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dc.contributor.supervisor Martens, Rhonda (Philosophy) en_US
dc.contributor.author Novelli, Nicholas
dc.date.accessioned 2015-09-01T17:58:09Z
dc.date.available 2015-09-01T17:58:09Z
dc.date.issued 2015
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1993/30702
dc.description.abstract In pop culture, artificial intelligences (AI) are frequently portrayed as worthy of moral personhood, and failing to treat these entities as such is often treated as analogous to racism. The implicit condition for attributing moral personhood to an AI is usually passing some form of the "Turing Test", wherein an entity passes if it could be mistaken for a human. I argue that this is unfounded under any moral theory that uses the capacity for desire as the criteria for moral standing. Though the action-based theory of desire ensures that passing a rigourous enough version of the Turing Test would be sufficient for moral personhood, that theory has unacceptable results when used in moral theory. If a desire-based moral theory is to be made defensible, it must use a phenomenological account of desire, which would make the Turing Test fail to track the relevant property. en_US
dc.subject Philosophy en_US
dc.subject Ethics en_US
dc.subject Artificial intelligence en_US
dc.subject Desire en_US
dc.subject Phenomenology en_US
dc.title Adventures in space racism: going beyond the Turing Test to determine AI moral standing en_US
dc.degree.discipline Philosophy en_US
dc.contributor.examiningcommittee Shaver, Robert (Philosophy) Hannan, Sarah (Political Studies) en_US
dc.degree.level Master of Arts (M.A.) en_US
dc.description.note October 2015 en_US


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