

Idealist versus Historical Materialist Approach
to the Analysis of Social Change
(The Rise of Nazism in Germany: 1919-1933)

by
Gary Ross Watkins

A thesis submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Master of Arts
(Sociology)
at the University of Manitoba
1983

Thesis Committee:

Dr. K.W. Taylor, Chairman

Dr. S. Brickey

Dr. K.E. McVicar, External Examiner

IDEALIST VERSUS HISTORICAL MATERIALIST APPROACH
TO THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CHANGE
(THE RISE OF NAZISM IN GERMANY: 1919-1933)

BY

GARY ROSS WATKINS

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

© 1983

Permission has been granted to the LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA to lend or sell copies of this thesis, to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film, and UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS to publish an abstract of this thesis.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction	
The Problem	1
Methods	3
Abbreviations	5
II. Four Idealist Approaches to the Analysis of the Rise of Nazism in Germany: 1919-33	
CHAPTER 1 - Hitler	6
CHAPTER 2 - Militarist Attraction of the NSDAP	13
CHAPTER 3 - The Promotion of Anti-Versailles Sentiment by the NSDAP	19
CHAPTER 4 - The Influence of Monopoly - Capital Interests	26
III. Historical Materialist Approach to the Analysis of the Rise of Nazism in Germany: 1919-33	35
IV. Summary and Conclusion	56
V. Appendix	61
VI. Bibliography	71

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE I	NSDAP Membership (1919-33)	12
TABLE II	Party and Military Unit Membership (NSDAP, SPD) (1924-32)	15
TABLE III	Vote Received (NSDAP, SPD) (1924-32)	15
TABLE IV	Vote for Major German Parties in Reichstag Elections (1919-33)	20
TABLE V	Percentage of Total Valid Vote Obtained by Specific Parties in Schleswig-Holstein (Urban and Rural Communities) (1919-32)	25
TABLE VI	Voting Patterns (Right, Centre, Left) (1924-32)	30
TABLE VII	German Occupational Status (Old/New Middle Class)(1882-1933)	42
TABLE VIII	German Occupational Distribution (1852-1939)	43
TABLE IX	Percentage of Total Vote Received by Various Parties (1919-33)	45
TABLE X	Selected Occupational Groups Ranked by Proportion of NSDAP Members (1935)	53
TABLE XI	Social Composition of NSDAP Membership by Occupation (1930)	54
TABLE XII	Social Composition of SPD and KPD Membership by Occupation (1930)	55

LIST OF GRAPHS

GRAPH I	SPD Members and Total Voters (1919-33)	16
GRAPH II	NSDAP Members and Total Voters (1919-33)	17
GRAPH III	Vote for German Parties in Reichstag Elections (1920-33)	22
GRAPH IV	Votes Received by Party Groups	29
GRAPH V	Voting Patterns of Major Parties (NSDAP, SPD, KPD, DNVP)(1919-33)	31
GRAPH VI	Voting Patterns of SPD and KPD (1919-33)	32
GRAPH VII	Indices of Industrial Production (1882-1933) with Registered Unemployment (1919-33)	40
GRAPH VIII	Voting Patterns of Major Parties with Unemploy- ment (1919-33)	47
GRAPH IX	Voting Trends of Major Middle-Class Parties (1919-33)	48

APPENDIX

TABLE A	Indices of Industrial Production (1882-1933)	62
TABLE B	Registered Unemployment (1919-33)	63
TABLE C	Reichstagg Election Results (1919-33)	64
TABLE D	Voting Tendencies by Major Industrial Divisions (1921-32)	65
TABLE E	Program of the Nationalist Socialist German Workers Party (1920)	66

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the tremendous sacrifice of my family throughout the extensive research and writing of the many voluminous drafts. Without their encouraging support and personal sacrifice this thesis would never have been possible. I am deeply indebted to the patience, understanding, and friendship of my daughter Melanie (age 5) who provided me with the most valuable of all lessons in understanding humanity. To Jennifer (age 1 1/2) who provided the extended joy and friendship necessary to our family. And to my patient and loving wife, Sonia, whose endless encouragement, strong support and personal sacrifice for us all enabled me to continue with this work. For all their selfless sacrifice, I am deeply appreciative.

INTRODUCTION

The 'Free Labor Party for a Good Peace' was founded on March 7, 1918. It was reconstituted after World War I under the name 'German Workers Party' and established the twenty-five point program on February 6, 1920 (see Appendix, Table E). On August 8, 1920 the party changed its name to the National Socialist German Workers Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei), and on July 11, 1921 Adolf Hitler was appointed its leader. In March 1933 the NSDAP secured power with 43.9% of the total vote, and 288 of 648 seats in the last 'free' Reichstag elections.

This study is an attempt to account for the origin, development and growth of the NSDAP during the period 1919-33. The thesis will evaluate whether historical materialist or idealist theories provide the better explanation of the rise of the NSDAP to power.

Engels wrote that, "The great basic question of all philosophy concerns the relation of thinking and being" and the question of which is prior (1955:362). This capsulizes the main opposition between idealism and materialism in theory, from which arises the question of what is the more reliable approach to take in social research.

While there are numerous factors to consider in the analysis of the rise of the NSDAP to power, we are concerned with the adequacy of these two major theoretical approaches. Idealist theory approaches questions of the analysis and explanation of phenomena on the basis that the non-material is prior to the material. It proposes that ideas, intentions and purposes are primary, in a causal sense (Marx/Engels, 1973:10). Materialist theory presumes that the material is prior to the non-material: that reality has an objective status. Material conditions give rise to ideas, intentions and purposes (Marx/Engels, 1955:362-4).

Theoretically, the two approaches are opposed to one another with respect to their direction of research. The application of the theory, however, often presents a combination of the two approaches.

Politzer (1977) explains that idealist theory proceeds from the premise that the ideological structure (i.e., ideas) is situated at the base of the social edifice and therefore considered the major factor of significance to understanding social phenomena (ideas --- will --- action). Materialist theory places the material conditions at the base, which give rise to ideas and intentions (material conditions --- ideas). The particular approach utilized can have an important influence on the direction of social research.

Four theories have been selected from the literature for study. Bullock (1952) considers the issue of Hitler's appeal for support to be the vital factor in the NSDAP's success, without which mass support would never have been forthcoming. He contends that the personal characteristics of one particular individual (Hitler), his ideas, as well as his intentions were the significant factor in the success of the NSDAP movement. A similar analysis is presented by Schokking (1955) who proposes that the German supporters were attracted to the militarist image of the NSDAP. From what might at first appear to be a materialist perspective, Baumont (1955) contends that it was not just the economic effects of the Versailles Treaty that brought about support for the NSDAP. He also proposes that the NSDAP successfully capitalized on the propagandized issue of the Treaty to gather support for the party. Neumann (1942) not only presents the more materialist premise of the crisis of monopoly capitalism, but also the ability of big business to direct major support for the NSDAP, a premise which leans more towards an idealist approach.

Historial materialist theory places the economic structure at the base, and studies changes in society by beginning with the social and economic conditions under which the people live (economic conditions --- class --- ideas). Marx's (1955) historical materialist approach proposes that what explains ideas is the social milieu in which we find classes, themselves determined "in the last analysis" by the mode of production.

All of these theories will be evaluated in terms of their ability to explain variations in voting patterns. The data also relies upon unemployment statistics, production levels, party membership as well as historical documentation.

METHODS - The respective theories address a question specific to Germany: the rise of the NSDAP (i.e., Nazis) to power under a parliamentary system of government. The unit of analysis for the evaluation of the theories is Germany, which was one of four advanced capitalist countries of this period. The study will attempt primarily to determine which theory gives the better accounting of the event under consideration. The period of analysis will be 1919-33. This marks the initial founding of the NSDAP as a political party up to its assumption of power in 1933. It denotes the actual period of origin, development and rise of the NSDAP to power. The major focus of this study will be on the internal events and social dynamics. The external forces such as international trade, imperialism, diplomacy, and geopolitics, whose relationship is not central to the question, will not be examined. This study will rely heavily on voting data to provide continuity in the examination of the theories, but other data on unemployment, production, party membership, etc. will also be utilized.

The evaluations, in short, will (i) be specific to Germany (ii) focus only on the rise of the NSDAP to power (iii) consider only internal

processes (iv) rely heavily on voting behaviour data. The above boundaries, however, impose the following limitations on the evaluations of the theories examined: (i) the evaluation of a single process in one country may not be as thorough as a comparative study involving separate countries; (ii) the relatively short time-span used in this analysis creates a lack of additional insight that might come from examination of periods of dominance, demise and afterwards; (iii) an examination of only internal processes risks overlooking external factors that might have had a contributing influence on the event under consideration; (iv) the voting data cannot be used to definitively refute the idealist theories. Only those aspects of the theories which have direct implication for voting behaviour are put to empirical test.

ABBREVIATIONS

- NSDAP: Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (National Socialist German Labor Party) or "Nazis".
- DNVP: Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National People's Party) or "Conservatives".
- DVP: Deutsche Volkspartei (German People's Party) or "Right Liberals".
- DDP: Deutsche Demokratische Partei (German Democratic Party) or "Democrats"; party later changed name to Staatspartei.
- SPD: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) or "Social Democrats".
- USPD: Unabhanengige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany).
- KPD: Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany) or "Communists".

CHAPTER I

HITLER

It is difficult to study the rise of the NSDAP movement to power without acknowledging the presence of its leader, Adolf Hitler. Bullock (1955) contends that Hitler's individual leadership characteristics were significantly responsible for the Party's success, "without which, support would never have been forthcoming". He also attributes the success of the NSDAP movement to the suggestibility of the German masses who responded to Hitler "the master of mass emotion". The analysis is supported, in part, by evidence of the growth and development of the Party from 1921-33 under Hitler (Table 1) and by the NSDAP's acquisition of power in March 1933.

Bullock's study proceeds from the primary assumption that there is one factor of significance to the phenomenon (i.e. Hitler). He contends that successful examples of Hitler's political manoeuvring support this conclusion.

The premise of Bullock's explanation suggests a co-relation between two separate levels of comparison - the individual and social movement. It is an attempt to indicate that a generalized psychological mechanism (i.e. identity with leader) is functioning in the mass, and that it is assumed to be a major function of the massified state. While this factor might appear to resist substantiation by verifiable data there is also the tendency with this direction of analysis to overlook the meaning of particular individuals involved in collective behavior. As Lebon (1960) has noted, the crowd is rarely considered unanimous or undifferentiated and, because of the lack of control there remains the potential to impute one's own factor of significance.

It would be difficult to adequately assess Hitler's personal contributions to the degree of NSDAP popularity. However, this general premise of collective behaviour might be examined on the basis of mass theory.

For the mass political theorist mass movements are typically movements of the uprooted, the powerless, those lacking integrative relationships (Sandor Halebsky, 1976:179); those segments of a society that lack a sense of membership in a class, religious, occupational, neighborhood or other major collectives (1976:45). Or, more succinctly, in the words of William Kornhauser, masses are composed of "people who are not integrated into broad social groups, including classes" (1960:14) rather, "the debris of other classes" (Hannah Arendt, 1951:138), a "glob of humanity", according to Philip Selznik (1952:284), formed by "the atomization of all social and cultural relationships within which human beings gain their moral sense of membership in society" (Robert Nisbet, 1953:198-99).

In accounting for the support received by the Nazi movement in Weimar Germany, the mass theory interpretation finds one of its clearest applications. Post-World War I Germany is described by Gerhard Ritter (1957) as exemplifying a Nazi ideology engendered by "an intense process of economic and social levelling, until the whole of society was ground down into a mass" (1957:396). In this regard, support for Nazism is understood as "a movement that appealed to the uprooted, declassed and anomic elements in German society" (1951:306) who supported Hitler and the Nazis en masse; and as Kornhauser (1960) explains, "where intermediate relations of community occupations and association are more or less inoperative" (1960:74).

There are, however, certain related difficulties with the type of

psychological origins of Nazi support. Robert Nisbet (1953) stated that what is crucial in the formation of the masses is the atomization of all social and cultural relationships within which human beings gain their moral sense of membership in a society (1953:198-99). But, according to Seymour Lipset (1963), the atomized individual, left alone without membership in any politically significant social unit would lack sufficient interest to participate in politics. For these people politics would be not only hopeless but meaningless (1963:8).

However, in Germany voter participation increased during the 1924-33 period (1963:150). And there is indication that initial NSDAP support was derived from a sustaining politicized sector, rather than the apolitical, apathetic non-voter (Loomis & Beegle, 1946:733).

While mass theory suggests that few factors other than estrangement, anomie and psychological disturbance remain to explain this phenomenon, an analysis of Nazi support indicates that it was much more than this. "The NSDAP's greatest support, for example, came from smaller, not the larger, urban centres and from areas of smaller, not larger, farms" (Rudolf Heberle, 1945). There is an inverse co-relation between the size of the community and the percentage of votes obtained by the NSDAP (1945:89). In addition, the increased popular vote in the large cities was generally cast against Hitler, while the agricultural areas regularly showed a strong interest in him (Pollock, 1944:93). In other words, in just those areas where communal forms, membership and conditions for personal affect, such as family ties, were greatest, and even exposure to overt party propaganda minimal, support for the Nazis was highest. Just the opposite should have been the case according to mass theory. William Allen (1965), for example, noted in his case study of the town of Thalburg (1930-33) that no major figures among the principal leadership of the Nazi party ever reached

Thalburg nor were the majority of the townspeople who voted NSDAP involved in the party or its activities beyond attending meetings. In this instance NSDAP support did not appear to arise from political estrangement, or lack or loss of ties and a consequent search for community, as Bullock suggests, but appeared to be based more on particular social realities. For example, Heberle (1945) states that support was greater where sensitivity to market conditions was greatest, communal solidarity higher and political experience lower, among other factors. He contends that the rational grounds of economic interest in a condition of scant political sophistication (and not an attempt to satisfy some sociopsychic needs arising from disruption of the community (1945:172)) lead to the high support for the Nazi movement. In this regard Jesse Pitts (1958) indicates that the extensiveness and strength of the informal participant organization have often been overlooked because they lack the clear references of name, headquarters, formal officers, and the like (1958:262). Halebsky (1976) has noted, for example, that the working class individual is strongly implicated in the working class community, and while formal organizational ties may not be great, group involvement and sense of belonging may appear high (1976:158).

While mass (social-psychological) theory might attempt to focus on the nature of the Nazi appeal, it would seem that attention might also be given to other factors to account for the NSDAP popularity, whose apparent "charismatic leadership" (1952) would have had minimal effect on those sectors of society which provided the NSDAP with its greatest source of support.

SUMMARY - The theory attributes the success of the NSDAP to the leadership qualities of Hitler. The analysis is supported in part by the growth of

the party to its ultimate rise to power in 1933 under his leadership. Also, there is strong evidence to suggest that Hitler was a skillful politician, who, for example, insisted on pursuing legal processes in the 1932 struggle for power until the chancellorship could be secured. Whether Hitler was solely responsible for these political manoeuvres is difficult to determine. But the theory is more than this. It not only attributes decisive moments of the NSDAP rise to power to the political skills of one individual but also proposes that this person, "the master of mass emotion", was the most significant factor in the success of the NSDAP movement. It is an attempt to indicate that a generalized psychological mechanism (i.e. identity with leader) is functioning in the mass. The advantage of the theory is its ability to apply this causal factor to all segments of the population simultaneously. Those who finally supported the NSDAP at the polls are considered to have been influenced by this factor. And, as Bullock notes, "he (Hitler) played like a virtuoso on the well-tempered piano of middle-class hearts". This might be true of some of the middle-class who supported the NSDAP, but is this also true of the non-supporting middle-class voters, including those from the less urban sectors of German society? The voting patterns indicate, for example, that major NSDAP support came significantly from small communities, with strong primary group relationships along with informal participant organizations where the people would be seemingly less susceptible to a mass-like influence. It came from those areas where communal forms, membership and conditions for personal affect such as family ties, were greatest and exposure to party propaganda minimal. In one case study of a town where the NSDAP received high support (Thalburg) Allen (1965) reports that no major figures among the principal leadership of the NSDAP party ever reached the town nor were a majority of the towns-

people who voted NSDAP involved in the party or its activities beyond attending meetings. And, as Heberle (1945) noted, support for the NSDAP was greater where communal solidarity was higher and political experience lower among other factors.

The limitation of this data however is that there is no clear basis for rejection of the generalized theory. The influence of the Hitler personality is questioned by the evidence, and doubts are raised concerning this being the primary factor of significance. However, the theory does not submit to this data analysis.

TABLE I

NSDAP Membership ('dues paying')¹

1920 -	55
1921 -	3,000
1922 -	4,500
1923 -	n/a ²
1924 -	n/a
1925 -	27,000
1926 -	49,000
1927 -	72,000
1928 -	108,000
1929 -	178,000
1930 -	200,000
1931 -	389,000
1932 -	800,000

Source: Payne, R., The Life and Death of Adolf Hitler, International Publishers, N.Y., 1972.

¹The figures for 'dues paying' membership tend to be misleading since there are certain ambiguities between the terms: 'dues paying', 'donating', or 'card carrying' memberships. Consequently the NSDAP records for membership are suspect. However there can be little doubt as to the general growth rate of the party membership.

²Figures are not available. The NSDAP was banned from Nov. 8, 1923 to Feb. 11, 1925.

CHAPTER 2

MILITARIST ATTRACTION OF THE NSDAP

Schokking (1955) proposes that the NSDAP appealed to many militaristic minded Germans, which resulted in substantial growth of the party. This analysis is supported by the association of military units (i.e. SA, SS) with the NSDAP. However the significance of this factor is not clear.

One possible indication of this militarist appeal might be the rate of membership in military groups during 1924-32, the hypothesis being that a large number with militaristic tendencies might be inclined to join military units. The foremost military indicator would be membership in the Reichswehr (Army). The Reichswehr, however, was limited by the conditions of Versailles to 100,000 persons (Shirer, 1960:59). While this unit maintained its full complement throughout the period in questions, its membership restriction provides a poor indicator of military support in Germany.

Another indication might be the rate of participation in other para-military units, since all the major political parties organized their private armies; for example, the DNVP (Stahlhelm), the NSDAP (Sturmabteilung and the Schuttstaffel), the SPD (Reichsbanner) and the KPD (Rotkammer). Although each unit represented a particular degree of military strength and character (Waite, 1952:54), what we are concerned with here is measuring the rate of participation in these units.

If we can use para-military unit membership growth (1924-32)(independent variable) in all of these groups, and co-relate this with the electorate support for the parties involved, there might be some indication of the rate of military attraction from the German electorate. The problem that

arises here is the lack of data. For example, with the various Freikorps (volunteer army) units, it is difficult to give even a loose approximation of the size of the movement. The difficulty arises from the ambiguity of the term "volunteer". However, an estimation of those troops capable of coping with any military problem is given between 200,000 and 400,000 (Waite, 1953:40). A search of the literature reveals similar problems with locating membership statistics of parties' respective military units.

The NSDAP (SA, SS) dues paying membership is estimated at approximately: 100,000 in 1927; 200,000 in 1930; and 600,000 in 1932 (Shirer, 1960:153). But there are no available statistics of membership in other para-military units. However, if we can presume that there is a close relationship between party membership growth and its para-military unit strength (e.g. NSDAP and SA, SS), we might find some indication of whether or not voters followed the members into the "militarized" party ranks. This would tend to lend support to Schokking's thesis.

The available membership statistics for the NSDAP and SPD are tabled and graphed on the following pages.

From a comparison of the voter and member curves in these two cases one may perceive that the rise and fall of membership 1924-32 appeared to follow the rise and fall of votes, but with a slight delay. As Hunt (1964) suggests, success at the polls might have stimulated membership recruitment or possibly, too, there might have remained a greater loyalty among members in periods of decline. However, if the proposed militarized mass of Germans was attracted to the increasing strength of the NSDAP and SPD membership, as Schokking's theory might suggest, there is little evidence of this in the data used to examine the rate of growth of these parties. Rather, there is some indication that voters tended to remain somewhat independent of party membership in these two cases.

TABLE II
PARTY AND MILITARY UNIT MEMBERSHIP 1924-32

Party (1,000's)	1924 ^I	1924 ^{II}	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932 ^I	1932 ^{II}
NSDAP	SA & SS	100	200	...	600	...
	members	27	49	72	108	178	200	800	...
											1200
SPD	Reichsbanner
	members	...	940	844	806	823	867	973	1021	1037	...
											1008

Source: B.N.I. Volume I, March 1944
 Payne, R., Life and Death of A. Hitler, International Pub., N.Y., 1973, pp. 138-237.
 Shirer, W., Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Simon and Shuster, N.Y., 1960, p. 153.


TABLE III
VOTE RECEIVED (NSDAP, SPD) 1924-32

Party (10,000's)	1924 ^I	1924 ^{II}	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932 ^I	1932 ^{II}
NSDAP	192	91	81	...	641	...	1375	1174
SPD	601	788	915	...	856	...	796	725

Source: Pinson, K., Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization, MacMillan Co., N.Y., 1970, p. 153.


GRAPH I

SPD MEMBERS AND TOTAL VOTERS 1919-33



Source: Hunt, R., German Social Democracy 1918-33, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1964, p. 101.

GRAPH II
NSDAP MEMBERS AND TOTAL VOTERS 1924-32



SUMMARY - The theory proposes that the supporters of the NSDAP were influenced by German militaristic thought and social processes. The reasoning follows that the NSDAP, which maintained a strong para-military unit, subsequently appealed to many of these militaristic minded Germans. The strength of the theory is clearly that the NSDAP gained more electorate support than any other in its rise to power in 1933. The fact that all major political parties maintained their private armies might also support this theory. But the question of why the NSDAP gained support over the other militarized parties, including the Left KPD is not made clear. The strength of these military units is not significant in relation to the population despite the restriction on membership in the Reichswehr. However, there is no indication as to what proportion of the proposed militarist minded eventually supported the NSDAP. The theory accounts for this by applying itself generally to all segments of German society. The data indicates that military unit support appeared to follow voter support in two particular cases, rather than voters following members as the theory might suggest. This could indicate the lack of militarist attraction. However, while the actual military unit membership was estimated as low, the degree of militaristic minded who might have supported the NSDAP is a factor that cannot be adequately evaluated when utilizing the general voting trends in this study. It might be inferred from the trends indicated that a particular military unit membership was not the major attraction to the electorate. However this does not rule out the possibility of the militaristic minded tendencies of the voters, nor that this might have been a major factor in NSDAP support. But the question of why the NSDAP over other military unit parties still remains unclear.

THE PROMOTION OF ANTI-VERSAILLES
SENTIMENT BY THE NSDAP

There have been attempts to attribute NSDAP support to the Versailles Treaty. Baumont (1955) contends that the conditions of the treaty provided an element of agitation which the NSDAP successfully used in its political campaign. The theoretical approach is sought not so much in the analysis of the actual conditions of the treaty, as outlined by Brady (1933), but rather in the suggested state of mind of the German people in response to the treaty. The support for the NSDAP is attributed not just to the adverse economic conditions associated with the treaty, but also the major anti-Versailles sentiment. The eventual support for the NSDAP is advanced as a manifestation of an effective party propaganda campaign.

While the imposition of the treaty (1919) coincides with the devaluation of the German mark (Shirer, 1960) and the rise of the NSDAP to power, it is difficult to verify the actual state of mind of the NSDAP supporters.

The author suggests that major NSDAP support came from those voters who were generally influenced by the NSDAP's anti-Versailles campaign. One indication of this factor might be the change in the electoral pattern of previous non-participants in party politics (i.e., former non-voters who, presumably, represented all social classes (Bendix, 1956)). If the NSDAP propaganda program (anti-Versailles) was as generally affective as the theory suggests NSDAP electoral gains might correlate with a decrease in non-voting.

TABLE IV indicates that there is some support for this hypothesis. The first great gain in NSDAP strength was between 1928 when it secured

TABLE IV
THE VOTE FOR MAJOR GERMAN PARTIES IN REICHSTAG ELECTIONS, 1928-1933

PARTY	JAN. 19, 1919		JUNE 6, 1920		MAY 4, 1924		DEC. 7, 1924		MAY 20, 1928	
	Total Votes	%	Total Votes	%	Total Votes	%	Total Votes	%	Total Votes	%
Right:										
Nazis					1,918,300	6.5	907,300	3.0	810,100	2.6
Nationalists ...	3,121,300	10.3	4,249,100	14.9	5,696,500	19.5	6,205,800	20.5	4,381,600	14.2
Middle:										
Non-Catholic ...	7,472,200	24.5	7,122,900	25.5	7,103,700	24.2	7,334,000	24.1	8,465,174	27.5
Catholic	5,980,200	19.7	5,083,600	18.0	4,861,100	16.6	5,252,900	17.3	4,657,796	15.2
Left:										
Socialists	11,509,100	37.9	6,104,400	21.6	6,008,900	20.5	7,881,000	26.0	9,153,000	29.8
Communists			589,500	2.1	3,693,300	12.6	2,709,100	9.0	3,264,800	10.6
Non-voters	6,366,200	17.3	7,753,500	21.6	9,093,200	23.7	8,697,200	22.31	10,471,400	25.4
Total vote	30,400,300	82.7	28,196,300	78.4	29,281,800	76.3	30,290,100	77.69	30,753,300	74.6
Eligible voters .	36,766,500		35,949,800		38,375,000		38,987,300		41,224,700	

PARTY	SEPT. 14, 1930		JULY 31, 1932		NOV. 6, 1932		MAR. 5, 1933	
	Total Votes	%	Total Votes	%	Total Votes	%	Total Votes	%
Right:								
Nazis	6,379,672	18.3	13,745,781	37.3	11,737,010	33.1	17,277,180	43.9
Nationalists ...	2,457,686	7.0	2,171,414	5.9	3,019,099	8.5	3,136,760	8.0
Middle:								
Non-Catholic ...	7,768,072	22.3	1,934,802	5.2	2,100,656	5.85	1,401,247	3.5
Catholic	5,185,637	14.8	5,782,019	15.7	5,326,067	15.0	5,498,457	14.0
Left:								
Socialists	8,575,241	24.5	7,959,712	21.6	7,247,956	20.4	7,181,629	18.3
Communists	4,590,160	13.1	5,282,626	14.3	5,980,102	16.85	4,848,058	12.3
Non-voters	8,026,441	18.0	7,344,481	16.0	8,929,259	19.5	5,342,433	11.2
Total vote	34,956,471	82.0	36,882,354	84.0	35,471,745	80.5	39,343,331	88.8
Eligible voters .	42,982,912		44,226,835		44,401,004		44,685,764	


Sources: Pinson, K., Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization, MacMillan Co., N.Y., 1970
 Pratt, S., "The Social Basis of Nazism and Communism in Urban Germany", Michigan State University, Michigan, 1948, pp. 29-30

2.6% of the total vote, and 1930 when the party captured 18.3% of the electorate's support. Between these two elections non-voting dropped from 25.4% to 18% of the eligible electorate, and new eligible voters increased by approximately 4.5% in 1930 over 1928. However, Loomis & Beegle (1946) found that when the changes in the rates of non-voting and of NSDAP vote were broken down into districts there was a negative rank order correlation of $-.2$ between the percent increase in the NSDAP vote and the increase in the proportion of eligible voters who voted. Either the voting gain is low and the NSDAP gain is high or vice versa. O'lessker (1968) notes that while the former non-voters might have helped to give the NSDAP its first success at the polls, he also notes that the NSDAP's first great gain (1930) was significantly comprised of former DNVP (Conservative) voters and also members of the middle-class.

While the increased NSDAP electorate gains might be in correlation with decreased non-voting, the evidence indicates that NSDAP support was comprised of voters from more particular social groups. For example, the middle-class non-Catholic parties register a significant drop in votes from 1930-32. Heberle (1945) further illustrates this point in Graph III. As imprecise as this graph might be, it tends to support the analysis that the former non-voters were not the only significant factor in the NSDAP appeal. It was also composed of those voters who were already involved in elections, and therefore disaffected in a more precise way than Baumont might suggest. Shirer (1960), for example, notes that the inflation period which followed Versailles (1921-23) was more economically destructive to the middle and working classes in particular. We might assume from this that NSDAP support was derived disproportionately from this particular sector.

GRAPH III

VOTE FOR GERMAN PARTIES IN REICHSTAGG ELECTIONS 1920-33



Source: Heberle, R., From Democracy to Nazism, "A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany", Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1945, p. 95.

While the NSDAP attempted to appeal to all segments of the population Franz (1949) noted that the core of the NSDAP strength came from the middle-class both urban and rural. However, Heberle (1945) found an inverse correlation between the size of the community and the percentage of votes obtained by the NSDAP. The larger the city the smaller the NSDAP vote. Pratt (1948) indicates that the party received less of their total vote in cities over 25,000 in size than did the other major parties. These findings are supported by Bracher (1954) who notes that the high NSDAP districts were more rural than low ones. Heberle (1945) gives some indication of this trend in Table 5. And Pollock (1944) found that although urban industrial centres indicated a strong electoral interest, this increased vote in the larger cities was cast against the NSDAP while the agricultural areas indicated greater support for the NSDAP. He also noted that significant NSDAP support was derived from the election districts on the eastern border of Germany. This region was considered to be more directly affected by the annexations of Versailles which tends to indicate support for the anti-Versailles program of the NSDAP. But what of the other anti-Versailles parties? The fact that the five major political parties all held an anti-Versailles position lends some support to the theory, but what is the distinction between these parties? Heberle (1945), for example, found a negative correlation in eighteen prominent rural election districts between the percentage of votes obtained by the DNVP (the most nationalist pre-Nazi opponent of the Versailles treaty) and the NSDAP (-.89). The DNVP were weakest where the NSDAP was strongest, and vice versa. Why this is so is not made clear by the evidence presented.

SUMMARY - The theory contends that major support for the NSDAP was due to the imposed conditions of the Versailles treaty on the deteriorating

German economy, which the author suggests disaffected generally all sectors of society. Whether this treaty can be considered the significant cause of the economic decline is not made clear, although the imposition of the treaty did coincide with devaluation of the German mark. But regardless of whether or not the premise of the theory is valid or not, Baumont proposes that the propagandized effects of the treaty by the NSDAP was significantly instrumental in marshalling this support. One problem with this approach is that the theory is applied to all sectors of society, and the middle-class (eventually the largest supporters of the NSDAP) conveniently fall into this category. The fact that NSDAP support came from more specific class and geographic sectors (i.e. rural versus urban) than the theory tends to imply, does not nor can it essentially refute the theory. In this regard, there is no clear explanation given for the negative correlation found between the amount of support given the DNVP as opposed to the NSDAP; nor why these other anti-Versailles parties received less total support than the NSDAP. It is important to note, however, that the theory does not entertain this sort of analysis.

TABLE V

PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL VALID VOTE OBTAINED BY SPECIFIED
PARTIES IN SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN, 1919 TO JULY 1932
BY URBAN AND RURAL COMMUNITIES

	Total	NSDAP	Land Volk	DNVP	DVP	Landes Partei	DDP	Centre + Minor	SPD	USPD	KPD
Urban											
1919	100	-	-	5.4	8.6	0.4	28.3	1.4	50.9	5.0	-
1920/21	100	-	-	16.2	19.6	1.2	10.5	1.9	39.8	3.2	7.5
1924 ^I	100	7.8	-	25.6	12.0	-	8.6	6.2	26.9	0.9	12.0
1924 ^{II}	100	2.9	-	27.8	14.5	-	9.2	3.9	32.8	0.4	8.5
1928	100	3.5	0.0	19.1	13.6	-	6.2	9.3	38.5	-	9.8
1930	100	23.2	0.6	5.3	8.4	-	5.7	8.7	33.1	-	13.1
1932	100	44.8	-	5.2	-	-	-	7.0	29.9	-	13.1
Rural											
1919	100	-	-	10.7	6.7	16.4	25.8	0.3	39.0	1.1	-
1920/21	100	-	-	28.6	16.1	8.6	7.3	0.6	33.0	2.6	3.2
1924 ^I	100	6.4	-	42.1	12.2	-	7.1	3.1	21.1	1.3	6.7
1924 ^{II}	100	2.3	-	43.4	14.9	-	7.8	2.4	25.4	0.5	3.3
1928	100	5.4	1.0	32.3	13.9	-	4.4	11.6	27.6	-	3.8
1930	100	35.1	10.7	7.9	4.8	-	2.5	11.1	22.8	-	5.1
1932	100	63.8	-	9.2	-	-	-	2.6	18.6	-	5.8

Source: Heberle, R., From Democracy to Nazism, Louisiana State University Press,
Baton Rouge, 1945.

CHAPTER 4

THE INFLUENCE OF MONOPOLY-CAPITAL INTERESTS

The rise of the NSDAP to power has been attributed by Neumann (1942) to the ability of monopoly-capital (big business) to direct social change in Germany. This theory is supported by Hallgarten's (1952) analysis of big business's financial support for the NSDAP through the critical years 1930-33, "without which support for the NSDAP would never have been forthcoming". But the essence of Neumann's theory contends that the very process of monopoly-capital development was disruptive to the prevailing entrepreneurial system. He points to the very lack of concessions from monopoly-capital "which would have led to a better life for the mass of German workers". It (monopoly-capital), is therefore, considered by Neumann to be the major source of social change. More importantly, the theory emphasizes the ideological power of this group to generate significant electoral support for the NSDAP. While there is some evidence of this particular group's political (i.e. economic) power, Neumann does not distinguish between economic and ideological influence. In 1923, for example, there are indications of public disapproval for the monopolization process. The Streisman Cartel Decree authorized the SPD government to attack and dissolve monopolistic situations generally (Stocking, 1948). But, instead, monopoly-capital (i.e. big business) pursued its own chosen course of development - the accentuated concentration of industry. Further, a 1929 plebiscite against the financing of the reconstruction effort failed to draw the necessary electoral support. It collected only four million votes during the first round, and 5.6 million the second. These figures are below those polled by the

right-wing DNVP in the 1928 election. This very lack of anti-monopoly support might appear as an endorsement of monopoly-capital interests. But, can we assume, as Neumann suggests, that there is a positive correlation between economic power to direct political decisions and ideological power to direct electoral support? An extrapolation of this early theoretical concept states, in part, that "the class which is the ruling material power of the society also constitutes that society's ideological power" (Reich, 1969). The degree of this influence is difficult to determine since Germany remained a capitalist nation throughout the period in question (Chirot, 1977).

The monopoly-capital political power might be evidenced by those political policies which were advanced in its favour. The rate of electoral support for the party which endorses such policies might provide some indication of the influence of monopoly-capital.

We might hypothesize that monopoly-capital had some influence on voter opinion:

1. If with a monopoly-capital endorsed political program, there was increased electoral support for the monopoly-capital political party during the same period.
2. If with monopoly-capital party electoral gains, there were non-monopoly-capital party losses.
3. If with the monopoly-capital support for other parties, the other party electoral gains should have increased proportionately.


Indicators - The major political program during 1919-32 was the "rationalization" and cartelization program which was undertaken 1924-28. This was endorsed by monopoly-capital primarily as an investment in improved equipment to lower labor costs (Michels, 1928:28; Brady, 1933; Benham, 1934:23). Because of its prominence and duration as a political program, a time-span analysis of its support may be utilized.

The selection of the monopoly-capital party is important. If we accept Lipset's (1960) analysis, which proposes that the conservative right is backed by the owners of large industry and farms, the managerial and free professional strata, we might assume that monopoly-capital were supporters of a right wing party. The DNVP was the strongest of the traditional right-wing parties. In fact, the DNVP was the only one of the non-Marxist and non-Catholic parties to retain over fifty percent of its 1928 proportion of total vote (Lipset, 1960:142).

If we can assume that the factors of: the monopoly-capital endorsed "rationalization" program 1924-28, and the DNVP party are relevant to the hypothesis that monopoly-capital had some influence on voter opinion, then support for the DNVP should theoretically increase or at least be maintained if the ideological factor is significant. An analysis of the voting in Graph IV for 1924-28 indicates that the DNVP lost votes during this period. Its support dropped from 20.5% of the total vote in 1924 (6,205,800 votes) to 14.2% in 1928 (4,381,600 votes). Although the electorate might have shown increased support for the SPD (which then formed the government) who provided grants of special privileges to giant monopolies, the voting patterns do not indicate that monopoly-capital (as the primary supporters of the DNVP) was invariably the electorate's spokesperson at least during 1924-28.

If we assume that monopoly-capital was the traditional supporter of the more conservative DNVP, and its influential program, then the non-monopoly-capital parties' losses (i.e. center parties) should theoretically have been the DNVP's gain at some time during 1924-32. If monopoly-capital was as ideologically strong as Neumann suggests, the center parties' loss of votes should have been the DNVP's gain. Table VI indicates that this did not occur even after 1928. While the center

GRAPH IV
VOTES RECEIVED BY PARTY GROUPS 1919-32



Source: Heberle, R., From Democracy to Nazism, Louisiana State U. Press, N.Y., 1945.

TABLE VI


VOTING PATTERNS IN GERMANY (RIGHT, CENTER, LEFT) 1924-32

	Dec. 1924	May 1928	Sept. 1930	July 1932	Nov. 1932
Nazi	3%	3%	18%	37%	33%
Other Far Right	22%	18%	14%	7%	10%
	25%	21%	32%	44%	43%
Center Parties	36%	33%	27%	18%	18%
Democratic Socialists	26%	30%	25%	22%	20%
	62%	63%	52%	40%	38%
Communists	9%	11%	13%	14%	17%
Others	4%	6%	3%	1%	2%

Source: Parker, R., Europe 1919-45, Delacorte, N.Y., 1970, p. 222.

GRAPH V


VOTING PATTERNS OF MAJOR PARTIES 1919-33



Source: Pinson, K., Modern Germany, MacMillan Co., N.Y., 1970

GRAPH VI

VOTING PATTERNS (SPD, KPD), 1919-33



Source: Hunt, R., German Social Democracy 1918-33,
(Quadrangle, Chicago, 1970, p. 114).

parties lost 80% of their vote during 1928-32 the Catholic center maintained its proportionate support. In the same period support for the DNVP dropped 40%. Contrary to the hypothesis that non-monopoly-capital parties' losses would be the DNVP's gain, the center party losses did not appear to create increased support for the DNVP. Nor did other traditional right-wing parties appear to gain votes as a result of center party losses.

While the KPD (Communist) political program was clearly non-monopoly-capital Graph V indicates that after 1928 the KPD surpassed the DNVP in percent of total vote. The KPD actually gained 41% in 1932 over 1928. This increased left vote is compared to the more traditional SPD vote in Graph VI.

But what of the support for the NSDAP? While the other right-wing parties lost support 1924-32, the NSDAP made major gains. There is some evidence to indicate that monopoly-capital contributed to the NSDAP success by donating funds to the party (Hallgarten, 1952). Although this does not necessarily guarantee electoral support perhaps there is some correlation between monopoly-capital's financial support of the NSDAP and this party's proportionate election gains.

We might assume that monopoly-capital's financial support for the NSDAP, which existed since 1925 (Mowrer, 1933; Henri, 1934), was indication of monopoly-capital's political support. The rate of electoral support for the NSDAP during the election period 1924-32 might provide some indication as to the effectiveness of this monopoly-capital support. If hypothesis 3 is to be supported electoral support should follow the NSDAP. However, the voting pattern (Graph 5) indicates a negative correlation between the hypothesized financial support for the NSDAP and the electoral losses that it experienced from 1924-28 (6.5% of total vote in 1924 to 2.6% in 1928). Lipset (1960) contends that this financial

support for the NSDAP was not forthcoming until it had become a legitimate party (Thyssen, 1941:102). This was clearly in 1930 when the NSDAP obtained 18.3% of the total vote, and became the largest party in the Reichstag. While the NSDAP support 1928-30 was significant, the electoral support for the NSDAP declines again from July 1932 to November 1932 (37.4% to 33.1%). If monopoly-capital was capable of manifesting support for the NSDAP it was having its problems.

SUMMARY - The theory suggests that there is a correlation between monopoly-capital (i.e. big business) economic power and its ability to influence public opinion. The NSDAP success is attributed to the power of monopoly-capital to direct public support. The strength of the theory is that big business did provide funding for the NSDAP which coincides with its increase in electorate support. But can this be attributed to its ability to direct public support? There is some indication, for example, that the public did not support monopoly-capital policies as the theory might suggest. But this is not the issue. The lack of support for right-wing parties (including the DNVP) along with periods of declining support for the NSDAP does raise some question concerning political influence. But this data cannot essentially refute the theory's claim. The fact that the Conservative DNVP experienced declining popular support, while the more Left KPD surpassed the DNVP in electoral support from 1928 on does not depreciate the theory's basic contentions. Whether financial support can translate into political influence is still not clear particularly with regards to the degree of significance. However, if the right-wing parties were equally funded by monopoly-capital, the question of primary difference between the parties still remains.


HISTORICAL MATERIALIST APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF
THE RISE OF NAZISM IN GERMANY: 1919-33

The basic premise of Historical Materialist theory contends that the mode of production (infrastructure) of the material means of life determines, in general, the social, political and intellectual processes of life (superstructure) and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness (i.e. ideas)(ideological superstructure).

This methodological approach is important to the study of social change. According to this theory the real driving force of change is sought not in the mind of the person, but in the economic infrastructure of society. The changes which take place in the economic base are therefore considered primary, and are succeeded by changes in the superstructure. The intention is not to diminish the ideological factor as influencing the form of social change but to place it into terms of priority.

A distinction should be made between the materialist transformation of the economic conditions of production and the ideological forces in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so we cannot judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the existing conflict between the productive forces and the relations of production (Marx, 1955:362).

The methodological approach of this theory is diagrammed as follows:



According to materialist theory, what explains ideas is the social milieu in which we find classes, themselves determined, in the last

analysis, by the economic factors (mode of production). The political factor appears in the ideological struggle as an expression of the class struggle.

In understanding the class action involved, the relationship between industrial production and class relations is considered important. The theory proposes that productive forces, which are continually developing, will eventually lead to an intensification of the class struggle. The consequences of this development, according to the theory, is that the relations of production will be changed if the productive forces are to go on developing.

The theory is not axiomatic. For example, if uninterrupted economic development of productive forces were to be combined with the prevailing private relations of production such as capitalist enterprise and profit the theory generally would be falsified. However, with the development of productive forces the theory also proposes a particular type of class action. According to this theory, while each class acts in accordance to its own interests, determined in the last analysis by the economic position and the role in the system of production (Marx/Engels, 1968:692), the dominant class is unlikely to give up its privileged position voluntarily. Because the status of this position is dependent upon profit returns, the allegiance of this group is towards the maintenance of its own class interests (i.e. profits) and against the continued development of the productive forces which might threaten its class position. In order to maintain these profits, the ruling class (the owners of the means of production) is not noted for the encouragement they offer to expand production. As Marx (1955) notes:

From the forms of development of the productive forces, these private relations of production turn into their fetters. (1955:362)

More importantly, and key to understanding this concept of restricted productive forces, is that a policy which attempts to maximize profits while restricting production results in broad reaching socio-economic ramifications, such as the rising of commodity prices at the expense of the entire community (Stocking/Watkins, 1948:100). And, according to materialist theory, the class antagonisms find their most definite form of expression in the struggle of political parties in these times of profound economic crisis (Lenin, 1974:378).

The relations between the productive forces and the relations of production, and the implications to social change is subject to analysis in this study of Germany 1918-32.

THEORY

With regards to historical materialist theory the following tentative assumptions are made concerning advanced capitalist development.

- | | | |
|----------|----|--|
| economic | 1) | If the productive forces do not develop the relations of production will not change. |
| ↓ | | |
| class | 2) | With restricted productive forces, and economic deterioration, class conflict will intensify. |
| ↓ | | |
| ideology | 3) | If there is no change in the private relations of production, the class vote will support the political party that it perceives will maintain its interests. |

FACTOR INDICATORS

The factor indicators utilized in this study will be as follows:

The productive forces in highly industrialized Germany will be considered a factor of industrial production and will be measured by the indices of this industrial production (EHS, 1980:373) (Appendix Table A). The economic conditions will be indicated by the registered unemployment and measured by the registered unemployment trends (Grunberger, 1966:84) (Appendix, Table B). The private relations of production will be indicated by social class which will be illustrated in terms of occupational status (Schoenbaum, 1966:196) (Table VIII). The class conflict will be indicated by the voting patterns of the major political parties along with their traditional class basis of support and will be measured comparatively with other major parties' gains and losses (Pratt, 1948) (Table IX).

HYPOTHESIS


With regards to Germany's high industrialized capitalist nation (and the rise of the NSDAP to power 1918-32) it is hypothesized that:

1. If industrial production does not develop, the private class relations will not change.
2. With restricted industrial production, and rise in unemployment, the class vote will polarize.
3. If there is no change in the private class relations, the middle-class vote, for example will support the political party that it perceives will maintain its interests.

Hypothesis 1

If there is not a continuous development in industrial production the class relations will not change according to hypothesis 1. Graph VII indicates that industrial production in Germany did not develop as it did in the latter 1800's and 1900's. The indices of industrial production from approximately 1919 registers a significant decline and fluctuation. This evidence is supported by Shirer's (1960) study which indicates industrial production in 1923 dropped to 55% of that of 1913, and then rose by 122% of the 1923 figure by 1927 (1960:117). Guerin (1939) found that industrial production fell by almost 50% from 1929-32, when the index for production (from a base of 1928=100) dropped from 101.4 in 1929 to 60 at the end of 1932 (1939:38). Dutt (1934) estimated that the 1932 production level was 50% of industrial capacity (1934:16). The evidence indicates that industrial production did not develop in accordance with its earlier rate of growth.

If hypothesis 1 is accurate, with no development of industrial production private class relations in Germany will not change. Table VII indicates that as a whole the middle class "occupational status" did not decline relative to the total population. The general maintenance of



Sources: European Historical Statistics, 1980, pp. 375-6
Grunberger, R., Germany 1918-45, B.T. Batsford Ltd., London, 1966

these class relations (private) in Germany during 1918-32 is also supported by: Dutt, 1934:81; Brady, 1937: ch. 1; B.N.I., 1944:250,270; Bruck, 1962:40; Schoenbaum, 1966:256; Trotsky, 1971:29.

Conclusion (Hypothesis 1)

The industrial production did not develop in accordance with earlier rates of growth. There was no change in class relations (i.e. private ownership).

Hypothesis 2

If hypothesis 2 is accurate then as economic conditions deteriorate the class conflict will intensify.

Economic Factor

If we can assume that unemployment trends are an indication of economic conditions, then unemployment should increase with restrictions on the forces of production. The premise of this theory is based on the increased concentration of industry which committed a large portion of workers to large enterprises (Schoenbaum, 1966:84) (Table VIII). In Graph VII the unemployment rate demonstrates a lagging response to industrial production, but there is sufficient correlation to indicate that it was inversely related to production levels. The 1921-23 depression exhibits a major economic contraction with unemployment beginning to rise in 1923 (see also Brady, 1933). The increased concentration of industry during 1924-28 is referred to as the Rationalization Period; a period of accentuated concentration of industry financed largely by foreign loans (Dawes Loan) (Bruck, 1962:173). The primary aim was to improve the commercial position of the leading producers and to establish centralized control over the domestic market (See Brady, 1933, 1942:41; Renham, 1934; Levy, 1935: ch. 10;

TABLE VII

GERMAN OCCUPATIONAL STATUS IN % OF POPULATION

	1882	1895	1907	1925	1933
¹ Independent	38	35	27	21	20
² Their employed dependents	4	4	8	10	11
White collar including civil service	8	11	14	19	18
Workers	50	50	51	50	52

¹Old Middle Class (self-employed)

²New Middle Class

Source: Schoenbaum, D., Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-39, Doubleday & Co. Inc., N.Y., 1967.

TABLE VIII

GERMAN OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION (% of population)

Year	Agriculture	Industry & Handicrafts	Services
1852	55	25	20
1880	49	30	21
1882	42	36	22
1895	36	39	25
1907	34	40	26
1925	30	42	28
1933	29	41	30
1939	27	41	32

Source: Grunberger, R., Germany 1918-45.

Stocking/Watkins, 1946:176; 1948:48,100,178 among others). However, as Stocking / Watkins (1946) note, the economy in production was sacrificed to market control. And, that Rationalization had expanded productive capacity far more than was necessary to supply domestic and export markets (1946:178). In 1929, the industrial production actually dropped and the unemployment appears to correspond to this trend by increasing rapidly. The registered unemployment ascends from 4 million to over 6 million by 1933. This was approximately 19% unemployment rate, based on the 1933 labor force statistic for 1932 and does not include the invisible unemployed which Dutt (1933) estimated to be at least 1.5 million (1933:210). According to Petzina (1969) over 30% of the working population of 32.2 million had no jobs at all during this period (1969:60).

Summary

The unemployment trend appears to correlate negatively with the industrial production.

Class Conflict Factor

We will regard the voting pattern for the political parties as an indicator of class conflict. The major parties are classified by Pratt (1948) (Table IX) in accordance with their traditional class basis of support (see also Heberle, 1945:112; Loomis/Beegle, 1946:730). That is, Conservative, Liberal (middle-class), and Left workers' parties. Class conflict will be measured by the increased polarization of this class vote - between the Conservative Right and the more Left workers' parties. If hypothesis 2 is accurate this suggested polarization will be positively correlated to deteriorating economic conditions (i.e. unemployment).

If we examine the voting patterns from the period of the NSDAP's major political gains (1928-32) (Table IV) it is noted that the former liberal

TABLE IX

PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL VOTE RECEIVED BY VARIOUS GERMAN
PARTIES, 1919-1933, AND THE PERCENTAGE OF THE 1928
VOTE RETAINED IN THE LAST FREE ELECTION 1932

Party	Percentage of Total Vote								Ratio of 1928 to Second 1932 Election Expressed as %	
	1919	1920	1924 ^I	1924 ^{II}	1928	1930	1932 ^I	1932 ^{II}	1933	(%)
Conservative Party										
DNVP	10.3	14.9	19.5	20.5	14.2	7.0	5.9	8.8	8.0	60
Middle-Class Parties										
DVP (right liberals)	4.4	13.9	9.2	10.1	8.7	4.8	1.2	1.9	1.1	21
DDP (left liberals)	18.6	8.3	5.7	6.3	4.8	3.5	1.0	1.0	.8	20
Wirtschaftspartei (small business)	.9	.8	2.4	3.3	4.5	3.9	.4	.3	...	7
Others	.6	2.5	13.4	7.4	9.5	10.1	2.6	2.8	.6	29
	Total proportion of middle-class vote maintained:									21
Center (Catholic)	19.7	18.0	16.6	17.3	15.4	17.6	16.7	16.2	15.0	105
Workers' Parties										
SPD (Socialist)	37.9	21.6	20.5	26.0	29.8	24.5	21.6	20.4	18.3	69
KPD (Communist)	...	2.1	12.6	9.0	10.6	13.1	14.3	16.9	12.3	159
	Total proportion of working class vote maintained:									92
Fascist Party										
NSDAP	6.5	3.0	2.6	18.3	37.3	33.1	43.9	1277
	Total proportion of increase in Fascist party vote:									1277

Source: Pratt, S., "The Social Basis of Nazism and Communism in Urban Germany"
(M.A. thesis, Department of Sociology, Michigan State U., Michigan, 1948).

middle-class parties lost almost 80% of their total vote. The right-wing DNVP dropped about 40%, but this was the only non-Catholic and non-Marxist party to retain over 50% of its 1928 vote. The SPD lost about 31% of its support during this same period. However the communist KPD gained 59% in 1932 over 1928, while the NSDAP increased its proportion of party vote 1277%. The major shift among the former liberal middle-class parties suggests that the NSDAP gained most heavily from this sector of the political electorate. This analysis is supported by: Heberle, 1945:112; Bracher, 1954:94; Bendix, 1956:605; Franz, 1957: 28-32 among others. If liberal middle-class interests can be considered to be opposed to Left communist party KPD interests and even the social democrat SPD, the evidence indicates that there was increased support for two political tendencies.


Graph VIII and IX indicates that as the NSDAP support grew, the former middle-class parties collapsed. The increased support for the KPD and the NSDAP with a major shift in the former liberal party support towards the NSDAP indicates the formation of a polarized voting trend. This tends to support a hypothesized class conflict. However, an actual class analysis to these two tendencies would be useful in formulating this conclusion.

Economic with Class Conflict

The suggested class conflict should follow the deteriorating economic conditions if hypothesis 2 can be supported. Graph VIII indicates a positive correlation of increased support for the NSDAP and KPD with unemployment. The fluctuation in the unemployment trend is recorded yearly. The electorate reaction does not appear in the interim between Reichstagg elections. Subsequently there is no registered electorate

GRAPH VIII


VOTING PATTERNS OF MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES 1919-33 (% of total vote)
WITH UNEMPLOYMENT (millions)



Source: Pinson, K., Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization, (MacMillan Co., N.Y., 1970).
Grunberger, R., Germany 1918-45, (B.T. Batsford Ltd., London, 1966).

GRAPH IX

VOTING PATTERNS OF MAJOR MIDDLE-CLASS PARTIES 1919-33 (% of total vote)



Source: Pinson, K., Modern Germany.

response to the unemployment fluctuations between 1924-28 specifically. The NSDAP first appeared on the ballot in May 1924. Its 6.5% receipt of the total vote at this time can be equated with the KPD's impressive initial gains since the NSDAP membership is registered at a modest 55 in January 1920 (Payne, 1972:138).

Conclusion (Hypothesis 2)

If increased NSDAP and KPD support is considered a significant factor of class conflict then the data tends to support hypothesis 2, that class conflict did increase with restricted productive forces. This conclusion is supported by the data that suggests that the old middle-class fared worse from economic deterioration than any other, and that the middle-class were in turn the main supporters of the NSDAP (Table VIII and IX). This analysis is supported by Knopf, 1939:106; Guerin, 1939:54-55; Schuman, 1939:106; Brady, 1942:13; B.N.I., 1944:254; Taylor, 1945:196; Stocking/Watkins, 1948:48; Gerth, 1952:106; Shirer, 1960:61; S. Neumann, 1966:16; Schoenbaum, 1967:28; Edward, 1972:52; Moore, 1978:410.

Hypothesis 3

If there is no change in the private relations of production according to hypothesis 3 the middle-class will support the political party that it perceives will support middle-class interests. That is, the middle-class electorate should vote for a middle-class party. An analysis of the NSDAP supports this conclusion. The party doctrine supports a strong middle-class sector (see Appendix: Table E). And, the social composition of the NSDAP membership indicates that it was composed of predominantly middle-class members (see Table XI). Schoenbaum (1967) found that relative to the total population, workers in the NSDAP were 30% underrepresented,

and farmers by nearly 100%. The middle-class sector of: white collar employees were overrepresented by 65%, the economically independent by 100% and civil servants by 160% (1967:72). The NSDAP, according to this data, might have appeared to best represent the interests of the middle-class electorate.

The assumption here is that the class composition of party members provides an indication of party support and promotion of the interests of that class. Approximately 60% of NSDAP membership came from the middle class (See Table XI) which suggests that the middle class acted in its own interests by voting Nazi. The middle class supported the NSDAP despite the fact that there were other major parties to choose from. Workers were underrepresented by a factor of 2 in relation to the composition of the general population. White collar workers and civil servants were overrepresented by a factor of 1.72 as were independents by a factor of 1.63. In order to strengthen the argument that the middle class acted in its own perceived interests by voting NSDAP it is important to determine also the class composition of other major parties.

Middle class membership in the SPD and KPD was approximately 22% and 10% respectively (see Table XII). Both parties maintained a predominantly working class membership. Accordingly, these parties drew strong support from areas where wage labourers made up a relatively large segment of the population and where the middle class made up a relatively small segment. (C.P. Loomis and J.A. Beegle: 1946).

There is no data available on the class composition of the membership in the right-wing DNVP. Documentation reveals, however, that the "conservative" DNVP membership was led and financed by Junkers. Also drawn into party ranks were industrialists, bankers, and owners of large estates

(Pool:1978). Under the conservative leadership of Alfred Hugenberg the DNVP was openly contemptuous of the "traitor" liberal parties which were predominantly middle class and which had helped to establish the Weimar Republic. The DNVP was equally as contemptuous of the "street gang party" of the NSDAP. In terms of support, there is a correlation of $-.89$ between the percentages of votes obtained by the NSDAP and the DNVP in 1932 (see Appendix: Table D). While the NSDAP gained its support from small farmers the DNVP drew from the landlords and big farmers (Heberle, 1970). The DNVP also lost the backing of the middle class small property owners but retained the backing of the upper strata conservatives and large property owners (Heberle/Lipset:142).

Despite the lack of data on DNVP membership it is still possible to infer that the NSDAP received its major support from the middle class. When the support base of other major political parties is also examined it appears that the middle class went along with the party which, it might assume, seemed to support its interests - i.e., the NSDAP.

Conclusion (Hypothesis 3)

Hypothesis 3 is thereby supported.

SUMMARY - The theory initiates its approach with an examination of the economic conditions in the analysis of social change. In this regard there is evidence of the restricted productive forces with the maintenance of private class relations in the case of advanced capitalist Germany. The successful political party (i.e. NSDAP) should then theoretically be representative of those private class interests. In Germany large sectors of the middle-class appeared to support the NSDAP which lends credence to the theory.

The weakness of the theory is that there is no absolute accounting for the form that this representation would take, other than it would be representative of the private class interests. The ideological program is not underestimated by the theory. As Marx (1968) explained "the economic situation is the basis ... but the various elements of the super-structure ... also exercise their influence upon the course of historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form" (1968:692). But this does not account for the political form which succeeded in Germany (i.e. NSDAP) in 1919-33. In this regard the theory's analysis of social change is more easily evaluated and/or supported on the basis of the material data presented. The form of this development, however, does not fall into its criterion.

TABLE X
SELECTED OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS RANKED BY PROPORTION OF NSDAP MEMBERS,
BASED ON 1935 PARTY FIGURES AND OFFICIAL CENSUS REPORTS (in thousands)

Occupation	No. of NSDAP Members in		Total No. In Occupation		No. of Males in		Unemployment rate for		Proportion of Nazis to	
	Sub- group	Group	Sub- group	Group	Sub- group	Group	Males Sub- group	Occup. Sub- group	Males Sub- group	Occup. Sub- group
GROUP 1										
1. Teachers		84		307		212				.40
2. Self-employed small merchants		188		1000		750				.25
3. White-collar employees (total)		484		3916		2385		.24	.22	.20
of which										
a) technical & others	197		1203		817		.23	.20	.24	
b) sales, office	287		2713		1568		.24	.21	.18	
4. Students		34		334		187				.18
5. Officials		223		1464		1336				.17
6. Self-employed craftsmen		208		1279						.16
7. Peasants		255		2005		1805				.14
8. Free professions		79		716		622			varied from .03 to .61	.13
GROUP 2										
9. Workers in indus- try & crafts (total)		662		9939		7982		.42	.39	.08
of which										
a) skilled metal	155		2232		2156				.39	.07
b) other skilled	322									
c) unskilled	162									
d) miners	22		446		446		.37			.05
10. Agricultural laborers		94		2530		1672		.15	.12	.06
GROUP 3										
11. Rentiers & Pensioners		38		5822		2786				.01
12. Housewives		63		9901						.006

Source: Parteistatistik, issued by Reichorganisationsleiter of NSDAP, 1935 in Moore, B., Injustice: The Social Basis of Obedience and Revolt, (Harper and Row, N.Y., 1978).

TABLE XI

Social Composition of NSDAP Membership by Occupation (1930)

Workers	26.3%
White Collar	24.0%
Independent (old middle class)	18.9%
Civil Servants	7.7%
Farmers	13.2%
Other	9.9%

Source: David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany 1933-1939, (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1967), p. 28

TABLE XII

Social Composition of SPD and KPD Membership by Occupation (1930)

	SPD*	KPD
Workers	78.0%	90.0%
Middle Class	5.0%	2.5%
White Collar	3.8%	1.9%
Independent	9.4%	4.7%
Civil Servants	1.6%	0.8%
Other	2.2%	0.1%

*The SPD figures represent only an approximation.

Source: W.L. Guttsman, The German Social Democratic Party from Ghetto to Government, 1875-1933, (London, George Albert Unwin (Publishers) Ltd., 1981), p. 159.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The two basic approaches involved in this study attempt to explain the rise of the NSDAP to power from two different perspectives. Idealist theory proceeds from the premise that ideas are situated at the base of the social edifice (ideas --- will --- action). Materialist theory places the material conditions at the base, which give rise to ideas and intentions (material conditions --- ideas). The particular approach utilized can have an important influence on the direction of social research. However, in many cases there is an inconsistent mixture of the two approaches.

Bullock (1952) gives primary significance to the idea of Hitler's personal appeal for NSDAP support. The presence of Hitler as NSDAP leader through 1920-33 lends prime support to this idea. The NSDAP rose to power during this period in which Hitler was the major figurehead. Support for the NSDAP could conceivably be interpreted as support for Hitler and/or attributed to this individual. But the significance of this factor is not clear. It is not so much what the theory claims but rather what it does not express. The theory does not include data which describes the lack of NSDAP support in urban areas, small communities and farms where exposure to party leadership was minimal; nor that there was a regional significance to the middle class vote for the NSDAP. This does not exclude Hitler as a factor of significance. However, its strength of explanation might also be considered its greatest weakness since the theory is incapable of accounting for these sorts of variables.

In a somewhat similar explanation of NSDAP success Schokking (1955) suggests that the NSDAP supporters were attracted to the NSDAP's military appeal. Although the NSDAP maintained a strong military unit throughout

its rise to power, the significance of this factor in attracting NSDAP support is not clear since all the major political parties maintained their own para-military units. There is some indication that military unit membership followed voter support in the case of the two largest parties in the Reichstag: the NSDAP and SPD. But all voters are not necessarily military unit candidates even though they might still be attracted to the militarist image of the NSDAP. The theory also does not distinguish between the support for the other major parties which also maintained military units. This does not refute the theory but questions the appeal to the NSDAP's military image as a single factor of explanation.

The existence of the Versailles treaty provides a materialist premise for Baumont's (1955) theory which is supported by the fact that the rise of the NSDAP to power followed the implementation of this treaty. The periods of inflation following 1919 have been attributed to Versailles. The group most affected by this inflation was the middle class sector, the largest supporters of the NSDAP. And a regional analysis of NSDAP support indicates that it came significantly from the border areas which were directly affected by Versailles land reclamations. The theory proposes that the strong anti-Versailles program of the NSDAP accounted for its success and suggests that this was the major cause of support. But all the major political parties maintained anti-Versailles programs. The SPD complicity with its implementation might exclude it from this category and the erosion of SPD support at that time is perhaps indication of this trend. But of the right-wing parties, there was an inverse correlation of votes found between the strongest anti-Versailles parties: The Conservative DNVP and the NSDAP. The theory fails to explain the wide difference in support between the two major anti-Versailles parties. The effectiveness of the NSDAP anti-Versailles propaganda campaign remains uncertain.

Neumann (1944) provides some indication that a period of German crisis capitalism assisted the NSDAP rise to power. Specifically, he suggests that monopoly-capital (big-business) interests determined NSDAP support. The maintenance of capitalist interests throughout 1919-33 lends support to the theory's basic premise. But the NSDAP was not the only party funded by monopoly-capital and support did not follow the heavily funded DNVP program as it might have. In this case the economic funding of political parties by monopoly-capital did not necessarily ensure that it maintained the political power to direct electoral support for a particular party. While the actual financial support of the parties is not completely known, there is some indication of right-wing funding and increased electoral support. However, the question of why the NSDAP received more support than other right-wing parties is still unanswered.

The premise of historical materialist theory places the existence of economic conditions before ideas and intentions (economic conditions --- class --- ideas). The theory is supported by the evidence of restricted productive forces with the maintenance of private class relations. The ideological program (i.e., ideas) is not underestimated by the theory, however, since the theory respects the reciprocal action of ideas on the infrastructure. As Marx (1968) explained, "The economic situation is the basis ... but the various elements of the superstructure ... also exercise their influence upon the course of historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form."

Having said this, the main question here is why was the major support for the NSDAP. Historical materialist theory provides evidence of the process of material conditions under which the rise of the NSDAP took place. The maintenance of private class relations gives some indication

that the prevailing political party (NSDAP) would reflect the interests of the private class. While this does not fully explain the major attraction to the NSDAP over other similar parties it provides a more thorough account of the event than do the more idealist theories.

Some of the more idealist theories provide elements which might be considered helpful in further understanding the material conditions under which the event occurred in Germany. The implementation of the Versailles Treaty, for example, contributes to the periods of economic depression already experienced in Germany in 1923 and 1929. These depression periods coincide with major NSDAP gains in the election periods of 1924 and 1930. And it is suggested that the adverse effects of Versailles affected more of the middle class who were the largest supporters of the NSDAP. Indeed the middle class vote was attracted to the NSDAP, which was composed of and supported a strong middle class position. But Versailles was imposed upon a particular type of infrastructure which might be considered more the source of economic deterioration. These deteriorating conditions, however, would not have benefited a political party which could not survive the situation of economic constraint. In this regard, there is the element of political funding by monopoly-capital which might have provided the NSDAP with sufficient resources to effectively continue its political campaign. While this provides a better understanding of the material conditions involved in this process, the question of why there was major support for the NSDAP over other similar right-wing parties still remains.

In this regard, a synthesis of the two approaches might well provide a better understanding of the actual content and form of the event. A more complete analysis of the event under study would first determine the

economic conditions (content --- infrastructure) that existed in Germany before and during the NSDAP's rise to power. An examination of the resulting social conditions (i.e., class differences) as well as the ideologies that followed (form --- superstructure) would together provide a more complete understanding of the political associations involved in this study. In attempting a "synthesis" of theories to explain the rise of the NSDAP, a historical materialist approach has a fundamental advantage: it provides a framework for systematic examination of both material and ideal elements. One can proceed from the analysis of material reality to the analysis of idealist elements which bear some significance. Idealist theory, in contrast, provides no systematic way of handling material elements. Historical materialism, then, is the preferred approach for further study of the phenomenon of German fascism.

APPENDIX: TABLES A - E

TABLE B

REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT 1919-33 (millions)

1919	1.2	1927	2.0
1920	.9	1928	1.4
1921	.8	1929	2.5
1922	.7	1930	3.2
1923	.6	1931	4.0
(May) 1924	1.9	(July) 1932	4.7
(Dec.) 1924	1.8	(Nov.) 1932	5.5
1925	.7	1933	6.0
1926	2.3		

Source: Grunberger, R., Germany 1918-45, B.T. Batsford Ltd., London, 1966.

TABLE C

REICHSTAG ELECTIONS 1919-1933

	NATIONAL ASSEMBLY JANUARY 19, 1919			JUNE 6, 1920			MAY 4, 1924			DECEMBER 7, 1924			MAY 20, 1928		
	Total Votes	%	No. Dep- uties	Total Votes	%	No. Dep- uties	Total Votes	%	No. Dep- uties	Total Votes	%	No. Dep- uties	Total Votes	%	No. Dep- uties
No. eligible voters	36,766,500		423	35,949,800		459	38,375,000		472	38,987,300		493	4,224,700		491
No. valid votes cast	30,400,300	82.7		28,196,300	78.4		29,281,800	76.30		30,290,100	77.69		30,753,300	74.60	
Majority Socialists	11,509,100	37.9	165	6,104,400	21.6	102	6,008,900	20.5	100	7,881,000	26.0	131	9,153,000	29.8	153
Independent Socialists	2,317,300	7.6	22	5,046,800	17.9	34
Communist Party	589,500	2.1	4	3,693,300	12.6	62	2,709,100	9.0	45	3,264,800	10.6	54
Center	5,980,200	19.7	91	3,845,000	13.6	64	3,914,400	13.4	65	4,118,900	13.6	69	3,712,200	12.1	62
Bavarian People's Party	1,238,600	4.4	21	946,700	3.2	16	1,134,000	3.7	19	945,600	3.0	16
Democrats	5,641,800	18.6	75	2,333,700	8.3	39	1,655,100	5.7	28	1,919,800	6.3	32	1,505,700	4.9	25
People's party	1,345,600	4.4	19	3,919,400	13.9	65	2,694,400	9.2	45	3,049,100	10.1	51	2,679,700	8.7	45
Wirtschaftspartei	275,100	0.9	4	218,600	0.8	4	693,600	2.4	10	1,005,400	3.3	17	1,397,100	4.5	23
Nationalists	3,121,500	10.3	44	4,249,100	14.9	71	5,696,500	19.5	95	6,205,800	20.5	103	4,381,600	14.2	73
Christlich-soz. Volksdienst
Landbund	574,900	1.9	10	499,400	1.6	8	199,500	0.6	3
Christlich-natl. Bauern u. Landvolk	581,800	1.8	10
Deutsch- Hannov. Partei	77,200	0.2	1	319,100	0.9	5	319,800	1.0	5	262,700	0.8	4	195,600	0.5	3
Deutsche Bauernpartei	481,300	1.5	8
National Socialists	1,918,300	6.5	32	907,300	3.0	14	810,100	2.6	12
Other	132,500	0.4	2	332,100	1.6	...	1,165,900	4.0	4	597,600	2.0	...	1,445,300	4.8	4

REICHSTAG ELECTIONS 1919-1933

	SEPTEMBER 14, 1930			JULY 31, 1932			NOVEMBER 6, 1932			MARCH 5, 1933			NOVEMBER 12, 1933		
	Total Votes	%	No. Dep- uties	Total Votes	%	No. Dep- uties	Total Votes	%	No. Dep- uties	Total Votes	%	No. Dep- uties	Total Votes	%	No. Dep- uties
No. eligible voters	42,957,700		577	44,226,800		608	44,373,700		584	44,685,800		647	45,141,900		661
No. valid votes cast	34,970,900	81.41		36,882,400	83.39		35,471,800	79.93		39,343,300	88.04		42,988,100*	95.2	
Majority Socialists	8,577,700	24.5	143	7,959,700	21.6	133	7,248,000	20.4	121	7,181,600	18.3	120			
Independent Socialists			
Communist Party	4,592,100	13.1	77	5,282,600	14.6	89	5,980,200	16.9	100	4,848,100	12.3	81			
Center	4,127,900	11.8	68	4,589,300	12.5	75	4,230,600	11.9	70	4,424,900	11.7	74			
Bavarian People's Party	1,059,100	3.0	19	1,192,700	3.2	22	1,094,600	3.1	20	1,073,600	2.7	18			
Democrats	1,322,400	3.8	20	371,800	1.0	4	336,500	1.0	2	334,200	0.8	5			
People's party	1,578,200	4.5	30	436,000	1.2	7	661,800	1.9	11	432,300	1.1	2			
Wirtschaftspartei	1,362,400	3.9	23	146,900	0.4	2	110,300	0.3	1			
Nationalists	2,458,300	7.0	41	2,177,400	5.9	37	2,959,000	8.8	52	3,136,800	8.0	52			
Christlich-soz. Volksdienst	868,200	2.5	14	405,300	1.1	3	412,500	1.2	5	384,000	1.0	4			
Landbund	194,000	0.5	3	96,900	0.2	2	105,200	0.3	2	83,800	0.2	1			
Christlich-natl. Bauern u. Landvolk	1,108,700	3.0	19	90,600	0.2	1	46,400	0.1			
Deutsch- Hannov. Partei	144,300	0.4	3	46,900	0.1	...	64,000	0.2	1	47,700	0.1	...			
Deutsche Bauernpartei	339,600	1.0	6	137,100	0.3	2	149,000	0.4	3	114,000	0.3	2			
National Socialists	6,409,600	18.3	107	13,745,800	87.4	230	11,737,000	33.1	196	17,277,200	43.9	288	39,638,800	92.2	661
Other parties	1,073,500	3.1	4	342,500	0.9	1	749,200	2.2	...	136,646	0.3	...			

*No. invalid votes:
1,349,363

TABLE D

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN--CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCENTAGES OF VOTES OBTAINED BY PARTIES IN 18 MINOR CIVIL DIVISIONS (CITIES OF 10,000 OR MORE POPULATION EXCLUDED) WITH PERCENTAGES OF POPULATION IN SPECIFIED SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASSES (BERUFSZUGEHÖRIGE) BY MAJOR INDUSTRIAL DIVISIONS

Party	Year	Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery				Industry and Handicraft			Industry, Commerce and Transportation			All Industrial Divisions including Public Services, Domestic Service, etc.		
		Pro pri- etors (a)	a+m	Wage earn- ers (c)	$\frac{b+c}{a}$	a	c	$\frac{b+c}{a}$	a	c	$\frac{b+c}{a}$	a	c	$\frac{b+c}{a}$
Socialists SPD, USPD KPD	1921	-.84	-.88	+.86	+.85	-.68	+.65	+.68	-.70	+.62	+.64	-.93	+.95	+.93
	1932	-.79	-.78	+.77	+.77	-.84	+.82	+.84	-.81	+.62	+.80	-.94	+.88	+.94
Liberals DVP, DDP Landespartei, Center Conservatives DNVP	1921	+.81	+.85	-.77	-.85	+.50	-.48	-.50	+.54	-.53	-.49	+.84	-.86	-.96
	1921	-.20	±0.0	+.22	+.20	+.23	-.24	-.23	+.15	-.31	-.17	+.08	+.07	+.10
	1924II	+.40	+.45	-.41	-.39	+.68	-.66	-.68	+.57	-.71	-.59	+.52	-.47	-.52
	1932	-.26	-.28	+.31	+.28	+.09	-.08	-.09	+.09	-.15	-.06	+.02	+.12	+.12
Landvolk	1930	+.67	+.69	-.64	-.68	+.58	-.30	-.53	+.49	-.39	-.26	+.74	-.77	-.74
NSDAP	1930	+.37	+.43	-.43	-.40	+.32	-.39	-.31	+.24	-.40	-.67	+.36	-.38	-.64
	1932	+.76	+.79	-.78	-.76	+.71	-.69	-.70	+.63	-.53	-.64	+.83	-.79	-.69

Explanation of occupational classifications:

a = proprietors

m = family members employed on farm

c = wage earners

b = salaried employees

$\frac{b+c}{a}$ = ratio of all employees to proprietors

Source: Heberle, R., From Democracy to Nazism, "A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany", Louisiana State U., Baton Rouge, 1945.

TABLE E (page 1 of 5)

PROGRAM OF THE NATIONALIST SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY

1. We demand the union of all Germans in a Great Germany on the basis of the principle of self-determination of all peoples.
2. We demand that the German people have rights equal to those of other nations; and that the Peace Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain shall be abrogated.
3. We demand land and territory (colonies) for the maintenance of our people and the settlement of our surplus population.
4. Only those who are our fellow countrymen can become citizens. Only those who have German blood, regardless of creed, can be our countrymen. Hence no Jew can be a countryman.
5. Those who are not citizens must live in Germany as foreigners and must be subject to the law of aliens.
6. The right to choose the government and determine the laws of the State shall belong only to citizens. We therefore demand that no public office, of whatever nature, whether in the central government, the province, or the municipality, shall be held by anyone who is not a citizen.

We wage war against the corrupt parliamentary administration whereby men are appointed to posts by favor of the party without regard to character and fitness.
7. We demand that the State shall above all undertake to ensure that every citizen shall have the possibility of living decently and earning a livelihood. If it should not be possible to feed the whole population, then aliens (non-citizens) must be expelled from the Reich.

8. Any further immigration of non-Germans must be prevented. We demand that all non-Germans who have entered Germany since August 2, 1914, shall be compelled to leave the Reich immediately.
9. All citizens must possess equal rights and duties.
10. The first duty of every citizen must be to work mentally or physically. No individual shall do any work that offends against the interest of the community to the benefit of all.

Therefore we demand:

11. That all unearned income, and all income that does not arise from work, be abolished.

BREAKING THE BONDAGE OF INTEREST

12. Since every war imposes on the people fearful sacrifices in blood and treasure, all personal profit arising from the war must be regarded as treason to the people. We therefore demand the total confiscation of all war profits.
13. We demand the nationalization of all trusts.
14. We demand profit-sharing in large industries.
15. We demand a generous increase in old-age pensions.
16. We demand the creation and maintenance of a sound middle-class; the immediate communalization of large stores which will be rented cheaply to small tradespeople, and the strongest considerations must be given to ensure that small traders shall deliver the supplies needed by the State, the provinces and municipalities.
17. We demand an agrarian reform in accordance with our national requirements, and the enactment of a law to expropriate

the owners without compensation of any land needed for the common purpose. The abolition of ground rents, and the prohibition of all speculation in land.

18. We demand that ruthless war be waged against those who work to the injury of the common welfare. Traitors, usurers, profiteers, etc. are to be punished with death, regardless of creed or race.
19. We demand that Roman law, which serves a materialist ordering of the world, be replaced by German common law.
20. In order to make it possible for every capable and industrious German to obtain higher education, and thus the opportunity to reach into positions of leadership, the State must assume the responsibility of organizing thoroughly the entire cultural system of the people. The curricula of all educational establishments shall be adapted to practical life. The conception of the State Idea (science of citizenship) must be taught in the schools from the very beginning. We demand that specially talented children of poor parents, whatever their station or occupation, be educated at the expense of the state.
21. The State has the duty to help raise the standard of national health by providing maternity welfare centers, by prohibiting juvenile labor, by increasing physical fitness through the introduction of compulsory games and gymnastics, and by the greatest possible encouragement of associations concerned with the physical education of the young.
22. We demand the abolition of the regular army and the creation of a national (folk) army.
23. We demand that there be a legal campaign against those who propagate

deliberate political lies and disseminate them through the press.

In order to make possible the creation of a German press, we demand:

- a. All editors and their assistants on newspapers published in the German language shall be German citizens.
- b. Non-German newspapers shall only be published with the express permission of the State. They must not be published in the German language.
- c. All financial interests in or in any way affecting German newspapers shall be forbidden to non-Germans by law, and we demand that the punishment for transgressing this law be the immediate suppression of the newspaper and the expulsion of the non-Germans from the Reich.

Newspapers transgressing against the common welfare shall be suppressed. We demand legal action against those tendencies in art and literature that have a disruptive influence upon the life of our folk, and that any organizations that offend against the foregoing demands shall be dissolved.

- 24. We demand freedom for all religious faiths in the state, insofar as they do not endanger its existence or offend the moral and ethical sense of the Germanic race.

The party as such represents the point of view of a positive Christianity without binding itself to any one particular confession. It fights against the Jewish materialist spirit within and without, and is convinced that a lasting recovery of our folk can only come about from within on the principle:

COMMON GOOD BEFORE INDIVIDUAL GOOD

- 25. In order to carry out this program we demand: the creation of a

strong central authority in the State, the unconditional authority by the political central parliament of the whole State and all its organizations.

The formation of professional committees and of committees representing the several estates of the realm, to ensure that the laws promulgated by the central authority shall be carried out by the federal states.

The leaders of the party undertake to promote the execution of the foregoing points at all costs, if necessary at the sacrifice of their own lives.

Source: Victor Gallantz, The Spirit and Structure of National Socialism, (London, 1937).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allen, W., The Nazi Seizure of Power, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1965.
- Arendt, H., The Origin of Totalitarianism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, N.Y., 1951.
- Baumont, M., Freid, J., Vermeil, E., et al, The Third Reich, Frederick A. Praeger Inc., N.Y., 1955.
- Bendix, R., "Social Stratification and Political Power" in Bendix, R., and Lipset, S., eds., Class, Status and Power, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1956.
- Benham, F., "The Iron and Steel Industry of Germany", Special Memorandum #39 Economic Services, London and Cambridge, 1934.
- Bracher, K., Auflosung der Weimarer Republik (Stuttgart and Dusseldorf: Ring Verlag, 1954) from Lipset, S., Political Man, Doubleday Co., N.Y., 1963.
- Brady, R., Business as a System of Power, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1942.
- Brady, R., The Rationalization Movement in German Industry, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1933.
- Brady, R., The Spirit and Structure of National Socialism, Victor Gallantz, London, 1937.
- British Naval Intelligence, Volume 1, University of Manitoba, March 1944.
- Bruck, W., Social and Economic History of Germany, Russell and Russell Inc., N.Y., 1962.
- Bullock, A., A Study in Tyranny, Odhams Press Limited, London, 1955.
- Dehio, L., "Germany and the Epoch of World Wars" from Kohn, H., German History: Some New German Views, Beacon Press Inc., Boston, 1954.
- Dutt, R., Fascism and Social Revolution, International Publishers, N.Y., 1934.
- Edwards, R., Reich, M., Weisskopf, T., eds., The Capitalist System, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass, 1972.
- European Historical Statistics, Winnipeg Public Library, 1980.
- Franz, G., "Die politischen Wahlen in Niedersachsen 1867 bis 1949", from Political Man, Lipset, S., Doubleday Co., N.Y., 1963.

- Gerth, H., "The Nazi Party: Its Leadership and Composition" in Merton, R., et al, eds., Reader in Bureaucracy, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1952.
- Grunberger, R., Germany 1918-45, B.T. Batsford Ltd., London, 1966
- Guttsman, W.L., The German Social Democratic Party from Ghetto to Government, 1875-1933, George Albert Unwin (Publishers) Ltd., London, 1981.
- Guerin, D., Fascism and Big Business, Pathfinder Press, N.Y., 1939.
- Halebsky, S., Mass Society and Political Conflict: Toward a Reconstruction Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976.
- Hallgarten, G., "Adolf Hitler and German Heavy Industry", Journal of Economic History Vol. XVII, New York University Press, N.Y., 1952.
- Heberle, R., From Democracy to Nazism, "A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany", Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1945.
- Henri, E., "Hitler Over Europe" in Fascism and Social Revolution, Dutt, R., International Publishers, N.Y., 1934.
- Hunt, R., German Social Democracy 1918-33, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1964.
- Knopf, A., The Nazi Dictatorship, International Publishers, N.Y., 1939.
- Kornhauser, W., The Politics of Mass Society, Routledge and Kegan, P., London, 1960.
- LeBon, G., "The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind", from McKee, J., Introduction to Sociology, McGraw-Hill, N.Y., 1976.
- Lenin, V., Collected Works Vol. XV (1916) pub. in Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974.
- Levy, H., Industrial Germany, Cambridge University Press, London, 1935.
- Lipset, S., Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics, Doubleday Co., N.Y., 1963.
- Loomis, C., and Beegle, J., "The Spread of German Nazism in the Rural Areas", American Sociological Review, II, 1946.
- Marx, K., and Engels, F., "Die Heilige Familie" ('The Holy Family'), 1845 (trans. by Erich Fromm in Marx's Concept of Man), Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., N.Y., 1973.
- Marx, K., and Engels, F., "Preface to a Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy", Selected Works, Vol. I, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1955.
- Michels, R., Cartels, Combines and Trusts in Post-War Germany, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1928.

- Moore, B., Injustice: The Social Basis of Obedience and Revolt, Harper and Rowe, N.Y., 1978.
- Mowrer, E., "Germany puts the Clock Back" in Dutt, R., Fascism and Social Revolution, International Publishers, N.Y., 1934.
- Neumann, F., Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, Octagon Books, Inc., N.Y., 1963.
- Nisbet, R., The Quest for Community, Oxford University Press, 1953.
- O'lessker, K., "Who voted for Hitler? A New Look at the Class Basis Of Nazism", American Journal of Sociology Vol. 74 #1, University Of Chicago Press, 1968.
- Parker, R., Europe 1919-45, Delacorte, N.Y., 1970.
- Parteistatistik, issued by Reichorganisationsleiter of NSDAP, 1935 in Moore, B., Injustice: The Social Basis of Obedience and Revolt, Harper and Row, N.Y., 1978.
- Payne, R., The Life and Death of Adolf Hitler, International Publishers, N.Y., 1972.
- Petzina, D., "Germany and the Great Depression", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. IV #4, N.Y., 1969.
- Pinson, K., Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization, The MacMillan Co., N.Y., 1970.
- Pitts, J., "Continuity and Change in Bourgeois France", In Search of France, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1963.
- Politzer, G., Elementary Principles of Philosophy, International Publishers, N.Y., 1980.
- Pollock, J., "An Areal Study of the German Electorate, 1930-33", American Political Science Review, Vol. 38, 1944.
- Pratt, S., The Social Basis of Nazism and Communism in Urban Germany, M.A. Thesis, Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, Michigan, 1948.
- Reich, W., The Mass Psychology of Fascism (trans. by Vincent R. Carfagno) Farrar, Straus and Giroux, N.Y., 1970.
- Ritter, G., "The Military and Politics in Germany", Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. XVII, 1957.
- Schoenbaum, D., Hitler's Social Revolution (Class and Status in Nazi Germany 1933-39), Doubleday and Co., Inc., N.Y., 1967.

- Schokking, J., "Militarism in German Society" from Baumont, M., Fried, J., Vermeil, E., et al, The Third Reich, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., N.Y., 1955.
- Schuman, F., The Nazi Dictatorship, A. Knopf Publishers, N.Y., 1939.
- Selznik, P., The Organizational Weapon, McGraw-Hill, N.Y., 1952.
- Shirer, W., The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Simon and Shuster, N.Y., 1960.
- Stocking, G., and Watkins, M., Cartels in Action, Twentieth Century Fund, N.Y., 1946.
- Stocking, G., and Watkins, M., Cartels or Competition, Twentieth Century Fund, N.Y., 1948.
- Taylor, A., The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany Since 1815, Coward-McCann, Inc., N.Y., 1946.
- Thyssen, F., I Paid Hitler, Farrar and Rinehart, N.Y., 1941.
- Trotsky, L., The Struggle Against Fascism, Pathfinder Press, N.Y., 1971.
- Waite, R., The Vanguard of Nazism, Harper and Row, N.Y., 1953.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCES USED

- Bakeless, J., The Economic Causes of War, Garland Publishing, Inc., N.Y., 1972.
- Baran, P., and Sweezy, P., Monopoly Capital, Modern Reader, N.Y., 1968.
- Barbu, Z., "The Uniqueness of the German Psyche 1918-33", Democracy and Dictatorship: Their Psychology and Patterns of Life, Grove Press, N.Y., 1956.
- Bottomore, T., Marxist Sociology, MacMillan Press, London, 1975.
- Cannon, J., Socialism on Trial, Pathfinders Press, N.Y., 1973.
- Carr, W., Arms, Autarky and Aggression, W.W. Norton, N.Y., 1972.
- Chirot, D., Social Change in the Twentieth Century, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., N.Y., 1977.
- Cornforth, M., The Open Philosophy and the Open Society (A reply to Dr. Karl Popper's "Refutations of Marxism"), International Publishers, N.Y., 1976.
- Daglish, R., trans., The Fundamentals of Marxist Leninist Philosophy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974.
- Einzig, P., Economic Warfare, MacMillan Co., London, 1940.
- Engels, F., Anti-Durhing in Marxist Leninist Philosophy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974.
- Fromm, E., Escape from Freedom, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., N.Y., 1941.
- Greene, F., The Enemy, Vintage Books, N.Y., 1971.
- Gunther, J., Inside Europe, Harper and Row, London, 1933.
- Hamilton, A., The Appeal of Fascism, MacMillan Co., N.Y., 1971.
- Hamilton, R., Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic, Princeton University Press, N.Y., 1967.
- Harrington, M., The Twilight of Capitalism, Simon and Shuster, N.Y., 1976.
- Hitler, A., Mein Kampf, Reynal and Hitchcock, N.Y., 1940.
- Jarman, T., The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany.
- Keynes, J., The Economic Consequences of Peace, in Monarch Notes, Monarch Press, N.Y., 1965.

- Kolnai, A., The War Against the West, Random House, N.Y., 1939.
- Laswell, H., "The Psychology of Hitlerism", The Political Quarterly, 4, N.Y., 1933.
- Lewis, J., Max Weber and Value-Free Sociology, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1975.
- Marx, K., Capital, International Publishers, N.Y., 1967.
- Marx, K., The Communist Manifesto, 1847, Gateway Edition, Chicago, 1969.
- Marx, K., and Engels, F., German Ideology, International Publishers, N.Y., 1968.
- Mayer, M., They Thought They Were Free: The Germans, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1955.
- McLeish, J., The Theory of Social Change: Four Views Considered, Schocken Books, N.Y., 1969.
- Merton, R., Social Theory and Social Structure, The Free Press, N.Y., 1957.
- Morris, R., and Graham, I., Harper Encyclopedia of the Modern World, Harper and Row, N.Y., 1970.
- Neumann, R., and Koppel, H., eds., The Third Reich, Bantam Books, N.Y., 1961.
- Northrop, B., Control Policies of the Reichsbank 1924-33, Columbia Press, N.Y., 1938.
- Parsons, T., "Some Sociological Aspects of the Nazi Movement", Essays in Sociological Theory, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1954.
- Poulantzas, N., Fascism and Dictatorship, Humanities Press, London, 1970.
- Sampson, A., The Sovereign State of I T & T, Faucett Publications, Conn., 1973.
- Saposs, D., "The Role of the Middle-Class in Social Development", Economic Essays, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1935.
- Smelser, N., Comparative Methods in Social Research, Prentice-Hall, N.J., 1976.
- Speer, A., Inside the Third Reich, MacMillan Publishing Co., N.Y., 1971.
- Speer, A., Spandau, MacMillan Publishing Co., N.Y., 1976.
- Togliatti, A., Why Fascism?, International Publishers, N.Y., 1976.
- Trotsky, L., The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany, Pathfinders Press, N.Y., 1971.

Weber, M., The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (trans. by Henderson, A., and Parsons, T.), The Free Press, N.Y., 1957.