MANITO GITIGAAN
Governing in the Great Spirit's Garden:
WILD RICE in TREATY #3
an example of indigenous government public policy making and
intergovernmental relations between the
Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg and the Crown,
1869-1994
@ by Kathi Avery Kinew
A Thesis
presented to the University of Manitoba
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of an
lnterdisciplinary Doctor of Philosophy
in Anthropology, Political Studies, and Nalive Studies
The University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Manitoba
September 1995
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UANITO GITIGAAN
GOVERNING IN TEE GREAT SPIRITIS GARDEN:
TÙIIJ) RICE IIT TREATY +3
BY
KAIEI AVERY KINEI{
A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba
in partiat fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of
DOCTOR OF PEILOSOPEY
@ 199s
Per¡rission has been granted to the LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA
to lend or sell copies of this thesis, to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to
microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film, and LIBRARY
MICROFILMS to publish an abstract of this thesis'
The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive
extracts f¡om it may be prinied or other-wise reproduced without the authofs written
perrrission.
Ma nito Gitisaa n 
*1;';':Jn,,l nrtl?,f ïi Spirit's Garden:
Table of Contents
Title Page
Dedication
Abstract
Acknowledgements
List of Figures
List of Appendices
Glossary
Chapter One:
Conceptual Framework and Research Design
Chapter Two:
Literature Review
Chapter Three:
Myths of Manomin
Chapter Four:
Manominikenshiiand the Mystique of the Ricefield
Chapter Five:
Manito Gitigann, the Great Spirit's Garden,
Early History of the Anishinaabe People and Manomin
in the Boundary Waters prior to 1873
Chapter Six:
The Spirit and lntent of Treaty-making in the
Boundary Waters, 1869-1873
Chapter Seven:
A Few'Crochety Kickers' and a'War Party'
The Aftermath of Treaty #3: Prolests and Petitions
Chapter Eight:
Provincial lncursions into Manito Gitigaan
The 1960 Ontario Wild Rice Harvesting Act:
"This is Legislation, not for lhe lndians"
tt
ilt
VI
IX
17
.f/
62
B9
104
128
152
Chapter Nine:
The Wild Rice lndustry, from the fur trade to the
"capitalization of a traditional pursuit"
Chapter Ten:
The Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-operative, 1972-1978
Treaty Rights and Commerce Hand in Hand
Chapter Eleven:
Flooding the Rice Basket - Flooding Manomin
on Lake of the Woods
Chapter Twelve:
Taking on the Provinces, 1970s to 1 9B0s
Chapter Thirteen:
Giving Meaning to Rights, '1980s-1990s
Chapter Fourteen:
Summary and Conclusions
Bibliog raphy
Appendices
't 63
192
215
246
282
327
349
379
Dedication
To my family who are an inspiration, individually and together -
Tobasonakwut Kagagewanakweb Kinew,
Wabanakwut Kokowekipiness Ozowebetung,
ShawoniPinasiik Kiiwatinashiik,
Maymaygwaysiikwe Ogimaapinasiik,
To my Mom and Dad, Peg and Ray AverY,
and
with love and gratitude
and hope for the spirit and intent of the Treaties to endure
1t
ABSTRACT
MANITO GITIGAAN
GOVERNING IN THE GREAT SPIRIT'S GARDEN:
WILD RICE IN TREATY #3, 1869.1994
This thesis offers an example of indigenous government public policy making and
intergovernmental relations between the Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg and the Crown,
from the mid nineteenth to late twentieth centuries. The case of Manomin (wild rice) in
the Treaty #3 Boundary Waters territory (at the juncture of Ontario, Manitoba and
Minnesota) is examined as a symbol of the constitutional conflict between Crown and
Anishinaabe governments: is wild rice a natural resource owned by the Crown or a gift
from the Creator given to the Anishinaabe? Secondly, the history of wild rice and the
Anishinaabe science and system of management is the slory of one of longest continuing
forms of indigenous self-government in Canada. Thirdly, manomin stands as a metaphor
for the struggles of the Anishinaabe peoples in asserting their treaty and aboriginal
rights, through years of suppression. An organic model of the suppression and
expression of aboriginal, treaty and Anishinaabe rights is presented.
The study draws from data collected from archival and government files from
1860s to 1980s, as well as interviews of Anishinaabe leaders, Elders, rice harvesters
and business people, Crown government negotiators, and the insight of a key informant.
This is an interdisciplinary study, drawing upon the methodology and frameworks
offered by Anthropology, Political Studies, Native Studies and Law.
iii
Acknowledgements
I am immensely grateful to the people who have supported and assisted me in ensuring
that this thesis is completedl First and foremost, to the person who acted as my key informant
and is my husband and partner in life, Tobasonakwut Kinew (Peter Kelly), ki zha wai ni min.
His brilliantly original thinking and his willingness to share his language, culture, friends and
relatives have provided the foundation and construction of this research. Without the love and
inspiration of Tobasonakwut, and of our children, Wabanakwut and Shawon, and his daughter
Diane, as a mainstay in my life, this thesis would never have been completed.
I thank my sister Lynne Balfour, and my aunt Betty Gay, who are still with me, and
especially, my mother and father, Peg and Ray Avery, who passed on a few years ago, for their
unfailing love and support.
Apitchi Miigwech to the very many people who have shared their lives, knowledge and
opinions with me through many years. I offer my gratitude to the Elders I can no longer thank in
person: Shuniah Goneb (Stuart Jack), Ta Kwe TaBetung (Sam Copenace Sr.), Azawashkwagoneb
(Fred Greene), Ponjigonayash (John Jones), Kwotit (Martha Tuesday), Neogezhik (Walter
Oshie) and Metehkamiganung (Doug Skead). Before they had gone ahead to the spirit world, all of
them opened my eyes and my heart to the beliefs, values and importance of Anishinaabe culture.
To Shawon (Maggie Copenace) and her sister Kwatok (Annie Bob) of Onigaming, and
Ogimaawanabiik (Nancy Jones) of Nickikousemencaning, I offer my heartfelt gratitude for their
kind acceptance of me and sharing their views over the years. To Wayzowabiikamok and
Mizhaki-wabiilung (Josephine and Ron Sandy) of Animakiwazhing, my admiration and thanks
for sharing, over many years, their ricing experience and the love of their wonderful family.
And to the people of the Ojibways of Onigaming, I cannot begin to say enough. These are
my friends and family who invited me into their ricefields and their lives, and involved me in
many community activities and ceremonies. To Mukataykinew (Fred Kelly Jr.), Totoons
(Edwin) and Mary Kelly, Wicheh (Richard Kelly) and Doug Kelly, Batins (Dorothy Copenace)
and Ron Seymour, Ron Kelly, Denise and Aanchkins (Norman Copenace Jr.), Dolores Kelly,
Evelyn Copenace, Tony Copenace (the man called Horse, Shtatim), Delford and Darlene Bob, Joe
Shebagegit, and many others, I thank you very much. Apitchi Miigwech to the Onigaming Tribal
1V
Education Authority and the Ojibways of Onigaming First Nation Council and community for your
support.
Many thanks are due to Grand Council Treaty #3 and the Chiefs and Elders, especially for
allowing me several opportunities to work and visit with them. For this thesis, I wish to thank
in particular, Niigonipiness (Don Jones), Director of Treaties and Aboriginal Research (TARR)
for his frank often humourous opinions and kind access to documents, Aabombitung (Andy
Skye), Assistant Director of TARR for his encouragement and assistance, and Leo Waisberg,
ethnohistorical consultant to TARR, for original research and often rye advice. Don Colborne,
legal counsel to Grand Council Treaty #3, has offered practical guidance and original
perceptions on numerous projects through the years. I appreciate these gentle men as friends
and relations, and applaud their commitment to Treaty #3 and the First Nations people.
To the people who agreed to be interviewed for this thesis, I owe a great deal. I would like
to thank them for openly sharing their experiences and views. A full listing is appended. I have
attempted to relate the comments received from the interviewees in an objective manner, yet
reflective of the issues and events upon which they were commenting. For any
misinterprelation, I accept the responsibility.
ln interdisciplinary studies, your advisor and the members of the advisory committee
are the significant connection to the university and source of guidance. My main advisor, Dr.
Wm Koolage of Anthropology, has always been helpful through what seemed to be a neverending
story. His knowledge of Aboriginal people and societies, and his humour and iconoclastic
approach assisted me in many ways. During the course of my thesis, Dr. Koolage overcame a
major physical illness with truly inspiring delermination and dogged persistence. Yet, his
interest in this topic and seeing it to completion never wavered. I wish to offer Dr. Koolage my
heartfelt gratitude. Prof. Paul Thomas of Political Studies offered many helpful suggestions and
questions, which have contributed to a clearer organization of this thesis and analysis of the
issues. Through humour and insight into Canadian political processes, Prof. Thomas offers his
students the potential that the future which can improve upon the past. Prof. Paul Chartrand of
Native Studies, presently a Commissioner with lhe Royal Commission on Aboriginal Affairs,
perservered to be appointed to my committee, and offered his encouragement and discerning
Vcomments particularly on issues of Aboriginal self government. The comments provided by these
committee members, and my external examiner, Prof. Norman Zlotkin of the Faculty of Law,
University of Saskatchewan, challenged me to be clearer and stronger in relating this story of
Anishinaabe governance. I am indebted.
Thank you to the University of Manitoba for the Duff Roblin Fellowship in 1990 and for
their assistance in my receiving the Social Sciences and Humanities Research grant for 1991 .
ln this thesis, I have described and analyzed the meaning of manomin and Manito Gitigaan
to the Anishinaabe people of Treaty #3, and the political ways in which the Treaty #3 people
have sought to protect lheir Anishinaabe rights to manomin. Where lhave missed that mark, I
apologize. Where the message is carried clearly, I am grateful.
Migizi'kwe
V1
Unies Report i 980:45
3. Stages Growth: Photos of manomin beginning to grow above water
on Sabaskong Bay,Manomin at floating stage, early June 1980,
manomin lifting to aerial stage July 1980. 40
4. ldealized Growth of Shattering Wild Rice for NW Ontario,
Unies Report 1980:44 Figure 2:i 41
5. Distribution of Wild Rice in North America, from GCT3 TARR files of F.P.Edman,
Wild Rice in Minnesota, 1968:58 42
6. Elements of Ricing Regime, Gathering Wild Rice, Rainy Lake
& Powassin patching a canoe, photos by Linde (n.d.) 51
7. Anishinaabe lndustrial Design Fred Copenace at thrashing machine,
Big Grassy 1980
Thrashing machine by Ben Copenace 55
8. Ron Sandy and daughter Ronni with harvesting machine,
Northwest Angle #33, assisted by Tobasonakwut Kinew 57
8a. Martin Tuesday at Big Grassy with Osnaburg style harvester 5B
9. Scoben Copenace at Onegaming, carving thrashing sticks, 1973 71
i 0. Harvesting the rice from canoe, with thrashing sticks - a tradition continues
List of Figures
i" Ojibways at Fort Frances, Hudson's Bay Post, I859, Fort Frances Museum
1. Map of Treaty #3 and First Nations
2. The Morphology of a Wild Rice Plant during the Life Cycle, Figure 2.2 in
Jack Spencer, Seine River, c.1973
1 1. Wabanakwut Kinew, ricing on Sabaskong Bay, 1988
12. Sketches of Poling Techniques by Alex Moose in van de Vorst 1985:145.
13. Obaasaan-nawa manomin - Tobasonakwut drying the rice
14. Kaapizige - Tobasonakwut & Wabanakwut Kinew
roasting the rice at Onegaming 1988
15. Nowkomigok & Migizikwe Kelly, Shawonipinasiik Kinew
training on the job at Onegaming 1988
XVII
2
38
72
72
73
77
77
77
vl1
16. Wabanakwut Kinew in jigging pit at Onegaming, 1988 78
1 7. Totoons, Edwin Kelly, "dancing" the rice in barrel at Onegaming 1988 78
18. Comaraderie in the jigging pit -
Wabanakwut Kinew & Makwa Copenace at Onegaming, 1988 78
i 9. Poweshkajigeh: winnowing
Tobasonakwut poweshkajigeh at Onegaming, 1988 81
20. Alysia and Denise Copenace, daughter and mother,
winnowing at Onegaming, 1988 81
21. Manomin in stages - clockwise from left - dried rice in pan for roasting,
after parching in akik, after winnowing, maazon (husks) 81
22. Rock Painting, Painted Rock lsland south of Split Rocl< lsland,
Lake of the Woods, Dewdney Collection, Royal Ontario Museum
94
23. Schreyer to tell Ottawa of claims that governments violating treaty,
Winnipeg Free Press, October 5, 1981 105
24. 1940 photo of Treaty #3 Chiefs (some with medallions) and Grand Chief
Miskwakapins stands nearby Capt Edwards
(Kenora lndian agent seated at left) 143
25. W¡ld Rice Harvesting Area (blocks) established under the Ontario Wild Rice
Harvesting Act, 1960 1 58
26.Wild Rice Harvesting Areas in Kenora, Dryden, Fort Frances administrative
districts of the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources 159
27. Steps in the Marketing of Wild Rice that Contr¡bute to the Marketing
Margin in the United States. Little 1968:57 1 69
28. Wild Rice Manomin - pamphlet of Kagiwiosa Manomin 186
29. Kagiwiosa Manomin processing plant opening at Wabigoon First Nation
Dryden Observer Sept.6, 1988 "new rice plant" 188
3O.Sabaskong First Nation buyer (formerly Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op buyer)
Edward Kelly receives help from wife Dorothy Kelly
in doing the books, 1979 ?02
vt_ t_ I
31. Garnet and Frances Councillor at Naicatchewenin, 1979,
store keepers & rice buyers & Garnet Councillor & daughter
storing purchased green rice at Northwest Bay, Rainy Lake 203
32. Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op repays lndian Affairs in Ottawa, 1974
L-R Fred Kelly, Hon. Judd Buchanan, Minister of lndian Affairs,
GCT3 President Peter Kelly, Kenora-Rainy River M.P. John Reid,
Steve Skead, President of Co-op, Arnold Bruyere, Co-op Manager,
Bert Yerxa, Co-op Board member 206
33. Map prepared by Mariange Beaudry of MAPIT for Joan Lovisek,
Tim Holzkamm and Leo Waisberg, for a paper entitled
" 'Deprived of Part of Their Livíng': Colonialism and Nineteenth
Century Flooding of Ojibwa Lands", presented at the 26th Algonquian
Conference in Winnipeg, October 1994. ?2?
34. Structure of the Ontario Tripartite Process, 1980
Attachment to AOCC Chiefs' resolution 78/30
supporting involvment in the Tripartite Mechanism 257
35. Treaty #3 Rice Pickers Button: Anishinahbe Manomin, designed by
Wayne Yerxa, Couchiching First Nation 265
36. National Treaties Conference 199? - Logo of Treaty Medallion 309
37. NationalTreaties Conference, Edmonton, April 1992
Treaty #3 Grand Chief Tobasonakwut Kinew with Treaty #3
Elder Alex Skead of Wauzhushk Onigum First Nation
and Chiefs with Governor General Ray Hnatyshyn 31?
38. Tradition & Technology - Variables of Anishinaabe Manomin 33?
39. Chat i: Organic model of suppressed and expressed sovereignty
Chart 2: Comparison of Manomin and Anishinaabe rights 34?
1X
List of Appendices
1. List of lnterview questions (14), interviewees, and sources ('l B)
2. Grand Council Treaty #3 Nation Declaration on Anishinaabe Manomin
(English 382; Anishinaabemowin 383)
3. Painted Rock lsland, Lake of the Woods,
Dewdney Collection, Royal Ontario Museum
4. Archeological Time Line for Northwestern Ontario,
Office of the Ontario Regional Archeaologist,
M¡nister of Culture & Heritage 385
5. Paypom Treaty, in pamphlet form published by Grand Council Treaty #3 386
6. Treaty #3, as published by the Government of Canada 388
7.1892 Petit¡on by Chiefs of Treaty #3 394
8. Ontario Wild Rice Harvesting Act, 1 960 397
9. Brochure of the Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op quiet Water Wild Rice 402
10. Terms of Reference for Unies Study of effect of water levels on wild rice,
throughout Treaty #3 Unies Report, 1 980
1 I . Treaty #3 Rice Pickers" pamphlet 1 980
12. Declaration of First Nations, December 'l 980
13. Resolution 1981 /6 of the All Ontario Chiefs Conference
14. l'¡anitoba Wild Rice Act, 1987
15. Ontario Statement of Political Respect, 1991
16. Declaration of Anishinaabe Meenigoziwin,
adopted in principle by Grand Council Treaty #3 Chiefs in Assembly,
Novemberl 992 at Couchiching 423
379
38?
384
403
405
407
408
409
422
Glossary of Terms
Oiibwav or Anishinaabe terms are written in
the exception of the names of people or places.
italics throughout the thesis, with
Adísokaan (singular) Adisokaanak (plural) refer to long ago ancestors of the
Anishinaabeg, lhe teachers of legend and tradition. Adisokaanan a(e the sacred stories
that come from these teachers. According to tradition, such stories are only allowed to be
told in the wintertime, from freezeup to breakup.
Anishinaabe (singular)lAnishinaabeg (plural) are the terms used by the Aboriginal
people commonly refered to as Ojibway or Chippewa in Ontario, Chippewa in Minnesota
and Saulteaux in Manitoba. lt is the term the people use to refers to themselves. Rather
than use divisive labels applied by outsiders, many prefer to call themselves
"Anishinaabe" as it is their own language that unites them. Since 1992, the double
vowel spelling is being promoted by the Lake of the Woods Ojibway Cultural Centre
(near Kenora) as a consistent orthography for the Treaty #3 area Anishinaabemowin
language.
Dodem (singular), dodemuk (plural) is the Anlshinaabe word used to describe the clan
and clan symbol for each large family grouping. The dodem would unite relatives from
afar. Teachings about the dodem included that members of the same dodem would offer
shelter, food and comfort to each other, but could not marry each other. Nor could dodem
members eat that dodem symbol (ie, wolf, bear, walleye), except under certain
circumstances.
Ishnunigaan is the Anishinaabe word for reserve land. Literally, "ishkunigaan"
refers to "leftover land", that is the land that was left over after government picked the
best they wanted to use. ln archival documents regarding Treaty #3, it is documented
that, while the Surveyor General and a Treaty Commissioner met with Treaty #3
headmen (1874-75) to choose appropriate lands to be set aside for their farms and wild
lands, the surveyors in the fields were directed to ensure the reserves were placed far
from "any known minerals lands and the probable line of settlement".
Manomin isthe Anishinaabe word for wild rice. ln deciphering its meaning, the root
can be found in "man" refering to the Creator or Great Spirit, Kizhe Manito, and "min"
or berry, delicacy as in "miin". Other words stem from lhis'. manominikenshii,lo
describe the wild rice culture of the Anishinaabeg; manominikigiizis,lhe wild rice
moon, and others. (See Chapter Four) Anishinaabe manomin is a more recent form of
expressing that wild rice belongs to the Anishinaabe people.
Manito Gitigaan translates as the Great Spirit's garden or the living gift of the
Creator. lt is a more ancient term for wild rice. This phrase reflects the spiritual tie
that the Anishinaabeg have for the Creator in their responsibility of caring for this gift
of life. (See Chapters Three and Four).
X1
Meenigoziwin (also spelled Miinigoziwin) is a declaration of self government by
Grand Council Treaty #3, in assembly November 4, 1992, at Couchiching First Nation.
This document is a declaration of Nationhood, including a statement of connection with the
Creator who "gave us our laws, rights, trusts and responsibilities". This comprehensive
document lists Anrshinnabe principles of nationhood and government, inherent and
traditional values, inherent powers and freedoms, areas of government jurisdiction, and
recognition of nations and governments. (Appendix 15)
Mite'win is the traditional religion of the Anishinaabe people and continues to be
practiced and attract members throughout the Treaty #3 area. ln anthropological
writings, it is often spelled Midewiwin. A debate continues as to whether it is a post
contact phenomena (Hickerson, Dewdney) or an aboriginal religion (Kinew, Rajnovich).
This spelling reflects the particular dialect of Lake of the Woods (Kinew).
Ogitchi fuaa (singular), Ogitchi tuaag (plural) describes the traditional leaders of
Anishinaabe society from before Treaty times. There are regarded as spiritually guided
leaders, chosen by the people according to tradition (Kinew).
English terms:
Aboriginal is the term most in use today as a common description of the original
peoples of Canada, whether non-slatus or status lndian, lnuit or Metis. Aboriginal is
commonly capitalized in reference to people and not capitalized in reference to rights.
Charlottetown Accord. A constitutional amendment negotiated from March to August
1992 and agreed upon by all First Ministers, and the leaders of the four Aboriginal
organizations and two territories. The Charloltetown Accord sought to entrench lhe
Aboriginal inherent right to self government with specific conditions. However, it was
rejected in an historic cross-Canada referendum, October 1992.
Co-Management refers to cooperative arrangements between recognized governmenls
of Canada (ie, federal and provincial) and First Nations governments for management of
lands andior resources. Such agreements, moslly beginning in the 1970's, include joint
advisory boards to shared decision-making bodies to actual power-sharing
arrangements.
Elder is an english term for an Anishinaabe concept. lt is used to denote a man or
woman of great knowledge of the teachings and traditions of the Anishinaabeg.Thal person
may be of any age.
First Nation is a term used to refer to the government and territory of status lndians
on reserves. Previous to the 1980s, reference would have been made to Chief and Band
Council, Bands and Reserves. Such terminology is consideredby Anishinaabeg and other
Aboriginal peoples of Canada to be outdated. This term was first used by the Chiefs
themselves and made official with "A Declaration of the First Nations, 1980" and at the
1982 assembly in Peneticton, 8.C.. lt was there that the Chiefs from across Canada
adopted "Assembly of First Nations" to replace the name and structure of the National
lndian Brotherhood. The House of Commons SubCommittee on Self Government under the
x]-1
chairmanship of Liberal M.P. Keith Penner held hearings across Canada and issued a
report in 1983 in which commentary and recommendations referred specifically to
"First Nations". This brought the term "First Nations" into prominence in the media.
This term "First Nations" is urged by Aboriginal representatives across Canada as
recognition of lheir inherent rights to self government. By the 1992 multilateral
constitutional process, this term had become accepted political language.
"tndians" is used in this thesis only when quoted. lt is a term in disfavour among
Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg, and increasingly, by First Nations people across Canada.
However, it continues to be utilized because of its historic demarcation of certain
aboriginal peoples, and continues today in such relics as the lndian Act.
Meech refers to the constitutional amendment reached by the Prime Minister and ten
premiers at Meech Lake in May 1987, which fundamentally rearranged the balance of
powers in the federation, enabled Quebec to endorse the constitution, and totally ignored
ihe history and present aspirations of Aboriginal peoples. This amendment was reached
in secret by the First Ministers, seeking to entrench the phrase "dislinct society of
Quebec", after the same First Ministers, a few weeks feore and on national television,
firmly rejected the phrase "Aboriginal self government" aS too vague. Thus, a new
phrase entered the political jargon, to be "meeched". The Meech Lake accord did not
receive unanimous consent of all ten provinces within the three year time limit required
and died in 1990.
Multilateral, Bilateral refers to levels of talks between or among governments
(including Aboriginal governments), or between governments and Aboriginal
organizations. Bilateral, in this thesis, refers to Treaty #3 and either the Federal or
provincial government. Multilateral would refer to, at least, the federal and one
provincial government with a PTO. The "multilateral constitutional process" beginning
in March 1993 included four Aboriginal organizations, lwo lerritories, nine provinces
and the federal government. The term "double bilateral" refers to the process of a First
Nation negotiating the same issue in separate processes, one with the federal government
and another process with the province. Frances Abele and Katherine Graham in "High
Politics is Not Enough: Policies and Programs for Aboriginal Peoples in Alberta and
Ontario" consider "double bilateral" agreements to be "ingenious devices to establish the
basis for delegated program delivery by aboriginal peoples that do not jeporadize the
constilutional principles held by any of the parties" (in Hawkes, 1989:158)
Native is not a term preferred by Aboriginal peoples because it generalizes the identity
and rights of each Aboriginal Nation. Native is often used by government to describe
policy (Weaver, 1987) and often used by urban Aboriginal people and wider society. The
Native Council of Canada (NCC) is the organizatioon for non-status lndian people across
Canada. (The subject of this thesis is the Treaty rights of status lndians in the Treaty #3
territory of Northwestern Ontario and southeastern Manitoba.)
Self government means the rights of peoples to choose freely how they would be
governed (Sanders 1985:26). lt is the government catchword of their policies of late
1980s and into the1990s regarding Aboriginal peoples in Canada. lt began to gain
prominence during the constitutional debates of the 1970's and 1980's, particularly
during the Joint Parliamentary Hearings leading to the Penner Report on Self
Government, 1983. To Aboriginal peoples in Canada, the word simply refers to the
abilily to take care of one's own people, lands and resources. ln the Charloltetown Accord
(1992), there was agreement among the First Ministers of Canada, ten provinces, two
territories, and the leaders of four aboriginal organizations that aboriginal (self)
x111
government would be entrenched as one of three orders of government in Canada.
Although Aboriginal peoples prefer to say self-government means different
arrangements in different parts of the country, a general definition would entail making
one's own decisions over one's own people, lands and resources'
Settler governments is a term used by some aboriginal peoples and scholars to
convey the fact that modern day state governments established their presence through
settlement of aboriginal lands and the usurpation or suppression of prior governments of
aboriginal peoples themselves.
Sovereignty refers to the "supreme power, subject to no restraints whatever",
including all internal and extrenal relations (Sanders 1985:27).lt has become an
emotionally laden term due to its allusion to the aspirations of the Parti Quebecois. ln
his 1990 inaugural address as Premier, Hon. Bob Rae of Ontario tried to lessen such
fears, in terms of Native peoples, by stating that "One's man's sovereignty is another's
self-government". This more closely reflects the statements of Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg ,
up to 1994, notwithstanding those of other Treaty areas or the lroquois Confederacy.
Specific Claims are claims brought by First Nations against the government which
specify a breach of the fiduciary duty of the government under the lndian Act or Treaty.
There has been a federal process for resolving claims since '1969, when then Prime
Minister Trudeau appointed an independent claims commissioner to investigate how
claims can be resolved. ln 1982, the specific claims policy announced that the federal
government would honour its "outstanding lawful obligations".
Critics of the 1982 policy point out that "lawful obligations" has come to mean
whatever the federal Department of Justice deems it to mean, as they act as sole arbiter
of validity of a claim. The Specific Claims policy of the federal government has come
under increasing fire for its prejudicial and unjust handling of claims, where the
federal government sits as judge and defendant on the validity of a claim against itself,
and where basic principles of compensation are not followed. The Red Book of the Liberal
government elected in October 1993 has stated that a new independent claims resolution
process will be established.
The provincial government of Ontario does not have a formal policy for handling
claims, although they follow the same general approach of the federal government of
having Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat (ONAS) research the 'facts' of the claim and
the lawyers for the Attorney General pronounce its 'validily'.
Stewardship is an English word and concepl adopted by the Teme Augama Nation
(situated near Norlh Bay Ontario) in the 1980s to describe the responsibility
aboriginal peoples have to the Creator for all the gifts that the Great Spirit has given.
The English term is used as an approximation of lne Anish¡naabe concept of both a sense
of responsibility and duty to the Creator as well as the actual human care to be given.
X1V
Acronyms are used throughout lhe text:
AFN refers to the Assembly of First Nalions, the organizational body of Chiefs across
Canada, representing 633+ First Nations. lt was established in 1982 as the successor to
the NlB, the National lndian Brotherhood. The NIB remains as an incorporated entity for
the purposes of handling funding for the AFN.
AgOan refers to the federal department of Agriculture.
GOO is the Chiefs of Ontario organization, whose Executive is composed of the four
regional organizations (GCT3, Nishnawbe-Aski Nation (NAN), the Union of Ontario
lndians (UOl), and the lroquois & Allied lndians (AlAl)) and representatives of
independent First Nations such as Six Nations and Temi Augami. The COO evolved through
the 1970's and became well established by19B0. The Ontario Regional Chief is the leader
of COO, elected by all 118+ Chiefs in Ontario every three years, and is a member of the
Executive Council of the AFN.
ACOO refers to the annual assembly of Chiefs of Ontario'
GCT3, the Grand Council Treaty #3, is the organization of 25 Chiefs in the traditional
55,000 square mile Boundary Waters territory in Northwestern Onlario, contained
within the territory west of Thunder Bay, whose waters empty into Hudson's Bay.
DIAND or INAC The Department of lndian Affairs and Northern Development or lndian &
Northern Affairs Canada, the federal government department responsible for carrying
out the lndian Act and attendant policies, and other legislation passed by the Parliament
of Canada, under the authority of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act. 1867.
FMCs refer to First Ministers' Conferences, which became a regular feature of
executive federalism during the 1970's and 1980's. FMCs brought together the prime
Minister and Premiers of the twn provinces (with/without the leaders of the two
territorial legislatures) and were required to be held with representatives of the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada under section 37 of the Conslitution Act. 1982.
lco is the lndian commission of ontario, first established in 1979 by the Province of
Ontario, Government of Canada, and the Chiefs of Ontario organization. The ICO exisls to
facilitate the resolutions of claims and other disputes among the parties. The terms of
reference of the ICO were jointly drafted and continue to be jointly reviewed
every five years. The ICO issues an annual report on the status of all issues brought
before the lCO. lt is headed by a Commissioner, jointly agreed upon and appointed, and
works under the direction of two levels, the Tripartite Council of the Minister of lndian
Affairs, Ontario Minister of Native Affairs, and the heads of the PTOs composing the COO,
as well as the next level of Deputy Ministers of the two departments, and Executive
Directors of the organizations. The ICO has a small staff to facilitate meetings and
negotiations.
ONAS, ONAD Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat or Directorate has been the provincial
government arm responsible for the development, analysis and coordination of policies
regarding Native people in the province. Since the Tory years of the mid 1970s, ONAS
has been the lead ministry responsible for coordinating provincial government policy
regarding Native peoples. During the Liberal years of Premier Peterson (1986-1990),
its role has expanded to include negotiating land claims and self government agreements.
Under Premier Rae's NDP government, ONAS was upgraded from a directorate to a
secretariat and its Director became a Deputy Minister status.
PTOs are the Provincial-Territorial Organizations who represent the regional issues of
each First Nation, such as Grand Council Treaty #3, Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs,
Nishnawbi-Aski Nation.
Leoal Terms:
For more detailed explanations, the reader is referred to:
Jack Woodward, Native Law 19Bg Toronto: Carswell
R.A. Reiter The Fundamental Principles of lndian Law 1994 Vol. l& ll Edmonton:
First Nations Resource Council
The Law of Canadian Treaties 1995 Edmonton: Juris Analytica Publishing
Brian Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987), 66 Can Bar Rev.727
Customary Law, traditional law, folk law are all terms used today to refer to the
"unwritten law based on ancient or traditional usages, customs and practices. Some
customary law is recorded. Aboriginal self-government should allow for the restoration
of lndian customary law where the First Nations so desire "(Sanders 1985:B). See
Chapters 2 and 14 for a discussion of customary law. lt is often confused with lndian or
Native Law, which terms mean Canadian law as it relates to lndians, e.g. the lndian Act.
Customary law is most aptly described as "immemorial law" by aboriginal leaders (see
Chapter 2).
Fiduciary refers to an obligation of the highest order on the part of the Crown to take
care that the best interests of the lndians (as named under Canadian law) are considered
in the actions of the federal government. This obligation, named the fiduciary duty, was
spelled out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Guerin, 1984.
"The source of this fiduciary obligation is found in the basic principles of
law relating to lndian lands. The requirement found in the Royal
Proclamation of 1753, that lndian t¡tle could not be alienated to anyone
except by surrender to the Crown, established a principle which runs
through all our law, and is enshrined in the lndian Act today, The Crown,
in imposing this restriction, assumes the duty to deal with the land in the
best interests of the lndians and a discretion to determine what those best
interests are. " (Woodward 1989:113)
Legal Pluralism ( literally, "many laws") refers to what has become almost a movement in
legal academe, whereby the conflicts and/or co-existence of slate laws and "other" laws, such as
those of indigenous peoples or minority groups, are analyzed.
State Law refers to the law of the government of a country, e.9., the Criminal Code of Canada.
"Sui generis" means literally "unique to itself" and has been used by (then) Supreme
Court Chief Justice Brian Dickson to characterize Indian Treaties (Simon, 1985)( as
neither the same as contracts nor international treaties) and the lndian interest in land(Guerin, 1984) (as different from common law concepts of property).
XVl
Time lmmemorial has a specific legal meaning stemming from its use by Justice
Emmett Hall in the Calder case ('1973, SCC:190), referring to centuries of occupation
by Aboriginal society prior to the assertion of Eurpean sovereignty.
"Usufructory" refers to the use of the land without outright ownership of the land and
stems from Scottish common law tradition. lt is a lerm used in the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council's decision as the highesl court of appeal in the St. Catherine's Milling
Co. case, 1888.
This famous case considered whether the federal or provincial government gained
the benefits of the federal government signing Treaty #3 with the Boundary Waters
Anishinaabeg, and thus, which level of government could grant that company a licence to
cut timber. The Lords pronounced lndian title to be " personal and usufructory right,
subject to the goodwill of the sovereign". The crown was found to hold the underlying, and
ultimate title.
Such an interpretation certainly does not coincide with Anishinaabe tradition
which views lands and resources as gifts of the Creator, which ihe Anishinaabe have a
sacred responsibility to take care of (see Chapter 6 on Treaty #3 and Elders' views).
This concept of "sacred stewardship" was never considered by the Lords who viewed
Anishinaabeg as "rude redmen of the northwest", incapable of having their own
government. lndeed, the judicial lords never set foot in Canada and the Treaty #3
Anishinaabeg were never consulted nor even informed of this case. Yet the legacy of St.
Catherine's continues into the 1990s when cases such as Temi Augami and Gitskan
Wetsuwe'ten are dismissed by courts as mere usufruct which disappeared at the behest
of any government explicitly stating so (Cassidy 1992). lt has had a devastating effect
within Treaty #3 and across Canada with regard to Aboriginal peoples' ability to reclaim
their lands and resources from provinces.
XVl 1
i. Ojibways at Fort Frances, Hudson's Bay Post, 1859, Fort Frances Museum
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ú É' S
Chapter One
Governing in the Great Spirit's Garden
Conceptual Framework and Research Design
This thesis provides a history and analysis of intergovernmental affairs between the
Anishinaabe (Ojibway) Nation of the Boundary Waters (now known as Northwestern Ontario
-Manitoba-Minnesota) and the governments of Canada and Ontario. (Figure 1, Map of Treaty #3
location within Canada). The point of view attempls to document and discuss Anishinaabe public
policy making and intergovernmental affairs through the period from the Treaty of 1873 to the
early 1990s.
The reader is referred to the glossary which explains many of the English and
Anishinaabe terms that will be used throughout this thesis, such as the use of the words
"Anishinaabe " or "Nation".
Seeking a way to understand and communicate Aboriginal viewpoints on self government
led me to look at my own experience in the Treaty #3 area of Northwestern Ontario, west of
Thunder Bay into the Whiteshell area of Manitoba. ln 1969, lhe Anishinaabe people of Treaty
#3 welcomed me with warmth and humour, from my first meeting onward. lt did not take long
to discover what mattered to these aboriginal people of the Boundary Waters of Northwestern
Onlario, Manitoba and Minnesota: family, traditions, fishing, hunting and - manomin ,
something they translated merely as 'rice'. lt took some years before I understood the profound
connection between the people and their spiritual relationship to lhe land and waters. I
gradually felt how indelibly forged was the bond between the Anishinaabeg of lhe Boundary
Waters and manomrn . When I began doctoral work and began to search for an example of
Aboriginal self government and intergovernmental affairs in Canada, manomin immediately
focussed my attention.
This researcher was advised by one Anishinaabe colleague that fishing was more
paramount 1o Anishinaabe culture, and by another, that emphasizing one resource without
attention to others would give an unbalanced view of lhe Anishinaabe cullure presently and in
the past. But from my travels to other Anishinaabe areas, it seemed clear to me that the
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Anishinaabe of the Boundary Waters were unique from their brothers and sisters of other areas
- precisely because of the fundamental importance of manomin to their essential being.
Certainly Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg shared language, fishing and hunting cultures,
dodemuk (clan system), legends and spiritual traditions wilh Anishinaabeg across Canada and
the United States. Yet, the integral role of manomin to the Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg
convinced me to investigate it more. Anishinaabe manomin has a legacy all its own which will be
explored in this thesis.
1:1 Focus of the Research
Within the past decade, lndian Self Government has become an accepted term
in Canada. Aboriginal governance has gained public acceptance and support (Reid 1989)
to such an extent that, in 1992, lhe Prime Minister and Premiers of nine Provinces
agreed to invite Aboriginal representatives as full and equal partners in the process of
constitutional renewal, known as the Canada round (Assembly of First Nations press
release, Feb.12, 1992).
Yet, despite their widespread support, Canadians have only a vague idea about
what Aboriginal government or lndian self government is, how it would operate within
Canada, and what it entails for Aboriginal peoples and their relations with the rest of the
country (Speech of Rt Hon JC Clark to Constitutional Conference on Aboriginal Peoples,
Feb 13,1992; Reíd 1990; Ponling 1990). ln April 1991, the Prime Minister of Canada
established the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples to investigate some of these very
issues (Mandate of the RCAP, Spring 1992).
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples research agenda includes some of
the very issues that this thesis addresses:
-"Governance issues - the exploration of how disputes between Aboriginal
and non-Aboriginal governments can be resolved more effectively"
(RCAP, The Circle 2(2): 6, "Focussing the Dialogue", April 1993).
-"Treaties and Governance - how Aboriginal self government and Treaties
impact one another - the roles of Aboriginal governments in Treaty
making - the historical impact of treaties in Aboriginal governance" -
"and the existing barriers to Treaty implementation"
(RCAP, The Circle 2(1):2-3, "Research: A Challenging Agenda, January
1993)
-" Aboriginal economic development, land, and labour - how economies
developed historically - problems, prospects, strategies, and experiences
with public policy" (The Circle, 2(2): B).
-"Lands and resources - importance to Aboriginal cultures and economies
- locally based and controlled resource development -
environmental and resource management" (The Circle,2(2):B).
The vast dimensions of the topic of Anishinaabe manomin in Treaty #3 could be
explored as a case study of many of the research issues of Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples. One purpose of this thesis is to better understand the concept of Aboriginal self
government as it relates to the traditions of First Nations and Treaty Nations within Canada, and
the conflict which results when the spirit and intent of Treaty are not accepted by settler
governments. This thesis considers the specific case of wild rice as an instance of self
government in Treaty #3 , and the Grand Council Treaty #3 interrelationships with the federal
and provincial governments seeking recognition of their responsibility for Anishinaabe
manomin .
Anishinaabe manomin is an indigenous plant, the only cereal grain native to North
America. the Anishinaabe considermanomin a gift from lhe Creator, as expressed in their word
for the plant: "Mano " derives from the root word, "manito " or "spiril", as in Kichi or Kizha
Manito, the Great or Kind Spirit; "min " is a shortened version of "berry" or "delicacy". Thus,
manomin is, very literally, a gift from the Creator (Kinew 1979). A more ancient way of
referring to wild rice is Manito Gitigaan , lhe Great Spirit's plant or garden (Kinew 1979;
Elder Alex Skead in Grand Council Treaty #3 Chiefs'Assembly 198B).
Manomin has been nurtured by, and has in turn nurtured, the Anishinaabe people since
before recorded time. (Syms 1982; Vennum 19BB).
To the Anishinaabeg , manomin has become a symbol of the lndigenous or Aboriginal right
of self government. Within the Anishinaabe worldview, this "right" may be better conceived as
a stewardship responsibility that ties the Anishinaabe to the Creator. 1
Manomin is a resource only recently considered important enough by setller-
governments to have the province "occupy the field" and pass legislation governing its
harvesting and sale (eg. The Ontario Wild Rice Harvesting Act, RSO, '1960; see Chapter B).
Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg have always considered this plant to be exclusively their gift from the
Creator and their responsibility. They had been willing to share land and resources with the
newcomers, as was expressed within the spirit and intent of Treaty #3. Newcomers had been
allowed to fish, hunt, farm, and mine. With regard lo manomin , alone among all resources,
however, the Anishinaabeg expected that their unique and sacred relationship lo manomin
would continue "as by the past". This is confirmed in the wording of the Paypom Treaty #3, the
version generally accepted by Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg to reflect the 'true' terms of the Treaty.
It is the Paypom Treaty that Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg refer to as Manito mazinai'igan (the
sacred document) (T.P. Kinew 1992). The caring for, seeding, harvesting, processing and
marketing oÍ manomin had always remained within the sole jurisdiction and responsibility of
lhe Anishinaabeg . For this reason, manomin stands unique as a symbol of an aboriginal
resource. 2
The concept of natural resources as an aboriginal and Treaty right is at the basis of
historical and present day conflicts between lndigenous and Provincial governments. The federal
government has vacillated between its role as fiduciary trustee, newly defined by the highest
court of Canada in 1984 (Guerin case cited in Woodward 1989:110-114; Reiter 1991:lV:23),
and official neutrality that has enabled a provincial power grab of resources. This classic
confrontation has been embedded in the Constitution Act. 1867 :Section 91(24) allocates
"lndians and lands reserved for lndians" to federal jurisdiction; under s.92, natural resources
are within provincial jursidiction.
To Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg, manomin stands as symbol as an Aboriginal and Treaty
right rather than an examples of a provincial Crown resource. As with most issues regarding
the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, manomin does not represent merely one issue. ln Trealy #3
territory, manomin affirms the spiritual foundation of Anishinaabe government. The culture
and governance of manomin in the Treaty #3 area is the longest continuing form of Anishinaabe
government.
The ceremonies, preparation, control of the growing period, harvesting camps where
Elders regularly check the harvest and state when to pick or when to rest the rice evidence the
sole Anishinaabe exercise of authority over and responsibility for the people and the resource.
Manomin is a resource whose Anishinaabe jurisdiction survived other forms of suppression of
Anishinaabe sovereignty under the lndian Act. Only since 1960, was manomin interfered with
by provincial natural resource laws and attempts at regulation.
This thesis will review the political history of the Anishinaabe of Treaty #3 regarding
manomin from before the treaty signing in 1873 to the immediate aftermath of the the 1992
'Canada round' of constilutional renewal. Anishinaabe concepts and viewpoints will be used in
the political analysis, to consider indigenous public policy making and intergovernmental
af f airs.
1.2 Setting the scope of the research
There is an abundance of literature regarding traditional forms of governance by the
Ojibway (Smith 1973; Coleman 1953; Hallowell 1942, 1955; Hickerson 1962,1970, 1971:
Warren 1BB5; Grand Council Treaty #3 1992 TARR pamphlet series), as well as an emerging
field of literature regarding lndian self government (Cassidy & Bish 1989; Cassidy 1990; Boldt
1993; Boldt & Long 1984, 1985, 1986; Long 1990; Asch 1982; Ponting & Gibbins 1979,
1984). A fuller review of the literature will be made more fully in Chapter 2.
A recent approach to the field is 1o consider the Aboriginal responses and adaptations to
federal government policy making (Pettipas 1990; Carter '1990; Long 1990; Klippenstein
1991). Such research, deriving from both archival documents and ethnographical or
sociological fieldwork, has lent a new and much-needed perspective to the ethnopolitical field of
aboriginal government in Canada. This research has aimed to present as its starting point an
indigenous perspective of Aboriginal history and development.
What has been lacking in varying degrees, even in this adaptation-response framework
however, is the informed viewpoint of the lndigenous people, in their own words, concepts and
language. The generation that came through the residential school system in the forties and
fifties and forged the political future of their people in the sixties and seventies is now willing
to share the worldview of their people, in sophisticated terms in several languages, Aboriginal
and English. lt is through the cross cultural understanding of their language and concepts that a
more in-depth appreciation of indigenous government will be possible.
To understand Anishinaabe governmenl in Treaty #3, in its traditional and
contemporary forms, it is necessary to have some understanding of the language and concepts of
these people (Henderson 1993). This thesis is enriched by the fluent speakers and thinkers of
the Treaty #3 Anishinaabe Nation who have consented to share their views and understanding.
lntroductory and cautionary notes are essential. Anishinaabe people do not view
traditions or "the traditional" as being from any particular period, frozen in time, such as the
eighteenth century trade or late nineteenlh century treaty making era. lnstead, they view
traditions as emanating from time immemorial, a time that predates the record keeping and even
contact of the EuroOanadian newcomers. Traditions hold as much portent today and for the future
as they did in some unspecified past. That is why they continue to be carried through the oral
tradition of the Anishinaabe people. When "traditional" forms of Anishinaabe government are
discussed, this note must be kept in mind.
This thesis seeks to insert \he AnÌshinaabe viewpoint and analysis of Anishinaabe
government public policy making and intergovernmental relations into the research on
aboriginal governance in Canada.
1:3 Research Questions
The central questions researched in this thesis are: How was and how is public policy
formulated by Anishinaabe governments through the years? What is the pattern of
intergovernmental affairs since Treaty in 1873? These quest¡ons focussed my interviews and
documentary research. The concluding chapter will address what can be learned to benefit
Treaty Nations-Crown relations today.
These questions will be analyzed through the viewpoinl of Anishinaabe interviewees
today and historical and archival documents of yesterday. The focus will be on Anishinaabe
public policy making and intergovernmenlal affairs regarding Manito gitigaan from just prior
to Treaty #3 in 1 873 to 1992.
To examine this period of history is to view the changes these people have endured from
a time of political and economic independence prior to 1873 through generations of suppressed
sovereignty under the lndian Act to the re-assertion of sovereign Treaty and Anishinaabe righÍs
in the 1970s to 1990s.
The example of manomin has already been explained to serve two major purposes.
Manomin focuses on the central conflict between indigenous and provincial governments within
Canada: natural resources as a (provincial) crown resource or a treaty and aboriginal right?
Manomin also serves as a continuing example of lndigenous forms of government in action, even
through generations of suppressed sovereignty under the federal lndian Act and provincial
wildlife legislation.
Manomin serves another useful function in this thesis. lt is a metaphor to explain the
Anishinaabe version of Anishinaabe or original rights. According to Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg ,
manomin is a gift from the Great Spirit; its use and development given to the people through
legend and ceremony (H.Redsky 1990; Vennum 19BB). This plant that seems to require no
tending or cultivation, actually requires annual reseeding. Many elements combine to thwart the
growth of this plant. Predators such as muskrat and moose eat the stems; blackbirds feast on the
grains; there are competitors such as water lillies and other water weeds; high waters can
drown the plant in its early stages of growth and elongation above the water; winds may rob the
grains, husk and all, from the stem (Aitken et al 19BB). Yet, Anishinaabeg have observed, even
when the planl has seemingly drowned for twenty years, it can arise again (H.Redsky 1990). A
fertile, slightly acidic soil can always be seeded, as Anishinaabeg have done for countless
generations (Aitken et al 19BB). lndeed, the Anishinaabeg extended the territory of this plant
through deliberate seeding and protection of its terrain (Moodie 1990; Syms 1982; van de
Vorst 1984).
So too, with the original rights of the original peoples. They grow through the
understanding of the people, nurtured and kept alive in the oral tradition of the Elders passed
down through countless generations, These traditional teachings contained in secular and sacred
stories (adisokaanan ) guide lhe Anishinaabeg in their lives, through their relationship with
the Creator, with other people, and all living things . The lessons of the interconnectedness of
life are reseeded each year by the people. And, the people have suffered through the dangers of
predators such as policies and laws imposed by external governments, competitors such as
settlers and their authorities, dangerous conditions such as cultural and physical dislocation.
Just like the plant, they have survived. And, so too have their traditional teachings that the
Anishinaabeg have rights and responsibilities given only to them by the Creator, just as
manomin was given to the Anishinaabeg by the Creator.
The drowning and life-threatening conditions of manomin symbolize the suppressed
sovereignty of the Anishinaabeg . This thesis examines more than one hundred years of
suppression and expression of Anishinaabe rights in Treaty #3 and develops a model of analysis
of Anishinaabe public policy making and intergovernmental affairs based on this concept.
1.4 Methodology
This thesis combines the anthropological fieldwork techniques of participant
observation, interviewing and use of a key informant, with established social science methods of
library and archival research. Reading in grounded theory gave the author confidence in the
development of a new paradigm and an adaptation of a model for understanding aboriginal-crown
intergovernmental relations. Grounded theory posits the "discovery of theory from data
systematically obtained from social research" (Glaser & Strauss 1967:2). To generate theory,
it is suggested that the researcher must be both "highly sensitized" and a "systematic agent",
using insight and comparative analysis (Glaser & Strauss 1967:251). As a researcher, lwas
advised to "deliberately cultivate reflections on personal experiences" (Weist 1990) The
scientific literature advised me then to compare these reflections with existing theory to
discover new categories (Glaser & Strauss 1967:252). lt was in such deliberate concentration
on the topic that the view of Anishinaabe governing in Manito Gitigaan as customary law, and the
vision of wild rice as a metaphor for aboriginal and treaty rights, emerged in my
consciousness.
Grounded theory seeks to avoid research which is "1oo impressionistic" or "overly
theoretical" (Glaser & Strauss 1967:14-15). lhave sought to avoid an impressionistic
approach by checking documentation over a 100 year span regarding ricing with oral testimony
10
lcollected particularly in'1977-80, 1983, 1989-1994 from Chiefs, Elders and rice
gatherers. The Anishinaabe interviewees I have spoken with over a period of 20 years relate
experiences and understanding gleaned over life spans of a much longer period. lnterview data
has also been checked with government documents and interviews of the past two decades. By
centring on the Treaty #3 area and Anishinaabe people, with a key informant and a number of
other interviewees, I have tried to avoid being overly theoretical. lnstead I have preferred to
record actual events by Treaty #3 people or Crown representatives, in most cases, and make
analyses which offer some ideas for future courses of action.
I approached the "interviews as conversations", with my asking about that person's
particular involvement in or knowledge aboul wild rice in Treaty #3 (Burgess 1984:111). ln
undertaking interviews from more than forty respondents, I encountered only three refusals.
The approach taken, particularly to an Elder or lo someone known by this researcher to follow
traditional ways, was to offer tobacco and ask for assislance through an interview. Some
Anishinaabeg interviewed, including all Elders, were given a small honorarium in appreciation
of their assistance. Others were content to spend one half hour to a couple of hours explaining
their involvment with Anishinabe manomin . All interviewees were advised that the information
they gave would be used with their names in a university thesis; only two requested anonymity.
During the interviews, I would sometimes ask "contrastive questions to discuss the
meanings of situations and offer opportunities for comparisons" (Burgess 1984:111). lsought
to avoid loaded questions or answering my own queslions, by asking prodding and followup
questions (Ellen 1984:231). ltook short notes during the interview (only two were taped) and
immediately transcribed the full text once I returned home in order to ensure memory was aided
by freshness.
By continually questionning my familiarity with the Treaty #3 AnÌshinaabe system of
wild rice management, in interviews with Anishinaabeg and Crown government interviewees, as
well as other documented sources, I have constantly tried to improve my observation, judgment
and conceptualization.
At the beginning of this research, I had wished to analyze public policy making and
intergovernmental relations among the federal and provincial governments and the
11
Anishinaabeg. It was only during the course of readings, conducting interviews, and reassessing
my own personal experience in light of historical documents, that I came to see what I was
analyzing was actually the longest continuing form of Anishinaabe government in Treaty #3:
governing in Manito Gitigaan, the Great Spirit's garden. ln reviewing lhe literature, it became
apparent that what had now become self-evident to me had been overlooked by other researchers
in many disciplines through the decades.
I lived in the Treaty #3 area, first at Kenora, then at the Ojibways of Onigaming First
Nation,65 miles south of Kenora on Lake of the Woods, from 197'1-1983. During that time, I
worked as a writer and researcher for the Chiefs' Association, the Grand Council Treaty #3, in
land and resources issues, education, economic development and other fields for approximately
six years. I worked as a social worker at Grassy Narrows and Whitedog for two years, as a Life
Skills Coach for six months at Onigaming, and as a report writer, researcher, advisor and
negotiator for several Treaty #3 and Manitoba First Nations and organizations, from the 1980s
to the present day. I have visited twenty-four of the twenty-five First Nation communities
within Treaty #3 territory and am acquainted with some members of all of them. From 1984
to the present, my family and I have maintained our principal residence at the Onigaming First
Nation and continue to spend as much time there as possible.
Through my marriage to a prominent Anishinaabe person in Treaty #3, and residing on
his reserve, I was honoured lo become involved in several years of "ricing". I joined my partner
in going onto the ricefields, checking the rice before harvest, then harvesting and selling the
rice at lakeside or in traditional processing of it for our own use at home. My husband taught and
involved me and our two children in the ricing rituals and all the stages of harvesting and
processing of manomin . He taught us lhe history, the language, lhe spiritual beliefs about
manomin - and expected us to understand and communicate this knowledge to generations beyond
us. He is Tobasonakwut Kinew, earlier known as Peter Kelly (also referred to in this thesis as
T.P.Kinew). Tobasonakwut is the Grand Chief of Grand Council Treaty #3, elected in October
1991, and has served as Chief of the Ojibways of Onigaming, 1976-80, Assembly of First
Nations Ontario Chief, 1982-83, and Grand Chief of Treaty #3 1971-74. Tobasonakwut is
considered a spiritual Elder of his people, and is a pipecarrier, a 3rd degree member of the
T2
Mile'iwin religion and a Sundancer. As the key informant in this research, Tobasonakwut's
insight has been contributed over a period of more than two decades.
ln staling this background, it is immediately recognized that the reader will be wary of
polemic and unsubstantiated protestations regarding manomin . This researcher spent several
years returning to university to gain some distance and some skills in analysis before
attempting this thesis, and spent some five years undertaking the research and writing. The
dangers of taking lhe Anishinaabe poinl of view in research are understood and accepted. Noted
Native American lawyer. professor and writer, Vine Deloria Jr., has stated that 'revisionary' is
used to describe any writing taking the Native American point of view (Deloria 1969,1974).
There needs to be a recognition that academic research into the history of Aboriginal self
government and settler-Aboriginal intergovernmental affairs in Canada is only beginning to
address the Aboriginal point of view and to reference Aboriginal political thought and strategy.
With the increasing numbers of Aboriginal writers, such points of view are beginning to reach
mainstream society (Cardinal 1969; Deloria 1969, 1974: Mercredi & Turpel 1993).
This thesis is informed by Anishinaabe concepts and language to forge a new way of
viewing Aboriginal public policy making and intergovernmental relations. Through the key
informant, Tobasonakwut Kinew, and generous interviews granted by Elders such as Nancy
Jones of Nickicousemenecaning, Fred Greene of Shoal Lake #39, and Bert Yerxa of Couchiching,
this thesis seeks to delve into the meaning of wild rice to the Anishinaabe people of Treaty #3,
and how they sought to protect lheir Anishinaabe rights to governing in the Great Spirit's
Garden. "Meaning requires interpretation from knowledge of the totality" of the culture, for
"without its meaning, an observable behaviour is not a fact for an anthropologist" (Maquet
1964:54). Thus, I consciously sought to understand and portray lhe Anishinaabe point of view
or perspective because I wanted to write the meaning, depth and complexity of manomin in
Anishinaabe existence. Anthropologists have long found that "impersonal methods of study" used
by physical scientists are an obstacle to understand "meaning which is an essential part of any
social phenonmenon" (Maquet 1964:53). I straddled the ways of white middle class from which
I came and the Anishinaabe way into which I was introduced and lived. As an outsider, I can only
present a limited view of lhe Anishinaabe perspective, as I understand only limited amounts of
13
lhe Anishinaabemowin language and have been privileged to gain glimpses of the Anishinaabe
worldview from Tobasonakwut Kinew and others mentionned.
ln examining possible bias, it is important to note that "content of knowledge is never
entirely independent from the subject; rather it is the result of the meeting of the subject and
object" (Maquet 1964:53). ln this thesis, what is presented is what lcame to learn over more
than twenty years, with more directed questionning and analysis in the last five. We can only
see reality from a point of view, and who is to say that the perspective adopted by analysts of
Crown governments is any more "objective" than that of lhe Anishinaabeg ?
It has been said that "the ultimate goal of action or participatory research is the radical
transformation of social reality and the improvement of the lives of the people involved" (Ryan
1990:58). I share this goal. While the questions of this thesis were formulated by me, they
were informed by the issues raised by Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg, and the solutions will certainly
be found by the First Nations people themselves. lt is my hope thal this thesis may contribute to
a wider understanding of the significance of Manito Gitigaan and the search and arrival at
positive solutions in the future.
My interviews included Anishinaabe politicians such as Elders, Chiefs and former
Chiefs, and Anishinaabe people involved as ricers and as business people in the rice industry.
As well, several non-Anishinaabe researchers and lawyers for Treaty #3 and provincial and
federal bureaucrats who have dealt with the Treaty #3 Anishinaabe people in the rice industry
or on the rights issue, were kind enough to answer many of my questions. Some of the
interviews were conducted for earlier writings and research on manomin in the mid to late
1970s, and a project in Maniloba in 1983, but most were specifically undertaken for this
thesis in the period 1989-1993.
I explained to all interviewees that I was recording their comments for use in this
doctoral thesis and their permission was granted. The 1970s interviews have been used as
background only, and permission was given at that time for information to be included in a
magazine publication (Avery & Pawlik 1979). Only two respondents requested that lnot
attribute remarks on one issue only.
74
Photographs, drawings and maps have been included to "see with the native eye" the
significance of some events decribed in the thesis. lt is hoped that the reader will accept that
such data is presented to intensify the understanding of the reader, rather than merely provide
local colour (Collier & Collierlg86: xvii,10,131). The reproduction of the rock painting in
chapter 3 is not intended to be disrespectful. Rather it is presented to demonstrate the ancient
governmental organization of the ricefield within Treaty #3, as well as the sacredness of the
Great Spirit's garden. Many times I have prayed and offered tobacco in the waters near the
ricefields on Lake of the Woods and Rainy Lake for guidance in presenting this story as it was
revealed to me.
The analysis of the data has depended upon an interdisciplinary approach of
anthropology, political studies, Native studies, and law (see Chapter 2).
1. 5 Research Direction and Organization of the thesis
ln describing and analyzing the public policy making and intergovernmental affairs of the
Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg with federal and provincial governments since the Treaty, a
realization came that this political history had come almost full circle. lnlergovernmental
relations began with alliances and treaties of the fur trade and culminated in the Nation to Nation
signing of Treaty #3 in 1873. The unilateral imposition of the lndian Act by the federal
government commenced an era of the abrogation of Treaty #3 by federal and provincial
governments that continues to this day.
The Anishinaabeg of the Boundary Waters have used every means at their disposal
including letters and petitions to Ottawa and the King of England, delegations to the local lndian
agent and Ottawa, and, since lhe 1960s, to Queen's Park in Toronto (Chapters 7,11-13). More
recent initiatives have included delegations to Parliament in Great Britain, the re-organization
of the Grand Council, and coalition with other lndian organizations across Canada, as well as
direct "uncivil obedience" (Borovoy 1991) (see Chapters 12 & 13).
The asymmetry of this intergovernmental relalionship has been reflected by the
response of the federal and provincial governments . The federal government institututed its
15
control through the use of local lndian agents to force meetings or elections, surrender votes or
other agreements by means of blank Band Council Resolution forms (Billie Archie 1977: Stuart
Jack 1977). Religious ceremonies were banned (Pettipas '1990) and cultural traditions
lrampled by the forced anglicization oÍ Anishinaabe names, removal of children to residential
school, and teaching of the children that their parents were heathens (lnquiry into the
Admínistration of Justice in Manitoba1991). People became dislocated in place as well as spirit
by the removal of families away from waterways and relocation of communities onto highways
(Grand Council Treaty #3 1974). The provincial regulalion of fish and wildlife through
unilaterally imposed legislation and punitive enforcement measures effectively removed the
livelihood and sustenance of the people, as well as that aspect of the spiritual bond to the Creator
(Miller 1989; Peter Kelly 1972; Stuart Jack interview 1977; chapler 7).
Since the 1960s, the assertive stand of the Grand Council Treaty #3, in conjunction
with organized lobbying by Aboriginal associations across Canada, has seen a change in public
and governmental attitudes. The passage of the Constitution Act, 1982 and its explicit
recognition of Aboriginal and Treaty rights in sections 35 and 25 marked a truly significant
point in the history of Aboriginal-Crown affairs. The evolution of agreements and modern day
treaties, including Prince Edward lsland Premier Joe Ghiz' proposed 1992 national treaty of
reconciliation with Aboriginal peoples, has demonstrated that the symmetry of Aboriginal-
Crown intergovernmental affairs may be returning. The issue is where the power and resources
lie.
Natural resources is one of the major issues of contention in this Canadian federation.
This analysis of governing in Manito gitigaan is offered as a example of how provincial
governments have intruded upon Aboriginal jurisdiction while the federal government has
relinquished its fiduciary duty as a trustee of Aboriginal and Treaty rights. Anishinaabe
manomin, wíthin the Treaty #3 territory, is an example of the longest continuing model of self
government of the Boundary waters Anishinaabeg .
This research offers a description and analysis of the Anishinaabe sacred bond with the
Creator and how their responsibility to manomin is indelibly tied to this spiritual connection
(Chapters 3 & 4). The thesis will outline how Anishinaabe representatives sought to assert and
i6
protect lhe¡ Anishinaabe, treaty and aboriginal rights lo this particular resource, in various
political arenas from treaty-making to constitution-making (Chapters 6 -13). Finally, this
thesis offers an analysis of various options available and obstacles to overcome to decision-
makers in the three governments involved (Chapters 13,14).
Endnotes:
1. Stewardship is defined as being "entrusted with management" (Funk & Wagnalls Canadian
College Dictionary 1989). ln Aboriginal writings, it is considered a useful English concept to
try to conceptualize indigenous thought about taking care of the Creator's gifts, as part of the
sacred relationship the Anishinaabeg (or other lndigenous people) have to the Creator (Little
Bear 1 994).
The "stewardship" principle has been accepted into the debate on environmental issues by
wider society. Stewardship in this context calls for "sustainable life" as a concept of "protecting
and maintaining earth, air, waler and crealing an independent home for all biological lifeforms
within it". (lt contains an understanding of humans as part of the web of life, but falls short of a
sacred responsibility and connection to the Creator.)lt was to be preferred to "sustainable
development" which promotes the continued use of resources, only to the extent that they can
regenerate for future generations. Stewardship was explained in a Lakehead University report
to the Teme Augama Nation (Lake Temagami area, northeastern Ontario) entitled: The Need for
Land Stewardship: A Holistic Management Plan for N'Daki Menan" (Hall 1990:21). lt called for
a moratorium on logging until old-growth ecosystem is fully understood. Both concepts of
"sustainable life" and "sustainable development" were adopted - in a uneasy union - in the
1993 Teme Augama Stewardship Plan, a co-management agreement with the Province of
Ontario.
2. Research into fiddleheads (ie, edible young ferns that resemble the handle of a violin) in New
Brunswick may find a similar relationship for the Mi'kmaq and Malecite Nations with that
plant.
T1
Chapter Two: Literature Review
Undertaking this research into "Governing the Great Spirit's Garden" in Treaty #3
territory and history necessitates adopting an interdisciplinary approach. It is important for the
researcher to consider what the literature has stated generally about the Anishinaabe people (the
Ojibwa, in anthropological parlance) and their worldview (Smith 1973, Densmore 1979,
Hilger 1951, Vennum 1988, Syms 1982), and specifically about the Boundary Waters
Anishinaabeg of Treaty #3 (Waisberg 1984a,b, L992:Holzkamm 1985 1988 1989 19901993;
Vennum 1988). Within the study of worldview, one encounters the dichotomy of Euro-
Canadian scienrific analysis between the sacred and the secular, the sacred and science.More
recently, scientific understanding of the manner of holistic Aboriginal conceptualization and
thought seems to have bridged the gap between social and physical sciences ( Black 1967;
Colorado 1989; Peat 1992; Knudtson & Suzuki 1992).
In reviewin g Anishinaabe history, the resea¡cher looked at historical and
anthopological accounts of the forms of governance, and Anishinaabe relations with
explorers, settlers and their governments (Miller 1989; Smith 1973; Leacock 1979). Until
recently, academic research has focussed on public policy making of Crown governments, the
intergovernmental affairs of federal-provincial relations and their impact on Aboriginal peoples
(Upton 1973; Tobias 1916: Milloy 1983). However, in the past decades since the infamous
1969 White Paper of the federal government, analysis has shifted from the crown to the
aboriginal side. And importantly, the focus has also changed from that of the 1960s-1970s
focus on aboriginal organizations as interest group lobbying, to the 1980s-1990s insistence of
First Nations to be taken seriously as governments acting according to their rights and
jurisdiction (Weaver 1985b, Dyck 1989, Richardson 1989,1993; Smith, D. 1993) .
The concepts of self-determination, self-government and sovereignty which entered the
political discourse of aboriginal peoples in the last half of this century, and most forcefully
since 1982, are being thoughtfully considered (Assembly of First Nations 1992; Smith 1993;
Richardson 1989,1993; Frideres 1993; Dickason 1993; Miller 1989; Cassidy 1990). There is a
iB
recognition of the need for more research which attends to the "words, images and concepts
that various aboriginal peoples use to describe their political ways" (Cassidy 1990:88 ). And,
an increased understanding that outsiders' words such as "sovereignty" do not readily translate
into aboriginal languages and may be misleading (Cassidy 1990:88). Priorities may also be
different . Aboriginal peoples may wish to raise land and resource management issues on the
aboriginal government research agenda as "they represent not only economic value and political
significance but also represent a way of life and spiritual commitment" (Cassidy 1990:90).
Within Canada, however, a consideration of intergovernmental relations necessarily
leads into an analysis of the federal state, the division of powers, constitutional entenchment
and change (Dickson 1991; Simeon 1990). When aboriginal peoples are involved in the
analysis of the status quo and the need for constitutional change, newly formed concepts such
as "treaty federalism" are brought into the public domain (RCAP 1992, Dickson 1991,
Opekokew 1982:Pryce 1979). The expanding field of legal pluralism (an interdisciplinary
field in itself) which holds the view that "many laws" can and do co-exist in a federal state has
done much to welcome such concepts into modern analysis (University of Manitoba Legal
Pluralism Conference, November 1992).
The social upheaveal of the 1960s made North American history popular and new
strains of political anthropology and ethnology emerged to investigate ways in which Native
peoples have "resisted acculturation .. and struggled to preserve cultures over centuries"
(Trigger 1988b:26). In the political life of Canada, the 1960s ma¡ked a time when aboriginal
peoples came "out of irrelevance" (Ponting & Gibbins 1981; Miller 1989; Boldt 1993).
Although Native North Americans had organized along both traditional and more westernized
forms throughout the post-Confederation period, the social ferment of the 1960s made their
cause popular within the context of civil rights and peace movements. Aboriginal political
activity came to resemble westernized political pressure groups and occupied centre stage in
Canadian political life, certainly for the last third of the twentieth century (Ponting & Gibbins
1981; Weaver 1981, 1982; Boldt 1993). Aboriginal participatory and confrontational politics
19
began to attract the attention of political science and sociology as well as anthropology,
geography and history. In the 1970s and 1980s, social scientists were forced by pressure from
aboriginal peoples and their supporters to reexamine the fundmental misconceptions of their
disciplines. Social scientists and historians began to research documents and record
observations through new perspectives. "Events are immutable; history changes" (Crowley
i988). Books and articles published a revised version of Native North American history and
contributions to Canada and the United States (Trigger 1988).
Within the discipline of history, aboriginal peoples were no longer seen as passive
victims of the older accounts of Canadian history but rather as peoples "who have always been
active, assertive contributors to the unfolding of Canadian history" (Miller 1989: x; G. Friesen
1985; J. Friesen 1985). Concepts of "discovery" have given way to more balanced protrayals
of explorers such as Alexander McKenzie and other historic figures being given a "conducted
tour" by aboriginal guides (Bliss 1989). Geographical analysis has assisted in reconsidering
trading patterns and alliances, settlement and migration of aboriginal peoples, traders and
settlers (Hamilton 1985; Dickason 1993).
This revision of thought and redirection of vision in academia would not have come
about were it not for the challenges provided by aboriginal peoples themselves. Today,
anthopological discussants are as concerned about the survival of hunter-gatherer societies as
in their analysis of patterns of subsistence survival (Feit 1982; Tanner 1983a, 1983b). Indeed,
advocate anthropologists consider themselves as privileged to be requested by indigenous
peoples to act as communicators to wider society - as equal, not as 'experts' (Dyck & Waldram
1993:215-232). Political anthropology vies with political science and sociology in studying the
dynamics of aboriginal political organizations as pressure groups in Canada (Weaver 1981
19821985; Ponting & Gibbins 1981; Boldt & Long 1985), and more recently, of First Nations
as reasserting and evolving traditional aboriginal governments (Smith, D. 1993; Richardson
1989,1993; Dickason 1993; Boldt 1993; Ponting & Gibbins ).
20
Notes on Anishinaabe leadership and government
How often have anthropologists, historians, and other social scientists tried to analyze
aboriginal self government and indigenous institutions without consideration of the Aboriginal
language or thought patterns at work in that society?
The Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg have been the subject of many anthropological,
historic and sociological analyses (Dawson l9l5, 1982, 1983; Hoyle 1986; Waisberg I984a,
1984b, 1992; Holzkamm & Waisberg 1990, 1993). However, analysis of tribal societies often
presumed an understanding which was not there. In fact, westernized societies were using
paradigms that bore little relation to reality. "The band-tribe-chiefdom taxonomy has given a
false sense that we understand" (Leacock , 1979:29).In fact, concepts were invented to ease
western negotiators and administrators into the colonies (Leacock, I919:I1; Bodley 1975,
1988). Anthropologist Eleanor Leacock explained how the usage of the word "chief" became
"encrusted with notions of power in a stratified state-organized society"; in actuality, in
egalitarian societies, a chief was " a first among equals"(Leacock, 1979:17).
Leacock proposed two basic sociopolitical principles goveming decision-making in
egalitarian societies, ones that are just as important in analyzing the twentieth century as the
eighteenth: "parties responsible for carrying out a decision or directly affected
by it must share in making it, commensurate with their experience and wisdom; those who do
not agree to a decision are not bound by it" (Leacock 1979:20).
Leacock explained that Algonkian peoples accorded leaders authority in dealing with the
new outsiders. Such authority was misread by Europeans as signifying formal authority over
people as "subjects". This was never the case for the Woodland peoples.
Decisions were made and action taken on the basis of consensus (Morris, 1880;
Dawson in GCT3, 7992; Cooper 1936). In a sense, as Gurnet describes, aboriginal leaders
were given the "opportunity, not a mandate, to authority .. power depended upon the power of
persuasion rather than the persuasion of power" (Leacock, I9l9:27).
27
Authority as an "opportunity, not a mandate" remains an important component of
Anishinaabe leadershìp and decision-making today. Indeed, this respect for equality and
acceptance of consensual democracy quite confused federal and provincial politicians and
bureaucrats in preparations for the Constitutional conferences with Aboriginal leaders since
1982 (Schwarz 1986; Sanders 1985; Delacourt 1993).
Anthropologist Robert Lowie, in examining political organization among American
Aborigines, found that "the right to act independently was never questioned" (Lowie 1967:66).
He noted that coercive authority did not exist with the Ojibwa. Council had "vague and limited
powers" while the chiefs powers were "even vaguer" (Lowie 1967:68).
James G.E. Smith wrote of the continuation of proto-historic Ojibwa social
organization and leadership patterns into the twentieth century (Smith I973).In the pre-
reservation period, "an ethos of egalitarianism was pervasive, and the limited government was
based upon consensual democracy" (ibid:13) (The "limited" description of govemment was
likely chosen to describe the minimal rules that guided behaviour within that society. In recent
parlance of legal pluralism, such an adjective would not be used as government by custom is
analysed according to its effectiveness, not its complexity.) Smith noted the different types of
Chiefs (or leaders) allowed by the Ojibwa - war chiefs, talking chiefs, pipe carriers, chiefs
appointed by fur traders or Indian agents, clan chiefs , Mite'iwin 8th degree priests. Such a
system was extant in the Lake of the Woods-Rainy Lake region of Treaty #3, as reported from
informants Miskwakapins (Jim Elliott) and Joe Seymour (Cooper 1936). Each had a duty to
perform depending upon the circumstances, but none evolved into a stratified society with a
"higher degree of political organization" or chiefs with a "higher degree of responsibility and
authority" (Smith 197316) The "Ojibwa democratic and egalitarian tendencies required a
system of ambiguity and alternatives to prevent leaders from becoming too powerfully
entrenched" (Smith I97 3:ll).
The fur rade and then the treaty-making period skewed this relationship between leader
and the people somewhat as "chiefs were given presents, supplies and equipment for their own
22
use, and for distribution". The effect of strengthening the chiefs' positions and "giving them
additional power and autonomy (was) consequently reducing their answerability to their
people" (Smith 1913 :19). "The quiet withdrawal of support is a traditional and continuing
method of expressing non-confidence in a leader and his activities, and the Ojibwa invariably
had alternative potential replacements" (ibid:17). This Anishinaabe way of politics has been
witnessed by the author during two decades of experience.
Smith analyzeÅ decision-making on an Ojibwa reservation in the USA in the 1960s,
demonstrating the tensions that arose in leaders aportionning benefits of employment
programs. Outside authorities could not understand the continual delay and consultation
throughout the community. Outsiders did not see that Ojibwa leaders "lack the implicit
authority to commit their people (usually expected of democractically elected representatives),
for a genuinely binding decision can be reached only through democratic consensus" (Smith
1973:33). He concluded that in the 1970s, "the implicit values of two societies are in conflict,
but neither the values themselves nor the fact there is conflict is recognized" (ibid) . This
situation pertained to a great extent into the 1970s in Canada. Yet, while the conflict of values
continues in the 1990s, there is increased recognition that conflict exists. Since the aboriginal
peoples emergence "out of irrelevance" in the 1960s and the constitutional entrenchment of
their rights in 7982, there has also been an accompanying recognition that a new or renewed
relationship must be found.
Smith and Cooper did not discover what lay beyond a listing of these titles and their
overall functions to see the interconnection of leadership in an organized society, likely because
Smith did not seek to understand the Anishinaabe terminology and conceptualization of such
leadership roles and Cooper spent only a few days with his fluent informants (Smith 1973;
Cooper1936). Even Densmore and Jenks who documented the detail of the Anishinaabe
system of preparation and management of the ricefields across eastern North America were
circumscribed by their own discipline of ethnology to define such activities and interrelated
23
ceremonies as more of a culture at work than as the Anishinaabe system of governance of the
Great Spirit's Garden (Densmore 191911929; Jenks 1899).
Eurocentric evaluations of aboriginal leadership and decision-making could not
comprehend that another social organization and government required its own
conceptualization, and even, its own terminology (Chapeskie 1986). As anthropologist Edward
Sapir noted in his analysis of Native societies and linguistics, native terminology reflects
"distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached" (Overholt &
Caldicott 1982:12). Thus, this thesis presents ideas within rhe Anishinaabemowin language
and conceptualization in order to convey the inextricable relationship that Anishinnabe people
have with mnnomin, where in fact, the people's culture is part of the culture of nature. Thus,
any analysis of the Anishinaab¿ laws regarding manomin include cultural laws as well as
natural resource management laws.
Today's understanding of Anishinaabe people (also known as the Ojibwa, Ojibway,
Chippewa, Saulteaux) has largely been through the eyes of anthropologists. Anthropology has
assisted in understanding culture, as both the folkways of dress, food, material life, and the
philosophical tenets of language, spirituality, and the phenomenon of "worldview" . Indeed,
with its emphasis on the holistic approach and fieldwork, anthropology is well suited to
understanding "the Other" (Maybury-Lewis 1990).
Yet, in many situations, classical anthropology did irreparable harm in aiding
colonization by placing indigenous peoples along a continuum of "progress" which relegated
their especial and intimate knowledge of the universe to the lowest categonzation (Bodley
1988; Dyck & Waldram 1993). Today, many professional anthropologists wish instead to
return some of what they have gained to the indigenous peoples by acting as interpreters,
communicators and even advocates of these peoples and their intimate knowledge of their
world. Applied anthropology and advocacy anthropology are two approaches in this'new'
thrust within the discipline (Dyck & Waldram 1993). This conundrum between the'old' and
the'new' continues, for at least one reason that it is the classical anthropological approach of
24
living within a culture as a pafticipant-observer (albeit as an outsider ) that has brought most of
our modern understanding of indigenous cultures throughout the world. Anthropology has not
only brought the'new' information but also has informed outsiders of how to look at and
assess such information. In more recent times, it has become as commonplace for
anthropologists to study intergovernmental relations of indigenous peoples within a Nation-
state as it is to study kinship (Dyck & V/aldram 1993).
However, in its examination of intergovernmental relations from an indigenous
perspective, anthropologists find themselves challenging the views of the debate that their
predecessors shaped in terms of progress. Are "indigenous institutions relevant to decision-
making and social regulation in modern aboriginal communities", and indeed modern society,
or are "claims based on cultural distinctiveness" to be "regarded as futile denials of the
inevitable course of progress" (Scott 1993:321)? Such an argument is addressed in this thesis
and forms a central question for the future course of the management of the Great Spirit's
Garden. We benefit today from the active participation of the Anishinaabe people themselves
in communicating the ideas and institutions of their people.
This thesis points to the need to study and understand the essential cultural features of
Anishinaabe law and management of their natural resources. When Crown govemment
representatives and First Nations were debating the wording for the constitutional amendment
known as the Charlottetown Accord in 1992, Crown negotiators sought to separate culture
from natural resources in their all-encompassing definition of the scope of aboriginal self-
government. This may have made sense to the practical political and legal minds at work, but
would make no sense to an Anishinaabe person, nor the anthropologist who has intimate
knowledge of the Anishinaabe history and law. Rather, it would be understood that the
removal of natural resources from within the cultural ways of indigenous peoples would be
nothing short of "ethnocide", which has been defined as "the end of a distinct cultural system"
or "genocide on the installment plan" (Bodley 1988:26i). 1
25
Anishinaabe Manomin Cultural Ways
The Anishinaabeg of the Boundary Waters of northwestern Ontario, southeastern Manitoba,
and northern Minnesota have depended upon hunting and trapping, fishing, gathering and
agriculture for many generations (Syms i982; Waisberg 1984; Hoyle 1986). Yet, manomin or
wild rice has remained of fundamental significance to the culture and economy @ensmore
197911929; Hilger 1951 ;Vennum 1988; Waisberg 1979,1986; Holzkamm 1985). Indeed,
manomin is one of the foods the Anishinaabeg considered an essential source of nutrition,
nourishment and medicine, and a sacred gift of the Creator (Avery & Pawlik 1979). Wild rice
was responsible for sustaining the Anishinaabeg and, through these original peoples, the fur
traders, voyageurs and later settlers through many historic periods of hardship (Vennum 1988;
Waisberg 1986; Moodie 1987). Manomin was so important to the Anishinaabeg that this is
the one resource they did not allow outsiders direct access. While non-aboriginal peoples were
allowed to hunt and fish in the Boundary Waters, none were permitted to seed, harvest or
process the wild rice - only finished rice was sold to voyageurs and traders (Holzkamm 1985).
This remained the case in Treaty #3 territory until the 1950's (see Chapter 9). Although the
Anishinaabe regulation of wild rice came to the attention of turn of the century ethnologists, it
was recorded as part of their culture (Jenks 1 899; Densmore 1979/1929; fltlger 1951; Vennum
1988). This thesis considers theAnishinaabe ceremonies, regulations, and caretaking practices,
and acknowledges its status as an indigenous institntion of govemment which cared for the
people and the resource in sharing the Great Spirit's Garden.
Aboriginal Languages and different worldviews:
The understanding ofindigenous languages by EuroCanadians began as an essential
requirement for the survival and growth of trade. The understanding of and cross-cultural
communication through indigenous languages followed the same pattern as the political
relationships between the indigenous Nations and the European newcomers: survival and trade
alliance; military alliance; irrelevance (Miller 1989). After generations of concerted effort by
26
missionaries and educators, and conscious policy by the federal government, most indigenous
languages are at the brink of extinctìon. The Commissioner of Official Languages in Canada
has raised concern about the survival of the remaining fifty-three indigenous languages,
beginning in the 1980s and continuing through 1992 (CBC National News, May 5, 1992 on
Annual Report of Commissioner Max Yalden). Federal government research undertaken in
1980's concluded that only three of the fifty-three indigenous languages could survive the next
decade (Foster, 1982; Priest, 1985).
Academic scholars are beginning to heed the importance of understanding indigenous
languages and concepts. Dr. Robert Newbury, an hydrologist formerly with the Freshwater
Institute at the University of Manitoba, gave insight into the modern necessity of
understanding indigenous languages at the May 1990 UM Conference on Northem Manitoba:
The People and the Land:
"I call it the Echimanish Conclusion. After an M.A. student had
spent two years researching , he reached the conclusion that the
Hays River actLrally flows two ways. Charlie Cazikapoo, a Cree
resident of the area, told him, "We call that river Echimanish -
yes, In our language, that means'the river that flows two
ways'." I recommend that Cree be required for any scientist or
academic working in northern Manitoba." (Personal observation)
Yet the neglect continues, as does the ignorance of the wisdom that these languages possess
about these people and this land. The constitutional multilateral process of the "Canada
round" chooses not to take the time to consider other viewpoints than the constitutional jargon
and concepts honed through three decades of executive federalism and constitutional renewal
(Constitutional Renewal Agenda for the Multilateral Process, Federal position paper given to
the Assembly of First Nations, March 1992). Aboriginal leaders, however, are themselves
bringing forward their own concepts, in their own languages to inform the constitutional
debate. At the National Treaties Conference in Edmonton, April 1992, Chief Ray Fox spoke
of the ancient principle of treaty making for the Blood Nation, "inaistisinni "'.
27
"The concept of reaty, inaistisinni, is not new to the
Blood Tribe. 'lnaistisinnl' is an ancient principle of law
invoked many times to settle conflict, make peace,
establish alliances or trade relations between the Bloods
and other Nations such as the Crow, Gros Ventre, Sioux
and more recently the Americans in i855 and the British
in 1817.
"lnaistisinni is a key aspect of immemorial law, which
served to forge relationships with other Nations.
Inaistisinni to my people is a sacred covenant, a solemn
agreement, that is tmly the highest form of agreement,
binding for the life time of the parties.
"Blood participation in Treaty #7 was based on our
understanding of inaistisinni, consequently our
expectations of the treaty a-re that it is a solemn and
binding undertaking existing in perpetuity. It is the basis
of our relationship with Canada.
By treaty the Bloods agreed to share their land with the
British Crown except for specifically reserved areas for
exclusive Blood use. The featy created a unique
relationship between the Bloods and the Crown,
modifying only one aspect of our rights, the right to
exclusive use of the land. We retain the same legal and
political status we did when we entered the treaties."
(Chief Roy Fox, Keynote Address, National Treaties
Conference, Edmonton, April 6-9,1992)
Once the concept of "[naistisinni " is conveyed in all its complextity, then it is certainly
easier to use the idea of "inaistisinni " than to reiterate the detailed historical and modern
understanding of the term.
The Inuit have put forward amendments to ensure that any recognition of
Quebec's distinct society would not be interpreted as infringing on the unique
constitutional status of the First peoples, their languages and cultures. While
recognizing the symbolic meaning the phrase "distinct society" has for Quebec, the
Inuit constitutional reform veteran, Zebedee Nungak, suggested that "since the present
wording - distinct society - was so controversial we should simply look to our own
language and be recognized - ingmigut iliqqusiqanzi4 (distinct society)." (R. Gruben,
Inuvialuit Regional Co.p, presentation to the Conference on First Peoples and the
2B
Constitution, Conference Report, March 1992:64). The appropriateness of using
"Ingmígut iliqqusiqarniq" 'àt once points out the distinctness of Inuit and Inuvialuit
societies and the relevance of their traditions to their own peoples. This is the inherent
right of self government discussed in the Canada Round of constitutional renewal or
amendmentin l99I-92.
The problems in communication between cultures often come from
misinterpretation of Indigenous peoples' messages when they are worded in English
terminology. Aboriginal leadership has been analyzed as having adopted a European-
western concept of sovereignty ( Boldt & Long 1984). Yet this in-depth analysis was
made without adequate consideration being given to the idea that Indigenous peoples
have merely adopted the closest English terminology to the concepts they wish to
convey. This is common knowledge among aboriginal leaders. It is not difficult to
imagine the resultant breakdown in communication when one side uses similar words
with different conceptual orientation s.
In the 1990s, Indigenous leaders are preferring to use their own terminology to
communicate the depth of conceptualization beyond the English terms used. It may well
be that the English language does not possess the concepts that Indigenous peoples
wish to convey and that indigenous concepts will become part of a new Canadian
political lexicon. Social sciences have often adopted words from languages other than
English to explain whole concepts that cannot be translated succinctly into English.
That has certainly happened in other social sciences, from the gestalt of psychology to
the ethos of anthropology. IndigenolÌs languages have not been considered in coining
these new concepts. The emerging interdisciplinary field of indigenous govemment in
political, anthropological and Native Studies is certainly open to the use of indigenous
terminology for In di genoll s con cep tu ali zation.
29
Anishinaabe Thinking: Toward an Anishinaabe paradigm
To integrate such knowledge with the data collected through field study, interviews,
library and archival research, required the consideration of pardigms offered in several fields,
and the development of new perspectives and thought structures. This thesis begins and ends
with the ideas of m.anomin as an example of continuing traditional indigenous self
government, as a symbol of Treaty rights and Native jurisdiction versus provincial
constitutional responsibility over natural resources, and as a metaphor for seeing Treaty and
Aboriginal rights issues from a Native and an organic perspective.
Indeed, listening to and heeding Anishinaabe thinking will require a "paradigm shift"
perhaps more subconciously profound than the one the cybernetic computer age is requiring of
so-called westernized modern society. A paradigm, as first introduced by Thomas Kuhn in
1962, is a "broad model or framework, way of thinking or scheme for understanding reality"
(Tapscott & Caston 1993:xii). The introduction of new pardigms or ways of thinking brings
about the fear the change. the feelings of dislocation, conflict, uncertainty and often invites
coolness, mockery or hostility (Ferguson 1976). What the Anishinaabe conceptualization
provides, though, is the "design for continuous change" that modernists long for, and physical
scientists are only now discovering in the ancient wisdom of the indigenous peoples of the
Americas, and around the world (Tapscott & Caston 1993:254; Knudtson & Suzuki 1992;
Peat 1990).
Anishinaabe thinking, and certainly that of other indigenous peoples of the Americas,
is cenred in the value of their basic relationship with the Creator, Kizha Manito, Gitchi Manito,
the Great Spirit. Within this relationship lies the respect and responsibility for all life, for all of
the Great's Spirit's creations. There is the understanding of the circle and the
interconnectedness of life. Respect and shared responsibility flow from such an understanding.
This indigenous perspective is closely approximated by such thinkers as Nobel prize winner
Aldo Leopold whose idea of a "land ethic" encouraged the individual to enlarge his/her
boundaries of community to include soils, waters, plants animals, and "the colìectivity of land,
30
.. a community of interdependent par-ts" (Overholt & Collicott 1982:153). Native American
thinkers have been espousing such an ethic throughout millenia of oral tradition:
"We humans must come again to a moral comprehension of the earth and air. We must
live according to the principle of a land ethic. The alternative is that we shall not live at all" (N.
Scott Mom aday I97 6:47 ).
For the Anishinaabe , this land ethic or environmental ethic "transcended enlightened self-
interest and involved selfless sentiments of respect, affection and admiration" (Overholt &
Collicott 1982:155).
This thesis seeks to contribute to an understanding of what the Anishinaabe people
have to offer: a new paradigm or an organic understanding ofpolitical and societal issues. For
example, wild rice stands as a metaphor for the treaty and aboriginal rights (the " Anishinaabe
rights" according to Tobasonakwut Kinew) which may be suppressed, just as wild rice is
drowned, preyed upon by muskrats and birds, or beaten down by bugs, pesticides, and wind.
Yet, just as the rice will grow again, with reseeding and ca¡etaking by the Anishinaabeg, so too
will rights continue through a period of suppression. This analysis allows an outsider to think
of rights as organic, that is, living and growing or evolving within the people to whom they
belong, who have a responsibility to care for those rights.
Such rights do not become frozen in time. Rather they evolve as the people do. For a
Íeaty and aboriginal right to hunt to continue does not relegate it to bow and a¡row or spear use
only. Rifles, powered boats and trucks are also considered part of hunring in the twentieth
century and the right incorporates these changes. So too does the people's responsibility
change, for improved efficiency of the weaponry means that conservation techniques must also
be adapted.2
To extend the concept of the mnnomin metaphor for the organic nature of aboriginal
and rreaty rights, particularly as they apply to natural resources, knowledge from other
disciplines became useful. Anthropologists developed a "modernizationlaculturation" paradigm
that placed peoples along a continuum of inevitable 'progress' and 'deveÌopment' (Dyck &
31
Waldram 1993; Maybury-Lewis 1990) Postman dismissed it as too simplistic (1992). Usher
and his colleagues hoped to relegate this model to the trash-bin when the Berger Inquiry gave
offrcial recognition to the "frontier-homeland" model of understanding conflicts at issue in the
north (Usher in Dyck & V/aldram 1993:120). Berger's model went beyond that of social
economist Harold Innis who had formulated the concept of "hinterland/metropole" . That
theory set out to explain the history of Canada in terms of resource development of the west
and the north while the eastern cities made all the decisions and drew all the benefits. Berger's
model sought to porrray as "homeland "the Native peoples' concept of what outsiders
considered the far outer reaches of "frontier". It gives an idea of the potential of listening to
and heeding the aboriginal concepts of this country.
Similarly, listening to the Temi Auganri people of northeastern Ontario speak of their
homeland and the need to save the old growth forests led to the new concept of "sustainable
life" (Teme Augami Nation-Government of Ontario Treaty 1994; Benedickson 1989). This idea
conveyed more of the responsibility that humans have to the Creator and the gifts of creation,
and the duty that humans must heed if we are to sustain this world. It is a recognition by
indigenous peoples that rights and responsibility are inextrably intertwined. To aboriginal
people and environmentalists, "sustainable life" offers a wider range of choices than the option
of "sustainable development", the latter being called an "oxymoron" by renowned
environmentalist Prof. W. Pruin of the University of Manitoba (University of Manitoba
Conference on Northern Manitoba, May 1990).
Frideres and others have utlized a more linear approach in analyzing aboriginal and
treaty rights and their existence in a federal state. Such scholars have used terrns that Native
organizations have popularized since the "section 37" constitutional talks of the mid 1980s:
First Nations have a "nation to nation" relationship with the federal government and a
"government to government" relationship with provincial governments (Frideres 1993; Asch
1984; Ponting and Gibbins 1980). This is portrayed as a layered structure of parallel and then
divergent straight lines. Such models are useful in aiding understanding on some rational place
5¿
but they do not satisfy the need to understand what is a more profoundly spiritual, cultural,
emotional issue of identity to aboriginal peoples. To indigenous peoples, treaty and aboriginal
rights need to be symbolizedin a living paradigm, not a boxed matrix or a diagram of divergent
lines representing relationships. The essence of Native rights is the lifeforce of the indigenous
peoples, from time immemorial to generations yet to come (Smith, D.1993; Richardson 1989,
1993; Boldt & Long 1984; Asch 1984; Syms 1982).
In the communications field, Neil Postman developed a paradigm of cultures along a
continuum of toolmaking, technology and technocracy. Toolmaking cultures invent tools "to
solve specific, urgent problems of physical life or to serve some symbolic need in the world of
art, politics or religion" (Postman 1992:22). Such tools "did not attack the dignity or integrity
of the culture that produced them" and did not disrupt the inextricable wholeness of social,
economic and spiritual life. According to Postman, this remains the case in many cultures of
the Third V/orld today. By the indusrrial revolution of the 19th century, technologies developed
whereby "anonymously and inconspicuously the old tools were transformed into modern
instruments" (Postman 1992:42). Indeed, machines were invented to make more machines.
And these tools began to play a central role in the thought -world of the culture - the
mechanized clock replaced other time measurements, the printing press replaced oral tradition.
In this age of technocracy, technologies and traditions were able to "co-exist in uneasy
tension"; while technology was stronger, traditions were still functional, stillexerting influence
(Postman 1992:48). The present age of "technopoly", Postman defines as the "sur¡ender of
culture to a totalitarian technocracy" (Postman 1992:48). "Technopoly hopes to control
information and thereby provide itself with intelligibility and order" (Postman 1992:91); "to
every Old World belief, habit or tradition, there was and still is a technological alternative":
instead of prayer, penicillin; family, mobility; sin; psychotherapy; resrraint, immediate
gratification; political ideology, polling to market popular appeal; death, cryogenics (Postman
1992:91).
33
The Postman paradigm has immediate application to governing in the Great Spirit's
Garden. The Anishinaabeg first developed the tools which allowed the seeding and caretaking
(via canoe), the harvesting ( canoe, thrashing sticks, poles and paddles), and the processing
(pots, paddles, poles, thrashers, winnowing baskets). In an era of mechanization,
Anishinaabeg and non-Anishinaabeg developed machines to do the harvesting (airboats with
"speedhead" attachments like wireframe baskets) and processing (parching ovens and thrashing
drums). This second era of technocracy created some dissonance between the new technologies
which allowed for the separation of the stages of labour involved in caring for the crop, and the
traditions that fostered a familial closeness with the preparations for the wild rice season.
Beginning with the provincial incursions in the ricefields in the 1960s, and more increasingly
with provincial statistìcal collection from the 1970s, the era of technopoly has sought to
disassociate the Anishinaabe people from the Great Spirils garden. Through the usage of
provincial legislation and regulations, and bureaucractic control of data and definitions, and the
promulgation of research intended to wrest control of the rice from Anishinaabeg, the Ontario
government has introduced the era of technopoly into the Great Spirit's Garden. Technopoly is
now th-reatening to force the original peoples from the gifts the Creator has given them. Thus,
the provincial ideology of crown resources and economic development is confronting the
Anishinaabe ideology of the Great Spirit's Garden, their stewardship responsibility and their
identity as a people that this responsibility entails.
To relate and analyze this story of the Great Spirit's garden in Treaty #3 requires the
adoption of an Anishinaabe perspective, concepts and language. A model of analysis will
require attention to the specifics of manomitz in Treaty #3 as well as the necessity of making it
understandable to outsiders, and the goal of making one applicable to other situations of
aboriginal rights to resources. A model from the field of law, argued in the eastern United
States case on behalf of the Mashpee peoples, is a plausible answer to all these requirements
(Brodeur I9l8). "Supressed sovereignty" speaks of the continuation of the sovereignty or right
of self rule by a people, and at the same time, the activities of an outside force to overwhelm
34
and subvert that self rule. The model of "expressed or asserted sovereignty" and "suppressed
sovereignty" is well applicable to the story of Manito Gitigaan, the Great Spirit's Garden.
And, it fits well with the paradigm of organic rights, which grow and evolve within the people,
despite the effects of predators, disease, or environmental onslaughts.
To provide the underpinning for this model of expressed as opposed to suppressed
sovereignty, it is necessary to look to an interdisciplinary field of law. Legal pluralism
considers how customary or folk law is enhanced or undermined, and how state laws may be
modified or adjusted to make way for the reassertion or continuation of customary aboriginal
law, or both (Morse & Woodman 198'7; Dockstator 1993; Burrows 1993; Boldt 1993; Little
Bear 1989) . Legal pluralism provides an interdisciplinary perspective to add to the fìeld of
aboriginal or "immemorial" law which documents and analyzes EuroCanadian law and its
effects on aboriginal peoples (University of Manitoba Legal Pluralism Seminar, November
7992; see Chapter 14 for comments on Canadian Native Law and Anishinaabe Law).
In the discourse of legal pluralism, researchers are seeking the order of an "Indian
conünon law", or unwritten rules that have guided past behaviour and continue to do so today
(Zion, in Morse & Woodman 1987:123-4). To overcome the ethnocentric view that'custom' is
something less than or lower than 'law', or that (outside and imposed) government law is alone
"powerful and binding", the term "customary law" has been widely adopted (Zion, ibid).
Aboriginal customary law can be considered as "a definable body of rules, practices and
traditions accepted by the community or traditional society" which may exist "as part of an oral
culture, with no written codes" (Crawford et al, in Morse & Woodman 1987:37).
Legal analysis succinctly states that "state law may replace, reform or conserve the
norrns and concepts of customary law" (Morse & V/oodman 1987:1). The story of manomin
in Treaty #3 is one in which outside Nation-state law seeks to replace and usurp the customary
law of the Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg.In the final chapter, alternatives to this ethnocide
are discussed wherein traditional law would be recognized.
35
Anthropological analysis allows a reader to consider the nuances of such legal
alternatives. For example, Scott considers concessions to customary law which the majority
society may allow after a process of "sensitization", such as the higher courts'
acknowledgement of tradítional adoption in Inuit society (Scott inDyck & Waldram 1987:
321¡.2 A second approach of a nation-state is statutory recognition of aboriginal custom or
tradition or elements of it, such as the Child V/elfare Act of Ontario (RSO 1988) in recognizing
"customary care" of children. A third approach has been "overt and tacit recognition of custom
and tradition via treaties, which confer constitutional status" (Scott 1981:324). This laner
option may hold the elements of a settlement of the contentious issue of governing the Great
Spirit's Garden of wild rice, through the practical recognition and implementation of Treaty #3.
Within Canada, the Constitution Act. 1982. section 35 has entrenched a recognition and
affirmation of the "existing treaty and aboriginal rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada" in
the supreme law of the country. First Nations say that what needs to be discovered and
unlocked is the potential for such recognition to extend to aboriginal customary law taking
precedence within First Nations' jurisdiction (Little Bear at la 1984; Richardson 1990, 1993:
Smith. D. 1993).
It has been noted that "despite voluminous literature devoted to policy, legal and
administrative aspects of aboriginal self government in Canada", much of it "fails even to
mention the role of indigenous institutions" (Scott I98l:325). The conferences sponsored by
University of Lethbridge Native Studies academics and then edited into scholarly works are
major exceptions (Little Bear et al 1986; Boldt & Long 1984, 1985). This thesis seeks to
rediscover the raditional government inherent in the management of wild rice within the Treaty
#3 territory. This system of government is alluded to in the name used by the Anishinaabe
people for the wild rice plant: Manito gitigaan - the Great Spirit's Garden.
36
Endnotes:
1. "Ethnocide occurs when one cultural system destroys another through genocide or cultural
assimilation. An entire culture ceases to exist as a distinct cultural system" ... "The loss of
one's cultural system is the most devastating effect short of death that a human being can
experience, and to be forced to relinquish the entire set of understandings and feelings within
oneself derived from that lost culture is to lose an inrrinsic part of oneself - the cultural part. It
is a partial death, perhaps the most meaningful part of complete death" (Weiss, "The tragedy of
ethnocide: a reply to Hippler", in Bodley 1988:128, 126).
2. Simon v. The Queen [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387.
3. The author is indebted to Prof. Paul Chartrand, Commissioner of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, for pointing out that "early colonial courts immediately recognized the legal
force of aboriginal laws, for example, Connoll)¿ v. Woolrich". (See also the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self-
Government and the Cons titu tion, Ottawa : 1993).
37
Chapter Three:
Myths ol Manomin
"What is it about wild rice anyway?"
Mel Crystal, Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources
land claims negotiator, 1990.
The discovery that wild rice is not rice at all, leads one naturally into the
mystery thal surrounds the plant. A member of the grass family, wild rice is the only
native cereal grain of North America. lt is called "manomin " by the Anishinaabe people,
in reference to its sacred nature - "man " referring lo Kizhe Manito, the Great Spirit
who created this grain, and"min ", in reference to a "good berry" or "delicacy" (TP
Kinew 1 978).
The well developed and detailed language Anishinabeg have for the manomin
plant provide initial clues to the significance of ricing culture to the Anishinaabe
society and people. For example, the month of the harvest moon from mid August to mid
September is called Manominigiisis, the wild rice moon, or manominikegiisis, the wild
rice picking moon (TP Kínew 1979). The beliefs, ceremonies and activities attached to
this season may be described as Manominikenshii or Anishinaabe wild rice culture (TP
Kinew 1993). Elders relate a more ancient way of referring to wild rice is Manito
gitigaan (Alex Skead at Grand Council Treaty #3 Assembly, October 1988). Manito
gitigaan may be translated as the Great Spirit's Garden or the gift the Creator.
Wild rice (" zizania âQuatica")1 is "an annual aquatic grass that grows in shallow
lakes and rivers 2 throughout eastern and north central North America" (Aiken et al
1988:7). (Figure 2: Diagram of plant growth) lt grows from seed each year and owes its
expansive terrítory to the Aboriginal peoples who sowed ¡t beyond its origínal territory
(D.W.Moodie 1987; L. Syms 1982). Genetically, wild rice today is essentially the same
The Morphology of a Wild Rice Plant during the Life Cycle, Figure 2.2 in
Unies Report 1980:45
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39
as it was when first explorers found certain indigenous peoples of eastern North America
using it as a staple food.
ln botanical terms, these are the stages of rice growth. After the ice breaks in
spring, usually mid to late April, germination begins with the wild rice seed buried in
lhe mud underwater. lt sprouts a first root that grows to anchor the plant firmly against
lhe water current. The stem grows upward through the water, creating other branch
stems (tillers), from basal nodes just below the water. From this submerged stage,
thin, pale green ribbon like leaves appear floating on the surface of the water. This
floating leaf stage occurs in mid to late June, with 2-3 leaves per plant floating
according to the wind and the waves. (Figure 3 : Photos of manomin growing stages;
Figure 4: Growth chart, Unies Report 1980). Slowly these submerged leaves begin to
bend upward with the growth of the tiller, and aerial leaves emerge, larger and "more
robust". The uppermost leaf, called the flag, is surrounded by the developing flowering
panicle. Male spikelets are on the lower flexible branches with female spiklets
extending higher in the plant. Wind pollination starts in late July and continues until all
tillers are pollinated. Grains develop in a casing and are shed about four weeks after
fertilization. The grains change from milky texture to powdered flour to a hard shell,
and ripen gradually (Aiken et al 19BB: 11-20; Vennum 19BB: 17; van de Vorst
1987:33-34).
The grain has been used for centuries in a geographic area from west of Lake
Superior to southern Manitoba and into Wisconsin and Minnesota (Jenks'1901).(Figure
5). However, varieties of this species have been known to grow from Florida to northern
latitudes of 50 in Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan (Aiken et al 19BB:7). lndeed, the
ricefields of the rivers and lakes of easlern and north cenlral North America became "an
lndian paradise" for many tribes, offering a staple food source in the grain itself, as well
as attracting ducks, birds, muskrats, moose (Stickney 1896; Vennum 19BB).
Stages Growth: Photos of manomin beginning to grow above water on Sabaskong Bay,
trË-.=
Manomin at float¡ng stage, early June 1980'
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The wild rice plant "shatters" or ripens gradually, allowing several harvesting
times throughout a 3-4 week period. The grain not picked then falls into the water,
weighted by its heavier end and "rudder-like awn" to fasten itself in the mud close to the
parent plant (Aiken et al 19BB: 19). Regeneration will take place the following spring
after breakup. lt is estimated that only 2-5"/" of seed of the standing crop is needed to
regenerate an area, and dormant seed areas have been known to regenerate after an
absence of several years (van de Vorst, 1987: 35-36; Aiken et al 1988:20). Herb
Redsky of Shoal Lake #40 stated he personally observed regeneration after twenty
years' absence (1991).
The wild rice plant is longer than most cereals in Canada, extending one to three
metres above the surface of the water. The hull is not attached and can be threshed clean
after parching. However, it is difficult to remove without heating. Understanding this
plant led lhe Anishinaabeg, and other lndigenous peoples such as the Menominee (a people
named after this plant), to develop an intricate management and processing regime.
(Figure 6,7).
Herb Redsky of Shoal Lake #40 believes it was a vision or sacred dream that
originally led the Anishinaabe to the manomin plant . That vision allowed the
Anishinaabeg lo understand its structure and growth, enabling them to develop an
effective and efficient processing system and requiring a close management system (H.
Redsky 1991). lndeed, it is through fasting, visions, and ceremonies such as the chisiki
(shaking tent) that lhe Anishinaabe people learned lessons from the Creator. While
Elder Nancy Jones did not discuss the origin of the plant, she was adamant that "manomin
is sacred and the Anishinaabe have a responsibility to care for it" (August 1992).
Former Treaty #3 Grand Chief and Elder Machipiness (Robin Greene of Shoal Lake
#39) stated on many occasions, "Manomin is basic to the culture and religion of our
people" (CBC Fifth Estate program, "Grain of Dissent" 1980). ln 1981, during
Trudeau's drive for a "Made in Canada" constitution, more than'100 Chiefs of Ontario
44
passed a resolution at their annual assembly that adopted wild rice as "a symbol and
rallying point as an lndian resource guaranteed by Treaty and aboriginal rights"
(Assembly of the Chiefs of OnÌario, Thunder Bay, 1981, Resolution #81-6 ). The
resolution was part of the Chiefs' ongoing campaign for recognition of such rights to
lands and resources within any renewed constitution of Canada.
"Symbols can be multivocal", said History Professor Jennifer Brown in
explaining the cross on Namewin's drum of Berens River (Nov.B, 1993 Public Lecture
at the Manitoba Museum). The design on that drum could be an "aboriginal depiction of
the four directions" and its strong religious connotations, or "interpreted as a Maltese
cross and evidence of Christian influence" .
There are many voices that speak of manomin, as well. There are the voices who
speak of its cultural and religious significance; others who speak of its economic and
nutritional importance; and still others recognize its political symbolism. The latter
group see manomin as a powerful symbol of aboriginal and treaty rights recognized in
section 35 of the Canada Act. 1982. Others see manomin as a victory for provincial
governments in protecting crown resources "for all the people".
ln examining these many voices, we find that each has its own myths - again in
many senses. The Anishinaabe voices have the authoritative myths of legend and legacy of
generations past (,Afasokaanan ). These atasokaanan are sacred myths which "interface
between what can be known and what can never be discovered, the mystery that
transcends all human research" (Campbell 1990). Such myths are "important to live
life with the knowledge of mystery and your own mystery" and "bring us into a level of
consciouness which is spiritual" (Campbell 1990).
Thus, Anishinaabeg have their relationship lo manomin deeply ingrained within
their psyche, through the medium ol atasokaanan, as told by the Elders from generation
lo generation. These sacred slories and explanations originate with the atasokaanak , the
ancestors lhal Anishinaabeg see dancing in lhe wawatay,lhe northern lights. As Elder
45
Alex Skead of Wauzhushk Onigum relates, "there ís a word older than manomin, and that
is Manito gitigaan, the Great Spirit's Garden" (Annual Assembly of Grand Council Treaty
#3, October, 19BB). This concept embodies the understanding that the Great Spirít gave
a special gift to lhe Anishinaabe people, a gift that needs to be tended and cared for, like
in a garden. "Manito Git¡gaan also connotes the gift of food, sustinence, medicine. Eating
manomin at a ceremony is to us like taking mass to a Catholic." (TP Kinew 1992). To
call manomrn a plant is to demean it in the eyes of many Anishinaabeg.
Manomin is used in making offerings to the Creator. ln some Anishinaabe
ceremonies, wild rice is part of the food dish burned as an offering lo Kisha Manito .
"Even a small amount is enough for the Creator to do whatever is chosen, to feed others
in the life hereafter or to use in reseeding the plant on earth. ln funerals, a kind of
pemmican is made of wild rice, berries, tobacco to eat on the journey to the life
hereafter. My mother used manomin as a poultice to cure people, because of its
properties of absorption. Mothers would wean babies lo manomin in a fish broth.
Manomin was essential to our people because it could be kept for a long time" (T.P.
Kinew, 1992). 3
Non-lndian business voices have their own 'myths', the kind of fashioned facts
which Anishinaabe people know to be false. Yet the majority society repeats falsehoods
about aboriginal people daily, and does so with authority, through larger society's major
organs of communication - from newspapers and radio phone-in shows to government
reports and university lectures. lt is precisely the public exposure that renders these
daily falsehoods into a reality, and repetition in daily discourse that elevates them to
mythical status. Edelman posits that belief in such myths is "reassuring regardless of
validity" and the very fact that it is "widely accepted ..discourages skeptical inquiry"
(Edelman 1977:3). This is certainly the case wilh manomin andlhe Anishinaabe people
of Treaty #3, from early historical accounts to modern day government publications.
46
The earliest version of such 'myths' began with the first explorers who visited
the Boundary Waters ricebowl. "They reap, without sowing it, a king of rye which
grows wild in their meadows, and is considered quite superior to lndian corn" (Jesuit
Relations 44:275 in Grand Council Treaty #3, 1975:'1). Despite the presumptuousness
of thís observation, it has been so often repeated that it is today an accepted "fact". This
is a myth of major impact because it depicts lhe Anishinaabe people as mere gatherers
with a limited understanding of the plant, rather than the reality that their management
of manomin enabled it to grow and expand its territory. Accepting "they reap but do not
sow" myth allows newcomers unlimited access to this marvelous plant, and does not
convey any sense of the tending and care required of "Manito gitigaan ". And it allows
scientists, rice paddy farmers, non-lndian businessmen in the wild rice industry today
to state, and believe, that they and their non-lndian culture developed the science and
lechnology of wild rice.
Were they with us today, Fred Greene and Stuart Jack would laugh at such hubris.
"l took a Lands and Forests assistant (Ontario government) on the
lake one year. He came and stayed with my family and l. He was
amazed at how Shoal Lake (reserve) was controlling the wild rice at
Crowduck (Lake, in the Treaty #3 area now called Whiteshell in
Manitoba). We had Dave Keesick, a World War ll veteran, and James
Redsky, a respected Elder. (Note: James Redsky is also the key
informant for Selwyn Dewdney's celebrated book, Sacred Scrolls of
the Southern Ojibway.) Together, they would check the rice and
control the harvest. The people had agreed beforehand . When a white
flag went up, ricing would end for the day. The field would be rested.
They wouldn't say for how long... maybe one or two days. They wouldjust keep checking.
"We had a beaver dam at the opening of Crowduck Lake . We would
open it up and regulate the water levels for the rice to grow.
Especially during the '50's and '60's." (Fred Greene, 1990)
Referring to an earlier time of the twenties and thirties, Fred said,
"To me, the old way was perfect. The people would call a meeting
and appoint one Elder to decide when to pick, when to rest the rice. lf
one area was rested. they'd all move to another. That's when I saw
freedom. That's when I lived freedom. The way it was is, in my mind,
almost perfect way to manage the rice." (Fred Greene, 1990).
4/
"We trapped around the fields to prevent muskrats from eating the
roots. We shooed away blackbirds (who love to eat the premature
grains). We checked the rice constantly and would not allow picking
too early. We taught our children how to pick so that the grain came
smoothly off the stalk into the canoe and no stems were broken. We
developed all sorts of ways of harvesting the rice. ln years of low
water, a picker would walk the shoreline on showshoes and hold a sack
as an apron for the rice to fall into as they picked." (S. Jack, 197S)
There are descríptions of this detailed processing and management regime of the
Anishinaabeg in historical accounts (Hilger 1951; Densmore 1979; Vennum 1988; van
de Vorst 1985 ) The accounts recorded that the Anishinaabeg actually had this intimate
knowledge of manomin, understood ils ecology and based a whole system of technology,
economy and culture upon this knowledge. However, there is no analytical summation
that this management was government.
ln the one classic study for the U.S. Bureau of Ethnology at the turn of the
century, "The Wild Rice Gatherers of the Upper Great Lakes" by Jenks, the author
mentions production techniques, processing, "property rights", consumption, and
"general social and economic interpretations", but Jenks does not name any aspects of
these as the regulatory practices of ricing tribes (Jenks 1899). Jenks was an academic
of his time, convinced that his civilization "had reached the pinnacle of cultural
development", while hunter-gatherers were thought to be "representatives of an
original, primeval society of human beings who had progressed least .. and remained
stagnant in a less productive and less efficent mode of existence" (van de Vorst
1987:30). This bias of anthropology did not change until the 1970s when "careful
studies of productivity and time-energy expenditure in primitive societies revealed that
even the most technologically simple peoples were able to satisfy all their subsistence
requirements with relatively little effort "(Bodley 1976: 51).
The Anishinaabe managemenl of Man¡to Gitigaan is impressive in its
sophistication. ln its details of governance, there is a general consensus as to who would
be the Manominiki ogimaa, the "rice chief". Each season, an Elder with knowledge of
4B
both the ecology and ceremonial aspects of manomin would be chosen. From that time on,
the Elder was responsible for checking the ricefields, and the kernals lhemselves, and
monitoring their development. Earlier in the season, families may check their own
ricefields and some marked them, by binding the stalks with basswood twine. This
served the dual purpose of protecting the ripening stalks from wind and birds, but also
marking territorial boundaries to be respected. (This may have been a more prominent
activity in Minnesota than Treaty #3, according to my informants.)
times":
Fred Greene related "how they controlled the harvesting and the ricing in the old
I recall the older, particularly the elderly people, used to gather
the people around to discuss how they were going to harvest the wild
rice. They appointed a member of the community and many of them
knew how rice grew, how long it took to mature in the field, and when
to go harvesting the rice. Many of them knew this, of course, but they
had to appoint a member of the community to be the person to look
after the harvesting, when he would say 'we will pick rice' and when
to get off the ricefield and so forth. He was the one who governed the
ricing. One man.
lf there was another field somewhere, another man was appointed
to look after a field - maybe 3-4 fields in that area. Each one was
appointed to look after the rice. Sometimes if a ricefield was
finished, the rice that was ready to be picked was finished, they'd shut
that part of the field off - or the lake or bay. And they were allowed to
go picking other places 'cause they were always on top of the rice,
always knew when to go picking and when to lay off."(Fred Greene 1990)
Annie Wilson of Manito Rapids spoke of this same regulatory system
where the "Elders always decided things" and "they all obeyed all their Elders". She also
described ceremonies that accompanied the harvest:
"The first day, they would pick the rice and finish it (note: f¡nish
means to process it ready for cooking). They would have a feast and
speak of the Great Spirit. They would pray for a good fall, no storms,
strong winds, whatever. lt was just that asking the Great Spirit for
things like no strong winds or hail storms so the rice crop would not
be destroyed by such. This rice was cooked and all ate from the bowl
that was offered to the Great Spirit. There was a small portion taken
from this bowl and placed in a clean place. This portion was put in a
birch bark container which was very small, along with some tobacco."(4. Wilson in Holzkamm 1989:28)
49
It may be the rice chief, or more likely another Elder, who would lead these
ceremonies (TP. Kinew 1990). The rice chief would also be called upon to resolve
disputes, for example, between pickers wishing to use the same ricefield or canoe
(Grand Council Treaty #3, 1992 pamphlet).
Nol surprisingly, though, it is the Jenks' view that predominates in wider
society today; the mid 1970s'revolution of anthropological thinking has not filtered
through. lt is not in keeping with the myths of either the "lazy lndian" or the "noble
savage" to believe that Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg developed the science, technology and
governance of wild rice (Mathews 1992). Such attitudes lead to an unqueslioning
acceptance of cherished concepts such as "progress", "development" and "more is
beller". ln order for such myths to take hold, a "displacement" or
"pushing/urging/pressing/shunting aside (or under) in order to make disappear" must
take place, such that the memories of "different than we think today" are not allowed
(Lutz 1 990:1 73).
Thus, wider society does not know, for example, that during the fur trade era,
Alexander Henry and others reported, were it not for their trade in wild rice provided
by the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg, the traders and voyageurs would not have survived:
"Without large quantities of wild rice, the voyage beyond the Saskatchewan River could
not have been persecuted to its completion" (Alexander Henry speaking on Lake of the
Woods trade in 1774, in Grand Council Treaty #3, 1975). Alexander Henry is also
quoted in "Manomin Wild Rice, A Recipe Book and History of Wild Rice", published by the
Ontario Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, circa 1989; however, emphasis
in this book is on the wild rice as a "valuable part of the economy of Northwestern
Ontario", with a "value to the primary producer alone (being) close to $1,000,000" in
1977. There is no reference to the fact the "primary producers " are the Treaty #3
Anishinaabeg, nor of their particular rights. All language in this booklet seeks to be
50
neutral or silent on issues, and thus, promotes Ontario's view of a generic, cash crop.4
Yet, despite such testimony, non-lndians continue to believe that white
entrepreneurs are the "pioneers" who began the wild rice industry in the 1930's
(Dedication in the Ratuski "Wild Rice Cookbook" 1990). This myth of the non-lndian
entrepreneur opening a new market is readily accepted by the public and resolutely
denies the luxury of "skeptical inquiry" (Edelman 1977:3). lnstead, the historical
account that non-lndians in Northwestern Ontario prefer is that "great crops of wild
rice (could) be obtained in each place with the outlay of little labour", bringing to the
imagination the myth or stereotype of the lazy lndian (Stickney 1896:121). Provincial
government officials continue to capitalize on such widely held beliefs in order to
advance their own political agenda of controlling wild rice as a natural resource (see
Chapter 12,13).
Yet, as chapter six documents below, lhe Anishinaabe people know that wild rice
is guaranteed by Treaty #3 as a resource which they can continue to use "as by the past".
An objective reading of what "as by the past" entails is the goverance of the ricefield,
including:
- the extension of areas through seeding,
-management of the growth of the plant through water level control, removal of
competing plants and debris, restriclion or removal of predators,
-monitoring of the growth,
-preparation and apprenticeship of pickers, and the continuation of traditional practices
of hand-harvesting ("..rigorous adherence to disciplined ricing practice will ..raise
production" as well as strengthen tradition", van de Vorst, 1987:155) (Figure 6)
-"the construction of housing near the manomin beds; the manufacture of canoes to
gather and plant manomin; the fabrication of containers and tools for harvesting,
processing, and storing manomin; and the collection of firewood" (for processing and
cooking) (Grand Council Treaty #3, 1992a, "Wild Plant Useage") (Figure 7)
-preparation for appropriate ceremonies and continuation of cultural traditions,
-continuing the tradition of choosing the rice chief(s) and the community díscipline of
abiding by his/her experienced guidance and decisions 
,
6. Erements of Ricing Regime, Gathering wird Rice, Rainy Lake
['
5i
It \l
I -ñ
J4 Èjry
.1- '' t*.
Powassin patching a canoe, photos by Linde (n,d.)
i+r
ì
-l
52
-continuing the tradition of respect for family territories and the rice chief(s) settling
disputes
-utilizing manomin as a staple in the Anishinaabe daily diet, as well as for medicinal
and ceremonial use
-processing, both hand and mechanized
-marketing and retailing
-continuing research and development into
processing and marketing
appropriate technologies for harvesting,
Given the detail of the Treaty #3 Anishinaabe system of governance in the Great
Spirit's garden , a re-examination is required of the question: "What is it about wild
rice anyway?". Modern science asserts that wild rice is not rice. When consideration is
given to documentation of how it has been tended by Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg for
centuries, is it really wild?
From this quandary comes the question, if Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg have a
system of governance in the Great Spirit's Garden that is identifiable, documented, and
practiced, then is this not a system of law?
The Anishinaabe governance of Manito gitigaan can be characterized as customary
law rather than codified. Unwritten, traditional law - or "immemorial law" - has been
the subject of disparagement in Canadian courts, subject to the same myths of public
debate that have too long gone without analysis. For example, in the Delgamuukw case of
1992, tried in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Chief Justice McEachern stated
that Gitskan-Wet'suwet'un tradilions, presented to the court as law , are "too flexible
and uncertain" and "often not followed" to be considered law. ln response, Law Professor
Catherine Bell of the University of Alberta, counters that the same description could be
equally applicable to English Canadian common law (Legal Pluralism Seminar,
University of Manitoba, November 1992). University of Manitoba Dean of Law, Roland
Penner, described the McEachern judgment "astonishing":
53
"... no reference is made to contemporary instruments of
international law and morality...but only to decisions of the Privy Council,
a colonialist court specifically established in the middle of the nineteenth
century to wield legal power over the vast British Empire, upon which, it
was once said, the sun will never set. Well, the sun has set on that empire,
but the decisions of the Privy Council apparently still cast a very long
shadow.
"The right of the lmperial Crown to proceed with a settlement and
development of North America without aboriginal concurrence was
confirmed by the Privy Council in the St. Catherine's Milling case...
can it really be argued that aboriginal rights depended on the constructs of
common law, which constructs were intended, in fact, to do nothing more
than derogate from and invalidate the notion of inherent aboriginal rights."(Roland Penner, Dean of University of Manitoba Faculty
of Law, in Cassidy, 1992:248-249)
It is evident even to such legal scholars that what is clouding the debate regarding
Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg and their rights to care for the Great Spirit's garden are the
myths perpetrated against them. The symbol of manomin is relevant in many contexts,
for it is the wildness of wild rice that connotes the wildness of the lndian and the areas
where it grows. lt is as difficult for non-lndians to see wild rice as a cultivated, managed
crop in the northern wilderness, as it is for them to believe the Anishinaabeg developed
lhe science, technology and governance of manomin . This is not, however, a difficult
concept for the Anishinaabe people who live wilh manomin as an integral part of their
lives and culture.
Another myth that prevents understanding and acceptance of Anishinaabe
governance over this natural resource is the dual concept of "progress" and
"development". Just as Jenks saw the Anishinaabeg on an evolutionary scale, so too do
non-lndians in Northwestern Ontario. Ben Ratuski, a Keewatin, Ontario businessman in
wild rice, dedicated his recipe book, Wild Rice. Naturally Yours, to his lale father, "One
of the original pioneers in the Wild Rice industry,..who started marketing Wild Rice
from the Lake of the Woods region some fifty-five years ago (circa 1935)(Ratuski
1990:1). Within such a short collective memory of EuroOanadian newscomers, there is
no acknowledgement of the discovery and inventiveness of the "tool-making society" that
brought this plant inlo use as a food, medicine, and lifegiving source of connection to the
54
Creator. There is also no acknowledgement of the original technology developed over
centuries by the Anishinabeg and neighbouring lribal nations, nor their own innovative
mechanization.
Big Grassy River ricer Ben Copenace created roasting and thrashing machines to
process the rice many decades ago, but his contribution is not mentionned in any review
of approriate technology in Northwestern Ontario, although it precedes many others
(Figure B: Photo of Ben's machine copied by his son, Fred Copenace, Big Grassy First
Nation).
With the introduction of harvesting and processing machines, non-lndians came
to believe their own myths that they were the masters of all nature and machines could
conquer all obstacles. The development of a "technocracy" in which the technology of
machines takes over the process of production, does lead people away from their
primary role and its integration with their cultural, spiritual and religious life
(Postman 1993). This was definitely not the thought-world of the Anishinaabeg who
nurtured the plant as a gift of the Creator.
The use of mechanization in the ricefields is a controversial topic in several
respects. As is usually the case, no credit is given to the Anishinaabeg who also
experimented with mechanical harvesters and processors, and developed prototypes of
their own. Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg developed motorized parchers and thrashers for
processing the rice. Some of their designs are still used loday as labour saving devices in
family ricing. And, as is related in Chapter 1 1, the Kagiwiosa Manomin processing plant
at Wabigoon First Nation, Treaty #3, has developed, with the Mennonite Central
Committee agricultural engineers, a processor which relies on wood burning technology
rather than gas fires. ln using traditional Anishinaabe processors adapted in a meld of
mechanized and traditional know-how, Wabigoon considers their brand superior lo
others.
55
7. Anishinaabe lndustrial Desiqn Fred Copenace at thrashing machine, Big Grassy 19gO
:$*ï HJï'i --_I t- tri.Ë
F;
Thrashing machine by Ben Copenace
56
Mechanical pickers for harvesting the rice are far more controversial, and in
many more places than Treaty #3. The first prototypes developed did uproot plants and
took so much of the seed that many fields did not regenerate. Traditional harvesting
allows for natural reseeding, when seeds fly across the canoe and into the water. The
quantity of rice taken by such machines and the violence to the fields led them to be
legislated out of the ricefields of Minnesota and Wisconsin (F. Green 1990; P.F.Lee
1990). This remains the case today.
Once airboats became available, Anishinaabeg developed some of their own
mechanical pickers by modifying boats, and adding a Volkswagen or airplane engine and a
speedhead. (A speedhead is a wiremesh scoup mounted on the front of the picking
machine. The machine speeds across the field, with rice grains falling into the wire
mesh.)(Figure B: Mechanical harvester of Ron Sandy, Northwest Angle #33, with
daughter Ronni and Tobasonakwut Kinew, 1984). Today First Nations like Shoal Lake,
Northwest Angle, Eagle Lake and Manitou Rapids all use airboat harvesters to increase
their harvest.
Anishinaabeg are often in the forefront of appropriate technology. The "Osnaburg
picker" is a model which puts a speedhead of wire mesh across a canoe driven by a small
molor mounted on a flatboard back. The motor was prevented from uprooting the rice by
a board nailed to underside of the canoe at the flat rear where the motor is mounted. This
underwater panel then leans diagonally backwards and under the motor blades. The canoe
would be propelled across the fields and the rice would be caught in the mesh of the
lengthy bucket of the speedhead. This mechanical picker was only useful in the thinner
fields of norlhern climes such as Osnaburg, just north of Treaty #3 territory. (Figure
Ba: Martin Tuesday with Osnaburg picker, Big Grassy, 1980).
By the 1980s, the "technopoly" of the mid twentieth century led non-lndians to
believe the answers to wild rice production were in mastering the information about
wild rice through scientific studies and data manipulation, and government legislating
57
Mechanical Harve
r o o 
" "î n ä n ;ï¡' "-i,i"t_ : ï 
" 
:,îH.,",,Åî 
n1 :, 
nu? !:, ln"¿, " " o
fits on keel at bottom
of freighter canoe,
and prevents m.otor
propellor from
uprooting rice plant
as boat skims across
rice fields.
Martin Tuesday at Big Grassy-with Osnaburg ,,r,. nråËr,.,.
Sept. 1980 Chief
Martin Tuesday of Big
Grassy shows the
Osnaburg model of
mechanical harvester:.
r- -J
This "speed-head" which
catches the rice bY
sittinq at the bow of
the canóe is hand-
built then covered
with screen and a
bottom catcher added.
8a.
.f
The hand-made board
59
regulations and policies to control the harvest and sales. This is a definite "surrender of
culture to technology", a capitulation (Postman 1993). lnformation technology and
legislative control dismiss not only the symbiotic relationship between the indigenous
peoples and an indigenous plant resource, but also the identity of the people whose sacred
ties with, respect for, and knowledge otmanomin led to its introduction into present day
society.
It is precisely the dichotomy between humans and nature, "the belief in man's
calling to dominate nature", "the weslern thought of radical disjuncture between nature
and culture, man and animals" that has led to the modern crisis of pollution, global
warming, and doomsday scenarios (Christian Bay in Bodley 1988:267; Maybury-Lewis,
1992: 55). Modern, technology- driven society has "overlooked the necessity of
respecting nature's limits and nature's vulnerability" (Christian Bay in Bodley 198B:
267 -268) .
the Anishinaabeg accepted a humbler role within creation. The Anishinaabe
system of governance of the Great Spirit's Garden intricately joined sound ecological
practices wilh the cosmology of the people, a kind of "ecosophy", as coined by Swedish
anthropologist Kaj Arhem (Maybury-Lewis, 1992:55). Yet, what the 'moderns' fail to
recognize is that through this ecosophy, under an indigenous system of governance, lhe
Anishinaabeg were able to ensure the continuance of wild rice as well as extend its
te r ri to ry.
The 'myth' of progress has almost reached the status of an "all-encompassing
myth", that is, one we believe in so much that it is taken for granted as true, and any
challenge to it present an angry response (David Keenan Lower1993). Western
societies claim universality for its myths, but an examination of "progress" from a
Native viewpoint exposes the irrationality of that certainty. By any measure of standard
of living, health, mortality rates, nutrition, lndigenous peoples around the world have a
lower standard after contact with western society (Bodley 1982). yet, "..almost by
60
definition, members of the culture of consumplion consider another culture's resources
to be underexploited and to use this as a justification for appropriating them" (Bodley
1982:7). Underutilization was one of the main rationales for the imposition of the
1960 Ontario Wild Rice Harvesting Act and the Ontario government's 1g70's attack on
Anishinaabe control of wild rice in block areas throughout much of Treaty #3 (See
Chapter I ).
The 'myth' of progress allows modern scientists and corporations to patent the
medicines of the"rain forest without consultation, credit or royalties to the lndigenous
peoples. lt leads to the same hubris that enables a non-aboriginal to apply to the
Canadian patent office for official sanction of the age-old Anishinaabe process of
"popping" wild rice (Globe & Mail, Social Studies section, Nov.11,1993; Willie Wilson
at Rainy Lake Tribal Chiefs meeting, Dec. 20,1993).
Myths operate on two different planes within Treaty #3 territory. Wider
society's underlying 'myths' serve to justify action against indigenous peoples and their
laws and customs. Anishinaabe 'myths' define who a people are and are kept private to
lheir own membership lest they be ridiculed. There is no communication or
understanding between the mythology of these two peoples precisely because their
'myths' work on differing levels of consciousness. Wider society's 'myths' seem, to the
people that hold them, to be founded in science and objectivity, while the Anishinaabe
'myths' reaffirm for the Anishinaabeg the spiritual connection of their people to the
resources as the Creators's gifts to the original peoples. As Joseph Campbell explains,
myths relate to "what we cannot know" (Campbell 1990). To connect the two worlds
would seem to require nothing less than a paradigm shift that would incorporate the
sacred and the secular. The Anishinaabeg themselves, however, carry their myths into
their seasonal activities regarding manomin, which serves to further integrate manomin
into the Anishinaabe psyche.
6l
Endnotes:
1. "The genus, zizania, was chosen to describe a plant specimen sent lo Holland from
Virginia in 1739. lt comes from the Greek word, zizanion, a weed of the Mediterrean
grain fields thought to be the tares of biblical parabale" (Aiken et al, 1988).
2. lts preferred habitat includes shallow waters, yet either too shallow ot too deep or
sudden fluctuations in water levels can severely affect production (Aiken, et al,
1988:39). A slight current in the water also aids the growth of manomin (Aiken et al
19BB: 39-41) .
3. Storing food was an important aspect of making their annual seasonal round. The
people of Northwest Angle, lake of the Woods, live at a place called "Aanumakee
WaZhing", which could be translated as "Thunderbird's Nest", but, according to Elder
Ians (Ron Sandy) actually refers lo 'the people who would cross the lake and store their
food in caches'. Aanamukeewazh is the name for a medicine bag. Aanamuk, the red earth
of the Mite'iwin also a form of food (Kinew, 1992).
4. Although at the time of writing and publication, the Paypom Treaty stating the wild
rice promise was in the public domain (as of October 1981), this Ontario Government
Recipe Book and History of Wild Rice fails to mention Treaty #3 in any form, whether as
a nation to nation agreement or as territory. The reference is always made to
"northwestern Ontario". As well, Ojibways (Anishinaabe) are only referred to as "the
lribe", after the original reference. And there is no mention of traditional caretaking
particularly seeding by the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg .
62
Chapter Four
Manominikenshii and the mystique oÍ manomín
The sacred myths record the spiritual connection lhe Anishinaabeg have with
Manito gitigaan . Yet it is the actual partaking in the annual harvest that develops the
visceral attachment. This is so strong it has been described as the mystique of manomin,
that is, "the body of attitudes that become associated with the thing and give it mythical
or supernatural status" (Webster's Dictionary, 3rd edition). I Th¡s is
Manominikenshii, the culture of manomin (Klnew 1994).
It is through the family and communal sharing of the harvest that the
Anishinaabeg feel so related lo manomin and their responsibility as expressed in
"Manito gitigaan". lt may be supposed that the converse may also be true: through
continuing years of high water levels (Chapter 11), the disruption in annual harvesting
may have lessened the bond lhal Anishinaabeg feel for manomin. Yet, it remains a
perennial topic at Grand Council Treaty #3 meet¡ngs of Chiefs and Elders. And, the
Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg have sought to overcome this weakening of a sacred, cultural
bond by continuing the oral tradition regarding manomin. Treaty #3 First Nations are
ensuring that school curriculum of schools on reserve, and the Native language
component in schools off reserve, include wild rice in several ways. The Native language
instructors working for the Fort Frances-Rainy River School Board, and some from
neighbouring reserve schools, have developed curriculum materials, relating the
language and customs of wild rice (Ojibwe Language Program, Fort Frances-Rainy River
Board of Education, 1990). Lake of the Woods Ojibway Cultural Centre near Kenora has
published a book of photos regarding the harvesting and processing of manomin wi1h
recipes (Lake of the Woods Ojibway Cultural centre 1995). Science and social studies
from elementary and high schools on reserves hold demonstration days when community
63
adults and Elders show and involve the youngsters in the processing of wild rice. ln
years of low crop yield, the green rice is obtained from areas where a crop was able to
be harvested. While this community activity cannot replace the family experience of
ricing itself, these activities illustrate once again the significance Treaty #3 people
place upon manomin . lt is worth noting that the sheer hard work of 'ricing' does not
take away from these pleasureable and memorable times.
"l live for that first green rice right out on the lake.. you just grab a handful and
chew it right there..Mmmm!" said Eli Carpenter of Whitedog, capturing the feeling of
Anishinaabe people in anticipation of the ricing season.
The sensory experiences of the ricefield yield an annual yearning so strong it
seems almost instinctual. You can hear the canoes whispering the rice stalks apart, the
swirl of the waler when the poler pushes, the brushing of the sticks along the plant, and
the spill of the grains into the bottom of the canoe. Memories are built on those sounds.
The close relationships on the ricefields are echoed in the laughter of the people, the
chit-chat of the picker and poler in a canoe, or good hearted kidding across the field from
one canoe to another: "Remember Agnes screaming and shaking the rice worms out of her
clothes? !"
And the smell is like no other. A sweet, pungent smell of rice, swelled with
moisture. The sight of the glistening golden brown manomin, some red grains on a
slender green stalk, looking so fragile. Yet this stalk is strong enough to withstand strong
winds and even the bending by picking sticks and canoe, to upright itself again.
Being in the canoe in the ricefield is assuredly a super-natural experience. The
ricefield is like a wheatfield on water , where the picker and the poler are both within it
and a part of it. As the picker gazes up at the sky, that harvester can feel a communion
with the Creator and all the gifts bestowed upon the Anishinaabeg .
The harvesting season, Manominikigiizis (the ricing moon) or
Manominikayigiizis (the rice making moon), when the moon is full and golden call for
64
bustling community activity (Translations by TP Kinew). Everyone begins the annual
procedure of getting the canoe, picking sticks, pole, and bags ready. The remembrances
of this time of year from mid August to mid September are some of the warmest of the
Anishinaabe Nation. The exigencies of modern life have shortened the harvesting period
to a couple of weeks when it used to stretch into October or the first snowfall (S. Jack,
1975; van de Vorst 1987; A. Wilson in Holzkamm 1989). lt is certainly a time of
family togetherness, with several generations and families bound together by the
expectation of and cooperative effort required by a good harvest.
The late twentieth century generation of leaders of Treaty #3 grew up as "canoe
brats", a term Philip Gardner of Eagle Lake uses to describe his youngest remembrances
on the ricefields. Children were expected to play around the shoreline campgrounds, with
some older ones watching, while other children joined their grandparents on the
ricef ields.
"My grandmother was the one who taught us. We lived the typical
nomadic life out on Rainy Lake. We picked rice and roasted it, and
sturgeon. We picked berries. I remember the social times. PowWows on
the ricefields. Fun times about 50 years ago (1940s). My grandmother
would tell us atasokaanon , the real traditional stories. Then the priests
would come to take us away to residential school and tell us we were
pagans."
Mitigomukakiins, Raymond Bruyere,1990
Unlike non-Aboriginal families whose closest family t¡mes may be Christmas
holidays and birthdays, Anishinaabe memories of family celebration are based upon
seasonal activities. lt was only during the summer months that their families were
allowed, by Canadian law, to be together. The rice harvest at lhe end of the summer was
one of the closest times for family relationships. Yet these pleasant memories were also
intermingled with the bitter sadness of separation, when the priests came to take all the
school age children away to Fort Frances, Kenora or Mclntosh residential schools. This is
likely another reason why the manomin harvest has such an inlense emotional tie for
65
Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg - it was one of the few times of the year when the people lived
again on the land, with close family and tribal ties.
The harvesl fields brought relations together from many surrounding reserves.
While the lndian Act separated people into reserves, assigned band numbers, and forced
out the "enfranchised" relatives who no longer had a band member, the rice fields
brought everyone back together. Peter Seymour remembers returning to Lake of the
Woods as a veteran after the second World War. That was in 1947, when manomin
covered the entrance and most of Obabikon Bay. His uncle, Miskwakapince (Jim Elliot),
a Grand Chief of Treaty #3, invited everyone to come and pick, to share the bounty.
Many, many families came from all parts of Lake of the Woods, and relatives from both
Canadian and United States sides of Rainy River.
Ann Wilson explained:
"They (Rainy River people) used to go to Nett Lake, U.S.A., for the
ricing..or to the Rainy Lake, whichever was the best place or where there
was plenty of wild rice. lt changed from year to year. We would be at
Rainy Lake, whitefish Lake, and one year in Lake of the woods, wherever
the rice was plentiful. At that time Bands did not go to certain lakes to
pick rice. They amalgamated together wherever there was plenty of rice..
They gathered together to have their ceremonial feats and they were
precautioned as to how they would harvest their rice, what days to pick
and rest their rice fields. Their ricing periods would be extended as long
as possible" (Holzkamm, 1989:25).
Nancy Morrison recalls travelling with her husband to the Whiteshell area on the
Manitoba side of Treaty #3 in the 1950s. lt was all part of the twentieth century
"annual round" (Waisberg 1979; Vennum 19BB) :cutting pulpwood and living at the
camp in the winter; guiding all summer, also picking blueberries in the summer, and
rice in the late summer-early fall, going to where the work and the resources were.
"Steve (Copenace, her husband) was a good provider then. He
would guide all summer and cul wood in the winter. we'd live at the
pulpwood camp. ln the summer, we'd all go by canoe to Sand point off
Dogtooth Lake and píck blueberries. We'd stay there till ricing time, then
we might spend a few days in Kenora spending our berry money and we'd
get on the boxcar and head for Malachi. some (Anishinaabe ) people used
to live there. lt was bush then, in the middle of nowhere. But we'd get out
and pick rice there for a while, then got on the boxcar again and head for
the whiteshell. ..4 truck would meet us and take us to the ricefield.
66
There'd be a whole group of us - a party - some of (husband's)
relatives, my grandmother (who was also with a Copenace), Alex
Copenace's parents, George Crow's grandparents. Our own little group.
There were lots of little groups around the Whiteshell area - people from
Kenora, Shoal Lake, Whitedog, Whitefish Bay, Fort Alex "(note: all are
Treaty #3 reserves except the last, known also as sagkeeng reserve in
Manitoba) (Nancy Morrison, 1992).
This scene was repeated in major ricing areas throughout Treaty #3. Families
would camp together under the direction of one elder, sometimes called the 'rice chief in
non-Anishinaabe observation, but referred to as Manominiki ogimaa by the
Anishinaabeg:
"My grandparents used to camp at Log River with all of us kids, parents
.. many families from all over .. sabaskong (onegaming), Northwest Bay,
Manitou. Old man Shebabgegit (Petung ) was the one who would check the
rice and say when it was OK to pick and when to give it a rest."
(Shtatim, Tony Copenace, Onegaming, 1gg4)
The manominiki ogimaa had specific duties: to check the rice personally during the
growing season, and more often closer to harvest time, and decide when to pick and when
to 'rest' the rice during harvesting. These decisions affected the duration and quality of
the harvest because manomin ripens at differing times throughout the harvest. As
Azawashkwagoneb (Green Feather, also called Fred Greene) of Shoal Lake #39 stated,
the rice chief's intimate knowledge of the rice and the people's willingness to be
regulated by this "one man" led to an "almost perfect system":
"Years ago, I think it was easier to control. The people listened to
the elders when they said, 'it's time to pick', they went picking. Or 'don't
pick', then they didn't go. That way, everyone was happy, everyone was
waiting for the next instruct¡ons to come. lt would come maybe the next
morning, or even at noon. The man in charge is always out there, checking
and watching the rice, because you can literally see the rice that is ready,
hanging. lt looks dark on the grains. .. And it's no use to go out there,
because they say, 'you're hurting the rice'. I remember going in the
ricefields 'cause they'd say the grain is ready, chock full and ready to
pick, even though it was picked maybe a day and half ago.
The harvesting season was prolonged right into September. I
remember picking until the snow started to fall in late September. That
was the benefit of harvesting the rice that was ready and leaving the
ungrown ones until they were ready to be harvested" (Fred Green, 1gg0).
67
The "one in charge" also had to resolve any disputes. The carrying out of such
duties was the continuation of the ancient role of the 'rice chief' and harkens back
centuries before to the rock painling of prehistoric times (See Chapter 5 on Pre-Treaty
times).
A specific ceremony marked the beginning of the harvest:
"Before anyone would start picking though, the old man Copenace(husband to my grandmother) would take some fruit and food and tobacco
and say a few words of prayer and then burn (the dish of food). We,d give
thanks and (then the actual harvesting could begin).
Each group would have an Elder who would go campfire to campfire
and tell everyone, 'today we don't go out' or '(go) for a few days' and
that's mostly the reason why they picked a long time."
(Nancy Morrison, 1992)
Raymond Bruyere remembers the same ceremony on Rainy Lake, to the south, as
does Philip Gardner at Eagle Lake to the east, and Herb Redsky on Shoal Lake, the
northwest arm of Lake of the Woods, and Annie Wilson of Rainy River to the south. The
prayer gives thanks to the Creator for the bountiful harvest and humbly requests that
the winds will stay away and the people be kept safe throughout the harvest time. lt is
the same prayer mentioned by lndian agent Robert Pither in the'1890's (Jenks 1899)
and recorded by Eagle Lake Elder, Aaginjigoneb, Fred lndian in the Grand Council Treaty
#3 -Anishinaabe Manomin Co-op film, Harvest of the Moon (1974).
Shuniaagoneb (Stuart Jack) of Onigaming told of the special dances in
celebration of the harvest - "not like the PowWows today but a real "shake'em up dance"
(S. Jack, 1975). His oldtime colleague at the early Cecilia Jaffrey residential school
then al Shoal Lake, Pinotinoway (Walter Redsky) sings one of those songs on the NFB
tape for the uncompleted film, "Manomin" (Dufaux 1981).
Across Treaty #3, the reverence for manomin endures:
"The pickers take their first handful of manomin and place it with
some tobacco into the water with a prayer of thanksgiving. lt may be an
individual act or one shared by husband and wife, grandparent and child,
but we give thanks to the Great spirit. After ricing, the p¡ckers from the
whole area join together for a pow-wow and feast of wild rice, ducks,
fish and berries" (P. Kinew in Avery & Pawlik 1979:35).
6B
This continues today even in the most unlikely places. Herb Redsky of Shoal Lake
prefers mechanical harvesting, to oblain a larger harvest in a shorter time, and
increase profits. He is joined by two brothers who also use machines, his sons who assist
in packing the rice, and his wife who drives truckloads of the green rice to the processor
in Keewalin, beside Kenora. Yet, the three brothers too, at the beginning of each harvest,
meet together, and take some of the first few grains of rice with some tobacco, offer it
into the water, and say the prayer of thanksgiving to the Creator (Herb Redsky 1990).
Philip Gardner of Eagle Lake follows Elders' advice of making an offering into the water.
"l take a coin, some cloth and tobacco and place it along the shoreline - the waves will
take care of the rest. I say thank you in whatever way I think we should" (Philip Gardner
1990). Such an offering and prayer is made by Anishinaabe people throughout the
lakes, rivers and bays of Treaty #3 territory each harvest time.
When I lived at Onigaming in 1970s and 1980s, particularly the bumper crops
of 1972-74, I could feel the community's anticipation of the rice season as the summer
days turned colder. The Elders, Shuniaagoneb (Stuart Jack) and Anama'egaabo (Bob
lndian), would be sent to check the rice each day. They would return with reports that
filtered through the community, "a few more days", "maybe by the end of the week".
when the word that the rice was "ready" was sent out, the people too were ready -
camping gear, tents or tarpaulins, blankets, axes, matches, pots and pans as well as
specially carved ricing sticks, knife and shovel for the other tasks of the rice field. And,
a canoe and paddles, of course.
The home community became almost a ghosl town for ten days to two weeks, as
extended families camped on ricefields, and spread out onto smaller, nearby bays, in
areas that the grandparent had harvested as a child. The small bays closest to the home
community at Onigaming was reserved for older grandparents and children who did not
have the wherewithal to reach the outlying rice fields. lt is no exaggeration to say that
everyone participated.
69
The inauguration inlo An¡sh¡naabe ricing culture begins at birth, with families
camping on the ricefields and all generations helping. Watching from the¡rkinaagan
(cradleboard),the baby becomes imbued with the smells, sights and sounds of the rice
harvest. Elder Bert Yerxa of Couchiching, the subject of a film "The Rice Dancer", first
remembers ricing at about age 5 on Rainy Lake. His family used to portage in to a bay
where lots of people from nearby reserves were camped together - Couchiching,
Stanjikoming, Nickicousemenecaning, Naicatchewenin. The small boy learned by
watching and helping, so that the next year when he returned, he started right away to
make a hole in the ground to "dance" the rice. He was preparing to step-dance on the rice
to loosen the roasted hull from the grain (a stage of traditional processing before
winnowing the chaff away).
ln reviewing the early historical records, I was often struck by just how long the
tradition of caring for the rice is for the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg - and how integral to
their identity and character. The methods, the ceremonies, the governing structures
connected wilh manomin described in accounts of two centuries before, were graphically
portrayed to me when I first accompanied my husband to the rice fields of Sabaskong
Bay, Lake of the Woods in 1972.
We went by motorboat, dragging our canoe, to the favourite family ricing area of
my husband, that is, the area where his parents (wabanakwut , his father from
Assabaska, now called Onigamíng and, Naynaygizhigook, his mother from Big lsland)
harvested rice while the children and other relatives camped nearby. We approached
Button Bay (off Sabaskong Bay at the southeast end of Lake of the Woods), waving to his
relatives from Big lsland and Big Grassy who were camped near the entranceway.
Nothing in my experience had prepared me for the sight around that bay. A wheatfield on
water - all around the shoreline of the bay and extending across to its fullest. The rice
stood about four to five feet above the waterl We parked the boat on one side of the bay,
got into the canoe, and proceeded across.
70
Tobasonakwut instructed me to push the canoe with the pole he had given me -
about eight feet long with a metal clasp resembling a duck bill to push off the mucky
bottom. He told me to make a path parallel to the shore and make one "pass" after another
through the marsh while he picked the rice. This he did by using two light weight, carved
cedar sticks about two feet long. (Figure 9 of Scoben at Onegaming carving sticks 1973).
The sticks were easily gripped, one in each hand, and then one was used to stretch out and
pull the slalk gently but firmly across the front of the canoe. With the other ricing
stick, Tobasonakwut would thrash the rice into the canoe - not in a downward motion
which would break the stalk, but in a long "push away" stroke which allowed the rice
grains to fall into the canoe. This practised movement was so quick and dextrous that the
ricestalk would spring back to its height once released. (Figures 10,11 of canoe
harvesting).
ln a few passes, I was using my utmost strength to push the flat bottomed canoe
and my 190 pound husband through the marsh - not to mention his ever increasing load
of rice, and my weight - although that was rapidly diminishing from sweatl I remained
astounded at the miracle of this plant and the technology of the Anishinaabeg who
harvested it. The paths through the rice caused by "passes" that we made almost
disappeared once the canoe went through. (Figure 12, drawings of proper steering
technique for picking canoes, based on Alex Moose in van de Vorst 1987).
Some of the rice stalks were trodden down by the canoe weight but others sprang
back up. And some rice was left on the stalks, as I was later to find out, left to ripen for
another day's harvest. Wild rice ripens at varying times (hence the modern, scientific
term "shattering") and requires "days of rest" for the pickers so that the pickers can
return and harvest more another day.
It was in the early to mid 1970s, in joining Tobasonakwut on the ricefields, that
I discovered lhe Anishinaabe governance of the ricefield, ll was as Nancy Morrison
described the 1950s, Fred Green the 1930s, and Jenks, lhe 1890s. Each reserve
7I
9. Scoben Copenace at Onegaming, carving thrashing sticks, 'l973
1 1. Wabanakwut Kinew, ricing on Sabaskong Bay, 1gg7
72
Jack Spencer, Seine River, c.1 973
/
' , /^
,/r,l
;/. ;
/
12. sketches of Poling Techniques by Alex Moose in van de Vorst 19g5:145,
Append i x F
SKETCHES 0F P0L I NG TECHN I QUES
(af ter Alex l,toose '1969 zJ2,JO,7Z,73)
73
lrRArclrr fil At{0 Rt6flI
Iïilts stDr l{lilo Ptcfftt6
N0TtllN6 BRTAKS +
PR0PIR Rtct ptclff{G
ïuRt{s mR cAu6 xe t.
fouþ* rrr*ils t
A6Å|N5T À uN0 Ptfiürú
ilO TIIIJP OR Tlt/IST.
-t65-
'74
community had Elders, or an Elder, continuously checking the rice to see how it was
ripening. That Elder or group of Elders would let the word go out that harvesting could
begin. Within a couple of days, the word would come that the Elder(s) said to 'rest the
rice' - and the pickers would stay off the fields. During the rest period, the Elder(s)
would check the rice to see how the sun, rain, wind or predators and insects were
affecting the plant and then decide when to allow the pickers to resume. Some pickers
might also go out onto the field, to see for themselves as a second opinion, but no one at
Sabaskong contravened the word of the Elders, Aanama'egaabo (Bob lndian) and
Shuniaagoneb (Stuart Jack 1973).
ln those days of the early seventies, ceremonies of thanksgiving regarding the
rice were held by families. Each canoeload of pickers would make their own offering of
lobacco into the water, some with the first grains of rice. Others would make the tobacco
offering and then take the first few passes of rice, bring it to shore and lay it in the sun
to dry. At the end of the day, this first rice was processed - roasted, danced on, and
winnowed - to provide a green, wonderful tasting dish for a feast of thanksgiving for the
family. All ages would join in the ceremony and feast to offer thanks to the Creator for
the special gift of sustinence for the people and the culture, and to pray for the good
wealher that would enable the harvest to continue.
The prayer that opens the Grand Council Treaty #3 film, "Harvest of the Moon",
(co-produced with Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op in 1974), is so similar to the one
reported to Jenks by the Rat Portage lndian agent Robert Pither in 1B9B that it appears
to be the same prayer:
What I am now about to voice in thanksgiving is for the wild rice(manomin). .produce (gift) of the Great Spirit (Manitou Gitigaan)
which we are about to partake.
I beseech Him - He who lives in this land, who creates this rice
that He bear no suffering upon us, that by partaking of it, we shall
benefit from it and also our children.
75
I beseech all who will harvest that they shall first hold a feast of
thanksgiving to acknowledge gratitude to the creator for this rice
and His blessings upon us.
May the Thunderbirds and origins of the winds withhold their
slorms for a while so we may harvest in peace. This is my
praye r. "
Aaginjigoneb , Fred lndian of Eagle Lake in Harvest of the
Moon, Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op film 1974
"The Ojibwa lndians in Canada, about Lake of the Woods, perform
the following ceremony: "Before commencing to gather the rice
lhey make a feast, and none are allowed to gather the grain till
after it. They thank the Master of Life for the crop, asking him to
keep off all storms while they are harvesting."
Robert Pither, lndian Agent, 1B9B to Jenks, in
Jenks:1899:1091
This litany was uttered by the rice chiefs of Treaty #3 since time before memory
in the est¡mation of Elder Walter Redsky of Shoal Lake #40. That prayer would
accompany the feast:
"The harvest feast was very important to the old people, years ago,
to have the feast for wild rice because we prayed to the wind not to damage
the wild rice, and to the thunder so no storm will come while we are
making rice. And again to the birds, the fowl of the air, not to destroy our
ricefields. Cause the lndians thought, the lndians think, it should be for
the lndians to pick wild rice first, that the wild rice is theirs. And we
pray that nobody doesn't get hurl. There's a lot of ways someone can get
hurt. if they overwork themselves.. hulls in the eyes or throat, damage to
your body. ... lt's important that the ceremonies be carried on.,,
Walter Redsky in DuFaux 1980
The people persevere with their ceremonies of thanksgiving. Although they have
adapted to the changing family and community patterns of the day, the reverence for
manomin and the harvest time remains.
Azawashkwagoneb (Green Feather, also called Fred Greene) of Shoal Lake #39
described how the people cared for manomin , particularly during the "glory days" of the
1 920's to 1940's - checking the rice well before harvest, trapping muskrats around
the ricefields to stave off some poachers. Sometimes, Anishinaabeg would cover the rice
with large nets to keep the saaganuk (blackbirds) from feasling on the rice. The people
76
always replanted some seed for the next year. Some of this replanting was done by the
very act of thrashing which allowed some seeds to fall from the plant by the side of the
canoe. Other planting was deliberate, such as wrapping rice grains in a mud ball and
purposely dropping the mudballs in certain waterways (Fred Greene 1990; Stuart Jack
1978; Frank White 1990; van de Vorst 1986; Vennum 19BB).
The technology of lhe Anishinaabe people regarding manomin is fascinating.
Describing the usual method when the water was quite low, Shuniaagoneb stated that
people would don snowshoes and use two poles with gunny sacks (or fawnskins in the 'old
days') between, as an apron to catch the rice that they would thrash, just as if they were
in a canoe; the only difference was, this time the rice would fall into the sack instead of
the bottom of the canoe (Stuart Jack 1977: Fred Greene1990). Another version had two
people holding the poles with gunny sacks so that the front person was the main holder
and guide, with the person behind being the picker (Kinew 1993).
Different approaches were taken to curing. This stage is called obaasaan-nawa
manomin or drying the rice. Most often these days, Anishinaabeg just spread the rice out
on canvas or another cloth and let it dry in the sun and wind. ln earlier days, they would
arrange the rice on a scaffold and build a slow fire underneath. The rice would slowly dry
this way and gain a new flavour. (Figure 13)
"The best rice that I ever tasted was the rice right off the
ricefields. After it has been dried, say in the evening, then you roast it
and the men tramp on it with moccasin feet. The women would winnow it
and finish it that one evening. lt was really a treat to eat. ln this condition
it remains green just as it is right off the field. lt doesn't turn brown. And
it's so soft that you can literally eat it by the mouthful. Not like machine
processed. You can just throw a handful of that rice into soup or stew and
eat it right away. Again, you can pop it in oil - just like popcorn - fresh.
You don'l have to wait" ( Fred Greene 1990).
Azawashkwagoneb (Green Feather or Fred Greene) described how "each method of
processing rice produces its own finished product .. with its own flavour":
"They used to slore the rice in bins and then construct some kind
of form using small logs 2-3 feet in diameter. They would put a stack of
lhat wood with cross pieces underneath a screen wire... I don't know what
13. Obaasaan-nawa manomin - Tobasonakwut drying'the rice
.--l ì '
77
l,'-\
14' Kaapizige - Tobasonakwut & wabanakwut roasting the rice at onegaming 1 ggg
15. Nowkomigok & Migizikwe Kell¡
Shawonipinasiik Kinew training on t
.f
at Onegaming 1988
78
16. Wabanakwut Kinew ín jigging pit at Onegaming, 19gg
I7. Totoons, Edwin Kelly, "dancing" the rice in barre
at Onegaming i 988
I8. Ca,rnaraderie in the jigging pit _
Wabanakwut Kinew & Makwa Copenace at Onegaming, l
,råtr
iffi
.'t 
-
üii
ú-J
79
they used before that - about 3 feet from the ground. You may have 15 to
20 feel of wire mesh stretched over the fire built underneath. Then the
rice was poured onto the screen to be roasted and turned over and over till
browned to your liking. Then it's finished. After that, they would put the
rice again on canvas - I remember my grandparents used birchbark
scrolls - this is where they poured the rice to dry after roasting." (Fred
Greene 1990)
That next stage was the roasting or kaapizige , so called for the popping noise
made while the rice is slowly parched. At this stage, a person uses a paddle to push the
rice around in a washtub placed over a glowing fire. The wood itself provides some of the
flavour through the natural smoke. (Wisconsin harvesters may prefer hickory, but
Boundary Waters people usually prefer poplar. (Kinew 1978; A. Wilson in Holzkamm
19Bg). (Figures 14,15,).
Once the husk is loosened through parching, the grain is placed into a pit
(waabikon, i.e., hole in the ground) and a person begins to dance on the rice (Nimbaabaa
pawe'ishkam ). (Note:wabegun means to knock against lhe earth, or in waabikon,lo mix
bottom clay with rice. Kinew 1993) This action might also be accompanied by certain
songs while the man would step, almost as in powwow (traditional dance), as he moved
across the rice. (Figures 16,17,18).
Annie Wilson of Manito Rapids described the processing she has participated in:
"(The rice) was dried first before we started to parch the rice or
whatever you want to call it. The women used to parch or roast lhe
rice in a washtub over a small fire .. sort of more hot coals in it. The
men would be there to help with the wood and stuff like that. lt's ready
to be danced on after it cools off a bit.
"All this time, the men are making the hole for the rice to be
danced in. lt was made smooth with clay or sometimes a hide was used
1o put the rice in. All you did after dancing it, you would lift the hide
with the rice in it and put it into birchbark winnowing baskets. You
would winnow the rice to take oul the husks. Another thing that I
found was that they didn't prepare things like you do today.
..Everything was done at the right time and so when the rice was being
processed for dancing, the men would just start on this digging the
hole to dance in.
"There was a special place for this. lt would be there where you
could work together. You would have two poles and an area would be
like a stall. You would hang on to these two poles, one on each side of
you. Sometimes, when there was a bunch of them, one would have a
hand drum and sing for the dancer. lt was such a chanting affair, it
made you feel like working, or maybe, it was a thanksgiving that made
BO
you happy. lt was indescribable..But this person knew how to dance to
that certain song. There was a certain way to dance the rice in this
hole. Just the men did this. lf a man was not available, the women
would have to use the other tools like a rounded pole and pound with
it." (Annie Wilson in Holzkamm, 1989:29-31) (Figure 17)
ln the 1920s and earlier, Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg would also follow the method
similar to that documented by Diamond Jenness at Parry lsland (Jenness 1931):
"Then they would dig a pit about 4 feet deep. The bottom was
probably 14-15 inches in diameter, and wider up top so you could
work in it if you had to. They used to use poles about 8 feet long -
maybe even longer, 10 feet - to poke at the rice down in the pit. There
was say maybe about 10 inches of rice laying down in the pit. They
used top start 4-5 or 6 men on top, each with a pole. They used to just
pound it away - for not more than 1S minutes. Then they'd take half
the rice, bring it out and lay it again on the birchbark scrolls. The
women would then put it inlo wigwaasinaagan (shallow birchbark
containers with gradually ledged sides) and begin to winnow away the
chaff. While they were doing that, the men used to put another load of
rice in the pit. Once you started doing this, you could regulate your
work. lt takes hours to finish a bag of rice (ed: maybe 50-90 pounds
of green rice)" (Fred Green i 990)
During the 1930's to 1950's, several machines were developed, some by
Anishinaabeg ,lo try to take the monotony and hard work out of thrashing. A model in use
today is a metal potbellied stove-type container with rubber encircled bars that paddle
the rice as they turn. The turning is accomplished by a belt connected between aZhp
motor and the thrashing paddles on a rotating bar. (Figure 8)
Finally, the winnowing phase, known as poweshkajigeh to the Anishinaabeg 
,
usually sees the women shaking the manomin in a curved 4 inch deep birchbarch
container, perhaps 2'feet long. The winnower develops a rhythm in shaking the rice up,
up and then allowing the chafe to blow away in the wind. A few decades ago, people would
keep this chafe as good cereal food called mazaan but it seems more to be prized by older
than younger today, although some continue this tradition. (Figures 19,20,21)
"The women would not dance on it. ..We cleaned the husk off and
then the man does it (ie, dances on the rice) over again. lt was any
man that would do it or had the energy to do it, .. a boy or anyone who
knew how. He could finish that and we would winnow the rice. This is
where they saved everything. There was a dust after the second time
they danced on the rice. They would save the dust and the fine rice.
1 9. Poweshkajigeh: winnowing Tobasonakwut poweshkajigeh at Onegaming, 1 988
Bi
{iTI*
ffi:
20. Alysia and Denise CoPenace'
daughter and mother,
winnowing at Onegaming, 1988
. Manomin in stages - clockwis-e from left
d rice in pan for roasting, after parching in
akik, after winnowing, maazon (husks)
B2
They separated the rice by placing a cloth on the ground. lt's hung
down where you are and there you separate the dust and fine rice. The
dust was used in pemmican or sometimes they would put grease or oil
into it. I've tasted that. lt is delicious. lt looks dirty because it's black
but it's very nice. lt's got a smoky flavour to it. Sometimes
blueberries were put into it. lt was like buying a chocolate bar for a
snack. lt was used for snacks, but it was very nutritious', (Annie
Wilson in Holzkamm, 1989:31).
Without continued planting by Anishinaabeg , the ricefields would have remained
where previous generations had seeded through harvesting, that is, where seed falls
from the stick and flail method inlo the water instead of all into the canoe. Elders on Lake
of the Woods and Rainy Lake both remembers deliberate seeding of lakes and bays by
Anishinaabeg . Such testimony could also be gathered for the northern areas of
Wabeseemong, Grassy Narrows, Wabuskang and Lac Seul, as well as the eastern lakes and
rivers of Lac des Mille Lacs, Eagle and Wabigoon.
"l saw Joe Nottaway seeding rice at Pipestone Lake. He was an old
man who portaged many sacks of rice into that lake where he trapped.
He threw the rice around and it grew well. Since the dams have been
built all over, maybe there's no rice now. (Bert yerxa, 1gg0).
"George Crow's grandfather sewed rice around Assabashkoshing,
out on Lake of the Woods. lt really took.', (Frank White, 1990).
(.This oral testimony corresponds directly to a Grand Council Treaty
#3 TARR report on national archival material submitted in 1BBos by
lnspector McColl at Assabaskoshing)
Anishinaabeg also knew the importance of maintaining water levels during the
critical growth periods of the rice.
"We had a beaver dam at the opening of Crowduck Lake. We would open it
up and regulate the water levels for the rice to grow. Especially during
the 1950s and 1960s." (Fred Green, 1990)
One of the first projects Wabeseemong (Whitedog) reserve undertook in the
1970s was the damming of a lake to ensure an annual crop, no matter what action would
be taken by the Lake of the Woods Control Board to benefit Manitoba Hydro dams farther
downstream on the Winnipeg River (Grand Council Treaty #3-University of Manitoba,
1972). Local water level control remains a high priority for Wabeseemong , Grassy
B3
Narrows, and on the drawing board for First Nations such as Big Grassy to dam the mouth
of Obabikon Lake, to bring back the glory days of bumper crops when everyone would be
invited to pick (P. Seymour, 1990). Water level control is a major issue for all Treaty
#3 First Nations. After the negotiation of Treaty #3 in 1873, all sixty-six reserves
chosen by Anishinaabeg lay along the water, and all their ricefields are affected by
decisions of the Lake of the Woods and Rainy Lake Control Boards (see Chapter 11,
Flooding the Rice Bowl).
It is not the search for simplistic solutions that has brought local water control
proposals forward. lt is the Anishinabeg 's intimate knowledge of the plant coupled with
the underlying belief lhal manomin is a gift of the Creator for the Anishinaabeg .
Certainly, there is understanding that a string of annual bountiful crops would
accumulate too much straw on the bottom to allow such plenty to continue unimpeded. And
harvesters look to a variation in water levels and weather to move out that straw, or
they must do it themselves.
Once harvested, the manomin must be cured soon or mold will appear. Manomin
that is dried through curing may keep for weeks or months; rice that is processed
through all the stages and kept dry may be stored for years. "Manomin is so much a part
of our tradition, an essential food that could be kept indefinitely. Our people stored it in
caches for use at another time" (Kwatook (Rosie Bob) 1992 T.P. Kinew 1992).
Mitigomukakiins (Raymond Bruyere) of Couchiching remembers the 1930s and
1940s when ricing was a lot simpler: "No fancy paraphenalia then, just brand new
moccasins, a hole in the mud and canvas cover for dancing on the rice. lf a visitor came
while we were making rice, then we gave him enough to make a meal" (R. Bruyere
1es0).
This sharing ethos is a deeply held belief of the Anishinaabeg that has been
described as a practical, essential means of survival - helping a relative now means that
you can expect reciprocation later. ln fact, this belief also related to the worldview of
84
Ihe Anishinaabeg , that how one treats another being, human or animal, bird, fish or
plant, is how one can expect to be treated later in life. lt is the view of humans as just
another of the Great Spirit's creations, no more or no less, that enabledlhe Anishinaabeg
to live in harmony with the world for so many generations. Thís balanced reciprocity
was disrupted by outside governments invading areas hitherto the exclusive domain of
lhe Anishinaabeg. Outside governments passed laws, imposed policies and unleashed
enforcement mechanisms, lhat have created havoc for the Anishinaabeg and their
culture, their traditional lifestyle, including the ricefield.
It was in the ricefield that the Anishinaabeg were able to maintain their
traditions and its related form of government for much longer than in any other facet of
life. When Treaty #3 was negotiated, there was no mention by Crown negotiators that
outside law would determine who would be the leaders, or even the members of their
community,. Yel that was the ultimate effect of successive lndian Acts being imposed.
Under the constitutional responsibility for "lndians and lands reserved for lndians"
(Constitution Act, 1867, s.91(24)), the federal government set about to disrupt and
replace traditions and traditional governmenl. 2
ln the ricefield, however, people continued to speak their own language, use their
own Anishinaabe names or terms of relationship and endearment. Ceremonies were
practiced, traditions carried on and taught to younger generations through actual
practice rather than didactic teaching. And leaders were recognized in the Anishinaabe
way of acknowledging expertise and experience. The rice chiefs were the Elders who
knew how the plant grew and prospered, knew the best conditions for harvesting, and
either they, or other Elders, knew the ceremonies of thanksgiving to hold to ensure a
good harvest.
Expertise in dispute resolution was also required of the rice chief. ln 1868, S.J.
Dawson, later to be a Treaty #3 Commissioner for the federal government, noted that
B5
"it was during the rice harvesting time that the authority of the(rice) Chiefs was put to the test, deciding disputed claims,
administering justice and reprimanding interlopers, who sometimes
had to be forcefully driven from the wild rice beds allocated to others"(Grand Council Treaty #3, 1992a, "lndigenous Government of Treaty
#3 lndians").
Jenks reported for the period at the end of the nineteenth century that ,
"Among the Ojibway lndians property right is quite generally
recognized in wild rice. lt seems to be due not to tribal allotment, but
lo preoccupation. Certain harvest fields are habitually visited by
families which eventually take up their temporary ü permanent
abode at or near the fields. No one disputes their ownership..(Jenks,
1899:1073)
ln the 1970s, large gatherings of people on ricefields were mainly extended
families, camping according to territories established by the grandparents' generation,
and these areas were widely respected. By the 1990s, pickers continued lo return to
their grandparents' areas although there was not as much on site camping as in the
1 970s.
Despite outside governments increasingly interfering with the harvest, the
efficacy of the rice chiefs was not undermined. dams of the twentieth century disrupted
water levels by controlling for hydro-electricity rather than considering wild rice and
lhe other natural gifts of the Creator, the rice (Chapter 11). Yet, preparation for and
carrying out of the rice harvest, processing and marketing had been handled well in the
respected system of Anishinaabe governance in the ricefield. Any instances of
trespassing were handled appropriately where the rule of the rice chief was respected.
With the gradual lessening of social norms as a legacy of lndian Affairs
administration, residential schools, and in turn alcohol abuse, conflicts amongst
Anishinaabeg was reportedly caused by trespassing on ricefields. This was cited as one
reason the Ontario Department of Lands & Forests reported holding meetings with
Anishinaabeg in the late 1950's (Schreiner 1979; P. SeymourlggO). lncursions into
traditional government continued through the Province of Ontario passing its Ontario
Wild Rice Harvesting Act in 1960, and then gradually increasing its presence (Chapter
B6
B). Most recent attempts at control have been by scientific data gathering and analysis
(1970s-1980s) and by provincial government promotion of the generic wild rice
"product and market", without reference 1o Anishinaabeg (1990s) (See Chapters 9,12
& 13 ) .
Certainly, one of the most insidious activities of the Ontario government to
undermine traditional governing of the rice has been the campaign to portray
Anishinaabeg as ignorant of the ecology of rice. A reading of early historical documents
and listening to the oral tradition of the people relates a history of sound management
practices (s. Jack 1978; F. Green, 1990; van de Vorst 1986) Yet, with the exception of
van de Vorst (1986) and Vennum (1988), Anishinaabe governance, technology and
business managemenl have not been included in official government or academic reports
on the biology or business side of wild rice.
"A lot of things have not gone right since the rice was legislated.
What used to be in the old days, how we were as Native people, that's
when I saw freedom, that's when I lived freedom. The way it was is, in
my mind, the almost perfect way to manage wild rice," (Fred Greene,
1ee0)
It is in returning to this intimacy wilh manomin, together with the practicing of
the traditions, that the Treaty #3 Elders say is the way in which the wild rice will again
grow in abundance and the government of the rice will be reasserted. Elder Nancy Jones
from Nickicousemenecaning states when respect for manomrn is demonstrated, the rice
will be there as before (Nancy Jones1992). Elder Alex Skead of Wauzhushk Onigum told
the Treaty #3 Chiefs' assembly in October 19BB where the ceremonies are practiced,
lhe rice will return in abundance.
ln preparation for the 19BB Grand Council Treaty #3 assembly, the Treaty #3
Elders proposed a "Grand Council Treaty #3 Nation Declaration on Anishinabe Manomin":
1. The Creator put what we need to survive, including
Anishinabe Manomin, on the land. He gave this to us. we have a duty
to protect these things for future generations. lf we do not, there
will be trouble ahead.
B7
2. Anishinabe Manomin is a sacred gift from the Creator. lt
must be used properly, according to the Elders' teachings. lt must be
respected and honoured.
3. Anishinabe Manomin was not given to lhe white people by the
Crealor. They do not know how to respect it. We did not give it to the
white people in the Treaty or at any time. The Treaty agreement was
that we would keep the Anishinabe Manomin. lt says:
"The lndians will be free as by the past for their hunting and
rice harvest."
4. How Anishinabe Manomin should be planted, picked, processed
and sold will be decided in our communities, according to our Elders.
5. Our rights are from the Creator and guaranteed in the Treaty.
lf we honour the Creator, and if the white people honour the Treaty,
we will not lose our rights. The white people must honour the Treaty
because it says:
"This Treaty will last as long as the sun will shine and water
runs, thal is to say, forever."
Grand Council Treaty #3 Nation
Declaration on Anishinabe Manomin, 19BB(Figure 37, Appendix 12)
It is in the carrying out of age old traditions that Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg asserl
and practice their government. lf governance is the "exercise of authority" (Funk &
Wagnalls Canadian College Dictionary 1989), lhe Anishinaabeg would add'which allows
people to live in harmony with all the gifts of the Creator' . This is part of what Grand
Council Treaty #3 refers to in 1994 as "sacred environmentalism" (Draft Political
Accord between Grand Council Treaty #3 and the Minister of the lndian Affairs 1994).
The spiritual identity of the Anishinaabeg entails caring for "all my relations" - the
land, the waters, animals, birds, manomin and other fruits of the land, according to the
"rules" that the Creator gave to the people. lt is these rules or customs of the people
that establish the law. Mawendopenais , one of the Grand Chiefs negotiating Treaty #3 in
1873, explained:
"We think where we are is our property. I will tell you what He(the Great Spirit) said to us when He planted us here; the rules that
we should follow - us lndians - He has given us rules that we should
follow to govern us rightly." (Morris, lBBB:59; Grand Council
Treaty #3, 1992).
cJ ct
Endnotes:
1. "Mystique: a complex of transcendental or semitranscendental beliefs and attitudes
directed toward or developing around an object (as a person, institution, idea or
pursuit) and enhancing the value or significance of the object by enduing (sic) it with an
esoteric truth or meaning" ( Smith & Vogel, 1gB4:748 fn.B)
2. ln the early part of the twentieth century, Anishinaabe names were replaced by
Anglicized names. Kinew's family became Kelly (T.p.Kinew, 1972). one brother,
George, smaller than his older brother, so lndian Affairs officials gave the family names
of "George" and "Big George", seemingly distinct families today but actually closely
related (S. Jack, 1977). At Seine River, an lndian agent happened to ask someone a
question, and the man replied to what he thought was the question, "Bush -kaygiin" or
"lt's up lo you", then that became the family name (S. Jack, 1977). The missionaries
also contributed to the anglicization when children were taken into residential schools;
enforced baptism ensured an anglicized name would be given and registered on the
official lndian Affairs band membership list. Decades of such increasing intrusion
indicated an increasing lack of respect and understanding.
The supression of indigenous religious ceremonies has been well described in
Pettipas 1988, and of traditional economic activities in Holzkamm & Waisberg 1989,
1 990, 1 993.
B9
Chapter Five
Manito Gitigaan, the Great Spirit's Garden
Early history of the Anishinaabe People and Manominln Treaty #3 prior to 1873
The Lake of the Woods and other Boundary Waters of Northwestern Ontario and northern
Minnesota are known as the "wild rice bowl" of North America (Jenks'1900; Aitken et al
19BB:B). Archaeological data can assist us in determining how long rice has been growing in
North America, but not how it appeared. ln their oral tradition, the Boundary Waters
Anishinaabeg relate its supernatural origin .
The Anishinaabeg believe that wild rice is manomin, literally, " a delicacy from the
Crealor". Man is part of the root of the word, Manito, the'Great Spirit'or Creator, and min
means'good berry'or delicacy (Kinew 1978; Avery & Pawlik 1979). The ricefields are Manito
Gitigaan, literally, "the Great spirit's garden" (Kinew 1978; Alex skead 19BB;
P. Gardner 1990). lndeed, the tending of the garden of the Great Spirit is a special gift entrusted
by the Crealor lo Anishinaabeg . An integral partof Anishinaabe legend and ceremony, manomin
has been known lo AnÌshinaabeg from the earliest times of the Nation's memory.
The great teacher in Anishinaabe legends, Nanaboozhoo has been called a trickster for
his supernatural abililies to transform into other animals or rocks, trees - and for his art of
deception (Overholt & Calicott 1982). Actually, Nanaboozhoo is considered the original
Anishinaabe (Kinew 1978; Binai 1981). The relating of his inventions and discoveries, along
with his foibles and failings, are lessons in survival and cooperation in this world (Kinew
1974; N. Copenace 1976; Binai 198j; Overholt & Callicott 1982).
"Albert Reagan in the 1910s collected the story:
'Manabozhoo [Wenabozhoo] goes Visiting" ... On his journey, the
hero comes to a distant village of his people. Duck-Bill invites him
home, but his wife has nothing to feed the guest:', 'Get things ready,'
commanded Duck-Bill. "l'll get you something to cook. ' Then the
men conlinued to tell more stories for a considerable time. As the
[cooking] stones began to show a white heat, Duck-Bill began to
flap his wings. ln a few minutes he flew over the country to a rice
field and soon returned with his mouth full of rice. This rice he put
in the cooking tray and it soon swelled till ¡t had filled the whole
vessel. His wife then threw in the heated stones and in due time a
feast of wild rice was set out before them and they had all that they
wished to eat."
90
On the following day Wenabozhoo reciprocates, and his wife
is without food for her guest. Attempting the same solution,
Wenabozhoo changes himself into a large clumsy duck and flies off
to find wild rice. On his return, he loses his balance, falls, and
injures himself badly, but manages to stagger to the cooking tray to
spit out the rice he has gathered. lnstead and unexpectedly, out
flows sour mud, quickly filling the tray. Wenabozhoo has
mistakenly turned himself into a mud-diver. The horrible odor of
the mud causes the wife to throw it out, whereupon Duck-Bill gets
rice for them. once it is cooked , Duck-Bill refuses to eat it,
saying., "No . . This is for hungry people. My people have plenty to
eat.'(Vennum'1988:63-64)
The humour of the above passage should not mislead people. This legend is a teaching,
which conveys the ritual and richness associated with wild rice. The story speaks to the
qualities otmanomin as a tasty food, wilh the ability to fill anyone's stomachl lt speaks to its
purpose as a lasting, nourishing food to be shared. Anishinabe teachings throughout rice
country, and particularly in Treaty #3, speak of the spiritual origins oÍ manomin and the
reverence due to this plant.
Plants are an integral part of Anishinabe spiritual life, as are wild meat and fish. plants
such as wikeh (bitterroot or sweetflag), kiizhig (cedar), zhingoop (spruce) are used in a
medicinal tea for fasting and other ceremonies. Their inclusion in ceremonial life conveys the
significance of such foods of sustenance, nutrition and healing that the Creator has bestowed
upon the Anishinaabeg : Manomin (wild rice), miinun (blueberries), shiiwaataagaanaabo
(maple syrup), kiigo (tish), wiiaas (meat) were foods considered at once blessed and part of
the varied economy and diet that kept Anishinaabeg healthy. The harvesting of these foods, both
plants and animals at different times of the year in an "annual round" was the sustainable
development plan in the Boundary Waters of pre-Treaty times (Waisberg 1984; Vennum
198B). The importance of plants and medicines to the Anishinaabeg is increasingly finding its
way into the literature (Densmore 1928; Moodie 1987; Holzkamm and Waisberg 1989,
1ee0).
ln considering the origins of wild rice, science utilizes both direct and indirect evidence.
Geologists posit that the whole Canadian region was under ice until some 23,000 to 13,000
years ago (Syms 1982: A-7). About'11,000 to 10,000 years ago, Lake Agassiz covered an area
larger than the Boundary Waters to a depth of 100 feet of water. By 10,000 years ago, Lake
Agassiz was retreating and a new ferlile environment evolving (Syms 1982:8-4). The change
91
was from a warmer, dryer climate 7000 years ago to a cooler, wetter climate some 3000-
2500 years ago (Rajnovich 1984).
The earliest palynological data has been found at Rice Lake in northern Minnesota where
high pollen increases occurred at about 2500 +- 100 years ago (McAndrews 1969). Charred
seeds have been found as well in the Boundary Waters dating from lhe middle to late Woodland
period (E.Johnson1969; Kenyon 196'l;Rajnovich 1984). Such positive evidence of wild rice
growth is difficult to locate in the Boundary Waters to the north of those sites, due to changing
water levels and erosion, and the greater difficulty of retaining plant remains rather than
arrowheads (Rajnovich 1984). As Rajnovich notes, though, difficulties in present recovery and
identification of wild rice do not necessarily indicate a real lack of utilization at certain periods
of time (Rajnovich 1984).
Yet while researchers can determine that wild rice was abundant among the Boundary
Waters 2000 years ago, some conclude "there is no evidence that the Laurel harvested it"
(Swanholm 1978:21). These researchers consider that later forest dwellers, the Blackduck,
probably the descendents of the Laurel, began the intensive harvesting of wild rice which
enabled them to support larger populations in more settled communities (Swanholm 197g:23).
"More recent research has stated that Laurel peoples extended into the thirteenth century
(1240 +- 45 ), overlapping with Late Woodland Blackduck site in the area by as much as 300
years" (Reid and Rajnovich 1991:198,219-220). Syms is confident that it was likely wild
rice that allowed the moundbuilders of the Laurel culture to congregate:
"A number of researchers have argued that manomin was spread
by lndian peoples who left the remains of Laurel culture behind(McAndrews 1969, Saylor 1976, Stoffman 1973). ln fact, it
may well be that the seasonally concentrated manomin stands
provided the surplus to enable the people to build the large burial
mounds along the Rainy River system...The lndian use of manomin
increased dramatically during the late Woodland period after 700
AD in part because of better preservation (Syms 1982: C-B)."
Archaeological researchers have also analyzed indirect evidence of manomin activity
based on the location and nature of certain sites of wild rice harvesting of modern times. The
office of the Ontario Archaeologist in Northwestern Ontario compared modern wild rice sites on
Lake of the Woods with known settlement patterns of Middle and Late Woodland peoples
(otherwise known as the Blackduck of 1,000 years ago and Laurel of up to 2,000 years ago).
92
The "site-stand hypothesis" was that settlement areas were chosen for their favourable access
to resources. While a causal relationship was not established, the archaeologist noted that there
is a "strong tendency for (Woodland)site-(wild rice) stand clustering", leading to the
hypothesis that "the people of both the Middle and Late Woodland periods were aware of and
gathered wild rice" (Rajnovich 1984:213).
By far the most significant find on Lake of the Woods is the Laurel site at the north end of
the Lake, west of present day Wauzhushk Onigum First Nation (Rat (muskrat) Portage reserve)
and the town of Kenora. Reid and Rajnovich's find of this Laurel site named Ballynacree indicates
that ricing on Lake of the Woods and Boundary Waters was definitely of this early Woodland
period of 2,000 years ago (Reid & Rajnovich 1991 :219-220).
Within the Boundary Waters area, a number of archaeological digs have dated evidence of
Aboriginal occupation from 5000 to 8000 years ago (Government of Ontario 1989; Halverson
1989; Reid and Rajnovich 1991). Artifacts dating back 8,000 years ago to Paleo lndians have
been recovered near Lake of the Woods Provincial Park ( the site of the Little Grassy reserve,
just a few miles south of present day Big Grassy River First Nation) on the southeast end of Lake
of the Woods ("Who Passed This Way?" Pamphlet of Ontario Regional Archaeologist, '1989).
At Nestor Falls, some 30 miles along the shoreline to the northeast of the Paleo site, and
just a few miles south of the present Ojibways of Onigaming First Nation (formerly Sabaskong
Reserve), a three year dig (1988-1990) found evidence of year round settlement over 3000
years (Halverson 19Bg). This site was not just a seasonal fishing station at the falls but a year
round settlement where the people hunted buffalo and caribou, fished and harvested wild rice
("lndian settlement believed at least 3,000 years old", Canadian Press, Feb. 1990). lndeed, it
is within memory of this generation of Anishinaabeg fiar both buffalo and caribou were seen and
hunted on Lake of the Woods (Kinew 1990; Government of Ontario 1990).The discovery of a
2000 year old burial ground at lhe rapids at Whitefish Bay First Nation, Lake of the Woods, in
1989 provided further documentation of the site-stand hypothesis that settlement areas were
chosen with favourable access to resources, particularly fish and rice (" Grisly discovery
distresses tribal elders", winnipeg Free press, sept.27, 1989; Rajnovich 1gB4).
93
One could ask, did the Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg find and follow manomin or did the
people bring the plant? To historical geographer Dr. Wayne D. Moodie,
"it would seem that all the rice producing areas identified in this
region by Jenks at the end of the last century were the legacy, not
of a bountiful nature, but of intentional plantings by the Ojibway
people" (Moodie 1991:77).
According to Manitoba Museum of Man & Nature archaeologist, Dr. Leigh Syms, only
Native peoples could have done this intentional spreading of the plant over vast distances. (Syms
1982: B-4lB). Moodie and others have documented "a variety of practices that were intended,
not only to regulate the gathering of wild rice, but also to enhance its production" (Moodie
1991:71). These methods which altered its "geographical distribution" and enabled "more
intensive forms of production" included intentional sowing of new stands, weeding, pest control
(eg. trapping muskrats who ate the roots and stem, making perches for hawks to control the
blackbird population), and bundling (ie, tying the rice grains to the stalks during ripening to
protect from birds, wind, hail, rains) (Moodie 1991: 72-73; van de Vorst 1985).
To the Anishinaabeg of the Boundary Waters known as Treaty #3, there is no question that
they are the same people of the lakes and rivers where manomin and fish were prominent in
sustaining their communal life many generations ago. The rock paintings throughout the Treaty
#3 area of Lake of the Woods and Rainy Lake, and other inland lakes such as Berry Lake (close
to Sioux Narrows) and Manitou Lakes (southwest of Dryden) are respected by Anishinaabeg
today, as is evidenced by offerings of clothes and tobacco at these sites. These rock paintings are
considered to be hundreds of years old. 1 While some academics conclude that the meaning of
these rock paintings has been lost to the ages, the rock paintings contain messages that are
understood by the Anishinaabeg , particularly members of their traditional religion, the
Mite'iwin , whose birchbark scrolls contain many of the same symbols (Kinew1990; M.
Seymour 1990; S. Bruyere 1990; Rajnovich 1994 and personal communication 1gg2).2
One of the most exciting pieces of evidence of the spiritual and cultural importance of
manomin to the Anishinaabeg is the painting of an "anthropomorphic (human-like) manomin
figure" on a rock face on Lake of the Woods (Dewdney 1975; Syms 1982; Rajnovich 1992
personal communication). (See Figure 22; also Appendix 3).
94
22' Rock Painting, Painted Rock lsland south of split Rock lsland, Lake of the woods,Dewdney Collection, Royal Ontario Museum
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95
The panel (Figure #22) is a replica of the rock paínting located on the south shore of
Kichi Nayashi (the Aulneau Peninsula) on Lake of the Woods, near Split Rock island (cited as
#108, Painted Rock lsland, Royal Ontario Museum files). At the upper right corner, one can
see the manomin man with a rootlike leg structure, a body as a spreading leaf and grain such as
manomin , and a pointed head. Manomin man (called the "Rice Chief" by Rajnovich, pers. comm.
1992) is connected in this rock painting lo kichi nameh (the great sturgeon). This is a fish that
was a mainstay of Anishinaabe diel and economy, and also a major dodem (clan) symbol for the
Boundary Waters. To the left of the manomin man is a figure that may be a Mite'iwrn lodge, but
it has been "almost totally obscured by lichen" (Royal Ontario Museum replication, figure
below). lmmediately adjacent to and to the right of manomin man is a very characteristic
painting of a chisiki inini (medicine man) doing a chisiki (shaking tent). The chisiki is a
uniquely Anishinaabe ceremony of ancient times, recorded in many historic journals, and one
still pracÌiced by Anishinaabeg Today.The chisiki inini (medicine man) enters a small,
cylindrical tent, and calls spirits of animals and people. They are to answer questions given to
him from pet¡tioners who seek to know about health, safety, future of themselves or family
members, or about other matters (Kinew 1990; Hallowell 1942). The bear figure on top of the
shaking tent may indicate the very great power at work in this particular ceremony or may be
the actual dodem of the artist and visionary. The line descending to the right of the chisiki
(shaking tent) is attached to an obvious depiction of the Mite'iwin lodge (Kinew, 1993)3
Thus, manomin man is both a central focus of the painting and indelibly linked with major
symbols of the Mite'iwin religion.
This rock painting evidences the very significant role of manomin to the Anishinaabe
people and their Mite'iwin religion, a fact that has been attested to many times by the Elders of
Treaty #3 (Kinew 1990; Mrs. Kejick, Shoal Lake #39, and Walter Redsky of Shoal Lake #40,
in Georges DuFaux, 1981;Stewart Jack 1977; Robin Greene of ShoalLake #39 in "A Grain of
Dissent" Fifth Estate, 1982; John Jones of Nicickousemenecaning).
96
Who were the artists and visionaries who drew the rock paintings of the Boundary
Waters? To the Anishinaabeg of Treaty #3, the answer lies in the drawings themselves - the
dodem symbols of the people who live in Treaty #3 territory today, and the symbols of the
Mite'iwin cermonies still practiced today (Rajnovich 1994). For years, academics have tended
to ignore this relationship. ln the late nineteenth century, when the first archeaologists delved
into the Rainy River burial mounds of the Boundary Waters, speculation on the identity of the
mound builders included speculations of Egyptians or one of the lost tribes of lsrael. No thought
was given to the Anishinaabeg who inhabit the area or their ancestors (Grand Mound
lnterpretive Centre tour and video, Little Fork, Minnesota).
Early missionaries and traders gave names to many Aboriginal peoples according to their
location or family or characteristic of the time. By refusing to link those names to present day
aboriginal peoples, some ethnohistorians and archaeologists have left successive generations
more bewildered. Thus, the archeaological time line used across North America stretches from
Paleo-lndian (3500+ before present), through Laurel ( 2000+8.P.), Blackduck (1000
B.P.), that is, early/middle/late Woodland periods including Selkirk. (Appendix 4). Some such
labels are given according to criteria developed by an archaeologist who 'discovers' the dig. The
Laurel people, for example, were named after the town of Laurel, Minnesota, which was used as
a supply lown for an archeaological team during the early 20th century digs of the Rainy River
Mounds (S. Bruyere 1990). The Blackduck peoples were also named after another northern
Minnesota town. Yet, academics now admit that Laurel and Blackduck were probably the same
people whose pottery and culture evolved over time. Not surprisingly, this leads to amazing
statements such as "experts agree thal the Blackduck were ancestors of the Cheyenne or
Assiniboine or Dakota or Ojibway or Cree" (Swanholm 1978:23)l Many scholars and
Aboriginal people who have been introduced to archaeology prefer to recognize that the
Blackduck are Ojibway and the Selkirk are Cree. Today, archaeologists state that "evidence
suggests the northwest Algonkians are the same as the southwest" (Dawson 1983:23,26). Once
again, social scientists of loday are catching up to what is sellevident to the lndigenous people
of this territory. Both Ojibway and Cree people refer to themselves as Anishinaabeg (Kinew
1972; S.Bruyere 1 990).
97
A whole debate has raged about who are the Ojibway? Some academics conclude that the
Ojibway are Cree (Morrison and Goldberg, 1986; Dawson 1983) while others consider the
Ojibway recent comers to this Boundary Waters territory, likely in the late 17th century
(Hallowell 1955, Dewdney 1975).
Who did the first explorers meet in the Boundary Waters? There are accounts that, in
1608, Jacques de Noyen, considered by some to be the first non-Aboriginal to see Lake of the
Woods 4, met the Cat people. This is the dodem or family clan symbol of the pizhew (lynx) who
live today at various First Nation communities throughout the Boundary Waters and beyond -
from Lac La Croix near Quetico Provincial Park to Roseau, Manitoba, from Onigaming and
Whitefish Bay on the east side of Lake of the Woods to Wabeseemong on the English River to the
northwest (Kinew1990).
This academic debate matters not to the Anishinaabeg . While some historians argue the
Ojibway migration occurred from the east only a few hundred years ago, many Anishinaabeg 
,
especially on the north and west side of Lake Superior, argue an earlier time (Kinew 1990).
One may even argue that their saltwater origin could have been what archaeologists call the
Tyrell Sea that receded into Hudson Bay (Kinew 1990), which would also explain many of the
teachings. The Anishinaabeg know from legend that they travelled from saltwater (where
legend says Nanboozhoo spit out the bitter tasting water ) and saw mishipizhew or lions in the
waters. (TP Kinew considers these likely sea lions and walruses). The people followed theMiigis
shell, an incarnation of the Creator (Benton-Binai 1981). Several academics question whether
it was the people themselves who migrated - or was it their religion, the Mite'iwin , that moved
(Moodie 1989; Waisberg 1984). Yet, the Anishinaabe people themselves accept both versions
of the origin and live happily in that acceptance (Waisberg 1984).
The Anishinaabeg who now live in the Boundary Waters are the people of the manomin
culture. lt was both wild rice and fishing that enabled the Ojibway to maintain permanent
settlements long before other nomadic peoples were able to do so (D.W.Moodie and James G.E.
Smith, University of Manitoba course lectures on The Ojibwa, 1989). A closer examination of
historical records of the late nineteenth century has afforded a view of the Boundary Waters
9B
Anishinaabeg as people who incorporated as a major portion of their diet, plants such as wild
rice, and gardens of potatoes, squash, pumpkins, beans, carrots, onions and corn (Holzkamm &
Waisberg 1993:417) lndeed, "two bushels per person of rice should be considered a
conservative average harvest", taking into consideration "occasional failures in the rice crop,'
(ibid). The Anishinaabe people of the territory that became known as Treaty #3 recognize
lheir relationship to manomin as being, at once, ancient, sacred and nourturing - a gift from
the Creator .
Early historical records bear witness to this legacy. ln the early seventeenth century,
LaVerendrye's travels west from Lake Superior, into what became Treaty #3 territory, led him
ínto the rice bowl of "wild oats .. found in abundance" throughout Lake of the Woods and the lakes
and rivers interconnecting (Holzkamm 1985:89, Appendix B). About thirty years later,
Alexander Henry reported at Lac des lles or Lake of the Woods that the Anishinaabe women
bartered their rice for goods with him most of the night, while their men drank rum from the
traders. Henry reported that "without a large quantity of rice, the voyage could not have been
prosecuted to its completion" (Holzkamm 19BS: 66, Appendix B).
Traders frequently reported the gifts of wild rice and dried meat or fish that were
presenled to them in the formality of trading of the day. Manomin was often packed and sold in
fawn skins or kept in bark boxes called moccucks (Fred Greene 1990; Jenks 19OO).
Peter Grant, at the turn of the nineteenth century, remarked about the importance of
manomin to the "saulteaux"(yet other name for lhe Anishinaabe people):
"A kind of wild rice grows spontaneously and in abundance in most of their
small muddy creeks and bays. This wholesome grain is of infinite use to
the Natives, being an excellant food when boiled with a little fat, fish,
sugar or any kind of meat, and, as it costs them nothing but gathering and
husking, which is a very simple process, they never fair to ray by large
quantities of it for the comsumption of the year." (Holzkamm 19g5:59,
Appendix B)
Grant also related the importance of wild rice to the feasting in ceremonial life:
(For a departing war party) "smoking and singing were alternately
repeated in this manner for the first part of the night; we were then
entertained with a feast consisting of wild rice, pounded meat, bear's fat
and sugar, all mixed in a large kettle, which the Michinawois himself
distributed to the company, not, indeed, by their ordinary custom of
giving each individual his share on a separate dish, but in this particular
occasion, the feast was too sacred to be poluted with either dishes, spoons
or even the fingers of the profane, the Michinawois alone, as the
99
immediate minister of the ceremony, could presume to handle it. He,
therefore, took the kettle in one hand, while, with great solemnity, he
crammed the other in the kettle, taking a small portion of the victuals
between his fingers and forcing il ín the mouths of the company as he went
around the circle" (Holzkamm igBS: 59-60, Appendix B).
Despite Grant's evocative language, one can draw a ready paralle to the Roman Catholic priest
dispensing the communion bread.
The major exploring expeditions of the early nineteenth century found the wild rice
plant to be in great abundance, particularly on Lake of the woods, and the
Chippewa/Saulteux/Ojibway (all names for Anishinaabeg ) very occupied in collecting it.
William Keating in his 1823 expedition recounted:
The chippewas obtain the wild rice, upon which they chiefly subsist, by
going in canoes, (two men in each canoe)s into the rivers or lakes in
which it grows. Both men are provided with long poles. when they have
reached a field of rice, one of the men with his pole turns down into the
canoe the plant from one side,. and the other thrashes it until all the grain
is separated from the stem. The same operation is performed with that on
the other side; after which they move the canoe to another place, and
continue until they have obtained a sufficient supply. They can, in this
manner, often collect with ease from twenty to thirty bushels per day.
The grain is subsequently dried over a small fire by placing it in a fine
sieve made of reeds, secured in a square frame. lt is then collected into a
small hole, and trampled under foot in order to separate the hull without
crushing the grain, which is afterwards separated from the chaff by
stirring it in wooden platters, exposed to a gentle wind. (Keating
1 959:1 56).
Simon J. Dawson, an engineer and explorer of the 1850s, who eventually became a
commissioner to Treaty #3, reported on the Ojibway country of the Boundary Waters in 1859:
"As many as 500 (Anishinaabeg ), I have been told, sometimes assemble
together .. the fact of their having an abundance of food at certain seasons
enables them to collect in numbers sufficiently great to be formidable if
inclined to be troublesome. Sir John Richardson, who passed several times
through their country, describes them as being 'saucy, and independent of
the Hudson's Bay company, from the fact that they have abundance of
sturgeon and wild rice, so that they can feed themselves without having
recourse to the supplies or clothing with which the Hudson's Bay company
supply their lndians'. " (Dawson, S.J., 18S9, in "We Ask for Fair play:
Wild Plant Useage in Treaty #3", Grand Council Treaty #3, 1992)
It was Dawson who recognized not only the economic and strategic importance of manom¡n lolhe
Anishinaabeg, but also the intertwining of manomin with the governance of the Anishinaabe
people:
100
"At ìhe time of the rice harvest the authority and patience of the chiefs
are put to the test in deciding disputed claims and meeting out justice to
all, which however, they manage to do, to the general satisfaction except
in the case of the lndians from the winnipeg, who, although belonging to
the same tribe, are looked upon as a sort of outside barbarians and being
the weaker party, are driven off without much ceremony.', (Dawson,
1870 in Grand Council Treaty #3, 1992)
Although Albert Jenks captured in more detail the unpredictability of the crop in his
classic study of the Wild Rice Gatherers of the Upper Great Lakes (1899), Dawson succinctly
described the natural forces at work in the rice harvest:
"lt may be mentioned that the rice is not always a sure crop. lf the water
should be too high, it in a measure fails, and even when it promises well,
if heavy rains with strong gales occur when it is ripening, it is beaten
down to the water and considered valueless and the moment it begins to
ripen the wild fowl attack it, sometimes in such numbers as to impair the
harvest." (Dawson, S. J., 1870 in Grand Council Treaty #3,.1992)
ln recognition of these nalural forces, lhe Anishinaabeg carried out ceremonies
to humbly ask the Creator for good weather to ensure a good harvest (Chapters 3 & 4).
And from this reverence for Manito gitigaan came intimate knowledge and the mastery of
technology, "the picture of aboriginal economic activity which is absolutely unique, and
ín which no article is employed not of aboriginal conception and workmanship" (Jenks
1900:1019). The aboriginal characler of manomin andthe Anishinaabeg themselves
are inlertwined.
There is no system in place in Canada that can comprehend or deal with such an
understanding of Anishinaabe relationship to the land and resources. To the Anishinaabeg, this
is not an issue. l1 is their sovereign jurisdiction, their self-governance that will be practiced
no matter what outside law may say. This is what is understood in having a "right", whelher
Treaty, aboriginal or Anishinaabe. The right continues. What is problematic is "the facts which
show the inability to be sovereign in the sense of having absolute control over one's lerritory
..The Anishinaabeg do not need this test to assert their identity and rights" (Paul Chartrand,
pers comm 1995).
Yet, if one were seeking recognition of outsiders to the Anishinaabe right to self-
governance in Manito Gitigaan, one can consider the tests established in Canadian law for
aboriginal control of territory. Canadian courts have utilized a test for proof of aboriginal title,
101
detailed by Judge Mahoney in Baker Lake v. Min. of lndian Affairs & Northern Development,
[1979] 3 C.N.L.R.:45. lt set out the foltowing conditions:
"The elements which the plaintiffs must prove to establish an
aboriginal title cognizable at common law are:
(i) That they and their ancestors were members of an organized society
(2)That the organized society occupied the specific territory over which
they assert aboriginal title
(3) That the occupation was to the exclusion of other organized socielies.
(4 ) That the occupation was an established fact at the time sovereignty
was asserted by England." (Woodwardl 989:21 6)
It is important to note that this Baker Lake test is "only relevant to legal proof of
aboriginal title in a Canada court", and that some legal authorit¡es question whether it is
"right in law" (Paul Chartrand, Norman Zlotkin pers. comm. 1995). The fact remains
that this test has been used by judges in subsequent cases, and has informed the public
with expectations regarding a 'proof' to be required for aboriginal title . At the risk of
second-guessing another judge, it is worth noting that the Boundary waters
Anishinaabeg of Treaty #3 do meet this test.
The Anishinaabeg continue to be an organized society, a people"having
institutions of theír own, and governing themselves by their own laws"( Hall J., in
Calder 1973, cited in Woodward '1989:216). Their traditional Boundary Waters
lerritory began to be carved up when the United States and Britain declared an
international boundary in 1789, and was further circumscribed when the 55,000
square mile territory was described in Treaty #3 of 1873. However, the ancient
occupation of this terrilory by the Anishinaabeg (both Cree and Ojibway) is an accepted
historical fact. And, Canadian law recognizes that "no tribe (was) wholly self sufficient
or occupied its territory to the complete exclusion of others" (in Sparrow, cited in
Woodward 1989: 217). Anishinaabe occupation of the Boundary waters certainly
predates the British assertion of sovereignty in 1763, and had carried on for
"a substantial period" as required in the Baker case (Woodward 1989: 21 6-218: Reiter
1991). Under such a test, the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg would demonstrate beyond a doubt
ro2
that theirs was the culture and governance of the Great Spirit's Garden in the Boundary Waters.
As archaeologists continue to extend our knowledge of early peoples of the Boundary
Waters, and new 'discoveries' are made about the tenure of manomin in this territory, Treaty
#3 Anishinaabeg continue to plant, harvest, process, and keep or trade the rice - as they have
since time before memory.
Endnotes:
1. Recent research by Bob Salzer and crew at the Gottschalt site in southwestern Wisconsin is
analyzing paint spills near rock art. Their analysis will allow a radiocarbon dating not
presently available to Shield art situated beside the water. Reports indicate that thê Wísconsin
rock art is dated to 900-1000 A.D. and should indicate as early a date for Shield Art (Grace
Rajnovich to Kathi Avery Kinew, July 13,1992 correspondence).
2. ln interpreting rock art, researchers are beginning to acknowledge \hal Anishinaabeg o,Í
today, who are initiated into the Mite'iwin , can understand the birchbark scrolls (witñ
pictographs written on, used in religious ceremonies) and may act as guides. As one
archeaologist says, "The idea is really very common sensicat - listen ùo the Elders of today and
of the old days whose thoughts were written down by trustworthy people like Frances Densmore
and others. They told their stories and philosophies for a purpose - they wanted us to knowl"(Grace Rajnovich to Kathi Avery Kinew, July 13,1992 correspondence)
3. " (This figure) is ..a pictograph on Lake of the Woods in northwestern Ontario.. The rock artpanel is Midewiwin, showing at the right the floor plan of the Mide lodge where ceremonies take
Place. A path leads out to a horned Mide master playing a drum and Bèar, a powerful spirit of the
Midewiwin. On the left is the Sturgeon and , above it, a figure that is probably a depictibn of the
Wild Rice Chief, either a person who is chief of the annual rice harvest or a spirit of the rice.
Both sturgeon and rice are ingredients of a feasl." (Grace Rajnovich, "Going Siraight to the
Heart at Gottschall", Gottshcall News, Newsletter of the Gottschall Rock Art project, Logan
Museum of Anthropology, Beloit College, May 1993, vol.9: 9-10)
4. Grand Council Treaty #3 Treaties & Aboriginal Rights Research (TARR) dismisses de Noyen's
importance and challenges whether he was, in fact, ever at Lake of the Woods (L. Waisberg þers.comm. 1993).
5. There is some debate about whether planting, tending, harvesting and processing wild rice
were historically women's or men's tasks. Some early historical recbrds refer to women
bundling the crop and then harvesting it, and some early drawings depict women only in the
canoe harvesting. However, some early descriptions, such as Keating's in 1823, reier to "two
men"' More likely is the joint involvment of both sexes. For example, botanist John Bigsby
reported of Lake of the Woods in 1830's reported that men and women were involveO - tne men
harvesting, the women in storing them away.
By the twentieth century, within Treaty #3, all combinations of people would plant and
harvest - married couples, grandmother and grandson or grandaughter, àisters or brothers,
best friends, young and old. The processing of the rice became more circumscribed to gender in
103
that, while both sexes may lay out the rice for curing, the women usually did the roasting and
the men would do the thrashing or'dancing' on the rice. Either sex, more often the women, would
do the winnowing - and would have made the birchbark baskets for this purpose, as well as
containers for the post-roasting phase and the final "finished" phase. The men more likely
carved the "rice sticks", the two foot length poles of light weight used to bend and thrash the rice
into the canoe.
The question of what sex roles were historically prominent in ricing came about in
historian Jean Friesen's consideration of Treaty #3 manomin. She was questioning why the
government printed version of Treaty #3 does not even refer to wild rice. Then some students
asked if ricing were mainly the women's task. Friesen considered that if this were the case, then
the Crown representatives would not have taken it as seriously as the men's occupations, or
"avocations" of hunting and fishing, as the government text of Treaty #3 reads (Jean Friesen
pers. comm. 1 991 ).
Early historical records attest to the importance of wild rice to the fur trade and the
economy of the Anishinaabeg . Such records also indicate the prominent role women played in
trading as well as ricing. On the basis of historical records alone, it is unclear but likely that
defined sex roles regarding ricing existed and have changed through time.
t04
Chapter Six
The spirit and intent of rreaty-making in the Boundary waters,
1869-1873.
"The Commissioners don't wish that their lndians leave theirharvest immediately to step into their reserves..The lndians shallbe free as by the past for their hunting and rice harvest."Treaty #3/Paypom Treaty, 1873
A fiercely cold wind blew across the Northwest Angle lnlet on October 3, 1981.
The Governor General's helicopter added a dusty force to that wind but managed to land
safely at Northwest Angle #338 reserve on Lake of the Woods, at the juncture of
Northwestern Ontario, Manitoba and Minnesota. Chief Ron Sandy, Tans, and his wife,
Josephine, and family greeted the Governor General Schreyer. His Excellency would
later say, he was greeted just as Chief Peguis had welcomed the first Selkirk settlers to
the mouth of Winnipeg River 160 years earlier - with warm clothes and good food. The
Governor General wore chief sandy's parka the rest of the day . (Figu re 23)
Chiefs, Elders, band members of all ages from the 25 member First Nations of
Treaty #3 had assembled at this site of Animakee Wa Zhing, the sacred place of the
Thunder Birds. 1 Tney had galhered to celebrate the 108th anniversary of Treaty #3
near the site where it was signed.
Master of Ceremonies, Chief Charlie Nash of nearby Northwest Angle #37,
welcomed everyone by explaining the significance of Treaty #3. lt was a treaty signed
Nation to Nation, after four years of negotiations, that was to be the model for all
remaining numbered treaties of weslern and northern Canada. Even Treaties '1 & 2 of
1871 had to be renegotiated in light of the stronger terms of Treaty #3 (Speech by Chief
Charlie Nash, Oct.3, 1981).
Chief Nash explained why Treaty #3 people were rededicating themselves to the
Treaty in that 1981 assembly:
ntétit or-tneíl ilíác¡rìrs about ottawa's
ãtlee.d dtsregard of flshlng ârrd riÒe
'har{esrlng ri8¡ts granted 
.th€rn. ln, ân
1873 treary.
Schreyel ñade the commenul Satur'
rv at rÉe Irdlan ræerve here, åbout 40day
tell Ottawa of claims that governments 
violating treaty'
Gr¡
the
23. SchreYer to
^ -.-^l^^-
q 1qR1
VJinnìPeg Free Press'
106
A few days ago (Prime Minister) Trudeau said he would bring the
Constitution home to Canada with an entrenched charter of rignts.
He said this Charter recognizes our Treaty and Aboriginal rignts.
But the charter can be changed by any six provinces añd the -
federal government. Thus, our Treaty and aboriginal rights are injeopardy wilhout the lndian people even being consulted. This is
not what our ancestors wanÌed or negotiated for in 1873.
ln the 108 years since lhe Treaty was signed, what has happened
to the promises made Nation to Nation? The Anishinaabe have kept
our promises. We have allowed settlement in our lands. We have
gone further and allowed development never dreamed of - we,ve
done more than our share ..
what about the promises the crown made? Today we see our people
being arrested for fishing with nets - their boats and gear
confiscated - their lives disrupted by court. Why? All because our
people continue to live according to our Treaty..,
Today we see the Ontario government is trying to
manipulate and take our wird rice harvest away from
us. The ontario government imposed a five year moratoiium on
any changes to the wild Rice Harvesting Act during which time
they were supposed to help us develop a better Native wild rice
industry. Next year is the end of that moratorium. we have seen
lwo years harvest flooded out completely, one year badly affected
by high waters and only one good year and no practical assistance
from Ontario in developing our industry. This moratorium must
be extended.
Yet we know our Treaty protects our right to rice. As you willhear our Elder Allan paypom of Washagamis Bãy tellyou that Treaty #3 promised wild rice would be ours
"free as by the past" - to our people. That means we would
be able to continue to sell rice, gather it, and develop new areas
and new methods of harvesting and processing, just as our
ancestors did. Manomin is a gift to the people from theGreat spirit, guaranteed to us by Treaty. our rights must
be recognized.
"Today when our rights are under attack by the very governments
who pledged to uphold the promises of our Treaty, when our tie
with the lmperial Crown is threatened to be cut forever, it is time
that we rededicate our selves to the promises that our forefathers
won through years of negotiations. lt is necessary for everyone to
remember that Treaty #3 promises the continuaiion of
our traditional livelihood and the future of economic
development."
(emphasis added, NFB recording of October 3,1981 celebration at
Northwest Angle #338, for uncompleted film, ,,Manomin',)
Northwesl Angle Elder Frank "Shorty" Powassin, a direct descendent of one of the
main Anishinaabe negotiators of Treaty #3, expressed his happiness at everyone
707
coming. Powassin said that to relate all that his ancestors told him about the Treaty
would keep him talking all day. And then, octogenarian Elder Allan Paypom from
Washagamis Bay, at the north end of Lake of the Woods, presented, for the Governor
General to view, a parchment copy of Treaty #3.
Paypom had kept this document in his possession since 1908: "l have this old
document in my hand .. I suppose no other government ever had a look at it - this old
copy - now lwant him to have a look at it." (Dufaux recording, 1981) Chief Nash told
everyone "We're going to let the Governor General have a look at it and read it over and
we're not going to present it to anybody." (The parchment treaty remains to this day in
the safekeeping of Allan Paypom's family.) (Appendix S)
The Governor General later said, that "in the few minutes I have had to read it, I
can certainly say to all of you that I believe this to be the terms of Treaty #3 signed back
in 1873". This pronouncement was greeted by applause and cheers from the audience.
Schreyer undertook to write a personal report to the Queen and senior people in
government, with a copy of the Paypom document íf the Elder and Chiefs would allow, to
report on what transpired at the Angle, in this "reenactment of history". The Governor
General said he would communicate with higher officials if there were documentation of
"some aspect of Treaty solemnly enlered into that is not being kept". Treaty #3 Grand
Chief Robin Greene thanked the Governor General and assured him that a copy of
Paypom's document would be made available for him to take the Treaty #3 message to the
Queen and senior people in government "that can protect our rights".
With Anlshinaabe singers of the Lake of the Woods drum singing their traditional
songs, and the British flag flapping in the bitter wind, the Governor General joined Elder
Powassin and the two Chiefs of Northwest Angle, Ron Sandy and Charlie Nash, in
unveiling a newly minted plaque.
Grand Council Treaty #3, whose Chiefs and staff had planned this historic event,
had a bronze plaque cast. Chief Sandy had then mounted it on a concrete platform. The
108
plaque still stands on a rock promontory surrounded on three sides by the waters of Lake
of the Woods, and and encircled on one side, by sweetgrass, the medicinal plant of
purification in Anishinaabe ceremonies.
The hisÌoric plaque is situated near the aclual site of the several days of
negotiations where Treaty #3 was finally signed in 1873. The Grand Council had tried to
interest Parks Canada and the Ontario Heritage Council in contributing to this historic
site and adding it to their list, but there was no positive response. The Grand Council
proceeded with its own celebration. Chief Ron Sandy built the monument and the Grand
council had the plaque engraved. The dedication of the plaque reads:
Animakee wa Zhing - sacred place of the Thunderbirds
Near this site, on October 3rd, 1873, powassin and Mawin Do
Penais, spokesmen for the ogitchi raug of the Anishinabe Nation,
concluded the Northwest Angle Treaty, Treaty Number Three, with
Lieutenant Governor Alexander Morris, representative of eueen
Victoria.
This Treaty between the British Crown and the Anishinabe Nation
recognized the sovereignty of the Anishinabe people in the Lake of the
Woods and Rainy Lake country, to the English River and Lac Seul in
the north. Treaty #3 was to become the model for all Treaties made
in western Canada thereafter. The Anishinabe permitted safe passage
to settlers, the Crown recognized the rights of the Anishinahbe people
to their lands, waters, resources, government and culture.
ln the words of Treaty #3, these rights will last as long as the sun
will shine and the waters run, that is to say forever.
This plaque is dedicated to the continuation of our rights by the
Chiefs and Elders of Grand Council Treaty #3, this third day of
October, 1981.
The unveiling of the plaque in what Schreyer called a "reenactment of history"
was memorable in itself. This October 3, '1981 was also the first time the Chiefs and
Elders of Grand Council Treaty #3, and Elder Paypom himself, had agreed to bring the
parchment document of the "real" terms of the Treaty into the public domain. yet,
perhaps the most significant legacy of this historic event was the public acknowledgment
of the Elders as the keepers of the Treaty, and the "spirit and intent" of the Treaty.
109
October 3rd 1981 celebrated the oral tradition that kept alive the'spirit and intent of
Treaty #3.
Grand Council Treaty #3 Treaties & Aboriginal Rights Research (TARR) program
has documented the written evidence of the Paypom document, now referred to as the
Paypom Treaty. The Elders know this Paypom Treaty by the name, Manito Mazina'igan 
,
lhe sacred document. Yet it was the oral tradition of the Elders which had always kept the
promises of the Treaty alive in the collective memory of the people.
Common practice among Anishinaabe people in those days of the nineteenth
century was to assign people who would commit to memory the important discussions and
conclusions of treaty making and other important meetings. Their memories provided the
invisible texts that would form the records of historic events ("lndigenous Rights of
Treaty #3 lndians" pamphlet, Grand council rreaty #3, 1992). promises were
committed to the future by the safekeeping of the oral tradition.
With Treaty #3, the Ogitchi Taaug, the renowned and spiritually guided leaders,
had gone further than this usual practice. The leaders had obtained the services of two
Metis interpreters who consigned the promises to writing. Messieurs Joseph and
August Nolin listened to the Ojibway and English negotiations and wrote the agreements
on paper. This parchment document was given to one of the lead Anishinaabe
negotiators, Powassin of Animakee Wa Zhing. Lt-Gov Morris attached a copy of these
"Nolin notes", written in English and signed by the interpreters, to his official report to
Ottawa. They can be found today in the Public Archives of Canada in Ottawa as well as the
Manitoba Archives in Winnipeg.
The Paypom document of Powassin's was obtained by Elder and Chief Paypom of
Washagamis Bay in the 1920s from a local photographer Charles Linde. The Nolin notes
of the two archives and the Paypom Treaty are in effect the same, and the order of
promises contained therein closely follows both Lt-Governor Morris and the Manitoban
110
news report of negotiations and conclusions of the Treaty making process (Morris 1880,
Grand Council Treaty #3 TARR i992).
Treaty #3 was one of the most strategic locations necessary to building the new
Canada, a mari usque ad mare. By the terms of the Act admitting British Columbia to
Canada in 1870, the Canadian Pacific Railway had to be built through this territory
(Morris 1BB0; Daugherty 1986). The Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg had "objected to
the progress of surveyors and troops through their territory", and the government had
begun talks with them even before the Red River resistance had been dealt with (Miller
1989:161). Treaty commissioner Simon J. Dawson was an engineer who explored the
area, and then designed and built the route of portages and corduroy roads connecting
Fort William with the Red River settlement, through the boundary waters that became
Treaty #3. He was well aware of the abundant timber and mineral resources of the area.
The Anishinabeg were also keenly aware of the riches of their land . At the Treaty
negotiations in 1873, Grand Chief Mawedopenais told the Lt-Governor, "The sound of the
rustling of the gold is under my feet" (Morris lBBO:62). The Anishinaabeg were
secure in their military prowess, having been challenged and victorious in years of
warfare with the Sioux. lmportantly, they had a long-established tradition of treaty and
alliance making, to ensure peace or to secure trading relations (Warren lBBS). Treaty-
making had become one of their "major tools of adaptation" (Friesen 1985:7; Miller
1 989: 1 68).
Accordingly, the original meeting to inaugurale the Treaty process with
representatives of the British Crown, took place - not at the Angle lnlet in iB73 but -
in Fort Frances in 1869. Boundary Waters Anishinaabe leaders or "headmen" (as they
were dubbed by the British Crown delegates) presented Simon J. Dawson with a list of
items including clothing, food, and agricultural implements and animals that would be
required in any treaty. They also required payment for the use of their land as a
thoroughfare, particularly the overland and waler route from Port Arthur lhrough
111
Treaty #3 area of Crane Lake, Lac La Croix, Rainy Lake, Rainy River through Lake of the
Woods and across the corduroy road known as the Dawson Trail to the Red River
settlement. The Anishinaabeg were definitely seen as a threat by future Treaty #3
Commissioner, S.J. Dawson:
"These lndians hold a very critical position on the line of route and
that, if disposed to hostility, they might give a vast amount of
trouble and occasion an outlay greatly in excess of what will be
involved in a conciliatory and liberal policy such as that I have
recommended". (s.J.Dawson 1870 report on the saulteaux and
resources of the boundary waters, cited in Grand Council Treaty#3, 1972:27).
ln 1870, the representatives of the British Crown and the Anishinaabe Nation
met, but could reach no agreement, particularly regarding compensation for past use of
their territory. The federal government decided to treat with lndians closer to the Red
River settlement the following year, and Treaty #1 and #2 were made in 187'l . ln
1872,Ihe Lake of the Woods meeting closed early due to the outbreak of an epidemic, and
no treaty was made.
However, discussions held up to that point led to an early drafting of the legal
jargon of Treaty #3 in Ottawa B-[qf to 1873. According to Commissioner Dawson, it
was the 1872 version that was "finally adopted and signed" at Northwest Angle; Morris,
"in his haste to conclude an agreement, used as a finalized version the drafl treaty which
did not reflect the new items of agreement" reached at the Angle (PAC, RG1O, v.3800,
Í.48,542, s.J. Dawson to Deputy Minister of lndian Affairs, Hayter Reed, 26 April,
1895). (Appendix 6)
lndeed, a review of Lt-Governor Alexander Morris' report of the proceedings
needs to be tempered with other sources regarding the Treaty, notably the papers of
Alexander Morris and simon J. Dawson, his fellow commissioneri the Manitoban
newspaper report of the 1873 proceedings; the Paypom Treaty and Nolin Notes; and the
oral tradition of Treaty #3 Elders. With an analysis of such documentation, it becomes
clear that the government printed version of rreaty #3 is misleading.
772
According to research undertaken by Grand Council Treaty #3 Treaties and
Aboriginal Rights Research, the actual contents of rreaty #3 include:
(i) the written promises of the Paypom Treaty ( to keep manomin "as by the past',)
(ii) 'outside promises' that can be documented as having been discussed and agreed upon
by both sides in 1873; some agreements were omitted or adapted in the government
printed text . There are several examples. The setting aside of the fisheries was
absolutely insisted on in negotiations in 1873, and meetings leading up to that time.
Treaty Commissioner S.J. Dawson related twenty years after Treaty that the Ojibway
never would have signed the Treaty if they had known their fishery would have been
affected; "Years afterward treaty commissioner S.J. Dawson remembered assuring the
First Nations that they would "forever have the use of their fisheries" ( Treaty rights
to Fisheries pamphlet, Grand Council Treaty #3, 1992). ln another instance, minerals
were part of the natural resources retained by the Anishinaabeg ; the government
printed Treaty is silent on the issue of minerals, though later legislation and policy
acknowledged the 100% ownership in Treaty #3 (Holzkamml gBB). There was also a
fundamental misunderstanding regarding reserves; Ihe Anishinaabeg never considered
them to be enclaves where only they would permanently settle; they expected to
continue to use the¡r trad¡tional territories in their annual round of utilizing all
resources. As reserves became their only home, lhe Anishinaabeg came to call them
"shkunigan " or "leftover land" (P. Kelly 1972, N. copenace Jr. 1993).
(iii) rights of the Anishinabeg that were considered so integral to their way of life that
they were not even mentioned, that is, the right 1o self government, freedom of religion
and the maintenance of culture and language (Grand Council Treaty #3 TARR 1992,
1 ee5).
The Anishinaabe language holds the key to understanding the conflict which has
existed for generations between the newcomers (and their imposed governments) and the
Anishinaabeg over the terms of their relationship. To the Anishinaabe people, it is the
i13
Treaty which governs their relations with the Crown governments and the newcomers.
All authority to enter into Treaty comes from the Creator, and all life and land come
from the Creator. To the newcomers and their governments, it is the Crown that holds
underlying title to all land and resources. Once a Treaty has been made, thereby
fulfilling the terms of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the philosophical tenets of
the day, then the Crown can proceed as it wishes to dispose of lndian lands (Díckason et al
1992; Kulchyski 1 994).
The Anishinaabeg know that the Paypom Treaty holds the closest documentation of
the spirit and intent of Treaty #3 for lwo very significant reasons. First, the English
words can be easily translated ¡nto the Anishinaabe language; such is not the case with
the 'legalese' of the government printed version. As indicated, Grand Council Treaty #3
TARR has also undertaken archival research which shows that the government written
version was actually written in Ottawa before the 1873 negotiations and brought to the
site for signature (Waisberg and Holzkamm 1992:48). Secondly, once translated from
the English on parchment back to the Ojibway language, Anishinaabemowin, the paypom
Treaty accurately reflects much of the oral tradition of the Elders regarding what was
said at Treaty in 1873. The oral tradition of the Elders kept the spirit and intent of
Treaty #3 alive, just as they have the traditional teachings - within the sacred
ceremonies and with members of the extended family and dodemuk (clans). Ceremonies
had to be conducted in secret due to the repression of government officials, the R.C.M.p.,
and missionaries, whose harsh penalties were approved under successive lndian Acts
(Pettipasl gBB),
Many historians used to plead the case that the lndians were not real participants
in the treaty process but mere receivers of the word drafted by Ottawa (Friesen, J.
1973:1-2 regarding Stanley, et al.) More modern historians have revisited the
archives and found evidence of actual negotiations and keenness of strategy by the
Anishinaabeg and other Treaty Nations that grew from their experience in the fur trade
174
and making alliances with neighbouring lndigenous Nations (Friesen, J. 1973, 1984,
1985; Taylor, JL 1975, 1991 ; Hall, D.1984; price 1979).
Yet, historian J.L. Taylor notes that when one realizes "those treaty provisions
that best support a claim for deliberation, wisdom and benevolence came from the lndian
side", then "the picture is one of a government seeking to forestall potential trouble
from the lndian inhabitants occupying the site of its prospective development project and
attempting to do so at least cost" (Taylor, 1991 :210).
First Nations leaders agree with this interpretation, Anishinaabeg of the
Boundary Waters were experienced in Treaty making and had the benefit of advice from
relatives who had entered major treaties in the United States; Treaty commissioner
Simon J. Dawson referred to the Boundary Water Anishinaabeg as "expert diplomatists
as compared to lndians who have never had such advantage" and considered their
leaders "in their actual dealings (to be) shrewd and sufficiently awake to their own
interests" (PAC, Sessional Papers, v.9, n.81, 1861). The Anishinaabeg also looked to
"hearty cooperation and sufficient aid" from their relatives, the Metis of the Red
River, who acted as interpreters at the Treaty proceedings, and, likely on more
occasíons than just 1873 (Grand Council Treaty #3 TARR files on Treaty #3; McNab
1984). lt was Metis interpreters who performed the valuable service of recording the
Nolin notes and Paypom Treaty.
The Canadian public is just beginning to hear the oral tradition of many
Treaty Nations. The Elders relate a common lheme, that the Treaty guaranteed the
Anishinaabe governance, traditional livelihood, and way of life would continue and be
strengthened. This theme is echoed in the comments of Treaty #3 spokespeople:
115
"At the time Treaty #3 was signed, the ojibway (Anishinaabe )people of our region had a concept of our rights which has
continued to this day. Our people were committed to protecting all
of their First Nation rights. During the negotiation of Treaty *3
the chiefs of the ojibway peopte of the Treaty #3 region weie
given a mandate. The mandate was to ensure that our First Nation
rights would be respected and protected through the treaty
relationsh ip.
"We,must keep in mind that, at the time Treaty #3 was signed,
our chiefs did not speak, read or write Englislr. A government
version of the treaty was presented for signature. Before signing
the non-lndian treaty negotiators once again made verbal
representations that through the treaty relationship our way of
life would be protected. Our Chief signed the treaty on the basis of
these understandings."
(Chief Arnold Gardner, Eagle Lake First Nation, Treaty #3,
Address to the Treaties Conference, Edmonton, Alberta, April B,
1ee2)
The oral tradition of all Treaty Nations in Canada records the "spirit and intent,'
of the treaty, as understood by the indigenous peoples. lt also richly enhances the
description of the actual treaty negotiations. Not recorded in Morris' official report to
Ottawa, nor by the Manitoban news reporter, are the events that occurred in 1g73
which signify the sacred nature of the treaty.
Oral tradition in the Treaty #3 area relates that the Anishinaabe negotiators of
Treaty #3 included some of the most powerful medicine people of the region. They were
there with their pipes, medicine bundles and offerings. Some of these people were so
powerful with their pipes that one had been known to be able to change shape into a huge
bear in order to scare off Sioux warriors (Robert KaKayGeesick, Sr. 1990). That pipe
was at the Treaty #3 negotiations (Robert KaKayceesick Sr. 1990). At Animakee Wa
Zhing, the Northwest Angle lnlet, when Treaty #3 was negotiated, ceremonies were held
such as purification sweats, pipe ceremonies and chisÌki (literally, a shaking tent,
where a medicine man within the tent, intercedes in speaking with the spirits for
answers to questions or to divine guidance). While Morris and the newsman reported
days of seemingly endless waiting for more than 1400 people to arrive (Morris,
116
1880:53-54, quoting The Manitoban newspaper report), the leaders, lhe Ogitchi Taug ,
were actually involved in days of spiritual readiness, which continued throughout the
negotiations (Rene Councíllor, Naicatchewenin, and Bill and Alex Skead, Wauzhusk
Onigum, Treaty #3 Elders meeting, 1973).
For these reasons, well known to the Anishinaabe people, the Treaty was
spiritually guided and is considered as sacred today as it was then. lndeed, meetings held
in 1993 have included Elders, Chiefs and pipecarriers who bring some of the very same
pipes and medicine bundles that were present at the 1873 negotiations (T. Kinew1993).
The agreement that lhe Anishinaabeg sought íncluded guarantees for the
continuation of their way of life which involved an "annual round" of activities to
harvest the foods of the land - hunting and trapping in the winter, fishing in spring, fall
and winter, gathering syrup in the spring, berries in the summer, and manomin (wild
rice) in the fall. As well, the people had, for generations before Treaty #3, kept gardens
of corn, pumpkins, beans, squash and potatoes on the islands (waisberg, 1984b;
Vennum, 19BB). This variety of foods and methods of collecting and preparing them made
these people some of the most prosperous in North America. They did not wish to have
their way of life, including their spiritual ceremonies at the four thanksgivings of the
seasons of the year, to be disrupted. Their medicine people had had dreams, read
prophecies in the rocks and elsewhere (Andy White1979) . They also knew from
relatives from afar, of the dire consequences the whiteman would bring .
Further, they wished to prepare for new developments and opportunities that
might occur, such as expansion of their gardens into farming operations. But they did not
feel the need to abandon their way of life, and instead offered to share their education by
having outside children live with them and their children would in turn live and learn
with the newcomers for a while (Morris, 1BB0: 63). lt was a true,'balanced
reciprocíty" that was offered (Friesen, Jean, 1973; 1984). There is agreement among
7r7
all Treaty Nations that the true intentions of the government to impose the lndian Act and
make the Treaty Nations wards of the Crown was never discussed or mentioned.
"We were to learn of .. government intentions' to assimilate us..
after the government version of the treaty was signed. Had our
Chiefs been informed (of the lnd¡an Act, of the horrors of the
residential school system), we know they would never have given
their consent to signing the written version of the trealy"(4. Gardner 1992:2).
A treaty medallion was given to each signatory of each numbered Treaty. Cast on a
background of the sun shining and the waters flowing, it depicted the Treaty
commissioner in flamboyant military uniform with a widebrim hat, one hand behind his
back, the olher extended to shake hands with an equally elaborately dressed Chief
wearing a headdress of eagle feathers. At the National Treaties Conference in 1992,
Chief Jerry Antoine of Treaty #B summed up the Treaty Nations' viewpoint of the
government printed treaties. He laughingly asked delegates to the April 1992 National
Treaties Conference in Edmonton, "What are we discussing (with the government) - the
handshake? Or the paper the whiteman hides behind his back?!".
This conflict is the major impasse in understanding and interpreting the treaties.
At the 1992 National Treaties Conferences, Elders and Chiefs were adamant that the
"spirit and intent" of the treaties must be honoured (ie, the handshake). At the same
conference, Governor General Ray Hnatyshyn echoed the 1973 speech of Her Majesty the
Queen when he stated that the government would honour the "spirit and terms" of the
treaties (ie, the paper hidden behind the back of the Queen's representative).
Recent historians accurately record that Treaty Nations "never consented to give
up self government, their religion or their institutions" (Friesen 1973:24: Taylor
1991; Price 1979). However, lacking any knowledge of the indigenous languages or
what is contained in the oral tradition, and relying solely on the English records of the
Treaty negotiations, even the most enlightened historians have come to some erroneous
conclusions.
118
Prof. Jean Friesen has concluded that, for Treaties #1 and #2, "There is no
doubt in my mind that at least some lndian leaders at Treaty #1 were well aware that
this was a land sale on an enormous scale" (Friesen, Jean, 1985:3S). From years of
researching these original documents of the numbered treaties, she believes that (Treaty
#3 Anishinaabeg ) "were prepared to transfer land rights - their birthright - to the
incoming Europeans for a guaranteed income and material comfort with an assumption
that their present harvest would continue and their transitional path to a more (but not
entirely) agricultural base would be eased" (Friesen 1973).
The Anishinaabe oral tradition in Treaty #3 completely denies that any such
concept of "selling" the land was possible even for the Anishinabeg to comprehend. The
Treaty #3 oral tradition states that the AnishÌnaabeg were willing to share the land,
only as deep as a plough could furrow (Walter Oshie 1990; Kinew 1974 and see also
footnote 3). lt should be noted that while Prof. Friesen is quoted regarding Treaty #1,
the damaging inference extends to all treaties. How can we assess these opposing views?
Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg understand the spirit and intent of Treaty #3 through
their oral lradition, through their language. At the October 3, 1981 celebration, Elder
Neogezhik (Walter Oshie) of Northwest Angle #34 remembered much of the oral
tradition surrounding Treaty #3. He spoke of how the redcoats of the Northwest Mounted
Police lent a coercive atmosphere to the Treaty proceedings - the effect of their guns
being just what Lt. Governor Morris has intended in asking for a full dress military
escorl.
Recorded on NFB film for posterity, Neogezhik spoke in his own language
regarding more specific events at the time of the treaty.
"An unnamed Elder who was not part of the official signing of the
Treaty asked permission to speak. His own sons tried to discourage
him but Mawedopenais, in his wisdom, suggested that he go ahead-.
The Elder drew a circle on the ground and drew a line across. He
said to the others, 'Did you stand aside and allow them to use all
your land?' He went on to say that only half the circle be (shared)
and that half be used for people who would be living in time
forward...
119
At the conclusion of the Treaty, chief powassin got up and took
some earth from any place on the ground. He took out the grass, the
lwigs, the leaves and said, 'All these items I have taken away from
the ground itself represent lhe natural resources and the natural
resources are not included as a result of this signing.
As he (Powassin) was tarking about the ground, he said, 'As deep
as the plough and the harrow would go, that is all we are allowing
you to use. The islands of this lake are not relinquished as a result
of this Treaty .. only the ground as I have outlined. The eueen's
representative then went on to say, 'That this is the way it shall
be, as you have outlined.",
(Neogezhik's words, as translated by T. p. Kinew, in Georges
Dufaux, Manomin (incomplete) film, NFB, 1981:reel B)
Tobasonakwut Kinew, who later translated Neogezhik's speech, explained the
intent of lhe An¡sh¡naabe word , Kii ta wi'in ,lhal Neogezhik chose to use when he said
"to step aside and allow you to use":
" 'Ki ta wi'in' is used in the sense that'you can push me so you can
use the land but that doesn't mean we give up the land'. lnstead, we
say 'l'll stand aside and allow you to use so much'. The Anishinaabe
word "ki ta wi'in" conveys the outsiders could 'use the land to stay
alive but you shall return it to me. Neogezhik deliberately did noi
use a word like "in da ta waa'gen" which means 'to sell or barter'.
Such a word is restricted to convey certain material things. The
land could not be sold. Anlshinaabe society would not allow that -
you cannot sell your mother.
This is a genuinely new concept for outsiders to comprehend.
Anyone knowing our language would intuitively grasp its meaning.
What the Elders are saying here is nothing less than a 'reverse
usufruct'l
since lhe racist decision of the privy council in their 19BB st.
Catherine's Milling Co. case, the Canadian legal and political
system has said that aboriginal title was no more than a 'usufruct'
or use of the land that was 'dependent upon the goodwill of the
sovereign'. Actually, what Neogezhik and rreaty #3 Elders know to
be true is "kii ta wi'in" , the concept in our language, that lhe
Treaty retains Anishinaabe ownership of the land. lt allows the
newcomers to use the land only, not the natural resources, and
only at the goodwill of the Anishinaabeg. we are the guardians, the
custodians, the trustees for all that the Great spirit has given us."(TP Kinew January 1993)
720
This Anishinaabe concept related by Neogezhk turns all conceptions of aboriginal title
and treaty rights upside down. Anishinaabe conceptualization even reverses the divine
right which Kings of Europe assumed for centuries and which continues to underline the
real property law of western civilization. To western thinking, Crown title underlies all
land title. ln the St. Catherine's Milling Co. case referred to, the Privy Council (at that
time the highest court of appeal to Canada) decided that Crown title even underlay the
possessory right of the indigenous people, the First peoples of that land.
Io Anishinaabeg, the ultimate authority is the Creator. 2 ln aboriginal concepts,
referred to by Chief Roy Fox of Treaty #7 as "immemorial law", only the Creator can
'own'anything (Fox, 1992). All of life is given by the Creator to share; humans have a
special responsibility to care for all living things of this world. There is a relationship
amongst life expressed by Anishinaabeg: the prayer for "all my relations" expresses as
much for rocks, trees, fish, birds as it does for blood relatives (Little Bear .1991). The
Anishinaabeg are the caretakers of their own region, including the special gifts of that
area, manomin or wild rice, prominent among fish, berries, roots and medicines,
animals and birds that the Great Spirit gave.
Any non-speaker of aboriginal languages needs to be wary of English translations
of speeches made by Anishinaabeg . Even letters and petitions that Anishinaabeg had
drafted for them need to be corroborated with the keepers of the oral tradition as to the
real intent of the signator or speaker. For example, Lt. Governor Morris reported what
has become a poetically haunting phrase for all the numbered treaties, when Treaty #3
chief negotiator, Mawedopenais, spoke at the conclusion:
"and now in closing this council, I take off my glove, and in giving
you my hand I deliver over my birthright and my lands: and in
taking your hand, I will hold fast all the promises you have made,
and I hope they will last as long as the sun rises and the water
flows, as you have said." (Morris, 1BB0:46)
What could have led to Morris' report? ln his record of negotiations, the
Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg were "fully alive" to their interests. Earlier in the
r27
week of negoliations, Lt Gov Morris spoke against compensation for the wood and water
used by newcomers before the Treaty: "wood and water were the gift of the Great Spirit,
and were made alike for the good of both the white man and red man" (Morris lBBO:57).
Mawedopenais counlered, "What was said about the trees and rivers was quite true, but
it was the lndian's counlry, not the white man's"(Morris 1BB0:57). And later, when
discussions turns to farming and fishing, Chief Sakatcheway of Lac Seul proposes the
accept the offer to "borrow your cattle..l will find whereon the feed them. The waters out
of which you sometimes take food for yourselves, we will lend you in return" (Morris,
1 BB0:63).
These speeches allude to the "balanced reciprocity" which is characteristic of
Anishinaabe treaty-making. The "deliver over my birthright and my lands" speech of
Mawedopenais, as reported by Morris, is totally out of character for the determined
person this lead negotiator was. His character in Anishinaabe oral tradition is reflected
in newspaper accounts of Treaty negotiations and in later historical files (Grand Council
Treaty #3, 1992, Education Promise & lndigenous Government pamphlets). And,
tellingly, Anishinaabe Elders relate that such concepts of "delivering my birthright" in
the English language is not expressive of lhe Anishinaabe language, as is also the case
with English words "cede, release, surrender and yield up ..all rights, titles and
privileges to the lands.." used in treaty documents. 3 lt is significant indeed that a less
poetic version of Mawqendopenmais' closing speech has been located in archival
documents by Grand Council Treaty ## TARR:
"And, I trust, what we are about to do today is for the benefit of our nation
as well as for our white brothers - that nothing but friendship may reign
between the nation and our white brothers. And now I take off my giove to
give you my hand and sign the Treaty. And now before you all, lndiáns and
whites, let is never be said that this has been done in secret. lt is done
openly and in the light of day." (Grand Council Treaty #3 199S)
722
Five decades after Treaty #3, a1927 letter by Jim Netamequon of Assabaska to
lhe Department of lndian Affairs lends further credence to the oral tradition of Treaty
#3' The Treaty is portrayed in this letter as an agreement, a promise by Anishinaabeg to
share the land with the newcomers, but not give away the whole territory nor any of the
resources. As a son of a chief and signator of rreaty #3, Netaquon stated:
"..yoy ask the railway track to be going through my land and you
promise me $3.00 for it and I give it to you and farming land you
were ask you promise me $2.00 for it and we give it to you and
you were not asking and gold mine not any timber not any muskeg
not any water not anything about hunting not any thing for that you
were told us we suppose lo owned....
".. I wish you could let me have something so I can feeled we were
told when first treaty made time we Shake hands we Said that we
never have any change and if it happens to be change we will talk
over again.." (Jim Netamequon, Assabaska, to Department of
lndian Affairs, October 10, 1927 on file at Grand Council Treaty
#3 TARR).
How are we to reconcile these thoughts with Morris' report of Mawedopenais' "deliver
over my birth-right" speech? Such dissonance in understanding can only mean that
some insight into the nuances of the Anishinaabemowin language and cultural concepts
is required in order to fully understand what the Anishinaabeg understand by the spirit
and intent of Treaty #3.
Neogezhik related that the Anishinaabeg would share the land "as deep as a
plough could furrow", but that they did not consider giving up the whole territory nor
the resources (Dufaux 1981). Nancy Jones remembers hearing exactly the same story
as she was growing up around Seine River (Nancy Jones 1992). There was such
agreement amongsl Elders across the numbered treaty regions in the 1g70s regarding
this particular concept about land tenure from treaty, that DIAND specific claims staff
and the 1970-1975 federal claims commissioner staff felt that there was collusion
amongst the Elders of Treaty Nations (Personal observation 1974)l lndeed, in each
numbered treaty area, the indigenous peoples "assumed freedom of access', (to
resources), and in Treaty #3, they assumed "perhaps exclusive use of wild rice,'
(Friesen, J. 1973:20\.
I23
Though wild rice is not even mentioned in the government printed version of
Treaty #3, it is mentioned twice in the Paypom Treaty. Treaty #3 was negotiated at the
end of Manominiikigiizis, the September harvest season of the wild rice moon, in one of
the most bountiful wild rice areas in Lake of the Woods, often referred to as the
"ricebowl of North America" (Jenks 1900; Aiken et al 19BB). Thus, government
representatives concerned about the present and future costs of their newly assumed
wards, urged that "the Commissioners don't wish that the lndians leave their harvest
immediately to step into their reserve" (Paypom Treaty, item #'13. See appendix S).
The Northwest Angle side of Lake of the woods, where Treaty #3 was signed, has
shallower bays which allow for a more regular crop than the rest of the lake, even in
years of high water. lt is likely 1873 was a good year for so many people to be gathered
at Angle lnlet during the harvest time.
lmportantly, the Paypom Treaty also notes that "the lndians will be free as by the
past for their hunting and rice harvest" (Paypom Treaty, item #11). This wording is
similar to some in the 1830s US treaties with the Chippewa (Anishinaabe ) (Holzkamm
1985:16,19-21). lt also harkens to the 1BS0 Robinson Superior Treaty which
guaranteed lhe right to hunt and fish throughout the territory "as they have heretofore
been in the habit of doing" (Friesen, Jean, 19BS:32). Also, in 1g7l rreaty #1
(covering what has became known as southeastern Manitoba), the lndians were "to make
use of (the lands) which you have in the past" (Morris, 1BB0:29) . "Free as by the
past" became understood as the protection for the continuation of the traditional way of
I ife.
For manomrn , this freedom to continue "as by the past" meant lhat Anishinaabe
people would continue to have exclusive use and stewardship of the wild rice. This
freedom "as by the past" would include all aspects:
-sewing and spreading the crop;
-bundling and protecting the crop from birds, weather, predators;
724
-preparing for harvest by building canoes,
paddles, and
-holding spiritual preparations by making
ceremonies;
carving sticks and
offerings and holding appropriate
-organizing and managing the harvesting (ie, respecting family territories, organizing
rest days (for the rice to grow), setting picking days and length of season);
-processing and marketing (see Chapter 3).
lnstead of recognizing Anishinaabe jurisdiction over wild rice guaranteed by
Treaty, the Prov¡nces of Ontario and Manitoba have assumed control and management of
wild rice through the enactment of their own legislations in 1960 (Ontario) and 1 983
(Manitoba). This would seem to be an untenable position in this period since 1982.
The Constitution Act. 1982 recognized and affirmed the "Treaty and Aboriginal Rights of
the Aboriginals peoples of Canada" (s. 35).
The provinces state, however, that the government printed version of Treaty #3
says nothing about wild rice, and therefore, wild rice is unprotected and remains a
crown resource by virtue of s.92 of the Constitution Act. 1867. Treaty#3 First Nations
state clearly that manomin (wild rice) remains theirs, protected by Treaty #3.
The basic disagreement is highlighted in their differing interpretations of the
Paypom documenvNolin notes which states "The terms of rreaty #3" (McNab
1991:160-161). The provincial government may question whether the document is a
record of the Treaty #3 negotiations but not necessarily the final agreement. However,
in 1980, the federal government went on record as slating that the Paypom document
stated the actual Treaty promise regarding wild rice (June 26, 19BO letter from Hon.
John Munro, Minister of lndian Affairs, to Justice Patrick Hartt, lndian Commissioner
of ontario). The Anishinaabe know: they refer to the paypom Treaty as,,manito
mazinaaigan ", the sacred document.
Grand Council Treaty #3 argues that there can be no other interpretation of the
Paypom documentation than its proteclionof manomin as an Anishinaabe resource. They
base this assumption on the historic fact that no non-lndian in the Treaty #3 territory
725
ever cared for or harvested wild rice until well into the twentieth century. Manomin
was the singular resource that the Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg retained for their
own exclusive use; all others were shared. 4
According to Grand Council Treaty #3 Treaties and Aboriginal Research,
manomin is covered as an 'outside promise' under the Agreement known as Treaty #3
(Grand Council Treaty #3 TARR, "We ask for Fair Play: Wild Plant Usage",1992:2).
This means that the wild rice promise can be documented as part of the Treaty
negotiations, but not formally recorded in the government printed version. According to
ethnohistorians who have spent the better part of two decades researching files about
Treaty #3, their evidence is sound:
"The issue of discrepancies between the text of the document
published by Canada as Treaty #3 and the written record of the
oral discussions and agreements, was fírst explicitly recognized
by Canada's officials in 1899. They concluded that the document
was not a complete record of the treaty agreement of 1873."(Waisberg and Holzkamm 1992:48)
ln 1991, the Aboriginal Justice lnquiry of Manitoba stated that, assuming the
Paypom Treaty has equal status to the written terms of the 'official' treaty,
"jurisprudence clearly supports the interpretation that its provisions would supersede
provincial laws to the exlent of any conflict" (Government of Manitoba 1991:190).
The case of R. v. Taylor and Williams (1981) was the precedent specifically
referred to by the Manitoba lnquiry report. ln that important judgment, the Ontario
Court of Appeal found that oral promises recorded in the minutes of the Treaty
negotiations justified the right to hunt (R. v. Taylor and Williams (1981) 34 O.R. (2d)
360 (C.4.) ). After the entrenchment of recognition and affirmation of aboriginal and
treaty rights in the Constitution Act, 1882, the courts could rule according to a "whole
new ballgame" (CM Sinclair 1991 lecture to University of Manitoba Law School,
Natural Resources lnstitute class). With such constitutional recognition, the Supreme
Court found that
"ll is no longer acceptable to be bound by the biases and prejudices
of another era"
726
and
"Treaties impose constitutional obligations...the provisions to hunt
"as before" are not to be interpreted as meaning only traditional
techniques but as methods change with time" (R.v. simon tlgBsI2 SCR 287).
And, in another landmark judgment, the highest court ruled that "a treaty is to be
construed liberally, in the sense that would be naturally underslood by the lndians,'(R.
v Nowegejick, C.N.L.R. n.2 (1983) 94 ).
Grand Council Treaty #3 believes they have a strong legal case for Treaty
protection, for the continuation of Anishinaabe governance of wild rice in their
traditional territory. ln Anishinaabe terms, the Chiefs and Elders of Grand Council
Treaty #3 affirm Treaty protection for their continued role of caretaking of Manito
Gitigaan, the Great Spirit's garden. This continued responsibility includes the historic
and modern methods for seeding and extending its area, preparation and harvesting,
processing and marketing. ln Anishinaabe oral tradition which continues today, the
Treaty protection tormanomin extends exclusively and forever.
I27
Endnotes:
1. Animakee wazhing is also known as the place where food caches were kept,
particularly before travelling on to the Dawson Trail overland to the Red River
settlement. Food caches were located throughout the lakes and rivers of the boundary
waters.
2. A belief that the foundalion of government is God, the Creator, is still prominenily
held in Treaty #3. ln 1992, Trealy #3 Anishinaabe leaders found it laugí-ringly
deplorable that Canadians should have any debate at all about including a reference to God
in the constitution of Canada in'1982 (Robin Greene, Assembly of First Nations hearings
on the Constitution, Kenora, January 1gg2).
3. Grand Chief Kinew responded to the Hon. Ron ln¡uin, Minister of lndian Affairs,
9!oling Mawedopensais' "l deliver over my birth-right and lands" in a speech to Treaty
#3 Chiefs at Fort Frances, January 19, 1995. He recalled how his mother had "held her
hand with thumb and little finger extended in opposite directions, to describe how deep a
plough could furrow. Then she said, 'This only did we agree to share.' "
4. A strong case is being made by Grand Council Treaty #3 that fisheries were a certain
promise of Treaty #3, on the bas¡s of Anishinaabe oral tradition, and documentation by
Treaty #3 Commissioner Simon J. Dawson:
"taken by itself, the wording thereof (of government printed rreaty #3)
does not convey an exclusive right, but it does convey to the lndians the
right to pursue their avocations of hunting and fishing and of course this
right, so conveyed, has in equity to be considered not from the wording
alone, but from the evident spirit and meaning of the treaty, as well as
from the discussions explanatory of the wording which took place at the
time the Treaty was negotiated... lam in a position to say that, as an
inducement to the lndians to sign the Treaty, the commissioners pointed
out to them that, along with the land reserves and money payments, they
would forever have the use of their fisheries. This point was strongly
insisted on and it has great weight with the lndians, who for some years
previously had persistently refused to enter into any Treaty." (S.J.
Dawson, member of Parliament, letter to lhe Deputy superintendent of
lndian Affairs, lBBB). (Waisberg & Holzkamm, 1992:S0)
L2B
Chapter Seven
A "Few Crochety Kickers" and a "War party"
The aftermath of rreaty #3: protest to the Broken promises
"lndian Affairs wants to bury you in detail about the modern day
incident. They don't want you to see the big picture, which covers
a much longer time."
Aboriginal Journalist, CBC Commentary, July 1990
As is the case with all situations regarding Aboriginal peoples in Canada, one
must delve much farther back than just the immediate dispute that hits the newspapers.
There is always a long historical background that forms part of the collective memory of
the people and gives rise to the motivations and actions of today. Such is the case for
Treaty #3 and the Treaty right to manomin
This chapter focusses on the organízation of Treaty #3 Anishinaabe leadership
and their actions in decades after 1873 to gain respect for their Treaty. The reader will
note that manomin is a continuing and prominent issue for Treaty #3 leaders, but that
they are confronted by a multiplicity of issues. As Grand Council Treaty #3 approaches
the twenty-firsl century, these issues seem to increase exponentially. And, the
conspicuous issue of manomin takes on a more symbolic role as standard-bearer for the
Treaty rights that must be protected after more than a century of dispossession and
suppression.
ln the understanding the Anishinaabe Elders of Treaty #3 today, and in the
political jargon of the '1990's, Treaty #3 was signed Nation to Nation. The Ogitchi Tuaag,
the traditional leaders of Treaty #3 were honour bound to deal with their counterparts,
the Treaty Commissioner, Alexander Morris. One year after Treaty #3 was signed,
Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba and the Northwest Territories Morris was already
planning his next "land cession", as he saw it, for the Ojibway and Cree farther west in
what was to become Treaty #4 lerrilory ( the Qu'Appelle Valley of Saskatchewan).
When Morris received the first letter of protest from Treaty #3 leaders in 1 874, he
729
assigned his former Treaty Co-Commissioner, Simon J. Dawson, and his assistant,
Robert Pither, a former Hudson's Bay clerk, to deal with the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg.
This may have been the first indication that Anishinaabe Nation-Crown affairs
were no longer of the highest importance to the Queen's government. However, there had
been ¡9 mention at the time of Treaty negotiations about any change in their own
government, nor any change in intergovernmental relations (Friesen, J. 19BS; Taylor,
J' 1975). Certainly, no federal legislation governing lndians, an Indian Act, nor even
section 91(24) of the BNA Act had even been mentionned during Treaty #3 negotiations
(Morris 1BB0). ln the 1873 negotiations, lhe Ogitchi Tuaag had promised that they
would bring their own wrongdoers to justice, while they looked to the Crown to police
liquor and to protect their people from being called into the Queen's wars (Morris
'1880; Paypom Treaty, 1990; Grand Council Treaty #3 1982) .
From this position of sovereignty and co-existence with newcomers, the
Anishinaabeg of Treaty #3 continued to exercise their own government, for example, by
meeting frequently in council to enforce rules and by carrying out the wild rice harvesr
as described in chapter four. They did not realize they were about to enter the
totalitarian regime of the lndian Act, which was to control all aspects of their daily
lives, from registration at birth to estates at death (A. Gardner 1992).
ln 1874, the Chiefs and headmen who knew well the terms, spirit and intent of
Treaty #3, protested the inferior cattle, the lack of action in delivering seed, farm
implements, and instructors, and their wish to determine their special reserves for
farming and wildlands (Waisberg 1984a) . They met with Dawson and pither and made
their issues known. Meanwhile, Dawson indicated in letter to the Lieutenant Governor
that the Crown representatives were heeding other orders, from Ottawa, that ,' the
reserves include no know mineral lands, and should be as far as possible from the line of
known settlement"( PAC RG10, c11,111 v.1918 f.2790D Jan.28, 1875 SJ Dawson to
EA Meredith, Deputy Minister of lnterior, Ottawa).
130
The following year, the Survyeor General, Col. Dennis, arrived from Ottawa to
meet with the Treaty #3 leaders. The Chiefs and headmen indicated that they wished to
lravel themselves to Ottawa to present their own issues. Dennis replied that "the proper
course" was for them "to await" delegation from Ottawa, and that he would transmit their
concerns (PAC RG10 v.1918 f . 2790).
According to his report, Surveyor General Dennis met the Chiefs and headmen of
the Rainy River and then Lake of the Woods, and after much deliberation, were able to
reach an agreement on the location of the reserves. This occurred despite what Dennis
called lhe Anishinaabe "deep laid scheme to claim the most fertile lands along the Rainy
River" (PAC RG 10 C11,111 v. 1918 f.279OD; Grand Council Treaty #3 1992a).
This line of analysis always held sway whenever Crown agents characterized Anishinaabe
protest; the protesters were always described as "stubborn" or "schemers" (Miller
19Bg). Col. Dennis presumed that he understood:
"l was pleased to hear you say that you desired nothing but what
was in the Treaty, because we undersland one another properly perfectly.
I was also pleased to hear you say that, while you would continue ìo agitate
constantly, till these little complaints were settled, you would do so
peaceably and quietly from year to year until a remedy was obtained. This
is the proper way for the lndians to do, if they have any complaint, and
you may depend upon it that, when you bring forward complaints in this
way, if they prove to be well grounded, the Government will listen to your
wants and will remedy all reasonable grievances." (pAC RG10, c11,111
v. 1918 f. 2790D).
Yet, there was not "perfectly properly" understanding. Col. Dennis spoke of the
terms outlined in the government printed version dated 1873 . The Ogitchi Tuaag 
,
however, were speaking of the spirit and intent of Treaty #3 as etched in the memory of
the negotiators and to be preserved in the oral tradition of the Anishinaabe Nation.
The subsequent surveys of Treaty #3 reserves were carried out by the Dominion
Lands Branch between 1876-1BBB. The reasons for the delays had somewhat to do with
the lack of surveyors and rough terrain, but infinitely more to do with federal-
provincial wrangling in some of the biggest battles after confederation.
131
The northwestern boundary of Ontario was in dispute from 1875 until 1BBg,
when the Privy Council in Great Britain decided on the boundary which now separates
Ontario and Manitoba. ln this decision, the 55,000 square miles of Treaty #3 was
divided into two jurisdictions, with one-fifth to one-quarter of that area to be in
Manitoba (known today as the Whiteshell region) (4.G. Can.v.A.G. Ont.[1897] A.C. 199
(P.C.). The Treaty #3 Ogitchi Tuaag were never informed of any new legal regime in
their territory. They were never informed of any court case affecting them.
ln 1BBB, the Privy Council also considered the federal and provincial
jurisdiction over Crown lands and resources in newly acquired territories after treaty.
The specific case centred on the St. Catherine's Milling Co., who was granted a timber
cutting lícence from the federal government to work in the Treaty #S area, near present
day Wabigoon and Dryden. The Ontario government sued the company for cutting timber
with a federal not a provincial licence. The federal government intervened, stating that
the federal government had effective control, having made Treaty #3 with the
Anishinaabe Nation. The Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg were never informed of any court
action affecting them.
Through the various appeal levels until the House of Lords Judicial Committee,
the St. Catherine's Milling Co. case wended its way, with Ontario arguing that they gained
the beneficial interest in the lands and resources, according to sections 92 and 103 of
the then British North America Act. 1867. Ottawa countered that they made the Treaty
with the lndians and the federal government gained the benefits. Despite the fact that the
essential arguments dealt with aboriginal title and treaty-making, Treaty #3
Anishinaabe leaders were not involved, not consulted, not represented, and nol even
informed that such a monumental case was taking place (Cottam 1990; Dickason 1993).
While the learned judges spoke about the "rough redmen of the Northwest",
"savages", and "poor children who know nothing about.." (Grand Council rreaty #3
L32
1992a) , Commissioner Dawson was reporting to Ottawa the actual state of Anishinaabe
government in Treaty #3:
"The Bands of the Rainy River and Lake of the Woods meet frequently in
Council. They discuss their affairs very intelligently and enfoice siernly
the rules and regulations considered necessary for common warfare.
"They collect (wild rice) on a systematic plan enjoined by their self-
imposed laws.." (Grand Council Treaty #3 1992a)
The reality of Anishinaabe government within the Treaty #3 territory was
never discussed in the courts. lnstead, the St. Catherine's decision, based on the
misguided imaginations and Victorian attitudes of the late 19th century, became etched
into Canadian legal history.
"..these gentlemen (ed: The Lords),who had never set foot in North
America and knew nothing about indigenous land-use traditions, came to
the conclusion (very conveniently) that any rights the lndians may have
were granted to them by the Royal proclamation of 1763; and that these
rights exist "subject to the goodwill of the Sovereign" (in other words,
that they can be abolished if the Sovereign feels like abolishing them)."
Richardson, B. 1993:290
The Judicial Council of the Privy Council stated that Ontario gained the beneficial
interest in the lands and resources, even though the federal government had made treaty
with the Anishinaabeg . Aboriginal title was considered a "usufructuary right" and a
"mere burden" on lhe Crown and "dependent upon the goodwill of the sovereign" (St.
Catherine's Milling etc. Co. v.R. (1BBB) 14 App. Cas.46,4 Cart. B.N.A. 107,2 c.N.L.c.
541, 58 L.J.P.O. 54,60 L.T. 197, s r.L.R. 12s, affirming 13 s.c.R. s77 (p.c.)
(ont.)).
The terminology of the St. Catherine's Milling Co. judgment led an outspoken
Winnipeg lawyer experienced in Aboriginal land claim and criminal cases to state that
the "lndians were used and fructed in this case" (Vic Savino, University of Manitoba
'Aboriginal Rights and Natural Resources' symposium, February 1989). This racist
judgment has continued to define aboriginal title and rights in the most ethnocentric and
demeaning way into the 1990s (Opekokew 19g2; Colborne 1992; Savino 1989). lts
awful legacy continues, even after the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
133
Canada's remarked in 1984 that "the language used... reflects the biases and prejudices
of another era in history. Such language is no longer acceptable in Canadian law and
indeed is inconsistent with the growing sensitivity to native rights in Canada" (Simon,
(1s86) 24 D.L.R. (4rh) 3e0 (S.C.C.) ar 3ee).
lndeed, any observer of the 199'1 Temi Augami decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada, and the 1992 and 1993 decision on the Delgamaakwu v. R. in Right of B.C. and
A.G. of Canada [1991] 5 C.N.L.R. 1, 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C.S.C.) case of the Gitskan-
Wetsu-weten Nation would agree that such outmoded legal thinking of the nineteenth
century is creating bad law today and perpetuating Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
conflicts into the next millenium (Legal Pluralism Seminar, University of Manitoba,
November 1992). University of Manitoba Law professor Roland Penner stated, in the
aftermath of the Delgammakwu case, expressed a legally-informed exasperation:
"Lislen to how dogmatically the law on these issues is stated (ed: in
Delgamaakwu, repeating St. Catherine's): .."Common law aboriginal
rights exist at the pleasure of the crown.." pleasure of the crown? ,lf it
pleases me, you've got them, if it doesn't please me, you don't have them.'
And what does "common law aboriginal rights" mean? Can it really be
argued that aborig¡nal rights depended on the constructs of common law,
which constructs were intended, in fact, to do nothing more than derogate
from and invalidate the notion of inherent aboriginal rights."
Roland Penner, "Power, The Law, and Constilution-making,,,
in Cassidy 1992:249
The Boundary settlement and the St. Catherine's Milling Co. case, however,
combined to insert the government of Ontario into the lives of the Treaty #3
Anishinaabeg . While lhe Anishinaabeg were to feel the effects immediately, in the
disastrous mismanagement of their waters, fishery and timber, they were not to
discover until the 1970's exactly how the Ontario government ever became involved.
Anishinaabeg knew their Nation had signed a Treaty with the federal government, not
Queen's Park (Grand Council Treaty #3 assemblies, '1970's and the Ontario Royal
Commission on the Northern Environment Hearings, 197B-197g).
r34
By 1892, the mismanagement of resources in the Treaty #3 territory had caused
so many problems that the Ogitchi Twaag of Treaty #3 met in Council and sent a petit¡on
to Ottawa so that remedial action would be taken. Foremost in their concerns was the
flooding of Lake of the Woods, the loss of the rice harvest, and overfishing by trawlers.
(Appendix 7: 1892 Petition) Their petition was supported by statements by Treaty #3
Commissioner, S. J. Dawson, later a member of Parliament, who was adamant that
Treaty #3 guaranteed "they would forever have the use of the¡r fisheries" ( Grand
Council Treaty #3, 1986:36). lndeed, Dawson stated that they would not have been able
to secure the Treaty were it not for this promise of continued fisheries (Waisberg
1992; Van West 1990).
The overfishing continued, without federal action to protect the Treaty right of
lhe Anishinaabeg , only the oft-stated promise to "look into it" (Grand Council Treaty
#3 1986:35). ln 1898, Ogitchitwaa, Powassin, one of the chief negotiators of Treaty
#3, saw no other recourse than to launch his own action. Powassin led a raiding party of
several warriors, replete with warpaint, onto Lake of the Woods to destroy the trawler
nets (Waisberg 1984a). Although the newspaper recounts this direct action, there is no
followup story to indicate any charges being laid or what reaction occurred about this
brave assertion of sovereignty and protection of the Treaty.
Powassin's was a futile albeit courageous attempt, as neither level of government
acted to protect the fishery. Within a decade, the sturgeon were almost extinct on Lake of
the Woods and Rainy River (Waisberg & Holzkamm 1992). This was the same fishery
that the Anishinaabeg managed for centuries, enabling them to gather in huge numbers
at various times of the year (Grand council rreaty #3 1986; 1992a).
The Anishinaabe Chiefs and headmen never gave up . As they had warned the
Surveyor General in 1874, they kept "complaining", writing letters and petitions to
Ottawa, whenever an issue required action. ln 1898, Lake of the Woods Chiefs again
addressed Ottawa's attention to rising water levels, loss of rice harvests, and other
135
violations of the Treaty. Chief Thomas Lindsay of Rat Portage protested in a speech to the
local lndian agent that "Our rice is a great loss to us" (Grand Council Treaty #3
1992a). 1
ln the meantime, the Ontario government had formally stated to Ottawa that their
government must agree to the "extent and location" of lhe Treaty #3 reserves. Both
governments passed joint legislation to that effect in 1891, followed by a joint
agreement of 1894, stating preliminary points of agreement. Ontario undertook a
thorough investigation of the land and resources of the Treaty #3 territory, reviewed
lhe surveys and acreage, and took exception to several of the reserves agreed to by the
federal representatives and lhe Ogitchi Tuaag of Treaty #3 (Grand Council Treaty #3
1975; McNab 1983b).
ln order to gain Ontario's acceptance of the extent and location of Treaty #3
reserves, the federal government undertook a number of measures that subverted the the
traditional Anishinaabe government and the location of Treaty #3 reserves. lndian
Affairs "cancelled" one reserve, relocated and amalgamated others, at Ontario's
direction. 2
Neither Crown government informed the Treaty #3 leaders that any such
agreements or laws were discussed or approved. the Anishinaabe oral tradition asserts
that the islands were reserved for AnÌshinaabeg (whether part of the reserve survey or
nol). Anishinaabe Elders say their people are prolected by Treaty #3 in continuing
their traditional livelihood of hunting, fishing, trapping, gathering wild rice, berries
and medicines, as well as other activities, throughout the whole 55,000 square miles of
Treaty #3 traditional territory (Grand Council Treaty #3 Elders Meetings: Rene
councillor, 1974, Bill skead, 1974, John Jones, 19Bo). As stated in the Treaty
chapter, Neogezhik relates how , at the time of the treaty-making in 1873, powassin
136
took some earth in his hand, and removed the twigs, rocks and other resources to indicate
it was only the soil which their Nation agreed to share; the resources remained with the
Anishinaabeg (Chapter six).
It would seem self evident that the Anishinaabeg would have been notified of all
these court cases, laws and federal provincial agreements that affected them. They were
not (Cottam 1990; Dickason 1993).
For decades after Treaty #3 was signed, large councils were held at two or three
locations within Treaty #3 - at the agency reserve known as Chi Nayashi (Pither's
Point) at Fort Frances on Rainy Lake, and at the agency reserve at Assabaskoshing on
Lake of the Woods, as well as the Savanne agency east of presentday Dryden. At these
treaty annuity assemblies, the Chiefs and headmen, and hundreds of Anishinaabe people,
gathered to meet with the crown representatives to receive their Treaty annuity ($25
per Chief, $15 per councillor and $5 per person) and advise the Crown representatives
about any issues of concern. lndeed, the 'lBgB Sessional Report of the lndian agent stated
that 800 galhered at Assabaskoshing that year, but the gathering only took three days
instead of the usual 6 or 7 as there was "less talk" (GCT3 TARR files: Sessional papers) .
This may have been because the Chiefs and headmen had already petítionned Ottawa for
action, knowing that local Crown agents had not represented their case well enough. This
was also the year when Powassin took malters of overfishing into his own hands (see
above).
As the reserves had been placed away from the "probably line of known
setllement", there was not much direct contact between lhe Anishinaabeg and the
newcomers. Although some Anishinaabeg found wage labour in timber cutting, their
world continued to be the annual round of the seasonal gathering in the bush.
Townspeople were still wary of the mythological "bloodthirsty savage" (Drinnon
1980). ln 1902, when hundreds of Anishinaabeg gathered at Windy Point, just north of
the town of Rainy River, non-lndian spokespeople called in the army to quell the
r37
"uprising". When a few brave souls finally went to meet the Anishinaabeg , they were
told that lhe Anishinaabeg were holding a religious ceremony and meant no harm
(Waisberg 1984a).
ln 1912, another similar incident occured closer to Kenora, according to Peter
Seymour of Rat Portage (Peter Seymour 1990). Anishinaabeg gathered tor a Mite'iwin
ceremony at Blueberry Point. Worried townspeople, in fear of an uprising, called for
army support. ln neither case were the Anishinaabe people contacted before calling out
the armed forces.
The beginning of the twentieth century was a time of considerable upheaval for
Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg . The effects of the lndian Acl were being felt in truly terrible
ways. Children were being removed to the St, Mary's lndustrial School at Kenora, and
soon to the Cecilia Jaffrey Presbyterian School at Shoal Lake, moved later near Kenora.
Every child by the age of 7 or B was required to attend school by the Act and those who
did not have nearby 'day schools' (on reserve schools with teachers supplied by the
Department of lndian Affairs) were captured by the priests or lndian agents and hauled
off to school. Most did not see their families for the next ten months; some never again
(TP Kinew 1968; Nancy Morrison 't992; Stuart Jack '1975-1977; Ontario Royal
Commission on the Northern Environmenl 1g7B-79 Hearings),
The lndian Act was also imposing a new system of government within Treaty #3 -
an elected system whereby the Chief and councillors would swear allegiance to the eueen
or King (figure of Treaty medallion) and they had to have permission of the agent,
usually as well, his presence, if they wished to hold a meeting (PAC, RG1O, f.11g-12g,
July 2, 1938 Letter from Captain Frank Edwards, Kenora agent to Secretary, lndian
Affairs, Ottawa). Chiefs and councillors were required to report any infractions of the
outside (non-Anishinaabe) law to the lndian Agent . The Agent would act as prosecutor,
judge and jury in such cases. ln the 1970s, Billie Archie, then an octogenarian member
of the Big Grassy River First Nation(then part of the Assabaska Band)recalls Captain
i3B
Edwards of Kenora sentencing him to a fine for not reporting a band member getting
drunk some 20 miles away by boat on another of their outlying reserues
As part of the avowed process of assimilation undertaken by the government of
Canada, during the first decade of the twentieth century, lndian Affairs and industrial or
residential schools began the process of anglicizing all Anishinaabe names. Within
Treaty #3, many strange results occurred. When Treaty annuity was given at Assabaska,
the agent asked one man what was his name, and he answered in loud, plain English, "Me
lndian!". The agent called him and his family by the last name of "lndian", a family name
slill carried by his descendents at Onegaming and Big Grassy today (Stuart Jack1974-
77).Two brothers at Big lsland, one taller than another, became the forebearers of the
family names, "George" and "Big George" (stuart Jackl 974-77; Kinew 1973). A man
at Seine River when asked his name replied in lhe Anishinaabe language, "pushkaygiin,'
("ll's up to you.") The agent there called him and his family by the last name of
Boshkaygan (Stuart Jack 1974-77). The nuns and teachers at residential school
imposed English names when children were baptised; many boys were called after
disciples and given asecond name to relate them to their older brothers. Thus, two John
Kelly's became John Jim Kelly and John Peter Kelly (Kinew 1969). While the children
would conlinue to be known by their family, relatives and close friends by their
Anishinaabe names, they would be addressed solely by their English names at school.
Their mother tongue of Anishinaabemowin was not allowed to be spoken and this was
strictly enforced. And one of the frequent lessons of the missionary teachers was that the
parents were "heathens", "pagans", and their ways, evil and unsavoury (Kinew 196g;
Nancy Morrison 1992). The emotional, spiritual, physical and sexual abuse that
occurred over several generations to the children in Treaty #3 residential schools would
warrent another book but is important background to an understanding of the
assimilationist campaign of the government of Canada to subvert and suppress
Anishinaabe government and cultural ways (TP Kinew 1969; Nancy Morrison 1992;
139
Gresko 1975; Pettipas 19BB). The result of such massive undermining of cultural and
family values became more and more evident in the homeless people who became known
as the "street people" or "chronic public drunkenness offenders", particularly in
Kenora, from the 1950s through the l9BOs (Grand Council Treaty #3 1973: Torrie
1 e8s).
Yet, Treaty #3 Anishinaabe leaders and members tried to remain strong in their
cultural traditions, and unswerving in their understanding of the spirit and intent of
Treaty #3, as continued through the oral tradition of their Elders. Mawedopenais, one of
lhe chief negotiators in 1873, was still fighting lndian Affairs who wished to impose
missionary teachers on his people until the turn of the century. The Grand Chief was
always ready to tell the federal government what the true meaning of the treaty was
(Waisberg 1984a; Savino 1992). Another Treaty negotiator and Grand Chief, powassin,
did not die until about 1910, and both he and his son, who was also present at Treaty
making, passed on their knowledge of the Treaty to their relatives throughout Lake of the
Woods (Frank Powassin &Neogezhik, October 1981). Those who dared to stand up to the
local agents, or bypassed them by writing directly to Ottawa, were soon labelled
"trouble-makers" (Taylor, J. 1g84).
The Fort Frances lndian agent Wright complained about "a few crochety kickers"
from the Rainy River reserves who petitioned Ottawa regarding dams and the flooding of
their ricefields, as well as overfishing by non-lndians (pAC RG 1o v.4BSl3-7 v.j
Delegations & Deputations 1909-1961) .ln 1914, however, a Treaty #3 Anishinaabe
delegation from Long Sault on the Rainy River did get to Ottawa, with lndian Affairs
approval, in order that the Department ensure the surrender of those fertile farming
lands (Waisberg 1984a). Later delegations did not always meet the approval of lndian
Affairs, and they often travelled at their own expense (pAC RG1 o 4\slg-7, v.1, June
10, 1940 TRL Maclnnes lo Fort Frances lndian agent Lockhart).
140
Such high level delegations followed major organizing meetings ot Anishinaabeg .
The usual course of action was to proceed by letter or petition to lndian Affairs first. ln
1923, the Chiefs and headmen of several Lake of the Woods and Winnipeg River reserves
took the hitherto unheard of step of obtaining the services of a lawyer to obtain
information about lheir own reserves and financial affairs from the lndian Affairs
branch. Kenora lawyer James Robinson wrote the Superintendent General of lndian
Affairs on behalf of Whitefish Bay and Whitedog, and then several other bands. Upon
receiving no reply, the lawyer wrote public letters in the Kenora Miner and News daily
paper. The Chiefs legal counsel raised publicly for the first time, the grievances of these
Treaty #3 reserves, such as the complete accounting by lndian Affairs of their trust
funds from sales of timber on reserves (GCT3 TARR files: James Robinson's letters in
Kenora Daily Miner & News, 1923). The local agent replied in the daily paper that such
questions were from impertent councillors not the real Chiefs, but refused to answer the
substantive charges. Public records do not indicate any higher level reply to the
substantive issues. However, the Deputy Superintendent General was pleased to advise
the lawyer of new amendments to the lndian Act, which outlawed the raising of funds and
the undertaking of activities regarding lndian claims. This amendment was effective from
1927 unlil 1951 amendments to the lndian Act.
During the 1920s and 1930s, the provincial government stepped up its presence
and enforcement of its game and fish laws against the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg . lndian
Affairs officials often urged protective action to their superiors in ottawa:
"l desire to draw your attention to the deplorable state of affairs
that is existing at present among the lndians of the Lake of the woods area(Treaty #3) due entirely to the action of the province of ontario in
curtailing their hunting and fishing rights.
I have seen many lndians practically starving on the shore, whilst
they watched whitemen fishing commercially in the bays adjacent to their
reserves, the lnd¡ans themselves being refused fishing licences by
ontario, although quite willing to pay the licence fee and purchase their
own nets and equipment.
Many instances of absolute persecution of lndians on the part of
officious game wardens have been reported, the most glaring being the
74I
recent instance of Game Warden Hemphíll descending on the lslington band
and confiscating all deer meat that the lndians had taken for food, ãnd also
the deer skins which they required for moccasins.
The Lake of the Woods lndians are physically suffering from the
wrongful treatment meted out to them by the province, patiently awaiting
the time when their wrongs will be redressed and their rights vindicated.
..[They] are possibly facing today the worst conditions of living
that they have ever experienced. prevented from hunting for food,
restricted from commercial fishing, failing to secure a blueberry crop,
they will assuredly need all the help and assistance that it is poséible togive them to tide them over the winters." (HJ Bury, Supervisor of lndian
Timber Lands, lndian Affairs, 1929 cited in Grand council rreaty #31986:44-46).
But Ottawa did not act in their bests interests and the ramifications were felt at
the regional level. Both the Kenora and Fort Frances lndian agents were despised by their
"wards", lhe Anishinaabe leaders (Pete Seymour 1990; Billie Archie 1974). The Grand
Chief of Treaty #3 and Chief of Assabaska during the 1930s, Miskwakapins, railed
against the Kenora agent, Captain Edwards, for his military, oppressive ways (peter
Seymour 1990; Billie Archie1974). Couchiching Chief Hector Mainvilte made it clear
to Ottawa that Fort Frances lndian "Agent Spencer is our enemy" (GCT3 TARR file on
Delegations & Deputations). Yet so detrimental was provincial interference in the
traditional Anishinaabe livelihood, even these agents felt obliged to complain to Ottawa
about the provincial infractions of the Treaty #3 right to hunt and fish (pAC RGlO
v.6761 f.119-129, July 2, 1938 Kenora Agent Edwards to Secretary, lndian Affairs
Branch, Department of Mines & Resources, ottawa; pAc RG10 f. 420-303, sept.27.
1938 Fort Frances lndian Agent Spencer lo Secretary, Departmenl of lndian Affairs,
Department of Mines & Resources, Ottawa).
Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg knew that their Treaty was intended to preserve their
traditional livelihood, and they considered it their protection to continue hunting and
fishing as they always had. However, the Ontario Lands and Forests game wardens
enforced the Fish and Game laws wiÌh unrelenting severity during the 1930's and
1940's. The lndian agents were at a loss as to how to protect lhe Anishinaabeg and their
livelihood, as well as how to protect the federal purse from having to support Trealy #3
I42
Anishinaabeg who were daily denied their only way to feed their families (pAC, RG10, v.
6761, f. 1 1 9-1 29).
The lndian agents questioned Ottawa what they could do, while the federal
government "adopted holus bolus, Provincial regulations regarding fishing and by such
action has placed the lndians in the same position as the ordinary resídent of the
province" (August 24, 1938, Solicitor cory memorandum to Mr. Maclnnes, Deputy
Secretary General in PAC RG 1O v.8865,f.1/18-11-13). The game wardens confiscated
boats, nets and charged the lndians, who were later fined or jailed. Moses Tom of then
Assabaska remembers as a young boy watching the game wardens come and take his dad's
boat and nels away, and days later coming to take his dad away, who he did not see until
months later (Moses Tom 1993). Despite the very great hardship experienced by these
Anishinaabeg , many remained defiant. Captain Edwards reported that Nick Skeet of Rat
Portage refused to give the game warden any undertaking that he would not fish again. 3
This is the collective memory of the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg - both the unjust and
severely repressive regime of the provincial game wardens, as well as the defiance of
the people based on their knowledge and belief that Treaty #3 meant to protect their
rights. (Figure 24: Photo of Treaty #3 Chiefs with Kenora lndian Agent Edwards).
During these repressive times, the Chiefs and headmen of several bands met to
discuss what could be done to stop this unjust persecution. At that time, Baybomahsigey,
Bob Roy, the Chief of Whitefish Bay, and Kokoko-o, Jack McGinnis of Manitou Rapids,
brought people together in the form of the "Amalgamated Organized lndians of Northwest
Angle Treaty #3". They prepared letters and petitions to lndian Affairs, which were
sometimes written by themselves and forwarded by non-lndian friends, such as C.G.
Linde, the photographer to the Department. 4'5 At that time, permission from the lndian
Agent to hold meetings at the reserve, and permission to leave the reserves, was
required according to the lndian Act. The Amalgamated Organized lndians of Northwest
Angle Treaty #3 held their meetings, sometimes notifying the agent ahead of time,
I43
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744
sometimes not bothering to do so (PAC RG10 v.6761,f. '119-129 Memorandum of a
Conversation held in the Office of the lndian Agent at Kenora in connection with a meeting
held by "The Organization of Amalgamated lndians", at Whitefish Bay Reserve No.32 on
June 11, 1938).
The Amalgamated Organized lndians of the Northwest Angle Treaty #S sent a
petitíon to the King of England to protest the violations of their Treaty, by the harsh
treatment by game wardens, and the flooding of their ricing areas, in particular. ln
1939, a delegation of three Anishinaabeg went to Ottawa to see the visiting King and
Queen, but no record or oral tradition has yet been located which finds them successful
in gaining an audience (PAC RG10 v.6761 f. 119-129) .ln 1940, the Amatgamated
Organization pressed again for a meeting with the Secretary General of lndian Affairs.
They were at fírst rebuffed, with the Agent being advised by Ottawa that such a delegation
" wasn't necessary" and "they'd be wasting their time" as "we would await word from the
agent anyway" ( PAC RG10 f.4B5l3-7 v.1 Delegations & Deputations 19Og-1961, June
10, 1940 TRL Maclnnes, Secretary, lAB, Ottawa to Fort Frances agenl Lockhart).
However, because of the "considerable agitation among the bands of Northwest Angle
Treaty", and the "willingness of Chief Jack Mclnnes and Chief Jim Horton of Manitou
Rapids" to pay their own way, the delegation did make it to Ottawa (PAC RGlO v.6761
f'119-129). lt was at this time that Chief Roy was advised that compensat¡on for Lake of
the Woods flooding was being finalized. That information proved totally erroneous: the
Lake of the Woods, Rainy Lake and Lac Seul First Nations await compensation for flooding
into the 1990s (Chapter 11).
ln the late 1940s, the Treaty annuity trips by the lndian agent were no longer
made to a huge gathering at an agency reserve, but, as part of a concerted approach by
Ottawa, took place at individual reserve settlements (Grand Council Treaty #3 1992a).
It was from such visits as interpreter for Lands and Forests, that Peter Seymour then of
Assabaska and later of Wauzhushk Onigum, made his organizing efforts at bringing
145
together the leaders of Treaty #3 bands. During the fifties, Peter Seymour of Assabaska,
Frank White of Whitefish Bay, Paul Pitchinese of Wabigoon and Fred Greene of Shoal
Lake #39 were prominent in getting their people to consider what action they could take
to make governments respect their Treaty. Through their own organizing efforts, the
Amalgamated Organization was renamed Grand Council Treaty #3. And, with their own
personal contributions of time and money, these leaders made delegations to Ottawa and
Toronto to present their case (P. Seymour 1990; Frank White 1990). Peter Seymour
was quite involved in pressing for a resolution of the headlands water boundaries to
Treaty #3 reserves, and lobbied Parliamentarians to have an lndian Claims Commission
bill passed into law, to seek justice for their many outstanding lands and resources
issues. That bill was never passed, but the major issue of Treaty #3 in the 1930's and
1950's remains the major issue of the 1990's - how to honour and implement Treaty
#3.
By the mid 1960's, Treaty #3 reserves were living in some of the most
impoverished and oppressive conditions known in Canada.
"At that time more than B0 per cent of lndian homes in Canada had no running
water, flush toilets or electricity. Seventy-five per cent of lndian families were liv-ing
on $2,000 per year or less and 4z per cent on 91,000 per year or less. The Kenora
area, of course, was no except¡on. The squalor of native life in that region was almost
unimaginable. Large numbers of native people spent much of the year on welfare. Unsafe,
overcrowded shacks housed the greatest number of lndian families. ...Relations with thejustice system were such that..if there was even a "shadow of suspicion" concerning lheguilt of the arrested lndian people who couldn't afford bail, (the lawyer) advised thém to
plead guilty because "it's smoother, sweeter, and faster to do so and-gei on with servinglhe sentence." (Borovoy 1991:30)
This was the era of civil rights movement in the United States, and the beginning
of an awakening in Canada that there might be problems of racism in this country as
well. The favourite canadian comedians of Ed sullivan, wayne and schuster,
immortalized the racist treatment of Anishinaabeg in Kenora by their offhand comment
about "Sodom and Kenora" . The lndian-White Committee of the town called for
assistance from human rights activists in Toronto, Alan Borovoy and Dan Hill. As the
I46
press dubbed them, "the Jew and the Negro" became, respectively, General Counsel and
founder of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, and the first Executive Director of
the Ontario Human Rights Commission. ln '1965, Borovoy and Hill came to Kenora to
work with the lndian-White Committee which wished to see improved conditions for
lndians in town and on the reserves. Young activist Fred Kelly of Sabaskong (now
Onegaming) shared membership with local lawyer Jack Doner, nurse Lassie Maloney,
and others. Fred Kelly worked as a social worker for Children's Aid. He devoted himself
to visiting nearby reserves and focussing their discontent toward solidified action.
Borovoy and Kelly were able to focus on four main issues which they decided to present
to the Mayor and Town Council, after a march from the local Presbyterian Church to
Council Chambers: requests for the establishment of an office of the Ontario Human
Rights Commission and the Ontario Addiction Research Foundation, for the extension of
lelephone service to the reserves, and an exlension of the trapping season. (lt should be
pointed out that by the 1940's, ontario had again contravened the Treaty by issuing
trapping licences, quotas, and seasonslo Anishinaabeg.) Such was the incursion of
provincial laws and regulations into the lives of Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg that three of
these requests were directly within the ballywig of the province.
The people of Kenora, aided by the national media, awaited the march with
trepidation. "Town on a Powder Keg" blared the media, while Kenora leaders and rank and
file accused outsiders of infiltrating "their lndians" and worried publicly about an
"uprising". Busloads of Anishinaabeg came from Whitedog, Whitefish Bay, Rat Portage
and other reserves in mid November. That evening, 400 men, women and children
walked quietly through the streets of Kenora, together with the very few whites of the
lndian-White commiltee to present their brief to Town Council. Grand Council Treaty
#3 President Pete Seymour and organizer Fred Kelly read the brief. 6 Town Council
I47
eventually supported the requests of the delegation, and forwarded them to the federal
and provincial governments.
The 1965 Kenora March was a watershed event in the history of lndian-White
relations in Canada. lt served notice to one nation that there were civil rights and justice
problems within its own Canadian borders. lt was a coming of age for another nation - a
revitalization of the Treaty #3 Anishinaabe Nation .
ln the 1960s, Treaty #3 leaders had been involved in the Union of Ontario
lndians (UOl), an organization of status lndians from reserves across the province.
Under the organizing direction of Omer Peters of Moraviantown (near London), the UOI
was becoming more prominent and outspoken about the need for improved conditions on
reserves across the province. During the 1968-69 lndian Act consultation process
across Canada by Trudeau's junior Ministers, Jean Chretien and Robert Andras, Treaty
#3 leaders were adamant about Treaty rights. Both Fred and Peter Kelly of Sabaskong,
Raymond Bruyere of Couchiching, Fred Green of Shoal Lake and many others spoke at
hearings in Toronto and in northern Ontario about the importance of the Treaty and the
necessity of settling land issues before revisions to the lndian Act could be taken
seriously. Treaty #3 leaders were among the national leadership taken aback when the
federal government responded to these hearings. The "White paper" of '1969 which
completely ignored lhe call of status lndians for just redress of their grievances and
espoused instead Prime Minister Trudeau's wish for equality for all Canadians (ponting
& Gibbins 1980; Weaver 1981).
It was during this time, as well, thal Treaty #3 leaders became disenchanted
with the Toronto based UOI and took the step of incorporating their own Treaty based
organization, Grand Council Treaty #3. The founding members included Fred Kelly and
Peter Kelly of Sabaskong, Ralph and Ray Bruyere of Couchiching, and philip Gardner of
Eagle Lake. Ralph Bruyere became the first President elected by all the Chiefs of the 20
odd bands in the newly incorporated organization; Philip Gardner was its first
I48
fieldworker. Gardner worked closely with the community development worker supplied
by the Ontario Labour Council after the 1965 March.By 1969, Grand Council Treaty
#3 hired its first executive director, Peter Kelly, and he set about the business of
establishing programs to further the mandate of the Grand Council - to protect and
strengthen Treaty #3 and to improve the socio-economic conditions of the reserves
within that territory.
Through decades of suppression of what Anishinaabeg considered always to be the
right to self government, as given by the Creator, Treaty #3 leadership adopted many
strategies to have the Treaty they entered with the Crown adhered to. lmmediately after
the treaty signing, court cases of the fledgling Dominion of Canada changed forever the
Anishinaabe Nation's relationship with the Crown. While the Treaty #3 Ogitchi Tuaag
sought to continue the spirit and intent of Treaty #3 as a Nation to Nation relationship,
the federal Crown sought to subsume Anishinaabe people under federal legislation, with
the bounty of the lands and natural resources accruing to the provincial Crown.
Treaty #3 leadership at first addressed their concerns directly to the Treaty
Commissioner. They were diverted to government officials. During the following decades,
the tactic of the federal Crown was to have lndians deal with the lower level lndian agent.
It was the purpose of the united efforts of Treaty #3 leaders to "take it to a higher level"
(quote from anonymous Elder in Report on Reorganization of Grand Council Treaty #3,
1987). Thus, when requests for adherence to the Treaty were rebuffed repeatedly by the
federal government, the Treaty #3 leaders would write Ottawa or petit¡on directly to the
King of England, as they did in 1892 and 1938. (Appendix 7:1892 petition). tf no
corrective action was taken, Ogitchi Tuaa Powassin demonstrated that direct action would
be taken to protect their resources, if required. From the lBgOs on, Anishinaabeg were
feeling the full force of assimilative policies of the federal government, and the punitive
power of the province in its increasing "regulation" of lands and resources. Their
leaders, however, brought their recommendations and "complaints" forward each year at
749
annuity meetings with the lndian Agent and lndian Affairs ¡nspectors. By the 1930s,
Treaty #3 had formalized their leadership into an organization which lndian Affairs
preferred to ignore or undermine. When they did reach Ottawa in person, the leaders
were either lied to, as was the case of compensation for Lake of the Woods flooding, or
were dismissed, by the perennial favourite of politicians and bureaucrats - "we'll look
into that". ln the 1950s, renewed leadership efforts in Treaty #3 focussed on opening
new communication links with the province and pressing for a claims tribunal to
investigate and rectify the grievances from the past behaviour of lndian Affairs. The
1960s saw direct action again being undertaken by Anishinaabeg in the 1965 Kenora
March . Building alliances with outside rights organizations produced political clout on
lhe Anishinaabe side, and this growing expertise in lobbying led to a further
reorganization of the Chiefs into a provincially incorporated organization, able to handle
funds for meetings, advisors, research and programs.
The intrusion of the lndian Act had changed the leadership of Treaty #3, however.
Although respected and spiritually guided leaders called Ogitchi Tuaag remained, lndian
Affairs would exercise its power not to accept such leaders as "chiefs". An electoral
system was imposed upon Anishinaabeg who had hitherto followed a traditional form of
governance which encouraged leaders with qualities appropriate to the requirements of
a situation to come forward (Chapter 2). lt was a system that encouraged participation
and consensual decision-making, whereby everyone had a voice and all voices were
considered in the councils of leaders.
Despite the enforced system of chiefs and councils under the lndian Act, these
"band councils" sought to act like traditional councils. They met to consider the best
interests of their people - for example, how to help a recent widow and her children or
whether to recommend per capita disbursement of timber dues or propose a saw mill
project (TP Kinew 1969-73; stuart Jack 't 973-76; Tony Copenace l ggz-4). Their
leaders knew well the need for solidarity in order to have the Crown representatives live
150
up to the Treaty they had entered with such solemnity. And they tried new means of
organization as they believed times required (Pete Seymour 1990; Frank White 1990).
These leaders, both the polilical and the keepers of the sacred ceremonies, kept the oral
lradition alive - not only of the spirit and intent of Treaty #3 - but of all the years of
trials they had lived through in seeking the Crown government's observance of it. This is
the sense of being Anishìnaabe that is maintained through the unique events and
ceremonies of Anishinaabe life. lt was this identity that was attacked through these years
of suppression, and manomin was to come to symbolize Anishinaabedefiance to one of its
last remaining resources, always reserved and cared for by the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg.
Endnotes:
1. This sorry story is part of a present day land claim against the federal and provincialgovernments for return of their land and compensation for the First Nation. Witn tne
biggest producing gold mine on Lake of the Woods on its land, Rat Portage Band actuallypaid out $600 to a company, whose federal licence proved deficient to ine provincial one
in court! (Personal observation of Rat Portage records in Record Group 1ô, public
Archives of Canada, 1972-1979).
2. lndian Affairs directed its Rainy Lake agent to amalgamate the seven reserves along
the Rainy River into one reserve at Manitou Rapids, some 20 miles west of Fort Franies.
This action took several years to complete and led the agent to make many promises, that
were never kept and are the subject of a land claim today (The forced amalgamation of
seven reserves led to a unique situation at Manitou Rapids, which continues to be
officially called the Amalagamated Rainy River Bands or First Nations. For a period of
lime, there were seven Chiefs and many councillors at the amalgamated reserve.
However, the seven Chiefs and many councillors were eventually whittled by lndian
Affairs to the present one Chief and one councillor per hundred population, áccording to
the lndian Act. As could be anticipated, the nature of the forced amalgamation led to very
strained relations among the people. lt is ironic to note that at least one renown
anthropologist, Ruth Landes, built her analyses and theories about the "atomistic"
Ojibwa on her fieldwork during the 1930's on Manitou Rapids, a reserve community
which had suffered such aggressive dislocation only a decade or so before. ).ln addition, Ontario refused to accept the Sturgeon Lake Band having a reserve on
Hunter's lsland. That lndian reserve was located in an area designated as á provincial
forest preserve in 1910, and later Quetico Províncial Park. ln a federal-provincial
agreement, reserve 24C was "hereby cancelled". ln actual fact, the Anishinaabe people
were forced out of their territory in mid winter, according to nearby Minnesota
observerwho complained to the Canadian writer (personal knowledge from pAC RG 10
records, 1973-197Q. The remaining members of the Sturgeon Lake band were
transferred by lndian Affairs to different bands. No surrender vote was ever taken, as
required by the lndian Act, nor any compensation paid. 24C is the subject of a land claim
today, by their descendents at Lac La Croix, which borders presentday Quetico park.
151
Other reserves, such as the Assabaska shoreline reserve between Big and Little
Grassy reserves on Lake of the Woods, were never formally surveyed but wére
confirmed as reserves then later disputed by Ontario, and have become land claims today(personal knowledge). At issue was what Ontario perceived to be "excessive acreage" the
federal government allocated to Treaty #3 reserves, based upon the Treaty formula of
"one square mile per family of five". The source of the problem lay in a number of
issues. During the several years of surveying, the lake levels throughout Treaty #3
were affected by provincial dams and surveyors often included marsh in the acreage
lhjat later became islands. Also, there were, in Ontario's estimation, disproportiõnately
more reserves on the Ontario side of Treaty #3 than on Manitoba's side. ln any event,
Ottawa agreed t9 pay Ontario more than $23,000 as compensation on the basis of g1 per
"excess" acre (Grand Council Treaty #3 TARR, 1g7S; McNab, lgBSb).
ln 1914, deputy ministers of the federal and provincial governments agreed to
the extent and location of the reserves, and, as called for in the 1894 agreement, were
both to pass legislation approving the agreement. However, ontario proceeded
unilaterally in 1915 and changed the wording of the 1894 agreement to suit its own
purposes. Most importantly, Ontario's law stated that Treaty #3 reserves were not to
include headland to headland water boundaries - the exact opposite to the 1894 wording.
Ottawa objected in writing but was advised by Queen's Park that such issues could be
"remedied in practice" (Treaty #3, 1g7S; McNab,.1g83b).
To an outsider, the practical effect of negating headland water boundaries of the
reserves would be to eliminate reserve land ownership and protection of the ricefields,
most of which were the reason these reserve sites were chosen. However, Treaty #3
Anishinaabeg considered all of Treaty #3 's 55,000 square miles to be their traditional
territory for ricing, fishing, hunting and all traditional activities, and so, the matter of
whether headland boundaries encased ricing areas was not the issue. lndeed, Treaty #3
Anishinaabeg refused to accept the Ontario government's proposal that Treaty #3
reserves map out ricing areas close to their reserves and these would be protected. To
Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg, this would be limiting and lessening their traditional ricing
areas.
The headlands issue remains outstanding into the 1990s.
3. Nick Skeet is actually Nick Skead of Wauzhushk Onigum. His defiance was echoed in
the 1970s by Joe Andy Sr. of Big Grassy who was given an award by the Chiefs of Grand
Council Treaty #3 for his dogged determination to fish according io Treaty #3 rights,
despite however many times the Ontario wardens confiscated his boat and géar andhauled
him into court.
!. Bob Roy's granddaughter, Evelyn Copenace of Onegaming, relates that her grandmotherOgimaabinesiik was the writer and author of the letters. She is directly mentióned by
Captain Edwards as one of a delegation of four from Whitefish Bay.
5.This is the same Linde who was such a friend of Powassin, the original Treaty #3
negotiator. Powassin left Linde the parchment document of the Treaty for safekeeping,
the same document later purchased from Linde by Allan Paypom, and now known as the
Paypom Treaty #3.
6. lmmediately after the 1965 March, Fred Kelly was to lose his job with the CAS. He
rose to many challenges in the 1970's to be Chief of Sabaskong, Grand Chief of Treaty
#3, and Director General of lndian Affairs, Ontario Region. An effective consultant
thereafter, Fred Kelly was honoured in 1990 by Anishinaabeg of Kenora for his
leadership role in the 1965 March twenty five years before.
Chapter Eight 7s2
Provincial lncursions into Manito Gitigaan:
1960 Ontario Wild Rice Harvesting Act
"This is legislation, not for the lndians."
ln the 1950s, Ontario continued its long standing practice of taking over and exercising
jursidiction over natural resources in the Treaty #3 area. The Province had begun with timber
(1870s), crown lands (1880), mining (189Os), fishing (1890s), then foilowed by trapping
in the 1940s. Manomin was the last remaining resource that was so singularly identified with
the spiritual foundation of Anishinaabe people and government that rhe An¡sh¡naabeg never
allowed any white person to harvest it (Holzkamm19B4; Bert yerxa 1990).
Pete Seymour al Wauzhushk Onigum First Nation near Kenora, a former Grand Chief of
Grand Council Treaty #3 during the 1950s-60s, likened the province getting involved in the
wild rice harvesting areas to the same way they got into a trapline system.
"The traplines didn't come until the 1940s - 1946 I think. Before
that there was traplines for whites but not for lndians. lndians
could trap anywhere." (p. Seymour 1990)
Frank White of Whitefish Bay, a former Vice President of Grand Council Treaty #3 in the era
of Pete Seymour, recalled:
. 
"lndians.used 1o trap all over the place. Used to be 5-6 families
in one trapping area. There were no sections. Then Sioux Narrows
white people were trying to get licences on lndian grounds where
we'd trapped all our lives..snake Bay, Black River. Logging was
another (reason for lndians' losing traplines). white peopie began
to buy the licences from lndians, and (ontario department of) -
Lands & Forests said 'if you don't trap, you lose your licence'. But
you need to leave your area at least once season or the animals
don't come back. Then lndians started asking for individual
licences (to protect what they had)." (White 1990) 1
Bert Yerxa is an Elder and descendent of Mikisens, a signator to Treaty #S. A trapper,
and former founding Board member of the Treaty #3 wild rice co-op, Anishinahbe Man-O-Min
Co-op, he recounted from his home at Couchiching the result of provincial traplines:
153
"ln 1947 I remember counling B0 lndian trappers at an Ontario
Trappers Association meeting of the Rainy River District(including Rainy Lake and part of Lake of the woods). ln 1990,
there's not many lndian trappers left.', ( yerxa 1g9O)
Pete Seymour was employed by the Ontario Department of Lands & Forests from
1940s to 1970s. Alone among interviewees for this thesis, he spoke of conflict among
Anishinaabeg in the bush.2
"lndians were raiding each other's traps and they were actually
fighting in the bush. So lndians asked for set areas that they could
trap themselves. The same with wild rice harvestings areas. There
were too many people trying to pick in the same bays. people
complained and asked for set areas. Lands and Forests had meetings
with the people. I know - I was there - I interpreted (ojibway and
English). The people said they wanted set areas. Lands & Foreéts
went back and drew maps. But even I was surprised when they said
they were legislated. Lands and Forests never talked about any
laws." (Seymour 1990)
This scenario of a request by Anishinaabeg tor set areas is definitely not a shared recollection
by any others of that era.
Fred Greene Sr. was Chief of Shoal Lake #39 at that time. He is a commercial fisherman,
trapper, singer and renown artist (Greenfeather), as well as a rice picker. Fred Greene Sr.
reviewed an account of this 'consultation' process, based on Ontario Department of Lands and
Forests notes and minutes (schreiner 1978). Fred Greene was livid.
"That's a lie. Why would we want Lands & Forests involved
with the rice? who knows better than we? Especially why would
we want them to tell us when to start picking (ed: as the
Departmenl of Lands &Forests minutes intimated)? We're the ones
who are out on the ricefields, checking the rice. we're the ones
who touch the stalks, see the kernals ripen, Lands & Forests didn't
know anything about rice. I never saw Lands & Forests out on the
fields in all the years after the Act was passed. They'd always be in
planes, flying over head .. rike God. Maybe they were counting
canoes.. They wouldn't see the rice..they don't know anything about
rice." (Greene 1990)
Fred Greene remembered only one meeting, an annual spring trapping meeling between
trappers and Lands & Forests personnel, when rice was discussed, among other issues.
According lo several informants interviewed for this research, there is a vast discepancy
between the Lands and Forests reports and the remembrances of Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg who
were actually present. According to Treaty #3 people, neither the Chiefs nor the pickers were
ever consulted about Wild Rice Harvesting Areas nor the development of any laws or ,..grfutiåfl
nor when or why legislation was to be introduced (F. Greene, F. White, G. Crow, B. yerxa, R.
Bruyere, W. Wilson, 1990). Chief Wilson of Manitou Rapids had pointedly asked one of the
Rainy River Elders, who denied any consultation or foreknowledge of Lands & Forests plans. ln
answering my question about the rationale for such legislation, Fred Greene thought it may have
been an idea from rice buyers and dealers like the Ratuski family of Keewatin, or perhaps that
rice remained "the last renewable resource to be legislated" (Greene lggo).
The original purpose of this legislation is not clear. Lands and Forests likely saw the
opportunity to legislate for this resource, for which both Manitoba and Minnesota already had
legislation. On record, there is no background as to why P.A. Thompson of the Kenora District
office of Lands & Forests wrote his report entitled "A Plan for the Orderly harvesting and
Marketing of Wild Rice in the Kenora District" (March 10, t9S9) (Shreiner tgZB:28-35).
The objectives were:
"(a) to manage wild rice fields on a susta¡ned yield basis;(b) to encourage native methods of harvest and culture;(c) to ensure lndian bands derive maximum profits (Schreiner 1978:28)
The Plan of Action included 4 steps:
"(1) lnventory (lndian knowledge obtained at Spring Trapping
meetings);
(2) Allocation and Description of wild Rice Harvest Areas (to
uphold traditional rights, there is to be an allotment to each of the
Bands in the district);(3) Legislation (regulalions are necessary governing
applications, licences, counter receipt forms, return forms);(4) District program (District office staff is responsible for
issuance of licences, planning experimental methods to increase
growth and production, and coordinating policy between
producers, buyers, lndian Affairs Branch and the Department of
Lands and Forests)". (Schreiner 1978:ZB_29)
According to this Thompson account, prior to the legislation,
"ricing was controlled and carried out by native lndians. They
still followed the traditional harvest method, keeping part of ihe
crop for personal consumption and selling surplus to buyers in
Ontario and Manitoba." (1978:29)
However, it was also noted that
"there were some conflicts between lndian Bands over harvesting
areas. Harvesting boundaries were defined by areas of wild rice
traditionally used by each Band. lt is not difficult to imagine how
155
misunderstandings over ricing locations could have arisen.,'(1 97 B:29)
According to this report, in October 1959, Lands and Forests called a meeting with ,'all
interested parties, including harvestors, buyers and decision makers" (Schreiner 1g78:30).
Discussion arose regarding dates to begin picking as some buyers "urged the lndian pickers to
harvest before the grain was ripe" under "the misconception that greater profits were to be had
by getting the rice early"(Schreiner'1978:30). According to Ontario Department of Lands &
Forests minutes of this meeting in Kenora, October 23, 1g59, some Ánrshinaabeg suggested
that Lands & Forests Conservation Officers work out with local pickers when to pick and enforce
the regulations. The Assabaska band supposedly recommended that the Officers be reimbursed
for their enforcement duties by a percentage of the rice sale (Schreiner 1978:30-31)
The purpose of the proposed wild rice legislation was also an issue during debate in the
Ontario Legislature. The Wild Rice Harvesting Act was introduced into the Ontario Legislature
by the Minister of Lands & Forests, Hon. Spooner, January 28, 1960. The purpose of the new
Act was stated to "control and regulate the harvesting of wild rice on Crown lands', (pAO, RG49,
Series l-7-H (original bills), Bx 509, B¡ll 40, 1960 Explanatory Note to the OWRHA, 1960;
Dec.1B, 1959). The Minister preferred to leave explanation until the second reading but when
pressed by the Leader of the opposition, Mr. wintermeyer, he offered:
".. At the present time there is no control over such activity , and
we think that it is desirable that such control should exist in
certain parts of the province.ln certain parts of the province the
harvesting is what you might call a small industry and we are of
the opinion that it should be done under some control from the
Department of Lands & Forests." (pAo, Legislature of ontario
Debates, official Report, lst session of the 26th Legislature,
Thursday, January 28, 1g60, p.35)
The second reading came lwo weeks later. The Minister offered some little detail:
"This is new legislation which we feel is desirable in that it
would provide the department - which is, after all, the
department most closely concerned with the natural resources of
this province, including the game and fisheries - with certain
authority to deal with the harvesting of wild rice which, in someparts of the province, is developing into a rather important
industry. I might say that the revenue from the harvesting of wild
rice is worth $500,000 to one million dollars a year for éome
600 to 800 lndian families . Our people are awaie of certain
peeds in that regard, and we feel that this is a desirable piece of
legislation."
156Mr. A. Grossman (Conservative from Toronto):"Will we feed Red
China?"
(PAO, Legislature of Ontario Debates, Official report, First
Session of the 26th Legislature, Monday, February 1S, 1960, p.
403)
The Liberal member of the Ontario legislature from Fort William (1959-63), Mr. John
chapple, questionned the conservative Minister of Natural Resources:
"..this is legislation, not for the lndians, but it is
legislation for someone who is going to go in there and
take over certain areas of Crown land with a licence
possibly, and make it so that they may hire lndians to do the job.
This does not necessarily improve the lot of the lndians.
I think that the department of Lands and Forests should go
ahead and develop these beds where wild rice grows to the greatest
possible extent so that the lndians can use them. lthink that the
department has a real obligation here, and that the lndians should
not be licenced so much. There should not be a licence issued; the
lndians should be allotted these areas so that they can go in and
harvest this wild rice and collect money for the sale of the wild
ríce so that the¡r revenue can be greatly improved.
Now, although we try to integrate the lndians into our way of
life, they do not necessarily go into our way of life. because they
are in that part of the country - northwestern Ontario - they are
shy, they are in bands, they travel for miles, and they only have
certain revenues at their disposal.
Another revenue they may have at their disposal is the
picking and selling of blueberries up and down the railway
tracks. Well, are we going to licence the lndians as far as
blueberries are concerned?
I think they should be allowed to sell the blueberries and the
wild rice and everything else on crown lands, and have the allotted
areas not under a licence. I say this because, once we
licence a thing, then we control it. once we control it, then
we are in a position where the advantage goes to the person who is
actually handling it rather than the person who the job is done for.(emphasis added in Ontario Debates, Feb.15, 1960:404, pAO)
M'P'P. Chapple contended that the Ontario Government had its own agenda of expansion in mind,
not the assistance of Anishinaabeg 
.
"l think the department has a real service to offer here, but I
do not think licencing is the answer.
I do not think that there should be any licences because those
areas that are licenced are no longer under the control of the
government, and they should be under the control not for the
government, not for the people who can come in and spend a year
there and get allocation, but for the lndians themselves who ðhould
be looked after. This is one way in which the Department of Lands
and Forests can do a good job." (Ontario Debates, Feb.1S,
1960:404)
157
The Minister of Lands & Forests wished to "allay the fears" of the Hon. member from Fort
William and stated that the purpose of the legislation would exactly do what he suggested. He
stated that Lands and Foresls "does as much, if not more, for these lndian people of Ontario than
the lndian Affairs branch of the (federal) Department of Citizenship and lmmigration
which is the one department primarily concerned with the lndians"(p.404). The debate
continued:
Spooner: "We have no intention, my hon. friends, of
taking away anything from the lndian population. lndeed,
by licencing, and by other means of regulation, we hope to achieve
a result that will be still more advantageous to the lndian
population than the present set-up. (emphasis added)
By being able to set aside, in the same way as we have managed
the trapping areas of this province, by having areas set aside for
wild rice harvesting, we will see that the waste, which now exists,
will be reduced to a very minimum..."
Chapple: "Mr. Speaker, the lndian is not mentionned here.
The lndian is not covered in this bill. lt is not
specifically laid out and there is no protection for the
lndian here in this bill." (emphasis added)
Spooner: As far as I am concerned, Mr. Speaker, I make no
differentiation or discrímination with regard to anybody. I do not
care whether a person is an lndian or a white man.,,
Motion agreed to: second reading of the bill.(Ontario Debates, Feb.15, 1960:.404)
A number of bills were passed during a late night sitting a month later. On March 1S, 1960 the
Legislature passed Bill #4, an Act to provide for the harvesting of wild rice. No debate was
reported. The Act received royal assent April 12, 1960, on the same day that the Provincial
parliament prorogued. (Appendix B)
Mr. Chapple, MPP for Fort William, clearly foresaw the future of this bill. The
Minister used what became a familiar argument in the 1g7O's: "equality" for everyone. Hon.
Spooner stated he did not care nor differentiate between lndian and white. The intention of the
bill was obvious to M.P.P. Chapple: to deprive the lndian of any control over the resources such
as wild rice and blueberries, which they had cared for and gathered since long before the
whitemen arrived.
The Ontario Wild Rice Harvesting Act. 1960 provided for the "control and regulation of
the harvesting of wild rice on Crown lands". As explained in the Lands and Forests Annual
Report, 1960, "The Act requires a licence for the harvesting of wild rice on crown Lands and 158
provides that a licence shall not be issued to a person who is not a resident of Ontario.
Regulations providing for licences, licence fees, wild rice harvesting areas and royalties may be
made under the Act" (Public Archives of Ontario, Government Documents, Department of Lands
and Forests Annual Report, 1960:2). The regulations that followed required the colour of eyes of
lhe licence holder lo be listed on the licence - a curious request if all harvesters were to remain
Anishinaabe ' Large 'Wild Rice Harvesting Areas' were carved throughout the Kenora district
while the Rainy River and Thunder Bay districts - also part of Treaty #3 - were sliced into
smaller ficenced areas and open territory.
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WILD RICE HARVEST ARËAS
160
The Whiteshell area of Treaty #3 had become enclosed in the boundary of Manitoba, after
the 1BB0 Ontario-Manitoba boundary issue was resolved by the Privy Council in Britain. This
area of Treaty #3 also became regulaled by Manitoba Department of Natural Resources in the
1950's, an obvious impetus to the Ontario legislation. The Manitoba regulations also required
licences - for Manitoba residents only. Such regulations would seek an end to Treaty #3 pickers
from Lake of the Woods, Shoal Lake and the English River from continuing their annual harvest
in their own traditional, treaty lands.
What neither the Ontario government nor the Opposition recognized was that the
Anishinaabeg had planted rice and fired the lands for blueberries in early horticultural
activities documented in the earliest historical records. While the Conservative government of
Leslie Frost went on record as helping lndians far more than the federal agency legally
responsible for them, the purpose of Bill 4 was to control and regulate wild rice - and
eventually to remove any semblence of centuries old control over the rice by Anishinaabeg .
Anishinaabe people who would eventually learn of this legislation would see it as further
evidence of the concept of "ki washkwe wag ", that is, the "white people are crazy to control
everylhing" (Ron and Josephine Sandy 1979).
The language used in this debate is interesling for ils revelation of attitudes.
Chapple, who perhaps had more firsthand experience with Anishinaabeg from Northwestern
Ontario, by his living in Geraldton and Fort William , saw lndians as gatherers of resources
(Canadian Parliamentary Guide 1961). The Conservative Minister Spooner conceived of lndians
as a labour pool who would benefit from improved revenue. Neither politician saw what the
Anishinaabeg believed: the Anishinaabeg have a sacred trust relationship with this plant, a gift
from the Creator. The Anishinaabeg had cared for the plant since time immemorial. They had
nurtured it, prayed for good weather, harvested it through conservationist ways that ensured
the annual replanting of the seed during harvesting. Anishinaabeg had intentionally extended
areas of seeding and harvesting and had undertaken their own commercial sales, in excess of
their own personal, community and ceremonial use. ln turn, the plant had provided them with a
nutritional food that, once processed, could be kept for years. Wild rice and fish enabled the
161
Anishinaabeg 1o form permanent settlements long before other Aboriginal nations who relied
more firmly on hunting and the travelling that hunting entailed (Chapters 3-5; Holzkamm and
Waisberg 1990; Vennum 19BB).
Once again, the non-Aboriginal governments passed laws lhat were lo have an
increasingly dangerous impact on the lives of the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg . And the settler-
government had accomplished this without the knowledge or consent of lhe people of the Treaty
#3 Anishinaabe Nation, directly affected. ln 1BBB, St. Catherine's Milling Co. case altered the
treaty agreement that the Anishinaabeg signed with the Queen, so that the province became the
main beneficiary and ever thereafter interfered in the lives of lhe Anishinaabeg (chapter 7) .
ln 1960, with the passage of the Wild Rice Harvesting Act, the Ontario government occupied the
field of this natural resource. According to the Constilution Act. 1867, section 92, the province
had this jurisdiction. According to the Paypom Treaty #3, the Anishinaabeg were the sole
trustees of wild rice within their territory.
Both the Conservative and Liberal members of the Ontario parliament missed that
essential message. While the Liberal Opposition critic was trying to protect the place of lndians
as the main harvesters of wild rice, the Conservative government was seeking to extend the
control of white entrepreneurs in this field. And lhe Anishinaabeg were unaware that this new
legislation had been proposed, drafted, debated, approved by the Ontario Legislature and given
royal assent April 12, 1960 - some eighty-seven years after Treaty #3 was signed and given
other royal assent.
r62
Endnotes:
1. The reader is referred to Chapter 7 for an understanding of the context of the times of the
1930's to 1950's, when lands and Forests conducted a fearsome campaign against lndians,
arresting them, confiscating equipment, imposing fines and jail sentences - merely for
exercising their Treaty right to hunt, fish and trap. By the 1950's, Anishinaabeg were seeking
protection from, and by, the imposing government whose regulations not even the Department of
lndian Affairs could protect them against.
2. There are likely several reasons for any such conflict which may have occurred. Certainly,
alcohol abuse became a very visible and destructive problem amonst Anishinaabeg during the
1950s, although , of course, alcohol had been used as a disruptive mechanism since the early
fur trade days. lndians in Canada were not legally able to drink until 1960 when they became
citizens and legally able to vote. However, most actual stories of conflict which I recorded from
interviewees occurred in the 1950s and later. All documented cases were members of Whitedog
(Wabeseemong) and Shoal Lake who were picking the Whiteshell area with Saakeeng First
Nation (Fort Alexander, Manitoba). Thus, the intra-Anishinaabe conflict accepted as fact in the
Ontario Department of Lands and Forests documentation may have aclually reflected a new
regulatory regime regarding wild rice imposed by the Province of Manitoba.
163
Chapter Nine
The Wild Rice lndustry
From the fur trade to the "capitalization of a traditional pursuit".
"We could not have continued without wild rice provided by the lndians"
Alexander Henry, fur Irader, 1775
Manomin has always offered the promise of security 1o the Anishinaabeg.
Together with the sturgeon and other fish species that their people prized, manomin
provided Anishinaabeg lhe opportunity of forming settlements long before other
aboriginal peoples of the midnorth (Smith, J.G.E. and Moodie W.G. course lectures on
"The Ojibwa" at the University of Manitobalg8g). The fishing seasons of spring and fall
brought large gatherings of people which served to strengthen dodem (clan) ties and
alliances through marriage and ceremonies (Smith J.G.E. and Moodie W.G. lectures
1989). Manomin harvest time of late August into October meanl continued large
gatherings with families on theirmanomin fields for harvesting and processing the rice.
One of the manomin myths fabricated by the first outsiders visiting this area was
that "they reap, without sowing it, a kind of rye which grows wild in their meadows.."
(Jesuit Relations 44:275 in Grand Council Treaty #3 1975:1). ln actual fact, as
explained in Chapter three,"'the Ojibways (Anishinaabeg) carefully managed wild rice
by allocating ricing areas and restricting access to beds " (Waisberg and Holzkamm
1990:4). The Anishinaabe people extended the territory of manomin by sewing the
rice, through various means, such as rolling the wild rice seed in mudballs and dropping
them in the the appropriate waters and sediments (T3 Elders'1979; Moodie 1990; Syms
1984; Waisberg and Holzkamm 1990:3-4).
Manomin was a major source of protein for the Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg
and contributed greatly to their "annual round" of seasonal activities designed to vary
their diet (Waisberg and Holzkamm 1990:3-4, 24-27;Vennum 19BB:175-1BB). lf
one food source was not available that season, such as rabbits or caribou, then the people
164
would sw¡tch toward a heavier reliance of what was available, such as manomin.. Basing
the¡r analysis on historic documents of population figures and actual harvests data from
1775 lo 1898, Waisberg and Holzkamm concluded that an average harvest consisted of 2
bushels of rice per person (1990:25) and this would have allow one person to subsist
64.12 days. Taken together with corn and potato harvest data, the agricultural activity
of Lake of the Woods Anishinaabeg provided 'l92.BB days of subsistence food per year ,
enabling a great variety in diet and the protein source to carry out the more gruelling
tasks of hunting and fishing (Waisberg and Holzkamm 1990:24-25).
Manomin historically grew in what has been described as a four year cycle -
one excellent, one poor, two average. Anishinaabeg themselves refer to a seven year
cycle - several good, one or two fair, one poor, and one failure (Stuart Jack 1978).
What was prized by Anishinaabeg and the newcomers who were feasted with this
good tasting protein was that, once processed and kept dry, manomin would last in
slorage for any length of time (Aiken et al 19BB; Vennum 19BB; Stuart Jack 1978;
Fred Green 1990). The finished, dehusked rice would be ready as a meal in itself or as a
nutritious addition to the main course of fish or meat.
Fur traders extolled its virtue as a portable and good tasting food source (Grand
Council Treaty #3 1976; Holzkamm 1985). Voyageurs often bemoaned their predictable
diet of 'hack tack' meat or pemmican (dried meat and berries rolled into lengths or
buns) and bannock. They looked forward to the variety lhat manomin offered in making
soups, stews, or stuffing. And with its high vitamin B content, they were healthier for it
(Aiken et al 19BB; Vennum 19BB; Grand Council Treaty #3 1976). ln every way, the
provision of wild rice was a bonus for the fur companies. (See also Chapter five).
Yet, alone among the resources of their traditional territory, manomin was the
sole proprietary interest of the Anishinaabeg. While fur traders often fished and hunted
throughout the area they travelled, they did not harvest or process rice, nor did they ask
165
permission to do so (Holzkamm 1985). lt was recognized Thal manomln was
Anishinaabe.
Such a 'hands-off' attilude of respect lasted until well into the twentieth century
in the Treaty #3 territory, even though, a differenl picture was seen in nearby
Wisconsin and Minnesota. ln these northern states, bordering Treaty #3 territory,
white people did usurp the ricefields from lhe Anishinaabeg to do their own harvesting
and processing (Holzkamm 1985; Vennum 19BB). What was different about Trealy #3?
Beginning about the 1930s in the southern part of Treaty #3 and the 1950s in
lhe more northern reserves, some of the first non-lndian entrepreneurs - such as
Cathcart from Fort Frances, Ratuski from Kenora - began to buy the traditionally
processed rice from lhe Anishinaabeg at lakeside. Fresh off the field, this wild rice had
lhen been roasted, thrashed and winnowed clean by the Anishinaabeg . Buyers sought to
sell it to a larger retail market well beyond the borders of Treaty #3, their primary
target was the big American cities and restaurants. (T. Bruyere 1990; H. Redsky 1990;
A. Wilson in Holzkamm 1990; Stuart Jack 1979)
For years, this trade continued with buyers paying so many cents a pound
directly to the heads of families who harvested and processed the cereal grain. Such a
system of sale maintained the balance of trade from the days of the fur trade, with the
Anishinaabeg holding the processed rice which would keep for a long lime and the buyer
wishing to negoliate a price for the product. ln theory, this was a seller's market.
However, these times were hard, and to a great extent, Anishinaabeg had entered the
cash-labour economy since the turn of lhe century lumber camps (P. Seymour 1990).
The balance of trade changed draslically in the 1950s, when buyers began to
purchase the rice green, right off the fields, without first being traditionally processed
by the Anishinaabeg . The lakeside buyers would then arrange to have the green rice
machine-processed and resell it on the retail or restaurant market. Or they would sell
for a profit immediately and directly to a processing plant, usually American. More
166
choices opened up when Manitoba processors developed their processing capacity in the
1960s, and the Keewatin Wild Rice plant under the Ratuski family near Kenora opened
their plant in the early 1970s (J. and R. Sandy 1979; H. Redsky 1990). Now, what had
been, at least in theory, a seller's market became a buyer's market. Pickers and buyers
were well aware that unprocessed rice has lo be sold within a short while of being
harvested or it will spoil and mould.
From this time of the 1950s, and perhaps somewhat earlier as birchbark canoes
were being replaced with manufactured ones, the buyers began to provide canoes and
some provisions to the pickers, to ensure loyalty to buyers, despite whatever price paid
(N. Morrison 1992; Stuart Jack 1975; TP Kinew 1975).
"We sold rice for other suppliers (ed: supplies?) . We never went
for groceries. The buyers seemed lo know what we needed. I don't
remember lhe buyer's first name, but it was Mr. Calhcart from Fort
Frances. He'd follow us around. Then there were other buyers. Once in a
while, we would sneak off to another buyer because he would give a few
cents more (a pound). We didn't want our buyer to know we had rice. lt
was because he would give an advance to us. This way, we would have our
own money to do what we wanted to do - have fun, gamble. There were
days of rest (ed: when rice chief told people to refrain from picking while
the rice ripened) and so there would be gambling going on" (Annie Wilson
in T. Holzkamm 1990:33).
After World War ll, there was a devastating societal change with the Anishinaabeg
Many of the people who had suffered years of oppression under the lndian Act and the
torment of residential schools turned to alcohol to remove their pain. Racist
discrimination meant that high schools were closed to most Anishinaabeg andjobs were
shortterm and in the bush - if any were available (N. Morrison 1990; Stuart Jack
1979; TP Kinew, 1975). Trying to get a buck was importanl, and trying to make a
living led many of the World War ll veterans to "enfranchise", that is, become legally
declassified as a status lndian under the lndian Act, in return for gaining the "rights" of
Canadian citizenship: voting, drinking alcohol and holding property (S. Copenace 1979;
Stuart Jack 1979; TP Kinew 1975).
r67
Societal changes also affected the trade on the ricefields. Selling green rice meant
instant cash for less work, without the processing to do. Traditional processing was left
to families who wished to keep some for their own.
"ln those resting days (ed: when rice chief ordered everyone off
the fields to allow more rice to ripen), I remember at One Sided Lake (ed:
near Sabaskong reserve 1940s), the people would really go full swing
into processing. At Whiteshell (ed: on ManiÌoba side of Treaty #3, mid
1950s), we'd make some of our own but all the people did was play poker.
My kids were small so I couldn't rice too much but I'd go out with my
husband later in the day just for something different to do. That's when I
remember the first time people sold green rice. They wanted the money
right then,
That's also the first time I saw people come in, bag their rice and
then leave it in the water. I wondered what was going on because at One
Sided Lake, we'd try to leave it out and dry it right away. Then I saw the
wet rice was heavier, and as long as the bag wasn't dripping, they'd get a
higher price from the buyer. Our men sold the rice - nol the women. The
buyers were from Maniloba." (Nancy Morrison 1990).
There are many funny stories of tricking the buyers from the two decades of
selling green from the mid 1950s to mid 'l 970s. This would lead to comments heard
today, "Well, how much have you got in that bag - I mean, besides, the rocks, turtles and
other stuff?!" (TP Kinew 1994). Those who did trick a buyer usually suffered the
consequences of not being able to sell their rice again - or not without it being dumped
first to see what was in there! (TP Kinew 1990). Bul, most pickers sold their rice at
day's end to the buyers and trickery was laughed at in a goodhearted way because it was
not the norm. lt certainly added to the folklore of the ricefield for generations later.
By the mid 1970s, the wild rice trade was developing into what some called an
industry. A federal ARDA worker in Manitoba called it more of a "fly by the seats of your
panls" business to describe its nature of being shorltime, high risk, venlure capital
(Avery 1983). The businessman would invest (usually borrowed) money in buying the
green rice from lakeside, paying to have it processed or selling it directly to the
processor. lf the rice were processed, it was then shipped 1o the identified markets -
either retail sales, gourmet restaurant contacts made on their own, or to major
processing companies such as Uncle Ben's. Major companies like Uncle Ben's would add
i6B
wild rice to their blends with white or brown rice for the mass rather than gourmet
market.
The risk to the entrepreneur came mainly in two main sources: (i) the
processing, when the relurn would be determined, and (ii) marketing the rice,
arranging solid contracts and ensuring the supply
There is much shrinkage in the initial roasting stage of processing, when the
moisture is removed before the husk is dehulled. A usual return is 2.2 to 2.5 pounds of
green to make 1 pound of finished rice, but that may vary as widely as 3:1 (T. Bruyere
1990; H. Redsky 1990; Aiken et al 19BB). After buying the rice at lakeside, the
business entrepreneur must pay the buyer a few cents a pound, a few more cents per
pound for transportation to the processor, a set fee per pound to the processor.
Additional costs in storage, packaging, delivery, marketing added to the shrinkage from
green to processed rice, make the investment more complex than first assumed.
(Figure#27)
What attracts people to this industry seems to be the high risk nature and the
potential to make a fast buck in the short 4-B week season each fall. Those who have
succeeded have learned the business, made the contacts, and settled their contracts
beforehand. Those who have tried to "corner the market" or buck the established
buyers, processors and players in the trade have more often than not lost .
The TreaÌy #3 rice harvester was certainly at the bottom of this industry by the
early 1970s. Pickers were receiving only 25 to 30 cents per pound when finished rice
was selling for $12 per pound or more. The Chiefs of Treaty #3 resolved to improve the
position of Anishinaabe pickers by establishing the Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op.
Chapter ten outlines the initial success of this Anishinaabe owned and controlled co-op
of the 1970s, which strove to become a competitive buyer, processor and marketer
under one roof. Briefly, the Co-op succeeded in raising the price per pound to the picker
to a dollar a pound "to fair market value" for a number of years (T. Bruyere 1990; W.
27. Steps in the Marketing of
States. Little 1968:57
PROCESS 03.
Ptr'NÀ TTF.TIlr-¿ 
^¡r
F ICU RE
\. 50
5 .62
o R?
îhe feas 1bl11tY ol PaddY
wlid rJ.ce 1n l'!¿'nltoba.
Yield of processed
rlce ls 33f.of Sreer:
rice . Estlnate 90,30/lÞ '
proce s.s 1ng cos ts and a
1 2-1 jfr margln.
Broker adcl s 25* of Pro-
cesrìor prl.ce for conrnls-
s 1on , transPortatlon r .
insr:I'erice r conrnì-lnlcation t
e tc .
Retal]er adds \31 mar'¿ln
f or a l.I ove rhead s anC
net return. SaIes i-n \-
end B-ounce Packages lngrocer outlets. Restaur-
ant prlces to consuners
woulä be trlgher bY factor
of Ìabc'ur and other'.
restaura't cests.
Wild Rice that Contribute to the Marketing Margin in the Unlted
CuruLative
PI J ce,/Pound
î1 .10
1 .20 Btr¡'er adcls $0.1 O/Ib.
as 'ouy ing conmls s 1cn
169
6,2 STEPS ni liiE )1.¿,F."3TIl'¡C CÎ Wrl¡ RICE T[{AT
CO;ITP,IBT'TE 1O TTiE I.Í.â.Rt:ÎTI}IG }4¡.RGIIf I}I T;'.:
U N ITED ST.iTES .
Llttle, .q'.D.prodtrctlqn of
1 948,, p. 51 .
hHCI,ÐSåI,ER
C O}iSUI'ÍER
Sourrce:
170
Wilson 1990; Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-operative'1976). The co-op also raised the
profile of manomin as a Treaty right, and lhe Anishinaabe picker as a worthy worker
and owner of a business enterprise. The Co-op's liaison with General Mills of Minnesota
led to the "Quiet Water" brand of wild rice being sold under the Betty Crocker label in
stores across the US and introduced into Canada. However, moves by the Department of
lndian Affairs undermined the success of the co-op, and internal management problems
in later years finally brought the co-op under. The Co-op remains a legacy that is
remembered by many Treaty #3 Anishinaabe people in the decades following, and one
venlure that initiated many Anishinaabeg into many more years in the business side of
the industry.
One of the major obstacles to the Co-op in the 1970s was the growing numbers of
wild rice paddies in Minnesota. The State government funded the University of Minnesota
to embark upon research and development. Combined with Uncle's Ben's assistance by a
fulltime agronomist in the field, the university extension work ensured Minnesota a
major place in the trade. By 1980, paddy rice supplied just over 607o of the world
production (Unies 1981:80 Table 4:4). Minnesota supplied a majority of that market
wilh 78% being paddy rice ralher than lake grown. California started paddy or
cultivated wild rice production in 1977 and by 1984 had supplanted Minnesota as the
largest major supplier (Aiken et al 19BB: 104).
What the ricebowl of Treaty #3 has to offer is natural growing lake rice, which
has a different length, look and taste than paddy rice. There are at least three ways in
which Canadian lake wild rice could make inroads into the world's markets: labelling,
marketing and ensuring supply.
Labelling is a major point of contention because paddy rice producers want to sell
lheir crop on the basis of it being "wild rice". Critics say that paddy rice is a total
agricultural operation, with pesticides, herbicides, hydrid seeds and combine
harvesting, and should be labelled as such. Minnesota has legislation called the Wild Rice
I7T
Labelling Act by which companies must state whether rice is paddy or lake grown and
whether the rice is organic or assisted by fertilizers and chemicals. However, according
to Winona La Duke, Anishinaabe coordinator of lhe lkwe Marketing Collective of Mille
Lacs, Minnesota, "the law has never been enforced. There is a brand called lndian
Harvested Wild Rice, a trademark of Continenlal Wild Rice Company that is a blend of
paddy and lake rice not harvested by lndians" and that label has never been questionned
in a court of law (LaDuke n.d.)
None of the provinces nor Canada has insisted on separate labels identifying paddy
from lake wild rice (T. Bruyere 1990; W. Wilson'1990; Joe Pitchinese 1990). Rather,
Agriculture Canada (AgOan) has been promoting the need for grading wild rice (Peter
Wyze 1990). AgCan's grading would consider texture, cleanliness, colour and size of
grain (Wild Rice Seminar Minutes, Rainy River Reserve, March 27,1980:2; Peler
Wyze 1990). Treaty #3 entrepreneurs did not agree with the so-called objective
standards that AgOan and a newly formed Canadian Wild Rice Council were promoting in
1990 (W. Wilson 1990; J. Pitchinese 1990). To Treaty #3 entrepreneurs Wilson and
Pitchinese, there are a lot of other imporlant variables to consider:
" I told AgCan to look at it from the consumer's point of view, such as
laste, cost per serving. Consumers want to know 'what can I get out of it?'
With Saskatchewan rice as grade A, they're looking at it like a simple
grain - size, texture, colour. lt won'1 work.
Lake of the Woods rice has more per serving than Saskatchewan rice. I
even proved it to them, using a#12 serving spoon. Lake of the Woods has
30-32 servings per pound while Saskatchewan rice has 28-29. With
paddy rice you only get 21-24 servings per pound.
The timing is important -before il reaches the starchy stage. The
standard should be when do you get it out of the pot. Paddy rice has lhat
swampy taste. But if that's what you get used to, you don't notice it ..
especially if you mix it with other foods. lt's what your taste buds get used
lo. That's what you're gonna buy."
Willie Wilson, Chief Stoneman's Wild Rice, 1990
"Our representative in Germany said our rice passed all tests as
'superior' and warned us against changing any grading or labelling.
..AgCan wanls to ram grade standards, saying at first they're voluntary.
According to Ag Can grades, Wabigoon's grade A rice would be grade C and
yet it commands a grade A price in Europe. . Government likes to promote
a sectoral generic rice - we have a speciality food. They're going to push
us oul eventually." Joe Pitchinese, Kagiwiosa Manomin, lnc. 1990
172
Lakehead University Researcher, Dr. Peter Lee 1, a consultant across North
America in developing wild rice potential, agrees with Treaty #3 Anishinaabe
entrepreneurs. Lee states that Saskatchewan rice should not set the standard (Lee
1990). Thus, grading remains another unresolved issue of the industry. Agriculture
Canada believes a system of grading would "develop a measure of quality control for
export market .. with voluntary labelling. lf you don't meet the standard you don't use the
label" (P. Wyze 1990). Treaty #3 Anishinaabe entrepreneurs are sure this particular
proposed system would sink their sales.
ln the promotion of wild rice as a commercial entreprise, either in marketing or
expanding production, Ontario and Manitoba did not wish to be outdone in this industry.
ln 1984, Manitoba changed its policies to open up more leases and areas to non-lndian
business. After intense lobbying by Ontario Conservative cabinet minister Leo Bernier,
and his campaign chair Ben Ratuski, owner of Shoal Lake Wild Rice of Keewatin and the O
Canada! wild rice label, Onlario charted the same course as Manitoba. Ontario directly
invested in changes in provincial ricing policies, and in research and development on
lake rice. (See also chapter ten and twelve). Ontario proposed to expand the harvest by
200% lo 400o/" in the 1974 strategic land use plans for North Western Ontario (MNR
1974:116,49-51)) and again in 1986 (see Chapter twelve). After some flirtation
with paddy rice in the 1970s, both Ontario, Manitoba and provinces new to the industry
like Saskatchewan ultimately accepted that "mechanical harvesting in good natural
stands is presently more profitable than commercial production" (Underwood Mclellan
& Associates Ltd 1975: Summary (no numbered pages)). This led to great federal and
provincial investments in Saskatchewan lakes in particular, and Ìo long term provincial
support of wild rice research at Lakehead University by Dr. Peter Lee.
Paddy production in Minnesota had a profound impact on the rice market.
t73
"A research program was started at the University of Minnesota which
developed non-shattering varieties of wild rice which could be harvested
by combines and (use) disease and insect control practices. These
advances allowed paddy growers to achieve yields up to 10 times those on
lakes. ln California, the more moderate climate and lack of fungal diseases
have resulted in even higher returns. Lake production, on the other hand,
had no such available technology..An industry which was still producing
rice in much the same manner as it had for centuries suddenly found itself
face to face with twentieth century agriculture." (P.F.Lee 1986:2)
There were attempts by Anishinaabeg to enter paddy production, notably by the
Fort Alexander Band (now called Sakgeeng First Nation of Treaty #1) in Manitoba in the
1970s (Lithman 1977) and by Willie and Alan Wilson of Manitou Rapids, Treaty #3
(Wilson 1990; Catherall 1990; Lee'1990). Paddy production is a farming operation,
requiring capital and combines. The Fort Alex experiment seemed to founder on the
management structure and lack of capital at appropriate times. This is documented in a
classic study of how "capitalization of a traditional pursuit" o't Anishinaabeg leads to the
"development of underdevelopment" (Lithman 1973:54-55) The Manitou Rapids
experiment foundered on the location of the paddies and a problem of acidic soil. Some
Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg speculated the paddy rice failure was due more to transplanting
a foreign approach to what is considered a sacred societal ritual. Certainly, it is difficult
for Anishinaabeg Elders to accept that non-Anishinaabeg can hold expertise in the plant
that the Great Spirit gave them (Fred Green 1990; Bert Yerxa 1990).
Paddy rice supplies 90% of the processed rice sold (Unies 198'l;Aiken et al
19BB:104; Lee 1986:2 see figure 2). California has an ideal climate for harvesting
"two crops of wild rice per year or to alternate wild rice with white rice" (Aiken et al
19BB:105). lndeed, paddy rice has a higher yield per acre than Canadian lake rice:506
kgiha in Minnesota; 1600 kg/ha in California;215 kg/ha in Canada (Aiken et al
1 9BB:1 04).
Why would there continue to be interest in lake rice? Many believe it simply
tastes better (Wilson 1990; Pitchinese 1990; Jones 1991). "Lake rice has had two
advantages over paddies: (1) il is cheaper to grow wild rice in lakes and (2) lake wild
174
rice is longer and targets the gourmet restaurant and consumer market" (Lee 1986:3).
However, the competition from paddies is fierce: "There is concern that the price paid
per pound for paddy rice will approach that paid for lake rice and since the yields are so
low in lakes, it will no longer be economical to grow rice, and the lake industry will
die..time is running out" (Lee 1986:4)
Clearly, Canadian lake rice is required to sell itself as distinct. To Dr. Lee, there
is one "straightforward, if not simple" answer to the survival of lake rice - "increase
production" (Lee'1986:4). Marketing the distinctive lake rice and ensuring the supply
became major concerns of the next Treaty #3 initiative in the 1980s: the Ontario lndian
Wild Rice Development Agency. Ensuring the supply had been a perennial concern withìn
Treaty #3 territory since the flooding of the wild rice bowl by navigational and hydro
dams (Chapter 1'1;Lovisek, Holzkamm and Holzkamm 1994).
Many Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg had developed more business expertise during the
Co-op years (1973-1982). During this time, there was continued insistence from
Treaty #3 Chiefs that Treaty rights to wild rice be recognized by Ontario and Manitoba
(see Chapter twelve). Grand Council Treaty #3 and the Co-op made forceful
presentations to the Ontario Royal Commission on the Northern Environment during
their initial hearings in 1977-78. The result was that Commissioner Justice Patrick
Hartt recommended, and persuaded then Premier Bill Davis to implement, a five year
moratorium on any new licences to harvest wild rice. The Province promised to support
the development of a nalive wild rice industry during this time (Chapter 12 ).
It was the federal government who responded, particularly in 1980 harvest,
with great influxes of money to First Nations for rice development - buying, seeding,
purchasing airboats and equipment for mechanical harvesting. Efforts to win provincial
assistance during this five year moratorium brought little result, despite intense
lobbying by Grand Council Treaty #3. ln 1978, wild rice was tabled by this Chiefs'
Assembly as a major issue for the newly created Tripatite Council of federal and
r75
provincial lndian and Native Affairs ministers and Chiefs of Ontario leaders. Ontario did
contribute to research & development work at Lakehead University in Thunder Bay
(1980-85 and therafter), and to a joint federal-provincial funded study through the
Tripartite Council of the effects of water levels throughout Treaty #3 (Unies 1981),
but did not make any direct financial contribution to the "native industry". ln the mid
1980s, after the original five years of the moratorium,the Rainy Lake Tribal Council
(of 10 First Nations in the southern part of Treaty #3) petitioned Ontario for financial
assistance to the native industry. Ontario gave no reply.
Within Treaty #3, leaders began to complain about the different approaches of
the tribal areas. The Kenora Chiefs did not wish to deal with the Ontario government,
because they stated that bilateral agreements with the province would undermine their
Treaty rights. 2 Forl Frances area Chiefs to the south wished to move on several fronts,
especially economic development initiatives, and enter into agreements with any
government. They stated that any such activity would be undertaken "without prejudice
to Treaty rights". ln 1987, the Chiefs of Treaty #3 debated such actions at their annual
assembly and signed a joint protocol allowing independent action by First Nations which
would not derogate from the treaty and aboriginal righls of all.
ln the early 1980s, several Treaty #3 Chiefs such as Willie Wilson of Manitou
Rapids, Herb Redsky of Shoal Lake #40 and Phil Gardner of Eagle Lake lobbied for
support for this Native industry from DIAND. They proposed a comprehensive Treaty #3
program of research and development, promotion and marketing, and development fund
for actual production, buying, processing. At the same time, federal lndian Affairs
Director of Operations in Ontario, John Connolly, wished to emulate the success of the
Manitoba & Saskatchewan lndian Agricultural Programs (MIAP and SIAP) and
recommended such a sectoral program be adopted in Ontario. The Chiefs were receplive
to Connolly's suggestion. The only problem was that Connolly (and his colleagues Van
776
Iterson and Conduit) would only support a sectoral program for the whole region, not
just Treaty #3 (W. Wilson 1990; A. Potson 1990). Despite vigorous objections from
Treaty #3 Chiefs at the outset, Connolly had his way . This course of action was adopted
even though 95% of wild rice in Ontario came from the Treaty #3 wild rice bowl
(Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources February 20, 1989 memo: Ontario Wild Rice).
One wonders at the advisability of an Ontario wide approach when the Minister of lndian
Affairs in 1980 had stated that Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg had a documented Treaty right
to wild rice, and Ontario states 95% of wild rice in the province is grown in that part of
Northwestern Ontario.
When asked why DIA refused to consider a Trealy #3 wide sectoral approach, lhe
1990 DIA Director of Economic & Employment Services for Ontario Region, Jules
Hebert replied:
"Grand Council Treaty #3 had no policy. We're - and they're - still
debating rights, harvesting methods (traditional hand harvesting vs
mechanical pickers), wild rice as a commercial commodity. As far as I'm
concerned, there's lots of room for flexibility with the harvesting
methods - there's room to accomodate both." (Hebert 1990)
Grand Council Treaty #3's actual position at the time was to support socio-economic
development of all First Nations, and as an organization, to strengthen and protect
Treaty rights. The Grand Council itself saw no inconsistency here, nor a lack of mandate.
(Chapterl 2).
The Treaty #3 Chiefs who spearheaded the sectoral approach proceeded to hire
consultants to develop a paper, which was subsequently presented to and approved by
DIAND. Native Board representatives were recruited from rice producing areas such as
Chief Roy Kaminawash of Osnaburg (Treaty #9 north of the CNR line) and from potential
areas such as Garden River near Sault Sle Marie and Dokis reserve near North Bay.
Treaty #3 Chiefs retained the majority of the seats. The Ontario lndian Wild Rice
Development Agency (OIWRDA) was formed in 1985, with a five year plan and budget
approved.
r77
"DlA said go province wide and unify the producers to have a better chance
at marketing. They favour a marketing board approach. Do market
research and promote .. buy space at sport shows, food fairs."
T. Bruyere 1990
"The Department responded to requests for action in this field. From
1985 on (to 1990), DIA provided $200,000 per year. They also got
$75,000 for a marketing study from NEDP (Native Economic
Development Program of federal Department of lndustry, Trade andCommerce)." Jules Hebert1990
The OIWRDA began by trying to expand the production base and utilized the services of
Dr. Peter Lee of Lakehead University to develop new areas. OIWRDA coordinator Archie
Potson of Seine River is not at all sure that this was a useful investment for Treaty #3
First Nations:
"Under the expert advice of Peter Lee, we seeded many lakes with
no results. One reserve even tricked him on purpose and took a soil
sample from a bay where rice had been plentiful for years - Lee said it
wasn't suitable! Good for a laughl" (Potson 1990)
Wabigoon First Nation dubbed Prof. Lee "Mr. Chemicals" for his interest in
testing increased capacity in lakes using fertilizers and/or pesticides, and for what they
perceived of his disregard of traditional Anishinaabe knowledge (E. Pitchinese 1990).
ln 1986 Wabigoon First Nation in the Dryden area of Treaty #3 established their own
wild rice company under the label "Kagiwiosa Manomin" . With the assistance of the
Mennonite Central Committee, Wabigoon proceeded to obtain funding and built their own
processing facility (Figure 28). Kagiwiosa Manomin is marketed on the basis of an
organic food, traditionally harvested and processed by Anishinaabe people.
Needless to say, the OIWRDA relationship with Prof. Lee of Lakehead University
was very controversial.
"The (OIWRDA) Agency was not worth salvaging. lts thrust supported
Peter Lee (of Lakehead University) to increase production. But that put
the cart before the horse. Marketing is what needs to be developed first.
Lakehead U now develops new strains of rice, new areas to grow - the
governmenl's to blame for that" (Tom Bruyere 1990)
Lee and Potson did assist Dokis, Garden River and some other non-Treaty #3 Reserves
develop new crops of rice. At the same time Dr. Lee also worked with the Ontario
17B
Ministry of Natural Resources and non-lndians on the northeast side of Treaty #3
territory to develop new ricing lakes. And, in 1989, Dr. Lee attended public meetings
with MNR in towns such as lgnace, to promote new seeding of wild rice. These meetings
led to petitions by northern rural municipalities to the Ontario government calling for
an end to the 1978 moratorium on new wild rice licences. During this time, Lee's
research at Lakehead University was underwritten by the Ontario government and, for
three years 1986-89,50% by the Department of lndian Affairs. This is the federal
department who holds the main fiduciary responsibility of prolecting Treaty rights.
Clearly, both federal and provincial governments saw the rights issue as an
obstacle to development. Grand Council Treaty #3 and Treaty #3 wild rice business
advocates agreed that both the federal and provincial refusal to recognize their rights
hampered the development of a Native wild rice industry in Treaty #3. While OIWRDA
coordinator Archie Potson blamed the "limited development" the Agency was able to
undertake on "the limited funding to serve the whole province", he also cited Ontario's
1986 wild rice policy when "they were trying to define ownership of the resource" (see
Chapter twelve). Ontario and Canada refused to consider the resolution of this issue by
"recognizing and affirming" Treaty rights as called for the Constitution Act. '1982, s.35.
lnstead a seltfulfilling prophecy gained credibility: "Wild rice takes off where there is
no conflict between business and culture" (Archie Potson 1990).
The result was a standoff. Canada and Ontario saw only Grand Council Treaty #3's
obstinence lhal manomin was a right guaranteed by Treaty:
"Five years ago, we (Ontario) were in first place (in rice production). Now
we're in 4th (in Canada). There's a lack of people coming in. We need to
identify markets ..there's too many competing interests. Within 4-5 years,
we have 3-4 processors in Canada (ed: Shoal Lake Wild Rice/Ratuski of
Keewalin, Ontario; Kagiwiosa Manomin at Wabigoon; The Pas, Manitoba; La
Ronge, Saskatchewan)." (J.Hebert1990)
"The economic polenlial of wild rice in the northwestern part of Ontario is
significant, with up to 50 million pounds available for harvest in years
when the weather is good...The period since 1978 (when the Ontario
government placed a moratorium on any additional non-aboriginal wild rice
harvesting licences in Northwestern Ontario) has seen the collapse of the
779
successful non-nal¡ve wild rice industry in the northwest, and one
subsequent unsuccessful attempt by the aboriginal community to gain
benefits from the potential of the annual crop. While the economic potential
of the northwest's wild rice should obviously be pursued by the aboriginal
community, its successful redevelopment will be difficult because of the
capture of a significant portion of the post-1978 market by producers in
California and Saskatchewan. The extensively distributed nature of the wild
rice stands across the northwest will likewise provide another major
challenege in the need for significant co-operation among a number of First
Nations" (Riley 1992:13-14)
On the other hand, the Treaty #3 assembly of Chiefs and member First Nations saw only
the Crown, as represented by Ottawa and Queen's Park, as obstructionist in refusing to
live up to its own laws ( Chapter 12):
"l never thought before it (wild rice) was a problem. I must admit
somebody else creates problems for us. They can take care of their own
problems. lf they could have left us alone, everything would have been the
way our people want to live."
Treaty #3 Grand Chief Machipiness (Robin Greene) in "Grain of Dissent",
Fifth Estate, CBC TV, January 5, 1981
True to its mandate, however, the OIWRDA sought to develop the agency for all
regions in the Province. within Treaty #3, Coordinator Archie Potson said:
"the Agency philosophy was to encourage people to look for different
areas to develop and then that would be theirs. Keep the traditional areas
for the hand pickers. lf the Province would agree that Treaty #3 did have
all the rice, then we would still have all the areas that we had already
developed. There was never any resolution - only general discussion"(Potson 1990).
The clear assumption here was that new areas would be developed as economic
enterprises, by individuals for profit, with the use of mechanical harvesting a given.
OIWRDA Chair Herb Redsky of Shoal Lake said that many Chiefs and Councils did not
agree with the OIWRDA approach (H. Redsky 1990). When a couple at Northwest Angle
#33 tried to seed a particular bay in their reserve's area of Shoal Lake, the Chief vetoed
it, saying it belonged to everyone (H. Redsky 1990). Pete Seymour found the same
reaction at Rat Portage (north end of Lake of the Woods) when he suggested developing an
area. He would do all the work and repay the band 10"/" of his rice sales each year. Chief
and Council refused, saying that the area belonged to everyone (Pete Seymour 1990).
180
OIWRDA staff and Board members found that "there's no doubt that it's easier to
develop rice as an industry where there's no tradition or it's 'long ago and all but
forgotten'. Dokis developed really well with the Agency and Lee's help. They now have
good rice, harvest it and have it processed in Wisconsin. They must be finding a market."
(Potson 1990).
The OIWRDA had annual public meetings which served as educational fora for new
information on wild rice, but did not have the manpower to do more. Archie Potson was
assisted by Basil Green of Shoal Lake for one year, as a fieldworker in identifying new
rice areas and promoting seeding. But the Agency did not have the communications
necessary to keep people up to date and involved. Nor did the Board agree on a mandate.
"DlA said that they could only get $60,000 for a Treaty #3
proposal but $200,000 if they were provínce wide. The large flux of
money was the carrot. DIA said,'the rest of Ontario doesn't grow rice
anyway'. But once it went Ontario wide, I got out right at the beginning - |
said it wouldn't work. .. The financial position of the Agency was that they
spent more time looking for money . They'd either spent it or need it to do
something. They were always at the whim of funding agencies and then the
funders would set conditions. We intended to go to Ontario because of the
moralorium but it didn't work." (W. Wilson 1990).
Although both DIA representative Don Wellstead and Chief Wilson thought the Agency did
well in present¡ng the product at international conferences and trade shows, the Agency
seemed to lose focus. "They should have stuck to promotion. (At first, the Agency) took
the point of view - expose rice to the people then compete for the market." (Wilson
1990). Others saw a definite conflict of interest:
"The mistake OIWRDA made was in using private producers at their
exhibits - Chief Stoneman and Kagiwiosa. (Treaty #3) people thought
they (OIWRDA) were promoting them (ed: those companies) only, and
lhey did make the sales. (OIWRDA) should have promoted lndian rice.
Each one of those private interests was saying 'our rice is better' and it
confused the consumer. OIWRDA forgot their mandate. They were a
support organization but they began to compete with their own
constituenls. ln 1987, Seine River, Lake of the Woods - where the
Directors lived - OIWRDA bought (rice) there."
Tom Bruyere 1990
181
ln 1989, lndian Affairs had noted that,
"OIWRDA is presumably phasing out. What type of organization will
replace ¡t? Will it be supported? Treaty rights are unresolved. Status of
moratorium unknown. No consistency among producers regarding type of
product they are producing. No grading standards. Producer groups being
formed subregionally. OIWRDA sponsoring a marketing study. lnterest in
lake seeding by some bands and individuals. Meetings of federal and
provincial government departments. The situation is now more confused
in Ontario than it was 4-5 years ago. We can't state our strategy or
workplan until we know the direction that the producers want to take(Handwritten note April-August 1989, INAC file #5800-2 v.4 land -
Natural Resources - Wild Crops).
After five years, DIA was relieved that they could allow the sun to set on the agency (J.
Hebert 1990). Changes to their departmental funding meant that all funds went to tribal
councils and thence to First Nations. lt would take a different mandate from the Chiefs to
fund the OIWRDA or its successor.
The demise of the OIWRDA may well be attributed to "too much money 3 and an
unclear mandate" but the complexity of their task was daunting. OIWRDA, and Grand
Council Treaty #3, were faced, on the one hand, with Ontario's build-up of research and
development to promote natural lake wild rice, and yet Ontario's continuing refusal to
follow Premier Davis 1978 commitment to "assist the development of a Native wild rice
ind ustry".
At the federal level, OIWRDA and Grand Council Treaty #3 met the refusal of
DIAND to follow through on all levels with their Miníster's 1980 recognition of Treaty
#3's right lo manomin . The Grand Council sought to address these issues on a political
level while OIWRDA tried a number of marketing routes to get some recognition for a
Native presence in the industry ( Chapter 12).
The federal bureaucracy established its own working group on wild rice in 1988:
lndian Affairs Economic Development, AgOan Crop Specialist, External Affairs export
liaison, and a representative from the Native Economic Development Program of
TB2
lndustry, Science, Technology (Peter Wyze 1990). They developed a discussion paper
that saw changes in the industry in a macro sense:
"* ln 1960, Canada produced over 60% of world production. By 1988, it
was producing less lhan 20"/". ..
* ln '1960, lake wild rice was grown primarily in Northwest Ontario,
southeast Manitoba and Minnesota, using traditional technologies. By
lhe late 1980s, lake wild rice had been inlroduced into new regions of
Canada using modern technologies.
* ln 1980, demand exceeded supply. retail prices were relatively high. ln
1987 and 1 9BB, Canadian production exceeded demand, leading to a build
up of inventories and low prices.
* Canadian production, while variable from year to year, has almost
doubled wilhin a decade. However, the traditional native growers in
Manitoba and Ontario are losing market share and the crop is no longer a
means of economic improvement. ...
ln Summary, the industry is moving from a cottage industry in which
annual production is peddled, into a modern agricultural industry
requiring selling and marketing practices comparable to other
agricultural commodities." ("National Wild Rice Association" Discussion
Paper, John Conduit, Director, Resource Development Directorate,
Ottawa lNAc to Economic Development Directors of INAC in Ontario,
Manitoba & Saskatchewan, January 4, 1990).
The Department of lndian Affair's proposal was to "suggest" lndian wild rice
producers (identified as "our lndian clients", OIWRDA, MIAP and SIAP) consider both a
"National Wild Rice Association" and "broadly-based 'marketing pools'(to) provide
lndian participants with an opportunity to participate fully within the industry, to
enhance economic well-being and overall profitability" (Conduit to INAC Regional
Economic Development Directors, Jan.4, 1990).
The lure of a Canadian Wild Rice Association, as seen by INAC, was in the
organization and systematization of this industry. (lronically many entrepreneurs
originally entered this industry to avoid the bureaucracy of other businesses.) Such an
organization could "provide producers with current market and price information to
enhance their lakeside bargaining powei', "develop lakeside curing technologies",
"assist individual sellers to develop new geographic markets and markets niches", and
183
"tailoring (rice) to the demands of the marketplace" (Conduit letter, Jan.4,1990:3-4).
Marketing pools were seen as vehicles to access Agriculture Canada's loan guarantees.
This is exactly what Saskatchewan did from 1983 on. They formed a cooperative
of all producers, accessing federal and provincial aid dollars, establishing a processing
plant, and stockpiling their rice. While Treaty #3 pickers and producers were looking
for federal and provincial assistance to develop a native industry, "provincial and
federal government support to Saskatchewan and Manitoba allowed them to stockpile rice
and destroyed the futures market," explained Tom Bruyere in 1990. The price to
pickers fell drastically.
The federal bureaucractic initiative led to a May 1990 meeting of potential
members of a National Wild Rice Association. Dr. Peter Lee of Lakehead University and
non-lndian businessmen Dick Trivers (from Emo near Fort Frances), Ben Ratuski (O
Canada wild rice, Keewatin, near Kenora) attended along with several Treaty #3
Anishinaabe businessmen: Joe Pitchinese, Willie Wilson, Tom Bruyere. lt was the civil
servants' hope that this meeting would develop into an industry association "not
fragmented along regional, ethnic and cultural lines". They also promoted the idea of a
marketing pool (Peter Wyze, 1990; "A National Wild Rice Association" Discussion
Paper, January 4, 1990:5). The Candian Wild Rice Association continues lo exist on an
informal basis and lhe marketing pool did take effect in Saskatchewan and Manitoba
through SIAP and MIAP. MIAP was seeking a major long term arrangement for sales to
Quaker Oats.
While the federal civil servants promoted an association to share information,
Ìhe Native business people of Treaty #3 saw it as another vehicle which would lobby
against their rights - and the best interests of their businesses (see above regarding
grading and standardization). A Board member of the Canadian Wild Rice Council was also
President of the Manitoba Wild Rice Producers Association, who spearheaded the
successful court challenge to Manitoba wild rice legislation which included affirmative
IB4
action proposals to assist their Native wild rice industry (Kroeker 1990). Pitchinese
and others could foresee a more forceful lobby against the system of rice harvesting
areas set aside in blocks for Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg in Kenora and Dryden areas.
Yet for many, "the use of the term 'industry' in connection with wild rice is not
real" (L. Catherall 1990). And what OIWRDA lacked was the support to see the'industry'
and the Native presence for what it was:
"OIWRDA tried to reflect Native needs but all the studies treated wild rice
as an agricultural commodity and didn't try to talk about rice in
understanding its mystique." L. Catherall 1980.
A strong feeling persists across Treaty #3 that "wild ricing should remain a traditional
endeavour ..and the bands should not go into it as a "business" (Allan Snowball of
Naicatchewenin First Nalion at Manitou Rapids wild rice seminar, March 27, 1990). A
former lndian Affairs district superintendent, then executive director of the Rainy Lake
Tribal Council for 10 First Nations, wilnessed the changing times of the late '1970s to
1 9B0s:
" I'm absolutely convinced lhat it's a mistake to turn wild rice into a
GM corporation. Judging from what I've seen in more than a decade, I'm
convinced that it should be a family oriented business rather than a
commercial venture. Wild rice is as much an event as a business. The
most success, money in the pocket, and joy I've seen is with the family in
wild rice. lt's such a personal thing ..almost a mystique .. and almost
impossible to get large numbers of people to cooperate on it. To try and
make it a band business is a mistake. What is needed are some key figures
who can match family enterprises with some buyers who won't lry to
stick it to them". (Catherall 1990).
Kagiwiosa Manomin 4 is a prime example of how a successful native industry does
work (Figure 28). ln the mid 1980s, Joe Pitchinese and the people of Wabigoon First
Nation welcomed the Mennonite Central Committee to work with them in developing their
wild rice business. Together they developed poplar burning ovens which replicate the
traditional parching process of their ancestors. ln 1985, Kagiwiosa Manomin lnc. was
"eslablished as a means to regain Native control over the non-native domination of wild
i85
rice processing" ("Riz Sauvage Manomin Wild Rice - Taste, in the Native Tradition",
Kagiwiosa Manomin Ltd. pamphlet). Just like the Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op (of
which Joe's father, Paul Pitchinese, was a founding board member and President), the
Wabigoon business organized as a worker cooperative.
"Kagiwiosa Manomin is dedicated to preserving the Ojibways traditions in
harvesting and processing manomin. At the same time, Kagiwiosa is
committed to bringing you the highest quality, certified organic wild rice
available at an affordable price" Figure 28).
lndeed, when a Canadian supermarket offered to purchase all the Wabigoon production,
Joe Pitchinese refused this mass-marketing approach (Richardson 1993:190). By
1994, the success of their "niche" marketing to gourmet and organic food outlets in
Germany, Japan, and selected Canadian locations has meant long term, seasonal
employment to members of that reserve, and others from which they buy rice. They
promote their rice as the "tastiest" because they process almost immediately to achieve a
lighter colour, faster cooking, chewy product.
The OIWRDA admired what Kagiwiosa was doing in "trying to maintain a fair
price for pickers (and) still be competitive within that natural, organic market". But
Executive Direclor Archie Potson recognized the conundrum they faced in trying to
develop a market for the whole Treaty #3 area: "ls it better to maintain a good price to
the picker as a specialty product or lower the price and sell more?" lndeed,
commentators have stated that Kagiwiosa Manomin "wouldn'l have survived in the
general market but in their own niche they command two times the going Price". 5
Kagiwiosa would reply theirs is a different and superior producl.
Kagiwisoa Manomin offers an inspiring success story. There are other individual
stories of Anishinaabeg buyers who have made tidy profits in good harvest years by
acting as the middleman for processors such as Ratuski. There have also been the money
losing experiences of Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op and Chief Stoneman's Wild Rice
zE. w¡td Rice Manomin - pamphret of Kagiwíosa ManomiË
\87
company of Manitou Rapids. Assessing such ventures next to the statistics of small
business viability across Canada, Treaty #3 entrepreneurship in this field is still
impressive. Government funding has a place in assisting, such as the provincial dollars
for the Kagiwiosa Manomin processing plant. (Figure 29). However, government
policies have had adversarial effects which oflen outweigh any financial support they
have provided.
ln the mid 1970s, the Province of Ontario let licences to newcomers, even within
the protected block system, and supported the long lerm research and development
within the Ministry of Natural Resources, and laler aÌ Lakehead University. Their
express purpose was to expand the wild rice industry by enticing non-Natives into
investing in new lakes. Treaty #3 Chiefs were quick to pick up that the Minister of
Northern Affairs, Hon. Leo Bernier, only became interested in controlling water levels
for optimum rice crops when the moratorium was reaching an end and new policies being
developed to bring in non-lndians into ricing. The provincial government interest was
clearly not in the development of a Native wild rice industry.
The immense influence of the Department of lndian Affairs can be seen in how
lheir initiatives pushed trends into realities. Rather than viewing the resolution of the
rights issue in favour of Treaty rights, as lobbied by Grand Council Treaty #3 and
member First Nations, lndian Affairs saw their role as economic development and
providing business advice to their "lndian clients" (J. Hebert 1990). There was no
followup to the Minister's letter of 1980 in which the federal government took a
conclusive stand on the side of Treaty rights. Two year later, the Constitution Act, 1982
recognized and affirmed "the exisling aboriginal and lreaty rights of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada" (s. 35). Yet at no time did the Department of lndian Affairs take the
highest law of the land as their mandate. lnstead, the economic development seclion
pursued its own agenda, oblivious to rights issues. "l don't know about the Treaty rights
Kagiwíosa Manomin processing plant opening at wab¡goon First Nation,gl__Dryden Observer S.ptql ?Sg "ne-w rice pl?-l{*.",,,Þ#; .:,::ji, ;,¡,.
1 988. iBB
New rice plant
Y*agirvioaa Manomin Inc., tlre their-green riee. as itie ono of tl
- 
*ffi f tr'å-å".r;*:'Sll* Íäi ?ffi S'Ïìçå -Ï.*.i*'#Ë'thf;Jåäõ;ãüñä;; óf wev dolùãr is pt"*{'-a 1*,
'iits ;'il;iLeitini ;ñt;; rice deielopmenl pool $ t1¡
L"1. t. It is locatid at the improvement' rn culttvallo:¡"äil; -lri.e Ctib*av Ñation h.añ'esting and farming pra
e8e¡.ve, tlces.
åK,9J*iL",l"' ",1,T ..ll * 
^ 
l|^i', I umm e r' e'i gì t In di e
ot over the proccssil";iiiiã ?g.f: Ì¡ave aoolied for and .
co ó"er æ r** d'd'Ëi n';*?m3ff"'åffï,*g
asiwiosa Manomin besan oper' . -'i;i;; iö.ö..ä,{.1. it 
'ffi; ;tiú;['talte "mechirni' ff:o,t]u
r:,i:i'#¿iäff¿:**,*iåffi :î:'^iå.."'iíii:å,üil
;Ëú; Ë"Í qør.' yäiä'tåió I'saliî"s.'ifl: :àäìfill'å.iiäv;i'ñ;ii,inott- ' ' f¡uaran
The vears tggt-,iä were a iraditional harvesting ruk
tåilfhä,üËväi#;J'";üü which prohibit thE uee of ar
i'ffiffffi,ËffiËffiris:frÏffit*
'$250,000.
ttte ile* processing plant-has- Kasiwio'a provides a mod'
capacity oi 500,000 p-ounds of for Naîve self-help and econom
nieherl'product. Markets are ã.ullãp-tnt whiõh is muh¡aìl
ling e,xólored in the United ¡enefiôial to their communitie
iatãa, Italy, DenmarÌ, the ãnd non¡ative society. ?hror'¡g
nited Kingdom, Spain and this kind of commru¡ity econ-om
rDan. ã"velopment, Nativês will !
'Xaø'r¡ota paid harvest¡rs $1. 
"Ute 
ø'U"eu¡. out of the welfi I
' ;r bllast year and witl pay the ðulture which is costly for t¡;
rme this year. Non-native pro' payers and even moreeo I "
seors are only paying in t'he Ñative people.
n¿e o1i2Ã cents to 50 cents Per
--.'"it"iitãiy i-;;;t"nt , to the Ojibwav ierm for wild Iî"". *a-ätd'*üi^iïñ*"r'L=. îl.*itiq t e\n- s¡p¿ns"ilr- t'
"f $ öiä) r.t* s o\-"i v ( vr<e \cv g \a_"t\ 
. r\L -r"å-! s g \ u i \- 5cr'e r,-e -
189
issue" said Peter Wyze, an Economic Development officer for lndian Affairs headquarters
in Ottawa, in 1990. He likely spoke the truth.
The Department of lndian Affairs and the Government of Ontario took the position
lhat rights had no place in business; indeed, they believed that Grand Council Treaty #3
calls for recognilion of their rights for rice were actually dampening the industry in
Ontario (Wyze 1990; Riley 1992; Crystal 1990; Hancock 1990). At another level, lhe
federal government was afraid to force the issue:
"The Treaty rights issue focusses on the right to grow and there's an
assumption that the resolution of this issue will pick up the development
of the crop. Wild rice growing is increasing in other provinces, not
Ontario,. There's a problem selling the crop now because there's too
much." Peter Wyze 1990
Under increasing criticism from Bands and lndian organizations in the 1960s and 1970s
about their poor track record in promoting economic development, the Department had
invested in hiring business graduates. These new business-orienled civil servants acted
to demonstrate their professionalism in providing expert advice to their 'clients'. No
consideration was given that wild rice in Treaty #3 was considered by Anishinaabeg lo
be the Great Spirit's garden. This was one territory where Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg had
centuries of experience in the business. The business grads proceeded to define the
macro-trends in the industry and set about assisting that realization, concentrating on
the 'cash crop' rather than on the significance of manomin to the people who first
extended its territory.
Was it that the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg wished to turn back the clock, as some
suggested? Or was it rather that they had learned from direct and bitter experience that
"once the whiteman and the province move in, there's nothing left" (W. Wilson 1990: P.
Gardner 1977; C. Wagamese 1990).
What Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg were grappling with was whether the
enlrepreneurial ethic was antithetical to the stewardship ethic. Could they co-exist? As
190
Fifth Estate host Eric Malling put it in 1981 , "Can wild rice be a cash crop and a sacred
part of lndian cullure?" (CBC-TV, January 5, 1981).
Many Anishinaabeg accept change as a fact of life and recognize their ability to
practice their traditions and do business while making a fair profit. Kagiwiosa is a
prime example. The complexity of this small wild rice industry is hidden from public
attention. What remains clear is that Anishinaabeg have lost increasingly more control
over this natural resource. And, this is so,
"not because of any peculiarity in 'lndian cultures' nor differences in
innovative or entrepreneurial spirit between lndians and Euro-
Americans. Rather, it is because EuroAmericans have acted on behalf of
and with the backing of vast institutions, from the Hudson's Bay Co. in the
early days to major food companies today .. in accordance with the
metripole-hinterland concept" (Lithman 1973:5).
By 1990, the Ontario lndian Wild Rice Development Agency fallered, to a very
great extenl because they were not able to concentrate on the Treaty #3 territory and
deal with the fundamental issue of culÌural adaptation and innovation regarding the
commerce of North American Free Trade and European and Asian trading zones . The
story of the Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op in the 1970s was that era's attempt to wed
economic enterprise wilh cultural traditions. ln both situations, the federal and
provincial governments played pivotal roles in undermining the Anishinaabe proposals
to develop a "native induslry" which combined their cultural traditions with sound
business sense.
191
Endnotes:
1. Dr. Lee conlinues to be an important player in the wild rice industry because of his
research slemming from the 1970s and his dedication to building a lake rice industry in
northern Ontario. He first became interested in wild rice when working for Ontario
Ministry of Natural Resources as a student. "They needed some work done on rice and it
looked interesting to me. I never thought it would be so political, I looked at it as just a
crop." (P. Lee 1990) Peter Lee went on to complete his PhD about wild rice, and has
followed this with two decades of research on "the crop".
2. lnterestingly, it was a Kenora First Nation, Wazhushk Onigum, who eventually
entered into discussion with Ontario and signed an agreement with Ontario to have
charitable gaming on their reserve (C. Wagamese 1990). lt should also be noted that
Wazhushk Onigum expressed their own sovereignty in the gaming issue by establishing
their own charitable foundation, and issuing their own permit and authorization to
operate, along with Ontario's license (September 1994).
3. "Too much money" indicated this observer, who requested anonymity. Funds to
OIWRDA were "wasted" in meetings, travel and food fair exhibits which paid no benefit to
the average picker. However, OIWRDA found underfunding to be a problem throughout
their mandate. Their original proposal was for multiyear funding to include everything
from loans to Native buyers, processing plants, etc. to research & development. The
method of funding OIWRDA, and the lack of input from Ontario, meant that Potson had to
seek funds continually.
4. "1n 1985, Kagiwiosa Manomin began operations using a portable mechanical
processor provided by the Mennonite Central Committee,. Sales to local stores were
$5000 for a volume of 1 ,000 lbs. The years 1987-BB were a breakthrough year for
marketing as contracts were negotiated in Toronto, Montreal, Switzerland and Germany.
Sales increased to 43,000 lbs. (their full production) for a dollar vale in excess of
$250,000. The new processing plant (opened September 2, 19BB) has a capapcity of
500,000 lbs of finished product.
Kagiwiosa paid its harvesters $1 per lb, last year and will pay the same this
year. Non-native processors are only paying 25 cents to 50 cents per lb. lt is very
important to Kagiwiosa Manomin members to pay harvesters a fair price for their green
rice, as it is one of the few forms of income besides welfare for mny Natives. Ten cents of
every dollar is placed in a wild rice development pool for further improvements in
cultivation, harvesting and farming practices.
This summer, eight lndian bands have applied for and received Organic
Certification from the Organic Crop lmprovement Association (O.C.T.A.). These bands are
cooperating with Kagiwiosa Manomin to provide organic green rice. This will guarantee
the continuance of traditional harvesting rules which prohibit the use of synthetic
chemicals or additives in the production of wild rice. The environmentally sensitive wild
ric elakes will be prolected from degradation for future generations." ("New rice plant",
Dryden Local Express, September 6, 19BB))
5. Anonymous source from Winnipeg, Manitoba.
r92
Chapter Ten
The Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-operative, 1973-1978:
Treaty Rights and Commerce hand in hand
Anishinaabe policy-making was about to enter a new era in the 1970's. The innovative
scheme came when leaders once again linked economic development with their Treaty and
aboriginal rights 1o natural resources, just as lhe Anishinaabe negotiators had done in 1873.
During the 1950s, a role reversal began, almost innocently, when the Anishinaabe
people began selling their rice green, at lakeside, right after picking. For centuries, the people
had processed lhe rice in their traditional way of parching, thrashing and winnowing. They
would then sell the finished rice to non-Natives. This was the way business had been conducted
since the earliesl years of the fur lrade.
By the 1950's, non-Natives preferred to use their own parching and thrashing
machines and control more of the whole process, leaving lhe Anishinaabeg to be the harvesters
only. No longer were the Anishinaabaeg lhe ones who directed the trade and negotiated their
price for the rice. lnstead, the lakeside buyers set the price which was kept intentionally low at
lakeside. The pickers received 20 cents a pound at lakeside while the rice sold for several
dollars at retail stores (8. Yerxa, H. Redsky, R. Bruyere 1990).
Any analysis of prices per pound must consider the 40/" recovery rate belween green
rice landed at lakeside and processed rice. ln other words, it takes about 2112lbs of green rice
to make'1 lb of finished rice (Avery, original manuscript to Harrowsmith 1978; Wilson,
Oct.1990; Aiken et al 'l9BB: 87). Even at that, the profit margin for the buyer, processor,
wholesaler and retailer was markedly high compared to the original harvester.
What began as a rice trade wilh Anishinaabeg as the sowers, gatherers, processors and
lraders had become a situation where lhe Anishinaabeg were solely resource gatherers or
labourers in a market economy. ln a classic study, Lithman documented this "capitalization of a
traditional pursuit" in the case of wild rice at Saugeen First Nation in Manitoba from the 1950s
to the early 1970s. There, Anishinaabe management of wild rice was gradually eroded by a
coalition of government and business forces (Lithman 1973).
193
Chief George Crow of Whitefish Bay credits the work of the Amik Corporation in the late
1960s with awakening Anishinaabe attention to the whole industry of wild rice. The Amik
Corporation was started as a development agency and training vehicle by churches to increase
lhe economic base of the reserves around Kenora.
Josephine and Ron Sandy of Northwest Angle #33, Robin and Mabel Greene of Shoal Lake
#39, Doug and Madeline Skead of Rat Portage were among the first family logging ventures that
were spearheaded by Amik. The Corporation would negotiate contracts with the Boise Cascade
pulp mill in Kenora and the cutting permits from the province. fhe Anishinaabe contractors
would provide the cutters and supervisors to complete the contract. Amik would assist with
bookkeeping, a role that George Crow provided for several years. During that time, he saw
Anishinaabe people take their expertise in woods operations, gained through years of seasonal
labour, and turn it into effective business operations directed locally.
George Crow also noticed a change in outlook. Whereas many Anishinaabeg used to take
for granted the preparatory and gathering work associated with each ricing season, they now
recognized the organizational activities that business required (Crow 1990).
Josephine Sandy saw it slightly differently. Josephine Sandy remembered that Amik was
established "to bring church people in contact with lndians on a higher level - not just as poor
people to help in soup kitchens". As a former Board member of Amik Corp, she agreed that it had
helped some Anlshinaabeg to see wild rice as a year round operation, although not in the case of
her family. "l always had grandiose schemes!" (Josephine Sandy 1992).
Mrs. Sandy did the books for the Northwest Angle logging operation while her husband,
Ron Sandy, recruited and supervised the men in the bush. They had always been independent
business people, utilizing the resources available in commercial fishing, rice harvesting,
trapping and logging whenever jobs were available. Amik Corporalion merely provided a
legitimized venue for developing logging operations under local Anishinaabe control. ln the
1950s and 1960s in the Kenora area, only a non-Native agency had the required credibility to
negotiate contracts and permits.
There had always been Anishinaabe business people on Lake of the Woods. Josphine's
grandfather, Tom Kinew, ran a store and barge service around the Aulneau peninsula for many
194
years until the 1930s. lt was not the case that trading or business was anathema to
Anishinaabeg. lndeed, trade was an established presence long before the coureurs de bois visited
the Boundary Waters of what became known as Treaty #3 (Dickason 1992; Jenks 1990).
Problems developed when increased settlement in the region brought a disruption and racial
segregation of relations between Anishinaabeg and non-lndians. lndian Act regulations
restricted Anishinaabe businessmen in their dealings. A permit system restricted the sales of
produce or timber (Holzkamm & Waisberg 1989). Other policy provisions limited their
ability to raise capital (Woodward 1989), and their ability to travel, for example, requiring a
'pass'approved by the local lndian Agent for an lndian to leave the reserve (Carter 1990:146-
156).
The lndian Act that established the system of lndian agents has been described as a "total
institution" and a "comprehensive mechanism of social control" that governed all aspects of
lndian daily life:
"The lndian Act is a Lands Act. lt is a Municipal Act, an Education Act and a
Societies Act. lt is primarily social legislation, but it has a very broad
scope: there are provisions about liquor, agriculture and mining as well
as lndian lands, band membership and so forth. lt has elemenls that are
embodied in perhaps two dozen different acts of any of the provinces and
overrides some federal legislation in some respects.. lt has the force of
the Criminal Code and the impact of a constitution on those people and
communities that come within its purview." (Dr. Munro, former
Assistant Deputy Minister, DIAND, in Ponting & Gibbins, 1980:B-9).
"The lndian agent had total control over people's lives," recounted Pete Seymour,
former Chairman of Grand Council Treaty #3 in 1950s-1960s (Seymour 1990). He
remembered how his uncle, Miskwakapince (Jim Elliott), the hereditary Grand Chief of Lake of
the Woods and Chief of Assabaska, railed against the lndian agent. During the 1930's and
1940's, Captain Edwards ruled as lndian agent with his tight fisted, "keep them under the
thumb" approach lo Anishinaabeg (Seymour 1990). Undertaking any Anishinaabe initiative in
business or politics during this era of lndian Affairs control was nearly impossible.
Thus, there was a need to change outside attitudes toward Anishinaabe entrepreneurs.
Then there was an internal struggle for Anishinaabe Io enter business. Amik Corporalion began
this process of reintegraling Anishinaabeg into the economy of Northwestern Ontario. For the
past several decades, Anishinaabeg hadbeen relegated to the role of wage labourers. Amik 
195
Corporation was an early bridge back to the role of entrepreneur.
Forcountlesscenturies,lhe Anishinaabeg had monitored the precipitation each
winter, watched the weather changes and the spring run-off, and predicted the rice harvest
based on the water levels, weather and other signs they considered important. They had expected
the rice to continue to follow the predictable seven year cycle of one to two excellant crops, two
good ones, two fair and one poor, in differing orders (Doug Skead 1979). During this time,
Anishinaabeg prompted the growth of the rice by sowing in increasingly wider areas (Syms
1980; Moodie 1989). They paid attention to conservation and developed the canoe and flail
method that ensured seed was returned each harvest for next year's crop (van de Vorst 1988).
The Anishinaabeg had originated other ideas such as "bundling" the rice to protect it from winds
and predators (Densmore 1928, 1929; Hilger 1939; van de Vorst 19BB; Aiken et al 19BB).
And, they had instigated and increased trade with the newcomers from the onset of the fur trade
until the twentieth century (Waisberg 1976,1979; Lee 1975).
ln the late 1960s, as George Crow and Josephine Sandy related, people connected with
Amik began to view the rice in a business sense, as something to be concerned about year round,
something to prepare for earlier than just in time for the season. With the possible exception
of Paul Pitchinese of Wabigoon, there were no Treaty #3 Anishinaabe business endeavours
started in ricing at this time. People's energies were focussed on woods operations, trapping and
commercial fishing.
As discussed in Chapter six, Treaty #3 leaders found that northern interests and
aspirations were not getting the attention needed within a southern based Union of Ontario
organization. Southern reserve Chiefs had better communications, easier access and more
experience than Treaty #3 Chiefs in meeting with politicians and bureaucrats. Treaty #3
reserves were without phones, without hydro, and many without road access. They were
definitely not in communicalion with, nor being served by, the provincial organization.
ln the fall of '1971 , the Grand Council became incorporated as an organization of
Chiefs of the bands within that 55,000 square mile territory. This was done under Ontario law,
considered at the time to be the fastest and cheapest way to proceed. Their charter retained the
196
original purpose to preserve and strenglhen Treaty and Aboriginal rights and promote the social
and economic developmenl of Treaty #3 reserves (Chapter 7). With this legal move, the Grand
Council became a body that could receive and dispense funds, and was now in a position to seek
and control some of the development dollars that were due to this region.
Grand Council Treaty #3 immediately set about to make their organization an effective
presence to represent their people in Northwestern Ontario, Queen's Park and Ottawa. Peter
Kelly began negoliating for and obtaining program funding - core funding from Secretary of
State, Treaty and Aboriginal Rights research funding from the Department of lndian Affairs,
Communications funding from the Secretary of State, project funding in education, health, youth
work, and the plum - a contract with DIAND for community development services in their 23
communities. Only the Manitoba lndian Brotherhood and the Federation of Saskatchewan lndians
had succeeded in securing such a resourceful program .
During this time, the leadership in Treaty #3 was growing restless for improved
Presidential leadership, and the stage was set for lhe next election. ln early 1972, Peler Kelly
was elected President. That night of his election, Peter Kelly sat in his office with staff whom he
had hired and who had worked with him for several months while he was coordinator. They
Iooked forward to his term as President. Community Development Coordinator John Dennehy,
Communications worker Eloise Soderfelt, and Executive Assistant Kathi Avery, listened while
Peter outlined his priorities for the future. His priorities became a vision:
"What if we (the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg ) controlled all aspects of
ricing - from the field to processing to marketing .. right to the table?
Wouldn't we be able to raise the price to the pickers .. and get those
fucking leeches off our backs ?" (He was referring to the lakeside buyers,
processors, and companies who set prices).
Peter began to diagram on a flip chart how it could work. The idea could not fail as it was
based on the fundamental recognition and protection of the people's Treaty and Aboriginal right
lo Anishinaabe Manomin (Ojibway wild rice) through an economic agency controlled by the
people. Dennehy, who had been brought into Treaty #3 as a hands-on economic development type
of person, recognized the beautiful simplicity and morality of this vision. From the very
beginning, rights and business were to be interrelated in a mutually supportive network to
ensure economic development for Treaty #3 people and communities. Dennehy had a Winnipeg
797
friend, Ron Kabaluk, assist with drafting options for development and various business
structures for Treaty #3 to consider. A short paper of three options was presented to the
Chiefs:
Number one : Do nothing - and continue the low prices to pickers and the
lack of protection of our rights to rice.
Number 2: a moderate proposal that wouldn't have changed much.
Number3 : create a co-op owned and operated by all the pickers in Treaty
#3 that would pool their rice harvest and sell it to a buyer
(contracted before the harvest season) for the highest price.
Dennehy remembered this Chiefs' meeting as a turning point in the organization of Grand
Council Treaty #3.
"You could tell everyone thought lhis was a great idea. They felt it was
their idea - and they were ready for it. For the first time since I worked
there - not one Chief showed up drunk for the meeting. They talked in
Ojibway, they asked me questions, they talked, they asked, .. and they
decided to go for it. Peter and I were on the next plane to Toronto, ready to
go for this year's harvest." (Dennehy, 1990)
The Regional office of the Department of lndian Affairs in Toronto was not ready for a
proposal of such impact. As Dennehy remembered,
"We had them. We had the proposal, the costing, the structure. Hell, they
didn't think of it and couldn't do it anyway. We got the $500,000 we
needed to get started." (Dennehy, 1990)
First Grand Council Treaty #3 had to jump through the regular Departmental hurdles,
which required a detailed business plan.
"At Treaty #3, we knew we had the whole approach figured out - control
all aspects from the harvesting through collection, processing, slorage,
packaging, marketing. Allwe needed to do was make the connections. We
had to define the cartel. I sat down with paper in hand and worked out to
the penny where all the rice was going with all the companies in
competition. Arrowhead, United, Davies, Black Gold, Uncle Ben's ..and
Shoal Lake Wild Rice in Kenora. Ratuski (Shoal Lake) was part of it,
although more independent, Gibbs(a processor in Minnesota) was willing
to deal with us. Once we figured it out, we knew what we had to do"(Dennehy,1990).
Dennehy worked with business consultant Dave Young of Winnipeg to prepare the plan.
"l talked to him for hours, oullining all our plans, all the details - he
wrote it all down in such an impressive way that lndian Affairs had to
fund us. Just adding his name, business name, and letterhead to our
proposal paved the way with government. Geez, I worked days and days to
get all the information - he writes it down and makes thousands of bucks
in a few hoursl" (Dennehy,1990)
198
The "Analysis of the Opportunities for Greater Wild Rice lncome in the Treaty #3
Area" was prepared by Dave Young's Resource Management Consultants (R.M.C.) for Grand
Council Treaty #3 in April 1972. the report detailed the background to wild rice, including
Treaty #3 rights, production methods, processing , marketing as well as possible courses of
action for the Chiefs to follow "to increase their harvest and take over the buying process"
(Letter of transmittal G.D. Kelly, R.M.C. Associates to Peter Kelly, Grand Council Treaty #3
President, April 1972).
The Report "essenlially examined what the lndians can do on their own with minimum
involvement of outside groups" (R.M.C., 1972:18). R.M.C. Associates identified several
problems "facing the lndian people in improving the income flow from the wild rice crops in the
Treaty #3 area:
1. Trying to control the lake levels to ensure that the crops have an
oplimum opportunity to grow.
2. Organizing the picking procedures to ensure that all areas are picked
and that maximum yields are obtained.
3. Controlling the competition among the harvesters and buyers to
prevent the poaching and trespassing that occurs.
4. Providing a uniform pricing system so that all pickers are paid a
uniform price for their grain.
ln short, the main problem is that there needs to be greater control over
the picking of wild rice." (RMC, 1972:11).
The Report noted that "many lndians" were asking for more legislation, yet "economic control"
could help them improve the situation "on their own". This statement about "many lndians
asking for more legislation" seems to be an importation of the attitude and approach of
Anishinaabeg in Manitoba rather than Treaty #3. R.M.C. Associales worked with both groups at
the same time. The idea of more provincial legislation in Ontario was not raised at the Treaty #3
Chiefs meeting.
The R.M.C. report is addressed to and undertaken for the Grand Council Treaty #3.
Toward the objective of obtaining federal funding, it is obviously written for consumption by
the Department of lndian Affairs. The Report seems to lend credibility to its proposals by stating
them as if they were the consultant's own - even though the concepts and approaches they came
199
from Treaty #3 leadership: Chiefs, community development staff, and the Grand Council's own
Management Committee on Wild Rice 1 .
The Chiefs saw the R.M.C. paper as a necessary means to the end of federal funding of
their proposed enterprise. They did not haggle over the details of the paper but approved it in
principle in order to expedite the process of doing what they proposed.
The R.M.C. report mentions two optional structures for control: the co-op structure or a
the corporation structure. The Report argued for the corporate structure to return funds to the
band entity, while raising prices minimally to the pickers. The Chiefs themselves chose the
co-op structure so that the business entity would be owned by the pickers and be more closely
allied to and responsible to the people as a whole.
ln retrospect, this choice can be said to be in keeping with the re-assertion of aboriginal
forms of governmenl, enabling each person to have a voice ralher than oligarchical rule. lt was
not a case of adopting the co-op structure for ils sharing of the profits. Most anthropologists and
community development specialists at lhe time tried to fit co-ops into traditional aboriginal
mores of sharing the hunt. Rather, the Chiefs showed preference to the idea of the co-op
slructure allowing each person an equal say, which is the essence of Anishinaabe decision-
making and government.
Treaty #3 President Peter Kelly and Community Development Manager John Dennehy
devoted most of their time and resources to ensuring the Co-op got organized and funded for the
1972 harvest, a year expected to be a good to bumper crop throughout the area. They met with
Chiefs and rice pickers thoughout Treaty #3. They travelled and met wilh Anishinaabe people in
Manitoba and Minnesota to consider their experience and place in the industry. They met with
companies such as Ben Ratuski's Shoal Lake Wild Rice company in Keewatin, next to Kenora;
Wayne Stack and Northland Wild Rice company in Winnipeg; and General Mills at Minneapolis,
Minnesota. They did their homework and had to consider all the players in the industry: where
did Gibbs Brothers fit in? What about Ratuski? Holden from Manitoba? "After hours and hours
and many contacls, I knew we had it figured out," recalled the Community Development manager
(Dennehy,1990).
200
At that time, Uncle Ben's of Texas bought most of the rice, which was available in the US
and Canada and not destined for the gourmet market. Gibbs at Grand Rapids, Minnesota was their
main processor. Uncle Ben's had a full time agronomist in Minnesota, Wayne Lemke, working
with the wild rice paddy farmers and the outreach researchers from the University of
Minnesota. Ratuski sought to supply his own contacts in the gourmet and retail market in
Canada and the US. Continental/United Wild Rice of Minnesota acted for several farmers as a
co-op selling to any market, but ensuring that Uncle Ben's paid a fair price through competition
(Personal observation, 1972-73; Dennehy'1 990).
General Mills was interested in getting a toehold in the business. They also had a very
immediate interest in getting an American wide boycott lifted against their products. The
company was being boycotted for their poor relations and hiring practices with ethnic
minorities, especially Blacks (P. Kelly 1972).
Through a contact with Gerry Sheehy of Nett Lake Reservation in Minnesota, a Treaty
#3 delegation of Peter Kelly, Phil Gardner, Ray Bruyere and John Dennehy travelled to the
"Valley of the Jolly Green Giant" in Minneapolis to talk aboul wild rice. They made their
presentation, indicating their interest in a long term relationship to move all the rice their
twenty-three reserve communities could provide.
Dennehy relaled:
"l'll never forget that day. General Mills wanted more production. They
asked, "How much would we have?" I was bluffing when I told (Mr.)
Donovan about 225,000 lbs. finished. He says,'Well, that'll keep us going
for an hour and a half - what are we going to do the rest of the year?' I
knew then we had made it !!" (Dennehy, 1990)
Both Peter Kelly and John Dennehy spoke with Manitoba leaders, Dave Couchene, high
profile President of the Manitoba lndian Brotherhood, and his brother, Gene Courchene, head of
lhe Manominike Co-op, to inÌerest them in a joint venture with General Mills and raise the
production. There was no interest ("no takers") at the time, partly due, in Dennehy's
estimation, to the fact that both organizations used the same consulling team, R.M.C. Associates.
Dennehy believes it was in Dave Young and his partner, Hildebrand's, best interests to keep the
two groups apart, and thewrefore, dependent upon their advice.
207
"After a meeting with some of the Manitoba Co-op, (Treaty #3
community development worker and soon to be Co-op manager) Steve
Jourdain told me to forget them as they were 'apples, red on the outside
and white on the inside'. Sure seemed like it when I found out later, the
(Manitoba) Co-op fixed the opening days on the Whiteshell lakes when the
hand pickers could start. Then they went in five days earlier and cleaned
out the crop with 1B mechanical harvesters. Their Co-op shafled their
own people." (Dennehy,1990)
The Treaty #3 Co-op structure was approved by the Chiefs. The Chiefs then approved
of a name devised by Basil Greene of Shoal Lake - ANISHINAHBE MAN-O-MIN CO-OP . The name
translated as 'Ojibway wild rice Co-op'. And, it stood for more: Man for Manitoba/ Q for
Ontario/ and Min for Minnesota - the three geographic areas where Ojibways had abundant wild
rice and where future business ventures with rice were foreseen to be potentially great. Letters
patent were granted Augusl 9,1972 - just in time for the harvest in mid August (Anishinahbeg
Man-O-Min Co-Operative Position Paper, 1976: 4).
DIAND provided an original outlay of $500,000 for purchasing the rice. Treaty #3
allocated its CD manager and workers to spend fulltime on the organization of the first season
from July on. Steve Jourdain of Lac La Croix became the manager; Basil Greene of Shoal Lake
#39, the assistant manager; and fieldworkers, Percy Tuesday of Big Grassy, Jack Angeconeb of
Lac Seul, George Pelly of Grassy Narrows, Steve Skead of Rat Portage, Harvey Churchill of Lac
des Mille Lacs, Chuck M,acPhearson of Couchiching were the legs of the organization. A system of
buyers working for 2-3 cents per pound commission was established and the season began .
Joe Shebagegit of the Ojibways of Onigaming First Nation(formerly Sabaskong Band),
an original Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op Board member, recalled the excitement of the day:
"For the first time, lndians had something to say about the price of
rice...We started at 55 cents per pound and raised it to 90 cents three
weeks later when the best grade of rice was being picked. Other buyers
would usually start at 30 cents and not go beyond 45 cents per pound for
the whole season (Avery & Hawlick, 1979:43)."
This first year, the Co-op had no canoes to lend the pickers and had to depend upon the
good relationships the local Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op buyer may have had in the
community. The Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op buyer was usually a member of that community
and could offer a good price at lakeside, with the promise of a dividend later in the year after all
the rice was sold (Figure 30,31).
0.Sabaskong First Nation buyer (formerly Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op buyer) Edward
Kelly receives help from wife Dorothy Kelly in doing the books, 1979 202
31' Garnet and Frances counciilor at Naicarchewenin, lgTg,store k
Garnet councillor & daughter storing purchased green rice at Northwest Bay, Rainy Lake
nce
204
"Easily more than half a million pounds" were bought and transported down to Gerry
Sheehy's rice processing plant at Nett Lake reservalion in Minnesota (Ray Bruyere 1990).
Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg Fred Kelly Jr. of Sabaskong and others were hired as processors. They
had to turn the rice in the outside yards during curing, operate the parchers and thrashing
machines, and learn on the job how to maintain quality control.
"The (US paddy rice) cartel was doing everything possible to harass us
and hold up production, force us out of business. They were so afraid the
Co-op might take off and destroy them. They spread rumours there was
glass in our rice. They sent the (US)Food and Drug inspectors over - and
even phoney ones. The (Man-O-Min Co-op) guys phoned me from Nett
Lake to say another inspector arrived in an unmarked car. I asked them 10
check his credentials. He told them he forgot his l.D. and they threw him
oul." J. Dennehy 1990
The Chiefs had had a big debate over whether to go with Gerry Sheehy of Nett Lake
reservation in Minnesota for processing, but they needed a US link for the General Mills liaison
and decided to proceed. The misgivings of some Chiefs who may have known the violence in that
community and in the industry soon proved real. John Dennehy remembered
"calling Chuck MacPhearson at Couchiching (located right on the Fort
Frances, Ontario-lnternational Falls, Minnesola border, about t hour
from Nett Lake) at 4 am one night. I was yelling at him to get dogs,
shotguns, guys, trucks, whatever was needed and get the hell over to Nett
Lake to protect our rice. We had it all laid out to cure, then turn it during
lhe day and process it gradually. The threal came that 'they' were gonna
burn our rice that very night. 'They' did burn down the warehouse right
across the street from ours. But Chuck took off right away with a bunch of
guys and stayed there. lt worked. We saved our rice." J. Dennehy 1990
The rice was then shipped to General Mills in Minneapolis for loading into small retail
packages, wilh lhe familiar Betty Crocker wooden spoon logo emblazoned on the front and
specially formulated recipes inside. General Mills had test marketed packaging and brand names
and came up with "Quiet Water" brand name for the Treaty #3 wild rice. General Mills also
commissioned an Anishinaabe artist from lhe US to design an exquisite mural of the stages of
harvesting and tradilionally processing rice . This was reprinted with a history and recipes for
enclosure in the Quiet Water box (Appendix 9). lt seemed like a fail-proof operation - devised,
negotiated and undertaken by Treaty #3 Anishinabeg .
The second year funding from the Department of lndian Affairs economic development
program came in the form of a repayable loan with interest (8. Yerxa,'1990). The President of
205
Grand Council Treaty #3, Peter Kelly, and the President of Man-O-Min Co-op, Bert Yerxa, led
a delegation to Ottawa to make a formal presentalion of $50,000 to begin to repay the
Departmental loan. Dennehy and Elder Bert Yerxa remembered the Minister kept them waiting
an hour while his underlings tried to figure out what this delegation wanted. When the assistants
were assured there would be be no kidnapping or other disruption, the Minister arrived. Hon.
Judd Buchanan is shown in this photo as pleasantly surprised to receive the cheque (Figure 32).
"They were all in shock", recalled Dennehy. "You see lhe upside down box", laughed then
President Bert Yerxa. "We didn't have much time to set up the picture before the Minister had to
leave. They didn't know what to make of us. We fooled them." (8. Yerxa1990).
The second year, too, the Co-op knew that they would have to supply canoes to the
pickers or they would lose sales to other buyers who were providing canoes. The Co-op rented a
warehouse in Keewatin and Co-op fieldworkers and buyers began making fibreglass canoes
-twenty-four hours a day to get ready in time for the season. Some reserves sent their own
workers but several found the fumes too naseating and the heat too oppressive.
"Lots of people from the reserves made their own (fibreglass canoes) for
the first time so they weren't all the best. But I remember one episode.
Steve Jourdain picked up the phone and got a blast through the receiver.
He held it out and said, 'OK, we'll see what we can do about your money.'
Seems this guy from Whitefish Bay and his wife were picking all day and
heading for shore when their Co-op canoe split right in half. Their rice
sunk! We must have laughed for an hour! But I'm amazed lo see some of
those original old red and purple canoes still being used today. "
J.Dennehy 1990
Underinvestment was a major obstacle for the Co-op. ln 1974, Treaty #3 Chiefs
and representatives of the Co-op met with an Ontario Cabinet committee in Thunder Bay to
request assistance for the Co-op and their plans for developing manomin as an economic base for
their reserve communities. Participants al this meeting recalled that the Ontario Cabinet was
concerned that the Co-op had gone to an American company for assistance instead of a Canadian
one (P. Kelly, 1974; Avery & Hawlick, 1979: 43). The Co-op explained their wish to work
with a Canadian firm but no one being available to help. The leaders found lndustry Minister
Alan Grossman to be "interested" but Natural Resources Minister Leo Bernier (whose portfolio
included wild rice) to be skeptical (Avery & Pawlick, 1979:43-44).
206
32. Anishinahbe Ma.n-o-Min co-op repays rndian Affairs in ottawa, r 974L-R Fred Kelly, Hon' Judd Buchanan, Minister of lndian Affairs, GCT3 president peterKelly, Kenora-Rainy River M.P. John Reid, Steve Skead, president of Co-op, ArnoldBruyere, Co-op Manager, Bert yerxa, Co_op Board member
207
"The lndian leaders did not know that, at the same time they were
vainly urging the Cabinet to assist the development of a native industry
the Ontario Department of Agriculture and Food was providing substantial
aid to Bernier's friend, Benjamin Ratuski, in developing Shoal Lake Wild
Rice Ltd. That aid included help in developing processing methods and in
marketing. The Ontarío Development Corporation, in 1973, had also given
Ratuski a $32,000 interest-free loan. No such help was forthcoming for
the lndians." (Avery & Pawlik, 1979:44)
"Participants at this meeting (in Thunder Bay) didn't volunteer that
information, and it was never announced publically.. ll was the
provincial Department of Agriculture & Food whose Ontario Food Council
helped develop the instant wild rice process that Raluski's firm uses to
market its "Oh Canada" brand of wild rice. Ratuski's firm is the only one
currently using the process. The same Food Council also helped him find
market contracts and tested recipes for cooking wild rice that Ratuski
uses in the brochure in his "Oh Canada" retail package.
.. As for the Man-O-Min Federal loan, it was not interest-free, as
was the provincial loan to Shoal Lake. The terms of repayment were
originally eight per cent and were later raised to 11 per cent. lndian
charges of favouratism (toward his campaign manager, Ben Ratuski), said
Bernier in a telephone interview, show that lndians are only 'trying to
lay blame on the government's doorslep for their own lack of
aggressiveness'. (Pawlik 1979: 50,48)
Although there were problems, the accomplishments of the Anishinahbeg Man O Min Co-
op were several. A 1976 joint report by Anishinahbeg Man-O-Min Co-operative and the Grand
Council Treaty #3 stated that the Co-op "was established and has achieved the following ends:
a. To obtain for the picker a fair price for his work, in relation to the
final market price of finished long grain wild rice. This did not exist
prior to the establishment of the co-operative.
b. To protect the lndians' traditional and historic right to harvest wild
rice crops as a good food source and for sale. With the decline in trapping
and the pollution of fish in the Treaty #3 area, wild rice is the only
remaining significant income source for the lndians of Treaty #3.
c. To establish an lndian owned and operated business which would provide
administrative, organizational, financial and marketing experience to the
lndians.
d. Generally to prevent the exploitive practices of white Canadians and
American buyers at the landing such as:
1. purchase rice with whiskey.
2. advancing credit (i.e. food) during winter to gain debt of lndian
picker and exploit him at harvest time.
3. agreement between buyers dividing up areas, eliminating
competition and paying lowest price per pound at landing, to
lndian pickers.
208
e. Prior to 1972 the average price of green rice at the landing was less
than 20 cents per pound - totally unfair price. ("Even with higher retail
sales in pre-co-operative days, this benefit never accrued or filtered
down to the picker at the landing" Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Cooperatíve
Pos itio n Pape r,1 976 :1 0)
f. lnvolve lndians in the buying of wild rice at the landing thus creating
further employment, with resultant income and business training and
experience.
g. To provide an opportunity for older lndians and their families to
receive a good financial return for their efforts in picking wild rice
sufficient to maintain themselves and their families in the traditional
family life style." (Anishinahbag Man-O-Min
Co-operative Position Paper, 1976:3-4).
The Co-op gained in field organizalion, buying and marketing expertise through the next
several years. However, by 1976, the Department of lndian Affairs was seeking immediate
repayment of loans made to the Co-op.
"Before 1973 when Arnold Bruyere started as manager and lbecame
accountant, there had been no regular payments back to DIAND. They had
been made only on a seasonal basis. We started paying off on a regular
basis, $1200 per month." (Crow, 1990)
The Co-op had already repaid $450,000 over the past four years. "Peter Kelly, then President
of Treaty #3, handed me the cheque for $400,000 (from bulk sales) himself", an Economic
Development head of lndian Affairs stated (Greg Hancock1990). The Co-op had $120,000
guaranteed in the fifth year from contracted sales to United Wild Rice, and had both the
infrastructure and staffing ready to reach its potential (Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op
Position Paper 1976:9; Crow 1990). "lndian Affairs wanted the money right away to pay off
the arrears," stated George Crow.
A joint committee of the Co-op Presidenl Steve Skead, Manager Arnold Bruyere, lawyer
Michael Dennehy, and Trealy #3 Grand Chief Fred Kelly Sr. got logether with two local lndian
Affairs employees to produce a position paper (Bibeau 1990). This document advanced by the
Co-op to lndian Affairs argued that this was no time to pull the plug. With interest forgiven,
they pointed out, as it often is with both Canadian and foreign enterprises, the Co-op would be in
a better position to continue and to repay the outstanding amount of $320,000 ( Position
Paper,1976:8). lndian Affairs at headquarters in Ottawa had decided on a new direction for
economic development and froze the Co-op's $200,000 in the Canadian bank accounts.
209
As George Crow relates,
"We had sufficient income to make regular payments and we were. The
problem was that the interest rates would fluctuate and the capital loan
would still be there. lt was a good thing that we had accumulated some
(Co-op) funds (from US sales) in Minneapolis banks. This kept us going
for a while. That allowed us to keep shipping out our orders we had made
in the U.S.,We filed reports from the States."
We had two warehouses in Minneapolis and one in Winnipeg.
We had stored up rice in the good years so that we could meet our orders
in the years when the crop was bad. We had sufficient rice processed to
feed our markets and increase volume sales. Even a minimum yield of
200,000 lbs. finished (ie, processed) rice from our lakes would have
been enough to keep up sales. Some years we got 800,000 lbs finished;
an average year was 500,000 lbs. "(Crow 1990).
After the Department of lndian Affairs move 1o reclaim funds, though, the Man-O-Min
Co-op President Steve Skead and legal counsel Mike Dennehy of Winnipeg must have
"realized that in order to get anything from DlA, they had to offer
something: partial control (of the Co-op) was il. I had worked out with
the Co-op and Treaty #3 a joint position paper that was almost co-
management. I recall a meeting in Kenora with our joint group of local
DlA, Treaty #3 President Fred Kelly, Man-O-Min Co-op President Steve
Skead and manager Arnold Bruyere, and lawyer Mike Dennehy with lndian
Affairs Regional Director General Howard Rodine, Ontario Economic
Development Director, Bill Van lterson, and a guy named Meredith from
Ottawa. Rodine said something along the lines of 'We should work together
- we've all made mistakes', but Meredith kept saying, "No more money. I
wanl my money back." lf the Co-op kept going after that, it must have
been through Region's money, not Ottawa's. I dunno - I was lransferred(Bibeau 1990)".
The immediate effect of the Department of lndian Affairs pulling their funding was
devastating. George Crow remembered:
"ln 1976, the government flooded the market. They gave our rice away'to
recoup lheir losses' , they said. That's when the price to the picker went
down 15 cents per lb. (Crow 1990)".
Even though the Co-op fell short of lndian Affairs' idea of financial success, there is no
doubt that Treaty #3 Anishinaabe alliludes and experiences were changed by the Co-op. The
Co-op improved both the financial status and self image of Anishinaabe pickers and buyers by
taking control of the harvest from lakeside to market. From the beginning, there were such
high expectalions from Anishinaabeg that could not then have been met.
270
"The original idea was to have a processing plant in each area (of Treaty
#3) - Kenora, Forl Frances, Dryden. That's the way Paul Pitchinese (of
Wabigoon, first President of the Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op) wanted
it." (Dennehy,1990)2
The Co-op didn't reach that goal.
"Every Anishinaabe connected with the Co-op believes that Man-O-Min could have
worked" (Crow 1990). Why didn't it?
By various accounts, alcohol was a factor in losing some money, equipment and rice
(Dennehy, Yerxa, Bruyere, Windigo 1990). At crucial times, particularly in 1972,1973 and
1977, either Board members or staff would be missing from meetings or work. But, to focus on
alcohol related problems would be to overlook the outstanding work by managers, Board
members, buyers, and processors from reserves across Treaty #3 who did their jobs well and
sober. ln the 1970s, alcohol abuse was a prevalent problem in Treaty #3 communities and had
to be confronted. This Co-op business was an Anishinaabe -originated venture that was operated
under Anishinaabe control. The Man-O-Min Co-op and its successes were seen by the
Anishinaabeg as a sign of hope and proof that lhey could succeed in their own traditional
livelihood and yet compete in the whiteman's business world.
" From a socio-economic development point of view, you gotta see the
Man-O-Min Co-op as an incredible development. I mean where else in
Canada was there a violent deaths report ?(Note: "While People Sleep",
Concerned Citizens'Committee of Kenora, published by Grand Council
Treaty #3, 1973. This report documented a violent death rate higher
than Detroit city, among Anishinaabeg around Kenora.). Where else were
there problems of mercury pollution, fishery closings, arrests, wild rice
conflict, Bended Elbow ?(a racist booklet by Eleanor Jacobson, a Kenora
nursing assistant, written in the aftermath of lhe 1974 occupation of
local Kenora park by the Ojibway Warrior Society). I mean - geezh! ln
1971, .. there were only 6 phones in all of the 23 reserves." (Dennehy,
1ee0).
Most Anlshinaabeg believe that the Department of lndian Affairs never wanted an
aboriginal business venture to succeed. Particularly at the local Kenora office level, John
Dennehy strongly believes that lndian Affairs was the intentional author of the Co-op's demise.
"They wanted to prove that lndians couldn't manage their own affairs or
they'd be out of a job. That first year (1972), lndian Affairs local
personnel caused a lot of interference. That stupid, ignorant Dick .. P. We
almost sued him. He cost us about $20,000 in just one phone call. We
were in Grand Rapids, Minnesota dealing with a buyer. We had him at
27r
$2.65 per lb. for an order of 200,000 lbs. finished rice. We broke for a
while. The buyer came back and told us,' l'll give you $2.35 a lb. and
nothing more. I just talked to (Dick) P. at lndian Affairs and he says they
own the rice.' We blew a fuse - you figure it out - 30 cents a lb.
difference on 200,000 lbs." (Dennehy 1990)
George Crow is just as blunt:
"lndian Affairs wanted the Co-op to fail. Of course. That's always been the
situation. I think the word came from the top - the highest bureaucrats.
That's where all the decisions are made, regardless of who's the political
head" (Crow 1990).
At the time DIAND froze the Canadian accounts in 1976, Crow related that
"we were operating out of Minneapolis, doing slrictly American sales,
with retail packages under our "Quiet Wate/' label and bulk sales under
our own name. The Co-op assumed all costs while General Mills provided
the channels and sales experts. We chased the sales and followed up our
own orders. We were beginning to open Canadian markets like B.C. , like
Safeway in Vancouver. California was our biggest market - and growing.
We were getting into international markets - Kuwait, Hong Kong and
Japan. There was no export development assistance then as there is now.
External Affairs threw all kinds of paperwork at us. They wouldn't allow a
Kuwaiti envoy to take a 100 lb. bag of sample rice back home with him
and wouldn't let it go by mail. We were still wading through the
paperwork when DIA froze the accounts. Man-O-Min would have been the
very first wild rice company in Asian markets." (Crow 1990)
ln an industry where ruthless competition is part of the expected 'fun' of the business game, the
Man-O-Min Board of Directors were often
"not prepared to deal with business pressures. They weren't strong
enough. They didn't realize once you made an agreement, you still had 1o
plan for the future. (ln that first year) they'd worry more about their
per diem (honoraria for meetings) than about the future" (Dennehy
1ee0).
Even an Anishinaabe businessman, Willie Wilson, who remained an independent buyer
for other rice interesls when Man-O-Min Co-op started, believed
"the Co-op was a fantastic idea (but) no one looked at it like a business.
There were too many actors. They should have paid less and looked for
dividends. They wanted to control everything - and at the wrong time.
1972 was a bumper crop." (Wilson 1990)
And, at lakeside, olher buyers would jack up the price to try to put the Anishinahbe
Man-O-Min Co-op buyer out of business. People on the reserves wanted to make the best money
they could in the shorlest time. The rice harvest had always been an important source of income
for families at the end of the summer when children were returning to school. The rice they sold
meant new clothes for the kids, bills paid at the grocery store. ln 1973, three brand new cars
272
were purchased at Sabaskong reserve by the rice pickers who brought in the bumper crop.
Josephine Sandy recounted how she and husband, Ron, a rice buyer put six thousand dollars cash
down on a trailer they were buying in Winnipeg after the 1972 harvest (Josephine Sandy
1992). While the Co-op managed to raise the price at lakeside, some pickers sold to other
buyers if the price were higher. Some opted for the higher price immediately rather than wait
for the Co-op dividend later. The Co-op could counl on some loyalty but could not corner the
rice entirely.
For people who had never operated a business at all, let alone on such a large scale,
lhe Co-op was quite a feat, reaching into all of the then 23 reserve communities of Grand
Council Treaty #3, and many more ricing areas spread over the 55,000 square mile territory
of Treaty #3. lt was to be expected that there would be some disorganization. As Willie Wilson
reported, other buyers could take advantage - and did.
"The Co-op really scared the price up. lt was better for me as a buyer to
stay independent and sell at a commission. The Co-op was unorganized and
I could come up from behind and determine what to pay. I remember one
time (in 1972, the first year), the Co-op was supposed to pick up the
rice at Wabigoon for three days and hadn't been able to get there. The Co-
op had promised $1.50 per lb. but lcame and offered $1.10. lgot the
rice. By the time the Co-op got there, I had 18,000 lbs from Wabigoon
and 2500 from Eagle (Lake reserve 30 miles away from Wabigoon)
loaded on my four ton truck. I remember because I got a ticket for
overload on my way to Grand Rapids (Minnesota)!" (Wilson 1990).
ln business, profit, some call il greed, is a major motivating factor. One commissioned
Co-op buyer was reported to have converted funds that were designated for buying rice for the
Co-op into buying rice machines that picked the crop. He then resold that harvest to the Co-op
(Dennehy 1990). lt is believed by some that others simply spent the money instead of buying
rice (8. Yerxa, R. Bruyere, J. Windigo 1990). No one has estimated the loss of funds in this
way. However, a very substantial amount of wild rice made it from lakeside to processing and
market, under the managemenl of the Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op during its years of
operation (Crow, Dennehy, Bruyere, Yerxa, Windigo1990).
According to some lndian Affairs officials, in the first two seasons (1972, 1973), the
Co-op had advanced money to pickers "without any attention paid to people's capability to pay -
even in some cases with no clear understanding that they were to repay" (Bibeau 1990)
However, that practice merely copied what was the usual practice of the rice industry . Buyers
2r3
made an investment of advancing food, canoes, cash in order to gain the loyalty (or indebtedness)
of the picker, come harvest season. lndian Affairs ignored that fact of life of the ricing business
and believed that "too much money per pound over the market rate" was being paid out (Bibeau
1ee0).
ln analyzing the folding of the Co-op, lndian Affairs came to see their role after 1973 as
a "salvage operation" (Bibeau 1990). On the other hand,lhe Anishinaabeg believed they were
on the brink of major expansion into Canada and international markets as well as maintaining
their U.S. sales.
Some lndian Affairs personnel questionned the whole thrust of the Anishinahbe Man-O-
Min Co-op. By putting the rice into Betty Crocker labels, they were putting a gourmet product,
"the caviar of grains" into a low grade, retail market (Hancock 1990). Yet, in hindsight, wild
rice has become more and more accepted by general consumers and rice production is increasing
with the demand. lndeed, in the 1990's, some see production to be superseding demand (Wilson,
Pitchinese, T. Bruyere1990).
A fatal flaw, in Hancock's estimation, was that the Co-op stockpiled rice and tried to
corner the market but the fledgling company was not powerful enough. He explained that it was
the classic example of a company getting too big, too fast: the Department of lndian Affairs drove
lhe Anishinaabeg to such an expansive program (Hancock 1990).
Yet, in the estimation of staff and Board members, the Co-op was stockpiling to meet
continuing and increasing orders (Crow 1990). Assistance was needed in cutting the red tape of
exports and border crossings, not in adding bureaucratic hoops to jump through.
ln the end, the Department of lndian Affairs had no confidence in the management and
direction of the Co-op. Their view was particularly so in an industry they felt they knew better
than the Anishinaabeg who had been working in the field for several years, and whose ancestors
were the first traders in the business. The Department could point to enough evidence of
problems to bolster their arguments for takeover of the Co-op. For the Anishinaabeg , lhe
scenario was all too familiar.
Once lndian Affairs began taking over the management of the Co-op, and offering their
marketing plans, the concept was not the same. "Man-O-Min only carried on only in harvest
274
season (ie, just August, September) after that." (Crow 1990) The Department was once again
in the driver's seat and lhe Anishinaabeg felt it. lndian Affairs took over the last warehouse of
rice in Winnipeg, flooded the market, and consequently, dropped the price to the pickers. The
Anishinaabeg lost their economic vehicle for the protection of their rights to rice (Hancock,
Yerxa, Crow,1990; Avery & Hawlick, 1979).
Endnotes:
(1) The 1972 RMC Report mentions major problems in passing - such as the distrust of
Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg of the Ontario Department of Natural Resources and their statistics on
"potential crop" and "harvest yield" (RMC, 1972: 5). Yet this distrust grew into a monumental
problem of public relations in the mid 1970s and continues into the 1990s, mitigating against
the implementation of co-management arrangements that would benefit all, including the wild
crops and wildlife.
2. Paul Pitchinese'family did achieve his dream in his own region. ln 1985, Kagiwiosa
Manomin lnc. was established and continues lo grow into 1994. See Chapter 9.
2r5
Chapter Eleven
Flooding the Rice Basket:
Manomin on Lake of the Woods
"There is a teaching in our traditions that relates how Nanaboozhoo vowed
to avenge the death of brother Wolf. Nanaboozhoo found out that Wolf had
been drowned by the underwater serpents and mizhipizhiw, the
undenruater panther. He set upon a plan and met an old toad woman who
was hurrying through the forest toward the waters. She was a vain old
woman and began bragging about how powerful she was. She related how
she knew so much medicine that she was the one who was called to cure the
underwater panther of some sickness. Nanaboozhoo killed the old toad
woman and disguised himself in her clothes and shape and made his way to
the underwater lair of Mizhipizhiw . He told the serpents to fetch
something and then he killed lhe Mizhipizhiw and made his escape. The
serpents returned to find their beloved Mizhipizhiw dead and all
pandamonium broke lose. The water churned and churned into whirlpools.
The only way Nanaboozhoo could escape is by remembering how he used to
play with the otters, twisting, bending up and down till he escaped. The
serpents called after him, threatening, "You will always have trouble
with water - either too high or too low!" Of course, Nanaboozhoo was the
list Anishinaabe."
Tobasonakwut Kinew 1993
To the Anishinaabeg of Treaty #3, a supreme law of respect for Kisha ManÌto ,
the Great and Loving Spirit, and for all of creation governed the people in how to care for
the land, waters and resources. And, there was only one trealy which governed relations
between Anishinaabeg and other governments in that territory. That was Treaty #3.
To the newcomers, however, law and regulations were created to assist business
and the commercial exploitation of resources whenever the need required it. ln 1925,
there was a new treaty signed, belween Canada and the United States, to govern relations
and decision-making in the boundary waters area. The Lake of the Woods Protocol
through the lnternational Joint Commission was a treaty made without notification or
involvement of the Anishìnaabeg . This was done despite the wording of Treaty #3 that
"you shall be free as by lhe past for hunting and the rice harvest" (Paypom Treaty #3,
1873). The Great Spirit's Garden and the livelihood of the Anishinaabeg were affected
deliteriously for generations afterward.
216
The creation of the Lake of the Woods Control Board in the early part of the
twentieth century, and its terms of reference which ignored wild rice and the rights of
lhe Anishinaabeg , threatened to be the main determinant in undermining the manomin
crop and Anishinaabe heritage into the twenty-first century.
"The wild rice crop has failed in the Lake of the Woods and Shoal Lake
rice grounds. ln the Lake of the Woods the failure is attributable to high
water in the early part of the summer; there was great hopes of an
abundant crop, but the water rose faster than the rice could grow, and
drowned it. We have had very little rain during the summer, the floods
were caused by the damming up of the channel of the Winnipeg River at
the foot of Lake of the Woods.."
Report of Assabaskashing Bay lndian Agent.
l BBB Sessional Papers, regarding 1887 crop
"The lake level is rising faster than the rice can grow. This is the
most critical time between the floating leaf and aerial leaf stage and
requires lower water levels being maintained or the crop will drown.. the
Lake of the Woods Control Board will be held responsible..."
Onegaming Councillor Peter Kelly/Kinew to
Lake of the Woods Control Board, June19B9
A major determinant of the success and health of a wild rice crop is the depth of
water. lt is vital that the depth of water be about 2 lo 4 feet and that level be maintained
during the crucial growing stages. This occurs between germination when the plant
begins to grow up through the water to the floating leaf stage (April-May), and then
from floating (June) to the aerial stage (July) when the stem elongates and the leafs are
higher on the stalk, in the air rather than the water. This was common knowledge among
lhe Anishinaabeg, garnered from centuries of planting and taking care ofManito Gitigaan ,
the Great Spirit's Garden (Chapter 3; Figures 3,4 ).
The Anishinaabeg believed that they had negotiated and signed a Treaty in 1873
which guaranteed lheir traditional way of life would continue (Chapter 6; Appendix 5:
Paypom Treaty). They certainly did not expect that there would be interference with
their way of life. The Anishinaabeg thought that assistance would be made available for
economic ventures including further development of agriculture they had already begun
generations before. lndeed, early explorers and nineteenth century surveyors were
surprised to see gardens Anishinaabeg had planted on islands and other locations
271
throughout the boundary lakes and riverways of the 55,000 square miles now known as
Treaty #3 (Holzkamm & Waisberg 1990).
It took only a little more than a decade to learn what industrial development from
lhe wemitgoshl perspective would do. ln 1879, a small dam called a "headrace" was
erected at the north end of Lake of the Woods, so that hydraulic power could be used by a
saw and planing mill. ln 1881, a cut was made between Portage Bay and Lake of the
Woods to provide power for the Lake of the Woods Milling Co.; it was further deepened in
1885. By 1887, the Canadian government granted $7,000 to John Mather, owner and
manager of the Keewatin Lumber Co., to construct a new dam at the western outlet of
Lake of the Woods. There was a need for this dam to "maintain walers at a constant level,
and thus permit the shallow draft steamers which have been built for navigation of the
Lake to ply their trade" and "afford uninterrupted connection between the settlemenls
around the lake and the C.P. railway", âS well as "to maintain a constant head of water for
lhe mills, both saw and grist" (Dr. A. P. Coleman, "Second Report on the Gold Fields of
Weslern Ontario", Annual Report of the Bureau of Mines, 1895:171).
The "Rollerway" dam (so named by its use of logs to be rolled away according to
the need for holdíng back water) raised the Lake of the Woods level by three feet (Final
Report of the lnternational Joint Commission on the Lake of the Woods reference,
1917:16-17). The Anishinaabe economy was affected immediately:
"The wild rice crop has failed in the Lake of the Woods and Shoal Lake rice
grounds. ln the Lake of the Woods the failure is attributable to high water
in the early part of the summer; there was great hopes of an abundant
crop, but the water rose faster than the rice could grow, and drowned it
out. We have had very little rain during the summer, the floods were
caused by the damming up of the channel of the Winnipeg River at the foot
of the Lake of lhe Woods.."
"The hay crop of last fall was a failure in most places; in the Lake of the
Woods the cause was high water covering the low hay fields and drought in
the higher lands. ln consequence of the failure of the hay crop, the lndians
had some trouble in saving their caÌÌle and some animals perished in the
spring. "
2IB
(George McPherson, Assabaskasing Agency, to Superintendent General of
lndian Affairs, September 21, 1887. Annual report of the Department of
lndian Affairs, Canada, Sessional Papers #15, A. 1BBB, p.56.)
Mather oversaw the construction of the rollerway dam, which five years later led
to the major construction of the Norman Dam, one mile below the Rollerway. (The
Norman Dam continues to operate into the twenty-first century.) A federal grant of
funds was made in response to a petition from the people of Rat Portage (note: the town,
not the First Nation reserve), Keewatin and Lake of the Woods" for a dam to improve
navigation and provide water power to mills" in the area.
During 1893-1898, the Lake level was lowered 1.5 feet, from the higher level
since l BBB rollerway was built, but this continued to be 1 .5 feet higher than normal
levels. During 1899-1913, the Lake fluctuated between.g to 6.3 feet above natural
conditions (Canadian Lake of the Woods Control Board, Department of the Environment,
Ottawa, "Mean Monthly Levels" Graph.).
The federal government listened well to the petitions of the new settlers, but
merely filed away the reports of its own government officials and the protests of the
Anishinaabeg .ln 1890, Chief Thomas Lindsay of Rat Portage made a speech to the lndian
agent at Kenora:
"We reserved this land (known as Sultana lsland) long before the Treaty
and we had gardens on it long long (sic) before the Treaty of 1873. And it
is only an lsland when the water is high in the Lake. Since the Dam was
built across the Mouth of the River it is higher and has killed all our Wild
Rice and nearly all our Hay fields are now covered with water - our Rice
is a great loss to us." (Chief Thomas Lindsay, Rat Portage, recorded by
Agent Robert Pither, to Superintendent General of lndian Affairs, July
25, 1893. Canada, Sessional Papers (#14) A. '1894:46)
ln 1892, Treaty #3 Grand Chief Powassin sent a petition, to Ottawa, with the
signatures by ten other Chiefs and headmen of the Lake of the Woods, protesting the
flooding and requesting the Treaty be honoured.
"Ever since the dam has been put up in the river, the water keeps
high, destroying the wild rice crop, which is the principal cause of our
starving in winter time. Apart from that, the hay grounds are also flooded
as well as some of our best gardens. ...
279
On account of the above mentioned reasons and for fear of
slarvation our young ones are gett¡ng restless. What can we do to
restrain them?
"Having kept faith with the Department it is only but fair that one
should expect that they would keep it towards us. We have kept our part of
lhe trealy, is it not hard that the government should keep theirs?" (NAC,
RG10,v.3880,f.92840, July 1sth, '1892, Assabaskashing, letter from
Grand Chief Powassing and 10
Chiefs to the Superintendent of lndian Affairs, Ottawa).
The Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg raised the issue of flooding continually during their
summer gatherings with the lndian agent of the Rat Portage/Assabaskashing agency.
Despite Anishinaabe protesls at such meetings, and letters and petitions by the
Anishinaabeg lo the Department of lndian Affairs, there was no formal protest filed by
the Department to officials regarding the construction of the rollerway dam.
ln 1909, a treaty signed by Great Britain and the United States established the
lnternational Joint Commission (l.J.C.) to prevent disputes regarding the use of
boundary waters. The l.J.C. immediately created a Commission on the Lake of the Woods,
calling for a report "pertaining to the regulation of the levels of the Lake of the Woods
and the advantageous use of its waters, shores, and harbors, and the use of the water
flowing into and from the lake, and the effect of such regulation on all public and private
interests involved"(Final Report, l.J.C., 1917:11).
Public hearings were held by the lnternational Joint Commission's Special
Commission in 1912 around Lake of the Woods, at lnternational Falls, Warroad,
Minnesota and Kenora, Ontario, yet the Department of lndian Affairs neither presented
any evidence nor did they inform lhe Anishinaabeg of the Commission or the hearings.
Despite continuing complaints trom Anishinaabeg about the flooding, lndian
Affairs did not table any information until the lnternational Joint Commission (l.J.C.)
specifically requested information. The Fort Frances lndian agent was requested to gather
information, while incurring only necessary small expenditures. The agent, J.P.
Wright, had recently strong-armed seven reserves on Rainy River to amalgamate and
surrender fertile land along the River for newcomers' farms (Rainy River claim, labled
220
with lndian Commission of Ontario, 1979, author's own notes). Wright stated to his
superiors that he could not "get any definite idea from the lndians and it would take a long
time and big expenses to get any reasonable information". Wright then asked the
surveyor who was re-tracing reserves to give a report. (Presumably, this lndian Agent
did not speak with the Anishinaabeg within his district, nor read the correspondence.)
He did forward the request to the Kenora lndian agent R.S. McKenzie.
Surveyor J.D. Gillon conducted surveys on Lake of the Woods during 1912-1913
and noted in his fieldbooks the effects of flooding on every reserve. For example, the Big
lsland fieldbook contains the following reference:
" ... the plan shows that a large part of this Reserve is now under
water Seamo Seebe being now practically a bay of Lake of the Woods ..
The entire south part of Reserve 31G is now under water, or rather
is composed of a floaling bog. According to the lndians there is now
water all the way across Big lsland from Seamo Seebe, on Reserve
31F to the southerly part of 31G." (NAC RG10 v.7585, f.6129-1,
pt.1 )
ln contradiction to such documentation, the Fort Frances agent reported to Ottawa
in 1914 that the higher water level would benefit two-thirds of the reserves, "as when
the water is high they can gather any quantity of wild rice" (R.S. McKenzie, Agent, to D.C.
Scott, Deputy Superintendent General, Department of lndian Affairs, April 29, 1914.
National Archives of Canada, RG10, v.7585,f.6129-1, pt.1)! The lndian agent
effectively ignored the need for lower and constant water levels to allow lhe manomin lo
grow at all. Mckenzie also reported that "the other one-third (of lhe reserves) (is)
differently situated, and the h¡gh water would not effect them very much, and further, the
high water would do but very little damage to any of the reserves" (ibid) . His flooding
observations are in direct contradiction to any authority on wild rice (Jenks
1900:1027, 1036).
And, despite years of Anishinaabe and other lndian Agent reports to the contrary,
lhe Department forwarded this 1914 lndian agent's report without change. The
Department completely disregarded almost twenty years of documentation by
227
Anishinaabeg and other lndian agents and surveyors regarding the major, deleterious
effects of flooding on the reserves and their traditional livelihood.
ln a final request to lndian Affairs for any complaints on file, the l.J.C. received a
letter from the Deputy Superintendent General J.D.Mclean that the only complaints were
from Rainy Lake reserves regarding the Minnesota and Ontario Power Company dam at
Fort Frances/lnternational Falls, and the Department was taking that up with the
company (JD Mclean to LJ Burpee, March 31,'1915; JB Challis to DC Scott, August 27,
1915. NAC, RG10, v.7585, f.6129-1, pt.1).t (Figure 33: Map of 19th century dams).
ln April of 1915, the Kenora lndian Agent was asked to attend hearings in Kenora
to be held in September 1915, "to watch the proceedings" but did not wish him "to take
any steps which may prove to be desirable in the interests of the lndians or their lands"
(DC Scott to RS McKenzie,25 August 1915. NAC, RG10, v.7585, f.6129-1, pt.1).
ln 1917, the Final Report of the lnternational Joint Commission on the Lake of the
Woods Reference was released. lt recommended that the ordinary maximum level of the
Lake should be 1061.25 a.sl. (above sea level), and that an international board should
ensure maintenance of an operating band. 2
ln the next few years, the Department of lndian Affairs did nothing to protect the
interests of Treaty #3 Anishinaabe people, their lands or livelihood from past or future
flooding of Lake of the Woods. A Lake of the Woods Control Board was created by federal
legislation in 1921, and subsequently approved by Ontario.
ln 1925, a Convention and Protocol between Canada and the United States
regarding Lake of the Woods agreed to regulate these waters "with the objects of securing
to the inhabitants or the United States and Canada the most advantageous use of the waters
thereof and of the waters flowing into and from the two countries for domestic and
sanitary purposes, for navigation purposes, for fishing purposes, and for power,
33. Early Navigation and Power Dams in Treaty #3 Terrilory,
Northwestern Ontario 222
l4qp_pt.pared by Mariange Beaudry of MAPII f.or loan Loaisek, TimHolzkamm and Leo Waisberg, for a paþer entitled " 'DEPRIVED OF
PART OF T}IEIR LTVING:,COLONIAT TSM AND NINETEENTH
CENTURY FLOODING OF OIIBWA LANIDS," presented at the
ãíthAlgonquian Conference in Winnipeg, Octób er 7994.
IN THE
EARLY NAVIGATION
TREATY #3 TERRTTORY
AND POWER DAMS
- NORTTIWESTERN OhTTARIO
çlínrr,
Rat Portage
1887
o 50 loo 1 50 200
@"(f
Inc SeuI
Wabigoon
Lale
Irc d6
Mi I ncs
Inke SuperiMarianse Beaudrv
KILOt'vlETERS
%ine R.
U¡u'reJ
223
irrigation and reclamation purposes" (Convention & Protocol Lake of the Woods,
1925:Article ll). There was no mention of the original inhabitants of the area, their
Treaty rights, or wild rice.
According to the Protocol, the Canadian government would be responsible for
flowage between 1056 and 1061.25 feet above sea level (a.s.l.); below and above these
levels, an lnternational lake of the Woods Board would be in control. A flowage easement
would be permitted up to 1064 feet above sea level. Each country would be free of
responsibility for claims within lhe other's borders, but would cover claims within their
own territories. Canada would pay the U.S.A. $275,000 plus one half of any excess paid
out in claims (NAC, RG 10, v.7585, f.6'129-1, pt.1) .
The presently operating Norman Dam was constructed one mile downstream from
the rollerway. This is the main outlet and control passage that the Lake of the Woods
Control Board still use today to control outflow from Lake of the Woods.
By the end of 1923, the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg again petitioned Ottawa for an
independent investigation of many complaints. Upon receiving no reply in the following
eight months, the Anishinaabeg took the unheard of step of soliciting the assistance of a
Kenora lawyer, James Robinson (PAO 1434-877). Robinson wrote several letters to the
local Kenora Daily Miner & News outlining the problems in getting a response from
lndian Affairs. After repeated attempts for a reply from the Department, Mr. Robinson
was advised:
"ln matters of this kind, which come purely within the scope of
the internal administration it is not cuslomary for the Department to
conduct negoliations with the lndians through an intermediary."( PAO 1434-8-77)
When lhe 1927 lndian Act was passed, the Department made sure that Mr. Robinson was
made aware that, in this new era, his advocating on behalf of the Anishinaabeg would be
against the law (Letter from Acting Assistant Deputy & Secretary, DlA, to James
Robinson, August 41h,1927, NAC RG10, v.7585, f.6129-1,pt.1).The 1927 revisions
to lhe lndian Act contained a new clause:
224
"s.141. Every person who, without the consent of the Superintendent
General expressed in writing, receives, obtains or solicits requests from
any lndian any payment or contribution or promise of any payment or
contribution for the purpose of raising a fund or providing money for the
prosecution of any claims which the tribe or band of lndians to which such
' lndian belongs, or of which he is a member, has or is represented to have
for the recovery of any claim or money for the benefit of said tribe or
band, shall be guilty of an offence to a penalty not exceeding two hundred
dollars and not less than fifty dollars or to imprisonmenl of any term not
exceeding two months." (R.S.C.,1927,c.32,s.6.).
(This clause was not repealed until lhe 1951 revisions to the lndian Act.) Without
legal or financial resources, the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg were again left to deal alone
with the Department.
According to Departmental records, in 1927, the Department was still
considering some type of compensation (in the range of $28,000) for lake levels between
1059-1064 feet a.s.l People's improvements were valued at no more than $500.00, as
in the Department's estimation, "That they (the improvements) are quite unimportant
may be taken for granted"(Memo, T.H. Dunn to J.T. Johnston, B February 1927). These
"unimportant" improvements included cattle stables and sheds as well as cabins, ice
houses and docks. Ceremonial structures and sacred sites affected would not even have
been mentioned.
A major conference of Chiefs and Councillors of the Kenora and Savanne agencies
was held on Lake of the Woods in July 1928 with an lndian Affairs official from Ottawa,
F.H. Paget. The Anishinaabeg protested the :
"damage done to all the reserves by the unnatural raising and lowering of
the water whereby timber was destroyed, hay land flooded, rice beds
drowned out and in some cases, lndian graves were covered with water and
being washed away. ... At Buffalo Bay reserve 100 feet of shore line has
been washed away, also part of the burying ground. This also has happened
at North-West Angle Reserve and at Windy Point Reserve belonging to the
Assabaska Band. Fur-bearing animals such as Muskrats were drowned out
or frozen due to the lowering and raising of the water. There were
practically no rats now and the lndians had to purchase hay where
previously they had been able to cut iÎ.
As The lndians depend on the wild rice largely for their winter food the
destruction of the rice beds is a serious loss for them.
225
While they realized the dam was necessary they considered they should be
compensated for the loss they sustain by raising of the natural lake
levels, especially as it was understood that the Department of the lnterior
lhrough the lnternational Control Waler Board and the Lake of the Woods
Control Board had compensated settlers on the American side for damage
caused by the unnaturally high and low waters on the Lake of the Woods
through lhe installation of the Dam. ...
The lndians have a real grievance and were informed that it would be laid
before the department for its consideration." (F.4. Paget to D.C. Scott, 11
Sept. 1928 NAC RG10, v.7585, f.6129-1, pt.1).
ln 1929, H.J. Bury, Lands and Timber Branch of lndian Affairs, requested and was
allowed to undertake a survey and valuation of the damaged reserve lands and interests on
Lake of the Woods. To be included were forty lndian reserves with 250 miles of shoreline.
ln October, Bury submitted his extensive report with valuations stating losses of land
acreage, losses of ricebeds acreage, losses of graves and a valuation amount to total
522,325.00. Based on his own measurements and statements from Anishinaabe leaders,
Bury concluded that lake of the Woods had risen no less than 14 feet since the Treaty #3
was signed in 1873 :
"The lndians of the Lake of the Woods are in a sadly impoverished
condition. Their hunting and trapping rights, under Treaty, have been
curtailed - their fishing rights have been handed over to white men -
their lands have been flooded - their rice fields have been swept out of
existence - and their livelihood has been impaired.
ln the name of juslice and British fair play, I cannot too strongly
emphasize the hope that their claims for generous consideration will
receive prompt and favourable treatment." ( H.J. Bury to the Deputy
Minister, October 2, 1929, NAC RG10, v.7585, f. 6129-1, pt.1)
His well-documenled plea fell on deaf ears. lndeed, lndian Affairs in Ottawa continued to
advise its Kenora agent, Frank Edwards, that "it is not considered desirable that the
lndians should in any way be encouraged to attribute any decrease in the muskrats and fish
lo the control of the lake levels" (A.F.Mackenzie to F. Edwards, 1B December 1930, NAC,
RG1-, v.7585, f .6129-1, pt.1).
At about the same time, however, Canada and Manitoba agreed by successive
orders in council in 1930 and 1931 to replace Buffalo Point Band lands flooded on
the Lake of the Woods (P.C. 1746, August 5, 1930 NAC RG10, v.7777, t.27129-7).
226
These lands were to replace lands flooded on Lake of the Woods. This is the only
compensation ever made to First Nations on the Canadian side. The Chippewas of Red
Lake, Minnesota, were compensated in 1934 on the basis of $1.25 per acre for a
total of $16,000. The Canadian government paid half this amount (NAC RG10
v.7777, f .27129-7). Through the 'moccasin telegraph', the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg
became aware of the settlement to their relatives on the U.S. side of the boundary
waters, and again pressed for justice.
When lndian Affairs Superintendent D.C. Scott retired in 1932, Bury again
pursued the issue of compensation for several years. The Dominion Water & Power
Branch of the Federal Government objected to Bury's inclusion of rice beds and fur losses
while Bury objected to the IJC's low valuation of effects on Anishinaabeg . He advocated to
"compensate the lndians" and "lessen the cost of direct relief"(HJ Bury to Director, 1B
October 1937, NAC, RG10, v.10294, t.487lB-4). Even though the new Director, H.W.
McGill, agreed, a Justice Department review stated that "any compensation should be
made on compassionate grounds not on assured legal rights"( JT Johnston to TL Cory,
November 5, 1937, NAC, RG10, v.7585, f.6129-1, pt.1). A year later, though, the
legal division of Mines & Resources came to a different conclusion: that "the lndians have
an enforceable claim under Treaty #3 and subsequent lndian Acts"(January 21, 1938,
TL Cory, Solicitor, Legal Division, Department of Mines & Resources, memorandum to TR
Daly).
ln 1938, the Treaty #3 organization of Chiefs and headmen met often. Their
spokesman, Whitefish Bay Chief Baybomahsigey , Rob Roy, conveyed their protest about
high water levels to lndian Affairs. "Before the Lake of the Woods was overflooded there
used to be a lot of wild rice and plenty of Muskrats, but ever since the Keewalin Dam was
built the rice has been flooded and also graves have floated from one place to another"
(Statement appended in Frank Edwards, Indian Agent to HJ Bury, 2B September 1938).
227
The lndian Agent passed on their protest to Ottawa with his own advice that the
Deparlment had been misinformed by its own agent in 1914 (October 2,'1938, Frank
Edwards to Secretary, lndian Affairs Branch). Chief Baybomahsigey , and organizer Ko-
ko-ko-o, Jack McGinnis of Manitou Rapids, and others formed an Organization of
Amalgamated lndians of Northwest Angle Treaty #3 delegation who visited the House of
Commons. There Chief Baybomahsigey was informed that money had been set aside as
flooding compensation. The delegation must have accepted the government at their word.
Upon their return home, however, they found no compensation forthcoming. A few months
laler, Baybomahsigey wrote to Ottawa:
"During my visit at the House of Commons Ottawa on the 28th day of
October 1938 A.D. the purpose of bringing the matter of our complaints
to the lndian Department, the following grievances on the clause no.7 as
follows by overflooding our wild rice beds and many other complants
against water flooding on the Lake of the Woods Region.
The satisfaction I got from my visit, - "l was told There is money
already set a side for that purpose. So we want that money to be laid in our
hands.
May lhear from you an early date." (January 1, 1940, Chief Rob
Roy of Whitefish Bay to H.J. Bury, Ottawa). 3
For several more years, Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg pressed the issue through
letters and meetings with the lndian Agent, but they were never compensated. ln 1944,
there was an actual recommendation for settlement in the amount of $12,266, on the
basis of $1.25 per acre for 9B'13 acres (W.M.Cory, Solicitor, Department of Mines &
Resources to Deputy Minister, Dec.12, 1944, Confidential source). This was nol
approved, because of fear of claims from white owners of land on the Lake, and concern
about the "altitudes" of lhe provincial governments of Ontario and ManiÌoba ( December
12, 1944, W.M. Cory, Solicitor, Department of Mines and Resources to Wardle, Deputy
Minister, Confidential source).
zzÕ
This issue of compensation is still ongoing in the 1990s. The political
organization for the First Nations, Grand Council Treaty #3, Treaties & Aboriginal
Rights Research (TARR) division has prepared the documentation for a major claim on
flooding damages to Lake of the Woods First Nations, and the Treaty #3 First Nations on
Lake of the Woods are reviewing their legal opinion and deciding how to proceed. (Flooding
claims by Rainy Lake, to the south, and Lac Seul, Grassy Narrows and Wabeseemong, to
the north, are in various stages of being documented and submitted to government and
Ontario Hydro. The political leaders of Grand Council Treaty #3 have continued to
address the issues of decision-making and control of the water levels and its impact on
Treaty #3 First Nations.
The Canadian Lake of the Woods Board empowered by the 1925 Protocol of Canada
and the United States to control levels within the ban of 1056-1061 .25 feet a.s.l. was
originally composed of four delegates: one from the federal governmenl, two from Ontario
and one from Manitoba. One of the Ontario delegates has always been Ontario Hydro;the
one Manitoba delegate has always been Manitoba Hydro. lt did not matter that the 1925
Protocol specifically mentioned several purposes for regulatíng the lake: a hierarchy of
priorities in the uses of the lake was thereby officially established by the dual Hydro
utilities membership of the Board. (Outside of the operating ban of water levels, the
lnternational Lake of the Woods Control Board would be in charge; this Board was
composed of two delegates: a federal Canadian government official and a member of the US
Army Corps of Engineers.) ln the early years, the Dominion Water and Power Branch was
the Canadian delegate; in reorganization under Trudeau, Environment Canada became the
authorized Department and the Lake of the Woods Control Board established an office of
one slaff, an engineer.
Unlil the late '1970s, the Lake of the Woods Control Board was operated as an "old
boys' network" of engineers appointed by their respective governments or corporations;
members used to be appointed and remain 20-30 years. They would meet, informally
229
over drinks, on an 'as needed' basis throughout the year, to review data on the Lake and
approve water outflows (T. Falk 1992). During the late 1970s, the "Young Turks", as
staff engineer Roy Watt used to refer to the newer delegates and alternates, worked to
professionalize the Board.
"For many years, the Board viewed its mandate as being responsible for
living within the legislation and just considered direct input from Hydro
companies - only Hydro was asked to come to meetings. The process (of
decision-making) was kind of mysterious to the public even if they knew
the Board existed. When complaints came regarding flooding or drought,
the public usually adressed them to their M.P.s or M.P.P.s because they
didn't know about the Board." (T. Falk 1992)
At the behest of these "Young Turks", bylaws and policies were developed where none had
existed before; the closed circle of engineers began to consider the whole mandate rather
than just Hydro concerns. For example, open houses began to be held in Kenora and
Winnipeg (to address cottage owners on Lake of the Woods and Winnipeg River).
However, it was not until the political Treaty organization made a formal presentation of
protest and request in 1976 to the Board, that the Board members really began to
consider that they needed to involve interests other than Hydro (T. Falk 1992).
Treaty #3 Vice Chief Sam Copenace Sr., Ka Qwe Ta Betung, of Northwest Angle
#37 presented the brief to the Lake of the Woods Control Board on behalf of Grand Council
Treaty #3. Chief Copenace argued that the water levels most conducive to an optimum
wild rice crop on Lake of the Woods would also be 1o the "most advantageous use" of all
users of Lake of the Woods, more so than the present operating criteria of the Lake of the
Woods Control Board. "While this sort of water policy, implemented by the Control
Board, has aided hydroelectric power interests, it has managed to injure almost everyone
else", including navigation and fishing, lwo of the specific uses mentioned in the 1925
Protocol (Grand Council Treaty #3, 1976:2). Treaty #3 argued against the "unjust
situation" that saw Northwestern Ontario users pay "double the price for power": "We
pay the standard rale for electricity, and in addition we have to give a good part of the
230
income that derives from our use of the water around us" (Grand Council Treaty #3
197 6:2) .
Grand Council Treaty #3 documented what the loss of wild rice due to high water
levels had meant to the people in poor diet and poor health, especially in situations of
"lhe failure of other protein sources due to mercury contamination".4 ln terms of
income, Trealy #3 stated that "members of lhe Ojibway wild rice co-operative gathered
about 450,000 lbs. for sale in 1973, versus almost nothing in the following years when
lhe waters were high.. a loss of a potential $.1,000,000 per year .. a loss in income, not
even considering the value of rice gathered strictly as country food" (for domestic
consumption) (Grand Council Treaty #3 '1976:4-5).
Treaty #3 reviewed recent regulation on Lake of the Woods and its impact on wild
rice as well as evidence presented in the l9lT lnternational Joint Commission Hearings.
Calling historic regulation on Lake of the Woods "an environmental disaster", the Grand
Council Treaty #3 proposed that the Lake of the Woods Control Board to "maintain a water
level as close to 1058 a.s.l. as possible during the April-September growing season" and
not to exceed an upper level of 1059 a.s.l. "Severe annual fluctuations must be curtailed.
Moreover these conditions must be achieved without excessive high water below the
outlets of Lake of the Woods on the Winnipeg River."(Grand Council Treaty #3 1976:9).
Noting that in their previous correspondence with the Lake of the Woods Control
Board, the Control Board engineer had stated that, "in high inflow years, optimum wild
rice production cannot be simultaneously achieved both upstream and downstream",
Treaty #3 noted that "such production was not achieved either upstream or downstream
of the oullet" and blamed policies of the Board which consistently favoured Hydro
interests (Grand Council Treaty #3, 1976: B). Chief Copenace did state that "optimum
production (of wild rice) in the future would of course vary each year, depending on
different climatic conditions, as well as any possible 'trade-off' with other local
23r
interests". He believed that the levels requested by Treaty #3 would benefit more users
than Hydro alone, as had been the historic case (Grand Council Treaty #3 '1976: S).
Just as Grand Council Treaty #3 had anticipated, the Control Board prepared a
response that dwelled on the technical. They responded as follows:
"The Board concludes that the demand for a compressed range of storage
made by Council to improve wild rice production is not in accord with the
objective of the Convention and Protocol. Hydraulic limitations to
outflows at the outlets of the Lake of the woods together with wide
fluctuations in inflows would make it impossible in many years to meet
the demand of Council for a mean level between 1058 and 1059 on the
lake during April through September.."
"Physical Factors other than mean six-month water levels would appear
to affect optimum wild rice production. ..There is evidence that weather
conditions could be as important as water levels in wild rice production."(Response to Presentation by Grand Council Treaty #3 on April 22,
1976 to the Lake of the Woods Control Board, October 13, 1976, p.i)
Unbeknownst to Grand Council Treaty #3, the Board was very concerned about
the Grand Council's remarks. They sought to discredit the Grand Council's reliance on
research by Peter Lee, a doctoral candidate in biology from the University of Manitoba.
Lee had undertaken work for the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources in wild rice at the
Kenora office. According to Dr. Lee, the Lake of the Woods Control Board engineer, Mr.
Roy watt, called to see if they could come over to discuss his research.
"ln rhose days, I shared cramped office space with my supervisor,
Dr. John Stewart. I had checked my stats with the b¡ostatistician and he
had advised me my analysis was correct. The Board showed up with a
delegation of 10 people, jammed into our office. They confronted me about
my data, analysis and conclusions (about water levels being the critical
determining factor of rice growth). After listening to them for a long
time, stewart finally told them, 'Look we said you could come over for a
chat. lf we had known what to expect we could have prepared with our own
biostatistician who could blow yours out of the water.' They soon left."
P.F.Lee 1990
The Control Board left to prepare their response to Treaty #3 in which they took
exception to Lee's data and his conclusion that water levels are a main determinant of wild
rice growth. Since that time, the Control Board has stayed with its stand that water level
is only one factor in determining rice growth and that weather, insects and disease are
major determinants as well.
--azJz
ln 1979, Grand Council Treaty #3 hired former Ontario NDP Opposition leader,
Stephen Lewis, fo assist in lobbying for recognition of their Treaty rights to wild rice.
(See also Chapter twelve). The Chiefs and Executive of the Grand Council decided that
control of water levels was crucial to the consistency of a good wild rice crop. They set a
two pronged approach. They would enlist the resources of the federal and provincial
governments in undertaking a major study to discover how Lake of the Woods could be
regulated for maximization of the wild rice potential, and seek a voting seat on the Lake of
the Woods Control Board. 5
Stephen Lewis and Treaty #3 representatives, Grand Chief Robin Greene and Wild
Rice representative Chief Peter Kelly/Kinew of Sabaskong, lobbied the federal and
provincial Ministers on the Tripartile Council established by Canada, Ontario and the
Chiefs of Ontario in 1979 to resolve lndian grievances. They also met with Justice
Patrick Hartt, then chair of the lndian Commission of Ontario, established also in 1979
to facilitate discussions among Canada, Ontario and the Chiefs of Ontario members toward
resolving disputes.
After some weeks of this lobbying effort, the Tripartite Council agreed to set aside
$250,000 for such a study to be undertaken under the auspices of the lndian Commission
of Ontario. A tender was let and the successful candidate was Unies Ltd of Winnipeg, whose
principals included Dave Young, a consultant to the Anishinabe Man-O-Min Co-op in the
early 1970s. Engineer Gordon Spafford played the lead role in this report submitted to
the lndian Commission of Ontario in Toronto, December 1981.
Under a management committee composed of representatives of the lndian
Commission of Ontario, the federal Deparlment of lndian Affairs, the Ontario Ministry of
Natural Resources and Grand Council Treaty #3, the Unies Study was authorized in
September 1980 to investigate water levels in the study area of Lake of the Woods, Rainy
Lake, Namakan Lake, Lac La Croix, English and Winnipeg Rivers. The main focus of the
study was to determine the relationship between wild rice and water levels, the water
233
regime most conducive to its growth, and compare "preferred wild rice regulation (of
water) to the impact on power production and other uses" (Unies 1981:7). (See
Appendix for Terms of reference)
After a year's fieldwork and computer modelling, the Unies study found "a strong
correlation between the volume of the wild rice crop and water levels throughout the growing
season". lt noted that the crop reliability could be substantially improved" with changes to the
present operating criteria of the Lake of the Woods Control Board (Unies 1981:10). "That is,
a decrease in frequency of crop failures would occur and low crop year volumes would
improve". lmportantly, "modifications to reservoir operating criteria preferred for rice
production result in changes in water levels and streamflows too small to have an appreciable
impact on resources other than wild rice and electrical energy" (Unies 1981:12). The study
noted that, while there would be a slight loss in electrical energy produced, if one considers
the economic multipl¡ers, the economic benefits from reliable wild rice crops to the region
would be greater than any loss of the value of the energy (Unies'1981:11).
It seemed clear that Grand Council Treaty #3 was now vindicated in its submissions to
the Lake of the Woods Control Board. The Report seriously called into question the preference of
the Control Board lo use the Lake of the Woods as a reservoir for power by filling up the Lake in
the fall and releasing water in the spring. Grand Council Treaty #3 had hosted Lake of the Woods
Control Board members in August 1980 around Sabaskong Bay to view water levels and their
effect on wild rice. ln 1981, with interim findings of the Unies Report in hand, Grand Council
Treaty #3 arranged for Board members to visit bays closer to Kenora. Sonny McGinnis of
Manitou Rapids and Treaty #3 elder statesman and former Treaty #3 President, Peter Seymour
of Wauzhushk Onigum, acted as guides, They ensured that the Board members observed the
floating leaf stage of mid to late June (just prior to the aerial stage) and discussed the effect of
water levels on crilical growing periods on the Lake.
234
However, the Unies Report also provided an internal problem for Grand Council -lreñy
#3: the increased productions on Lake of the Woods and the English and Winnipeg Rivers would
be arranged only in accompaniment with slight decreases in annual crops on Rainy Lake.
How was this conflict to be mediated within Treaty #3? Another problem ensued when the
Grand Council disagreed with the amount billed by the Unies consulting firm. Without financial
or skilled resources either to critique or to capitalize on the Report, Grand Council Treaty #3
did not press the issue immediately after its release to the lndian Commission of Ontario and
tripartite forum.
The Lake of the Woods Control Board received a copy of the Unies Report through the
Ontario representative of the tripartite process, but no formal consideration was given to the
Unies Report at any level. The Report was reviewed by government bureaucrats, but was still
not considered a public document in 1983 (Grand Council Treaty #3 Presentation on Water
Levels to the Lake of the Woods Control Board, February 9, 1983). Grand Council Treaty #3
made unofficial comments about the Unies Report in their February 1983 presentation to the
Control Board. The Grand Council was concerned about the problem presented of increased
harvests in some areas but a reduction in others. Treaty #3 noted, that overall, with new
regulation guidelines focussed on optimum wild rice yields, "harvests would be more reliable"
and "bumper crops would not be affected" (Grand Council Treaty #3 1983:4). The Grand
Council applauded the Study's finding that minor modifications in regulation for rice production
would "be too small to have an appreciable impact on resources other than wild rice and
electrical energy" . They challenged the Control Board to "work toward accomodation and
compromise rather than dwelling on conflicts" which may not, in fact, exist (Grand Council
Treaty #3 1983:.a).
Control Board officials found the Unies Report well done on the whole but lacking a
fundamental understanding of the constraints on regulating the water levels. One noticeable
"problem may be that weather forecasting, especially predictability of precipitation and its
subsequent ¡mpact on water levels, is not as accurate as Unies assumes" (T. Falk 1992).
235
The Report stands a decade later, with a wealth of information, including maps, available þr
use. The member First Nations in the 1990s are developing the skilled human resources and the
financial ability through projects such as land claim and self government negotiations to finally
avail themselves of this information . For example, in October 1992, the Chief of Grassy
Narrows wrote to Grand Council Treaty #3 requesting information undertaken by Unies in a
Band survey of Grassy Narrows (as was done for all First Nations of Treaty #3). This data
would assist their documentation of the impact of flooding on their wild rice industry for their
upcoming talks with Ontario Hydro.
To address the issue of voting status on the Lake of the Woods Control Board,
Stephen Lewis began overtures 1o the Chair of the lnternational Joint Commission, and
then arranged for the Treaty #3 delegation of Grand Chief Robin Greene and Chief Peter
Kelly/Kinew to accompany him to meet the federal Ministers of the Environment and the
Ontario Ministers of Natural Resources and Native Affairs, as well as the Chair of Ontario
Hydro. The political leaders were urged to consider the necessity of regulating Lake of the
Woods levels for the economy of Northwestern Ontario (a potentially million dollar
crop). Treaty #3 leaders also reminded the government of their year old promise, that
is, a commitment to assist the development of the lndian wild rice industry.
Ontario Supreme Court Justice Patrick Hartl had the year before convinced
Premier Bill Davis to declare a five year moratorium on any new licenses to wild rice so
that a Native industry could be developed (Chapter twelve). Ontario had committed its
"efforts to assist lndian licensees to develop appropriate technology and increase
utílization of the available crop with the primary objective of establishing an economic
base for the involved lndian communities" (Grand Council Treaty #3 to Lake of the Woods
Control Board 1980:5) Grand Council Treaty #3 asked Ontario cabinet ministers how
they could ever establish an economic base if they continually lost their harvest due to
drowning? (1980:5) Chief Fred Copenace of Big Grassy had always questioned the logic of
the Ontario government:
236
"On the one hand, the Ministry of Natural resources says there's a twenty
million dollar crop of wild rice on Lake of the Woods, Then they allow the
Board to raise the water levels and drown the rice!"(Avery & Pawlik, 1979:44)
ln these days before the entrenchment of Treaty and Aboriginal rights in the
Constitution Act. 1982, recognition of Treaty rights was raised by the Treaty #3
leaders, but did not find a ready audience with Ontario cabinet ministers. Lewis argued
for the practical political initiatives, such as Associate state on the Control Board - with
a voice, but no vote. (Lewis himself had held lenthy discussions with the chair of the IJC
and was privy to what might be acceptable to the higher-ups.)
Once again, in May '1980, Grand Council Treaty #3 met with the Lake of the
Woods Control Board. This time, the meeting was called by the political masters of the
Board members, and the Board members were advised to be attentive. Grand Chief Greene
reminded the Board that Treaty #3 was in the midst of a moratorium on new licences and
pressure was on Treaty #3 to develop a viable Native industry. Specifically, Treaty #3
wanted to know "if nature will be allowed to take its course to produce an abundant supply
of wild rice", or was the Board going to raise the water levels? (Grand Council Treaty #3
Presentation to the Lake of the Woods Control Board, May 7,1980:2). Treaty #3
requested that a Treaty #3 "Wild Rice Associate Advisor" be appointed to the Lake of the
Woods and Rainy Lake Control Boards, "to participate with a voice, but without vote, in
the deliberations of the Board", "to improve communication and the Board's awareness of
the effects of its policies on Wild Rice" (May 7,1980:6). Grand Chief Greene stated that
"the survival of wild rice is a life and death issue for us.
We can only survive as an independent, self-reliant people if our
traditional resources are allowed to grow and to be replenished.
From our Elders we learn of the intimate relationship between the growth
and harvesting of Wild Rice and our lndian culture. Wild Rice is an
essential part of our identity as lndian people living in this land of lakes
with the generous gifts of the Great Spirit. The protection of Wild Rice
should be guaranteed to us by Canadian society out of respect for our
aboriginal and trealy rights. Furthermore, we know that we can only
escape from the present debilitating dependence upon welfare if
governmental and public authoritles act to support the development of a
Wild Rice industry controlled by lndian people which can contribute a
237
value of many millions of dollars to lhe rest of society. ... lf the Control
Board cannot or will not assist us then we will be forced to take other
measures quickly. (May 7,1980:7-B)
At that meeting, the Board tabled their pre-typed response. They refused to admit
"special interest groups at this time" and instead offered public meetings to ensure "an
appropriate balance of views" ("Public lnput to decisions Regarding Water Levels and
Flows (Lake of the Woods and Lac Seul)", Lake of the Woods Control Board statement, May
7,1980, Kenora). When queried later in the meeting, the Ontario representative from
the OnÌario Ministry of Natural Resources, Mr. M. Odell, stressed that he personally
would like to see a representative from Treaty #3 during Board deliberations, as his
Minister had recommended in a letter tabled at that meeting. However, he did question
why Grand Council Treaty #3 should have access lo all Board policy discussions,
documents, position papers, etc. as Treaty #3 had stated in that meeting .
A while later, the Board changed its mind. The Board members had conferred with
the ministers who had been lobbied by Grand Council Treaty #3, the same ministers who
appointed them as Board members. The members of the Lake of the Woods Control Board
reviewed the matter and offered observer status- not just to Grand Council Treaty #3,
but to to all "interest groups". The Control Board itself saw this as an "incredibly far
reaching move" that had to overcome Board members' fears about public participation and
disruption of meetings (T. Falk, 1992).
Grand Council Treaty #3 political leaders were initially pleased that their
lobbying had brought results, but quickly realized their achievement came with a cost.
Lewis could speak of gradual viclories, but Grand Council Treaty #3 had considered
voting status on the Control Board as recognition of their Treaty status. The Grand
Council's proposal for "Associate status" was made as a political move at Lewis'
recommendation, bul was actually considered as a compromise. The Board's invitation to
"observer status" was an insult.
238
The Board also invited "other interest groups" from the area to participate as
observers, thereby ignoring Grand Council Treaty #3's stand that such groups were
already represented by the Board members; Treaty #3's legal rights were not
represented. The Observers' list grew to include: Kenora District Camp Owners'
Association, Lake of lhe Woods & District Property Owners Association; City of Winnipeg;
Sioux Lookout & Hudson Tourist Outfitters Association, Boise Cascade Ltd. Grand Council
Treaty #3 acknowledged others' interests, but had fought for recognition of their own
rig hts.
The Lake of the Woods Control Board saw the Grand Council's 1980 brief as "the
straw that broke the camel's back" (Falk 1992). Several Board members believed that
public participation would make Board decisions better. The Grand Council, however, saw
the offer of observer status as a dilution of their rights. ln essence, to the Board, the
1925 Protocol was the only treaty they considered; to the Grand Council, Treaty #3
governed all relations in their territory.
Grand Council Treaty #3 never accepted their "observer status" with relish but
they originally intended to make their presence known. At the outset, Treaty #3 Wild
Rice representative Chief Peter Kelly and Kenora Area Tribal Chief Sam Copenace were
appointed as alternates to attend the Board meetings . Grand Council Treaty #3 invited
the Board members to spend a day on the Lake of the Woods with their representatives in
Sabaskong Bay 1980 and Matheson Bay in 1981.ln 1980, summer students, Roderick
Skead of Rat Portage, Diane Kelly of Sabaskong and Sonny McGinnis of Manitou Rapids,
were hired by Treaty #3 to collect weekly information from all member reserves about
water levels and rice growth and forward these to the Lake of the Woods Control Board in
Ottawa. This information was planned to add Treaty #3 input into the Control Board's
decision-making. ln later years, Sonny McGinnis of Manitou Rapids, went on to work in
several capacities for Grand Council Treaty #3. As Treaty #3 wild rice representative,
Mr. McGinnis was given an orientation to the Board by Ontario Hydro engineers, and
239
became accepted by Board members as a credible observer who knew the engineering
language and understood the constraints on decision-making, while continuing to make
arguments on behalf of Treaty #3 (McGinnis 1990; Walden 1990; Falk 1992).
ln February 1983, a formal meeting between Grand Council Treaty #3 and the
Lake of the Woods Control Board was convened at the Grand Council's request. Grand Chief
John P. Kelly of the Ojibways of Onegaming stated their appreciation to the Board for
attending the field trips they had arranged and becoming more aware of the effect of water
levels. Kelly then went on to review the five years of rice crop during this moratorium,
which was soon to end:
1978 - complete crop failure due to flood conditions
1979 - crop failure due to high water levels
1 980 - good crop
1981 - poor crop due to rapidly rising water during floating leaf
stage - seemed like good crop previous to late June
1982 - poor crop due to high water levels
Grand Council Treaty #3, 1983:2
Kelly concluded that there had been "only one good crop during the five years that many
outsiders see as a crucial period for lndian people to develop the rice business" (Grand Council
Treaty #3,1983:2)
The Grand Council emphasized, once again, their perennial message that governments
must "undersÌand not to raise water levels during the growing slage of wild rice" (1g83:a).
Grand Council Treaty #3 had previously argued that the wild rice needs could be met if the
Control Board considered other users than Hydro (1976), and, that a specific "Wild Rice
Associale advisor" to the Board was needed to consider the water levels required by wild rice
(1980). ln 1983, Grand Council Treaty #3 took another tack. Grand Council Treaty #3 argued
that the specific purpose of "irrigation" mentioned in the 1919 mandate of the Board would
clearly cover the "natural crop on Lake of the Woods", wild rice (1983:a),
Chief Sam Copenace of Northwest Angle #37 tabled the weekly calendar he had kept of
rice growth in 1981, "which showed the crucial 'floating leaf'being flooded within the last two
weeks of June" (1983:4). Grand Council Treaty #3 expressed anger that the Board may then
240
listen to political pressure to regulate water levels for rice: the Ontario Minister of Nortl-rern
Affairs was publicly recommending it, "now that the moratorium is coming to an end"
( 1 eB3:5).
"Does this mean that the Board is under public pressure to heed non-
lndian economic desires more than to work with people who have Treaty
and Aboriginal rights guaranteed by the constitution in this country?"...
We must state in the strongest possible terms that the plant called wild
rice, that we call manomin , is a sacred trust given to our people. Our
Elders speak oÍ'Manitou Gi Tigahn'-Manomin is a gift from the Great
Spirit to our people and we must protest it. Unless you understand this
basic concept, then you cannot understand why it is that we will never
give up this cause.
... we will continue to insist that wild rice is covered under the present
mandate of the Board and must be considered as a major factor in
determining water regulalion decisions. Grand Council Treaty #3 will
continue our efforts to ensure that our voice is heard. (1983:5).
Presumably, this "voice" was to mean formal meetings between the Control Board and the
Grand Council, as Treaty #3 participation in regular meetings did not continue after 1983
(McGinnis 1990).
At one of the last Board meetings when Treaty #3 took an active part, in March
1983, Grand Chief Machipiness (Robin Greene) of Shoal Lake #39 and Kenora Area
Tribal Chief Ka Qwue Tay Betung (Sam Copenace Sr.) of Northwest Angle #37 viewed
with Lake of the Woods Board members two films on wild rice in the Treaty #3 area:
"Grain of Dissent" from CBC's The Fifth Estate ; and another from CBC's Points West. The
Treaty #3 delegates led discussion about the films, pointing out "the failure of the films
lo cover all the significant points concerning the importance of wild rice" (March 21,
1983 letter from R.F. Walden, Executive Engineer of the Lake of the Woods Control Board
to Mr. Sam Copenace, representative to the Lake of the Woods Control Board, Grand
Council Treaty #3, Kenora). The Board appreciated "the insight gained from the films
inlo the development and politics of wild rice" and were quick to note that the films failed
to cover the two most prominent contentions of the Board and the Grand Council, that is,
"the importance of climatic conditions and water levels on rice growlh and development
241
(March 21, 1983 Walden to Copenace). Robin Greene noted that the cultural and
spiritual significance of manomin to the Anishinaabeg had not been fully considered on
film yet.
When Grand Council Treaty #3 began to attend Board meetings irregularly, lhe
Lake of the Woods Control Board became "disappointed" and expressed some exasperation
that no regular delegales from Treaty #3 participated (Rick Walden 1990). A former
voting member expressed his understanding that the Grand Council felt their active
participation had not translated into better rice crops (Falk 1992). By the late 19BOs,
the Board was holding conference calls with a GCT3 Regional Chief (then Kenora Area
Tribal chief) George Kakeway of wauzhusk onigum (Rat portage) to gain input
regarding wild rice (June 12, 1992, draft minutes, Lake of the Woods Control Board
regulation meeting, p. a). ln 1992, Chief Kakeway Ìold the Board, once again, "that due
to high lake level, there would not be any wild rice this year" (June 12, 1gg2
minutes). Chief Kakeway had attended Lake of the Woods Control Board meetings
periodically during the late 1980s but felt he should withdraw until an official
appointment was made by the Grand Council (Report to the Grand Council Treaty #3
Economic Development & Resource Management committee, Jan.15, 1gg3).
The lack of participation from Grand Council Treaty #3 was actually due to two
reasons. One, certainly, was lack of resources. The Grand Council derived its operating
budget from a number of federal and provincial grants to carry out proposed programs
(such as Heallh consullation or Social Services Review), or to participate in consultation
and negotiation processes (such as the lndian Commission of Ontario meetings on rights
and resources). Except for one or two years in 1978-1980, there was no specific
funding for a person to work fulltime on wild rice issues. After 1982, all efforts in this
regard were concentrated at the tripartite lndian Commission of Ontario level (see
Chapter 12).
242
Most importantly from the Grand Council's viewpoint, this effective withdrawal
from the Lake of the Woods Control Board forum coincided with Grand Council Treaty #3,
and its member First Nations, taking a more adamant stand regarding effective self
government and implementing Treaty rights.
ln the 1970s and into the 1980s, the First Nations were evolving a more
affirmative stand for self government. During the Trudeau push for patriation of the
Constitution, Treaty and status lndians across Canada led delegations to Great Britain and
other parts of world including Germany, Australia, and the United States, and held
assemblies and rallies in Canada such as the Constitutional Express train from BC to
Ottawa in 1980. Treaty #3 Grand Chiet Machipiness (Robin Greene) participated in the
Fall 1979 visit to the Queen and the subsequent lobby of British M.P.s and Lords. At the
December 1980 Assembly of Chiefs in Oltawa, Treaty #3 leadership, through Fred Kelly
Sr. of Sabaskong, actively participated in the drafting of the "Declaration of the First
Nations" which declared that
"We the Original peoples of this Land know the Creator put us here; The
Creator gave us laws that govern all our relationships to live in harmony
with nature and mankind..."
A Declaration of the First Nations, December, 1980
The media and the public were unsure whether this was a philosophical document
or a political tract. They were soon to find that this was an expression of will and the
introduction of the new political language of Treaty and status lndians across the country.
ln the 1980's, the Treaty #3 Band Councils had begun referring to themselves as
"First Nations". The Grand Council Treaty #3 was considered by the Chiefs as the
organization of their territory, dedicated to safeguarding Treaty rights, now "recognized
and affirmed" in section 35 of the Constitution Act. 1982. Since reorganization in 1970,
Grand Council Treaty #3 had taken the stand that Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg had legal
Treaty and aboriginal rights and could not be considered an "interest group" or mere
political organization. The speeches of Anishinaabe leaders continually stressed their
sovereignty, their right to self determination and the nationhood of the Treaty #3
243
Anishinaabeg . Treaty #3 leaders spoke of the new recognition for Treaty #3
intergovernmental relationships: government to government relations with Ontario; and
Nation to Nation relations with Canada (G. Kakeway, Grand Council Treaty #3 assembly,
December 19Bg).
Thus, political developments within aboriginal political scene across Canada and
the indigenous populations around the round meant that, in the 1980's, "observer
status" to a Board which made decisions with crucial repercussions for the culture and
economy of their people was not acceptable to the Grand Council. This view was
particularly so when the Board had offered the invitation to the Grand Council in concert
with invitations to actual "lnterest groups" in Northwestern Ontario. lnterest groups
such as the Lake of the Woods Campowner's Association had as their sole function to lobby
for their best interests; they did not have legal and historic rights constitutionally
recognized.
By 1993, members of the Lake of the Woods Control Board were beginning to
understand that Treaty #3 had certain rights in that area and had never been compensated
for any easemenls assumed by the federal government. lnstead of addressing the central
issue of which treaty held sway, Treaty #3 or the Lake of the Woods Protocol, or even the
issue of when and how to compensate the First Nations of Treaty #3, members of the
Board and the governments and agencies they represented continued to act as if they had
full legal control, but wished to deal with the lndians honourably!
For example, Ontario Hydro, a member of the Lake of the Woods Control Board,
began a process to resolve long outstanding grievances First Nations had with that utility.
Hydro offered some vague assistance in considering the feasibility and design of water
control structures in small lakes and ponds nearby 1o Lake of the Woods. Hydro had first
taken this stand during the lobbying effort by the Grand Council with Stephen Lewis in
1979-80 (Personal observation; T. Falk, 1992). ontario Hydro, for one, seemed to
prefer to coax lhe Anishinaabeg into relinquishing Lake of the Woods manomin , in favour
244
of newly seeded inland lakes. ln effect, Hydro was promoling Anishinaabeg giving up what
had been dubbed "the biggest ricebowl in North America".
ln the 1990s, Grand Council Treaty #3 remains adamant that there is one treaty
which governs overall relations within the 55,000 square miles of their traditional
territory of the Boundary waters. ln the eyes of Anishinaabeg,Trealy #3 takes
precedence over all else, including other international treaties such as the establishment
in 1909 of the lnternational Joint Commission and in 1919 of the Lake of the Woods
Control Board. While talks begin again between Ontario Hydro and Grand Council Treaty
#3, this battle of competing rights and interests continues toward the next century.
ln the meantime, during the period 1983 to 1992, there has not been one good crop of
wild rice, only one or lwo fair crops. What this has meant to the people is that only the
people with machines have been able to harvest the rice for profit and families have been
left without this economic boost at an important time of year. And, the lack of any
significant crop in more than fifteen years - from 1977 Io 1994-has meant that the
present growing generation of young Anishinaabeg have been effectively removed from
one of the most sacred traditions of their culture. The ceremonies, the cultural and social
activities, the togetherness of extended family ties while camped out on the lake, the care
giving of the plant, the language of the season - all this has been effectively devastated .
Almost a generation of Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg is growing without participating in one of
the most meaningful events of identity, solidarity and nationhood that is offered in the
Boundary Waters. lt is to be expected that Grand Council Treaty #3 will be addressing
the issue of cultural genocide and ethnocide in any future discussions wilh governments,
crown corporalions and industrial concerns.
a/1 ç.
Endnotes:
1. The Rainy Lake First Nations Flooding claim is the subject of research by Grand
Council Treaty #3, TARR, as has been the case for Lake of the Woods and Lac Seul. For the
purposes of this thesis, Lake of the Woods is used as the prime example. The devastation
caused by 19th century dams throughout Treaty #3 territory has been well documented
in Lovisek, Holzkamm & Waisberg, " 'Deprived of Part of Their Living': Colonialism and
Nineteenth Century Flooding of ojibwa Lands", presented at the 26th Algonquian
Conference in Winnipeg, October 1994. The map prepared for their presentation ¡s
presented in this thesis, Figure 33.
2. Dr. R. Newbury, hydrologist, stated that Clifford Sifton wanted a much larger area
flooded around Lake of the Woods, for hydro needs, but fierce lobbying by forestry
interests led to the introduction of an "operating band" of optimum water levels being
adopted (University of Manitoba "People and the Land", Northern Manitoba Conference,
May 1990 Workshop on Hydro flooding).
3. Baybomahsigey's wife, ogemaabinesiik , Mrs. Rob Roy, was the actual person to
compose and write all the letters and petitions for the United Treaty #3 Council,
according to their granddaughter, Evelyn Copenace of Onegaming (December 1992).
4. Whitedog & Grassy Narrows First Nations, members of Grand Council Treaty #3, were
continuing their struggle to reach a compensation agreement with the governments of
Ontario and Canada, Ontario Hydro and Reed Paper Company. (Reed Co. was later bought
out by Great Lakes Paper Co.) Mercury contamination was one of the impacts of
government and industrial development policies on their communities. lt was also
considered a threat to Manitou Rapids First Nation, downstream from the Minnesota Pulp
and Paper Co. at the twin border towns of lnternational Falls, Minnesota and Fort
Frances, ontario. That pollution may have continued into Lake of the woods.
5. The author worked for Grand Council Treaty #3 as Assistant Director, Treaty &
Aboriginal Rights Research during this period, 1979-1981. Grand Chief Robin Greene
of Shoal Lake #39 and Chief Peter Kelly of Sabaskong, the Chiefs' representative on wild
rice, were the main spokespeople for Grand Council Íreaty #3 on this issue during this
period.
246
Chapter Twelve
"lrreconcilable Dif ferences": Taking on the Provinces
1970s to 1985
ln the summer ot 1974, the Ojibway Warrior Society of Treaty #3 young people
from teens to late twenties, held a youth conference at Anicinabe Park, situated between
Wauzhushk Onigum First Nation and the Town of Kenora. At the end of the cÐnference,
the Warriors stayed to occupy and reclaim Anishinaabe land. 1 The Park was
immediately cut off and surrounded by Town and Ontario Provincial Police, and a seige of
several weeks followed (Better Read Collective 1974; Harper 1979).
This standoff with arms on both sides was an omen of another'hot summer': the
summer of 1990 at Kanesatake (Oka). Anicinabe Park brought into public focus - once
more - the deplorable conditions of Kenora area reserves and reserve life. The violent
death rate of the Kenora area and surrounding ten reserves was higher than 'murder
city' (Detroit) of the United States (Grand Council Treaty #3 1973). This was a
statistic that told the actual life history of the leaders of the Ojibway Warrior Society -
each had lost one or both parents, brothers, sisters, and other close relatives, through
violence. The young people were calling for action - now.
As the Chiefs, Elders and their organization, Grand Council Treaty #3, tried to
mediate an end to the armed standoff, the townspeople of Kenora rallied numerous times
in frustration and rage at the drums, the chanting, lhe strangeness of the Anishinaabeg
in their park. Tempers flared. Negotiations plodded. Finally, in late August, the
Warriors left the park with some of their demands met. 2 The leaders soon joined the
Native People's Caravan crossing Canada to march on Parliament Hill for the opening of
Parliament.
During the Anicinabe Park occupation, a small booklet of sensationalist photos
and racist sentiment was published and circulated throughout the Northwesl. lts litle,
247
"Bended Elbow", was an obvious reference to the alcohol abuse in the Kenoraarca.ll was
also a swipe at Kenora Anishinabeo who equated their situation with those of the
American lndian Movement who earlier that year had held off the FBI at Wounded Knee.
lnto this tempetuous political climate, in September 1974, the Ontario Ministry
of Natural Resources released a book, "Background lnformation and Approach
to Policy". lts stated purpose was to solicit public comment regarding the development
of a strategic land use plan for Northwestern Ontario (OMNR 1974). This plastic-
coiled, green cardboard-covered report of 130 pages unleashed another whirlwind.
ln its evaluation of the development and use of natural resources, the OMNR
report noted that wild rice "Canada's only indiginous (sic) cereal, has been associated
wilh native tradition and dates from the beginning of recorded history" (1g74:49) . The
report estimated that the "former Kenora Administrative District accounted for some
75/" of the normal Ontario harvest of wild rice ... 400-1000 people, mostly lndian, are
employed (i.e. picking) for a period of two to three weeks" (1974:50). Stating there
was a market demand as a gourmet food, the report proceeded: "ll is worth noting only
about 25"/" of the potential harvestable crop is picked each year. Current research is
aimed at developing new varieties of rice with non-shattering heads which may increase
the potential harvest by 10 times." (197a:50). While stating that the harvest may
range from 60,000 lbs one year to 1.2 million the next, the report emphasized "present
harvest is about 1.2 million pounds with value of 2.1 million dollars" and recommends
expansion by 400% (1974:115) or "realistically ..200% rather than 4007o"
(1974:116). ln a brief three 1o four pages, OMNR had managed to gloss over the very
real issues of treaty rights, water level control, transfer of research and development
from paddies to lake stands. And, MNR promised new policies to ensure a 2OO-4OO%
increased crop.
Rationalization of the industry was one of the main reasons Ontario used for the
imposition of the 1960 Ontario Wild Rice Harvesting Act (OWRHA). (See also Chapter
248
B). ln 1974, underutilization of the crop became the theme of the Ontario government's
attack on Anishinaabe conlrol of wild rice in the block areas, established by the OWRHA,
throughout much of Treaty #3 (Chapter B).
Resource development issues were being defined by the Ontario government.
Their use of language cloaked the biases of government leaders and set the tone and
direction of the debate. Then Minister of Natural Resources, Hon. Leo Bernier, M.P.P. for
the Kenora riding, launched a personal tirade aginst Treaty #3 rights to rice.
It was no coincidence that his campaign manager, Ben Ratuski, was owner and manager of
the Keewatin Wild Rice Company, a wild rice processing and retail business (Avery and
Pawlick 1979; Pawlick 1979).
Bernier's assault was two-fold: demonstrate that the wild rice crop is under-
utilized, and therefore "wasted"; secondly, bring into public debate, the issue framed as
"Equal rights versus lndian privilegs"3 (For more detail, see Chapters 3 &9).
Through the innocuous-sounding program of land use planning for the Northwest,
wild rice was targeted for a 200-400% increase in production, and terms such as
"percentage of harvestable rice" and "available rice" were introduced into public debate.
The effect was clear: "casual references to terms of this sort help create popular biases
regarding which people deserve support and which need to be controlled" (Edleman,
1977:1 1 0).
The Minister of Natural Resources, Hon. Leo Bernier of Hudson, went on the
airways and attended public meetings, calling for the adoption of policies that would
increase the harveslby 400%. ln the Ontario legislature, Bernier claimed "we are
harvesting about 20/" of wild rice now" and in 1976 said "only 10olo" was harvested
(Avery & Pawlick 1979:36). Bernier molded public opinion by "appealing to fears and
hopes always prevalent" in the public (Edleman, 1977:50).ln the case of Northwestern
Ontario, there was a fear of loss of resources to the original owners of these resources,
249
"the lndians", long considered the bottom rung of society in the northwest. The public
debate about wild rice took on emotional, racist overtones almost immediately.
When labels and statistics stated that much of the "available crop" was not
harvested by the lndians, the MNR public offensive put the Grand Council Treaty #3 and
the Anishinaabe Man-O-Min Co-op on the defensive. Grand Council Treaty #3 Chiefs and
staff analyzed the methodology of MNR and found glaring problems in their estimation of
the crop from aerial surveys. 4
There were also problems in the reliability of their records of the harvest,
particularly when lndian harvesters kept some rice harvested for their own home
processing and use, an amount which would not be reported. Usually, rice buyers
(mostly non-lndian) either did not file reports or filed inaccurate ones with MNR (to
hide business profits). Customs' records of amounts shipped to American processors did
not reflect full amounts harvested either. ln 1974-5, Grand Council Treaty #3
critiques of this nature were addressed to the Minister and the Ministry.
However, political developments were occurring at a higher level than one
Ministry. The Anicinabe Park occupation had had far-reaching ramifications. A very
direct result was act¡on by the Ontario government in meeting the Chiefs of Ontario in
assembly in March 1975. The leaders of the four Ontario organizations - Fred Kelly,
President of Grand Council Treaty #3, Andy Rickard, President of Grand Council Treaty
#9, Leighton Hopkins, President of the Association of lroquois and Allied lndians, and
Michael Roy, President of the Union of Ontario lndians - followed this by a meeting with
the Premier and Cabinet in April. Ontario responded positively to a joint lndian
organization-Ontario Cabinet committee approach to resolving disputes. Premier Davis
committed Ontario to funding a core budget for a Joint Associations' office in Toronto
(May 22, 1975 Premier Davis to Presidents of the four lndian organizations). Out of
this initiative grew the Chiefs of Ontario office that continues into the 1990s.
250
ln a confidential memorandum to file dated June 2, 1975 (obtained by the
Presidents later in June 1975), the Ontario Government acknowledged that their action
was due to the Anicinabe Park occupation. "The greatest sense of urgency is felt by
Government, wishing to avoid strife and bloodshed." Ontario noted that "Ontario lndians
have a strong sense of frequently justifiable grievance at past and alleged current
infractions of what they regard to be their legitimate claims to land and resources."
(Secretariat for Social Development, May 26, 1975:1; It is likely this author was D.T.
Wright, Assistant Deputy Minister of that joint Ministry, who also negotiated the
agreement with the Ojibway Warrior Society to vacale the Anicinabe Park peacefully.)
However, Ontario noted:
"lt would appear also to be appropriate to acknowledge that there may be
additional claims which the lndians feel strongly to be legitimate, but
which are not well supported by explicit treaty references or other
legally binding documentation. (Wild rice is probably in this category,
and lndian concerns about infringements in this atea ate acute.)"( Secretariat for Social Development, May 26, 1975:4)
It was recommended: (#4)"That the discussions already initiated concerning the use and
development of the wild rice resource be pursued expeditiously." lt is clear that Ontario
had no notion of the Paypom Treaty promise regarding manomin (Chapter 6).
ln 1977, the Minister of Natural resources proposed to replace the Wild Rice
Harvesting Act, eliminating the large "block areas", and 'protect' smaller "traditional"
areas for Native pickers. There would be two classes of licences: commercial, and
pr¡vale, for those who wished to pick less than 50 lbs. The guidelines also proposed to
give the first right of refusal to Ontario processors. The only actively-operating wild
rice processor in Northwestern Ontario was Bernier's campaign manager, Ben Ratuski
of Shoal Lake Wild Rice in Keewatin (Avery & Pawlik 1979:36; Pawlik 1979:48-49).
Grand Council Treaty #3 understood that a major offensive must be launched to
combat the Ministry's proposals. ln November 1977, afler Grand Council Treaty #3
lobbied opposition leaders to raise questions in the Legislature, the Minister of Natural
Resources, Hon. Frank Miller, replied with the same slanderous innuendo used by his
257
predecessor. MNR was consulting with Grand Council Treaty #3 on changes to their
policy on wild rice but he didn't intend to see "95% of the crop wasted.. if they (ed:
lndians) are not really able to use modern techniques to harvest wild rice" (Ontario
Legislative Debates, November 10, 1977:1738). The opportunity for GCT3 to bring the
full force of moral authority - with attendant press coverage - presented itself in the
hearings of the Ontario Royal Commission on the Northern Environment (RCNE).
ln 1977, Premier Bill Davis announced his appointment of Justice Patrick Hartt
of the Supreme Court of Ontario to head the Royal Commission. The RCNE was the
Premier's answer to joint environmental and Native attacks against his Tory
government, who had secretly let a huge timber tract north of the 50th parallel to the
Reed Company of Dryden. Reed was the same company held responsible for mercury
pollution of the English-Wabigoon river syslem, which threatened the lives of Grassy
Narrows and Whitedog First Nations within Treaty #3. Although the focus of the RCNE
was to be the impact of leasing huge timber rights and other development north of 50,
Grand Council Treaty #3 convinced the Commissioner to learn about abuses that had
occurred in Treaty #3 territory, most of which lay south of the CNR line. (Four of
Treaty #3 territory First Nations - Grassy Narrows and Whitedog (now Wabeseemong),
Wabuskang and Lac Seul- are situated to the north of that line.). Thus, Treaty #3
lobbied to hold lhe 1977-78 hearings in its territory, gained public participation funds
from the Commission, encouraged the Commissioner to hire a Treaty #3 liaison who was
knowledgeable of their people and area s , and made major presentations in Kenora and
Dryden, as well as other smaller intervenlions at Geraldton and Toronto. Hearings were
also held in Whiledog, to hear firsthand the impact of mercury pollution and the First
Nation's proposals for the future. The impact of Treaty #3's presence was felt in Justice
Hartt's recommendations.
252
Grand Council Treaty #3 was joined by individual bands such as Grassy Narrows
and the Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-cop in emphasizing wild rice as an Anishinaabe
resource under attack:
"For many years trap-lines were held exclusively by native families who
harvested their own particular areas. Then the government came along
and told us they were going to register trap-lines and manage the taking
of furs. They said they were doing it for our own good. But it was not many
years before trap-lines started to pass from the old native families to
friends of government officials. The people on the reserves tell us that the
government is now saying the same things about wild rice as it used to say
about trapping."
Grand Chief John P. Kelly, "We are All in the Ojibway Circle",
Presentation to RCNE, in Ondaatje 1990 :587
"My people wish to harvest wild rice in the traditional way. But, most
importantly, my people look on wild rice as theirs to harvest by right. lt
is an lndian resource, not a white resource. We will fight anyone on any
battleground to defend our wild rice rights."
Man-O-Min Wild Rice lndian Co-operative, Sioux Lookout hearing,
p.211; RCNE lssues Report 1978:105
" The government, of course, claims my people do not exploit the wild rice
efficiently enough ..But allow me to point out once again that the white
man at one time claimed that lndians were not efficient at harvesting
buffalo, and everyone knows what happened to the buffalo."
Chief Philip Gardner, Treaty #3 Presentation to RCNE, Dryden, 1977.
RCNE lssues Report 1978:107
Justice Hartt's lnterim report was tabled by the Premier in the Legislature
April 4, 1978. Hartt argued that the problem Native people in northern Ontario faced
"is largely due to lack of opportunity in the communities and this lack of opporlunity is
directly due to the absence of a resource base" (RCNE 1978:21). Hartt heeded the voice
of Treaty #3, and Nishnawbe Aski Nation (NAN) First Nations such as Osnaburg, that
"wíld rice, this important traditional base of their economy and culture may be lost to
them through proposed Government change to the wild rice policy" (1978:19). He
recommended that "the lndians be given the opportunity to develop a viable wild rice
industry on their own", with "rìo new licences to non-lndians allowed in the next five
years and governmenl assistance in water control structures, appropriate research and
training" (1978:38,41).
253
Grand Council Treaty #3 applauded the RCNE recommendations. They lobbied the
legislature, including NDP leader Stephen Lewis and Liberal leader of the Opposition
Stuart Smith, vigourously, and question period was often peppered with queries to the
government about its intentions regarding wild rice in Treaty #3.
The provincial government's five or six year emphasis on a "wasted resource"
had fostered anti-lndian, 'pro-development' voices. The "whitelash" (as Tobasonakwut
Kinew called the backlash to any pro-lndian policies) was immediate. On April B,
1978, "a group of non-native northerners involved in wild rice production joined
together to form the Wild Rice Producers Association (OWRPA). Their express purpose
was to:
"...protect and promote the development of the wild rice industry
in Ontario. We request the Ontario government to reject the
recommendation on wild rice by Mr. Justice Patrick Hartt as it is
discriminatory and not in the best interests of future economic growth
and development of the north. We ask that the Ontario government adopt a
policy for wild rice that would enable and encourage the development of
this renewable resource in Ontario for the benefit of all Ontario
residents."
emphasis added, Kenora Daily Miner and News, April 10, 1978,
quoted in the RCNE "lssues" Report 1978 :105
On May 16, 1978, the Premier announced his government's policy on wild rice.
He had given "careful consideration" to Justice Hartt's recommendation. He prefaced his
commenÌs by saying that the Commissioner's premise that "present markets are limited
and future markets uncertain...", and "thal any expansion of wild rice production by
non-lndian producers could jeporadize the lndians' industry" would "require future
testing". Davis also noted the "concerns" of non-lndians and non-status lndians and
Metis who wished greater access to wild rice harvesting areas. 6 Ontario had already
agreed to deal with this "complex and sensitive issue" through the tripartite process, and
a working group on wild rice "is now being established". Nevertheless, in the interests
of "arriving at solutions satisfactory to all parties", Ontario tabled the following five
year program:
254
"1. ln accordance with current policy, only lndian bands will be licensed
to harvest wild rice in the Kenora and Dryden district for the coming
1978 season.
2. Outside the Kenora and Dryden district all 1977 licenses will be
renewed for 1978 and annually thereafter.
3. Effective immediately Ontario will extend its efforts to assist lndian
licensees to develop appropriate technology and to increase utilization of
the available crop with the primary objective of establishing an economic
base for the involved lndian communities.
4. The tripartite working group on wild rice should give the highest
priority to the determination of current and future markets for Ontario
wild rice. The first report should be no later than January of 1979.
5. No additional licenses will be issued to non-lndians during the next five
years unless it can be demonstrated to the tripartite working group that
market potential for Ontario wild rice is sufficient to support an
increased share of production by non-lndians without jeporadizing our
efforts to establish wild rice production as a viable economic base for the
lndian people.
6. ln keeping with the spirit of the Hartt Commission that all northerners
should be involved in the determination of northern issues, we propose
the tripartite working group on wild rice be expanded to include
representation of the Ontario Wild Rice Producers Association and the
Ontario Metis and Non-Status lndian Association.
Grand Council Treaty #3 celebrated the announcement of a moratorium. lt was truly an
historic first in the government listening to the Anishinaabe people.
Actually, Bill Davis had listened to his own appointee, Justice Patrick Hartt.
Davis knew well of Bernier's views and his widespread political support across northern
Ontario. The Premier asked the Commissioner, a long time friend, why he should accept
his recommendation, with all the political risks well known to him. Justice Hartt had
been thoroughly touched by lhe Anishinaabe people of the north. He simply replied,
"Because it's the right thing lo do." 7
Not everyone agreed. ln headlines in the Kenora Daily Miner & News, the Fort
Frances Times and the Dryden Observer, northern spokesmen blasted the government
with cries of "reverse racism" . The Kenora Miner & News editor stated: "The lndians
need to get cracking in the next five years ... or there'll be no justification whatsoever to
255
enforcing a closed shop on non-natives after that" (Avery & Pawlick 1979:46). The
non-lndian Ontario Wild Rice Producers Association (OWRPA), and another group,
Heritage Ontario, were established in the wake of the Ontario wild rice moratorium. Both
groups were founded by Hugh Carlson of Red Lake, Ontario, a bush pilot who had sown
northern, fly-in lakes with wild rice, and wanted to protect his investment from what
he perceived to be "groundless" claims of treaty rights. The view of these two groups
was that the Ontario government should protect the rights of its citizens to resources
within its boundaries. Any allocation of ricing areas to lndians under the 1960 Ontario
Wild Rice Harvesting Act was considered a violation of the "equal rights of all citizens".
As secretary of the OWRPA, Ron Bell of Red Lake stated, "Somewhere along the line, we
all have to be considered natives. None of us has lived here any longer than we are old"
(Avery & Pawlick 1979:36).
Government policy both reflected and fostered such talk by juxtaposing citizens'
rights to resources versus lndian "privilege". This was the Conservative government
agenda during the 1970's. lndeed, the RCNE lnterim report and the Premier's announced
moratorium on wild rice harvesting licences drew the full wrath from non-lndians that
Cabinet Minister Bernier had encouraged.
Grand Council Treaty #3 was presented with the opportunity to ensure Premier
Davis' recommendations were implemented. Early in 1978, the National lndian
Brotherhood withdrew from the bilateral mechanism with the federal Cabinet (Weaver
1985). At this time, lhe Chiefs of Ontario (of which Grand Council Treaty #3 was a
member and its Grand Chief an Executive member 8) reached agreement with Ontario and
Canada to establish a triprtite process to resolve disputes.
The Tripartite Council was established in March 1978.9 At the first March
meeting chaired by the Minister of lndian Affairs, Hon. Hugh Faulkner, agreement was
reached among federal-provincial Ministers and the leaders of the lndian associations on
the tripartite structure. The Ministers and Presidenls in the Tripartite Council would
256
decide the issues to be addressed and provide direction. Subcommittees of staff would
research and analyze issues in "working groups" . They would make recommendations to
a Joint Steering Committee level of Deputy Ministers, and then on to the Tripartite
Council to provide the political response.
Through joint federal-provincial orders in council and approval of the All
Ontario Chiefs' Assembly, the lndian Commission of Ontario was established. Justice
Hartt was appointed its first Commissioner. (He also remained as Commissioner of the
RCNE.) The ICO was given the mandate to facilitate the resolution of outstanding issues
with status lndians. The ICO was to act as an independent body to facilitate talks at the
Tripartite Council, and was mandated by all three parties to act as chair, secretariat,
and facilitator, yet with no enforceable powers of mediation or adjudication (DEL
Community Organization Services lnc. 1982: 21).
At the fourth annual Assembly of Chiefs of Ontario, the Chiefs by resolution gave
a mandate to the Executive Council of the Chiefs of Ontario "to participate in the
tripartite mechanism and ensure that forums are developed in which issues of direct
concern to lndian people of Ontario can be negotiated and resolved ... to the satisfaction of
the lndian people and bands involved" (78130). (Figure #34). ln deciding the
Tripartie agenda, Treaty #3 Grand Chief John Kelly ensured that Treaty #3 interests
were prominent among the four areas of immediate concern: wild rice harvesting, social
services, hunting and fishing (raised by the lndian Associalions) and lands and resources
(raised by Ontario) (Del 1982:16).
The working group on wild rice assumed responsibility for:
"(1) ascertaining lndian rights to harvest wild rice;(2) recommending steps to ensure a viable industry producing the
greatest economic benefit to lndian people and the Provincial economy"
Del 1982:18-19.
The Joint Steering Committee (JSC) level of senior officials from all three
parties (Treaty #3 representing all the Chiefs of Ontario; Ontario; Canada) met on June
19, 1978. Their terms of reference had two major objectives:
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involvment in the Tripart;te
258
"(a) to recommend a mutually agreeable policy regarding lndian rights to harvest wild
rice by establishing the historical (including Treaty), cultural, religious and economic
importance of wild rice to lndian and non-lndian people.
(b) to recommend a mutually agreeable wild rice development policy that will ensure a
viable industry producing the greatest economic benefit to lndian people, and to the
Provincial economy consistenl with 5 (a)[ed:the Premier's statement], by studying in
detail all aspects of the growing, harvesting, processing and marketing of wild rice,
including paddy rice, particularly but not exclusively in northwestern Ontario. "
lmmediately, problems beset the process. As announced by the Premier May
1Bth, the province insisted that the Ontario Wild Rice Producers Association (OWRPA)
and the Ontario Metis and Non-Status lndian Association (OMNSIA) have seats on the
working group and be involved in any discussions regarding development of the wild rice
industry. Ontario was pursuing its emphasis on rice as a crown resource and its policy
that lndians had "privileges", not rights, regarding that resource. Grand Council Treaty
#3, however, was just as certain that those groups would not sit at the table to make
policy. ln the view of Treaty #3, only Anishinaabeg had a treaty and aboriginal right to
manomin . After vehement objections from Treaty #3 Grand Chief John Kelly, the two
organizations (OMNSIA and OWRPA) were inviled to send representatives only to a newly
named "task force" level. The task force would deal with wild rice development policy
while the working group was to address the lndian rights policy.
By January 1979, the working group completed its terms of reference for the
proposed task force to be considered by the steering committee. The report Premier
Davis recommended in item 4 of his May announcement was tabled February 1979. Prof.
M.A. MacGregor of the School of Agricultural Economics and Extension Education,
University of Guelph, recommended that a research program of field and bench research
be undertaken to "establish wild rice as a commercial crop in Ontario" (MacGregor
1979:17). ln his concluding comments, the author engaged prof. J.B. Robinson, a
specialist in applied aquatic biology at Guelph, to "observe and analyze the existing
situation". Prof. Robinson's comments musl have taken some wind out of OWRPA and
MNR 's sails; he slated "the current moratorium on new licences for wild rice
259
development is generally good" because "it would ensure that major development errors
are not made over larger areas (such as fertilization, introduction of new breeds into
new areas which may not accept other more favourable varieties in the future, or wash-
out of some component in sediment that is required but noÌ yet known). Further, Prof.
Robinson stated that "we met no licensee who even came close to satisfactory development
of the rice areas under his control".. and advised caution about "possibly irreversible
and potentially damaging activities". He also supported a research program which would
give licensees "incentive to manage their present holdings more carefully "(MacGregor
1 97 9:21 -22) .
The JSC tried to find a high profile chair of the task force, but instead, due to the
political strains and the MacGregor report, the task force idea was abolished by
September of 1979 (Del 1982:54-55). The wild rice working group met ten times
from June 1978 to January 1979, with the federal government as chair. The working
group was instructed by the JSC to examine the boundaries between the rights policy and
the industry policy. ln turn, the working group recommended a study on the cultural and
religious significance of wild rice in lndian culture. The working group also promoted
lhe idea of an "lndustrial Market Study" and proposals by Treaty #3 for studies on water
levels and a survey of stands and yields. No funding was approved for any of these studies.
ln 1981 , ICO undertook an evaluation of the working groups for the JSC and
attempted to recovene the group on wild rice. Based on their frustration of no follow
through from the first ten meetings, Grand Council Treaty #3 representatives were
reluclant to get involved (Del 1982:56).
It has been observed that policy makers make decisions wilhin a framnwork
which restricts their range of options. This was as true for Grand Council Treaty #3 as
it was for the Province of Ontario.
260
The Ontario government became clearer in its intent. They tabled a position
paper with the Ïripartile process. Entitled, "Negotiating Position, 'lndian Rights to Wild
Rice"', Ontario summarized their position as:
"Ontario is prepared to recognize specific areas where wild rice has been
commonly harvested by the lndian people, and Ontario will ensure that the
privilege of harvesting wild rice on these areas will be reserved for and
granted lo lndian people. " August 1979. (emphasis added)
Onlario's negotiating position was developed despite Treaty #3 Grand Chief John Kelly's
statement to Premier Davis in August 1978 that "manomin (wild rice) is an exclusive
lndian right" (OMNR Negotiating Position, August 1979:3). Ontario stated that Grand
Council Treaty #3 had presented "no substantiation ..to indicate that there is any legal
basis (i.e., wild rice is not mentioned in treaties) for the lndian claim that wild rice
belongs to them, exclusively or otherwise". (oMNR Negotiating Position, August
1 979:3).
By that dale, Grand Council Treaty #3 had not tabled documentary evidence to the
tripartite forum, although they had presented an overview to the Lake of the Woods
Control Board in 1975 ("Wild Rice in Early Historical Records", by Leo Waisberg of
Treaties and Aboriginal Rights Research, Grand Council Treaty #3). There were a
number of reasons why the Chiefs' association did not table any documentary evidence.
Fundamentally, the Chiefs had no wish to re-negotiate their treaty, nor did they want to
be perceived as doing so. First, the Treaty #3 leaders were secure in their oral
tradition, lhal manomln was theirs. Secondly, they had not seen any forum yet conceived
where written, documentary evidence had assisted the cause of their people.10 Thirdly,
the Paypom Treaty was in the safe-keeping of Elder Paypom of Washagamis Bay and he
did not agree to show it to the public until 1981, during the Governor General's visit to
the site of the signing of Treaty #3 (Chapter 6). ln 1979, Grand Council Treaty #3 d¡d
take the precaution of having Trealy Research Director, Sam Copenace Sr., videotape his
interview with Elder Allan Paypom talking about and holding the parchment treaty.
267
After the debacle of the working group early recommendations and the absence of
follow through at higher levels, it took some convincing to revive Grand Council Treaty
#3 interest in the tripartite level. Treaty #3 Chiefs'advisor on wild rice, Chief Peter
Kelly, recommended to Treaty #3 Grand Chief Robin Greene that Treaty #3 obtain the
services of Stephen Lewis, consultant and former NDP Leader of the Opposition in
Onlario. ln late 1979, Mr. Lewis agreed to lobby for effective action regarding wild rice
in Treaty #3, and brought his assistant, Celia Chassels, to work out of the Kenora Treaty
#3 office. 12
Mr. Lewis worked with Grand Chief Robin Greene and Chief Peter Kelly in making
high level federal and provincial contacts to ensure Davis' recommendations were acted
upon. The campaign began February 1980 with a major presentation to Justice Hartt.
GCTS suggested that lhe contentious issue ' rights to rice' be held in abeyance. "We do not
want the tripartite process to be rendered obsolete by these irreconcilable differences."
(Brief by Grand Council Treaty #3 to lndian Commissioner of Ontario, Feb.29,
1980:4). lnstead, the Commissioner should urge the federal and provincial governments
lo concentrate on implementing the focus of Premier Davis' moratorium on new licences
for wild rice: to develop a mutually agreed upon provincial policy. The Grand Council
urged action by the working group on water levels, research on MNR statistics,
development of Native wild rice industry, and needs of individual bands and groups of
bands (Feb.29,1980: 4).
The Grand Council also spelled out how the federal government had worked
covertly with Ontario in developing a comprehensive wild rice plan, tabled in November
1979. lndian Affairs had made one glaring omission - no one spoke with Grand Council
Treaty #3 or those reserves. Needless to say, that policy was doomed from the start.
Grand Council Treaty #3 explained to Juslice Hartt the "moratorium pressure"
they were under. They placed some onus on the Commissioner to act because his
recommendation for a moratorium had "started a course of history which is now
262
unfolding". Treaty #3 supposed, lhe 1980 expiry of the ICO mandate could mean either
the ICO ended or the appointment of a successor commissioner not as empathetic as
Justice Hartt. Then, at the end of the moratorium, MNR would publicize the McGregor
report as 'proof' that markets exist that will not harm a native wild rice industry. This
would be done - even though McGregor did not investigate markets but rather presumed
lhey existed. "Our (Treaty #3) comments will sound like 'sour grapes' to the public and
the cabinet will rest easy making its decision to open up our ricing areas." (Grand
Council Treaty #3 to Hartt, Feb.29, 1980:9). Or, even with an extension to the
moratorium, without governmental assistance to contain water levels and develop a
native industry, the Ontario Wild Rice Producers Association will develop their industry
around us. The moratoríum would then end "with only the OWRPA as our market outlets
and development expertise!" The Grand Council stated that the moratorium
"was established to serve notice to non-lndians, not lndian people. Rice is
our right. We do not lose this right at the end of some arbitrary deadline.
No one negotiated this with us. We appreciate this moratorium was the
only way you saw of staving off the Ministry of Natural Resources' policy
revisions to open up our block areas to white developers. We appreciate
your efforts in convincing the Premier of the justice of our cause... we
urge you not to relax your stand." (ibid).
Justice Hartt followed through with letters to all Ministers involved with Tripartite,
calling for action.
At the same lime as the higher level political action, Lewis assigned Celia
Chassels to undertake internal Treaty #3 work by visiting every First Nation, with
Treaty #3 staff, to discuss wild rice issues. Their task was to bring the message home
thal Grand Council Treaty #3 was working politically to ensure Treaty rights to rice
were protected, and everyone needed to address this urgently. All pickers were
encouraged to protect their rights, for example, by making sure they harvested their
areas. Chassels gathered data from the Grand Council and member bands, and surveyed
the pickers by interviewing key people in each community. Prior to ricing season, she
ensured that buyers' prices and other information went out to the bands. This
263
information was key to Lewis & P. Kelly influencing DIAND to release economic
development dollars for rice buying, seeding, processing and equipment in the 1980
season (See Chapter 11).
Yet, unbeknownst to Grand Council Treaty #3, a researcher who had volunteered
her time to draw together wild rice information (from universities and businesses on
rice growth, methodologies for measuring harvests, relationships among buyers) had
left the Grand Council to arrange a contract for herself with the Department of lndian
Affairs. That researcher took the knowledge she gained from documented evidence and
references which Grand Council Treaty #3 Treaties and Aboriginal Rights Research had
built over several years in preparation for political and court action, or either of them.
She also took the knowledge given her by Anishinaabeg about the Paypom Treaty. Then
she wrote a report of archeological and historical background to the Treaty #3 right to
rice, passing it as her own original research. The Grand Council did not know and could
not prevent this sieve of information. The Paypom Treaty became known to the
Department of lndian Affairs before the Grand Council could prepare its offensive.
Fortunately, however, the evidence for Treaty #3's position was compelling and did
convince the Minister of lndian Affairs, Hon. John Munro and his staff. The Minister
wrote the lndian Commissioner, Justice Hartt, in June 1980:
"Until recently, the federal government has not commented substantively
on the rights issue. Recently, however, we have undertaken research in
the area, and as a result are now able to offer information that should
help to clarify the issue.
This anthropological and historical research has uncovered solid evidence
that wild rice has been of supreme importance to the lndians of the Treaty
#3 area for the past 2,500 years (and probably longer). During the
search, the archives also yielded
original notes taken by federal and lndian representatives at meetings
preliminary to the signing of Treaty #3.. These notes make it clear that
the lndians were assured that they would maintain their traditional and
historical rights to wild rice. An original, hand-written, vernacular
language copy of the treaty that was agreed to by the chiefs of rreaty #3
is currently in the possession of chief Allan paypom of washagamis Bay
Band. ...There is also evidence that the 'official treaty' was actually
written one year prior to its official signing and prior to the above
meetings.
264
ln my view, this new information would indicate that the lndians
of Treaty #3 can make substantial arguments regarding their claims to
historical and treaty rights to wild rice throughout the 55,000 square
miles that constitute the Treaty #3 area. A resolution to this rights
questions should, I believe, be sought through the tripartite forum as soon
as possible."
(June 26, 1981 Hon. John Munro to Justice Hartt, ICO)
The Minister also recommended funding the study of water levels, strengthening the
bands' traditional wild rice committees to deal with poaching and other matters, and
called on the Commissioner to ensure "the tripartite forum take a lead role in
determining the types and amounts of funding and expertise necessary to develop the wild
rice industry".
The Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources was clearly as surprised by the the
new revelations in Munro's letter about the Paypom treaty, as they were by the federal
support for the Grand Council. ln a meeting a month later with MNR tripartite working
group member Rick Monzon, a Trealy #3 staff reported that Monzon felt Munro's
information "puts the rights questions into a completely different light and the province
would have to examine its position". However, MNR still wanted to "negotiate the rights
issue" in tripartite, while Treaty #3 said that there would be no negotiation of rights,
only of economic assistance. (25 July 1980, Grand Council Treaty #3 staff report on
meeting with Rick Monzon).
During the GCT3 consultation with First Nations, issues that were presented by
the pickers became the main agenda items at lhe political meetings with the Province
lhat Lewis arranged and Hartt encouraged: water levels, Treaty rights, poaching.
Chassels worked with rreaty #3 staff to produce a pamphlet for all rreaty #3
harvesters. (Appendix 10) Grand Council Treaty #3 commissioned Couchichiching First
Nation artist Wayne Yerxa to design a logo that would raise the profile and pride in being
Treaty #3 harveslers.(Figure 35) Yerxa's logo adorned the pamphlet and "Anishinaabe
265
35. Treaty #3
Wayne
one of
Rice Pickers' Button, Anishinahbe Manomin,Yerxa, Couchiching First Nation, descendentthe original signators of Treaty #3, 1BZ3
designed by
of Migissíns,
ANISHINAHBE
266
Manomin" buttons handed out at PowWows and other public events or visits at reserves.
Pamphlets were senl to all band offices with requests to deliver to each house.
Through these buttons and pamphlets, Treaty #3 harvesters were told "Our
rights to rice (are) attacked" and they were urged to act on their rights by respecting
the rice, ensuring they followed the traditions of the Elders in their communities, and
protect their areas against poachers. The reasoning - and fear - was that non-lndians
would try to pick their block areas during the moratorium. What started as a pamphlet
to assist pickers against poachers became more all-emcompassing when Grand Chief
Robin Green wanted rights and responsibilities of lhe An¡shinaabeg made clear so that
there would be no recognition of provincial authority. He called for an lndian Wild Rice
Harvesting Act (as he said should have been the case in the first instance of any
legislation). For the immediate future, the Grand Council Treaty #3 and Lewis
strategized that the bands would rely upon their own resources and tell "MNR that we
don't recognize the Wild Rice Harvesting Act or their conservation officers". A letter to
the Province was drafted to that effect. (June 15, 1980. Notes of special Grand Council
Executive meeling with S. Lewis).
The suggestion that MNR game wardens should be notified to evict or charge
poachers was a contentious one. Some in Treaty #3 suggested that such requests would
demonstrate that MNR had neither the manpower nor the knowhow to manage the
harvest; others worried if this might be framed later as an acknowledgement by Treaty
#3 bands of the raison d'elre for provincial management. However, the final policy
decision was two-fold: call for the end of the Ontario Wild Rice Harvestinq Act, and in the
!-nled-!L, use the Act's recognition of huge block areas and MNR's automatic renewal of
First Nations licences in Treaty #3 (whether returns filed annually or ignored by the
First Nations) as de facto evidence that Treaty #3 guaranteed ricing forever.
Lewis tried to persuade Treaty #3 political leaders to include MNR in dealing
with poaching infractions as a way of involving them in the overall tripartite process. lf
267
so, this would have been a case of an outside political professional advising practicality
over long term implications. Lewis argued for measures to ensure improvement in the
immediacy of retaining the whole harvest. Grand Council Treaty #3 saw beyond this,
however. They had consistently raised their stand of exclusive use to all aspects of
manomin based on Treaty and aboriginal rights in all fora. Such an argument was
accepted as imporlant by Lewis but not considered saleable to Queen's Park: treaty rights
was a "non-starter" in discussions with government politicos.l2 The political
environment in Ontario was such that Treaty #3 leaders wanted to meet the immediate
danger of MNR and Bernier's policies and ensure that they did not go through the
Conservative majority at Queen's Park. Lewis argued that Grand Council Treaty #3
would win public support through evidence that they were harvesting the "available
crop", contrary lo MNR propoganda. Lewis argued that Treaty #3 should continue to
make their point about rights, but do what he considered to be achievable. Grand Council
Treaty #3 insisted on the two-pronged strategy to ensure that their treaty was
paramount.
Grand Council Treaty #3 was assisted in gaining positive press and in lobbying
MPPs by the Canadian Association in Support of Native Peoples (CASNP) Toronto
chapter, and Ten Days for World Development, a lobby group of the United Church.
lndeed, during 1979-83, one Toronto woman, Betty Stone, who was actively promoting a
Christian sense of justice within the Ten Days for World Development of the United
Church, undertook much lobbying for Treaty #3. Stone was responsible for prompting
the writing of numerous letters to MPPs and MPs, the organizing of church meetings and
workshops , and keeping wild rice as a high profile issue within the church and social
action groups. 12
Grand Council Treaty #3 was able to accomplish much of its work in wild rice,
268
holding meetings, assigning slaff, contracting the services of Stephen Lewis, through a
grant received from lndian Affairs in 1979-80 and 1980-81. However, this funding
ended, and no specific representative was able to be appointed by the Chiefs to continue.
The Grand Chief and TARR staff continued to pursue lhis issue as the high priority the
Chiefs deemed it to be.
During 1980, the GCT3 learned that the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources
had continued to authorize licences to non-lndians in Treaty #3 territory. MNR
superiors told staff that it was perfectly alright to offer permits for personal use up to
50 pounds, and to continue permits to people who had started seeding and harvesting
operations prior to the moratorium (March 9, 1980 Executive Coordinator, Outdoor
recreation, MNR to Reginal Directors). Grand Council Treaty #3 objected strenuously
through the tripartite process. Justice Hartt wrote the Minister for a clarification, and
was given the Natural Resources'view that Davis'1978 announcement of "no new
licences" allow them to do this. However, the furour caused by the Grand Council led to
MNR limiting its renewals only to ricefields actively used in the northern and eastern
Treaty #3 territory of Treaty #3. (Some of these eastern lakes near lgnace had been
seeded by Mr. Ben Ratuski, Mr. Bernier's friend, in cooperation with MNR and Dr. Peter
Lee's research.)
ln 1980, the Ministry of Northern Affairs began funding a five year research
program to Dr. Lee at Lakehead University, on developing lake wild rice (Lee 1979).
Grand Council Treaty #3 challenged the propriety of Ontario granting - without Grand
Council Treaty #3 consultation - such funding to Dr. Lee during the moratorium.
Practical MNR assistance to First Nations to "build a Native industry" had yet to
materialize. MNR replied that they were sure Dr. Lee would be glad to share his
research, if the Grand Council wished lo ask him (Hon. Alan Pope, Minister of Natural
Resources to Treaty #3 Grand Chief Greene, June 26, 1gB1).
269
Grand Council Treaty #3 made the most of opportunities within its own fora. ln
December 1980, at Ottawa, Treaty #3 delegales were among those who framed the
"Declaration of Chiefs" of the Assembly of Chiefs from across Canada. The Declaration
stated clearly "the Great Spirit put us here and gave us laws to govern us". lt was passed
unanimously in the assembly (which greeted the Constitutional Express Train of First
Nalions protestors from BC on eastward) and was presented to the Governor General
(Appendix 12). At the 1981 Ontario Chiefs'Assembly, Grand Council Treaty #3 won
acceptance of wild rice as a rallying symbol ot an Anishinaabe treaty and aboriginal right
at risk in constitutional wrangles (Appendix 13).
This resolution raised the profile and the stakes considerably from earlier COO
resolulions which urged that wild rice harvesting "be left as an lndian right"
(1975131) and which later pressed for support for "an lndian wild rice industry"
(1 e7 e t26) .
By 1981-82, Grand Council Treaty #3 was involved with other PTOs through
their association, Chiefs of Ontario, to negotiate a new fishing regime with the Province
of Ontario which would recognize "lndian rights" to fishing. These complex discussions
involved frequent and direct consultation with fishermen and women in First Nations of
Treaty #3 and across the Province. At the end, the Ontario Minister of Natural
Resources, Hon. Alan Pope, signed an agreement with all PTOs, but Hon. John Munro, the
federal Minister of lndian Affairs, refused. Munro called for more public consultation.
The agreement blew up in a backlash of public reaction against the deal, which many
perceived as taking "their" fish resource away and "giving" it to the lndians (Library of
Parliament, Canada 1987; Avery 19BB). The political fallout was 1o haunt relations
between Anishinaabeg (and other PTOs and First Nations in Ontario) and MNR for years
to come. The Minister of Natural Resources had stuck his neck out and had been
undermined by the federal government and lambasted by the public. ln future years, the
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources was to prove itself very reluctant to go so far on
270
any resource issue involving lndians, deferring always to the need for public
consultation.
During this same heated time, the Manitoba Department of Renewable Resources
was moving toward reorganization of its control of wild rice. ln 1981, the Province
cancelled all leases in the Whiteshell region (part of Treaty #3's western territory)
and allowed only hand-harvesters in that area. Manitoba set up a block system of five
areas of land and water traditionally used by five reserves for harvesting. The Pawley
government introduced new legislation for the "regulation and management of the
growing wild rice industry, designating some areas for exclusive hand-harvesting, and
olhers for exclusive aboriginal use. Aboriginal peoples were still permitted to harvest
anywhere on crown lands, providing it was for household purposes." (Aboriginal Justice
lnquiry 1991:'189). Manitoba's policy of granting a "leading role" to Aboriginal people
(without recognizing any basis in treaty or Aboriginal rights) was referred to and
approved by the Manitoba Human Rights Commission.
These proposals included the Treaty #3 area of the Whiteshell, southeastern
Manitoba, with no provision for Treaty #3 First Nations. Treaty #3 people had
traditionally picked there (Chapter 4), but their main settlements lay within Ontario's
designated borders. Grand Council Treaty #3 took action. They lobbied the NDP Premier
Pawley and Cabinet to recognize Treaty #3 rights to manomin in the Whiteshell area.
Grand Chief John Kelly and legal counsel appeared before a Legislative committee
reviewing the bill and gained opposition support to amend it. lt was of no avail.
The NDP Wild Rice Act made provisions for affirmative action allocaÌions of
licensed areas to Native peoples and such aboriginal ricers were required to be residents
of Manitoba. Grand Council Treaty #3 argued their Treaty rights protected and
reserved manomin exclusively to Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg in their own lerritory,.
(Treaty #3 First Nations were willing to make agreements with First Nations in
Manitoba regarding ricing areas). Meanwhile Aboriginal groups and First Nations in
277
Manitoba relied upon affirmative action. This latter approach proved to be a losing
proposition for Manitoba First Nations. When challenged in court by non-lndian rice
grower groups, these affirmative act¡on clauses in the Wild Rice Act were later struck
down (Report of the Aboriginal Justice lnquiry .i991: 189-190).
"The Manitoba lndians just caved in," says Charlie Perreault of Eagle Lake.
"We (in Treaty #3) would never do that. Manomin means too much to us.,'
lndeed, the Aboriginal Justice lnquiry of Manitoba addressed the issue of wild
rice rights, and noted Ìhat, " although the Wild Rice Act. 1984, does say that this Act is
"not intended to derogate from those rights,...this is not the same thing as accepting that
such rights exist in relation to wild rice and that provincial jurisdiction is restrained."
(Report of the lnquiry into the Administration of Justice in Manitoba1991:190). The
commissioners found Grand council rreaty #3 evidence to be compelling.
Manitoba's Aboriginal Justice lnquiry in its1991 final report stated that they could not
give their opinion of the Paypom document which they considered 1o be "before the
courts". However, the judges concurred that
"based upon a review of the information before us, the right to harvest
wild rice is, at least, an Aboriginal right. We believe that this Aboriginal
right encompasses both personal consumption and commercial purposes.
This right can be exercised on reserves and on Crown lands. As with other
Aboriginal rights, it now has constitutional protection." (Report of the
lnquiry into the Administration of Justice in Manitoba 1991:191).
The assembly of Treaty #3 Chiefs approved taking court action against Manitoba,
to recognize Treaty #3 ricing rights in their territory. A motion was filed in court,
however, lack of funds precluded proceeding. 14 This action remains, to be activated at
any lime by the Chiefs.
ln the meantime, Treaty #3 First Nations were very busy in numerous projects
to extend seeding into new lakes and rivers, purchase mechanical harvesters, develop
new processors or new sales for traditional processing, and form new business
272
relationships. 14 AÍter the Lewis-Kelly meeting with the Ottawa head of economic
development for lndian Affairs, the Department released some $1.2 million dollars in
1980 to assist such projects (July 13, 1981, Eugene Harrigan, Ontario Regional
Director General, INAC to Grand Chief Greene). Eagle Lake, as a different example,
"organized seeding, rice buying. and marketing, as well as lraditional and mechanical
harvesting all on their own, with no government money or assistance." ln addition, "this
band made sure thal they picked all of their harvesting area and policed their area
against poachers." (January 22, 1981 Peter Kelly/Kinew to E. Harrigan, INAC).
Similar projects continued into 1981 season, but were undermined by higher water
levels on Lake of the Woods. The Ministry of Natural Resources, however, tried to assert
its authority against what MNR considered to be the "uncontrolled seeding of lakes" and
sought an alliance with lndian Affairs economic development staff. They wanted to ensure
bands would refer designated lakes to MNR first whereupon they would check these lakes
for suitability and conflicting uses. There is no record of INAC's response but First
Nations were not cooperative with further provincial intrusion in Manito Gitigaan .
The Minister stated in a June 1981 letter to the Grand Chief that MNR wished to
know "some specifics which Treaty #3 believe are required from Ontario relative to
equipment, economics, assistance, etc. in order that the development of the wild rice
industry, as it relates to lndian people, can be increased in a substantive way." (June
26, 1981, Hon. A. Pope to Grand Chief Robin Greene). Grand Council Treaty #3
continued to refer this discussion to the tripartite level, where the federal government
would also be involved. The Grand Council read through what they considered to be the
Province's intentions. ln that same letter, the Minister requesled Treaty #3 First
Nations to identify "those areas you deem important...for the cultural and religious
significance of wild rice ... and we can take the necessary steps to protect them in order
lo conserve them for their continuing contribution to a traditional way of life"(ibid). lt
273
was clear to the Grand Council that identifying meant limiting their ricing areas. As
well, the Minister stated it was premature to consider an extension to the moratorium;
he was confident a mutually beneficial policy could be worked out (ibid).
The Grand Council's suspicions of Ontario seemed confirmed in November 1981,
after Elder Paypom had shown his parchment treaty to Governor General Schreyer. The
Miníster of Natural Resources continued to speak of Treaty #3's "special interests" in
wild rice. He affirmed the Province's "position that non-lndian people also have rights to
wild rice and I doubt that you or other members of the lndian people would refuse them
their rights" (November 18, 1981, Hon. A. Pope to Grand Chief J.p. Kelly).
At a December 1981 meeting of Tripartite Council, Grand Chief John Kelly
sought to offset the ICO's recommendation to suspend the working group on wild rice.
Funding arrangements for PTOs to participate more equally in tripartite negotiations had
been approved, OMNSIA and OWRPA were not invited to the January 1981 working group
meeting, and it was hoped that the negotiation of lndian rights was off the table - "We
will not renegotiate Treaty #3" (December 14,'1981, Grand Chief John Kelly to the
Tripartite Council). lnstead, the Grand Council proposed, in the hopes of reaching a
mutually agreeable interim policy, to disclose the Paypom document and related
evidence if Ontario withdrew its negotiating position. That proposal did not meet with
ready acceptance by Ontario.
It could be argued that during these days of the moratorium, 1978-1982, that
Grand Council Treaty #3 evolved from a lobbying organization of the 1970s into a
political arm of the First Nations of Treaty #3 in the 1980s . At first, the Grand Council
focussed its efforts, with the advice and guidance of Stephen Lewis, on lobbying and
ensuring that the moratorium fulfilled its promise. However, when high waler levels
prevented the potential of a secure economic base being establishedl6 , then the Grand
Council reviewed its political actions taken to date and reassessed its strategy.
274
Grand Council Treaty #3 continued to propose an exlension of the moratorium, as
notice to non-lndians regarding the Anishinaabe Treaty right. ln a grand display at
Northwest Angle in October 1981 , near the site where Treaty #3 was signed, Elder
Paypom showed the Governor General the terms of Treaty #3 that guaranteed wild rice
lo Anishinaabeg"as by the past". And Grand Chief Greene and Chief Charlie Nash spoke of
the need to go beyond five years of the moralorium (see Chapter 6). Shortly after re-
elected Grand Chief John P. Kelly raised the need for an extension to the moratorium in
tripartite fora. However, it became clear that the Ontario government was again
pursuing a policy of opening the ricing areas.
As a result of this renewed aggression on the part of OMNR in developing wild
rice policy, Grand Council Treaty #3 again relied upon the strength of its Treaty. lt had
always been emphasized by Treaty #3 Elders, as they proclaimed to Governor General
Schreyer in 1981 ,lhal manomin was given as agiftto :the Anishinaabeg by the Creator:
Manito Gitigaan , the Great Spirit's garden. Ontario was a mere interloper. The Chiefs
and Grand Chief had made this clear at numerous tripartite and other fora. Thus, the
Grand Council decided that the most appropriate action would be to ignore the end of the
moratorium. Their reasoning was, as they had told Justice Hartt in February 1980,
that the end of a provincial policy regarding an Anishinaabe resource was of no
consequence to the Anishinaabeg . Ontario had no jurisdiction over wild rice. Treaty #3
reserved manomin forever and exclusively to Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg .
To an outsider, an analysis of how such policy was adopted by the Grand Council
may find a turning point difficult to identify - or even a process of reaching this
conclusion and strategy. After all, the Grand Council had argued for the extension of the
moratorium. The Grand Council had an articling student review all aspects of the
moratorium and provincial ricing policies, and recommend specific courses of action
(Auger 1982). His analysis was a thorough summary of policies, economics and
business aspects of wild rice. Although cultural and treaty aspects were given a
275
respectful nod, extension to the moratorium and coordinated business development was
emphasized in its recommendations. lt was, however, an internal report out of touch
with the Chiefs and the politics of treaty and aboriginal rights by the 1980s.
Grand Council Treaty #3 was vigorously involved in political actions against
Prime Minister Trudeau's patriation of the constitution. Treaty #3 Chiefs and
organization staff were lobbying for the inclusion of specific clauses in the Constitution
to safeguard Treaty and Aboriginal rights. 17 Grand Chief Robin Green travelled with a
delegation of Chiefs and Elders from across Canada to London, England to make their case
to the Queen and the British Parliament (D. Sanders 1985). ln their own terrilory,
Treaty #3 decided to concentrate its energies on protecting and strengthening their
Treaty.
It can be seen that, in the 1978-1984 period, there were very real obstacles to
reaching goals set at the highest political level of the tripartite council. ln effect, the
Ministers and Grand Chiefs sent their representatives to steering committee and working
group meetings with political direclives which precluded any compromise for
agreemenls. The working group on wild rice was to continue, in fits and spurts, for
another few years. They considered a "Memorandum on Reference to Wild Rice"
(September 14, 1984, Ava Sutherland, Executive Director, Chiefs of Ontario, to Hon.
John Munro). This proposed memorandum called for the appointment of a mediator and
negotiators to assist in developing policies. lt also stated amendments would be made to
The Wild Rice Harvesting Act, R.S.O. c.'1980 c.532, "which will be in accordance with
the aboriginal and treaty rights of lndians in Ontario with respect to wild rice". The
Crown representalives refused to consider mediation, and this Memorandum of
Understanding approach was left to another day. (See Chapter 13). The lndian
Commission of Ontario was to state, in a later report of 1984 (lCO Wild Rice Reading
File), that
2-/ 6
"the special cultural significance of wild rice to lhe lndian people and a
basic disagreement over approaches to negotiations have contributed to
making this one of the most delicate issues to be dealt with under the
auspices of the Commission. ln fact, over the past six years, negotiations
have never progressed beyond preliminary discussions.
During the past year, ... agreement for terms of reference for negotiations
on wild rice rights ... provided for direct involvment of both the Minister
of Natural resources and the Grand Chief of Treaty #3. At a staff level
meeting , March 26, 1984, the parties considered the question of wild
rice rights and, in particular, the parties examined and discussed
documentation on which the respective legal opinions regarding wild rice
rights are based."
This led the parties to consider procedures for obtaining the evidence of Elder
Paypom that would preserve such evidence. Grand Council Treaty #3 wanted Ontario to
agree that such evidence would not be objected to as future court evidence. The Ontario
representative said that decision would have to be made by cabinet. Provincial or
Federal Orders in Council and a statutory declaration wilh cross-examination were all
options on the table. Elder Paypom died (at an estimated age of 86+) in August 1985,
before any inquiry was established. The parchment Paypom Treaty remains in the
possession of his daughter, Verna Paypom, at Washagamis Bay. The other record is the
Treaty #3 videotape of Elder Paypom being interviewed by then Treaty #3 Research
Director, Sam Copenace, in 1979. Mr. Copenace passed away in 1986.
Yet, how the Paypom Treaty would be used in a court of law 18 is not as important
to the Anishinaabeg of Treaty #3. What is significant to them is the history of the
Paypom Treaty, its first possession by Grand Chief Powassin from the 1873 Treaty
signing, and how it came to be with Paypom (Chapter 6). Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg know
the Paypom family takes care of that document for the future of the whole Treaty #3
Nation. For manomrn , Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg are "free as by the past" as the Paypom
Treaty states. The Paypom Treaty continues to play a prominent role in the public
affairs of Treaty #3 Firsl Nations. During constitutional discussions in 1982, Grand
277
Council Treaty #3 published a pamphlet quoting the document and explaining its origin
(Appendix 4 ).
This era of the mid 1970s to mid 1980s saw both very high profile, headline
grabbing political action by the Grand Council Treaty #3, as well as backroom lobbying.
It was a break from tradition: Anishinaabe leaders had not just walked the hallways of
political power, as their predecessors had in the 1930s (Chapter 7\.By the 1g8os,
Treaty #3 leaders were right in the offices of the Premier and Cabinet Ministers, in
Ottawa and Queen's Park. With the Tripartite Process, and other bilateral meetings,
Chiefs had come full circle since treaty-making: they were again at the same table as the
Crown, talking. ln the 1870s, it was Ottawa's acknowledgement of the military might of
the Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg , and their ability to disrupt westward expansion of
Canada, that brought the Crown to the treaty table. So too in the 1970s, it was the
violent reaction of the Anishinaabe youth, followed by concerted negotiations by
Anishinaabe leaders to capitalize on this crisis, that created new mechanisms for
resolving differences. lt remained to be seen whether the spirit and intent of the Treaty
promises would ever be realized through talk at the table.
410
Endnotes:
1. The Ojibway Warrior Society had made themselves known several months earlier by
occupying the offices of the Department of lndian Affairs at the post office building in
Kenora. They wished to dramatically change the way Anishinaabeg were treated and to
ensure decision-making was returned to the people. Prominent members included a
cross-section of Treaty #3 reserves - Louie Cameron of Whitedog, Tom Keesick of
Grassy Narrows, Joe Bird of Whitefish Bay, and Ron Seymour of Big Grassy, among
others.
The Ojibway Warrior Society convened lheAnishinaabe Youth Conference in July
at Anicinabe Park and invited speakers from the American lndian Movement (AlM)
Wounded Knee occupation in South Dakota (where they remained under seige by the FBI)
An the end of the three days, the youth decided to reclaim the Park where the conference
was held.
Anicinabe Park had been once set aside and listed as an agency reserve by the
federal Department of lndian Affairs. (During the occupation by the Warriors, Grand
Council Treaty #3 researched and published the history of that Park, which
demonstrated the lndian interest. The Grand Council filed a claim to that Park but INAC
refused to consider it valid. The occupation ended without a resolution to this land
ownership issue, rather, like the 1964 Kenora March, on the resolution of more
practical issues. (See Chapter Seven)
At that location, the Presbyterian Church had an "lndian House" where
Anishinaabeg could rest or stay overnight when visiting their children at nearby
residential schools, coming for checkups at the doctor or shopping in nearby stores. De
facto segregation existed in Kenora in the 1940s and 50s, when the "lndian House" was
used. Anishinaabeg were refused food or lodging in local Kenora establishments for many
years after that. A concerted testing of such places and laying of formal complaints
through the Ontario Human Rights Commission in the late.f 960s and 1970s proved
necessary to change this situation and open things up.
2. As a specific example, a Street Patrol of Native People was set up under the auspices
of the Neechee Friendship Centre in Kenora and funded by the Ontario government. This
patrol went on lo save hundreds of lives of people who live(d) on the streets of Kenora.
This program has won several safety and peace-keeping awards and continues into 19g5.
3. The same concerns were raised in '1993 regarding the Whitefish Bay First Nation
negotiating self government agreements with the federal and provincial governments.
The general public reaction was that "all citizens, aboriginal or otherwise, should have
equal access to publically owned resources" (Government of Ontario 1993:6). The
Northwestern Ontario Tourism Association "holds that access to resources is an inherent
right of the non-native citizen, as iÎ is of the native person" (Government of Ontario
1 993:1 7).
4. The methodology used to measure the wild rice crop in the 1970s and 1980s by the
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources was considered unreliable by Treaty #3
Anishinaabeg and outside observers. For example, Dr. Oelke at the University of
Minnesota, one of the scientists with the longest record of field research on wild rice,
queried, "Where do they (MNR) get such numbers (of harvest yield)? I've never seen
anything close." (Summer 1980, Ratkoff-Rajnoff report to Treaty #3).
Grand Council Treaty #3 accused MNR of " 'cooking' data to portray lndian people
as lazy and the crop as underutlizied", in order to open up the block areas to outsiders(Grand Council Treaty #3 to Hartt, Feb.29, 1980:6).
2-7 9
As well, MNR labels such as "available crop", "harvestable".. raised further
suspicions regarding their political purpose and public effect.
Grand Council Treaty #3 recommended an independent body of scientists work in
close conjuncton wilh Treaty #3 bands (ibid). MNR soon hired a biologist, Pritam Sain,
to carry out annual surveys. His survey techniques included extrapolations from field
samples as well as aerial surveys, but the criticisms remained, and no independent body
was consulted.
5. Kathi Avery Kinew worked for the RCNE as Treaty #3 liaison worker Sept.1977 Io
Sept.1978.
6. I am indebted to Paul Chartrand, Commissioner of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples, for pointing out such government tactics have been called "official fraud". He
refers to John Goddard, Last Stand of the Lubicon, Toronto: Douglas & Mclntyre, 1991.
7. This incident was oft quoted by senior and junior staff of the RCNE, of whom Kathi
Avery Kinew was a member 1977-1978. lt was welcomed as a validation of Justice
Hartt's effectiveness and in the worth of the whole Commission as an instrument of
positive change in the north.
8. The Chiefs of Ontario structure was agreed upon by the four associations - Grand
Council Treaty #3, Grand Council Treaty #9 (subsequently known as Nishinawbe-Aski
Nation (NAN)), Union of Ontario lndians (UOl) and the lroquois & Allied lndians
Association (AlAl). These four included, at lhat time, almost all 118 Chiefs and Councils
across the province. Each association would have its President or Grand Chief sit on the
Executive Council of the Chiefs of Ontario.
ln subsequent years, changes occurred to the make-up of the Executive Council.
After the National lndian Brotherhood reorganization into the Assembly of First Nations
in 1982, the Regional Chief for Ontario became a new position as an ExecuÌive member
of the AFN and a coordinator of initiatives at the provincial level. First Nations such as
Six Nations and Temi-Augami demanded and obtained their own seat as independents
(from the PTOs) and voice on the "Priorities and Planning Committee" of the COO. Thus,
representation at tripartite council meetings expanded accordingly.
9. "March 16, 1978 marks the formal beginning of the Tripartite Process. Agreement
was readily reached among the Presidents of the lndian Associations and the federal and
provincial ministers to their mutual purpose and mission. The parties were well
prepared for this decision. For three years, the President had met two or three times
per year with provincial Ministers through the Joint Steering Committee on Native
Affairs. The Presidents had also on less frequent occasions met directly with the
Premier. A similar paltern of bilateral talks had existed for several years with the the
federal Minister of lndian Affairs, with occasional meetings with other federal Ministers
and Cabinet and house committees" (Del 1982:15-16).
lmportantly, in the fall of 1974, the federal cabinet of Pierre Trudeau had
invited Native leaders to join in an historic and direct bilateral process of the NIB
leaders with federal cabinet ministers, led by Hon. Marc Lalonde. The invitation to
establish such a bílateral process came while Native Caravan protestors camped on
Parliament Hill and a nearby abandoned building. This joint Cabinet-NlB vehicle was
proposed in September 1974 after the summer occupation of Anicinabe Park in Treaty
#3, the road blockade at Cache Creek, 8.C., and the Native Caravan across Canada for the
opening of Parliament. That latter scene was also the first use of the riot squad of the
RCMP and the use of barbed wire to keep demonslrators away from Parliament. ln the
280
fall of 1977, after three years of talks had led to no progress, NIB leaders withdrew
from lhis process to pursue more effective routes (Weaver 1982).
10. The 1969 White Paper had disregarded all presentations by lndian people across
Canada and, in the view of Anishinaabeg , presented its prearranged agenda of ending
special status for lndians. The Paper established an lndian Claims Commissioner to
consider "specific claims" regarding the crown's "lawful obligations" to meet the
conditions of the federal lndian Act. In 1982, "lawful obligations" became the
centrepiece of the federal government's new "Specific Claims Policy", now much-
maligned (Savino 1989; lndian Commission of Ontario 1990). From 1969 to 1995,
only one claim has been settled in the Treaty #3 area. Although the federal government
officially shelved the White Paper in 1970, its recommendations are considered by
observers to be slowly implemented over the decades (Weaver 1981, 19BSa).
11. Mr. Lewis and Ms. Chassels were assisted in their work by Treaty #3 staff, notably
lhe Executive Director, Francis Kavanaugh of Whitefish Bay, and Kathi Avery Kinew,
who was then assistant Research Director of Treaties & Aboriginal Rights Research al
the Grand Council 1979-81 .
12. ln 1990, Stephen Lewis was also to relegate Treaty and Aboriginal rights issues to
lhe backburner in the "larger" considerations of keeping Canada together. Lewis joined a
cast of other eminent people who hysterically urged the approval of the ill-fated Meech
Lake Accord. He and others took this stand despite the Accord's enunciation of lhe "two
founding nations" theory. lt was the arrogance of Canada's First Ministers in reaching
this agreement in private, their cheering section of elites, and their ignorance of
Aboriginal peoples as the First Peoples of Canada with inherent rights, which ultimately
led to the downfall of the Accord. (See Chapter 13).
13. ln response to the oft-asked question, "what can one person do?", Betty Stone, a
United Church member in Toronto, became passionately devoted to understanding and
protecting Anishinaabe rights lo manomin . She singlehandedly organized workshops
where Treaty #3 representatives, Chief Peter Kelly (Kinew), Diane Kelly (Treaty #3
summer student) and Nancy Jones of Nicickousemenecaning First Nation, spoke of, and
demonstrated lhe harvesting, processing and cooking of wild rice to groups in Toronto,
Peterborough, and other cenlres. Mrs. Stone paid her own way to visit the ricefields of
Lake of the Woods, Treaty #3 in September 1981. She continued thereafter to organize
meetings and spearhead letter writing campaigns of members of United, Anglican,
Presbyterian, Lutheran and Catholic churches to provincial legislators and Cabinet
ministers.
14. Winnipeg lawyer Vic Savino prepared and registered the court documents, and
participated in strategy sessions with Treaty #3 political reps, Grand Council Treaty
#3 TARR and other legal counsel regarding actions in Ontario and Manitoba to protect
Treaty#3 rights.
15. The simplistic view promoted for public consumption is that Anishinaabeg arc
averse to technology. Rather Anishinaabeg arc aware of the toll that technology takes on
their people and culture. The reserves that use mechanical harvesters have adopted
policies that seek to ensure mechanical pickers either stick to specific bays, or do not
pick until the traditional hand pickers are finished. However, there are conflicts in
following such a policy, with handpickers feeling the pressure of the pickers with
machines who are "breathing down our necks".. The other problem is that mechanical
pickers do pick more in a shorter time than hand pickers - and who is to share in the
28I
profit? The owners of the mechanical pickers or the whole communily whose legacy is
the ricefield. What percentage, if any, should go to the reserve community?
16. Hon. Leo Bernier first mentionned possible control of water levels through the Lake
of the Woods Control Board when he presented renewed ideas to open up ricing areas to
non-lndians. His intention was clear to Treaty #3: as long as manomin remained within
lndian control, then it could expect no help from him or his powerful Ministry of
Northern Affairs. As Chief Andy White of Whitefish Bay First Nation stated in 1978, at
the beginning of the moratorium, "We could have a bad crop every year for five years,
Then the province will say, "See, the lndians can't manage the resource'. Then watch
them control the water levels." (Avery & Pawlik 1979:45). Chief Fred Copenace of Big
Grassy First Nation saw through the hyprocisy of the Ontario government, also in 1978,
"On the one hand, the Ministry of Natural resources says there's a $20 million dollar
crop on Lake of the Woods. Then they allow the Board to raise the water levels and drown
the ricel" (Avery & Pawlik 1979:44).
17. Ïrealy #3 politicians and technicians were instrumental in drafting clauses that
became s.15 and s.35 of the Constitution Act 1982. See also D. Sanders 1985:151-
189, regarding "The lndian Lobby and the Canadian Constitution 1978-1982".
18. However imporlant the potential finding of a court regarding the Paypom Treaty,
there remains other evidence which has been assessed sufficient to cause provincial
governments to ponder their actions. Manitoba's Aboriginal Juslice lnquiry in its 1991
final report stated that they could not give their opinion of the Paypom document which
they considered to be "before the courts". However, the judges concurred lhat "based
upon a review of the information before us, the right to harvest wild rice is, at least, an
Aboriginal right. We believe that this Aboriginal right encompasses both personal
consumption and commercial purposes. This right can be exercised on reserves and on
Crown lands. As with other Aboriginal rights, it now has constitutional protection." (AJl
1991:191).
282
Chapter Thirteen
lmplementing Treaty and Aboriginal Rights in the 1980s and 1990s
s.35 (1) "The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the
aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and
affirmed." Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Constitution Act. 1982
ln the late 1970s, Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg had joíned with other First Nations
people across Canada to prevent the patriation of the Canadian constitution. Treaty people
in particular believed in their tie with the British Crown, and they believed that only
this international tie could prevent the Canadian government from unilaterally
extinguishing their rights. Grand Council Treaty #3 was a participant in the political
and legal strategy sessions, and subsequent meetings and demonstrations. They did not
join the lawsuits of hardline First Nations of BC and Saskatchewan in the British Courts,
but did take part, through Grand Chief Robin Greene, in international lobbying and,
through numerous Chiefs and representatives, in Canadian demonstrations.
By November 1981, Grand Council Treaty #3 political leaders and staff joined
others in the National lndian Brotherhood, to work through successive drafts and lobby
for an agreement to entrench aboriginal and treaty rights in a new patriated constitution.
The announcement of that achievement was welcomed by many. Within a few days,
however, Constitutional Affairs Minister Jean Chretien changed the wording. Once again,
the duplicity of the federal and provincial governments was proven to First Nations
(Sanders 1985). What was finally agreed to by the Premiers was that "the existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized
and affirmed." There was an uproar from the First Nations, lnuit and Metis regarding the
inclusíon of the word, "existing", which seemed designed to limit Native rights.
Decisions and interpretation by the Supreme Court in past years had made aboriginal and
treaty rights subject to the will of Parliament, and did not bode well for the future. Yet,
283
this was the wording that the Queen signed into law when the Constitution Act of Canada
became law in April 1982.
Another significant event that April was the tranformation of the National lndian
Brotherhood, an association of provincial and territorial organizations representing
Chiefs, into the Assembly of First Nations, whereby the Chiefs were the direct and
ultimate decision-makers. An A.F.N. executive of Regional Chiefs (Atlantic, Quebec,
Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, BC, Yukon and Territories) were to be
assisted by a larger decision-making body, the Confederacy of Nations. However, lhese
representatives were expected to consult with the Chiefs regularly and abide by the
Chiefs' resolutions of the full assembly, meeting each year and in special assemblies as
requ ired.
To outsiders, it may not have seemed a drastic change, in that PTOs continued to
have a voice at the Executive and Confederacy level. However, the change had been
demanded by the Chiefs over the past several years, and signified a reminder to
organizational leadership that the First Nations, the community level of Chiefs and
Councils, had the final say. ln the 1983 report of the Parliamentary Committee looking
at self-government, the term "First Nations" gained wider acceptance. Anishinaabeg
welcomed the change to replace "band councils" which reflected a bygone era of lndian
agents ruling reserve members and approving or disallowing their leaders. "First
Nations" spoke of their inherent right of self-government and self-determination - an
end to their suppressed sovereignty.
The Premiers may have thought that they had curbed such notions in
circumscribing rights by the insertion of the word "existing" into the constitution.
However, the Supreme Court of Canada, under Chief Justice Brian Dickson, differed.
ln a series of judgments, from 1983 to 1990, the Supreme Court gave substance to
"existing aboriginal and treaty rights", that had almost been severely undermined before
the 1982 constitutional entrenchment clauses (Sinclair 1990;
284
Kulchyski 1994; Woodward 1989; Reiter 1991,1994).
ln Noweoejick v. M.N.R. [1983] 1 S.C.R.29, the Court ruled that "lndian treaties
should be given a fair, large and liberal construction in favour of the lndians" (Reiter
1995:1:5). A year later, in Guerin v.R. [1984] 2 S.C.R.335, the Supreme Court ruled
that aboriginal and treaty rights were legally enforceable. The Supreme Court stated that
the Crown had a "fiduciary responsibility", which was more than a mere "political
trust" that the federal Justice lawyers had argued (Woodward 1989, Reiter 1991,
Kulchyski 1994). Rather, the fiduciary duty of the Crown to the lndians was legally
enforceable, and in cases of breach, compensation must be paid, remedies made.
A year later, in Simon v. the Queen [1985] 2 S.C.R.387, the Supreme Court
recognized treaty rights as original sources of rights. Treaties were to be considered
"sui generis", unique, and unlike either contracts or international treaties.
The pinnacle of the Court's positive interpretation of "existing" rights came in
two rulings, released at the end of May 1990. ln Sioui v. A.G. Quebec [1990] 3 C.N.L.R.
127,lhe Court ruled that a treaty superseded provincial Park legislation, when they
found that a 1760 letter by a General Murray to the Huron guaranteeing "free exercise
of their religion, their customs" was a treaty within the meaning of section 35 of the
constitution. "The intention to create'mutually binding obligations'is of primary
importance; the form that the treaty takes is secondary" (Reiter 1994:1:22).
Significantly, the Court further stated in Sioui that "preservation of the natural
environment may be a precondition for the exercise of nalive religion" (Woodward
1992:338).
And, in Sparrow v. The Queen [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 127,Ihe Court determined that
aboriginal rights did not derive from the Royal Proclamation or any legislation of the
Crown, but from original occupation of the land. These rights that had been regulated or
restricted cannot be said to have been extinguished, but rather to have been recognized.
"The honour of the Crown" is at stake in dealings with aboriginal peoples, and any
285
infringement on aboriginal rights must be proven necessary by the Crown, and
underlaken, in full consultation with the aboriginal peoples. Subsequent case law in
Treaty #3, R.v.Bombay [1993] 1 C.N.L.R.92 (Ont. C.A.) found that Sparrow rules
applied to treaties as well (Reiter 1994:lll:69).
All the above rulings had direct and positive ramifications for the legal
enforcement of Treaty #3 Anishinaabe rights lo manomin, and were to be used by Grand
Council Treaty #3 in pressing for recognition of their rights to all aspects of governing
the Great Spirit's Garden. For example, the Sioui pronouncements by the Supreme Court
of Canada are importanl lo Manito Gitigaan in Treaty #3 territory, both in the state-
sanctioned ability to continue their traditional activities under Anishinaabe laws and
supervision, and in the preservation of the natural environment that would be required
lo carry out their ceremonies and religion. The necessity of conservation and the
requirement of management of human activity with regard to the plant are basic to
Anishinaabe cusÌomary law (Chapter 3-5). The Anishinaabeg believe that the
government of Ontario and the Lake of the Woods Control Board and their sister water
control boards could learn from this Anishinaabe system to act with respect and
responsibility.
Yet, just as this trail was being broken by the Supreme Court, the political arena
became strewn with many obstacles. ln 1983 Justice Hartt returned to the bench, and
his assistanl, Mohawk lawyer Roberta Jamieson, was appointed the lndian Commissioner
of Ontario, by Federal and Provincial Orders in Council and a vote of approval from the
Chiefs of Ontario. Jamieson's approach was to push for time limited framework
agreements, through which parties would agree to talks. These framework agreements
would clearly set down ground rules and goals, including the issues of "mandate and
authority of the negotiators, providing resources to participants, and adopting a
workplan, including timeframe" (Canadian Bar Association 19BB: 75) . Manomin in
Treaty #3 was targetted for this strategy when Commissioner Jamieson wrote to all
286
parties stating "wild rice had not been the subject of active negotiations for some time...
allhough identified by the parties as an issue of mutual concern in 1978" (lndian
Commission of Ontario 1987:12). She requested a statement of intent and "all parties
agreed they were willing to deal with the issue of wild rice within the Tripartite
Process" (ibid). After an initial meeting in April 1986, the "part¡es agreed to negotiate
a Memorandum of Understanding on Manomin (MUM) on the rights issue, and deal with
lhe development of the wild rice industry in separate discussions outside of the
Tripartite Process" (ibid).
From April to Novembell986, at least four draft memoranda were discussed and
passed among Ontario, Federal lndian Affairs, and Grand Council Treaty #3 in working
group sessions chaired by the lCO. By 1986, it seemed as if a final agreement to define
the terms of future negotiations in a Memorandum of Understanding on Manomin (MUM)
would be signed.l The draft memorandum stated, in brief, that the parties were
committed to talks within the time frame of twelve months, and under the chairmanship
of the lndian Commission of Ontario. Grand Council Treaty #3 was making arrangements
for an official signing in their territory, first for September 1st, and then for
December 1Sth. A target date for signing January 30,'lgB7 was set, but Canada
announced it was conducting a "policy review in that area and could not proceed with
negotiations at that time". Since thal time, Canada has not informed the ICO that it is
prepared to proceed (ibid). As Commissioner Jamieson stated, "the presence of
sustained political commitment to actually resolve issues is ..the determining factor for
success of negotiations", and this was not present for manomin (Canadian Bar
Association 19BB: 75).
Ontario negotiator, Mel Crystal of the Ministry of Natural Resources, cited
"slumbling blocks" in talks with Treaty #3: the Grand Chief wanted the Minister there,
not his representalives. The Grand Council also wanted the whole 55,OOO square miles of
287
Treaty #3 terrilory recorded in the memorandum, but Ontario "couldn't accept that.
Ontario can't represent Manitoba. I don't know if that's what (Grand Chief Greene) was
saying or not. I mean I'm not sure his point was to include Manitoba. But he kept saying
it and we drew our own opinion" (Mel Crystal 1990). The MNR negotiator wondered if
the Treaty #3 representatives understood what was at stake:
"The (continuing) years of the Government of Ontario moratorium
...means we're serious lhat there is something about the Treaty right to
wild rice. When Treaty #3 came in and said the (MNR stand on continuing
to issue licences (from the period prior to 1978) during the
moratorium) was wrong, that there should be no licences at all, that's
what really killed it. ...
We do recognize a Treaty #3 right but not exclusivity. ..But a
policy on no non-lndian involvment doesn't make a lot of sense to me. lt's
stifling an environmentally friendly activity which could also be
economically successful. When seeding a new lake could lead to a business
opportunity, MNR sees the need for recognizing a preferred right, just
like the right to hunt, yet short of an exclusive right.
There's still a willingness to negotiate the Treaty right to harvest
...something like tenure to harvest wild rice at certain locations and
include the right of first refusal for other locations within Treaty #3.
...We know that there's a spiritual attachment although we're not exactly
sure why." (Mel Crystal 1990)
Treaty #3 Grand Chief Robin Greene knew full well the implications for drafting
such a framework agreement. The Fort Frances Chiefs wanted immediate economic
development in the rice industry, but had no wish to transgress the Treaty (Chapter
11). They proposed leaving the Treaty issues aside on a'non-prejudice'basis and get on
with the business of wild rice. The Kenora Chiefs wanted - first - the Treaty
recognition of manomin as a right. Elders in all regions of Trealy #3 sought protection
of the sacred and spiritual traditions of Manito Gitigaan .
It was impossible for a Grand Chief to say that such rights would be negotiated or
circumscribed, in territory or any other way. All that could be said would be that
discussions would be held to have Anishinaabe rights recognized and implemented. To the
Chiefs, Elders and people of Treaty #3 this was not a symbolic but a real distinction.
And, to lhe Anishinaabeg of Treaty #3, it was unacceptable to have less than that written
in a memorandum intended lo focus negotiations to recognize that right.
28B
ICO clearly had difficulty in getting the parties to go beyond their positions and
set their sights on the larger goal of a mutually agreeable policy recognizing rights. lt
seemed that the MUM itself was used to begin negotiations, instead of the MUM merely
setting the stage and protocols, as was intended.
The Liberal government of 1986-1990 preferred to change the political
environment and announced with much fanfare a framework for negotiating self-
government. The Attorney General and Minister responsible for Native Affairs, Hon. lan
Scott, tabled the new policy in the Ontario Legislature, with a special reception for
Chiefs of First Nations and Grand Chiefs of organizations. Once again, however, treaties
and recognition and implementation of treaty rights were being placed on the back
burner. The Ontario government guidelines for negotiating of Aboriginal Self
Government Agreements were strictly:
"directed toward enabling aboriginal specific institutions to exercise a
range of administrative powers for the purpose of:(i) regulating the manner in which aboriginal community members
exercise rights of access to Crown land and natural resources;(ii) participating with the province in the management of certain Crown
lands and natural resources; and(iii) managing programs of economic development for aboriginal
community members." (Ontario Government Guidelines for the
Negotiation of Aboriginal Self Government Agreements, December 1987:
1e)
Significantly, the Ontario policy stated its priority was to lhe wider public and to the
limitation of aboriginal governance:
"ln order to retain development opportunities for the wider community,
Ontario will negotiate on the basis that there should be an inverse
relationshop between the degree of power to be exercised by aboriginal
specific institutions in relation to Crown lands and natural resources and
the extenl of the territory over which those powers are intended to be
exercised." (Ontario Guidelinesfor lhe Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-
Government Agreements,'1 gB7 :21)
The Ontario Liberal design was more pro-active than the Tories of the 1970s but their
direction was the same: their priority was to meel the needs of Aboriginal communities,
to provide basic services to Canadian citizens on reserves. There remained a refusal to
meet the legal obligations of section 35 entrenchment of treaty and aboriginal rights in
289
the constitution. Minister Scott's right hand assistant expressed the policy of that
government succinctly.
".. the need for cooperation between the federal and provincial
governments is obvious and paramount. lt must be clear that the
aboriginal peoples cannot be made to suffer harm or neglect as a result of
federal or provincial intransigence or contentiousness. Their needs must
come before the rights of either level of oovernment" (Emphasis added in:
Shelley Spiegel, Special Assistant to Ontario Attorney General and
Minister responsible for Native Affairs, Hon.lan Scott, in Long & Boldt,
1 9BB:1 0B).
lmportantly, Grand Council Treaty #3 always had to consider the western part of
their treaty area, and initiatives of the province of Manitoba (Chapter 12).
ln order lo address the Treaty rights concerns of many in Treaty #3, Elders
from several First Nations held a meeting in March 1988. Their task was to set down the
traditional teachings, lhe Anishinaabe law regarding manomin . They worked together
with younger people listening and providing translation. Their finished work was
published in a poster format by Treaty #3 TARR and presented to the Chiefs' Assembly
that spring, entitled "Grand Council Treaty #3 Nation Declaration on Anishinabe
Manomin":
1. The Creator put what we need to survive, including Anishinabe
Manomin, on the land. He gave this to us. We have a duty to protect these
things for future generations. lf we do not, there will be trouble ahead.
2. Anishinabe Manomin is a sacred gift from the Creator. lt must be used
properly, according to the Elders' teachings. lt must be respected and
honoured.
3. Anishinabe Manomin was not given to the white people by the Creator.
They do not know how to respect it. We did not give it to the white people
in the Treaty or at any time. The Treaty agreement was that we would keep
the Anishinaabe Manomin. lt says:
"The lndians will be free as by the past for their hunting and rice
harvest."
lf that was not in the Treaty then there is no Treaty and the white people
should go home.
4. How Anishinabe Manomin should be planted, picked, processed and sold
will be decided in our communities, according to our Elders.
290
5. Our rights are from the Creator and guaranteed in the Treaty. lf we
honour the Creator, and if the white people honour the Treaty, we will not
lose our rights. The white people must honour the Treaty because it says:
"This Treaty will last as long as the sun will shine and water runs, that is
to say forever." ( Appendix 2)
It is indicative of Anishìnaabe thought that the Anishinaabe law regarding manomin would
be written simply as "according to our Elders" and "according to our Elders' teachings".
It is not a codified system, but rather one of cuslomary law that has well served the
Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg for millenia (Chapters 3-5, 14).
At the assembly, the Chiefs expressed their appreciation that the Elders had
prepared this declaration. They questioned Treaty #3 Research staff, however, about the
simple English wording. The Chiefs knew full well how the Elders speak in
Anishinabemowin , their own language, about such matters, and to read such uplifting,
complex thoughts simplified into this foreign language did not sit well with some Chiefs.
They also asked that the real dodem symbols of the Treaty #3 people be placed on the
border of such a poster, instead of the drawings used in the "mockup" to indicate the
dodemuk of Treaty #3. 2
The intent of the Elders was followed by the Chiefs. The Grand Council had
launched court action in February 1986 against the Province of Manitoba proposed
legislation that violated their Treaty rights of access to the wild rice in the Whiteshell
area (Chapler 12). Treaty #3 Chiefs had spearheaded and established the Ontario lndian
Wild Rice Development Agency, to promote business and development opportunities for
wild rice within Treaty #3 and beyond (Chapter 11). And, Grand Council Treaty #3 had
been pursuing political arrangements which might lead to practical implementation of
the ïreaty.
The Chiefs of Ontario coordinating body was working toward a Declaration of
Political lntent by parlies to the Tripartite Process. This DPI was signed in 1986. At
that time, though, Grand Council Treaty #3 was seeking a bilateral recognition of the
Treaty with the federal government, and, Grand Chief Greene was coming to realize that
29r
this bilateral initiative was not going to happen. He signed the DPI "under duress". The
Grand Council did not participate in these trilateral talks .3
Shortly thereafter, the Chiefs resolved to undertake a reorganization of the Grand
Council, as they deemed it was "out of touch" with the First Nations, and needed to
strengthen its original purpose of protecting the Treaty. Each tribal area hired a person
to discuss with Chiefs, Elder and councillors what needed to happen. As one Elder said,
the Grand Council's purpose was "to take (our concerns) to a higher level". ln this age of
instant communications by phone, fax, and plane, with budgets for Chiefs and office staff,
the First Nations were becoming used to taking initiative on their own. lt was only when
they needed strength in numbers that they joined together in tribal councils to undertake
programs such as economic development. ln the field of Treaty rights, they were of one
mind lhat unity to protect their Treaty was needed. However, many Chiefs felt that the
"efficiency and effectiveness of our political organization" must improve (GCT3
Resolution Re: organization Structure Oct.6, 19BB). They wanted to ensure the Grand
Council "fulfils the treaty and lraditional mandate'. Certainly, the Grand Council
assemblies saw the involvment of Elders, their advice and teachings offered, the
presence of the pipe symbolizing " a way to pray to the Creator and a way of sharing
ideas and gathering strength and unity amongst the people." (Grand Chief Robin Greene is
quoted in the Chief's Report, ojibways of onegaming, November 19BB). Some of the
Chiefs' comments were that the Grand Council lacked consistent follow-through on
resolutions and needed continuing communication to and from the First Nations
communities. Reorganization was lo become a constant theme of Treaty #3 Chiefs'
Assemblies, and finally, a mission of some substance by the Chiefs from 1992-'199S.
During this period of the mid '1 9B0s to 1990s, the Grand Council continued its
political work. lt did canvas and consider several possible ways of proceeding: claims
negotiation toward agreements; co-management; political protocols; bilateral
agreements; and finally, Anishinaabe assertion of Anishinaabe jurisdiction.
292
Several Treaty #3 First Nations were pursuing settlement of their so-called
"land claims" with Canada and Ontario. 4 Grand Council TARR usually would undertake
the historical research in consultation with one or more First Nation(s), liaise with the
legal counsel chosen by the First Nation(s), and prepare the package to be presented to
the Crown governments upon launching a 'claim' . The Crown governments would then
review the documents, undertake their own research and legal review, and announce,
after this "validation stage", whether a 'claim' would be "accepted for negotiations" .
There would be no reasons given for acceptance or rejection, and no appeal, except
political access to the Minister or Cabinet. Thus, the Crown acted as judge, jury and
defence in such claims. The Specific Claims "process" has been highly and roundly
criticized by First Nations, and by outside observers such as the Canadian Bar
Association, and the Red Book of the Liberal Party of 1993.5 The "black hole" of
specific claims (Savino 1989) continues to suck dollars f rom the taxpayers, energy
from the participants, and make a mockery of the Supreme Court admonition that the
"honour of the Crown is at stake in relations with aboriginal peoples" (Sparrow v. The
Queen [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 160). Clearly, claims resolution mechanisms existing in
Ontario or Manitoba were not an oplion lhat Treaty #3 Chiefs could use to resolve the
conflict regarding governance in the Great Spirit's Garden.
At the time of the Liberal government at Queen's Park, 1986-88 (minority),
198B-90 (majority), Treaty #3 First Nations were given 1o understand, by political
appointees in the office of the Minister responsible for Native Affairs, not civil servants
in the Ministry of Natural Resources, that the most they might expect with regard to
manomin would be some sort of co-management. As the government watched the actions
of the ontario lndian wild Rice Development Agency (198s-1990)and saw a gap
developing between the OIWRDA and Grand Council Treaty #3 (Chapter 11), the civil
servanls developed a "credibility gap" with respect to the Grand Council's ability to
293
manage rice. One idea floated was that the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources might
give over jurisdiction for wild rice to an independent tripartite mechanism, with an
Anishinaabe majority on the Board, perhaps even an Anishinaabe chair, somewhat along
the lines of the James Bay Agreement. Such a regulatory body would go a long way toward
Ontario believing that the industry would develop "along rational lines" within Treaty
#3. (Sources for this information requested anonymity.)
The Grand Council looked at co-management agreements being developed and in
force across Canada and the United States.
"A co-management regime is an institutional arrangement in which
government agencies with jurisdiction over resources and user
groups enter into an agreement covering a specific geographic region
and spelling out (i) a system of rights and obligations (ii) a
collection of rules (iii) procedures for making collective decisions.
It is not required to relinquish or transfer any legal jurisdiction or
authority but share decision-making with user groups".(Osherenko 19BB:13)
" The "interests" , not the rights of the First Nations, are recognized in such agreements
(Angus 1989:62). (lndeed, most ministries of natural resources specifically use the
jargon of "user groups" or "stakeholders" whether speaking of sportsmen, campowners
and other local people, or Treaty Nations.) The promise of co-management is that "the
practical and knowledgeable views of people - hunters, fishermen and biologists -with
firsthand experience are brought to bear directly on the issues" (Wagner 1986:27).
And, while First Nations and Crown representatives sit in equal numbers at the
meetings. co-management arrangements tend to allow Native people to act in an advisory
capacity only, with the Crown government representatives holding the final decision. ln
each agreement, the Crown reaffirms its determination to "protect the interests of all
users, to ensure resource conservation, ..and to manage renewable resource within its
jurisdiction" (Angus 1989:62).
Grand Council Treaty #3 had observed and learned from the "truly sordid history
of non-implementation" of the James Bay Northern Quebec Agreement (Feit 1988:85).
GCT3 recognized from James Bay that "political pressures (become) more significant in
294
present decision-making than management and conservation considerations, more
important than legal obligations and negotiated compromises" (ibid). GCT3 saw that in
co-management agreements thus far there is little or no recognition of prior aboriginal
jurisdiction, nor of the conservation since time immemorial by the aboriginal people for
the gifts the Creator gave them as the First Peoples of this land.
Certainly, there is a legacy of mistrust by Native people of biologists and Natural
Resources personnel:
"The language of scientific management rarely makes sense to
native hunters, while professionals are prone to dismiss native customs,
beliefs and even observational data..scientists use sophistocated
observational and statistical techniques, while hunters reply, 'You didn't
look in the right place'. "(Peter Usher 1982 in Connell 1983:93)
Notwithstanding all this background, many observers believe there is potential for such
a Crown government-Aboriginal government partnership "to foster mutual respect" and
to lead to "everyone taking responsibility for the success of joint conservation and
management" (Osherenko 19BB:40). What is required is "mutual education and
interchange" and a leaving aside of the "non-Native community's rigid insistence lhat it
always knows what is best" (Hunt 1979:592).
Yet, problems that exist need to be overcome if First Nations and Treaty Nations
are to enter into co-management regimes with Crown authorities. One problem familiar
to Grand Council Treaty #3 from its experience in tripartite negotiations is the lack of
equality in informed decision-making, demonstrated by a lack of financial and paper
resources to support the institutional capability of the First Nations representatives to
participate (Osherenko 19BB:42) . To the Anishinaabeg, this is an indication of the lack
of recognition and respect that the First Nations were bringing their knowledge of
millenia in this land to the table.
The Great Lakes lndian Fish & Wildlife Commission, for example, was established
in the wake of court decisions which recognized the Treaty rights the states of Minnesota,
Wisconsin and Michigan had long refused to acknowledge. Further, the Anishinaabeg in
295
the Boundary Water States recognized that "DNR has resisted power sharing with tribes
in ceded lerritories, so implementing co-management means a change in the way DNR
does business with tribes, including changed attitudes, politices and practices (Bushian
1990:19) W¡th no such attitude change in Ontario or Manitoba, what could co-
management offer Treaty #3 First Nations who knew their right to all aspects of Manito
gitigaan was guaranteed by treaty "as by the past"? The Anishinaabe tribes "in ceded
territories" in the United States agree that "cooperation (is) required of government,
lndians, anglers and others to implement Chiipewa (Anishinaabe) treaty rights"
(Wisconsin State Department of Nalural Resources pamphlet, "Fish Wisconsin 2000
Action Program). No government in Treaty #3 territory was at that point yet.
The Chiefs also recognized dangers in translaling Anishinaabe governance into
modern day institutions. For example, one insidious fact of the 1960 Ontario provincial
legislation and policies that established new regimes in wild rice is that these new
regimes such as Wild Rice Harvesting Areas (WRHA) or blocks set aside for certain
"bands" may be taken as reflective of Anishinaabe tradition. This is certainly not the
case, as the following testimony documents (see also Chapter 3-5):
"At that time (1930s) Bands did not go to certain lakes to pick rice. They
amalgamated together wherever there was plenty of rice. ln those days,
the Bands did not belong to certain areas at that time. They gathered
logether to have their ceremonial feats and they were precautioned as to
how they would harvest their rice, what days to pick and rest their
f ields."
(Annie Wilson in Holzkamm 1989:25)
"Back then (1959) the Province (of Ontario) was pulling the blinds on a
lot of things. I doubt if lhere was any consultation when they set up these
checkerboard areas. lf there had been true consultation, then Whitefish
Bay's traditional area would have gone into Manitoba. There was an annual
movement out to the ricefields and among many ricefields".
(George Crow, 1990)
"My uncle, Miskwakapins (Jim Elliott), told me they'd invite everyone to
come and pick ..at Obabikon Bay (1900s and 1947) ..we really managed
the rice. We'd invite people to pick in certain bays.We'd have Elders say
when to pick and when not.." (Pete Seymour 1990)
296
ln the case of the OntarioWild Rice Harvesting Act ,1960, law has served "as the
handmaiden for processes of domination, helping to create new systems of control and
regulation" (8. Cohn 1985 in UM 1992:33). The general public surrounding the
reserves have taken this 1960 system of block areas (and band licences in the Fort
Frances area) as an historic reality, while generations of children raised on Treaty #3
reserves have heard of both their assigned WRHAs and their wider use of the 55,000
square miles that is Treaty #3 territory. With areas defined by the province, Ontario
Ministry of Natural Resources officials say they "regulate the harvest" by insisting on
annual licences and harvest reports from each band. lt took Ontario Lands and Forests
(the predecessor of OMNR) perhaps a decade for bands to apply for a licence and fill out
returns, just as the Province insisted Anishinaabe trappers do. Some bands never did.
The ones who did subsequently refused as they began to act on their inherent right to self
-government. They rejected what they saw as lhe irrationality of the province having
anything to do with manomin, their God-given gift and Treaty right (Robin Greene
1982; Fred Greene 1990). Certainly, First Nations of Treaty #3, as they now call
lhemselves, do not abide outside regulation of Manito Gitigaan, as has been witnessed in
resolutions by Grand Council Treaty #3 and Chiefs of ontario (Chapters 7,12) .
lmportantly, however, such laws as the Ontario Wild Rice Harvesting Act. 1960
can also "constrain these (colonial) systems and serve as arenas of resistance" ( B. Cohn
1985 in UM 1992:33). For example, the very fact that Onlario set aside huge
continguous blocks of wild rice harvesting areas within the Kenora and Dryden regions of
Treaty #3 area has assisted Grand Council Treaty #3 in arguing for further recognition
and implementation of the Treaty. The possible conundrum presented by the lack of such
WRHA blocks in the Fort Frances area has been simply considered a provincial mistake.
First Nations in that southern part of Treaty #3 support and helped to frame GCT3
arguments regarding recognition of 55,000 square miles of wild rice areas.
297
Ontario and Manitoba remain unmoved by protestations of treaty rights. They
cont¡nue to insist that wild rice is one "crop" and "natural resource" for which they have
constitutional responsibility (Chapter 12).
Grand Council Treaty #3 sought to negotiate a bilateral accord with Ontario, for
recognilion of all Treaty #3 rights to lands and resources, among other matters, and
implementation of that recognitíon on a day to day basis. The Grand Council tabled with
Ontario, on an informal basis, a detailed document to negotiate a new agreement. GCT3
stated that it contained "interesting possible approaches to a permanent settlement of
..the treaty right to the wild ríce harvest". This comprehensive agreement was intended
"to clarify, renovate and implement existing treaty provisions covering the use and
jurisdiction over natural resources ¡n the Ojibway Nation Lands ..and to recognize
mutually their respective jurisdiction, to facilitate the exercise of exclusive
jurisdiction and to cooperate in the exercise of joint jurisdictions" (September 2, 19BB
DR Colborne to Mark Krasnick, ONAS Secretary). There were no talks forthcoming, so
GCT3 countered with another tack.
Grand Chief Green met with Hon. lan Scott and proposed that their techn¡cal
advísors work on a draft accord which would govern provincial relations with Treaty #3
First Nations, and guide government policy, programs and direction, The Minister asked
for time to "cost" what recognition of treaty rights would mean to Ontario. No word was
heard from the Minister's office, despite repeated requests from the Grand Council, and a
new government was elected in 1990. lt seemed the Liberal government considered the
cost of implementing Treaty #3 rights was too high.
The 1990s ushered an entirely different era into the stage of Aboriginal politics
in Canada. After the Queen signed the Constitution Act into law in April 1982, there was
a flurry of activity by the federal government to prepare for a conference of aboriginal
leaders with Federal and Provincial First Ministers, required under section 37 of the
new Constitution. For the First Nations, the activity centred upon whether to attend.
298
Ultimately, the Assembly of First Nations was fractured among those who refused to
attend (Prairie Treaty Nation Alliance and the Union of New Brunswick lndians), those
who would participate as observers only, and those from the AFN who took the chair.
Representatives of the lnuity Tapirisat, Metis National Council, and Native Council of
Canada also attended. 6 As a result of the first conference, the one and only made in
Canada amendment to the Constilution Act. '1982 was passed in 1983, to clarify treaty
and equality rights. The section 37 constitutional conferences (1983, 1984,
1985,1987) were called to a close by Conservative Prime Minister Mulroney in 1987,
without any agreement to entrench the concept of the inherent right to self-government
- or recognize that it is already in the constitution. 7
Within ten weeks of that snub lo Aboriginal Peoples, the Prime Minister
brokered a new constitutional deal dubbed the Meech Lake Accord, in honour of the site
where all ten premiers unanimously agreed to its terms. The Meech Lake Accord could
nol have been more ominously timed as an affront to Aboriginal peoples. Aboriginal
leaders were livid: all ten Premiers agreed to recognize Quebec's "distinct society"
only weeks after they refused to recognize "aboriginal self government" as too vague a
notion. Aboriginal people across Canada immediately understood what was at play: they
were to be relegated to the sidelines of history once again. Meech Lake perpetuated the
myth of two founding nations of French and English."What are we - chopped liver?" lnuit
leader Zebedee Nungak wanted to know (Hall 19BB)
However, 1990 saw a new stage set. New governments in Manitoba and
Newfoundland had fundamental concerns about the Meech Lake Accord which the
Mulroney government had failed to address, holding firm to its stand about "the seamless
web" of Meech that would become unraveled if even one change was made. By May of
1990, two months before the deadline for unanimous approval by provincial
legislatures for the Accord, Mulroney's team was franctically foisting its "politics of
fear" on Manitoba Opposition leader Sharon Carstairs and Premier Clyde Wells of
299
Newfoundland. The Prime Minister threatened political and economic disaster if this deal
did not go through (Delacourt 1993: 402-3).
Aboriginal leaders, ever the astute political observers and actors, were waiting
for opportunities. The Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs (AMC), led by Phil Fontaine, and
aided by Assembly of First Nations Regional Chief Ovide Mercredi, found that opening:
P.M. Mulroney decided to let the clock tick on and, as the P.M. arrogantly confided to a
newsreporter, "roll the dice" when he thought there would be just enough time for the
two remaining provincial legislatures to approve the deal.
The AMC recruited the only Aboriginal Member of the Manitoba Legislature,
Elijah Harper of Red Sucker Lake First Nation, to the cause of obstrucling the vote. The
Manitoba legislative procedures for review of constitutional measures could not be
followed and a vote was not held in Manitoba before the clock ran out June 22, l gg0 -
three years after the unanimous Premiers' approval. Despite Mulroney's denial of the
Aboriginal role and his frothing at the mouth against the Newfoundland Premier (a blame
the P.M. still attached on his resignation speech in February 1993), it was clear to
Aboriginal people, and many others, that Aboriginal people had stopped Meech Lake.
Treaty #3 Chiefs and organization staff were in Winnipeg to support the AMC
initiative and helped to celebrate on the lawn of the Manitoba Legislature Ìhat sunny June
day. A feeling of exhuberance and solidarity - 'Aboriginal Solidarity' proclaimed the
smiling Elijah T-shirts - was felt by everyone. lt was a feeling of a new day, a new
beginning - not an end at all. 'This time, this time would be our time'. Aboriginal people
would never again be left out of constitutional renewal. The myth of two founding nations
seemed to have been buried along with Mulroney's dreams of being a constitution maker.
Within a few weeks, the Securite de Quebec stormed the Mohawk blockade at
Kanesastake and so began the three month seige that will be remembered in Canadian
history simply as Oka (Richardson 1993; Dickason 1992). Many individuals from
Treaty #3 went to the peace camp outside the Mohawk blockade; others joined at peace
300
camp of solidarity formed on the grounds of the Manitoba Legislature. Those peace camps
were one of the few outlets for the pent-up rage of Aboriginal people for this latest
subjugation of their brothers and sisters and theft of their land. Without a place to pray
and carry out ceremonies, to receive the latest news and be able to send support in
words, money and supplies directly to the Mohawks, there would have been many more
acts of violence. Blockades were erected in many places by Aboriginal people across the
country; hydro transmission towers were toppled in Ontario. Children in reserves
across Canada put a new twist on playing with tiny cars in the dirt. Suddenly the 3 to10
years old Aboriginal kids were building dirt blockades and playing Mohawk warriors vs.
the army. Only in the 1990 version, the warriors won.
Oka provided the impetus for the Canadian government to fast track many specific
land claims and to commission retired Supreme Court Justice Brian Dickson to inquire
into a mandate for a Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. ln April 1991, the
Dickson mandate was accepted in full by the Conservatives, and Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal co-chairs and another five commissioners were named. The most
comprehensive inquiry into the relations between Aboriginal peoples and the rest of
Canada, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal peoples, is still continuing in 1995.
ln Ontario, other fallouts from the Meech Lake fiasco were visible. Ontario
Liberal Premier David Peterson, confident of victory, called a summer election early in
his term. On September 4th, 1990, the voters of Ontario sent a message - an end to
elitist decision-making: the first NDP government in Ontario history was elected with a
majority. Premier Bob Rae immediately set about to make his government different and
important to people who had been marginalized before.
One of Rae's first meetings was with the Chiefs of Ontario, an umbrella
organization of the major status lndian organizations and independent First Nations in
Ontario - including Grand Council Treaty #3. The Premier urged the Chiefs'
organization and their Regional Chief, Gord Peters, use this mandate to "do more than
30i
fiddle with words", but to make real changes that will improve conditions for the people
on reserves (Wedge 1990). Peters replied that they wanted a statement of respect that
would guide all government action regarding Aboriginal peoples in the province.
ln August 1991 , after months of wording proposals and changes, the Premier
and the Chiefs met at Mount McKay on Fort William First Nation at Thunder Bay to sign
the Statement of Political Respect, the first official Canadian document to agree that "the
inherent right to self-government of the First Nations flows from the Creator and from
the First Nations' original occupation of the land". lt further stated that this right is
"within the Canadian constitutional framework and that this relationship between
Ontario and the First Nations must be based upon a respect for this right". The SPR also
committed the First Nations and Onlario "involving the Government of Canada where
appropriate .. to facilitate the further articulation, the exercise and implementation of
lhe inherent right to self-governmenl within the Canadian constitutional framework by
respecting existing treaty relationships and by using such means as lhe treaty-making
process, constitutional and legislative reform and agreements acceptable to the First
Nations and Ontario." (See Appendix 15 for full script).
Unlike the earlier Declaration of Political lntent signed through the tripartite
process, Grand Council Treaty #3 signed willingly, having participated in the process of
wording. The Treaty #3 Chiefs assembled at Mount McKay to witness what they
perceived to be an important and historic occasion. Treaty #3 Elders blessed the
occasion and the participants through a pipe ceremony led by Robin Greene of Shoal Lake
#39, a former Grand Chief of Treaty #3, and Alex Skead of Wauzhushk Onigum. (Alex
Skead is arguably the mosl photographed elder in the country since his involvment in the
1980s constitutional meetings, sharing his pipe with Prime Ministers Trudeau and
Mu lron ey).
Native Affairs & Natural Resources Minister Hon. Bud Wildman predicted major
accomplishments as a resull of this SPR. "The way every ministry of the government
302
deals wiÌh the First Nations will change." ("Ontario to recognize native governments:
Province sees end to paternalism with historic signing by Rae, Chiefs", Richard Mackie,
Globe & Mail, August 6, 1991).
Time and events had a way of undermining the good intentions of all these
participants. Constitution making was to become the priority of the Ontario Government,
Chiefs of Ontario and Grand Council Treaty #3. While Ontario's recognition of the
aboriginal inherent right to self-government was to be a beacon in talks leading to the
Charlottetown Accord of 1992 (which was to recognize aboriginal sellgovernment in
practical ways), the "big show" took away the attention of major players who would be
required to implement the SPR throughout all Ontario ministries.
During the 1990-91 period, Grand Council Treaty #3 held meetings with the
Minister of Native Affairs, Bud wildman, and his Deputy, Murray coolican, to seek a
specific statement of respect for Treaty #3. The Chiefs and Elders of Treaty #3 wanted
their Treaty recognized in government directives and policy as binding and overriding -
particularly in any issue concerning the Ministry of Natural Resources (Don Jones
1990). A bilateral process was established by the fall of 1991 whereby the Ontario
Native Affairs Secretariat (raised in status from a directorate by the NDP government)
would meet regularly with a Treaty #3 delegation to hammer out appropriate wording.
ln the fall of 1991, after Keith Spicer had received a full course of venom from
the public in the Citizens Forum on Canada's Future, a federal policy paper on
constilutional renewal was issued. lt called for a 'Canada Round', one that would include
everyone - most prominently, Quebec and Aboriginal peoples. However, the federal
proposals fell far short of what the Chiefs and Elders were seeking in having self
government entrenched in any renewed constitution. The AFN was speaking for their
whole constituency when they insisted that the "inherent right to self government" must
be included. After all, Ontario had crossed that threshold. As Premier Rae had stated in
his 1990 inaugural address, "One man's sovereignty is another's self-government". lt
303
was a necessary, essential ingredient for Grand Council Treaty #3. They assumed that
practical respect for treaties would flow from the 1991 Statement of Political Respect.
The Treaty #3 Chiefs and Elders held their annual meeting in October 1991 at
Wauzhushk Onigum First Nation near Kenora and elected as Grand Chief, Tobasonakwut
Kinew, a man formerly known as Peter Kelly who had served as CGT3 President (now
called Grand Chief) of Treaty #3 from '1971-1974.Ihe Chiefs wanted someone who
could speak knowledgeably and forcefully about Treaty #3 and their rights. Kinew's first
task was to represent Grand Council Treaty #3 at the AFN in Ottawa that November:
"We know what it means to have a document that states the basic
relationships between Peoples and Nations - just as we know how it is to
have the Great Law which shows our relationship with the Creator and
each other... We must always keep in mind that our rights derive from the
Creator, certainly not from the legislation of Canada. ..An Elder (who
initiated me into the Mite'iwin traditional religion) showed me the
Mite'iwin teachings recorded by the Great Spirit in the sky. I realized if
the invaders wanted to burn things, let them burn lhe sky! That is what
our people meant when they said at Treaty signing, that we will hold fast
to these promises "as long as the sun will shine and water runs, that is to
say, forever. ..Negotiations based upon the sacred relationship of our
people to the lands, waters and resources confirmed in our Treaty, and
defined by the teachings of the Mite'iwin for us.,provide the opportunity
for enshrining promises that will last in the Constitution of Canada."
(Address by Treaty #3 Grand Chief T. Kinew to the Assembly of First
Nations Constitutional Conference, Ottawa, November 26, 1991.)
Respect for Treaty rights was to be the hallmark of Treaty #3 for the nexl few
years. The Grand Chief immediately became involved in planning the first National
Treaties Conference to be held in Edmonton in April 1992. Grand Council Treaty #3
played a prominent role in the Ontario Roundtable on the Constitution, a conglomeration
of Aboriginal organizations invited together to advise the Premier and Cabinet on
constitutional issues. Treaty #3 embarked on a re-organization of the Grand Council
which involved meetings in every First Nation, major assemblies of on and off reserve
status lndians throughout Treaty #3, meetings with Friendship Centres and local tribal
councils. The message was that the Chiefs and Grand Council should represent everyone
and work to protect treaty rights - rights that included the inherent right to self
government and were "portable", that is, not dependent upon residency on reserve.
304
The approach of Grand Council Treaty #3 was traditional. The Chiefs relied upon
direction from the Elders. They opened and closed their meetings with prayers. They
held traditional ceremonies and caucuses throughout larger meetings, to allow the time
and respect needed for everyone to have an equal say, to participate in consensual
decision making. Yet such approaches had been questionned, even ridiculed in earlier
years (Wagamese 1990; McGinnis 1990). Now, lhe Treaty #3 traditional approach was
being studied and copied by other organizations and the leadership of Treaty #3 Grand
Chief, Chiefs and Elders welcomed. Grand Council Treaty #3 was becoming recognized as
the earliest organization based upon the Treaty.
ln Ontario, the Chiefs of Ontario with its member organizations were holding
regular meetings with the Cabinet Committee on the Constitution, led by Native Affairs &
Natural Resources Minister Bud Wildman. By January 1992, the Chiefs of Ontario held
an historic meeting with this Cabinet Committee at Sault Ste Marie. Elders, Chiefs and
Grand Chiefs who were pipe carriers brought their pipes, and medicine bundles, to the
meeting at Garden River First Nation, near Sault Ste Marie. The prayed early in the
morning, before each session, and held sweat lodges each night.
When they met Ministers Wildman, his colleague Howard Hampton (the Attorney
General and MPP for the Rainy River riding within Treaty #3) and other cabinet
ministers, the Chiefs and Elders had decided that they needed to delve deeper into the
concept of the inherent right to self government. They went after and received the
assurance from this powerful Cabinet committee that the inherent right indeed included
lands and resources (Kinew 1992; Chiefs of Ontario memorandum to First Nations
January 1992). Wild rice was going back on the constitutional agenda.
While Hampton in particular tried to distance the government from the
significance that the Chiefs of Ontario made of this Cabinet understanding, Native Affairs
Minister Wildman said that it only made sense. Yet, Wildman added in a comment full of
portent, such a statement linking self government to lands and resources was not as far
305
reaching as some aboriginal leaders indicated. Chiefs of Ontario leaders considered the
Sault Ste Marie agreement as a major breakthrough. The key would be to elicit an
appropriate provincial response. This would prove difficult.
Ontario's NDP government had stuck its neck out in some decisions early in its
mandate. Notably, the proposed agreement for Ontario co-management with the
Algonquins of Golden Lake First Nation. ln this agreement, the Ontario government
proposed to establish a joint regime with the First Nation to manage the continuation of
their treaty right to hunt in Algonquin Park, the oldest jewel in the provincial park
system. Environmentalists, sportsmen and tourist operators were apoplectic! They saw
such an agreement as "open season" on the trees, fish and animals by 'predatory lndians'
(McNab 1992; Smith, Dan 1993).
Disregarding wider public backlash, Grand Council Treaty #3 proceeded to speak
out about their Treaty right to resources. ln February'1992, the Grand Council gave
Elder Robin Greene the responsibility to issue the first Treaty #3 license to fish to the
Minister of Natural Resources for Ontario. lt stated:
"Grand Council Treaty No.3 Association of Ojibway Chiefs.
Grand Council Treaty Nations agreement to fish in lndian territories.
The Creator placed fish in the water to sustain the Anishinaabe. ln return
the Anishinaabe must manage and protect the fish. The Elders advised on
how this is done and the Chiefs set the rules in accordance with the Elders
advice.
The Anishinaabe are prepared to share the Creator's gift, but only with
lhose who do not abuse it. The person named in this agreement accepts the
duty to abide by the Crealor's teaching by honouring the rules made by the
Chiefs"
At this historic occasion, the Hon. Bud Wildman, Ontario Minister of Natural Resources,
signed his name as a licensee (Minutes of February '13, 1992 Grand Council Treaty #3
Chiefs meeting wilh the Minister of Natural Resources at Wauzhushk Onigum First
Nation). lt seemed that symbolic geslures were easier for both parties to undertake than
the resolution of substantive issues. During this visit, the Minister also spoke to the
Northwestern Ontario Municipal Association (NOMA) stating "the wild rice resource
306
should be considered a resource primarily for the aboriginal people in the area and an
important step toward a self-sufficient economy" (October ô, 1992 Hon. Wildman to
Grand Chief Kelly-Kinew). Such a policy was not any different from the government
policies of the previous Conservative and Liberal governments. More was expected of the
NDP.
Grand Council Treaty #3 had been pressing for bilateral talks since Peterson's
government two years before, and continued to press the Ontario NDP government for
their own bilateral process to actually start. The Ontario ONAS deputy minister funded a
Treaty #3 staff person and some meetings, assigned one of their Thunder Bay staff to
meet, and let the process evolve. Frustration mounted with each delay of another meeting
or the few meetings that led nowhere. The Grand Council had insisted on a declaration of
policy which would force all bureaucracies to cut through technical defences and
difficulties and honour Treaty #3 rights. The ONAS negotiator thought otherwise. The
Ontario representative stated that the government would prefer to "address major issues
head on" but were willing to work on a joint slatement similar to the August 1991 SPR -
"mighty words signifying nolhing" (4. Skye 1992).
That summer, letters were exchanged between the Grand Chief and the Minister
to try to guide the process and set the agenda of issues, with wild rice prominent among
lhem. The SPR had seemed to be a good beginning, but it did not take long for the process
to be delayed and caught up in lack of bureacratic mandate. The more direct political
route seemed to be the only way to go.
ln March 1992, the Treaty #3 Grand Chief was involved at the inception of the
multilateral constitutional process, under the chairmanship of the Right Honourable Joe
Clark . Grand Chief Kinew continued through the mulitlateral process and was invited by
the National Chief Ovide Mercredi and Ontario Regional Chief Gord Pelers to speak on
treaties at several multilateral meetings with constitutional and First Min¡sters.
307
Premier Rae and Native Affairs Minister Wildman were always present and attentive.
The time was coming when this educational process would have to bear fruit.
Aboriginal leaders across the country appreciated the crucial role played by
Premier Rae in bringing aboriginal peoples to the constitutional table. The National
Chief was so sure of Rae's personal commitment to the cause that the AFN did not bother
lobbying the Ontario premier and delegates (Delacourt 1993). The Chiefs of Ontario and
Treaty #3 did lobby the Premier to ensure he was up to date and supportive. Premier
Rae was onside in a very visceral way, not only because of recent lobbying, but because
of his involvment in Aboriginal causes when he was leader of the Opposition (Delacourt
1 ee3).
Treaty #3 had played a significant role in promoting treaties. The divergence of
views held by First Nations regarding the treaties was well evidenced at the first
National Treaties Conference April 6-9, 1992, when Treaty #3 co-hosted the
conference with Treaties 6,7,8. Grand Chief Kinew co-chaired. The Lake of the Woods
drum and Treaty #3 Elders had a front and centre seat at the assembly and guided the
proceedings toward consensus.
Treaty #3 Chiefs seemed to stand somewhere in middle ground between Treaty
#6 & 7 of the west who spoke against the danger of the multilateral process
"domesticating trealies" 8 and Treaty # 1, 2 who were just beginning to organize around
the protection of their treaties. The Dene and Cree of the later treaties B, 9, 11 , had
argued for almost two decades the pre-eminence of their aboriginal rights. At this
Conference, they were speaking about honouring their treaty rights, in their "spiril and
intent", as understood and communicated by their Elders, nol as written in documents by
the Crown governments. These themes were spoken of again and again by all treaty areas:
the spirit and inlent of the treaties kept alive by the Elders, the sacredness of the
treaties, their bilaferal Nation to Nation nature with the Crown, in right of Canada.
308
Chief Gerry Antoine of Treaty #B (where his First Nation is located in what is now
known as the Northwest Territories) spoke of the symbolism in the Treaty Medallion
used as the Conference logo (Figure #36). He said the First Nations were together to
discuss the "handshake, not the paper that the Treaty Commissioner is hiding behind his
back."
Ovide Mercredi attended this conference to state unequivocally that treaties would
be protected in the constitutional amendments the AFN was participating in drafting.
What he asked from the Assembly of Treaty Nations was for them to state the principles
they would agree must be protected. That evening, Chiefs and advisors such as Fred Kelly
of the Ojibways of Onegaming, Sonny McGinnis of Manitou Rapids and Don Jones of
Nickikousemenecaning, all of Treaty #3, prepared a resolution to establish a Sovereign
Treaty First Nations Council (STFNC) within the Assembly of First Nations. The
resolution noted that AFN resolutions from 1987 and 1989 to establish a treaty unit
within AFN had not been followed through, and the expectation was that the STFNC would
followup on these resolutions as well. The Chiefs of the National Treaty Conference stated
that the STFNC would be guided by, but not limited to, the following principles:
1. That we are Sovereign Nations under our sacred laws as given to us by
the Creator.
2. That the Nation to Nalion status of the Treaties is protected and
guaranleed, and that the Constitution of Canada respect the Sovereiegn
Treaty First Nations.
3. That the Crown in right of Canada recognize, guarantee, and honour our
inherent and Treaty rights.
4. That the Constitution of Canada recognize and respect all differences
between Treaty Sovereign First Nations and Sovereign First Nations
which do not at present have rights under Treaty.
5. That a complete review of all non-lndigenous laws and agreements
which affect the Treaty relationship be undertaken.
6. That a complete review of Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act of
1867 to deal specifically with the fiscal relationship between the Crown
in right of Canada and the Sovereign Treaty First Nations be undertaken.
36. Nalional Trealies Conference 1992 - Logo ot Treaty Medallion 309
NATIONAL TREATY CONFERENCE
INDIGENOUS TREATIES - SELF-DETERMINATION
PASTOPRESENToFUTURE
310
7. That any Constitutional amendment can only occur with the consent of
lhe Sovereign Treaty First Nations.
Moved by Chief Gerald Antoine, Fort Simpson First Nation, Treaty 11,
seconded by Chief Peter Yellowquill, Long Plain First Nation, Treaty 1,
approved by consensus of the National Treaties Conference, April 8,1992
This resolution also attached AFN resolution 6/87 which included 11 guiding principles,
including the statements that treaties were made on a "Nalion to Nation basis between
First Nations and the Crown" (#5), and that "the Treaties must be honoured and
implemented in accordance with the spirit and intent of each Treaty as understood by the
First Nations signatories" (#9). While the resolution stated that any process to
"clarifying their treaty, rectify unconscionable treaties, or renovating or implementing
treaties" (#11 (iii)) was and continues to be a "bilateral process with the Federal
Crown; the provinces have no constitutional role in making treaties", it also allowed that
"at the request of a First Nation, the provincial government may be involved in this
process but shall nol be a party to the treaty nor involved as a treaty-maker. (#11
(v))." lt was clear to First Nations that their main tie to the Crown continued through
the federal government, and that provinces were to be secondary players.
The Treaty #3 presence at this conference was very pervasive and persuasive.
Treaty #3 Treaties and Aboriginal Rights Research staff had prepared, and distributed at
the Conference, several pamphlets on Treaty rights to wild rice, education, fishing,
indigenous government and other issues that pertained to the 1992 discussion of the
spirit and intent of the treaties and giving meaning to their historical context. Treaty #3
Elders met in caucus with their Chiefs and leaders at the assembly and voiced their
concerns and direction, Treaty #3 Elders and the Lake of the Woods drum had met their
leaders one week before leaving for Edmonton and had thoroughly discussed the Treaty
and its meaning to their people. Now these Elders and the drum were in front centre
throughout the whole Treaties assembly.
311
On the last day of the Conference, recalled in a photo reminisicent of a bygone
Victorian era, the Chiefs welcomed and posed with Governor General Ray Hnatyshyn at
lheir conference (Figure #37). The Governor General echoed the Queen's words twenty
years before, that "you may be assured that my Government of Canada recognizes the
importance of full compliance with the spirit and terms of the treaties" (Speech on the
Occasion of the Closing Ceremonies of the Treaty Leaders Conference, His Excellency the
Right Honourable Ramon John Hnatyshyn, Governor General of Canada, Edmonton,
Alberta, April 9, 1992:3)
The careful choosing of these words came to be a major debate at the multilateral
constitutional negotiations when Canada accepted, instead, that the "spirit and intent of
the treaties" would be honoured.The constitutional ministers in the multilateral process,
however, refused to accept the clause "as understood by the lndians" as a guide to
interpretation.9
All the while that the Grand Council Treaty #3 was participating in the
multilateral process of constitutional ministers, the Ontario Roundtable with Ontario
aboriginal organizations, and the conferences and meetings with First Nations across
Canada, they were also consulting the people in their First Nation communities.
Meetings were held in several communities . A large gathering of Treaty #3 students met
for one day in March, and the next day, all interested Treaty #3 First Nations members
considered constitutional proposals with their leaders listening to what the people
considered important. Natural resources and lhe land, economic development and
education, protecting and strengthening the language and culture were all considered
priorities. The issues were as inextricably tangled and as tied to Anishinaabe identity as
had been the case when Treaty #3 was negotiated 1869-1873. Treaty #3 leadership
knew from this reporting back and listening to the communilies that what they were
promoting about treaties at the constitutional table was indeed an accurate reflection of
the Elders and Treaty #3 members.
372
'lalional rreaties co'f crerrce. Ecrrronro., Aprir r gg2Trealy #:l GrarcJ chir:f robaso.¡rkrvut i i.ó,v wirtl Trea,;, -Elder Aiex Sk.¿d of \',.iauznushk Onigu,r Firsl Nalion;Chiefs with Goverrror General Ray Hnaryshyn(Treaty #3 Elder & t(.)llìer GraniJ Ct,ief Robi¡ Greeneseated at left of Gover.or Genei;rr anci Grard chief Kinervstand¡rìg behind at rir¡trt).
313
When National Chief Mercredi left the Edmonton Treaties conference early, he
headed for the April multilaleral process in Halifax (April B-9). There, all
governments agreed that the inherent right to self government, as lobbied by all
Aboriginal organizations and as recommended by the Senate-Commons Committee in
March, would be included in the constitution. And the Treaties conference did establish a
broad mandate to negotiate protection of treaties. As stated above, the resolution required
lhat only each Treaty Nation could speak to its own treaty and that any constitutíonal
amendment include the implementation of the spirit and intent of the treaties.
At the Edmonton multilateral meeting April 29-30, the aboriginal delegations
were angry at the lack of progress on their issues - any difficult questions were being
put off. After the aboriginal delegates withdrew to caucus away from the main meeting,
the Premiers agreed to spending a day and a half at the next meeting in Vancouver, where
the AFN staged a "sensitivity session" lunch. At the next meetings in Vancouver (May
11-14) and Toronto (May 25-31), the National Chief called upon Treaty #3 Grand
Chief Kinew to explain the significance of treaties and the essential message that there
must be protection in the constitution. The AFN knew treaties were a 'make-or-break'
issue as far as garnering First Nations' support for any constitutional changes
(Delacourt 1993:334). Joe Clark couldn't understand why specifics on treaties were
important given the litany of positive Supreme Court rulings on treaties in recent years
and the place of such court interpretations in the constitutional tradition in Canada
(Delacourt 1993). However, progress was made at the multilateral talks when Clark
took the posilion (which won out whenever major agreements were made at this table):
"l don't agree with what you're saying but I understand that you believe it's important."
(Delacourt 1993:335,402). The federal government changed its mind and agreed to
entrench treaty clauses; the provinces followed suit, led strongly by Saskatchewan. ln
Toronlo, multilateral representatives agreed that treaty rights would be guaranteed in
the constitution (Delacourtl993:447).
3I4
However, the constitutional process was missing two key players - Prime
Minister Mulroney and Quebec Premier Bourassa. By the time they both joined the
process, agreement had been reached on all issues by all other players on July 7th.
Both insisted on major changes. First, the context clause 10 to describe aboriginal rights
was removed, then reinstated. ll Financial commitments to aboriginal governments,
however, were to be placed in separate political memos, not in the constitution itself.
Newfoundland, speaking, as Premier Bourassa ironically noted, for the interests of
Quebec as well, required that aboriginal self government be subject to the Peace, Order
and Good Government clause in the 1867 Constitution. And, finally, also for Quebec, a
clause was added that no "new" lands were to be included in any future agreements. The
aboriginal rights clauses were quite circumscribed. lt was debatable whether there was
enough left to support. 12
Grand Council Treaty #3 tried another approach to evaluate the Accord. At an
AFN Executive strategy meeting in Saskatoon early in September, Treaty #3 Grand
Ghief Kinew told the National Chief Ovide Mercredi that the people of Treaty #3 wanted
simply to know how this Accord would affect their treaty and their lives. How would it
honour and implement Treaty #3 rights to fishing and manomin? lf the Accord would
take a positive, practical effect, then Treaty #3 people would likely support it. Kinew
invited the National Chief to join him 13 in pressing the Premier of Ontario to make this
practical result of the Accord a reality to Treaty #3: the Grand Council would propose
that the Province of Ontario vacate the field of wild rice within Treaty #3 territory. lf
not, then it would be clear to Treaty #3 First Nations that the Charlottetown Accord
would mean nothing more than 'business as usual' with the provinces.
After consultation wilh Treaty #3 Chiefs, the Grand Chief wrote 1o the Premier
of Ontario:
315
"The Grand Council Treaty #3 is very appreciative of your efforts
personally, and that of your government, to entrench our inherent right
lo self-government in the constitution of Canada. However, doubt remains
in the minds of many First Nations people that there will be tangible
benefits. We propose that a concrete demonstration of the benefits of those
new provisions is in order..There seems to be an obvious and easy
demonstration available, with any foreseeable problems able to be
resolved. lt is our suggestion that the province vacate the field of wild
rice (manomin) in the Treaty #3 area; and recognize the mechnisms that
the Treaty #3 First Nations will put into effect to manage the resource."(September 21, 1992 Grand Chief Kinew to Ontario Premier Rae).
The Grand Chief added that "these mechanism would protect the present licences of third
parties", in a bid to make it easier for Ontario to "open discussions immediately".
The response came in an immediate meeting the Treaty #3 Grand Chief and legal
advisor Don Colborne had with the Deputy Minister of ONAS. lt was agreed the Minister
would set out in a letter "Ontario's understanding of this issue (wild rice) in the context
of the constitution"(October 2, 1992 M. Coolican, ONAS Secretary to Grand Chief Kelly-
Kinew), and further that the Grand Council could advise in drafting that letter.
The subsequent letter from the Minister responsible for Native Affairs to the
Grand Chief gave much hope for discussions to begin immediately after the referendum
vote (October 26, 1992), and further that "l am prepared to recommend to my
colleagues that we begin a process to resolve this issue as a priority irrespective of the
outcome of the constitutional lalks" (October 2, 1992 Hon. Bud Wildman to Grand Chief
Kelly-Kinew). Mr, Wildman stated that the inherent right clauses in the Charlottetown
Accord called for negotiation of agreements to elaborate the relationship between our
governments, including lands and resources:
"ln my opinion a reading of these clauses leads to the conclusion that the
harvest of wild rice would be an important part of the negotiations
leading to the implementation of Treaty #3 First Nations' right to self-
government...(as well as act) as an important issue to be resolved both
to clarify lhe treaty and to implement its terms as understood by the
Treaty #3 First Nations. A possible outcome of these negotiations would
be that the Wild Rice Harvesting Act would no longer apply in Treaty #3
territory and an agreement on a transition process to recognize Treaty
#3 and Ontario rights and interests. Under the self-government
provisions of the constitutional accord the replacement for the Wild Rice
316
Harvesting Act could be a law passed by the duly constituted legislative
body of the Treaty #3 First Nations."
Hon. B. Wildman to Treaty #3 Grand Chief Kelly-Kinew,
October 6, 1992
The Minister pointed to a number of issues which would have to be discussed
between Ontario and Treaty #3 First Nations:
"What questions would require cooperalion in management between our
governments?
How would Ojibway regulation of wild rice harvesting relate to otherjurisdictions over land and resource use?
What process of consultation would be required to determine issues of
land use and compensation where harvesting rights are affected?
What transitional process would protect the interests of existing licence
holders as we move to a new management regime?"
(October 6, 1992 Hon. Wildman to Grand Chief Kelly-Kinew)
On October 21st, the Grand Chief met the Premier at the airport while they were
heading to the Vancouver AFN assembly. After some discussion on lhe matter, Bob Rae
reviewed his Minister's October 6th letter and handwrote on the margin of it:
"l fully endorse the contents of this letter. Afler discussions with Chief
Peter Kelly-Kinew we are agreed that the Treaty #3 itself will be the
basis of our negotiations over wild rice, a resource historically, tied to
the tradition and economy of the people of Treaty #3." (signed) Bob Rae,
Premier of Ontario
The Grand Chief also handwrote on the letter: "l agree as Grand Chief of Treaty #3. I look
forward to full implementation of my people's treaty and aboriginal rights." This
commilment seemed - at last - to be something tangible. 1a
At the October annual assembly of Chiefs and Elders at Wabigoon, the Grand Chief
tabled a proposed Treaty #3 Anishinaabe Manomin law for discussion . This law was
intended to take the place of provincial legislation, once Ontario repealed lhe Ontario
Wild Rice Harvesting Act tor the Trealy #3 territory. The proposed Treaty #3 law was
brief, following the advice of legal experts who spoke against codification and detail,
preferring to follow the Navajo model that practices would follow custom and tradition.
The draft Treaty #3 Anishinaabe Manomin Law, 1992 proposed to govern "the
management of Anishinaabe Manomin (known also as Manito Gitigaan in the
Anishinaabemowin language and as wild rice in the English language) throughout the
3r7
Treaty #3 territory". lt was to be enacted "as a continuation of the responsibility of the
Anishinaabe people to care for and use the gifts given by the Creator" and was to be
"interpreted in a manner consistent with the fundamenlal characteristics of the
Anishinaabe people and their relalionship with Anishinaabe Manomin"..such as
"(i) Manomin is of fundamental spiritual, cultural and economic
importance to the Anishinaabe people, and the ownership is in the Creator(ii) The 1873 Treaty of Northwest Angle included a treaty promise to
recognize Anishinaabe manomin as the responsibility of the Anishinabaig
since time immemorial
(iii) The treaty promise amounts to an exclusive right of use and
management of the resource, in perpetuity, and is a land right."
The administration of this law was to be "under the control and direction of the Treaty
#3 Anishinaabe Manomin Management Board, who are in turn directly responsible to
Grand Council Treaty #3 in Assembly." lmportantly, "Traditional Anishinaabeg
practices shall be honoured and encouraged."
Treaty #3 Chiefs who had been long involved in both the politics and business of
wild rice, such as Willie Wilson of Manitou Rapids, spoke strongly in favour. Many liked
the approach and wished to take it back to their communities for consideration. The
approach suggested was to have each First Nation pass a resolution of support for such a
law, and establish a working group to consider the transition period from the Ontario
Ministry of Natural Resources administration to a Treaty #3 Anishinaabe body.The
Chiefs did not pass a resolution at this meeting. Rather, The Grand Chief was authorized
to continue his inter-governmental affairs portfolio, and to push the province on Treaty
implementation of resource rights as far as possible. The Grand Chief did commission
consultant Fred Kelly to prepare a briefing paper outlining the work to be done to pursue
an administrative transfer and political protocol with Ontario. This was done
immediately.
Grand Council Treaty #3 had commissioned a thorough review of the whole
Charlottetown Accord by experienced lawyers and legal scholars; the results were
compiled in a binder of information for the Chiefs' fall assembly, October 1992. On
318
balance, the legal analysts viewed the Charlottetown Accord as having given sufficient
recognition of lhe inherent right and as offering new processes which seemed belter than
what had existed at any level before. The Chiefs discussed the Accord, and asked for
immediate community information sessions. During the last three weeks of October, the
Grand Chief visited many of the 25 First Nations in Treaty #3 for community meeting to
explain the Charlottetown Accord and its potential for treaty implementation of rights,
especially to wild rice, fishing and education. However, on October 26, most First
Nations across Canada joined with millions of Canadians in rejecting the Accord. (Ontario
accepted it by the narrowest of margins).
After the referendum defeat, politicans across Canada scampered to shelter,
vowing they'd "learned their lesson" and would concentrate on the economy from now on.
ln the estimation of several observers, aboriginal rights suffered a backlash in B.C. and
northern Ontario. ln mid November, when Grand Council Treaty #3 again raised the
issue of wild rice, the Deputy Minister of ONAS put otf any dates for talks.
Treaty #3 First Nations, however, had continued in their reorganization of the
Grand Council Treaty #3, and in a special assembly at Couchiching First Nation,
November 4th, the Chiefs and Elders formally adopted the "Declaration of Anishinabe
Meenigoziwin" ('What the Creator has given us'), whose preamble proclaimed :
"We, the Anishinabe, know that the Crealor placed us here on Mother
Earth as sovereign peoples of the Ojibway Nation and as part of the
international human family, and
Knowing that the Creator also gave us our Language, Culture, Customs and
Beliefs which form a part of our Sacred Gifts as a distinct society; and
Knowing that the Creator have us our laws, rights, trusts and
responsibilities; and
Continuing our special relationship of being at one with the land, air,
water and resources therein from time immemorial; and
Seeking for ourselves, as a nation, the freedom to continue to live in peace
and harmony with Nature and all life including all of our brothers and
sislers of other nations in the international community." (See Appendix
16 for full text)
319
The Meeingoziwin document affirmed, among other things that:
"All Anishinabe peoples have the right of self-sufficiency through the
inherent right of self-determination and self-government, ..
"Our treaty relationship with The Crown in right of Canada is confirmed
and as such our relationship with Canada is as Nation to Nation and her
several Provinces and Territories as government to government. ...
"Any agreements, treaties or jurisdictional arrangements as a nation with
other nations and their governmenls must be based on the truer and
informed consent of all of our Anishinabe in our traditional territory."
The "inherent and traditional values" recognized in Meeingoziwin included spirituality,
honour, sharing, kindness, love and respect, integrity, equality" and affirmed the First
Nations commitment to the sacred teachings of "Kizhi-wa-tiziwin, Ot-so-kay-nun, Ka-
ge-kway-nun and Kinama-tiwi-nun as passed from generation to generation by our
elders". The inherent powers and freedoms, and areas of government jurisdiction which
the Anishinaabe reserved included the power and freedom "to make and enforce our own
laws", "to regulate our land and property", and "to make treaties, alliances and
agreements with other nations and their governments" regarding "land and land
management, and natural resources" among other things.
With Meenigoziwin securely in place and in mind, Grand Council Treaty #3
proposed to Ontario in January 1993 a new initiative for recognition of Treaty rights:
"The Chiefs and Elders of Treaty #3 believe that you and l, as the political
leaders of our people, must redirect the process and set the political
direction 1o be followed ..or civil servanls will continue to ..find these
issues chronically irresolvable.
It is proposed that you and I meet soon to discuss two items:(i) Anishinaabe Manomin - Wild Rice. A decision from you is needed that
Ontario will withdraw from the field in the Treaty #3 area.(ii) Statement of Respect for Treaty #3. A decision from you is needed if
Ontario is going to proceed with a legally binding document or merely a
statement of political intent. lf the latter, then Grand Council Treaty #3
is not interesled." (Jan.26, 1993 Grand Chief Kinew to Premier Rae).
ln a subsequent letter to Minister of Natural Resources & Native Affairs, the
Grand Chief proposed that the Ontario Statement of Respect for Treaty #3 be finalized so
that "Ontario adhere to the trealy". The Grand Council called for talks to recognize
fishing rights to begin immediately, and for an end to using individuals as "guinea pigs"
320
in testing treaty rights issues in the courts. With regard Io manomin , the Grand Council
suggested :
"lt is (an issue) in which First Nations management of the resource can
be renewed wilhout undue practical complications, or concerns by third
parties. (Manomin).. presents the opportunity of putting into actual
practice some of Ontario's publically declared principles." (January 28,
1993, Kinew to Wildman).
The Grand Chief proposed a joint process begin. Grand Council Treaty #3 would
develop, in consultation with Ontario, a written manomin resource management law. The
Grand Council of Chiefs and Elders would enact this law according to their own protocol.
Thereupon, Ontario would "formally withdraw from management of the resource in all
respects within Treaty #3 territory". Thereafter, Treaty #3 Anishinaabe government
would carry out managemenl of manomin, in consultation with the Crown. The details of
coordination with Ontario's management system would be worked out (January 28,
1993, Grand Chief Kinew to Hon. Bud Wildman). The Minister of Native Affairs (his
other portfolio of Natural Resources had been reassigned) ostensibly agreed that
"lechnical work should commence on the appropriate steps toward recognition of
Anishinaabe authority over manomin" (April 19, '1993 Treaty #3 Grand Chief to Hon.
Bud Wildman). A target date for signing an agreement was set for May 26, 1993.
At a staff level, however, the mandate was not received from the Deputy and no
meetings were held. "Ontario is not prepared at this time to name persons to commence
the technical talks" was the message to GCT3 (April 27, 1993 Grand Chief Kinew
address to Ontario)
The Grand Chief raised this problem at an April 27,1993 Chiefs of Ontario
meeting of Hon. Bud Wildman. The topic of this summit was the Statement of Political
Respect and how this could be implemenled, that is, what the Ontario government and
Chiefs could do now that all their eggs in the constitutional entrenchment basket had been
broken. Grand Chief Kinew reminded the Minister of Nalive Affairs of his government's
commitment to respect treaty rights and the inherent right of self government. Then he
327
itemized numerous refusals by the Ontario government to reach a statement of respect
for Treaty #3 or to recognize Treaty rights to fish - even in the aftermath of the
February 1993 Ontario Court of Appeal ruling in favour of Treaty #3 fishing rights (R.
v. Bombay [1993] 1 C.N.L.R. 92 (Ont. C.A.). The Grand Chief reminded the Minister of
his commitment to work toward the May 26th, 1993 deadline for an agreement on
recognizing Treaty rights to wild rice, while his officials stated they have no staff to
meet:
"l ask you, Sir, if we have the political will and can seconde staff from
within our organizalions, tribal councils and First Nations to make such
an historic agreement, surely the Ontario government can do the same
with its thousands of civil servants within ONAS and MNR" (April 27,
1993 address by Treaty #3 Grand Chief to Hon. Bud Wildman).
The Grand Chief reminded the Minister of the historic January 1992 meeting at
Garden River First Nation, Sault Ste Marie, when the cabinet committee on the
constitution agreed that the inherent right included lands and resources, and that Ontario
could vacate its jurisdiction to the prior rights of First Nations. Once again, the
Minister promised action, Meetings were to be scheduled, staff assigned, deadlines
reestablished. None of this took place.
When a new Minister of Natural Resources was named in Ontario, the Grand
Council again pursued talks on recognition of Treaty #3 rights to governance in Manito
gitaan (June 29, 1994, Grand Chief Kinew to Hon. H. Hampton, Ontario Minister of
Natural Resources). The Minister replied - during rice harvest season - that the
Premier, the Minister of Native Affairs and he as Minister of Natural Resources
recognized "the need to resolve outstanding matters" and were "aware of the importance
of wild rice to Aboriginal peoples..and the need to address the complex set of issues
related to wild rice harvesting", Then, he begged off any movement on rice by stating that
Grand Council Treaty #3 and MNR were pursuing trapping negotiations and these "may
lay the groundwork for progress in other nalural resource negotiations" (August 24,
1994 Hon. Hampton to Grand Chief Kinew).
322
Grand Council Treaty #3 was succinct in its reply:
"Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg have a Treaty, Aboriginal and
Anishinaabe right to manomin (wild rice). Ontario has no business in this
area and never has.
We are not seeking talks to'address the complex set of issues
related to wild rice harvesting'. lnstead we have every intention to
seeking (sic) Ontario's implementation of our Treaty right to manomin,
and of Ontario honouring its Statement of Political Respect for our
inherent rights. ... Our people have a history of governance regarding all
aspects of manomin which the Creator gave to our people for (sic) care
for. Harvesting wild rice is only one part of this tradition, legacy and
right. ... We wish to meet immediately, as has been promised several
times by leaders of your government, to honour and implement Treaty #3
rights lo manomin." (September 1, 1994 Grand Chief Kinew to Minister
OMNR Hampton).
The Grand Chief indicated that while an Ontario-Treaty #3 trapping agreement may be
proceeding, "progress in this one sphere cannot replace action to implement Treaty #3
in all spheres" (Sept.1,1994 Grand Chief Kinew to Min¡ster Hampton). As of 1995, no
meetings to recognize Treaty #3 rights lo manomin have taken place.
The Grand Council Treaty #3 had been undergoing a review and self-analysis for
several years, as to how to make self-governmenl a reality across the Treaty territory.
Reorganization meetings at communities, with Elders, women, youth, and all interested
members, had led to the declaration on fishing licences of February 1992, the
Meenigiziwin Declaration of 1993, and other initiatives such as agreements with
Ontario Hydro to research and negotiate rights of way as nation lo corporation
agreements (1991) and with Bell Canada for Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg to permit rights of
way for fibre optic cable to cross Treaty #3 territory, subject to agreed conditions
(1994). Several First Nations had entered into historic agreements with the Province of
Ontario to co-manage traditional territory (Lac La Croix -Quetico Park Agreement
1994; Shoal Lake Watershed Agreemenl 1994). lf self-government is the actual
decision-making about the future of the people, land and resources, then certainly
Treaty #3 First Nations were making great strides in the direction they wished.
The oldest form of traditional government within Treaty #3, the Grand Council,
had undergone many metamorphoses during the several decades afler Treaty. The
323
overarching goal was always clear: to preserve and strengthen treaty rights. The Treaty
#3 First Nations of the 1990s were envisioning ways to make their treaty organization
more relevant and effective to pursue that long held vision. But, thus far, talk at the
table, even at the highest level of constitutional talk, had not realized the elusive goal of
treaty implementation.
As of the fall of 1994, another harvest continued. Manomin remains on the
political agenda of Grand Council Treaty #3. The recognition of Treaty #3 jurisdiction
remains before the Minislers of the Crown. There have been no talks in Ontario or
Manitoba to give meaning to the constitulional recognition and entrenchment of Treaty
and aboriginal rights for Treaty #3. And the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg believe that the
metaphor of Manito gitigaan also remains'. manomin -and Anishinaabe rights - may be
submerged, but they will grow when and where tended.
Endnotes:
1. There is never one single issue to deal with at one time in politics. Anishinaabe
politics is no exception. Grand Council Treaty #3 was seeking separate bilateral
discussions with Canada to recognize Treaty #3 rights, and was participating in
tripartite fora on lands & resources, policing, social services, and some land claims.
As well, the lndian Commission of Ontario arranged for a mediator to listen to arguments
from Ontario, Canada and Grand Council Treaty #3 regarding the issue of the import of
Ontario's 1915 legislation confirming Treaty #3 reserves. When were Treaty #3
reserves in legal existence - after choosing by Anishinaabeg and approval by the federal
government, after federal survey and acceptance, or not until the 1915 legislation?
Although lhe legal positions of the three parties remained in
disagreement, the mediation process was considered to be successful in
that these positions were clearly presented to each side; legal problems,
in particular reliance upon cases that would be decided differently by
the courts if they were heard today, were identified; and areas of
consensus were reached, especially regarding the validity of the Treaty.
No further mediation was required and in his report, the mediator
expressed his "hope that the mediation may open new doors toward a
resolution of the Treaty 3 land claims at an early date." (Cottam
1994:276-7)
All claims in Treaty #3 remain outstanding almost ten years later.
2. According to TARR Director Don Jones, several including TARR staff, however, were
disappointed. They had brought the Elders together, and had fluent speakers (such as
Shirley Andy of Big Grassy)translate the substance of what the Elders spoke about
324
manom¡n to make the five key points. Then Don Jones had the key points translated back
again into written Anishinaabe language. This was written by his mother, Nancy Jones, a
fluent speaker and Anishinaabe culture and language teacher, and Don's brother Dennis
Jones, a university graduate and Anishínaabe language teacher at a nearby college. A dual
poster featuring both languages was to proceed. Perhaps, part of the Chiefs' delay was
because written Anishinaabemowin (with an agreed upon orthography) was not widely
read nor accepted across Treaty #3 in 1988, and thal continues to be the case into the
late 1990s. ln the end, the TARR staff felt that the Elders themselves had approved this
project and the wording, and how could they change it? lt remains available to the
Chiefs lo use in the future, as guidance offered by the Elders.
3. Grand Council Treaty #3 decided to rejoin the DPI process, chaired by lCO, in 1992.
By this time, its high sounding words to implement self government had become focussed
on education and pilot projects to implement on a regional basis some further local
conlrol of educational programs. lt was no longer a far-reaching proposal.
4. "Land claims" is a classic example of the use of oppressive language by government to
mainlain social control of a minority and continually assert de jure and de facto control
of lands and resources. The Crown denotes the process in which a First Nation (or Treaty
or non-Treaty region) asserts their rights to territory and resources as an "abopriginal
land claim". lt is the First Nations who are making a claim, rather than the settler-
governments who arrived later and imposed a foreign system of government and law.
Once this language of oppression is utilized, then the onus of proof is on the "claimant" to
make the case for "ownership" of land and resources, while the Crown retains for itself
the position of judge and jury. (See also Glossary for brief description of Specific
Claims Policy).
5. lt is said by the Liberal government elected in 1993 that the present process would be
replaced by an independent commission. However, as of this writing in 1995, no
concrete steps have been taken to do so.
6. For a consideration of the tensions and politiking of these times, see Sanders 1g83.
Another good source to consult is newspaper files, particularly Native newspapers such
as The Ontario lndian and Windspeaker from Alberta.
7. This question refers to the debate about whether s.35 is a "full box" or rights
including the inherent right to self-government or an "empty box" just referring to a
few rights "existing" as of 1982. For more discussion see Hawkes & Peters 1g86;
Little Bear, Boldt & Long 1984; Boldt & Long 1985; Boldt 1993; Mercredi &
Turpel1993; Richardson 1989, 1993.
B. "Domestication" of the treaties refers to the efforts in Canadian constitution making to
bring lndian Treaties under Canadian jurisdiction rather than international. ln Supreme
Court judgments since the Constitution Act, 1982 (Simon 1985), lndian treaties have
been considered "sui generis" or unique, neilher a contract nor an international treaty.
Treaty #6 First Nations find this ruling as evidence of a move toward "domestication",
which would render First Nations in Canada similar to the "domestic dependent nation"
status of tribes in the United States. lt is rather the case, in the view of Treaties 6,7 in
particular, that lndian treaties are international treaties which are gaining stature
through the United Nations Declaration on lndigenous Peoples and through a U.N.
sponsored review of treaties. ln this view, lndian Nations signed treaties with the
British Crown, who passed on their obligalion, to Crown Canada. There is no room in this
view for any but bilateral relations with Crown Canada - not the provinces. Treaty #6,
325
with strong support from Treaties #7 and #8, did not approve of being lumped into a
"Melting pot" as "aboriginal" with Metis, lnuit and non-status Native Council of Canada.
They were not supportive of any process, like the multilateral process, which equated
Treaty Nations with "other aboriginals". (From notes author took in attendance at
National Treaties Conference, April 1992).
9. Most of the words included in the treaties section of the Charlottetown Accord reflected
Supreme Court of Canada decisions since the Constitution Act, 1982, with that sole
exception of omitting the phrase "as understood by the lndians" as a guide to
interpretation.
Yet, the Charlottetown Accord was an historic breakthrough as well as a confusing
patchwork of recognition and potential limitation. The Canada clause of the Accord
recognized:
"(b) the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, being the first peoples to govern this land, have
the righl to promote their languages, cultures and traditions and to ensure the inetgrity
of their societies, and their governments constitute one of three orders of government in
Canada."
The "inherent right to self government was recognized, and - significantly - was not
considered contingent upon negotiations with the federal and provincial governments, as
had been the First Ministers' position during the 1985-87 constitutional talks. Self-
government rights had specific recognition and specific enforcement mechanisms,
through negotiations, and after five years, through the courts.
10. The context clause to describe the inherent right of self government in the
Charlottetown Accord was summarized:
"The exercise of the right of self-government includes the authority of
the duly constituted legislalive bodies of Aboriginal people, each within
its own jurisdiction:
(a) to safeguard and develop their languages, cultures, economies,
identities, institutions and traditions; and,
(b) to develop, maintain and stengthen their relationships with their
lands, waters and environments,
so as to determine and control their development as peoples according
to their own values and priorities, and ensure the integrity of their
societies." (Delacourt 1 993:329)
1 1. lndeed, to gain an understanding of First Natíons perspective on theír
comprehension of the Charlottetown Accord and attempts by translators to convey the
meaning of what their leaders were negotiating, the reader is referred to "Governing the
lmplicate Order:Self-Government and the Linguistic Development of Aboriginal
Communities" James (Sagej) Youngblood Henderson, presenled to the University of
Otlawa, Faculty of Law, December 19g3.
"The contextual clause of self-government (ed: see above) was
translated as the 'Aboriginal or lndian vision' or L'nuwey. .. The most
difficult translation process was understanding the'justiciability'
clause, which created a five-year delay in enforcing the inherent
right of self-government. After many discussions over a long time,
326
the Mikmaq elders translated this as the 'disappearing, reappearing
ink-rights' or Keskateskewey." (Henderson 1993:18).
12. Trealy #3 leaders attended the AFN assembly at Vancouver at the end of September
and were presented with great confusion. A panel of legal experts promoting the Accord
began the sessions, in a technical, legal way which put off many delegates (Kinew,
1992). When it became evident that a vote by all Chiefs might not approve the Accord, a
vote was put off indefinitely. lt was a portent of things to come.
13. Both National Chief Ovide Mercredi and Ontario Regional Chief Gord Peters
personally contacted Premier Rae to urge that he abide by his commitment under the
Charlottetown Accord, and agree to negotiate to positive conclusion the recognition of
Treaty #3 jurisdiction over wild rice (Kinew 1993).
14. lf there were ever a time for an Ontario government to understand and be amenable
to Treaty #3 rights lo manomin , it certainly seemed to GCT3 and the COO to be with Bob
Rae's NDP government. ln 1993, the Premier's principal secretary, Melody Morrison,
was a longtime associale of Stephen Lewis and worked with him on the lobbying effort for
lhe recognition of Treaty #3 rights to wild rice in 1979-80. A special consultant to the
Ontario Native Affairs Secretariat, and former executive assistant to Minister Wildman,
was a lawyer, Grant Wedge. He had worked for the Grand Council Treaty #3 from 1979-
81 on wild rice, treaty rights and constitutional issues, and subsequently for the Chiefs
of Ontario on constitutional entrenchment of treaty and aboriginal rights and other
issues, and then for the lndian Commission of Ontario on claims resolution.
327
Chapter 14
Manito Gitigaan - Governance in the Great Spirit's Garden
Conclusions
"What is it about wild rice anyway?" , an Ontario bureaucrat asked. He seemed to
wonder in all sincerity why the great Canadian compromise could not work with this
environmentally-friendly cash crop. Upon further inquiry with the Anishinaabe people
of Treaty #3, I came to realize lhal manomin is neither "rice" rìor "wild". Wild rice is
a member of the grass family and is North America's premier and only native grain. An
annual plant which requires reseeding, wild rice extended its territory by the
intentional seeding by Anishinaabe and other neighbouring peoples. Their aboriginal
methods of taking care of the plant ensured its continuance and growth. Their system of
managemenl developed into the longest lasting form of aboriginal governance in this part
of the land (Chapter 3-5).
The Anishinaabe people of Treaty #3 are living in 55,000 square miles of the
Boundary Waters can relate their heritage back to long before recorded history. lndeed,
archeological digs determine that ancestors of the present day Anishinaabeg have lived in
that area from 8000 B.P. (Before Present). Year round settlements in the area have
been excavated and determined to be 3000 years 8.P., with evidence of wild rice being
used by the people then (Chapter 5).
The ancient origins of the relationship of the Anishinaabe people lo manomin can
be traced through the rock painting of the anthropomorphized wild rice grain (Chapter
3; Appendix 3), while the present day ceremonies mark its continuing significance to
the spiritual life of the Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg (Chapter 4). Historically, the
location of village sites and reserves have been proven to be adjacent to rice fields,
many the people have sowed themselves (Rajnovich 1981;Vennum 19BB; Moodie 1987;
Syms 1982).
328
The root of this word, manomin, indicates the people's sacred relationship to the
plant. "Man " refers to the Creator and Great Spirit, Kizha Manito, who gave this gift of
"min", a berry or delicacy, to the Anishinaabeg.A more ancient term for wild rice,
according to Elder Alex Skead of Wauzhushk Onigum, is Manito gitigaan, the Great
Spirit's Garden. ln this term is understood the sacred relationship of stewardship and
caretaking which the Anishinaabe people have for manomin. Within this phrase is the
connotation of both rights and responsibility. The Anishinaabeg understand their
responsibility as being to the Creator, for the gifts given, a duty owed to those who have
passed before, those living today, and those yet to come. The ceremonies associated with
Anishinaabe manomin cont¡nue to ensure the growth of manomin and the identity of the
people (Alex Skead 1988, Nancy Jones 1992).
And yet, Anishinaabe manomin and the governance in Manito gitigaan have been
undermined by the myths of progress, whereby explorers thought "they (Anishinaabeg)
reap without sowing a kind of wild oats" (Chapter 3). Such myths which undermine or
ignore Anishinaabe science and governance contrast with the sacred myths of the
Anishinaabe people, lhe atisokaanan which teach the people their identity, rights and
responsibilities (Chapter 3,4).
ln this thesis, manomin or wild rice has been examined from the perspective of
the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg in three dimensions. As a symbol, manomin signifies the
conflict in the constitutional division of powers in Canada. ln the Constitution Act.
1867. s.91(24) gives authority over "lndians, and Lands reserved for the lndians" to
the federal government while s. 92 reserves crown lands and natural resources to the
provinces. This conflict continues despite the Constitution Act, 1982 where section 35
recognizes and affirms the Aboriginal and Treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of
Canada. Manomin as a symbol, then, affirms wild rice as an aboriginal and Treaty right
rather than a provincial crown resource.
329
ln fact, the culture and governance of manomin in the Trealy #3 area has been
documented as the longest continuing form of self government in this area. The
ceremonies, preparation, control of the growing period, harvesting camps where Elders
regularly check the harvesl and say when to pick, when to rest the rice, are all evidence
of Anishinaabe government in Treaty #3 territory (Chapter 3-5). As Jenks described
it in 1900, manomin provides a portrait of "an aboriginal economic activity which is
absolutely unique, and in which no article is employed not of aboriginal conception and
workmanship" (Jenks 1900:1019). lt is a solely Anishinaabe exercise of authority by a
people regarding a resource and the organization of their people that was untouched by
successive lndian Acts and survived other forms of suppressing the sovereignty of the
people such as residential schools, relocation of villages, anglicization of names,
outlawing of traditional religion and ceremonies (Chapter 4,7).
Thirdly, manomin can also be seen as a metaphor for the continued existence and
re-assertion of aboriginal and treaty rights. Significantly for the cultural and political
life of the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg , it affirms the spiritual foundation of Anishinaabe
government. One of the main Anishinaabe negotiators at the Treaty #3 final discussions
in 1873, Grand Chief Mawedopenais, explained:
"We think where we are is our property. I will tell you what he said when
He planted us here;the rules that we should follow - us Anishinaabeg. He has
given us rules that we should follow to govern us rightly." (/n Morris 1BB0:59)
Treaty #3 affirms for the people the nation-to-nation agreement that they
negotiated. Although the federal government has their own printed version of Treaty #3,
this document does not reflect the oral tradition of the people whose ancestors gathered
in the thousands to be present at the Treaty negotiations in 1873 and whose leaders
instructed several of their own to record in memory the negotiations and promises made
(Chapter 6). Their oral tradition is corroborated by other written records.
While the printed federal government version is silent about wild rice and stales
that hunling and fishing will be subject to regulations, the Paypom Treaty and
330
corroborative documents state that "the lndians shall be free as by the past for their
hunting and rice harvest" (Chapter 6). This freedom regarding wild rice would have
included the seeding, caretaking of the growing period (eliminating competing plants,
trapping predators such as muskrats, shielding rice from blackbirds by bundling the
rice, and holding the water levels constant for the growing period by using beaver dams,
for example), preparing for and carrying out ceremonies, preparing the tools and
organizing the community for carrying out harvesting and processing, and marketing
(Chapter 4,6). While the commercial use of any resource by Treaty and Aboriginal
peoples is just beginning to be recognized in Canadian law (Chapter 13), for manomin 
,
ils exclusive and commercial use by Anishinaabeg is a documented historical fact
(Chapter 3-6,7,9).
The "commercialization of a traditional pursuit" changed the political situation
of wild rice from one of de facto Anishinaabe control to provincial-commercial intrusion
and legislated control (Lithman 1973; see also Chapter 9,10). Historically, manomin
was one resource that the Anishinaabeg of the Boundary Waters (later known as Treaty
#3) reserved for themselves. And, unlike fishing and hunting, in the Treaty #3 area,
there is no record or memory of white man ever being allowed to harvesl manomin or
ever doing so... until intermarriage with whites from 1950s on (Holzkamm 1984; see
also Chapter 4,5,9).
From the 1 930s, but increasingly in the 1950s, white entrepreneurs entered
the Treaty #3 area as buyers of hand processed rice at lakeside and became the
wholesalers and retailers. Hand processing of manomin is an elaborate activity
involving curing and parching the rice to remove the moisture, thrashing or 'dancing' it
to loosen husk, and then winnowing lo remove the husk by shaking the husk and blowing
ít away (Chapter 4). These are the basic steps, with many variations according to the
ingenuity of the people (Fred Green sr., stuart Jack). with the development of
processing machines to remove the grain from the hull, entrepreneurs began to buy
331
green rice, just harvested off the field, and the Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg began to process
the rice by traditional means for their own use only.
Once manomin is processed, it can be kept for years, indefinitely - one reason
why it was so important for the fur trade. However, if sold 'green', right off the lake,
the rice must be sold quickly to avoid fermentation and spoilage. Once this change
occurred in the 1950s, to sell green rice at lakeside, there became increased pressure
on Anishinaabeg to see wild rice as a "cash crop" which would provide quick monetary
income (Chapter 9,10). Thus, a major economic and cultural shift occurred. Figure
#38 illustrates the variables of tradition and technology affecting Anishinaabe Manomin.
The recent history of Treaty #3 since 1873 saw the establishment in colonial
law of the OntarioiManitoba boundaríes, and the infamous lBBB St. Catherine's Milling
Co. case (Chapter 7). ln St. Calherine's, the British Lords of the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council, who had never stepped foot in North America, ostensibly decided a
case regarding which level of government in Canada (federal or provincial) could let a
timber cutting license in the Treaty #3 territory. However, this judgment defined
aboriginal rights as a "personal and usufructuary right ...dependent upon the goodwill of
the sovereign". The effect of these two decisions was that the beneficial interest in the
lands and resources of Treaty #3, which lhe Anishinaabeg had signed with the crown in
right of Canada, came under the jurisdiction of the Province of Ontario, and after 1930,
the western portion of Treaty #3, under the Province of Manitoba. This is the same
decision that has to date deprived the Nishga, Gitskan-Wet'suwet'en, and Teme Augami
people, among others, of lheir just day in court and recognition of their traditional
governance of their lands (Chapter 13). The legacy of the St. Catherine's case has been
destructive and all-pervasive.
Such cases belong to an established branch of law in Canada called "Native Law" or
"lndian Law" in the United States. This law documents the interprelations that the courts
of those nation-states have given to treaty and aboriginal rights and all things "lndian"
332
Figure 38.
Tradiqion and Technology
Anishinaabe caretaking & ceremonies(practical science)
Marketing
Variables ofinishinaabe Manomin
Growth
Weath
I
Water
er
- traditional vs machine
- tradítional vs machine
- Lake vs paddy
- organic vs chemical
- grading
ha rvested
processed
Leve ls
Predators
Diseases
Competitors
Sell 
- 
Keep\ \
Buver
Non-f ndian/ - \
"/Entrepreneur Fir
Anishinaabe
\
st Nation Co.
Soil
Processing
Traditional Machine
Homemade lndustry
Ha rvestino *
.¿ "\.
,/\Canoe & flail n'iachine
333
that have been considered by the courts (Chapter 13). lnterestingly, Native law actually
has nothing to do with what the indigenous peoples living in those nation-states would
call their "law", that is what Chief Fox of the Blood Nation calls, "immemorial law".
lndeed, Native people who have become lawyers are "dismayed by the general lack
of scholarship on what may be termed the Native perspective to the study of law, not how
Native people view Canadian law, when, to what extent, under what circumstances these
(ed: outside, imposed) laws apply to lhem, but rather the larger, more encompassing
theories of Native epistemology, metaphysics and jurisdictional thought vested in Native
people" (Dockstatorl 993:1 ).
ln such indigenous lhinking, the concept of Native title in Canada is necessarily
much different, and expresses the "reverse usufruct" that Treaty #3 elder Nowegejick
spoke of (Chapter 6). lndeed, following the thinking of Mawedopenais that the Creator
made everything and "placed us Anishinaabeg here .. and given us rules that we should
follow to govern us rightly", then:
"title or interest of the Crown is a mere personal and usufructory
inlerest dependent upon the goodwill of the lndians. The lndians have
all along had a paramount estate underlying the Crown's interest. The
Crown's interest is a mere burden on the title of the lndians."(Little Bear 1989:34).
The fact lhal Anishinaabe legal thinking has not yet found acceptance in Canadian Native
law is reflective of Eurocentric bias (Henderson 1993). Such a system of law and
governance and its suppression of Aboriginal and Treaty rights is summarized as:
"The preamble to the Charter of Rights and Liberties states, 'whereas
Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of
God and the rule of law ..' ..1 feel confident enough in saying to you
that'law'does not rule. People rule. People pass laws. people
interpret laws. People enforce laws, and do so, substantially out of
self-interest." (Penner in Cassidy 1992: 248)
Yet, within the federal state that is Canada, there are alternatives. This thesis
about governing in the Great Spirit's Garden demonstrates the system of customary law
wilhin the context of the Anishinaabe relationship to the Creator and its attendant
responsibilities of respect and caretaking. To understand customary law is to begin to
334
comprehend how much "Native law" has usurped the position and conceptualization of
Indigenous "immemorial law". ln "Native law", and Canadian property law, underlying
"title" is held by the Crown. ln customary or immemorial law, there can be no
ownership of land: title is held and granted by the Creator. What exists is a relationship
to the Creator, by the indigenous peoples, to care for this land and the other gifts ( that
is, what others or outsiders called "resources").
An Anishinaabe family has the right to harvest a particular field each year, and
to invite others to join, because they, and their family predecessors, have cared for that
ricefield for generations. Perhaps they have planted rice and extended the area, trapped
muskrat around it, chased the blackbirds away, or torn the weeds out. "Thus, the rights
to both the land and the resources are understood to be relational rather than possessive"
(John in Little Bear 1995:14). And, for the aboriginal people, "the telling of stories
arising out of the relationship to the land, renewal ceremonies, and songs is what
evidences an exclusive grant from the Creator for'relating'(Little Bear 1995:22).
Indeed, "the relational network 'with all my relations' (ed:humans, animals, plants,
rocks, trees included)is going to continue: "Europeans (ed: or settler Canadians) are
going to be incorporated inlo the network" through treaties (Little Bear 1995:27). ln
such a philosophical approach, the basic tenets of "Native law" do not hold; rather
immemorial law of the First Peoples begins with the premis of the Creator and the
interconnectedness of the land and the people. Newcomers are allowed entrance to this
circle through treaty-making.
lmmemorial law included the consensual decision-making of the council of
headmen where everyone present had a voice, and there were ceremonial ways of
resolvíng disputes. This law spoke of resolving disputes by restoring wholeness and
balance between people. The rules were based upon the sacred relationship with the
Creator who "planled " the Anishinaabeg and all the fruits of the lands and walers for the
Anishinaabeg to look after. This is a law in which rights and responsibilities are
??EJJJ
interrelated and integral to any understanding of the cultural identity of the people. lt is
not a case, as outsiders have written, of Native rights versus crown responsibilities.
lnstead, il is Anishinaabe rights and responsibilities to the Creator, to the essence of
cultural and individual identity and being. This is why Treaty #3 Elders speak of
continuing the ceremonies and the rice will grow (Alex Skead 1988, Nancy Jones
1992). As elder Fred Greene stated, "Our authentic ways are still with us."(Fred Greene
1se0).
lncreasingly, Ontario and Manitoba have sought to assert their authority across
Treaty #3 territory through legislation and enforcement of laws and regulations against
Anishinaabe fishermen, hunters, trappers. Commercial interests also asserted their
authority by cutting immense tracts of timber across Treaty #3, developing mines
without benefit lo Anishinaabeg , and flooding the Lake of the Woods, Rainy Lake, Lac Seul
and other boundary waters (Chapter 11). The court judgments and subsequent major
flooding and regulation by outside authorities took place without consultation or
notification given to lhe Anishinaabe people, and certainly without regard to Treaty #3
(Chapler 11).
As white entrepreneurs invested more in processing and marketing, they pressed
the province lo become involved in this "cash crop" , which they considered to be a
natural resource properly within the jurisdiction of the province under Canadian
constitutional law (Chapter B, 9, 12). Anishinaabeg of Treaty #3 saw this as further
evidence of the concept of "kiiashkway andimog", ie, whites being 'crazy to control
everything'. ln 1960, the Ontario Legislature approved the Ontario Wild Rice Harvesting
Act which established a permit system and provided for other measures of control
(Chapter B). (Significantly, lhe regulations governing the permits asked for the colour
of eyes of the permit holder, an obvious indication that this legislation was not designed
to protect Anishinaabe interests.)
336
Western law has justified and legitimized conquest and control of aboriginal
peoples, lands and resources, and has acted as the "handmaiden of domination through
control and regulation" (Cohen in Pue 1992). ln the case of manomin, the Ontarío Wild
Rice Harvesting Act "constrained systems and provided arenas for resistance" (Cohen in
Pue1992).. The OWRH Act provided for ten vast tracts of lands and waters within the
Kenora and Dryden Lands & Forests districts of Ontario land within Treaty #3 to be set
aside as Wild Rice Harvesting Areas for certain bands. ln the southern portion of Treaty
#3, ie. Ontario's Fort Frances and Thunder Bay districts, traditional areas of bands were
set aside for annual permit renewal, in effect, whether applied for or not. Thus, the
provincial legislation provided recognition of Aboriginal and Treaty rights through its
own regulatory procedures (Chapter 8,12, 13).
The Grand Council Treaty #3 led the fight against provincial incursions inlo Manito
gitigaan (Chapter 7,9 -13). ln 1972 lhe Chiefs wed commerce and Treaty rights by
forming the Anishinaabe Man-O-Min Co-op, which continued trom1973-79 (chapter
10). The Chiefs wished to establish an economic presence with their Treaty and
aboriginal right to exclusive use of manomin . During 1977-78, Grand Council Treaty
#3 made strong representations to the Ontario Royal Commission on the Northern
Environment, which led to the Province declaring in 1978 a five year moratorium on
any new licences to harvest wild rice (Chapter 12). This moratorium continues today.
The story of manomin involves the development of Grand Council Treaty #3 from
a traditional form of government through its years as a lobbying organization (1930s to
1990s) to its present evolution into an adapted form of traditional governance with law
making ability (Chapter 7,9 -13). For example, at the'1992 Annual Assembly the
Chiefs and Elders of Treaty #3 discussed a draft Treaty #3 Anishinaabe Manomin Law
which would re-assert its own customary law across the 55,000 square miles of Treaty
#3 (Chapter 13).
337
During the negotiations toward the Charlottetown Accord in 1991-92, and
thereafter, Grand Council Treaty #3 pursued an initiative with the Premier and cabinet
of Ontario that proposed to see the province vacate the legal field of manomin and
recognize the jurisdiction of Treaty #3 immemorial law (Chapter 13). The Ontario NDP
government stated it was committed to the jointly constructed and signed Statement of
Political Relationship recognizing that aboriginal rights includes "an inherent right to
self government". The Premier signed this SPR with status lndian leaders from across
Ontario in'1990. ln 1992, cabinet level meetings with Grand Council Treaty #3 and
olher provincial/territorial organizations in Onlario led to the further clarification that
this government recognizes that inherent right to self government included lands and
resources (Chapter 13). ln Manitoba, Grand Council Treaty #3 lobbied hard to gain
recognitíon of their Treaty rights undell9B0s wild rice legislation. Despite political
support from Opposition M.L.A.s and later positive findings by the Manitoba lnquiry into
the Administration of Justice regarding wild rice as "at least an aboriginal right",
Treaty rights to rice have no standing in Manitoba. Regardless of vigorous lobbying by
the Treaty #3 Chiefs' organization and individual First Nations, no Crown government -
Ontario, Manitoba nor Canada - has taken the concrete steps required to implement the
practical recognition of Anishinaabe governance of Manito gitigaan in Treaty #3
(Chapter 12, 13)
lronically, the key to the recognition and implementalion of Treaty rights is
within the vision and grasp of all legislators in Canada: federalism.
"Federalism gives us the key to reconciling multiple communities. We are
on much more fruitful ground when our starting point is the legitimacy,
in fact, desirability of multiple loyalties, multiple communities, co-
existing and strengthening each other... A neat and tidy mind is an enemy
of federalism." (Simeon'1990:54).
Many versions of federalism were discussed and debated throughout the
Charlottelown Accord deliberations and referendum campaign in 1992, including
338
asymmetr¡cal federalism, Charter- federalism, cooperative federalism, Treaty
federalism (Chartrand 1995; Delacourt 1993). (Any and all are preferred to executive
federalism, whose last hurrah was the two failed constitutional "Accords" of '1987 and
1992, judging by the results of the Charlottetown Referendum.)
Asymmetrical federalism allows for a differing arrangement of powers for
different governments within the federation, allowing one province (or other
government) to have conlrol in jurisdictions that others may not wish to hold or
exercise. Charter-federalism preaches accomodation of the "multiple Canadian
conceptions of community and identity" - federalism to manage space and territorial
senses of community" and the Charter addresses the identity, hopes and aspirations of the
many peoples composing Canada (Cairns 1992:28-29). Cooperative federalism allows
for agreements among federal, provincial and lndiegnous authorites to implement self
government: "important matters as jurisdiction, financing and transitional
arrangements can be handled in an orderly and amicable manner" (RCAP 1993:47).
Ïrealy federalism, however, returns to the older model of co-existence of two
societies 2 çBear Robe 1992; Little Bear 1989). lt calls for a recognition of existing
treaty arrangements or lhe establishment of new arrangements for co-existence through
treaty. Treaty federalism acknowledges that other forms of federalism impose limits on
lhe role and position of lndigenous nations wilhin Canada. lt understands that existing
federal-provincial constitutional arenas "will always tend to lead towards the
development of constitutional provisions that circumscribe Aboriginal government
within a federal-provincial framework ' one which does not principles of Aboriginal
governing authority" (Cassidy 1994:10). Completing the circle of Confederation would
mean that Canadians recognize "the right of lndigenous peoples to preserve and protect
their cultural distinctiveness" (Lenihan, D. 1992:32), and that this cultural
distinctiveness is based upon their traditional lands and resources. This would imply the
339
need for agreements between Crown governments and lndigenous governments for
ownership, access, shared and exclusive use, and any other oplions, including "a
lransformation in thinking and language" (Cassidy 1994:11). 3
Giving meaning to and implementing treaty and aboriginal righls will involve
cooperation and respect to achieve recognition of jurisdiction and exercise of authority
through protocols, agreements and structures. ln the 1970s-90s, Grand Council Treaty
#3 believed that they were raising one of the simplest ways to do so, in pressing Ontario
first, and later Manitoba, to respect and recognize Treaty #3 rights of governing in
Manito gitigaan (Chapter 12,13).
Along with strategizing for the practical implementation of Treaty rights, Treaty
#3 Chiefs and leaders are considering such issues as, whether and to what extent to
codify customary law. They are considering what forum ( eg. lntergovernmental
protocols, Anishinaabe processes, international tribunals) may be used to re-establish
lraditional laws and traditional stewardship of the lands and resources given by the
Creator to the Anishinaabeg . The Elders continue lo say simply, the traditions need to be
taught and practiced, the language spoken, and the ceremonies carried out.
ln reflecting on Manito Gitigaan from an interdisciplinary field, I looked in many
directions for a paradigm that would assist in explaining the conflicts of governance at
issue here (Chapter 1,2). ln the communications field, Neil Postman developed a
paradigm of cullures along a continuum of toolmaking, technology and technocracy.
Toolmaking cultures invent tools "to solve specific, urgent problems of physical life or
to serve some symbolic need in the world of art, politics or religion" (Postman
1992:22). Such tools "did not attack the dignity or integrity of the culture that produced
them" and did not disrupt the inextricable wholeness of social, economic and spiritual
life. Later, machines were invented to make more machines. And these tools began to play
a central role in Ìhe thought -world of the culture - the mechanized clock replaced other
340
time measurements, the printing press replaced oral tradition. ln this age of
technocracy, technologies and traditions were able to "co-exist in uneasy tension"; while
technology was stronger, traditions were still functional, still exerting influence
(Postman 1992:48). The present age of "technopoly", Postman defines as the
"surrender of culture to a totalitarian technocracy" (Postman 1992:48). "Technopoly
hopes to control information and thereby provide itself with intelligibility and order"
(Postman 1992:91).
The Postman paradigm has immediate application to governing in the Great
Spirit's Garden. Ihe Anishinaabeg first developed lhe tools which allowed the seeding and
caretaking (via canoe), the harvesting (canoe, thrashing slicks, poles and paddles), and
the processing (pots, paddles, poles, thrashers, winnowing baskets) (Chapter 3,4,5).
This is "the absolutely unique economic activity .. .in which no article is employed not of
aboriginal conception and workmanship" (Jenks'1900: 1019). ln an era of
mechanization, Anishinaabeg and non-Anishinaabeg developed machines to do the
harvesting (airboats with "speedhead" attachments like wireframe baskets) and
processing (parching ovens and thrashing drums). This second era of technocracy
created some dissonance between the new technologies, which allowed for the separation
of the stages of labour involved in caring for the crop, and the traditions, that fostered a
familial closeness with the preparations for the wild rice season (Chapter 3,4).
Beginning with the provincial incursions in the ricefields in the 1960s, and more
increasingly with provincial statistical collection from the 1970s, the era of technopoly
has sought to disassociate the Anishinaabe people from the Great Spirit's garden.
Through the usage of provincial legislation and regulations, bureaucractic control of data
and definitions, and the promulgation of research intended to wrest control of the rice
from Anishinaabeg, governments have introduced the era of technopoly into the Great
Spirit's Garden (Chapter 8,9,11,12). Technopoly is now threatening to force the
original peoples from the gifts the Creator has given them. Thus, the provincial ideology
a-l
Figure 39
Chart 1: Organic Model of Expression,/Suppression of
Express¡on
Pre-i873 --r.. lg90s
lndian Act & prov legisf ation
S u ppress ¡o n
Chart #Z: Organìc
1 930s 1 950s
Anishinaabe Rights
Ex p ress ¡on
1 960s 1 990s
Model - comparison of Manomin & Anishinaabe
Maniro Gitigaan
Anishinaabe ceremonies &Care-taking act¡vities
R ig hts
(- Relationships _ì
Anishínaabe cultu ral traditions
of Manominikenshii
Anishinaabemowin language
Anishinaabe spirituality & Mite'iwin
Anishinaabe governance & stewardship
in Manito Gitigaan
Anishinaabe ldentity
ïrea ty #3
Oral tradition
safeguarding spirit & intent
1,
)
I
t
paypom Treaty
Continuat¡on of language
ceremon¡es, traditions
' Anishinaabe
)
!
Environmental determ¡nants
Water Levels*
*(affected by Crown regulatory bodies as
weather predators
-muskrats,
blackbirds, bugs
well)
Com pet¡tors
-wate r pla nts
Diseases
Soil conditions
Environmental determinants
-political climate
-backers of movement for
Equal rights vs Treaty rights
Predators 
-
lndian Act suppression
of gov't, culture, Ianguage,
re lig ion(including residential schoolsl
Diseases
-epidemícs followed
by alcohol abuse, mercury
contaminatíon & other polluta
-disease of the soul
lost identity as internal threat to Na
Predators & Competitors
Dispossession of tands & Resources
by Crown gov'ts thru,
courts, legislation, enforcementpolicies & 'rule of outside law,
Manomin
Rig hts
,4
'2/11Ja a
of Crown resources and economic development is confronting lhe Anishinaabe ideology of
the Great Spirit's Garden. the Anishinaabeg understand that their concept of Manito
gitigaan involves lhe Anishinaabe slewardship responsibility to care for the Garden and
their identity as a people that this responsibility entails.
To relate and analyze this story of the Great Spirit's garden in Treaty #3
requires understanding an Anishinaabe perspective, concepts and language. A model in
the English language may be developed from the concept of "supressed sovereignty", a
phrase from law argued in the eastern United States case on behalf of the Mashpee people
(Brodeur 1978). lt speaks of the continuation of sovereignty or right of self rule by a
people, and at the same time, the activities of an outside force to overwhelm and subvert
that self rule . A model then of "expressed (or asserted) sovereignty" and "suppressed
sovereignty" is well applicable to the slory of Manito Gitigaan , the Great Spirit's
Garden. And, it fits well with the paradigm of organic rights, which grow and evolve
within a people as well, despite the effects of opponents (predators), internal pressures
(disease), or environmental determinants (Figure #39).
Just as manomin needs Anishinaabe protection from predators such as muskrat,
blackbirds and moose, so loo treaty and aboriginal rights require Anishinaabe protection
from their 'predators' (seeking to eliminate them or their rights) and competitors
(seeking to intrude and take over their territory). Such opponents speak of the primacy
of "equal rights" and mask the dispossession of the Anishinaabeg of their land and
resources by the "rule of law". As Penner has noted, "law does not rule. People rule. "
And they pass laws, interpret and enforce them, and "do so substantially out of self-
interest" (/n Cassidy 1992:247-252). Opponents of treaty and aboriginal rights speak
in laudatory terms of antiquated and Eurocenlric decisions of courts and governments
which have perpetuated Crown supremacy, even against the prior occupation of the First
Peoples. Treaties, on the other hand, can be seen in the context of expressing the co-
2/1'>JÏJ
existence and inler-connection or relationship of two peoples, lwo governments, two
worldviews.2
Manomin must also resist disease, as must Anishinaabeg resist the everpresent
temptations of assimilation and acculturation. To maintain treaty and aboriginal rights
means that a member of that society states "l am Anishinaabe " (or another culture) and
"the survival of my culture and my people means that I need to act according to my
understanding of that culture". The internal threat to the protection and strengthening of
treaty and aboriginal rights is like a disease. lt can strike at any lime, at any part of the
body. This 'disease' needs both prevention (through active participation in culture,
ceremony, language) and treatment (revitalization of cullural activites, ceremonies,
language) in order to ensure survival and health. The need for prevention and treatment
of such a disease has been described forcefully in comparison to a lwentieth-century
nation-state, wilh ancient roots:
"..the survival of lndians as lndians depends primarily upon cultural
revitalization within a framework of traditional philosophies and
principles, not upon political sovereignty. Put another way, revitalized
lndian cultures are a prerequisite for political sovereignty, not the
reverse. Jewish culture survived for thousands of years without benefit
of political sovereignty. But the Jewish state would have been impossible
without lhe survival of Jewish culture." (Boldt 1993: 201)
Given soil conditions conducive to growth, such as opportunity to join speakers and
practitioners of the Anishinaabe language and culture, lhen the disease described is less
likely to take hold.
The environmental determinanls of manomin such as water levels and weather
have their counterpart in human life in the political climate of each succeeding era.
Treaty #3 Anishinaabe culture, religion, government and way of life have been under
seige since first contact, and more graphically so, since the Treaty-signing in 1873:
first, by the Crown imposition of the lndian Act and by Crown protection of non-lndian
business interesls, then by their imposition of missionary teachers, schools and
344
residential schools, and f¡nally by provincial incursions in nalural resources, education
and social services. When the right lo Anishinaabe governance in Manito gitigaan is
undermined, so too is the culture of the Manominikenshii (Chapter 3,4). So too is the
connection or relationship of manomin to the Anishinaabemowin language, lhe Mite'iwin
religion, the identity of a people. To protect this right is to ensure the survival of the
Anishinaabe people.
The political climate of the late twentieth century is certainly more amenable to
respect for treaty and aboriginal rights than that of one hundred years ago. Rights have
been protected by First Nations forcing their way "out of irrelevance" and into the front
seats of constitution making and resource development decisions in Canada.
This model of "expressed vs suppressed sovereignty" also assists in analyzing and
understanding the conflicts inherent in the federal state of Canada, Each level of
government has historically acted to protect its sovereignty - First Nations, Canada,
Provinces. While the treaty making eras of the 'lBth and 19th centuries were greeted by
lndigenous peoples as offering peaceful co-existence of peoples, cultures and laws, these
intergovernmental-relations instead led to conflict of laws.
The Anishinaabeg, and other aboriginal governments trace the roots of their
governments back to a time before recorded history. The "responsible government" of
Canada and the provinces has very definite roots (and dates) in British, French,
American and early Canadian history of the past few centuries. Yet, despite being recent
arrivals from the same legal, political and social tradition, each Crown govenment has
sought to extend its authorily and jurisdiction, at the expense of the other, and certainly
at the displacement and dispossession of the First Peoples (Chapter 7). Aboriginal
governments have always sought co-existence, with the Crown respecting and
recognizing their inherent rights (Chapter 7,12,13).
This model of expressed vs suppressed sovereignty can be used to understand
present conflicts. Yet to find a way beyond such conflicts, it is useful to look to an
345
interdisciplinary field of law. Legal pluralism considers how customary or folk law is
enhanced or undermined by state laws, and how state laws may be modified or adjusted to
make way for the reassertion andlor continuation of customary aboriginal law (Morse &
Woodman 1987; Dockstator .1993; Saugeen 1992; Boldt 1993; Little Bear 1989) .
Legal pluralism provides an interdisciplinary perspective to add to the field of
aboriginal or "immemorial" law which documents and analyzes EuroOanadian law and its
effects on aboriginal peoples (University of Manitoba Legal Pluralism Seminar,
November 1 992)
Within Anishinaabe governance in Manito gitigaan, one can discover an "lndian
common law", or unwritten rules that have guided past behaviour and continue to do so
today (Zion, in Morse & Woodman 1987:123-4). Such aboriginal customary law can be
seen to be "a definable body of rules, practices and traditions accepted by the community
or traditional society" which may exist "as part of an oral culture, with no written
codes" (Crawford et al, in Morse & Woodman'1987:37). The "almost perfect system" as
Treaty #3 Elder Fred Greene described lhe Anishinaabe governance in Manito gitigaan
continues into today and has the ability to be recognized by outside Crown governments
without overemphasis on codification. Treaty #3 First Nations can determine the format
and the extent of writing in any Treaty #3 Anishinaabe Manomin Law of the future,
according to the principles they have outlined in Meenigoziwin 1993 (Chapter 13).
These are not the political concepts that one expects from a government: spirituality,
honour, kindness, sharing, love and respect, integrity and equality. Yet, these allow for
the tradition of consensual decision-making to prosper. These values allow for
ceremonies to play an integral part of social and political life. ln Manito gitigaan,
ceremonies are a part of every aspect of manomin, from making offerings in the bush
before taking the cedar and carving the thrashing sticks, to offering tobacco into the
water and offering a prayer of thanksgiving, to preparing the first bowl of rice for
feasting with family and community. "Ceremony builds social policy... and sets out the
346
processes which have to be followed prior to moving into a position of responsibility"
(Hodgson 1992:7). This is an essential uniqueness of Anishinaabe governance, which has
been characterized as "oral social policy" (ibid), and it explains much about why
Anishinaabeg are reluctant to legislate and codify their traditions:
"Mainstream society thinks you can legislate behaviour. We
believe social policy is built by role models and setting new
community norms. ... Social policy dictated who, and how, people
became leaders - what processes they had to go through. ... You gotta
earn it. You don't get something for nothing." (Hodgson 1992:7)
Thus, when the Treaty #3 Elders speak of the need to practice the ceremonies and
the rice will return, they are speaking in many dimensions deeper than first thought.
Upon some considered reflection, olher meanings would be revealed. The significance of
ceremony in Anishinaabe political and social life. The stewardship inherent in Manito
gitigaan. The inextricability of the culture of manominikenshii, the language of
Anishinaabemowin, and Anishinaabe spirituality and identity.
There are opportunities in federalism for aboriginal and treaty rights to be
implemented: "State law may replace, reform or conserve the norms and concepts of
customary law" (Morse & Woodman 1987:1). ls there room for a people simply
continuing to act according to traditions that predate the recorded history of Canada?
The story of manomin in Treaty #3 is one in which outside nation-state law
seeks to replace and usurp the customary law of the Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg .
Grand Council Treaty #3 and member First Nations are working to hall what they term
ethnocide. They want the traditional laws of Manito gitigaan to be recognized and
conserved. Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg assert that it is their right to determine how
customary laws will operate into the next millenium.
This thesis has studied Treaty #3 Anishinaabe people, "not as the subject of
government policies" but rather to understand how, over a period of more than one
hundred years, they have sought to "create and re-create their governments" (Cassidy
1990:74).
) A1
Manomin continues to overcome historic and pervasive lhreats to its survival.
Predators, competitors, environmental hazards of changing water levels and weather are
among the many factors that affect the growth of manomin. So too, Treaty #3
Anishinaabe people see themselves as emerging from a prolonged period of what they
characterize as "suppressed sovereignty" into an era of "expressed sovereignty". To the
people of Treaty #3, Anishinaabe governance in the Great Spirit's Garden is an
expression of their continued sovereignty and their continued taking care of their
responsibilily to Kizhe Manito for all the gifts, for the rules to live by, for the life of
their people. Just like manomin, Treaty #3 Anishinaabe rights will continue as long as
there is a seed.
Mi'kaikitowat. Mi'akaakitowakobanin. Mi'initimun.
Endnotes:
1. Professor Catherine Bell of the University of Alberta Law School also expressed
derision at the Delgamuukw decision and the judge's view of aboriginal rights as "vague
and ill-defined'...dependent upon "ordinary usage". Said Bell, "Sounds exactly like
common law to me." (University of Manitoba Legal Pluralism Seminar, 1993).
2. "Two peoples, two governments, two worldviews" is to be understood in the generic
sense of two referring to "lndian" and "non-lndian". This may refer to "lndian" as the 53
remaining aboriginal language groupings or the 500+ First Nations or the number of
348
Treaty or aboriginal title areas, and "non-lndian" as any number of immigrant groups
who have stayed in Canada in the past few centuries.
To speak of "two peoples .." is to speak in terms suggested by the Two Row
Wampum that the House of Commons Special Commiltee on lndian Self-Government
selected for their logo in 1983:
"When the Haudenosaunee first came into contact with the European
nations, treaties of peace and friendship were made. Each was symbolized
by the Gus-Wen-Tah or Two Row Wampum. There is a bed of white
wampum which symbolizes the purity of lhe agreement. There are two
rows of purple, and those two rows have the spirit of your ancestors and
mine. There are three beads of wampum separating the two rows and they
symbolize peace, friendship and respect.
These two rows will symbolize two paths or two vessels,
travelling down the same river together. One, a birch bark canoe, will be
for the lndian people, their laws, their customs and their ways. The
other, a ship, will be for the white people and their laws, their customs,
their ways. We shall each travel the river together, side by side, but in
our own boat. Neither of us will try to steer the other's vessel.
The Principles of the Two Row Wampum became the basis for all
treaties and agreements that were made with the Europeans and later the
Americans. Now that Canada is a fully indepdendent nation, perhaps it will
be possible to strike up the Two Row Wampum between us, so that we may
go our ways, side by side, in friendship and peace.
-excerpted from presentations to the Special Committee by the
Haudenosaunee Confederacy and from Wampum Belts by Tehanetorens.
(Back cover, the Report of the House of Commons Special Committee on
lndian Self-Government in Canada, 1983)
3. Conflict about any sort of federalism ensues when it is presented to Aboriginal
peoples as a definition or limit to their authority. This was lhe case when the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples lobbied for the inclusion of aboriginal self-
government in any revision to the Canadian Constilution:
"any new constitutional provision dealing with the Aboriginal right of
seltgovernment should satisfy six criteria. lt should indicate that the
right is inherent in nature, circumscribed in extent, and sovereign
within its sphere. The provision should be adopted with the consent of the
Aboriginal peoples, and should be consistent with the view that Section
35 may already recognize a right of seltgovernment. Finally, it should
be iusticiable immediately."
(RCAP "The Right of Self-Government and the Constitution:
A Commentary", February 13, 1992:23).
This commentary managed to infuriate the AFN National Chief, who resented the RCAP
official pronouncements on a delicate issue in negotiations toward what became the
Charlottetown Accord, and the weslern numbered treaties, who most vociferously
considered their trealies to be international, certainly not "circumscribed". Yet, the
inherency of self-government was becoming an accepted fact of Canadian political life,
and the Liberal government elected in 1993 agreed that they would acl as if it were
already recognized in the Constitution (Chapter 13).
349
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Appendix 1:A
Guide Questions for unstructured interviews of Treaty #3 Anishinøabeg(Exploratory and probing questions on specific issues would follow)
How do you feel about wild rice, manomin? What is important about it to you? Do you
practice ceremonies a¡ound manomin, with manomin?
How do you use it? Do you harvest, process, keep, sell manomin?
How do you view Anishinaab¿ control of wild rice? In what ways do/did Anishinaabeg
control wild rice? How would it work today? or what would it take to get there?
What conflicts are involved in wild rice?
V/hat role did you play in the development of strategy at Grand Council Treaty #3 (or your
First Nation? or at Anishinahbe Man-O-Min Co-op? or at OIWRDA?)
How does the policy process work at GCT3? In tripartite (GCT3-Ont-Canada)?
What do you think the federal gov't role is, vis a vis GCT3 and tripartite?
What do you think the Ontario govt role is, vis a vis GCT3 and tripartite?
How do you see the role of the Indian Commission on Ontario?
How do you view Indian self-government? What does it mean to you?
Guide questions for unstructured interviews with federal & provincial
offïcials. (Exploratory and probing questions on specific issues would follow)
What role do you and did you play in policy making re: wild rice?
How does your policy procvess work?
How do you/did you involve Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg rn your policy-making? At what
point, when?
At what point do you/did you involve the other level of Crown govt?
What do you know of wild rice?
What do you know about Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg and their cultural connection to
manomin?
What is your opinion about Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg control of wild rice?
TVhat are the conflicts involved?
What is a workable model to resolve these conflicts? What would it take to get there?
What is your view of Indian self-government?
380
Appendix 1B : List of People lnterviewed for this thesis
Treaty #3 Anishinaabeg
Mr. Tobasonakwut Peter Kinew, Ojibways of Onigaming, Key informanl
Mr. Raymond Bruyere, Elder & former rice buyer, Couchiching, Oct. 6, 1990
Mr. Tom Bruyere, (then) Director of Economic Development, Pwi Di Goo Zing Advisory
Services, Couchiching, Oct.6, 1990
Mr. Eli Carpenter, Wabeseemong, July 17, 1990
Mrs. Evelyn Copenace, Onegaming, July 3, 1990
Mr. George Crow, (then) Chief, Whitefish Bay Sept.'12, 1990
Mr. Don Jones, Director, Treaties & Aboriginal Rights Research (TAnR), Grand Council
Treaty #3, Fort Frances, Nicickousemenecaning, July 12, 4u9.23,1990
Mrs. Nancy Jones, Nickicousemenecaning August 1992
Mr. Phil Gardner, Elder (Chief tor 22 years), Eagle Lake, Oct.S, 1990
Mr. Fred Greene, Elder, Shoal Lake #39, July 5, 1990
Mr. Harold (Sonny) McGinnis Jr., (then) Executive Director, Grand Council Treaty #3,
Manitou Rapids, July 14, '1990
Mrs. Nancy Morrison, Kenora January 9, 1992
Mr. Charlie Perreault, Eagle Lake, Oct.5, 1990
Mr. Joe Pitchinese, Kagiwiosa Manomin Ltd., Wabigoon F.N. Oct.4, 1990
Mr. Archie Potson, (lhen) Executive Director, Ontario lndian Wild Rice Development
Agency, Seine River, Oct.19, 1990
Mr. Walter Oshie, Elder, Northwest Angle #34, July 3, 1990
Mr. Herb Redsky, Rice buyer, former President OIWRDA, October 4, 1990
Mr. Ron Sandy, Rice buyer, Northwest Angle #33 *, October 1990
Mrs. Josephine Sandy, Rice business bookkeeper, Northwest Angle #33", October 1990
Mr. Pete Seymour, Elder, Wauzhushk Onigum, Aug.25, 1990
Mr. Charles Wagamese, (Then) Acting Executive Director, Grand Council Treaty #3,
Wabeseemong Sept. 13, 1990
Mr. Willie Wilson, (then) Chief, Manitou Rapids, Oct.19, 1990
Mr. Jim Windigo, Elder, former Chief & Man-O-Min Co-op Board member Oct.6, 1990
Mr. Frank White, Elder, Whitefish Bay , Oct.27, 1990
Mr. Bert Yerxa, Elder and former Man-O-Min Board member, Couchiching
Oct.19, 1990
Government of Ontario
Mr. Grant Wedge, Executive Assistant to Minister of Natural Resources & Native Affairs,
Toronto November 14, 1990
Mr. Mel Crystal, Senior Negotiator regarding Native lssues, Ontario Ministry of Natural
Resources, Nov. 14, '1990.
Ms. Monika Turner, Resource Policy Advisor for Outdoor Recreation, OMNR,
Nov. 14, 1990.
Dr. Lise Hansen, Policy Analyst, Ontario Native Affairs Directorate, Nov.'16, 1990*
Mr. Victor Lytwyn, Researcher, Ontario Native Affairs Directorate, Nov. 16, 1990"
381
Government of Canada
Mr. Jules Hebert, Director, Economic & Employment Services,, INAC, Toronto,
Mr. Bob Bibeau, Economic Development Officer, INAC, Toronto, Nov.14, 1990
Mr. Greg Hancock, Business Development Advisor, INAC, Ontario, Nov.15, 1990
Mr. R.E. Hadfield, Associate Director, Lands, Revenue & Trusts, INAC, Ontario Region,
Mr. Peter Wyze, Economic Development, INAC, Ottawa Nov. 15, 1990 (telephone
in te rv ie w)
Other
Mr. Leo Waisberg, Ethnohistorian and consultanl to Grand Council Treaty #3 TARR,
Kenora, July 20, 1990
Dr. Peter F. Lee, Professor of Biology, Lakehead University, August 23, 1990
Mr. Laurie Catherall, (then)Executive Director, Pwi Di Goo Zing Advisory Services,
Fort Frances (tribal council support staff), Aug.20, '1990
Mr. John Dennehy, (former Community Development Director, Grand Council Treaty #3
1972-74) Winnipeg, Sept.26, 1990
Primary Sources: Files
I would like to thank the following people and organizations for allowing me access to
their files of correspondence and reports regarding the years 1970s-'1 980s, and public
archive material from 1873-19ô0s:
Don Jones, Research Direclor,
Grand Council Treaty #3, Treaties and Aboriginal Rights Research
Jules Hebert, Director of Economic & Employment Development, lndian & Northern
Affairs, Ontario Region, Toronto, Ontario
Ralph Abramson, Director,
Manitoba Treaties & Aboriginal Rights Research Centre, Winnipeg
Bennett McOardle, Head Archivist,
Public Archives of Ontario
GRAND COUNCIL TREATY #3
DECLARATION ON ANISHINABE.
NATION
M,A.NOMIN
l. The Creator put what we need to survive-' including Änishinabet\i"";;;.;; thË land. H. s"". this-to us.' we hlye " g-TiY¡1,t:::fi:
these things for future g;;tii;;'Ïf we do not' there will be trouble
ahead.
2. Anishinabe Manomin is a sacred gift frorn the Creator' It must be
used properly, 
"..orai.,gìïinJiããitrit"ctrin 
gs' I t must be respected
and honoured.
3. Anishinabe Manomin was not given to the white people by the
ä..;;;;. i;Aão .,o, t"'à* h;t; ri'p'ct it' we did not give it to the
ittî" 
"..o1. in the 
Treaty or at any time' The Treaty agreelrrent was
irtåi'*'.-*ã"fd keep the Ánishinabe Manomin' It says:
"The Indians zuill be free as by the past for their hunting
anl it¿e høtvesL"
If that was not in the Treaty then there is no Treaty and úre white
people should go home'
4. How Anishinabe Manomin should be planted, picked, proc.essed
and sold will be decide¿io ã"ito*-unities' accord-ing to our Elders'
5, Our rights are from the Creator and g"ua-ranteed in the Treaty' If
l" frãr,o,-,."t¡e Creator, and if the white people honour the Treaty' we
;li^;;i;t. ã". ¡gttit-rrtt *ttitt peåplé must Lronour the Treatv
because it saYs
"This Treaty uill last os long as the sttn uill shin¿ andutatzt nnu'
thøt is to saY foreuet."
Declared b¡ the Chiefs pÎ the Treaty #3 Nation'