

Deconstructing Neoliberal Rationality in an Increasingly Punitive Society:
Canadian Public Support for “Tough on Crime” Policies

by

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ABSTRACT

Research has shown that criminal justice policy in Western democratic societies has become increasingly punitive (e.g. Wilson and Petersilia 2010), and that the public largely supports these policies, despite the fact that crime rates have been declining (e.g. Roberts 2003). However, few studies have attempted to explain this paradox in the context of neoliberalism, and within a Canadian context. Using the 2011 and 1997 Canadian Election Study, this project employs logistical regression and a comparative analysis to examine the extent to which neoliberal governance has produced prejudicial attitudes towards racialized “Others,” social and economic insecurity, and attitudes that individualize causes of poverty, and the extent to which these factors predict support for punitive treatment of violent young offenders. The results of this study show that the advent of neoliberalism has precipitated racialized “othering” towards Aboriginal people, which has increased punitive attitudes, but that insecurity and individualization, in relations to punitive attitudes, was present previous to 1997.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Analysts have noted a steady expansion of neoliberalism in Canada, which has shifted the way in which Canadian society is governed and shaped. Neoliberalism is best understood as a collection of ideas and practices focused on an increased role of the free market, flexibility in labour markets, and a restructuring of state welfare practices (Smith et al. 2008: 12). The focus of the following project is to empirically examine a theoretical framework that is predicated on the notion that, with the emergence of a neoliberal governance model, there has been a rise in social and economic insecurity, an increased emphasis on attributing individual responsibility and blame for the disadvantaged social positions that marginalized individuals find themselves in, and an accompanying disdain for racialized individuals, and that these three main social aspects explain the public's support for tougher crime policies.

The advent of neoliberalism is largely understood as a response to the perceived limitations of Keynesian economic policy. Keynesianism held that the free market does not have the necessary self-regulating capability to stabilize the economy; as such, government intervention in the economy through social policy was necessary in order to stabilize both the economy and employment. Neoliberalism, in contrast, situates the governance of society within the confines of the market, which is deemed by critics to be problematic in that “wedded to the belief that the market should be the organizing principle for all political, social, and economic decisions, neoliberalism wages an incessant attack on democracy, public goods, and noncommodified values” (Giroux

2004: xiii). The result has been the “neoliberalization of ever-increasing aspects of life” not just in Canada, but in other Western democratic societies as well (Smith et al. 2008: 12).

The Progressive Conservative (PC) government in Ontario that held power from 1995 to 2002 is often cited as one example of the social deregulation that has accompanied neoliberal governance (Bezanson 2006; Little 2001; McMullin, Davies, and Cassidy 2002). Using the slogan of the “Common Sense Revolution,” the Ontario PC platform consisted of promises to reduce the provincial deficit, decrease taxes, streamline social services, cut social spending, restrict the public sector in general, and reduce the role of government (Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario 1994). Their platform also emphasized the need to increase individual responsibility which, they argued, had been undermined by state regulations and excessive social spending (Bezanson 2006: 3). Once in power, the PC government withdrew equity legislation, rewrote labour legislation, reduced protections for workers, and cut low-income supports, such as social housing and social assistance. For example, in 1995 social assistance rates were cut in the province by 21.6% (*ibid*). Similar cuts in social spending were made in other provinces as well.

Starting in the 1990s, therefore, economic restructuring and government cut backs in Canada have eliminated many of the well-paid jobs, especially in manufacturing. The result has been an increase in low-paid, low-skilled, and precarious wage work, which has contributed to an increasing inequality gap. Moreover, critics argue that these unstable employment and financial conditions have led to a generalized sense of social and economic insecurity among citizens of neoliberal countries (Wacquant 2001; Britto 2011). Due to the fact that stable employment opportunities have become scarcer and the

employment opportunities that do exist offer lower wages (many below the poverty line) than in previous times, the middle class has been shrinking and the gap between the “haves” and the “have-nots” has been increasing. As a result a large majority of citizens are finding it more difficult to meet their subsistence needs and as such feel financially, economically, and socially insecure. This rising inequality, and social and economic insecurity, has since been reconfigured by governments as a problem of safety and personal security or, in other words, of crime and social disorder. Social and economic insecurity, thus, can be defined as employment and income insecurity, as well as fear over safety concerns posed by social problems, such as crime and poverty.

Of particular concern to critics is the new “tough on crime” approach to dealing with both violent and non-violent offenders that has accompanied neoliberalism. Due to the neoliberal economic restructuring and resulting loss of jobs and rising inequality, there has been an increase in economic and social insecurity. As a response to this rising insecurity, governments have begun framing the issues of social and economic insecurity in individualized terms. As a result, crime has become a ready scapegoat for pinning all problems and issues arising from insecurity, and it is in this context that the “tough on crime” strategy has emerged. The “tough on crime” agenda is a product of both neoliberalism and neoconservatism, the latter being the political platform on which economic neoliberalism operates (Campesi 2009: 39). The central tenet of both neoliberalism and neoconservatism is to emphasize within the political debate the need to eliminate the “culture of dependence” on the state and instead require individuals to solve their problems on their own and take responsibility for their own wellbeing. Stemming from the neoconservative political climate of the 1980s, getting “tough on crime” became

a central issue in the political debate, particularly in the British, American, and Canadian electoral campaigns. Where previously the “crime problem” was seen as a public health or socioeconomic problem, under a neoconservative political climate the problem was conceptualized as one of social control. As such, an explicit punitive discourse revolving around notions of responsibility and retribution has replaced the previous “rehabilitative” approach to crime policy. For instance, reformed criminal justice policies in the U.S. included resolute and swift application of criminal penalties, mandatory sentences for certain types of crimes, such as drug-related offences, and a greater use of the death penalty (Campesi 2009: 39-40).

Claims made by neoconservative politicians suggest that crime is still as much a problem today as it was in the 1980s. A recent statement made by Prime Minister Stephen Harper illustrates this point:

Too many Canadians are still victims of crime. Despite years of unceasing effort, there remain many areas requiring determined action in our criminal justice system. When it comes to keeping our streets and communities safe, we will not rest for there is much more to be done. (*The Star* 2013)

Contrary to commentary by Harper and other neoconservative politicians, however, crime rates in both Canada and the U.S. have been on a downward trend since the 1990s (Farrell et al. 2011). For example, in Canada in 1991 the homicide rate per 100,000 of the population was 2.69; in 2012 the number dropped to 1.56 per 100,000 (Statistics Canada 2014). As well, both the volume and seriousness of police-reported crime in Canada have declined every year from 2003 to 2013; for instance, there was a 9% decrease in police reported crime from 2012 and a 36% decrease from 2003 (Statistics Canada 2014).

However, despite the fact that crime rates have been on a downward trend, prison populations have in fact been swelling to unprecedented numbers. In 1981, the

incarceration rate in the U.S. was 243 prisoners for every 100,000 of the population (Boe 2004); by 2009 the number had increased to 707 prisoners per 100,000 of the population (International Centre for Prison Studies 2009). Similarly, the incarceration rate in Canada in 1981 was 91 prisoners per 100,000 of the population (Boe 2004); by 2009 the number jumped to approximately 118 prisoners per 100,000 of the population (International Centre for Prison Studies 2009). Although the incarceration rate in Canada appears modest in comparison to the U.S., Canada is increasingly incarcerating its citizens at a higher rate compared to other countries. As of 2009, the incarceration rate in France was 102 per 100,000; Ireland was 82, Denmark, 67, and Sweden, 57 (International Centre for Prison Studies 2009).

Accompanying this recourse to incarceration has been the overrepresentation of racially marginalized individuals in the total prison population in Canada. For example, in October 1996, Aboriginal men accounted for 18% of the male inmate population and Aboriginal women accounted for 23% of the adult female inmate population (Finn et al. 1999). By 2010/11, Aboriginal men accounted for 25% of the male inmate population and Aboriginal women accounted for 41% of the female inmate population (Dauvergne 2012). Yet, Aboriginal people represented only 3.8% of the Canadian population in the 2006 Census (Statistics Canada 2008). Similarly, the Correctional Investigator notes that: “Over the last 10 years, the number of federally incarcerated Black inmates has increased by 80%, from 778 to 1,403” (Sapers 2013: 8).

Despite the fact that crime rates have been declining in both Canada and the U.S., public opinion still reflects the misconception that crime is increasing. According to Julian Roberts (2003), historically, public opinion has tended to reflect the idea that crime

rates have been increasing regardless of when public opinion has been polled. To illustrate, in 1974, 85% of Canadian respondents believed that crime rates were increasing (Roberts 1994); in 1999, 83% of Canadian respondents believed that crime was either increasing or stable when in fact it had been declining for seven years prior (Besser and Trainor 2000). Similar results were found for both the U.S. (Maguire and Pastore 2000) and the United Kingdom (Mattinson and Mirrlees-Black 2000).

Further, when asked about “the most important problem” in the country, only 5% of Americans replied that crime was the most important problem prior to 1993, a time when the crime rate was actually increasing. However, when asked the same question in 1994/95, 31% of Americans responded that crime was the most important problem, a time when the crime rate had been decreasing (Roberts 2003). Predictably, when asked about attitudes towards sentencing, public opinion polls reflected attitudes that were unrelated to both crime rates and the existing sentencing policy. In the U.S., the number of respondents who believed that the courts were too lenient remained between 70% and 85% from the years 1971 to 1998 (Cullen et al. 2000). As well, support for the death penalty in the U.S. remained at 66% of respondents from 1976 to 2000 (Maguire and Pastore 2000). In Canada the landscape of public opinion on sentencing is similar. For instance, in 1974, 66% of respondents expressed the opinion that sentences were too lenient (Roberts and Doob 1989); by 1999 the number had increased slightly to 69% (Roberts 2003). Further, two-thirds of the Canadian public believe that the parole boards are too lenient and, more specifically, 70% supported the view that parole boards release too many offenders (Roberts 1992).

In both Canada and the U.S. criminal justice policy has gone through transformations whereby harsher penalties and practices have been implemented, even though crime rates have been decreasing. Of further concern is that poor, racialized, and disadvantaged individuals are incarcerated at an increasingly alarming rate. Yet, there is widespread public support for such draconian policies and practices, despite the far-reaching consequences among marginalized populations.

If public opinion does not reflect the realities of crime in Canada, then why is it that Canadians support and encourage tougher punishments for offenders? Using a theoretical framework involving neoliberal governance strategies, this project seeks to answer the following research questions: 1) Do feelings of social and economic insecurity affect support for punitive crime policies? 2) Are people who subscribe to an individualistic ideology for the causes of poverty more likely to support punitive crime policies? 3) Do negative attitudes or stereotypes of racialized individuals affect support for punitive crime policies? 4) What demographic characteristics are more likely to predict support for punitive crime policies? 5) Have any of these factors changed over time?

In order to elaborate further on the project, the remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. First, in Chapter 2, an overview of the theoretical framework that informs the analysis, namely, governmentality, is presented, followed by a discussion of how neoliberalism and neoconservatism have played out in recent decades. More specifically, the increase in individualization and retreat from the welfare state, the rise in social and economic insecurity, the emergence of the racialized “Other” and the increased criminalization of poverty, and, lastly, the emergence of “tough on crime” policies are

discussed. In Chapter 3, the research on public support for punitive crime policy and how it is related to feelings of social and economic insecurity, negative attitudes towards racialized individuals, and support for a “pull yourself up by the bootstraps” mentality as a result of neoliberal and neoconservative rationalities are reviewed. Next, in Chapter 4, the methodology that has been employed to undertake this project is outlined, including empirical expectations, a description of the data used, and the statistical techniques and measures that have been employed to examine the relationship between social and economic insecurity, neoliberal rationality of individual responsibility, negative attitudes towards racialized groups, and support for neoconservative punitive crime policies. In Chapter 5, an overview of the statistical results will be provided. Chapter 6 provides a discussion of the implications of the results. Lastly, the potential contributions that the results of this analysis could have, as well as the limitations of the study, are considered.

CHAPTER TWO

INTERROGATING NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY AND NEOCONSERVATIVE POLITICS

Commentators have argued that neoliberalism has become the main political and economic rationality through which society is governed in much of the developed world (Harvey 2005; Gill 1995; Campbell and Pedersen 2001). There are a variety of different lenses through which neoliberalism has been conceptualized, including neoliberalism as a policy framework, an ideology, and as a governing structure (Larner 2000: 6).

Neoliberalism as a policy framework is understood as a shift from Keynesian welfare policies towards policies that promote the unrestrained operation of markets. As an ideology, it is argued that the concept of neoliberalism captures the policy agenda of the neoconservative political platform, which encompasses a wider range of institutions, organizations, and political processes, than neoliberalism understood as simply a set of policies (*ibid*). Arguments have been made as to how neoliberalism encompasses all of these different conceptualizations, but for present purposes, neoliberalism is best understood as a distinct governing structure. In adopting this conception, there is a differentiation made between government and governance such that neoliberalism incorporates less government but not less governance. In other words, there is less state presence in the actual governing of citizens, but this does not translate into less governance, but instead a different technique of governance (*ibid*).

The difference in conceptualizing neoliberalism as a governing structure, as opposed to just a policy framework or ideology, is the way in which neoliberalism is manifested. In particular, conceptualizing neoliberalism as a governing structure lends

itself to a deeper understanding of how neoliberalism operates. That is, neoliberalism, from this standpoint, is first and foremost a rationality of governance from which policies and ideologies are produced in order to maintain the governance model. In particular, governing rationalities refer to the patterns of reasoning that are embodied within the practice of governing and that shape and organize this practice. According to David Garland (1997) governing rationalities are practical rather than theoretical in that “they are forged in the business of problem solving and attempting to make things work. Consequently they manifest a logic of practice, rather than of analysis, and tend to bear the hallmarks of the institutional settings out of which they emerged” (p. 184).

Understood through this lens, a neoliberal rationality situates the individual as the focus of governance. In particular, neoliberalism includes a set of practices that institutes the governing of individuals “from a distance” (Larner 2000: 6). In this regard, citizens are encouraged to see themselves as individuals and active participants who are responsible for improving their own wellbeing. Under neoliberal governance individuals are conceptualized as rational, calculating beings whose autonomy is gauged by their ability to self-care, or to provide for themselves and facilitate their own goals (Brown 2005: 42). Thus, the governing power is not one of “direct” state power, but of individual self-governance.

In addition to expanding on the theoretical basis for understanding neoliberalism as a form of governance or “governmentality” (Foucault 2009; Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006; Dean 1999), the following discussion will consider the ways in which a neoliberal rationality has informed: an increase in individualization and retreat from the welfare state, the rise in social and economic insecurity, the emergence of the racialized

“Other” and the increased criminalization of poverty, and, lastly, the emergence of “tough on crime” policies.

Governmentality

The concept of “governmentality” (government + mentality) draws from the work of Michel Foucault and incorporates both the objective and method by which the state governs under neoliberalism. According to Foucault, the purpose of government is concerned solely with the “conduct of conduct” or the shaping of human behaviour. Government, understood through the concept of “conducting conduct” could therefore involve not just the state, but also any number of agencies or authorities attempting to direct human behaviour (Comack 2014: 54). Put differently, the “conduct of conduct” incorporates the idea that those who are governed are actors and therefore make up a centre or location of freedom. As such, governance is an activity that attempts to control and shape freedom through controlling the field of action (Dean 1999: 13).

Government as the “conduct of conduct” includes various forms of thought about the nature of rule and knowledge of who and what are the targets of governance; it employs particular techniques and strategies in achieving governance, establishes identities for the governed and the governors, and involves ideas about what the direction of conduct ought to be (Dean 1999: 18). Thus, for Foucault, government is not strictly an institution of state power; it is an art. The “art of governance” suggests that governing is an activity which requires craft, skill, imagination, shrewd fashioning, and intuition (*ibid*). Governing is an art in that it does not involve an empirical investigation of how the

state exercises authority, but instead an analysis of the practices by which populations are governed and by which they govern themselves.

Foucault's concept of "governmentality" refers to the relatively taken-for-granted ideas, beliefs, and knowledge that inform the practices or art of governing. Dean (1999) says that it is "how we think about governing" (p. 16). More specifically, governmentality is an "ensemble of power that has the population as its target, its major form of knowledge is political economy, and its essential technical instruments are apparatuses of security" (Oksala 2013: 324). It is this concept that best encapsulates the self-governance model, which is the practice by which governance is based on techniques for directing human behaviour (Foucault 2009). As Wendy Larner (2000) points out, neoliberalism is marked by less government but not by less governance, such that the state governs through individuals. This new rationality is predicated on the idea of "governing through freedom"—through individual choice, autonomy, and self-responsibility— and has created a model that has allowed the state to dissociate itself from many of its previous responsibilities; instead, "quasi-autonomous entities" are created that are governed "at a distance" (Rose, O'Malley, and Valverde 2006: 91). In other words, governmentality is the process by which the state governs the actions of individuals through invoking within them both the freedom and responsibility of governing their actions to the extent that they are required to manage their own wellbeing with minimal state intervention. Governance through governmentality is accomplished through the use of a specific form of power.

Understanding power through a governmentality lens differs from that of other conceptions of neoliberalism. For example, the concept of power, as understood from a

standpoint of neoliberalism as a policy framework, is based on the notion of direct sovereign power. From this standpoint the state exerts its power in a direct form through the use of policies and practices to maintain its sovereignty. However, within a governmentality framework, the focus is on the techniques through which power is exerted. Unlike sovereign power, governmentality enlists the cooperation of actors who translate power from one locale to another (Garland 1997: 182). The cooperation of actors is achieved by constructing individuals as autonomous citizens who are capable of choice, and who are influenced and encouraged to align their choices with the objectives of the state. As such, the governing strategy of governmentality is based on “technologies of the self” whereby individuals produce the ends of government by acting upon themselves rather than being merely obedient (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006: 89). Through these technologies of the self, individuals “come to understand and act upon themselves within certain regimes of authority and knowledge, and by means of certain techniques directed to self improvement” (p. 90). Indeed, the success of governmentality rests on the willingness of individuals to accomplish a “responsibilized” autonomy and to pursue their interests in ways that are socially approved and legally authorized (Garland 1997: 180). Such an approach, thus, utilizes both “indirect” state power as well as “mundane government technologies” that are autonomizing and responsabilizing, such as budgets, audits, standards, and benchmarks (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006: 91). Governmentality, therefore, is the dual process by which the state recedes in its more direct governing strategies and instead governs from a distance; governmental power is dispersed throughout various societal institutions and social fields and is exercised by individuals themselves.

Jeremy Bentham's proposed Panopticon, as detailed by Foucault (1995), best illustrates the practice of "indirect" state power and how it relies on the implementation of technologies of the self. The Panopticon is a type of prison architecture that illustrates the shift in social control mechanisms. The structure was conceptualized as a circular building surrounding a tower, which was divided into cells for the inmates. The cells would include a window facing out of the building and another facing the tower, which would allow anyone within the tower to see all inmates. Moreover, the tower would be designed such that one could not tell whether it was occupied (Caluya 2010). This architectural design thus resulted in the permanent effects of surveillance such that inmates would be required to behave as if they were always being surveilled. According to Foucault (1995) the Panopticon was an idealized version of governmentality in that the system of surveillance aided in the self-regulation of inmates, particularly against "deviant behaviour," by forcing them to self-monitor at all times.

Because governmentality is a form of indirect power, it is differentiated from direct forms of power in that there is no clearly defined hierarchy of power. Instead, governmentality employs a "branching out" of power from the state whereby the state diffuses the power of social control to the population itself. That is, the power to govern becomes, for the population, a necessity to govern themselves, and the result is a society that is governed less by laws and more by norms (Schrift 2013: 147). Under this governance strategy the majority of citizens are transformed into self-governing entities. Those who are unable to conform to the self-governing model, however, are perceived as "social disorders" who are at a higher risk for criminality.

Governing Crime through Risk Management

In order to manage these “unruly” groups, the criminal justice system has employed what Pat Carlen (2008) refers to as a “risk-crazed governance” model, which is predicated on an overemphasis of the risk associated with crime. “Risk-crazed governance” employs a persistent sense of social risk-consciousness as a tool of control within the population, which results in a demand from the population for increased protection and security from this perceived risk. However, according to Carlen (2008), this demand for protection essentially becomes unyielding and surpasses the capacity of the governing structure to meet the demand (p. 1). In other words, the emergent crime discourse both helps to produce and preserve an acute awareness of the risk of crime within the population, which further fuels the rising concerns over crime and produces a demand for more protection from the risks of being victimized. Since this demand cannot be met by the governing structure, the inevitable result is an increased and perpetuated fear of crime.

Emerging from a risk management model have been new crime control strategies that are based on actuarial methods and risk-level assessments in order to counter to the growing concern over “unruly groups” and their perceived criminality. In the modern penal system crime control is carried out through a more positivist approach; more specifically, through forms of economic reasoning (Garland 1997). To this end, the focus of crime control is on greater efficiency and predictability of crime, instead of the previous contextual analysis of the broader causes and effects of crime that characterized the penal welfare model.

The resulting economic rationality of managing and controlling crime is seen to produce a “new penology” that is characterized by three main departures from the old

penology (Feeley and Simon 1992). The first is the emergence of new neoconservative political discourses and, in particular, new language surrounding probability and risk that has superseded prior correctionalism discourse of clinical diagnosis and retributive justice. The result has been twofold. First, there is an absence of examining the causes of criminal behaviour at a systemic level and instead applying statistical and actuarial probability of criminal behaviour to a population of “Others” in order to address and control crime. Second, when dealing with individual offenders on a risk-based case management level, causes of criminality are seen as arising out of the individual offender, and in particular as individual criminogenic needs, with a disregard for environmental and systemic factors (Hannah-Moffat 2009).

Another characteristic attributed to the new penology is the implementation of a new set of objectives that have superseded previous goals of rehabilitation and reducing recidivism. The new penology is concerned with identifying and managing deviant groups through managerial processes, such that crime control strategies are now characterized by efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control (Shichor 1997; Ritzer 1993). As well, the objectives are less focused around eliminating crime and more focused on making crime tolerable through systemic organization and management (Feeley and Simon 1992). In this sense, the new penology is one predicated, not on the systemic causes of crime, but on regarding crime as an inescapable social fact and seeks to address crime through the management of the deviant and criminal “Others.”

The last characteristic associated with the new penology is the use of new techniques to target offenders as a collective, whereas previous techniques for crime control and rehabilitation targeted individual needs of offenders through a desire to create

more equity (Feeley and Simon 1992). Through the increased use of incapacitation through incarceration, offenders can be removed from society altogether, thus “eliminating” the crime problem.

Critics argue that the result of these new penological methods is that the systemic or economic structures that are the cause of deviancy are discounted and the blame is therefore assigned to the individuals who comprise these groups. Under the new penology, “it is the population, subdivided into groups according to their risk potential, that becomes the target of power” (Slingeneyer 2007: Para. 28). The result of the modern day criminal justice system, it is argued, is a prison industrial complex whereby the rehabilitative potential that the prison system had previously possessed is nullified, and replaced by modern-day economics of imprisonment that are based on the cost-effectiveness of punishment and social control, and are at the expense of education and transformation for the offenders. Further, state finances are increasingly applied to the costs of building and sustaining prisons, whereas finances that were previously used for maintaining and improving communities are diminished (Davis and Shaylor 2001: 3). Finally, other outcomes of these new policies include an ever-increasing prison population, an expanding prison industry, and an increased representation of racial minorities in custody (Garland 2001).

To summarize, neoliberalism understood as a governing structure is informed by Foucault’s (1995) concept of governmentality, which involves a shift in the way in which the state governs. Where previously the state was characterized by its exertion of direct power, the state under neoliberalism is characterized by an indirect form of power. In particular, the state exerts its power and influence through invoking the necessity of

citizens to become self-monitoring and self-governing through promoting individual choice and autonomy. Those that are perceived as non-conforming to the self-governance model are conceptualized as “unruly” individuals who pose a threat to social order. In order to manage these deviant groups, the criminal justice system has employed a “risk-crazed governance” model (Carlen 1998), which is predicated on an overemphasis of the risk associated with crime. Accompanying this risk governance model has been the implementation of the new penology in helping to managing risk. The new penology is characterized by new neoconservative political discourses surrounding probability and risk that have superseded prior correctionalism discourse of clinical diagnosis and retributive justice, the implementation of a new set of objectives that have replaced previous goals of rehabilitation and reducing recidivism, and new crime control strategies that are based on actuarial methods and risk-level assessments that target offenders as a collective, which have replaced previous techniques for crime control and rehabilitation which targeted individual needs.

The Impacts of Neoliberal and Neoconservative Rationalities

From the standpoint of governmentality, the “rolling out” of neoliberalism and neoconservatism has initiated two significant changes in societal governance: a transition to self-governance whereby responsibility to regulate and moderate behaviour is allocated to the citizens of neoliberal states, and a simultaneous decoupling of “welfare” from state responsibility. With the retrenchment of state welfare practices, there has been an expanding population of marginalized individuals who are seemingly divergent from the self-governance model. As such, these individuals are conceptualized

as “social disorders,” and are thus perceived as needing heavy surveillance and stricter governance tactics. As a way to mitigate this insecurity and manage these “unruly” individuals, the neoliberal state has sought to govern society “through crime” (Simon 2007), whereby social problems that were previously addressed through social policy and programs, such as social housing and assistance, are now understood as a crime issue. From this perspective, marginalized individuals are perceived to be the cause of social and economic insecurity, and therefore require paternalistic and punitive treatment. As a result, the public conceptualizes these individuals as criminal “Others,” and, in turn, supports the punitive treatment of these individuals by the state. Following from this neoliberal rationality, it is argued that public support for neoconservative punitive crime policies can be explained through this process of “othering” as an attempt to mitigate social anxiety, coupled with rationalizing the actions of the “individual” as opposed to systemic societal issues.

Neoliberalism’s Individualization and Retreat from the Welfare State

According to Adrian Smith and her colleagues (2008), the new form of governance under neoliberalism is predicated on forging new citizen identities based on individualization, which are organized and assembled around discourses of “empowerment” and “autonomy” (p. 5). Specifically, the basis of neoliberal and neoconservative discourses is the idea of individual choice; inequalities are no longer explained through unequal social structures, but through individual irresponsibility.

By way of contrast, state governance in Western democratic societies was previously marked by a Keynesian welfare governance model whereby social security

was a responsibility primarily of the state. In particular, it was believed that the state should focus on maintaining full employment, economic growth, and the welfare of its citizens. In this regard, state power should be unreservedly implemented alongside of, or substituting for, market developments in order to achieve these goals (Harvey 2005: 10). Thus, under Keynesianism the state engaged in redistributive politics, implemented controls over the free mobility of capital, expanded public expenditures, initiated welfare-state building, and employed active state interventions in the economy (*ibid*). Under such conditions, the working class had achieved an improved standard of living and a sizeable degree of state-provided social security, such as unemployment insurance, welfare benefits, and healthcare (Gordon 2010: 34).

However, beginning in the 1970s many Western democratic nations entered into an economic recession that stemmed from a collapse in economic growth. More specifically, the recession was predicted by a crisis of capital accumulation, including stocks, property, and savings. Contributing to this collapse was rising unemployment combined with accelerated inflation, which resulted in widespread stagflation (Harvey 2005). In response to this economic crisis of the 1970s many of the liberal Western democracies, including Canada, underwent a shift toward a neoliberal governance model (Knight and Rodgers 2012). This shift was by initiated by neoconservative politicians, most notably Margaret Thatcher in the U.K., Ronald Reagan in the U.S., and a combination of Brian Mulroney and Jean Chretien in Canada (Bezanson 2006). The state, under neoliberalism, began separating itself from the social security responsibilities it had previously acquired by deregulating the economy, privatizing state-owned organizations and state-provided services, and using market substitutes in the public sector.

Contributing to the downfall of the welfare state was a sustained and persistent critique of social security apparatuses, state ownership of organizations, and the whole social state itself from neoconservative commentators. These neoconservative critics claimed that the Keynesian state governance model was based on paternalistic, protracted social control, and did not effectively reduce social inequality (Rose, O'Malley, and Valverde 2006: 91). Further, these critics claimed that the welfare-centred state was generating government overload, fiscal crisis, and dependency. Thus in order to correct for these perceived inefficiencies, a new governing rationality for the state was slowly implemented.

The proposed solution was a state governance model based on “market concerns” and a state that is organized by market rationality (Brown 2006:694). In particular, it was believed that the state, more than just aiding the economy, should construct itself in market terms, as well as develop policies to propagate a political culture that conceptualizes citizens as rational economic actors in every aspect of society (*ibid*). It was believed that the market provided a better way to organize economic activity because it is associated with efficiency, competition, and choice (Larner 2000). As such, the focus of the neoliberal state was on reducing debt, decentralizing state responsibility for program and service delivery, and reallocating responsibility for state welfare to families and non-governmental organizations (Bezanson 2006).

In Canada, one result of neoliberal and neoconservative cutbacks was the dismantling of the Canada Assistance Plan in the mid-1990s, which was replaced with the Canada Health and Social Transfer. The new policy effectively eliminated federal-provincial cost-sharing for social assistance and social services, and eradicated national

standards related to the social rights of poor Canadians associated with social transfers (Bezanson 2006). In order to promote individualization, the state embarked on propagating an “intensified individualist ideology, which viewed those who were not self-reliant in market terms as suspect” (*ibid*: 10). In so doing, the state attempted to reduce “welfare dependency” by some of its citizens, as well as reduce the deficit by allowing the market to pay the “true” value of labour, effectively lowering the cost of labour. As such, the blame for poverty and unemployment was directed towards the individual, rather than the market or the state; it was up to the individual to be self-sufficient and autonomous.

Social and Economic Insecurity

Arguably the most prolific result of neoliberalism’s steady retrenchment of welfare responsibilities and economic restructuring has been an ever-increasing social and economic anxiety felt by citizens of neoliberal states. According to Alessio Viano, Michele Rocco, and Silvia Russo (2013), insecurity has largely stemmed from universal deregulation, which has reduced the public’s confidence about their professional future, as well as increased labour’s growing variability and insecurity, increased social inequality, and abated social mobility, all of which have weakened social support and protection for individuals. Indeed, without state protection against poverty, unemployment, disability, sickness, and old age through programs, services, benefits, and provisions, social inequality and the number of individuals living in poverty have increased in both the U.S. and Canada since the 1990s (Olsen 2002: 27).

As a result of social deregulation at the behest of neoliberalism and

neoconservatism, there has been a rise in precarious wage work and unemployment (Wacquant 2001), as well as the retrenchment of previous social “safety nets” that assisted those in financially unstable positions. Increased unemployment and risk of unemployment, coupled with cutbacks to social-assistance-related programs and services, have contributed to an increasing inequality gap. In Canada, the average income of the poorest 20% of families fell by 48% between 1980 and 1996, while the average income of the wealthiest 10% increased by 14%. Moreover, the average Canadian family income, before taxes, in 1997 has remained relatively the same as that in 1980, which signals two decades of stagnant income growth among Canadian households. Further, the percentage of individuals who had been out of work for at least a year or more doubled from 1989 to 1997 to 38.4%, and the number of individuals who worked part time due to a lack of other suitable full time employment options has increased steadily since 1976 (Schrecker 2001: 36-37). As a result, risk of unemployment, ill health, single-parent poverty, and poverty in old age has increased since 1973 (*ibid*). Subsequently, unstable employment and financial conditions have produced a generalized sense of economic insecurity among citizens of neoliberal countries, including Canadians.

Accompanying labour-related economic insecurity have been cutbacks in spending on social-assistance-related programs, which have also contributed to an increase in economic anxiety among citizens of Western states. For example, in Canada the average social assistance income for a single-parent family with one dependent in 1998 was approximately 50% of the Statistics Canada Low-Income Cutoff of \$28,119. Further, the number of Canadians receiving Employment Insurance declined from 83% in 1991 to 42% in 1997, due in large part to changes in eligibility criteria (*ibid*).

Closely related to the increase in economic insecurity has been an accompanying rise in more general social insecurity. According to Sarah Britto (2011) the 1970s provided the “perfect storm” for increasing social insecurity due to the largest economic recession since the Great Depression, high unemployment rates, increased economic inequality, spatial redistributions of society as a result of suburbanization, an increasing concentration of minorities and the marginalized in the inner cities, and the media increasingly blurring the distinction between entertainment and news that has resulted in misrepresentative crime coverage. As a result of these societal changes, according to Garland (2001), there has been growing anxiety over the state of the economy, “big government,” welfare spending, union-led inflation, and affirmative action strategies. Although social and economic insecurity are somewhat different in their implications, they are often used interchangeably in that they are closely related concepts. Both indicate insecurity arising from similar sources; however, economic insecurity refers to anxiety over individual financial situations, whereas social insecurity can be defined as more general anxiety over societal changes, such as the economy, increased inequality, etc.

Commentators such as Britto (2011) have argued that as a way to address and manage these social and economic insecurities, political discourse has increasingly linked these social problems to problems of crime. Thus, these insecurities have been reconstructed as anxieties over crime in an effort to manage vulnerability and risk created by “criminals and the undeserving poor” (*ibid*). As a result of this shift in conceptualizing social and economic insecurity as problems of crime, the focus of anxiety not only includes social and economic insecurity but fear of crime and criminals as well, who

threaten the public's already precarious social and economic positions. Indeed, multiple studies have documented this generalized individual and nation-wide social and economic insecurity that has accompanied an increased fear of crime (*Washington Post* et al. 1996; Hummelsheim 2011). These studies show that with an increase in insecurity over both personal financial and social positions, as well as the economy more broadly, there has also been an increase in concern over crime; more specifically, the belief that crime is increasing and a growing threat. As a result of these insecurities, the public tends to support politicians who "claim they can manage the risks faced by the general public through longer and more punitive sentences for criminals" (Britto 2011: 19).

Racialized "Othering" and the Criminalization of Poverty

According to Michal Krumer-Nevo and Orly Benjamin (2010) as citizens of neoliberal states have become increasingly insecure, there has been an accompanying intensification in "othering" individuals who are perceived to be the cause of social anxiety. "Othering" is the process by which individuals are socially segregated based on their differences from "normal" society, which are then translated into indicators of inferiority. These "Others" are identified as lacking complexity, rationality, and motivation—all of which has been used to justify their inequality within society (*ibid*). As such, those that are excluded and "othered" include the unemployed, the homeless, the "welfare bums," the "drunken Indians," the immigrants, and the "criminals." In essence, "Others" can be summed up as the poor, racialized individuals of society. Indeed, with growing inequality and insecurity, society has shifted from being characterized as "inclusive" to being "exclusive"; where previously society was marked by assimilation and incorporation it

now aims to separate and exclude those who do not conform (Young 1999).

Loïc Wacquant (2002) conceptualizes “Others” as constituting the “bottom” of what he calls the new neoliberal “Centaur state.” This state structure is characterized by “top” and “bottom” social divisions, such that it is:

Uplifting and ‘liberating’ at the top, where it acts to leverage the resources and expand the life options of the holders of economic and cultural capital; but it is castigatory and restrictive at the bottom, when it comes to managing the populations destabilized by the deepening of inequality and the diffusion of work insecurity and ethnic anxiety. (Wacquant 2002: 74)

Thus, the top includes individuals of a higher socioeconomic status and is characterized by liberal practices such that these individuals are excluded from the punitive grasp of the penal system. Conversely, the bottom is characterized by a punitive paternalism and encompasses the socially and economically marginalized “Others.” In particular, this social division is characterized by inadequate employment opportunities and racialized segregation. Further, individuals at the bottom are perceived to be at a higher risk for criminality due to their lack of ability to self-govern, and as such are subjected to enhanced surveillance and increased policing, criminalization, and punitive measures by the criminal justice system.

It is these marginalized individuals who are constructed as the “social disorders” of society, and who become “ready-made” scapegoats for whom the public can direct their fear and anger towards (Wacquant 2010). As such, the “Others” include individuals who are targeted as being the cause of social unrest, posing the greatest threat to social security. It is these “castaway categories,” as Wacquant (2009) calls them, that have become noticeable in public space, and whose presence is undesirable and their actions intolerable because they are perceived to be the living and threatening personification of

universal social and economic insecurity. Indeed, individuals living in poverty are conceptualized as being different from the larger society and are increasingly targeted as the focus of blame for their social positions. To this end, arguments are made at the individual level to explain poverty that focus on a “dysfunctional” family structure, dependency on welfare, and individuals’ “free choice” to live such a lifestyle (Krumer-Nevo and Benjamin 2010). As a result, “Others” have increasingly become the targets of punitive social and criminal justice policy. The result of such societal exclusion has been an enduring dispossession among the marginalized individuals of society, which produces anxiety among those better off through the perceived negative side effects that poverty has on their wellbeing, in turn, breeding intolerance and punitiveness towards the poor (Young 1999).

According to Kaaryn Gustafson (2009) in an effort to manage the risk posed by the dispossessed, there has been a growing intersection between the welfare system and the criminal justice system such that welfare now not only bears the stigma of poverty, but of criminality as well. The intertwining of poverty with criminality is best illustrated by the attack on welfare recipients in the 1990s through the establishment of welfare fraud investigative procedures, which were followed by criminal prosecutions (*ibid*). Neoconservative political discourse in the 1970s and 1980s also fuelled punitive policy towards welfare recipients. Stereotypes of the “welfare queen” and of “welfare dependents” became popular phrases used by politicians to illustrate the perceived problems with the welfare system. Further, despite claims that welfare fraud was on the rise, estimates provided by the Province of Alberta suggested that the instances of welfare fraud had been decreasing since the 1970s, which was true of other areas as well

(Harrison 2010).

Nonetheless, welfare policy controlling the accessibility of social assistance became increasingly rigid and strict, especially under the direction of neoconservative politicians. In particular, the definition of “spouse” was broadened in order to inhibit a wider range of previously entitled individuals, the legislation was restructured from “welfare” to “work,” mandatory drug testing was implemented, a quit/fire regulation was introduced that required the termination or suspension of assistance to individuals who resign employment without “just cause” or who were dismissed with cause, anonymous “welfare snitch” lines intended to encourage people to report suspected welfare fraud by their neighbours were implemented, and a zero-tolerance policy was implemented that invoked permanent ineligibility for anyone convicted of welfare fraud (Chunn and Gavigan 2004). These policies were meant to deter citizens from accessing welfare through the stigmatization of welfare, such that individuals would be less inclined to apply for social assistance in order to evade stigmatization and, as the reasoning implies, would thus be more inclined to pull themselves up “by their bootstraps.” In Gustafson’s view, however, these and related “tough on welfare” policy reforms were “designed to punish the poor, to stigmatize poverty, particularly poverty that leads to welfare receipt, and to create a system of deterrence aimed at the middle class” (Gustafson 2009: 666).

According to Gustafson (2009) what these policy reforms also accomplished was the implementation of the welfare system as a tool of law enforcement and the criminal justice system more broadly. From this standpoint, the welfare system has since been utilized by the government as a method of crime policing in that offenders of both welfare crimes and non-welfare-related crimes are being identified and caught through

information sharing between the welfare system and the criminal justice system. As well, welfare eligibility is being used as a deterrent for criminal behaviour such that individuals with criminal records are increasingly disbarred from accessing welfare. Thus, not only has it become increasingly difficult to be considered eligible for social assistance, those that are able to access it are increasingly scrutinized and subject to punitive surveillance measures and punitive criminal measures if found to be “abusing” their access to social assistance.

The public’s “othering” response to social and economic insecurity, coupled with the aforementioned shift towards personal “responsibilization,” means that while previously there existed more acknowledgment of social factors that influence individuals’ social and economic situations, there is now a shift from this view toward a type of reasoning that minimizes collective or societal causes of “social disorders” such as crime and poverty. This type of reasoning has also provided the basis for individual sanctions (Wacquant 2009). In other words, the shift in focusing on the “criminal Other” helps to justify the various sanctions that these individuals are subject to in that they become the focus of blame for their criminality or their reliance on social assistance. The social desire and determination to deter and punish those that are seen to be the cause of social problems supersedes any action towards rehabilitation and/or providing social assistance; thus, the result is that the public demands tougher and harsher punishments for those who deviate from “normal” society.

Getting “Tough on Crime”

Changes in both social and crime policy have inevitably produced changes in crime

control practices. Along with welfare retrenchment and the emergence of the “responsible” individual has come the subsequent retraction of the previous penal welfare model. The criminal justice system was previously identified as operating under a welfare model such that it was premised on the recognition that individuals are affected by “criminogenic” factors that produce criminal behaviour and deviance. These criminogenic factors, under the penal welfare model, were conceived of as various social and psychological determinants, and, as such, it was these factors that needed to be acted on in order to reduce crime. Thus, the crime control method under the penal welfare model was twofold: the implementation of criminal justice policy aimed at addressing the social and economic determinants of crime, and the use of rehabilitative methods to manage the psychological determinants of crime (Campesi 2009). More specifically, under the penal welfare model the offender correctional strategy was based on individualized treatment, indeterminate sentencing, and criminological-based research, and was carried out primarily through probation, parole, juvenile courts, and treatment programs (Garland 2001).

As with changes in other areas of social policy, the penal welfare model began to deteriorate under the expansion of neoliberalism and neoconservatism, beginning in the 1970s. With the expansion of neoliberalism came a persistent critique of correctionalism from neoconservative political discourse, as well as indeterminate sentencing and individualized treatment. Contributing to this critique was also the increased politicization of crime as a national, as opposed to local, concern by neoconservative politicians. As such, in the decades following the subtle shift towards neoliberal governance, changes were made in prison practices, sentencing law, parole, probation,

and academic and political discourse about crime (Garland 2001). Although this movement to “get tough” on crime began in the 1970s, it was hastened under the Regan administration in the U.S. through his “war on drugs.” As a result of this “crack down” on drug offences, drug arrests doubled in the 1980s and by 1998 there had been a total of 1.6 million drug arrests. Further, many drug offenders were subjected to a new five-year mandatory minimum sentencing law enacted under the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, which contributed to the already increasing prison populations (Mauer 2001). Since the 1980s laws and policies have continued to be enacted that attempt to “get tough” on crime, including “Three Strikes and You’re Out” policies, among others. The result has been a “transformative process that has brought about major changes in institutions, ideas, and practices across the whole crime control field” that has essentially remained intact today (Garland 2001: 53).

In Canada, the penal welfare model in the 1990s was characterized by a “balanced” approach whereby social and crime policies were aimed at balancing the rights of society, victims, and offenders, and in particular, recognized the importance of alternatives to incarceration for some offenders (Meyer and O’Malley 2005). Specifically, this approach was focused on maintaining proportionality between the severity of penalties, the seriousness of the offence, and the guilt of the offender (Roberts 2007). Several sentencing reforms were made in the 1990s, most notably with the introduction of Bill C-41. In 1992, Bill C-90, a major sentencing reform bill, was introduced, which included: a statement of the purpose and principles of sentencing, rules of evidence and procedures for sentencing hearings, an outline of alternative measures for adult offenders, among others. Bill C-90, however, was never fully implemented, but in

1994 Bill C-41 was introduced and finally implemented in 1996. The new bill contained various reforms, some of which included: enabling jurisdictions to establish alternative measures to incarceration, a new fine system, new sentencing alternatives, and conditional sentences. The alternative measures were introduced in order to increase opportunities for individual responses to offenders of minor crimes, and included: restitution, personal service work for the victim, community service work, mediation, and counselling and treatment programs, among others. However, the most profound facet of Bill C-41 was the creation of a new sentencing option, the conditional sentencing of imprisonment. The implementation of conditional sentencing allowed judges a greater degree of discretion to select among various optional conditions and to impose other conditions deemed necessary. These conditions could include: law-abiding behaviour, appearing before the court when required to do so, reporting to a supervisor, remaining within the jurisdiction of the court, etc. (Daubney and Parry 1999).

In recent years, however, Canada, like the U.S., has shifted from a “welfare state” to a “penal state,” precipitated mostly by the election of Steven Harper’s Conservative party in 2006. Following Harper’s appointment as Prime Minister, Canada’s incarceration rate increased for the first time in more than a decade (DeKeseredy 2009). Approximately 33,123 adults and 1,987 youths were in custody in 2006, which was 3% more than in 2005 (Statistics Canada 2007). The “tough on crime” approach in Canada has produced drastic changes in crime policy and crime control practice as well, especially in the last decade. In addition to the implementation of various mandatory minimum sentences, the Harper government has also put into practice a wide variety of other punitive crime policies. For example, the enforcement of Bill C-25, *The Truth in Sentencing Act*, in 2010

eliminated the existing policy of allowing a “two-for-one” credit for pre-trial custody (Mallea 2011). This policy essentially allowed inmates to collect two days for every one day served while being held in custody before their trial had taken place. The logic behind this policy is that extra credit should be given to offenders held in remand due to the terrible conditions of pre-trial facilities, as well as the lack of access to programming in these facilities. It should also be noted that time spent by offenders in these facilities is not calculated in their release date after sentencing and that extra credit would help account for this time served. As well, many inmates held in remand have not in fact been convicted of a crime, and many have simply been unable to fulfill bail conditions, usually due to a lack of a permanent address or someone acting as a surety for them (*ibid*). This has resulted in extreme overcrowding in remand centres and jails across Canada, which now house individuals with all types of criminal histories, including both serious and less serious charges. Indeed, according to Nicole Myers (2011) in 2009, one in every 12 cases in youth court in Canada had “failing to comply with an order” as the most serious charge due to the increased use of bail conditions. As a result there has been a higher number of remanded youth on the basis of failing to comply with bail conditions.

Punitive crime policies targeting young offenders have also emerged in recent years under the Harper government, most notably through Bill C-4, or the “Sebastien’s Law (Protecting the Public from Violent Young Offenders)” that was enacted as part of the crime omnibus bill in 2011 (Mallea 2011). Some of the stipulations of this law include: treating offences against property as serious offences, requiring courts to consider adult sentences for youth charged with serious offences (which result in longer sentences for many youth), and lifting publication bans in some instances (*ibid*). With its

focus on incarceration, Bill C-4 will send more youth to jail, undermining the previous Youth Criminal Justice Act, which was largely successful in diverting youth from prisons and focused on more extrajudicial disciplinary measures. As well, it should be noted that the majority of youth crime stems from complex social and systemic issues such as violence in the home, poverty, and mental health issues. One consequence of Bill C-4 is that it dismisses these systemic issues and therefore increases the probability of youth criminality.

Changes to conditional sentences and parole provisions in Canada have also taken place in recent years, with the emergence of Bill C-16 (*Ending House Arrest for Property and Other Serious Crimes by Serious and Violent Offenders Act*) and Bill C-59. Bill C-16 has succeeded in disbarring 38 offences for which conditional sentencing was previously used, the majority of which are less serious crimes such as making and possession of counterfeit money, forging passports, etc. (*ibid*). Conditional sentences can include house arrest, require refrainment from drug or alcohol use, curfews, and electronic monitoring and are, in many cases, more ideal than incarceration in that some conditional sentences allow offenders to remain employed, support their families, and continue their education. As well, conditional sentences pose less of a financial cost and reduce the exposure of first time offenders to career criminals. With regards to parole, Bill C-59 has abolished accelerated parole reviews for first time non-violent offenders after one-sixth of their sentences have been served. These reviews were established as a way of recognizing that non-violent offenders are different from violent offenders and should be treated accordingly. With the abolishment of these reviews, both violent and non-violent offenders are now treated similarly in regards to parole.

As well, there has been an increasing shift away from the use of judicial discretion in criminal cases and trials, which allows for individual circumstances to be taken into account, toward an increased reliance on blanketed sentencing for most types of offences. Replacing the use of judicial discretion has been the implementation of mandatory minimum sentences for a large amount of offences. Prior to the Conservative party taking power in 2006, the majority of mandatory minimum sentences had been in place since 1995, with the addition of only a few after 1995. However, after 2006 the Conservative party implemented 20 new mandatory minimum sentences (Mallea 2011). The result is a “one-size-fits-all” approach that captures a large number of less serious offences in a large punitive net (*ibid*).

Concluding Remarks

The theoretical framework that informs this analysis is based on the conception of neoliberalism as a distinct governing structure. Informed by Foucault’s (1995) concept of governmentality, it involves a recognition of a shift in the way in which the state governs. Where previously the state was characterized by its exertion of direct power, the state under neoliberalism is characterized by an indirect form of power. In particular, the state exerts its power and influence through invoking the necessity of citizens to become self-monitoring and self-governing through promoting individual choice and autonomy. Those that are perceived as non-conforming to the self-governance model are conceptualized as “unruly” individuals who pose a threat to social order. In order to manage these deviant groups, the criminal justice system has employed a “risk-crazed governance” model (Carlen 1998), which is predicated on an overemphasis of the risk

associated with crime. Accompanying this risk governance model has been the implementation of the new penology in helping to managing risk.

With the advent of neoliberalism there has been a shift towards a governance model that is based on a combination of state welfare retraction and individual responsabilization. Under this governance model, therefore, the responsibility of individual welfare and obedience to the law has been assigned to the citizens themselves. Accompanying the implementation of neoliberalism has also been changes in labour relations and social inequality, and, as such, citizens have become more socially and economically insecure. The overarching result of this governance model has been an intensified “othering” and criminalization of individuals living in poverty, and an accompanying support from the public for more punitive measures in dealing with the socially marginalized individuals of society, who have become the personification of social and economic insecurity. The next chapter provides an overview of the various studies have examined the relationship between the various social products of neoliberalism and neoconservatism and public support for punitive crime policies.

CHAPTER THREE

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE CRIME POLICIES

Research has attempted to measure the various social outcomes of neoliberalism and neoconservatism and how they are related to public support for punitive crime policies. In particular, there are four main areas of analysis that are relevant to the present study. The first area of research to be discussed involves the findings that have been made in measuring the relationship between feelings of social and economic insecurity and support for tougher crime practices. The second area of research involves studies that have measured the extent to which subscription to the belief that individuals are responsible for their own welfare, and attitudes toward welfare in general, affect support for tough on crime policy. Third, research that has examined the relationship between perceptions and views of racialized individuals and how that affects public support for punitive crime policies is discussed. Lastly, an overview of the socio-demographic factors that have been examined in relation to support for punitive crime policies will be provided. Such socio-demographic factors include: race, sex, political party affiliation, income, marital status, religion, and highest level of education.

Insecurity and Support for “Tough on Crime” Policies

Few studies have examined the relationship between feelings of social and economic insecurity and how those feelings translate into support for punitive crime policies. More specifically, there are only four known studies that have examined this issue, none of which, however, were conducted with Canadian respondents, and none of which have

included data collected since 2003. Further, studies that have examined this relationship have all conceptualized social and economic insecurity in different ways, and so the measures used to examine the relationship vary. For instance, Devon Johnson (2001) used “family income” and measures of respondents’ personal financial situation as economic insecurity indicators. The findings suggest that there is no relation between respondents’ personal financial situation and supporting “tough on crime” policies, which, in this case, is measured by support for the death penalty and the belief that the courts do not deal harshly enough with offenders.

Similarly, Michael Hogan, Ted Chiricos, and Marc Gertz (2005), using measures of respondents’ personal financial situation in the past year and expected financial situation in the next year in relation to their current situation, found that there was no relationship between economic insecurity and support for punitive policies. In measuring punitive attitudes, this study used a “punitive index” that included respondents’ support for items such as: eliminating parole, more severe sentences, increased policing, limiting appeals to the death penalty, chemical castration for sexual offenders, and prosecuting juvenile offenders as adults (p. 399). In a slight variation of this study, Michael Costelloe, Ted Chiricos, and Marc Gertz (2009), using similar measures of punitive attitudes, measured economic insecurity through respondents’ expectations in looking ahead to their future financial position, independent of their current situation, and whether they thought it would be better, worse, or the same. The findings showed that expected economic insecurity in the future was significantly related to support for punitive crime policies, but only for Caucasian males who have a relatively low income and less education, and not for the entire sample.

The only known study that examined the relationship between social insecurity and support for punitive crime policies outside of the U.S. was conducted by Anna King and Shadd Maruna (2009) in London, England. Results differed slightly from those based in the U.S. in that they found that social insecurity (the perception that the economy was getting worse) was positively associated with punitiveness, but that economic insecurity (respondents' personal financial situation) was not related to punitive attitudes. In this study, respondents' crime control attitudes were measured by a "punitive scale" that included items such as: would consider "volunteering time or donating money to an organization that supported toughening sentences," "need to condemn offenders more," agree that "offenders should be treated harshly," and support for "bringing back the death penalty" (King and Maruna 2009: 156). Insecurity, in this case, was measured by items that attempted to examine collective trust, economic anxiety, and generational anxiety, but in particular the insecurity measures of interest included the items "personal financial situation" and "feelings about the economy."

The results of this small body of research imply that personal financial insecurity does not predict an inclination among individuals to support punitive crime policies, but that concern or fear over the state of the national economic condition does predict public support for punitive crime policies. These results seem to suggest that concerns over more macro-level issues are related to the perception that crime is more problematic, and thus requires stricter policies. Such a relationship seems to hold true regardless of both the state of individuals' personal financial situation and whether or not individuals predict that their personal financial situation will become better or worse in the near future.

The level of confidence that individuals have in the police is an important measure of generalized feelings of social security in that the police are seen as the “gate keepers” of crime and victimization. As such, individuals with low confidence in the police will likely feel more socially insecure and at a greater risk of being victimized by offenders. One could hypothesize that individuals who feel more at risk of being victimized are more likely to support punitive crime policies out of a fear of crime. Indeed, a study by Statistics Canada (2000) showed that Canadians who are concerned for their personal safety from crime are more likely to support the use of prison-based sentences for offenders. In particular, this study showed that 51% of respondents who were concerned for their personal safety supported the use of prison sentences for first-time adult offenders convicted of break and enter, as compared to 37% of those who were not insecure. Similarly, 36% of those who were insecure supported prison sentences for first time, young offenders, compared to 20% of those who were not insecure.

Although there are no known studies that have examined the relationship between the level of confidence in police and support for punitive crime policies, one study confirmed that confidence in the police is influenced substantially by the belief that crime has decreased, and, in turn, confidence in police significantly increases feelings of safety (Nofziger and Williams 2005). This study suggests that the opposite is also true: fear of crime is likely to result in a lack of confidence in the police and, subsequently, feelings of insecurity. Interestingly, a related study found that individuals who had lower acceptance of deviant individuals had higher levels of confidence in the police, which suggests that individuals who are more likely to support punitive crime policies have higher confidence in the police (Jang, Joo, and Zhao 2010).

Individualization and Support for “Tough on Crime” Policy

As with research on social and economic insecurity, few studies have examined the extent to which public attitudes that individualize poverty and marginalization influence public support for punitive crime policies. In particular, research that measures the extent to which respondents blame marginalized individuals for their social situation, and whether these attitudes predict support for “tough on crime” policies, is lacking. As Darren Wheelock and his colleagues (2012) point out, few studies have attempted to investigate whether the public’s attitudes towards criminal justice and welfare policies have merged or coincided, and further, that all prior research has treated public perceptions of crime and welfare policies as separate and unrelated to one another. As mentioned, there is substantial theoretical inference for the correlation between public attitudes towards welfare policies and recipients and criminal justice policy such that those who hold negative views towards welfare recipients, and who blame marginalized individuals for their social position, are more likely to support more punitive crime policies as well. On a more macro level, Katherine Beckett and Bruce Western (2001) have shown that within the U.S., states with more substantial and generous welfare policies tend to have less punitive incarceration policies, which suggests a relation between more extensive welfare policies and a more rehabilitative approach to crime and offenders.

Although few studies have focused on public opinion of welfare recipients, there has been a substantial amount of research examining the relationship between how the public attributes crime and support for punitive policies towards offenders. The findings of this body of research is of interest to the present study in that there are implications

within the theoretical literature which suggest that the way individuals view the causation of crime and criminal behaviour is also linked to how they view the causation of poverty. In other words, there is substantive theoretical evidence which suggests that individuals who focus on a lack of responsabilization of the individual offender as being the cause of crime (e.g. they lack morals, do not care about other people, etc.) are more likely to believe that the causation of poverty, or marginalization, and reliance on social assistance is due to a lack of individual responsabilization as well (e.g. they lack motivation to find a job, they do not want to work, they are lazy, etc.). As such, a review of some of the research that has investigated the relation between individual attributes (versus social and systemic causes of crime) and support for punitive crime policies will be useful insofar as it may shed some light on the link between public attitudes of welfare and marginalized individuals, and support for punitive crime policies.

Unsurprisingly, many studies have found that respondents who believe the cause of crime and criminal behaviour to be at the individual level, instead of at a larger societal level, are more likely to support punitive crime policies (e.g. Perlman 1980; Carroll and Payne 1977a; 1977b). Francis Cullen and colleagues (1985) found that respondents who attribute causes of crime to the individual are more likely to support the death penalty, as well as other punitive responses to offenders. Further, Darnell Hawkins (1981) found that respondents' dispositional attributions of crime are associated with higher support for more punitive responses for crimes that are committed by both adults and juveniles. In addition, Barbara Sims (2003) found a correlation between the belief that the criminal justice system should be used to discourage further crime through various means (e.g.

more prison sentences should be handed out) and subscribing to individual attributions as the cause of crime.

When examining this relationship among African-American respondents, Johnson (2007) found that attributions of crime to individual failings—which included items such as “people become criminals because they don’t care about the rights of others or their responsibility to society” and “people turn to crime because they are lazy”—are related to increased support for harsh punishments— such as, trying juveniles as adults, stricter punishments for violent offences, stricter parole practices, and support for a “three strikes” policy.

With regard to public opinion on welfare and welfare recipients, many studies have shown that the belief about those who rely on welfare is largely that they are responsible for their situation due to a lack of work ethic or moral character (Golding and Middleton 1982; Smith and Stone 1989; Henry, Reyna and Weiner 2004; Somers and Block 2005). Within a Canadian context, however, Linda Reuter and her colleagues (2006) have shown that Canadians’ general attitudes about the causes of poverty tend to be more structural rather than individual, as opposed to that of Americans. This means that Canadians are more likely to acknowledge that broader social and systemic factors, which are outside the control of individuals, contribute to, or play a large part in, the perpetuation of poverty. Conversely, Americans are more likely to blame marginalized individuals for their own poverty.

When race is examined in conjunction with support for welfare, studies have shown that low support for welfare among Americans is linked to negative attitudes towards African Americans (Gilens 1995, 1996, 2000; Nelson 1999; Frederico 2005;

Winter 2008). Within a Canadian context, studies have shown that the public often blames Aboriginal people for the social and economic problems they face (Kirby and Gardner 1973; Mackie 1974, Gibbins and Ponting 1977; Bell, Esses and Maio 1996; Vorauer, Main and O’Connell 1998). Further, Allison Harell, Stuart Soroka, and Kiera Ladner (2013) have shown that Canadians are likely to oppose social assistance if they have negative views of Aboriginal people, which seems to suggest that these individuals believe that Aboriginal people are undeserving of social assistance and that their social and economic situation is the result of individual choices and failings.

As mentioned, there is little known research that has investigated attitudes towards welfare and crime policies, with the exception of one study conducted by Wheelock et al. (2012). This study measured punitive attitudes using a scale that included items such as: courts are too lenient, need tougher prison sentences for repeat offenders, people convicted of murder should receive the death penalty. Attitudes towards welfare were assessed with the measure “spending on welfare type programs should be decreased.” Results found that opposition to welfare spending was a significant predictor of respondents’ punitive attitudes, which means that individuals hold punitive attitudes toward both offenders and welfare recipients. This finding could also suggest that individuals do not differentiate between crime and poverty, and perceive the causes of both poverty and criminality to be at the individual level.

Racial Prejudice and Support for “Tough on Crime”

Similar to the previously discussed research, studies that have examined the role that racial prejudice and stereotypes play in predicting support for punitive crime policies

have mainly focused on the attitudes and beliefs of individuals within the U.S., with very few studies conducted on the Canadian population. As such, much of the literature in this area is focused on attitudes towards the African American population within the U.S., instead of those toward Aboriginal people within a Canadian context. The following studies are related to the previous discussion of individual attributions of poverty and reliance on welfare in that many of the measures of racial prejudice and stereotypes have relied on examining the extent to which the beliefs of the respondents reflect the idea that members of racialized groups are responsible for their “inferiority” or marginalized positions within society.

There is a large body of literature that supports the claim that one of the most significant predictors of punitive attitudes, especially among Caucasians, is racist attitudes and beliefs (Aguirre and Baker 1993; Barkan and Cohn 2005; Bobo and Johnson 2004; Johnson 2008; Lee and Rasinski 2006; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003). Regarding support for specific punitive policies, Robert Young (1985) found that racial prejudice directly influences support for the death penalty, as well as other various punitive crime policies. In measuring racial prejudice, Steven Stack (2000) used a scale that included questions such as: “are blacks hard working or do they tend to be lazy;” “are they intelligent/ unintelligent,” “patriotic/unpatriotic,” “violence-prone/not violence-prone,” and “prefer to be self-supporting or prefer to live off welfare?” The results of the study suggest that higher levels of racial prejudice predict greater support for the death penalty, and, more specifically, that respondents believe racialized individuals are more “criminal” than non-racialized individuals.

Another study conducted by James Unnever and Francis Cullen (2010) found that “racial resentment” was related to punitive attitudes, but that belief in racial stereotypes was not. In this study, punitive attitudes were measured by the question: “what is the best way to reduce crime – address the social problems that cause crime; make sure criminals are caught, convicted, and punished; or do something in between?” Support for the death penalty was also included as a measure of punitiveness. “Racial resentment” included items such as: “other minorities have overcome prejudice and worked their way up and blacks should do the same without any special favours” and, “if blacks tried harder they could be as well off as whites.” Racial stereotypes were measured by the extent to which respondents believe that African Americans are unintelligent, lazy, and un-trustworthy. Again, these results suggest that non-racialized individuals hold the belief that crime and poverty are a result of life choices made by racialized individuals.

In examining respondents’ punitive attitudes in terms of support for harsher court decisions, Steven Cohn et al. (1991) found that traditional or “Jim Crow” racial prejudice was positively associated with Caucasian respondents’ support for more punitive court sentences. In this study, racial prejudice was measured by questions such as: “do you think there should be laws against the marriage between blacks and whites,” “whites have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods if they want to and blacks should respect that right,” and “would you vote for a law that states people can refuse to sell their home to blacks?” Johnson (2001) also found that punitive attitudes, which were measured by support for the death penalty and the belief that the courts are not harsh enough, were related to “laissez-faire racism,” which refers to a less direct and systemic form of racism (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997). Laissez-faire racism was measured through

respondents' opinion of whether, on average, African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than whites, and if so, whether they believe it is because most African Americans do not have the motivation or willpower to pull themselves out of poverty. Results illustrate that respondents believe African American people are more criminal, and are socially marginalized due to a lack of individual responsibility over their choices and social situation.

The only study found to examine the relationship between racial prejudice and punitive attitudes among the Canadian public was conducted by Harell, Soroka, and Ladner (2013), which found that support for the death penalty was predicted by the presence of racial intolerance. This study differed slightly from the rest in that it used items pertaining to attitudes towards immigrants as measures of racial intolerance. The measure of racial intolerance included items such as: "we should look after Canadians born here first and others second," "Canadian unity is weakened by other ethnic and cultural backgrounds sticking to their old ways," "we should admit fewer immigrants," and "too many immigrants just don't want to fit in." The study is unique in that it did not measure attitudes towards racialized groups that have a history of discrimination in Canada (that is, Aboriginal people), but instead generalized the measure to all racialized individuals by using attitudes towards immigrants (not all of which are racialized individuals). Results suggest that respondents hold negative attitudes towards immigrants, and that punitive attitudes towards them predict punitive attitudes towards offenders.

Socio-demographics

There have been a variety of different socio-demographic factors that have been measured in relation to support for punitive crime policies. The following discussion will include research that has been conducted in examining the effects of respondents' race, political party affiliation, income, age, education, sex, marital status, and religious affiliation in predicting support for punitive crime policies.

Race and Punitive Attitudes

The examination of respondents' race in conjunction with support for punitive crime policies is inextricably linked to attitudes of racial prejudice in that much of the support for punitive crime policies by Caucasian respondents is likely due to their beliefs that members of racialized groups are more "criminal." Research has confirmed this connection between race, racism, and support for punitive crime policies by showing that Caucasian respondents who express racist views towards African Americans are more likely to favour the death penalty and other harsh sanctions (Johnson 2001). Further, research shows that African Americans are more opposed to the use of the death penalty than are Caucasians (Stinchcombe et al. 1980). Similar results were found when asking respondents whether they thought the courts were too harsh or not harsh enough. In one study, for example, African Americans were 9.6% less likely to believe courts were not harsh enough (Cohn, Barkan, and Haltzman 1991). When asked about the best way to reduce crime (should we: "address the social problems that cause crime," "make sure criminals are caught, convicted, and punished," or "do something in between?") African Americans were less likely to support the more punitive measures, as well as less likely

to support the death penalty (Unnever and Cullen 2010). Moreover, when asked about juvenile offenders, African Americans were less likely than Caucasian respondents to agree with: “the use of the death penalty for juvenile offenders who murder,” “moving repeat young offenders to adult court,” “locking up more juvenile offenders,” “giving more severe sentences for all crimes,” and “limiting appeals to death sentences” (Costelloe, Chiricos, and Gertz 2009). When measured against multiple racialized groups, Caucasian respondents were more likely to hold punitive attitudes relative to African Americans and Hispanics (Wheelock et al. 2012). More specifically, Caucasians were more likely to agree that: “the courts are too lenient,” “we need tougher prison sentences for repeat offenders,” and “people convicted of murder should receive the death penalty.”

A study by Johnson (2001) found that Caucasian respondents who were economically insecure were more likely to favour harsher courts, which may point to a relation between viewing racialized individuals as the “criminal Other” and the belief that it is these individuals who are responsible for their feelings of economic insecurity. The same study also showed that the percentage of Caucasian respondents who support the death penalty and harsher courts was high regardless of respondents’ other background or socio-demographic characteristics. Similarly, Justin Pickett et al. (2012) found that Caucasian respondents were more supportive of holding sex offenders in custody indefinitely than were African Americans.

Contrary to the above noted research, some studies have shown that African American respondents are in fact more punitive with certain types of offences and under certain circumstances. For example, Brian Payne et al. (2004) found that African Americans were more supportive of punitive approaches to gun offences, in particular.

Specifically, the scenario given to respondents was one in which a legal gun dealer sells a gun to a teenager, and the results showed that African Americans were more likely to support a punitive response for these types of offenders. Other studies have shown that African Americans are more likely to support harsher sanctions if they report a high level of fear of crime (Cohn et al. 1991; Langworthy and Whitehead 1986). Further, Michael Combs and John Comer (1984) found that African Americans were more likely to favour harsh criminal penalties if they self-identify as politically conservative.

Only one study found that race of the respondents was not a significant predictor of punitiveness (King and Maruna 2009: 156). Punitiveness was measured by responses to the following: “would consider volunteering time or donating money to an organization that supported toughening sentences,” “we need to condemn offenders more,” “offenders should be treated harshly,” and “we should bringing back the death penalty.”

Political Orientation

Research has shown overwhelmingly that political conservatives hold more punitive attitudes than do political liberals (see Bowers 1998; Rossi and Berk 1997). These findings have been consistent across different measures of punitive attitudes, including the type of punitive policy, the offence committed, and the type of offender. In terms of specific punitive policies, research has shown that respondents who identify as being politically conservative are more likely to support the death penalty and other harsh sanctions (Moon et al. 2000; Vogel and Vogel 2003; Johnson 2001). For instance, one study found that identification as a conservative predicted an increased likelihood that

respondents would: “consider volunteering their time or donating money to an organization that supported toughening sentences,” agree with the statements that “we need to condemn offenders more” and that “offenders should be treated harshly,” and “support bringing back the death penalty” (King and Maruna 2009). When probed for the best strategy to reduce crime through closed-ended options (address the social problems that cause crime, make sure criminals are caught, convicted, and punished, or do something in between), respondents with conservative political orientation showed higher support for making sure criminals are caught, convicted, and punished as a way to reduce crime. In addition, politically conservative respondents also reported higher support for use of the death penalty (Unnever and Cullen 2010). Lastly, Wheelock et al. (2012) found that conservative respondents were more likely to agree that the courts were too lenient, that we need tougher prison sentences for repeat offenders, and that people convicted of murder should receive the death penalty.

One study examining the effects between type of offences and support for punitive policies found that respondents who subscribe to a liberal ideology were less likely to support punitive policies for the following scenarios: selling 200 pounds of marijuana, selling two pounds of substance with a small amount of heroin, a drunk driver has an accident and kills a passenger, and the health and safety standards at a company are not met and an employee dies. The only scenario where political party affiliation was not related to punitive attitudes was selling a legal gun to a teenager (Payne et al. 2004).

Moreover, researchers investigating punitive attitudes toward young offenders have found similar results. Costelloe, Chiricos, and Gertz (2009) found that conservatives were more likely to show support for: the death penalty for juvenile offenders who

murder, moving repeat young offenders to adult court, locking up more juvenile offenders, and, in general, giving more severe sentences for all crimes and limiting appeals to death sentences. Stephen Baron and Timothy Hartnagel (1996) also found that respondents who were more conservative on social values were more likely to support curfews for juveniles, trying young second-time offenders in adult court, and agreeing with the statement that: “youth courts have become too lenient with young offenders.”

The above results are not particularly surprising given that individuals who identify as politically conservative also tend to adopt the belief that inequality stems from individual life choices and a lack of work ethic, and that criminality is also a result of individual failings. It follows, then, that politically conservative individuals are likely to feel unsympathetic towards deviant and marginalized individuals, and will thus support punitive crime policies as a way to deter future criminality. Indeed, one study showed that the conservatism is a “system-justifying ideology” whereby it justifies social, economic, and political arrangements and institutions through a fairly wide range of rationalizations (Napier and Jost 2008). As such, politically conservative individuals believe that inequality is justified and does not constitute a social problem.

Personal Income

Research examining the relationship between income and support for punitive crime policies has produced mixed results. Some studies have shown that a higher reported income predicted more punitive attitudes (King and Maruna 2009). Conversely, Wheelock et al. (2012) found that a higher reported income predicted less punitive attitudes. Another study found that income was not a significant predictor of believing

that “the courts are too harsh or lenient” (Spott 1999). However, studies that have examined the relationship in regards to respondents’ race found that higher reported incomes for African Americans predicted punitive attitudes, but not for Caucasian respondents (Johnson 2007); whereas Combs and Comer (1984) found that the correlation between the reported income of African Americans and support for punitive policies has varied over time.

Educational Achievement

A large majority of research has found that respondents with higher levels of education tend to be less supportive of punitive policies than people with lower levels of education (Bowers 1998; Rossi and Berk 1997; Wheelock et al. 2012). This correlation was found for support for harsher courts (Johnson 2001), holding sex offenders in custody indefinitely (Pickett et al. 2012), and punitive juvenile justice policies (Schwartz, Guo and Kerbs 1992). Specifically, Costelloe, Chiricos, and Gertz (2009) measured support for the death penalty for juvenile offenders who murder, trying repeat young offenders in adult court, locking up more juvenile offenders, imposing more severe sentences for all crimes, and limiting appeals to death sentences, and found that those with higher levels of education were less likely to support these policies. King and Maruna (2009) found similar results when measuring the following outcome variables: would consider volunteering time or donating money to an organization that supported toughening sentences, support for condemning offenders more, agreeing that offenders should be treated harshly, and support for bringing back the death penalty. Further, when asked about the best way to reduce crime (address the social problems that cause crime, make

sure criminals are caught, convicted, and punished, or do something in between), those with higher levels of education were less supportive of the more punitive measure, and were also less likely to support the death penalty (Unnever and Cullen 2010). A study conducted by Payne et al. (2004) found similar results.

There have been a few studies, however, that have produced results that differ from the large majority of previous research. For example, Baron and Hartnagel (1996) found that respondents with higher education were more punitive (measured by support for a curfew for juveniles), but were not likely to support trying young second-time offenders in adult court or agreeing that youth courts have become too lenient. Finally, some studies have shown that there is no relationship between level of education and punitive attitudes (Spott 1999; Cullen et al. 1985; Cohn et al. 1991).

Sex and Punitive Attitudes

Research on respondents' sex and punitive attitudes has also produced largely inconsistent results, with some studies showing that males are more likely to favour the death penalty (Johnson 2001; Bohm 1991; Fox, Radelet and Bonsteel 1990-91; Sandys and McGarrell 1995; Walker, Collins and Wilson 1988), stricter policies in regards to juvenile justice issues (Schwartz, Guo and Kerbs 1992), and support for the death penalty for juvenile offenders who murder, trying repeat young offenders in adult court, locking up more juvenile offenders, imposing more severe sentences for all crimes, and limiting appeals to death sentences (Costelloe, Chiricos, and Gertz 2009).

Other studies have shown that respondents' sex was not related to support for punitive attitudes (King and Maruna 2009; Unnever and Cullen 2010; Baron and

Hartnagel 1996). Further, several studies have investigated the relationship between sex and punitive attitudes and have found that women were more punitive than males for certain types of crime (Roberts 1992; Rossi, Berk and Campbell 1997; Sprott 1999). For example, Payne et al. (2004) found that females were more likely to support punitive policies for the following scenarios: a drunk driver gets in an accident which kills a passenger, a company whose health and safety standards are not met and subsequently an employee dies, and a legal gun dealer sells a gun to a teenager. Pickett et al. (2012) also found that females were more supportive of holding sex offenders in custody indefinitely than males.

Marital Status

Only a few studies have examined the relationship between marital status and support for punitive policies, producing inconsistent results. For example, a study conducted by Costelloe, Chiricos, and Gertz (2009) found that female respondents who were both married and Caucasian are more punitive than those who were not married. These individuals were also more likely to support the death penalty for juvenile offenders who murder, trying repeat young offenders in adult court, locking up more juvenile offenders, more severe sentences for all crimes, and limiting appeals to death sentences. Pickett et al. (2012) found that spouses who were also parents were more supportive of holding sex offenders in custody indefinitely. Conversely, Ira Schwartz, Shenyang Guo and John Kerbs (1992) found that respondents with children were less punitive with regards to juvenile justice issues.

Religious Affiliation

Lastly, research examining the relationship between religious affiliation and support for punitive crime policies has shown that respondents who report being affiliated with any religious group were less punitive (King and Maruna 2009). Respondents who were more religiously oriented were less likely to support a punitive approach when asked what is the best way to reduce crime (address the social problems that cause crime, make sure criminals are caught, convicted, and punished, or do something in between), as well as less likely to support the death penalty (Unnever and Cullen 2010). Some studies have examined the effects of different types of religious affiliation with punitive attitudes and have found that conservative theological beliefs influence punitiveness (Evans and Adams 2003), while others have found no effect (Unnever, Cullen and Applegate 2005; Unnever, Cullen and Fisher 2005).

Gaps in the Literature

As shown, a significant amount of research has been dedicated to investigating the different factors that are related to, or predict, public support for punitive crime policies. While these studies offer important contributions to scholarly work, there is a lack of research that links the effects of neoliberalism and public opinion towards crime policy, more generally. Further, there is a significant lack of research that examines this relationship within a Canadian context.

In regards to research examining social and economic insecurity in relation to support for punitive crime policies, there have been very few studies that have actually undertaken such an investigation. As noted, there are only four known studies that have

examined this relationship, three of which were conducted within the U.S., while the fourth was situated in London, England. Thus, no research has examined the relationship between social and economic insecurity and support for punitive crime policies among a Canadian population.

In addition, the majority of existing studies only include measures of economic insecurity and fail to address the issue of social insecurity. In particular, the existing research, with the exception of the London-based study, measured economic insecurity through items that target micro-level indicators, and ignore possible macro-level measures. In other words, most of the studies only rely on measures of the respondents' personal financial situation, and do not account for insecurity that may stem from larger systemic sources, such as the state of the economy or the level of confidence in the police.

Similarly, previous research that has examined racial prejudice in conjunction with support for punitive crime policies have largely been focused within the U.S., and subsequently have only examined public attitudes and stereotypes towards African American individuals. The only study that examined Canadian public opinion towards support for punitive crime policies in relation to racial prejudice was focused on indicators measuring attitudes towards immigrants. Thus, what is lacking is a focus on Canadian attitudes towards Aboriginal people and how they relate to support for punitive crime policies, particularly since Canada has an extensive history of discrimination and prejudice against Aboriginal peoples.

There is a body of research that has examined the relationship between how individuals attribute the causes of crime and level of support for punitive crime policies,

as well as studies that have examined public support for welfare in general. However, there are no studies that investigate the relationship between how individuals attribute the causes of poverty and general attitudes towards social assistance, and support for punitive crime policies. Moreover, there has been research that examines the connection between welfare spending and the crime policies of specific countries and states, on a macro level, but none that have examined this relationship on an individual level.

Lastly, there is no research that has examined the relationship, *over time*, between either individuals' attitudes of racial prejudice, feelings of social and economic insecurity, attitudes toward marginalized individuals, and support for punitive crime policies. The few studies that have been conducted mostly date back to the late 1990s, and none have undertaken a time-comparative investigation of similar measures to assess if the correlations, or lack thereof, have changed over time.

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

The methodological strategy employed in the current study is based on empirical survey data and incorporates a variety of different statistical techniques. The following discussion will include: an overview of the research questions and empirical expectations of the analysis; a description of the samples used in each data set; descriptions of the measures employed in the analysis; and an overview of the analytic procedures used.

Empirical Expectations

As previously mentioned, the research questions that inform the current study include:

1. Do feelings of social and economic insecurity affect support for punitive crime policies?
2. Are people who subscribe to an individualistic explanation for the causes of poverty and marginalization more likely to support punitive crime policies?
3. Do negative attitudes toward racialized individuals affect support for punitive crime policies?
4. What socio-demographic characteristics are related to support for punitive crime policies?
5. Have any of these relationships changed over time and, if so, in what ways?

In accordance with the theoretical framework in which this analysis is situated, it is expected that respondents who report higher levels of social and economic insecurity will be more supportive of punitive crime measures. As well, it is predicted that

respondents who subscribe to an individualistic ideology and who report more dislike for, and negative attitudes toward, racialized individuals will also be more supportive of punitive crime policies.

The theoretical literature implies that the advent of neoliberal and neoconservative social policies precipitate the emergence of social and economic insecurity. Ultimately, increased social and economic insecurity leads to an intensified racialized “Othering” by citizens of neoliberal states, as well as influences beliefs of individualistic causes of marginalization. According to the literature outline previously, it is the combination of social and economic insecurity, racialized “Othering”, and individualization of poverty that leads to increased support for punitive forms of punishment. Due to the nature of statistical measures of causation and inference, measuring the relationship directly as it is portrayed in the literature is not feasible. More specifically, there is no statistical procedure to measure the extent to which insecurity produces racialized “Othering” and individualistic attitudes, and then to measure the extent to which the results of this first relationship are related to support for punitive crime policies. The result of such an analysis would be various statistical models that are measured independently of one another, and it could not be determined conclusively that all variables and models are statistically correlated with one another. To address this statistical limitation, insecurity is measured first and independently with support for punitive crime policies, to determine if this relationship exists. Insecurity is then measured again with support for tough on crime policies, in conjunction with racialized “Othering” and individualistic beliefs. The reason for this order of measurement is twofold: first, to determine if the relationship between insecurity and support for tough on crime policies exists, and second, to determine if that

relationship is a “true” relationship. If there is a relationship between insecurity and support for punitive crime policies and it remains after including other variables, then we can conclude that the relationship is authentic.

In regards to the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, it is expected that, similar to previous research, support for tough on crime policies will be higher in respondents who: are married, are part of the racial majority, are male, have lower levels of education, identify as politically conservative, report lower than average income, and are affiliated with a Christian religious organization. Lastly, it is expected that, in addition to the above-mentioned covariates, when the results of the analyses are compared between two time periods (1997 and 2011), these relationships have either emerged in the latter time frame, or have strengthened over time as neoliberalism has become more entrenched in Canada.

Sample Description

The data used for this study are taken from the *Canadian Election Study* (CES), collected over two time periods: 1997 and 2011. Although these surveys are primarily focused on election issues, they also measure Canadian public opinion on other issues and include several hundred items that measure a wide array of societal concerns. As such, these data provide a wide range of items that measure public attitudes toward punitive crime policies, poverty, racialized groups, and social and economic insecurity. The 2011 survey is included because it is the most recent CES survey that has been produced. The 1997 survey was chosen based on specific items included within the study. Although the CES produces survey results after every federal election, it does not always include the same

items in each survey; thus, the 1997 survey was chosen based on the consistency of its items with the 2011 survey. For example, the item used in this analysis to measure support for punitive crime policy was only included in the 1997 and 2011 surveys, and not in any earlier surveys.

As well, the inclusion of the 1997 survey provides a noteworthy comparison period in that the mid 1990s were marked by considerably less punitive crime policies and more correctional-based approaches to crime control, which were significantly different from crime policies of the later 2000s. Further, in the mid 1990s the impacts of neoliberalism and neoconservative social policies were not as extensive as they were by 2011 (Mallea 2011). As such, the comparison of public attitudes from 1997 to 2011 provides an interesting analysis of two contrasting time periods, which differed in both the focus of social and crime policy, and the extent to which neoliberal governance had become a dominating presence. It is expected that results from the analysis of public opinions from 1997 will display a stark contrast to the results from 2011, thus confirming the impacts of neoliberal governance on public opinion.

1997 Canadian Election Study

The 1997 survey includes three survey components: 1) the campaign-period survey (CPS), 2) the post-election survey (PES), and 3) the mail-back survey (MBS). The CPS was completed between April 27th and June 1st 1997, before the federal election took place, and included 3,947 interviews. To select survey respondents, a two-stage probability selection process was used. The first stage involved the selection of households by randomly selecting residential telephone numbers (random digit dialing).

The second stage involved the selection of one respondent from the identified household. If more than one eligible person resided in the household (i.e., over the age of 18 and a Canadian citizen), then the eligible person who had the next approaching birthday was invited to participate in order to ensure a random selection of respondents.

The PES was a follow-up questionnaire, which was completed by respondents who participated in the CPS. Data collection occurred in the eight weeks following the June 2nd, 1997 election. Of the CPS respondents, 3,159 (approximately 80%) completed the PES survey. At the end of the PES, respondents were then asked if they would be willing to provide an address so that a mail-back survey could be sent to them. Of the PES respondents 2,641 (approximately 83%) provided mailing addresses. The MBS was completed from June 19th to October 24th, 1997, with 1,853 (59%) of the PES respondents completing the mail-back survey (Northrup 1998). The current analysis will include all three surveys due to the fact that some of the items being utilized were only asked in certain survey waves.

The probability of an adult member of the household being selected for an interview varies with the number of members in the household. For example, in a household with only one adult there is a 100 percent chance of that individual being selected. In a household with two adults, there is a 50 percent chance of selection. As such, one-adult households are over-represented and larger households are under-represented in the dataset, and it is possible that analyses based on un-weighted estimates will be biased. To compensate for this unequal probability of selection, sample weights were calculated and included in the public-use dataset (Northrup 2008). The weighting algorithm is as follows: households with one adult are given a weight of one, households

with two adults are given a weight of two, three adult households are given a weight of three, etc. In addition, a campaign-period national weight was also calculated, which is the product of the household weight and the regional weight. The regional weight was calculated based on the size of province or territory so that statistical results can be inferentially generalized to reflect the Canadian population.

Not surprisingly, the majority of unweighted survey participants were from Canada's two largest provinces, Ontario (38.8%) and Québec (24.7%). Some 83.5% of respondents reported being Christian, with the rest reporting either an "other religion" (4.0%) or no religion (12.5%). In terms of political ideology, on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being liberal and 10 being conservative, the mean score was 5.7, or leaning slightly more toward conservative. There were 51.8% female respondents and 48.2% male participants. Most of the respondents were either married or living with a common law partner (69.3%). The majority of the respondents were working for pay (63.3%), with 19.7% not working and 17.0% retired. Finally, the mean household income was \$58,919 with a standard deviation of \$39,902.

Due to fact that this survey includes multiple waves, some of which include questions not asked in other waves, the sample had to be reduced in order to lower the missing values that were based on respondents not being asked certain questions. For example, the question "If people really want to work, they can find a job" was asked only in the MBS, which means that respondents who participated in the CPS but not in the MBS did not have the opportunity to answer the question, and therefore their "response" to this question (i.e. missing value) was removed from analysis. After selecting out all of these respondents the final sample size for 1997 was 1,396, compared to the original

1,853 that returned the MBS.

2011 Canadian Election Study

The data for the 2011 survey include four data collection waves: 1) the campaign period survey (CPS), 2) the post-election survey (PES), 3) the mail-back survey (MBS), and 4) the web-based survey (WBS). As with the 1997 survey, the CPS was conducted through telephone interviews, and was completed with 4,308 respondents. The sampling method used was the same as the 1997 study. In the CPS, respondents were asked to provide their email addresses so that they could complete the WBS. As such, 2,329 (approximately 54%) of CPS respondents provided their email address, and 767 (or 33%) completed the WBS. Of the CPS respondents, 3,362 (approximately 78%) were re-interviewed for the PES via telephone. In the PES respondents were asked for their postal mailing address and, using this information, the MBS was sent and completed by 1,567 (approximately 46%) of the PES respondents (Northrup 2012). The same data weights were calculated for the 2011 survey as they were for the 1997 survey. The present analysis will include data from the CPS, PES, and the MBS (but not the WBS) due to the fact that, like the 1997 study, some of the items being analyzed were only asked in certain survey waves.

The majority of participants in the 2011 study were from Ontario (30.6%) and Quebec (28.7%). Three-quarters (74.5%) of the respondents reported being Christian, with the rest of the respondents reporting either no religion (19.8%) or “other” (5.7%). In terms of political ideology, on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being liberal and 10 being conservative, the mean score was 5.1, or leaning slightly toward conservative. There were 55.5% female and 44.5% male respondents. Most of the respondents were either married

or living with a common law partner (64.2%). The majority of respondents (56.8%) were working for pay; 10% were not working, and 33.2% were retired. Finally, the mean household income was \$78,102, with a standard deviation of \$61,080. Similar to the 1997 survey, some responses were selected out due to the high number of missing values for some items. After selecting out respondents who did not participate in some survey waves, the final sample size was 1,339.

Measures

The measures used for the current analyses include a dichotomous dependent variable, as well as four categories of independent variables. The four categories of independent variables include: neoliberal (individualistic) ideology items, attitudes toward racialized individuals, social and economic insecurity measures, and socio-demographic variables.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable being employed is a measure of support for punitive crime policy, and is measured by the following questionnaire item: “What is the BEST way to deal with young offenders who commit violent crime?” with response options being: 1= give them tougher sentences, and 0= spend more on rehabilitating them. In the 1997 data set, this variable included more response options, which comprised of (in addition to “give them tougher sentences” and “spend more on rehabilitating them”), “both” (3.9%), “restitution” (0.7%), “proactive” (1.4%), “change the Young Offenders Act” (0.5%), “corporal punishment” (0.3%), and “other” (0.7%). In order to maintain consistency with the 2011 survey, “be proactive,” and “restitution” categories were recoded into the

“spend more on rehabilitation” grouping, while “corporal punishment” was collapsed into the “give them tougher sentences” option. All other responses were set to system missing. Item frequencies for both the 1997 and 2011 surveys are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1: Item Frequencies for the Dependent Variable

| <i>Item</i> | <i>%</i> | |
|---|----------|------|
| | 1997 | 2011 |
| What is the BEST way to deal with young offenders who commit violent crime? | | |
| Give them tougher sentence | 60.1 | 53.7 |
| Spend more on rehabilitating them | 39.9 | 46.3 |

The logic of using such a variable to measure punitive attitudes is twofold. First, although there is another measure of punitive attitudes in an earlier survey (the 1993 CES) – namely “support for the death penalty” – it was decided to retain the former variable (and survey) because it measures a less punitive measure, which Canadians may be more supportive of given that the death penalty was abolished in 1976 (Government of Canada, Correctional Service of Canada 2007). Conversely, the death penalty is still a sentencing option in several American states, which means that Americans may be more supportive of such a sanction than Canadians. As such, the item measuring attitudes toward young offenders will likely be a more accurate, and therefore robust, predictor of punitive attitudes among Canadians. Second, the young offender item as a measure of punitive attitudes allows for a comparative analysis in that it was asked in both the 1997 and the 2011 surveys.

Independent Variables Measuring Individualistic Attitudes

The first category of independent variables is organized around items relating to individualistic attitudes about poverty and the welfare of citizens, and includes the following variables (Table 2):

1. Should the federal government spend more, less, or about the same as now on welfare? (1=Spend more, 2=Spend about the same as now, 3=Spend less).
2. The government should: 1=See to it that everyone has a decent standard of living, 2=Leave people to get ahead on their own.
3. People who don't get ahead should blame themselves, not the system (1=Strongly disagree, 3=Somewhat disagree, 5=Somewhat agree, 7=Strongly agree).
4. If people really want to work, they can find a job (1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Agree, 4=Strongly agree).

TABLE 2: Item Frequencies for “Individualization” Variables

| <i>Item</i> | <i>%</i> | |
|--|----------|------|
| | 1997 | 2011 |
| Government spending on welfare: | | |
| Spend more | 33.7 | 32.0 |
| Spend about the same as now | 49.2 | 51.3 |
| Spend less | 17.1 | 16.7 |
| The government should: | | |
| See to it that everyone has a decent standard of living | 72.4 | 81.4 |
| Leave people to get ahead on their own | 27.6 | 18.6 |
| People who don't get ahead should blame themselves, not the system | | |
| Strongly disagree | 10.4 | 14.7 |
| Somewhat disagree | 22.4 | 26.7 |
| Somewhat agree | 34.4 | 39.3 |
| Strongly agree | 32.8 | 19.3 |
| If people really want to work, they can find a job | | |
| Strongly disagree | 7.1 | 3.7 |
| Somewhat disagree | 23.4 | 21.9 |
| Somewhat agree | 49.0 | 52.8 |
| Strongly agree | 20.5 | 21.6 |

These items have been recoded so that all variables follow the same ordinal direction and then have been transformed into an “Individualization” index by standardizing their scores and creating a composite Z-score measure. The first two items were selected because they are measures of public support for actual welfare programs and spending. Respondents who believe there should be less spending on welfare and who think that the government should “leave people to get ahead on their own” are those who display low support for welfare as an institution and who believe that individuals should take responsibility for their own welfare, which are central tenets of a neoliberal doctrine. The third and fourth items measure respondents’ opinions and beliefs about economically marginalized individuals. Those who agree that individuals who do not “get ahead” in life should blame themselves, and who agree that individuals who really want to work should be able to find a job, are placing blame for marginalized positions on the individuals and are subscribing to the belief that individuals are responsible for their own social and economic situation, thereby ignoring the possible social causes of poverty and unemployment.

To measure the strength of correlation between the four “Individualization” variables, Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient and Cronbach’s alpha were employed. For the 1997 variables the correlation coefficients ranged from .222 to .306, which suggests a weak to moderate relationship. In measuring the reliability of the correlation, the result was a Cronbach’s alpha of .58, meaning questionable to weak reliability (George & Mallery, 2003).¹ For the 2011 “Individualization” variables, the Spearman’s

¹ It is important to note that while both the Spearman’s rho and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are rather low, the latter is dependent on both the number of items in a scale and the mean inter-item correlations (Gliem & Gliem, 2003). As such, one reason for the lower than desired Cronbach’s alpha is simply the result of only having four items in the calculation.

rho values ranged from .275 to .340, which suggests that the correlation between these variables is weak to moderate. The Cronbach's alpha for this correlation was .60, or questionable.

The "Individualization" index scores were then centred on the mean such that positive scores indicate attitudes that are above average and negative scores indicate scores that are below the average. Thus, positive scores reflect beliefs that are more individualizing than average, and negative scores reflect attitudes that do not align with the average individualistic ideology. When examining the normality of the distribution of the "Individualization" index, the skew and kurtosis values of both the 1997 and 2011 data were both within the +/- 2 range, which means that the distribution is normal. Further, upon examination of the histograms of the "Individualization" index for both 1997 and 2011, the distribution again appears normal in that there is no evidence of skew or kurtosis, and there are no significant outliers present.

TABLE 3: Mean Scores and Univariate Checks for "Individualization" Index

| <i>Item</i> | Skew | | Kurtosis | | M | | SD | |
|-------------------------|------|------|----------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1997 | 2011 | 1997 | 2011 | 1997 | 2011 | 1997 | 2011 |
| Individualization Index | .04 | .26 | -.61 | -.40 | 0 | 0 | 2.72 | 2.78 |

Independent Variables Measuring Attitudes toward Racialized Individuals

The second category of independent variables includes items that measure attitudes toward racialized individuals. These include:

1. How much do you think should be done for racial minorities: More? (0=No, 1=Yes).
2. How much do you think should be done for racial minorities: About the same? (0=No, 1=Yes).
3. How much do you think should be done for racial minorities: Less? (0=No, 1=Yes).
4. How do you feel about racial minorities? (0=really like to 100=really dislike).
5. Do you think Canada should admit more immigrants, fewer immigrants, or about the same as now? (1=More, 2=About the same, 3=Fewer).
6. We should look after Canadians born in this country first and others second (1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Agree, 4=Strongly agree).
7. Too many recent immigrants just don't want to fit into Canadian society (1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Agree, 4=Strongly agree).
8. Which statement comes closest to your own view? 0=Social and economic conditions make it impossible for Aboriginal peoples to overcome poverty, 1=If Aboriginal peoples tried harder, they could be as well off as other Canadians.
9. How do you feel about Aboriginal peoples? (0=really like to 100=really dislike).

These items have also been recoded so that all variables follow the same ordinal direction, with the exception of the variable “How much do you think should be done for racial minorities.” This variable has been split into three separate dichotomous variables with the response options being “no” and “yes” for how much support should be given to racial minorities (more, the same as now, or less). The rationale for splitting this variable was so that, in the analysis, positive, negative, and neutral attitudes toward racial

minorities can be measured separately against support for punitive crime policy.² In other words, by splitting the variable into discrete dichotomous variables, the findings will give a better illustration of how different attitudes toward racial minorities affect support for punitive crime policies. The variable indicating positive attitudes toward racial minorities is excluded from the analysis and is used as a comparison group for the variables measuring negative and neutral attitudes toward racial minorities. In other words, the results of “do less for racial minorities” and “do about the same as now for racial minorities” are generalizable only to the extent that they are in comparison to those that think more should be done for racial minorities (Tabachnick and Fidell 2013).

All items measuring attitudes toward racial minorities are analyzed separately in relation to the dependent variable, with the exception of the items measuring attitudes toward immigrants. These three items have been computed into an “Immigration” index by standardizing individual scores and creating a composite Z-score index.

The above items measure attitudes toward various racialized groups of people, and were included in order to measure attitudes toward a broad spectrum of racialized individuals. The theoretical literature implies that members of many different racialized groups can be, and are, conceptualized as the “criminal Other,” and are thus targeted by punitive crime and social policies. The implication, therefore, is that negative attitudes toward all racialized groups should provoke support for punitive measures.

In addition, items measuring attitudes toward Aboriginal people were included due to the widespread historical discrimination of Aboriginal people within Canada.

² Since the variable in its original form is measured at the ordinal level, it cannot be used in the regression model (i.e. all independent variables must be either continuous, dichotomous, or discrete).

These items measure both general attitudes toward Aboriginal people, as well as the extent to which the Canadian public blames Aboriginal people for their largely marginalized position within society. These items assess both attitudes of racial prejudice and the neoliberal model of individual responsabilization toward poverty and marginalization. By separating out the various groups of racialized individuals into different measures, the analysis will provide more accurate and precise results than if all indicators of negative attitudes toward racialized people were combined into one index. For example, it is possible that the negative attitudes held by Canadians toward Aboriginal people will predict support for punitive crime policies, but that negative attitudes toward other racial minorities do not predict support for punitive crime policy. Thus, if these items were combined into the same index it is possible that the results would be distorted.

TABLE 4: Mean Scores and Frequencies for Racialized “Othering” Variables

| <i>Item</i> | % | | M | | SD | |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1997 | 2011 | 1997 | 2011 | 1997 | 2011 |
| How much do you think should be done for racial minorities: More? | | | | | | |
| No | 71.4 | 64.4 | | | | |
| Yes | 28.6 | 35.6 | | | | |
| How much do you think should be done for racial minorities: Less? | | | | | | |
| No | 83.2 | 82.4 | | | | |
| Yes | 16.8 | 17.6 | | | | |
| How much do you think should be done for racial minorities: About the same? | | | | | | |
| No | 46.3 | 53.3 | | | | |
| Yes | 54.7 | 46.7 | | | | |
| How do you feel about racial minorities (scale)? | | | 38.9 | 24.8 | 22.7 | 22.3 |
| Which statement comes closest to your own view: | | | | | | |
| If Aboriginal peoples tried harder, they could be as well off as other Canadians. | 54.3 | 42.4 | | | | |
| Social and economic conditions make it impossible for Aboriginal peoples to overcome poverty. | 45.7 | 57.6 | | | | |
| How do you feel about Aboriginal peoples (scale)? | | | 40.2 | 75.3 | 22.4 | 22.2 |

The scores of the “Immigration” index, similar to the “Individualization” index, have been centred on the mean such that positive scores indicate attitudes that are above average and negative scores indicate attitudes that are below average. Thus, positive scores indicate more negative attitudes toward immigrants than average and negative scores indicate less negative attitudes toward immigrants compared to the average. To measure the strength of correlation between the three “Immigration” variables, Spearman’s rho was again used. For the 1997 variables the correlation coefficients ranged from .391 to .410, which suggests a moderate to strong relationship (Cronbach’s alpha of

.66 shows an acceptable reliability of correlation). For the 2011 variables the Spearman's rho values ranged from .415 to .456, which also suggests that the correlation between these variables is strong (Cronbach's alpha of .69 shows an acceptable reliability of correlation).

When examining the normality of the distribution of the "Immigration" index, the skew and kurtosis values for both 1997 and 2011 were all within the +/- 2 range, which means that the distribution is normal. Upon examination of histograms of the "Immigration" index, both the 1997 and 2011 distributions appear to remain within a normal distribution range, although the 1997 index appears to be slightly positively skewed.

TABLE 5: Item Frequencies for "Immigration" Variables

| <i>Item</i> | <i>%</i> | |
|--|----------|------|
| | 1997 | 2011 |
| Do you think Canada should admit: more immigrants, fewer immigrants, or about the same as now? | | |
| More | 9.0 | 12.6 |
| About the same | 45.3 | 60.8 |
| Less | 45.7 | 26.6 |
| We should look after Canadians born in this country first and others second. | | |
| Strongly disagree | 12.8 | 14.2 |
| Disagree | 34.7 | 45.1 |
| Agree | 33.1 | 26.5 |
| Strongly disagree | 19.5 | 14.2 |
| Too many recent immigrants just don't want to fit into Canadian society. | | |
| Strongly disagree | 5.9 | 7.2 |
| Disagree | 29.7 | 38.4 |
| Agree | 41.6 | 34.4 |
| Strongly agree | 22.7 | 20.0 |

TABLE 6: Mean Scores and Univariate Checks for “Immigration” Index

| <i>Item</i> | Skew | | Kurtosis | | M | | SD | |
|-------------------|------|------|----------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1997 | 2011 | 1997 | 2011 | 1997 | 2011 | 1997 | 2011 |
| Immigration Index | -.19 | .15 | -.65 | -.54 | 0 | 0 | 2.35 | 2.42 |

Independent Variables Measuring Social and Economic Insecurity

The last category of independent variables measures respondents’ feelings of social and economic insecurity. These include:

1. Over the past year, your personal financial situation has: 1=Become better, 2=Stayed about the same, 3=Become worse.
2. The policies of the Federal government have made your personal financial situation: 1=Better off, 2=Not made much difference, 3=Worse.
3. Are you worried about your job in the near future? (1=Not at all, 2=A little, 3=Somewhat, 4=A lot).
4. Over the past year Canada's economy has: Become better? (0= No, 1=Yes).
5. Over the past year Canada's economy has: Stayed about the same? (0= No, 1=Yes).
6. Over the past year Canada's economy has: Become worse? (0= No, 1=Yes).
7. Confidence in the police: 0=A great deal or quite a lot, 1=Not very much or none at all.

These items were included because they measure different aspects of social and economic insecurity, and cover a broad range of possible sources of insecurity. As discussed previously, research measuring social and economic insecurity has focused mainly on respondents’ personal financial situation, with the exception of one study

(King and Maruna 2009). By including micro and macro levels of operationalization, a more accurate illustration of economic insecurity is produced. Further, confidence in the police, as a measure of social insecurity, has not previously been analyzed in relation to support for punitive crime policies and will provide a novel approach to measuring insecurity.

The first three items (over the past year, your personal financial situation has become better, worse, etc., the policies of the Federal government have made your personal financial situation better, worse, etc., and are you worried about your job in the future) have been combined to create a “Personal Insecurity” index. These items are intended to measure the level of insecurity that respondents have over their own personal financial situation, and are measured separately from the rest of the “insecurity” variables in that the other items measure different aspects of insecurity, including economic insecurity and safety-related insecurity. Although the 2011 survey did not include the item “are you worried about your job in the future,” the item “loss of household income in the near future is likely, unlikely, etc.” was used instead. Although not a perfect match, this item was retained because it was the closest indicator of concerns about financial loss.

To measure the strength of correlation between the three “Personal Insecurity” variables Spearman’s rho was employed. For the variables in the 1997 data set, the correlation coefficients ranged from .05 to .30, which suggests a negligible to moderate relationship. In measuring the reliability of the correlation there was a Cronbach’s alpha of .32, meaning weak reliability. For 2011, the Spearman’s rho values ranged from .07 to

.39, which suggests that the correlation between these variables is negligible to moderate. The Cronbach’s alpha for this correlation was .39, or weak.

The “Personal Insecurity” index scores were also centred on the mean such that positive scores indicate attitudes that are above average and negative scores indicate scores that are below the average. Thus, positive scores reflect attitudes of higher personal financial insecurity than average and negative scores reflect attitudes of lower personal financial insecurity than average. When examining the normality of the distribution of the “Personal Insecurity” index, the skew and kurtosis values of both the 1997 and 2011 data are both within the +/- 2 range, which means that the distribution is normal. Further, upon examination of the histograms of the “Individualization” index for both 1997 and 2011 the distribution again appears normal in that there is no evident skew or kurtosis, and there are no significant outliers present.

TABLE 7: Mean Scores and Univariate Checks for “Personal Insecurity” Index

| <i>Item</i> | Skew | | Kurtosis | | M | | SD | |
|---------------------------|------|------|----------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1997 | 2011 | 1997 | 2011 | 1997 | 2011 | 1997 | 2011 |
| Personal Insecurity Index | .35 | .58 | -.32 | .67 | 0 | 0 | 2.01 | 2.06 |

The item measuring attitudes toward the economy has been split into three separate dichotomous variables with the response options being “no” and “yes” for whether the economy has gotten better, worse, or stayed the same. The rationale for splitting this variable was so that, in the analysis, opinions that are both negative and positive toward the economy can be measured separately against support for punitive crime policy. In other words, by splitting the variable into separate dichotomous variables

the findings will give a better illustration of how different opinions about the economy affect support for punitive crime policy. As with all discrete dichotomous variables in parametric multivariate analyses, the variable “economy is better” is removed from the analysis and used as a comparative measure for the other economy variables. In other words, the results of “the economy is the same” and “the economy is worse” are generalizable only to the extent that they are in comparison to those that think the economy has gotten better.

TABLE 8: Mean Scores and Frequencies for Social and Economic Insecurity Variables

| <i>Item</i> | <i>%</i> | |
|--|----------|------|
| | 1997 | 2011 |
| Over the past year, your personal financial situation has: | | |
| Become better | 16.8 | 15.5 |
| Stayed about the same | 55.0 | 63.3 |
| Become worse | 28.1 | 21.0 |
| The policies of the Federal government has made your personal financial situation: | | |
| Better off | 7.0 | 7.7 |
| Not made much difference | 68.5 | 79.5 |
| Worse | 24.5 | 12.8 |
| Worried about loss of job/income in the near future? | | |
| Not at all | 49.0 | 65.9 |
| A little | 17.4 | 22.5 |
| Somewhat | 18.8 | 7.8 |
| A lot | 14.8 | 3.9 |
| Over the past year Canada's economy has: Become better? | | |
| No | 62.1 | 65.2 |
| Yes | 37.9 | 34.8 |
| Over the past year Canada's economy has: Become worse? | | |
| No | 81.4 | 78.2 |
| Yes | 18.7 | 21.8 |
| Over the past year Canada's economy has: Stayed about the same? | | |
| No | 56.5 | 56.5 |
| Yes | 43.5 | 43.5 |
| Confidence in the police: | | |
| Quite a lot or great deal | 83.9 | 82.8 |
| Not very much or none at all | 16.1 | 17.2 |

Socio-demographic Variables

Lastly, the following socio-demographic items are included as control variables in order to assess for possible spurious effects: sex, income, highest level of education completed, region of residence (Ontario, prairies, west, and east), racial ethnicity, religious affiliation, political party affiliation, employment status, immigrant status, and marital status. As was shown in the literature review, these demographic characteristics have been linked to support for punitive crime policies. The variables that have been removed from the analysis and used as a comparative measures include: region: Quebec and “not working for pay.”

The variable age was originally included in the analysis in that it is a common socio-demographic item used in most quantitative studies. However, this item was removed after preliminary analyses showed that the inclusion of the variable was affecting the data such that the missing variables were statistically significant (they were not missing completely at random). As well, these analyses showed that age was not a significant predictor of support for punitive attitudes for either the 1997 or 2011 analyses, so to avoid problems with the overall models the age variable was removed.

Many recodes that were conducted with the socio-demographic variables were done so in a way that maintained consistency across both the 1997 and 2011 surveys. Because some items in both surveys were not asked in the same way, some of the variables needed to be recoded such that they included the same categories for each data set. For example, marital status was recoded to include only two response categories: married/living with common law partner, and separated/divorced/widowed/never married. Similar recoding was done for religious affiliation, employment status, and

ethnic background.³ The variable ethnic background is problematic, however, in that it has been recoded to include only racial minority and racial majority. The recoding of this variable is problematic in that it was recoded on the basis of geographic region and not specific race. Therefore, assumptions have been made such that individuals who reported that their ethnic identity is South American, for example, were coded as a “racial minority” but we cannot know this for certain. Due to the lack of a more suitable measure of racial or ethnic background, this variable is being used, with the acknowledgement of caution in interpreting the results.

Level of education was recoded such that the scores were centred on the mean, to the effect that positive scores reflect higher than average education and negative scores reflect lower than average education. For 1997 the average level of education was “completed technical college” and for 2011 it was “some technical college” (ranged from “no schooling” with a value of 1 to “professional/PhD” with a value of 11). The variable political ideology was also recoded to create a scale of “political left” to “political right” ranging from 0 to 10, respectively. The measure of “household income” was recoded to represent actual dollar amounts, by multiplying all values by 1000.

³ In addition to maintaining consistency across survey waves, items needed to be recoded into either dichotomous variables or discrete dichotomous measures, which are requirements for logistic regression models (Tabachnick and Fidell 2013).

TABLE 9: Mean Scores and Frequencies for Socio-demographic Variables

| <i>Item</i> | <i>%</i> | | <i>M</i> | | <i>SD</i> | |
|---|----------|------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | 1997 | 2011 | 1997 | 2011 | 1997 | 2011 |
| Sex | | | | | | |
| Male | 48.2 | 44.5 | | | | |
| Female | 51.8 | 55.5 | | | | |
| Marital Status | | | | | | |
| Married/Common law partner | 69.3 | 64.2 | | | | |
| Divorced, Separated, Widowed, Never married | 30.7 | 35.8 | | | | |
| Province | | | | | | |
| Eastern (Nfld., NB, NS, PEI) | 9.2 | 14.3 | | | | |
| Quebec | 24.7 | 28.7 | | | | |
| Ontario | 38.8 | 30.6 | | | | |
| Prairies (MB, SK) | 7.0 | 9.7 | | | | |
| Western (AB, BC) | 20.3 | 16.7 | | | | |
| Highest Level of Education Completed | | | 0 | 0 | 2.10 | 2.14 |
| Employment Status | | | | | | |
| Working for pay | 63.3 | 56.8 | | | | |
| Not working for pay | 19.7 | 10.0 | | | | |
| Retired | 17 | 33.2 | | | | |
| Religious Affiliation | | | | | 1.06 | |
| None | 12.5 | 19.8 | | | | |
| Christian | 83.5 | 74.5 | | | | |
| Other | 4.0 | 5.7 | | | | |
| Ethnic Background | | | | | | |
| Ethnic minority | 6.3 | 6.4 | | | | |
| Ethnic majority | 93.7 | 93.6 | | | | |
| Total Household Income | | | 58,919.62 | 78,102.71 | 39,902.62 | 61,080.43 |
| Were you born outside Canada? | | | | | | |
| Born in Canada | 89.0 | 86.7 | | | | |
| Born outside Canada | 11.0 | 13.3 | | | | |
| Which Political Party do you feel closest to? | | | 5.7 | 5.1 | 2.03 | 2.06 |

Analytical Procedures

The analytical procedures employed in conducting the statistical analysis have been conducted at the multivariate level. Logistic regression is being used due to the fact that the attributes of the dependent variable are dichotomous. The results of the logistical regression models for both 1997 and 2011 are then compared to determine if, over time, the impacts of neoliberalism have produced the expected outcomes. The following sections outline the results from the missing values analysis, and provides an overview of the multivariate technique that has been used and why it is most appropriate for this project.

Missing Values Analysis

Upon examination of the item frequencies in the 1997 survey, it was determined that several variables had a missing value that exceeded 5% of the entire sample. These variables included: “In your view, if Aboriginal people tried harder they could be as well off, or social and economic conditions make it hard for Aboriginal people to succeed?” (15.0% of the entire sample), the “Individualization” index (17.1% of the entire sample), the “Immigration” index (14.6% of the entire sample), “total household income” (25.4% of the entire sample), and “political ideology” (6.6% of the entire sample). Therefore, Little’s MCAR test was used to determine if the missing values are significant. The results showed that the missing values for these variables were missing completely at random ($p=.17$). As such, EM estimation was used to replace the missing values with predicted values in order to complete the data set (Tabachnick and Fidell 2013). The

same procedure was undertaken for the 2011 data. Results showed that the data were missing completely at random, thus EM estimation procedures were employed.

Multivariate Technique

The statistical procedure employed to undertake the analysis is a logistic regression model, using the block-enter method. Afterwards a comparative analysis between the 1997 and 2011 surveys is conducted. Logistical regression is deemed suitable because the outcome variable is dichotomous (Tabachnick and Fidell 2013). The first block model includes the social and economic insecurity variables in order to produce a zero-order baseline with the dependent variable. As mentioned previously, according to the theoretical literature, social and economic insecurity brings about greater support for individualistic ideologies, which in turn increases racialized “Othering.” It is this sequence that influences support for tough on crime policies. As such, insecurity is being measured first and independently of the other independent variables in order to determine if there is a relationship between insecurity and support for tough on crime policy. If such a zero-order correlation exists, the second block of the logistic regression model then includes the individualistic measures in order to determine if the initial relationship is a “true” one (i.e., it is not spurious). If there is a relationship, and it remains after including other variables, then it can be concluded that that relationship is authentic.

As mentioned, the second block model includes the “Individualization” index in that, according to the literature, individualizing poverty and welfare theoretically precedes racialized “Othering” and, in turn, influences it as well a support for punitive crime policies. As such, the “Individualization” index is being measured next in relation

to support for tough on crime policies. The third block model includes variables measuring racialized “Othering.” The last block model includes the socio-demographic independent variables. Separate regression models are conducted for both the 1997 and 2011 surveys.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESULTS

The following discussion outlines the results of both logistic regression models for the 1997 and 2011 data, and provides an overview of the comparative results from 1997 and 2011.

Logistical Regression Results for the 1997 CES

For the 1997 survey, the results from the first block of variables, that is, the social and economic insecurity variables, showed significant results only for the variable “the economy is the same as last year,” which was significant at the $p < .01$ level. As such, personal insecurity, confidence in the police, and believing the economy has gotten worse were not related to support for getting tough on violent young offenders. More specifically, the odds ratio for “the economy is the same as last year” was 1.49, which means that compared to respondents who believed the economy was getting better, individuals who believed it was the same as last year were one and a half times more likely to support punitive crime policies toward young offenders (See Table 10).

When adding in the second block of variables (the “Individualization” index), the variable “economy is the same as last year” remained significant, as well the “Individualization” index, which had an odds ratio of 1.27. This suggests that those who subscribe to an individualistic ideology for the causes of poverty and economic marginalization were 1.27 times more likely to support a tough on crime policy.

After adding the racialized “othering” variables, there was no change in the significance of the previous block entries. The “Immigration” index was significant (OR = 1.15), which suggests that those who display above average negative attitudes toward immigrants were 1.15 times more likely to support getting tough with violent young offenders. None of the other racialized “othering” variables were statistically significant.

Finally, as shown in Table 11, the results of the overall model, with all variables included, confirmed the authenticity of the previous block entries, with the following socio-demographic factors being significant: sex, all region variables (compared to Québec), racialized ethnicity, and a retired employment status. Thus, after controlling for socio-demographic factors, respondents who believed that the economy was the same as a year ago, who held individualistic ideologies, and who held negative attitudes toward immigrants were more likely to support punitive crime policy. In regards to the socio-demographic characteristics, respondents who were male, a racialized minority, and who were not retired (compared to those who were not working) were more likely to support tough on crime policy. As well, respondents in all provinces, in comparison to those that live in Quebec, reported more punitive attitudes.

Logistical Regression Results for the 2011 CES

For the 2011 survey, the results from the first block of variables, that is, the social and economic insecurity variables, showed significant results for the variables “the economy is the same as last year” and “confidence in the police”, which were both significant at the $p < .01$ level. As such, personal insecurity and believing the economy has gotten worse were not related to support for getting tough on violent young offenders. More

specifically, the odds ratio for “the economy is the same as last year” was .72 (Inv. OR=1.39), which means that, compared to respondents who believed the economy was getting better, individuals who believed it was the same as last year were 72% less likely to support tougher policies toward young offenders. The significant odds ratio for “confidence in the police” means that respondents who had a lot or a great deal of confidence in the police were 1.48 times more likely to support punitive crime policies than individuals who had little or no confidence in the police (See Table 10).

When adding in the second block of variables (the “Individualization” index), the variable “economy is the same as last year” did not remain significant, but the variable “confidence in the police” did, with relatively the same odds ratio (1.41). As well, the “Personal Insecurity” index became significant ($p < .05$) to the effect that those who had higher personal insecurity were 1.08 times more likely to support punitive crime policies. The “Individualization” index was also significant ($p < .001$), indicating that subscription to an individualistic ideology of welfare and economic marginalization increased the likelihood of support for tough on crime policy (OR= 1.36).

After adding the racialized “othering” variables, there was no change in the significance of “confidence in the police” or the “Individualization” index. However, “economy is the same” became significant again, with an odds ratio of .74 (Inv. OR = 1.35), and the “Personal Insecurity” index did not remain significant. The “Immigration” index was significant, ($p < .001$; OR= 1.36), which means that those who had above average negative attitudes toward immigrants were 1.36 times more likely to support getting tough with violent young offenders. One measure of attitudes toward Aboriginal people was also significant, such that those who believed that “if Aboriginal people tried

harder they could be as well off as other Canadians” were 2.27 times more likely to support punitive crime policy. In comparison to all other findings, this variable had the highest odds of predicting support for punitive crime policies. None of the other racialized “othering” variables were statistically significant.

Finally, the results of the overall model, with all variables included, confirmed the authenticity of the previous block entries, with the following socio-demographic factors being significant: education and political ideology (see Table 11). Thus, after controlling for socio-demographic factors, respondents who believed that the economy was not the same as a year ago, who held individualistic ideologies, and who held negative attitudes toward immigrants and Aboriginal people were more likely to support punitive crime policy. In regards to the socio-demographic characteristics, respondents who had lower than average education and who were more politically conservative were more likely to support tough on crime policies.

Comparative Results

In 1997, respondents who believed that the economy was the same as last year, as opposed to those that believed the economy was getting better, were more likely to support tough on crime policy. However, in 2011 the reverse was the case; meaning, respondents who believed that the economy was not the same as last year, compared to those who believed it was getting better, were more likely to display punitive attitudes. Another notable result is that, over time, confidence in the police was shown to be related to punitive attitudes, as can be seen in the 2011 data, such that those who had higher confidence in the police were more likely to support tough on crime policy. When adding

in the “Individualization” index, in both 1997 and 2011 “neoliberal” attitudes were related to punitive attitudes, to the effect that those who had more individualistic attitudes than average were more likely to support getting tough on violent young offenders. As well, the odds ratio of this index was consistent from 1997 to 2011 (1.18 for both). In regards to the racialized “othering” variables, the “Immigration” index was significant in both the 1997 and 2011 surveys, but the odds ratio of the index was slightly higher in 2011 (1.34), as opposed to 1997 (1.16). As well, the view that “if Aboriginal people tried harder, they could be as well off as other Canadians” was significant in 2011 but not in 1997, which means that this relationship developed over time.

The socio-demographic variables also produced some interesting comparative results. In 1997, sex, or more specifically, being male, was related to support for tough on crime, but by 2011 this relationship disappeared. The same was observed in region of residence; in 1997 all the regions, in comparison to Quebec, were significant predictors of punitive attitudes, but by 2011 relationships disappeared, meaning punitive attitudes could not be identified based on region of residence. As well, in 1997 “ethnicity”, or being a racialized “Other”, and “retired” (i.e., were less likely to support punitive crime policies), compared to those that were employed, were related to support for punitive crime policies, but by 2011 the relationship vanished. Conversely, in 2011 “level of education” and “political ideology” were related to punitive attitudes such that those who had lower than the average level of education and those that identified as politically conservative were more likely to have punitive attitudes. However, these relationships did not exist in 1997, which means they both developed over time and became indicators of punitive attitudes.

Table 10: Block Input Analysis for Odds Ratio for Measures Predicting Support for Punitive Crime Policy

| <i>Predictor</i> | <u>Social and Economic</u> | | <u>Individualization</u> | | <u>Racialized</u> | | <u>Socio-demographic</u> | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| | <u>Insecurity</u> | | <u>Ideology</u> | | <u>“Othering”</u> | | <u>Factors</u> | |
| | <u>1997</u> | <u>2011</u> | <u>1997</u> | <u>2011</u> | <u>1997</u> | <u>2011</u> | <u>1997</u> | <u>2011</u> |
| | OR | OR | OR | OR | OR | OR | OR | OR |
| Personal Insecurity Index | 1.0 | .99 | 1.05 | 1.08* | 1.02 | 1.07 | 1.00 | 1.06 |
| Economy is worse | 1.09 | 1.03 | 1.27 | 1.16 | 1.06 | .80 | 1.17 | .79 |
| Economy is the same | 1.49** | .72** | 1.60*** | .81 | 1.44** | .74* | 1.56** | .74* |
| Confidence in Police | 1.03 | 1.48** | .95 | 1.41* | .94 | 1.51* | .83 | 1.46* |
| Individualization Index | | | 1.27*** | 1.36*** | 1.20*** | 1.22*** | 1.18*** | 1.18*** |
| Do less for minorities | | | | | 1.88 | 1.43 | 1.61 | 1.47 |
| Do the same for minorities | | | | | 1.03 | 1.20 | .98 | 1.18 |
| Feelings toward minorities | | | | | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Immigration Index | | | | | 1.15*** | 1.36*** | 1.16*** | 1.34*** |
| View of Aboriginal people | | | | | 1.30 | 2.27*** | 1.32 | 1.97*** |
| Feelings toward Aboriginal people | | | | | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Sex | | | | | | | .71** | .90 |
| Region: East | | | | | | | 1.74** | 1.05 |
| Region: Ontario | | | | | | | 1.92*** | .84 |
| Region: Prairies | | | | | | | 1.83** | .86 |
| Region: West | | | | | | | 2.00*** | 1.06 |
| Religion: Other | | | | | | | 1.54 | .75 |
| Religion: Christian | | | | | | | 1.47 | 1.07 |
| Born in Canada | | | | | | | 1.08 | 1.21 |
| Ethnicity | | | | | | | .51** | .64 |
| Working | | | | | | | .88 | .71 |
| Retired | | | | | | | .58** | .64 |
| Marital Status | | | | | | | 1.18 | 1.06 |
| Education | | | | | | | .98 | .90** |
| Income | | | | | | | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Political Ideology | | | | | | | 1.03 | 1.15*** |
| <i>Total</i> | n=1309 | n=1317 | | | | | | |

Table 11: Logistical Regression Analysis for Measures Predicting Support for Punitive Crime Policy

| <i>Predictor</i> | <i>b</i> | | Odds Ratio | | 95% CI | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|--------------|------------|------|-----------|-----------|
| | 1997 | 2011 | 1997 | 2011 | 1997 | 2011 |
| Personal Insecurity Index | .00 (.04) | .06 (.04) | 1.00 | 1.06 | .93-1.08 | .98-1.14 |
| Economy is worse | .15 (.20) | -.23 (.20) | 1.17 | .79 | .78-1.73 | .53-1.17 |
| Economy is the same | .44 (.14)** | -.30 (.15)* | 1.56 | .74 | 1.17-2.01 | .55-1.00 |
| Confidence in Police | -.18 (.17) | .38 (.18)* | .83 | 1.46 | .60-1.16 | 1.02-2.08 |
| Individualization Index | .17 (.03)*** | .17 (.03)*** | 1.18 | 1.18 | 1.12-1.25 | 1.11-1.26 |
| Do less for minorities | .48 (.32) | .39 (.23) | 1.61 | 1.47 | .81-3.18 | .93-2.32 |
| Do the same for minorities | -.02 (.17) | .17 (.16) | .98 | 1.18 | .70-1.38 | .86-1.63 |
| Feelings toward minorities | .00 (.00) | .00 (.00) | 1.00 | 1.00 | .99-1.01 | .99-1.01 |
| Immigration Index | .15 (.04)*** | .29 (.04)*** | 1.16 | 1.34 | 1.08-1.25 | 1.24-1.44 |
| View of Aboriginal people | .27 (.16) | .68 (.16)*** | 1.32 | 1.97 | .97-1.80 | 1.43-2.71 |
| Feelings toward Aboriginal people | .00 (.00) | .00 (.00) | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00-1.01 | 1.00-1.01 |
| Sex | -.34 (.13)* | -.11 (.14) | .71 | .90 | .55-.92 | .68-1.19 |
| Region: East | .55 (.25)* | .05 (.23) | 1.74 | 1.05 | 1.07-2.82 | .66-1.65 |
| Region: Ontario | .65 (.18)*** | -.18 (.19) | 1.92 | .84 | 1.36-2.72 | .57-1.22 |
| Region: Prairies | .61 (.26)* | -.15 (.27) | 1.83 | .86 | 1.09-3.07 | .51-1.46 |
| Region: West | .69 (.18)*** | .06 (.23) | 2.00 | 1.06 | 1.40-2.86 | .68-1.67 |
| Religion: Other | .43 (.38) | -.29 (.31) | 1.54 | .75 | .73-3.25 | .41-1.37 |
| Religion: Christian | .39 (.20) | .066 (.18) | 1.47 | 1.07 | 1.00-2.17 | .76-1.51 |
| Born in Canada | .08 (.21) | .19 (.21) | 1.08 | 1.21 | .71-1.64 | .80-1.83 |
| Ethnicity | -.68 (.29)* | -.44 (.31) | .51 | .64 | .28-.90 | .35-1.19 |
| Working | -.13 (.18) | -.35 (.28) | .88 | .71 | .62-1.27 | .41-1.23 |
| Retired | -.55 (.23)* | -.45 (.28) | .58 | .64 | .37-.90 | .37-1.11 |
| Marital Status | .17 (.14) | .06 (.16) | 1.18 | 1.06 | .90-1.55 | .78-1.45 |
| Education | -.02 (.04) | -.11 (.04)** | .98 | .90 | .92-1.05 | .84-.97 |
| Income | .00 (.00) | .00 (.00) | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00-1.00 | 1.00-1.00 |
| Political Ideology | .03 (.03) | .14 (.04)*** | 1.03 | 1.15 | .97-1.10 | 1.07-1.24 |

*p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001.

CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION

The current study involves the investigation of different factors that predict punitive attitudes among Canadians; specifically, whether feelings of social and economic insecurity, attitudes that individualize poverty and marginalization, and negative attitudes towards racialized individuals predict these punitive attitudes. To conduct this analysis a logistic regression was performed on data collected in 1997 and 2011 from the Canadian Elections Survey (CES). The following discussion examines the implications of the results especially in terms of how they relate, or not, to the theoretical model, previous literature, and research questions outlined in previous chapters. As outlined in the Data and Measures chapter, five research questions informed the current project. The Discussion chapter is organized around the first four research questions, while the fifth research question (Have any of these relationships changed over time, and if so, in what ways?) is discussed throughout the chapter. This chapter also discusses the limitations of the current statistical analyses, and provides suggestions for future research, and ends with some concluding remarks in terms of the potential contributions that could be made from this research.

Insecurity and Support for Tough on Crime Policy

In terms of the four research questions that informed this work, the first question – do feelings of social and economic insecurity affect support for punitive crime policies? – provided mixed results. Results show that the only measure of insecurity correlated to