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
*H. S. Guild*

CANADA  
AND  
IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

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THESIS  
SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA  
FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF ARTS  
1914.  
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WILLIAM FORBES GUILD.

*Approved for  
M.A. Thesis  
Gilbert B. Wilson*



## P R E F A C E .

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The story of our Empire and the study of its future for many years has had for me a peculiar charm. To the lover of history the rise and fall of nations cannot fail deeply to impress the mind, and it is a natural, almost unconscious tendency to contrast features of their development with our own; to seek the cause of their decadence and apply the lesson to avert a similar fate. To do so, at some point or other leads us to the question of defence.

No one can be more sensitive than the writer of his limitations in dealing with this very important and difficult theme. Breadth of view and amplitude of knowledge, on an issue affecting a vast world Empire can only fully be attained by travel and by a study at first hand of those manifold conditions and facts, geographical and otherwise which in the subject of Imperial defence, even restricted in application to Canada, is so essentially a pre-requisite to intelligent discussion.

The extreme difficulty of properly dealing with such an intricate question as Imperial defence in the space of a short review is only realized when the attempt is made. The constant necessity of assumption - of sweeping generalization and even of important omission leaves one's argument open to attack and almost induces the view that a subject of more limited scope would for our purpose here have served us better. Of suitable themes connected with our

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## CHAPTER I.

### I N T R O D U C T I O N .

Of the making of books it is said there is no end. The statement is almost equally true or at any rate not beyond the bounds of truth that there is no end to what has been written and spoken on the subject of Imperial Defence and Canada's relation thereto. For almost half a century this theme, or some of its many phases, has from time to time, and of late years, continuously engaged the earnest thought and attention of statesmen, historians, politicians, constitutionalists, military authorities, naval experts and indeed practically all intelligent and serious-minded citizens.

We are not surprised to find therefore that the question is daily made the subject of editorial comment in our newspapers, particularly since the question of Canada's participation in the naval defence of the Empire has become an issue in our politics<sup>1</sup>. Magazine and journal, book and pamphlet are alike favourite channels utilized by students and writers for the communication of their views and ideas. It is here that we find some of the ablest discussions of an intricate problem. In addition cognizance is to be taken of a veritable mass of literature emanating from defence leagues, navy leagues, nationalistic clubs, peace societies and bureaus<sup>2</sup>, confederation leagues and imperialistic organizations, all bearing, directly

or indirectly, on some one or other phase of this exceedingly extensive subject. And last but not least in volume we might mention that large body of official and quasi-official literature contained in Hansard and in other reports of committees, conferences and parliamentary bodies.

All this written material which defies even a cursory perusal (not a little of it indeed being unworthy even of such, though in the main it represents real public opinion) is but an index of the intense public interest aroused in our subject. It is doubtful if in Canada any question<sup>3</sup> since confederation has aroused such heated discussion and controversy and attracted such widespread attention throughout the length and breadth of our land as the problem before us. Indeed it has aroused a world-wide interest and attention, for, the important bearing and influence of the solution of this question upon the nations of the world are openly recognized. Few can gainsay and none can overestimate the vital and tremendous importance to our Empire of a proper and sound solution. Great issues are at stake. On such a solution, some go so far as to say, may depend the future welfare, if not the very existence of the Empire. In view of the universal interest, but especially in view of the great importance attaching to the problem before us, it is submitted that no subject is more worthy of our earnest thought and consideration, nor can any more fittingly be made the topic of careful and serious study.

Such a study reveals the fact, the realization of which becomes more complete as we proceed in our investigation that many mistaken theories and wrong impressions obtain in certain quarters resulting and being manifest in illogical argument and fallacious reasoning. Some of the argument we regret to say seems prompted by a spirit of specious sophistry

and political expediency. Only honest mistake in a matter of such grave importance is pardonable. Apart from the argument which exhibits a 'mens rea' however there is often-times lacking the evidence of careful investigation and study. The subject is the last one to be pronounced upon from superficial impressions merely. Its importance forbids that even if its intricacy and complexity did not call for accurate thinking and clearest expression.

Many difficulties stand in the way of a clear analysis. Certain advantages will, it is hoped, follow from an enumeration at the outset of some of the more outstanding of these, and in directing the attention further to certain features of the problem which are together responsible for some unfortunate results. Simply to recognize these difficulties will help us to avert similar results or worse misfortunes and to appreciate the better, sound argument and clear opinions when we find them.

In the first place it should be remembered that we are dealing with a present situation which is ever changing. Bagehot experienced the force of this difficulty in sketching the constitution which he termed a 'living' subject, - one undergoing constant change. This difficulty is not felt by the historian who deals with the past or the events and their consequences during a stated period of time, but the author referred to is at pains to point out that "a contemporary writer who tries to paint what is before him is puzzled and perplexed, for what he sees is changing daily"<sup>4</sup>. We who are in the very midst and thick of this change may not always see in proper perspective the bearing of each new factor in the drama of the ever-present.



In our case too this difficulty is more marked in that the extent and rapidity of the changes materially altering or modifying the situation and conditions in matters relating to the defence of our country are very much greater than in the case of those changes affecting the growth and development of a constitution which, so far as relates to British institutions at any rate, are comparatively slow. In the field of our enquiry every day may bring to light some fact or development which adds a new aspect to some particular phase. Science and invention which are responsible for the dreadnought, the superdreadnought, the submarine, cruiser and torpedo boat destroyer have in this way alone brought about a complete change in naval warfare in the space of a single decade. Who can say what further startling effect may not be produced in a lesser space of time by the science of aviation, or what will be the full import and final effect of the opening of the Panama Canal? There is moreover the possibility of our study being rudely interrupted or our views and opinions shattered or coloured by some transient attitude of another nation. Treaties, ententes, alliances are continually being made and unmade. The existing facts of today may justify a complete reliance on the state of some international relationship wholly unwarranted in the added knowledge of the immediate future. One year our relations with a certain power may be the most cordial, the next may see them strained to the snapping point.

Thus, not only do we experience in greater degree the difficulty of the constitutionalist, but we have a further extension of the same difficulty in that the future element plays a far more important role in our enquiry. Our policy of defence is framed to meet the estimated requirements of future conditions. Great Britain's programme of ship-building

for instance is planned for several years to come. We must lay down so many ships in 1915, such a number in 1918, and so on. These requirements are based largely on the programmes of other nations which are also drawn with an eye to the future. But none of us can read the future with absolute precision. We do not know when or from what source will come the danger, if indeed it come at all. The statesman, Cassandra-like, may but how are we to know the statesman until he stands revealed in the light of tomorrow? It is at once seen that this necessary forecasting of the future introduces a very uncertain element into our study and is alone accountable for the distinction between the 'emergency' and 'permanent' policies of our political parties. If politicians differ on matters that are past and present there is infinitely greater latitude and opportunity for divergence of opinion as to what is to happen in the future, and consequently on the question of the policy to be adopted. Little wonder that there are conflicting opinion and schisms on this question, in which above all matters it is essential that unanimity prevail.

A second main source of difficulty lies in Canada's anomalous position. What is Canada? What is the British Empire? True we have in some degree common conceptions of the significance of these names. Geographically speaking for instance our conception of Canada is exact and definable although in some quarters a deplorable lack of a true conception or knowledge of Canada, her extent and resources, is manifest<sup>5</sup>. Her role in history is equally definable. It is in regard to her constitutional status that the difficulty arises.

Thirty years ago the difficulty was not experienced. Canada was then in common with the other self-governing

dominions of the Empire styled a colony plain and simple, and our Empire has in consequence frequently been called a "Colonial Empire"<sup>6</sup>. No one questioned the use of the term. During recent years however there has been a quickening sense of nationhood among Canadians which has demanded greater recognition. Her steady progress following confederation, the noticeable increase in her population, her growing popularity in the eyes of other countries as a possible future home, the increasingly large measure of self-government she has enjoyed, and not least of these causes her glorious participation in the Boer War, have all led Canada gradually to realize the change in herself. Reflection gives rise to expression<sup>7</sup>. Her consciousness of nationhood could not but force such a recognition from the so-called Mother Country, a recognition tardily given<sup>8</sup>, but now tacitly and even openly admitted<sup>9</sup>. "Canada is a nation", so that even the poet sings "Last born of nations, the offspring of freedom".

And yet the statement is not the whole truth. As a nation she differs from the United States or France, opinion in one quarter to the contrary notwithstanding<sup>10</sup>. The difference lies in her connection with the British Empire. This it is which constitutes the anomaly referred to. History affords no precedent for her position, nor does it afford an example of an Empire such as the British Empire.

The word "Empire" when used in reference to territory connotes a supreme power or sovereignty exercised by one country over another or as it is defined in Murray's dictionary "an aggregate of subject territories ruled over by a sovereign state". In this strict sense the use of the words in the expression 'the British Empire' is correct only in such a

relationship as that existing between Great Britain and India, and so the reference to our sovereign as Emperor of India is strictly accurate. Even in this case however it is pointed out that the word 'Empire' should refer strictly to the Indian Territory alone and not in addition to that of Great Britain, the ruling state. But as expressive of the relationship existing between Great Britain and the colonies so-called, the appellation is a mis-nomer and in the words of Lord Milner "with the idea of ascendancy or domination inevitably associated with it a very unfortunante mis-nomer".

And so we must distinguish carefully between our empire and that of those of the old world whether Persian or Macedonian, Roman or Turkish, which were founded on conquest and maintained by force. Ancient history affords but one nearly similar organization in the Grecian confederacies or leagues. Only federation was possible in the case of the Grecian states for the city was a state, there being indeed but one word  $\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\varsigma$  for either of our ideas and each new city or colony founded was a distinct state with no political connection with the one from which its founders came. This lack of nexus in the Grecian states marks thus the chief distinction between them and our empire, but it is a distinction which in our opinion loses weight as time goes by for the political connection between us and Great Britain however important theoretically and legally has since Seeley's day loomed less large in importance with Canada's rise to nationhood already noted. Some would even urge that we are actually in a position not greatly dissimilar to that of the old Grecian states, but there is undoubtedly apart even from the legal tie of the Crown a definite and tangible connection between us and the Empire not characteristic of Hellenism. It may be too,

that the secret of success of British institutions and the British Empire alike is based on a dependency on convention and understanding rather than upon finely-spun theories of organization and colonial government. And so whatever be the actual position, whatever be the various views which in fact are held of that position and our status in the British Empire, the situation, it is conceded, is one which bristles with difficulties when we come to a study of Imperial defence.

Opinion differs as to the result of this position of affairs on the subject of defence. One section believes that the tendency in the future will be for Canada to grow into real nationality and gradually to become more like other nations. What section at least favours a local navy. Another group labours for closer union between Canada and Great Britain and prays for Imperial federation<sup>12</sup> or organic union - they find it easier to respond to a suggested contribution towards the maintenance of one Imperial navy. Others fluctuating between these two divisions advocate policies accordingly. Our point then is made, that much difficulty in our subject is due to Canada's peculiar and anomalous position in her relationship with Great Britain and the British Empire. And whatever be the final result none will deny the effect of the present situation as an exceedingly disturbing factor in our investigation.

A third difficulty remains to be noted, a difficulty due to the great scope and intricacy of our enquiry. The subject 'Defence' is many-sided and may be discussed from various viewpoints. To begin with it is dual in nature, being partly scientific and partly political. In the former aspect the subject again presents two divisions, namely, military and naval warfare, each of which alone constitutes a

very wide field. The conditions and principles of the one are in most respects quite different to and independent of those of the other. They are indeed two distinct sciences, each founded on different considerations, each demanding special knowledge and special training.

Another feature of this difficulty is that warfare or defence is not an exact science. All things are possible<sup>13</sup>, many contingencies are to be provided against. Moreover much of our preparation for war and defence is based on theory and has not been tried in the fire of actual practice. Theorists do not always agree. Some for example would contend that the naval armament of Great Britain is sufficient and ample for all purposes<sup>14</sup>; others maintain that its condition and dimensions are such as to justify disquiet and create alarm<sup>15</sup>. Some protest with vigour that Great Britain's policy of voluntary military service is abject folly, that only by universal training can she raise an army commensurate with her requirements<sup>16</sup>. Others decry what they conceive to be a form of conscription and urge the uselessness of any army however large; for, British safety, they claim, admittedly lies in the navy, her first arm of defence. In so far then as our subject is scientific it is speculative, uncertain. Difference of opinion therefore in the science is to be expected; there cannot fail to be a corresponding difference of opinion in the political aspect.

In this latter aspect we shall not anticipate our argument by enlarging here upon the great divergence of opinion and the considerations responsible for such as they are matters of common knowledge. To do so would be to magnify the difficulties presented by crosscurrents of public opinion in-

duced in part by the conflicting forces of imperialism, nationalism and pacifism. Sufficient be it simply to name these phases of the political aspect which raise, apart from the purely political, manifold considerations, geographical, historical, ethnological and constitutional. Our purpose is merely to suggest the tremendous range of our subject, its numerous phases, its infinite ramifications and inevitable complications.

That these three difficulties (others might be mentioned) are experienced and recognized by students of imperial defence in general is clear from the terse summary of one author in these words:-

"No empire in ancient nor yet modern times, has, when providing for its security been faced with a problem so complex as the British Empire of today is faced with. Its vast superficial area, its wide dissemination over the face of the earth, the extraordinary diversity in strategical conditions which manifests itself in connection with its individual component parts, the existence of acute racial problems in certain parts of its states, and not in others, the fact that the great oversea Dominions are in a constitutional sense virtually independent and that they are only linked to the Mother Country by allegiance to the Crown and by the ties of sentiment - all these factors combine with each other to render the question of Imperial defence one of abnormal intricacy."

Enough has been said to suggest the infinite scope of our enquiry, its interest and importance, its intricacy and complexity, and the difficulties in our path. Two qualities are very essential to an intelligent and valuable discussion, the one, a knowledge of history and political science, the other, a fearless and conscientious regard for the truth. By the former we mean not merely a knowledge of historical fact, what we might term an informational knowledge. Admittedly it is very necessary that we have "that minimum of information without which all discussion of Imperial problems is barren if not productive of mischief itself", but in addition there is

insight into the essential principles underlying both historical and political science by which we distinguish the substance from the shadow, by which we may know the tendency of the times, by which we may forecast the future and formulate policy accordingly, an office so admirably suggested by the expressive phrase "telescope of history". Without this and a serious regard for truth our study cannot fail to be barren of good result.

And now we may proceed to a closer examination of the conditions and principles of Imperial defence as affecting Canada. It is our purpose in the following chapter to deal briefly with the military aspect of the subject. The remaining chapters will be devoted to the naval problem - the storm-centre of our enquiry.



## CHAPTER II.

### M I L I T A R Y   D E F E N C E .

It is pleasant to direct our course for a time into the less controversial field of military defence for here we find comparative unanimity of opinion. Even before confederation it was adopted as a guiding principle that the Colonies should provide as far as possible for their own military defence, this being recognizedly a burden more or less incident upon the gift of responsible government. In 1863 the Colonial Office announced to the Australian Commonwealth that Britain would no longer be under the expense of maintaining troops in Australia and these were gradually withdrawn until in 1870 her complete military organization was provided and controlled by Australia herself<sup>18</sup>.

In Canada a similar policy was adopted and with confederation an arrangement arrived at whereby the Dominion Government undertook at an annual expense then of \$1,000,000.00 (today increased to \$10,000,000.00), to provide in some measure such military protection as was deemed necessary. It is remembered, however, that British Regulars joined with Colonial troops in the suppression of the locally historic rebellion of 1870; but, in the North West Rebellion of 1885 the volunteer militia alone engaged, with the assistance and the supervision, it is true, of General Middleton and Staff officers loaned from