Understanding Solidarity: The Role of Emotions and Inclusive Victim Consciousness Among Gender and Ethnic/Racial Groups in Canada

by

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Abstract

Oppressive and discriminatory systems, laws, and policies impact people collectively over many generations, such as Indigenous Peoples in Canada. Reconciling such harms requires a collective effort from many within a society, meaning it is important to understand who is likely to be a source of support and why. Certain groups, such as women and racialized people, are especially likely to express solidarity, yet the underlying reasons for this may differ. In this dissertation, I examined how gender and ethnic/racial background relate to intergroup solidarity and the potential drivers of these relationships: inclusive victim consciousness and emotional responses to injustice. This project included three studies. First, to ensure that the measures I used were psychometrically robust, in Study 1, I developed multi-item scales that measured several emotional domains. In an online study, 280 university students learned about discrimination toward Indigenous Peoples in the child welfare system and then shared how they felt. Using factor analyses, I examined, identified, and retained items to develop scales that measure the domains of love, anger, sadness, feeling sorry, and hope. Further, configural invariance testing suggested the factor structure was similar between gender and ethnic/racial groups. Using these scales, in Study 2, I examined the relationships among gender, ethnicity/race, inclusive victim consciousness, emotions, and solidarity among 352 university students. In Study 3, I examined whether findings generalized in a diverse national sample of 612 adults from across Canada. Using *t*-tests, correlational analyses, and path analyses, the general pattern of results from Studies 2 and 3 suggest that (1) women express stronger emotions than men when they learn about injustice, and some feelings, such as empathy and feeling sorry, in turn, predict greater solidarity; (2) Racialized participants feel a greater sense of inclusive victim consciousness and in some circumstances, stronger emotions than White participants, which may, in turn, predict

more solidarity; and (3) of all emotions, empathy is a particularly strong predictor of solidarity, whereas anger is not a significant predictor once other emotions are accounted for. I end with reflections on strengths and limitations, applying an Indigenous lens to quantitative research, and theoretical and applied considerations.

Keywords: Solidarity, inclusive victim consciousness, emotions, gender, ethnicity/race, Indigenous Peoples

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my late father, Vince Fontaine, and my late cousin, Tonya Field. My father believed that artistic expression has the power to bring about transformative societal change and reconciliation. Guided by this vision and through his music, he built countless relationships between people from all walks of life and brought awareness to many critical issues our community has faced. His spirit, teachings, and legacy will always live on in his music. Raised in part by my father, my cousin Tonya was also incredibly committed to her community. Known for making people feel like family, she dedicated her career to reunifying families impacted by the child welfare system. Her kindness, compassion, and empathy illuminated the path for many. We love you deeply and miss you both every single day.

Join the parade today

Let them see our light

Show them the path we're creating

Toss all your fears away

I know we have the right

There is no reason or rhyme for separating

Stars are moving, spinning, it's beginning

People, we're gonna have our say

Cause we're getting closer, so much closer

Pretty soon tomorrow will be today

Let's walk this path together

-The Path, Indian City (2021)

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Understanding Solidarity: The Role of Emotions and Inclusive Victim Consciousness Among Gender and Ethnic/Racial Groups in Canada

There are many social issues of pressing concern globally that require change at the system level. Within Canada, it is critically important for everyone to advance reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples. Though not exhaustive, people in Canada must work to end boil water advisories in First Nations communities and guarantee the Government of Canada upholds the conditions of a class-action settlement agreement with those affected (Stefanovich, 2020; Stefanovich & Raycraft, 2021); ensure Indigenous women, girls, and two-spirit are safe from violence (National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, 2019); affirm, respect, and protect Indigenous rights (Jones, 2020); and reform systems in which Indigenous families are overrepresented, such as child welfare (Dawson, 2020). Though change can be slow, public support and collective action can lead to positive movement. For example, residents of Shoal Lake 40, a Manitoban First Nation under a long-term boil water advisory, along with their many non-Indigenous supporters, successfully secured government funding to build "Freedom Road" after years of tireless campaigning. This allowed the community to build a water-treatment plant and road so that community members could safely travel in and out year-round (Indigenous Services Canada, 2019; Edwards, 2019). To address inequality and build a society that is just for all, people must collectively support and advocate for system change.

Though there are many important issues affecting Indigenous people, addressing the high number of Indigenous children within the child welfare system is arguably of greatest concern. Consistent with this, the first five Calls to Action in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's (2015a) report on the Indian Residential School system relate to addressing this issue. As well, in 2017, then Canadian Indigenous Services Minister Jane Philpott called the disproportionate

number of Indigenous children within the child welfare system a "humanitarian crisis" (Barrera, 2017), as nearly 90% of children in care are of Indigenous heritage in provinces such as Manitoba (Manitoba Legislative Review Committee, 2018). Families who become involved with the child welfare system often experience life-altering consequences. Both mothers and children suffer when children are taken into care. After their children are apprehended, mothers are more likely to develop mental health (as indicated by anxiety and suicide), physical health (as indicated by physician visits, hospitalization, and prescription use), and substance use problems (Wall-Wieler et al., 2017; Wall-Wieler et al., 2018a; Ritland et al., 2021). Likewise, children in care are more likely to struggle in school, live with more mental health issues, experience homelessness after "aging out" of the system, and become involved in the criminal justice system (Brownell et al., 2015; Fowler, 2017; Alberton et al., 2020; Brownell et al., 2020).

Systems are not simply policies. Systems are made up of people and, ultimately, people must stand in solidarity with others and support change for circumstances to improve. Thus, it is important to understand who is most likely to stand in solidarity so that those wishing to enact social change know who to approach for support. For this dissertation, I focused on how gender and ethnic/racial[1] background relate to solidarity. I also examined personal and psychological factors that may explain these relationships, with a focus on how people respond emotionally to injustice and experiences of collective harm and oppression. Before reviewing these factors, however, I first provide context surrounding the high number of Indigenous children within the child welfare system.

[1] Within Canada, "ethnicity" is the preferred term, whereas in other places, "race" may be preferred. Though I acknowledge that there are differences between these terms, for the purpose of this dissertation, I will use these terms interchangeably to refer to people's population group based on the origins of their ancestors.

Historical and Current Systemic Discrimination Within Canada

Indian Residential Schools

Canada, like other settler-colonial nations, has long attempted to forcibly assimilate Indigenous Peoples into Euro-centric Canadian society through various laws, policies, and systems, with the most well-known being the “Indian Residential School” system (Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996a; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015a). Starting in the 1820s in what would later become Canada, Christian missionaries began operating boarding schools for Indigenous children with the aim of “civilizing” and converting them to Christianity (Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996a; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015a). After Canada’s confederation in 1867, the federal government began funding these church-run schools, and, starting in the 1880s, started to expand this system significantly (Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996a; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015a). The purpose of these schools was to end Indigenous nations’ political, cultural, and spiritual institutions, which Canada saw as inferior and a threat to its interests (Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996a; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015a). Primarily run by Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, and Presbyterian churches, these schools were intentionally located far from children’s homes to limit family and community influence and remained in operation until the mid-1990s (Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996a; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015a). The schools were overcrowded, underfunded, and provided poor-quality education. Staff and clergy banned Indigenous languages and cultural practices, kept siblings apart, and frequently abused and neglected the children. Children were often profoundly lonely, malnourished, and contracted diseases at high rates, and, tragically, records document that

thousands of students died (Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996a; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015a). Today, many children remain missing. In recent years, Indigenous communities have begun the difficult work of searching for these children and have since identified over 2,000 more potential unmarked burials at former school sites (Office of the Independent Special Interlocutor, 2023). As would be expected, these schools have had deep ramifications.

Collective Trauma and Legal Aftermath

Destructive historical events, such as the implementation of Residential Schools, can continue to harm groups in profound ways many years after they have occurred, a response that is referred to as collective trauma (Hirschberger, 2018; Li et al., 2023), historical trauma (Brave Heart, 1998; Duran, 2019), or privity (Starzyk & Ross, 2008). Though the last Residential School closed nearly three decades ago, many Indigenous families still feel the aftermath of collective trauma. Not only have the students who survived this "school" system been heavily affected, their children and grandchildren have been as well. In support of concepts such as historical and intergenerational trauma (Brave Heart, 1998; Duran, 2019), Indigenous youth and adults who have a family history of Residential School attendance experience more psychological distress, have more frequent thoughts of suicide and attempts, use addictive substances more frequently, and report worse physical health than Indigenous youth and adults who do not have a family history of attendance (Bombay et al., 2014; McQuaid et al., 2022; Toombs et al., 2022). The serious human rights abuses that occurred within these schools have had legal ramifications as well.

Survivors of this school system, having been deeply affected by these traumatic experiences, launched a class-action lawsuit against the Government of Canada. In 2006, the

parties reached a settlement that included an agreement for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to be established to gather and share Survivors' testimonies (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015a). After several years of statement gathering, during which thousands of Survivors and intergenerational Survivors shared their stories, commissioners concluded that the Indian Residential School system amounted to cultural genocide in their final 2015 six-volume report. Since, many others, including the Pope of the Roman Catholic Church and Canadian Members of Parliament, have acknowledged that the system was genocide (Raycraft, 2022). Sadly, Canada's history of separating Indigenous families and removing children from the influence of their cultures did not end here.

The Sixties Scoop

The Indian Residential School system is not the only way Canadian policies, laws, and institutions have harmed Indigenous families. Starting in the 1950s, during an era now commonly known as the "Sixties Scoop," child welfare authorities apprehended thousands of Indigenous children from their families and adopted them out into primarily middle-class White families across Canada, the United States, and other countries (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996b; Sinclair, 2007; Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015b). This practice was often done without family and community knowledge or consent and justified by questionable ideological and economic concerns, rather than abuse or neglect (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996b; Sinclair, 2007; Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015b). In a 1985 report on this era entitled "No Quiet Place," investigator Justice Edwin Kimelman claimed that the child welfare system's policies amounted to cultural genocide. Like the Residential School system, the "scoop" has had long-lasting painful consequences for many adoptees and their birth families. Survivors were forced to assimilate into a foreign culture, many faced

significant racism, and many adoptions broke down (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996b; Sinclair, 2007; Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015b). Survivors continue to suffer because of damage to their cultural identity, disconnection from family and community, and other traumatic experiences (Kodeeswaran et al., 2022). Like Residential School Survivors, former adoptees launched a class action lawsuit and reached a settlement agreement with the Government of Canada in 2017 for the suffering they experienced and have called for a federal inquiry (CBC News, 2021). These traumatic experiences, and their impact on the health of Indigenous families, have in turn set in motion a cycle of continued involvement in systems like child welfare.

Cyclical Effects

Researchers have found that children whose caregivers attended Residential Schools are at increased risk of becoming involved with the child welfare system, with involvement in child welfare sometimes continuing for multiple generations. Indigenous adults who had a parent attend Residential Schools were nearly four times more likely to be apprehended during the Sixties Scoop era than Indigenous adults who did not have a family history of attendance (Bombay et al., 2020). In turn, and continuing the cycle of family separations, former mothers in care are more likely to have their children apprehended than mothers who were never in care (Wall-Wieler et al., 2018b). Cycles of trauma that were set in motion by Residential Schools, and further compounded by child welfare policies during the Sixties Scoop, are still maintained today.

Millennial Scoop

Many have argued that the present-day child welfare system shares many similarities with Residential Schools and policies during the Sixties Scoop, and continues to traumatize

Indigenous children by separating them from their families, communities, and culture (McKenzie et al., 2016; CBC Radio, 2018; Choate et al., 2021; Stefanick & Tait, 2024). Further, many have voiced that most apprehensions today are justified by child welfare workers' concerns regarding neglect, often rooted in poverty and housing-related issues that caregivers have limited control over, rather than abuse (Brittain & Blackstock, 2015; Sterritt, 2017; Stefanick & Tait, 2024). Like Residential School and Sixties Scoop Survivors, Indigenous children and families affected by the "Millennium Scoop," the title given to the most recent era of mass child apprehensions that occurred from 1992 to 2019, have also recently launched a class action lawsuit (Aziz, 2022). This lawsuit claims that Canada did not take reasonable steps to protect Indigenous children's language, heritage, spirituality, and traditions, and as a result, families have suffered psychological, emotional, and spiritual harm (Kirkup, 2023). Disappointingly, Canada has not learned from its past mistakes and has continued to cause deep harm.

Systemic Discrimination in Canadian Law

Though failure to learn from the past and break cycles of collective trauma has contributed to Indigenous overrepresentation within the child welfare system in the present-day, longstanding and legally entrenched systemic discrimination in the provision of social, educational, and health services has significantly worsened the situation. Today, the relationship between the Government of Canada and many First Nations is still governed by the *Indian Act*, an act which, among other legal powers, determines who is registered as a legal status "Indian" (Fryer & Leblanc-Laurendeau, 2019). Through section 91(24) of the *Constitution Act, 1967,* "Indians, and Lands reserved for Indians" are under the legislative authority of the federal government (Fryer & Leblanc-Laurendeau, 2019). In contrast, in most areas of Canada, provincial governments have jurisdictional authority over the health, educational, and social

services citizens receive (Fryer & Leblanc-Laurendeau, 2019). This jurisdictional overlap has caused disputes between federal and provincial governments over who is responsible for providing services to Indigenous Peoples (Fryer & Leblanc-Laurendeau, 2019). Typically, for First Nations living on reserve, public services such as education and child welfare are federally funded and are not equivalent to provincially funded services other Canadians receive (Parliamentary Budget Officer, 2016; 2020). Because of jurisdictional disputes and unequal funding provided by federal and provincial governments, many families have experienced delays in accessing services or have received services that are substandard and inadequate, fueling unnecessary family separations (Blackstock, 2010, 2016; First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, n.d.). Discrimination has consequences: Indigenous peoples have sought justice for their experiences.

Legal Challenges

In seeking legal recourse for the harmful impact of these laws, in 2007, the Assembly of First Nations and the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society filed a complaint to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, alleging that the Government of Canada was providing inequitable and insufficient funding for child and family services to First Nations on reserve (Indigenous Services Canada, 2021; First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, n.d.). In 2016, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruled that the Government of Canada was racially discriminating against First Nations children on reserve and ordered the government to immediately cease its discriminatory practices (Indigenous Services Canada, 2021; First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, n.d.). Three years later, in 2019, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ordered the Government of Canada to compensate First Nations children affected by this systemic discrimination, along with parents or grandparents whose children were taken

unnecessarily from their care (Barrera & Stefanovich, 2019; Parliamentary Budget Officer, 2020). Despite the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruling, change and reparations have been slow. Since the 2016 ruling, the Government of Canada faced many non-compliance orders and filed multiple appeals to prevent compensation (Jackson, 2020). After several failed negotiations (Stefanovich, 2022), in April 2023, the Government of Canada, the Assembly of First Nations, and the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society reached a revised $23.3-billion agreement (Fiddler & Walsh, 2023) that the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal approved in July 2023 (Major, 2023). The implementation process for compensation is expected to begin in 2024 (Government of Canada, 2024). This will be an important initial step toward advancing reconciliation.

Reconciliation and Solidarity

It takes significant time and substantial effort from many to repair harm and reconcile after serious, longstanding discrimination and abuse. Over 15 years have passed since the Assembly of First Nations and the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society brought forward their complaint to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. It is encouraging to see that, because of many people’s tireless advocacy work, First Nations children and their families will receive compensation. Yet, compensation is only an initial first step toward reconciliation. Like other Survivors, families impacted by the child welfare system must be able to tell their stories, have their truth documented, and have their experiences acknowledged and honored by the larger public. Further, services within the child welfare system must be redesigned in such a way as to ensure that families can heal from collective, intergenerational trauma, and thrive. To do so will be no easy undertaking and will take much work from many in Canada. Educators, writers, and others within media can share and bring awareness to families’ stories; social workers, mental

health providers, and other health professionals must work with Indigenous communities to develop culturally appropriate social services; and "ordinary people" can witness how change unfolds over the coming years and hold those with power accountable to ensure we continue to move forward in a good way. Social change, such as this, requires collective effort grounded in strong relationships. If our aim is to bring people together, it is valuable to understand who is likely to be a supportive advocate and why.

Identity, Collective Experiences of Harm, and Solidarity

One of the most well-known theories of social change is the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA; Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Van Zomeren et al., 2011; Van Zomeren et al., 2018). At the heart of this theory is the importance of identity; when a person has a psychological tie to a group seeking change (i.e., they adopt a politicized identity), they are more likely to engage in collective action. In addition to identity, when a person believes in the group's ability to achieve their goals (i.e., efficacy), feels the situation is unfair (i.e., perceived injustice and anger), and judges the situation to violate their core beliefs about right and wrong (i.e., moral convictions), they are also more likely to engage in collective action (SIMCA; Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Van Zomeren et al., 2011; Van Zomeren et al., 2018). Importantly, one need not be a member of a disadvantaged group seeking change for identity to still be relevant. This is because identity and moral motivations are especially intertwined. For example, if a person considers racial discrimination an issue that violates their moral beliefs and they witness discrimination, they may self-categorize as part of a politicized group of people that will not tolerate such discrimination (Van Zomeren et al., 2018). Moral convictions may lead outgroup members to adopt a politicized identity, but other factors may also influence why people identify with a group seeking change.

Historically, most social psychological research on intergroup relations has focused on relationship dynamics between disadvantaged and advantaged groups, such as between Black and White people in the United States (Burson & Godfrey, 2020). In recent years, however, researchers have started to study "intraminority relations," a field that focuses on understanding relations among social groups that have been marginalized due to an aspect of their social identity, such as race, gender, or sexual orientation (Burson & Godfrey, 2020). When marginalized groups feel a sense of similarity, have a shared identity, and think about historical and structural factors involved in injustice, they are likely to express solidarity with one another (Craig & Richeson, 2012, 2016; Cortland et al., 2017; Burson & Godfrey, 2020; Kim et al., 2022). Conversely, when there is competition, or groups feel their social identity is threatened, they are less likely to express solidarity with one another (Gay 2006; Craig et al., 2012; Craig & Richeson, 2014, 2016; Burson & Godfrey, 2020). Groups vary widely in their sociopolitical histories and the ways in which they are disadvantaged, oppressed, or harmed, but despite these differences in circumstance, some still see similarities between their own and others' experiences. Such perceptions have implications for solidarity.

A person's perception of their own group's experiences with disadvantage, victimization, or oppression influences their orientation toward other social groups, advocacy, and social change (Vollhardt, 2015). Inclusive victim consciousness, a mindset that is defined by a belief that "many groups in the world have suffered in ways similar to my group," predicts greater support for other victimized groups such as refugees in both India and the United States (p. 8, Vollhardt et al., 2016). Conversely, exclusive victim consciousness, or a belief that "no other group has suffered the same way as my group has," does not predict victim support (p. 8, Vollhardt et al., 2016). As seen in other areas of the world, such as in the Great Lakes region in

Africa, exclusive victim consciousness even relates to feelings of intergroup distrust and intolerance (Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015). Of course, people hold many intersecting identities. Some, however, may become especially salient when learning about another groups' experience.

Though a person might experience disadvantage, oppression, or victimization based on various aspects of their social identity, a person's ethnic/racial identity may be an especially relevant factor that influences solidarity with Indigenous Peoples harmed by systemic racism. One reason for this is that members of racialized[2] groups are more likely to have experienced similar collective harms, such as racism, which in turn influences how they think about other injustices. Following this reasoning, in a study on intergroup solidarity in Canada, Starzyk et al. (2019) found that Racialized people expressed greater solidarity and support for reparations for Indigenous Peoples than did White people. This was because Racialized people reported experiencing more collective victimization than White people, leading some to adopt an inclusive victim consciousness mindset and perceive greater continued suffering (Starzyk et al., 2019). It appears that seeing similarities in experience, such as racism, can serve as a basis for solidarity. But what about situations where discrimination is of a different nature?

Considering the shared harm discrimination causes, whether based on ethnicity/race, gender, religion, ability, or sexual orientation, one might expect that reminding people of discrimination they experience on one dimension (e.g., sexism) might lead them to support others experiencing discrimination in other dimensions (e.g., racism). Yet, research suggests that this is not always the case. In fact, in other research, when White women were reminded of

[2] Terminology is evolving. In the past, researchers used terms now considered outdated, such as "racial minority," "visible minority," or "non-White." "Racialization" describes a process where societies construct races as real and unequal, in a way that negatively impacts people in various areas of life. The term "racialized identities," currently used by the University of Manitoba's Anti-Racism Task Force, reflects this process (University of Manitoba, n.d.). When I use this term as an adjective, I will not capitalize it. When I use this term to compare groups, I will capitalize it.

sexism, they reported more anti-Black and anti-Latino attitudes, because these reminders triggered a threat to their social identity (Craig & Richeson, 2012). Similarly, when Black and Latino people were reminded of racism against their group, they reported more negative attitudes toward gay and lesbian people (Craig & Richeson, 2014). It appears to be much easier for people to see similarities between their group and other groups' experiences of collective harm within identity dimensions (e.g., racism) than between identity dimensions (e.g., sexism and racism, or racism and homophobia). When attempting to build solidarity between different marginalized groups, one must take care to ensure identities are not threatened.

These findings raise interesting considerations. First, in other contexts in which women did not have their social identity deliberately threatened through reminders of sexism, researchers have found that, compared to men, women are more likely to identify various social inequalities and more strongly feel that something must be done to address such issues (Roberts et al., 2019). This is consistent with unpublished research in our laboratory showing that women report more solidarity with Indigenous Peoples and feel more warmly towards them in comparison to men (Starzyk & Fontaine, 2022). Why might this be? Interestingly, even though women experience oppression in the form of sexism, they do not report higher feelings of inclusive victim consciousness in comparison to men (Starzyk & Fontaine, 2022). Given this, along with the challenges in fostering solidarity with groups that experience discrimination of a different nature when one's social identity is threatened (Craig & Richeson, 2012; 2014), there must be other factors that are not related to collective experiences of harm that explain why women express more solidarity than men. One explanation may relate to how people respond emotionally, which I turn my discussion to next.

Emotions and Solidarity

The way people think about similarities in collective group experiences is important, but the way that people feel matters greatly too. In intergroup relations and social change movements, people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are interrelated and influence one another (Zanna & Rempel, 1988; Haddock & Zanna, 1999; Birtel & Crisp, 2015). People's beliefs about the fairness of the world (Lerner, 1980; Hafer & Choma, 2009; Hafer & Sutton, 2016) and the social, political, and economic systems they are a part of (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, 2019) predict how they respond to victims, evaluate the status quo, and support collective action. Importantly, such beliefs are also tied to people's emotional experiences. For example, when people justify unfair systems, they feel more satisfied with the status quo and feel less unpleasant emotions, such as outrage (Jost et al., 2008). Yet, unpleasant feelings like anger and collective guilt can also drive support for social change (Jost et al., 2008; Solak et al., 2021). Though there are less studies on positive emotions and social change (Van Zomeren, 2021), researchers have found some emotions, such as feelings of pride following successful collective action (Tausch & Becker, 2013) and hopefulness (Greenaway et al., 2016; Wlodarczyk et al., 2017; Cohen-Chen & Van Zomeren, 2018), are associated with increased willingness to take part in collective action as well. Clearly, emotions, whether positive or negative, have a role in motivating support for social change. But do people always connect emotionally to a cause?

Some people tend to suppress or avoid their emotions, a tendency that has implications for their willingness to take collective action. Avoiding positive emotions is related to poorer mental health (Buhk et al., 2020), but in the context of social change, we know little of the impact of such tendencies. Some research does, however, point to the detrimental impact of suppressing negative feelings on support for social change. For example, even among people

who have a low tendency to justify systems already, those who generally push down negative feelings tend to want to take collective action less (Solak et al., 2021). Some emotions can be uncomfortable, but they are valuable to have in that they motivate social change. Though suppressing uncomfortable feelings can make people feel better short-term, emotional apathy maintains societal issues long-term.

Given the key role emotions have in driving collective action, it is important to consider how different social groups approach emotional experiences. Such differences may help explain the gender differences we see in solidarity. Researchers have found that, compared to women, men are more likely to suppress their emotions (Flynn et al., 2010; Rogier et al., 2019). This has important implications, for the reasons I have described above. Others (Fujita et al., 1991; Grossman & Wood, 1993; Gohm, 2003; Merchán et al., 2021) have also found that, compared to men, women report experiencing both positive and negative emotions more intensely. Indeed, in previous pilot research I have conducted, women tended to report stronger emotions when they read about ethnic/racial, religious, and gender identity discrimination than did men (Fontaine & Starzyk, 2022). Conversely, we did not find strong or consistent evidence of differences between ethnic/racial groups (Fontaine & Starzyk, 2022). Thus, it is likely that Racialized people and women express more solidarity than do White people and men for different reasons; for Racialized people, this difference is primarily explained by experiences of collective harm, whereas for women, this difference is primarily explained by a more intense emotional experience.

Women may express stronger feelings than men when they encounter injustice, but of the many and varied feelings people can have, we know little about which emotions relate to solidarity the most. Compared to negative emotions, there has been much less research on the

role of positive emotions in social movements, leading some theorists to call upon other researchers to address this imbalance in the literature (Van Zomeren, 2021). Why might it be important to examine positive feelings as well? As discussed above, people justify unfairness in part because it makes them feel better by soothing negative feelings. If, however, people primarily feel positive emotions, they may have less of a need to push down their feelings and justify unfairness. This raises the question of whether positive emotions are more effective in encouraging solidarity than negative ones. Though exploring all possible positive and negative feelings is beyond the scope of this project, several emotions connected to existing research on helping behavior, theories of social change, and real-life examples are especially relevant, such as anger, hope, empathy, love, sadness, and guilt. I review each of these emotions in greater detail next.

Anger

Anger is an emotion people may feel when others attack or threaten them, or someone they care about (Linehan, 2015; Ekman & Cordaro, 2011). When people feel that a situation is unjust and angry about it, they are more motivated to take part in collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Van Zomeren et al., 2011; Van Zomeren et al., 2018). Certainly, injustice threatens people's well-being and people often feel angry during many social and political movements.

Anger is an emotion that is positively associated with collective action. Immediately following the 2016 United States election, people believed Donald Trump would threaten progressive causes so, in response, they donated more to organizations such as Planned Parenthood, which received nearly 40 times their usual donations (Walters, 2016). In the context of this phenomenon, which media termed "rage donations," one study demonstrated that anger predicted greater efficacy beliefs, which in turn predicted greater financial support (Austin et al.,

2020). In another example that demonstrates the link between anger and collective action, on May 15, 2011, in Spain, the *Indignados* ("The Indignant Ones") organized widespread protests to express their discontent with politicians who put austerity measures in place in response to the 2008 global recession (Altares, 2021; Wlodarczyk, 2017). Within the context of this movement, called 15-M (for May 15th), one study found that perceived injustice predicted greater anger (Wlodarczyk, 2017). In turn, anger predicted greater hope for improvement and hope predicted greater participation in protest. Anger is therefore an important emotion some people feel in social change movements. When people feel threatened or believe a situation is unjust, anger can motivate people to act, especially when people have hope and believe that change is possible.

Hope

Hope is a feeling people experience when they have a desire for a possible, but uncertain, future outcome (Pleeging et al., 2021). Importantly, it is an emotion that researchers have found plays a role in motivating people to support social change. For example, a series of studies demonstrated that people who believed their group could bring about change were more willing to take part in collective action, but only when feelings of hope were high (Cohen-Chen & Van Zomeren, 2018). In another series of studies on how low-status group members respond to social justice efforts led by high-status group members, women who read that a leadership team comprised primarily of men (versus women) were leading efforts to combat gender inequality perceived the leadership team to be less aware of inequality (Iyer & Achia, 2020). This perception led women to feel less hope, a feeling that subsequently led them to be less likely to take collective action (Iyer & Achia, 2020). Also in support, in another series of studies, people who felt hopeful reported greater support for social change that would benefit outgroups, such as Native Americans in the United States (Greenaway et al., 2016). Greater efficacy beliefs

explained why feeling hopeful predicted more support for social change (Greenaway et al., 2016). Hope, therefore, is another important emotion related to collective action, as it is closely tied to our beliefs about our ability to enact change. To feel hope means believing that a better future is possible; in the context of social change, this future is one that often involves a better life for those who are suffering.

Empathy

In response to injustice and others' suffering, people also often feel empathy, a "moral emotion" that is closely tied to prosocial helping behavior (Hoffman, 2008; Tangney et al., 2007). Empathic concern involves "feeling for" another person who is in need, an emotional state that may in turn lead the empathic person to value the person in need's welfare more (Batson, 2023). Though empathy is often directed toward another individual, empathy may also generalize and be felt in intergroup contexts (Batson, 2023). For example, framing water as a human right led non-Indigenous people in Canada to perceive greater suffering, a perception that in turn led to higher empathy and more support for government action (Starzyk et al., 2021). Though empathy can lead people to support others in need, witnessing suffering can lead to other responses that are different from true empathic concern.

It can be emotionally difficult to witness others' suffering. Some people feel personal distress, a response that is distinct from empathy. A classic source, Batson et al. (1997) distinguished empathy, which he proposed includes feelings such as sympathy, warmth, and compassion, from personal distress, which he proposed includes feelings such as alarm, disturbance, and worry. He hypothesized empathy is an other-oriented response, whereas distress is a self-oriented response. More recent research supports these assertions (López-Pérez et al., 2014). Empathy and personal distress have different consequences. For example, people who

feel empathy recognize others' emotions more accurately than people who feel personal distress (Israelashvili et al., 2020). People who witness suffering that is so aversive that they focus on their own distress rather than the victim may also respond in less helpful or avoidant ways (Carrera et al., 2013; Hoffman, 2008). People are especially likely to avoid connecting to the suffering of others when they feel they cannot help the victim (Hoffman, 2008; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Starzyk & Ross, 2008). True empathy involves "feeling for" another. This sense of connection often leads to support, though there are other feelings involving connection to others as well.

Love

Love, like empathy, is another positive emotion that involves feeling a connection to another that people might have that leads them to support others. Relative to other emotions, however, there is less research on love in the context of intergroup relations and social change. Anecdotally, I have found love can bring people out to show their support in the face of tragedy. Following the murder of Tina Fontaine, a 16-year-old Anishinaabe girl from Sagkeeng First Nation in Manitoba, Canada, hundreds of people gathered to honor her life after her accused killer was acquitted in court. Many who attended carried signs reading "Love for Tina" and "Justice for All." Organizer Niigaanwewidam Sinclair told the crowd "I want you all to look around you—this is love for Tina" (MacDonald, 2018). Some research also points to the important role love plays in motivating collective action. In qualitative interviews, Black women most frequently discussed feelings of love, alongside feelings of anger and solidarity, when they described what motivates their involvement in AIDS activism (Harris, 2018). Thus, feelings of love also likely influence how we respond to social injustice.

Though love may take different forms, compassionate love is especially relevant to

intergroup contexts as it involves feeling concerned, tender, and caring toward close others, strangers, or humanity (Sprecher & Fehr, 2005). People who feel compassionate love toward strangers and humanity want to help those in need and are more likely to behave in prosocial ways, such as volunteering (Sprecher & Fehr, 2005). Attraction, attachment and commitment, and caregiving are core factors in all forms of love (Tobore, 2020). These core factors of love, along with feelings of connection, respect, and trust are present whether love is felt toward close others, such as romantic partners or children, or, surprisingly, material brands (Tobore, 2020). Feeling drawn, connected, and committed to as well as caring toward members of other social groups may arouse us to connect to their causes and support change that may benefit them.

Sadness

How do people feel when others they care about are in pain? Sadness is another feeling people might experience that leads them to act. This may be somewhat surprising, given that sadness is typically considered a non-arousing emotion. Many situations may lead to sadness. For example, people may feel sad when they lose someone or something, are rejected or excluded, or do not get something they want (Linehan, 2015). People can also feel sad when they are with someone who is in pain or learn that others are experiencing hardship, even when they may not personally know the person (Linehan, 2015).

There are many anecdotal examples of people feeling sad over strangers' suffering. For instance, over the years many Canadians have gathered at vigils to grieve and honor missing and murdered Indigenous women and girls (Therien, 2020). More recently, people across Canada have collectively mourned the loss of countless Indigenous children who were found in unmarked graves at former Residential School sites (Bergen, 2021; Honderich, 2021). In yet another example, thousands of community members gathered to grieve the loss of a family that

was murdered in a targeted hit-and-run attack because of their Muslim faith in London, Ontario (Lupton, 2021). In addition to anecdotal examples, some research also supports the notion that sadness has a role in collective action.

Though sadness has received less attention in research, some researchers have found an association between sadness and support for social change. In one study, people who felt sad about relations between Native and non-Native Americans in the United States reported greater support for social change to address unequal status relations (Greenaway et al., 2016). Some (e.g., Gray et al., 2011) have proposed that sadness is adaptive in that it strengthens social bonds and have demonstrated that people who feel sad after a social loss want, more than they normally do, to connect socially. Others (e.g., Greenaway et al., 2016) have speculated that sadness in intergroup contexts may in part reflect feelings of guilt, an emotion that may prompt people to want to fix the issue.

Guilt

Guilt is an aversive feeling that people experience when they regret having done something that violates their values or harms another (Linehan, 2015; Ekman & Cordaro, 2011), though it can also be felt on a collective level when a person accepts that their ingroup is responsible for actions that harmed another group (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Branscombe et al., 2004). People respond to this aversive feeling in different ways that may, or may not, help promote good intergroup relations.

Naturally, guilt is an unpleasant feeling. In response, some people adopt various guilt-avoidance strategies that are unhelpful to improving intergroup relations, including minimizing harm and in-group responsibility, questioning the appropriateness of group-based guilt, and raising concerns about the potential costs of reparations and apologies (McGarty et al., 2006). On

the other hand, some people cope with feelings of guilt by supporting actions aimed at repairing harm and making amends. For example, American students who felt guilt over the United States' actions during the Second Gulf War were more supportive of providing compensation to Iraqi people for damages the U.S. military caused (Pagano & Huo, 2007). Additionally, feelings of White guilt explain why people who recognize their privilege report greater support for affirmative action (Swim & Miller, 1999). Further, non-Indigenous Chileans who felt collective guilt and shame over their group's treatment of Indigenous Chileans expressed greater support for reparations in the short term, with feelings of guilt also predicting support in the long term (Brown et al., 2008).

Collective feelings of guilt can also motivate people to support symbolic amends, such as apologies. For example, in Australia, non-Indigenous people were more likely to support a government apology to Indigenous Peoples for historical harms when they recognized their relative advantage and felt group-based guilt (McGarty et al., 2006). Though governments worldwide have offered official apologies to groups they have harmed (Blatz et al., 2009; Dyer, 2017), such apologies are often controversial. Indeed, lawyers caution that apologies can be construed as an admission of guilt, leading to concerns surrounding liability and redress (Drey, 2017; McAlinden, 2022). As might be expected, some people oppose saying "we're sorry" because they view this as admitting guilt and accepting responsibility for the actions of previous generations (Pettigrove, 2003). Though controversial and unpleasant to experience, some consider guilt a "moral emotion" (Tangney et al., 2007) because it can lead people to apologize and support those harmed by their ingroup.

The Different Pathways to Solidarity

In summary, the social groups we belong to influence how we experience the world. In

turn, these experiences influence how we think and feel toward others fighting for social change. Members of certain groups, such as Racialized people and women, tend to express more solidarity than members of other groups, such as White people and men. However, the reasons for this may be different. For Racialized people, who tend to have experienced collective victimization to a greater extent than White people, a sense of similarity or inclusive victim consciousness primarily drives solidarity. For women, who approach emotional experiences differently than do men, a stronger emotional experience may explain the typically higher level of solidarity.

In conclusion, people may experience many feelings when they encounter injustice. People, especially those from cultures that hold a "dialectical" worldview characterized by tolerance for contradiction (Goetz, Spencer-Rodgers, & Peng, 2008), can experience both positive and negative emotions together (Larsen & McGraw, 2011; 2014). By developing a comprehensive understanding of people's emotional experiences, along with how previous experiences of collective harm relate to solidarity, we may better understand how we might build a more socially just world together.

Research Objectives and Questions

The overall objective of this dissertation was to develop a holistic understanding of how various emotions, inclusive victim consciousness, gender, and ethnic/racial background relate to solidarity. Despite the important role emotions play in driving solidarity and social change, there are few existing scales appropriate to measure people's emotional responses to social injustice. In Study 1, my goal was to develop multi-item scales that researchers could use to measure several emotional domains in a way that was consistent with one another. This allowed me to explore my research questions and test my hypotheses in later studies. In Studies 2 and 3, I

aimed to understand the extent to which emotions and inclusive victim consciousness explained the relationships between gender and ethnicity/race and solidarity with Indigenous Peoples.

Project Overview

This dissertation included three online studies. First, it was important that the measures I used for later studies were psychometrically robust (i.e., reliable and valid). In Study 1, I combined and altered previous measures of discrete emotions, as well as added my items, to create multi-item scales intended to measure the overarching emotional domains of love, anger, sadness, guilt, and hope. University of Manitoba and University of Winnipeg students ($N = 280$) completed a survey in which they shared how they felt after learning about systemic discrimination toward Indigenous Peoples. I examined the psychometric properties of these scales by evaluating their reliability and validity to identify and retain the strongest items. To ensure the scales were suitable to use with men, women, Racialized, and White people, I also examined the factor structure across gender and ethnic/racial groups.

In Study 2, I examined the relationships among gender, ethnicity/race, emotions, inclusive victim consciousness, and solidarity. University of Manitoba and University of Winnipeg students ($N = 352$) learned about systemic discrimination toward Indigenous Peoples and then answered questions that gauged their emotional reactions, using the scales from Study 1, inclusive victim consciousness, and solidarity. With a correlational 2 (Gender: Men, Women) x 2 (Ethnicity/race: White, Racialized) factorial design, I examined how gender and ethnic/racial background related to solidarity, and tested whether inclusive victim consciousness and emotions explained these relationships.

Finally, I examined whether the results generalized to other populations. To strengthen my confidence in the findings, in Study 3, I examined whether the results replicated in a community sample of adults of various ages from different regions across Canada (*N* = 612).

I preregistered these studies in November 2022 on Open Science Framework in two projects entitled "Measuring Emotional Responses to Social Issues" (Study 1; https://osf.io/eu348) and "Understanding Solidarity: The Role of Gender, Ethnicity/Race, Inclusive Victim Consciousness, and Emotional Responses to Injustice" (Studies 2 and 3; https://osf.io/mnxbu). In these preregistrations, I included the background, objectives, hypotheses, methods/procedure, and analysis plan.

Hypotheses

Given findings from prior research, I had several hypotheses. As some hypotheses were common across studies, I have listed them together in Table 1, indicating which are relevant to each study.

Table 1

List of Hypotheses

Hypothesis		Study	
#	**Prediction**	**1**	**2 and 3**
H1.	There would be six factors representing the overarching emotional domains of love, empathy, anger, sadness, guilt, and hope.	X	
H2.	All emotional domains would positively correlate with one another.	X	X
H3.	Women would report statistically stronger emotional reactions to injustice than men.	X	X
H3a.	Women would report statistically stronger feelings of anger than men.	X	X
H3b.	Women would report statistically stronger feelings of sadness than men.	X	X
H3c.	Women would report statistically stronger feelings of guilt than men.	X	X
H3d.	Women would report statistically stronger feelings of hope than men.[3]	X	X
H3e.	Women would report statistically stronger feelings of love than men.	X	X
H3f.	Women would report statistically stronger feelings of empathy than men.	X	X
H4.	There would be configural equivalence between men and women. That is, each emotional domain would load onto similar factors for these groups.	X	
H5.	Generally, Racialized people would report statistically equivalent levels of emotional reactions to injustice to White people, except for guilt.	X	X

[3] Though I hypothesized that women would report stronger feelings of hope than men, I acknowledged in the preregistration that pilot research I have conducted has shown mixed support so this hypothesis may not be supported.

H5a.	Racialized people would report statistically equivalent levels of anger to White people.	X	X
H5b.	Racialized people would report statistically equivalent levels of sadness to White people.	X	X
H5c.	Racialized people would report statistically lower levels of guilt to White people.[4]	X	X
H5d.	Racialized people would report statistically equivalent levels of hope to White people.[4]	X	X
H5e.	Racialized people would report statistically equivalent levels of love to White people.[4]	X	X
H5f.	Racialized people would report statistically equivalent levels of empathy to White people.	X	X
H6.	I expected to find configural equivalence between Racialized and White people. That is, each emotional domain would load onto similar factors for these groups.	X	
H7.	Groups would differ in their mean level of emotions, with Racialized women reporting the strongest emotions, followed by White women, Racialized men, and White men. The exception would be for guilt, for which White women would report the highest levels. I made no predictions for the ordering of the other groups for guilt.[5]	X	
H8.	Gender would relate to emotional responses to a greater extent than would ethnic/racial background.	X	
H9.	I did not expect there to be a significant interaction between gender and ethnic/racial background.	X	
H10.	Women would report statistically more solidarity than men.		X
H11.	Women would report statistically equivalent feelings of inclusive victim consciousness to men.		X

[4] Though I hypothesized that Racialized people would report lower levels of guilt than White people, I acknowledged in the preregistration that pilot research I have conducted has shown mixed support. I also acknowledged that some pilot research has suggested that Racialized people report greater feelings of love and hope than White people. As these findings were inconsistent across studies, and I had no theoretical explanation for why this may be, I did not make this hypothesis.

[5] Given that pilot research I have conducted has shown some mixed support regarding differences in emotional reactions between Racialized and White people (see previous footnote), I predicted that, if there were differences between groups, differences would follow this order.

H12.	Racialized people would report statistically more solidarity than White people.	X
H13.	Racialized people would report statistically greater feelings of inclusive victim consciousness than White people.	X
H14.	Inclusive victim consciousness would positively correlate with solidarity. People who report greater inclusive victim consciousness would report more solidarity.	X
H15.	All emotions would positively correlate with solidarity.	X
H15a.	Anger would positively correlate with solidarity. People who felt greater anger would report more solidarity.	X
H15b.	Sadness would positively correlate with solidarity. People who felt greater sadness would report more solidarity.	X
H15c.	Guilt would positively correlate with solidarity. People who felt greater guilt would report more solidarity.	X
H15d.	Hope would positively correlate with solidarity. People who felt greater hope would report more solidarity.	X
H15e.	Love would positively correlate with solidarity. People who felt greater love will report more solidarity.	X
H15f.	Empathy would positively correlate with solidarity. People who feel greater empathy would report more solidarity.	X
H16.	Though I expected that all emotions would positively correlate with solidarity (H15), I hypothesized that positive emotions (i.e., hope, love, empathy) would positively correlate with solidarity more strongly than negative emotions (i.e., anger, sadness, guilt).	X
H17.	Inclusive victim consciousness would not mediate the relationship between gender and solidarity, because women would not report statistically greater inclusive victim consciousness than men.	X

H18.	Emotional responses would mediate the relationship between gender and solidarity. That is, women would report statistically stronger emotional responses, which would in turn predict[6] higher solidarity.	X
H18a.	Women would report statistically greater feelings of anger than men, which would predict higher solidarity.	X
H18b.	Women would report statistically greater feelings of sadness than men, which would predict higher solidarity.	X
H18c.	Women would report statistically greater feelings of guilt than men, which would predict higher solidarity.	X
H18d.	Women would report statistically greater feelings of hope than men, which would predict higher solidarity.[7]	X
H18e.	Women would report statistically greater feelings of love than men, which would predict higher solidarity.	X
H18f.	Women would report statistically greater feelings of empathy than men, which would predict higher solidarity.	X
H19.	Inclusive victim consciousness would mediate the relationship between ethnicity/race and solidarity. That is, Racialized people would report statistically greater inclusive victim consciousness, which would in turn predict higher solidarity.	X

[6] I use words such as 'predict' and 'effect' as these terms are commonly used in regression analyses. In using these terms, however, I wish to clarify that I am not making causal claims, as I am not using experimental designs.
[7] Though I hypothesized that feelings of hope would mediate the relationship between gender and solidarity, I acknowledged in the preregistration that pilot research I have conducted has shown mixed support.

H20.	Generally, emotional responses would not mediate the relationship between ethnicity/race and solidarity, except for guilt.[8]	X
H20a.	White people would report statistically stronger feelings of guilt, which would in turn predict higher solidarity.	X

[8] Though I hypothesized that guilt would mediate the relationship between ethnicity/race and solidarity, I acknowledged in the preregistration that pilot research I have conducted has shown mixed support. I also acknowledged that pilot research has shown mixed support regarding feelings of hope and love, and that these emotions may also mediate the relationship between ethnicity/race and solidarity.

General Methodology

Positionality Statement

Though less commonly seen in quantitative research, I wish to begin by sharing some of my background so readers can better understand how I came to this work. Through my late father's side, I am a proud Anishibaabe'kwe (Ojibwe woman) and urban band member of Sagkeeng First Nation, with several family members affected by Indian Residential Schools or the child welfare system. Through my mother's side, I am also of British and German heritage. Growing up, I watched both of my parents as well as many family members act as strong advocates for various challenges Indigenous Peoples face, leading me to be sensitive to and adopt a strong interest in social justice issues. Important to this project, in my early university years, I worked as a youth care practitioner in group homes for youth in care, and during this time, I became aware of many issues within the system. This has led to a strong desire to see systemic change, which I believe can only be achieved with collective work and cooperation.

Participants

In all studies, participants were eligible to participate if they were born in Canada or had lived in Canada for at least 10 years. They must have been currently living in Canada as well. Indigenous people and people of mixed ethnic/racial backgrounds who also identified as White (e.g., White and Filipino) were ineligible. I excluded participants for various other reasons, including those who did not provide informed consent, did not commit to responding conscientiously, or were missing significant proportions of their data overall (i.e., more than 20%). In all studies, my final sample had even numbers of men, women, Racialized, and White participants. In Study 1 ($N = 280$) and 2 ($N = 352$), I recruited participants from both the University of Manitoba and University of Winnipeg. In Study 3 ($N = 612$), I recruited

participants through Leger, a Canadian market and analytics company that has an in-house polling panel. In the study-specific results sections later, I provide a detailed description of participant exclusions and demographic characteristics.

Procedure

Recruitment

In all studies, participants completed a survey online hosted by either Qualtrics, a survey software company (Studies 1 and 2), or Leger (Study 3). I recruited participants in multiple ways. For Studies 1 and 2, I first recruited participants from the University of Manitoba through the Introduction to Psychology research participant pool, starting in September 2022. Participants completed the study from any electronic device and received partial credit as part of a course requirement as compensation. Unfortunately, I had difficulty recruiting enough men from the Introduction to Psychology research pool. To achieve my proposed sample, in November 2022, I started to recruit University of Manitoba participants in-person at the EITC (Engineering) building. I set up a table in the atrium with a study recruitment poster, information/consent and debriefing forms, and chocolate bars on it. I explained the study to interested participants who then scanned a QR code with their smart phones that took them to the survey. If participants were ineligible for the study based on their answers to the demographic questionnaire at the beginning of the survey, they were redirected to the debriefing page. I gave participants a chocolate bar and entered them in a gift card draw as a thank-you. In January 2023, however, participant recruitment through this method started to slow, so I started to recruit participants through the University of Winnipeg's Introductory Psychology research participant pool. University of Winnipeg students completed the study online and received partial course credit. Finally, in February 2023, I also sent out an email to eligible University of Manitoba

students who had taken Introduction to Psychology in previous years and had indicated that they would be interested in taking part in future studies in our laboratory's annual "prescreen" survey. I entered participants in a gift card draw as a thank-you. I describe how many participants were recruited through each method in more detail in the study-specific results sections later.

For Study 3, in October 2022, I recruited participants through Leger's in-house polling panel. Leger aimed to recruit an even number of men, women, Racialized, and White participants who were balanced across age brackets (18–34; 35–54; 55+), household income (0–50k; 50k–100k; 100k+), and region (British Columbia, Prairies, Ontario, Quebec, Atlantic). Participants received their typical compensation, determined by Leger, which involved earning points that they could redeem for travel, gift cards, and so on.

Survey Overview

In all studies, participants first read an information and consent form (see Appendix A for sample form). After providing digital consent, all participants responded to questions asking whether they committed to responding conscientiously, provided demographic information, and read instructions intended to decrease socially desirable responding. Then, all participants read a passage describing systemic discrimination within the child welfare system. In Study 1, participants then shared their emotional reactions and finally, we provided them with a debriefing form. In Studies 2 and 3, participants shared their emotional reactions and in addition, their level of inclusive victim consciousness and level of political solidarity. To ensure participants left the study feeling well, they also completed a self-affirmation exercise. Finally, I provided them with a debriefing form.

Materials

As described above, many of the materials (e.g., issue description, emotional responses)

were common to all three studies. As such, I summarize them together below.

Commitment to Respond Conscientiously

After providing digital informed consent, I asked participants in all studies to respond to three questions (*Yes* or *No*) intended to increase the likelihood that they would respond carefully throughout the survey. The questions were (1) "It is important to us that participants complete this study in a distraction-free environment, within one sitting. Are you willing to minimize outside distractions and complete the study in one sitting?" (2) "It is important to us that participants in this study pay close attention to the materials. Are you willing to carefully read the materials and answer all of the questions to the best of your ability?" and (3) "It is also important to us that you do NOT use outside sources like the internet to search for the answers. Will you answer the following questions without help from outside sources?" (Clifford & Jerit 2015, 2016). I later excluded participants who answered "No" to these questions.

Instructions to Decrease Socially Desirable Responding

Next, participants in all studies read a short passage intended to decrease socially desirable responses that said:

> Before you start the study, we just want to say one really important thing: **There are no right or wrong answers to the questions you'll see.** So, to help us understand people's true thoughts and feelings about things, please respond honestly. If some questions make you feel uncomfortable, keep in mind that people have good and bad things to say about many things. **Remember that we will keep your responses confidential.** Please remember that your participation is voluntary—you are free to withdraw from the study at any time or not answer a question.

Demographic Questionnaire

Before completing the main measures, participants in all studies answered a short demographic questionnaire. This included reporting their current gender identity (Cameron & Stinson, 2019), age, and ethnic/racial background (Statistics Canada, 2017). Participants could select multiple ethnic/racial backgrounds. Participants also reported whether they were currently living in Canada, their Canadian status (Statistics Canada, 2017), and annual household income. If participants reported that they were not a citizen at birth, I also asked how many years they had lived in Canada. In addition, for Study 2, I asked participants their political stance on "foreign policy issues," "economic issues," and "social issues" using the rating scale (1) *very left-wing,* (2) *left-wing,* (3) *slightly left-wing,* (4) *middle of the road,* (5) *slightly right-wing,* (6) *right-wing,* and (7) *very right-wing* (Pratto et al., 1994). We decided to add the political orientation questions partway through data collection. As such, I linked data from our laboratory's annual prescreen survey to obtain information from participants who had already completed the study, however some of this data is still missing for some participants. It was not possible to obtain this information for Study 3, as Leger completed data collection quickly and before we decided to add these questions in. Finally, in Study 3, I asked participants which province or territory they lived in. Please see Appendix B for a list of these questions and their response options.

Issue Description

In all studies, participants then read a short passage describing systemic discrimination toward Indigenous families within the child welfare system in Canada. I wrote this passage based on information from Amnesty International (2021), the Government of Canada (2017), and Stefanovich & Boisvert (2022). In the passage, I described how Indigenous Peoples have experienced race-based discrimination, and that because of Indian Act, the Government of

Canada has long funded family support services within the child welfare system at inequitable and inadequate levels for First Nations on reserve. I then described the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal case that started in 2007, including the Tribunal's ruling that the Government of Canada was discriminating against First Nations and the Tribunal's orders for compensation. Finally, the passage ended by stating that the parties had reached a settlement agreement in January 2022, but that there is still a need for people in Canada to develop and implement child and family support services to address the lasting impact of discrimination. The full passage is available in Appendix C.

I chose to highlight the issue of systemic discrimination within the child welfare system for multiple reasons. First, the first five Calls to Action in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's (2015) report all relate to addressing the overrepresentation of Indigenous children within the child welfare system. Second, as discussed earlier, having previously worked as a youth care practitioner in group homes for youth in care, I witnessed how systemic underfunding of services on reserves negatively impacted youth and their families. On a personal level, I wish to see the youth that I have worked with are understood, compensated, and supported moving forward.

Emotional Responses

In all studies, participants then shared their emotional responses. They read the following instructions: “Using the scale below, please indicate the extent that you are feeling each of the following right now, when you think about Indigenous People’s experiences within Canada.” I presented participants with various emotion labels that were intended to measure the broader emotional domains of (listed in order) love, empathy, anger, sadness, guilt, and hope. Each domain had 8 items each (except for empathy, measured with Batson et al.’s already established 1997 scale, which includes 6 items). The domains were presented on separate pages. Participants rated the extent to which they were experiencing each item using the rating scale 1 (*not at all*), 2 (*slightly*), 3 (*somewhat*), 4 (*very much*), and 5 (*extremely*). Five-point rating scales tend to have sufficient variability and, unlike long rating scales, minimize task difficulty (Furr, 2011; Krosnick & Presser, 2010).

The purpose of Study 1 was to examine the reliability of validity of these items to determine which were the strongest to use in scales for the later studies. As I will describe in the Study 1 results section later, I chose 3 items to represent each domain. As I will also discuss in more detail later, upon reviewing the results, I decided to no longer measure the construct of “guilt” and instead measure the construct of feeling “sorry.” After deciding upon the final items for each domain, I created a composite score by taking the average of all items, so long as the participant had responded to at least 2/3 items.

Love

First, I assessed participants’ feelings of intergroup love. Love is a complex emotion and there was not an existing measure of love that was like the other validated measures before I did this research, making comparisons across emotional domains problematic. Given the lack of

appropriate measures, I chose to measure love using items I selected based on the attraction, attachment-commitment, and caregiving comprehensive model of love (Tobore, 2020). These items included (1) “love,” (2) “interested,” (3) “connected,” (4) “attached,” (5) “committed,” (6) “devoted,” (7) “caring,” and (8) “concerned.” Based on the findings of Study 1, which I describe in detail later, I retained the items (1) “love,” (3) “connected,” and (4) “attached.” This scale had acceptable to good internal consistency (Study 1: α = .85, Study 2: α = .75, and Study 3: α = .87), based on Cicchetti’s (1994) criteria.

Empathy

Next, I assessed participants’ feelings of empathy toward Indigenous Peoples using Batson et al.’s (1997) measure. Participants rated how much they felt six different emotions such as (1) “sympathetic,” (3) “warm,” and (5) “tender.” I did not alter this measure in any way. This measure had excellent internal consistency in all studies (Study 1: α = .92, Study 2: α = .93, and Study 3: α = .95).

Anger

Next, I measured feelings of anger using a combination of items others (Iyer & Achia, 2020; Greenaway et al., 2016) have used to assess emotional responses to social justice issues and synonyms for anger. The initial item pool included (1) “angry,” (2) “outraged,” (3) “exasperated,” (4) “irritated,” (5) “annoyed,” (6) “furious,” (7) “fed up,” and (8) “mad.” Items (1), (2), and (4) to (7) were from Iyer and Achia (2020) and items (1) to (4) were from Greenaway et al. (2016). I added item (8) as it is a synonym for anger. Based on the Study 1 results, I retained items (1) “angry,” (2) “outraged,” and (8) “mad.” Internal consistency in all three studies was excellent (Study 1: α = .95, Study 2: α = .95, and Study 3: α = .94).

Sadness

Like anger, I measured feelings of sadness using a combination of items others (Greenaway et al., 2016) have used and synonyms for sadness. These items included (1) "sad," (2) "unhappy," (3) "depressed," (4) "sorrowful," (5) "down," (6) "disheartened," (7) "blue," and (8) "low." Greenaway et al. (2016) previously used items (1) to (4). I added the remaining based on synonyms for sadness. Based on the Study 1 results, the final items I decided upon were (1) "sad," (5) "down," and (8) "low." Internal consistency was good to excellent across studies (Study 1: $\alpha = .90$, Study 2: $\alpha = .86$, and Study 3: $\alpha = .88$).

Sorry

Originally, I intended to measure participants' feelings of guilt. Other existing measures of collective guilt have included statements assessing feelings of regret (e.g., "I feel regret for my group's harmful past actions toward other groups") and acceptance of responsibility (e.g., I think that members of a group are accountable for what others in their group do"; Branscombe et al., 2004). As such, I included the items (1) "guilt," (2) "regret," (3) "responsible," (4) "remorse," and (5) "accountable." In addition, I also included the items (6) "blameworthy," (7) "sorry," and (8) "badly." Smith et al. (2002) used items (4) and (6) to (8) to assess feelings of guilt, though in their study they used "bad conscience" rather than "badly." In Study 1, I found that these items loaded on separate factors. For reasons I will describe later, I ultimately decided to retain items (4) "remorse," (7) "sorry," and (8) "badly," and rename the construct to "sorry." Internal consistency was good across studies (Study 1: $\alpha = .82$, Study 2: $\alpha = .80$, and Study 3: $\alpha = .87$).

Hope

Finally, I measured feelings of hope using a combination of items others (Greenaway et al., 2016; Iyer & Achia, 2020) have used. These included (1) "hopeful," (2) "aspiration," (3)

"positive anticipation," (4) "wishful," (5) "inspired," (6) "optimistic," (7) "excited" and (8) "confident." Item (3) was originally "positive expectation." Items (1) to (4) were originally from Greenaway et al. (2016) and items (1) and (5) to (8) were from Iyer and Achia (2020). Based on findings from Study 1, I retained items (1) "hopeful," (5) "inspired," and (6) "optimistic." Internal consistency was acceptable to good across studies (Study 1: α = .84, Study 2: α = .78, and Study 3: α = .89).

Inclusive Victim Consciousness

After measuring participants' emotions, in Studies 2 and 3, I then measured participants' level of inclusive victim consciousness using one subscale from Vollhardt et al.'s (2016) Group Based Victim Consciousness scale. Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with 3 statements such as (1) "Many groups in the world have suffered in ways similar to people of my group" on a 5-point scale, using the anchors 1 (*strongly disagree*), 2 (*disagree*), 3 (*neither agree nor disagree*), 4 (*agree*), and 5 (*strongly agree*). I created a total score by taking the average of the three items. Internal consistency was good to excellent in both studies (Study 2: α = .91 and Study 3: α = .86).

Political Solidarity

Finally, in Studies 2 and 3, I assessed participants' level of political solidarity to address discrimination against Indigenous Peoples using the 9-item Political Solidarity scale (Neufeld et al., 2019). This scale includes three factors that assess allyship, cause connection, and social change commitment. Participants rated their agreement with statements such as (1) "I feel a sense of "brotherhood" or "sisterhood" with Indigenous Peoples" (allyship), (4) "In some ways, I view the issue of addressing discrimination against Indigenous Peoples as my cause, too" (cause connection), and (7) "Policies negatively affecting Indigenous Peoples should be changed"

(social change commitment) on a 5-point scale using the anchors 1 (*strongly disagree*)*,* 2 (*disagree*), 3 (*neither agree nor disagree*), 4 (*agree*), and 5 (*strongly agree*). I created a total score by taking the average of all 9 items. This scale had good to excellent internal consistency in both studies (Study 2: $\alpha = .87$ and Study 3: $\alpha = .94$).

Self-Affirmation Exercise

To mitigate potential emotional distress, I ended with a self-affirmation exercise (Cohen et al., 2009). Participants picked one value, such as creativity, music, or relationships with friends or family, that was important to them. Then, they wrote about why this value was important and answered questions such as how that value had influenced their life.

Study 1 Results

Data Analytic Overview

To evaluate the reliability and validity of the various items I used to measure emotions, I conducted exploratory factor analyses, reliability analyses, correlational analyses, and *t*-tests, as well as assessed for configural invariance. I used SPSS (version 29) as well as Mplus (version 1.8.8). Missing data was handled using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method in this study as well as the others. After screening the data, I conducted an exploratory factor analysis with the full sample on all items intended to measure the domains of love, hope, anger, sadness, and guilt, examining the model fit. Next, I refined the scales in a series of iterative steps based on multiple considerations (Furr, 2011): for example, I removed items that cross-loaded onto multiple factors, had loadings $< .30$, had the lowest squared multiple correlations, and were the least correlated or had the lowest covariance with the title word. The final scale included three items from each of the emotional domains. I will describe the process for how I arrived at these three items in more detail later.

In addition to completing a factor analysis of the items intended to represent love, anger, sadness, guilt, and hope, I also completed factor analyses that included Batson et al.'s (1997) empathy items to ensure that all domains were distinct from empathy.

Next, to explore the relations among the six emotional domains, I computed total composite scores for each of the emotional domains and conducted correlational analyses. To examine whether there were differences in the extent to which men and women and Racialized and White participants felt these emotions, I conducted *t*-tests and ANOVAs. In the final step, to test whether the factor structure was similar between men and women, as well as Racialized and White participants, I assessed configural invariance.

Data Screening

Before conducting the main analyses, I screened the data. A total of 387 students took part from September 2022 to February 2023. Of these, I recruited 304 from the University of Manitoba's Introduction to Psychology research participant pool, 56 from the University of Winnipeg's Introductory Psychology research participant pool, and 27 through email advertising to previous University of Manitoba Introduction to Psychology students. From this pool, I excluded participants who did not provide informed consent ($n = 4$), did not commit to responding conscientiously ($n = 16$), were Indigenous ($n = 4$), had lived in Canada for less than 10 years ($n = 32$), had a mixed racialized and White background ($n = 7$), or were missing more than 20% of their overall data ($n = 33$). Next, I checked for univariate outliers by standardizing the variables, considering cases with z scores ± 2.5 to be outliers for potential exclusion. Based on this, there were 11 outliers for "angry," 9 for "outraged," 6 for "exasperated," 7 for "mad," 6 for "depressed," 2 for "blue," 5 for "guilty," 8 for "regret," 6 for "accountable," and 4 for "blameworthy." In all cases, these were participants who selected the "extremely" response

option. When considering whether to remove outliers, researchers should ask themselves the fundamental question of whether the outlier represents the sample, and if so, to include it (Meyers et al. 2017). Some people naturally feel emotions deeply, so it is perfectly plausible that some participants would select the "extremely" response option. As such, I decided against removing these participants. Overall, I excluded 78 participants, some of whom were excluded for multiple reasons. This left me with a total of 83 Racialized women, 78 White women, 70 Racialized men, and 78 White men (N = 309). In the interest of keeping group sizes equal, I further excluded the last 13 Racialized women, 8 White women, and 8 White men who took part so that all groups would have 70 participants (total N = 280). In keeping group sizes equal, I ensured that when conducting analyses using the total sample, no one group had more influence than the others. Statistical power is based mostly on the size of the smallest group (Rusticus & Lovato, 2014), meaning that excluding some participants in the interest of making group sizes equal likely had little impact on overall power.

Next, I examined whether the individual items were normally distributed by calculating the ratio of skew and kurtosis to their standard errors. I considered ratios less than -2 or greater than +2 indicative of non-normality. Based on this, all items had a non-normal distribution except for "interested." I visually inspected matrix scatterplots to examine whether the items within each hypothesized emotional domain were linearly related; all appeared so. Finally, I also examined whether the emotion composite pairs were homoscedastic by visually examining residual scatter plots; all appeared so. I have included the descriptive statistics for the initial item pool in Table 2.

Table 2

Study 1: Descriptive Statistics for Initial Item Pool

Item	*M*	*SD*	Skew	SE_{Skew}	Kurtosis	SE_{Kurtosis}
Love	2.74	1.30	0.13	.15	-1.08	.29
Interested	3.17	1.07	-0.26	.15	-0.56	.29
Connected	2.69	1.16	0.04	.15	-0.80	.29
Attached	2.58	1.20	0.27	.15	-0.88	.29
Committed	2.87	1.14	-0.10	.15	-0.85	.29
Devoted	2.65	1.13	0.18	.15	-0.73	.29
Caring	3.21	1.12	-0.49	.15	-0.57	.29
Concerned	3.13	1.17	-0.21	.15	-0.89	.29
Sympathetic	3.31	1.21	-0.51	.15	-0.69	.29
Softhearted	3.03	1.17	-0.21	.15	-0.76	.29
Warm	2.76	1.20	0.05	.15	-0.96	.29
Compassionate	3.19	1.14	-0.39	.15	-0.64	.29
Tender	2.60	1.21	0.19	.15	-0.95	.29
Moved	2.73	1.23	0.09	.15	-0.97	.29
Angry	1.93	1.17	1.09	.15	0.14	.29
Outraged	1.83	1.13	1.22	.15	0.46	.29
Exasperated	1.96	1.12	0.92	.15	-0.22	.29
Irritated	2.38	1.23	0.43	.15	-0.96	.29
Annoyed	2.41	1.23	0.42	.15	-0.94	.29
Furious	1.73	1.05	1.31	.15	0.81	.29
Fed up	2.32	1.28	0.57	.15	-0.87	.29
Mad	1.92	1.12	1.01	.15	-0.04	.29
Sad	2.27	1.20	0.54	.15	-0.76	.29
Unhappy	2.29	1.16	0.58	.15	-0.57	.29
Depressed	1.89	1.10	0.95	.15	-0.15	.29
Sorrow	2.11	1.19	0.73	.15	-0.61	.29
Down	2.23	1.13	0.58	.15	-0.69	.29
Disheartened	2.35	1.22	0.36	.15	-1.11	.29
Blue	2.03	1.04	0.66	.15	-0.61	.29
Low	2.27	1.11	0.50	.15	-0.69	.29

Guilty	1.83	1.04	1.09	.15	0.32	.29
Regret	2.02	1.14	0.84	.15	-0.32	.29
Responsible	2.19	1.22	0.56	.15	-0.97	.29
Remorse	2.19	1.24	0.64	.15	-0.83	.29
Accountable	2.01	1.12	0.78	.15	-0.46	.29
Blameworthy	1.72	1.02	1.27	.15	0.66	.29
Sorry	2.67	1.35	0.18	.15	-1.26	.29
Badly	2.21	1.20	0.59	.15	-0.75	.29
Hopeful	2.95	1.14	-0.06	.15	-0.73	.29
Aspiration	2.47	1.14	0.34	.15	-0.58	.29
Positive anticipation	2.74	1.08	0.02	.15	-0.69	.29
Wishful	3.02	1.23	-0.20	.15	-0.97	.29
Inspired	2.61	1.19	0.26	.15	-0.78	.29
Optimistic	2.74	1.13	0.20	.15	-0.69	.29
Excited	2.33	1.22	0.48	.15	-0.82	.29
Confident	2.57	1.18	0.32	.15	-0.74	.29

Note. $N = 280$. All items used the following rating scale: *not at all* (1), *slightly* (2), *somewhat* (3), *very much* (4), and *extremely* (5).

Participants

My final sample included 280 students from both the University of Manitoba and the University of Winnipeg. There is no clear consensus on sample sizes when conducting factor analyses. Researchers have given many recommendations, including rules of thumb that consider the number of participants (*N*) to the number of measured variables (*p*). These recommended ratios have varied, but typically fall between 5 to 10 participants per item (Kyriazos, 2018). I included 46 items, making the ratio 6.09 participants per variable. Further, for multigroup CFAs, a general rule of thumb is 100 participants in each group (Wang & Wang, 2012). I compared the factor structure between men and women (*n* = 140 for each group) and Racialized and White participants (*n* = 140 for each group). Due to difficulty in recruiting participants, I was unable to reach my original target of *N* = 450. Nevertheless, this sample size did fall within the range of recommended participant-to-item ratios and met the recommended group size for multigroup analyses.

Participants were on average 19.53 years old (*SD* = 4.20). Age differed significantly across gender/ethnic groups, $F(3, 144.22) = 3.61$, $p = .02$, with pairwise comparisons indicating that White men (*M* = 20.74, *SD* = 4.85) were significantly older than both Racialized men (*M* = 18.99, *SD* = 1.97, $p = .03$) and Racialized women (*M* = 18.73, *SD* = 2.09, $p = .01$), but not White women (*M* = 19.64, *SD* = 6.10, $p = .64$). Of the racialized participants, 58 (41%) were Filipino, 36 were South Asian (26%), 16 were Southeast Asian (11%), 13 were Chinese (9%), 10 were Arab (7%), 8 were Black (6%), and 7 (5%) identified with other backgrounds such as Korean, Latin American, and West Asian. Percentages add up to greater than 100% because some participants identified with multiple backgrounds. For household annual income, 45 (17%) reported 0–50k, 92 (35%) reported 50–100k, and 126 (48%) reported +100k. 17 participants did

not report their income. Finally, most participants were citizens at birth (*n* = 195, 70%); 70 (25%) were citizens by naturalization, 13 (5%) were permanent residents, and 2 (< 1%) reported other (e.g., temporary resident, refugee). Please see Table 3 for a further breakdown of demographic information by gender and ethnic/racial group.

Table 3

Study 1: Participant Demographics

Variable	Total *N* = 280	Racialized Women *n* = 70	White Women *n* = 70	Racialized Men *n* = 70	White Men *n* = 70
Age	19.53 (4.20)	18.73 (2.09)	19.64 (6.10)	18.99 (1.97)	20.74 (4.85)
Income					
0–50k	45 (17%)	9 (14%)	13 (20%)	15 (23%)	8 (12%)
50–100k	92 (35%)	33 (52%)	18 (28%)	26 (39%)	15 (22%)
100k+	126 (48%)	22 (34%)	33 (52%)	25 (38%)	46 (67%)
Canadian Status					
Citizen at birth	195 (70%)	31 (44%)	65 (93%)	31 (44%)	68 (97%)
Citizen by naturalization	70 (25%)	35 (50%)	3 (4%)	31 (44%)	1 (1%)
Permanent resident	13 (5%)	4 (6%)	2 (3%)	7 (10%)	0
Other (e.g., temporary resident, refugee)	2 (< 1%)	0	0	1 (1%)	1 (1%)

Note. Age is reported as *M* (*SD*). Income and Canadian Status are reported as *n* frequency and (%). 17 participants did not report their income. Percentages may not exactly add up to 100% due to rounding.

Main Analyses

Factor Analyses

Extraction Method. During data screening, I found that nearly all items had a non-normal distribution. Because of this, it was important to carefully consider which extraction method to use. Researchers most often use the Maximum Likelihood (ML) extraction method, as one can compute a wide range of goodness-of-fit indices. A disadvantage of the ML method is that it assumes the data has a normal distribution (Fabrigar & Wegener, 1999). When data is non-normal, researchers can use alternative methods such as Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) because this method does not have distributional assumptions. A major disadvantage of PAF is that it does not provide goodness-of-fit indices (Fabrigar & Wegener, 1999). Considering this, I conducted the initial exploratory factor analysis with all items using both methods and compared the pattern of results. The results between the two methods were nearly identical (see Tables 4 and 5). Both suggested a seven-factor structure, with the same items loading on each factor. As results did not meaningfully change between the two methods, I decided to use ML as this would allow me to compute goodness-of-fit indices. I also used an oblique rotation so that factors could correlate with one another.

Table 4

Study 1: Exploratory Factor Analysis for Initial Item Pool (Maximum Likelihood)

Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ANGER1: Angry	0.98						
ANGER8: Mad	0.92						
ANGER2: Outraged	0.90						
ANGER6: Furious	0.88						
ANGER7: Fed up	0.85						
ANGER5: Annoyed	0.76						
ANGER3: Exasperated	0.69						
ANGER4: Irritated	0.67						
HOPE1: Hopeful		0.83					
HOPE3: Positive anticipation		0.81					
HOPE6: Optimistic		0.78					
HOPE2: Aspiration		0.74					
HOPE5: Inspired		0.74					
HOPE7: Excited		0.68					
HOPE8: Confident		0.65					
HOPE4: Wishful		0.61					
SAD8: Low			0.89				
SAD7: Blue			0.88				
SAD5: Down			0.82				
SAD3: Depressed			0.77				
SAD1: Sad			0.74				
SAD2: Unhappy			0.63				
SAD4: Sorrow			0.57				
SAD6: Disheartened			0.47				
EMP5: Tender				-0.87			
EMP2: Softhearted				-0.87			
EMP3: Warm				-0.78			
EMP4: Compassionate				-0.71			
EMP6: Moved				-0.63			

EMP1: Sympathetic	-0.56			0.41
LOVE6: Devoted		-0.83		
LOVE5: Committed		-0.79		
LOVE4: Attached		-0.78		
LOVE3: Connected		-0.76		
LOVE1: Love		-0.70		
LOVE2: Interested		-0.65		
LOVE7: Caring		-0.62		
GUILT5: Accountable			0.70	
GUILT6: Blameworthy			0.70	
GUILT3: Responsible			0.68	
GUILT1: Guilty			0.60	0.32
GUILT2: Regret			0.55	
GUILT7: Sorry				0.65
GUILT8: Badly				0.49
GUILT4: Remorse				0.45
LOVE8: Concerned				0.41

Note. $N = 280$. Pattern matrix loadings. Extraction method: Maximum Likelihood. Loadings < .3 are not shown.

Table 5

Study 1: Exploratory Factor Analysis for Initial Item Pool (Principal Axis Factoring)

Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ANGER1: Angry	0.94						
ANGER8: Mad	0.92						
ANGER7: Fed up	0.89						
ANGER2: Outraged	0.85						
ANGER6: Furious	0.85						
ANGER5: Annoyed	0.83						
ANGER4: Irritated	0.74						
ANGER3: Exasperated	0.71						
HOPE1: Hopeful		0.84					
HOPE3: Positive anticipation		0.80					
HOPE6: Optimistic		0.78					
HOPE2: Aspiration		0.75					
HOPE5: Inspired		0.73					
HOPE7: Excited		0.68					
HOPE8: Confident		0.64					
HOPE4: Wishful		0.62					
GUILT5: Accountable			0.70				
GUILT6: Blameworthy			0.69				
GUILT3: Responsible			0.69				
GUILT1: Guilty			0.59				0.35
GUILT2: Regret			0.54				
EMP2: Softhearted				-0.87			
EMP5: Tender				-0.86			
EMP3: Warm				-0.77			
EMP4: Compassionate				-0.71			
EMP6: Moved				-0.65			
EMP1: Sympathetic				-0.58			0.37
LOVE6: Devoted					-0.82		
LOVE4: Attached					-0.78		

LOVE5: Committed	-0.77		
LOVE3: Connected	-0.77		
LOVE1: Love	-0.70		
LOVE2: Interested	-0.65		
LOVE7: Caring	-0.62		
SAD8: Low		-0.88	
SAD7: Blue		-0.87	
SAD5: Down		-0.81	
SAD3: Depressed		-0.77	
SAD1: Sad		-0.76	
SAD2: Unhappy		-0.64	
SAD4: Sorrow		-0.59	
SAD6: Disheartened		-0.49	
GUILT7: Sorry			0.68
GUILT8: Badly			0.50
GUILT4: Remorse			0.45
LOVE8: Concerned			0.40

Note. $N = 280$. Pattern matrix loadings. Extraction method: Principal Axis Factoring. Loadings < .3 are not shown.

Initial Item Pool. Exploratory factor analyses, over confirmatory factor analyses, are most appropriate to use when initially developing a new measure (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2012). As such, to examine the basic factor structure of the items, I first conducted an exploratory factor analysis with all items. As I indicated above, the initial results suggested a seven-factor solution, based on Kaiser's (1960) criterion of retaining factors with an eigenvalue > 1 along with a visual inspection of a scree plot. This factor structure did not support H1, in which I expected to find six factors representing the domains of love, empathy, anger, sadness, guilt, and hope. The items intended to represent the domains of anger, hope, and sadness all loaded cleanly on separate factors (i.e., no cross-loading > .3). The items intended to represent guilt were split between two factors. "Accountable," "blameworthy," "responsible," "guilty," and "regret" loaded on one factor. "Sorry," "badly," "remorse," and "guilty," along with "sympathetic" (from Batson's empathy scale) and "concerned" (intended to measure love) loaded onto a seventh factor. Next, I examined model fit. As stated in the preregistration, for chi-square, instead of focusing on the absolute significance level, I focused on a change in values between models and considered a reduction as indicating improvement (Bauldry, 2015). For RMSEA, I considered a value of < .05 close fit, .05 to .08 fair fit, and .08 to .10 mediocre fit (Bauldry, 2015). For CFI, I considered a value of > .95 acceptable fit (based on Hu & Bentler, 1999). For SRMR, I considered a value < .08 acceptable fit (based on Hu & Bentler, 1999). Based on these guidelines, model fit was acceptable for some indices, but the model certainly had room for improvement, $\chi^2(734) = 1434.96$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, 90% CI [.05, .06], CFI = .93, SRMR = .02. When Batson's empathy scale was not included, model fit (for a six-factor solution) was similar, $\chi^2(555) = 1139.85$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, 90% CI [.06, .07], CFI = .93, SRMR = .03.

Scale Refinement. In the first round of scale refinement, I dropped items from the

seventh factor, which included “sorry,” “badly,” “remorse,” and “concerned.” Though “sympathetic” from Batson’s empathy scale loaded onto the seventh factor, I did not remove it because it was from an established measure, nor did I remove “guilty” because that was the title word of one of the hypothesized constructs. I also removed the lowest 1–2 loading items from each factor, which included “exasperated,” “irritated,” “wishful,” “confident,” “sorrow,” “disheartened,” and “caring.” This left all hypothesized factors with six items each, except for the hypothesized guilt factor which included five. When I re-ran the factor analysis all items loaded cleanly onto their hypothesized factors, with model fit (not including empathy) being $\chi^2(271) = 514.42$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, 90% CI [.05, .06], CFI = .96, SRMR = .02, and (including empathy) being $\chi^2(400) = 816.50$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, 90% CI [.06, .07], CFI = .95, SRMR = .02. Though there was improvement on some indices with this initial round of refinement (e.g., Chi-square, CFI), there was still room for improvement on others (e.g., RMSEA).

Professor Starzyk joined me in conducting the subsequent rounds of refinement. In the second round, we further excluded items so that each domain (except for empathy) would have five items each. This included dropping the lowest loading items of “annoyed,” “excited,” “unhappy,” and “interested.” Model fit improved slightly, with indices (not including empathy) being $\chi^2(185) = 342.85$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, 90% CI [.06, .06], CFI = .97, SRMR = .02, and (including empathy) being $\chi^2(294) = 595.09$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, 90% CI [.05, .07], CFI = .96, SRMR = .02. Wanting to further understand which domains were the most problematic, we examined each domain individually. As I show in Table 6, model fit, across most indices, was bad for empathy and guilt and acceptable/good for sadness and hope. The pattern was mixed across measures of model fit for love and anger. Many of the domains had a high RMSEA. As

RMSEA penalizes overly complicated models, this suggested that one issue might be that there were simply too many items. Considering this, in the third round of refinement, we further excluded items so that each domain would have 4 items, except for empathy, which we left alone. We decided to exclude "committed" and "aspiration" because they had the lowest correlations with the title words "love" and "hopeful," respectively. We decided to exclude "fed up" and "depressed" because they had the lowest correlations with the title words "angry" and "sad" and had the lowest factor loadings. As Table 5 shows, the guilt domain was especially problematic. In the initial factor analysis with all items, the items had loaded onto separate factors. Because of this, we ran a factor analysis with all items to better understand this domain. The items "sorry," "badly" "remorse," "guilty," "regret" and "blameworthy" loaded on the first factor, and the items "guilty," "regret," "accountable," "responsible," and "blameworthy" onto the second. "Guilty," the title word, loaded more strongly on the first factor than the second (.54 versus .34). Considering this, I decided to re-consider which items I would include to measure this domain. As "blameworthy" and "regret" had the lowest loadings on the first factor (.32 and .44 respectively), I examined the items "sorry," "badly," "remorse," and "guilty." Model fit for these items was $\chi^2(2) = 10.26$, $p = .001$, RMSEA = .12, 90% CI [.06, .20], CFI = .98, SRMR = .02. Though some indices (e.g., Chi-square and RMSEA) were poor, this was a substantial improvement over the other five items, "accountable," "blameworthy," "responsible," "guilty," and "regret."

Table 6

Study 1: Model Fit Indices for Individual Emotional Domains

Domain	Chi-Square			RMSEA		CFI	SRMR
	χ^2	*df*	*p*	Point Est.	90% CI		
Love	31.87	5	< .001	.139	[.095, .187]	.968	.026

Empathy	113.76	9	< .001	.205	[.172, .239]	.914	.049
Anger	29.84	5	< .001	.135	[.091, .183]	.983	.013
Sadness	5.71	5	.34	.023	[.000, .089]	.999	.009
Guilt	83.21	5	< .001	.237	[.194, .283]	.849	.067
Hope	9.28	5	.10	.056	[.000, .111]	.995	.015

Note. Extraction method: Maximum Likelihood. Each domain includes 5 items each except for empathy which includes 6. Love = “devoted,” “attached,” “committed,” “connected,” and “love.” Anger = “angry,” “mad,” “fed up,” “outraged,” and “furious.” Sadness = “low,” “blue,” “down,” “depressed,” and “sad.” Guilt = “accountable,” “blameworthy,” “responsible,” “guilty,” and “regret.” Hope = “hopeful,” “positive anticipation,” “optimistic,” “aspiration,” and “inspired.”

When I re-ran a factor analysis on the total model (with 4 items per domain), model fit (not including empathy) was $\chi^2(100) = 161.87$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.03, .06], CFI = .99, SRMR = .01, and (including empathy) was $\chi^2(184) = 330.74$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.04, .06], CFI = .97, SRMR = .02. This was better than the model that included 5 items for each domain. Many would stop here, but we felt there was still room for improvement.

Final Item Pool. In the final round of refinement, we selected the top 3 items for each domain. We considered multiple factors when deciding which items to exclude. We excluded “devoted” because it had the lowest correlation and covariance with the title word, “love.” We excluded “furious” because it also had the lowest correlation and covariance with the title word, “angry,” lowest squared multiple correlation, and the lowest factor loading. We excluded “blue” because it had the lowest correlation and covariance with the title word, “sad,” and lowest squared multiple correlation. We excluded “positive anticipation” because it also had the lowest correlation and covariance with the title word, “hopeful,” and we also judged it to be a more difficult word.

Again, the construct of “guilt” needed especially careful consideration. We considered removing “sorry,” because, of all items, it had the lowest correlation and covariance with

"guilty." However, if I removed this item, Cronbach's alpha would have dropped from .83 to .75. Similarly, removing "remorse" or "badly" would have reduced Cronbach's alpha to below .80. Alternatively, removing "guilty" would result in an internal consistency of .82. Further, of all items, "guilty" also had the lowest squared multiple correlation (.32, all other items > .44) and lowest factor loading (.60, all other items < .71). Upon reflection, I became intrigued by the idea of focusing on the construct of feeling "sorry," rather than "guilty." As such, I ultimately decided to remove "guilty" and re-name the construct "Sorry." Please see Table 7 for final factor loadings.

After deciding upon the final items, I tested the model fit. Without empathy, all indices suggested a well-fitting model: $\chi^2(40) = 51.73$, $p = .10$, RMSEA = .03, 90% CI [.00, .06], CFI = .97, SRMR = .01. When I included empathy, model fit was slightly worse, $\chi^2(99) = 182.89$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, 90% CI [.04, .07], CFI = .98, SRMR = .02, likely because the empathy scale has poor model fit. All items loaded onto their hypothesized factors with no cross-loadings > .30. The exception was "sympathetic" from the empathy scale which cross-loaded onto the "Sorry" factor at -.38. As this scale is already established, I did not remove this item. Finally, internal consistency for each of the individual domains all fell within the "good" to "excellent" range: love $\alpha = .85$, empathy $\alpha = .92$, anger $\alpha = .95$, sadness $\alpha = .90$, sorry $\alpha = .82$, and hope $\alpha = .84$. I computed total average scores for each of the domains. Scores could therefore range from 1–5.

Table 7

Study 1: Exploratory Factor Analysis for Final Items

Item	1	2	3	4	5	6
ANGER1: Angry	1.00					
ANGER2: Outraged	0.92					
ANGER8: Mad	0.84					
EMP2: Softhearted		0.87				
EMP5: Tender		0.84				
EMP3: Warm		0.77				
EMP4: Compassionate		0.76				
EMP6: Moved		0.64				
EMP1: Sympathetic		0.53		-0.38		
SAD8: Low			0.94			
SAD5: Down			0.85			
SAD1: Sad			0.62			
GUILT7: Sorry				-0.87		
GUILT8: Badly				-0.65		
GUILT4: Remorse				-0.56		
HOPE1: Hopeful					0.87	
HOPE6: Optimistic					0.73	
HOPE5: Inspired					0.69	
LOVE4: Attached						0.80
LOVE3: Connected						0.78
LOVE1: Love						0.75

Note. $N = 280$. Pattern matrix loadings. Extraction method: Maximum Likelihood. Loadings < .3 are not shown.

Correlational Analyses

After computing total scores, I conducted correlational analyses (presented in Table 8) to understand the relationships among the emotional domains. Before doing this, I checked whether the composites were normally distributed. Love, anger, sadness, and sorry did not have a normal distribution. When data is nonnormal, Pearson correlations sometimes provide an inflated value (Bishara & Hittner, 2015). As such, I report Spearman rank-ordered correlations as this method addresses this inflation and does not rely on the assumption of distributional normality (Bishara & Hittner, 2015).

Table 8

Study 1: Correlations Among Emotion Composites

Variable	Love	Empathy	Anger	Sadness	Sorry	Hope
Love	*.85*	.52*	.03	.11	.07	.51*
Empathy		*.92*	.31*	.28*	.39*	.42*
Anger			*.95*	.57*	.59*	.03
Sadness				*.90*	.54*	-.03
Sorry					*.82*	.06
Hope						*.84*

Note. N = 270–278. Due to non-normal distributions, I report Spearman's correlations. Italicized values on the diagonal represent the composite's internal consistency. *$p < .001$.

I expected that all emotional domains would positively correlate with one another (H2). This hypothesis was partially supported. Love positively correlated with both empathy and hope to a medium extent, but not with the other emotions. Similarly, hope also positively correlated with empathy to a small extent, but not with the other emotions. Conversely, anger positively correlated with sadness, sorry, and empathy to a small to medium extent, but not love or hope. In addition to positively correlating with anger, sadness also positively correlated with feeling sorry

and feeling more empathy, but not love or hope. Finally, in addition to positively correlating with anger and sadness, feeling sorry also positively correlated with empathy. This overall pattern of results suggests that positive emotions like hope and love relate to each other, and negative emotions like anger, sadness, and feeling sorry relate to each another. Empathy is positively related to all.

Wanting to better understand the extent to which empathy related to the different emotions, I conducted two-tailed Fisher's z tests to compare the strength of associations between empathy and love, anger, sadness, sorry, and hope. According to these tests, the strength of the relationship between empathy and love was stronger than the strength of relationships between empathy and anger, $p < .01$, empathy and sadness, $p < .001$, and empathy and feeling sorry, $p = .04$, but similar in strength to empathy and hope, $p = .12$. Given that empathy and love are both other-focused emotions, this made sense. The strength of the relationship among empathy and all other emotions were similar (all ps > .06).

***t*-Tests**

To understand whether men and women as well as Racialized and White participants differ in the extent to which they feel different emotions, I conducted *t*-tests. I used bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapped (BCa) *t*-tests (5,000 bootstraps, seed = 1,282) because several of the composites had non-normal distributions. Non-parametric tests such as this do not have distributional assumptions (Puth et al., 2015).

I expected that women would report stronger emotional responses than men across all domains (H3a–f). These hypotheses were only partially supported. As I summarize in Table 9, compared to men, women reported greater empathy, anger, and sadness. Conversely, men and women did not significantly differ in the extent to which they felt love, sorry, or hopeful.

Table 9

Study 1: Independent Samples t-Tests for Emotion Composites by Gender

Variable	Men		Women		*t*(261)	*p*	95% BCa CI		Cohen's *d*
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*			LL	UL	
Love	2.63	1.09	2.63	1.06	-0.02	.98	-.28	.27	-.003
Empathy	2.81	0.95	3.07	1.04	-2.10	.04	-.49	-.02	-.26
Anger	1.77	1.04	2.05	1.14	-2.09	.04	-.55	-.01	-.26
Sadness	2.02	0.96	2.50	1.10	-3.83	< .001	-.73	-.24	-.47
Sorry	2.25	1.10	2.42	1.13	-1.28	.20	-.44	.09	-.16
Hope	2.87	1.03	2.65	0.95	1.77	.08	-.03	.46	.22

Note. Bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapped (BCa) *t*-tests (5,000 bootstraps, seed = 1,282). Assumed equal variance for all emotion composites except for sadness (*df* = 256.46).

I expected that Racialized and White participants would report similar levels of emotions across all domains, except for guilt, for which I expected White participants to report higher levels than Racialized participants (H5a–f). As I am no longer measuring guilt, this hypothesis is no longer relevant (H5c). The data mostly supported my other hypotheses. As I show in Table 10, Racialized and White participants reported similar levels of love, anger, sadness, sorry, and hope. Contrary to my expectations (H5f), compared to White participants, Racialized participants reported more empathy to a small extent.

Table 10

Study 1: Independent Samples t-Tests for Emotion Composites by Race/Ethnicity

Variable	White		Racialized		$t(261)$	p	95% BCa CI		Cohen's d
	M	SD	M	SD			LL	UL	
Love	2.61	1.07	2.67	1.09	-0.47	.64	-.33	.20	-.06
Empathy	2.81	0.99	3.08	1.00	-2.18	.03	-.51	-.03	-.27
Anger	1.95	1.16	1.87	1.03	0.60	.55	-.18	.34	.07
Sadness	2.28	1.12	2.24	0.99	0.31	.76	-.20	.28	.04
Sorry	2.34	1.11	2.32	1.05	0.17	.87	-.24	.29	.02
Hope	2.66	1.01	2.85	0.98	-1.50	.14	-.42	.06	-.19

Note. Bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapped (BCa) *t*-tests (5,000 bootstraps, seed = 1,282). Assumed equal variance for all emotion composites.

Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)

One-Way ANOVA. Another way to think about how gender and ethnicity/race relate to one's emotional experience is to consider how these identities intersect. I hypothesized that gender and ethnic/racial groups would differ in their mean level of emotions, with Racialized women reporting the strongest emotions, followed by White women, Racialized men, and White men (H7). I also hypothesized that guilt would be an exception, in that White women would report the highest levels, but this hypothesis is no longer relevant because I am no longer measuring guilt.

These hypotheses were only partially supported. As I show in Table 11, groups did not differ on their overall level of love, anger, or feeling sorry. They did, however, differ in their level of empathy, sadness, and hope. Racialized women reported the most empathy, which was higher than White men, who reported the least. Neither group significantly differed from White women or Racialized men, who also reported similar levels. Racialized women also reported the

highest amount of sadness, which was higher than both White and Racialized men. Racialized and White women were sad to similar extents. Like Racialized women, White women were also sadder than Racialized men, but did not differ from White men. Finally, groups also differed in how hopeful they felt. Contrary to expectations, Racialized men were the most hopeful, more so than Racialized women, White men, and to an almost-significant extent, White women. Racialized women, White women, and White men were all hopeful to similar extents.

Table 11

Study 1: One-Way ANOVA for Emotion Composites by Gender and Race/Ethnicity Group

Variable	Racialized Women	White Women	Racialized Men	White Men	F	p	η^2
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)			
Love	2.61^{a} (1.07)	2.75^{a} (1.08)	2.84^{a} (1.12)	2.49^{a} (1.04)	1.44	.23	.015
Empathy	3.18^{a} (1.04)	2.97^{ab} (1.04)	2.99^{ab} (0.98)	2.63^{b} (0.89)	3.66	.01	.039
Anger	1.98^{a} (1.06)	2.07^{a} (1.20)	1.70^{a} (0.98)	1.82^{a} (1.08)	1.62	.19	.018
Sadness	2.55^{a} (1.03)	2.46^{ab} (1.14)	1.93^{c} (0.83)	2.07^{bc} (1.04)	6.76	< .001	.063
Sorry	2.46^{a} (1.12)	2.40^{a} (1.14)	2.23^{a} (0.99)	2.33^{a} (1.10)	0.59	.62	.006
Hope	2.65^{a} (0.91)	2.67^{ab} (1.04)	3.10^{b} (1.00)	2.65^{a} (0.98)	3.44	.01	.037

Note. Subscripts denote non-significant differences between groups. Assumed equal variance for all emotion composites, except for sadness. Love df = (3, 274), empathy df = (3, 272), anger df = (3, 270), sadness df = (3, 151.65), sorry df = (3, 274), and hope df = (3, 272).

Two-Way Factorial ANOVA. In addition to examining how these identities intersect, I was also interested in comparing the size of effects for gender, ethnicity/race, and interactive effects. I hypothesized (H8) that gender would relate to people's emotional responses to a greater

extent than would ethnic/racial background, and that there would not be significant interaction effects (H9). To test these hypotheses, I conducted bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapped (BCa) two-way factorial ANOVAs (5,000 bootstraps, seed = 1,282).

Overall, my hypothesis that there would not be significant interaction effects was mostly supported. There were no significant interactions for love, $F(1, 274) = 3.61$, $p = .06$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$, empathy, $F(1, 274) = 0.46$, $p = .50$, $\eta_p^2 = .002$, anger, $F(1, 270) = 0.01$, $p = .93$, $\eta_p^2 < .001$, sadness, $F(1, 275) = 0.93$, $p = .34$, $\eta_p^2 = .003$, and sorry, $F(1, 274) = 0.40$, $p = .52$, $\eta_p^2 = .001$. There was, however, a significant interaction for hope, $F(1, 272) = 3.90$, $p = .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$, which I will discuss in greater detail later.

The data partially supported my hypothesis that gender would relate to people's emotional responses to a greater extent than ethnic/racial background. In support of my hypothesis, for anger, there was a significant effect of gender, $F(1, 270) = 4.17$, $p = .04$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, though not for ethnic/racial background, $F(1, 270) = 0.63$, $p = .43$, $\eta_p^2 = .002$. Estimated marginal means were $M = 1.76$ ($SE = .09$) for men and $M = 2.03$ ($SE = .09$) for women. Also, for sadness, there was a significant effect of gender, $F(1, 275) = 17.34$, $p = < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$, but not for ethnic/racial background, $F(1, 275) = 0.06$, $p = .81$, $\eta_p^2 < .001$. The estimated marginal means were $M = 2.00$ ($SE = .09$) for men and $M = 2.51$ ($SE = .09$) for women.

Contrary to my hypothesis and consistent with the *t*-test results, for love, there were no significant main effects of gender, $F(1, 274) = 0.02$, $p = .89$, $\eta_p^2 < .001$, or ethnicity/race, $F(1, 274) = 0.67$, $p = .41$, $\eta_p^2 = .002$. Similarly, for feeling sorry, there was no significant main effect for gender, $F(1, 274) = 1.33$, $p = .25$, $\eta_p^2 = .005$, or ethnicity/race, $F(1, 274) = 0.03$, $p = .87$, $\eta_p^2 < .001$. For empathy, there were significant main effects for both gender, $F(1, 274) = 4.91$, $p = .03$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, and ethnicity/race, $F(1, 274) = 5.84$, $p = .02$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, but these effect sizes are similar

in magnitude, contrary to my expectations. The estimated marginal means were $M = 2.81$ (SE = .08) for men, $M = 3.07$ (SE = .08) for women, $M = 2.80$ (SE = .08) for White participants, and $M = 3.08$ (SE = .08) for Racialized participants.

As I discussed above, there was a significant gender by ethnicity/race interaction for hope. There were no main effects for either gender, $F(1, 272) = 3.28$, $p = .07$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$, or ethnicity/race, $F(1, 272) = 3.14$, $p = .08$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. Simple main effects analysis found that, among men, Racialized participants were more hopeful than White participants ($p = .01$). In contrast, among women, there were no significant differences across ethnic/racial groups ($p = .88$). Further, men were more hopeful than women among Racialized participants, ($p = .01$), but there were no gender differences ($p = .92$) among White participants. This is consistent with the results of the one-way ANOVA, which found Racialized men to be especially hopeful compared to other groups, who were all similar.

Configural Invariance Testing

Finally, I investigated whether the factor structure of these scales was similar across men and women, and Racialized and White people. I expected that the factor structure would be similar for gender (H4) and ethnic/racial groups (H5). To test this, I conducted configural invariance testing. I began with gender. First, without empathy in the mix, I specified a "configural" 5-factor model that allowed factor loadings for men and women to be unequal (i.e., "unconstrained"). Then, I specified a "metric" 5-factor model that required the factor loadings for men and women to be equal (i.e., "constrained"). Finally, I compared the unconstrained configural model to the constrained metric model using a Chi-square test and the value was not significant, $\chi^2(10) = 3.71$, $p = .96$. As the model fit did not significantly change for the worse when I constrained the factor loadings, the factor structure and loadings are similar for men and

women. I repeated this process with the 6-factor model (with empathy). The Chi-square test that compared the configural model to the metric model was also not significant, $\chi^2(15) = 5.83$, $p = .98$.

I repeated the above process for both the 5-factor and 6-factor models between White and Racialized participants. As with gender, the Chi-square test that compared the configural and metric models were not significant for the 5-factor, $\chi^2(10) = 12.08$, $p = .28$, suggesting the structure across groups was equivalent. However, there was a significant result for the 6-factor model, $\chi^2(15) = 39.25$, $p < .001$. To determine where the difference was, I examined modification indices. The largest modification suggested that the item "sympathetic" from the empathy scale should load onto the "sorry" factor for White participants, but not for Racialized participants. In the final factor analysis, this item was also problematic in that it had also cross-loaded onto the "sorry" factor (-.38). When I removed this item and compared the configural and metric models, the result was not significant, $\chi^2(14) = 20.95$, $p = .10$. This suggests that the factor structure is similar for both White and Racialized people without this item. However, because this is an established scale, I did not remove this item.

Study 1 Discussion

There is little consistency among existing measures of emotions in the context of social change, making it challenging for researchers who wish to study many emotions at once and make comparisons. In response to this need for psychometrically robust measures, the purpose of this study was to develop multi-item scales that measure a range of feelings people may have when they learn about injustice. This provided me with the measurement tools I needed to test my hypotheses in later studies. Other researchers may also use these scales to examine people's emotional experiences comprehensively and holistically.

My original aim was to develop scales that measured each emotional domain with six items, like Batson et al.'s (1997) measure of empathy. In developing these scales, however, I found that "less is more" regarding the number of items. Though the final scales only have three items per domain, I found that the psychometric properties were much stronger with fewer items. Further, using shorter scales can have other advantages, such as reducing survey length and participant fatigue.

In addition to aiming to create scales to measure people's emotional responses, I also made several hypotheses regarding potential gender and ethnic/racial group differences. First, I expected women to express stronger emotions than men. The data partially supported this. Women reported stronger feelings of empathy, anger, and sadness than men to a small extent, but reported similar levels of love, feeling sorry, and hope. Second, I expected Racialized and White participants to express similar levels of emotions. The data mostly supported this hypothesis. Racialized and White participants reported similar levels of all emotions except empathy, in which Racialized participants expressed more than White participants to a small extent.

In thinking about group differences from an intersectional perspective, I also hypothesized that Racialized women would report the strongest emotions, followed by White women, Racialized men, and White men. I found only partial support for this hypothesis. Though groups expressed similar levels of love, anger, and feeling sorry, Racialized women reported more empathy than White men, as well as more sadness than both Racialized men and White men. Racialized and White women did not differ in the extent to which they experienced any of the emotions. Racialized and White men were also very similar in their emotional experiences except hope, for which Racialized men reported higher levels than all other groups. It is unclear as to why Racialized men are especially hopeful. Future research may explore why this might be.

Other research methods, such as qualitative approaches, may be particularly well-suited to answer this question.

In developing these scales, the construct of "guilt" deserves special attention as it was more difficult to measure in comparison to the other domains. The initial pool of items loaded on separate factors, with "sorry," "badly" and "remorse" loading on the first, and "accountable," "responsible," "blameworthy," and "regret" on the second, and "guilty" on both (though more strongly on the first). We originally chose these items based on previous measures of collective guilt that emphasized feelings of regret and acceptance of responsibility for harm (Branscombe et al., 2004), as well as other emotion labels other researchers have used in the past (e.g., "remorse," "blameworthy," "sorry," and "bad conscience," Smith et al., 2002). Based on the factor analysis, it appears that "guilt" is a construct with multiple components. Though not a perfect description, the first component implies negative feelings regarding a harm, whereas the second component implies acceptance of responsibility for the harm. In the context of harm at the collective level, it is perhaps unsurprising that these two factors are distinct. Many people may feel bad that their social group has caused harm, but do not necessarily see themselves as personally responsible. The construct of what I decided to call "sorry" (which involves feeling bad about a harm, without necessarily feeling responsible) is an especially interesting one that has received little attention in the literature. Upon further reflection, this is perhaps surprising. After all, when one hears about other people's suffering, one of the first things people often say is "I'm sorry that happened to you." Expressing "sorry" is also a common response in reconciliation efforts. In Australia, for example, they have a national "Sorry Day" to acknowledge and remember the Stolen Generations, Indigenous Peoples who were forcibly removed from their families and communities by the state (Reconciliation Australia, 2020).

Future research may further explore and flesh out this construct and its relation to guilt and a sense of responsibility.

In summary, in Study 1 I developed multi-item scales to measure people's emotional responses to injustice through altering and combining previous measures of emotions as well as adding my own items. The final scales have strong psychometric properties and can be used by other researchers to measure and compare various feelings people may experience in the context of social injustice. Developing psychometrically sound measures is a necessary first step to examine how emotions relate to other factors associated with social change. In Studies 2 and 3, which I describe next, I use these scales to examine their relationship to solidarity among different gender and ethnic/racial groups.

Study 2 Results

Data Analytic Overview

The purpose of Study 2 was to understand the relationships among gender, ethnicity/race, inclusive victim consciousness, emotions, and solidarity. To examine the extent to which men and women and Racialized and White people express solidarity with Indigenous Peoples, hold an inclusive victim consciousness mindset, and feel different emotions, I conducted *t*-tests. Next, to understand the relationships among solidarity, inclusive victim consciousness, and emotions, I conducted correlational analyses. This also included conducting Fisher's *z* tests to determine whether some emotions were more strongly related to solidarity than other emotions. Finally, to test whether inclusive victim consciousness and emotions explained the relationship between gender and ethnic/racial background and solidarity, I conducted path analyses. I used SPSS (version 29) as well as Mplus (version 1.8.8).

Data Screening

Before starting the main analyses, I computed total scores for the composite variables (see Table 12 for reliability statistics; all Cronbach's alpha were > .75) and screened the data. To achieve my sample, I recruited participants in four ways. First, I recruited 361 through the University of Manitoba's Introduction to Psychology research participant pool, who received credit as part of their course requirement. Second, to increase the number of men, I recruited 101 participants in-person on campus in the Engineering building. As a thank you, I entered these participants in a gift card draw and gave them a chocolate bar. Third, I recruited 41 participants, also entered in a gift card draw, via email who had previously been University of Manitoba Introduction to Psychology students and consented to ongoing contact. Fourth, and finally, I recruited 74 participants through the University of Winnipeg's Introductory Psychology research participant pool, who received credit as part of their course requirement. This resulted in a total of 577 participants.

Table 12

Study 2: Correlations Among Composite Variables

Variable	Love	Empathy	Anger	Sadness	Sorry	Hope	IVC	Solidarity
Love	*.75*	.54*	.26*	.33*	.40*	.47*	.04	.44*
Empathy		*.93*	.44*	.44*	.48*	.51*	.06	.59*
Anger			*.95*	.65*	.49*	.21*	.07	.45*
Sadness				*.86*	.60*	.32*	.03	.48*
Sorry					*.80*	.39*	-.07	.47*
Hope						*.78*	.07	.46*
IVC							*.91*	.16*
Solidarity								*.87*

Note. N = 351–352. IVC = Inclusive Victim Consciousness. Due to non-normal distributions, I report Spearman's correlations. Italicized values on the diagonal represent the composite's internal consistency. *$p < .01$.

I excluded participants for multiple reasons. I excluded people who did not provide

informed consent (n = 4), did not commit to responding conscientiously (n = 36), were Indigenous (n = 5), had lived in Canada for less than 10 years (n = 73), had a mixed racialized and White background (n = 18), or were missing a significant portion of their data (n = 108). I excluded some participants for multiple reasons; for example, those who did not meet the demographic requirements were redirected to the end of the survey, meaning they were missing most of their data. As before, I checked for univariate outliers by standardizing the variables, considering cases with z scores ± 2.5 for potential exclusion. Based on this, there were seven for love and 8 for political solidarity. Upon closer inspection, it appeared that two had a pattern of choosing the same response options that were presented on each page, suggesting that they were not responding conscientiously. I decided to remove these two participants. As the rest of the univariate outliers comprised such a small proportion of the sample (~2%), and did show variability in their responses, I left them in. To assess for multivariate outliers, I computed the Mahalanobis distance of each case. Then, I compared these distances to a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of variables (eight) and considered those with a p-value of < .001 to be outliers. Based on this, there was one case, which I excluded. This left a total of 108 Racialized women, 117 White women, 88 Racialized men, and 102 White men. To keep group sizes equal, I randomly excluded 20 Racialized women, 29 White women, and 14 White men, for a final N of 352, with n = 88 in each group.

Next, I checked whether the composites were normally distributed by calculating the ratio of skew and kurtosis to their standard errors, considering ratios less than -2 or greater than +2 indicative of non-normality. Based on this, all composites had a non-normal distribution except for hope. To check whether the emotions and inclusive victim consciousness were linearly related to solidarity, I visually inspected bivariate scatterplots. All appeared linearly

related. I also examined whether the emotions and inclusive victim consciousness with solidarity pairs were homoscedastic by visually examining residual scatter plots. All also appeared so. Finally, I checked for issues with multicollinearity by examining VIF and Tolerance values. Tolerance values < .20 and VIF values > 4 typically indicate a problem (Garson, 2012). All variables had a tolerance > .46 and a VIF < 2.2, suggesting that multicollinearity was not an issue. In Table 13, I include a summary of the composite variable descriptive statistics.

Table 13

Study 2: Descriptive Statistics Composite Variables

Variable	*M*	*SD*	Skew	SE_{Skew}	Kurtosis	SE_{Kurtosis}
Love	2.45	0.86	0.30	.13	-0.14	.26
Empathy	3.37	0.94	-0.36	.13	-0.37	.26
Anger	2.92	1.25	-0.09	.13	-1.13	.26
Sadness	2.82	1.04	0.08	.13	-0.70	.26
Sorry	2.94	1.09	-0.17	.13	-0.89	.26
Hope	3.04	0.90	-0.09	.13	-0.53	.26
IVC	3.18	1.14	-0.34	.13	-0.81	.26
Solidarity	3.68	0.62	-0.60	.13	0.77	.26

Note. N = 352. IVC = Inclusive Victim Consciousness. Emotion composites used the following rating scale: *not at all* (1), *slightly* (2), *somewhat* (3), *very much* (4), and *extremely* (5). Inclusive victim consciousness and political solidarity used the rating scale *strongly disagree* (1), *disagree* (2), *neither agree nor disagree* (3), *agree* (4) and *strongly agree* (5). 1 participant is missing a score for hope.

Participants

The final sample included 352 students recruited at the University of Manitoba and the University of Winnipeg. This was below my original target of 680 participants, but due to ongoing issues with recruitment and time constraints, I decided to end recruitment. In structural equation modelling, one should consider the ratio of cases (N) to the number of model parameters that require statistical estimates (q), with the recommended ratio being 20:1 (Kline,

2015). If the *N*:*q* ratio falls below 10:1, the results may become untrustworthy. My main hypothesized model included 25 parameters that I planned to compare against an alternative, saturated model with 31 parameters. Based on this, my ideal sample size should be 620. I added on approximately 10% to account for any potential participant exclusions for a total *N* of 680. Though my sample of 352 is below my original target, it does not fall below an *N*:*q* ratio of 10:1.

Participants were an average of 19.59 years old ($SD = 3.65$). Gender and ethnic/racial groups did not differ in age, $F(3, 348) = 1.17$, $p = .32$. Half ($n = 176$) of the participants were White. Of the racialized participants, 61 (17%) were Filipino, 48 (14%) were South Asian, 22 (6%) were Black, 16 (5%) were Chinese, 12 (3%) were Southeast Asian, and 22 identified with other backgrounds (6%, e.g., Arab, Latin American, Korean). Some participants identified with multiple backgrounds, so percentages add up to slightly more than 100%. For the entire sample, 74 (22%) reported that their annual household income was 0–50k, 118 (35%) reported 50–100k, and 142 (43%) reported greater than 100k. 18 participants did not report their income. Most participants were citizens at birth ($n = 264$, 75%). Of the remaining, 72 (21%) were citizens by naturalization, 15 (4%) were permanent residents, and 1 (< 1%) selected other (e.g., temporary resident, refugee). Politically, the sample was "middle of the road" to "slightly left-leaning." We do not have data for 16 participants on foreign policy or social issues and 17 for economic issues. On a scale of (1) *very left-wing* to (7) *very right-wing*, the sample average was 3.50 ($SD = 1.33$) for foreign policy issues, 3.65 ($SD = 1.40$) for economic issues, and 3.39 ($SD = 1.49$) for social issues. Gender and ethnic/racial groups differed politically on foreign policy issues, $F(3, 332) = 3.54$, $p = .02$ as well as economic issues, $F(3, 331) = 3.29$, $p = .02$, but not social issues, $F(3, 332) = 1.34$, $p = .26$. On foreign policy issues, Racialized women ($M = 3.15$, $SD = 1.30$) were more left-leaning than Racialized men ($M = 3.71$, $SD = 1.24$), $p = .03$, and White men ($M = 3.72$,

$SD = 1.35$), $p = .03$, but not White women ($M = 3.40$, $SD = 1.37$). The other groups did not significantly differ from one another (all ps > .41). On economic issues, White men ($M = 4.00$, $SD = 1.51$) were more right-leaning than both Racialized women ($M = 3.44$, $SD = 1.37$), $p = .04$, and White women ($M = 3.43$, $SD = 1.47$), $p = .04$, but not Racialized men ($M = 3.74$, $SD = 1.15$), $p = .61$. The other groups did not significantly differ from one another (all ps > .47). In Table 14, I have included a further breakdown of demographic characteristics by gender and ethnic/racial groups.

Table 14

Study 2: Participant Demographics

Variable	Total $N = 352$	Racialized Women $n = 88$	White Women $n = 88$	Racialized Men $n = 88$	White Men $n = 88$
Age	19.59 (3.65)	19.53 (3.48)	19.19 (3.29)	19.45 (2.62)	20.18 (4.85)
Income					
0–50k	74 (22%)	17 (21%)	20 (24%)	19 (23%)	18 (21%)
50–100k	118 (35%)	38 (48%)	24 (28%)	37 (45%)	19 (22%)
100k+	142 (43%)	25 (31%)	41 (48%)	26 (32%)	50 (58%)
Political Orientation					
Foreign Policy	3.50 (1.33)	3.15 (1.30)	3.40 (1.37)	3.71 (1.24)	3.72 (1.35)
Economic Issues	3.65 (1.40)	3.44 (1.37)	3.43 (1.47)	3.74 (1.15)	4.00 (1.51)
Social Issues	3.39 (1.49)	3.32 (1.60)	3.16 (1.52)	3.58 (1.30)	3.51 (1.50)
Canadian Status					
Citizen at birth	264 (75%)	46 (52%)	86 (98%)	47 (53%)	85 (97%)
Citizen by naturalization	72 (21%)	32 (36%)	2 (2%)	36 (41%)	2 (2%)
Permanent resident	15 (4%)	9 (10%)	0	5 (6%)	1 (1%)
Other (e.g., temporary resident, refugee)	1 (< 1%)	1 (< 1%)	0	0	0

Note. Age and Political Orientation are reported as *M* (*SD*). Income and Canadian Status are reported as *n* frequency and (%). For political orientation, participants used the rating scale (1) *very left-wing*, (2) *left-wing*, (3) *slightly left-wing*, (4) *middle of the road*, (5) *slightly right-wing*, (6) *right-wing*, and (7) *very right-wing*. 18 participants did not report their income. 16 participants did not report their position on foreign policy or social issues and 17 did not report their position on economic issues. Percentages may not exactly add up to 100% due to rounding.

Main Analyses

t-Tests

First, to understand whether men and women as well as Racialized and White participants differ in the extent to which they feel emotions, hold an inclusive victim consciousness mindset, and report solidarity, I conducted *t*-tests. Because most of the composites had a non-normal distribution, I used bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapped (BCa) *t*-tests (5,000 bootstraps, seed = 4,789).

I hypothesized that compared to men, women would report more solidarity (H10), have similar feelings of inclusive victim consciousness (H11), and have stronger emotional responses (H3a-f). All these hypotheses were supported.

As Table 15 indicates, as hypothesized, women expressed more solidarity than men. Compared to men, women also felt more love, empathy, anger, sadness, hope, and sorry. Finally, also as expected, men and women reported similar levels of inclusive victim consciousness.

Table 15

Study 2: Independent Samples t-Tests for Variable Composites by Gender

Variable	Men		Women		$t(349)$	p	95% BCa CI		Cohen's d
	M	SD	M	SD			LL	UL	
Love	2.30	0.80	2.60	0.90	-3.36	<.001	-.49	-.12	-.36
Empathy	3.09	0.92	3.65	0.88	-5.78	<.001	-.74	-.36	-.62
Anger	2.65	1.18	3.17	1.27	-3.96	<.001	-.78	-.25	-.42
Sadness	2.52	0.95	3.10	1.05	-5.44	<.001	-.79	-.36	-.58
Sorry	2.70	1.04	3.18	1.10	-4.20	<.001	-.70	-.24	-.45
Hope	2.92	0.88	3.16	0.91	-2.48	.01	-.42	-.05	-.27
IVC	3.24	1.07	3.11	1.20	1.04	.30	-.11	.36	.11
Solidarity	3.57	0.65	3.79	0.58	-3.38	<.001	-.35	-.09	-.36

Note. IVC = Inclusive Victim Consciousness. Bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapped (BCa) *t*-tests (5,000 bootstraps, seed = 4,789). Assumed equal variance for all composites except for inclusive victim consciousness (df = 343.54).

Next, I compared ethnic/racial groups. I hypothesized that Racialized participants would express greater solidarity (H12) and greater feelings of inclusive victim consciousness (H13) than White participants. In contrast, I expected groups to report similar levels of emotions except for guilt (H5a–f). As I am no longer measuring guilt, I did not test this hypothesis. These hypotheses were mostly supported.

As Table 16 summarizes, as I hypothesized, Racialized participants reported greater feelings of inclusive victim consciousness than White participants to a large extent. Also as hypothesized, Racialized and White participants reported similar levels of love, empathy, anger, sadness, and hope. White participants reported feeling more sorry than Racialized participants to an extent that was marginally significant, perhaps because of this emotion's relation to guilt. Contrary to my expectations, I found limited support that Racialized participants would report

greater solidarity than White participants (H12), as the difference was only marginally significant.

Table 16

Study 2: Independent Samples t-Tests for Variable Composites by Ethnicity/Race

Variable	White		Racialized		$t(349)$	p	95% BCa CI		Cohen's d
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*			LL	UL	
Love	2.47	0.87	2.42	0.86	0.53	.60	-.13	.23	.06
Empathy	3.34	0.92	3.40	0.96	-0.61	.54	-.26	.14	-.07
Anger	2.87	1.24	2.95	1.27	-0.55	.59	-.34	.18	-.06
Sadness	2.77	1.03	2.86	1.04	-0.80	.44	-.31	.12	-.09
Sorry	3.05	1.13	2.83	1.05	1.84	.07	-.02	.44	.20
Hope	3.00	0.91	3.07	0.88	-0.68	.50	-.25	.12	-.07
IVC	2.43	1.03	3.93	0.63	-16.36	<.001	-1.67	-1.33	-1.74
Solidarity	3.62	0.63	3.74	0.61	-1.74	.08	-.24	.01	-.19

Note. IVC = Inclusive Victim Consciousness. Bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapped (BCa) *t*-tests (5,000 bootstraps, seed = 4,789). Assumed equal variance for all composites except for inclusive victim consciousness (df = 290.03).

Correlational Analyses

To understand the extent to which inclusive victim consciousness and people's emotions related to solidarity, I conducted correlational analyses (presented in Table 12). I hypothesized that people who had a stronger inclusive victim consciousness mindset (H14) and had stronger emotional responses (H15a–f) would report more solidarity. I also hypothesized (H16) that positive emotions (i.e., love, empathy, and hope) would relate to solidarity to a greater extent than negative emotions (i.e., anger, sadness, and guilt). The data mostly supported these hypotheses.

As expected, people who had a stronger inclusive victim consciousness mindset also

reported more solidarity. Also as expected, all emotions positively correlated with solidarity. Additionally, I expected positive emotions to correlate with solidarity more strongly than negative emotions. This was not supported. According to Fisher's *z* tests, empathy correlated with solidarity more strongly than did all other emotions and solidarity (all *p*s $< .01$). However, the strength of correlations between solidarity and all other emotions were similar (all *p*s $> .50$). In summary, feeling any of the emotions more intensely is related to greater solidarity, but empathy appears to be particularly important.

Demographic Analyses

In addition to the main analyses, I conducted other analyses to understand how other characteristics, such as political orientation, age, and income related to solidarity. People who were more right-leaning on foreign policy issues, economic issues, and social issues reported less solidarity than those who were more left-leaning ($r_s = -.27$, -.20, and -.30 respectively, all *p*s $<$ .001). Additionally, age positively correlated with solidarity to a small extent ($r_s = .19$, $p < .001$). Finally, I also examined whether there were differences across income brackets (0–50K, 50–100K, and 100K+). Groups in different income brackets reported similar levels of solidarity, $F(2, 331) = 0.69$, $p = .50$, $\eta^2 = .004$.

Path Analysis

Finally, I was interested in whether emotions and inclusive victim consciousness explained the relationship between gender and ethnicity/race and solidarity. I hypothesized that emotions would mediate the relationship between gender and solidarity (H18a–f), but not inclusive victim consciousness (H17). Conversely, I hypothesized that inclusive victim consciousness would mediate the relationship between ethnicity/race and solidarity (H19), but not emotions (H20). In other words, I expected that women and Racialized people would report

greater solidarity than men and White people for different reasons. I expected that women would express stronger emotions which would in turn relate to greater solidarity, whereas Racialized people would report stronger inclusive victim consciousness which would in turn relate to greater solidarity. To test these hypotheses, I conducted path analyses (5,000 bootstraps).

Hypothesized Model. First, I tested my hypothesized model (see Figure 1) as follows: gender → mediators (six emotional domains); ethnicity/race → mediator (inclusive victim consciousness); mediators (six emotions and inclusive victim consciousness) → solidarity; gender → solidarity, and ethnicity/race → solidarity. I also allowed errors for the emotions to correlate, as I expected that emotions would positively relate to one another and participants responded using the same rating scale. As political orientation on foreign policy, economic, and social issues differed across gender and ethnic/racial groups, I conducted analyses with and without them as covariates. I did not include age as a covariate because age was similar across groups. Model fit (without covariates) was $\chi^2(14) = 20.54$, $p = .11$, RMSEA = .04, 90% CI [.00, .07], CFI = >.99, SRMR = .02, BIC = 7799.67. Overall, these variables accounted for 50% of the variance in solidarity.

Figure 1

Study 1 and 2: Hypothesized Model



Note. Errors for mediators and solidarity are not shown. Errors for the emotions were correlated.

As Table 17 shows, without covariates, as expected, gender significantly predicted all emotions. Of the six emotions, being a woman predicted feeling empathy and sadness to the strongest extent and predicted greater hope to the least extent. Further, as expected, being a member of a racialized group predicted greater inclusive victim consciousness. Most, but not all, mediators significantly predicted solidarity. Unexpectedly, anger, love, and inclusive victim consciousness did not, though love was marginally significant and trending in the expected direction. Of the mediators that significantly predicted solidarity, empathy was the most strongly related and feeling sorry the least.

There was a significant overall indirect effect of gender on solidarity. However, my hypothesis that all emotions would explain the relationship between gender and solidarity was only partially supported (H18a–f). Of the emotions, the specific indirect paths were only significant for empathy, sadness, and feeling sorry. The specific indirect path was marginally significant for hope. Because anger and love had not predicted solidarity, these indirect paths were not significant.

The data did not support my hypothesis (H19) that inclusive victim consciousness would mediate the relationship between ethnicity/race and solidarity because inclusive victim consciousness did not predict solidarity. Finally, the total effects of both gender and ethnicity/race on solidarity were significant, but the direct effects were not. Thus, women tended to report more solidarity than men because they experienced some emotions, such as empathy, sadness, and feeling sorry to a stronger extent. Racialized participants reported greater inclusive victim consciousness than White people. There was only limited evidence to suggest that they reported more solidarity, however, and even less evidence to suggest that inclusive victim consciousness explained this relationship.

Table 17

Study 2: Path Analysis (Hypothesized Model without Political Orientation Included as Covariates)

	Mediators (*M*)																				
	Love			Empathy			Anger			Sadness			Sorry			Hope			IVC		
Path	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β
Gender → *M*	**.30**	.09	**.17**	**.56**	.10	**.29**	**.53**	.13	**.21**	**.59**	.11	**.28**	**.47**	.11	**.22**	**.24**	.10	**.13**	-	-	-
		[.15, .45]			[.40, .72]			[.32, .75]			[.41, .76]			[.29, .66]			[.08, .39]			-	
Eth./Race → *M*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**1.49**	.09	**.66**
		-			-			-			-			-			-			[1.35, 1.64]	
M → Sol.	.07	.04	.09	**.23**	.04	**.34**	.04	.03	.08	**.09**	.03	**.16**	**.06**	.03	**.11**	**.10**	.03	**.15**	.04	.03	.07
		[.01, .12]			[.17, .29]			[-.01, .09]			[.04, .15]			[.02, .11]			[.05, .16]			[-.02, .09]	
Gender → *M* → Sol.	.02	.01	.02	**.13**	.03	**.10**	.02	.02	.02	**.06**	.02	**.04**	**.03**	.02	**.03**	.03	.01	.02	-	-	-
		[.001, .04]			[.08, .18]			[-.003, .05]			[.02, .09]			[.01, .06]			[.01, .05]			-	
Eth./Race → *M* → Sol.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.05	.05	.04
		-			-			-			-			-			-			[-.03, .13]	

	Total Indirect Effects				Direct Effects				Total Effects			
	B	*SE*	β	95% CI	*B*	*SE*	β	95% CI	*B*	*SE*	β	95% CI
Gender → Sol.	**.28**	.05	**.22**	[.20, .36]	-.05	.05	-.04	[-.13, .04]	**.22**	.06	**.19**	[.13, .34]
Eth./Race → Sol.	.05	.05	.04	[-.03, .13]	.05	.07	.04	[-.06, .16]	**.10**	.05	**.08**	[.02, .18]

Note. *N* = 352. IVC = Inclusive Victim Consciousness. *B* = unstandardized beta, *SE* = standard error for the unstandardized beta, β = standardized beta, 95% CI = 95% confidence interval for the unstandardized beta. 5,000 bootstraps. Bolded values are statistically significant as indicated by a *p-value* < .05, or a 95% confidence interval that does not include 0. Model fit: $\chi^2(14) = 20.54$, $p = .11$, RMSEA = .04, 90% CI [.00, .07], CFI = >.99, SRMR = .02, BIC = 7799.67. $R^2 = .50$, $p < .001$

Wanting to understand the impact of political orientation, I also conducted analyses with these variables as covariates (see Table 18). Model fit (with covariates) was $\chi^2(20) = 34.43$, $p = .02$, RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.02, .07], CFI = .99, SRMR = .04, BIC = 7481.93, with variables accounting for 51% of the variance in solidarity. The pattern of results was similar to before, with some exceptions. First, love significantly predicted solidarity whereas sadness only predicted solidarity to a marginally significant extent. This meant that the specific indirect path from gender to sadness to solidarity became not significant, whereas the specific indirect path to love became marginally significant. Finally, hope mediated the relationship between gender and solidarity, and inclusive victim consciousness mediated the relationship between ethnicity/race and solidarity to marginally significant levels, providing some limited support for those hypotheses. This suggested that when political orientation is considered, the gender difference we see in solidarity is explained mostly by empathy and feeling sorry (and potentially feelings of love and hope). Further, when political orientation is taken into account, the ethnic/racial background difference we see is potentially explained by experiences of collective victimization.

Table 18

Study 2: Path Analysis (Hypothesized Model with Political Orientation Included as Covariates)

	Mediators (*M*)																				
	Love			Empathy			Anger			Sadness			Sorry			Hope			IVC		
Path	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β
Gender	**.31**	.09	**.18**	**.51**	.10	**.28**	**.48**	.13	**.19**	**.57**	.11	**.28**	**.47**	.12	**.22**	**.24**	.10	**.14**	-	-	-
→ *M*		[.15, .46]			[.35, .67]			[.26, .69]			[.39, .75]			[.28, .67]			[.08, .40]			-	
Eth./Race	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**1.57**	.09	**.68**
→ *M*		-			-			-			-			-			-			[1.41, 1.72]	
M	**.07**	.04	**.10**	**.21**	.04	**.32**	.03	.03	.06	.06	.04	.10	**.07**	.03	**.13**	**.10**	.03	**.15**	.05	.03	.10
→ Sol.		[.01, .13]			[.14, .28]			[-.02, .08]			[-.001, .12]			[.02, .12]			[.04, .15]			[.001, .11]	
Gender	.02	.01	.02	**.11**	.03	**.09**	.01	.02	.01	.03	.02	.03	**.03**	.02	**.03**	.02	.01	.02	-	-	-
→ *M* → Sol.		[.002, .04]			[.06, .16]			[-.01, .04]			[-.001, .07]			[.01, .06]			[.01, .05]			-	
Eth./Race	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.08	.05	.07
→ *M* → Sol.		-			-			-			-			-			-			[.002, .17]	

	Total Indirect Effects				Direct Effects				Total Effects			
	B	*SE*	β	95% CI	*B*	*SE*	β	95% CI	*B*	*SE*	β	95% CI
Gender → Sol.	**.24**	.05	**.20**	[.16, .31]	-.01	.05	-.01	[-.09, .07]	**.23**	.06	**.19**	[.12, .33]
Eth./Race → Sol.	.08	.05	.07	[.002, .17]	.02	.07	.02	[-.10, .13]	**.10**	.05	**.09**	[.03, .19]

Note. *N* = 352. IVC = Inclusive Victim Consciousness. *B* = unstandardized beta, *SE* = standard error for the unstandardized beta, β = standardized beta, 95% CI = 95% confidence interval for the unstandardized beta. 5,000 bootstraps. Bolded values are statistically significant as indicated by a *p-value* < .05, or a 95% confidence interval that does not include 0. Model fit: $\chi^2(20) = 34.43$, $p = .02$, RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.02, .07], CFI = .99, SRMR = .04, BIC = 7481.93. $R^2 = .51$, $p < .001$.

Saturated Comparison Model. Finally, I tested a saturated model to serve as a comparison to my hypothesized models (see Table 19 and Figure 2 for a summary). The model I tested was specified as follows: gender → mediators (six emotions, inclusive victim consciousness); ethnicity/race → mediators (six emotions, inclusive victim consciousness); mediators (six emotions and inclusive victim consciousness) → solidarity; gender → solidarity, and ethnicity/race → solidarity. I allowed errors for the emotions to correlate and included political orientation as covariates. Model fit was $\chi^2(13) = 23.25$, $p = .04$, RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.01, .08], CFI = .99, SRMR = .03, BIC = 7511.45. Overall, this model accounted for 51% of the variance in solidarity.

As with the hypothesized model, gender significantly predicted all emotions. In support of H10, gender did not predict inclusive victim consciousness. As before with the hypothesized model, ethnicity/race predicted inclusive victim consciousness. In support of H20, ethnicity/race did not significantly predict any of the emotions, though White participants reported feeling sorrier than Racialized participants to a marginally significant extent. All mediators significantly predicted solidarity, except anger, sadness, and inclusive victim consciousness.

The total indirect effect of gender on solidarity was significant as with the hypothesized model, though only through empathy and feeling sorry; the direct effect was not significant and the total effect was significant. In contrast, all indirect effects, the direct effect, and total effects of ethnicity/race to solidarity were not significant. As before when political orientation was included as covariates, the specific indirect pathway through inclusive victim consciousness was marginally significant.

Table 19

Study 2: Path Analysis (Saturated Comparison Model)

	Mediators (*M*)																				
	Love			Empathy			Anger			Sadness			Sorry			Hope			IVC		
Path	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β
Gender	**.31**	.09	**.18**	**.51**	.10	**.28**	**.48**	.13	**.19**	**.57**	.11	**.28**	**.47**	.12	**.22**	**.24**	.10	**.14**	-.07	.09	-.03
→ *M*		[.15, .46]			[.35, .67]			[.26, .69]			[.39, .75]			[.28, .67]			[.08, .40]			[-.22, .08]	
Eth./Race	-.06	.10	-.04	.03	.10	.02	.07	.13	.03	.07	.11	.04	-.21	.12	-.10	.04	.10	.02	**1.57**	.09	**.68**
→ *M*		[-.21, .10]			[-.13, .20]			[-.15, .28]			[-.11, .25]			[-.41, -.03]			[-.12, .20]			[1.41, 1.72]	
M	**.07**	.04	**.10**	**.21**	.04	**.32**	.03	.03	.06	.06	.04	.10	**.07**	.03	**.13**	**.10**	.03	**.15**	.05	.03	.10
→ Sol.		[.01, .13]			[.14, .28]			[-.02, .08]			[-.001, .12]			[.02, .12]			[.04, .15]			[.001, .11]	
Gender	.02	.01	.02	**.11**	.03	**.09**	.01	.02	.01	.03	.02	.03	**.03**	.02	**.03**	.02	.01	.02	-.004	-.01	-.003
→ *M* → Sol.		[.002, .04]			[.06, .16]			[-.01, .04]			[-.001, .07]			[.01, .06]			[.01, .05]			[-.01, .01]	
Eth./Race	-.004	.01	-.004	.01	.02	.01	.002	.01	.002	.004	.01	.004	-.02	.01	-.01	.004	.01	.003	.08	.05	.07
→ *M* → Sol.		[-.02, .01]			[-.03, .04]			[-.01, .01]			[-.01, .02]			[-.04, -.001]			[-.01, .02]			[.002, .17]	

	Total Indirect Effects				Direct Effects				Total Effects			
	B	*SE*	β	95% CI	*B*	*SE*	β	95% CI	*B*	*SE*	β	95% CI
Gender → Sol.	**.23**	.05	**.19**	[.16, .31]	-.01	.05	-.01	[-.09, .07]	**.22**	.06	**.19**	[.12, .33]
Eth./Race → Sol.	.08	.07	.07	[-03, .19]	.02	.07	.02	[-.10, .13]	.10	.06	.08	[-.004, .21]

Note. *N* = 352. IVC = Inclusive Victim Consciousness. *B* = unstandardized beta, *SE* = standard error for the unstandardized beta, β = standardized beta, 95% CI = 95% confidence interval for the unstandardized beta. 5,000 bootstraps. Political orientation on foreign policy, economic, and social issues were included as covariates. Bolded values are statistically significant as indicated by a *p-value* < .05, or a 95% confidence interval that does not include 0. Model fit: $\chi^2(13) = 23.25$, $p = .04$, RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.01, .08], CFI = .99, SRMR = .03, BIC = 7511.45. $R^2 = .51$, $p < .001$.

Figure 2

Study 2: Path Analysis (Saturated Comparison Model)



Note. Unstandardized betas, with standardized betas presented in brackets. *Statistically significant as indicated by a *p* value < .05, or a 95% confidence interval that does not include 0. Political orientation on foreign policy, economic, and social issues were included as covariates. Errors for mediators and solidarity are not shown. Errors for the emotions were correlated.

Of the three models (i.e., hypothesized model without covariates, hypothesized model with covariates, and a saturated model), I wanted to test which fit the data the best. Researchers may use Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values to compare models to another, with smaller BIC values favored. A difference between two models of 0–2 constitutes weak evidence in favor of the model with the smaller BIC, 2–6 constitutes positive evidence, 6–10 strong evidence, and finally a difference greater than 10 constitutes very strong evidence (Raftery, 1995). The hypothesized model with political orientation included as covariates had the smallest value (BIC = 7,481.93), differing from the hypothesized model without covariates (BIC = 7,799.67) by 317.75 and the saturated comparison model (BIC = 7,511.45) by 29.52, which suggested that there is very strong evidence in favor of the hypothesized model with political orientation as covariates compared to both the hypothesized model without covariates and the saturated comparison model.

Study 2 Discussion

The purpose of Study 2 was to examine the relationships among gender, ethnicity/race, emotions, inclusive victim consciousness, and solidarity. In previous research, women and Racialized people have expressed more solidarity with groups seeking social change than men and White people (Roberts et al., 2019; Starzyk et al., 2019; Starzyk & Fontaine, 2022). I was especially interested in exploring why this was and hypothesized that these group differences would be explained by different, underlying driving factors. I expected that, compared to men, women would express stronger emotions which would in turn relate to higher solidarity. I also expected that, compared to White people, Racialized people would have a stronger sense of inclusive victim consciousness that would predict higher solidarity. The data supported many, but not all, of my hypotheses. As I expected, women reported stronger emotions and more

solidarity than men, but not a greater sense of inclusive victim consciousness. As well, though all emotions positively correlated with solidarity, when I included all in a path model simultaneously, only some effects were significant, and some to only a very small extent. This meant that only feelings of empathy and feeling sorry significantly mediated the relationship between gender and solidarity. Women experienced these feelings more strongly than men, which in turn predicted greater solidarity.

Also consistent with some of my hypotheses, Racialized participants reported a stronger sense of inclusive victim consciousness than White participants but expressed similar levels of emotions. However, I found only limited support for my hypothesis that Racialized participants would report more solidarity than White participants, as the difference between groups was only marginally significant. Further, I found that inclusive victim consciousness only predicted solidarity to a marginally significant extent, and only when political orientation was included as a covariate. This meant that I had limited support for my hypothesis that inclusive victim consciousness would mediate the relationship between ethnicity/race and solidarity. It is less clear as to why this effect was only marginally significant, considering previous findings (Starzyk et al., 2019) that found an association between inclusive victim consciousness and solidarity. It is possible that, considering my sample size was less than I aimed for, I was slightly underpowered to detect a small sized effect.

Other hypotheses were not supported. Interestingly, when I included all six emotions in path models simultaneously, anger and (when political orientation was included as a covariate) sadness did not significantly predict solidarity. This was a particularly intriguing finding, considering perceived injustice and anger are central to well-known models of social change, such as the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA; Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Van

Zomeren et al., 2011; Van Zomeren et al., 2018). The SIMCA model, however, does not include or account for other feelings such as empathy, which was, out of all the emotions, the most strongly related to solidarity. Future research may further explore where other emotions “fit” within this model. For example, how does a person’s social identity relate to empathy? And do people feel sorrier when strongly held moral convictions are violated?

Another interesting finding is the way that results changed once I accounted for participants’ political orientation. For example, in a model that did, versus did not include political orientation as a covariate, feelings of love significantly predicted solidarity whereas sadness only predicted solidarity to a marginally significant extent. In this case, the indirect path from ethnicity/race to inclusive victim consciousness to solidarity were also marginally significant. Yet, these effects were nevertheless very small in size. Comparatively, other factors, such as empathy, had much larger effects and should thus be the factor that those wishing to enact social change should focus their efforts on the most.

Finally, some of the results from this study were consistent with findings from Study 1, whereas other results were not. In both Study 1 and 2, Racialized and White people reported similar levels of love, hope, sadness, feeling sorry, and anger. However, Racialized participants expressed more empathy than White participants in Study 1, but similar levels in Study 2. Further, in both Study 1 and 2, women expressed more empathy, anger, sadness, and (to a marginally significant extent) hope than men. In Study 2 only, women also expressed more love and felt sorrier than men. It is unclear as to why some results were inconsistent. I explored several potential explanations, including differences between the two studies on factors such as participants’ political orientation, income, and Canadian status by linking data from our laboratory’s pre-screening survey. There was little evidence to suggest that the two samples were

substantially different on these characteristics, suggesting that there might be other, unmeasured factors that make these two samples different. Future research might explore additional factors that might moderate the relationship between gender, ethnicity/race, and emotional responses.

Study 3 Results

Data Analytic Overview

To increase confidence in findings, the purpose of Study 3 was to determine whether the results from Study 2 replicated in a community sample of adults from across Canada. As such, I followed the same data analytic plan as in Study 2.

Data Screening

First, I computed total scores for the composite variables (see Table 20 for reliability statistics; all Cronbach's alpha were > .86) and screened the data. In total, 782 participants took part. I excluded participants if they did not commit to respond conscientiously (n = 32), I could not tell what their ethnic/racial background was (e.g., they preferred not to answer, specified that they were "human" or "Canadian," or has a mixed background without specifying how; n = 35), if they were missing more than 20% of their data (n = 1), if they were Indigenous (n = 3), if they had a mixed racialized and White background (n = 1), or if they identified with a gender other than man or woman (n = 2). I checked for univariate and multivariate outliers using the same method as in the previous studies. When deciding whether to exclude outliers, researchers should ask whether the outlier represents the sample, and if so, to include it (Meyers et al. 2017). Further, if the outliers only represent a very small percentage of the sample, they are likely best left alone (Meyers et al. 2017). There were 16 univariate outliers for inclusive victim consciousness and 17 for political solidarity. Of these, 5 were outliers for both. Upon closer inspection of the participants who were outliers for both inclusive victim consciousness and

political solidarity, it appears that 3 of the 5 had chosen the same response options that appeared on each page, suggesting that they were not responding conscientiously. As such, I decided to exclude them from further analyses. Because the rest of the univariate outliers made up such a small percentage of the sample (~2%), I left them alone. Next, I checked for multivariate outliers. There were $n = 8$ cases, which I excluded. Overall, I excluded 81 participants, excluding some for multiple reasons. This left 159 Racialized women, 197 White women, 153 Racialized men, and 192 White men. To keep group sizes equal, I randomly excluded a further 6 Racialized women, 44 White women, and 39 White men. This left each group with 153 participants for a total *N* of 612.

Table 20

Study 3: Correlations Among Composite Variables

Variable	Love	Empathy	Anger	Sadness	Sorry	Hope	IVC	Solidarity
Love	*.87*	.66*	.21*	.33*	.39*	.57*	.11*	.52*
Empathy		*.95*	.49*	.59*	.60*	.60*	.15*	.70*
Anger			*.94*	.71*	.59*	.22*	.01	.46*
Sadness				*.88*	.73*	.37*	.03	.56*
Sorry					*.87*	.44*	.06	.56*
Hope						*.89*	.20*	.55*
IVC							*.86*	.23*
Solidarity								*.94*

Note. $N = 610–612$. IVC = Inclusive Victim Consciousness. Due to non-normal distributions, I report Spearman's correlations. Italicized values on the diagonal represent the composite's internal consistency. $*p < .01$.

I assessed distributional normality, linearity, and homoscedascity using the same methods as in the previous study. There were no issues with linearity or homoscedascity, but all composites had a non-normal distribution. Finally, I also tested for multicollinearity by examining tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) values for the predictor variables.

Typically, tolerance values < .20 and VIF values > 4 indicate a problem (Garson, 2012). All variables had a tolerance > .34 and a VIF < 2.95, which suggested that multicollinearity was not an issue. See Table 21 for a summary of the composite variable descriptive statistics.

Table 21

Study 3: Descriptive Statistics Composite Variables

Variable	*M*	*SD*	Skew	SE_{Skew}	Kurtosis	SE_{Kurtosis}
Love	2.53	1.01	0.22	.10	-0.55	.20
Empathy	3.12	1.03	-0.25	.10	-0.47	.20
Anger	2.69	1.29	0.20	.10	-1.13	.20
Sadness	2.54	1.09	0.37	.10	-0.74	.20
Sorry	2.51	1.15	0.34	.10	-0.89	.20
Hope	2.81	1.02	0.13	.10	-0.58	.20
IVC	3.53	0.88	-0.55	.10	0.27	.20
Solidarity	3.40	0.87	-0.63	.10	0.23	.20

Note. $N = 612$. Emotion composites used the following rating scale: *not at all* (1), *slightly* (2), *somewhat* (3), *very much* (4), and *extremely* (5). Inclusive victim consciousness and political solidarity used the rating scale *strongly disagree* (1), *disagree* (2), *neither agree nor disagree* (3), *agree* (4) and *strongly agree* (5).

Participants

My final sample included 612 adults living in Canada. As with Study 2, I originally aimed to recruit approximately 680 participants. This target was based on an ideal sample of 620, adding on approximately 10% for exclusions. Though $N = 612$ is slightly below my target, this sized sample is still sufficient as it does not fall below an N:q ratio of 10:1.

On average, participants were 49.35 ($SD = 16.98$) years old. According to a one-way ANOVA, gender and ethnic/racial groups significantly differed in age, $F(3, 608) = 6.41$, $p < .001$. Pairwise comparisons showed that White men ($M = 53.89$, $SD = 17.99$) were significantly older than Racialized women ($M = 45.71$, $SD = 16.16$), $p < .001$, and Racialized men ($M = 48.18$,

SD = 15.74), $p = .02$, but not White women ($M = 49.61$, $SD = 17.05$), $p = .12$. Racialized women, Racialized men, and White women were similar in age (all *p*s > .18). For ethnic/racial background, 306 (50%) participants were White. Of the racialized participants, 141 (23%) were Chinese, 59 were South Asian (10%), 34 were Black (6%), 17 (3%) were Filipino, 15 (3%) were Southeast Asian, 11 (2%) were Latin American, 10 (2%) were Arab, 9 (2%) were Japanese, and 31 (5%) identified with other backgrounds such as Korean or West Asian. Some participants identified with multiple backgrounds, so percentages add up to more than 100%. For annual household income, 148 (24%) reported $0–50k, 254 (42%) reported between $50–100k, and 210 (34%) reported greater than $100k. Participants were from across Canada; 104 (17%) were from British Columbia, 124 (20%) were from the Prairies (Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba), 308 (50%) were from Ontario, 41 (7%) were from Quebec, and 35 (6%) were from the Atlantic (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island). Regarding Canadian status, 395 (65%) were citizens at birth, 181 (30%) were citizens by naturalization, 35 (6%) were permanent residents, and 1 (< 1%) selected other (e.g., temporary resident, refugee). Though Leger had aimed to have even numbers of men, women, Racialized, and White participants across age brackets, income levels, and region, there is some imbalance. Please see Table 22 for a further breakdown of demographic characteristics by gender and ethnic/racial group.

Table 22

Study 3: Participant Demographics

Variable	Total *N* = 612	Racialized Women *n* = 153	White Women *n* = 153	Racialized Men *n* = 153	White Men *n* = 153
Age	49.35 (16.98)	45.71 (16.16)	49.61 (17.05)	48.18 (15.74)	53.89 (17.99)
Income					
0–50k	148 (24%)	39 (26%)	42 (28%)	27 (18%)	40 (26%)
50–100k	254 (42%)	71 (46%)	65 (43%)	61 (40%)	57 (37%)
100k+	210 (34%)	43 (28%)	46 (30%)	65 (43%)	56 (37%)
Region					
BC	104 (17%)	30 (20%)	18 (12%)	34 (22%)	22 (14%)
Prairies	124 (20%)	27 (18%)	41 (27%)	23 (15%)	33 (22%)
Ontario	308 (50%)	77 (50%)	76 (50%)	78 (51%)	77 (50%)
Quebec	41 (7%)	14 (9%)	6 (4%)	13 (9%)	8 (5%)
Atlantic	35 (6%)	5 (3%)	12 (8%)	6 (3%)	13 (9%)
Canadian Status					
Citizen at birth	395 (65%)	61 (40%)	136 (89%)	63 (41%)	135 (88%)
Citizen by naturalization	181 (30%)	79 (52%)	9 (6%)	77 (50%)	16 (11%)
Permanent resident	35 (6%)	13 (9%)	8 (5%)	13 (9%)	1 (< 1%)
Other (e.g., temporary resident, refugee)	1 (< 1%)	0	0	0	1 (< 1%)

Note. Age is reported as *M* (*SD*). Income, Region, and Canadian Status is reported as *n* frequency and (%). Percentages may not exactly add up to 100% due to rounding.

Main Analyses

t-Tests

To understand whether gender and ethnic/racial groups differ in the extent to which they feel different emotions, hold an inclusive victim consciousness mindset, and express solidarity, I conducted *t*-tests. As with the previous studies, I used bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapped (BCa) *t*-tests (5,000 bootstraps, seed = 3,114) because of non-normal distributions.

I expected that, in comparison to men, women would report more solidarity (H10), have similar feelings of inclusive victim consciousness (H11), and have stronger emotional responses (H3a–f). The data supported these hypotheses.

As I summarize in Table 23, as expected, women reported more solidarity than men. Also as expected, men and women reported statistically equivalent levels of inclusive victim consciousness. Further, compared to men, women felt more love, empathy, anger, sadness, and sorry. Though the regular *t*-test suggested that women were not significantly more hopeful than men, the bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapped 95% CI did not include 0, indicating a statistically significant difference.

Table 23

Study 3: Independent Samples t-Tests for Variable Composites by Gender

Variable	Men		Women		t(608)	p	95% BCa CI		Cohen's d
	M	SD	M	SD			LL	UL	
Love	2.44	1.05	2.62	0.98	-2.22	.03	-.34	-.02	-.18
Empathy	2.94	1.00	3.29	1.03	-4.21	<.001	-.51	-.18	-.34
Anger	2.45	1.23	2.94	1.30	-4.72	<.001	-.69	-.28	-.38
Sadness	2.32	1.06	2.75	1.08	-4.89	<.001	-.60	-.25	-.40
Sorry	2.30	1.07	2.70	1.20	-4.30	<.001	-.57	-.21	-.35
Hope	2.73	1.05	2.89	0.97	-1.91	.06	-.31	-.01	-.16
IVC	3.53	0.91	3.53	0.86	-0.07	.94	-.15	.13	-.01
Solidarity	2.44	1.05	2.62	0.98	-2.22	.03	-.34	-.02	-.18

Note. IVC = Inclusive Victim Consciousness. Bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapped (BCa) *t*-tests (5,000 bootstraps, seed = 3,114). Assumed equal variances for all composites except for sorry (df = 600.28).

Next, I examined the extent to which White and Racialized participants differed for these variables. I expected that, in comparison to White participants, Racialized participants would express greater solidarity (H12) and greater feelings of inclusive victim consciousness (H13). I expected groups to report statistically equivalent levels of emotions except for guilt, for which I expected White participants to report higher levels than Racialized participants (H5a–f). As I am no longer measuring guilt, I did not test this hypothesis. Overall, the data only partially supported my hypotheses.

As I show in Table 24, as hypothesized, Racialized participants reported greater solidarity than White participants. Also as hypothesized, Racialized participants reported higher feelings of inclusive victim consciousness than White participants. Finally, as expected, White and Racialized participants were angry, sad, and felt sorry to similar extents. Contrary to my

hypotheses, White and Racialized participants significantly differed in how much love, empathy, and hope they felt, with Racialized participants feeling these emotions to a greater extent than White participants.

Table 24

Study 3: Independent Samples t-Tests for Variable Composites by Ethnicity/Race

Variable	White		Racialized		$t(608)$	p	95% BCa CI		Cohen's d
	M	SD	M	SD			LL	UL	
Love	2.38	1.01	2.67	1.00	-3.95	< .001	-.45	-.13	-.29
Empathy	2.99	1.07	3.24	0.97	-3.07	.002	-.42	-.09	-.25
Anger	2.78	1.30	2.61	1.27	1.58	.11	-.04	.37	.13
Sadness	2.52	1.13	2.55	1.06	-.35	.73	-.21	.14	-.03
Sorry	2.50	1.18	2.50	1.13	-.05	.96	-.19	.17	-.004
Hope	2.71	1.01	2.90	1.01	-2.33	.02	-.35	-.02	-.19
IVC	3.28	0.93	3.78	0.75	-7.24	< .001	-.63	-.36	-.59
Solidarity	3.28	0.92	3.52	0.81	-3.47	< .001	-.38	-.11	-.28

Note. IVC = Inclusive Victim Consciousness. Bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapped (BCa) *t*-tests (5,000 bootstraps, seed = 3,114). Assumed equal variances for all composites except for inclusive victim consciousness (df = 581.51) and political solidarity (df = 597.97).

Correlational Analyses

Next, I investigated the extent to which inclusive victim consciousness and emotional responses related to solidarity (presented in Table 20). I expected that people who felt a greater sense of inclusive victim consciousness would report more solidarity (H14). I also expected all emotions to positively correlate with solidarity (H15a–f). Finally, I hypothesized that positive emotions (i.e., hope, love, and empathy) would correlate with solidarity more strongly than negative emotions (i.e., anger, sadness, and guilt; H16). The findings were partially consistent with these hypotheses.

As hypothesized, people who felt a greater sense of inclusive victim consciousness reported more solidarity and all emotions positively correlated with solidarity. I expected that positive emotions would relate to solidarity more strongly than negative emotions, but there was inconsistent support for this hypothesis. Like Study 2, Fisher's *z* tests indicated that empathy correlated with solidarity more strongly than all other emotions, including positive ones like hope and love (all *p*s < .001). Love did not correlate with solidarity more strongly than anger, sadness, or feeling sorry (all *p*s > .16). Further, hope did not correlate with solidarity more strongly than sadness or feeling sorry (both *p*s = .80), but hope did correlate more strongly with solidarity than did feeling angry ($p = .03$). Though I did not make specific hypotheses regarding other potential differences, Fisher's *z* tests suggest that sadness and feeling sorry more strongly related to solidarity than anger (both *p*s = .02). Taken together, these findings indicate that empathy is especially important because it relates to solidarity more strongly than do other emotions. Further, other emotions like hope, sadness, and feeling sorry related to solidarity more strongly than anger. Overall, however, people who felt emotions more deeply, regardless of what kind, expressed more solidarity.

Demographic Analyses

In addition to these main analyses, I conducted exploratory analyses to determine whether solidarity was related to age or differed across regions and income brackets. Unlike Study 2, solidarity did not correlate with age here, $r = .02$, $p = .65$. Solidarity was also similar across regions, $F(4, 128.21) = 1.68$, $p = .16$. In addition to these demographic characteristics, I also examined differences across income brackets. Unlike in Study 2, solidarity significantly differed across income, $F(2, 608) = 3.87$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2 = .01$. Those who made 100K+ reported less solidarity ($M = 3.29$, $SD = 0.89$) than those who made 0–50K ($M = 3.55$, $SD = 0.83$), $p = .01$.

Those who made 50–100K fell within the middle (*M* = 3.40, *SD* = 0.87) and did not differ from the other two brackets (both *p*s > .11). Leger aimed to recruit an even balance of men and women and Racialized and White people across regions, age brackets, and income brackets, but there was some imbalance. When I included gender and ethnicity/race as covariates results were similar, with those with an income of 100K+ reporting less solidarity than those with an income of 0–50K, $p = .01$.

Path Analysis

Finally, I was interested to know whether emotions and inclusive victim consciousness explained the relationship between demographic characteristics (i.e., gender and ethnicity/race) and solidarity in a community sample of adults in Canada. As I intended to examine whether findings replicated in a community sample, my hypotheses were the same as in Study 2. I expected that emotions would mediate the relationship between gender and solidarity (H18a–f), but inclusive victim consciousness would not (H17). Conversely, I hypothesized that inclusive victim consciousness would mediate the relationship between ethnicity/race (H19), but emotions would not (H20). As I did not have information on participants' political orientation, I did not include this variable in the model. As before, I conducted path analyses (5,000 bootstraps).

Hypothesized Model. First, I tested my hypothesized model which I specified as follows: Gender → mediators (six emotional domains); ethnicity/race → mediator (inclusive victim consciousness); mediators (six emotions and inclusive victim consciousness) → solidarity; gender → solidarity, and ethnicity/race → solidarity. I allowed errors for emotions to correlate. Model fit was $\chi^2(14) = 51.60$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, 90% CI [.05, .09], CFI = .99, SRMR = .05, BIC = 13703.77. Overall, these predictors accounted for 57.6% of the variance in solidarity.

As Table 25 describes, mostly as expected and consistent with *t*-test results, being a woman predicted experiencing all emotions to a stronger extent except for hope, which was only marginally significant. Of the different emotions, being a woman predicted anger to the greatest extent and love to the least extent. Also as expected, being a member of a racialized group predicted having a greater sense of inclusive victim consciousness. Except for anger, all emotions and inclusive victim consciousness significantly predicted solidarity. Of these mediators, empathy was the best predictor and love was the worst predictor of solidarity.

Table 25

Study 3: Path Analysis (Hypothesized Model)

Path	Mediators (*M*)																				
	Love			Empathy			Anger			Sadness			Sorry			Hope			IVC		
	B	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β	*B*	*SE* [95% CI]	β
Gender → *M*	**.18**	.08	**.09**	**.35**	.08	**.17**	**.49**	.11	**.19**	**.43**	.09	**.20**	**.40**	.09	**.17**	.16	.08	.08	-	-	-
		[.05, .32]			[.21, .48]			[.31, .66]			[.28, .57]			[.25, .55]			[.02, .29]			-	
Eth./Race → *M*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**.50**	.07	**.28**
		-			-			-			-			-			-			[.39, .61]	
M → Sol.	**.07**	.03	**.08**	**.31**	.04	**.38**	.03	.03	.04	**.13**	.04	**.16**	**.07**	.03	**.10**	**.14**	.03	**.16**	**.11**	.03	**.11**
		[.02, .13]			[.25, .39]			[-.02, .08]			[.06, .19]			[.02, .12]			[.08, .19]			[.06, 16]	
Gender → *M* → Sol.	.01	.01	.01	**.11**	.03	**.06**	.01	.02	.01	**.05**	.02	**.03**	**.03**	.01	**.02**	.02	.01	.01	-	-	-
		[.001, .03]			[.06, .16]			[-.01, .04]			[.02, .09]			[.01, .05]			[.002, .04]			-	
Eth./Race → *M* → Sol.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**.06**	.02	**.03**
		-			-			-			-			-			-			[.03, .08]	

	Total Indirect Effects				Direct Effects				Total Effects			
	B	*SE*	β	95% CI	*B*	*SE*	β	95% CI	*B*	*SE*	β	95% CI
Gender → Sol.	**.24**	.05	**.14**	[.15, .33]	.02	.05	.01	[-.06, .10]	**.26**	.07	**.15**	[.15, .37]
Eth./Race → Sol.	**.06**	.02	**.03**	[.03, .08]	.07	.05	.04	[-.02, .15]	**.12**	.05	**.07**	[.04, .20]

Note. *N* = 612. IVC = Inclusive Victim Consciousness. *B* = unstandardized beta, *SE* = standard error for the unstandardized beta, β = standardized beta, 95% CI = 95% confidence interval for the unstandardized beta. 5,000 bootstraps. Bolded values are statistically significant as indicated by a *p-value* < .05, or a 95% confidence interval that does not include 0. Model fit: $\chi^2(14) = 51.60$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, 90% CI [.05, .09], CFI = .99, SRMR = .05, BIC = 13703.77. $R^2 = .58$, $p < .001$.

Gender had a significant overall indirect effect to solidarity. However, the data only partially supported my hypothesis that all emotions would mediate this relationship (H18a–f). In examining specific indirect effects, the paths were only significant for empathy, sadness, and feeling sorry. As well, the specific indirect path was marginally significant for hope. The pathways through anger and love were not significant, presumedly because anger did not predict solidarity, and the regression coefficients for love were smaller than the others.

As hypothesized (H19), the indirect effect of ethnicity/race on solidarity through inclusive victim consciousness was significant. Finally, the total effects of both gender and ethnicity/race on solidarity were significant, though the direct effects were not. This suggests that emotional responses and experiences of collective victimization explain solidarity for these variables.

Saturated Comparison Model. As with Study 2, I tested a saturated model to serve as a comparison to my hypothesized model. I specified the model as follows: gender → mediators (six emotions, inclusive victim consciousness); ethnicity/race → mediators (six emotions, inclusive victim consciousness); mediators (six emotions and inclusive victim consciousness) → solidarity; gender → solidarity, and ethnicity/race → solidarity. As before, I allowed errors for the emotions to correlate. Model fit was $\chi^2(7) = 25.63$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, 90% CI [.04, .09], CFI = .99, SRMR = .03, BIC = 13722.71. These predictors explained 58% of the variance in solidarity.

As Table 26 and Figure 3 show, gender significantly predicted all mediators, except inclusive victim consciousness (as expected) and hope (though as before, hope was marginally significant). Like the hypothesized model, and as expected, being a member of a racialized group predicted greater inclusive victim consciousness. Unexpectedly, ethnicity/race also significantly

predicted love, empathy, hope, as well as anger at a marginally significant level, in that Racialized participants reported greater love, empathy, and hope, but less anger than White participants. Of these mediators, ethnicity/race predicted inclusive victim consciousness the most and hope the least. Also like the hypothesized model, all mediators, except for anger, significantly predicted solidarity, with empathy predicting solidarity to the greatest extent and love the least.

The total indirect effect of gender on solidarity was significant, though the specific indirect effects were only significant for empathy, sadness, and feeling sorry as well as marginally significant for hope. In support of H17, inclusive victim consciousness did not mediate the relationship between gender and solidarity, because women did not report greater inclusive victim consciousness than men.

Also, as before with the hypothesized model, the total indirect effect of ethnicity/race on solidarity was significant. Inclusive victim consciousness, and, unexpectedly, some emotional responses mediated this relationship. The specific indirect effects were significant for empathy and hope, as well as marginally significant for love, in that being a member of a racialized group predicted feeling these emotions to stronger extents, which in turn predicted greater solidarity. Finally, the total effects of both gender and ethnicity/race on solidarity were significant and the direct effects were not significant. These findings suggest that women reported more solidarity than men because they felt more empathy, sadness, and sorry, whereas Racialized people reported more solidarity than White people because they held a greater sense of inclusive victim consciousness as well as felt more empathy, hope, and potentially, love.

Table 26

Study 3: Path Analysis (Saturated Comparison Model)

	Mediators (*M*)																				
	Love			Empathy			Anger			Sadness			Sorry			Hope			IVC		
Path	*B*	*SE*	β	*B*	*SE*	β	*B*	*SE*	β	*B*	*SE*	β	*B*	*SE*	β	*B*	*SE*	β	*B*	*SE*	β
	[95% CI]			[95% CI]			[95% CI]			[95% CI]			[95% CI]			[95% CI]			[95% CI]		
Gender → *M*	**.18**	.08	**.09**	**.35**	.08	**.17**	**.49**	.11	**.19**	**.43**	.09	**.20**	**.40**	.09	**.17**	.16	.08	.08	-.003	.07	-.002
	[.05, .32]			[.21, .48]			[.32, .66]			[.28, .57]			[.25, .55]			[.02, .29]			[-.11, .11]		
Eth./Race → *M*	**.29**	.08	**.14**	**.25**	.08	**.12**	-.17	.10	-.07	.03	.09	.01	.01	.09	.003	**.19**	.08	**.10**	**.50**	.07	**.28**
	[.16, .42]			[.12, .39]			[-.34, -.01]			[-.11, .17]			[-.14, .15]			[.06, .33]			[.39, .61]		
M → Sol.	**.07**	.03	**.08**	**.31**	.04	**.37**	.03	.03	.04	**.13**	.04	**.16**	**.07**	.03	**.10**	**.14**	.03	**.16**	**.11**	.03	**.11**
	[.02, .13]			[.25, .39]			[-.02, .08]			[.06, .19]			[.02, .12]			[.08, .19]			[.06, 16]		
Gender → *M* → Sol.	.01	.01	.01	**.11**	.03	**.06**	.01	.02	.01	**.05**	.02	**.03**	**.03**	.01	**.02**	.02	.01	.01	0	.01	0
	[.001, .03]			[.06, .16]			[-.01, .04]			[.02, .09]			[.01, .05]			[.002, .04]			[-.01, .01]		
Eth./Race → *M* → Sol.	.02	.01	.01	**.08**	.03	**.05**	-.01	.01	-.003	.004	.01	.002	0	.01	0	**.03**	.01	**.02**	**.06**	.02	**.03**
	[.004, .04]			[.04, .13]			[-.02, .003]			[-.01, .02]			[-.01, .01]			[.01, .05]			[.03, .08]		

	Total Indirect Effects				Direct Effects				Total Effects			
	B	*SE*	β	95% CI	*B*	*SE*	β	95% CI	*B*	*SE*	β	95% CI
Gender → Sol.	**.24**	.05	**.14**	[.15, .33]	.02	.05	.01	[-.06, .10]	**.26**	.07	**.15**	[.15, .37]
Eth./Race → Sol.	**.18**	.06	**.10**	[.09, .27]	.07	.05	.04	[-.02, .15]	**.24**	.07	**.14**	[.13, .36]

Note. $N = 612$. IVC = Inclusive Victim Consciousness. *B* = unstandardized beta, *SE* = standard error for the unstandardized beta, β = standardized beta, 95% CI = 95% confidence interval for the unstandardized beta. 5,000 bootstraps. Bolded values are statistically significant as indicated by a *p-value* < .05, or a 95% confidence interval that does not include 0. Model fit: $\chi^2(7) = 25.63$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, 90% CI [.04, .09], CFI = .99, SRMR = .03, BIC = 13722.71. $R^2 = .58$, $p < .001$.

Figure 3

Study 3: Path Analysis (Saturated Comparison Model)



Note. Unstandardized betas, with standardized betas presented in brackets. *Statistically significant as indicated by a *p* value < .05, or a 95% confidence interval that does not include 0. Errors for mediators and solidarity are not shown. Errors for the emotions were correlated.

Comparing the BIC values of the hypothesized model to the saturated comparison model, there was a difference of 18.94 (hypothesized model BIC = 13703.77, saturated comparison model BIC = 13722.71). Though there were some unexpected results, and the data did not support all hypotheses, this suggests that there is very strong evidence in favor of the hypothesized model compared to the saturated comparison model. In essence, my hypothesized model reflected the data better than a model that assumed there was a predictive relationship between all demographic characteristics, all mediators, and solidarity.

Study 3 Discussion

In this final study, I sought to understand whether the relationships I expected to find among gender, ethnic/racial background, emotions, inclusive victim consciousness, and solidarity generalized in a larger, more diverse national Canadian sample. Within psychology, researchers often rely on using university student samples to test their hypotheses. Though university student samples are relatively easy to recruit and inexpensive, this practice can be problematic as students differ from the public on personal and attitudinal variables (Hanel & Vione, 2016). Unfortunately, the current structure of academia disincentivizes conducting replication studies (Nosek et al., 2022). Even so, researchers need to test hypotheses in diverse samples or use alternative methodologies to strengthen confidence in the generalizability of findings. This, ultimately, leads to better science.

As with Study 2, the data supported many, but not all, of my hypotheses. As expected, women expressed more solidarity and reported stronger emotions in all domains than did men, but not more inclusive victim consciousness. Also as expected, Racialized participants expressed more solidarity and a greater sense of inclusive victim consciousness than did White participants, but unexpectedly and contrary to my hypotheses, Racialized participants also reported more

empathy, love, and hope. Except for anger, all emotions as well as inclusive victim consciousness predicted greater solidarity. Further mediational analyses suggest that women and Racialized people reported more solidarity than men and White people for both similar and different reasons. Women reported more solidarity than men in part because they experienced certain emotions, such as empathy, sadness, and feeling sorry to a stronger extent. In contrast, Racialized people reported more solidarity than White people in part because they experience certain emotions, such as empathy and hope, to a stronger extent, as well as because of their experiences with collective victimization.

In this study, I aimed to understand whether findings from Study 2 replicated in a larger, more diverse sample of adults from across Canada. Some of the Study 3 findings were consistent with Study 2 findings, whereas other findings were not. Consistent with findings from Study 2, though all emotions positively correlated with solidarity, anger did not significantly predict solidarity when I included all in the path analysis. Again, models such as SIMCA that have anger as a central feature do not include or account for other feelings such as empathy, the emotion that most strongly predicted solidarity in both studies.

Also consistent with findings from Study 2, gender had a significant indirect effect on solidarity because women expressed more empathy and felt sorrier than men. However, in Study 3, being a woman also predicted feeling sadder, which in turn predicted greater solidarity, whereas in Study 2, this path was only significant when I did not take political orientation into account. It is possible that, had I measured political orientation and included it as a covariate in Study 3, results would be similar, with the effect of sadness no longer being significant.

The relationships among ethnicity/race, emotions, inclusive victim consciousness, and solidarity also differed among the studies. In this study, Racialized participants reported greater

inclusive victim consciousness, empathy, and hope than White participants, which in turn predicted greater solidarity. This is consistent with some findings from Study 1, in that Racialized participants had also reported more empathy than White participants, as well as some unpublished pilot research I conducted that found Racialized participants reported greater love, empathy, and hope than White participants. In contrast, in Study 2, Racialized and White participants reported similar levels of all emotions. It is unclear why. In follow-up unregistered exploratory analyses, I examined potentially relevant factors such as income and status in Canada. When I combined the data sets from Studies 2 and 3, I found some differences between the two samples. In the present study, White women as well as White men were less affluent than they were in Study 2, $\chi^2(2) = 8.22$, $p = .01$ and $\chi^2(2) = 10.31$, $p = .01$, respectively. Further, among Racialized participants, in the present study, there was a greater proportion of participants who were not citizens at birth (60%), compared to participants in Study 2 (48%), $\chi^2(1) = 6.85$, $p = .01$. Wanting to probe for potential moderating effects, I used PROCESS V4.2 (5,000 bootstraps; Hayes, 2022). Neither income nor Canadian status moderated the relationship between ethnicity/race and empathy or hope. It is still unclear as to why the results were different, though as I discussed in the Study 2 discussion section, political orientation matters. As I did not measure political orientation in this study, I could not determine whether the samples differed on this variable. Researchers may therefore wish to study the role of political orientation in further research.

Further, in Study 2 there was only limited support that inclusive victim consciousness explained the relationship between ethnicity/race and solidarity, as inclusive victim consciousness predicted solidarity to only a marginally significant level and only when I included political orientation as a covariate. It was unclear as to why, so I again probed for

potential moderating effects using PROCESS V4.2 (Model 1, 5,000 bootstraps; Hayes, 2022). Income did not moderate the relationship between inclusive victim consciousness and solidarity. One partial explanation, however, may be Canadian citizen status. Among Racialized participants, the interaction between inclusive victim consciousness and Canadian status was significant, $B = 0.17$, $SE = .09$, $p = .05$, 95% CI [.001, .35], in that the relationship between inclusive victim consciousness and solidarity was weaker among participants who were citizens at birth ($B = 0.32$, $SE = .07$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.19, .45]) than participants who were not citizens at birth ($B = 0.50$, $SE = .06$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.38, .61]). It is therefore possible inclusive victim consciousness only predicted solidarity to a marginally significant extent in Study 2 because there was a greater proportion of Racialized participants who were citizens at birth than not citizens at birth. Nevertheless, inclusive victim consciousness did still predict solidarity among citizens at birth in the combined data set (albeit to a weaker extent), suggesting that while this may be one contributing factor, there are likely other factors as well.

Another factor affecting conclusions regarding replication between studies may simply lie in flaws associated with null hypothesis significance testing. In a series of simulated experiments, Cumming (2014) demonstrated that even when one has 80% power, only 68% of replications were successful when one bases the criteria for replication solely on the significance status of *p*-values; this percentage fell even lower to 38% when power was 50%. In contrast, when one instead bases the criteria for replication on whether the point estimate of one study falls within the 95% CI of the previous study, 83% of replications were successful. I found this pattern to be true in my research as well. Take, for example, White and Racialized participants' level of empathy across the three studies. In Study 1, the mean difference between White and Racialized participants was -.27, with a 95% CI of [-.51, -.03], $p = .03$. In Study 2, the mean

difference between White and Racialized participants was -.06, with a 95% CI of [-0.26, .14] and a *p*-value of .54. Though the difference was significant in Study 1 and not significant in Study 2, the mean group difference in Study 2 of -.06 does still fall within Study 1's 95% CI of [-.51, -.03]. Further, in Study 3, the difference between the groups was -.25, with a 95% CI of [-.42, -.09] and a *p*-value of .002. Again, though the difference was not significant in Study 2 and significant in Study 3, the mean group difference in Study 3 of -.25 does fall within Study 2's 95% CI of [-.26, .14]. From this perspective, findings across the three studies are reasonably consistent with one another.

In another example, in Study 2, the indirect effect of ethnicity/race on inclusive victim consciousness to solidarity (without political orientation as covariates) was $B = 0.05$, with a 95% CI of [-.03, .13], $p = .26$. In Study 3, this effect was $B = 0.06$, with a 95% CI of [.03, .08], $p = .001$. Though the effect was statistically significant in one study and not in the other, Study 3's beta coefficient of .06 still fell within Study 2's 95% CI of [-.03, .13]. Again, from this perspective, the findings from these two studies are consistent. Taken together, this suggests that the failure of some effects to replicate may be due to the dichotomous thinking null hypothesis significance testing is based on. Indeed, some (Cumming, 2014, p. 8) claim that we should "not trust any *p*-value" and call for researchers to avoid their use entirely, and instead adopt estimation thinking.

Finally, exploratory analyses revealed some interesting findings. People within the lowest income bracket reported more solidarity than people within the highest income bracket. Though I did not find these differences in Study 2, this finding is consistent with some research that suggests people who have fewer material resources (e.g., income, educational attainment) tend to be more compassionate, hold stronger egalitarian attitudes, and are more likely to help others in

distress than people who have more material resources (Piff et al., 2010; Stellar et al., 2012). Yet, some research also suggests people who earn less and have less education tend to score higher on right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1998) and social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto et al, 1994), two system-justifying attitudes that in turn predict greater prejudice (Carvacho et al., 2013). Some (Mansetead, 2018) have suggested the association between income and prejudice is due to the perception that outgroup members pose an economic threat; indeed, people who score higher on right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation tend to view the world as more dangerous, threatening, competitive, and cut-throat (Perry et al. 2013). In these studies, however, is possible that participants did not view the disadvantaged group (Indigenous children) as particularly threatening, as they might with other groups. Considering these findings, researchers might explore why and under what conditions people with lower incomes express more solidarity than people with higher incomes. For example, compared to people with more resources, those with less tend to make external rather than internal attributions and have a more interdependent than independent self-concept (see Manstead, 2018, for a review). As social psychological research on identity has focused mostly on characteristics such as ethnicity/race, gender, sexual orientation, nationality, and age (Manstead, 2018), there is a need to expand focus to include other characteristics, such as income, as well as other indicators of socioeconomic status such as education.

General Discussion

Throughout the world, many ethnic/racial, religious, and national groups have experienced historical violence that continues to affect members collectively, sometimes for many generations (Hirschberger, 2018; Li et al., 2023). Like others who have endured collective violence, in Canada, Indigenous peoples continue to feel the painful aftermath of oppressive and

genocidal systems, policies, and laws such as the Residential School system, the Sixties Scoop, the reserve system, and the Indian Act, among others. Sadly, current-day systems such as child welfare continue to harm, often worsening the profound repercussions of these traumatic experiences. Though Canada has started the process of truth-telling and reconciliation in response to these harms (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015a), true change and healing will require collective understanding, support, and effort from many others. To bring about much-needed change, Indigenous and non-Indigenous people must create strong alliances, making it important to identify who is likely to be a supportive advocate and to understand different psychological factors that drive solidarity.

Within social psychological research on intergroup relations and social change, researchers tend to find that certain groups, such as Racialized people and women, are especially likely to express support for addressing issues of social justice (Starzyk et al., 2019; Roberts et al., 2019). Studies suggest Racialized people tend to express more solidarity than White people in part because they have a greater sense of inclusive victim consciousness (Starzyk et al., 2019), yet little is known why women tend to express more solidarity than men. Previous unpublished research I had conducted found that, compared to men, women report stronger emotions across many domains when they learn about racial, gender identity, and religious discrimination (Fontaine & Starzyk, 2022). Considering this, I hypothesized that the pathways to solidarity for Racialized people and women may be different; for Racialized people, I expected solidarity to be explained by a greater sense of inclusive victim consciousness. For women, I expected solidarity to be explained by stronger emotional reactions to injustice. To explore these relationships, I conducted three online studies using university (Study 1 and 2) and community samples (Study 3).

Summary of Findings

In this dissertation, I sought to explore a range of different emotions people might have in response to social injustice, both positive and negative. However, existing measures of different emotions had little consistency among them, making comparisons among emotions problematic. Given the importance of using psychometrically robust measures in research (Furr & Bacharach, 2008), in Study 1, I combined and altered previous measures of emotions to develop multi-item scales that could measure various emotional domains that I and other researchers could use in later studies. Using exploratory factor analyses, I tested, identified, and retained the strongest items from an initial total pool of 40, resulting in 3-item scales that measure the domains of love, anger, sadness, feeling sorry, and hope. In further configural invariance testing, I found that the factor structure for these scales was similar between gender and ethnic/racial groups. The results of this study provided me with the foundational tools needed to test my hypotheses in Studies 2 and 3.

In Study 2, I aimed to explore the relationships among gender, ethnicity/race, inclusive victim consciousness, emotional responses to injustice, and solidarity among a university student sample. Using *t*-tests, I found that, as hypothesized, women expressed more solidarity and stronger emotions across all domains than men, but similar levels of inclusive victim consciousness. In further correlational analyses, I found that, also as expected, all emotions positively correlated with solidarity. Correlations ranged from $r_s = .44$ to $r_s = .59$ in size, representing about a medium-sized effect. Empathy most strongly related to solidarity. In fact, this relationship was stronger than the relationship between all other emotions and solidarity, which did not differ from one another. Finally, using path analysis, I found that gender had a significant indirect effect on solidarity, though only through empathy and feeling sorry once

political orientation was included as a covariate. This is likely because other emotions had weaker relationships with solidarity (or in the case of anger, no significant relationship) once all were included in the model simultaneously. Together, these findings suggest that emotions matter greatly. Except for anger, all emotions significantly predict greater solidarity, with empathy being especially important. Further, gender matters as well. Women tend to express more solidarity than men in part because they feel greater empathy and feel sorrier when they learn about injustice.

In this study, I also focused on the relationship between ethnicity/race and solidarity. Using *t*-tests, I found that, as expected, Racialized people reported a much greater sense of inclusive victim consciousness than White people but similar levels of emotions. Further, as expected, inclusive victim consciousness positively correlated with solidarity, though only to a small sized extent, $r_s = .16$. Contrary to my expectations, however, I found only limited evidence to suggest that Racialized people express more solidarity than White people, or that inclusive victim conscious mediated the relationship between ethnicity/race and solidarity, as these effects were only significant to marginal levels. In all, the results of these analyses suggest that Racialized people have a much greater sense of inclusive victim consciousness than White people, but there was limited evidence to suggest that this in turn relates to greater solidarity.

As discussed earlier, to increase confidence in the generalizability of findings, researchers need to test hypotheses in diverse samples. In Study 3, I sought to replicate Study 2 using a large national sample of adults from various regions in Canada. Replicating findings from Study 2, I found that women reported stronger emotions across all domains than men and similar levels of inclusive victim consciousness, though the difference between groups for hope was only marginally significant. Also replicating findings from Study 2, all emotions positively

correlated with solidarity. Empathy was related to solidarity (r_s =.70) more strongly than all other emotions, and hope, sadness, and feeling sorry (r_s = .55–.56) related to solidarity more strongly than anger (r_s = .46). Like Study 2, gender had an indirect effect on solidarity through feelings of empathy, sadness, and feeling sorry. The general pattern of results across these two studies suggest that gender is important, and emotions are important—especially empathy. Women tend to express more solidarity than men because they feel more empathy and sorrier, and perhaps because they feel sadder as well.

Though Study 3 results were mostly consistent with Study 2 results regarding gender and emotions, there was less consistency between the two studies regarding ethnicity/race and inclusive victim consciousness. Consistent with results from Study 2, in Study 3 Racialized people reported a greater sense of inclusive victim consciousness than White people, and inclusive victim consciousness positively correlated with solidarity to a small extent. However, unlike in Study 2, Racialized people also reported stronger feelings of love, empathy, hope, and solidarity than White people. This in turn meant that ethnicity/race had a significant indirect effect on solidarity through feelings of empathy, hope, and inclusive victim consciousness. Differences between samples regarding participants' Canadian status may partially explain why inclusive victim consciousness significantly predicted solidarity in Study 3, though the reason why there were differences between studies regarding Racialized and White participants' emotional experiences is less clear. As discussed previously, whether we judge results as having replicated or not is also dependent on what criteria we use. From a null hypothesis significance testing perspective, findings did not replicate, however, from an estimation thinking perspective, findings were reasonably consistent. In summary, then, though I am somewhat less confident in conclusions regarding ethnicity/race than gender, the general pattern of results suggests that

Racialized people feel a greater sense of inclusive victim consciousness than White people, and in some circumstances feel some emotions to a stronger extent. These factors may in turn relate to greater solidarity.

What Best Predicts Solidarity?

Across studies, gender, ethnicity/race, emotions, and inclusive victim consciousness were all relevant factors to solidarity. However, some of these factors mattered more than others. When making comparisons among groups of people, it is important to consider the magnitude of the difference. Take, for example, findings from the national sample in Study 3. Based on the CL (common language) effect size, if I were to randomly select one Racialized and one White participant, there is a 58% chance that the Racialized participant would report more solidarity than the White participant. Between genders, findings are similar. If I were to randomly select one man and one woman, there is a 58% chance that the woman would report more solidarity than the man. Though statistically significant differences do exist, these statistics remind us that our ability to predict who reports more solidarity, feels stronger emotions, and so on based on ethnicity/race and gender is often only slightly better than flipping a coin. In contrast, people's emotional responses appear to matter greatly. Based on findings from these studies, emotions relate to solidarity more strongly than does a sense of inclusive victim consciousness. Emotions alone accounted for a sizable 49% of the variance in solidarity in Study 2 and 57% of the variance in solidarity in Study 3. In both studies, empathy emerged as the strongest predictor of solidarity. Interestingly, however, in both studies the effect of anger was non-significant. Thus, those wishing to promote solidarity will find the most success in appealing to people's emotions, with a particular focus on increasing a sense of empathy.

Though the results of the present studies found inclusive victim consciousness predicted

solidarity to a lesser extent than did emotions, it is important to acknowledge that these variables were measured at different levels of specificity. In other words, inclusive victim consciousness (as I measured it) was a broader, trait-like variable that was less specific and more general, whereas emotions were states that were specific, direct responses to a situation. If, for example, I measured inclusive victim consciousness in a more specific way (e.g., perceptions that Indigenous children have suffered in similar ways to their group), it is possible that the relationship with solidarity would be stronger. Considering this, future researchers should continue to reflect on the implications of comparing variables that are measured at differing levels of specificity.

Reflections on Strengths and Limitations

As with all research, this project had several strengths and limitations. First, recognizing the importance of replication within science, Study 3 had a sample that was particularly strong in its diversity, including adults from various regions across Canada who were a wide range of ages and had various educational backgrounds and income levels. Given that it is problematic to make generalizability claims when one relies solely on university student samples (Hanel & Vione, 2016), the diversity of this sample was a clear strength for this project. Second, though researchers of collective action have examined the role of various emotions, studies most often focus on only one or two emotions at a time and disproportionately focus on negative feelings. In life, however, people often experience many emotions at once and not all feelings, such as hope and love, are negative. Considering this, this project offers a more comprehensive, holistic, and balanced view of the range of emotions people can experience when learning about injustice. Third, within the intergroup relations literature, Indigenous and non-Indigenous relations have received less attention than relations between other groups, even within Canada. Considering the

Government of Canada and many others' commitment to advancing reconciliation with Indigenous peoples and the urgent need to address many other issues outside of child welfare, understanding factors that relate to solidarity will be important for bringing people together to work toward much-needed change.

Though this project has several strengths, this project had several limitations as well. Notably, I had substantial difficulty with participant recruitment, especially for men. Because of this, my sample sizes for Studies 1 and 2 were smaller than originally wanted, meaning I had less power to detect small effects. It is possible that I was underpowered to detect some effects, which would, in turn, have implications for the conclusions I make about replication if I base the criteria solely on *p*-values. Recognizing this issue, I have offered alternative, estimation-based perspectives that move away from relying on null hypothesis significance testing. I encourage others to consider adopting this perspective as well.

Second, within this project, I aimed to ensure my measures were psychometrically valid and reliable. Due to resource limitations, however, I was not able to conduct additional psychometric studies with non-university student samples in other geographic areas, nor examine scale properties in the context of other social issues, which may limit generalizability. Further, when considering other methodological issues, future researchers might also consider the value of alternative analytic methods that do not use equally weighted composite scores. For example, when possible and feasible, researchers might consider using more sophisticated methods where the measurement model is embedded, such as structural equation modelling (Hwang et al., 2021) or, alternatively, factor score path analysis (Devlieger & Rosseel, 2017).

Third, in this project, I explored my research questions using only one type of methodology: quantitative. Quantitative research tends to make certain philosophical

assumptions about the nature of the world that differ from qualitative methodologies (Willig, 2019). Traditionally, Western philosophy, in which much quantitative research is grounded, has viewed knowledge and truth as existing outside of culture and objective. In contrast, traditionally, Indigenous philosophies and many qualitative research paradigms view knowledge as deeply embedded within social, historical, and cultural contexts, and thus subjective (Walter & Anderson, 2013). Indeed, Indigenous scholars (Walter & Anderson, 2013) have critiqued that dominant, Western quantitative methods rarely include elements of epistemological reflexivity and argue that "objectivity" is tightly tied to our social position, the assumptions we make about what counts as "knowledge," and our values. To "Indigenize" quantitative research, therefore, requires us to reflect on and acknowledge the way that these factors impact the research process.

Applying an Indigenous Lens to Quantitative Research

Recognizing the limits of traditional quantitative approaches, and in keeping with my desire to "Indigenize" psychological research, I now turn my discussion toward some reflections on how my own life experiences and others have influenced this research process, including my chosen issue, study variables, and methodology. There are many issues of social justice that I might have focused on. But, because of my experiences working with youth in government care, I have had a strong desire to see the injustices I witnessed in the child welfare system rectified, leading me to focus on this particular issue. Early on in my program, I met with several people including a former youth in care, a Knowledge Keeper, an Elder, and former youth care workers for feedback on some pilot study materials. Though I ultimately decided against pursuing those studies (due to inconsistent results and other issues), these meetings reaffirmed to me how important it is to bring more awareness to issues within child welfare and increased confidence that I had chosen an issue to highlight that was of value and interest to the Indigenous

community.

My identity as a White and Anishinaabe'kwe (Ojibwe woman) has also influenced my interest in intergroup relations and my choice of study variables. Having come from a mixed family, I have seen the deep love, care, and connection Indigenous and non-Indigenous people can have for one another and wish to see more of that in Canada. Like many Indigenous people, I tend to view all life as connected through networks of dependent relationships and lean toward a more interdependent self-construal. As such, I believe that healthy relationships need to be at the center of social change. This belief, along with my preference for taking a strength-based orientation, another Indigenous teaching, led me to focus on solidarity—a desired relational-based future that I wanted to see, rather than racism, an outcome that I did not want to see. Further, my culture traditionally values holism and balance. It is not a mistake that in choosing which emotions to focus on, I wished to include many feelings that were an even mix of (what I originally conceptualized as) positive and negative.

Other aspects of my background, such as my education, have also influenced the study design and the methodology I used. Having been trained within a discipline that primarily uses quantitative research methods, I have come to value and enjoy such approaches to inquiry and am comfortable and most confident with these methodologies. Of course, others have also influenced this research project. My advisor and committee members' training backgrounds have impacted my chosen studies, in that I have wanted to take advantage of what they could teach me based on their areas of expertise. For example, were it not for Prof. Starzyk's expertise in and enthusiasm for psychometrics, I likely would not have known the importance of using robust measures and may have not conducted the first psychometric study. Though it may be less common to explicitly discuss these matters, I encourage all to reflect on how their background

influences research as well. There are personal reasons and experiences for this research. Finally, being aware that Western perspectives have heavily influenced my training environment (and again, perhaps this speaks to my wish for balance), I have sought to bring in elements of "two-eyed seeing" (Wright et al., 2019) by ensuring study variables are grounded in my cultural values, explicitly incorporating reflexivity into my work, and by encouraging others to do the same.

Future Directions

There are many future directions that this work may take. As I have discussed above, this project used one methodology, quantitative. This approach was top-down in nature, in that I formulated hypotheses to test based on prior research and theory and pre-chose all variables. However, future research may take a bottom-up approach that is open and exploratory. For example, in qualitative interviews, researchers may ask participants about feelings that naturally arise when they learn about injustice and times when they have (or have not) shown solidarity. Using quantitative pretesting, researchers may also purposely recruit participants to take part in individual interviews who naturally express high (or low) solidarity to better understand motives and barriers. These qualitative findings may be subsequently tested with larger samples and used to inform potential interventions (exploratory sequential mixed-methods design; see Almeida, 2018, for a review of common mixed-methods approaches).

Another area of research involves investigating what story elements about injustice lead to different emotions. Emotions differ on multiple dimensions, with researchers most commonly focusing on dimensions such as valance and arousal (Posner et al., 2005). However, emotions hold other characteristics, such as who the target of such feelings is. For example, empathy, love, and anger are all other-focused feelings, though whom these feelings are directed toward differ;

typically, empathy and love are directed toward victims, whereas anger is directed toward perpetrators. Considering this, to invoke empathy and love, it may be most impactful to share stories that focus on the characteristics of individual victims. In contrast, to induce anger, it may be most effective to share stories that focus on the perpetrator's actions. Emotions can also differ in their temporal orientation. Feeling sorry and hope are alike in that they are both change-based emotions that involve a desire for a different reality; however, feeling sorry is based on a wish for a different past, whereas hope is based on a wish for a better future. As such, to induce feeling sorry, stories might focus on how perpetrators and others could have acted differently, whereas to invoke hopefulness, stories might present feasible solutions that may be implemented moving forward.

Finally, another area of research might investigate whether these findings hold in other areas of discrimination, other than ethnicity/race. Unfortunately, discrimination can be based on various characteristics such as religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, nationality, or ability. Other research in our laboratory, conducted by recently graduated honors' student Jessica Plett, examined the same variables that I examined in my dissertation, but in the context of religious discrimination against Muslim people. Many of her findings on gender and ethnic/racial group differences and correlations (Plett, 2023) were consistent with my findings, though further analyses are still needed. In addition to focusing on religious discrimination, other follow-up studies may also examine other areas, such as discrimination toward LGBTQ+ people, women, newcomers, or disabled people.

Theoretical and Applied Considerations

The findings from this project have both theoretical and applied implications. As discussed earlier, well-known models of social change, such as the SIMCA model (Van Zomeren

et al., 2008; Van Zomeren et al., 2011; Van Zomeren et al., 2018), are missing feelings such as empathy, love, sadness, and feeling sorry, though other emotions, such as anger and hope, have been linked to elements such as perceived injustice and efficacy beliefs, respectively (Wlodarczyk et al., 2017). Considering that emotions accounted for such a sizeable portion of the variance in solidarity (49% in Study 1 and 57% in Study 2), researchers might consider and explore how such emotions map onto other relevant drivers of social change. Within the SIMCA model, theorists propose that violated moral convictions and identification with the group seeking change are closely tied to one another, and drive other factors related to collective action such as perceived injustice and efficacy beliefs (Agostini & Van Zomeren, 2021). Is empathy, the most important emotion in relation to solidarity within Studies 2 and 3, related to a shared sense of identity? In the same way that identity is the foundation for other factors, do people first need to have empathy for victims to experience other emotions, like anger, sadness, or feeling sorry? These are all theoretical questions that I can only speculate about without further research.

The findings from this study also prompt us to consider how emotions relate to other relevant social psychological theories, such as system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, 2019) and belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980; Hafer & Choma, 2009; Hafer & Sutton, 2016). According to these theories, people are strongly motivated to see the world they are part of as fair and justify harmful systems in part because this reduces negative feeling, but how do such beliefs relate to other feelings that are positive? One especially intriguing emotion is hope. It is possible that encouraging hope for a more just future may help people cope with the discomfort they feel when they encounter injustice. Research on the relationship between support for historical reparations, continued victim suffering, and feasibility suggests support for this possibility. In two studies, Starzyk & Ross (2008) found that participants who believed that

victims of a historical injustice continued to suffer (versus not suffer) reported greater compassion for victims, viewed the situation as more unjust, and expressed more support for reparations, but only when reparations seemed feasible. Though the researchers did not measure hope in these studies, it is possible that seeing reparations as a feasible way to address victims' suffering increased feelings of hopefulness for a better future.

Finally, this project has applied implications for those wishing to advocate for social change. First, in seeking out others who may be especially likely to provide support, advocates may find that certain groups, such as men and White people, may need specialized intervention and encouragement. Advocates may also approach organizations, particularly women's and different ethnic/racial associations, for support as members of these groups appear to naturally express more solidarity. Second, empathy is especially important for solidarity. As such, when bringing awareness to an issue, those wishing to increase solidarity should focus their efforts on framing the issue in such a way that centers the experiences of those who have been harmed and elicits empathy. Third, across studies, other emotions related to solidarity to similar extents (though there was some evidence to suggest that anger was less related than some others). Considering this, I encourage advocates to focus on spreading messages that elicit more positive feelings, such as hope and love. These feelings are about equally related to solidarity as are negative feelings but are less likely to have unintended negative consequences. Political despair, for example, are feelings of despair, depression, and hopelessness some feel when they perceive a situation as unjust, and importantly, intractable. Though political despair is associated with collective action, it is also associated with increased stress, burnout, and a lack of optimism about one's future (Bird et al., 2024). I am unaware of research on the long-term impacts of other negative feelings, but it is likely that experiencing such emotions over a long period of time, in

combination with viewing a situation as intractable, has a damaging effect on one's well-being, leads to burn-out, and eventually disengagement.

Conclusion

To heal from collective trauma and create pathways to a better, more just future, people must create strong connections with and support one another. Our desire to stand with and support one another is closely tied to our own groups' experiences and how we feel emotionally when we encounter injustice in the world. Though some feelings may be uncomfortable to experience, they are important nonetheless in that they can drive us to act. Importantly, some feelings, such as empathy, love, and hope, may especially be key to building good relations and sustaining long-term health in social movements. Those wishing to enact change may focus on spreading stories and messages that elicit such feelings.

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Appendix A

Information and Consent Form

Study Title: Views About Social Groups and Issues

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Thank you for your interest in this study! This consent form, a copy of which you may print or save for your records and reference, is only part of the process of informed consent. It should give you the basic idea of what the research is about and what your participation will involve. If you would like more detail about something mentioned here, or information not included here, you should feel free to ask. Please take the time to read this carefully and to understand any accompanying information. Please contact Aleah Fontaine or Dr. Starzyk if you have any questions about the study now or later. You will get the fastest response by email; please put "Views About Social Groups and Issues" in the subject line.

We are conducting this study to learn about people's attitudes and emotions toward current social issues in Canada. This study is part of Aleah Fontaine's Ph.D. research and is supervised by Dr. Katherine Starzyk at the University of Manitoba and is being conducted in collaboration with Dr. Lisa Sinclair from the University of Winnipeg. Should you choose to participate, you will complete a demographics questionnaire (e.g., age, gender), learn about a current social issue in Canada, share how you feel about social groups you belong to, and how you feel about the issue.

We expect most participants will complete the study in 15 minutes or less.

A potential benefit to participating is that participants will learn first-hand about research in Psychology at the University of Manitoba. This research may also be of interest to those who wish to better understand who is likely to be a source of support for addressing social justice issues and why. Should people, such as those involved in advocacy work, use this information to enhance intergroup solidarity, participants may also indirectly benefit from positive social change and cohesion.

Participants will also receive 1 credit toward their PSYC 1200 research participation grade. Participants still receive this compensation if they withdraw partway during the study.

A potential risk associated with participating in this study is that you may experience negative emotions as a result of reflecting on a current social issue. We believe that this risk is minimal, and no greater than that which people likely experience in everyday life.

We may use this data in Aleah Fontaine's dissertation and to develop things like empirical journal articles, presentations, or other written work at academic or other meetings. To ensure your anonymity, we will only report aggregate results (i.e., the average response across large number of participants). We will keep your information confidential until approximately April 2023, when data will be anonymized and aggregated. We will store your data online on the secure Qualtrics survey platform and on UM OneDrive. We may keep this anonymized data indefinitely, post it in an online data repository such as Open Science Framework (as funding for this project recommends), or make it available to qualified researchers. The University of Manitoba may look at your research records to see that the research is being done in a safe and proper way.

Some data and information from this study may be sent outside of the University of Manitoba to other researchers, organizations, or made publicly available. This is for further analysis, testing, as part of the research study, or a requirement by a granting agency or journal. Any information sent out of the University of Manitoba will not show identifiable personal information about you.

This research has been approved by the Research Ethics Board at the University of Manitoba, Fort Garry campus. If you have any concerns or complaints about this project you may contact any of the above-named persons or the Human Ethics Officer at 204-474-7122 or HumanEthics@umanitoba.ca. A copy of this consent form has been given to you to keep for your records and reference.

If you would like to receive a summary of results (available approximately June 2023), you may leave your contact information at the end of the study. Should you wish to withdraw partway through but would still like a summary, please click the "I wish to withdraw" link at the bottom of the page. This will take you to the end of the survey where you can access a link to leave your contact information. We will not link your contact information to your study responses.

Now it is time for you to decide whether you want to participate in this study. By clicking "I agree" below you will indicate that you have understood to your satisfaction the information regarding participation in the research project and agree to participate as a subject. In no way

does this waive your legal rights nor release the researchers, sponsors, or involved institutions from their legal and professional responsibilities. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time, and /or refrain from answering any questions you prefer to omit, without prejudice or consequence. Your continued participation should be as informed as your initial consent, so you should feel free to ask for clarification or new information throughout your participation.

If you would like to withdraw partway through the study, please click “I wish to withdraw” at the bottom of the page. This will take you to the end of the survey where you may leave your contact information should you wish to receive a summary of results, and will ensure you are still granted your research participation credit. Should you wish to withdraw your responses after you have submitted the survey, please contact Aleah Fontaine by April 30, 2023.

If you choose to withdraw partway through the study, may we still include the questions you have completed in our analysis?

Yes
No

You should only click “I agree” if you agree to participate with full knowledge of the study presented to you in this information and consent form and of your own free will.

Please select “I agree” if you wish to participate.
If you would like to withdraw and would like to exit the survey, please select “I disagree.”

I agree
I disagree

Appendix B

Demographic Questions

1. What is your current gender identity?
   Man
   Woman
   I identify my gender as (please specify): _____________

2. What is your age? [drop down list]

3. What is your ethnicity? Please check off as many as applicable. Examples within brackets are not complete—other groups are possible within categories.
   Arab
   Black
   Chinese
   Filipino
   Indigenous (First Nation, Métis, Inuk)
   Japanese
   Korean
   Latin America
   South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, etc.)
   Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, Thai, etc.)
   West Asian (e.g., Iranian, Afghan, etc.)
   White
   Other, please specify: _____________

4. Please specify your status within Canada:
   Citizen at birth
   Citizen by naturalization
   Permanent resident
   Other (e.g., temporary resident, refugee)

   (If other than Citizen at birth is selected)

   4b. How many years have you lived in Canada? [drop down list]

5. Do you currently live in Canada?
   No
   Yes

6. In what province or territory do you live?
   Alberta
   British Columbia
   Manitoba
   Newfoundland and Labrador

New Brunswick
Northwest Territories
Nova Scotia
Nunavut
Ontario
Prince Edward Island
Quebec
Saskatchewan
Yukon

7. What is your annual household income? [drop down list]
   $0-$4,999
   $5,000-$9,999
   $10,000-$14,999
   $15,000-$19,999
   $20,000-$24,999
   $25,000-$29,999
   $30,000-$34,999
   …continues in $5,000 increments to $250,000+

8. Using the scale below, please indicate how you would describe your stance on each of these three categories of issues.

Very Left-Wing	Left-Wing	Slightly Left-Wing	Middle of the Road	Slightly Right-Wing	Right-Wing	Very Right-Wing
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

- Foreign policy issues.
- Economic issues.
- Social issues.

Appendix C

Issue Description

Discrimination Within the Child Welfare System in Canada

Discrimination is an issue that harms individuals and communities alike. Within Canada, groups such as Indigenous Peoples have experienced systemic discrimination on the basis of their race under legislation such as the Indian Act. Up until 2008, the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA) did not provide full protection against discrimination for First Nations, due to section 67 of the CHRA which stated: *"Nothing in this Act affects any provision of the Indian Act or any provision made under or pursuant to that Act."*

As a result, First Nations living or working on-reserve could not file complaints with the Canadian Human Rights Commission alleging discrimination that happened because of the Indian Act. This has had significant consequences for children, youth, and their families. For decades, First Nations who lived on-reserve received less funding for public services, such as child welfare, than others in Canada received. This led to children being removed from their families and communities at disproportionately high rates, often for problems that could have been solved had there been equitable family supports available.

In 2007, the Assembly of First Nations, the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, and Amnesty International brought a complaint before the Canadian Human Rights Commission, alleging that child welfare services for children living on-reserve was underfunded and discriminatory. After several years of court battles, in 2016 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruled that the Government of Canada was "willfully and recklessly" discriminating against First Nations children. In 2019, the Tribunal ordered the Government of Canada compensate First Nations children, youth, and families who had been unnecessarily separated. Though the Government of Canada initially appealed this ruling, the parties announced that they reached a settlement agreement in January 2022.

Despite this progress, much work remains. People in Canada will need to develop and implement child and family support services to address the lasting impact of discrimination and ensure that Indigenous children, youth, and families can thrive.