An Analysis of Pre-Revolutionary Russian Liberalism and Its Parallels to the Gorbachev Reforms.

by

PAMELA ISFELD

A thesis
presented to the University of Manitoba
in fulfillment of the
thesis requirement for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
Political Studies

Winnipeg, Manitoba

ISBN 0-315-76970-X

AN ANALYSIS OF PRE-REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIAN LIBERALISM AND ITS PARALLELS TO THE GORBACHEV REFORMS

BY

PAMELA ISFELD

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis.

I authorize the University of Manitoba to lend this thesis to other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research.

Pam Isfeld

I further authorize the University of Manitoba to reproduce this thesis by photocopying or by other means, in total or in part, at the request of other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research.

Pam Isfeld

ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the Russian liberal movement at the turn of the century and compares it to the recent Gorbachev reforms in the contemporary Soviet Union. Some aspects of **glasnost** and **perestroika.** are similar to Russian liberalism as expressed by the Cadet Party. Like Gorbachev, the Cadets found that their gains in the areas of freedom of speech and political activity actually helped their rivals, many of whom were overtly hostile to their ideas and values. After the Bolsheviks coup and the dissolution of the Provisional Government in 1917, it seemed that liberalism had been abandoned in the Soviet Union. But, in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev initiated a reform programme which has several parallels to pre-revolutionary Russian liberalism in terms of its goals, ideology, constituency, and the obstacles to its implementation.

The thesis begins with a brief history of the liberal movement in Russia, and traces its development in relation to important social and political events. Then the basic values, policies, membership and constituency of the movement, up to the formation of the Cadet Party in 1905, are analyzed. The next chapter compares the movement to its opponents including the conservatives and the Marxists. The central argument here is that liberalism was not as solidly rooted in Russian culture and tradition as its competitors. Then the Cadets and their actions in the political arena are discussed, and their strategies and tactics in dealing with factions in their own party are assessed. They made several errors including failing to broaden their base of support by maintaining alliances with compatible elements of the left or right, overestimating the Tsar's commitment to the Duma, and supporting the government on unpopular issues.

The next chapter discusses Gorbachev's efforts to reform the Soviet Union, with attention to his reasons for beginning the process, his bases of support, the opposition he faced, and his methods of dealing with the problems that arose. The conclusion sums up the similarities and differences between the two movements.

CONTENTS

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Before 1985, students of Soviet politics were often tempted to view that country's government as monolithic and impregnable, immune to the political and economic upheavals that seem to confront the rest of the world on a regular basis. Furthermore, the reigning Communist Party claimed to have made a complete break from the capitalist period before 1917.

This thesis will attempt to argue that some aspects of the pre-revolutionary period are of relevance to politics in what until recently was known as the Soviet Union. It deals with two related issues. The first concerns the failure of the liberal movement in turn-of-the century Russia. At first glance, liberal objectives seemed reasonable: democratic reform and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. These reformers sought to improve the system rather than destroy it completely. But the liberals, who came to be represented by the Constitutional Democratic Party, did not achieve their goals because they unwittingly came to play a destructive role in the Russian political system.[1] Ironically, their ideology and policies served to

[1] The Cadet Party gets its abbreviated name from the combination of the Russian letters "kah" and "deh" for

enhance and exacerbate the many anti-liberal elements and attitudes present in Russia in the 1900's, while failing to make use of those factions which could have facilitated democratic reform. The changes they sought would have been very difficult (if not impossible) to achieve within the framework of Tsarism.

This analysis of the failure of the liberal movement in pre-revolutionary Russia gives rise to a second question of more current interest. Did the liberalization programme initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 have anything in common with its Tsarist predecessor? There are many obvious differences between the two movements, but some aspects of **perestroika** are similar to the goals of the Cadet Party. Furthermore, Gorbachev was forced to deal with many of the same issues as the Cadets, and made some of the same mistakes as they did.

The argument offered in this thesis hinges on certain basic assumptions regarding the nature of liberalism. Although it has never been precisely and completely defined to everyone's satisfaction, it may be said to stand for certain values and beliefs. In the political realm, these would include effective representative government, with a freely elected legislative branch able to wield real power in enacting laws and checking the power of the executive, and an administration chosen on the basis of merit rather

---

Constitutional Democrats.

than nepotism. Liberals throughout history have also sought the establishment of an independent judiciary, able to dispense justice according to the rule of law, without fear or favour.

In the economic arena, liberalism involves respect for private property, scope for private initiative with minimal bureaucratic interference, and reliance upon the free market as the primary means of production. In the social and cultural milieu, liberals emphasize individualism and personal choice regarding matters of conscience, and promote religious tolerance, separation of church and state, constitutional safeguards for individual rights, freedom of association and expression, and respect for cultural diversity.

Circumstances have caused (or allowed) individuals and groups to add to or subtract from these basic tenets. Just as no single definition of liberal philosophy can be adequate to describe all aspects of each of its acolytes, no person or party constitutes a "perfect liberal." Adherence to liberalism, like socialism or fascism, is a matter of degree. With regard to countries, it may be broadly stated that India, for example, is more liberal than China, North America more liberal than South America, England more liberal than Germany, and Western Europe more liberal than Eastern Europe. Indeed, for good or ill, liberalization has

been closely associated with westernization. Few political leaders in Russian or Soviet history espoused liberalism in every sense of the term. Rather, Miliukov was more liberal than Stolypin or Lenin, and Gorbachev more liberal than Stalin or Brezhnev. Where Boris Yeltsin and the emerging leaders of the new Commonwealth will fall on this continuum is yet to be determined.

Chapter Two deals with the specific question, "What is Russian Liberalism?" One of the main problems facing anyone interested in this aspect of Russian politics is the difficulty of defining the term in the Imperial context. The familiar British and American theories were modified almost beyond recognition by Russian tradition and political culture. This chapter discusses the mystique of autocracy and the people's periodic efforts to rebel against it. Some of the deepest controversies arose in regard to the value of Western ideals, first introduced by Peter the Great. After the Decembrist uprising of 1825, those who sought to introduce European ideas of political freedom became a threat to the status quo.

Liberalism did not become an influential political contender until the 1890's, when a number of forces united under the auspices of 'democracy' and zemstvo constitutionalism. From 1900-to 1904, the constitutionalist

movement grew from a hazy cluster of ideas and theories supported by a few intellectuals to an organized force with its own apparatus, platform, and press. Unfortunately, the seeds of conflict between the gentry liberals and the zemstvo professionals were planted during this period, before an official party was even formed. These groups would later disagree on a number of important issues, including the adequacy of the October Manifesto as a basis for constitutional reform. However, most liberals, including members of the Cadet Party, did share a commitment to certain basic values, including a desire to improve Russia as a state and respect for the rule of law.

Chapter Three deals with the competition faced by Miliukov and his followers. While the democrats were divided amongst themselves, other ideologies were offering alternatives to their philosophies. Some of these movements arose in response to the Slavophile-Westernizer debate of the 1840's, a conflict over the value and relevance of foreign ideals for Imperial Russia and its subjects. The Westernizers felt that the nation would benefit from becoming more like Europe, while the Slavophiles thought too much outside influence would destroy the people's uniqueness. The latter group believed that Russia's problems would be solved by a return to ancient Slavonic traditions. Even after the controversy was no longer central for Russian intellectuals, it continued to

influence political and social thought. One of its main legacies was the view of the post-Petrine Tsarist state and society as two distinct, even antagonistic entities.

The majority of liberals, particularly those in the Cadet Party, fell firmly on the Westernizer side of the issue. Other influential thinkers, like Pobedonostsev, Soloviev, and Tolstoy, leaned toward the Slavophile view. The Marxists under Plekhanov are most often classed as Westernizers, but the populists believed in the Russian peasant as the source of everything positive. Lenin managed to synthesize these two views. The one thing most of these movements shared was a hostility to the concept of liberal individualism.

The fourth chapter deals with the activities of the liberals, represented primarily by the Constitutional Democratic (or Cadet) party, in the Russian political arena after the revolution of 1905. In spite of their disadvantages in comparison to other groups, the Cadets did manage to attract a considerable following. The reasons for both their early success and their ultimate failure lie not only in the broad social and intellectual context in which they were forced to operate, but also in their leadership's methods of dealing with internal factions and political rivals.

The central argument in Chapter Four is that while the Cadets did face a number of obstacles beyond their control, they also made several strategic errors. These include failing to make alliances with like-minded members of either the left or the right, placing too much faith in the Duma as a means of bringing about permanent reform, and supporting the government position on a number of contentious issues. These mistakes weakened their image in the eyes of the Russian people, and other groups managed to exploit those weaknesses for their own gains.

Chapter Five deals with the Gorbachev reforms in the contemporary Soviet Union, and discusses them with reference to the issues faced by the Cadets over eighty years before. Gorbachev's initial interest in change arose in response to the economic stagnation which set in during the Brezhnev era. The origin of these problems can be traced to Stalin's industrialization programme, which established entirely new branches of industry and created new classes of government managers and bureaucrats. By World War II, the Soviet Union had become an industrial power due to the implementation of the planning system. But by the end of the 1950's, the system had begun to weaken, and by 1985 the situation had become critical. Gorbachev recognized that reform was a political issue as well as an economic one, since it involved deeply entrenched interest groups and a political culture that was opposed to many of his ideas.

In order to implement his programme, Gorbachev had to gain the support of at least some members of the intelligentsia. At the same time, he had to avoid antagonizing those Party members and bureaucrats already in positions of power, and convince them that they would benefit in the long run. In spite of his best efforts, he was not always successful in this endeavor. By 1988, public discontent had risen sharply and the conservative opposition had begun to voice its grievances openly. Gorbachev tried to reconcile the interests of both the left and the right, but did not succeed in satisfying either. Ultimately, in August 1991, conservative members of the Politboro, the military, and the KGB tried to seize power in an unsuccessful coup. Although Gorbachev himself did resign shortly thereafter, he was succeeded by others who wish to see reform implemented at an even faster pace. In some ways, his programme succeeded beyond his own expectations.

Finally, the conclusion summarizes the similarities and differences between the two movements. Although there are many obvious contrasts, including the fact that Gorbachev was in charge of the government while Cadets were comparative outsiders to the system, there are also some interesting parallels. Both could be classed as Westernizers, with similar views of the type of society they wanted to develop, both had problems finding a constituency, and both found that their opponents benefitted from the reforms they implemented.

Chapter II

WHAT IS RUSSIAN LIBERALISM?

One of the main problems facing students of Russian liberalism is the difficulty of defining the term itself. The unique nature of Russian history and political culture has caused profound modification of the familiar British and American theories. In order to understand the movement itself, it is necessary to first trace its development in relation to other important social and political events. Then, the basic values, policies, membership, and constituency of the Russian liberal movement can be better understood.

Liberalism in Russia must be viewed against the background of Russian political culture. Even at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Tsar possessed power unparalleled by that of any ruler in the world, with the possible exception of the Emperor of China. Autocracy was widely revered as the force which had united the Empire, and protected the people from both internal and external enemies. Furthermore, Russia had always lacked the type of institutions which had given birth to the concepts of "individual rights" and "rule of law" in Europe. Many have noted that there was no Russian "high middle ages,"

equivalent to that which produced the parliaments, universities, and independent law courts upon which medieval European society was based. Nor did Russia possess the institution of Roman law, which delineated the individual right of property, and laid the foundation for the concept of natural right as the basis for political sovereignty. Perhaps most significantly, it lacked an independent church, which, sometimes in conflict with the governments of the day, articulated a set of obligations other than those of the individual to the state.[2]

In Russia, the state was always the dominant social institution, and anarchy and dissolution were often seen as the only alternatives to its control. All social institutions were created and sustained by the autocracy, which had even managed to make the once-independent Russian Orthodox Church a department of the bureaucracy. Although Russia, like other premodern European societies, was agrarian, service to the state, rather than inheritance or financial success, brought the gentry its privilege and status.[3] These attitudes were encouraged by the last three monarchs, who, while they saw themselves as Europeans,

---

[2] Geoffrey A. Hosking, The Russian Constitutional Experiment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1973. p. 1. Cf. Theodore von Laue, "Prospects of Liberal Democracy In Russia," in Charles E. Timberlake, (ed.), Essays on Russian Liberalism. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 1972. p. 2.

[3] Robert Edelman, Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution. New Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers University Press. p. 2.

believed that the doctrine of autocratic rule offered protection for Russia's strength in the face of Western decadence. At the turn of the century, it was still generally accepted and even expected that the Tsar would make unilateral decisions.

In spite of this cultural tolerance for autocracy, the Empire experienced periodic dissatisfaction and even rebellion. The deepest controversies seemed to arise in regard to the value of Western ideas for Russia and her people. Although the seeds of such conflict were sown by Peter the Great's attempts to modernize the country, they did not pose a serious threat to Tsarism itself before the Decembrist uprising of 1825.[4]

On December 14, 1825, part of the St. Petersburg garrison mutinied against the new Tsar, Nicholas I. The garrison's officers, taking advantage of their impressionable subordinates, convinced them that Nicholas was trying to usurp the throne from Constantine, the "rightful" heir.[5] The leaders were, almost without exception, officers who had served during the Napoleonic Wars and had the opportunity to glimpse some positive aspects of Western culture. Even in defeat, France was characterized by an intellectual and

---

[4] Paul Miliukov, Russia and Its Crisis. New York: Collier. 1962. p. 173-4. Also, Bernard Pares, Russia and Reform. London: Constable. 1907. p. 30-1.

[5] Adam B. Ulam, Russia's Three Failed Revolutions. New York: Basic Books. 1981. p. 3.

social life unparalleled in Russia. Most importantly, its government respected certain individual rights and did not subscribe to serfdom.[6]

Circumstances encouraged the uprising. Although Alexander I had seemed to personify national resistance and Russian ideals during the war, he embraced mysticism and reaction soon after Napoleon's defeat. His youthful plans for reform were abandoned and replaced by a desire to maintain the status quo by military and police force if necessary. Moreover, the postwar settlement granting Finland[7] and the Polish territories representative institutions and limited local autonomy was a blow to Russian pride.[8]

Since Alexander's regime did not allow any forum for even the mildest discussion of reform, organizations interested in such issues were forced underground. The restrictions on freedom of expression meant that the Decembrists had no means of educating the people or gaining their support.[9] There was no middle class in the Western sense, and no

---

[6] Ulam, p. 5.

[7] Jacob Walkin. The Rise of Democracy in Pre-Revolutionary Russia. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1962. p. 120.

[8] Michael Hryhory Voskobiynyk, The Nationalities Question in Russia in 1905-1907: A Study in the Origin of Modern Nationalism. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms. 1984. p. 72.

[9] James Billington. The Icon and the Axe. New York: Vintage Books. 1962. pp. 266-7.

industrial proletariat like that of France or England. Most of society consisted of peasants who were seen as too ignorant or passive to contemplate change through political action. Therefore, any reformist or revolutionary movement was destined to be an elite "conspiracy," forced to strike at the top of the system rather than build slowly from the bottom.

The Decembrists were unsuccessful for many reasons, ranging from lingering personal attachments to the Tsar and a common distaste for assassination to their lack of organizational structure or shared ideology. But, while the mutiny lasted only one day and was easily suppressed by the Tsar's forces, it captured the popular imagination. Although many people begged the Tsar to show mercy, the rebels were either sent into permanent exile or hanged.[10]

The Decembrists mark the end of the period of "aristocratic reformism" which had begun when Catherine the Great convened her first legislative commission.[11] They and their legend stand at the beginning of the modern phase of Russian politics, when the myth of "enlightened absolutism" began to disintegrate. Some began to wonder if it was wise to depend upon the Tsar to keep their best interests uppermost in his mind. After all, why would he accept

---

[10] Edward Crankshaw, In the Shadow of the Winter Palace: Russia's Drift Toward Revolution 1825-1917. New York: Viking Press. 1976. p. 18.

[11] Billington, p. 266.

changes that would limit his power, even if it would help the nation? For the rest of the Empire's history, the battle took place between reaction and outright rebellion, with periods of compromise and reform appearing as interludes in the struggle.

From this context there emerged the constitutionalist movement, whose advocates sought to break the confines of reactionary rule and establish a democratic government modelled after those of Britain and the United States. Generally, they rejected the idea of change through violence which was central to most anti-government movements in the country. As the constitutionalists were hampered by many of the same factors as the Decembrists, the movement was fragmented and limited, for the most part, to members of the aristocracy and the new professional class.[12] It was not until the 1890's, when a several groups banded together in secrecy to promote democracy and zemstvo constitutionalism that the liberals gained a national platform and increased intellectual respectability.[13]

During the 1890's, Russia experienced a great upsurge of modern industrialization. After the Crimean War, which gave the Tsar reason to reflect on his ability to wage war

---

[12] George Fischer, Russian Liberalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1980. p. 45-6. Cf. George Nelson Rhyne, The Constitutional Democratic Party From Its Origins to the First State Duma. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms. 1969. pp. 21-23.

[13] Billington, p. 447.

against a Western power, and prompted by the formation of new military alliances in Central Europe, he and his advisors decided to drastically increase the Empire's economic potential. Although the government was still considerably dependent upon foreign investment, the structure of rural administration created under Alexander III gave the bureaucracy the power to collect taxes from the peasantry. This new source of funds increased the government's ability to finance industrialization amid relative price and currency stability.[14] The peasants, however, felt that they were being unfairly burdened and saw few benefits from the development of industry in the cities.

This period of economic growth was different from previous spurts in that it was based on fixed, durable capital and therefore had greater recuperative powers than its predecessors. It was characterized by a more substantial investment in human resources, and by bringing about considerable changes in entrepreneurial attitudes, it made industrialization less dependent on the state.[15] Many of these new entrepreneurs were interested in both political and economic freedom, and, even after the depression of 1900, they provided a ready constituency for the liberal movement.

---

[14] Alexander Gershenkron, "Problems of Industrialization." in Robert H. MacNeal (ed.), Russia in Transition 1905-1914. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1970. pp. 71-2.

[15] Ibid. p. 73.

The period from 1900- 1904 was a watershed for the movement. It marked the group's transition from an amorphous collection of ideals and programmes, supported by a few activists, to a concrete force with its own organization, platform, and press. During these years, the liberals acquired powerful new weapons, including the magazine Osvobozhdenie (Liberation) and the organization, the Union of Liberation. At the same time, their interests shifted from local and essentially cultural issues, such as education, to national politics. As this change occurred, the gentry was forced to yield leadership of the movement to the relatively new professional middle class.[16]

Although the two groups shared an interest in the zemstvos, or local councils, the gentry and the professional classes differed considerably in their attitudes, interests, and plans for reform. Like their counterparts in England at the time of the Magna Carta, many members of the aristocracy sought greater security from the capriciousness of autocratic rule. Their privileged position had been attacked several times over the centuries. Most recently, the abolishment of serfdom had disrupted their power bases.[17] They wanted the entrenchment of individual rights and freedoms, including the freedom to own private property

---

[16] Fischer, p. 120. cf. Terrence Emmons, The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1983. p. 22.

[17] Paul Miliukov, p. 177.

and to move freely about the Empire. In addition, they sought more control over national affairs and decision-making, and this made a guarantee of freedom of speech and conscience essential.[18]

While the gentry could be "liberal" in this sense, however, they were basically happy with their position in the hierarchy of the Empire and did not want to jeopardize it with sweeping economic or social change.[19] Many aristocrats believed that a constitutional arrangement which was binding on the Tsar would threaten Russia's uniqueness and make it a cheap imitation of Europe. These "Slavophile liberals" thought any parliament should play only an advisory role in Russian politics.[20] In the meantime, they sought to use the zemstvos as a means of political expression and local autonomy, not because of any great attachment to the principles behind them, but rather because they were the only forums available for **any** sort of reformist ideas.[21]

---

[18] Billington, p. 445.

[19] Edelman, pp. 2-6, and Emmons, p. 24.

[20] Fischer, p. 130-3. For a detailed discussion of the ideal Slavophile parliament, see Hans Rogger, "Was There a Russian Fascism: The Union of the Russian People." Journal of Modern History. XXXVI. no. 4. Dec. 1965. pp. 398-415.

[21] Edelman, p. 20.

The adult education movement of the 1890's arose in response to the growing demand for scientists and technicians created by the industrialization process. The zemstvos hired large numbers of these new professionals to deal with their day-to-day business. Generally speaking, these youthful appointees and recruits were more radical than the gentry and sought deeper systemic change. Many came from "lower-class" backgrounds and saw their education as a tool for climbing the socio-economic ladder. Ironically, while many were employed by the zemstvos as experts on various matters from law to agriculture, they soon realized that the Tsarist system did not allow their expertise much scope in power-sharing. They had limited personal freedoms and little chance of really influencing government decisions.[22]

Like the liberal gentry, the new professional class believed in the importance of individual rights and freedoms, but they tended to be less patient with the slow pace of reforms. They had little to lose and a great deal to gain if change took place rapidly. The new class had less personal attachment to the Tsar or the elite in general, and stronger connections to the peasants and workers. Its members were also much less likely to embrace Slavophilism than their aristocratic counterparts were.

---

[22] Billington, p. 450. For a discussion of the gentry's views on the influx of professionals, see Edelman, pp. 11-12.

They sought explicit Western-style limitations on the Tsar's powers, universal suffrage, and by extension, the elimination of some aristocratic privilege.[23] Tensions between the two groups were inevitable.

Also, as the revolutionary fervour of 1905 grew, so did calls for more legislation in favour of the national minorities. At the Moscow Congress of the zemstvos in 1905, the liberal majority demanded that any future constitution should guarantee cultural self-determination for all ethnic groups.[24] Although many members of the Congress defined themselves as liberal, they often belonged to organizations dedicated specifically to advancing nationalist interests. The most active of these was the Union of Federalists and Autonomists whose members included Azerbaijans, Armenians, Estonians, Poles, Georgians, Ukrainians, and Jews.[25]

The 1905 zemstvo congress asserted that "all peoples of Russia are interested in decentralization of state power."[26] It also proposed the "organization of the sovereignty of the people on the principle of a federated union," and the establishment of a constitution with "such rules as would guarantee to each and every minority and nationality the

---

[23] Fischer, p. 121.

[24] Voskobiynik, p. 122.

[25] Max M. Laserson, Russia and the Western World. New York: Macmillan and Co. 1945. p. 78.

[26] quoted in Ibid. p. 79.

inviolability of its inalienable rights and interests."[27] But in spite of these sentiments, many liberals feared that minority members' ties to national and ethnic groups would prove stronger than their allegiance to the constitutional movement as a whole. At least one analyst argues that liberalism, with its emphasis on achieving basic political freedoms as a precondition for all other change, was actually an impediment to non-Russian nationalism.[28]

Even with these divisions within the movement, the liberals did manage to accomplish a number of important things during the first part of the decade. The Stuttgart-based emigre journal Osvobozhdenie was a joint gentry-intelligentsia effort, at least initially. Its first issue, published on June 18, 1902, contained an editorial by Peter Struve, a prominent left-leaning liberal and former Marxist. In this piece, he pleaded for unity among all those seeking change in Russian society:

> [W]hile the extreme currents of our country are organized, the liberal moderate nucleus of Russian society remains in an amorphous state...The liberal and revolutionary currents are part of the same great liberation movement since the struggle for freedom can triumph only as a broad national movement, whose paths, forms, and methods must be and cannot but be varied.[29]

---

[27] Ibid.

[28] Voskobiynyk, pp. 441-2.

[29] quoted in Fischer, p. 133

In the interests of maintaining ties to the gentry, the more moderate Paul Miliukov committed the magazine to the zemstvo cause in the same issue. As they were still the only organs of self-government in Russia, the local councils possessed the only legal means of political action in the country, and some liberals thought they could be used to advance the cause.[30]

Although the two major liberal activists, Miliukov and Struve, had similar backgrounds, they differed radically in interests and temperament. Miliukov was born near St. Petersburg in 1859, the son of a professor of architecture. After serving as a medical orderly in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, he entered the faculty of history and philology at Moscow University.[31] There he studied a number of Western thinkers, and grew to admire Auguste Comte's positivism and Marx's theory of history. In spite of his interest in Marx he rejected radical politics and belonged to the most moderate wing of the student movement. He explained this by saying he was "younger than the generation of the seventies which was enthusiastic about populism, but older than the generation of the eighties and nineties which pledged allegiance to Marx."[32] Nonetheless, his activities

---

[30] Edelman, p. 19.

[31] T. Riha, A Russian European: Paul Miliukov in Russian Politics. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 1968. pp. 6-8.

[32] Miliukov, Outlines in Russian Culture. Vol.I. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1942. p.

after the assassination of Alexander II were enough to get him jailed and barred from the university for a year.[33]

After completing his doctorate in history, Miliukov, like many other moderate reformers, began to take part in the adult education movement in the hope of changing society from within. He was soon exiled to Riazin, and after two years was ordered to move to the remote city of Ufa, or go abroad. He opted to become a professor of history at Sofia University in Bulgaria, but he offended the Tsar's ambassador in 1898 and was dismissed under Russian pressure.[34] After spending some time in Turkey, he was allowed to return to St. Petersburg. In 1901 he was arrested for taking part in a demonstration honouring a populist writer, and was sent to jail for six months. Although he was banished from the city after his release, he maintained his contact with his fellow liberals.[35] It was during this period that he helped to found Osvobozhdenie.

When members of the government became aware of Miliukov's work with the journal, they offered him the choice of exile for three years or prison for six months. He chose prison, but was released with a warning when his former advisor

---

5.

[33] Donald Treadgold, "Foreword." in Russia and Its Crisis. p. 6.

[34] Riha, pp. 27-34.

[35] Treadgold, p. 7.

intervened with the Tsar. In 1903 he left to tour the United States and Europe, and did not return to Russia until the outbreak of revolution in 1905.[36]

The Tsarist government did manage to prevent Miliukov's election to the first two Dumas, but he remained the real leader of the Cadet party. Later he served as Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government of 1917, where he directed Russia's efforts in World War I. After Lenin seized power, he tried to organize an anti-Bolshevik front, hoping to obtain Western support. After the Bolsheviks consolidated their power in 1921, Miliukov fled to Paris where he remained until his death in 1943.[37]

Peter Struve was only eight years old when Miliukov was serving in the Russo-Turkish War. His father, the Governor of Perm, was forced into early retirement because of his mild opposition to some government policies.[38] From an early age, Struve showed an interest in politics, and amazed his teachers by devouring political pamphlets and journals while still in grade school. He also had a photographic memory and could repeat verbatim conversations held twenty years before.[39]

---

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid. p. 7-8.

[38] Fischer, p. 99.

[39] Richard Pipes, Struve: Liberal on the Left. Cambrige: Harvard University Press. 1970. pp. 13-14.

At the University of St. Petersburg, Struve participated in Social Democratic agitation among the workers and was arrested and later placed under police surveillance.[40] Although he was committed to Marxism, he believed in knowledge for its own sake, regardless of political relevance. This tendency was frowned upon by other members of the intelligentsia, who saw his insistence on separating knowledge and art from politics as a sign of an imperfect committment to their goals. They viewed him with mistrust, and he treated them with disdain. Nonetheless, he did spend most of his time in their midst until he was thirty.[41] Struve spent much of his youth in Stuttgart, where he studied philosophy and economics, and became involved with the German Social Democratic Movement. At twenty-four, he wrote Critical Comments on the Economic Development of Russia, the first full-length original Marxist work published in Russia. Its thesis that capitalism is an essential phase of Russian development led to Struve's split with Lenin and the revolutionary socialists.[42]

According to his memoirs, Struve was a liberal constitutionalist even before he became a Marxist:

> Just as naturally as in 1885 I had become, by passion and conviction, a liberal and a constitutionalist, so about three years later I became, but this time **by conviction** only, a Social

---

[40] Fischer, p. 99.

[41] Pipes, p. 15.

[42] Billington, p. 462.

> Democrat...[I] came to the conclusion that [socialism] was the historically inevitable result of economic development.[43]

Although he disliked the orthodoxy and authoritarianism he saw in the Russian socialist ranks, Struve maintained a Marxist approach to social and economic analysis even as he became a leader in the liberal movement. He also blamed the modern tradition of alienation from government for the lack of constructive evolution in Russian politics and society.[44]

The founding of Osvobozhdenie one of Struve's most important acts as an official member of the constitutionalist movement. The magazine's first edition boldly described the transition to parliamentary government. After the Tsar proclaimed the personal and civil liberties demanded, the zemstvos and municipal dumas, rather than the government, were to name representatives to a congress which would then draft electoral statutes. The final two stages of the changeover would involve mass elections and the organization of a national assembly.[45] Osvobozhdenie specifically rejected the Slavophile dream of a consultative, rather than a legislative body on the grounds that:

---

[43] Peter Struve, "My Contacts and Conflicts With Lenin." Part One. pp. 575-80, quoted in Fischer, p. 101.

[44] P. Struve, "The Intelligentsia and Revolution." in Landmarks 1909. pp. 156-74.

[45] Fischer, p. 134-5.

> free forms of political life are no more national than the use of an alphabet or a printing press, of steam or electricity. They are simply the forms of advanced culture--sufficiently broad and flexible to contain within them heterogeneous national content.[46]

It was characteristic of this initial period that both the Struve and Miliukov statements emphasized unity and broad principles, while avoiding the thorny problems of tactics and social reforms. The hope that constitutional liberalism could unite both leftist revolutionaries and rightist non-constitutionalists was uppermost in their minds, but such dreams had to be modified, if not abandoned altogether, by 1903. Miliukov felt that the group had tried to represent too many interests, and particularly disagreed with what he saw as 'pandering' to the Slavophile liberal element of the gentry.[47] He feared that this faction might, at any moment, follow its fellow nobles into a deal with the autocracy. His strategy was to mobilize the forces that were "oppositionary without being revolutionary," or "those elements [that] either by their social position or their political views, are intermediate between the rulers and the revolutionaries."[48]

---

[46] quoted in Ibid. p. 135.

[47] Rhyne, pp. 52-3, and Emmons, pp. 23-6.

[48] Paul Miliukov, Russia and Its Crisis. p. 377.

Although it appeared that this issue could cause a split between the two most important liberal theorists of the day, Struve agreed with the criticism and developed a programme for the group of constitutionalists Miliukov wished to organize. Such an organization would be explicitly democratic and thus would have to exclude most of the Slavophiles, except as potentially useful allies. It would also have to extend the request for creation of an electoral law to a demand for outright universal suffrage, clarify its position on social and agricultural issues, and combine both legal and illegal tactics.[49] These changes caused the movement to move further to the left on the political spectrum, and appealed to the intelligentsia liberals much more than to those of gentry origin.

Struve called for the establishment of a formal political party several times from 1902 on. Nonetheless, the majority of constitutionalist leaders resisted such pressure from their followers, preferring to maintain a loose united from encompassing as many factions from the non-revolutionary left to the moderate right as possible. Miliukov believed that parties would evolve naturally after the basic constitutional framework was in place, and civil liberties were assured.[50] If the opposition split into separate factions before Tsarism had been defeated, it would weaken

---

[49] Rhyne, p. 54-5.

[50] Miliukov, Russia and Its Crisis. pp. 166-7.

itself and assure the triumph of autocracy.[51]

The formation of the Union of Liberation in 1903 was partly an effort to placate Struve and his supporters. The Union started as a clandestine organization, with conspiratorial activities as well as secret leaders and branches. Gentry liberals were far outnumbered by the intelligentsia in the group's membership.[52] In accordance with the shift in priorities that occurred after the Miliukov-Struve debates, the nobles' role was reduced even further by the official separation of their group from that of the middle classes in the organization.[53]

Soon after the Union was founded, its members were faced with a national event which shook the entire nation. When the Japanese attacked Russian ships at Port Arthur on February 8, 1904, they made the Tsarist government much more dependent upon the good will of its people.[54] This development should have strengthened the reformist group, but it provoked a division instead. The split between the 'defeatists,' who believed that a Japanese victory would precipitate social change more quickly than anything else, and the 'defensists,' who still hoped the Russians would

---

[51] Emmons, p. 24.

[52] Edelman, p. 20.

[53] Rhyne, pp. 54-5.

[54] Hugh Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1960. pp. 219-20.

win, foreshadowed the dilemma which would later plague the Provisional Government in the midst of World War I.[55]

Miliukov and Struve fell on opposite sides of the debate, with the the latter supporting the war effort and the former less enthusiastic. In his controversial "Letter to Students," Struve advised activists to participate in patriotic demonstrations, and adopt the slogans "Long live the army" and "Long live Russia," but add "Long live free Russia" and "Long live freedom." He argued that an anti-war stance would only alienate the public. He warned Miliukov:

> For the sake of the great liberation task which demands the greates possible unity, it is essential for you to treat with care and tact the uncomplicated patriotism of your friends, for whom Russian freedom is still an empty sound.[56]

Miliukov replied that the liberals "should be patriots for ourselves and the future, not worrying whether our patriotism will be recognized as such [by chauvinists]."[57] He held that, in the longer term, the people would lose respect for opposition if it seemed to ally itself with the unpopular government. While he did not go as far as to say that the opposition should actively work for a Japanese victory, he did say they should withhold any form of support.

---

[55] Fischer, pp. 160-7.

[56] Listok Osvobozhdenie no. 1. Feb. 24, 1904. quoted in Ibid. p. 162.

[57] Osvobozhdenie. no. 3. March 7, 1904. quoted in Ibid.

The liberals were unable to agree on a position, and eventually drafted a resolution which stressed the need for reform regardless of the outcome of the conflict.[58] Although the war did divert some attention from reform issues for a while, in the end, it produced a nation-wide crisis of confidence in the Tsar, which helped all members of the opposition.[59]

Another important event in the history of the movement was the Third Zemstvo Congress, held in November, 1904. The Second Congress had been divided over the constitutionalist versus Slavophile issue and had narrowly averted a split by agreeing to include **two** sections dealing with the future political system of Russia: one which represented the majority opinion and another which expressed the minority view of Dmitri Shipov and his Slavophile followers.[60] The Third Congress attempted to resolve the question but came up with the Trebetskoi Memorandum, which again reflected both positions.

Dmitri Shipov was one of the most influential liberals of the 1890's. A member of the Moscow gentry, he was elected to both his local and provincial zemstvos at the age of twenty-six. By 1893, he was chairman of the provincial board,making him the most prominent zemstvo official in all

---

[58] Seton-Watson, p. 219-20.

[59] Rhyne, p. 433

[60] Fischer, p. 189.

of Russia.[61] Although he had become involved with the councils because of government efforts to limit their powers, he was adamantly opposed to constitutions.

According to Shipov, he and the constitutional left had entirely different world views and philosophies. While the left believed that politics was "a process of constant competition between society and state" and sought to construct an order on the basis of individual rights, his own view was based on "Christian love and unity."[62] He believed that Russia's problems could be solved not by eliminating autocracy, but by making it more responsive to the people. Reformers should seek to eliminate

> the separation of the Tsar from the people, the lack of access to the Tsar of the voice of the population...[W]hat is desirable is a renovated imperial authority on the one hand and on the other free access to the Tsar of the people's voice through elected representatives.[63]

He maintained his belief in the Slavophile maxim "the power of authority to the Tsar, the power of opinion to the people,"[64] even after the government branded him a dangerous radical and refused to confirm his election as provincial zemstvo chair in 1904.[65]

---

[61] Ibid. p. 22.

[62] Dimitri Shipov, Vospaminnaniia. p. 276-8, quoted in Emmons, p. 90-1.

[63] Shipov, K Mneniiu menshinstva chstnoq o zasedaniia zemskikh delatelei. pp. 7-8. quoted in Fischer, p. 24.

[64] Donald W. Treadgold, Lenin and His Rivals. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1955. p. 115.

The Trebetskoi Memorandum addressed the importance of peasant concerns, such as the land reform question, but stressed political freedom as the essential first step toward any solutions. Interestingly, it pointedly described the Tsar as the logical source of change:

> Before it is too late, let the initiative for this great and holy cause come in this case, too, from the supreme authority. It alone can accomplish [the reforms] in a peaceful manner and thereby solidify all the more the basis of its own strength for future times, for the future of Russia.[66]

This statement was both an attempt to placate the Slavophiles and a reflection of the group's ambivalence toward the autocracy. Like many such attempts at conciliation, however, this one served only to anger both factions.

The deferential and patriotic sentiments of the Trebetskoi Memorandum set the tone for most future liberal public statements. The attitudes expressed in this document pervaded most zemstvo assemblies as well as the four national zemstvo congresses that took place in 1905. Even the petition carried by Father Gapon in his famous Bloody Sunday march on the Winter Palace gave priority to political demands and identified the Tsar as the source of the desired transformations.[67] Indeed, the liberals' demands were

---

[65] Emmons, p. 92.

[66] quoted in Fischer, p. 190.

[67] Crankshaw, p. 338.

echoed, at least temporarily, by all but the most radical groups.[68] But, while their programme included the usual goal of mass suffrage, the Cadets did not take a stand on the introduction of female suffrage or the desirability of a bicameral legislature.[69]

In the period leading up to Bloody Sunday, there was, according to one prominent liberal, "one common front, from the revolutionaries to the conservative sections of our society."[70] Almost everyone despised the autocracy, if not the autocrat. Even the ultra-conservatives were disgusted with Nicholas II's inability to maintain order. Like the majority of the opposition, Miliukov moved closer to the idea of revolution, much to the chagrin of the gentry element. He believed that everyone who shared the goal of democratic freedom should forget their differences until autocracy was destroyed. Therefore, he led the liberals into a shaky alliance with the revolutionary socialists.[71] He hoped to encourage mass action that would compel the Tsar to cede power to the people.

---

[68] Rhyne, p. 138-9. cf. also Emmons, pp. 78-88, and Rosenberg, pp. 24-32.

[69] Rhyne, p. 128.

[70] Maklakov, Vlast' i obshchestvenost' Vol. II. p. 352, quoted in Treadgold, Lenin and His Rivals, p. 191.

[71] Treadgold in Lenin and His Rivals. pp. 191-3.

The revolution of 1905 had a major influence on the whole of Russian economic, social and political life, and many of the changes which took place following that event affected the Cadet Party. The Russian economy had just recovered from the slump of 1899 to 1903 when the Russo-Japanese War began.[72] The mobilization of the peasants disrupted agriculture and hurt food supplies, and scarcity of raw materials generated unemployment in resource- dependent industries. The peasants felt that they were being asked to shoulder the burden for reforms that would never benefit them. These economic hardships were made even harder to bear by the general population's concern regarding the conduct of the war, and their alarm at what they perceived to be a growing series of defeats, beginning with the Crimean War.[73]

The immediate results of the Bloody Sunday massacre were a general strike in St Petersburg followed by sympathetic walk-outs in other cities, such as Moscow, Riga, Lodz and Vilna. The relatively liberal Svyatopolk-Mirski, who had assumed Plehve's position as Minister of the Interior, could not cope with the strife and stepped down. His replacement was Bulygin, a professional bureaucrat.[74] In early February, peasant revolts began in Kirsk Province and soon spread to

---

[72] Edelman, pp. 10-11.

[73] Seton-Watson, p. 219.

[74] Sir John Maynard, Russia in Flux. New York: Collier Books. 1962. p. 78.

neighbouring districts. In mid-October, a railway strike was declared in Moscow and soon spread to St Petersburg, central and south Russia, Poland, the Caucasus, the Urals, and the Asiatic lines. The entire Imperial rail system was at a virtual standstill by the end of the month. Finally, the workers of St Petersburg formed a council, or soviet, of strike deputies, which soon became a political body and made demands on the state.[75] A second soviet was soon formed in Moscow.[76]

It was the combination of the creation of the soviet, the mass rural unrest, and the railway strike, which forced the Tsar to issue the Manifesto of 17th October. This document officially marked the end of absolute monarchy in Russia. It provided for the election of a legislative Duma on an indirect but relatively wide franchise. And, while political parties were not explicitly sanctioned by the new law, the creation of a representative body meant that they would probably be tolerated.[77] The document also announced the restructuring of the government to include a council of ministers, with a President whose position could be compared to that of a Western Prime Minister. Sergei Witte was the

---

[75] Ann Erickson Healy, The Russian Autocracy in Crisis 1905-1917. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books. 1976. pp. 30-1.

[76] Maynard, p. 80.

[77] Rhyne, pp. 140-1, Emmons, pp 13-16. English translation of the Manifesto in Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy: A Study of the Evidence. New York: Vintage Books. 1939. p. 503.

first appointee to the post.[78]

This unprecedented wave of mass political activity brought many important changes in the organization and political attitudes of the main social classes in Russia as well as in the structure of the government itself. The industrial workers were the most active class, and their strikes and demonstrations were the events which made the opposition movement a dangerous and effective force. The first strikes had been largely economic protests against food shortages and rising prices, but the rapid spread of the disturbances and the brutally repressive official reaction gave political agitators the opportunity they were waiting for. They voiced their grievances against the entire system, including an economy that was undergoing rapid change without benefitting the lower classes. Under the leadership of labour activists, trade union organizations became a major political force.[79] The most striking manifestations of increased worker consciousness were the St Petersburg and Moscow Soviets.

The captains of Russian industry had, for the most part, stayed out of politics. They had been satisfied with state support in the form of tariffs and government contracts, and

---

[78] Sergei Pushkarev, The Emergence of Modern Russia. Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press. 1985. p. 236.

[79] Seton-Watson, p.225. Cf. Leopold Haimson, "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia 1905-1917. Pt. 1. Slavic Review. Dec. 1964. pp. 619-642.

their only grievance had been what they perceived as excessive privilege for agriculture. But the activities of 1905 inevitably affected their political awareness. Most industrialists were not opposed to political reforms, provided they did not involve radical social transformations. Indeed, during the month immediately following Bloody Sunday, several provincial business and industrial committees issued liberal sounding statements.[80] Most believed that increased freedom would only heighten productivity.

As soon as the government suggested mild reforms which would have been to the advantage of the workers, the employers began to voice strong objections. The industrialists' political liberalism was outweighed by their economic conservatism, and, for the first time, a strong employers' organization emerged. The members of this group agreed to raise wages only with the approval of their peers, and also to take common stands against strikers. Later, the industrialist union acted as a lobby to influence governmental decisions involving taxes, tariffs, and contracts.[81] Their reaction only served to confirm the opinions of those who saw liberals in general as willing to abandon their principles the minute they ceased to be convenient.

---

[80] Ibid. p. 227.

[81] Ibid. p. 228.

The peasants' discontent was primarily economic in origin and was linked most strongly to farm rent increases.[82] This group sought reduction of rental payments, the exclusion of rich tenants in favour of land-hungry smallholders, and the partition of the landowners' estates. The Social Democrats won the peasants' support in the Caucasus, the Urals, the south-west provinces, and the Baltic, but elsewhere the Socialist Revolutionaries were most popular.[83]

The attitude of the land-owning gentry changed a great deal during 1905. At the beginning of the decade, most had supported the zemstvo constitutionalist movement. The Bulygin proposals for a consultative Duma divided the group when Shipov and the Slavophiles declared themselves satisfied. The Manifesto of 17th October deepened the split at a time when the peasant uprisings forced the gentry to depend on the authorities to reinstate order. By the end of 1906, the landowners had formed three relatively distinct political groups. A small minority continued to support the Cadets in their demand for a constituent assembly, but most conservative parliamentarians backed the relatively new Octobrist Party, who accepted the October Manifesto as the basis for a new political order. The most reactionary of the group aligned themselves with the extreme right, and

---

[82] Roberta Manning, The Russian Nobility in Revolution and Counter-Revolution. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms. 1975. p. 20.

[83] Pushkarev, p. 219-20.

became the organizers of the Black Hundred detachments which actively encouraged violence against Jews, intellectuals, and rebellious members of the lower classes.[84]

After the revolution of 1905, the liberal movement itself underwent many significant changes. The zemstvos shrank into the background as many of the gentry reacted to the popular violence with a sharp turn from liberalism to pro-government nationalism. At the same time, politically homogeneous parties replaced the earlier coalitions. The new Constitutional Democrat, or Cadet , Party represented intelligentsia liberalism without much of the ideology of the left or right. Although it had been formed by the merger of the Union of Liberation and the constitutionalist zemstvo faction, the Slavophiles who had taken part in the founding groups were not influential in the new party. This was due, in part, to their exclusion from the Union following the Miliukov-Struve discussions of 1903.[85]

The history of the liberal movement in Russia can be difficult to analyze because the liberals, even after the formation of the Cadet Party, were never a monolithic group in the Bolshevik sense. Although leaders like Paul Miliukov

---

[84] S. V. Utechin, Russian Political Thought. London: J. M. Dent and Sons. 1963. p. 74. see also Rogger, pp. 340-6.

[85] Gregory L. Freeze, "A National Liberation Movement and the Shift in Russian Liberalism." Slavic Review. 28. March 1969. pp. 89-91.

later immersed themselves in legislative politics, many members of the party continued to view themselves as **nadklassnost,** or representative of all social groups.[86] They believed they represented "not class opinion, but general public opinion."[87] They proposed to transcend narrow interests and work toward the goal of liberal development for the nation as a whole.

All liberals did share a commitment to the movement's general principles and underlying system of values. Besides their nationalistic interest in achieving progress for the nation as a whole, they had a profound patriotic attachment to Russia as a state. The political and economic well-being of all citizens was translated into the health of the nation as an abstract entity. This concern for everyone, regardless of ethnic origin, held particular appeal for Jews and other minorities who had felt victimized by the Russification programmes of the past.[88] Liberals like Miliukov feared that the country would be "beaten for her backwardness" in the competitive international arena.[89] Opposition to Tsarism became synonymous with the advancement of state power.

---

[86] Rosenberg, p. 13.

[87] Miliukov, Russia and Its Crisis. p. 169.

[88] Voskobiynik, p. 430.

[89] Rosenberg, p. 14.

Also, most liberals were strongly committed to a rule of law. They viewed the legal system as society's only means of ensuring personal freedom and protecting one interest against another. Most accepted the views of Western thinkers like Comte and Mill, who believed that the government should regulate social behaviour in order to protect the welfare of all citizens.[90] An ideal constitutional system would prevent the domination of one group over another, and the rule of law would prevent arbitrary behaviour on the part of private citizens or state officials.

Russian liberalism's dominant concern was the promotion of political rather than social change. Its goal was the entrenchment of basic civil liberties, including freedom of speech, expression, association, assembly, the press, and religion. In order to defend these freedoms, the liberals sought goals that they thought, however mistakenly, could be achieved without major changes in the social structure, or the redistribution of wealth.[91]

Although liberalism proudly claimed to represent all Russians, most of its adherents came from the professional classes. Almost all had higher educations, and the vast majority were over forty. This was equally true after the

---

[90] Ibid. p. 15.

[91] Theodore von Laue, "Prospects for Liberal Democracy," in Timberlake, Essays on Russian Liberalism. pp. 174-78.

formation of the Cadet Party. Of the forty-seven members of the Central Committe, forty-six were men.[92] Professionals were also prominent in the provincial organizations, while the rank-and-file tended to be scientific workers, judicial figures, and even some bureaucrats.[93]

The differences between a professional middle class and an industrial one are important to an analysis of Russian liberalism. Fischer explains that when the western bourgeoisie espoused the idea of a non-interventionist state, European society was in the relatively flexible and uncomplicated stages of early industrialization. Such a concept of the state was quite plausible for the times. Similarly, the liberal consciousness of the European industrial class grew at a time when the lower orders tended to be passive, deferential to authority, and politically apathetic. The fact that the bourgeoisie, who claimed to speak for all groups, really had its own agenda in mind went relatively unchallenged because the lower classes were not yet ready to articulate their own interests.[94] Also, there were no other groups attempting to speak for them.

The western industrial middle class combined such liberal symbols as individualism and liberty with specific class goals including the establishment of a laissez-faire state,

---

[92] Emmons, p. 63.

[93] Rosenberg, p. 20. cf. also Emmons, p. 63-5.

[94] Fischer, pp. 119-120.

ruled by a sympathetic oligarchy rather than an autocrat.[95] The universal principles survived in the movement's Russian incarnation but were thoroughly altered in practise by the differences between the types of groups advocating them. First, the professions belonged to a later, more complicated form of industrialized society. Russia was already part of a capitalist world system. Advanced development, on a global scale, forced the state to become more actively involved in business and economics. Of course, the entrepreneurs thought they should be the beneficiaries of this involvement, while the reformers felt the government should act in the interest of the common good. The rapid industrialization of the 1890's had raised everyone's expectations, and although the economy did recover from the depression of 1900, growth continued at a much slower pace in the following decade. It seemed that Nicholas II did not have the ability to manage the Empire's economic growth, and this served to increase both groups' dissatisfaction.[96]

Also, the century between the rise of the business class and the later growth of the professions saw the entry of larger segments of the lower classes into the political arena. The professional classes tended to identify with both the democratic hopes of the peasants and the oligarchic

---

[95] Ibid. pp. 120-1.

[96] Theodore von Laue, "Problems of Industrialization." in Theofanis George Stavrou, Russia Under the Last Tsar. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press. 1969. pp. 126-7.

hopes of the industrialists and gentry. A good deal depended on how well the ruling elite responded to the professionals' modernist ideas and granted them a share of power and status. In Russia, few members of the intelligentsia saw much chance of improving their position under Tsarist rule. Therefore, this group remained even more actively political than its counterpart in the west, and made a very early and permanent commitment to complete democracy. Since the intellectuals felt that this concept must entail economic as well as political equality, it required the establishment of a welfare, rather than a laissez-faire state. When traditional liberalism began to accept some of these principles at the end of the nineteenth century, it attracted some members of the intelligentsia who would otherwise have chosen socialism.[97] At first, the newcomers were welcomed by the old guard, who hoped to broaden their base of support.[98] In addition, unadulterated capitalism, like liberalism itself, was viewed by many as a foreign concept, especially after the influx of Western capital in the 1890's.

As liberalism changed to reflect the concerns of the professional classes, it alienated large segments of the gentry. The noble classes were rural based and lacked the urban intelligentsia's social flexibility. In addition, the

---

[97] Fischer, pp. 122-3. p. 121-2

[98] Freeze, pp. 90-1.

gentry's class interests and suspicion of the peasantry led them to believe that the lower classes were unprepared for democracy. At the turn of the century, liberal strategists like Miliukov and Struve were faced with the choice: should they rely upon the untried masses and the reformist intelligentsia at the expense of the already established and influential upper classes?

Thus, even after the creation of their own formal party, the liberals faced a serious challenge. If the Cadets were to maintain liberalism as a political force, they had to attract the interest of a larger segment of the population than had taken part in the liberal movement prior to 1905. Alliances with the left or right were possible but would involve compromise. Should the Constitutional Democrats be more flexible in an effort to gain support, should they remain true to their basic principles in the hope that the public would eventually come to appreciate them? Unfortunately for the liberals , they were just one group of many competing for the support of the Russian people. While they debated their strategy, other groups were busily enacting their own programmes.

Chapter III

ALTERNATIVES TO LIBERALISM IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

Liberalism was only one of the options available to the many peoples resident in Tsarist Russia. Although it attracted the interest of intellectuals, its rationalist debates failed to arouse populist enthusiasm or passion. This was in part due to various cultural factors, and in part to the skill of rival groups who succeeded in exploiting such emotions as fear and hatred. The liberals' penchant for professorial analysis, sometimes tedious and arid, of complicated constitutional procedures, could mean little to the majority of citizens whose reading capacity, if it existed at all, was limited to simple slogans.

Most of Russia's political movements stemmed, in some way, from the continuing Slavophile-Westernizer debate. The controversy, over the value of Western ideals and institutions for Russia, had been a part of political and intellectual life since the time of Peter the Great, and was exacerbated by the Decembrist uprising of 1825. This uprising also enhanced the division between Russian government and society. As a result of this duality, and the people's attitudes toward it, Russian thinkers operated within a framework that was considerably different from that of their Western counterparts.

Many of the nation's intellectual and political movements were attempts to solve the problems caused by the cleavage. The liberals proposed to manage the tension between the two sides by acknowledging its inevitability and even its desirability and placing restrictions on state power while bolstering individual rights. But other programmes and philosophies promised to heal the schism altogether. And, not only were many of these competing ideas and movements more attractive to more people, many were overtly hostile to the liberals' individualist ethic. These included Slavophilism and Russian Orthodoxy (with their corresponding attachment to autocracy), mystical idealism as espoused by Soloviev, populism, anarchism, Marxism, and Leninism. Each had its own appeal, and all were hostile to liberalism.

In 1842, the first salvos in the war of words between Slavophiles and Westernizers were fired. At issue was Russia's future course, along with a cluster of problems first formulated and given detailed consideration in nationalist writings. Indeed, the Westernizers seemed content to let the other side set the agenda, and accepted the need to "master the themes and issues put into circulation by the Slavophiles."[99] According to Herzen, the two viewpoints were as inextricably linked as the "two faces of Janus" and could not be separated.[100] Since neither camp

---

[99] P. V. Annenkov, The Extraordinary Decade. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1968. p. 160

[100] quoted in Ibid. p. 161.

was organized, but rather made up of intellectuals with loosely similar viewpoints, there was considerable cross-pollination of ideas. Both sides advocated solutions that were outside contemporary social realities, and neither viewed Nicholas I as the ideal ruler.[101]

An interesting aspect of the debate is the ability of the two sides to interpret the same historical phenomena in entirely different ways. The Westernizers, like Belinsky, saw the liberal concepts of personal honour and responsibility as important aspects of the modern, Western ideal of an independent, autonomous personality. The Slavophiles dismissed this as destructive hubris and egoism.[102] But, both sides used the Petrine Reforms to illustrate their points. For example, Belinsky wrote that before the Reforms, Russia was:

> a patriarchal society in which the social strata [were] not even distinguished by different customs but only by certain fine shades of behaviour...The peasant had no difficulty in understanding his master and made not the least attempt to raise himself to his level, while the master understood the peasant without having to lower himself...[S]uddenly, by Peter's volition, everything changed: the man of the people...now failed to understand the language and actions not only of his Emperor or lords, but even of the merest infantry officer with his **honour, minuet,** and **Reithosen.** The upper strata continued to understand the lower, but the lower no longer wanted to understand the upper. A gulf opened up between the people and their masters...But as far

---

[101] Andrej Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1975. p. 396.

[102] Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers. New York: Viking Press. 1978.

> as statehood was concerned, 'the people' [or folk] had ceased to exist-- it had now become a nation.[103]

In his view, the gulf was a necessary part of development and would disappear in time. Any attempt to force a premature fusion would mean a step backward for society. The Petrine Reforms represented the negation of immediate particularism in favour of universal human values.[104]

It was precisely these values, which they saw as European rather than universal, that offended the Slavophiles. They believed that Peter had stripped Russia of her national character and identity.[105] They pointed to the decadence of the Westernized aristocracy as evidence of the destructive effect of Europeanism. They also disagreed with Belinsky's assertion that the elite still understood the masses. The Petrine Reforms had disrupted the natural course of Russian history and had completely warped society. The only way to cure the nation was to return to the values and social structure of ancient Russia, in which the people were united through bonds of kinship and interdependence rather than external laws and coercion. "Personality in the sense of an exclusive individualism which sets itself up to be the measure of all things" had not existed there, but "personality as an organ of consciousness," whose role it is

---

[103] quoted in: Andrej Walicki, p. 401.

[104] Ibid. p. 402.

[105] Billington, pp. 321-4.

to integrate man's spiritual forces had flourished.[106] As evidence, the Slavophiles admired the spiritual wholeness traditionally attributed to ancient monks, aristocrats, and folk heroes.

In this traditional perspective, contrary to liberal notions of progress, the Slavonic village was the secular and historical embodiment of Christian principles.[107] The common folk's resistance to change had preserved these community values, now attracting the interest even of socialists, who were losing faith in liberal individualism as a way toward justice.[108] Slavophiles and Westernizers agreed that the peasantry was a conservative force, but to the former that conservatism was a national asset rather than a liability.

These were not the only issues dividing the two camps. They also had differing concepts of personal freedom. To the Westernizers, an individual was free if he could emancipate himself from routine convention and consciously determine his own destiny.[109] The Slavophiles believed that this sort of independence was an illusion at best, and held that real freedom was found in the internalization of traditional roles and values that occurred in the course of

---

[106] Walicki, p. 409.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Annenkov, p. 110.

[109] Walicki, p. 425.

participation in communal spiritual life. Forcing an individual to rely solely on his own imperfect judgement was harmful to him and to the collective. Society should help its members develop an unquestioning faith.[110] In contrast, the Westernizers believed that reasonable self-interest would lead most individuals to recognize their common interests, and ultimately unite mankind, even across national lines.[111]

Belinsky and his compatriots dismissed the Slavophile concept of history as a divine mystery which could never be understood through rational means, preferring to view it as a process of evolution of human consciousness and rationalisation of social relations. This evolution would entail the replacement of immediate, emotional, and traditional bonds with effective juridical structures and political norms in a modern liberal state.[112] Not surprisingly, their opponents rejected this as an alien concept, and advocated the restoration of small folk communities organized on the basis of the old ties.

Likewise, since a liberal market economy was incompatible with the maintenance of feudal social structures, most of the Slavophile thinkers also dismissed this idea outright. Here, some Westernizers were in a more delicate position,

---

[110] Crankshaw, p. 88.

[111] Walicki, p. 426.

[112] Annenkov, pp. p. 161-3.

having their own misgivings about capitalism as a means of achieving a just society. Most were inclined, however, to accept liberal economics to some degree, at least as a stage in Russia's development.[113] They could see no other way for Russia to become the European nations' economic equal. The less materialistic Slavophiles thought that such parity was not necessary. Although the ancient folk communities lacked material comforts, they were rich in spiritual values. For this reason, ancient Russia would always be superior to the West.[114]

This emphasis on intangibles also affected their view of the social hierarchy. While the peasant and the Tsar did not enjoy the same level of money or power, both were equally valuable to society. Like the Westernizers, the Slavophiles believed in the basic dignity and equality of all human beings, but they disagreed with the idea of using external criteria such as wealth or power as a means of gauging an individual's worth.[115]

Even after it ceased to be the central issue for the intelligentsia, the Slavophile-Westernizer controversy influenced most of the nation's subsequent debates. The debate encouraged people to question the nature and method of their government, and much of Russian social thought

---

[113] Ibid. pp. 459-50.

[114] Ibid. pp. 450-1.

[115] Ibid.

after the 1840's centred around the concept of Tsarist state and society as two distinct, often antagonistic, entities. On the one hand was "official Russia," or everything pertaining to the autocrat, his bureaucracy, and his official ideology. On the other hand was "popular Russia" or anyone not involved in government.[116] State power was viewed by these "others" as an alien force in their land. The state, as the active or conquering power, was in control, and the population was only a tool for government plans.

Of course, a population has many options when faced with an alien conqueror. These range from active collaboration and support to passive resistance or outright rebellion. Miliukov later described the unifying thread in these responses, suggesting that the Russian state had always remained:

> an outsider to whom allegiance was won only in the measure of its utility. The people were not willing to assimilate themselves to the state, to feel a part of it, responsible for the whole. The country continued to feel and to live independently of state authorities.[117]

While the split was the result of this entire historical process, Peter the Great's Westernization programme probably did do the most to exacerbate the problem. In the process of bringing in Western ideas and technology, he centralised

---

[116] Paul Miliukov, Russia Today and Tomorrow. New York: Macmillan. 1922. p. 10.

[117] Ibid. p.10.

and restructured the state bureaucracy, moved the capital away from the population, and forced changes to dress and manners (including, among other things, removal of beards and the study of foreign languages).[118] All of this challenged the old Russian way of life.

The group most affected by this cultural revolution was the bureaucracy itself. Thus, the difference between the state and the population became visible in the concrete areas of language and dress. In fact the Russian government became so 'foreign' in the eyes of the people that some peasants viewed uniformed officials as representatives of the German government. An English observer, Sir Donald McKenzie Wallace, was led to this observation:

> The government, aiming at the realization of designs which its subjects neither sympathised with nor clearly understood [has] become separated from the nation... A considerable section of the people looked on the reforming Tsars as incarnations of the spirit of evil, and the Tsars in their turn looked upon the people as raw material...[L]ooking for direction and approbation merely to their superiors, [the officials] have systematically treated those over whom they were placed as a conquered or inferior race. The state has thus come to be regarded as an abstract entity, with interests entirely different from those of the human beings composing it... [119]

The fact and the perception of these differing interests help to explain why the emergence of an organised revolutionary movement should occur at the same time as the

---

[118] Billington, pp.180-5.

[119] Russia New York: Macmillan. 1912 p. 379

liberalising state reforms of the 1860's.[120]

The liberals were forced to deal with this unresolved conflict in Russian social thought. Critics of the status quo were torn between the Slavophiles' anti-intellectual, "irrational" adherence to the idea of enlightened authoritarianism, and "scientific," rationalistic insistence on the direct and immediate transformation of Russian society. The similarity between the two sides lay in their ideal of a totally renovated, morally righteous society, as opposed to the constitutionalist dream of a tolerant one which had been gradually changed from within through practical reforms.[121]

In the 1890's and early twentieth century, Constantine Pobedonostsev embodied the reactionary viewpoint. As lay head of the Church Synod, this lawyer came to be seen as the symbol and author of Alexander III's programme of reaction. He believed in the ideal of a theocratic ruler who governed through mystery and authority, and was critical of any Tsar who seemed to bow to law or popular consensus. He was opposed to freedom of expression, and favoured the subordination of minority cultures and religious sects to the dominant Russian view. And, since foreign ideas, in his view, were almost directly responsible for the country's problems,he held that they should be available to only a

---

[120] Crankshaw, p. 156.

[121] Billington, p. 324.

carefully chosen intellectual elite. Otherwise, education should be confined to basic indoctrination in Russian traditions and morals, and should discourage dissent and questioning.[122] As a Slavophile virtually in the classic sense, he felt that the nation's problems would be solved once all citizens abandoned troublesome foreign ideals and renewed their commitment to their Slavic heritage.

Pobedononstsev was influenced by the novelist Constantine Leonte'ev, who proposed to save their nation from becoming like the "Europe of railroads and banks...of increasing material indulgence, and prosaic dreams about the common good."[123] Leonte'ev achieved notoriety when he suggested "freezing up Russia to avoid rotting."[124] His disgust with bourgeois mediocrity, common to novels of the populist era, is reminiscent of Nietszche. Since there can be no beauty in life without inequality and violence, Leonte'ev insisted that liberal nihilism had produced a decrepitude of the mind and heart which could only be cured by a series of long, glorious wars. In accordance with his aristocratic aesthetic, he justified Pobedonostsev's reactionary programme, and proposed a total return to what he saw as the ritual and discipline of the heroic Byzantine era.[125]

---

[122] Ibid. p. 440.

[123] quoted in Ibid. p. 440.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Walicki, p. 520.

Pobedonostsev was also a supporter of Panslavism, the idea that all peoples of Slavic heritage and Orthodox religion should be united. The fact that the war of liberation, while based on moral principles, would also bring territorial advantages helped increase his interest in the idea. He endorsed these views of K. Aksakov, one of the most famous Slavophile thinkers:

> A new path to power opens up before Russia... A great age is dawning, one of the greatest in world history-- a lasting alliance of all Slavs under the supreme patronage of the Russian tsar....Russia will fulfil her mission of liberating the ethnically homogeneous and largely Orthodox peoples... and the whole Slavonic world will breathe more easily under the patronage of Russia once she finally fulfills her Christian and fraternal duty.[126]

Although Slavophilism did not originally entail this kind of unification, many Slavophiles did find the idea appealing. Nikolai Danilevsky, one of the main Panslavist theorists based many of his writings on Slavophile principles, but rejected his predecessors' view of Russians as a peace-loving, contemplative people who disliked power. The nation's destiny, as he saw it, was to unite all Slavonic peoples in an entirely new civilisation which would have little in common with that of Germany or Rome. [127] His ideas were later adopted by Michael Katkov, a former radical, who presented the doctrine as a campaign against

---

[126] quoted in Ibid. p. 395.

[127] Ibid. p. 504-5

godless Turks and heretical Westerners.[128] At the same time, the Tsar pursued the domestic policy of "Russification," which was designed to "encourage" the Empire's minorities to adopt the dominant language and culture.

In spite of his interest in mysticism and his affinity for Leonte'ev's ideas, Pobedonostsev was very practical. He valued organisation and was unemotional, even cynical, in his methods. Unlike the liberals, whose optimism he disdained, he had a low view of human nature and insisted that systems based on more charitable psychology were destined to fail. He had especially harsh words for the constitutionalists, whom he saw as naive and doomed because:

> The state must show itself a living faith. The popular mind is suspicious and may not be seduced... by compromise.[129]

He is remembered for calling parliamentarianism "the great lie of our time"[130]

Because the Russian peasant, in Pobedonostsev's view, secretly craved discipline and structure, any effort to impose democratic institutions upon Russian society would lead only to confusion among the masses and end in revolution. He disagreed with those liberals who held that

---

[128] Billington, pp. 365-6

[129] Constantine Pobedonostsev, Reflections of a Russian Statesman. London: Macmillan. 1898. p.5.

[130] Seton-Watson, p. 131.

a moderate amount of dissent was healthy and natural for a society because he did not believe that such divisions could be kept under control in Russia.[131] His own forms of organisation, ideology, and enforced conformity were attempts to prevent the disintegration of the country as he knew it.[132]

Although Pobedonostsev differed radically from the populists in his concept of human nature, both were defending an idealized, and even mythical vision of Ancient Russia. Like the Slavophiles, the populists of the 1860's and 1870's had great faith in the peasant commune as a conservative institution. They held that the **muzhiks,** as the lowest members of society, were farthest from the evils of "official Russia." Writers like N. G. Chernyshevsky, the editor of the socialist magazine Sovremenik believed that the communes could also pave the way for socialism by training Russians in co-operative living. This aspect of their history gave Russia a better chance of achieving social change than nations in which capitalism was more deeply rooted.[133]

To assist their innocent virtue, most populists like Chernyshevsky and D. I. Pisarev believed that Russian peasants had to be guided along the path to true political

---

[131] Crankshaw, p. 265-6.

[132] Billington, p. 441.

[133] Seton-Watson, p. 60-1.

awareness and co-operation. However, Pisarev's concept of the role of individual leadership had much in common with Saint-Simon while Chernyshevsky owed more to Fourier.[134] Since more than mere enthusiasm was needed to help the masses, the "thinking realist" needed to develop his or her own intellect before venturing forth. Many intellectuals had been corrupted by their proximity to the powerful and needed to reconnect with their instincts and reaffirm their connection to "popular Russia" and the wisdom of "the folk."[135]

A true leader should therefore be ruthlessly practical, critical and scientific. Otherwise, he or she could be sidetracked by decadent pursuits, like the humanities and the arts, which represented man's arrogant and futile attempts to imitate the universe. Human beings should concentrate on scientific analyses, which might actually do society some good, and leave creation up to Nature. In this respect, the peasants, whose lives were necessarily dominated by practical concerns, could teach the intelligentsia that life without art was both possible and satisfying.[136] Only when humanity regained sight of what was really important would society change for the better.

---

[134] Billington, pp. 390-2.

[135] Seton-Watson, pp. 60-1.

[136] Billington, p. 391.

Pisarev also denounced everything handed down from previous generations, including morality, and viewed Turgenev's "nihilists" (meaning "those who accept nothing") as the ultimate revolutionaries.[137] Although some thinkers developed the idea of negation to such an extreme that they began to advocate the complete destruction of all forms of social organisation, Pisarev viewed this as self-indulgence. The rejection of past ideas and structures should not mean complete freedom for the individual, since the new morality dictated that all forms of life had to be subordinate to the cause of human liberation. He saw the liberals as counter-revolutionary in the sense that they advocated individual liberties at the expense of the collective good.[138] People should realize that their lives and abilities are not theirs alone, but instead are tools to be used in the struggle for justice.[139]

Although he did not offer a concrete programme for achieving these goals, Pisarev's puritanism offered freedom from religious doubt and moral uncertainty. During the late 1860's and early 1870's, several groups of students abandoned their studies and went to the countryside to educate and learn from the peasants. Some groups, such as the People's Will, used terror as a means of disrupting the

---

[137] Crankshaw, p. 194.

[138] Walicki, p. 599.

[139] Seton-Watson, p. 63-4.

state and increasing public awareness of their cause. Although liberals like Miliukov dismissed these efforts as "infantile," they did capture the popular imagination.[140] Populism influenced the thinking of many subsequent revolutionaries, including the Bolsheviks and the anarchists.

Leo Tolstoy was a contemporary of Pobodonostsev and a consistent opponent of his policies. Nonetheless, Tolstoy developed a number of concepts that were equally a part of Russia's intellectual tradition. Like Pisarev, his moral puritanism, rejection of sexual lust, and dislike of the "conceits" of artistic creativity were part of 1860's asceticism, and his admiration for the peasantry and his worship of nature were shared with the populists of the 1870's.[141] Along with many other great Russian thinkers, he was firm in his belief in the perfectability of mankind, and expressed an anarchistic dislike of institutions and legal process. And, in the tradition of many religious sectarians, he saw his own religious teachings as true 'moral' Christianity, which needed neither church nor dogma.[142] This indifference to organized religion served him well when he was excommunicated from the Orthodox Church by Pobedonostsev.[143]

---

[140] Miliukov, Russia and Its Crisis., p. 296.

[141] Walicki, pp. 279-80.

[142] Billington, p. 442.

Although none of Tolstoy's ideas was in itself entirely new, Tolstoy combined and developed them much further, into a comprehensive philosophy of compelling appeal. In War and Peace, he extended his belief in popular power to the point that he denied the significance of the individual entirely, and attained a theory of history similar, in that respect, to Marxism. He believed that moral ideals are so powerful that any coercion in support of them is not only unnecessary, but also counterproductive.[144] And, the populist belief that justice cannot be found without personal commitment to Truth led him to give up a rewarding career and family, and travel to the countryside in search of enlightenment.[145]

Tolstoy's quest for the secret of a rational moral society kept alive the populist tradition of moral dedication to utopian dreams. Although his goals were almost antithetical to those of Pobedonostsev, the two did have one thing in common: they were both defending idealized versions of established Russian traditions; one of the imperial authority and the other of the truth-seeking intellectual. Both attached a high value to the innocence of the peasantry, and believed that an infusion of Western

---

[143] Crankshaw, p. 302.

[144] Leo Tolstoy, "The Power of History," in E. Black (ed.), The Other Tolstoy: Excerpts From His Philosophical Writings. New York: Pergammon Press. 1984. p. 33-38.

[145] Billington, p. 442.

liberal values and ideas could destroy much of what was good about Russia.[146] Neither was interested in the possibility or process of constitutional reform; and their activities and influence, coming from somewhat different directions, both undermined and hindered the more moderate liberal movement.

Both Tolstoy and Pobodonostsev could be categorized as followers of the mystical idealist tradition. This type of transcendental thought helped provide thinkers who were not attracted to Western philosophies with a way to apply their uniquely Russian ideas to the rest of the world. Vladimir Soloviev, an outspoken critic of 'Pan-Slav and Orthodox parochialism,' was the main popular spokesman for the twentieth century proponents of idealism. In spite of his wide range of interests his concerns are better described as religious and aesthetic rather than political. Like the Marxist Plekhanov and the liberal Miliukov, Soloviev was born in the 1850's and was influenced by the Slavophile-Westernizer debates and other trends of the 1860's. He was concerned with the fate of the Russian Jews and other religious and ethnic minorities in the Empire, and called for the establishment of a universal church.[147]

---

[146] Berlin, pp. 74-80.

[147] Walicki, p. 574.

Soloviev's concept of 'renovation' was, in some respects, even more revolutionary and utopian than the Marxists' dream of the perfect society. Like Plekhanov and his followers, Soloviev offered absolute solutions to the nation's problems. He believed in the supernatural to the exclusion of all else, explaining that the material world was nothing but "a nightmare of sleeping humanity."[148]

Like Marxism, his idealism had a dynamic, historical cast: it is based on the belief that all things in existence are in search of a unity that must inevitably be realised through **Sophia,** the feminine principle of internal wisdom. In fact, history itself can be described as "the spiritualization of man through his assimilation of divine principles."[149] In Soloviev's cosmology, Sophia was the link between Man and God. But, by egoistically putting himself in conflict with God, other humans, and nature, mankind has lost his ideal self and is no longer part of the 'world-soul.' Although we have made ourselves foreign to Sophia, she increasingly pulls us back to this ideal, natural state. In seeking a kind of mystical union with her, humanity puts itself in touch with the ideal 'oneness' which pervades God's universe.[150]

---

[148] S. Frank (ed), A Soloviev Anthology. New York: Macmillan. 1960. p.10.

[149] Ibid. p. 12.

[150] Ibid.

Though Soloviev's ideas clearly placed him a considerable distance from the liberals of his time, he did agree, in perhaps a peculiar way, with their emphasis on broader participation in the political process. Mankind must take part in the world, rather than retreat from it, he felt, since the only way to fulfillment through union with Sophia was creative involvement in artistic, political, or similar activity. In contrast to Tolstoy, who saw the human desire to assert the self as the cause of all evil, and sought to repress humanity's impulses, Soloviev's goal was to find constructive uses for man's energies. Sexual desire, in particular, was seen as one of the most positive, potentially unifying of human urges. Evidence for God's personal approval of the material and the sensual lay in his having taken the human form of Christ.[151]

But what concrete actions can one take in order to attain this unity in real life? Soloviev believed that secular struggles for political, social, and economic justice played a large role in helping man attain oneness with Sophia. In the late 1870's, he created a number of programmes. These consisted of practical steps to alleviate popular suffering (large donations to the Red Cross), and efforts to renew reverence for the older spiritual unity of pre-schismatic Christendom (generous contributions to projects such as the restoration of the Santa Sophia Cathedral in

---

[151] Billington. pp. 466-7.

Constantinople.) He also encouraged his followers to fight for justice for the economically and socially disadvantaged of the empire, and campaigned for practical improvements to public education, medical care, and housing.[152]

Most importantly, Soloviev fought an academic battle for the unification of scientific knowledge and religious faith. He believed that the split between the two could be overcome if only each side would abandon dogma. 'Free and scientific theosophy' would recognize three valid, and ultimately complementary methods of knowledge: the mystical, the intellectual, and the empirical.[153] Since the doctrine of total unity was not scientifically demonstrable in itself, it would have to be taken on faith. But, even the divisions between East and West would be resolved in this process, as each side came to recognize that they must accept the value of both man and God. Western secular humanism cannot survive based on the belief that "man is a hairless monkey and must lay down his life for his friends."[154] But, the Orthodox East is similarly handicapped by its insistence that man, by God's design, is an irredeemably evil being who must be ruled by brutality. When the two sides of these debates inevitably realized this, Soloviev believed they would join in creating a positive, rational, altruistic

---

[152] Ibid. p. 467.

[153] Walicki, pp. 567-8.

[154] Frank, p. 14.

society.[155]

Such views had tremendous popular appeal. Although some listeners were alienated by the mystical nature of his proposals, others welcomed the mysticism as an appropriate response to the terrible state of the world.[156] One lecture in particular, in which Soloviev urged Nicholas II to forgive the assassination of Alexander III and usher in a new era of Christian love, became particularly famous and ended his academic career.[157] His efforts to present religious Truths in such a way as to make them acceptable to modern scientific thinkers, and to show them how social change was dependent upon Christian ethics and practice led many to declare that he "embodied the essence of the Russian approach to life's problems and the solution of the problems which had tormented all peoples in all ages."[158] His use of science, while it may have disconcerted some Westerners and liberals, thus found a secure niche in the religious and mystical traditions of Russian thought.

Although he had little influence on the new Tsar, Soloviev did inspire a number of developments at the turn of the century. First, along with Tolstoy, he helped revive

---

[155] Ibid.

[156] G. Putnam, Russian Thinkers. New York: Basic Books. 1975. p. 51.

[157] Walicki, p. 572.

[158] Putnam, p. 54.

idealism as an intellectually respectable philosophy. He believed that philosophic idealism followed logically from the moral idealism of the populist tradition. And he allowed future generations to absorb some of slavophilism's philosophical and theological arguments while ignoring its reactionary aspects.[159] While some liberals feared his 'theocratic' tendencies, many Marxists of the 1890's, including Berdiaev and Struve, converted to the new idealism under Soloviev's influence. Many intellectuals also renewed their commitments to the Orthodox Church after listening to his arguments. In 1909, Berdyaev and Bulgakov professed to believe in Soloviev's 'new' Christianity, insisting that the 'true' religion taught freedom rather than oppression and facilitated rather than inhibited social change.[160]

Unlike constitutional liberalism, both mystical idealism and Russian Marxism sought to build on the previous experience of the nation's intelligentsia. They both offered a comprehensive programme for strengthening the nation, while liberalism appeared to seek only the amelioration of some of its most critical problems. The Marxists and idealists sought to answer the long-standing questions of the intelligentsia, rather than to challenge

---

[159] Walicki, p. 578.

[160] Nikolai Berdyaev, "Philosophic Truth and the Moral Truth of the Intelligentsia." and Sergei Bulgakov "Heroism and Asceticism: Reflections on the Religious Nature of the Russian Intelligentsia." in Landmarks: A Collection of Essays on the Russian Intelligentsia 1909. New York: Karz Howard. 1977. pp. 3-22 and 23-63.

their relevance to the contemporary situation. While the liberals tended to be impatient with the widespread preoccupation with seemingly antique abstract ideals, its very success showed that it was rooted solidly in tradition and culture.

Prior to George Plekhanov's conversion to Marxism, Russian intellectuals had read Marx's work but generally rejected it as irrelevant.[161] But, by the 1890's, populism's call for morality and simplicity had come to seem naive in the face of an increasingly complex industrial society, and people began to look for a new, more comprehensive philosophic basis for the struggle against Tsarism.[162] Like Proudhon, whose near-anarchistic ideas had often interested the Russian populists of a generation before, many radicals remained suspicious of dogma and centralised authority. It was left to Plekhanov to conduct the Russian phase of the struggle between authoritarian and libertarian socialism.

The essence of his position is contained in "Socialism and the Political Struggle,"written in 1883. In this essay, he praised populism's practical efforts to organise the people but insisted that the struggle would fail unless it were based on scientific socialism and a repudiation of Proudhon.[163] Constructive social change was impossible

---

[161] Billington, p. 458.

[162] Berlin, pp. 234-5.

[163] George Plekhanov, Selected Philosophical Works vol I.

without a comprehensive understanding of economics and Marxist analysis. Later he challenged the populist drift toward anarchism as nothing but an irrational form of protest that was not only ineffective, but counterproductive to the goal of achieving a just society.[164]

Unlike populism, which had difficulty reconciling noble ideals with harsh realities, and liberalism which welcomed diversity and dissent, Plekhanov's Marxism was completely monistic. The material world alone is real, he maintained, and all other things, including ideals, are determined by its condition. In The Development of the Monist View of History, he declared with unequivocal certainty that absolute objectivity is not only possible but inevitable, because "the test of truth lies not in me, but in the relations which exist outside me."[165] Thus,like Soloviev, he offered an end to divisions and subjectivity. His philosophy also prescribed violent social change, since the liberation of humanity was the inevitable result of the clash of social classes in the material world.

As early as 1884, Plekhanov insisted that Russia was a capitalist state. The emerging urban proletariat was the true bearer of progress, and the growth of this class was

---

Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. 1961. p. 65.

[164] Plekhanov, "Programme of the Social Democratic Emancipation of Labour Group." in Ibid. p. 400-1.

[165] New York: International Publishers. 1972. p. 73.

historically inevitable. Acceptance of this point entailed the abandonment of the populist view of the old communal peasant organisations as potential alternatives to Marx's pattern of economic development. It also implied criticism of the romantic vision of a 'special path' for Russians, and denied the power of individuals, and its avowed internationalism appealed to many members of minority groups who felt victimised by the Russification programmes of the late Imperial period. Even before the first Marxist circle had formed in Russia itself, a journal was already being published in occupied Latvia, and the Social Democrats were popular in Finland, Poland, Georgia, and the Pale of Jewish Settlement.[166] Jews were particularly prominent in both socialist and populist groups after 1870.[167]

After the Marxist-Populist debates, many members of the intelligentsia began to adapt Marxism to their own situation. Part of the reason for this surprising conversion was the powerful anticapitalist streak that had been present among the anti-Tsarist forces since the Slavophile-Westernizer controversy. Also, since the class struggle was conceived in political terms, Marxists shared the populist goal of overthrowing the Tsar. Finally, the concept of the elimination of the state and government in the final stages of communism appealed to the

---

[166] Healy, pp. 18-20.

[167] Oscar I Janowsky, Jews and Minority Rights 1898-1919. New York: Macmillan. 1933. pp. 32-5.

intelligentsia's strong anarchist tendency. Thus, a Russian radical could continue the populist tradition of waging war against "official Russia" under the auspices of Marx's "proletarian revolution."

Lenin was one of the key Marxist figures in the anti-populist debates of the 1890's. He contended that the industrial worker, not the peasant, was the main force of change in Russia, and that the rise of capitalism was a positive step in the direction of a just society. In spite of his opposition to the populists, however, he had inherited their hatred of the state. Lenin explicitly synthesized the question of the Russian dichotomy between government and society with Marx's goals. His theory of the Party as the politically conscious "vanguard" of the revolution came from the populist notion of the intelligentsia as "the self-aware," who could mobilize the lower levels of society. And, The State and Revolution emphasized the anarchist aspect of Marx's utopia. Once the proletariat took over, the two levels of society would be eliminated. As Lenin wrote in 1917:

> The most pressing and topical question for politics today is the transformation of all citizens and workers into employees of one big 'syndicate,' namely the state as a **whole.** [Emphasis added.][168]

[168] Moscow: Novosti Press Publishing House. 1980. p. 27.

Lenin initially hoped that this could be done without a governing bureaucracy standing **outside** society, but, like Pisarev, he denounced the ideal of individual freedom as the liberals understood it. In his view, there could be no true freedom without social justice.[169] The constitutionalist programme was nothing more than the bourgeoisie's attempt to abdicate any responsibility for the people and delude them into thinking that their lot had changed. Too much emphasis on individual rights could prevent the achievement of the proletariat's goals. The new society would possess a completely new system of values, and in the meantime, individuals would `have to make sacrifices in the interests of the collective future.

Although most of the movements discussed here were similarly hostile to liberal values, all benefitted from constitutional gains in the area of political and intellectual freedoms. Unfortunately for the liberals, their assumption that greater awareness of their goals would translate into greater public support proved incorrect. In fact, the opposite was often true, as many Russians responded to the idea of individual freedom with fear for their old way of life, or with resentment at the slow and uncertain pace of so-called liberal reform, in contrast to

[169] Marlin Buber, Paths in Utopia. Boston: Beacon Hill. 1949. p. 103.

the dramatic promises of outright revolution.

The programmes advocated by the illiberal elements of Russian society tended to be much more comprehensive than any constitutional framework. Miliukov and his followers held that abstract philosophical questions were both insoluble and irrelevant to the establishment of a rational political system. Once such a system was established, all issues could then be debated. Most aspects of human life would not be of interest to the government. In this sense, the division between the state and its citizens was not only inevitable but desirable, as it allowed more freedom for the individual. As Struve explained:

> Liberalism in its pure form, that is, the sense of the recognition of the inalienable rights of the individual standing above the encroachments of every collective, supra individual entity, no matter how organized and how designated--such liberalism is the only species of true nationalism, of genuine respect for... the national spirit. It entails recognition of the inalienable right...to free creativity and seeking, to the erection and rejection of goals and 'forms of life.'[170]

But the competing movements rejected these basic values. Not only did such philosophers as Soloviev, Tolstoy, and Plekhanov believe that abstract question were important and deserved consideration, they readily provided answers to at least some of them. While the liberals proposed the rationalization and acceptance of the society's duality, the idealists and Marxists proposed to either eliminate the

---

[170] quoted in Pipes, Struve: Liberal on the Left. p. 306.

state altogether or make it an integral part of "popular Russia."

Finally, the acceptance of the constitutionalist programme would have meant a struggle to meet standards set by Europeans. The Slavophiles and their populist, idealist, and Marxist successors, on the other hand, proposed to judge Russia by different criteria, and valued rather than deplored its deviation from the European "norm." Although its origins were in Europe, Russian Marxism promised to place the country in the vanguard of history, as a model for the rest of the world rather than as a camp-follower of Britain and the United States, and this extraordinary proposal no doubt enhanced the ideology's appeal to those who were tired of feeling, or being judged to be, inferior. With the revolution, by some presumably remarkable metamorphosis, the last, at long last, would be first. The beleaguered liberals in the dying Russian Empire could offer only stubborn and complicated realities which could scarcely compete with this magical fantasy.

Chapter IV

THE CADETS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA

In spite of the presence of other political movements more deeply rooted in Russian culture, the Cadet Party did manage to attract a considerable following after its formation in 1905. In fact, one analyst characterizes the liberals as "the group many Russians thought would lead their country through the revolution into the ranks of Western European democracies."[171] The reasons for both their early success and their ultimate failure lie not only in the broad social milieu in which the party operated, but also in their leadership's strategies and tactics in dealing with internal factions and with the other political actors of the day. The liberals not only had to contend with their competitors' ideologies and policies, they also had to deal with the rush of daily events.

This chapter deals with the question of how much power the Cadets actually had in the political system after 1905, and how effectively it was used. It shall be argued that while the party did face a number of obstacles beyond its control, its members did make several strategic errors. These mistakes included failing to maintain alliances with

---

[171] Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution. p. 4.

like-minded elements of either the left or the right, placing too much faith in the Duma as a means of permanent reform, and supporting the government position on a number of controversial issues.[172]

The formation of the Constitutional Democratic Party represented the crystallization of over seventy years of Russian liberal thought. Before 1905, liberal goals could only have been fulfilled by a radical change in the state system. After the signing of the October Manifesto, the Cadets were able to work within an entirely different political framework. For the first time, politics became as important as ideology to the liberal movement.[173] Like any other political party, the Cadets found their options limited by the need to preserve party unity, attract votes, and maintain a united front against the both the regime and other members of the opposition.

At the height of the Empire's unrest in 1905, many Cadets were inclined to view the Manifesto as the basis for a constitutional monarchy. Alexander Kerensky, who would later serve as Prime Minister in the Provisional Government of 1917, wrote:

---

[172] Cf. Judith E. Zimmerman, "Cadets in the Duma." in Charles E. Timberlake (ed.). Essays on Russian Liberalism. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 1972. pp. 119- 138., and William G. Rosenberg, "Kadets and the Politics of Ambivalence." in Timberlake, pp. 139-163.

[173] Rosenberg, "Politics of Ambivalence," in Timberlake, p. 139.

> The age-long bitter struggle of the people for freedom and for the right to participate in the affairs of state seemed to be over. 'Constitution' was no longer an empty slogan of the revolutionary movement. The Constitution had become the cornerstone of a new Russia.[174]

The document did promise that "those classes of the population which at present are altogether deprived of rights" should be allowed to vote, and it also granted that "the further development of the principle of universal suffrage [would be left]to the newly established legislative order."[175] It also promised, "as an unchangeable principle, that no law can obtain force without the consent of the State Duma."[176]

While progress had definitely been made, the Cadets were still unhappy with many aspects of the Manifesto. Elections were to be held on the basis of the curial system already used for zemstvos and town administrations. Before 1905, the electorate was divided into three curia: private landowners, business and urban property holders, and the peasantry. The Manifesto added another category for workers and stipulated that members of each group in each district would choose electors, then all the electors in each

---

[174] Alexander Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 1965. p. 57.

[175] English translation of the Manifesto in Bernard Pares. The Fall of the Russian Monarchy: a Study of the Evidence. New York: 1939. p. 503. and Sidney Harcaves, First Blood: The Russian Revolution of 1905. New York: Macmillan. 1964. pp. 195-6.

[176] Ibid.

province would assemble to choose the Duma deputies. Needless to say, the propertied classes controlled a disproportionate number of electoral votes, even after the 1905 reforms.[177] Also, the Manifesto did not define the Duma's constitutional status, nor was anything said about institutions with which it would share power.[178] There was not even an explicit guarantee of political freedom.[179]

Most Cadets felt that the Manifesto signified only the end of autocracy. The future state structure of Russia would have to be defined in a new constitution. Furthermore, they believed that the Tsar, after acknowledging defeat in October, had disqualified himself as the source of the new framework.[180] Therefore, they felt the government should act only in a caretaker capacity until elections could take place. On the other hand, the Tsar's closest advisor, Count Witte, hoped that the autocracy would be able to seize control of the liberation movement by taking the initiative in granting some of the liberal demands.[181]

---

[177] Emmons, pp. 11-14.

[178] Zimmerman, p. 120. and Hosking, The Russian Constitutional Experiment. p. 11-12.

[179] T. Riha, "Constitutional Developments in Russia." in Stavrou, pp. 92-3.

[180] Zimmerman, p. 21.

[181] T. H. von Laue, "Sergei Witte and the Revolution of 1905." American Slavic and East European Review. XVII no. 1. Feb. 1958. pp. 30-1; Hosking, pp. 4-5.

In spite of a lack of support from the business and propertied classes, the Cadets fared very well in the First Duma elections. A left wing boycott helped the Party to achieve its impressive victory. Cadet strength lay in the provincial cities and towns, where they were chosen as 39% of the electors to the assembly. They won only 11% of the landlords'electors, and 4% of the peasant representatives. But, in some of the 26 cities with separate Duma representation including Kursk, Odessa, Moscow, and St. Petersburg, all the victors were Cadets. They also achieved large majorities in Kiev, Kazan, Riga, and Yaroslavl.[182] All told, they managed to capture 178 out of 500 seats.[183]

A special law defining the Duma's composition, powers, and operation was not promulgated until February, 1906, well after elections had been held. Although the Tsar upheld his promise that no law would become effective without the

---

[182] Seton-Watson, p. 347-50.

[183] Paul Miliukov, "Liberal Disappointment in the Duma." in Robert McNeal (ed.), Russian in Transition 1905-1914. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. 1975. p. 24; Political Memoirs 1905-1917. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1964. pp.90-5. Cf. Warren B. Walsh, "Political Parties in the Russian Duma." Journal of Modern History. XXII June 1950. pp. 520-7; Emmons, pp. 353-9; Hosking, pp. 18-21; Rhyne, pp. 225-9; and Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution. pp. 26-31. Figures differ because some deputies were elected as independents or members of other parties and allied themselves with the Cadets only after they reached the Duma, and others were members of small liberal groups that maintained their own organization and leadership but campaigned on the promise to support the Cadets and follow their platform. Emmons, for example, counts these "adherents" as Cadets (for a total of 182), but Rhyne does not.

deputies' consent, he also announced that no Duma measure could obtain force without his approval and that of the State Council. [184] He also included the definition of the State Council in the Fundamental Laws, which meant that although the Duma could draft an electoral law, it would have no power over the appointed upper chamber.[185]

Although the liberal dream of a constituent duma was dashed, the Cadets were in a confident mood after its electoral victory. The Duma statutes forced them to realize that the Tsar's commitment to reform was fragile, and could disappear at any time. They negotiated with Nicholas's government in an attempt to establish a more responsible Duma ministry, but succeeded only in creating a stalemate between the two sides.[186] Although they abandoned confrontation in favour of a "business-like" tone in debates, they could not prevent the dissolution of the First Duma.[187] Cadets then led the deputies in issuing the Vyborg Manifesto, which urged peasants and workers to withhold taxes and avoid the draft until the parliament was

---

[184] Emmons, pp. 14-16.

[185] Gilbert Doctorow, "The Fundamental State Laws of 23 April 1906," Russian Review. April 1975. pp. 33-6; Zimmerman, p. 124.

[186] Robert L. Tuck, "Paul Miliukov and the Negotiations for a Duma Ministry. 1906." American Slavic and East European Review. 10 (April 1951). Cf. Miliukov's own account in "Liberal Disappointment" in Macneal, pp. 26-7, and Political Memoirs. pp. 109-116.

[187] Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution. p. 37.

reconvened. Most Cadets signed the Manifesto in the hopes of channeling public outrage toward passive resistance rather than revolutionary violence.[188] They retained this hope even though signing such a document was illegal and, as criminals, they would be banned from seeking election to the Second Duma. "At the very least," explained Miliukov, "it would be a warning to the government against taking further violent steps."[189]

The Cadets still had to deal with pro-autocracy groups like the Trade Industrialists as well as with the left. The huge successes in St. Petersburg and Moscow had raised hopes of government responsiveness, but the Vyborg Manifesto still provoked fear of reprisals from the state and/or reactionary groups like the Black Hundreds.[190] Russia was under what amounted to martial law, and both urban and rural dwellers resented the liberals for aiding the radical left. Their former supporters tended to become more right-wing in their outlook and or chose to ally themselves with other bourgeois groups. The Cadets reacted to these shifts by reaffirming their support for peaceful reform in order to pacify the middle classes, and by including more peasant and worker candidates on their Second Duma slates in order to appeal to the masses. At the Fourth Congress in 1906, they distanced

---

[188] Ibid. p. 28.

[189] Political Memoirs. p. 132.

[190] Hans Rogger, "The Formation of the Russian Right. California Slavic Studies. Vol. 3 (1964). pp. 69-72.

themselves from the Vyborg resolutions.[191] Nonetheless, they experienced severe losses in their former urban strongholds. The left parties gained 13% overall.[192] Russia was polarizing, and the left and right were gaining at the centre's expense.

Changes to the electoral law in 1907 weighted subsequent elections even more in favour of the gentry and the landowners, but this meant gains for the Octobrists and other libertarian parties rather than the moderate Cadets. The left continued to win over the poorer groups.[193] Most importantly, the changes caused other politicians to lose faith in the Duma as an agent of real change, and they began to concentrate on extraparliamentary politics. The Cadets, however, continued to see the legislature as the best forum for their ideas.

After 1907, the only steady support for the Cadets came from the "second curia" of cities and towns, whose voters were males with property valued at less than one hundred roubles, small business owners, tenant famers (as opposed to peasants paying reparations), persons occupying private lodgings in their own names, and salaried government

---

[191] Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution. p. 28.

[192] Seton-Watson, p. 350.

[193] C. J. Smith, "The Third State Duma: An Analytical Profile." Russian Review. XVII no. 3 July 1958. pp. 202-4; Emmons, p. 366; Walsh, pp. 149-150.

employees.[194] The number of Cadet deputies to the Second Duma dropped to 99 from 178, while the Social Democrats increased from 17 to 65, and the Octobrists from 38 to 54.[195] This decline in support eventually caused the deterioration of the party's organizational network, and membership dropped from over one hundred thousand in 1906 to less than ten thousand by 1917.[196]

The Cadet Party's general goals were still radical. They sought to maintain the early liberal commitment to **nadklassnost** by working for the interests of all members of society at the expense of none. Many Cadets believed they should ignore narrow partisan interests, and form alliances with anyone who could help Russia regardless of political affiliation. Although the idea of a non-partisan **(nadpartiinost)** political party struck some Cadets as an oxymoron, others saw it as a continuation of the nineteenth century intelligentsia's tradition of selflessness.[197] Since the party believed that Russia's development depended on the satisfaction of all vital social interests at the expense of none, its representatives supported the abolition of taxes on necessities, the establishment of a progressive income tax, limitations on hours of factory work, and compulsory

---

[194] Emmons, p. 367.

[195] Alfred Levin, The Second Duma. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1940. pp. 66-7.

[196] Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution. p. 31.

[197] Rosenberg, "Politics of Ambivalence." p. 140.

government health insurance and old-age pensions. They also advocated redistribution of private lands as well as Church and state holdings. However, they qualified these demands by stating that the income tax should be "non-confiscatory," and the labour laws and insurance plans must not compromise industry's competitiveness.[198] Also, any landowners who were "alienated" from their lands should be compensated "according to a just (not market) evaluation."[199]

Such caution enabled their critics to characterize all Cadets as 'bourgeois.' In fact, most members did come from the professional classes. Of the twenty-six members elected to the first Central Committe in 1905, there were nine attorneys and nine professors, including Miliukov, the party's leader.[200] Professionals were also prominent in the provincial organizations, while the rank-and-file tended to be scientific workers, technicians, judicial clerks, junior administrators, and even some senior bureaucrats. While the provincial zemstvo liberals were often more radical than their urban counterparts, particularly on the land question, they were still more akin to the gentry than to the peasantry. In the city, ties between the professionals and the privileged elite were even closer than in the countryside. Many prominent Moscow Cadets were members of

---

[198] Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution. p. 17.

[199] Rhyne, p. 467.

[200] Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution. p. 20.

prominent aristocratic families, but they believed they could transcend their backgrounds and speak for all citizens of the Empire.[201]

In practical terms, this national orientation meant that the conflict between the gentry liberals who wanted to ally themselves with reformist bureaucrats in the regime, and the liberationists who believed strength could only be found in the masses, could never be resolved. After the Tsar issued the October Manifesto, the question of alliances caused the fragmentation of the liberal movement. Shipov and his followers were alienated by slogans like "No enemies to the left,"[202] and formed their own Slavophile party, the Octobrists, while more radical liberals defected to the revolutionary parties over the issue of how strongly the Cadets would push the demands of workers and peasants.[203]

The Cadet commitment to promoting the interests of all at the expense of none was reflected in their nationalities policy. They viewed the entire problem of ethnic unrest as a by-product of Tsarist restrictions on cultural and political freedom. Therefore, they saw the creation of a federal system as unnecessary and even dangerous. As

---

[201] Ibid. p. 38

[202] Terrence Emmons, "The Russian Landed Gentry and Politics" Russian Review. July 1974. p. 270.

[203] Treadgold, "The Constitutional Democrats and the Russian Liberal Tradition." American Slavic and East European Review. 10:2 (April 1951). pp 85-94.

Miliukov explained:

> The national questions, by their very existence, threatened to complicate the social and constitutional questions which were our main problems. Moreover, the different desires and demands of the various nationalities [were] fused into general formulas, [which were] a means of asserting the demands of those nationalities who were least prepared for autonomy.[204]

He feared that further decentralization of the Russian state system would only aid the forces of reaction.[205]

Nonetheless, the Cadet Party Programme of 1906 did make several provisions for national minorities, including:

> 1. All Russian citizens, regardless of sex, religion, and nationality, are equal before the law....
>
> 11. [A]ll people inhabiting the empire [should be guaranteed] the right to free cultural self determination....
>
> 12. The population of every region must be assured of the opportunity to receive elementary, and insofar as it is possible, higher education in the native tongue.[206]

They also insisted, however, that "Russian must be the language of the central institutions, the army, and the fleet."[207] The national liberal parties co-operated with the Cadets at first, and their support was instrumental in the party's success. Unfortunately for the Russian liberals,

---

[204] Political Memoirs. p. 101.

[205] C. J. Smith, "Miliukov and the National Question." Harvard Slavic Studies. Vol. IV 1957. pp. 418.

[206] English translation of the Programme in Rhyne, pp. 461-2.

[207] Ibid.

the minorities grew dissatisfied with Cadet efforts on their behalf, especially in regard to Polish independence. Many switched their allegiance to other parties, including the Socialist Revolutionaries.[208]

Since the days of the Union of Liberation, the problems of constituency, social composition, and even values had caused a great deal of debate in liberal ranks. Cadets had almost always disagreed about the political maturity of the masses, the desirability of alliances with other groups, and even the degree to which the party should co-operate with the Tsar or seek further reform. Since it never really developed a coherent strategy for social change, it never achieved the cohesiveness of units like the Bolshevik Party.

From the beginning, the Cadet Party had a significant revolutionary contingent. Many of these were holdovers from the Union of Liberation, and many others were from the provinces. They identified with mass protests, and believed that the party should let public demands dictate more of its policies. In the fall of 1905, this group had pressed the Party into supporting general strikes. Like the militant socialists, the leftists had also wanted to boycott the Duma to protest the limited franchise and indirect electoral system.[209] Miliukov offended them by being too conciliatory

---

[208] Voskobiynyk, p. 155.

[209] Healy, pp.17-18; Cf. Freeze, pp. 88-89.

in his dealings with the government. After the Stolypin reforms of 1907, this faction sought closer ties with the Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries.[210]

Although the leftists were a minority in the Party, they had many forceful spokesmen. The most radical of these was the Moscow lawyer Michael Mendelshtam, who kept the notion of a left alliance alive into the Third Duma.[211] Unlike Miliukov and the moderates, Mendelshtam and his followers believed that the regime would be swayed by mass movements rather than elite persuasion. They opposed Miliukov's gradualist approach, and instead agitated for the immediate establishment of a full range of civil liberties. Their confidence in the political readiness of the population meant that they found the possibilities of mass anarchy less threatening than the continuation of autocratic repression.[212] While Mendelshtam's journal Zizhn (Life) took an explicitly Marxist stand, his initial goals remained political rather than social, on the grounds that a democratic system was the first prerequisite for a solution to the country's problems. Like the Mensheviks, he believed that the historical situation was not yet ripe for a proletarian victory.[213]

---

[210] Alfred Levin, "P. A. Stolypin: A Political Appraisal." Journal of Modern History. XXXVII no. 4 Dec. 1965. pp. 459-60.

[211] Emmons, p. 74.

[212] Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution. p. 33.

Practical political considerations rather than philosophical kinship were the basis for the left liberals' call for an alliance with the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats. They believed that such a merger would only benefit the Cadets by giving them a foothold among other demographic groups. Once this goal was achieved, the liberals were confident they would be able to convert the voters and the other politicians to their point of view. When the Fourth Duma elections showed a great proportional increase in SD strength, Mendelshtam and his followers became even more convinced of the validity of their position.[214]

The problem was that few of the other parties saw any real reason to ally themselves with the Cadets. The Socialist Revolutionaries acquired great popularity in the countryside through their own call for the transfer of all land to the peasants and the complete democratization of the electoral franchise. Their extensive propaganda, combined with terrorism against state officials, won them considerable influence in the multi-ethnic and officially non-partisan Peasants' Union[215] (in spite of their own internal debates over the merits of violence).[216] Unlike the

---

[213] Emmons, p. 75.

[214] Hosking, p. 194.

[215] Arthur P. Mendel, "Peasant and Worker on the Eve of the First World War." Slavic Review. XXIV: March. 1965. pp. 25.

Cadets, they had no qualms about declaring themselves representative of a particular class. Their ideology owed a great deal to the nineteenth century populists' veneration of the **narod,** or folk, as did that of the slightly more moderate Trudovik Party. Their emphasis on the peasantry also brought them support from the nationalities, who saw them as closer to the non-Russian citizens than the intellectual Cadets.[217] By committing themselves to the idea of national cultural independence, they became the first to acknowledge the existence of a serious national problem in Russia.[218]

Both the Trudoviks and the SR's organisations also possessed strongly Slavophile philosophies and were inclined to view liberalism as something "foreign" and irrelevant in many respects. Although the latter group claimed to speak for "all the toilers and not just one small group of them," its members also respected the values of the uneducated, "uncivilised" Russian above others.[219] Like the SR, the Trudoviks called for the complete nationalisation of land. Its support came from many of the segments the Cadets were trying to win over, including moderate elements of the peasantry, the army, and the industrial working class.

---

[216] Utechin, p. 139-40.

[217] Voskobiynyk, p. 441.

[218] Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1964. p. 31.

[219] Voskobiynyk, p. 243.

Although they were not a true political party because they had no formal organization outside of their Duma membership, the Truds often held the balance of power and made a difference to the Cadets as they tried to turn their policies into legislation.[220]

At first, Miliukov was popular among the Trudovik group, and the peasants even expressed regret at not having anyone in their own party "who could explain everything so clear and smart."[221] The alliance soon disintegrated, however, when "the intellectuals of their party began to influence them. Systematic attacks on the Cadets then took place at their meetings."[222] The Truds had their own ideas, which were only sometimes in harmony with those of the liberals, and they began to resent the feeling that Miliukov, who was not even a deputy, "was directing the Duma from the snack bar."[223]

The only leftist group which expressed any continued willingness to co-operate with the liberals was the Menshevik branch of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party. This faction agreed with Lenin's Bolsheviks on the validity of Marxist theory but disagreed on tactics.

---

[220] Healy, p. 159.

[221] Vinaver, leader of the Trudoviks, quoted in Riha, A Russian European. p. 121.

[222] Miliukov, Political Memoirs. p. 100.

[223] Ibid. p. 98.

Plekhanov argued that the revolution of 1905 was bourgeois, and must end in the establishment of a capitalist system. Lenin saw this as a betrayal of Marxist goals, and held that the proletariat should ally itself with the peasantry, gain power, and then begin the struggle with the bourgeois in general and the bourgeois peasantry in particular. Accordingly he advocated an active boycott of the Duma while Plekhanov preached co-operation and participation.[224] But, even Plekhanov himself was wary of becoming entangled with the Cadets, who he believed were becoming preoccupied with their own internal struggles. Also, like the other revolutionary groups, the Mensheviks had only limited faith in the Duma as an agent of social change, so many of their efforts were concentrated elsewhere.[225]

At first both the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks denied the significance of the national problem in the Empire. They believed that economic forces were making such divisions irrelevant. Later, the Mensheviks, while remaining hostile to the idea of federalism, reconciled themselves to the thought of cultural autonomy. Lenin was slower to recognize the significance of the issue, but by 1912 he saw that ethnic dissatisfaction was a force he could exploit.[226] To him, the actual structure of a nation was of

---

[224] Harold Shukman, Lenin and the Russian Revolution. London: B. T. Batsford Ltd. 1966. pp. 126-9; Seton-Watson, pp. 151-2.

[225] Rhyne, p. 268.

secondary importance to the moblilization of the workers against the autocracy. The nationality question was viewed as part of the challenge of securing power. Lenin's concept of national self-determination was developed with an eye to creating the best possible conditions for the mobilization against capitalism. By granting the minorities the right to statehood, he was hoping to pre-empt any desire to actually secede.[227] After all, he noted, "the right of divorce is not an invitation to all wives to leave their husbands."[228] Like the Mensheviks, he also attempted to discredit the Cadets' national policies in an effort to bolster his own position.[229]

While the right and left wings of the Cadet Party were equally committed to the concepts of rule of law, civil liberty, and constitutionalism, they disagreed on matters of emphasis and approach. Rightists like Peter Struve and Ariadna Tyrkova saw 1905 as the climax of Russia's political struggle. From that point on, the real danger came not from the regime, but from irresponsible leaders who would "intoxicate simple-minded peasants with demagogic

---

[226] Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union. pp. 34-36.

[227] Graham Smith, "Nationalities Policy from Lenin to Gorbachev." in Graham Smith (ed.), The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union. London: Longman. 1990. pp. 3-4.

[228] V. I. Lenin, On the Nationalities Question. Moscow: Novosti Press Publishing House. 1980. p. 7.

[229] Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union. pp. 34-6.

promises."[230] Attempts to weaken authority through mass opposition movements only detracted from the more pressing need to develop social consciousness and political maturity. In their view, a completely western constitutional structure was impossible so long as the population was incapable of understanding the demands and responsibilities of the system. Therefore, a liberal's true duty was to engage in practical work in the areas of economic development, social reform, and education. Once the people were "ready," representative constitutionalism would evolve and flourish naturally.[231]

While this point of view was present at the early congresses, it was not expressed strongly until after the First and Second Dumas. By the Third Duma, rightists were defending Stolypin's land policies as a means of pacifying the country, while their leftist colleagues were denouncing them as an abuse of state power and a betrayal of the peasantry.[232] By 1911, the right Cadets had close ties with the Octobrists.[233]

---

[230] A. Tyrkova Williams, From Liberty to Brest-Litovsk. Westport Conn.: Hyperion Press. 1977. p. 88.

[231] Ibid. p. 90-95.

[232] Levin, "P. A. Stolypin." pp. 460-2.

[233] Smith, "The Third State Duma." p. 209.

The Octobrists, or the Union of 17th October, were led by Shipov. This group differed from the Cadet Party in its avowedly monarchist nature and its acceptance of the Tsar's October Manifesto as the basis for future reforms. They took issue with the concept of popular sovereignty and the idea that every citizen is capable of actively participating in politics. Instead, they believed that political participation should be undertaken by the "best people," and popular representation should serve as an organ for public opinion rather than as an instrument of government.[234] Essentially, their platform involved the application of the "zemstvo system," which Shipov had advocated since the 1890's, to the national arena. Many of its supporters were provincial gentry and property owners who had long supported the zemstvo cause.[235]

Although the right wing of the Cadet Party did have much in common with the Octobrists, Shipov's support came from the moderate nobility and industrialists, rather than from the professional classes. Miliukov believed the group had been artificially created with the help of the government.[236] In spite of their call for improvement of peasant conditions, most Octobrists feared the implementation of measures which would adversely affect

---

[234] Emmons, p. 97.

[235] Ibid. p. 98.

[236] Miliukov, Political Memoirs. p. 160.

agricultural productivity. And, while they were willing to make limited constitutional and linguistic concessions to minorities, they also promised to preserve the essentially "Russian" nature of the Empire, including the supremacy of the Orthodox Church.[237] Octobrists often denounced the left Cadets as irresponsible and accused them of a willingness to sacrifice the country's best attributes in a rush toward reforms which would evolve naturally in good time. Like the right Cadets, the Octobrists saw rapid change as the gravest danger to peace and security.[238]

To the right of the Octobrists lay a number of comparatively small factions which lacked formal organization as parties. These included the Nationalists, who sought the complete domination of Russians over all other imperial citizens, and the Moderate Rightists.[239] Further to the right were the genuinely reactionary parties, who refused to recognize the Duma and demanded the reinstatement of autocracy in its full glory. The Monarchist Party believed the solution to the Empire's problems lay in the forging of a close relationship between the Tsar and his people. The Union of the Russian People espoused much the same principles and also sought to divert social discontent toward the Jews and other minorities.[240]

---

[237] Edelman, p. 10.

[238] Emmons, pp. 109-12.

[239] Edelman, p. 10.

These organizations, though small, were nonetheless influential. Since many of their members were highly placed officials or members of prominent families, they managed to have a disproportionate effect on government policy.

Miliukov was perhaps the most politically oriented of all the liberal leaders, and his desire for a unified Cadet Party was calculated. Only a stable, disinterested liberal intelligentsia, in his judgement, could prevent the escalation of the conflict between the volatile lower orders and the reactionary administration. Such a moderate and reasonable group, he hoped, could also direct the country's social and economic modernization in a way that would, in time, benefit everyone. In an effort to reconcile disparate groups, he encouraged autonomy for local committees and solicited non-binding minority reports.[241] He was involved in all major decisions, and later recalled: "My share consisted in determining the middle position of a meeting, and working out a conciliatory formula."[242]

The Cadets had to make all social groups realize that Russia's development required a legal framework, and that parliamentary democracy, civil liberties, economic welfare and domestic peace were all inextricably linked. The

---

[240] Hans Rogger, "Was There a Russian Fascism? The Union of the Russian People." pp. 398-9; Ibid. p. 25-26.

[241] Rosenberg, pp. 36-7.

[242] quoted in Riha, A Russian European. p. 119.

question of alliances was always one of degree, since the party had to convince the regime of its loyalty without alienating the masses. The constitutionalists' course involved a complex balancing act in which they tried to champion the demands of the peasants without arousing the hostility of the Tsar, who still had the power to crush the opposition.

Although Miliukov and his followers saw their dilemma early, they believed that pressure from both sides was simply one of the risks involved in building a national rather than a class-based programme. They felt that they would have to accept their group's difficult position simply because of Russia's backwardness.[243]

After the 1907 changes to the franchise narrowed the Cadets' electoral base, Miliukov and his colleagues had decided that their best strategy was to gain the goodwill of government and work for reform by securing appointments to administrative posts. Although some conservatives still saw the Cadets as dangerous, Miliukov hoped the need for experienced politicians would help them gain the Tsar's confidence, and enable them to lobby for changes from within the bureaucracy.[244] The appearance of unity and stability

---

[243] Rosenberg, William G. "Russian Liberals and the Bolshevik Coup." Journal of Modern History. 40 (3): Sept. 1968. pp. 329-31. and "The Politics of Ambivalence," in Timberlake, p. 141.

[244] Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution. p. 38.

was essential if this was to happen. Unfortunately for this liberal strategy, many influential Russians had been frightened by the revolutionary rhetoric into supporting groups like the conservative Octobrists or the reactionary Union of the Russian People.[245] Political polarization was clearly hurting the moderate liberals; with the crisis of August, 1914, their plight worsened.

The outbreak of World War I turned out to be a major crisis for the Cadets. Initially, war strengthened the nationalist commitments of almost all members, reinforcing their traditional desire to defend state interests. Russia, all patriots agreed, had to maintain her international position.[246] Before long, however, the war accentuated differences between politically oriented Cadets like Miliukov and their more socially oriented colleagues. Some reforms were necessary for military victory, but should they come from above or below? Should patriotic liberals ally themselves with the regime or with the mass revolutionary movements? The answer depended upon whether the Party should continue to rely on the Duma, or return to the liberationist strategy of 1905.

---

[245] Emmons, "The Russian Landed Gentry and Politics." p. 272.

[246] George Yaney, "Some Aspects of the Imperial Russian Government on the Eve of the First World War." Slavonic and East European Review. XLIII no.1 Dec. 1964. p. 88.

Miliukov hoped that the war would encourage the administration to recognize the Cadets' government potential. Liberal ministerial appointments could become necessary after the conflict wrought its inevitable political changes. But the introduction of major constitutional reforms could hurt the defense effort, so the best course of action seemed to lie in the pursuit of bureaucratic changes from above, which permitted liberal participation without untimely disruption.[247]

These were the views which formed the basis of the Progressive Bloc, a loose coalition of liberal and conservative leaders supporting administrative reform. Not one of the proposals put forward by the Bloc demanded basic changes in Russia's political system. The Cadets, for their part, committed themselves to the idea that progress could be achieved through co-operation with the established authorities.[248] Some of their right-wing members such as Tyrkova worried that even the Bloc's modest proposals were dangerously close to disloyalt,.[249] but Miliukov saw it as "the last attempt to find a peaceful way out."[250]

---

[247] T. Riha, "Miliukov and the Progressive Bloc in 1915: A Study in Last Chance Politics." Joural of Modern History. XXXII 1960. p. 17.

[248] Ibid.

[249] cf. Tyrkova, pp. 11-20.

[250] Political Memoirs. p. 319.

The main concern of party members outside the Duma was the task of organizing society and industry in support of the war. The focal points were the nonpartisan Union of Zemstvos and Towns, and War Industries Committees. However, these groups became political as major defeats provoked economic and social problems, and even people who did not want to get involved in the reform process felt compelled to protest government ineptitude. What kind of changes were needed to ensure victory? Many members of the Progressive Bloc, including the Cadets, felt that the nation was facing a revolutionary tide, and needed to bridge the gap between the elite and the masses if workers and peasants were to be kept from outright violence.[251] Also, the growth of independence movements in areas like Poland and Lithuania put added pressure on the Empire, and many Russians felt that these had to be dealt with one way or another before the war effort would be effective.[252]

Membership in the Bloc committed the party as a whole to a reform coalition that basically depended on the goodwill of those it was trying to change. When the Tsar decided to dismiss the Duma rather than listen to the Bloc's demands, Cadet militants became more numerous and vocal. They wanted to see the establishment of an entirely new authority that could win the war. The more moderate elements wanted to see

---

[251] Ibid. p. 320.

[252] Smith, "Miliukov and the National Question," p. 92; Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution. p. 36.

the Duma become the country's sole governmental organ, but not by means of partisan struggle or mass rebellion, and the centrists, wanted to continue to support the Bloc. The right thought that all Imperial citizens should devote their time to improving conditions at the front.[253] Not surprisingly, the Congress of 1916 did not manage to express a coherent party line.[254]

In the meantime, economic and political conditions deteriorated, and the Tsar responded to any criticism with anger. The population suffered from the lack of food and other supplies, and many families experienced hardship when a "bread-winner" was sent away to the front.[255] Most people did not understand the reason for the war and were very resentful of those who supported it. This resentment added to the general feeling that the Cadets were out of touch with the needs of the people.

Other parties, including the Bolsheviks, were able to capitalize on these sentiments in 1917. While the Cadets devoted their energies to Duma politics, many of these groups had been taking advantage of the new political freedoms and educating the masses to their own viewpoints, often at the expense of liberalism. Since the Cadets had so few ties to workers and peasants, it was easy for the

---

[253] Riha, "Miliukov and the Progressive Bloc." p. 22.

[254] Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution. p. 43

[255] Seton-Watson, pp. 360-1.

revolutionaries to paint them as agents of Tsarism.[256] Unfortunately, for the Cadets, their own recent actions in support of the government, however well-meaning, seemed to confirm this propaganda.

Thus, in spite of their electoral victory in the First Duma, the Cadet liberals found themselves isolated by 1917. Even the Western democracies they so admired failed to come to their aid after the Bolshevik coup. Many Cadet leaders, including Miliukov and Kerensky did escape to the West and managed to live out their days under constitutional governments. Sadly, most were haunted by the question that has intrigued observers ever since: How could something that began with such promise go so badly awry?

The failure of the Cadets to survive the maelstrom of 1917 led to the extinction of liberalism for decades as a major political force in Russia. The events affecting the Russian liberal movement and the Cadet Party can be viewed in three rough periods. The first five years after 1900 can be viewed as a time of development. During this period, the liberals became a force to be reckoned with in the national arena, and many of the issues which would later affect the Cadet Party came to light.

---

[256] Ibid. p. 364.

After the revolution of 1905, it seemed that the constitutionalists had won an important victory with the establishment of the Duma. In fact, until 1907, the concerns of the Cadets seemed to be shared by a good portion of the population. However, the government took a reactionary stance from 1907 until well past the end of the decade, and public opinion became divided over whether repressive measures were needed to preserve society.

Those who supported the government's actions gravitated to the right and often called for stronger measures, while those who were outraged at what seemed to be abuses of power were inclined to favour progressively more radical programmes for social change. The Vyborg Manifesto was a classic example of a Cadet attempt to please everyone which in fact satisfied no one. To the revolutionaries, it seemed an insignficant protest in light of the Tsar's cavalier treatment of the Duma, but to the conservatives the idea of refusing to pay taxes or co-operate with the draft was almost seditious. They had abandoned legality, one of their biggest strengths, and gained nothing in return.[257] Most members of the lower classes did not think the Tsar would negotiate or compromise, and the propertied classes were not willing to trade order and privilege for a set of untried reforms which might place them in jeopardy.

---

[257] Rhyne, p. 432.

The Constitutional Democrats emphasis on broad political goals also led them to underestimate the significance of the national question. Although their liberal belief in freedom made them reluctant to dismiss the aspirations of the various minorities, they tended to see such issues as secondary. Once a constitutional framework was in place, all other problems could be solved. But most national liberation groups would sooner have established their independence before deciding on the details of their political systems. Other opposition groups, including the Bolsheviks, realized they could capitalize on this unrest by seeming to place a higher priority on national aspirations.

The Cadets continued to see themselves as best equipped to govern Russia, but the Party itself had little cohesion and reflected the interests and values of a relatively small segment of the population. If they were to succeed, they had to appeal to a broader constituency. Their activities in 1905 and 1906 were more extensive than those of any other political group. In their efforts to capitalize on Nicholas II's concessions, they set up special courses for agitators, organized lecture tours for party spokesmen, and began publishing books, magazines, and even daily newspapers. In most cases, their rhetoric was general in focus, reflecting the early liberal commitment to **nadklassnost.** They concentrated their efforts on the peasants and workers, leaving the commercial classes alone. The reasoning behind

this decision was that this latter segment already had close ties with the state, and would have to be won over when liberalism was stronger. But they failed to realize that the educated members of society would seldom remain neutral. Instead, many used their considerable resources **against** the liberals.

The left wing of the Cadet Party wanted to adopt some of the politics of the revolutionaries, but as the intelligentsia sought to replace the gentry's cautious approach with its own more aggressive one, it was faced with another problem. In the early years of the Duma, reforms from above were the only alternative to revolution. So long as the Tsar still held the reins of power, the voice of the gentry would carry more weight than the cries of 'upstart' professionals, peasants, or workers. And, until the parliament was created, the zemstvos offered a base of operations preferable to any other in the Empire. These factors help explain the years of wavering on the part of the Union of Liberation, and also show why large segments of the Cadet Party could consider an expedient alliance with libertarian, but non-constitutional and non-democratic elements of the gentry.

The Cadet liberals made their most important tactical mistake after 1905. They placed too much faith in the Duma as an instrument of true democracy and social change. When

the Tsar began to take reactionary measures against the parliament, they found that they had lost much of their ability to influence politics by extraparliamentary means, and in a sense were caught in a trap. The general population was angered by the government's repressive moves, and found the Cadets' centrist, legalistic approach to change unsatisfactory in the new situation. Many would vote for the party, but few would fight for it. And, with the breakdown of the gentry alliance, the intelligentsia lost the ears of many powerful members of the establishment. Miliukov's attempt to regain the trust of the government by seeking administrative postings came too late, and served only to increase the distance between his camp and that of the revolutionary socialists.[258] Had the Cadets made more of an effort to accommodate the gentry liberals after Bloody Sunday, they might have been able to lobby effectively for social change in spite of the Tsar's reactionary mood. It is even possible that the implementation of the necessary agricultural and social reforms would have stopped the Revolution, although it would have been difficult if not impossible for any government to make such changes while fighting a war.

As one analyst concludes:

> [T]he Russian context demanded either movement to the left, and tactics designed to press mass partisan demands; or consistent conservatism, with

---

[258] Donald Treadgold, "Russian Radical Thought" in Stavrou, p. 85.

> a corresponding decision to work for change only after having become part of the established bureaucratic order. However reasonable the derivation of their ambivalence, it did not advance the Party's goals. [259]

The debates over tactics point to the most important weakness in the Cadet programme: its objectives were western, and alien to Tsarist Imperial Russia. Unlike the nations of Europe, Russia had no liberal traditions of its own. The basic concepts of constitutionalism, individual liberty and democracy were introduced abruptly from the West. They had not evolved over hundreds of years, but had been modified in mere decades. Instead of improving their own conditions in the same haphazard way as Western liberals had done, Russian liberals were trying to achieve a predetermined goal, and were doomed to feel imitative and inferior as they fell short. The entire ideology had been designed elsewhere, and the nation was expected to meet outside standards of advancement and progress. In contrast, groups like the Bolsheviks offered a chance to be in the forefront of political and social development while presumably remaining true to authoritative communal aspects of the ancient society. Ironically, the Bolsheviks and other extremist groups owed some of their opportunities to liberal gains in advancing political freedom and civil liberty: in an odd paradox that must have gratified their victorious opponents, the Cadets' success, limited as it

---

[259] Rosenberg, "Politics of Ambivalence." p. 163.

was, contributed to their ultimate defeat. Seventy years later, a similar irony would afflict Mikhail Gorbachev.

Chapter V

REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION

In 1985, after the relative stagnation of the Brezhnev period in Soviet politics, a new leader emerged in the Soviet Union. When Mikhail Gorbachev announced his policy of **perestroika,** or restructuring of the nation, he surprised many by his frank discussion of his country's woes. Reform, he said, is:

> an urgent necessity arising from the profound processes of change in our socialist society. Any delay in beginning **perestroika** could have led to an exacerbated internal situation in the near future, which to put it bluntly, would have been fraught with serious social, economic and political crises.[260]

Glasnost, or openness and freedom of speech, was cited as an integral part of the reform process.

Since these goals seemed both laudable and overdue to Western observers, the removal of Gorbachev following the defeat of the conservative coup of August 19, 1991 came as a surprise. How could the Soviets abandon a leader who had taken them so far in a mere six years? At least one analyst has argued that Gorbachev's demise was the consequence of major economic mistakes made early in the reform

---

[260] Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World. NY: Harper and Row. 1987. p. 1

programme.[261] Alternatively, the defeat of the hard-liners and the installation of an even more radical government under Boris Yeltsin could be viewed as the vindication of **glasnost** if not of **perestroika.**

Although Gorbachev insisted that he was a Marxist and that his policies represented "a jump forward in the development of socialism,"[262] rather than the adoption of any other ideology, many of his ideas sound familiar to Western analysts and to students of the liberal movement under Tsar Nicholas II. He and his followers:

> attach priority to political measures, broad and genuine democratization, the resolute struggle against red tape, and violations of law, and the active involvement of the masses in managing the country's affairs.[263]

They seek "to form a rule of law socialist state in which abuse of office...will be rendered impossible and in which the triumph of law and order and democratic principles will be reliably ensured.[264]

These political goals, as well as the concern for the nation's economy and its place in the international arena, are common to both movements. And, although their

---

[261] Marshall Goldman, What Went Wrong With Perestroika. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1991.

[262] Gorbachev, Perestroika. p. 37

[263] Ibid. p. 40.

[264] Mikhail Gorbachev. Bringing Out the Potential of Socialism More Fully. Moscow: Novosti Press Publishing House 1988. p. 7.

situations differ in a number of important ways, Gorbachev and the Cadet Party faced many of the same challenges. A brief discussion of the Gorbachev programme, followed by an assessment of the similarities and differences between the philosophies, tactics and situation of the two movements shall show that while Gorbachev was in a better position to implement his theories , he still faced many of the same obstacles as his reformist predecessors.

Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was born in the tiny village of Privolnoe, 900 miles south of Moscow, and about 100 miles from Stavropol. Although Privolnoe is a tiny farming village, it has produced several Soviet leaders, including Gorbachev's mentor, Yuri Andropov.[265] It was also a refuge for free farmers before serfdom was abolished in 1861.

Gorbachev's family was not particularly noteworthy, but one of his grandfathers was arrested for failing to fulfil the seeding plans on his collective in 1933, when Gorbachev was two. When the head of the family was sent away to Siberia, many of the remaining members starved to death. Not long afterward, the other grandfather, head of a collective farm, was sent to prison and interrogated for over a year. His family, who thought he had been executed, were ostracized for harbouring an enemy of the state.

---

[265] Zhores A. Medvedev Gorbachev. New York: W. W. Norton. 1989. p. 72.

Gorbachev later referred to this period in explaining why he sought to reform the political system.[266]

Since Gorbachev was only nine at the start of the Great Patriotic War, he stayed on the farm and finished high school. In 1950 he applied for membership in the CPSU.[267] He then went to Moscow State University to study law. Although this is not considered an unusual move for an aspiring politician in the West, most Soviet apparatchiks pursued a programme of technical studies followed by a course at a Higher Party School. Law was often dismissed as a bourgeois field. By pursuing this course of study, Gorbachev had already distinguished himself from his peers.[268] Shortly after graduating in 1955, he was assigned to do organizational work for the Stavropol Komsomol. He rose rapidly through the ranks, becoming regional leader by 1961.[269]

In 1962, Gorbachev left the Komsomol to become a rural Party organizer. In order to learn more about agriculture he studied for a degree at the Stavropol Agricultural Institute.[270] His rise continued, and by 1970 he was First

---

[266] Gail Sheehy, "The Man Who Changed the World." Vanity Fair. Feb. 1990. p. 119.

[267] Ibid. p. 122.

[268] Geoffrey Hosking, The Awakening of the Soviet Union. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1990. p. 127.

[269] Medvedev, pp. 46-9.

[270] Ibid. p. 55.

Secretary of the Stavropol CPSU. He was now a senior official, and few were surprised by his Central Committee appointment in 1971.[271]

Gorbachev's experiences in Stavropol helped shape him in many ways. He had an opportunity to experiment with various agricultural reforms, ranging from production incentives to increased centralisation of farming and industry.[272] As First Secretary, he travelled to the West to view capitalist production firsthand. He had no direct experience in Soviet industry, however, which probably made dealing with the realities of economic reform more difficult. Nonetheless, it was as an agricultural expert that he was first appointed to the Politboro in 1978. His influence steadily increased until he took over as First Secretary after the death of Chernenko in 1985.[273]

Unlike the Russian liberals, who believed that political change could be pursued independently of social or economic reform, Gorbachev sees the three areas as inextricably linked. However, his initial interest in change arose in response to the economic stagnation which occurred during the Brezhnev era. The origin of this malaise and the

---

[271] Ibid. p. 59.

[272] Ibid. p. 81-83.

[273] Gail Sheehy, The Man Who Changed the World. New York: Harper Collins. 1991. pp. 125-52.

interdependence of political, social, and economic interests can be traced to Stalin's industrialization programme. During the 1930's, entirely new branches of heavy industry were established, new sources of energy and raw materials were developed, and a new class of economic managers and scientific specialists arose. By World War II, the Soviet Union had become a powerful industrial nation.

This rapid progress had been accomplished by the now well-known mechanism of five-year plans. The planning system was based on central control of all areas of manufacturing, concentration of resources in specific areas such as heavy industry and defence, organizational separation of scientific research and production, stress on the maximization of gross industrial output at the expense of quality and innovation, and heavy dependence on the adaptation of Western technologies.[274] This framework, reinforced by systematic political control, promoted rapid growth during an early phase of technological development. It was well-designed both for the shock of the German invasion of 1941 and the subsequent reconstruction. In these situations, the ability of central planners to identify and pursue a few key objectives, even at the expense of others, saved the day. Unfortunately, by the 1950's, the system was beginning to weaken.

---

[274] A. C. Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1930-1945 Stanford Ca.: Hoover Institution Press. 1971. pp. 2-10.

In the postwar period, the economy entered a much more complicated phase of development, requiring the creative formulation of priorities at the periphery instead of their direct imposition from the centre. As the international technical revolution advanced and Soviet scientific research became more sophisticated, technological policy became too complicated for conservative, bureaucratic planners. Also, the growth of new branches of the economy, and the proliferation of links and cross-dependencies between them created a more complex system of material balances. In short, the planning mechanism suffered from information overload.[275] Both Gorbachev and his predecessor Andropov declared that "one third of all Soviet work hours were wasted."[276]

Stalin's successors recognized this problem but faced a serious dilemma: deep structural changes could increase efficiency and motivation, but would undermine the social, economic, and political position of groups which had adapted to the system and even learned to thrive within it. Firstly, an enormous group of party officials, and those bureaucrats whose political reliability had to be confirmed by the Party before they could take office, had acquired many privileges in return for their loyalty. This group,

---

[275] Peter Ruland, The Myth of the Plan. London: Hutchinson 1985. pp. 24-48.

[276] Ernest Mandel, Beyond Perestroika. New York: Verso. 1989. p. 8.

known as the **nomenklatura,** controlled the flow of supplies, and many were tempted to abuse their power in order to procure scarce items or to offer protection to black marketeers. Secondly, managers of economic enterprises had often devoted years to the development of a network of contacts who could help them meet the demands of the Planning Committee. Switching to a market-based economy would require more effort and an entirely different set of skills. Thirdly, the work force itself was cushioned by subsidies and guarantees of employment. Unrestrained competition could mean the elimination of certain enterprises as well as consumer price increases. And, finally, the military-industrial complex would not be anxious to give up its privileged status and access to scarce resources.[277]

Gorbachev recognized, therefore, that economic reform in the Soviet Union is very much a political issue. It involves basic, deeply entrenched interest groups. Like the liberalization programme proposed by the Cadets at the turn of the century, **perestroika** requires a change in the societal distribution of power, the mobilization of new allies, and the abandonment of old client groups. It is not difficult to understand why, like their Tsarist predecessors, Stalin's heirs were inclined to shy away from this process. However, the end result of the political

[277] Ruland, pp. 40-8.

procrastination of the Brezhnev era was a widening technological gap between East and West, as well as falling growth rates and decreasing productivity.[278] The political impact of this deterioration could be seen in the difficulty in attaining military parity with the West, the near impossibility of satisfying competing domestic demands for resources, and the lessening attraction of the Soviet Union as a model for Third-World development.[279]

At the crucial Plenary Session of the Central Committee in April 1985, Gorbachev laid the groundwork for a series of economic "reforms from above." Measures included the freeing of economic enterprises from detailed central controls, greater freedom for co-operatives and private enterprises, more autonomy for industries wishing to trade internationally, the encouragement of joint ventures with Western companies, long term leases of land to farm families, and preparation for price and currency reform.[280] These moves have important political ramifications because they strike at the cultural and ideological roots of the command economy, but at first it seemed that Gorbachev would be an advocate of tighter social control. Many agreed with Andrei Gromyko's observation that "[t]his man has a nice

---

[278] Mendel, pp. 3-6.

[279] Phillip Hanson. "Economic Constraints on Soviet Policies in the 1980's." International Affairs. 57(1980-81) pp21-23.

[280] Seweryn Bialer, "Gorbachev's Move." Foreign Policy. no. 68: Fall 1987. p. 60.

smile, but he has iron teeth."[281]

The public was also sceptical about whether Gorbachev's promises would mean any more than those of his predecessors. After all, he had gained power with the support of the KGB, the military, and other conservative forces. He was widely known as the disciple of his immediate predecessor, Yuri Andropov, who had also denounced corruption and lack of discipline as the reason for the Soviet Union's woes. Like Andropov, Gorbachev tightened labour laws and called for greater productivity. He established an official quality-control bureau, and encouraged the vigorous prosecution of corrupt officials. His most unpopular move, however, was the banning of alcohol from both Party and state functions, combined with restrictions on the sale of vodka.[282]

Gorbachev also had to deal with members of a dissident movement that had arisen in response to a 1965 attempt to rehabilitate Stalin. Courageous intellectuals such as the physicist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Andrei Sakharov, the historian Roy Medvedev, and the novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn came to play a role in the genesis of political opinion.[283] **"Glasnost"** was not even Gorbachev's term--it had

---

[281] Bernard Gwertzman and Michael T. Kaufman (eds.), "Introduction," The Collapse of Communism. New York: Times Books 1991. p. 6.

[282] Hosking, p. 128.

[283] Harvey Fireside, "Dissident Visions of the USSR."

been a major demand of critics such as Solzhenitsyn during the Brezhnev years. The practical features of **perestroika,** as well as the remarkable lattitude given to individual critics, was in line with Sakharov's manifestos. The Party's commitment to grow closer to the people without losing sight of Lenin's ideological goals was compatible with Medvedev's philosophy.[284] Nonetheless, for the first half of 1985, Helsinki Watch and other groups monitoring human rights violations in the USSR reported no change in the number of dissidents and activists arrested.[285] When, in December 1986, Gorbachev released Sakharov from internal exile in Gorky, he seemed to be signalling his commitment to liberalization. In turn, Sakharov began to advise foreign leaders to support **perestroika.**

The new leader sought input from a wide variety of sources, including the head of the Siberian Academy's Institute of Economics, Abel Aganbegyan. Like his former student, the sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya, the economist was an outspoken critic of the system, he adhered to the orthodox Soviet wisdom regarding the primacy of heavy industry. He believed that "[m]achine building lies at the heart of the technical reconstruction of the economy," and

---

Polity. 22(2) Winter 1989. pp. 227-9.

[284] Ibid. p. 227.

[285] Roy Medvedev, "The USSR After Brezhnev." in Jon Bloomfield (ed.), The Soviet Revolution. London: Lawrence and Wishart. 1989. p. 213.

should be given priority over all other sectors, including consumer goods.[286] Where he differed from other economists was in his assertion that completely new factories were not the answer-- the country already had enough buildings, and should concentrate on machine tools instead.[287]

Since 1988, the level of public discontent has risen sharply. However, political resistance to economic change was only part of the reason for the reforms' slowness. To a certain extent, the gradual pace of the transformation, and the modifications that occurred along the way, were an unavoidable part of the timing and circumstances of the programme. For one thing, a major institutional change was initiated in the middle of an existing five-year plan. This anomaly restricted the extent to which the reformers could tamper with the roles of industrial branch ministries, or the proportions of state economic activity controlled by government orders.[288] Rapid change could result in confusion or sabotage, causing halts to existing production and the loss of precious resources.[289] The market and plan compete for supremacy, a situation similar to that found in Western

---

[286] Abel Aganbegyan, The Economic Challenge of Perestroika. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1988. p. 105-6.

[287] Ibid. p. 106.

[288] P. Bunich, "The Reform and Parodies on It." in J. L. Black (ed.), USSR Documents Annual 1987: The Gorbachev Reforms. Gulf Breeze, Fl.: Academic International Press. 1988. p. 245.

[289] G. Popov, "Restructuring the Economy." in Black, USSR Documents 1987. pp. 230-3.

economies after World War II. Economic analysts agree that a difficult period of adjustment is inevitable, and that it would be imprudent and possibly dangerous for them to underestimate the magnitude of the challenges they face. Gorbachev did achieve a substantial dismantling of much of the planned economy, but there is continuing debate as to how much of the process was intentional.[290]

Another conflict inherent in the reform process arose from the simultaneous pursuit of both increased quantity and enhanced quality of goods. If technical progress was to be achieved, talented engineers and workers had to be moved away from established production lines, even as the government faces pressure to maintain the flow of goods into the shops in order to show **perestroika** was really working.[291] But this pressure to enjoy the fruits of change could divert attention from the structural reforms, which offered the only long-term hope of success. Economic managers were disturbed by the fact that the many of the most talented administrators moved to the private sector, in effect abandoning the problems of state industries.[292]

---

[290] Goldman, What Went Wrong With Perestroika. p. 143.

[291] Marshall I Goldman, Gorbachev's Challenge: Economic Reform in the Age of High Technology. New York: W. W. Norton and Company 1987. p. 77.

[292] S. A. Silarian, "Reform: Step by Step." in Black, USSR Annual 1989: The End of Empire?. pp. 160-2.

Although the vested interests of party officials, economic managers, subsidized workers, and the military-industrial complex constituted a formidable opposition to Gorbachev, there was also a substantial intellectual movement against **perestroika.** There were conservative elements, among both the leadership and the intelligentsia, who expressed philosophical and emotional reservations about major market-oriented reform. They doubted the novel ideological claims that a decentralization of planning and the introduction of private enterprise and personal property would strengthen socialism. Instead, they foresaw the rise of various "anti-socialist" transitional phenomena, such as unemployment, declines in the standard of living, increased income differentials, "class-based" lifestyle differences, inflation, and enhanced regional disparities.[293]

Moreover, longstanding collectivist tradition, entrenched by over seven decades of Marxism-Leninism, encouraged many Soviet citizens, especially among those who had experienced the hardships of World War II, to question the need for radical change. Instead, they tend to look to the central government with respect, for help during any hardship, and for the effective leadership they remembered with some

---

[293] Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform. London: Pinter Publications. 1989. pp.37-66; Nikolai Shmelyov, "New Worries." in Isaac J. Tarasulo (ed.), Gorbachev and Glasnost: Viewpoints from the Soviet Press. New York: Scholarly Resources. 1989. pp. 117-26.

nostalgia. This attitude makes it difficult for the central power to distance itself from events, or to dilute or abdicate its responsibility for them. Conflicts between social groups and nationalities have aggravated the situation, making political disintegration, gangsterism, and even civil war seem clear and present dangers. At the very least, conservative leaders warned, precipitate market reform would encourage selfish individualism at the expense of community and overall "social interest."[294] But, while they had severe misgivings about the Gorbachev programme, they were slow to offer viable alternatives.

Unlike his predecessors, Khrushchev and Andropov, Gorbachev was openly interested in "disrupting" the elite as well as the masses. By March of 1987, 70% of the Politboro and 60% of the regional party secretaries had been replaced. Also, 40% of the Central Committee, who had been in power at least since October 1982 had been dismissed.[295] At first, there was considerable popular and even Party support for these changes, since most agreed that the country could not go on as it had. Yet even some of Gorbachev's policies, such as those restricting the availability of alcohol, cost him public goodwill he could ill do without. Also, the remaining Party members were increasingly resentful of any attempt to curb their privileges, which they saw as small

---

[294] Ibid. p. 65-6.

[295] The Washington Post. March 8, 1987, cited in Goldman, What Went Wrong With Perestroika. p. 173.

enough payment for their years of faithful service.

The right finally articulated its grievances in an organized form on March 13, 1988. A letter entitled "I Cannot Waive [or Renounce] Principles" appeared in the influential newspaper Sovietskaya Rossiia. It took up the entire front page and was accompanied by a picture of its author lecturing to one of her university classes. No one believed that such an important paper would grant such an unusual amount of attention to a reader's opinion without Party encouragement.[296] Although the letter was signed by Nina Andreeyeva, a chemistry professor, it was probably written with the help of Igor Ligachev, Gorbachev's most vocal conservative opponent.[297] Whether he was involved in the composition or not, Ligachev used his influence to see that the document was published in more than forty regional newspapers, including those serving the military.[298]

In the letter, Andreeyeva criticized the growing renunciation of the Soviet past, particularly the "heroic" Stalinist years. She believed that this lack of respect for the old ways, combined with the recent growth of political opposition, religious tolerance, sexual promiscuity, and

---

[296] Turaselo, Gorbachev and Glasnost. p. 277.

[297] Hedrick Smith, The New Russians. New York: Random House. 1990. p. 135.

[298] Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin. New York: Viking/Penguin. 1990. p. 307; Turaselo, Gorbachev and Glasnost. p. 277.

emigration had caused her students to become confused and depressed.

> Glasnost, openness, the disappearance of zones where criticism is taboo, and the emotional heat of mass consciousness, (especially among young people), often result in the raising of problems that are, to a greater or lesser extent, 'prompted' by Western radio voices or by those of our compatriots who are shaky in their conceptions of socialism.[299]

Soviets in general were beginning to question the value of their own lives. Those who supported the reforms were "kowtowing" to capitalism and its charms at the expense of their own pride. Leaders of "neo-liberal" and "neo-Slavophile" organizations, who called for " 'power-sharing' on the basis of a 'parliamentary system,' 'free trade unions,' 'autonomous publishing-houses,'" ignored the contribution of the Party in "socialist building."[300] In Andreeyeva's view, Soviet citizens should remember the debt they owed the Communists.

Although Gorbachev had Andreeyeva and Ligachev reprimanded in a strongly-worded Pravda editorial in early April,[301] their statement became a rallying point for anti-reformers. Andreeyeva continued to protest and formed an organization called **Edinstvo** (Oneness or Unity), made up of conservative bureaucrats and intellectuals. The group

---

[299] Nina Andreeyeva, "I Cannot Waive Principles." in Ibid., p. 277.

[300] Ibid., p. 289.

[301] "Principles of Perestroika." in Ibid. pp. 291-303.

was linked to **Soyuz** (Union), a right wing caucus of the Supreme Soviet which formed in 1990.[302] Reformers blame **Soyuz** for the surprise resignation of their ally Edward Shevardnadze, the liberal Foreign Minister, and for Gorbachev's reluctance to implement the reforms more quickly.

Indeed, by December of 1990, Gorbachev found himself isolated from many of his long-time liberal associates, including Shevardnadze. After the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies, he found himself more dependent on the Communist Party, the military-industrial complex and the KGB just to maintain the public peace. His choice of Genady Yanayev, a loyal Party functionary as Vice-President seemed to illustrate his desire to placate the right.[303] It seemed that "the period of reform [had] passed, and the period of law and order [had] arrived."[304]

In light of his own views on democratization, Gorbachev should have welcomed the organization of a conservative opposition. He actively sought input and questioning of government processes from both the left and the right. But, like the unduly optimistic Cadets at the turn of the century, he was too confident that open and reasonable

---

[302] Ibid.

[303] Bill Keller, "Mourning Soviet Reform," in Gwertzman, p. 512.

[304] Ibid. p. 514.

discussion would banish all opposition to **glasnost** and **perestroika.** Although such unanimity might have been forthcoming in the recent past, when the analyses came from regime supporters, the right to dissent now expressed itself even in troublesome and embarassing personal attacks. For example, one editorial entitled "The USSR Will Not Wait for Godot," questioned the leadership's intelligence for not recognizing the depth of the nationalities' unhappiness.[305] Many of the reformers, including Shevardnadze, saw this as disloyalty and personal abuse rather than legitimate criticism.

Like the pre-revolutionary liberals before him, Gorbachev found out that freedom of expression can result in the spread of "bad" ideas as well as "good" ones. **Pamyat** (Remembrance) was one group that articulated concepts many Soviets would sooner have left unexpressed. Led by Dimitri Vasileyev, this organization sought to warn Russians that their leaders had fallen victim to a Masonic-Zionist plot. As evidence, they cited the fact that Lenin's grandfather might have been Jewish, and that Lenin had three copies of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion in his library. Also, they reminded their compatriots that Marx was of Jewish origin, and Stalin had for a time been influenced by two Jews, Trotsky and Kaganovich. **Pamyat** claimed that Kaganovich constructed the Moscow street system in the

---

[305] Black, USSR Documents Annual 1990 vol. I. pp. 36-8.

shape of a star of David, just as the Protocols had predicted.[306] The most extreme wing of the group was opposed to anything Western, including Christianity because Jesus was a Jew.[307] Although such ideas were expressed in a new format, their aggressive anti-Semitism was for many Soviets a disturbing echo from a malignant past.

Like its Tsarist predecessor, the Black Hundreds, **Pamyat,** did not limit itself to propaganda. Its more zealous members wore black shirts and often beat up their opponents and disrupted meetings and court proceedings. One of their raids on a writers' convention was televised, and revived some viewers' fears of fascism.[308]

Groups like **Pamyat** exploited the fear and uncertainty felt by many Soviet workers. Although some actively supported the reforms, others feared unemployment and impoverishment. Furthermore, years of Marxist education had taught them to expect only exploitation in a free market system. When groups like the United Russian Workers' Front emerged under **glasnost,** they were very critical of the inequalities capitalism would bring. Labour leaders also pointed out that, even under the new system, worker candidates generally lost to managers and intellectuals.

---

[306] Walter Laqueur. "Glasnost's Ghosts." The New Republic. Aug. 13, 1987. p. 13.

[307] Smith, The New Russians. pp. 406-8.

[308] Ibid.

Thus, labourers might lose the little representation they had enjoyed under the old socialist system.[309]

Although the rural population was slow to get involved in politics, unrest in the countryside became evident by 1990. The USSR Peasant Union was opposed to the establishment of private and family farms, on the grounds that since most state farms were already unprofitable, the situation would only get worse if people were left to fend for themselves.[310] Conservatives like Ligachev encouraged their fears.[311] Of course, this logic was the precise opposite of that used by Gorbachev and his supporters.

In spite of the Peasant Union's name, many of its members were actually collective and state farm bureaucrats who were afraid of losing their positions.[312] Urban managers also began to organize in support of their own interests. Since they were dependent upon Gosplan for their manufacturing components, the disintegration of central planning threw their enterprises into chaos. They wanted to return to central control over the delivery and allocation of supplies, the re-establishment of "discipline" in the

---

[309] Goldman, What Went Wrong With Perestroika. p. 190.

[310] Ibid. p. 191

[311] Y. K. Ligachev, "I Believe in the Soul and Wisdom of the People." in Black, USSR Documents Annual 1990 Vol. I. pp. 136-140.

[312] Goldman, What Went Wrong With Perestroika. p. 191.

workplace, and guarantees of managers' rights.[313] Military producers were among the hardest-hit by the changes, and by huge cuts to defence expenditures. The general consensus among many administrators was that they were simply unable to handle a switch to market-driven production.

By 1990, elements in the KGB and the military were also becoming vocal in their doubts about perestroika. In a speech to the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies, Vladimir Kryuchkov, the chairman of the KGB, charged that the only beneficiaries of **perestroika** had been the speculators and members of the "Mafia." While the rich thrived on ill-gotten gains, crime and pornography had become a major problem throughout the nation. "What has happened to socialist morality [and] Russian dignity?" he demanded.[314]

Many like Kryuchkov wondered if **perestroika** meant the end of everything they had fought for over the years. Some members of the armed forces felt that the **glasnost**-sanctioned criticism of the war in Afghanistan represented a personal attack on the soldiers who had fought there.[315] They worried that young people in particular were losing respect for the very forces that had protected them against the West for so long.

---

[313] Ibid. p. 193.

[314] Bill Keller, "KGB Chief Denounces Gorbachev." in Gwertzman, p. 223.

[315] Andrew Wilson and Nina Bachkatov, Living With Glasnost. London: Penguin Books Ltd. 1988. pp. 73-6.

Gorbachev clearly recognized the very real problems inherent in introducing a new economic system within the framework of an old political and social order.

> [W]e are working for a balance between two aspects [of society] -- the economy and the social sphere. If the interests of this sphere are disregarded for the sake of economic development rates alone, interest in the results of labour is lost. On the other hand, the social sphere must not be built in such a way that the base is eroded, since then the very possibility for dynamic social development is lost.[316]

As economic change became crucial to the regime's future, it seemed that political opposition would necessarily be overcome. In the 1930's Stalin managed to impose his political will through his use of purges, mass murder, and terror; but Gorbachev sought a more permanent and radical solution, somewhat similar to Miliukov's, through discussion, debate, and reasonable civil discourse. But, both the scale and the complexity of the Gorbachev programme were so great that marginal increases in material incentives to managers or workers seemed scarcely enough to motivate them. Salary hikes meant little in a society where there were few things worth buying. A revolution of mass consciousness and commitment, or of what Gorbachev called "the human factor" needed to come into play.[317] Clearly, propaganda and Marxist education failed to bring this about.

---

[316] Perestroika. p. 89.

[317] Perestroika. p. 89

In order to vanquish the conservative opposition Gorbachev and his followers needed to win over the **non-nomenklatura** technical and professional intelligentsia, since this was the group with the strongest material and social interest in creating a market-oriented system.[318] Any significant increase in the real income of this segment, however, could only be achieved at the expense of **nomenklatura** privileges and workers' incomes, making such a policy very dangerous.

In this dilemma, the reformers' strategy was similar to that of the Russian liberals and their pursuit of the zemstvo professionals. With the advantage of being in power, Gorbachev was in a better position to weaken the old guard and broaden his constituency. However, he himself was tainted by his leadership of the Party, and had to struggle to maintain his credibility with his new client group. And, like Miliukov before him, the distractions of day-to-day legislative and administrative crisis-management overrode his capacity to broaden his popular support.

There was also the very real threat of bureaucratic back-sliding and "creeping re-centralisation" of the economy. In Hungary, during the 1970's, the preservation of influential contacts in Budapest, and the willingness of

---

[318] R. Amann, "Searching for an Appropriate Concept of Soviet Politics: The Politics of Hesitant Modernization." British Journal of Political Science. 16(1986) p. 490.

enterprise directors to respond to special requests from the centre undermined the implementation of the New Economic Mechanism. Managers were still dependent on political favour for promotion and naturally looked for help in easing any problems arising from the operation of market forces.[319] In short, without changes in the patterns of political power, old habits of dependence and deference remain in place. As in the days of the Duma, reformers were caught in the conflict between old habits and new needs.

Above all, something had to be done to keep up the morale of any population suffering from shortages of goods, inflation, and general economic dislocation. Unable to fulfill its basic promise of satisfying its citizens in the material sense, the regime undertook with increasing urgency the search for alternative sources of legitimation. By now, questions about the Communist Party's leading role could no longer be avoided and to the astonishment of most observers, the Party itself became one of the first casualties in the search for legitimate civil institutions.[320] The formal abandonment of the Party's leading role could have attracted popular trust, as Gorbachev hoped; but instead it led, almost helter- skelter, to even more startling developments. Like Miliukov and the Cadet Party, Gorbachev and the

---

[319] T. Laky, "The Hidden Mechanisms of Recentralisation in Hungary." Acta Oeconomica. 24 (1980) pp. 95-96.

[320] James P. Scanlan, "Reforms and Civil Society in the USSR." Problems of Communism. 37 March-April 1988. pp.41-6.

reformers were pushed aside, as their success, limited and uncertain as it was, led to their being displaced by the unmanageable populist, Boris Yeltsin.

The tensions which have arisen since **perestroika** threaten the basic fabric of Soviet society, and have caused many analysts to wonder whether or not they were anticipated by Gorbachev in his initial strategy. After 1985, the momentum of political reform not only gathered speed, but its essential nature changed. Some of the main areas of change, including greater public involvement in elections and glasnost in decision-making, the reduction of the Party's role in economic management, greater toleration of opposition groups, and limits to the terms of state and party officials, are well-known. But while it is one thing to have freedom to articulate interests, it is quite another to have the assurance that those interests will be taken into account when policy is made.

Once the state acknowledges the presence of individual, conflicting interests within society, and recognizes that the pursuit of these interests can represent a dynamic, economic force, it must create a framework for the management of differences as they arise. A few key figures, including Gorbachev himself, have begun to call for the introduction of a system of checks and balances similar to that found in Western liberal democracies. In a speech to the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev observed that:

> our own socialist system of checks and balances is taking shape in this country, designed to protect society against any violation of socialist legality at the highest state level.[321]

But, given the Soviet Union's ethnic and linguistic diversity, one wonders how such a system can be introduced without sacrificing stability and order.

Gorbachev may have been counting on the fact that in liberal, federalist societies, the individual is generally affiliated with a large number of formal or informal interest groups. Therefore, since these interests are always in conflict, people rarely become so focussed on a single issue long enough to exert a threat to destroy the country.[322] North American examples are fortunately few, and might include the slavery question that led to the U.S. Civil War, and the current question of Quebec's autonomy within or outside Confederation. But, the Soviet Union's circumstances are very different from those of the United States or Canada. Interests and resentments have been suppressed since Stalin, while expectations of increased prosperity continued to rise amid stagnant scarcity and frustration. Also, Soviet ethnic and cultural divisions are more fundamentally based upon national homelands, and the demands for national self-determination that were defeated

---

[321] "Toward Full Power to the Soviets and the Creation of a Socialist State Based on the Rule of Law." in Black, USSR Documents Annual 1988. p. 57.

[322] R. Amann, Soviet Politics in the Gorbachev Era: The End of Hesitant Modernization." British Journal of Political Science. vol. 18(4) 1990. p. 308-9.

after 1917 now could no longer be contained by military force. The Gorbachev programme could not succeed in solving all these accumulated problems and conflicts, but it did create a much freer arena in which they could be considered.[323] Like Miliukov and the early liberals, Gorbachev and his reformers could not be discounted as mere casualties of the historical process: their contribution would be remembered as relevant, instructive, and on balance, positive.

Electoral reform brought about the representation of a larger range of interests and opinions in both the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies. Between the extreme left and right, there is now a broad spectrum of opinion which defers to neither the old guard nor the reforming intellectuals. The new groups include the Democratic Union, the Green Party, and the Christian Democratic Movement.[324] Since the Supreme Soviet is indirectly elected by the Congress from a wide variety of constituencies, it could become a mechanism for dealing with and moderating popular demands. But its legislators, like those in the old Duma, will be confronted with the task of maintaining popular credibility even as they are forced to make compromises.[325] It is to be hoped that they fare better

---

[323] Ibid p. 309

[324] "There Are Such Parties! Multi-Coloured Palette." in Black, USSR Documents Annual 1990 Vol. I. pp. 31-2.

[325] Amann, "Soviet Politics." p. 309.

than Miliukov's liberals, and are not overtaken by public impatience and extremist polarization.

The economic reforms also have an important political dimension of their own. They draw attention away from the state as the focal point of blame for all social and economic ills. Market forces, at least in theory, create a wide range of interests and then mediate them in a seemingly impersonal manner. However, while Adam Smith's idea of a disinterested "invisible hand" held sway in Britain and the United States during the Thatcher and Reagan era, it will not begin to do so in the Soviet Union without a radical change in political culture. As Boris Yeltsin found out shortly after he gained power in the Russian Federation, citizens of the former Soviet Union still hold the state responsible for their economic well-being.

The market economy also presupposes a fairly large degree of administrative decentralisation. The most pressing issue in this regard is the rise of nation-states among the former republics of the Soviet Union. In 1989, the Party abandoned its earlier dream of "fusing" the various nationalities, calling it a "dangerous notion."[326] Although this, along with the move toward economic federalism was geared to alleviate some of the tension, it did not address the basic sources of the divisions. In spite of Gorbachev's assertion

---

[326] "Nationalities Policy of the Party Under Present Conditions (CPSU Platform)," in Black, USSR Documents Annual 1989. p. 346.

that "[t]he Revolution and socialism have done away with national oppression and inequality, and ensured economic, intellectual, and cultural progress for all nations and nationalities,"[327] many national minorities have long felt victimized by the persistent efforts to create a single "Soviet" culture.

Greater economic autonomy could lead to even greater divisions, but, if devolution of power proceeds beyond the Republican level, creating a web of interests between and within the Republics and national areas, traditional conflict might be blurred. As such diverse interests proliferate, politics could be more multi-dimensional, involving more than just battling with the central government, and a greater market orientation could highlight the value of co-operation.[328] However, Gorbachev and his followers seemed determined to retain the Party's position as the main unitary force in the country; and it may have been their effort to preserve this role which mobilized the opposing nationalist forces against the Union itself.

The nationalities issue was certainly not new to the Gorbachev period. Although it seemed at times to be dormant in the last half of the twentieth century, it was always there, below the surface unity maintained with varying

---

[327] Ibid. p. 348.

[328] Paul A. Goble, "The Fate of the Nationalities." in Walter Laqueur, Soviet Union 2000. New York: St. Martin's Press 1990. p. 122.

degrees of ruthlessness and duplicity by Tsarist and Soviet leaders. The sheer size of both the Tsarist and Soviet states meant that there were always problems at the "periphery," and each government found its own method of dealing with them. One writer with a penchant for metaphor has offered a vivid sequence:

> Marx once described the tsarist Russian empire as the prison of nations, and Stalin turned it into the graveyard of nations, [but] under Gorbachev the Soviet Empire is becoming the volcano of nations.[329]

The official assertion that socialism created a new community without national antagonisms has been certainly discounted, and conclusively disproved.

A number of sensitive issues previously banned from public discussion became important after **glasnost.** Can national republics exercise any real sovereignty? How should resources be allocated among the regions? Why were the national republics not represented in the federal leadership? Could, or should, Russian still be the **lingua franca** of the former Soviet Union or the new Commonwealth of Independent States? The question of who has the right to even make such decisions in the first place has also been raised.[330] These debates are as passionate and contentious as those which convulsed the Duma in Miliukov's time, and his advice, as a historian believing in reason over passion,

---

[329] Zbigniew Brezhinski, "Post Communist Nationalism." Foreign Affairs. 68:5 (1989) p. 1.

[330] Brezhinski, pp. 10-11.

remains as valid today as it was then.

There are two competing visions of the reformed Soviet Union contenting with each other in these debates. The first, which seems to have prevailed for the moment, seeks to recognize and enshrine national diversity within the system. Adherents of this philosophy, including Boris Yeltsin, believe that the former USSR is a collection of independent republics who should enjoy maximum political and economic autonomy. This group is concerned with collective minority and nationality rights. The other philosophy gives greater priority to economic and political integration. Proponents of this view use the American model of individualism as a model for their concept of the individual as the focus of political rights.[331] Gorbachev tried to straddle this issue, and wound up alienating both factions.

To **perestroika's** opponents on the right, the growing national unrest meant that the democratization process had gone too far, the media were overly negative, the Party had been unduly challenged, and the republics were gaining too much power. "Nationalistic ideas and manifestations...only strengthen the opponents of **perestroika,**" warned Pravda.[332]

---

[331] Gail Lapidus, "Gorbachev's Nationalities Problem." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 68. No. 4. pp. 93.

[332] May 22, 1989. p. 2 quoted in Ibid.

Gorbachev and his supporters, however, argued that greater openness, compounded by the deteriorating economy, has exposed, not created, long-simmering resentments. Now that there is a legitimate outlet for their expression, perhaps they be dealt with better than they were in 1917. A return to authoritarian methods would not only be ineffective in preventing further discord but would also hinder the economic reform process.[333]

Gorbachev evidently did not realize that the reform movement would reignite the nationalities question in such an explosive way. He underestimated both the growing assertiveness of the national elites in challenging central control, and the resentment of many groups, including workers and youth, against outsiders.[334] In order to cope with these problems, there must be changes in attitudes toward minorities, as well as the establishment of a clear line between acceptable protest and violence.

Like the liberals in the Imperial period, Gorbachev was impatient with intensely emotional or "irrational" impulses that could divert people's attention from reform. Ironically, it was his own programme that played a crucial role in bringing such issues to the fore. First of all, **glasnost** legitimized public discussions of taboo issues, and allowed the media to become a forum for genuine debate.

---

[333] Ibid. p. 94

[334] Brezhinski, pp. 7-8.

Gorbachev himself encouraged such discussion even as he warned that those who were stirring up national hatreds were dangerous. Secondly, the reformers' own critique of Stalinism, and its call for the development of a new model of socialism, also encouraged reassessment of the nationalities question. By criticizing Stalin's deviations from Leninist policy, Gorbachev encouraged an even stronger assault from other quarters. More and more analysts spoke out against overcentralization, regional economic disparity, and Russo-centric cultural policies.[335] They also grew impatient with the central government's reluctance to back up its words with meaningful policies.[336]

Although the Russians were the target of a great deal of minority criticism, they themselves began to question the idea of Soviet unity and equality. This re-evaluation led to complaints that the greatest hardships had been borne by their republic, which had made sacrifices in order to help the disadvantaged ones.[337] Boris Yeltsin has capitalized on this feeling that the old federal system became an instrument of Russians' victimization rather than domination.

---

[335] Ibid.

[336] Bohdan Naylo, "Nationalities." in Martin McCauley (ed.), Gorbachev and Perestroika. London: Macmillan. 1990. p. 143.

[337] Brezhinski, p. 12.

The increase of official tolerance for the revival of national consciousness marked the trend toward normalization of state- society relations, and a growing appreciation of pluralism. The effects of **glasnost** were heightened by the growing political democratization, which, by 1988, occupied a central place in the reform programme. Greater grass-roots involvement was encouraged and common nationality and shared historical grievances offered an obvious base for many organizations. The emergence of popular fronts in three Baltic republics served as a model to a number of groups including Byelorussia, Georgia, Moldavia, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation itself. Leaders' careers were now dependent upon their responsiveness to local constituencies as well as to their political superiors.[338]

Thus, Gorbachev was caught between contending forces agitating for and against major change in nationality, economic and political policy. His strategy seems to have been to build a coalition between reformers in the central government and moderates in various regions. His goal was the avoidance of a polarization of political alternatives along nationalist or ethnic lines. But, at the same time, he ran the risk of alienating conservative elements who saw him presiding over their country's disintegration.

---

[338] Darrel Slider, "More Power to the Soviets? Reform and Local Government in the Soviet Union." British Journal of Political Science. 16: 4 p. 495.

The coup which took place in the Soviet Union on August 19 and 20 1992 took most Westerners by surprise. How could Gorbachev's associates turn on the leader who had brought an end to the Cold War and given them **glasnost** and **perestroika?** To the West, it seemed that everyone inside and outside the Soviet Union had benefitted from Gorbachev's efforts.

Things looked different from within the country. Although Gorbachev was acknowledged to have made many important changes, not all of them were viewed as having been for the better. Many Soviets held what they saw as Gorbachev's indecisiveness and incompetence at economic reform directly responsible for the deepening crisis. Inflation was increasing, and production was decreasing. The average citizen had experienced a significant drop in his or her standard of living since 1985.

In spite of the problems with his economic reforms, Gorbachev's political reforms succeeded beyond most expectations. In a mere six and a half years, his efforts to broaden the bases of decision making and promote freedom of expression had encouraged a new political pluralism. Gradually, large numbers of citizens had lost their fear of the state and gained a feeling of political efficacy. Miliukov would have approved.

Although Gorbachev survived the coup, it was clear that he was no longer acceptable to his citizenry. In spite of

the fact that he had been the one to set the reforms in motion, it is Yeltsin who will preside over the next stage, although what it might be is still far from clear. Perhaps Gorbachev's political demise was inevitable due to the very nature of his project.

At first, Gorbachev had sought to reduce, rather than eliminate political and economic controls. When local leaders and groups began to take their own initiatives, however, he could no longer direct the results. For example, although he did his best to ensure the defeat of Boris Yeltsin in his bid for Chairmanship of the Russian Supreme Soviet, Yeltsin won a sizeable majority on the third ballot.[339] Unlike his predecessors, Yeltsin had been elected as a delegate to the Supreme Soviet by free ballot, and had received more than 80% of the votes cast.[340] Since Gorbachev had never tested his own mandate at the polls, he could not claim the same kind of support, and feared that Yeltsin would use his power to implement his own agenda and perhaps hinder the reform process. His fears were realised when Yeltsin immediately called a press conference to announce his plans for Russian sovereignty, and later presided over a Supreme Soviet resolution which declared that Russian statutes would take precedence over Kremlin laws.[341]

---

[339] Celestine Bohlen, "Yeltsin Is Elected Russian President on Third-Round Vote." in Gwertzman, p. 423.

[340] Ibid.

[341] Bill Keeler. "Russian Republic Asserts Its Laws Have

The failure of the August coup proved that Gorbachev had achieved some of his goals, but while **glasnost** had reasserted itself, the country's political and economic problems persisted. Not Gorbachev but Yeltsin and other leaders of the new national republics would have to deal with these issues. Friends and observers could only hope that Mikhail Gorbachev's successors in the 1990's would turn out to be more liberal, and less authoritarian, than those who, in 1917, pushed aside Paul Miliukov and the Cadets.

Primacy Over Kremlin Rule." in Ibid. p. 427.

Chapter VI

CONCLUSION

Parallels Between Russian Liberalism and the Gorbachev Reforms.

It has been noted in the previous pages that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were aided in their quest for power by their liberal rivals' success in persuading the Tsar to grant basic political freedoms to all citizens. The Communists learned this lesson well and limited all forms of political life in an effort to suppress opposition before it began. For many years it seemed they had been successful and liberalism was no longer a force in the Soviet Union.

Ironically, the latest instigator of reform came not from outside the ruling establishment, but from its own highest echelons. Although Gorbachev does not call himself a liberal, many of his policies would not be incompatible with those of the Cadet Party. Like Miliukov and his followers, Gorbachev sought to establish the rule of law and an atmosphere of free expression. He did not advocate laissez-faire capitalism, but instead hoped to create a

"humanitarian" free market system which would be subject to government intervention.

The economic situations of both the Tsarist and Communist states provided fertile ground for reformist sentiments. After the period of rapid, disruptive industrialization in the 1890's, Russia faced a depression followed by a period of reduced economic growth. While the increases in production continued at a fairly steady rate, the lower classes were becoming more and more upset. It seemed that although they were paying the price for the development of industry, in terms of high taxes on agriculture and low wages in the factories, they were not seeing any of the benefits. Similarly, the period of rapid industrial growth during Stalin's term in office had encouraged Soviet citizens to expect that the standard of living would improve for each successive generation. When Brezhnev and his successors were unable to fulfill their end of the bargain, the people grew angry. Therefore, Gorbachev's promises of more consumer goods and improved material conditions appealed to a previously hidden constituency including dissatisfied housewives, concerned industrial workers, and worried students.

Gorbachev's bases of intelligentsia support were similar to those of the Cadets. While the latter focussed in part on the emerging class of zemstvo professionals, the former

concentrated on winning over the non-nomenklatura intellectuals. Both of these groups were educated but could not hope for much advancement under the established order. Their education lead them to sympathize with the reformers like Miliukov in the Imperial period, and dissidents like Sakharov in the Soviet era. These segments of the population had comparatively little to lose in the reform process. They could afford to take risks if it meant realizing their visions of the future.

Neither reform movement would have gotten very far without the support of some members of the establishment. Elements of both the Communist Party and the gentry sought increased security in light of the capriciousness of their leadership. They wanted the implementation of laws that were binding on all citizens, and the establishment of institutions that could mediate between the individual and the state. But these groups were already privileged and were afraid that rapid reform would mean a loss of prestige and influence.

Like the Cadets, Gorbachev found himself trying to balance the competing demands of his various followers. The intellectuals tended to fear that the establishment would back away from the reforms if they felt they would not benefit, even in the short run. Gorbachev's own position and background as a loyal Party leader made even his own

commitment suspect. At the same time, conservative elements of the Party thought he was losing touch with "socialist values." In the end, he, like his Tsarist predecessors, found that the middle ground only satisfied everyone so long as there were no other options.

Neither Gorbachev nor the Russian liberals were prepared for the opposition to their ideas. Both assumed that free discussion would convert others to their views. In the end, the sheer diversity of the countries overwhelmed both Miliukov and Gorbachev. They tended toward rationalism and discounted the impact emotional issues like nationalist hostilities would have on the process. Gorbachev in particular could not understand why the republics were not able to put aside their differences until a common goal was achieved. He offered benefits for everyone in the long run, while the various independence movements promised immediate rewards.

Some of the opposition to both reform programmes can be attributed to the age-old conflict between Slavophiles and Westernizers. Conservative opponents to both movements were afraid that change would destroy their nations' unique characters. They rejected the idea that Western institutions could simply be applied to their situations, and feared that an influx of foreign ideals, particularly those of capitalism, would destroy the public's morals and

bring a host of new problems. In their views, the West should be looking to them as a source of social justice and morality, and they resented the reformers' assertions that their nations were "behind" America and Europe.

Although both the Cadets and Gorbachev sought to improve the existing systems rather than destroy them completely, their conservative opponents were not comforted. Also, those who accepted their analyses of the problems of the pasts wondered why any aspects of the old regime should be preserved at all. Political pluralism meant that others were free to raise these questions, and some, like the Bolsheviks and Boris Yeltsin, promised immediate solutions.

In spite of the parallels between the Gorbachev reforms and the Russian liberal movement, the two faced substantially different outcomes. The Bolsheviks promised to enact a system that was substantially different from liberalism, while Gorbachev's successors rejected an attempt to stop the reforms, and promise to continue the process in an even more vigorous manner than their instigator had done. While the Cadets over-estimated the extent to which their efforts at public education and propaganda had helped create a civil society in Russia, Gorbachev underestimated the strength of the emerging non-governmental, non-party actors in the USSR. Intentionally or not, Gorbachev did manage to inspire more of the population than the Cadets.

The failure of the August coup represented the triumph of Gorbachev's political programme even in the face of his economic failure. Perhaps he was more successful in this than his predecessors because his position gave him more control over the system. The economic base has changed and is now more compatible with decentralized control. Also, the level of public education is much higher now than at the turn of the century, and the populace has had considerable exposure to Western ideas through the global media. They have also had a chance to see the effects of capitalism in other nations, and compare it to their own system. Today's generation has very different expectations from those of their great-grandparents.

This analysis of the parallels between the Russian liberal movement and the Gorbachev political reforms has attempted to prove that some aspects of pre-revolutionary history are still relevant to contemporary politics in the former Soviet Union. The issues which confronted the liberals were similar to the ones faced by the Cadets, and some of the same factors contributed to the failure of both movements. Although the Communist Party claimed to have made a complete break from the problems of the capitalist period before 1917, they found themselves confronting some of the same questions several decades later. As Boris Yeltsin and his supporters are discovering, social and

economic issues do not vanish simply because the structure of government has changed.

Indeed, history may even grant the Cadets a second chance. In May 1990, a group called the Party of Constitutional Democrats was formed. Their expressed hope was "to revive the party of the intelligentsia, the professors' party."[342] but they believe that much of the legacy of the pre-revolutionary Cadet Party is obsolete. In true Cadet fashion, however, a splinter group formed before the end of the month. The new party called itself the Constitutional Democratic Party (Party of the People's Freedom), and its organizers decided to return to the programme adopted by Miliukov and his followers at the Seventh Congress in March 1918. On this basis, the Party of People's Freedom declared itself restored after a 73 year hibernation.[343] Perhaps they will have better luck this time.

---

[342] "There Are Such Parties!" Soviet Documents Annual 1991. p. 32.

[343] Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Articles.

Amann, R. "Soviet Politics in the Gorbachev Era: The End of Hesitant Modernization." British Journal of Political Science. vol. 18 (4) 1990. pp.289-310.

----. "The Empire Strikes Back." The World Today. 43 (1987). pp. 132-37.

-----. "Searching for an Appropriate Concept of Soviet Politics: The Politics of Hesitant Modernization." British Journal of Political Science. vol. 16(4) 1986. pp. 475-494.

Bialer, S., Afferica, J. "The Genesis of Gorbachev's World." Foreign Affairs. 63:4 1986. pp.605-644.

----. "Gorbachev's Move." Foreign Policy. Fall 1987. pp. 59-87

----. "Inside Glasnost." The Atlantic. 261: Feb. 1988. pp. 64-8.

Blough, Roger A., and Stewart, Phillip D. "Political Obstacles to Reform and Innovation in Soviet Economic Policy." Comparative Political Studies. 20: April 1987. pp. 72-97.

Brown, Archie. "Change In the Soviet Union." Foreign Affairs. 64: Summer 1986. pp. 1048-65.

Brzenski, Zbigniew. "Post Communist Nationalism." Foreign Affairs. 68:5. 1989. pp.1-25.

Bunich, P. "The Reform and Parodies On It." Moscow News. July 10, 1987. 2-10.

Cohen, S. F. "Perceiving Soviet Change." Harper's. Nov. 1986. pp. 273-318.

Doctorow, Gilbert. "The Fundamental State Laws of 23 April 1906." Russian Review. April, 1975. pp. 32-52.

Emmons, Terrence. "The Russian Landed Gentry and Politics." Russian Review. July, 1974. pp. 269-83.

Fireside, Harvey. "Dissident Visions of the USSR: Medvedev, Sakharov, and Solzhenitsyn." Polity. 25(2) Winter. 1989.

Franklin, Daniel. "A Survey of the Soviet Economy: Gorbachev's Gamble." The Economist (London). pp. 49-67.

Freeze, Gregory L. " A National Liberation Movement and the Shift in Russian Liberalism." Slavic Review 28 March 1969. pp. 81-91.

Goldman, M. I. "Gorbachev's Risk in Reforming the Soviet Economy." Technological Review. 89: April 1986. pp. 18-19.

----. "Perestroika in the Soviet Union." Current History. 87: Oct. 1988. pp. 313-316.

Gustafson, Thane, and Mann, Dawn. "Gorbachev's First Year: Building Power and Authority." Problems of Communism. May- June 1986. pp. 1-19.

Haimson, Leopold. "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia 1905-1917." pt. 1. Slavic Review. XXIII no 4, Dec. 1964. pp 619-642. and pt. 2 in XXIV March 1965. pp. 1-22.

Hanson, Phillip. "Economic Constraints on Soviet Polcies in the 1980's." International Affairs. 57(1980-1). pp. 21-42.

Hauslohner, Peter. "Gorbachev's Social Contract." Soviet Economy. 3: Jan/Mar. 1987. pp. 54-89.

Jenkes, Helmut W. "Gorbachev's Economic Reform: A Structural or a Technical Alteration?" International Journal of Socialist Economy. 15: 3: 2. no. 1, 1988.

Kaiser, R. K. "The Soviet Pretense." Foreign Affairs. 62: Wint. 1986-87. pp.236-51.

Laky, T. "The Hidden Mechanisms of Recentralization in Hungary." Acta Oeconomica. 24: 1980. pp. 85-110.

Lapidus, Gail. "Gorbachev and the Reform of the Soviet System." Daedalus. 116: Spring 1987. pp. 1-30.

----. "Gorbachev's Nationalities Policy." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 68. No. 4. pp. 92-108.

Laqueur, W. "Glasnost and Its Limits." Commentary. 86: July 1988. pp. 13-24.

----. "Glasnost's Ghosts." The New Republic. August 13. 1987. pp. 11-23.

Levin, Alfred. "More on Social Stability." Slavic Review. XXV no. 1: March 1966. pp. 149-154.

----. "P. A. Stolypin: A Political Appraisal." Journal of Modern History. XXXVII no. 4: Dec. 1965. pp. 445-463.

Markov, Vladimir. "The Province of Russian Futurism." Slavic and East European Journal. VIII no. 4: Winter 1964. pp. 401-406.

Mendel, Arthur P. "Peasant and Worker on the Eve of the First World War." Slavic Review. XXIV: March 1965. pp. 23-33.

Pfaff, W. "The Question Not Asked: Reconciling Marxist Principles with Reform." The New Yorker. 64: August 1 1988. pp. 60-75.

Ploss, S. I. "A New Soviet Era." Foreign Policy. 62: Spring 1986. pp. 42-60.

Putnam, George. "Russian Liberalism Challenged From Within: Bulgakov and Berdyayev in 1904-05." Slavonic and East-European Review. 43: June 1965. pp. 335-353.

Riha, Thomas. "Miliukov and the Progressive Bloc in 1915: a Study in Last Chance Politics." Journal of Modern History. XXXII: 1960. pp. 16- 24.

Rodichev, F. "The Liberal Movement in Russia 1891-1905" Slavonic and East European Review. 2: December 1923. pp.249-262.

----. "The Veteran of Russian Liberalism: Ivan Petrunkevich." Slavonic and East European Review. 7: Jan. 1929. pp.316-26.

Rogger, Hans. "The Formation of the Russian Right 1900-1906." California Slavic Studies. Vol. 3 (1964). pp. 66-94.

----. "Was There a Russian Fascism? The Union of the Russian People." Journal of Modern History. XXXVI: no. 4. Dec 1964. pp. 398-415.

Rosenberg, William G. "Russian Liberals and the Bolshevik Coup." Journal of Modern History. 40(3): Sept. 1968 pp. 328-47.

Scanlan, James P. "Reforms and Civil Society in the USSR." Problems of Communism. 37: March-April. 1988. pp.41-46.

Schapiro, Leonard. B. "The Vekhi Group and the Mystique of Revolution." The Slavonic and East european Review. XXXIV: Dec. 1955. pp. 56-76.

Schlapentolch, Vladimir. "The XXVII Congress: A Case Study of the Shaping of a New Party Ideology." Soviet Studies. 40: Jan. 1988. pp. 1-20.

Sheehy, Gail. "The Man Who Changed the World." Vanity Fair. August. 1990. pp.42-47 and 118-127.

Slider, Darrell. "More Power to the Soviets: Reform and Local Government in the Soviet Union." British Journal of Political Studies. 16(4). pp. 495-511.

Smith, C. J. "Miliukov and the Russian National Question." Harvard Slavic Studies. Vol. IV (1957). pp. 195-419.
----. "The Third State Duma: an Analytical Profile." The Russian Review. XVII: no. 3: July, 1958. pp. 201-10.

Starr, S. F. "The Soviet Union: a Civil Society." Foreign Policy. 70: Spring 1988. pp. 26-41.

Treadgold, Donald. "The Constitutional Democrats and the Russian Liberal Tradition." American Slavic and East European Review. 10: June 1951. pp. 85-94.

Tuck, Robert L. "Paul Miliukov and the Negotiations for a Duma Ministry,1906." American Slavic and East European Review. 10: June 1951. pp.117-129.

Tyrkova-Williams, Ariadna. "The Cadet Party." Russian Review. 12 July 1953. pp.173-186.

---- "Russian Liberalism." Russian Review. 12 Jan 1951. pp.3-14.

Von Laue, Theodore H. "The Chances for Liberal Constitutionalism." Slavic Review. XXIV. pp. 34-46.

----. "Counte Witte and the 1905 Revolution." The American Slavic and East European Review. XVII no. 1: Feb 1958. pp. 25-46.

Walsh, Warren B. "Political Parties of the Russian Duma." Journal of Modern History. XXII. June 1950. pp. 144-50.

Warnke, P. C. "Gorbachev's American Ways." Harper's. 272: June 1986. pp. 20-22.

Yaney, George R. "Social Stability in Pre-Revolutionary Russia: a Critical Note" Slavic Review. XXIV no 4: Sept. 1965. pp. 520-7.

----. "Some Aspects of the Imperial Russian Government on the Eve of the First World War." Slavonic and East European Review. XLIII no.1: Dec. 1964. pp. 68-90.

B. Books.

Aganbegyan, Abel. The Economic Challenge of Perestroika. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1988.

Annenkov, P. V. The Extraordinary Decade. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1968.

Aslund, Anders. Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform. London: Pinter Publications. 1989.

Bachkatov, Nina, and Wilson, Andrew. Living With Glasnost. London: Penguin Books. 1988.

Berlin, Isaiah. Russian Thinkers. New York: Viking Press. 1978.

Bialer, Seweryn. The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline. New York: Knopf. 1986.

Billington, James. The Icon and the Axe. New York: Vintage Books. 1966.

Black, Cyril E. The Transformation of Russian Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1960.

Black, E. (ed.). The Other Tolstoy: Excerpts From His Philosophical Writings. New York: Pergammon Press. 1984.

Black, J. L. (ed.). USSR Documents Annual 1987: The Gorbachev Reforms. Gulf Breeze, Fl.: Academic International Press. 1988.

----. USSR Documents Annual 1988: Perestroika- The Second Stage. Gulf Breeze, Fl.: Academic International Press. 1989.

----. USSR Documents Annual 1989: The Gorbachev Reforms Continue the End of Empire? Gulf Breeze, Fl.: Academic International Press. 1990.

----. USSR Documents Annual 1990: Restructuring Perestroika Vols. I and II. Gulf Breeze, Fl.: Academic International Press. 1991.

Bloomfield, Jon (ed.). The Soviet Revolution. London: Lawrence and Wishart. 1989.

Bohon, John. Reactionary Politics in Russia 1905-1909. Ann Arbor. University Microfilms. 1967.

Buber, Marlin. Paths in Utopia. Boston: Beacon Hill. 1958.

Charques, Richard. The Twilight of Imperial Russia. London: Phoenix House. 1958.

Crankshaw, Edward. In the Shadow of the Winter Palace: Russia's Drift Toward Revolution 1825-1917. New York: Viking Press. 1976.

Curtiss, John S. Church and State in Russia: The Last Years of the Empire. New York: Macmillan. 1940.

----. Essays in Russian and Soviet History. San Diego: University of California Press. 1963.

Doder, Dusko, and Branson, Louise. Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin. New York: Viking/Penguin. 1990.

Duff, J. D. (ed.) Russian Realities and Problems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1917.

Edelman, Robert. Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 1980.

Eisen, Jonathan (ed.). The Glasnost Reader. New York: New American Library. 1990.

Emmons, Terrence. The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1983.

Fadner, Frank. Seventy Years of Panslavism in Russia: Karazin to Danilevsky, 1800-1870. Washington, D. C. : Georgetown University Press. 1962.

Fischer, George. Russian Liberalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1958.

Florinsky, Michael. Russia: a History and an Interpretation. New York: Macmillan. 1953.

Frank, S. A Soloviev Anthology. New York: Macmillan. 1960.

Gelai, Shmuel. The Liberal Movement in Russia 1900-1905. Cambridge University Press. 1973.

Gerschenkron, Alexander. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press. 1962.

Goldman, Marshall I. Gorbachev's Challenge: Economic Reform in the Age of High Technology. New York: W. W. Norton. 1987.

----. What Went Wrong With Perestroika. New York: W. W. Norton. 1991.

Gorbachev, Mikhail. Bringing Out the Potential of Socialism More Fully. Moscow: Novosti Press Publishing House. 1988.

----. Documents and Materials: Reports and Speeches. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House. 1988.

----. Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World. New York: Harper and Row. 1987.

----. Socialism, Peace, and Democracy: Writings, Speeches, and Reports. New York: Humanities Press. 1987.

Gunlicks, Arthur B., Treadway, John D. (eds.). The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: Assessing the First Year. New York: Praeger. 1988.

Gwertzman, Bernard, and Kaufman, Michael T. The Collapse of Communism. New York: Times Books. 1991.

Harcave, Sidney. First Blood: The Russian Revolution of 1905. New York: Macmillan. 1964.

Hare, Richard. Portraits of Russian Personalities Between Reform and Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press. 1959.

Healy, Ann Erickson. The Russian Autocracy in Crisis 1905-1907. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.1973.

Hosking, Geoffrey A. The Awakening of the Soviet Union. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1990.

----. The Russian Constitutional Experiment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1973.

Oscar I. Jankowsky. The Jews and Minority Rights 1898-1919. New York: Macmillan. 1933.

Jelavich, Barbara. A Century of Russian Foreign Policy: 1814-1914. Philadelphia: Lippincott. 1964.

Juvilier, Peter, and Kimura, Hiroshi, (eds.) Gorbachev's Reforms: U. S. and Japanese Assessments. New York: A. de Gruyter. 1988.

Karpovich, Michael. Imperial Russia 1801-1917. New York: Holt. 1932.

Keep, J. L. H. The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1963.

Kerblay, Basile. Modern Soviet Society. New York: Praeger. 1983.

Kerensky, Alexander. Russia and History's Turning Point. New York: Duell 1965.

Kochan, Lionel. Russia in Revolution, 1890-1918. New York: New American Library. 1966.

Kohn, Hans. The Mind of Modern Russia. New Brunswick N. J. Rutgers University Press. 1955.

Kohn, Hans. Panslavism: Its History and Ideology. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Vintage. 1960.

----. The Second Duma. Handen Conn.: Archon Books. 1966.

Laqueur, Walter (ed.). Soviet Union 2000. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1990.

Laserson, Max. Russia and the Western World. New York: Macmillan. 1945.

Lenin, V. I. The State and Revolution. Moscow: Novosti Press Publishing House. 1980.

Lerner, Lawrence W. and Treadgold, Donald W. Gorbachev and the Soviet Future. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1988.

Lewin, Moshe. The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation. Berkely: University of California Press.1988.

Lossky, Nikolai. O. History of Russian Philosophy. New York: International Universities Press. 1951.

Maklakov, V. A. The First State Duma. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1964.

Mandel, Ernest. Beyond Perestroika. New York: Verso. 1989.

Manning, Roberta. The Russian Nobility in Revolution and Counter-Revolution. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms. 1975.

Maynard, John. Russia in Flux. New York: Collier Books. 1962.

MacCauley, Steven (ed.). Gorbachev and Perestroika. London: Macmillan. 1990.

McNeal, Robert (ed.). Russian in Transition 1905-1914. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1970.

Medvedev, Zhores A. Gorbachev. New York: W. W. Norton. 1989.

Miliukov, Paul N. Outlines of Russian Culture Vol. I. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1942.

----. Political Memoirs, 1905-1917. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1964.

----. Russia and Its Crisis. New York: Collier Books. 1962.

----. Russia Today and Tomorrow. New York: Macmillan. 1922.

Miller, Margaret. The Economic Development of Russia 1905-1914 with Special Reference to Trade, Industry and Finance. 2nd Ed. New York: A. M. Kelly. 1967.

Miller, R. F.(ed). Gorbachev at the Helm: A New Era in Soviet Politics? New York: Croom Helm. 1987.

Moore, Barrington Jr. Political Power and Social Theory: Seven Studies. New York: Harper and Row. 1962.

----. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston: Beacon Press. 1966.

----. Soviet Politics-The Dilemma of Power: The Role of Ideas in Social Change. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1951.

Naylor, Thomas H. The Gorbachev Strategy: Opening the Closed Society. Heath , Conn. Lexington Books. 1988.

Nove, Alec. Soviet Agriculture: The Brezhnev Legacy and Gorbachev's Cure. Santa Monica: Rand/UCLA Centre for the Study of Soviet International Behavior. 1988.

Owen, Launcelot. A. The Russian Peasant Movement, 1906-1917. London: Macmillan. 1937.

Pares, Bernard. The Fall of the Russian Monarchy. New York: Vintage Books. 1939.

----. Russia and Reform. London: Constable 1907.

Pavlovsky, George. Agricultural Russia on the Eve of the Revolution. London. 1930.

Pipes, Richard. The Formation of the Soviet Union. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1954.

---- (ed.). Revolutionary Russia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1967.

----. Russia Under the Old Regime. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1973.

----. The Russian Intelligentsia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1961.

----. Struve: Liberal on the Left. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1970.

----. Struve: Liberal on the Right. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1980.

Pithyridge, Roger. (ed) Witnesses to the Russian Revolution. New York: Citadel Press. 1964.

Plekhanov, George. The Development of the Monist View of History. New York: International Publishers. 1972.

----. Selected Philosophical Works. vol. I. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. 1961.

Pobedonostsev, Constantine. Diary of a Russian Statesman. London: Macmillan. 1898.

Pushkarev, Sergei. The Emergence of Modern Russia. Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press. 1985.

Putnam, George. Russian Thinkers. New York: Basic Books. 1975.

Rhyne, George Nelson. The Constitutional Democratic Party From Its Origins to the First State Duma. Anne Arbour: University Microfilms Inc. 1969.

Riasanovsky, Nicholas. Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1952.

Riha, Thomas. A Russian European: Paul Miliukov in Russian Politics. Notre Dame Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 1968.

Robinson, Geriod T. Rural Russia Under the Old Regime. New York: Macmillan. 1929.

Rogger, Hans, and Webber, Eugene. The European Right. Berkely: University of California Press. 1965.

Rosenberg, William G. Liberals in the Russian Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1974.

Rostov, W. W. The Stages of Economic Growth. Cambridge. 1960.

Rowen, Henry S. and Wolf, Charles (eds.). The Future of the Soviet Empire. New York: St. Martin's. 1987.

Ruland, Peter. The Myth of the Plan. London: Hutchinson Press. 1985.

Sack, A. J. The Birth of the Russian Democracy. New York: Russian Information Bureau. 1918.

Schapiro, Leonard. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. 1960.

Schwartz, Solomon M. The Russian Revolution of 1905: The Workers Movement and the Formation of Bolshevism and Menshevism. Chicago. 1967.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. The Decline of Imperial Russia. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1960.

----. The Russian Empire 1801-1917. New York. 1967.

Sheehy, Gail. The Man Who Changed the World. New York: Harper Collins. 1991.

Shragin, Boris, and Todd, Albert (eds.). Landmarks: A Collection of Essays on the Russian Intelligentsia 1909. New York: Karx Howard. 1977.

Shukman, Harold. Lenin and the Russian Revolution. London: B. T. Batsford Ltd. 1966.

Simmons, Ernest J. (ed). Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1955.

Smith, Hedrick. The New Russians. New York: Random House. 1990.

Stavrou, Theofanis G. Russia Under the Last Tsar. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press. 1969.

Sutton, A. C. Western Technology and Soviet Econonic Development 1930-45. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 1971.

Stojanovic, Svatozar. Perestroika: From Marxism and Bolshevism to Gorbachev. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. 1988.

Szamuely, Tibor. The Russian Tradition. London: Secker and Warburg. 1974.

Tarasulo, Isaac J. (ed.). Gorbachev and Glasnost: Viewpoints From the Soviet Press. Washington: Scholarly Resources Inc. 1989.

Timberlake, Charles E.(ed). Essays on Russian Liberalism. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 1972.

Tompkins, Stuart Ramsey. The Triumph of Bolshevism: Revolution or Reaction? Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1967.

Treadgold, Donald.(ed). The Development of the USSR: An Exchange of Views. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 1964.

----. Lenin and His Rivals. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1955.

----. Twentieth Century Russia. Chicago: Rand Mcnally. 1959.

Tucker, Robert C. Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: from Lenin to Gorbachev. New York: Harvester Press. 1988.

Turin, S. P. From Peter the Great to Lenin. 2nd ed London. 1968. Tyrkova-Williams, A. From Liberty to Brest-Litovsk. Westport: Hyperion Press. 1977.

Ulam, Adam B. The Bolsheviks. New York: Macmillan. 1965.

----. In the Name of the People. New York: The Viking Press. 1977.

----. Russia's Failed Revolutions. New York: Basic Books Inc. 1981.

Utechin, S. V. Russian Political Thought. London: J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd. 1963.

Von Laue, Theodore H. Why Lenin? Why Stalin? Philadelphia: Lippincott. 1964.

Voskobiynik, Michael. The Nationalities Question in Russia in 1905-1907: A Study in the Origins of Modern Nationalism. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms. 1984.

Walicki, Andrzej. The Slavophile Controversy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1975.

Walker, Martin. The Walking Giant: Gorbachev's Russia. New York: Praeger. 1986.

Walkin, Jacob. The Rise of Democracy in Pre-Revolutionary Russia. New York: Praeger Publishers. 1962.

Wallace, Sir Donald M. Russia. New York: Macmillan. 1912.

Wilson, Andrew, and Bachkatov, Nina. Living With Glasnost. London: Penguin Books Ltd. 1988

Wittfogel, Karl. Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Wolfe, Bertram D. Revolution and Reality. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1987.

----. Three Who Made a Revolution. New York: Dial Press. 1948.

Zenkovky, V. V. A History of Russian Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press. 1953.