Cicero as Translator of Greek in his Presentation of the Stoic Theory of Action

by

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Dedications

I dedicate this work to my wife, whose patience made this project possible, and to my son, who was born during the period of writing. Their support and encouragement cannot be measured.

Abstract

This thesis involves the study of Cicero's translation of several Greek terms and concepts. In this analysis I examine some of the historical relations between Greek and Roman cultures in order to establish some of the factors that Cicero encountered when attempting to use Greek terms. This includes, in specific, an examination of Cato the Elder as an example of an elite Roman. The latter half of the thesis focuses on a series of specific Greek terms that deal with the Stoic theory of action. This section illustrates how Cicero introduced the Greek term, how he attempted to translate it into Latin, and any problems that occurred in the translation. Finally, I offer some explanations for any differences that I detected between the Greek Stoic meaning of the term and Cicero's own translation.

Introduction

In his portrayal of the Treaty of Versailles, author Piers Brendon (2000: 21) writes of the Japanese delegate Prince Saionji Kinmochi:

> The Prince had imbibed Rousseau during a voluntary exile so protracted that he spoke perfect French, with a Marseilles accent. In fact, though he still thought about natural objects and emotions in Japanese, he thought about technical subjects in French.

These "technical subjects" must have been issues that the Prince learned or conversed about in French. Thus for him the most suitable language for these subjects was French, not his native Japanese. In fact, Brendon claims that the Prince did not even think about these subjects in Japanese. This raises an intriguing possibility, one in which students of a foreign subject would reject translating that subject into their own native language. Further, if these students did choose to translate their subjects, what problems would occur?

There are immediate parallels between this example of the phenomenon and my own study, which is a consideration of the challenges that surround Cicero's attempt to translate Greek technical terms. My focus shall be on the terms of the Greek Stoics, and I shall attempt to discern any differences between their usage of their terms and Cicero's translation. In Cicero's time there were a number of Roman elite who were familiar with Greek learning. A possible way to achieve this familiarity was to study in Greece, under Greek teachers who, at least in the case of Cicero's education, taught in Greek. We may wonder whether Cicero

thought, primarily, about philosophical matters in the Greek language, a language of which he knew the technical vocabulary. As we shall see, there were a number of Romans who had studied Greek philosophy who preferred to read philosophy in Greek rather than their native Latin. Yet it is apparent that Cicero refused to be satisfied with the study of philosophy in Greek, and insisted upon "naturalizing" philosophy into Rome. Since it is possible that the Greek technical vocabulary was foremost in his mind while writing, I believe that Cicero encountered certain difficulties in his attempt to translate a technical vocabulary. Further, we must account for the culture that Cicero was writing in, as well as the simple difficulty that is inherent in accurately translating technical terminology. All of these factors could produce certain variations not only in Cicero's translation of terms, but also in his translation of concepts and theories. For this reason I shall give special attention to Cicero's source material where possible.

I shall explore several facets of Roman culture that could have influenced Cicero's methods of translation in the earlier half of my study. In the latter half, I examine specific examples of Cicero's attempts to translate Greek technical terms. All of the terms are related to "action" and, I believe, to the Stoics.

1. Cato

I shall begin with an examination of Cato as an example of typical upper-class Roman sentiments towards the Greeks and their language in his own time. Cato (234 – 149 BC) was a member of the Roman elite, a class which is usually labelled as conservative. Yet Cato lived in a period which was witness to a great influx of Greek culture into Rome. For example, in 155 an embassy was dispatched to Rome from Athens. The embassy was made up of some of Athens' leading philosophers, Carneades, Diogenes and Critolaus. They all held public lectures, at which Cato was an audience member. As a result of this event, and others of its kind to be explored later, measures directed at slowing the spread of Hellenism seem to have been taken up by certain Romans. Cato certainly appears to have been a part of this group, but to what extent was this measure only a public image, aimed at promoting Latinism while Greek was privately admired?

Cicero, as we shall see, frequently endeavours to elevate Latin by degrading Greek. Acting in a similar manner, Cato attempted to elevate Roman culture. According to Plutarch (*Cat. Ma.* 12.5), he said that the words of the Greeks come from their lips, while those of the Romans come from their hearts. Plutarch and Pliny report that Cato warned his son about Greek doctors, claiming that they had taken an oath to kill all barbarians by means of their medicine, among whom they

counted the Romans.[1] Plutarch also reports that Cato was wholly hostile towards Greek philosophy (ὅλως φιλοσοφίᾳ προσκεκρουκώς, *Cato* 23.1). He called for the expulsion of all Greeks from Italy (Plin. *Nat.* 7.113), he referred to the Greeks as a *nequissimum et indocile genus* (Plin. *Nat.* 29.14), and he warned that learning from the Greeks would cause the Romans to lose control of their own affairs (Plin. *Nat.* 29.14; Plut. *Cat. Ma.* 23.3). All these examples portray Cato as a stout anti-Hellene. He probably was not, at any rate, a philhellene, as he had some harsh words for such people.[2] Yet the sturdiness of his anti-Hellenism should be mitigated. Much work has been done in this area by Gruen (1992) and Astin (1978).

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[1] Pliny (Plin. *Nat*. 29.13) quotes Cato: *nequissimum et indocile genus illorum, et hoc puta vatem dixisse: quandoque ista gens suas litteras dabit, omnia conrumpet, tum etiam magis, si medicos suos hoc mittet. iurarunt inter se barbaros necare omnes medicina, et hoc ipsum mercede faciunt ut fides is sit et facile disperdant. nos quoque dictitant barbaros et spurcius nos quam alios opicon appellation foedant. Interdixi tibi de medicis.* ("The [Greek] race is worthless and foolish, and know that this is said by a prophet: when that race gives us their literature, it shall pervert everything, and all the more so if it sends its doctors here. They have sworn amongst themselves to kill all barbarians with their medicine, and they do this with pay so that there is a trust and so they can destroy more easily. They often say that we too are barbarians and they pollute us more filthily than others with the name Opici. I have forbidden you from dealing with doctors"); Plutarch (*Cat*. *Ma*. 23.2) relates this story about Cato and doctors: καὶ τὸν Ἱπποκράτους ὡς ἔοικεν ἀκηκοὼς λόγον, ὃν εἶπε τοῦ μεγάλου Βασιλέως καλοῦντος αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς τισι ταλάντοις, οὐκ ἄν ποτε βαρβάροις Ἑλλήνων πολεμίοις ἑαυτὸν παρασχεῖν, ἔλεγε κοινὸν ὅρκον εἶναι τοῦτον ἰατῶν ἁπάντων, καὶ παρεκελεύετο φυλάττεσθαι τῶ παιδὶ πάντας ("It appears that [Cato] heard the words of Hippocrates when Hippocrates was called to the Great King for a great deal of money, and he said that he would never offer his services to barbarians, the enemies of the Greeks. Cato used to say that this was a common oath of all doctors, and he ordered his son to be on guard against them all").

[2] Both Plutarch (*Cat*. *Ma*. 12.5) and Polybius (39.1) reference Cato's contempt for Postumius Albinus, who prefaced his history (which he wrote in Greek) with the request that the reader pardon any mistakes that Postumius made with the language. Polybius also says that Postumius was excessive in his Greek learning, which was offensive to the elite. See Astin 1978: 168.

The first step in countering Cato's apparent anti-Hellenism is to note that the statesman himself knew the Greek language. Cicero tells us that Cato came to Greek rather late in life (*Ac.* 2.5; *Sen.* 1.3, 7.26). In his *De Senectute*, Cato is portrayed as a man familiar with various Greek authors.[3] Cicero may be attempting to defend his own familiarity with Greek culture by creating a Roman tradition of the study of Greek learning, and thus embellishes Cato's knowledge.[4] Still, in his own works Cato often made allusions that required familiarity with Greek literature and legends (Gruen 1992: 57; Astin 1978: 162-163). Horace tells us that Cato added words of Greek derivation to Latin (H. *AP.* 52-58; See Gruen 1992: 58). According to Plutarch, when on an embassy in Athens, Cato could have spoken to the Greeks in their native tongue, though he chose not to (*Cat. Ma*. 12.5). The evidence, although it is perhaps exaggerated, indicates that Cato was familiar with Greek learning. In fact, he advised his son to sample Greek literature (Plin. *Nat.* 29.14).

Thus we must reconcile the apparent conflict. Several answers are available to clarify the supposed examples of his anti-Hellenism. Many modern authors have attempted to explain the Roman attitude towards Hellenism by claiming that the Romans appreciated the Greeks of the past, while frowning upon the

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[3] Xenophon (*Sen*. 17.59), Sophocles (*Sen*. 7. 22), Homer (*Sen*. 7. 23). Plato is mentioned in the work five times (*Sen*. 5.13, 7.23, 12.41, 13.44, 21.78), and *Sen*. 2.6 marks the beginning of an adaptation of a Platonic passage. See Powell 1988: 111-122.

[4] Cicero worries that his Cato may seem to debate with more skill than he was accustomed to do in his own books (*Sen*. 1.3); see Gruen 1992: 58-59. In *De Orat*. 3.135 Cicero tells us that the only characteristic of a great orator that Cato lacked was *hanc politissimam doctrinam transmarinam atque adventiciam* ("this highly polished overseas and foreign doctrine").

contemporary Greeks.[5] In other words, the assumption is that Romans accepted some aspects of Hellenism but rejected others. This theory that Romans approved only of the Greek ancestors, as attractive as it is, does not withstand the evidence. Cato, for one, is said to have had an association with Ennius, and may have played a role in bringing him to Rome (Astin 1978: 167). Cicero associated with many Greeks, and when he did criticize Greeks, it was not for their contemporary base characters.[6]Another explanation is that remarks taken from sources other than Cato himself may be something of an exaggeration. As noted, Plutarch finds Cato hostile to Greek philosophy.[7] Yet Plutarch tells us that Cato critiques Socrates not for his philosophy, but for his despotic ambitions (*Cat. Ma.* 23.1). This raises the possibility that Cato was a supporter of the traditional Greek culture that he thought Socrates was trying to overthrow (Gruen 1992: 65). In the embassy of 155, Cato is said to have disapproved of Carneades,[8] yet apparently not for his practice of philosophy in general, but for teaching young men to argue both (or either) sides of an

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Gruen (1992: 67) concludes that this *doctrina* must have been philosophy, which Cato studied but found lacking.

[5] Horrocks: 78-9; Kaimio 1979: 325; Woolf 1994: 120-12; Boyd 1961: 64. In opposition, see Gruen 1992: 63.

[6] As I discuss in Chapter 3, Cicero attempts to promote Latin over Greek. His criticisms are aimed at the Greek language, not culture.

[7] Plutarch may be inferring this from Cato's reaction to the discourse of Carneades. Gruen (1992: 66) argues that "Plutarch exaggerated and misconstrued their [Cato's comments'] intent."

[8] Plu. *Cat. Ma.* 22.1; Plin. *Nat*. 7.112. The report is that Cato urged the Senate to expel the embassy either because one could not tell when Carneades was speaking the truth (Pliny) or because the youth of Rome might turn their efforts towards talking rather than acting (Plutarch).

argument.[9] Nor can it be ignored that Cato was actually a member of the audience at this philosophical display. He may not, then, have completely disregarded philosophy. As to what Cato says in his own writings, Gruen concludes that the work addressed to his son could not have been a private handbook, since one son was too old, while the other was just an infant (Gruen 1992: 78). Rather, this work must have been aimed at a wider audience, and thus contains Cato's *public* opinions. The difference between public and private sentiments cannot be stressed enough. I shall return to this difference and what it may mean for our conclusions about Cato. On his remarks about Greek doctors, at least one of our sources, Pliny, seems to have thought the same thing.[10] Perhaps more importantly, as Astin concludes, Greek doctors were in fact unreliable and dangerous.[11]

The best explanation for his actions, however, comes when his exploits are viewed as a whole. The analysis can rely upon the difference between Cato's private sentiments and his public appearance. Privately, Cato did not disapprove

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[9] Cicero refers to Carneades as being accustomed to advocate any views that suited his needs (*Rep*.3.8). Note, however, that the remaining text in Cicero's work ends after stating that Carneades "was a Greek man and accustomed, whatever may be convenient, with words ..."(*Graecus homo et consuetus, quod commodum esset, verbis*). I follow Astin's conclusion (1978: 175) about the content of the missing text, who relies on the summaries made by Augustine (*De civitate Dei* 2.21) and Lactantius (*Divine Institutes* 5.14.3).

[10] Plin. *Nat*. 29.1-28. Pliny relates the story of Archagathus, a Greek doctor who was awarded Roman citizenship. His methods of treatment, however, eventually earned him the nickname *carnifex* ("butcher"). Archagathus came to Rome in 219 BC, and thus it is likely that Cato was aware of him and his reputation.

[11] Such is the conclusion of Astin (1978: 171), having noted some actual "dangerous" doctors.

of Greeks. He himself had a Greek slave who served as a tutor.[12] We have seen that he knew Greek literature well enough to make allusions to it in his own writings, and he understood the Greek language well enough that he could have addressed the Athenian assembly in Greek.[13] Publicly, though, Cato must have felt that any promotion or praise of Greek would come at the expense of Roman culture. It betrays the fear that Romans had about the stability of their own unique culture, which was geographically situated so near to Greece.[14] Thus Cato sought to promote Roman culture and, within that sphere, Roman ideals (Gruen 1992: 78-80). Active duty was more important than the study of philosophy and literature. The appropriate time for such devotion was late in life, as Cicero hints (*Ac.* 1.11). If philosophy is given any attention during youth, it is only to be sampled. Cato's criticisms of philosophy and literature were not aimed at the very nature of these subjects. He wanted to prevent them from pulling people away from the political

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[12] Cato did not allow his slave to educate his son. According to Plutarch (20.4), Cato believed that if his son did not do well, he should not be disciplined by a slave. Conversely, if Cato's son excelled, it should not be because of a slave.

[13] He did not actually speak Greek during this occasion, so perhaps he did not know it as well as the legend would make us believe.

[14] Neither Astin (1978: 176) nor Gruen (1992: 66) believe that Cato thought that Greek philosophy was able to undermine the Roman moral code. Yet Astin (1978: 176) states: "Cato's principal concerns were with effective participation in public and military activities and with high standards of integrity"; and Gruen (1992: 81): "Cato perceived the risk of being engulfed by its [Greece's] attractive traditions and established patterns more acutely than most of his contemporaries." Astin's comment indicates that Cato thought philosophy would draw young men away from active duty, an activity which was a principal part of Roman morality. Gruen states outright that Cato recognized that Greek culture could overcome the Roman traditions, which were obviously part of the Roman moral code. For my own part, I must conclude that Cato believed that Greek learning would not sway men of his own calibre, but the Censor was unsure about the younger generation.

sphere.[15] Thus Cato publicly denounced Greek learning, but studied it, to some extent, privately.

[15] Astin 1978: 177-181. Astin cautions us to think of Cato's "attitudes" rather than "attitude" towards the Greeks, implying that Cato may have approved some aspects of Hellenism while rejecting others. While it is tempting to take this stance, we must recall that Cato spoke out against the very things that make up what a Roman may have considered to be Hellenism (philosophy, rhetoric, medicine). Thus I do not think that Cato was selective in his approval and rejection of Hellenic features. If he was selective, it is difficult to see a pattern of approval. See also Gruen 1992: 63.

2. Rome and Greece

In the previous chapter I discussed the actions of Cato, modeling him as a typical upper-class Roman of his time. In this chapter, I shall discuss certain elements in the relationship between Rome and Greece that could have given rise to the sentiments expressed by Cato and, ultimately, by Cicero.

Various dates exist for what we may consider as the beginning of a Greek presence at Rome. It is not difficult to imagine that Greeks had been in Rome for much of the city's existence (Marrou 1956: 243; Gruen 1992: 229.), but several events may have greatly increased their numbers and influence: Rome's capture of Tarentum (Boyd 1961: 64), which brought an influx of Greek slaves, the first two Punic Wars (Momigliano 1975: 16-17), and even the Mithridatic Wars are all considered to be periods in which Greek learning increased greatly (Rawson 1985: 7). It is more important for this study, however, to note that the Greeks *had* a steadily increasing presence in Rome, which may have resulted in some sort of reaction from the Romans. There are several events, instigated by Romans, which seem like responses to the growing Greek presence. First, however, I shall examine the history of interaction between the two cultures.

A major point of contact between the two cultures is reflected in the story of Numa and Pythagoras. According to the legend, Numa was a student of

Pythagoras.[16] The exact date of the creation of this story is unclear, but Rome became acquainted with the Greeks of Magna Graecia and the legend of Pythagoras around the end of the fourth century. Pythagoras' character must have impressed the Romans, for, as the story goes, they erected a statue to him outside the *comitium* as the wisest of the Greeks. Whatever his appeal may have been,[17] it is clear that the Romans of the fourth and third centuries held Pythagoras in high regard.[18] Gruen concludes that the allure of pairing Pythagoras, the wisest of the Greeks, with Numa, famed for his justice and wisdom, was "too hard to resist" (Gruen 1990: 162). The story was apparently passed down in Rome from generation to generation. Some Romans found it implausible.[19]

The first record of a Roman speaking Greek is of L. P. Megellus, who in 282 BC spoke the language so poorly that it angered his audience in Tarentum.[20] Shortly after, Livius Andronicus came to Rome and taught in both Latin and Greek (Suet. *Gram*.1). In the late third century, Q. Fabius Pictor wrote a history of Rome in Greek, a work that was perhaps intended for other Greek-speaking Romans (Gruen 1992: 230-231). Histories of Rome were also written in Greek by P. Scipio (consul in

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[16] D.H. 2.59.1; Ovid *F*. 3.151-154; *Met*. 15.1-8, 15.60-72, 15.479-484.
[17] Gruen (1990: 161-162) offers some explanations. See also Jocelyn 1976: 329.
[18] I would not ague so on the basis of the building of a statue, which may have been done tostrengthen relations between Rome and Syracuse (see Jocelyn 1976: 329). I would, however, pair the building of the statue with the durability of the legend of Pythagoras and Numa tocome to this conclusion.
[19] Cicero (*De Orat*. 2.154) notes that the two men did not live at the same time.
[20] D.H. 19.5; Appian, *Samn*. 7.2. See also Gruen 1992: 229 – 230; Kaimio 1979: 96 -97.

162 and 155),[21] C. Acilius[22] and A. Postumius Albinus.[23] Gruen contends that this fact contradicts the theory that the Romans had an inferiority complex, and in fact indicates that the Romans welcomed their history being written in Greek (Gruen 1992: 231). Also in the second century, Ennius came to Rome and taught there in both languages (Suet. *Gram*. 1.1).

The history of Roman education illustrates how Romans were eventually able to write in Greek. Education in Rome, before Greek influences, was an introduction to the traditional Roman way of life (Marrou 1956: 231). The *mores maiorum* that elders taught the young included all aspects of life. Living in imitation of one's ancestors was the rule in Roman life. A child was first instructed by his mother, and then by his father (Marrou 1956: 232-233). Around the age of 16, some young men had the opportunity to study under an older friend of the family (Marrou 1956: 233). The introduction of Greek education (in the subject of *grammatica,* i.e. the study of language and literature) in Rome may have occurred in the early third century,[24] though it may have happened in 168, when Crates of Mallos came to Rome and, as Suetonius believes, began the study of grammar (Suet. *Gram.* 2). As the Hellenic influences in Rome became stronger Romans began to view Greek as an international language, and became attached to the skill of

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[21] Cicero refers to Scipio's history as *Graeca scripta dulcissime* ("written most pleasantly in Greek," Brut. 77).
[22] Mid-second century, and translator for the Athenian embassy of 155.
[23] A praetor during the Athenian embassy of 155.

rhetoric.[25] Polybius writes that by 167 there were many qualified Greek teachers in Rome (Plb. 31.24). Aemilius Paulus hired a staff of Greek tutors for his children (Plut. *Aem.* 6), and Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi, ensured that her children had an education in Greek literature (Cic. *Brut.* 104). The wealthy were able to send their children to Greece for an advanced education, though there does not seem to have been a large number of young men doing so until the early decades of the first century.[26] I shall return to the topic of education and educators at other intervals, but for now it suffices to note that the introduction of literary education by the Greek *grammatici* resulted in an increase in the number of Roman readers and speakers of Greek.[27] Nevertheless, this gradual acceptance of Hellenic culture was also met by opposition.

In 181 the tomb of Numa was excavated.[28] The excavators discovered writings in the tomb; one set was about pontifical law, another, in Greek, was about Pythagorean philosophy. The writings were passed about, but when he

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[24] Kaimio 1979: 195. Kaimio credits Livius Andronicus for initiating Greek education. Andronicus was brought to Rome in 272 BC.
[25] Mehl (1972: 61- 62) characterizes the Romans as distrusting speculative thought that offers no moral lessons. This, then, is his explanation for why philosophy did not have a major foothold at Rome.
[26] Rawson 1985: 6-11. Rawson calls the leaders of the early first century (e.g. Cicero, Caesar)"of a still newish fashion," but believes that in the generation following these men it was"almost obligatory for young men of the elite" to study abroad.
[27] Horrocks (1997: 72) claims that it was routine for the elite to learn how to read Attic and Koine. Rawson (1985:14), who believes that there would have been some "acquaintance" with contemporary spoken Greek and with the Homeric and Attic dialects, warns against exaggerating this claim.
[28] Liv. 40.29.3-14; Plin. *Nat*. 13.84-87; Plut. *Num*. 22.6-8.

learned about the discovery the Urban Praetor ordered the writings to be burnt. The writings appear to have been a remarkable discovery that could have characterized an important figure in Rome's history. However, Gruen finds the entire event suspicious, and believes it to have been fabricated. He offers that it was an attempt to separate Rome from its past when Numa relied upon Pythagoras and Greek teachings (Gruen 1990: 169-170). As Rome grew, it no longer required its attachment to Pythagoras: Numa could have innate justice and wisdom, and did not require to be taught by a foreigner. The Numa – Pythagoras connection implied that the Roman tradition (*mores maiorum*) was inspired by a Greek. Gruen goes so far as to call the burning of the writings an exorcism of the Roman past (Gruen 1990: 169). It is an intriguing and dramatic interpretation. Regardless of whether the entire event was staged or not, it is apparent that the Roman patrician class, a group that the Urban Praetor surely belonged to, was active in a deliberate *public* opposition to Greek.

In 173 BC[29] two Epicurean teachers were expelled from Rome, apparently for spreading the doctrine of pleasure.[30] In 161 the Senate authorized Marcus Pomponius to purge Rome of all philosophers and rhetors (Suet. *Rhet.* 1; Gell. 15.11). Such an undertaking, like the acts of Cato, seems to have been about public perception (Gruen 1990: 171-174). The measures would have been simply unenforceable at a private level.

The next major event between the two cultures came in 155, during the Athenian embassy. Apart from the reaction of Cato, which I discussed in Chapter 1, it is interesting to note other aspects of Plutarch's description (*Cat. Ma.* 22). Plutarch says that the φιλολογώτατοι τῶν νεανίσκων ("the most philosophical of the young men")[31] went to hear the lectures of the philosophers. Carneades' speech caused the youths to ἐνθουσιῶσι περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ("become inspired about philosophy"). Rather astounding is Plutarch's next statement:

> ταῦτα τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἤρεσκε Ῥωμαίοις γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὰ μειράκια παιδείας Ἑλληνικῆς μεταλαμβάνοντα καὶ συνόντα θαυμαζομένοις ἀνδράσιν ἡδέως ἑώρων. ὁ δὲ Κάτων …(Plu. *Cat. Ma.* 22)
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> These events were pleasing to the other Romans, who looked happily upon the young taking part in Greek education and associating with wondrous men. But Cato, on the other hand ….

It is a little peculiar to hear how Roman men (presumably elders) were pleased about the youths' association with philosophers. Plutarch later describes Cato's hatred of philosophy, which, as noted in the previous chapter, is probably an exaggeration. Perhaps the happiness of the other Roman men is an exaggeration as well. However, even if it is, the philosophers must have garnered some interest. Yet when the Athenians were speaking in the Senate, C. Acilius had to translate their speech into Latin (Gel. 6.14; Plut. 22.4). At least one senator, and probably more, knew Greek. Thus the insistence on the translation may be an example of

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[29]Gruen (1990: 177) dates the event to 154 BC.
[30]Athen. 12.547a; Ael. *VH* 9.12.
[31] All translations are my own.

public posturing (Gruen 1990: 176). Privately, the senators knew Greek and may have had an interest in hearing public lectures held by Greek teachers. Publicly, though, the senators expected that ambassadors would present their case in the Senate in Latin. It was a formality, certainly, but one that underlines the importance of the *mores maiorum*.

The embassy of 155 is an important event, but there are other instances of philosophers at Rome. I have already mentioned Pythagoras' association with Rome. Panaetius came to Rome in the later part of the second century, and he apparently stayed with Laelius and Scipio,[32] two members of the "Scipionic Circle." While Cicero was in his youth he met with the visiting Phaedrus, an Epicurean (Cic. *Fam*. 13.1.2). Catulus, a character in Cicero's *Academica*, is said to have been associated with Philo of Larisa (Cic. *Ac*. 2.12). Posidonius met a young Cicero when he came to Rome in 87-86 (Plu. *Mor.* 45.4). The grandson of the Elder Cato urged the Stoics Antipater and Athenodorus to come to Rome (Plin. *Nat.* 7.113). Jocelyn finds it significant, however, that more men went abroad to meet philosophers rather than study from philosophers in Rome (Jocelyn 1976: 337). There are a number of men, such as Crassus, Pompeius, Caesar and M. Iunius Brutus, who paid visits to Greek philosophers. Their motives for the visits are, however, called

[32] As often noted by Cicero (*Rep*. 1.15, 1.34, 3.5; *Fin*. 4.23; *Tusc*. 1.81; Off. 1.9). See also Plut. *Mor*. 814c; Gell 17.21.1.

into question.[33] Some of the men who visited philosophers abroad or entertained them at Rome may have genuinely been interested in the teachings of the Greek men, but that does not require that any Roman adhered to the philosopher's school. Crassus, for instance, visited Charmadas, Cleitomachus and Aeschines of the Academy, but also the Stoic Mnesarchus and the Peripatetic Diodorus (Cic. *De Orat.* 1.145-7, 2.365, 3.75). It is no less telling that L. Gellius Publicola offered to arbitrate the disputes of the various schools (Cic. *Leg.* 1.53). The eclecticism of men like Crassus indicates that curiosity may have been a leading factor in these visits. Men like Publicola apparently believed that the divisions between the schools could be settled like mere disputes.[34] These examples of hospitality and visitation indicate only an interest in the realm of philosophy by men of the Roman elite.[35]

For the next fifty years there are few points of interest in regard to the relationship between Greek and Roman culture.[36] In 92 BC there was an edict, preserved by Suetonius, issued against the schools of those who gave themselves the name Latin rhetors (Suet. *Rhet*. 1.1). According to Suetonius, the innovations of these schools went against what the Roman ancestors had decided should be

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[33]Jocelyn (1976: 338) claims that Romans abroad "liked to see famous sites and famous people."

[34]The Romans seem to have thought that the Greeks indulged in petty arguments. See Cic. *De Orat*. 1.47; Plin. *Ep*. 5.20.4.

[35] Jocelyn (1976: 353-357) raises the problem of the language used by the Greek philosophers. If they lectured in Greek, as Jocelyn supposes, it is unclear how well Roman listeners could interpret the lectures.

[36] Gruen (1990: 178) discusses a few minor events which point to Romans attempting to distance themselves from the doctrines of pleasure and amusement.

taught to the young. Thus it was made known that these schools were displeasing to the Senate, but that was the extent of the action taken (Gruen 1990: 179). It is possible that political motives or fears of democratizing the education process instigated this act. The most interesting explanation, though, is provided by Gruen, who believes that this incident is an indication of a major cultural shift in Rome (Gruen 1990: 187-190). In his analysis, the censors were acting to preserve the teaching of rhetoric *in Greek*. The Latin rhetors had cluttered the skill by teaching in Latin. Thus, the teaching of Greek rhetoric became part of the *mores maiorum*.

Although I am sceptical that Greek ever became part of the *mores maiorum*, Cicero, as we shall see, had to defend himself against those who thought Greek a superior language for philosophical discourse. Greek had become entrenched in some Roman circles. Yet I believe that the division between what could be publicly recommended and one's own private habits still existed at the time of Cicero's writings. In the next section, I shall address this point, as well as answer *why* this difference may have existed.

3. The period of Cicero

In the previous chapters I examined the history of Roman and Greek relations. I attempted to show that there was a distinct difference between public stance and private sentiment in regard to Hellenic culture. Yet Cicero grew up in a Rome where Greek was gaining acceptance. The generational difference between Cato and Cicero had an interesting effect. At first glance, it may seem that Cicero, like Cato, publicly denounced Hellenism while maintaining a private appreciation for the culture. Cicero had an understanding of Greek and, despite what one author believes,[37] was able to read Greek texts in their original. These Greek writings obviously had an influence on him, and he must have desired to translate and remodel their theories into a form that was suitable for a Roman audience. If we recall the apparent situation of Cato and the discrepancy between his public and private opinions, we may expect that Cicero avoided appearing in public as excessively appreciative of Greek learning. Yet most of his criticisms that are directed towards the Greeks (which Cato used to distinguish himself from philhellenes) are about linguistic matters. Because of a shift in Roman culture, Cicero had to defend Latin against a class of people who believed Greek to be a superior language. I believe that while Cicero did avoid appearing to be a

[37] Mehl (1972: 68) states that Cicero immersed himself in Greek philosophy "albeit always in Latin translation." The source for this theory is not stated, and can be summarily dismissed.

philhellene, he did not do so at the cost of consistency between his private and public sentiments.

Plutarch provides a biography of Cicero. During the civil war between Sulla and Marius, Cicero left his political life and began to associate with philosophers (Plu. *Cic*. 3.3). While in Athens, he heard Antiochus speak (4.1). Once, while in the presence of Apollonius, Cicero was asked to declaim in Greek. After Cicero had delivered his speech, Plutarch claims that Apollonius was upset that learning (παιδεία) and oratory (λόγος), the last things left to Greece, had passed to Rome through Cicero (4.7). Note, however, that Cicero was speaking in Greek rather than Latin. However adept Cicero may have been at speaking Greek, he was criticized upon his return to Rome. Plutarch says that his enemies called him Greek, which was apparently an insult, and "man of leisure"[38] (5.2). Clearly there was a stigma attached to this type of learning, or at least Plutarch believed so. The criticism that Cicero received may have caused him to be careful to avoid appearing to be a philhellene. Perhaps he was wary since he was a *novus homo* (Guite 1962: 159). Or his caution may have been because of his respect for Cato, who a generation earlier maintained a public opposition to Hellenism.

Cicero's caution lest he appear to support Hellenic culture is evident in his philosophical and rhetorical writings, as well as his orations. These can, to a certain

[38] This likely has much to do with the Roman belief that philosophy should be studied in times of leisure. Cicero is usually careful about mentioning that his study only occurredduring his times away from public duty. See *Ac*. 1.1.

extent, be contrasted with his letters, which seem to contain more of his private sentiments, rather than being full of attempts to portray a public persona. In his public works,[39] there are several instances where Cicero insists that Latin is a superior language to Greek. For instance, *Tusc.* 3.11:

> *Graeci autem* μανίαν *unde appellent non facile dixerim: eam tamen ipsam distinguimus nos melius quam illi; hanc enim insaniam, quae iuncta stultitia patet latius, a furore disiungimus. Graeci volunt illi quidem, sed parum valent verbo: quem nos furorem,* μελαγχολίαν *illi vocant.*
>
> But I cannot easily say on what basis the Greeks call it μανία: and yet we distinguish this better than they do; for we separate this insanity, which has a wider application because of its connection with foolishness, from rage. Those Greeks mean this as well, but they are not strong enough in their vocabulary: what we call rage, they call μελαγχολία.

In a similar fashion, Cicero points out that Latin is better for describing the disturbances of the soul (*Tusc.* 3.23). In *De Senectute,* Cicero's Cato remarks that the Roman ancestors provided a better name for a group of friends coming together (*Sen.* 5.13). He says that the Latin term, *convivium*, is better at conveying the most important part of the event than what the Greeks would call it, a *compotatio* or a *concenatio*. Such statements are examples of Roman clarity in their naming practices.

This clarity is especially prominent when the Roman naming practice is compared that of the Greeks. Yet Cicero is less concerned with condemning Greek than he is with promoting Latin. Even in situations where Cicero is not providing a direct translation of a Greek term he promotes Latin:

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[39] I refer to his philosophical and rhetorical works, as well as his orations, as public works.

> *Non est omnino hic docendi locus, sed ita sentio et saepe disserui, Latinam linguam non modo non inopem, ut vulgo putarent, sed locupletiorem etiam esse quam Graecam. Quando enim nobis, vel dicam aut oratoribus bonis aut poetis, postea quidem quam fuit quem imitarentur, ullus orationis vel copiosae vel elegantis ornatus defuit?* (*Fin.* 1.10)
>
> This is not really the place for saying this here, but I feel, and I have often discussed this, that the Latin language is not only not weak, as is generally thought, but it is even richer than Greek. For when have we -I am speaking of good orators or poets, certainly after there were examples for them to imitate - lacked any dressing of either copious or eloquent speech?

Cicero continues this claim of Latin superiority in other places.[40] It is rather telling that he feels the need to do so as often as he does. This defence must indicate that some Romans thought Latin to be inferior to Greek,[41] a sentiment that Cicero attempted to refute. Cicero even hints at his notoriety for this defence in *De Finibus*. Cato the younger is discussing Zeno's terminology when he says:

> *… cum uteretur in lingua copiosa factis tamen nominibus ac novis, quod nobis in hac inopi lingua non conceditur; quamquam tu hanc copiosiorem etiam soles dicere*.
>
> (*Fin*. 3.51)
>
> … since he was making use of newly made words in a copious language, which is not granted to us in this meagre language; although you often say that Latin is richer.

This Cato is clearly the type of person that Cicero is arguing against. Cicero makes it clear in several of his introductions that men like Cato existed, that is, those who thought that Greek was a better language for philosophy. There he defends the act

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[40] *Fin*. 3.5; *Tusc*. 3.10; *ND* 1.8. Contrast *Tusc*. 2.35, where Cicero admits that the Greek language is more abundant (*copiosior*). However, he seems to be faulting the Greeks here for poor naming practices, for although they have a richer language, they still apply only one term to toil (*labor*) and pain (*dolor*). Cicero has a similar complaint at *Tusc*. 3.7. *Fin*. 3.35 is a restatement of this complaint by Cicero's Cato.

of writing philosophy in Latin. At the outset of *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero defends his philosophical writings by alluding to the fact that he will be improving philosophy, since he believes that the Romans have always shown more wisdom than the Greeks (1.1). Further, at the outset of *De Finibus* Cicero alludes to the class of people that are learned (*eruditi*) in Greek and have contempt for Latin, and as a result they say that they would rather spend their time reading Greek (1.1). Cicero says that he marvels at this class of people, for he is unable to understand why they would not desire to use their language for the most serious matters (*gravissimae res*), while they are willing to read Latin plays translated word for word from Greek (*fabellas Latinas ad verbum e Graecis expressas non inviti legant,* 1.4). Cicero claims that to treat Latin this way is part of an extremely indulgent taste (*fastidi delicatissimi,* 1.5).

Clearly in Cicero's time there were those who carried their love of Hellenism to a point that they neglected their own language. This theme appears frequently in Cicero's writings. In *De Finibus*, Cicero mentions a class of people who would rather be Greeks than Romans (3.5). In *Academica,* Cicero personifies this class of Romans with his character Varro. Cicero questions why Varro, having written so much, and being a student of philosophy, had not written a text on philosophy in Latin. Varro answers:

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[41] Lucr. 1.136, 832, 3.260; Sen. *Ep*. 58.1; Plin. *Nat*. 4.18.1.

> *Nam cum philosophiam viderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi si qui de nostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca potius quam nostra lecturos; sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos quae sine eruditione Graeca intellegi non possunt; itaque ea nolui scribere quae nec indocti intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent.* (*Ac.* 4.)
>
> For when I saw that philosophy had been displayed most diligently in Greek literature, I deemed that if some of us were held by the study of it, and if they are students of Greek doctrine, they would rather read Greek than Latin; but if they shrank back from the arts and teachings of the Greeks, they would care not even for those things that cannot be understood without Greek learning; and thus I was unwilling to write those things which neither the unlearned would be able to understand nor the learned would want to read.

Varro then remarks how difficult it would be to duplicate, in Latin, the precision that is necessary in philosophical discourse (5-8). Varro concludes by saying that he sent to the Greeks those of his friends who desired to learn about philosophy (8): *ut ex fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur* ("so that they may drink from the source rather than seek out rivulets"). Cicero admits that perhaps some prefer to read Greek but feels that it is more likely that those who cannot read Greek literature will read philosophy in Latin, and those that can read Greek will still read the Latin. He indicates (10) that the people who can read Greek nevertheless read Latin poetry, so they will likely do the same in regard to philosophy in Latin. He concludes by pointing out that Brutus is so adept at writing philosophy in Latin that there is no need for the Greek equivalent (12). Cicero clearly thought that there was opposition to his writing in Latin. It is striking that others apparently pressured him to leave philosophical discourse in Greek. Greek is now in such a position that some Romans would prefer to read Greek than their native Latin. The

majority of Cicero's comments on Greeks and their language are concerned with this type of statement. To be clear, these are defences, not attacks. This is decidedly different from Cato telling his son that the absorption of Greek learning would ruin Rome. In his own time, Cicero cannot merely chastise those who would prefer Greek, but he actually needs to defend against them, as if he was the outsider.

There are examples in which Cicero seems to be insulting the Greeks. While prosecuting Verres, Cicero proclaims that the Sicilian Greeks are as un-Greek as possible; in fact, they are nearly Romans (ii. *Verr.* 2.7). This statement nearly functions as a compliment to these Sicilians, and perhaps some Romans would view it as such. Yet it is an insult to Greek culture to imply that some Greeks would seek to become "nearly Roman." In this instance, however, Cicero is attempting to prove to his audience that the Sicilians should be pitied. His audience is the important factor, and his quasi-compliment indicates that Cicero suspected that he would garner little support in the prosecution of a Roman for his crimes against Greeks (Guite 1962: 145). Thus in response to his own suspicions about the prejudices of the audience, he attempts to collect some support. In *de Oratore*, Cicero's Crassus states that the Greeks are so *inepti* that they do not even have a word for this deficient characteristic (2.17-18). The statement appears to be an insult, yet perhaps even this comment is aimed at a linguistic deficiency. *De Oratore* contains several other apparent anti-Hellene sentiments. Cicero's Crassus labels

Plato a *Graeculus*, a term that is used mostly in a contemptuous sense,[42] and says that these *Greeklings* are *contentionis cupidiores quam veritatis* ("more passionate for a competition than for the truth," 1.47). The insult levelled at Plato cannot be dismissed, but the slight arises out of a discussion on vocabulary. Crassus' complaint about Plato is that while Plato was mocking the orators, he himself seemed to be a *summus orator*. Cicero's Crassus is not calling Plato a degenerate, nor is he mocking his philosophy. He is, however, pointing out an oddity in the Greek naming practice. Later in Book 1, Crassus claims that the Romans' *prudentia* ("good sense") stands before that of all other people, especially the Greeks (1.197). Cicero's intention is apparent: he is trying to elevate the Romans by means of comparison with the Greeks. The comparison is made with the Greeks since that comparison produces the greatest result; it seems unlikely that Cicero would have made this comparison between the Romans and the Gauls. The comment is not because of a belief that the Greeks have the smallest amount of *prudentia.* In Book 2 Cicero exposes what may have been a contemporary debate. Antonius admits that to ignore Greek teachings would be inhuman (*pecudis esse, non hominis*), but he thought that he should not openly admit to a familiarity with Greek, lest his public reputation be diminished (2.153). Catulus replies that Italy has never disdained philosophy; the whole land was once filled with Pythagoreans. Even those most glorious and illustrious men Scipio Africanus, Laelius and Furius had about

[42] See the entry in *OLD* and Guite 1962: 152.

themselves the most educated men from Greece (2.154). Catulus marvels that Antonius has nearly declared war on philosophy (2.155). Antonius answers that he only meant that he believes the study of philosophy should be kept within limits (2.156). Cicero is speaking out against those who would hide their study of philosophy. Even so, Antonius' final comment on the matter represents the same sentiments that we saw in Cato.

These are excerpts taken from works that Cicero expected (or hoped) many people would read. His letters provide an opportunity to contrast his projected public personality with his private sentiments. I should note, however, that Cicero may have intended to publish his letters after editing them.[43] If Cicero had intended to edit his letters, he may have wanted to remove or re-present them (Hooper and Schwartz 1991: 17). I do not believe, however, that Cicero needed to. In a letter to his brother Quintus, Cicero says that the Romans owe their civilization to the Greeks (Cic. *QF*. i.1.27.8). In a letter to Atticus (1.19.10), Cicero makes an interesting statement that has several implications. He states that he is sending to Atticus an outline of his consulship. The noteworthy point is that Cicero has written it in Greek. He contrasts himself with Lucullus, who apparently told Atticus that he had inserted into his literature a few barbarisms and solecisms[44] to

[43] *Att*. 16.5. Cicero remarks that there are no collections of his letters in existence. He states that he ought to look through the collection Atticus has and make corrections to them. He explicitly states that they will not be published until he looks through them.
[44] These are terms the Romans adapted from the Greek language. In Greek, anyone who used a barbarism made an error of grammar or syntax. A solecism indicated a mistake in usage. These terms have a geographical reference, since a barbarism placed the offender as

make his readers believe that a Roman had written it. Cicero says that any mistakes on his part are honest errors. Motives for writing a history of his consulship in Greek can be called into question, and possibly answered by the precedent set by other Roman historians writing in Greek. Yet Cicero's choice of language is interesting for someone who consistently promoted Latin. He could have taken the opportunity to exemplify how well suited Latin was to describe history. That he did write in Greek betrays Cicero's personal view of the language. Of course, it is also interesting to note Lucullus' excuse, which indicates that he felt embarrassed that he made mistakes in his use of the Greek language. If he was being genuine, it is an intriguing statement concerning the audience. Would a Greek audience not accept that a Roman could write perfect Greek? For that matter, was his audience composed of Greeks, or Roman bilinguals like Atticus? These are all interesting questions, but the important point is that Cicero considered Greek to be a valid choice of language for some of his works.

There is another point concerning a difference between Cicero's public and private works, one which has implications for the remainder of my study. In his books on rhetoric and philosophy, Cicero appears to use Greek terminology, with its Greek spellings and characters, as a means of achieving his overall goal. His goal, in these books, is to transfer philosophy from Greece to Rome. Romans may

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someone from outside the Hellenic world, and a solecism as someone from Soli. See Farrell 2001: 36 - 39.

have been engaged in philosophical studies, but these men were not writing their own works in Latin. It is Cicero's goal to illustrate that Latin is capable of expressing the abstract notions, but also the precision, required in philosophy. Thus he mentions a Greek term and then shows how it may be translated into Latin. I find that this is an essential act in Cicero's process, an act that is part of a deliberate attempt to promote Latin (though not necessarily "Roman") philosophical studies. In contrast, the Greek terms in his letters have different purposes, though at times they seem to have no purpose at all.[45] Several explanations are provided for the phenomenon of switching into a different language mid-speech, termed code-switching.[46] As a rhetorical device, code-switching can create distance between the speaker and the audience, or it may conversely create unity between the two. Code-switching may be about appearances.[47] The writer may wish to create distance when discussing topics that require tact (Adams 2003: 310-311). Yet it can create a unity, or at least speak to an existing unity, when a speaker employs code-switching. The rhetorical device may illustrate a shared experience, or education, between the writer and his audience. When code-switching indicates a bond between author and audience, it may be used for serious or light-hearted conversation. In the case of Cicero, it may also be used as a code to prevent outside members from reading the author's words. Thus

[45] For example, in Cic. *Att*. 2.1.3, Cicero inserts the Greek σῶμα for *corpus*, the effect of which is difficult to discern.

[46] As named by Adams 2003: 300-3. Adams discusses the possible reasons that I discuss, and others as well.

in a letter to Atticus Cicero states: *Cetera erunt* ἐν αἰνιγμοῖς ("the rest shall be in riddles").[48]

Perhaps more interesting are the examples where Cicero does not use Greek in his letters. He does not, for instance, use Greek to express any of his emotions in his letters following the death of his daughter Tullia, an experience which had a grave impact on him.[49] This omission or avoidance of Greek indicates that Cicero deemed its use to be inappropriate for serious matters. In a letter to Marcus Brutus, whose praise we have seen above, Cicero uses only one Greek term (Cic. *Fam*. 13.1). This has been interpreted to show that Cicero would not use Greek if he feared that he might be outdone (Baldwin 1992: 8), but that theory presupposes that Brutus was a better Greek speaker than Atticus. In all of his letters to his wife Terentia, he uses Greek but once, and that is to describe his χολὴν ἄκρατον ("excessive bile," *Fam.* 14.7). He does not use it to write love poetry to her,[50] he only uses it to describe a painful bowel situation. Using Greek in a medical context is a common occurrence (Bailey 1977: 496), but since most of his letters to Terentia are about health, it is odd that this is the only Greek term (Baldwin 1992: 12). Baldwin wonders whether Roman etiquette dictated that gentlemen keep foreign language out of their letters to their wives, in which case Greek would rarely be used in love

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[47] Hutchinson 1998: 14; Adams 2003: 300; Steele 1900: 389

[48] *Att*. 2.19.5. Cicero tells Atticus that in future letters he may write under a pseudonym, but the rest of the letter will be in code. See also *Att*. 2.20.3, 6.7, *Fam*. 7.18 for the possibility of using Greek as a code.

[49] Cicero discusses his grief at *Att*. 12.13, 15, 20. Adams (2003: 313) argues that the artificiality of code-switching made it inappropriate when discussing serious matters.

letters; or perhaps, in this case, the matter was simply too vulgar to discuss in Latin (Baldwin 1992: 12-13). Therefore, while code-switching in letters serves several purposes, these are distinctly different from Cicero's purpose in his public literature.

It is difficult to discern the same discrepancy between public and private views in Cicero that we saw in Cato. Cicero's comments are based on a defence of Latin[51] and Roman ideals (like *prudentia*), whereas Cato was making an attack upon Greek culture, presumably to avoid having to make a defence of Latin. Cicero's comments deal with the ability of Latin to express philosophy. It is possible that Cicero's public works do contain posturing; Cicero may well have had doubts about Latin's richness. He may not have actually believed that Latin was superior to Greek, as he indicates. Cicero seems to have undertaken a serious defence of Latin, and in his apology he may have exaggerated his opinion of Latin in order to achieve equality between Greek and Latin. We know from his letters that Cicero wrote in Greek. Yet he does not refer in his letters to Greek as superior to Latin, which *would* be inconsistent. There was an apparent irregularity in Cato between his public posture and his private opinion. We saw that this manner of public

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[50] Juvenal (6.184 – 196) indicates that Greek is bedroom talk. See also Kaimio 1979: 192.
[51]The prominence of language in culture seems fairly obvious, but in regard to the Romans, there is some evidence for this: ambassadors had to speak Latin to the Senate, or at least have a translator; Cato made a point out of speaking Latin in Greece; Cicero, speaking Greek in Syracuse, was chastised for it (Cic. *Verr*. 2.4.147). See also Jocelyn (1976: 357-8) for Latin as a representation of power, but note that Woolf (1994: 120) disagrees, and claims that Rome had a history of incorporation. I would not deny that argument, yet I would point out that other groups were incorporated into Rome and encouraged to speak Latin.

posturing was a common feature in the Roman Republic. Yet in Cicero, the noteworthy aspect is not the posturing but the fact that Cicero was apparently defending Latin against the complaints of Romans.

4. The defence of Latin

In the previous chapters, I discussed the relationship that Romans had with Greek culture. I focused specifically on Cato the Elder and Cicero in an attempt to illustrate that they were involved in a process of elevating Latin culture over Greek culture, albeit in different circumstances. In this chapter, I will discuss various rhetorical devices that Cicero uses to defend his choice of writing in Latin.

The *why* of Cicero's translation should, by now, be clear. It was part of a deliberate attempt to transfer an aspect of Greek culture to Rome. By Cicero's time philosophy may have become accepted at Rome, but it was not being written in Latin. In attempting to transfer philosophy, Cicero has been accused of lacking originality. Yet Cicero was engaged in attempting to adapt the original Greek texts he read for his Roman audience. Therefore, the fact that Cicero's *De Officiis* is based upon Panaetius' περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος may not be a suitable indication of the theories of Panaetius. Cicero himself proclaims that he takes from the different schools of philosophy at his leisure, using what suits his need and committing himself to nothing that he does not fully support (*Fin*. 1.6, *Off*. 1.6, 2.60).

Gisela Striker dismisses attacks upon Cicero's lack of originality by theorizing that since all philosophers wanted to show that their doctrine went back to Socrates, originality was not an issue (Striker 1995: 56). Striker also believes that Cicero felt compelled to whet the appetite of the audience, and having done so, send his students to Greece to learn from the Greek teachers, or at least encourage

them to read the Greek philosophical texts (Striker 1995: 60). This, in theory, is because Cicero could not possibly have known that all the works that he based his own on would be lost (Striker 1995: 58). Yet the process of sending students abroad sounds suspiciously like the description from Cicero's Varro in *Academica*. We saw how Cicero spoke out against this process. Clearly there was a practice of sending students to Greece for higher education; Cicero sent his own son abroad to further his studies. Yet I do not accept that Cicero was satisfied that Roman youth had to be sent abroad for their education, let alone that he would encourage study abroad by writing texts that only introduced students to philosophy rather than offer them meaningful education. On the contrary, there is evidence that Cicero found the Greek texts to be inadequate for a Roman audience.

> (Cicero) *Quid tibi ergo opera nostra opus est? Num eloquentia Platonem superare possumus? Evolve diligenter eius eum librum, qui est de animo, amplius quod desideras nihil erit.* (*Tusc*. 1.24)
>
> Therefore why do you need my service? For are we able to surpass Plato in eloquence? Pursue diligently that book of his, which is about the soul, and you will desire nothing more.

The statement supports the theory of Striker; what could Cicero possibly do that Plato could not? The student's reply, however, hints at something different:

> *Feci mehercule et quidem saepius; sed nescio quo modo, dum lego, adsentior; cum posui librum et mecum ipse de immortalitate animorum coepi cogitare, adsensio illa omnis elabitur.* (*Tusc*. 1.24)
>
> Indeed I have! And often! But somehow while I am reading, I am in assent (with what I am reading); when I put the book aside, though, and I begin to consider the immortality of the soul, all assent slips away.

The implication is that Cicero intends to do what Plato could not. The teaching that

Cicero is about to provide is even better than study abroad (Gildenhard 2007: 244 - 245).

Cicero believed that a well-written Latin work would be independent of the source. In *De Divinatione,* he states that he could do nothing better for the Republic than to make philosophy accessible in Latin (*Div*. 2.4). Thereupon he comments:

> *Magnificum illud etiam Romanisque hominibus gloriosum, ut Graecis de philosophia litteris non egeant; quod adsequar profecto, si instituta perfecero* (*Div*. 2.5)
>
> It would be splendid and glorious for the Roman people not to require Greek literature on philosophy; this I shall surely achieve, if I will have accomplished my intentions.

I have already mentioned the passage in which Cicero claims that Brutus writes so well that the Greek literature on similar topics become unnecessary (*Ac*. 4). He asserts that if the studies associated with the Greeks are transferred to Rome, Romans will no longer need Greek libraries (*Tusc*. 2.6). Cicero clearly believes that the translation, or adaptation, can exist freely from the original (Kaimio 1979: 288).

4.1 The vocabulary of translation

Cicero's goal in translation was to adapt Greek philosophical studies to Rome. As we saw in the previous chapter, Cicero questions why Romans would pass up the opportunity to read philosophy in their native tongue (*Fin*. 1.4-5). The matter is further compelling for Cicero, since these same Romans appear willing to

read Greek plays that have been translated into Latin. The first word that Cicero chooses to describe the process of translating is *exprimere*. This word does not seem to imply anything other than simple translating or copying, and its use designates a word-for-word translation (*verbum e Graecis expressum*).[52] Cicero also uses the term *convertere* while discussing the translation of Greek play into Latin. He believes that even poorly written translations (*mala conversa*) of Greek plays are worth reading (*Fin*. 1.5). Here, the focus is on the quality of the reproduction, rather than the process, but it is still apparent that, as with *exprimere,* Cicero intends nothing more than translating with the term *convertere*.

Cicero's appeal continues. After quoting a line of Ennius' *Medea Exsul,* translated from the *Medea* of Euripides, he asks whether, since Romans are willing to read Ennius, *quae autem de bene beateque vivendo a Platone disputata sunt, haec explicari non placebit Latine* ("would it not be pleasing to have those [works] in which the proper life is rightly and abundantly discussed by Plato set forth in Latin," *Fin*. 1.5-6). He seems to be referring to a possible direct translation of Plato, for he immediately contrasts the above line with the following:

> *Quid si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea quae dicta sunt ab iis quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus.* (*Fin.* 1.6)

[52] The expression "*verbum e Graecis expressum*" is clearly related to the similar *verbum e verbo*. Cicero uses (*Fin*. 3.15, 52; Luc. 17, 21) the phrase *verbum e verbo* to describe a literal translation. At *Fin*. 2.100 and *Tusc*. 3.44 there are variations on this phrase but with the same meaning. See Powell 1995: 277.

> What if we are not engaged in the duty of translators, but we uphold the things that are said by those whom we approve of, and we add our judgement and our arrangement of writing to their works.

The insinuation is that this is what the poets have been doing, and what could be done by a translator of Plato. Instead, Cicero would uphold the authors that he approves of, and he would attach his judgment and arrangement to them. As to adding his arrangement, it is possible that he is stating his intentions to organize works as he sees fit. Next, Cicero argues against those who would say it is pointless to read in Latin what has already been written and, presumably, read. Cicero compares his writings to those of Diogenes. He does not see why his works would be ignored, while people still read Diogenes although Chrysippus said everything on Stoicism.

Cicero wonders if it would not be a service to the state to translate Plato and Aristotle in the fashion of the poets. Here he uses the term *vertere*, denoting a simple turning of the Greek into Latin.[53] Cicero believes that the translation would be a benefit, thus elevating what he intends to do. Lest anyone think that this is indeed what he will do, he clarifies: *Sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen ne faciam interdictum puto* ("I have not done this yet, but I do not think that I am prohibited from doing so," *Fin.* 1.7). In this one passage, he has proposed his method: he will not act as mere *interpres*, but he will select authors and modify them as he sees fit.

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[53] *Quamquam si plane sic veterem Platonem aut Aristotelem ut verterunt nostri poetae fabulas, male, credo, mererer de meis civibus si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem* (*Fin*. 1.7).

There are many instances of his use of *interpres* and *interpretari* in his surviving works. The above example was intended to introduce the connotations that Cicero connected with the term, partly through its relation to words such as *exprimere, convertere* and *vertere*. Before examining instances where *interpres* is an isolated term, it would be beneficial to examine Cicero's contrast of the term with *intellegere,* which should imply a degree of understanding. *Interpres*/*interpretari* and *intellegere* are best contrasted in an area where Cicero needs to qualify his translation because he is choosing a Latin term that most Romans would not immediately associate with the Greek term. When discussing εὐταξία, Cicero stresses that he is not talking about what Romans would call *modestia*, but the Roman concept of *ordinis conservatio*. Cicero writes:

> *Haec autem scientia continentur ea, quam Graeci εὐταξίαν nominant, non hanc, quam interpretamur modestiam, quo in verbo modus inest, sed illa est εὐταξία, in qua intellegitur ordinis conservatio* (*Off*. 1.142).
>
> These are contained in that science which the Greeks call εὐταξία, not that which we translate as *modestia*, a word that includes *modus*, but this is the εὐταξία in which observance of order is understood.

The contrast is immediately apparent: to *interpretari* εὐταξία would be to call it *modestia*. Cicero appears to be stating that in this action, i.e. *interpretari,* the translator does not need to go beyond a literal translation. *Modestia* is simply the first word that would be used by a Roman when discussing εὐταξία. For Cicero, there is need of some alternative definitions of the Greek term, and thus he chooses *ordinis conservatio*. Having to use two words to describe one Greek is rather

inconvenient, but it is a practice that he defends.[54] His use of two different verbs suggests that Cicero does not believe every Roman who knows Greek would list *modestia* and *ordinis conservatio* as definitions of εὐταξία. Of the two verbs, *intellegere* is the one which implies a greater understanding.

Cicero further isolates the practice of an *interpres.* At times, he contrasts the process with *sequi*. Cicero seems to attach a different process to *sequi* than to *interpretari*. In the introduction to *De Officiis*, he relates his method in composing his text on duty. He claims that the teaching of ethics is the peculiar right of the Stoics, the Academics, and the Peripatetics (*Off*. 1.6). He continues:

> *Sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus* (*Off.* 1.6).
>
> Thus at this time and in this line of questioning we shall chiefly follow the Stoics, not as translators, but, as we are accustomed, we shall draw from their sources with our own judgment and choice, in as far as and in the way in which it will seem best.

Cicero explicitly separates *sequi* from *interpretes*. He will not blindly translate Stoic doctrine, but he will follow them. He indicates that as part of this process he will use only those Stoic principles with which he agrees. Later in the work, Cicero mentions the philosopher Panaetius when discussing public edifices, a philosopher

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[54] *Nec tamen exprimi verbum e verbo necesse erit, ut interpretes indiserti solent, cum sit verbum quod idem declaret magis usitatum; equidem soleo etiam, quod uno Graeci, si aliter non possum, idem pluribus verbis exponere* ("And yet it will not be necessary that the term be imitated word for word, as ineloquent translators are accustomed to do, when there may be a word which says the same thing but is used more; and still I, for my part, am in the habit of using many words to describe one Greek word, if I am not able to do otherwise," *Fin*. 3.15).

quem multum in his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus... ("whom I have followed a great deal in these books, not translating ...," *Off.* 2.60). Cicero is not an *interpres*, but a follower. The implication is that Cicero has studied Panaetius, understands his principles, and, while following the general outline of Panaetius' work, is omitting things that he does not agree with and adding his own comments. It supposes a certain understanding and appreciation that is apparently not present in an *interpres*. In both cases he has illustrated his guideline that he will be a follower of certain doctrines but will do more than an *interpres* would. It might be said that one could do both, that is, be one to *sequi* while still being an *interpres*. Cicero seems to acknowledge a connection between the two, but in the former example he seems to be separating them on purpose. That is, he will be following the Stoics, just not as an *interpres*.

It is possible to offer an example to counter this apparent distinction between *sequi* and *interpretari*. In Book 1 of *De Natura Deorum*, Velleius and Cotta are discussing Epicureanism. Velleius is the supporter, Cotta, the Academic, is the opponent. Cotta, discussing the nature of the gods, mentions those who believe that great men are deified after death, *quae ratio maxime tractata ab Euhemero est, quem noster et interpretatus et secutus est praeter ceteros Ennius* ("an idea which was discussed especially by Euhemerus, who was translated and followed above all by Ennius," *ND.* 1.119). It appears that *interpretari* and *sequi* are synonyms for the

same act. Perhaps Cicero intends to distinguish *interpretari* and *sequi* as two distinct acts, yet there is no grammatical evidence in this passage for this intent.

We can further ascertain the meaning *interpretari* by contrasting it with other terms. Cicero compares the terms *fingere* and *interpretari* in the *Tusculan Disputations*. Cicero has been discussing Epicurus' concept of pleasure with the Epicurean Torquatus. He is about to quote Epicurus: *fungar enim iam interpretis munere, ne quis me putet fingere* ("for I will perform the duty of a translator, lest anyone think that I am inventing something," *Tusc.* 3.41). The contrast of *munere interpretis* with *fingere* is notable. He is stating here that he has not adapted, modified, or added something to Epicurus. When one does none of these things, he is engaged in the work of the *interpres*.

There are several instances where the terms *interpres* and *interpretari* appear alone. These instances help to qualify what Cicero means by the term. In Book 3 of *De Finibus*, Cicero has come to the villa of Lucullus. There he finds Cato the Younger, surrounded by Stoic books. The two carry on a conversation about Stoicism, Cato defending, and Cicero on the offensive (*Fin*. 3-4). Before Cato begins to expound Stoic theory, he admits that it will be difficult to discuss this topic since he will need to introduce new terms into Latin (*Fin*. 3.15). Cicero assures him that

he need not worry, since if Zeno invented Greek terms, why can Cato not do the same in Latin?[55] Cicero remarks:

> *nec tamen exprimi verbum e verbo necesse erit, ut interpretes indiserti solent, cum sit verbum quod idem declaret magis usitatum; equidem soleo etiam, quod uno graeci, si aliter non possum, idem pluribus verbis exponere* (*Fin.* 3.15).
>
> It will not be necessary that (the Greek term) be reproduced word for word, as ineloquent translators are accustomed to do, when there is a word which says the same thing while being more in use; indeed, I am accustomed to expressing by many terms, if I am unable to articulate it otherwise, a word that is expressed by one word in Greek.

There are several things in this passage that require discussion, but especially Cicero's use of the description *interpretes indiserti*. He says that these ineloquent *interpretes* are in the habit of *exprimere* word-for-word.[56] *Interpretes* are ones to *exprimere*, and Cicero does not believe this to be necessary when a word exists which means the same thing but has the benefit of being greater in use. The method of using several terms to translate one single term is open to Cicero, and may imply a degree of freedom in the procedure. If Cicero wishes to use this method, he does not need to labour over an exact Latin equivalent and can offer several terms in order to stress the meaning of the Greek equivalent.[57] Yet this freedom relies upon an understanding of the terminology. Presumably, this understanding either does not reside in the *interpretes*, or they do not use it.

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[55] *Si enim Zenoni licuit, cum rem aliquam invenisset inusitatem, inauditum quoque ei rei nomen imponere, cur non liceat Catoni*?(*Fin*. 3.15)

[56] See above for discussion of *exprimere*

[57] Note that this also appears to be a rhetorical device to illustrate the richness of Latin. I discuss such devices in greater detail below.

Further, his description of them as *indiserti* raises the question of whether Cicero believes that there are any *interpretes* that are not *indiserti*. In context, the description cannot be ignored, especially since it is becoming clear that Cicero does not intend to function as an *interpres*.

Discussing the *perturbationes animorum*, Cato points out that this is his translation for the Greek πάθη (*Fin*. 3.35). Yet he says *poteram ego verbum ipsum interpretans morbos appellare, sed non conveniret ad omnia* ("I, translating that word could call it diseases, but it does not suit all purposes," *Fin.*3 .35). He claims that people do not usually call pity or anger a disease, though the Greeks would include them under the title of πάθη.[58] If Cicero's Cato were to *interpretari* the very word πάθη, he would use *morbi*. Yet he realizes that the term *morbus* is not appropriate in all cases. It is a striking statement that reveals much about the act of *interpretari*. Cicero's Cato realizes that most of his audience will be thinking of *morbus* when he says πάθη. Thus, anticipating their questions, he tells them that *morbus* is not always an appropriate translation. When he has shown that this is indeed the case, he once again offers his term for πάθη: *sit igitur perturbatio.* This is a clear example of one of Cicero's rhetorical devices that I discuss further below: he introduces the term; he admits that there may be another that the reader is expecting; he points out how the expected term does not suit his needs; he

[58] *Quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere*? *Fin*. 3.35

reiterates his new term. In the centre of the statement lies *interpretari*, with clear implications of its simplistic nature.

Yet there are times when Cicero seems content to *interpretari*. In Book 2 of *De Natura Deorum*, Balbus is discussing beautiful shapes (*ND.* 2.45-49). He mentions that the Epicureans think the cone most beautiful, but he claims that two forms are better than the others, *ex solidis globus (sic enim* σφαῖραν *interpretari placet), ex planis autem circulus aut orbis, qui* κύκλος *Graece dicitur...* ("the globes [for thus it seems reasonable to translate σφαῖρα] from the solids but from flat objects the circle or orbs, which is called a κύκλος in Greek," *ND*. 2.47). Cicero's Balbus sees no reason to attempt a better definition of σφαῖραν, perhaps because it is not an abstract notion.

In Book 2 of *De Officiis*, Cicero has resumed his defence of his writings (*Off*. 2.1-8). He claims that it is good to be able to write down those things that are worth knowing but are not known to Romans. He argues that there is nothing better for man than to seek wisdom (*sapientia*). Cicero wants to relate, by *interpretari,* the term *sapientia* to *philosophia*¸ which is just a transliteration of the Greek term: *hanc igitur qui expetunt, philosophi nominantur, nec quicquam aliud est philosophia, si interpretari velis, praeter studium sapientiae* ("Those who seek after this, are called philosophers; and philosophy is nothing else but, if you wish to interpret it, the study of wisdom," *Off.* 2.5). *Studium sapientiae* is a literal and simple interpretation of *philosophia*, and a literal translation of the Greek φιλοσοφία.

We should note that Cicero credits Pythagoras with inventing the name "philosopher" (*Tusc.* 5. 7-10). Cicero retells a tale in which Pythagoras visited Phlius and discussed various subjects with the King Leon. Leon became an admirer of Pythagoras and asked him what he called his art. Pythagoras answered "philosophy." Leon was unfamiliar with the term and thus asked for a definition. Pythagoras told him that philosophers are people "who eagerly considered the nature of things and thought nothing of everything else" (*qui ceteris omnibus pro nihilo habitis rerum naturam studiose intuerentur*). Once again Cicero offers *studium sapientia*[59] as the meaning of *philosophia* when he continues: *hos se appellare sapientiae studiosos, id est enim philosophos* ("these men called themselves devotees of wisdom, for that is philosophers"). Cicero believes that Pythagoras increased the content of philosophy, though he does not offer examples. He does state that before Socrates philosophy dealt with numbers and movements, from where things came and to where they went, as well as astrology (*Tusc*. 5. 10). Socrates, however, brought philosophy into people's homes and turned philosophy into questioning life and morality (*Tusc*. 5. 10-11). It seems unlikely that Pythagoras introduced the term

[59] Cicero regularly translates σοφ- by *sapient-*. *Sapientia* is Cicero's translation of σοφία at *Off*. 1.153, and he translates σοφοί as *sapientes* at *Tusc*.5.7. He does not offer any other translation.

philosphia,[60] but we should note that Cicero recognizes that Socrates altered the meaning of "studying wisdom."[61]

There appears to be a different meaning for *interpetari* when it is used in a legal context. In *De Officiis*, Cicero writes *Existunt etiam saepe iniuriae calumnia quadam et nimis callida, sed malitiosa iuris interpretatione* ("Often injustices arise by some false and too-crafty claim and harmful interpretation of the law," *Off.* 1.33). Presumably, the laws do not need to be translated, but interpreted. Cicero seems to intend the word to mean "interpret," as a modern English speaker would when speaking about such a legal situation. Cicero relates a story about Tiberius Gracchus in *De Natura Deorum.* Cicero tells us that during an election of consuls an irregularity occurred that caused the Senate to refer the matter to the *haruspices* (soothsayers). The soothsayers gave an answer that angered Gracchus, whom Cicero quotes as saying: *an vos Tusci ac barbari auspiciorum populi Romani ius tenetis et interpretes esse comitiorum potestis* ("And do you Tuscan barbarians preserve the law of the Roman people, and are you able to be the interpreters of the Comitia?" *ND.* 2.11). Two factors qualify this passage: first, it has a legal sense; and secondly, it may be an actual quotation, and these could be the words of Gracchus, not Cicero. Neither of the above passages is concerned with the act of translating, so

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[60] See Hadot 2002: 15.

[61] In Cicero's translation of φιλοσοφία and his attempt to explain the origins of the term he appears to be taking part in a history of attempts made to describe this concept. Fordiscussion by modern authors, see Burkert 1960; Hadot 2002: 9-54.

perhaps there remains a division. However, it is clear that to *interpretari* denotes here some type of understanding.

Further examples exist. Cicero's Cotta recalls that Aristo of Chios was in the custom of saying: *nocere audientibus philosophos iis qui bene dicta male interpretarintur* ("philosophers harm the listeners who interpret badly things well said," *ND.* 3.77). Again, this does not seem to be an act of translation. Instead, one imagines philosophers talking in an uncommon manner, leaving the audience to interpret their language, which they do poorly. Once again, it may be that this is an actual quotation of Aristo, and not Cicero's own terminology. Further, the statement raises the question whether anyone listening to these philosophers is able to interpret their words well, rather than *male*. However, the sense is clear: Cicero's Cotta, or Aristo, was speaking about the process of interpretation. In the third book of *Tusculan Disputations,* when discussing distress Cicero argues that it is a present evil. He then acknowledges Zeno's contribution to his definition, i.e. *ut illa opinio praesentis mali sit recens* ("that this idea of a present evil is recent"). He explains:

> *hoc autem verbum sic interpretantur, ut non tantum illud recens esse velint, quod paullo ante accideret, sed, quam diu in illo opinato malo vis quaedam insit, ut vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem, tam diu appelletur recens* (*Tusc.* 3.75).
>
> But they interpret this word in such a way, that not only that which just recently happened is "fresh" (*recens*), but it is called "fresh" as long as there is such strength in the imagined evil that it thrives and has some strength.

It is not expressed who the subjects of *interpretantur* are. If the unexpressed "they" are the followers of Zeno, then it is unclear whether Cicero is referring to Latin-

speaking followers or Greek-speaking ones. Thus it is possible that either Cicero heard this definition from other Romans, or he himself has translated it into *recens*. Beyond that initial problem, the rest of the statement is clear. Zeno left it open to interpretation, which his students undertook, and Cicero relays their definition of a *recens* evil. Whether "they" are Latin or Greek, it is apparent that *interpretari* has, at least, a sense of "interpretation."

A similar example occurs in *De Finibus*. In Book 2, Cicero has been enumerating different theories concerning the end of goods. He claims:

> *Stoicis consentire naturae, quod esse volunt e virtute, id est honeste vivere, quod ita interpretantur, vivere cum intellegentia rerum earum quae natura evenirent, eligentem ea quae essent secundum naturam reicientemque contraria* (*Fin.* 2.34).
>
> Among the Stoics (the end) is to be in harmony with nature, which they consider to be done by virtue, that is, to live honourably, which they interpret thus: to live with knowledge of those things which are produced by nature, choosing those things which are in accordance with nature, and rejecting their opposites.

For the Stoics, it is best to be in unison with nature, and to do this with virtue. Cicero interrupts to redefine this as *honeste vivere*. He then concludes with an explanation of how Stoics interpret *consentire naturae*. Once again, it is unclear whether these Stoics need to translate this idea to reach *consentire naturae*, or if Cicero himself has done this. If he is alone in offering this translation, it is curious that he redefines it without qualification. Nevertheless, there is clearly a sense of "to interpret." The Stoics are expanding a small, central statement into a larger value. In *De Natura Deorum*, Cicero creates a conversation on how well the gods

have created mankind. Balbus the Stoic proclaims *sensus autem interpretes ac nuntii rerum in capite tamquam in arce mirifice ad usus necessarios et facti et conlocati sunt* ("the senses, as the interpreters and messengers of things, are positioned in the head and wonderfully formed for their necessary uses," *ND.* 2.140). Here, *interpretes* are related to *nuntii*, more in the sense of messengers and repeaters of "things." Yet, it is entirely possible that Cicero's Balbus is envisioning a greater action, whereby the senses interpret outside stimuli and then relate them to the brain.

These latter examples could be offered as a counter to the thesis that Cicero has a single concept of *interpretari*. As noted above, he does engage in the activity; he says as much himself, and he has already defended the practice.[62] Yet there is an important factor: primarily, in the above "counter" examples, Cicero is not referring to the act of translating. The term *interpretari* can imply understanding when it is an exchange between two speakers of the same language, and this does not interfere with the notion that Cicero regarded it as a simple act of translation. It is also significant that *interpretari* is not contrasted with terms such as *conversare* or *exprimere*, though it is contrasted with *intellegere.* The former group are other terms for translating that need not imply understanding; they involve the process of simple translation, without much consideration given in regard to capturing the essence of the meaning of the terms.

[62] See above, and *Fin*. 1.7

4.2 Cicero's rhetoric

Cicero has other rhetorical devices he uses as part of his attempt to illustrate the ability of Latin speakers. Cicero, in translating a term, may wish to display how simple the task is.

> *Omne pronuntiatum – sic enim mihi in praesentia occurrit ut appellarem ἀξίωμα: utar post alio, si invenero melius* (*Tusc*. 1.14)
>
> Every proposition – for this is the word that at the moment has occurred to me to use for ἀξίωμα: I shall use another term later if I find a better one.

The implication seems to be that Cicero hardly even needed to consider how to translate the term. The translation occurred to him in the moment, while he was speaking.[63] It appears that Cicero is attempting to portray the spontaneity that we may expect in a conversation, although he obviously composed the speech for his written work. It is interesting that Cicero believed that readers would accept this spontaneity when it occurred in areas of translation. I do not detect reservation in this statement[64]; Cicero knew and used other Latin terms to describe the meaning of ἀξίωμα (*quasi ecfatum* [*Luc*. 9] and *enuntiatum* [*Fat*. 1.20]). At any rate, he does not hold himself to the statement *utar post alio, si invenero melius*, since he never thinks of a better translation for ἀξίωμα.[65] We must note that in a written work Cicero had the freedom to edit his translation, if he thought a better term actually existed.

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[63] The term *indifferens* occurs to Cicero's Cato for the translation of ἀδιάφορον, *Fin*. 3.53.
[64] Cf. Glucker 1995: 131. I find, though, that Cicero uses *quasi* to denote hesitation on his part.
[65] He never mentions the Greek term, nor any Latin equivalent, again in the *Tusculan Disputations*.

At other times, Cicero dismisses what may have been an existing translation before offering his own. He usually does this when the common translation does not suit the context. Thus Cicero's Cato rejects *gloria* as a translation of εὐδοξία, and instead uses *bona fama* (*Fin*. 3.57). Cato tells Cicero that Chrysippus and Diogenes used to say that *bona fama* was not worth stretching out a finger for. The difference between the Latin terms is difficult to discern. We cannot assume that *gloria* refers to military or political fame, while *bona fama* is a type of fame gained from some other, less honourable, means. Cato's emphasis in this section is that *honestum* is the only good, so neither *bona fama* nor *gloria* should matter to a Stoic. Since Cicero does not use the term elsewhere in his works, there is little else that we can glean from this remark. Yet it is possible that Cicero is attempting to illustrate how precise Latin can be. The Greeks use one term, εὐδοξία, while in Latin *bona fama*[66] and *gloria* are possible translations.

In Book 3, Cato supplants the term *malitia* with *vitium* as a translation of κακία (*Fin*. 3.39). Cato is attempting to be precise in his discussion of moral defects which result in wicked deeds. In this Stoic context, *malitia* is too general to describe the condition of the non-Sage. Cicero is attempting to detail how greater Latin is in regard to precision by rejecting the more general term *malitia,* which is the equivalent of the Greek term.[67]

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[66] *Bona fama* seems to be a literal translation of εὐδοξία.

[67] This method also appears in Cicero's translation of ἡδονή, πάθη and προηγμένα. I discuss these terms and this method in more detail below.

These are a few of the rhetorical devices that Cicero used to prove his point that Latin is suitable for philosophical studies, and thus justify his own writings. At times, Cicero explicitly states that Latin is a richer language than Greek. Cicero defends his own works by claiming that he is not merely translating the dogmas of his predecessors, but he is in fact adapting them. He may also imply his belief in the Latin language by showing that Latin has several terms to describe one Greek term. Cicero may even appear to be translating casually, as if he did not need to concern himself over particulars. The rhetoric that Cicero used to defend Latin and, ultimately, himself, hints at the structure that we will see in the following examination of the Stoic theory of action.

5. Καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα (*officium*)

It was the goal of every Stoic to perform καθήκοντα ("duties") and, eventually, κατορθώματα ("absolute duties"). Cicero bases one of his works, *de Officiis*, on the Stoic work περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος. In his introduction to the work (1.7), he defines *officium* as having two parts. One pertains to the End of Good: *unum genus est, quod pertinent ad finem bonorum* ("There is one kind, which pertains to the End of Goods"). There is another *quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in omnis partis usus vitae conformari possit* ("which is situated in those teachings by which the custom of life, in all its parts, is able to be moulded"). The difference is not so stable, since Cicero admits that these teachings also *pertinent ad finem bonorum,* but they seem to look more towards the institution of *vita communis.*[68] These *officia* will be his focus.

In *De Officiis* 1.8, Cicero introduces the Greek terms for these two groups. He defines καθῆκον as *commune officium.* He differentiates it from κατόρθωμα, which he translates as *officium perfectum,* and he also calls it *officium rectum*. As further clarification he offers:

[68] Dyck (1996: 75-76) finds the distinction lacking, and he expects κατορθώματα to form a subset of καθήκοντα. Yet he concludes that the distinction is drawn between the theoretical and practical aspects of appropriate action to differentiate this discussion of officium from the discussion in *De Finibus*.

> *Atque ea sic definiunt, ut, rectum quod sit, id officium perfectum esse definiant; medium autem officium id esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis*[69] *redidi possit.*
>
> And they (the Greeks) define these things thus, so that whatever is right they define as *perfectum* duty; but they say that *medium officium* is whatever a justifiable account may be given as to why it is done.

To a reader who is unfamiliar with Stoicism the distinction between καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα is still unclear. Further, why would Cicero stress a life filled with duties for which a defence can be made, rather than ones that are inherently right? Cicero later clarifies the situation:

> *Haec enim officia, de quibus his libris disputamus, media Stoici appellant; ea communia sunt et late patent; quae et ingenii bonitate multi assequuntur et progressione discendi. Illud autem officium, quod rectum idem appellant, perfectum atque absolutum est et, ut idem dicunt, omnes numeros habet nec praeter sapientem cadere in quemquam potest. Cum autem aliquid actum est, in quo media officia compareant, id cumulate videtur esse perfectum, propterea quod volgus, quid absit a perfectio, non fere intellegit; quantenus autem intellegit, nihil putat praetermissum.* (*Off.* 3.14-15)
>
> For these duties, which we are discussing in these books, the Stoics call *media*; they are communal and extend widely; many people follow them by the goodness of their nature and by the progression of their learning. But that duty which the same people call *rectum*, is perfect and absolute and, as they say, has all numbers and cannot be toppled except by the one who has wisdom. But when something is done, in which *media* duties may appear, that act is liberally viewed as perfect, because the commoners do not generally understand how far removed it is from perfection; but as much as they do understand, they think that nothing is missing.

Cicero notes that this happens in art, since the uneducated are unable to note anything wrong in a piece of work. Yet when they are instructed by experts, they abandon their previous opinion. In addition, Cicero claims that the duties that he is

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[69] The Greek equivalent of this is εὔλογος ἀπολογία (see Stob. *SVF*.3.494). I discuss the

talking about are called *quasi secunda quaedam honesta...non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni hominum genere communia* ("a quasi-second-rate goodness...not characteristic of only the wise, but shared by all of mankind"). These duties should appeal to those who have an innate sense of virtue (*in quibus est virtutis indoles*). Finally, those who are called "wise," like Cato or the Seven, are so called because they bear a certain appearance and a likeness to the wise, since they are observant to the *media* duties (*ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientium*). This passage explains several items: only the Sage can perform κατορθώματα, thus clarifying the difference between these duties and καθήκοντα; a καθῆκον can be mistaken for a κατόρθωμα; both the Sage and the non-Sage perform καθήκοντα[70]; καθήκοντα appeal to one's nature; being observant to καθήκοντα may lead others to assume that you are a Sage.

The definition of κατόρθωμα is incomplete, however. In *Off.* 1.8, Cicero only states that what is *rectum* is *perfectum*. At 3.14-15, we come closer to a Stoic definition. Here Cicero informs us that κατορθώματα can only be performed by the Sage. This provides some clarification, but only in the sense of further defining καθῆκον, which is Cicero's only goal in *de Officiis*. For a proper definition of κατόρθωμα, we need to turn our attention to *de Finibus*.

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meaning of this phrase in section 5.4 below.

[70] The validity of this statement depends on a few factors. If Cicero means that judging by appearance the Sage and the non Sage perform καθήκοντα, then he is correct. Everything that the Sage does is a κατορθώματα. Of course, he could mean to say that both the Sage

At *De Finibus* 3.24, 3.45 and 4.15, κατόρθωμα is presented and translated as *rectum officium*. A satisfactory explanation of κατόρθωμα is not presented until 3.58-9. Here Cato reveals that the Stoics consider an appropriate act to be neither good nor evil (*id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis*). He states that if a reasonable account can be provided for the action, and thus is reasonably performed, it is an appropriate action (*est autem officium quod ita factum est ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit*). Cato notes that there is something called "right action" (*recte factum)*; he defines it as a "perfect appropriate action" (*perfectum officium*). There is also the *inchoatum officium* (imperfect appropriate action). At a critical point, Cicero's Cato provides this example:

> *Ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito iuste, fit recte factum* (*Fin*. 3.59)
>
> So that, if the just return of a deposit exists in the sphere of right action, the return of a deposit then must be placed among appropriate action; for when "just" is added to it, it makes the deed "right."

The point is made by the adverb *iuste*: an appropriate act (καθῆκον) done *iuste* is a κατόρθωμα.[71] Still, the example provided omits some information about a *rectum officium*. We know from the above passage and the discussion in *de Officiis* that it is an act that is done "justly," it can only be performed by the Sage, and it must have a resemblance to καθῆκον, since one can be mistaken for another. Thus we know

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and the non-Sage perform acts of the group that we call καθῆκον, to which κατόρθωμα belongs.

who does it (only the Sage), we know how he does it (justly), we have an idea of what he is doing (something that has the same outer appearance as a καθῆκον), but what makes it *iuste*, and why only the Sage can perform it, we are unsure.

Cicero's Cato discusses *officium* in a conversation with Cicero himself (*Fin.* 3.20-1). He lists the order of appropriate actions as follows: *Primum est officium (id enim appello καθῆκον) ut se conservet in naturae statu ...* ("the first *officium* [for this is what I call καθῆκον] is to preserve yourself in your natural state..."). Next is to select those things that follow nature while driving out those contrary to nature. When this process of selection and rejection has been discovered there follows *cum officio selectio*. The *selectio* then becomes *perpetua* (regular). Finally, the *selectio* is constant (*constans*) and agreeable with nature (*consentaneaque naturae*), at which point "good" first comes into being and is able to be understood. Humans progress from childhood where, by instinct, they are drawn towards things in accordance with nature to adulthood, where they choose those things which are in accordance with nature. The selection (the choosing of appropriate acts) is an *officium*.[72]

However, Cicero's Cato seems to be omitting something. In his ordering of appropriate actions, he begins with the non-Sage and ends with the Sage. The point of becoming a Sage occurs at the final step, where the selection of appropriate acts is constant. In fact, this process of selection is so constant that the Sage will do

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[71] This refers to "how" (*quomodo*) an act is done, but also the "why." Seneca discusses the "how." (Sen. *Ep*. 94.23; 95.40,41). He also recognizes that this "how" has much to do with "why" (*Ep*. 95.39, 43). Sextus (*SVF*. 3.516) and Philo (*SVF*. 3.513) speak in terms of "why."

nothing *but* appropriate acts.[73] It is important to note that the Sage constantly performs κατορθώματα, which have the external appearance of καθήκοντα. According to Cicero, this is why Cato was called wise, although he was not really. His adherence to καθῆκον had the external appearance of the Sage's practices. Yet Cato was not wise because he did not, so we must assume, perform acts *iuste*. Further, using the passages of *de Officiis* as a guide, we expect Cicero's Cato to label this final group of καθήκοντα as κατορθώματα; or, if we know something of Stoicism, as members of Cicero's audience surely did, we may expect the modifier τέλειον ("complete") to describe καθῆκον. Cicero's Cato has passed from the vicious to the virtuous agent without noting a change in terminology used to describe the acts. Given Cicero's apparent reluctance to use the modifier τέλειον, his omission of κατόρθωμα may well be an attempt to simplify his argument, and for the moment he may have no interest in drawing out differences between καθήκοντα and κατορθώματα. Of course, since καθῆκον is the title for all duties, he does not need to mention κατόρθωμα if he is not discussing specifics. In this passage, Cicero's Cato is primarily concerned with adherence to nature, which does not require a discussion about the doings of the Sage. We can now see that the Sage is apparently doing many of the same acts as the non-Sage, in so far as the non-Sage is performing acts that are in accordance with his nature. The only difference

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[72] Rackham 1914: 238 n. a.

[73] The Sage acts by making selections, a process that is notably different from making decisions on the basis of emotions.

is an internal dissimilarity (the presence of wisdom), which results in the Sage doing these acts all the time, while the non-Sage may possibly commit acts that are vicious.[74] This consistency provides evidence as to why only the Sage can perform κατορθώματα. Since both καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα are essentially the same act, with the same result and outward appearance, Cicero does not need to recommend two separate modes of life, that is, one for the Sage and another for the non-Sage.[75] Of course, Cicero is not writing for the Sage; the Sage already has perfect knowledge, and thus needs no advice, especially from a non-Sage such as Cicero.

5.1. Problems in the translation

In the first passage noted above (*Off.* 1.7), Cicero resists providing the Greek term when he writes that *officium* has two parts. If he had provided the Greek, it would surely have been καθῆκον. It seems that he cannot write this, at this point, because when he splits the concept into two parts, he defines one simply as καθῆκον, the other as κατόρθωμα. In this case Cicero is attempting to simplify the matter by withholding the Greek equivalents until each term corresponds to only

[74] There is a point in this scale where an agent is doing all the same acts of the Sage, though he is still a vicious agent, and everything that he does is still an error. The only difference is internal, where the Sage's assent is firm (because of his wisdom/knowledge) and there still remains the possibility that the non-Sage may err. Such an agent was recognized by Chrysippus as the Progressor (ὁ προκόπτων, Stob. *SVF*. 3.510), who seems to be as rare as the Sage. See Brennan 2005: 176-180.

[75] As Inwood (1999: 99-100) points out, there is only one Stoic morality, and it applies to the Sage and the non-Sage.

one subset. Otherwise, he has to say that there are two types of καθῆκον (the title): one is καθῆκον (the subset), the other is κατόρθωμα (the other subset). The reason for this complication is that Cicero appears unwilling to use Greek adjectives in his discussions. Otherwise, he could well have said that there are two types of καθῆκον: one is μέσον καθῆκον, the other is κατόρθωμα or τέλειον καθῆκον. The most recent editor of *de Officiis* (Winterbottom 1994), however, is doubtful about the text of 1.8; here is what he prints:

> *Perfectum officium rectum, opinor, vocemus, quoniam Graeci catorthoma, hoc autem commune officium <meson> vocant. Atque ea sic definiunt, ut, rectum quod sit, id officium perfectum esse definiant; medium autem officium id esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit.*[76]

He does not explain the supplement of *meson* in his edition of *De Officiis* (1994), nor in an article (1993) in which he discusses the manuscripts of this work. We can understand why Winterbottom adds *meson* to the text: it makes the passage much more precise and creates a more accurate account of Stoicism. Yet I am not convinced that Cicero believed that this matter required so high a degree of precision. His primary purpose in this passage is to note that there are two subsets of duty (*officium*). One is *perfectum,* which the Greeks call κατόρθωμα, and the other is *medium*, which the Greeks call καθῆκον. Cicero, I believe, is free to refer to *medium officium* as καθῆκον, without the adjective, because he has not told us that the title for all duty is καθῆκον.

[76] Note that Winterbottom does not use Greek characters in his edition.

I am also uncertain whether the addition of *meson* actually does clarify the text. If Cicero had referred to the *perfectum officium* as τέλειον καθῆκον rather than κατόρθωμα, then I admit that the addition of *meson* would be necessary. But he does not. Without the prescence of τέλειον καθῆκον, the addition of *meson* may cause the reader to wonder what καθῆκον (without any modifiers) means, since this is the only time in *De Officiis* that Cicero uses the Greek terms.

Dyck (1996: 78-79) accepts the supplement, noting that without it the reader cannot know that *commune* and *medium officium* are the same. He points out that *commune* may refer to the idea that both the Sage and the layman performed these acts, and thus they have them "in common."[77] Yet we may also understand *commune* to mean "ordinary," in that they are not the "special" acts of the Sage, and can be done by ordinary people. The term was used with this meaning in Rome (Hor. *S.* 1.3.66; Sen. *Ben*. 1.12.3; Var. *L.* 5.6), and Cicero uses it with this meaning in *Tusc*. 3.11. He is noting the difference between *insania* ("insanity," but as Cicero notes, this is associated with "folly" and thus has a wider meaning) and *furor* ("madness"). According to the Twelve Tables, those who are "mad" are not permitted to remain in control of their property. Cicero then remarks on the importance of the distinction between *insania* and *furor*:

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[77] In *Fin*. 3.59 Cicero writes: *ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis; ex quo efficitur versari in iis, quae media dicamus* ("thus there is a certain common duty for the wise and unwise; from which it is proved that (duty) resides in those things that we call middle"). Yet from other passages, we know that Cicero is aware that it only appears that the Sage and the non-Sage are performing the same act.

> *Stultitiam enim censuerunt constantia, id est, sanitate, vacantem posse tamen tueri mediocritatem officiorum et vitae commune cultum atque usitatum; furorem autem esse rati sunt mentis ad omnia caecitatem.*
>
> For they (the creators of the Twelve Tables) thought that folly, though lacking steadfastness (i.e. sanity), would still allow someone to uphold the medium duties and the normal and customary conduct of life; but they thought fury to be blindness of the mind towards everything.

I suspect that *commune* is, in this passage, referring to the "everyday" parts of life, for even those who are inflicted with "folly" can perform this type of *cultum*. Further, Cicero relates this *commune cultum* to *mediocritas officiorum*. It appears that words with the *med-* root could be used synonymously with *commune*. Thus I do not believe that it is difficult to realize that *commune officium* and *medium officium* are the same thing in the passage from *De Officiis*.

Further, if we admit that the connection between *commune* and *medium officium is* not apparent, by this standard (i.e. by the terms alone) it is not obvious that *medium* refers to something different from *perfectum*. In order to differentiate the duties by name, Cicero should refer to the middle duties as *incohatum*. He does, in fact, make this explicit contrast between perfect and imperfect duties at *Fin*. 4.15:

> *Alterum significari idem ut si diceretur officia media omnia aut pleraque servantem vivere. Hoc sic expositum dissimile est superiori; illud enim rectum est – quod* κατόρθωμα *dicebas – contingitque sapienti soli, hoc autem inchoati cuiusdam offici est, non perfecti, quod cadere in non nullos insipientes potest.*
>
> The second (interpretation) is that it signifies the same as if to say (that the End is) to live in service of all, or most, of the middle duties. This interpretation is different from the previous one in the following way; for that is right (duty) – what you call κατόρθωμα – and it is connected only with the wise, but this (interpretation of the End) is of a certain imperfect duty, not perfect, which can fall upon quite a few of the foolish.

Thus if we are to complain that it is not apparent that *commune* and *medium* are the same thing, we must note that it is not immediately evident that *medium* and *perfectum* refer to different things. I myself believe that Cicero differentiates the two types of duties more by his sentence structure than by the adjectives that he applies to the terms. He transitions from perfect duty to imperfect duty with the adversative *autem* twice in *Off*. 1.8. Both times he positions perfect duty at the beginning of the sentence, and then shifts to imperfect duty after *autem*. I suspect that the similar construction in both sentences (*perfectum officium ...* καθῆκον *vocant* and *atque ea sic definiunt ... ratio probabilis redii possit)* is used to formulate two categories. Since Cicero creates this division between the two categories, he is able to list adjectives in either category without explicitly noting that the adjectives of a certain grouping belong together.

I cannot dismiss Winterbottom's supplement with certainty. It alleviates some of the problems that exist with the text. Yet the benefit of adding *meson* seems to be for those who are already familiar with the Stoic concepts and do not require Cicero's instruction. I am not convinced that Cicero was aiming *De Officiis* at this audience, and thus I have reservations in accepting Winterbottom. For this paper, it is clear that if we accept *meson* there is little else to say regarding this passage. If Cicero wrote *meson* then the passage accurately reflects Stoic terminology. Yet we should also consider the impact of Cicero omitting this adjective.

While Cicero may not signify the different types of duties with Greek terms, he does so in Latin, using *medium, commune, inchoatum, perfectum, rectum* and *absolutum*. We must note that the Greek terminology makes any translation complicated. καθῆκον is the overall title for all appropriate acts, yet both μέσον καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα fall under this heading. Cicero inherits a situation where a subset of the group (μέσον καθῆκον) has the same name as the title (καθῆκον); and there is another uniquely named subset (κατόρθωμα). In an attempt to clarify the situation, Cicero uses only one word to describe all acts (*officium*); he then uses Latin qualifiers to illustrate the various meanings of the word.

Perhaps Cicero considers the use of the Greek modifiers to be a complicating factor. It would be for a Latin audience that lacks a fairly comprehensive knowledge of Stoic terminology. Yet the omission may in fact be a complicating factor to an audience that boasts bilingual members such as Atticus. As the passage stands, Atticus may have to question what exactly Cicero is speaking about. In fact, there is evidence that Atticus doubted Cicero's title for this work. In a letter to Atticus, Cicero comments on an apparent complaint of Atticus: *Quid de inscriptione quaeris, non dubito, quin* καθῆκον *officium sit, nisi quid tu aliud* ("And about your questioning concerning the title, I have no doubt that *officium* means καθῆκον, unless you have some other term," *Att.* 16.11.4.11). In another letter:

> *Sed, ut aliud ex alio, mihi non est dubium quin quod Graeci* καθῆκον, *nos officium. Id autem quid dubitas quin etiam in rem publicam praeclare caderet. Nonne dicamus consulum officium, senatoris officium, imperatoris officium? Praeclare convenit; aut da melius.* (*Att. 16.14.3.1.)*
>
> But, as one thing to another, I have no doubt that what the Greeks call καθῆκον we call *officium.* But why do you doubt whether the word also fits in well in matters of the republic? Should we not speak of the duty of consuls, the Senate, and of generals? It fits well; (stop bothering me about it) or give me a better term.

Evidently, Atticus could provide no better term. Yet this letter reveals that there were some doubts about Cicero's terminology. This could have resulted from Cicero's reluctance to supply the Greek modifier.

5.2. The clarity of Cicero's translation

To understand Cicero's definitions a reader needs to have a background understanding of Stoicism and its vocabulary. Cicero's definition of καθῆκον spans at least two separate works. The relationship that Cicero draws between καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα at the introduction of *De Officiis* is not at all satisfactory. His practice of delaying the introduction of the Greek equivalent or omitting it entirely prevents a thorough understanding. When reading *De Finibus* 3.20, the audience would comprehend that the best acts fall under the category of καθῆκον. They would not know that these acts can only be done by the Sage. At 3.59 the audience learns that these are acts that are done justly. They now form an idea of an agent who performs only these acts, which are done justly, or, perhaps better, "morally."

At 4.15, while recounting Cato's speech, Cicero notes that the κατορθώματα are connected only with the Sage (*contingitque sapienti soli*). The agent of κατόρθωμα is the Sage; he does only this type of act, and he does it morally. Yet an uniformed reader would have little verbal evidence to connect these passages together. At 3.20, the only Greek term used is καθῆκον. Cicero's Cato does not even modify *officium*. In 3.59, he mentions *rectum, perfectum* and *inchoatum officium*, but not the Greek equivalents. Cicero mentions κατόρθωμα in the final passage, as well as *rectum officium*, but he does not speak of καθῆκον. At best, an uninformed reader may be able to group 3.59 with 4.15 through the term *rectum officium*¸ but that would leave out the essential fact that the Sage constantly performs proper duties.

The complication continues if the translation is examined across both works, but the above illustration suffices to demonstrate the problem. The question then becomes why Cicero would wish to do this. At times, he appears to have his own goals in mind only, and does not force himself to explain the Stoic concepts at each turn. He does not believe it to be critical to know at each point the proper definitions of καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα. Cicero is engaged in a process of simplifying a rather complex matter, as we can see when he chooses only one term, *officium*, to translate both καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα. Thus, he can omit a proper definition of κατόρθωμα in *De Officiis* when he is only concerned with prescribing proper daily-living. There is no reason for him to engage in a discussion concerning the theories of the Sage's actions.

5.3 The classification of acts

The terms καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα are inherently difficult to grasp and translate. These terms are labels for actions, the term κατορθώματα describing acts that ordinary men cannot even do. It may be for this reason that Cicero attempts to simplify the matter, leaving out Greek terms at certain points. Yet in his simplification he blurs the concepts and cannot provide a perfect definition of the terms. In contrast, when discussing ἡδονή (as we shall see), Cicero is able to sum up the concept in a few sentences, and subsequently discusses how Epicurus defined it. Such treatment does not, and perhaps cannot, exist for these terms.

In Stoicism, we may imagine a level of completed acts: at the bottom stands παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον ("things contrary to proper action"), at the top κατόρθωμα (or τέλειον καθῆκον). In the middle is μέσον καθῆκον.[78] It is important to note that acts fall under these titles on the basis of two criteria: (1) whether or not they are appropriate, and (2) whether they are done morally. Κατορθώματα are moral and appropriate; μέσα καθήκοντα are immoral and appropriate; παρὰ τὰ καθήκοντα are immoral and inappropriate. All things that are καθήκοντα, therefore, are appropriate, but only κατορθώματα (τέλεια καθήκοντα) are moral. We have seen how only the Sage can act "morally." The morality refers to the consistency of the agent. The Sage consistently performs *officia* because he *knows* that that is the proper thing to do. The Sage performs the act from wisdom, and thus for the

proper reasons, which results in the certification of the act as *iuste*.[79] The non-Sage does not know that what he is doing is right; he may only believe it, as Brennan states: "He (the Sage) has knowledge, the non-Sage has belief" (Brennan 2005: 177). This belief results in a weaker assent, making it possible for the non-Sage to perform acts that are inappropriate. This is simply impossible for the Sage, whose assent is strong and stable. The Sage must have wisdom in order to perform κατορθώματα. In other words, the Sage must be a Sage.

Cicero does not describe this division of acts precisely. In *Academica* 1.36, he tells us that, according to Zeno, among the things that are neither good nor bad (virtue or vice) are things that are in accordance with nature, some that are contrary to nature and even some that are neither. He proceeds to say that Zeno classed appropriate action (*officium*) and inappropriate action (*contra officium*) between right action (*recte factum*) and misdeeds (*peccata*). It appears that Cicero is confusing the fact that anything that is contrary to nature must be a vice, since it is already immoral (Rist 1969: 97-99). A defence of Cicero's statement has been made by Kerferd, but the result is a division of acts into nine types (Kerferd 1972: 69). While I cannot argue against this division, I would submit a different possibility. If we recognize a difference between Stoic theory and practice, then this passage becomes clear. In theory, there are acts that are likely to turn out to be appropriate,

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[78] But see the defence made for Cicero in Kerferd 1972: 60-74.

acts that are likely to be inappropriate, and acts that are so insignificant that their outcome is impossible to foretell (Rist 1969: 101; Long and Sedley 1987: 367). In practice, though, there are the three types of acts that I listed above. If we try to combine these two different scenarios (theory and practice), then we are forced to accept rather complex divisions. I believe that the difference between theory and practice arose out of teaching. We may imagine a scenario in which a Stoic was attempting to teach a student that there are three types of acts (κατόρθωμα [τέλειον καθῆκον], μέσον καθῆκον, and παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον) that are grouped on the basis of two factors, appropriateness and morality. If acts are grouped only by appropriateness or morality, then there are two types of acts. The problem with this type of teaching is that it does not answer to what appropriateness really refers. It is easy to explain how an act is "moral"; it is any act that is performed "justly," and besides that, only the Sage can perform it, and becoming a Sage relies upon doing καθήκοντα until eventually the agents understands the reason why these acts should be done.[80] Therefore, advice for becoming a Sage is, in fact, the same as advice for everyday living: perform καθήκοντα. Yet this type of teaching does not illustrate appropriateness, which is the only important issue in instruction of Stoic ethics. Therefore Stoic teaching was forced to classify certain acts into likely appropriate, likely inappropriate, and absolute intermediate. The only time that

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[79] The acts of the Sage are often described with adverbs to illustrate the difference between them and the imperfect, though proper, acts of the non-Sage. Stobaeus (2.96 [*SVF*. 3.501]) lists adverbs such as "prudently," "moderately" and "kindly" in addition to "justly."
[80] See *Fin*. 3.20-1.

acts can be discussed this way is in theory, for when an act is done it is either appropriate or inappropriate.

In another criticized passage, Cicero's Cato states that Stoics consider the execution of an *officium* to be suitable, yet it is neither a good nor an evil (*consentaneum tamen est fungi officio cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis*, *Fin.* 3.58). The apparent error is that Cicero indicates that *officium* is not the title for acts of the Sage. John Rist interprets this as Cicero misunderstanding τὰ οὐδέτερα to mean that an act, once completed, may be neither good nor bad, rather than either good or bad (Rist 1969: 99-102). The Sage, of course, does perform *officia*,[81] albeit modified by the qualifier *perfecta* (*Fin*. 3.59). If Cicero had qualified *officium* with a term like *medium*¸ the passage would be much clearer. *Medium officium* is a translation of μέσον καθῆκον, which, as we saw, is appropriate but not moral (done with virtue), and thus not "good." *Officium* corresponds to καθῆκον, which is the title for all actions. Thus *officium* may refer to *perfectum officium*, which is appropriate *and* moral (done with virtue). Therefore, Cicero seems to be leaving out a modifier; had he added it, we would understand that there are three levels of acts, and *media officia* are in the middle. Further, we can understand that here as well Cicero may be mixing theory and teaching, which results in morality being discussed alongside appropriateness. This is the same issue that we saw in the

[81] As Cicero explicitly states: *Atque perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem* ("And it is clear that the wise man performs actions that belong to this middle group") *Fin*. 3.59.

Academica passage in the above paragraph. The passage becomes more acceptable if we recognize that Cicero was primarily concerned with teaching. I believe that the division of καθήκοντα into preferred (likely appropriate), rejected (likely inappropriate) and absolute intermediate was a concession made for the purpose of teaching, and does not refer to acts that are completed.

5.4 Futher explanation of "appropriate" acts

The Stoic doctrine is that virtue is the only good. This translates into acting with virtue as being a perfect action (*perfectum officium* or κατόρθωμα). Yet the goal of the Stoic is to do appropriate acts, and this can be anything in any given circumstance.[82] Cicero makes this evident in the qualification of καθῆκον as something to which a reasonable defence can be attached (*quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis redidi posit*, Cic. *Off.* 1.8). The Greek equivalent of *ratio probabilis* is εὔλογος ἀπολογία. This qualifying statement has been rendered as "whatever the Sage would do," in that the Sage's reason is perfect and infallible (Brennan 2005: 170). It may mean that, when done, a reasonable defence can be constructed for the act (Inwood 1999: 102). Or it may refer to the probable effectiveness of the act. The example for this interpretation runs thus (Rist 1969: 107-111): if A believes that

[82] Diogenes Laertius (7.108-9) indicates that it is always wrong to neglect parents. However, in particular circumstances, agents may choose to neglect their parents. Therefore, the only way to express wrong acts, that is, non-καθήκοντα, is to label them as contrary to right reason (Stob. 2.93 [*SVF*. 3.500], 2.96 [*SVF*. 3.501]; Cic. *Off*. 3.18-19).

repaying B will be successful (where B is satisfied with the repayment, and does not seek interest or such) and A does so morally (perhaps by wanting to), this is a κατόρθωμα; when A believes that repaying B will be successful, but does so non-morally, this is a καθῆκον; finally, when A does not believe that repaying B will be successful, and does so non-morally, this is παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. All of these interpretations have reason as the common factor. The role of reason in choosing *what* to do is to decide whether an act is in accordance with nature or not.[83] Thus *officia* (καθήκοντα) are those acts that reason dictates that we should do (DL 7.108). Therefore, if agents can produce a εὔλογος ἀπολογία for their actions, it indicates that they considered their options and decided upon an act that was reasoned to be in accordance with their nature (Sedley 1999: 128-129). When agents perform acts that are in accordance with their nature, as determined by reason, they complete appropriate acts (καθήκοντα)

5.5 Preferred Intermediates

Above I mentioned the class of acts that are preferred intermediates. Cicero, recounting the position of Cato, offers several possibilities for the Greek term that describes the preferred intermediates, προηγμένα (*Fin*. 4.72). He initially proposes *producta,* but he quickly states that he prefers *praeposita* or *praecipua,* because these terms are more tolerable (*tolerabilius*) and more pleasant (*mollius*). Earlier in their

[83] *SVF*. 3.491; DL 7.107; Cic. *Fin*. 3.17.

conversation, Cato appears to gloss over the translation of προηγμένα. He initially offers *producta*, which he calls a word for word translation (*verbum e verbo, Fin.* 3.52). He also proposes *promota, remota, praeposita* and *praecipua*. Cato then seems to diminish the process of translation by stating that if the concept is understood, translators should be easy-going in their use of words.[84] I would point out that this is not an instance of Cicero being uncertain as to which term suits best. His initial proposal, *producta*, is rejected on the grounds of it being a *verbum e verbo* translation. The term *producta* reappears in Book 5, but at that point Cicero is berating Cato for the Stoic terminology and does not seem concerned with defining terms (*Fin.* 5.90). Yet Seneca uses the term as a translation of προηγμένα (*Ep.* 74.17), as does Aulus Gellius (12.5.7).[85] This is the only point in the works of Cicero selected for this study in which Cicero uses the term *promota,* as well as the only time that *remota* is used with this sense. Cicero reiterates his preference for *praecipua,* paired with *praeposita,* at 3.53, 4.72 (as mentioned) and *Tusc*. 5.47. Cicero appears to favour, overall, the term *praeposita*, which is used 20 times in *de Finibus,* far more than any of the other possible translations. Further, after *Fin*.3.52, Cicero's Cato begins to use *praeposita* as the exclusive translation for προηγμένα.[86]

It may be tempting to theorize that these "preferred" acts are the basis of καθήκοντα; that is, the completion of a preferred act is a καθῆκον (Sedley 1999:

[84] *Re enim intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus*.
[85] He does not, however, use the neuter of the noun.
[86] *Fin*. 3.53, 54, 55, 57, 69.

129). However, it is at times an appropriate act (καθῆκον) to do something that is usually ἀποπροηγμένα (demoted intermediates), like suicide.[87] Thus, προηγμένα exist as general rules and guidelines, rather than being concrete examples of καθήκοντα.[88] These rules could only have been very general (Inwood 1999: 102). Being healthy would be a preferred indifferent, since health is usually preferable to illness. Therefore an agent should usually choose to act so as to promote their health; however, being healthy, in the present sense, is an indifferent state.[89] By knowing what acts are generally, or "by definition" (Rist 1969: 100), either preferred or rejected, an agent would, in theory, be better equipped to make decisions in concrete situations.[90]

It is worth noting that the validity of providing such guidelines was questioned, as Seneca indicates (Sen. *Ep.* 94.1, 95.1-4).[91] Seneca refers to these guidelines as *praecepta*. He stresses that these precepts are not universal (94.1) and indicates to his addressee that there was a debate in the Stoic community as to whether teaching *praecepta* was useful or not. Aristo dismissed such teaching, deeming that *decreta* (dogma) were far more important (94.2). If a man knows

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[87] Cic. *Fin*. 3.60, DL. 7.130.
[88] Kidd (1978: 252) notes that these types of rules are "hypothetical imperatives implying maynot must."
[89] Diogenes Laertius (7.108-9 [*SVF*. 3.495, 496]) considers health to be a proper function regardless of circumstances (whether it is proper at that time, the agent's disposition, etc). This cannot adhere to Stoicism, however, since it is at times a proper function to die. See Inwood 1999: 103 n. 28.
[90] Inwood 1999: 109,111; Kidd 1978: 252.
[91] Seneca introduces both letters by indicating that there was a debate concerning the worth of this type of teaching. Seneca dedicates each letter to resolving this debate.

decreta, he can form *praecepta* for any given situation on his own (94.3).[92] Further, teaching these guidelines to a student is similar to teaching a sick man what he ought to do if he were well, rather than making him well (94.5). Seneca, however, does not dismiss *praecepta*. He admits that they are not enough to educate a student alone (94.21), but he denies that this fact renders them useless. They may not be able to "cure" the non-Sage, but, once the student is cured, *praecepta* play an important role in education. In fact, Seneca believes that these principles administer *officia* (94.33).

Although Seneca admits that *praecepta* play an important role, he maintains that they are not sufficient on their own. Precepts may be a part of the "cure" (94.36) to madness, yet the soul of the patient must be receptive (95.4). Even if a student knows the precepts, they may not always do the right thing, for everything except virtue changes its name and becomes now good and now bad (95.35). Agents who only know precepts cannot continue to act as they should, because they do not know why they are acting that way (95.39). Seneca, then, considers the *praecepta* to play a role in the curing process; the teaching of the precepts would come once the soul was receptive. Given only these precepts, the student knows what to do, but not how to do the acts.

[92] Seneca provides the example of agents training in the ability to hit a target. Once they gain this skill, they can hit any target.

6. ὁρμή

The term *appetitio* has the meaning of two English terms. It contains a general, abstract sense, and is thus represented by the English "appetite." An example of this use is "Nature has given us an appetite to do things that are in accordance with nature." Thus "appetite" refers to the *tendency* that we have to complete certain actions. However, the Greek ὁρμή, which can be translated into Latin by *appetitio*, is often rendered by the English "impulse." By impulse we understand a force that immediately terminates in an action, a force over which, once produced, we have no control. Yet we should reserve "impulse" to translate *impetus*, which Cicero says is the appetite of an animal that is only seeking pleasure (*Off*. 1.105). Thus I shall translate *appetitio* below as "appetite," so as not to confuse it with the impulse of an animal.

As seen in the previous chapter, Cicero's *De Officiis* is a discussion about daily-living. It is based upon, in part, the work περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος by the Stoic Panaetius. Within it, Cicero describes the activity of the soul:

> *Duplex est enim vis animorum atque natura; una pars in appetitu posita est, quae est ὁρμή Graece, quae hominem huc et illuc rapit, altera in ratione, quae docet et explanat, quid faceindum fugiendumque sit. Ita fit, ut ratio praesit, appetites obtemperet.* (*Off*. 1.101)[93]
>
> The nature and strength of the soul is twofold: one part is positioned in the appetite, which is called ὁρμή in Greek, and which drags men this way and

[93] Cicero later states that whenever we enter upon any action there are three principles to observe. The first is that appetite should obey reason (*appetitus rationi pareat, Off*. 1.141) . He expresses a similar sentiment at *Off*. 1.103.

> that, and the other is situated in reason, which teaches and explains what should be done and what should be avoided. Thus it is that reason should be in charge, and the appetites should obey.

Cicero, agreeing with Plato,[94] discusses a non-unified soul. One part is rational, another irrational which responds to appetites. Cicero is advising against following the whims of the appetites, and he uses some strong language to describe the effects of appetites. He claims that they drag (*rapere*) men this way and that. To use the term *rapere* seems to be an indicator of the vicious and violent quality of appetites; it even implies unwillingness on the part of the *homo*. Cicero recommends that the rational side of the soul rule over the irrational and the appetites. Cicero proposes a similar theory at *De Officiis* 1.132. There he tells us that the movements of the soul (*motus animorum*) are of two kinds: one side is the area of thoughts (*cogitiones*), and the other is of *appetitiones*. Thoughts seek the truth, appetites compel (us) to action (*appetitus impellit ad agendum*). Thus, Cicero says, we should use our thoughts for the greatest matters, and ensure that we keep our appetites under the control of reason (*appetitum rationi oboedientem praebeamus*). Once again, Cicero illustrates that the soul is divided and that we should control our appetites by means of our reason.

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[94] Pl. *Phdr*. 271a, 246b, *R*. 439B, 439C. Cicero explicitly states at *Tusc*. 4.10 that he follows the division.

Conversely, though, Cicero illustrates the result of the appetites ruling the soul:

> *Nam qui appetitus longius evagantur et tamquam exsultantes sive cupiendo sive fugiendo non satis a ratione retinentur, ii sine dubio finem et modum transeunt; relinquunt enim et abiciunt oboedientiam nec rationi parent, cui sunt subiecti lege naturae; a quibus non modo animi perturbantur, sed etiam corpora. Licet ora ipse cernere iratorum aut eorum, qui aut libidine aliqua aut metu commoti sunt aut voluptate nimia gestiunt; quorum omnium voltus, voces, motus statusque mutantur.* (*Off.* 1.102)
>
> For when the appetites wander afar just as if they were rejoicing either in desire or fear[95] and they are not restrained enough by reason, they without doubt cross beyond boundary and measure; for they leave behind and reject obedience and they do not yield to reason, to which they are subject by the law of nature; by these (appetites) not only are minds disturbed, but also bodies. For it is possible to discern the very faces of those who are angry or those disturbed by lust or desire or those exulting with too much pleasure; the face, voice, movement and being of all those people are changed.

Cicero imagines a breakdown of the individual which may have implications to the wider society as well. He states that these appetites refer to both the *animus* and the *corpus*; they, in fact, are capable of disturbing (*perturbare*) both.

Cicero continues the theme of reason ruling the appetites. He also tells us three properties of virtue. One is wisdom; another is justice, and the third:

> *Alterum cohibere motus animi turbatos, quos Graeci* πάθη *nominant, appetitionesque, quas illi* ὁρμάς, *oboedientes efficere rationi* (*Off*. 2.18.6)
>
> The other (property) is to restrain the agitated movements of a mind, which the Greeks call πάθη, and to make the appetites, which they call ὁρμαί, obedient to reason.

[95] Two of the four Stoic πάθη.

This division of virtue is different from what Cicero says at 1.100. There he includes *et id, quod vehemens atque forte*. Still, Cicero is imposing a life that denies irrationals such as emotions, and restrains the appetites. This is not to say, however, that Cicero would eradicate these irrationals, as may be expected in a Stoic system.[96] I will discuss this apparent conflict in greater detail below, but for the present we must attempt to discern Cicero's concept of the nature and use of these appetites. Cicero's Cato presents this view:

> *Atque ut membra nobis ita data sunt ut ad quondam rationem vivendi data esse appareant, sic appetitio animi, quae ὁρμή Graece vocatur, non ad quodvis genus vitae sed ad quandam formam vivendi videtur data, itemque et ratio et perfecta ratio. Ut enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus non quivis sed certus quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conveniens consentaneumque dicimus.* (*Fin*. 3.23-24)
>
> And as our limbs are produced in such a way that they are clearly given towards a certain plan of living, thus the appetite of the mind, which the Greeks call ὁρμή, seems to have been given not for (an indefinite) sort of life but for a certain form of living, just as it is for reason and perfected reason. For as a certain type of action, not (indefinite), is given to a performer and a certain movement to a dancer, thus life is to be conducted by a specific method, and not however you like; this method we call "fitting" and "consistent."

Cato tells us that there is a certain way to use the appetites. In Stoicism they have a use, and they do not need to be eradicated. They must then have some worth, but only when they are used in the proper method. To judge from *De Officiis*, the appetites are used properly when they are ruled by reason. This, however, is not a

[96] As I will discuss below, these irrationals cannot exist within the Stoic monistic soul. It is possible, however, that these passages of Cicero indicate a change in the Stoic system. See Dyck 1996: 259.

satisfactory explanation. To say that those appetites which have been judged by reason are being used in the proper method describes only the *type* of appetites, that is, those approved of by reason. The passage does nothing to clarify *what* the appetites are to be used for, nor why reason should approve them. In regard to why reason should approve these appetites, Cicero states:

> *Si sequemur ducem, numquam aberrabimus sequemurque et id, quod acutum et perspicax natura est, et id, quod ad hominum consociationem accomodatum, et id, quod vehemens atque forte. Sed maxima vis decori in hac inest parte, de qua disputamus; neque enim solum corporis, qui ad naturam apti sunt, sed multo etiam magis animi motus probandi, qui item ad naturam accommodati sunt*.(*Off.* 1.100)
>
> If we follow (nature) as our guide, we shall never wander and we shall follow that which is sharp and penetrating by nature, that which is fit for an association of mankind, and that which is vigorous and brave. But the greatest force of decorum lies in this part which we are now discussing; for not only those movements of the body which are suitable to nature, but still more those of the spirit which are accommodated to nature are to be approved of.

Cicero provides some clarification in this passage when he tells us that the movements (appetites) of the soul that are accommodated to nature should be approved. Also in this passage, Cicero has provided a breakdown of decorum into four parts that correspond to wisdom, justice, bravery and temperance. On temperance, Cicero states that it sedates (*sedat*) the appetites and makes them obey *recta ratio*. Temperance also maintains the well considered judgments of the mind (*considerata iudicia mentis*). *Intemperantia,* the opposite of temperance, inflames,

disquiets and enrages the entire status of the mind (*omnem animi statum, Tusc.* 4.22). Thus temperance allows reason to control the appetites.[97]

The above passages serve as an introduction to the relationship between Nature and the appetites. There are several other instances. In Book 4 of *De Finibus*, Cicero is critiquing the Stoic school. He believes that, in essence, the Stoics and the Peripatetics are discussing the same subjects, though he prefers the Peripatetic way of speaking (*Fin.* 4.2). This stems from a theory that the only disagreement between Stoics and Peripatetics is a matter of words (4.2). When Cato urges that Cicero qualify this statement, Cicero states that Plato and his pupils developed a doctrine that left nothing to be desired (4.3). Zeno retained the division of philosophy into three departments that was made by his predecessors (4.4). The Stoics were either unwilling or unable to produce any work on rhetoric (besides those of Cleanthes and Chrysippus, which Cicero discounts as works for those who want to say nothing, 4.7). Zeno could add nothing to the fields of logic (*disserendi ratio*) and the study of nature (*cognitio naturae*, 4.8). Cicero recalls that before Zeno, philosophers had already devised the end as "to live in accordance with nature" (4.14). Further, the "ancients" decided that every being wants to preserve itself in its natural type. Man is both body and soul, and although the mind is greater, the virtues of each are desirable for their own sake (4.16; 25). Why then did the Stoics discard the body (4.26)? Cicero then relates how Nature has created man. Nature added reason to

[97] Note that this really means being temperate. It refers to an agent's disposition.

sensation, and after creating reason she did not discard sensation (4.38).[98] When an organism acquires sensation (at birth), sensation protects the organism. When Reason is added it is given the dominant position, and it has under its control all the other faculties. He continues:

> *Itaque non discedit ab eorum curatione quibus praeposita vitam omnem debet gubernare; ut mirari satis istorum non possim. Naturalem enim appetitionem, quam vocant ὁρμήν, itemque officium, ipsam etiam virtutem volunt esse earum rerum quae secundum naturam sunt. Cum autem ad summum bonum volunt pervenire, transiliunt omnia et duo nobis opera pro uno relinquunt, ut alia sumamus, alia expetamus, potius quam uno fine utrumque concluderent.* (*Fin*. 4.39)
>
> And thus it (reason) does not depart from its duty, and having been placed in this duty, it is obliged to govern all of life; and so it is that I am not able to marvel enough at your (fellow Stoics). For they consider natural appetite, which they call ὁρμή, and also duty, and, in the same way, virtue, to be among those things which are in accordance with nature. But when they wish to reach the supreme good, they pass over all these and they leave to us two tasks instead of one, that we are to select some things, expect others, rather than containing both into one.

The passage indicates the importance and prominence of reason. A striking feature of the passage is the adjective *naturalis* to describe the appetite. Cicero may be indicating that those appetites which are natural, and thus in accordance with nature, are to be approved. However, the division of appetites into those according to nature and their opposites disappoints when he mentions the Greek ὁρμή. Cicero is being unclear in his report of the Stoic concept of ὁρμή: would the Stoics

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[98] In *De Natura Deorum* we are told more concerning the relation of sensation and reason. Nature bestowed upon beasts both sensation and appetite (*sensus* and *appetitus*): appetite so that they would act to seize appropriate food, sensation so as to enable the creatures to distinguish between harmful and beneficial things (Cic. *Nat*. 2.122). This relation would only apply to beasts and the young, when reason has not yet been added.

say that only those appetites which are *naturales* are ὁρμαί? Not so according to the above passages where all the appetites, Greek ὁρμαί, should be stifled and subject to reason.

There are several other occurrences of *naturalis appetitio* that warrant examination. Cicero tells us that the first thing entrusted to us *ex natura* is to have the appetite to conserve ourselves (*Fin*. 4.25).[99] He continues to say that from this point it is necessary to consider what sort we are, so that we may keep ourselves in proper character. We, as human beings, are of a certain kind of body and soul. The *prima appetitio naturalis* demands that we value (*diligere*) our body and soul. Thus the first appetite is given to us by nature. It is, therefore, a *naturalis appetitio*. This appetite is to be accepted, not rejected. It is possible to imagine the scenario where other stimuli entice the appetites; these would presumably be rejected if they are not *naturales*.

As I discussed above, Cicero considers that the only difference between Zeno and his predecessors was verbal. If this thesis is correct, Cicero prefers the terminology of the older philosophers (*Fin*. 4.58). In order to judge his theory, he recommends a review of the older philosophers' sentiments.

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[99] *Off*. 1.11; *Tusc*. 2.58: we are by nature *studiosissimi appetentissimque honestatis*; *Tusc*. 4.13: we naturally desire good (*bona natura appetimus*), and naturally turn away from evil; *Ac*. 2.30: no animal can refrain from seeking to get a thing that is presented to its view as suited to its nature; *Nat*. 1.104: all animate things seek that which is in accordance with its own nature. See *Fin*. 3.17, 5.44; DL 7.85-6 (reporting Chrysippus).

> *Dicunt appetitionem animi moveri cum aliquid ei secundum naturam esse videatur; omniaque quae secundum naturam sint aestimatione aliqua digna, eaque pro eo quantam in quoque sit ponderis esse aestimanda;* (*Fin.* 4.58)
>
> They say that the appetite of the mind is moved when something appears to it to be following nature; and all those things which are in accordance with nature are worthy of some value, and they are to be valued according to how great a weight is in each of them.

This particular passage provides an opportunity to discuss the development of a human. We have noted above that at birth nature gives people the appetite to retain themselves in their natural form. At *De Finibus* 5.24, Cicero's Antiochus develops this theory. There he states that at the outset of the life of a human, the human nature is obscure, and thus a human seeks only to protect itself. Yet as a human grows, it begins to understand why it has the first appetite and it then seeks (*appetere*) those things that it thinks are in accordance with its own nature. Thus the End is to live in accordance with nature.

In concluding his speech against Cato, Cicero finds this to be the greatest fault with the Stoic school:

> *Quid enim est tam repugnas quam eundem dicere quod honestum sit solum id bonum esse, qui dicat appetitionem rerum ad vivendum accommodatarum a natura profectam?* (*Fin.* 4.78)
>
> For what is so incompatible as the same person saying that morality is the only thing that is good, who (also) says that there is an appetite for things, having been sent by nature, that are accommodated towards living.

Nature instils within us the appetite for things that are in accordance with nature. Thus the guide for living is to seek such things. Yet what if they only *appear* to be in accordance with nature? This appears to be the realm of reason, to judge the

appetites on the basis of their relation to nature. We are told what happens if the appetite is not in accordance with nature:

> *Constitui necesse esse initium quod sapientia cum quid agere incipiat sequatur, idque initium esse naturae accomodatum. Nam aliter adpetitio (eam enim volumus esse* ὁρμήν*), qua ad agendum impellimur et id adpetimus quod est visum, moveri non potest … quo modo autem moveri animus ad adpetendum potest si id quod videtur non percipitur accommodatumne naturae sit an alienum?* (*Ac.* 2.24-5)
>
> It is necessary that a beginning be established which wisdom follows when it begins to act, and it is necessary that that beginning be in accordance with nature. For otherwise appetite (for this we take to mean ὁρμή), by which we are driven to action and by which we have an appetite for that which is seen, cannot be set in motion … but how could an *animus* be moved to action if that which is seen is not perceived as to whether it is in accordance with nature or foreign to it?

The passage reiterates some of our concepts concerning ὁρμή: the stimulus' relation with nature drives the agent to action and the Sage fulfills only those actions that are in accordance with nature. Cicero has little to say regarding the judging process, but here *sapientia* is acting in the role that *ratio* occupied earlier.

Thus we have a fairly concise concept of the appetites from Cicero. Some of them are good (the *naturales appetitiones*), some of them are bad.[100] There is a primary appetite, from nature, to conserve ourselves. This particular appetite is always good, and can function without reason since it exists before nature adds reason to man. Eventually this appetite makes us seek things that are in accordance with nature. Once reason is added its function is to judge all the appetites as to

[100] For the "bad" appetites, see the discussion below in section 6.3.

their relation with nature. There are several issues that exist within this scheme when viewed in comparison with those of Cicero's predecessors.

6.1 The judging process

In Cicero's evaluation, it is the job of reason to rule over and restrain the appetites. By this, Cicero means that it is the job of reason to judge which appetites are in accordance with nature. Temperance allows reason to take control.[101] Those appetites that are in accordance with nature should be acted upon, their opposites rejected. At this point, Cicero is at odds with two Greek schools.[102] The appetites cannot be restrained; an appetite, when aroused, immediately results in an action.[103] Thus you cannot "feel" an appetite, and then decide whether to act upon it or not.[104] Appetites are the products of the reasoning process in Stoicism.[105] Reason does not exist to judge appetites, but impressions.[106] A "bad" appetite is the result

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[101] Though, at a different point, Cicero tells us that *frugalitas* seems to *regere* and *sedare* the movements of an *animus appetens* (*Tusc*. 3.17).
[102] I.e. the Stoics, as will be examined below, and Aristotle. In the process expressed byAristotle, there is: (1) the desire to drink, (2) discrimination by perception, imagination orthought of something as "drinkable," (3) desire, which causes (4) the immediate act of drinking (Arist. *MA* 701a32-35). See also Lloyd 1978: 233-246.
[103] *Ac*. 2.108: *dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus esse, quos quoniam adpetitio consequatur,actionem sequi* ("for the Stoics say that the senses is itself an assent, and since appetite follows these, action follows"); Sen. *Ep*. 113.2: agi autem nihil sine impetu potest ("but it is notpossible to act without appetite"); *SVF*. 3.175. See also Inwood 1985: 50-53.
[104] Brennan (2005: 88-89) notes the difficulty for a modern reader to understand this in a post-Hume world. According to Hume, reason judges the appropriateness of fulfilling a desire, and not whether one should have the desire or not.
[105] See section 3 below.
[106] *SVF*. 2.988, 3.178.

of faulty judgement, which is formed due to the agent's disposition, not because of a lack of reason.[107] The agent would complete those actions that are in accordance with nature and not do the opposite actions because of a *disposition*, not a decision. The disposition leads agents to reason in whatever way they may, even if it leads to irrational decisions.[108] It is clear how this would be the case in the Stoic system. In a unified soul, there cannot be a "ruler"; the *animus* is not subject to any interior force. If it were, the soul would be at the least dualistic.

Yet a different interpretation is possible. Perhaps Cicero envisions a reality where men are so situated that they all seek what is in accordance with nature. Or, as he writes at *De Finibus* 4.58, those stimuli that appear to be in accordance with nature stir the appetites.[109] In this system, it is the duty of reason to judge which *stimuli* are in accordance with nature.[110] Thus reason judges the stimuli, and not the appetites *per se*.[111] Such a treatment is possible in a unified soul, where before the appetites even arise reason judges the stimuli. The Stoics themselves believed that everything automatically seeks things that are appropriate.[112] Thus reason stands before appetites, and withholds them until it has judged the stimulus as to its

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[107] Judgments, not things, harm men; Cf. Epict. Manual 5.
[108] White 1995: 228.This will become clearer in the next chapter in regard to passions.
[109] Cicero states that the predecessors of Zeno held this theory.
[110] Or, to be more technical, it is the job of reason to judge which stimuli, when assented to, will produce appetites that lead to actions that are in accordance with nature.
[111] In Stoicism, the soul produces the appetites, which reason judges, in response to the impressions. Cf. Philo *SVF*. 2.991; Plu. *SVF*.3.175.
[112] DL 7.85-6; Sen. *Ep*.121; Plu. *SVF*.3.179. As part of this theory, if an agent commits an act that is inappropriate it is because of a mistake in judging the appropriateness, not

relation with nature. If this is Cicero's intent when he speaks of the appetites being subject to reason, then the system can exist within the Stoic theory of the unified soul. In *De Officiis,* however, Cicero states that he believes in the multi-unit soul. At 1.108 he presents a scenario where reason feuds with the irrational side of the soul.[113]

Further, we have seen in *De Officiis* and *Tusculan Disputations* that Cicero did consider the soul to be multi-unit. In Cicero's evaluation, one side of the soul is irrational, the other rational. Reason lives in the rational side, the *appetitiones* reside in the irrational. The two sides are at conflict and the victor influences the actions of the agent. It appears that Cicero's Sage is someone whose rational side is far stronger than his irrational. In fact, the rational portion is *dominant*, since no action should take place before reason judges it. Thus Cicero is at odds with the Stoics because of his reckoning of the nature of the *animus*.[114] His system where reason evaluates the ὁρμή cannot exist within a unified soul.

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adeliberate choice. In this they agree with Aristotle (*EN* 7.13, 1144b3). See Nussbaum 1994:333.

[113] He also claims (*Tusc*. 4.10) that he is going to follow the division of the soul as proposed by Plato and Pythagoras. Note that he does not say that he is following the division of the soul as proposed by Posidonius. If he had, then perhaps Cicero could have been following a Stoic division of the soul. As it is, though, Cicero seems to consider the multi-part soul to be a non-Stoic feature.

[114] I discuss whether Posidonius is a source for this theory at VI.4.

Cicero's complaint about Stoic vocabulary (*Fin*. 4.2) may provide an indication as to why Cicero pairs seemingly incompatible concepts.[115] If Cicero believes that the Stoics and their predecessors were actually saying the same thing, what difference would it make to Cicero exactly where reason interferes? If it is the same to Cicero to say that bodily goods are "goods" as it is to call them "indifferents," it is likewise irrelevant if reason judges the *appetites* or the *stimuli*. For Cicero, the importance appears to be that reason does have primacy over the appetites, and not *when* it does so. In this interpretation, Cicero's presentation is a simplified form of his own predecessors' theories.[116]

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[115] In a similar pairing, Cicero couples Plato's division of the soul with the Stoic definitions and subdivisions of the passions. At the level of specifics, the two are incompatible, for the reasons described above. Cicero seems to know this when, having discussed Plato's division of the soul, he states: *Sit igitur hic fons: utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis Stoicorum definitionibus et partionibus, qui mihi videntur in hac quaestione versari acutissime* ("So let this be the starting point: and yet let us use the definitions and partitions of the Stoics to describe disturbances, (the Stoics) who seem to me to be involved in this question most acutely," *Tusc*. 4.10). I would emphasize *tamen* as an acknowledgment that, technically speaking, Cicero should not be pairing Stoic concepts with Plato's and Pythagoras' divisions of the soul.

[116] Cicero's process of simplification often involves combining the aspects of various schools that are most appealing to him. Thus the example of *Tusc*. 4.10-11, noted above, where Cicerocombines the Plato's division of the soul and the Stoic definitions of the passions. Ciceroseems to believe that this eclecticism was a feature of the New Academy (*Off*. 3.20, *Tusc*.5.82). See Glucker 1988: 34-69 for a discussion of Cicero's eclecticism.

6.2 The *appetitiones*

Above we have seen how those appetites for things that are in accordance with nature are the "good" ones, or those that the agent should act upon. Cicero does not seem concerned with providing any greater explanation.[117] However, some further discussion of the Stoic concept of ὁρμή is merited. For the Stoics, the occurrence of an inappropriate appetite transpires because of a false evaluation of the stimulus. It is important to note that every appetite is the result of a judgment; that is, no impression bypasses reason in creating an action. Only animals react directly to impressions.[118] The result of this is that men are responsible for their actions.

An agent is said to give assent to impressions. Reason decides whether to give or withhold assent to the impression. All impressions (e.g. my wife is dead) include only one proposition (e.g. it is thus appropriate that I feel grief), and for this reason the impression and the proposition may be mixed together or spoken of as one (Brennan 2005: 57-58). Further, according to the Stoics, nothing is important that does not cause an action. As Brennan (2005: 91-93) points out, "winter" in Stoicism is not a period of time, but it either produces a result ("the winter killed my crops") or it causes a reaction in agents ("the winter caused me to wear a sweater"). The same condition applies to emotions: "anger" is worth discussing

[117] I do not discuss the problems associated with false appearances in both Stoicism and Cicero's theory here.

only in scenarios like "my anger caused me to hit my friend." Impressions cannot exist without the proposition. Thus an agent can be said to assent to an impression, yet it is perhaps easier to consider this as assenting to the proposition. Everything in the universe appears to the Stoic thus: it exists and it is good (or bad) for me. An agent will then choose whether or not to assent to the proposition. Nothing more is required for the Stoic to act; agents act on the basis of accepting things that are in accordance with their nature and rejecting their opposites.[119] It is not necessary, therefore, that all impressions include commands of some sort (e.g. there is cake [impression], I should eat it [proposition], eat it! [command]).[120]

If an agent, upon seeing some cake, assents to the proposition that "it is fitting for me to eat cake," the agent will subsequently develop an appetite for cake. The agent may be wrong in this evaluation that "it is fitting for me to eat cake," and thus the appetite that follows the assent would be false (Brennan 2005: 88). Reason should judge the impression and determine its appropriateness, yet if the soul is ill an agent's reason will be perverted. The result is that reason will assent to impressions that create inconsistent appetites (Long and Sedley 1987: 420-

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[118] Stough 1978: 206; Inwood 1985: 42; Reydam-Schils 2005: 26; Nussbaum 1994: 325; Sandbach 1975: 60.

[119] Cicero (*Ac*.2.38) tells us that this urge to seek the appropriate things cannot be resisted (*nam quo modo non potest animal ullum non adpetere id quod accomdatum ad naturam adpareat*).

[120] Inwood (1985: 61-64) argues that agents may assent to an impression, but this does not cause them to act. Sorabji (2000: 44-45) believes that the Stoics held that impulses only typically produced action. For commentary on Inwood's argument and an opposing view, see Engberg-Pederson 1988: 254-255. For the sufficiency of the impulses for action, see Lloyd 1978: 237.

422). We shall see in the next chapter that this faulty reasoning may also result in passions.

We can speak of things being appropriate if they are in accordance with our own nature, but if able to view the universe as a whole, we would see that when we are living life in accordance with our nature, we are in fact living life in accordance with nature at large. Thus for the Stoics "in accordance with your own nature" and "in accordance with nature" amount to the same thing (D.L. 7.87-9).

The ability of reason to determine the appropriateness of a stimulus is based upon the agent's disposition. That is, if you are so disposed that reason properly judges the stimulus in regard to its appropriateness, you are a healthy person. Thus the emphasis is not on reason, but rather on the disposition. Cicero hints at this when he states that temperance allowed reason to act. Thus *being temperate* creates a scenario in which reason can properly judge the appetites. The Stoics, then, would make people *temperate*, and not treat them on a situational basis. We shall see in the chapter on πάθη how Cicero objects to this treatment. It is useless when someone is actually experiencing the emotion, or appetite. A similar scenario exists for the ὁρμαί; the Stoics are of no aid when someone is about to eat some inappropriate cake. The similarity exists because the πάθη make up a subset of the ὁρμαί.

To Stoics, every action, or non-action (Inwood 1985: 100), is the result of experiencing an appetite. Thus the ὁρμή can be divided into three parts.[121] One part is made up of the πάθη, which are entirely bad, and should not be experienced. Another is composed of selections and rejections. A selection involves viewing everything present as indifferent, and selecting things on the basis of their future merit. Thus eating is selected only because it may give us health, and in general health is preferable to illness. Therefore eating is selected. Since selecting involves an action, an appetite must be involved. This group should replace the passions of desiring and fearing. The final class is the appetites of the Sage alone, because they involve actual knowledge, which only the Sage can have. These are the εὐπάθειαι. Such is the grouping of the ὁρμή: agents would experience any particular appetite because of their disposition.

In discussing ὁρμή, Cicero does not provide such a breakdown.[122] He does, however, eventually tell us that the appetites that are "by nature" are to be approved of. These could not be πάθη, and thus for the non-Sages to whom Cicero is trying to speak they are selections.[123] Thus Cicero is recommending selections. However, Cicero diverges from the Stoic stance in advising a *process* of selection. This process involves using reason to judge the appetites. This is not a process for

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[121] As described by Brennan 2005: 90-100.
[122] As seen when he translates *naturalis appetitio* as ὁρμή at *Fin*.4.39. Technically, some ὁρμαί are *naturales appetitiones*, but not all of them, a distinction that he does not draw.
[123] "Selections" since the non-Sage cannot have a εὐπάθειαι appetite because these appetites involve actual knowledge. Cicero is not speaking to the Sage, because obviously

Stoics, since an agent's disposition has already predetermined the way that the agent will act. It is a result, not a process.[124] The focus of Cicero and the Stoics is different, as we shall see in the chapter on πάθη, yet the result is to be the same. Cicero and the Stoics recommend that right reason guide actions.

6.3 Cicero's sources

Cicero appears to be basing his discussion of appetites on the Stoic technical term ὁρμή. Of course, Aristotle has some views that are similar to the Stoic concept. For Aristotle, the agent acts when it affirms the proposition that is inherent in the stimulus. Therefore the object of desire is a proposition.[125]Thus it is for the Stoics. For Aristotle, the acceptance of the proposal is due to the agent believing that the act is appropriate, as it is for the Stoics (*Metaph*. 1072a). Yet when Aristotle discusses the theory of action, he uses the term ὄρεξις, and not ὁρμή (*MA* 701a32-701b1, *de An.*414b.1-6). When Cicero does provide the Greek equivalent of *appetitio* it is ὁρμή, not ὄρεξις, a word that never occurs in the works of Cicero selected for this thesis. Further, Aristotle does not believe that all of the passions, which form a subset of the appetites, are inherently bad.[126] Cicero classifies the appetites in a Stoic manner, insisting that they are to be kept under control.

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someone who is a Sage does not take advice from a non-Sage. In fact, the Sage does not take any advice, since he must already have perfect knowledge in order to be a Sage.

[124] Cicero, as noted, does seem to hint at similar views when discussing temperance.

[125] Arist. *Metaph*.1139a21-26, 1147a27. See also Charles 1984: 84-86.

Further, he often mentions the appetite that we take from Nature which compels us to protect ourselves in our natural state. This is reminiscent of the Stoic theory that we automatically seek things that are in accordance with nature. Cicero diverges from the Stoics in his concept of *when* and over *what* reason enforces its rule, a divergence which stems from his belief in a divided soul.

In regard to Cicero's theory of a divided soul, he himself states that he is following Pythagoras and Plato. Yet by Cicero's time there were some members of the Stoic community who did not believe in a unified soul. Posidonius discarded the monistic soul of his Stoic predecessors.[127] Cicero, as he mentions in his works, knew Posidonius.[128] Thus it is possible that Cicero was following Posidonius in his description of the soul. If this is the case, then Cicero is not diverging from the dogma of the early Stoics, since he perhaps views Posidonius' belief as an evolution within the school.[129] However, while Cicero does mention Posidonius

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[126] See his discussion on fear in *EN* 1.1101a9-14.
[127] Gal.4.3.2-5, 5.5.8-26, 4.7.24-41.
[128] *noster Posidonius, quem et ipse saepe vidi* ("our Posidonius, whom I have often seen," *Tusc*. 2.61*), in primisque familiarem nostrum Posidonium* ("foremost our friend Posidonius," *Fin*. 1.6)
[129] Note that Galen did not believe that Posidonius was diverging from orthodox Stoicism. According to Galen, Posidonius was only in disagreement with Chrysippus, who had diverged from Zeno (Posidonius fr.166 Kidd). Yet he also claims (Posidonius fr.34 Kidd) that Posidonius followed the "old view," which Kidd (1972: 169) understands to be the view of Plato and not Zeno. See also Posidonius fr.152 Kidd. Galen pairs Posidonius' theory of the soul with Plato's several times (Posidonius fr.142 -144, 150 Kidd). Yet he also attempts to claim (Posidonius fr.142 Kidd) that there was a difference between the theories of Posidonius and Plato (see Kidd's argument [1972: 539] that the τὸ μὲν ... τὸ δὲ construction of fr. 142 pairs Posidonius and Aristotle on one hand, and Hippocrates and Plato on the other). Further, we may wonder whether Posidonius' insistence on "faculties" or "powers" of the soul is different than "parts" of the soul, and to what degree this was accepted in Stoicism. Kidd (1999: 211 n.98) notes that Galen (Posidonius fr.160) may say that the soul has different "parts" (μόρια), but Posidonius rejected this term and used only

within his works, he never attributes to him this theory of the divided soul. Rather, when Cicero is about to follow this scheme, he cites Pythagoras and Plato. These names may have supplied greater credibility to the theory, but that does not explain why Cicero did not at least attribute this theory to *some* Stoics in general. He in fact seems to have recognized that the divided soul was at odds with Stoicism in general when he pairs the Platonic soul with Stoic naming practices:

> *in his explicandis veterem illam equidem Pythagorae primum, dein Platonis discriptionem sequar, qui animum in duas partes dividunt, alteram rationis participem faciunt, altera expertem … Sit igitur hic fons; utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus, qui mihi videntur in hac quaestione versari acutissime. (Tusc.* 4.10-11)
>
> In setting forth these things I, for my own part, shall first follow that ancient description of Pythagoras, then that of Plato, who divide the mind into two parts; they give one a share of reason, and they make the other free from reason … So let this be the starting point; nevertheless, let us make use of the definitions and divisions of the Stoics in describing these passions, the Stoics who seem to me to be involved in this question most acutely.

In this passage, the term *tamen* may serve as an acknowledgement that Cicero is pairing divergent concepts.[130]

Another possible source for this belief in a divided soul is Panaetius. In writing *De Officiis*, Cicero seems to have been following Panaetius, a debt which he

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"powers" (δυνάμεις, fr.142 – 146). Thus while Posidonius rejects Chrysippus, he does so on the criticism that Chrysippus had turned away from his own predecessors. These earlier philosophers may have included Zeno, though not necessarily. Posidonius' theory of the soul appears to be similar to Plato's, yet Posidonius is different in that he believes that the soul is a single substance that has different "powers," not "parts." I am uncertain to what degree other Stoics agreed with Posidonius. It is a question that, although such a study may prove beneficial, I do not explore here. At this point, we shall only note that Cicero claims to follow Plato in his division of the soul.

often notes. Thus, it is possible that Panaetius believed in the divided soul.[131] This assumes that Cicero was only translating (and not interpreting in the sense that we saw in Chapter 4) the work of Panaetius. I do not believe that Cicero wrote any of his works in such a way, and he explicitly tells us this was not the case for *De Officiis* (2.75). Further, if he *was* only translating Panaetius line for line, it does not explain Cicero's theories about a divided soul in *Tusculan Disputations*. Therefore, I cannot completely attribute Cicero's statements regarding the soul to the Stoic Panaetius.

Finally, there are discussions as to whether the Stoics actually believed in a monistic soul.[132] I can simplify any answer to this debate by pointing out

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[130] See n.22 above.

[131] There is some support, from authors besides Cicero, that Panaetius believed this; see Panaetius fr.85 Van Straaten (Tertullian).

[132] Some take Chrysippus' discussion of the soul's parts to be literal. Yet even if these parts are admitted to be separate entities, they cannot be acting in opposition. This theory of opposing parts is a feature of Plato. There are some misleading passages that may indicate that the Stoic soul had many parts. Sextus Empiricus (*M*. 7.234) claims that some of the Stoics say that the soul can be discussed in two ways: the soul as a whole and the commanding faculty. Aetius says that from the commanding faculty there are seven parts of the soul which extend through the body (five senses, one called seed, and one called utterance) (4.21.1-4 [*SVF*. 2.836]). Galen, discussing Chrysippus, speaks on parts of the soul (Stoic.2.841). According to Long and Sedley, these are not "parts" but faculties that pick out the qualities of the commanding faculty. "They designate its different modes of operation, and in such a way that the soul or self is not fragmented into a plurality of psychic entities, as in the Platonic model" (Long and Sedley 1987: 321). Posidonius, though, does believe in a divided soul (Galen, *On Hippocrates' and Plato's doctrines* 4.3.2-5, 5.5.8-26, 4.7.24-41). Posidonius also claimed that even Zeno did not believe in a unified soul (Gal. 5.6.34-7). However, Long and Sedley (1987: 422) do not find enough supporting evidence for this claim in the surviving material.

thatwhatever they did believe in regard to parts and faculties of the soul, not until Posidonius did they believe in a soul that was divided by opposing forces.[133]

[133] Inwood 1985: 27-41; Lloyd 1978: 235

7. πάθος

Cicero has told us that reason should guide our actions and control our appetites. By this he means not only "control" in the sense of keeping them within normal levels, but Cicero intends to say that reason should allow only those appetites that are aimed at things that are in accordance with our nature. I provided the subsets of the appetites in the previous chapter, and we saw that the passions were, in Stoicism, completely bad. In Stoic teaching, the passions arose from an ill disposition, which prohibits reason from acting correctly. Thus the agent's faculty of reason may falsely judge the images presented to it. As I shall discuss further, this definition of passions is formed because of a belief in a unified soul, a theory that Cicero did not share with the Stoics. Yet Cicero did desire to illustrate the passions as a type of illness, and this creates several difficulties:

> *perturbationes animorum, quae vitam insipientium miseram acerbamque reddunt (quas Graeci πάθη appellant, poteram ego verbum ipsum interpretans morbos appellare, sed non conveniret ad omnia; quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? at illi dicunt πάθος... omnesque eae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures, aegritudo, formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi ήδονήν appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam).* (*Fin.*3.35)
>
> The disturbances of the mind, which render the life of the foolish miserable and painful (which the Greeks call πάθη, and I might have called them *morbi*, translating word for word, but this term does not apply to everything; for who usually calls pity or passion a disease? But they call it πάθος... All these *perturbationes* are of four kinds, in many parts: grief, fear, lust and something the Stoics call, in a common name for body and soul,

> ἡδονή,[134] but which I prefer to call *laetitia,* a pleasant elation, so to speak, of a rising mind.)

Cicero tells his audience that the Greeks consider the passions to be like diseases. If he is referring to the Stoics, this is not exactly true,[135] but he makes his claim in order to strengthen his argument that philosophers are the doctors of the soul.[136] It is a theory upon which he frequently remarks in *Tusculan Disputations*,[137] and it appears that Cicero believes that characterizing philosophers as doctors of the soul will spread philosophy in Rome.[138] Yet the analogy for τὸ πάθος does not work as well in Latin as it does in Greek, in part because of the former's vocabulary. As indicated in this passage, Cicero believes that πάθος may refer to both a passion[139] and a bodily illness, or perhaps better, symptoms of the *animus* and the *corpus*. In Latin, however, *morbus* should only refer to the bodily illness, and thus Cicero introduces the word *perturbatio* to describe the passion. Cicero wants to treat the passions as diseases, but he realizes that he cannot use the corresponding Latin terminology. Cicero rejects the literal translation for a disease, but in his translation he supplies a term which is not associated with diseases. Thus, as we shall see

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[134] Cicero's translation of the Stoic classes of πάθη: λύπη, φόβος, ἐπιθυμία, ἡδονή.
[135] See 7.1 below.
[136] The Stoics believed that the disposition to have a passion was the illness, and not the passion itself. For reasons that will be discussed below, Cicero believes it better at times totreat the passion.
[137] See 2.11: "for philosophy brings this (relief from distress) about: it provides healing tosouls, it removes the meaningless worries, it frees us from desires and dashes away fears" (*nam efficit hoc philosophia: medetur animis, inanes sollicitudines detrahit, cupiditatibus liberat, pellit timores*); 3.1, 3.6: "There certainly is a medicinal art for the soul, philosophy" (*est profectoanimi medicina, philosophia*); 4.58.
[138] Notwithstanding Cato's sentiment towards doctors.
[139] Which could technically be described as a "movement."

below, Cicero constantly needs to remind the audience that he considers *perturbatio* to be similar to a disease by reminding us of the literal translation of τὸ πάθος.

> *Num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines, libidines, iracundiae? Haec enim fere sunt eius modi, quae Graeci πάθη appellant; ego poteram morbos et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet: nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantes; nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, nisi quid aliud tibi videtur.* (*Tusc.* 3.7)
>
> Do you also mean the other distresses of the mind, fear, lust and anger? For these are generally of that group which the Greeks call πάθη; I might have called them *morbi*, and that would be a word for word translation, but it would not fall into our custom: for to feel pity, envy, exultation, joy, all these things the Greeks call *morbi*, that is, movements of the soul that are not submissive to reason; but we rightly, as I think, call these same movements of an agitated mind *perturbationes*, but we would not really call them *morbi* in ordinary usage, unless you think otherwise.

In *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero is concerned with relieving the mind of distress. In Book 1 he deals with fear of death, in Book 2 with pain. Book 3 is primarily focused on grief, which he considers to be the greatest distress (*aegritudo, Tusc.*3.81). The above section continues the practice, seen in the *De Finibus* passage, of referring to πάθη as diseases. Cicero desires to continue the "philosopher as the doctor of the soul" thesis, but he is aware that the terminology fails him in Latin. This passage is very similar to the *De Finibus* section: Cicero mentions the *perturbationes*; he comments that the Greeks call these πάθη; a literal translation would be *morbi*; a literal translation is not fitting, for it is not coherent with regular Latin usage to refer to passions as diseases. The entire passage is set to remind the reader that,

although they cannot be called thus, the passions are like diseases, and the cure is philosophy.

As Inwood notes, Cicero is not correct in arguing that the passions are diseases, if he is drawing upon the Stoics as his source.[140] Inwood accounts for the supposed error by noting that where Cicero got it right at *Tusc*.4.23-33, he did so while using a different source.[141] In this passage Cicero shows that he understands the Stoic theory that the *disposition* to have a passion is the illness, not the passion itself:

> *Atque ut ad valetudinis similitudinem veniamus eaque collatione utamur aliquando, sed parcius quam solent Stoici, ut sunt alii ad alios morbos procliviores, itaque dicimus gravedinosos quosdam, quosdam torminosos, non quia iam sint, sed quia saepe, sic alii ad metum, alii ad aliam perturbationem.*
>
> And let us come to the similarity with health and let us make use of that comparison at this time, albeit more sparingly than the Stoics are accustomed, as some men are more inclined (prone) towards some diseases (*morbi*), and thus we say that some are prone to colds, some to suffer from colic, not because they are thus at present, but because they often are, and thus some men are prone to fear, and others are prone to a different passion (*perturbatio*) (*Tusc.* 4.27)

Cicero is adhering to the Stoic belief that if a man prone to anger were tested enough, he would eventually show himself to be an angry man, even though at

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[140] Inwood 1985: 128. Graver (2002: 79) presents the theory that this particular definition of πάθος is presented in order to argue against those who would consider emotions as natural and normal. Erskine (1997: 45) believes that Cicero offers *morbus* because he is taking the analogy between bodily and mental health too far.
[141] Inwood 1985: 128 n.7.

any given instance he may be in a state of tranquility.[142] Cicero proves his knowledge in the following:

> *Haec igitur proclivitas ad suum quodque genus a similitudine corporis aegrotatio dicatur, dum ea intelligatur ad aegrotandum proclivitas.* (*Tusc*. 4.28)
>
> And thus let this proneness to his own variety (of illness) be called sickness (*aegrotatio*) on account of its similarity to (the illness) of a body, provided that it is understood as proneness towards being sick.

According to Cicero, the proneness is the illness. Yet Cicero realizes that this is a problem in the treatment of particular individuals suffering particular passions. Of what benefit is it to know that the Sage is not distressed by death when one is confronted with painful thoughts? Does being told that what we perceive as grievous is not an evil aid the process of removing our grief? As Cicero tells us:

> *Quid me decipis, Zeno? Nam cum id, quod mihi horribile videtur, tu omnino malum negas esse, capior et scire cupio quo modo id, quod ego miserrimum existimem, ne malum quidem sit. Nihil est, inquit, malum nisi quod turpe atque vitiosum est. Ad ineptias redis. Illud enim, quod me angebat, non eximis. Scio dolorem non esse nequitiam; desine id me docere: hoc doce, doleam necne doleam nihil interesse.* (*Tusc.* 2.29)
>
> Why do you deceive me Zeno? For when you deny that what seems to me terrible is an evil at all, I am seized and I desire to know in what way that which I estimate to be the most miserable is not even an evil. Zeno says, "Nothing is an evil except that which is shameful and vicious." You are reverting towards playing the fool. For that which was distressing me, you do not remove. I know that pain is not wickedness; stop teaching me that: teach me this, that it makes no difference whether I am in pain or not.
>
> *nihil enim esse malum quod turpe non sit, si lugenti persuaseris, non tu illi luctum, sed stultitiam detraxeris; alienum autem tempus docendi.* (*Tusc.* 3.77)

[142] A Stoic example: Does all mud stink? No? Stir it up (*Tusc*. 4.54).

> If you persuade the mourner that nothing is evil that is not shameful, you do not remove his grief, though you remove his folly; but the time for being taught is not suitable.
>
> *illa autem altera ratio et oratio, quae simul et opinionem falsam tollit et aegritudinem detrahit, est ea quidem utilior, sed raro proficit neque est ad vulgus adhibenda.* (*Tusc.*4.61)
>
> But that other plan and speech (showing that that which produces passions [pain, poverty] is neither good nor evil), which simultaneously destroys the folly and removes the disease, it is more useful, but it is rarely successful, nor is it to be put to use on the mass public.

The Stoic method is not practical.[143] It does not remove actual grief; it is best suited for preventing future grief (White 1995: 235). It seems that, to Cicero, Stoicism can only be useful in this regard if taught from birth, when grief is only theoretical. It is then no surprise that Cicero has some sympathy for the Cyrenaic belief that nothing that is accounted for beforehand could cause grief.[144]

Cicero recognizes that this is a particular weakness in the practice of Stoicism.[145] Perhaps most importantly, it is one that he personally had to overcome. Having suffered the death of his daughter Tullia, Cicero writes that he was overcome by grief (*Att.*12.13,15). Thus, when he writes about this *perturbatio* in

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[143] Erskine (1997:44) refers to the Stoic approach as the "ideal" one.

[144] Cicero discusses the Cyrenaic belief at *Tusc*. 3.28. He eventually rejects the model at *Tusc*.3.59.

[145] I am not arguing that Cicero turned solely to Stoic writings for consolation, only that he evidently found Stoicism unable to aid him in his search for consolation. See *Tusc.* 3.76 for Cicero's admission that he included several different methods in his consolatory effort.

Tusculan Disputations, he is not discussing a theoretical passion; he is attempting to provide a cure for actual grief.[146]

Cicero attempts to illustrate why the passions are like diseases at *Tusc.*3.22-23:

> *Itaque praeclare nostri, ut aliam multa, molestiam, sollicitudinem, angorem propter similitudinem corporum aegrorum aegritudinem nominaverunt. hoc propemodum verbo Graeci omnem animi perturbationem appellant; vocant enim πάθος, id est, morbum, quicumque est motus in animo turbidus: nos melius; aegris enim corporibus simillima animi est aegritudo; at non similis aegrotationis est libido, non immoderata laetitia, quae est voluptas animi elata et gestiens. ipse etiam metus non est morbi admodum similis, quamquam aegritudini est finitimus, sed proprie ut aegrotatio in corpore, sic aegritudo in animo nomen habet non seiunctum a dolore.*
>
> And thus our ancestors, as they did in many other matters, splendidly called annoyance, anxiety and anguish mental illness (*aegritudo*),[147] on account of their similarity to a sick body. By nearly this word the Greeks name all disturbances of the mind; for they call πάθος, that is, *morbus*, any wild movement in the mind. But we do better; sickness of the mind is very much like the diseased body, but not at all similar is lust, nor is immoderate joy, which is an elated and exulting pleasure of the mind. And still fear itself is not quite like *morbus*, although it is a neighbour to *aegritudo*, but it is proper that sickness in the body, like sickness in the mind, does not have a name far off from pain.

Cicero, in a bit of pro-Latin rhetoric, reminds the audience that the Roman ancestors were better with their vocabulary than the Greeks. The Romans named the passions mental illnesses (*aegritudo*), the Greeks call them πάθη, which is *morbus* in Latin. The Roman classification is better. The rest of the passage is more

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[146] Erskine (1997: 41-42) suggests that while the study of removing passions was a part of something larger for the Greeks, for Cicero it was central.

[147] According to the *OLD*, *aegritudo* is an illness of the mind only, whereas *aegrotatio* refers to both mental and bodily illnesses.

difficult to understand, but it is consistent with this opening. Cicero notes that *aegritudo* is similar to *aeger corporis*. He contrasts this with passions such as lust and immoderate joy, which are not like the *aeger corporis*. Cicero seems to be arguing that not all passions (*perturbationes*) fall under the heading of *aegritudo*. In fact, only those passions which cause a contraction of the soul are similar enough to a sick body to be referred to as *aegritudo*.[148] Those which cause an expansion of the soul, although they are still irrational, are not much like a diseased body. Yet the process of classification goes further: even fear, which causes a contraction of the soul, is not quite like a *morbus*. Cicero is making a visual comparison. If one were to look at someone who was feeling annoyance, anxiety or anguish, he would have much the same appearance as someone who was suffering from a *morbus*. "Downtrodden" seems the best descriptor. Yet, of course, the physician cannot cure these people, because they are not suffering from *morbi*. Only the philosopher can aid these souls.

Before Cicero attempts to establish the relation between mental and bodily illness at *Tusc*. 4.23,[149] he reminds the reader that τὸ πάθος should not be translated as *morbus*, although the passions are like diseases; e.g. *Tusc.* 4.10: *quoniam, quae Graeci πάθη vocant, nobis perturbationes appellari magis placet quam morbos...* ("since,

[148] Cicero (*Tusc*. 3.19) follows the Stoic doctrine that the *perturbationes* lust and pleasure cause an expansion of the soul, while fear and pain cause a contraction. See DL 7.115; Andronic.Rhod. *SVF*. 3.391; Stob. *SVF*. 3.378; Gal. *SVF*. 3.463.

[149] Note that Cicero does not want to force this comparison: *Atque ut ad valetudinis similitudinem veniamus eaque collatione utamur aliquando, sed parcius quam solent Stoici* ("And

what the Greeks call πάθη, it is more pleasing for us that they be called *perturbationes* than *morbi*"). Cicero then produces this analogy:

> *quem ad modum cum sanguis corruptus est aut pituita redundat aut bilis, in corpore morbi aegrotationesque nascuntur, sic pravarum opinionum conturbatio et ipsarum inter se repugnantia sanitate spoliat animum morbisque perturbat. ex peturbationibus autem primum morbi conficiuntur, quae vocant illi νοσήματα, eaque, quae sunt eis morbis contraria, quae habent ad res certas vitiosam offensionem atque fastidium, deinde aegrotationes, quae appellantur a Stoicis ἀῤῥώστήματα, hisque item oppositae contrariae offensiones*. (*Tusc.* 4.23)
>
> Just as when blood is spoiled or there is an overflow of mucus or bile, and in the body sickness and disease (*aegrotationes)* are produced, so the disorder of crooked opinions, fighting amongst themselves, deprives the mind of reason and confuses it by disease. But, in the first place, from the disturbances (*perturbationes*) there arise bodily illnesses (*morbi*), which they call νοσήματα, and those, which are opposite to these bodily illnesses, and which have a vicious displeasure and loathing towards certain things, and then (secondly) there are diseases (*aegrotationes*), which are called by the Stoics ἀῤῥώστήματα, and likewise these have opposite displeasures.

Cicero seems to believe that *perturbationes* can create *morbi*. There also appears to be some inconsistency here since *morbi* is now translated as νοσήματα. Yet this passage is consistent with his overall definition. Cicero, as seen above, is attempting to illustrate that *perturbationes* are similar to illnesses, *morbi*. He has already repeatedly told us, though, that they are *not* the same, or at least no Latin speaker would use the same name to describe them, as a Greek apparently would. Let us attempt to summarize the position. When discussing πάθος the Greeks give to this word many connotations of a disease. That is, they treat it as if it were a disease. It need not actually be a disease; for such a thing the Greeks have νόσος, a

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to come to the analogy of health and to make use of that comparison to some degree, yet more sparingly than the Stoics are accustomed," *Tusc*. 4.27).

word that Cicero clearly knew. All Cicero has told us is that the Greeks, when discussing τὸ πάθος, give it a disease-like quality. In Latin, Cicero says, our term for something disease-like would be *morbi*. Cicero does not wish to use this term, simply because nobody would. It is a misunderstanding to believe that Cicero is calling the *perturbationes* diseases; he is only saying that they are disease-like.

In other works, Cicero also translates τὸ πάθος as an emotion. In *de Officiis*, Ciceo lists one of the properties of virtue as: *cohibere motus animi turbatos, quos Graeci πάθη nominant* ("to restrain those violent motions of the mind, which the Greeks call πάθη," *Off.* 2.18). In *Orator*, Cicero claims that two topics will be handled by the orator in order to arouse admiration for his eloquence. One is what they call παθητικόν, or "relating to the emotions," "that arouses and excites the emotions" (*Orat.* 128). In both instances Cicero is speaking about the emotional aspect of πάθος. In *Ad Atticum* 9.4.2, Cicero is reflecting on his life thus far, and considering what he should do next. He wonders whether one who has done good service for his country, and by it has won ill treatment and envy (δι' αὐτό τε τοῦτο ἀνήκεστα παθὼν καὶ φθονηθεὶς), should voluntarily put himself in danger for that country, or may at length take thought for himself and his dear ones and avoid the struggles against those in power. In *Ad Atticum* 12.3.1, Cicero is waiting for Atticus to arrive in Rome. He exhorts his friend to harden his heart, since Cicero believes Atticus to be in the same distress as he himself suffers (*ut te quoque ponam*

in eodem πάθει). All instances speak to the mental distress that we have seen Cicero discuss above.

I mentioned above that Cicero is criticized for translating πάθη as *morbi*. The conclusion that I would draw is that this is not a mistake on his part, but a deliberate effort to cast the passions as "disease-like." He hesitates to translate πάθη as only *morbi,* as he prefers the term *perturbationes*. Yet in his therapy, Cicero would primarily treat the passions. He clearly believes that the passions are results of an ill soul, a theory which he may take from the Stoics.

7.1 τὸ πάθος as a disease

I noted that when stating that the Greeks call τὸ πάθος a disease, Cicero means to say that they give it a disease-like quality. This is not exactly consistent with the Stoic sources that we may presume Cicero knew. The Stoics considered the disposition to assent to the impressions in such a way that the soul creates *perturbatio* to be an illness.[150] The term for this type of disposition would be νόσος. In this classification, the passions are considered to be "movements," or a type of impulse (ὁρμή).[151] The passions, as impulses, have four subsets: desire, fear, pleasure and distress. Desire and fear refer to the future, in that they are (irrational)

[150] Posidonius fr. 163; Stob. *SVF*. 2.93.
[151] For the passions as "movements," see Inwood 1985: 129; Brennan 2005: 87. For the classification of the appetites, see my previous chapter.

longings or aversions to things that may happen. Pleasure and distress refer to the present time and circumstances, and are likewise irrational. These passions may be triggered by two types of judgements: that something is good or evil, or that a certain response is appropriate.[152] Thus if a loved one was lost, the first judgment would be that the death is an evil, the second judgement would be that grief is an appropriate response.[153] At this point there was a disagreement among Stoics on which judgment should be treated. Cleanthes focused on the first judgment. The disposition is the νόσος, the passion is the πάθος, and Cleanthes' treatment is to cure the νόσος in order to prevent any future πάθη from arising.[154] Chrysippus treated the second judgment (*Tusc*. 3.76-79). He says that those in distress should focus on what they should do and follow exempla from others in similar situations (*Tusc*. 3.79). This way the distress is eventually lessened. From this point, when the patient is in a state ready to learn, Chrysippus can focus on curing the νόσος.[155] Cicero agrees with Chrysippus since he considers it best to teach patients how to deal with their distress before teaching them that the circumstances that surround them are not evil.[156] In addition, there is a particular problematic scenario if the

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[152] Sorabji 2000: 29. Erskine (1997: 46) suggests that Chrysippus added the second judgment in light of the concept that passions (like grief) can fade over time. Chrysippus argued that the second judgment, that it was appropriate to grieve, faded.
[153] Reydam-Schils 2005: 134.
[154] For the association of the νόσ/νουσ- root with the soul, see Pl. *Grg*. 480b; Chrysipp. *SVF*.3.103; A. *Pr*. 227,685,978, *Pers*. 750; Hes. *Th*. 527; S. *Aj*. 185.
[155] Yet it is possible that Chrysippus was only providing an explanation as to how thepassions could cease, whereas Cicero was actually seeking a cure. See Erskine 1997: 46-47.
[156] In addition, according to Cicero (*Tusc*. 3.61) Cleanthes' treatment can only be taken in bythe Sage, and the Sage does not require any therapy.

teacher stresses curing the first judgment (*Tusc*. 3.77-78). In Stoicism, there is only one evil, and that is vice. If an agent realizes that they are lacking in virtue, they may be able to judge that they are experiencing something that is in fact an evil circumstance.[157] Thus the first judgement, that something is evil, would be correct. Yet by teaching the patient that feeling distress is not an appropriate response to this circumstance, the teacher is able to keep the student in a non-passionate state of being.

7.2 Use of *perturbatio* and πάθος

As I discussed in the previous chapter, the Sage may have proper emotions (εὐπάθεια) since only the Sage can actually recognize when circumstances are good. We must note that Cicero, in his use of Latin, is at a disadvantage when he attempts to name εὐπάθεια, since he cannot add a prefix to his name for the passions, *perturbationes*. *Perturbatio* is taken from the verb *perturbo*. *Perturbo* could be used to describe a disturbance in the mind during Cicero's age.[158] *Perturbo*, of course, is the verb *turbo* with the prefix *pre-*. *Turbo* was used in Classical Latin to describe a disturbance of a person or state,[159]to rouse a passion,[160] and to

[157] For the problem that this realization creates in Stoic values, see White 1995: 244; Reydam-Schils 2005: 134-135; Sorabji 2000: 32.
[158] See Lucr. 6.1280; Caes. *Gal*. 2.21.3, 4.14.2; Liv. 30.37.9 as examples.
[159] Liv. 8.17.8
[160] Verg. *A*. 8.435; Sen. *Dial*. 5.30.1; Cic. *Tusc*. 3.25.

confound.[161] Cicero does not seem to be modifying the meaning of *perturbatio,* other than to try to relate it to *morbus*. Clearly, though, Cicero could not add a prefix to *perturbatio* for grammatical reasons since it already has one, but also because the root of the verb already denotes a negative disturbance. The Greek term πάθος, in contrast, could be used to describe an event or experience that was either good or bad.[162] Thus the prefix εὐ- could be added to πάθη to stress the positive qualities of these emotions.

There are other obstacles that Cicero had to overcome in his discussion of passions. Chrysippus could have developed a system for treating incurred passions without having any difficulties with terminology. Terms with the παθ- root had connotations of a bodily affliction. Hippocrates uses the παθ- root thus.[163] Perhaps more importantly for Cicero, though, Plato uses the root in such a manner, in a work that Cicero himself modeled. At 439c-d of the *Republic*, Plato discusses the contest between two parts of the soul. One side urges one to drink, the other may forbid it. The inhibitor arises from reason, but the impulse arises from πάθηματα τε καὶ νοσήματα. Plato is treating παθ- in much the same manner that Cicero does: he is clearly drawing a relation between πάθος and νόσος, and he is treating them as problems of the *animus*, though they apparently can be associated with the *corpus* as well. Thus in Chrysippus' treatment, when he refers to the πάθη

[161] Verg. *A*. 2.200,8.223; Liv. 7.173.
[162] Pl. *Tht*. 139c; Hdt. 5.4; S. *Aj*. 313; A. *Ag*. 177,533; Arist. *Cael*. 298a28.
[163] Hp.*VM*. 2, Epid. 2.2.24.

there is already a sense of the symptoms of the *corpus*. Cicero does not seem to have that freedom in his use of language. For him to convey his concept that *perturbatio* is disease-like he needs to equate the two terms. Thus, in addition to the sections noted above:

> *Omnes autem perturbationes animi morbos philosophi appellant negantque stultum*
>
> *quemquam his morbis vacare*. (*Tusc*. 3.9)But philosophers call all the disturbances (*perturbationes*) of the soul diseases (*morbi)* and they deny that anyone that is a fool is free from these diseases.
>
> *Sed de omni animi, ut ego posui, perturbatione – morbo, ut Graeci volunt – explicabo.* (*Tusc*. 3.13)
>
> But I shall discuss every disturbance of the soul, disease, as the Greeks prefer, as I established (that I would do).

Cicero fears that his reader may forget the analogy that he is making, and thus he regularly pairs *morbus* with his selected term *perturbatio*, even though he admits that it is improper Latin. It is interesting to note that after Cicero, in the works of Horace and Juvenal, *morbus* is used as an affliction of the *animus* (Juv. 2.7; H.*S.* 1.6.30, 2.3.121).

7.3 *morbus*

Perhaps surprisingly, Cicero also uses *morbus* as a symptom of the *animus* without feeling any need to qualify the usage.

> *Venio nunc ad istius, quem ad modum ipse appellat, stadium, ut amici eius, morbum et insaniam, ut Siculi, latrocinium* (2 *Verr*. 4.1)

> I come now to his devotion, as he himself (Verres) calls it, but what his friends call his disease and insanity, and what the Sicilians call his villainy.
>
> *Ut saepe homines aegri morbo gravi, cum aestu febrique iactantur, si aquam gelidam biberunt, primo relevari videntur, deinde multo gravius vehementiusque adflictantur, sic hic morbus qui est in re publica relevatus istius poena vehementius reliquis vivis ingravescat* (*Cat*. 1.31)
>
> As often when men are distressed with a serious disease, when they are disturbed by heat and fever if they drink cold water, they at first seem to be relieved, but then they are afflicted much more strongly and seriously, so this disease, which is in the Republic, relieved by the punishment of this man, will grow worse while the others are still living.
>
> *Quid si corporis gravioribus morbis vitae iucunditas impeditur, quanto magis animi morbis impediri necesse est. Animi autem morbi sunt cupiditates immensae et inanes divitarum, gloriae, domintionis, libidinosarum etiam voluptatum.* (*Fin*. 1.59)
>
> Well, if the charm of life is hindered by the more painful bodily diseases, then how much more must it be hindered by the diseases of the mind? But immense and foolish desires for wealth, glory, power and even wanton pleasures are diseases of the mind.

In the passages from the speeches Cicero is referring to a mental perversion of sorts, and the usage appears to be mainly a rhetorical tool for a courtroom setting. It does indicate that, at the very least, Cicero believed that the analogy would not be difficult to imagine. In the passage from *De Finibus*, Cicero is apparently unwilling to substitute *perturbatio* for *morbus animi* at this point. It is unclear why he believes *this* to be fair use of Latin. It may be that he does not believe that *morbus* is able to mean "passions" without noting that they are *morbi animi*.

8. ἡδονή

The passions form a group of impulses that Cicero believes should be subject to reason, and according to the Stoics, ultimately eradicated. Cicero writes a great amount on the passion of grief in the latter parts of *De Finibus*, but the early half of the work contain his thoughts on the passion of pleasure. In *De Finibus* 2.5, Cicero requests that Torquatus, an Epicurean, define pleasure (*voluptas*). Torquatus laughs at the request: who is there that needs a definition of pleasure? Cicero says that he himself would be such a person if he did not already have a thorough understanding of the concept. Cicero provokes Torquatus into the definition by stating that he believes that Epicurus himself did not know what pleasure was, even though he was persistent in stating that it was necessary to express the meaning of the terms he was using. Torquatus laughs at the idea that the one who said that pleasure is the End (*finis*) would not know what pleasure is. Well, Cicero replies, either Epicurus does not know or the rest of the world is mistaken. Cicero then defines *voluptas*:

> *Voluptatem hanc esse sentiunt omnes quam sensus accipiens movetur et iucunditate quadam perfunditur.* (*Fin.* 2.6)
>
> Everyone thinks that this is pleasure; that is, a sense, taking it in, is movedand is imbued by a certain pleasantness.

Torquatus believes that Epicurus thought the same thing. Cicero does agree that Epicurus uses this definition at times; however, he has an issue with Epicurus grouping "freedom from pain" under the title of pleasure. For as Cicero writes:

> *Omnes enim iucundum motum quo sensus hilaretur Graece ἡδονήν, Latine voluptatem vocant.* (*Fin.* 2.8)
>
> For everyone calls the pleasant movement by which the sense may be gladdened ἡδονή in Greek and *voluptas* in Latin.

This is Cicero's introduction of the term ἡδονή. It may be possible to anticipate it in his earlier comment on *voluptas*, but this is the first time that Cicero actually states the Greek equivalent in this work.[164] In any case, Cicero uses several terms that are of interest. Primarily, he refers to *voluptas* as a *iucundus motus*. This "movement" could refer to several different things. It could refer to an external stimulus; the fact that Cicero is speaking with an Epicurean may lead us to think that he is discussing a bodily sensation, and his inclusion of the term *sensus* may strengthen that opinion. Yet it is also possible that Cicero is describing a Stoic "movement," which, as we saw in the previous chapter, is a term used to describe the passions, in the sense that the appetites are movements of the mind towards propositions in images. Thus, it is possible that there is a conflict of language in the discussion between Cicero and the Epicurean Torquatus. Cicero indicates that this conflict existed, and that Epicureans accused outsiders of not understanding their

[164] The Greek term ἡδονή only appears in *De Finibus* and twice in *Epistulae ad Familiares*.

language, when he states that he is rather annoyed that Epicureans tell him that he does not understand what Epicurus means by pleasure:

> *tamen interdum soleo subirasci. Egone non intellego, quid sit ἡδονή Graece, Latine voluptas? Utram tandem linguam nescio?* (*Fin.* 2.12)
>
> And then sometimes I get annoyed. Do I not understand the meaning of the Greek (word) ἡδονή, the Latin *voluptas*? Which of the two languages am I ignorant of?

Cicero continues:

> *Et quidem saepe quaerimus verbum Latinum par Graeco et quod idem valeat; hic nihil fuit quod quaereremus. Nullum inveniri verbum potest quod magis idem declaret Latine quod Graece, quam declarat voluptas.* (*Fin.* 2.13)
>
> Indeed, we quite often seek for a Latin word that is suitable for a Greek term and has the same power; but here there was no need that we conduct such a search. For no word can be found which signifies the same thing in Latin as in Greek more than *voluptas* does.

Cicero is adamant that ἡδονή and *voluptas* mean the same thing. Yet we do not know what he means by *voluptas* at this point. He is either discussing a sensation of the body, or he is discussing an emotion. He appears to anticipate this objection because he tells us that *voluptas* is commonly associated with both the body and the soul:

> *Huic verbo omnes qui ubique sunt qui Latine sciunt duas res subiciunt, laetitiam in animo, commotionem suavem iucunditatis in corpore.* (*Fin.*2.8)
>
> Everyone, everywhere, who knows Latin attaches two ideas to this word: *laetitia* in the mind and an agreeable arousal of pleasantness in the body.

Thus, according to Cicero, *voluptas* is not only corporal, and therefore neither is ἡδονή. The terms can refer to both a mental and a bodily feeling. In this manner,

Cicero attempts to alleviate the conflict of language between himself and the Epicureans. Torquatus cannot accuse Cicero of not understanding what Epicurus means by pleasure; everyone in the Latin world believes that *voluptas* refers to a happiness (*laetitia*) in the mind *and* a pleasurable feeling in the body.

At this point, having dealt with conflicts in the language, Cicero discusses his concept of the value of pleasure. For much of the dialogue, he attacks Epicurus for not offering two Ends. Epicurus appears to have two definitions of pleasure: one is that which sweetly and joyfully moves the sense (*id est qua sensus dulciter ac iucunde movetur*, *Fin*. 2.18), and the other is freedom from pain (*dolor*). Cicero ridicules the former definition, stating that if sheep could talk this would be their definition of pleasure. Cicero claims that pleasure should be set aside, since acting pleasantly cannot compare to acting "well" (2.25-26).[165] [165]After reviewing the Ends of the different schools, Cicero states that reason, not the senses, must judge the End, and reason will not place pleasure among things of moral worth (*honestas*, 2.36-37). Cicero ridicules the idea that humans came into being in order to eat and enjoy the pleasure of procreation (*procreandi voluptas*) as if they were slow and sluggish sheep (2.40). The human's faculty of reason indicates that humans are meant for more than simple pleasure. Cicero, referencing Chrysippus, decides that the central issue, in regard to the End, is the contest between virtue (*virtus*) and

[165] Cicero uses *bene* as his adverb "well." He qualifies this with the terms *recte, frugaliter, honeste*.

pleasure (*voluptas*) (2.44). He believes that nature stirs us towards the virtues wisdom, justice, courage and temperance (2.46-47). These are virtues that Epicurus mentions too seldom (2.51). In fact, Epicurus' doctrine removes the possibility for acting with temperance or courage (2.60). Yet examples of Romans acting out of virtue, not pleasure, are many (2.62). There are no great Romans, or Greeks, who were supporters of pleasure and who are now honoured (2.67). Cicero then attacks the Epicureans because of the lack of dignity in the word *voluptas* (2.75). For this reason, says Cicero, Torquatus speaks like a Peripatetic or a Stoic when he is in the law courts or the Senate, and mentions virtues such as duty and public dignity rather than advancing the concept of acting for his own *voluptas* (2.76). Happiness, the attainment of which is the aim of every philosophical school, cannot rest on something as fleeting as pleasure (2.86). It is possible that humans will lose the feeling of pleasure. This loss would make them miserable, and thus they would live in fear. Happiness must be permanent, as wisdom is (2.87). Epicureans cannot guarantee that the Sage will be happy. The agent who believes that pleasure is the chief good judges everything by sensation (*sensus*) and not by reason (2.91). Cicero concludes his attack on pleasure by stating that the Epicurean Chief Good does not distinguish between humans and beasts (2.111), and to judge by pleasure is to judge with the lowest part of the mind (2.115).

We can see that Cicero discards pleasure (*voluptas*). We have seen that he uses *voluptas* to refer to the bodily sensation and the emotion. While it appears that

Cicero is attacking the bodily sensation, he clarifies the type of pleasure that he is condemning. His attack on the bodily sensation is explicit when he refers to the *voluptas corporis*, but he notes that he is willing to add to this *voluptas animi*. Yet he states that he will do so only if his audience understands that by this he means the mental pleasure that is aroused by the bodily pleasure (*in voluptate corporis* [*addam, si vis, animi, dum ea ipsa, ut vultis, sit e corpore*], 2.89). This is an important qualifier, because Cicero later contrasts this type of mental pleasure with the pleasure that comes from reading a poem or studying pictures (2.107). Cicero is quite explicit that not all forms of pleasure come from the bodily sensation. Thus we may conclude that *voluptas* is that name for pleasure that is associated with the bodily sensation, whether it be the bodily sensation or takes its source from it. Further, at 2.107 Cicero is careful to avoid describing the pleasure taken from reading as *voluptas*, instead rendering it in the verbal form *delectare*. At this point, Cicero does not provide an abstract noun for describing the type of pleasure that derives from reading, though he does indicate two possibilities in an earlier passage when he states that neither *laetitia* nor *gaudium* refer to the body (*non dicitur laetitia nec gaudium in corpora, Fin* .2.13). I shall first devote my attention to the study of Cicero's term *laetitia,* to see if he uses it to describe our particular type of pleasure.

8.1 *laetitia*

There are several instances where Cicero presents both *laetitia* and *voluptas* in close proximity to each other. These are the best areas in which to determine the relationship, if any, Cicero sees between *voluptas* and *laetitia*. We have seen how, according to Cicero, *voluptas* is the best translation of ἡδονή. The process of translation, according to him, is simple; no Latin term could better describe the Greek original. He indicates that *laetitia* and *voluptas* can refer to a mental feeling, but only *voluptas* can mean a bodily feeling (2.13). At *De Finibus* 1.25, Cicero states that there are so many Epicureans because they believe that Epicurus declares *recta et honesta quae sint, ea facere ipsa per se laetitiam, id est voluptatem* ("do those things that are right and honest for their own joy, i.e. pleasure"). Here, it is apparently not important whether one says "do something for its own *laetitia*" or "do something for its *voluptas*." In this statement, Cicero portrays the two terms as interchangeable, and does not appear to reserve one for the body and one for the soul.

The matter is further confused when Cicero's Torquatus states: *quamquam autem et laetitiam nobis voluptas animi et molestiam dolor afferat* ("but although there is a *voluptas* of the mind which gives us *laetitia* and pain which produces annoyance," *Fin.*1.54). We have seen that *voluptas* of the body can produce *voluptas* of the mind, but here Torquatus indicates the Epicurean belief that the mental pleasure develops into *laetitia*. Also significant here is the contrast of *voluptas* and *dolor*. Both words

can describe the mental and bodily feelings, and *dolor* could be describing "grief" here as easily as "pain."

In Book 3, when Cicero is conversing with Cato the Younger, the topic turns to *perturbatio*. Cato is dividing the disturbances into classes, and he defines one thus:

> *Quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi ἡδονή appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam...* (*Fin.*3.35)
>
> Something the Stoics call, in a common name for body and soul, ἡδονή, but I prefer to call it *laetitia*, a sort of pleasant elation of an exulting soul...

According to Cicero's Cato, Cicero is quite in line with Stoicism when he claims that ἡδονή refers to both bodily and mental feelings. Yet why, having devoted so much effort to attaching *voluptas* to ἡδονή in the previous book, does Cicero thus ruin his translation? One may argue that Cicero is actually representing Cato's beliefs here, not his own. Cicero portrays Cato as an important participant in the translation of Greek terms into Latin. Cato, while discussing κακία, states *Quas enim κακίας Graeci appellant, vitia malo quam malitias nominare* ("For what the Greeks call κακίαι, I prefer to call vices rather than malice," *Fin.* 3.39). At this point Cicero interrupts to exclaim how clear Cato's language is. It seems to him that Cato *Latine docere philosophiam et ei quasi civitatem dare* ("is teaching philosophy in Latin and is giving to her a sort of citizenship," *Fin.* 3.40). Hitherto philosophy has not seemed at home in Rome, since *nec offerre sese nostris sermonibus* ("she does not present herself to our language"). For these reasons, Cicero says:

> *Attendo te studiose et quaecumque rebus iis de quibus hic sermo est nomina imponis memoriae mando; mihi enim erit iisdem istis fortasse iam utendum.* (*Fin.* 3.40)
>
> I am paying close attention to you and whatever names you are imposing on those things about which this conversation is, I am committing to memory; for perhaps I will need to make use of the same things.

He continues by saying that Cato is quite right to have defined κακία thus. The emphasis could be on κακία, then, and less on what Cato discussed earlier. However, that would seem unlikely since through much of his speech Cato has been introducing Greek terms and defining them as he chooses.[166] The entire passage in which Cicero praises Cato for his translations and allows him a certain freedom in the process (*Fin*. 3.15) seems to be directed more towards Cicero himself than the historical Cato.[167] Therefore, we should not dismiss the translations that Cicero's Cato provides on the grounds that they are not spoken by the character Cicero. Yet if Cicero is referring to Cato's translation of ήδονή, it becomes unclear how Cicero translates the technical term ήδονή. As I indicated above, Cicero may suppose that there are two forms of mental pleasure; one is that which arises from bodily pleasure, and the other comes from acts similar to looking at beautiful scenery. He demotes the bodily sensation, including the accompanying pleasure of the soul. We may expect that Cicero reserves the term *laetitia* to describe the pleasure taken from reading, and thus interchanging the terms creates a problem.

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[166] See also Cato's discussion on: καταλήψεις (*Fin*. 3.17); καθῆκον (3.20); ὠφέλημα (3.33); πάθος (3.35); ήδονή (3.35).
[167] MacKendrick 1989: 132.

The two terms appear together in another of Cicero's works, *Tusculan Disputations.* In 3.24, Cicero states that disturbances arise in four ways. He defines them:

> *Nam duae sunt ex opinione boni, quarum altera, voluptas gestiens, id est, praeter modum elata laetitia, opinione praesentis magni alicuius boni...*
>
> There are two that arise from belief of good, one of them, exulting pleasure, that is, *laetitia* elevated beyond limit by the belief of some great present good...

Apparently, Cicero is referring to the emotion. It is perplexing that whereas before we have seen *voluptas* produce *laetitia*, now Cicero claims that *voluptas* is the extreme form of *laetitia*. Is it then that the external *voluptas* produces *laetitia*, which, when taken to an extreme enough level becomes the mental *voluptas*? This concept is reminiscent of Chrysippus' writings on passions. Chrysippus refers to the passions as an impulse going beyond reason (Gal. *Stoic.* 3.462, 3.480).[168] Cicero clearly has this concept in mind when he is describing pleasure in this passage. Further, he identifies the "reasonable" emotion as *laetitia*, and this corresponds to the Stoic concept of the εὐπάθειαι. These, as I have discussed in the previous chapters, are the emotions of the Sage. This type of classification and distinction between *laetitia* and *voluptas* is what we may hope for from Cicero, but he does not adhere to it; cf. *Tusc.* 5.68: *et ut turpes sunt qui efferent se laetitia tum, cum fruuntur Veneriis voluptatibus*... ("and as they are base who raise themselves by *laetitia*, when they enjoy the pleasures of Venus"). The *laetitia* mentioned here has close ties to

bodily pleasure. Either it is synonymous with *voluptas*, or it is the result of it. Either way, it is clear that Cicero does not approve of it.

There are a few other places where Cicero identifies *voluptas* and *laetitia* as virtually interchangeable. In a letter to Atticus *(Att.* 14.17a.1.1) Cicero writes: *etsi contentus eram, mi Dolabella, tua Gloria satisque ex ea magnam laetitiam voluptatemque capiebam* ("Content as I am, my Dolabella, with your glory, and finding in that great joy and pleasure"). The Latin terms are interchangeable as a description of an emotion, and neither seems to be the result of a bodily pleasure. In *de Oratore* 1.197 Cicero's Crassus tells his audience that *percipietis etiam illam ex cognitione iuris laetitiam et voluptatem, quod, quantum praestiterint nostri maiores prudentia ceteris gentibus, tum facillime intellegetis* ("For you will know, from the examination of the law, that joy and pleasure, because you will easily understand how much our ancestors surpassed the wisdom of other peoples"). Once again, *voluptas* and *laetitia* appear to represent emotions, and not products of corporal pleasure. In these two passages, Cicero elevates *voluptas*, separating it from the bodily pleasure that we saw him dismiss. At *Tusc*. 5.68 he demoted *laetitia.* The result is that, despite the passages from *Fin*. 2.107 and *Tusc*. 3.24, we cannot conclude that Cicero reserves *laetitia,* and only *laetitia*, to describe a pleasure that he approves of.

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[168] Note that Stobaeus (*SVF*. 3.378) attributes this definition to Stoics in general.

8.2 *gaudium*

The term that the Stoics used to describe the joy of the Sage was χάρα (DL. 7.116). Cicero offers a different possibility for the translation of χάρα in *Tusc*. 4.13. He states that if the soul believes that it is in possession of some good and it is moved in a rational, calm and consistent manner (*nam cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter*) then this state is called *gaudium* (usually translated as "joy"). He contrasts this with when the soul exalts foolishly and extensively (*cum autem inaniter et effuse animus exsultat*). He refers to this state as a passionate or too strong happiness (*laetitia gestiens vel nimia*). This state is elation without reason (*sine ratione animi elatio)*. The problem with this definition is that by calling the passion an excessive *laetitia*, it implies that the *normal laetitia* is fine. At *Tusc*. 4.66 Cicero contrasts the approvable emotions with the passions, arguing that it is fitting to feel joy (*gaudere*), but not fitting to rejoice (*laetari*). He explains that he is explicitly distinguishing rejoicing from joy for the sake of his argument (*sic gaudere decet, laetari non decet, quoniam docendi causa a gaudio laetitiam distinguimus*). He also uses *gaudium* when he describes the soul of the Sage as being in a state of joy (*Tusc*. 5.69, 72), and when he argues that the soul can take an insatiable joy from the divine mind (5.70).[169]

[169] These last three examples (5.69, 70, 72) are spoken by Cicero's Antiochus (of Ascalon), who is a member of the Academy.

However, Cicero is not always consistent with this definition, especially when using the verbal form. At *Tusc*. 3.19, and elsewhere, he portrays a scenario where a man may take joy (*gaudere*) in another man's misfortune. Also in this passage, he uses *laetari* and *gaudere* interchangeably, which we saw him explicitly contrast at *Tusc*. 4.66. Later in the work, while discussing Epicurus, Cicero attaches feeling joy (*gaudere*) with *voluptas* (3.47). He makes a similar attachment in *De Finibus* 1.30, when Torquatus states that according to Epicurus every animal is happy (*gaudere*) with *voluptas*. According to Cicero's Torquatus, everything that humans take joy in is a *voluptas* (*omne autem id quo gaudemus voluptas est*, *Fin*.1.37). Cicero freely uses *gaudere* to describe the emotion felt when the agent achieves *voluptas*. He usually creates this relation in reference to the beliefs of the Epicureans, as at *Fin*.2.31, 41, 57, yet the effect that this creates cannot be ignored. Cicero never explicitly corrects the terminology of the Epicureans. For example, he does not offer: "*gaudere* is the rational joy an agent feels upon knowing that they have some good, and not the emotion that the agent may feel upon partaking in *voluptas*. That emotion is *laetari*." He does tell us that it is fitting to *gaudere* (*Tusc*. 4.66), but at times he defines *gaudere* as the resultant emotion of *voluptas*, something that he does not approve of.

8.3 Stoic pleasure

I should trace out the Stoic belief about pleasure, since I believe that Cicero has this in mind when he appears to separate the pleasure taken from bodily sensation from that which is derived from activities like reading. I have mentioned in the previous chapter that the Stoics considered the passions "bad," and they considered that pleasure was one of the passions. Stobaeus (*Stoic*. 3.378) reports that the Stoics believed that pleasure was something we experienced when we grasped the objects of our desire or avoided those of our fear. Andronicus (*Stoic*. 3.391) refers to pleasure as an opinion[170] that something good is present. The good feeling (εὐπάθεια) that corresponds to pleasure is as Diogenes Laertius calls it (7.115) χάρα. The relationship that χάρα has with reason (εὐλογία, *ratio*) distinguishes it from ἡδονή. For the Stoics, pleasure (ἡδονή) in the bodily sense is an indifferent (Gel. 1.2.9) and a by-product (DL 7.85). It becomes a passion when the agent assents to false judgments about the desirability of pleasurable experiences.[171] Thus, in Stoic teaching, ἡδονή is either an indifferent or a passion. The corresponding emotion that they approve of is χάρα. It seems unlikely that a Stoic could use these two terms interchangeably, as we saw Cicero use them.

[170] This opinion is, of course, false. The Sage never opines, and only a Sage can know what is good.

8.4 Roman concept of pleasure.

We have seen that Cicero freely uses *laetitia* and *voluptas* to describe the sensations of both mind and body. We have also seen that he uses both terms to downgrade the concept of pleasure, although at times he uses *laetitia* or *gaudium* to describe the Stoic emotion that is a εὐπάθεια. This interchanging of terms creates a problem in Cicero`s classifications, and we may suspect that this is because of common Latin usage during his time. If it was a common feature of Roman speakers to speak of pleasure by any of these terms (*laetitia*, *gaudium* or *voluptas*), then perhaps the areas where Cicero is not distinct are places where he slips into common Latin usage. An examination of the treatment of ήδονή by Cicero's contemporary Lucretius may prove illuminating.[172] Though Lucretius does not use the word ήδονή, he is surely translating it throughout his work. For various reasons, we cannot expect that Lucretius is as vigorous in creating direct translations as Cicero. Yet the comparison between Lucretius and Cicero should reveal the contemporary perception of the term ήδονή.

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[171] Long and Sedley 1987: 421. The same definition applies to *dolor* (λύπη), which is an indifferent in the physical aspect, and it becomes a passion when the agent gives importanceto that physical aspect.

[172] I chose Lucretius because the probability that he was often translating ἠδονή seemed high. Yet other Latin authors display the same tendency to use the three terms, *voluptas, laetitia*,and *gaudium* in reference to bodily pleasure and the emotion. For *voluptas* and emotion, see Stat. *Silv*.1.pr; Tac. *Hist* .3.83; Suet. *Tib*. 42.2. For *voluptas* and sex, see Ov. *Ars*. 2.623; Petr. 134.9; Apul. *Met*. 2. On *gaudium* in a physical sense, see Hor. *Carm*. 3.6.28; Ov. *Ars*. 3.88, *Met*.7.736. For *gaudium* as an emotion, see Sen. *Ep*. 59.2; Tac. *Hist*. 2.55; Verg. *A*. 6.513. For *laetitia*, see Verg. *A*. 12.700; Liv. 26.37.2; Tac. *Hist*. 2.45.

In *De Rerum Natura* 1.2, Lucretius praises Venus as the *voluptas* of man and gods. It is difficult to decide whether Lucretius is referring to an emotion or a bodily sensation. Lucretius may be stating that Venus provides humanity with joy, yet if we understand "Venus" in the figurative sense of "sex," then *voluptas* could refer to the bodily sensation. This dual meaning also appears at 2.171, where Lucretius tells that Venus urges nature to produce *voluptas*. There are many instances where *voluptas* refers to the bodily sensation: 4.625 describes the *voluptas* of flavour; 4.1050 mentions the sexual *voluptas;* 4.113, lovers' limbs are full of *voluptas*; 4.1206, dogs become stuck together because of *voluptas*. Also, at times, Lucretius uses *voluptas* to refer to the mental emotion: 1.139, Lucretius proclaims that putting Greek into Latin is difficult, but the *voluptas* of friendship urges him forward; 3.27, he describes a quasi-divine *voluptas,* which comes from natural events that have taken hold of him; 4.1200, Lucretius claims that females take *voluptas* from impregnation.

Thus far, there exists no discrepancy between Cicero's and Lucretius' translations of ἡδονή. As Cicero says, everyone who speaks Latin would translate ἡδονή as *voluptas.* However, problems arise when examining Lucretius' treatment of *laetitia*. We have seen how Cicero views this term as a description of only the emotion. Lucretius does not define it thus. In many instances, he uses the adjectival form to describe something as "joyful."[173] Yet at times, he appears to be describing

[173] See, for instance, 1.13, 1.254, 2.316, and 2.698.

the bodily sensation of ἡδονή. At 3.115, in describing his notion that different parts of the body can feel different things, Lucretius wites that at times *omnis accipit in se laetitiae motus et curas cordis inanis* ("the whole takes into itself *motus* of *laetitia* and inane cares of the heart"). It is not clear that Lucretius means the bodily sensation, but he seems, at any rate, to be demoting this type of pleasure with the adjective *inanis*. At 3.149, continuing his argument, Lucretius describes how just as when the head or eye is struck with pain and the whole body is not tormented, *sic animus nonnumquam laeditur ipse laetitiaque viget, cum cetera pars animai per membra atque artus nulla novitate cietur* ("thus the mind sometimes is pained or thrives by *laetitia*, when another part of the soul is not moved by the organs and limbs"). This, also, could be a reference to the mental emotion. If the *animus* thrives by *laetitia*, it could either refer to a state of joy or an external stimulus producing the state of thriving. However, we may grant some strength to the bodily sensation, since Lucretius completes the clause by discussing external stimuli of the limbs.

Lucretius uses the term *gaudium* in a similar manner. He says at one point that the soul can become joyous (*gaudere*), seemingly without any pleasure of the body (3.144). Lucretius uses the term to describe the emotion at 5.169 and 5.1060, and also at 3.71, although in this passage he is discussing an emotion of seemingly base men. Yet Lucretius links *gaudium* with sex just as frequently (4.1105, 1195, 1204, 5.853).

It is not entirely clear that Lucretius attaches both the mental and corporal to the term *laetitia*. It appears likely that *gaudium* is associated with bodily pleasure. This rendering of ἡδονή would fit with Lucretius' translation practice. Sedley describes the process of translation, explicitly contrasting Lucretius and Cicero. He believes that Cicero would narrow down the possibility of Latin terms, as translations of Greek terms, to only one. However, he argues that Lucretius, as a poet, is attempting to capture the sense of the Greek not by a technical term, but by many metaphors.[174] Thus, the two are approaching the process from entirely different goals, and that they have different results should be no surprise. The inclusion of Lucretius into this study, however, helps illuminate what Cicero was confronting when attempting to translate ἡδονή.

[174] Sedley 1998: 44.

Summary

My goal in this study was to research various aspects of Cicero's translation of certain Greek technical terms. As part of this analysis, I examined the background relationship between Greeks and Romans, up to Cicero's own time. I found that Cato the Elder had publicly denounced aspects of Hellenism while maintaining a private appreciation of Greek learning in order to defend Roman culture. I believe that in this respect Cato was acting in similar fashion to many of his contemporaries. Yet by Cicero's time Greek learning had become accepted at Rome, even to the point that the Greek language was thought to be more suitable than Latin for philosophical discourse. It was against such a theory that Cicero aimed his criticism. This fact provides some of the background necessary to understand Cicero's process of translation. He often provides Greek technical terms and subsequently offers several possible translations. This could be viewed as Cicero's uncertainty which Latin term best translates the Greek, but I believe that by providing several Latin choices for a single Greek term Cicero aims to illustrate the richness of the Latin language.

It is also evident that Cicero allowed himself a certain freedom in his translations, as he himself mentions several times. He claimed that he was not providing simple word for word translations, but that he was in fact enriching his source material by using only the best facets of the various schools with which he was familiar. These are important points to remember when examining his

translations. In the section on καθῆκον (*officium*, "duty") we saw that Cicero did not, at any one point, provide a concise theory on the various types of duties. Yet if we examine his translation across the breadth of two works, *De Officiis* and *De Finibus*, we can see that Cicero understood the Stoic concepts that he was translating, and I am certain that he could have provided a concise breakdown of the different types of duty had he thought it to be beneficial or necessary.

We can come to a similar conclusion for an apparent oddity in Cicero's translation of ὁρμή (*appetitus*, "appetite"). I believe that although he primarily uses the term ὁρμή in a technical Stoic sense, Cicero's translation of the term is at times influenced by his belief in a divided soul. Thus the translation of ὁρμή appears to be an example of Cicero being rather eclectic in his philosophy, pairing Stoic and Platonic concepts. We must recall that Cicero has given himself permission to behave in this manner, and can conclude that omitting the lesser parts of theories was a facet of his approach.

Again, we may see a divergence from Stoicism, despite his use of a Stoic term, in Cicero's translation of πάθος. I offer that this occurs because of very personal reasons for Cicero, i.e. his failed attempt to console himself after the death of his daughter. The Stoics (though perhaps with the exception of Chrysippus) would treat the disposition of an agent who was suffering a passion. Cicero would rather that treatment focus upon the passion, and then progress towards the proper treatment of an agent's disposition. We can only conclude that when he comments

on the futility of the Stoic method he is speaking from personal experience, and his letters offer some support for this. Thus Cicero has found the Stoic practice wanting and, desiring to offer Rome a philosophy, incorporates different forms of treatment of the passions (mainly grief). As part of Cicero's belief that the passions should be treated by philosophers, he frequently relates the term πάθος to *morbus*. Cicero thus casts the passions as the disease that is to be treated.

In my final chapter, in which I examined Cicero's translation and treatment of the term ήδονή, I found that Cicero was using a variety of terms to translate ήδονή. We may be inclined to approve of this treatment, since Cicero discusses two different types of pleasure: one that is taken from bodily sensation and another that is aroused by activities such as reading or viewing some attractive scenery. Despite offering the Latin terms *laetitia* and *voluptas* to describe these variant types of ήδονή and being explicit in the distinction, Cicero does not force himself to reserve each term for only its respective meaning. In fact, he appears to consider the terms interchangeable. In order to offer some solution to this problematic occurrence, I examined Lucretius' translation of ήδονή. I acknowledge that choosing a poetic author for a comparison with a prose author offers several problems, yet I believe that this comparison, since Cicero and Lucretius were contemporaries, proves illuminating. If we accept that this is a valid comparison then we can conclude, since Lucretius also interchanges *laetitia* and *voluptas*, that it was a common feature of Roman speakers in that time to speak in this manner. Thus I suspect that Cicero,

in those instances where we find that the distinction between the terms is blurred, is simply following regular Latin usage. This does not excuse the act, for this interchanging does not provide a concise reading, yet it is perhaps the best answer as to why it occurs.

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