

"ATHENS IN RELATION TO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR"

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CHAPTER I.

The Causes of the War

Sparta's alarm at the growth of Athenian power.

Athenian development from 479 B.C. The Delian Confederacy.

Athenian expansion by land from 461 to 447 B.C. Athenian

expansion by sea. Sea power of Athens. Spartan inactivity.

The spread of democracy alarming to Sparta. Athenian policy of encirclement. Sparta's uneasiness based on reality.

The economic causes of the war.

Corinthian and Athenian trade rivalry. Corinth influential in the west. Athenian penetration westward. Corcyra an ally of Athens. Athens' naval strength predominant. Corinth fosters the war spirit in the Peloponnese. The Megarian decree. Aegina's enmity for Athens.

The immediate causes of the war.

Epidamnus : Potidaea : Plataea.

Relative importance of the causes.

Sparta's fear of Athens the most important. Evidence.

Preliminaries.

Congress at Sparta. Demands of the Spartans. Impossibility of Athens granting the demands. Sparta's aims : to gain time, and to win moral support. Sparta as liberator of Greece.

Athens' attitude to the war.

No unanimity of opinion. Pericles favors war. His policy.

Criticism of his policy.

War inevitable. Evidence for that conclusion.

Sparta's alarm at the growing power of Athens was the main cause of the Peloponnesian war. A study of the fifty years' period from 479 B.C. to the outbreak of the war indicates the reason for that alarm.

During this period Sparta observed a rapid development of Athenian power. After the repulse of the Persians, Sparta had no great fear of her former rival, Athens, for that city lay helpless without fortifications. This condition did not exist for long. Inspired by Themistocles, the Athenians rebuilt the fortifications of Athens and the Peiraeus, and began to give to naval matters that attention which was to lead them on to empire. Leadership of the allies in the war, which was still being carried on against Persia, next fell to the lot of Athens. The Delian Confederacy was organized, contributions of ships and men by the allies were replaced gradually by contributions of money, and the allied fleet in time became an Athenian fleet. Athens had acquired among the maritime states that superiority which Sparta still maintained on land.

Athenian ambition and enterprise was brought more clearly to the notice of Sparta by Athens' attempt to establish a land empire in Greece. In 461 B.C. control of Megara, Pagae, Nisaea, and Achaea was obtained by Athens. In 456 B.C. Boeotia and Phocis came under Athenian power. Although, subsequently, from 447 to 440 B.C., these were lost, recollection of that period of Athenian expansion in Greece must have remained vividly in the minds of the Spartans. Control of the Megarid by Athens meant the cutting of the line of communication between Sparta and Boeotia, a strong dependable ally of the Peloponnesians.

That Sparta had reason to fear Athenian plans in the Megarid as well as in Boeotia, is shown later by Athens' return to the policy of acquiring a land empire. Cleon, Demosthenes and Hippocrates aimed at regaining Athens' former supremacy in those regions.⁹

Spartan fears were allayed perhaps, for the time being, upon the concluding of a thirty years' truce with Athens in 440 B.C.¹⁰ But the development of Athenian power went on with unabated vigor in a different direction. Attention was centred on the maintenance and extension of the maritime empire. Aegina had¹¹ been added to the empire in 456 B.C. and all of Euboea had been acquired in 447 B.C. Now in the far north-east the important city of Byzantium became an Athenian dependency; and Samos,¹² vainly attempting to withdraw from the confederacy, was reduced to the status of a tributary. In the Aegean, north of Crete and Cyprus, Athens, by reason of her undisputed supremacy, had a monopoly of trade. In the trade with Egypt, with North-western Greece, and with Sicily and Italy, Athens entered into friendly competition with rival maritime states. In 454 B.C. treaty relations had been arranged with Segesta, and in 433 B.C. with Rhegium and Leontini.¹³¹⁴¹⁵¹⁶

Athenian sea power seems to have been unquestionably superior to that of any other Greek state, during this period. In accordance with the policy of the Delian Confederacy, a fleet of two hundred ships was maintained in constant readiness for war.¹⁷ Upon the cessation of the Persian war, the Athenians did not reduce the size of their armament, nor permit the allies to discontinue their contributions. The funds, which were paid annually, were accumulated as a reserve.¹⁸ The fleet was kept at a

The sea power available for Athens may be estimated from the expeditions undertaken at various times. In 450 B.C. a fleet of two hundred ships under Cimon had made an expedition to Cyprus. Pericles had a fleet of one hundred and twenty-five ships when engaged in suppressing the revolt at Samos in 440 B.C. At the beginning of the war the Athenians had a sufficient number of vessels to provide a reserve fleet of one hundred ships for emergencies, and still have two hundred more for active service.

During this entire period of about fifty years, the state of Sparta had remained, to a large extent, inactive, while Athens had pursued the aggressive policy initiated by Themistocles. The Athenians had become the acknowledged leaders of the Delian Confederacy, had carried on with vigor the war against the Persians, and had attempted, although unsuccessfully, to establish a land empire in Greece. Their efforts had gained for them supremacy at sea, and control of an extensive maritime empire, which embraced the islands and coast lands of the Aegean, extended into the Bosphorus, and had an outpost in western Greece at Naupactus. Athenian trade had developed to a large extent and wealth from commerce had enriched Athens.

Another disturbing element, from the standpoint of Sparta, was the system of government of Athens and her empire. Democracy, perhaps, would not have been so strong among Greek states had not Athens favored that type of government and maintained it throughout her empire. Sparta's government was oligarchic, and her confederacy was composed of states governed by oligarchies. Change of government during the war meant change of alliance, as for example, Argos in 417 B.C. and Thasos in 411 B.C.

The extension of the Athenian empire meant the extension of Democracy which in turn threatened the government of Sparta and of her allies.

The Athenian policy of encirclement just prior to the outbreak of the war served to increase Sparta's uneasiness with regard to the development of Athenian power. The settlement of Naupactus provided a base for Athenian activity in north-western Greece. The alliance formed with Corcyra pointed to a severance of Peloponnesian connection with the Dorian states of Sicily and of Italy. The acquiring of Zacynthus was another step in the same process. Athenian fleets could sail at will around the Peloponnese, and inflict damage whenever they desired as Tolmides had shown in 455 B.C. Sparta must have felt that she was being encircled for a purpose, and that Athenian designs might again include the acquisition of Achaëa and the Megarid.

Sparta's uneasiness at the growth of Athenian power thus was founded on reality. Within fifty years, a city, apparently permanently weakened by the Persian invasion, had become the queen city of Greece, supreme in wealth and in power. More serious still, her people were known to be ambitious, annoyingly energetic, and withal, exceptionally capable, as the Corinthians pointed out to the members of the Congress at Sparta in 432 B.C.

A second main cause for war was the steadily increasing rivalry between Corinth and Athens. In this rivalry may be found the economic cause for the war. Economically the self-sustained state of Sparta was affected little, if at all, by

the growth of Athenian commerce. The contrary was the case with Corinth, and with Megara and Aegina.

At one time Corinth had been a greater centre of commerce than Athens. Gradually superseded in the Aegean region by the Athenians, the Corinthians had developed their trade in the Corinthian gulf, in the north-west of Greece and with the Greek states of Italy and Sicily. That the Athenians did not leave them alone is shown by the settlement at Naupactus, and by the treaties made by Pericles with Leontini and Rhegium. Competition appears, however, to have been on a friendly basis, or perhaps not keen enough to warrant pronounced antagonism between the states. The Epidamnian affair, bringing in its train an alliance between Corcyra and Athens proved of such serious consequence that from that moment Corinth persistently fostered the war spirit among the Peloponnesians. Corcyra was a colony of Corinth and possessed the third strongest fleet in Greece. With the addition of this power, Athens' naval strength would become preponderant. Corinth therefore strove to prevent the alliance, but when it was formed, she was faced with the prospect of losing her commercial superiority in the west. The alternative was war in order to preserve her power and cripple that of Athens.

No less serious was the dispute between Megara and Athens. Megara was important to Athens for two reasons. First, control of Megara meant control of the route from the Peloponnese to northern Greece; secondly, Megara had two seaports, Nisaea on the east, Pagae on the west, and from there carried on a flourishing trade. Athens had been forced to relinquish her hold on the

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 Megarid in 445 B.C. A few years before the outbreak of the war, in order to cripple the power of Megara, Pericles passed the Megarian decree, a regulation which excluded Megarians from the use of harbours in the Athenian empire. This marked the end of Megara's trade in the Aegean, and entailed considerable hardship for the city. As a member of the Spartan confederacy, ⁴⁵ Megara pressed Sparta to take action against Athens on her behalf. ⁴⁶ The Aeginetans joined their word of complaint to that of the Megarians. ⁴⁷ They had lost their independence which had been guaranteed them by the treaty between Athens and Sparta. Aegina, a trading nation like Megara and Corinth, also had felt the competition of Athens in commerce and had suffered from it.

These underlying causes for war, namely Sparta's alarm occasioned by the growth of Athenian power, and the commercial rivalry of Corinth with Athens were of sufficient importance to bring on the conflict. Three important events, however, served to fan to a flame the smoldering spark of war in Greece. Corinth's trouble with Corcyra had brought about an alliance between Corcyra and Athens. Armed conflict took place between Athenian and Corinthian vessels. This gave the Corinthians ground for accusation against the Athenians. ⁴⁸ Potidaea, a former Corinthian colony which had become a possession of Athens, was instigated to revolt by the Corinthians. A Corinthian force was sent to aid the Potidaeans, and Athens was put to considerable trouble to regain the city. This affair caused very great ill feeling between Athens and Corinth. ⁴⁹ The third event was the attempted capture of Plataea by the Thebans. ⁵⁰

This was the most glaring violation of the Thirty Years' truce and was the action which put an end to all uncertainty.

Of these causes for war, Sparta's fear of Athenian power ranks as the most important. That alone might not have brought war in 431 B.C. but eventually it was bound to do so. The economic cause may be considered as secondary. Influential as Corinth was, it is doubtful if the pressure she brought to bear on Sparta would have had any effect if the Spartans themselves had not been prepared in their minds for war with Athens. Sthenelaidas in his speech at the Congress at Sparta, was in favor of assistance to Sparta's allies on the basis of their grievances but he also stressed the advancing power of Athens as a reason for action. Had the interests of Corinth and Megara only been at stake, there likely would have been a considerable diversity of opinion at the Congress. Archidamus, it is true, did oppose the declaration of war at that particular time, not in the interests of peace but merely in order that opportunity might be obtained for better preparation. His speech, however, provided the opening for general opposition, but apparently none was made. By a large majority the Spartan Assembly voted for war. As additional evidence there is Thucydides' judgment that fear of the Athenians and of their increasing power was the most important consideration in the minds of the Spartans.

After they had obtained a favorable reply from Delphi, the Spartans summoned another conference of the allies in order to decide the question of peace or war. Prior to this assembly the Corinthians had fostered the war spirit among the allies,

and when they were gathered together, were foremost in setting forth reasons for declaring war at that time. The allies, accordingly, voted for war and commenced preparations. To gain time negotiations were opened with Athens. Some minor demands of the Spartans were made with the intention of discrediting Pericles who was their most influential opponent.⁵⁶ These requests were followed later by a number of demands of such a nature that their rejection was the only course for Athens.⁵⁷

The Spartans required the raising of the siege of Potidaea; the restoration of the independence of Aegina; the rescinding of the Megarian decree. These demands Athens could not fulfil without sacrificing her prestige and eventually her power. Maintenance of the empire intact was one of the cardinal principles of Athenian policy, and Potidaea, therefore, had to be compelled to remain subject. An independent Aegina, close by the Peiraeus would have been an ever present source of danger to Athens herself. To rescind the Megarian decree would have been an acknowledgment that Athenian had been wrong. Of this the Athenians were not convinced for Megara was too important a place to be permitted to prosper outside the boundaries of the empire.⁵⁸ As an ultimatum Sparta declared that peace would be maintained on condition that independence should be granted by Athens to the Greeks. In other words, Athens was to relinquish her empire.

These demands Sparta could not have expected the Athenians to grant. They were put forward for two purposes - to gain time while war preparations were being completed, and to win the moral support of the Greek states. The requests with

regard to Potidaea, Megara, and Aegina would appeal favorably to Dorian states for their kindred were affected. The demand for independence would make a general appeal to Greek states within or without the Athenian empire. Independence was one thing which all Greek states desired, and Athens appeared in the unfavorable role of opponent of independence. Sparta, on the contrary, desired to appear as the liberator of Greece.⁵⁹ This idea of liberating the Greeks is first mentioned by the Corinthians in urging the allies to vote for war; it was as a liberator of the Greeks that Brasidas made his appeal to the Chalcidians, and his ready reception in their country indicates the effect that that appeal made upon Athenian subject states.⁶⁰ Sparta thus skilfully obtained the moral support of the Greek states for the coming struggle.⁶¹

What of Athens' attitude to the war? Unanimity of opinion did not prevail there as at Sparta. The proffered alliance with Corcyra, which the Corinthians indicated would mean war,⁶² was not accepted by the Athenians without discussion and change of opinion.⁶³ The alliance was rejected at first; on secondary consideration it was accepted. Had war been desired by the Athenians generally, there would have been no hesitation in acquiring as an ally the third naval power in Greece. Apparently, considering war with the Peloponnesians inevitable, the Athenians favored the continuance of strife between Corinth and Corcyra so that those naval powers would become weaker.⁶⁴

The revolt of Potidaea, caused by Corinth, stirred up the anger of the Athenians but not to the extent of bringing on war. When the Corinthians, at about this time, were pressing⁶⁵

the Spartans to declare war, Athenian envoys at Sparta urged rather arbitration of differences in accordance with the treaty. Again, when the Spartans presented their ultimatum with regard to Potidaea, Aegina, and the Megarian decree, there was by no means a clear-cut Athenian opinion in favor of war. Some were for rescinding the Megarian decree in order to preserve peace. The decision to oppose all Sparta's demands was made when Pericles threw the weight of his opinion into the scales. On him rests the responsibility for Athens' participation in the war.

Pericles' policy both before and during the war may be considered as follows: maintenance by the Athenians of the empire handed down to them by their ancestors; extension of the empire by peaceful penetration, and no wanton aggression. During Pericles' time the empire was maintained intact. Revolts in Euboea, and Samos were put down without delay. Athenian influence and trade were extended gradually until Pericles could say that the present generation of Athenians had carried on well the work of improvement; had endowed the city with all things; and that the produce of the whole world flowed in to Athens. Athenian interest in Sicily and Italy has been mentioned above as an indication of Athenian penetration westward. When war was imminent the acquisition of Corcyra and Zacynthus to protect those western interests was a natural outcome of former policy.

Was Pericles' unyielding attitude to the demands of Sparta justified? It appears so, in view of his policy outlined above. There is no evidence that he desired war, but there are indications

that he considered it inevitable. An ardent believer in the Athenian empire, in the superiority of Athens to all other states, Pericles, would not have considered, for a moment, acquiescence in a demand for independence for Potidaea or Aegina. Such a concession would have weakened materially the empire which he was eager to maintain. The rescinding of the Megarian decree, in the opinion of some, would have averted war. To Pericles, yielding on that matter would have appeared to have indicated fear on the part of Athens, and would have led to greater demands. Then too, Pericles had perfect confidence in the power of the Athenian empire and in the character of the Athenian people. What need for yielding to the demands of opponents whose aim was the weakening of Athens' power and the destruction of democracy? That Pericles was aware of the conflict between oligarchy and democracy as a cause of war, is indicated by his remarks in reply to Sparta's ultimatum regarding the liberation of the cities of Greece. His counter demand was for Sparta to permit her allied states a true independence, which would imply selection of their type of government, not acceptance of the type desired by Sparta.

No serious attempt to avert war was made by either Sparta or Athens. Sparta made demands which she knew could not be met; Athens suggested arbitration but made no conciliatory proposals which might have led to a peaceful settlement. A fatalistic impression that war was inevitable seems to have pervaded the minds of the Greeks at that time. The Corcyraeans and the Corinthians both mentioned it, Archidamus implied the same, Pericles stated clearly his view that war

could not be avoided, and there is also Thucydides' statement
that the Athenians knew that war with Sparta was inevitable.

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CHAPTER II.

The Contrast between Athens and Sparta

The allies of both sides.

Resources. Athens' resources in men, money, ships. The fleet her strength. Comparison with Corinthian fleet. Sparta's resources. Money lacking. Military force large. Ships few. Aid sought from Sicily and Persia. No mercenaries.

Racial differences.

Athenian confederacy largely Ionian. Spartan confederacy Dorian. Racial antagonism utilized to incite war spirit. Racial affiliation a bond of confederacy.

Organization of confederacies.

Athens' centralized control. Sparta's loose union. Athens' system more advantageous. Delay and private interest a fault of Sparta's system.

System of government.

Athenian democracy. Spartan oligarchy. A cause for bitterness. Evidence of a clash between the two systems.

Character of the two peoples.

Spartan character presented in a bad light. Corinthians' estimate. Pericles' opinion. Evidence from events of war. Athenian character as observed by Corinthians. Contrasted with Spartan. Evidence from the events of the war. Effect of character on the course of the war.

Leaders: No great disparity in ability.

Athens and Sparta, the leading states in the Peloponnesian war presented a contrast in many ways. There were great differences in resources, in the number and type of allies, in management of the confederacies, in the system of government of the principal cities, and in the character of the two peoples.

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The allies of both states at the beginning of the war were numerous, and comprised the more important states of the Grecian world. The Spartan confederacy included all the states of the Peloponnese except Argos and Achaea. Beyond the Peloponnese they numbered among their supporters the Dorian peoples of Megara in the isthmus; Phocis, Locris and Boeotia in central Greece; and Ambracia, Leucadia, and Anactorium in western Greece. The Athenian empire and allied states consisted, in eastern Greece, of Attica and Plataea; in western Greece of the Messenian settlement at Naupactus, Acarnania, and the islands of Corcyra and Zacynthus. Athenian influence and power had spread north and east through the Chalcidice, the Thracian coast, the Hellespont and among the Ionian states of Asia Minor, namely, Caria and Ionia. Almost all the islands of the Aegean were either tributary or non-tributary members of the Athenian empire. Neutrality was observed through a great part of the war by the islands Melos and Cythera, and the states of Argos and Achaea in the Peloponnese. All the other states of the Grecian world were allied with either Sparta or Athens.

In resources the Athenians appeared to have the advantage as indeed Archidamus pointed out to the Spartans. He maintained that Sparta was inferior in navy and in financial resources, and that her lack of money was sufficient reason for postponement

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86 of war. The Corinthians also conceded the same weakness. 87

Athens possessed a treasure which had been accumulated from the annual tribute payable by her allies, amounting to six thousand talents of coined silver. There were also treasures in the various temples, gold and silver votive offerings, sacred vessels used in the processions and games, spoil from the Persian war - all of a value of at least five hundred talents. For an emergency there was available the gold plate on the statue of the goddess Athena, in weight forty talents, equivalent to four hundred talents of silver. Therefore in reserve treasure Athens had six thousand, nine hundred talents of silver, equivalent to about six million nine hundred thousand dollars. Then there was the annual tribute amounting to six hundred talents, about six hundred thousand dollars. These resources were cited by Pericles to the Athenian citizens as sufficient to ensure victory in approaching war. Military forces he reported as follows; twenty-nine thousand hoplites, of which number sixteen thousand were needed for garrison duty, twelve hundred cavalry and 88 mounted archers, and sixteen hundred foot archers. In her fleet, however, lay Athens' main strength. The Corcyraean alliance united under Athenian leadership the two strongest fleets of Greece and gave to Athens a preponderance in naval power, which she maintained until the destruction of the Sicilian expedition. Sparta could rely on the fleet of Corinth only. This was not large for at no time during the war did a 89 Corinthian fleet number more than one hundred and ten ships. Pericles estimated the naval strength of Athens to be three

hundred triremes ready for immediate service.

The resources of the Spartans were more limited in some respects. With the exception of the Corinthians, Megarians and Sicyonians they numbered among their allies few sea-faring people and hence were without a navy fit to compete with the overwhelming naval power of Athens.⁹⁰ They had no common treasury, as at Athens, and no tribute paying allies hence there was no reserve fund established nor any annual contribution assured. Being the foremost military power in Greece Sparta could boast, however, of a larger and better equipped force of heavy-armed infantry than was at the disposal of Athens. In her ally Boeotia she had available strong cavalry assistance.⁹¹ To offset her deficiency in ships Sparta attempted to obtain war vessels from the Dorian states in Sicily and Italy, and considered making overtures to the king of Persia for naval aid.⁹² No success attended these efforts until the closing years of the war.⁹³ Sparta enjoyed another advantage in that she was under little need of employing mercenary forces whereas Athens depended to a certain extent on foreign sailors to man her ships.⁹⁴

Besides the variance between Athens and Sparta in resources and equipment for the war there was the general difference of race. The Athenian confederacy was comprised largely of people of Ionian stock, notable exceptions being the Corinthians in Potidaea, the Plataeans, the Messenians at Naupactus, and the Corcyraeans. The Peloponnesian League on the other hand was made up chiefly of races descended from the parent Dorian stock. The racial differences and age old antagonism were taken note of by the Corinthians in inciting the Spartans

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 to war, and in the Greek settlements in Italy and Sicily when
 both parties attempted to exert their influence there; by
 96
 Brasidas when raising ~~revolt~~ in Chalcidice; by Gylippus when
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 encouraging the Syracusans; and by the Argives when fighting at
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 Miletus. Dorian pride of race coupled with contempt of Ionians
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 served as a strong link binding together the members of the
 Peloponnesian League.

In the organization of their leagues or confederacies the
 Athenians and Spartans showed yet another difference. In
 establishing control the Athenians started first on an equality
 with the other members of the confederacy, who deliberated
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 with them in common council. In course of time, through failure
 to maintain their required contributions of ships and men,
 the allies, with but few exceptions, became tributary to
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 Athens. The Spartan confederacy was more loosely organized, 102
 and had no regular assembly. All the representatives had
 equal votes. This difference in organization between the
 Athenian empire and the Spartan confederacy was in favor of
 Athens. It was easier for the Athenians in their assembly
 at Athens to consider war measures, form policies, adopt plans
 of campaign and generally conduct the war from central
 headquarters. At Sparta there was the necessity of consulting
 the independent allies. This naturally occasioned considerable,
 delay, for as the allies were independent, there was always
 the possibility of private schemes interfering with affairs
 of common interest.

The system of government throughout the two confederacies
 provided another contrast. In Athens and her dependencies

democratic government was in power, and in Sparta and her
 allies, oligarchy. This difference in government intensified
 the bitterness between the belligerents and affected the allies
 of each. The final demand of the Spartans prior to the war
 was for liberty for the states within the Athenian empire.
 Brasidas gained the Chalcidice with that offer, and established
 oligarchies. Pericles replying to the Spartan ultimatum made
 the same demand of her, namely, liberty for the allies of
 Sparta. To the Spartan this liberty meant the freedom to establish
 oligarchy; to the Athenian it meant the freedom to set up
 democracy. In the debate on the fate of the Mytilenaeans,
 Diodotus mentions the friendship of democracies for Athens,
 and the hostility of oligarchies. Thucydides comments on the
 general struggle that the war caused throughout the Grecian
 world between the two types of government.

It is in the character of the Athenians and the Spartans
 that the most marked contrast between the two peoples appears.
 These differences were the subject of comment on the part of
 speakers at various assemblies which took place at the
 commencement of the war. The Spartans perhaps suffer more in
 this comparison than the Athenians for, in the one instance,
 the Corinthians compare the two nations for the purpose of
 urging on Sparta to war and appear to use disparagement to
 goad the Spartans to action. Pericles, also, contrasting
 Spartans and Athenians, possibly deliberately underestimated
 Spartan character through a desire to encourage his own people.

The Corinthians found fault with the Spartans for their
 excessive conservatism, for their desire to maintain the

status quo, for originating no action for remaining quiescent until the very last moment. Although powerful in military forces the Spartans hesitated to act boldly in accordance with their strength. They had so little confidence in their power and ability that they were distrustful of even prudent plans and were hesitant in carrying them out. Calamities and defeat they bore with little fortitude, despairing of a turn of fortune for the better. They showed no enterprise in ventures far afield but preferred to remain at or near
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 home. Pericles suggests that Spartan courage was not inbred but due to and dependent upon persistent laborious military
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 exercises.

Certain instances throughout the Peloponnesian war may be cited as confirming some of these opinions with regard to Spartan character. Dilatoriness they displayed in their year long preparations after declaration of war, in tardy
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 assistance sent to the Lesbian insurrectionists in 428 B.C.,
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 in failure to follow up the success they achieved in Euboea
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 in 410 B.C. when the Piraeus and Athens were at their mercy.
 No very active policy was shown by Sparta in connection with
 111 112
 invasions of Attica until Decelea was fortified. Brasidas
 113 114
 in the Chalcidice, Gylippus at Syracuse and Callicratidas at Mytilene are exceptions and give evidence of Spartan enterprise, but outside the Peloponnese. The disaster suffered
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 by the Spartans at Sphacteria seemed to them overwhelming, although their actual loss was not excessive, and it occasioned great and continued depression in Sparta and an entire lack of confidence in their power though little impaired.

The character of the Athenians as depicted by their enemies the Corinthians was in sharp contrast to that of the Spartans. Spartan slowness was offset by Athenian impetuosity, rapidity of conception and execution of plans; Spartan lack of confidence by Athenian over-confidence which gave them a boldness beyond their actual strength and which buoyed them up in times of misfortune with hope for the future. While the Spartans were reluctant to leave their home land, the Athenians were ever abroad in the desire to gain some new advantage. They were always ready to devote their minds and bodies to the interest of their native land.

Athenian activity in the war furnishes proof of these aspects of Athenian character. They acted with despatch in assisting Corcyra, in reducing Lesbos, in recovering parts of the Chalcidice. They showed confidence beyond their powers in their bold plans in Boeotia, and in Sicily. They scorned the ease of quiet and peace for gain overseas, reducing first the island of Melos and then striving for a greater prize at Syracuse. Even after the disaster there with their power severely crippled, and Sparta's on the increase, with defection of allies on every hand, Athenian character showed its vigor and courage in the final years of the war when the struggle was continued in the face of overpowering odds.

In the Funeral Oration which he delivered at the close of the first year of the war Pericles took advantage of the opportunity of encouraging his countrymen by drawing their attention to the character of the Athenians which set them above their adversaries. Whereas the Spartans lived a humdrum

existence of state-ordered lives with military training the daily portion and military service the end in view, the Athenians enjoyed individual liberty and comparative freedom from state control. This tended to be reflected in their characters. They practised no exclusiveness in public life. They showed no suspicion of each other in private life. Respect for authority and laws, and a readiness to serve the state were engendered through love of liberty and country and not through laborious daily drill. The Athenians evinced tolerance through permitting to foreigners free entrance to their city, the Spartans showed narrowness in their exclusion of strangers. Through the freedom of democratic government, moderation in the use of wealth, lack of ostentation in all things, love of the beautiful and the cultivation of their minds the Athenians developed characters, freedom-loving, tolerant, dependable and energetic in distinction to Spartan narrowness, intolerance and lack of initiative.

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These differences in character had their bearing on the course of the war. Athenian enterprise in the early stages of the struggle proved more than a match for the cautious dilatory Spartan; but Athenian over-confidence, haste in decision and in execution of plans, led finally to disaster. Sparta, conservative in policy throughout, preserved carefully her power and resources and emerged victorious. In the element of courage there is no evidence that either side appeared deficient. Both displayed boldness in attack and in defence and grim tenacity in times of misfortune.

Nor did there appear a great disparity in the ability of the leaders of both sides. The Spartans developed no such

eminent sea-captain as the Athenian Phormio, but in Brasidas and Cylippus they had military commanders equal, if not superior in resource, initiative and strategy to the Athenian commanders of note, Pericles and Demosthenes and Alcibiades. On the Athenian side, Nicias, Cleon and Hippocrates failed to establish unblemished reputations as military leaders, and, on the Spartan side, Agis gave evidence in the war with Argos of lack of ability. In one respect the Spartans had an advantage. Among their leaders appeared no such rash demagogue as Cleon, nor such an unstable, irresponsible genius as Alcibiades, both of whom did incalculable harm to Athens.

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CHAPTER 111.

Athenian Political and Military Leadership, 431-421 B.C.

Pericles

His character. His policy: Athenians to retire within city; to avoid land conflicts; not to extend empire during the war; to rely upon naval and financial strength. Removal of Athenians from country to city. Spartan invasion of Attica. Reprisals on Peloponnesian coast. Emergency and protective measures. Invasion of Megarid. Alliance with Sitalces and Perdiccas. The plague. Events of second year of war. Death of Pericles. Criticism of his policy.

New leaders and a new policy.

Cleon and Nicias the political leaders. Demosthenes the military leader. Cleon's character. The new policy of offense inaugurated. Athenian sea power well established. Athenian interest in Sicilian affairs. Demosthenes' schemes to establish a land empire. His ability. The campaign in north western Greece. Important region from economic standpoint. The affair of Sphacteria. Effect of this success on Athenian people and Athenian policy. The military activities on Nicias.

The failure of the new policy.

Athenian plans in Sicily unsuccessful. Attempt on Megara and on Boetia fail. The Chalcidice won over by Brasidas. Truce for one year. Athenian attempts to regain Chalcidice. Death of Brasidas and Cleon.

The Fifty- Years' Peace.

Nicias' part in the settlement. The provisions of the treaty.

The outbreak of the war in 431 B.C. found Athens in particularly fortunate circumstances with regard to leadership. Pericles, who had been directing the affairs of the city for many years, and who enjoyed the confidence of the majority of the citizens, was still in power. A man of marked integrity, the outstanding orator and statesman of the day, he exercised a remarkable influence over the Athenians by reason of his ability and force of character. It was on his advice that Athens opposed all Sparta's demands and eventually entered upon the war.

His policy with regard to the impending conflict he set forth very clearly. He proposed to the Athenians that they should give up their land and houses in the country, retire within the walls of the city, and keep strict watch over it while also giving close attention to maintaining their supremacy at sea. Avoid land conflicts with the Peloponnesians in force was his counsel, for the reason that several victories would be required on land to ensure complete success, whereas the risk of one defeat for Athens was too great, due to the effect it would have on the confederacy. He advocated no extension of empire during the war, and the avoidance of unnecessary danger. In short, his plan was to rely upon the maritime strength of Athens and her greater financial resources to gain victory over Sparta. He favored maintaining supremacy on the sea, preventing the development of a Peloponnesian navy, retaliatory raids on the coast of the Peloponnese, and, in general, a defensive war calculated to exhaust the limited resources of the enemy.

During the early part of the war this policy was carried out by the Athenians. While the Peloponnesian army was gathering

at the Isthmus, the Athenians moved into the city, This removal occasioned very great hardship but was an indication of Pericles' influence over the people. So also when the Spartan army appeared and commenced ravaging the countryside, and when the Athenians were eager to prevent them, Pericles displayed his confidence in his policy and in his power over the people by refusing to lead forth the troops and risk an engagement. Meantime to offset the invasion an Athenian fleet of one hundred ships was despatched to ravage the Peloponnesian coast. An attack was made on Methone; Pheia in Elis was ravaged as well as other places along the coast. Later, Sollium and Astacus were taken and the island of Cephallenia was induced to join the confederacy.

To ensure proper protection at home, the Athenians posted guards to keep watch by land and sea. For emergency use against attack by sea upon Athens a sum of one thousand talents was set aside, and one hundred triremes were to be kept in reserve yearly for the same purpose. A fleet of thirty ships was given the commission of keeping Euboea under guard and also was instructed to ravage Locris, an ally of Sparta. Later the island of Atlanta, off the coast of Locris, was fortified and made a guard station for the protection of Euboea. The island of Aegina, a possible source of trouble, was colonized by Athenian settlers and the Aeginetans were expelled. Such were the defensive measures of Pericles with regard to Athens.

By way of reprisals for the invasion of Attica, Pericles led the Athenians in force into the Megarid and laid waste the country. This policy of ravaging the country of Megara was followed yearly until Nisaea was occupied in 424 B.C. An alliance,

expected to be of value in the Chalcidice where the city of Potidaea was still in revolt, was concluded with Sitalces of Thrace and Perdiccas of Macedonia.¹³¹

In this first year of warfare from the spring of 431 to 430 B.C. Athens' fortune prospered and the Periclean policy of defensive warfare in Attica and of offensive warfare on the coast of the Peloponnese was carried out. The disastrous visitation of the plague in the following year was the beginning of a reversal of fortune for Athens. Upon the death of Pericles a change of policy took place.

The second year of the war proved very severe for the Athenians due to the plague which raged in the city and which was carried by Hagnon's army to the besieging force at Potidaea. Large numbers succumbed to the disease and great depression of the spirits of the survivors resulted. The Peloponnesians made a second invasion of Attica; Pericles' counter expedition against Epidaurus was not successful; Hagnon and Cleopompus did not succeed in their expedition against Potidaea. Thus dissatisfaction became rife throughout Athens. The blame for all the troubles was placed on Pericles, who then was tried and fined.¹³²¹³³¹³⁴¹³⁵

Can Pericles' policy for the conduct of the war be justified? Did his policy imply anything more than the "strategy of exhaustion"? In the first instance, it may be that Pericles had more in mind than just defensive warfare, but that, due to the siege of Potidaea and the devastation of the plague, he was able to attempt no definite offensive. It has been stated that Pericles failed to use his sea power in effective co-operation with his land forces, and that the establishment of fortified posts in the

Peloponnese would have been better than the mere raiding
 137
 expeditions which he undertook. That very plan he himself had
 stated as a possibility in discussing the retaliatory measures
 138
 against Sparta. The reason he did not put the plan into
 operation during the first year is not clear. He seemed willing
 to endure all the disadvantages of the invasion of Attica,
 as if there were no means of preventing them. Demosthenes had
 to demonstrate later the means of curtailing Spartan inroads.
 The weakness of Athenian policy during the following three
 years seems to have been due not so much to Periclean policy
 as to the effects of the plague on Athenian military power
 and on Athenian morale.

Pericles' policy of risking no engagement in Attica with the
 Spartans appears to have been wise. Spartan numerical superiority
 in military forces was unquestioned. It is doubtful if Pericles
 could have put into the field an army equal to that of the
 139
 invading force. Spartan reputation for military skill as well
 as for courage in battle did not warrant Athenian attempts on
 a basis of mere numerical equality. Again, victory over Spartans
 140
 in Attica would not have been decisive, as Pericles pointed out.
 Unless invasions of Attica could have been prevented there was
 no object in fighting battles in Attica. However, as Henderson
 suggests, cavalry and light-armed troops might have been used
 effectively to annoy the enemy even if he could not have been
 141
 dislodged.

On the whole, Pericles' policy has much to commend it. He was
 willing to sacrifice the Attic countryside in order to maintain
 intact the city and the empire. As the events of the war showed,

the invasions of Attica and even the occupation of Decelea could not break the power of Athens. Pericles had no reason to doubt the maintenance of Athenian sea power, and had no reason to fear the enemy's naval strength. For years Athens had kept up an efficient navy; and, at the beginning of the war, she had double the number of ships possessed by her opponents. What reason then to fear loss of sea power? If the unexpected events of the plague and the death of Pericles had not occurred, Periclean policy might have succeeded.

In the summer of the third year of the war Pericles died and Athens was left without the leader who had guided her affairs for years with safety and prudence. Other men, more on an equality with each other, now come to the fore and a change in the general conduct of the war and in the management of the empire takes place. Cleon and Nicias direct the policies of the empire, Demosthenes emerges as the leading figure in military operations. Cleon first appears as the most influential leader of the people in connection with the revolt of Lesbos in 428 B.C. Upon the downfall of Mytilene he advocated and was successful in carrying a decree condemning to death the whole male population of that city. Fortunately for Mytilene the Athenians reversed their decision next day and the city was saved. In his attitude on this occasion Cleon gives evidence of being violent in speech, a
142
slanderer, and a man without mercy. He was in favor of similar
143
vigorous measures later against Scione. In his advocacy of an
144
energetic war policy he indicates his patriotic feeling for he was anxious to maintain the empire. His courage he showed in actively engaging in the affair at Sphacteria, and his over-

confidence in his own ability in undertaking an expedition
 145
 against Amphipolis.

Cleon and Demosthenes, during this period of the war, appear to have been the leaders of the war party at Athens. Under their guidance a change from the Periclean policy of defensive warfare was inaugurated. Energetic measures were put into force against the Spartans, an attempt was made to establish a land supremacy, and Athenian interest was extended to far distant Sicily.

The conduct of the various expeditions of the war, from 429 to 421 B.C., was largely in the hands of Demosthenes and Cleon and, later, Nicias. During this time they extended Athenian influence widely and achieved notable successes but finally by blunders, tactical and strategical, they lost the advantages obtained.

Athenian supremacy at sea was established so completely in 429 B.C. by the two outstanding victories of Athens' greatest sea captain, Phormio, over the Peloponnesians in the Corinthian gulf, that for a long time the Peloponnesians did not essay
 146
 trial of Athens' naval power. This lack of confidence of the Peloponnesians in their navy left the Athenians free to carry on such expeditions at sea as they desired, and to maintain unimpaired their wide-spread confederacy. In 428 B.C., when the revolt of Lesbos occurred, the Mytilenaeans expected the Spartans to attack Athens by sea and thus cause the Athenians to relax their counter measures against the Leshian city. However, the Athenians were disturbed so little by the naval preparations of the Peloponnesians that, without diminishing their force at Lesbos, and without recalling thirty ships which were cruising

around the Peloponnese, they manned an additional hundred ships, made a display of force off the Isthmus, made descents upon the Peloponnesian coast and effectively put a stop to the plans of Sparta. Later a Spartan fleet, under Alcidas, sent to aid Lesbos, crossed the Aegean sea and appeared off the coast of Ionia but returned in haste to the Peloponnese without risking an engagement. The same fleet with reinforcements then sailed to Corcyra with a view to re-establish there the influence of Sparta. A minor success was achieved by the numerically superior Peloponnesian fleet in the encounter which took place, but, on the following day, when Athenian reinforcements arrived, the conflict was not renewed.

This continued success of the Athenians at sea led them to try their fortunes further abroad, and in the year 427 B.C. they first began to take an active interest in Sicilian affairs. Disturbances in that region between the cities of Syracuse and Leontini resulted in victory for Syracuse. The Leontines appealed to Athens for help on the ground of an old alliance and because of their Ionian descent. The Athenians were only too ready for an excuse to interfere in western affairs, partly in order to cut off corn supplies coming from Sicily to the Peloponnese, partly in order to extend their empire. This interest in Sicily marked the first notable departure from the policy of Pericles who had urged his countrymen to refrain from extending their empire while the war was in progress. Other changes in his policy were to take place soon nearer home.

The next three years, to 424 B.C., are of importance due to the continued aggressive measures undertaken by the Athenians.

The military leader, Demosthenes, appears as the originator of grandiose schemes of re-establishing for Athens the land empire relinquished after the battle of Coronea, ¹⁵² twenty-one years before. Demosthenes proved the most able general produced by Athens during the Peloponnesian war. His skill in leadership, his ingenuity in attack and defence, his daring place him far above his contemporaries, Nicias, Cleon and Hippocrates, to mention three of the most prominent. He exhibited none of the hesitancy of Nicias, no deficiency in military knowledge such as that shown by Cleon, no such lack of skill as was displayed by Hippocrates. His projects in Acarnania, at Pylos, in Boeotia were daring in the extreme but were executed with great skill. In Aetolia his rashness resulted in disaster but the experience acquired there he utilized later at Sphacteria. He played an honorable part in the Sicilian expedition and had his advice been followed, or if the sole command had rested in him it is highly probable either that success would have attended Athenian arms there, or that the expedition would have been abandoned without delay. The confidence of the Athenian people in Nicias, the eulogy by Thucydides of the same person, ¹⁵³ give the impression that the Athenians, although desirous of extending their power, were not willing to run excessive risks in so doing. They preferred, obviously, to entrust the greater authority to a general who was sparing of Athenian lives, albeit less capable in actual military operations. The greatest military successes of the war were achieved by Demosthenes, yet he was overlooked, apparently, when vigorous action was required against Brasidas in the Chalcidice; and in the Sicilian he was subordinate

to Nicias.

In 426 B.C. Demosthenes was engaged actively in a campaign
 154
 in north-western Greece. In Aetolia he suffered a severe defeat. Later he saved Naupactus from falling into the hands of a Peloponnesian force. The Spartans proceeded onward against Acarnania, intending to attack that country with the aid of the Ambraciots. Demosthenes, summoned to aid, was successful in defeating the Ambraciots and the Spartans in two battles. Incidentally he saved his reputation which had suffered from his Aetolian adventure. The defeat of the Peloponnesians and their allies put an end to their attempts to gain a foothold in the north-west.

The importance of this north-western campaign, as well as the victories of Phormio in 429 B.C. and Cnemus' expedition
 155
 against Acarnania, is based on an economic not a political condition. Corinthian trade with the west was the issue.
 156
 Corcyra had been lost to Athens, thus imperilling for Corinth the corn trade with Sicily. By destroying Athenian naval power in the Corinthian gulf or by acquiring a land route through north-west Greece the Peloponnesians thought it might be possible to offset Athens' advantage in the possession of Corcyra. The work of Phormio in the gulf, and of Demosthenes on land effectively prevented the realization of these plans.

In the following year, 425 B.C., Demosthenes achieved his greatest success. He planned to establish a fortified post on the west coast of Laconia and from there to harass the Spartans by raids. Eventually he was able to carry out this scheme.
 157
 Pylos was chosen as the situation for this fort. The Spartan army, engaged in its annual invasion of Attica, returned home in

haste and proceeded against Pylos. Due to a tactical blunder the Spartans permitted the Athenians to sail into the harbour and to cut off their communication with the island of Sphacteria.

On this island they had posted a garrison of Spartans.

The Spartan authorities in order to save the lives of their men on the island, now made overtures for peace. These were

rejected, largely by reason of the uncompromising attitude of

Cleon, leader of the war party at Athens. The fortune of Athens was now at its height and Cleon was desirous of obtaining for the city as much power as possible.

The blockade of Sphacteria was continued by the Athenians. Finally Demosthenes, in conjunction with Cleon, made a carefully planned attack on the island and was successful in forcing the surviving Spartans to surrender.

This unexpected and demoralizing defeat of the Spartans was due in great measure to the bold plans of Demosthenes. Considerable credit for the victory was obtained also by Cleon who had opposed at Athens the peace offers of Sparta and, finally, had undertaken to bring the blockade of Sphacteria to a conclusion. With the success Athens reached the apex of her good fortune in the war. An unbroken series of victories at sea and now a number of successes on land, capped by an unexpected achievement over the Spartans themselves, served to inspire the war party at Athens, and created a feeling of superiority and of unlimited strength. This led the Athenians finally to undertake enterprises beyond their power and eventually brought their downfall. Pericles, it may be assumed, with victory assured and Sparta humbled would have been content to have re-established

peace, to have maintained and strengthened the bonds of empire, and to have recuperated from the effects of war and plague.

Not so the successors of Pericles. Victory over Sparta was the signal for even greater war effort on the part of Athens and for attempts at extending the empire. To these efforts both Cleon of the war faction and Nicias of the peace faction were party. Instead of peace, a reduction of expenses, and consolidation of the empire, war was continued with its mounting expenses and unforeseen risks.

With the power and prestige of Sparta weakened, following the disaster at Sphacteria, and with her spirit depressed, the Athenians experienced little opposition in expeditions which they now undertook. Nicias, who, next to Cleon, was the most influential man at Athens and heretofore eager in the interests of peace, led expeditions against the Peloponnesians. His aim was to weaken further their position, and, possibly, to re-establish his own prestige, somewhat diminished by his attitude with regard to Sphacteria. He made a descent on Corinthian territory, defeated the Corinthians at Solygea, and proceeding thence ravaged the countryside of Crommyon and Epidaurus and cut off by a wall the town of Methone.¹⁶³ The next summer, 424 B.C., he sailed to the island of Cythera and gained the place for the Athenians. This island had served as Sparta's protection against attacks by sea, and was a stopping-place for merchant vessels from Egypt and Libya. This loss was felt severely by the Spartans. Nicias then sailed to the city of Thyrea, on the east coast of Laconia, stormed the place and carried off all the survivors.¹⁶⁴

During this period the Athenians had been taking an active

interest in Sicilian affairs. Laches had led an expedition there in 427 B.C. to assist Leontini against Syracuse and from
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then the Athenians had maintained a force there. In 426 B.C. Pythodorus was sent to take command and was followed by a fleet
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of forty ships. The Athenians expected to finish the war in Sicily in a short time. In 425 B.C., however, the city of Messene, the key to Sicily, revolted from the Athenians. The fleet of forty ships, delayed by the affair at Pylos, did not reach Sicily until late in the summer. No vigorous prosecution of the war was undertaken and in 424 B.C. the Sicilian states, alarmed chiefly by fear of Athenian power, settled their differences and made peace. To this peace the Athenian generals agreed and sailed home. Their failure to acquire the island of Sicily was a defeat, in the eyes of the Athenian people, As it had come at a time when everywhere else success had attended their efforts, they were enraged therefore at the generals. Two of these, Pythodorus and Sophocles, they punished by exile, Eurymedon by a fine. This action gives an indication of the dominance of the war spirit at Athens
167
and the desire for extension of empire.

No relaxation of effort was evident on the part of the Athenians in Greece. The enterprising Demosthenes, assisted by Hippocrates, concerted with some conspirators within Megara to seize first the harbour of Nisaea and then the city itself. The first part of the plan was successful. The plot, however, was discovered in Megara before that city could be betrayed. Brasidas, Sparta's foremost military leader, who was near by, hurried to Megara in time to offer resistance to the Athenians and to save the city from capture. The Athenians had to be content

with the occupation of Nisaea. Consolidating their position there, the generals, Hippocrates and Demosthenes, set forth on another enterprise. This time Boeotia was the scene of action. Plans were made for a simultaneous attack on Siphæ in the west, and on Delium in the east. The plans miscarried; the Boeotians marched in force to Delium and inflicted a severe
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defeat on Hippocrates.

This was the first serious reverse the Athenians had suffered in years. In their eagerness for power, and in their excess of confidence, they were expending their energies on attempts to establish supremacy on the mainland and were neglecting their possessions elsewhere. It was at this time that Brasidas was already in the Chalcidice commencing there his victorious campaign which seriously weakened the power of Athens, restored the prestige of Sparta, and annulled the advantages which Athens had secured at Sphacteria and elsewhere.

Spartan policy favored assisting the dissatisfied allies of Athens. Brasidas, a man of action, was eager to undertake such work in the Chalcidice whence had come appeals to Sparta for help. Perdiccas of Macedonia also desired Spartan assistance and was prepared to render financial aid. The Athenians apparently took no precautions and Brasidas was successful in making his
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way with a small army unhindered through Thessaly.

In the Chalcidice he experienced no difficulty in gaining over many of the cities. By the moderation and justice which he displayed, as well as by his energy and rapidity of movement, he quickly obtained control of the greater part of the Chalcidice, including the most important place of all, Amphipolis.

These successes gained by Brasidas, following closely on Athenian reverses at Siphæ and Delium, prepared the way for a truce for one year. This truce was agreed formally by Athens and Sparta in 425 B.C. Nicias appears as one of the Athenian signatories of the treaty.

The troubles in the Chalcidice were not brought to an end by the truce for it appeared that Scione had revolted to Brasidas two days after the truce had been declared. Brasidas refused to restore the city and shortly afterwards he received Mende also. Nicias and Nicostratus led an Athenian force against Mende, failed in their first attempt on the place but succeeded on the following day. Next they blockaded Scione. Perdicas, deserting his alliance with Brasidas, came to an agreement with the Athenians and was useful to them in preventing Spartan reinforcements from coming through Thessaly.

In the tenth year of the war, 422 B.C., Cleon sailed with an expedition against the Chalcidian cities. He was successful in securing Torone and then prepared to make an attempt on Amphipolis. Through bad generalship he allowed Brasidas to surprise him. His army was routed with great loss. Both Brasidas and Cleon fell in the battle.

Peace was now possible for both sides, as well as being desired by both. The Athenians ardently pressing on the war two years previously when flushed with victory, were bearing up ill with the change of their fortune, and, instead of vigorously attempting to re-establish their power, were eager for peace. The chief opponents of peace, Brasidas and Cleon, were now dead and the direction of policy lay with the leaders of the peace

parties in Sparta and at Athens. Nicias appears at this time as
 174
 the most influential leader at Athens. He had served his country
 in war with considerable success, enjoying the reputation of
 being the most fortunate general. Peace appeared to him as
 the best way in which to preserve his good fortune and
 reputation. The Spartans, for their part, were still anxious to
 regain the prisoners who had been taken at Sphacteria, and now
 that peace sentiments predominated at Athens the way was open
 for a settlement.

Negotiations were continued throughout the winter and by
 spring an agreement had been reached. By the terms of the
 treaty there was to be peace between Athenians and Spartans,
 and their respective allies for a period of fifty years. Both
 parties agreed to give up what they had acquired by force of
 arms, and to restore the prisoners. Of the places taken during
 the war only Plataea and Nisaea were not restored, the Thebans
 retaining the former the Athenians the latter.
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Thus ended the first stage of the Peloponnesian war. Athens
 had commenced the struggle under the guidance of Pericles, on
 the defensive. Later her leaders had pursued a more aggressive
 policy which led to supremacy at sea, enterprises to distant
 Sicily, and bold attempts to establish supremacy on land.
 Temporary success inspired over-confidence which led to disaster
 in battle, which in turn brought on defection of allies, as
 Pericles had warned. Finally truce with Sparta on equal terms
 seemed the only remaining course.

CHAPTER IV.

Athenian Policies and Leaders in the Second Phase
of the War, 421-413 B.C.

Introduction

Two distinct tendencies in the Athenian policy. Interest in Peloponnese. Interest in Sicily.

The Peace of Nicias.

Its purpose. Weakness of treaty. Self interest in Sparta. Fundamental causes of the war disregarded by the peace settlement. Allies of Sparta do not ratify treaty. The terms are partially fulfilled. Change of policy at Sparta. Nicias' efforts to make treaty effective.

Alcibiades' continental policy.

His influence at Athens. His hostility towards Sparta. The ambitions of Argos. Alcibiades favors alliance with Argos. Argos, Elea, Mantinea and Athens form a confederacy. The battle of Mantinea. The end of the Athenian continental policy. The character of Alcibiades.

Sea Supremacy.

Athenian interest returns to the maritime empire. Melos acquired. Supremacy on sea unquestioned.

The Sicilian Expedition.

Egesta appeals to Athens for aid. Nicias opposes sending the expedition. Alcibiades in favor of it. The people eager for it. The first expedition sent. The policies of the generals. Criticism of their policies. The recall of Alcibiades. His advice to the Spartans. Nicias in sole command. Arrival of Gylippus. The second expedition. Criticism of Athenian policy. Evidence of the incapability of Nicias. The end of the expedition.

The second phase of the Peloponnesian war, from 421 to 413 B.C., is marked by two distinct tendencies in Athenian policy. For a period of five years, to 416 B.C., Athenian political leaders confined their attention to attempts at establishing Athenian influence in the Peloponnese. In his eagerness for peace Nicias seems to have been animated by almost pro-Spartan feeling. However, upon the failure of a full peace settlement, Alcibiades, whose advances had been rejected at Sparta, advocated firm measures against that country and energetically pursued a course of intrigue with a view to weakening Sparta's position in the Peloponnese. This line of action was temporarily successful until Spartan military capacity, based upon a discipline and training superior to other Grecian states, was again re-established in the eyes of the Greeks by the battle of Mantinea. The subsequent four years are important for a change of Athenian interest from Greece to Sicily, preceded by an unjustifiable encroachment upon the independence of Melos. The Sicilian expedition, undertaken with great hope by the Athenians, and persisted in with that unbounded confidence which marked many Athenian enterprises, ended in complete disaster and dragged down to ruin the mighty Athenian empire.

The peace treaty arranged by Nicias with Sparta had for its object peace and the re-establishment of the status quo. Athens chief concern was the regaining of her possessions in the Chalcidice, particularly the city of Amphipolis. Sparta was mainly desirous of getting back her captives held at Athens since the loss of Sphacteria. The weakness of the peace treaty from the Athenian standpoint lay in the fact that various



members of the Spartan confederacy refused to ratify it. These were chiefly, Megara, Corinth, Boeotia and Elea.¹⁷⁶

This was the vital point in the treaty. It was not acceptable to Sparta's allies and therefore could be but temporary. The failure of Athenian statesmen to recognize this fact resulted in a renewal of the war before many years had passed. The peace treaty had for its object the readjustment of affairs between the two chief antagonists, Sparta and Athens. No consideration was paid to the more important question of adjusting those matters of dispute which had brought on the war.

Corinth and Megara had been most urgent in their demands for Sparta to go to war. Their antagonism for Athens rested on grounds of trade rivalry. Both were affected by Athenian competition. Corcyra and the western trade was the point of dispute between Athens and Corinth; the Megarian decree restricting Megara's commerce was Megara's complaint. In the war both Corinth and Megara had suffered. Yearly ravages of her territory as well as the capture of her sea port had affected Megara. Corinth had endured defeats at sea, had lost control of the route to Sicily, and had been excluded from north-western Greece. No provisions of the peace treaty affected favorably these two states. Sparta, governed by self interest, was concerned only about her prisoners, and Nisaea and Corcyra were forgotten.

Boeotia also refused to ratify the treaty and for the same reason as Corinth and Megara, namely that no compensation was arranged by the treaty for Boeotia. From the standpoint of both Corinth and Boeotia no peace with Athens was practicable

unless Athens was reduced to impotence. The same implacable attitude, and similar dissatisfaction with the peace at the close of the war is evident on the part of these two states.

The fulfilment of the terms of the treaty resulted advantageously to Sparta, but with little benefit to Athens. This is an indication of the weak policy of the Athenian leaders. The revolted cities in the Chalcidice did not approve of the terms and refused to abide by them. The Peloponnesian forces were withdrawn from that region but the cities remained independent of Athens. Panactum, an Athenian border fortress, had been betrayed to the Boeotians in 421 B.C. and was still in their possession, as were also some Athenian prisoners. The Spartans, however, regained their prisoners from Athens, and were successful in having the Athenians withdraw from Pylos the Messenian and Helot troops, although the place was not given up. Thus Athenian diplomacy, under the guidance of Nicias, accomplished for Sparta practically all that had been desired by that state, without acquiring for Athens the advantages which had been sought in the first instance.

New Ephors now entered office at Sparta intent upon reviving anti-Athenian feeling. In order to get the Boeotians to restore Panactum, by which means they might recover Pylos, they made a separate treaty with them. This was contrary to their treaty with Athens which forbade such arrangements without the consent of both parties. Spartan envoys then proceeded to Athens to request the restoration of Pylos, but, as the Boeotians had demolished Panactum in the interval instead of restoring it intact, the Athenians refused to consider the matter.

A final attempt was made by Nicias to persuade the Spartans to fulfil their part of the agreement with Athens. He proceeded to Sparta and requested the Spartans to rebuild and restore Panactum, restore Amphipolis, and renounce their treaty with Boeotia. The fatal error of having given back the prisoners of Sphacteria before complete fulfilment of the terms of the peace must have been clearly evident to Nicias on this occasion. For the war party at Sparta, having already obtained more than could be expected, refused to take the steps demanded and Nicias returned to Athens to receive the blame for the complete failure of the treaty with Sparta.

This provided Alcibiades with the opportunity he had long desired of taking an influential part in Athenian political affairs. He had befriended the captives from Sphacteria in the hope of establishing his importance with the Spartans, and had also favored the peace treaty. Due, however, to his youth, his actions had been disregarded by the Spartans. He then adopted a distinctly anti-Spartan attitude, and upon Nicias' failure, he became head of the war party at Athens and utilized his influence to weaken Spartan authority in the Peloponnese and to establish there Athenian power. An alliance between Argos and Athens was the immediate result of his activities.

Argos had remained neutral in the preceding war, her resources were consequently unimpaired, and, as a result, the present occasion seemed a suitable time for her to attempt to gain the leadership of the Peloponnesian states. The truce between Argos and Sparta was on the point of expiring, and as the reputation of Sparta was at low ebb, Argos preferred not to renew the treaty. She

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 favored rather an ambitious scheme of acquiring the leadership
 of the group of states already dissatisfied with Sparta.

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 Encouragement for this policy came from Corinth and from
 Mantinea. Later, Elea joined the new confederacy which was
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 formed and plans were made to include Boeotia. These plans,
 however, failed to mature, and, disappointed in her schemes, Argos
 190
 wavered between renewing her alliance with Sparta or becoming
 an ally of Athens. At this juncture Alcibiades began to consider
 favorably an alliance between Athens and Argos, and upon the
 failure to procure satisfaction from Sparta, he persuaded the
 Athenians to vote in favor of such an alliance. This was
 carried out and Athens became an ally of the Argives, Eleans
 and Mantineans. Corinth took no part in the new alliance.
 Alcibiades was active in organizing the affairs of this
 191
 confederacy.

By 418 B.C. matters came to a head between Sparta and Argos.
 The Argive league had prospered to such an extent through the
 alliance with Athens and through the ability of Alcibiades,
 that Argos was now definitely a contender with Sparta for the
 leadership of the Peloponnesians. There was also the danger of
 the disaffection becoming widespread throughout the Peloponnese.
 The contest proceeding at this time between Argos and Epidaurus
 furnished sufficient cause for Sparta actively to intervene in
 full force. Under the leadership of Agis the Spartans advanced
 against the Argives and were on the point of engaging when an
 understanding was reached between the Argive leaders and king
 192
 Agis, resulting in a declaration of a four months' truce.
 Alcibiades persuaded the Argives to disregard the treaty and

renew the war. This they did by attacking and seizing Orchomenus,
 193
 and then proceeding against Tegea. In great alarm the Spartans
 mustered their forces and advanced against the allies. In the
 battle of Mantinea, which followed, the Spartans won a complete
 victory, which brought to an end the Argive confederacy and re-
 194
 established the former prestige of the Spartan army.

Athenian attempts at continental power were definitely ended
 by the battle of Mantinea, as they had been on a former occasion
 by the battle of Delium. The Argive alliance was lost for a
 short interval but was regained after a period of civil disorder
 195
 in Argos. However, the re-establishment of Spartan influence in
 the Peloponnese precluded any Athenian attempts there, so their
 attention was directed elsewhere by the fertile mind of Alcibiades.

Alcibiades was undoubtedly the most enterprising and capable
 of the Athenian leaders of the period. Of high descent, wealthy
 and talented, he early obtained a position of importance in the
 state. Unfortunately his personal excesses and his evident
 ambition for power, created in the minds of the citizens a
 distrust for him so that they did not grant him that control
 and management of affairs which his ability warranted. He
 displayed organizing ability of high character and great energy
 in the part he took in the affairs of the Argive confederacy.
 He was chiefly responsible for inciting the Athenian people
 196
 to make the attempt on Sicily. When he became an enemy of Athens,
 his were the plans which brought disaster upon the city. Towards
 the closing years of the war he again rendered Athens signal
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 service, but too late to be of lasting value. Throughout the
 war, from the peace of Nicias onward, Alcibiades appears from

time to time, making alliances, proposing expeditions, inciting revolt, everywhere acting with energy, enthusiasm and capability, but never accomplishing anything of permanent value or making any sacrifice other than for selfish interest.

The years 421 to 416 B.C. had been spent by Athens in comparative quiet. An era of peace with Sparta had been entered upon and, although there was dissatisfaction through non-fulfilment of the treaty provisions yet there was no direct renewal of hostilities. The attention, which, it seems, should have been centred upon regaining Amphipolis and the Chalcidice was diverted, through the machinations of Alcibiades, to Argos and the Peloponnese. Then followed the turning of interest to the Aegean with the occupation of Melos. Undisputed supremacy at sea with a persistent desire for extension of empire led inevitably to a focussing of attention on the much more desirable prize of Sicily. So in 415 B.C. the Athenians with unprecedented zeal, and with the highest hopes, embarked upon that enterprise which proved their ruin.

Athenian policy, foiled in its continental plans, now sought an outlet elsewhere for Athenian energy. Melos, a Dorian populated island, which had resisted joining the Athenian confederacy, was attacked. Justifying their seizure of the island on the plea that might makes right the Athenians persisted in their blockade until Melos surrendered. The male inhabitants of military age were then executed and the place was colonized by Athens. Although of minor importance as a possession, its reduction by the Athenians serves as an example of Athenian policy and of the extremes of punishment condoned by a war-

engrossed state. An imperialistic policy of the grasping sort seems to have marked Athenian leaders of this period. No apparent strategical value lay in the acquisition of Melos, no urgent need of its possession, particularly with the Chalcidice still in revolt, no purpose other than to satisfy greed for power and to present to other states a spectacle of supreme control on the sea. Pericles himself, although warning the Athenians against wanton aggression during the war, yet in a desire to raise their despondent spirits, had stressed that very fact of supreme sea power and had caused Athenian minds to dwell upon the extension of the empire by way of the sea. ²⁰¹

The occasion of Athenian intervention in Sicily was, as formerly, an appeal for aid from a city of Sicily. Egesta, worsted in a quarrel with Selinus, was in imminent peril of being brought under the control of Syracuse. ²⁰² The Athenians, readily influenced to give aid, due to their desire to conquer the island despatched envoys to survey the situation. On their return with a favorable report of an abundance of money available at Egesta, the Athenians resolved to send an expedition under the command of Alcibiades, Nicias and Lamachus. ²⁰³

Nicias appointed to command contrary to his desire, and opposed to the expedition, endeavored to persuade the Athenians ²⁰⁴ to reconsider their decision. He considered it an impolitic and ill-timed move due to the unsettled state of affairs in Greece. The treaty with Sparta was one in name only; some states had not yet signed it, Boeotia could declare war on ten days' notice, ²⁰⁵ Corinth had already done so. The Thracian Chalcidians were still in revolt and should be attended to first. Then again he

pointed out the difficulties connected with an enterprise of such magnitude. Sicily being distant and populous would be hard to control even if conquered. He considered that there was more to be feared from Sparta still anxious for revenge, that time should be taken for recuperation from the effects of war and plague, that the selection of the youthful Alcibiades to command was a mistake, and finally that the best policy for the Athenian was non-intervention in Sicilian affairs. ²⁰⁶

Alcibiades was the most ardent supporter of the expedition due to his ambition for personal advancement. He claimed that he was worthy of command by reason of his past services to the state and particularly by his action in bringing about the Argive alliance. It was his opinion that the reduction of Sicily would be easy, due to the composite nature of its inhabitants, and that Nicias' fears of Sparta were groundless because Athenian supremacy at sea insured safety for the city at all times. He advocated action to prevent retrogression and to maintain and increase Athens' power and influence in Greece. ²⁰⁷

Nicias again endeavored to restrain the enthusiasm of the Athenian people by giving his opinion of the great size of the armament requisite for such an expedition. But the people were not to be deterred. The larger the armament, the greater the security and the greater the possibility of success. All were convinced that success was assured and that great benefits would result. ²⁰⁸

Accordingly the fleet was fitted out with great care and expense and despatched on its journey. All went well until the ²⁰⁹

Athenians arrived at Rhegium in Italy. They had expected this place to join them but it preferred to remain neutral. The next disappointment was the information that Egesta was not the wealthy city that the Athenians had been led to believe, and that it had but a small amount of money available. Finally, the three generals were of different opinions as to the policy they should pursue.

Nicias, cautious as always, and desirous of running no undue risk, was for attacking Selinus as desired in the first instance by the Egestaeans, then for making a display of force along the coast and returning home. Alcibiades, recalling doubtless his success in unsettling the Spartan confederacy in the Peloponnese, favored utilizing the arts of diplomacy first in an endeavor to gain over various Sicilian states, then, with allies secured, to attack Selinus and Syracuse. Lamachus preferred immediate direct action against Syracuse itself before defensive preparations could be completed. Upon the downfall of Syracuse the other Sicilian states would come over to them without difficulty.

Alcibiades' plan was finally adopted, Lamachus having selected it as his second choice, and so attempts were made at winning over various Sicilian states. No success attended these efforts at Messene or Camarina. Naxos however received the Athenians and Catana also, after first having refused them admittance. At the latter place the Athenians established their base for operations.

Was Alcibiades' policy better than those suggested by his colleagues? Nicias' policy need not be discussed for it avoided the issue entirely and contained no implication of war.

Lamachus was for immediate attack. In this the advantage would be that of surprise, than which nothing is more important in warfare. Demosthenes recognized this when he arrived with the second expedition, and promptly attempted to make good use of his initial advantage. That the Syracusans were unprepared was the opinion of Lamachus. In this he was right as is indicated by Thucydides in his account of the dissension in Syracuse prior to the arrival of the Athenians. The Syracusans were not fully prepared and the psychological advantage was all on the side of the Athenians. Even after the long delay of the Athenian armament, during which time the Syracusans made their preparations, the initial encounter resulted in victory for the Athenians. Later, although the Syracusans had had plenty of time for putting their city in a state of defence, the Athenian siege operations were on the point of proving successful, and would have been so if Gylippus had not arrived. It is reasonable to conclude that Lamachus' policy was sound and would have been successful.

Henderson states that the element of surprise was lacking, for Syracuse had been forewarned. Evidence may be adduced to show that that conclusion is not altogether correct. Even when the Athenians were assembled at Corcyra there were Syracusans who had doubts of their coming. It was only then that the Syracusan generals were planning to increase their army and to communicate with the neighboring cities. Not until the Athenians reached Rhegium, did the Syracusans take proper precautions for war, and there was not time then for adequate preparations.

Alcibiades' policy ranks second, upon consideration, for the following reasons. It was a policy based on the principle of destroying the unity of the enemy by winning away from him his allies. The Athenians were aware of a lack of unity in Sicily, and of the frequent changes of government in Syracuse itself. No need then surely to take time to win over the cities of Sicily. Could they not have been influenced more readily when the central power, Syracuse, was in danger of annihilation? Lamachus thought so. The weakness of Alcibiades' policy became apparent later, when the delay of the Athenians brought them into contempt in the opinion of the Syracusans and gave time for Gylippus to bring reinforcements.

The Sicilian expedition, doomed to misfortune, now received its first serious reverse in the recall of Alcibiades. Accused of the mutilation of the Hermae, and of profanation of the sacred mysteries, he was summoned to return to Athens for trial. On the journey he escaped and became an exile. His loss to the expedition was irreparable. His enthusiasm had brought it into being, his energy and talent would have prevented it from being wasted away, his advice to its enemies caused its ruin.

Alcibiades eventually found his way to Sparta, and there outlined for the Spartans the policy necessary to bring about the defeat of Athens. He pointed out the far-reaching schemes which embraced not only the acquisition of Sicily, but Hellenic Italy and even Carthage, with a view to using the power so obtained for the complete overthrow of Sparta by the Athenians. He then advised them to offset Athens' efforts in Sicily by sending there a Spartan force, and, particularly, a Spartan

commander. In Greece they were to invade Attica, and to fortify a permanent post at Decelea. These plans adopted by the Spartans, in course of time undermined the power of Athens and led to her downfall.

Athenian affairs in Sicily proved moderately satisfactory until the death of Lamachus.²²⁶ From then on the sole command of the Athenian forces was vested in Nicias who was feeling already the effects of that illness which gradually incapacitated him for active service as well as for the direction of affairs.²²⁷ His policy was of the "wait and see" type, which is particularly advantageous to the enemy.²²⁸

The arrival of Spartan and Corinthian assistance for Syracuse altered the general situation to the disadvantage of the Athenians.²²⁹ Nicias had been apprised of the coming of Gylippus in good time, yet he had failed to take the necessary precautions to prevent him landing in Sicily.²³⁰ Thus on the eve of victory he was thwarted by the rapid action of his opponents and was forced to take the defensive. Athenian affairs steadily became worse as those of the Syracusans improved under the energetic direction of Gylippus. Finally, despairing of success, Nicias wrote to Athens requesting either the recall of the expedition or immediate reinforcements. He wisely expressed a desire to be relieved of his command due to his ill health.²³¹

The Athenians, on receipt of the message, made two decisions. One of these was reasonable; the other was their greatest mistake in the whole war. They decided to send a second expedition under Demosthenes, but they retained Nicias in his command.²³² The relieving expedition under Demosthenes was a

justifiable plan. Its purpose was to secure victory by immediate action, or, if that was impossible, to arrange for the safe withdrawal of the Athenians from Sicily. The despatch of this second force did weaken materially Athenian strength in home waters, but it cannot have been part of the Athenian plan to risk the whole expedition on a protracted campaign in Sicily. The policy of retaining Nicias in his command cannot be justified. He had shown his inefficiency already in the long delay in getting to grips with the enemy, and in doing nothing to prevent the arrival of Spartan assistance. He had cooped up his fleet in the harbour of Syracuse where he could not care properly for either ships or crews. He had permitted a relaxation of discipline which impaired the efficiency of his fleet. He had no policy except to "remain idle", awaiting attack. Surely such a record of dismal failure, together with a plea for retirement on the grounds of ill health would have convinced the Athenians! They were aware of Nicias' reluctance, in the first instance, for the Sicilian expedition, and, although his reputation as a general had been well established, still it was not the reputation of a genius. Perhaps no one imagined, when he was so eager to relinquish his responsibility, that he would prove so obstinate towards the advice of Demosthenes. It was this obstinacy which brought on the final catastrophe.

The second expedition under Demosthenes in due course arrived at Sicily. Athenian hopes immediately revived. These were soon dashed by the failure of the night attack on Epipolae. Lack of organization and lack of discipline were the causes of this failure. Demosthenes then proposed withdrawing at least as far

as Catana, where the Athenians would be assured of freedom of movement for their fleet.²⁴³

That Nicias did not act upon this excellent advice is another proof of his incapacity for command. Supremacy at sea was essential for the success of Athenian plans in Sicily. Naval tactics, as developed by Athenians, required sea room,²⁴⁴ as Phormio had demonstrated. In addition, Nicias had had experience of the folly of light Athenian ships meeting heavily built Syracusan vessels, prow to prow, as they were forced to do in restricted quarters.²⁴⁵ His belief that the city was on the point of yielding did not warrant him risking the whole expedition on the strength of information supplied by partisans within Syracuse.²⁴⁶

There is no doubt that fear of disgrace and death had its effect on Nicias' decision to remain.²⁴⁷ He had reason to doubt good treatment at the hands of the Athenians if he returned unsuccessful. The great Pericles had been deprived of office and fined;²⁴⁸ and many other generals had been dealt with harshly by the Athenian Assembly. Demosthenes in 424 B.C. had remained at Naupactus in preference to facing the Assembly after his defeat in Aetolia.²⁴⁹ Pythodorus and Sophocles had been exiled, and Eurymedon had been fined in 425 B.C. because they had withdrawn from Sicily.²⁵⁰ Thucydides had been exiled for the loss of Amphipolis.²⁵¹ Alcibiades, condemned to death, had fled into exile.²⁵² However, serious as withdrawal might be, Nicias was faced with the choice between his own fate and that of forty thousand men. He endeavored to save his reputation.

At length, however, upon the return of Gylippus with

reinforcements from the interior of Sicily, and in view of the continued wasting away of the Athenian army by sickness, Nicias agreed to withdraw. His decision came too late. Just as Athenian plans were completed for secret departure an eclipse of the moon occurred. ²⁵³ According to the soothsayers no movement of the army was to be attempted for thrice nine days. Nicias approved of their opinion.

The final destruction of the Athenian force was now entirely a matter of time. Another defeat in the harbour reduced them to very great straits so that, if unsuccessful in a final attempt to force their way out by sea, they had no alternative but to retire by land. ²⁵⁴ The last attempt was made but resulted in complete failure. Then was commenced the Athenian retreat foredoomed to disaster. Delay again by the Athenian generals gave the Syracusans an opportunity to block the roads, and, when the Athenian set forth on their attempt to reach the interior and their Sicel allies, they were harassed on all sides ²⁵⁵ by the victorious Syracusans, and were soon forced to yield. Demosthenes, fighting a rear-guard action was compelled to surrender first. Nicias was overtaken on the following day and with no hope of escape surrendered to Gylippus. Of forty thousand men, most perished during the retreat or were made ²⁵⁶ prisoners; few escaped.

Thus ended the Sicilian expedition, Athens' greatest effort during the course of the long war. Conceived by the ambition of Alcibiades, desirous for power, eagerly undertaken by a populace grown reckless by reason of its undisputed sea supremacy, and greedy for increased wealth and rule, the expedition, unwisely

led, ended in disaster. It might have prospered had it not been doomed to the leadership of Nicias, a man opposed to it from the first and incapable of bold decisive action. The final disaster might have been averted had Nicias been relieved of his command as he had requested, or if sickness of body had not produced lassitude of mind. Even at the last, if the influence of soothsayers and the art of divination had not had so great an effect on Nicias, the remnants of the once noble force might have retreated in safety.

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CHAPTER V.

Athens in the Third phase of the War. 413 - 404 B.C.

Introduction.

The effect of the disaster of the Sicilian expedition. The long resistance of Athens. Alcibiades' actions.

The Ionian Revolt.

Athenian dependences eager for revolt. Appeals made to Sparta. Alcibiades favors assisting the cities of Ionia. He raises the standard of revolt there. Athenian measures. Their reserve fund needed to equip a fleet. The activity of Alcibiades.

The Oligarchical Revolution.

Alcibiades the instigator of the revolution. The support and opposition of the various Athenian leaders. Peisander at Athens. Duplicity of Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. The effect on Athenian military activity. Revolution at Athens. The Four Hundred. Peace negotiations.

The Restoration of Democracy.

Reaction among the Athenians at Samos. The recall of Alcibiades. Growth of opposition to the Four Hundred. The loss of Euboea, and its effect on Athens. The Four Hundred deposed; government by the Five Thousand. Alcibiades recalled to Athens and pardoned.

The Hellespontine War.

Spartan activity at the Hellespont. Cynossema. Athenian lack of finances. Cyzicus. Alcibiades' success. His dismissal. Cyrus the Younger. Arginusae. Treatment of generals. Aegospotami.

The Surrender of Athens.

Lysander's policy. Attitude of the Athenians. Oligarchic interest. Theramens' actions. Peace terms. Government of the Thirty established.

The Athenian defeat at Syracuse marked the beginning of the end of the Athenian empire. The loss of men, ships and money was very considerable and was a great drain on the resources of the city. There followed the defection of the allied and subject states with a consequent decline in revenue so that it was only a matter of time until Athens should submit to her enemies. However, for nine years longer the struggle was continued, the Athenians displaying admirable courage and endurance, the Spartans considerable lack of zeal and energy. The deciding feature of the protracted struggle was the intervention of Persia with financial assistance for Sparta. Through the influence of Alcibiades with Tissaphernes for a time, this assistance was too meager and intermittent to bring about the rapid completion of the war. With the ending of his influence with Persia, and the arrival of Cyrus the younger to vigorously prosecute the war, the final act of the drama was prepared. There was needed only the dismissal of Alcibiades by the Athenians to hasten the end which was brought about by the crushing defeat at Aegospotami.

As soon as the disaster of the Sicilian expedition was known throughout the Greek world, the dependencies and allies of Athens began to prepare for revolt. The Euboeans were the first to appeal to the Spartans for help, followed quickly by Lesbos, Chios, and Erythraea. Upon the advice of Alcibiades, who was still at Sparta, the request of Chios and of Erythraea was considered first because they had the support of Tissaphernes, a Persian satrap. His offer to provide 'the sinews of war' was the deciding factor for the Spartans and the most ominous for

Athens. Pharnabazus, satrap in the region of the Hellespont, also made an offer of monetary assistance in hope of Spartan help in reducing the Athenian allies there.

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The Spartan armament, however, prepared to sail for Chios. Although checked at the outset by the Athenians, who had been apprised of the Chian plans, they persisted in their expedition by reason of the insistence of Alcibiades. He himself proceeded across the Aegean with a small fleet, appeared at Chios, Erythraea, and Clazomenae and induced them to revolt. Other cities soon followed their example and ere long, Teos, Miletus, Labadus, Erae, Mytilene and Methymna declared revolt against the Athenians.

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The situation was becoming increasingly serious for Athens. Loss of empire meant loss of revenue without which the war could not be carried on. Nevertheless despondency was not allowed to prevail for long. Prior to the revolt of Chios, the Athenians had built a fleet, had fortified Sunium to protect their grain ships coming to Peiraeus, had made such economies as they could and had maintained watch over their allies. When they were made aware of the projected Chian revolt they actively prepared to forestall it, obtaining pledges from the Chians and obstructing the sailing of the Peloponnesian fleet. When, despite these precautions, the revolt of Chios occurred, the Athenians, realizing the extremity of the danger to their empire, for Chios was their most important possession, displayed great energy. Their shortage of money was very evident now for they were forced to use the thousand talents set aside by Pericles at the commencement of the war as a reserve fund in case Athens herself was attacked. Using this money they equipped

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their fleet and commenced active measures to stem the tide of revolt among the cities of Ionia. At Samos a democratic government was established and the island became the Athenian base for all future operations. Mytilene and Methymna were recovered, then the whole of Lesbos, and later Clazomenae. The Chians were defeated in three battles and their country ravaged. Next the Athenians defeated the Milesians and their Peloponnesian allies and prepared to invest Miletus. Approach of Peloponnesian and Sicilian reinforcements forced them to retire to Samos. There they mustered their forces and redistributed the fleet in order to prosecute their operations at Chios and to maintain command of the sea.

Throughout this period, 413 to 412 B.C., Alcibiades had been assisting the Spartan cause with his accustomed energy and ability. He had been instrumental in causing the revolt of Chios, Erythraea, Clazomenae and Miletus. He had fought with the Milesians against the Athenians and had advised the Spartans to retain Miletus at all costs. After the defeat of the Spartan forces at Miletus the general distrust for Alcibiades, combined with king Agis' hatred for him, led to his withdrawal from the Spartans to Tissaphernes. He now devised a policy calculated to injure the Spartan cause, and he began at the same time to look for his recall by the Athenians. His policy regarding the Spartans was to persuade Tissaphernes to curtail his payments of money and to make these at infrequent intervals so that the war would not be concluded with rapidity, but both Athenians and Spartans would gradually wear themselves out. This policy Tissaphernes adopted to the detriment of the Spartan cause.

Their fleet was denied the opportunity of risking an engagement and thus it gradually deteriorated due to its inactivity.

Alcibiades now commenced intriguing with the leaders of the Athenian army at Samos, with the object of effecting his return from exile. Basing his intrigue on his friendship and influence with Tissaphernes he persuaded the leading Athenians at Samos to attempt the overthrow of the Athenian government. His recall, and financial support from Tissaphernes, was to be the sequel to their actions.
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Among the nobility this scheme met with immediate approval, and the majority of the army was won over to the plan by the prospect of pay from Persia. Phrynichus, one of the generals, opposed the idea from the start, arguing that Alcibiades cared naught for either oligarchy or democracy but desired merely his own recall. He was opposed to bringing into their present affairs the element of disunion, He considered that the proffer of Persian assistance was of very doubtful reliability. Further he thought that the promise of an oligarchic government would not be an inducement to their allies.
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Peisander was the most active person in furthering the proposed change of government. Proceeding to Athens he advocated the formation of an oligarchic government and the recall of Alcibiades to lead the state. Persian alliance and Persian financial support were the chief arguments.
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The people were compelled by stress of circumstances to yield to Peisander's suggestions. He was appointed along with an embassy of ten to negotiate with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. Before leaving Athens on this mission, Peisander organized all the Athenian clubs for the

anticipated coup on his return.

Duplicity on the part of Alcibiades caused the breakdown of the negotiations. Tissaphernes apparently feared the power of Sparta more than that of Athens and was inclining towards a renewal of alliance with the Spartans. Alcibiades not wishing the Athenians to conclude that he could not influence Tissaphernes, made excessive demands on behalf of Persia so that the Athenian commission had no recourse but to refuse the demands and to discontinue negotiations. Tissaphernes, thereupon, pursuing his policy of wearing out both sides renewed his alliance with the Spartans, and prepared to give them some assistance.

The political disturbances of this period were having their effect on the Athenians at Samos and at Chios. Although the latter city had been very closely invested, the inactivity of the Athenian forces resulted in a revival of strength on the part of the Chians. Also, at about this time, in the spring of 411 B.C., a Spartan force proceeded to the Hellespont and took the cities of Abydos and Lampsacus. Strombichides hurried north from his station at Chios and recovered Lampsacus. Abydos resisted successfully his attempt on it so he had to be content with establishing a guard station at Sestos.

Athenian carelessness in regard to the Hellespont was due doubtless to the general inactivity caused by the intriguing of the oligarchs at Samos and at Athens. The Hellespont was of greater importance to Athens at this period than any other portion of her empire, next to Euboea, for it was from this region chiefly that the grain supplies came for the city. From the time of the permanent

occupation of Decelea in Attica, in 413 B.C., and the intercepting of the land connection with Euboea, Athens had come to depend more than ever on supplies from the Hellespont. That that vital artery should now be imperilled indicates a surprising lack of initiative and forethought on the part of Athenian generals.

The oligarchical movement continued among the Athenians, despite the loss of the support of Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. With plans already so far advanced Peisander and his colleagues decided to carry on the project to completion. He himself returned to Athens while others were sent to establish oligarchies in the subject cities. When he arrived at Athens he found the revolution already begun. Some of the younger men had assassinated Androcles, the instigator of the plan to banish Alcibiades. They had made away also with others and had contrived by these means to keep the people in a state of mutual distrust so that combined action in opposition was not possible. Their policy, made public, was to the effect that no one was to be paid unless for military service, and that a share in the government should be given to not more than five thousand persons.

Peisander now proceeded with more detailed organization. Ten commissioners were appointed to frame a constitution. Then a motion was passed by the assembly to the effect that anyone might propose whatever motion he desired. This was done to clear the way for an entire change of governmental system. All magistracies were abolished then and a board of five appointed with power to choose one hundred members. These were to add to their number three hundred more. In this way the government of the Four Hundred was inaugurated. The Five

Thousand were to be summoned at any time by the Four Hundred. Behind this oligarchic revolution the chief men were Antiphon, who originated the plan yet worked in secret, and Peisander, Phrynichus and Theramenes who openly supported it.

The old Council of Five Hundred was dispersed immediately and despotic rule was instituted by the Four Hundred. Negotiations for peace were opened with Agis who was at Decelea, and ambassadors were despatched on like purpose to Sparta. Ten commissioners were sent to the army at Samos to gain the confidence of the men there.

However, while these events were transpiring at Athens, there had occurred a complete change of heart at Samos. Opponents of the revolution had been stirred up by some acts of violence which had been carried out by a band of three hundred Samian oligarchs, and by their plans to attack the members of the popular party. The generals Leon and Diomedon, the ship-captain Thrasybulus, and Thrasyllus, a private soldier, had resisted this movement and had re-established the democracy. When the news of the affairs at Athens reached them they became more resolved on maintaining the democracy, and prepared to make resistance to the Four Hundred at Athens. Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, who were the chief leaders of the soldiers, were elected generals of the army now. The Samian people were of the same opinions as the Athenian army and took oaths with them to maintain the democracy, oppose the Four Hundred, and resist the Spartans. As the army, at this time, was receiving no money from Athens it did not feel its dependence on the city, but looked rather to the recall of Alcibiades and to the obtaining of Persian gold.

The next step was to obtain the recall of Alcibiades from exile. Thrasybulus accomplished this by persuading an assembly²⁸⁴ of the army to vote for the return and pardon of Alcibiades. They were influenced chiefly by reason of his power, real or imaginary, over Tissaphernes, rightly judging that, while Persia's support of the Spartans continued, there could be no hope for the Athenians. Alcibiades, accordingly, was brought over to Samos. He quickly re-established all his former prestige with the army and set about to implement his promises regarding Tissaphernes. He immediately visited the satrap, ostensibly to apprise him of the state of affairs at Samos and to enlist his²⁸⁵ support. He let it be understood that he would persuade him not to bring up the Phoenician fleet, whose coming had been threatened for some time, or, if he did bring it, to use it against the Spartans. Tissaphernes, however, continued his former policy of making promises yet withholding help. So that, although Alcibiades did not obtain active support for the Athenians, yet²⁸⁶ he appeared to be successful in keeping the same from the enemy.

The restoration of the democracy at Samos and the recall of Alcibiades by the army soon produced an effect on the oligarchy at Athens. That that effect was not immediate and drastic was due to the conciliatory policy of Alcibiades. The army had been in favor of proceeding immediately to the Peiraeus to depose the Four Hundred, but Alcibiades had advised against that procedure, fraught as it was with very grave danger for the Athenian empire. For had the fleet sailed from Samos, Ionia and the Hellespont would have been at the mercy of the enemy. However, holding the army to its proper duty in the meantime,

Alcibiades sent word to Athens that the Four Hundred must be deposed and the former Council of Five Hundred restored. He also urged upon the city the necessity of presenting a firm front to the enemy, and held out hopes that he would be able to reconcile the army to the city. This moderate policy weakened the unity of the oligarchs. Some, actuated by fear of the army and of Alcibiades, began to lose confidence in the permanency of the oligarchy. Theramenes and Aristocrates became leaders of the moderate group and favored establishing in reality the Five Thousand, who had not yet been selected. Phrynichus, Aristarchus, Peisander and Antiphon headed the extreme oligarchs, and now in alarm, despatched another embassy to Sparta with authority to make peace. At the same time they proceeded with the fortification of Eetionea, the mole of the Peiraeus, commanding the entrance to the harbour.

When the envoys returned from Sparta, without having effected a treaty, Theramenes instigated rumours to the effect that the city was to be betrayed and that the fortifying of Eetionea was part of the scheme. The appearance of a Peloponnesian fleet in the neighbourhood strengthened this opinion and the opposition to the oligarchy increased. With the assassination of Phrynichus the opposition became quite open. A little later the feelings of the democratic element were vented by the demolition of the fort at Eetionea. Actual restoration of the democracy was not yet voiced but merely the establishment of the Five Thousand, in preference to the Four Hundred. The oligarchs were prepared to accede to this request when the near approach of an enemy fleet created a panic in Athens.

A Peloponnesian squadron had sailed from Megara along the coast of Salamis when the alarm was given at Athens. Expecting an attack on the city, a fleet was manned hastily and was sent to sea against the enemy. The Peloponnesian fleet had sailed on northward in the direction of Euboea, whither the Athenians followed. In the ensuing engagement the Athenians suffered a crushing defeat. Shortly afterwards the revolt of Euboea followed. Athens had entered upon the darkest period of the war.

The loss of Euboea was irreparable for it had been the main source of supplies for Athens during the war, and particularly from the time of the occupation of Decelea. Coupled with the loss of Euboea was the defection of the army at Samos, lack of ships and crews at Peiraeus, revolution imminent in the city. Had the Peloponnesians evinced a little enterprise the Peiraeus would have fallen into their hands. Athens was saved by Spartan inertness.

This near catastrophe had the effect of bringing about a sudden political change in Athens. An assembly was called, the Four Hundred deposed, and government by the Five Thousand established. This number was to include all who could furnish themselves with arms and would thus exclude only the poorest elements of the free population. A vote recalling Alcibiades was also passed and the army at Samos urged to act with vigour. The extreme oligarchs made their escape from the city, Peisander and Alexicles to Decelea, Aristarchus to Oenoe which he betrayed to the Boeotians.

With Athenian political affairs placed on a better basis and with harmony restored between city and navy, there ensued a

period of renewed activity on the part of the fleet at Samos. The scene of war shifts from the south to the Hellespont. The Spartans, thoroughly disappointed with the shifty Tissaphernes, had acceded to the requests of Pharnabazus to interest themselves in the region adjoining his province and particularly in the Hellespont. Apprised of the departure of the Peloponnesian fleet, Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus set off in pursuit. Mindarus, the Spartan commander, reached Abydos in advance of the Athenians. They, in turn, came to Sestos, lying opposite, and prepared for battle. The engagement was fought in the strait by Cynossema, and victory was gained by the Athenians. Later, they defeated Mindarus again and captured thirty of his ships.

These victories coming at a time when Athenian affairs were at low ebb, proved very encouraging and again raised hopes among the Athenians of final victory. Lack of finances, however, proved the deterrent to energetic measures. Sections of the fleet had to depart on expeditions to levy money. In the autumn of the year 411 B.C., Alcibiades with twenty-two ships was absent from the main fleet, levying money from Halicarnassus. In the spring of 410 B.C., both Theramenes and Thrasybulus were away at the same time on this work, each with twenty ships. Lack of the former regular tribute thus crippled Athenian enterprise, reducing the power of the main fleet.

Encouraging as had been the success at Cynossema, still more so was the great victory gained by Alcibiades at Cyzicus, in 410 B.C. In this affair the Peloponnesians lost their whole fleet of sixty ships, and their commander Mindarus was slain. Cyzicus was regained then by the Athenians, and other less

important cities in the neighbouring region. Steps were taken to collect the ten per cent duty on ships sailing out of the Bosphorus³⁰². The Spartans began to despair, in their turn, but were relieved, as on former occasions by Persian assistance. Pharnabazus provided clothing and pay for the Peloponnesian sailors, and timber and money for the construction of another fleet.

The year 409 B.C. was marked by no outstanding event. Thrasyllus, with Athenian reinforcements, failed in an attempt on Ephesus³⁰³. Later in the year Alcibiades defeated Pharnabazus in a minor engagement³⁰⁴. Next year, 408 B.C., the Athenians proceeded against the important cities of Byzantium and Chalcedon, which were in possession of the enemy³⁰⁵. Byzantium was betrayed to them and Chalcedon they besieged closely³⁰⁶. The siege was raised on payment of twenty talents by Pharnabazus, and on agreement that the former tribute rights of Athens be recognized. Pharnabazus also arranged for an Athenian embassy to visit the Persian king³⁰⁷. Athenian affairs had been prospering during these last three years under the general direction of Alcibiades. Various military successes had been achieved, the morale of the fleet strengthened, dissension introduced between the Spartans and Tissaphernes, the help of Pharnabazus nullified by defeat of Spartan forces. In addition, Athenian supremacy had been re-established in the Hellespont, the grain route kept open, tribute again levied at the Bosphorus. Successful money-raising expeditions had been undertaken and the fleet thereby made self supporting. The genius of Alcibiades had been responsible in no small measure for this revival of Athenian prospects. He now returned to

Athens for the first time since his banishment, received the grateful plaudits of the people, and was elected general-in-chief of the Athenian forces. ³⁰⁸ As an indication of his confidence in Athenian power, as well as to increase his popularity, he conducted by land, in defiance of Agis at Decelea, the procession of the Eleusinian Mysteries from Athens to Eleusis.

Alcibiades' success and popularity were of short duration. With his final dismissal by the Athenians soon after this, following the battle of Notium, the beginning of the end approaches for Athens. The more vigorous prosecution of the war after the appearance in Ionia of Cyrus the Younger, accounts very largely for the overthrow of Athens. But Alcibiades' success, first in directing the policy of Tissaphernes, secondly in crippling the efforts of Pharnabazus, leads one to believe that he might have undermined the power of Cyrus also, either by intrigue, in which he had no equal, or by energetic and skilful action, in which he excelled. The loss of his leadership, coincident with renewed energy on the part of Sparta, backed by Persia, proved too much for Athens impoverished in leadership and in money.

In this spring of 407 B.C. a Spartan embassy returned from Persia with promise by the king of full support. His son Cyrus was sent to rule the people on the coast and to aid Sparta in prosecuting the war. ³⁰⁹ The Spartans encouraged by this forward policy, appointed Lysander, an able general, to command their forces. ³¹⁰ He repaired and re-organized his fleet but delayed adopting the offensive. His opportunity came when Antiochus, Alcibiades' pilot, temporarily in command of the Athenian fleet, rashly ventured out

against him. Lysander accepted the challenge, attacked the Athenian fleet while disordered, and gained an easy victory. ³¹¹

This defeat brought to a head such dissatisfaction as there had been with Alcibiades and led to his dismissal. ³¹²

The following year, 406 B.C., Callicratidas succeeded to the command of the Peloponnesian fleet. Conon had replaced Alcibiades. ³¹³ ³¹⁴⁴
 The Spartan, acting with a celerity not in evidence since the time of Brasidas, attacked and stormed Methymna in Lesbos, defeated Conon before Mytilene, blockaded him in the harbour, took ten of twelve ships coming to his aid, and invested Mytilene by land and sea. ³¹⁵
 When the Athenians sailed to its relief with a force of one hundred and fifty vessels, Callicratidas displayed the same energy and valour as heretofore, sailed against them with one hundred and twenty ships and joined battle near Arginusae. ³¹⁶
 Loss of their valiant leader and defeat of their fleet was the Spartans fate.

Athenian rejoicing for this victory was tempered by sorrow for the loss of several crews of wrecked ships, which, due to a storm or to the incompetence of the generals, had not been saved. ³¹⁷ Subsequently the generals concerned were condemned to death by the Athenian people, an action indicative of the instability of the Athenian assembly at this time and the lack of sane political leadership. ³¹⁸

Athenian success was but temporary. For a time Spartan interests languished but with the return of Lysander to command in 405 B.C. and with renewed support on the part of Cyrus, active measures were again undertaken. ³¹⁹ Lysander sailed to the Hellespont and took the city of Lampsacus. He was followed by

Conon who took up a position opposite, at Aegospotami. Contrary to custom the Athenians had selected a location at a distance from their base of supplies, Sestos, and thus could not keep their fleet in the necessary continual state of preparedness. Of this fact Lysander eventually took advantage, sailing forth at a time when the Athenian crews had dispersed for provisions. Taken completely by surprise, only nine vessels effected their escape under Conon. The rest were taken without a struggle, in number more than one hundred and seventy. The crews were made prisoner on shore. Thus ended, ³²⁰ingloriously, Athens' aspirations for supremacy. The once proud mistress of the seas was humbled without a struggle on her own element!

Lysander did not proceed immediately against Athens, but, visiting in turn all cities with Athenian garrisons, he sent the garrisons home to Athens to swell the population there and hasten the effects of the famine that was inevitable. ³²¹After the affairs of all places of importance, except Samos, had been set in order in the interests of Sparta, Lysander sailed to the Peiraeus and closed the harbour. ³²²Pausanias with a large force of Spartans and allied troops had advanced up to the outskirts of the city. ³²³

No ready submission, however, was made by the Athenians. Fearful of the fate which might be meted out to them, and mindful of the treatment they themselves had accorded the vanquished, they were at a loss to know what to do. No overtures for peace were made until their provisions were exhausted and famine was at hand. Then they proposed to king Agis that they should become allies of Sparta, still retaining their walls and the

Peiraeus. These proposals were rejected, but the Athenians were not yet ready to accede to the Spartan demands to demolish their long walls, so nothing further was done. ³²⁴

The oligarchic element in Athens now became more active. Theramenes, one of the former Four Hundred, offered to treat with the Spartans and was sent to do so. For three months he delayed with Lysander. Those three months of waiting broke down the last elements of resistance and the Athenians were ready for peace on any terms. Theramenes then proceeded to Sparta with a commission of ten empowered to negotiate peace terms. ³²⁵

These terms were arranged soon. Such delay as occurred was due to a difference of opinion among the victors as to the severity of the punishment. Thebes and Corinth desired the complete destruction of Athens. Sparta, no longer afraid of Athenian power with the empire dismembered, was satisfied with more lenient conditions. ³²⁶ Destruction of the long walls, the walls of the Peiraeus, surrender of all ships but twelve, the return of the oligarchic exiles, and an alliance with Sparta, ³²⁷ were the requirements. Upon the return of Theramenes to Athens, ³²⁸ the terms were accepted, the walls demolished, and peace restored.

In the following spring, 404 B.C., the Athenian government was reorganized under the control of an oligarchy of thirty. ³²⁹ After the establishment of this government to the satisfaction of Sparta, Lysander withdrew his fleet from the Peiraeus, and Agis ³³⁰ his army from Decelea. Thus ended the Peloponnesian war.

CHAPTER VI.

Reasons for the Failure of Athens

Weakness in the organization of the empire.

The development of the Athenian empire. Athens' attitude towards allies seeking independence. Evidence of the ever present danger of revolt. An empire based on force presents many weak points to an army.

Defects of the system of government at Athens.

Policy of empire subject to whims of assembly. Evidence. Opportunity for intrigues for personal interest. Appointment of generals affected by popular appeal. These defects encouraged oligarchic attempts on the government.

Defects of Athenian policy.

Pericles' policy of defensive warfare and maintenance of empire. Subsequent change under Cleon, Demosthenes and Alcibiades. Attempts at aggression. Empire not maintained. Sea supremacy lost.

Lack of resources.

Resources sufficient for defensive war. Maintenance of empire necessary to ensure tribute. Loss of sea supremacy meant loss of tribute.

Inefficient leadership.

Good leadership may offset bad policy. Success of some Athenian leaders. The far-reaching effect of Nicias' incapacity for leadership.

Superior policy of Sparta.

Sparta's conservative policy. Her resources of man-power carefully guarded. Good policy in the use of Brasidas, Gylippus, Agis, and Alcibiades.

The failure of Athens to break the power of Sparta and achieve success in the Peloponnesian war cannot be attributed to any single reason but to a number of causes which, acting at the same time in various ways, sapped the power of Athens and brought ruin. For enfeebled leadership in the Assembly and on the field of battle, gradual depletion of resources, policy changed for the worse, defects of the system of government, weakness in organization of the empire, and superior policy of the enemy - all these played a part. Not one alone could have ruined the empire but elements of all being present, eventually caused failure.

Weakness in the organization of the Athenian empire was a basic contributing cause of failure. Originally the empire had been a confederacy of independent states co-operating against a common enemy, Persia. Leadership of the confederacy, once vested in Sparta, had been transferred to more energetic Athens. Lassitude of the allied states led to contributions, to the central power, of money in place of military forces and before long Athens supplied the greater part of the armament which furnished protection for the whole confederacy. Power once procured was maintained by superior force. Allies seeking their former independence were reduced to the ranks of the tributary portions of the Athenian empire which had come into being now. A few sections remained nominally independent, notably Chios and Lesbos, which maintained their own fleets. An empire thus built up of former independent parts, and controlled by force, offered many weak points of which an adversary might take advantage. The spark of revolt was ever present waiting only to be fanned into

flame. Witness Potidaea, the Chalcidian cities and Lesbos in the early part of the war; Chios, Lesbos, Euboea and the cities through-
 331
 out Ionia towards the close of the war. That the maintaining of a watch on their allies occasioned ceaseless vigilance is attested by the remarks and actions of Athenian leaders from Pericles' time onward. Had the connections between Athens and the parts of her empire been based on alliances and not on force, her empire would not have gone to pieces so readily through the actions, for example, of Brasidas in the Chalcidice, and Alcibiades in Ionia. This weakness of empire was noted by Pericles when advising the Athenians to avoid the dangers of land battles for fear of the effect of defeat on the allies. "If we fail", he said, "our confederacy which is our strength will be lost to us; for our allies will rise in revolt when we are no longer capable of making war upon them."
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Another cause of failure may be traced to elements of weakness in the democratic system of government at Athens. During the period when Athenian affairs were at their best and when Athenian policy was well devised, Pericles was at the helm of state and the government inclined rather more to autocracy than to democracy. Later, when his influence no longer predominated, democratic principles of government were more in evidence, with all their accompanying defects. The policy of the empire was at the whim of the people gathered in assembly, the majority deciding the weightiest issues, influenced not always by consideration of the best interests of the state, but by the readiest speakers. For example the assembly was won over to agree to the Sicilian expedition chiefly by the popularity of

Alcibiades and his appeal, the weighty objections of Nicias
 333
 being given scant attention. The destruction of the male
 inhabitants of Mytilene, a proposal injurious to Athens' best
 interests, would have been carried out had not the fickle
 334
 multitude been swayed to a reversal of their first decision.

A system of government which granted to the people the
 decision of all matters of policy provided ready opportunity
 for the operation of intrigues contrary to the best interests.
 The occasion of the outwitting of the Spartan envoys by
 Alcibiades, when peace might have been maintained, in 420 B.C.,
 335
 is a case in point. The weakness of a democracy attempting to
 function along the same lines in war time as in peace time is
 shown clearly by the decidedly ill service the assembly at
 Athens rendered the state when the army and fleet were deprived
 of the services of eight generals at one time, through a popular
 336
 decision later much regretted. A similar incident occurred
 when the Sicilian expedition, on the point of commencing
 operations, was deprived of the chief enthusiast for the scheme
 337
 as well as the ablest leader. Again, appointments to high
 command were not based always on ability. Due to the system of
 election of generals by the people, popularity played a greater
 part in their choice than was compatible with the exigencies
 of war. Cleon's selection for the expedition to Amphipolis was
 arrived at largely through his influence with the assembly, not
 338
 by reason of pronounced military ability. Pericles, in time of
 stress, as in the first invasion of Attica, wisely refrained from
 calling the people together. He did not trust their judgement
 339
 under such conditions. The lesser men who followed Pericles

were concerned rather with personal advancement than with furtherance of the interests of the state, and vied with each other for the approval of the people.³⁴⁰

Defects of the system of government and of the conduct of the war under democracy prepared the way for those desiring a change of government, and weakened Athens' cause considerably. Warfare demands united effort. The oligarchical disturbances at Athens and at Samos caused inactivity of the forces and created disunion among the citizens.³⁴¹ Had the democracy been wisely led and the conduct of the war not left to the decision of the people, discontent of the oligarchic faction would not have developed so readily. The appearance of the Peloponnesians in force at the Hellespont to disrupt Athenian interests there, and to obtain the support of Pharnabazus, occurred at a time when the oligarchic intrigues created a general condition of uncertainty and led to a lack of effort and initiative on the part of the military forces.³⁴²

Another cause contributing to failure was Athenian military policy. Pericles had advised carrying on a type of warfare calculated to affect least the Athenian resources, both of manpower and of material. Maintenance of the empire above every other consideration, command of the sea, descents on the Peloponnesian coasts to annoy the enemy and to devastate his property, no pitched battles on land, no distant enterprises at sea, were the chief points in his policy.³⁴³ Subsequently, Athenian policy underwent a change. Land encounters were attempted with all the risks of defeat by an enemy acknowledged to be superior on that element - for example, by Demosthenes in Aetolia and in

Acarnania, Hippocrates in Boeotia, and Alcibiades in the
 Peloponnese. Maintenance of the empire intact was not considered
 of primary importance, as witness the neglect of the Chalcidice
 following the death of Cleon. Extension of empire during the
 war was undertaken, first by the acquisition of unoffending
 Melos, then by the attempt at Syracuse. Sea supremacy, well -
 established by Phormio, was not maintained. For by the time of
 the Sicilian expedition Corinth was able to meet Athens on
 equal terms, and the Syracusans, unused to naval matters, in an
 incredibly short space of time attained to sufficient proficiency
 to inflict crushing defeats on what had been Athens' finest
 fleet. On the occasion of the revolt of Mytilene in 428 B.C.,
 the sight of a Peloponnesian fleet in the eastern Aegean was a
 cause for wonder, and the fleet which then appeared there risked
 no engagement. From 413 B.C. onward, Peloponnesian fleets contend
 with Athenian fleets more on an equality, and at times display
 superior seamanship and skill. Peloponnesian superiority was
 acknowledged by the Athenians when they formed for battle at
 Arginusae. Callicratidas' defeat of Conon; and finally the battle
 of Aegospotami, reveal the extent of Athens' loss of her former
 pride, complete sea supremacy. A policy, directly opposed to that
 adopted at the beginning of the war, and ill adapted to the
 requirements of an empire linked together by the sea, contributed
 its share to Athens' fall.

From the standpoint of material resources Athens was well
 equipped for warfare fought along certain well-defined lines.
 Under a changed policy she was ill equipped for a war of long
 duration. Athens' chief power lay in her navy. Upkeep of her

navy depended upon guaranteeing a steady supply of the materials for its equipment, but more so on an adequate fund of money for payment of the sailors and marines. That money was derived from tribute from her subject states, from mines at Laurium, and in Thrace, and from shipping dues levied at the Bosphorus. The resources of Athens, ample in Pericles' opinion for a defensive war, were first exhausted by the distant enterprise in Sicily, and later imperilled by loss of the command of the sea. Had the command of the sea been maintained, the empire could have been held together, and tribute would have continued. It is not clear how Sparta could have triumphed then for she was not able to maintain a fleet without Persian support and, without a fleet, subjugation of a maritime empire was impossible. Command of the sea would have interfered also with Persian assistance of Sparta, and, even with that assistance, had Athens been sure of her tribute it is doubtful if she would have failed. Thrasybulus and Alcibiades, although forced to maintain themselves, yet demonstrated that Sparta, although allied with Persia, could be successfully opposed. Without tribute coming in however, Athens had not sufficient resources for even defensive war and so speedily succumbed.

In the final analysis leadership ranks as one of the most important elements in the conduct of a war. Under continuous wise leadership, Athens, despite the weaknesses of her government and empire, despite mistakes in general policy, doubtless would have emerged triumphant. But when those weaknesses and mistakes were coupled with bad leadership disaster was inevitable. The short period of the war when Pericles was in control was

characterized by safe and sane leadership. Bold and risky, yet clever, leadership was given by Demosthenes, whose successes outweigh his failures. Alcibiades, during the time when his services were at the disposal of Athens, carried out his military exploits with skill and resolution. Phormio, and Thrasylbulus displayed military and naval ability of high order. But at the most crucial time for Athens, when her greatest effort was put forth, when the future of city and empire depended upon the result, when all advantages were in her favour, when victory meant complete supremacy and defeat the end of power, leadership of the Athenian army and fleet was in the hands of the general most incapable of aggressive action - Nicias! The defeat of Hippocrates at Delium, another instance of bad generalship, yet occasioned no irreparable loss for Athens; but the disaster of the Sicilian expedition brought in its train the downfall of the empire. Had Alcibiades remained in charge, had Lamachus been given supreme command, or had Demosthenes not been overlooked until too late it is inconceivable that the expedition would have frittered away its energies in so futile a manner. No other Greek leader of importance, with the exception of Agis when ³⁵⁸ opposed to the Argives, showed such fatal indecision as was displayed by Nicias throughout the Sicilian campaign. The loss of men and of ships, excessive though it was on that occasion, was not so potent in effect as the loss of the prestige of Athens throughout the full extent of her empire and that of the enemy. To such an extent did inefficient leadership affect the course of the Peloponnesian war.

Another element accounting in part for the failure of Athens

may be found in the superior policy of Sparta. Sparta pursued a safe course, running no undue risks, conserving her resources even to the extent of crippling her enterprises, and thus lengthening the war. She avoided the element of risk entailed in occupying Decelea until urged on by Alcibiades, at the time when Athenian efforts were concentrated on Sicily. She conserved her resources of heavy-armed infantry by limiting very strictly her support of Brasidas in the Chalcidice to a force of Helots. The value she placed on her man power is evidenced by the length she was willing to go to regain the men taken at Sphacteria. Throughout the conflict, however, cautious as was her policy, yet it was well-calculated and sure. The outstanding plans which achieved success were, the sending of Brasidas to the Chalcidice, Gylippus to Syracuse, Agis to Decelea, and Alcibiades to Ionia. It was the irony of fate that the success of Spartan policy was due, in no small measure, to the defects of Athenian policy which drove Alcibiades into the arms of Sparta.

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CHAPTER VII.

The Effect of the War on Athenian Democracy

The political parties at Athens.

Three parties based on the division of the people.

Democratic, oligarchic and middle party. The objects of

each. Conduct of the war affected by the policies of the parties.

Oligarchy established at Athens.

Lysander's action. The menace of oligarchy during the war.

The Four Hundred and the Thirty.

The rule of the Thirty.

Their policy to secure complete control. Spartan aid solicited.

Repressive measures.

The opposition of the democratic party.

Thrasybulus leads the democratic party. Defeats oligarchics.

Controls the Peiraens.

The intervention of Sparta.

Lysander again threatens democracy. Pausanias intervenes.

Defeats democrats. Arranges a settlement.

Democracy re-established.

The Thirty, Ten and Eleven excluded from amnesty. Democratic

government again set up. Final attempt of the oligarchs. End

of party strife at Athens.

The conduct of the war by Athens was affected very largely by the power exercised at various times by the political parties in the state. A consideration of these parties is essential for an understanding of the general policy pursued. Whibley conjectures that there were three main parties in the Athenian state, based on the divisions of the population. These classes of the people he divides into the rich landowners; the middle class, composed of property owners in good circumstances; the poor class, comprising some farmers, but chiefly the industrial section of the city and of the Peiraeus, men who depended for their living on the produce of their labours. The political parties have a definite relation to these classes. The oligarchs represented the rich, the democrats the poor, and the middle party, or moderates, the middle class. The policy of these political parties favored the classes of people they represented. It was to the interest of the democratic and middle parties to carry on the war vigorously, in order to maintain Athens' democratic constitution, endangered by Sparta, as well as by the oligarchs within the state. The oligarchic party, on the other hand, which represented the wealthy owners of estates and business enterprises, was the chief supporter of the cost of the war, following the adoption of the property tax. They were desirous of political power, as well as freedom from taxation. They favored discontinuance of the war, and the establishment of oligarchy, even at the cost of submission to Sparta.

The democratic party was numerically strongest, including about half the citizen body. Its policy was clearly set forth by its leaders, and was followed consistently throughout the war.

The main objects were defence of the democracy and maintenance of the empire. This policy accounts for the democrats' desire to prosecute the war to a decisive end; and makes clear the adamant resistance of Pericles to Spartan demands, the attitude of Cleon when advantage already rested with Athens after Sphacteria, and the persistent resistance during the closing years of the war. The chief leaders of the democratic party were in turn, Pericles, Cleon, Alcibiades and Thrasybulus. The weakness of the party's policy was in the application of the principles laid down by Pericles at the beginning of the war. Cleon and Alcibiades over-reached themselves in attempting too extensive war schemes.

The members of the oligarchic party were opposed to the Athenian constitution which conferred on the poorest citizen equality of political power with the richest. The war, moreover, laid on the rich a heavy burden in the matter of the property tax, in addition to the trierarchy and other liturgies. Inferior in numbers to the democratic party, the oligarchs were compelled to work in secret against the state and did not attempt open opposition until 411 B.C. Their attainment of power on that occasion, accompanied as it was by violence and bloodshed, is an indication of the lengths to which the oligarchs would go. Their readiness to surrender the city to Sparta in order to maintain their power shows to what an extent they were actuated by self interest. The obvious treachery at Aegospotami and the dilatory embassy of Theramenes point to subversive oligarchic policy.

The middle party, in the opinion of Whibley, was composed of

members of the middle class who favored neither the extreme policy of the oligarchs nor of the democrats. This was the party that formed the regular opposition during the early period of the war, and that desired peace if obtainable on reasonable terms.³⁷² Nicias appears to have been the leader of the middle party.³⁷³ During the periods when this party exercised control, a moderate policy was pursued and inclinations toward peace are evident.³⁷⁴ In the oligarchic disturbances in 411 B.C., and again in 404 B.C. the middle party appears to have inclined towards the oligarchs in the hope of establishing a government based on a limited franchise, which would exclude the extreme elements of the democratic party.³⁷⁵ The general policy of opposition and of compromise, which marked the middle party, failed to have, however, any definite effect on the outcome of the war or on the government of the state.

In the relation of these three parties to the war, it appears that the democratic and middle parties were actuated throughout the struggle by political convictions, not by personal interest.³⁷⁶ The middle class, engaged in agriculture, suffered immediate and direct loss; the poor were affected along with the other classes by the rise in prices and the decline of trade, and were the first to feel the effects of poverty. The distress they suffered from these causes did not bring them to the point of seeking peace. The maintenance of democracy was more important.

The defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian war led inevitably to an alteration in her form of government. Sparta favored oligarchy in preference to democracy, and having enjoyed throughout the war the support of the oligarchs in the Athenian empire,³⁷⁷

she now set up at Athens a government of that type. Lysander, before departing, appointed a group of thirty to frame a constitution for Athens.³⁷⁸

During the course of the war, democratic Athens had continually in her midst the menace of the oligarch. It was the oligarchic leaning of Alcibiades that contributed largely to the distrust of him inspired in the Athenians by his ungoverned actions.³⁷⁹ The friends of Sparta in Athens were the oligarchs, who were ready for peace and who hoped thereby to obtain power. When Athens' power commenced to decline, subsequent to the Sicilian expedition, the oligarchs then seized the opportunity of overthrowing the government of the state. Inspired first by Alcibiades, Peisander carried through his plans which resulted in establishing at Athens the rule of the Four Hundred.³⁸⁰ At that time the peace party was the oligarchic party, which went so far as, apparently, to make plans to betray the city to Sparta.³⁸¹ With the deposition of the Four Hundred, democracy was re-established, but the surrender of the city in 403 B.C. again gave control to the oligarchs.³⁸²

The Four Hundred had given to the Athenians a taste of oligarchy such as they had not experienced for a hundred years.³⁸³ Now the Thirty were to inflict upon Athens the full measure of tyranny and despotism deemed necessary to ensure the safety of a minority government based on force. The leaders of the movement were Theramenes and Critias, the one noted for a policy of moderation, the other for one of repression and violence.

The Thirty, upon their appointment, did not proceed with the framing of a constitution but set up a Senate and such magistrates

as they considered advisable. They then commenced to make their position secure by removing those likely to prove dangerous. First they arrested the persons who under the democracy had acted as informers against the oligarchs. This occasioned no feeling of opposition on the part of the citizens. However, ostensibly to assist in ridding the city of such undesirables, the aid of Sparta was solicited and a Spartan garrison obtained. Emboldened, the oligarchs now arrested more prominent people, selecting those who were likely to stir up opposition. Step by step the process of rendering the citizens servile was continued and many were unjustly put to death.

Objections to the close oligarchy were brought forward by the moderate Theramenes and led to an extension of the rule of the Thirty to include, in all, three thousand citizens, who were then placed on the roll. By a subterfuge the main body of citizens was disarmed by the three thousand who thus made armed resistance in the city impossible. Personal enmity was then more boldly displayed and for its gratification the lives of many citizens were sacrificed.

At this stage, Theramenes, who already had raised objections to the actions of the Thirty, came into bitter conflict with Critias, the apostle of ruthlessness. He opposed the limiting of the number on the roll to three thousand, the unjust condemnation of free citizens and metics, and the employing of a Spartan garrison. Critias arraigned him before the Senate, and then, without their sanction, consigned him to the Eleven who had charge of executions. The death of Theramenes marks the first weakening of oligarchic power.

Signs of active opposition to the rule of the Thirty now became evident. Citizens not on the roll had been expelled and their property had been confiscated. Many had sought refuge in Peiraeus, at Megara, and at Thebes. From the latter city, Thrasybulus led a small party of exiles towards Athens, occupied and fortified a post at Phyle. Unsuccessfully attacked by the Thirty, he maintained his position, and his force rapidly increased from seventy to seven hundred. By a surprise attack he inflicted a very severe defeat on the oligarchic forces. So seriously did this affect them that they felt compelled to ensure for themselves immediately, a place of refuge. This they found at Eleusis, after they had condemned to death the male inhabitants of that place.

The revolt against the Thirty continued actively. Thrasybulus with augmented forces advanced to the Peiraeus and occupied there a strong position. The Thirty led forth their troops, attacked him, suffered defeat, and lost their leader Critias. This defeat so thoroughly disorganized the oligarchic party that the Thirty were deposed and a group of Ten appointed in their place. In order to save themselves from their opponents, who now had the city almost in a state of siege, aid was sought from Sparta.

In response to the request for help, Lysander arrived, blockaded the Peiraeus and again the cause of democracy was placed in peril. Relief came from an unexpected source. Pausanias, jealous of Lysander's growing power, appeared himself at the scene of action, and assumed control. After inflicting defeat on the men of the Peiraeus, he set about bringing to an end the civil strife. This he soon accomplished in favor of the

democratic party and a general reconciliation was effected. The Spartans then departed and permitted Athens to re-establish her former type of government.

According to the settlement, arranged by the Spartan king, the Thirty, the Ten, and the Eleven were excluded from the general amnesty. They therefore departed from the city. The old form of government was then set up again. Two years later in 401 B.C., a final attempt to gain control was made by the oligarchs. They set out from Eleusis for the city but their leaders were taken and executed. Their followers were then persuaded to return in peace to their homes in Athens. This ended for Athens the menace of oligarchy. No reprisals had been undertaken after the restoration of the democracy and from then on the amnesty between the two parties was observed and political peace was assured for Athens. In this way did the Peloponnesian war affect democracy in Athens, disclosing to view its weaknesses and preparing the way for oligarchy. So thoroughly, however, had democratic principles become ingrained in Athenian character that the excesses of despotic government soon brought the inevitable reaction and resulted in the establishment on a firmer basis of the rule of the people.

References

Abbreviations :

Thuc.	-	Thucydides
Hell.	-	Xenophon, "Hellenica"
Hen.	-	Henderson, "The Great War between Athens and Sparta"
Zimm.	-	Zimmern, "The Greek Commonwealth"
Grun.	-	Grundy, "Thucydides; the History of his Age"
Whib.	-	Whibley, "Political Parties in Athens"

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| 1. Thuc. | I.23, 33, 86, 118 | 41. Thuc. | I.37-43 |
| 2. " | I.90, 91, 93 | 42. Hen. | pg.4 |
| 3. " | I.95 | 43. Thuc. | I.114 |
| 4. " | I.96 | 44. " | I.67 |
| 5. " | I.97, 98 | 45. Hen. | pg.5 |
| 6. " | I.103, 115 | 46. Thuc. | I.67 |
| 7. " | I.108 | 47. " | I.67 |
| 8. " | I.113, 114 | 48. " | I.44, 48, 51, 67 |
| 9. " | IV.66, 69, 70 | 49. " | I.57-65 |
| 10. " | I.115 | 50. " | I.1-6 |
| 11. " | I.108 | 51. " | I.86 |
| 12. " | I.114 | 52. " | I.80-85 |
| 13. " | I.117 | 53. " | I.87 |
| 14. " | I.117 | 54. " | I.23, 88, 118 |
| 15. Zimm. | pg.372, 373 | 55. " | I.119 |
| 16. " | pg.374 | 56. " | I.127 |
| 17. " | pg.407 | 57. " | I.139 |
| 18. " | pg.408 | 58. Hen. | pg.4, 5 |
| 19. Thuc. | I.112 | 59. Thuc. | II.9 |
| 20. " | I.116 | 60. " | I.122, 124 |
| 21. " | II.13, 24 | 61. " | IV.85, 86, 87, 108, 121 |
| 22. " | I.38; Zimm.pg.406 | 62. " | I.40 |
| 23. Whib. | pg.33 | 63. " | I.44 |
| 24. Thuc. | III.47 | 64. " | I.44 |
| 25. " | I.19 | 65. " | I.66 |
| 26. " | V.82 | 66. " | I.71 |
| 27. " | VIII.64 | 67. " | I.78 |
| 28. " | II.7 | 68. " | I.139 |
| 29. " | II.69, 84 | 69. " | I.139 |
| 30. " | I.44 | 70. " | I.145 |
| 31. " | II.7 | 71. " | I.144 |
| 32. " | I.108 | 72. Hen. | pg.2 |
| 33. " | I.89 | 73. Thuc. | I.144 |
| 34. " | I.70 | 74. " | I.114 |
| 35. " | I.13 | 75. " | I.117 |
| 36. " | II.19 | 76. " | II.36, 38 |
| 37. Hen. | pg.2 | 77. " | I.44, 144 |
| 38. Thuc. | I.44 | 78. " | I.140 |
| 39. " | I.67-71 | 79. " | I.144 |
| 40. " | I.36 | 80. " | I.33, 42 |

81.	Thuc.	I.80-85	134.	Thuc.	II.55-58
82.	"	I.144	135.	"	II.59
83.	"	I.44	136.	Hen.	pg.41
84.	"	II.9	137.	"	pg.65
85.	"	I.80	138.	Thuc.	I.142
86.	"	I.83	139.	"	I.143
87.	"	I.120	140.	"	I.43
88.	"	II.13	141.	Hen.	pg.64
89.	"	I.47	142.	Thuc.	II.65
90.	"	I.80,141	143.	"	III.36
91.	"	II.9	144.	"	IV.122
92.	"	II.7	145.	"	V.2
93.	"	VIII.26	146.	"	IV.4,84,92
94.	"	I.121	147.	"	III.16
95.	"	I.124	148.	"	III.29,31,69
96.	"	VI.77,82	149.	"	III.76,77,79
97.	"	V.9	150.	"	III.86
98.	"	VII.5	151.	"	I.144
99.	"	VIII.25	152.	"	I.113
100.	"	I.97	153.	"	VII.86
101.	"	I.99	154.	"	III.94,98,102,112
102.	"	I.141	155.	"	II.80
103.	"	I.19	156.	Grun.	pg.326-331
104.	"	III.47	157.	Thuc.	IV.2
105.	"	III.82	158.	"	IV.6,8
106.	"	I.70	159.	"	IV.14
107.	"	II.37	160.	"	IV.16
108.	"	I.125	161.	"	IV.21,22
109.	"	II.29	162.	"	IV.29,38
110.	"	VIII.96	163.	"	IV.42
111.	"	VI.93	164.	"	IV.53-57
112.	"	IV.78	165.	"	III.86
113.	"	VII.1	166.	"	III.115
114.	Hell.	I.6.16-18	167.	"	IV.65
115.	Thuc.	IV.55	168.	"	IV.66,69,70
116.	"	I.45,50	169.	"	IV.76,96
117.	"	III.3	170.	"	IV.80
118.	"	V.2	171.	"	IV.117
119.	"	II.55-41	172.	"	IV.122,123
120.	"	I.139 ;II.65	173.	"	V.2
121.	"	I.145	174.	"	V.16
122.	"	I.143	175.	"	V.17
123.	"	II.14,15	176.	"	V.17
124.	"	II.21,22	177.	Hell.	II.2.19
125.	"	II.23,25,30	178.	Thuc.	V.21
126.	"	II.24	179.	"	V.3
127.	"	II.26	180.	"	V.24
128.	"	II.32	181.	"	V.35
129.	"	II.27	182.	"	V.36
130.	"	II.31	183.	"	V.39
131.	"	II.29	184.	"	V.46
132.	"	II.47	185.	"	V.43
133.	"	II.58	186.	"	V.46

187.	Thuc.	V.28	240.	Hen.	pg.344
188.	"	V.27	241.	Thuc.	VII.42
189.	"	V.29,31	242.	"	VII.43,44
190.	"	V.38	243.	"	VII.49
191.	"	V.52	244.	"	II.83,86
192.	"	V.58,60	245.	"	VII.40
193.	"	V.61,62	246.	"	VII.49
194.	"	V.75	247.	"	VII.48
195.	"	V.81,82	248.	"	II.65
196.	"	VI.15	249.	"	III.98
197.	"	VIII.86	250.	"	IV.65
198.	"	VI.12	251.	"	V.26
199.	"	V.84	252.	"	VI.61
200.	"	V.116	253.	"	VII.50
201.	"	II.62	254.	"	VII.52
202.	"	VI.6	255.	"	VII.74
203.	"	VI.8	256.	"	VII.85
204.	"	VI.6,9,10	257.	"	VII.86
205.	"	V.115	258.	"	VIII.2
206.	"	VI.11-13	259.	"	VIII.5
207.	"	VI.6-18	260.	"	VIII.6
208.	"	VI.20-24	261.	"	VIII.14
209.	"	VI.31	262.	"	VIII.16,17,19,22
210.	"	VI.6,46	263.	"	VIII.4
211.	"	VI.47-49	264.	"	VIII.9,10
212.	"	VI.50,51	265.	"	VIII.15
213.	"	VII.42	266.	"	VIII.21
214.	"	VI.36-41	267.	"	VIII.23
215.	"	VI.70	268.	"	VIII.24
216.	"	VI.103	269.	"	VIII.30
217.	Hen.	pg.362	270.	"	VIII.26
218.	Thuc.	VI.35,37	271.	"	VIII.45
219.	"	VI.41	272.	"	VIII.45,46
220.	"	VI.45	273.	"	VIII.47
221.	"	VI.17,38	274.	"	VIII.48
222.	"	VI.49	275.	"	VIII.53
223.	"	VI.63 ;VII.42	276.	"	VIII.54
224.	"	VI.61	277.	"	VIII.56
225.	"	VI.89	278.	"	VIII.57
226.	"	VI.101	279.	"	VIII.55
227.	"	VI.103	280.	"	VIII.64-66
228.	"	VII.15	281.	"	VIII.67,68
229.	"	VII.1,2	282.	"	VIII.69,70,72
230.	"	VI.104	283.	"	VIII.73-76
231.	"	VII.4	284.	"	VIII.81
232.	"	VII.6	285.	"	VIII.82
233.	"	VII.42	286.	"	VIII.88
234.	Hen.	pg.377	287.	"	VIII.86
235.	Thuc.	VI.63	288.	"	VIII.89
236.	"	VII.1	289.	"	VIII.90
237.	"	VII.12,13	290.	"	VIII.91-94
238.	"	VII.13,14	291.	"	VIII.95
239.	"	VII.11	292.	"	VIII.96

293.Thuc.	VIII.97	344.Thuc.	III.94;IV.96;V.73
294."	VIII.98	345."	V.116
295."	VIII.99	346."	V.50
296."	VIII.100	347."	II.84,92
297."	VIII.104	348."	VII.34
298.Hell.	I.1.7	349."	VII.41,52
299.Thuc.	VIII.106	350."	III.2,23
300."	VIII.108	351.Hell.	I.6.31
301.Hell.	I.1.12	352."	I.6.17
302."	I.1.22	353."	II.1.28
303."	I.2.9	354.Thuc.	II.13
304."	I.2.16	355."	VI.91
305."	I.3.17	356."	IV.105
306."	I.3.9	357.Hell.	I.1.22
307."	I.3.13	358.Thuc.	V.59
308."	I.4.20	359."	VI.91
309."	I.4.2-3	360."	IV.80
310."	I.5.1	361."	IV.41,117; V.15
311."	I.5.14	362.Whib.	pg.45
312."	I.5.16	363."	pg.45
313."	I.6.1	364."	pg.34
314."	I.5.18	365."	pg.31
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316."	I.6.25-26	367."	pg.50
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319."	II.1.7	370."	pg.83
320."	II.1.28	371."	pg.87
321."	II.1.2	372."	pg.97
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324."	II.1.10,11	375."	pg.96
325."	II.1.16,17	376."	pg.133
326."	II.1.19	377.Thuc.	III.82
327."	I.20	378.Hell.	III.2
328."	II.1.23	379.Thuc.	VI.15
329."	II.2.2	380."	VIII.47,48,67
330."	II.3.3	381."	VIII.90
331.Thuc.	I.56-58;III.2;VIII.	382."	VIII.97
332."	I.143	383."	I.18
333."	VI.9-26	384.Hell.	II.3.11
334."	III.36-49	385."	II.3.12
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336.Hell.	I.7	387."	II.3.17
337.Thuc.	VI.61	388."	II.3.19,20
338."	V.2	389."	II.3.21
339."	II.22	390."	II.3.25
340."	II.65	391."	II.3.50
341."	VIII.48,63,65-70	392."	IV.1.1-9
342."	VIII.101	393."	IV.1.10,19,23
343."	I.143	394."	IV.1.28,29,34,38
		395."	IV.1.43