

**THE EMERGENCE OF NEW STRATEGIES AND ALLIANCES
AMONG COMMUNITY-BASED NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
IN A GENTRIFYING INNER-CITY NEIGHBOURHOOD**

**A CASE STUDY OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN
VANCOUVER'S DOWNTOWN EASTSIDE**

by

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A Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

Department of Sociology

University of Manitoba

January 6, 2009

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

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**The Emergence of New Strategies and Alliances Among Community-Based Non-Profit
Organizations in a Gentrifying Inner-City Neighbourhood:**

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Allan Weinshenker

**A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University of
Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirement of the degree**

Of

Master of Arts

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Abstract

This case study concerns community-based non-profit organizations within Vancouver's Downtown Eastside (DTES) and the efforts of these organizations to forge a new political voice on behalf of the most marginalized members of the community. This research is being conducted within the context of the current pressures faced by the DTES arising from gentrification and the potential for evictions and displacement of residents in advance of the 2010 Winter Olympics. The case study involves an examination of community organizing strategies in the DTES during three distinct periods in the organizational life of the neighbourhood's most influential neighbourhood organization, the Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA). DERA's achievements in terms of social housing development and resident advocacy, as well as its oppositional stance to Expo '86 in Vancouver, are internationally renowned. However, the rise of a service dependent resident population and the proliferation of numerous non-profit social service organizations since the early 1990s, has diminished DERA's political influence in the DTES. More recently, a network of non-profit organizations with diverse organizational mandates and often conflicting visions and strategies has emerged in the DTES. The changing nature of the resident population in the DTES and the greater diversity and concentration of non-profit service organizations justified an examination of the current efforts by these non-profit social service organizations to reclaim a political voice for this low-income neighbourhood.

Following a series of interviews conducted with key informants of the main non-profit organizations in the DTES, the study found that these non-profit organizations have developed a form of social cohesion based on the 'niche' that each organization has carved out for itself within the neighbourhood's increasingly competitive social service environment. The study also revealed an increasing reliance on formal and informal coalitions among the non-profit organizations as a means of coordinating their diverse strategies and visions. To date, these coalitions have been effective in pressuring governments to provide written promises for the protection of social housing in advance of the 2010 Winter Olympics. In addition, the emergence of informal coalitions among the non-profit organizations has further strengthened their capacity for social action on behalf of marginalized residents of the DTES. However, the ad hoc nature of these informal coalitions could render them less effective in respect of the longer-term threat posed by the gentrification of the DTES. Further research on these coalitions should be conducted after the 2010 Winter Olympics to determine their stability and effectiveness.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to extend my sincerest gratitude and thanks to my thesis advisor, Professor Rodney Kueneman, for all his guidance, abundant patience, insightful discussion, and encouragement, during all phases of this research.

I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to the members of my thesis committee, Professor Russell Smandych (Department of Sociology) and Professor Brad McKenzie (Department of Social Work) for their support and constructive criticism during the preparation and presentation of this thesis.

Special recognition must also be granted to Margaret Currie, Graduate Program Assistant in the Department of Sociology, for her assistance in all administrative aspects of the thesis process.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

For much of the twentieth century, inner-city neighbourhoods in major Canadian cities, as well as in the United States, experienced significant increases in the population of low-income individuals and others marginalized by social problems such as alcoholism, drug addiction and mental illness. Inner-city regions, in the post-war years until the 1980s, were being abandoned by middle-class professionals who were attracted to the newer suburban neighbourhoods and the desire for a more family-oriented suburban lifestyle. With the exodus of the middle-class to the suburbs, however, municipal governments slashed spending on infrastructure construction and maintenance, as well as public services, within low-income inner-city neighbourhoods. As a result of this increasing government neglect, many inner-city neighbourhoods fell into serious decline and suffered severe deterioration in the neighbourhood's stock of affordable housing. The combination of the deteriorating living conditions and increasing social problems within these neighbourhoods resulted in their being given the label of 'skid road'. Nevertheless, these inner-city neighbourhoods were still viewed by many low-income individuals as places where they could obtain access to affordable housing, public transportation, and social support services. Until the 1970s, much of the social service provision within low-income neighbourhoods was the responsibility of religious organizations which were mainly concerned with helping marginalized residents cope with the declining living conditions rather than with pressuring governments to ameliorate worsening levels of neighbourhood poverty and deprivation.

By the 1970s, activists in many low-income neighbourhoods were inspired by the American civil rights movement and the confrontational approach to community organizing developed by Saul Alinsky. These community activists formed grassroots organizations comprised of neighbourhood residents with the objective of demanding government action to halt the deterioration of social conditions in low-income neighbourhoods. A further goal of these community organizations was the mobilization of neighbourhood residents to collectively demand protection of their social rights. These organizations were intended to be more than just social service providers. The organizations were intended to act as vehicles for the empowerment of marginalized community members enabling them to assume the role of active civic participants. A few such community organizations became well known for their effectiveness with respect to political activism, such as the Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA) in Vancouver.

Commencing in the 1980s, local governments began new efforts to revitalize deteriorating inner-city neighbourhoods. In order to boost the economic viability of these low-income neighbourhoods, municipal governments instituted policies intended to attract private capital investment for the construction of market-based housing and commercial development. Increasingly, however, many state-led revitalization initiatives are taking the form of gentrification resulting in the displacement of many low-income residents. These efforts to gentrify inner-city neighbourhoods have been justified to the general citizenry on the basis that low-income residents are of a generally disreputable character with little prospect of contributing to the economic betterment of the neighbourhood. Thus, these officials argue, the residents do not have a legitimate right to

remain in the neighbourhood as their continued presence will impede the neighbourhood's future economic growth.

Many low-income neighbourhoods have tried unsuccessfully to organize grassroots resistance to gentrification plans and the potential displacement of residents. The rise of service-dependent resident populations owing to the deepening of poverty and addiction-related disabilities has rendered substantial proportions of the population unfit for political mobilization and self-governance. Nevertheless, a few inner-city communities have managed to become organized and have initiated action to slow the gentrification process and obtain government guarantees for the protection of residents' social rights. In many of these cases, the responsibility for organizing the neighbourhood resistance to gentrification and displacement has fallen on the neighbourhood's non-profit social service organizations. Community-based non-profit organizations are becoming increasingly involved in political activism and neighbourhood organizing during a time when governments are offloading greater responsibility for social service provision to these non-profit organizations. In addition, state-led neighbourhood revitalization projects are placing greater emphasis on entrepreneurship and the creation of business ventures that can serve as sources of funding for the organizations' service provision activities. In light of these contradictory roles of social service provision, business development, and political activism, community-based non-profit organizations have been forced to devise new strategies to balance these roles and to forge new alliances with other non-profit organizations in order to maintain political pressure on governments for the amelioration of worsening social conditions in low-income neighbourhoods.

Research Purpose and Methodology

This purpose of this study is to conduct an empirical investigation of the organizing strategies and alliances emerging within a network of non-profit organizations in a low-income neighbourhood. The study employs a single case study approach which focuses on several community-based non-profit organizations in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside (DTES), widely regarded as the most disadvantaged neighbourhood in Canada. The DTES was chosen as the research site for this study in view of the neighbourhood's rich history of community organizing, particularly since the early 1970s and the birth of the neighbourhood's most celebrated community-based organization, the Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA). The DTES was also considered an ideal research site because of the high concentration of social service non-profit organizations, the changing demographic of the resident population, and the current threat of resident displacement arising from the process of gentrification and the hosting of the 2010 Winter Olympics.

Following a purposeful sampling process, the researcher, in consultation with respondents in identified organizations in the DTES, selected seven non-profit organizations to participate in the study. These participant organizations were considered to be the main organizations involved in the current struggle to protect the neighbourhood's social housing and to halt resident evictions in advance of the Winter Olympics. Interviews were conducted with key informants from each of these organizations using an interview protocol as a guide for the interviews. However, the researcher's approach to the interviews was to allow the key informants to expand on each interview topic with as little direction from the researcher as possible. The study

also approached a well-known DTES activist who was an important source of information concerning the history of activism in the DTES. The researcher also interviewed a senior planner with the City of Vancouver to gain the perspective from the city's point of view. The study also involves an analysis of relevant policy documents pertaining to the current revitalization initiatives in the DTES.

Thesis Structure

This thesis is divided into six chapters which are as follows:

Chapter 1 presents the historical background behind the research, a statement of the research purpose, and a brief review of the study's methodology. The chapter also discusses the contribution made by the study to the current issues affecting the DTES and to similar issues being confronted by non-profit organizations in other low-income neighbourhoods.

Chapter 2 presents a review of the relevant literature pertaining to the study's main research questions. The chapter discusses the change from community organizing to community economic development approaches to community development. This is followed by a discussion of the literature concerning welfare state restructuring and the rise of neoliberal policies underpinning state-led neighbourhood revitalization initiatives. The chapter proceeds to outline the main analytical perspectives for the study, specifically Foucault's concept of governmentality and Rose's concept of responsibilization. The chapter concludes with a review of the literature concerning gentrification as an increasingly prevalent state-led form of neighbourhood revitalization.

Chapter 3 outlines the study's methodology. The single case study is justified on the basis that case studies generally allow for a more in-depth analysis of the relevant research issues. The chapter discusses the reasons for choosing Vancouver's DTES as the research site and then proceeds to detail the sampling process leading to the selection of the participant non-profit organizations. The preparation for the interviews with the key informants from the participant organizations is discussed. In addition, the chapter outlines the selection and analysis of the relevant government policy documents. Finally, the chapter reviews ethical considerations and study limitations.

Chapter 4 begins with an informational profile regarding the DTES and discusses changes in the neighbourhood's population demographics. The changing nature of the resident population is a critical factor that affects the ability of community-based non-profit organizations to mobilize the grassroots for social action. The chapter then examines the history of community organizing in the DTES from the late 1960s until the late 1980s. The study examines the organizing activities of DERA, the neighbourhood's most influential community organization, to provide context to the current struggles to organize resistance to the potential for large-scale resident displacement arising from the Olympics. It is argued that gaining an understanding of DERA's history of activism on behalf of the DTES, particularly during the pre-Expo '86 years, is essential for understanding the changing nature of neighbourhood organizing in this neighbourhood.

Chapter 5 presents the major themes that emerged from the analysis of a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with key informants from the participant non-profit organizations. A short profile of each participant organization is also provided. The themes that emerged from the interview analysis are as follows: the fragmentation of

political voice in the DTES; the emergence of niche strategies as the basis of social cohesion among the competing non-profit organizations; the emergence of formal and informal coalitions as a coordination strategy for forging a unified political voice on behalf of marginalized neighbourhood residents. The chapter also presents the analysis of the main governmental policy documents and discusses the themes that emerged from this analysis.

Chapter 6 presents a discussion of the research findings, the implications of the findings, possibilities for future research and concluding remarks. The analysis of the policy documents revealed that community-based non-profit organizations in the DTES were becoming professionalized in the area of social service provision. Policy references to partnerships between government and the non-profit organizations were based on the utilization of the expertise and knowledge of these organizations for management of social housing and the provision of support services. The rationalities behind the professionalization of the non-profit organizations relate to the importance placed upon ensuring that the DTES is able to take advantage of the growing interest of private capital investment in the neighbourhood. A second rationality relates to the need to manage the worsening levels of poverty and social deprivation in the DTES.

Chapter 6 also highlights some of the unique and significant developments taking place in the DTES. Within this environment of professionalized service provision, the key informant interviews revealed the emergence of a network of interdependent non-profit organizations. Each organization had developed its own 'niche' in regards to its approach to social change in the DTES. However, the diversity of social change strategies, instead of contributing to the fragmentation of non-profit solidarity, appeared

to enhance this solidarity by fostering respect among the organizations for their respective contributions to the betterment of living conditions in the neighbourhood. The interviews also revealed the importance placed on formal and informal coalitions between various non-profit organizations as a means of reclaiming a political voice on behalf of the DTES.

Significance of Research

A review of the literature concerning community-based non-profit organizations reveals numerous case studies that have documented the capacity of these organizations for political action. However, the majority of these studies have focused on individual organizations as isolated units rather than as part of a larger network of non-profit organizations competing for funding and scarce human resources within disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The present case study attempts to rectify this bias in the literature by shedding light on the dynamic relationships between non-profit organizations within an urban environment that contains both opportunities and constraints for community-based non-profits to engage in political agitation on behalf of marginalized neighbourhood residents.

The present study also attempts to bring a more critical analysis of neighbourhood revitalization initiatives. Community-based organizations have become important players within state-led neighbourhood revitalization initiatives. While these organizations have welcomed the opportunity to participate more meaningfully in neighbourhood planning, a more critical perspective of these developments reveals that non-profit organizations may become no more than professionalized service

organizations rather than equal partners with the public and private sectors in revitalization efforts. The concepts of governmentality and responsabilization, as employed in this study, are useful analytical perspectives that can serve to uncover the underlying neoliberal agenda within current state-driven neighbourhood revitalization efforts.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the relevant literature pertaining to this study's key concepts and research issues. The first part of the chapter examines community-based non-profit organizations within the context of the shift from a conflict approach to community organizing characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s toward a community economic development approach to neighbourhood revitalization commencing in the 1980s. The second part of the chapter focuses on the literature concerning welfare state restructuration in Canada and the rise of neoliberal policies underpinning state-led neighbourhood revitalization initiatives. The chapter then proceeds to outline the study's main analytical perspective based upon Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality, and Nikolas Rose's concepts of responsibilization and governance-at-a-distance. The argument is made that these concepts are useful as a means of understanding the contradictory pressures faced by non-profit social service organizations in the context of neoliberal urban policies and welfare state retrenchment. The chapter concludes with an examination of gentrification as a form of neighbourhood revitalization that typically involves the eviction and displacement of the marginalized residents of inner-city neighbourhoods and to the permanent loss of social housing. Increasingly, community-based social service non-profits are assuming the responsibility for organizing the anti-gentrification response on behalf of the neighbourhood. While this new role for social service non-profit organizations requires their greater cooperation and collaboration, the processes of devolution and the trend towards partnerships with

government are leading to the fragmentation of visions and strategies among these organizations for positive neighbourhood change. The last part of the chapter will consider several case studies conducted in low-income neighbourhoods as empirical illustrations of these contradictory pressures placed upon community-based non-profit organizations.

Community Organizing and Community Development

The literature concerning community organizing distinguishes between community organizing and community development. Randy Stoecker argues that community organizing is concerned with building community power. Stoecker maintains that community organizing is based on a conflict worldview where residents of local communities confront elites and demand changes in the distribution of power. However, community development, according to Stoecker, “works from a win-win worldview where providing such necessities such as housing and jobs will expand the pie and make a redistribution of power unnecessary.” (Stoecker, 2003: p.495) He also argues that community development centralizes power in the hands of experts and professionals, while community organizing decentralizes power into the hands of community residents. But Stoecker argues that, in practice, community organizing and community development exist in a dialectical relationship. He states that, “community organizing is necessary to get power. Community development is necessary to keep it.” (Stoecker, 2003; p.497)

Eric Shragge, a scholar of community development in the Canadian context, argues that the 1960s and 1970s were a time of community organizing initiatives in Canada. He attributes this to a stable national economy and to the expansion of the trade

unionist movement. Shragge states that social change in local communities was rooted in a “socialist vision” and that community-based organizations “created for many participants an experience of direct democracy that demonstrated the capacity of people to manage their own lives and institutions.” (Shragge, 2003; p. 49) In a study of community organizing practices in Vancouver, researchers James DeFilippis, Robert Fisher and Eric Shragge developed several principles regarding successful organizing practices in community-based organizations. These principles are as follows: 1) an explicit commitment to social and economic justice; 2) efforts that go beyond the local but do not ‘de-responsibilize’ the state; 3) a connection to broader social movements; 4) an understanding that conflict is central to their practice; 5) the use of a combination of approaches including service provision with political education, advocacy and action. (DeFilippis et al, 2007). These principles represent an ideal-type of community organizing while, in practice, many community-based non-profit organizations are becoming professionalized service providers.

Commencing in the 1980s, Shragge argues, the reduction in the support of welfare services from the state contributed to the growing importance of community-based non-profit organizations as ‘gap-fillers’ to compensate for the failures of governments for adequate provision of social services in marginalized neighbourhoods. According to Shragge, “community organizing was reshaped from a process of grassroots development and conflicts to innovative and professionalized services representing the needs and ‘interests’ of their clients.” (Shragge, 2003: p. 51) Non-profit community organizing, in the confrontational style of politics for social and economic justice characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s, was being replaced by market-based forms of

community economic development (CED). CED is a community development strategy that is based on the goals of local economic revitalization, the amelioration of poverty through entrepreneurship and employment and the active participation of local residents and community organizations. (Shragge, 2003: p.123) According to Shragge, CED, in its more progressive form, “has some potential as a vehicle for social change and as a means of building a voice for those excluded from economic debates in our society.” (Shragge, 2003: p. 129) However, he contends that CED practice is more often becoming “a means of directing the community sector into an entrepreneurship mode without any vision of what can be gained by that process and without asking how business development can be a tool for social change.” (Shragge, 2003: p. 129) Jenny Lo and Greg Halseth, in their research concerning CED practices in community-based organizations in Vancouver, acknowledge that “CED initiatives exist within the dominant capitalist regime and are, therefore, vulnerable to broader market conditions.” (Lo and Halseth, 2007: p.2) The market-based form of CED has also allowed the state to “lessen its responsibilities to deal with the social consequences of capitalism and its related social inequalities, while the poor themselves are told to step up and become entrepreneurs within the capitalist system.” (Shragge, 2003: p.129)

Globalization, Devolution and Welfare State Retrenchment

This section reviews the literature pertaining to welfare state retrenchment and the shifting of responsibility for social welfare provision from the state to the non-profit sector. In the post-war Keynesian welfare state, the state was responsible for the provision of social welfare in order to maintain the economic stability of the citizenry as

a right of social citizenship, Keynesian welfarism is characterized by four main dimensions: full employment, a welfare orientation based on mass production and mass consumption, a national economy within the context of a national state and, state responsibility for developing and implementing welfare policies. (Jessop, 1999)

With respect to the Canadian welfare state, the guarantee of the social welfare rights of citizens by the state formed the basis of post-war social policy at the federal level. Izzat Jiwani, a scholar of Canadian social policy observes that “social rights were of critical importance, as they guaranteed all citizens the right and freedom to participate in society with state support to alleviate impediments to participation such as poverty and other inequalities.” (Jawani, 2000: p. 33) Further, Betsy Donald explains that local economic development in Canada during the post-war era was based “around a theme of social justice through a redistributive welfare state.” (Donald, 2005: p.263). According to Ilcan and Basok (2004), community-based voluntary or non-profit organizations were treated by the federal government as sources of “advice, information and expertise.” (Ilcan and Basok, 2004: p.134) Since these organizations represented the collective interests of citizens, they were viewed as the means by which citizens could participate in government decisions affecting social policy. According to Jawani, “third sector organizations were very much a part of the Canadian citizenship regime. The Canadian government sought the partnership of various voluntary groups to foster the Canadian identity and to organize training for citizenship.” (Jawani, 2000: p. 34)

Commencing in the 1980s, the processes associated with economic and technological globalization contributed to the decline of state sovereignty over the economy and the rise of the free market as the basis for national economic policy in the

industrialized nations. Globalization is a contested concept which “has been predominantly conceived as an economic process” (Clarke, 2003: p.202), although globalization also contributes to changes in the political, social and cultural realms of social life. As an economic process, globalization involves “large-scale, long-term flows of capital, commodities, technology and labour across national boundaries.” (Petras, 1999: p.459) Globalization involves the rescaling of economic activity from the level of the nation state to “non-national scales” (Purcell, 2008: p. 9) including both supra-national and sub-national scales. The political rationale underpinning the rescaling of the national economy was the creation of localized spaces of economic production and the enhancement of the capacity of local economies to attract capital investment and become competitive in the globalized economy. In order to achieve this goal, the state has devolved many of its “functions, obligations, and expectations to local states at various scales, from province/state to municipal.” (Purcell, 2008: p.11) The devolution of state authority to local governments and other non-state actors has significantly reduced the social policy-making and social service provision functions of the federal government and, thus, the retrenchment of the Keynesian welfare state. Purcell argues that “national states have increasingly offloaded responsibility for welfare provision onto local governments. Local governments, in turn, have outsourced a range of responsibilities to non-profit, volunteer, and private organizations.”(Purcell, 2008: p.17) Despite the devolution of social welfare policy-making and service provision to local non-state actors, the state remains an important institutional player with the new role of fostering a competitive and entrepreneurial environment for the private and non-profit sectors.

The retrenchment of the Canadian welfare state, according to Jiwani, has resulted in a shifting of the provision of public services to lower tiers of government (provincial and municipal governments) and to non-profit organizations. According to Stephen McBride and Kathleen McNutt, in the Canadian case, “devolution was a key measure in reducing federal spending.” (McBride and McNutt, 2007: p.187). However, Jiwani states that “the action of devolving responsibility to lower tiers is not necessarily only about budget constraints, but it is also about the new moral order of neoliberals wherein individuals, families and the community should take responsibility for their own problems.” (Jiwani, 2000: p. 36)

Neoliberalism, Governmentality and the Responsiblization of Community-based Non-Profits

Neoliberalism is most commonly understood as an economic policy favouring the “unfettered operation of markets” arising from the globalization of capital. According to Larner, “neoliberalism is associated with the preference for a minimalist state. Markets are understood to be a better way of organizing economic activity because they are associated with competition, economic efficiency and choice.” (Larner, 2000) Jessop writes that neoliberalism is often regarded as both an economic and a political project. In economic policy terms, neoliberalism is based upon the “liberalization and deregulation of economic transactions” and “the privatization of state-owned enterprises and state-provided services.” (Jessop, 2002: p. 454) As a political project, neoliberalism promotes the rollback of the Keynesian welfare state and the advancement of new forms of governance more in line with a market-driven economy.

Jessop points out that neoliberalism is only one of four ideal-type state regimes, the other regimes being neocorporatism, neostatism and neocommunitarianism. It is the neocommunitarian regime that promotes a greater role for non-profit organizations, the social economy and civil society organizations. Neocommunitarianism emphasizes “the link between economic and community development, notably empowering citizens and community groups; the contribution that greater self-sufficiency can make to reinserting marginalized local economies into the wider economy; and the role of decentralized partnerships that embrace not only the state and business interests but also diverse community organizations and other local stakeholders.” (Jessop, 2002; p.463) William Sites argues that, within communitarian theory, non-political strategies such as cooperation, coordination and consensus are emphasized while conflict and pressure are devalued. (Sites, 1998) Sites further argues that many current community revitalization initiatives combine a communitarian perspective with an emphasis on “local autonomy and self-help solutions to social problems.” (Sites, 1998: p. 59)

As an alternative to the neocommunitarian theory of community development, a number of theorists have advanced a critique of neoliberal urban revitalization based upon Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality. Nikolas Rose’s interpretation of governmentality, and in particular his concept of ‘governance-at-a-distance’ has been employed by contemporary community development theorists as a theoretical framework for the analysis of how governmental rationalities promoting responsibilized autonomy and entrepreneurial self-reliance have become routinized within the discourses and practices of civil society actors, such as community-based non-profit service providers in low-income urban neighbourhoods.

Governmentality is characterized by ‘technologies of government’ which refers to the practices and tactics of governing the conduct of others. It is also characterized by ‘technologies of the self’ whereby individuals and collectives become self-governing through the internalization and normalization of behaviour and action underpinning governmental objectives. (Triantafillou, 2004)

According to Thomas Lemke, technologies of the self is a governing strategy that renders “individual subjects ‘responsible’ (and also collectives, such as families, associations, etc.) entails shifting responsibility for social risks such as illness, unemployment, poverty, and so forth, and for life in society, into the domain for which the individual is responsible and transforming it into a problem of ‘self-care.’” (Lemke, 2002; p.59) Lemke further points out that “this strategy can be deployed in all sorts of areas and leads to areas of social responsibility becoming a matter of personal provisions.” (Lemke, 2002; p. 59)

Nikolas Rose is the most notable theorist employing Foucault’s governmentality perspective to shed light on how neoliberal governmental rationalities (or what he terms as governing under advanced liberalism) “create a distance between the decisions of formal political institutions and other social actors, conceive of these actors in new ways as subjects of responsibility, autonomy and choice, and seek to act upon them through shaping and utilizing their freedom.” (Rose, 1996; pp.53-54) A central concept within Rose’s writings on governmentality is that of the ‘responsibilization’ of both individual citizens and collectivities for the provision of social services and for the development of entrepreneurial initiatives for solving specific social problems within local communities. According to Rose, “within this new regime of the actively responsible self, individuals

are to fulfill their national obligations not through their relations of dependency and obligation to one another, but through seeking to *fulfill themselves* within a variety of micro-moral domains or “communities” – families, workplaces, schools, leisure associations, neighbourhoods.” (Rose, 1996: p. 57)

Rose’s concept of the ‘responsibilization’ of citizens and collectives has informed recent analysis of neoliberalism within the context of urban governance strategies from the 1980s to the present. Raco and Imrie suggest that a governmentality perspective is useful for understanding “the shift toward a rights and responsibilities agenda” in urban policy. (Raco and Imrie, 2000: p. 2189) They argue that the importance of a governmentality perspective “lies in its ability to link the mentalities, norms, aspirations, and actions of members of the population with the objectives and techniques of (advanced liberal) government.” (Raco and Imrie, 2000: p.2201) Within this perspective, the notion of responsibilization represents a technique of government which can resonate strongly with the growing demands from community-based non-profit organizations for greater participation in urban policy-making and for autonomy in the planning and implementing of neighbourhood development initiatives.

Several recent studies have shown that community-based non-profit organizations are especially vulnerable to potential derailment of their social objectives and goals as a result of the efforts of municipal governments to ‘responsibilize’ them through the offloading of social service delivery and of the management of poverty in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Eikenberry and Kluver argue that “because of their inherent value, it is extremely important for nonprofit organizations to focus on their organizational missions. Yet, organizational mission is threatened when for-profit partnerships, the

generation of commercial revenue, and social entrepreneurship activities emphasize profit at the expense of a nonprofit organization's mission.” (Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004)

Ilcan and Basok apply Rose's notion of responsabilization in their Canadian study which documents how neoliberalization of national economic policies has transformed voluntary agencies into a “target community of service providers” (Ilcan and Basok, 2004: p.133) thereby derailing their original objectives for advocating for social justice on behalf of their members. They point out that “in many respects, the voluntary sector is an ideal site where techniques of governance, such as responsabilization, have been used to mould ‘responsible citizens’. (Ilcan and Basok, 2004: p. 135)

The utility of a governmentality perspective and of the notion of responsabilization is particularly evident from recent studies examining the growing trend toward of involving community-based non-profit organizations in partnerships with the public and private sectors within revitalization and social housing initiatives in disadvantaged inner-city neighbourhoods. Kathe Newman and Philip Ashton highlight this growing participatory role for non-profit organizations as more than simply social service providers, stating “nonprofit organizations and other third parties play a key role in managing the risks of inner-city investment, spurring partnerships with lenders and developers.” (Newman and Ashton, 2004: p.1163)

Governmentality and responsabilization are useful critical lenses which can highlight the contradictory pressures posed by market-based community economic development strategies promoted by local governments as both empowering and inclusionary practices for social service non-profit organizations. While these strategies can open up new opportunities for grassroots organizations to influence the trajectory of

revitalization initiatives in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, they can equally serve to constrain and temper the more oppositional voices among community-based non-profit organizations, thereby depoliticizing their demands for government protection of basic social rights (such as affordable housing) for residents of low-income inner-city neighbourhoods. As Scott L. Cummings notes, “the notion of building political power among the poor to challenge institutional arrangements is viewed as inimical to the goal of packaging low-income communities as attractive business environments. However, rather than fostering community renewal, the depoliticization of CED work has instead circumscribed antipoverty efforts and hindered progressive movement building.” (Cummings, 2001: p. 451)

Neighbourhood Revitalization, Gentrification and Displacement

As mentioned in the previous section, community-based non-profit organizations in low-income inner-city neighbourhoods are becoming increasingly important participants within neighbourhood revitalization plans instituted by municipal governments. Neighbourhood revitalization can be defined as a governmental strategy “for improving and raising the quality of life in urban neighbourhoods.” (Elwood, 2003: p. 121) Sarah Elwood, who has conducted research on collaborative forms of urban planning in the U.S., explains the potential benefits that can accrue to community-based non-profit organizations within collaborative planning initiatives with municipal authorities. Elwood argues that neighbourhood revitalization programmes “offer new forms of participation in planning, problem solving, and service delivery, sometimes providing new resources to support these activities, and expanding the responsibilities of

citizens and community organizations in urban governance.” (Elwood, 2003: p.121) As community-based non-profit organizations had become accustomed to only tokenism in respect of their input into neighbourhood revitalization projects, the opportunity of playing a more influential role in these neighbourhood renewal plans has generally been welcomed. Nevertheless, more radical community-based organizations believe that participation in state-led revitalization projects, even if it occurs within a partnership arrangement, is still problematic. These organizations fear that participation in partnerships led by local bureaucrats and urban planners will result in a loss of community control over the trajectory of neighbourhood revitalization plans and to the loss of the neighbourhood’s critical political stance and voice of opposition to market-driven urban policies. In addition, these organizations argue that government promises of greater autonomy for non-profit organizations through partnerships with the municipal government will result in the depoliticization of their struggles against neighbourhood poverty, homelessness and the loss of social housing. However, other non-profit social service organizations, particularly those that have fought for years against government indifference to the deteriorating living conditions within inner-city neighbourhoods, view the opportunity to participate as equal partners with local government officials as a successful outcome in their struggles to influence urban social policy.

Over the last two decades, many low-income inner-city neighbourhoods in North America have been subjected to pressures related to the process of gentrification. There is no simple definition of gentrification as its characteristics and effects on low-income neighbourhoods are dependent upon local political and economic factors. However, for the purposes of this study, gentrification can be defined “as the process whereby higher-

income households move into low-income neighbourhoods, escalating the area's property values to the point that displacement occurs." (Levy, Comey and Padilla, 2006: p.1)

Displacement refers to the exclusionary effects of gentrification upon residents of low-income neighbourhoods characterized by "housing demolition, ownership conversion of rental units, increased housing costs (rent, taxes), landlord harassment and evictions."

(Newman and Wyly, 2006: p.27) While there is considerable debate among gentrification researchers as to whether displacement is an inevitable outcome of the gentrification process in low-income neighbourhoods, several prominent researchers have argued for more critical research to be undertaken regarding gentrification which examines displacement. Tom Slater, a prominent gentrification researcher, argues that "displacement is and always will be vital to an understanding of gentrification, in terms of retaining definitional coherence and of retaining a critical perspective on the process." (Slater, 2006: p.748) Slater further argues that the state is taking a more active role in instituting market-driven gentrification within the context of welfare state restructuring and neoliberal urban policies. Known in the literature as 'third wave' gentrification, this state-led form of gentrification "is characterized by interventionist governments working with the private sector to facilitate gentrification." (Shaw, 2005: p. 183) As an empirical illustration of 'third- wave' gentrification, Slater refers to research he conducted in Toronto's South Parkdale neighbourhood where revitalization policies instituted by both the municipal and provincial governments have encouraged middle-class resettlement of this low-income neighbourhood. With the intention of encouraging a policy of neighbourhood 'social-mix', the City of Toronto and the Conservative Provincial Government of Ontario during the 1990s instituted by-laws that were intended "to reduce

the percentage of singles in the neighbourhood, with middle-class families from other areas taking their place.” (Slater, 2005: p.50) Slater refers to ‘social-mix’ as the “state-led process of gentrification via the promotion of social or tenure ‘mixing’ (or ‘social diversity’ or ‘social balance’) in formerly disinvested neighbourhoods populated by working-class and/or low-income tenants.” (Slater, 2006: p.750) Although the municipal and provincial governments touted mixed housing in South Parkdale as a means of changing the image of this low-income neighbourhood to one of “livability, freedom, tolerance, cross-class interaction, diversity, mixing and conviviality” (Slater, 2005: p.45), Slater’s study instead found that there was only minimal social interaction between low-income and middle class residents. He further remarks that the rationale behind social mix policies is the improvement of the local tax base rather than the promotion of social diversity. Slater concludes that “social mix, projected by boosters of Canadian cities, sits uneasily with the apparent entrenchment of gentrification which has brought few benefits to low-income residents of these neighbourhoods.” (Slater, 2005: p.56)

While gentrification-related displacement poses an ongoing threat to marginalized residents of low-income neighbourhoods, the potential exists for larger-scale resident evictions and displacement resulting from the city’s successful bid to host an urban mega-event such as the Olympic Games or World’s Fair. According to Kris Olds, a Canadian researcher studying urban-mega event effects on low-income neighbourhoods, these major events “are increasingly associated with the emergence of new forms of entrepreneurial governance at the local and regional level, as cities and regions seek to devise strategies to attract flows of capital which will (theoretically) spur on urban redevelopment processes.” (Olds, 1998: p.4) As this comment suggests, the hosting of an

urban mega-event, such as the Olympics, is often part of a state-led strategy to initiate market-based gentrification of low-income neighbourhoods. Many SRO hotel owners take advantage of increasing property values in advance of the mega-event and proceed to renovate their SRO hotels which are then rented to tourists attending the event and later to higher-income tenants on a permanent basis. Research examining the effects of mega-events on low-income inner-city neighbourhoods has shown that these events often result in the forced eviction of low-income tenants and in permanent losses to the neighbourhood's stock of affordable housing. (Olds, 1998) Case studies conducted in mega-event host cities have documented the negative consequences for residents of low-income neighbourhoods subjected to evictions and displacement such as rising rates of homelessness, violent crime and addictions. Furthermore, neighbourhood residents and community-based organizations have typically been excluded from the decision-making process pertaining to the hosting of the mega-event. According to Olds, "the dominant state and private sector goals are to bring *new* people, *new* facilities, and *new* money to cities at a rapid pace, and this goal is rarely evaluated in an open democratic manner." (Olds, 1998: p.41) This exclusion of grassroots input can stimulate community resistance against mega-event redevelopment and spur organized protest and demands for the protection of the social rights of marginalized residents, particularly the housing rights of evicted and displaced tenants. In order to temper community resistance to mega-event neighbourhood development, the state has adopted a rhetoric of collaboration and partnership with community-based non-profit organizations

The responsibilities devolved to service- oriented non-profit organizations for social service delivery and for the development of profitable neighbourhood social enterprises can bring these organizations into conflict with those neighbourhood non-profits that advocate taking a more critical stance toward governmental policies and applying political pressure on all levels of government for recognition of the basic social rights of low-income residents. According to Immergluck, “with activism also comes occasional conflict among activists. Variations in the types, methods, and militancy of different activist movements, together with their propensity to intersect on many different issues, can lead to discord among activists.” (Immergluck, 2003) As a consequence of these conflicting strategies, disadvantaged neighbourhoods may experience a fragmentation of voices, visions and strategies among the various non-profit agencies, thus threatening community solidarity and cohesiveness. Nevertheless, while this fragmentation of approaches and strategies can adversely affect the building of community power, other researchers have found that diversity among neighbourhood non-profit strategies can also lead to greater potential for the formation of strategic coalitions and alliances among those non-profit organizations that are able to set aside their differences.

Chapter 3

Methodology

Case Study Approach

The purpose of this study is to examine the practices and strategies of the main non-profit organizations in Vancouver's DTES in their struggle to fulfill their organizational mandate within a market-driven community development regime. In addition, this study examines efforts by these community-based non-profits to forge new alliances and collaborations with other neighbourhood organizations, as well as with the public and private sectors, as a means of resisting the depoliticization of their demands for the protection of the social rights of marginalized residents of the neighbourhood, particularly their rights to affordable housing. The outcome of these struggles is of even greater importance at this time due to the pressures of gentrification and potential eviction and displacement of residents in advance of the 2010 Winter Olympics.

While the main focus of this study is the current organizing efforts of the non-profit service organizations in the DTES, the study also examines the political activism of the Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA), widely regarded as the most influential activist non-profit organization in the DTES. DERA's activism is examined during two distinct eras of its existence. The first era is from its birth in 1973 through the 1970s when DERA built a large grassroots membership and achieved recognition for the DTES as a legitimate 'community'. The second era covers DERA's organizing efforts during the 1980s when it gained international attention for its struggles to prevent resident evictions and displacement arising from Vancouver's Expo '86. These first two eras are examined through historical accounts of DERA's achievements in

neighbourhood organizing and confrontational activism on behalf of marginalized residents of the DTES. This historical analysis is intended to provide a context for research concerning the current efforts of non-profit organizations in the DTES to slow the process of gentrification and to stop the eviction and displacement of low-income residents in advance of the 2010 Winter Olympics. Several interviews with key informants from the main non-profit organizations and community activists form the basis of this study's analysis of current neighbourhood organizing efforts in the DTES.

Research site: Vancouver's Downtown Eastside

The Downtown Eastside has been chosen as research site for this study for the following reasons:

1. The high concentration of social service non-profits servicing the DTES, an area of increasing social deprivation in terms of homelessness, drug addiction, mental illness and chronic unemployment. The diversity of social service non-profit organizations makes the DTES an ideal site for an examination of the strategies employed by these organizations in their competition for material and financial resources in order to realize their respective mandates.
2. The changing demographics of the resident population, particularly since the 1990s. The growing population of younger adults with more severe drug and alcohol addiction problems and with mental illness has led to a much larger service- dependant resident population. This population, generally speaking,

lacks the capacity to self-organize or to become mobilized for collective action in order to pressure governments for protection of social welfare rights and for the preservation of social housing. Consequently, the major social service non-profit organizations have undertaken the added task of political activism and advocacy on behalf of these marginalized residents.

3. The rich history of community organizing, particularly since the 1970s and the rise of Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA). DERA is widely regarded as one of Canada's most successful community-based non-profit organizations in terms of its ability to organize and mobilize a large grassroots membership base for the protection of the social rights of marginalized neighbourhood residents. In addition, DERA became active as an innovative social housing developer and an excellent example of an Alinsky-style organization using confrontational tactics and radical action, especially during the years leading up to Expo 86 in Vancouver. DERA's influence in the neighbourhood has declined due to the confrontational tactics it uses in furtherance of its objectives and because of its association with more radical antipoverty groups within the neighbourhood.

4. The current threat of gentrification and displacement of residents of the Downtown Eastside due to loss of SRO stock of social housing. The potential for resident evictions from SRO housing and the lack of government action for the development of new social housing has spurred on the more activist non-profit

organizations to politicize their antipoverty efforts and to form new alliances with other neighbourhood non-profits in order to forge an organized and unified voice on behalf of the community. The approaching 2010 Winter Olympics has created a heightened sense of urgency among the non-profit organizations wishing to avoid the displacements that occurred in advance of Expo 86. Nevertheless, there remains considerable disagreement among the main non-profit organizations about what is the most effective strategy for ensuring that the social rights of marginalized members of the community are protected.

Research Questions

This study is guided by the following research questions:

1. What are the political rationalities underpinning governmental policy objectives for collaboration with community-based non-profit organizations in the DTES and what practices have been employed by the state to give effect to those rationalities?
2. To what extent have governmental policies promoting market-based revitalization in the DTES, constrained the capacity of non-profit organizations to forge a political voice on behalf of marginalized residents of the DTES?
3. What strategies and tactics have been employed by the non-profit organizations to oppose the threat of tenant evictions and displacement arising from the current efforts to revitalize the DTES in the lead-up to the 2010 Winter Olympics?

Sampling

Initially, a purposeful sampling technique was employed in the selection of DERA, as the focal organization for this study. Preliminary research into non-profit activism in the DTES revealed that DERA has a long history of social activism in the DTES dating back to the early 1970s. Thus, the researcher believed that this organization would be a source of important insights into how changes in government policy affecting the DTES had an impact on the practices and strategies of this well-known activist organization. It was also intended that DERA act as a gateway into the wider field of social service non-profit organizations in the DTES. Initial inquiry was made through email directed to the Executive Director of the organization as to the organization's willingness to participate in this study and also requesting a list of potential participant non-profit organizations. Upon reply to a follow-up email, the Executive Director of DERA indicated the organization's willingness to participate in the study, and a subsequent telephone conversation was held to arrange for a face-to-face interview. At that time, the Executive Director provided a list of names of other non-profit organizations in the DTES that would be beneficial to contact for the study. The information letter that was provided to each organization approached as a possible participant in this study is attached as Appendix 'A'. Each potential participant organization was contacted initially by email and subsequent confirming telephone calls were made to arrange in-person interviews for the period of July 6-26, 2007 in Vancouver.

Through this sampling process, a total of 7 non-profit organizations, including DERA, were recruited for this study. Besides these non-profit organizations, a senior

planner with the City of Vancouver who was familiar with the issues in this study was interviewed for the purpose of providing the city's perspective. In addition, a well-known activist in the DTES who has participated extensively in activism on behalf of neighbourhood residents in various capacities including as director of a social service non-profit organization in the DTES and as a city councilor, agreed to be interviewed for this study. This activist became an important source of information regarding the history of activism in the DTES, particularly with respect to the development of social housing. In addition, the activist has extensive involvement in advancing the concerns of residents regarding the impact of the 2010 Winter Olympics on the DTES, particularly regarding concerns about the potential evictions and displacement of SRO hotel tenants as a result of Olympic gentrification.

The following table lists the names of the organizations participating in this study and the position of the representative interviewed:

Organization	Position
Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA)	Community Legal Advocate
Portland Hotel Society	Executive Director
Eastside Movement for Business & Economic Renewal Society (EMBERS)	Executive Director
Pivot Legal Society	Staff Lawyer and Activist
Carnegie Community Action Project	Antipoverty activist
St. James Community Service Society	Administrator
VanCity	Senior Sustainability Programs Manager
City of Vancouver	Senior Planner

Data Collection

Data collection for this study involved a combination of primary semi-structured key-informant interviews and secondary documentary sources including government policy documents, organizational annual reports and newsletters, organizational website materials, media reports, published scholarly articles.

Key-Informant Interviews: All interviews were conducted between July 6- 26, 2007 in Vancouver, B.C. The duration of the interviews was 1 hour to 1 ½ hours and most interviews were conducted at the informants' business office. One interview took place at café in the Downtown Eastside. The rationale for the selection of the key-informants from the participant organizations was to select key organizational decision-makers as well as key housing and antipoverty advocates in the DTES. These informants are best able to articulate how changes in government policies, such as the growing emphasis on partnerships and a greater entrepreneurial role for community-based non-profit service providers, affect the capacity of neighbourhood non-profit service providers to realize organizational goals and to advocate on behalf of the most disadvantaged residents of the DTES. A semi-structured interview methodology was employed for this study. The semi-structured method is appropriate for studies that are exploratory in nature as "they are well suited for the exploration of the perceptions and opinions of respondents regarding complex and sometimes sensitive issues and enable probing for more information and clarification of answers." (Barribal and While, 1994: p.330) The ability to ask probing questions is "an invaluable tool for ensuring reliability of the data" (Barribal and While, 1994: p.331) through clarification of relevant issues and of inconsistencies of accounts provided by informants. In addition, probing "maximizes the

potential for interactive opportunities between the respondent and interviewer which helps to establish a sense of rapport and reduces the risk of socially desirable answers.” (Barribal and While, 1994: p. 331)

An interview protocol was developed after an extensive literature review. The original interview protocol was divided into the following topics: 1. organizational characteristics, 2. organizational values and ideology, 3. organizational undertakings, 4. community development, 5. impacts of organizational initiatives on community development, 6. informants' thoughts and ideas. The Interview Protocol for the Focal Organization is attached as Appendix 'B'. These topics were utilized as a general interview guide, but the overall approach for all interviews allowed informants to expand on their experiences and knowledge with as little direction as possible, consistent with the exploratory nature of the study. The interview protocol was treated as an evolving instrument and as data collection proceeded and as new information was received, the interview questions were amended to build on the knowledge gained from previous interviews. The semi-structured nature of the interviews ensured a degree of consistency between interviews and each informant was given the opportunity to respond to the same main areas of inquiry. All interviews were tape-recorded with the informants' informed written consent. Each informant was provided with an Information Letter prior to the interview which set out the main objectives of the study and information concerning the informant's participation in the study. The Information Letter is attached as Appendix 'C'. The Consent Form is attached as Appendix 'D'. Each informant was provided with a copy of these documents for their own records. All audio-tapes were stored securely at the researcher's residence.

Data Analysis

Key Informant Interviews

All audio-taped interviews were initially played back and detailed written notes were made for each interview by recording the tape counter number to correspond with the written notation of the interview excerpt. This procedure would facilitate quick reference to the part of the actual tape in order to obtain an informant's actual words. In light of the small number of informant interviews and a shortage of financial resources, the interviews were not transcribed. However, the procedure mentioned was followed to ensure that any quotations used in the study would employ the exact words of the informant. The notes of the interviews were reviewed repeatedly to establish greater familiarity with the raw data through a process of immersion and saturation in order to identify key concepts and themes.

The methodological approach for the analysis of key informant interviews was informed by institutional ethnography. Institutional ethnography is concerned with "the work activities through which people are themselves involved in producing the world they experience in daily life." (Grahame, 1998: p. 353) According to Marie Campbell and Frances Gregor, in institutional ethnography "analytically, there are two sites of interest- the local setting where life is lived and experienced by actual people and the extra-or trans-local that is outside the boundaries of one's everyday experience." (Campbell and Gregor, 2002: p. 29) Furthermore, "institutional ethnography complements the governmentality themes by assessing how structures of power mediate the social world from the standpoint of those who live in it." (Murray et al, 2006: p.378)

Document analysis

The analysis of documentary data for this study employs a thematic content approach which draws upon the critical perspective of Foucault's concept of governmentality within the urban policy literature. According to Raco and Imrie, employing a governmentality perspective in the examination of urban policy draws attention to the underlying political agenda or rationalities of government which form the basis of urban policy documents. In this respect, Raco and Imrie argue that "government, in seeking to respond to the 'problematics' of its subject matter, becomes programmatic through the context of white papers, other official documents, committees of inquiry, etc, all of which seek to transform regimes of (government) practice." (Raco and Imrie, 2000: p. 2190) Within the governmentality perspective, government policy documents represent the codification or the "durable form" (Rose and Miller, 1992: p. 184) of technologies of government. It is through policy documents that governments confer rights and devolve responsibilities upon local social actors in urban settings while setting the structural parameters within which those rights and responsibilities are to be exercised. Thus, governmentality is useful as a critical lens to examine urban policy documents which purport to empower community-based non-profit organizations through a discourse of partnership and self-reliance while limiting opportunities for asserting claims for protection of social rights.

The following policy documents are analyzed for this study:

Government Policy documents: Vancouver Agreement, 2005; Project Civil City Main Report (November, 2006), Letter from Mayor Sullivan (November, 27, 2006), City of Vancouver, Administrative Report- Project Civil City Progress Update (March 27,2007);

Dobell Fairbairn Report: Vancouver Homelessness Funding Model- More Than Just A Warm Bed; Vancouver Agreement –Economic Revitalization Plan; B.C. Housing- News Release (October 29,2007)

2010 Winter Olympics documents: 2010 Winter Games Inner-City Inclusive Commitment Statement; Final Report of The Inner-City Inclusive Housing Table (March, 2007)

Community documents: organizational annual reports and newsletters, organizational website materials, media reports, published scholarly books and articles.

Ethical Considerations

Confidentiality: All informants were advised that any information provided by the participants in this study remain confidential. Names of informants do not appear anywhere in the study, but informants were advised that anonymous quotations may be used in the written thesis.

Anonymity: Informants were advised that the researcher could not guarantee the anonymity of participants as the research was being conducted within a small community of non-profit organizations in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside.

Study Limitations

The limitations of this study relate to two main concerns: Firstly, the single case study as it applies to the issue of generalizability and secondly, the small sample of key informant interviews.

This study involves research conducted within a single inner-city neighbourhood, Vancouver's Downtown Eastside. As such, it is a single case study. Time and financial constraints led the researcher to concentrate his study on the DTES, an inner-city neighbourhood with a high concentration of community-based non-profit organizations. Simmering tensions between the non-profit service providers and municipal authorities began to 'boil over' recently due to the crisis of social housing and the threat of gentrification and possible tenant displacements in advance of the 2010 Winter Olympics. The purpose of the study is to explore how the community organizing strategies and tactics of community-based non-profit organizations have responded and changed in the face of the neoliberalization of municipal revitalization policies stressing market-led economic development, partnership and social entrepreneurship. To this end, the study contextualizes the main research focus by examining the community organizing phenomenon during three different periods within the history of non-profit activism in the DTES. A single case study is appropriate for conducting a more in-depth analysis of community organizing in light of the rich history of successful organizing efforts in this low-income neighbourhood.


A second limitation for this study is the small number of participant organizations. The rationale behind the choice of participant organizations was based on obtaining a diverse sample of key non-profit organizations, or more simply put, quality

over quantity. This decision was partly based on time constraints of the researcher as all interviews with key informants took place during a three week period while the researcher was in the Vancouver area. In addition to the diverse sample of participant non-profit organizations, interviews were conducted with a well-know community activist based on this informant's special knowledge that spanned the entire period of time under consideration in this study. This informant was able to provide information about changes in relationships between key non-profit organizations and about how changes in government policies affected the political representation of the DTES. An elite informant from the municipal planning department was selected to provide a governmental perspective of the research issues.

Chapter 4

A Profile of Vancouver's Downtown Eastside

The Downtown Eastside (DTES) covers an area over 200 hectares immediately east of Vancouver's downtown business core. (Mason, 2006) DTES is comprised of seven communities: Gastown, Victory Square, Chinatown, Oppenheimer, Thornton Park, Strathcona, Hastings Corridor and Industrial Area.



Downtown Eastside Communities
(Adapted from City of Vancouver, Housing Plan for the Downtown Eastside, 2005)

The current population of DTES is estimated to be around 16,000 (2001 Census). About one third of the population is over age 55, as compared with one fifth for the general population of Vancouver. The greatest number of people is in the 40-44 age cohort. Children and youth (under age 25) make up less than 15% of DTES population. Males comprise about 61% of the population. DTES is an ethnically diverse

neighbourhood with Chinese comprising about 36% of population. There are a higher proportion of aboriginals in the DTES (9%) as compared with only 2% city-wide. The DTES contains a high percentage of immigrants (43%) with 34% of immigrants arriving between 1991 and 2001. (City of Vancouver, Housing Plan for the Downtown Eastside, 2005)

A housing survey conducted by the Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA) in 1988 showed that the average resident of the DTES “is a Caucasian male who: lives alone; is 51 years of age; on welfare with an income of \$439 per month; pays \$226 for rent; has no shower, bath, toilet or laundry in the building; has lived in the unit for 3.9 years; in the community for over 10 years; and there is a 47% chance he is disabled.” (Gerecke, 1991: p. 12)

Since the late 1980s, the profile of the average resident in the DTES began to change with the arrival of younger, visible minority and aboriginal unemployed males. (Smith, 2003) In addition, deinstitutionalization of persons suffering from mental illness has led to an increase in the numbers of residents in the DTES with chronic mental health issues along with an increase in drug addictions due to the arrival of crack-cocaine and crystal-meth.

Community Organizing in the Downtown Eastside – The 1960s to 1973

The DTES is Vancouver’s oldest neighbourhood and it was the site of “the logging mills, shipping activities, hotels and drinking places and residential areas of the new city.”(Gerecke, 1991: p. 12) For much of the twentieth century, the residents of the DTES were comprised mainly of injured or handicapped former loggers, miners and

other various resource industry labourers, predominantly male, who resided in the single room occupancy hotels (SROs) concentrated in the neighbourhood. The concentration of so-called 'damaged men' in the DTES and the continuing deterioration of the neighbourhood's SRO hotel stock led to the labeling of the DTES as a 'skid road' area. According to Jeffrey Sommers, the term 'skid road', which arose post-World War II, referred to inner-city neighbourhoods, usually adjacent to the central business district, where the built environment had severely deteriorated and where the residents, predominantly male, "were notable for their 'maladjustment' to the expected norms of the larger community, characteristics of which included homelessness, poverty and 'acute personal problems.'" (Sommers, 2001: p.65)

During the 1960s, Vancouver's civic government was of the view that any plans for the elimination of 'skid road' conditions would "hinge on interventions directed at its population, rather than on its built environment. Indeed, it would become apparent to various authorities that changing the latter was contingent on efforts to transform the people who made skid road what it was." (Sommers, 2001: p. 122-123) Urban renewal efforts proposed by civic officials during the 1960s called for the elimination of skid road conditions in the DTES through management of its 'problematic' population. This was to be achieved by a coordination and centralization of social services as a means of control over the more deviant members of the neighbourhood. (Sommers, 2001) In essence, social service agencies were to become sources of knowledge for civic authorities about the population of the DTES, in order to assert greater control over the neighbourhood "thus rendering it less threatening".(Sommers, 2001: p.117)

Social service agencies in the DTES, mostly religious organizations, welcomed the greater attention being paid to the social problems afflicting residents of the DTES. However, they opposed civic plans for coordination of services as a means of managing neighbourhood residents and argued that residents should be treated more like ‘patients’ needing medical care. Sommers states that “the agencies sought to assert an imperative of medicalizing regulation through which the behaviour of deviant individuals could be governed.” (Sommers, 2001: p.124) These social service and religious organizations formed The Downtown Clergy Committee. As an early example of community activism in the DTES, these organizations collectively opposed urban renewal on the basis that “reinvestment in land, infrastructure and building stock would be all for naught unless there was a concomitant rehabilitation of the humans involved.” (Sommers, 2001: p.123) The efforts of the Downtown Clergy Committee represented the first serious attempts by community-based non-profit organizations in the DTES to shed the image of the DTES as ‘skid road’ and to shift political attitudes toward the neighbourhood through a redefinition of the DTES as a space of “therapeutic action”. (Sommers, 2001: p.138)

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, further attempts were made by non-profit social service groups to coordinate activism on behalf of residents of the DTES. In 1967, the Vancouver Inner-City Service Project (VISP) was formed by summer students with the Vancouver School of Theology working through the First United Church in the DTES. These student activists regarded the DTES as a space of exclusion where residents were the victims of “exploitation by a range of authorities both public and private.” (Sommers, 2001: p. 169) Nevertheless, VISP activists believed that the DTES was “a place where social change was both necessary and highly possible if the correct

tools and processes were deployed.” (Sommers, 2001: p.169) In contrast to earlier conceptions of DTES residents held by the religious non-profit organizations- that residents were in need of medical treatment and moral reformation- VISP activists characterized residents as possessing individual autonomy. Thus, these activists argued that the goal of community-based non-profit interventions should be the removal of institutional barriers that prevented inhabitants of the DTES from realizing their autonomy, individually and collectively as a community. In describing the innovative approach taken by VISP activists in cultivating a political identity for the DTES, Sommers explains that “VISP served as a vector of a new mode of governing urban poverty. Its strategy of participation, designed to mobilize the objects of governmental power, constituting them as subjects, inaugurated a process that pushed political authorities toward an engagement with poor people as citizens rather than as subordinates.” (Sommers, 2001: p. 183) VISP activists also enhanced the political legitimacy of the growing number of non-profit organizations in the DTES and ensured that these organizations would no longer be ignored by government authorities in the development of any plans for the DTES. As Sommers suggests “henceforth, it would no longer be possible for political authorities in Vancouver to operate without cognizance of the aspiration of the skid road population through engagement with those groups that acted in its name.” (Sommers, 2001: p.185)

With the increasing levels of community organizing in the DTES, as exemplified by VISP, civic officials began to take steps to exert greater control over the growing number of community-based organizations that claimed to represent the marginalized residents of the DTES. As Sommers explains, “initial civic forays into the new territory

that was being formed on the site of skid road took place through the newly established Social Planning and Community Development Department (SP/CD), which was assigned the task of dealing with the social consequences of Gastown renovation and mediating between politicians, community organizers and organizations, whose demands increasingly required state intervention.” (Sommers, 2001: p. 187) The goal of the SP/CD was “the coordination of social services through the mobilization of residents of ‘local areas’ in cooperation with service agencies.” (Sommers, 2001: p. 187) Through the SP/CD, a population survey was conducted in order to construct a base of knowledge about the residents of the DTES in order to better fashion civic responses to the new demands being made by social service organizations. One of the main revelations from this survey was that many of the residents in the DTES willingly chose to live in the neighbourhood. Therefore, the city was forced to abandon attempts to eliminate the ‘skid road’ population through resident dispersal and to concentrate on the coordination of services as well as improving the stock of social housing in the DTES. While civic officials allowed greater participation in decisions affecting these issues by neighbourhood residents, through the mediating efforts of neighbourhood organizations, their participation, mainly of a token nature, was acceded to by the city only grudgingly and with much ambivalence. The continued ambivalence of civic authorities toward the recognition of the DTES as a legitimate community, along with organizing efforts in adjacent communities to the DTES, such as Kitsilano and Strathcona, contributed to an escalation of community organizing efforts in the DTES with the birth of The Downtown Eastside Residents Association.

From 'Skid Road' to 'Community' – DERA and Community Organizing in the
Downtown Eastside in the 1970s

For much of the 1970s and 1980s, community organizing efforts within the DTES centered on the visions and strategies put forward by its most dominant grassroots organization, The Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA). Formed in 1973, DERA quickly became the most widely known neighbourhood organization in Canada, particularly for its efforts in protecting the existing SRO stock of affordable housing in the DTES and for the innovative social housing developments it undertook in the 1980s. John Punter, in his book *The Vancouver Achievement*, extolled the successes achieved by DERA in grassroots organizing in the DTES, stating that “by common agreement, the achievements of the Downtown Eastside Residents Association were the most impressive of any resident association in Canada.” (Punter, 2003: p.97) Kent Gerecke, in an article detailing the achievements of DERA in the revitalization of the DTES, maintains that “their success is phenomenal, taking the most neglected area of the city and making the largest gains in community improvement of anywhere in the country.” (Gerecke, 1991: p.11) While DERA began its existence as an Alinsky-style grassroots organization utilizing political confrontation and agitation to further its objectives, it actually achieved its greatest recognition as a developer of social housing during a time (during the 1980s) when DERA adopted a less confrontational stance and became more collaborative with civic officials in revitalization plans for the DTES. As Jeffrey Sommers points out, “by the mid- to late-1980s, the organization operated primarily as a brokerage agency and its bellicosity was limited mainly to rhetoric.” (Sommers, 2001: p. 230) The dramatic changes in DERA’s strategies and tactics during the first two decades of its existence

point to the necessity of examining its activities during two distinct time periods: the first period covering the time from DERA's formation in 1973 until the end of the 1970s and the second period from the beginning of the 1980s until about 1990, with particular attention being paid to its oppositional stance toward the 1986 Expo in Vancouver and its organizing strategies regarding the threat of evictions and displacement of tenants from SRO housing.

According to Kent Gerecke, DERA was formed by "residents who were tired of indifference, years of neglect and the exploitation which increased their poverty and labeled their community 'Skid Road'." (Gerecke, 1991: p. 13) Municipal politics in Vancouver had, for 35 years, been dominated by one party, the Non-Partisan Association (NPA), from 1937 through 1972. The political agenda of the NPA centered on the promotion of "business interests, downtown commercial development, and efficient decision-making." (Punter, 2003: p.18) By the late 1960s, several Vancouver neighbourhoods, such as Kitsilano and Strathcona-Chinatown, began to voice their opposition to development plans proposed by the NPA for their communities. Community organizers in those neighbourhoods alleged that development plans were proceeding with little or no community input or consultation. Growing public dissatisfaction with the development policies as well as with the political and ethical practices of the NPA contributed to the rise of two political organizations that challenged the dominance of the NPA: The Electors Action Movement (TEAM) and the Confederation of Progressive Electors (COPE). TEAM had a "strong professional management and academic representation", while COPE "was dominated by union officials and teachers with more socialist leanings." (Punter, 2003: p.26) By 1972,

TEAM defeated the NPA in civic elections to form a majority in city council. However, TEAM lost its majority in city council in 1976 with the NPA taking over the majority of city council in 1978. TEAM regained its majority in 1980 until 1986 when the NPA once again established its dominance at the municipal level in Vancouver.

The election of a TEAM majority in city council in 1972 represented the beginning of a “new regime of planning and development with an ideology of livability informed by the idea of neighbourhood communities of citizen residents. The new regime instituted local area planning, officially dividing the city into neighbourhoods, thus, conferring formal status on the latter.” (Sommers, 2001: p. 208) Under this new regime of local area planning, according to Sommers, community organizations were granted a degree of legitimacy within Vancouver municipal politics, mainly “as mediators between individuals, particularly residents of neighbourhoods, and the local state.” (Sommers, 2001:p. 209) A critical assessment of the greater legitimacy accorded to community-based organizations under TEAM’s local area planning was offered by Jacob Muller in his analysis of a similar neighbourhood organization to DERA, the West Broadway’s Citizens’ Committee (WBCC) in Vancouver’s Kitsilano neighbourhood during the 1970s. It was Muller’s contention that “local area planning (LAP) was an important social mechanism for city council. First, development issues pertaining to the neighbourhood were ‘decentralized’ through LAP. Second, LAP created a buffer of proper channels for city council concerning development issues.” (Muller, 1985: p. 109) Muller further maintained that “the different administrative procedures at city council’s disposal make it relatively easy for them to regulate Alinsky-style conflict and the local organization initiating it.” (Muller, 1985: p.110) Muller argued that the participation of

neighbourhood associations, such as the WBCC, in the local planning process allowed TEAM to depoliticize community dissent in relation to its development plans by providing an officially sanctioned outlet for community agitation.

DERA's own frustration, stemming from its involvement with TEAM's local area planning committee for the DTES, was expressed in an article by Libby Davies, a DERA founder and activist during the 1970s:

The Downtown Eastside local area planning committee was established in 1976. From day one it became an arena for battles between residents and non-residents; between what City Council and the planners saw as a priority versus the needs and desires of those of us who lived in the community. The committee's initial structure ensured that local low-income residents were in a minority. We were told that a variety of 'interests' had to be represented, including those of the industrial and institutional sectors, social services, business and so on. We had pushed for an official development plan that would protect low-income housing, and we saw this as a deliberate maneuver by the City to marginalize low-income residents by stacking the deck. Although we managed to make some changes to the structure of the committee- with several planners being "chewed up" in the process- my lasting impression of this experience was outrage that local area planning principles that had been designed to help communities like ours were sacrificed for political purposes.
(Davies, 2003)

During the 1970s, DERA developed a two-pronged approach in its efforts to re-define the DTES, both socially and politically, as a legitimate and a proud inner-city neighbourhood. Firstly, DERA sought to continue VISP's fight to rid the neighbourhood of its image as 'skid road' and to advance a more positive image of its residents as individuals possessing the capacity for collective action and spontaneous mobilization in the face of threats to the well-being of the neighbourhood. An important aspect of this

strategy involved building an active membership base for the organization. As Kent Gerecke points out “three months after incorporation, DERA had 238 members.” (Gerecke, 1991: p.13) This membership grew dramatically through the 1970s and the 1980s, so that by the mid-1980s, DERA’s membership was over 4,000 within a neighbourhood population 12,000 to 15,000. DERA’s large membership base provided the organization with a distinct advantage over similar organizations in other neighbourhoods in the Vancouver area. Muller argues that a major factor contributing to the decline of the West Broadway Citizens Committee in Kitsilano was the fact that “it was never able to mobilize more than two percent of the approximately 40,000 residents of Kitsilano.” (Muller, 1985: p.110) DERA’s large grassroots membership, in contrast, provided the organization with a legitimacy that had eluded other service agencies in the DTES allowing DERA to advance its political objectives more forcefully through the mobilization of its members who were committed to DERA’s vision for the DTES. DERA’s grassroots legitimacy greatly enhanced its capacity to engage in political activism and agitation, the second part of its two-pronged strategy during the 1970s. Most of DERA’s activism in the 1970s centered on the issue of the city’s failure to adequately enforce building codes and standards against SRO landlords. John Punter, describing DERA’s activist stance regarding social housing, states:

The issue of decent affordable housing being paramount, the organizers of the resident association began a campaign to ensure that the housing codes were enforced, particularly as regards the fire standards, sanitation, and the quality of single-room occupancy hotels. Their well-publicized ‘crummy cockroach haven’ contest was typical of their ironic and uncompromising approach. (Punter, 2003: p. 97)

Kent Gerecke further describes DERA's confrontational tactics concerning social housing in the DTES, commenting that "DERA lobbied tenaciously for the city to carry out inspections and enforce its bylaws. They cried that council fiddles while skid road burns. They helped in an exhaustive joint investigation of 23 hotels- almost 10,000 violations were found." (Gerecke, 1991: p. 16) DERA's confrontational approach regarding the enforcement of city bylaws against SRO landlords could only be effective after it had achieved some success in pursuit of its main objective of shedding the skid road image of the DTES. DERA understood that the image of the DTES needed to be redefined "as a beleaguered community where long neglected citizens maintained their dignity by struggling to improve their neighbourhood and themselves" (Sommers, 2001: p.227) rather than the stereotypical image of an impoverished inner-city neighbourhood as merely a place of human failure. This reframing of the DTES's image was, at least to some extent, successful in altering the negative views held by many civic officials about the DTES and contributed to a greater understanding of the plight of residents forced to live in deteriorating housing conditions. As Sommers points out DERA's activism in the 1970s led civic officials to give "at least verbal commitment to the neighbourhood." (Sommers, 2001: p.227) However, Sommers further notes that DERA's activism in the 1970s gained increasing support from politicians and civic administrators mainly because DERA promoted an ethic of self-help which was "bound up with liberal notions of self-improvement and the exercise of individual responsibility." (Sommers, 2001: p. 226)

Thus, while civic officials and bureaucrats denounced DERA for its confrontational approach to community organizing, they, nevertheless, applauded DERA for its efforts in promoting neighbourhood self-reliance, a quality that was becoming more attractive to

civic bureaucrats interested in shifting the cost burden for management of neighbourhood poverty and homelessness onto the widening network of non-profit social service providers.

DERA and the Expo '86 Evictions – The Struggle for Affordable Housing and Against Displacement in the Downtown Eastside in the 1980s

The greatest challenge facing community activists in the DTES during the 1970s was combating government disinvestment and neglect of the worsening social problems plaguing the DTES as evidenced by the severe deterioration of social housing conditions for neighbourhood residents. By contrast, during the 1980s, the main challenge for community organizers in the DTES was combating the loss of affordable housing and the displacement/evictions of SRO tenants arising from pressures for market-led community development within the DTES, an inner-city neighbourhood which was quickly becoming the focus for public and private sector capital investment in advance of Vancouver's Expo '86. As a result of the political gains it achieved on behalf of DTES residents during the 1970s and due to its expanding grassroots following in the 1980s, DERA remained at the forefront of the struggle to stop the displacements and evictions of SRO tenants as well as the ongoing losses of social housing in the DTES. While DERA continued to employ a confrontational approach in its dealings with government officials and bureaucrats, particularly regarding the issue of SRO tenant evictions and displacements, the organization moved beyond confrontational tactics and became internationally recognized for developing its own innovative co-operative housing projects in fulfillment of its objective to provide affordable housing in the DTES.

A well-known DERA organizer during the 1980s and long-time DTES housing activist, interviewed for this study, explained that the impetus for DERA's involvement in social housing development boiled down to one simple fact: "people needed housing...Why should we keep people living in slums when I can build housing for them that's top of the art form".

The comments from this DERA organizer reflect the importance DERA placed upon pragmatic material change in the DTES and an ethic of self-help, particularly regarding the provision of social housing. Punter, in his analysis of DERA's achievements during the 1980s states that "at the heart of the association's campaigns were concerns to build a community that could empower itself, despite its poverty and deprivations, to campaign for environmental, social and housing improvements." (Punter, 2003: p.97) Kent Gerecke further notes that "community control for community change has always been central to the activities of DERA." (Gerecke, 1991: p. 15) This ethic of self-help is evidenced in DERA's preference for the construction of tenant-managed co-operative housing in the DTES. In fact, during the 1980s, DERA constructed some 209 units of co-operative housing under tenant management. (Gerecke, 1991) By the early 1990s, DERA was internationally recognized as a developer of innovative social housing and, according to Punter, it became "one of the city's biggest east end landlords with 640 units in its control, and it was actively pursuing a range of other projects in a management as well as development capacity." (Punter, 2003: p. 97)

Although DERA's foray into the field of social housing development represented a departure from its activist approach of the 1970s, it was aided in its social housing objectives by changes to Vancouver's city council during the early 1980s. Two of

DERA's co-founders were elected to city council in the early 1980s. In addition, Mike Harcourt, a longtime supporter of DERA and of affordable housing development in the DTES, was elected as mayor in 1980 and re-elected in 1984. The election of these DERA organizers and of a mayor sympathetic to DERA's concerns was significant for the organization as it held out the possibility that city council might become more inclusive in terms of its revitalization plans for the DTES, thus permitting DERA, as well as other community-based non-profits, greater access to and control over the financial and material resources necessary for the implementation of community-based development initiatives. In fact, DERA was successful in lobbying for federal funding for the construction of two cooperative housing projects as well as other social housing initiatives during the 1980s. However, Sommers points out that, despite DERA's success in obtaining social housing funding, its "demands for financial assistance from the state for both organizational operations and re-construction of the built environment positioned DERA, as well as a burgeoning host of community service groups, as a brokerage agency, which channeled and managed the resources it obtained from private charitable and state organizations" (Sommers, 2001: p. 231). Sommers further states that, by the mid-1980s, DERA's militancy was reduced merely to rhetoric while it became more collaborative with government agencies in the provision of social housing. Sommers believes that the moderation in DERA's activism may have occurred "because DERA had achieved certain structural goals. As a result of its struggles in the 1970s, the Downtown Eastside was accepted as a community." (Sommers, 2001: p. 230)

While there may have been a softening of political attitudes toward DERA and the DTES at the civic level, this was not at all the case at the provincial level.

Commencing in the early 1980s, Vancouver's core area economy was being shaped increasingly by "global processes", such as by the rising tide of immigration from Asia, especially from Hong Kong, new capital investment, particularly from Asian investors, and by Vancouver's new "global identity" arising from its hosting of Expo '86. (Hutton, 2008: pp.233-236) In addition, Vancouver's traditional resource industries, concentrated mainly in the inner-city regions, were greatly weakened by a deep recession during the early 1980s contributing to "unemployment levels of 13-14 per cent in Vancouver." (Hutton, 2008: p. 236) The provincial government led by then-Premier Bill Bennett was convinced that Vancouver's hosting of an urban mega-event, Expo '86, would serve as "a feel-good spectacle to help people forget the conflict and economic hardships being felt in the 1980s, while creating jobs (construction and tourism), and demonstrating to the world potential investment opportunities in various sectors of the economy, including real estate."(Olds, 1998: p.6) Furthermore, the government considered Expo '86 as catalyst for market-led revitalization of Vancouver's impoverished inner-city regions including the DTES, long viewed by provincial politicians as an embarrassment to the city and an impediment to the growth of tourism and the general economic well-being of Vancouver. This revitalization was to be achieved through private capital investment in market-based or mixed-use forms of housing replacing the deteriorating stock of SRO hotel housing. In the years following the awarding of Expo '86 to Vancouver, a destabilization of land values in the DTES prompted many landlords to renovate their SRO hotels as well as other low-income housing with the intention of converting them to accommodations for tourists attending Expo '86 and, subsequent to the event, to market-based housing on a permanent basis.(Olds, 1998; Smith, 2003) The effect of these SRO conversions was to

significantly reduce the stock of low-income housing in the DTES, with the actual numbers of lost housing units estimated to be between 1000 and 1500 rooms. (Olds, 1998) More importantly, the loss of low-income housing led to the displacement of between 500 and 950 SRO tenants during the pre-Expo years. (Olds, 1998) Sadly, many displaced tenants developed significant health problems and as many as eleven tenants died following their eviction.

DERA along with other DTES housing activists attributed the deaths of evicted SRO tenants on the provincial government's failure to heed the activists' warnings of the potential harmful effects of the Expo-related evictions on the health and well-being of the most vulnerable residents of the DTES. (Olds, 1998) For DERA, Expo'86 market-led development represented a threat to the continued existence of non-market housing in the DTES. Nevertheless, the mega-event presented DERA with opportunities for challenging private economic interests by implementing new activist strategies in its efforts to pressure all levels of government to safeguard the social rights of DTES residents, particularly their rights to safe, affordable housing. As Gotham argues, urban spectacles, such as World Fairs and Olympic Games, are "contested terrains" which present opportunities for local groups to assert control "over the conditions of their communities in the face of global market-based agendas.(Gotham, 2004: p.243)

Almost immediately after the announcement was made by provincial officials that Vancouver was to host this mega-event, DERA began raising concerns about the potential adverse impact that market housing would have on the existing stock of SRO housing and the potential for displacement of long-term residents. (Olds, 1998) However, unlike its activism of the 1970s which confronted years of government neglect

of the DTES and established the neighbourhood as a legitimate community of low-income residents, DERA was now forced to combat an external threat to the DTES posed by market-based revitalization plans from the public and private sectors in advance of Expo '86. While DERA had no formal input into the political process that led to the decision making Vancouver the host city for Expo '86, it sought, however, to take advantage of the growing political and media attention given to the DTES, particularly at the commencement of the evictions. In the years prior to Expo '86, DERA stepped up its lobbying of civic and provincial officials for legislative action proposing the enacting of a rent freeze and a no-eviction plan in order to protect the housing rights of SRO tenants, the residents most vulnerable to displacement.(Olds, 1998) This proposal was initially met with resistance from civic officials, but as the evictions accelerated in the months before Expo '86, the city agreed to lobby the provincial government to pass the necessary legislation in a last ditch attempt to halt the evictions. The provincial government, however, "refused to act because they did not perceive the evictions to be a 'serious' problem." (Olds, 1998: p.11) The province's refusal to take legislative action to halt the evictions provided the impetus for DERA to bring its struggle for protection of the housing rights of evicted tenants to the international media arriving to report on preparations for Expo '86. A leading DERA organizer and housing activist during the campaigns to stop the eviction and displacement of SRO tenants, spoke about the struggles DERA faced during this challenging period of its existence, commenting that:

during Expo, the only organization that really got involved in stopping the evictions was DERA. We also had the double problem of not only trying to stop the evictions and bringing attention to that around the world, but to relocate the people...We

had to relocate 100 people from a hotel in one day. It's an extremely difficult task. We did the best we could.
(Interview, DERA activist, July 20, 2007)

As the quote from this activist suggests, DERA's strategy involved not only taking action to halt the evictions, but also bringing its struggles for protection of the housing rights of SRO tenants to a global audience. To this end, DERA became well-known for its effectiveness in mobilizing its membership and much of the general population of the DTES, to participate in public protest rallies as a means of demonstrating their solidarity in the resistance to the evictions thereby placing even greater pressure on civic and provincial politicians to find an immediate solution to the social housing crisis precipitated by the pre-Expo evictions. One such rally occurred at the beginning of March, 1986 which "attracted considerable media attention. Six days after the rally, a Provincial-City Task Force was created and the City (via the Social Planning Department) was pressured into creating a 'clearing house' to relocate tenants." (Olds, 1998: p.11) Civic and provincial officials were interested in showcasing the DTES and the City of Vancouver to the international media as a 'world-class' destination for elite tourism and consumption and as an ideal site for market housing development. The collective voice of resistance to this development agenda, spearheaded by DERA, was dismissed by these officials as "being opposed to change and development." (Beazley et al., 1997: p. 185) Nevertheless, DERA was still effective in attracting the attention of the international media in order to expose the denial of the housing rights of low-income DTES residents during the pre-Expo '86 housing crisis. DERA succeeded in advancing an image of the DTES as a 'community under siege' where once- proud residents were increasingly exploited by profit-hungry private developers and property

owners, thereby subverting the image of the DTES as a site for market-led development promoted by the dominant political and economic interests.

DERA's activism during the Expo '86 housing crisis was instrumental in raising awareness among long-term DTES residents of their housing rights as citizens and in mobilizing its large membership base in a collective resistance to the actions of exploitive developers and property owners. Furthermore, DERA encouraged DTES residents to vigorously and publicly assert their demands for greater government protection of their housing rights. By the mid 1980s, however, the resident profile of the DTES changed with the arrival of "younger, often visible minority or native-Canadian, male and unemployed patrons." (Smith, 2003: p.499) The influx of these young adults to the DTES, many of whom were victims of physical and sexual abuse, also signaled the deepening and concentration of poverty and social problems such as drug and alcohol addictions in the DTES. At the same time, provincial government policies favouring de-institutionalization of mental health facilities and "cutbacks to programs designed to connect with young people considered to be in a dangerous situation" (Sommers, 1998: p. 249) contributed to the neighbourhood's growing numbers of mentally ill residents. As a consequence of these demographic trends, a larger segment of the DTES population was becoming increasingly service-dependant while their disabilities rendered them unfit to participate in any collective action demanding government protection of their social rights, including the right to affordable housing. According to Sommers, "the retired workers who inhabited the Downtown Eastside were increasingly seen as helpless, somewhat decrepit figures whose need for protection and services overshadowed their abilities to defend themselves and their community." (Sommers, 1998: p.235) It was also

evident that this service-dependent population was the most vulnerable to eviction from SRO hotels in the pre-Expo years and to chronic homelessness and criminal victimization. Consequently, the DTES witnessed a significant rise in visible homelessness, open use of drugs and a rise in violent criminal activity, especially after the closure of Expo '86.

The growing need for social services in the DTES led to a proliferation of non-profit social service organizations. The objectives of these social service organizations centered on “the ‘normalization’ of the Downtown Eastside as a community” (Sommers, 1998: p.247). Sommers explains that evicted SRO tenants were regarded by these social service providers as being “incapacitated by circumstances beyond their control, necessitating the intervention of professionals to provide services that would presumably, normalize the situation.” (Sommers, 1998: p.246) Moreover, Sommers contends that 1970s activist strategies and discourses promoting social equality and political participation of all citizens, served as a “repertoire of terms and ideas” underpinning the demands of social service providers for official recognition and for funding, most often from the state. These organizations regarded their missions not only as the provision of services to needy residents of the DTES, but also as “channels of civic participation” or as “projects of self-government.” (Sommers, 1998: p.248) Nevertheless, these non-profit service organizations received most of their funding from the government, and thus, according to Sommers, they functioned more as “quasi-agencies of state, incorporating the division between service producers and consumers that underpinned the structure of welfare programs.” (Sommers, 1998: p. 251)

The proliferation of non-profit service providers in the DTES created a more competitive environment for funding sources while also challenging DERA's long-held position as the collective voice of the Expo '86 evictees and of marginalized residents of the DTES in general. By 1986, the Non-Partisan Association (NPA) had regained its majority on city council while Gordon Campbell, known as favouring market-led development, became mayor. According to Olds, the prevailing political climate at the time of Expo '86 and after its closing reflected "a philosophy which values the exchange value of housing over the use-value; a belief in the primacy of economic relations; a belief that the inner-city must be redeveloped; and a belief that Downtown Eastside residents do not live in a 'community'." (Olds, 1998: p.16) Given this political climate and in order to preserve its ability to influence the trajectory of development in the DTES, DERA adopted a more cooperative approach in its relations with other community-based non-profit organizations as well as with state agencies. Sommers takes a somewhat pessimistic view of DERA's diminished organizing capacity in the late 1980s, arguing that "DERA itself succumbed to the institutionalization of the professional-client relation as its engagement with a whole range of state agencies shifted from direct confrontation to what Ley (1994) calls 'co-production', a form of mutual cooperation with state agencies. In the absence of a confrontational stance, DERA assumed the position of a subordinate partner." (Sommers, 1998: p.247)

At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, public and private sector efforts to put into effect revitalization plans for the DTES were well underway. Increasingly, DERA found itself on the outside looking in as these revitalization plans were initiated, while DERA's funding requests were more often denied by provincial and

civic authorities, now taking a more hostile stance to DERA's demands for community-controlled development. Kent Gerecke acknowledges that DERA's efforts to push for community control of development in the DTES were running into greater resistance from pro-market-led development interests, commenting that "community control is not an absolute but a relative thing – a process and a struggle." (Gerecke, 1991: p.19)

Nevertheless, as Smith notes, the widening network of non-profit social service agencies in the DTES created "an obstacle around which the intensifying gentrification and revitalization initiatives in the neighbourhood must unfold." (Smith, 2003: p.506)

Chapter 5

Interview and Document Analysis

Introduction

With the decline of DERA's dominance as the main political voice of marginalized residents of the DTES by the 1990s, this inner-city neighbourhood has since entered a new era of community development and neighbourhood organizing initiatives. The principal actors in the current period of market-led community economic development (CED) efforts in the DTES are the state, major charitable funding organizations, and a diverse set of competing community-based non-profit organizations. The focus of this study concerns the strategies and tactics of the main non-profit organizations and their struggles to forge a new political voice for the DTES. This struggle is taking place during a time when market-based CED initiatives have forced these social economy organizations to accept greater responsibility for efficient and cost-effective social service delivery, as well as for developing entrepreneurial initiatives as local solutions to the problem of deepening poverty in the DTES. The non-profit organizations involved in this study are: DERA, Pivot Legal Society, Eastside Movement for Business and Economic Renewal Society (EMBERS), Portland Hotel Society, Carnegie Community Action Project and St. James Community Service Society. This study also considers the role of a major funding organization, VanCity, which has provided funding for several of the main non-profit organizations in the DTES. These non-profit organizations are attempting to build new alliances and collaborative efforts with the state, the major funding organizations and between themselves to take advantage

of the potential benefits of revitalization efforts for the DTES. At the same time, these organizations are struggling to control the trajectory of development plans for the DTES in order to minimize the negative consequences stemming from ongoing revitalization/gentrification, resident displacement, and the continuing loss of affordable housing in advance of Vancouver's hosting of the 2010 Winter Olympics.

This chapter presents the major themes that emerged from the analysis of a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with key informants from the non-profit organizations previously mentioned during July, 2007. In addition, a leading DTES activist, organizer and social housing developer was interviewed who proved to be an invaluable resource regarding the history of community organizing in the neighbourhood and who is currently involved in the struggles to prevent SRO tenant evictions and displacement leading up to the 2010 Winter Olympics. A senior planner with the City of Vancouver was also interviewed to obtain the city's perspective concerning revitalization plans affecting the DTES. In addition to the semi-structured interviews, this chapter also presents major themes derived from an analysis of relevant documents pertaining to government policies, reports arising from multi-sectoral discussions in regards to social housing and the 2010 Olympics, as well as documentary material derived from the various non-profit organizations, organizational websites and other media sources.

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part of the chapter provides a brief introduction to the DTES non-profit organizations participating in this study including their organizational characteristics, funding sources and description of organizational mission. The non-profit organizations are classified into four types based on Immergluck's classification of activist styles or the method used to pursue social

change. Accordingly, the organizations are classified as direct service, research, advocacy or direct action. These are ideal types and most of the organizations in this study combine activist styles. The utility of this classification is that it acknowledges the potential for conflicting styles of activism pursued by competing non-profit organizations within a particular neighbourhood. It also recognizes that community organizing is a complex phenomenon wherein a plurality of community-based organizations may pursue niche strategies within a single neighbourhood while the possibility remains for inter-organizational collaboration that builds on each organization's strengths. The second part of the chapter involves an application of a governmentality perspective in an examination of the major government policy initiatives concerning social housing development and the alleviation of homelessness in the DTES. The third part of the chapter involves thematic analysis of a series of semi-structured key informant interviews conducted with several of the major non-profit organizations in the DTES.

Participant Non-Profit Organizations- Characteristics, Structure, Values

Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA)

DERA is currently managed by a board of directors (tenants of buildings run by DERA and other residents of the DTES), and employs an Executive Director as well as approximately 25 staff including 3 full-time advocates. Funding for housing comes from B.C. Housing and rent collection. DERA is a direct action and advocacy organization. Advocates are funded by The Law Foundation, gaming grants and other small grants. Funding for DERA's Chinese Seniors Coordinator was cut by the City of Vancouver due to its confrontational political activities. DERA's membership is composed of the

general resident population of the DTES. DERA presently owns 3 social housing buildings in the DTES. Decision-making resides with the Executive Director and Program Manager, but the organization is moving toward more decentralized decision-making style. A DERA advocate, interviewed for this study, describes DERA's mission as the promotion of the values of "justice, dignity and respect" (Interview, DERA advocate, July, 2007) This advocate further explains that DERA's direct action strategies center on confronting social injustice perpetrated against marginalized residents of the DTES, stating that :

There is an overwhelming amount of injustice in this community... whether it be the police brutality that poor people face all the time, whether it is the unfair treatment of people who are on social assistance and going through the welfare system and that bureaucratic, humiliating, dehumanizing experience, whether it be landlords and property owners and the way they take advantage of poor people. So, I think challenging that injustice would be part of our goal. And a big part of our goal and our mission is to, as an organization, both on the ground and in the political sphere, challenge that injustice.
(Interview, DERA advocate, July, 2007)

DERA is also extensively involved in advocacy on behalf of DTES residents by "navigating the bureaucratic system with them so that they are empowered to navigate it themselves, so that they are empowered to do these things for themselves and take their power back." (Interview, DERA advocate, July 2007)

Portland Hotel Services Society (PHS)

Portland Hotel Services Society is a non-profit organization that provides housing and advocacy services for the most marginalized members of the DTES since 1993. PHS is concerned with providing housing and services to people who are viewed as the "hard

to house”, the people most at risk of homelessness owing to the severity of their addictions to alcohol and drugs, chronic mental illness and HIV/AIDS. PHS operates and maintains several SRO hotels in the neighbourhood and has adopted a ‘no eviction’ policy in recognition of the extreme marginality of most of the residents it houses and of the fact that many of these tenants have already been evicted from other social housing in the DTES. PHS currently employs a staff of 120, and each of its buildings has a staff person on duty 24 hours a day. The organization also makes available physician, nursing and dental services to its clients. PHS is also well-known for its operation of Canada’s only safe-injection site in the DTES. The organization receives most of its funding from various levels of government, but also receives some private funding. PHS also operates a number of social enterprises including the Potluck Café, which provides funding for some of its services. The organization’s basic philosophy which guides its mission to provide housing and services to the most marginalized members of the DTES is “acceptance of people”. (Interview, PHS informant, July 2007)

Eastside Movement for Business and Economic Renewal Society (EMBERS)

EMBERS is a non-profit community economic development organization that assists low-income residents of the DTES and other inner-city neighbourhoods to develop small businesses and micro-enterprise ventures. Incorporated in 2001, EMBERS also provides access to business training and helps low-income residents to access capital funding. The organization’s sole employee is its Executive Director, while its other services, such as business coaching and consulting, are arranged on a contract basis. EMBERS does not have a confirmed membership at this time but it is in the process of

establishing a membership list. EMBERS receives funding from a variety of sources including VanCity Community Foundation (3-year funding), Western Diversification (Federal-main funding), B.C. Social Venture Partners (recurring grant up to 3 years). EMBERS' Board of Directors is not a community resident board, but "it is a board that knows the community." (Interview, key informant, EMBERS, July 2007) EMBERS bases its services on the community economic development (CED) model. However, a key informant explains that EMBERS's approach to CED is much more holistic due to low-income population in the DTES:

Because we're focusing on low-income people, we're different than a regular business development organization. We're trying to give people opportunities, low-income people, marginalized people opportunities to participate in the economy and the wealth that's being created in the area.
(Interview, EMBERS key informant, July 2007)

Pivot Legal Society

Pivot Legal Society is a non-profit legal advocacy and research organization in the DTES. It was formed in 2002 and presently employs 5 lawyers, 3 non-legal staff, volunteer interns and part-time volunteers. Pivot Legal Society has a Board of Directors comprised of legal professionals and community representatives. The organization is funded through a variety public and private funding sources including private donors, private foundations, government and fundraising events. A key informant speaking on behalf of Pivot Legal Society and interviewed for this study, described the organization's mission as follows:

The mandate of Pivot Legal Society is to advance the interests of marginalized persons through strategic litigation, public education and law reform... What that translates into in terms of what we actually do here is that we have a number ...we get direction from the community. The community tells us what areas it's concerned about... The community identified a number of issues but the most important to them was policing... That became Pivot's first campaign area. The second area that they identified was housing... In that sense, we try to see ourselves almost as lawyers for the community. We get our instructions from a very broad group of people who know what they think we should be working on and they prioritize it for us... so we have policing, housing, sex work, addiction and child apprehension or child protection which are the five main campaign areas right now, and all those campaigns are active at various stages.

(Interview, key informant/Activist, July 2007)

Carnegie Community Action Project (CCAP)

The Carnegie Community Action Project began about 10 years ago and is an advisory body to the Carnegie Community Centre. CCAP activism is centered on issues related to housing and incomes in the DTES. The organization is also involved in the efforts to stop the gentrification of the DTES. CCAP employs an organizer, coordinator and researcher but also relies heavily on volunteers. It is funded by VanCity Foundation, the Real Estate Foundation and by private donations. Decision-making is entrusted to CCAP's organizer who consults with the organization's coordinator. A key informant for CCAP interviewed for this study described the organizations values and mission as follows:

We want the Downtown Eastside to be a low-income friendly neighbourhood. And to do that we need more affordable housing and higher incomes. And another value

would be respecting the people who live here... and participation by them in decisions affecting their lives.
(Interview, key informant, CCAP, July, 2007)

St. James Community Service Society

St. James Community Service Society is a non-profit social service organization that has been operating in the DTES since 1955. The organization provides social housing ranging from independent low-income housing to fully- supported licensed housing along with home support services and other personal services such as financial administration and adult guardianship. The organization operates 2 hospices and 2 shelters (one of each in the DTES). The organization currently has a closed membership comprised of Board members with various areas of professional expertise. The organization receives its funding from Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and B.C. Housing and employs approximately 150 full-time equivalent employees. The core values of St. James Community Service Society are contained in the organization's annual report and are stated as follows:

To acknowledge the worth of each individual we serve by treating them with compassion, trust and respect; to offer our services to each individual with a concern for social justice and without prejudice or discrimination; to provide our employees and volunteers with an environment of equal opportunity for personal growth; to actively seek out ways of enhancing our services and financial stability.
(Annual Report '05-'06)

Funding Organization

VanCity Credit Union

VanCity Credit Union, formed in 1945, is Canada's largest credit union (outside Quebec) with 340,000 members and \$12 billion in assets providing a variety of financial products and services to individuals and communities. As a cooperative organization and as part of the credit union movement, it has adopted a commitment "to give back both to the community and to our members." (Interview, key informant, VanCity, July 2007)

VanCity currently has a staff of about 2,200 and 9 elected board members with a variety of professional experience including several who have familiarity working with non-profit organizations. According to the key informant interviewed for this study, VanCity has moved toward a strategic planning model regarding funding for community development. This strategic planning focuses on protecting the environment, assisting individuals to gain access to financial services to achieve financial self-reliance and finally, building strong social economy organizations, social enterprises for non-profit sustainability. While much of VanCity's funding of community organizations is achieved through grants, the organization is now taking a more "integrated approach" in its funding strategy for non-profit organizations. This integrated approach is further explained by VanCity's key informant:

We also focus on supporting non-profits or organizations to... changes in terms of policy development or creating what might be a more enabling environment for them to do their work, so we're not only funding programs and specific projects but we're trying to be more holistic in terms of how we approach the issue and achieving outcomes.

(Interview, VanCity key informant, July 2007)

VanCity provides funding of approximately \$5 million to \$6 million per year directly to non-profit organizations for programs. In addition, it provides grants to non-profit organizations for business development, social enterprise development, bridge housing and other organizational projects.

Non-Profit Organizations and the Revitalization of the Downtown Eastside- A

Governmentality Perspective

According to Raco and Imrie, a useful way of comprehending the shift toward a “rights and responsibilities” agenda in current urban policy is through the analytical lens of Foucault’s concept of governmentality. Governmentality analysis involves a consideration of the political rationalities, defined as the “the moral justifications” or the ideals, for governing the conduct of others. These rationalities are diffused through “a panoply of institutions, agencies and groups.” (Raco and Imrie, 2000: p. 2190) Political rationalities are associated with “programmes of government” and can be discerned through official government policy documents. A governmentality perspective is also concerned with examining the ‘technologies of government’ or the governmental practices employed to govern the conduct of individuals, groups or organizations. (Raco and Imrie, 2000: p. 2190) Drawing upon the governmentality perspective, this section examines existing neighbourhood revitalization policies applicable to the DTES as codified expressions of the underlying governmental rationality. The analysis also considers governmental practices (technologies) employed to give practical effect to these rationalities in the context of the growing demands from the non-profit organizations for government action to halt the progression of gentrification in the DTES.

The specific governmental policy documents under consideration in this study are as follows: The Vancouver Agreement 2005, Vancouver Agreement Economic Revitalization Plan (October, 2004), Homeless Action Plan (June, 2005), Housing Plan for the Downtown Eastside (October, 2005), Vancouver Homelessness Funding Model (March, 2007), City of Vancouver, Project Civil City-Progress Update (March, 2007)

This study considers two rationalities that can be discerned from the policy documentation which underpin government policies and programmes devolving greater responsibility for service provision to non-profit organizations in the DTES. The first is the importance of ensuring that the DTES is primed to take advantage of the growing interest of private investors in commercial and residential development in the neighbourhood. The second is the necessity of managing worsening levels of poverty and social deprivation in the DTES. The first governmental rationality is reflected in attempts to involve the non-profit organizations in new forms of governance such as partnerships with various levels of government and in non-traditional activities such as social entrepreneurial projects in furtherance of market-based community development. The second rationality is reflected in the devolution of service delivery and social housing management to the non-profit service and housing providers in furtherance of the need to manage poverty, homelessness and crime in the DTES.

The Vancouver Agreement 2005, an urban development agreement between the federal government, the B.C. provincial government and the City of Vancouver, is regarded as the main policy document which sets out the guiding principles for the

involvement of non-profit organizations in government-led neighbourhood revitalization initiatives. In his comprehensive analysis of The Vancouver Agreement, Michael Mason notes that the agreement “features an explicit commitment to inclusive and accessible community participation: the Policy Committee is charged with establishing processes for community input, while the Downtown Eastside Strategy sets ambitious objectives for community capacity-building.” (Mason, 2006: p.22) However, these commitments for community inclusivity and capacity-building have been rendered mostly ineffective owing to government failure to provide funding for the implementation of community-based initiatives. Several key informants interviewed for this study expressed frustration with the lack of government funding under the agreement, one informant complaining:

You can't get any money out of the Vancouver Agreement.
We've tried... They'll give you money to do a market
study to do something else... So it's basically, we have to
create work to get money out of them.
(Interview, Key Informant, July, 2007)

A key informant with the City of Vancouver's planning department also laments the lack of financial backing from governments rendering The Vancouver Agreement ineffective as a tool for implementing community-based initiatives in the DTES, stating that,

there's no teeth to the agreement. There's \$20 million set
aside. There's probably a \$2 billion problem in the
Downtown Eastside.
(Key Informant, City of Vancouver, July, 2007)

The Vancouver Agreement's principal economic development strategy for the DTES is contained in the Economic Revitalization Plan (October, 2004). The Plan focuses on “business retention and business development” and “ensures comprehensive

health and social services are available to respond to and meet local population's needs.” (Economic Revitalization Plan, 2004: p. 4) The Plan places specific emphasis on the promotion of social enterprise development, stating “community members have identified support for community development through social enterprise as a critical element for implementing a strategy of ‘revitalization without displacement’.” The Plan also places priority for successful implementation of its strategies by measuring “levels of new private and public investment, total employment, resident participation in the work force, and the range of goods and services available locally.” While another measure of success is stated to be “affordable housing units”, the clear emphasis in this economic development strategy is on increasing the levels of private and public investment in the DTES through social enterprise development and resident labour force participation. In light of the lack of funding under The Vancouver Agreement to support local initiatives, it is clear that responsibility for successful implementation of the plan's strategies has been shifted onto residents of the DTES and onto the non-profit organizations that operate pursuant to a community economic development model (CED). In order to give greater support to neighbourhood CED organizations, the partner governments of The Vancouver Agreement opened a non-profit organization, Building Opportunities With Business Inner City Society (BOB), with the mandate “to promote business development, mentoring, employment training, and small business loans programs, gradually expanding to a wider range of services and initiatives.” (Western Economic Diversification Canada, News Release, October 12, 2005) BOB's non-profit status can be viewed as a governmental strategy for institutionalizing CED practices within partnerships between BOB and the non-profit organizations in the DTES.

The issues of rising homelessness and the lack of affordable housing in the DTES are viewed by all stakeholders, government, private and non-profit sectors, as the most critical issues threatening revitalization plans for the DTES. In the short term, the government, municipal and provincial, views homelessness and the lack of social housing as problems that are overshadowing the city's preparations for hosting of the 2010 Winter Olympics through the negative images of Vancouver being brought to the media's attention by community-based housing activists struggling against government indifference with respect to protection of the housing rights of marginalized DTES residents. In the longer term, these same social problems also threaten to disrupt the government's plans for the integration of the DTES into a restructured inner-city economy, which is dependent on the neighbourhood being perceived as desirable for the influx of private investment. The private sector, meanwhile, considers homelessness and social housing matters as obstacles in the way of private developers, property owners and retailers from realizing increasing profits arising from the potential economic spinoffs stemming from the 2010 Winter Olympics. The private sector has relied on government to implement policies that will foster the economic growth potential of the DTES while managing the intractable problems such as homelessness and social housing in a way that does not adversely affect their interests. It has consistently been the non-profit organizations in the DTES that have politicized the social housing issue and have maintained pressure on all levels of government to address these difficult social issues through policies that benefit the low-income residents of the DTES. The importance that the non-profit organizations place on the resolution of the social housing and homelessness problems in the DTES was stated by several key informants interviewed

for this study. For example, when asked to describe the most pressing issue standing in the way of positive change in the DTES, one informant stated, “truly, housing is the main issue. Housing is the main issue for everyone in Vancouver.” (Interview, Key Informant, EMBERS, July, 2007) A key informant with one of the major funding organizations, VanCity, reiterated the importance of the housing issue for non-profit organizations in the DTES, stating “It’s the major issue down there, it’s really stabilizing these SROs.”(Interview, Key Informant, VanCity, July, 2007)

While the non-profit service providers in the DTES continue to take a confrontational stance toward the government for its indifference to the continuing losses of social housing, recent policies implemented by the municipal government have attempted to de-politicize the issue by partnering with neighbourhood non-profit organizations for the purpose of service provision and social housing management. The Housing Plan for the Downtown Eastside (2005) proposes that:

A partnership between all levels of government and non-profit housing societies should be formalized to develop and fund a training program for SRO operators. This can draw on the experiences gained by governments and non-profits in operating social housing and SROs... In this program, staff from the City, Vancouver Coastal Health, BC Housing, and experienced non-profit and private operators can provide advice, expertise and training on good SRO management techniques, including use of existing community services for troubled tenants, drawing on experience with existing housing operations. (Housing Plan for the Downtown Eastside (2005), p.24-25)

The Vancouver Homelessness Funding Model (March, 2007), a proposal for the development of a new funding strategy for the city’s homelessness and social housing initiatives, places particular emphasis on the development of supportive housing in the DTES and on establishing partnerships with non-profit service providers in order to

utilize their expertise in social service provision, stating that “non-profit organizations play an important role in development of sites and operations, and most importantly with the delivery of support services to tenants.” (Vancouver Homelessness Funding Model (March, 2007), p.36) The Homelessness Action Plan (June, 2005) provides even further evidence of the city’s preference for the development of partnerships with non-profit service providers for supportive housing in the DTES. The plan states that:

There is a solution to homelessness that is working in other North American cities and can be effective in Vancouver and this is to build more ‘supportive housing’ - affordable housing linked to support services. Supportive housing can take various forms. In some cases, support services are provided on-site, while in other cases residents are linked to community-based services.”
(Homelessness Action Plan (June, 2005))

The Vancouver Homelessness Funding Model (March, 2007) provides for a new organization, Vancouver Homelessness Foundation, to “act as an independent facilitator helping to bring together government agencies, non-profit providers, and representatives of the local community to address issues that arise from time to time related to the delivery of supportive housing programs and to discuss further opportunities for collaboration. There may be significant opportunities to improve the efficiency of service delivery and augment services.”(Vancouver Homelessness Funding Model (March, 2007): p.36)

It is clear from these excerpts of the city’s policy initiatives concerning social housing and homelessness that they reflect a governmental strategy (technique) of professionalization of the non-profit organizations with respect to service provision and housing management that is tied to supportive housing development in the DTES.

According to research conducted by Ilcan and Basok concerning voluntary organizations in Canada, “service provision is no longer seen as the project belonging to a central bureaucracy. Instead, various partnership arrangements and diverse partners (individuals, agencies, companies, schools, hospitals, organizations) are now taking on the responsibility of dealing with issues of service provision in a climate of increased flexibility.”(Ilcan and Basok, 2004: p. 132) A key informant with another non-profit organization, interviewed for this study, described that organization’s experience with the contracting of service provision and the necessity for the organization to become more efficient in order to maintain government funding:

We get held to the fire because we are funded by Vancouver Coastal Health and B.C. Housing... and a number of programs are funded that way, right...and they have more power than we do and if you piss them off they can make your lives miserable, to put it bluntly...we went along for a number of years where they reduced funding. We kind of went, OK, and we cut whatever we had to do. We reduced service levels, we consolidated contracts...Its forced us to become more efficient in terms of our service deliveries, so in terms of building maintenance and different services that we require just to keep the brick and board part and the operational part working. We’ve consolidated that and made that really efficient. That’s been a good thing. The other part of that is that we’ve laid off staff to the point where we’re running at essential service levels. So there’s no more fat to trim. And then again last year we got to, you know, well you have to wait for money or, you know, you’re not going to get any money but you’re still expected to provide the same level of service...We’ve become far more professional. We do business cases for everything.
(Interview, Key Informant, July, 2007)

The quote from this informant clearly illustrates the pressure that government funding has placed on the non-profit organizations in the DTES to become more efficient in social service provision if the organization is requesting funding. What is even more

interesting from this informant's comments is that the pressure to deliver services more efficiently is regarded as "a good thing". Arguably, this comment is quite understandable as this particular organization is engaged in providing direct services to neighbourhood residents. Thus, more efficient service delivery would be a benefit to the residents needing the organization's services. However, it is also indicative of the technique of professionalization which has apparently become internalized in the practices of this organization and has therefore allowed the organization to be 'governed-at-a-distance' by partnering with the government and funding organizations, thus making them more accountable for achieving the service delivery objectives as set by government policy. A key informant with a major housing non-profit organization in the DTES commented on the inability of the organization, which is dependent on government funding, to politicize the social housing issue, stating:

We don't do so much stuff in the media because we'd be criticizing. So really...you sell out that section because you can't be attacking... You wouldn't hear us in the media attacking the premier or the mayor...because we're in a position where that becomes complicated. So that's a kind of sell out compromise you make.
(Interview, Key Informant, July, 2007)

A similar concern about the de-politicization of anti-poverty advocacy in the DTES by the threat of withdrawal of funding was voiced by another key informant, commenting that:

You can't have one organization doing civil disobedience, interacting with government, lobbying government, doing grassroots work, doing high level advocacy and also providing services because you'll lose your funding as soon as you're engaged in civil disobedience. You'll lose funding for services, like DERA lost their Chinese Seniors grant. You will be shut out of government offices

if you're doing civil disobedience. You can't do that kind of advocacy work and if you're too strong in the media, you are going to be shut out of government offices. So there's this whole set of contradictions that you can't do a certain type of advocacy without giving up something else. (Interview, Key Informant, July, 2007)

The Fragmentation of Political Voice in the Downtown Eastside

This section of the chapter presents the research findings from the series of key informant interviews conducted with the participant non-profit organizations. While the previous section employed a governmentality perspective for analysis of the main policy initiatives affecting non-profit organizations in the DTES, the findings in this section were generated by the application of qualitative thematic analysis informed by institutional ethnography. As mentioned in the methodology section of this thesis, institutional ethnography can complement a governmentality perspective “by assessing how structures of power mediate the social world from the standpoint of those who live in it.” (Murray et al., 2006: p.378). Within this perspective, power does not act only in a top-down manner to constrain the agency of individuals or collectives, but rather power can be acted upon by individual or collective action and can be transformed by them. In this study, community-based non-profit organizations are not simply embedded within a political environment in which they are ‘governed-at-a-distance’ by the policy initiatives initiated by various levels of government, but are instead active agents capable of self-organization and collective action in the pursuit of social justice objectives for the improvement of living conditions in their local communities. This section therefore involves a discussion of the main themes that emerged from the key informant interviews revealing not only the conflicts between the non-profit organizations in their efforts to

give effect to organizational objectives, but also the new alliances that have been forged between the non-profit organizations, government agencies and private sector interests.

An important theme that emerged from the key informant interviews concerns the conflict between a community economic development approach, including social entrepreneurship and partnerships with government as a means of bringing employment and business opportunities to the DTES, and a more radical, confrontational stance as the strategy necessary for pressuring governments to take responsibility for meeting the social housing commitments included in government policy initiatives and for ensuring that marginalized residents are not displaced as a result of neighbourhood revitalization plans.

DERA has gained wide recognition for its achievements in building a community identity and in mobilizing DTES residents in well-publicized protest rallies. For example, in July, 2006, The Georgia Strait, a Vancouver news publication, reported that DERA had erected a 15-meter banner on the roof of its building that read "No Homes, No Peace", which was clearly visible to people heading into the Downtown area. In addition, DERA's association with the more radical Anti poverty Committee (APC) indicates the organization's commitment to confrontation as a strategy for positive social change in the DTES. A key informant, speaking on behalf of DERA, spoke about the organization's belief that a radical approach is the only strategy that will bring the necessary pressure on the government to act on the issues of homelessness and lack of affordable housing, arguing that:

There have been a lot of different organizations down here that have been working to keep VANOC and the city and

the province accountable to their Olympic commitments. That is simply isn't doing anything. They're not. They completely buried the Housing Table report. The city is not enforcing it... So when that's the reaction to legitimate forms of pressure, I think that only leaves the more radical approaches to enforcement. And I think DERA has been a part of that and will continue to be a part of that because other tactics are simply not working.
(Interview, Key Informant, DERA, July, 2007)

With regards to the organization's stance toward the adoption of a community economic development approach, this informant further commented that, "I don't think that DERA is on the train at all of community development theory right now...DERA is not like that. And I think that is partly because of just the entrenched way that things have happened here, and also the chaos of working in the DTES." (Interview, Key Informant, DERA, July, 2007) A key informant with Carnegie Community Action Project, when asked if the organization was becoming more entrepreneurial in order to fund its political activities in the DTES, stated, "We're not doing that. If we had to do that we couldn't do our work...If you're raising money, if you're selling things, you're not doing political work." (Interview, Key Informant, CCAP, July, 2007) A key informant with EMBERS, a community-based economic development non-profit organization in the DTES, was asked about the significance of an entrepreneurial approach in relation to non-profit organizations. The informant commented:

I think it is true many organizations have had to become entrepreneurial in order to...because of the government funding just being not secure or drying up...This whole area of social enterprise development is huge. And now with non-profits, it's becoming bigger and bigger, but it is also a very difficult, difficult kind of task to undertake for a non-profit.
(Interview, Key Informant, EMBERS, July 2007)

This pressure to become entrepreneurial was similarly expressed by a key informant with a direct service organization in the DTES. This informant stated:

The problem is with the entrepreneurial stuff, that is a lot of what got us into trouble to begin with... We started doing this. We can't rely on the government. Fundraising is so competitive and we're not doing very well at it... We did a partnership with a property management organization... At the time we had some expertise in managing brick and board and building and maintenance and all of that stuff, and how could we leverage off that.
(Interview, Key Informant, St. James Community Service Society, July 2007)

A key informant with Portland Hotel Society (PHS) spoke about the social enterprise run by the organization called Potluck Café, and commented on the lack of adequate funds that this enterprise actually generates for its housing projects:

That one does actually ... It doesn't generate any money for us. But it generates, you know, about a million dollars and it does break even and it does leave a little bit of money to buy our residents here one meal a day. It's really not going to fund housing. So what it funds is one, a sandwich and a soup every day for our residents.
(Interview, Key Informant, PHS, July, 2007)

The comments from these informants clearly show that many of the non-profit organizations in the DTES are becoming more entrepreneurial in order to fund their activities, often due to reduced government funding. However, even when these organizations are involved in a social enterprise, the funding it generates is often inadequate to meet the organizations' needs for service provision. It is also apparent that operating a social enterprise leaves the organization little or no time to pursue a more political agenda. This seems to be a growing source of conflict for non-profit organizations in the DTES, resulting in a fragmentation of non-profit solidarity. A leading DTES activist and a former DERA organizer spoke candidly about the fracturing

of solidarity among the non-profit organizations in the DTES, stating:

Absolutely, there's a fracture. There's certainly nothing that I see that's a unifying force within existing community groups, and I am not saying they're all bad. Many of them are fabulous...but there is no coalescence behind the leadership...It's a very different story now. It's a different attitude. Also, we didn't believe in competing with others for funds. We went and did our stuff and we supported everyone else and now there are even organizations set up to tell the province who they should fund and not fund, you know, which is a complete breach of solidarity in my view.

Niche Strategies

Despite the fragmentation of non-profit solidarity in the DTES, there is a growing recognition among the non-profit service providers of the emergence of a different type of neighbourhood cohesion based on a respect for the diversity of activist strategies within the field of non-profit service organizations. This view is best expressed by an activist at Pivot Legal Society, who compared the network of non-profit organizations in the DTES to an “ecosystem”, stating:

I think what you'll see down here, it's like an ecosystem. So each organization has carved out a little niche within which they work. And so our niche is the law. APC's niche is direct action. DERA's niche is sort of a dial back direct action. And then a little bit softer core than that is the Carnegie Action Project. A little softer core than that is like the Urban Core Religious Service Providers Association where they're afraid, you know, to speak out so they'll lose provincial or federal funding. So it's a spectrum, but it is also an ecosystem in that a multiplicity of tactics is essential.
(Interview, Key Informant, Pivot Legal Society, July, 2007)

This informant further acknowledged that Pivot Legal Society's more moderate approach to community organizing based on legal advocacy has been aided greatly by the

political activism of the more radical non-profit organizations in the DTES, such as DERA and the Anti Poverty Committee (APC). The informant states that:

We couldn't do what we do without the DERAs and the APCs, the Carnegies... the groups that are far more conservative than us like the Urban Core group, we wouldn't have the information that we get through the Urban Core group. We wouldn't have the sort of moderate appearance that we have because there are people to the left of us...people who are more radical than us that make us seem moderate.

(Interview, Key Informant, Pivot Legal Society, July, 2007)

A key informant with DERA supported the above-noted comments when asked to speak about DERA's influence on other non-profit organizations in the DTES.

The informant stated:

I think people are kind of in their corners. You know they have their decision-making structures and their funding problems. They have their tactics that they're going to use and they have their lines. You know, I think in many ways DERA has created a space for people to be more outspoken because at least they're not DERA, at least they're not saying things like DERA, at least they're not seen as crazy as the Anti Poverty Committee

(Interview, Key Informant, DERA, July, 2007)

A key informant with Portland Hotel Society also spoke about the diversity of visions and viewpoints among the non-profit organizations in the DTES, but indicated as well the importance of solidarity among the competing 'voices', stating:

On any issue, the other part of community development is you need all the multiple voices...To me when we're trying to work out a strategy to get from A to B, we're thinking of the multiple voices...you need them all to be firing together to get things to happen. So we do try to make that happen. So I don't really think it's like one group or person. It's all those things together.

(Interview, Key Informant, PHS, July, 2007)

Coalitions and the Struggle against Olympic Displacement and Gentrification

A final theme that emerged from the analysis of the key informant interviews concerned the increasing reliance on coalitions among the non-profit organizations as a means of coordinating the diverse claims and visions existing in the DTES and creating a more unified political voice for marginalized residents of the DTES. Coalitions have become an increasingly important form of organized cooperation between the non-profit organizations in the DTES as a means of combating the loss of solidarity and of forging a unified political voice on behalf of the neighbourhood's marginalized residents. However, the building of these coalitions must take place within the competitive social service-oriented environment currently existing in the DTES. In addition, non-profit organizations are struggling with the issues of the loss of affordable housing stemming from the displacement of SRO tenants as result of Vancouver's hosting of the 2010 Winter Olympics and also from the ongoing process of gentrification. Animositities exist between those non-profit organizations that are taking an oppositional stance to the Olympics and those non-profit organizations that are taking a more neutral stance while seeking to leverage the greatest benefits that can be gained for the DTES. Despite these differences, however, a number of coalitions, formal and informal, have emerged from the effort to forge a new political voice for the DTES. These coalitions have been successful in pressuring government into providing concessions regarding the protection of social housing in advance of the 2010 Winter Olympics.

The key informant with Pivot Legal Society discussed the role that the organization plays with respect the building coalitions with other non-profit organizations in the DTES, stating:

What's not apparent just from the outside looking in is that there's this functioning coalition between all these different groups. Pivot has the advantage of being able to move between all the different groups quite fluidly. We do that. But there's the Save Low Income Housing Coalition, which is all the grassroots sort of more radical service providers. There's the Urban Core Service Providers Coalition, which is a religious-based coalition. There's the Impact of the Olympics on Community Coalition, which is sort of a more moderate Olympic coalition and then there's the 2010 Watch, which is the more radical. And we're involved in all of these groups. We sit on all these groups and talk with all these people. And there aren't many groups that do that. I think that's one of our strengths. That's what makes us quite strong, is that we're able to move between these various coalitions.

(Interview, Key Informant, Pivot Legal Society, July, 2007)

The coalition referred to in this quote, the Impact of the Olympics on Community Coalition (IOCC), a community-based grassroots coalition, was successful in pressuring Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC), into accepting the IOCC's recommendations for the protection of social housing, which are contained in the document, the 2010 Winter Games Inner-City Inclusive Commitment Statement. Besides the formal coalitions noted in this quote, the informant further spoke about the importance of informal coalitions in the DTES that can act strategically on specific issues:

When you're on the outside studying this neighbourhood, it looks like there's no coalition between the groups who are working down here, when actually many of the coalitions are not... they don't have a letterhead or a banner or a website or whatever. They are informal working coalitions where you can call each other and say there's this big thing coming up at city hall and we need to go out and everybody goes out and they line up and they talk in the mike and everybody's focused on a particular issue...so there's these less formal coalitions.

(Interview, Key Informant, Pivot Legal Society, July, 2007)

Chapter 6

Discussion, Implications and Conclusion

Introduction

This chapter presents a discussion of the research findings in this case study concerning community-based non-profit organizations within Vancouver's Downtown Eastside (DTES) and the efforts of these organizations to forge a new political voice on behalf of the most marginalized members of the community within the context of the pressures of gentrification and the potential for displacements/evictions of residents in advance of the 2010 Winter Olympics. The overall research approach to this case study involved an examination of community organizing strategies in the DTES during three distinct periods in the organizational life of the neighbourhood's most influential neighbourhood organization, the Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA). During the first two periods, from its birth in 1973 until the beginning of the 1990s, DERA was the most politically active non-profit organization in this low-income inner-city neighbourhood and its achievements in terms of social housing development and resident advocacy, as well as its oppositional stance to Expo '86 in Vancouver, are internationally renown. However, the rise of a service dependent resident population and the proliferation of numerous non-profit social service organizations since the early 1990s, have diminished DERA's political influence in the DTES. These developments justified an examination of the current efforts by the non-profit social service organizations to reclaim a political voice on behalf of the neighbourhood, in the face of ongoing process of neighbourhood revitalization/ gentrification and the threat of resident

displacement in advance of the 2010 Winter Olympics. Thus, the discussion of the research findings will follow this periodization approach, in order to better understand the current state of organizing in the DTES within the context of DERA's legacy of political activism. This chapter also includes the policy and practice implications of the research findings as well as a discussion of the generalizability of the findings to other low-income neighbourhoods. The chapter provides a conclusion which summarizes the study and provides comments regarding the potential for future research.

Community Organizing in the Downtown Eastside in the 1970s and 1980s- DERA's Legacy

As discussed in Chapter 4, DERA quickly gained recognition as an effective political voice on behalf of the marginalized population living in the DTES. The organization was successful in developing a large membership base comprised mainly of grassroots members of the neighbourhood. The organization itself was formed by DTES residents and was largely run as a grassroots organization. DERA adopted an ethic of self-help and a confrontational style of political representation. As a result of its loyal following at the grassroots level, DERA gained a degree of legitimacy that had not been achieved by any other neighbourhood association to that time in Vancouver. This legitimacy gave DERA the confidence to pursue a more confrontational approach in its representation of the interests of the DTES. DERA was successful in lobbying the municipal government to enforce building standards and codes against negligent landlords. At the same time, however, The Electors Action Movement (TEAM), then at the helm of municipal politics, instituted a regime of local area planning that provided for

input by local groups into the development of neighbourhood revitalization plans. While the change to local area planning appeared, on the surface, to satisfy the demands of grassroots groups for greater control over the trajectory of neighbourhood revitalization, a more critical view of TEAM's local area planning initiatives (Muller, 1985) suggests that local area planning also served as a means of channeling neighbourhood dissent, and depoliticizing tougher issues such as the lack of social housing and neighbourhood poverty. DERA's large grassroots membership provided the organization sufficient legitimacy to force the city to take greater steps to ensure enforcement of building codes and bylaws against SRO landlords, but arguably DERA was less effective in respect of its efforts to stem the loss of affordable housing in the DTES. The successes DERA achieved in ensuring bylaw enforcement against negligent landlords allowed the city to sidestep the more intractable problems affecting the neighbourhood. DERA's experience with the local area planning committee for the DTES was one of utter frustration, as the quote in Chapter 4 from former DERA organizer Libby Davies suggests. DERA's ethic of self-help was instrumental in raising the image of the DTES from a 'skid road' to "a beleaguered community where long neglected citizens maintained their dignity by struggling to improve their neighbourhood and themselves" (Sommers, 2001: p.227). However, the promotion of the DTES as a self-reliant community would later become the rationale for civic policies seeking to unload greater responsibility on local groups for neighbourhood improvement and social service provision.

DERA's effective community organizing tactics in the DTES during the 1970s empirically illustrates the main strategies identified in the community organizing literature that were characteristic of community-based organizations in low-income

neighbourhoods across North America during the 1970s. Firstly, DERA was formed by grassroots community members and quickly built a large membership base comprised of neighbourhood residents. In this way, DERA gained considerable credibility in its struggle to rid the DTES of its 'skid road' image and obtain material improvements to the neighbourhood. Secondly, DERA employed a confrontational approach in its dealings with government officials and concentrated on pragmatic issues such as enforcement of housing bylaws and standards against negligent landlords. DERA's efforts were aided by the change to a more participatory planning regime with the election of a TEAM majority at the municipal level. A major criticism leveled at this Alinsky-style of confrontational community organizing is that it is concerned with only short-term victories within the neighbourhood, rather than with seeking fundamental change in the distribution of power between the state and local social actors. Critics of the Alinsky-style community organizing argue that the pressure tactics employed by community-based organizations, such as DERA, are easily controlled by the state through official channels intended to regulate community dissent. Furthermore, these critics argue that governments, rather than fearing, actually applauded the efforts of these organizations to cultivate a culture of self-reliance within low-income neighbourhoods. These criticisms are valid to some extent in the case of DERA's organizing efforts in the DTES during the 1970s. Nevertheless, DERA's achievements on behalf of the most vulnerable neighbourhood residents ensured that the DTES would have a strong political voice and that the rights of its residents would no longer be ignored by governments at all levels. Furthermore, DERA's status as an effective mobilizer of collective protest remained intact entering

into the 1980s, and the challenges posed to social housing in the DTES resulting from the hosting of Expo '86 in Vancouver.

By the beginning of the 1980s DERA had gained a measure of respect in the eyes of civic officials and the election of two of its founders to city council helped to ensure that the problems relating to social housing, homelessness and poverty would make it onto the civic agenda. It was during the early 1980s that DERA achieved its greatest recognition for the cooperative housing projects that it constructed in the DTES. DERA had matured as an organization while it continued to build its grassroots membership. Thus, DERA entered a new phase of its existence as a collaborator with the city in providing social housing at a time when the provincial government in British Columbia was devolving more responsibility for social housing to municipal government. However, DERA's efforts to add to the DTES's dwindling non-market housing stock were being thwarted by the closure of many SRO hotels in the lead up to Expo '86. The provincial government of Bill Bennett viewed the hosting of Expo '86 as an opportunity to clear the DTES of its abundance of slum housing and to begin a process of gentrification through the construction of more market and mixed housing. DERA, as well as other community-based non-profit organizations, regarded Expo '86 as a threat to the neighbourhood's stock of SRO hotels. DERA's more respected position at the civic level convinced the city to join in its efforts to lobby the provincial government to pass rent freeze and no-eviction legislation. When this strategy failed, DERA began stepping up its media campaign to try to embarrass the provincial government and force both the provincial and municipal governments to take action to protect social housing in the DTES. It was this vigorous media campaign that brought international attention to

DERA and the problems of the DTES. DERA was successful in mobilizing its large membership, estimated at that time to be between 4,000-5,000 members, to attend numerous public rallies and protests to demand action from the provincial government for protection of the SRO hotels. While the media attention was of limited success regarding government action, DERA's media tactics were instrumental in demonstrating that marginalized members of the community could be mobilized to demand that government act to protect of their rights to affordable housing. DERA had succeeded in bypassing the government's official channels for neighbourhood dissent by placing the plight of DTES residents before the media. This tactic set an example for the non-profit organizations presently struggling with the same issue of the loss of affordable housing and potential tenant displacement in advance of the 2010 Winter Olympics.

By the end of the 1980s, DERA's position as the political voice of the DTES diminished due to the changes in the neighbourhood population, leading to a more service dependent resident population, with more severe addictions to drugs and alcohol. The rise in concentrated poverty led to a proliferation of non-profit social service providers and to greater competition between these organizations for funding. As mentioned in Chapter 4, it is Sommers argument that DERA began to act more as a brokerage agency primarily responsible for the management of funds from various sources. (Sommers, 1998)

In Chapter 2, the literature review discussed the changing relationship between the state and community-based non-profit organizations during the 1980s within the context of the retrenchment of state provision of social welfare and the rise of market-driven community economic development practices in low-income inner-city

neighbourhoods. In this context, low-income neighbourhoods became the focus of state-led and private sector revitalization efforts in order to attract private investment and stimulate competitive entrepreneurship in the private and non-profit sectors. These revitalization initiatives recast the role of community-based non-profit organizations as service providers to fill the gaps in social service provision for the growing population of marginalized service-dependent residents. The effect of this change in the role of neighbourhood-based non-profit organizations was the depoliticisation of the struggle for protection of the social rights of marginalized residents of these low-income neighbourhoods. Community-based non-profit organizations in many North American inner-city neighbourhoods welcomed greater government attention to the deteriorating social conditions in their neighbourhoods and readily accepted the devolution of greater responsibility for service provision. For example, a study conducted in New York City's Lower East Side regarding changes in community housing activism, concluded that "widespread community organizing found during the 1970s was replaced by community development and service delivery as community organizations changed strategy to survive devolution. Groups came to expect governmental inaction and devised a portfolio of community rebuilding self-help initiatives." (Bockmeyer, 2003: p.185)

The present study's examination of non-profit organizations in the DTES shows that, for much of the 1980s, DERA not only maintained its capacity for political agitation but it also expanded its influence and strengthened its credibility through the development of tenant-managed cooperative housing. It can be argued that DERA's involvement in social housing development supports Bockmeyer's argument that community-based organizations have abandoned community organizing and are

becoming professionalized social service providers. However, DERA benefited from the participatory planning approach to DTES revitalization espoused by the TEAM majority at the municipal level and seized the opportunity to develop its own housing initiatives. At the same time, Vancouver's hosting of Expo '86, a mega-event promoted by the provincial government as a means to kick-start the gentrification of the DTES, spurred DERA to continue its confrontational approach as illustrated by its effort to pressure the government to guarantee protection of social housing in the DTES. While Expo '86 represented a significant threat to the DTES and its stock of SRO housing, the oppositional response to the mega-event led by DERA allowed the organization to solidify its role as the political voice of the marginalized residents of the DTES. While DERA's political influence diminished by the late 1980s, it could be argued that this loss of influence was more the result of demographic change in the DTES owing to the influx of youth and young adults, the deepening of poverty, rising unemployment, addictions and mental illness. These demographic changes resulted in a more service-dependent population base that could not be readily mobilized for political action. Nevertheless, DERA's strong political voice on behalf of the residents of the DTES paved the way for an emerging field of non-profit organizations to organize for a renewed effort to assert a political voice for the DTES.

Political Rationalities of Revitalization Policies Affecting the Downtown Eastside

This section of the chapter presents the research findings that emerged from the analysis of the key governmental policy documents concerning the DTES. The first research question posed in Chapter 3 concerned the political rationalities underpinning

the main policy documents governing relations between the state non-profit organizations in the DTES and state strategies which give effect to its policy agenda for the neighbourhood. To answer this research question, the relevant policy documents were analyzed thematically drawing on the concepts of ‘governmentality’ and ‘responsibilization’ as analytical perspectives. As discussed in Chapter 4, an analysis of policy documents employing a governmentality perspective seeks to uncover the political rationalities or the moral justifications for governing the conduct of others. (Raco and Imrie, 2000) These rationalities are connected to “programmes of government which are evident through the language employed within written governmental policy statements.

Responsibilization, as previously discussed in Chapter 2, is a neoliberal governance strategy the objective of which is the transferring of responsibility for social welfare provision from the state to community-based non-profit organizations through such discourses and practices as partnership, collaboration and social entrepreneurship. These contemporary governance discourses and practices have underpinned efforts by the state to defuse neoliberal norms and practices, such as privatization, professionalization and efficiency, within the context of neighbourhood revitalization initiatives. The effect of these efforts is “to depoliticize urban governance practices and effectively discipline community organizations into forms of participation that are more manageable for the state.” (Elwood, 2002: p.123)

The analysis of the policy documents revealed two rationalities:

1. The importance of ensuring that the DTES is able to take advantage of the growing interest of private investors in commercial and residential development in the neighbourhood.
2. The necessity of managing worsening levels of poverty and social deprivation in the DTES.

The policy documents were analyzed to discern the techniques of government through which these rationalities are made effective. The analysis revealed professionalization of social service providers and the management of social housing as techniques of government. The policy documents refer to the establishment of partnerships between the municipal government and non-profit organizations in the DTES as a means of the government to utilize the expertise of the non-profit organizations. The documents also make reference to utilizing non-profit organizations to manage social housing, in particular supportive housing which is tied to social service provision.

Strategies of Non-Profit Organizations in the Downtown Eastside

The analysis of the key informant interviews revealed two main themes concerning the strategies of the non-profit organizations in the DTES in respect of their current efforts to pressure the government for protection of social housing and the possible displacement of residents for the 2010 Winter Olympics. The first theme concerns the capacity of the non-profit organizations to develop an area of expertise, or

as one informant had termed it, a ‘niche’, which allowed the diverse organizations in the DTES to overcome the fragmentation of non-profit solidarity arising from the competitive environment currently existing in the DTES.

Within this more inter-dependent environment, two of the non-profit organizations in this study have emerged as leading neighbourhood organizers for the current efforts by the non-profit organizations in the DTES to stem the losses of affordable housing. Pivot Legal Society has emerged as the organization that has gained the most credibility not only with among the other non-profit organizations in the DTES, but also with government agencies and the private sector. Pivot’s advocacy approach has positioned it as the principal advocate for the neighbourhood in the current fight against the potential displacement of SRO tenants arising from the hosting of the Winter Olympics. The organization has also taken a leading role the organization of the media campaign that has brought the current threats of displacement to international attention. At the same time, DERA remains a vital and politically active organization in the DTES having stepped up its confrontational tactics through its association with the more radical Anti Poverty Committee, an organization well known for its disruptive tactics and political agitation. DERA’s organized protest rallies have become critical to the current media campaign. In the interview with Pivot Legal Society’s key informant, the informant acknowledged that the organization could not be as effective in its own neighbourhood advocacy work without the other organizations in the DTES being equally effective in their respective areas of expertise.

Pivot Legal Society’s advocacy approach and DERA’s confrontational strategy are critical to the renewed efforts to create a political voice for the DTES. Their work has

also allowed the other non-profit organizations to develop their own 'niche' within the field of non-profit organizations in the DTES. In this respect, Portland Hotel Society has become a respected provider and developer of social housing and has been influential in the struggle to obtain municipal and provincial governments assurances for protection of social housing units in the DTES. While DERA's position as a social housing developer has greatly diminished since the late 1980s, Portland Hotel Society has filled in the gap regarding social housing provision at a crucial time when gentrification and resident displacement are threatening to severely reduce the levels of affordable housing in the DTES. St. James Community Service Society and Carnegie Community Action Project have also been active in the areas of supportive housing and social service provision through a wide range of support services for low-income residents in the DTES.

With the increasing importance of a community economic development approach to neighbourhood revitalization in the DTES, the work of EMBERS has created employment and business development opportunities for residents of the DTES as a means of taking advantage of the government's focus on local economic development. However, as explained in the interview with EMBERS informant, the organization approaches CED more holistically by assisting marginalized residents of the DTES to develop skills and capacities to participate in the local economy of the DTES. The hope is that residents take greater ownership of the neighbourhood and a sense of individual empowerment through employment or engaging in entrepreneurial initiatives. The CED approach is not supported by some non-profit organizations which contend that entrepreneurialism places the burden of responsibility for revitalization of the DTES on marginalized residents and their supporting non-profit service organizations. Despite this

concern, EMBERS approach to CED has brought government non-profit and private sector funding and expertise together to assist residents of the DTES to take greater control over the economic fortunes of the DTES and “counter outsiders’ perceptions of the neighbourhood.” (Lo and Halseth, 2007: p. 26)

The second theme which emerged from the key informant interviews is the importance of formal and informal coalitions of non-profit organizations, which serve as a further means for these community-based non-profit organizations to overcome the fragmentation of their solidarity in the DTES. The neighbourhood is facing two separate issues at this time: the potential displacement of residents in advance of the Olympics and the longer term threat of gentrification. In the interview with the informant from Pivot Legal Society, the informant stressed the importance of informal coalitions between the various neighbourhood organizations as a strategy for social action. According to this informant, these coalitions are very ad hoc, which enables the coalition to react quickly to political developments adversely affecting the interests of residents of the DTES. Due to their ad hoc nature, these informal coalitions may pose difficulties for empirical investigation. Nevertheless, any future research should address the question of their effectiveness as an organizing strategy to overcome the fragmentation of non-profit solidarity. It is arguable that the strategic nature of these informal coalitions provides the non-profit organizations with the capacity to initiate political action despite attempts by the state to regulate and depoliticize their demands for protection of the social welfare rights of the marginalized residents of the DTES.. The long-term stability of these strategic coalitions remains questionable. The threat posed by the ongoing gentrification of the DTES may require a more stable coalition of organizations to have any degree of

success in halting the gentrification process. An example of a more formal coalition that was mentioned during the interviews is the Save Low Income Housing Coalition. This coalition has successfully drawn together a diverse range of non-profit interests in the DTES and appears to have the necessary stability to effectively respond to the threat of resident displacement and the loss of affordable housing in the ongoing plan for gentrification of the DTES.

Policy and Practice Implications of Research Findings

In this section, the policy and practice implication of the research findings are discussed. The practice implications are discussed in relation to the major themes concerning strategies of non-profit organizations which emerged from the key informant interviews. This section also discusses potential urban policy implications which are relevant to current and future initiatives for revitalization of the DTES. The issue of the generalizability of the research findings to other low-income neighbourhoods is also considered.

The first theme that emerged from the research relates to the development of 'niches' or areas of expertise among the non-profit organizations in the DTES. Within the current competitive social service environment in the DTES, the main non-profit organizations have developed a network form of neighbourhood governance that depends on each organization becoming effective within their respective area of expertise. While there is a danger that antagonisms between the organizations may increase within the present competitive funding environment, this study indicates that multiple activist strategies, such as direct action, advocacy, and service provision, can be successfully

supported within the non-profit community in this low-income neighbourhood. A supportive environment for multiple approaches to community organizing is critical to the current efforts of these organizations to reclaim an effective political voice for the DTES. Alternative funding organizations can assist in fostering this network of strong non-profit organizations through the funding of multiple organizations thereby lessening competition for funds.

The second theme that emerged from this research relates to the development of formal and informal coalitions between the various non-profit organizations in the DTES. The formal coalitions, such as Save Low Income Housing Coalition and the IOCC, have brought together several of the non-profit organizations in the current struggle to prevent the loss of affordable housing and gain protections from the various levels of government for the housing rights of residents of the DTES. In addition, the research found that several of the non-profit organizations had organized informal coalitions formed on an ad hoc basis to quickly respond to political developments affecting the interests of residents of the DTES. The formal coalitions have enabled the non-profit organizations to sustain political pressure on governments for guarantees regarding the protection of social housing in the DTES. The IOCC has been effective in obtaining written promises from the government for protection of SRO housing in advance of the 2010 Winter Olympics. While more research is necessary to gauge the effectiveness of the informal coalitions between non-profit organizations, the informal coalitions appear to be an important method of mobilizing non-profit organizations that have common goals and interests. Furthermore, the informal coalitions can be more open to disruptive tactics which can

gain media attention while not jeopardizing the reputation and funding of the other non-profit organizations in the DTES.

With respect to the policy implications arising from the research findings, this study reviewed several government policy documents governing the revitalization plans for the DTES. These policy documents emphasize the importance of non-profit organizations mainly in the area of social service provision. This research has shown that a strong element of political resistance exists within formal and informal coalitions of non-profit organizations in the DTES. These coalitions have successfully pressured the various levels of government to provide written concessions for protection of social housing. All further neighbourhood revitalization policies for the DTES should formally recognize the vitality and legitimacy of the non-profit organizations as representatives of the residents of the DTES.

The implications of the research findings should be viewed within the context of the unique history of community organizing and political action in the DTES. It can be argued that DERA's legacy of confrontational neighbourhood organizing has created a space for other non-profit organizations to engage in political agitation as an effective strategy for asserting the rights of marginalized residents of the DTES. In addition, the high concentration of non-profit organizations in the DTES has allowed some organizations to devote their energies toward political protest while relieving the other organizations from such activity and the consequent possibility of the withdrawal of funding. The presence of a more socially progressive funding organization, such as VanCity Credit Union, has also allowed non-profit organizations in the DTES to rely less on government funding, further enabling their capacity for confrontational organizing

strategies. All of these factors have created a unique opportunity for non-profit organizations in the DTES to be more effective in advancing their claims for government protections related to the social housing rights of neighbourhood residents. For example, the organizations have been successful in obtaining written promises from the provincial government for the protection of social housing in advance of the 2010 Winter Olympics. The government has purchased at least 15 SRO hotels for management by local non-profit organizations, thereby preventing their destruction or conversion to market-housing prior to the Olympics. In light of these unique set of circumstance existing in the DTES, the research findings may not be generalizable to low-income neighbourhoods with few non-profit organizations and to neighbourhoods with organizations that have little access to alternative sources of funding. Nevertheless, gentrification has become a popular state-driven form of neighbourhood revitalization in many North American cities. Therefore, many low-income neighbourhoods are facing similar threats of resident displacement and loss of social housing. The strategies employed by the non-profit organizations in the DTES for overcoming fragmentation of solidarity and for the formation of strategic coalitions may still be effective as forms of organized resistance to the gentrification process in other low-income neighbourhoods. According to Olds, “the critical prerequisite for any action to occur on housing rights issues is the presence of an organized, strategic and resourceful coalition of community-based groups which have the *capacity* to analyze complex situations, act forcefully at a variety of levels, and use diverse strategies in order to take advantage of key ‘openings’ when seeking to achieve their goals.” (Olds, 1998: p. 41)

Suggestions for Future Research

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the DTES witnessed a change in the demographic makeup of its resident population, beginning in the late 1980s, with the influx of younger adults and of individuals with multiple social problems such as alcoholism, drug addiction and mental illness. Consequently, a larger proportion of the DTES resident population was rendered unfit for political mobilization and self-organization due to their severe addictions and disabilities. The loss of the capacity for neighbourhood self-organization in the DTES has meant that the non-profit organizations have become the primary advocates for this service-dependent population. It is proposed that a comparison study could be undertaken which contrasts the role of non-profit organizations in the DTES with that of non-profit organizations in a neighbourhood where residents have a high capacity for self-organization.

A second possible study involves the larger question of land use within the Vancouver area. The scarcity of land for further residential development within the Vancouver region and the desirability of Vancouver as an urban environment have underpinned the current drive to gentrify the DTES. The claims of low-income residents to continue residing in the DTES have come up against the more powerful interests of private developers and governments interested in the economic prosperity of the neighbourhood. A study could be conducted that compares the effect of land use in the Vancouver region on the claims by low-income residents for housing in the DTES with another desirable urban center where there is no constraints on the amount of land available for development.

Conclusion

This case study has examined the efforts of non-profit organizations in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside to forge a political voice on behalf of the marginalized residents of this inner-city neighbourhood. The study has examined three distinct periods in the history of the most well-known neighbourhood organization in the DTES, the Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA). DERA's efforts to give a voice to the community, long neglected by government inaction, were largely successful during the 1970s and 1980s because DERA promoted an ethic of self-help and was able to gather a large grassroots membership that could be mobilized for collective action. However, as this study has shown, the changing composition of the resident population of the DTES resulted in a greater concentration of poverty and social problems and the proliferation of social service non-profit organizations. This change in the nature of the neighbourhood population requires new strategies to combat government efforts to institute a market-based community development in the DTES. Policy initiatives at the municipal level have stressed the importance of establishing partnerships with the non-profit organizations and of encouraging the organizations to become more entrepreneurial. In essence, the non-profit organizations have become more responsible for delivery of social services to a needy population while at the same time, they are becoming responsible for initiating entrepreneurial endeavors to fund their activities and ensure the neighborhood is able to take advantage of the promised economic benefits arising from the 2010 Winter Olympics. These pressures have placed much strain on the non-profit organizations in the DTES and this has led to serious fragmentation in non-

profit solidarity and a diminished political voice for marginalized neighbourhood residents.

This study has also examined the strategies that the current network of non-profit organizations have implemented in order to reclaim the political voice for the community. The emergence of a more moderate legal advocacy organization has quickly established itself as an anchor organization and a coordinator of non-profit political action, particularly in respect of the threat posed to the neighbourhood's social housing and the potential displacement of low-income residents in advance of the 2010 Winter Olympics. While DERA's political influence has waned, it has stepped-up its confrontational tactics and this has served to bring greater media attention to the current struggle to protect the neighbourhood's social housing. The emergence of informal coalitions between various organizations, although difficult to research empirically, may very well provide the type of strategic action required to be an effective political voice for the DTES. However, the strategic nature of these coalitions could make them too unstable to be effective in respect of the longer-term threat posed by the gentrification of the DTES. Further research on these coalitions after the end of the 2010 Olympics could be conducted to determine their stability and effectiveness.

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APPENDIX 'A'

June 29, 2007

INFORMATION LETTER

Dear

I am a graduate student in the Master's program in the Department of Sociology at the University of Manitoba. I have recently received approval from my thesis committee to proceed with my thesis research. My thesis supervisor is Professor Rodney Kueneman. This letter is an invitation to consider participating in my thesis research. I would like to provide you with more information about this study and what your involvement would entail if you decide to participate.

My thesis research concerns the efforts of community-based organizations to self-organize and assert autonomy over the planning and implementation of their own development initiatives. A growing number of community-based organizations are looking at the formation of partnerships with the state and private sector as a means of enhancing their resource base for the pursuit of their own local initiatives. In addition, these same organizations regard these partnerships as providing them with greater legitimacy within local community politics. Critics of these partnerships argue that they threaten the autonomy of community-based organizations through the cooptation of their own initiatives by a local development agenda which forces these organizations to become social service delivery specialists.

Despite the criticisms of these collaborative partnerships, several community-based organizations have still managed to develop and implement innovative local social service delivery initiatives. My study will involve an exploratory analysis of the institutional and power relations that have contributed to shaping the practices of these community-based organizations in the context of their own local initiatives.

I have conducted an extensive review of the literature on community-led development and it is apparent that the bulk of research in this field has centered on the Province of Quebec, through the research of Eric Shragge. While his research is important for understanding the role of community-based organizations in assisting local residents to self-organize and take control of their own initiatives, it is apparent to me that there has been little similar research done within Vancouver's Downtown Eastside. The time is especially ripe for such research in this community due to the pressure of gentrification in preparation for the 2010 Olympics. It is my belief that your organization can contribute a wealth of practical knowledge and insight on how community-led development is experienced "on the ground."

Participation in this study is voluntary. It will involve an interview of approximately 1 to 1 1/2 hours in length and will take place at a mutually agreed upon location. The participant may decline to answer any of the interview questions if he or she so wishes. Further, the participant may decide to withdraw from this study at any time without negative consequences by advising the researcher. With the participant's permission, the interview will be tape-recorded to facilitate collection of information for later analysis. Shortly after the interview has been completed, I will provide the participant with a summary of the interview to confirm the accuracy of our conversation

and to add or clarify any points that he or she wishes. All information provided by the participant is considered confidential. Names will not appear in any thesis or report resulting from this study and participant names will not be revealed to any other participants. However, since the research is being conducted in a small community setting, the researcher cannot guarantee the anonymity of the participants. With the participant's permission, anonymous quotations may be used. Data collected during this study will be retained until final completion of the thesis, anticipated to be the end of December, 2007. All information collected will be stored in a locked cabinet at the researcher's residence or at the office of the researcher's thesis advisor. Only researchers associated with this study will have access. The final thesis report will be distributed among the researcher's thesis committee members and will also be available to all participant organizations through the Elizabeth Dafoe Library at the University of Manitoba. An Executive Summary of the research findings will be sent to each participant organization to confirm the accuracy of the conversation and to add or clarify any points that he or she wishes. There are no known or anticipated risks to the participant in this study.

The research findings resulting from this study are expected to contribute to the body of theoretical knowledge regarding the practices and strategizing dynamics of social economy organizations for control of their own local development initiatives. In addition, the research is expected to provide the participant organizations with practical insight into the distribution of power between the local government and community-based voluntary organizations. This insight may lead to changes in the social delivery practices of these organizations in order to assert greater control over their own initiatives and to advance their social mission for democratic local development.

I intend to travel to Vancouver in July to conduct a series of interviews with the appropriate individuals in several organizations in the Downtown Eastside. Due to time and funding constraints, I would like to schedule as many interviews as possible in the approximately 3 weeks that I expect to be in Vancouver. Accordingly, I would like appreciate if you could provide me with dates in July when you would be available for an interview. I would also appreciate if you could also forward any written materials that you think would be beneficial for me to review by e-mail prior to July 5th.

If you wish to discuss my intended research by phone, I would be pleased to provide you with any further information you require. My phone number is

If you wish, you can also contact Professor Rodney Kueneman, my thesis advisor. His phone number is

I hope that the results of my study will be of benefit to those organizations directly involved in the study, as well as to the broader research community.

I look forward to hearing from you shortly.

Allan Weinshenker
Master's student- Sociology
University of Manitoba

APPENDIX 'B'

Interview Protocol

Organizational Characteristics

- 1. Please tell me about your organization? What does your organization do?**
2. Could you tell me how your organization was formed? When was your organization formed? By whom was the organization formed?
3. What is the structure of the organization? What is the membership of the organization?
4. What is the size of the organization?
5. What are the sources of funding for the organization?
6. What is your role in the organization? What is your educational background? Work history? How did you become involved in the organization? In the project?

Organizational Values and Ideology

- 7. I'm interested in knowing about the values of the organization? Could you talk about the values of the organization?**
8. What are the goals of the organization?
9. What impact have co-operative principles had on the initiative?

Organizational Undertaking

- 10. Could you describe for me how the organization accomplished the project?**
11. Who were the stakeholders in the project?
12. Were there any partnerships formed to complete the project? If so, with whom did your organization partner? What other organizations were involved in the project?

13. How much involvement did the government have in the conceiving and implementation of the project? What levels of government were involved? How much funding for the project came from government sources?
14. Whose idea was the project? How much input for drawing up the plans for the project came from expert or professional sources? Who hired the professionals?
15. How much input came from the grassroots? Organizational members? Were organizational members or other community members encouraged to participate in the project?
16. How would you describe the project in terms of innovation? Did any part of the project depart from the recommendations of professionals?
17. What particular problem was being addressed by this project? For whose benefit was the initiative undertaken? Would you describe the initiative as a success or did it adequately address the problem?
18. In what way has your organization created a permanent record of how this project was accomplished? Has any documentary record been kept? Have any of the documents been shared with other organizations about the initiative?

Community Development

19. What does the term “community development” mean to you?

20. How do you see your organization playing a role in promoting community development?
21. Would you associate community development with entrepreneurialism? How would you define entrepreneurialism? Do you see your organization as entrepreneurial?
22. Are you familiar with the term ‘social entrepreneurship’? Could you describe how this project and your organization may be considered as promoting social entrepreneurship?
23. How important were ‘market competitiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ to the completion of the project? To the goals of your organization?
24. In what way have the values of your organization helped or hindered the completion of the project? Have those values contributed to greater participation of members in the project? How much has the organizational structure (whether it is a co-operative or non-profit organization) helped or hindered the project?

Impact of Organizational Initiative on Community Development

- 25. How would you describe the impact of this project on the way community development is being implemented?**
26. How has this initiative improved the way community development is taking place?
27. Can you identify any changes in how government or other organizations conduct community development in light of your organizations undertaking?

Other Thoughts and Ideas

28. Is there anything about the interview or any related topic that you would like to add?
29. Do you have anything else that you would like to share?

APPENDIX 'C'

June 29, 2007

INFORMATION LETTER

Dear

I am a graduate student in the Master's program in the Department of Sociology at the University of Manitoba. I have recently received approval from my thesis committee to proceed with my thesis research. My thesis supervisor is Professor Rodney Kueneman. This letter is an invitation to consider participating in my thesis research. I would like to provide you with more information about this study and what your involvement would entail if you decide to participate.

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Despite the criticisms of these collaborative partnerships, several community-based organizations have still managed to develop and implement innovative local social service delivery initiatives. My study will involve an exploratory analysis of the institutional and power relations that have contributed to shaping the practices of these community-based organizations in the context of their own local initiatives.

I have conducted an extensive review of the literature on community-led development and it is apparent that the bulk of research in this field has centered on the Province of Quebec, through the research of Eric Shragge. While his research is important for understanding the role of community-based organizations in assisting local residents to self-organize and take control of their own initiatives, it is apparent to me that there has been little similar research done within Vancouver's Downtown Eastside. The time is especially ripe for such research in this community due to the pressure of gentrification in preparation for the 2010 Olympics. It is my belief that your organization can contribute a wealth of practical knowledge and insight on how community-led development is experienced "on the ground."

Participation in this study is voluntary. It will involve an interview of approximately 1 to 1 1/2 hours in length and will take place at a mutually agreed upon location. The participant may decline to answer any of the interview questions if he or she so wishes. Further, the participant may decide to withdraw from this study at any time without negative consequences by advising the researcher. With the participant's permission, the interview will be tape-recorded to facilitate collection of information for later analysis. Shortly after the interview has been completed, I will provide the participant with a summary of the interview to confirm the accuracy of our conversation

and to add or clarify any points that he or she wishes. All information provided by the participant is considered confidential. Names will not appear in any thesis or report resulting from this study and participant names will not be revealed to any other participants. However, since the research is being conducted in a small community setting, the researcher cannot guarantee the anonymity of the participants. With the participant's permission, anonymous quotations may be used. Data collected during this study will be retained until final completion of the thesis, anticipated to be the end of December, 2007. All information collected will be stored in a locked cabinet at the researcher's residence or at the office of the researcher's thesis advisor. Only researchers associated with this study will have access. The final thesis report will be distributed among the researcher's thesis committee members and will also be available to all participant organizations through the Elizabeth Dafoe Library at the University of Manitoba. An Executive Summary of the research findings will be sent to each participant organization to confirm the accuracy of the conversation and to add or clarify any points that he or she wishes. There are no known or anticipated risks to the participant in this study.

The research findings resulting from this study are expected to contribute to the body of theoretical knowledge regarding the practices and strategizing dynamics of social economy organizations for control of their own local development initiatives. In addition, the research is expected to provide the participant organizations with practical insight into the distribution of power between the local government and community-based voluntary organizations. This insight may lead to changes in the social delivery practices of these organizations in order to assert greater control over their own initiatives and to advance their social mission for democratic local development.

I intend to travel to Vancouver in July to conduct a series of interviews with the appropriate individuals in several organizations in the Downtown Eastside. Due to time and funding constraints, I would like to schedule as many interviews as possible in the approximately 3 weeks that I expect to be in Vancouver. Accordingly, I would like appreciate if you could provide me with dates in July when you would be available for an interview. I would also appreciate if you could also forward any written materials that you think would be beneficial for me to review by e-mail prior to July 5th.

If you wish to discuss my intended research by phone, I would be pleased to provide you with any further information you require. My phone number is ()

. If you wish, you can also contact Professor Rodney Kueneman, my thesis advisor. His phone number is

I hope that the results of my study will be of benefit to those organizations directly involved in the study, as well as to the broader research community.

I look forward to hearing from you shortly.

Allan Weinshenker
Master's student- Sociology
University of Manitoba

APPENDIX 'D'

CONSENT FORM

Research Project Title: Social Economy Organizations and Their Struggle for Autonomy within Local Development Initiatives: Using Grounded Theory and Institutional Ethnography

Researcher(s): Student Researcher: Allan Weinshenker
Advisor: Professor Rodney Kueneman

This consent form, a copy of which will be left with you for your records and reference, is only part of the process of informed consent. It should give you the basic idea of what the research is about and what your participation will involve. If you would like more detail about something mentioned here, or information not included here, you should feel free to ask. Please take the time to read this carefully and to understand any accompanying information.

This thesis research concerns the efforts of community-based organizations to self-organize and assert autonomy over the planning and implementation of their own development initiatives. The study will involve an exploratory analysis of the institutional and power relations that have contributed to shaping the practices of these community-based organization in the context of their own local initiatives. The bulk of research in this field has centered on the Province of Quebec. It is apparent that there has been little similar research done within Vancouver's Downtown Eastside.

Participation in this study is voluntary. It will involve an interview of approximately 1 to 1 1/2 hours in length with the appropriate representative of your organization and will take place at a mutually agreed upon location. There are no known or anticipated risks to the participant in this study. With the participant's permission, the interview will be tape-recorded to facilitate collection of information for later analysis. All information provided by the participant is considered confidential. Names will not appear in any thesis or report resulting from this study and participant names will not be revealed to any other participants. However, since the research is being conducted in a small community setting, the researcher cannot guarantee the anonymity of the participants. With the participant's permission, anonymous quotations may be used. Data collected during this study will be retained until final completion of the thesis, anticipated to be the end of December, 2007. All information collected will be stored in a locked cabinet at the researcher's residence or at the office of the researcher's thesis advisor. Only researchers associated with this study will have access. The final thesis report will be distributed among the researcher's thesis committee members and will also be available to all participant organizations through the Elizabeth Dafoe Library at the University of Manitoba. An Executive Summary of the research findings will be sent to each participant organization to confirm the accuracy of the conversation and to add or clarify any points that he or she wishes. At the completion of the study, the researcher will provide the participant organization with an executive summary of the research findings and recommendations. Should the participant also require a copy of the executive summary, please provide an e-mail address at the end of this form. No remuneration or compensation is to be provided to research participants.

The research findings resulting from this study are expected to contribute to the body of theoretical knowledge regarding the practices and strategizing dynamics of social economy

organizations for control of their own local development initiatives. In addition, the research is expected to provide the participant organizations with practical insight into the distribution of power between the local government and community-based voluntary organizations. This insight may lead to changes in the social delivery practices of these organizations in order to assert greater control over their own initiatives and to advance their social mission for democratic local development.

Your signature on this form indicates that you have understood to your satisfaction the information regarding participation in the research project and agree to participate as a subject. In no way does this waive your legal rights nor release the researchers, sponsors, or involved institutions from their legal and professional responsibilities. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time, and /or refrain from answering any questions you prefer to omit, without prejudice or consequence. Your continued participation should be as informed as your initial consent, so you should feel free to ask for clarification or new information throughout your participation.

Principal Researcher: Allan Weinshenker
Master's Student – Department of Sociology
University of Manitoba

Advisor: Professor Rodney Kueneman
Department of Sociology
University of Manitoba

This research has been approved by the Psychology/Sociology Research Ethics Board. If you have any concerns or complaints about this project you may contact any of the above-named persons or the Human Ethics Secretariat at 474-7122, or e-mail margaret_bowman@umanitoba.ca. A copy of this consent form has been given to you to keep for your records and reference.

Participant's Signature

Date

Researcher and/or Delegate's Signature

Date

Participant's e-mail address