Planning and Equity: An Approach to Reducing Distributional Inequities for Community Planners

by

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Master of City Planning

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PLANNING AND EQUITY: AN APPROACH TO REDUCING DISTRIBUTIONAL INEQUITIES FOR COMMUNITY PLANNERS

BY

CHERYL ANN SHINDRUK

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF CITY PLANNING

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This thesis is dedicated to the loving memory of
Mary Shindruk Sichewski.

For Mom and Dad . . .

Abstract

The author explores the potential for incorporating equity into community planning thought and practice as a means to redress distributional inequities in urban communities.

The purpose of the thesis is three-fold: (i) to draw attention to distributional issues in the context of community planning; (ii) to explore the concept of equity as a decision criterion for the planning process and as a professional value for planners; and (iii) to stimulate thought and discourse on the topic of a philosophy of action for equity-oriented planning.

The rationale for the thesis is based on the following normative arguments: (i) that planners, through their practice, should uphold the rights of individuals; (ii) that planners ought to care for those in society who are least advantaged; and (iii) that planners need to be concerned with how society's limited resources are distributed. Futhermore, the rationale includes the following substantive arguments: (i) that, in order to redress the socio-economic disparities evident in our communities, community planning needs an alternative to the utilitarian ethic ; (ii) that incorporating equity into the planning process would result in a more effective distribution of limited resources; (iii) that equity in the distribution of resources is a pre-requisite to efficiency in the production of society's resources; (iv) that the extent of fiscal retrenchment currently experienced by Canadian municipalities demands increased sensitivity to "who is getting what"; and (v) that such an approach by planning would lend support to the community empowerment movement and the healthy communities movement, which are both fundamentally concerned with equity and social justice.

The distributional nature of public goods is explored in light of its contribution to real income and ultimately the social welfare of individuals. The traditional utilitarian approach to planning is examined with respect to its ability to deal with distributive issues, such as the equitable distribution of public goods among members of society. The distributional and social aspects of equity are explored as decision criteria for planning practice and a new equity paradigm is described.

The author concludes that the growth and efficiency paradigm, rooted in utilitarianism, and within which planning has traditionally functioned, and thus drawn its values and goals, provides an inappropriate epistemological foundation on which to develop a "philosophy of action" for equity-oriented planning. An equity paradigm, rooted in social contract philosophy, is offered as an alternative epistemological foundation for planning which seeks to redress distributional inequities.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables

List of Figures

If a man [sic] will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties.

Francis Bacon (1561-1626)
The Advancement of Learning, I

CHAPTER 1.0 INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, urban planning has embraced a utilitarian ethic, characterized by the tenets of economy and efficiency. For utilitarianism, the crucial question is production - how to produce the greatest amount for the greatest number of people. For this reason, planning has not been as concerned with the question of distribution, that is, how society's limited resources are distributed among members or groups of society. For a variety of reasons, inequities in the distribution of society's resources exist. To the extent that use value of public goods contributes to social income, and hence the social welfare of individuals, the manner in which public goods are distributed among members of the community has the potential to either (a) exacerbate existing disparities, (b) maintain them, or (c) redress them.

The author of this thesis will argue that urban planners should be concerned with the distribution question, and more specifically with the equity of distribution. To this end, the social contract philosophy, such as that espoused by John Rawls, is offered as an alternative ethic and set of values to those offered by utilitarianism. It is hypothesized that introducing equity as a value into the decision process will serve to highlight distributive issues in the domain of planning.

Objectives

The overall purpose of this thesis is to explore the potential for incorporating the notion of equity into the community planning process. There are three main objectives:

(i) to draw attention to the distributional issues in the context of community planning;

(ii) to explore the concept of equity as a decision criterion for the planning process, and as a professional value for community planners; and

(iii) to stimulate thought and discourse on the topic of a 'philosophy of action' for equity-oriented community planning.

Methodology

In pursuit of the above objectives the following steps will be performed:

1. The distributional nature of planning activities will be explored in order to illustrate the effect that planning decisions have on the social welfare of individuals; real income will be used as a measure of social welfare, and the theory of public goods will be discussed to illustrate how public goods increase or decrease real income;

2. the traditional utilitarian model of community planning will be reviewed to determine its efficacy as an epistemological foundation for planning which would be oriented to reducing distributional inequities;

3. the distributional and social aspects of the concept of equity will be explored as decision criteria for the planning process, and Rawls' 'Theory of Justice' will be considered as a philosophical foundation for an equity paradigm for planning;

4. the literature on urban social reform will be reviewed, with particular attention to the philosophy of action which guides such reform activities. In

terms of contemporary examples of equity-oriented community planning, the activities of the Cleveland Planning Commission in the 1970's will be carefully examined, as well as the experiences of two cities - Savannah, Georgia and Austin, Texas - that incorporated equity-oriented bureaucratic decision rules for the delivery of urban public services.

Logic Track

- Social and economic disparities/inequities exist among individuals and groups in urban communities;
- Planning's traditional adoption of utilitarian values has served well the goals of growth and efficiency, but has the effect of maintaining or exacerbating existing inequities;
- For planning to redress existing inequities it requires a different set of values, from that offered by utilitarianism;
- Social contract philosophy offers values such as cooperation, interdependency, and mutual aid, and as such provides a more appropriate epistemological foundation for planning which is equity-oriented.

Outline of Thesis

Chapter 1.0 discusses the context and rationale for equity-oriented planning. It provides background information and a statment of the problem.

Chapter 2.0 will explore the distributional nature of public goods and explain how the allocation of public goods, specifically impure public goods, affects the distribution of social income and ultimately the social welfare of individuals.

Chapter 3.0 is a discussion of the philosophical roots of urban planning. The growth and efficiency paradigm, in which urban planning has remained for two centuries, is discussed as a manifestation of planning's traditional values. The propriety of the growth and efficiency paradigm, in which the production question is most important, is questioned as a paradigm which would be conducive to planning which is equity-oriented. It is concluded that planning practice has neglected the question of distribution. Implicit in the distribution question is equity.

Chapter 4.0 will define the concept of equity from a variety of perspectives: distributional, social, and generational. Then, equity will be explored as an alternative social paradigm for urban planning. Social contract philosophy of John Rawls is offered as a philosophical foundation for the equity paradigm and for equity oriented planning.

Chapter 5.0 will present an overview of the literature which informs equity-oriented planning. It will highlight the arguments which have been made for an equity orientation in the urban planning profession. From the eighteenth century Utopian Socialists to Krumholz & Forester's (1990) experiences with the Cleveland Planning Commission, an attempt is made to present the concepts which define and characterize equity-oriented planning.

In Chapter 6.0 the concepts which define and characterize equity-oriented planning will be synthesized a presented in an attempt to begin constructing a conceptual framework. Social contract philosophy presented in Chapter 4.0 is offered as a philosophical foundation for equity-oriented planning. Conceptual goals are presented, as well as a set of underlying assumptions. Finally, a set of tools are presented to assist planner and planning departments in equity-oriented planning.

Concluding remarks and comments on current issues affecting the future for equity-oriented planning will be presented in Chapter 7.0.

Background

The urban planning profession has historically prided itself on its mandate to improve the quality of life in cities - in both a pragmatic sense (to deal with urban problems) and in an ideal sense (to strive for better urban environments). In fact, as Hodge (1986) states, "cities themselves were seen as symbols of a society's aspiration to achieve progress and human betterment" (p. 10). It is easy to document the improvements in civic life which planning is quick to lay claim to - improved sanitation and health through waste removal and building codes, elaborately designed transportation networks, housing developments, people-oriented town centres, and pleasant urban vistas. The utility principle called for maximizing the benefits for the greatest number of people. In the domain of urban planning, this became synonymous with serving the public interest - a unitary public interest. At a glance it can be argued that planners, guided primarily by the utilitarian philosophy, have indeed brought about "the greatest good for the greatest number".

However, it also contributed to the inequities and social disparities which characterize western urban society today. In the quest to serve a unitary "public interest", some members of the population have not and do not receive their fair share of society's benefits and burdens. This sector, generally known as the "poor" or "least advantaged", is growing and the gap between it and the more "advantaged" is widening at the local level (Gerecke and Reid, 1991) and at the global level (Gardner & Roseland, 1989).

The professional values of urban planners, as expressed in the CIP's Code of Conduct, do not currently require that planners work to reduce social and economic inequities in our urban communities. Grounding the professional values of planners in a spirit of mutual aid, such as that espoused long ago by Prince Peter Kropotkin (1902), and a spirit of co-existence[1] (Friedmann, 1959) this conviction would be the first step towards a commitment, by the profession, to equity-oriented planning thought and practice.

In this thesis, the author calls attention to issues of distribution which have gone relatively unaddressed in planning thought and practice. The author illustrates how, through planning's traditional alignment with utilitarian ethics, planners have been preoccupied with growth and efficiency, with order and technical rationality, with scientific rigor and professionalism. It is suggested that planning theory be expanded so that it speaks to the equity of planning actions and outcomes. If planning is to be a fair and just process with fair and just outcomes, planners need to move beyond utilitarian ethics and towards equity-oriented ethics.

Statement of the Problem

Grave inequities in the distribution of society's resources exist, so that certain groups continue to enjoy greater proportions of society's benefits and, at times, certain other groups bare a disproportionate level of the costs associated with the benefits[2]. Social groups with fewer advantages do not enjoy the same

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[1]The essence of Friedmann's spirit of co-existence is that the existence and well being of one person depends on the existence and well being of other persons in the society they share.

[2]Nowhere is this more evident than at the global level. Existing disparities, at the global level are significant. For example, the poorest fifth of the world's population has less than two percent of the world's economic product while the richest fifth has 75 percent; and the 26 percent of the world's population living in the developed countries consumes

access to social power or opportunities for employment, income and wealth, for example, as compared to social groups with more advantages.

Planning decisions are inherently distributional in that they cause society's resources to be unevenly distributed, or redistributed based on competing demands (Kiernan, 1982; Davidoff, 1978). Eversley (1973) describes how planners affect resource allocation in the following excerpt:

> ...the planner, as defined here, is the person who determines where people shall build, and where they shall not build, where there shall be new or expanded towns, or growth areas, and where national parks or Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty shall prevent building, where power stations shall be sited and canals reopened, motorways built and railways shut down, he [sic] is in fact responsible for the allocation of this very large part of the national product, and the benefits it confers. Private decisions are influenced by public decision: the entrepreneurs who build shops, offices, places of entertainment, hotels and houses for sale, must follow the land use allocations of the planners (p. 8).

Forester (1988) has concluded that "planners can and do influence issues of equity in myriad ways; as they affect the quality of other's participation, access, information, obligations, status, trust, procedural opportunities, and so on" (p. 106). Furthermore, in their attempts to maintain objectivity and a value-neutral stance, planners can and do contribute to upholding the status quo, which has the unfortunate consequence of maintaining the present social and economic inequities. Planners can and should take a stand on issues involving equity. By doing this they can play an important role in reducing distributional inequities, thereby expanding the realm of social justice in our communities and

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80 to 86 percent of nonrenewable resources and up to 34 to 53 percent of food products (Gardner and Roseland, 1989, 26-27).

between communities. An equity-oriented approach to planning involves a change in focus - from a solely efficiency- and growth-oriented perspective to one which would explicitly take into consideration matters of equity. Such an approach would be a more humanly- and environmentally-sensitive way of viewing the world and the communities in which we live, and consequently, a more sustainable way to maintain and preserve our human and natural environments.

The process begins with accepting that the rights of individuals cannot be suppressed in the interest of the larger collectivity, that is, in the interest of a unitary "social good" or "public interest". In his paper entitled, *From Polemics To Dispassionate Analysis*, Friedmann (1959) challenges this society-individual dichotomy. He argues that the "social good" must necessarily include the claims of the individual person and his or her immediate family - as the nuclear group within society (p. 335). Society is not an independent entity with the attributes of a person (Harper & Stein, 1983). It is composed of individuals with different objectives and values. It is therefore argued that planning should strive to achieve a fair distribution of good (and bad) for all, as opposed to the greatest good for the greatest number.

Rationale for Adopting an Equity Orientation in Planning

The rationale for the thesis that community planning should adopt an equity orientation is supported by both normative and substantive arguments.

Normatively it is argued that: (i) community planners, through their practice, should uphold the natural rights of all individuals; (ii) community planners ought to have a moral and a professional obligation to care about those in society who are least advantaged; (iii) community planners should be

concerned with how society's limited resources are distributed, and further, should strive to achieve an equitable distribution; and (iv) an equity-orientation would imbue the planning profession with a strong sense of social responsibility.

At a substantive level, it is argued that: (i) in order to redress the socioeconomic disparities evident in our communities, and enhance the well being of all members of the community, community planning needs an alternative to the utilitarian ethic; (ii) incorporating equity into the planning process would result in a more effective distribution of limited resources; (iii) equity in the distribution of society's wealth is a pre-requisite to efficiency in the production of that wealth; (iv) the extent of fiscal retrenchment currently being experienced by Canadian municipalities demands increased sensitivity to "who benefits" and to "who pays?"; and (v) an equity-oriented approach by community planners would lend support to the community empowerment movement and the healthy communities movement, which are both fundamentally concerned with equity and social justice.

Normative Arguments

(i) Community planners should uphold the natural rights of all individuals.

One of the most eloquent expressions of the natural rights of individuals in western society is that made by 17th-century English philosopher John Locke He said . . . "all men [sic] are created equal. . . and are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" (Smyth, Soberman & Easson, 1987, 4). An equity-orientation by community planners is not unusual or extraordinary but merely affirming what has been advocated consistently throughout history: that equity in the social, economic, and political relationships among people is a requisite condition for a just and lasting society. Planning for equity is not a bizarre position; it is rooted

in reason, and represents the deepest thinking and the strongest, most humane currents in the Judeo-Christian social, religious, and political discourse.

(ii) Community planners ought to have a moral and a professional obligation to care about those in society who are least advantaged

The plight of the least advantaged will be much improved if society accepts that they (for the most part) are disadvantaged due to the inequitable results of existing political and economic structures, and therefore, society as a whole is obligated to care for them as fellow human beings, with whom we share a common destiny.

(iii) Community planners should be concerned with how society's limited resources are distributed, and further, should strive to achieve an equitable distribution

The realities of life in most North American cities point to the many inequalities in income that separate the people of the inner city from those of the suburbs, region, and nation; that separate aboriginals from whites; and that separate single parent households from dual parent households. The disparities between those who have and those who do not have are increasing (Gardner & Roseland, 1989; Gerecke & Reid, 1991).

(iv) An equity-orientation would imbue the planning profession with a strong sense of social responsibility.

An equity-oriented stance by planners would give renewed relevance to the planning profession. Beauregard (1990) suggests that the absence of a common core and the weakness of explicitly moral and political positions have contributed to planning's loss of direction, influence, and legitimacy. Friedmann

(1987) has concluded that "mainstream planning is in crisis" because the state has lost its "ability to satisfy the legitimate needs of the people" and thus to provide societal guidance. Beauregard further explains that the "crisis involves a multiplication of functional specializations, estrangement of theory from practice, and the peripheralization of political and moral commitments. As a result, our collective identity has become diffused, our common purpose unclear, and our social contribution ill-defined" (Beauregard, 1990). An equity-oriented stance could clarify the collective identity of the profession, provide a common purpose and make more definitive the profession's social contribution.

Substantive Arguments

(i) To offer an alternative to the utilitarian ethic

Incorporating equity ethics into the planning process will be the first step toward redressing inequities produced by the profession's traditional alignment with utilitarian ethics. Without this change in orientation, planning decisions are more likely than not to continue to perpetuate present social, economic, and political inequities.

(ii) More effective distribution of limited resources

> Planning has gone wrong because it has been defined too often in terms of economic analysis, production capacity, projections, distribution schedules, acquisition formulas, forecasts of demand, and other bloodless criteria - in these terms almost to the exclusion of the 'people' aspects (Ewing, 1969, 42).

The above passage by David Ewing was extracted from his book, The Human Side of Planning. Its message is that the human side of planning is too

often subordinate to the technical aspects of planning. Contemporary planners have tended to eschew politics and avoid taking a moral stand on issues, particularly distributional issues. To be sure, the activities of planning affect the lives of people, but when those activities are divorced from their effects, the question of effectiveness arises. Focussing on the distributive aspect of planning is critical to help planners to know the effects of their actions on various groups in society.

(iii) Equity is a pre-requisite to efficiency.

David Harvey (1973) argues that equity is a pre-requisite to efficiency. Equity in the distribution of society's resources is necessary for efficiency in the production of those resources.

(iv) Fiscal retrenchment.

As cities continue to experience fiscal retrenchment, agency resources are subjected to increased scrutiny, and service allocation or "who gets what" decisions receive a more thorough review. "Equity will be more salient in a period of scarcity, winners and losers will become more evident and more aware of what they are winning and losing" (Lucy & Mladenka, 1980). With this enhanced sense of awareness, residents will be more likely to seek to maintain their share of public resources. Furthermore, administrators may find themselves in the difficult position of making decisions regarding service reduction, something which our political process does not do well. As Thurrow (1981) states:

> In this situation the essence of problem solving is loss allocation. But this is precisely what our political process is least capable of doing. When there are economic gains to be allocated, our political

> process can allocate them. When there are large economic losses to be allocated, our political process is paralyzed (p. 12).

Eversley (1973) states that, in periods of no-growth in incomes, the planner has a more difficult allocation decision to make: "who shall benefit" and "who shall suffer?" In a time of fiscal retrenchment, there is greater need to ensure equitable distribution of resources, for the poor lose their ability to absorb loss very, very quickly.

(v) *Lend support to the community empowerment movement and the healthy communities movement, which are both fundamentally concerned with equity and social justice.*

Healthy Communities

The need to reduce distributional inequities in urban communities has been highlighted by the Canadian Healthy Communities Project and the Framework for Health Promotion as presented in The Epp Report (1986), which has as its goal "Achieving Health For All." The Epp framework identifies three health challenges: (i) reducing inequities; (ii) increasing prevention; and (iii) enhancing coping. It also specifies three health promotion mechanisms: (i) self-care; (ii) mutual aid; and (iii) healthy environments. Finally, the Epp model outlines three implementation strategies: (i) fostering public participation; (ii) strengthening community health services; and (iii) coordinating healthy public policy. Although most components of the framework fall outside the domain of *traditional* community planning (most fall within the domains of the social and health care professions), there are important challenges for the planning

profession[3]. Mathur (1989) provides this summary of the scope for community planning within Epp's model for health promotion:

> the creation of healthy physical environments through the fostering of public participation to meet the challenges of reducing inequities, increasing the prevention of disease and enhancing coping with urban living (p.38).

Predicated on the belief that public intervention as well as individual and community effort are required to address the health challenges (Mathur, 1989, 35), the healthy communities model calls on the planning profession to work to reduce distributional inequities.

Citizen Action Groups/Community Empowerment Movement

Today there are a growing number of citizen action groups that are mobilized to fight for the right to quality of life services. No longer are these services viewed as discretionary. Grass roots organizations, such as Choices, for example, have as its purpose the upholding of the rights of the least advantaged in society. Disenfranchised clienteles have been known to rectify what they believe to be inequitable service allocation patterns through the courts. Equity-oriented planning will help to substantiate the claims of communities in the process of becoming empowered, and may help other communities to empowerment.

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[3]Traditional community planning is rooted in physical land use planning. A broadened view of community planning sees it as encompassing social, economic and political issues. Moreover, the broadened definition of health offered by the Healthy Communities Project, suggests that the domains of the health care and planning professions have encroached one another to the point that their domains now overlap.

Summary

This chapter has provided the objectives, methodology, and logic track for the thesis. It has also presented background information, a statement of the problem, and the rationale for exploring equity as an orientation or value for community planning. Chapter 2.0 will illustrate how planning decisions can affect the social welfare of individuals.

Of great Riches, there is no real use, except it be in distribution; the rest is but Conceit.
Francis Bacon (1561-1626)
Essays I, Of Riches

CHAPTER 2.0 SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE THEORY OF PUBLIC GOODS

Introduction

This chapter will illustrate how planning decisions affect the allocation of public goods, and how the allocation of public goods affects the distribution of real income and hence, the social welfare of individuals.

Social Welfare

Social welfare is the formal term most often used to represent the notion of "well-being" of individuals in society (Armitage, 1975). It is fundamentally concerned with the distribution of society's resources. The expression "society's resource" includes all private and public material goods, services such as education, health care, and counselling; and political rights such as the right to influence the form of the society around one (Armitage, 1975, 16). Because society's resources are limited and not equally accessible to all members, they have the characteristic of being scarce.

The role of the planner, here defined very broadly, is one which involves the allocation of society's scarce resources among competing demands, such that the social welfare of the individuals in that society is enhanced.

In order to evaluate either the absolute level of social welfare or the distribution of social welfare, it is necessary to establish the substantive nature of the concept and an appropriate measure. As stated above, social welfare is

concerned with the distribution of society's resources. Because it would be nearly impossible to determine how all of society's resources are distributed, and even more difficult to determine the resulting levels of well being, real income will be used as a measure of the social welfare of individuals.

Real Income As a Measure of Social Welfare

There are several interpretations of the meaning of real income. Economists have generally defined real income as the buying power of earned income and transfer payments, taking into account temporal and spatial variations in the cost of living (Hodge, 1975). A rather comprehensive definition was offered by Dalton (1929) who suggested that real income is comprised of four factors obtained other than by exchange:

1. goods which individuals produce for themselves;
2. goods and services which individuals receive gratuitously from other individuals or private institutions;
3. goods and services which individuals receive gratuitously from public authorities, and the benefits individuals derive from the direct use of property; and
4. such free and unappropriated goods as climate and other amenities that individuals make use of (Dalton, 1929, 196).

The definition of real income, most appropriate for this thesis, was first presented by Titmuss (1962) and further developed by Harvey (1973) where real income is defined as an individual's "command over society's resources".

Conceptually, this definition of real income most closely fits with the notion of social welfare as referred to above. Unfortunately, this interpretation

cannot function as an operational measure. Therefore, a more specific definition of real income, incorporating the notion of "command over society's resources" will be developed. Figure 1 shows that real income is comprised of "the dollar value of earned income plus the dollar value of social income, where earned income refers to wages, inheritances, and all other direct cash transfers, and social income refers to the net benefits derived from differential access to society's resources" (Hodge, 1975, 35-6).

Real Income =	Social Income +	Earned Income
As a measure of well-being or social welfare.	Determined by the net benefits derived from differential access to society's resources.	Comprised of wages, inheritances, direct cash transfers.

Figure 1. Components of Real Income as Measures of Social Welfare

This thesis will not deal with "earned income" as a factor of real income, but will explore the nature of the relationship between social income and the social welfare of individuals. To this end, the theory of public goods is presented to illustrate how public goods and services, specifically impure public goods and services, contribute either positively or negatively to social income, and hence real income and ultimately, individual well being.

The Redistribution of Wealth and Real Income

Planning activities are inherently distributional and redistributional (Davidoff, 1978). More specifically, planning decisions influence the allocation of impure public goods. Because the impact or use value of impure public goods is determined by location, these goods are distributional. The benefits and burdens

derived from such goods is therefore, dependent upon their location relative to the people who use them. Insofar as planning decisions affect the location of impure public goods, they render some areas of the city more valuable, more amenable, more attractive, more healthful than others, and in so doing increase social income to those who happen to reside therein. Conversely, planning decisions can also cause some areas to be less valuable, less amenable, less attractive, and less healthful such that the residents are burdened with the negative effects resulting in a reduction in social income. As Eversley (1973) writes, "it is the planner who has made the division of the costs and benefits possible" (p. 98).

Planning, as it is commonly understood today, influences the allocation of resources among competing demands. Competition occurs among socioeconomic groups in the community, neighborhoods in the community and among a variety of other delineations.

The Theory of Public Goods

Private Consumption Goods

Samuelson (1954) defined private consumption goods as those which can only be consumed by one person or a small group of people such as in a family or household. Food, clothing, housing and consumer durables such as cars and radios are examples. Consumers have a vast array of preferences for these goods, both in terms of quantity and quality, and consequently they are amenable for distribution by private markets.

Public Consumption Goods

Public consumption goods, in contrast, have properties which make it impossible for distribution by private markets. Steiner (1970) defines a public good as any good or service provided by a legally established, collective governmental body..."when the coordinating mechanisms for providing a collective good invokes the powers of the state, I define the good as a public good" (p. 25). However, there are different types of public goods and services. They can be differentiated on the basis of their respective distributional characteristics. Basically, there are two types: (1) pure public goods, and (2) impure public goods.

Pure Public Goods

Pure public goods, such as national defence, are provided by the entire society or community for the common benefit and are equally enjoyed by all members of the society. They have uniform spatial and demographic distribution, and as such are equally enjoyed regardless of location or social class. As Dorfman (1966) states,

> There are certain goods that have the peculiarity that once they are available no one can be precluded from enjoying them whether he [sic] contributed to their provision or not (p. 4).

Musgrave (1959), among others has defined three basic criteria which characterize pure public goods. First, there is the concept of *joint supply* (or *non-rivalness*) which means that, if a good can be supplied to one person, it can also be supplied to all other persons at no extra cost. Second, there is the idea of *non-excludability* whereby, having supplied the good to one person, it is impossible to withhold the good from others so that those who do not wish to pay for it

cannot be prevented from enjoying its benefits. Third, there is the notion of *non-rejectibility*, which means that once a good is supplied it must be equally consumed by all, even those who do not wish to do so.

Impure Public Goods

A second class of public goods, impure public goods, is collectively consumed and is inherently distributional in nature. That is, the impact of impure public goods and services is determined by location. They are not universally available, they are provided unequally in space and therefore, the social income derived from such goods is dependent upon location. Hall (1972) states:

> This category includes goods as diverse as the availability of health, education, and welfare services; protection against crime; regulation of water and air and noise pollution; the preservation of fine landscapes and historic townscapes; the quality of transportation services available and many other things (p. 3).

Pinch (1985) describes three factors which undermine the purity of the theory of public goods, and thus give rise to the notion of impure public goods: (i) jurisdictional partitioning; (ii) distance decay; and (iii) externalities.

(i) Jurisdictional Partitioning

Most countries are divided into smaller local government jurisdictions or administrative areas. For a variety of economic, social, political and administrative reasons, such local government units vary significantly in the quantity and quality of public goods and services they provide. As a result, the location or political unit in which one resides, indirectly determines the amount

of public sector resources he or she receives. In this sense, jurisdictional partitioning may positively or negatively influence real income.

(ii) Distance Decay

Public services and amenities, such as parks, libraries, swimming pools and recreation centres, which are theoretically available to all members of the community obviously have to be located at particular points, hence they are often termed "point-specific" services (Wolch, 1979). Even if these services are provided free at the point of supply, individuals will typically have to bear the cost of travelling to the facility. As Harvey (1973) states, "the social price people are forced to pay for access to certain facilities is something which can vary from the simple direct cost involved in transport to the emotional and psychological price imposed upon an individual who has an intense resistance to doing something . . ." (p. 57). In general, costs, together with time and effort tend to increase with distance travelled. Furthermore, the so-called "law of demand" suggests that as the cost of accessing a particular good or service increases, the quantity consumed will decrease, thereby decreasing real income.

> Insofar as these facilities and services are accessible to people they contribute to the use value of the place of residence. Insofar as they are inaccessible they contribute nothing to the well-being of the population. Benefits from access to services and facilities thus may be unevenly distributed over places of residence...Changes in location of service have the potential to add and subtract use value to a place of residence and thereby may have progressive or regressive effects upon the real income of different individuals or groups (Harvey, 1971, 269).

In instances of a fixed budget of money, time or effort, the amount of a public good, or the frequency with which a service or facility is consumed, will decrease with increasing distance from its location. Eventually a point may be reached where the costs are such that the service or facility is not utilized. Similar principles apply in what Wolch (1979) has termed "outreach services", that is, services that are delivered to the consumer, such as fire protection. In these situations the costs are typically borne by the supplier of the service so that it costs more to supply recipients distant from the facility supply base. Furthermore, the quality of the service will vary with distance from the base. As a result, some areas of the community may be less well-served by police patrols and other emergency services. In both point-specific and outreach services, distance undermines the criteria of joint supply, and thus serves to reduce the real incomes of individuals in the community.

(iii) Externalities

An externality, in the broadest sense, is an unpriced effect of the action of one element in an urban system on other elements in that system (Harvey, 1973, 57-8). These unpriced or non-monetary effects emanate in a spatial field and tend to diminish with increasing distance from the source (due to distance decay). The effects may be positive, producing benefits and hence increasing real income for individuals in the surrounding area, or they may be negative, producing burdens, thereby reducing real income. Activities producing negative externalities are sometimes referred to as noxious facilities, for example, the smell from nuisance grounds, or the noise from roads and airports. Activities with positive externalities are sometimes termed salutary facilities, and include the quiet associated with parks and open space, or the social mobility promoted by good-quality educational facilities.

The relative importance of externalities depends upon individual value systems. For example, activities which arouse opposition in some localities may be treated with indifference in others. Therefore, there may be differences regarding the importance of externalities between jurisdictional areas, and more importantly from a distributional point of view, between the individuals within the same area.

Externality effects need not exist only within local government boundaries but may have impacts which extend across jurisdictional boundaries. The term spillover is often used to describe a situation in which facilities are provided in one area and consumed, but not paid for, by "free riders" in another political jurisdiction. Major recreational facilities, shopping centres and roads are examples of services provided by large cities but widely enjoyed on a regional basis by those who live outside city boundaries. Conversely, certain activities may create negative side effects in nearby areas, as when heavy industries produce pollution or when untreated sewage is pumped upstream into a river, from which the people downstream derive their water supply.

Physical services, such as sewage removal, garbage collection, and street lighting, and social services such as medical care, education and recreation are increasingly being provided, directly or indirectly, by the public sector. Indeed, some would say that western society's image of the urban system is moving toward that of public responsibility for primary physical and social services. Since industrialization, the urban sector has increasingly come to depend upon the public sector for these things.

In summary, a jurisdictional area with its particular array of public goods, the proximity to, and access of those public goods an individual enjoys, and the effects of externalities all combine to either contribute to or detract from the real income of that individual.

Impure Public Goods and Social Welfare

It has now been demonstrated that the distribution of impure public goods can have a significant impact on the social welfare of individuals. An understanding of the relationship between impure public goods and real income is crucial to redressing distributional inequities in urban communities.

If urban communities were a homogeneous mixture of social groups, the provision of impure public goods would be without bias to any particular social or economic group. However, communities are often segregated spatially by a variety of socioeconomic characteristics. Consequently, avoiding bias in the distribution of real income derived from impure public goods is difficult to do. Consider the example in which a community is separated into four social groups: A, B, C, and D (Figure 2). Only one location, the centre of the community would result in an equal distribution of social income to be derived from the provision of an impure public good or service. If that location was not available or not selected, there would necessarily be some bias resulting from any other location chosen. For example, in Scenario I, the public good is located at a site in the community that enables Groups A and B to share equally the net benefits[1] of the public good, all other things being equal. In Scenario II, the public good is located at the centre of the community, and therefore, all four social groups enjoy equal net benefits from the public good. In Scenario III, only social group C enjoys the net benefits of the public good.

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[1]The expression "net benefits" describes the net balance of benefits and disbenefits accruing from the public good to social groups in the community.



Figure 2.
Distribution of Net Benefits of an Impure Public Good
in a Spatially Segregated City

It is apparent then, that the provision of impure public goods acts as a "hidden mechanism" which contributes disproportionate amounts of use value (social income) to the residents in some locations. Impure public goods are a major component of social income and hence real income. Furthermore, Eversley (1973) has shown that public decisions can influence private decisions (p. 8) which also subsequently affect, either positively or negatively, the real incomes of individuals.

Given the vulnerability of the distribution of real income derived from impure public goods to locational bias, the question of how decisions are made regarding the provision of those goods assumes a special significance.

Rather than allocating public resources so that utility maximization is the sole concern, as is the case with utilitarian ethics, there should be some manner by which public resources can be allocated such that real income from the

distribution of goods and services would reduce existing distributional inequities.

Summary

This chapter has introduced real income as a measure of social welfare. It has illustrated how impure public goods contribute to real income, and how real income is differentially distributed among individuals in an urban community. Planning decisions influence the allocation of public goods and the resulting distribution of real income. This finding highlights the potential for planners to reduce distributional inequities through the planning process.

Now that the relationship between the distribution of real income and the allocation of public goods has been established, Chapter 3.0 will look at planning's traditional approach to resource allocation. This approach will be analyzed in light of its ability to address the distribution question, that is, how are society's limited resources distributed.

We are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men [sic] do, and not what they ought to do.
Francis Bacon (1561-1626)
Advancement of Learning

CHAPTER 3.0 COMMUNITY PLANNING AND THE GROWTH AND EFFICIENCY PARADIGM

Introduction

This chapter will explore planning's traditional approach to resource allocation. It will illustrate how utilitarianism, as the roots of traditional planning practice has contributed to the existing distributional inequities in urban communities. It will be argued that in order for planning to redress distributional inequities it needs to adopt a different set of values which speak to equity and distributional concerns.

Planning and the Principle of Utility

Planning as a social responsibility has developed on the principle of utility (Smith, 1979) as first expressed by Jeremy Bentham(1948) in 1789. As a philosophical concept, utilitarianism is commonly equated with such abstractions as good, happiness, welfare and well-being. The cardinal tenet of utilitarianism, the principle of utility, rules that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the fundamental criterion of morality (Smith, 1979).

The utility ethic was the foundation of much beneficial government reform. Utilitarianism was an attack on the *laissez faire* approach to freedom of enterprise which led to the enormous waste and inefficiency characterizing much of European society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the utilitarian view, the environmental defects of the nineteenth century, for

example, were an offence against reason. Thus, efficiency became the goal of utilitarian reform.

The success of utilitarianism in coping with some of the physical problems of the urban environment led to the unwarranted assumption that all urban problems would be equally amenable. All urban problems are not equally amenable or elemental that they can be so neatly judged as the threat of typhoid, for example. The utilitarian contribution to urban planning has been a belief in a consensual view of the general happiness and following from that, a belief in a "best" technical solution to every problem (Smith, 1979).

Rawls (1971) further explains why utilitarian thought has been so dominant and influential, even in contemporary society.

> During much of modern moral philosophy the predominant systematic theory has been some form of utilitarianism. One reason for this is that it has been espoused by a long line of brilliant writers who have built up a body of thought truly impressive in its scope and refinement. We sometimes forget that the great utilitarians, Hume and Adam Smith, Bentham and Mill, were social theorists and economists of the first rank; and the moral doctrine they worked out was framed to meet the needs of their wider interests and to fit into a comprehensive scheme (p. vii).

There is no doubt that utilitarianism has an important place in the workings of society; but it needs to be challenged as the theory which guides *all* human action, particularly action which is concerned with the equitable allocation of public goods among competing demands in society. Utilitarianism has been challenged, but unfortunately no other doctrine has been able to successfully challenge every aspect of it, for no other doctrine has had the impressive scope and refinement.

> Those who criticized them [the utilitarian philosophers] often did so on a much narrower front. They pointed out the obscurities of the principle of utility and noted the apparent incongruities between many of its implications and our moral sentiments. But they failed, I believe, to construct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose it. The outcome is that we often seem forced to choose between utilitarianism and intuitionism. Most likely we finally settle upon a variant of the utility principle circumscribed and restricted in certain ad hoc ways by intuitionistic constraints. Such a view is not irrational; and there is no assurance that we can do better. But this is no reason not to try (Rawls, 1971, viii).

Planning and the Growth and Efficiency Paradigm

A paradigm is a philosophy, a construct that guides our actions, an inescapable nature of reality, the inevitable background for social research, and the framework that coordinates our thinking and evaluations (Hodge, 1975). In essence, it is the way we think, without really being conscious of it. Friedmann (1981) refers to a paradigm as the "reigning conventional wisdom that informs the accepted practice of science." Our paradigm determines our values, as a society, including the values we place upon research. This is manifested in how we do research, what we research, our methodologies and our analytic methods. The unconscious bias of our work and actions, predetermined by our modes of thinking and analysis, restricts us to certain solutions to social issues.

In the growth and efficiency paradigm, technical rationality, economic growth, and efficiency in production are highly valued; cost-benefit analysis (in the aggregate) is an accepted analytic method. In this paradigm, thinking tends to be skewed and constrained by an infatuation with growth and efficiency[4] .

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[4] In Chapter 4.0 it will be argued that a paradigm rooted in equity would have the similar effect of ingraining distributive justice into the realm of thinking such that it would become a part of society's ethos, a fundamental belief held by all.

The infusion of "neutral" economic methodology into the analysis of public investment has led to a separation of the moral implications of policy from the decision process itself (Hodge,1975, p. 3). In fact the question of public morality or the morality of public policy has been driven from view. Society has embraced a mechanistic paradigm of supposedly objective rational evaluation of its social actions. By default and because no activity is value-less, the goals of social action have been harmonized with the goals of economic analysis, which provides the optimal solution to a particular problem. In the following passage, Forester (1988) refers to economists in the context of the equity-efficiency question in land policy matters. While it refers directly to economists, the extent to which planners tend to emulate the apparent objectivity of economic analysis, his observations may be even more, rather than less true, of planners.

> It is rather traditional among economists to separate efficiency and equity. They often look first at the efficiency of a given policy and then deal with equity -- if they remember. Forgetfulness is convenient because economists have useful observations about efficiency but very little other than opinion to offer about equity. Efficiency may thus outweigh equity (p. 97).

Increasingly, we examine the performance of individuals within society with a yardstick of economics devoid of morality. As a result, we tend to "blame the victim" (Ryan, 1971 in Hodge, 1975) for his inability to measure up when in fact it may be that he or she is being manipulated by a "neutral" economic system which fails to recognize or acknowledge the morality of public policy. (See the discussion by Hochschild on blaming in Section 5.0.)

Utilitarian ethics were combined with industrial capitalism, and gave rise to the canons of growth and efficiency. Initially defining the rules and standards of the private economic market, they eventually found their way into the public arena and the planning decision process. Technical rationality is highly valued in the growth and efficiency paradigm to the extent that there is no explicit concern for the distribution of the benefits and burdens which inevitably result out of planning decisions. In the growth and efficiency paradigm, "growth for the sake of growth" is the driving force in the managing of our cities and indeed, in the managing of our planet, unfortunately to the detriment of some groups of people, and of the natural environment. In this paradigm, the distribution question is obscured by the production question. In other words, concern over how society's resources are distributed is subordinate to (if at all remembered) an overwhelming concern for increasing production[5] , regardless of who enjoys the benefits, who endures the costs.

Utilitarians maintain that society in general, and all individuals gain absolutely from growth and efficiency. The following passage illustrates this point:

> From the dollars-and-cents point of view it is quite obvious that over a period of years, even those who find themselves at the short end of inequality have more to gain from faster growth than from any conceivable income redistribution. (Wallich, 1962, 86)

Benefit-Cost Analysis and Pareto Reasoning

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[5] Schumacher (1989) provides an excellent critique of western society's infatuation with increasing production.

One of the methods commonly employed in evaluating public investment options in the growth and efficiency paradigm is benefit-cost analysis. This type of analysis is generally concerned with the ratio of the output (in this case public good) to the input (in this case public dollars). It views public investment as a production question, that is, is seeks to maximize the ratio of benefits to costs. The concern, from an equity-oriented perspective, is that it attempts to do this in the aggregate . . . it attempts to maximize "aggregate" social welfare. There is no explicit distributional concern inherent in such analysis.

In response to this criticism, utilitarians quickly appeal to Pareto reasoning. The principle of "Pareto reasoning" is a widely accepted criterion for analyzing the costs and benefits of action in the public domain (Mishan 1981b in Friedmann, 1987, 20). According to this doctrine "social welfare is enhanced, so long as an action makes at least one person better off than before and no one's situation is made worse." The underlying assumption is that the gain of some is not necessarily consistent with the gain of all. Pareto reasoning, however sets aside the question of fairness in distribution for the single decision in the hope that it will be attained in the aggregate.

Reliance on potential Pareto improvement does not work when a series of decisions systematically favors some and hurts others. Nor does it work when there is a politically powerful group that refuses to bear an asymmetric burden and can force a decision to be restructured with different distributional impacts. Furthermore, the concept of Pareto improvement will not work when the costs from one decision are believed to be incommensurate with the gains from another (as often happens in cases of health and liberty), so that the consequences of one decision are not taken to offset the consequences of another.

As persuasive as the Pareto argument may be, it does not come to grips with the question of a relative or differential change in social welfare (Hodge, 1975, 69).

Summary

This chapter has briefly illustrated that planning thought and practice has its history in Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism. It has been shown that although the utilitarian ethic has brought about important social and economic reform, it is inappropriate for equity-oriented planning because it is concerned with maximizing the efficiency of production and thus precludes an explicit accounting of the distribution question. Furthermore, utilitarian analyses, such as benefit-cost analysis is an inappropriate tool for equity-oriented planning since it assesses social welfare at the aggregate level, rather than among individuals or classes of individuals.

Equity-oriented planning is explicitly concerned with the distribution question and with the distribution of social welfare among individuals or classes of individuals. As such, it requires a different ethic to guide the allocation of public goods.

In the next chapter, the concept of equity will be explored as an ethic which would reorient the goals of planning towards distributive justice.

I am never to act without willing that the maxim by which I act should become a universal law.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
The Critique of Practical Reason

CHAPTER 4.0 EQUITY AND SOCIAL CONTRACT PHILOSOPHY

Introduction

In the previous chapter we explained why planning which is guided by utilitarian ethics cannot deal with distributional issues. It was concluded that an alternative ethic or set of values is required. In this chapter, equity is explored, first as a concept, and then as a paradigm for equity-oriented planning.

The results of a literature search indicate that the concept of equity is the subject of great philosophical debate[6]. Far more embedded in the disciplines of economics (particularly, taxation) and political science, equity has not been adequately discussed within the context urban planning. As a value for planning, it remains a contentious topic, and is too often discarded and replaced with growth and efficiency values (Forester, 1988). In spite of this, and perhaps because of this, the concept of equity is here explored with the intention of incorporating it as a value in the planning process.

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[6] See for example McCord, W.M. (1977). Power and equity: An introduction to social stratification. Rawls, J. (1979). The concept of justice in political economy. In Hann & Hollis (Eds.) Philosophy and Economic Theory. Oxford University Press. Fishkin, J.S. (1988). The complexity of simple justice. Ethics. 98 (3): 464-471. Murnion, W.E. (1989). The ideology of social justice in economic justice for all. Journal of Business Ethics, 8, 847-857. Hammond, P.J. (1979). Equity, Arrow's conditions, and Rawls's difference principle. In Hann & Hollis (Eds.) Philosophy and Economic Theory. Oxford University Press. Wilson, J. (1966). Equality. London: Hutchinson of London. Arneson, R.J. (1990). Liberalism, distributive subjectivism, and equal opportunity for welfare. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19 (2), 158-194. Buchanan, A. (1990). Justice as reciprocity versus subject-centred justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19 (3), 227-252.

Equity as a Concept

Equity involves treating unequals in a way that they may become equals. It is rooted in Jean Jacques Rousseau's (1712-1778) belief that all humans are equally perfectible and in Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804) expression that all humans must be treated as ends and not as means, because all humans are equal. It has to do with fairness, and with justice and in this respect has to do standards established through the social institutions of a given society.

> The degree of correspondence between what ought to be and what actually is; between a normative state and reality; between the ideal and the real. Equity can also be a measure of fairness as prescribed by society. Most significantly, equity demands an explicit accounting of the distribution question (Hodge, 1975, p. 7).

Distributional and Social Aspects of Equity

Equity is a difficult and subjective concept. However, it is possible to discuss it in more objective terms. There is both a distributional and social aspect to the concept of equity. The distributional aspect of equity has two dimensions: a horizontal dimension and a vertical dimension. The social aspect of equity is characterized by both a procedural and a substantive dimension and the two are related.

The Distributional Aspects of Equity

The similar or comparable treatment of individuals, or communities, which have similar access to resources (this includes more than financial resources, for example, social support systems and problem-solving skills) constitutes horizontal equity. In other words, what one neighborhood or socioeconomic group of the city obtains, other neighborhoods or groups should also receive, provided the need is the same. Horizontal equity does not necessarily redress distributional inequities. Generally horizontal equity is a widely accepted principle.

Perhaps one of the most difficult things to accept is the suggestion that outcomes can be equitable even if they are unequal. Where inequities already exist, it is necessary that outcomes be unequal in order to reduce the extent of those inequities. Vertical equity involves redistribution from the so-called "haves" to the "haves not" or "haves less" geographical areas or socioeconomic groups of the city. In the domain of urban planning, vertical equity would be served if public projects which benefitted the "haves not" were publicly funded. Vertical equity is the more contentious aspect of equity.

The Social Aspects of Equity

The procedural aspect of equity has to do with the fairness or equitability of the process. In terms of community planning, this might involve how open the planning process is to community participation, respecting the rights of minority and disadvantaged groups, and enabling the meaningful participation of those in the community who do not have a voice, for example, the under-represented.

The substantive aspect relates to the fairness or equitability of the outcome of the planning process. In substantive terms, the outcomes of the planning

process can be measured by income levels of community residents, the number of years of education acquired by members of the community, or the level of service received by members of the community vis-a-vis need. The discussion, in Chapter 2.0, of social welfare and the distribution of real income from the allocation of impure public goods relates to this, the substantive, aspect of equity.

A fair and equitable process should result in a fair and equitable outcome, or distribution of resources.

Intragenerational Equity and Intergenerational Equity

There are two other distinctions in the concept of equity which are relevant to the equity-oriented planner: intragenerational equity and intergenerational equity. Intragenerational equity implies a fair distribution of benefits and burdens among members of the *current generation*. This concept of equity is fundamental to the reduction of distributional inequities in our communities at the present time.

Intergenerational equity implies an equitable distribution of benefits and burdens *among generations*. It includes consideration to time, to the present generation, and to future generations. This concept of equity is fundamental to the concept of sustainable living (Gardner & Roseland,1989; Robinson et al., 1990).

From the above discussion of equity, it is apparent that planning which is equity-oriented would have to incorporate the above aspects in some manner.

Man is born free, and everywhere is in chains.
Rousseau (1712-1778)
Social Contract

Equity Paradigm and Social Contract Philosophy

The discussion so far has focussed on equity as a concept. The following discussion will consider equity as a paradigm for equity-oriented planning and explore the philosophical roots of such a paradigm.

Hodge (1975) has argued that society is in fact moving from a growth and efficiency, rooted in utilitarianism, to an equity paradigm, rooted in social contract philosophy. In the equity paradigm, the issue of distribution is a crucial question in and of itself and takes priority over any question of production. Rawls'(1971) theory of justice[7] is a contemporary interpretation of traditional social contract philosophy as first represented by Jean Jacques Rousseau (1973), and Immanuel Kant (1961). His theory of justice as fairness is what Rawls believes "best approximates our considered judgements of justice and constitutes the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic society."

At one time, social contract philosophy held that society could not even come into existence without at least a tacit agreement among the individuals of the society. The social contract was the "natural law" governing human behavior. In contemporary times, social contract philosophy is viewed as a social ethic of society, stressing that production without a social contract is impossible. In this respect, the principle of equity is based upon the interdependence of persons within a society. The well-being of any individual can not be maximized without consideration of the effects of his or her choices upon others.

In the equity paradigm, the real issue before society is equity in the distribution of society's resources among individuals. This contrasts from the

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[7] Rawls' theory of justice has been the foundation for other normative perspectives in planning. See for example, Klosterman, 1978; Beatley, 1984; McConnell, 1981; Marlin, 1989.

growth and efficiency paradigm which is concerned primarily with increasing production, and with which planning has been rather preoccupied.

Distribution in the Equity Paradigm

Where conservative and libertarian thinkers view personal talents, resources, and successes as essentially deserved, Rawls views life's distribution of benefits and burdens as morally arbitrary and the result of factors and circumstances mostly beyond the control of the individual. For Rawls, society is a mutual and shared endeavor in which all benefit from the cooperative actions of each, rather than simply a collection of independent people (Rawls, 1971, 15). According to Rawls, individuals do not, in a strict sense, "deserve" their earnings, wealth, or other social or economic advantages, but should be entitled to keep them if that is to the advantage of everyone, and specifically, of those who are least advantaged. The primary task of moral theory, in Rawls' view, is to determine the appropriate standards of justice for governing the cooperative social arrangement and its resultant distribution of benefits and burdens.

The "Original Position"

According to Rawls, a society's principles of justice are determined by individuals who view society from an original neutral vantage point, which he labels the "original position." The "original position" is a theoretical construct, which has not and cannot exist in reality, but from which individuals argue and hypothesize about acceptable principles of justice. In the "original position" individuals find themselves under conditions of complete equality. Individuals in the original position are rational, self-interested, and "cloaked in a veil of ignorance." The "veil of ignorance" prevents them from knowing their

actual personal circumstances and social position, information that, if known, would surely bias the neutrality of the resulting principles of justice.

Rawls believes that in the original position, and cloaked in the veil of ignorance, the self-interested, rational individual would choose the alternative that constituted the "maximin". The "maximin" is defined by Rawls as the social arrangement, under which the effects of its worst possible outcome would be better than the effects of any other arrangement's worst possible outcome.

From his belief in the maximin choice, Rawls' two principles of justice are derived.

> Principle One
>
> Individuals have a right to the same basic liberties available to all, that is, formal democratic liberties, such as freedom of conscience, freedom of thought and discussion, political liberty and equality under the law.
>
> Principle Two (The Difference Principle)
>
> Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (Rawls, 1971, 302).

It is important to note that the two principles are arranged serially, implying that the first be satisfied before advancing to the second. This illustrates the importance that Rawls attaches to the preservation of an individual's basic liberties. One's basic liberties should not be sacrificed even if the sacrifice advances one's immediate welfare. The essence of Rawls' first principle is that "means" cannot be sacrificed in the interests of "ends". In this respect, his first principle upholds the rights approach held by libertarian thinkers.

Rawls' second principle of justice is the heart of his distributive theory and provides support for planning which is explicitly equity-oriented. The difference principle states that inequalities in the distribution of primary goods are permitted if they are to the greatest benefit of those who are least advantaged. Rawls defines primary goods as things which every rational person is presumed to want, most notably, rights and liberties; powers and opportunities; and income and wealth; and self-respect (Rawls, 1971, 62).

Planning decisions inherently distribute public goods among various groups in the community (Davidoff, 1978; Beatley,1984) and as we have shown in chapter 2.0 impure public goods contribute either positively or negatively to the real income or social welfare of individuals in the community.

Although Rawls provides a rather general definition of primary goods, it is clear that this category includes the goods whose distribution is influenced by planning decisions. For example, urban planning decisions can affect what types of housing are available in a community and whether low- and moderate-income families can find adequate housing. Planning may affect what employment opportunities available in the community and who is able to take advantage of them. Through transportation systems and land use patterns, planning activities can affect the ability of members of particular socioeconomic groups to change residences and their accessibility to employment, cultural, and other social resources and opportunities;. Urban planning typically affects the recreational opportunities available to residents, such as neighborhood parks, and the quality and safety of neighborhood environments, such as traffic control and proximity to natural and manmade hazards.

Relating Rawls' Difference Principle to Distribution

Given that the difference principle is at the heart of Rawls' distributive theory, it will be utilized to illustrate how the decisions of the equity-oriented planner could be guided. To illustrate how the difference principle would operate in planning situations, it will be compared to three competing ethical dictates: utilitarian, equal shares, and egalitarian.

1. Utilitarian

The utilitarian planner strives to maximize the quantity of benefits and minimize the quantity of costs for the community as a whole, regardless of how those benefits and costs are distributed. In figure 3, Scenario 1 provides the greatest net benefit to the community. Note however, that the higher income groups enjoy a larger proportion of the benefits. For the utilitarian planner, this is not an issue.

2. Equal Shares

Planning decisions should be made so that benefits and costs are distributed equally amongst relevant social and economic groups in the community. Decisions based on this principle would tend to perpetuate existing inequities, however. The planner who believes in equal shares would choose Scenario 2 in Figure 3.

3. Egalitarian

For the egalitarian planner, decisions are made so as to reduce any existing social or economic inequalities among social and economic groups in the community. To do this, the scenario which delivered most benefits to the least advantaged and fewest benefits to the most advantaged would be chosen. The

egalitarian planner seeks to reduce the extent of relative inequality and would therefore choose Scenario 3 in Figure 3.

4. Rawlsian

The Rawlsian planner begins with the assumption that everyone should have equal access to primary goods, and designs planning policy and programs to maximize the extent of benefits available to the least advantaged groups in the community, regardless of the availability of benefits to the more advantaged groups. Referring again to Figure 3, the Rawlsian planner would choose Scenario 4, since of the four scenarios, it is the one which yields the greatest amount of net benefits to the lowest socioeconomic group. Note that the Rawlsian planner will support inequalities in certain primary goods if they will lead to a higher level of benefits for those who have fewest advantages to begin with. In Scenario 4, for example, the significant level of benefits to the high income group might be construed as an incentive for research and development which "increase the size of the pie" and at the same time indirectly boost the welfare of those in the least advantaged position. *Where such inequalities in primary goods do not increase the level of benefits available to the least-advantaged group, they are unjustified.*



Source: Beatley (1984)

Figure 3.
Hypothetical Distribution of Net Benefits
From Four Community Planning Scenarios.

Summary

This chapter has explored the concept of equity. It has been shown that there are distributional and social aspects to equity, as well as intragenerational and intergenerational perspectives. Equity was then explored as a social paradigm within which equity-oriented planning would fit and derive its values. Where the growth and efficiency paradigm is rooted in utilitarianism, the equity paradigm is rooted in social contract philosophy. The work of contemporary American philosopher, John Rawls (1971), A Theory of Justice is introduced and explored as a philosophical foundation for equity-oriented planning.

Before proceeding to an overview of the literature in Chapter 5.0, as summary of the arguments made thus far will now be presented.

In Chapter 2.0, it was determined that planning decisions influence the allocation of public goods; and the allocation of public goods influences the distribution of real income. Therefore, it was concluded that planning decisions can influence the distribution of real income among individuals or groups of individuals.

In chapter 3.0 it was determined that incorporating utilitarian values, such as growth and efficiency into the planning process would serve to, at best perpetuate existing distributional inequities, and at worst, exacerbate them. A different set of values would be needed for community planning to address the problem of distributional inequities.

This chapter has explored the concept of equity and has concluded that an equity paradigm rooted in social contract philosophy provides an appropriate philosophical foundation from which to build planning thought and practice which is equity-oriented.

In the next chapter the literature on equity-oriented planning will be reviewed.

What we have to learn to do, we learn by doing.
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)
Nicomachean Ethics, I

CHAPTER 5.0 REVIEW OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR EQUITY-ORIENTED PLANNING

Introduction

This chapter will present an overview of the arguments which have been made for equity-oriented planning. All share the fundamental characteristic of attempting to improve the living standards of the least advantaged people in society.

The Utopian Socialists

The notion of equity has existed since at least the days of Socrates, (ca 469-399 B.C.), Plato (ca 427-348 B.C.) and Aristotle (ca 384-322 B.C.)[8] , but did not penetrate the domain of community planning until about the end of the eighteenth century.

During the late 1700's and early 1800's the social reform activities of the utopian socialists influenced urban life in England, France, and the United States. Urban life at this time was characterized by a burgeoning factory system,

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[8] Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are perhaps the three most famous individuals in the history of thought. They are here noted for their contribution to the early notion of "justice". Socrates, Plato and Aristotle denounced the relativism, skepticism, and individualism of the Sophists, on the grounds that the virtues of goodness and justice were being reduced to the whims of the individual. "If there is no final truth, and if goodness and justice are merely relative to the whims of the individual, then neither religion, morality, the state, nor society itself can long be maintained" (Ralph & Burns, 1974, 196). Aristotle is credited with introducing the notion of the "golden mean" as the key to self-realization. For Aristotle, the highest good for man [sic] consists of self-realization. The notion of self-realization is the highest ideal for individuals is contemporarily reflected in Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, which has formed the basis for many social justice arguments (see Hodge, 1975).

escalating social costs, and horrendous labour conditions. The resultant social unrest of the time was caused not only by the terrible working conditions in the factories, but also by the fact that machinery was beginning to replace manual labour.

Among the original utopian socialists was Robert C. Owen (1771-1858). Although the benevolent Mr. Owen was characterized as a radical free thinker who possessed a strange mixture of practicality, naivete, achievement, fiasco, common sense and madness (Heilbroner, 1980), he is nevertheless considered the soundest and most realistic of the utopian socialists (Burns & Ralph, 1974, 825). Owen believed that people were no better than their environment, and so in his quest to reform the living and working conditions for the factory workers, he conceived the *Village of Cooperation.* New Lanark, Scotland was Owen's first *Village of Cooperation* in which he built new houses for his workers, reduced their hours of work from fourteen to ten, and established free schools for their children. His solution to the problem of poverty rested in making the poor productive.

Owen was criticized for wanting to create a"community of paupers" , for meddling in people's lives, and for trying to settle people (the poor) who were not "settleable" (Heilbroner, 1980, 109). In his day of "untrammeled *laissez-faire*", his ideas were mostly ignored. The following quote, however, is an expression of Owen's philosophy of hope, a philosophy which has endured his fantastic notions about spades and plows, money, and Villages of Cooperation:

> "Man [sic] is a creature of circumstances, and who makes the circumstances but man [sic] himself? The world is not inevitably good or bad, but to the extent that we make it so" (Heilbroner, 1980, 113).

In contemporary society, Owen's philosophy of hope has still relevance: inasmuch as we create disparities among ourselves, we can redress those disparities.

Where Robert Owen was born a poor man, the Count of Saint-Simon (1760-1825) was an aristocrat by birth who became a passionate disciple of freedom and democracy. He believed that "every man [sic] was dependent on his brothers" and that "man [sic] must work to share in society's fruits" (Heilbroner, 1980, 117). His theory of society was based on the principle that the *industriels*, that is, the technicians and working classes, should occupy the position of power and overthrow the old ruling classes (Benevolo, 1971, 55). In his eyes, the aristocracy was simply ornamental, and the workers of all ranks deserved the highest rewards of society; the idlers deserved the least.

Saint-Simon's work attempted to put a "moralistic emphasis on the value of public works" (Benevolo, 1971, 56), and pointed to grave injustices in the distribution of society's wealth, but it gave little guidance to those who wanted to set things right.

Where Saint-Simon was inspired by a passion for the grand idea, Charles Fourier (1772-1837) was inspired by a passion for trivia. Agreeing with Owen and Saint-Simon that the world was hopelessly disorganized, he proposed a "meticulously exact utopia based on a highly complex philosophical and political system (Benevolo, 1971, 56). Fourier believed that a society based on the rivalry of individual or class interests was immoral and absurd and believed that a state of universal harmony could be reached through joint effort. His idea was to remove the restrictions and conflicting interests in such a way as to guarantee the satisfaction of individual tendencies while respecting the rights and privileges of others. Fourier envisioned a harmonious society as being organized into phalanxes, where efficiency would be achieved through

centralization. Everyone would be required to work, but would do what they liked best. Amicable competition would yield great communal profit which was to be divided five twelfths to labour, four twelfths to capital, and three twelfths to ability. In Fourier's plan, everyone was to be encouraged to become a part owner as well as fellow worker.

As heirs of the Enlightenment, the utopian socialists were more interested in social justice than in discovering economic laws or in laying the foundations of national prosperity as most of their comtemporaries were. They were courageous dreamers in their time. The intellectual climate in which they worked was harsh and cruel, rationalized by economic laws.

> It was the world that was cruel - not the people in it . . . the world was run by economic laws, and these were nothing with which one could or should trifle - they were simply there - and to rail about whatever injustices might be tossed up as an unfortunate consequence of their working was as foolish as to lament the ebb and flow of the tides (Heilbroner, 1980, 122).

The utopian socialists, nevertheless saw the potential for a better life for humankind and challenged the laws of the day. As the first urban reformers, they were inspired by the economic and social changes which produced the inequalities of the first decades of the nineteenth century, and by the changes in political theory and public opinion which meant that these disparities were no longer accepted as inevitable but were regarded as obstacles that could and should be removed (Benevolo, 1971). Their ideas did not change the world as they predicted, but should be applauded for planting the notion of equity firmly, if briefly, within the domain of community planning. Their efforts were not simply philanthropic - the utopian socialists believed in cooperation, mutual aid,

mutual respect, and productivity, but their fundamental cause was the struggle for social justice.

In spite of the efforts of the utopian socialists, community planning proceeded under the auspices of utilitarian values - economy, efficiency, growth - with little or no concern for how the fruits of production, that is, society's resources, were being distributed. However, by the 1960's, social justice re-emerged as an issue in the realm of community planning when Paul Davidoff (1978) and others cast the spotlight on the redistributive function in planning.

The Redistributive Function in Planning

The redistributive function in planning is aimed at reducing negative social conditions caused by great disparities in the possession, by classes of the population, of important resources resulting from public or private action (Davidoff, 1978). It aims to create conditions of greater justice, equality or fairness - usually termed equity. The redistributive function in planning demands consideration of who pays and who benefits, and further, to what extent.

Davidoff (1978), among others, claims that planning is not value free...the right plan is always a matter of choice, not of fact. In the case of redistributive or equity-oriented planning, planners must first accept the concept of equity as a professional value. Introducing equity as a value into the planning process, will necessarily influence the goals of that process in the same way that valuing growth and economy influences the goals.

Advocacy Planning

While, the redistributive function in planning has not won wide acceptance among planners, Davidoff's (1965) branch of advocacy planning and

its redistributional stance is perhaps the exception. Coming into existence in the 1960's in the United States, and later expanding to Great Britain, advocacy planning was a movement that "exploded the myth of planning in the public interest and urged city planners to mediate the demands of the urban poor vis-a-vis state agencies (Heskin, 1980 in Friedmann, 1987, 300). In this respect, advocacy planning was a solid attempt by some members of the planning profession to reorient the goals of planning towards equity and to bring about distributive justice. Friedmann (1987) provides this reflection on advocacy and planning:

> In retrospect, advocacy planning was not radical at all, though its flamboyant rhetoric initially suggested otherwise. As it turned out, the notion of advocacy fitted quite comfortably into the reality of a pluralist politics, with planners giving the poor a professional voice to defend their "interests" in an arena where other, better-endowed groups were already busy with advocates of their own contending for a share of the available resources. As advocates, planners assumed the role of "public defenders" of the urban poor, and like public defenders in the courts, their work typically was paid for by the state (p. 300).

Advocacy planning calls for the production of plural plans to reflect the multiplicity of interests in the community, the inclusion of citizens in the planning process, and support for the welfare of all, as well as the welfare of minorities (Davidoff, 1965; Davidoff & Reiner, 1962).

In summary, advocacy planning attempted to provide opportunities to those who had few, to give a voice to those whose concerns went unaddressed in the public domain, and more importantly, to redress the power imbalance between the more advantaged and the less advantaged, as Friedmann's (1987) passage above reveals.

Evaluating the Equity of Public Investment

Hodge (1975) proposes that an evaluation of the equity of the spatial and social distribution of the benefits and costs of public investment be part of the planning process. His argument is predicated on the belief that contemporary western society is moving from a social paradigm of growth and efficiency to a social paradigm of equity.

> The infusion of the equity paradigm into contemporary society has been brilliantly portrayed by Boulding (1964), Toffler (1970), and Reich (1970). Their arguments correlate the rising economic opulence and improved education of the common man [sic] with increased distributional sensitivity (Hodge, 1975, 9).

The equity paradigm differs from the paradigm of growth and efficiency primarily on the issue of distribution. Hodge (1975) argues that rising economic opulence and improved education are not equitably distributed among members of society. In substantive terms, grave inequities in income and education still exist. The essence of his argument is that society in general is better off, and therefore, in its "leisure of physical satisfaction and economic opulence" should be more concerned with the way benefits and burdens are distributed. Using Maslow's Hierarchy of Human Needs, Hodge (1975) illustrates how western society in general has satisfied the first three levels of need and is now striving to satisfy the top two levels of need. To each level of need he relates a corresponding philosophy and social paradigm (Table 1).

Table 1
Maslow's Hierarchy of Human Needs and Their Corresponding Philosophies and Social Paradigms

Human Needs	Corresponding Philosophy	Corresponding Social Paradigm
1. Physiological Needs	Utilitarianism	Absolute Growth
2. Safety Needs	Utilitarianism	Absolute Growth
3. Belongingness & Love Needs	Utilitarianism	Absolute Growth
4. Esteem Needs	Social Contract	Equity
5. Self-Actualization Needs	Social Contract	Equity

Source: Hodge, (1975).

Utilitarianism and its corresponding social paradigm of absolute growth are associated with the first three basic human needs. By embracing social contract philosophy and advancing to the equity social paradigm, Hodge (1975) argues that society will fulfill its "esteem" and "self-actualization" needs.

> In the final analysis, the propriety of the equity social paradigm is the most compelling force behind the general acceptance of the paradigm. Two arguments can be used to make this point. Such a paradigm is: (1) representative of the more mature needs of individuals and (2) more in keeping with the loftier goals of a democratic society (Hodge, 1975, 11).

Hodge (1975) bases his argument on the short-comings of utilitarianism as an ethic to guide the decision process for an equitable allocation of society's resources. He offers social contract philosophy as espoused by John Rawls (1971) as an alternative to utilitarianism, for the single reason that the former demands

an explicit accounting of the distribution question, whereas the latter is preoccupied with the production question.

Hodge's (1975) proposed equity evaluation model utilizes distributional analysis as an analytic methods to determine the distribution of costs and benefits among individuals or groups of individuals. Once this information is discerned it can be incorporated into the planning decision process for consideration. His approach to distributing public goods equitably begins with asking and determining "who benefits" and "who pays?"

Equity and Growth Management[9]

Beatley (1984) proposes that growth management strategies be based on Rawls' theory of justice, as presented in chapter 4.0. Beatley's argument is rooted in the premise that the policies guiding growth management inherently distribute primary goods[10] unevenly among various groups in society. As a result, different growth management policies and programs provide different levels of benefits and burdens to various sub-groups in the community.

Beatley (1984) uses Rawls' difference principle to argue that planners, considering various growth management programs should select the one that provides the greatest amount of benefits to the least advantaged group, regardless of the amount of benefits to other groups. Having achieved this, Beatley (1984)

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[9] Growth management constitutes one area of the entire urban planning sphere. This thesis makes the case for incorporating equity into the more broadly defined urban planning process. Beatley calls for a serious discussion about the distributive norms, both explicit and implicit, which guide growth management decisions. In fact, I would argue that this discourse needs to be extended to urban planning as a profession and activity which impacts the lives of people in the present and in the future.

[10] Remembering from chapter 3.0, primary goods are "things which every rational man [sic] is presumed to want...whatever a person's rational plan of life". Chief among them are "rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and self-respect" (Rawls, 1971, 62).

turns to Rawls' lexical difference principle which requires that benefits be maximized for the next least-advantaged group.

Beatley (1984) extends the difference principle argument to address ethical obligations to individuals and groups in other localities. He calls for an "intercommunity difference principle" which would require growth management policies to be maximally beneficial to the least advantaged across jurisdictional boundaries. However, he does acknowledge that a planner has a legitimate moral responsibility to his or her own community.

Planning to Increase Choice and Opportunity for the Disadvantaged

In their book, Making Equity Planning Work, Krumholz & Forester (1990) describe the equity-oriented planning experiences of the Cleveland Planning Commission during the 1970's. They provide an account of the trials and tribulations of planners and politicians who were committed to increasing choices for the least advantaged citizens of Cleveland. Krumholz and Forester (1990) provide this provocative observation about the role of contemporary planners:

> Planners cannot single-handedly change the landscape and political economy of our cities. We should not ask planners to do what only broader social movements can accomplish. But planners can make more of a difference in the face of inequality, poverty, and human suffering than we now expect. So we should not ignore the real possibilities that equity-oriented planners have in their day-to-day work, simply because they cannot do as much as we might like (Krumholz & Forester, 1990, p. 210).

In a spirit of mutual aid, Krumholz and Forester (1990) believe that planning should be "focussed to improve the lives of the most distressed people

of the city". For them, planning has as its goal the expansion of choices and opportunities for those who have few, and the service of those most in need. Grounded in the Rawlsian notion of justice, such a goal provides the planners with a sense of direction, mission, even solidarity. As an activist, poverty-focussed, public-educating style of practice, it is necessarily political. An equity planning strategy recognizes political complexity, exploits intrinsic ambiguity[11], and engages in political reality, rather than shunning it.

> ...it is not apolitical - it is politically sensitive, engaged, and practically pitched. (Krumholz & Forester, 1990)

According to Krumholz & Forester (1990), the equity planning process identifies urban problems[12], shapes public agendas, produces technical analyses (where necessary), organizes task forces, protects some interests (those of the poor and less fortunate) and fights other interests (those of the rich and powerful). It is both practical and technical in nature, depending on the situation. Moreover, the goals of equity-oriented planning inform practice, and practice informs its goals. In this manner, the specific goals evolve as issues involving equity

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[11] In fact, the Cleveland Planning Commission, under the directorship of Norman Krumholz, over the 1969-1979 period, saw ambiguities as a source of opportunity to serve the poor. The lack of a clear mandate allowed the Cleveland planners to invoke the broader traditions of public service, professionalism, and the ideals of a democratic political culture to legitimate their efforts and to expand choices for those who had few (Krumholz & Forester, 1990, 215).

[12] The question of "what is an urban problem?" is addressed by Harper & Stein (1983). They define urban problems as public problems occurring in cities for which public intervention is justified using normative (ie. moral) criteria. Furthermore, while the consequentialist (ie, utilitarian) moral approach is generally adopted, they argue that the "rights approach" should be given more consideration in evaluating urban government intervention. (Social contract philosophy is rooted in the "rights" approach. (See Appendix A for a comparative discussion of the "consequentialist" and "rights" approaches as ethics. The Cleveland planners too, took a "rights approach" in deciding which issues were equity-oriented.

surface. Planning practice then, responds as required, either practically or technically.

The experiences of the Cleveland planners suggest that equity-oriented planning incorporates (i) elements of the "social learning" planning model espoused by Friedmann (1987); (ii) the notion of "learning by doing" developed by John Dewey (1950); and (iii) Paulo Freire's (1973) "education for critical consciousness.

As in Friedmann's (1987) social learning model (p.185), (i) the action group (in this case, the Cleveland planners) learned from its own practice; (ii) learning manifested itself as a change in practical activity (with the arrival of Norm Krumholz as the Director, the planning department was staffed with planners who were committed to expanding choices for those who had fewest; this alone had a profound effect on the actions of the planning department; nevertheless, as they gained an intimate understanding of the equity issues at hand, their actions were responsive and timely); and (iii) the process involved agents who encouraged, provided guidance, and assisted the disadvantaged populations in the process of changing their reality (to be sure, every aspect of the work of the Cleveland planners was aimed at helping disadvantaged groups to bring about positive change in their lives).

Dewey's (1950) theory of pragmatism, colloquially expressed as "learning by doing", results not only in an understanding of the world, but also in its transformation. As stated above, the goals of the equity-oriented planners informed their practice, and their practice informed their goals. Although the Cleveland planners embraced equity *a priori*, the process of learning by doing, helped them to change the norms governing their actions so that eventually all actions were governed by a concern for the ultimate distribution of the costs and benefits of that action. In this manner, learning by doing resulted in "double-

loop learning" (Friedmann, 1987, 185-6) in that the norms guiding the action process underwent a major reconstruction, from the growth and efficiency norms of the previous Administration of the Planning Commission to the equity norms established by Krumholz and his staff.

Freire's (1973) concept of "education for critical consciousness" was relevant in the Cleveland context in that the planners helped disadvantaged populations to critically examine their world and to take action to transform it. For example, they enabled public scrutiny of a developer's inflated promises, and helped to publicize alternatives to a privately lucrative but publicly costly construction project. Their activities enlightened and helped to empower those who stood to lose from the underhanded actions of "the powerful" (Krumholz & Forester, 1990, 220).

Social Equity in Sustainable Development

The role of equity in sustainable development is explored by Gardner & Roseland (1989). They conclude that sustainable development is not possible without addressing the issue of social equity. Vast disparities in human well-being exist at the present time, suggesting that "we are not meeting our obligations to our contemporaries; the abuse of the earth's store of resources likewise indicates that we are not prepared to share with future generations" (p. 28). Both intragenerational and intergenerational equity are being jeopardized. That we refuse to share with each other and with future generations seriously undermines our future and the fulfillment of the four basic principles of sustainable living as outlined by Gardner & Roseland (1989): (i) the fulfillment of human needs; (ii) the maintenance of ecological integrity; (iii) the provision for self-determination; and (iv) the achievement of equity (p. 28).

Gardner and Roseland (1989) suggest that non-material needs are not being met in western consumer societies, even amongst the affluent, largely because they have been subverted to the struggle to meet artificially exaggerated material needs. Leiss (1976) agrees in the following passage from his book entitled, The Limits to Satisfaction:

> a high-intensity market-setting promotes, and a social process enshrines a lifestyle that is dependent upon an endlessly rising level of consumption of material goods . . . individuals are led to misinterpret the nature of their needs and to misunderstand the relationship between their needs and the ways in which they may be satisfied . . . (Leiss, 1976, x)

Increasingly, quality of life is confused with the consumption of goods and services to the point that consciousness of non-material needs is lost. The poverty of affluence is a term for this condition -- relatively affluent people become pre-occupied with satisfying material needs but never really feel satisfied because their non-material needs have been badly neglected. The poverty of affluence leads to over-exploitation of the natural environment through over-consumption - but the irony of the situation is compounded by the fact that the acquisition of material goods no longer bears a direct relationship to human need.[13]

Reincorporating non-material needs into the consciousness of society would have some interesting implications. First, being conscious of non-material needs might help to better understand and accept the concept of

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[13] For some interesting readings on the topic of material and non-material needs in consumer society see: Brown, Lester (1981). Building a Sustainable Society. New York: W.W. Norton.; Berman, Morris (1984). The Reenchantment of the World. Toronto: Bantam.; Leiss, William (1976). The Limits to Satisfaction. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.; Gorz, Andre (1980). Ecology as Politics. Montreal: Black Rose Press.

sustainable living and the changes which need to be made in the way people live. Secondly, as the focus shifts from self-interest to mutual-interest and indeed, survival of all, the notion of social equity no longer feels so slippery or foreign.

Gardner & Roseland (1989) present a perspective which contrasts with Hodge (1975). Whereas Hodge (1975) argues that western society can finally afford the shift to an equity paradigm, Gardner & Roseland (1989) argue that we cannot afford not to shift to an equity paradigm, in other words, western society cannot afford to maintain the growth ethic inherent in utilitarianism.

While Gardner & Roseland's (1989) argument is widely applicable at the global level (and thus pertains to equity-oriented planners who choose to tackle global development issues) it nevertheless offers important advice to community level urban planners: an equitable distribution of resources is vital to the sustainable community. Even at the community level, the "material need versus non-material need" debate has relevance. Insofar as the more affluent members of a community struggle with the poverty of affluence, as described above, they are likely to demand a disproportionate level of public goods and services to satisfy their artificially inflated material needs. In this respect, the task for equity-oriented planners and environmentalists alike, is that of re-educating those who consume a disproportionate level of society's resources so that they become aware of the effects of that over consumption, in the hope that they ultimately change their consumption patterns.

Planning and the Estranged Poor

Hochschild (1991) provides insight into the estranged poor, the most obvious segment of the population who experience the negative impact of distributional inequities. Although her perspective is distinctively American and informed by the black ghetto, there are parallels with the Canadian experience and Canada's disadvantaged populations. Her discussion is perhaps most important and relevant to equity-oriented planning for its appeal to the moral responsibility of individuals to pro-actively alleviate the vulnerabilities of those who are poor, weak, and helpless in our communities.

Hochschild (1991) presents the following three conclusions regarding the estranged poor:

(i) the number and difficulties of the estranged poor grew during the 1970's and 1980's because of foreseeable, intelligible, and avoidable choices made by other Americans; these are manifested as structural constraints in the process of reducing distributional inequities;

(ii) some of the estranged poor are profoundly alienated from, and alien to the rest of American society; this is a manifestation of their destructive values and acts; this finding points to the need to increase choices and opportunities within this population; and

(iii) the estranged poor engage in exaggerated and distorted versions of activities that many other Americans also engage in, for example, leadership and entrepreneurship in the illicit drug industry; some call this exaggerated mirroring; this finding supports the assertion by Rousseau (1973), that all humans are perfectible, but that due to misfortune and bad luck, find themselves striving for perfection in an imperfect social setting. The inequities implicit in this finding represent serious challenges to society, including planners.

The Politics of Helping the Estranged Poor

Hochschild (1991) describes how the art of "blaming" is used as the most common approach to helping the estranged poor. This involves determining the most fundamental cause of their plight, and identifying who is to blame for that cause. For example, if capitalism creates inner city poverty, the villains are capitalists and their minions, and the political prescription is struggle against them through government action and community activism. On the other hand, if misguided policymakers have made the poor lazy or incapable, the villains are policymakers and perhaps the poor themselves, the prescription is more unfettered capitalism and individual initiative. The prescriptions are debatable but the procedure is clear - find the basic cause and the worst villain. The causality approach to problem solving is a product of scientific technical rationality, which emerged out of utilitarianism.

> Blaming has emotional as well as instrumental attractions. The Left wants to shift attention away from the antisocial actions of the estranged poor; the Right wants to divert gazes from the capitalist economy and self-interest driven polity. Both sides are dismayed by the thought that the estranged poor mirror the rest of society. Leftists do not want to admit that the freedom to use drugs, dissolve or not enter into marriages, reject unattractive jobs can be so destructive. Right-wingers are just as reluctant to admit that the profit motive of the drug seller or the rationality of the welfare mother is the same as the profit motive of the investment banker or the rationality of the salary negotiator. (Hochschild, 1991, 573-4).

Hochschild (1991) suggests that political, economic and cultural forces outside the poor community that disempower and impoverish it, and similar forces within the community that demoralize and destroy it, are to blame for the

predicament of the poor. This raises two important points about blame. First, blaming is a waste of time because everyone - politicians, capitalists, the media, the poor themselves, other Americans (living and dead) - is to blame. Second, given the complexity of the problem, the process of blaming diverts the much needed energy to find multifaceted solutions, which will require the participation of all the people being blamed.

Hochschild's approach to helping the estranged poor is rooted in "task responsibility" as opposed to "causal responsibility", the latter referring to the blaming process and the former referring to "the moral imperative to help someone who is vulnerable, regardless of whether you had any role in causing the vulnerability" (Hochschild, 1991, 574). The distinction she makes between "task" and "causal" responsibility paralells the distinction between social contract philosophy and utilitarian thinking. Social contract philosophy, with its tenets of interdependency, cooperation, and mutual aid, very much fits with Hochschild's notion of "task responsibility" - the moral imperative to help others who need it.

> People who have failed to take advantage of opportunities to avert harm to themselves may, in some sense, 'have themselves to blame' for any harm that befalls them; but they rarely have only themselves to blame. Once all their opportunities for self-help have passed...the situation is beyond their control. Others, however, may still be able to act so as to avert [or correct] harm to them. To suggest that those others should (or even that they *may*) stand idly by and watch people reap the bitter fruits of their own improvidence is surely absurd. At that point, if not before, those who have gotten themselves into a dangerous situation truly are unable to help themselves. They are, instead, enormously (perhaps uniquely) vulnerable to the actions and choices of particular others for getting them out of the mess. On my analysis, such

> vulnerabilities generate strong responsibilities (Goodin, 1985, in Hochschild, 1991, 574-5).

The above passage suggests that political actors should find those people and structures to whom the poor are most vulnerable and who are best situated to alleviate that vulnerability and then persuade or require them to act. The political process is a search for levers for action rather deciding who to blame or who to praise. The basic principle underlying the arguments put forward by Hochschild is that those who can alleviate vulnerability are morally bound to do so.

Implications for Planning

Clearly, Hochschild is not calling on planners specifically to address the complex needs of the estranged poor. But her argument is a provocative statement on the responsibilities people have to one another, including planners. If nothing else, her argument reinforces the need to seek an alternative to utilitarian thinking and decision-making. In spite of their limited capabilities to address the needs of the poor, community planners do influence the allocation of scarce resources, and the quality of participation, access to information, and procedural opportunities for others, and as such are in a position to help alleviate the vulnerabilities of the less advantaged members of society. Hochschild (1990) would argue that as public servants, planners should be guided by professional values that obligate them to provide reasons for the distributive choices they make and to work to reduce vulnerabilities. A professional obligation, as she sees it is rooted in a moral obligation - a moral obligation rooted in care for the fellow person.

Compensatory Equality and the Distribution of Urban Public Services

The Responsive Public Services (RPS) Program of the City of Savannah, Georgia incorporated compensatory equality into the bureaucratic decision process to determine an equitable distribution of urban public services in order to maintain all neighborhoods at an acceptable level of livability. Before the RPS Program, the city used an "input equality" approach to urban service delivery which was found to be ineffective in reducing distributional inequities (Toulmin, 1988).

Input equality involves equalizing the amount of city resources devoted to a particular topic area (for example, education or police protection) across particular units of analysis (for example, neighborhood schools or police precincts). It compares favorably to the concepts of "horizontal equity" and "equal opportunity." The city would have been required to spend the same amount to resurface streets in every neighborhood of equivalent population regardless of need, for example.

By contrast, output or compensatory equality requires equality of condition *after* receipt of service. This method of service delivery is compensatory in nature in that it identifies existing deficiencies and need, and actively moves to correct and fill them (Toulmin, 1988, 395). The notion of "vertical equity" as described in Chapter 4.0 describes this approach. The following excerpt describes the findings which motivated the change in approach, from input equality to compensatory equality, by the City of Savannah:

> To the extent feasible, the city government through its service programs should seek to maintain each neighborhood at an acceptable level of livability. To accomplish this goal, the city must first identify the neighborhoods which fall below the desired level of livability and then design service programs that can

> correct the conditions causing this problem . . . From the study, it is clear that the level of services being provided in some of the neighborhoods is not effective. This is a significant finding, for it points out that we cannot plan our service programs to provide a uniform level of service throughout the city, as we do now (City of Savannah, 1973 in Toulmin, 1988, 391).

It does not appear that proponents of the RPS Program linked the provision of public goods with the differential distribution of real income. However, it is an example of civic politicians and administration recognizing the need to correct for the variation in levels of livability among neighborhoods in the city. The RPS Program is a testimonial for the need to differentially distribute public goods and services.

Equity in Parks and Recreation Service Allocation

Wicks & Crompton (1989) present four generic equity concepts - (i) compensatory equity; (ii) equity defined as equality; (iii) equity defined as demand; and (iv) market equity - which were used to develop eight models (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H) for the equitable allocation of public leisure services (see Table 2). As established in Chapter 2.0, public leisure services, as an impure public good, have the potential to increase or decrease the real income of individuals, and are thus, inherently redistributional. The following eight equity models will be discussed in terms of the potential of each to reduce distributional inequities.

TABLE 2
Generic Equity Concepts and Corresponding Equity Models for Delivering Public Leisure Services

Generic Equity Concept	Public Service Equity Model
I. Compensatory Equity	**A.** To those with greatest need (based upon socioeconomic factors)
II. Equity Defined as Equality	**B.** Equally to each individual or unit of analysis (equality of inputs). **C.** Where fewest examples of service now exist (equality of outputs).
III. Equity Defined as Demand	**D.** Where the service is most used (economic demand). **E.** Where levels of citizen advocacy are greatest (political demand).
IV. Market Equity	**F.** To those who pay the most taxes. **G.** Where fees cover costs. **H.** Where the cost of service provision is lowest; (cost-benefit option).

Source: Wicks & Crompton (1989).

Equity Concept I: Compensatory Equity

Compensatory equity corresponds to the notion of equity put forward by Rawls. It bespeaks vertical equity as presented in Chapter 4.0. The corresponding service delivery model (Model A) is based on need and in this respect could bring about a redistribution of real income.

Equity Concept II: Equity Defined as Equality

Where equity is defined as equality, two service delivery models are presented. The first, Model B, is predicated on "equality of inputs" and would result in no redistribution of real income to the least advantaged (Toulmin, 1988), in fact this model would perpetuate distributional inequities. The second, Model C,

however, aims to equalize outputs. This could be done either by (i) increasing the allocation to those currently receiving lower levels of service to bring it up to levels received by other groups or (ii) reducing service levels for those currently enjoying higher levels of service to bring it down to the levels received by other groups. The former, option (i), would bring about an increase in real income for the disadvantaged group, and as such has the potential for redistribution, but the latter, option (ii), would not. While the latter approach would reduce the gap between the two groups, it would not necessarily expand the choices or opportunities for the disadvantaged group.

Equity Concept III: Equity Defined as Demand

In the third example, equity is defined demand: economic demand and political demand. Model D, based on economic demand, would distribute public services to those areas where they are demonstrated to be most used, that is, where economic demand is greatest. From a redistributive point of view, this model would not ensure a reduction of distributional inequities. Demonstrated use does not imply need. Therefore, it is conceivable that groups who already enjoy access to public services will continue to receive those services, while groups needing, but not currently using the service, would not receive them. Model E is based on political demand and as such has the potential to redistribute real income. However, given that the more disadvantaged groups in society tend to have the least political power, this model would not ensure the reduction of distributional inequities.

Equity Concept IV: Market Equity

The fourth generic concept of equity is described as "market equity". The three models (F, G, and H) which emerge out of this concept would not reduce

distributional inequities. The allocations which result from these three models are not necessarily related to need and are not sensitive to existing distributional inequities. They are based on ability of user to pay or on aggregate cost-benefit criteria (which was determined to be ineffective in dealing with distributive issues in chapter 3.0).

In summary, Model A seeks to distribute public services such that distributional inequities would be reduced. It is based on the Rawlsian concept of equity, and seeks to compensate those who do not enjoy the same levels of service of others in the community.

Summary

This chapter has provided an overview of the arguments which have been made for equity-oriented planning.

The idealism sustained by the utopian socialists in their quest for social justice underlines the importance of working to change the status quo. Their approach suggests that equity-oriented planning be cooperative in nature, distribute society's resources on the basis of need and contribution to the common good.

The distributive function in planning is key to planning which is equity-oriented and which seeks to reduce the distributional inequities that exist in our communities.

Hodge (1975) offers an equity model which would incorporate distributional analysis into the planning process. Distributional analysis will be an important step for equity-oriented planners because it will allow them to answer "who benefits" and "who pays?"

Beatley (1984) and Krumholz & Forester (1990) offer support for incorporating Rawls' difference principle into the planning process.

Social equity has been linked to the concept of sustainable development and the poverty of affluence by Gardner and Roseland (1989). Equity-oriented planning will need to address the inequities resulting from the disproportional consumption of scarce resources by more affluent members of the community.

Toulmin (1988) and Wicks & Crompton (1989) provide examples of a bureaucratic decision approach to equitable public service allocation.

Krumholz & Forester (1990) argue that bureaucratic planners, politicians and the various interests in the community need to be actively involved in the planning process, and further that equity-oriented planners need to champion the needs of the least advantaged.

The discussion in Chapter 6.0 will attempt to synthesize the arguments put forward in the preceding five chapters.

The new city planner should have moral commitment to an ethics of emancipation, be embedded in critical thinking and be steeped in the social learning paradigm with its reliance on group processes and tacit knowledge.

John Friedmann (1987)

CHAPTER 6.0 FOUNDATIONS FOR EQUITY-ORIENTED COMMUNITY PLANNING

Introduction

This chapter will present the theoretical and practical foundations for equity-oriented community planning. This discussion is intended to accomplish two things: (1) to help community planners recognize the need and potential for planning to become an agent for distributive justice (2) and to provide a framework from which to begin to shape the decision-making process for the equitable distribution of real income derived from the benefits and burdens of impure public goods.

Equity-Oriented Planning Defined

Equity-oriented planning involves a reorienting of the goals or mission of planning towards improving the living and working conditions of those least advantaged. More generally, it seeks a just and fair distribution of public goods through a just and fair process. It embraces democratic ideals, such as the protection of all citizens, the provision of opportunities, the reduction of vulnerabilities among those most vulnerable to exploitation, and the consideration of "public welfare" in addition to "private welfare" (Krumholz & Forester, 1990).

As discussed in Chapter Five, equity planning fits with the social learning model presented by Friedmann (1987); borrows from Dewey (1950) the idea of "learning by doing"; and is actively involved with educating the community with respect to equity issues, and in the spirit of Freire's (1973) "education for critical consciousness".

Equity-oriented planning accepts that the problem of equity will be more pressing in some circumstances than others. Where the gains and losses are small, the concern for equity is small; and where the gains and losses are larger, and more skewed, the concern for equity is larger (Page, 1988). Questions over the fair distribution of benefits and costs arise most sharply when the decisions are large, lumpy and possibly irreversible and when they also involve such basic goods as health, liberty and the means of survival and affect the process of valuation itself.

Equity planning tries to deal with the problems of sustaining political vision in professional practice in a liberal democracy that rewards self-interest and sometimes ridicules public service (Krumholz & Forester, 1990). It addresses the question: "How can we plan so that we can respond seriously to, rather than neglect, the real and painful issues surrounding poverty, racism, power and powerlessness?" It begins by accepting that the rights of individuals cannot be suppressed in the interest of the larger collectivity.

Goals of Equity-Oriented Planning

The ultimate goal of equity-oriented planning is the promotion of a more equitable allocation of society's benefits by helping to overcome obstacles to access and choice among those poorest and least powerful members of society. In this respect, the equity planner functions as an agent for social and economic change. To enable equity-oriented planning, locally responsible government

institutions must give priority to the goal of promoting a wider range of choices for those people who have few. This will enable a reduction of existing distributional inequities among the members of society. Miller's (1977) concept of equity in Figure 4 is a graphical representation of this goal. The goals of equity-oriented planning inform practice and practice informs its goals. In this manner, the specific goals evolve as issues involving equity surface (Krumholz & Forester, 1990).



Note: A = achievement, attainment, or income; N = numbers of individuals; $\bar{X}$ = mean of group; 1 = Group 1 (Disadvantaged); 2 = Group 2 (Advantaged)

Figure 4: The Goals of Equity-Oriented Planning

Theoretical Foundation for Equity-Oriented Planning

Equity-oriented planning is rooted in social contract philosophy and utilizes Rawls' (1971) theory of justice as its theoretical foundation. Specifically, it builds on Rawls' Difference Principle and holds that society's resources should be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution would benefit all, and would provide the greatest amount of benefit for the most disadvantaged. Where inequities in the distribution of resources already exist, Rawls would insist that future allocations be aimed at reducing those inequities, unless those inequities are benefitting the least advantaged.

In theory, equity-oriented planning deals first with the distribution question, and then would be concerned with the production question. While it is recognized that distribution and production of society's resources are integrally related, this thesis has not explicitly explored those linkages, except of course, for Harvey's (1973) argument that equity in distribution of society's resources is a pre-requisite to efficiency in the production of those resources. In this sense, it borrows from utilitarianism the tenet of efficiency (ie. maximizing benefits and minimizing costs), but is distinctive from utilitarianism in that it is fundamentally concerned with the distribution of benefits and costs among individuals or classes of individuals.

The rationale for serving the goal of efficiency along with the main goal of equity is to ensure maximum resources for the promotion of a more equitable society. In other words, if the goal of efficiency is to be served at all, remembering that it is the goal of equity which is ultimately being served, it shall be done only as a means towards the end of a more equitable society. For example, the rationale for seeking more efficient collection and expenditure of public funds would be to ensure maximum resources for the promotion of a more equitable society.

Relating Equity and Efficiency in Equity-Oriented Planning

At first glance "equity" and "efficiency" seem to refer to different domains of social life. "Efficiency" remains primarily an economic term while "equity" has been a central concern for political or moral philosophers. There is a simple but significant difference, too, in the grammar of the two concepts: for example, one easily refers to the efficiency of a machine, but would find it awkward to question the equity of the same machine. "Efficiency" refers to a world of transformation of input and output processes; "equity" refers, in contrast, to a social world of moral persons. Efficiency is an attribute of system performance; equity is an attribute of social and moral relations among members of a society. At this juncture it seems plausible that the two concepts are hardly related.

> Efficiency" is quickly defined to be a "positive" (empirical, scientific) concept while "equity" is more likely thought of as an ethical, value-laden, "normative" concept (Forester, 1988, 93).

The problem here is that we feel forced to choose between "efficiency" on the one hand and "equity" on the other. Because we have come to understand the two concepts as being entirely unrelated[13], we do not consider merging the two such that decisions could be more holistically informed, particularly with respect to distributional issues.

Equity-oriented planning involves the consideration of both equity and efficiency. "Planners do not have to choose one mode of thought or reason, practical or instrumental, over the other in the abstract; . . . but planners do need, though, to understand and appreciate the meaning and significance of both

[13] "Efficiency' has meaning in a highly formalized language and the conceptual framework of economics (or engineering); 'equity' has meaning in a political and philosophical framework of argumentation, interpretation, and judgment" (Forester, 1988, 94).

equity and efficiency -- and this calls for understanding both instrumentally rational, technical modes of thought and practically rational, interpretive modes of thought and analysis as well" (Forester, 1988, 94).

Equity Criteria in the Decision Process

Any decision process requires criteria by which alternative actions are judged. The question before the equity planner is, on what criteria can an individual make a claim on society's resources, such that an equitable distribution will result?

In Chapter Four the distributional and social aspects of equity were presented. If the horizontal notion of equity is taken as the decision criterion, resources would be distributed equally to individuals with similar needs. If, on the other hand, the vertical aspect of equity is the decision criterion, more resources would have to be distributed to those with more needs. Similarly, if the decision criterion is procedural equity, the planning process would be judged on the extent to which the relevant individuals are included.

While the above criteria relate to intragenerational equity, intergenerational equity could also serve as the decision criterion for planning activities. In this case, planning activities would be oriented towards the fair distribution of resources among generations. For example, ensuring that the current generation's use of a city's river system does not pollute the water such that future generations are prevented from enjoying the river or a burdened with the costs of cleaning it up.

To summarize, the criteria for the equity planning process can be horizontal or vertical equity, substantive or procedural equity, or intragenerational or intergenerational equity - depending on the goals of the community.

Guiding Principles for the Equity Planner

Based on the preceding chapters of this thesis several guiding principles for the equity planner emerge. They include: (1) equity planning is not value-free; (2) it recognizes a plurality of interests in the community; (3) it is political; (4) it involves collective task responsibility; (5) it demands an accounting of the distribution question; (6) it promotes fairness for all members of society; (7) it demands persistence on the part of community planners; and (8) the principles of equity must be written into the municipal plan.

1. Equity-oriented planning is not value-free

Equity-oriented planning begins with the premise that planning is not value-free. Instead, equity planning is value-laden and seeks not pure scientific objectivity, but fairness and distributive justice.

> Appropriate planning action cannot be prescribed from a position of value neutrality, for presumptions are based on desired objectives (Davidoff, 1965, 331).

The value-neutral stance by the planning profession has been appropriately criticized for maintaining the status quo, which has the inevitable effect of maintaining current social and economic inequities.

> Planners who provide just the facts, or information about procedures, to anyone who asks for them seem to treat everyone equally. Yet where severe inequalities exist, treating the strong and the weak alike ensures only that the strong remain strong and the weak remain weak. The planner who pretends to act as a neutral regulator may sound egalitarian but is nevertheless acting,

> ironically, to perpetuate and *ignore* existing inequalities (Forester, 1989, 101. The emphasis is mine.)

The question of "values" and "facts" in the planning process is one which insists on the mistaken separation of the two and then the selection of either "values" as decision criteria, or alternatively of "facts". Generally, values are discounted and discarded, viewed as clouding the process of "rational" thought. However, as Davidoff argues, "values are inescapable elements of any rational decision-making process" and the values held by the planner should be made clear (1965, 331). In fact, values need to be articulated before the planning process can proceed (see Table 3). Forester (1989) reminds us that a value-free analysis of facts for example, would be, by definition, worthless.

While much discourse has criticized planning for taking a value-neutral stance on urban issues, another school of thought insists that planning has never been value-neutral, but that it has aligned itself with corporate interests and as a result has adopted utilitarian values such as growth and economy.

Table 3
The Effect of Manipulating Values on Selected Steps of the Planning Process

Step 1. Articulation of values	Step 2. Articulation of goals	Step 3. Application of analytic methods	Step 4. Application of decision criteria
A. Utilitarian Values • technical rationality • growth • efficiency • order	Maximize good for greatest number of people; maximize aggregate social welfare	Aggregate cost-benefit analysis (Concerned with efficiency of costs and benefits)	• least cost • most profit
B. Equity Values • distributive justice • fairness • rights of individuals • mutual aid • interdependency • cooperation	Maximize benefits for least advantaged individuals or group; Increase choices for those who have fewest; empower and involve the relevant publics	Distributional analysis (Concerned with how costs and benefits are distributed among individuals or classes of individuals)	• vertical equity • procedural equity • intergenerational equity

Table 3 illustrates the effect of manipulating the values in the planning process. In scenario A, utilitarian values are expressed; the goals are oriented to the values and the analytic methods are oriented to the goals, and the decision criteria relate to the values. In scenario B, the same progression of steps occurs but, because the values have changed, the nature of the activities undertaken at each step is different. The point is, values have a profound effect on the process. A re-orientation in the values held by planning professionals is fundamental to the equity planning process.

2. Equity-oriented planning serves a plurality of interests

Equity-oriented planning rejects the notion of a unitary public interest and instead accepts that at any given point in time there exists a plurality of interests which compete for scarce resources. The equity-oriented planner then

determines which interest(s) (or group(s) is/are least advantaged and allocates public resources to improve the the disadvantaged condition (this condition can be related to income education, political power, for example). The need to move away from the notion of a unitary public interest is related to the need to know how the benefits and costs are distributed among groups in society. The unitary public interest is related to maximizing benefits for the greatest number of people, that is, maximizing social welfare in the aggregate. Accepting that there are a plurality of interests competing for scarce resources forces consideration of the distribution question.

3. Equity-oriented planning is political

Equity-oriented planning recognizes the political nature of planning. It identifies those issues which have equity implications and presents not only the technical facts, but also the ethical concerns from a distributional point of view. As Krumholz & Forester (1990) said, "it is politically sensitive, engaged, and practically pitched". It is an activist, public-educating style of practice which recognizes political complexity, exploits intrinsic ambiguity, and engages in political reality rather than shunning it. This heightens the relevance of equity-oriented planning. Politics has always been a part of planning but has not always been recognized as such.

Equity-oriented planners are not just seeking consensus. They identify and clarify the often opposing interests of the more and the less advantaged and keep before the decision-makers the probable consequences of inequitable decisions for the future of the City. In these terms, conflict is unavoidable and planners will have to be prepared to work through it. Ultimate consensus and the adoption of desirable policies will have to be forged out of conflict between those interests - through the political process.

4. Collective Task Responsibility

Hochschild (1991) argues that as members of society, we all have a responsibility to one another, which includes caring about those who are most vulnerable, and working to alleviate vulnerabilities. Equity-oriented planning strives to promote a wide range of alternatives and opportunities leaving individuals free to define their own needs and priorities. This involves undertaking activities which serve as enabling mechanisms, expanding choice and opportunity for those who have little, if any. To the extent that planners are in a position to reduce social and economic inequities among members of the community, their professional values should obligate them to do so.

5. Equity planning demands an accounting of the distribution question

Where utilitarian planning is concerned primarily with the production question, an accounting of the distribution of benefits and burdens is an integral part of the process of equity planning. In policy and program evaluation, such an accounting would be the first step. Normative distribution (established using equity criteria) is compared to actual distribution; the gap between the two is a measure of equity or inequity; action must be taken to close the gap.

According to Wicks and Crompton (1989), methods for quantifying service distribution have been well developed for the array of urban services that local governments normally provide, but the challenge is to select the most appropriate unit of analysis and service measures. Such data collection efforts represent a significant commitment by an agency to tracking service distribution patterns, a commitment which equity planners must be prepared to secure.

"Who pays" and "who benefits?" are key elements in the analytic framework. In keeping with the goal of achieving equity, planners must work to

ensure that public program benefits go to those most in need, and that those least able to pay do not bear a disproportionate share of the costs.

6. Equity planning promotes fairness for all members of society.

Equity-oriented planning is advocacy planning but inasmuch as it is advocacy on behalf of people less favored by current conditions it is not intended to ignore or demean the interests of the more favored individuals or groups. Reflecting back to Chapter 4.0, Figure 3 illustrated the distribution of net benefits from four different scenarios. It is important to remember that while Scenario 4 presented the greatest amount of net benefits for the low income group, it in fact yielded even greater benefits for the high income group. This illustrates that equity planning attempts to treat all groups fairly.

7. Equity planners must be persistent in their quest for social justice.

The equity-oriented planner must have hope, like the utopian socialists, that change in the direction of greater equity and social justice is possible, and that his or her work can contribute to that change. The planner must consistently place before his or her political superiors, analyses, policies, and recommendations which lead to greater equity, and to publicly join in the fight for the adoption of those recommendations. This process, conducted with verve, imagination, and above all persistence, offers the most hope.

8. Writing equity into the municipal plan

In a discussion of the ethical problems that planners face when planning for development, Grant (1990) argues that if equity is to be part of the criteria upon which planning decisions are based, the principles of equity must be written into the municipal plan.

> The best negotiations come from the strength of the municipal plan. If your plan is weak, or vague, or only tells half the story, then your ability to stay on a particular track becomes very difficult, and you begin to put in variables that you are pulling out of the clouds, that aren't in your plan (p. 31).

Furthermore, Grant (1990) states that planners run the risk of applying standards inconsistently in the absence of clear policies, and as a result allegations of unethical dealing become difficult to refute. On the other hand, Grant (1990) argues that we cannot write regulations to cover every situation in which planners may face an ethical dilemma. How does one legislate morality? It is here that the profession must rely on personal morality, on individual planners to "do the right thing" (p. 32). (There may be a role here for planning schools. Incorporating moral philosophy into the planning curriculum might help to imbue planning thought and practice with a stronger sense of morality.)

While a code of professional conduct cannot resolve all of planning's ethical problems, nor answer all the questions that arise in planning practice, it can assist in drawing attention to the need for social equity and distributional justice. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, including principles of equity in a municipal plan may help to give relevance and commitment to the equity perspective with the intention that it receive formal recognition in the decision-making process.

Tools for the Equity Planner

Apart from the guiding principles presented above there are two important equity mechanisms which can be used as tools for the equity planner: (i) networking and (ii) distributional analysis. The first tool is social in nature

and involves linking up with other equity-oriented professionals and service providers; described in more detail below, this tool is known as 'networking'.

The second tool is technical in nature and is used in the analysis of competing public projects. It must be emphasized that this tool, distributional analysis, does not however provide guidance in the selection of projects to be evaluated, in the selection of socioeconomic groups, or in the selection of equity criteria -- the selection of these factors must be guided by values. Its single most important contribution for equity planning, is that it enables the explicit accounting of benefits and burden among various socioeconomic groups in the community.

(i) Networking

The persistent and careful articulation of an equity-serving goal gives the planner a crucial visibility, so that others, in neighborhoods and agencies alike, have the opportunity to ally themselves with the equity planner(s). Friedmann (1987) stresses the importance of networking to small action groups who are working for social emancipation and toward the larger goal of social transformation:

> What needs to be stressed in the present context is the importance of linking these groups to each other in informal networks and political coalitions... Groups of often disparate backgrounds and experience, with different 'realistic visions' of what is attainable, must be brought together for specific struggles in order to hasten the arrival of the new order (p.400).

In the above passage, Friedmann is referring to radical planning practice outside of the government structure. Networking among groups with an equity orientation is necessary whether working within or outside of existing political

structures. Forming links with other equity-oriented action groups will serve as a resource in an efficiency-oriented system, if not for the present, for the future.

(ii) Distributional Analysis

This method of analysis shows the distribution of costs and benefits by socioeconomic group or class rather than in the aggregate, as conventional cost benefit analysis does. (The mathematical foundations for distributional analysis and aggregate analysis are presented in Appendix B) Therefore, by subjecting a proposed public expenditure to an analysis of the distribution of costs and benefits, decision-makers should be able to see the potential effects of alternative public investment projects on various groups of people. Ultimately, distributional analysis should provide choices. Equity-oriented planning strives to provide choices for those who have fewest.

Incorporating Distributional Analysis into Project Evaluation

An evaluation of the distribution of net benefits resulting from a public project or program is a measure of the equity of that distribution. Therefore, comparing such equity measures for competing public projects may be utilized to select the most equitable project. Hodge (1975) proposes a three-stage process to perform this evaluation: (1) analysis of the distribution of net impact; (2) evaluation of distribution equity; and (3) choice of best project. It should be noted that this equity evaluation process differs from a utilitarian evaluation process primarily in Stage One. In Stage One, an analysis of the *distribution* of benefits and burden is undertaken. This involves the selection of demographic groups, across which the benefits and burdens will be distributed. Utilitarian benefit-cost analysis does not incorporated this step -- it is concerned with the aggregate amount of benefits and burdens produced.

Three Stages of Equity Evaluation Process

Stage One: Analysis

- Select demographic classes

(such as income groups, racial groups, age groups etc)

- Select alternative projects
- Select impact variables
- Determine distribution of net impact

Stage Two: Evaluation

- Select equity criterion

(vertical, horizontal, intergenerational equity etc)

- Determine equity of proposed projects.

Stage Three: Decision

- Contrast equity of projects.
- Choose most equitable project.

As stated above, the equity evaluation process enables an accounting of the distribution of benefits and burden among socioeconomic groups in the community. However, which project wins the support of the decision-makers and is ultimately funded is another question. This question will be dealt with through the political process.

It is at this point that the political aspect of equity-oriented planning would be activated. Activities, such as public education, and the rallying of public support for the most equitable project (in the eyes of the equity planners, whose opinions have been informed through the process of social learning with the community) need to be undertaken. This aspect of equity planning, the

political aspect, is the domain which public community planners are least prepared to do.

Measuring the Success of Equity-Oriented Initiatives

The success of equity-oriented planning and its activities which seek to reduce distributional inequities among groups in the community, can be discerned by comparing pre-intervention measures with post-intervention measures. These seven measures are based on Miller's (1977) concept of equity as represented in Figure 4 (above):

i) change from pre-intervention to post-intervention in the overall mean;

ii) change in the overall variance;

iii) change in the mean for groups that started out as "advantaged";

iv) change in the variance for "advantaged" groups;

*v) change in the mean for "disadvantaged" groups;

*vi) change in the variance for "disadvantaged" groups; and

*vii) change in the disparity between the mean of "advantaged" and "disadvantaged" groups.

Furthermore, change in rank order would be observed with the expectation that the worst would show marked improvement.

The process is repeated, and equity-oriented activities are directed at the group which has slipped into the disadvantaged category. This represents the activation of Rawls' lexical difference principle.

Three measures of particular interest to equity-oriented planners are denoted by an asterisk (*). The reason for this particular interest is self-evident - it is the disadvantaged groups which are their prime concern. However, the disadvantaged situation of any group is only relevant in the context of the rest of

society. Equity-oriented planners need to keep abreast of socioeconomic trends in the community.

Throughout this thesis, equity planning has been contrasted with traditional utilitarian planning. Table 4 presents a synoptic comparative characterization of traditional planning and equity-oriented planning.

Table 4
Comparative Characterization of Traditional Utilitarian Planning and Equity-Oriented Planning

Traditional Utilitarian Planning	Equity-oriented Planning
Substantive	Normative
Utilitarian Philosophy	Social Contract Philosophy
Unitary Public Interest	Plural Public Interests
Concern for the Collective	Concern for the Individual
Seeks majority good	Seeks minority good
Seeks technical rationality, order, efficiency, and growth	Seeks distributive justice
Utilizes top down style of decision-making	Utilizes bottom-up decison-making and enabling mechanisms
Utilizes aggregate benefit-cost analysis in pursuit of efficiency	Utilizes distributional analysis in pursuit of distributional equity

Limitations To Equity-Oriented Planning

There are several factors which undermine the efficacy of equity-oriented planning. They include: (1) planners' lack of political power; (2) the perception

that redistribution is a federal jurisdiction; (3) the partial control problem; (4) the lack of power among the disadvantaged groups; (5) external political pressures; (6) defining equity; (7) private sector activities; and (8) the fact that professional values tend to preclude equity. Some of the factors relate to community planning in general, and some relate specifically to community planning which is equity-oriented.

1. Planners Lack Political Power

Planners alone cannot achieve their equity-oriented goals because they lack the necessary political power to change reality. Equity-oriented planners depend on mobilized grass-roots support from the community. Together, planners and community rally for the political support of decision-makers.

2. Redistribution is Perceived as a Federal Responsibility

The prevailing perception among community planners and indeed among municipal politicians, is that income redistribution is a federal responsibility and that local governments are not able to affect a redistribution of income. This thesis has attempted to show that some redistribution of real income occurs at the local level through the allocation of public goods and services. This is a problem of perception, and perceptions can be changed. Equity-oriented planners should be prepared to do this.

3. Partial Control Problem

The inequitable nature of the results of the existing economic and political system are pervasive. Therefore, the activities of a public agency within that system seldom, if ever, solely determine the degree to which that agency achieves its goal (for example, a secure community, an educated citizenry).

Similarly, the activities of equity-oriented planners will not be the sole determinant of their success (or failure). The forces of existing economic and political structures may be stronger than equity program forces and therefore, any positive effects of an equity-oriented program may be undermined by such prevailing structural forces. For example, while the activities of a police department contribute to the security of a community, these activities are never the sole determinant of the state of security and in fact, may seem futile in the face of the activities of street gangs. The amount of control that any given jurisdiction has over its particular problem area varies from problem area to problem area. For example, the fire department is able to take greater control of its problem area (fighting fires), by increasing the number of fire hydrants and rescue teams, than the police department is able to reduce crime rates by increasing the number of foot patrols. In problem areas where social forces are strong and the jurisdiction has a good deal less control, equity will be more difficult to achieve.

Equity-oriented planning recognizes the role played by legal, political, economic and social institutions in promoting and sustaining inequities. Laws, customs and practices have to be changed or altered and this has to be more than political rhetoric and good will. This will be difficult to do.

4. Lack of Political Power Among the Disadvantaged

The lack of political power among the disadvantaged is a potential obstacle to achieving equity, particularly when the interests of the politically powerful obscure the interests of the politically weak. The politically weak tend to enjoy fewer benefits from public goods and have a low awareness that government is responsible for the provision of those goods. Furthermore, the effects of the lack

of political power are likely to be compounded by a lack of economic power, low social status, and minority status (Toulmin, 1988).

Equity-oriented planning is directed at serving those most in need. Those most in need tend to be those with least power and least resources (personal and economic). Therefore, the process of community empowerment is fundamental to the success of planning which is equity-oriented. Empowerment will lead to citizen involvement with organizations in the political community, which can have the effect of making government more responsive to the needs of the community. It will also facilitate the achievement of the wider goals of social justice in the distribution of societal resources and in the treatment of individuals. Out of local efforts to gain control over the life space of individuals come social movements with the potential to make a difference in the larger society (Castells, 1983).

5. External Political Pressure

The pluralist and power structure literature point to potential external political problems that could be expected in a system which focuses on equity. This would include pressure from powerful corporate and elitist interest groups, political parties, city council members, the press, and the public. Sayre & Kaufman (1965) found that there are "de facto vetoes built into the system . . . [that] enable every group to obstruct governmental decisions that fail to take its interests into account" (p. 721). Yates' (1978) theory of "street-fighting pluralism" suggests that it would be impossible to maintain an ongoing policy of equity because administrators would likely "suffer from a political and administrative overload at the center - an overload that would lead to frantic activity and crisis management" (p. 155). Dahl (1960) suggests that a proposal to implement serious compensatory equality service delivery schemes would not get very far if the

powerless were continually benefitting at the expense of the powerful. The powerful groups or individuals in society would intervene to stop such equity-oriented schemes in the absence of benefit for themselves.

The arguments presented is this thesis are predicated on the belief that the more powerful groups in society will have the foresight, or will have the ability to understand, that equity-oriented activities have long-term benefits for the community as a whole. In this respect, the more powerful groups, too, benefit from the equity-oriented activities. It should be further noted that, equity-oriented planning is not launched as an offence against the rich and powerful, that is, it does not, in a strict sense, attempt to "take away" the benefits they currently enjoy. As a future-oriented activity, equity-oriented planning attempts to distribute future resources in an equitable manner. This may involve challenging the claims that the more powerful make on future public resources.

6. Defining Equity

There are difficulties involved with defining what exactly one means by "equity" (vertical, horizontal, procedural, substantive, intergenerational, etc) and there will be difficulties in ensuring that the definition and related goals are understood by all actors in the planning process. The concept of equity may not be understood nor embraced by all service providers to the extent necessary for program success. This limitation underlines the need for education and the dissemination of information, directed at the public at large, but also at other bureaucrats, politicians, and service providers in the community.

7. Private Sector Activities

The activities of private land developers may enhance or hinder the city's equity-oriented initiatives. Steps need to be taken by the city, so that the land

development process does not *blatantly* contradict or obliterate the social equity goals. It must be recognized that equity planning is not done in a spirit which demeans or denigrates the more advantaged groups in society, and thus does not have as its mandate the halting of all activities which do not explicitly address the needs of the least advantaged. It does, however, judge the merits of private sector activities which involve public dollars, in terms of the benefits which extend to the least advantaged citizens. Furthermore, where private sector activities eventually become a financial burden to the city, a decision must be made as to who will be the long-term benefactors. If the benefactors are not the least advantaged, equity goals will be seen to be obliterated.

How does an equity planner prevent a political decision which contravenes equity goals? The first step would be to inform those involved, including the public, with respect to "who benefits" and "who pays". By articulating the long term affects of the decision, regarding where the benefits and burdens will eventually fall, equity planners can also work with grass roots community groups to rally public support for or against the decision at hand. Beyond this, the only thing that the planner can do is hope that decision-makers will then do the right thing.

In the Savannah experience, land development went unchecked and as a result, hindered the efforts by the RPS. For example, new homes were constructed in the Flood Plain Zone, and new semi-suburban housing was built beyond the reach of fire hydrants and sewer service, causing failure in the flood/drainage, water service for fire-fighting, and sewer service areas, respectively.

8. Professional Values Preclude Equity

This thesis has repeatedly stressed the importance of articulating equity as a value in the decision-making process. However, the professional values of community planners do not generally include social justice or equity. More typically, they include growth, efficiency, economy and technical rationality. This limitation relates to the education of community planners and to the nature of the profession's code of conduct, and further, to the profession's lack of a professional code of ethics.

With respect to serving the disadvantaged groups in society, Section 1.13 of the CIP's Code of Professional Conduct states:

> A Corporate member . . . may offer services to disadvantaged groups in society to ensure that their rights and interests are protected without fee or with minimal fee. This public service shall not jeopardize any other principles outlined in this Code of Professional Conduct.

In Section 1.13 the assistance given to disadvantaged groups is contingent on that assistance not being at odds with the planner's employer's needs. For example, if a planner, employed by a city, wished to provide assistance to a group of residents who were opposed to a highrise apartment building in their neighborhood, and if the civic politicians wanted to approve the proposal for apartment, then the planner would be obligated by his or her Code of Professional Conduct to respect the wishes of his or her employer.

It is the opinion of this author, that planners need of Code of Professional Conduct which allows them to make their own professional decisions and further, that the profession as a whole would stand behind such decisions. Therefore, in cases where the professional opinion of the planner was at odds with his or her employer, it would be the profession speaking and not the individual, thereby alleviating the risks of being fired.

This underlines the need for a Code of Ethics for the planning profession. Again, it is the opinion of this author, that a Code of Ethics should commit planners to redressing inequities, and to social justice. Presently, The Canadian Institute of Planners does not have its own Code of Ethics. Section 4.0 of the Institute's Code of Professional Conduct states:

> A corporate member shall abide by the Code of Ethics of any affiliate organization of the Institute to which the corporate member belongs.

Canadian planners do not have a shared sense of social responsibility. It varies from province to province (as affiliates of the CIP). If planning is to heighten its social responsibility and embrace equity as a value, it will have to be expressed in a Code of Ethics for the profession as a whole in the country.

Criticisms of Equity Planning

Equity-oriented planning has been criticized for being too ideological, for lacking in expertise, for being too political, and for being too broad. These criticisms are presented here along with the responses of the Cleveland planners (Krumholz & Forester, 1990, 55-56).

1. Equity planning is too ideological.

An ideological commitment to beautiful design, efficiency, or the value of real property lay behind every planning perspective. Community planners too often focus on professional techniques that obscure those ideological biases. An ideological commitment is as fundamental to utilitarian planning as it is to equity planning.

2. Equity planning needs more expertise.

The importance of highly sophisticated technical analysis may be overestimated. Given the time and resource constraints and the political parameters of local decision making, it is more appropriate to (i) articulate issues; (ii) provide clearly organized supporting data; and (iii) recommend policies and programs in keeping with defined equity objectives. While the author of this thesis, among others (Hodge, 1975), suggests that distributional analysis be used as an alternative to conventional aggregate benefit-cost analysis, it is recognized that time does not always permit such analysis. The importance of having up-to-date data bases on the existing distribution of wealth in the community, is fundamental to articulating equity issues, providing supporting data, and recommending policies.

3. Equity planning is too political and therefore too dangerous.

Planning is a political activity. Involvement in policy and program formulation inevitably means involvement in politics. Equity planning does not "put politics into planning", it has always been there. In light of the limited information available to local decision-makers and the shifting political coalitions characteristic of local government, planners with an informed, equity point of view could survive and prosper and even improve the quality of decision-making.

4. Equity planning is too broad and threatens to diminish the stature of city planners as professionals with definitive expertise in land-use matters.

An equity orientation does indeed take planners away from a concentration on land-use matters, but this does not compromise their identity, it extends it. Although land use decisions are typically made to achieve order

and efficiency, they have serious implications for equity. For example, the decision of whether or not to re-zone a residential area to industrial might be motivated by desire of some to have more order in the layout of the city, but the decision also has important equity implications for the residents who would be displaced. Equity planning expands the role of community planning so that it has a social responsibility and so that it speaks to fairness and distributive justice.

Summary

This chapter has laid down some of the foundations for community planning which is equity-oriented. It has defined equity planning as an activity which is both issue-oriented and future-oriented in its quest for distributive and social justice. The ultimate goal of equity planning is to increase choice and opportunity for those in the community who have least, and are least able to flourish in a political and economic system which produces inequities.

The theoretical foundation of equity planning is rooted in social contract philosophy with its emphasis on cooperation, mutual aid, and interdependency. A shift to an equity paradigm involves a shift away from thinking which is dominated by growth, efficiency and order. A synoptic comparative characterization of equity planning and traditional utilitarian planning was presented in Table 4.

This chapter has also presented a list of guiding principles and limitations, and concluded with a series of criticisms which have been directed at equity planners.

The next and final chapter in this thesis will present concluding remarks and suggestions for the furtherance of equity-oriented community planning.

New opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any reason but because they are not already common.

John Locke (1632-1704)
Essay concerning Human Understanding

CHAPTER 7.0 CONCLUSION

Western society is characterized by cities in which there exist disparities in the distribution of scarce resources. These disparities can exist among individuals, groups of individuals, or geographic areas of the city.

The activities of planners have been show to influence the allocation of scarce resources and as such either contribute to, maintain, or redress distributional inequities. Past activities within the domain of planning have tended to be influenced by utilitarian values, and have thus, been concerned with maximizing benefits for the greatest number of people. As a result, the goals of community planning have been overwhelmingly skewed in favour of achieving growth and efficiency, and as such are in conflict with the goals of achieving distributive justice.

What has been proposed in this thesis is that planners can be involved in the reduction of distributional inequities. For this to occur, planners must first be aware that the decisions they make or influence have distributive or redistributive effects. Second, planners must embrace equity as a professional value and incorporate it into the decision-making process.

It has been said that equity planning is "just done" by those who embrace the philosophy of equity. To wait for municipal or other government to adopt this as policy will never work, according to this school of thought. On the other

hand, the presence of the political will to approach issues in an equity-oriented manner will undoubtedly add to the success of equity planning. As the Cleveland planning experience has shown, the equity-serving planners took the initiative to work to increase choices for those who were least advantaged and normally had fewest choices. It must be noted, however, that the Cleveland planners did have the support of two consecutive city mayors. That support was garnered because the equity-oriented activities of the planners made good sense - from a political and a moral point of view.

> Municipal governments play an important role in shaping the physical and social environments for nearly three quarters of the population of Europe and North America. They are involved in a wide range of functions which include the management of urban growth, provision of infrastructure, utilities, transit, civic amenities, health services, recreation, and several social and cultural services. Most are also involved in undertaking neighbourhood improvements and providing housing and/or improving the housing stock (Mathur, 1989, 36).

The above passage exemplifies the relationship between the municipal government and the people. In fact, municipal governments do much more than the above passage indicates. They have the critical responsibility of deciding on the allocation of public resources among competing demands. The wide range of responsibilities assumed by municipal government provides a sound basis from which to work to reduce inequities among individuals and groups of individuals in the community.

To be sure, the task of incorporating equity into the planning process is desirable, morally sound, and rooted in social responsibility, but it is a task that is

also fraught with challenges. Paramount is the fact that current thinking and analysis in community planning impedes a focus on distribution. It has been shown that the cardinal tenet of utilitarian doctrine - greatest good for the greatest number of people - dominates planning decisions. This practice precludes concern for distributive issues.

Equity planning is an attempt to bring distributive issues to the fore in the domain of community planning. It attempts to do this by demanding that the planning process be fair and just, and that its outcomes be fair and just (read equitable).

Equity planning is both issue-oriented and future-oriented. It is issue-oriented in that it identified those issues which have equity implications, and proceeds to influence decision-making such that equity is served -- procedurally and substantively. For example, if a private developer was proposing to build an office complex on a site currently occupied by a recreation centre utilized by low income citizens, equity planners would intervene on the grounds that the net effect of replacing the recreation centre with an office complex would yield disbenefits or a reduction in social income to the low income citizens.

On the other hand, it can be future-oriented, or pro-active, in the sense that it attempts to foresee the equity-implications of proposed public investment (programs and projects), and then supports the initiative which is most equitable. For example, if the city was considering three proposals for mass transportation, the equity planner would select the proposal which yielded greatest net benefits for the least advantaged.

In both of the above instances, equity planning has the primary goal to increase opportunities and expand choices for those with fewest. In the first example, the removal of the recreation centre would likely decrease choice in recreation and possibly employment opportunities for the people in the

immediate community. In the second example, the mass transportation project which was least expensive for the city to build might have disrupted hundreds of low-income households. for the utilitarian planner, this would not be an issue. For the equity planner, however, this would be a fundamental issue. Conversely, the mass transportation proposal which would present the greatest amount of benefits for the least advantaged might cost the city (and all taxpayers) more; for the equity planner this would be acceptable, since it would partially redress an socioeconomic inequity.

There is no simple model for equity planning. It is build on a philosophical foundation of cooperation, caring, mutual aid, and interdependency. By supporting initiatives which enable those who are least advantaged to have more control over their lives, to have more (instead of less) choice and opportunity means that we are prepared to share society's resources in a way that all may benefit.

> *Man [sic] must choose whether to be rich in things or in the freedom to use them.*
>
> Ivan Illich
> Deschooling Society

Suggestions for the Furtherance of Equity Planning

The suggestions made here are related to the education of community planners and to the development of their professional values. It is the opinion of this author that these two spheres of planning have the potential to give greater credence to planning which is explicitly focussed on distributional issues and, more specifically on equity.

Planning Education

The equity-orientation of the planning profession could be presented and more fully explored by faculty and students in planning schools. A course in professional issues, ethics, or moral philosophy would draw attention to equity issues and equity-oriented approaches to those issues. Underlying this of course, is the need for community planners to know the demographic trends at the local and global levels. This can begin in planning school, where the skills to read demographic trends must be nurtured and given relevance. In addition to conventional benefit-cost analysis, planning students should be introduced to distributional analysis as a means to identify how benefits and burdens are distributed among various groups in the community.

Furthermore, the softer, less empirical ways of learning should be presented in addition to the more scientific ways of learning. For example, Friedmann's process of social learning has much to offer planning which is equity-oriented. It is transactive and involves mutual learning -- planners learn from the community and the community learns from the planners. In a similar fashion, the goals of equity planning inform practice, and practice informs the goals.

Equipping planning students with a strong moral conscience and skills to realize equity would be important steps for equity-oriented planning.

Professional Code of Ethics

While the American Institute of Planners has a professional code of ethics which requires that its members work for social equity, most members are in violation of it most of the time. In fact, one observer has stated that if the AIP could enforce its code of ethics it would be without a membership.

The Canadian Institute of Planners has a code of conduct but does not have a code of ethics. At present, the CIP sets out the responsibilities of planners primarily as they relate to other planners and to employers. There is no explicit articulation of planners' responsibilities as they relate to society, or the members of society. To the extent that planners are required to serve the public interest, it is generally interpreted in utilitarian fashion, where the public interest is equated with the majority. Viewing the public interest as being comprised of plural interests enables the introduction of equity criteria - since the public interest can then be equated with serving equity.

Articulating a set of social responsibilities, which include redressing socioeconomic inequities, for the planning profession may serve to lend credibility to the profession as a whole. Furthermore, it would indoctrinate equity as professional value.

Summary

This thesis had three objectives: (i) to draw attention to distributional issues in the context of community planning; (ii) to explore the concept of equity as a decision criterion for the planning process and as a professional value for planners; and (iii) to stimulate thought and discourse on the topic of a philosophy of action for equity-oriented planning.

Distributional issues abound in the context of community planning. They relate to where public swimming pools are located in relation to where they are needed; how accessible public transportation is to those who need it most; how much public money is being invested into new suburbs vis-a-vis the need for public investment and upgrading in aging neighborhoods; and where educational opportunities are available in relation to those who need them the

most. Community planners influence decisions which affect these distributional issues.

Using equity as a decision criterion requires that planners first accept it as a professional value, and second that decision-makers accept it as a valid criterion in the decision process. This will be a challenge because planners are not accustomed to thinking along the lines of equity, and perhaps more critically, are not accustomed to convincing others to think that way too. Therefore, planners who embrace equity also have the responsibility of educating other decision-makers.

Planners, and indeed all decision-makers, need to explain the reasons behind the decisions they make. Equity planning involves an explicit accounting of the distribution of benefits and burdens produced by public projects. At a time when the public are increasingly expecting accountability in their elected officials and in the bureaucrats who assist them, equity planning makes good sense - it describes who benefits and who pays.

In the final analysis, what are the prospects for community planning which is equity-oriented? The future of equity-oriented planning depends on the vision of the profession -- on the vision which planners have of themselves as agents for social justice. To a large extent, this vision will come from continued discourse on a philosophy of action for equity planning.

> *Planners cannot single-handedly change the landscape and political economy of our cities. We should not ask planners to do what only broader social movements can accomplish. But planners can make more of a difference in the face of inequality, poverty, and human suffering than we now expect. So we should not ignore the real possibilities that equity-oriented planners have in their day-to-day work, simply because they cannot do as much as we might like* (Krumholz & Forester, 1990, 210).

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APPENDIX A

Ethics in Planning

The terms "ethics" is often used as a synonym of moral philosophy. Thus, as a field concerned with the study of values, ethics has contributed much in the way of moral theories and perspectives which may be helpful to individuals who find themselves making normative decisions in a complex environment. Ethical issues, therefore, are issues which entail moral agents (for example, persons) and questions of the goodness or rightness of their behavior (Hendler, 1990). Liberal thought has traditionally separated the "good" from the "right" such that, society is permitted to deliberate on standards of justice (what is "right"), but it has no business telling individuals what in life should hold personal value (what is "good").

Ethical issues abound in both planning practice and planning theory (see Wachs, 1985). The former includes conflict of interest, ethical aspects of planning techniques such as cost-benefit analysis (Kelman, 1985; MacIntyre, 1983) and everyday normative decisions manifested in planning documents. I would also argue that questions of distribution present themselves as ethical issues in the practice of planning. The latter includes questions of justifying the planning profession using moral theories (Harper and Stein, 1983; Haworth, 1984; Klosterman, 1978; McConnell, 1981).

Ethics: A Dichotomy

A major line along which moral theories divide is the distinction between (i) a teleological view of ethics (the consequentialist perspective) and (ii) a deontological view of ethics (the non-consequentialist perspective). The former view is concerned with the goodness of the results of actions, or the goodness of consequences; it includes theories such as utilitarianism. The latter is made up of rights and/or duty-based theories which are concerned with the rightness of the act

itself. With deontological theories, the inherent value of actions are regarded as measures of their moral worth. Social contract philosophy, such as that developed by Kant, Rousseau and Rawls evolved out of the deontological view of ethics.

Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is the most common doctrine within the teleological view of ethics. This particular doctrine dictates that virtue is defined and achieved by its tendency to promote the highest happiness of mankind; it focuses on the goodness of consequences in deciding what is right (Howe, 1990). Utilitarianism has influenced planning thought indirectly through the liberal mind-set which dominated the development of political institutions throughout the nineteenth century. More recently and directly, it has influenced planning through the discipline of economics. Utilitarianism has been widely criticized for its inability to deal well with issues of distribution of the good or harm so created (Krumholz & Forester, 1990[1]; Schumacher, 1989; Howe, 1990)

Deontology

Deontology focuses on rules, rights and actions that are right in and of themselves. It is the theory or study of moral obligation and involves the ethics of duty. In planning terms, it is concerned with the rules governing process rather than outcomes. Contractarian ethics of John Rawls has influenced planning thought in ways such as judgements based on principles such as fairness and democratic responsiveness. Concern with personal liberty, autonomy and fairness is deontology's strength. It has been criticized as being too rigid for real use.

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[1]By explicitly adopting the social contract arguments of John Rawls, it might be said that Krumholz and Forester implicitly reject the utilitarian argument for its inability to guarantee basic liberties for all individuals.

"Rule-utilitarianism" and "act-deontology" (intuitionism) are two approaches which have been developed in the field of planning to attempt to deal with the respective weaknesses of "utilitarianism" and "deontology".

A Code of Ethics for the Planning Profession

Hendler (1990) calls for a deontological approach in establishing a code of ethics and conduct for the planning profession. While she recognizes that such a code may have the unwanted effect of limiting professional choices, it may be essential in order to define and promote ethically appropriate behaviour among planners.

APPENDIX B

Mathematical Foundations of Conventional Cost-Benefit Analysis and Distributional Analysis[1]

Conventional cost-benefit analysis is concerned with the relationship between aggregate benefits (ΣB_i) and aggregate costs (ΣC_i). Change in social welfare is similarly considered as aggregate change. However, implicit in this accounting is a change, also, in individual social welfare. Consider the composition of any given benefit, B_i. The i^{th} benefit is the sum of the i^{th} benefit to all individuals:

$$B_i = b_{i1} + b_{i2} + b_{i3} + \ldots + b_{in} = \sum_j b_{ij}$$

where: B_i = total value of i^{th} benefit;

b_{ij} = value of i^{th} benefit to j^{th} individual.

The i^{th} cost can similarly be considered the sum of the i^{th} cost to all individuals:

$$C_i = c_{i1} + c_{i2} + c_{i3} + \ldots + c_{in} = \sum_j c_{ij}$$

where: C_i = total value of i^{th} cost;

c_{ij} = value of i^{th} cost to j^{th} individual.

Traditionally, cost-benefit analysis makes no attempt to identify those individuals benefiting or paying, hence the "neutral" posture of the methodology. Consequently, the impact on individuals is not noted even

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[1]Here I wish to acknowledge the work of David Hodge (1975) from whose PhD dissertation I have borrowed extensively with respect to the mathematical foundations of aggregate and distributional analyses.

though such impact is implicit in the formulation of the cost and benefit functions.

The shift from an emphasis on the production question to the distribution question requires an alternative analytic framework. The basic data is the same. The difference lies in whether one evaluates impact in the aggregate, that is, as the sum of costs and benefits, or as impact on individuals. In conventional cost-benefit analysis, values are summed across rows yielding an aggregate figure of benefits. In a distributional analysis, the crucial variable is the individual (or class of individuals). Thus, values are summed by column to give the impact value on each individual (or class of individuals).

Aggregate Analysis $\{B_i\}$

$$B_1 = b_{11} + b_{12} + \ldots + b_{1j} + \ldots + b_{1n} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} b_{1j}$$

$$B_2 = b_{21} + b_{22} + \ldots + b_{2j} + \ldots + b_{2n} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} b_{2j}$$

$$B_i = b_{i1} + b_{i2} + \ldots + b_{ij} + \ldots + b_{in} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} b_{ij}$$

$$B_m = b_{m1} + b_{m2} + \ldots + b_{mj} + \ldots + b_{mn} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} b_{mj}$$

Distributional Analysis $\{\Delta w_j\}$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{m} B_i = \sum_{i=1}^{m} b_{i1} + \sum_{i=1}^{m} b_{i2} + \ldots + \sum_{i=1}^{m} b_{ij} + \ldots + \sum_{i=1}^{m} b_{in} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{i=1}^{m} b_{ij}$$

The reorientation of the analysis ultimately permits an evaluation of changes in the distribution of real income. It is now possible to mark formally the change in social welfare for any individual or class of individuals:

$$\Delta w_j = b_{1j} + b_{2j} + b_{3j} + \ldots + b_{mj} = \sum b_{ij}$$

where: Δw_j = change in social welfare of j^{th} individual; and
b_{ij} = value of i^{th} benefit to j^{th} individual.

In calculating benefits, Δw_j is positive and in calculating individual costs, Δw_j is negative. In the final analysis, the total change in real income (social welfare) for an individual is a function of both costs and benefits:

$$\Delta w_j = \sum_i b_{ij} - \sum_i c_{ij}$$

where: Δw_j = change in social welfare of jth individual;
b_{ij} = value of ith benefit to jth individual; and
c_{ij} = value of ith cost to jth individual.

In the end, total change for the entire system can be viewed as the sum of changes to *individuals* rather than as net change between benefit and cost *variables*:

$$\Delta W = \Delta w_1 + \Delta w_2 + \Delta w_3 + \ldots + \Delta w_n = \sum_j \Delta w_j$$

where: ΔW = total change in social welfare of a given society;
Δw_j = change in social welfare of j^{th} individual.

Given this accounting, it is possible not only to evaluate aggregate systems changes but also to evaluate distributional system changes.