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CONVERGENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES:

THE GREEK CASE

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CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

2.

Political parties are popular subjects of research among social scientists. There are many scholars who have done a great deal of academic work analysing the institution of political parties from political, sociological, economic, historical and psychological perspectives, on national or on cross-cultural levels. This is not surprising. There is no doubt that political parties are the major social institution through which political action occurs in developed and in most underdeveloped political systems.<sup>1</sup>

As Roy C. Macridis observes,

"It is generally taken as axiomatic that no political system can exist without political parties."<sup>2</sup>

In fact, all types of political systems rely on political parties: democratic pluralist societies, to articulate and aggregate demands; "totalitarian societies" to mobilize support; traditional societies in a transitional period, to create and "structure new norms of behavior."<sup>3</sup> Almond and Powell go on to observe that political parties are now found almost universally around the world and that this empirical fact is be-

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<sup>1</sup>Curtis Michael, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introductory Essay in Political Science (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968), p. 135.

<sup>2</sup>Roy C. Macridis, Political Parties (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 9.

<sup>3</sup>Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 74.



yond serious dispute;

"Totalitarian or democratic, developed or modernizing, large or small, modern nations have turned to the political party as an essential institution of the political system."<sup>4</sup>

Political parties are essential institutions of any system not only because they affect the socio-political environment but also because they reflect to a large extent changes within society. This is very clear today, with the complexity of our society imposing close interrelations among the institutions of the system.

In fact one can distinguish a recent important development of political parties, which began to take place after World War II. This contemporary stage of development has to do with the convergence of the nature of this institution.

"After World War II, and more notably in the last decade, all political parties of the Western world and of the industrially advanced societies began to display some novel characteristics; they began to lose their ideological character. All parties became brokers of a society that because of progressive industrialization became divided into many social, professional, occupational, and interest groups. Therefore, parties become both more representative and reformist; they deal with ad hoc problems and search for ad hoc solutions; that is to say, they become programmatic. No longer is an attempt made to resolve issues by an appeal to total solutions involving the economic or social structure of the society, but rather by careful compromises and incremental changes. The ideologue in favor of the manipulator and the visionary leader in favor of the cautions representative."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 915.

<sup>5</sup>Roy C. Macridis, op. cit., p. 13.

This recent development of political parties will be the major focus of our work. Given the significant role of the institution in our society, it is not only interesting but worthwhile to examine and analyse it. Furthermore, given the ever-changing nature of human society this piece constitutes not only a study of political parties in general but also a sort of case study of this institution in the context of the present. More concretely we will analyse the recent development of political parties in Greece, in an effort to examine the relevance of the concept of convergence in this case.

#### A Brief Background to the Development of Political Parties

We first encounter some sort of party in the Greek "polis", where citizens formed groups to support political leaders in the "agora". Apparently these never took the form of well organized parties. They were rather spontaneous gatherings of people with the same interests who were authorizing a statesman to represent their interests; in exchange for this they offered to him their votes.

During medieval times the social and political structure did not allow any formation of political parties. In fact, only a small group of privileged citizens affected the process of policy making while the majority of people had no opportunity to contribute to this process. It was this absence of mass participation in politics which prevented the development of political parties. However, in the Italian city-states as well as in the Byzantine Empire, there were some political factions, which had the form of political parties.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Bakojannis, P., Parties in the Representative Democracy in per. "Syntagma", Vol. 2 (Athens, Sakoulas, 1976), p. 616.

Between the 13th and 17th centuries some forms of political parties emerged which were synonymous with a cabal or had special relationships with the monarch.<sup>7</sup> In fact, given the political structure, their main function was to provide administrators for the governmental apparatus. This was due to the fact that the number of administrative positions increased a great deal as time passed and consequently the monarch's capacity to deal with them declined proportionately.

The decline of monarchial authority under the pressure of revolutionary movements and the extension of the franchise were important factors in the development of political parties. However, one can identify the first stable representative groups in England during the 17th -18th century:<sup>8</sup> Tories and Whigs. These two parties adapted to the ideas of accepting each other's functions and existence and limiting their competition in the polls, at all times remaining far from violence.<sup>9</sup>

The greatest development of political parties occurred in the decades preceding the end of the nineteenth century and was bound up, as Maurice Duverger observes,

"...with the rise of parliamentary groups and electoral committees.... The more political assemblies see their functions and independence grow, the more their members feel the need to group themselves according to what they have in common, so as to act in concert."<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup>Roy C. Macridis, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>8</sup>Bakojanis, P., op. cit., p. 617.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 618.

<sup>10</sup>Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1967), pp. xxiii-xxiv.

In other words the parliament was the predecessor of political parties and not the political parties of the parliament as one might find logical.<sup>11</sup> Thus it is obvious that the entire development of political parties is linked with democracy, that is to say with the extension of popular suffrage and parliamentary prerogatives. This does not mean that Duverger and other scholars, who underline this important factor, disregard the role of other organisations which originated outside parliament in the activities of social organisations. Duverger does take into consideration the interrelations between the groups which originated in parliament and those which did not. According to him, as the suffrage was extended, it became necessary to organize the electors by means of committees capable of making the candidates known and campaigning on their behalf. Generally speaking, first there was the creation of parliamentary groups then the appearance of electoral committees, and finally the establishment of a permanent connection between the two: a political party.

It is generally accepted that outside of parliament, many different organizations have encouraged the creation of political parties. Many parties, with a social reform orientation have their origins in trade unions (e.g. the British Labour party). Other parties have originated through churches and religious sects (e.g. the Anti-Revolutionary party in Netherlands by the Calvinists).<sup>12</sup> Others, mainly left wing parties, have emerged from various student groups. Illegal and consequently clandestine groups, unable to function on the parliamentary plane, tend

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<sup>11</sup>P. Bakojannis, *op. cit.*, p. 617.

<sup>12</sup>M. Duverger, *op. cit.*, p. xxxi.

to change into political parties when the legal ban is lifted (e.g. the Russian Communist, the French Mouvement Republicain Populaire).<sup>13</sup> Finally, political parties have also been formed by the actions of industrial and commercial groups (e.g. the Canadian Conservative Party.)<sup>14</sup>

There are other causes for the emergence of political parties, which seem to us to be more relevant today, since parliament is unlikely to play this kind of role after all these years. Kay Lawson indicates some of these other origins of political parties<sup>15</sup>: They originated inside other parties as in the case of "Manifesto" in Italy from the Communist Party (P.S.I.) in 1969; political parties rise can also be linked to several types of crises: legitimacy crises—when the existing governmental system and its rules for electing leaders seem to be challenged, as in the case of the emergence of pro-monarchist parties in Greece after the ousting of monarchy; participation crises—when changes in the patterns of economic system demand the admittance of new strata into the process of political decision-making, as in the case of the parties of "arabic-socialism" mainly in Syria and Iraq; crises of territorial integration as in the case of E.T.A. in Spain.

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<sup>13</sup>M.R.P. (People's Republican Party) became a party after the end of "Resistance" in 1945. Ibid., p. xxxiii.

<sup>14</sup>The Canadian Conservative party emerged in 1854 as E.H. Underhill demonstrates, from the activities of the Bank of Montreal, the Grand Trunk Railway and Montreal "big business". E.H. Underhill in "Encyclopedia of Political Science", cited, ibid., xxxiv.

<sup>15</sup>Kay Lawson, The Comparative Study of Political Parties (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), p.226.

In conclusion, we should point out that all these patterns of the origins of political parties cannot be isolated from each other. Given the complexity of society there cannot be exclusive patterns for the rise of political parties. For example, we cannot say that the emergence of E.T.A. in Spain or the other separatist groups originate exclusively in crises of territorial integration. Apparently there were other economic, social, political and psychological reasons for the rise of these parties. That is, in the process of the emergence of a political party there can be a combination of factors contributing to this process.

#### Constitutional Status

Despite the long history and the obvious importance of political parties as an institution in any political system, there has been considerable hesitation on the part of written constitutions to recognize political parties. In fact it was only after World War II that the European constitutions started to contain positive recognition of the political parties. The vanguard of this recognition, though not clearly so, was the Italian constitution in 1948. One year later the Constitution of the German Federal Republic recognized political parties as the main factor in the formation "of the political will of the people" and consequently "they may be freely formed" (Article 21).<sup>16</sup> Article 4 of the constitution of the Fifth Republic (October 4, 1958) contains a similar regulation.<sup>17</sup> In Greece the constitutional recognition of

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<sup>16</sup> Steven Muller (ed.), Documents on European Government (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 22.

<sup>17</sup> Lowell G. Noonan, France: The Politics of Continuity in Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1970), p. 472.

political parties took place only very recently. In 1975, for the first time in Greek constitutional history, the new constitution recognized political parties as an institution of democracy (Article 29).

This constitutional development marks a considerable step forward toward the legitimacy of political parties. There had previously been a strong detestation of them, a reaction which is certainly as old as the history of political parties. It was not only rooted in historical or political reasons such as the preservation of monarchies, since the rise of political parties and the proliferation of parliaments had meant the disappearance or at least limitation in monarchical powers.

It was also rooted in theoretical - philosophical writings of the 16th - 19th centuries. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) argued that the civil rights of citizens must be "united as a person by a common power"; the will of the "common power", the sovereign will must include and involve the will of everyone, so the will of one citizen was compounded "of the forces of all the citizens together."<sup>18</sup> Later on, Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) claimed that the citizens must obey only the law of society, which has been accepted by them officially in the social contract. It is obvious that in theories like these there is no room for legitimacy of political parties which would not only divide the citizens but would also ruin the whole society since the citizens would no longer obey only the social contract. Furthermore, these theories along with the divinity of the state in the Hegelian system, the use of nationalist theories and a static, abstract consideration of the "common good" created a hostile

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<sup>18</sup> Sheldon, S. Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1960), p. 276.

climate for the legitimacy of political parties.

In contrast, the development of political parties is a healthy institution of society since they legitimate the structure of the society, which is based on a multiplicity of interests. Furthermore, through out their structure, functions and ideology, political parties facilitate the legitimate expression of these interests.

### Structure - Functions - Ideology

Structure, functions and ideology are the main criteria in the determination of the type of political party. In fact, the latter reflects the general traits of structure and the functions; simply, the ideology and the program of a political party cannot be separated from its structure and functions.

### Structure

As in so many other cases, scholars approach the question of the structure of political parties in different ways depending on the purpose of their analysis. This fact along with the number of peculiarities of the issues, as a result of the complex socio-political environment, make the codification of the structure of political parties problematic. However, for the purpose of this work, some effort has to be made.

The study of party structure has been dominated by Maurice Duverger's analysis. Two classification schemes are developed by Duverger: The first is based on party organization and the second on party membership.

On the horizontal plane, Duverger makes the distinction between the direct party in which the members themselves form the party's community without the help of other social groupings, and the indirect party which



is made up of the union of the component social groups, e.g. British Labour Party, Belgian Catholic Bloc. Direct parties are the rule and indirect parties the exception. Despite this distinction, there are some indirect political parties, as in the case of the British Labour Party, which could be transformed into a mixed party over time.<sup>19</sup>

On the vertical plane, a party is made up of several basic elements, or small groups dispersed throughout the community, which are linked by coordinating institutions. Each party has its own structure, and their basic elements have their own particular form. Four main types of basic elements can be distinguished: caucus, branch, cell and militia.

The caucus parties are dominated by a small close group of experts or notabilities. The caucus is recruited by tacit cooption, which functions in a fairly large geographic area and yields considerable power due to the influence of its members. Its activities reach their peak during election times. Neumann calls these parties "parties of individual representation" and claims that they are characteristic of a "society with restricted political domain and only a limited degree of participation."<sup>20</sup> Between elections, the activities of caucus are limited and the caucus can enjoy its "absolutely free mandate" to decide only according to the members' conscience. The notion of free mandate, though well rooted in theories of representative government obviously suffered greatly with the rise of lobbies and of party discipline in legislatures.

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<sup>19</sup>Maurice Duverger, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-17.

<sup>20</sup>Sigmund Neuman, Modern Political Parties (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1956) p. 404.

Generally speaking, there is a decline of this type of party organization, but caucus parties still occupy an important place in the present day structure in the parties of the right in most countries.

Initially the caucus was characteristic of the Conservative or Liberal parties but later the Labour party though in a different form was organized on a caucus basis. Today the English Conservative party, the North-European Liberal and Conservative parties as well as the French parties of the Right and the French Radical party are organized on the basis of the caucus.<sup>21</sup>

The branch parties are more extensive groups, which recruit members from the masses in order to increase numbers and represent the masses. The activities of this kind of party are regular even between elections; they deal not only with election tactics but also with political education; and they function within a smaller geographic area than the caucus parties. In fact, these are what Neumann calls "political parties of integration."<sup>22</sup>

The branch type organization is a socialist invention. The socialist parties both direct such as the French Socialist party as well as indirect such as the Belgian Workers' party are organized on a branch basis. However, the branch became an interesting example of contagious

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<sup>21</sup>Maurice Duverger, op. cit. p. 21.

<sup>22</sup>Sigmund Neuman, op. cit. pp. 404-405.

organization since the Conservative or Centre parties, though more in theory than in practice have adopted the branch system (e.g. Belgian Christian Social party).<sup>23</sup>

The cell type political parties have an occupational rather than a geographically based structure. The cell unites all party members who work in the same place, and is quite a small group of about fifteen to twenty members; the area based cells, if any, are of lesser importance. These units are strong ones, in their hold on membership, due to their permanent nature, every day contact between members, and their concrete working place basis. However, this latter point may tend to minimize the importance of wider political issues.

The cell type party was an invention of the Russian Communist party, which first used it for clandestine action, and was subsequently imposed on other Communist parties. Duverger argues that the choice of the cell as organizational basis entails a profound change in the very concept of a political party. Instead of a body intended for the winning of votes, for grouping the representatives, and maintaining contact between them and their electors, the political party becomes an instrument of agitation, propaganda, discipline, and if necessary, clandestine action, for which elections and parliamentary debates are only of secondary importance.<sup>24</sup>

The militia type political parties are organized as a kind of private army; the members are enrolled along military lines and subject to

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<sup>23</sup>Maurice Duverger, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-27.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

the same discipline and training as soldiers. Some members constitute a kind of active army, while others remain in reserve. The whole structure is based on very small groups which build up into pyramids to form larger and larger groups. Although the militia organization is fundamental to some parties, no political party has ever existed exclusively on this basis; they usually exist side by side with other organizational elements—often cells.<sup>25</sup>

The militia organization is a fascist creation, and is even further removed from electoral and parliamentary action than is the cell type. "Ordine Nuovo" in Italy is a good example of contemporary militia organization.

In addition to the above basic structural features of political parties, there are other classifications based on the party organization: personality parties, "parties of democratic centralism". A personality party is one which is centered around a single man and which lives and dies with him. The leader dominates the whole structure of the party and his principles and aims guide the party's activities. This type of party is usually mass based and covers a very wide spectrum of ideologies and attitudes; most commonly, it has a populist character. Peron's party in Argentina is a good example of this type of party.

The parties of "democratic centralism" are most commonly the communist parties and other marxist groups. Despite the common origin of this structure, which is the theoretical work of Lenin as well as the history of the Third International, one can easily note the basic differences among the organization of these parties; these differences are not only based on the different conditions under which the communist

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 39

parties act, but are also rooted in the different, often controversial, interpretation of Marxist Weltanschauung.

The above categories of party structures used to be one of the main criteria for the determination of a party's orientation; the right wing political parties had structures quite distinct from the left wing and vice-versa. Today though it does not seem that this is the case. Very often we encounter difficulties of categorization when using these criteria. Political parties no longer follow distinct structural patterns. For example, as we noticed above, the branch party is an invention of the left but it is now common among the right wing as well. Furthermore, no one today can say that democratic centralism is the main characteristic of communist party structure since there are communist parties which have rejected the notion in practice, such as the Communist Party of Spain and the Italian Communist Party (P.C.I.).

In conclusion, we observe a significant convergence of party structure, the determination of political parties is no longer possible by looking at party structure.

### Functions

As we indicated above, the functions of political parties are one of the criteria in the determination of the type of political party. As in the case of structure, there is no general agreement among scholars. Thus, a codification of the functions of political parties is not a simple problem.

However, the main functions of political parties can be considered<sup>26</sup> as political recruitment, political socialization, interest articulation and interest aggregation.

In most political systems, political parties are the chief agents of political recruitment at all levels of the political apparatus. Political parties provide the leadership personnel for the various governmental offices. The selection of candidates as part of this function helps the voters to orient their preferences and make real choices. However, as Peter Merkl observes, one can easily argue that this ideal choice is limited by the prior selection of the parties.<sup>27</sup> In the few political systems where there are no political parties or where political parties have no power to affect the process of political recruitment, political recruitment is performed by other social institutions such as trade unions, military or legal pressure groups, which underlines the importance of this function for any political system.

The function of political socialization, performed by political parties is in many senses the basis for their every other function. Political socialization involves the social integration of individuals into society and the body politic. Political parties throughout their activities (electoral procedure, response to the issues, political programs) transform the private citizen; they integrate him into the community. They are the major agents which make the private citizen a

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<sup>26</sup>Neuman Sigmud, op. cit., pp. 396-400. See also Peter H. Merkl, Modern Comparative Politics, (Illinois, The Dryden Press, 1970), pp. 272-284; Michael Curtis, op. cit., pp. 139-140; Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 73-112.

<sup>27</sup>Peter H. Merkl, op. cit., p. 273.

"zoom politicon" (political animal); a man whose aims are adjusted and correlated to the needs of society.

This function of political socialization apparently is the major prerequisite of political participation, and political participation in its turn is the main prerequisite for the realization of other functions of political parties. For example, we cannot imagine how a political party can select leadership in the course of its political recruitment function without any political participation even if the political participation is for form's sake and not essential to the whole process.

The next major functions of political parties are interest articulation and interest aggregation. Every political system has some way to processing needs, demands and attitudes, and this is called interest articulation. It may be performed by many different substructures in the system, for example, mobs, business groups, labor unions, political parties, etc. Political parties though are usually, but not always, the major agents in the performance of this function; in the societies where the development of political parties is at a very low level, other institutions undertake the social responsibility of interest articulation.

It is obvious that the interest articulation function is linked with interest aggregation; the function which involves the convergence of needs, demands and attitudes into general policy alternatives. Thus, one can consider the two functions as parts of the "policy process" in Easton's model of political analysis. If we adopt this to the level of political parties, articulation and aggregation must simply be viewed "as different ends of the same continuum."<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>Kenneth Janda, A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties, p. 92 in Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics (California, Sage Publication INC., 1970).

Apparently, political parties, in order to achieve their goals, have to articulate and aggregate social interest. No party can achieve its goals without social support; consequently, articulation and aggregation of interests are fundamental functions. This fact and the difficulty of clearly distinguishing the "borders" of these functions have created disagreement among scholars on the role and definition of these functions. For the purpose of this work we will treat them as logically separate, defined in terms of expressing interests (articulation) and gathering interests (aggregation).

Apart from the main functions of political parties referred to above, many scholars consider the brokerage of ideas as an additional function. In fact, in some indirect ways, this is true; and takes place most of the time independent of their intentions. Of course, there are parties which act according to a very concrete ideological framework. This framework very often forms the party's Weltanschauung, which in its term is imposed upon the society by the activities of the political parties.

Furthermore, in addition to the fact that some political parties become "brokers of ideas" explicitly in the process of their activities, some others, without a clear ideological program, perform the same function implicitly. It must always be kept in mind that every part of a political party's activities and structures contain value judgment based on their ideology; consequently, their activities reflect their ideology which is diffused to the society.

The above categories of functions are performed, more or less, by the whole spectrum of political parties. However, there is another category of functions, which are said to be performed only by certain



types of political parties.

A good example is that of political parties in those new states without any set political behavior norms. These parties can be the chief forces of modernization. They can shape the government, provide the main link between the different social and economic groups, and they can also constitute the chief agent of political education and socialization. Finally, by breaking down various forms of traditional behavior, the political parties of these countries can be the binding force in communities divided by groups based on tribal affiliation, religious denomination or national origin.<sup>29</sup>

The Marxist political parties are another type of political party which are content to perform some distinct functions. These functions, theoretically, are not only distinct from the functions of the liberal or conservative parties but also are the distinguishing factors of the parties of the left. Marxist political parties are the political expressions of working class. Their main goals are the formation of the proletariat into a class, the overthrow of bourgeois domination and finally the conquest of political power by the proletariat. It is obvious that the working class parties have to undertake some particular functions, in order to correspond to the above aims.

Consequently, under democratic conditions revolutionary-marxist parties oppose the established order as such. They do not aggregate the largest number of common interests but underline points of discontent, which can serve their goals. However, obviously the marxist communist parties do not exist in a vacuum; they have to compete and preserve their

<sup>29</sup>Michael Curtis, op. cit., p. 140.

existence in a given system.

In fact, there are not distinct functions for the different types of political parties; functions are no longer distinguishing characteristics of political parties. A radical convergence has taken place. The left still tries to express the working class interest but the working class is not the only class they want to have affiliated with them. At the same time, the right wing has started to respond more and more to working class attitudes. In France, for instance, the governments started to respond more and more to Labour.\* Furthermore, the left has not only reduced the activities of its main function - to organize the proletariat into a class and overthrow the bourgeois domination - but they also perform functions which were distinct to the right wing parties. For instance, in the interest aggregation function the communist parties have reached the point of not only trying to represent the working class but also other social classes and strata such as the middle class, small business, even the national bourgeoisie, but interposing them in their strategic goals.<sup>30</sup>

### Ideology

As we noted above, the recent convergence of political parties at the structural and functional level is reflected on the ideological - programmatic level. Ideology used to be one of the determinant criteria for the type of political party. However, today it does not seem that this is the case. The ideological convergence of political parties become clear not only through the change in their program but also in their

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<sup>30</sup> Santiago Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State (Athens, Themelio, 1977), p. 62.

\* Suzanne Berger, The French Political System (N.Y. Random House, 1974) pp. 117-118.

political practice.

A brief look at France and Italy is enough to see that at times the policies of the biggest parties (Communist and Right Wing) are hardly distinguishable. In these countries, where the Communist parties are the strongest in the "non-socialist world", the policies of the major parties tend to be identical. For example, the Italian Communist Party has in fact the same policy as the Christian Democratic Party on the major issues of the E.E.C., NATO, terrorism<sup>31</sup> as well as on minor every day problems as in the case of "self reduction in 1975."<sup>32</sup> In France during the campaign for the European parliament, the Gaullists and the Communists both followed the same pattern by exploiting the traditional French xenophobia! As the "Washington Post" observed, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish between Communist and Gaullist electoral propaganda.<sup>33</sup>

Furthermore, the "Bad Godesberg"<sup>34</sup> among the parties of the Second International has become routine; the examples also of the communist parties which abandon traditional communist principles such as "the

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<sup>31</sup> Pavlos Nerantzas, After election developments, ANTI, Athens, Vol. 137 p. 26-27.

<sup>32</sup> The dramatic increase in the cost of living (25% of inflation and widespread unemployment) at the beginning of 1975 met a strong people's reaction in the form of "self-reduction"—i.e., the refusal to comply with price increases of essential services. The Communist party's reaction to this was in fact the same as the governmental one which was condemning the "self reduction" as an outbreak of "civil disobedience." (Bruno Ramirez: The Working Class Struggle Against the Crisis: Self-Reduction of Prices in Italy, in Zerowork Political Material 1, New York, December, 1975).

<sup>33</sup> The Washington Post, June 1, 1979.

<sup>34</sup> "Bad Godesberg" was the name of the city where, in 1959, the German social democrats during their conference denounced Marxism.

dictatorship of the proletariat" and the "democratic centralism" as basic principles of their organization, are not insignificant (P.C.I., P.C.S.). At the same time the cases in which the parties of the right are following interventionist policies, despite their initial principles, are not uncommon any more (France, England).<sup>35</sup>

### The Recent Development: Convergence

It is obvious that the above indications lead us to the conclusion that today we are facing the convergence of political parties at all levels, which in fact make political parties look alike. However, we have to note that these indications do not demonstrate the disappearance of parties functional, structural, ideological - programmatical differences but rather indicate that in practice the political parties in modern societies tend to act in very similar ways.

Many scholars have examined this particular phenomenon of political parties and have contributed interesting analyses to the already rich literature on political parties. However, there is a great variety of approaches among these analyses, as the scholars usually stress only one aspect of this development.

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<sup>35</sup>A. King notes: "A Conservative government rescues Upper Clyde Shipbuilders and nationalizes part of Rolls-Royce; Labour Government picks up the pieces after the collapse of Court Line, a privately owned airline and holiday company that was not particularly important in the national economy. Public is still public; private in 1975 is also public." A. King, Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970's, in Political Studies, Vol. 23, 1975, pp. 287-288.

For example, Robert Michels, at the beginning of the century, in his "Political Parties", tried to apply his idea of the "iron law of oligarchy" of any large scale of organization to the organization of political parties. For Michels, in all political parties there is a near monopoly of power by the officers and this oligarchy of power can take only conservative forms which make parties look alike:

It is far from obvious that the interests of the masses which have combined to form the party will coincide with the interests of the bureaucracy in which the party becomes personified. . . . The interest of the body of employees (that is, the party officials) are always conservative.<sup>36</sup>

Simply, Michel's thesis of the "iron law of oligarchy" is a statement about what must happen in groups — and in this case, in political parties — which initially are democracies.<sup>37</sup>

More recently Ralph Miliband, in his The State in Capitalist Society, approaches the issue from a quite different perspective. First, he tries to prove the co-ordination and in fact unification of the right wing parties in their effort to control any dynamic of the left wing movement.<sup>38</sup> Secondly, he focuses his analysis on the left wing

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<sup>36</sup>Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 18.

<sup>37</sup>John D. May, "Democracy, Organization, Michels," in The American Political Science Review, Vol. LIX 1965, p. 419.

<sup>38</sup>Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Quartet Books, 1977), p. 80-106.

parties by referring mainly to the Communist ones' where he applies Gramsci's notion of "hegemony".<sup>39</sup> Miliband argues that the ideological predominance of the dominant classes in civil society over the subordinate classes (hegemony) infiltrates the activities of the left wing parties. Consequently the left cannot really serve its own purposes and in this sense serves the goals of the right. Miliband claims that the result of this "hegemony" is the creation of a "national supra party consensus"<sup>40</sup> which alienates party differences.

In addition to the above indicative analyses there are many others, which have dealt with the issue. Moreover, we think, that these demonstrated convergences of the political parties can be considered as an effort of the institution to adapt itself to the economic, social and political changes of the environment in which it acts.

#### Convergence: Adaptation

In fact, political parties have been affected by the unprecedented development which the developed countries have been undergoing since the end of the World War II. State intervention in the economy caused all

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<sup>39</sup>"Hegemony: an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout the society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotations." (Gwynn Williams, "Gramsci's Concept of Egeomnia", in *Journal of History of Ideas*, 1960, Vol. 21, No. 4, p. 587, from ibid., p. 162 footnote.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 163.

the major transformations which have taken place in these societies. The state ceased to be a constitutional liberal one, which operated as a "neutral" component of the society. It initiated not only policies which radically affected the whole of society (distribution, redistribution), but it became one of the major — if not the major — sector of the economy.<sup>41</sup> This growth of the state eventually resulted in the growth of the state apparatus. The public services became highly specialized requiring a large number of experts, and the bureaucracy or rather the significance of bureaucrats in the structured modern state became an unquestionable fact.

A similar tendency can be detected within the world of business. We could say that the trademark of modern society has become big business. Technological developments and the concentration of economic power into a small number of economic units has led to the formation of big enterprises. Another main feature of modern society is the huge "service sector".

These two developments, the growth of state apparatus and the expansion of the services in the level of private sector, have caused major social changes; the most notable of which may be the creation of a huge middle class strata. In this process the scapegoats of imperfect economic competition — small businessmen — have contributed significantly. The members of this middle class, which is the biggest social strata in modern society, illustrates the heterogenous nature of this class; its major trait being a wide mixture of values, norms and attitudes.

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<sup>41</sup> See Appendix I.

The "middle class ideology" is not distinct in and of itself; and is formed in every day contact with the socio-economic environment.

Furthermore, the above developments played an important role on the level of ideological process. The state's intervention in society has singled it out as the major agent of socialization within society. The state, as an institution, is the representative of the status quo and consequently it operates accordingly. The maintenance of the status quo becomes the major trend of socialization through the agents, which are operated by the state: the mass media, and the educational system. The "middle class" ideology is most widely propagated because of the size of this strata. This "middle class ideology" supplements the ideological framework of the western societies.

Political parties, as all other institutions of society, had to adapt themselves to the new developments of the economic, social and political environment. Thus an adaptation of the parties of all political spectrums took place, and has taken place on all levels of political parties: functional, structural, grammatical-ideological.

Before examining the details of this adaptation, it will be useful to examine the common goal of all political parties which, in fact, makes this adaptation a prerequisite for their continued existence. Any political party, apart from its ideological trends, intends to take over the government, and it uses certain strategies to reach this goal. The name of the game in western democracies is: elections. This acceptance of the electoral race as the only way to gain power, was not accepted by the mainstream of Communist parties. Today, though, the major Communist parties in the capitalist European countries (P.C.I. - P.C.F.) have accepted not only in theory but in practice a strategy towards "a new



model of socialism" through "the electoral race and representative institutions".<sup>42</sup> This general acceptance of the "rules of the game" in the above mentioned social framework determines the nature of the party's adaptation.

At the structural level, the tendency of adaptation is quite clear. Political parties adapt their structure to the new developments of the social environment. The nature of the modern state (bureaucratization, high expertise, etc.) has an effect on party structure. Given their main political goal - to gain power through the electoral procedure - political parties must display not only their approval of these changes to the electoral clientele but also their capability to correspond to the complexities of the governmental apparatus.

Thus, political parties must provide political figures who are experts in all sections of the state's activities. The complexity of the issues of modern society require specialized analyses in many different fields. Such complexity cannot be dealt with in abstract and general analyses by the traditional politician who could deal only with general administrative problems. This necessity, though, bureaucratizes the whole structure of the parties since the majority of the membership not only cannot follow the highly specialized analyses but cannot even stay informed on the issues. Consequently, the role of the membership of the party is reduced to that of financial, electoral supporter. Thus, then, political parties are led to a de-democratization of their structure.

Furthermore, at the functional level we can note the same trend of adaptation. The attitudes of the society without concrete orientation,

<sup>42</sup>Santiago Carrillo, op. cit., p. 165.

as we explained above, determine the functions of the political parties in the electoral market.

The main function of political parties has become the aggregation of interests. Simply because the more interests a party can combine, the more votes it gets. Of course, the social stratification of these societies facilitates the realization of this function. The class differences are not apparent as they used to be for two main reasons. First, the tremendous development of productive forces during the last decades resulted in a greater accessibility of the income classes to the goods and commodities they could not enjoy before. Secondly, it is because of the size and role of the middle class as we explained above.

Apparently the functional and structural adaptation of political parties had had significant effect on their ideologies. As we stated above there are incidents, which indicate this tendency of adaptation at the programmatic - ideological level. In other words, the goals, functions and structures of political parties in fact make up their ideological framework and determine their ideological borders. Simply stated, two political parties, which exist in the same social environment, cannot have similar or sometimes identical goals, functions and structures and be completely different ideologically. Obviously, under the above consideration, the emerging ideology is nothing but the ideology of "middle class".

In conclusion, we have to say that the above observations, on the contemporary tendencies of political parties, cannot lead to the conclusion that the political parties in western democracies are the same. The purpose of this analysis is to underline the process of adaptation which political parties have been undergoing in their efforts to respond to the

environmental developments and mainly to show that the nature of the economic, social and political environment facilitates the above analysed tendency of political parties to look alike or rather act similarly.

This idea of adaptation is very similar to Otto Kirchheimer's approach on the transformation of Western European parties. Kirchheimer argues that the main stream of this transformation leads to the emergence of a catchall "people's" party; simply, to a party which tries to embrace as many social strata as it can for the sake of getting votes. Given this assumption and the fact that Kirchheimer's model more or less follows the pattern of our analysis, we can easily apply it to the case study we are going to undertake.

Although Kirchheimer's analysis does not refer to the role of the state in the transformation of political parties, it underlines the same facts stated above. For him, the old-style political party of individual representation became an exception after World War II. This old-style political party ("mass integration party") is transforming itself into a catch-all "people's" party since the conditions which produced it -- "harder class lines and more sharply protruding denominational structures" -- no longer exist.<sup>43</sup> Kirchheimer includes the parties of the left in the same realm of transformation. He claims that they are still trying to hold their special working class clientele but at the same time they try to embrace a variety of other classes.<sup>44</sup> Kirchheimer looked to electoral reasons for the explanation of the modern party practice of reaching as far as possible over a wide spectrum of potential clientele.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems", in R.C. Macridis and B.E. Brown, Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, 3rd edition, p. 268.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 271.

Even "if the party cannot hope to catch all categories of voters, it may have a reasonable expectation of catching more voters in all those categories, whose interests do not adamantly conflict".<sup>46</sup> On this point we can say that he agrees with A. Downs' argument that a political party "always organizes its action so as to focus on a single quantity: its vote margin over the opposition in the test at the end of the current election period."<sup>47</sup>

Kirchheimer goes on and explains the phenomenon of the party transformation into "catch-all" ones. His explanation is based first on the "present conditions of the spreading of the secular and mass consumer-goods orientation" which places obstacles in the clarification of class lines and secondly, on the de-ideologized orientation of modern society.<sup>48</sup> In other words, Kirchheimer argues that the widely spread out consumerism has broken down the apparent borders of classes and this fact facilitates the above changes of political parties. Furthermore, he notes that de-ideologization "in the political field involves the transfer of ideology from partnership in a clearly visible political goal structure; into one of many sufficient, but by no means necessary motivational forces operative in the voter's choice."<sup>49</sup> It is obvious that these arguments are similar to our own. However, there is quite a significant difference.

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 270.

<sup>47</sup> A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 174.

<sup>48</sup> Otto Kirchheimer, op. cit., pp. 271-272.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 271.

Kirchheimer does not relate these two arguments; he cannot see that the de-ideolization results from the absence of clear class stratification, which was the base of "ideolization". Furthermore, he does not explain the role of the state in the whole process. As we explain above, the state cannot be considered neutral in any social process.

However, the above remarks are not intended to minimize the value of Kirchheimer's model on party transformation. In fact, his codification of these changes is very useful in testing whether or not the parties in our case are moving towards a catch-all formation. This involves:

- 1) Drastic reduction of the party's ideological baggage. . . .
- 2) Further strengthening of top leadership groups, whose actions and omissions are now judged from the viewpoint of their contribution to the efficiency of the entire social system rather than identification with the goals of their particular organization.
- 3) Downgrading of the role of the individual party member, a role considered historical which may obscure the newly built-up catch-all party image.
- 4) De-emphasis of the classe gardee, specific social-class or denominational clientele, in favor of recruiting voters among the population at large.
- 5) Securing access to a variety of interest groups.<sup>50</sup>

Kirchheimer's observations are very obvious. For example, party's de-ideolization becomes quite apparent when we look at their programmes; sometimes it is really difficult to distinguish the differences between them and only during election campaigns are differences created on major foreign and military issues, especially between the major parties of the left and the parties in power (e.g. Italian Socialist Party).<sup>51</sup> The

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 272.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 276.

decisive role of the leaders becomes very clear whenever we refer to the leader instead of to the party, and happens even with the Communist parties although Kirchheimer initially seems to exclude these parties from the whole process of transformation. In fact, not only the names of Giscard d'Estaing, Andreotti, Rimonde Barre, but also the names of Mitterand, Marchais, Carillio, Berlinguer, are used as substitutes for the names of their parties.<sup>52</sup> This tendency in its turn minimizes the role of party membership not only at the level of the very bottom mass membership, but also at the middle level of member activists. On the one hand, this fact eliminates meaningful membership participation in party activities, and on the other hand, with a combination of the fourth and fifth factors determines party functions. Thus, the selection of the leaders and the struggle to secure the support of as many interest groups as possible has become the main activity of political parties. This limited nature of party activities should be seen in contrast to the complexity of the political system in modern society. Consequently, the role of political party is reduced automatically and its position becomes more "limited than would appear from its position of formal preeminence."<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup>In 1976, during Carillio's visit to Greece, the slogan "Berlinguer-Carillio-Dracopoulos (leader of the pro-Euroco-munist Greek "Communist Party of the Interior") Marchais" was very popular in the Eurocommunist section of the Greek left.

<sup>53</sup>Kirchheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 278. For an interesting analysis from another perspective on the role of the parties today, see: Nicos Poulanzas, The Crisis of Political Parties, *Mont Diplomatique*, Sept., 1979.

In conclusion, although Kirchheimer notes that the rules deciding the outcome of "catch-all mass party competition are extremely complex and extremely aleatory",<sup>54</sup> it is clear though that his observations on party transformation arise from party competition for votes in the electoral market.

Harold Hotelling in his analysis of the rules of stability in oligopoly markets, provides an approach which can apply to an examination of the electoral market, as he indicates in the conclusion of his analysis.<sup>55</sup> In his model (see Appendix No. I) the position of the entrepreneurs can be seen as that of the political parties which compete in the electoral market of a certain country.

In the following pages we will use the theoretical framework outlined above to examine the recent developments in the Greek political parties.

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<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 272.

<sup>55</sup>Hotelling claims that the duopoly market organization militates against social welfare, generally speaking, because it militates against ideal product differentiation. Consequently his model explains the reason why the platforms of the Republican and Democratic parties are too similar; why "our cities become uneconomically large and the business districts within them are too concentrated. Methodist and Presbyterian churches are too much alike; cider is too homogeneous." C.E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory (Richard O. Irwin, Inc., 1972), p. 344.

CHAPTER II



## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of Chapters II and III is to introduce the case study to the reader. In this chapter we will deal with the pre-history of the present day Greek political system. We think that such a reference is very useful for the purpose of this work. Firstly, the reference to the previous party systems will make the comparison much easier and eventually the convergence of political parties will become clear. Secondly, the analysis of the political environment will help us to examine the major factors which have influenced the recent development of the Greek party system.

The periodization of history is rather a difficult job, since any period of history is just a few links in the chain of the historical process. However, some times a fragmentation of history becomes necessary for a better understanding of the whole process. A useful starting point for an examination of Greek contemporary history can be found in the year 1936. In 1936 a dictatorship was established in the country, ending the life of the old political and party system, since it was followed by the foreign occupation of the country, the dramatic events of the civil war and the definite break down of the old structure. Thus, the first period we will analyse is from 1936 when Metaxas' dictatorship took place, to 1949, when the civil war ended with the victory of the "national" forces. These were years of instability and the orientation of the party system.

The period from 1949 to 1967, which is the period between the end of the civil war and the military coup, can most likely be characterized as the period of stability. It is the period in which post-war Greece

developed its political institutions and the party system took a form, which has influenced to a certain degree in today's system.

The dictatorship (1967-1974) is a period that has to be examined separately, since it is the most significant factor contributing to recent developments in the political and party system. In fact, the dictatorship broke down the old party system and fostered the development of new political attitudes which eventually led to a convergence of the political spectrum and party system after 1974.

In this chapter we are going to deal with the first two periods — from 1936 to 1949 and from 1949 to 1967. We will examine party alignments on the major issues of the period — foreign relations, the constitutional and legal framework, the military and the monarchy. We will also examine the main traits of the party system as well as the functions and the structures of the major political parties. This section will be very useful to our subsequent analysis since it will make it easier for us to identify the development of the party system and to examine the recent convergence of political parties.

### The years of Instability (1936-1949)

In August 1936, Prime Minister, Ioannis Metaxas, overruled the constitution and established the dictatorship, which is now known as the "regime of August the 4th". Metaxas an authoritarian, fascist, pro-German type of politician with a military background, not only could not solve the problems of the country but also generated many more. Metaxas responded to the pre-existing political instability with a dismissal of parliament, anti-democratic legislation, attacks on civil rights, official

terrorism against any organized (i.e. political parties) and non-organized (i.e. individuals) opposition. To the economic problems of the country, he responded with an increase of foreign influence by signing new contracts for loans (350 million drachmas from Germany and 4 million from England) and by allowing foreign technocrats to decide on the country's economic policies.<sup>1</sup> When Italy attacked Greece in October 1940, the Athens regime was one of the most authoritarian and fascist in Europe.

It was the Greeks who achieved the first victory of the Alliance forces against axis; and soon after, the Greek army was in an offensive position. The people were united as never before, as were the political leaders, and they were not defeated until the German invasion. As we noted above, political parties, which were trying to survive underground was fairly clear: national unity to fight the threat to the country's sovereignty. A letter written by imprisoned N. Zachariades, leader of the Communist Party, about the war is a very good example of the predominant spirit of national unity in the country.<sup>2</sup>

The occupation of the country was extremely hard on the people. The country was divided between the Germans, Italians and Bulgarians and it had no control over its own resources. Famine became an every day phenomenon and along with executions and percecution the tragedy was complete.

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<sup>1</sup>Nicos Svoronos, History of Modern Greece (Athens, Themelio, 1976) pp. 131-132.

<sup>2</sup>In this letter issued on October 31, 1940. Zachariades wrote: "To this war which is directed by Metaxas' government, everyone has to give all his energy, without any reservation." From: Text on the History of the Communist Party. (Athens, Social Publishings, 1978) pp. 191-192.

In spite of the difficulties described above, (political suppression and the lack of any political organization and political parties), it did not take long for the appearance of the first resistance groups. Due to the strong nationalist Greek tradition, the resistance movement developed very rapidly. The role of the political parties, with some exceptions was very limited. However, we can distinguish two major trends of the political spectrum in regard to the resistance movement. The left — communist and non-communist — as well a liberal fraction which would be characterized as radical, stayed in the country and joined or formed resistance groups and organizations. The majority of the liberal politicians, though, who had come from the old Venizelos' Party as well as the politicians around the government and the Royal family left the country and formed a government in Cairo. Another relatively small right wing fraction remained in the country and co-operated with the German and Italian conquerors.

It was inevitable that the alignment of the political spectrum would change. Instead the old division between democratic or Venizelian and promonarch or popular, the terms left and right were introduced into Greek political life. Due to the increasing influence of the left and particularly the intensive activities of the Communist Party, polarization became a fact. Thus, the people at the time were to identify the right with the politicians who were abroad and who supported the monarch, and the left with the groups which formed the "National Liberation Front" (E.A.M.) in the country.

Several events which took place mainly after the beginning of country's occupation until the end of the civil war contributed to the above described political alignment. Thus, a brief reference to these

events must be made.

In September 1941, the Socialist Party, the People's Democratic Party and the Communist Party along with other small underground resistance groups founded the "National Liberation Front" (Ethnikon Apelefterotikon Metopon - E.A.M.). E.A.M. very quickly became the predominant political group. This, of course, does not mean that there was an absence of other resistance groups such as the "Union for National and Social Liberation" (E.K.K.A.) and the "National Democratic Greek Association" (E.D.E.S.) but rather that E.A.M. was indisputably the most popular.<sup>3</sup>

E.A.M. from the first moment of its foundation was the vanguard of the resistance, and its assistance to the anti-Axis alliance was very significant. Furthermore, it liberated some regions and established local governments. Its administration was based on democratic principles, which were cited in the "Code of People's Self-Management and Justice". E.A.M. finally established the "Provisional Committee for National Liberation" (P.E.E.A.). The committee, whose president was Alexandros Svolos, a university professor, was regarded as the legitimate government of the country since the official pre-existing administration was abroad and had no representatives or other presence in the country.

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<sup>3</sup>In a German report on the "political situation in Greece from June 4 to July 3, 1943", we read: "90% of the population is against the Axis forces and is ready for an open insurrection... E.A.M. is a main organizer and the main body of the resistance struggle. The majority of resistance groups are controlled by it. On the political level it is dominant not only because of its strong leadership but also because it is very active. E.A.M. is the major enemy of the occupational forces...". From Nicos Svoronos, op. cit. p. 141.

Political polarization became a fact and the situation was to be followed by dramatic events. The attitudes of the two fractions of the political spectrum made the differences, more radical and unbridgeable. It is obvious that when a fraction has a clear program of changing the pre-existing order into a People's Republic (Laokratia) as E.A.M. had, and the other was planning to prevent any radical change by imposing the pre-existing regime — Royal Republic — the only thing which can be achieved is a deadlock.

However, when the victory of the alliance forces became visible the two fractions — the democratic resistance movement in the country and the pro-monarch government — started to approach one another. This approach was carried out mainly by political personalities and not by particular parties. Although there was not a total absence of political parties it was obvious that the existence of strong resistance groups as well as the definite polarization of the political spectrum did not allow enough room for the pre-existing party system.

In August 1943, E.A.M., E.K.K.A., E.D.E.S. and personalities from the old political parties announced that the "constitutional issue", was one of the major problems which had to be solved by a referendum. King George II agreed to the proposal and finally the two parties came to an agreement, according to which a government of national unity was to be formed (Lebanon, May 1944). A few months later E.A.M. and E.L.A.S. — the military section of E.A.M. mainly controlled by the Communist Party — signed a new agreement according to which they agreed that they would not attack Athens and that they would accept the idea of British military "assistance" (Kazert, September 1944).

General Scobie, who was the general commander of the alliance forces — mainly British — in Greece, asked for a complete disarmament of E.L.A.S. before the 10th of December. The representatives of E.A.M. in the government resigned and E.L.A.S. strongly defended the attacks of the British and pro-monarchist forces. Athens became a battle-field for more than a month. Churchill himself visited Greece in an effort to cool down the situation. Finally, an agreement was achieved (Varkiza, February 12, 1945). The agreement, which was under British guarantee, anticipated the democratization of the military and the police as well as the creation of the best possible conditions for the referendum and the elections. Damaskinos, archbishop of Athens was appointed as viceroy.

However, the agreement was never put into practice. Ultra right wing terrorism became an every day phenomenon.<sup>4</sup> Under these conditions a free, democratic election or referendum was not possible. The British though, put tremendous pressure on the government for an election and referendum on the "constitutional issue". Many ministers resigned and

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<sup>4</sup>In June 1945, the leaders of the political parties of the centre — Sofoulis (liberal), Kafadaris, Tsouderos (prime minister of the pro-monarch government in Cairo), Plastiras — announced: "...established by the extreme right wing terrorism is spreading out every day and the life of the non pro-monarchist citizen becomes difficult. These actions do not even allow us to think about free referendum and election... The terrorist groups of the right, which partially use German equipment as a result of their collaboration with Germans during the occupation not only are not under the control of the police but also they work together to squeeze any democratic expression..." Ibid. p. 143.

the "Popular Party" (Laiko Komma) won an easy victory in the election held on March 31, 1946.<sup>5</sup> The majority of E.A.M.'s parties did not participate in the election in an effort to show the unfair nature of the competition. Thus, it became obvious that the problem of polarization of the political forces which was a result of the historical facts during the foreign occupation of the country could not be solved peacefully.


Terrorism reached its peak and by September the referendum turned in favour of the monarchy (September 1, 1946).<sup>6</sup> As a result of this situation, a significant number of old E.A.M. members started to form guerrilla groups in an effort to confront the organized terrorism. These groups formed the "Democratic Army of Greece" (October 28, 1946) and a little later they established the "Provisional Government of Free Greece" (December 23, 1947).

The civil war began again much more cruelly than before. The crimes committed on both sides are beyond description. The British government informed the U.S. that it could not uphold its commitments to Greece. Truman declared that "... (the) U.S. (will) have to help Greece in order to preserve its democratic regime" (March 12, 1947). This marked the beginning of American influence in Greek politics. The American assistance was decisive in the result of the war and the insurrection was defeated by the nationalist forces led by General A. Papagos (Fall 1949).

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<sup>5</sup>See Appendix III.

<sup>6</sup>See Appendix IV.





We do not dispute the responsibility of the Communist Party for this, the second insurrection. However, it would be unfair if we did not also point out that a great deal of the responsibility, perhaps the greatest, has to be assigned to the right wing forces, which should have had more respect for the rules of a democratic system rather than making policies on the basis of revenge against the left.

The outcome of the civil war led to a further deterioration of the political life and the party system in Greece. For many years after the end of the war Greece did not manage to build a democratic, non-discriminatory, non-authoritarian, healthy party system. The polarization, with its simplistic logic of "black and white" in politics, though in a different mode, continued to be the dominant characteristic of the Greek political scene. Even after the end of right wing domination, in 1963, its consequences continued to be a dominant factor in the political environment. As a matter of fact, today's politics cannot be said to be untouched by the events of the above described historical period; many references to it, though for different reasons are still being made by whole spectrum of political parties.

#### 1949-1967 DEVELOPMENTS

##### The Country's Situation

If we want to be accurate, short phrases such as "broken country", or "tragedy" are not adequate to describe the situation of Greece after the end of the civil war. War and the Axis occupation had left the

country prostrate.<sup>7</sup> Civil war made the depth of the disaster immeasurable. According to official statistics during the civil war, 41,970 from the "Democratic Army" and 15,000 from the national army had been killed;<sup>8</sup> and the material damage was estimated at 3.5 billion drachmas, in current currency. The poor economy became poorer and the limited economic infrastructure—transportation system, housing, tools and agricultural equipment—had been destroyed. The administration was essentially non-existent. The balance of payments was totally uncontrolled and governmental expenditures were 18 percent more than revenues by the end of the civil war.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to the above situation, the lack of strong political institutions and the dissension of the two sections of the population completed the picture of political instability. Thus, the various governments and political parties had to deal with these problems: first the restoration of the country and second the creation of a strong state apparatus by consolidation of the "status quo", which had been challenged.

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<sup>7</sup>In the terrible winter of 1942, less than a year after the beginning of the occupation, some 450,000 Greeks died of starvation alone. J.P.C. Carey and A.G. Carey, The Web of Modern Greek Politics, (N.Y. Columbia University Press, 1968) p. 131.

<sup>8</sup>"In March 18, 1952, the newspaper "Elefteria" wrote that the deaths due to the civil war were 154,561. In fact, there were many more. In this total are not included some thousands, who were killed by right wing terrorist groups and the 5,000 executed officially, as member of E.A.M. and some thousand patriots who died in exile or in the prisons 10, 15 or 20 years later!" Nicos Psyroukis, History of Contemporary Greece, (Athens, Epikerotita, 1976) Vol. I p. 400. See also: T. Papa-konstandinou, Political Education (Athens, Kabanas Hellas, 1970) pp. 454-456.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 241.

Consequently the parties' alignments had to respond to these issues. We will follow the major issues of the period — foreign relations and dependency, the constitutional and legal framework, the role of the military and the role of monarchy — which were related with country's vital problems. Thus, we will be able to examine the parties' positions on environmental developments as well as the process of the parties' alignment.

Before we go on, a general observation on the political spectrum must be made. Despite the pressure of the "winner" right wing on the "loser" left, there were some incidents of de-polarization and overcoming of the previous political situation. The fact that the left was for a long time illegal provided an opportunity for the emergence of the forces of the centre. In fact, the centre legitimized the peculiar democratic regime of the period, since a democratic system cannot be acceptable without opposition. Thus, the previous political division, between right and left, changed into "nationalist" or "right", and "democratic" which has been tried by the right came to be identified with the left. When, finally the left gained legal expression the polarization of the political spectrum did not disappear but it was significantly reduced.

#### Foreign Relations and Dependency

The new foreign influence in the country started, as we noted above, with Truman's declaration on Greece (March 12, 1947) and took its official form with the "Greek-American agreement for an application of Truman's Dogma in Greece". (June 20, 1947).

It is not difficult to see that the main formation of foreign influence was an economic one; every other influence on the country such as political, cultural, military came as results of foreign economic influence. The economic influence, during this period, was realized in two ways: through foreign, mainly U.S., aid<sup>10</sup> and direct investments.

It is commonly believed that only direct investment can turn an independent country into dependent one. However, economic aid consolidates the status of direct investments and generally helps to control a country at almost every other level— political, military and all of which are necessary for the stability of other investments.

It is rather pointless to dispute the size of U.S. aid to post-war Greece (Appendix V). However it is necessary to make some basic remarks. A disproportionate amount of the economic aid was in the form of military assistance. It was <sup>easy</sup> necessary for the U.S. to sell its outdated military equipment to a poor country in order to rid the U.S. of this technologically inferior equipment.

Furthermore, the dramatic situation in Greece at the time certainly cried out for other more productive governmental expenditures. In addition this kind of development resulted not only in the military dependence of the country of the U.S. but also in the political dependence as well. Apparently, Greece, by following a dependent economic road, lost its flexibility not only at the level of internal planning but also at the level of external affairs and international relations. The fear of a possible withdrawal of the flow of U.S. aid which could stop the previous rate of growth led the government to follow U.S. foreign policy (e.g. N.A.T.O., Korea expedition).

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<sup>10</sup>See Appendix V.

Greece was not unfamiliar with the issues concerning foreign investments. From the establishment of the kingdom to 1930, foreign investments had reached 610 million gold francs.<sup>11</sup> However, after the end of the civil war the increasing American influence through foreign investment was intensified. The legal system played an exceptionally significant role in the promotion of policies in favour of foreign investment. In the 1952 constitution, there is an act which provides for "the protection of foreign capital". By October of the following year, Act 2687 emerged under which foreign capital was very well protected.<sup>12</sup> This was only the beginning of a series of legal provisions and a series of special status contracts, namely Act 4171 in 1961, and the contract with Pechiney-Niarchos in August 1960.<sup>13</sup>

It is obvious that these legal provisions were a great attraction for foreign capital; and in this case the flow of capital was not exclusively American. A lot of capital from other countries was invested in Greece during this period, although American investments still had a dom-

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<sup>11</sup>In 1947, the Greek government announced that from 1831 until 1938 the flow of foreign capital into the country had reached the amount of 850 million gold francs (excluding the country's international loans), 610 million was invested in various enterprises as direct or portfolio investment. The annual return on these investments was 130 millions. J. Meynaud, Political Powers in Greece, (Athens, Byron, 1966) p. 429.

<sup>12</sup>This important act dealt with: a) annual returns on the foreign capital 10% can leave the country b) the transfer out of the country of profits and interest 12% in the first case and 10% for the latter c) facilitating tax regulations d) the management and foreign employees of the foreign companies obtaining special status.

<sup>13</sup>From the time the 2686 act was put into practice in 1953 until the end of 1963, the Greek ministry of finance approved 341 applications for foreign investment in the country; the 341 applications represented Ibid., pp. 431-433.

inant or rather the dominant position among foreign investments in the country.

One does not have to pause too long to understand how destructive these investments were not only economically but also politically and socially. A relatively poor country like Greece, under these circumstances cannot plan its economy according to its social needs since foreign capital is invested in most profitable sectors and not in those most desirable for the "social good".<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, economic planning based on foreign investment does not secure control over a country's resources.<sup>15a</sup> Any possible effort to control national resources would have to put limits upon foreign capital and would consequently discourage such foreign investment, which would in turn delay development. In addition, the local governments in some cases promised to provide infrastructure to attract foreign investors.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, foreign capital enjoyed not only a special status — due to its origins — but also the benefit which accrued to local capital e.g. certain tax concessions. Thus, local investments had to develop under circumstances in which they had to compete with corporations, which had highly developed technology and enormously greater capital.

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<sup>14</sup>The allocation of foreign investment was: 300 million dollars to secondary industry, 40 million to mining, 34 to the shipping industry, 12 to tourism and only 16 million to agriculture or fishing. Ibid. p. 433.

<sup>15</sup>The contract with "Pechiney-Niarchos" is very typical of this kind of contract. Karamanlis' government provided roads along with electric power to the industry which exclusively exploited country's bauxite. The price the industry pays for the energy it gets, is nine times less than the regular price the other industries pay. The Public Enterprise of Energy loses 350 million drachmas every year.

<sup>15a</sup>For both these points see: Richard G. Lipsey et. al. Economics (N.Y. Harper and Row Publishers, 1979) pp. 408-419. Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (N.Y., Monthly Review, 1967) pp. 281-298.

Another negative aspect of foreign investment was administrative corruption. As Jean Meynaud notes there was always something suspicious behind the signing of big agreements on foreign investment in the country. The corruption at times reached the level of the prime minister (e.g. Karamanlis in the case of Pechiney-Niarchos investment) or more commonly high level civil servants. These facts created a feeling of distrust toward the government and the administration generally.<sup>16</sup>

In summary, the flow of foreign capital to Greece during this period was very destructive. Of course we do not deny the fact that in the course of foreign capital's activities large sections of the population benefitted to a certain degree. However, we have to point out that the small wealthy sections of the population became richer, were exposed to different consumer behavior and to a different imported life style. The damage was absolute at the level of the structure of the economy. In its 1964 report O.E.C.D. stated that the preservation of the rate of growth and of exchange stability appeared to be closely linked to "the behavior of foreign capital, public or private in the Greek economy".<sup>17</sup>

#### Other forms of foreign influence.

Foreign influence in Greece, after the end of the civil war did not stop at the economic level. It is quite wrong to believe that foreign economic influence can exist without any influence at other internal structural levels, such as political, cultural and military.

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid. pp. 452-454.

<sup>17</sup>O.E.C.D. (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 1964 Report p. 34.

The post war governments in order to control the "communist threat" had to accept U.S. aid and foreign capital; apparently they needed a certain rate of growth to keep social discontent under control and foreign capital was the only visible and easy way to achieve this. Consequently, the government's orientation remained pro-U.S. In order to survive in power, they had to secure the flow of foreign capital since the only other visible solution required a radical change of the social and political order.

Foreign cultural influence came as a natural result of economic dependency and political domination. After the end of the civil war and the beginning of the cold war, there was a clear effort to reorient the political culture, and social attitudes and way of life generally. American films were imposing a western, American, "ideal" life style, while many scholarships were available from the U.S. for Greek graduates to attend North American universities.<sup>18</sup>

U.S. influence and finally U.S. control of the military and police started as a consequence of dependence on supplies and it developed through educational exchanges, common projects and participation in international organizations. It is obvious that if an army acquires its equipment from one source exclusively it eventually becomes dependent on this source technologically, strategically and ideologically. A large number of Greek police and military officers participated in a series of educational programs in the U.S. and the headquarters of N.A.T.O. in Ismir and in Germany. The alienation and finally the corruption of Greek military and police under these circumstances now appears to have

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<sup>18</sup>Jean Meynaud, op. cit. pp. 410-413.



been inevitable.<sup>19</sup>

### Constitutional and Legal Framework

The legal system was not only important for the achievement of the economic goals of the government but was also of great significance for governmental efforts to consolidate the political and social status quo, which had been challenged seriously by the left. Thus, the legal system over the period in question was dominated by the idea of containing people's political attitudes. It is not the purpose of this work to refer to these legal acts in detail but a brief reference to them must be made in order to discuss one of the determining factors in the political spectrum at the time.

This authoritarian, anti-democratic legal expression of the system started with Act 509 (December 27, 1946) under which the Communist Party was banned. The appeals to this act had to be heard by regular or special military courts. The governments of the period, using the excuses of the possible resurgence of civil war had "frozen" some of the civil liberties in the 1952 constitution. This excuse of civil war and in fact its continuation long after its actual end<sup>20</sup> was used by various governments to introduce laws which defeated the nature of the "democratic" regime assigned by the constitution.

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<sup>19</sup>It is well-known that George Papadopoulos, the leader of the coup in 1967 was an agent of C.I.A. since 1954. Source: New York Times, August 2, 1974 (Section 1, p. 2).

<sup>20</sup>"Council d' etat" recognized officially the end of the civil war in 1962, "only" thirteen years after the actual event.

In fact, there were two categories of laws: the old and the new. In the first case the governments put into effect some previously existing laws; for example, the "Metaxian" law referring to spying<sup>21</sup> according to which many people were sentenced to death, during peacetime, on the basis of just an accusation. In the second case the government introduced new laws, which were aimed at manipulating people's political attitudes. For example, the law by which the idea of "certificate of social beliefs" was introduced.<sup>22</sup> According to this act, anyone, who wanted to find a job in the private or public sector had to obtain a "blank" certificate. It is a fact that people who were involved in the civil war had a hard time finding jobs unless they had signed a certificate of repentance.

Obviously, these kinds of policies not only influenced people's political attitudes but also contributed significantly to the shaping of people's political beliefs. It is amazing and disturbing how the political beliefs of the masses can shift from one side to a quite opposite one in a fairly short period of time following well organized manipulation.

### The Military

The role of the military was not of limited significance in the political developments of the period under examination. Of course, military involvement in Greek politics is a routine rather than an exceptional

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<sup>21</sup>This is the 375 act of December 1936.

<sup>22</sup>This is the 516 act of January 1948. See also Appendix VI.

phenomenon. During this period military influence in politics can be distinguished first in the form of direct political intervention, second in organizing military-political organizations and third in organizing para-military groups.

The political influence of the army starts from the so-called "political education" it gives to the soldiers during their military service.<sup>23</sup> The attitudes of the military, as we briefly noted above, were defined by its relations to the U.S. and N.A.T.O. as well as to the monarchy. Thus, the political socialization they were providing was nothing but pro-Western, pro-N.A.T.O. propaganda as well as the idea of unquestionable support for the monarch, who was commander general of the army. This propaganda had one very clear orientation: anti-communism. The military never hesitated to label any democratic citizen a "communist". The whole political climate, resulting from the civil war and the defeat of the leftist movement contributed to this political socialization of the citizens. Furthermore the unstable political situation apparently necessitated actions like this and helped to legitimize the army's activities.

Apart from this rather indirect intervention of the military into politics there were other incidents of direct involvement. This direct involvement had only one goal: to support the monarchy or to change a certain situation in favour of the right wing governments of the time. In May 1951 a militant group of army officers tried to stage a coup and establish a military government. General Papagos, a political leader favoured by the U.S., disagreed and eventually managed to prevent the

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<sup>23</sup>We have to keep in mind that military service is compulsory in Greece. All males, with no exception have to serve in the army for more than two years some time between the ages of 19 to 28.

coup. The army officers, who were involved in its preparation did not receive any serious penalty. In addition there were a series of other military involvements in the country's politics, especially during electoral campaign periods; it would be redundant to note that these activities were exclusively in favour of the right and its leader at the time.

The second type of military interference was no less important nor effective than the previous one. This form of the involvement entailed the establishment of clandestine military organizations whose goals could not easily be characterized as military. The dominant clandestine military organization was I.D.E.A.,<sup>24</sup> which was established by young officers of the army in 1943 in the Middle East. This organization though unofficial or rather underground, became very strong and eventually a legitimate organization since it had semi-official discussions with the leaders of the whole spectrum of political parties in August of 1947. Furthermore, at the same time the heads of I.D.E.A. started almost regular meetings with the director of military affairs of the U.S. embassy.<sup>25</sup>

I.D.E.A.'s goals were aimed at both military and political issues. By obtaining key positions in the army, officer members pushed non-members either to join the group or to resign. In its declaration, I.D.E.A. made its political aims clear and these were nationalist, anti-communist oriented, and were to be realized even with a "dictatorship of I.D.E.A." since the corruption of politicians was taken for granted by the organization.<sup>26</sup> After eighteen years, in 1967, I.D.E.A. carried out its threat

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<sup>24</sup>"Sacred Bundle of Greek Army Officers".

<sup>25</sup>D.K. Paralikas, I.D.E.A. and A.S.P.I.D.A.: roots and ramifications (Athens, 1978) pp. 34-35.

<sup>26</sup>In I.D.E.A.'s declaration of July 7, 1949, Ch. VI. Ibid. pp. 36-39.

and the result was a "dictatorship" which as we will see led to bloodshed, stagnation and national calamity.

Finally, the military, using as an excuse the "communist threat", promoted the creation of the para-military organization: T.E.A. ("Battalions of National Security"). There were well organized armed groups of civilians with an ultra anti-communist orientation. They dominated the rural area by terrorizing the people on the basis of their political beliefs. These groups were very active and "influential", especially during the electoral campaigns of the period.

The above facts are far from indicating that the Greek military over the period 1949-1967 was neutral or indifferent to the course of the political development. On the contrary, the army was a very significant factor in Greek politics, and always acted in favour of the social and political status quo.

### The Monarchy

The Greek monarchy has an important tradition of political involvement. The Glücksborg dynasty, which was imposed on Greece in 1863 by Britain, never managed to limit itself to its constitutional role.<sup>27</sup> After the end of the civil war the monarchy did not do anything to escape from this "bad habit". On the contrary, over this period, royal involvement in politics became more intense and better organized.

The constitution of 1952 defined the monarchy's position in the state apparatus by constitutionalizing the idea that "kings reign but do not govern". However, the constitution did not describe the royal duties

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<sup>27</sup>The only exception to this was the reign of King George A', who in practice respected the democratic institutions of the country.

in the system strictly enough. For example, article 29 says that "the king does not hold formal responsibilities and he is an inviolable person" while article 30 allows some political activities for the monarch, given the agreement of the ministers. This lack of clarity in the constitution fostered royal involvement and influence in the political life of the country. The actual royal influence on politics entailed an indirect involvement through social activities as well as a direct involvement which at many times took the form of open violation of the constitution.

A significant part of royal indirect involvement in politics took place in the course of the activities of the "Royal Foundation" or as it more commonly called the "Queen's Foundation". The foundation was subsidised by funds collected by governments through an indirect taxation system; thus, the "Royal Foundation" was funded by tax-payers. According to the constitution, though, no-one could check and control the wealth of the foundation except the members of the royal family. It was estimated that about 10 million dollars was used from the national budget annually for this purpose.<sup>28</sup>

The consequences of an institution such as this are obvious. The crown, using tax payers' money, could demonstrate its philanthropic feelings and at the same time create its own "clientele" among the people who worked in the foundation as well as among the people who benefitted from the activities of the institution.

In addition, the crown in Greece managed to maintain groups of loyal supporters at all levels of the governmental machine as well as in the business lobby. As Professor Meynaud notes, this promonarchist lobby,

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<sup>28</sup>J. Meynaud, *op. cit.* p. 341.

which through family relations had strong international connections could be called "royal party". The politics of this lobby aimed at the consolidation of the regime by supporting any government, party or individual who was loyal to royal institutions, which was identified with the preservation of the status quo. At this point, we have to note that the crown in Greece was constantly supporting the major right wing parties — "Greek Rally" and "National Radical Union". However, the "royal party" had close links with the politicians of the centre — "Union Centre" — not only those on the right wing of the party, such as Petros Garoufalias and Stefanos Stefanopoulos, but also on the left, with such members as Ilias Tsirimokos.<sup>29</sup> In conclusion, we could say that the main characteristic of this kind of crown politics was secrecy and plotting.

As long as the political situation did not indicate danger, the crown did not take open political initiatives. It limited its activities within the above framework and only occasionally intervened by giving anti-communist talks and lectures or by trying to reach some kind of international agreement in the absence of the government's representative who was in charge.<sup>30</sup>

However, by 1963, in the monarchy's opinion, the stability of the political situation was destroyed when the "Union Centre" of George Papandreou, a moderate liberal with no intention of changing the constitution, won the election. The crown did not approve of this election re-

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<sup>29</sup> Ilias Tsirimokos was one of the leaders of E.A.M. and had very close relations with the left.

<sup>30</sup> In March 1963, King Konstantine gave a very strong anti-communist lecture to the leadership of the Greek church. Later on and during Churchill's funeral he tried to reach an agreement with Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State, on the Cyprus problem. Ibid. p. 343.

sult or the popularity of Papandreou's government which achieved 52.72 percent of the popular vote in the following year's election (Feb. 1964). In reality, though, the monarchy had nothing to fear since there was no danger of constitutional reform. However, "occasione data" the king openly attacked the prime minister. In the summer of 1965, King Konstantine did not approve the replacement of the minister of defence. The king had no right to do this and his reaction was considered an open violation of the constitution. The violation became clearer when the king considered Papandreou's letter to him as a resignation and gave the mandate to George Athanasiadis-Novas, a pro-monarchist politician of the governmental party.

By this time the political storm had broken. The crown had become deeply involved in politics. Like his grandfather, King Konstantine "believed his power to dismiss was absolute", and included the right to force the resignation of a prime minister and government of which he disapproved, even though it had a majority in parliament.<sup>31</sup> Many historians of this episode claim that the king's mother, Frederika, was the major organizer of the whole incident.<sup>32</sup> Even if we accept this observation as not far from the truth, we cannot interpret history using exclusively personal motivations of the protagonists on the political scene. Apparently, the crown wanted to maintain for its

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<sup>31</sup>J.P.C. Carey - A.G. Carey op. cit., p. 202.

<sup>32</sup>From D. Paralika op. cit., pp. 61-62.



own benefit its unwritten privileges as the major regulator or rather manipulator of the political system of the country.<sup>33</sup> And it was this royal tendency for political involvement in politics, which made the institution one of the most important issues of the period, one which could not be ignored by an political party or politician.

### The Major Party Alignments

Before we pursue the development of our thesis it is necessary to refer to the major alignment of the political spectrum with respect the above analysis of the major issues — foreign relations, constitutional and legal framework, the military the monarchy — as well as to the major characteristics of the party system during the period 1949-1967. This brief analysis is necessary in order to identify the recent development of the Greek party system. To put it differently, only an understanding of the previous party system can provide us with a full comprehensive analysis of the recent convergence which in fact is part of the hypothesis of this work.

The right wing alignment on the major issues of the country is not difficult to identify, since right wing political parties — "Greek Rally" and "National Radical Union" (E.R.E.) — were in power for over a decade, during the period examined above (Nov. 1952 - Nov. 1963). Thus, if we follow the governmental policies of the period we can figure out the major right wing alignments.

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<sup>33</sup>Jean Meynaud, Political Powers in Greece: The Royal Deviation from Parliamentarianism (Athens, Byron, 1974) p. 78.

However, we can say that when people referred to the right they had a certain idea about the political implications of the term. The right wing parties in fact put in practice the foreign policies of the country. They were openly pro-western, pro-American and believed that the development of the country could be achieved by importing capital and basing the economy on the almost absolute adoption of the free-enterprise system. Although the majority of the right wing was pro-parliamentarian and had accepted a democratic way of ruling, they never hesitated to introduce anti-democratic authoritarian legislation. Their aim was quite clear: the squeezing of the left and the control of the political attitudes of the people in the long run. Furthermore, the right had very close relations with the army. In fact, the first right wing leader, who tried successfully to unify this part of the political spectrum, was General Papagos. However, the good relations between right wing parties and the military were not only based on personal or historical reasons. Their relations were far more deep rooted, mainly in the structural needs of the state after the civil war. The right won against the socialist forces in 1949, but its victory was not an easy one; it had to be backed by the U.K., and the U.S. as well as the local supporters of western policies. X knew that the international as well as the internal-social-balance of power could not be secured without a strong and politically influential army. To put it differently, a strong and not politically indifferent army in Greece was not only in the interest of the U.S. foreign policy but also of a vital importance for the internal political powers which were interested in the maintenance of the "status quo". Thus, as we will see, the army and the police often intervened throughout the period, in favour of the right wing parties, sometimes under the guidance of prom-

inent right wing politicians - as in the elections of 1958 or 1961. Furthermore, the right had identified its policies as being loyal to the monarchy. We would not be wrong if we were to argue that the right wing parties of the period were pro-monarchist. Understandably, the crown was always in favour of the right wing, since whenever it intervened in politics, it did so in support of the dominant right wing party. In fact, the relations between the crown and the right wing parties did not stop only at the support one another. It went far beyond this level with the almost direct intervention of monarchy in party issues as in 1955 when the king appointed Karamanlis successor of General Papagos in the leadership of "Greek Rally".

These were the major alignments of the right over the period. At this point, we have to point out that the right tried, not unsuccessfully, to identify its policies with the notion of nationalism. Anyone who criticized the right for its policies could easily be labelled anti-nationalist, that is, against the national interest, or even traitor.

The policies of the Centre parties are more difficult to identify. The centre did not manage to establish a strong political formation until 1961, when a plethora of small liberal social democratic and even conservative groups were unified under one formation, the "Union Centre". Thus, the idea of the centre in the context of the Greek political spectrum was very vague and often contradictory.

However, there was an apparently significant characteristic of the parties of the Centre - their strong opposition to right wing rule. In fact, though, this basis of opposition was not a qualitative difference between the two fractions. The Centre during this period had no objection to the exclusive western orientation of the country's external relations,

and had no different understanding about the economic development of the country, other than the one based on the flow of foreign aid and capital. Furthermore, the majority if not the entire centre was not against the monarchy as an institution, and did not object to the foreign influence in the army.

Although there was no difference between the orientation of the political alignment between the centre and the right wing parties, there was a clear difference in the way the two fractions wanted to apply their policies. The centre was much more moderate, less provocative and willing to follow the constitution. For instance, they wanted the crown to act according to the constitutional framework; the army to "stay in the camps" and not get involved in politics, and put some kind of limits on the way the foreign capital was flowing. But the most important difference in the tactics of the two fractions were in their policies toward the defeated of the civil war — the left. The centre was against repressive legislation, the discrimination on the basis of political beliefs, displacements and imprisonments which were introduced by the right wing governments. Over all, the centre, despite its quantitative differences with the right, never reached the point of crucial, essential qualitative difference. The trading of politicians between the two fractions is a very good example of the depth of differences between the centre and right wing parties during the past civil war area.

The left, as we noted already, was the big loser of the civil war. The banning of its major political organization — C.P. — as well as a lack of legitimation, as a result of the violent anti-communist propaganda, were some of the crucial problems of integration of the left part of the Greek political spectrum. The notion of left wing during the period was

associated with the "United Democratic Left" (E.D.A.), which was established in 1951 mainly by communists and left socialists. Despite its diverse membership, the party was largely controlled by the underground Communist Party, due of course to the C.P.'s organizational experience and international support.

The political alignments of the left were qualitatively different from the other two major fractions of the political spectrum. However, their policies were not particularly radical. To make this point schematically clear, we would not be mistaken if we were to say that E.D.A.'s policies at the time would not be characterized other than as moderately social democratic in the context of today's Greek political spectrum.

Of course, E.D.A. opposed quite clearly the imposed model of economic and political development of the country. They were against the development of one-dimensional — only with the west — international relations as well as the restriction of the democratic civil rights in the country. On the issue of monarchy, E.D.A. had a position very similar to that of the Centre: no objection to the institution itself but rather a desire to keep crown's activities under constitutional control.

In conclusion, we can say that the major party alignments during the 1949-1967 period are quite different from today's developments of the Greek party system. We will deal with the details of this development in the next chapter but for a better understanding of this convergence of the party system in Greece, we will deal with a quite characteristic phenomenon: the organizational structure of the political parties.

Today's political parties feel very concerned about their organization and structure — at least in theory. In fact, they try to create permanent structural bodies, and function like regular conferences, permanent

local offices and steady membership etc.<sup>34</sup> However, that was not the case for the parties — with an exception of E.D.A. — during the period under examination where parties' organizational structure was based upon a very peculiar and primitive institution: "Kommatarchis".<sup>35</sup>

"Kommatarchis" were local or regional agents of M.P.'s or candidates who happened to be influential in the area and consequently could influence the whole constituency. The party which could control or even "buy" the influence of these people was ahead of the other which happened to lack the services of these men. Most commonly though, "Kommatarchis" were affiliated with politicians and not with the party itself; thus, they used to travel from one party to another according to politicians' desires. Given the lack of other party structures, Kommatarchis became very powerful, especially during electoral periods.

This main trait of the parties' organization during the period under examination is almost totally absent today. The parties tried to build up stronger permanent structures so that this old or rather primitive style of organization is falling out of fashion even in some isolated areas in the country side. This fact is an additional argument for the understanding of the recent development - convergence - of the Greek party system.

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<sup>34</sup>For more details see Chapter III and IV.

<sup>35</sup>Litterally the word means leader (head) of a party. But it has finally come to mean the local agents of a party, since in fact they were more than vital for parties' electoral surviving.

## THE ELECTIONS

### The Electoral System and the Electoral Conditions

Before we pursue an examination of the development of the party system through the electoral procedure a brief reference to the electoral system and electoral conditions must to be made. Thus, not only will the developments of the period under examination be more comprehensible but also the major differences with the present period will be more identifiable.

The electoral system plays an important role in political development and particularly in the development of the political parties of any system. In Greece, during the period under examination, the electoral systems influence on the political process was very significant.

The constitution of 1952 does not contain the electoral system of the country. It just states that electoral procedure will be defined by another bill. This hesitation to constitutionalize one of the most vital elements of any parliamentary system shows that the ones who worked out the constitution wanted to be free to adjust the electoral system to their needs every time an election was held.

Basically, the electoral system can be defined as a proportional one. We would, though, be mistaken if we considered it a truly democratic electoral system, since there were restrictions put upon it which have made it less democratic than any majoritarian one. Firstly, there were restrictions made upon participation in the second and third distribution of seats. For example, a political party in order to be eligible to participate in the second distribution of seats must have had a certain proportion of votes cross country; the required proportion was much higher a

coalition of two or more parties.<sup>36</sup>

The intentions of lawmakers were apparent: on the one hand the reinforcement of the position of the strong party, which usually was their own one — "Greek Rally" or E.R.E.— and on the other a discouragement of organized opposition by the formation of coalitions among the smaller parties. Moreover, this kind of electoral system had a significant influence on voting behavior by creating the idea of the "lost vote".<sup>37</sup>

Furthermore, there were some other factors in the electoral system which to a great degree influenced the electoral conditions generally: the notion of the eligible voter and of constituencies' definition.

In Greece there were two different conceptions of the notion of "citizen": one was relative to permanent residence and the other relative to voter eligibility. All Greeks had the right to vote — with the exception of the people who had lost this right because of their activities during the civil war. However, Greeks were eligible to vote only in the constituency in which they were registered as permanent residents and not in the constituency in which they happened to live during the election. Thus, people who had left their initial residence had either to go home and vote or to undertake a bureaucratic procedure in order to transfer their "electoral status". The first solution was rather expensive, while the second one took a long time. Usually, people did not bother to apply for a transfer of their electoral status during a non-election period.

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<sup>36</sup>This restriction ranged from 15 to 25 percent and from 25 to 40 for a party or a coalition respectively.

<sup>37</sup>This is commonly used in Greece; it expresses the popular feeling or rather attitude to vote for the possible winner since a vote for a smaller party could not make any difference.



Under two conditions, this issue would not significantly influence the electoral results. Firstly, if the governments did not consider the applications according to the political beliefs of applicants, discouraging the "democratic"<sup>38</sup> ones and facilitating the pro-government ones.<sup>39</sup> Secondly, if the mobility of the population was not so pronounced. In fact, after the civil war, a radical urbanization took place in the country. As a result of this 42.11 percent of the population in 1961 in Athens had "no electoral right" in the place of their permanent residence.<sup>40</sup>

Moreover, a kind of "gerrymandering"<sup>41</sup> characterized the definition of the electoral constituencies of the country. In 1946, there were 36 electoral ridings and in 1958 this number was increased up to 55. In the course of this increase the governments' intentions became clear: They wanted to spread out their support as much as possible and to achieve a major concentration for their opposition. The split of the Piraeus constituency in two is a very good example of this; the government tried to isolate the "red" influence of the Piraeus suburbs.

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<sup>38</sup>The term was used quite commonly to characterize any neutral or anti-government - right wing - citizen.

<sup>39</sup>J. Meynaud, *Political Powers in Greece*, op. cit. p. 63.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 59.

<sup>41</sup>"Gerrymandering": The drawing of the legislative district boundary line in order to obtain partisan or factional advantage. Gerrymandering is engaged in by partisan majorities in state legislatures when they are drawing up congressional and state legislative districts. The objective is to spread the support for one's own party over many districts and to concentrate the support for the other party in a few districts. Jack C. Plano et al, Political Science Dictionary (Hinsdale, The Dryden Press, 1973) p. 172.

Another defining factor of the elections was the institution of "acting governments", which in fact was a constitutional custom rather than a constitutional order.<sup>42</sup> During the period under examination, 1949-1967, six elections took place under these "acting governments" (1950, 1952, 1958, 1961, 1963, 1964) and only two under the existing "political" government of the time (1951, 1956). "Acting governments" were "non political" governments, which were in charge of the normal electoral procedure as well as of current issues of the state. In other words, the "acting governments" were intended to guarantee unbiased, free, democratic elections.

Once more, we should not be misguided by the democratic image of the institution. These governments were usually appointed by the crown and the previous government. Apparently the purpose which was served by them was to tailor elections for the exclusive benefit of the government — usually right wing — which had appointed it. The government of K. Dova in 1961, is a very good example of this pattern: the 1961 election was called an "electoral coup" by both the centre and the left as well as by foreign observers.

The above description detailed the political environment in which elections were held and the political parties developed. Even the most subjective observer could classify this as an ideal type. There is no historical experience which can prove that government parties, in a democratic system, do not take advantage of their power in order to increase political parties try to explain the electoral result by referring to this fact, although these parties tend to act the same way if they ever

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<sup>42</sup>This constitutional custom appeared in Greece for the first time in 1867 — before the election of 1868.

get into power. However, it seems to us that these kind of incidents were so extensive in Greece during the period under examination, that not much of an effort has to be made before one can challenge the legitimacy of electoral results.

Of course, there are some excuses offered for the situation by the administration. The destruction of the governmental machine in some historical instances (e.g. Metaxas' dictatorship, foreign occupation, civil war) seems to be the major excuse for these "mistakes". But such a concentration of anti-democratic activities is rather excessive. Thus, even if we do not ignore these excuses, which are reasonable to a certain degree, it is difficult to avoid the explanation that everything was set up deliberately. This framework was built up by a small minority of the population, who have always been afraid of a free, democratic expression of people's will, especially whenever this can challenge the "status quo", which works to their own advantage.

These major characteristics of the electoral conditions are not to be found in the post-dictatorship period. This period, as we will see, is characterized by much more democratic habits and an overall radicalism, which has contributed to the phenomenon of the parties' convergence, which we are just about to examine.

### Election of March 1950

A few months after the end of the civil war a new election was announced and in January 1950 a government was formed by I. Theotokis, as "acting government" in charge of the election.

Although the number of seats was reduced from 354 to 250 the number of political parties or groups, which participated, increased from 27 to

44. The major antagonists, though, remained the Popular and the Liberal parties. The winners of the election (Appendix III) became the parties of the centre (i.e. Liberal, National Progressive Union of the Centre, Party of G. Papandreou), while the Populists, by not forming a coalition emerged from this race much weaker.

But it became obvious fairly quickly that this result could not secure a strong government. Within the period of eighteen months five governments, based on coalitions of the parties of the centre, were formed. Eventually two major developments emerged from this situation, which were very significant in the process of the party system during the period under examination.

The first has to do with the emergence of a new party of the right. Marshal Papagos decided to resign from the military and become involved in politics. Papagos skilfully manipulated the influence of his strong personality and his prestige as leader of the Nationalist forces during the civil war, to unify all the right wing parties and groups and establish a new party called "Greek Rally" ("Ellinikos Synagermos E.S."). Despite the Rally's attacks against both Liberals and Populists and its effort to create a supra national party image for itself, Papagos' party was generally made up of monarchists and conservatives in sympathy and not much of a difference could be seen between the new party and the old Popular one.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>J.P.C. Carey et al. op. cit. p. 150

The other development took place on the left of the political spectrum. After the legal banning of the Communist Party there was no political expression for the communists in the country. They also could not find political expression among the parties of the centre since the latter's policy was not decisively radical. In addition, some of the left wing leaders indicated the necessity of a coordination of the political activities of the radicals in the country. Thus, after the announcement of the next election (June 30, 1951) many, communist and non-communist personalities and activists were attracted by the idea of a new party of the left. Finally, in August 1951 a new party named "United Democratic Left" ("Eniea Demokratiki Aristera" -E.D.A.) was formed. From that time until the military coup in 1967 the left of the country was organized in E.D.A.: from moderate socialists to communists.

The political instability of the country, as well the differences in the leadership of the political parties of the centre<sup>44</sup> caused the proclamation of a new election, in September 9, 1951— much earlier than it was due.

#### Election of September 1951

The two major characteristics of this election were the changes in the electoral system and party participation. The electoral system changed from a simple proportional to a "modified proportional" one.

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<sup>44</sup>One of the major issues of the disagreement among the leaders of the centre was the issue of amnesty to the defeated of the civil war. General Plastiras wanted to take this step in order to unify the nation, while S. Venizelos and G. Papandreou were strongly against such a policy. Apparently, the two leaders, since they had the king's promise of no political involvement, supported the royal policy on the issue. J. Meynaud, op. cit., p. 89.

Some restrictions were placed on the representation of small parties and additional flexibility was given to the administration in order to add some extra seats to the initial 250, to make up for distributional problems. The radical reduction of the number of political parties, which participated in this election is the other significant difference from the last election. In 1951 there were only nine participating parties in contrast to forty-four in 1950. Apparently the electoral system and the emergence of the new parties — which in fact were the creation of other smaller parties — were the major factors of this development. Definitely, a movement towards a smaller multiparty system had started at the time.

The results (Appendix III) were in favour of the "Greek Rally", which had managed to skillfully manipulate the military vote.<sup>45</sup> However, it did not obtain enough seats (114 out of 257 seats) to form the government. Thus a government was formed by General Plastiras, as leader of the two strongest parties of the centre — "National Progressive Union of the Centre" and the "Liberal Party" — which had gained 131 seats.

Plastiras had a rather hard time in office as he was under pressure from Papagos, the Crown and Americans to prevent any implementation of his promises for amnesty. In March 1952, despite international protests, Nicos Belojannis, the leader of the Communist Party, was sent to the firing squad. Plastiras lost the confidence of the left and the resultant election was inevitable.

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<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 93.

Election of November 1952

The acting government of D. Kiousopoulos was in charge of the election. Papagos and Plastiras agreed to introduce an electoral system different from the previous one in order to have strong and viable government. The U.S. played the key role in this agreement since the American ambassador in Athens managed to convince the two leaders that a majority system of voting was the most acceptable for the U.S.<sup>46</sup>

Papagos' party, by promising to forget the past as to assist in the liberation of Cyprus from British occupation, was the big winner of the election (Appendix III). In fact, the imposed electoral system worked in favour of the Rally, which won 247 seats out of a total of 300, squeezing out in an unprecedented manner the other two fractions of the political spectrum: the centre and the left. The result of this election was of great significance in the development of the Greek party system, since the dominant right wing party — although with another name and leader — remained in power until Papandreou's victory in 1963.

Papagos remained the leader of the "Greek Rally" until his death (October 4, 1955). Using his strong personality, Papagos introduced a sort of "Bonapartism" into Greek politics: the ignoring of parliament and the other political parties; the obedience of M.P.'s to the leader, and the strengthening of executive power. This pattern is followed even today, by the leader of the political parties, as we will see below.

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<sup>46</sup>The American ambassador believed that the large sums of American aid permitted "greater American involvement in affairs which would have otherwise been considered strictly domestic" and that the introduction of a "simple proportional" electoral system would be disruptive to the flow of the American aid into the country. Theodore A. Coulombis, Greek Political Reaction to American and N.A.T.O Influences (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966) p. 52 also J.P.C. Carey et al. op. cit., p. 153.

After Papagos' death and before any official election for party's leadership the king appointed Konstantine Karamanlis, a less prominent member of the cabinet as prime minister and eventually as leader of the party. It was a surprising choice, the reasons for which are not yet clear. Some observers argue that the crown considered Karamanlis willing to accept the "logical" solution for the Cypriot issue that is according to the British plans.<sup>47</sup> People's rumours at the time implied that Karamanlis had some kind of personal influence over Queen Frederika. However, whatever explanation can be given, we must admit that the yet little recognized Karamanlis was to be so strong a prime minister that he was able to guide country's fortunes uninterrupted from 1955 until 1963, which is a record length of time in Greek politics.

Karamanlis' main goal was to maintain the strength of the right in the coming election, which was due on February 19, 1956. In the course of this effort Karamanlis founded a new party, "National Radical Union" ("Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi", E.R.E.). E.R.E. managed to be supported by both Rally and the old Popular Party. Karamanlis also introduced a new electoral system, which fit the needs of this party. The new system was extremely complicated and was a combination of majoritarian and proportional systems. According to Professor Meynaud the intention of the government was clear: to push all right and centre parties to the formation of two big anti-communist political formations.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup>J. Meynaud, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 96-98.



### Election of February 1956

The results of the election (Appendix III) were those intended by Karamanlis' government. The "National Radicals" with almost one percent less of the popular than the "Democratic Union",<sup>49</sup> got 33 seats more than the actually most popular party!

During this session the Karamanlis government faced a lot of problems arising mainly from the Cypriot struggle for independence. Apparently Karamanlis could not ignore the people's strong attitudes in support of the Cypriots, while at the same time he had to respond to the country's international commitments, which were far from agreement with the patriotic trend for "Union" (Enosis) between Cyprus and the mainland. In 1957, Karamanlis did not react strongly against U.S. and N.A.T.O. pressure to accept the installation of nuclear missile bases on Greek soil. He only asked for postponement while the parties of the centre and the left were against the idea.<sup>50</sup>

Finally, in the spring of 1958 Karamanlis lost on a vote of confidence in parliament when sixteen M.P.s, including two of his cabinet ministers, withdrew their support of the government. Karamanlis resigned and a new election was announced for May 11, 1958. An active government was formed by K. Georgakopoulos, president of the Greek Red Cross, and intensive discussion and negotiations started on the electoral system. Ultimately, both Karamanlis and G. Papandreou, who meanwhile had become

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<sup>49</sup>The "Democratic Union" was a coalition of almost all the parties of the centre and E.D.A.

<sup>50</sup>J.P.C. Carey et. al. op. cit., pp. 160-161.

leader of the Liberal Party, agreed to introduce a "modified proportional" system. The intentions of this electoral system were no different from the previous one: beneficial for the two strongest political parties, aiming at the creation of two strong, anti-communist oriented, political formations, and a squeeze of E.D.A.

### Election of May 1958

The electoral system did not work out according to the expectations of the parties which introduced it. Although Karamanlis' party was again the winner of the election and retained a strong majority in parliament, E.D.A. had an unprecedented result and, with a little under a quarter of the total votes, became the leading opposition party.

At this point we have to note that the electoral behavior of Greeks more often is influenced by international issues related to the country than by strictly domestic ones. E.D.A. with clearly nationalist policies, on the country's international alignments – Cypriot "unity" with the mainland and protesting against the establishment of U.S. missile bases in the country – exploited this basic characteristic of the Greek electorate. This characteristic of the Greek voting behaviour, as we will see, is still dominant despite significant changes in the political environment in the country.

Another outcome of this election was that Karamanlis consolidated his position as the dominant figure of the right. Under his leadership the right wing was to be united during almost the entire period under examination. However, in spite of this strength, he was very upset because of the strengthening of the left. Thus, he decided to hold an election and use the international situation (the Berlin crisis) against the left.

At the centre of the political spectrum a rather interesting development took place. The parties of the centre were facing big problems since, although they were the majority just seven years before, they had not even managed to survive as the leading opposition party in this election. Thus, great efforts for unity among these parties took place after 1958. The leading figure in these efforts was Georgios Papandreou. Finally, as Professor Meynaud claimed, under his leadership and the intensive activities of American officers<sup>51</sup> a new party was established, "Centre Union". All the parties of the centre, as well as some small right wing ones, swallowed their differences and were unified. This party, despite its contradictions, was to play a very significant rôle in contemporary Greek politics.

Among the left there were no significant developments. After the failure to unify all "democratic political forces" against the right, E.D.A. decided to form a coalition with the "National Agricultural Party". This electoral coalition, "Pandemocratic Agrarian Front of Greece" (Pandemokratikon Agrotikon Metopon Ellados, P.A.M.E.), aimed at the concentration of some centre-left personalities in an organization, in order to confront the open attacks of the government against E.D.A. as well as the consequences of the "dual struggle" — against the right and the left — of Papandreou's party.

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<sup>51</sup> Professor Meynaud claims that the American interest in the creation of a new strong party of the centre was not only based upon the American uncertainties about the usefulness of Karamanlis' party but also that this interest was reflecting the changes in the American administration taking place at the time. J. Meynaud, op. cit., p. 107.

Finally, the next election was announced for October 9, 1961 and K. Dovas, a military man, was appointed as prime minister of the acting government. The electoral system remained basically the same. The election of 1961 though, was to be one of the most biased in Greek political history.

#### Election of October 1961

From the first moment, it became clear that E.R.E. was anxious to win the election by any means. Thus, it organized its electoral campaign as if it were a military operation. The activities of the army the police and other "underground" right wing groups during the campaign are beyond description; beating, threats, terrorism and even assassinations along with political propoaganda became the every day activities of these institutions. This right wing organized campaign was called "Periklis" and the objective was the re-election of E.R.E.<sup>52</sup> Many prominent members of the junta, who organized the coup in 1967, were the chief organizers and executives of this plan.<sup>53</sup>

Moreover, the contribution of the acting government to the above described operation was not insignificant. It worked on the voting registration lists in such a manipulative way that not only was the outcome accommodating to E.R.E. on the procedure of seats' distribution but also

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<sup>52</sup>The general order was the use of "beating or money" in order to elect the "Blue" (E.R.E.) and not the "Yellow" (Centre Union) or the "Red" (E.D.A.). D. Paralika op. cit., p. 96-99.

<sup>53</sup>George Papadopoulos was the co-ordinator of the operation (Periclis) Ibid., p. 99.