

ANGLO-GERMAN POLITICAL RELATIONS
1890-1912

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A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
AND THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF MANITOBA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTERS OF ARTS

JESSIE H. FRASER, B.A. (Hon.)

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PREFACE

Anglo-German relations 1890-1912 are of paramount interest to the student of modern history because within that period, just prior to the World War the Nations of Europe gradually ranged themselves in two opposing and armed camps--the Triple Alliance versus Triple Entente. Germany was the strong power of the Triple Alliance and Britain possibly the most influential factor in the Triple Entente. One owned the greatest army in Europe, the other ruled the seas. The German people and the English are first cousins, their royal families were closely related. They are historical and natural allies, a thought which was voiced by the Kaiser on a state occasion in 1890 in the phrase, "The Brotherhood in arms of Waterloo."

Bismarck haunted by dread of a war on two fronts appreciated the importance of Anglo-German friendship and retained it so long as he was in power. After his fall in 1890 subversive forces which he had held in check were given full rein and no longer was German policy lent consistency by a statesman of the first rank. Conflicting purposes at home led to confusion and suspicion abroad. Bismarck had aimed at peace believing that Germany had nothing to gain by war. His successors, saturated with theories of German expansion and intoxicated by 'Welt Politik,' were soon talking in terms of war.

England, hitherto true to her policy of isolation, found herself at the end of the century at odds with France and Russia in many parts of the world, and Germany, while professing friendship, more than once took advantage of England's need of her support to exact concessions. Britain's position was neither "isolated nor glorious," hence the urgent need for true friends.

Repeated attempts were made from 1898-1901 toward an agreement with Germany ending in rather dismal failure. Unable to co-operate with her natural allies England resolutely set about to protect her interests by clearing up all sources of dispute between herself and France and Russia. She defended herself against the latter in the far East by an alliance with Japan, and later by the Persian agreement. Her troubles with France were solved by the Egypt--Marocco agreement of 1904. These negotiations were in no way aimed against any other country but German Anglophobes invented the Encirclement theory, and it was henceforth their policy to sow dissension between France and Britain, and if possible to form a continental coalition against the "mortal enemy." They cried out that Germany must have her place in the sun," denied her by other nations and determined to build a navy equal to that of the greatest naval power. Maritime sensible statesmen on both sides strove continuously to bring about harmony between these two nations whose interests were really similar and who had no acute causes of strife anywhere in the colonial world. Their efforts achieved some modicum of success in 1913--but too late. They were dragged by their respective obligations into the general conflagration of the Great War. Had these two but come to some agreement earlier, perchance the catastrophe had been averted.

It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the political relations between Britain and Germany in these years and if possible to account for this failure to co-operate in the cause of world peace. The effort is made possible through the translation into English of selections from the 'Grosse Politik' by H.F.S. Dugdale and by the publication of British Foreign Office Documents by Drs. Scoch and Temperly. It is evident from secondary reading that within these volumes lies the means of proving widely varied stories. But, in the words of Baron von Eckardstein, "truth sometimes looks out even in official documents." An earnest en-

endeavour is herein made to glean from said prevailing diplomatic snavity and understatement some grains of truth.

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Chapter I.

BISMARCK'S ATTITUDE TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN.

The nineteenth century saw the rise of Germany by means of three wars, into a united, virile nation under the able leadership of Prince Bismarck. After 1870 his one aim was to protect his handiwork against the aggression of Pan-Slavism in the East and against 'Revanche' on the part of France. England, the nation of shop-keepers, was at this time chiefly interested in her commercial and colonial affairs in various parts of the world and observed an attitude of complete neutrality in European disputes. The years immediately preceding the Franco-Prussian war and the establishment of the German Empire are passed over almost without notice in the documents selected and translated by E.T.S. Dugdale. For England it was a period not only of peace but of complete absence of diplomatic interest.

After 1870 however, there were signs that she was not altogether indifferent to events on the continent. In 1875, for e.g. the representations of her ambassador in Berlin, Lord Ampthill, were one of the factors in restraining Germany's supposed intention of again attacking France before the latter could fully recover from the effects of 1870.

This revived interest in European affairs was again exemplified at the time of the Russo-Turkish war and the Congress of Berlin. The events of 1875-76 registered the breakdown of the Dreikaiserbund of 1872. Since that date Bismarck had maintained genuine neutrality as between Austria and Russia and at the Congress of Berlin played the "Honest Broker."

Russian threats compelled him to reconsider his whole policy. The Gastein Conversations with Austria led to the alliance of 1879 which, followed by the adhesion of Italy, became the Triple Alliance. Bismarck had been forced to choose between Russia and Austria in such a way that he would be implicated in an Austro-Russian war. But war would be a misfortune to Germany at this stage. He must strengthen Germany so that his neighbors would not hazard war—hence his advances toward England.

In 1876 and 1877 he discussed the question of an alliance with Salisbury and Lord Derby and at the Berlin Conference, with Beaconsfield. The latter, somewhat surprised, consented to take up the matter and Andrassy was included in their conferences. Back in England he labored to familiarize the public with the idea and before the fall of his government in 1880 he actually drew up the draft of a treaty which Lord Rostow, his secretary, was to give to Bismarck when the time came. This was kept secret from Salisbury. In 1880 Herbert Bismarck while in London made confidential approaches on his father's behalf but in that year owing to a change of government in England overtures for a time ceased. Bismarck had not such great confidence in Gladstone's administration as he had in that of Salisbury.

In 1883 came the military occupation of Egypt by England, a situation which embarrassed British foreign policy until 1904. France had at first co-operated with England in Egypt but eventually deserted her and then took up an attitude of active hostility to British reform there. On account of the network of agreements, by which Egyptian affairs were complicated, France could readily impede the work of renovating the administration which was

Britain's main purpose. In general, France was supported by Russia. It was thus of great importance that Britain should have the support of Germany, implying that of Austria and Italy. Bismarck found himself in a position where he could facilitate or frustrate the prosecution of British policy.[#]

At first his action was friendly and helpful. He was satisfied that the comparatively small interests of Germany in Egypt should be protected by Britain and German representatives were instructed to co-operate with the British. But in 1884 there was a perceptible change. Bismarck who had opposed a growing agitation in Germany for colonial possessions and who had discouraged the Colonial Association formed a year earlier, now made concessions under pressure. "I am against it but I give way to it." Again he said, "I value Lord Salisbury's friendship more than twenty swamp colonies² in Africa," which meant that the foreign relations of Germany were to him of greater importance than colonies and that valuable as the latter might be, they were not worth the sacrifice which colonial rivalry with Britain might entail. A world policy outside Europe was only possible in amity and association with Britain. Throughout all the negotiations with Britain on the colonial question he had to consider the impression made upon the Reichstag and that upon Britain. The result was an imperious impatience. When manoeuvres to acquire colonies on the west coast of Africa and in the south seas began in 1884, Britain did not appreciate the change and did not treat his requests as matters of urgency. The great man resorted to threats, using the situation in Egypt to force concessions with regard to New Guinea, Zanzibar, etc. In his own words: "I beg you therefore, not to forget that Egypt in itself is quite in-

Dugdale I, Intro. pg. 18.

2 Eckardstein, pg. 98.

different to us and is merely a means of overcoming England's objections to our colonial aspirations." He even avowed the object of improving relations with France and encouraged her opposition to Britain in Africa. His ill temper was no doubt largely due to the fact that he was driven to a policy that was distasteful to him and which was not his primary interest.

The period of acute friction did not last long. The fall of Ferry's cabinet in France put an end to thoughts of a Franco-German rapprochement and Bismarck received the impression that "we ought not to overestimate the determined attitude of the French government against England," drawing the conclusion that "we cannot afford to embroil ourselves with England more than is necessary." In June of the same year Salisbury returned to the foreign office and Bismarck reverted to his policy of friendship with England. His quarrel had been not so much with England as a country as with the Gladstone administration. It was intensified by the fact that the Liberals were adherents of free trade while Bismarck had changed to protection. He had actually used Lothar Bucher to start an anti-British campaign in the German press against the influence of British thought on German opinion. With Salisbury however he had great intellectual sympathy and it was natural that with the return of the Conservatives to office close co-operation between England and Germany should be resumed.

A large measure of agreement ^{with regard to} colonial difficulties in Africa was attained by Count Herbert Bismarck in 1887 and the Anglo-German

2Dagdale I, Intro. pg. 20.

2Dagdale I, pg. 162, Bismarck to Count Munster, Aug. 12/84.

3Dagdale I, Intro. pg. 24.

agreement of Nov^{ember}, 3 1888 marks the coming together of England and Germany with regard to the unrest in East Africa and the slave trade. Herbert Bismarck expressed his appreciation of Salisbury in a private letter to Count Hatzfeldt:—"I share your Excellency's conviction that Salisbury has gone as far as ever he could and that we can claim no more from him. His high position and his retention of office is worth ^{one hundred} ~~100~~ times more to us than the whole of Africa. My father is of exactly that opinion."

In 1887 Lord Salisbury strengthened the rapprochement by entering into two agreements with Germany's allies, Austria and Italy. By the first it was agreed that the three powers should act together for the maintenance of the status quo in the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas. Britain declared her readiness to support Italy as against the encroachment of a third power (France) at every point in the North African coast districts, especially Tripoli and Cyrenaica. The second was in effect an agreement to defend the independence of Turkey as the guardian of European interests against all foreign preponderating influences. ² These agreements expressed community of interests but in accordance with British policy avoided anything in the nature of a binding treaty. They constituted none the less an important step toward a definite and formal co-operation with the Triple Alliance as against France and Russia.

In the same year Bismarck renewed conversations in regard to an alliance with Sir Edward Malet the British Ambassador to Berlin and in Nov^{ember}, 22 1889 he followed them up with a private letter to Salisbury. ³ In this communication he expressed in unambiguous terms his desire for an alliance between Britain and Germany, assuring Salisbury with special

[Dagdale I, pg. 345. German note.
Dagdale I, Intro. pg. 25.
Dagdale I, Intro. pg. 26.]

reference to Prince William of Prussia, later William II, that never would Germany systematically adopt an hostile attitude toward England. This last move was mentioned by Holstein in a cypher telegram of March 1901, in which he said, "I know of no other case in which Bismarck addressed himself to a foreign premier in this direct form and that he should have taken this unusual step, when at the height of his power, shows what crucial importance he attached to Salisbury's response." ¹ As we know Salisbury found it impossible to give him any encouragement as such an agreement would have caused a collapse of his parliamentary majority. To Herbert Bismarck he said he hoped to live to see conditions under which he might be able to give the proposal practical consideration, "Meantime we leave it on the table without saying yes or no; that is unfortunately all I can do at present." ² The offer of an alliance was accompanied by a speech in the Reichstag favorable to England, January 26, 1889,

"I think of England as the old traditional ally whose interests do not clash with ours. I use the word 'ally' not in its diplomatic sense; for we have no treaties with England; but I desire to cling to the friendship that we have enjoyed for at least five hundred years with England, even in colonial questions. If I were warned that we are losing it I should take precautions to avoid doing so." ³

Within a few months Bismarck was out of office. Reviewing his policy in these years, it is obvious that, despite his determination to make British acquiescence in German colonial expansion the price of German assistance to Britain in Egypt, the extreme bitterness of feeling aroused about colonial controversies was quite unnecessary. ⁴ Sharp discussions with regard to particular territories were inevitable because of Bismarck's innate impatience and the slowness of the British Foreign Office in answering his categorical questions. Yet Gladstone and Granville were always conciliatory and though possessing little intellectual sympathy with the German

¹ Eckardstein pp. 133.

² Dugdale I, pg. 374, Herbert Bismarck to Bismarck Mar. 22/89.

³ Dugdale I, pg. 373, German note.

⁴ Dugdale I, Intro, pg. 24.

Chancellor were essentially tolerant towards his colonial activities. Had more frankness and alacrity been used in dealing with such problems, negotiations could have been carried on in a friendlier atmosphere. This point is worthy of note because in the next decade there is evidence of a latent resentment in Germany against Britain which can be traced back to 1884.

Bismarck's overtures for an alliance were made with a view to English diplomatic support in Europe, in order that colonial expansion might be carried on without danger to the Empire. When the project failed he still adhered to the policy. It was followed in general by his immediate successor Caprivi but a gradual change took place and by the time Britain was ready to combine with Germany. "The purblindness of his successors" and the poisoning of public opinion by Anglo-phobe propaganda had made Bismarck's policy practically impossible.

Foot Note: Dugdale I, pg. 182, Herbert Bismarck to Bismarck Mar. 7, 1885. Mr. Gladstone assured Herbert Bismarck that "even if we had no colonial aspirations, I should beseech you to go forward in this direction—I promise you that we shall meet you in an entirely friendly spirit, provided that you do not mix other political questions with the colonial question." See also note Dugdale I, pg. 190.

Chapter 2.

THE LAST DECADE OF THE 19TH CENTURY.

A--British Association with the Triple Alliance.

Within the decade following the fall of Bismarck Germany spread her wings as the eagle and aggressively soared out into world politics. The period was not marked by events of first magnitude but European interests became enlarged and nations were concerned with affairs in Africa and the Far East, as well as on the European continent. Bismarck had permitted some German activities in the colonial sphere ^{AND} in so far as possible utilized them in directing ^A his foreign policy. Under William II German interests in non-European questions developed rapidly but German foreign policy was still actually aimed at securing a prominent if not paramount position among the six great powers. This idea inspired all negotiations and hence her affairs abroad were all means to one end--German dominance.

The Kaiser's favorite method of attaining prestige was to encourage rivalry between other nations and utilize their quarrels for his own benefit. Now France, Italy, England and Spain were intent upon the partition of North Africa; Russia and Austria, as ever were at odds in the

Foot Note: Dugdale I, pg. 64, Munster, at Paris to Caprivi, Apr. 29/90.

"The minister and the official world here are embittered against England. According to the utterances of the British embassy the same seems to be the case in London against France." (Hoyor--"May they both long remain in the same condition!")

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near East, and Asia Minor provided a rich field for commercial enterprise. In view of these facts the shores of the Mediterranean became the sphere of chief diplomatic interest in the last ten years of the 19th century.

At the same time the growing intimacy between France and Russia naturally led to a closer association between Germany and England. Each required the diplomatic support of the other as against the new group and the Caprivi period 1890-94 was the high water mark of Anglo-German friendship. The Kaiser himself remarked that Britain's Mediterranean policy was the corner-stone of European politics.

In the Western Mediterranean France labored to increase her African possessions in Morocco, Tunis and in the general direction of Tripoli. In Morocco, Germany supported Britain's claims and prayed that the latter would "set herself in acute and lasting rivalry with France by seizing Tangier or Sparta." ² Bismarck's letter to Katsfeldt here quoted concludes—"I beg you to continue to avoid arousing the suspicion that it is not the natural development of the world events but the policy of Germany that is forcing an Anglo-French rivalry in the Mediterranean." With regard to Franco-Italian disputes the Triple Alliance was implicated because Germany could only hold Italy's allegiance in return for her support in North Africa. Now in accordance with the Mediterranean agreements between England, Austria and Italy, England felt that her interests were identical with those of Italy, i.e., in maintaining the status quo. ³ Italy therefore became a link between Germany and England.

In the Eastern Mediterranean the situation still turned around Anglo-French rivalry in Egypt where the success of Britain's activities were directly dependent upon German support against the intrigues

¹ Bismarck II, pg. 44, Bismarck to Katsfeldt, Jan. 18/97.

² Bismarck II, pg. 142, Bismarck to Katsfeldt, June 13/91.

³ Bismarck II, pg. 104, Katsfeldt to Caprivi, June 5/91.

of France and Russia. It should not be forgotten that this co-operation in Egypt was not tendered until Britain had agreed not to place difficulties in the way of Bismarck's colonial schemes and Germany never failed to threaten withdrawal of her assistance at any sign of lack of compliance on England's part. English statesmen never knew what concessions might be exacted and hence the association was not always comfortable-- witness the ultimatum of 1892 with regard to competition in obtaining railway concessions in Asia Minor when British firms had to withdraw for the sake of Egyptian interests.

On the above occasion in the autumn of 1892, Sir Clare Ford at Constantinople did not prove sufficiently accommodating to Germany. At the same time Britain had asked permission of the powers to appropriate £60,000 from the savings on the conversion of the privileged

Foot Note: Dugdale II, pg. 70, Bismarck to Caprivi, May 8/91.

The Grand Vizir had said with a shrug--"His Majesty (Sultan) is always asking Frenchmen and Russians what he ought to do in Egypt." Their advice was never to acknowledge the presence of Britain in Egypt.

Also--Dugdale II, pg. 83, Memorandum by Marshall, July 6/91.

"It might however be well asked whether France was not contemplating Syria as a field of political operation whence to challenge British occupation of Egypt and to provide compensation for herself at a future date."

2 Dugdale II, pg. 295.

3 Grey I, pg. 9.

debt in Egypt for the purpose of increasing the army. Suddenly a telegram arrived at Cairo and notice was sent to London to the effect that if German permission had not yet been given, it should be withheld because Britain's conduct in Asia Minor was incompatible with the spirit Germany had hitherto shown in Egypt.

The charge has been made.

~~It has been charged~~ that Grey exaggerated when he calls this note an ultimatum and that he lays too much stress upon its importance. But certainly the tone has a threatening ring. The same critic notes that Rosebery did not feel offended, but met Germany's wishes and within three weeks was ready again to co-operate with the Triple Alliance. Katsfeldt, however, in a letter to the Foreign Office, Jan. 14/95 insisted that while Rosebery always defended a rapprochement of England with the Triple Alliance he feared difficulties owing to Germany's change of attitude in Egypt. He had not been warned of it, could not have anticipated it and the French were sure to make full use of it.³ From this it is obvious that he too was shocked at this appearance of the mailed fist, but was in no position to object and aptly remarked, "What would be the situation of Great Britain if the Triple Alliance were broken down and we were then alone in face of the Franco-Russian group?"⁴

Even while supporting Britain, Germany had no wish to make England's position in Egypt too secure for the reason explained by Baron von Rotenhan to von Hay King July 5/94—"We are satisfied with the present situation, which is driving Egypt as a wedge between England and France. This is better than a protectorate, for if the powers chiefly interested recognized the British occupations, it would make England more independent of us than she is now...there are situations arising from the Anglo-

³ Dispatch II, pg. 180, Bismarck to Katsfeldt, Jan. 7/95.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pg. 180.

⁵ Dispatch II, pg. 180.

⁶ *Ibid.* pg. 24.

French difference, in which it is to our advantage to hold the decision in our hands."

For Berlin there was always the question of how to make Britain realize that in the defence of her own interests, she must draw even closer to the Triple Alliance. That combination needed the co-operation of Great Britain because:

(1) Its policy in opposition to France would be hopeless without the British fleet.

(2) Austria feared a Russian attempt to gain control of the Straits.

Britain's support of Austria would relieve Germany of the necessity of incurring Russian enmity. Hence the alarm of the Central Powers at any sign of reconciliation between England and Russia e.g., a suggestion from Russia that she might exchange with Britain "a free hand on the Nile for a free hand...in the Straits."

The Central Powers consistently took the attitude that the Russian menace was primarily England's interest, that without a definite pledge they would not pull England's chestnuts out of the fire for her. It is interesting to note, however, that after Rosebery had denied any change of policy with regard to the defence of the Straits, Prince von Ratibor, German chargé d'affaires at Vienna, voicing the opinion of Kalnoky, wrote--"it will be cheaper for the monarchy to get the Eastern chestnuts pulled out of the fire by England, than to rely on Russia who might make disagreeable demands."

In short, while Britain was satisfied with the existing situation, in which, without any definite Anglo-German commitment, she received

* Dugdale II, pg. 300.

† Dugdale II, pg. 437. Hattenbach at Cairo to the Chancellor, Nov 23/96.

‡ Dugdale II, pg. 231, Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, Dec. 6/93.

§ Dugdale II, pg. 255, Ratibor in Vienna to Caprivi, Feb. 13/94.

German diplomatic support in Egypt in return for her own similar support extended to Germany's Italian ally, Germany was anxious to commit Britain to a formal undertaking under which both Austria and Italy would be certain of Britain's assistance in the event of war. For this reason the Wilhelstrasse hailed with joy the Emperor's cordial reception in London in 1891. Hatzfeldt wrote to Caprivi, July 2, 1891—"Whilst one should not overestimate the political significance of the British public's reception, nor infer from it that public opinion would permit British policy to be actively employed in the interests of the Triple Alliance, without questions being asked, there remains nevertheless, the pleasing fact that a British Cabinet, which like the present one, considers it to the country's advantage to support the peace policy of the three powers, will, when the time comes, no longer be checked to the same extent as hitherto by the personal prejudices of the public, and its anxiety that England's friendship with us might draw her into war-like adventures.* That Germany's motive was still consistent with that of Bismarck ten years earlier, is shown by a marginal note by the German Chancellor on a report of Reuss, July 1892 which reads—"We must have in mind the possibility of being on a friendly footing with England, as soon as there is a politically approachable government there again."

Accordingly a proposal was made to Salisbury to enter into a treaty of mutual guarantee with regard to Britain's position in Egypt and that of Italy in North Africa, having in view an imminent threat of war. It was of course coolly received as Salisbury had no wish to encourage Crispien's antagonism to France and because as in 1879

* Dagdale II, pg. 156.

‡ Dagdale II, German note, pg. 303.

any commitment would be disapproved by the public. To assuage feeling on both sides he explained in parliament that,

"The government had reserved to itself full freedom of decision and action under every conceivable circumstance. Italian statesmen knew perfectly well that His Majesty's government was at one with them in maintaining the 'status quo' in the Mediterranean and also in adjacent waters and that England's sympathies would be on the side of that power which would maintain existing conditions so vital to British interests."

The whole situation shows the basic difference of attitude between Great Britain and the Continental powers. The former had long attained her world status and was interested only to defend her position and possessions by diplomacy. Although it cannot be said that in any particular moment the Central Powers wanted war, (The Kaiser decided ^{it their}), [^] method of reasoning was based upon the assumption that sooner or later it would come, and their efforts were directed accordingly. To Austria and Italy, in case of a crisis, the immediate co-operation of the British fleet was a vital matter but British statesmen could not and would not commit themselves. When the Liberals, under Gladstone and Rosebery, returned to power in 1892 there was consternation in Europe but since Rosebery was, for all practical purposes, Salisbury's representative in the Liberal Cabinet, there was no definite change in policy. The situation was very like that which arose in the next decade.

In 1906 there was a general entente with France similar to that with Italy in the nineties and a vague understanding that in the event of war the common interests of the two nations would force them into

* Bagehot II, pp. 104, Hotschelt to Caprivi, June 5/91.

actual co-operation. In both cases the British Government firmly declined any tightening of the entente. A statement hazarded by Rosebery when pressed by Bertie with regard to his attitude toward Italy and France is strangely similar to that of Grey in 1906.

Rosebery: "My personal view is this, but it may be held to be nothing more, that in the event of France groundlessly attacking Italy, the interests of England, as a Mediterranean and Indian power, would bring her naturally to the rescue of Italy..... That was my personal conviction but beyond that I could say nothing."

Grey: "I could only state as my personal opinion that if France were to be attacked by Germany in consequence of a question arising out of the agreement which our predecessors had recently concluded with the French government, public opinion in England would be strongly moved in favor of France."

Each of these statements is a carefully phrased expression of what must ever be Britain's line of action.

The object of Germany in the nineties as of France in the following period was to acquire certainty with regard to Britain's policy. German statesmen were angered and baffled by Britain's consistent refusal to pledge her policy in advance and they gloried in every occasion which threatened to bring her into the open against France, e.g., in Morocco she was encouraged to seize Tangier, in Egypt the Dongola Expedition was expected to cause a crisis, and with regard to Tripoli, Lord Vivian, in Rome, was asked to instruct Constantinople to resist actively French

1 Budgeffell, pp. 172-73, Batsfeldt to Caprivi, Sept. 11/92.

2 Grey I, pp. 70, Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10/05.

3 Budgeffell II, pp. 143, Batsfeldt to Batsfeldt, June 13/91.

4 Budgeffell II, pp. 42, Budgeffell to German Foreign Office, March 21/96, [Marginalia].

aggression. Caprivi even wrote that the war should be started by England and only when she was committed would the Triple Alliance take action. "That is the correct military sequence and diplomacy must act in accordance with it."

Whether or not, after 1905, France was trying to encircle Germany it is certain that in the nineties Germany aimed at associating Britain with the Triple Alliance for the purpose of encircling France. But Salisbury and Rosebery, hoping to prevent an outbreak, refused to give either of the rival groups ascendancy by undue encouragement. To Germany this attitude seemed weak and indecisive but from the British point of view it was sufficient that in both cases they secured a general understanding, which seemed to guarantee that in case of a great crisis, Britain should not be isolated, without at the same time committing herself to a definite policy of hostility, in the first case toward France and in the second toward Germany.

While Salisbury and Rosebery followed the logical, in fact the only feasible policy in this period, there is no doubt that it had one evil result. On account of the Egyptian situation Britain's policy played into the hands of Germany while that virile nation grew ever more haughty and patronizing. The frequency with which Germany succeeded, by the more or less indirect use of pressure, in extracting concession from an embarrassed English government, undoubtedly created a false optimism at Berlin as to the extent to which this method could be successfully employed. Between 1894 and 1897 the policy of conditional threats had repeatedly secured for Germany the profits of war without its risk, and there were not wanting men at Berlin to draw the too obvious conclusion. One result of the

events of these years was, as we shall see, to create in the minds of German statesmen the belief that German support would become indispensable to England, and that in consequence Germany had only to wait for the day upon which she would be in a position exclusively to dictate the terms of any Anglo-German alliance.

B--Colonial Agreements.

In 1880 British influence had long been supreme at the court of Zanzibar and the Sultan had recently offered to place his foreign policy under British protection. In 1884 a German Consul was appointed there, though Bismarck denied any intention of establishing a protectorate. In the same year Karl Peters hoisted the German flag over sixty thousand square miles of territory and founded the German East Africa Company. The Sultan protested but Britain supported Germany. However, when Peters went on to add Witu and parts of Somaliland and Wabuliland, an Anglo-German delimitation agreement became necessary. In 1889 after the negotiation with Herbert Bismarck, above mentioned, Britain recognized Germany's claims over part of the coast, over Uganda, Witu and Kilimangari.

It was with regard to the above agreement that the Kaiser and Crispien, the new Chancellor, made their first move. In June 1890 Germany, after long negotiation and opposition on the part of British African Companies, acquired the Island of Heligoland in return for which she recognized the British protectorate over Witu, Uganda and the Somaliland coast, and agreed to a British protectorate over Zanzibar. England promised to urge the Sultan to sell his coastal strip to Germany, empowered that power to extend her influence to the Great Lakes and German South West Africa to the Zambezi. Salisbury

1 Dugdale I, ps. 243. German note.

2 Dugdale II, ps. 25, and Schachtelstein ps. 99.

was pleased, believing that Heligoland was of no value and that the agreement would promote good relations. The Kaiser, bent on naval development, was delighted. Many Germans felt however that the island had been bought at the cost of disproportionately large concessions. Bismarck complained that later a better bargain might have been driven. Hatzfeldt was censured, but according to

Foot Note: Dugdale III, pg. 36, Hatzfeldt to German Foreign Office, May 30/90.

"I never forget the importance of Heligoland but I should not recommend indicating its true importance too soon to Salisbury, who so far regards Heligoland as in reality of no value to us. There would then be no further concession to be obtained in the colonies and we should be obliged to grant all colonial demands, in order to gain the Island."

Foot Note: Memoirs of Ex-Kaiser, pg. 54.

"The negotiations were concluded and one evening shortly before dinner, I was able to tell the Empress and a few intimates the exceedingly joyful tidings, that Heligoland had become German. A preliminary and very important extension of the Empire had been achieved without bloodshed; the first condition for the extension of the fleet was fulfilled, something which the natives of the Hanseatic towns and the rest of the North Germans, had desired for centuries had come to pass. In silence an important event had occurred."

Foot Note: Dugdale II, pg. 40, Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, June 4/90.

"You will indicate especially to Lord Salisbury that the main success of such an agreement will consist in the assurance of both parties that unsettled colonial difficulties will not give rise to disagreements likely in incalculable ways to disturb the continuity of European policy."

Eckardstein,[#] the responsibility lay with the Kaiser. His Imperial Majesty, in the midst of negotiations, sent a telegram to the effect that an agreement must be reached immediately, no matter what the terms, because it suited his plans to attend the hoisting of the German Flag over Heligoland on a certain date and arrangements were already made. This is just one instance of the erratic interference of the Kaiser which so often embarrassed his ministers.

The Kaiser, in these early years of his reign, studiously cultivated British friendship and much to the annoyance of the Prince of Wales, inflicted himself and an imposing retinue, annually, upon his English relatives. English officials overlooked his flamboyant manner knowing that he was sincere in his desire for close relations. When he and Marschall were at Windsor in 1891 they conversed with Salisbury, who promised still to uphold the Triple Alliance and tentatively suggested German aid in certain exploits in North East Africa, but the Germans were not willing to commit themselves too far. Both sides feared the Dual Alliance but were averse to definite pledges.

A colonial treaty of 1895 opened up the way for Germany from the Cameroons to Lake Chad. Britain had made the concession to prevent France from getting that territory but was somewhat uneasy about German progress. There was a feeling of strain apparent with regard to Walfish Bay, Egypt, Samoa and the question of Chinese coolies, and in September Katsfeldt informed Rosebery that Germany must be very reserved unless England became more accommodating.²

In the following years the sky darkened perceptibly. Ill feeling

[#] Eckardstein pg. 99.

² Brandenburg pg. 40.

was roused in Britain because Germany made an agreement with France with regard to the Cameroons, granting to that power territory which Britain had given to her specifically to prevent France from having it. Then again Britain arranged a treaty with the Congo Free State by which she handed over Bahar-El-Ghazel in return for a strip of territory between the lakes connecting South Africa with Uganda. This agreement was found to be contrary to a previous one between the Congo and Germany. The latter, together with France, protested, the Kaiser airing his opinion most forcibly to Sir Edward Malet. He threatened to refuse to assist England in Egypt if the Congo dispute were not settled to his liking and hence Rosebery was forced to yield. During the autumn the premier discussed relation at length with Hatzfeldt and the effect appeared in a speech in which he stressed ^{the} good relations between England and France. He questioned the permanence of the Triple Alliance and warned Berlin that it would be well not to let relations cool down. Hatzfeldt replied that he favored close connection with England but England must not obstruct German colonial expansion or expect service without some definite bond. Rosebery admitted the Congo blunder and the danger of losing Malta and Egypt, even of the Mediterranean becoming a French lake but avoided any reference to an alliance. When Hatzfeldt complained to Kimberley that England wanted service without tying her own hands, the latter replied that England did not join alliances. #

The estrangement was real and although the outstanding colonial disputes had been cleared up by the above agreements and the Kaiser insisted upon keeping the door of the Triple Alliance open to England, there was present suspicion and general distrust. In this year too

#Brandenburg pg. 4b, also Baydole II, pg. 302-2.

Marginalia by Kaiser on a letter from Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, July 4/94.

Sapirivl, who had striven to follow Bismarck's policy toward England was replaced by the aged Hohenlohe, whose opinions carried little weight. For three years the Kaiser was his own master and in that time came the real change in German policy. It became definitely forward, hysterically expansive. The Kaiser was aware that the Triple Alliance was the pivot of the balance of power--on one side the Dual Alliance, on the other the isolated Island Empire. He would cultivate their quarrels to his own advantage.

(C) South African Danger.

As early as 1841 British relations with the Transvaal were becoming difficult and there were signs of a flirtation between Berlin and Pretoria. In 1874, when Britain was seeking Portuguese permission to land troops in Delagoa Bay, two German war ships were sent there as a reminder of German interest in that area. Also, on the completion of the Railway from Pretoria to Lorenzo Marques 1895, the sending of a telegram of congratulation by the Kaiser was extremely untactful because the work was unpalatable to Britain. In October of that year Sir Edward Malet, after an altercation with Marschall, was recalled from Berlin to London. He had complained drastically about German support of Boer obstinacy, to which Marschall replied, that Germany on account of her economic interests could not consent to the incorporation of the Boer states in Rhodesia and intimated that England could not afford to break with Germany. Malet made it clear that England had means to satisfy her enemies and even, according to the Kaiser, used the word "war". Salisbury disapproved Malet's speech and declared England had no intention of changing the legal status of South Africa. Holstein took pains to let England know that Germany could do without her--"The Triple Alliance

will not under all conceivable circumstances follow the colours."

At this critical juncture came news of the Jamieson Raid. Marshall again warned England concerning the 'status quo' and instructed Hatzfeldt to demand his passports if the raid were authorized.² He also had Munster inquire in Paris whether France would co-operate to prevent further British expansion. The Transvaal problem was to be used to make England feel the danger of her isolation. Salisbury censured Hatzfeldt, but Marshall's haughtiness was followed on Jan. ^{uary} 3 by the launching of that official explosive, the Kruger Telegram. In it the Kaiser congratulated the Boers upon their success against the armed invaders and upon having, by their own energetic action, safeguarded the independence of their country. Authorities differ as to the origin of this offensive missive. Eckardtstein declares it to have been commonly believed that the Kaiser personally drafted the message while on the train going up to Berlin. On the other hand the Kaiser, in his Memoirs,³ confirms the suggestion by Adolph Stein in his book 'William II,' published in 1903, that it was a deeply thought out action of the Foreign Office.⁴ It is evident that the telegram was approved at a meeting of His Imperial Majesty, the Chancellor, Ballmann, Secretary of State for the Navy, and von Sunden, chief of the Naval Cabinet, and hence is an official document. Hammann quotes the evidence discovered by Dr. Thimme in von Karsenall's Diary which tells of a conference at the Chancellor's residence on Jan. 3 during which the Kaiser made such proposals with regard to the Transvaal. When the Chancellor objected that such would mean war with England, the

¹ Brandenburg, pg. 82.

² Dugdale II, Intro. pg. 18.

³ Memoirs of the Kaiser, pg. 80.

⁴ Dugdale II, pg. 387, German R., etc.

Kaiser replied, "Yes but only on land." Marschall says that finally on his suggestion a congratulatory telegram was sent to the Boers. It was then, in the words of the Brandenburg, a "lightning conductor" for the Kaiser's energy designed to prevent something worse. ² Eckardstein however quoted von Hallmann as eye witness, who speaks of having accompanied the Kaiser to such a meeting at the "Foreign Office," where Marschall awaited them. After formal greeting Marschall informed the Kaiser that with the help of the colonial Director, he had drafted a telegram which he wished to submit to His Majesty for approval. On seeing the draft the Kaiser observed, "What will happen to our relations with England? Is it really necessary that such a telegram be sent to President Kruger?" To which, von Marschall replied, "I am convinced that it is absolutely indispensable to show the world that the Imperial Government most severely condemns this outrageous raid of English filibusters, both from a moral and also from a juridical standpoint." Thereupon Herr Kaiser chimed in with: "In my capacity as Colonial Director I cannot but assent to the view of the Secretary of State." The Kaiser then said, "Very well, the telegram can go." Eckardstein assures us that in many other respects von Hallmann severely criticized the Kaiser, so that in this case he could not be trying to shift the blame, popularly attached to the Kaiser, to other shoulders. This account, moreover, coincides with that of Stein mentioned above and agrees with what little appears in the German records. The Kaiser has Hallmann witness that before his arrival Marschall was boasting about the telegram, which he had drafted and that the text would be a great

¹ Hallman pg. 68, excerpt from Marschall's Diary.
² Brandenburg, pg. 84.

success. He also calls upon Holmann to verify the fact that he was quite entrained by his Ministers. All this seems to prove that the chief culprit was Marschall, though the Kaiser was to blame in giving his consent to this fatal step. There is some suspicion that Holstein, was implicated but little evidence. However he was very reticent with regard to the event and Eckardstein, who was in constant correspondence with him gathered the impression that he had had a finger in the pie, but was ashamed to admit it. The Kaiser too suggests that Holstein's song swayed Bismarck to support Marschall. In March 1896 he wrote in a private letter to Matsfeldt: "It was unfortunately impossible for me to stop the Kruger telegram. The Foreign Secretary, stampeded by our colonial wildmen had taken the bit in his teeth and I could not do anything." Yet the influence that Holstein had exercised since the dismissal of Bismarck, was so uncontested that he could probably have prevented the mischief had he wanted to do so. It may be noted that his words also point to Marschall as the instigator of the telegram.

Public opinion in England was immediately inflamed at this unwarrantable interference in her affairs and Chamberlain announced publicly that England would oppose such action by foreign powers at any cost. The Kaiser wrote to his grandfather disclaiming any hostile intent but made little impression since at the same time he was in communication

Foot Note: Marginalia on an article in the Frankfurter, Zeitung, March 1899.

Also, Kaiser's Memoirs, pg. 86 et seq.—"In view of the fact that I knew how ignorant Freiherr Marschall and the foreign office were of English National psychology, I sought to make clear to Freiherr Marschall the consequences which such a step would have among the English.... but Marschall was not to be dissuaded."

2 Eckardstein, pg. 88.

3 Memoirs of Ex-Kaiser pg. 61.

with the Boer rebel Dr. Leyds. He assured the Boers that he would consent to no oppression in South Africa while Professor Brandenburg tells us that he would have seized Lorenzo Marques but for the restraining influence of Hohenlohe.²

German statesmen counselled moderation to the Boers and in this were influenced by their failure to negotiate in Paris for a Continental bloc--the Courcelles had on that occasion flatly discouraged any "unnatural alliances." Thus Germany had to fall back on a prudent defensive. Her attitude had been little influenced by commercial interests but rather a wish to warn England regarding undue expansion and her need of the Triple Alliance. In this it failed. Bismarck tore his hair over the "incomprehensible insanity of the telegram,"³ and warned his government now that they had shown their teeth to go back to neutrality and not force England into the arms of France. He labored to remove the bad impression but the affair had definitely lessened the attraction of the Triple Alliance for England.

Professor Brandenburg states that the refusal of Britain formally to renew the Mediterranean agreement of 1887 was a direct result of the above contretemps.⁴ However a newer source of information reveals the fact that "neither in Berlin nor elsewhere is there evidence in the contemporary records for the view held later in Vienna, that the British secession from the entente a trois was caused by the bitterness over the Kruger Telegram and was directed not so much against Austria and Italy as against their ally, Germany.

² Dugdale II, pg. 391, Emperor to Hohenlohe, Jan 6/86.

³ Brandenburg, pg. 86, also Dugdale II, Hohenlohe to Kaiser, Jan. 7/86.

Marginalia--Emperor: "The loss of a failure to acquire

Delagoa Bay will one day be severely avenged, and we shall deeply regret it."

Richardstein, pg. 86.

⁴ Brandenburg, pg. 84.

Rather had Lord Salisbury, in his letter to Sir Frank Lascelles early in March, laid it down as a fundamental principle that England should never give a promise binding her to go to war in any future event whatever.¹ Be this as it may, it is evident that at least the British Prime Minister's favorite theory received at this time a new lease on life and a point was scored against Germany.

The astute Hatzfeldt, in the spring of 1896 light^{ed} upon an idea for improving relations. He knew that Britain was worried about the inroads of the Dervishes toward Egypt and would settle with the Mahdi in the Soudan but feared trouble with France. Now Italy was hard pressed by the Dervishes on the Erythrean frontiers of Abyssinia. Hatzfeldt therefore suggested a British expedition to take the pressure off Italy while Germany supported her against the interference of a third party in a Soudan Campaign.² This was acceptable to Salisbury and the Cabinet. It led to the Dongola expedition and a successful campaign by which in this year Kitchener crushed the Mahdi and recovered Khartoum, adding the Soudan to the Empire. Hatzfeldt had killed two birds with one stone—a service to Italy and co-operation with Britain in direct opposition to France.³ Bismarck had well said, "If only we could drive it into the needles of

¹ Dugdale II, pp. 414, German Note, also, Dugdale II, pp. 424, Bismarck's Memorandum, Mar. 13/96.

² Dugdale II, pp. 422, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Mar. 12/96.

³ Foot Note: To a communication from Rodolin to the German Foreign Office, March 21/96, Dugdale II, pp. 428, in which he mentioned that Russia and France, with whom relations had improved tended to consider Britain's action aggressive, the Kaiser added, "Good—our object is gained. England has made a move and is compromised. Her flirtation with Bismarck is upset. That is all I wanted. I am delighted!"

our diplomatists that Egypt is of no political interest to us of itself but only as a means of arranging our international relations to suit ourselves."

The effect of the Kruger telegram was thus to some extent modified but not wholly removed. It was a Zoolish move, to which British statesmen could always refer in sarcastic vein and which was harped upon by the British press at every future crisis. Moreover, the Kaiser's popularity in England was not enhanced, since to him, was commonly attached the odium. The two governments again renewed friendly intercourse but the Kaiser's regular visits ceased and henceforth his references to England were invariably disparaging.

When the South African question came to the fore again with the outbreak of the Boer war in 1899, popular opinion on both sides was exceedingly bitter. Both cast slurs revealing the ugly sides of the national character—in Germany malicious moralising; in England brutal arrogance. Through the press, the German Foreign Office did try to crush this feeling but it was at the same time intensified by wild reports of Boer women and children being herded in ⁱⁿ _^ torment camps and treated as prisoners.

Then again the Burenst incident in which German mail boats were stopped by British war ships on suspicion of carrying contraband, caused resentment. Bismarck protested so sharply that Salisbury in return complained of his harsh tone. The affair was disposed of in a few weeks but not until the German foreign office, influenced by Holstein, threatened to send an ultimatum. It then required all Bismarck's skill in diplomacy to cajole Salisbury into completing the agreement, by which he, in all essential points complied with the German demands. This contretemps left an unpleasant impression upon officials and populace alike.

§ Richardstein pg. 88.

2 Richardstein pg. 152.

Early in the war, the Kaiser sent his famous advice to Edward VII with regard to the conduct of the struggle, urging that it was better to bring matters to a conclusion if he were not sure of security from interference. "Even the strongest football club, when beaten in spite of the bravest defence, ultimately accepts its defeat with equanimity." The implication was highly offensive to Edward, who was not on good terms with the Kaiser and he replied coldly that he failed to grasp the comparison. This is merely another instance of the Kaiser's irresponsible action which roused so much ill-feeling against Germany.

The irrepressible monarch in that year felt an urge to visit England. He had not been invited there since he had caused so much grief in 1895 and four years absence was a hardship. He thereupon had his representatives manoeuvre an official invitation to which Edward good naturedly agreed since in view of the Boer War such a visit might be of political value. It is amusing to note, that the date set was in November--too late for the Cowes Regatta. Because of his dictatorial manner, he had earlier earned the title "Boss of Cowes," and no one craved his presence there.

However he sent over his yacht, the "Heteor," which won the Queen's Cup. The Prince congratulated him duly in an after-dinner speech and even regretted his absence. Later he remarked "Whatever I think personally about my nephew, I wanted to say something publicly, to show that the relations between the two governments had again been put upon a normal and friendly basis." But such rosy dreams fled with the dawn--a telegram arrived from the Kaiser in which he roundly abused the Race Committee, e.g., "Your

1 Brandenburg, pp. 146.

2 Hohenzollern, pp. 112 et seq.

handicaps are perfectly appalling." The Prince was in despair—
 what could one do with a person who would throw mud and who in-
 sulted England's national reputation for fair play in sport?
 Still the visit was to be tolerated. It almost did not happen
 because Edward objected to the presence of Von Soden in the
 Kaiser's suite but his Imperial Majesty would bring whom he
 chose or stay at home.² Edward had to submit, and the visit,
 from social point of view was apparently a huge success. It
 at least declared to the world friendly relations between the
 two governments at a time when Britain was feeling her isolation
 rather painfully.

During the war, Germany's official attitude was one of
 strict neutrality. True, when Britain's fortunes were at the
 lowest, the two rival groups of the continent showed signs of
 being disposed to come to terms and to attack her. But, when
 in March, 1900, the Czar proposed a continental alliance in
 favor of the Boers, he met with no encouragement at Berlin.
 Germany was not disposed to forfeit England's good will by
 joining in any action inimical to England's interests, unless
 Russia and France would formally guarantee her against any
 disturbance of the continental status quo. Such a guarantee
 would have involved a French recognition of the frontiers of
 1871, a recognition which Berlin well knew no French govern-
 ment was likely to concede. The time clearly therefore, was
 not ripe for such a league and no one seriously wanted to
 fight for the Boers. Moreover, Lord Newton hazards the
 opinion, that no one power was willing to risk the loss of
 its fleet.³

¹ Eckhardtstein, pg. 120.

² Dugdale III, pp. 102, Hatzfeldt to German Foreign Office,

³ Newton, pg. 196.

In face of the embarrassing retort raised by the Anglo-phobes and general irritation on the score of British expansion in the south, the German Foreign Office, undoubtedly played a waiting game. While outwardly making friendly overtures which did discourage interference on the part of other nations, in actual fact, "The British government had to pay heavily, not for German support but merely for the privilege that German threats and insults should not be pressed to action. Over the Portuguese colonies, over Samoa, and over China, Lord Salisbury's government showed such contemptible weakness as almost to justify the Kaiser's description of them as 'unmitigated noodles.'² Thus did Germany take advantage of Britain's stress to exact concessions and emphasize her dependence upon the Triple Alliance.

Moreover, despite the correct attitude of the German government and a last minute effort to reorientate public opinion, the bitterness and suspicion between the two peoples was intensified and henceforth, remained a prevailing influence in both countries.

Foot Note: The Kaiser was later to claim credit for having refused to receive the Boer generals tearing Europe in 1902. The truth is that he was only deterred from seeing them by the representations of M. Bell and others as to the probable effect on English opinion and by his own naive desire not to prejudice his proposed visit to England.

² Liddell Hart, p. 23.

(B) Armenian Massacre and Crises.

In addition to strife in Africa a sharp divergence between Germany and Britain was caused by that time-worn canker in European affairs--Turkey. The immediate source of anxiety was Armenia, where the first massacre broke out in 1893. Lord Rosebery instructed the Ambassador Sir Clarendon Darnley to turn his attention to the question and demand the appointment of an impartial commission of inquiry. The German Foreign Office credited the British Ambassador with starting a troublesome business at a peculiarly unfortunate moment, i.e. "When the Sultan has been upset by events in Armenia itself and by the discussion in the British Parliament." ¹ Hatzfeldt assured his superiors however that Rosebery had given the order, ~~and he himself~~ acting under pressure from English philanthropists and that he was not trying to fish in troubled waters. Rosebery had even said that "for himself Armenia did not interest him in the least." ²

In November of the same year Prince Radolin, German Ambassador at Constantinople reported the Sultan to have declared that he would not give way to the Armenians and that he begged the Kaiser to convince the Queen of England of the groundlessness of British complaints. The Imperial comment on this communication is "The Devil I will. If the English want to burn their fingers I shall not stop them." ³ The attitude of Radolin nevertheless was quite fair to Sir Philip Currie, his English colleague, e.g. "I feel I must bear witness" he says "that he [Currie] is calmly and wisely doing his utmost to prevent the Porte and Tildiz from committing further

¹ Dagdale II, pg. 114, German Note.

² Dagdale II, pg. 218, Hatzfeldt to Hatzfeldt, Oct. 10/93.

³ Dagdale II, pg. 14, Intro.

⁴ Dagdale II, pg. 214, Radolin to Hatzfeldt, Nov. 10/94, with Marginalia by the Kaiser.

errors.¹ While the Kaiser and the German Foreign Office did not wish England success it does not appear that they intrigued against her. When in Decem^{ber} 1894 the Italian Foreign Minister indicated that he thought them ~~(The Russians)~~ better fitted than the British to restore order and peace in Armenia, Marshall telegraphed Rome that since the Rosebery Cabinet was about to fall, 'Italy will do well not to destroy the bridge for further co-operation with England for the sake of Armenia.'² However Britain's drastic plan of reform was rejected by the Porte for lack of the hearty support of Russia and Germany.³

Salisbury in 1895 reluctantly inherited the problem and made it clear that if the Sultan should propose an acceptable government for Armenia and effective superintendence of reform Britain would withdraw. Otherwise she could not and the Prime Minister must consider radical means of dealing with Turkey.⁴ Actually the British public was the only force which was interested. Russia declared she would not permit coercion of Turkey and hence the Sultan could complacently neglect British advice.⁵

Just at this time Germany requested British aid for Italy who was suffering reverses in Abyssinia. Salisbury replied that to give Italy the required facilities on the Red sea would create French jealousy but that he was ready to recognize Italian claims to a portion of Albania and Tripoli.⁶ Hatzfeldt objected that such an arrangement would sharpen Austro-Italian

¹ Dugdale II, pg. 220, Bismarck to Schenkels, Nov. 26/94.

² Dugdale II, pg. 225-6, Bulow in Rome to German Foreign Office, Dec. 18/94.

³ Dugdale II, pg. 224, Bismarck to Schenkels, June 27/95.

⁴ Dugdale II, pg. 227, Hatzfeldt to Schenkels, July 10/95.

⁵ Dugdale II, pg. 231, Bismarck to Schenkels, June 2/95, also, Dugdale II, pg. 316, Bismarck to Schenkels, Oct. 23/95.

⁶ Dugdale II, pg. 323, Hatzfeldt to Schenkels, July 3/95.

rivalry and thus weaken the Triple Alliance. He felt also that any unravelling of the Balkan question would endanger Russo-German friendship and also involve a partition of Turkey. Salisbury then declared that he set quite as much store on maintaining Turkey as during his last term of office, but he "could not fail to realize that the force of circumstances was ever bringing that possibility (i.e., partition) nearer." He felt that it was high time for the powers to agree on their claims in the event of Turkey breaking up and was quite prepared to accord to Russia an ample share of the Sultan's estate.

Holstein who during these conversations played the role of secret director was convinced that Salisbury's real object was to relieve England's unpleasant situation in Egypt by involving the continent in a war which would probably smash the Triple Alliance and in which England would play the part of an unconcerned spectator. Hatzfeldt, on the other hand, thought Salisbury saw in the Triple Alliance the best security for British interests and was honestly trying to provide for future contingencies. The Ambassador was refused permission to enter into further parleys on the subject and was instructed to keep a free hand for the purpose of demanding coaling stations later.

When in the summer of 1895 the Kaiser came to Gross, Yon Biderlon, who accompanied him, was warned to see that he did not discuss the Turkish problem with the British Prime Minister. However, after the Queen's Banquet, Salisbury raised the question with His Majesty. The Kaiser dutifully reiterated the

† Dugdale II, pg. 333, Hatzfeldt to the German Foreign Office,

Aug. 3/95.

2 Dugdale II, pg. 335, Holstein to Biderlon at Selligeland,

Aug. 3/95.

3 Dugdale II, pg. 332, Hatzfeldt

Aug. 3/95.

4 Brandenburg, pg. 72.

objections to the opening of the Eastern question, concluding most emphatically that he was altogether opposed to the dismembering of Turkey. When Salisbury urged that the Armenian atrocities were final proof of the impossibility of preserving Turkey, the Kaiser minimized the horrors and the conversation left the worst possible effect on both sides. Salisbury complained that the Kaiser forgot he was talking to the Prime Minister of England and not to a German Minister. German authorities tell us, however, that reports of the Kaiser's rudeness are based on gossip and certainly he did invite Salisbury to converse with him again. For some obscure reason the invitation was neglected. Holstein declared the meeting did not materialize because the Emperor could not be converted to the idea of a partition of Turkey. However, according to Sir Charles Eliot, there is no official evidence in the English Documents to show that such a proposal was ever made. He is convinced that Salisbury was merely speculating about what should happen if the crash did come. Also Hatfield reported in the same month that Lord Salisbury did not desire war between the continental powers and was glad that, at present, there was no fear of a Turkish break-up. Professor Brandenburg regrets that the negotiations with regard to delimitation of territory in a division of Turkey were not

Foot Note: Daghle II, pg. 239, German Note.

"That it was Lord Salisbury's behaviour and not the Emperor's that was incorrect is shown clearly by the British Premier's letter of apology Aug. 8, after he had ignored the Kaiser's telephonic invitation to come and continue the conversation."

2 Daghle II, pg. 541, Holstein to Hatfield, Aug. 14/95.

3 Daghle II, pg. 16, Historical Preface.

4 Daghle II, pg. 242, Hatfield to German Foreign Office, Aug. 16/95.

carried ^{on} because they would at least have had the effect of bringing the various claims to light. The failure was due to Germany's great distrust of Salisbury's near Eastern policy, an attitude created in and largely fomented by the crotchety brain of Holstein.

The Kaiser further decreased, in fact obliterated his popularity in England on this same occasion by making one of his characteristically provocative harangues. It was the anniversary of the battle of Worth and he spoke on board the cruiser 'Worth' in a fashion which gave offence to France as well as to Britain.² The Conservative Press, notably the 'Standard,' advised him, in future, to send his challenges from his own territory, whereupon he and Merschell in turn, became offended. Hosts and guests parted with mutual ill-will and for four years the Kaiser was not again invited to Cowes.

Meantime the Sultan knowing that Russia was averse to coercion in Armenia rejected nearly all proposals for reform and threatened, if England persisted, to throw herself upon the protection of Russia.³ In September, the great Armenian Massacre broke out and the alleged revolt was used as an excuse for deferring reform of any kind. Germany was indifferent. France followed her Russian ally and England had to look on in impotent anger. She had failed to aid the Armenians and had lost her influence at Constantinople, while the Sultan found compensation for the loss of her friendship in accepting that proffered by Germany.

Though Turkey had defied Britain safely in Asia Minor she

¹ Bismarck, pp. 77.

² Bismarck, pp. 82.

³ Bismarck II, pp. 346. Telegram in Petersburg to Berlin, Oct. 29/98.

could not do so in Crete. In 1897 the recurrent unrest in the island culminated in civil war and the Christian Cretans proclaimed their union with the Greeks who sent troops to occupy the island. The powers were at once in condemning this action and required the Greeks to leave. Here, however, the unanimity of the Powers ended; for while Berlin and Vienna were concerned only to compel a Greek withdrawal, Salisbury argued that the future of the island should be regulated before pressure was used. Even when it had been decided that the Cretans should in future enjoy autonomy under Turkish suzerainty, Anglo-German divergence was not yet at an end and the final choice of Prince George of Greece as High Commissioner, was carried through in November 1898 by England, Russia, France and Italy in the disgruntled absence of the two German Powers. This proceeding was condemned by the Kaiser as robbery, and by Marshall as an "immense and grievous act of injustice."

In other words, if England had been as successful in the matter of Crete as she had been unsuccessful in that of Armenia, in both cases her humanitarian whims had equally placed her in opposition to the wishes of Berlin. We find the Emperor writing that England's policy in Armenia was incomprehensible and that "this feeling among the nations had led to their all without exception being filled with a strong mistrust of England." England emerged from these two crises weaker than she had begun and even more isolated. Her relations with the Dual Alliance were still cool and her estrangement from Germany had been emphasized.

1 Dugdale II, pp. 445, German Note.

2 Dugdale II, pp. 445, Ratsfeldt to Foreign Office July 29/95, indicated that Salisbury was influenced by the Grandophil sentiment which inspired the Parliament and people of England.

3 Dugdale II, pp. 449, Von Marshall to Bismarck, Nov. 25/97.

4 Dugdale II, pp. 449, Emperor William II to Marshall Oct. 25/98.

(E) German Imperial Tone.

In 1895 Germany took her first official excursion to the far East. Under the Imperialist Hohenlohe, she surprised Europe by joining the opponents of the Triple Alliance in a protest against the treaty of Shimonoseki, which closed the Sino-Japanese war. The Kaiser had, until recently, frankly admired the military prowess of the Japanese, but now was impressed by danger of the 'Yellow Peril' and intent upon preserving the territorial integrity of China. The purpose of intervention was to prevent the Japanese from acquiring Port Arthur, but incidentally, each of the three powers received concessions from China. Hohenlohe was anxious to restore good relations with Russia and the latter, intent upon getting, Port Arthur for herself, had no objection to Germany securing a coaling station in China. The British cabinet, however, resolved that the national interests were not injured by the Sino-Japanese treaty sufficiently to justify intervention. England thus associated herself with Japan, the rising power of the East, who stood in opposition not only to her world wide enemies, France and Russia, but also, strange to say to Germany. From Germany's point of view the whole episode was ill-starred. Russia demanded and received German subservience, e.g., concerning Chinese loans, the Franco-Russian alliance was not weakened and Germany's breach with England was definitely widened. Germany was henceforth bound to support Russia in the East and did so until 1905, a circumstance which made any German understanding with England extremely difficult. This point, together with the estrangement over Turkey and the personal antipathy between the Kaiser and Salisbury, make 1895 a red letter year in Anglo-German relations. Despite the efforts of well meaning statesmen the breach was never again closed and as

noted above, in the very next year the Kaiser threw to the winds what remained of his popularity in England by the Kruger telegram.

Germany took the first step in the spoliation of China when, in 1897, she secured the lease of Kiao Chan.¹ In March 1898 Russia promptly took over Port Arthur and Talien Wan as compensation. France and Britain, not to be outdone received the harbours of Kwang-Chow and Wei-Hai-Wei, respectively. The Eastern question was again made prominent in 1897 when, during the Boxer rising, the German Ambassador² von Kettler was shot. The Kaiser's attitude was, as usual, offensively theatrical. The Powers immediately collected a large force to protect European interests in China and after vain hints to Salisbury and the Czar, the Kaiser on pretext of the Czar's invitation shipped off Waldersee as Commander-in-Chief of the united forces, flaunting German power in such phrases as "No quarter will be given, no prisoners taken."³ Almost before the Germans arrived Russia sent a request for the withdrawal of all foreign legions, and the whole continent shook with laughter at the Kaiser's expense.⁴ The effect was a tragic loss to German prestige and according to Baron von Eckardstein, Berlin lost its head and demanded that the German Ambassador "keep the English at all costs in Peking." It was evidently felt that association with Britain would lessen the wide-spread ridicule of His Imperial Majesty. To this end Eckardstein played upon the anxiety of British statesmen with regard to Russian aggression in China.

The acute Netsfeldt, who had in mind an Anglo-German alliance, saw in the Eastern situation an opportunity to draw the Governments of Germany and Britain closer together and at the same time benefit German commerce. Germany was keen to prevent Britain

¹ Hamann, pg. 77. ² Eckardstein, pg. 172.

³ Hamann, pg. 86. ⁴ Eckardstein, pg. 174.

obtaining exclusive rights in the important Yangtze valley and when an acute controversy developed between England and Russia the Emperor informed Lascaris that he was ready to give Britain his general support, provided she would engage to observe the policy of the open door in that area. The offer was welcomed by a large section of the British cabinet and though Salisbury did not approve he agreed to discuss the proposals duly drawn up by Hatzfeldt.

After long and tedious negotiations a formula was eventually arranged according to which both powers were to defend the principle of the open door and the territorial integrity of China, "so far as they are able to exercise influence." The treaty was published simultaneously in Berlin and London Oct. ^{ober} 15/1900. So far as Britain was concerned it was aimed against the expansive policy of Petersburg and when later Russia showed a tendency to monopolise Manchuria, Bulow evaded the issue by declaring that he never considered that territory to be inside Germany's sphere of interest. In fact the text of the agreement provided but an ambiguous and unsatisfactory definition of the respective obligations. The whole proceeding was shifty and not over creditable to either British or German officials, a circumstance which was caused by Salisbury reluctance to enter the agreement at all and Germany's desire to associate herself with England on account of the Boxer fiasco. No real confidence was by this means established between either the peoples or governments. Russophiles in Germany, who called everything English bad, were enraged at even this association between the two governments and prophesied estrangement with Russia on that account. Bulow, however, in a budget speech assured them that no breach with Russia would occur, that "we have no intention of acting as a light-

¹ C & 72, pp. 2.

² Brechtens, pp. 151, 2 & 3, pp. 15, English Draft as finally settled.

ning conductor for any other power."

Reviewing the last decade of the century from the point of view of German world policy and its bearing upon Anglo-German relations, we find, in the first five years, chiefly haggling over colonial difficulties in Africa, which were for the most part cleared up. Then, in 1895, came the estrangement over Turkey, opposite sides taken in the far East and cessation of the Kaiser's visits to England. In the earlier years, foreign policy had, in accordance with that of Bismarck, invited an English alliance, but now developing an inflated opinion of Germany as a world power, the Kaiser remarked with satisfaction, "If England needs us she will come of herself,...our support is conditional on concessions.... no one in Europe can achieve anything without our co-operation."¹ Especially after the Kruger affair, he was scathing in his tone toward British Ministers and he, personally, was intensely disliked in England. But English Ministers recognized the twinge of blisss of the Kaiser for what they were,² and took no defensive action until his dreams achieved a real basis through the building of a great fleet of battle-ships.

A fleet had been from the beginning of his reign the darling of the Kaiser's heart and incidentally one cause of difference with Bismarck.³ On the occasion of the Heligoland treaty in 1890, he spoke of the German army and British fleet protecting the world but at the same time had in mind that

¹ Haasemann, pg. 100.

² Brandenburg, pg. 72.

³ G. A. II, pg. 6, Lascelles to Salisbury, Aug. 9/1890.

⁴ Foot Note: Memoirs of Ex-Kaiser, pg. 7. Kaiser tells us that when he tried to discuss the need for a navy with Bismarck the Prince turned a deaf ear and used his pet phrase: "If the English should land on our soil, I should have them arrested."

Holigoland was a valuable naval base. After the Sino-Japanese war and the part played by Germany and England respectively in the resulting negotiations, it was easy for the Pan-Germans to convert public opinion to the idea that a rich and powerful Empire required a fleet to defend its territory, safeguard its commerce and support its diplomacy. In Admiral von Tirpitz, the Kaiser chose the right man to speed on his scheme and to aid him, he appointed to the Foreign Office the brilliant imperialist, Count von Bulow.

In the diary of the Chief of the Naval Cabinet, Baron von Sanden, we learn of the unlimited naval program which was in the air in 1896. An item of January 7, 1896, i.e., four days after the Kruger Telegram, states that von Tirpitz, being ready to seize every chance to realize the ambition of his life, considered that the psychological moment had arrived for increasing the naval estimates of 1896-97 and thereupon, presented a petition to the Kaiser. We know from the Memoirs of Waldersee, that Tirpitz so influenced the Kaiser that His Majesty wanted to have a naval bill brought in for three hundred million marks, a step which would not have cooled the heated feelings of England. According to von Sanden's diary, it was thanks only to Hohenlohe's intervention, that a bill for only one hundred million marks was passed. Tirpitz in his zeal had von Sanden sent to Friedrichsruhe on January 10, to see if the Ex-Chancellor would not advocate an increase in the naval estimate. ² In an article in the Hamburger Nachrichten of January 27, however, the aged statesman favoured a larger number of cruisers, not battleships, and stated that it was not necessary to exceed the existing estimate. He thus sought to curb the naval policy, which was brewing. The first

1. Hamann pg. 68-69, Dr. Thimme quoted by Hamann.

2. Hamann pg. 70.

navy bill passed in November 1897, and instead of aiming at coastal defence, it was obviously the beginning of a high seas battle fleet.[#]

Though British officials did not take the naval question too tragically, the stirring propaganda which accompanied the birth of the German navy was resented by the English populace. Thus by the end of the century, despite a series of agreements, the absence of any definite cause of disagreement and the demonstrable advantage to be gained from co-operation, there was, in fact, wide spread enmity between the two peoples--heightened by world wide sympathy for the Boers and the attitude taken by German colonial wild men, that England was a stumbling block in the way of German colonial and commercial expansion.

[#] Brandenburg pg. 272, also, C & F, pg. 117, Lascelles to Salisbury.

CHAPTER III

ATTEMPTS AT RAPPROCHEMENT. 1898-1901.(A) Attempted Anglo-German Agreement.

At the end of the Century, Britain found herself in a state of extreme isolation among the powers, and almost universally condemned by the populace of the continent. She was at enmity with Russia in China and on the Indian frontier, and with France in Africa. War with the Boers was imminent and the Sudan was a source of grief. This situation was deemed by Chamberlain to be dangerous and independently of Salisbury, he decided that a change of policy was necessary. Despite recent annoying episodes in Anglo-German relations, e.g., the Kruger Telegram, he felt that there was no serious cause of estrangement from Germany, as there was in the case of France and Russia. Hence he focussed his attention upon a definite agreement with the latter.

Matters were taking exactly the turn desired by Holstein and the Kaiser—"if England needs us, she will come to us." For Germany there were obvious advantages in such a connection but Holstein, while desirous of obtaining an alliance eventually, was imbued with the fear of being converted into a check absorber for Britain's policy in opposition to Russia. He, therefore, resolved to play one off against the other, to preserve friendship with Russia and hold out to Britain hope of an alliance while taking advantage of her weakness to wring concessions from her and emphasize her need of the Triple Alliance. This policy, known as Holstein's theory of hostages, dominated the negotiations until their final failure.

Another important element in the game, however was the Prime Minister's staunch adhesion to Britain's age-old policy of

isolation. When at the end of 1897, Bismarck was instructed to improve relations with England by threatening a German alliance with Russia, he, perforce, dealt with the Prime Minister, Salisbury, who reiterated Britain's customary policy and bitterly reminded him of the Kruger Telegram. This incident seems to be symbolic of the clash of purposes throughout.

However, in the winter of 1898, when Salisbury was absent and there was almost panic over Russian incroachments in China, Chamberlain and Bismarck met weekly, their conversations assuming the form of negotiations for a general alliance between Britain and Germany. On March 23 proposals were made by Salfour and Chamberlain to the effect that in return for German support, England was willing to co-operate with the Triple Alliance, and a binding agreement was suggested. The overture was met in Berlin with skepticism. Bulow feared that in case of a change of government England would not be bound. ¹ If it were made public and parliament should reject it then Germany would be compromised with Russia who had warned her that "the only danger to peace would arise if we were forced to the conviction that Germany had come to a definite agreement with England, threatening the balance of power." ² English ironclads could not protect Germany's eastern frontier and Bulow decided that there was no present need for "risking the hazardous game of concluding treaties." ³ An alliance should only be considered if Russia definitely threatened and England became less overbearing. Moreover England

¹ Dagdale III, pg. 21, Bismarck to German Foreign Office, Mar. 29/98.

² Dagdale III, pg. 23, Bulow to Bismarck Mar. 30/98.

³ Brandenburg, pg. 107.

⁴ Brandenburg, pg. 108.

was concentrating on African and Asiatic matters, whereas, in the words of Holstein the "Niger or the Gulf of Pechili matter for loss to us than Alsace Lorraine."¹ However the possibility of such an alliance must be kept as a card against Russia and especially since, if the offer were refused outright² in the present rabid mood of the English Cabinet, a rapprochement with France would not be unlikely.³ Balow advised Chamberlain to renew the old treaty with Italy and Austria and pointed out that for German neutrality, which would keep France out of an Anglo-Russian war, adequate compensation would be required. Thereupon Chamberlain replied that England was not prepared to guarantee the maintenance of Turkey, at which Austria aimed and referred to a possible Anglo-French agreement. Balow and Holstein thought it quite safe to let Britain go to Paris if she wished because Paris would not act in opposition to Russia, and England would find that she had no choice of allies.⁴

In May, Chamberlain started to educate public opinion and in a speech at Birmingham on the 13th made it clear that he wanted the alliance as a counterpoise to Russia in the East—"Who supe with the devil must have a long spoon." Again, "Russia wanted what we did not want and we had nothing to offer her to induce her to desert from her plan."⁵ Batsfeldt, who personally desired the alliance, was thus encouraged and took the matter up with Salisbury on his return.

When the Prime Minister arrived in June, he explained, in a private conversation with Batsfeldt, that though he agreed in the abstract with Chamberlain, he believed it "more advisable

¹ Brandenburg, pp. 109.

² Brandenburg, pp. 108.

³ Du dale III, pp. 26, German Note.

⁴ Hannover, pp. 61.

for powers, whose similar interests suggested joint political action, not to reduce their understanding to a formal treaty until a case of necessity arose through some serious menace to their interests."

It was finally agreed that the most important task of both governments was gradually to dispel the ill humor prevailing between the two countries by a spirit of accommodation in minor questions and thus to prepare public opinion for a definite political agreement.² Matters were made difficult by the fact that Salisbury and Chamberlain did not always agree, the former building slowly for the sake of peace, the latter concentrating always on Britain's interests abroad. Salisbury shortly afterward summed up the situation thus, "alliance non; rapprochement, oui."³

(B) Sources of Friction.

A risky step taken by the Kaiser on his own initiative, revealed a farther source of strain. On May 30, he wrote to the Tsar and, mentioning the possibility of a British alliance, asked, "Now as my old and trusty friend, I beg you to tell me what you can offer and what you will do for me if I refuse." On June 3, he was paid back in his own coin when the Tsar answered that he himself had refused an offer from England. The Kaiser had not elicited an overture from Russia but had made a discovery which seemed to justify distrust of England and proceeded to express himself in drastic terms. If England wanted German support to spread her power she must pay handsomely. Holstein declared every settlement with England endangered the Eastern frontier while every one with Russia affected

² Hammer pp. 79, also, Brandenburg, pp. 109,--Salisbury said to Kautskopf, "You expect too much for your friendship."

² Dugdale III, pp. 25, Kautskopf to Hohenlohe, Apr. 7/98.

³ Hammer, pp. 80.

England. "Hence we ought not to ally ourselves with either side," and, as usual, Bulow concurred. Bismarck continued discussions with Salisbury and Bulow with lascivies. At the same time the German Foreign Office became aware of an opportunity for negotiations in a particular sphere which would doubtless bring forth remuneration.

Portugal was in dire need of credits and through the agency of Luis de Soveral, offered her colonies in London as collateral for a loan. The German government decided to use pressure, so as to be admitted as joint lender to Portugal. Bismarck was supplied with a list of desiderata, representing the wishes of German colonial circles, as compensation against British territorial expansion in Africa. The following places among others were specified as basis for negotiations--in West Africa, a naval station on the Canary Islands; Angola, Benguela and Walvisch Bay; in East Africa Zanzibar; in Asia, Portugal's portion of Timor Island, in the Pacific, Samoa.

Conversations began between Bismarck and Salisbury, in which the latter refused to admit in principle, that the British government would not be justified in assisting the Portuguese Government financially without the previous consent of Germany, and played for time. On June 25, Bismarck, pressed by Salisbury to show his cards, made a definite proposition according to the above instructions. The British Prime Minister told him that his demands were too large and he much doubted whether they would lead to the conclusion of any engagement. Whereupon Germany, as usual, resorted to threats. Bulow, in his instructions to Bismarck, had said-- "No proof is needed to show that the attitude of Russia and France

¹ Brandenburg, 114.

² Dugdale III, pg. 27, Bulow to Bismarck, June 6/98. Brandenburg, pg. 135, et seq.

³ Dugdale III, pg. 23, Bismarck to German Foreign Office, June 14/98.

would change at once if Germany proposed settling in order all African questions—including that of Egypt.¹ "since Germany is not in a position to render political services, gratis, we expect a corresponding return as the natural outcome of our action in cases where we have rendered important assistance." It is interesting to note Salisbury's report of the above interview.

"It may be well to note, that His Excellency claimed from England, a benevolent examination of the proposals he was making, on the ground that in past negotiations Germany had been of great service to this country. When I pressed him to specify these incidents, which my memory did not enable me to recall, he said that Russia and France together were very much disposed to attack us on the subject of the Suez Canal, and had only been prevented by the disapproval of Germany."²

In later conversations Salisbury commented upon Germany's encouragement to the Boers and her unfriendly attitude in protecting the pretender at Zanzibar, while Hatzfeldt attacked the attitude of Sir Philip Currie in Constantinople. In spite of this fencing, however, His Majesty's government became 'disposed to admit the participation of Germany.'³ When the negotiations threatened to break down over the inclusion of Tinsur Island, Salisbury was forced to make that concession. The German government through Hatzfeldt, intimated that their demands were the minimum for the abandonment of the Boers and the Transvaal, that without such a compensation they could not justify themselves to the German public.⁴

¹ Dugdale III, pg. 33, Salis to Hatzfeldt, June 22/98.

² G & T pg. 52, Salisbury to Goup, June 23/98.

³ Dugdale III, pg. 36, Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, July 6/98.

⁴ Dugdale III, pg. 37, Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, Aug. 19/98, and G & T pg. 67 I, Balfour to Lascelles, Aug. 19/98.

The later conversations, conducted by Balfour, were likewise in the extreme and turned chiefly on Angola and Mozambique. Both colonies were eventually divided into spheres of influence. Belegoa Bay and Lorenzo Marques, plus the railway to the hinterland, fell to England—which ended the Kaiser's dream of a Boer protectorate. The question of Samoa was not raised, and the British Cabinet successfully opposed the cession of Walfisch Bay. London was to supply a loan if necessary and receive revenues from her sphere of influence, as security. Both were given the right of supervising the collection of customs and both agreed to oppose any intrusion of a third party. A treaty to this effect was concluded August 30, and ratified September 26. The treaty never became operative because the loan to Portugal was not found necessary and hence Balfour's expectations with regard to an increase of territory were not realized. This was quite in accordance with England's wishes and was in fact augmented by the secret, so-called Treaty of Windsor, which discouraged disposal of the colonies. The sole advantage left to Germany was that England was prevented, by a secret treaty, from acquiring independently economic and political rights in those parts of the Portuguese colonies abutting on German colonies in Africa.

The Germans thought that England, in her treaty with Portugal did not act in accordance with the spirit of the above agreement but its actual terms were not broken and since Salisbury so obviously acted under German pressure, little enthusiasm could be expected. The Kaiser considered the English minister insolent in his reluctance and traced it to lack of anxiety because

Germany had no fleet. He had declared to Lascelles that, if England did not accept their last proposals, the further presence of a German Ambassador in London would be superfluous, that for the present England must accustom herself to the idea that Germany required a colonial Empire and would acquire one with or without Britain's aid. This blustering was not of course taken seriously in London but to a large degree, it cancelled any good effect which the agreement might have had on public opinion. The treaty, though extorted by threats, was valuable in that it removed one source of conflict and optimistic statesmen hoped it would prove one step toward better relations.

2

Another cause of friction was forced upon the attention of England and Germany in the spring of 1899, i.e. a revolution in Samoa. A triumvirate of representatives from

§ G & T, I, pg. 117, Lascelles to Salisbury, May 26/99.

2 Brandenburg, pg. 116-117.

Foot Note: Note the Kaiser's marginal comment on von Richthofen's urgent report of July 20, is given in *Grosse Politik* XIV, pg. 297. Kaiser to Foreign office Aug. 22/98, *Grosse Politik* XIV, pg. 333.

Also, *Dagbladet* III, pg. 40, Salow to Baseline, Sept. 2/98. "Seeing that the conclusion to be drawn from our inquiries in Russia and France, was that we were isolated against England in protecting German interests in South Africa, the only course left was to reach an understanding direct with England on the South African question. With this in mind we negotiated and have now made an arrangement having as its subject the possibility of a loan to be granted to Portugal on suitable security, and excluding intervention by a third power, we and England stand together to protect this arrangement."

Also, G & T, I, pg. 58, Lascelles to Salfour, Aug. 22/98.

Germany, Britain and United States had been in charge of the Island and now a dangerous muddle had been caused by arbitrariness and excited interference. Bulow brought the matter up and suggested surrender of Germany's share, in exchange for Gilbert Island but Chamberlain declared the price too high. Fighting broke out on the Island and Bulow, quite in accordance with German methods, was instructed, in case of breach of the previous Samson treaty, to recall the Ambassador from England. On April 11, Germany demanded a committee of three plus one independent delegate to take charge of affairs in Samoa, and in case England rejected this, "His Imperial Majesty is resolved, in view of the unfriendly attitude of the English Government and of the hopelessness of further negotiations owing to this attitude, to break off diplomatic relations with England, until such a time as the English Government shall have shown its respect for treaties already concluded, as well as the respect which is due to us." Before delivering this threat however, Bismarck sounded the British Ministers through Rothschild as to the consequences of this attitude and found that Salisbury would accept the German proposal for a commission. He then advised waiting to see whether England was prepared to honour German friendship and the Kaiser consented, though he declared he would not go to England again, while Salisbury was in power.

The crisis was over but the Samoa question was not settled. The Kaiser gave unrestrained expression to his dislike for Salisbury. He was deeply offended at not being invited to the eightieth anniversary of the Queen's Birthday and complained to Her Majesty

1 Brandenburg, Nr. 126, Despatch to Bismarck, Apr. 12/93.

2 Brandenburg, Nr. 126, Private letter from Bismarck to Holstein with marginal comment by Kaiser. Grosses Pol. Bk. XIV
Nr. 606.

personally. Salisbury, he said, had transgressed the elementary rules of international courtesy and that he could not be insulted with impunity. Thereupon, Salisbury wrote a memorandum justifying his procedure and hoping for a personal interview with the Kaiser.

after this merile interjection of personal feeling into foreign affairs, it was again possible to renew the discussion with regard to Samoa. Chamberlain and Eckardstein agreed to a compromise, by which Germany renounced her share in the Island, in exchange for compensation in the South Seas and in Africa. Eckardstein was sent to Berlin to discuss the matter, and found Holstein in favor, but Tirpitz on hearing of it, wrote off an urgent memorandum to the Kaiser condemning the whole convention and insisting upon the acquisition of Samoa by Germany. The Kaiser who had already agreed in principle, thereupon, changed his mind. Holstein described the memorandum in a telegram to Bismarck as "a document of frothy flattery stained with bloody tears to suit the Kaiser's taste." Since the colonial section were agreed, and wished to get the affair cleared up, Eckardstein was sent to interview Tirpitz. He was not allowed to make a single suggestion—and his one impression afterward was of much talk by Tirpitz of "the shadow dance that was to be performed by German diplomacy until our naval arrangements were completed." The Admiral recommended energetic action against England. There could be no question of surrendering Samoa. Bismarck now reversed his earlier

† Pagdale III, pg. 64, Emperor to Victoria, May 22/99, also, Victoria to Emperor, June 12/99.

2 Eckardstein, pg. 111.

3 Eckardstein, pg. 112.

attitude, out of respect for the Kaiser's wishes and public opinion. The average politician did not know whether Samoa was "a fish, a fowl or a foreign Queen," but they were played upon by the naval fanatics and the Virpitz press, which shouted that Samoa was German and must ever remain so.

Actually, Virpitz valued Samoa as a coaling station and for cable service and would part with it only at a high price.² A telegram from Bethmann, October 18, indicated that Chamberlain was not prepared for further concessions so a new basis for negotiation had to be arranged.³ Chamberlain became petulant and refused to negotiate so Salisbury took the matter in hand. Bismarck sent word that co-operation was only possible if Samoa were granted to Germany.⁴

The German Documents bristle with evidence of the typical German methods of persuasion, used in forcing Salisbury into line and of the motive behind their efforts. Bismarck wrote to the Foreign Office—"We should be blamed for lack of diplomatic skill, if we did not now obtain a satisfactory settlement of several of the questions outstanding between ourselves and England—especially that of Samoa!"⁵ With reference to Britain's precarious situation in South Africa, Bismarck said, "The present moment is

¹ Eckardstein, pp. 112.

² Dugdale, III, pp. 75, Virpitz to Bismarck, Oct. 11/98.

³ Dugdale, III, pp. 72, Bethmann to German Foreign Office, Oct. 9/98.

⁴ G & T, pp. 123, Bismarck to Salisbury, Oct. 6/98, quoting conversation with Bismarck.

⁵ Dugdale, III, pp. 168, Bismarck to German Foreign Office, Sept. 1/98.

particularly favorable to us..... we must strike while the iron is hot." Finally, with regard to German neutrality in South Africa, the same official said, "Any German government which was ready for such a renunciation without tangible and sufficient compensation by England, would be tolerated neither by German public opinion nor by His Majesty." That is, once again in this time of Britain's distress, Germany deliberately put on the screw and extracted concessions. Even Chamberlain, the advocate of a German Alliance, complained bitterly that "Germany wanted to make capital out of England's embarrassment in South Africa." It was threatened that unless the question was settled immediately, in Germany's favor, the Kaiser would refuse "with inflexible tenacity" to go to England, that Germany might turn toward other powers, and that, of course, negotiations for an alliance would not be continued. Salisbury, despite the opposition of the Australian colonies, was compelled to give way. In November, a treaty was concluded by which England acquired Fong and the Solomon group and Germany renounced her extraterritorial rights in Zanzibar in return for Samoa. The breach in itself was significant because the mailed fist had been very obvious. In the words of Professor Brandenburg—"The way in which German policy invariably opened fire at once, was extremely antipathetic to English statesmen; who were sensitive to threats." Would Germany make a congenial partner? The question was in the air.

1 Dugdale III, pg. 70, Salow to German Foreign Office, Sept. 25/99.

2 Dugdale III, pg. 68, Matsfeldt to German Foreign Office, Sept. 20/99.

3 G & T, I, pg. 23, Salisbury to Lancelotti, Sept. 15/99, also, Dugdale III, pg. 69, Salow to German Foreign Office, Sept. 25/99. Dugdale III, pg. 68, Matsfeldt to German Foreign Office, Sept. 20/99.

4 G & T, I, pg. 123, Grierson to Bough, Nov. 6/99.

5 G & T, I, pg. 110, Hartman Cox to Foreign Office.

6 Brandenburg, pg. 129.

At the Hague Conference in May of this year an attempt had been made to restrict military armaments. Bismarck instructed his representatives to stay in the back ground, consent to nothing that would fetter Germany, but to avoid the onus of refusal. The discussion ended in a general statement, that the limitation of arms was desirable in future. Much strain was occasioned by the desire of the English representatives for a permanent International Tribunal, appeal to which should be obligatory in certain cases. The obligatory clause was however, evaded. The Kaiser declared he had consented to a farce to please the Tsar, but in practice he would rely entirely upon God and his own sharp sword. This statement, which aptly expressed the attitude of the Tirpitz school toward world peace, naturally accentuated suspicion in England and encouraged Chauvinism at home.

(C) Chamberlain's Advance Rebuffed By Bismarck.

Eminent statesmen however, did not despair of closer Anglo-German relations. When the Kaiser and Bismarck eventually arrived in England in November 1899, i.e., immediately after the Samoan agreement and during the Boer war, the event was hailed as auspicious, and a second move toward an alliance resulted. The Kaiser received Chamberlain twice and heard his plan for an alliance including America. The Minister emphasized England's traditional course and Germany's consideration for Russia and suggested that they proceed by isolated points, e.g., the Baghdad Railway and Morocco. The Kaiser was much impressed but his diplomats reminded him, that if he waited for the right moment, the decision of all great European questions would lie in his hands. Salfour, in conversation with Bismarck and His Majesty,

urged that economic competition was no ground for political hostility and they discussed the serious prospect of a disruption of Austria Hungary.

The most important interview was between Salow and Chamberlain, November 24, when the latter unfolded his ideas regarding an alliance, mentioning Russian power in China, the necessity of maintaining Turkey and the value of good relations with America. Salow encouraged the British statesman to air his opinions in public and see how far they would be accepted. He received the impression that Salisbury was skeptical but that the British public was not so unfriendly as the German and summed up German policy thus, "I consider the future task of the German government is to await the development of events patiently and calmly, confident in the possession of a stronger fleet and careful to preserve good relations with Russia as well as England."

Great hopes were aroused in England by this visit. Chamberlain believed he was sure of an agreement with Salow on all cardinal points and took the opportunity of a speech at Leicester November 27, to develop his program of an alliance or at least a friendly understanding with Germany and America. "Every far sighted statesman has long been anxious that we should not permanently remain isolated on the continent and I think that the most natural alliance is that between ourselves and the German Empire."

On December 1, he explained in a letter to Eckardtstein—"Count Salow whose acquaintance I was delighted to make, also greatly impressed me. He expressed a wish that I might be able at some

Brandenburg, pg. 130.

2 Eckardtstein, pg. 130.

time to say something as to the mutual interests, which bound United States to a triple understanding with Germany, as well as Great Britain. Hence, my speech yesterday which I hope will not be unsatisfactory to him."

While the afore said speech was received skeptically in England, in Germany an anti-English agitation plunged into wildest excesses. The English press retaliated. Sir Valentine Chirol of the Times said to Eckardstein, "The British public never expected much from France or Russia but after the Imperial visit and the reception given to the Kaiser we expected better things from Germany. It is a question whether it would not be preferable to join with even enemies like France and Russia even at greatest sacrifice than with a double faced friend like Germany." This comment was quoted by Eckardstein to Holstein January 1900 and the answer received March 3 was, "Chirol seems to me so arrogant that I think it not consonant with our dignity to go on running after him...The English will need us more than we do them for some time to come."

King Albert of Saxony mourned to Eckardstein, "I love my Saxons but their political stupidity is bottomless. If only the good people who agitate against England could see what they are brewing for England and the selves!" The press section of the Wilhelmsstrasse did everything possible during the Boer war to dampen the violent explosions of feeling against England but its efforts were ineffective. The government was paying the penalty for not keeping the public correctly informed. The storm increased when Germany learned of the Leicester speech and Balow's position became difficult. Probably pressed by

1 Eckardstein, pg. 151.

2 Eckardstein, pg. 140.

3 Eckardstein, pg. 141.

4 Eckardstein, pg. 143.

Holstein, he knuckled under to the Anglophobes by throwing Chamberlain over in a speech in the Reichstag, practically repudiating further relations with him. It was Eckardstein's work to reassure the English officials and prevent hard feeling. Bulow, he assured them, would hold fast to his former policy and the time would come when he could stand for it publicly without arousing dangerous opposition in the Reichstag or country. The Chancellor's weakness, on this occasion, proclaimed him but a second rate politician (~~of both countries~~) and ruined the rapprochement.

The press of both countries harped on, while that of France and Russia exploited the situation. The liberal press in England even hammered Chamberlain until he became exasperated. On December 29, he wrote to Eckardstein,—"I will say no more here about the way in which Bulow has treated me, but in any case I think we must drop all further negotiations in the question of an alliance. Whether it will be possible to return to them after the end of the South African War, that has raised so much dust....must be left for further consideration... everything was going so well, and even Lord Salisbury became quite favorable and in entire agreement with us as to the future developments of Anglo-German relations. But alas it was not to be!"

In the following February, just after the unpleasant Bundesrat affair, Lord Salisbury, who never quite believed in Chamberlain's method, said to Hatzfeldt, that he wished for a strong Germany but it was not wise to be always talking about an alliance. "The old English policy of not meddling in the lesser affairs of the continent, still holds good. To this attitude it would be well to add that England, in

† Eckardstein, pg. 151.

case of need, will place herself on the side of the Power whose interests agree with England's interests.¹ Thus the second effort ended in general awareness and suspicion among statesmen and violent antipathy between the two peoples.

(3) Negotiations for an Alliance, 1901.

After the election of 1900 in Britain, Lansdowne took charge of the Foreign Office, though Salisbury was still Prime Minister. The attitude of the new Secretary toward Germany was expressed in a letter to Sir Frank Lascelles, in which he stated, that his one preconception was the idea that, "We should use every effort to maintain and if we can, to strengthen the good relations which at present exist between the Queen's government and that of the Emperor."² In his reply November 17, Lascelles reported, that while, he, himself was optimistic and Kaiser apparently anxious to arrive at an understanding, the latter was afraid of public opinion, which was unmistakably hostile to Britain. He, therefore, did not recommend concessions anywhere except in return for a completely adequate consideration.³

In January 1901, during a visit to Chatsworth, Baron Richardstein was assured by Mr. Chamberlain⁴ the Duke of Devonshire that the time for splendid isolation was over; that England desired to settle all pending questions, especially Morocco and the Far East, in co-operation with either the Triple Alliance

¹ Brandenburg, pg. 140, Rotterdam, Feb. 22/00

² Norton, pg. 135.

³ Norton, pg. 136.

⁴ The country house of the Duke of Devonshire.

or France and Russia. Chamberlain, himself, favored a rapprochement with Germany but ~~should~~ that be impossible, England would turn to the Dual Alliance, even at the cost of great sacrifices in China and the Persian Gulf. However, the reasons for his previous offers to Germany still remained and since the Hsiaoan and Yangtze agreements, Chamberlain had reason to expect a better reception of his overture.

Batzfeldt made it clear to the Chancellor January 18 that "He (Chamberlain) wished these remarks of his, except in so far as they bore on the Morocco question, to be considered for the present not as an overture but only as an academic subject for discussion." But the storm of indignation in Germany, on account of the Boer war, still continued and in Berlin, Chamberlain's gesture was received with distrust. Holstein called it a bluff. If Germany accepted it she would expose herself to the risk of war on two fronts and must demand compensation--to which England would consent only when she realized her own sore plight.

Then, too, Germany deemed that she had special cause for distrust--England had refused to prevent Portugal from using European sources of revenue, as cover for the issue of a loan. Salisbury said he was only obliged to intervene if Portugal mortgaged Angola or Mozambique. But Germany wanted the collapse of Portugal, while England, by the Windsor Treaty, bolstered up the tottering structure. This was not contrary to the German treaty in fact, but Germany considered it so in spirit.

On January 22 the Kaiser insisted upon rushing to the death bed of Queen Victoria despite a barrage of telegrams from his female relatives, whom he termed "petticoats", bidding him to stay at home.

He came "as a grandson" to wait upon his "unparalleled Grand -

† Scherstein, pp. 184-185. G & T, II, pg. 60, Editorial note.

‡ Scherstein, pg. 186, Batzfeldt to Chancellor Jan. 18/01. (over)

...as never ever existed before. However his public reception was so warm, that he prolonged his visit till Feb. 6, an extension which was resented by his own subjects and also his Ministers, who suffered from the groundless fear that uncle and nephew might become so friendly as to endanger the interests of Germany.

Hofmeister tells us that Chamberlain took advantage of this improved feeling, together with the coming of Lansdowne to the Foreign Office and the absence of Salisbury, to urge again his views with regard to a rapprochement. The Kaiser had a long conversation with Lansdowne, wherein he showed bitterness toward Russia—adding the opinion, that the Tsar was fit only to live in a country house and grow turnips and that the only way to deal with him was to be the last to leave the room.² The Kaiser was evidently instructing the new Foreign Minister in his duties and states in his records, that he made a visible impression upon Lansdowne. He telegraphed to Bismarck: "They are coming on it again, just where we expected."³ Bismarck, fearing the Kaiser might enter a binding engagement answered, "Everything now depends on neither discouraging the English nor letting ourselves be captured prematurely." "Any eagerness would diminish our

² O & T, II, pp. 80. Editorial note.

³ Brandenburg, pp. 169.

⁴ Hoxton pp. 187, Kaiser to Sir Frank Lascelles, Jan. 1901.

⁵ Hoxton pp. 188.

⁶ Brandenburg, pp. 169, Kaiser's telegram to Bismarck, Jan. 20, German Politik, XVII, pp. 17.

prospect of gain." An understanding with the Dual Alliance was simply a "hideous spectre invented to terrify us," England must not think German relations with Russia were not good.

Holstein^{wrote} to Richardstein January 21, 1901, "The threat of withdrawal from China and from the Persian Gulf is nothing but rubbish, humbug. There is nothing in it for France, who will be moved by no concessions to hand over Tangier to England. If England strengthens her enemies she will make her struggle for existence all the more inevitable." "England still holds to what Salisbury said to Bismarck, 'You ask too much for your friendship.'" This, and the ill treatment of Germany, that has become a habit under Salisbury must be forgotten before we can start fresh." At present, Kitchener is treating the Germans in South Africa on Salisburyian lines."

Richardstein replied to Holstein--"The Kaiser is at present exceedingly bitter against Russia....he had in mind the negotiations of an accession of Great Britain to the Triple Alliance, the separation of France altogether from Russia and its association, as far as possible, with the new combination. On my pointing out to His Majesty, that we could only commit ourselves to a combination with England, after getting requisite compensation and guarantee and that this could not be done in a moment, but only methodically, the Kaiser replied that he entirely agreed that we must keep quiet for the present and let

Brandenburg, pg. 197, Bulow's telegram to the Kaiser, Jan. 21, German Politics, XVII, pg. 20.

2 Richardstein, pg. 187, also, Brandenburg, pg. 197.

(~~as at the present time~~) the English came further to assist us. For that reason he had said nothing to either "the King, Lord Salisbury, or Mr. Broderick" concerning an Anglo-German alliance.

In the winter, then, it seems clear that the German Ministers were at one in their wish to prevent the negotiations until the ultimate concession had been wrung from English necessity. The Kaiser, however reluctantly, was compelled to yield to the ministerial admonitions, and his genuine, though flexible, impulse of friendship toward London was checked by the over-reaching policy of men who were determined to make no bargain until it could be made entirely on their own terms. Thus, the German reception of Bismarck's advances was anything but encouraging and did not argue well for the favorable progress of further negotiations.

Helmuth von Moltke did his utmost to take Holstein out of the clutches of Lord Salisbury and other English supporters of the alliance. February 10, 1881, he wrote for the information of Lord Salisbury's intentions, saying that the English minister was convinced that no progress could be made against the difficulties in the East, without a continental alliance and that therefore, one with Germany was very desirable. If this were not attainable, they would immediately set to work to give a different direction to Britain's world policy. Helmuth even sent a draft of instructions that should be sent to him, couched in cordial terms but at the same time insinuating, that if Germany were to later danger at the hands of her neighbors, it would be justifiable to provide stronger defense for the Central Empire. Moltke answered with violent invectives against Salisbury's

† Moltke to Salisbury, pp. 130, Telegrams to Moltke, Jan. 1881.

"unbearable personality," revived the memory of his "beautiful project" for partitioning Turkey ^{and} ~~against~~ his lack of perspicacity with regard to the Portuguese colonies. Then too, the disagreement about the interpretation of the Yangtze treaty, made Berlin cautious. Holstein had no belief in England's sincerity while Salisbury was in power. He believed the Prime Minister was leading Germany on by empty promises with regard to Africa, (a partition of Morocco had been suggested at Chatsworth.) He would have been pleased to see England and Japan fight Russia without German intervention and was annoyed because England declined to challenge Russia for breach of the treaty of Tientsin, while still at war in South Africa. In agreement with Bismarck he laid down the following instructions for German policy, "We remain neutral, and only conclude an alliance when there are actual facts to prove that it is not of use only to England."

As could be expected, the Kaiser's friendships to England began to flag immediately he arrived back in Berlin. There he came under the influence of fanatical Anglophobes and those who had financial interests in South Africa. He was also influenced by Waldersee, who was raising trouble about the Chinese indemnity in order to secure the return to Europe of the 21,000 Germans there. Waldersee dictated that the customs be doubled for the purpose, a project to which England had refused to consent. Holstein instructed Schenkels to insist upon attention to these two problems. At the same time, French and Russian agents were successfully sowing dissension by indicating to

† Hammer, pp. 100.

‡ Brandenburg, pp. 100. Holstein to Bismarck, Feb. 11, and Mar. 1. Grosses Politik XVI, pp. 217, 225.

Chamberlain, that Berlin passed all information regarding negotiations on to Petersburg and hinting at Berlin that Salisbury was arranging with Russia a partition of China.

Despite the attitude of the German Foreign Office, Eckardtstein returned to the subject of an Anglo-German alliance—a subject rendered more possible for discussion by the threatening danger of a war between Russia and Japan. On March 10, in an interview with Lansdowne the subject was discussed. Eckardtstein ascribed the initiative to Lansdowne, though he states that, when dining with the English Secretary on March 16, he gave him a strong hint to approach with an offer of alliance—in these words—"If there were a definite alliance between Britain and Germany covering all possibilities, it would be obvious that Germany could at once agree to localize a war between Russia and Japan, by influencing France." He claims that as a result of this hint Lansdowne broached the subject two days later. Lansdowne, however, in his report to Lascellies of the same day, attributes the suggestion wholly to Eckardtstein and Lascellies, in turn, emphasized that point in his letter to Mr. Chirac, January 16, 1902. At any rate, Eckardtstein explained, that while Germany could be adverse to any agreement entered into solely with reference to the situation in China, the idea of an understanding of more extended character would be favorably entertained. He had in mind, a defensive alliance between the two powers directed solely against France and Russia, neither being bound to help the other until attacked by more than one power. When he assured Lansdowne that he was acting without instructions, the Foreign Minister, and later also Lascellies, were decidedly

incredulous. Eckardstein was truthful, however, and not a little nervous because the day before he had received from Holstein a communication commenting upon the silence of the British government in this regard and ending thus—"I forbid you expressly, my dear friend even to breathe a word about an alliance. The proper moment, if it ever comes, is certainly not now."² His motto, according to Eckardstein was always—"Make me an unelette but break me no eggs." Surely an impossible man with whom to work!

The conversation was duly reported, in a manner which gave the impression that Lansdowne had spoken without encouragement. Eckardstein urgently reminded Berlin that England was at the parting of the ways and that the answer was of decisive significance. Holstein admitted the importance of the occasion, but said matters were complicated by Salisbury's personality. Also, it was advisable to include the Triple Alliance and Japan—to all of which Bismarck agreed. They issued instructions to accord Lansdowne's ideas a sympathetic reception, if applied to the security of present possessions. Hayashi was an interested on-looker, since in case of a Russo-Japanese war, such an agreement would protect Japan's rear.

Lansdowne was not too optimistic. In his letter to Moltke of March 16, he commented upon the fact, that Eckardstein, who without authority, had often suggested that England and Germany egg on Japan to fight and then prevent a third party from interfering,

¹ G & T II, pp. 61.

² Eckardstein, pp. 206, Holstein to Eckardstein, Mar. 17.

³ Brandenburg, pp. 161.

had changed his tactics, and now advocated a definite alliance. He added "I doubt whether much will come of this and there are obvious difficulties in giving effect to such an arrangement, even if it were accepted in principle. It would oblige us to adopt in all foreign relations a policy which would no longer be British but Anglo-German."² He expressed doubts also about the possibility of distinguishing readily between offensive and defensive activities. All of which would indicate that his attitude was, in reality, not very different from that of his superior, Salisbury.

However on March 25, the foreign Minister took a step forward and submitted to the German Ambassador this series of questions.³

1. Will the German government, in spite of the anti-English state of public opinion, enter upon a binding defensive agreement with England?
2. If the answer is in the affirmative, would they prefer an unconditional defensive alliance⁴ or an agreement, the terms of which would become operative if one of the contracting powers were attacked by several powers?
3. Would they choose a secret agreement or one sanctioned by Parliament?
4. Would Japan, so far as concerns the East, be taken into consideration?

Salow instructed the Ambassador to reply,

1. It is most practical for England to join the Triple Alliance.

¹ Foot Note: This was Holstein's idea and Eckardstein had probably been acting on his advice.

² Norton, pg. 200, Lansdowne to Bunsen, Mar. 15/01.
G & T II, pg 80.

³ Brandenburg, pg. 153, Bunsen's letter to German Foreign Office, Mar. 23/01, also, Dugdale III, pg. 141.

2. The treaty should be operative only in case of two or more opponents.

3. The agreement must be sanctioned by Parliament.

4. Japan wants a policy of acquisitions and would see no unqualified advantage in a definite alliance but would then enter good political company.

Thus guided, Richardstein again interviewed Lansdowne, who in effect opposed both joining the Triple Alliance and the idea of Parliamentary sanction. Though both men were disappointed, however, negotiations still proceeded, and Lansdowne was busy studying previous attempts at rapprochement. When however Richardstein mentioned Holstein's wish that negotiations be transferred to Vienna, he was dryly given to understand that though British Minister was bent on clearing up matters with Germany.

When an alliance seemed to be trembling in the balance, the Kaiser, possessing as usual no sense of fitness, sent ~~over~~ ^{to London} Mr. Stobel to investigate the question of Chinese indemnity and South African claims. Richardstein in despair, offered to resign because, in the words of Lansdowne, the demands made were 'unreasonable and unrealisable.' Stobel soon grasped the situation and his report, together with Richardstein's attitude, made some impression on Berlin and these questions were not pressed. Negotiations got under way again and in April, Richardstein reported that he had mentioned the subject of an alliance to Lansdowne but that, since Salisbury was ill and the present tone of the Reichstag irritable towards England, the question would be left until after

¹ Brandenburg, pg. 188.

² Richardstein pg. 212, and Eudais II, pg. 148, German Note.

³ Richardstein pg. 212, Lansdowne quoted by Bortie.

Easter.

In the meantime, there occurred another unpleasant contretemps. It seems that Rothschild told Eckardstein, that a number of Ministers, including Balfour, believed that no dependence could be placed on Bulow or the Kaiser because they were again flirting with Russia. Eckardstein reported this to Holstein, who told the Kaiser, and His Imperial Majesty, in turn staged a heated altercation¹ with Lascelles in which he referred to persons who gave credence to such suspicions as 'unmitigated noodlers.'² The Foreign Secretary, Richthofen, thought he had struck the right note.

On April 15, Eckardstein called to see Edward VII, who had just received a letter from the Kaiser in which, he had again used the offensive epithet in reference to the British Ministers. The German Minister advised him to treat the matter as of no consequence but the King declared himself tired of such jokes. He, himself, believed that England and Germany together could police the world but that Salisbury distrusted the Kaiser and Bulow, and that the German Naval organs were not calculated to dispel distrust.³ Edward's annoyance soon passed but Eckardstein felt that, from that time on, he and his ministers were beginning to ask themselves whether Germany, under the regime it then had, was really a possible ally.

After these two untimely interruptions, negotiations proceeded quite favourably and the German Ambassador thought success was assured. Eckardstein wrote to Holstein May 23, "The alliance is moving again.....Devonshire and Chamberlain are fully determined to carry through their idea,.....Salisbury is.....quite satisfied

¹ S & T II, pg. 62, Lansdowne to Lascelles, Mar. 29/01.

² Eckardstein pg. 215, Holstein to Eckardstein, Apr. 10/01.

³ Eckardstein, pg. 217.

that the policy of splendid isolation is over and that something must be done. Lansdowne seems to manage him very cleverly", --an opinion which was, of course, unduly optimistic. Eckardstein flattered himself.

However, negotiations did proceed so far that Lansdowne actually had a Draft Convention drawn up at the Foreign Office and submitted to Salisbury, May 1900. The Prime Minister who, at heart, was still wedded to isolation, after careful perusal of the document, stated that he approved a strictly defined defensive alliance but that all contingencies must be scrutinized, and ways and means discovered for disposing of the difficulties, which a long term treaty was bound to create in Parliament. The greatest difficulty was the German demand that not only Germany, but the Triple Alliance, must be received into the compact in return for which Britain, along with her colonies, would enjoy its protection and that negotiations must be carried on in Vienna. In his opinion, the liability of having to defend the German and Austrian frontiers against Russia was heavier than to aid in the defence of the British Isles against France. Therefore, the bargain was bad for England. She had never been in danger on account of her isolation. But his greatest objection to the proposal was, that neither the English nor the German officials were competent to make the suggested promises. For example, the promise of a defensive alliance with Britain would excite bitter murmurs in every rank of German society. Again, the British government could not undertake to declare war, unless for a purpose of which the electors would approve, lest the promise be repudiated and the government turned out. No minister could forecast what attitude the public would take.

Eckardstein Pg. 219

2 G. & T. II Pg 68

Memo. by Salisbury

Newton: Pg. 200

Dugdale III Pg. 146 Editorial Note

All this Lansdowne explained to Hatsfeldt on his return from the Riviera and when Hatsfeldt reported the reference to all possible contingencies, e.g., disruption of Austria Hungary and complications concerning Morocco, Holstein "insisted upon the bond", that is, support of Austria Hungary. Hatsfeldt, at Lansdowne's request, summed up Germany's attitude as follows:

(1) Germany must identify its interests with the continuance and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and can therefore only conclude an agreement, if there is no doubt that England will consider it, a *Causa foederis* if Germany comes to the assistance of the Austrian Empire, in case it is attacked by two powers.

(2) A storm of indignation would stir the Reichstag and public opinion in Germany, if we concluded a treaty permitting England in such a case to remain a passive spectator.

(3) Nothing stands between Germany and Russia but Austrian interests. If we had been willing to abandon these, we could have brought about closest relations with Russia long ago.

Lansdowne courteously expressed thanks for this elucidation but pointed out, that he would have many difficulties, especially of a parliamentary kind, to overcome with the Prime Minister. After this, Holstein persisted in denying that there was ever any serious intention on England's part and advised Hatsfeldt to submit nothing in writing to Lansdowne.²

In fact, Salisbury, Holstein and Bulow were alike suspicious. In a private audience with Hatsfeldt, the king admitted, that while Lansdowne was

¹ Haumann Pg. 111-112

² Haumann Pg. 112.

very favorably disposed, the Prime Minister was "quite exceptionally distrustful." A marginal note by Bulow, on a memorandum by Metternich, is eloquent of the Chancellor's attitude. The document was to the effect that, should the United States swallow Canada and Russia come to a reckoning with Britain in Asia, an English treaty with the Triple Alliance, would be an obstacle to Russian plans and Russia would concentrate her hatred on Germany. To this, Bulow added, "That is the major objection to any understanding with England; the Russians would vent all their disappointment and rage on us and the English would make use of this, in spite of the treaty, to get in well with Russia and to snub us in colonial matters. The idea of an alliance could not take root in such an atmosphere.

In spite of Hatzfeldt's urgent pressure, no attempt was made to formulate in writing, the terms of an alliance and his hands were tied by stringent instructions from Berlin. Owing to the Ambassador's illness and the absence of Lansdowne, negotiations were, in June, transferred to Berlin and prospects of success began to disappear. The Rothschilds were melancholy,--A. Rothschild to Eckardstein, June 14, wrote "Your negotiations in March and April were 'Tacheles' (Yiddish for business), but what is going on now is only 'schobleshaus' (blathers). Nobody, here in England, has any more use for the fine phrases of Bulow. Frank Lascelles laughs at the clumsiness, with which Berlin is handling the business, moreover, your government no longer seems to know what it wants."

† Dugdale III Pg. 146
Hermann Pg. 112.

2 Eckardstein Pg. 221.

In June too, the Bagdad Railway question came up for discussion in Berlin. The line taken by the German Foreign Office was, in a phrase of Von Muhlberg, "with a bow to the British lion and a curtesy to the Russian bear we will work our way little by little down to the Persian Gulf."[#] Eckardstein and Holstein agreed that there was danger of having to pull British chestnuts out of the Russian fire or vice versa and that the project could only be safely carried out, in co-operation with England. The director of Deutsche Bank, Von Siemens, was sent to England to inquire about participation. He came heavily armed with documents, discussed the matter with financial magnates and was supposedly about to approach the Government when he suddenly left London. This was the result of the opposition of Marschall at Constantinople to any co-operation with England. Upon him lies the responsibility for ruining this chance of improving relations and inextricably intangling that particular problem.

Another opportunity for rapprochement came in July, when the French policy in Morocco moved the British government to seek closer relations with Germany.² The broad outline of a solution had been laid down at Chatsworth in January, and it was understood that Salisbury was willing to negotiate. Now Nicholson, from Tangier, reported danger of a French protectorate and on behalf of Lansdowne, proposed an agreement between Britain and Germany for maintenance of the 'status quo' and suggested joint Anglo-German peaceful penetration.

[#] Eckardstein Pg. 168

² Eckardstein Pg. 223

This plan was to be initiated by a Commercial treaty, defining the Concessions that each were to receive. Eckardstein reported all this in long official telegrams to Berlin, but he was not honored by a reply, -- even when he pointed out the opportunity for successful Anglo-German negotiations. At the time, he was bombarded by telegrams from Holstein expressing fear lest Japan make terms with Russia. "Once again, the morbid nightmares of Holstein lost us an opportunity for an alliance with England." [#] Eckardstein's opinion is biased but has its foundation in truth.

Meanwhile, England had definitely decided that she would ally herself with Germany, but not with the Triple Alliance. Lascelles told Eckardstein in July, that Lansdowne speaking for himself and Salisbury had said that in view of ^{the} Parliamentary attitude and public opinion in both countries, this obstacle was too formidable. This position was explained in a memorandum given by Lansdowne to the King when he went to meet the Kaiser at Hamburg in August. There occurred but a reiteration of the old conditions and Chamberlain gave up hope. Lascelles frankly stated that an alliance was impossible. "Salisbury's policy is, after all, the policy of England, and we must remind ourselves that one-sided considerations for anyone who knows no consideration are sheer waste." ²

While negotiations were hanging fire in September, a meeting between the Czar and the Kaiser at Danzig increased England's suspicion and in the late autumn there were other signs that English overtures had come to an end. The "Times" advocated an understanding with Russia, and agitated against the German navy. In October Valentine Chirol was invited to Berlin by Holstein, an old personal friend. The purpose was to win the support of the "Times" in an effort to gain an alliance on Germany's own terms and Bulow was given a chance to exercise his powers of persuasion. ³

[#] Eckardstein Pg. 223.

2. Norton Pg. 203.

3. Norton Pg. 205.

Though never anglophil, he was a plausible advocate. He rehearsed events of the past decade emphasizing Germany's lofty motives and friendly attitude, especially during the Boer war and finally suggested an alliance from the scope of which Asia should be excluded, as Germany was unwilling to compromise her own relations with Russia, --an arrangement which would have been an excellent one-sided bargain for Germany. He ended in his best theatrical manner, "Believe me, I shall never allow, as in the past I have, never allowed, the anti-British sentiments of an ignorant public to deflect me by so much as a hair's breadth from the policy of true friendliness toward England, which lies nearest my heart." #

This oration came immediately after Chamberlain's speech at Birmingham October 25th, in which he referred to the attacks of European press concerning atrocities of the British army in the Boer War and retorted by comparing the conduct of our troops, with that of the continental armies in Poland and in the War of 1870. It is significant that Bulow did not mention this to Chiról but within a few days after the flowery epilogue quoted above, Chamberlain's words were disinterred for the benefit of the press. Bulow delivered a violent harangue in the Reichstag, which produced a new outburst of Anglophobia and an arrogant echo was heard from the British press. A few days after the "granite speech", Balfour publicly stated that England refused to consider the disgusting floods of calumnies that were poured out by the Continental press, --refused with distaste and indifference. He shared the distaste but not the indifference, on the contrary he considered it a serious matter.

These recriminations revealed clearly the gulf between the two nations and may be said to have dealt a death blow to the negotiations.

Newton 206

2. Hamann Pg. 114--Chancellor in the Reichstag: "Let him alone and don't excite yourself: he is biting granite."

On December 19th, Lansdowne wrote to Lascelles informing him that "The temperature of the two countries was not in a particularly favorable state", and that "while we certainly did not regard the German proposition with an unfriendly or critical eye, he did not think that for the moment we could take it up. A suggestion that the two countries might arrive at an understanding concerning specific questions in particular parts of the world, met with no encouragement from the German ambassador who said that with his government it was a case of "the whole or none."² About the same time the Kaiser wrote to his nephew that he hoped for lasting friendship but in the last sentence of his missive, there is unconsciously, a threatening tone. "May your government never forget this and never expose me to the danger of being compelled to choose a course, which would lead you and us into misfortune."³

On February 8th, at an official dinner at Marlborough House, Chamberlain the chief exponent of the alliance, made it clear to Eckardstein that his effort was finished. Referring to Bulow's speech, he complained bitterly,—"It is not the first time that Count Bulow has thrown me over in the Reichstag,—now, I have had enough of such treatment and there can be no more question of an association between Britain and Germany."⁴ From that moment, Chamberlain was ready to adopt the alternative policy, —accession to the Dual Alliance, in consequence of the failure of Anglo-German negotiations. On the same evening Edward VII spoke with sincere regret of the turn affairs had taken and after reference to the Japanese agreement said, "Unfortunately, I cannot face the future with the same confidence concerning Anglo-German relations."⁵

¹ Newton pg. 207 and G&T pg. 60-61.

² Newton pg 207, and G & T pg. 82, Lansdowne to Lascelles Dec. 19 quoting Katsf ldt.

³ Brandenburg, pg. 173.

⁴ Eckardstein pg. 308.

⁵ Eckardstein pg. 230.

The failure of these negotiations meant a new and definite orientation of British policy. Friends were necessary and since it was impossible to co-operate with their natural allies, English statesmen must needs turn to the ancient enemy, who was likewise the enemy of Germany. In fact, Chamberlain had conversation with Cambon on the same night that he announced to Eckardstein the end of his effort toward an Anglo-German rapprochement. From this point on, all events seemingly lead to the war and each attempt toward an understanding becomes more futile than the last. Now why did these various attempts fail?

(E) Reason for Failure of Attempts.

Professor Brandenburg aptly maintains that, in 1901, the alliance was not declined by Germany. It came to naught, because Britain could not acquiesce in the two conditions laid down by Germany,--incorporation in the Triple Alliance, and Parliamentary sanction. # Regarding these two points, it was as natural for Germany to insist as for Britain to resist. Without those conditions Germany foresaw the possibility of a war on two fronts from which their ally could stand aloof. The alliance might fail where it was most needed. Britain, on the other hand, had no wish to be bound to Austria's Eastern policy and the maintenance of Turkey. Salisbury wanted vigorous Balkan States as a check upon Russia, but such ^{States} would obviously menace the Dual Monarchy. Then too, Germany would have been pledged to defend Britain's world Empire, which military authorities thought rather a large order considering Britain's small fighting force. On the other hand, English leaders thought responsibility for Germany's Eastern frontier too much to expect for all that country could ever do in defence of the Empire.

Brandenburg, pg. 173.

Regardless of these general principles, however, the dominating factor throughout all the ill-fated negotiations from 1898-1901 remained hidden in the Wilhelmstrasse, i.e., the influence of that miserably, suspicious, narrow minded and crotchety official, Geheimrat Holstein. From his brilliant but distorted mentality emanated the abysmal mistrust of Great Britain and hatred of Salisbury, the exaggerated conception of Germany's world power and the greed for immense concessions in return for services rendered or opportunity to hurt foregone. The Ex-Kaiser tells us that his importance rested upon his wide personal knowledge in the entire domain of foreign service and hence he became the guiding spirit of German foreign policy.

Holstein's efficiency is scarcely enough in itself to explain his vast influence, since his position was but a minor one. One might well ask concerning this period--where was Bulow--the brilliant foreign Secretary appointed to carry out the Kaiser's Imperial policy and the Chancellor who in 1908 pressed for an understanding with Britain? We find that in every question of foreign policy he merely seconded the advice of Holstein. History has classed him as a second rate politician because in this crisis, despite his many high qualities, he failed to support the efforts of those who struggled toward a rapprochement. A very plausible explanation of this situation has recently been revealed by Professor J. Haller of Tübingen², in the semi-official "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung." He declares that Germany's foreign policy 1899-1906 was dictated by a husband's fear of social scandal and that that husband was Bulow. In support of this conclusion Haller relates the romantic story of a little shrine displayed by Princess Bulow in which were locked love-letters from a musician, Karl Tausig. These were stolen by Holstein. Now the Princess' earlier career was evidently too varied, according to the

Memoirs of Ex-Kaiser William II, pg. 96.

2 Article in 'The Observer' called "The Blackmailing of Bulow."

etiquette of thirty years ago, to bear publicity. Hence Professor Haller insists that from the day of the theft Bulow was in Holstein's hand. These letters explain the extinction of the German Chancellor as peace-maker in the Anglo-German negotiations at the turn of the century.

Holstein, then, was the man with whom Britain had to deal. In Germany this official was popularly conceived to be the spiritual heir of Bismarck where as he had only "inherited his immoral methods."[#] Certainly he lacked Bismarck's confidence. While he would have liked an alliance with Britain as an offset to the Dual Alliance, he feared that after Germany had fought Britain's battles against Russia, i.e., had rescued Salisbury's chestnuts, the new ally, by virtue of her superiority at sea, would benefit herself in colonial matters at Germany's expense. This suspicion had no foundation in fact but was a typical creature of Holstein's jealous imagination.

Moreover, for a decade, Germany had held a favorable position between Britain and the Dual Alliance and had reaped many advantages therefrom. Holstein was unwilling to give up that source of remuneration by pledging Germany to one side without the promise of adequate recompense. He did not or would not realize that, as a matter of fact, Germany's independent position had become an illusion. In 1901 Britain's relations with France were fast improving whereas Germany had no choice of allies unless she gave up the Austrian connection and turned to Russia. Even then there was France in the back ground. The threat of a continental bloc, which Holstein held like a sword of Damocles over the heads of British statesmen, was a myth because of Alsace Lorraine. Hence that master intriguer was fatally mistaken when, though convinced

[#] Liddell Hart, pg. 22.

of the value of an alliance, he thought he could delay indefinitely, and extract high compensations and that eventually Britain would come grovelling to his feet to receive an alliance on his own terms. Acting on his 'hostage theory' his conduct was that of a peddling tradesman who as a precaution always asks a small sum in advance. Because of Britain's weakness he received his deposit in the case of the Portuguese treaty, Samoa, and the Yangtze agreement and was thus encouraged to continue putting on the screw. Even the seeming success of his policy cannot explain or pardon the man's presumption in believing Britain could not turn to France and work in harmony with her but would instead enter an alliance which ensured her dependence upon German foreign policy. "In retrospect, the most extraordinary feature is the number of kicks required to drive Britain away from Germany and into the awkward embrace of the Dual Alliance."

In the wary Salisbury Holstein finally met his equal. Isolation was the Prime Minister's policy and he held to it to the bitter end. He knew that the British people would not consent to being committed to a European conflagration before it was strictly necessary. Moreover his policy had just been proven less dangerous than Germany claimed, by the failure of the European countries to form a coalition against England during the Boer War.² Further, there was a difference of opinion within the British cabinet, Chamberlain favoring the German alliance while Salisbury would retain a free hand. The only chance of unanimity in the British Ministry was Germany's surrender of her claim for help against a double attack. This would have been risky for her but Professor Brandenburg thinks more far sighted statesmen than Holstein and Bulow might have attempted it.⁵

These leaders of Germany were unduly impressed by one of the few legacies of Bismarck i.e., the habit of over-estimating the strength of Russia as a foe and underrating that of Britain. Even without

the Kaiser's agitation for a navy to protect German commerce it should have been obvious that if, in case of war, Britain joined the enemy she could destroy their trade and seize their colonies, as actually happened at a later day. Granted that an alliance was, at the time, impossible, every effort should have been made to retain a firm friendship between the two countries by means of further separate agreements. A Morocco treaty or one concerning the Bagdad Railway, both of which were offered in the summer of 1901, might have been arrived at then as well as in 1913. As it happened Morocco became the bridge between Britain and France instead of between Britain and Germany. Utter disregard by Bulow and Holstein of Hatzfeldt's warning is responsible for that result and it led straight to Algeciras.

There is no doubt that Eckardstein, Hatzfeldt and Metternich, were sincerely anxious to promote the scheme. At times too the Kaiser desired it but his erratic personality was too easily influenced by those nearest him to have any stabilizing effect upon German policy. Moreover the violent antipathy between him and his English relatives, the Kaiser's investives against English ministers, and his characteristically bombastic harangues, though all largely discounted at the Foreign Office, proved a definite source of cleavage. It is difficult to believe that any friendly feeling prevailed among other responsible officials e.g., von Tirpitz and von Marschall. The latter was the sworn foe of England while the Military chiefs never viewed the project with any favor. Tirpitz had just passed a second navy law and his followers were discussing 'dextag.' Despite the fact that during the negotiations no specific objection was made to the

2 G & T pg 76, Memorandum by Bertie, Nov 9/01.

3 Brandenburg, pg. 179.

German navy, its rapid growth was by the end of 1901 becoming a source of anxiety to British statesmen.

There was clearly a reluctance on both sides to enter into so critical an enterprise. Salisbury was still Prime Minister of England and could not be disregarded. He would have agreed to a purely defensive and more or less indefinite arrangement but the Bureaucratic habits of German statesmen led them to exaggerate the value of the written word and to regard with suspicion anything not tied down to formulae. An entente depends upon the will to hold together and in the absence of that will ~~lay~~ the secret of the failure. In other words, the real barrier lay in the suspicion and bad feeling between the two countries. Salisbury realized that when he stated, in March, that neither he nor the German officials were competent to sign a treaty covering all contingencies. The outburst of German feeling over the Janjesson Raid had resolved into mutual dislike and eventually hatred, which was stimulated by a series of unfortunate incidents, e.g. Bundesrat affair and the Bulow-Chamberlain recriminations. The mob mind is invariably more impressed by altercations than by friendly overtures and the pugnacious instinct once aroused is difficult to allay. It was particularly manifest in Germany where, on account of exaggerated tales of British atrocities in South Africa, there was popular sympathy for the Boers and where public opinion was being moulded, by the Virpitz, press to consider Britain the mortal enemy, the latter attitude being the necessary background for the consummation of the Admiral's naval plans. Hence it seems that even an entente was impossible and as Lord Newton sagely dismisses the subject, "one-thing is certain and that is, that William II would have been almost intolerable as an ally."^{2g}

Newton, pg. 208.

Nevertheless one cannot escape the conclusion that there need not have been so decisive a breach, that 1901 need not have been a turning point in the history of the World. Co-operation in particular spheres was declined by Germany--a direct reflection upon the statesmanship of those in control of the German foreign office. In trying to escape the imaginary danger of being exploited by England they conjured up the greater peril of driving their natural allies to co-operate with their hereditary enemy.

Chapter 4.

THE GREAT ENTENTE.

(A) Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

In whatever directions Lansdowne looked at the end of 1901, he found only coolness if not hostility toward Great Britain. The German alliance which had not materialized, had been valued largely on account of the Russian danger in the far East. It was not then surprising that British statesmen should turn to Japan, who was prepared to fight for Korea and valued British friendship. Hence in January of 1902 a definite alliance with the yellow race was consummated. It was reported to the German government before any other as a mark of friendship. But the step was interpreted by Holstein as an attempt to make it appear that Germany had a part in it and thus implicate her with Russia--another figment of a morbid imagination. The Kaiser welcomed the news, being sure that Britain was now irrevocably estranged from Russia. To Lascelles on February 8, he voiced his approval thus; "The needles seem to have had a lucid interval." After the conclusion of this treaty Salisbury, on account of his age and ill health gave up the direction of English politics. He had for a generation exercised such influence on Britain's position in the world and for seven years had wielded such power that he was popularly styled "His Majesty Salisbury."

The Japanese treaty was a more definite step than any which Britain foreign policy had taken in many years. It was a check upon Russia and the logical sequence would have been a like arrangement with Germany against France but that possibility had been removed.

† Newton, PG. 247, Lascelles to Lansdowne, Feb. 8/02.

Hence the only alternative was a gradual and business like clearing up of all sources of friction with the latter country.

Chamberlain made this clear to Eckardstein as early as September, 1902 when the latter visited him at Highbury. The colonial minister, in a bad temper toward Germany and Bulow especially, said he had learned by bitter experience that it was a 'bad job' to try to do business with Germany. They (the German officials) did not know what they wanted and they could not be trusted. So long as Bulow was in power he would not move another finger for an understanding with Germany. Asked whether he really meant to join with France and Russia he said nothing was settled but anything might happen at any time.

(B) Anglo-French Colonial Agreement.

Edward VII visited Paris 1903 and was well received. Eckardstein went, at the same time, to Berlin to warn his government that negotiations were in process. He declared that French high finance required a partner to aid in loans to Russia a point of view which collided with the theory commonly held at Berlin that an Anglo-French rapprochement would be a wedge between Russia and France. Holstein said the idea was 'naive,' Eckardstein's memorandum was pigeon-holed and the Wilhelmstrasse slept. Despite the fact that Berlin had just rebuffed Russia with regard to the Triple Alliance in the East aimed against England--Osten Sacken having assured them that Russia had control of French foreign policy no matter what 'scurvey politician' was in power, Bulow declared that they couldn't be too phlegmatic regarding the Anglo-French negotiations. He was complacently waiting for a Franco-Russian quarrel over Britian, when the time, would be ripe for a return to the Three Emperor's League.

1 Eckardstein, pg. 233.

2 Eckardstein, pg. 247.

3 Hamann pg. 141.

In September it was known to Bulow through the Queen of Spain that a treaty of demarcation, concerning Morocco had been prepared, nothing being said of Germany's share, and in November Lansdowne, remarked to Metternich that France, as a ^{close} neighbor ^{of Morocco}, could not be prevented from acquiring a preponderating influence there. On April 18, a treaty was signed, which meant a complete clearing up of colonial spheres of influence and from which co-operation in a world crisis would naturally develop. Britain acquire greater freedom of movement; the need of German support in Egypt had slipped from her neck. This disappointed Bulow, as Germany had profited by Anglo-French dissension. He resented the failure of the two powers to consult himself with regard to Morocco but bided his time and consoled himself with the thought that Britain and France would find themselves in opposing camps at the negotiations ending the Russo-Japanese war.

With the coming of this entente, Germany's position, held since 1895, as arbiter between the two groups, passed for all time. It might still have been feasible, had other nations trusted her not to exploit it for her own advantage but her habit of demanding compensation for every courtesy made them suspect her of dangerous schemes. They wearied of her pettiness and unreliability and now began a process of grouping themselves in self defence.

In England there was no wish that the colonial agreement with France should appear as evidence of unfriendliness toward Germany. On the contrary, during a discussion of the treaty in parliament, several members of the opposition, including Grey, recommended, with complete concurrence from Lansdowne, that "this treaty should be used as a practical model in other cases of disputes between rival nations" and Balfour expressly controverted the idea

that the Anglo-French Entente was incompatible with an amicable Anglo-German agreement.¹ Shortly afterward Edward VII and the Kaiser had a most harmonious interview at Kiel where, even Hammann admits, there was no inkling of Britain's so called policy of Encirclement. "But," continues that astute historian, "Neither courtesies exchanged nor smooth and alluring Parliamentary speeches could gloss over the fact that, as far as Germany was concerned, only disadvantageous results could be expected from the Entente Cordiale. It reduced the value of the old Anglo-Germany friendship, weakened the Triple Alliance, (despite its recent air-tight renewal) and strengthened French hopes of abrogating the treaty of Frankfurt."²

(C) Theory of Encirclement.

The attitude expressed by Hammann was exaggerated by Anglo-phobes, who conjured up the idea that Britain, the mortal enemy, inspired by jealousy of Germany's growing power, was leading a movement to hem in Germany and prevent her further development. This conviction dominated German foreign policy throughout the rest of the pre-war period and gave birth to a fierce determination to retrieve Germany's glorious position of the nineties, by means of smashing the obnoxious entente. The vulnerable point in this policy was the total lack of agreement between leaders as to the means to that end. The Naval school under Tirpitz would so strengthen Germany as to attract all smaller nations to the shelter of the eagle's wing. The civilians of the foreign office attempted by various tactics to cause disagreement between the allies and both angled for a one sided agreement with Britain, designed to reserve Germany's freedom of action, while insuring British neutrality. Every move was met with friendly reserve and continuous efforts to reach some agreement which promised peace in Europe. Repeated

¹ Hammann, pg. 145. ² Hammann, pg. 146.

failures merely strengthened and enlarged the entente.

(D) Attempted Continental Bloc Against Britain.

Events within the next two years proved an acid test of the newly formed friendship. During the Russo-Japanese war, Japan protested against Germany coaling Russian vessels in the theatre of war and Lansdowne suggested that Japan might well ask whether her treaty with England were not operative if Germany was thus allowed to violate her neutrality. Germany was forced to refuse the coal to Russia and feeling was inflamed on both sides. In October, owing doubtless to a certain nervous tension, the Russian fleet fired on British fishing boats on the Dogger banks. It was suspected that German propaganda was in some way responsible and that she had hoped to cause conflict between England and Russia a suspicion which embittered feeling against Germany. Holstein used the event to further the cause of a continental League aimed at Britain. He proposed that Germany and Russia conclude a defensive alliance and then communicate it to France, asking her if she would fulfil her treaty obligations if Britain joined Japan. It was assumed that even Delcasse would see that the English fleet could not defend Paris and that he would choose Russia and Germany against England and Japan. The Tsar thought this a splendid idea for curbing John Bull's insolence and asked for a preliminary draft. However the negotiations fell through because the Tsar wanted to communicate² the plan to France before concluding the treaty. Unity with Russia was not gained and since rumours reached London through Spring Rice at Petersburg relations with England became more strained.

After the destruction of the Russian fleet, Berlin became

Dagdale III, pg. 185.

2 Dagdale III, pg. 187, German Note.

anxious lest England and France take a hand in the peace negotiations and pave the way for a Quadruple alliance. There upon the Kaiser met privately with the Tsar at Bjorko, where he intimated that France and England might have a secret agreement with regard to the Far East and suggested again the treaty, which had failed to materialise in the previous fall. The Tsar, feeling himself deserted, agreed to everything. Balow was pleased at the idea but objected to its limitation to Europe, since Russia could only aid Germany in India. Witte was in favour, but overtures to France proved difficult and when Russia proposed that the treaty be non-operative in case of a Franco-Germany war, it became waste-paper. Germany's idea had been to win France through Russia or detach the two but they had underestimated the strength of relations between Petersburg and Paris. The result was cooling of friends ip with Russia and an increase of enmity with England. Germany was indeed isolated.

Relations between King Edward VII and the Kaiser were particularly strained in the years following the latter's correct but chilly reception in London 1902. The Kaiser made serious grievances out of insignificant incidents, e.g., a report of "unseemly romping in unlighted corridors" while the German Prince was visiting the English court." On the other hand Lansdowne admits that "The King talks about his royal brother in terms which make one's flesh creep." Edward's share as a cause of irritation was social and personal rather than political. A little more tolerance toward his nephew's gaucherie might have helped to ward smoother relations. These personal antipathies and pinpricks, of little account on the British side where the king was a constitutional ruler and also had a sense of humour, had a deeper reaction on the German side of the North sea where the ruler could influence policy decisively and had no sense of humour. Still there were continuous efforts to

bring about these personal meetings which were seldom satisfactory.

On December 23, 1904, Lascelles reported to Lansdowne a conversation with Metternich, who said he found the Kaiser very bitter against us and convinced that England was seeking an opportunity to attack Germany, which Metternich had denied. Spring Rice also had said to Lascelles that Witte had expressed his astonishment at the Kaiser's hatred of England.² Lansdowne replied that no sane individual thought of fastening a quarrel on Germany but "Are they perchance meditating one (a coup) against us and are they seeking to justify it in advance? All this talk about one driving them to lean toward Russia looks a little like it."³ Lansdowne probably had in mind the attempt at a continental alliance and the incident indicates the alertness, with which statesmen were attempting to follow the foreign policy of Germany.

(E) Morocco Affair, 1905-6.

The isolation of that nation was again emphasized by the Morocco affair, which Bulow instigated supposedly for the purpose of upholding German prestige on the scene of the recent Anglo-French agreement. The Kaiser's theatrical journey to Tangier caused a sensation throughout the world. He himself felt a certain repugnance, saying it was "too serious a matter to interpose the person of the Emperor for a

Hart pg. 28, also, Newton pg. 330. Lord Newton tells the following story;--After a court reception at Berlin the guests were conveyed to their houses in closed, unlighted coaches. In a certain coach rode one Englishman among several German officers. The last officer to enter failed to notice the Englishman and remarked, "Gott sei dank! die verdammten Engländer sind alle weg!" The incident was duly reported and when King Edward VII was asked whether he wished any official notice taken of it, he replied, "Certainly not! It is exactly what you would have said, had I been entertaining a party of Germans at Windsor."

2 Newton, pg. 331.

3 Newton, pg. 332.

mere demonstration which, after all, was not without danger particularly since it was at the same time directed against England." The real purpose of the expedition was veiled from the public, Buloz's instructions to all officials being to "emulate the sphinx who, surrounded by inquisitive tourists, gives nothing away." Warnings were heard that in England the visit was not regarded as a measure for protecting Germany's interests but as a demonstration against the Anglo-French Entente and on April 5, 1905 Lansdowne explained to the German Ambassador that England would go even farther than her treaty obligations to support France in conflicts arising from Morocco. April 9, 1905 he wrote to Lascelles—"We can hardly regard this Tangier exhibition as an isolated incident—no doubt the Kaiser was much annoyed by an Anglo-French agreement—we shall find that the Kaiser avails himself of every effort to put spokes in our wheels and convince those who are watching the game that he intends to take an important part in it." The British attitude was justified by a violent campaign in the German press against the Entente.

The challenge to France, England and Spain was followed by a demand that a conference be held to settle the Morocco question in general, and the French government became so alarmed as to dismiss Delcasse, who opposed the conference. Lansdowne wrote to Bertie June 12, 1905 "Of course the result is, that the entente is quoted at a much lower price than it was a fortnight ago." Tentative plans were thereupon made to concert measures with France, in case of German aggression and periodic discussions between the general staffs were begun.

Before the conference took place there was a change of ministry in Britain and the Liberals under Campbell-Barnerman,

† Hasemann, pg. 160.

2 Brandenburg, pg. 222, Buloz to the Foreign Office March 24, *Grosse Politik*, XL, pg. 271.

3 Newton, pg. 534, Lansdowne to Lascelles, Apr. 9/05.

with Grey at the Foreign Office, Haldane as Minister for war and Lloyd George as Chancellor of the Exchequer, continued the policy of Lansdowne and Balfour. In January, Grey wrote to Bertie, telling him that Cambon had asked whether France would be able to count upon the assistance of England, in the event of an attack by Germany and he had replied that, if war were forced on France by Germany to break up the Entente, public opinion would be on the French side. Cambon had said the question was grave and serious because the German Emperor had given the French government to understand that they could not rely upon England and it was important to France to feel that they could.

January 3, Grey assured Metternich that if all went well at the conference, the Entente would not be used afterward to prejudice the interests or policy of Germany, that he wished to see France on good terms with Germany and so would not 'egg on' her representatives at the conference any further than they themselves wished to go.² This was in reply to the charge that the British government was more French than the French, which he denied, declaring that British diplomacy was quite open and frank. Grey's object in these interviews was to make Germany understand that the situation was serious and let France feel that England was sympathetic without raising her expectations too high.

Bertie reported to Grey that unfortunately many Frenchmen of education and position and also of political circles, credited rumours spread by German agents to the effect that Britain was about to come to some arrangement with Germany behind their backs.³ Hidden forces were working upon the hereditary distrust of the French race for the British, to create discord between the two. British apprehension concerning the result of Algeiras, was

² Grey I, pg. 72, Lugdale III, pg. 234, et seq, Metternich to Bulow, Jan. 3/06.

² Grey I, pg. 60, Lugdale III, pg. 234, et seq, Metternich to Bulow, Jan. 3/06.

³ Grey, I, pg. 107.

aptly expressed in a letter of Lord Ripon to Fitzmaurice: "That a European war should come out of the matter seems almost impossible but when one has to deal with a potentate like the German Emperor, one can feel no real security. One of his principle objects, I imagine, is to break down the Entente Cordiale and separate us from France and I have some fear that he may succeed in doing so."

However at the conference, Germany except for her second, Austria, was almost completely isolated. England stood manfully by the side of France. In spite of Björke, Russia supported France wherever possible and "on the soil of Algiers, Russia took the first discernible step toward attaching herself to England."² The only course left for Germany was to get herself, as gracefully as possible, out of that blind alley. Bulow had swept Delcasse out of office but only caused France to draw the cloak of the entente more closely about her. Moreover, before the tortuous negotiations were finished, he found it necessary to part with the services of that misanthrope, Holstein,³ lest his devious methods result in worse humiliation. Peace was maintained but so far as Germany was concerned the main object of the fuss had hopelessly failed.

In the summer of 1906 the sun of German cordiality shone on London. Press men and burgomasters came and were well received.

1 Grey I, pg. 99, Life of Ripon, pg. 232-3, also, Dugdale III, pg. 237, German Note.

2 Hansmann, pg. 169, German Note. Sir D. McKenzie Wallace who represented the Times at Algiers was, before his departure received by the King who urged him "to use every effort to bridge over the differences between Germany and France."

3 Holstein twisted the Emperor's orders and Bulow's arrangements in such a manner as to make it appear that Germany desired war with France. At the time of his removal the Chancellor suffered a breakdown from overwork. Of minute by the Emperor to a decision, of

Apr. 17/07, by Stumm in London, Dugdale III, pg. 249.

In July, of a sudden the French minister reported to Grey that Radolin had interviewed President Bourgeois and told him that an Entente was proceeding between Germany and Britain. The latter had been surprised at the formality and the fact that the news came on the instruction of the German government. Grey too, was surprised and replied that there was nothing in the nature of an entente between the two and nothing of which one could be made--^{though the tone of the Anglo-German} ~~even the~~ press had improved of late. The effect of such a communication was again, evidently in accordance with German wishes, to create suspicion of Britain in France and Haider's visit to Germany in this year had to be carefully explained.

(F) Anglo-Russian Entente, 1907.

When the Liberals came into power in England, Grey had specified as parts of his policy, friendship with United States, the alliance with Japan and the agreement with France. He added that Russia's position should be re-established in the councils of Europe. Regarding Germany, he said, "It must be, in my opinion, a condition of any improvement in the public relations between Germany and ourselves that the relations of Germany with France should be fair and good also."² When it became known, in the fall of 1906, that an Anglo-Russian agreement with regard to Persia was reaching consummation, Bismarck made a speech in the Reichstag which gave warning of the danger of world war: "Unless the world powers were friendly toward Germany the Entente cordial would endanger the peace of Europe. A policy which aimed at encircling Germany, at creating a circle of powers around Germany in order to isolate and cripple her, would be

¹ Grey I, pg. 110.

² Gilbert Murray, pg. 116.

a policy hazardous for the peace of Europe. It is not possible to form such a ring without the use of certain pressure and finally explosions can result from pressure and counter pressure." German historians shudder to think how Germany could but watch passively while the ring was closing around her. In August, 1907, Britain was relieved of her worries in the middle east by the Russian agreement. The system was now complete. The Dual Alliance together with the Anglo-Japanese group constituted what was known as the Big Entente. Its secret bond was said to be hatred of Germany but, so far as Great Britain was concerned, her connections were purely business arrangements for the preservation of peace and her own world status and had no aggressive character.

(6) Daily Telegraph.

In November 1907, the Kaiser, accompanied by von Binow, Von Schoen and others made a visit to Windsor as a matter of courtesy, hoping that such a move would be conducive to the improvement of relations with England. The visit was successful beyond all expectations and at the Mansion House Banquet the Kaiser assured the guests that "blood is thicker than water." The friction with regard to the Bagdad Railway came up for discussion between the ministers and negotiations were even started for a settlement, the Kaiser having promised to Haldane the required 'gate' to the Persian Gulf. Later, difficulties were raised from Berlin because Grey insisted upon consulting France and Russia, and Germany would not thus recognize the new combination. The discussion, though it did help to promote frankness between the two foreign offices, revealed again Germany's dislike of the Entente.

Any improvement in relations due to the tranquilizing discussion above mentioned, was soon cancelled by what is known as the Daily Telegraph affair.

† Hamann, pg. 175.

2 Hamann, pg. 217, also, Bagdale III, pg. 312.

While the Kaiser rested at High Cliff on the Isle of Wight, an ambitious paperman, Harold Spencer, was inspired to publish some observations by the Kaiser to Englishmen and wrote an article on the conversation between the Kaiser and Col. Stuart Wortley. The manuscript was forwarded to the chancellor at Reminton, who returned it to the foreign office. There it was checked for facts, not for suitability and did not even come into the hands of Von Schaan, the Foreign Minister. It was published in the Daily Telegraph, October 28, and at once created a tempest. The unfortunate impression was due to the Kaiser's patronizing claim to gratitude for having refused to see the Boer envoys, for refusing to intervene in the war even for having worked out a plan of campaign for England much like that used. His statements, boastful and lapolitic, caused all the annoyance and resentment accumulated in two decades on account of his autocratic behavior, to be let loose. His own ministers were in despair and a socialist member of the Reichstag spoke the unvarnished truth when he said, "No matter how much the Kaiser promises to exercise self restraint he cannot make himself different from what he is." The affair was a shocking reflection upon the efficiency of the German Foreign Office. Also, it caused an estrangement between the Kaiser and Bulow which led to the latter's dismissal within a year and perceptibly widened the gulf between the two countries.

The North Sea Agreement of 1908 concerning the 'Status Quo' was
5
according to Von Schoen, the outcome of a wish to give England proof
of Germany's pacific intentions and therefore promote European peace.
England however took the same attitude as with regard to ^{the} Bagdad
question and proposed to include all the North Sea states. It was ob-
vious that, were France not included, she would be dissatisfied and
Germany fell in with the British suggestion, ^{On} December 13, 1907, Grey
had written to Kipon, "I am not sure that Germany has any motive except

to show that she is not isolated. She may have intended to separate us and France but that is over, for she has put the North sea proposal before France and told her that she has done so because we said France must be a party....if Germany is set upon appearing before the world arm in arm with us and France, it will not do to affront her by refusing before it is clear that there is anything that is objectionable in the proposal." The above shows again that Grey would make agreements with Germany, only when they were not incompatible with Britain's friendship for France and that he was thoroughly imbued with suspicion when Germany made any overture.

(H) Crisis of 1908.

The year 1908 saw the second great European crisis of this century--caused by Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Britain was not directly implicated but because of her attitude toward Turkey could not be disinterested. Her agreement with Russia had given that country leisure to turn her attention to the Balkans and this together with the fact, that ^{the} British philanthropic attitude toward christians in Turkey was never appreciated, led to the charge that Grey was deliberately fomenting a world-war beginning in the Balkans. He, himself replied to that suspicion, "I can only qualify as utterly absurd, the Austrian suspicion that His Majesty's Government are desirous of bringing about European war." Austria's action had been taken without the consent of the other signatories of the Treaty of Berlin 1870 and hence struck at the root of international order. So, according to Grey, "We therefore took a very firm stand on principle and said that, though our interests were not involved, we would not

2 Brandenburg, pg. 348, also Dugdale III, pg. 315.

3 Von Schoen, pg. 64.

4 Von Schoen, pg. 64, also, Grey I, pg. 144.

recognize Austria's action and the change she ^{had} made, until all other powers, who were parties to the treaty, were ready to do so."

Russia objected and Serbia was hysterical while France, newly escaped from the Morocco trouble, wished to avoid any complication. Clemenceau was more angry with Izvolsky for not reporting to him the Buchlau conversation than with Austria for her breach of treaty. French public opinion remained indifferent. Germany on the other hand was prepared to support her ally "in shining armour" if necessary. Izvolsky in London, pleaded for the opening of the straits as compensation, which Grey refused though he was willing to support the Russian request for a conference. Izvolsky was eventually faced with the alternative of supporting Serbia to the point of war or of recognizing the annexation. Not being prepared to accept the challenge, Russia was compelled to forsake Serbia and consent to the abrogation of Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin. It was a humiliation not to be endured again. For the Central Powers the crisis was a source of gratification in that it had revealed the strength of their own alliance, while the Triple Entente had not held together under the shock of a European problem.

(I) Agadir.

The third great crisis in the life time of the Entente occurred in 1911, when Germany suddenly sent a gun boat, the Panther, to a closed port, Agadir, as a protest against French occupation of Fez. Since Germany had no commercial interest in that particular vicinity,

§ Grey I, pg. 189.

2 Foot Note: Dugdale III, pg. 299, Bulow to Asseurthal, Oct. 30/08

"I have complete confidence in your judgment: in this special case I will add that you are in a better position to judge the Servian situation and the circumstances depending on it than we can at this distance. I shall therefore regard the decision at which you finally arrive as being that best suited to the circumstances." This is symbolical of the lead henceforth assumed by Austria in the Foreign Policy of the Triple Alliance.

the gesture had an unnecessarily threatening tone. The fact that France had altered the 'status quo' was evident and negotiations were accepted on that basis. Grey indicated to Metternich, that in case of trouble, Britain would support France and hoped that Germany's demand for compensation would not be such as it was impossible for any government to concede. France was urged to withdraw from Fez.

Kiderlin-Wächter was responsible for the move and seems to have troubled little about the effects of his methods on the outside world. He thought it was necessary to seek a solution with France without outside influence and that nothing could be gained in Paris unless the French felt that the failure of negotiations meant war. Hence discussions were long and protracted and London became suspicious regarding Germany's intentions. On July 4, Grey had informed Metternich that the attitude of His Majesty's Government could not be disinterested, that England could not recognize any rearrangement that was come to without her and that Germany's action in sending a ship to a closed port was sure to excite the press everywhere. This communication remained unanswered and since no news was forthcoming, Grey voiced the suspicion to Metternich that Germany might occupy Agadir as a naval port. He gave the impression that England did not object to Germany's expansion elsewhere but would object to her establishing herself in South Morocco. On the same day, July 21, Lloyd George made a speech at the Mansion House, in which he declared that Britain could not under any circumstances be treated in matters which concerned her vital interests, as if she were no longer to be reckoned within the council of the nations. In such a contingency peace at any price would be an intolerable humiliation for any great

† Grey I, pg. 214, Sir E. Grey to Count de Salis, July 4.

country.

The effect of the speech was instantaneous. France could now depend on British support and immediately the Kaiser informed Metternich that Germany would not continue to hold Agadir. Grey was relieved though not allowed to reassure Parliament, as the information was confidential. The German government was unwilling that the communication should appear to be the result of the speech. The interview between Grey and Metternich was stormy--the German Ambassador objecting that England should have expressed her wishes through diplomatic channels instead of resorting to threats. Grey replied that there was no threat since the speech dealt only in general terms, without even recognising that there was a crisis. The German government thought it not consistent with their dignity to explain what was going on at Agadir and Grey thought that the tone of their communications made it inconsistent with England's dignity to explain the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer--except that it was not intended to embroil Germany's negotiations with France.² The discussion was kept within the bounds of diplomatic etiquette and Metternich reported that England did not desire a hostile clash but only peace between France and Germany and that her attitude was due to anxiety concerning the Entente and fear of peril to her interests. There followed haggling between Berlin and Paris and only in September, did they arrive at a delimitation of territory. Germany's method, that of negotiation with a pistol in each hand, left once again the impression that teutonic arrogance was becoming a world peril. England was provoked to greater hostility because Morocco was the only place concerning which she was bound by treaty to support France.³

With regard to the purpose of the Agadir drama, Goshen to Grey,

Brandenburg, I, pg. 379, Metternich July 21.

2 Grey I, pg. 220-222, Grey to Ed. Goshen, July 25/11. (Over)

July 28, reported, "I am bound to say that even Herr Zimmerman smiled when I mentioned the Hamburg Merchants!"[#] He knew that there was something behind any explanation given of the whole affair. It was obviously another attempt to break the Entente. The Bosnian episode had revealed the looseness of that structure and encouraged the idea that another crisis against France would not be a hopeless project. The result was a fiasco for Germany because she struck at the vital interest of Britain as well as of France. The Entente emerged stronger for the test.

In these various remote ways did Germany try to relieve her own isolation, by sowing dissension between members of the Entente with the aim of breaking it up. It has been seen that all such attempts failed and not because of any natural love between members of the Entente but by virtue of concerted fear. The real reason for that fear and suspicion lay, not in these isolated events, but in the work of Admiral von Tirpitz, (the building of the German Navy,) which, from the beginning of the century, flourished in the sunshine of the Kaiser's smile.

[§] Brandenburg pg. 384.

[#] Grey I, pg. 228.

Chapter V.

NAVAL RIVALRY.(A) British Anxiety Regarding German Naval Development.
1900-1906.

The origin of the German Navy, as a pet scheme of the Kaiser's in support of his world policy and as the fixed ambition of the fanatical Von Tirpitz, has been discussed. In the nineties, British statesmen regarded its growth with good natured tolerance and condensation, aptly expressed by the Prince of Wales when he said of the Kaiser, "Let him play with his fleet!"[†] It was natural that Germany should build cruisers to protect her overseas possessions and even after the Naval bill of 1898, which sanctioned the construction of seventeen battleships, eight ironclads, nine large and twenty-six small cruisers, England remained phlegmatic. The law of 1900, however, doubled the numbers. It provided, in fact a fleet of war ships and allowed for expansion. At the same time, the noisy agitation of the Navy league, which knew not the meaning of restraint, focussed the attention of the world upon this new development and uttered the watchword, "to down England." Already this navy commanded respect and the genius of von Tirpitz, from that time, became continuously more obnoxious to the Island Empire.

Lascelles had not thought that the German Navy was directed against England but he adds a post script to a letter to Lansdowne, April 26, 1902,[‡] which reveals a change in his attitude. "I have had a talk with Captain Swart, who has pointed out to me that the development of the German navy, was directed against England." This was stated over and over again during the debates in the Reichstag

[†] Harman pg. 168.

[‡] Newton, pg. 248.

and the preamble of the Navy Bill states, that its object is to create a navy, which will be equal to that of the greatest sea power." This opinion was shared by every suspicious naval attaché at the Berlin embassy. Also Chamberlain had the German fleet in mind when in September 1901, he remarked bitterly to Eckardstein, that he had given up his plans for an alliance, as Germany seemed convinced that she would succeed in ruining the British colonial Empire and in taking possession. He added that no ministry could disregard the hatred of Germany in England and that England would always find allies.

When the Kaiser was in London, November 1902, he spoke to Balfour of Germany's need for a navy to strengthen the feeling of unity in the morals of the Empire, but ^{said that} it was not intended for attacking others. "A couple of palm trees, more or less, in the tropics is a matter of indifference to us," and he assured England that, given the right spirit, all colonial difficulties could be settled. But at that time feeling ran high with regard to the evacuation of Shanghai and the closing of the Straits to war-ships and the Kaiser's visit merely caused further annoyance without allaying suspicion regarding the fleet.

During the Russo-Japanese war occurred the so-called "Navy Scare," which attracted attention to the respective navies. When rumors reached England of the negotiations between the Tsar and Kaiser, there was an outbreak of hostility towards Germany, a large element of which was caused by ~~the~~ fear of a naval raid on England. Jacky Fair gave an alarm and the Army and Navy Gazette

Dugdale III, pg. 333, Flight to Bulow, Jan. 4/03.

2 Brandenburg, pg. 181, Eckardstein Sept. 14 & 17/1902.

Grosse Politik, XVII, pg. 331.

3 Brandenburg, pg. 181.

took up the cry. Lee, Civil Lord of the Admiralty in 1903, sounded a loud reveille against the German danger and Lord Fisher demanded an immediate annihilation of the German navy as a preventative measure. This naval spectre exercised little influence on the Foreign Office and Edward expressed his great indignation at the 'idle talk of silly newspapers', that England wanted to wage an offensive war against Germany. According to Metternich's report of January 11, Lansdowne explained that Vanity Fair was a gossip paper, which no one took seriously and that the Army and Navy Gazette was not the official mouthpiece of the Admiralty. Metternich, himself, assured his government that no rational being in England was thinking of a war against Germany.

As a result of increased anxiety with regard to the Anglo-German relations in general and the fact that when the King attended a review of the German fleet at Kiel, it impressed him as being dangerous, England, in 1906, augmented her fleet in home waters. The naval base at Scapa was strengthened, while Salisford declared that the fighting force available for the first twenty four hours of conflict had been trebled. Thereupon, Bulow formulated the policy "To get through the next ten years with patience and give no reasonable ground for suspicion-- meanwhile strengthen the fleet!"

Britain now came to realize, that her difficulties with Germany, were not due to any particular colonial disputes.

¹ Hammer, pg. 161.

² The new British naval developments had arisen mainly from the wish to be independent of Germany under all circumstances. England had weakened herself in the Mediterranean and had sunk to the rank of a 2nd class maritime power there, so to speak, simply in order to insure her home against all eventualities. This object was now assured by the great increase of forces which England had transferred to her home ports.

Statement of Spring-Rice reported by Metternich to Bulow, Dec. 25/04.

Dugdale III, pg. 208.

These had mostly been settled by concessions in the nineties. There was, as Gray said later, little if anything, upon which any agreement could be based. Yet Britain could not let the German Navy grow until the small nations thought here the safe side. The introduction of the Dreadnought to secure Naval supremacy, since it was immediately copied by Germany, merely accentuated the rivalry. British statesmen were disturbed by the prospect of Tirpitz' Supplementary Naval Law for 1906, which the Kaiser deemed necessary to secure the respect of England. Their plans for naval construction until 1917 were, by this bill, augmented, over and above six large cruisers laid down in 1906, by provision for an increase in size and arms in all new classes of ships. This meant that Germany must also build Dreadnoughts. The necessary money was voted and provision made for enlarging the Kiel Canal. The completion of this program, would involve not only greater risk for any assailant but for England in addition, because of her too power standard, a much heavier financial burden (which increased popular ill-will toward Germany), to say nothing of the possibility of losing her superiority at sea. Hence the importance of inducing the Kaiser to reduce his program.

(B) Liberal Policy.

The Campbell-Bannerman Ministry showed a conciliatory spirit and ^{was} resolved to convince the central powers that it was in the best interests of all to reach a business agreement, e.g., that of Britain with France, for the cessation of reasons for piling up arms. They caused a reduction of the British naval program for 1907, opened confidential conversations with Berlin with regard to

cordial relations and Salisane was sent over to press further the effect of our example. No better representative could have been chosen since he was respected in England and persons great in Berlin. But though his reception was friendly his purpose was baffled. He was told that Germany could not discuss the reduction of armaments. It seemed evident that British friendship would be sacrificed for the sake of sea power as a means to world power.

The same problem was discussed when Edward and Barington met the Kaiser at Berlin in 1906 and then the Kaiser said decisively that he must follow the program and doubted if England could keep up the two power standard. Other nations might feel the burden of arms too much for them but Germany did not and meant to have both her army and navy as large as she thought fit.

Campbell-Bannerman still persevered, in the hope that the peace-feeling in Europe would be strong enough to influence Germany. On March 2, 1907, he wrote an article in "the Nation" urging the cause of disarmament and expressing his willingness to make further reductions in the British fleet if other powers would co-operate. Tirpitz then sought to convince the British naval attaché of Germany's peaceful intentions by pointing out that at the time of the 1906 Naval Law, he had not asked for twice as many ships—an argument which made little impression. England proposed a discussion between Tirpitz and Fisher but, though Fisher was in favour of the idea, it did not materialize and no further step was taken until the Hague Conference.

The Peace Conference, scheduled for this year (1907), was to be chiefly devoted to reform of the rules of Naval

§ Gilbert Murray, pp. 111.

§ Brandenburg, pp. 270, Murray 111.

§ Brandenburg, pp. 275, Tirpitz Note Jan. 9, 1907.

warfare. Britain and America demanded that the question of universal disarmament be discussed. The former doubtless had in mind the great expense of naval rivalry while the Germans objected lest any check should be placed on the development of their navy. Campbell-Bannerman made his proposals of the 'Nation' article officially to the seven powers¹ and Metternich advised his government, for the sake of appearance, not to shun the question. Bismarck, however, preferred to play the 'honest man'. In a debate in the Reichstag April 3, 1897, he assailed Campbell-Bannerman's proposals by declaring in favor of each country deciding such questions² for itself³ and added a comment upon the strain caused by Edward's policy of encirclement. Though Isvolsky favored discussion for the sake of giving the subject "a first class funeral,"⁴ Russia and Austria sympathized with the attitude of Germany and hence Bismarck, in the words of Reventlow,⁵ "fortunately succeeded in foiling any discussion." At the same time he acquired for Germany the odium of rejecting a move toward peace for which the world was longing. That statesman's bluntness did "more honour to honesty than political judgment⁶ and aroused a distrust which could not be dispelled by our later attempts, however honest, to reach a naval understanding with England."⁷ Hence forward attempts to reduce German armaments could only be direct.

On the occasion of the Kaiser's highly successful sojourn in England in 1907, the armament question was not discussed

¹ Murray, pp. 3, Mar. 2/97.

² Murray, III, Bismarck: "The German government refused to participate in any such discussion."

³ Brandenburg, pp. 276.

⁴ Murray pp. 116, Reventlow, pp. 250-2, quoted by Murray.

⁵ Von Schoen, pp. 235.

officially by the Emperor, but he had conversations with several British experts. The visit might have had very beneficial effects but for the fact that the day after His Imperial Majesty left Windsor, November 19, the German Government announced their intention of replacing battleships after a life of twenty years instead of twenty-five years. After the cordial reception of the royal couple in England the news came as a cold douche to any further confidence in German intentions and naval rivalry promptly became far more acute.

When early in 1903, the British conservatives were crying for a naval increase the Emperor wrote privately to Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord of the Admiralty, to emphasize his peaceful intentions. Germany, he said, must be allowed to protect her trade against England and would not build more than she required. It was ridiculous that England should have any fear of Germany. He admired the British fleet and wished to have it always on his side, etc. The British Minister replied courteously and inclosed England's estimates for 1903-05 which had not yet been submitted to Parliament. Rumors reached the public and the Kaiser was suspected of trying to influence Tweedmouth. Edward VII expressed shocked surprise that a foreign Sovereign should correspond with his Minister and added that the Kaiser's explanation did not alter the fact that Germany was constantly augmenting her fleet and England had to follow. Thus, as usual, the Kaiser's impulsive action only enhanced the strain between the two nations. In March, Asquith questioned the sufficiency of England's preparations, while in July, Lloyd George declared that the Government was not altogether guiltless in the armament race and that her measures

† Dugdale III, pp. 268.

‡ Dugdale III, pp. 273, also, Brandenburg, pp. 273, Kaiser's letter to Tweedmouth, Feb. 16/03, and latter's reply, Feb. 22, now published in Virgile, Politische Dokumente, pp. 58-61.

had aroused fears of attack in Germany. Metternich was sensitive to British anxiety but the Kaiser expressed the opinion that England, having got herself into a plight by her dreadnought policy, was now developing nerves. She would have to accustom herself to the German Navy.[#]

In June of this summer (1906) Edward VII and his favorite travelling companion, Sir Charles Hardinge, made another excursion abroad. At Reval, they met the Tsar for the purpose of furthering friendly relations with his country. Sir Charles stated that the interview need not cause other states any anxiety, adding, "As for Germany, the English government sincerely desires to maintain the very best of relations with that country and does not believe that these relations will become more acute from any cause in the immediate future." "Nevertheless," said Sir Charles, "no discerning person can shut his eyes to the fact that a very disquieting and tense situation can arise, in seven or eight years, if Germany continues her naval preparations at the same accelerated pace".....a situation "in which Russia if strong in Europe might be the arbiter of peace." He also intimated that he expressed not his own personal opinion² but a definite political conviction of the English cabinet. German historians now point to the above speech as an invitation to Russia to increase her armaments rapidly and they note, too, that Hardinge's prophecy was wrong only by a year. They conclude that then Russia, with England's assistance, played the aggressor. Attention is also drawn to the fact that in Hardinge's report to Grey, the phrase 'if strong in Europe' is but incidental while in Izvolski's report the English minister is said to have returned to this point several times during the conversation. The writer adds, not without sarcasm, "Yet Grey is convinced that

Dugdale III, pg. 284, Metternich to Bulow, July 16/06.

2 Hermann pg. 195, Izvolski's Official Memorandum among Russian Documents.

Hardinge always reported accurately what took place on the pleasure points of Edward VII and Hardinge." There is no doubt that the entente with Russia was strengthened on this occasion and that was the purpose of the visit. Nevertheless, though the supposition that the British government was preparing for war at a given date was absurd, Hardinge's speech was, to say the least, open to adverse interpretation and hence quite derogatory to the cause of peace.

(C) Struggle for a Naval Understanding, 1908-09.

In the meantime the English public clamoured against the German navy and wrong or inaccurate information was endangering good relations. Above all was the suspicion that Germany was laying down more ships than were accounted for. In order to enlighten influential circles with some reliable data, there was arranged, at the end of June, a meeting between Albert Ballin of the Hamburg American Line, a friend of the Kaiser, with Sir Edward Cassel, who was closely associated with Edward II. Cassel explained that the King considered the German fleet a menace to Britain's naval position. Edward VII recognized, he said, that his nephew would never recklessly enter a quarrel and that war with its horrors was repugnant to his nature, but it was well known that Germany's naval increase was greater than that reported. Anxiety with regard to the German peril was the driving force of the entente policy, a policy which did allay anxiety. For that reason, Cassel said, had Russia been advised at the Reval meeting to forgo the enlargement of her navy and to concentrate all her energies on her army. When he intimated that some day the Triple Entente might ask Germany whether she intended to halt the increase of her naval armament, Ballin answered that such a question would mean war. Germany would re-

1
 siet such a Fashoda with all her might. Hammann told Ballin in a
 letter that Bulow and Schen were of the opinion that his comment
 2
 was as "Commendable as it was correct."

In a signed circular from Bulow, June 25, it was laid down
 that "agreements bearing upon the limitation of our fighting strength
 are not under any circumstances to be discussed by us. A power which
 demands such an agreement must clearly understand that such a demand
 3
 means war with us." Hardinge discussed the problem with Metternich,
 complaining that while England was also free to build she had no
 guarantee that at any time the German program might not be suddenly
 increased. British supremacy must be maintained at whatever cost
 and if the burden were onerous popular blame would fall on Germany.
 When Metternich reminded him that England had started the Dread-
 4
 nought business Hardinge sighed and could not dispute it.

It seems evident that during this summer each side considered
 the other capable of a surprise attack upon itself. The Kaiser
 wailed, "All we want is for them to leave us in peace to extend
 5
 our commerce undisturbed." Grey and Lloyd George were agreed that
 relations could never improve so long as both sides kept tightening
 the screw in Naval rivalry and that the German fleet and army were
 a menace to England. They sounded the German Ambassador on the
 subject and when Metternich said England must allay the suspicion
 caused by the Entente against Germany before talking of a reduction
 in naval construction, Lloyd George remarked, in return, that a
 slackening of the pace would do more to allay anxiety than polit-
 ical action. He admitted that the introduction of ^{the} Dreadnought

1 Brandenburg, pg. 281.

2 Haldermann, pg. 141.

3 Brandenburg, pg. 281.

4 Brandenburg, pg. 282.

5 Brandenburg, pg. 283, Metternich, July 10 with marginal com-
 ments by the Kaiser.

was a mistake and was prepared to give guarantees against the introduction of new types. Metternich was of the opinion that English officials only refrained from a formal proposal because, according to Ballin's remarks, in doing so they would run the risk of War.

The German Ambassadors report of the above conversations roused the Kaiser's indignation. He deemed the English Ministers arrogant and Germany must allow no dictation! The Ambassador had exceeded his functions in discussing the restriction of fighting forces. "He must be made to feel that a good understanding with England is not desirable at the cost of the completion of Germany's fleet. If England only intends graciously to offer us her hand on condition that we reduce our fleet that is an unparalleled impertinence and a bitter insult to the German people and their Kaiser, which the Ambassador must reject" etc. "France and Russia might with equal reason demand a limitation of our land arms. The law will be carried out to the last iota, whether the English like it or not, is immaterial. If they want war they can begin it. We are not afraid of it!"² Such remarks indicate the atmosphere in which the Kaiser was enveloped--that of the naval circles. It is impossible for rational beings to see the insult to Germany in confidential discussions with regard to the limitation of armaments which would bind England as well as Germany.

Lloyd George again pressed the subject and declared that if the armament race continued the tension would increase.³ Germany would gain nothing while the war party in England would be strengthened even to the point of compulsory service. Even one

¹ Dugdale III, pg. 284, Metternich to Bulow, July 16/06.

After a conversation with Grey and Lloyd George.

² Dugdale III, pg. 288-89, and Brandenburg, pg. 284.

³ Brandenburg, pg. 284, and Dugdale III, pg. 289, 290.

Metternich to Bulow, Aug. 1/06.

Dreadnought a year fewer would produce a change in the public mood. The Kaiser received this in the same spirit as before—he could only return a 'Triple No' to any such proposition. "I must request that in future he (Metternich) shall reject unhesitatingly all such effusions." Thus the Kaiser and Tirpitz would impress England and make her recognize Germany's rights while Metternich trembled for the result. Bulow, too, was aware of the danger and had an open dispute with the Kaiser on the subject at the end of July. On this occasion the Kaiser merely indicated that the subject was not suitable for discussion and he would part with Bulow if he did not accept his view. Bulow yielded and passed the censure on to Metternich in a diluted form. As a tactical move the Ambassador might point out to England that it would aid the German Foreign Office in facilitating a slower pace, if England would guarantee complete neutrality in the event of war with France. The question of naval construction could only be decided when England pursued a more friendly policy. Out of respect for the Kaiser, a temporising attitude must be adopted, and Bulow suggested that any sign of political compliance evinced by England, might be used to influence the Kaiser.

English statesmen quite appreciated the mental attitude of the leading circles in Germany but an understanding meant so much that it was decided to use Edwards' visit to Friedrichshof in August, 1903 for another attempt. Hardinge and Lloyd George accompanied him, and the former engaged in a long and energetic discussion with the Kaiser with regard to the German naval program, which, since it would shortly be equal to the English, he termed an object of grave apprehension.

† Brandenburg, pg. 235.

2 Brandenburg, pg. 236, Foot Note: Ref: Von Moller to Tirpitz, July 31/03, Tirpitz, Documents, pg. 98. The date there given, Aug. 31, is an error. The Kaiser was at that date in Lorraine, but at the end of July he and Bulow were at Swinemunde, which is important as it shows that the dispute took place before the meeting at Kronberg.

In reply to the English Minister's expression of anxiety the Kaiser exclaimed, "Your data are wrong. I am an Admiral of the British Navy and knew all about it and understand it better than you, who are a civilian and know nothing about it."

To convince Hardinge of what he termed the real limits of the German program he sent for the Nauticus and pointed out certain graphic tables. These showed the relative strength of the two navies to be as follows:

	<u>1908</u>		<u>1911</u>	
	England, Germany,		England, Germany	
Ships of the line over 10,000 tons	52	22	56	25
Armoured cruisers over 5,000 tons	34	8	39	10

Hence he claimed England enjoyed a vast superiority. But Hardinge did not accept this record as proof positive. Both he and the Kaiser displayed excitement which reached its culmination when Sir Charles directly demanded of His Majesty, "You must stop or build slower!" To this the Kaiser replied with the thrust, "Then we shall fight, for it is a question of national honour and dignity"--whereupon, Hardinge apologized and the Kaiser, quite elated at having spoken the unvarnished truth for once flattered himself that he knew how to handle Englishmen.

A comparison with Hardinge's report of the conversation to the British Foreign Office gives no reason to doubt the above remarks from the Kaiser's letter. It is evident that Sir Charles became irritated and spoke in an imperious fashion which in turn encouraged the Kaiser's natural love of fanfare. The necessity of apologizing, a phase of the affair which delighted His Majesty, was inexcusable in a British diplomat. Mac-
celles, who was present, was annoyed at his fellow-countryman and

† Brandenburg, pg. 237, Europäische Gesprachen, pg. 76/25.
Where Hardinge's report on his conversation with the Kaiser

exclaimed, "This comes of their not believing my reports about Germany at the Foreign Office, Hardinge is just as bad about the Naval affair and as ill-informed as any of his loud voiced compatriots." The British royal party had been interviewed by Admiral Fisher just before leaving for Germany, which doubtless accounts for Hardinge's intolerance.

Bulow, too, speaks of the sharpness of the British official's tone and rightly comments that it would have been more in accordance with diplomatic and constitutional custom if Hardinge had expressed his wishes, not to the Monarch, who is not responsible, but to the Imperial government through Sir Frank Lascelles. Such asperity would have been avoided. Confronted with these delicate matters the Emperor replied more bluntly than would otherwise have happened. Though the visit terminated in a most cordial fashion Hardinge's political mission proved an entire failure.

The importance attached by British statesmen to the above overture, is manifest in Lloyd George's communication to the press while the meeting was taking place and published in the *Neue Freie Presse*, August 12. He said, "It is the only way in which to terminate the anxious suspense brooding over Europe; there is really no occasion for a struggle between the two peoples; this agreement must be directed exclusively toward the limitation of the building of new ships in the future." He also spoke of Germany's attitude toward the entente as "shocking suspicion." The fact that Lloyd George had, in July, frankly criticized the two power standard

is published. Reports compared by Jenisch, envoy with the Kaiser to the German Foreign Office, Aug. 12 & 14.

2 Dagdale III, pg. 285, Emperor to Bulow, Aug. 12/08.

3 Ramsam pg. 198, also, Dagdale III, pg. 291, which gives the Kaiser's report of the conversation. Also, Brandenburg, pg. 287, Kaiser to Bulow, Aug. 11-12, vide Tirpitz, Documents, pg. 196.

4 Dagdale III, pg. 297, Bulow to German Foreign Office, Aug. 22/08.

and the introduction of the dreadnoughts, gave weight to his opinion that only the question of naval construction stood in the way of a real political understanding between the two nations. It was obvious to German statesmen that the whole British cabinet stood behind Harding's effort and after the Kaiser's cryptic refusal of a naval agreement at Friedrichshof, neither he nor any other Englishman made pro-German speeches.

The Kaiser, not unconscious that he had increased the Anglo-German antagonism but quite under-estimating the immediate danger of the situation, ignored Metternich's vehement protests and demanded the uninterrupted building of big battleships. He was convinced that England aimed to destroy Germany's navy and commerce, that Russia and France were striving toward goals which could only be attained through a violent change in the status quo of Europe and against which Germany must be armed. That conviction was strengthened by the visit of the English King and his Ministers to Ischl, immediately after the discussion at Friedrichshof. There they met Francis Joseph and German historians claim an unequivocal attempt to have been made to persuade the Emperor to swerve in his loyalty to the Triple Alliance. Harding is reported to have made this significant remark on their departure, "A grand old man, the Emperor! a capital fellow, though perhaps he missed just now one of the best opportunities of his long life." Standing alone, this seems to permit of the German interpretation and it is just possible that Sir Charles was again unfortunate in his choice of words. As a matter of fact we now know, from the Austrian archives, that Francis Joseph was asked to assist in reducing the friction between Britain and Germany, his alliance with the latter being valued as a common link between these two nations.

Harnann pg. 198-199.

2 Harnann pg. 201-2.

3 Liddell Hart, pg. 53.

Also, the report of the German representative Brockendorff to Bulow makes clear the fact that though an attempt to detach Austria was expected, in reality, there was revealed during the interview not the faintest indication of such an intention on the part of the Englishmen.¹

The prevalent suspicion of King Edward as a political intriguer, is voiced by Bulow, in his book, "Deutschland unter William II, wherein he says, "Similar attempts with regard to Austria-Hungary as on the occasion of the meeting of the Monarchs at Ischl, failed because of the steadfast loyalty of the grey-haired Emperor Francis Joseph."² This belief was the outgrowth of the conviction that Edward VII swayed British Foreign Policy and that the 'encirclement' was at his instigation. Eckardstein declared that nothing could be farther from the truth than the belief that Edward was a sworn enemy of Germany.³ He was a master of the German language and had grown up in the old tradition of Anglo-German comradeship in arms, and his friend Eckardstein even hazards the opinion that had he been alive in 1914, the war could have been avoided. Sir Edward Grey, who was in charge of foreign affairs, declared that, while Edward kept in touch with that department, he rarely made any comment and at no time any criticism. He enjoyed his visits to Germany and had no desire to spoil them by political complications. The suspicion surrounding him was probably part of the propaganda emanating from a desire to keep German public opinion up to the high water mark for expenditure on arms.

Lloyd George and Hardinge returned home after the Kaisers decisive rebuff at Friedrichsrof, convinced that nothing could be done with Germany. The only alternative was to face Parliament and apply for credits for the navy. Lloyd George's famous Budget of 1909 included a scheme of heavy taxation which gave rise to violent disputes.

¹ Dugdale III, pg. 226, Count Brockendorff-Bantzen in Vienna to Bulow, Jan. 9/08.

² Bulow "Deutschland unter William II, quoted by Hamann, pg. 202.

³ Eckardstein, pg. 54.

in parliament, while He Kenna, who in July had declared Britain's program to be adequate, now justified his new naval estimates by reports that Germany was building beyond her program. Anglo-German relations were from this date, August, 1908, definitely under the spell of naval rivalry.

Prince Balue, though he approved the fleet as the Kaiser's appointed task, was firmly convinced that Germany must not again irritate England by an acceleration in naval construction and, during his final months in office, endeavoured to arrive at some understanding with that power. He had absented himself from Friedrichshof and refused to meet the British ministers because he disapproved the Kaiser's tactics and now assured His Majesty that "everything depends on how we get through these next years." Through third parties he learned that England would consider an official statement to the effect that Germany would not exceed her naval program as a sign of friendliness and as a basis for further conversations. Knowing the Kaiser, he made a direct appeal to Tirpitz, who assured him that no new increases in the fleet were planned and; if England would alter her policy toward Germany, he thought possible a future agreement and with regard to the construction of ships, provided the sanctioned program were not altered. Metternich however, warned them that the important point for England was not a mere promise of no further increase but of slackening the present rate of building.²

The Chancellor then, in a letter of Dec^{ember} 23, tried to persuade Tirpitz to consent to a retardation of from four to three new ships in the next three years, the numbers to be made up in the years following those. There would thus be no reduction in the total output. He also stressed the importance of coastal defence.

Brandenburg, pg. 239, Balue to Kaiser, Aug. 29/08.

2 Brandenburg, pg. 230, Metternich, Nov. 26.

as a necessary work which would not enhance British anxiety. Tirpitz' answer was a political lecture, by the chief of a military department, which condemned the proposed action as backing down before English threats and hence a humiliation for Germany. Moreover the rate could not be altered except by alteration of the navy laws and if such were contemplated he begged to be allowed to retire. In his mind the risk for England had to be increased by means of a large battle fleet, otherwise war would cost England nothing. "The backbone of our whole naval policy from its inception has always been to create such a risk for other states in our military and also, above all, ⁱⁿ our political relationship with them."

The above letters display the difference in policy between the Chancellor and Tirpitz, the latter being heartily supported by the Kaiser and the Navy League. Bulow wished to decrease the risk of war for Germany by an understanding which would prevent a tightening of the Entente and ease Britain's nervousness for a few years, thus giving Germany time to complete her preparations. He felt that peace could only be preserved by lulling British fears. Tirpitz on the other hand, based his whole policy on the theory 'si ^{vis} pacem bellum para.' The risk must be such as to intimidate all nations.

While much tedious argument was going on in Berlin the British government was preparing defensive measures. The Budget was nearing completion and when inquiry was made with regard to the possibility of an understanding with Germany, Asquith replied on March 6, that the German government would not entertain any such proposals because it took the attitude that its own needs, not the strength of a foreign fleet must decide the rate of construction. Bulow,

Dugdale III, pg. 332, Bulow to Tirpitz, Dec. 23/03.

2 Dugdale III, pg. 335, Tirpitz to Bulow, Jan. 4.

3 Brandenburg, pg. 293, Dugdale I II, pg. 340, Bulow to Metternich, pg. 145.

thereupon argued in the Reichstag that England had never brought forth
 an official statement of this nature,¹ a claim which was literally
 correct but which studiously ignored the fact that Germany had de-
 clined any official consideration of the subject by a categorical
 refusal of preliminary confidential overtures. Metternich pointed
 out that the psychological moment had been in the summer when Eng-
 land was doubtful, and announced that now she was prepared to meet
 Germany in the Dreadnought Competition on the basis of the Two
 Power Standard.² He cautioned his government against the idea that
 England would ever bow to the inevitable. "Both Ministers
 (Asquith and McKenna) as well as the leader of the opposition (Balfour)
 declared themselves resolved to maintain England's supremacy at sea."³
 With reference to Tirpitz' policy he said "fear would never drive
 England into our arms but to face us armed."

In March, exaggerated press stories plus the resulting strain
 led Grey to make a characteristic proposal regarding an arrangement
 and whereby naval attaches should exchange detailed information con-
 cerning the work under construction and convince themselves at the dock-
 yards that the facts supplied were true. Tirpitz consented re-
 luctantly but the Kaiser refused outright. He apparently had no
 appreciation of the importance of thus removing suspicion and Bulow
 perforce forbade Metternich discussing that subject at all giving
 as the reason that the English did not believe statements already
 communicated to them, so that to offer more was only to invite
 humiliation.⁴

On March 29, Sir Edward Grey made an important speech in the
 House of Commons, in which he strongly urged the necessity of a
 naval agreement, with Germany. Schoen reported to Bulow April 13,
 that he had put forth three possibilities:

¹ Hildebrandt, pg. 145. 4. Dugdale III. Bulow to Metternich, Mar. 19/09.
² Brandenburg, pg. 295, Metternich to Bulow, Dec. 29/08, Jan. 14/09.
³ Dugdale III, Bulow to Metternich, pg. 347, Mar. 17/09.

1. A general agreement with regard to the limitation of naval expenditure.
2. An understanding with regard to the naval budgets year by year.
3. Exchange of information with regard to ship-building.

The Chancellor promptly interviewed the Kaiser at Venice where he eventually succeeded in getting his consent to the principle of a naval agreement, maintaining the then present relative standard of strength. He drew up plans for a general political rapprochement which, it is worth noting, made no mention of Austria-Hungary and to which a naval arrangement could be appended. Von Stumm, armed with these, was sent off on April 29, to sound the London Foreign office.² There he was received cordially but his cause met with little encouragement. Hardinge insisted that until Germany reassured England about the construction of her fleet, no agreement on other subjects was possible. Grey, on receipt of the suggestion of an alliance, "fell into a long meditative silence, which he broke by saying that Europe was divided into two camps; the balance of power might not be disturbed, but it would be very difficult to unite all the Powers into one camp." He finally said there was nothing to be done for the present and the governments must be content with dealing with each other as frankly as possible.³ Obviously he feared to endanger his relations with France and Russia and Von Stumm thereupon refrained from revealing the details of his plans.

As a result of Grey's speech Bulow made one more effort to

¹ Dugdale II, PG. 350, G & T, VI, PG 255.

² Dugdale III, PG. 351, Brandenburg, 345.

³ Dugdale III, PG. 351-2, Stumm's report to Berlin, Brandenburg, PG. 345, and Memorandum by Hardinge, G & T, V, PG. 324.

induce the Emperor and Tirpitz to meet England in a naval understanding. On June 3, he called a meeting of the leading authorities, which included Bethmann-Hallweg, Tirpitz, Moltke, Admiral von Müller, Metternich and Schoen. The naval authorities reiterated that retardation would reduce the value of the entire naval law. At most they could consent to an agreement which would fix a ratio of three to four for future construction and in that case the promise given by Metternich not to bring in a naval budget in 1912 must be withdrawn. The Ambassador indignantly begged not to be instructed to make communications in London that only raised hopes not to be fulfilled. All those present agreed that reciprocity in naval matters together with adequate political assurance was an absolute condition for an understanding with England. Tirpitz prophesied that the menace from England would be over in 1915, as by that time the William II Canal would be widened and Heligoland fortified. He declined the Chancellor's request for a detailed statement with regard to rate of construction, saying such should only be prepared if England took the first step. Though the proposed ratio was a slight concession to Bulow's line of thought, the opportunity had passed to profit by it. In April Lloyd George laid his budget before the British parliament and there was no longer the same interest in securing German concessions as before.

The German historian, Professor Brandenburg, mourns the summer of 1908 as a lost opportunity for promoting better relations with England by means of naval concessions and thus preventing the Entente from becoming securely welded. From the British point of view failure to reach an agreement meant vast expenditure to uphold the Two Power Standard which was all important for, the defence

Dugdale III, pg. 352, Minutes of Discussion of June.3.

of the Empire. The decisive factor in that failure was the personal feeling of the Kaiser and Tirpitz that concession was humiliating to Germany. Bulow's influence had grown continuously weaker after the Daily Telegraph affair and hence he was very careful in opposing the Kaiser. He dared not press too obviously his desire for a conciliatory policy toward England but as late as June 25, 1909, he advised Metternich in a personal letter¹ at every available opportunity to make it clear that a naval ^{understanding} with England is not outside the domain of possibility.² Tirpitz was the man who counted and his great miscalculation lay in the fact that he believed that England would capitulate, that the nation would rebel against the strain. But England could and did, pay. Because of the Two Power Standard there was no escape from the danger zone.³

- 2 Brandenburg, pg. 298, Correspondence of Tirpitz, 125-126.
- 3 Dugdale III, pg. 355, also, pg. 362, Metternich to Bulow, June 29/09.
- 4 Dugdale III, pg. 358.
- 5 Brandenburg, pg. 299.

Dugdale III, pg. 416, Tirpitz comment to Bethmann-Hollweg, with regard to McKenna's proposals for exchange of information, "I think we might fall in line with the British Government's proposals were it not for the fear that our showing accommodation might be used in England, for purposes of agitation and represented as a score over German policy.

OF. G & T, VI, pg. 515, also Dugdale III, pg. 360, Tirpitz to Schoen, June 27, /09.

2 Brandenburg, pg. 295-6.

3 Dugdale III, pg. 360.

(D) Bethmann-Hollweg & Naval Negotiations, 1909-10.

As a result of the Bosnian crisis, in which the Entente was somewhat shaken, Germany's prestige in world affairs was enhanced in no small degree. Bulow remarked in June, that in twenty years, the Empire had not been so respected or feared as now.¹ The Kaiser took this opportunity to dispense with the Chancellor who had often disapproved of his methods and who had failed to defend him adequately with regard to the Daily Telegraph Affair.

The new Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, was more skeptical than his predecessor about the general situation which he inherited. In truth Germany had become deeply involved in two great risks--the thwarting of Russia in the Balkan peninsula and naval rivalry with England. Bethmann deemed it his duty to seek immediately a rapprochement with London and thus end Germany's dangerous dependence on Austria's aimless Eastern policy. The great difficulty in his path was the fact that German national feeling had become centred in the navy. Any fear concerning it was promptly smothered by Tirpitz and public opinion always supported the naval authorities. Between Tirpitz and Bethmann-Hollweg, there was mutual and hearty dislike while the arrogant Pan German group were openly hostile to the Chancellor. The position of the latter was certainly not enviable.

Nevertheless new negotiations were begun with London, unofficially, through Ballin and Cassel in July 1909. The main object of their informal discussion was "to insure that a number of 'experts and men of moderate means' i.e., naval experts, in the first instance, should join in conference in order to discuss how, without injury to their relative fighting efficiency both countries could bring about a reduction in their naval armaments."²

¹ Dugdale III, pg. 352, Minutes of discussion, June 3.

² Haldermann, pg. 152.

Virpitz approved Ballin's report and sent it on to the Chancellor who robbed the effort of all spontaneity by recommending an official exchange of opinion.

Bethmann suggested to Goschen an agreement concerning the retardation of the rates of building in return for a German bias in British policy, i.e., England should join a declaration that neither country had any idea of aggression and that in case of either being attacked by a third the other nation would remain neutral. Virpitz maintained rigid adherence to the naval law of 1907, and refused to make any detailed statement regarding retardation. Bethmann could make no promises until England had shown her willingness to render service in return for concession. It soon became evident that no real reduction was contemplated while the political demands were such as would alienate Britain from France and Russia. German manoeuvres looked suspiciously like an attempt to break the Entente rather than a mark of sincere friendship and, according to Grey, "One does not make new friendships worth having by deserting the old ones. New friends by all means let us make but not at the expense of those we have." The foreign minister again asserted that previous agreements must be respected and Britain could not promise more to Germany than to France and Russia, with whom there were two general treaties. In reply to this contention, von Schoen declared that Germany had no wish for a naval agreement. Therefore Grey's argument had no meaning for that country and if England wanted anything of Germany she would have to pay for it.² The only practical result of the negotiations of 1909 was a reluctant German consent to the inspection of shipyards and work under construction, by naval attaches, on a promise of reciprocity.³ Bethmann-Sollweg also in-

¹ Murray pg. 117, Grey Nov. 27/11.

² Dugdale III, pg. 411, Memorandum by Schoen, Nov. 1.

³ Dugdale III, pg. 411, Von Schoen, Nov. 1/19.

dictated that Germany would not share responsibility for the far reaching activities of Austria in the East--a promise which was of doubtful value.

Negotiations were resumed when the Kaiser came to Edward's funeral in May 1910. In July, Mr. Asquith explained in a speech on the naval program, why no understanding with Germany had not been reached. "The German government told us.....I cannot complain and I have no answer to make..... that their procedure in this matter is governed by an act of the Reichstag, under which ^{their} program automatically proceeds year by year,.....We have approached the German government on the subject. They have found themselves unable to do anything.....without an act of the Reichstag repealing their navy law. They told us and no doubt with great truth, they would not have the public support in Germany to a modified programme." Thus the German officials who had refused to leave the matter in the hands of naval experts sheltered their own inefficacy behind public opinion.

Bethmann replied, that the German government had not met the British overture with a non possumus, that while reduction in naval construction was impossible, they were still ready to discuss retardation. Britain at once responded. In a memorandum of August 11, Grey intimated his readiness to drop the contention that a naval agreement must be based upon a reduction of the German programme and to negotiate upon the following basis-- (1) temporary retardation, (2) no increase of the existing German programme, (3) exchange of information by naval experts regarding the progress of construction, (4) assurance that in agreement with other powers, there was nothing directed against Germany and that Britain had no hostile intention toward her. Discussion based upon these points

was carried on throughout the winter of 1911. The first was eventually repudiated by Germany lest the ship industry suffer loss. Also, in October the Kaiser declared to the British ambassador that he would never consent to any agreement binding Germany not to enlarge her naval programme. Bethmann agreed to the principle of supervision of construction by naval attaches. With regard to the last point the Kaiser declared that a political agreement must precede a naval one to which Britain reluctantly consented.² There ensued a brief altercation on between Grey and Bethmann-Hollweg with regard to mutual ill-will but Grey told Metternich that he urgently desired to see the two groups closer, to find a formula that would remove the appearance of opposing camps in Europe and thus insure peace.³

Negotiations dropped on till the spring of 1911. In March Gaschen sent to Berlin a memorandum, couched in general phrases and in May Bethmann-Hollweg announced that the moment for restricting building had passed.⁴ He said, that, from 1912 on, Germany would build two ships yearly and then three yearly. In any agreement, an attack by one on the other ought to be excluded and provision made for friendly discussion in case of any difficulty. The proposal amounted to an arrangement "more comprehensive, far-reaching and intimate than any England had, short of an alliance, with any other power."⁵ Though in Metternich's opinion the desire for closer relations had never been so evident, the situation had become impossible. Germany was unwilling to make any substantial

¹ Murray pg. 116.

² Haldemann pg. 186, also, Dagdale III, pg 418, Memorandum to Gaschen by Bulow, Oct. 18/10.

³ Dagdale III, pg 421, Metternich to Bethmann Hollweg, Dec. 7/10.

⁴ Dagdale III, pg. 422, Bethmann Hollweg to Metternich, May 9/11. also, G & T VI, pg. 625-29.

⁵ Murray pg. 116, Grey Mar 8/11.

naval concession, while England, on the other hand, obviously did not want a definite political agreement. Grey pressed instead for a general settlement of disputes which would bring Germany into harmony with the other powers. There could be no co-operation with her which would facilitate the assertion of her supremacy over Europe. Negotiations were still in suspense when the new Morocco crisis came to "end the political dead calm and suspicious watchfulness of the adversaries."²

(B) Haldane's Mission.

After the Agadir crisis public opinion in England felt that a policy which had almost led the nation into war on two occasions for Morocco was not entirely satisfactory and there was a general desire to draw nearer to Germany.³ Though German public opinion was inflamed against England on account of Lloyd George's Mansion House speech of July 1911 Metternich endeavoured to impress upon his government the fact that a reconciliation was still possible.

Tirpitz, however, had decided, as early as 1910, that the rate of building (two battleships yearly) was too slow and must be supplemented before the old law expired. He took advantage of the Kaiser's mood, when England supported France in 1911, to emphasize the fact that she had done so because the German fleet was not strong enough to intimidate her. Thereupon the Kaiser remarked in a newspaper article of August 21, "A better tone toward Germany can only be obtained by a stronger fleet. Downright anxiety with regard to such things brings Britain to an understanding.... hence we must by means of a supplementary law replace the cruisers of the Hansa class, one every year!"

¹ Murray 119.

² Brandenburg, pg 369.

³ Haldemann, pg. 165.

The Admiral's plan consisted mainly of a great change in organization through the introduction of a third squadron. Three battleships plus those already granted were to be built in the years following and the crews were to be increased. When, in November, the Kaiser ordered the new bill to be incorporated in the budget Bethmann Hollweg objected and was able to persuade the Emperor not to place it before the Reichstag until January.

To propitiate the Kaiser, the Chancellor asked Metternich on November 22, to get some tangible sign of friendliness from England, suggesting a return to the idea of a general political agreement, possibly in the form of a neutrality arrangement. In reply the ambassador reported Grey's speech of November 27, in the House of Commons, in which the Foreign Minister had reviewed England's attitude during the Morocco crisis. From this, Metternich had received the impression that England would have nothing to do with a political agreement which involved a renunciation of the Entente. He warned his government that England would not easily be persuaded to take sides against Germany but that, if the fleet were again increased, the Entente would probably harden into an alliance. Upon this communication the Kaiser remarked, "The poor fellow is beyond help!"

When in ^{cc} December, Grey and Metternich, informally discussed colonial questions, the Kaiser declared he wanted no colonies at England's favour. He could buy them! There must be no detailed agreement of that sort before the conclusion of a 'political working agreement' recognizing equality of rights and the establishment of their respective policies on parallel lines. An increased colonial Empire without a fleet was out of the question and the "armament proposals stand irrespective of visions of this kind."

Nevertheless Grey, encouraged by Metternich sent a memorandum to Berlin suggesting the resumption of formal negotiations which had been in abeyance since 1911. At the same time an overture was sent through Cassel and Ballin which suggested an interview between members of the English cabinet and Bethmann Hollweg. The note contained these points, in return for Germany's recognition of England's naval supremacy and Germany's renunciation of an expansion of her naval program England would promise to further Germany's colonial aims and to enter into mutual declarations of neutrality in the event of aggression by a third power.

The answer, in the form of a confidential note of February 4, was to the effect that, "we are willing to continue the discussion in a friendly spirit....any agreement would have to state that either power undertakes not to join in any plans, combinations or war-like complications directed against the other. If concluded, it might pave the way for an understanding as to the sums of money to be spent on armaments." It was hoped that a British Minister might visit Berlin for a confidential exchange of ideas.

When Metternich read the note he objected that Britain would not include the new supplementary law in the naval program while Germany would insist upon it. Now Bethmann Hollweg was not, as might be inferred from the note, willing to drop the addition to the program ^{but} thinking it ~~improbable~~ that Grey would accept his conditions anyway, he wished to avoid blame for an unyielding attitude toward the Navy. ² The communication was sent without ² Brandenburg, pg. 402.

¹ Haldermann, pg. 170, Excerpt from official note.

² Brandenburg, pg. 403, Metternich's opinion.

the knowledge of Tirpitz.

At the same time Muldersmann was delegated to visit Cassel in London and carried with him a letter of explanation from Ballin. The latter considered that a definite step forward had been taken, since 'it is agreed to submit the question of the proposed increase of naval tonnage to a bona fide discussion.' He stressed the fact, however that a neutrality agreement must come first, that naval concessions must be reciprocal and finally urged that the British representative, sent to Berlin, should at least be accompanied by a naval expert. # After a long discussion with Cassel, Muldersmann reported to Ballin as follows: "He assured me most emphatically that Great Britain would concede to us as much as she had conceded to other powers but not more. We could rely on her absolute loyalty 'and' Cassel had added, 'our attitude toward France proves that we can be loyal to our friends.'" 2 This was a clear warning to Berlin not to expect Britain to commit herself from the political point of view.

Ballin had cherished the hope that Churchill would visit Berlin, and that once the two really responsible persons, Churchill and Tirpitz, had met in conclave, the feeling of their mutual responsibility would be too strong to allow the negotiations to end in failure. 3 Unfortunately this meeting never took place. All that was achieved was a preliminary step, the visit of Haldane.

In February, Viscount Haldane duly arrived in Berlin. He was prepared for frank discussion but without authority to conclude any binding agreement. Should he find a path open for unity Grey and Churchill were to follow him. As a result of his interview with the Kaiser, the latter and Tirpitz declared them^{selves} ready if a political agreement were reached, to renounce the building of a new fleet in 1912 and delay the proposed three new ships until 1913-16-19. 4

Bethmann Hollweg then tried to arrive at a clear definition of a political agreement. He wanted a promise of benevolent neutrality in the event of one power being involved in a war with several. Haldane thought that too comprehensive. It was obviously aimed at preventing Britain from ever going to the aid of France. The most the British minister could promise was that neither of the contracting parties should make an unprovoked attack on the other or join any coalition intending to do so. This of course did not satisfy Bethmann. Colonial problems were then discussed at great length. Haldane returned to England possessed of a copy of the new supplementary naval law and a meagre concession of delay for a year plus the drafts of possible political and colonial agreements.

Haldane's report seemed to make a favorable impression on the British Foreign Office and Gray told Metternich that he was 'immensely impressed.' However events soon showed ~~that~~ Metternich's prophecy, with regard to ^{the} naval law to be true. Careful study of that document by the British Admiralty revealed a much increased state of preparedness in the whole German navy and a corresponding increase in personnel, all of which warranted the conclusion that other new formations were planned. After a discussion with the Colonial Secretary Gray declared that the colonial question depended on a settlement of the naval estimate and the neutrality agreement and that the former must be postponed for a time. This Germany regarded ^{as} a repudiation of Haldane's basis for negotiation.

Winston Churchill, speaking at Glasgow, took the occasion to point out that while, for Britain a fleet was an absolute necessity, for Germany it was a luxury. This indiscretion roused resentment in

2 Haldermann, pg. 173.

3 Haldermann, pg. 165.

4 Haldermann, pg. 175, Kaiser's report to Bismarck of conversation with Haldane. He said, "I have made no end of concessions but this must be the limit."

Germany and encouraged a stubborn attitude at home. Bethmann wrote to Ballin that, according to information from a reliable private source, the revelation of the contents of the bill and official comments thereupon, had caused such a revulsion of feeling in England that the British government dared not accept a political agreement plus the bill as it stood. ¹ Ballin intimated to Cassel at Marseilles, through Huldemann, that the bill had been reduced to the minimum. "We would not and could not give rise to the suspicion that great alterations had been made merely to meet Britain's objections." ²

It was a critical moment in the negotiations Cassel and Ballin hurried to London where the latter on March 5 submitted a memorandum, reiterating his remarks to Cassel and drawing attention to the altered conditions. He stated that Germany was resolved to adhere to the basis agreed upon with Haldane, though prepared not to fix a particular year for laying down the third of the new ships, which was planned for 1919.

In the meantime the Kaiser became impatient and, egged on by Tirpitz, demanded the publication of the naval law. Bethmann-Hollweg threatened to resign and when he was appeased, Tirpitz threatened to take that step, and so on until, on March 8, the naval proposals were actually published in the *Kölnische Zeitung*. This move was regarded by London as an indication that no vital change would be made in the law and henceforth the English tone became more rigid in colonial and general matters. Grey declared that, since Germany was again strengthening her fleet, England could not imperil her old friendships and "A direct neutrality agreement ³ would inevitably offend French susceptibilities." In fact

¹ Huldemann pg. 176.

² Huldemann pg. 179.

³ Brandenburg pg. 411.

Isvolski reports that Peincare stated in March that if England signed such an agreement of neutrality the result would be to bring about the end of existing Anglo-French relations.

Grey's last proposal for an agreement was made on March 14, and read as follows: "England will make no unprovoked attack on Germany nor associate herself with such, nor pursue an aggressive policy toward her. An attack on Germany is not the object and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England, at the present time, is a party and she will not agree to any arrangement having such for its aim." At Metternich's suggestion the cabinet agreed to the addition, "England will naturally observe benevolent neutrality should Germany be forced into war." Regarding colonies he was ready to continue negotiations. The Kaiser declared however that the abandonment of Waldane's basis had wrecked the agreement and a new basis must be found. Bethmann-Hollweg recognizing that only a definite treaty would satisfy the Kaiser and that only the repudiation of the supplementary law would suffice for England, wrote to Metternich March 19 ordering him to drop the matter for a time. He wrote to Ballin that he considered the problem inherently insoluble.

Grey and Metternich continued conversations from March 20-29 during which time the British cabinet again considered the German formula and decided not to go beyond that previously defined by England. Metternich then announced "that the Imperial Government failed to see in the English formula for the agreement, conditions, that would lead to the favorable result desired by Sir Edward Grey."

1 Nassau pg. 327.

2 Brandenburg pg. 410.

3 Huidermann pg. 185, Kaiser to Ballin, Mar. 19, "The latest proposals arriving here.....raised impossible demands and were so offensive in form that they were promptly rejected...."

4 Huidermann pg 184, also Brandenburg pg. 410

Though conversations continued to be exchanged regarding ships under construction it was now understood that negotiations had failed. April 15 the German Supplementary Law and proposals for increasing the land army were submitted to the Reichstag and May 14 were accepted.

Thus the enterprise that Ballin and Cassel, Bethmann Hollweg and Haldane had started with such high hopes ended in nothing but smoke. Negotiations were frustrated because Germany demanded an unconditional pledge of neutrality in case of war as the only condition upon which to base a naval agreement. Tirpitz and the Kaiser wished to pursue their world policy with the security that Britain was bought off beforehand and this Grey would not concede. Their conditions were amazingly presumptuous and one is reminded of a saying of Bismarck's quoted by Bulow and again by Gilbert Murray: 'If Mr X makes you a proposal which is obviously advantageous to him and ruinous to you, it by no means follows that Mr X is a fool. It only follows that you will be one, if you accept.'

The final discussions proved fruitless for lack of political genius and decision on the part of the German Chancellor, who sincerely desired an understanding, but who was convinced that the problem was insoluble. Certainly one who felt that a situation was hopeless could not save it. Albert Ballin believed that, had Churchill and Tirpitz been allowed to discuss the matter, as naval experts, their sense of responsibility would have enabled them to overcome all difficulties. But, in view of Tirpitz' ignorance of British strength and determination, that step would probably have availed little. The Admiral saw no need to calm British fears since he believed that the danger zone would be passed in 1915. His presumption was only equalled by that of Holstein in 1901.

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In October 1910, Tirpitz himself admitted in a letter to the Kaiser: "If the English fleet is permanently and fundamentally made and maintained so strong as to make it safe to attack Germany, then German naval development, from an historical standpoint, was a mistake and your Majesties' fleet policy an historical fiasco." This tentative supposition was accurately born out, by the facts, long before the year set for 'der tag.'

(F) Conclusion.

Looking back over the period under discussion we find accord between Germany and England throughout the eighties of the last century and extending to 1896. The political interest of Prince Bismarck was concentrated upon continental Europe and, except for temporary disaccord over colonial matters, England lay somewhat outside his daily cares. The origin and foundation of the cleavage between Germany and Great Britain lies at the beginning of the new era, in Germany's change of policy from continental to overseas expansion. The growth of her commerce and influence soon brought her interests into contact with those of Britain. Under skilful handling this contact need not have caused friction but tact was not an outstanding characteristic of the successors of Bismarck. Even his disciples forgot his principles and remembered only his method---the mailed fist.

The year 1894 was the high-water mark of Anglo-German friendship and henceforth there is perceivable a steady decline in what had been mutual good will. In 1895 saw Germany associated with Russia and France in the far East as opposed to Britain and Japan, a clash between the Kaiser and Salisbury with regard to the Near East and one between Marshall and Malet over German interference in South Africa, interference which culminated in the Kruger Telegram.

Brandenburg pg. 299.

That this threat to British prestige was not pushed farther was probably only due to Germany's consciousness of her weakness at sea and from 1896 dates the real development of the German navy. Henceforth the whole German nation, impressed with the idea that the eagle had but one wing stood firmly behind the Kaiser's naval program.

1897 was a critical year for Germany because therein was passed the first naval bill with its preface to the effect, that Germany's fleet must equal that of the largest naval power. In this year also the Kaiser, during his visit to Damascus, proclaimed himself the protector of all Mohammedans throughout the world—a theatrical challenge to Britain and France no less than to Russia. In this two fold gesture, of naval expansion with its certainty of collision with England, and of expansion in the near East with its threat of a collision with Russia, may be found the germ of German difficulties for the next two decades. William II "saw too many things at once." Not content with having broken Bismarck's wire to Petersburg, he had now alienated Russia still further at the very moment when he entered upon a second risk that of naval rivalry with England. He thus forced the other powers, whom Bismarck had successfully held apart, to join against that development of German ambition which seemed to thwart their several aims whichever path they chose.

The years from 1890-1900 covered a decade of diplomatic alarms and discourtesies in which, in return for Germany support in the Eastern Mediterranean, England was compelled to push colonial concessions to extreme limits and to suffer tamely the ill-humour and vagaries of the Wilhelmstrasse. At the end of that period she tried to exchange this uneasy co-operation for a

definite alliance, but in Berlin her move was interpreted as a sign of weakness which could be yet further exploited. The negotiations of 1901 failed because Britain's independence finally asserted itself against German dominations. Britain declined to pledge the Empire to support the foreign policy of the Triple Alliance. The idea that England could be forced into such an agreement was the obsession of Holstein and the result of an exaggerated opinion of German power.

In this matter of the negotiations for an alliance, Holstein always acted on the assumption that while Anglo-Russian hostility was a permanent factor in the European situation, Germany could, at any time, find means to dissolve the Franco-Russian alliance and once more draw closer to Russia. Actually neither assumption was warranted. In spite of occasional protestations of monarchic solidarity between the Kaiser and the Czar, German support of Austria had by this time permanently alienated Russia and the Czar stood irrevocably committed to France. Episodes such as that of Björke notwithstanding a continental bloc against England of anything save the most ephemeral character, was never within the range of practical politics. Holstein's threats of a coalition against Britain, were, under these circumstances, farcical. This fact, together with the Kaiser's sabre-rattling, virtually isolated Germany long before the Triple Entente became a reality. That grouping of the powers was merely a defensive gesture and, even after Britain's alliance with Japan, her treaty with France, and her arrangement with Russia, need never have solidified but for Germany's threatening tactics.²

Lyddall Hart, pg. 25.

2 Lichnowsky: "That this reproachment and the agreement referred to, were anything more than an attempt on the part of France and England to make themselves secure against the vast armaments of Germany or that these agreements were intended for aggressive purposes has never been shown by anything that has yet been published." pg. 30

Britain's reconciliation with France made Italy a doubtful partner in the Triple Alliance and henceforth Germany was increasingly driven to cling to her sole remaining ally, Austria. With this new and urgent necessity to preserve the Austrian alliance Germany forfeited her old capacity to frame the terms of that alliance. So long as Austria needed Germany more than Germany needed Austria, Berlin could always decline to support Austria in extraneous adventures in the Balkans. But when the friendship of England and Russia had been irrevocably lost, Austrian support became a necessity for Germany and the latter could no longer limit her commitments to Vienna. Germany's subsequent efforts to break the entente merely tightened the noose about her own neck and she passed from one blunder into another. The voyage of the Argonauts to Tangier together with the Bjorko escapade led to military conversations between France and Britain and the concentration of the British fleet in home waters. Germany's refusal to listen to any proposal for the limitation of armaments at the Hague Conference, the expansion of her naval program in 1906-8 together with the Kaiser's rebuff to Hardinge at Friedrichhof, in the summer of 1908, created the impression that an appeal to arms would not be unwelcome. As a result the Liberal Government of Britain was forced, at an immense cost, to enter seriously into a naval race in defence of the Two Power Standard. Finally, the Bosnian crisis enhanced Germany's prestige, it also increased fear of her power and the succeeding crisis, at Agadir, found the entente powers ranged firmly in defiance of the 'mailed fist.'

From 1906 onward, British statesmen made every effort to arrive at an agreement to prevent competitive naval construction.

Their efforts failed in 1908 because the Kaiser felt any concession to be a humiliation. They achieved little in 1910 because Tirpitz thought that the end of the Danger Zone was drawing near. Germany had no need of a naval agreement and in consequence argued that Britain must pay dearly in the political field for any concession in the Naval. The Haldane Mission was barren of any practical result because, in return for mere retardation German ^{of} shipbuilding, Britain was asked to sacrifice her connection with the Entente by giving to Germany a guarantee of absolute neutrality in case of war! Had Lord Salisbury been alive he might well have repeated his remark to Hatsfeldt in 1901, "You expect too much for your friendship!"[#]

Throughout this whole period, Germany, though already the strongest power on the continent, insisted upon keeping the world in a state of chronic neurosis by her everlasting grante for an army long since the largest, and for a navy which from the outset was avowedly meant to be second to none,² and by her refusal to consider any limitation of armaments. Behind this policy stood the person of William II, Emperor of Germany.

The Kaiser's responsibility for the failure to arrive at an understanding with Britain, which would have freed Germany from her dependence upon Austria's eastern policy and thus lessened the danger of war, is a large one. By the abysmal distrust and alarm which his bellicose utterances created everywhere he filled Europe with gun powder. He had no desire for war but his unrestrained blustering, his self-satisfaction and his periodic fanaronades, such as the grotesque 'Welt Marschall' expedition of 1900, caused world-wide suspicion of Germany's motives. He

[#] Brandenburg pg. 127.

² Brandenburg pg. 347.

saw himself arrayed in shining armour where actually he was wearing the garb of puck,[#] and he made mischief which led to war. It is in vain that German historians claim that his harangues and even his intrigues should have been overlooked because of his good intentions. The ill effects of his performances were reflected in the public opinion of every nation and must be recognized as one of the outstanding causes of Germany's apparent encirclement.

Again, it is claimed that the Kaiser, personally, was not responsible for the conduct of his advisors. That he was ever the ultimate originator of German policy in any consistent sense may well be questioned, but on the other hand his impulsive interferences and periodic, if intermittent, political "coups," disconcerted his neighbors and gave to German policy an appearance of theatricality and overweening strength. There was no place for a statesman of genius in the Kaiser's retinue and the inhabitants of the German Foreign Office were, with considerable acumen, labelled by Count Munster as "lesser live-stock." Their inefficiency and inability to co-operate are evident in every page of history. They, like the Kaiser, flew off at tangents. Holstein was responsible for the failure of negotiations in 1901 and for the Tangier ebullition. Kiderlen-Wachter recklessly made his place in the annals of history, through the Agadir affair. Bulow refused to meet the British ministers at Friedrichshof, and Kiderlen-Wachter was not permitted to see Haldane in 1912. In short, German policy was never directed by a single brain along a single path. It was always the resultant of various minds, and even when framed, liable to be diverted by imperious impulses.

Hart pg. 24.

In contrast, the British Cabinet was united in the firm determination to arrive at an agreement with Germany and was prepared to make any concession that would not involve the surrender of her foreign policy to Germany's keeping. That Britain made mistakes is true. Without doubt the most serious one was the introduction of the dreadnought, which simply cancelled the value of her old fleet and made the race almost even. Then, too, though Edward VII did not engineer the encirclement of Germany, his constant travelling companion Sir Charles Hardinge was, to say the least, not pro-German. On three occasions, at Reval, at Friedrichshof, and at Ischl, he blundered into making statements which seemed to contain veiled threats. Such tactics were foreign to the policy of Grey and Hardinge should have remained at home. Finally, Germany was astonished at the delegation to Berlin, in 1912, of the War Minister, Haldane, instead of a naval or foreign office official and the Kaiser decided that the whole proposal was merely a 'political manoeuvre.'[#] In retrospect, especially since politicians had repeatedly failed to achieve results, it seems that it might have been wiser to follow the advice of Hallin and have given the Naval experts a chance. However, these points weigh lightly in the scale as compared with the aggregate blunders of German statesmen. A policy which between 1900-1908 could compel the Liberal Government of England to make common cause with the autocracy of Russia stands self condemned.

The immediate cause of the failure of Great Britain and Germany to co-operate, in the cause of world peace, lay in Germany's naval policy. This was, however, but the practical expression of certain underlying and determining factors, chiefly: the absence

Ex-Kaiser pg. 151.

among German officials of the spirit of compromise, an exaggerated opinion of the country's strength, crass ignorance of foreign countries and above all an almost incredible amount of bureaucratic conceit. All these characteristics point back to that nation's mushroom growth in the post-Bismarkian era. Germany played the role of a flaunting upstart among the nations of Europe and her collapse was as sensational as her rise. That Germany had every right, in an imperialistic age, to expand her trade, her influence, and her prestige, is not denied, but when she undertook to make her interests and those of her Austrian ally prevail in every quarter and at every point, she undertook what was beyond her strength. Wisdom and enlightened self-interest should have suggested to the power, whose creation had been achieved in the teeth of France, and whose development was being pursued at the expense of Russia, that the opposition of England should not be gratuitously added to the obstacles which beset her feet.

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