THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

Urban Planning in Canada in Historical Perspective:
The Frustrated Promise of an Applied Social Science

by

FRANCIS W. QUANCE

A thesis
submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology

Winnipeg, Manitoba

1987

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INTRODUCTION

The social sciences have always concerned themselves with social change, though they have not always cared to admit it. Perhaps the single, most obvious, and widely experienced manifestation of social change in the 19th and 20th centuries, at least in the western world, has been urbanization. It is not surprising, then, that an attempt should be made to develop a science with which to understand and deal with this phenomenon. Indeed, there have actually been two such efforts made; urban sociology, and urban planning. This paper will look at the failure of the latter endeavour in Canada.

The overwhelming majority of Canadians now live in urban centres. This urban majority has existed and been growing for the past 50 or 60 years, depending upon your willingness to include unincorporated municipalities within the urban group. Even the colonial population prior to confederation was urbanized to a greater degree than that of the world average.[1]

During the late 19th century, dissatisfaction with urban conditions gave rise to demands for change. In response, the urban planning movement was born. In keeping with the long tradition of western thought, the scientific method was applied, problems identified, and solutions proposed. Some of these were even implemented. Nevertheless, there are few

who would argue that the cities of the modern world have much improved from the state of virtual chaos which existed in the 19th century. A reading of Milton Acorn's "On Saint-Urbain Street" can be most instructive in this respect:

"My room's bigger than a coffin/ but not so well made./ The couple on my left drink, and/ at two a.m. the old man shouts/ of going back to Russia./ About five he or his wrung-out wife/ puke up their passage money.

The janitor (pay, five a week/ plus a one-bed apartment/ with furnace in kitchen) has/ one laughing babe at home/ and two girls, for lack of room,/ in the orphanage./ On holidays they appear/ with their soul-smashed faces.

Upstairs the Negro girl/ answers the phone, sings my name/ in a voice like a bad angel's./ Her boyfriends change/ every weekend, like the movies./ But my room's cheap, tho'/ when the wind shifts north/ I wear my overcoat/ to type this bitter little poem."[2]

Writing in 1969, Acorn could just as easily be describing the Dickensian conditions of cities during the late 19th or early 20th centuries. It would certainly appear that very little of consequence has changed during all that time, despite the best efforts of urban reformers, urban planners included.

Why doesn't urban planning work?   In a country with the
tremendous human and material resources which this one has,
how is it that we can't build the cities of our dreams?   In
this paper,   a qualitative analysis   will be used to
investigate, in historical perspective, the development of
urban planning in Canada.   Primary sources, for the period
up to 1959,   such as the Town Planning Institute of Canada's
"Journal",   the   "Canadian   Engineer"   and   the   Royal
Architectural   Institute   of   Canada's   "Journal"   were
inaccessable.   Consequently,   secondary sources had   to be
used.   These included various journals and books, primarily
from the growing field of Canadian urban history.   Great
reliance was also placed on the work of historian Walter van
Nus, whose Ph.D. thesis provides a most informative look at
the   development of   urban   planning   in Canada   during   the
period 1890-1939.   The   professional   journal of   Canadian
urban planners, "Plan Canada" (1959-1987), was the primary
source used for the analysis of the post-war era.   It is the
only refereed planning journal in Canada, and thus may be
expected to be representative of the ideas and concerns of
urban planners.   No sampling was used,   but rather,   an
exhaustive search of the journal was undertaken in order to
gain a systematic and thorough appreciation of planning
thought in Canada during the post-war period.   Two other
journals were consulted, "Habitat" (1950-1984), a journal
published by the C.M.H.C. to promote new ideas which the

corporation deemed useful, and "Community Planning Review" (1951-1976), the journal of the Community Planning Association of Canada, a group funded by the C.M.H.C. for the purpose of popularizing community planning in Canada. Various other secondary sources were used as well. The following is an examination, in five chapters, of the discipline's roots in the movement for urban social reform, its development into a nascent profession, and its eventual failure to deal effectively with the urban crisis.

FIRST MOVES

Urban planning in this country has always been characterized by the adaptation of other planning traditions to the Canadian experience. There has never been a cohesive, fully-fledged theoretical approach to urban planning in Canada.

This is a somewhat curious circumstance, in as much as many share Hans Blumenfeld's view that "Canada is a creation of planning."[1] Those who hold this view, point to the period of European colonization which began during the 17th century and ended, at least technically, with confederation. Although this Eurocentric view of Canada is clearly a narrow and limiting one, it is, nevertheless, true that the European colonists did construct their settlements according to plans which were well-considered beforehand. As Gertler has indicated, Quebec City, with its citadel, walls, and the small, formal squares of Lower Town, is still physically linked with "...the grandeur of the baroque city, the city of royal formality and order."[2] The Annapolis Valley of Nova Scotia also bears the imprint of 17th century French planning. The Acadians who settled there brought with them the land management technique of diking and cultivating marshland from the west coast of France; a technique which remains a feature of land use in the area. The Acadian pattern of market centres, in addition to their pattern of

orchard and mixed farming, remains as well.[3] In 1753, at the invitation of the British government, the German (Hanoverian) settlement of Lunenburg was established. The settlers adorned their buildings with decorative scrollwork and took great care in choosing the right sites and prospects for their homes, on difficult and rugged coastal terrain. Today, it still "...retains a special interest as a place in which landscape, plan and architecture achieve an uncommon harmony."[4] New England settlers, who arrived both before and after the 1776 revolution, brought with them a system of surveying land and settlement which included the rectangular rural enclosure as well as the gridiron town plan. The basic unit of subdivision used by the gridiron plan was a square block made up of sixteen 60 x 120 foot lots. Shelburne provides a good example of the use of this system. Land was set aside for the use of the church, school, courthouse, gaol, orphanage and the government wharves. It is the balance between freehold and public land established by these Nova Scotia Yankees which, today, has come to be taken for granted.[5]

All of this is not to say that European settlement always went strictly according to plan. In 1784, when Cape Breton was separated from Nova Scotia, its first governor was the noted cartographer Col. J. W. F. des Barres. He drew up an elaborate plan for the town of Sydney. His plan was, in some respects, remarkably similar to some of the regional

plans proposed by modern planners. Included in the des Barres plan was the notion of a major centre, connected on an axial road pattern, to five satellite communities. The core of each of the six centres was circular and included commercial plazas and an inner common.[6] It is not entirely understood why the des Barres plan was never implemented, but the pattern of development in Sydney conformed to the prevailing Loyalist mode.

In any case, while European settlements did not always evolve according to their initial plans, they were hardly thrown up in the manner commonly associated with some of the resource towns on the Canadian frontier of the late 19th and 20th centuries. Dawson City, during the Klondike goldrush, provides a notable example of this latter group. It has been described as the "prototype" of such towns, which were "Haphazardly built, [and lacking] centralized direction or control by company, government, or even an established municipal corporation."[7] This would hardly serve as a description of Lunenburg or Shelburne.

In addition to the experience of planned European settlement, P. J. Smith has claimed that "... a Canadian inspiration was vital to the formative ideas of the modern planning movement."[8] John Arthur Roebuck was an English colonial who was born in India in 1801, but who lived in Upper Canada from 1815 until 1824 when he returned to

England.   Although in Canada for only 9 years, he seems to
have identified strongly with the country, and was still
referring to himself as a Canadian in 1835.   Roebuck was one
of the philosophical radicals who,   in the 1820s,   arose as
propagandists for the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham.
Advocating the productive management of land resources in
the public interest, according to the utilitarian principle
of the greatest happiness of the greatest number,   Roebuck
conceived a notion of town planning which exemplified the
utilitarians' construct of social progress.[9] Smith credits
Roebuck, in fact, with providing "...the first explicit
formulation of the role of town planning as a social
institution."[10] In Roebuck's vision the business of building
towns was to be taken out of the hands of speculators, and
town authorities were to be given the legal sanctions
necessary for the acquisition of land for parks,   "green
belts", and the like.   The idea was to improve the lot of
the urban population without overturning the social system,
through the manipulation of social institutions; the legal
system and private property, for example.   Hence,   the
philosophical radicals offered, Smith contends, a "pragmatic
compromise" between two revolutionary alternatives;   a
violent seizure of power by liberals in the name of equality
and the rights of man, or a social transformation guided by
the principles of the Owenite socialists.[11]

The similarity between the approach to planning taken by Roebuck and that adopted by later Canadian planners is quite remarkable. In a pamphlet published in 1836 Roebuck expressed his view that land resources should be productively managed for the public good:

> "Wild land is the great means of the improvement of Canada... and could, by careful management, be made the means of supplying all the expenses of government, and of improving and settling the country... The management of these lands in reality may, and does, influence the well-being of the entire colony. This management becomes then not a matter of mere administration, viz., the carrying out certain definite orders of the legislature, but is in fact one of the most important portions of the business of governing the country, and applying its resources beneficially."[12]

Clifford Sifton was to make this same point many times. He was the first chairman of the Commission of Conservation, which was founded on this very idea and was to become, after 1909, this century's first great promoter of town planning in Canada. When Sifton addressed the City Planning Conference, a group of U. S. planners, in Toronto in May, 1914, he argued that a large part of the answer to the urban ills of the day was "...to be found in a rational system of Town Planning, a rational system of supervising the

conditions in which the people in our great cities shall live."[13] The Town Planning Institute of Canada was also established on this principle. This was not too surprising, as Smith points out, considering that it was organized by the Commission's town planner, Thomas Adams, who was a practicing Benthamite. Furthermore, Roebuck's statement of the philosophy of land management could well have served as the summary for Adams' famous book, Rural Planning and Development. Smith concludes that, "It can be said ... that Roebuck was the first exponent of the central convention of Canadian planning thought, which is the belief that land can be efficiently managed for an identifiable public good through the effective application of scientific knowledge."[14] This convention is still to be found today in legal definitions of planning[15], as well as in the bylaws of the Canadian Institute of Planners. In section 1.6 of Bylaw Number 4 (New Series), 1976, the definition of planning is given as, "... the scientific, aesthetic and orderly disposition of land, with a view to securing physical, economic and social eficiency, health and well-being in urban and rural communities."[16]

As Smith explains, Canadian planning has, for the most part, always been considered to be derivative in character; the product of imported ideas and imported minds. His study of J. A. Roebuck leads him to conclude that, "... the date of origin [of Canadian planning] can be pushed back more

than seventy years, into the mid-1830s " and that "... a Canadian inspiration was vital to the formative ideas of the modern planning movement."[17]

One can argue, of course, that it is quite ludicrous to present the work of a long-standing, active member of the British parliament, an early 19th century English colonial who spent only 9 years as a teenager in Canada, as a Canadian influence on anything, much less the development of modern planning thought.

In defence of the Canadian link it may be said that Roebuck's connection with Canada did continue over the years. He was a leading spokesman on Canadian affairs, and he became the offical agent for the Assembly of Lower Canada, in Britain, in 1835. He was also heard at the bar of the House of Lords in opposition to the Canada Bill in 1838.[18]

However, in the final analysis, whether one chooses to argue that Roebuck was a Canadian influence or a British one, is of little real importance. His contribution to the development of planning thought was a significant one, regardless of his nationality. There is no doubt that Roebuck and others of the utilitarian reform effort had a hand in shaping the planning of their day, in both Britain and in the British colonies, including British North America. J. A. Roebuck remains the first to articulate the

utilitarian notion of the role of town planning as a social institution; a view which Canadian planners must still confront today.

It is one thing for individuals to make a contribution towards the development of a body of thought, and it is even more significant when sporadic instances of the application of that thought appear. However, the most significant, and perhaps the most important, event is the succesful transition from an esoteric, seldom practiced, body of thought, to a widely held and commonly practiced one. In Canada this involved the implementation of urban planning practice in a new (at least to Europeans) land, in which wide tracts of open space meant that any mistakes made in land use, aesthetics, organization, or whatever, could usually be compensated for by simply redoing it somewhere nearby. The abundance of land was a great eraser. There was also a widespread, liberal notion of freedom of the individual. In the context of planning this meant that the individual should be free to build and develop his property as much as possible without restriction. Tory ideas of public works and development were fine on one level but liberal notions, at least among those with the personal resources to develop property, held sway at the level of the individual. How was it then, that urban planning managed to gain a foothold in Canada? It grew out of the drive for urban reform.

The modern era of town planning began during the latter years of the 19th century and the early years of this century. The growing interest in planning was, fundamentally, a response to the urban monstrosities which Canadian cities had become. The ugliness of Canadian cities, by the turn of the century, was widely acknowledged. In 1893, A. T. Taylor, an architect from Quebec, complained in "The Canadian Architect and Builder" that "... we [as architects] are only allowed to touch with the finger of beauty a spot here and there."[19]

The larger Canadian urban centres had been thrown up in a helter skelter fashion, with virtually no regard to any consideration other than that of the developers. Indeed, western cities, in particular, were noted for their hodgepodge, and tangled appearance.[20] Older, and smaller, wooden frame structures stood side by side with the heavier, brick constructions of the 1890s, complete with their ornamental stonework. The newer, "secular, classical temples" which the banks erected in the 1900s humbled the simple brick stores and warehouses of the 1880s.[21] An unsightly mess of lines strung on poles planted along city sidewalks provided electricity and telephone service, while streetcars ran under a canopy of their own power lines. The physical appearance of the city itself accurately reflected the jumble and confusion from which it had been wrought. The period from about 1870 to the severe recession of 1913

was one of astonishingly rapid and uncontrolled urban growth and it was not long before there were problems.

One of the difficulties which quickly became apparent was the undesirable mixture of industrial and commercial activity with residential use. Winnipeg's Point Douglas provides a useful example of this. In 1880 Point Douglas was an exclusive residential area, the home of Hudson's Bay officials, successful businessmen, and government functionaries. The commercial district was centred on Main Street between Portage Avenue and Point Douglas Avenue, which now runs parallel to the Canadian Pacific Railway's main line. Winnipeg's leading industries were located along the Red River, there being, as yet, no railway.[22] In June, 1881 the C. P. R. was enticed to cross the Red River at Winnipeg.[23] In March, 1882 the first train from the east crossed the Red into Point Douglas.[24] The population of Winnipeg by 1884 had nearly trebled to 17,000, from 6,000 citizens in 1880, and the built-up area had doubled.[25] Point Douglas was inundated with industries. Saw and planing mills, foundries, agricultural implement factories, as well as medium and light industries such as wagon and clothing factories, all located in Point Douglas. The result, of course, was that Point Douglas became "... a neighbourhood of industrial and commercial activity mixed with pockets of less desirable housing."[26] Artibise and Dahl have observed that the genesis of this change was the construction of the

C. P. R. main line through the Point.[27] While there can be little doubt that the rail line was the great magnet which drew the commercial and industrial interests to the area, it is not unreasonable to suggest that these interests could have been directed to locate elsewhere along the line, perhaps nearer the city limits, had regulations been in place or enacted. The residents connected to the Hudson's Bay Company, the government or successful businesses, incidentally, removed themselves to more pleasant and agreeable surroundings.[28]

The railways added to the jumbled nature of cities in other ways. Turning again to Winnipeg, the railways were accused of making the city's streets into a "nightmare".[29] The Canadian Pacific, Canadian Northern, Grand Trunk Pacific and Midland railways all enjoyed their own points of access to the city. The great number of level crossings occasioned by these various entrances played havoc with the Winnipeg street system.[30] Subways and overhead bridges did not satisfactorily answer this problem. In addition, as the City Planning Commission Report of 1913 noted, the numerous branches, yards and shops of the various railways also cut the city up into many different sections, fragmenting the urban community.[31] This echoed the sentiment of the Winnipeg Tribune, which, in early December, 1900, had criticized the city's acquiesance to the C. P. R. and stated, "If there is any valid objection... to having the railway come into the

city from the northwest, clearing Main Street and all streets east of any C. P. R. traffic during the day, and making the city one continuous whole none has been offered."[32] The city's relationship with the railroads was a contentious one throughout this period, and the additional compartmentalization of Winnipeg which occurred with the closing of East Broadway for the Grand Trunk Pacific in 1904, and which was furthered by the entrance of the Midland Railway in 1911, did nothing to alleviate the city's traffic flow problems, much less reduce the discordant nature of the association. Small wonder then, that Winnipeg's slogan for 1913 was "Do it out of rush hours."[33]

There were, indeed, rush hours in turn-of-the-century Canadian cities, particularly in western cities which had an abundance of space into which they could expand. Electric street railways were in widespread use from the 1890s onward, and, as J. M. S. Careless points out, urban sprawl was an early phenomenon of the western urban environment. The automobile had arrived in Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver by the end of the first decade of this century. Canada's first gas station, for example, was established in Vancouver in 1908.[34] The electric trolley and the automobile provided the technology which made urban sprawl possible. Equipped with the means to move greater distances quickly and with relative ease, people could live in less expensive areas, farther away from their workplace in the city centre.

However, it was the vigorous real estate promotion industry which was the great engine of rapid urban expansion. Indeed, the cities of early 20th century western Canada have been aptly described as "real estate casinos".[35] The tripling of Edmonton's area, through a series of annexations which took place between 1904 and 1914, is a good example of the tremendous urban growth which occurred during the period.[36] It is also a splendid illustration of the manner in which urban sprawl was greatly advanced by the relationship between the technology of the electric streetcar and the urban real estate speculator.

The streetcar was of inestimable value to real estate promoters of the time, especially in the west where city-building and its attendant boosterism were in full swing. A complete municipal trolley network was considered to be a palpable symbol of maturity and a measure of civic parity with cities of the east. It is also worthy of note, although not surprising in light of the Tory tradition in Canadian politics, that public ownership of streetcar systems was rarely an issue. Franchises were frequently granted to private concerns but their performances, with the exceptions of the British Columbia Electric Railway Company and the franchise in Montreal, were seldom a source of satisfaction to the municipalities concerned.[37] In St. Thomas, Ontario for example, the franchise granted by the town in 1897 was forfeited by its London owners in 1902,

when they willingly gave up their slender assets. Private investment could not be lured to continue operation of the line and public ownership resulted by default.[38] In Toronto, the private ownership of the streetcar franchise could not be induced to expand their network beyond a few well-travelled and, therefore, profitable lines, to the great dismay of city boosters.[39] Construction had never been undertaken in Edmonton, although franchises had been eagerly granted to any who asked for them. That city's desire to present the world with the image of a burgeoning metropolis, combined with its lack of success at attracting a privately held line, rendered the issue of public ownership moot.

The key issue in Edmonton wasn't ownership but routes. The fact that the streetcar routes themselves commanded the most attention is indicative, Weaver asserts, of "... the real estate concerns of civic leaders."[40] Moreover, the discussion did not concentrate on choosing the most sensible and well-travelled routes, as one might expect. Indeed, there was widespread agreement that track should be laid to serve barren suburbs where the system could not possibly break even, much less make a profit. It was well-understood that an extensive streetcar system would go a long way toward solving the developers' problem of luring people out to their surveys.[41] Only one alderman questioned the operation of lines in areas which, if not completely uninhabited, were very lightly populated. George Armstrong

noted that the only purpose of doing so was to promote speculation. In a wonderfully absurd, and self-condemning, reply, another alderman, Robert Manson, confirmed that Armstrong had reason to be apprehensive. Manson argued that land speculation was no obstacle to building a far reaching streetcar network as "... all the property in question had already been secured by speculators."[42] In March, 1907, the Edmonton council decided to build an extensive system, in spite of the criticism.

Interest waned somewhat with the credit crisis of 1907, but when better times returned in 1909 developers again found an agreeable City Council. A real estate speculator himself, Alderman Tipton stated, "I believe that street railway extensions are the greatest of city builders."[43] This was a consummate expression of the prevailing attitude. In a desire, perhaps, to demonstrate their faith in this principle, the city councillors entered into several questionable deals with various developers. The prototype agreement was concluded in the fall of 1909. James Carruthers and H. R. Round, the principals of a syndicate with holdings in the Glenora tract, asked for a streetcar extension which would require the bridging of ravines. The developers would share the cost of constructing the bridges and laying the track; the city, however, would take on all of the costs of operating the line. George Armstrong, still a council member, and still a critic, complained that the

deal was "... merely a money making proposition for Messrs. Carruthers and Round."[44] Council was unimpressed. At a later meeting procedure was suspended and the agreement passed at one sitting with "... very little discussion and no dissenting voice."[45] Similar undertakings were soon concluded with other developers.

The economies of Canadian cities, especially western ones, had been flourishing for 10 years on the strength of private construction and public works. It had seemed as though it would go on forever, with the demand for houses, public buildings, factories, municipal improvements, public utilities and the like, never satisfied. However, by the end of 1912, it was clear that, "suddenly", the demand had been met and, indeed, that there existed a condition of oversupply.[46] The depression of 1913 was a surprise to most, although as early as 1912 there had been signs of its imminent arrival. People were squeezed by housing and food costs which rose far more quickly than their wages. H. M. Drummond, the Deputy Receiver General, Winnipeg, wrote in early 1912; "Both house rents and living expenses have advanced during the past two years fully 50% - and of course the working man and those on fixed salaries are feeling the pressure most."[47] Friesen has remarked that, "... by the end of 1912 the construction of the urban west, or as much as was needed for a generation, was complete."[48] In as much as there seemed little left to build, it might have been of

little consequence that the primary source of capital for
Canada, the London money market, had dried up. However,
there were other demands being placed on municipalities
which required large sums of money. The cities were flooded
with farmers, their families, tenants, and hired men, all of
whom had abandoned the farms to creditors and who now sought
employment or, failing that, relief, in the large urban
centres.[49] The process of urbanization was in high gear.
Added to this influx of people due to rural depopulation,
was the constant, and growing stream of immigrants who also
required jobs, or relief. More than 400,000 people, the
largest number to that time, immigrated to Canada in 1913.[50]
Keeping in mind that social welfare during this period was
the sole responsibility of municipalities, and that there
were very few jobs available, it is not surprising to find
that the increased demand for social assistance precipitated
a financial crisis for the large urban centres.

The heavy debt burden which had been undertaken in order
to expand the street railway system contributed greatly to
the city of Edmonton's financial difficulties, as it did for
other cities with such a service. Ironically, the extensive
rail network had contributed to the problem by encouraging a
loose pattern of light density development. People would
move to the ends of the various lines, or just past them,
attracted by the lower lot prices and property taxes, and,
frequently, the lack of a building code. They could still

easily commute to and from the city using the trolley. The remarks of Alderman East, a Trades and Labour councilman, concerning one developer's deal for a streetcar line indicate that at least one member of Edmonton's council was aware of the problem. He protested that people would be enticed to move "... some nineteen blocks south of Whyte Avenue to live. This would mean that utilities of every description would have to be carried out there, while parts of the city closer in would have to wait."[51] He was not wrong, and at the onset of the 1913 depression Edmonton found itself with a number of serviced pockets of unoccupied land; in other words, with a high fixed debt and a sagging tax base.[52]

Edmonton was not alone in this predicament. Other municipalities, both large and small, had fallen into the same trap; actually encouraging real estate speculation by servicing lots before they had been sold for building purposes. Some centres, as Walter van Nus has indicated, were less irresponsible than others.[53] The actions of Toronto, for example, were less questionable in this regard than those of Vancouver. In that city, speculators, as did those in other cities, used the simplest and, therefore, least expensive survey method, called the grid system. This method had the added advantage of producing lots which were of a standard size and shape and which, as a result, maximized the versatility of future use. This, in turn,

allowed for the maximum speculative resale value of the survey. Zoning was not yet something which developers had to consider seriously. Speculators in Vancouver are known to have been permitted to lay out streets with grades of up to 16% in places where another layout would have allowed for grades of 5%. This greatly added to the city's costs, not only for the construction of the roads themselves but also for the provision of other services, such as pumped water.[54] However, the most outstanding member of this group was, without doubt, Calgary. In a wonderful display of pioneering ingenuity and initiative, that city, by 1914, possessed 26,763 vacant lots, all of which were serviced with sewers and watermains; enough uninhabited, serviced lots to provide, at two persons per lot, for its entire population.[55]

This was a very serious situation for Canadian municipalities, and there should be no misunderstanding of the importance of municipal finances during this period. In 1907, for instance, it was pointed out that, "... the annual expenditure of Winnipeg clearly exceeds that of Manitoba: Montreal's that of the province of Quebec: and until the present year Toronto's that of the province of Ontario."[56] The city of Edmonton, in 1913, disposed of an amount which was 1.5 times the total disbursement of the province of Alberta.[57] It is also worth noting that although the onset of war in 1914 saw the return of prosperity to the rural

areas of the west, this merely served to veil the economic difficulties of the larger urban centres which continued for another 5 years. The prairies received less than 1% of the $1 billion worth of Canadian munition production, for instance, and did not share in the restoration of manufacturing activity which occurred in the east. Soldiers who returned after the war found little opportunity for employment in the as yet unrecovered western cities, and added their names to the relief rolls and their frustration to that of those already unemployed.[58]

Urban sprawl and financial difficulty weren't the only imbroglios in which street railways were involved. At times they were used as weapons in interurban rivalries.

Port Arthur's public transportation system was inspired by civic rivalry. The elite of Port Arthur was challenged in the late 1880s by the increasingly vigorous Fort William. Although Port Arthur was able to offer better shops and lower retail prices, employment opportunities, in both construction and manufacturing, were to be discovered on the other side of the bay. Workers, naturally, found it more convenient to move nearer to their worksites. The Port Arthur Sentinel was jubilantly quoted in the Fort William Journal as having declared that, " They left Port Arthur like rats desert a sinking ship."[59]

Initially, a publically subsidized stage coach line was introduced to offer Port Arthur residents the chance to commute to Fort William rather than move there. Electric streetcars were widely publicized by 1890 and it became clear that the stage coach service, with its limited capacity and uncomfortable ride, was inadequate. Private investors could not be persuaded to build and operate a line which had to cross a large, thinly populated area. In addition, there was great opposition from the community leaders of Fort William, who understood the purpose of the proposed service. The Fort William Journal put it plainly enough, declaring:

> "Our friends across the ferry don't exactly like to see our little boom ... and they want to pull things their own way a little and ... they propose patronizingly to help us along a trifle by offering to build us an Electric Railway ... The electric road from Port Arthur would enable Port Arthur people to keep all those workmen as citizens."[60]

Further opposition was to be found among some Port Arthur residents who objected to public ownership. However, the merchants and civic boosters of Port Arthur, who insisted that the only way to acquire the desired service was to make it a civic undertaking, prevailed. The Edison Company was persuaded to install the road as a practical test and demonstration of their new equipment, and one of the

earliest electrified lines in the country became the first to operate under municipal ownership.[61]

Although it was quite unusual for the electric streetcar line to be introduced so directly into civic competition, as in the case of Port Arthur's attempt to short-circuit the urban expansion of Fort William, public utilities, of all sorts, were frequently deployed in municipal battles for citizens, capital, and growth.   The provision of sewers and watermains to 26,763 vacant lots by the City of Calgary, for example, was prompted by its competition with other western cities, particularly Edmonton.

Streetcar systems, although a contributing factor, were not, of course, the cause of urban sprawl. H. J. Selwood, in an examination of extensions to Winnipeg's trolley system found that "... they reinforced rather than initiated the patterns of growth."[62] However, streetcar systems quickly became recognized as harbingers of municipal expansion and, as such, served both as a focus for, and a target of, opposition to uncontrolled urban growth.

The rapid expansion of urban areas affected the relationship between town and country which became increasingly irritated and fractious.   As the town spread out into the countryside, demands were made upon the rural municipalities for services such as good, surfaced roads, sewers and water.   Considering their small tax base, it is

easy to understand why the lightly populated rural municipalities were unable, and unwilling, to provide such services. Furthermore, the perceived threat of more urban expansion presented by systems of street railways which extended far beyond the continuously built-up areas, and the "persistent aggravation" engendered by the difference between the high land values and taxes of urban areas, and the less expensive land and lower taxes of rural districts, did nothing to diffuse the tension between town and country.[63] The rural municipalities felt greatly put upon, and the urban municipalities resented the luring away of part of their tax base.

Two methods were employed to resolve such situations; annexation, and the redistribution of municipal boundaries. In Winnipeg, for example, the initial land boom of 1880-1882, resulted in the city's annexation of large areas of land from the rural municipalities of Kildonan in the north and Assiniboia to the west and south. Most of Winnipeg's land use and functions were then contained within its administrative boundaries, a condition which lasted until about 1900, when a great deal of commercial and residential construction began to appear outside the city limits. Accordingly, the next major annexation occurred in 1906 when the city took over Elmwood to the great relief of the residents and R. M. Kildonan. In 1907, an area along the city's northwest boundary was annexed from rural

Kildonan when another dissatisfied group of urban residents in a rural municipality joined the city.

Another reason for redistributing the municipal boundaries arose when, as urbanization increased, it became obvious that the original, large rural municipalities which straddled the rivers were no longer desirable. The rivers were no longer the unifying features of the municipalities which they had once been, when they had provided transportation, water and wood to residents. They had become, instead, barriers, requiring expensive bridges which were few and far between. Consequently, the breakup of the large units took place, using the rivers as boundaries. R. M. Fort Garry was cut away from St. Vital in 1912, Charleswood from R. M. Assiniboia in 1913 and, a year later, Rural Municipalities Kildonan and St. Paul were split into East and West versions. Whereas in 1880 there had been six administrative units, by 1915 there were eleven. Four more, smaller, changes occurred. The urbanized corner of R. M. Rosser became the village of Brooklands in 1919. St. James was created in 1920, the result of spillover from westend Winnipeg into R. M. Assiniboia and subsequent disputes over responsibility for provision of services. Old Kildonan broke away from West Kildonan in 1921 for the same reason, and, similarly, North Kildonan escaped the burden of East Kildonan in 1924. In that year, only the two southerly municipalities of Fort Garry and St. Vital had any

substantial portions left which were still essentially rural.[64]

All of this effort was an attempt to separate the purely rural functions from the urban ones. However, the result of all this boundary redistribution was not a simple, dichotomous separation of urban and rural, but rather, the creation of a new group of urban-centred municipal divisions, each competing with the other. As Weir has observed, "There was little unity in such diversity."[65] An increased number of interurban rivalries had been added, then, to the urban-rural tensions.

Another troubling problem for turn-of-the-century Canadian cities was a severe shortage of decent housing. As was discussed earlier, the major centres of central and western Canada experienced an enormous rate of population growth during the first decade of this century, as immigration and rural depopulation swelled the ranks of urbanites. This incoming group contained an exceptionally large proportion of people of child-rearing age, and as a result, severely pressured the available supply of family accomodation.[66] Decent housing, at the time, was considered to be shelter which was sanitary, and which also provided the individual privacy necessary to safeguard morality. Private enterprise demonstrated itself to be woefully inadequate in its attempt to meet the great demand for such

housing.   Rents in Canada increased 35.9% between 1910 and
1914.[67] Many houses were converted into flats by their
owners,   and many tenants found it necessary to subdivide
their homes and apartments, or to take in lodgers, in order
to make   ends meet.   Room overcrowding   reached very
disturbing levels. It was not at all uncommon, by 1914, for
families to occupy only one or two rooms each.   Indeed,
literally thousands of families endured such conditions. In
Toronto,   in 1913,   a police inspector found 565 people in 5
houses on King St. East.[68] Twelve people were discovered in
a room which measured 13' x 12' x 7' by a Winnipeg health
inspector on a midnight raid in 1909.[69] In 1913, the report
of Winnipeg's City Planning Commission complained of
overcrowding in many districts, poor construction leading to
uncomfortable and insanitary conditions, and rows of houses
built on narrow 25 or 33 foot lots which prevented the "...
proper access of light and air to certain rooms."[70] The
strong correlation which existed between overcrowding and
high mortality rates did not go unnoticed by public health
authorities.   The   overcrowded slum,   with its   inadequate
sewage facilities, was described as a nurturing ground, "...
wherein huge cultures of disease are growing,   ready when
ripe to rise and sweep the city streets."[71]

Agitation for housing reform was widespread. Concern for
the slum residents aside,   it was well-understood by the
middle and upper classes that they held a large measure of

self interest in municipal and provincial efforts to deal with public health problems. The germ theory made it clear to most that the health and sanitation of the entire city depended on the quality of the health and sanitation of each of its districts, including that of the congested and insanitary slums. The Medical Officer of Toronto, Charles Hastings, expressed this when he argued, in 1917, that disease did not consider the social register:

> "The city slum with all that that term involves, is a greater social danger than the average citizen ever dreams of ... the contamination of any one class of people [will] infect the rest of the social body ... The diseases that are propogated under slum conditions do not infrequently affect the rich, but they thrive most among the poor, and by reason of their common humanity they are all, whether rich or poor, more nearly related here than we are apt to think."[72]

Port Arthur's Medical Officer of Health was equally aware of this very direct connection, in matters of health, between the "higher and lower orders". In consequence of this, Lt.-Col. C. N. Laurie directed his men to continually pester the homes of "... ignorant and careless ..." foreigners from which came "... a large proportion of the servant girls, who may contract and pass the fever along into the homes where they work."[73] It was never difficult to garner

support for measures to resolve the housing crisis or to improve the public health in turn-of-the-century Canadian cities.

Pre-first world war Canadian city dwellers then, found themselves confronted by the results of uncontrolled urban growth and rapid urbanization: an environment made ugly and unhealthy by a helter skelter mixing of industrial and residential uses, of old structures with new, and a hideous overhead web of electrical and telephone wires; a plethora of irksome railway crossings and vexing rush hour traffic jams; urban sprawl, with its very thinly populated, if fully serviced, suburbs, fiscally draining electric street railways, and socially irresponsible real estate speculators; a staggering debt burden due to enormous, unnecessary capital expenditure and an immense relief obligation; interurban rivalries added to urban-rural tensions; and, finally, urban congestion and its threatening, disease-breeding slums. There was, by 1914, a good deal of interest in, and strong support for, urban reform.

OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS -OR- THE BOYS MAKE QUITE A RACQUET

There can be no question that, by the time of the First World War, the opportunity for urban planning to blossom and develop in Canada had arrived. In addition to the still unsated demand for urban planning which arose from the more general pressure for urban reform, the very idea of a pristine, "empty", vast land, particularly in the Canadian Northwest, seemed to ordain the creation of a new Eden; a paradise which could only be achieved through the orderly execution of sound and properly developed schemes.[1] This notion, along with the Government of Canada and the Canadian Pacific Railway, among others, promoted a great deal of experience with community planning in this country.

Canadians, for the most part, like the painter faced with a blank canvas, saw a rare opportunity to create something entirely from scratch, without the impediment of having first to tear down that which had previously existed. Europeans, for example, were confronted with a situation more akin to being faced with blank verse than blank canvas; the old having first to be removed before the new vision could be constructed. The Canadian challenge was a good deal less complex, and, therefore, less difficult, than that which faced the Europeans. In Canada, the chance for urban planning to establish itself had not only arrived, but, it seemed, had fetched its own blank canvas as well.

Owing much to the late 19th century utopian visions of
Ruskin, Bellamy, Hudson and Morris, this was a time of great
social experimentation, particularly in the Canadian
Northwest. As A. W. Rasporich has observed, "... group-
settlement ideology combined with a moral projection of a
new order was a continuing theme in early western Canada."[2]
Such community experiments were both numerous and diverse in
nature.

Some groups tried to introduce aristocratic society to
the prairies. Cannington Manor, which was established in
1882, south of Moosomin in the Qu'Appelle Valley of
Saskatchewan, emerged from the urban middle classes of
England. The village society which was reproduced at
Cannington was replete with its worker, or "artisan" group,
and its "sporting" faction of remittance men, who, for a fee
of $500-$1000 per annum were instructed in the art of
farming. It was not until 1900 that the Cannington
settlement finally dissipated completely.[3] Community
settlements based on the aristocratic model were not just
spawned by British immigrants. Several French counts and
noblemen took up homesteads in 1885 at Whitewood, some 40
miles away from the Cannington experiment. Their settlement
was, in many ways, a replica of the British effort and was
centred around the chateau La Rolanderie. Livestock was
imported to stock the farms. So, too, was a labour force to
do the menial work, not to mention all of the other

accoutrements deemed necessary to sustain the life to which they were accustomed. This experiment, like the one at Cannington, had also more or less dissolved by 1900, and for virtually the same reasons: the railway passed by them 10 miles to the south; many were lured by the gold fields of the Klondike; the economic failure of many of their capital ventures; and, even for the French it seems, the Boer War, which attracted many to join the colours.[4] This is not to suggest that attempts to establish such settlements ended at the turn of the century. One of the original members of the Whitewood community, the Comte Paul de Beaudrap went on to help establish a similar French ranching company in Alberta, at Trochu, in 1905. This enterprise, composed primarily of army officers who had become disillusioned by the Dreyfus affair and the expulsion of the Catholic religious orders which followed, and of urban bourgeois, functioned until the First World War, when most returned to France.[5]

Religious sectarianism was another motivating factor in the establishment of community experiments during this period. Groups like the Doukhobors in eastern Saskatchewan, the Mormons in southern Alberta, and the Hutterites and Mennonites, all founded settlements. Many of these survive today, though, to a greater or lesser degree, in an altered form.[6]

Alcoholic temperance, too, engendered community experiments. The most famous of these, perhaps, being the short-lived Temperance Colony of Saskatoon, which was inspired by the temperance movement in late 19th century Toronto.[7] Scandinavian groups were also prompted to launch such temperance-oriented co-operatives. The late 1880s saw the establishment of New Finland and the Icelandic Thingvalla in the Qu'Appelle Valley. British Columbia also seemed to attract a variety of such groups, including the Norwegian colonies at Bella Coola, founded in the 1890s, and at Quatsino Narrows.[8]

The radical-socialist Finnish community, Sojntula, on British Columbia's Malcolm Island shared the concerns for temperance of these groups, but differed in other ways. Seeking escape from the dangerous mines of Vancouver Island, the members of this Finnish commune asked the Finnish socialist intellectual Matti Kurikka to join them from Australia, where he had helped to start a similar community in Queensland. Kurikka believed that drunkenness had destroyed the Queensland experiment and so brought with him the temperance ideal. However, there the similarity with the other temperance-oriented communities ended. Sojntula was anti-clerical as well as "dry". Furthermore, it was organized along the lines of other cooperative groups, in contrast to settlements like those at Cannington or Whitewood. Sojntula had common shares and organized

communal business endeavours. Founded in 1901, the colony collapsed in 1905, having largely succeeded in its cultural aims but failing in its economic ones.[9]

Sojntula was not the only experimental community to diverge so greatly from the aristocratic model. In the summer of 1895 a group of farmers from western Manitoba met at Beulah, Manitoba and organized the Harmony Industrial Association for the purpose of projecting the new social order of "Hamona" into the Qu'Appelle Valley near Tantallon.[10] J. E. Paynter, one of the founders, expressed the utopian nature of the enterprise when he wrote that he had become convinced, "... that something would be accomplished for the good of humanity by organizing those interested into a colony to demonstrate to the world what men could accomplish by working co-operatively instead of competing against one another."[11] That fall building operations were started, although some members continued to operate their holdings in Beulah in the interests of the Association. It was not until the fall of 1898 that all of the members joined the colony at Hamona. Never a large settlement, at most 50 people joined the community, Hamona, like Cannington and many of the others, failed to develop a staple export base. Unable to sustain the expensive social services, such as health care, education, and child allowances, which it offered to its members, the Harmony Industrial Association dispersed, amicably, in 1900.[12]

A democratic-socialist experiment was undertaken near Red
Deer, Alberta, at Sylvan Lake, by a French group in 1906.
Attracted by the C. P. R. land advertisements, apparently
prompted by the unsuccessful coal miners' strikes which took
place in northern France in 1905, and led by a Dr. Tanche of
Lille, they tried in the winter of 1906-07, to institute
their plan. Various hardships, including poor land and the
death by freezing of their cattle in the winter of 1907, did
not make for a good beginning. Their leader, Dr. Tanche,
suffered a stroke in 1911 and the group's cooperative
businessess failed to sustain themselves. A gradual
dispersement took place as members took up their own
homesteads or returned to France.[13] Another community of
vision had vanished.

It should be stressed that all of these communities were
planned communities. Canadians had a good deal of
experience with planned communities by 1914. They were well
aware of the existence of the experimental communities,
which were not the isolated, xenophobic entities which some
have taken them to be. The colony at Hamona, for example,
was in regular correspondence with other communities,
including one at Commonwealth, Georgia, and the Ruskin
Colony on the Fraser River in British Columbia. Indeed,
Hamona arranged, on a barter basis, the exchange of products
with the Ruskin Colony, trading flour and butter for lumber
and salmon.[14] Considering the number of community

experiments which were undertaken and the fact that these were undertaken during a period of about 35 years, from the late 1880s until the First World War, Canadians had ample opportunity to acquaint themselves with the notion of planned communities. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that the idea of planning a community would seem less strange to the general public and be less likely to be dismissed out of hand.

It is likely that the familiarity with planning which Canadians had gained by 1914, when coupled with the interest generated by the urban reform movement, made the job of promoting the usefulness of urban planning a good deal less difficult. Opportunity it would seem, was indeed knocking very loudly.

Social mythology also played a role in the development of urban planning in this country. It helped to inculcate and nurture an adversarial relationship between human society and the natural world. The treatment of nature, as a wild thing to be tamed, promoted the interventionist attitude which still obtains today. Intervention requires planning. Intervention on the vast scale which we commonly see today, the James Bay Hydro-electric project for example, needs fairly complex and involved planning, taking into account a wide array of concerns and utilizing large quantities of information. Compare this with the minimal planning

required by the aboriginal peoples of Canada, who perceived themselves to be a part of the natural world and not alienated from it. Like many of their late 20th century counterparts, turn of the century Canadians believed, as Owram has noted, that "The power and beauty of the wilderness was indeed impressive, but it was too powerful for man to accept unaltered without becoming dominated by it."[15]

This hostile attitude toward nature was reflected in the popular culture of the day. It is true that from the 1880s on, many writers, particularly the boosters and pamphleteers of the various colonization companies, the Canadian government, and the C. P. R., began to describe the Canadian frontier as something close to an Elysian ideal.[16] Nevertheless, the inimical image of the natural world persisted in the popular literature. As H. Kreisel observed of the western plains, "Man, the giant-conquerer, and man, the insignificant dwarf always threatened by defeat, form the two polarities of the state of mind produced by the sheer physical fact of the prairie."[17] Northrop Frye went further, giving pride of place to the image of nature as menace, when he wrote that, "... everything that is central in Canadian writing seems to be marked by the imminence of the natural world."[18]

He argued that popular literature was different in character from what he simply termed "literature". Literature, according to Fyre, is conscious mythology. It creates an autonomous world with which we can perceive the real one. Popular literature, which is read casually, at leisure, conveys social mythology. The object of social mythology is to "... persuade us to accept existing social values."[19] In 19th century Canada, those social values were in keeping with what Frye called the "garrison mentality". This garrison mentality developed in the early, small, and isolated communities of Canada which were separated, not only from each other, but from American and European sources of culture as well.[20] A mentality such as this is one of confinement; hostile to that which is outside of the garrison walls. This notion was expressed by Kreisel when he described the effect of the prairie on its non-native immigrants:

> "The prairie, like the sea,
> ... often produces an
> extraordinary sensation of
> confinement within a vast and
> seemingly unlimited space.
> The isolated farm-houses, the
> towns and settlements, even
> the great cities that
> eventually sprang up on the
> prairies, became islands in
> that land sea, areas of
> relatively safe refuge from
> the great and lonely
> spaces."[21]

It takes a great deal of work and effort, and, above all, planning, to maintain and operate a garrison. Without planning, the walls come tumbling down and the enemy is among the inhabitants.

Canadian expansion was never a haphazard, uncontrolled affair. As Frye notes, the social values of the garrison mentality are those of its officers.[22] Hence, the social mythology of the garrison mentality, advanced by the popular literature of the day, helped to promote the hegemony enjoyed by Canada's "officers", the ruling class, in establishing both the agenda for, and the manner of, Canadian expansion into the Northwest. Indeed, neither the Canadian government nor the Canadian public would contemplate a repeat of the "unplanned and chaotic movement of the frontier of Ontario."[23] Instead, they sought to implement a plan, based on information garnered about the territory, which would bring about the orderly development of the Northwest. Planning, as an important element of the garrison mentality, was part of the mainstream of Canadian thinking. Moreover, it was not long before the city joined "the garden West of the farm" as part of the literary paradise which the pamphleteers and boosters were trying to project onto the western plains.[24] In such a culture, urban planners were left with little to do in the way of persuading Canadians of the usefulness of their craft. Opportunity had knocked, and the pathway to general acceptance had opened to urban planners and their schemes.

Who then, was to step through this opening and seize this opportunity which lay before Canadian planners? As is usually the case with a new species, there was not one mystical moment when the first Canadian planner winked out of the cosmos and into existence among the speculators, developers, and politicians. Urban planning, of a sort, had been going on for years. It now seemed readily apparent that the chance to create a new, and universally recognized, speciality with which to legitimate a claim to expertise in urban planning, was at hand. A circumstance which did not escape the notice of many Canadian architects, engineers, and surveyors.

On May 31, 1919, a small group from these three "plan-making professions" founded the Town Planning Institute of Canada (T.P.I.C.), in an effort to mould this new Canadian profession.[25] The first President of the T.P.I.C. was Thomas Adams, who, as Advisor on Town Planning to the Commission of Conservation, was the leading figure in Canadian planning. He had earlier told the Commission that the Institute was being organized "... for the purpose of promoting educational courses on town planning in the Universities."[26] In this way it was hoped that the T.P.I.C. would help to meet the most pressing phase of town planning work at the time; the need to train Canadians as planners.[27] Full membership in the Institute was retained for those architects, engineers and surveyors who had taken a course

in town planning and had either passed qualifying examinations in town planning or had submitted a thesis on some aspect of town planning. This reflected the concern of the founders to promote high standards for the new profession, which would help to lend credibility to the new speciality and also exclude those who were less qualified from the Institute, and, consequently, from the profession.[28]

This last consideration, the desire to exclude others from the competition for planning jobs, was not, by any means, an inconsequential matter to the membership of the T.P.I.C., or its leadership. Although surveyors and engineers were particularly hard put to find employment, underemployment, after 1913, was a major concern for all three founding groups.

The drastic decline in real estate activity which occured after the collapse of the speculative markets in 1913, severely reduced the income of surveyors across the country. Calgary was not the only municipality with an overabundance of surveyed, unoccupied land. There was little demand for surveys of new suburban tracts. Many surveyors joined the army in 1914-15. It had little effect, however, in easing the plight of those unemployed colleagues who remained at home. In late 1918, there was a good deal of apprehension with respect to the formidable task of reintegrating those

members of the profession who were about to return as
veterans. In addition to the great decline in real estate
activity, wartime retrenchment by the Department of the
Interior resulted in the dismissal of many Dominion Land
Surveyors.[29] As Noulan Cauchon, a well-known Canadian
planner of the day declared to the Association of Dominion
Land Surveyors at their 1918 convention, "The Northwest is
now offering less opportunity for Dominion Land Surveyors
than it used to offer and they should look for something
else. Economic town planning affords that opportunity."[30] In
trying to recruit new members for his profession, Cauchon
had gauged his audience well. Over and above the
difficulties imposed by wartime retrenchment and the decline
in real estate activity, the municipal financial crisis of
1913 had provoked massive layoffs of surveyors and engineers
from coast to coast. In the face of such appalling
prospects for employment, surveyors were confronted by the
fact that "... fully half the active members of their
Association would be returning from active service overseas
by 1919."[31] Cauchon, and the other members of the T.P.I.C.,
were pitching to a receptive audience.

Underemployment among engineers had also reached
worrisome levels by 1918-19.[32] Housing starts nosedived
during the war, in spite of a serious pre-war shortage of
urban housing, and the huge influx of people to the cities
to satisfy the demand for labour needed to sustain wartime

industrial production. Private capital, building materials, and labour were all in short supply and very expensive. Neither was there much in the way of public building or public works projects during the war.[33] In such circumstances, few opportunities were available for engineers, or architects for that matter, to apply their craft.

Small wonder then, that the three planning professions looked to the T.P.I.C. to give them an edge in the pursuit of employment, by excluding others from consideration for planning jobs. Moreover, the new planning professionals believed themselves to be chasing after more than an empty promise of employment. Many architects, engineers and surveyors, by 1918-19, felt that a national planning profession was a viable proposition. During the years of the First World War, "... the belief was created among many engineers and surveyors, and other professionals, too, that the post-war period would bring much town planning work."[34] This conviction was not without foundation. In his second report to the Commission of Conservation, in early 1916, Thomas Adams was able to report that only two of the nine provinces, Prince Edward Island and British Columbia, did not have town planning legislation in force.[35] The fact that town planning was now ensconced in the law of the land was of incalculable benefit to the effort to legitimize the new profession. After all, the town planners were now following

the same path used, so successfully, by the medical and legal professions. Besides being a boon to the drive for legitimation, the town planning acts would provide employment opportunities for town planners as a consequence of their implementation. The members of the T.P.I.C. had reason to like their prospects.

All seven provincial statutory instruments were of Adams' own construction and are a measure of the influence which he enjoyed within the planning movement in Canada. He was truly a driving force. Adams contributed a great deal, travelling extensively, speaking to all and sundry, tirelessly promoting the planning ideal. His efforts were well rewarded when public support for the planning of urban expansion not only continued during the war but actually appeared to reach new levels by 1919.[36] Moreover, a profusion of planning activity was already underway by war's end.[37] Toronto, for example, was pursuing the implementation of its City and Suburbs Plans Act, passed in 1912.[38] It was understood that the implementation of these plans would be put off until peace was once more restored, but this did little to dampen enthusiasm. Adams, himself, participated in many of these efforts, usually as a consultant. He was involved when an official plan was drawn up for Halifax, and again when an expansion scheme was produced for St. John. In keeping with the national scope of his work, Adams was consulted on the development of Stanley Park in Vancouver,

as well as judging that city's Civic Centre Competition.[39]
Adams spoke for many when he told the Commission of
Conservation that he felt the war provided a golden
opportunity to do the preparatory planning work for the
reconstruction which lay ahead.[40]

The new planning acts, high level of public support for
planning and the considerable extent to which planning
activity had already commenced, all served to encourage the
conviction that the post-war years would furnish great
opportunities for planners in Canada.

In addition to the belief that employment opportunities
lay just around the corner, a related issue, dissatisfaction
with their own professional associations, prompted many to
join the planning movement and the T.P.I.C. Prior to 1914,
no collective action was undertaken by any of the surveyors'
or engineers' societies.[41] They were too much preoccupied
with concerns of their own. These organizations were, in
any case, largely ineffectual as advocates for their
members. They had had very little success in staving off
the wholesale firings of municipal employees after 1913.
The engineers, for example, were clamouring for a more
militant, national body which would enforce higher pay for
junior men and also help to find jobs for its members.[42] The
growing planning organization, the T.P.I.C., appeared to
offer a more useful alternative.

Further encouragement, for those who looked to the new planning profession as a means of securing employment, was gained from the widespread recruitment of town planners, or, alternatively, the assignment of greater planning responsibilities to bureaucrats trained in the arts of one or another of the three plan-making professions.[43] These were largely provincial appointments and were occasioned by the Federal-Provincial Housing Loan scheme established by the Borden government to stimulate the construction of new housing on Dec. 3, 1918.

The Housing Loan program was ostensibly to provide for low-income housing, another example of Ottawa's compassion for the poor. There can be no doubt, however, that knowledge of the general housing shortage, even more acute now than prior to the war, and of the large number of veterans who were returning to face this shortage along with poor employment prospects, clearly played a role in the decision. The demobilization of a standing army is never a matter of indifference to any government. The revolution of 1917 in Russia was still fresh in everyone's mind, and the Canadian government, in 1918, was about to invade the Soviet Union. The Borden government was clearly aware of Bolshevism and quite alarmed by the prospect of its gaining a foothold in Canada. Moreover, they had good reason to fear the response of labour to the restoration of peace. Having impeded the collective bargaining process, and

carried out various other actions against the working class, the Borden government of "national unity" was faced with extensive labour unrest. Strikes and lockouts had risen to "epidemic proportions" throughout Canada by June 1918, seriously interrupting war production in some areas.[44] Another major concern of workers was postwar economic dislocation. The Boer War had been followed by a severe depression which was still remembered. Besides, returning veterans posed a real threat to trade unions because they would be able to underbid organized workers by the amount of their military pensions. Disabled veterans had already been used to break a strike by Calgary theatre projectionists in early 1916.[45] Poor communication between the state and the labour movement only exacerbated the strained situation. Borden never invited the participation of union leaders in the wartime councils of the nation, although he had the examples of both Britain and the United States to follow.[46] Small wonder then, that there was widespread fear of Bolshevism and a well-organized and militant labour movement. It was hoped that the new housing measure would help to diffuse working class unrest. A good measure of just how strong the fear of labour had become is provided by the following. In 1921, an advertisement of the Cut-To-Fit Buildings Company, of New Westminster, B.C., exhorted the Canadian employer to "... solve his labour troubles by providing proper housing accomodation for his employees."[47]

The ad bore the bold headline, "Kill Bolshevism by Erecting Homes", of Cut-To-Fit manufacture, of course.[48] Here was a company unafraid to promise a big bang for the buck.

In any case, and regardless of how cynical it may have been, the Housing Loan scheme was really the first attempt to apply national standards to planning practice, and as such, was a significant event in the development of the new profession. Nationwide standards conferred a new degree of importance to planning practice, furthered the notion of a unique and specialized body of knowledge which, naturally, could only be entrusted to professionals, and enhanced the stature of the profession by giving it a national scope.

The generation of the Federal-Provincial Housing Loan program had been set in motion when the provinces had asked the federal government for assistance in the area of low-income housing at the federal-provincial premiers' conference in the fall of 1918. In response, the Borden government had made $25,000,000 available to the provinces, to be repaid, at 5% interest, within 20 years. After consultation with the provinces, an Order-in-Council of Feb. 20, 1919, incorporated these standards into the eligibility requirements for the loans. The general planning scheme established by each province was required to include a schedule of minimum standards as to the grouping of houses, a provision for open spaces, and a provision for light and

ventilation. Furthermore, it was strongly recommended that: comparatively large sites should be developed, so that the new houses would be constructed within comprehensively planned subdivisions; the sites should be restricted to residential development and any gain in land values, when a lot was permitted to be used as a store or for some other business purpose, should be appropriated by the municipality; local improvements should be installed before or during construction and not afterward (Calgary had a headstart on this one); at least 10% of the subdivision should be reserved for playgrounds or future public institutions; no residence should face a back lane; and, finally, detailed figures were provided to establish the minimum space to be allowed between houses, as well as setting a maximum height of two and a half stories.[49] The loan scheme was implemented under the War Measures Act but it continued to be in force until 1924. In peacetime, the restriction of provincial jurisdiction which was implicit in imposing standards was justified, as is the case with conditional grants today, with the argument that the federal government has a responsibility to assure that federal funds are well spent.[50] The adventures with uncontrolled overexpansion had surely left their mark. The emphasis of these new planning standards and guidelines was squarely focussed on efficient suburban development.

Opportunity had, indeed, knocked on the door of those Canadians interested in town planning. Their response was to organize themselves as a new, professional group. Led by the world-renowned Thomas Adams, they had begun to be both officially and popularly recognized as experts in their field. Organized and recognized, the new planning professionals were now in a position to make use of their craft, and to begin the shaping of their world.

STANDING ON THE THRESHOLD -OR- ALL DRESSED AND NOWHERE TO GO

Canadian urban planners continued to enjoy success during the 1920s, and by the end of the decade had finally emerged from the wilderness. Rather like David Thompson standing at the headwaters of the Columbia, they were now ready to proceed. The comparison between the members of the young town planning profession and an explorer such as Thompson is not an entirely facetious one. The notion that they were setting out into relatively new territory was quite prevalent among the members of the T.P.I.C. This sentiment was reflected in the enthusiastic optimism of Alfred Buckley, an editor of the Journal of the Town Planning Institute of Canada (T.P.I.C.), when he declared in 1923 that planning was at once a people's movement, a foundation of social reforms, and the friend of business.[1] This unqualified promise, to be all things to all people, shared the same idealistic, naive outlook as that held by the planned utopian communities which had earlier settled in the Canadian Northwest. The planning profession was unquestionably a profession as yet unbowed by defeat; a profession, moreover, which had not suffered the limitation of its options or the circumscription of its ideas. Urban planners in Canada, having organized and achieved recognition, must surely have felt that they were standing on the threshold of achieving success in carrying out their

mission.   As part of the urban reform movement they would
render order   from the urban   chaos around   them and
substantially improve the quality of life enjoyed by their
fellow citizens.   Despite such optimism, however, there is
little question that urban planning in Canada has proven to
be a great disappointment.   There are few who would argue
that during the past 60 years our urban centres have become
the healthy,   well-ordered,   safe places of social justice
foreseen by the pioneers of the profession.   Indeed, N.H.
Lithwick noted in 1970 that, "There appears to be a general
consensus...that the problems of   the urban unit have
multiplied and intensified so greatly as to threaten the
long-term viability of the city as we know it."[2] It could
hardly be said then, that the urban planning profession,
after such a promising beginning,   has made much progress
toward its goals.

There have been of course, a number of factors which have
contributed to the frustration   of the urban planning
movement and,   indeed, to the failure of urban planning
itself.   These obstacles have included lack of resources,
problems of legitimation, difficulties with the state, and
questions of theory.

The lack of sufficient resources with which to pursue
their work has always been a pressing concern for planning
professionals.   After the relative success which they had

begun to enjoy during the late 1920s the Great Depression of the 1930s was a real blow. As the global economy collapsed, so did that of the planners. Opportunities for employment dwindled as urban development was sharply curtailed. Just as in 1913, the services of urban planners were no longer in great demand.

In the United States, federal relief funds kept planning agencies alive, and even created some new ones, as part of Roosevelt's New Deal. Unfortunately, for Canadian planners, neither the Canadian federal government nor its provincial counterparts were quite so forthcoming. No comparable action was taken and, to add insult to injury, the Bennett government even withdrew the small, unofficial subsidy which had been given to support the T.P.I.C. Journal. It ceased publication in 1931, and put an end to the planners' most effective means of communication. This contributed greatly to a burgeoning sense of the hopelessness of their cause.[3]

As late as 1931, planning professionals had still been able to find cause for widespread optimism. A new planning commission had just been installed with the responsibility of executing what would be called a comprehensive regional plan for the greater Vancouver area. This plan included zoning by-laws covering the whole of the expanded area; a major street and transit plan, a continuous parks and parkways system, and a grand scheme for a civic centre. In

what must have been one of its last issues, if not the final one, the T.P.I.C.J. proclaimed in June 1931, that the Vancouver plan "...may well be regarded as a textbook for the province and the Dominion of the aims and purposes of modern planning."[4]

However, by 1932 most Canadian municipalities had assumed strict policies of retrenchment and the last vestiges of such ebullience disappeared. As Walter van Nus has dryly remarked, "As the real value of new residential construction fell by 61% between 1929 and 1933 [constant 1949 dollars],[5] and the value of all building construction even more sharply, planning for future urban growth ceased to be of immediate concern to most local governments."[6]

Insufficient funding for planning in municipal budgets was not entirely new to the 1930s. While it was true that urban planning had been gaining broad acceptance and received encouragement from the new Planning Acts, many of the smaller municipalities had found it difficult to undertake the expenses of planning.[7] In addition, some measure of resistance to planning on the part of all municipalities still remained, a matter which will be discussed more fully later. After 1932, however, even the larger centres found it difficult to carry on planning activity.

The fiscal crisis of the municipalities would be hard to overstate. They held primary responsibility for the relief of unemployment and destitution. In January, 1933 it was estimated that 30.4% of the labour force was unemployed.[8] In Manitoba, rural municipalities were meeting their relief obligations with free one-way tickets to Winnipeg.[9] The municipalities had the most limited and regressive tax structure of all the units of government, a shrinking tax base, declining assessments and collections, and it was not long before the borrowing required to meet relief obligations had placed many cities in serious risk of default.[10] Hundreds of local authorities across Canada became financially insolvent and subject to strict provincial supervision and control; assuming a dependent status themselves.[11]

This finally settled the relationship between the larger municipalities and their respective provinces. Unlike the situation which existed prior to W.W.I., the financial clout of the larger municipalities no longer rivalled those of their provinces. With their new dependent status, the large urban centres were now creatures of the provinces in more than name only.

This dependent role of the municipalities is now taken for granted, but the shift in the provincial-municipal balance of power was important to planners. The province,

and indirectly the federal governement, were now in a
position to exert a much more significant influence on the
selection of planning goals and means, through the use of
such devices as conditional grants. The already difficult
political milieu in which planners were working was now
substantially more complicated. Securing support from one
level of government was often difficult enough, but planners
dealing with more than one jurisdiction would certainly find
it more difficult to obtain the funding required to
implement their plans. The more parties involved in the
decision-making process, the more conditions to be
satisfied; another barrier to solving the planners' problem
of lack of funding.

It has been argued by Gerecke among others, that, "During
the Depression and World War Two Canadian city planning
ceased to exist."[12] The preoccupation with the financing of
unemployment relief greatly diminished interest in town
planning and precipitated the abolition of many planning
commissions and the dismissal of many municipal engineering
and surveying personnel. There was so little work available
for the consultant firms that most of them went out of
business as well.[13] The severe underemployment of planners
led most members of the T.P.I.C. to allow their memberships
to lapse. The Institute had had 110 members in 1921.[14]
There were only 2 members left by the early 1940s. One of
the two remaining members, J.M. Kitchen, who had been the

Honorary Secretary-Treasurer since 1924, kept up the annual payment on its federal charter, in the hopes of better days to come.[15]

Moreover, many of the gains made by the urban planning movement during the 1920s were lost during the Depression. Many municipalities set aside zoning by-laws and subdivision servicing regulations in a desperate attempt to stimulate their local construction industries; the only exceptions being those zoning by-laws which protected existing neighbourhood amenities, and hence property values.[16] In addition, the architects and engineers, the two planning groups hit hardest by the collapse of the construction industry, were not simply dropping out of the T.P.I.C. but were seeking an alternative to it.

The Royal Architectural Institute of Canada and the Engineering Institute of Canada joined with the Trades and Labour Congress, the Canadian Construction Association and many building suppliers associations to found the National Construction Council in February, 1933. The chief function of this new organization was to solicit government aid in the resuscitation of the industry.[17] The urban planning movement was clearly breaking apart. Ironically, the T.P.I.C., which had itself originally attracted members with the offer of opportunities for employment, was now losing members to an alternative organization which promised to do

a better job than the T.P.I.C., at finding jobs for its members. The planning movement was losing both the regulatory and the organizational gains it had made during the last decade. It can be said, therefore, that the effect of the Depression on urban planning was nothing short of devastating.

However, to speak of its complete extinction, as Gerecke does, is something of an overstatement and obscures the fundamental changes which occurred in the practice, and in the nature, of Canadian urban planning during this period. When the revival of planning took place after W.W.II., the regulatory route to achieving planning goals was dominant, the planning profession of the public sector was firmly entrenched within the bureaucracy of the state, and planning initiative had shifted from the public to the private sector.

The use of regulation to control development was not new to the Depression. The same approach had been used since the depression of 1913. Local authorities were unwilling to provide sufficient funding to implement the many comprehensive plans which were created. Planners, looking to establish themselves, readily accepted the notion that some planning was better than no planning at all. However, they continued to strongly advocate the implementation of comprehensive schemes rather than the hodge-podge

development that resulted from the more permissive regulatory approach to development. Ever since the boom of 1896-1913 had ended, planners had been required to follow the largely negative regulatory route, because of the lack of funds available for development schemes of more grandeur. As John C. Weaver has observed, civic boosters could no longer afford to put into effect monumental projects, and by-laws concerning the width of streets, the spacing of buildings and the height of office towers came to represent "...city-beautiful on a shoe-string budget."[18] The major developers of real estate also participated in the regulatory approach through the use of covenants. The large suburban tracts which were laid out during the early years of this century, the 1920s, and after W.W.II, included winding street plans and restrictions on minimum building values. While these covenants created more pleasant surroundings, they also restricted access to them, and were in many cases nothing more than instruments of social and racial segregation.[19]

Urban planning in Canada did not completely disappear during the depression. As van Nus has demonstrated, there were a few significant examples of the implementation of plans which had been drawn up during the 1920s. These generally involved the use of zoning to protect existing neighbourhood amenities, and thus salvage what property values remained to residents.[20] In 1931 St. John realized

that it should have discouraged the excessive subdivision of the 1920s, by forcing developers to provide more of the servicing themselves, and asked the province to approve the city's 1922 plan for future growth, which had included such provisions. There was a little more planning work to found in the Maritimes during the 1930s. Horace Seymour prepared a new Town Planning Act for the province of New Brunswick in 1936; completed the planning of the St. John area in 1937; and prepared a new Town Planning Act for Nova Scotia in 1939. While the province of Quebec continued its disinterest in planning and zoning, the city of Montreal had, by 1937, adopted zoning by-laws for about half its wards. In Toronto, Tracy le May continued his work on traffic planning, particularly the creation of arterial routes through the linking of disconnected streets. The higher income suburbs of Toronto came to rely increasingly on the authority of the Municipal Board, to see that the use of lots acquired from tax defaulters continued to conform with that of the neighbouring properties.

The city of Saskatoon, which had had a planner elected to its city council in 1927, and had come the closest of all Canadian cities to actually employing comprehensive planning, benefitted substantially from the planning done during the late 1920s and early 1930s. At a time when most cities were condemned to spending millions of dollars on relief with no result of lasting benefit, Saskatoon was able

to make its public works projects part of an overall plan, to its ultimate advantage.[21] In contrast, Edmonton, which had never made the application to the Alberta Cabinet, necessary to make its 1930 street plan official, and had never hired the staff necessary to draw up a master plan with which to guide the administration of its zoning by-law, was floundering. In the face of a serious housing shortage, and in its desparation to attract industry, no matter how noxious, even planning by regulation was effectively dropped. The zoning by-law was constantly amended after 1934. Indeed, it was amended 39 times from 1938 to 1945, to allow the wholesale granting of applications made for reclassification. The Zoning Appeal Board granted virtually all of the 75 appeals made to it in 1937.[22] Nevertheless, the practice of zoning, or regulatory planning, did survive the Depression in Edmonton. Although it was very badly battered in the process.

Planning suffered less in the city of Vancouver, during the 1930s, than elsewhere. The city's zoning by-law stabilized property values, and prevented the appearance of mixed use areas. Traffic counts continued to be made every 5 years. The street improvement appropriations made by City Council followed the plan with virtually no exceptions. Moreover, although the civic centre project was not carried out as originally conceived, when the new city hall was built as a depression project, it did retain some of the

imposing effect intended by the designer of the original project.[23]

Planning work did continue, throughout the Depression, in at least a few centres, usually involving the use of zoning. Comprehensive planning, for all practical purposes, had virtually disappeared. The regulatory route to achieving planning goals had unquestionably become the dominant mode of urban planning practice.

Another of the fundamental changes in the practice of urban planning which occurred during the Depression was that the public sector planning professionals became firmly entrenched within the bureacracy of the state. At the very moment when planning commissions, municipal engineering and surveying departments and private planning consultant firms were being decimated, or vanishing altogether, "...the ideals of planning were [being] quietly kept alive within a number of government bureaucracies."[24] Almost every major city in Canada was funding its relief obligations directly through borrowing, or indirectly through the suspension of sinking fund payments by 1934. What made matters worse, as far as city councils were concerned, was the fact that, the civic assets which traditionally accrued as the result of such debt, were not forthcoming.[25] There was, then, very little support for funding separate planning agencies and the like.

However, literally thousands of properties were being forfeited to the cities for non-payment of taxes, and also, in order to lower assessments, the outright destruction of property was widely practiced.[26] There was great concern among remaining property owners that their property values should not suffer, as a result of either the neglect of the now city-owned land, or this new practice, of property demolition. There was, therefore, at one and the same time, support for the planning ideal of maintaining neighbourhood amenities (nee property values) through the planning practice of zoning, but no comparable support for the funding of planning agencies with which to administer such by-laws. This contradiction was solved by attaching these planning responsibilities to existing city departments. The best example of this was Saskatoon, as was demonstrated earlier. Its public works, during the 1930s, were carried out by the various city departments, according to the city plan. In this way, then, the urban planning profession of the public sector became firmly entrenched within the bureaucracy of the state.

Finally, the Depression saw planning initiative shift almost entirely from the public to the private sector. Whereas, during the 1920s, the various provincial Planning Acts had encouraged municipalities to make comprehensive plans for subdivision of suburban tracts, and the improvement of existing areas of development, by the end of

the 1930s, there was very little left to be seen of public
initiative in the process of urban planning.
Municipalities, by that time, had dropped their urban
planning departments, most of their planning professionals,
and even those few meagre standards for development which
had been adopted. Edmonton was prepared to allow noxious
industries to mix with residential areas, for example. In
London, Ontario, the developers of apartment buildings had
soon realized, that even the watered-down version of the
zoning by-law, which that city's Council had adopted in
1927, would cause them difficulty. It would have made spot
zoning for apartment buildings in single-family areas almost
impossible. The apartment building interest's opposition to
the zoning by-law was formidable, and the zoning by-law
itself had never actually been made official by the Ontario
Municipal Board. However, after the fiscal crisis of 1930,
they had little difficulty in having the zoning by-law
replaced with a building by-law, despite the strenuous
opposition of the City Engineer and the Town Planning
Commission's Chairman. The $10,000 and 10 years spent on
developing the city's plan were largely wasted.[27]

As land use and construction restrictions were relaxed in
the attempt to stimulate construction, the covenants drawn
up by developers took on an increasingly important role in
the shaping of urban centres. As a result, "Planning as
reflected in public zoning or in the zoning of covenants

drafted by developers, [has] tended to segregate the city into social and economic fragments.[28] There was very little public control of urban development left by the end of the decade, and the initiative for planning had clearly shifted into the hands of the private sector.

A good illustration of this lack of planning initiative may be found in the public sector's response to the acute housing shortage which occurred during the Depression. It was not just the municipalities which were suffering severe financial hardship, but most of the provinces as well. The heavy reliance upon the personal income tax, which is taken for granted today, was virtually unknown in the 1930s. In Manitoba, for example, the personal income tax furnished only 5.9% of current account revenues in 1931 and 5.6% in 1936, a smaller proportion than the automobile licence fees provided in each year.[29] Deficit financing was generally considered to be far too radical an approach, and as provincial fiscal problems became more acute, the demands for assistance from the Dominion Treasury became increasingly vigorous.[30] Total relief expenditures made through Manitoban municipal-provincial agencies rose 437.5% between 1930 and 1931.[31] A measure of the Bracken government's grievous financial difficulty may be drawn from its vain attempt to slow down the furious pace of urbanization, which, it was felt, contributed greatly to its relief burden. It tried to stem rural depopulation by

encouraging families on relief to resettle the abandoned homesteads and disorganized municipalities. The idea was to provide them with subsidies of from $8-$15 per month, depending upon the size of the family, for up to 12 months, after which the families would, theoretically, be self-supporting.[32] This rather pathetic attempt was doomed to failure. After all, the relief families sent out to the abandoned areas faced the same conditions as those families which they replaced. Although Manitoba's straitened circumstances were among the most severe to be found among any of the provinces during this period, it neverthless provides a representative case of the financial incapacity of the provinces at this time, and of their generally negative approach to urban problems like the housing shortage. Manitoba's response, is indicative of the failure of the provinces to take the initiative, in planning solutions to the problems of their urban centres.

The federal government's response to the shortage of decent housing was no more positive than that of the provinces. Over and above the pressure mounted for aid to the home construction industry, was the clamor for a remedy to the overcrowding and dilapidation of the country's housing stock. During the 1930s, slum clearance became widely advocated, for the first time. It was widely held, that only the national government had the wherewithal with which to finance slum clearance and programmes to build low

income housing.[33] In late 1934, the National Construction
Council joined the RAIC, and many local groups, in an effort
to obtain the financing for such projects from the federal
government.   Sensing its imminent demise in the general
election of 1935, the Bennett government responded with the
Dominion Housing Act of 1935, as part of its effort to
retain power.   It was a disappointment, however, as the Act
only provided for the establishment of an economic council
to study slum clearance, and state aid for the construction
of low-rental housing.[34] It rejected both the provision of
housing grants to the provinces,   which would then be
administered by provincial housing authorities, and direct
grants to local authorities.[35] A $10 million dollar fund was
provided for "pump priming", to get the lending institutions
to put their surplus funds into residential mortgages.
However,   the assistance was directed to individuals or
commercial builders, and not toward the provision of public
housing.

The principle of a housing policy had been accepted, for
the first time, by the Dominion government.   However, the
instruments of that policy were to be the private commercial
lending and finance institutions,   stimulated by federal
incentives.[36] The individual would put up 20% of the
construction costs, the private institutions would lend 60%,
and the federal fund would provide loans for the remainder
to the financing institution. This federal portion was lent

at 3%, and the lending institutions were to pass these funds on to the borrower at an average of not more than 5%.[37] The planning of large-scale housing projects was not encouraged by the Act, and what scattered building did result from its implementation was certainly strongly influenced by the private sector.

The Dominion Housing Act of 1935 was quite ineffective. Very few low-income families could produce their 20% downpayment, and, in any case, the lending institutions had indicated that they were unwilling to lend on a house costing less than $3500. A low-income house was estimated to cost $2700.[38] As of May 31, 1938, only $4.5 million of the $10 million fund had been committed.[39]

Enthusiasm for slum clearance and low-income housing, however, continued to grow. The Dominion Mayors' Conference resolved, in 1936, that the federal government subsidize the elimination of slum conditions and finance low-cost housing.[40] In September, the King government announced that, as part of its new, progressive housing policy, municipalities would be required to provide "adequate zoning and city planning" before any federal aid would be granted to low-cost housing projects.[41] It must have appeared to planners that employment opportunities, and the chance to build low-income housing projects, on a large enough scale to be useful, were looming on the horizon.

They were to be disappointed however. The National
Housing Act of 1938 repealed the 1935 Dominion Housing Act,
but retained many of its principles; most notably the use of
private lending institutions as the means of achieving the
policy's goals. This aspect of federal housing policy, the
use of private lenders as the main instrument of policy, has
remained a fixture of federal housing policy to the present
day.[42] That the planning initiative had shifted from the
public to the private sector, was simply confirmed by the
1938 Act.

Part I of the 1938 Act was aimed at individual families
who wished to own their own homes, and was really an updated
version of the Act of 1935. It did not improve the former
Act's condition of adequate zoning and city planning.

Part II of the N.H.A. 1938 was viewed by Ottawa as an
instrument for dealing with the slums of the major cities.
It placed the onus for the construction of large-scale low-
income housing projects on local authorites. The
municipalities could either act on their own, or, acting
through a limited-dividend housing corporation, enlist the
cooperation of private enterprise.[43] This section of the Act
also failed to set criteria for planning, leaving it to the
municipalities receiving the federal low-interest loans,
through their right, under the Act, to veto any project.
Moreover, the Act made it financially burdensome for

municipalities to support such projects, as they could recover no more than 1% of the cost of the project through property taxes each year, and were also responsible for making up any federal losses which might be incurred. All municipalities were distressed financially, and, as one might expect, no municipality took action under Part II.[44] Another opportunity for public sector planning was lost.

Part III of the N.H.A. 1938 did enjoy some measure of success. The property taxes on low-cost homes, built on inexpensive municipal lots, whose construction started between June 1, 1938 and December 31, 1940, would be subsidized by the Dominion Treasury for the first 3 years, on a diminishing scale.[45] Its aim was to increase employment and provide more low-rental accomodation through the stimulation of the construction industry. The Minister of Finance even went so far as to encourage the relaxation of building by-laws. So much for federal support of urban planning. As van Nus points out, if the government would not improve planning criteria for housing projects, "...it would certainly not insist on city-wide planning to protect the value of new homes on widely scattered lots acquired because of tax arrears."[46]

The new legislation, like the old, made no provision to oblige the lending institutions to make loans, their discretion was to remain sacred and uncompromised. In every

instance, the private sector held the ultimate decision-
making authority concerning which projects would go ahead,
and which would not. Consequently, it also held the
initiative for urban planning.

There was little support for public sector planning among
citizens at the local level. Although pleased to accept the
protection of property values which they believed to be
furnished by the clearance of slums, beleaguered property
owners opposed any municipal subsidy for projects such as
slum clearance and low-income housing. Property tax payers
bitterly protested such plans in Halifax, St. John and
Montreal.[47] In Toronto, where the Lieutenant-Governor's
Committee on Housing Conditions in Toronto had found, in
1934, "...thousands of families living in houses which are
unsanitary, verminous and grossly overcrowded", the vigorous
opposition of the Toronto Property Owners' Association
discouraged any provincial or municipal action.[48] Even the
public health menace, which had fostered so much support for
urban planning among property owners at the turn of the
century, failed to generate any backing for public sector
planning. In Winnipeg, during the same year, the Health
Department's housing survey had so appalled City Council
that they voted $1.5 million towards the solution of the
housing problem, provided Ottawa would classify the project
as a relief measure. A large-scale development for 588 low-
income families was drawn up, but was not carried out. A

smaller, $500,000 programme, which included the rehabilitation of older homes, was rejected by taxpayers in December of the following year. Similar experiences occurred in Edmonton and Vancouver. The demolition of some of the most scandalous slums had taken place in every Canadian city by 1939, but nowhere had the low-rental housing projects, required by the evicted, been constructed.[49]

Lack of funding was a serious obstacle to the development of urban planning during the Depression. At the local level, there was little willingness to support the funding of it. In any case, both the municipalities and the provinces lacked the means to fund the planning effort. Where the means did exist, at the federal level, there was, again, a disinclination to provide the funds required. Due to lack of funds, urban planning in the public sector, even as a part of the relief effort, had just about faded away by the end of the decade. Furthermore, as the public sector's response to the acute housing shortage of the 1930s clearly demonstrates, a shift of planning initiative, from the public to private sector had taken place.

There was one other development which, although a phenomenon of much longer term, became a matter of consequence to planners during the Depression; the further erosion of local autonomy.[50] In a process which began about

the time of the first World War, the municipalities bit by bit, lost much of their independence. The provinces, for example, increased their statutory control over municipal government, through the passage of such legislation as the various town planning acts. In Alberta, by 1929, all planning actions of municipalities required the approval of the provincial Minister of Municipal Affairs. Moreover, the Minister was free to intervene at any time if he felt that planning was not initiated where it ought to be, or if an existing plan was not being correctly administered. In addition to the increase in statutory control, a concomitant tightening of administrative control took place, by both the federal and provincial governments. The province of Manitoba, for instance, appointed the Greater Winnipeg Unemployment Advisory Board during the 1930s to standardize the city's administration of relief and relief schedules. Federal bureaucrats of the Department of Labour also exerted great influence, as they enjoyed such rights as the approval of projects and contracts for public works, the schedules of families assisted under relief settlement agreements, and control of investigation activities and audits. It is interesting to note, as Bettison does, the degree of control considered necessary for local authorities, compared with the relative autonomy allowed the private lending institutions, under the various Housing Acts.[51] The erosion of the local tax base also contributed to the shrinking

ability of the municipalities to innovate or take
independent action. In April 1941, they ceded the right to
levy income taxes to the Dominion, along with the provinces,
as part of the war effort.[52] Over and above this, the
provinces had been eliminating local sales taxes, personal
property taxes, liquor, and motor vehicle taxes. The only
source of revenue of any consequence left to the
municipalities, was the taxation of real property, and some
provinces even imposed restrictions on that.[53] As property
assessments declined during the 1930s, the gap between
municipal revenues and expenditures became larger and
larger. This gap was closed with conditional grants,
federal or provincial, which further compromised the
autonomy of local authorities. Conditional grants, by the
1940s, had become "...an important and seemingly permanent
feature of inter-governmental finance and policy making".[54]
Local autonomy, by the end of the Depression, had been
seriously undermined.

Since the Dominion government was uninterested in setting
planning criteria, the provinces lacked the means to set
them, and the municipalities lacked both the means and the
autonomy to engage in urban planning, it is not surprising
that the initiative for planning shifted from the public to
the private sector; it was virtually defaulted to it.

The shift of planning initiative from the public to the private sector greatly affected the practice of planning in Canada. It marked the final ascendancy of pragmatism as the watchword of practicing professionals. The dispute over the relative merits of aestheticism and pragmatism had not ended, and endures to this day. However, for all intents and purposes, the debate had become an empty one. The public sector, as already noted, was interested in only the most meagre planning, if indeed, it still retained any interest in urban planning at all. The past record of private developers and speculators was one of outright exploitation, the extraction of the maximum profit in the shortest possible time, from their buildings and subdivisions. There was certainly every encouragement for urban planners to practise with pragmatism.

This was not really a dramatic change for most planners. While those members of the profession with backgrounds in architecture, had been somewhat more inclined to consider the aesthetic aspects of urban plans than their brethren from the engineers and surveyors, the profession as a whole had always found it prudent to stress the increased efficiency to be gained from planning in the promotion of their cause. Although a number of large comprehensive plans had been created, few were ever actually implemented, as evidenced by the examples of St. John, London and the Bartholomew Plan for Vancouver.

As early as 1912 C.W. Hayler had made it clear that the basic aim of applied science, to increase efficiency and economy, should also be the motivating force behind city planning.[55] This attitude was reiterated by Thomas Adams in 1919 and by A.E.K. Bunnell in September, 1923, "Good city planning is not primarily a matter of aesthetics, but of economics. Its basic principle is to increase the working efficiency of the city."[56]

The planners well understood, from the beginning, that if they were to enjoy any longevity as a profession they would have to appeal to the most powerful elements at the local level and they understood their audience well. In promising to allow for the most efficient land use and, through the intelligent forecasting of future community needs, a dramatic reduction in "...the costly replacement of water and sewage pipes and the continual widening of streets and bridges necessitated by the uncontrolled intensification of land use," planners at once appealed to: local producers, whose costs would be reduced; local politicians, who would obtain the gratitude of every community for the diminution of the expense of public works; and, finally, local property owners, who would be thankful for any tax relief they could get.[57] In British Columbia, for example, the support of the local business communities of Vancouver and Victoria was critical in obtaining amendments to the Municipal Act in 1925, which granted new zoning powers to municipalities.

The Vancouver Branch of the T.P.I.C. and the Real Estate Exchange had cooperated since 1922. Zoning protected property values. Nevertheless, even the Institute's Journal, a long-time antagonist to speculative real estate interests, allowed that, "...without their co-operation, that Act would have been delayed for years."[58] The T.P.I.C., apparently, felt no need to draw similar attention to the good effect to which their own appeal to efficiency and pragmatism had played to their selected audience.

In any case, pragmatism, inspired largely by the lack of resources made available to urban planners, and their desire to encourage support within the community, expressed itself through the medium of regulation. The regulatory route was permissive, and therefore largely negative, when compared to the more positive, comprehensive approach which might have been taken, had urban planners found more political will, and received more support for the public interest in the public sector. The one contribution made by the federal government toward the development of Canadian urban planning during the whole of the 1930s was the model zoning by-law developed by the National Research Council in 1939.[59] Urban planning under the aegis of all provincial Planning Acts was concerned primarily with subdivision regulation and zoning by-laws. Even in Alberta, where architectural control had been consigned to the municipalities, zoning by-laws were adopted, rather than more comprehensive schemes.[60] Indeed,

this was the course of action taken by Canadian
municipaliteis generally. A further consequence of this
permissive approach, was that planners were forced to rely
on their personal contacts with developers, as well as
statutory controls, in their efforts to achieve planning
goals which were in the public interest.[61] This, in turn,
only strengthened the influence over planning initiatives by
those in the private sphere.

These four factors,insufficient funding, pragmatism,
permissive control through regulation, and the loss of
initiative to the private sector, continued to foster each
other, and obstruct the urban planning movement after 1945,
and indeed, still present problems to planners today.

Urban planning had been dealt a serious blow by the
fiscal crisis of the 1930s. Fundamental changes had
occurred in both the conditions, and the nature, of planning
practice. The pragmatism of the planning profession had
been reinforced, and the initiative for urban planning had
been lost to the private sector. They had survived, largely
within the nooks and crannies of the state bureaucracy, and
lost a large measure of the profession's autonomy as a
result, but they had survived. This was no small feat,
given the duration, and the severity, of the fiscal crisis
which the nascent profession had faced. Urban planners had
been ready to launch themselves onto the floor of

professional society, but found the ball suddenly cancelled. They were all dressed up, with nowhere to go. They had endured the unendurable for nearly a decade, and, like the intrepid Thompson, they were still ready to proceed, whenever times got better.

POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION —OR— WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

As the post-war era began, the urban planning profession was once more filled with optimism. Like the explorer, David Thompson, the discipline was ready to chart new territory. The severe economic retrenchment of the 1930s had left a huge backlog of deferred public works.[1] All construction projects, which were not directly related to the war effort, had been deferred since 1942.[2] Moreover, the rapid expansion of industrial employment which occurred during the war, had also meant the rapid growth of many urban centres.[3] The opportunities for Canadian planners, seeking to practise, seemed to have increased as well. Their happy confidence was to prove misplaced, however.

While it was true that the demand for planners during the late 1940s was strong, many local authorities established planning commissions or boards during the war, the jobs were filled by planners imported from elsewhere, mostly the United Kingdom. As Anthony Adamson described it, "...the British take-over of planning in the forties was massive."[4] The T.P.I.C., after all, was but a wraith by the end of the war. It has been estimated that in 1949, there were only 45 people engaged in planning; 20 on large city staffs, 10 on provincial staffs and 15 private consultants.[5] Most Canadian planners had had to find other pursuits during the 1930-1945 period, and were not quick to return to the field. The

T.P.I.C. was reactivated in 1951.[6] However, in 1964, it was still said, that of the 300 members of the T.P.I.C., 60% were "imported", mostly from the U.K.[7] In any case, the demand for urban planners remained strong as the membership of the T.P.I.C., now the Canadian Institute of Planners (C.I.P.), has grown steadily over the years: about 870 members in July, 1970[8]; 1375 members in 1975[9]; 2300 practising Canadian planners in 1978[10]; and 3169 members according to the C.I.P.'s 1987 Annual Report.[11] There is no doubt that there were a great many positions to be filled. As early as 1954, 75% of Canadian cities with a population greater than 25,000 had some kind of planning board in place.[12]

Nevertheless, the planners of the post-war era have still had to face the same problems which confounded their predecessors. Just prior to war's end, the federal government passed the 1944 National Housing Act which largely consolidated the various pieces of existing legislation. However, it still relied on the private lending institutions to provide the necessary funds for diverse projects. The only new principle, of any significance, was the prominence afforded city and community planning, as part of developmental policy.[13] The federal government was to provide grants directly to municipalities for the clearance of slums. New housing projects had to be built in conjunction with a community plan, thus obliging

local authorities to develop official urban plans.
Additionally, the Minister of Finance, still responsible for
the administration of the N.H.A., would not approve any
investment until the project was in accordance with "...an
official community plan satisfactory to the minister."[14] The
paradox remained, urban planning was being encouraged,
though not funded, and local autonomy was still being
undermined.

It soon became clear that the federal government's
dominant position in the areas of housing and urban affairs,
resulting from the 1944 N.H.A., rendered impossible its
administration, as a branch of the Department of Finance.
Consequently, the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation
(C.M.H.C.) was created in late 1945, to act for the Minister
in the administration of the Act.[15] The lending policies of
the C.M.H.C. "...literally created a Canadian house-building
industry...", increasing the number of houses financed under
the scheme from 12,000 in 1946 to 65,000 in 1955.[16] However,
little planning actually accompanied this rapid growth, in
spite of the 1944 N.H.A., and cities were allowed to sprawl
into formless suburbs.[17] During the 1950s, the orientation
of the C.M.H.C. was redirected toward the urban renewal
aspect of the Act. Three major projects were undertaken in
Toronto, Montreal and Halifax, but they met with limited
success. The revitalization of the urban centres failed to
materialize, and the low-income residents were simply left,
segregated in their public housing ghettos.[18]

The C.M.H.C. had been given an other task. It was required "...to cause steps to be taken for the distribution of information leading to ...the understanding and adoption of community plans in Canada."[19] As a result, it joined with the Royal Architectural Institute, and the Engineering Institute, in founding the Community Planning Association of Canada (C.P.A.C.) in 1946. This was to be a popular agency, not a professional one, and its purpose was to inform the Canadian public of the benefits to be derived from community planning.

The professionals soon founded their own organization, the Institute of Professional Town Planners, in Ontario in 1947. This was not a national body, however, and soon disbanded to join the reactivated T.P.I.C., in 1952, partly in order to obtain funds from the C.M.H.C.., which would not fund the more parochial I.P.T.P.[20] The C.M.H.C. remains one of the most important instruments of federal urban policy today.

Another notable development during the 1950s, was the institutionalization of urban planning into formal departments of municipal government. Indeed, Gerecke has described this event as the most significant change of this period.[21] The replacement of the old, supposedly apolitical, system of planning commissions and boards, with civic departments, brought the practice of urban planning under

direct political control. In 1950, 6 municipalities had local planning departments, in 1960, there were 30 such departments, and by 1977, all Canadian cities with populations in excess of 10,000 had planning departments.[22] The institutionalization of urban planning in municipal departments, further diminished the independence of planners, and constrained their capacity for innovative practice within the public sector. This development merely advanced the shift of initiative toward the private domain.

LACK OF RESOURCES

Insufficient funding has continued to be a matter of great concern to Canadian planners in the post-war era. In 1962, the T.P.I.C. published its submission to the R.A.I.C.'s inquiry into the residential environment, in its journal "Plan Canada". One of the fundamental obstacles to the successful improvement of the residential environment, cited by the brief, was the lack of money available for the compensation of land owners. This prevented the expropriaton and assemblage of large parcels of land, and interfered with the execution of comprehensive planning. The shortage of funds allowed for only the most rudimentary planning control.[23]

Planners had encountered the frustration of small budgets early on in this period. In 1949, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta had all set up provincial town planning services, but the appropriations had been very small; in Ontario, for example, the planning service had been allocated a mere $32,545. Planners found that they were not able to do much, with such small resources.[24]

There seems to have been less dissatisfaction with funding during the early 1970s, but this was short lived.[25] In the editorial to the June, 1977 issue of "Plan", M.A. Qadeer noted government retrenchment, and decried its limiting effect on the development of planning.[26] The Bureau of Municipal Research noted that, in Ontario at least, "...prudent spending and the paring of budgets", had become the by-words for all council activities, including planning, from about 1975 on.[27]

The depression of the early 1980s made its mark on planners as well. In the spring of March 1983, Reg Lang remarked that times were especially hard. Municipal governments were economically stressed, and all levels of government were cutting back on developments and hirings. Even the private sector was troubled, as it was rumoured that one of the large consulting firms had laid off 400 planners.[28] In his keynote address to the 1982 National Convention of the C.I.P., N. Harvey Lithwick cited money, as the number one issue confronting planners. He declared that planners must fight for a greater share of the fiscal resources of the state, and resist the erosion of the resources needed to conduct planning activities, which was being encouraged by the anti-planning and anti-intervention ideology of neo-conservatism.[29]

In the face of continued funding deficiencies in the post-war period, planners continued to be pragmatic in their practice. In 1940, Horace Seymour, a founding member of the planning profession in this country, had noted an increasing recognition that town planning "...is fundamentally economic," and that urban planning was an essential way of reducing the tax levy, and of obtaining more essential services for the tax dollar.[30] In 1959, in the very first issue of "Plan", A. Benjamin Handler acknowledged the need for Master plans to be "flexible".[31] The close connection between funding and pragmatism was recognized by John Dakin in 1961, "Planning...must not consist only of plans to be carried out; it must also indicate that means for carrying them out are within reach."[32] Planners suffered from no illusions as to what the character of their practice was expected to be. It was to be pragmatic. The Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs for B.C. noted, in their professional journal, that planners sometimes tended to be too visionary. This excess vision "...implies that there is some weakness in the advice being offered by planners, which means in turn that there are some factors that planners are overlooking when offering their advice."[33]

During the late 1960s, urban planners, who had always placed more emphasis on design, began to include more "social" planning in their practice. Urban planning had always planned for social objectives, but had routinely neglected certain objectives, or pursued them through changes in the physical environment.[34] One might interpret this more deliberate inclusion of "social" objectives in planning practice as being indicative of a higher social conscience among planners, or, at the very least, a less pragmatic approach. This was not the case, however. As the planners recognized themselves, this was still part of their long-time pragmatic practice. They were simply changing their product to suit the changing demand for their services. The urban planning profession faced the prospect

of a dwindling number of jobs and contracts if their practice didn't change. They faced the loss of government funding, and the prospect of other professions "horning in" on their territory.[35] Planners' lack of autonomy, in the definition of their practice, was expressed by Guttenberg, in 1968. Whether on the job, and bureaucratically acountable, or off the job, and competing for government funds with members of other professions, the planner, "...appears to be more controlled than controlling, a fact which contrasts oddly with his public image as initiator and innovator."[36] A year later, planners were being cautioned not to give way entirely to such techniques as Systems Analysis, in attempts to minimize costs. Ideas, or vision, were still important and should not be discarded.[37] In a summer 1969 editorial, N.H. Richardson called for the inclusion of the "social" in planning, "We persist...in thinking of a city in terms of things, when we ought to think of it in terms of people...".[38] In 1971, W.T. Perks began to call for the rejection of the unwieldy, inflexible Master Plans, which turned planners into planning policemen. Urban planning was an art, not a science, and planning was becoming a "process".[39] How flexible, and pragmatic, can one get?

Nevertheless, by the end of the prosperous 1970s, the mood of restraint, and old-time pragmatism, had returned to the public sector. A shift was discernible, by 1977, from the goals-oriented regional planning process of the decade, to a more limited, hard-nosed economic approach.[40] The role of planning policemen, that is, the administration of subdivision control and zoning by-laws, was not to be lost so easily. Pragmatism, no matter what the product, remains a hallmark of the urban planning profession.

The control of urban planning initiative, which so completely shifted to the private sector during the Depression, has never been relinquished. It remains there today.

In 1960, Gordon Stephenson observed that the demand for urban planners emanating from private industry and commercial enterprise had increased substantially.[41] The private sector was clearly exercising its advantageous position. The results of such action were denounced in a March 1967 editorial of Plan. N.H. Richardson complained that planners were "...still destroying the scanty architectural heritage bequeathed us, still erecting massive anonymous structures designed by the dollar, still allowing our city centres to be ruled by the automobile."[42]

Qadeer noted, 10 years later, that the public sector was actually shrinking due to the retrenchment of public programs.[43] However, the extent of private control over

planning initiative was more clearly demonstrated by Jean Cimon, who cited the examples of York, a borough of metropolitan Toronto, and Halifax. The former could possibly break even, over the long-term, with respect to the tax revenues received from newly constructed apartment towers and the services provided to the development. Halifax stood to lose $200,000, because of new "development" downtown.[44] Another example of the private sector's influence during this period, is provided by Ontario's Comay Commission. It conducted the first review, in 30 years, of the Ontario Planning Act 1946. The investigation was almost entirely instigated by developers' complaints of delays and red tape.[45] One of the key recommendations of the Comay Report was that the burden for demonstrating the need for planning intervention, should rest with the public rather than the developers. The negative, permissive approach to urban planning had not died. The Commission also recommended that the Ontario Municipal Board be, effectively, neutralized, and that final planning decisions be made by municipal councils or the Minister of Housing. The drive for the institutionalization of urban planning was still alive as well. Finally, the Comay Report suggested that greater responsibility and decision-making authority be granted to the municipalities.[46] This was not a chance to recapture a greater degree of local autonomy; the municipalities weren't going to receive a higher level of funding, commensurate with these responsibilities. The effect of this last recommendation, would be to place local authorities at the mercy of developers, who would be able to play one municipality off against another, as developers employed the strategy of divide and conquer, to their advantage. As Narasim Katary observed, "Municipal autonomy has more advantages for the real estate industry than for the public at large."[47]

In the 1980s, Canadian urban planners have continued to complain about the private sector's control over initiative. In June 1981, Anne Beaumount noted that the traditional planning approach views the government's role as one of reaction to private sector initiatives, and of placing limits on development, based on factors such as environmental capability and the public sector's ability to pay the costs of development.[48] Perhaps the best example of the private sector's continuing control over planning initiative, was the Campeau Corporation's 1984 $2,000,000 buy-out of opposition to their Scotia Plaza development in downtown Toronto.[49] The density of the development was twice that allowed by the urban plan. In return for a $2,000,000 donation to the Co-operative Housing Federation of Toronto, for the building of low-cost housing, a coalition of N.D.P. aldermen, and other opponents of the Campeau development, agreed to withdraw their appeal. The Scotia Plaza was a $400,000,000 development. So, for a surcharge of 0.5%, the

developer was able to virtually ignore the public sector's planning effort. This serves as a very powerful example of the private sector's continuing control over urban planning initiative, and the public sector's ineffective role as passive reactor, to urban development which has already occurred. In this sense, the practice of urban planning has not progressed much from the days of uncontrolled urban development of the late 19th century. Urban planners have never really managed to acquire the resource base necessary for them to advance their practice, beyond a rudimentary, largely negative, permissive level. The lack of sufficient resources has been an obstacle to both the urban planning movement and the urban planning profession.

LEGITIMATION

Urban planning has also suffered from a failure to legitimize its role in controlling urban development. This is reflected in its incremental legislative history. In part becase of the permissive, regulatory approach, which urban planners have been forced to accept, and, in part, because of planners' inability to convince others of the need to use a more positive, comprehensive strategy, the legislative authority for urban planning has been bestowed, in a piecemeal fashion, over the years. Ontario's Planning Act 1946, for example, "...had been amended almost every year and had had various new powers and responsibilities grafted onto it, all without any overall organic plan," by the time it was examined after about 20 years of service.[50] The result of this ad hoc approach to legislation was that a fairly simple statute became "...a very complex set of legislative provisions, spawning in the process an impressive body of case law."[51] In consequence of such legislation, conflicts occurred between official plans, for example, under the authority of the Planning Act, and zoning by-laws, which were enacted under the Municipal Act. This problem of conflicting legislation is still considered to be a serious problem today.[52] The experience of Ontario is representative of the other provinces. Given such conditions, it is not surprising that planning practice, at least in the public sector, became administrative and bureaucratic, evolving cumulatively on the basis of precedents, which were only occasionally established deliberately to direct future development. Planning in the public sector, made manifest by its incremental legislation, was a "policy no-man's land".[53] The fragmentation of planning authority did little to convince others of the planners' right to legitimately claim a unique area of expertise.

Another legitimation problem which urban planners have had, at least since the early days of the urban reform movement, has been their failure to attract mass support for their activities. This failure to justify their cause in the eyes of the public, has largely been seen by the planning profession to be the result of poor communication, and/or the failure to educate society at large as to the benefits to be derived from planning. Mass support would have been a very useful tool in the planners' struggle for sufficient funding, for example.

This lack of success with the public's affection, was noted in "Plan" in the early 1960s, as was the need to communicate more effectively, and educate the public in order to gain its support.[54] Public support was seen to be crucial to the success of any urban plan, and, as was stated earlier, the Community Planning Associaiton was the group expected to foster a supportive attitude among the public.[55] E.T. Rashliegh, in 1962, felt that the difficulty experienced in gaining support for planning was due to the following, dated, factors: the traditional attitude that land was a limitless, forgiving commodity; an uneducated public; an increase in the social value placed on land ownership; the limited responsibility of municipalities; and, finally, individualism.[56] The T.P.I.C. acknowedged that, "The development of a planning system is often seen as a fundamental attack on a basic right [to own land]".[57] The failure of planners to communicate with the public, and the public's resulting apathy and mistrust, was noted by Carver in 1967. He observed that planners and planning bodies were too secretive about their intentions because they feared interference from real estate speculators.[58] Perhaps they feared interference from the public as well.

The planning profession continued to note the need for increased public support during the 1970s. Gertler hoped that the heightened public awarness of the environment might be expanded, to include the community and the urban environment.[59] Alan Gummo reiterated the need to improve communication when he advocated, in 1976, the democratization of the decision-making process, the alleviation of bad feelings, and the encouragement of constructive involvment in community affairs. Otherwise, urban reforms, then undertaken, would "...prove to be so much spitting into the wind."[60] The Bureau of Municipal Research also remarked on the high level of public apathy toward planning, in its report on the Comay Commission. It noted that "...there [had] been scant media attention and no widespread discussion" of urban planning generated by the Commission's report.[61] Jackie Wolfe observed in March, 1979, that an adverse effect on public receptivity to particular programs should be expected, if public participation was to simply be ritual. The public would see that they were not a

part of the decision-making process, and disillusionment and apathy were sure to follow.[62] The failure to secure mass support for urban planning among the public, has contributed to the difficulty experienced by the urban planning profession in realizing the legitimation of their cause.

One of the chief obstacles to the planning profession's achievement of legitimate status was their tremendous difficulty in establishing a unique area of expertise. Planning is, after all, endemic to all human activity.

Nevertheless, planners have spent much time and effort in an attempt to convince themselves and others, that they do, in fact, possess a unique area of expertise, and that planning is a separate and distinct profession, with its own body of knowledge.[63] The problem was certainly well understood, the very first editorial of Plan, and a subsequent article the following year, emphasized the past record of urban planners in Canada, with a view to establishing a professional track record and, consequently, their claim to a professional territory.[64] As John Dakin wrote in December, 1961, if the planner "... is a generalist, on what does his status depend in a society which is increasingly using expertness as the criterion of status determination? Specialised [sic] knowledge-skill is the basis of the professional man's status in our society."[65] Putting Dakin's sexism aside, he was pointing to the very nub of the problem for planners. Drawn from various design professions, with diverse backgrounds, the function of urban planners was to put together the various components of a plan in order to achieve a desired result. In this case, the generalist was at a distinct advantage. There is no doubt the Canadian planners were feeling the heat with respect to competition from other disciplines of expertise. At one conference on urban problems in the early 1960s, specialists from other disciplines were asked to prepare papers, and, even more galling, kept calling for urban planning as though it were a new idea; "This suggestion of novelty is disconcerting."[66] Dakin tried to solve this generalist/specialist difficulty by offering the definition of the planner as, "the specialist in co-ordination."[67] Gertler proffered that planning was a separate discipline, straddling a number of related fields, but was, "...unique as a synthesis leading to the techniques for shaping the physical environment."[68] They were beginning to sound more like liberal arts graduates all the time. In his 1964 Presidential Address, Humphrey Carver, the godfather of Canadian urban planning, wanted to stake out urban design for the profession, in order to avoid becoming "planning policemen" and administrators.[69] He didn't realize that it was, for the most part, already too late. Zoning, the most important tool of municipal planning at the time, had been studied twice in 1960, and again in 1965, but by

the R.A.I.C., not the T.P.I.C. It was also noted that most big city projects, like Kitimat or Brasilia, were being planned by architects, often through competitions judged by architects. The role of professional planners was highly uncertain in the general scheme of things, and neither the public, nor the other professions were sure what special expertise planners had.[70] N.H. Richardson wrote that, "...the way is open to a drastic, difficult, probably never-ending, but perhaps extremely rewarding reformulation of what we mean by 'planning'," thus neatly side-stepping the problem of definition. His solution was simply to claim the planning territory for planners, by identifying all those engaged in planning of any sort, "planners", and making them members of the T.P.I.C.; planning is planning. Useless, but easy to remember.

The urban planning profession has never really been able to satisfactorily define their unique area of expertise. In the 1970s, P.J. Smith claimed the moral high ground for the profession, by stating that urban planners were the only professional group with "...professional commitment to recognize and protect the public interest in the totality of community development."[71] W.T. Perks suggested in 1971 that planners give up trying to characterize their practice as "professional", and substitute "managerial" instead, because of the poly-disciplinary roles of planners and the inter-disciplinary nature of their practice.[72] Towards the end of the decade urban planning practice began to expand to include new areas of interest, such as area-wide housing policies, employment programs, industrial development programs, and programs for the delivery of public facilities and services. The emphasis on design was beginning to give way to greater attention to the social aspects of the urban environment. M.A. Qadeer defined urban planning as, "...the process of guiding the development of an area in accordance with the public interest, and inhabitants needs and aspirations."[73] To Smith's public interest, the needs and aspirations of those affected by the plan, had now been added. This also marked the beginning of a more comprehensive outlook for planners, and an attempt to break away from the administrative box which had created Carver's planning policemen. Unfortunately for planners, as Qadeer noted, the change was more evident in theory than in practice.[74]

The trend to expand and become more flexible continued in the 1980s. As the view of the urban environment became more complex, the linkages of planners with other professions, and other groups in society would become more numerous. Different skills, techniques and theories would be needed as situations developed and changed. Consequently, the planners must be prepared to work at problem-solving in collaboration with others; less territorial imperative and

more team play.[75] The attempt to stake out a unique area of expertise now seemed to be less important. Matthew Kiernan described urban planning practice in 1982 as pseudo-professionalism.[76] N.H. Richardson, however, was still consistent, although in a new language. The planning profession, in 1985, had a serious responsibility "...to move from its traditional preoccupation with the urban fabric to the development of policies for dealing with the inter-related area-specific consequences of nation-wide economic, demographic and technological change."[77] Planning was still planning. Perhaps Hans Blumenfeld delivered the definitive statement on the matter, in April of this year, when he declared, "Ain't no such thing as a planner."[78] Now, that's difficulty in establishing a unique area of expertise. The failure to establish a unique area of expertise greatly hindered the urban planning profession's attempt to achieve legitimation.

Similarly, the planning profession's drive for legitimation suffered from a lack of cohesion among its members. As Howell S. Baum has pointed out, professionalization is a political process. In order to achieve hegemony over a particular area of expertise, a group of experts must first develop a shared-consciousness of themselves as practitioners, doing similar work and having common interests. Only then can they set about the task of persuading others that their professional knowledge is specialized, substantial, reliable and important and, further, that their advice should be accepted.[79] The historical extension of planning however, has had paradoxical effects. Among some, it has prompted concern about the delineation of the area of practice belonging to planners. Among others, however, it has made it increasingly difficult to develop a professional consciousness, based on a clear perception of the central tenets of planning. Page and Lang found no consensus among planners with respect to either the central components of their work, or, the distinctions between their work and that of other professions.[80]

One obvious reason for this diversity among members is the diversity of their origins. In the beginnning, they were drawn from the 3 planning professions, the design professions. However, by 1960, the profession was recruiting more of its members from the social sciences, particularly through the various planning schools which had, by then, been established.[81] A group drawn from such diverse origins would seem bound to have diverse interests.

One of the ways in which this diversity manifested itself was in the fragmentation of the profession during the 1960s. As the number of planners grew, many formed provincial associations, independent of the T.P.I.C., which had always

viewed itself as the central, national body for all planners. This fragmentation of the membership of the profession was considered a real crisis by many.[82] Among those professionals remaining in the T.P.I.C., there was "...unmistakable and widespread discontent", by 1968. Members complained that the Institute was not doing enough for them as individuals; that it failed to confront fundamental issues; that it was not sufficiently concerned with immediate practical matters, and that it was preoccupied with internal affairs. Richardson, in defence of the Institute, noted that only once, in the 10 years of publication of "Plan", had the journal received an unsolicited, written comment on any editorial dealing with either the profession or the Institute.[83] Lack of cohesion would seem to be something of an understatement, in this case.

This situation continued. In July, 1973, the editor of Plan remarked that, although the journal had not been published for nearly a year, due to lack of funds, no one seemed to have noticed or cared.[84] A palace coup took place a year later, when a group of T.P.I.C. members took over the journal and tried to put it on a more respectable footing, with regular publication, refereed articles, and in general, a higher degree of polish.[85] In 1977, Reg Lang and Audrey Armour commented on the diversity among the membership noting, "We don't share effectively what we know, do, and learn."[86] The Comay Commission found "...no common agreement [among planners] on what the [planning] system was for, how it operated, or what changes were required."[87]

In the early 1980s, a C.I.P. Task Force found no consensus on the issues which the Institute should confront, massive indifference toward the Institute on the part of its members, and loose and ambiguous membership requirements.[88] In their March, 1985 editorial, Michael Cleland and John Curry summed it all up very nicely when they observed that, while "Plan" was the "principal voice" of Canadian planners, and a "window" on the profession; "The essential problem which had bedevilled [it], and one that reflects the profession as a whole, is the extraordinary diversity of its audience." An audience consisting of a broad range of subspecializations, living in various regions, some of whom wanted an academic journal, and some of whom wanted a professional journal for practitioners.[89]

Such a confused, diverse membership undermined the profession's ability to present a united, cohesive front to the public and to the planning decision-makers. The resulting lack of credibility damaged urban planners' hopes for the legitimation of their profession.

Given the profession's difficulty in establishing a unique area of expertise, and the diverse interests and origins of its members, it is not altogether surprising to discover great uncertainty with respect to the urban planner's proper role in the planning process. This confusion is certainly reflected in the professional literature. No fewer than seven different roles are proposed for professionals to follow.

The most widely held conception has also been around the longest; that of the planner as co-ordinator. In 1962, the T.P.I.C. described this role as the overall supervision and management of the work of all the design professions involved in a particular project; "The planner is the specialist in co-ordination..." of the design team.[90] This view was endorsed by L. O. Gertler in an editorial in November 1964, advocating that planners act as co-ordinators, creating a workable synthesis from the interdisciplinary approach to planning.[91] Carver called for more integration and the blending together of the various elements of a city into more dynamic and lively compositions in his Presidential Address of that year.[92] In September, 1984, Ron Cope, a planner of the City of Saskatoon, still described the role of his profession as that of the co-ordinator, collaborating and co-operating with private developers, among others, to achieve good results.[93]

A similar role identified by others, but concentrating more on the co-ordination of planning design, is that of mediator.[94] The proponents of this role emphasize the building of consensus among the public, planners and decision-makers. First mentioned in the 1960s, it seemed to gain more acceptance during the 1970s.[95] Interestingly enough, however, by 1977, Qadeer had narrowed the mediation process to include only the public interest and the public.[96] Clearly, the planner identifies with the local authority in this view, but is still seen to mediate between the decision-makers and the public, despite this more clearly political position.

The leadership role was clearly stated in 1966 by Robert L. Williams, who declared that, "The effective planner has a point of view and he skilfully markets his view point."[97] The planner was a leader and was to coordinate community forces in a selected direction.

N.H. Richardson was aware of the profession's gatekeeper role. Canadian planners were expected to provide "useful ideas" and information to the governments and people they served. Planners were to be the source of disinterested advice.[98]

Another idea of the role of the urban planner was that of advocate. Planners were to act on behalf of the public and their communities, which were being overwhelmed by the machinations of government and the public interest. This populist concept was expressed by Eugene Van Cleef in 1966, "It therefore becomes incumbent on planners to learn first what the people's objectives are and then to draw up designs which will serve these purposes."[99] Lawrence Haworth concurred, when, in 1970, he suggested that planners had put the cart before the horse. The problem was not to decide what people ought to do, and then design the environment which would induce such behaviour. Rather, it was to identify those features of the urban environment which were obstacles to community goals and draw plans to remove the impediments.[100]

In 1975, Gerald Hodge observed another notion of the planner's role which he found to be prevalent among regional planners in particular. He called it "colonialist"; imperialist would have served as well. He was referring to the likelihood that planners would forget the people of other areas, who are indirectly affected by planning work elsewhere. Hodge used the example of the people of James Bay, who experienced the flooding of the La Grande River, in order to air-condition the City of Montreal.[101] City planning is not an isolated activity.

The seventh role, that of the administrator, or "planning policeman" as Carver would have put it, was suggested in 1981 by Ray Spaxman, the director of planning for the City of Vancouver. He identified the primary client of the urban planner as being the planner's City Council, which in turn means the endless enforcement of city planning by-laws and zoning restrictions.[102]

Finally, it should be noted that the debate over the planner's role continues, this in spite of Anthony Adamson's 1973 admonition that, "There is no definition of a planner possible today,"[103] and Blumenfeld's warning of this year, that no such thing as a planner exists.[104]

Much of the confusion surrounding the urban planner's role arises from the tension which exists between urban planning as a social movement and urban planning as an activity of government. As discussed earlier, by the end of the 1930s urban planning had become firmly ensconced within the apparatus of the state. Urban planners either worked in the private sector as consultants for developers or were taking their place in the bureaucracies of the three levels of government. Urban planning, by the late 1950s, was no longer part of a larger movement for urban reform. It was now an activity of government and there was no question of a return to its earlier, more independent status.

Nevertheless, the planning profession's more socially conscious past, the legacy of the urban reform movement, remained as a prick to the conscience of those practising in the post-war era. The tension betwen planning as a social movement and planning as an activity of government remained in the minds of its practitioners.

In 1959, the opening editorial of "Plan" still described urban planning as a universal social principle. [105] Zides acknowledged, in the next issue, that planning had become "... part and parcel of governmental activity...", and that planners had lost much of their autonomy as a result.[106] This view was corroborated by Rashliegh in 1962, "...the planning profession as a group in Canada has tacitly pursued a policy of not taking a public stand on issues."[107]

J.T. Brown, however, drew attention to the complaint that planners "want to play God" and reminded his colleagues that "...when one is acting in an advisory capacity he has to forgo [sic] the crusading role."[108] Richardson's editorial, in the December 1965 issue, remarked that town planning had come of age and was "...no longer...a cause to be struggled for by socially conscious amateurs."[109] Then, in April 1966, in another editorial, he complained of complacency among his colleagues and of the profession joining the establishment; there still being much to do in the way of urban reform.[110] Ambivalence could be found even within the minds of individuals of the profession.

In July 1966, Van Cleef urged planners not to lose the idealism of the past and observed that planners were often in conflict with City Councils which were "...all too often obstacles to planning."[111] In 1970, P.J. Smith wrote that planners must choose between two roles. The technocrat, who gives advice on demand in reference to particular problems, or, the more positive role of the political animal, who has a greater influence on the decision-making process of planning. Smith's solution to this dilemma was advocacy planning:

> "We would no longer be torn by the uncertainty of knowing whom we serve, particularly those government planners who believe that they have a responsibility to the whole community but know that they are subject to an institutional employer whose administrative goals may conflict markedly with those of the community outside."[112]

In Smith's view the reformist tradition of the past could thus survive in the administrative ethic of the present.

Seven years later M. A. Qadeer was less optimistic about this approach, "Tempted by regulatory powers and confronted with continual market pressures, urban planners often content themselves by assuming that if properties are cared for, people's well-being will follow suit."[113] Thus, the provision of a school site and a swimming pool in an official plan, is taken to be an expression of urban planning's educational and recreational objectives. Social conscience through design. Qadeer urged planners to become more socially aware, and to consider operational and organizational elements as well, in what he referred to as the practice of social planning.[114] In 1982, Kiernan offered much the same advice, suggesting that the tension could be eliminated by reestablishing the nexus between planning and social justice, through a reformulated managerialist approach; changing things from within, through the vehicle of an extended version of advocacy planning.[115]

The tension between urban planning's identity as a social movement and an activity of government, only adds to the confusion and uncertainty about planning's role, and further hinders planner's attempts to legitimize their activities and their profession.

The history of incremental planning legislation, the failure to gain mass public support for planning goals, the inability of urban planners to gain acceptance as a professional group with a unique area of expertise and a cohesive membership, and the confusion pertaining to the role of the urban planner within the planning process, have all contributed to urban planning's continuing problems of legitimation.

CO-OPTATION

Difficulties with the state have proven to be another obstacle to the success of urban planning. As discussed earlier, by the 1960s, most urban planning in the public sector had been brought under direct political control. As a result, it became a part of the state bureaucracy, and, at the same time, a victim of that bureaucracy.

This notion was not lost on the planners themselves. In the 1970s, R.N. Percival, who had served both as a public planner and as a private consultant, noted that, in Ontario at least, the planning process had become bureaucratic and lacking in positive effect. Indeed, urban plans had become "...buried in red tape of various kinds", and consequently, there were not so many plans being created.[116] Dakin described as "unpalatable" the fact that urban planning must now find "...its realization through the machinery of bureaucracy."[117] In 1967, H.S.M. Carver observed the effect of bureaucratic working conditions on planners themselves; "In the rough and tumble of local politics, and the short-term view of city people, the planner sometimes...gives up the fight and becomes a bureaucrat working to rule and sometimes he just gets mad and quits."[118] Bureaucratic accountability was said to limit planners, restricting their freedom to be creative or to define problems, and turning them into administrators or technicians.[119]

In 1971, W.T. Perks noted that too much energy was wasted by planners on trying to beat the system, thus distorting creative thinking and inhibiting motivation.[120] In 1979, Barry Sadler observed that strong official resistance existed, to any change in the way urban policy was made. He also remarked that the bureaucratization of the urban planning movement had made it remote from those it hoped to

serve.   Citizen groups,   with limited time and resources at
their disposal,   found themselves involved in a continuing
struggle to gain   access to information,   the   key decision-
makers,   and   to   win   bureaucratic   acceptance   of   their
legitimate interest in the issue at hand.[121]

In the 1980s this predicament has continued to frustrate
planners.   In the turbulent times of the early decade,   it
was noted that one response to the uncertainties of the time
was to seek more power.   The most obvious result of this was
the   proliferation   of   bureaucracy   and   planners   found
themselves embroiled   in   ever   more   titanic   inter-
organizational struggles.[122]   This left   them less   and less
time to actually conduct the   business of planning.   It was
no longer enough for planners to have technical knowledge,
they now would require practical, organizational know-how as
well.[123] Tied up as an instrument of the state, at the local
level,   or   at   a   more senior   one,   the   urban   planning
profession had become a victim of bureaucratization.

Existence as   a part   of the apparatus   of the   state was
restrictive for the urban planning profession in other ways
as well.   Lack of authority has been one such problem.   It
has already been shown how planners gave up much of their
independence as   they came more and more under the direct
control of their political masters.   Planners were left only
the   meagre   tools   of   subdivision   by-laws   and   zoning
regulations,   with which to pursue their   task.   Rashliegh
noted in 1962 that zoning regulations were really not very
useful, particularly in older urban areas.   Using apartment
block   development   as   his   example,   he   observed   that
developers had   very little   trouble circumventing   official
development policy, as in Toronto in 1984.   Zoning was also
the typical defence in the early 1960s and was merely,   "...
a   negative safeguard   with   legal non-conforming   loopholes
that   have   particular   significance in   this   part   of   the
city."[124]   In   1967,   Carver   called   for   more   effective
professional   planning control.   Decisions concerning   the
long-term future of cities were to be made by the planning
experts, with "Napoleonic authority".[125]

The Comay Committee found,   during   the 1970s,   that,   in
Ontario at least,   the planning system had   real structural
problems.   Chief among these was a lack of authority due to
the division of power,   fragmented authority and diffused
responsibility.[126] Katary   complained in 1978   that planning
without legal enforcement authority was devoid of substance;
"Without legal backbone planning degenerates into a welfare-
type activity which only serves to keep a group of people
occupied."[127]

The frustrating   degree of   powerlessness experienced   by
planners was   only compounded as   local authorities   gave up

more and more planning responsibility to the provinces.   In
1983, Lithwick urged the C.I.P. to find ways to restore
responsibility to the local government level.[128]

The resistance of the municipalities, which had earlier
been   directed against   the   transference of planning
responsibilites to the senior levels of government, was now,
ironically, reversed. The local authorities of the post-war
era no longer wanted planning control. Urban planners,
however, found this as difficult as the municipalities
former position had been.   How were they to gain more
authority if the local government wouldn't accept it on
their behalf?

The T.P.I.C. noted, in 1962, that confronted by out-dated
boundaries,   inadequate   revenues,   and   the absence of
qualified   technical   advice,   municipalities   were
understandably reluctant to take on more responsibility for
local planning.[129] Fifteen years later, the Comay Committee
echoed this view when it expressed doubt that the
municipalities had sufficient resources to take on greater
responsibility for   urban   planning.   The   regional
municipalities strongly opposed the creation of needless
confusion and the proliferation of differing administrative
practices which would result from the delegation of more
planning authority to smaller local governments.   Local
authorites resisted any such change as well. Local councils
were reluctant to accept the greater accountability for
tough decisions that would accompany such a move.[130]
Planners were not to obtain more authority through the
actions of their local political masters.

As a result of being co-opted by the state, urban
planning was used primarily in the prosecution of three of
the state's functions: patching over the contradictions of
capitalist society;   assisting in the state's function of
fostering the accumulation of wealth;   and finally, the
reproduction of the capitalist system,   primarily in the
context of social control.

Urban planners have never seriously questioned the
capitalist system, particularly the right to private
property, although planners have always argued against the
treatment of land as a commodity. This sentiment was
expressed again in 1962, "If land is regarded as a
commodity, then concern for its best use becomes a secondary
aspect to the conditions of its sale and purchase.[131]
However, planners have always managed, somehow, to
distinguish between the land speculator and other private
land owners. The profession has never questioned the idea
of private property.

In 1971, Perks noted the planning profession's role in the control of social change; "The art [of planning] lies not only in anticipating the nature of change but in conceiving strategies by which change is either mastered or suppressed, and according to which new cultural values are simultaneously nourished."[132] This observation was supported by Qadeer in 1977, who remarked that "...the functional scope of social planning is essentially limited to fill in "market failures" in the provision of general welfare."[133] The status quo of social relations has never been seriously questioned by the profession, although its inequality has been noted by at least some of its members, and urban planning continues to be used to patch over the contradictions evident in the structure of capitalist society.

Planners have generally been less willing to recognize their role in aiding the accumulation of wealth. It was not until 1982, that an article appeared in the professional literature which acknowledged the distributional consequences of urban planning. Kiernan condemned planners' refusal to recognize these effects of their work and noted the opportunity consequently lost to the profession, to perform a socially redistributive function. The apolitical planning ideology not only denies the negative impact which planning may have on social problems, but also denies the profession the possibility of making a conscious, positive contribution. In Kiernan's view, planners are doomed by this conception to play an irrelevant role, if not a pernicious one, with respect to the process of social change.[134]

The most important aspect of the role of urban planning as an instrument of the state lies in the area of social control. Urban planning has traditionally been concerned with the rendering of order from the chaos of urban centres. The concern for controlling disease in the interest of public health, and the reduction of the threat to social order due to the appalling living conditions of a large segment of the urban population, were all seen as legitimate aims of the urban planning movement. In the post-war era, however, urban planning has also been directed towards the control of public dissent with respect to urban development.

As is the case with other professions, language has been the primary device available to planners for the accomplishment of this task. Each discipline develops its own terminology, thereby delineating its own territory of expertise. Guttenberg noted this use of language by planners. The ambiguity of planning terms was no accident he wrote, as they were the battleground on which rival groups tried to appropriate word use for their own ends. Guttenberg also observed that the language changes over

time. In addition to the professional dynamic, in which the
terms change in the same way as the product does in the
planners' pursuit of employment,   he identified two other
determinants of language transformation.   The first was the
technical dynamic, in which the professional planning expert
redefines, in the least controversial way, the public's hope
or discontent with various planning proposals.   Secondly,
Guttenberg took notice of the social dynamic, in which
language serves a mediation function.[135] In this way slum
clearance,   for example,   becomes urban renewal.   In
controlling the language of discussion, the urban planning
profession is also able to control the debate.   In 1980,
Yvonne Macor noted that while industry and government
related well,   accepting the same assumptions and speaking
the same language,   public groups did not share this
understanding of the decision-making process and "... didn't
speak the same 'expert' language".[136] They were, therefore,
at a disadvantage, in any conflict over urban development.

Control over the language of debate gave urban planners
the necessary tool with which to neutralize articulate
dissent.   This became particularly useful during the 1970s
as governments established a greater number of formal
citizen participation schemes with a view to combatting the
cynicism with which the public viewed the planning process
in general.[137] As Lang, a supporter of public involvement,
noted in 1977,   the planning process would become
increasingly unpredictable and difficult,   in direct
relationship to the degree of public participation.[138] Small
wonder then, that participation programs were generally
closely controlled by the planner to achieve professional
goals.[139] Wolfe has remarked that this may be a short-
sighted approach.   If planners truly desire to plan on
behalf of the communities they serve, they will require the
participation of the citizens of those communities.
However, if "...   incorporation of citizens into a formal
institutionalized participation program is mere ritual ...
citizen disillusionment will quickly develop ...",   and
community involvement in the planning process will
dissipate.[140]

Appealing to expert knowledge,   precedent, legislative
mandate and administrative regulations, developers, public
agencies, and/or planning departments themselves,   try to
minimize public conflict and   secure consent to their
proposals.   John Forester has observed that, "As consent can
be gained and managed, organizations extend their power and
manage, if not co-opt, their opposition as well."[141]

Kiernan has noted the usefulness if the unitary public
interest model in neutralizing articulate dissent.   It has
performed an "indespensible ideological function"   in
conjunction with the rational/comprehensive paradigm in this

regard.   As   he   has   indicated,   "...   how   could   valid
objections possibly be raised against an activity which
purported   to   advance   everyone's   interests
simultaneously?"[142] Opponents are left nothing with which to
disagree.

A much   subtler and more cynical   way in which   the urban
planning profession   has contributed   to the   social control
function   of the   state has   been   its use   in bringing   the
public to an "active and voluntary (free) consent."[143]

In   November 1960,   Dakin remarked that   part   of   the
planner's job   was to study the   public and learn   "...   how
their preferences may be modified ...".[144] In this way,   the
urban   population,   whose   daily   existence   was   directly
affected by the implementation of planning schemes, could be
brought to willingly accept the imposition of such programs.
Four years later, Pastalan proposed a "plan readiness scale"
by which planners could   judge the   willingness of   a given
population to accept the planning machinations of the state.
The   success   or failure   of   a   large   plan could   thus   be
predicted   prior   to   the   expense   and   effort   of
implementation.[145] Over and   above the   use of   statistical
measures   to   predict   public   compliance,   the   technical
language of the profession was also deemed useful.   The dry
rationality of planning terms could   be used by legislators,
administrators and   planners to   render the   emotional fears
and aspirations of the public   "...   objective and therefore
manageable by turning them into things."[146]

Public participation in the planning   process began to be
more common by 1970.   Haworth noted, however,   that citizen
participation had   more to   do with   the marketing   of urban
plans than the   appraisal of them.   It   had become standard
practice in cities for a small   group,   made up of planners,
businesspeople,   and politicians,   to design a redevelopment
scheme and then,   plan   in hand,   set out to sell   it to the
public;   "Citizen groups   are formed,   ostensibly for   the
purpose of evaluating,   but actually   for   the purpose   of
endorsing,   the   plan."[147] Anthony   Adamson was   quite
forthright about   the planners' view of   public involvement.
The C.M.H.C.,   he said,   "...   invented the   C.P.A.C.   and
subsidized it to   sell people the brave new   activity – town
planning."[148] It should   be stated,   to give   planners their
due,   that public participation was not something which they
found easy   to accommodate.   After   long years   of battling
with speculators, their practice had become discreet, if not
downright secretive,   and the   profession was not accustomed
to freely sharing information.   Add to this the bureaucratic
fetish of   hoarding any   and all   intelligence,   and   it may
fairly be said   that   urban planners   were   being asked   to
behave in an uncharacteristic manner.   The planning process
itself   had   never   been   designed   to   allow   for   citizen

intervention. As Sadler noted in 1979, officials were now "... faced with the issue of accommodating public involvement in a process ill-adapted to it.[149] He further contended that, even when allowed to participate, citizen groups were disadvantaged. They were forced to make their arguments within a restricted period of time, using a limited information base. This severely distorted public involvement; "Not only do these conditions bias the outcome of all efforts at citizen intervention, they also work toward the exclusion of individuals and groups who command neither the skills nor the resources for bargaining with bureaucracies."[150] The result was the formation of smaller, more organized and sophisticated activist groups, and, paradoxically, the development of an elitism of participation, in contradiction to the basic ideal of the desire for increased public participation: "Ultimately the quantity and quality of participation that can be achieved is constrained by the structural inequalities of the existing political economic and social order."[151] Thomas Burton's observation , of the same year, that, "... in the large majority of cases, public participation in Canada has been seen as an opportunity for the public to inform and consult, but not to advise and consent," demonstrates that the attitude of planners toward the public's participation in the planning process had changed little since the early 1960s.[152]

Urban planners continued to view public participation in the same light during the 1980s. The planning process was still described as a "... private decision-making process followed, as it often is, by largely unsuccessful efforts to convince the public of the correctness of the decision."[153] One of the difficulties encountered in successfully bringing the public to an "active and voluntary (free) consent" was itself a direct result of increased public participation. As the base of citizen involvement expanded, there was a corresponding contraction of the likelihood of achieving consensus. This had a disabling effect on the decision-making process, as governments became more reluctant to make choices; "... decision-making by inaction" became the rule.[154] In Ontario, for example, dissent had been institutionalized to such an extent that, "... there are now a multiplicity of forums in which those opposed to a project may participate."[155] How does one herd the group when it is so dispersed?

According to John Forester, by controlling information. The old methods remain tried and true. Planners at the turn of the century used the same technique. Urban planners follow their example still; "As organizations develop or restrict information, they shape others' knowledge and beliefs, and as significantly, they shape others' abilities to act and to organize."[156] As attention is selectively

drawn to certain issues, and information is disseminated
with discretion, it becomes possible to influence the issues
which others deem relevant. In managing attention to
issues, planning organizations are able to "... highlight or
neglect both needs and opportunities, and thus enable or
discourage political action and coalition-information."[157]
In consequence of this, Forester asserts, consent has been
appropriated from the public by the decision-makers of the
planning process; the politicians, the developers and the
urban planners.[158]

In this way the urban planning profession, as an agency
of the state, is instrumental in bringing the public to an
"active and voluntary (free) consent." It would seem that
the urban planning profession has retained little of its
earlier reformist ideals.

PLANNING THEORY

There is little theoretical content in urban planning,
and never has there existed an objective body of knowledge
allied to a coherent theory. In 1960, John Dakin expected
that the social sciences would eventually provide planning
with its foundation of theory. He acknowledged that there
was not yet a coherent body of planning theory which was
generally accepted and used by the majority of planners.[159]
There was no question in Dakin's mind that the development
of planning theory was important to the profession; "If
planning is to be a serious discipline ... it must develop
its own system of theory."[160] He resisted the idea that
planning should fall into an ethic of pure pragmatism. This
would ultimately lead to planners directing their time to
the mere solving of administrative problems. Dakin
suggested the use of theory developed by other disciplines,
notably that of sociology, social anthropology, and social
psychology, as a bridgehead to the day when urban planning
would have its own body of theory.[161] In 1963, the Deputy
Minister for Municipal Affairs in British Columbia still
felt that the discipline suffered as a result of being
insufficiently theoretical and analytical. The profession
was weak, in that its stock-in-trade was largely empirical
and descriptive, "As a discipline it should have certain
basic principles and theories to control and guide its
activities."[162] That same year, L. O. Gertler remarked on
the "frivolous" rise and fall of planning concepts; "The
neighbourhood concept is obsolete, the Radburn principle is
passe, redevelopment is decadent, regional planning is
impossible, zoning is useless, and greenbelts are for the
birds."[163] Theories, he wrote, need time to develop and be
evaluated, for the basic framework of planning is inductive
and planners must rely on their experience to develop their

theoretical knowledge.[164] One planner was quite unhappy with the situation. Norman Pearson wrote that planning was not a distinct field, but a nebulous land of waffle and good-fellowship; compounded of idealism and paperwork; "We are now immersed in formalism and theology..."[165]

W. T. Perks rejected theory entirely in the 1970s, endorsing instead a formless relativism. This idea was not a new one. It had been expressed in 1960 by Don South, Director of the Regional Planning Division in British Columbia. He declared that "... planning is a technique" and that "... there are no kinds of planning but rather there are names given to the intensity of the technique used to resolve some set of conflicting interactions."[166] Moreover, South felt that the profession already faced enough challenges, and for the public's sake, as well as their own, planners should "... try to cope with what is already in front of [them] rather than add to the burden by complicating the number of tools that [they] work with."[167] However, while South urged planners to retain the discipline's emphasis on design, Perks rejected this notion. He complained that the emphasis on design had turned the discipline of urban planning into "architecture enlarged."[168] Planning was now an art and no longer a science, "...the planner's vision must retain flexibility and be capable of shifting emphasis in form, though not in substance."[169] As a science, planning, with its emphasis on design, was mired in the past. All planning projects were influenced, directly or indirectly, by the design of the existing built environment. Whether correcting a current design flaw, or constructing a new development, a key concern of each new plan was the degree to which it was in harmony with environs extant. Planning as art, Perks believed, would be oriented to the future: "The capacity for sustaining a vision of the future consistent with shifting conditions of form, fashion or style will increasingly become a distinguishing feature of planning as art, as opposed to planning as science."[170] No longer concerned with ends, planning was to become an ongoing process, without interruption. Perks' position may be seen to be the logical consequence of the long-practiced pragmatism of the urban planning profession. As Rosemary Mellor has argued, given this new approach, there are no solutions; ideas, theories and policies are always provisional. Planning becomes the practice of planning, and lapses into formless relativism.[171]

Nevertheless, there were still demands for the maturation of planning theory. As Katary declared in 1978; "Planning which focusses exclusively on physical development is inadequate."[172] Such calls fell on deaf ears. It is a measure of the intellectual immaturity of the urban planning profession that, as late as 1980, John Udy noted that

"planners don't care to discuss and articulate why they plan because values are "tricky, elusive and evanescent."[173]

In the 1980s there has been more willingness to admit that the apolitical ideology which dominates contemporary mainstream planning is spurious, and that planning is, in fact, not a value-free science.[174] This apolitical ideology, according to Mathew Kiernan, stems from two complementary and spurious planning ideologies; the rational/comprehensive paradigm and the unitary public interest model.[175]

Arising from the pragmatic tradition of the profession, the rational/comprehensive paradigm seeks to optimize the rationality of the decison-making process through the analysis and integration of as many variables as possible. It is also indicative of the planners' attempt to shift from the design-oriented planning models of the past to the more managerial, administrative approaches of the post-war era. Design concepts such as the Garden City movement, the City Beautiful and the City Efficient, have given way to managerial schemes like the Systems model, which was introduced in the 1960s. It "... sought to incorporate and analyze an even greater array of variables, and renewed the spurious promise of transforming planning into a truly scientific endeavour."[176] Kiernan noted in 1982 that the rational/comprehensive paradigm was enjoying yet another renaissance in the contemporary professional literature, with the added wrinkle that the more recent theoretical formulations were attempting to expand its domain "... from a purely instrumental to a normative level."[177] The theoretical task was no longer simply to rationalize the means of planning, the traditional concern, but now to apply reason to the ends of planning as well. This repudiated Perks' rejection of theory, and was an attempt to escape the formless relativism of the 1970s, and the fate of Sisyphus, the interminate task of planning process. However, Kiernan was able to find little encouragement among his colleagues. Citing Page and Lang's <u>Canadian Planners in Profile</u>, a survey of professional attitudes and beliefs, Kiernan discovered "... a nation of planners who overwhelmingly conceive of their discipline as an intrinsically technical one, whose principal and ostensibly unobjectionable goal is the dispassionate pursuit of rationality and order."[178] The wholesale acceptance of the rational/comprehensive paradigm not only robbed urban planning of its political content but obscured the distributional effects of its practice as well. As Kiernan noted, without a political epistemology, planners could not hope to recognize the need or the latent promise which planning held as instrument of intervention and change.[179]

The myth of a unitary public interest obscured and falsely denied the many and various individual, seemingly

unconnected, planning problems faced daily by professional planners. Kiernan advocated the development of a meaningful and explicit political analysis which could "... underpin and render coherent" the profession's approach to the chaos of urban living and thus eliminate the need for finding coherence in a mythical purpose, to serve the fiction of a unitary public interest.[180] Liberal pluralists, like Herbert Gans, were among the first to criticize the unitary public interest myth in the 1960s. It contradicted their notion of the scattered distribution of power in advanced capitalist society. This critique was furthered by the advocacy planning model put forward in the late 1960s, most notably by Davidoff and later by Piven. They argued that each interest group in society should have its own planning advocate, thus recognizing both the fiction of a unitary public interest and the conflicting objectives of different social classes. More recently, the critique has been advanced by neo-Marxist writers such as Castells, Pickvance and Beauregard who have placed the genesis, not just the symptoms, of social inequality within the economic and social logic of advanced capitalism itself.[181] Nonetheless, the durability of the unitary public interest ideology has been remarkable. Restatements of it by Friedmann in 1973 and Klosterman in 1980 attest to its vitality.[182] Kiernan's alternative to the apolitical ideology of planning was what he referred to as a reformulated managerialist approach. He accepted the neo-Marxist diagnosis of the problem but found little in the way of guidance for future practice. Advocacy planning was rejected on the grounds that its successes are preventive in nature and that therefore it provides only a negative approach to practice. Without power and resources it is not possible to take positive action. One must, Kiernan concludes, operate within the planning apparatus, and work for change from within. Synthesizing the neo-Marxist analysis and the social justice morality of advocacy planning, Kiernan makes the following assertion: "A reformulated managerialist approach would concede to the neo-Marxists that planners' situation within an overwhelmingly capitalist political economy imposes substantial constraints, but would continue to insist that planners nonetheless retain enough discretion to make decisions which do substantially affect people's life chances."[183] He considers this to be an extension of advocacy planning, conducted within the central planning bureaucracies themselves, thus reestablishing the nexus between planning and social justice, and dissolving the tension between urban planning as a social movement and an activity of government. Planners should throw their support behind the disadvantaged in society and practice the politics of positive discrimination. Kiernan suggests however, that his positive discrimination paradigm be applied only to future planning proposals. It would not involve the confiscation of any present amenities or

privileges: "This does not involve taking anything away from those who have more; what it does require is giving more to those who currently have less."[184] As well as practising the new paradigm, planners must also accept more responsibility for the results of planning actions. The profession can no longer hide behind their political masters because, "... planners by virtue of their near-monopoly on information and expertise, generally have a profound influence over the number and nature of the options placed before the politicians."[185] Kiernan claims that the positive discrimination paradigm offers the promise of an entirely new style of planning. One that is more politicized, committed and relevant than the pseudo-professionalism of contemporary practice.

Considering Kiernan's fine critical analysis of post-war planning practice, it is curious indeed that he accepts so naively his proposals for practice within the state bureaucracy and the redress of social inequality. It is very difficult to understand how urban planners, working within the same state organizations in which planners have practised for years, under the same conditions and given the same set of constraints and pressures, are going to dramatically alter the nature of their practice through the mere exertion of their free will. There is nothing in the history of the discipline's practice in Canada to suggest that the intellectual, emotional and moral integrity required for such a conversion exists among the profession. Surely, this is an unreasonable expectation on Kiernan's part. He also fails to see that by narrowing the gap between the privileged and the less privileged, he is undermining the status of the former group. Simply giving more to one group without taking away from the other will not forestall resistance. As the privileged classes find their position diminished, their active opposition will be swift and resolute. This curious assumption of social harmony is one which is to be found throughout both planning literature and practice and will be discussed more fully later.

In spite of the weakness of Kiernan's proposal, at least he offers one. As Gerald Hodge noted in March 1978, the "... reluctance of planners to appraise critically their peer's work" is quite evident from a reading of the planning literature. There is little discussion of theoretical issues, and very few alternative theories are advanced.[186] In 1983, Reg Lang observed that there was still no discernable body of theory to guide practice and no clear substantive guidelines for members faced with ethical choices.[187] With little or no theory to direct their actions, urban planners have been left with an ad hoc approach which has done little but maintain the status quo, as opposed to directing social change in a manner conducive to beneficial urban development.

The assumption of social harmony is the keystone of urban planning. Unfortunately for the urban planning profession, it is also the discipline's greatest flaw, weakening the whole structure of urban planning practice.

The first premise of urban planning, from its earliest days, was the proposition that it is possible to provide an urban environment which is agreeable to all. This was taking the utilitarian notion of providing the greatest good to the greatest number and stretching it beyond all recognition. It would certainly promise a great deal more than anything which Arthur Roebuck had ever contemplated. The comprehensive master plans, constructed from the late 19th century, were the manifestation of this assumption, despite the increasing measure of flexibility which planners have tried to instill in them. In 1959, Handler defined comprehensive planning as "... the harmonious utilization of the possibility of a city."[188]

However, when such techniques as zoning by-laws and development regulations failed to produce the desired degree of flexibility, the profession began to move from the use of the great master plans, with their emphasis on design, to the managerial/administrative models, with their emphasis on process. In spite of the new, less rigid approach to planning, the assumption of social harmony remained an integral part of planning practice. In 1970, P. J. Smith noted that the traditional methods of determining public interest and public goals were inadequate. He argued that the continued use of the naive assumption of a general public interest was only to be found in planning reports. Declaring that "... there is no such thing as a single right planning solution", Smith went on to suggest that; "Perhaps the only public interest goal we really need is the assurance that all disparate views will be fairly represented in the planning process."[189] He was, however, perceptive enough to see the bind in which planners, accepting his suggestion, must find themselves. Planners must be guided by some conception of the public interest. If they tried to take into account the interest of all groups, planners would soon find themselves concentrating on consensual goals which were so broad and universal as to be beyond challenge and quite useless as guides to practice. Another consideration was, that in order to influence development policies and programs, the planning profession would have to conceptualize more specific goals. More precision in the choice of planning objectives would certainly alienate segments of the population which the profession was trying to serve. Nevertheless, it was clear to Smith that if urban planners failed to become more precise in their practice, they would risk not only the loss of influence over policy decisions, but their jobs. Governments would soon turn to technical experts for advice on immediate development issues.[190]

Planners have always been quick to recognize the problems posed by their domain assumption, but they have never rejected it. In 1971, Perks offered systems theory as a means of escaping the inflexibility of the old planning approaches: "Systemics has closed the door on the old world of planning; it has supplanted the notion of mechanical, causal relationships between phenomena by the notion of dynamic progression towards coherent order among random arrangements in the environment."[191]

As one can see, while the new method of planning would be more dynamic and responsive to change, the assumption of social harmony remained; the progression, (there's a value-laden word), towards Perk's coherent order. In 1978 Jean Cimon found, perhaps, another reason for the durability of the assumption of consensus among planners, when he noted that there was, indeed, social harmony to be found in connection with the control of urban development; the consensus "... hammered out in the backrooms between aldermen and developers, both of whom represent the same class of interest."[192]

Gary Paget, a Planning Co-ordinator for the British Columbia Ministry of Municipal Affairs declared that the old assumption of society in equilibrium had always been a false premise and that it was now a false hope. He observed that urban planners, using the old premise, were able to isolate themselves from both their subject (who) and their purpose (what) and concentrate on their method (the how). In abandoning the consensus assumption, planners would be able to reject the insular "corporate" approach to planning and open up the process. Every problem would have its own resolution, planning could be done in an environmentally sound (long-term) manner, planners would have to plan with a social conscience and lose their, "... irresponsible infatuation with technique and process."[193] However, Paget demonstrates that he too finds the assumption of social harmony difficult to drop when he declares that, "We [planners] need to accept that by working with the people who will ultimately 'own' the problems and developing/articulating organizations, we [planners] 'will make it happen' but in a socially sensitive manner."[194] Paget had not rejected the assumption of social harmony in favour of a view of society in conflict. He had merely changed his method, not his perspective.

Ray Spaxman the Director of Planning for Vancouver, recognized the need to accept the conflict model of society but his suggestion to planners with respect to changing their practice was not very positive. He urged them to be opportunistic, to try not to fall into hopelessness, and to try to stay relevant.[195] Allan Sutton, also writing in 1981, took a similarly dismal view of practice without the domain

assumption of social harmony. He observed that planners feared they were "... becoming irrelevant, not just ineffective."[196]

In spite of the planning profession's reluctance to do so, planners must abandon their assumption of social harmony, wrote Kiernan in 1982. He recognized that the consensus assumption had led planners into the intellectual cul de sac of relativism and that the profession would remain trapped there unless they abandoned it. The way out was to change their perspective of society; "If instead ... we assume that society is fundamentally conflictive rather than consensual, an entirely different set of propositions begins [to] emerge."[197] In contrast to the hopeless, opportunistic irrelevance of Spaxman, Kiernan was quite optimistic that the profession's relevance could be enhanced if only it would recognize that the multitude of politically-inspired positions in society were irreconcilable, and if each planner would simply adopt one of them explicitly.[198] Kiernan, as has already been discussed, rejected the assumption of social harmony, which he described as the myth of a unitary public interest. However, this was contradicted in his proposal of the alternative positive discrimination paradigm. Even Kiernan, in advocating that planners work for change within the current system, and in his naive assertion that social discord could be avoided by giving more to one social group, while "not taking away" from another, sought to avoid conflict. The implication is clear, the social harmony assumption was retained as an integral part of his practice.

In 1983, Henry Hightower gave a very good indication of the continued vitality of the assumption of social harmony among the planning profession. He found it necessary to remind planners that there should be no bar to a planner taking issue with a colleague's perception of "the public interest", and indeed, that such debate should be encouraged.[199]

It is not difficult to understand why urban planners should be so reluctant to let go of the assumption of social harmony. As Mellor points out, one very good reason for its retention is its usefulness in explaining planning failures. Should a planning scheme be frustrated in the pursuit of its goals, it is easily interpreted as a failure of communication between planners and public.[200] The existence of a grand consensus, which is greater than any individual or group, reifies the goal of urban planning, no matter how vague it might be. Moreover, the argument goes, there can be no doubt that members of the profession, with their expertise, know what it takes to achieve it. Therefore, any problem must lie with the public, which lacks the special knowledge of the professional, and must be shown the way to

the urban utopia. This, in turn, can only be accomplished through the education of the public by those possessing the required knowledge and skills; the urban planners. Thus, it is reasoned, planning failures are to be rectified by overcoming communication failures between planners and the public. Indeed, the planning literature contains numerous examples of planners citing the need for improved communication with the public,[201] and demanding a more open planning process to accomplish this purpose.[202]

Perhaps the most important reason for the retention of the assumption of social harmony is that it relieves urban planners of final responsibility for the consequences of the plans which they create. In clinging to the assumption of consensus they are steadfastly able to avoid the question; planning for whom? If the question remains unasked, it requires no answer. In this way the discipline can concentrate on its methodology. Having separated means from ends, planners are relieved of any ideological difficulties. Society, either through the building of a general consensus, or through the liberal-democratic tradition of political representation, is left with the responsibility of choosing ends. It would be difficult to underestimate the value of the assumption of social harmony to the urban planning profession. As Rosemary Mellor puts it, "Only in this assumption of harmony in society can the planner justify his declared professional responsibility as that of maintenance of a system."[203]

Like a ship without a rudder, meagre theoretical content and the assumption of social harmony have deprived the urban planning discipline of direction. Aimlessly concentrating on its methodology, the profession has lapsed into a formless relativism from which it is unable to benefit the urban population which it pretends to serve.

The discipline's inability to obtain sufficient resources, achieve legitimation, avoid the bureaucratic trap and develop an objective body of knowledge allied to a coherent theory, have all contributed to the frustration of the promise of urban planning and the urban planning profession. The legacy of the urban planning movement has been let down. Canadian urban planning has proven to be less like David Thompson, who did not lose his way, than John Franklin, who simply disappeared into the vast Arctic, never to find his Berings.

THREE CARD MONTE —OR— WORKING THE STREETS

The fundamental problem of urban planning practice is the capitalist treatment of land as a commodity. As C. B. Macpherson so succinctly put it:

> "Property has always been a central concern of political theory, and of none more so than liberal theory. And nothing has given more trouble in liberal-democratic theory than the liberal property right."*1

This idea is of special significance to urban planners. What could be more pivotal to their discipline than the right of private property? As planners have long appreciated, it constantly interferes with collective intervention; "If land is regarded as a commodity, then the concern for its best use becomes a secondary aspect to the conditions of its sale and purchase."*2 In spite of this awareness, they have consistently stuck to their liberal principles. The profession, as previously indicated, has never seriously challenged the appropriation of land for private use, and fealty to this precept of liberal thought has not been without cost. The dogged refusal to recognize the conflictive nature of society, has left urban planners bereft of any substantive theory. In its stead the planning profession substituted methodology. Attempting to circumvent the difficulties imposed by the capitalist

property ethic, without admitting its deleterious effect on collective intervention, the planning discipline adopted a variety of different methodologies. These ranged from the early design models to the later managerial/administrative ones, with their emphasis on process. Such a response, however, has utterly failed to make useful the ineffective practice of the discipline. They have merely changed the saddle, when they really required a new horse. Unless the profession is prepared to drop its assumption of consensus, and confront the private right to property, it is doomed to remain an irrelevant, ineffective actor in the struggle to direct social change for the benefit of the urban population as a whole.

How is it then, that planning has survived? Surely, something of so little consequence would have faded away long ago? It has survived because, although it has been of little use to those whom it purports to serve, it has not been without purpose in the service of others. As C. Paris has observed, town planning can be both objectively useful to the capitalist state, and a repository of blame for the social effects of capitalist urbanization.*3

Planning has never been a radical force. With the fleeting exception of the various utopian colonies of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the discipline has always been directed toward the maintenance of the social

status quo.   During the earliest days of imperialist

expansion,   planners,   if not   actually   constructing

fortifications, were carving small niches of order from what

they perceived to be the chaos of the wilderness.   The

social movement for urban reform, as demonstrated earlier,

was always a bourgeois movement.   They wanted reform, not

revolution, and urban planners tried to give them what they

wanted.   As Dear and Scott have noted, it is precisely when

the dislocations, irrationalities and conflicts of the urban

system begin to subvert the prevailing social relationships

that urban planning makes its historical appearance, "... as

a means of collectively re-adjusting the spatial and

temporal development of urban land use."*4 Kept on a short

leash,   with insufficient resources to implement grand

schemes capable of producing sweeping change, urban planners

were content to carry on,   patching over the pathological

outcomes of the urban land-use system which the privatized

rationality of capitalist society failed to resolve. Having

secured employment, the members of the profession had solved

their own fiscal crisis and they were largely satisfied.

Although the urban planning profession has never been

able to resolve its own legitimation problems, the state has

found the discipline to be useful in trying to cope with its

own crisis of legitimation.   As an agency of the state, the

urban planning profession has served as both a scapegoat,

for the urban crisis,   and as an instrument of social

control. The rational/comprehensive paradigm has been used, as discussed earlier, to neutralize articulate discontent and to bring the public to an active and voluntary acceptance of state programs. As Alan Wolfe noted, the dominant class interest is quite clear in its assertion that, "Individuals and groups should be depoliticized since a functioning [democratic] system requires 'some measure of apathy and non-involvement'."*5 He also observed that great importance is placed on the widely held belief of decision-makers that, "... the [number of] arenas where democratic procedures are appropriate are limited."*6 The language and ritual of the urban planning process provide one such arena, where it is felt to be safe to allow public participation. Protected by the language and ritual of the planning profession, as well as its rational/comprehensive paradigm, the interests of the dominant class are further protected by the private sector's appropriation of the initiative for planning; a kind of ace in the hole.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should be stated clearly that it is not the intent of this thesis to place the analysis of the relationship between the urban environment and social change within some simple reduction of Marxist thought or conflict theory. Such an approach would be far too simplistic and limiting. The fatalism of such statements as Piven and Cloward's assertion that, "Protesters win, if they win at all, what historical

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circumstances have already made ready to be conceeded," are not useful.*7 The determinism of such statements does nothing to advance the understanding of social processes and only encourages a resigned acceptance of the status quo. Why struggle, when events are foreordained by the preprogrammed stages of social and political evolution? Another example of the difficulty of applying grand theory to the local level is provided by Gwyneth Kirk, who argues that social objectives such as affordable housing and access to social facilities of all kinds, will not be achieved "... in any general way until it is beneficial to the capital accumulation process."*8 Such oversimplified analyses tend to obscure, more than they reveal, the social relationships they seek to understand. As Peter Newman remarks, while "Grand theory offers the attraction of combining critique and utopia in political discourse," it is too abstract to be useful. He rejects the Marxist critique and suggests that social criticism be based on the issues, organizational and political forms and limits actually found at the local level.*9 However, Newman's approach is equally unsuccessful as it isolates the urban centre from the larger society of which it is most certainly a part. As urban sociologists have found, to their chagrin, the city does not stand up as a scientific object.

The most promising theoretical approach offered to date is that of Manuel Castells. He, too, has rejected the city

as a scientific object, and has recognized the awkwardness entailed in the application of grand theory to the urban level. In this he agrees with Newman. Castells, in writing of his own research efforts, declared: "Our intellectual matrix, the Marxist tradition was of little help from the moment we entered the uncertain ground of urban social movements."*10 He goes on to say that, with few exceptions, "... Marxism a whole has been unable to stand up fully to the challenge."*11 The problem with Marxist theory lies in the connection between the mode of production and the historical process of class struggle. According to Marx, the connection was established through class formation and class consciousness. A class in itself becomes a class for itself. The problem arises, Castells observes, in understanding how these phenomena occur. Marx offered no explanation, but Lenin and the Third International did; the revolutionary party. Classical Marxism recognized existing social movements as demonstrations of class struggle and resistance to capitalist exploitation, yet such movements could not produce history on their own, and could only play a role in the implementation of the next stage of programmed historical development. Leninism simply institutionalized social movements.*12

However, as Castells notes, there are many examples, both contemporary and historical, of social movements which have made significant contributions to the redefinition of social

goals and values,   which have not had a class basis.   The

feminist movement is a good example of this.   As Castells

writes:

> "People   mobilized,   in   a
> variety of historical contexts
> and social structures, without
> parties, beyond parties, with
> parties, against parties, and
> for parties. The parties' role
> has not been a discriminating
> variable;   the   crucial
> phenomena have   been   self-
> conscious,   self-organized
> social movements. So although
> Marxist theory might not have
> room   for   social   movements
> other than the historically
> predicted   class   struggle,
> social movements persist.   So
> experience   was   right   and
> Marxist theory was wrong on
> this   point,   and   the
> intellectual tradition in the
> study of social change should
> be recast."*13

Castells does   not reject   the historical   materialist

approach,   rather, he seeks to advance it.   He   still

recognizes the city as a social product resulting from

conflicting   social   interests   and   values.   Class

relationships and class struggle are still fundamental in

understanding urban conflict.   They are not, however, "...

the only primary source of urban social change."*14 Other

sources include the autonomous role of the state, gender

relationships, ethnic and national movements,   and self-

defined citizen movements, among others.   A theory of urban

change then,   "... must account both for the spatial and

social effects resulting from the action of the dominant interests as well as from the grassroots' alternative to this domination."*15 In this way, Castells seeks to remain informed by grand theory while avoiding the awkward, oversimplistic obscurantism so often encountered, when grand theory is applied to social relationships at the local level.

In the sense that urban planners have never had a body of substantive theory of their own, the planning discipline has never faced the difficulty of placing its analysis at the local level. Substituting methodology for theory, the urban planning discipline has carried on its uninformed practice. Trapping itself in formless relativism, the urban planning profession has rendered itself ineffective and irrelevant.

In holding fast to the assumption of social harmony, and failing to confront the liberal property right which interferes so directly with the achievement of planning goals, the urban planning profession has betrayed the legacy of social responsibility which it inherited from the urban social reform movement. Moreover, the discipline is destined to continue its illusory practice and retain its irrelevant status until it renounces the self-serving pragmatism and the liberal-democratic values with which it directs its practice. Some Canadian planners are aware of this, "We cannot be soothed by the liberal, who innocently

believes that the traditional democratic process automatically brings about justice for all."*16 The planning profession, self-deceived, and deceiving the public, begins to look like the travelling Three Card Monte player; they're both just working the streets.

After such a promising beginning, the urban planning discipline has failed in its attempt to become an applied social science, to direct urban social change through the application of scientific principles, for the benefit of all. As Rosemary Mellor writes, "The ideology which attempted to side-step ideology, to tread the middle ground of realism and rationality, has lost its credibility... especially as [capitalist] society moves out of the euphoria of post-war growth and stability, into an era in which class ideologies are reasserted."*17 Urban planning stands as a monument to the barrenness of 19th century liberalism and its 20th century mutations.

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ABSTRACT

A qualitative analysis of the history and thought of urban planning in Canada is undertaken to discover the reason for its ineffectiveness in dealing with the urban crisis. The period reviewed ranges from the era of imperialist expansion to the present. Included is an exhaustive examination of the professional journal "Plan Canada" (1959-1987). The thesis concludes that urban planning has been frustrated by a chronic lack of resources, difficulties in legitimizing its status, co-optation by the state, and a failure to develop any substantive theory.