

AN INTERPRETATION OF
THE ANTI-CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN
1973-1975

A thesis submitted by M.E.S. Mellen
to the Department of Political Science
for the degree of Master of Arts
October, 1977

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BY

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A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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CHAPTER 1

The purpose of this paper was to examine the 1973-1975 anti-Confucius campaign. It was important to study this mass campaign because such campaigns were a normal feature of the Chinese communist political process and thereby served as a gauge of the political climate. The anti-Confucius campaign occurred in the crucial years after the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution and the downfall in 1971 of Defense Minister Lin Biao. At this time the radicals and the moderates appeared to be vying for key power positions as the Party, government, and country were being rebuilt. Most writers who analysed or gave their interpretations of the various facets of this campaign, such as its possible leaders, targets, and functions, tended to emphasize the unique political context of the time. But by doing so, they missed the similarities between the anti-Confucius campaign and other mass campaigns which have taken place on a continuing basis under the communist regime. This most likely was the reason we discovered nine different interpretations from nine different authors. It was precisely this lack of consensus (probably due to the narrow scope taken) which impressed upon this writer the need to approach the anti-Confucius campaign from the broader perspective. Therefore, this paper primarily attempted to study the anti-Confucius campaign in the context of mass campaigns. It was felt that by first regarding the anti-Confucius campaign as another mass campaign and attempting to establish similarities, many leaders, tar-

gets, and functions, could possibly be simply and accurately explained. Afterwards we attempted to view the anti-Confucius campaign in the context of recent political events to possibly explain what could not be explained by studying the campaign in the context of mass campaign in general.

SYNOPSIS OF THE ANTI-CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN

A May 1974 pronouncement in an article in Peking Review stated:

Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius is a political and ideological struggle in the superstructure, through which Marxism prevails over revisionism and the proletariat over the bourgeoisie.¹

Therefore, in order to deepen the revolution in the superstructure and the ideological realm and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is necessary to repeatedly criticize the reactionary ideas of Confucius.²

From the beginning of the campaign in August 1973 until the summer of 1974 varying aspects of the above quotes were stressed along with praise of the Cultural Revolution and the reforms (the "socialist new-born things") it launched. There was strong criticism of the backsliding from the ethos of the Cultural Revolution, the neglect of its reforms, the "opening to the West", and the rehabilitation of disgraced cadres. The tone of this part of the campaign strongly suggested criticism of Premier Chou En-lai who appeared to be leading China along a moderate-gradualist course of development and consequently was probably responsible for the policies attacked. At least this first part of the campaign

seemed to be the radicals' bid to regain the power and prestige that was probably slowly slipping to the moderates as Chou was rebuilding the Party. Headed by Ch'iang Ch'ing and Wang Hung-wen, the radicals in the Politburo possibly felt that if they could return China to the revolutionary course of development and ethos of the Cultural Revolution, then, as during the Cultural Revolution, the mobilized masses converted the Maoist ideology, would become the radicals' power base and they might therefore regain the balance of power and become Mao's heirs. In attempting "an ideological revolution", the radicals in their writings and speeches during this broad campaign portrayed Confucius as a vain and proud man who was determined to revive the old (slave-owning) system, hated anything new, and encouraged people to practise moderation and obedience. The masses were to struggle against any remnants of such traditional attitudes and practises wherever they existed in Chinese society, even if they were within the Party. Confucian culture was to be replaced with the Maoist ideology, and they were to "go against the tide", to "advance boldly and without care", and to "continue the ideological revolution in the superstructure launched during the Cultural Revolution, accepting it and all 'socialist newborn things'."

After June 1974 it was clear that the campaign was no longer completely ideological nor purely radical. Criticism sessions and the writing of wallposters were apparently taking people

out of the production process and causing economic difficulties. The moderates subsequently injected economic matters into ideological discussions and debates in attempts to make the campaign aid, not hinder, production and to channel the "revolutionary fervor" of the masses (as they became aroused during the meetings and sessions) into economic activities. If the masses were to become mobilized, the moderates would attempt to control it for constructive economic purposes. The phrase often read during these later stages of the campaign was "revolution and production." Concurrent with this apparent attempt to deradicalize the campaign and use it for both ideological and economic purposes (after all, the moderates among the leadership also probably wanted the masses to accept the communist ideology and relinquish traditional attitudes and practises which undoubtedly hampered growth), Chou stressed unity within the factionally split Party and obedience to it by the masses. This contrasted with the radicals' attempts to takeover the main power and to encourage the masses to rebel against the moderates in the leadership. The power struggle which seemed to be occurring made the anti-Confucius campaign appear so confusing as there were conflicting Party communiques within the same edition of Peking Review.

When the anti-Confucius campaign was launched in August 1973, the anti-Lin Piao campaign was already in progress. Criticism of Lin Piao had begun shortly after his death in September 1971, and was now linked with criticism of Confucius.

In the February 8, 1974 issue of Peking Review there appeared an article entitled "Carry the Struggle to Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius through to the End". Here for the first time Lin Piao was accused of being a "devout disciple of Confucius" and of using Confucianism as a "reactionary ideological weapon ... to usurp Party leadership, seize state power, and restore capitalism."³ If Confucianism was the doctrine extolled by Lin in opposition to the "thought" of Mao, "only by criticizing the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius advocated by Lin Piao can we repudiate the ultra-Rightist nature of his counter-revolutionary revisionist line penetratingly and thoroughly."⁴ Quotes such as these seemed to imply that criticism of Confucius was primarily designed to intensify criticism of Lin Piao. (This may be the very reason so little had been written about the anti-Confucius campaign per se, believing that it was simply an appendage of the anti-Lin Piao campaign, infusing the anti-Lin campaign with greater force and validity.) However, articles attacking the views of the ancient philosophers Confucius and Mencius began to appear in August 1973. While these may have prepared the way for the criticism of Lin Piao's "Confucianism" their scope seemed much broader. An article entitled "Attach Importance to the Revolution in the Superstructure" in the August 24, 1973 edition of Peking Review described how Liu Shao-ch'i and "other political swindlers" were using the "weapons" of Confucius and Mencius to attack the proletariat and "stage a counter-revolutionary come-back."⁵ The exposé

went on to conclude that the proletariat must struggle against "outdated traditional ideas and erroneous schools and trends in thought" so that there would be a revolution in the superstructure, "filling it with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought".⁶ Another article entitled "Confucius - A Thinker who Stubbornly Upheld the Slave System" (October 12, 1973) described the ancient "class struggle" between the Confucianists and the Legalists "on the ideological front" and went on to say that criticism of Confucius was helpful in allowing the people to take part in an "actual class struggle and especially in grasping the class struggle in the ideological sphere of the superstructure."⁷ It would therefore appear from articles written before the linking of Confucius with Lin Piao that there was a goal behind the anti-Confucius campaign of a different nature and that since the campaign to criticize Lin Piao was still in progress, a bond was formed between them to strengthen both campaigns. Accepting as given that nothing in Chinese politics is simple and unifunctional, it will further to assumed that both these campaigns were multi-faceted with only a few such features in common (these being exploited by the linkage). The anti-Lin Piao campaign will no longer be discussed.

THEORIES

If one were to review Party communiques concerning the anti-Confucius campaign from 1973 to 1975 (or only the beginning or end of the campaign), one could postulate many dif-

erent hypotheses as to the nature of the campaign - its leaders, targets, and functions. The ambiguity of the rhetoric and of all other pronouncements pertaining to the anti-Confucius campaign was reflected in the lack of consensus over the appropriate interpretation of this campaign. The narrow scope from which most writers viewed the campaign - simply from the context of recent political events - probably further hindered their ability to agree on chief components of the campaign such as its leaders, targets, and functions. While each writer had an interpretation which varied in some ways, these nine interpretations of the campaign fell into two main categories centering on a power struggle and the Cultural Revolution. Concerning a possible power struggle two generalizations arose. First, that the anti-Confucius campaign represented a power struggle by the radicals against the moderates, or second, that it represented a power struggle by the moderates against the radicals. Concerning the Cultural Revolution, three generalizations arose. First, that the anti-Confucius campaign was a continuation of the Cultural Revolution second that it was a reversal, or third, that the campaign was unrelated to the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution category encompassed broader issues of mobilization or consolidation which in turn included revolutionary morality, cadre rehabilitation, educational and economic policy, orientation, foreign policy outlooks, and so on. While there was some overlap between these two main categories, it was felt that matters con-

nected to the Cultural Revolution merited a separate status due to the nature of the Revolution and Mao's views towards it. However, we made note that it was not necessarily only the radicals who were disposed in a positive way towards a continuation of some of the reforms which emerged from the Cultural Revolution and/or the concept of mobilization and mass revolutionary fervor. Starr, Wich and Goodstadt seemed to be inclined to believe that the moderates had more control over the anti-Confucius campaign, yet they likewise noted acceptance of some aspects of the Cultural Revolution ethos by this group. A brief summary of all the interpretations will now follow.

A. Doak Barnett, in his book Uncertain Passage (1974), briefly mentioned the anti-Confucius campaign. He believed that the radicals were responsible for the campaign, using it as pressure upon Chou En-Lai. The radical faction within the Central Committee of the Party supposedly employed the campaign to criticize Chou for rehabilitating old cadres, most notably Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and for emphasizing professional standards over ideological ones (particularly in education). Barnett also suggested that the radicals used the campaign to protest routinization and decreasing revolutionary zeal in ideological indoctrination and political activity. It appeared to him that attempts may have been made to transform the anti-Confucius campaign into a mass mobilization campaign, restressing, as during the Cultural Revolution, revolution, struggle, and dynamic tension. In

other words, Barnett concluded that this campaign was evidence of a serious power struggle occurring in the coalition leadership (presumably this was the coalition formed to oust Lin Piao and his military supporters in 1971).^{8.}

In the March-April 1974 edition of Problems of Communism, Michael Oksenberg and Samuel Goldstein contributed an item entitled, "The Chinese Political Spectrum". In this article they wrote that there had always been a coalition in the Chinese political hierarchy primarily of "radical conservatives", such as Mao, with various other groups leading to continuous tension and instability. In the post-Mao era this instability and tension had drastically increased as members and groups were vying for power positions. According to Oksenberg and Goldstein, by 1973 conditions had shifted to favor "eclectic modernizers", such as Chou, over the "militant fundamentalists", such as Ch'iang Ch'ing, and therefore this later "opinion cluster" was in 1973-1974 struggling to regain "power and vitality as a force in Chinese society." Hence the anti-Confucius campaign was supposedly at a very basic level a struggle for survival by the "militant fundamentalists". On a more general plane, Oksenberg and Goldstein wrote that the campaign was a controlled and disciplined movement which "may conform to what Mao originally intended in 1966."^{9.} To ensure their survival, the extreme radicals attempted to use the anti-Confucius campaign to "reinvigorate Cultural Revolution policies in the cultural, educational, and - to a lesser extent - economic realms."^{10.}

Jurgen Domes in "The Pattern of Politics" (September-October 1974, Problems of Communism), was of the opinion that for him, the anti-Confucius campaign represented another attempt to apply the Maoist approach to economic and social development, especially mass mobilization and harsh austerity. He was of the opinion that conflict in disputes over personal power and policy in China all revolved around the proper approach to development. The anti-Confucius campaign supposedly demonstrated that the Maoist strategy had the upper hand, much as it had during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the Great Leap Forward, and 1970-1971 before the demise of Lin Piao, when the society was highly "militarized."¹¹ Domes also noted that during the campaign the "organizational instrument" appeared to be the urban working class, with some mass involvement. The leadership was seen to be in open factional strife.¹²

Another interpretation appeared in Current Scene, in July 1974.¹³ This article claimed that the anti-Confucius campaign was launched after the Tenth Party Congress (August 1973) to halt the erosion of the radical reforms of the Cultural Revolution. The campaign began by criticizing ideological backsliding in education and then in the cultural sphere. The campaign became linked with that against Lin Piao for two reasons: first because Lin attacked the Cultural Revolution, and second because both Lin and Confucius could be charged with conservatism and patronizing attitudes toward the masses. This interpretation echoed the others in its views that the

campaign was initiated by radicals for "the continuation of the specialist revolution in the superstructure." More specifically, the article added that the anti-Confucius campaign was aimed at "feudal landholders" who exercised power independent of the center and yet promised more central control. Current Scene also claimed that the campaign was to function as an educational tool to increase the people's ideological knowledge and their ability and willingness to criticize, an example being the formation of "peasant theoreticians" and "theory teams".

Simon Leys also maintained that all developments of the anti-Confucius campaign were engineered by the Maoist radical group headed by Ch'iang Ch'ing, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chung-Chiao, and Yao Wen-yuan (now known as the "Gang of Four" or the "Shanghai group") to challenge the authority and prestige of the powerholders (especially Chou). Leys considered it obvious that the anti-Confucius campaign was attacking character traits and policy preferences directly analogous to those of Chou. Criticism of Confucius for his aristocratic and conservative tendencies could easily be read as criticism of Chou's own style and of the policies and decisions of his leadership such as rehabilitation of disgraced cadres, the reintroduction of Western music and visitors, and diplomatic overtures to "enemy" countries. In Leys' interpretation, the anti-Confucius campaign was a way for the radicals to warn against backsliding. For example, the use of Mao's saying "going against the tide" was a warning that the minority (in

this case, the radicals) were correct in attempting to preserve the changes wrought by the Cultural Revolution. Leys likewise maintained that Mao used and encouraged this criticism in the campaign to restrain Chou, that is that he used the anti-Confucius campaign to keep Chou from becoming the dominant leader. However, Leys believed that Chou was able to deflect some of this criticism by linking the anti-Confucius campaign to the one against Lin Piao, shifting focus from himself to Lin. After all, noted Leys, there really was no plausible connection between Confucius and Lin Piao, and therefore this linkage had to be more than simply another avenue of criticism towards Lin.¹⁴

Merle Goldman was the only person to have written an article specifically about the anti-Confucius campaign. In "China's Anti-Confucius Campaign 1973-1974" (China Quarterly, September 1974), Goldman maintained that the campaign was directed by Chou against the "disruptive groups" which had arisen out of the Cultural Revolution, specifically Lin Piao and his followers, the regional military commanders, and the radical ideologues. While the anti-Confucius campaign may have been started by the radicals and the military in 1973, Goldman maintained that after the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973 and the anti-Confucius campaign was taken over by Chou and turned against the radicals. After that point he argued, the anti-Confucius campaign served to support the retreat from Cultural Revolution, stressing pragmatic economic development and ideological approaches less. Goldman stated

that the anti-Confucius campaign therefore was not an extension of the Cultural Revolution but a counter-movement against the disorders of the Cultural Revolution, that is a movement towards consolidation after a mobilization phase. According to Goldman, the historical figures and references used in the Peking Review articles were to promote centralization, institutionalization, ideological unity, and production, and not struggle, decentralization, or revolutionary fervor.^{15.}

Richard Wich also offered some comments on the anti-Confucius campaign in the course of his analysis of the Tenth Party Congress. Wich noted that Lin Piao was opposed by both Chou and his group and Wang Hung-wen and the other new leaders who had emerged as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Thus, there was a semblance of unity at the Tenth Congress and a stress on coalition rather than division and conflict. Wich however wrote that the top leadership re-divided along old lines soon after the Party Congress. This split at the top afforded the radicals an opportunity to become active again. Seen in this light, the anti-Confucius campaign was to be "an esoteric notice of warning against rear-guard attacks on the dominant line."^{16.} Wich commented that an example of this was the battle between Ch'in Shih-huang and the Legalists, on the one hand, and Confucius and those wanting to maintain the system on the other. This supposedly represented Mao and those seeking to regularize the Party's control of affairs against those military leaders and any others who feared the loss of their political authority to the revived

Party apparatus. The historical accounts stressed the progressiveness of Ch'in (although he was previously seen as tyrannical) and this was associated with Mao and his crack-down on Lin Piao and others. In its more obvious aspects it appeared to Wich that the anti-Confucius campaign was used to spearhead an attack by the radicals on ideological and cultural relaxation that accompanied China's opening to the West and stabilization at home.^{17.}

In Asian Survey (January 1975) John Starr wrote a lengthy article dealing with events which occurred in China in 1974 ("China in 1974: Weeding Through the Old to bring forth the New"), which discussed in some detail the anti-Confucius campaign. Starr looked at the campaign in five contexts: (1) academic debate, (2) Confucian outlook, (3) Cultural Revolution preservation, (4) link with Lin Piao, (5) mass campaign. While Starr noted remnants of a genuine academic dispute over the proper interpretations of Confucius, he likewise noted that references to Confucius and the Analects were incorrect, the "debate" was one-sided (presenting Confucius simply as an advocate of slave society), and the articles were only on historical questions with any "erroneous views" of scholars who maintained the opposite not mentioned. The exception was Feng Yu-lan who supported the new "correct" interpretation but said he had earlier thought otherwise. Previous discussions on Confucius and traditional culture had regularly presented opposing viewpoints in full. Therefore, Starr concluded, the anti-Confucius campaign was

either a model for academic "debate" post-Cultural Revolution or the articles had other less scholarly purposes.

Starr preferred to interpret the anti-Confucius campaign as an attempt to take the dialectic interaction between Confucian culture and communist ideology to a new stage. Starr maintained that Mao believed that the Confucian tradition first had to be revived to be surmounted. The peasants apparently had retained Confucian values, even though these values were supposed to be associated with slave society because they were not destroyed by either feudalism, capitalism (on account of a weak bourgeoisie with no inherent ideology), or imperialism (which fostered these ideas to keep China underdeveloped).¹⁸ Therefore, an "anti-Confucius" mass campaign was needed to make explicit these traditional values and attitudes which had persisted (along with some vestiges of capitalism and imperialism) into the socialist society so that they could be surmounted possibly with a revolution like the Cultural Revolution. This link made between the two led Starr to likewise conclude that the anti-Confucius campaign was intended to foster and preserve acceptance of the Cultural Revolution and its changes - that the anti-Confucius campaign represented a genuine campaign against Confucianism and capitalism. Starr reminded us that the Cultural Revolution had only imperfectly changed values and that serious problems remained such as the rustification of students, cadres refusing to take part in manual labor, and the deterioration of the reforms in art and literature.

Starr's more literal interpretation of the anti-Confucius campaign saw no contradiction in the link with the anti-Lin Piao campaign. Starr implied that the two campaigns were linked not simply in order to strengthen the anti-Lin Piao campaign but also to deepen the anti-Confucius campaign. It was a matter of timing revolving around strong criticism of Lin Piao at the Tenth Party Congress and the concurrent launching of the anti-Confucius campaign. Lin now a "deposed" and faulty leader, was to serve as a dramatic negative example. Lin himself was depicted as a Confucianist with examples given of his use of Confucian language and ideas and his writing of Confucian scrolls. Confucius and Lin were charged with analagous sins. Both attempted to restore the old, thus thwarting the true interests of the workers and peasants by supporting mental skills over manual ones, urging non-violence, celebrating innate genius and so on.

The fifth context in which Starr looked at the anti-Confucius campaign was mass movements, although very unlike our presentation. Before the Cultural Revolution there were a series of mass campaigns (known as phases of mobilization) interspersed with periods of consolidation which could be predictable (in that sense) and was an attempt supposedly by Mao to make mobilization the norm of social life. Starr saw the anti-Confucius campaign as a part of this process, although he felt the campaign more closely resembled the 1962-1965 Socialist Education Campaign than the Cultural

Revolution. Starr concluded that the campaign had Mao's imprimatur and its lines of criticism were in accordance with his, but that Mao probably did not take an active part in the campaign. He attributed the contradictory aspects of the anti-Confucius campaign to contending factions which on the one hand encouraged the students, workers and peasants, and on the other hand attempted to limit these impulses.¹⁹

The most comprehensive reporting concerning the anti-Confucius campaign appeared in a series of articles by Leo Goodstadt in the Far Eastern Economic Review from November 1973 to October 1974. They are interesting because they demonstrated the difficulty and uncertainty to which analysis of the campaign so easily lent itself. Initially in November 1973, Goodstadt noted that while the Soviet press reflected a view that the anti-Confucius campaign was part of a "secret campaign" against Chou because of his rehabilitation of disgraced cadres,²⁰ the Yugoslavian press disagreed. Goodstadt shared their view that the anti-Confucius campaign was not against Chou but an attempt to tackle problems from the grassroots up.²¹ He dismissed any suggestion that the campaign was a purely intellectual confrontation, because any annotations were erroneous or distorted.²² From the start, Goodstadt felt the campaign was initiated by Mao and Chou to stress discipline and a strong, orderly government (as represented by the Legalists), and to weed out "heretics" everywhere in order to solve China's problems. In January 1974, Goodstadt

drew an analogy between the 1962-1965 Socialist Education campaign and the anti-Confucius campaign. He felt that the present campaign was being turned in the direction of the Socialist Education campaign by Chou. He suggested that Chou was using the anti-Confucius campaign to further his goals of better management and greater production. The use of a mass movement with radical trappings meant that Chou would be less susceptible to attack by the radicals while legitimately moving towards more moderate objectives.²³

By February 1974 Goodstadt wrote of two reasons for the anti-Confucius campaign. First, many Party, military, and government officials were allegedly unconvinced of the "crimes" of Lin Piao or the seriousness of the campaign against him. Confucian terminology would lend more credibility to Lin's errors so that the ordinary cadre would take criticism of Lin seriously. Second, while the economy was moving ahead, traditional attitudes and organizations were clashing with economic growth and modernization, hindering further progress. The anti-Confucius campaign would supposedly change values, and thereby change organizations, reflecting these values. The anti-Confucius campaign was to be a revival of the Cultural Revolution by Mao who wanted to mobilize the masses for a new political upsurge, economic growth, and a cleansing of the Party.²⁴ In the later (March 1974) edition were two articles stating Goodstadt's interpretation of the anti-Confucius campaign.²⁵ He concluded that the object of the anti-Confucius campaign was not to drag down current political

leaders but to prevent the return of those disgraced during the Cultural Revolution, especially those who were in the Ministry of Culture. A return of these people would mean a defeat for the radicals and question the roles they had attained by the Cultural Revolution. Those disgraced, were supposedly symbols of treason against Mao and Ch'iang Ch'ing, of corruption of officials, and of promotion of an anti-Maoist decadent culture. Reconciliation could easily lead to criticism of the Cultural Revolution. Goodstadt maintained that the anti-Confucius campaign and the denunciation of Western art and music was an "olive branch" extended by Chou who wanted P'eng Chen's return (and other rehabilitations), yet condemned the cultural "feudalism" he was associated with.²⁶ He wrote that Chou was never overtly attacked and allowed the campaign to go on as long as it did not demand the dismissal of present cadres or members of the Central Committee.²⁷ Goodstadt later noted that when production began to suffer because of the campaign (April-May), Chou toned down and used ideological aspects of the campaign to increase production, promoting "struggle" for greater production.²⁸ In a final October 1974 article, Goodstadt stated that, unlike the Cultural Revolution, the anti-Confucius campaign was to protect the Party and leaders from extremists who were discontented with the return of old cadres and managers and with the restoration of conventional government and Party structures. The campaign was not to exploit this discontent but to solve it through open debate and criticism.

flushing out dissidents as during the Hundred Flowers campaign. Chou therefore allowed the radicals' influence to expand in order to expose them. In other words the anti-Confucius campaign was to halt the undoing of the Cultural Revolution in a way which deflated the extremists' position so that they could no longer use the "backsliding" after the Cultural Revolution as the legitimizer of their diverse attacks.²⁹

As must be apparent from the above brief survey of the interpretations of the anti-Confucius campaign, there was no singular, satisfactory explanation of the campaign. One can see that the interpretations had certain assumptions behind them. Interestingly it may be noted that all these analysts shared the assumption either that the Chinese leaders were divided or that a power struggle was in progress (these both either being new phenomena or continuations of old patterns). One did not find consensus even here over the political events surrounding the anti-Confucius campaign, and therefore over the role of the campaign itself. Hence some study of this political milieu encompassing the anti-Confucius campaign must be undertaken to clarify these matters in order to aid explanation of what could not be understood in the campaign simply through study of it in the context of mass campaigns.

HYPOTHESES

The hypotheses of this paper are:

1. that the anti-Confucius campaign 1973-1975 was a mass campaign similar to other mass campaigns after 1956, and therefore in many respects a continuation of the ideological trend in mass campaigns, and
2. that the anti-Confucius campaign was not like post-1956 mass campaigns because it was a crucial part of a power struggle within the party leadership.

Our assumptions were that the anti-Confucius campaign was similar to other post 1956 mass campaigns in that it also was initially ideologically oriented by Mao and/or the radicals (in the case of the anti-Confucius campaign as a new phase of the Cultural Revolution), but was shifted in its later stages by Chou En-lai and/or the moderates to encourage production. However the anti-Confucius campaign was assumed to be different from other campaigns because of its crucial role in a power struggle, to the extent of becoming the arena for such a struggle. It was this aspect of the anti-Confucius campaign which may have marked it as the beginning of a shift in the ideological trend of mass campaigns. (The current campaign in China against the "Gang of Four" may bear this out.)

The validity of these hypotheses will be examined in two contexts, namely that of current political events and of mass campaigns. The problem with the explanations of the anti-Confucius campaign put forth by the various authors was that they dwelt too much on the unique features of the

campaign in the context of recent events. In looking at the anti-Confucius campaign as a unique phenomena within the context of an unstable political climate, they neglected the fact that campaigns had occurred before and were a continuous aspect of the Chinese political ethos. Thus it is necessary to examine the past to see if the anti-Confucius campaign was comparable to other mass campaigns. The 1957-1958 All People Rectification campaign and the 1962-1965 Socialist Education campaign were chosen for this purpose. Chapter 2 will be a brief study of these two campaigns; a review of the communiques of the anti-Confucius campaign will be done in Chapter 3. With background information on the three campaigns, the anti-Confucius campaign can then be compared with the Rectification and Socialist Education campaigns to determine to what degree the anti-Confucius campaign was similar to and must be viewed as a continuation of the trend of mass campaigns (Chapter 4). After establishing to what extent the anti-Confucius campaign corresponded to other mass campaigns, Chapter 4 will also review the current events and place the anti-Confucius campaign in the context of the times in an attempt to account for its unique features, that is those that were not explained by a comparison with other mass campaigns. In conclusion, what has been learned about the anti-Confucius campaign will be compared to other writers' interpretations. This paper will conclude by speculating about what our findings may mean for the study of Chinese politics.

METHODOLOGY

The ensuing chapters will be an attempt to learn more about the anti-Confucius campaign by testing the validity of the hypotheses of this paper. In Chapter 2, mass campaigns will be discussed in general and then divided into two chronological-functional trends, namely Party program campaigns prior to 1956 and ideological ones afterward. Two campaigns from the post 1956 period will be selected for comparative study, namely the 1957-1958 All People Rectification campaign and the 1962-1965 Socialist Education campaign. It is hoped that this examination would demonstrate the salient features of this second, or "ideological", trend in mass campaigns. After reviewing these two campaigns certain conclusions will be made concerning the nature of post-1956 mass campaigns.

Chapter 3 will proceed to survey the official communiques of the anti-Confucius campaign in detail, to see what can be discovered about its leaders, targets, and purposes. Analysis of these communiques will be offered in Chapter 4. A comparison between the anti-Confucius campaign and the previous two campaigns will then be undertaken to determine how well the anti-Confucius campaign fits into the past trend of mass campaigns. In trying to determine their commonness, we will be able to better speculate as to what extent the anti-Confucius campaign can be explained by the context of other mass campaigns. Because the anti-Confucius campaign

may be observed to have unique features, an examination of political events following the Cultural Revolution will be done to ascertain to what degree the uniqueness of the campaign can be viewed as a symptom of a divided leadership and/or power struggle. Hence the campaign will also be studied in the context of current political events. Chapter 4 will conclude with a summary of the findings about the anti-Confucius campaign from the studies made of it in the two contexts and thereby test the validity of the hypotheses. Chapter 5 will close this paper with a restatement of the hypotheses and findings, a comment on the other writers' interpretations in relation to these findings, and speculations as to the implications of this paper for the study of Chinese politics.

Footnotes - Chapter 1

1. "The anti-Confucius campaign", Peking Review (May 4, 1974) p.2
2. Ibid. p.3
3. "Carry the Struggle to Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius through to the End", Peking Review VI (February 8, 1974) p.3
4. Ibid.
5. "Attach Importance to the Revolution in the Superstructure", Peking Review (August 24, 1973) p.1
6. Ibid. p.4 Note: when articles discussed "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought", Tse and Tung were printed together.
7. "Confucius - A Thinker who Stubbornly Upheld the Slave System", Peking Review XLI (October 12, 1973) p.6
8. A. Doak Barnett, Uncertain Passage, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974 p.217
9. M. Oksenberg and S. Goldstein, "The Chinese Political Spectrum", Problems of Communism XXIII March-April 1974 p.1
10. Ibid.
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CHAPTER 2

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the nature of mass campaigns in the Chinese political system, and therefore lay a basis for the study of the anti-Confucius campaign in comparison with others of its type. This should possibly allow explanation of some part of the anti-Confucius campaign and point out any unique aspects which may have to be studied in another context.

We will begin our study of mass campaigns by briefly looking at their leaders, targets, and functions or goals. Most scholars now have recognized that the Politburo and/or the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party apparently cannot be viewed as stable monoliths, with all leaders in agreement over policies, their reasons, or the groups they were aimed at. We will then attempt to show that mass campaigns in China have changed in character since the 1956-1957 Hundred Flowers campaign. (We felt it was necessary to describe very briefly mass campaigns prior to 1956 so that a reader would understand why we state that the anti-Confucius campaign was like "ideological mass campaigns", not just "mass campaigns" in general, and to demonstrate that shifts in the purposes of mass campaigns do occur. Also the brief description will give the reader more information about mass campaigns as a whole.)

Two major mass campaigns of the post-1956 period will be carefully analyzed - the 1957-1958 All People Rectifica-

tion campaign and the 1962-1965 Socialist Education campaign. Once these two campaigns have been studied, general observations can be made about the nature of mass campaigns, especially those after 1956. This chapter should make clear the past leaders, targets, and functions of mass campaigns, and therefore be a reference and guide in studying the anti-Confucius campaign.

DESCRIPTION OF MASS CAMPAIGNS

Most China watchers have noted the "cyclical" nature of Chinese politics both before 1949 and afterward. Under the communist regime this cyclical pattern referred to alternating periods of mobilization and consolidation (or de-mobilization) rather than to dynastic changes. These peaks and plateaus corresponded to the presence or absence of mass campaigns, particularly after 1956.³⁰ According to Alan Liu,

a mass campaign consists of a series of organized, planned actions for a particular purpose, usually involving the mobilization of a large number of people to engage in highly visible, intensive, and concentrated activities.

31.

Such political phenomena had been heavily relied upon by the Chinese Communist Party since its victory in order to mobilize the Chinese people in pursuit of the Party's ideological, socio-economic, and political programs. According to "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought", history is a clash of contradictions; it is a conflict which, while the contradictions may change in nature after the advent of socialism,

continues until communism (this idea lies behind the "law of unity of opposites"). Mass campaigns could therefore be viewed ideologically as the resolution of contradictions through the mass confrontation of those who move history and those who oppose this forward thrust of history. The Chinese communists formalized this principle in the "mass line". Fundamentally the mass line has two tenets, based on the salience of the masses in history, that is (1) a need for the Party to depend on and be in constant contact with the masses, and (2) the correct method of exercising Party leadership, which was summed up as "coming from the masses and going to the masses", namely collecting the views of the masses, studying and coordinating them, and turning them into policies for the masses to act upon.³²

James Townsend, in his book, Political Participation in Communist China,³³ also addressed himself to mass campaigns (or movements) and the mass line. According to Townsend the practical application of the mass line revolved around two central functions. First, while the mass line demanded mass participation, the masses were to execute policies rather than to formulate and control them. Second, it demanded political activities to change popular thinking in order to increase the degree of acceptance of communist ideology and policies. These two political-economic components were expressed in mass campaigns which the Chinese maintained were "the most concentrated and salient form of ex-

pression of the mass line" and "the climax of the revolutionary action of the masses."³⁴ Townsend felt that mass movements sprang from a "mystical faith in mass action" and a "guerrilla mentality" reminiscent of the manner in which the communists handled problems and came to power during the Yennan period of the 1930s and 1940s. The communist victories in both Russia and China, plus the success of early mass campaigns in reconstructing the country after 1949 seemed to prove to the Party the ability of movements to fulfill Party tasks.³⁵ Besides performing the functions expressed in the mass line and of acceptance and policy execution, Townsend noted two other purposes of mass campaigns. They were also used, primarily through the insistence of Mao, to rectify the Party leadership and organization (especially the cadres' "style of work"), centering on eradicating the "three big evils of bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism." Likewise the mass movements provided a stimulating "revolutionary atmosphere" for those lacking revolutionary experience. These campaigns served to train the cadres for Mao believed that only in a class struggle could the quality of the cadres as revolutionary successors be judged.³⁶

In considering Townsend's point of mass movements being the vehicles to foster acceptance of the communist ideology and policies by the masses, Lucian Pye further commented on the ideological change which was supposed to occur with such action.³⁷ He regarded mass campaigns as attempts to end

"private interest and individual concern" which made up the old, pre-communist societal ethos.

The practises of mass mobilization were designed to expand the individual's commitment and identification in order to reach beyond family and class and to incorporate the nations and the forces of world revolution.

38.

Pye wrote that from the very beginning, the Party wanted mass participation to be the "wave of the future and to set in motion a bandwagon psychology that would win over the support of the doubtful and hesitant elements."³⁹ After all, he noted, the Party had witnessed what the masses could accomplish in their own and the Russian revolutions and similarly saw growing demands by people everywhere for change after World War 1.

These views suggested that mass campaigns could have ideological, political, and/or socio-economic functions. However, both Liu and Townsend maintained that these prime functions did not appear in combination in the campaigns but that, in different time periods, one function would predominate. While Liu drew a much finer distinction, he agreed with Townsend that there were two fundamental trends in mass movements with the 1956 Hundred Flowers campaign serving as the dividing event.

Between 1949 and 1956, the mass campaigns launched by the Party leadership were aimed specifically at programs of current political-economic interest. Land Reform (1950), Labor Emulation Drive (1951), Three and Five Anti Movements

(1951-1952), Study of Election Law (1953), or the Discussion of Draft National Constitution (1954), were examples of this trend in mass campaigns which Liu had labelled "functionally specific".⁴⁰ The ideological content of mass campaigns was secondary to other goals of political and socio-economic reconstruction possibly because the Chinese leadership felt that ideological conversion would follow naturally from participation in "building socialism" and the changes produced. Therefore mass campaigns of this first type and period (1949-1955) seemed to be led and agreed upon by a unified Party leadership, directed at the people as a whole, for the purposes of rebuilding China economically and for launching new socialist political organizations.

The 1956-1957 Hundred Flowers campaign was a campaign granting an unusual degree of freedom of expression to the population by an apparently self-confident leadership. Although 1956 did not herald much in "free expression" or criticism by any group (usually just parochial matters without ideological ramifications), 1957 witnessed the opening of the flood gates. Probably believing that the Party leadership would indeed allow a "cool breeze and mild rain" to expose what they thought to be Party errors, people (mainly the intelligentsia) expressed their dislike, not only of Party elitism and bureaucratism but likewise of its dictatorship, programs, and even leaders. The "blooming of a hundred flowers" and the "contending of a thousand schools of thought"

was quickly terminated on June 8 to be replaced by an "anti-rightist" campaign against those who had criticized the regime. This may have been because the Party leadership suddenly feared that was it neither totally supported nor had the people been converted to socialism. Thus, after the Hundred Flowers debacle, the emphasis in mass campaigns was reversed and a new trend emerged.

The new trend in mass campaigns beginning in 1957 with the All People Rectification campaign demonstrated a primary dedication to ideological education and moulding to "reconstruct man", with "reconstruction of the system" becoming secondary. As an article in Political Study stated:

Socialist construction has two aspects; one is reconstruction of the system, the other is reconstruction of man. At present, the reconstruction of man is not yet concluded. Old thoughts and habits which reflect the old system have not been basically eliminated; new thoughts and habits which reflect the new system are still not well established.

42.

Liu characterized most of the mass campaigns of this second trend as "functionally diffuse", that is "those which were primarily designed to create a new value system among the people."⁴² Townsend labelled these mass campaigns "ideological", that is those aimed primarily at "ideological indoctrination".⁴³

The events of the first half of 1957 had shown the Party that mass assistance in 'reconstructing the system' had not brought about a 'reconstruction of man'. The people had participated in the great mass movements of 1949-1955, but without accepting communist ideology. The 1957-1958 rectification campaign

and most mass movements since then have assumed that the 'reconstruction of man' through ideological indoctrination is essential for the further advance of socialist construction.

44.

Although Townsend used the term "ideological indoctrination" often, he never defined ideological, only implying that ideological indoctrination was for the purposes of getting the masses "accepting communist ideology."⁴⁵ Since there appeared to be no unanimity among writers concerning ideology, we defined ideological as relating to a certain world outlook which critiques past and present events, presents values and goals for the future, and designates a plan of action to attain these goals. Ideological campaigns in China seemed to be primarily for the purposes of breaking down traditional attitudes and values, indoctrinating the populace with the Chinese communist ideology, and thereby creating a new socialist ethos, that is "a new value system". These campaigns appeared to stress a collectivist ethic (values, attitudes, and practises), revolutionary zeal, and constant mobilization as the prime aspects of the Maoist ideology. This sharply contrasted with prior political and economic mass campaigns which focused on concrete political action to accomplish political tasks in the daily working of the government and Party, such as participating in the National People's Congress, becoming Party member, studying laws and policies, attending Party-sponsored meetings, and joining mass organizations. Ideological campaigns, on the other hand, aimed at a psychological change of the individual, in

attempts to reconstruct the very nature of man - his beliefs, values, and attitudes. These were normative endeavors in which there was criticism of people's attitudes (and subsequently actions based on such attitudes), discussion of dialectics, struggle, and the role of the proletariat in history, and debate over erroneous interpretations of past events, the correct course of the dictatorship, and the correct path of China's modernization.

Neither Liu nor Townsend, the two who have written the most about mass campaigns, gave a detailed account of this ideological trend in mass campaigns. However, as examples of this trend and purpose of mass movements after 1956, Townsend mentioned the All People Rectification campaign and the Socialist Education campaign, writing a little about the former and just noting the latter.

The 1957-1958 rectification movement was, therefore, a new type of mass movement in that it was primarily dedicated to ideological indoctrination rather than the implementation of more specific Party programs.

... the revival of national campaigns for ideological indoctrination in 1963-1965 ...

46.

Because the only other major campaign during this period (1957-1973) was the Cultural Revolution which was too complex and filled with ambiguities for use in a brief summary and comparison, we will use the two mass campaigns mentioned by Townsend for study and comparison. Hopefully by examining the All People Rectification movement and the Socialist Education campaign, a clearer picture of the nature of this ideological

trend in mass campaigns will emerge and lend itself to comparison with the anti-Confucius campaign. This comparison should determine which of the features of the anti-Confucius campaign might be explained in the context of the campaign simply being another mass movement.

1957-1958 ALL PEOPLE RECTIFICATION CAMPAIGN

From the end of the liberalization period to the beginning of the de-escalation or retreat from the Great Leap Forward (approximately June 1957 to July 1958), Mao and the radicals in the leadership held the balance of power. A number of mass ideological campaigns were initiated in this period such as the anti-Rightist campaign, the Two-antis campaign, the "hsia-fang" ("downward transfer") campaign, the Great Leap Forward, the Party rectification campaign, and the Socialist Education movement. The first was aimed primarily at "weeding out" the intellectuals who had expressed criticism during the Hundred Flowers campaign and at warning and indoctrinating the rest. The next three dealt more noticeably with political and economic matters. All four however apparently did have ideological overtones such as "class struggle" to root out "noxious bourgeois weeds" and "class enemies" (especially in the countryside), "waste is conservatism", and cadres to be "transferred down" to basic-level units to regain closer ties with and learn from the masses, as the mass line required.⁴⁷ Although the Party rectification actually began prior to 1957, in this paper it will be amalgamated

with the Socialist Education movement for mass rectification. Therefore, the All People Rectification campaign will be discussed here as encompassing the Socialist Education movement, and to a lesser extent Party rectification, which increasingly came to be done within the Party ranks, and shall simply be called the Rectification campaign. The Rectification campaign and the Socialist Education movement could be viewed, as was done in most of the literature, as being synonymous.

While many authors have mentioned the Rectification campaign in their work, few have written more than a brief comment about the campaign, seeming to have lost it between the uproar of the 1957 anti-Rightist campaign and the 1958 Great Leap Forward. However, from what little has been mentioned the campaign appeared to be a result both of the Hundred Flowers campaign and of Party difficulties. It undoubtedly became clear during the period of "liberalization" that the masses had not been converted to communism and that they particularly did not approve of the cadres' attitudes and work style. Similarly it appeared that the leadership felt (especially after the Eastern European crises) that the Party and the masses had to once again be in closer communication as in the Yenan days. Therefore, possibly to end the "three big evils" of bureaucracy (excessive 'red tape'), sectarianism (discrimination against non-Party people), and subjectivism (dogmatism and empiricism),⁴⁰ which the apparently felt continued to plague the Party, and to educate both cadres and

masses to a collective socialist ethos, the Rectification campaign was launched.

The Third Central Committee Plenum September 1957 changed this policy [Party rectification]. Teng Hsiao-p'ing's "Report on the Rectification Campaign" did call for the rectification of the cadres, but the emphasis shifted to education for socialism, that is, intensification of the ideological indoctrination of the rural population and cadres.

49.

Because of the ideological content and nature of the Rectification campaign (September 1957 through the spring of 1958), it was commonly referred to as a "socialist education" movement. Rectification at the mass level

took the form of a nationwide debate, under the slogans of 'great blooming and contending' held over from the 'hundred flowers' period, on the following general questions, whether or not the revolution and the work of construction had been correct; whether or not the socialist road should be taken; whether or not the Party leadership, proletarian dictatorship, and democratic centralism were necessary; whether or not foreign policy had been correct. There was, of course, only one correct answer to these questions, and the objective of the campaign was to instill a genuine acceptance of the 'correct' answers in the entire population.

50.

Before the mass debates took place, there was solicitation of opinions in small groups followed by intense discussion and consequently debate. Meetings were held in factories, cooperatives, street association, and most other popular groupings apparently to discuss and debate the Party's "work style" and to educate the people towards accepting socialism.^{51.}

While the focus and language of the rectification campaign remained ideological (stressing "political and ideological revolution") a shift became noticable by July 1958.^{52.}

The discussions and debates to bring about ideological indoctrination were now connected to critical economic issues among the population. In addition to problems with cadres, workers discussed issues of increasing production, welfare, and wages. Peasants debated questions concerning grain supply and distribution, management, and cooperation in and among Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives. In resident committees, housewives discussed neighbourhood services, good housework, small-scale street projects, and volunteering for rural labor.⁵³ In other words, ideological indoctrination seemed to be eventually accompanied by attempts to better the economy so that "a great spiritual force becomes a great material force." However, although economic matters were being stressed along with ideological education, the premise that "correct thinking" was an absolute pre-condition of economic development was very explicitly stated, probably so that everyone would know the true order of priorities.⁵⁴ With the strong ideological focus and the added economic issues, the Rectification campaign appeared to flow naturally into the Great Leap Forward to become part of a continuous push for increasing correct mass consciousness and creating a socialist economy.

The 1957-1958 All People Rectification campaign thus seemed to have been highly ideological. While its prime purpose apparently was to educate and re-indoctrinate the masses to foresake their traditional values and attitudes for those of the Maoist ideology, production was stressed

in later stages of the campaign. Besides debating ideological matters dealing with "correct thinking" concerning socialism and the Party's dictatorship, discussion of economic questions to increase production also occurred. While the radicals in the leadership may have wanted to stress ideological changes above all else, the moderates were possibly more concerned with the economy; Mao, as the Great Leap Forward showed, was apparently interested in both aspects. The leadership was therefore probably able to remain quite united after the Hundred Flowers campaign as to the need for ideological changes among the masses as well as to the need for economic progress.

The 1957-1958 All People Rectification campaign seemed to be initially and primarily an ideological mass campaign. This could suggest that this campaign was begun by Mao and the radicals, aimed at the people and cadres, to change their traditional-capitalist values and practises and indoctrinate them to the new Maoist ideology based on a collective socialist ethic. While the above was probably the first configuration of leaders, targets, and purposes, another configuration seemed to arise in later phases of the campaign. We could speculate that with Mao's approval (or possibly insistence) the moderates also included economic matters in the ideological discussion sessions. A truer picture of the nature of this mass campaign may therefore be to regard Mao as principal leader, with the radicals and moderates heading



different aspects of the campaign. Both aspects of the campaign seemed to be aimed at the masses and cadres (although the moderates, especially Liu and Teng, apparently believed party rectification should be an intra-party undertaking and not open to the masses) for the purposes of either ideological or economic changes.

1962-1965 SOCIALIST EDUCATION CAMPAIGN

The Socialist Education campaign (SEC) was launched during the Central Committee's Tenth Plenum in September 1962 and ended in approximately November 1965 with the attack on the historian-playwright Wu Han, which unofficially began the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution can be seen as the natural extension of the Socialist Education campaign on a gigantic, more comprehensive scale. Although Richard Blaum and Fredrick Teiwes, who had written most extensively on the Socialist Education campaign, dated the campaign to August 1966 (when the Cultural Revolution was formally viewed as taking-off), they called the November 1965 - August 1966 time span a "transition period", filled with uncertainty, which Westerners could only speculate about.⁵⁵ Therefore, our time period for the campaign will end in November 1965.

The Socialist Education campaign subsumed many other smaller campaigns such as the "Four Cleans", "Learning from the PLA" (People's Liberation Army), "part-time work - part-time study" education, rural cadre rectification, compiling

village histories and surveys, cultural reform, class struggle, and many others - all being couched in ideological language. What were the motives for this flurry of political and ideological activity during these years? It may be that the motives were basically two-fold, namely Mao's attempts to re-gain power supremacy and to reinstate his plan for China's development according to his "thought" (ideology).

The period after the Great Leap Forward, namely 1960-1962, witnessed an increasing number of liberal policies primarily aimed at the recovery of the Chinese economy. In attempting to ease economic difficulties and soothe people's feelings after the tumultuous mobilization effort of the Leap with its subsequent excesses and failures (as well as those caused by natural calamities of the time), the Party leadership allowed private plots, free markets and individual households (although as part of cooperatives). Eventually the observance of traditional socio-economic practises such as religious festivals, dowries, and arranged marriages even seemed to return. In January 1962 at a Party "work conference", Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i criticized the Great Leap Forward (and indirectly Mao) by reaffirming the continuation of economic consolidation. He declared that some of the "right-ists" who had lost their positions in 1957-1958 would be rehabilitated, and concluded that the Party needed more internal democracy and less centralism. Mao apparently objected, although ineffectually, to both Liu's economic and political positions.⁵⁶ In August Liu was confirmed as Chairman, and

published "How to Be a Good Communist", which was to be read concurrently with the writings of Mao, constituting "a piece of self-assertion of a kind rarely attempted in China since 1949 by anyone but Mao."⁵⁷ Both Liu's and General Secretary Teng Hsiao-p'ing's power appeared to be increasing as they seemed to be firmly entrenching themselves at the head of the Party organization.⁵⁸ By the September Plenum, Mao appeared to have reinjected himself into the political mainstream. Liu apparently had been saying since the 1956 Eighth Party Congress that there no longer was a struggle between capitalism and socialism, but that the contradiction now was between an advanced social system and a backward productive sector. Mao seemed to have got the Plenum to reaffirm that there was class struggle between the stages of capitalism and communism and that it was presently occurring. He stated:

There still exist in society bourgeois influences, the force of habit of old society and the spontaneous tendency towards capitalism among parts of the small producers. Therefore, among the people, a small number of persons, making up only a tiny fraction of the total population who have not undergone social remoulding, always attempt to depart from the socialist road and turn to the capitalist road whenever there is an opportunity ... We must remain vigilant and resolutely oppose in good time various opportunistic ideological tendencies in the Party.

59.

Mao similarly stated that the liberal post-Leap policies had generated undesirable problems. Among them were first, the peasants' "spontaneous tendency toward capitalism" such as private plots, "speculation", free markets, and the cadres

co-operating with the peasants furthering this tendency; second, the revival of "feudal practises" such as witchcraft, religious festivals, arranged marriages; and third, problems with the cadres such as corruption, demoralization, "commandism", and "bureaucratization".⁶⁰ Hence, possibly in order to "never to forget the class struggle", to alleviate these difficulties, and to reassert the dominance of his political position and "thought", Mao launched the Socialist Education campaign during the Plenum, "... intending the SEC to be a revolutionary movement of cosmic scale."⁶¹ Most of the cadres, on the other hand, probably were tired after the Great Leap Forward and did not want another mass campaign, while many in the leadership appeared apprehensive over the disruptive effects the campaign could have on the economy.⁶² They seemed particularly concerned about agriculture which was just beginning to revive after the Leap. However, they acquiesced and did not formally oppose the launching of the Socialist Education campaign possibly feeling that they could redirect or quietly end it.⁶³

In the winter of 1962-1963, the campaign proceeded on a limited basis in certain rural areas. It was not apparently proving to be very effective which the leadership said was because of the lack of good leadership at the basic levels felt to be due to the "impurity of basic-level cadres' work style". Leading cadres were told to raise the ideological, political and managerial levels of the basic cadres by criticism-self-criticism. Many were also "transferred down".

People outside the Party were encouraged to form "work teams" to assist in the training of the cadres and the education of the masses.

It may be that when Mao saw that the campaign was floundering, he decided to give it formal direction. Hence it really became a systematic campaign with the issuing of the "First Ten Points" in May 1963. The "First Ten Points" proclaimed once more the continuing class struggle in which both the people and the cadres had to participate, as well as the need for socialist education and work (Article 1). In the countryside, the socialist reconstruction took the form of the "Four Cleans", that is "cleaning up" (or better handling) of accounts, granaries, properties, and cadre work points. (Mao apparently felt that it was cadre corruption causing peasant dissatisfaction). Peasant associations were to oversee the work of the communes and production brigades, although not to interfere (Article III). The poor peasants were to form "representative groups" to educate, raise ideological consciousness, and "consolidate the collective economy" (Article IV). Attempts were to be made to solve the contradiction between labor (in the production process) and work (administrative and leadership responsibilities) (Article V). All this was to detect the misdeeds of hostile classes and "to set the masses in motion" for a "socialist revolutionary struggle that would deal a smashing blow to the frenzied attack of the capitalists".⁶⁴ In the cities, the campaign took the form of the "five Antis", but little is

known of this campaign (probably because it was too close to the Party top bureaucracy)⁶⁵. Thus, while economic factors were mentioned by Mao, these were probably used to further the Maoist development strategy for the First Ten Points seemed to really be stressing ideological change and indoctrination. Mao wrote at the beginning of the First Ten Points:

This struggle is one for the re-education of men; for the reorganization of the revolutionary class force to wage sharp and effective struggles against the forces of capitalism and feudalism which are launching an audacious attack upon us; it is a movement to suppress their counter-revolutionary activities and to remould the majority of these elements into new men; it is also a campaign for the joint participation of cadres and the masses in productive labor and scientific experiments, with a view to bringing our Party a step further in becoming a more glorious, greater, and more correct Party, and making our cadres well-versed in politics and business operations, both red and expert, well integrated with and supported by the masses, instead of being divorced from the masses, and considering them officials and overlords. After the completion of this education movement, there will emerge in the country a climate of brightness and prosperity.

66.

The campaign's success was to be judged by political criteria since fundamentally and foremost it was said to be to "re-educate" man, changing traditional-capitalist values and practises.

In September 1963, Party General Secretary Teng Hsiao-p'ing brought out a further document concerning the Socialist Education campaign named "Some Concrete Policy Formulations of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in the Rural Socialist Education Movement (Draft)", simply

known as the "Later Ten Points". The Later Ten Points appeared different from the previous ones in that they stressed the need for the cadres to keep everything under control. While there was a stronger call for the formulation of work teams, the teams were instructed not to undermine the authority of the existing Party structure (Article II). Tutelage over the basic-level cadres was not to be interpreted as taking control. Only lip service seemed to be paid to mass mobilization and class struggle as the document made it quite clear that the "revolution" depended upon the quality of the Party organization.⁶⁷ While the Later Ten Points (like the First Ten Points) restated that there was to be a readjustment of basic Party units, organization, and the economic structure to strengthen political education and eliminate "bad elements" (this to be done by the work teams), all this was to be accomplished by "gentle handling", even of landlords and rich peasants (Article VII). The movement was to be a mild one so as not to harm production while advancing the class struggle, and from the Later Ten Points it appeared that economic factors were to be the important ones of the campaign. Both Parris Chang and this writer (Baum implied this also) believed that although Mao criticized the Later Ten Points for neglecting the struggle between the "two classes" and the "two roads", he did not really see the true distortion of his initial purpose for the campaign until June 1964 at which time he reaffirmed that the success of the campaign could only be established by political criteria.⁶⁸ The 1964

New Year edition of the Chinese daily papers carried Mao's address stressing the "great vigor" of the people and the radical political developments during the campaign as "politics taking command". The PLA was to be emulated for its political and ideological virtue (this became the 1964 "Learn from the PLA" campaign). The editorials emphasized the need to cultivate a "revolutionary successor" generation to keep up the class struggle when the old leaders died. It also contained a strong vilification of Soviet revisionism, and warned that China too may "change colors" if it should stray from its revolutionary path to become capitalistic. The editorials ended with a glorification of "Mao-study" which stated that by participating in the "cult of Mao-study" one could learn how to deal with daily problems and follow the "correct road".^{69.}

In June 1964, Mao possibly optimistic over the advance of ideological conversion of the people, issued the "Organizational Rules of Poorer and Lower-middle Peasants Associations", which gave the peasant associations greater power to "supervise" the work of management committees at each level, while stressing that their true purpose was to educate and struggle against capitalism and feudalism. The "Spring Forum on Education" (February 1964) and Ch'iang Ch'ing's (Madame Mao) reform of the Peking Opera were supposed to change societal institutions with the aim of re-shaping attitudes and values.^{70.} The "Learn from the PLA" and the "Bringing up of Successors" campaigns were in full motion by the summer. In July Mao put

Liu Shao-ch'i in charge of the "Four Cleans". (He was later to label Liu as "China's Khrushchev" and say that he put Liu in charge, knowing that Liu was elitist and that his handling of the campaign would demonstrate that he was only concerned with production.) Liu issued a revised draft of the Later Ten Points, known as the Revised Later Ten Points in September 1964. The revised draft had a very pessimistic outlook and dwelt on the seriousness of the problems facing China. Basically, the Revised Later Ten Points focused on the lack of integrity and political awareness of the basic-level cadres, and emphasized the great importance of the work teams which were to be chosen and controlled by the leading cadres. The document stated that "the whole movement should be run by the work teams" (Article III). The basic cadres were to be dealt with more seriously and with less leniency. A hard line was also to be taken towards the masses, subjecting everyone to greater mobilization.

Among all work items of the Socialist Education Movement, mobilization of the masses should be put in the first place. It is the fundamental task in developing the Socialist Education Movement. (Article II)

The document went on to say that the majority of cadres could be consolidated only after the peasant masses had been fully mobilized (Article VI). In this way Liu seemed to be reversing the Later Ten Points which intended this undertaking to go on simultaneously. The Revised Later Ten Points was subsequently attacked by Mao as putting all the blame for political and economic difficulties on the lower-level cadres

in order to distract attention from the vices of the top bureaucracy. Mao appeared to have said that he was not willing to compromise on the issues of class struggle and decentralization, and that Liu was a "revisionist" for he was not using the "Marxist-Leninist method of looking at things" and was neglecting to study the contradiction between capitalism and socialism.⁷¹ Hence, Mao apparently decided that the campaign should also include involving the masses to rectify the top Party people who were taking the capitalist road.

In December 1964 Premier Chou En-lai's report to the National People's Congress, "Report on Government Work", called for an enlargement of the Socialist Education campaign for "cleaning up in politics, economics, ideology, and organization" everywhere. This seemed to imply that the campaign was to have a greater scope than before. There similarly appeared to be a realization that economic factors could be incorporated into the campaign although Mao's principal priorities for the Socialist Education campaign still focussed on greater on peasant mobilization, the improvement of leadership, the elimination of "bad elements" engaged in destructive activities, and the elimination of cadre corruption and malpractice. In Chou's report to the Congress he emphasized:

We must promote both the revolutionary spirit of daring to think, daring to speak and daring to act and a scientific realistic approach. On the one hand, there must be great enthusiasm in work and on the other, labor must be alternated with rest.

72.

It was apparently Chou who apparently in a less pretentious and non-threatening manner (to Mao's political position) got Mao's approval to include economic matters so that production would not suffer because of the campaign but might benefit by linking enthusiasm for socialism in its ideological form with enthusiasm for socialism in its economic form. While political consciousness was stated to be always necessary for increased production as "politics takes command", mistakes of the Great Leap Forward were not to be repeated.

... When the movement was completed, there would 'emerge throughout the nation a new climate for progress into greater prosperity.'

73.

In 1965 there seemed to be clear indications that Mao was struggling hard for the ascendancy of his version of the campaign. The New Year editorial for 1965 in People's Daily once again affirmed the antagonistic contradiction between capitalism and socialism which had been downgraded in the Revised Later Ten Points. Mao formally repudiated the Revised Later Ten Points and in a new dictum, "Some Problems Currently Arising in the Course of the Rural Socialist Education Movement" (known as the "Twenty-three Points"), began by stating the existence of antagonistic contradictions and a struggle between capitalism and socialism which the campaign was to eradicate. This view of the campaign as revolving around the "two roads" was presented as the only Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the campaign (Article II). A new set of "four cleans" ("clean politics, clean economics,

clean organization, and clean ideology") was to be applied to both the countryside and the cities. "Three-way Alliances" were to be formed between the peasants, basic cadres, and work teams to "boldly unleash the masses" (Article V). Consequently there was also to be less hostility to the basic-level cadres who were to be rectified through education and persuasion. The real villains were said to be residing higher up.

The key point of this Movement is to rectify those people in positions of authority within the Party who take the capitalist road ... for there are some [among those at higher levels]... even in the work of Provincial and Central Committee department, who oppose socialism. (Article II)

By the spring and summer of 1965 "consolidation of cadres and masses became a major focus"⁷⁴ of the campaign. The quest for unity between the cadres and the masses and better production apparently became the core of a new rural policy giving greater power to the peasant associations. Harsh methods were no longer used to weed out class enemies among the basic-level cadres.

There was little evidence, however, that this easing of pressure on the basic-level cadres was accompanied by any major shift of the Four Clean movement to new targets at higher levels;

75.

no effective mechanism for such a campaign existed as yet.

76.

The last major campaign which took place under the rubric of the Socialist Education campaign began in July 1965 to "study the thought of Mao Tse-tung". It seemed to

demonstrate a more radical shift in the campaign as Mao was probably increasingly regaining power over Liu and Teng. Very strong emphasis was placed on self-reliance and self-sacrifice. Mao more strongly seemed to imply that good economic performance did not mean good ideological performance. In order to extend political control and ideological education, "political instructors" (usually from the PLA) and "political team leaders" were sent into production brigades. By October 1965 a smaller campaign was in progress to "revolutionize hsien Party committees", and Party secretaries started to submit to public self-criticism. In November began the attack on Wu Han, and from there, the Socialist Education campaign quickly expanded into the Cultural Revolution.

The Socialist Education campaign was interesting for a number of reasons. Mao (and his supporters) seemed to have launched it at a time when he appeared to have lost effective control of the Party organization and apparently stood in opposition to its two central figures, Liu and Teng. China was recovering from the Great Leap Forward and the ensuing years of difficulties and natural calamities, and was enjoying a period of "capitalistic" liberalization.⁷⁷ As a result Mao launched his campaign, it would seem, to regain control of the Party using a highly-revolutionized PLA and masses as power bases, aiming to redirect China along the "revolutionary" development path he felt the country should follow. It was this latter purpose which seemingly made the

Socialist Education campaign an ideological mass movement like the All People Rectification campaign. Here again Mao apparently attempted to change the values, attitudes and practises of the Chinese population as the first and necessary step to the type of development he envisaged. As in the Rectification campaign, Mao possibly hoped the Socialist Education campaign would mobilize and ideologically convert the masses, change the attitudes and corrupt work style of the cadres, improve leadership, eliminate "bad elements" everywhere who were trying to destroy socialism, and afterward increase production. However, it was the first of these purposes - the attempt to regain effective control of the Party apparatus - which made the Socialist Education campaign different from the Rectification campaign. In the Socialist Education campaign one could easily note the attempts of the Party apparatus leaders to shift the emphasis of the campaign away from ideological indoctrination and mass mobilization for ideological-political purposes to economic matters and increased discipline to the Party. This shift in the campaign was probably to decrease its radicalism, and the possible destructive effects upon the leaders of the Party apparatus themselves and the economy. While on a general, more superficial level the two sides apparently disputed the direction and criteria for judging the campaign, there seemed to be evidence of a deeper struggle behind the campaign showing a divided leadership and hints of a much more profound struggle for power to come. It came in the form of the

Cultural Revolution.

Although the prime focus of this mass campaign was ideological, like the All People Rectification campaign, later stages of this campaign demonstrated that economic issues were also to be discussed and acted upon. Those Party leaders who controlled the Party apparatus and hence policy implementation apparently tried to dilute the ideological aspects of the campaign to shift the campaign's prime focus to economic matters. While it would seem that Mao was able to return the campaign to its initial purposes, economic factors remained in the campaign, although they were not Mao's principal concern. As in the Rectification campaign, one could speculate that it was Chou and his supporters in the State Council and Central Committee who were able to get Mao to endorse the addition of some limited economic issues to the campaigns, attempting to ensure that production would not suffer as a result of the campaign. Ideology and economics were seemingly linked in later stages of the campaign so that "when the movement was completed, there would emerge throughout the country a new climate for progress into greater prosperity."⁷⁸ One could so speculate that Chou was able to do this since Mao knew him to be a loyal supporter and no threat to his power, unlike either Liu and Teng.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter began with a look at mass campaigns in general. Since they were a regular phenomena of the Chinese

political process, they had great significance in the operation of the system. To determine why the communists seemed to have felt them to be important and successful enough to use continuously, we decided to look at their leaders, targets, and purposes. In the early years of the People's Republic (1949-1955), mass campaigns appear to have been used to accomplish basic Party programs and tasks. A united Party leadership apparently aimed its programs at the masses in order to reconstruct the economy and build socialist sociopolitical organizations and institutions. Such "functionally specific" mass campaigns were for land reform, labor drives, studying of election laws, discussion of the constitution, ending waste, malpractice, corruption, and so on. Even the setting up of the National People's Congress and the First Five Year Plan could be viewed as belonging to this group.⁷⁹ In these mass campaigns, therefore, the leaders were probably the whole Party leadership, the target was apparently the entire Chinese population, and the goals appeared to be the accomplishment of the political and economic tasks designated by the Party.

After the 1956-57 Hundred Flowers campaign there seemed to arise a new trend in mass campaigns, primarily different in its purpose and leaders. These post-1956 campaigns were apparently not to accomplish a specific political or economic Party task, but to change the entire value system, and consequently the attitudes and practises, of the people through ideological indoctrination to the new Maoist ideology. Social-

ism and the Maoist revolutionary ethic stood in opposition to tradition, capitalism, and revisionism.

A review of the 1957-1958 All People Rectification campaign and the 1962-1965 Socialist Education campaign showed that possibly Mao and his supporters among the radicals were the principal inaugurators of these campaigns, although it appeared that the whole Party leadership acquiesced and supported Mao and his campaigns (in the Socialist Education campaign they later appeared to turn against him however). These two campaigns seemed to be aimed at both the masses and the cadres, unlike the pre-1956 mass campaigns which did not specifically label the cadres as needing to be changed and "rectified". Quite likely, the prime purpose of the post-1956 campaigns was ideological, that is for indoctrination to the Maoist ideology. However, while these mass campaigns apparently dealt principally with developing a new social system and revolutionary ethos, in later stages economic issues were introduced. This is not to say that the campaigns ever changed their basic ideological direction, but that along with ideological matters, economic ones were also discussed in the campaign's later phases. This may have been because Chou and the moderates, after reaffirming and furthering all Mao's ideological goals for mobilization and modernization, could add and encourage economic mobilization and modernization. The economic issues, however, were in the same type of ideological terms used in the other discussions, ensuring

that the movement always focused back on its central purpose.

For example,

a party directive ... equated conservatism with waste; it instructed cadres to immediately do away with 'obsolete' norms and systems that would hamper production and challenged cadres to 'think and act' bravely to invent new ways and new models to promote a great leap in every sphere of work. 80.

In the Socialist Education campaign, economic progress could probably be attributed to Chou and the moderates, who by supporting Mao (and therefore the ideological aspects of the campaigns), could add economic issues on to the closing phases of the campaigns. The moderates may have been able to do this because they apparently did not attempt to redirect the campaign away from its ideological goals to solely concentrate on production (as Lui and Teng had undoubtedly attempted) and therefore did not threaten Mao's political position or Mao's principal goals for the campaign. What occurred in later stages of the campaigns was simultaneous ideological and economic study and work.

In conclusion, the 1957-1958 All People Rectification campaign and the 1962-1965 Socialist Education campaign, appear to have been attempts by Mao (and the radicals) "to institute fundamental changes according to his vision of the good society."⁸¹ The leaders of mass campaigns of the "ideological" type had assumed that the 'reconstruction of man' through ideological indoctrination was essential for the further advance of socialist construction."⁸² In both cases

however, these were not simply ideological campaigns. Economic issues were added to their later phases, probably under the guidance of Chou and the moderates, although ideological indoctrination always remained the prime purpose. Therefore one might conclude that the post-1956 mass campaigns had as their leaders Mao and the radicals whose purpose for the campaigns was ideological indoctrination to a new society aimed at the masses (and cadres), with Chou and the moderates as leaders of an attempt to include economic issues into the later stages of the campaign for the purpose of increasing production (naturally also aimed at the masses).

One might raise the question at this point if all mass campaigns which were first ideological were later also economic? At best we could only speculate since the number of mass campaigns since 1956 has been few. In studying the All People Rectification campaign and the Socialist Education campaign, we found this dual functioning to be true. However, besides the anti-Confucius campaign, the only other mass campaigns not studied here were the Cultural Revolution and the anti-Lin Piao campaign. It was not until 1974-1975 that one noticed the linking of the Cultural Revolution and any of its "reforms" with great strides in production.⁸³ This was similarly the case with criticism of Lin Piao. However, the anti-Lin Piao campaign was still in progress at this time, while the Cultural Revolution had ended by 1969. Therefore, if we acknowledged that the Cultural Revolution was an "ideological" mass campaign, then we could not definitely

state that all campaigns which were first ideological were later also economic since this did not appear to be the case in the Cultural Revolution. We would speculate, however, that as the Chinese leadership in the post-Mao era seemed to put greater emphasis on a prosperous economy (it now appears to be of prime importance), that any other mass campaign in the future would have economic issues being at least as crucial as any others in the campaigns.

So far this discussion of mass campaigns, especially the post-1956 ideological ones, has not taken us much further in validating the hypotheses of this paper, namely that the anti-Confucius campaign was similar in many ways to the mass campaigns prior to it, but that it differed with them primarily because it was the arena of a crucial power struggle. What now must be done is to discover the nature of the anti-Confucius campaign - its leaders, targets, and purpose, in order to compare it with what is known of mass campaigns. This should validate the paper's first hypothesis concerning similarities of campaigns. A review of the political context of the times should then do the same for the second hypothesis concerning a power struggle.

Since it seems apparent that the mass campaigns of this second "ideological" trend, were not simple, clear-cut phenomena, we will have to watch closely during the review of the anti-Confucius campaign in Chapter 3 to see if different shifts occurred as to purposes and leaders. The Socialist

Education campaign showed a divided leadership and the beginnings of a power confrontation; these also should be watched for. In order to make a comparison we will be looking in particular for the campaign's leaders, targets, and purposes. In Chapter 3 there will be an examination of the official pronouncements of the anti-Confucius campaign, taken principally from 1973-1975 editions of Peking Review. Afterwards, in Chapter 4 we will be able to proceed with the comparison and review the political context of the time to see if the points of the anti-Confucius campaign which were not explained in the context of mass campaigns could be explained in this way.

Footnotes - Chapter 2

30. A. Liu, "Mass Campaigns and Political Development in China", Current Scene XI (August, 1973) p.1
31. Ibid.
32. J. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, Berkley: University of California Press, 1969 p.72-73
33. Ibid.
34. Quoted in J. Townsend, op.cit., p.185
35. Ibid. p.186
36. Ibid. p.189 and p.190-191 respectively
37. L. Pye, "Mass Participation in Communist China: Its Limits and the Continuity of Change", China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, (ed) J. Lindbeck, Seattle University of Washington Press, 1971 p.32
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid. p.20
40. A. Liu, op.cit., p.2
41. Quoted in J. Townsend, op.cit., p.188n
42. A. Liu, op.cit., categories C and D, p.2-3
43. J. Townsend, op.cit., p.187ff
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid. p.188
46. Ibid. p.188 and 186 respectively
47. Ibid. p.187
Ibid. p.189, A. Liu, op.cit., p.2-3; P. Chang, Power and Policy in China, London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975 p.76

48. R. MacFarquhar, The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals, New York: Praeger Publishing, 1960 p.35-36
49. P. Chang, Power and Policy in China, London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975 p.67-68
50. J. Townsend, op.cit., p.188
51. Ibid.
52. S. Schram, "Introduction: the Cultural Revolution in historical perspective", Authority, Participation, and Cultural Change in China, (ed) S. Schram, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973 p.52
53. J. Townsend, op.cit., p.188
54. J. Gray, "Two Roads: alternative strategies of social change and economic growth in China", S. Schram (ed), op.cit., p.116
55. Baum included this "transition period" in the time sequel for the Socialist Education campaign. R. Baum and F. Teiwes, Ssu-ch'ing" The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-1966, Berkeley: University of California, 1968 p.24
56. H. Hinton, Introduction to Chinese Politics, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973 p.50
57. Ibid. p.50-51
58. Ibid.
59. "Lienchiang Documents" (Party communiques collected from October 1962 to March 1963) Peking Review XXXIX, 1962
60. P. Chang, op.cit., p.147-149
61. Ibid. p.148

62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. S. Schram, op.cit., p.78
65. Ibid. p.77n
66. "Draft Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Some Problems in Current Rural Work", Peking Press, May 1963
67. S. Schram, op.cit., p.77
68. P. Chang, op.cit., p.152
69. New Year editorial, Peking Review (January 1, 1964)
70. S. Schram, op.cit., p.80
71. R. Baum and F. Teiwes, op.cit., p.37
72. "Premier Chou En-lai's Report on the Work of the Government", Peking Review (January 1, 1965) p.11
73. H. Hinton, op.cit., p.52
74. R. Baum and F. Teiwes, op.cit., p.38
75. Ibid. p.39
76. S. Schram, op.cit., p.76
77. R. MacFarquhar (ed), op.cit., p.127
78. H. Hinton, op.cit., p.52
79. A. Liu, op.cit., p.2
80. P. Chang, op.cit., p.70
81. A. Liu, op.cit., p.9
82. J. Townsend, op.cit., p.188
83. "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is Fine", Peking Review XVII (June 14, 1974) p.5

CHAPTER 3

This chapter will attempt to summarize the themes and official documentation of the anti-Confucius campaign. Hopefully this will enable us to answer questions concerning the leaders, targets, and functions of the campaign. An analysis of the campaign will follow in Chapter 4.

The data in this chapter was primarily acquired by reading Peking Review and China Reconstructs, the latter in most cases reprinting articles from the former. Peking Review carried the main articles of China's daily Party newspapers, and articles pertaining to the anti-Confucius campaign dominated the journal from the fall of 1973 to the summer of 1975, the bulk of the items appearing in 1974. Although all the key points of the campaign were continuously being stated, they will only be noted once unless they changed, or were emphasized differently. Moreover, the historical background and exploits of Confucius, Mencius, Emperor Ch'in Shih-huang, and the Legalists will not receive the detailed attention that so many of the articles in Peking Review gave them. The encapsulation of the events of these times (approximately the ninth and tenth centuries B.C.) provided by Peking Review was filled with inaccuracies and was written with a strong class struggle slant with the obvious intention of making Confucius the reactionary villain and the Legalists the progressives of history. It should be noted however, that the "sins" of Confucius and the "correct thinking" of

the Legalists were apparently used as an analogy to current events, trends, and people.

The final point to be made before the summation concerned the link between the anti-Lin Piao and anti-Confucius campaigns. In Chapter 1 of this paper we stated that we did not believe that the anti-Confucius campaign was simply an appendage to the campaign against Lin Piao in order to strengthen it. The other writers listed also treated the anti-Confucius campaign as distinct. However, the Chinese press did commonly link the two campaigns with such statements as "strengthen the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius" in the titles and opening paragraphs of articles. While it seemed that no time went by when the press did not try to show that Lin was a diehard Confucianist, we will nevertheless attempt to note the distinctive feature of the anti-Confucius campaign wherever possible. Points raised during the campaign and the actual attack upon Confucius should answer the questions about the nature and reasons for the anti-Confucius campaign and enable a comparison between it and the other ideological mass campaigns previous to it.

In August 1973 an article appeared in Peking Review which began a somewhat lengthy campaign to criticize Confucius and his disciple Mencius.⁸⁴ Liu Shao-ch'ei and "other political swindlers" were said to be using the "weapons" of Confucius and Mencius to attack the proletariat and stage a counter-revolutionary come-back.⁸⁵ The prolet-

ariat was entreated to struggle against "outdated traditional ideas and erroneous schools and trends of thought", as Emperor Ch'in Shih-huang and the Legalists had done. The article went on to say that the past repeats itself. People must therefore learn past history and know the other schools and trends of thought so that they could recognize old vestiges of these things when they reappeared in the present and be better prepared to struggle against them. "The struggles of different schools and trends of thought in the ideological sphere in the last analysis reflect the tendencies and ideology of the antagonistic classes in modern society."⁸⁶. The "Party's basic line" was said to be the masses' guide through these struggles.

In conjunction with discovering old enemies and struggling against them, the article strongly championed the need for the revolution in the superstructure, where traditional tendencies still persisted, in order to fill it with "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought". Apparently there was not enough "revolutionary fervor" or use of the Party line in handling problems. "Some comrades" were worried solely about production and did not see that changes were needed in the superstructure which in turn would benefit the economy.

Take firm hold of the revolution in the superstructure and a great spurt in production and construction will follow on the heels of its victory. One powerful proof is the flourishing Big Leap situation of 1958, which came in the wake of the great victory of the socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts in 1957.

87.

In August 1973 the Tenth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party took place. The Congress was the scene of both strong calls for unity within the Party and even stronger attacks upon the late Defense Minister and heir apparent Lin Biao. The campaign to criticize him was to continue and a campaign to educate people about Confucius so that they could recognize and struggle against remnants of his reactionary practices was officially launched. In October an article in Peking Review marked the official beginning of the pronouncements about Confucius and the Legalists, discussing Confucius and the "class struggle" between the Confucian and Legalists schools.⁵ The core of Confucius' thought was summarized as "benevolence" (jen) which could be traced back to the ideology of the slave-owning class of the Yin and Western Chou Dynasties. Benevolence (or tolerance, compromise, or good-fellowship) was practised by the slave-owners amongst themselves in order to remain strong and united to keep the slaves controlled. According to the article, benevolence was false, for it was not practised with the slaves, and it contradicted the moving force of history which was struggle - the struggle of the oppressed against the oppressors. The Legalists who opposed the slave-owners and Confucianism were written as being fighters, "on the ideological front", for a new economic order and a society governed by laws. The article announced that the contention between Confucius and the Legalists was therefore really a class struggle on the ideo-

logical front between retrogression (or stagnation) and the progressive forces of history.⁸⁸ (It must be noted, however, that the communists never placed the Legalists' struggle on the same level as that of the proletariat. The Legalists' struggle was not entirely seen as the ancestor of present struggles since it did aid the establishment of a landlord system which still exploited the lower class.) Current criticism of Confucius was to be equal to participating in a real class struggle the same as occurred in the regime's early years against traditional practises and institutions.

Criticism of Confucius' reactionary thought is therefore helpful to taking part in actual class struggle, and especially to grasping the class struggle in the ideological sphere of the super-structure.

89.

Articles between October 1973 and January 1974 did not deal with Confucius or link him with Lin Piao. Pronouncements about Lin continued to call the campaign against him "the movement to criticize Lin Piao and rectify the style of work" as they had always done. The last edition of 1973 complained that "many are thinking and advocating the theory of the dying out of class struggle".⁹⁰ The "New Year Message" only mentioned that it was necessary to criticize "worshipping" Confucius and similarly increase the number of Marxist theorists.⁹¹ However, in February 1974 editions of the Peking Review focussed almost completely on Confucius and Lin Piao, now linked as master and follower. The first article demonstrated that criticism of both, as well as other

"political swindlers" who were "reactionary", could be done at one time.

They [plant workers] criticize Confucius' reactionary points of view and at the same time expose and criticize the criminal aims of Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao and other swindlers who worshipped and exalted Confucius. 92.

Lin Piao and the others were said to be using Confucius' reactionary ideology to restore capitalism. An article also appeared in the same edition against Antonioni, the Italian director, and the film he was permitted apparently by Premier Chou En-lai to make about China. The critique basically stated that Antonioni had not filmed China's revolutionary progress and accomplishments but that this was to be expected from a bourgeoisie attempting to discredit socialism.^{93.}

In the ensuing edition many articles appeared dealing in depth with the sins and similarities of Lin and Confucius. The first article stated that it was Mao who was against Confucius and those who opposed the Legalist school. A comprehensive list was given of Confucius' reactionary ways (some of these were mentioned in all subsequent articles concerning the campaign). The wickedness Confucius advocated centered on: (1) "restrain oneself and restore the rights" which was against revolutionary mass fervor and scientific socialism, (2) "born with knowledge" maintained class and status distinctions, (3) "highest are wise and the lowest are stupid" maintained fatalism, permanency, and the baseness of the peasants, (4) "virtue, benevolence, and righteous" was against violence

and dictatorship, (5) "doctrine of the mean" was against struggle, (6) "recoiling in order to extend" maintained compromise and corruption among careerists waiting to strike, (7) mental rule is better than physical labor was against cadres doing manual labor, and (8) "revere only own school" maintained narrowmindedness and the building of personal dynasties.⁹⁴ Lin was said to also have advocated these ideas, as well as having taught them to his son. He was apparently using Confucianism

as a reactionary ideological weapon to usurp the Party leadership, seize state power, and restore capitalism and the old order. Therefore only by criticizing the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius advocated by Lin Piao can we repudiate the ultra-rightist nature of his counter-revolutionary revisionist line penetratingly and thoroughly.

95.

Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius was seen as a "serious class struggle and a thoroughgoing revolution in the realm of ideology in China today."⁹⁶ It was linked with "the current class struggle and struggle between the two lines, persisting in revolution, opposing retrogression, adopting the correct attitude toward the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and enthusiastically supporting new emerging socialist things."⁹⁷ With the campaign to criticize Confucius, war was declared on feudalism, capitalism, revisionism, and reactionism, and a blow was to be struck against imperialism, this to be accomplished by an attempt "to go against the tide, advance in the teeth of storms."⁹⁸ There was also a section

in this same edition titled "Lin Piao is a devout disciple of Confucius". This section had various small items by students, soldiers, peasants, and workers in it. Besides reiterating the connections between the two villains, the anti-Confucius campaign was linked to the Cultural Revolution, the end of old culture, and the remoulding of the intellectuals. Criticism of Confucius was to help in "consolidating and expanding the achievements of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" and, in "transforming the superstructure", it allowed "a complete rupture with old culture, old traditions, and old ideology".⁹⁹ The Cultural Revolution had apparently created "new ideas, new culture, new customs, and new habits"¹⁰⁰ and with the anti-Confucius campaign formed "an ideological revolution".¹⁰¹ The anti-Confucius campaign was likewise to be an attempt

to remould the ideology of the intellectuals. Looking down upon the workers and peasants, despising labor, regarding knowledge as one's private property and seeking to sell it at a good price, observing the "doctrine of the mean", advancing the concept that "he who excels in learning can be an official", etc. - such are the ideological problems often found among the intellectuals. Only by criticizing the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius can the deepest roots of these ideological problems be exposed ... and help the intellectuals remould their world outlook.

102.

Therefore, while Confucius was long dead, Confucian agents were at work in the Party, Confucian ways were practised by the intellectuals, and Confucian attitudes were struggling against those proclaimed during the Cultural Revolution in

the minds of the masses.

Peking Review's next edition was also principally composed of articles involving Confucius and Lin Piao. For the first time the anti-Confucius campaign was labelled a mass movement and said to have the functions of deepening the criticism of Lin Piao, the rectification of Party's work style and the social revolution in the superstructure.^{103.} The article went on to state that there had been a struggle between the Party and Lin on opposing Confucius which was the struggle between the two classes and the two lines, that is between progression and retrogression, revolution and counter-revolution during socialism, consolidating or retreating from the achievements of the Cultural Revolution.^{104.} Criticism of Confucius, as well as of Lin Piao, would "make clear the distinction between Marxism and revisionism, between materialism and idealism, between revolution and counter-revolution."^{105.} These opposing forces still continued to exist under socialism for remnants of exploiting classes still existed.

Looking down on manual labor, contempt for women, despising workers and peasants, dislike of newly emerging things and forces, idolizing things foreign and restoring the old order and the unhealthy trend of letting people 'go in the back door' - these are traditional concepts of the exploiting classes which have their social and class origins and can be traced ideologically to the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius. 106.

In the ensuing section, the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius was said to "stand for retrogression against progression, for conservatism and against reform, for restora-

tion of the old order and against revolution, ... of opres-
sion and exploitation, of staging a counter-revolutionary
come-back."¹⁰⁷ Criticism of this doctrine could easily be
linked with "concrete struggles and reality", but first the
masses had to know the two lines thoroughly so that they
could adequately and successfully criticize Confucius and
"the Rightist deviationist trend of thought which negates
the achievements of the Great Proletarian Culture Revolution,
opposes new socialist things and tries to turn back the wheel
of history."¹⁰⁸ Taking part in criticism would apparently
enable the people "to be more conscious of resisting the
bourgeoisie ideologically and develop the style of plain
living and hard work."¹⁰⁹ The articles in other February
editions of Peking Review continued along the same lines,
with occasionally some lengthy texts on the historical strug-
gle between Confucius and the Legalists added. Articles
against Antonioni's film on China also continued.

While March editions presented the same themes in the
Confucian articles, a few new points were made. Confidence
was expressed in the cadres and masses ability to carry the
anti-Confucius campaign through to a successful finish by
launching a revolution in the superstructure against old,
bourgeois, and/or capitalist practises. "Party committees
and leading cadres at all levels should stand in the fore-
front of the movement ..."¹¹⁰ to give direction to the en-
thusiasm and actions of the masses and cadres.

As part of the struggle in the superstructure, a sharp struggle was waged in art and literature between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. An article criticized allowing Western music in China since bourgeois music would apparently adversely influence the masses. It was claimed that nothing was abstract and could be enjoyed as such because everything had social content and reflected social class.¹¹¹ A strong complaint was issued in the article against increasing bourgeois penetration into Chinese communist culture, a "fetish for foreign things and restoring the old order of things."¹¹² In March 1974 was also the beginning of a series of articles lasting into 1975 about how Confucianism exploited women. One article stated that Confucius layed down the principle of "male superiority, female inferiority". This unfortunately was still true in socialist China because exploiting classes still existed. The struggle between the two lines would apparently lead to the emancipation of women; "this movement will surely create still more favorable conditions for the thorough emancipation of the women of China."¹¹³

At the end of March came the only article about Confucius which mentioned erroneous thinking about Confucius. Feng Yulan wrote that he used to be a follower of Confucius, but now, through the anti-Confucius campaign and his participation in it, he saw the mistakes that he had made. Feng entreated other intellectuals to learn by taking part in the campaign, and that the Party now had a new policy to "unite with, educate, and remould the intellectuals" to help them come to socialism.¹¹⁴

Another article in the same edition gave a warning to all "reactionaries both at home and abroad who attack both the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and now the Lin Piao-Confucius campaigns." This was a serious mistake made by "some comrades in our own ranks". The article concluded that "it is right to rebel against reactionaries".¹¹⁵

During the rest of the spring months similar articles appeared concerning the anti-Confucius campaign. Particularly visible were articles about women, art and literature, and Antonioni's film. Beginning in April, stress was placed upon youth going back to the country (pro-rustification movement), a continuation of school reforms such as manual work, political study, greater teacher-student cooperation, and the cadres doing manual labor and attending "May 7" cadre schools - all of these reforms of the Cultural Revolution. There was also near constant reference to Confucius and his sympathizers, the "Soviet revisionist social-imperialists".¹¹⁶ Referring to both China and the Soviet Union, an article stated that "a given culture is the ideological reflection of the politics and economy of a given society."¹¹⁷ Therefore, cultural and ideological campaigns would definitely have political and economic ramifications.

In June new components were brought into the anti-Confucius campaign. An article called for more theory building and study so that everyone could become Marxist theorists and better engage in struggle. Thus the campaign was to serve as

a school for this.¹¹⁸ "Worker-peasant-soldier theorists who are not divorced from production" were to develop as well as a "contingent of professional theorists" who were to integrate them.¹¹⁹ This was to be the immediate task of the whole Party. In this same edition of Peking Review, two articles were published praising the Cultural Revolution and promoting production. The many achievements of the Cultural Revolution were said to be inspiring economic successes. "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a powerful motive force for the development of the socialist productive forces in our country."¹²⁰ Besides many other accomplishments, the anti-Confucius campaign was said to be encouraging production, "getting higher output for the revolution, ... smashing schemes to restore capitalism."¹²¹ In criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius, cadres have further raised their consciousness in taking part in productive labor."¹²²

The last June edition re-stated the need and the purpose of the anti-Confucius campaign.

Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius is a political and ideological struggle in the superstructure, through which Marxism prevails over revisionism and the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. Therefore, in order to deepen the revolution in the superstructure and the ideological realm and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is necessary to repeatedly criticize the reactionary ideas of Confucius.

123.

These reactionary ideas were the upholding of feudalism and political, clan, religious and masculine authorities. The only authority which the masses were to uphold was that of

the Party, which acted on the behalf of the proletariat. The masses were to be united behind the Party, carrying out its policies in order to accomplish a revolution in the superstructure, the real aim of the Cultural Revolution.¹²⁴.

The first Peking Review edition for July began with lengthy articles on Confucius, his family, and society. In one, "Confucius - the Man" there were descriptions of Confucius and a restatement of many of the subjects linked in the campaign. The general description, though, was of a different nature than others which had focused on benevolence, virtue, restoring rights, and so on.

Confucius was a stubborn, fierce but very weak man; he was sinister, cunning and rotten to the core. This was the nature of the declining slave-owning class he represented and a feature common to all reactionary classes on the verge of extinction. Thorough exposure of Confucius' reactionary features is of great significance today in order to see through such political swindlers as Wang Ming, Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao and counter-attack the adverse current of retrogression and restoration.

125.

This article also contained a strong commentary on women. Confucius had "put the masses of women in the lowest stratum of society", but they were apparently disproving "male superiority" in China by taking important places in the economic process. A similarly strong commentary followed on the Cultural Revolution. Opposition to the Cultural Revolution was seen as analogous to Confucius being "against all new-born things arising from big social upheaval".¹²⁶. Another article in this section dealt exclusively with the need and

merits of "spare-time study groups" and "worker theorists". These were to be greatly encouraged by the Party for they gave the mass campaign its vigor. Here also was the first mention of the anti-Confucius campaign as "personally initiated and led by Chairman Mao".^{127.}

A few weeks later Peking Review carried another item about Confucius. A new sin of Confucius was his desire to "politically liberate without exception all renegades and rightists". This doctrine was also "peddled by the ring-leaders of the opportunist lines in the Party".^{128.} Confucius' doctrine and this faction of the Party were linked to Soviet revisionism again. Students were entreated not to be detracted from going to the countryside, a reform labelled "a socialist new-born thing which class enemies will inevitably try to sabotage."^{129.} The Cultural Revolution and all of its "socialist newborn things" were praised and shown to be responsible for great advances in production in Tibet. Here in matters of production, knowledge was integrated with practise, this being "helpful in increasing agricultural production". However, the article continued that, for even greater strides in development, there was a tremendous need for simple "hard work" (statistics for one commune were given to demonstrate this).^{130.}

An August editorial in Peking Review stated that criticism of both Lin Piao and Confucius had greatly raised "social enthusiasm" with such examples as in the areas of water conser-

vancy and irrigation.¹³¹ Other articles in this edition were on opera and art. In "A Decade of Revisionism in Peking Opera", a new militant line was proclaimed in culture, particularly opera, repudiating the revisionist line of "worshipping the old and the foreign" imposed by "Liu Shao ch'i, Chou Yang, and their gang". The new militant direction became dominant after the major literary struggles in August and September 1962 at Peitaiho and the Tenth Plenum. Mao, who supposedly initiated this change, had continuously been demanding that the Party and the masses "never forget class struggle and prevent revisionism". Through the anti-Confucius campaign, Chiang Ching was apparently carrying out Mao's dictates.¹³² Chiang's revolutionary work in culture was praised, for apparently she was attempting to put into practise the reforms of the Cultural Revolution. But, there was a "present reactionary trend of thought trying to negate the Great Proletarian Culture Revolution", opposing the militant changes in the literary revolution.¹³³ An old Maoist slogan - "no construction, without destruction" - was emphatically stressed.¹³⁴ This edition likewise had a few short items about youth going to the countryside, increasing both their study and production. Factory workers were also supposed to have given great support to agriculture and sharing the work.¹³⁵

Later August editions once more carried articles about Confucius. Once again the reason for the anti-Confucius cam-

paign was given:

the basic idea of the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius is restoration and retrogression; under the condition of socialism the ring-leaders of the opportunists wishing to restore capitalism invariably take the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius whose reactionary spectre haunts these counter-revolutionary revisionists. This is why, during this period, the struggle between the two classes and the two lines has been linked up with the struggle between opposing and worshipping Confucius.

136.

The next edition also had articles about Confucius and revolutionary opera. The items about opera stressed struggle and the Cultural Revolution and praised new-born things. The article stated that the anti-Confucius campaign was responsible for great economic strides. Because of the campaign all major cities had overfulfilled their production plans, keeping in mind that "revolution means liberating the productive forces and promoting their growth."¹³⁷. The masses were to work in the same spirit they showed studying and criticizing the cadres.

With the deepening of the movement, an experienced contingent of Marxist theoretical workers has emerged among the workers. Having received a deep education in the Party's basic line, the workers pledge to further strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, consolidate the victorious achievements of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and build socialism with greater, faster, better and more economical results.

138.

The article continued that the workers

deeply realize that criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius is a powerful motive force for developing the socialist productive forces. They pledge to continue the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius and regard it as a matter of

primary importance so as to win still greater victories in revolution and production.

139.

Because of their heightened consciousness from the campaigns,

They are now more determined than ever to implement the principle of maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands and relying on our own efforts and in following their own path in developing industry.

140.

An article appearing in the last August edition of Peking Review was a strong statement for change and revolution. Confucius preached "being unchangeable and not exceeding the limits" but Mao (and Marxist theory) demanded that everything should keep changing. In developing the productive forces, the old economic base and superstructure would have to change; those clinging to the old would be swept away. Everyone was told to struggle for change and socialism.

The opening September editorial stated that the two-line struggle was being acutely waged in the countryside, particularly in the spheres of ideology and culture. The anti-Confucius campaign would "extend the domination of socialist and culture in the countryside."¹⁴² "Old culture, old ideas and old habits and customs are being toppled, and are being replaced by new culture, new ideas, new habits and customs."¹⁴³ Production was also being greatly spurred on, with almost thirty percent greater grain output in the communes.¹⁴⁴

During the remaining months of 1974 articles related to Confucius appeared approximately every week, and glowing production reports about the Chinese economy appeared with greater

frequency. They followed the same lines as forementioned, only occasionally adding new points or shifting some emphasis. In a November article a list of some of the "new-born things" and accomplishments of the Cultural Revolution was given. Some of these were revolutions in art, literature and education, youth to the countryside, "May 7" cadre schools, cooperative medical services and "barefoot" doctors, Marxist theoretical workers, millions studying the Confucius-Legalist struggle and class struggle, and great increases in economic production.¹⁴⁵ Since these were also features of the anti-Confucius campaign, the campaign was labelled "a continuation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It is a political and ideological struggle in the super-structure through which Marxism triumphs over revisionism and the proletariat over the bourgeoisie."¹⁴⁶

In another November edition, Confucius was accused of being hostile to innovation and talent and preferred to believe in fate and the "mandate of heaven". He was said to hate everything new and all progressive social thinking;¹⁴⁷ this was likewise said to be true of many within China. The people were told by the article that they should foresake these traditional ideas and realize they could do anything, even economically. The Legalists were said to have a materialist outlook conducive to invention, but could not develop very far because "the key to the development of science and technology is a correct ideological and political line."¹⁴⁸

A December article stated that the situation in revolu-

tion and production had improved but the anti-Confucius campaign must continue to consolidate these and the gains of the Cultural Revolution. The article strongly emphasized the need to "strengthen the Party's leadership and revolutionary unity which Lin Piao tried to split ... to broaden and deepen the movement ... over a long period of time and further promote production."¹⁴⁹ There was also a call for more use of militant "theorists-workers" and activists to keep the campaign going. "At the present time we must direct our main attention to study and criticism. ... Only when we study well can we do better in raising criticism to a higher level and push the movement forward."¹⁵⁰

An article in December returned to the question of "new-born things" and cultural change. More "new-born socialist things" were added to the previous list such as physical labor by leading cadres, revolutionary theatre, and revolutionary committees.¹⁵¹ All these would ensure the continuation of the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat which, along with the all "socialist new-born things", the bourgeoisie were fighting to end. "Influenced by the force of habit, some people in our own revolutionary ranks also try wittingly or unwittingly to suppress them."¹⁵² These socialist new things were all products of Mao's mass line and the authors of the article apparently felt it was essential to popularize them. Everyone was told to remember Mao's phrase, "destroy the old and foster the new".¹⁵³

When the anti-Confucius campaign continued in 1975 the emphasis varied somewhat and quite different points were added. One of the first articles of the new year incorporated new features. In "Study the Historical Experience of the Struggle Between the Confucius and Legalist Schools", the struggle between the two schools was studied by "workers, peasants and soldiers, revolutionary cadres and revolutionary intellectuals".¹⁵⁴ These groups maintained that the struggle

helps us understand and persist in Chairman Mao's teachings that the correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything and practise Marxism, and not revisionism; unite and don't split; be open and above board, and don't intrigue and conspire.

155.

(Note: all underlining in quotes done in the articles)
The statement was made that the Party was not relying enough on the masses and was afraid of allowing the masses to perform revolutionary tasks.

Direct reliance on the revolutionary masses is a basic principle of the Communist Party ... It won't do to explain them [ideological principles] only to a few people; they must be made known to the broad revolutionary masses.

156.

In this article, when the struggle between the two historic groups was again recounted, there were some differences, which seemed to be more than ones of emphasis. In this version, the slave-owners were said to be giving economic trouble to the dynasty and conspiring with conservatives to form independent states. "They gathered together a large number of Confucian scholars to create public opinion for restoration

in the ideological realm and used their military forces to stage armed rebellion."¹⁵⁷. The slaveowners whose "experience of struggle in certain respects was richer than that of the statesmen of the new emerging landlord class" pitted it "again and again against the landlord class that was coming up."¹⁵⁸. They tried to subvert the "new centralized dynasty" by "attacking on many sides" and by attempting the line of "cleaning up around the Emperor"

...which under the facade of supporting the central authority, aimed at removing the policy-making Legalists in the central organs and putting an end to the Legalists leading group at the central level, thereby basically changing the Legalist line in the political power of the Western Han Dynasty as a whole.

159.

Mao supposedly said that since that time "many careerists have regarded it [cleaning up around the emperor] as invaluable."¹⁶⁰.

The landlords were said to be only able to triumph when the emperor put down the rebellion and launched a counter-attack.¹⁶¹.

The article concluded that the masses must be ever vigilant to counter-attack revisionism and backsliding, and that "only by persevering in long-term social revolution and social education in the political, ideological and economic fields..." can the dictatorship of the proletariat be consolidated.¹⁶².

From January 13 to 17, 1975 the Fourth National People's Congress was held. Peking Review's first report on the Congress stated that "from the beginning to the end the Congress was permeated with an atmosphere of jubilation, unity, vigor, and militancy."¹⁶³. The slogan continually reiterated was

"grasping revolution, promoting production and other work and preparedness against war."^{164.}

In Chou En-Lai's "Report on the Work of the Government" he primarily discussed the development of revolutionary works in literature and art, the revolution in education and health, the three-in-one revolution committees, "May 7" schools, and theoretical contingents. He listed many economic successes and called for harder work to speed up production.^{165.} Chou's main call was to "unite more closely, adhere to the Party's basic line and policies ..."^{166.} There should be closer ties between the leading cadres and the masses and simpler and better administration at lower levels.^{167.} Agriculture and industry were also important areas, which should not be hurt by revolutions in education and culture.

We should thoroughly criticize revisionism, criticize capitalist tendencies, and criticize such erroneous ideas and styles of work as servility to things foreign, the doctrine of trailing behind at a snail's pace, and extravagance and waste.

168.

As Chairman Mao points out: Rely mainly on our own efforts while making external assistance subsidiary, break down blind faith, go in for industry, agriculture, and technical and cultural revolution independently, do away with slavishness, bury dogmatism, learn from the good experience of other countries conscientiously and be sure to study their bad example too, so as to draw lessons from it. This is our line.

169.

The Report concluded with six future imperatives ("we must's"): first we must grasp Mao's line, that is practise Marxism and not revisionism; unite and don't split; be open and above-board, and don't intrigue and conspire", second we must support

the centralized leadership of the Party; "Of the seven sectors- industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, the Army, the government, and the Party- it is the Party that exercises overall leadership.", third we must observe discipline, practise democratic centralism and "achieve unity in thinking, policy, planning, command and action", fourth we must observe the mass line, fifth we must build socialism, and sixth we must forward proletariat internationalism.^{170.}

In 1975 these imperatives became the foci of the pronouncements in the newspapers, with only occasional articles still dealing with Confucius or any of the themes associated with the campaign. An article in March warned leading cadres who took theory and criticism campaigns too lightly and belittled Mao's mass line; a revolutionary style was said to be needed for study and practise in all fields.^{171.} In April there were two articles by Chang Chun-chiao (of the Central Committee) concerning landlord and capitalist agents inside the Party who followed Confucian ideology and defended their own political and economic interests. These cadres supposedly believed in restoring bourgeois rightists, private ownership, and the superiority of mental over physical labor.^{172.} All were told to persist in the struggle "against the forces and traditions of the old society".^{173.} According to Chang, the economy was still too capitalist - the economic base was not yet solidly socialist and new bourgeois elements were growing daily.^{174.} Old ideas and habits were holding back the

socialist new things, because parts of the superstructure were still apparently controlled by the bourgeoisie.¹⁷⁵ There was a "bourgeois wind" (fame, gain, pride) afflicting the leading cadres who "look at everything as a commodity" and say "study is a flexible task".¹⁷⁶ All bourgeois presence must be destroyed; there should be no concessions, half-way measures, or material incentives.¹⁷⁷ Chang wrote that thorough revolution to sweep away all old and bourgeois influences was needed.

The rest of the spring witnessed articles by various groups criticizing passages in Analects. During the summer articles continued about grassroots revolutionary culture, production, and women's liberation. One of the last articles concerning the campaign in China Reconstructs stated,

We don't just want to drive the landlords, emperors, feudal ministers and warriors off the stage, ... we want to drive the ideas these old operas spread out of our heads. That was the object of the mass campaign to repudiate the ideas of Confucius and his follower Mencius which the Party has led since last winter.

178.

From this review of the official pronouncements concerning the anti-Confucius campaign, it seemed apparent that while some of its aspects of the campaign, such as its two emphases on ideology and economics (in later stages), could be easily seen, there appeared to be many other confusing aspects of the campaign. Contradictory themes of militancy and caution, rebellion and unity, in the space of several editions, or even within a single edition, suggested a divided

leadership and a power struggle. This probably would make answering questions as to the functions, leaders, and targets of the anti-Confucius campaign quite difficult, and we could easily see how such complications as possibly a power struggle and divided leadership would lead to various interpretations of the campaign by the different analysts. However, in the next chapter, we shall proceed to attempt an analysis of the data in Chapter 3. This, coupled with a comparison of the anti-Confucius campaign with the two aforementioned campaigns, should allow us to speculate with some assurance as to the nature of the anti-Confucius campaign (its leaders, targets, functions) and its similarities to the ideological trend in mass campaigns. Once a review of recent political events (1969-1975) has also been undertaken in Chapter 4, we should be able to answer questions left unresolved from studying the anti-Confucius campaign in the context of mass campaigns. Hence the anti-Confucius campaign will have been studied in two contexts.

Footnotes - Chapter 3

84. "Attach Importance to the Revolution in the Superstructure", Peking Review XVI (August 24, 1973)
85. Ibid. p.6
86. Ibid. p.7 Here and following, any part of a quote underlined represents that part being in heavy black print set differently from the rest of the text in the original articles.
87. Ibid. p.6
88. "Confucius - A Thinker who Stubbornly Upheld the Slave System", Peking Review XVI (October 12, 1973), p.9
89. Ibid.
90. "Lin Piao Anti-Party Clique: Sworn Enemy of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", Peking Review XVI (December 28, 1973) p.4
91. "New Year Message" (editorial), Peking Review XVII (January 4, 1974) p.7
92. "Deepening Criticism of Lin Piao through repudiating Confucius", Peking Review XVII (February 1, 1974) p.3
93. "Criticize Antonioni's Film", op.cit., p.7
94. "Carry the Struggle to Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius Through to the End", Peking Review XVII (February 8, 1974) p.5-6
95. Ibid. p.5
96. Ibid. p.9
97. Ibid. p.11
98. Ibid. p.6

99. "Lin Piao is a devout disciple of Confucius", op.cit.,
p.12
100. Ibid. p.15
101. Ibid. p.16
102. Ibid. p.12
103. "Broaden and Deepen the Struggle to Criticize Lin Piao
and Confucius", Peking Review XVII (February 15, 1974)
p.4
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid. p.5
106. Ibid.
107. "Lin Piao and the Doctrine of Confucius and Mencius",
op.cit., p.11
108. Ibid. p.13
109. Ibid. p.14
110. "Criticize 'Restraining Onself and Restoring the Rites' ",
Peking Review XVII (March 1, 1974) p.8
111. "Criticize the Revisionist Viewpoint in Music", Peking
Review op.cit., p.18
112. Ibid.
113. "The Doctrine of Confucius and Mencius - the Shackle that
Keeps Women in Bondage", Peking Review XVII (March 8, 1974)
p.18
114. "Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius and the Party's
Policy toward the Intellectuals", Peking Review XVII
March 22, 1974) p.14

115. "Further Criticism of "Restraining Onself and Restoring the Rites", op. cit. p.14
116. "Confucius and the Flunkys of Imperialism", Peking Review XVII (June 7, 1974) p.11
117. Ibid. p.13
118. "Strengthen the Ranks of Marxist Theorists", Peking Review XVII (June 14, 1974) p.5
119. Ibid. p.6
120. "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is Fine", Peking Review, op.cit., p.9
121. "A Powerful Motive Force in Promoting Production", op. cit. p.14
122. Ibid. p.16
123. "Continue to Criticize Confucius", Peking Review XVII (June 18, 1974) p.15
124. Ibid. p.16
125. "Confucius - the Man", Peking Review XVII (July 5, 1974) p.15
126. Ibid. p.16
127. "More Study Groups and Worker Theorists", op.cit., p.22
128. "Confucius' Benevolence, Righteous and Virtue and Lin Piao's Revisionist Line", Peking Review XVII (July 19, 1974) p.7
129. Ibid. p.15
130. Ibid.
131. Editorial, Peking Review XVII (August 2, 1974) p.1-3

132. "A Decade of Revisionism in Peking Opera", op.cit., p.5
133. Ibid. p.8
134. Ibid. p.7
135. "Increasing Production", op.cit., p.10
136. "Criticism of Confucius and the Two-Line Struggle", Peking Review XVII (August 16, 1974) p.8
137. "Movement to Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius Spurs Industrial Production", Peking Review XVII (August 23, 1974) p.6
138. Ibid. p.7
139. Ibid. p.8
140. Ibid. p.7
141. "The Working Class Rejects the 'Doctrine of the Mean' ", Peking Review XVII (August 30, 1974)
142. Editorial, Peking Review XVII (September 6, 1974) p.7
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
145. "A Great Practise of Hundreds of Millions of People in Opposing and Preventing Revisionism", Peking Review XVII (November 8, 1974) p.6
146. Ibid. p.8
147. "Struggle Between Confucius and the Legalist School and Ancient China's Science and Technology", Peking Review XVII (November 22, 1974) p.11
148. Ibid. p.13

149. "Continue to Do a Good Job in Criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius", Peking Review XVII (December 6, 1974) p.5-6
150. Ibid. p.6
151. "Develop the Socialist New Things", Peking Review XVII (December 20, 1974) p.9
152. Ibid. p.10
153. Ibid. p.15
154. "Study the Historical Experience of the Struggle Between the Confucius and Legalist Schools", Peking Review XVIII (January 10, 1975) p.8
155. Ibid. p.10 Note: All underlining in quotes were done in the articles. This was the same in all cases used here.
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid.
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid. p.11
160. Ibid.
161. Ibid. p.10-11
162. Ibid. p.12
163. "Fourth National People's Congress", Peking Review XVIII (January 24, 1975) p.7
164. Ibid.
165. "Report on the Work of the Government", op.cit., p.22-23
166. Ibid. p.22
167. Ibid. p.23

- 168. Ibid.
- 169. Ibid. p.24
- 170. Ibid. p.25
- 171. "Leading Cadres Must Study Well", Peking Review XVIII (March 28, 1975).
- 172. "Criticize the Doctrine of Confucius and Mencius to Consolidate the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", Peking Review XVIII (April 18, 1975) p.4
- 173. "On Exercising All Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie", Peking Review XVIII (April 4, 1975) p.5
- 174. Ibid. p.6
- 175. Ibid. p.8
- 176. Ibid. p.10
- 177. Ibid.
- 178. "We Don't Put Our Trust in Heaven, We Make Revolution", China Reconstructs XXIV (February 1975) p.7

CHAPTER 4

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the anti-Confucius campaign in the context of other mass campaigns and in the context of recent political events, thereby attempting to validate the hypotheses of this paper. First there will be an analysis of the data from Peking Review summarized in Chapter 3, coupled with a comparison of the anti-Confucius campaign with the other two campaigns studied in Chapter 2. This should demonstrate to what extent the anti-Confucius campaign was similar to those campaigns of the ideological trend. Second, a review of recent political events will be undertaken in attempts to explain the distinctive features of the campaign. Hence, by studying the anti-Confucius campaign in the contexts of mass campaigns and current events (1969-1975), we shall have attempted to validate the two hypotheses of this paper - that the anti-Confucius campaign was in many respects similar to other post-1956 mass campaigns, and that it differed from these others in that it was part of a crucial power struggle.

DATA ANALYSIS

After having briefly reviewed the leading points of the anti-Confucius campaign in Chapter 3, three salient features seem to present themselves. First, like the All People Rectification campaign and the Socialist Education campaign, the anti-Confucius campaign appeared clearly to be an ideolog-

ical mass movement. Second, like the Rectification and Education campaigns, the anti-Confucius campaign appeared to be closely linked with economic production in its later stages. Third, to an extent unlike the Rectification and Education campaigns, the anti-Confucius campaign appeared extremely bifurcated in its leaders, targets, and functions, probably demonstrating the presence of a power struggle of considerable magnitude. A short re-examination of the Rectification and Education campaigns to see if they also were parts of power struggles will be done later in this chapter. The first two findings concurred with this writer's first hypothesis that the anti-Confucius campaign was a campaign similar to those of the second trend established after 1956, that is primarily ideological with economic matters also stressed in later stages. The third point concerned with the second hypothesis, that the anti-Confucius campaign deviated from this trend as the campaign seemed to be an integral part of a power struggle. A discussion of these three features will follow in order to make finer distinctions as to leaders, targets, and purposes of the anti-Confucius campaign after which a comparison can be made with the other mass campaigns. Recent political events prior to the anti-Confucius campaign will be discussed to place the campaign in the context of the political events of the time and possibly shed more light on the power struggle apparently occurring in the campaign. Hence the anti-Confucius campaign will have been studied in two contexts of mass campaigns and

of current political events, (post-Cultural Revolution).

Ideological Aspects of the anti-Confucius campaign

From the numerous quotations and the unrelenting strong emphasis, there could be no denying that the anti-Confucius campaign was an ideological mass campaign, or as many articles in Peking Review stated, "an ideological revolution".^{179.} "It is a political and ideological struggle..."^{180.} "in order to deepen the revolution in the superstructure and the ideological realm and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat"^{181.} by forwarding "the current class struggle and struggle between the two lines, persisting in revolution, opposing retrogression, adopting the correct attitude toward the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and enthusiastically supporting new emerging socialist things."^{182.} Essentially the campaign seemed to be an attempt to topple "old culture, old ideas, and old habits", replacing them "by new culture, new ideas, new habits and customs."^{183.} These new things were supposedly to have emerged from the Cultural Revolution with roots in the very ideology of the Chinese Communist Party, namely "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought". Those in China who denied the "new" goals and their "reactionary" ideology of returning to times before the Cultural Revolution (when there was supposedly Party elitism and bureaucratism, traditional and capitalist tendencies among the cadres and the masses and a general negation of struggle and revolution in favor of compromise and gradualism) were seen as analogous

to Confucius and his philosophy. As Confucius, the "reactionaries", and their ideology were to have acted as guardians of the old ways, the Legalists, Maoist "revolutionaries", and their ideologies were seen as acting as the progressive historical force fighting for the new. (Again one will be reminded that the Legalists and the proletariat were not equated by the articles in Peking Review on the same revolutionary plane or of the same ideology since the Legalists wanted to replace one form of class exploitation with another.) There could be little doubt that ideological matters dominated this campaign, probably to educate the masses as to past (Confucian) and present attempts to negate class struggle and revolution (which supposedly formed the basis of the new culture), so that the masses could "struggle" against these attempts. Exposing remnants of the "old culture" in the country and the Party and living according to the new revolutionary societal ethos was regarded as tantamount "to taking part in actual class struggle".¹⁸⁴ Everyone could become a revolutionary without picking up a gun. This appeared to be the core of the ideological indoctrination to change the values, the attitudes, and practises of Chinese society.

During the campaign, Confucius and his fellow "reactionaries," such as Lin Piao, Liu Shao-ch'i and other "political swindlers" seemed to serve as negative examples while the Legalists and those who promoted the Cultural Revolution and its reforms (the "new-born socialist things") served as

positive examples for new culture and attitudes. It appeared, however, that the Cultural Revolution did not merit such a dominant position in the anti-Confucius campaign solely to serve as an example. Many statements which dealt with the masses struggling also mentioned the need for "adopting the correct attitude toward the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and enthusiastically supporting new emerging socialist things"¹⁸⁵. as something which should be done in its own right. The anti-Confucius campaign was to be "a continuation" of the Cultural Revolution, "transforming the superstructure" allowing for a "complete rupture" with everything that occurred prior to 1966,¹⁸⁶. not only of things Confucian. Similarly the greatest sin of the "Rightist deviationist trend of thought" was that it tried to negate the achievements of the Cultural Revolution and to oppose its reforms, thereby trying "to turn back the wheel of history".¹⁸⁷. This seemed to indicate that the Cultural Revolution was to serve as more than a positive example, to the extent of being the model of the type of value system that was wanted. Therefore, emphasis on the Cultural Revolution undoubtedly functioned to tell the masses that the ethos and values of the Cultural Revolution were to be accepted as beneficial to China, at least as much as it apparently functioned to degrade and attack traditional (Confucian) and reactionary attitudes and practises. In other words, the campaign was probably more pro-Cultural Revolution than it was "anti-Confucius". Discussion of the place of

Confucius in China's heritage had always taken place and did not seem easily able to be satisfactorily resolved. This inclined us to assume that the ideological aspects of the campaign were primarily to foster acceptance of the Cultural Revolution with its revolutionary ethos and/or reforms, with the intention of criticizing Confucian principles per se being secondary. One may wonder to what extent the criticism was actually anti-Confucian or whether "Confucian" was the label attached to the system under radical attacks. "Historical" articles on Confucius and references to Analects were filled with inaccuracies which would be obvious to anyone who had studied history or philosophy. "Confucius" may have been the scapegoat or negative example of whatever was considered bad or reactionary. There will probably be future discussion and debate about Confucius and his place in China's development which would undoubtedly shed more light on the "Confucian" nature of the anti-Confucius campaign.

In conclusion, the ideological aspects of the anti-Confucius campaign probably acted to encourage the Chinese population to accept and incorporate a new revolutionary culture, rooted in the communist ideology and born of the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, the anti-Confucius campaign could be seen as similar to the All People Rectification campaign and the Socialist Education campaign in their sharing of this prime purpose - ideological indoctrination. They were all

mass campaigns to change the value system or culture of Chinese society. A pronouncement at the beginning of the campaign even drew a similarity between the anti-Confucius campaign and the Rectification campaign stating that when the anti-Confucius campaign fostered a "revolution in the superstructure, it would lead to a great spurt in production" like the 1958 Great Leap Forward sponsored by "the great victory of the socialist revolution" of the Rectification campaign.¹⁸⁸ Since the other two ideological mass campaigns were probably initiated by Mao and those in the leadership who were more radical, we assumed that it was logical to believe the same was true for the anti-Confucius campaign. Official pronouncements did state that Mao "led and initiated" this campaign,¹⁸⁹ but this was probably doubtful due to Mao's health and age. Most likely the radical leaders in the case of the anti-Confucius campaign were Ch'iang Ch'ing, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chung-chiao, and Yao Wen-yuan. We assumed the leaders of the ideological aspects of the campaign were the radicals not only because this was the case for the other two campaigns, but since the radicals could be viewed as those who espoused the primacy of the Maoist ideology (class struggle, permanent revolution, mass line, "guerrilla warfare" perspective) above all else, and since the Cultural Revolution was the embodiment of this ideology, those who initiated a campaign for the continuation of the Cultural Revolution ethos were probably the radicals. However, with-

out delving any further into what will later be handled in the discussion of the power struggle, it should be noted here that Chou En-lai and possibly some of his followers among the moderates also probably favored some of the reforms of the Cultural Revolution. While Chou undoubtedly would not support a highly tense, uncontrolled, and non-unified atmosphere such as occurred during the Cultural Revolution (which destroyed the Party and severely hampered the government and the economy), Chou did seem to come out in favor of the Cultural Revolution and its reforms, such as rectification of the youth, "May 7" cadre schools, greater discussions and ties between the masses and the Party, and mass mobilization (in his case to be used for production).¹⁹⁰. Although more detail will be given later in the chapter, it will be stated now that while(as in the other mass campaigns of an ideological nature) it was the radicals who initiated and continuously wrote about the need for ideological changes of the Cultural Revolution-Maoist ideology type, this did not mean that all non-radicals opposed the Cultural Revolution and the desire to change the values of the Chinese society. However, we will state here that it appeared to be the radicals who were the leaders of and principle fighters for the ideological aspect of the anti-Confucius campaign; for them, the purpose of the anti-Confucius campaign definitely appeared to be ideological change.

Economic Aspects of the anti-Confucius Campaign

After having reviewed all the documents from June 1974 onward, we could speculate that the anti-Confucius campaign also had a definite economic purpose. In the later stages of the campaign production was linked both to the Cultural Revolution and the anti-Confucius campaign. Articles stated that the Cultural Revolution gave China a new revolutionary culture which in turn was responsible for production increases. The Cultural Revolution was praised as the "powerful motive force for the development of the socialist productive forces"¹⁹¹. - these same words were also used in discussing the results of criticism of Confucius and Lin Piao.¹⁹² Ideological revolution and economic production were linked. Mao was written to have said that "revolution means liberating the productive forces and promoting their growth".¹⁹³ Besides all the other benefits that the anti-Confucius campaign was supposed to accrue, it was also stated to be stimulating the masses and the cadres "to win even greater victories in revolution and production".¹⁹⁴

The addition of economic issues into a basically ideological campaign appears to have been accomplished very smoothly and naturally. The Cultural Revolution (which as mentioned was a key feature of the ideological aspects of the campaign) was likewise praised as being a "motive force" for production. Later the Cultural Revolution was specifically held responsible for great advances in production in Tibet,

with the note that all that was needed for such "great strides" elsewhere was the correct ideological outlook and simple "hard work".¹⁹⁵ Since the anti-Confucius campaign was stated to be an extension of the Cultural Revolution, it too aided production as criticism debates created "social enthusiasm". At first the benefit of the criticism sessions was just mentioned for agriculture, dealing with water conservancy, irrigation,¹⁹⁶ and factory workers' support of agriculture,¹⁹⁷ but later on it spread to industry as workers and cadres strove for self-reliance.¹⁹⁸ With the "social enthusiasm" they showed in criticizing Confucius, the cadres, peasants, and workers attempted to "build socialism with greater, faster, better and more economical results"¹⁹⁹ "to win still greater victories in revolution and production".²⁰⁰ (The terminology was much the same as that of the Great Leap Forward.) Afterwards, production figures became used more often. Articles appeared contrasting negative Confucian attitudes and past economic production with "correct thinking" and the masses had seen what it was economically possible to do. Similarly Confucius was said to be hostile to inventions, innovation, and talent while the masses had found that making use of these had greatly improved their lot.²⁰¹ Even articles dealing with the emancipation of women appearing in the later half of 1974 discussed women as "struggling" to be free from housework and childcare to do other jobs in the production process, challenging the Confucian principle of male superi-

ority and exclusive male domains.²⁰² However, it was strongly stressed that "the key to development" lay in "a correct ideological and political line."²⁰³ During the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975, a new slogan emerged: "grasping revolution, promoting production and other work ..."²⁰⁴ Articles read in Peking Review even into 1976 stressed that the masses must continue to work hard to build socialism.

From the above discussion, one could see how economic matters were joined on to a fundamentally ideological campaign. This skillful maneuvering was most probably done by Premier Chou En-lai. His prime concern, especially after the Cultural Revolution, had been to re-build the Party and the economy. As in the Rectification and Education campaigns, it appeared that it was the moderates under Chou who ensured that the economy would suffer as little as possible because of campaigns. During mass campaigns, the radicals stressed criticism meetings and ideological discussions to such an extent that people had little time to do their work. If in these meetings and discussions economic issues were raised and if directives called for "revolution and production", then less harm might be done to the economy and positive benefits could even be reaped as peasants and workers debated managerial, cadre or technical problems and strove to increase output to "build socialism with greater, faster, better and more economical results".²⁰⁵

Therefore, the three mass campaigns studied were similar,

in both ideological and economic respects. The anti-Confucius campaign was a mass campaign in the same ideological trend as those occurring since 1957. The All People Rectification campaign, the Socialist Education campaign, and the anti-Confucius campaign were all principally ideological mass campaigns which in their later stages had economic issues attached to the ideological ones. Ideological indoctrination was never replaced by production as the most obvious prime goal of the campaigns, but ran throughout the campaigns dominating them. Thus, the functions of these post-1956 mass campaigns appeared to have been ideological first and economic second. The leaders were seemingly the radicals for the ideological aspects and the moderates for the economic, while the targets for both functions were probably the masses and the cadres.

POLITICAL EVENTS (1969-1975)

Unlike either the first or second trends in mass campaigns (the second exemplified by the Rectification and Socialist Education campaigns), the anti-Confucius campaign reflected the presence of a strong power struggle, this to such a degree that the anti-Confucius campaign might have been the arena for the struggle. Before determining what evidence for this statement could be found within the actual pronouncements of the campaign as reviewed in Chapter 3, a brief survey of the political events of this period will be presented. This should help place the campaign in the context of the time, namely

that of events between the Cultural Revolution and the campaign (1969-1975).

The period between the end of the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of the anti-Confucius campaign was also the period between the Ninth and Tenth Party Congresses of the Chinese Communist Party. By the spring of 1969 the PLA apparently had put a stop to the anarchic and violent situation in China (mainly perpetrated by the Maoist Red Guards) and had the country under control. Because the Party apparatus was destroyed, the military almost by necessity held power and had authority at all levels of government and organization. Local government was by Revolutionary Committees officially based on a new "three-way alliance" of military, Party, and "revolutionaries", unofficially dominated by the PLA. Where there were no such committees, the PLA established Military Control Committees which performed the major political and civil duties previously done by the Party. Even more noticeable was the military's presence at the provincial and central levels. Military men filled twenty-one of the twenty-nine provincial Revolutionary Committees and made up forty-five per cent of the new Central Committee and approximately half of the new Politburo (established at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969).²⁰⁶

When the Ninth Party Congress was called, it was most notable for the overwhelming representation of the military. Defense Minister Lin Piao, one of Mao's principal supporters

besides Chou during the Cultural Revolution, was officially proclaimed by Mao as his heir apparent while many young radicals who were closely tied with Cultural Revolution Group also rose to important positions along with Ch'iang Ch'ing in the Politburo and Central Committee. Leaders of the Party organization such as Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and P'eng Chen were severely criticized and removed from all offices. At the Congress, Chou called for a spirit of unity in order to rebuild the Party and the government and get the economy fully operational again.

In the first two years after the Cultural Revolution (which was said in Party pronouncements to be continuing), the radicals and the military vied over the re-distribution of power as the re-building of the Party and government took place. The military commanders during 1970 and 1971 appeared to increasingly be consolidating their power positions and using their political posts to influence the reconstruction so when the reconstruction was completed their own authority would not have decreased. Once again twenty-one of the twenty-one of the twenty-nine first secretaries of the new Party Committees in the provinces were military officers.²⁰⁷ By 1971 it seemed that Mao had become alarmed by the growing power of the military commanders and their reluctance to return power to Party or civilian personnel. Mao probably swung his support behind a radical-moderate coalition in a new power struggle against Lin Piao and his followers among the top

staff. The Mao-Chou-Ch'iang Ch'ing coalition, aided by some regional military leaders who apparently disliked Lin's excessive politicization of the PLA, won. In September 1971, Lin and some of his military associates died reportedly enroute to the Soviet Union. Afterwards, Chou appeared to be slowly stripping the military of its political power and returning the PLA to its subordinate position under the Party. In the Politburo and Central Committee formed at the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973, only thirty percent were military men, and in 1974 the remaining military leaders in regional political positions were reshuffled.²⁰⁸ A rehabilitated Teng Hsiao-p'ing became PLA Chief of Staff in 1975, probably allying the military with the moderates.

While the military effectively could be removed as a principal power broker,²⁰⁹ politically we speculated that it supported the moderates within the leadership who, like the military itself, preferred the PLA to move toward greater professionalization and less politicization. This had appeared to leave the moderates under Chou and the radicals under Ch'iang Ch'ing as the main power contenders. Their views as to which direction China should take towards modernization and how it should proceed to do so seemed vastly different. This probably meant that in the rebuilding of the Party and the country, as well as in the redistribution of power, both would come into conflict. While the radicals seemingly

expounded Mao's development strategy as elucidated in his "thought" and manifest during the mass campaign, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution, Chou and the moderates held a more conservative approach. They appeared to stress Party unity and discipline, a gradualist strategy to economic development with some material incentives, leniency to old enemies and a more pragmatic stance towards the West. They attempted to "rehabilitate old rightists" such as Teng Hsiao-p'ing, to allow Western music and art, and to "open the door", to other countries. There were presidential visits and inter-country athletic and cultural exchanges. Needless to say this attitude of "liberalization" undoubtedly was unfavorably viewed by the militants. Probably to them, China was backsliding from the Cultural Revolution, negating all the reforms and "socialist things" that had been the Cultural Revolution's legacy. Realizing that their power position deepened on just such a legacy and ethos, the radicals by 1973 seemed to be strongly criticizing the shunning of the Cultural Revolution and the direction Chou was leading China. As these conservative changes continued, the radicals possibly found their prestige and power diminishing. Even though there appeared to be a semblance of unity at the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973 as both moderates and radicals vilified Lin Piao, this only masked a divided leadership. Probably seeing their previous criticisms going unnoticed, the radicals launched the anti-Confucius campaign which seemed to

become the public arena for their conflict. The moderates, supported by the army, knew that they could control the campaign if, like the Cultural Revolution, it turned against them or hampered the Party or economy.

POWER STRUGGLE IN THE ANTI-CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN

At the very beginning of the campaign, one read that in China there still remained even within the Party, the "tendencies and ideology of antagonistic classes"²¹⁰. and those who advocated the "dying out of the class struggle"²¹¹. which were to be struggled against by the masses. Immediately the radicals, who based their ideology and course of development on the necessity of struggle, set the goals and targets of the campaign, this being to change the masses ideologically and defeat the moderates politically. Afterward, articles on revolution, struggle, counter-revolutionary comebacks, backsliding from the Cultural Revolution, praise of "socialist new-born things", militancy in art and opera, "going against the tide", transforming the superstructure, and fighting restoration and retrogression demonstrated the radicals' position. In demand or criticizing these things, they obviously were saying the opposite was occurring. There were also quite a few comments in the articles which could be seen as specific attacks upon Chou. Criticism of Antonioni and his film may have been covert criticism of Chou who permitted Antonioni to make the film. This could also be the case of the criticism of Western music, ²¹². as it was Chou who allowed

the Philadelphia Orchestra to appear in 1973. "Idolizing things foreign" may have referred to what the radicals felt was Chou's blind praise of America and excessive entertaining for foreign guests. "Restoring the old order" could have referred to the way he was rebuilding the Party and economy, while "letting people 'go in the back door' " probably signified Chou's rehabilitation of some disgraced cadres.²¹³ This last point - rehabilitation of purged cadres - appeared to be a serious point of contention between the moderates and the radicals, reoccurring very often in the campaign, and at one point being said to be practised by "the ringleaders of the opportunist lines in the Party."²¹⁴ When articles made reference to Confucius having certain personality traits or opposing certain concepts such as "things arising from social upheaval" or all "progressive thinking",²¹⁵ these similarly appeared to be covert attacks upon Chou. Articles that mentioned "leading cadres" who regarded everything as commodities, that is in production terms, or no longer cared about revolution just economic growth,²¹⁶ the Chinese probably recognized as attacks upon Chou too. Basically, since the current course of events in China (1972-1975) being attacked by the radicals was apparently initiated and led by Chou, in a sense one could view all attacks on backsliding, conservatism, rehabilitation, retrogression, and so on, as attacks upon Chou and those in the Party who supported either him or what he was doing. In re-reading the pronouncements of the anti-Confucius campaign, the radicals' attack now seems clear. While definitely using this campaign as an ideological mass movement to change the

value system of society, the radicals also undoubtedly used it to forward their perspective, attack the other and those upholding it, and regain their lost power.

The moderates appeared to have a counter-strategy to these attacks and the attempts by the radicals to remould and remobilize the masses that may have seemed to be less dramatic but which were nevertheless apparently effective. In March 1974 when Zambian President Kaanda visited China, Chou expressed his support of the anti-Confucius campaign and highly praised the Cultural Revolution.²¹⁷ Articles which came out afterward linking Confucius with Lin Piao were presumably written by the moderates. Although the militancy of the campaign continued into the spring, especially in Peking where many people were writing wallposters in a highly critical and radical vein, the Central Committee declared that study and criticism should be well supervised, in small groups, and within organizations. By June 1974 economic issues played a large part in the campaign. Revolutions were also said by Chou to be needed in industry and agriculture; China was to learn from the good experience of others. Dogmatism and slavishness were to be done away with.²¹⁸ Speeches and actions such as these, while seeming to be of little weight compared to ideological aspects and attacks of the campaign put forward by the radicals, did seem to demonstrate Chou's control of the situation. By publically criticizing things that may have been linked to himself²¹⁹ and also by supporting the campaign and Cultural Revolution, Chou probably

helped quell inuendos that he was one of those who was servile to foreign things, extravagant, slow and hated and wanted to destroy new socialist reforms which emerged from the Cultural Revolution and might emerge from the campaign. The villain to be linked with Confucius was strongly emphasized as being Lin. Criticism was done in smaller groups possibly so as to be better controlled and not allow a repeat of the Cultural Revolution. Adding economic issues onto the ideological ones meant that any change of attitudes or revolutionary fervor which occurred could possibly be channelled into increasing output and not into what the moderates no doubt felt could be destructive mobilization. It should be noted that in the later stages of the campaign there were fewer general ideological articles dealing with Confucius and the radicals' assorted grievances, with the radicals seemingly narrowing their scope to culture and education. (This was not to say that very critical articles such as the one by the radical leader, Chang Chung-chiao, did not keep reappearing probably attacking present Party policies and indirectly Chou.²²⁰) What also should be noted was that there was apparently independent action from the masses themselves criticizing some of the backsliding from the reforms of the Cultural Revolution. John Starr best stated this point:

As we have seen, however, there were also times in the campaign when it appeared to be a difficult task (assuming that it was the intention of some to do so) to 'abandon the achievements [in this case also the methods] of the Cultural Revolution'. Once

mobilized to engage in criticism by verbal exchange or wall posters, to expect cadres to take part in labor and to be responsive to the interests of their subordinates, to regard education and cultural systems as stripped of their traditional standards of authority, once mobilized in this way, some segments of the Chinese populace were apparently not to be demobilized easily.

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These impulses for changes apparently would be encouraged by the radicals while the moderates attempted to limit and/or control them.

There was an article in the anti-Confucius campaign in which the moderates seemed to employ the same covert attack tactics as the radicals had used throughout the campaign. The language was the same as that used by the radicals and at first reading the initial impression was that this was another of the radicals' attack. However, the timing of the article and some of its phrases hinted that this could have been an article of counter-attack by the moderates. In January 1975 an article appeared, dealing with the struggle between Confucius and the Legalists, that had different features from other such articles.²²² The article stated that the slaveowners, richer in the experience of struggle, supposedly pitted their strength against the "new emerging landlord class" in order to overthrow them,²²³ and to bring about a "restoration in the ideological realm."²²⁴ In trying to subvert the "new centralized dynasty" they attempted to "clean up around the emperor" by removing the new "policy-making Legalists in the central organs" and change the power formation.²²⁵

The Legalists apparently launched a counter-attack and put down the rebellion.²²⁶ This struggle was said to demonstrate that all could be successful in preventing backsliding and forwarding "social revolution and social education in the political, ideological, and economic fields" to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat.²²⁷ In this article it appeared that the "new centralized dynasty" and the Legalist-"new emerging landlord class" represented the moderates in the Party leadership. Undoubtedly they were the "new group" constituted by Chou as the Party was being rebuilt. Therefore it would appear to be the radicals who were to be synonymous with the slaveowners. They were supposedly experienced in struggle because of the Cultural Revolution, and their outlook could be seen as "backsliding" and the desire for a "restoration" but a restoration of the highly ideological mobilization, confusion and excesses of the Cultural Revolution, the Great Leap Forward and past mass campaigns. It was implied that the radicals probably staged this attack and struggle to remove the moderates from their policy-making positions around Mao. The Legalists' resistance and success could be seen as analagous to the successful counter-attack (and the addition to economic measures to the campaign), by the moderates, putting down the "rebellion".

In re-examing the article (a concluding article of the anti-Confucius campaign) an important point seems to have been raised. In the recount of the struggle, the emperor aided

the landlords in quelling the rebellion. This would apparently imply that Chou had the support of Mao in attempting to modify and control the anti-Confucius campaign as well as in countering the radicals. The past relationship of these two men might lead one to assume this was correct. Mao, very old and dying, most probably did support Chou in his attempts to rebuild the Party and strengthen the country, possibly feeling more at peace about what Chou was doing than about leaving the country to the radicals who appeared to be becoming more extreme in their vision and demands. (Tales of this extremism are now appearing in China as the population shows its strong hatred of the radicals and their apparent McCarthyist tactics.) Also we shall note that Chou was probably in favor of many of the ideological aspects of the reforms. He, as a communist, no doubt wanted the masses to have a change of attitudes, to accept the socialist ethos and to reject inhibiting traditions. Although the economy was slowly growing, it was still apparently hampered by traditional attitudes and organizations. As modernization and tradition clashed, Chou undoubtedly knew that further economic growth along socialist lines would probably only occur if there was this change in values and outlook. Like Mao in many ways, he also seemed to favor closer ties between cadres and people, health and education reforms, as well as students and cadres doing manual labor. These things, while having ideological implications, also no

doubt held practical and economic benefits. (Both Mao and Chou could be said to be pragmatists.) Therefore while Chou probably did not want a return to the uncontrolled and destructive ethos of the Cultural Revolution, he no doubt supported its reforms and attempts to establish a new socialist culture.

In retrospect, the anti-Confucius campaign did seem to play an important role in the power struggle between the moderates and the radicals. Of this power struggle we could only speculate but our speculation was based on the best data available to us. It would appear that the power struggle was initiated by the radicals in their bid for key power positions, against Chou and the moderates, and that they were unsuccessful. One gauge of this contest might be the content of the anti-Confucius campaign. The radicals appeared to demand an end to present policies and a return to the ethos and reforms of the Cultural Revolution. As these current policies were most probably initiated by Chou En-lai (and also from the covert criticisms of the things synonymous with him and his outlook), the campaign could be seen as an attack upon Chou and the moderates. The addition of economic issues and greater control of the criticism probably demonstrated Chou's ability to deflect this attack away from himself and to take control of the campaign, maintaining his power position. The radicals were not purged at the end of the campaign, as they now seem to be (1976-1977), but they apparently did lose consider-

able power and had the scope of their activities narrowed to culture and, to a lesser extent, education. Chou possibly allowed the campaign to continue because he might have felt that positive economic and ideological benefits, or because, by pursuing the reforms of the Cultural Revolution, it might deflate the position of the radicals, as sole champions of the Revolution. It must also be remembered that with the support of the military, Chou had little to fear.

CONCLUSIONS

In comparing the anti-Confucius campaign with the two mass campaigns, it becomes evident that in many ways the 1973-1975 anti-Confucius campaign appeared similar to other mass movements of an ideological (economic) nature and in other ways quite distinct. Like the 1957-1958 All People Rectification campaign and the 1962-1965 Socialist Education campaign, this campaign seemed to be an ideological mass movement to change the very nature of society. And like these two, the campaign also seemed to have economic issues added to the ideological ones in campaigns later stages. All three mass campaigns probably were initiated and led by the radicals (Mao definitely being classified here as a radical) for the principle purpose of changing the value system by ideological indoctrination and were aimed at the masses and the cadres. They also all seemed to have had moderates under Chou heading a secondary goal for the campaign (likewise aimed at the masses and cadres) of increasing production.

This indicated that the anti-Confucius campaign was apparently like other mass movements of the post-1956 ideological trend since many of its features appeared to be able to be explained in the context of mass campaigns. Therefore we speculate that the anti-Confucius campaign should be studied in the context of other ideological mass movements to be understood.

However, unlike the Rectification and Education campaigns, the anti-Confucius campaign seemed to play an important role in a power struggle, to the extent of possibly being the arena for that struggle. Continuous messages in 1975 especially, on uniting, being open, and not intriguing,²²⁸ usually were evidence that in China just the opposite had previously taken place. Probably the radicals seeing the Party and country being rebuilt along what they apparently felt were conservative lines, struck out against Chou and the moderates who seemed to be the leaders of this reconstruction, in a struggle of survival for themselves and their vision of development for China. Chou and the moderates appeared to be able to weather the attack and reap some benefits from the campaign by adding economic issues to the ideological ones (as they had done in past mass campaigns). It was this apparent power struggle which possibly made the anti-Confucius campaign so fragmented and difficult to fathom. Thus one had also to study the anti-Confucius campaign in the context of events of the times (1969-1975) to get a clearer picture of

its nature.

Literature on post-1956 ideological mass campaigns usually assumes that all such campaigns were part of power struggles. It was implied that these campaigns were phases of mobilization corresponding to Mao's attempts to redirect China along a course of revolutionary development in opposition to what others within the Party leadership were allowing to happen. If such was the case, then the anti-Confucius campaign did not significantly differ from other mass campaigns in respect to being part of a power struggle. To attempt to determine if power struggles were indeed inherent in ideological mass campaigns, we shall return to our information about the Rectification and Socialist Education campaigns.

As was noted, the 1957-1958 All People Rectification campaign seemed to occur under a somewhat unified leadership. All the top personnel of the Party leadership may not have enthusiastically supported what Mao wanted to do in this campaign (or even in the Great Leap Forward which followed), but they apparently acquiesced and agreed to have the campaign for the ideological purposes Mao proposed and aimed at the targets Mao delineated. This did not appear to be the case in the 1962-1965 Socialist Education campaign. Proposals such as the Ten Points, Later Ten Points, Revised Later Ten Points, and the Twenty-three Points clearly illustrated in our opinion a lack of consensus and unity within the Party leadership. Mao's purpose and target groups were most probably not the

same as Liu's and Teng's who seemed to want the campaign to be solely economical, tightly controlled by the Party, and run by the cadres and work teams. Mao, on the other hand, probably began the campaign for principally ideological purposes, aimed at reform both among the people and the cadres, with much spontaneity and PLA involvement. Since the Socialist Education campaign also appeared to be Mao's attempt to regain control of the Party organization (besides re-directing China's development), there possibly were vestiges of the power struggle which came into the forefront in the Cultural Revolution. However, this mass campaign, as in all those previous to it, did not appear to be involved in a power struggle to the same degree as the anti-Confucius campaign was.

In the Socialist Education campaign there seemed to be no attacking even covertly by each faction within the Party leadership as one saw in the anti-Confucius campaign. The Education campaign did not appear to function as an attack against a specific group in the leadership. There undoubtedly were attempts to change the direction of the campaign, but both the radicals and those moderates of the Party apparatus appeared more concerned with pushing their own policies than stopping certain individuals. (This only seemed to come in the Cultural Revolution.) However, the anti-Confucius campaign appeared to be a struggle for political survival in which apparently there were obvious attacks on each other for the

purpose of getting rid of their opponents. Mass campaigns prior to the campaign against Confucius, while hinting at the future possibilities of power struggles, never actually seemed to be arenas for power struggles, where there were obvious personal attacks upon the opposing leadership faction and the pushing of power position before policy. (It appeared that, in other campaigns, policies would be championed which, if they were acted upon, would in turn put the leaders responsible for such policies in prime power positions. For example, the moderates held power supremacy after the Great Leap Forward probably not because they struggled and won it, but because the following of their economic policies put them in that position.) Therefore the anti-Confucius campaign remained distinct from the other mass campaigns because it probably was the arena for a crucial power struggle.

Thus, by studying the anti-Confucius campaign, other mass movements, and recent political events, we have been able to validate our hypotheses. By comparing the three mass campaigns, we have found that in respect to their leaders, targets, and purposes they were essentially alike. Therefore our first hypothesis was correct - the anti-Confucius campaign was similar to other mass campaigns (and therefore should be studied in this context). By noticing some confusing dissimilarities between the anti-Confucius campaign and the others, and then by reviewing past political events to find explanations for these differences, we uncovered a

power struggle. Therefore our second hypothesis was correct - the anti-Confucius campaign played a crucial role in a power struggle (to the extent of possibly being the arena for such a struggle). The next and concluding chapter of this paper will briefly review the hypotheses and findings, comment on the other interpretations, and speculate as to the implications of these findings for the study of Chinese politics.

Footnotes - Chapter 4

179. Supra, p. 73
180. Supra, p. 78
181. Supra, p. 78
182. Supra, p. 72
183. Supra, p. 73
184. Supra, p. 70
185. Supra, p. 72
186. Supra, p. 73
187. Supra, p. 75
188. Supra, p. 68
189. Supra, p. 80
190. "President Kaanda visits China", Peking Review XVII (v.17
#10) March 8, 1974
191. Supra, p. 78
192. Supra, p. 78
193. Supra, p. 82
194. Supra, p. 83
195. Supra, p. 80
196. Supra, p. 80-81
197. Supra, p. 81
198. Supra, p. 83
199. Supra, p. 82
200. Supra, p. 83
201. Supra, p. 84
202. Supra, p. 76
203. Supra, p. 84

204. Supra, p. 88
205. Supra, p. 82
206. J. Domes, "The Pattern of Politics", Problems of Communism XXVI (September-October 1974) p.22-23
207. Ibid.
208. Ibid.
209. Power broker is taken to mean a group that (1) can act to achieve power, (2) wants to act, (3) acts for its own purposes, and (4) usually acts independently. In many countries of Africa and Latin America, one can view the military as "principal power brokers".
210. Supra, p. 68
211. Supra, p. 70
212. Supra, p. 76
213. Supra, p. 74
214. Supra, p. 80
215. Supra, p. 79 and 84
216. Supra, p. 90
217. "President Kaanda visits China", Peking Review (v.17 #10) March 8, 1974
218. Supra, p. 88
219. Supra, p. 88
220. Supra, p. 89-90
221. J. Starr, op.cit., p.11-12
222. Supra, p. 86-87
223. Supra, p. 87
224. Supra, p. 87

- 225. Supra, p. 87
- 226. Supra, p. 87
- 227. Supra, p. 87
- 228. Supra, p. 86

CHAPTER 5

The purpose of our paper was to prove that first, the anti-Confucius campaign of 1973-1975 was a mass campaign similar to other mass campaigns occurring after 1956 and thus should be studied in this context and second that the anti-Confucius campaign was similarly an important part of a top leadership power struggle within the Party and therefore should likewise be studied in the context of recent political events (1963-1975). This approach was felt to be an original and viable one which could make a contribution to understanding of the anti-Confucius campaign and the study of Chinese politics.

FINDINGS

In considering the first hypothesis, both mass campaigns and the anti-Confucius campaign were studied. In Chapter 2 mass campaigns were initially discussed very generally. Since the anti-Confucius campaign occurred after the 1956-1957 Hundred Flowers campaign, the second trend in mass campaigns was regarded as needing more detailed study in order to clearly elucidate what in fact was happening in these campaigns generally labelled by authors as "ideological". Only with a fuller understanding of the second trend could there be an adequate basis for comparison with the anti-Confucius campaign. To obtain a better grasp of what these ideological mass campaigns entailed, two from this trend were chosen as representative to be more closely studied. The two picked

and reviewed were the 1957-1958 All People Rectification campaign and the 1962-1965 Socialist Education campaign. Conclusions were then drawn about the post-1956 mass campaigns from the example of these two. Chapter 3 was a summary of the official pronouncements of the anti-Confucius campaign, primarily found in Peking Review. This led in Chapter 4 to an analysis of the anti-Confucius campaign and a comparison of it with the other two mass campaigns (and thus the post-1956 trend in mass campaigns) to determine in which ways there was a correlation. The similarities demonstrated to what degree it was important to view the anti-Confucius campaign in the context of mass movements.

In considering the second hypothesis, Chapter 4 also included a review of the political events post-Cultural Revolution. After having undertaken a comparison of the anti-Confucius campaign with the other campaigns, there appeared to be a major dissimilarity between this campaign and the others before it, namely evidence of a serious power struggle within the Party leadership. Thus to obtain a clearer picture of the struggle - its cause and manifestations, the principle political events after the Cultural Revolution were assessed. With some background as to recent political events and the documentation from the anti-Confucius campaign which strongly seemed to imply a power struggle, we attempted to determine to what extent the anti-Confucius campaign was a part of a power struggle and to what degree

it was likewise important to view the anti-Confucius campaign in the context of recent events.

After having followed and completed this basic format, certain findings seemed to present themselves. The first major finding concerned the second trend in mass movements. Those writing about campaigns, like Townsend, Liu, and Chang, labelled these post-1956 movements ideological. While this writer found in her study of the Rectification and Socialist Education campaigns in Chapter 2 that mass campaigns after the Hundred Flowers campaign seemed primarily to be for the purpose of ideological indoctrination to the Maoist ethic, they also appeared to have a secondary function. As was apparently witnessed in these movements in their later stages, economic issues were similarly raised for discussion and debate. Although the supremacy of ideological conversion was not denied (although for a time during the Socialist Education campaign, Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing possibly attempted to sabotage it), the moderates by supporting Mao and not threatening his leadership position were probably able to incorporate economic matters into these concluding phases of the campaigns in order to ensure that production was not hurt by the campaigns but might even be bettered. Therefore, while continuing to call post-1956 mass campaigns "ideological", we recognized that a more correct description would be ideological-economic, yet still with the emphasis clearly on ideological.

This finding, namely an apparently truer determination

of the nature of "ideological" mass campaigns, lead to the validation of the first hypothesis for after having reviewed the official sources of information concerning the anti-Confucius campaign in Chapter 3, it was found that the pronouncements seemed to demonstrate an ideological and economic orientation of the campaign. While the anti-Confucius campaign was to be "an ideological revolution" and "a continuation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", the summer and fall of 1974 found documents strongly stressing both "revolution and production". Seemingly, as in the other mass campaigns, ideological indoctrination was the salient issue pushed by the radicals, the moderates under Chou En-Lai were able to incorporate their own goals of economic production into the campaigns' later phases. Therefore, the first hypothesis was correct, that the anti-Confucius campaign was similar to other mass campaigns of the post-1956 period. Hence, only a study of the anti-Confucius campaign which does not fail to look at the campaign in the context of mass movements will have any substantial value.

The second major finding dealt with the leadership power struggle. After having completed the summary of the anti-Confucius campaign in Chapter 3, discrepancies apparently arose. Revolution and "going against the tide" seemed to be antithetical to unity and discipline, the same as bourgeois music and "learning from the West" to proletarian opera and "struggling against capitalism and things foreign", or de-

voting all one's time to "criticizing and repudiating class enemies" and "working even longer and harder to increase production". Conflicts such as these abounded in the official articles, many occurring within the same edition. (This writer was constrained by time and length to show in any greater depth the numerous instances of this which could be found if one reads Peking Review for the time period in consideration.) Such contrasting demands implied a more crucial problem than simply the evil influences of Confucian philosophy. The linkage of Confucius and his ethic to many current policies and procedures clearly implied that a more serious drama was unfolding. It was at this point that a review of recent events after the Cultural Revolution was undertaken in Chapter 4.

When the political events of the early 1970's were considered, we saw the growing division within the leadership over those same questions which became the bulk and basis of the anti-Confucius campaign. Some of these were the method and direction of modernization, the importance of the Maoist ethic, the correct stand towards class enemies, foreigners, and "rightists", the place of the Cultural Revolution and "socialist new-born things", the power and areas of influence for the radicals, and so many other aspects dealing with the rebuilding of the Party and the country. By 1973 it appeared obvious that under Premier Chou En-lai the more moderate position was being implemented. The radicals under Ch'iang Ch'ing seemed opposed to such moves

as "opening to the West", "restoring old disgraced cadres", the economic growth ethos of the early 1960s which was being now restored, "backsliding" from the Cultural Revolution and ignoring "socialist new-born things" among others. Their stance clearly reflected their "ideology" and the basis on which their power rested. (Most of the leading radicals under Chiang Ching rose to power under Mao during the Cultural Revolution and owed their power to it.) Therefore in order not to find their power being slowly ebbed away or to be relegated to minor areas of policy-making, it appeared that the radicals launched the anti-Confucius campaign in a struggle for survival. Since power, personality, and policy seemed to be so closely tied in China, if the population did become mobilized and converted to the Maoist collective ethic, the radicals would then win the key power positions away from the moderates and set China on what they believed was its "correct" development course. Maybe the radicals even felt that with the aid of the masses and youth they could attempt to sweep the moderates from office as Mao had done during the Cultural Revolution. In any case, the anti-Confucius campaign probably was an arena for a power struggle of great consequence. Therefore, the second hypothesis was proved. The anti-Confucius campaign was different from other mass campaigns in that it seemed to play a crucial role in a power struggle.

THEORIES

The validation of these two hypotheses had implications

for the other authors' interpretations. In Chapter 1 we stated that the nine different interpretations could be condensed into two categories - power struggle and Cultural Revolution. The two generalizations concerning a power struggle in the anti-Confucius campaign were that the campaign was either a struggle by the radicals against the moderates or by the moderates against the radicals. Those like Barnett, Oksenberg and Goldstein, Domes, and Current Scene who said that the anti-Confucius campaign was initiated by the radicals for survival purposes were proved correct. However, Leys maintained that the radicals were responsible for all the aspects of the campaign, and this was shown to be inaccurate because the economic features of the campaign were probably sponsored by Chou and the moderates. Those like Goldman, Wich, and Goodstadt who wrote that Chou was leading and directing the campaign from the start, were apparently wrong, for while Chou said that he supported the anti-Confucius campaign (how could he have said otherwise and not be branded an outright disciple of Confucius), the campaign appeared clearly to be the radicals' bid for power and there were attacks upon him. Chou seemed able to intervene in the later stages of the campaign to diffuse its radicalness and turn enthusiasm to productive purposes.

The three generalizations concerning the Cultural Revolution were that the anti-Confucius campaign was either a continuation, a reversal, or unrelated to the Cultural Revolution.

Those like Oksenberg and Goldstein, Leys, Starr, and Goodstadt were apparently correct in assuming that an important issue in the anti-Confucius campaign was the continuation of the Cultural Revolution (or more accurately its reforms). There did not appear to be any evidence to support the claims of Goldman and Current Scene that the campaign was to halt (or even reverse) the changes and reforms of the Cultural Revolution. Even Chou En-lai was not found to have stated this. Authors like Barnett or Wich who did not mention the Cultural Revolution in their analyses, missed a crucial point of the campaign. As we previously speculated, the campaign appeared to be more "pro-Cultural Revolution" than "anti-Confucius".

None of the interpretations can be completely dismissed nor were they completely accurate. Neither the radicals nor the moderates had sole control over the campaign, nor was the campaign's only purpose to be ideological, political, or economic. Because the different writers did not appear to study the anti-Confucius campaign in the context of mass campaigns as we did, they probably did not notice those features which could be explained by the anti-Confucius campaign being another mass campaign, such as its dual, ideological-economic purposes, the target groups, or the different leaders for the different purposes. In just placing the anti-Confucius campaign in the context of the time, it was easy to pick one leader and purpose and tie it with a power struggle. The authors seemed to have ignored divergent data their uni-directional approach could

not explain. Hence, from seeing all these different interpretations and the greater degree of clarity wrought because of the way the anti-Confucius campaign was studied in this paper, it appears obvious that one should study the campaign in the context of mass campaigns as well as that of recent political events. In this way it was shown that the 1973-1975 anti-Confucius campaign was a mass campaign similar to those prior to it in its leaders, targets, and purposes, but that it was dissimilar to the other campaigns due to the fact that the campaign was also probably the arena for a crucial power struggle.

IMPLICATIONS

Our findings may have important implications for the study of the Chinese political process. We have noticed that those who have written about post-1949 China had tended to view all political developments as unique and as the result of power struggles ("constant conflict" within the Party leadership model). As our study of three mass campaigns demonstrated, there were many similarities between the campaigns. If the anti-Confucius campaign was to have been analyzed as a unique phenomena in the context of recent political events, such important features as its leaders, targets, and purposes would not have been correctly ascertained. This was noticed in the analysis of the authors. Our study of the anti-Confucius campaign strongly implied that more comparison studies need to be done about political events in communist countries.

Without this type of analysis, studies done will only be partially accurate. Similarly regarding all events as manifestations of power struggles, was also shown to be incorrect and presumptuous. While the anti-Confucius campaign appeared to be the arena for a power struggle, besides probably the Cultural Revolution, these seemed to be the only two cases of mass campaigns being crucial parts of power struggles. Our reviews of the Rectification and Education campaigns were evidence of this. As with the other mass campaigns, they were not dramatically involved in power struggles. In fact, besides for hints in the Socialist Education campaign of a future leadership conflict, the other campaigns showed a united leadership. In the Education campaign, there were no overt attacks and Mao was not openly opposed. While differences of opinion among the leaders presented themselves, compromise rather than conflict appeared to be the norm. Our findings also strongly implied that the "constant conflict" model be evaluated as to its practicality, with a look towards "compromise" as the reasoning behind any stability or longevity within the leadership. Therefore, our study of the anti-Confucius campaign does have implications for the study of the Chinese political process.

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