauer's philosophy, particularly his view of sexual instinct, Alexander congratulates O'Neill (and presumably himself as well) on the success with which O'Neill conveyed Schopenhauer's view of life in Strange Interlude, but wonders whether "great drama" can "be constructed on the basis of such an outlook". Dr. Kurt von Sonnenfeldt in an essay entitled: "Shakespeare and Schopenhauer" provides us perhaps with an answer to this question when he proclaims: "For there is no human passion, no potentiality of the human soul, that is not portrayed in living flesh and blood, in all its tragedy and all its humor, by Shakespeare, and that has not been interrogated as to its contribution to the meaning of life by Schopenhauer".⁹ The nature of Schopenhauer's influence upon modern thought has thus been both wide and diverse. He has provided the philosophical background for movements other than philosophical, and the groundworks for philosophizing itself.

Our purpose here, however, is not to count how many heads there are in Schopenhauer's camp but rather to explain why they are in Schopenhauer's camp, and how they got there. Although it is of value to know what aspect of Schopenhauer's work has been influential in the creation of a particular

⁹P. 705.

effect, one would like to know how a particular person or movement came to be influenced by Schopenhauer. The answer to this problem lies in Schopenhauer's handling of philosophical problems. Schopenhauer's person unfolds itself on every page of his work. It has reinforced the fabric of his thought and made the very structure of his work more accessible. His fabric, that is, is not built in a way to keep you out, but to let you in. The reaction of a reader of Schopenhauer is always one of deep feeling.

The first time one reads Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung he is carried away by the dramatic interest and intensity of this profound, seemingly dispassionate work. Its construction, its dizzy ascent from the theory of knowledge through metaphysics and aesthetics to ethics, affected me, the first time I read it, precisely like a four-act drama. This play, whose hero is Man, whose plot is the successive stages in the evolution of the will-to-be, with its tragic sequence of exposition, climax, and catastrophe, arousing as it does both fear and pity, lacks only dialogue to be a tragedy. This is why I would call Schopenhauer the Shakespeare of philosophy.¹⁰

The dramatic intensity of Schopenhauer's style captivates the reader and holds him spellbound. Schopenhauer's character and style are intimately linked in his work. In Schopenhauer the style is the man. He writes with a sense of urgency and conviction, with a passionate awareness of the human situation and its total vulnerability.

Schopenhauer's method consists in awakening in the

¹⁰"Shakespeare and Schopenhauer", p. 708.

reader his own thoughts, in elevating the reader to the level of intellectual contemplation as well as to aesthetic enjoyment. It is not a method which can be taught but it is one which can be learned by being attentive to one's own thoughts. The remarkable thing about this type of handling of philosophic problems is that it is also a tool which one can use in order to interpret works of art for oneself. Schopenhauer's use of the principle of elevation in conveying his thoughts is precisely that very thing which he elaborates into a critical tool. The state produced by the elevating experience is what Schopenhauer calls the aesthetic state. Thomas Mann, whose own work is a living embodiment of the value of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche for art and creativity, has described this aesthetic state in these terms:

There is a state, where the miracle comes to pass, that knowledge wrenches itself free from will, the subject ceases to be merely individual and becomes the pure, will-less subject of knowledge. We may call it the aesthetic state; this is one of the greatest and profoundest of Schopenhauer's perceptions.¹¹

Schopenhauer in his attempt to outline the principle of elevation approached the problem from several angles. Firstly, the goal, Schopenhauer argued, of both the creator and spectator of a work of art is the attainment of Platonic

¹¹The Living Thoughts of Schopenhauer, p. 13.

Ideas. Thus art, both from the artist's and spectator's point of view, was a vision, an insight into the nature of reality. This vision, however, could only be achieved through a double elevation: the elevation of the subject himself (whether it be the artist or spectator) to the position of pure Subject of Knowledge, and the elevation of the observed object to the level of pure Platonic Idea. Once these conditions were fulfilled, the vision was complete and the purpose and the nature of art is immediately realized.

Secondly, Schopenhauer distinguishes the arts according to the Idea each strives to express and the material it works with. Architecture, for example, which deals in stone is thus incapable of attaining to the height of, let us say, poetry, for the inherent quality of stone (rigidity, gravity, cohesion) limits the possibilities of the art. The extent to which architecture is thus capable of contributing to the elevating experience is not considerable. Thirdly, Schopenhauer uses the concepts of beauty and of the sublime to indicate the two extremes in the process of elevation. Whereas everything which contributes to, or helps the experiencing of elevation can be said to be "beautiful", only that which helps us to attain to the extreme of the elevating experience can be called "sublime".

Lastly, in Schopenhauer's image of art as being the stage upon the stage in Hamlet we have another attempt to

express the principle of elevation. What Schopenhauer intends with this image is to show that art objectifies, elevates life's experiences upon a higher plane and in the process raises both the artist and man in general onto a higher stage of perception. Nietzsche too, as we have seen, uses the image of Hamlet (the man) to indicate his meaning and intention. To Nietzsche, however, the essence of elevation does not consist in a relaxing outward movement but rather in an intense inward movement. Hamlet,¹² Nietzsche tells us, "looked in" and saw the contradiction at the core and as a result his ability to act became impaired. Although the result of a Schopenhauerian vision into reality also results in non-activity, the process of achieving this vision is conceived in different terms.

Here, of course, lies the major difference between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Nietzsche does not argue with Schopenhauer's description of life. He accepts it. Instead however, of succumbing to life as Schopenhauer does, he wishes to affirm life. Thus to Nietzsche art is not the salve to life but its very justification. Art is life. The elevating experience itself (Dionysian perceptions as Nietzsche would put it) lies, according to Nietzsche's views, at the very basis of life. Nietzsche thus accepts

¹²Cf. Chapter II, pp. 127-8, above.

Schopenhauer's principle of elevation as lying at the basis of both the creation and appreciation of art but re-interprets it to mean a realization of the vision which arises not from the denial of the Will but in the affirmation of Will, in the "joining in".

The chief source of Schopenhauer's influence on Nietzsche was thus really Schopenhauer's own personality and manner of philosophizing. The chief bond between the two men was that of a similar intellectual personality. Schopenhauer's personality and unusual ability to induce elevation constituted Nietzsche's lasting impression of him. In Nietzsche's essay on Schopenhauer as educator it was this particular point about Schopenhauer which he emphasized, that is, Schopenhauer's ability to stimulate one's own ideas, to make one educate oneself. If it is to be argued that all great thinkers do just this, then our point is well taken for our attempt here is to show that both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are representative of all great thinkers. To see however, how and in what way Nietzsche continued the Schopenhauerian tradition we must turn to Nietzsche himself.

II. NIETZSCHE

Like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche has his train of followers, and although his disciples differ in many respects from Schopenhauer's, there are points of marked similarity. Those

who are indebted to Nietzsche for their own awakening see in him the forerunner of modern thought. As André Gide says in his Journal: "Every time I pick up Nietzsche again, it seems to me that nothing remains to be said and that it is enough to quote him."¹³ It is also André Gide who sees in Nietzsche's Die Geburt the preface to all future 'dramaturgie'. "Voilà ce qui me faisait considérer plus haut l'oeuvre entière de Nietzsche comme une préface, ou pourrait dire: Préface à toute dramaturgie future".¹⁴ The existentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers declares categorically: "To come to terms with Nietzsche is an absolute necessity for the contemporary philosophical mind".¹⁵ Jaspers holds to this affirmation because he sees in Nietzsche one of those thinkers who belong to the nineteenth century but have come into their own in the twentieth and whose influence determines current continental philosophy. They are still in process of being assimilated and without their contribution it is impossible to understand the thought and language of the time. Nietzsche stands in such a relationship to our time because, as Jaspers explains: "Nietzsche's philosophizing is indispensable because it makes

¹³The Journals of André Gide, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), Vol. III, p. 165.

¹⁴Morceaux Choisis (Paris: NRF, 1921), p. 179.

¹⁵"The Importance of Nietzsche, Marx and Kierkegaard in the History of Philosophy", pp. 233-4.

us aware of the real problems, not because it solves them. His thinking is an experiment: he himself calls it an "experimental philosophy".¹⁶

In discussing Nietzsche's influence (or for that matter the influence of any one writer upon another) care must be taken to distinguish between a superficial resemblance and a necessary relation. Such care will avoid looseness of thought, a looseness all too frequent in this matter. It is well to remember what André Gide declared about "influences".

It is very bold to assert that you would have thought the same without having read certain authors who will later seem to have been your initiators. Yet it seems to me that had I not known Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche, X or Z, I should have thought just the same, and that I found in them rather an authorization than an awakening. Above all, they taught me to cease doubting myself, not to be afraid of my thought, and to let myself be led by it since moreover I found them in it.¹⁷

The "authorization" rather than the "awakening" of which André Gide speaks is not a matter which we wish to argue here, for in some ways the "awakening" of one's thought is very close to an "authorization". What we must keep in mind is that Nietzsche and Schopenhauer awaken our own thought as well. A. Hellman in an article entitled: "Hauptmann and the Nietzschean Philosophy" also points out that it is "an unnecessary duty" that many critics take upon themselves to

¹⁶Ibid., p. 288.

¹⁷Journal, Vol. I, p. 347.

find in every utterance of an artist the genealogy of his thinking. Hellman, however, cannot help stressing that the philosophical writings of Nietzsche have colored deeply much of the art of to-day. In the case of Hauptmann, Helmann states: "the figure of a tragic, persistent fighter, of Friedrich Nietzsche, towers high in the background which forms the poetry and ethics of Gerhart Hauptmann".¹⁸

One may justly ask, What is it in Nietzsche that has caused so much stir? What is it that made August Strindberg write: "I end all my letters to my friends with, "Read Nietzsche"!".¹⁹ Part of the answer lies in Leo Tolstoy's remark about Nietzsche. Tolstoy's reaction to Nietzsche was: "Nietzsche was a real madman, but what a talent! I was absolutely charmed by his language when I first read him. What vigour and what beauty!"²⁰ "Vigour" and "beauty" is what Tolstoy chooses to emphasize in Nietzsche. It is this very vigour which also brought André Gide to Nietzsche and left its permanent mark on both his work and outlook. This vigour is the element in Nietzsche which shakes the reader to his very foundations. Herbert Read in his Annals of Innocence and Experience states that Nietzsche was to him a new world

¹⁸P. 347.

¹⁹Quoted in Selected Letters, ed. and trans. O. Levy, p. 302.

²⁰Gerald Abraham, Nietzsche, p. 11.

and since his discovery of Blake, "the most cataclysmic".²¹

To a considerable extent this vigour in Nietzsche is due to his dynamic presentation and style. A. L. Carter in an essay on Nietzsche makes it clear that it is a commonplace of literary criticism that Nietzsche did more for German prose "than any other writer except Goethe".²²

Nietzsche's style and handling of his material have produced this powerful effect. Like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche writes from the point of view of the passionate, directing idea. He once said of Schopenhauer (and this could as well be said of Nietzsche himself) that his teaching was dated but the form, the How, would last. Style, method and personality all combine to present us in Nietzsche a formidable force. Otto Julius Bierbaum in an article on Dostoyeffsky and Nietzsche declares:

I know now that he (Dostoyeffsky) is more than a hilltop; I see in him a mountain-peak, measured by whose loftiness all other writers of our time, with one sole exception, look small indeed. In comparison with his huge, rough bulk, Nietzsche, the one who towers above him, affects us in a way that we might call disquieting, as a finished work of art, as something constructed beside something elemental.²³

This was written in 1911. We would perhaps no longer consider Nietzsche a "finished work of art" but the juxtaposition of

²¹London: (Faber & Faber, 1940), p. 86.

²²"Nietzsche on the Art of Writing", p. 99.

²³"Dostoyeffsky and Nietzsche", p. 823.

of Dostoyeffsky and Nietzsche is still relevant for us. In terms of stimulation and suggestiveness Nietzsche is to us as huge, rough and elemental as Dostoyeffsky.

Nietzsche has been able to affect the intellectual life of to-day so powerfully because his emphasis has been on the human element, on personality,²⁴ on the individual in his predicament. With this emphasis upon personality Nietzsche comes close to Goethe. Barker Fairley makes this point forcibly when he writes:

Goethe teaches us to do the same, not because he talks about it,--he hardly ever plays the professional critic--but because he practises it, making himself his own personality, the instrument of his own truth in a way for which there was no precedent. When we have finished reading Goethe--if we ever finish-- we read all books differently. All our comfortable generalizations about impersonality and truth, about subjective and objective are impossible now. In him the personal merges into the impersonal, the particular into the general in such a variety of ways that like Nietzsche he gives us a new standard, a new orientation in aesthetics. The professional writers on aesthetics are altogether less potent than these two, Nietzsche and Goethe, who did not on the whole choose to compete with them. Nietzsche teaches us better or more directly than Goethe how to discover the personal in the works of others; Goethe teaches us better than Nietzsche that the personal cannot be circumvented and that it can be turned to the ultimate ends of man. Between them they offer what is perhaps the most radical experience in the field of aesthetics that the modern reader can find.²⁵

²⁴Thomas Mann has even made use of Nietzsche's own personal experience for an incident of considerable importance in Doktor Faustus. Cf. J. C. Blankenagel, "A Nietzsche Episode in Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus", pp. 387-90.

²⁵"Nietzsche and Goethe", p. 12.

Because much of the value in Nietzsche's contribution to modern thought stems more from his emphasis on personality than from his set of ideas or a particular system of philosophy, Nietzsche the man must be taken into account as well as his work. Nietzsche the man illustrates a certain philosophical method and a particular philosophical attitude. J. G. Gray, however, goes too far when he refers to this attitude as the "method of revelation", that Nietzsche writes like a man who is communicating revealed truth, not developing a point of view with supporting evidence. "The method", continues J. G. Gray, "is introspective, mythical, dogmatic. The conclusions reached, they (Nietzsche and Heidegger) are saying, are not invented by them; they are not poets, not makers, but seers."²⁶ Nietzsche's method is that of the seer, on the one hand, in so far as it suggests to each successive generation new and individual interpretations, but on the other hand, it is not mythical and dogmatic when he is concerned with proving and demonstrating truths once gained through direct intuitions. Whatever the means whereby Nietzsche has arrived at his particular assertions (Greek tragedy for example) these assertions are not asked to be taken at their face value. Nietzsche, as we have seen, was deeply concerned in presenting a good case for his assertions.

²⁶"Heidegger 'evaluates' Nietzsche", p. 308.

It is thus foolish to think that Nietzsche's method, viewed as a whole, is dogmatic and lacking of supporting evidence. In his discussion of tragedy, his demonstrations are not only drawn from a historical analysis of the thought of the time but also a close investigation of philological problems. The point is, however, that Nietzsche's handling of this material is undertaken in such a manner as to enable future generations to continue to build. Nietzsche's work does not present a closed system.

In this Nietzsche's method is similar to Schopenhauer's, and for this very reason it is not surprising to find that another critic analyzing another work of O'Neill's comes to the conclusion that O'Neill constructed the basis of his work upon Nietzsche's Dionysian Weltanschauung.²⁷ If that is the case, how then do Schopenhauer and Nietzsche differ? To use a sociological figure of speech, even though both are concerned with the principle of life, Schopenhauer puts the emphasis on the adaptibility of human nature to its environment, while Nietzsche puts his upon the ability of human nature to conquer and rise above its environment. Still both have this in common that their value does not lie in the sum of ideas or concepts which they have added to the body of traditional thought but rather in the way they have changed

²⁷H. Steinhauer, "Eros and Psyche: A Nietzschean Motif in Anglo-American Literature".

our perceptions.

Philosophy in English speaking countries has tended in the last fifty years to ignore the fact that thought and emotion only too often interpenetrate and that a separation of the two can only spell the death of constructive thinking. This is not a problem solely confined to philosophy. Poetry too stands suspended over the abyss which has been created as a result of this dichotomy of thought and emotion in relation to truth and how it is arrived at. As Walter Kaufmann explains: "The traditionalist critics take for granted that we know the truth of beliefs quite independently of poetry, and that the greatness of a philosopher is unquestionably determined by the truth of his beliefs. Both these assumptions are false".²⁸ Philosophy cannot afford to ignore that "feelings" are necessary conditions for the perception of certain truths.

The dichotomy of thought and emotion on which Eliot depends is quite modern and particularly characteristic, pace Eliot, of logical positivism, especially in its first and crudest phase. It was largely alien to Greek philosophy. Plato juxtaposed reason and the senses without confining emotion to either realm: he knew the passion of thinking too well. Among the earliest pre-Socratics there is no evidence of any division of man into disjointed faculties; and this is one main reason why Heidegger rejects the whole Western tradition that begins with Plato, why he goes back to the pre-Socratics, and why he has occupied himself so largely with Hölderlin and Rilke, saying that his own philosophy is really an

²⁸"Art, Tradition, and Truth", p. 22.

explication of Rilke. He seeks a mode of perception that leaves behind the disunity of modern man. And Rilke, like Nietzsche, is an outstanding representative of a non-positivistic sensibility in which thought and emotion interpenetrate.²⁹

Although Nietzsche's handling of philosophic problems does not differ in general principles from Schopenhauer's, it yet takes a direction which is opposed to Schopenhauer. We shall arrive at a more precise understanding of this opposition through a closer examination of Nietzsche's use of the principle of elevation.

The concepts of "Being" and "Becoming" in Nietzsche's early work can be interpreted in terms of the principle of elevation. Nietzsche believed that the effort to impose Being (the image of the stable ego--the knowing process) upon the process of Becoming (the welter of events taking place outside the ego) and through this attempt to penetrate the nature of reality, was a falsification since the ego itself was a process. If the ego is then to retain its high function, Nietzsche insisted, we must re-interpret its purpose as the creative faculty in life, a faculty ever striving towards re-evaluations. Schopenhauer, on the other hand, looked upon this process from another point of view. He wished to stabilize this constant flux of events and in its moment of stability obtain an insight into the eternal aspect

²⁹Ibid., pp. 24-5.

of things. Thus whereas elevation to Schopenhauer is conceived in terms of repose--the deeper the repose the higher the elevation--to Nietzsche elevation is conceived in terms of activity and the more persistent the activity, the more intense must be the elevation.

Because the essence of elevation, according to Nietzsche's view, lies in the intensity of feeling, "contemplation" (as Schopenhauer understands it) will not help us achieve it. We can only experience elevation through participation. There is no other way by which it can be communicated. Thus, according to Nietzsche tragedy does not appeal to our powers of contemplation but rather to our ability to experience what the hero experiences. Consequently, whereas to Schopenhauer tragedy elevates the spectator by detaching him from life, for Nietzsche it elevates the spectator by making life more meaningful, more intense for him. Although this is strictly true only of Dionysian art, similar distinctions can be drawn in Apollonian art as well. The world of the plastic artist and epic poet deals with a realm which is purely contemplative but this world still has value for us, Nietzsche argues, in that it is an Apollonian outgrowth from a Dionysian subsoil. The Apollonian vision can be used as a bridge to the Dionysian. The Apollonian is then not entirely devoid of the power of elevation. Schopenhauer, on the other hand, contends that

the principle of elevation consists in contemplation and also avoids contradiction by stating that although the world of plastic art is somewhat removed from the higher Ideas, it nevertheless expresses Ideas. In the case of both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche the arts do not differ qualitatively but only quantitatively. They (Schopenhauer and Nietzsche), however, interpret the nature of this qualitative element in individual ways.

Both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche believe that the plurality of our universe results from a primal force breaking up its original unity because of its inherent desire for self-expression. Both also believe that struggle among the plurality of elements is essential for the evolution of the higher Idea. Schopenhauer, however, sees a possibility of refuge in such a cosmology by positing the view that an original means (the human intellect) working towards a definite goal (the service of the Will) has the tendency to acquire independence and become an end in itself. This, according to Schopenhauer, is brought about by the temporary preponderance of the intellect over the Will. Salvation for Schopenhauer thus lies in the higher intellectual development. Nietzsche, on the other hand, does not cower before this cosmology. Nietzsche traces the source of this cosmology, the source of this conception of the creative principle to Heraclitus and accepts Heraclitus' conclusions. The world to Heraclitus is

the Game of Zeus (the game of fire with itself) and world-creation, the pouring out of itself into forms of plurality. It was over-satiety, overflow at the core which resulted in plurality and because (as the old Greek proverb tells us) "satiety gives birth to crime", the act of creation is an act of crime. Nietzsche thus establishes his cosmology not on the foundation of the myth of the Fall of Man but rather upon the Promethean myth. The distinction to be made between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is that while Schopenhauer looks beyond the "overflow" for the aesthetic possibility, Nietzsche accepts this very "overflow" as the basis for creativity.

Schopenhauer may have been led to his particular conclusions in regard to "overflow", to Will, because unlike Nietzsche he interpreted it for himself in terms of the Semitic myth. There are of course important differences between the Jewish myth of the Fall, and the Graeco-Indian conceptions. And it may be argued that Schopenhauer's affinity is with the latter more than the former, that while in the Biblical myth the desire for knowledge is responsible for the Fall, in the Greek it is the absence of knowledge, or ignorance, which immerses the soul in matter. But it should always be remembered that the desire for "knowledge" means, according to Bible interpretation, sexual desire. Now although it is not strictly correct to speak of Schopenhauer's

cosmology in the light of Nietzsche's researches, such a procedure is nevertheless justified since Schopenhauer himself very frequently thinks of Will as sexual striving. We may also surmise that Nietzsche's thought took the direction of acceptance of Will rather than rejection because he did manage to give Will a Hellenic (masculine) rather than a Hebraic (feminine) interpretation. Although the notion of Will itself is not clearly present in most ancient thinkers (since it emerges definitely only with thinkers like Augustine) Nietzsche would justify his interpretation by pointing at ancient tragedy and deducing it from that.

The difference between such a Hebraic-Christian and Hellenic outlook is not only confined to the problem of the emergence of plurality out of unity. What the Hellenic outlook is and the problems involved in clasifying such a diverse number of Greek thinkers in such a way were well-known to Nietzsche. We have already touched upon this aspect in Chapter II, but a few words may still be in place here. Nietzsche arrives at the nature of the "Hellenic view of life" through an analysis of ancient Greek tragedy. He realized that Greek tragedy represented perhaps only a part of the Greek thought of the time, that there were what we might call "anti-Hellenic" attitudes or as Nietzsche himself puts it, "un-Greek" thinkers. What then influenced him to make such a supposedly "arbitrary selection"? I think that if

we looked at the matter pragmatically we should probably arrive at a correct answer. The Hellenic view of life as portrayed in Greek tragedy, Nietzsche would say in James' terms, "paid off", that is, produced the best results, and consequently if we can at all speak about a Hellenic view of life it is the Hellenic tragic view that we ought to have in mind--as indeed we do. It may however still be questioned whether one is justified in putting forth such bold generalizations as "Hebraic-Christian" and "Hellenic". Many writers (Heine, Arnold), however, have found it useful and productive to make such distinctions and I have adopted it here.

These differences then (Hebraic-Christian and Hellenic) in approach can be discovered in Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's individual handling of Tragedy as well. The tragedy of the ancients, Schopenhauer argued, is inferior to modern Christian tragedy. The ancients show only submission to inevitable fate but no surrender of the Will to live itself, while Christian tragedy manifests surrender of the whole Will to live and the joyful forsaking of the world in the consciousness of its worthlessness and vanity. In fact, Schopenhauer argues, the ancients had really not yet attained to the summit and goal of tragedy nor to that view of life itself. In discussing architecture, on the other hand, Schopenhauer comes close to Nietzsche. Ancient architecture

which, according to Schopenhauer, is conceived in a purely objective spirit and is based upon laws founded in nature is superior to Gothic architecture which is based upon Christian sentiments and essentially subjective in character.

In Nietzsche's view of tragedy resignation plays no part. To him tragedy means and implies that in spite of the perpetual of phenomena, life at bottom is indestructibly powerful and pleasurable. Tragedy not only denies resignation but saves man from longing for a Buddhistic negation of Will. In contradistinction to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche prefers not only Greek tragedy but the Hellenic view of life itself. Nietzsche regards the modern Christian tragedy (and "culture" generally) as a falling away from the golden age of Hellenism.

As Schopenhauer speaks of the aesthetic state (the state wherein elevation is possible) Nietzsche speaks of the Dionysian state. To Nietzsche elevation consists in achieving the Dionysian vision of reality--it is the inner experience of strength and oneness. Furthermore, as Schopenhauer's concept of elevation is used by him as a critical instrument in evaluating works of art, Nietzsche's Dionysian principle serves the same purpose. A work of art to Nietzsche is valuable so far as it is able to arouse in the spectator the Dionysian experience. In the case of both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche their theories require that the work of art appeal

to the reader's own reaction. Both want to convey to us that art can mean little or nothing to him who brings nothing to it. Art is not so much concerned with unburdening facts as it is with arousing individual response and a personal challenge.

Even though Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are at one as far as the "How" of their propositions are concerned, we discover a greater unity between method and substance in Nietzsche than in Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer insists that salvation from the constant striving-power of Will lies in the aesthetic state, in the calm, intuitive state of elevation, yet he propounds this doctrine with a passionate intensity which betrays his own position in regard to this very Will. Although it is true that it is no inconsistency for a man, for example, to write with passion about metaphysics, yet not hold that metaphysical thinking is itself a matter of "passion"; or conversely, to write quite dispassionately that metaphysical thinking is "passion", still such a procedure would lack harmony. It is likewise with Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's "How" stands in strange juxtaposition to his "What". In reading Schopenhauer we not only respond to his final vision of repose in elevation but are moved by the insistent urgency of his language with its passionate re-creation of this vision. In Nietzsche there is a greater unity between the "How" and the "What",

for the subject matter in Nietzsche is of the essence of his method.

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