

**Bureaucrats With Rifles:**

Comparative analysis of two instances of crisis, reform, and new ethical doctrine in  
the Canadian Armed Forces from the perspective of military professionalism

By

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## ABSTRACT

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are currently in the midst of a crisis stemming from sexual misconduct within the service. Multiple external inquiries have arrived at the conclusion that the solution to this problem is found in culture change within the Canadian military, and energetic reforms have been begun to that end. This is not the first time in recent memory that a scandal has rocked the CAF; a similar crisis surrounding unethical behaviour of service members resulted from the torture and murder of teenager Shidane Arone by members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in 1993 in Somalia. The Somalia scandal also led to multiple external inquiries and a host of recommendations which embarked the CAF on an ambitious series of reforms. This thesis compares the two cases from analytical perspectives grounded in military professionalism and civil-military relations, investigating the capstone ethical doctrine that was issued in response to both crises. Although significant media and academic attention has been paid to the current sexual misconduct crisis in the CAF, to date there has been no substantive comparison made between the two cases from the perspectives identified above. This research finds that the newly released CAF ethos, unlike that which resulted from the Somalia scandal, excessively civilianizes the CAF by promulgating a set of values too far isolated from the unique requirements of the profession of arms, leaving CAF members ill-prepared for the harsh demands of military service. The thesis concludes with two measures to address the overcorrection.

## CONTENTS

<b>Abstract</b> .....	<b>ii</b>
<b>List of Figures</b> .....	<b>iv</b>
<b>List of Tables</b> .....	<b>iv</b>
<b>List of Abbreviations</b> .....	<b>v</b>
<b>Chapter 1</b> .....	<b>1</b>
Introduction .....	1
The Research Plan.....	5
<b>Chapter 2 – Civil-military relations and the military profession</b> .....	<b>9</b>
Introduction .....	9
Huntington – <i>The Soldier and the State</i> .....	10
Janowitz – <i>The Professional Soldier</i> .....	18
The maturation of the field.....	25
After the collapse of the Soviet Union – Feaver and Agency Theory .....	30
Changing society and evolving professionalism .....	36
Conclusion: Civil-Military Relations – Three giants, plus the “shared” approach .....	40
Conclusion: Conceiving the military profession.....	42
<b>Chapter 3 – <i>Duty With Honour</i></b> .....	<b>48</b>
Introduction .....	48
The Canadian Context.....	48
The Somalia Affair – Crisis and Reform.....	55
What was the problem, and what was the solution? .....	57
<i>Duty With Honour</i> .....	60
Discussion and Analysis.....	70
<b>Chapter 4 – <i>Trusted to Serve</i></b> .....	<b>76</b>
Introduction .....	76
The Sexual Misconduct Crisis in the CAF .....	77
<i>Trusted To Serve</i> .....	82
Conclusion: Civil-military relations and the parallels between the two crises.....	93
<b>Chapter 5 – Comparison, Analysis, and Implications</b> .....	<b>94</b>
Introduction .....	94
Differing reforms – change the instructions, change the results. ....	94
<i>Trusted To Serve</i> and Impacts on Military Professionalism .....	102

Focusing on the “military” in CAF military culture.....	110
Recommendations .....	116
Conclusion.....	120
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>123</b>
<b>Appendices.....</b>	<b>132</b>

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 - Command and Control of the DND and CAF - Theoretical View. ....	50
Figure 2 - Organizational structure of DND and CAF .....	51
Figure 3 - Theoretical Construct of the Profession of Arms in Canada.....	62
Figure 4 - <i>Duty With Honour's</i> ethical framework. ....	66

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 - Appearance/Absence of particular words in each text.....	86
Table 2 - Ethics and values in various DND publications .....	87

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADM – Assistant Deputy Minister

CAF/CF – Canadian Armed Forces/Canadian Forces

CFHQ – Canadian Forces Headquarters

CDS – Chief of the Defence Staff

DM – Deputy Minister

DND – Department of National Defence

DWH – *Duty With Honour*

MND – Minister of National Defence

MP – Member of Parliament

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NORAD – North American Aerospace Defence Command

NDA- National Defence Act

NDHQ – National Defence Headquarters

OP – Operation, in the sense of specific military mission.

TtS – *Trusted to Serve*

VCDS – Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

## CHAPTER 1

### Introduction

This thesis is about military professionalism in Canada. Because any military is necessarily and inextricably linked to the broader society which sustains it, it is also concerned with civil-military relations in Canada. The timing for an inquiry into these subjects is ideal. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)<sup>1</sup> have frequently been in the news and the subject of public and academic scrutiny recently for a variety of reasons, only loosely related to each other. One consistent locus of interest is related to current missions such as Canada's and the CAF's supporting efforts to Ukraine in the current war between that country and Russia, both in material and training aid being provided, and Canada's increasing military footprint in Latvia as part of NATO deterrence against Russia. A second, perennial framing of the CAF relates to its readiness and equipment shortfalls, but confronted by an increasingly violent and unpredictable multi-polar world, the salience of this perspective has taken on greater importance since war returned to Europe and as tensions rise between China and the USA. A third common perspective has concerned itself with misbehaviour in the CAF, which in the last decade has been primarily fixated on issues regarding sexual misconduct, its unacceptable prevalence in the CAF, and how the institution has attempted, or has failed, to adequately address the problem. This last viewpoint has most recently been framed, in one way or another, as requiring a culture change within the CAF.

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<sup>1</sup> During the 1990s under PM Jean Chretien, Canada's military began to be referred to as the Canadian Forces (CF) until 2013 when PM Stephen Harper returned to the previous CAF designation. (<https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadas-military-is-getting-a-new-name-again>). Both Chretien and Harper largely engaged in an act of political labelling, rather than any substantive change. The National Defence Act (NDA) itself uses both terms without establishing an authoritatively "correct" appellation. For instance, section 14 of the NDA states "The Canadian Forces are the armed forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces". For clarity in this thesis, I use the term CAF throughout, however, some quoted material may refer to the CF instead. Both acronyms refer to the same entity.

Military professionalism, and related elements of civil-military relations, sit at a nexus which informs debate and analysis on all of the above. The degree of competence and professionalism CAF members possess has profound importance to the quality of training Ukrainian soldiers receive from Canadian mentors, as well as the credibility of the CAF's military deterrent in Latvia. The same concerns are important when assessing the ability of the CAF to carry out all the existing and potential demands that may be placed on it by the citizens of Canada through their elected government, but equally important here is how the CAF fits within Canadian society, and is perceived by Canadian citizens. If the CAF cannot recruit or train new members effectively because of either poor training standards and institutional cultures that do not prepare its members to carry out their unique tasks, or on the other hand, through societally abhorrent practices which cause it to be shunned by potential recruits and starved of resources by government officials, Canada may lose its combat capable forces. Finally, the CAF's institutional culture is strongly informed, at least in part, by an ethos which is developed from military professionalism. The profession of arms includes particular values and practices which have been demonstrated to be necessary throughout history and across cultures in order to succeed in the application of military force, the very *raison d'être* of a state military. These professional values necessarily must come under intense scrutiny when the CAF's culture as a whole is implicated and condemned as a major contributor to sexual misconduct among its members.

The sexual misconduct crisis currently besetting the CAF, and the reforms being driven as a result, will not just attempt to deal with sexual misconduct in the present, but also will play a significant role in shaping the CAF of the future, particularly with respect to its values and practices, which in turn inevitably inform how it will perform in the application of military force and against potential adversaries. An inquiry into military professionalism in the CAF at this time

is both appropriate and largely missing from what little academic debate the CAF occupies, which has tended to focus on the CAF's culture from analytical perspectives more narrowly concerned with its relevance towards particular outcomes unrelated to its reason for existence,<sup>2</sup> and not the ramifications of either contemplated or recently enacted reforms on the CAF's ability to fulfil its unique role in Canadian society.

This is not the first time that the CAF has undergone an intense period of public scrutiny and reform following deeply unethical behaviour. The 1993 torture and murder of Shidane Arone in Somalia by members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment also served as a major inflection point which led to intense scrutiny and later substantial reforms to the entire CAF. A recurring conclusion stemming from inquiries into the Somalia crisis was that, like the current sexual misconduct crisis, it largely stemmed from failures of culture and leadership. In the Somalia case this led, among other reforms, to the articulation and promulgation of a capstone document on the Canadian profession of arms and a Canadian military ethos entitled *Duty With Honour (DWH)*.<sup>3</sup> *Duty With Honour* emphasized military professionalism and carved out a distinct role and ethos for CAF members, while also developing a framework linking CAF members back to broader Canadian society.

The more recent sexual misconduct crisis has likewise seen the promulgation of new ethos for the CAF, once again designed in part to address the leadership and culture failings identified in various recent inquiries. This new document, entitled *Trusted to Serve (TtS)*,<sup>4</sup> largely replaces

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<sup>2</sup> See, for a few recent examples, Duval-Lantoin, Charlotte. *The Ones we Let Down*. Human Dimensions in Foreign Policy, Military Studies, and Security Studies. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2022; Wegner, Nicole. "Helpful Heroes and the Political Utility of Militarized Masculinities." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 23, no. 1 (2021): 5-26.

<sup>3</sup> Canada. National Defence. *Duty With Honour: the Profession of Arm in Canada*. Canadian Defence Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003.

<sup>4</sup> Canada. National Defence. *Canadian Armed Forces Ethos - Trusted to Serve*: Canadian Defence Academy - Professional Concepts and Leader Development, 2022.

*DWH* while developing a rather different ethical framework and core message. Instead of emphasizing military professionalism and a role and values distinct from broader Canadian society, *TtS* instead downplays the strictly military aspects of CAF service and instead emphasizes its fundamental normative alignment with what *TtS* articulates as Canadian societal values. Both documents share a strong emphasis on earning public trust, but where the former makes an appeal for trust based on professional military competence and ethics, the latter takes a different, somewhat opposing tack and campaigns for trust based on being, first and foremost, Canadians of good character.

The two respective crises and their responses, as represented by the release of a new capstone ethical doctrine in each case, share many commonalities and were published relatively close together in time. From a civil-military relations perspective, particularly a conventional one which accepts that military service has a unique societal function to fulfill (i.e., protecting the state), the two divergent reformation efforts, both driven by Liberal governments, present a compelling puzzle and an outstanding opportunity for comparison. Why did the civil authority lean first towards increasing military professionalization, and then in a subsequent iteration of similar scandals, lean in the opposite direction by down-playing professionalization and any distinct military ethic in favour of more wholesale normative and ethical alignment with the Canadian public? Perhaps of even more value, what functional ramifications to military performance *and* social ramifications to societal acceptance of the CAF can be foreseen or predicted as a result of the current reform efforts?

## The Research Plan

Key concepts such as the military profession and civil-military relations will be developed in detail in the following chapter; however, *military culture* permeates the entire study and needs to be discussed. Military culture has been described as “the bedrock of military effectiveness”.<sup>5</sup> Yet culture is an inherently contested term and amorphous subject, the discussion of which could be allowed to fill a study ten times the size of this thesis and still not be comprehensive. Still, despite its ambiguous conceptual boundaries, it remains vitally important. Rather than attempt to develop an independent definition of military culture in an inadequate manner, this study instead largely adopts what is likely the mostly widely accepted definition of military culture, offered by James Burk, with an additional Canadian twist. According to Burk, military culture is:

A symbolic ‘toolkit’ of rituals, ceremonies, assumptions, and beliefs that grow out of and guide a military force...Military culture is no more homogeneous than human culture or war itself. Like all cultures it is, to use Ann Swidler's term, a kind of “tool kit” and it holds at least four distinct and commonly used tools: discipline, professional ethos, ceremonies and etiquette, and esprit de corps and cohesion. In general, however, one finds in each element an attempt to deal with (and, if possible, to overcome) the uncertainty of war, impose some pattern on war, control war's outcome, and invest it with meaning or significance.<sup>6</sup>

The Canadian contribution is made by Allan English, author of one of the very few book-length treatments of military culture from a Canadian perspective. English accepts Burks fundamental definition, but regroups the “tools” into two more inclusive categories of “professional ethos and the relationship between the armed forces and society (sometimes expressed as civil-military relations): this approach is taken because these three of Burk’s four elements are determined by a

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<sup>5</sup> Dorn, Edwin, Howard D. Graves, Walter F. Ulmer Jr, Joseph J. Collins, and T. O. Jacobs. *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century: A Report of the CSIS International Security Program*. Washington: The CSIS Press, 2000, xv.

<sup>6</sup> Burk, James. "Military Culture." In *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, edited by Kurtz, Lester R. San Diego: Elsevier Science & Technology, 2008.

military force's professional ethos and the relationship the force has with its civil society".<sup>7</sup> English's adaptation of Burk's definition of military culture also grapples directly with the linkages and tensions between a given military's values and those of its parent society, making it a particularly useful analytical concept to be employed here, as those influences figure strongly in both *DWH* and *TtS*.

In terms of research method, both *DWH* and *TtS* are separately subjected to an in-depth textual analysis from the perspective of military professionalism. In turn, the two documents are then evaluated comparatively, with an eye towards determining their realized and expected influences on CAF culture, and subsequently on CAF military performance and societal acceptance. The potential tension between two very different objectives (military performance and societal acceptance) is what makes an analytical approach informed by military professionalism and civil-military relations so appropriate to this inquiry. This is the core contribution of this thesis.

Beyond this introduction, the rest of this study progresses over four additional chapters. Chapter Two provides a comprehensive literature review regarding theories of civil-military relations and the military profession. Treatments of either of the closely related subjects could also go on at great length, so the discussion attempts to sketch out the most salient and influential aspects of the entire field in relatively broad and general strokes, rather than attempting to confine the discussion to theorists only focused on a single country and its military. The purpose of the chapter is two-fold: first, to become acquainted with the dominant theories of civil-military relations, particularly those of Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and Peter Feaver in order to productively employ them in subsequent analysis to better understand each case; and second, to

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<sup>7</sup> English, Allan D. *Understanding Military Culture*. Montreal, CA: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004, 6.

trace the evolution of the idea of the military profession and provide my own synthesis of the concept, once again with an eye to subsequent analysis.

Chapter Three begins by providing an overview of the Canadian specific context to this inquiry. This section delineates how the CAF is constituted, how civil control of the military is achieved in Canada, and highlights some enduring Canadian-specific debates and tensions regarding both civil-military relations and military professionalism in the CAF and the country. Next, a short historical synopsis of the Somalia incident and its subsequent reforms is presented, which culminated, in part, in the publication of the capstone ethos and Canadian military profession statement, *DWH*. A textual analysis of that document is then conducted, followed by an analytical section and partial evaluation of the broader effects of the reforms instituted within the CAF following the Somalia scandal, of which the promulgation of *DWH* was a key element.

Chapter Four is of a similar format, but this time omits a redundant examination of underlying civil-military and military professionalism influences in Canada, and instead devotes a bit more time to capturing the broader public and political events surrounding sexual misconduct within the CAF. This section identifies how the crisis unfolded and led to the calls for reform that it did, including the troubled development and eventual publication of a new capstone military ethos statement in *TtS*. Once again, a theoretically informed textual analysis of that document makes up the main contribution of the chapter.

Chapter Five has three main components. The first places the two cases of *crisis-response-capstone ethos* in comparative context. In doing so I attempt to account for why, despite having many shared commonalities between the two scandals, the shape and emphasis of *DWH* and *TtS* differs so dramatically from the perspective of military professionalism. Although various influences contribute, I argue that the largest determining factors are: how hurriedly or deliberately

the publications were conceived and developed, the types of mandates afforded to external inquiring agencies by the government and CAF, and the relevant expertise of those whose were engaged to conduct those inquiries. The Somalia crisis was noteworthy for broad and permissive mandates issued to commissions of inquiry which adopted a whole-of-Forces approach, with significant military-specific expertise on those commissions, and a very deliberate and long-considered reform effort overseen by an external commission. The sexual misconduct crisis on the other hand, featured narrow and prescriptive mandates issued to inquiring agencies, targeting one specific issue – sexual misconduct in the CAF-, with expertise also well suited to that more confined subject matter, but lacking in broader expertise on the unique requirements of the military institution writ large.

The second component evaluates the changes in emphasis, ethos, and beliefs found in *TtS* with an eye on predicting the likely effects on military professionalism and military culture in the CAF, and by extension, effects on the functional and societal imperatives of military performance and societal acceptance. The key conclusion is that *TtS* undermines military professionalism, and by extension may endanger military performance, setting up an apparent dilemma between having an effective military and a societally acceptable one. This segues into the third and final component of the chapter, which discusses what is genuinely *military* about military culture, and what may simply happen to be present in the culture of a given military at a particular time. I argue that there is no incompatibility between a professional military culture and one in which aggravating beliefs and values contributing to sexual misconduct are eradicated. A brief synopsis of this inquiry, including two policy recommendations, concludes this thesis.

## CHAPTER 2 – CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION

### Introduction

The aims of this chapter are two-fold, and intertwined. One goal is to provide a survey of important theoretical work in the field of civil-military relations in order to trace the maturation and evolution of the field, and to flesh-out, in particular, three dominant theoretical perspectives – those of Huntington, Janowitz, and Feaver – all of which will be analytically useful throughout the remainder of this project. The second goal is to develop a well-informed and defensible conceptualization of the military profession. Although civil-military relations and military professionalism are distinct, there are also significant areas of overlap and interplay between the two concepts, particularly in more sociologically derived approaches.

Civil-military relations in academia is the study of the interactions between the military of a particular state and its civil government, as well as its broader society. The field of modern civil-military relations largely begins with the work of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, whose theorizing continues to inform and influence all subsequent efforts. Huntington's 1957 *The Soldier and the State*<sup>8</sup> and Janowitz's 1960 *The Professional Soldier*<sup>9</sup> are essential to a review of academic literature relevant to civil-military relations and the military profession. Their works are touchstones to what became the political-institutional and sociological approaches to civil-military relations, which remain dominant today. It is worthwhile to unpack their theorizing in detail before moving on to subsequent works, all of which remain strongly informed by one or both of Huntington and Janowitz.

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<sup>8</sup> Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State*. New York: Vintage Books, 1957.

<sup>9</sup> Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier*. New York, NY: Free Press, 2017 [1960].

## **Huntington – *The Soldier and the State***

*The Soldier and the State* begins by identifying a dilemma that exists at the core of civil-military relations. Every state maintains a military to ensure its security from aggression and to pursue its national interests. The military, as an institution, is shaped by an interplay between two imperatives which exist in some tension with each other. The first, the functional imperative, is the above obligation to maintain national security. The second, the societal imperative, is the aggregate sum effect on the military of the various social forces, ideologies, and institutions present in the larger collective society of the state. Depending on the nature of a given society, a military institution too strongly influenced by its larger society may fail in its primary task of maintaining military security. On the other hand, a military which is too singularly influenced by that functional imperative may find itself fundamentally incompatible with the host society to which it belongs, leading to a dissolution of either the state (through a coup), or of the military institution itself (through societal abhorrence). Put another way, states establish militaries which, if they are powerful enough to secure their societies, are also powerful enough to take over the state itself; and if they are not powerful enough to do so, render the state unacceptably insecure. This paradox sits at the center of civil-military relations, and this tension and interplay, for Huntington, is explored in his examination of the relation of the officer corps to the state.<sup>10</sup>

Writing during the era of American conscription and the draft, Huntington chose to focus on the officer corps because they are the actors responsible for both leading the military institution, as well as interacting with their civilian masters. He began his theorizing by making the case for conceiving of the military officer corps as a *profession*. Like doctors or lawyers, the military officer corps, as a vocation, is defined by a highly specialized field of knowledge whose practitioners

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<sup>10</sup> Huntington *Soldier and the State*, 2-3.

perform a necessary public service to society, and hold a sense of unity and conception as a group apart from the typical layman or citizen. In short, as a profession they are defined by “expertise, responsibility, and corporateness”.<sup>11</sup> Huntington argued that professional officers are not distinguished by their natural genius, mechanical ability, or social rank outside of the military, but by their mastery of a complex and demanding intellectual skill, which requires high amounts of both a liberal and specialized education, combined with practice ‘in the field’. He emphasized the requirement for significant and continuing levels of schooling within the military profession, as it was an eminently *learnable* vocation, which required about a third of one’s military career devoted to education.<sup>12</sup> Professionals are motivated by a “technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize this craft for the benefit of society”.<sup>13</sup> As a professional body governed by a public bureaucracy, an officer’s commission is equivalent to a physician’s or lawyer’s license to practice.

Huntington empirically substantiated his theory regarding the development of military professionalism by tracing the development of five key institutions of the military profession in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. These are: the requirements for entry into officer corps, the means of advancement within the officer corps, the character of military educational systems, the nature and growing role of the military staff system, and the general esprit and competence of the officer corps.<sup>14</sup> From militaries dominated by mercenaries and amateur aristocrats, an evolution occurred towards professional standing armies, training in clearly defined and increasingly autonomous institutions with open and transparent entry and advancement standards, with rigorous professional education

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 13.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 19-58. The term “institution” in this case is Huntington's. They capture the key innovations of the time, including officer career development and progression, the creation of a military staff, and a universal esprit de corps, vs the armies of compelled obedience and amateur aristocratic leadership which preceded this period.

programs, and coordinated by competent General Staffs who liaise with and advise their civilian masters. Where no state had featured these elements in their military at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, nearly every major state had adopted them and professionalized their military by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup>.<sup>15</sup> Huntington incorporated the view, like the 19<sup>th</sup> century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz before him, that war, being the continuation of policy with additional (military) means,<sup>16</sup> should subordinate the practice of war (and its practitioners) to the leaders of the state who are responsible to determine the political objectives to be attained, yet demanded autonomy for the military within its own particular sphere of expertise, i.e. the actual conduct of war.<sup>17</sup> This leads to a classic and frequently challenged divide in civil-military relations, as Huntington and Clausewitz drew a sharp line distinguishing the realm of political policy and grand strategy, which was the realm of the statesman, and operations, tactics, and doctrine, which fell within the professional soldier's expertise. In Huntingtonian theory, each actor was supreme within their respective spheres of expertise, and refused to trespass into the domain of the other.

At an ideological level, Huntington argued that the professional military mind, tasked with an unchanging functional imperative in assuring the security of the state, is a conservative one. In this view, war is seen as the inevitable clash between competing interests in an uncertain, anarchic world, to be both prepared for and feared. The military institution must eschew individualism, subordinate ethical judgements to military necessities, and maintain loyalty to the state. In short, "the military ethic is thus pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. It is,

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 19.

<sup>16</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Translated by Graham, J. J., edited by Rapoport, Anatol. London: Penguin Classics, 1982.

<sup>17</sup> Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 56-58.

in brief, realistic and conservative”.<sup>18</sup> In becoming a profession with an area of specific competency, Huntington’s officer renounces the claim to political expertise in the broader conduct of the state itself. Gone is a soldier-statesman like Napoleon. Instead, enter the duo of Bismarck the diplomat and Moltke the staff officer.<sup>19</sup> In this dynamic, obedience to lawful authority is the *highest* military virtue, regardless of its moral quality. The military professional holds a threefold responsibility to the state: to represent the military and the requirements of its functional imperative of security, to advise the state on the ramifications of considered policies, and ultimately to execute the will of the state.

Having thus defined the military profession, Huntington then offered his own hugely influential solution to the classic civil-military dilemma. Returning to the central question of civil-military relations, how to ensure civilian control over the military institution while maintaining military security, Huntington created a two-type typology. The first, *subjective civilian control*, achieves this aim by maximizing civilian power over the military: “Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state”.<sup>20</sup> Huntington’s alternative and preferred form is what he called *objective civilian control*, which is achieved by maximizing military professionalism and its “built-in” ethos of subordination to political masters: “The one prime essential for any system of civilian control is the minimizing of military power. Objective civilian control achieves this reduction by professionalizing the military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral. At the same time, it preserves that essential element of power which is necessary for the existence of a military profession”.<sup>21</sup> Huntington claimed true objective civilian control is rare even in modern times however, as most civilian groups are simply unwilling

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 79.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 70.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 83.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, 84.

to accept a truly neutral military, particularly when the values of the military institution do not mesh well with that of the party in government.<sup>22</sup>

This brings an ideological element of potential conflict between the military ethic on the one hand, and its civilian master on the other. However, there is no continuum or spectrum between the military mind and the civilian because there is no single civilian ideological mind. Whereas Huntington's military ethic is "concrete, permanent, and universal",<sup>23</sup> various civilian ideologies could be conservative, liberal, fascist, communist (to name the few the Huntington explored in depth), and many more besides. According to him, only the non-universalizing conservative ideology sits easily with the military mind due to their broad agreement in understanding the world because "The taming effect of political power makes them good liberals, good fascists, or good communists, but poor professionals. The satisfactions of professional performance and adherence to the professional code are replaced by the satisfactions of power, office, wealth, popularity, and the approbation of nonmilitary groups".<sup>24</sup> The other ideologies would either relegate the military to an isolated backwater as the military renounced power in the state to maintain its professionalism, or else reshape the military institution and erode the norm of professionalism, according to their own worldviews.

Another relevant component of Huntington's theorizing was his three-type typology of the possible institutional and command relations between the President, Secretary of Defence, and the military chief. Although he was writing specifically about the US system, the typology remains useful to understand possible variations in key organizational approaches to civil-military relations in any national context. In a *balanced* system, the president and secretary are political leaders in

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 85.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 89.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 95.

the chain of command above the military, and inside the defence department there exists both civil and military chiefs. The military chief is subordinate to secretary and president, but neither exercises direct military authority. The civilians employed in the department report to the civil chief/deputy Secretary, and onward to the Secretary in an adjacent organizational structure, and do not fall under military authority. This is Huntington's ideal type, which maximizes professionalism and civilian control. There is also the *coordinate* type, which sees the secretary fall out of the chain of command and becomes the civilian side of the department's chief, and parallel with the military chief, whose superior is now the President. This undermines civilian control and military professionalism, as the military chief has direct access to President, and needs to include political calculations in his dealings with him. Finally, there is the *vertical* type, where the military chief's superior is the secretary again, who in turn reports to president. But this time the civil side of the department also reports to the military chief instead of directly to the secretary or a civilian under-secretary. The military chief now has civil subordinates, which is problematic because in directing and managing civilians, he exceeds his military professional competence.<sup>25</sup>

Huntington believed that what he conceived as the enduringly liberal character of US society was simply too hostile to allow such a large and powerful military, with its alien conservative ethic, to survive as an effective and professional institution. Objective civilian control, achieved via a fully professionalized military, was unsustainable: "The tension between the demands of military security and the values of American liberalism can, in the long run, be relieved only by the weakening of the security threat or the weakening of liberalism".<sup>26</sup> Huntington's solution was ultimately the wholesale ideological realignment of broader American society to conservatism, thereby becoming more sympathetic to military values:

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 186-192.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 456.

In a liberal society the power of the military is the greatest threat to their professionalism. Yet, so long as American military security is threatened, that power is not likely to diminish significantly. The requisite for military security is a shift in basic American values from liberalism to conservatism. Only an environment which is sympathetically conservative will permit American military leaders to combine the political power which society thrusts upon them with the military professionalism without which society cannot endure.<sup>27</sup>

Here is encountered another enduring concept of civil-military relations; that of the ideological and value-based “gap” between the military institution and its host society. For Huntington, since the military ethic was unchanging and a large, professionalized military was the only solution to American Cold War national security problems, the values and ideology of military institution itself must not change. Yet too much divergence between military and societal values was untenable in his view, so US society itself must evolve to a more sympathetic ideological position vis-à-vis the military. Rather than the military adjusting, it was society itself that had to evolve.

The civil-military paradigms that Huntington developed continue to dominate the field,<sup>28</sup> if often only as a departure point for either new vantage points or additional criticism.<sup>29</sup> And there is no shortage of criticism either. First, the empirical record strongly rejects any clear demarcation

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid, 464.

<sup>28</sup> Witness, for example the sheer number of texts and articles which riff on Huntington’s title and numerous variations as it applies to other countries. Nielsen and Snider in particular provide an excellent overview of Huntington’s impact on real world civil-military policy and organization:

Legault, Albert and Joel J. Sokolsky, eds. *The Soldier and the State in the Post Cold War Era*. Kingston, Ont: Royal Military College of Canada, 2002.

Nielsen, Suzanne C. and Don M. Snider, eds. *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.

Barany, Zoltan. *The Soldier and the Changing State*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2012

Desch, Michael C. "Soldiers, States, and Structures: The End of the Cold War and Weakening U.S. Civilian Control." *Armed Forces and Society* 24, no. 3 (Apr 1, 1998): 389-405.

<sup>29</sup> For summative critiques aimed at the *The Soldier and the State*, see Kohn, Richard H. "Building Trust: Civil-military Behaviors for Effective National Security." In *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, edited by Nielsen, Suzanne C. and Don M. Snider, 264-289. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, pages 264-267.; or Feaver’s “Problematique” article: Feaver, Peter D. "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control." *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 2 (Dec 1, 1996): 149-178. Feaver & Seeler provide an instructive overview of the field of civil-military relations in specific relation to Huntington’s contributions. Feaver, Peter D. and Erika Seeler. "Before and After Huntington: The Methodological Maturing of Civil-Military Studies." In *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, edited by Nielsen, Suzanne C. and Don M. Snider, 72-90. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.

of authority between the statesman and the generals at the highest level in even the most “professional” militaries or militarily sympathetic societies. There is simply too much overlap, even addressing only concerns relevant to Huntingtonian derived civil-military competencies. Second, with parallels of one form or another in most countries, the constitutional separation of powers between Congress and the Presidency inevitably meant that the military would be drawn into a politics to a degree as it was called upon, on the one hand, to defend the Commander-in-Chief’s military policy to Congress and the public, while on the other, it needed to lobby, in one form or another, to Congress for funding and support. Third, empirical studies on military members have largely rejected the inherently conservative mindset postulated by Huntington. To the contrary, soldiers appear broadly reflective of the pluralism of their host societies’ beliefs and values in many respects, with an important exception in that they largely uniformly share a communitarian ethic that prioritizes the common good and an ethic of service,<sup>30</sup> as well an ability to reconcile a broad diversity of beliefs with the requirements of military service. In other words, they do “not simply transpose, unaltered, military requirements into all their ideological commitments”<sup>31</sup> but simply accept the values and imperatives of a hierarchical military system within its appropriate sphere of behaviour while maintaining pluralistic beliefs outside that sphere. Fourth, Huntington was guilty of simply defining away the problem of military subordination to civilian control. For him, a soldier could not *be* professional if they did not accept that subservience. In this tautological move, he made subordination and obedience to civil authority a

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<sup>30</sup> See Driver “The Military Mind” for a US example, while a 2005 study in Canada “Canada’s Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century” produced similar results:

Driver, Darrell W. "The Military Mind: A Reassessment of the Ideological Roots of American Military Professionalism." In *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, edited by Nielsen, Suzanne C. and Don M. Snider, 172-193. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.

*Canada's Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century: The Major Findings of the Army Climate & Culture Survey and the Army Socio-Cultural Survey*. Ottawa: Land Personnel Concepts and Policy, 2005

<sup>31</sup> Driver, “The Military Mind”, 177

vital component of the professional military identity without really explaining why it should be so, only that it had to be in order to make his ideal theory function. Rather, as Gabriel points out, “the only barrier between the military’s control of deadly force and its subordination to civilian authority is the ethical barrier imposed by the military’s commitment to its ethical role as subordinate and responsible to the democratic process itself”,<sup>32</sup> but this idea is only imperfectly alluded to in Huntington’s approach. Fifth, his historical analysis of US society, problem statement, and prescription for US national security in the Cold War was simply wrong, as history has shown. The United States survived and “won” the Cold War while growing ever more liberal as a society, while concurrently maintaining an incredibly large and powerful military. The tension Huntington depicted was simply not as pronounced or crucial as he believed.<sup>33</sup> All that said, as Feaver and Seeler point out in an examination of its influence, “it is almost impossible to think or write about civil-military relations without engaging Huntington”,<sup>34</sup> and *The Soldier and the State* remains the vital first cut into theorizing modern civil-military relations.

### **Janowitz – *The Professional Soldier***

Turning now to the other first-mover in civil-military relations and military professionalism, one encounters Morris Janowitz. Where Huntington adopted a political science derived institutionalist approach, Janowitz approached civil-military relations from a sociologist’s perspective. To over-simplify, the former approach tends to fixate on designing the best org-chart or matrix of institutions and demanding actors comport to the model’s idealized behavioural expectations to achieve the appropriate form of civil-military control. In contrast, Janowitz and sociology are more interested in what kind of human beings and social groups are either

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<sup>32</sup> Gabriel, Richard A. *The Warrior's Way: A Treatise on Military Ethics*. Kingston, Ont: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007. Page 49

<sup>33</sup> Feaver, Peter D. *Armed Servants*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003, 16-38.

<sup>34</sup> Feaver & Seeler, “Before and After Huntington”, 77

empirically found, or theoretically necessary, to sustain the military institution itself, its relationship with society, and its application in combat. While it more richly describes the humans in the military and has strongly informed the development of military professionalism, the sociological approach typically lacks any clearly articulated, rigorous analytical theory with which to study civil-military relations at the level of political institutions.

In *The Professional Soldier*, confronted by and rejecting the prospect of annihilation in a nuclear war, Janowitz asserted that the US military must evolve into what he termed a *constabulary force*, which seeks to maintain the status quo and avoid at all costs total war between nuclear armed states. From an International Relations perspective, this is a strain of liberalism, and places the US military in the role of global policeman. In order to understand how to obtain that result, he first set about understanding the military institution as it then existed by rigorous sociological study, focusing particularly, like Huntington, on the officer corps as a profession, but also on the military as a functional society.

Based on his findings, Janowitz argued that there was an evolving fundamental change in organizational authority with the military profession, from one based on domination to one increasingly reliant on group consensus, persuasion, and manipulation.<sup>35</sup> In other words, the soldier was no longer motivated to fight the enemy out of fear of punishment from higher authorities, but, within the still strict bonds of military discipline, because the soldier shared and understood the goals to be accomplished and willingly fought to achieve them. This was a form of leadership and organization, derived from the Prussian model, which encouraged independent action within broad guidelines, and allowed for more responsive and adaptive sub-units who could be trusted to vigorously pursue objectives without constant supervision and the threat of repression

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 8.

and punishment to ensure compliance. This consensus-based philosophy remains the functional basis which underlies most Western militaries' "Mission Command" operating principles, and as such remains a vital component of the military professional ethic.

Further, due to the adoption of increasingly complex modern technologies and equipment, the differential between the skill sets required by the military professional and their civilian counterpart was narrowing. Janowitz thought that a military had always featured a tension and struggle between heroic leaders, who embodied the martial virtues of honour, valour, and fighting spirit, and military managers, who were more preoccupied with the scientific and rational conduct of war: "The [military manager] is the professional with effective links to civilian society. The heroic leader is a perpetuation of the warrior type".<sup>36</sup> But technological advances and their adoption had created and grown a third type in the modern profession, that of the military technologist, who, unlike the heroic traditionalist, readily embraced new technologies and innovations. The engineer/manager and the technologist shared a great deal with their civilian counterparts, whereas the heroic leader was a pre-modern anachronism. With the endless adoption of new and more complex technology and increase in military members in trades and roles that figured further and further away from the brutal violence of intimate combat, one might suppose that the military institution would eventually converge with and become indistinguishable from broader society, but here Janowitz drew a sharp line:

Despite the rational and technological aspects of the military establishment, the need for heroic fighters persists. The pervasive requirements of combat set the limits to civilianizing tendencies...Of course, both the engineer and the technologist are held in high esteem. But the ideal image of the military profession continues to be the strategic commander, not the military technician. It is the image of a leader, motivated by national patriotism, rather than personal monetary gain, a leader who is capable of organizing the talents of specialists for every type of contingency...Particularly in a free-enterprise, profit motivated society, the military establishment requires a sense of duty and honor to accomplish its objectives.

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 22.

Heroism is an essential part of the calculations of even the most rational and self-critical military thinkers.<sup>37</sup>

The military profession then, notwithstanding its increasing administrative and technological focus, needed to remain oriented toward its unique societal function, even if the practitioners of violence in combat were an increasing minority within the whole: “To understand the logic of military authority is to understand the practices of combat commanders”.<sup>38</sup> For Janowitz then, as with Huntington, the functional imperative to be able to fight and win a war led ineluctably to a degree of constancy in military values, and separation, or gap, in values and operating procedures between broader civilian society and the professional military institution. The fact that Huntington arrived at that conclusion largely deductively and through historical analysis, whereas Janowitz reached the same conclusion through methodologically rigorous sociological research on professional soldiers, only reinforces its validity.

Although Janowitz differed with Huntington regarding some aspects of civil-military relations, they were more closely aligned with respect to the military profession itself. Janowitz empirically substantiated Huntington’s claim depicting the profession of arms as more than simply a job or a trade, but a vocation, or special calling. Regarding the officers he surveyed, “for a substantial minority, at least, the choice of a military career was a strong decision. To speak of a strong career choice means that a person feels that a particular occupation is singularly important to him, since he believes that it will give him the rewards and gratifications he wants. For such persons, the military career had overtones of a ‘calling’ with a sense of mission”.<sup>39</sup> Janowitz also concurred on the requirement for, and large time commitment to, both liberal and specific

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 33-35.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 40.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 107.

education within the profession, while noting the (largely positive) effects of inculcation of values to be found in military academies with respect to patriotic nationalism or reinforcing norms of civilian supremacy in civil-military relations.<sup>40</sup>

Appropriately for a sociologist, Janowitz explored in detail US military culture as he encountered it, while also offering informed analysis for the reasons it existed as it did, which he was well-positioned to provide given his prior experience. Performing sociological research by the US military during the war by interviewing German prisoners, he had already published a groundbreaking study<sup>41</sup> on the importance of interpersonal relationships within an infantry company as a predictor of how well, or poorly, that sub-unit would fight, particularly in the face of casualties and battlefield losses. Largely rejecting National Socialist ideology as the primary reason so many German units had fought so well, and so long, despite the brutal losses sustained during the last years of the war, Shils and Janowitz argued that the primary determining factor predicting continuing cohesion and fighting performance, or in the opposite case, disintegration and surrender, was the social support system provided by the company as a primary social group to the individual: “When the individual's immediate group, and its supporting formations, met his basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem from both officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power and adequately regulated his relations with authority, the element of self-concern in battle, which would lead to disruption of the effective functioning of his primary group, was minimized”.<sup>42</sup> The “band of brothers” concept, in other words, had proven empirical worth for combat performance.

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 125-149.

<sup>41</sup> Shils, Edward A. and Morris Janowitz. "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (1948): 280-315

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 281.

In studying the US military then, Janowitz dedicated a significant portion of *The Professional Soldier* to discussing social norms and a military lifestyle that maintained its distinctiveness from civilian society. Manners, etiquette, and ceremony are all inflated in importance, perhaps a holdover from the military's former aristocratic roots. Janowitz justified the existence of a self-contained lifestyle as a necessary bulwark for the military: "In a free enterprise society, the military profession cannot compete with the private sector in monetary rewards for its elite members. Professional commitments therefore depend on the persistence of a style of life, and a belief in the superiority, or at least worth, of that style of life".<sup>43</sup> The self-contained military lifestyle thus had instrumental utility in providing the vital esteem and self-worth that was necessary to maintain cohesion in the horrors of combat. Further, as soldiers needed not just to derive self-worth from their immediate peers but also to inculcate a communitarian ethos that promoted military effectiveness, the professional soldier required some ideological "space" to allow for differentiation from the broader norms of collective society: "The distinctive quality of the military life makes it possible to perpetuate the martial spirit. To survive, the martial spirit must be taken for granted, and not constantly subjected to critical evaluation".<sup>44</sup> For Janowitz, as Huntington, the unique burden of responsibility for fighting and dying on behalf of the state demands at least degree of fundamental distinctiveness from the more liberal, individualist mores of the host society.

Janowitz also placed another apparently pre-modern anachronism, the concept of honour, within a professional conceptualization. He found that the coercive power of honour, as a system of differentially valued behaviours, within the military profession remained considerable, and

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<sup>43</sup> Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, 196.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, 211.

“persistently points to a single over-riding directive. The professional soldier always fights”.<sup>45</sup> Further, although the pursuit of glory as a feudal goal in and of itself is summarily dismissed, martial achievements are still afforded honour, measured instead as practical contributions of the profession to the community. The archaic feudal tradition is thus married to the modern invention of the nation-state and its requirement for security in a practical and professionalized manner.

As opposed to Huntington’s strict ideal-theoretical divisions between civil and military spheres however, Janowitz suggested that overlap was both inevitable, and managed correctly, appropriate to transparent debate and a republican, public-square ethos. Janowitz went even further in his prescriptions for his future *constabulary* military, arguing that a much more politically educated and sophisticated military profession was required in order to exercise appropriate care and judgement on the deployments and battlefields of the future, and also to reinforce a commitment to democracy at home:

Bold experimentation in the political education of the officer corps is also required. It is impossible to isolate the professional soldier from domestic political life, and it is undesirable to leave the tasks of political education completely to the professionals themselves, even though they have been highly responsible in this assignment. The goal of political education is to develop a commitment to the democratic system and an understanding of how it works.<sup>46</sup>

This increased engagement by the military professional in the public sphere demanded by Janowitz, as opposed to the strict isolation called for by Huntington, has been termed the *convergence* theory of civil-military relations, referring to the aforementioned gap between citizen and soldier. Like Huntington, Janowitz concludes by advocating for a reduction in the ideological distance between soldier and citizen. Huntington chose to leave the professional soldier in a perfectly apolitical, conservative outlook, but pushed for American society itself to adopt a less

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 215.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 439.

liberal, more conservative philosophy to close the gap. Janowitz wants both citizen and soldier to come closer together, although he continues to allow for a degree of separation to enable the requirements of distinctive military values and hierarchy within the profession, to closer approximate a civic republican tradition that sees civil society place a greater value on the worth of the soldier, and the soldier become a more politically sophisticated professional “integrated into civilian society because he shares its common values”.<sup>47</sup>

### **The maturation of the field**

Perhaps in no other sub-field of academic study has the work of two scholars so defined and set the terms of ongoing debate as in civil-military relations and military professionalism with Janowitz and Huntington. Now, having laid out in detail their positions and contributions as first-movers, one can place in context all the subsequent evolutions in debate surrounding both related sub-disciplines. The next meaningful contribution to conceptualizing military professionalism belongs to Briton Sir John Hackett, who clearly articulated the concept of unlimited liability while providing a more sophisticated and encompassing definition of the *raison d'être* of the profession—*the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem*<sup>48</sup>—than had heretofore been developed, although fighting and winning in battle was still the imperative to be trained for. As for *unlimited liability*, it is the condition of military service that members can be ordered to act, without the right of refusal, even though it will certainly result in their death. Hackett posited that this obligation, unique to the profession of arms, unlike medicine or law, fundamentally set the military institution both at some remove from, and yet ideally, also linked to, broader society: “The essential basis of the military life is the ordered application of force under an unlimited liability. It

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid 440.

<sup>48</sup> Hackett, Sir John W. *Officer's Call: The Profession of Arms*. CMH Pub 70-18. Washington, DC: Center of Military History - US Army, 1966, 3.

is the unlimited liability which sets the man who embraces this life somewhat apart. He will be (or should be) always a citizen. So long as he serves he will never be a civilian".<sup>49</sup> To the professional qualities of corporateness, expertise, and responsibility that Huntington listed and Janowitz supported, unlimited liability was now added as a component of the military profession.

The Vietnam War also elicited, unsurprisingly perhaps, some enduring *negative* lessons on both civil-military relations and professionalism. In a scathing and oft-cited analysis,<sup>50</sup> Savage & Gabriel argued that the US Army in Vietnam had progressively degenerated throughout its tenure there, to the point that it was largely incapable of sustaining effective operations. They set up a binary between the positive condition of *cohesion* as already discussed with Shils & Janowitz in regard to the performance of the German army in late World War II and *disintegration*. The former was defined as "the assurance that a military unit will attempt to perform its assigned orders or charged mission, irrespective of the situation",<sup>51</sup> while disintegration in a military organization is "the emergence of conditions which make effective operations impossible".<sup>52</sup> Through a variety of quantitative and qualitative data sources, they produced evidence of alarming and ahistorical rates of desertion, mutiny, assassination or attempted assassination of leaders, and drug use within the US Army in Vietnam, and argued that the root cause was "directly related to the loss of officer professionalism expressed in the pervasive phenomenon of 'managerial careerism'".<sup>53</sup> They substantiated this claim with evidence of rampant inflation of the officer corps both in pure numbers and the proportion of senior officers with higher rank, yet a disproportionate reduction in

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<sup>49</sup> Hackett, *Profession of Arms*, 40.

<sup>50</sup> Savage, Paul L. and Richard A. Gabriel. "Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army: An Alternative Perspective." *Armed Forces and Society* 2, no. 3 (Apr 1, 1976): 340-376., the authors developed their arguments in more depth in their subsequent book: Gabriel, Richard A. and Paul L. Savage. *Crisis of Command: Mismanagement in the Army* Macmillan, 1978.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, 341

<sup>52</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>53</sup> *Idem*.

the amount of casualties sustained by those officers compared to other ranks. Primary group cohesion was degraded through officers rotating through combat units for periods shorter than those of the soldiers they led, while the rotational system which continually substituted individual members in and out of line units, instead of cohesive groups training and fighting together over sustained periods of time was another aggravating factor. Further, the profession's ethics had degraded, officers' ethical leadership was sacrificed for careerist ticket-punching and a zero-fault approach to administrative minutiae, while more systemic issues of discipline and conduct were ignored. Using Janowitz's typology of military managers, technologists, and heroic leaders, Savaage and Gabriel argued that the institution's behavioural core had, in effect, swung too closely to the managerial model and away from the vital military ethic put forward by the heroic leader's example.<sup>54</sup> The result was a bureaucratic Army, increasingly unfit for combat operations, and buckling under those conditions.

Staying in the sociological vein, at about the same time, Moskos advanced a now well-known typological argument that the US military was moving from an organizational format of an *institution*, to one of an *occupation*. The former is "legitimated in terms of values and norms, i.e. a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good".<sup>55</sup> An institutional basis offered a range of both tangible and intangible benefits to its members, including pay, non-financial social and material benefits like housing and leave policies, but also societal and institutional esteem, while the corporate nature of an institution also encouraged self-regulation via the military discipline and grievance systems. Moskos contended such a format had historically married well with military professionalism as it allowed for the particular space and

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Moskos, Charles C. "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization." *Armed Forces and Society* 4, no. 1 (Oct 1, 1977): 41-50, p42.

autonomy the military institution required in order to maintain its distinctive ethic within broader society, as Janowitz had earlier argued.

The occupational format, on the other hand, “is legitimated in terms of the marketplace, i.e., prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies...The occupational model implies priority of self-interest rather than that of the employing organization”.<sup>56</sup> Although Moskos allowed that the distinction between the two formats could be overdrawn and elements of both ideal types had always been empirically found in the military, he identified the on-balance changeover point from an institutional to occupational basis as the cessation of the military draft.<sup>57</sup> Moskos would go on to update the typological model a few years later with ten discrete variables in order to make more defensible and comparable evaluations,<sup>58</sup> while others have used it as a starting point for their own subsequent research and theorizing.<sup>59</sup>

Perhaps the most useful of these variations is Caforio and Nuciari’s innovation which recreated the typology using broadly similar professional/occupational ideal types,<sup>60</sup> measured empirically within many European militaries in the years following the Cold War. Their results led them to identify a sort of compromise type present in high numbers in their survey—the *pragmatic professional*. This blended type combines attributes from both professional and occupational types: “The pragmatic professional officer has high scores both in professional and occupational variables. He or she is at the same time positively predisposed to ideal and traditional

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid, 43

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 44

<sup>58</sup> Moskos, Charles C. "Institutional/Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update." *Armed Forces and Society* 12, no. 3 (Apr 1, 1986):.

<sup>59</sup> See for example, Segal, David R. "Measuring the institutional/occupational change thesis." *Armed Forces & Society* 12, no. 3 (1986): 351-375, or Nuciari, Marina. "Rethinking the military profession: Models of change compared." *Current Sociology* 42, no. 3 (1994): 7-21.

<sup>60</sup> Caforio, Giuseppe, and Marina Nuciari. "The officer profession: Ideal-type." *Current Sociology* 42, no. 3 (1994): 33-56.

professional values, and to the concrete professional setting in the realms of daily working life, family and parent society”.<sup>61</sup> The authors further found evidence of a reduction in the professional ‘isolation’ from society that was wholly advocated for by Huntington, and espoused to a more limited degree by others such as Janowitz or Moskos, leading to a military more integrated within broader society.

Similarly somewhat at odds with unbounded integration into broader society, in his influential treatise *To Serve With Honor*,<sup>62</sup> Gabriel advanced an argument for codifying military ethics. Allowing that all soldiers were principally citizens first, and that each arrived with their own set of beliefs and values, Gabriel nonetheless developed a sophisticated effort arguing for a distinctive set of military ethics *within* the military profession. Soldiers in volunteer armies could not be automatons for whom obedience was the paramount virtue, but rather needed to be ethical actors capable of understanding and decision-making in the unique military environment. The profession of arms, with its unique behavioural requirements, was just too different to simply expect citizen’s pre-existing ethical codes to be adequate to preparing them for this distinct environment:

[The profession of arms’] primary function requires organized social violence in which the sacrifice of its members in pursuit of the community’s right to self-protection is often demanded. Moreover, it requires the deliberate taking of the lives of other human beings, and sometimes results in the deaths of completely innocent others, in the conduct of legitimate military operations. These activities involve grave questions of right and wrong that the soldier cannot legitimately escape merely by following orders. The soldier must understand that what he or she is asked to do is far more ethically burdensome than what any other social institution asks its members to do. Not surprisingly then, the values that govern the soldier are different from those of other social institutions.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid, 41.

<sup>62</sup> Gabriel, Richard A. *To serve with honor: A treatise on military ethics and the way of the soldier*. (1982), republished by CDA as *The warrior’s way: A treatise on military ethics* in 2007.

<sup>63</sup> Gabriel, *Warriors’ Way*, 1-2.

Gabriel ultimately put forth a suggested code of military ethics comprising nine rather lengthy precepts which has not been completely adopted anywhere, but his discussion and arguments regarding military ethics remains a vital component of the *corpus* of military professionalism since publication.

### **After the collapse of the Soviet Union – Feaver and Agency Theory**

Huntington's dominance of political-institutional theory in civil-military relations, frequently challenged but never credibly supplanted since its publication, came under increased critical scrutiny in the 1990s, when a confluence of events attained the combined mass necessary to elicit a shift in his supremacy. The epoch-shifting collapse of the USSR and end of the Cold War, a rise in civil wars, a massive expansion in multi-national interventions by Western powers with simultaneous force reductions resulting from the end of the bi-polar arms race, combined with broader societal trends-such as increased emphasis on equality of rights to women and the LGBTQ community *vis-à-vis* the military more generally in Western countries all combined to bring more tension, and attention, to civil-military relations. Fittingly perhaps, one of the best articulated challenges<sup>64</sup> to the Huntingtonian paradigm and description of its shortcomings came from one of his own students in Peter Feaver, who has arguably taken up at least a position of equal importance to the field with his agency theory approach. Feaver prepared the field by publishing an article decrying the lack of an institutional ideal-theoretical approach that was capable of addressing what he called the civil-military problematique, which concerns "the delegation of responsibility of the notional civilian to the notional military. It is about increasing or decreasing the scope of delegation and monitoring the military's response behaviour in the context of such delegation".<sup>65</sup> Feaver also

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<sup>64</sup> Feaver, "Problematique"

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, 168.

dismissed the *professionalism=submission to civil authority* tautology found in Huntington and others, and called for a deductively derived theory of civil-military relations that did not rely on it.

Unsurprisingly, shortly thereafter, Feaver published his own theory<sup>66</sup> which neatly solved the problem as he depicted it. Agency theory borrows heavily from the now ubiquitous rational actor model, game theory, as well as the principal-agent framework,<sup>67</sup> all derived from economic theory, while ideal democratic theory gives it a normative and hierarchical structure. In Feaver's approach, the civilian (*principal*) invents the military (*its agent*), and then delegates to it certain tasks, while maintaining overall responsibility for their performance. Both have their own set of preferences, in part informed by Allison's seminal 1971 *Essence of Decision*, and in particular his development of the organization process model.<sup>68</sup> The relationship between the principal and the agent is hierarchical (at least in democratic countries), and agency theory conceives of their relationship as a series of strategic interactions. The principal issues their instructions, and can choose to *monitor* more or less intrusively, where monitoring induces additional costs, but comes with the likelihood of greater compliance. The agent in turn has a choice whether to *work*, in that they follow the letter and spirit of the instructions, or *shirk*, where they do not, either through resistance, slow-rolling, deliberate imperfect execution, up to and including outright disobedience. Complicating the game, the principal also has the imperfect ability to detect shirking, and prerogative to *punish* the military if it so desires, where punishment may be more intrusive

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<sup>66</sup> Feaver, Peter D. "Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring of American Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces and Society* 24, no. 3 (Apr 1, 1998): 407-434.

<sup>67</sup> For introductions to the theory, see:

Altfeld, Michael F., and Gary J. Miller. "Sources of bureaucratic influence: Expertise and agenda control." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28, no. 4 (1984): 701-730.

Ferejohn, John, and Charles Shipan. "Congressional influence on bureaucracy." *JL Econ & Org.* 6 (1990).

Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. *The logic of delegation*. University of Chicago Press, 1991.

<sup>68</sup> Allison, Graham. *Essence of Decision*. New York: Harper Collins Publ, 1972., see also Allison, Graham. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *The American Political Science Review* 63, no. 3 (Sep, 1969): 689-718.

monitoring, the reprimand or sacking of military officials, or even the dissolution of the military institution.

Within agency theory, Feaver reiterates extensively that civilians have the “right to be wrong. Civilian political leaders have the right to ask military agents to do something that ultimately proves costly, foolhardy, and even disastrous. Military agents have an obligation to advise honestly about the consequences of proposed courses of action, but in the final analysis they must obey even dumb orders”.<sup>69</sup> Yet also, even if the military is doing exactly what the civilian principal wants, and produces the results desired, if in doing so the civilian master has delegated more policy making decisions to the military than democratic theory calls for, than that is in fact shirking as well.<sup>70</sup> Further incentives and advantages afford to one or the other actor, such as the desire to politicise decisions or use the military to achieve other non-military objectives by the civilian principal, or the military’s ability to obfuscate and conceal information from effective monitoring through jargon and classification systems, as well as the potentially mortal stakes at play for the military agent, while inherent fallibility in both actors all combine to create a model which expects a great deal of friction and distrust, with only fleeting periods of equilibrium.<sup>71</sup> Four general patterns of behaviour are predicted: the military works with either intrusive or non-intrusive monitoring, or it shirks with either condition. Working with non-intrusive monitoring corresponds with Huntington’s vision of objective civilian control, whereas working with intrusive monitoring lines up with Huntington’s abhorred subjective civilian control and violation of professional autonomy. The shirking conditions were not allowed for at all in the Huntingtonian model.

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<sup>69</sup> Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 172.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*, 66.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, 72.

Agency theory has a number of shortcomings, most of which Feaver credibly anticipated and acknowledged<sup>72</sup> in pursuit of simplicity and parsimony. In assuming a single principal and agent, much dynamic interplay between services and civilian authorities is lost to view. In attempting to inform and define the preferences of the two actors in the game in an analytically useful way, researchers applying the model need to choose themselves from imperfect information sources and assign subjective weighting to various criteria, i.e. the extent to which either electoral or foreign policy motivations were paramount for a principal in a given situation. More broadly, the self-interest assumed by the rational-actor model itself runs expressly counter to the communitarian, justifiable sacrifice ethos inculcated within military institutions. And perhaps paramount, agency-theory largely ignores the requirements of Huntington's functional imperative – the need for military security and the allowance that the enemy also gets a say in affairs- within its calculus. Thus, although it purports to be a theory of civil-military relations, apart from informing some actor preferences in its game theory it utterly ignores fully one-half of the foundational requirements of the field and simply applies a theory stemming from mundane bureaucracy to assess the degree of civil supremacy enjoyed in particular interactions. As one commentator noted, “effective civil-military relations enable democratic societies to adequately *balance* the ongoing requirement to sustain an efficient military able to fight and a free society able to regulate its own affairs. Achieving that may or may not require civilians to win particular policy debates”.<sup>73</sup> It is thus a process-oriented model, rather than one concerned with functional outcomes. However, conceived as it was in the 1990s, at the apex of American military dominance and the unipolar moment, where military actions by the USA and other Western powers were

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid 54-117. Feaver readily acknowledges many biases and contestable assumptions that underlie his deductively derived theory as he develops his discussion of agency theory's construction.

<sup>73</sup> Burk, James. "The Logic of Crisis and Civil-Military Relations Theory: A Comment on Desch, Feaver, and Dauber." *Armed Forces and Society* 24, no. 3 (Apr 1, 1998): 455-462. p462.

discretionary and limited and genuine interstate war between major powers seemed a ridiculously remote possibility, Feaver's theory was perfectly situated to try to understand new civil-military tensions regarding humanitarian interventions, acrimonious relationships between principals and agents such as President Clinton and General Powell, conflicts between militaries resistant to change and increasingly progressive social values, and all manner of other situations occurring where national security and survival itself was little endangered, but civil-military frictions were pronounced. Agency theory, or variations upon it, has been applied broadly and frequently since it was introduced,<sup>74</sup> and enjoys perhaps unrivalled contemporary influence.

The end of the Cold War and all the factors described above ensured that Feaver was not the only civil-military relations theorist trying to build a better mousetrap. Schiff introduced *concordance theory*<sup>75</sup> as an attempt to better describe civil-military relations in non-Western states in order to predict the likelihood of military coups. In it, a three-way interaction is described, between political elites, the military, and her addition of broader society as third actor. In concordance theory, who decides what, i.e. the spheres of influence and competence appropriate to each actor, is relatively unimportant, so long as agreement among the three players exists on a few foundational issues. Desch, like Feaver, focused explicitly on civilian control, but created a structural theory that expected civil-military frictions depending on whether states faced high or low degrees of internal or external threat.<sup>76</sup> Avant argued that domestic political institutions also matter for civil control, contrasting the UK (Westminster) and US systems in various counter-insurgency wars.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> See, for example: Donnithorne, Jeffrey W. "Principled agents: The role of service culture in American civil-military relations." *Orbis* 61, no. 4 (2017): 506-526; or Petrina, Gilbert E. *An Agency Theory View of the Military Advisor*, 2005.

<sup>75</sup> Schiff, Rebecca L. "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance." *Armed Forces and Society* 22, no. 1 (Oct 1, 1995): 7-24

<sup>76</sup> Desch, Michael. *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* 1999.

<sup>77</sup> Avant, Deborah. *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars* 1994.

Canadian Doug Bland responded directly to the challenge that Feaver had put to the field with his original “Problematique” article by putting forward the what he described as a regime theory, or “theory of shared responsibility”<sup>78</sup> model of civil-military relations. Similar to Schiff’s concordance theory, mutual consent is a key ingredient, and a single perfect org-chart is an impossible dream. The central thesis of that model is that civil control is achieved through the sharing of responsibility: “civil authorities are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control and military leaders are responsible and accountable for others”.<sup>79</sup> How, exactly, responsibilities are shared depends on nationally evolved regimes of “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge”.<sup>80</sup> In this view, frictions are common and normal as regimes and responsibilities evolve according to changing preferences, but what really wants to be avoided is the *absence* of shared responsibility, which might be conceived of as a sullen “work-to-rule” bureaucratic military. Herspring embraced this model to offer instructive and rare comparative studies of civil-military relations within Russia, USA, Canada, and Germany.<sup>81</sup>

All of the above alternatives, however, have not achieved nearly the impact or further investigation that Feaver’s agency theory has realized. Nor has new institutional theorizing remained as prevalent or sought after in the decades since the 1990s, although it can hardly be said to have stopped. Gibson has channelled James Madison in arguing for a civil-military relations of overlapping responsibilities, robust public and departmental debate and open civil-military

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<sup>78</sup> Bland, Douglas L. "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces and Society* 26, no. 1 (Oct 1, 1999): 7-25. Bland further developed his theory on a comparative basis between the USA and Canada in Bland, Douglas L. "Who Decides what? Civil-Military Relations in Canada and the United States." *Canadian-American Public Policy* no. 41 (Feb 1, 2000): 1.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid*, 10.

<sup>81</sup> Herspring, Dale R. *Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility: A Four-Nation Study*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013.

competition *within* the DoD.<sup>82</sup> Levy offers a theory that civil control hinges on an equilibrium between two societal exchanges; one where soldiers are compensated for their mortal sacrifices by the civil republic, and the other where the military willing subordinates itself to political elites in exchange for resources.<sup>83</sup> Yet the parsimony and potential for broad application offered by agency theory, whatever its limitations, seems to have adequately addressed the felt “need” of the field following the Cold War, and no similar demand has yet resurfaced. As a result, after four decades of solitary pre-eminence, Huntington’s model now shares centre stage with Feaver, while all others enjoy more limited application or acceptance.

### **Changing society and evolving professionalism**

From the sociological perspective, the concept of military professionalism also enjoyed a period of renewed scrutiny and theorizing following the end of Cold War, for all the reasons identified above, but with somewhat greater emphasis now placed on the evolving values of Western societies in the place of the changing geo-political realm. Moskos made another important typological contribution to the field by identifying two transitions in 20<sup>th</sup> century militaries; the first from a conscription-based mass mobilization *modern* army existing from the 19<sup>th</sup> century to end of WWII, transitioning to what he described as a *late modern* military, which was defined by increasingly volunteer forces in a period where total war was circumscribed by the potential for nuclear armageddon, and finally to a *postmodern* military. For Moskos, the postmodern military was characterized by four major organizational changes. The first was greater cultural and structural interpenetration between civilian and military spheres. The second was reduced

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<sup>82</sup> Gibson, Christopher P. "Enhancing National Security and Civilian Control of the Military: A Madisonian Approach." In *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, edited by Nielsen, Suzanne C. and Don M. Snider, 239-263. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.

<sup>83</sup> Levy, Yagil. "A Revised Model of Civilian Control of the Military." *Armed Forces and Society* 38, no. 4 (Oct 1, 2012): 529-556.

difference *within* the services, lessening the distinctions between army or navy, combat or support, colonel or corporal, etc, in a sort of flattening and homogenizing of the military institution. The third was a shift in fundamental purpose, away from fighting wars *per se* to other, non-traditional missions. The last change was an increase in multinational interventions, moving the concept of the legitimate use of force beyond the nation state to a more collective enterprise.<sup>84</sup>

For Moskos, all of these changes were taking place in an environment distinguished more by wars *among* the people, and less *between* peoples, or existing states, a construction which should be quite familiar after three decades of troubled international interventions. At an ideological level, postmodern societies are characterized by moral relativism and pluralism vs their more monolithic forbear societies. Further, the postmodern society no longer viewed as credible the idea of war as an existential threat to the survival of a nation. Militaries increasingly organized to support limited (but frequently long duration) expeditionary deployments as opposed to planning for total mobilizations of society in national war efforts. Conscription was replaced with increasing employment of part-time reserves to support deployment cycles. The postmodern military as a profession, Moskos argued, would see the rise in importance of two new types to Janowitz's original triad of heroic leader, military manager, and technologist: the highly educated soldier-scholar, and the media- and diplomacy-adept soldier-statesman.<sup>85</sup> Both of these types, always latent within the institution, would see a rise in prominence and promotion in the postmodern environment. Moskos and a group of scholars then measured and analyzed a variety of Western societies with respect to their new typology and associated variables, ultimately finding the same trends in various stages of progress. His key conclusion riffed off his already established institutional/occupational thesis and the increasing importance (deleterious to military

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<sup>84</sup> Moskos, Charles. *The American Soldier After the Cold War: Towards a Post-Modern Military?*, 1998.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid*, 11.

professionalism in his view) of marketplace factors on the all-volunteer, late modern military institution: “The postmodern model, however, implies much more. The structure, makeup, and purpose of the armed forces changes as well as the values. The basic point is that a postmodern military ultimately derives from the decline in the level of threat to the nation and, in the American case certainly, the rise in identity politics based on ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation”<sup>86</sup>. In other words, the nation itself was becoming less relevant to the military institution as perceived threats lessened and other aspects of identity took its place in prominence both to service members and broader society. Canada also received particular attention in the study:

Canada has probably moved earliest and farthest from a traditional military model. Canada’s military posture is increasingly driven by internal rather than external considerations, and both value integration with the host society and transparency of the civil-military interface are paramount...The armed forces themselves have been increasingly democratized, liberalized, and civilianized. The dominant professional roles in the Canadian military are becoming the soldier-diplomat and the corporate manager.<sup>87</sup>

Although Moskos was not entirely clear on what the long-term ramifications of a post-modern military would entail, it seemed to him that Canada might discover them before other Anglo-American countries. He had a particular concern for what might ensue between a technologically advanced, occupational-type post-modern military, and one less advanced but featuring more traditional institutional values within its social organization.

Within this context, Sarkesian and Connor identified a new problem for the military profession, or at least a new variation on an enduring theme: How to reconcile the need to prepare for, fight, and win a war, remain connected to its broader host society, and now also to simultaneously and continuously conduct operations other than war across the globe.<sup>88</sup> Their own

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid, 26.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid, 23-24.

<sup>88</sup> Sarkesian, Sam Charles and Robert E. Connor. *The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century*. 1. publ. ed. London [u.a.]: Cass, 1999. p 17.

solution was what they termed constructive political engagement, which entailed a military more involved in the public forum, but still doing so in a judicious and non-partisan manner.<sup>89</sup> Sarkesian and Connor broadly followed the Janowitzian school of *convergence but not fusion* between society and the military, but went to greater lengths to justify and defend a degree of separation due to the unique role of the military and requirements of the profession. As they put it,

to expect the military profession and military institution to reflect an exact picture of society is to make the profession and institution another civilian organization shorn of the organizational fibre with which it can carry out its unique purpose. For it is one thing to say the profession must be more than a killing business, and it is quite another to say that it need never get involved in the killing business.<sup>90</sup>

Contrary to the Huntingtonian model of distinct and inviolable spheres of competence, or agency theory's rigid demand for utter civil dominance, Sarkesian and Connor articulated an "equilibrium model" of civil-military relations. In a nutshell, "equilibrium requires that there be open debate between all segments of the public, those in the national security establishment, and military professionals. From this, adjustments can be made and understanding reached about military perspectives and civilian concerns".<sup>91</sup> Equilibrium theory thus expects a dynamic relationship between civil and military actors as friendly adversaries, quite similar to Bland's Canadian-made theory of shared responsibility, and also somewhat echoed in elements of Freedman's recent survey of civil-military relations in crisis situations.<sup>92</sup>

In developing their own conceptualization of the military profession capable of fulfilling its own responsibilities in both combat and the public forum, Sarkesian and Connor reiterated and brought together familiar principles which drew on Janowitz, Hackett, Gabriel, Moskos and others regarding the importance of a military ethos and military culture, a distinctive, combat-ready

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid, 160

<sup>91</sup> Sarkesian and Connor, *The US Military Profession*, 163.

<sup>92</sup> Freedman, Lawrence. *Command*. London: Allen Lane, 2022.

leadership model built on trust and respect from the top to bottom of the institution, and education (including broad liberal and political education). They also went a step further than their predecessors in clearly and unequivocally including enlisted members within the profession of arms,<sup>93</sup> thus erasing a distinction between the officer corps and other ranks which was increasingly ill-fitting in an era of mission command philosophies, voluntary service, and ever-increasing levels of both general and professional education within the non-commissioned officer corps. This addition has been, thus far, the last major innovation in conceiving the military profession to date.

### **Conclusion: Civil-Military Relations – Three giants, plus the “shared” approach**

To recapitulate, the study of civil-military relations has enjoyed two key periods of interest and theoretical innovation. The first was the early Cold War, when Huntington and Janowitz first grappled with a new security paradigm for the USA and charted two distinct approaches to both understanding civil-military relations and prescribing their own solutions to inferred problems. Huntington developed a comprehensive and parsimonious political-institutional theory which centered on his idea of objective civilian control, entailing an apolitical, professional military and clearly delineated areas of jurisdiction for both civil and military actors. His approach neatly solved the challenges of civil-military relations as he portrayed them, while problematically relying on a definitional crutch in including an unexamined ethic of subordination in his approach to military professionalism, and rather unrealistic expectations against what he might describe as “trespass” by either civil or military actors into their counterpart’s area of expertise.

Janowitz approached civil-military relations from the perspective of the sociologist, meaning that he first attempted to understand soldiers and what was necessary to sustain their performance in peacetime and combat, and then endeavoured to provide a theory which

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<sup>93</sup> Sarkesian and Connor, *The US Military Profession*, 169

successfully married that institution to broader society and also prevented total nuclear war. The result was convergence theory and the constabulary force, the latter being an accurate descriptor of the type of military missions and force employment strategies that Western powers have pursued since the end of World War II. But in developing a more sophisticated and nuanced portrait of the military and its needs and wants, Janowitz' approach sacrificed parsimony for richness, and lacked the clarity of Huntington, while its sociological basis left it inadequate to fully analyze the political-institutional aspects of civil-military relations. Both Janowitz and Huntington rather ambitiously also called for fundamental reforms to the values of society itself; more conservative for Huntington, more civic republican for Janowitz.

After a long period where Janowitz and Huntington continued to largely define the field, the end of the Cold War brought about a second period of interest and innovation. Feaver challenged Huntington's approach on its own ground with his own deductively derived and parsimonious agency theory, which was better equipped to identify and understand the frictions between civil and military actors in an environment where national survival and military security no longer seemed credibly endangered and military employment was simply a question of volition and civil direction. Agency theory provides an analytical lens which expects and credibly accounts for tension and contestation in civil-military relations in a manner overlooked by Huntington, although its normative demand for unlimited civil supremacy ignores questions of actual national security. Agency theory as a result sees success where others see abject failure, such as the US intervention in Vietnam. In agency theory, even a nuclear war or utter defeat and dissolution of the state is fine, provided that the civil principal's demands reign supreme. *The operation was successful, but the patient died.*

Concurrently, a variety of civil-military theories were put forward which all, in one way or another, were predicated on a degree of agreement between civil and military actors, while avoiding the absolute delineations of authority and competence as found in Huntington, or the rigid demands of Feaver. Schiff's concordance theory, Bland's shared responsibility, and Sarkesian and Connor's equilibrium theory are all examples. Like Janowitz, these theories can all more richly describe particular examples of civil-military relations and perhaps are a more truthful reflection of civil-military relations in the empirical realm. However, their equivocal stance and lack of parsimony, acceptance of shifting roles, as well as a deliberate unwillingness to articulate the one "right" way, at a political-institutional level, civil-military relations *ought* to be carried out, has rendered all of them less analytically appealing or as broadly applicable as Huntington or Feaver.

### **Conclusion: Conceiving the military profession**

Meanwhile, the concept of the military profession evolved in a more iterative manner, with useful theoretical additions and innovations occurring slightly more frequently than the broader field of civil-military relations, at least until recently. Using Huntington, Janowitz, Hackett and others, a defensible conceptualization of the military profession can now be encapsulated. It begins with three aspects of the military's unique relationship with mortal violence, and then broadens to more traditional aspects of a profession within that context.

*Unlimited liability.* The military is entrusted by their host society, to paraphrase Hackett, to solve social problems-including deterring, and if necessary, fighting and winning wars-through the ordered application of military force.<sup>94</sup> This "no-fail" task imposes the obligation of unlimited liability upon military service members, legitimately demanding-and knowingly accepted by those in uniform-risk and sacrifice up to the deaths of its members in the pursuit of its objectives. The

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<sup>94</sup> Hackett, *Profession of Arms*, 3.

state can quite literally and legally command its soldiers to knowingly sacrifice their lives in the instrumental pursuit of higher objectives.

*Obligation to kill.* The military's unique role demands that its members be not just willing to lay down their own lives, but also to deliberately kill others. For some, this mortal violence may be an even heavier burden than that of unlimited liability, and is largely antithetical to the dominant values of Western liberal societies.

*Burden of command.* Leadership has been described as the art of getting someone else to do what you want, as Eisenhower once opined.<sup>95</sup> This may be a necessary component of leadership, but it is by itself insufficient to describe the obligations of military command. The third aspect of the military's unique relationship with mortal violence is that of ordering *others* into harm's way, including unto death, in the attainment of military objectives. In a very real way, an officer's commission can be conceived as a license by society to spend the lifeblood of its citizens in the pursuit of the community's goals. The ethical burden is enormous, and once again the public citizen is in no way prepared by the values of broader society prior to joining the military to execute this responsibility. Bureaucratic management practices, as Savage and Gabriel argued,<sup>96</sup> cannot replace military leadership, nor do evolving technologies or changing norms change the fundamental calculus.

These three elements put together are unique to the military profession. Police may be called upon to kill in specific circumstances, and both police and firefighters, although they are not legally required to do so, often are willing to sacrifice their own lives in the moment of crisis to save others. The profession of medicine also shares a commonality related to the burden of

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<sup>95</sup> Dwight D Eisenhower quote on leadership, speaking at the Annual Conference of the Society for Personnel Administration, 5/12/54.

<sup>96</sup> Savage and Gabriel, "Cohesion and disintegration"

command, in that limited resources and triage may require difficult decisions that knowingly result in choosing who lives and who dies. However, nowhere else in society do all of these elements combine as they do in the military. This very unique set of societal demands also requires a particular ethos if it is to be successfully accepted and internalized by service members. As Gabriel points out, “The soldier must understand that what he or she is asked to do is far more ethically burdensome than what any other social institution asks its members to do. Not surprisingly then, the values that govern the soldier are different from those of other social institutions”.<sup>97</sup> In order that the moral soldier be capable of fulfilling their societal role, and not be psychologically torn apart by the actions required of them by the state, the military requires sufficient cultural space, or autonomy over its members, so that its distinctive ethos can be cultivated and maintained. Or, as Janowitz argued: “The distinctive quality of the military life makes it possible to perpetuate the martial spirit. To survive, the martial spirit must be taken for granted, and not constantly subjected to critical evaluation”.<sup>98</sup> Only through this socialization of a military ethos can combat performance and cohesion in the face of casualties be obtained, and the worst psychological injuries avoided. It falls upon the military institution to deeply inculcate the values of mutual trust, duty, honour, discipline, and the understanding that lives will never be spent needlessly, which all underwrite the three elements described above. As Janowitz pointed out:

The need for heroic fighters persists. The pervasive requirements of combat set the limits to civilianizing tendencies...The ideal image of the military profession continues to be the strategic commander, not the military technician...The military establishment requires a sense of duty and honor to accomplish its objectives. Heroism is an essential part of the calculations of even the most rational and self-critical military thinkers.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Gabriel, *Warriors Way* 1-2.

<sup>98</sup> Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, 211.

<sup>99</sup> Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, 33-35.

*Responsibility.* From here, one can turn to parallels with traditional depictions of professions as Huntington argued, albeit remaining in the context of the military's unique societal role as developed above. Like other professions, the military holds a social responsibility in that it performs a necessary service on behalf of society, just as doctors practice medicine or lawyers practice law. Unlike doctors and lawyers who can move through a variety of private practices however, the profession of arms, through the institution of the military, has a single client in collective society, and also largely enjoys a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, with the notable exception of law enforcement agencies within their more limited and proscribed roles.

*Expertise.* The profession of arms has a body of specialized knowledge which is acquired through extensive education and experience. This is not the technocratic expertise which accompanies all of the various trades and jobs within the military, but the broader and more diffuse accumulation of knowledge and expertise regarding the maintenance and application of military power. This body of professional knowledge can and must be learned and it maintains both practical and academic aspects and linkages. Objective standards of professional competence exist to differentiate relative skillsets and expertise. Further, mastery of the body of specialized knowledge must be combined with a broader liberal education which informs how that specialized knowledge can best be applied to further societal goals. Instrumental automatons, expert only in violence and dissociated from the values and beliefs of broader society, lack the contextual knowledge necessary to fulfil their professional role.

*Corporateness.* Membership in the profession of arms is highly, although not exclusively, self-regulated. Rank, responsibility, and privilege, particularly at lower levels, are largely awarded at the discretion of the military institution in line with its own standards and regulations. As with lawyers called to the bar, or doctors licensed to practice, the profession of arms, through the

military institution, has a degree of autonomy with which it establishes and enforces the standards of professional conduct, and promotes certain values and behaviours either formally through a code of ethics or informally through the norms of the institution, or both. The officer's commission exemplifies the professional license, however, the increasing amounts of responsibility delegated to, professional education invested in, and performance expectations of, the non-commissioned officer corps in a volunteer military demand that a contemporary conception of the profession of arms include them within its professional membership.

As has been discussed here, the definition of the military profession is less about the specific words and more about the underlying concepts which inform it. These "ingredients" can be combined in a variety of ways to inform broader categorizations like ethos or culture, and can lead to a number of definitions which use very different words to ultimately say something very similar. The exact definition being less important than an informed appreciation of its contents, and in the interest of aligning this inquiry with its primary research object, this thesis adopts Canada's own definition of the military profession:

The profession of arms in Canada is composed of military members dedicated to the defence of Canada and its interests, as directed by the Government of Canada. The profession of arms is distinguished by the concept of service before self, the lawful, ordered application of military force and the acceptance of the concept of unlimited liability. Its members possess a systematic and specialized body of military knowledge and skills acquired through education, training and experience, and they apply this expertise competently and objectively in the accomplishment of their missions. Members of the Canadian profession of arms share a set of core values and beliefs found in the military ethos that guides them in the performance of their duty and allows a special relationship of trust to be maintained with Canadian society.<sup>100</sup>

This chapter has thus developed a diverse set of analytical lenses with which to understand and interpret behaviour in the civil-military realm, and has also established a well-informed framework

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<sup>100</sup> *Duty With Honour*, 10. This definition reappears in many other Canadian documents, but they refer to *Duty With Honour* as the authoritative articulation.

conceptualization of the military profession. Equipped with these tools, the next chapter will lay out the fundamentals of Canadian civil-military relations, and explore the history and events which led to the murder of Shidane Arone in Somalia by Canadian soldiers in 1992, and the subsequent actions taken to reform the Canadian Armed Forces which culminated in the capstone ethos document *Duty With Honour*.

## CHAPTER 3 – *DUTY WITH HONOUR*

### Introduction

This chapter is divided into four parts. Part one provides a general overview of Canadian civil-military relations and the Canadian Armed Forces. Part two investigates the first of two case studies in this thesis and offers a brief historical summary of the torture and murder in Somalia of teenager Shidane Arone by members of the CAF and the ensuing inquiries and reform efforts which led to, among other things, the publication of the capstone CAF document *Duty With Honour (DWH)*. The third part provides a comprehensive textual study of that publication. The fourth and final part returns to the theoretical core of this thesis by providing analysis of the Somalia case and in particular *DWH* from the perspectives of civil-military relations and military professionalism as developed in the previous chapter, setting the stage for comparative analysis of the sexual misconduct case in the subsequent chapter.

### The Canadian Context

Prior to 1968, Canada had three separate armed services (an army, navy and air force). They were merged into one by Minister of National Defence (MND) Paul Hellyer in 1968, four years after the first Canadian defence policy was released.<sup>101</sup> Hellyer also established the position of a single Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), and a joint (i.e. combined services) Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ). The act of unification was a contentious one, which saw very high numbers of departures from the military in the immediate years that followed, particularly at higher rank levels.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Canada. National Defence. *White Paper on Defence*, 1964.

<sup>102</sup> Granatstein, Jack L. *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*. 1. ed. Toronto, Ont: Harper Flamingo Canada, 2004, 76.

Bilingualism was officially adopted in 1970, and in part realized through contentious quota systems in the years that followed.<sup>103</sup> The military and civilian sides of the department, hitherto operating separately, were integrated at a National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in 1972. This created more opportunities for communication between civilians and service members, but “the department failed to delineate respective responsibilities in any legal or binding manner through amendments to the National Defence Act”.<sup>104</sup> One high level administrator at the time termed it “an act of mayhem committed in the name of administrative madness”<sup>105</sup> and it subsequently led to growing concerns about “civilianization” of the CAF due to this working relationship with the civilians of the department.<sup>106</sup> Attempting to (or refraining from) incorporate into the CAF practices and values that originated in business or elsewhere in the civil service, and the relative merits of so doing (or not doing) has been an enduring source of tension ever since.

The CAF are led by the CDS, the senior serving member of the military. They hold a four-maple leaf rank of General/Admiral. Since the 1968 unification, the CAF consists of a single service called the Canadian Armed Forces according to the *National Defence Act*.<sup>107</sup> However, there are still entities within the CAF called the Royal Canadian Air Force, Royal Canadian Navy, and Canadian Army, with their own distinctive environmental uniforms, staffs, and organizations, which for simplicity’s sake will still be referred to as services in this thesis. The CAF falls within the Department of National Defence (DND), a ministerial department headed by the Minister of National Defence, who is an elected member of Parliament (MP), serving in Cabinet of the ruling

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<sup>103</sup> Granatstein, Jack L. *Canada's Army*. 2nd ed. Toronto [u.a.]: University of Toronto Press, 2011, 370-371

<sup>104</sup> Ibid, 373.

<sup>105</sup> Bland, Douglas L. *Chiefs of Defence*. Toronto: Brown, 1995, 93. Quoted in Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 72.


<sup>106</sup> Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 72-74.;

Bland, Douglas L. "Institutionalizing Ambiguity: The Management Review Group and the Reshaping of the Defence Policy Process in Canada." *Canadian Public Administration* 30, no. 4 (Dec, 1987): 527-549.;

Kasurak, Peter C. "Civilianization and the Military Ethos: Civil-Military Relations in Canada." *Canadian Public Administration* 25, no. 1 (Mar, 1982): 108-129.

<sup>107</sup> *National Defense Act*, (2022): R.S., c. N-4, s. 14.

elected government. The allotted strength of the Regular Force is 71,500, with another 30,000 members in the Reserves,<sup>108</sup> although both components are currently severely understrength, with over 10,000 vacancies as of 2022.<sup>109</sup> As of 2021 there are an additional 28,712 civilians employed within DND who contribute to the defence of Canada, including human rights specialists, analysts, budget experts etc.<sup>110</sup>



**Figure 1 - Command and Control of the DND and CAF - Theoretical View.** Source: CAF 101 for Civilians (a DND civilian employment manual) – undated.

Within DND, there is also an unelected civilian deputy minister (DM), who as the senior bureaucrat in the department serves as the senior civilian advisor to the MND and head of the civilian workforce, an associate deputy minister, and a host of assistant deputy ministers (ADMs) as well. There is also frequently an associate minister of National Defence, who is another elected MP and member of Cabinet. In principle, like Huntington's desired *balanced* approach to civil-military relations, within the department there is separation between civilian and military members

<sup>108</sup> Canada. National Defence. *Strong, Secure Engaged -Canada's Defence Policy*: Department of National Defence, 2017, 44. This policy increased allotted strength from 68,000 in the Regular Force, and 28,500 in the Reserves.

<sup>109</sup> Cnockaert, Jesse. "Military Recruitment and Retention Crisis Requires Addressing Low Morale, Housing Availability, Say Tory, NDP Critics." *The Hill Times*, Nov 23, 2022.

<sup>110</sup> "Canadian Armed Forces overall Footprint". Accessed Feb 24, 2023. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/transition-materials/mnd-transition-material-2021-dnd/tab10-caf-overall-footprint.html>.

in both supervision and functional role (see Figure 1). In reality, there is a significant degree of overlap and mutual permeation of civilian and military hierarchies by their counterparts. Currently, five ADMs report to both the CDS and DM, while five more ADMs, along with the associate deputy minister, report solely to the DM (see Figure 2).<sup>111</sup> Such interpenetrations of the civil and military personnel spheres continue at lower levels within DND:




Figure 2 - Organizational structure of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/organizational-structure.html>)

In practice...civilian and military personnel, collectively referred to as the *Defence Team*, are highly integrated with one another. About two-thirds of DND's full time civilian workforce is actually employed in the military structure, and several thousand CAF military

<sup>111</sup> "Organizational Structure of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces." Accessed Feb 24, 2023. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/organizational-structure.html>.

personnel perform departmental functions inside DND. In fact, many DND civilians are supervised by military managers and some civilians manage CAF personnel.<sup>112</sup>

As a result, at the departmental level, civil-military relations in Canada are a cross between the *balanced* and *vertical* organization types of Huntington's typology. On the one hand, the MND oversees the department and has both a civilian and military senior advisor in the DM and the CDS, which corresponds with the *balanced* type. On the other hand, the lack of any impermeable boundary between military professionals and civilian departmental employees, wherein soldiers manage civilians (and vice versa), exceeds what Huntington saw as the professional competence of the military officer and corresponds to the *vertical* organization type, and convolutes and complicates command and reporting relationships. Begrudging this situation, former CDS General Rick Hillier memorably argued that "Civilian control of the armed forces is not [and inferentially, ought not to be] civil service control of the armed forces"<sup>113</sup>. Others have decried this state of affairs for its bloated staff size and the civilianizing effects it has had on CAF culture.<sup>114</sup>

In any case, although there is frequently ambiguity and multiple reporting relationships, *for the most part* military command authority rises through the ranks of the CAF in the various environments and headquarters up to the CDS. From there, the official Commander-in-Chief of the CAF is the Governor General, but in the Westminster system the head of state is largely a figurehead; this authority is purely ceremonial. In practice, authority rests with the Cabinet and the

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<sup>112</sup> Goldenberg, Irina, Angela R. Febraro, and Waylon H. Dean. "Introduction-Military-Civilian Integration in Canada's Defence Establishment." In *The Defence Team*, edited by Goldenberg, Irina, Angela R. Febraro and Waylon H. Dean, 1-10. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2015, 1.

<sup>113</sup> Gosselin, Daniel. "The Unarmed Servants of the State: The Evolving Role of Civilians in National Defence." In *The Defence Team*, edited by Goldenberg, Irina, Angela R. Febraro and Waylon H. Dean, 11-45. Ottawa: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2015, 11.

<sup>114</sup> See, for example: Kasurak, "Civilianization and the Military Ethos"; Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*; Leslie, EMD. "Too Much Management, Too Little Command." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 2, no. 3 (1972): 30-32; Neelin, J. E. and L. M. Pederson. "The Administrative Structure of the Canadian Armed Forces: Over-Centralized, Overly Staff-Ridden." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 4, no. 2 (1974): 32-40.

Prime Minister, who can deploy the CAF at their discretion without Parliamentary approval. The Canadian government in turn legitimates its authority from the citizenry through federal elections.

The Westminster system also plays a significant role in how the CAF communicates, or does not communicate, with the public. In the US system of checks and balances, an independent Congress can summon departmental representatives and subject them and their departments to legislative scrutiny and increase resultant public debate on salient issues. However, in the Westminster system, the legislative and executive branches of government are largely coterminous in that the government and ministers in power at the time also typically control all Parliamentary committees, and can control who is, or is not, invited to testify. Additionally, although there are standing committees on national defence in Parliament in both the Senate<sup>115</sup> and the House of Commons,<sup>116</sup> their members do not hold the high-level security clearances required in order to hear and review classified briefings and intelligence. Put simply, the nature of operation of the Westminster system ensures that the government of the day can very tightly control and shape the amount of public scrutiny, as well as the nature of the discussion, that DND and the CAF are subjected to, providing a discretionary mantle of protection and secrecy over departmental operations. On the flipside, it also sharply limits the extent to which the CAF can exercise their professional obligation to inform the public regarding important issues of national security. The result is a form of civil-military relations with very robust civil control (although that oversight power may not always be exercised), but at the potential functional cost of reduced security due to a lack of effective and informed debate.

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<sup>115</sup> Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence - <https://sencanada.ca/en/Content/Sen/Committee/441/SECD/55417-E>.

<sup>116</sup> House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence - <https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/nddn>.

Fortunately, it might be argued, Canada's national security has rarely been credibly endangered. Canada's only land border is shared with the most powerful state in the world, and at least since the end of World War II, Canadian defence was readily guaranteed both by the USA's vast military power and the good fortunes of geography. Canada does not engage in an arms races, faces no credible threat of invasion or border hostility, and has no enduring requirement for any particular degree of military power to provide for its own safety. Instead, Canada enjoys the luxury of shaping its military to meet its largely discretionary expeditionary military commitments, as well as a "just enough, just-in-case" approach to its alliances with NATO and the USA via NORAD. This sets up enduring frictions, well-anticipated by the agency-theory view of Feaver, or of differing civil and military priorities argued by Huntington, between Canadian military members who are concerned by an anemic, undersized military, incapable of meeting alliance and intervention commitments as they understand them, let alone adequately prepared to fight in a major war, and government officials who see better uses for discretionary funding and have little fear of punishment from a Canadian public largely unconcerned with national security. As one Canadian defence scholar may have apocryphally opined, "Canada's defence problem is that it doesn't have a defence problem".<sup>117</sup>

To summarize this section, a few enduring themes of Canadian civil-military relations and DND/CAF organizational behaviour are present and relevant to this inquiry. First, elected ministerial oversight of the military has often been somewhat disinterested, is usually lacking in significant background expertise, but it is always politically sensitive. Second, the Westminster system itself allows the government to limit the amount of public scrutiny ministerial departments can be subjected to in Parliament, but it also sharply limits the ability of military members to

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<sup>117</sup> I have seen this quote in other works, attributed to Joel Sokolsky, but have been unable to locate the original statement. Whether or not he actually said it in writing, the observation remains valid.

exercise their professional obligation to inform public debate on national security issues. Third, following unification of the military services and the subsequent merging of civilian and military components of defence personnel into an integrated structure, the CAF has perpetually faced concerns relating to civilianization and over-bureaucratization. Finally, all of these conditions operate in an environment where Canada does not face pressing existential threats to its national security, which makes the size and activities of its military much more discretionary than most other states.

### **The Somalia Affair – Crisis and Reform**

On March 16, 1993, Master Corporal Clayton Matchee and Private Kyle Brown tortured 16-year-old Somali Shidane Arone to death. The two were members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, deployed on a UN mission to Somalia. As word spread in the months and years that followed, more stories came out regarding profoundly racist hazing rituals in the Canadian Airborne Regiment<sup>118</sup>, rape in the military<sup>119</sup>, and a leadership more bent on limiting fallout and punishing the victims than delivering justice<sup>120</sup>. This thesis does not attempt to fully develop the history and specifics of these events in detail, but merely identifies them as the causes, at the public and political level, that drove an appetite for inquiry and reform of the CAF which was to continue for years afterwards.

The murder in Somalia spawned numerous inquiries and reports. The CAF quickly organized its own Board of Inquiry<sup>121</sup> into the murder itself, which concluded, essentially, that

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<sup>118</sup> Fisher, Luke. "Bonding and Brutality." *Maclean's*, Jan 30, 1995

<sup>119</sup> O'Hara, Jane, Brenda Branswell, John Geddes, Shanda Deziel, Sharon Doyle Driedger, and Stephanie Nolen. "Rape in the Military." *Maclean's*, May 25, 1998.

<sup>120</sup> O'Hara, Jane, Shanda Deziel, and John Nicol. "Of Rape and Justice." *Maclean's*, Dec 14, 1998.

<sup>121</sup> A copy of the terms of reference for the De Faye Board of Inquiry is available on page 1513 of *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*. Ottawa: The Commission, 1997.

everything was fine within the Airborne and other institutions of the CAF, no systemic problems existed, and it was the isolated actions of a few miscreants only that needed to be dealt with. Few were convinced.<sup>122</sup> A subsequent military review of the BOI's report at a higher level within DND suggested enough concern was warranted to justify a much higher-level inquiry into the performance and particularly the leadership of the CAF and NDHQ.<sup>123</sup> By 1995, media coverage and scrutiny had grown ever more critical as more details came out about racist and abhorrent hazing rituals in the Airborne Regiment,<sup>124</sup> as well as "accusations of cover-up, scandal, failed leadership, lack of professionalism, and, most especially, the seeming inability of the senior leadership of the CAF to clarify who should be held accountable for what".<sup>125</sup> As a result, then-MND David Collenette of the recently elected Liberal government finally announced the establishment of a public Commission of Inquiry into the Somalia affair in March of 1995, chaired by Justice Gilles Letourneau.

Equipped with a broad mandate and prone to adversarial hearings with witnesses, the Somalia Commission took on a costly life of its own and showed no sign of even approaching a conclusion more than year later. When new MND Doug Young took over the department in late 1996, he shortly thereafter ordered the commission to complete its work and submit a report no later than June of 1997. As then-PM Jean Chrétien described it, "the Somalia Inquiry had simply taken on a lucrative [for lawyers] life of its own and developed into a nasty intra-departmental fight. So when it became obvious that the inquiry was having a negative effect on the morale of the troops and leading nowhere, I closed it down".<sup>126</sup> Even forcibly truncated, the Commission

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<sup>122</sup> Horn, Bernd and Bill Bentley. *Forced to Change*. Toronto, Ontario: Dundurn, 2015, 48.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid*, 49.

<sup>124</sup> Fisher, "Bonding and Brutality".

<sup>125</sup> Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 49.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid*, 51.

eventually published a door-stopping, five volume, 1675-page report with 157 recommendations entitled *Dishonoured Legacy*,<sup>127</sup> but by that time the energetic new MND had already produced his own *Report to the Prime Minister on Leadership and Management in the Canadian Forces* in March of 1997,<sup>128</sup> and had also received another report he had commissioned on military justice by an expert panel chaired by Justice Brian Dickson.<sup>129</sup>

### **What was the problem, and what was the solution?**

Young's *Report* was his own synthesis, informed by the work of four academic scholars of the Canadian military with whom he had engaged for external advice, as well as the *Dickson Report*, preliminary work by the Somalia Commission, and a variety of older reports and studies. Although particulars differed, they were fairly united in a few respects. They condemned the poor state of professional education within the CAF, attempts to cover up and conceal misbehaviour, and they found serious problems with the state and ethos of CAF leadership, which had become overly bureaucratized and distanced from its professional *raison d'être*. Similar to the findings of Savage and Gabriel,<sup>130</sup> they identified a military in which discipline had broken down, with leadership more concerned with covering their own ass than exemplifying and demanding professional modes of military behaviour. This in turn had been caused by the slow erosion of military professionalism within the CAF as a cumulative result of various high-level administrative "reforms" inflicted on the military and DND, funding cuts, and excessive operational tempo which was spreading the over-worked members of the military far too thinly. In his book on the Somalia murder and related events, Bercuson was scathing in explaining how things had gotten so bad:

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<sup>127</sup> *Dishonoured Legacy*

<sup>128</sup> Young, M. Douglas. *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces (Young Report)*, 1997.

<sup>129</sup> Canada. National Defence.. *Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services (Dickson Report)*, 1997.

<sup>130</sup> Gabriel and Savage. *Crisis of Command: Mismanagement in the Army*.

That crisis was caused initially by the deliberate bleeding of the defence establishment by successive, mostly Liberal, governments. It was made a great deal worse by unification and the imposition on the Canadian Forces of a structure designed to ease political and bureaucratic burdens rather than promote military effectiveness. The sins of unification were compounded by the creation of National Defence Headquarters, designed to murder military initiative. With NDHQ safely ensconced at the top of the defence structure, it was not long before soldier-managers took control of the army and soldier-warriors were shunted aside.<sup>131</sup>

The Somalia Commission's *Dishonoured Legacy* began in much the same way:

Leadership errors in the Somalia mission were manifold and fundamental: the systems in place were inadequate and deeply flawed; practices that fuelled rampant careerism and placed individual ambition ahead of the needs of the mission had become entrenched; the oversight and supervision of crucial areas of responsibility were deeply flawed and characterized by the most superficial of assessments; even when troubling events and disturbing accounts of indiscipline and thuggery were known, there was disturbing inaction or the actions that were taken exacerbated and deepened the problem; planning, training and overall preparations fell far short of what was required; subordinates were held to standards of accountability that many of those above were not prepared to abide by. Our soldiers searched, often in vain, for leadership and inspiration.<sup>132</sup>

In other words, the events of Somalia did not stem from a military that was training cold-blooded killers in a culture of unfettered violence like some feared, but instead, like the My Lai massacre in Vietnam, caused by breakdown of military values and military leadership in the first place. Or as Domansky succinctly noted, "The CAF failed to cultivate a suitable officer development system supporting a strong professional ethos, and this contributed to the myriad problems facing the institution by the 1990s".<sup>133</sup> This included failing to inculcate and reinforce an ethos which both accepted the necessity of violence, yet also circumscribed the act of killing only within clear ethical and professional bounds. With respect to leadership, the mutual respect and trust between higher ranking and front-line soldiers that is essential for effective *command*, the vital third unique aspect of the military profession, had been subverted by wide-spread adoption of individualist,

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<sup>131</sup> Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 241-2.

<sup>132</sup> *Dishonoured Legacy*, xxix.

<sup>133</sup> Domansky, Katie. "Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces: Leadership, Education, and Professional Development (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis)." PhD, University of Calgary, 2018, 72.

bureaucratic norms over a more corporate and communitarian ethos. Instead of seeking out and accepting responsibility, rank and prestige were sought while reducing and diffusing actual responsibility wherever possible, a practice greatly enabled by the byzantine reporting relationships at NDHQ and ambiguous accountabilities.

To correct these issues, two of the lengthiest sections of the Young's Report were focused on leadership, and values and ethics. Whereas the former section made twenty-two recommendations, particularly emphasizing education, professional development and reforms to career progression, the latter concluded with only one, but at the highest level: to establish and promulgate "a formal statement of values and beliefs...of all members of the Canadian Forces at all levels".<sup>134</sup> The CAF needed an ethical "anchor" which formally articulated the ethos of the profession and provided a constant reference point to define what "right looked like" in the CAF in the face of change, ambiguity, and various sub-cultural norms across the vast institution. This was an idea that echoed a conclusion which two earlier inquiries into officer professional development following Somalia had reached,<sup>135</sup> but which had seen little institutional implementation.<sup>136</sup> It was as a result of this direction that *DWH* was eventually published, following earlier foundational work on military ethics, leadership, and professionalism,<sup>137</sup> as the capstone ethos and civil-military relations document of the CAF in 2003.<sup>138</sup> In a single text, it lays out why the CAF exists, provides an encapsulation of the CAF conceptualization of military professionalism, articulates its ethos, places the CAF within its civil-military relations context, and

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<sup>134</sup> Young Report, 44

<sup>135</sup> Canada. National Defence. *The Officer Professional Development Working Group Final Report*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1996.; and Canada. National Defence. *Final Report of the Officer Development Review Board (Morton Report)*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1995.

<sup>136</sup> Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 40.

<sup>137</sup> These earlier DND publications included: in 1997, the *Officer's Professional Development Handbook*; the 1998 *Statement of Defence Ethics*, and the 2001 *Officership 2020*.

<sup>138</sup> *Duty With Honour*

provides guidance for the never-ending process of adaptation and evolution that retains the vital characteristics of the profession, both from changes in broader society and from the evolving nature of conflict and operational missions. A detailed analysis of *DWH* here follows.

### ***Duty With Honour***

As Domansky points out, *DWH* “represented the first time that any statement of CAF professional identity or its component parts had ever been defined in writing”.<sup>139</sup> It might seem odd that no such document had hitherto existed within the Canadian military, but a historical perspective is useful here. From the country’s birth until just before World War II, Canada’s foreign policy (including declarations of war) had been the province of the UK, and the small peacetime military Canada maintained had templated itself on the British model. Following WWII and for the duration of the Cold War, the *raison d’être* and probable mission of the CAF had seemed clear enough, and narrow enough, that no overarching ethos was required, although even then this was probably mistaken. But with the collapse of the USSR, the explosion of peacekeeping and humanitarian deployments and other, non-traditional employment of the CAF, and ultimately the murder in Somalia and its fallout, it became clear that the CAF could not simply be all things to all people, and required an institutional “center of gravity” that both represented the CAF to the Canadian public and united service members within itself.

*DWH*’s four chapters develop, in order, a vision of military professionalism in Canada, the military ethos itself, the organization of the Canadian military and its relation to its civil masters, and finally a chapter on future challenges (see Appendix 1). At all times the document emphasizes military professionalism, indeed, one of the recurring headline statements of the document is “We

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<sup>139</sup> Domansky. "Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces", 212.

are Canada's military professionals".<sup>140</sup> The lengthy bibliography is well developed on the academic subjects of civil-military relations and professionalism more generally, including Huntington, Janowitz, Hackett, and others, while also including important contributors to the Canadian-specific discussion.

The first chapter articulates a view of the military as a profession within the Canadian context and its specific history. Although informed by Canadian specifics, it is a concise and fairly conventional articulation, and would be immediately recognized by Huntington or Janowitz, from which it is largely derived. It clearly states the *raison d'être*, or essential function of the military profession, as "the ordered application of military force in defence of the state and its interest".<sup>141</sup> As servants of the state, *DwH* acknowledges that the CAF will do whatever is asked of it by the state, including aid to other departments, provinces, and territories, but:

Conducting military operations remains the CF's overriding purpose, however, and this shapes the fighting identity of Canada's military professionals. It also delineates the profession's responsibility to the government and to society, and dictates the expertise necessary for the success of operations. The values and beliefs of the profession of arms, expressed and communicated by the Canadian military ethos, are also clearly shaped by the CF's unique and special role.<sup>142</sup>

Thus, *DwH* also retains a primary focus on what renders the military a distinctive element of society, and what logically follows from its role.

*DwH* does however, deviate slightly from the traditionally understood triad of a profession – expertise, responsibility, and corporateness – by replacing corporateness with the term "identity", all of which are built around and anchored by a particular CAF ethos, which constitutes a fourth distinctive element to the profession in this construction (see Figure 3). A collective identity and unity of the CF is derived from three underlying values: voluntary military service, unlimited

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<sup>140</sup> *Duty With Honour*.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid*, 7.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid*, 13.

liability, and service before self, while the nature of voluntarism includes an acceptance of Canadian values within the identity as well.<sup>143</sup> Compared to using “corporateness”, the identity construct also incorporates some components that might otherwise belong within the military ethos, or in my own three distinctive aspects of the military profession related to mortal violence, particularly the concept of *unlimited liability*. It still covers the same essential ground of a military profession, but it is organized in a somewhat different manner. As for the ethos itself, its contents are developed in the subsequent chapter, but its purpose is made clear: “The military ethos embodies the spirit that binds the profession together. It clarifies how members view their responsibilities, apply their expertise and express their unique military identity”.<sup>144</sup> Finally, all members of the CAF, regardless of rank or full- or part-time status, are considered members of the profession upon taking the Oath of Allegiance and donning the uniform.<sup>145</sup>



**Figure 3 - Theoretical Construct of the Profession of Arms in Canada (*Duty With Honour*, 8)**

The second chapter, and core contribution of *DwH*, develops a specific military ethos for the CAF, beginning with a quote from the Minister’s Monitoring Committee that oversaw reforms to DND and the CAF in the years following submission of the various reports and inquiries: “Ethos

<sup>143</sup> Ibid, 20.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid, 10.

is the heart of the military profession and operational effectiveness”.<sup>146</sup> *DwH* defines the CAF’s military ethos in the following way:

The military ethos comprises values, beliefs and expectations that reflect core Canadian values, the imperatives of military professionalism and the requirements of operations. It acts as the centre of gravity for the military profession and establishes an ethical framework for the professional conduct of military operations. In establishing desired norms of behaviour, the military ethos acts an active and unifying spirit that brings all members of the Canadian Forces together...

The military ethos, therefore, is the foundation upon which the legitimacy, effectiveness, and honour of the Canadian Forces depend. The uniquely Canadian military ethos is made up of three fundamental components: beliefs and expectations about military service; Canadian values; and Canadian military values.<sup>147</sup>

Having thus set out its purpose, *DWH* goes on to flesh out its ethos to bridge the gap between the bounds of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness (or identity), and the distinctive requirements of military service. Many parallels with academic understanding of the military profession are found, but organized in its own manner. In order, *DWH*’s fundamental expectations about military service, Canadian values, and Canadian military values will each be discussed here, culminating in their synthesis as the Canadian military ethos.

First, *DWH* identifies four norms of behaviour, described as fundamental beliefs and expectations, that inform the broader Canadian military ethos. The first is accepting unlimited liability, i.e. the acceptance that death may result in the course of one’s duties as discussed in Chapter 2. The second is fighting spirit, which “requires that members of the Canadian Forces be focused on and committed to the primacy of operations. They therefore strive for high levels of operational effectiveness and readiness, and are willing to engage in or support combat

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid, 25. Original quote found in Canada. National Defence. *Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces: Final Report*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1999.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid, 25.

operations...including the use of lawful, lethal force”.<sup>148</sup> Put more simply, in an echo of Janowitz, the “professional soldier always fights”,<sup>149</sup> and does not shy from battle. This of course runs starkly against the natural human instinct to avoid danger, and is a fundamental aspect of the distinctive military profession. Thus, norms of behaviour for a soldier are, and must be, in sharp contrast to those of other Canadians.

The other two values are teamwork, both within and with others outside the CAF, and discipline. With respect to the latter, “discipline plays a major role in maintaining a high standard of military professionalism. Discipline helps build the cohesion that enables individuals and units to achieve objectives that could not be attained by military skills alone and allows compliance with the interests and goals of the military institution while instilling shared values and common standards”.<sup>150</sup> Discipline in other words is the corrective and uniting force which punishes deviations from the communitarian, service before self ethic demanded by military professionalism, while also reinforcing norms of obedience which underwrite military command.

Second, as described above, Canadian values are integral to the Canadian military ethos and provide a direct linkage for service members to broader society and its ever-evolving norms, but here they are also explicitly linked to both the 1982 *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, and the *Statement of Defence Ethics*, which “requires members of the Department to respect the dignity of all people; to serve Canada before self and to obey and support lawful authority”.<sup>151</sup> The latter is a departmental wide statement, encompassing the civilian workforce at DND as well, later published in the *DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics*. Here, there might seem to be an ethical conflict between the military requirements to use force, including deadly force, against other

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<sup>148</sup> Ibid, 26.

<sup>149</sup> Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 215.

<sup>150</sup> *Duty With Honour*, 27.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid, 28.

human lives, set against a demand to respect the dignity of all people. But as the latter document makes clear, for CAF members, these three principles “*complement* the values and ethics that constitute the Canadian military ethos reflected in *Queen’s Regulations and Orders* as well as CAF customs and practices described in *Duty With Honour: the Profession of Arm in Canada*”.<sup>152</sup> Thus, conflicts encountered between these ethical principles and those underpinning the military ethos itself in Canadian military values can expect one or the other set of ethics to take precedence depending on the specific environment a dilemma is found, but they are always present. As for specific military tasks,

Canadian values mandate members of the Canadian profession of arms to perform their tasks with humanity. Members of the Canadian Forces understand the inherent violence of armed conflict, characterized at an extreme by death and destruction. While they must act resolutely, and sometimes with lethal force, the concept of humanity forbids any notion of a *carte blanche* or unbounded behaviour.<sup>153</sup>

Respecting the dignity of all human life is probably impossible when ordering an artillery fire mission or an air strike, or when directly engaged in combat, but CAF members’ military duties can still be executed in a spirit of humanity informed by their Canadian values within a coherent ethical framework (see Figure 4).

Next, the third aspect of the Canadian military ethos is Canadian military values. Here, four more values are described: duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage.<sup>154</sup> They “come from what history and experience teach about the importance of moral factors in operations, especially the personal qualities that military professionals must possess to prevail. But military values must always be in harmony and never in conflict with Canadian values”.<sup>155</sup> The meaning of each of the

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<sup>152</sup> Canada. National Defence. *Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces Code of Values and Ethics* Department of National Defence, 2012, 3.

<sup>153</sup> *DWH*, 29.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid*, 30-31.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid*, 30.

four values is largely intuitively obvious and needs little additional expansion here, but a clear connection can be established between the *absence* of each of these values and the misbehaviours and malfeasances which were tolerated before, during, and in the fallout from the Somalia scandal, particularly as they relate to the requirements of effective leadership and command.




Figure 4 - Duty With Honour's ethical framework (Duty With Honour, 33).

Finally, the last part of the ethos section of *DWH* ties all of the above together and delivers the core message relating to ethos of the capstone text:

The values, beliefs and expectations reflected in the Canadian military ethos are essential to military effectiveness, but they also serve a more profound purpose. They constitute a style and manner of conducting military operations that earn for soldiers, sailors and air force members that highly regarded military quality — honour.

Honour itself flows from practising the military ethos. It comes from being loyal to your unit and faithful to comrades in fulfilling your duties. It comes with adhering fully to the law of armed conflict, especially in the humane treatment of prisoners of war. Honour insists that all non-combatants be protected and accorded the dignity and other considerations their situation may entitle them to. In total, honour is earned by the men and

women of the Canadian Forces when they uphold the values and beliefs of the Canadian military ethos.<sup>156</sup>

In this way, *DWH* sets out a deliberate and accessible ethical anchor point which “defines and establishes the desired institutional culture of the Canadian Forces”<sup>157</sup> in a manner which both encourages military professionalism and also maintains strong normative linkages with broader society.

The third chapter of *DWH* provides a somewhat dry but instructive primer on civil-military relations in Canada, that then lays out the organizational basis of the government, CAF, DND, and key appointments and relationships found therein. Further discussion is also dedicated to both organizational responsibilities, as DND and the CAF are deliberate constructions of the civil government, and professional responsibilities, which fall more directly upon leaders of the CAF as the custodians and exemplars of the profession of arms within Canada. As this chapter is devoted to the political-institutional aspects of civil-military relations, Huntington is strongly implicated throughout, particularly his discussion of the tension between societal and functional imperatives of the military, along with the paramount importance of civil control of the military. However, *DWH* clearly articulates that there are areas of functional overlap between civilians and military professionals,<sup>158</sup> contrary to the inviolable spheres of competence which Huntington assigned, or the unlimited prerogatives which Feaver envisions for the civil principal. Instead, some responsibilities are shared, as Janowitz allowed for, and which Bland further developed into a more sophisticated theory of shared responsibility in civil-military relations.<sup>159</sup> One also finds statements regarding reciprocity and good faith treatment of soldiers, or what in the UK has

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid, 32.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid, 34.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid, 42.

<sup>159</sup> Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces and Society* 26, no. 1 (Oct 1, 1999): 7-25.

become termed the military covenant,<sup>160</sup> which are the obligations of the state to service members and their families in return for the burdens of military service. There is additional discussion on how military professionals can engage with the public to inform debate in a loyal and non-partisan manner, as well as a lengthy treatment on leadership and how the CAF envisions that it can be cultivated and sustained, which helps to fill in some of the gaps caused by *DWH's* substitution in the original profession paradigm of identity for corporateness. All told, the third chapter articulates a comprehensive high-level vision for how civil-military relations should be conceived and conducted in Canada, in accordance with norms of military professionalism, and with additional reference to the *DWH* 3+1 triad of expertise, responsibility, and identity, plus the encompassing military ethos.

The fourth and final chapter depicts fundamentals of military professionalism as a frame of enduring reference through which to adapt to new and future challenges. The vital ground it is built on what it describes as *relevance*, which amounts to continuously balancing the societal and functional imperatives of civil-military relations in Canada: "To be relevant, the profession must be accorded full legitimacy by Canadians because of its operational effectiveness, combat capability, reflection of Canadian values, and adherence to the core military values of duty, loyalty, integrity and courage. This legitimization is shown by the public support, trust and confidence bestowed on the profession of arms in Canada".<sup>161</sup> Three other principals which inform the managed evolution of the CAF are openness, consistency, and reciprocity. Openness demands an educated CAF committed to continuous professional learning and critical reflection. Consistency demands adherence to professional norms regardless of the evolving organizational forms of DND and the CAF. Reciprocity returns to the societal and functional imperatives discussed above, but

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<sup>160</sup> "Armed Forces Covenant.". Accessed Feb 24, 2023. <https://www.armedforcescovenant.gov.uk/>.

<sup>161</sup> *Duty With Honour*, 66.

with a more human, Janowitz-informed appreciation of the requirements for sustaining a professional military, both internally with respect to the care of service members, and between broader society and the collective military institution. These four principals interact with the profession's responsibility, expertise, identity, and military ethos in a manner which allows for dynamism and change, but which ultimately holds that the fundamentals remain constant even as societies evolve and technologies change: "The profession of arms will remain anchored on two fundamental responsibilities. First, in accord with its *raison d'être*, it will be responsible for serving Canadians through their elected officials. Second, it must manage the profession's evolution so that the Forces will continue to defend Canada and its interests".<sup>162</sup> Further, that while the domains of expertise and responsibility can expect to see greater shifts (e.g., as new domains of warfare like cyber and space are incorporated in military planning and capabilities), "military identity must remain essentially defined by the primary function of applying force in the resolution of political problems",<sup>163</sup> and that "military professionals [must] continue to see themselves as distinct from civil society, performing an essential and unique service to Canada while operating according to the principle of reciprocity".<sup>164</sup> *DWH's* conclusion is therefore simply a reiteration of the Janowitzean premise, echoed by Hackett, that military professionals are *both* members of, and distinct from, broader society, and it is only by successfully maintaining both societal linkage *and* distinctive military professionalism that they can successfully execute their unique obligations to the state.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> Ibid, 69.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid, 72.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*; Hackett, *The Profession of Arms*.

## Discussion and Analysis

To summarize, the Somalia affair was the impetus which led to a period of intense critical examination of the CAF. Multiple inquiries and reform agendas had arrived at the conclusion that, far from being an isolated incident, the murder of Shidane Arone was the result of systemic conditions which had both created the circumstances enabling the crime, and prevented the CAF from self-correcting and acknowledging broader institutional failure during the resultant fallout. Funding cuts and unsustainable deployment tempos during the 1990s had played their part, but so too had long-simmering problems within DND and the CAF. One such problem was an over-bureaucratized combined military headquarters in NDHQ wherein the civilians had become the permanent fixtures, while military members rotated through on short postings, leaving civilian employees as keepers of institutional knowledge, and norm-setters of institutional culture, which had “fueled rampant careerism and placed individual ambition above the needs of the mission”.<sup>166</sup> Another problem was the anti-intellectual mindset entrenched within CAF leadership of the day, contemptuous of education and professional development, resistant to change, and ill-equipped to execute their professional obligations either in civil-military relations with their departmental civilian counterparts and civil government masters, or in the uncertain environment of post-Cold War deployments to places like Bosnia, Rwanda, or Somalia.<sup>167</sup> The overarching conclusion was that there was a profound failure of professional military leadership, particularly at the careerist highest ranks. As Doug Young explained, “At the top...I didn’t have candid meetings with the senior ranks. All were reaching for the top rung, and I didn’t feel I would get much, and I didn’t”.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> *Dishonoured Legacy*, xxix.

<sup>167</sup> This is a common refrain in analysis. See Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, Domansky. "Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces", or Granatstein, J. L. "A Diary of the Defence Review, 1997." *International Journal (Toronto)* 52, no. 3 (Jul 1, 1997): 524-532.

<sup>168</sup> Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 78.

Senior leadership had likewise lost the faith of the rank and file.<sup>169</sup> Therefore, it was toward changing the leadership culture of the CAF, including re-establishing an appropriate military ethos, that the majority of reforms were directed.

Although MND Young occupies a central role as the minister who compelled an end to increasingly unproductive further inquiry and instead embarked on an ambitious and energetic reform program, it was his successor Art Eggleton who suspended the military's professional ability to self-regulate by establishing the civilian Minister's Monitoring Committee (MMC) which oversaw the process of reforms, and maintained pressure on DND and the CAF in the face of bureaucratic stalling, for years to come.<sup>170</sup> This unrelenting pressure helped to enable the institutional momentum that compelled significant reforms, culminating, from the perspective of military professionalism and ethos, in the publication of the capstone document *DWH* in 2003, which for the first time articulated a manual for the profession of arms in Canada, and provided a touchstone of reference in establishing and defending a distinctive military ethos.

A full evaluation of *all* of the reforms stemming from the Somalia scandal in one way or another that were enacted is beyond the scope of this thesis. Thankfully, a few works already exist which set out to do just.<sup>171</sup> Largely uniformly, they are positive in both the identification of fundamental problems confronting the CAF/DND, and in the type of reforms that were sought—education, leadership, and ethos. They are more reservedly positive in how effective and enduring the reforms have been in truly changing the values and culture of both institutions, especially the CAF. Bentley and Horn point to the high performance of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan and

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<sup>169</sup> Bercuson, *Significant Incident*; Horn & Bentley, *Forced to Change*.

<sup>170</sup> Horn & Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 97-115.

<sup>171</sup> Bercuson, David. "Up from the Ashes: The Re-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces After the Somalia Affair." *Canadian Military Journal (Ottawa)* 9, no. 3 (Jan 1, 2009): 31; see also Horn and Bentley's *Forced to Change*; and Domansky's "Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces".

point to improvements in the junior officer corps versus their early 1990s contemporaries as the difference, yet also point with concern to the subsequent emphasis on operational performance over liberal education and professional development in later promotions, combined with funding cuts to the Canadian Defence Academy and related institutions, and fear a return to the CAF's anti-intellectual roots,<sup>172</sup> although Domansky shows that when it comes to a degreed officer corps, the bar is still *much* higher than it was in the 1990s, with between 80 and 90% of officers holding degrees in 2009, versus some 19% in 1988.<sup>173</sup> With respect to the civilianizing effects of the combined NDHQ, where civilian bureaucrats remain throughout their careers but service members only rotate through on shorter postings, leaving the civilian DND employees the custodians of corporate knowledge and exemplars of organizational culture, former CDS Rick Hillier lamented the missed opportunity he had had to separate the headquarters into distinct military and civilian elements.<sup>174</sup> The resulting organizational form continues to act as an impediment to maintaining a distinctive military ethos and leadership culture within the CAF. As for Domansky, she concluded in 2018 that "the CAF is a more professional, critical, and educated institution today than at any time in its past. It has demonstrated the ability and willingness to regulate itself according to certain professional standards, informed by a professional ideology built on a distinct Canadian military ethos",<sup>175</sup> yet she also found that, notwithstanding a sophisticated and well-articulated ethical framework, the ongoing sexual misconduct crisis indicates the CAF leadership is not matching its rhetoric with its actions. This is a thread that will be taken up in the following chapter.

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<sup>172</sup> Horn & Bentley *Forced to Change*, 118-125.

<sup>173</sup> Domansky, "Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces." 235.

<sup>174</sup> Hillier, Rick. *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War*. Toronto: HarperCollins, 2009, 427.

<sup>175</sup> Domansky, "Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces." 235.

From a civil-military relations perspective, many analytical points can be quickly sketched out in relation to Somalia scandal. Feaver's agency theory provides a lens which sees the murder in Somalia, and the subsequent institutional reluctance to acknowledge problems or embark on ambitious reforms, as a form of military *shirking*. After increasing forms of civil *monitoring* via commissions and other internal DND efforts, the civil principal then *punished* the military by sharply restricting their ability to self-regulate through the establishment of the MMC, in order to drive through the reforms desired and compel the military agent to *work* in the manner desired by the civilian principal. It bears emphasizing here that ultimately the impetus to improve military leadership and reinvigorate a distinctive military ethos was driven by external civilians, who were better able to overcome, via external compulsion, the bureaucratic resistance to change found to greater or lesser degrees (but in this case, much greater) in all large organizations. The MMC was only finally dissolved, and the CAF's ability to self-regulate restored, in 2003.<sup>176</sup>

Huntington's theory allows us to see how, through the Somalia scandal, the Canadian military had become abhorrent to Canadian society and failed to meet the requirements of his societal imperative. The resultant reforms attempted to maximize military professionalism, which both regained the trust of its citizens and increased genuine civil control of the military. To be sure, Huntington's prescription was only partially applied, as, far from placing the military in splendid professional and normative isolation from broader society as was his wont, the Canadian reform effort very deliberately attempted to reconnect its soldiers with broader society.

It is therefore Janowitz's vision of civil-military relations which most informs the Canadian Somalia experience, and particularly *DWH*. In the Janowitzean lens, the Somalia scandal had revealed an imbalance greatly favouring the military manager over the archaic yet still vitally

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<sup>176</sup> Horn & Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 114-115.

necessary heroic leader, in much the same manner as that identified by Savage and Gabriel in their scathing indictment of US Army performance in Vietnam.<sup>177</sup> *DWH* attempts to incorporate the civic-republican approach of Janowitz or Hackett, where all soldiers are first and foremost citizens of the state, and vitally need to maintain this relationship with broader society by embracing and embodying Canadian values to the greatest extent possible. But Janowitz was no more a fan of a civilianized military, indistinguishable from society, than was Huntington. The profession needed to be reinvigorated by re-emphasizing what had dwindled away – a military ethos which undergirds effective leadership and accountability, a culture which embraced continuous learning and education as the requirement to maintain professional expertise, and strong yet structured linkages with Canadian society to maintain the reciprocal relationships of mutual obligation and professional trust.

From the perspective of military professionalism, *DWH* accepts and promotes the idea that a military can and should be professionalized. This might seem utterly banal, but the opposite case can also be made. If one disagrees with the idea that that *raison d'être* of a military is in one way or another the management of force and violence on behalf of broader society, and ergo there is no special body of knowledge over which the military can claim particular expertise or responsibility, the case for conceiving of a professional military is undone. Likewise, one could simply reject, for example, the premise of unlimited liability as an immoral burden that the community has no right to demand, leaving a watered-down aversion to workplace hazards and unacceptable risks in its place. In either case, what would be left behind would be some organized grouping of employees with little to distinguish them from other occupations, governed *solely* by the norms and values of their broader host society. This is exactly what Huntington rejected and

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<sup>177</sup> Gabriel and Savage. *Crisis of Command: Mismanagement in the Army*.

derided as *subjective civilian control*, which might be more pleasing to certain aspects of broader society, but hamstring the military's performance in combat conditions and in such situations greatly endangers both the lives of service members and potentially state security.

However, as discussed above, *DWH* develops a comprehensive, coherent and largely orthodox vision of military professionalism, grounded strongly in the sociological vein of Janowitz, Hackett, Gabriel, Moskos, Sarkesian, and others. It deliberately constructs a broad ethical framework that incorporates broader Canadian values and the *DND/CF Code of Ethics*, and provides guidance for how the two sets of values can be integrated, while zealously guarding and promoting the distinct military ethos necessary for the CAF to fulfil its societal obligations. This ethos, at various points in its discussion, addresses all three of the distinctive aspects of the military profession I have identified related to three different aspects of mortal violence: *unlimited liability*, the *obligation to kill*, and the *burden of command*. Thus, it successfully articulates and promotes, for the first time in Canada, both a comprehensive vision of Canadian military professionalism, and the distinctive ethos that is demanded of those professionals.

Following the end of Canada's missions to Afghanistan, another set of crises regarding sexual misconduct slowly took hold in the Canadian military, providing a second, comparative episode of crisis, response, and reform in the CAF, which in turn culminated in the replacement of *DWH* with a second capstone ethos publication, entitled *Trusted to Serve*. *Trusted to Serve* differs significantly from *DWH* in emphasis, ethos, and views of military professionalism. How and why it came to be published, and a comparative analysis of the events and text from the perspectives of civil-military relations and military professionalism, is the subject of the next chapter.

## CHAPTER 4 – *TRUSTED TO SERVE*

### Introduction

This chapter examines the second crisis and response that culminated in the publication of new capstone professional doctrine in the CAF in 2022. This second crisis centers around sexual misconduct. Although there was not a single genesis event for the crisis that can be pointed to like the torture and murder of Somali teenager Shidane Arone, the sexual misconduct crisis *became* an institutional crisis due to the continuous accumulation of evidence of sustained misbehaviour which came to light over the course of multiple events that pointed to deeper, more systemic problems within the CAF. As before, part of the response to this crisis was the publication of a capstone profession and ethos document, *Trusted to Serve (TtS)*, which superseded and largely replaced *DWH* upon its release in 2022.

This chapter is organized in two parts. First, I provide a brief historical overview of the events of the sexual misconduct crisis in order to furnish sufficient contextual understanding of the impetus for reform, and the perceived need to establish and promulgate a new center-piece document of the CAF, featuring a new ethos and emphasis. In the second part I develop a textual synopsis of *TtS*, with analysis informed by civil-military relations and military professionalism, highlighting in particular both what it retains and what it jettisons or replaces from its predecessor. Despite both crises sharing significant commonalities in their broader contours and being driven by external reviews, the central thrusts of the respective recommended reforms, of which both *DWH* and *TtS* are emblematic, are sharply divergent. This sets the stage for the following chapter comparing *TtS* with *DWH*.

## The Sexual Misconduct Crisis in the CAF

Sexual misconduct is not a new issue within the CAF. Even during the Somalia scandal, reports had come to light regarding rape and gender-based violence within the military.<sup>178</sup> The issue was not ignored, and led to new service wide mandatory training events,<sup>179</sup> while some other aggravating factors contributing to sexual misconduct identified by Bercuson, such as profoundly low rates of pay and unsustainable deployment cycles<sup>180</sup> were corrected over the course of the more general reforms enacted in the decade following the Somalia crisis. Rates of sexual misconduct against women nonetheless remained at higher levels than the general public. However, with the events of 9/11 and the subsequent sustained deployments to Afghanistan by CAF members where they performed well, sustained casualties, and avoided any devastating scandals as in Somalia,<sup>181</sup> there was a sea-change in public support for the military as a Canadian institution. The “decade of darkness”<sup>182</sup> was over; the CAF had a charismatic CDS in Gen Rick Hillier. The public had a rally to the flag period, and although sexual misconduct continued, it did so below the public’s radar and did not become a salient political issue during the 2000s.

Canada’s combat mission to Afghanistan ended in 2011, and even a reduced training mission wrapped up by 2014.<sup>183</sup> The CAF no longer enjoyed the sustained, positive media

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<sup>178</sup> See, for example: Bergman, Brian and Luke Fisher. "A Night of Terror." *Maclean's*, Mar. 28, 1994.;

O'Hara, Jane, Brenda Branswell, John Geddes, Shanda Deziel, Sharon Doyle Driedger, and Stephanie Nolen. "Rape in the Military." *Maclean's*, May 25, 1998.;

O'Hara, Jane, Shanda Deziel, and John Nicol. "Of Rape and Justice." *Maclean's*, Dec 14, 1998.

<sup>179</sup> In the 1990s, the CAF introduced its Standards for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP) program, a 4-hour mandatory certification course. Results were limited. A brief contemporary assessment of the SHARP program is found here: Wakelam, Randall. *Training Won't Get the CAF a New Culture*. Centre for International and Defence Policy. Vol. 7-2. Kingston: Queen's University, 2021.

<sup>180</sup> Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 115-135

<sup>181</sup> Horn & Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 116-118.

<sup>182</sup> According to a 2003 article, the term was first used by Lt Gen (ret'd) Al DeQuetteville in an interview that year, which the authors incorporated in their paper's title: Sharpe, G. E. and Allan English. *CFLI Project Paper - the Decade of Darkness*, 2003. The term gained much broader traction following then-CDS Hillier's use of the term in the media: Galloway, Gloria. "Hillier Decries Military's 'Decade of Darkness'." *The Globe and Mail*, Feb 16, 2007.

<sup>183</sup> Canada. Veteran's Affairs. "The Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan". Accessed Feb 24, 2023. <https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/canadian-armed-forces/afghanistan>.

coverage that had existed during their time in Afghanistan, and the Conservative government of the day was less invested in providing unlimited support to the military when it lacked a high-profile mission and faced calls to reign in spending and find efficiencies after years of rapidly increasing defence spending.<sup>184</sup> At this time, the French language magazine *L'actualité* published a thorough and damning piece on sexual misconduct in the CAF<sup>185</sup> which quickly elicited an English version in *Maclean's* by the same authors,<sup>186</sup> garnering a powerful public response in both French and English speaking Canada. Then-CDS Gen Tom Lawson acted quickly to deal with the issue by ordering an external review into the issue in July of that year, engaging with former Supreme Court justice Marie Deschamps to conduct an independent inquiry and deliver a report by spring of the following year.<sup>187</sup> The Deschamps inquiry had a fairly limited mandate and was excluded from examining any military police, investigation, or military justice element, but rather more narrowly focused on sexual misconduct itself, and policies, definitions, training, etc. aimed toward its prevention.<sup>188</sup>

CDS Lawson and the CAF were not prepared for scope and scale of Madame Deschamps' report, which went beyond identifying particular shortcomings and condemned the culture of the entire institution:

One of the key findings of the External Review Authority (the ERA) is that there is an underlying sexualized culture in the CAF that is hostile to women and LGTBQ members, and conducive to more serious incidents of sexual harassment and assault. Cultural change is therefore key. It is not enough to simply revise policies or to repeat the mantra of "zero

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<sup>184</sup> Goodman, Lee-Anne. "Canadian Government Sacrificing Military Spending for Budget Surplus." *Toronto Star*, Oct 30, 2014.

<sup>185</sup> Castonguay, Alec and Noémi Mercier. "Crimes Sexuels: Le Cancer Qui Ronge L'armée Canadienne." *L'actualité*, Apr 25, 2014.

<sup>186</sup> Mercier, Noemi and Alec Castonguay. "Our Military's Disgrace." *Maclean's*, May 26, 2014.

<sup>187</sup> Deschamps, Marie. *External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces* Canada. National Defence, 2015, 3-4.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

tolerance”. Leaders must acknowledge that sexual misconduct is a real and serious problem for the organization, one that requires their own direct and sustained attention.<sup>189</sup>

The CAF accepted all 10 of Deschamp’s recommendations. Shortly thereafter Lawson conducted an awkward interview on national television on the subject where he opined that sexual harassment in the CAF was to an extent because people were “biologically wired in a certain way”.<sup>190</sup> Within a month, he was out as CDS and replaced by Gen. Jonathan Vance. A few months after that, the incumbent governing Conservatives under Stephen Harper were swept from power in a federal election, replaced by the Liberals under Justin Trudeau in 2015.

The new CDS got to work quickly, launching the OP HONOUR campaign against harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour in the CAF within a month of taking office. The campaign was the “highest institutional priority”<sup>191</sup> of the CAF, and carried on for a number of years, yet results were only middling. During that time, a 2016 Statistics Can survey of service members found that 1.7% of the CAF population had been a victim of sexual assault in the past 12 month, with a 4.7% victimization rate among female service members, and a 27.3% rate for women over the course of their entire careers.<sup>192</sup> For comparison, another Statistics Canada survey in 2014 established baseline Canada-wide numbers of 2.2% victimization overall for Canadians aged 15 and older over a 12 month period, and 3.7% for females.<sup>193</sup> Thus the CAF numbers overall were within or below national norms, but featured an elevated incidence rate against female service members versus that national baseline. A second survey in 2018 found that the incidence rate in the CAF against females

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<sup>189</sup> Ibid, i.

<sup>190</sup> CBC News. "Military Sexual Misconduct due to 'Biological Wiring,' Gen. Tom Lawson Tells CBC News." *CBC News*, Jun 16, 2015.

<sup>191</sup> "About Operation Honour". Accessed Feb 24, 2023. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/conflict-misconduct/sexual-misconduct/about-operation-honour.html>.

<sup>192</sup> Cotter, Adam. *Sexual Misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces, 2016*: Canada. Statistics Canada, 2016.

<sup>193</sup> Conroy, Shana and Adam Cotter. *Self-Reported Sexual Assault in Canada, 2014*: Canada. Statistics Canada, 2017.

had fallen to 4.3%, indicating some progress,<sup>194</sup> perhaps attributable to the efforts of OP HONOUR. In 2018, the Auditor General of Canada released a report also indicating some progress, but with many issues unresolved.<sup>195</sup> 2019 saw another Statistics Canada survey of Canadian military colleges find that, while unwanted sexualized behaviour was actually experienced less, and called out more, than in Canadian post-secondary schools more generally, females still suffered elevated rates of sexual assault during the preceding 12 month period, measuring 15%<sup>196</sup> vs 11%<sup>197</sup> respectively, although paradoxically, more students claimed to feel safe at military colleges than their civilian counterparts.

Throughout this period, the sexual misconduct scandal continued at a slow burn. For every instance of tentative reform, something else came to light that showed continued problems as more and more media suggested there were systemic issues. Events came to a head in 2021. Shortly after General Vance was replaced as CDS by Admiral Art McDonald in that year, allegations came to light about sexual misconduct by Vance, and then additional allegations against MacDonald, and in short order, a total of 8 senior officers were suddenly facing allegations of sexual misconduct.<sup>198</sup> Worse, some complainants alleged that the MND Harjit Sajjan and PM Justin Trudeau had been made aware of the allegations against CDS Vance and had done nothing.<sup>199</sup> What had been a departmental problem suddenly became a national political scandal that demanded commensurate

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<sup>194</sup> Cotter, Adam. *Sexual Misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces Regular Force, 2018*: Canada. Statistics Canada, 2019.

<sup>195</sup> Canada. Auditor General. *Report 5—Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour—Canadian Armed Forces*, 2018.

<sup>196</sup> Maxwell, Ashley. *Experiences of Unwanted Sexualized and Discriminatory Behaviours and Sexual Assault among Students at Canadian Military Colleges, 2019*: Canada. Statistics Canada, 2020.

<sup>197</sup> Burczycka, Marta. *Students' Experiences of Unwanted Sexualized Behaviours and Sexual Assault at Postsecondary Schools in the Canadian Provinces, 2019*: Canada. Statistics Canada, 2020.

<sup>198</sup> Burke, Ashley. "A Military in Crisis: Here are the Senior Leaders Embroiled in Sexual Misconduct Cases." *CBC News*, Oct 21, 2021.

<sup>199</sup> Connolly, Amanda. "Telford Repeatedly Dodges Questions about Not Telling Trudeau of 2018 Vance Allegation." *Global News*, May 7, 2021. Global News has created a useful web timeline of these events:

Connolly, Amanda. "Timeline: The Canadian Forces Sexual Misconduct Crisis." Accessed Feb 24, 2023. <https://globalnews.ca/news/7883717/canadian-forces-sexual-misconduct-timeline/>.

response. CDS MacDonald was placed on leave, never to resume his post, although the subsequent investigation deemed charges unmerited.<sup>200</sup> Vance was charged with, and ultimately pleaded guilty to, a single count of obstruction of justice.<sup>201</sup> DND contracted an additional external review, focusing on sexual misconduct, leadership, and recruitment, which became the Arbour Report in May, 2022.<sup>202</sup> The Fish Report, a decennial review of the military justice system, came out in June 2022 and found that the CAF's handling of sexual misconduct remained as bad as it had been in 2015.<sup>203</sup> The House of Commons' Standing Committee on the Status of Women Committee released its own scathing report on sexual misconduct in the CAF in June.<sup>204</sup> Sajjan himself was shuffled off to a different ministerial portfolio, replaced as MND by Anita Anand in October, who, with the DM and new CDS General Wayne Eyre, offered an unprecedented departmental apology to all victims of sexual misconduct in December.<sup>205</sup> Public trust in the military fell,<sup>206</sup> as did recruitment and retention within the CAF, although other factors such as the Covid-19 pandemic factored in CAF personnel levels as well. Clearly, significant change was required, and now publicly demanded.

This broad sketch of the influential events of the sexual misconduct crisis is striking in its parallels with the Somalia scandal. History may not repeat itself here, but it certainly rhymes. The major event that starts the scandal unfolding, although not quite on the same scale as the torture

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<sup>200</sup> Connolly, Amanda, Mercedes Stephenson, and Marc-André Cossette. "Military Says Adm. Art McDonald Already Faced 'significant' Action as Police Report Released." *Global News*, Dec 1, 2021.

<sup>201</sup> Connolly, Amanda. "Gen. Jonathan Vance Pleads Guilty to Obstruction of Justice, Gets Conditional Discharge." *Global News*, 30 Mar, 2022.

<sup>202</sup> Arbour, Louise. *Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review of Department of National Defence, Canadian Armed Forces*, 2022

<sup>203</sup> Fish, Morris J. *Report of the Third Independent Review Authority to the Minister of National Defence*, 2021.

<sup>204</sup> Canada. *Eliminating Sexual Misconduct within the Canadian Armed Forces*. Report of the Standing Committee on the Status of Women – Marilyn Gladu, Chair. Ottawa: House of Commons Canada, 2021

<sup>205</sup> Brewster, Murray. "Anand, Eyre Offer Official Apology to Victims of Military Sexual Misconduct." *CBC News*, Dec 13, 2021.

<sup>206</sup> Raycraft, Richard. "Pride in Canada's Military has Eroded Over the Past Year: Report." *CBC News*, Jul 24, 2022.

and murder of Shidane Arone, is the near simultaneous publication of scathing articles in English and French public affairs magazine. The CAF made an effort to respond to the still isolated crisis, but on the whole these efforts were lacking. Falling public opinion and political demands for more substantive reform to the CAF grew over the course of years as more evidence of military malfeasance accumulated. Rather than a public inquiry, like the Somalia Commission, which led to numerous high-profile resignations and the replacement of multiple chiefs of the defence staff in the face of institutional scandal, the sexual misconduct crisis played out primarily in the media. The crisis culminated in 2021 with firings at the CDS office, but this time at least one (Vance) of those CDS' was not just a supervisor to the scandal, but a perpetrator. In both cases, the pressure on the government in power to solve the problem created a strong demand for concrete action and tangible reforms, which sets the stage for the promulgation of a new capstone ethos.

### *Trusted To Serve*

Within this environment, in 2018 *DWH* underwent what was intended to be a second<sup>207</sup> light revision and reissue, but instead became a tortured, multi-year process of shifting priorities and authorities, culminating in a completely new document. Then-CDS Vance kicked off the process, mandating “comprehensive consultations with all key stakeholders and a novel methodology”.<sup>208</sup> A 2019 cross-country consultative tour by the writing group met with close to 2,000 service members, which ultimately resulted in a renewed draft that was “a minor evolution of the 2009 publication”,<sup>209</sup> itself a very lightly retouched version of the 2003 original. However,

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<sup>207</sup> *DWH* had been very lightly edited and re-issued in 2009. The changes largely reflected minor organizational reforms that needed to be captured in the civil-military relations chapter, along with the addition of “physical fitness” to the list of fundamental beliefs and expectations; a result of readiness issues as the CAF attempted to sustain its ongoing operations in Afghanistan.

Canada. National Defence. *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada 2009*. 2nd ed.: Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2009.

<sup>208</sup> Martinelli, Guilherme, Bill Cummings, Mélanie Denis, T. Gregory, and Lee Jarratt. "It's about Time: The Renewal of the Canadian Armed Forces' Ethos." *Canadian Military Journal* 22, no. 3 (Jul 1, 2022). 6.

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*

this version never made it to the CDS's desk, as 2020 changes in internal CAF authorities had placed professional development, and by extension the ownership of *DWH*, into the control of the Vice Chair of the Defence Staff (VCDS) instead.<sup>210</sup> That office was also seeing high turnover at the time, with Lt Gen Lanthier retiring in 2020, replaced by Lt Gen Rouleau. Rouleau would not last long in the office, being himself replaced by Lt Gen Allen – the first ever female in such a position - the following year amid questions of Rouleau's conflict of interest regarding investigations against then-CDS Vance.<sup>211</sup>

Amid broader criticism of a lack of emphasis on equity, diversity, and inclusion (EDI) against the institution as a whole by others,<sup>212</sup> Greco and Von Hlatky argued that *DWH* lacked sufficient EDI emphasis,<sup>213</sup> although they were ambiguous with respect to how, exactly, they saw EDI meshing with any professional outlook informed by the unique role of the military in society. An additional review of the *DWH* draft in Oct 2020 by the little-known Armed Forces Management Board directed that the publication be reassessed completely, with a greater focus specifically on ethos, and more external consultation.<sup>214</sup> It was during this time that the scandalous events of 2021 discussed above came to dominate the news cycle, and strongly informed the writing of what became *TtS*. As an accompanying article to the publication in the *Canadian Military Journal* observed, "The vast majority of the consultative process took place in a highly charged media

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<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

<sup>211</sup> Connolly, Amanda. "Canadian Military's Second-in-Command Resigns Role After Golfing with Vance." *Global News*, Jun 14, 2021.

<sup>212</sup> See, for example: Edgar, Alistair D., Rupinder Mangat, and Bessma Momani. *Strengthening the Canadian Armed Forces through Diversity and Inclusion*. UTP Insights. Toronto; Buffalo; London: University of Toronto Press, 2020.; or Johnstone, Rachael and Bessma Momani. "Organizational Change in Canadian Public Institutions: The Implementations of GBA+ in DND/CAF." *Canadian Public Administration* 62, no. 3 (Sep, 2019): 500-519.

<sup>213</sup> Greco, Sarah and Stefanie von Hlatky. "Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion: Revising the Concept of Military Professionalism in the Canadian Armed Forces." In *Rethinking Military Professionalism for the Changing Armed Forces*, edited by Hachey, Krystal K., Tamir Libel and Waylon H. Dean, 189-200. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG, 2020.

<sup>214</sup> Martinelli et al., "It's About Time", 6.

environment. While it would be impossible to quantify the impact of that climate on the development of a renewed CAF Ethos, it was glaringly evident that the status quo was no longer acceptable”.<sup>215</sup> In other words, rather than the deliberate and long-considered culmination of an entire enterprise-wide process of reform and professionalization, which described the publication of *DWH* a decade after the murder of Shidane Arone and several years after the scandal lost political salience amid ongoing reforms, what became *TtS* was thrust into existence during the peak of the scandal. This was emblematic of what Madame Arbour had described in the CAF response to sexual misconduct as a “flurry of activities[,] usually consisting of making lists, charts, inventories and PowerPoint presentations, as well as enacting new orders, policies and directives on top of an already complex structure”.<sup>216</sup> All of this hustle and bustle was designed to publicly *display* an immediate, pro-active response, while it lacked the more deliberate and holistic approach necessary to coherently manage organizational reform across an enterprise of one hundred thousand people. But before delving too deeply into the follow-on effects and ramifications of *TtS*, one must first understand the document itself.

What would become the final draft of *TtS* was an attempt to bring into one document all of the ethical contents of various inter-related capstone publications in the CAF and DND which had been generated following the Somalia reforms, along with new additions for *TtS*.<sup>217</sup> This included the *DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics* and *DWH*, and four related CAF publications on leadership doctrine: *Leadership in the CF: Doctrine; Conceptual Foundations; Leading the Institution; and Leading the People*.<sup>218</sup> The conceptual core of the document, rather than building

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<sup>215</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>216</sup> Arbour. *Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review*, 10.

<sup>217</sup> Martinelli et al. “It’s About Time”, 7-8.

<sup>218</sup> Canada. National Defence. *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005a.; Canada. National Defence. *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine* Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005b.; Canada. National Defence. *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading People* Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces

from established themes of military professionalism to inform its ethos as had its predecessor, centered around *character* and *trust*, relying in particular on selected work of Canadian business and leadership scholar Dr Mary Crossan and her associates,<sup>219</sup> and American business author Stephen MR Covey.<sup>220</sup>

Before delving into each section of *TtS*, a general overview is useful. At 62 pages, it is somewhat shorter than *DWH*'s 84 pages, and deals at greater length and more prescriptively with the CAF ethos itself while, unlike its predecessor, it largely ignores any fully-developed conceptualization of civil-military relations or military professionalism. Its tone and structure are also less academic and aimed at a more general audience. It is divided into 3 parts: an introductory discussion on the importance of trust as supported by character and competence, where character is prioritized, a much larger main chapter developing in detail the new CAF ethos, and brief third part relating the CAF ethos to leadership (see Appendix 2). The changes in tone and language between the two documents can be detected by examining what is in, and out, of *TtS* compared with *DWH*. Words like combat, force, expertise, and honour figure largely in *DWH*, while on the other hand, *TtS* features markedly more emphasis on culture and EDI (see Table 1). Where one sits on a political-ideological spectrum goes a long way to determine whether these changes are welcomed as a much-needed improvement, or lamented as an undue politicization of the CAF. Regardless, there is in *TtS* a much greater emphasis on contemporary Canadian values and a corresponding de-emphasis on what has largely been seen as enduring components of a distinct military ethic.

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Leadership Institute, 2007a.; Canada. National Defence. *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution* Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2007b.

<sup>219</sup> Crossan, Mary M., Alyson Byrne, Gerard H. Seijts, Mark Reno, Lucas Monzani, and Jeffrey Gandz. "Toward a Framework of Leader Character in Organizations." *Journal of Management Studies* 54, no. 7 (Nov, 2017): 986-1018.

<sup>220</sup> Covey, Stephen M. R., Rebecca R. Merrill, and Stephen R. Covey. *The Speed of Trust*. Riverside: Free Press, 2006.

	<i>Duty With Honour</i>	<i>Trusted to Serve</i>
Honour	27	0*
Combat	16	1
Force	63	10
Expertise	93	0
Equity	0	9
Diversity	1	14
Inclusion	1	21
Culture	7	36
Character	0	36
*excluding references to the publication it replaced.		

**Table 1 - Appearance/Absence of particular words in each text**

The brief first part of *TtS* lays out the conceptual framework for the document, and communicates its intended purpose and function. As the title would indicate, it sets trust as the very core component required, both to enable military service on behalf of Canada, and to internally function as a defence institution. Directly channeling Stephen MR Covey's work on the two aspects that establish trust<sup>221</sup>, *TtS* states that "Trust is built through a commitment to character and competence".<sup>222</sup> Both components are briefly expanded on, with character receiving a larger share of attention than competence and adhering to Crossan's work,<sup>223</sup> a theme that recurs throughout the text, and is presaged by this quote in the introduction: "Even more so now than ever, character is just as important, and indeed often more impactful, than competence".<sup>224</sup> In presenting the case for the CAF ethos, *TtS* states that "CAF personnel who embody and live our military ethos allow our profession to operate with the trust of those within the organization, with the trust of the Government of Canada, and of Canadians".<sup>225</sup> Further, it makes a bold effort at shaping culture by claiming that the CAF ethos is a complete and all-encompassing moral and

<sup>221</sup> Covey et al. *The Speed of Trust*, 1-26.

<sup>222</sup> *Trusted to Serve*, 9.

<sup>223</sup> Crossan et al. "Toward a Framework of Leader Character in Organizations."

<sup>224</sup> *Trusted to Serve*, 6.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid*, 11.

ethical code for existence, concluding that “the goal is to live the CAF Ethos to such a degree that we view *all* [emphasis added] behaviours, decisions and actions through its lens”.<sup>226</sup> With the conceptual basis and extensive intended scope of the CAF ethos in *TtS* thus articulated, it then moves on to the second part to lay out the new CAF ethos itself.

<b><u>CAF/DND Code of Values and Ethics</u></b>	<b><u>Trusted to Serve</u></b>
<b>Ethical principles</b>	<b>Ethical principles</b>
1. Respect the dignity of all persons	1. Respect the dignity of all persons
2. Serve Canada before self	2. Serve Canada before self
3. Obey and support lawful authority	3. Obey and support lawful authority
<b>Values and expected behaviours</b>	
1. Integrity	<b>Military Values</b>
2. Loyalty	1. Loyalty
3. Courage	2. Integrity
4. Stewardship	3. Courage
5. Excellence	4. Excellence
	5. Inclusion*
	6. Accountability*
<b><u>Duty With Honour</u></b>	
<b>Beliefs and expectations about military service</b>	<b>Professional Expectations</b>
1. Accepting unlimited liability	1. Duty
2. Fighting spirit	2. Accepting Unlimited Liability
3. Discipline	3. Fighting Spirit
4. Teamwork	4. Leadership*
5. Physical Fitness (2009 addition)	5. Discipline
<b>Canadian Military Values</b>	6. Teamwork
1. Duty	7. Readiness (mental + physical)
2. Loyalty	8. Stewardship
3. Integrity	
4. Courage	*new in <i>Trusted to Serve</i>

**Table 2 - Ethics and values in various DND publications**

Part 2, which lays out the CAF ethos in its entirety, comprises seventeen elements, “categorized as three ethical principles, six military values, and eight professional expectations”.<sup>227</sup> What follows, essentially, is a cumbersome seventeen-item laundry list of values and behaviours that combines those found in the *DND/CF Code of Ethics* with others previously found in *DWH*, along with a few new ones found nowhere else, including inclusion, accountability, and leadership (see Table 2). Each value is followed by a discussion, typically at greater length than their

<sup>226</sup> Ibid, 12.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid, 16.

corresponding equivalents in the *Code* or *DWH*. The addition of *inclusion* as a professional expectation aligns with the textual themes already highlighted in Table 1, while *accountability* had previously been conceived of as a sub-component of *integrity* and *responsibility* in both the *Code* and *DWH*. The addition of *leadership* as a professional expectation is a curious one, as ideas regarding leadership already permeate the entire CAF institution due to its intimate relationship with command, and leadership is already the subject of entire courses and doctrinal publications within the CAF. As discussed above, although many of the nominal values remain the same, the accompanying narratives paint rather different pictures, with reduced emphasis on any war-fighting requirement, and significantly increased emphasis on moral character. Compare, for example, the discussion which follows the expectation “fighting spirit” in both texts, first, from *DWH*:

Fighting spirit requires that members of the Canadian Forces be focused on and committed to the primacy of operations. They therefore strive for high levels of operational effectiveness and readiness, and are willing to engage in or support combat operations. It imparts to individuals the moral, physical and intellectual qualities necessary to operate in conditions of extreme danger, to endure hardship and to approach their assigned missions with confidence, tenacity and the will to succeed. Fighting spirit is especially important to act decisively—including the use of lawful, lethal force against an adversary—during combat operations.<sup>228</sup>

Here there is a clear focus on the particular instrumental role of the military; employing armed force to achieve national objectives, including in deadly combat. Now, compare discussion of the same expectation in *TtS*:

Having a fighting spirit means that we willingly undertake challenging tasks. It demands an unwavering will to succeed, requires grit and the will to fight against all adversity. It is a vital source of strength to draw upon in times of need. It drives us to view obstacles as opportunities to overcome adversity and complete the mission. Through this tenacious attitude, we find ethical ways to overcome significant challenges, undertaking our assigned missions with confidence and a relentless will to succeed.<sup>229</sup>

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<sup>228</sup> *Duty With Honour*. 26

<sup>229</sup> *Trusted to Serve*. 35

Here, the same expectation identifies no *adversary*, simply impersonalized *adversity*, and the discussion on the whole is less about using armed force to the point that one might find similar discussions in the world of business for enterprises attempting to cultivate particular corporate cultures.

However, the major difference between *DWH* and *TtS* is not in the nominal values themselves, which are quite similar, if more numerous, but in their overarching approach that provides an ethical framework to apply those values and develop the CAF ethos in its entirety. *DWH* established a model built around Canadian military values (duty, loyalty, integrity, courage), informed by a lengthy preceding discussion on the *raison d'être* of the military and the unique requirements of the military profession, with the admixture of its beliefs and expectations about military service on the one hand, and Canadian values on the other (refer to Figure 1 in Chapter 3). In *TtS*, there is no articulated framework whatsoever, simply the aforementioned categorizations, which also appear to serve as indications of priority, at least according to the preamble to the three principles:

The CAF Ethos has three ethical principles founded on *The Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982* which in turn describes the basic principles of the Canadian democratic government and the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. These principles are the foundation of our CAF Ethos and underpin strength of character. The ethical principles are presented here in order of their importance to the CAF Ethos.<sup>230</sup>

The result is a list of values and behaviours some three *times* longer than typically found or recommended in business or government,<sup>231</sup> defying simple recollection. Worse, lacking a

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<sup>230</sup> *Trusted to Serve*, 16.

<sup>231</sup> Three to five values seem to be standard; anything more than 9 is strongly discouraged. *Duty With Honour* was already bulky at 8 total values (9 in 2009 edition), while the *DND/CF Code* also featured a total of 8. See, for example: Canada. Treasury Board. *Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector* 2011.; Collins, James C. and Jerry I. Porras. "Building Your Company's Vision." *Harvard Business Review*, Sep 1, 1996, 65-78.; Dorskind, Nicole. "Defining Your Corporate Values? Keep these Things in Mind." *Forbes*, Jun 18, 2019.

coherent framework of application, this lengthy list also introduces new tensions and ethical dilemmas between numerous competing values, something which I will return to in subsequent discussion.

The brief third part of *TtS* focuses on ethos and leaders, and urges CAF leadership to embody and “socialize” the new ethos as part of a larger effort at culture change within the Canadian military. “We must ensure that our practiced culture is constantly aligned with our desired culture as expressed in the CAF Ethos. Military leaders have a responsibility to socialize new military members into the organization and embrace its ethos”.<sup>232</sup> The *trust = character + competence* model incorporating Covey and Crossan’s work is reinforced throughout this section, as is the professional obligation to call out and quash deviations from the ethos. The concluding page goes even further in exhorting and demanding moral perfection of the CAF and complete alignment with Canadian societal values: “In volunteering for military service, we accept the responsibility to embody the highest ideals of Canadian society”.<sup>233</sup> *TtS* finishes with two matrices which attempt to provide examples to illustrate the new ethos in action. The first offers a list of acceptable and unacceptable potential behaviours according to the six military values, while the second attempts to map positive behaviours in an *x-y* type chart, with military values on one axis and ethical principles and professional expectations on the other (see Appendices 3 & 4).

In sum, *TtS* follows broader CAF trends in focusing on culture change, here focusing much more narrowly on promoting and enumerating a list of desired values and behaviours within the CAF than did its predecessor, *DWH*. The basic framework of the document follows Covey’s trust-centric model<sup>234</sup>, and incorporates recent theorizing by Crossan<sup>235</sup> regarding the importance of

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<sup>232</sup> *Trusted to Serve*, 47.

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid*, 51.

<sup>234</sup> Covey et al *The Speed of Trust*

<sup>235</sup> Crossan et al. "Toward a Framework of Leader Character in Organizations."

leaders' character in organizations. Notably, both authors originate in, and were writing largely for the business community, not the military. Although, on one level, this can seem ill-fitting to the unique requirements of military performance, importing 'outside' thinking and increasing the exposure of the CAF to external organizations and reducing CAF distinctiveness and insularity were some of the themes of the Arbour Report's recommendations.<sup>236</sup> The new ethos' values are a collation of those found in the *Code* and *DWH* with a few new additions as well. Although the nominal values are largely the same, narrative trends are evident in the text which diminish the unique role of the military and bring it in closer alignment with contemporary Canadian values more generally. By far, however, the most important change in *TtS*, compared with *DWH*, is what is not included, which is any substantive discussion of the Canadian military as a profession of arms, or well-developed understanding of how the military's instrumental societal role necessarily informs and shapes its ethos.

This absence of discussion on the profession of arms in *TtS* is what caused *DWH* to be both superseded by *TtS* and yet also remain in a sort of purgatory as a not-entirely obsolesced text. On the one hand, the CDS' preface in *TtS* clearly indicates the obsolescence of *DWH* as well as the narrower focus of *TtS*:

Mainly in response to strategic transformation at the turn of the century, the previous publication *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* emphasized the profession, organizational aspects and future challenges related to the evolution of our Profession of Arms rather than our ethos. Instead, *Trusted to Serve* is focused on expanding and refining our shared understanding of our military ethos.<sup>237</sup>

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<sup>236</sup> Madame Arbour elaborates on this in the introduction of her report: "While the current leadership of the CAF has expressed a strong commitment to culture change, I believe it is unlikely to be affected without first a change in its culture of isolation and resistance... External input will go a long way to assist in the much-needed cultural change that the CAF claims it is committed to. Opening up to outside input and assistance, not just occasional non-binding advice, could have far-reaching impact, ultimately enabling the CAF to keep pace with Canada's evolving society, and demonstrate an earnest effort to effect organizational change" (Arbour, *Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review*, 15-16).

<sup>237</sup> *Trusted to Serve*, 3.

Although clearly downplaying *DWH* in favour of the new publication, the statement that *DWH* was developed in response to strategic transformation, or did not emphasize military ethos, does not stand up to careful scrutiny. A path from *DWH* and its development of a CAF ethos can be traced back to key recommendations and criticisms that came out of the Somalia inquiry and resultant reforms, particularly the 9th recommendation in MND Young's *Report to the Prime Minister*, which pledged to produce a formal statement of values and beliefs for the CAF.<sup>238</sup> Articulating a military ethos was the key effort of *DWH*, the preceding discussion of military professionalism in that text first established the professional requirements that necessarily informed that ethos.

On the other hand, the absence of a discussion on military professionalism and civil-military relations in *TtS* meant that the content of *DWH* was not fully replaced by its successor. As a result, in the DND/CAF-wide email announcing the release of *TtS*, the CDS also stated that *DWH* remained temporarily valid, but would be truncated and replaced in short order: "The new publication will be primarily an academic textbook for use in professional military education institutions. *Trusted to Serve* will remain the primary reference on how we live our military ethos".<sup>239</sup> The resultant ambiguity and doctrinal issues that result from placing *DWH* in a sort of liminal space where its ethos was largely invalidated but the rest of the discussion that informed that ethos was awkwardly retained to a degree, is a thread taken up in greater detail in the following chapter.

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<sup>238</sup> Young, *Report to the Prime Minister*, 11-14.

<sup>239</sup> Eyre, Wayne and Gilles Grégoire. Email: *CDS and CAF CWO Message to the Defence Team: Release of the CAF Ethos: Trusted to Serve*, addressed to All DND/CAF system email users, Jun 22, 2022.

**Conclusion: Civil-military relations and the parallels between the two crises**

In both the Somalia and sexual misconduct scandals, an initial crisis took on increasing political urgency in the face of snowballing events and evidence of additional malfeasances. Feaver's lens of agency theory and its paradigm of shirking, monitoring, punishment, and working is once again particularly instructive here. Both instances were examples of unethical military behaviour (*shirking*) in peacetime, not military failure in wartime. Both resulted in a series of external inquiries and recommendations initiated by a Liberal government succeeding a Conservative one, which also resulted external *monitoring* and reporting. Both sets of inquiries pointed to failures of leadership, military professionalism, and a careerist CAF senior leadership culture more concerned with damage-control than making substantive reforms. Both saw the replacement of multiple chiefs of the defence staff in short order, as well as at least one MND in both cases (*punishment*). Following the changes in personnel and through external monitoring, the CAF once again began *working* in a manner acceptable to the civil authority. Thus, in both case, Feaver's theory helps to understand the broader shape of these events, particularly at the highest interfaces between the civil principal and military agent. These parallels help set conditions for the final chapter of comparative analysis and discussion regarding implications of the new ethical doctrine in *Trusted to Serve*.

## CHAPTER 5 – COMPARISON, ANALYSIS, AND IMPLICATIONS

### Introduction

This final chapter has three parts. The first section highlights the parallels between the two capstone documents as representative of wider reforms in both cases, yet contrasts the actual direction of those reforms. I argue that the reasons for this divergence in otherwise similar cases include the timing and political context at the time of publication, but primarily stems from the particular mandates issued to external inquiries, and the relevant expertise engaged within those inquiries. The second part examines the probable effects on military performance and professionalism within the CAF as a consequence of the new capstone ethos in *TtS* and replacement/obsolescence of *DWH*, arguing that professionalism is undermined and that performance may diminish. The third and final section identifies an apparent conflict in CAF military culture between the functional and societal imperatives in the maintenance of military professionalism and the elimination of sexual misconduct. I put forward an argument that changing the culture of the CAF need not mean de-professionalizing that culture, as obliquely called for in the Arbour Report<sup>240</sup> and of which *TtS* is emblematic.

### Differing reforms – change the instructions, change the results.

Both *TtS* and *DWH*, as capstone documents, are emblematic of the broader, externally directed reform efforts related to each crisis. Building from the recommendations of the Young and Dickson Reports, as well as the Letourneau commission and the recommendations that then-MND Doug Young solicited from four Canadian military experts in academia, *DWH* was part of an effort to professionalize the Canadian military in a very Janowitzean manner. It sought to maintain close linkages with broader Canadian society, but also articulated a clear vision of

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<sup>240</sup> Arbour, *Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review*, 15-16

Canadian military professionalism, demanding and instilling a distinct military ethos in CAF service members while defining an institutional culture that was developed from an appreciation of the unique role of the military in society.

*TtS* is equally representative of the broad themes of the Deschamps, Arbour and Fish reports and recommendations, which, in identifying insular CAF culture as part of the root cause of sexual misconduct in the CAF, demanded culture change, reduced CAF autonomy,<sup>241</sup> greater interaction and cross-pollination with external agencies, and greater adoption of organizational practices encountered elsewhere in business and government. The boundaries between the CAF and broader Canadian society had grown too firm, it was argued, and the ideological distance too far. Thus, *TtS* reduces the emphasis on military professionalism and the unique demands placed on a military, and does away almost entirely with any comprehensive vision of the Canadian military as an institution serving the state in a distinct and unique role. Instead *TtS* emphasizes an

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<sup>241</sup> Quotes from the *Arbour Report* have already been highlighted to this end, but she is not alone. Fish's Report includes recommendations that also directly target any professional basis to the CAF by diminishing corporate autonomy, and advocates for as much in his introduction: "In my view, increasing the independence of its actors would enhance Canada's military system of justice without harm of any sort to the discipline, efficiency or morale of the forces. My recommendations, if implemented at least in substance, would foster that CAF objective" (v). Some of the representative recommendations include:

**Recommendation #1.** Military judges should cease to be members of the Canadian Armed Forces, and therefore become civilian...

**Recommendation #2.** The *National Defence Act* should be amended to allow the Governor in Council to appoint to the position of military judge anyone who is a barrister or advocate of at least 10 years' standing at the bar of a province and who has been an officer or a non-commissioned member of the Canadian Armed Forces, including the Reserve Force, for at least 10 years...

**Recommendation #12.** A working group should be established to consider further reforms aimed at enhancing the independence of military prosecutors and defence counsel. The working group should include an independent authority, as well as the Judge Advocate General, the Director of Military Prosecutions and the Director of Defence

Counsel Services or their representatives. The reforms considered should, at a minimum, include:

(a) the full or partial civilianization of the positions of Director of Military Prosecutions and Director of Defence Counsel Services, or military prosecutors and defence counsel more generally...

**Recommendation #13.** Section 18.3 of the *National Defence Act* should be amended to provide that the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal be appointed by the Governor in Council and hold office during pleasure. The Chief of the Defence Staff should accordingly have no authority to remove the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal.

Fish, *Report of the Third Independent Review Authority*, 2021.

ethos that appears to place the highest normative priority upon contemporary Canadian values, subordinating distinct military values and restating them in terms more congruent with an ethos that sharply reduces the normative distance between broader Canadian society and CAF service members. Instead of Janowitzean professionalism, *TtS* and other contemporary reforms are better equated with Huntington's *subjective civilian control*, where the military becomes a mirror of its broader society, a trend already noted by other observers of the CAF.<sup>242</sup>

Why, if so many shared commonalities existed between these two crises, were the prescribed remedies so divergent? Several general factors, such as evolving societal values or the extra political significance sexual misconduct in society took on in the wake of the **#metoo** movement<sup>243</sup> are worth consideration, but a few specific ones stand out. As previously discussed, *DWH* was the deliberate culmination of an entire series of CAF reforms and was intimately linked with other key elements of a coherent new vision of CAF professionalism, finally published long after the political salience of the Somalia scandal had faded. *TtS*, on the other hand, had a tortuous path to publication and was released at the very peak of the sexual misconduct crisis, in isolation, as will be shown, from other capstone doctrines. Further, the vital period of the Somalia scandal that saw inquiries concluded and an energetic path to reforms initiated was carried out under MND Doug Young, who, for unrelated reasons, already knew he would not likely win re-election and was dropped into the department by PM Chrétien as a fixer who did not have to over-concern himself with personal electoral consequences for his actions.<sup>244</sup> Neither of MNDs Sajjan or Anand fit that description to fix the sexual misconduct problems. Even more stark in difference, however,

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<sup>242</sup> Kasurak, Peter. "Huntington in Canada: The Triumph of Subjective Control." *Armed Forces and Society* 48, no. 2 (Apr, 2022): 323-342

<sup>243</sup> "The Facts about the #MeToo Movement and its Impact in Canada." Accessed Mar 22, 2023. <https://canadianwomen.org/the-facts/the-metoo-movement-in-canada/>.

<sup>244</sup> Domansky. "Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces", 160-161

are the nature of the mandates issued to external agencies in both crises, and the type of external expertise engaged.

The Somalia, or Letourneau, Commission, was given the mandate to “report on the chain of command system, leadership within the chain of command, discipline, operations, actions, and decisions of the Canadian Forces and the actions of the Department of National Defence in respect of the Canadian Forces deployment to Somalia”.<sup>245</sup> The Dickson Report (formally, the *Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services*) was told to “assess the Code of Service Discipline, not only in light of its underlying purpose, but also the requirement for portable service tribunals capable, with prompt but fair processes, of operating in time of conflict or peace, in Canada or abroad”<sup>246</sup>. These are broad mandates which encourage consideration of the functional requirements of the entire military institution, rather than focus narrowly on a specific issue. MND Young engaged academic experts to support his reform efforts to “fix” the CAF, but rather than sharply constraining their reports in narrow subdomains, told them that they could write on anything they wanted toward that end.<sup>247</sup> Finally, Young himself set his entire report within the context of not simply of fixing a particular problem regarding misconduct, but, taking into account an informed appreciation of the unique role of the military in Canadian society, “to provide renewed impetus for change and to improve an institution that must now respond to the emerging challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century”.<sup>248</sup> In all, what is striking about the mandates for all of the Somalia-related external engagements is how broadly and holistically they approached the entire DND/CAF enterprise in their considerations.

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<sup>245</sup> The Somalia Commission’s terms of reference are found in the appendices of *Dishonoured Legacy*, 1503.

<sup>246</sup> The Special Advisory Group’s terms of reference are found in Annex A of the *Dickson Report*, 103.

<sup>247</sup> Note a particular quote Granatstein, JL "A Diary of the Defence Review, 1997." *International Journal (Toronto)* 52, no. 3 (Jul 1, 1997): 524-532: “Young said that he did not want our papers to treat operations, but when I suggested that over-commitment of the forces was important, he promptly said I could write on anything I wanted.” (524)

<sup>248</sup> Young, *Report to the Prime Minister*, 38.

With respect to expertise, the Somalia Commission consisted of Gilles Letourneau, Robert Rutherford, and Peter Desbarats. Letourneau was a career jurist but with particular expertise in military law, having sat as judge on federal appeal court for court martials prior to leading the commission.<sup>249</sup> Rutherford was an Ontario supreme court judge, but also a WWII veteran and active in the Reserves.<sup>250</sup> Desbarats was the “pure” civilian on the commission, being an influential writer and journalist, as well as Dean of Journalism at the University of Western Ontario.<sup>251</sup> Similarly, the Dickson Report’s committee members were Brian Dickson, Lt Gen (ret’d) Charles Belzile, and J.W. Bud Bird. Dickson was also a WWII veteran, as well as a supreme court judge and later Chief Justice.<sup>252</sup> After retiring from the military where he had served as head of the Army, Belzile had gone into private business as well as serving on numerous reviews and advisory groups on militaries both in Canada and abroad.<sup>253</sup> Like Desbarats, Bird was unaffiliated with the military, being a former MP and MLA from New Brunswick, ex-mayor of Fredericton, and active businessman and community member.<sup>254</sup> Both commissions featured a high degree of pre-existing expertise and familiarity with the requirements for an efficient and effective military. So too did the academic experts Granatstein, Legault, Morton, and Bercuson. From academia, they had all devoted significant portions of their careers to the study of the Canadian military and defense and security more broadly, from the disciplinary perspectives of both history and political science.<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>249</sup> "The Honourable Justice Gilles Létourneau.". Accessed Mar 1, 2023. <https://military-justice.ca/the-honourable-justice-gilles-letourneau/>.

<sup>250</sup> "Robert Rutherford Obituary.". Accessed Mar 1, 2023. <https://www.legacy.com/ca/obituaries/thestar/name/robert-rutherford-obituary?pid=188699028>.

<sup>251</sup> "Remembering Peter Desbarats.". Accessed Mar 1, 2023. [https://www.fims.uwo.ca/news/2014/remembering\\_peter\\_desbarats.html](https://www.fims.uwo.ca/news/2014/remembering_peter_desbarats.html).

<sup>252</sup> "The Right Honourable Robert George Brian Dickson, P.C., C.C., C.D." Accessed Mar 1, 2023. <https://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/bio-eng.aspx?id=robert-george-brian-dickson>.

<sup>253</sup> "Charles H. Belzile.". Accessed Mar 1, 2023. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles\\_H.\\_Belzile](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_H._Belzile).

<sup>254</sup> "Bud Bird.". Accessed Mar 1, 2023. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bud\\_Bird](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bud_Bird).

<sup>255</sup> "David J Bercuson". Accessed Mar 1, 2023. [https://cms.ualgary.ca/profiles/david-j-bercuson](https://cms.ualgary.ca/profiles/david-j-bercuson;); "Décès Du Professeur Albert Legault.". Accessed Mar 1, 2023. <https://www.fss.ulaval.ca/actualites/deces-du-professeur-albert-legault>. "Desmond Morton (Historian)". Accessed Mar 1,

Granatstein and Legault also had limited personal military experience. In sum, the external agencies engaged to guide and inform reforms to the CAF and DND following the Somalia crisis were given broad mandates to consider a “whole of Forces” perspective, and were also particularly well qualified to do so given the breadth and depth of subject matter expertise available to them.

On the other hand, the CAF narrowly constrained the Deschamps Inquiry, providing a limited mandate to consider and make recommendations regarding factors related to sexual misconduct in the CAF, while also explicitly fencing out any consideration of the military or criminal justice systems.<sup>256</sup> The Fish Report was the third independent statutory review of the military justice system, occurring approximately every decade since 2003. It has no mandate to consider broader elements or requirements of the CAF or DND, and was further constrained by ministerial direction that recommended “focusing on the statutory and regulatory provisions, and administrative policies and practices that have been implemented, and have an adequate operational record upon which to ground a review”.<sup>257</sup> The Arbour Report, coming in the face of growing political pressure in 2021, was given a somewhat broader mandate in that she was invited to make recommendations with respect to culture, recruitment, leadership, performance appraisal and related elements of the CAF,<sup>258</sup> but they also dictated the methodology of the inquiry,<sup>259</sup> and the particular objective (eradicating sexual misconduct) to be obtained:

The Contractor will conduct a review of the current policies, procedures, programs, practices and culture within the CAF and the DND, identify the causes for continued presence of harassment and sexual misconduct despite efforts to eradicate it, identify barriers to its reporting, and assess the adequacy of the policies, procedures and practice to respond when reports are made. The Contractor will also make recommendations to

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2023. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desmond\\_Morton\\_\(historian\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desmond_Morton_(historian)). Azzi, Stephen. "Jack Granatstein.". Accessed Mar 1, 2023. <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/jack-granatstein>.

<sup>256</sup> Deschamps, *External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces*, 4.

<sup>257</sup> Fish, *Report of the Third Independent Review Authority*, 263.

<sup>258</sup> Arbour, *Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review*, 323-324.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid*, 321-322.

eradicate sexual harassment and sexual misconduct, drive change, improve prevention measures, and reduce or remove barriers to its reporting.<sup>260</sup>

Even MND Anand's ministerial mandate letter from PM Trudeau shares this focus and priority. Taking office in December 2021, her "immediate priority is to take concrete steps to build an inclusive and diverse Defence Team, characterized by a healthy workplace free from harassment, discrimination, sexual misconduct and violence".<sup>261</sup> Thus, throughout the sexual misconduct crisis, DND and the CAF, as well as the government of the day, made deliberate decisions to constrain the mandates of the engaged external agencies to focus narrowly on the salient issues of sexual misconduct and the military justice system. However, perhaps unfortunately for those who had ordered the reviews and who may have sought to limit the scope of reforms envisioned, the recurring theme of the Arbour and Deschamps reports centred not on narrow administrative and policy minutiae, but on recommendations targeting enterprise-wide cultural change.

The experts engaged during this crisis likewise may have been well-suited to speak on the issues of their respective mandates, but not, unfortunately, as well-informed on the broader and distinct requirements and demands of the military institution. Nor was there the same breadth of expertise available, as both the Deschamps and Arbour inquiries contracted with single principal investigators, whereas the Somalia Commission and Dickson Report engaged three-person committees. Marie Deschamps is a career jurist from Quebec who served as a justice on both the Quebec and Canadian Supreme Courts, and is an expert in constitutional and commercial law.<sup>262</sup> Prior to being contracted by the CAF for the 2014 External Review into Sexual Harassment, she had no military background or particular expertise in that field. Morris Fish is likewise a distinguished Quebec jurist and Supreme Court of Canada alumnus and lecturer on criminal law

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<sup>260</sup> Ibid, 320.

<sup>261</sup> Trudeau, Justin (Prime Minister of Canada). *Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter* 2021.

<sup>262</sup> "Marie Deschamps." Accessed Mar 1, 2023. <https://www.mcgill.ca/definetheline/marie-deschamps>.

who has served on many public committees and advisory groups, but lacked any military expertise or familiarity prior to conducting his review of the military justice system.<sup>263</sup> Louise Arbour is another renowned former justice of the Supreme Court of both Canada and Ontario, who arguably has at least some experience dealing with military issues. She has served with the UN as High Commissioner for Human Rights, Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC), and as the Special Representative on International Migration, as well as a member of other high profile public commissions and advisory groups. Her résumé is incredibly impressive, yet prior to her work on the *Independent External Comprehensive Review* her sole dealings with military issues had been trying war criminals at the ICC from the conflicts in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, some of whom had been soldiers.<sup>264</sup> Yet this position was primarily concerned about meeting the standards of culpability regarding international humanitarian law in conflict situations. There was no requirement for familiarity with the demands of normal military service, nor would most of the armed factions participating in conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia be considered professional in the first place.

Notwithstanding the absence of specific military expertise by external agents, both Arbour and Deschamps made recommendations targeting the entire institution. The solution that was accepted was wholesale culture change, but no one has been asked to inquire or make recommendations to that end from a position that takes the health and performances of the CAF *as a whole* as its priority.

Given the relevant mandates and expertise engaged for both crises, it is unsurprising to find in the capstone document *TtS* a deprecation of expertise and some of the more unpleasant aspects

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<sup>263</sup> "Hon. Morris J. Fish, C.C., Q.C.". Accessed Mar 1, 2023. <https://www.dwpv.com/en/people/morris-j-fish>.

<sup>264</sup> "Louise Arbour - Disputes Senior Counsel". Accessed Mar 1, 2023. <https://www.blg.com/en/people/A/Arbour-Louise>.

of the role of a military, and instead an emphasis on culture and values derived primarily from external practices and organizations. Yet, departing civil-military relations and turning to the impacts on military professionalism that result from the obsolescence of *DWH* by *TtS*, it becomes clear that the apparent solution was culture change, but those demanding it were not equipped to determine the most appropriate *military* culture, only *a* culture more appropriate to avoid sexual misconduct itself within the CAF.

### ***Trusted To Serve* and Impacts on Military Professionalism**

The first question from the analysis must be: is there a problem with the ethos-only approach taken by *TtS*? Issues exist both from what is in *TtS*, and also what is left out. From an ethical perspective, *DWH*'s framework, including an extended section on conceiving military professionalism and the role of the military in society, was useful to ground the values put forward in the ethos in the unchanging requirements of the military's functional role, while still keeping CAF values both married to, yet still distinct from, Canadian society and values. The result is that each military value and expectation could be clearly traced back to underlying performance requirements of the military in its unique role, and defended on that basis. That foundation is absent in *TtS*, which makes all of the values far more malleable and subject to revision as required for political palatability, while obfuscating the aspects of the military's role which require values distinct from broader society.

As discussed above, *TtS* dispenses with the interpretative guide *DwH* provided to incorporating the various ethical statements and documents found in the CAF. However, despite attempting to amalgamate the values and behaviours described in other texts like *DwH* and the *Code*, *TtS* ignores those indirectly expressed elsewhere. This includes examples like the passages in the *National Defence Act* or subsidiary *Queen's* (soon to be *King's*) *Regulations and Orders*

detailing specific service offences and punishments, particularly those with respect to misconduct “in presence of enemy”, such as Section 73 of the *National Defence Act*, which is worth quoting at length:

73 Every officer in command of a vessel, aircraft, defence establishment, unit or other element of the Canadian Forces who

(a) when under orders to carry out an operation of war or on coming into contact with an enemy that it is the duty of the officer to engage, does not use his utmost exertion to bring the officers and non-commissioned members under his command or his vessel, aircraft or other materiel into action,

(b) being in action, does not, during the action, in the officer’s own person and according to the rank of the officer, encourage his officers and non-commissioned members to fight courageously,

(c) when capable of making a successful defence, surrenders his vessel, aircraft, defence establishment, materiel, unit or other element of the Canadian Forces to the enemy,

(d) being in action, improperly withdraws from the action,

(e) improperly fails to pursue an enemy or to consolidate a position gained,

(f) improperly fails to relieve or assist a known friend to the utmost of his power, or

(g) when in action, improperly forsakes his station,

is guilty of an offence and on conviction, if the officer acted traitorously, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life, if the officer acted from cowardice, is liable to imprisonment for life or less punishment, and in any other case, is liable to dismissal with disgrace from Her Majesty’s service or to less punishment.<sup>265</sup>

Notably, the death penalty was only removed from the scale of these punishments in 1998 when it was fully abolished in Canada, long after it had been removed from the Criminal Code. No private citizen would ever be held liable for fleeing from danger or shunning violence, let alone not fighting “to their utmost.” Private Canadian citizens are encouraged to do exactly those things in the face of danger. Not so the CAF, which is very deliberately and legally held to a harsh and demanding code of conduct informed by its unique role, which demands some behaviours and underlying values utterly at odds with those developed in broader Canadian society.

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<sup>265</sup> *National Defense Act*, (2022), 53.

This is why the department wide *DND/CF Code of Ethics and Values* provides guidance on how its own code is to be adopted. Reflecting the rushed and isolated process that saw *TtS* issued, the *Code* still refers to its obsolesced predecessor. It states “For CF Members, [the Code] *complements* (emphasis added) the values and ethics that constitute the Canadian military ethos reflected in *Queen’s Regulations and Orders* as well as CF customs and practices described in *Duty With Honour*”.<sup>266</sup> Yet as discussed above, and despite the tenuous existence and partial validity *DWH* still retains, *TtS* discards the interpretative ethical structure of *DWH* by emphasizing “Canadian values” over all else, civilianizing and diminishing any distinctive CAF ethic.

The ethical framework of *DWH* arrived at the conclusion that soldiers had to do the full spectrum of military activities, including killing, “with humanity”.<sup>267</sup> On the other hand, the normative priority afforded by *TtS* toward the *Code*’s three ethical principles, first and foremost respecting the dignity of all persons, over military values, places killing of any kind in a problematic light. This is appropriate for civilian Canadians, but introduces profound dilemmas for service members. If respecting the dignity of all persons is the most paramount ethical behaviour, how does one then reconcile that with the military requirement to kill in battle? This may align with McMahan’s (*Killing in War*) radical philosophical interpretation, which argues that killing in war is no different, and no less wrong, than killing in other circumstances,<sup>268</sup> but it is very far from more conventional and broadly accepted doctrine of just wars and appropriate behaviours in combat, which underly the Law of Armed Conflict.<sup>269</sup> It also invites psychological trauma for those military members of whom such behaviour is demanded, and runs expressly

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<sup>266</sup> *DND/CF Code of Ethics and Values*, 3.

<sup>267</sup> *Duty With Honour*, 29.

<sup>268</sup> McMahan, Jeff. *Killing in War*. Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009

<sup>269</sup> The Law of Armed Conflict, also known as the Law of War, or international humanitarian law, is the body of international conventions and agreements (Geneva, Hague, etc) which lays out the legal and philosophical foundation for the conduct of “legal” war, as well as provide protections for non-combatants, prisoners, etc.

against the unique *obligation to kill* aspect of the military profession, with lesser, but still profound implications for *unlimited liability* and the *burden of command*, as both of those aspects also necessarily diminish the worth of some human lives over that of others.

The newfound emphasis on EDI initiatives and authenticity in *TtS* also invites a new ethical tension with the requirements of service before self. In introducing *TtS*, the CDS stated that “Our goal is an armed forces that embodies Canadian values, and in which every member is able to be their authentic self, feels valued, included, and empowered to bring their very best in service to Canada each and every day”.<sup>270</sup> Although a laudable goal towards self-actualization and reflective of broader societal trends, there is an unexplored potential conflict between the values and beliefs of each individual CAF recruit, and those legitimately demanded by the military. The emphasis on individual autonomy and fulfilment runs against corporateness and group identity. Unlimited liability needs to be rationally accepted; this is true and important to recognize. But unlimited liability also needs to be unconsciously adopted by those in combat situations. As both study and story recognize, people do not really give their lives for their “country” in the heat of the moment, they do it for the people next to them.<sup>271</sup> They value their own life less than the needs of the community around them. I can personally attest to this, the burden of obligation to “*not let the others down,*” is incredibly motivating to operate and do one’s job in the face of immense personal danger, as happened multiple times in firefights in Afghanistan. This is why militaries have

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<sup>270</sup> Eyre, Wayne and Gilles Grégoire. *Email: CDS and CAF CWO Message to the Defence Team: Release of the CAF Ethos: Trusted to Serve*, addressed to all DND/CAF system email users Jun 22, 2022.

<sup>271</sup> For an older, already discussed source, see Shils and Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II.” Times and terms have changed, and “primary group cohesion” has been replaced with “identity fusion” in the sociological parlance, but the core premise continues to be validated. For more recent work, see: Swann, William B., Michael D. Buhrmester, Angel Gómez, Jolanda Jetten, Brock Bastian, Alexandra Vázquez, Amarina Ariyanto, et al. “What Makes a Group Worth Dying for? Identity Fusion Fosters Perception of Familial Ties, Promoting Self-Sacrifice.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 106, no. 6 (2014): 912-926, or Whitehouse, Harvey. “Dying for the Group: Towards a General Theory of Extreme Self-Sacrifice.” *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 41, (2018): 1-e192.

traditionally subsumed the individual to the whole in everything they do, from basic training onward. It is a form of indoctrination, and also why Janowitz claimed that the military required some ideological space from broader society to inculcate and maintain its ethos.<sup>272</sup>

The Canadian military, like other Western democracies, is fundamentally *exclusive*, not inclusive. It necessarily imposes some values and behaviours and demands their acceptance on its members. Given its unique role and responsibility over the legitimate use of societal violence and military force, this is a good thing, as it imposes an ethic of subordination to civil and legitimate authority.. Compared to broader society, it demands that *all*<sup>273</sup> of its members be prepared to do unnatural things, counter to instinct and broader societal values. Service members may have to don fighting gear, live and work in austere circumstances with limited supports, take another human's life, give orders that will see others sacrifice their own lives, etc. The unique role of the military instrumentally demands a particular set of values and behaviours, often antithetical to those of broader society. There is certainly room for diversity of thought and opinion with the military - this is empirically proven in multiple studies of military members<sup>274</sup> - but always within the framework of subordinating individual wants to community requirements - the very basis of service before self. Or put differently, potential recruits can hold a broad array of disparate values and beliefs and still be welcome in the CAF, provided they are willing to subsume them to the requirements of military service. Whether or not that is enough freedom for them to feel like their

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<sup>272</sup> Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*. See in particular Part IV "The Military Community: The persistence of manners", 175-214.

<sup>273</sup> This refers to universality of service— the idea that, with very limited exceptions, any service member could be ordered to execute any lawful command within their ability, not just related to their particular occupation with the CAF. A cook might temporarily become an infanteer, a dental hygienist might have to act as an armed sentry, etc.

<sup>274</sup> This point has been brought up previously while exploring criticism of Huntington. See Driver "The Military Mind" for a US example, while a 2005 study in Canada "Canada's Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" demonstrated the same fact: Soldiers are not a homogenous group, but hold a vast array of diverse beliefs. However, they all share an overriding acceptance of the requirements of the community taking precedence over individual requirements where it is militarily necessary to do so.

most authentic selves is a question only answerable by that individual; that threshold cannot and should not be determined by the CAF.

Differentiating what is more important and when becomes much more difficult with the laundry list approach to values of *TtS*. The absence in *TtS* of an overarching vision of the profession itself is crippling even just with respect to ethos, as it relegates the listed values to seventeen things that one can say complimentary things about, rather than establishing a central identity and developing a comprehensive vision of the profession built around the military's unique role, which can both inform and mutually constitute the military ethos. *TtS* also locks in an unchanging articulation of specific "Canadian" values, whereas *DWH* largely referred to a living corpus of legislation to flesh out those values rather than articulating them at length itself. The difference is that one continues to evolve, whereas the other shackles the CAF to the values of a particular document frozen in time. "Because it's 2022" (when *TtS* was published) will not have the same ring to it in 2031.

More broadly, *TtS*, in replacing *DWH* with a dissimilar document, has left a gap in capstone CAF doctrine which articulates what the CAF is and does, and why it has necessarily taken the shape that it has today. This is why *DWH* has retained a truncated existence, while *TtS* attempts to "pick and choose" by superseding the ethos of *DWH* while awkwardly endeavouring to retain the remainder. *DWH* was the central conceptual building block of an inter-related series of publications that embodied a comprehensive reform of the military leadership model in the wake of Somalia (footnote on all the other texts).<sup>275</sup> This framework is described as follows:

These publications form part of a closely linked series. *Duty With Honour*, published in 2003, serves as a defining and guiding document for the profession of arms; it provides the foundation for the development and implementation of values-based leadership in the CF.

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<sup>275</sup> All have been mentioned already. They consist of 1) *Duty With Honour*, 2) *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 3) *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*, 4) *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading People*, 5) *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*.

*Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*, published in 2005, builds on this foundation, as a companion publication to *Duty With Honour*, it incorporates the key ideas on Canadian military professionalism into CF leadership doctrine. Similarly, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces*: also published in 2005, provides the theories and intellectual foundation underpinning the doctrinal leadership manual.<sup>276</sup>

Further, *DWH* provided a clear institutional “center of gravity” which informed other high-level publications as well. *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01 – Canadian Military Doctrine*, which describes the roles and missions assigned to the CAF, fundamentals of warfare, command and control, organization of the CAF, as well as sets guidelines for the conduct of operations and other critical fundamentals of the CAF, leans heavily on the perspectives put forward by *DWH*:

0413. The profession of arms. The CF military ethos defines the profession of arms as a distinct calling and rejects any notion that service in the CF is equivalent to employment in other areas of Canadian society. While all of the qualities intrinsic to a vocation apply to members of the CF, they are also expected to embrace the values of the nation, as well as those of their profession, in order to serve Canada to the best of their abilities.<sup>277</sup>

0415. The Canadian military ethos is not just a statement of values, it is the essential unity of values, beliefs, expectations, and conduct of the profession of arms. The Government of Canada’s and Canadian society’s trust in the CF is contingent on the application of the military ethos and the structure that it provides to the military profession. The CF military ethos serves to shape and to guide conduct for CF members and is the standard used by all CF members when confronted with an ethical dilemma.<sup>278</sup>

0601. Although the Canadian Forces (CF) trains for and may be called upon to perform many tasks short of war, the central tenet of the CF is to have adaptable, combat-ready, deployable forces trained and willing to fight and win in support of Canadian government interests. A warrior ethos coupled with a willingness of all members to engage, when necessary, in combat operations in pursuit of legitimate national interests, underpins CF military doctrine.<sup>279</sup>

In hurriedly and partially replacing *DWH* by a dissimilar document in *TtS*, this mutually constituting and reinforcing framework is undone. Nor can *TtS* and *DWH* easily coexist in the short-term to address the conceptual absences in *TtS*, as *TtS* unquestionably establishes a new and

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<sup>276</sup> *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*, viii.

<sup>277</sup> Canada. National Defence. *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01 – Canadian Military Doctrine*. 1st ed. Ottawa: Colonel Steven P. Noonan, MSC, CD, 2009. 4-1.

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid*, 4-2.

<sup>279</sup> *Ibid*, 6-1.

distinct ethos and values from *DWH* with different priorities, and indirectly informs a different conceptual approach to the Canadian military profession. The current tension between the documents means that the CAF puts one face forward in its accessible ethos in *TtS*, while its other high-level doctrine and institutional approach to leadership are informed by a different ethical framework. The result is a degree of professional confusion of what “right looks like”.

By failing to articulate a clear vision of the military profession and instead simply emphasizing character, *TtS* undermines military professionalism. There is nothing in *TtS* that significantly informs an *oeuvre* over which the military has specific expertise, or particular social responsibility, two core components of any profession. Expertise is deliberately downplayed, while responsibility is vaguely assumed without ever being clearly articulated. The third leg, corporateness (and autonomy), is deliberately diminished by *TtS* as part of a broader theme supported by the Arbour and Deschamps reports in order to reduce the insularity of the CAF and increase external involvement in its promotions and practices. One might argue that the external monitoring committee that MND Eggleton established did the same, but the MMC was created solely to oversee the implementation of reforms stemming from the Somalia crisis and was subsequently abolished when its job was completed, whereas the current recommendations, especially in the more comprehensive Arbour Report, seek to permanently diminish CAF autonomy and corporateness.

To conclude this section, the innovative contribution of *DWH*, from both a civil-military relations perspective and one of military professionalism, was that it bridged the gap, or Huntington’s two imperatives, between the functionally-derived requirements of military professionalism on the one hand, and the esteem of society at large towards the military on the other. It did so by reconceiving Canadian military professionalism, replacing corporateness *per se*

with its “identity” construct, which included an inescapable linkage to broader Canadian society as a core component of the profession, yet tempered that linkage with a distinct military ethos that fulfilled the unique societal requirements of a military. *TtS*, by replacing *DWH*'s ethos without articulating any replacement for all of the other contents of the latter publication, undermines the only comprehensive conceptualization of CAF military professionalism that Canada has ever had.

Still, it might be argued that, confronted with the malfeasances of the sexual misconduct crisis, diminishing professionalism and increasing subjective civilian control in the manner in which *TtS* is emblematic are simply the price that must be paid in order to stamp out this problem. Framed in this manner, the choice is a normative one, which depends solely on what one subjectively believes is more important between a professional military and an institution which no longer has a problem with sexual misconduct and assault. However, I will now briefly demonstrate that this is a false choice, and that the CAF can in fact, adopt an institutional culture that prevents endemic sexual misconduct, while simultaneously promoting military professionalism.

### **Focusing on the “military” in CAF military culture**

The CAF was not the only military facing upheaval, misbehaviour, and profound change in the 1990s. In the USA, the end of the Cold War, events like the Navy Tailhook scandal (in which US Navy and Marine corps pilots were accused of sexually assaulting 83 women and seven men at a conference),<sup>280</sup> the media circus surrounding B-52 pilot Kelly Flinn- the first female pilot of such an airframe - charged with adultery and the subject of a Senate committee hearing,<sup>281</sup> and

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<sup>280</sup> Stilwell, Blake. "The Tailhook Scandal: How a 'Top Gun Mentality' Led to a Disastrous Navy Conference." . Accessed Mar 26, 2023. <https://www.military.com/history/tailhook-scandal-how-top-gun-mentality-led-disastrous-navy-conference.html>.

<sup>281</sup> Sciolino, Elaine. "Air Force Chief has Harsh Words for Pilot Facing Adultery Charges." *New York Times*, May 22, 1997. <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/97/12/14/home/052297airforce-pilot.html>.

the election and intended policies (such as effectively eliminating the ban on homosexuals in the military) of President Bill Clinton all helped to stir a powerful debate surrounding military culture, as discussed earlier in Chapter 2 with regards to Feaver, Sarkesian, Moskos, and others writing in the 1990s. On the one hand, some claimed that women in the combat arms, or openly homosexual members serving more generally, would only serve to undermine military cohesion and effectiveness.<sup>282</sup> On the other hand, others claimed that such a position was antiquated, bigoted, and out of touch with the morality of broader American society.<sup>283</sup> In both cases, soap boxes were used to argue about issues and pursue agendas not directly related to military performance and professionalism themselves. Decrying this condition, Snider wrote that

America has, and has had, a very successful military, and to debate policies designed to change its culture without at the same time having an informed discussion of the consequences in terms of military effectiveness is folly...<sup>284</sup>

A truly informed debate is called for—one concerned with effective policymaking and focused on all the subcultures and their influences, both positive and negative, on military capabilities and effectiveness. The purposes of the military and its ability to fulfill those purposes should drive the debate, not its racial or gender composition. At the very least, such a political dialogue should focus on what is distinctively *military* about military culture and why that is so... the level of analysis should extend to missions and tasks to be undertaken by the services and the relative priorities of each. As discussed earlier, these are the principal determinants of the professional ethos and the reason there are military cultures in the first place.<sup>285</sup>

Those advocating for maintaining the status quo at the time were also defending the military culture of the moment, but in a manner which accepted *all* of the values that that institution held, not just the ones strictly informed by the unique functional role the military was established to fulfil. Some of those taking the opposing position were likewise painting with broad brushes,

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<sup>282</sup> Mitchell, Brian. *Women in the Military: Flirting with Disaster*. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1997.

<sup>283</sup> Stiehm, Judith. *Arms and the Enlisted Woman*. Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1989.

<sup>284</sup> Snider, Don M. "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture." *Orbis (Philadelphia)* 43, no. 1 (1999): 11-26, 12.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid*, 25.

willing to jettison any and every entrenched value encountered in the military if it interfered with making the military look like broader society.

However, as English points out, what is *essential* in a military culture does not capture all of what is present:

While military forces share certain basic parts of their ethos, societal differences account for variations in ethos among military groups in time and space. A historical approach to this subject shows that certain constant and repeating patterns of military ethos are revealed in a survey of the characteristic spirit of military forces through the ages. These commonalities may be contrasted with parts of the military ethos that are specific to any one military group.<sup>286</sup>

In other words, even if one charitably accepts the argument that openly gay and lesbian service members would have undermined the cohesion of the hetero-normative primary groups found in the US military *at that time*, the argument is only supported by some *non-military* values also present in that particular culture, in this case, values largely derived from the Anglo-Christian societal heritage that had earlier informed US military culture. But those values are superfluous to the *military* core of necessary values that inform the profession in general. Replace those members and their values with those who feel that homosexuality has no bearing on military performance, and while the culture of that military will have (and has) demonstrably changed, the core military ethos can remain. The values, or ideology, that necessarily undergird military professionalism can thus be thought of as an incomplete ideology, or limited belief system, that can be adopted and incorporated within a much broader range of values and beliefs.

This is why effective and highly professional militaries can look quite different in some aspects, while still performing in similar manners in the field. The German Army in World War II, and the US Army in the first Gulf War were both highly professional, but both were also broadly

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<sup>286</sup> English, *Understanding Military Culture*, 60-61.

representative of their parent societies and hosted vastly different broader values within individual members from each other. One put a high emphasis on racial purity underpinned by ethnic fascism, the other featured a diverse, multi-racial military underpinned by melting-pot liberalism. Both delivered impressive military results. As General Schwarzkopf (the commanding general of the coalition against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War) noted “We could have traded equipment with the Iraqis and still won”.<sup>287</sup> The key takeaway is that cultural and value changes in a given military may be entirely feasible without sacrificing parts of the ethos fundamental to the profession of arms.

One Canadian soldier-scholar expanded on the unchanging essentials of soldiering across time and space by comparing Captain Nichola Goddard, a female artillery soldier who died in combat in Afghanistan, with the Greek hoplites of antiquity:

In this, the crushing collision of two hoplite phalanxes is not so different than the impact of a Taliban rocket-propelled grenade against the side of a light armoured vehicle (LAV); nor does the exchange of modern weapons fire produce effects dissimilar to the push and stab of the *othismos*. Either form of combat affects the minds and souls of participants in similar ways, and creates its own requirement – a will to fight despite brutality and fear.

To believe that this will to fight is a result of the imposition of a particular society’s assumptions of hypermasculinity, of class expectation or submissiveness, or any kind of exclusive ethnic or gendered right or advantage is to mistake cause and effect in war. For all humanity for all of history, combat has proven that it does not discriminate; that its conditions produce a common need – a readiness to kill.<sup>288</sup>

Put differently, the instrumental requirements of the application of military force necessarily promote, through a rather harsh Darwinian winnowing in the realm of combat-the true workplace of the profession of arms-, a particular form of military culture. Hillen argues that “the best test of

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<sup>287</sup> Quoted in Snider, Don and Gayle Watkins. "The Future of Army Professionalism: A Need for Renewal and Redefinition." *Parameters* vol 30, no. 3 (Oct 1, 2000): 5-20.

<sup>288</sup> Hope, Ian. "Combat Motivation in the Contemporary Canadian Army." In *Why we Fight: New Approaches to the Human Dimension of Warfare*, edited by Engen, Robert C., H. Christian Breede and Allan English, 109-128. Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2020, 96-97.

a given military culture was whether its recruits could train and fight effectively, especially when they first came under fire.”<sup>289</sup> In Canada, that culture may previously have included elements which normalized misogyny and turned a blind eye to sexual misconduct, but the wheat *can* be separated from the chaff in this respect, and a professional military ethos can exist while elements superfluous to that core can be forcibly rooted out or modified. That is why previous efforts like OP HONOUR have continued to see declining incidence of sexual misconduct year after year since 2015.<sup>290</sup> It is also why Madame Arbour’s recommendation to remove the prosecution of sexual misconduct from the military justice system is another vital, if unpleasant, step.<sup>291</sup> Military justice has always been a rough-and-ready form of maintaining discipline, designed to expediently deal with malfeasances with an eye on maintaining military performance in the field. Most identified crimes are transgressions against the community in one form or another, either through abuse or insubordination within the chain of command, or failure to perform duties to appropriate standards. Sexual misconduct, which is typically an intimate crime of transgression by one individual against another, has always sat somewhat uncomfortably within the military justice system. The inevitable organizational pressures of any large institution motivate those in authority to “make it go away” as opposed to having a painful and public reckoning, which is typically a win for the organization, but a bitter injustice for the victim. The same organizational pressures can be evident in other recent reckonings in the country, be it in Hockey Canada,<sup>292</sup> the sweeping-under-the-rug effect of non-disclosure agreements appended to sexual misconduct settlements in

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<sup>289</sup> Hillen, John. "Must US Military Culture Reform?" *Parameters (Carlisle, Pa.)* 29, no. 3 (1999): 43-57, 45.

<sup>290</sup> Canada. National Defence. *2019 Sexual Misconduct Incident Tracking Report*, 2019.

<sup>291</sup> Arbour, *Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review*. Recommendation #5 reads in part: “Criminal Code sexual offences should be removed from the jurisdiction of the CAF. They should be prosecuted exclusively in civilian criminal courts in all cases...” (103).

<sup>292</sup> Burke, Ashley. "Crisis on Ice: What You Need to Know about the Hockey Canada Scandal." *CBC News*, Jul 29, 2022. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/hockey-canada-sexual-assault-crisis-parliamentary-committee-1.6535248>.

universities,<sup>293</sup> or elsewhere. The military having its own justice system to handle the offenses only makes matters worse. Although extracting sexual misconduct from the purvey of military justice will obviously present hurdles to delivering expedient resolutions in the field, particularly on international deployments, at this point the balance of costs and benefits to military readiness, ethical leadership, and essential trust between service members clearly favours swallowing the less bitter pill of surrendering jurisdiction over sexual misconduct entirely. This change by itself will go far to achieving necessary cultural change without greatly endangering military professionalism.

*DWH* was not part of the problem of sexual misconduct in the CAF. In fact, many otherwise quite critical observers pointed to the ethos set out and promoted by *Duty With Honour* as something laudable that the CAF had failed to live up to.<sup>294</sup> *DWH*'s ethical framework is informed by a nuanced appreciation of both the profession of arms and the importance of linkages to broader society. Jettisoning *DWH* and replacing it with the Canadian-values-first-and-foremost ethos found in *TtS*, which does not provide any equivalent framework that fully comes to grips with the values necessary to sustain the profession in its unique role. At best, it substitutes one problem for another by undermining and diluting military professionalism, replacing professional soldiers with *bureaucrats with rifles*.<sup>295</sup> This remains the key analytical conclusion of this comparative analysis, while this last section demonstrates that it need not be this way at all. The solution and desired culture of the CAF is actually best obtained with an approach that looks very similar to that called

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<sup>293</sup> Exact numbers are unknown, because of the NDAs in the first place. However, the problem has become so severe that legislatures are moving to restrict their use: Rivers, Heather. "London Lawyer Hails Victory on University, College use of Non-Disclosure Agreements." *London Free Press*, Dec 5, 2022. <https://lfpres.com/news/local-news/london-lawyer-hails-victory-on-university-college-use-of-non-disclosure-agreements>.

<sup>294</sup> See for example, Deschamps, *External Review*, 12; Arbour, *Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review*, 15; Domansky, "Post Somalia Reform and the Canadian Armed Forces" 235-236.

<sup>295</sup> The term is not my fully my own, but simply modified for my own use. I first encountered the idea in Gabriel, *The Warrior's Way*, 29, who invokes the term "armed bureaucrats" to condemn a theoretical soldier who has been divorced from any professional ethos.

for and envisioned, but never fully realized, by *Duty With Honour*. To conclude this chapter and analysis, two policy recommendations follow.

## Recommendations

**Recommendation #1 Establish one authoritative CAF ethos document which includes a well-developed articulation of what the CAF is, the role it plays in Canadian society, what it must be prepared to do, and a development of the particular military values that are necessary to fulfil that instrumental role.**

The current ethos in *Trusted to Serve* is too far removed from any conceptual appreciation of the requirements that sustain the application of military force, while the current authoritative document that does contain that analysis (*Duty With Honour*) develops an ethos distinct from that published in *Trusted to Serve*. This conflictual tension is untenable. The ethos-in-isolation approach of *Trusted to Serve* risks being a document that, while political palatable, fails to adequately prepare CAF members from the unyielding requirements of military service and lacks sufficient reference to what the military *does* in order to serve as a vital touchstone of identity and values. To reiterate a previous quotation from CAF doctrine, “The Canadian military ethos is not” [*and must not be*] “just a statement of values; it is the essential unity of values, beliefs, expectations, and conduct of the profession of arms”.<sup>296</sup> Although *Duty With Honour* executed this requirement by itself, the solution moving forward need not simply be a reissue of *Duty With Honour*. Times change, and the military profession must always remain linked to its evolving broader society, as it must also remain focused on its unique role in service to that society. A new publication on the CAF’s professional ethos, with a somewhat different approach and different fundamental expectations is also entirely viable, so long as it continues to bridge the gap between Huntington’s societal and functional imperatives.

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<sup>296</sup> *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01*, 4-1.

Just as writing this thesis was drawing to an end, I became aware that the CAF may be withdrawing or modifying *Trusted to Serve* in the near future, replacing or augmenting it with another document entitled *Fighting Spirit*.<sup>297</sup> No information other than that title is available to me, so it is difficult to provide much in the way of analysis, however the title of the new document would seem to support much of the analysis and criticism found in this thesis, that *Trusted to Serve* develops an ethos too isolated from the requirements of the profession of arms.

If *Fighting Spirit* is to fully replace or supersede *Trusted to Serve*, then the above recommendation stands. If *Fighting Spirit* is to serve as the wonky compendium to *Trusted to Serve*, replacing *Duty With Honour* in that role as the piece that provides the intellectual foundations for the profession of arms in Canada, but not intended for broad dissemination or socialization, then this *partially* addresses some of the problems identified by this thesis. Presumably a new companion piece would align itself fully with *Trusted to Serve*, eliminating the tension and misalignment between the two documents that currently reappear elsewhere in doctrine, as already discussed. Eliminating contradictions in foundational doctrine is always beneficial.

However, this would not solve other problems identified here. *Trusted to Serve*, unlike *Duty With Honour*, lacks a fully developed, coherent ethical framework that can inform decision-making when one value comes into conflict with another, something that becomes increasingly likely with seventeen separate values and 136 possible binary combinations. No ethical doctrine can simply be every value, everywhere, all the time. It would make no sense for that ethical framework to be found in *Fighting Spirit*, outside of the core ethical document itself. The sole

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<sup>297</sup> This news was conveyed in an email on March 9, 2023 from my graduate supervisor, defense and security expert Dr Andrea Charron. She had heard it straight from CDS Eyre's speech at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) annual conference 9-10 March.

apparent normative priority found in *Trusted to Serve*, emphasizing the three ethical principles, first and foremost respecting the dignity of all persons, introduces already-discussed ethical dilemmas in the execution of military duties that no companion piece can correct without contradicting it.

*Fighting Spirit*, like *Duty With Honour*, could go far to articulate a comprehensive vision of the Canadian profession of arms that informs other capstone doctrine. It may answer the key questions central to any collective group with a particular task, but even more critical in the unique, instrumental requirements of the military institution, of “who we are” and “what we do”, that is largely missing from *Trusted to Serve*. But these are not merely academic questions to be dragged out on professional development exercises. They are central to the identity and directly influence the values of all CAF members. It makes no sense to hide them away in a separate document when they should appear foremost and inform any statement of CAF values in the first place. Their appearance in a companion document cannot fully correct their absence in the core ethos discussion. At best, this would be inefficient and sub-optimal, needlessly complicating and separating into two documents what belongs in one.

**Recommendation #2 Establish an external, public commission with the broad yet targeted mandate to “maximize the effectiveness of the Canadian Armed Forces”.**

This entire thesis has narrowly examined two capstone ethos documents, with only limited consideration of other factors affecting CAF culture and military effectiveness. The importance of one or another single publication should not be overstated to the ultimate performance of the CAF in its unique role – the application of military power. Other factors, such as the mutual permeation of civil and military hierarchies in the combined NDHQ, or the lack of informed and effective parliamentary debate on defence and security issues due to the workings of the Westminster system of government, exert very powerful influences on the organizational culture of the CAF that need

to be better understood and evaluated from the perspective of military effectiveness. Military effectiveness is defined here as “the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power. A fully effective military is one that derives maximum combat power from the resources physically and politically available. Effectiveness thus incorporates some notion of efficiency.”<sup>298</sup> The key point here is that both *Duty With Honour* or *Trusted to Serve* matter little more than shuffling the deck chairs on the *Titanic* if they are not both informed by, and reflective of, broader organizational efforts, and these efforts should be ever-focused on maintaining and enhancing military effectiveness even as they continually adjust to an evolving relationship with Canadian society and its values. Getting the ethos document “right” for the Canadian profession of arms is important, but it cannot happen in isolation if it is to be meaningful. Nor should that broader policy direction simply be informed by this (or any individual’s) lone analysis.

One American observer of Canada opined that “If anything has characterized civil-military relations in Canada, it has been the creation of one commission after another, all attempting to bring rationality into the defence process, especially when it came to command and control, the budget, and the inefficiency of the bureaucratic process”.<sup>299</sup> On the one hand, one could cynically conclude that yet another commission will accomplish little where many before have had little influence. On the other hand, reform by commission is largely “how we do things around here” in Canada, and both public and institutional pathways are already well-travelled in this respect, which means that any such inquiry and subsequent reform has a real chance of enjoying significant success. This study has shown that the inquiries and recommendations that came out of both the Somalia and sexual misconduct scandals in the CAF have had very tangible results. What is needed

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<sup>298</sup> Millett, Allan R., Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman. “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations.” *International Security* 11, no. 1 (1986): 37-71, 37.

<sup>299</sup> Herspring, *Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility*, 144.

is simply the political will to embark on the process, and a clear mandate to the commission. While the exact composition of the proposed “military effectiveness” commission is beyond the scope of this paper, it would ideally consist of 3-5 expert members, none of them currently serving in the CAF or government. Expertise could be engaged from Canadian academia and past distinguished DND/CAF members, but importantly, should also include military experts from outside of Canada for a diversity of perspectives.

Whereas the first recommendation is a relatively “low-hanging fruit” and is required simply to salvage the current untenable situation, any other similarly narrow prescriptions ultimately hinge on what Canada wants its military to *be* and *do*. The current situation seems to have been arrived at without having asked that important but general question, but rather simply as a response to a particular political crisis. A broader assessment is in order, and any other possible reforms rightfully belong to the outcome of that process. A brief recapitulation of this thesis follows in the conclusion.

## **Conclusion**

Both the 1993 torture and murder of Shidane Arone by members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, and the more recent sexual misconduct scandal in the CAF set off chain reactions of external inquiries and reform processes that resulted in significant changes to how the CAF conducts its affairs. Each culminated with the promulgation of a new capstone ethos articulating a specific set of core values of the CAF, the first crisis resulted in *Duty With Honour*, the second crisis led to the release of *Trusted to Serve*. The former built a case for trust from the Canadian public based on expertise and military professionalism, in essence claiming that “You can trust us because we are consummate professionals”. The latter took a different tack, and imported paradigms from the realm of business that constructed a two-faceted case for the trust based on the

competence, and especially the character, of CAF members. This ideal character was expressed through a lengthy list of values that emphasized the essential “Canadian-ness” of CAF members. The claim this time could be simplified as “You can trust us because we are good Canadians”. The two ethos were both generated from similar events, yet took very different approaches in attempting to resolve the problem.

This thesis set out to examine and understand both cases through a set of analytical lenses developed from civil-military relations, as well as a well-informed conceptualization of the military profession. In each case, the particular mandate and expertise engaged through external inquiries into the scandal had profound consequences for the shape of the resultant reforms. Huntington’s approach to obtaining either objective or subjective civilian control is instructive here: “Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective military control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state”.<sup>300</sup> In the case of *Duty With Honour*, external inquiries and engaged parties featured a large amount of previous military experience and specific military expertise, which resulted in a set of reforms which, set out to *militarize* the military. Likewise, external reforms that led to *Trusted to Serve* were informed by experts whose *oeuvres* originated outside the military realm, and in the end, so too did their *civilianizing* recommended solutions.

Confronted with unification and budget challenges in 1968, former CDS General Allard stated that “It matters little whether the Forces have their present manpower strength and financial budget, or half of them, or double them; without a properly educated, effectively trained, professional officer corps the Forces would in the future be doomed to, at the best mediocrity, at the worst; disaster”.<sup>301</sup> His words remain correct. A well-equipped, well-staffed, and well-paid

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<sup>300</sup> Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 83.

<sup>301</sup> Quoted in Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 31.

military that nonetheless lacks expertise, or is morally ill-equipped to carry out their unique societal obligations, is just a dysfunctional bureaucracy. For whatever the advice of a simple graduate thesis is worth with respect to developing a service ethos and all that that capstone document both informs and shapes for the entire CAF, here it is: *Move slowly and deliberately, and always keep foremost in mind the most effective CAF attainable that balances both the societal and functional imperatives of Canada. Canada's citizens and soldiers deserve no less.*

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**APPENDICES**

Appendix 1 – Table of Contents of *Duty With Honour*

Appendix 2 – Table of Contents of *Trusted to Serve*

Appendix 3 – *Trusted to Serve* – Acceptable and Unacceptable Behaviour Matrix

Appendix 4 – *Trusted to Serve* – Values, Principles, and Expectations Matrix

Appendix 1 - Table of Contents of *Duty With Honour*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface .....	1
Foreword .....	2
The Military Profession in Canada .....	3
Section 1 Introduction .....	4
Section 2 Evolution of the Profession of Arms. ....	5
Section 3 The Profession of Arms in Canada .....	10
Section 4 The Attributes of the Profession of Arms in Canada ....	14
Section 5 Conclusion .....	23
The Statement of Canadian Military Ethos .....	24
Section 1 Military Ethos and its Function in the Profession of Arms .....	25
Section 2 Fundamental Beliefs and Expectations .....	26
Section 3 Canadian Values .....	28
Section 4 Canadian Military Values .....	30
Section 5 Military Ethos and the Warrior's Honour .....	32
Section 6 Conclusion .....	33
The Organization and Functioning of the Profession of Arms in Canada .....	35
Section 1 Introduction .....	36
Section 1 The Military Profession in Canada .....	37
Section 2 Fundamental Imperatives and the Professional Construct .....	43
Section 3 Sustaining the Profession .....	55
Section 4 Conclusion .....	61
Adapting to Future Challenges .....	62
Section 1 The Enduring Nature of the Profession of Arms .....	63
Section 2 Managing the Evolution of the Profession of Arms .....	68
Section 3 Conclusion .....	77
Selected Bibliography .....	79

Appendix 2 - Table of Contents of *Trusted to Serve*

# The Canadian Armed Forces Ethos

## Trusted to Serve

Preface.....	2	Professional Expectations .....	33
Introduction.....	5	1. Duty .....	33
Part 1 – The Importance of Trust .....	8	2. Accepting Unlimited Liability .....	34
Character.....	10	3. Fighting Spirit .....	35
Competence.....	10	4. Leadership .....	36
The Purpose and Function of the Canadian Armed Forces’ Ethos .....	11	5. Discipline .....	38
Part 2 – What is the Canadian Armed Forces Ethos, and How do I Use It?.....	14	6. Teamwork .....	41
Ethical Principles .....	16	7. Readiness.....	42
1. Respect the Dignity of All Persons.....	16	8. Stewardship .....	43
2. Serve Canada Before Self .....	19	Part 3 – Ethos and Leaders .....	46
3. Obey and Support Lawful Authority.....	21	The Ethos is the Foundation of How We Lead Our People .....	47
Military Values .....	22	The Ethos is the Foundation of How We Lead Our Institution .....	48
1. Loyalty.....	22	Conclusion .....	51
2. Integrity .....	24	Glossary.....	53
3. Courage .....	25	Selected References .....	58
4. Excellence.....	27	Acceptable and Unacceptable Behaviour Matrix .....	60
5. Inclusion.....	28	Values, Principles and Expectations Matrix .....	61
6. Accountability .....	31		

Appendix 3 - *Trusted to Serve* Acceptable and Unacceptable Behaviour Matrix

## Acceptable and Unacceptable Behaviour Matrix

	LOYALTY	INTEGRITY	COURAGE	EXCELLENCE	INCLUSION	ACCOUNTABILITY
ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOUR	<p>Demonstrate respect for Canada, its people, our profession, our leaders, peers and subordinates.</p> <p>Execute, with loyalty, lawful orders and commands and support accountability to Canadians and the Government of Canada.</p> <p>Safeguard information and disclose it only upon receiving approval from authorized officials.</p> <p>Be loyal to our profession, subordinates, peers, and superiors.</p> <p>Ensure that all personnel are treated fairly and given opportunities for professional development.</p> <p>Never leave anyone behind.</p>	<p>Serve Canada with a principled approach to duty.</p> <p>Act, at all times, in a manner that will stand up to the closest public scrutiny.</p> <p>Prevent or resolve any conflicts of interest, particularly those involving yourself.</p> <p>Act with strength of character to earn and maintain the trust of the team.</p> <p>Adhere to the highest ethical standards, be honest and reliable.</p> <p>Be fair and just regardless of personal consequences.</p>	<p>Accomplish the mission despite fear, significant risk, and other obstacles.</p> <p>Overcome physical adversity or moral dilemmas with determination and strength of character.</p> <p>Make the right choice, weighing the alternatives.</p> <p>Condemn, correct or report unethical conduct and behaviour.</p> <p>Identify, discuss and resolve ethical issues using appropriate resources and authorities.</p>	<p>Commit to continuous learning and self-development in pursuit of professional excellence.</p> <p>Improve the quality of military service you provide to Canada.</p> <p>Push yourself to achieve personal bests.</p> <p>Foster an environment that promotes team learning and innovation.</p> <p>Perform duties in a manner that respects and promotes Canada's official languages.</p> <p>Communicate with others in their Canadian official language of choice.</p>	<p>Create a sense of belonging and cohesion within the CAF.</p> <p>Consider the present and long-term effects that your actions have on people and their families.</p> <p>Identify, address and overcome your unconscious biases.</p> <p>Capitalize on the diverse talents that each individual brings to the team.</p>	<p>Identify, report and correct any elements of military culture contrary to the CAF Ethos.</p> <p>Bring to attention any action or inaction detrimental to the good of the CAF.</p> <p>Discuss the CAF Ethos regularly with others as it pertains to military service.</p> <p>Accept and own up to your mistakes.</p>
UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOUR	<p>Breach security of information.</p> <p>Failure to take responsibility for one's action or inaction.</p> <p>Failure to give credit to whom it is due.</p> <p>Failure to develop subordinates.</p>	<p>Belong to, support or maintain an association with groups or organizations that are contrary to CAF values and principles.</p> <p>Support conduct that is in any way hateful, discriminatory, illegal or inappropriate.</p> <p>Obtain personal gain from those doing business with the CAF or DND.</p> <p>Act in a manner that would bring discredit to the CAF.</p> <p>Use position or status to obtain a personal advantage, or to disadvantage others.</p>	<p>Avoid tough decisions, confrontations or danger to the detriment of military service.</p> <p>Go with the flow to "not rock the boat."</p> <p>Act in a cowardly manner.</p> <p>Fail to identify, respond, report and rectify unethical or illegal actions.</p> <p>Condone, in any way, behaviour contrary to the CAF Ethos.</p>	<p>Complete only essential or mandatory training.</p> <p>Apply the minimum effort required to avoid repercussions.</p> <p>Fail to encourage the use of both official languages within the workplace.</p> <p>Fail to achieve minimum standards.</p> <p>Disregard the importance of total health and fitness.</p>	<p>Allow favouritism in the selection of personnel for professional development, thereby disadvantaging others.</p> <p>Withhold fair and consistent feedback on the performance of subordinates.</p> <p>Disregard other's healthy work-life balance.</p> <p>Dismiss subordinates' accomplishments as being "part of the job."</p> <p>Ignore rituals of hazing in any form, particularly as an initiation into a group or organization.</p>	<p>Pass by faults, leaving them for someone else to correct.</p> <p>Make excuses to avoid work or responsibility.</p> <p>Apply different standards of behaviour when on- and off-duty.</p> <p>Blame others for your mistakes.</p>

Appendix 4 - Trusted to Serve Values, Principles and Expectations Matrix

## Values, Principles and Expectations Matrix

VALUES	ETHICAL PRINCIPLES			PROFESSIONAL EXPECTATIONS							
	Respect the Dignity of All Persons	Serve Canada Before Self	Obey and Support Lawful Authority	Duty	Accepting Unlimited Liability	Fighting Spirit	Leadership	Discipline	Teamwork	Readiness	Stewardship
<b>LOYALTY</b>	Prioritize others' well-being and safety. Safeguard personal information received in confidence.	Always give your best effort for the team.	Inform superiors of all pertinent information that assists in their decision-making. Be part of the solution when unpopular orders are necessary.	Be fully committed to achieving the assigned task or mission. Take initiative to add value within the commander's intent.	Without fail give your all to the team, especially in the face of danger.	Never quit nor give up on your team. Never leave anyone behind.	Treat your subordinates fairly and assign work equitably. Recognize your subordinate's achievements and give praise and constructive criticism accordingly.	Be loyal to the team and hold each other accountable to professional standards. Act decisively in matters of discipline.	Foster a team environment where members look out for each other. Share credit where it is due.	Maintain healthy relationships both at home and in the workplace. Establish a healthy work-life balance, even during demanding high-readiness preparations.	Make sure your chain of command is aware of any issues that may impact your conduct and performance. Give subordinates time to address personal issues.
<b>INTEGRITY</b>	Always treat every member of your team with dignity.	Never put personal interests ahead of accomplishing the mission. Put your team's welfare above your own.	Execute lawful orders and commands to the best of your ability and help others to do the same.	Consistently perform your duty with initiative, accept responsibility and work with dedication.	Share in your team's hardships and danger.	Admit failures and weaknesses and learn from them as they help build character. Have the humility to ask for help when needed, but never fail for lack of trying.	Know yourself so that your bias does not affect your judgement of others. Stay true to who you are and be a better version of yourself every day.	Have the self-discipline to conduct yourself in a manner that brings credit to the CAF. Enforce high standards of collective discipline within your teams.	Be honest and transparent when making decisions and taking action. Keep the well-being of your team at the forefront. Actively maintain trust within the team.	Know your subordinates well and look after their welfare. Keep an eye out for indicators of stress which decrease personal and team performance.	Set realistic goals that will not unduly jeopardize resources. Maintain your personal life so as not to negatively impact the performance of duty.
<b>COURAGE</b>	Intervene when the dignity of a person is threatened by anyone in the team.	Do what is best for the mission and your team despite any personal consequences. Accept the risks that come with accomplishing the mission.	Have the courage to report manifestly unlawful orders to higher authorities. Execute lawful orders and commands in spite of any inherent risk or danger.	Accept the hardships of military service.	Complete tasks and missions to the best of your ability even when there are dangers, obstacles or adversities.	Have the courage to overcome adversity. Set the example so others will follow you, even into danger.	Have the courage to request honest feedback from your subordinates and the humility to listen to their comments on your character and performance. Lead from the front and share in the risks with your subordinates.	Report breaches of discipline promptly regardless of the ranks involved.	Share in the team's hardships. Encourage team members to ask for help, and also accept help when it is offered.	Identify and correct pre-conceived notions or biases which may adversely affect team performance. Demand the highest standards possible to maximize collective performance.	Demand the necessary resources to achieve the assigned task, even if they are not initially provided.
<b>EXCELLENCE</b>	Provide others with opportunities to reach their potential. Foster a respectful and supportive work environment.	Anticipate challenges and prepare yourself professionally and personally to excel at your job.	Know well and follow applicable policies, orders and regulations. Promote a habit of conscientious obedience.	Complete your work to the highest professional standards.	Prepare yourself physically and mentally for adversity by training for the worst possible conditions and situations.	Train in realistic scenarios to overcome significant obstacles and develop the physical, mental and moral resilience necessary to excel.	Develop strength of character by committing to a principled approach every day. Pursue mentoring and coaching opportunities to be a better leader.	Exemplify self-discipline and help build it in others. Consistently work towards the highest standards of conduct and performance.	Leverage the team member's individual skills and knowledge to help accomplish the mission. Encourage team members to achieve professional and personal competence.	Share lived experience with the team to enhance mutual respect and understanding. Pursue the highest individual and collective professional standards.	Take a personal investment in the Profession of Arms as if you owned it, because you do. Always plan for the future, health and effectiveness of the Profession of Arms.
<b>INCLUSION</b>	Respect and seek the unique talents and perspectives of others within the team.	Maximize the advantages of diversity to the mission by soliciting input from everyone. Support the needs of diverse subordinates.	Make sure that policies, orders and regulations allow for the expression of unique identities. Encourage an atmosphere where all feel empowered to support the chain of command with their diverse perspectives and talent.	Capitalize on everyone's potential. Learn from others' rich life experiences.	Prepare subordinates equitably for the task at hand, sharing knowledge and resources, and by mitigating risks. Do not let personal bias determine the allocation of tasks.	Motivate the team, acknowledging their unique talents as being essential to success.	Get to know your subordinates and promote their welfare. Take care of your subordinates and let them take care of you. Recognize and develop the leadership potential in every member of the team.	Purposefully maintain order, discipline and cohesion within the team. Enforce discipline fairly within the team.	Give each team member the opportunity to contribute to the team goal. Create a team climate where people are valued and feel they belong, and that generates trust, loyalty and cohesion.	Seek and establish trusting relationships with people who are different from you to help build group cohesion. Maximize the diverse perspectives within your team to enhance collective decision-making.	Ensure personnel policies are fair, equitable and in line with the CAF Ethos.
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY</b>	Correct others in a respectful manner, including superiors.	Do not let self-interest and personal gain influence your decision-making.	Follow orders and support lawful authority to achieve commander's intent. Never pass a fault. The fault you walk past and do not correct is the standard you accept. Always correct errors in a respectful manner.	Be reliable and demonstrate initiative in the completion of your tasks. Be responsible for your actions and inactions.	Accept the possibility that you may be put in harm's way, including risk to life and limb. Accept the moral responsibility when ordering someone into harm's way, including risk to life and limb.	Never ask a subordinate to do something you are not willing to do yourself.	Give credit where it is due, and never take credit for others' work.	Create an atmosphere where team members hold each other respectfully to account. Admit when we fall short of professional standards and accept the opportunity to learn from mistakes.	Make certain everyone takes ownership and responsibility for their role in achieving team goals.	Attain and maintain high personal and collective standards. Encourage higher levels of physical and mental fitness and help others attain them.	Make efficient use of the resources assigned to you and your team. Uphold the credibility of the Profession of Arms through professional conduct.