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THE DRAMATURGY OF LABOUR/MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

BY

MARK G. NUTTALL

A Thesis

**Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of**

MASTER OF ARTS

**Department of Sociology
University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Manitoba**

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The Dramaturgy of Labour/Management Negotiations

by

Mark G. Nuttall

**A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University
of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree**

of

Master of Arts

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DEDICATION

For Dale

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Many people have given of themselves in the development of this thesis.

Dan Albas has worked tirelessly, effectively and cheerfully over the years to help bring this work to culmination. His efforts go beyond any that a student or colleague could expect. Douglas Rennie's rigorous and scholarly reviews, and John Mundie's insight and industry perspective, have also been invaluable. Any accolades for this work must be shared with my advisory committee, while any criticisms should be directed solely at me. Cheryl Albas also requires special mention, having introduced me to the mysteries of sociology and generously assisted me throughout my academic career. It has been an enjoyable honour to work with them all.

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ABSTRACT

Research on labour/management negotiation traditionally has focused on the *instrumental* elements of negotiating, including the likelihood of bargaining success based on a series of structural factors. The *expressive* dimension of negotiating, i.e., the interactional strategies employed by negotiators, has been less emphasized. This study is an attempt to address this imbalance. It investigates and describes labour/management negotiation using Goffman's Dramaturgy Model. The primary objectives of this study are to determine whether labour/management negotiations are dramaturgical in nature and to describe the dramaturgy employed by negotiators.

In-depth interviews, primarily consisting of open-ended questions, were conducted with ten labour/management negotiators. Chief negotiators, five from labour and five from management, were selected to ensure an interview group with maximum interactional experience and expertise. The interview group was diverse, included both male and female negotiators, and was drawn from multiple sectors, including the health care, education, government, not-for-profit and private sectors. The interviews were transcribed and then coded for instances of the dramaturgical principles delineated by Goffman. Additionally, data gathered through the open-ended questions yielded elements of the dramaturgy of labour/management negotiations beyond those expressly indicated as principles.

Findings of the study indicate that labour/management negotiations are richly dramaturgical. Numerous characteristics and strategies associated with the dramaturgy of negotiations emerged in the categories of region, team, clothing, props, body language and performance. In stark contrast to most theoretical perspectives on bargaining, which place emphasis on instrumental factors, respondents unanimously confirmed that the dramaturgical skill of the negotiator is a major factor in the determination of the negotiated outcome. Respondents evidenced a high degree of *interactional awareness*: much like a performer in the theatre, the negotiator is consciously aware of many of the performance strategies he or she employs, and hopes to successfully project a particular definition of the situation through the use of such strategies.

In addition to investigating and illustrating the dramaturgical nature of labour/management negotiations, this study may serve as a guide to bargaining strategies practised by seasoned labour/management negotiators.

A. INTRODUCTION

I. OBJECTIVE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

The objective of this study is to investigate and describe labour/management negotiation using Goffman's dramaturgy model.

Labour/management negotiations form a key interactional arena. In 1994, over four million Canadians were unionized, working under collective agreements achieved through labour/management bargaining (Gunderson & Ponak, 1995). This represents 37.5% of non-agricultural paid workers in Canada. Labour/management negotiations are an everyday occurrence in our country, and have an impact on the lives of a vast number of Canadians. Dramaturgical analysis can shed light on the actions of the negotiators in this key area or, more appropriately, the negotiations of the "actors."

Negotiations are fundamental dramas of human existence. Whether it be a Mid-East peace conference, labour/management bargaining, or the decision making processes employed by a married couple, negotiations and their outcomes affect and structure the lives of participants, and in many cases, non-participants. Negotiations typically produce outcomes, and discussion of them has often

focused on such questions as: which side won? how much did they get? who got what? Perhaps as a result, considerable research has been conducted on the instrumental elements of negotiating, including the likelihood of success based on a series of structural factors (see Brown & Rubin, 1975; Young, 1991; and Putnam, 1994). The expressive dimension of negotiating, i.e., the interaction between negotiating participants and the interactional strategies they employ, has been less emphasized. This study will seek to make a contribution in this area, with a specific focus on the dramaturgy of labour/management bargaining.

One of the central principles of dramaturgy, as discussed in greater detail below, is the concept of impression management. People, in the course of social interaction, attempt to manage the impressions which others receive. In labour/management bargaining, two chief negotiators ("negotiators")¹ and their respective teams interact, each trying to convince the other of the veracity of their views or positions. Negotiators take on the role of performing impression management duties on behalf of groups of people sharing a common interest or goal: labour negotiators represent unionized employees, while management negotiators represent management, or the employer. It is suggested that the generally adversarial nature of labour/management negotiations, the high stakes involved, and the use of professional negotiators produce a highly skilled interaction, with unusually overt use of impression management. With this in

¹ Only team leaders, i.e., chief negotiators, will be referred to as 'negotiators' within this analysis.

mind, dramaturgy emerges as a particularly appropriate analytical framework for the examination of labour/management negotiations.

As indicated above, this study examines an area of substantive importance within the Canadian social landscape. However, the results of this study should be of particular interest to labour/management negotiators themselves, serving as a guide to negotiation strategies, and fostering further understanding of the interactive dimension of the negotiating process. The interaction implications for, and strategies of, labour/management negotiators may also provide insight, and potentially instruction, to all those who are interested in negotiations, labour/management or otherwise.

II. THE DRAMATURGICAL PERSPECTIVE: THEORETICAL REVIEW

Dramaturgy asserts that, in the course of social interaction, people ("actors") attempt to give to others (the "audience") a particular desired impression. That is, as in the theatre, actors attempt to define the situation for their audience.

Actors express themselves through both verbal discourse and body language, including gestures, facial expressions, posture, and mood. But the means of expression are not limited to the actor's speech and body. Props, clothing,

setting, and other environmental elements can be used to dramatize a message. As in the theatre, social actors make use of all available means in order to convey a consistent message - a convincing "performance."

Dramaturgy as a sociological model of interaction is closely associated with Erving Goffman and his seminal work, "The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life." In this book, Goffman describes six dramaturgical principles: the performance, the team, the region and region behaviour, discrepant roles, communication out of character, and impression management. Each of these principles will be addressed in the study, as well as the roles played by the various participants. The six principles are briefly described below.

1. Performance: The *performance* refers to "all the activity of an individual which occurs during a period marked by his continuous presence before a particular set of observers and which has some influence on the observers" (Goffman, pg. 22). As Manning describes it, a successful performance requires actors to demonstrate their conviction that what is enacted is "the real reality," while maintaining a viable "front." The "front" is concerned with the staging of the performance, and includes the setting, facial expressions and role attitudes of the performers. Through such activities, "performances are both realized and idealized as our all-too-human selves are transformed into beings capable of expressive control" (Manning, 1991, pg. 75). In addition, Goffman suggests that,

at least some of the time, virtually all performers engage in concealed practices that are incompatible with fostered impressions (Goffman, pg. 58). The final performance strategy indicated by Goffman is that of “mystification,” which involves generating a favourable impression through the maintenance of social distance (Goffman, pg. 67).

2. Teams: The second dramaturgical principle expressed by Goffman is that of *performance teams*. A team is a group of individuals who must cooperate if a given projected definition of the situation is to be maintained (Goffman, pg. 104). This concept is extremely relevant to the analysis of labour/management negotiations. In such bargaining, each side is typically represented by a team.

3. Regions: Teams, in Goffman's conception, operate in both front and back *regions*. Front regions are where the “performance” occurs, while back regions are places where the team can relax and rehearse. Anything that might interfere in the success of the performance should only be on display “backstage.” For example, the front and back regions of a funeral are very distinct. The funeral service itself must be seen as a seamless and respectful tribute to the deceased. However, to accomplish this goal, extensive preparations are required which would be quite unsettling for the “audience” - the family and friends of the deceased. Therefore, a backstage region is essential in order to attend to

preparations outside the perception of the audience (Turner and Edgley, pp. 377-392).

4. Discrepant Roles: As Manning indicates, the concept of *discrepant roles* becomes pertinent when knowledge of back-region activities would be valuable to the audience. Opposing team members may masquerade as in-team members in order to gain access to backstage - the role they pretend to play is discrepant with the role they intend to play (Manning, 1991, pg. 75). Such actors attempt to give the impression they should have access to back-region activities, even though their intentions may not coincide with those of the team in question. Goffman discusses the mediator or arbitrator as sometimes playing a discrepant role in labour disputes. In such disputes the go-between may provide a means by which two hostile teams may arrive at a mutually beneficial agreement (Goffman, pg. 149). Kolb describes some of the expressive tactics used by mediators in order to achieve the status required to perform the role (Kolb, pp. 317-332 in Brissett & Edgley).

5. Communication Out of Character: *Communication out of character* involves performers mistakenly or inadvertently disclosing information damaging to the performance. A serious slip of this nature might involve the audience seeing an activity that should be reserved only for the back-region, as discussed above. This principle can be extended to all communication that discredits the

“definition of the situation officially projected by the participants” (Goffman, pg. 169).

6. Impression Management: The final principle, *impression management*, is almost interchangeable with the concept of “performance.” Impression management is the series of techniques we use to manage the impressions that others receive of us during our performances. Goffman believes participants and non-participants alike must possess and express certain attributes in order to maintain the “show.” He groups them under three headings: “defensive measures used by performers to save their own show; the protective measures used by audience and outsiders to assist the performers in saving the performers' show; and, finally, the measures the performers must take in order to make it possible for the audience and outsiders to employ protective measures on the performers' behalf” (Goffman, pg. 212).

In the context of the discussion above, it is argued that two additional theatrical concepts can be applied to the interactional world: the *suspension of disbelief* and *interactional awareness*.

7. Suspension of Disbelief: In theatre, there is an agreement between performer and audience that information which contradicts or is logically inconsistent with the performance is ignored in order to sustain the performance.

This conception is relevant to all interaction and is prevalent in Goffman's work. The theatrical concept of "suspending disbelief" may serve as a useful analytical tool in the analysis of labour/management negotiations.

8. Interactional Awareness: In the theatre, the performer is aware of many of his or her performance strategies. An actor will purposively and consciously employ a particular stance, tone of voice, or expression in order to convey a specific impression to the audience. A social actor is similarly aware of many of the performance strategies he or she employs. The concept of *interactional awareness* may prove relevant in the analysis of labour/management negotiations and the impression management techniques employed.

III. HYPOTHESES

This study hypothesizes that: 1. Labour/management bargaining will be dramaturgical in nature; 2. The bargaining process will be infused with dramaturgy - dramaturgical elements such as setting, clothing, props, regions and performance teams will be present and recognized by participants as relevant to the negotiated outcome; 3. Negotiators will employ impression management strategies to achieve a favourable negotiated outcome; and 4. The interactional skill of the negotiator will be demonstrated to be a major factor in the

determination of the negotiated outcome. Project participants will assess the skill of the negotiator, including impression management abilities, as relevant to the success of negotiations and to the achievement of bargaining objectives.

IV. DATA AND SOURCES

The primary data source for this study is in-depth interviews conducted with ten labour/management negotiators. The interviews were designed to elicit data on the elements of a labour/management bargaining performance, including the dress, props, and tactics employed by negotiators to present their chosen definition of the situation.

The interviews included both closed-ended and open-ended questions. Primarily, however, the emphasis was on allowing the experiences and techniques practised by the negotiators to come forward, resulting in a guide to the dramaturgy employed by these actors.

The interview group was diverse. Five management negotiators and five labour negotiators were interviewed. Chief negotiators were selected in order to ensure a sample with the greatest degree of interactional experience. Both male and female negotiators were accessed. The negotiators interviewed were drawn

from, and have negotiated in, multiple sectors, including health care, education, government, not-for-profit and the private sector. Similarly, labour groups represented by interviewed negotiators include professional, clerical, and skilled labour personnel, while management groups represented include private employers, universities, health care organizations, not-for-profit organizations, charities, and government. While all of the negotiators interviewed have a long history with at least one specific organization, most have experience in multiple bargaining environments, and some have made, or are making, their livelihood as freelance negotiators. Several have also been on both sides of the bargaining table at different points in their careers, affording a unique perspective on the negotiating process. There is less diversity in the interview sample based on age: the majority of selected negotiators have a lengthy history of relative success and are considered fairly senior within their profession. This emphasis on seniority was done to help secure a high degree of interactional experience within the sample.

A second data source was the notes and minutes of meetings previously conducted by the researcher with labour/management negotiators, referred to here as “bargaining notes.” This written documentation was coded for instances of the interactional techniques and principles discussed above.

V. ANALYSIS

The primary tasks of this study are to determine the dramaturgy employed by negotiators, and to assess whether the dramaturgical principles delineated by Goffman are present in the labour/management negotiating arena. As such, for each dramaturgical principle, the most important analysis goal is to determine whether the principle is present in labour/management negotiations, and to identify the dramaturgy associated with the principle in this specific arena.

Specifically, the results of the interviews were transcribed and then coded. Negotiator responses were coded for instances of the dramaturgical principles described in the theoretical review.

For each principle, a matrix was developed representing the responses of the ten interviewees. This matrix provides a framework for analysing the data. The matrix includes whether the principle is exhibited by each respondent, the manner in which it is exhibited, and remarks regarding various propositions developed by the author and potentially associated with the principle. An example matrix is attached as Appendix A.

The results are illustrative in nature, describing the dramaturgy of labour/management negotiations. As indicated, both the dramaturgical principles

and a series of propositions will be explored. However, due to the open-ended nature of the data, additional elements of the dramaturgy of labour/management negotiations are identified beyond those expressly indicated as propositions. Moreover, not every dramaturgical principle is equally relevant in the negotiation environment, and the principles identified as particularly pertinent will receive emphasis in the discussion of findings. The analysis is richly ethnographic, with the intent of providing a sense of the dramaturgy employed by negotiating actors in labour/management bargaining.

The study is of an exploratory nature, and among the first applications of the dramaturgical analysis framework to labour/management negotiating techniques and strategies. Although dramaturgy and labour/management negotiations appear potentially highly compatible, a first review of the literature suggests little work of this nature has been done. As such, this study may serve as a useful starting point for additional research into the expressive, interactive dimension of negotiations. In addition to subsequent qualitative analysis of this dimension, in the future the interactive strategies of negotiators identified in this open-ended small group study could be assessed through a complementary large scale study which would be primarily quantitative in nature.

B. DATA AND FINDINGS: THE DRAMATURGY OF LABOUR/MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

The dramaturgical characteristics of labour/management bargaining, and the strategies employed by negotiators, are presented below. The dramaturgical characteristics and strategies are grouped within the following categories: clothing, body language, props, regions, teams, and performance. It is important to note that the bargaining arena is a fluid and changing world, and that certain of the strategies or characteristics presented may be relevant to multiple categories. To avoid redundancy, such strategies and characteristics will generally be discussed within only one category.

Characteristics will describe variations in the particular category and other defining aspects of it. **Strategies** will describe not only ways in which particular strategies relevant to the category are used, but also the functions or reasons toward which such actions and techniques are directed, placed in a dramaturgical context.

Strategies are ways in which actors behave in order to influence and have a particular effect upon audiences. In the context of this study, **actors** refers to bargaining team members and, in particular, team leaders or chief negotiators.

Audience primarily refers to the opposing team, although strategies will sometimes be directed at one's own team, the self, or constituents.

I. USE OF CLOTHING FOR IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT

1. CHARACTERISTICS

Clothing, in a sense, can be regarded as a prop. In fact, Goffman includes clothing within the general rubric of props. However, for the purposes of this study, clothing will be treated as a category in its own right, and miscellaneous other props will be relegated to a later section (please see Section II. Use of Props for Impression Management).

This division is utilized to reflect the rich data related to clothing. Clothing emerges as a major focus for negotiators, and thus receives particular emphasis in the discussion of results. This division is also theoretical in nature, reflecting certain distinctions between clothing and other props. Clothing is a *body* prop continually attached to the actor and, in many ways, directly associated with the actor and her self, while other props may be considered *environmental* props – props external to the actor which the actor may bring into use as necessary.

This section describes variations in the use of clothing and other defining aspects of this dramaturgical category.

i. Clothing as Expressive Equipment: Negotiators in the study were unanimous in indicating the value of utilizing clothing as a means to express a particular image, or to support or enhance a particular performance. There are many different manifestations of this principle, and numerous meanings imputed to a variety of specific clothing choices. Examples of clothing selections and associated meanings will be discussed below. The common principle among these examples is the belief that different messages are conveyed by different clothing; that apparel acts as expressive equipment. Negotiators believe the labour/management negotiating process is richly dramaturgical, going far beyond the simple instrumental exchange of bargaining positions. As one respondent states:

“If I came in my favorite jean shirt and jeans, they would hold the impression that their issues weren’t serious. Anyone can discuss issues, you can discuss things anywhere, but paying attention to what you wear and to whatever else you do to get your point across is what matters. I have mainly used the apparel not to intimidate or not to outdo the other side, but rather for my own committee to have a level of importance around their issues. I will dress up.”

The negotiator believes that the simple verbal exchange of positions is insufficient – “anyone” can do that. The best results come from “dressing up” to fulfill the requirements of the role and to enhance one’s position.

Many observers might suggest that clothing simply serves instrumental goals – it covers the body, keeping us warm and clean. Negotiators in this study all reject

this notion, according a highly expressive element to apparel. One negotiator summarized this perspective:

“I just see it as a costume, I have always seen a suit as a costume and I have always seen how I use the costume as part of the picture. It wasn't like “we wear clothes so I need a sweater – I am cold so I am going to put a sweater on.” It didn't serve those practical purposes, but served rather a very important characteristic or drew a characteristic out that was a tool at the bargaining table.”

Clothing is seen as inherently dramaturgical by negotiators; study respondents consciously recognize and employ clothing as a means of practicing impression management.

ii. Consistency of Dress: Negotiators may vary their dress or maintain dress consistency depending on their negotiating style and specific objective. Two strategies relevant to this characteristic, demonstrating different degrees of consistency, are “Maintaining Formal Dress Throughout Negotiations to Indicate Discipline” and “Gradual Dressing Down: Alignment of Dress with the Opposing Team to Develop Rapport.”

iii. Degree of Formality: Negotiators may vary the degree of formality to convey differing impressions. For example, more formal dress can be used to indicate a serious juncture in negotiations, while less formal dress can be used to suggest a feeling of casual camaraderie among the participants.

iv. Team Alignment of Formality: While not all negotiators provide their team with guidelines concerning dress, most, however, attempt to bring team members who excessively diverge from the desired image back into performance consistency. If a negotiator feels certain team members are dressing in a manner inconsistent with the current desired performance, they endeavour to reinstitute consistency. Often this inconsistency takes the form of an inappropriate level of formality, either too much or too little. If the negotiator is trying to make a certain statement through dress, it will be undermined if team members contradict it through contrasting clothing choices. The degree of formality can usually be determined and discussed beforehand, ensuring a seamless performance. When a negotiator makes a statement through use of clothing formality, it usually is a commentary on how negotiations are proceeding, or a signal regarding the bargaining positions of either team.

v. Aligning the Uniform with the Message: Most examples involving alignment of the team uniform typically focus on the spectrum of formality, whether someone is dressed with too little or too much formality for the particular stage of negotiation at hand. As mentioned above, varying formality is often a commentary or signal regarding ongoing negotiations. However, there are also circumstances where the content of the in-group's proposals can be supported or weakened through the use of clothing. In such cases, the negotiator strives to ensure team members' uniforms do not contradict the teams' message.

For example, if a union is arguing for the professional status of its members, it does not serve to dress in an unprofessional manner. If a company is attempting to show it has little money, it is problematic to wear extremely expensive suits, or to arrive at the negotiations in luxury automobiles.

One negotiator related a story where the appearance of wealth was inconsistent with the intended message of being “hard done by”:

“I can remember years ago, I had a negotiating committee in Kingston and some of our members were extremely wealthy, in spite of being nurses where the majority of them would not be described that way. I had a member of one of my negotiating committees ... and she would be driven to the negotiations in her limo and she would wear all her jewelry – her rings would be amazing. She had quite a fantastic mink coat, so when it came time for the interest arbitration, we sort of suggested that she might tone it down so that the arbitrator might better buy into our argument that we were basically overworked and underpaid in spite of the fact that all of this woman’s wealth had nothing to do with the fact that she was a nurse.”

It may have been possible to state simply that the woman in question had acquired her wealth elsewhere, or to assume that the validity of the union’s arguments would stand on their own. However, the impression conveyed by such a clear presentation of wealth was considered too powerful. The negotiator and the other team members had to bring her clothing into alignment with the message.

vi. Humour in Clothing: Garment Gags or Funny Finery: Negotiators will often employ humour as a means of either bringing the two teams closer together, helping the other side identify with them, or breaking an impasse. Humour is used to show that the negotiator is a “good guy, a regular guy who’s fun to be around. He’s not an ogre. Maybe his positions are reasonable after all.” It is also used when tensions have mounted and discussions appear unfruitful. As one negotiator describes:

“I remember this one guy I negotiated with. He came and his team had actually bought him a tie that said, ‘I’m too sexy for my body,’ which got quite a response. Often you will do something like that if things are particularly tense and you are looking for some kind of an outlet or something that will kind of ease the tension a bit. You might do that or wear a silly pair of socks. For guys, its often around ties. Some of the employer people, some of the women, are a little eccentric around the hats.”

vii. Colour Consistency: Colour also plays a role in developing a convincing presentation within the bargaining arena. Dark colours are considered appropriate to convey that the negotiator is professional, serious and capable. Interestingly, while both male and female negotiators typically dress in this manner, there are some gender differences regarding this choice. Male negotiators interviewed tend not to ponder the colours they might wear as much as do their female counterparts. Female negotiators evince a larger “vocabulary of colour,” associating certain messages with different colours. This difference may be attributed to the societal focus on fashion for women, or to the necessity of using all available tools to overcome gender prejudice at the bargaining table.

As one negotiator stated:

"If I am in a formal environment which we most often are while we are negotiating, I generally wear a suit, usually a dark colored suit like navy, dark green or sometime I will wear purple. And some days I will wear red if I am in one of those fighting moods...You want to send a message that you are strong and firm, but professional and confident and if you go in there with a pink flowery outfit on you, often times it doesn't send the same message as if you are in a dark suit. Now, maybe some people don't think that way, but that is the way I think."

viii. Gender-Based Dress Strategies: Female negotiators interviewed were particularly conscious of the necessity of using clothing to create an impression that they are professional, and as capable as any other negotiator, regardless of gender. While those female negotiators interviewed did not feel it was necessary to dress "exactly like a man," they also thought it was important not to appear "too frilly, or too pretty." A serious presentation is necessary. While this is also considered true by male negotiators, women negotiators feel their dress is more likely to be an issue, more likely to be examined, and so they place special emphasis on it.

As one negotiator indicated:

"Well, I think particularly as a woman, [dress] is very important. My experience has been that very often when you are dealing publicly or in a group of people, people tend to look at what you are wearing and judge it in a different way than what a man is wearing. I will use the example of when I go on TV, people will say to me, 'Oh, you need a haircut,' or 'I loved your outfit,' but they have no idea what you said. The same goes at the bargaining table. So if you

can sort of neutralize what you are wearing thereby making it very simple or very strong, then you have leveled the playing field a little bit. So yes, I always think about what I am wearing.”

ix. Dramaturgical Effect vs. Physical Comfort: Like anyone else, negotiators want to be physically comfortable, and when negotiations extend late into the night, or over the weekend, there is a desire to dress in a more relaxed style. Nonetheless, even in these circumstances, dramaturgical effect often is considered of greater import than physical comfort. Negotiators want to ensure that role expectations are met: “When I talk about it it sounds kind of corny, but even at 3 o’clock in the morning I have had my team say, take your tie off at least. It has to come from them, and then I am comfortable.”

2. STRATEGIES

This section describes strategies relevant to the dramaturgical category of clothing, including how the strategies are implemented and the functions or reasons toward which such actions and techniques are directed.

Strategies are ways in which actors behave in order to influence and have a particular effect upon audiences. In the context of this study, *actors* refers to bargaining team members and, in particular, team leaders or chief negotiators. *Audience* primarily refers to the opposing team, although strategies will sometimes be directed at one's own team, the self, or constituents.

Of the various strategies employed by negotiators, those involving clothing are directed at perhaps the most diverse set of audiences. As a result, clothing strategies will herein be divided into self-directed, in-group directed, opposition directed, and constituency directed strategies. In addition, strategies directed jointly at both in-group and opposition will be reviewed.

i. Directed at Self

Dress to Impress Self: Negotiators practice impression management on themselves through the use of clothing. Typically, they dress in a manner which

they believe will serve to bolster their self-confidence. There is a sense of donning a suit of armor that will protect them in battle, giving them the confidence and security they need to perform effectively.

The strategy of dressing to impress self is widespread, and not limited to negotiations. For example, graduate teaching assistants, on occasion, may wear more formal or professional clothing to distinguish themselves as part of the faculty, because frequently they are within the same age range as their students. In addition to clarifying their role as teacher, some report such attire also gives them added confidence or assurance in dealing with their students (Knapp, pg. 181). It is proposed that situations of higher stress or perceived importance will result in increased use of this strategy. The high stakes involved in labour/management negotiations creates an environment where dressing to impress the self occurs frequently.

As described by one negotiator:

"In someway it is me internally feeling better...I don't really know if other people notice it but there are... certain things that I wear that make me feel tougher, tougher isn't the word for it. Maybe it is certain things that you wear that you feel more comfortable in. Like "this is you," this is how you really want to look whereas other things are sort of not an extension of yourself...no matter what situations you are in you feel good in it and there are other things you wear that you say, yes, that's nice...but it is not an extension of you. When it comes down to the wire in negotiations, you want to feel at your best. And maybe I haven't really thought of it but when I wear those things that make me feel more powerful, I am more

powerful and I do behave differently because you just feel good, you feel right. Everything is just right with this picture. ”

A lack of formal dress will often result in a lack of self-confidence in the overall presentation, undermining the negotiator's position. For example, as one negotiator indicates, “If I come in a t-shirt and jeans with the knee torn out, I hardly take myself seriously in the nature of this business...and I wouldn't think that they would either.”

The symbolic importance of clothing to the negotiator's self-image may vary by age to some degree. While negotiators of all ages wanted to look professional, many negotiators indicated that when they were younger, “the suit made the man.” Without appropriate attire, they might lose confidence in their own ability. As an experienced negotiator, clothes become simply one more tool in the negotiator's toolbox. As one negotiator stated,

“As a younger negotiator, I thought it was important to look professional and again I also think it was a confidence thing. I felt more confident in a suit or a jacket and tie. And I also thought it was expected from my negotiating committee, that they wanted me to look professional and have that kind of image. Probably if I had been 55 years old, I would have felt more comfortable in a t-shirt and blue jeans but at 24 or something just out of school I didn't.”

ii. Directed at Own Team

Meeting In-Group Clothing Expectations: Negotiators feel their negotiating teams or committees have certain expectations regarding their presentation of

self through apparel. Rather than simply assuming that the role of negotiator requires a certain standard "costume," many negotiators believe that they must dress in accordance with the expectations of the group they represent, and that clothing choices may vary depending on group. For example, one negotiator indicated,

"I think if we were in a blue collar union, I am sure the steel workers would hold a whole different impression of a guy coming in in a suit. The groups that I represent are female and they have visions of what the successful male delivering a successful message looks like, which is different than someone who works 2,000 feet underground."

The same negotiator will vary his or her dress depending on whom s/he represents, and what is being negotiated:

"I negotiated for the staff of Jobs Unlimited on a volunteer basis, dealing with the volunteer group [management] on the other side. If I would come in dressed as I would to negotiate with a government team [i.e., formally] it would have been over done and over acted and over dramatized to the point where I would have been behind an eight ball because of what I was wearing. Whereas with my own group [a union representing professionals] if I am dressed on a casual basis then I have learned that it doesn't match their expectations of how their issues should be packaged and argued with the other side."

While always wanting to maintain a clean, professional appearance, negotiators will vary their dress to suit in-group role expectations. The primary variation involves the degree of formality, although both colour and fashion aesthetic (or 'style' of dress) are on occasion varied to conform with in-group expectations.

Team Uniformity – Of Negotiator with Team: Negotiators generally want to maintain a professional performance and support this through wearing professional, formal attire. However, negotiators also are concerned with maintaining a consistent image within their negotiating team. As a result, these negotiators will alter their clothing to match changes in presentation by other team members. Negotiators who employ this strategy consider such consistency important for several reasons: 1. maintaining the strength and togetherness of the in-group, 2. communicating to the in-group that the negotiator is in “tune” with their feelings, and 3. conveying to the opposing group that their team is all “on the same page,” having a high degree of solidarity. By changing their clothing to mirror changes on their own team, negotiators are practicing impression management on both teams.

As one labour negotiator indicates,

“I tend to find that the later it gets, if your meeting is at 10 in the morning, how you will dress is very different than what it would be like at midnight or 2 a.m. or 4 a.m. At some point the tie usually comes off. Oddly enough, I find in my own teams, though while they are prepared to be in business attire during the day, that once they get into the evening they tend to dress more casually so taking your tie off is a sort of move in the direction of being casual like them without becoming unprofessional.”

Note the importance of not crossing the line into unprofessionalism. Although negotiators practice mirroring, they do so only if it does not endanger more important performance necessities.

While the above negotiator is practicing mirroring, a substrategy might be entitled “predictive mirroring”: attempting to foresee the mood and associated clothing selection of his or her team, and then mirroring these clothing predictions in his or her own choice of attire. A labour negotiator describes his deliberations in one such scenario:

“Over a 3 day pattern for example, a 3 day bargaining session -- by the third day, if it is a half day, I will feel myself looking in the closet in the morning and saying it is a half day and people will be wanting to go home. They are not going to be that intensely focused on the job at hand and I have to consciously decide if I am going to be relaxed here a bit, but it wouldn't be appropriate to go too far. Like I would never wear pants like these [khakis] in negotiations, but I would go without a dress shirt or tie...I would just wear a dress sweater or something that would still say, look, we are still serious here. This is still serious business.”

Again, clothing selections that are considered to imply a lack of seriousness or professionalism will not be mirrored.

Team Uniformity – Of Team with Negotiator's Wishes: Negotiators vary in whether they instruct their team concerning appropriate dress at the outset of bargaining. Negotiators who do this suggest a “dress code” for the team, with individuals permitted to exercise personal taste within general guidelines. Within the course of a negotiation, negotiators may occasionally try to bring team members into a degree of performance consistency, but will usually act only if the situation is severe. Even then, they will attempt to subtly “nudge” people toward

certain attire choices. This oblique approach helps ensure that “feathers aren’t ruffled,” and “good will is maintained on the team” – considered essential to successful bargaining. It is more common in these situations to detail a peer of the transgressor to address the issue.

Removing Clothing...from the Equation: If a negotiator’s clothing does not meet with role expectations, or is in fact even notable in any significant manner, some negotiators are concerned that their team will inefficiently focus on how s/he is dressed. Dressing in a way that meets with team expectations also serves to eliminate clothing as a topic that could potentially dominate discussion and reduce the opportunity to debate the proposals at hand. Negotiators with a high proportion of women on their negotiating teams were more likely to characterize this as a particularly important strategy, although it was considered relevant for both genders. Negotiators want to have an impact on both the opposing negotiating team and their own team with what they are wearing, but they do not want their own team placing undue emphasis on their chief negotiator’s clothing selections. As one negotiator states,

“In a caucus meeting, after the first session on any given day, undoubtedly there will be some comment about what one is wearing today. They might say, ‘She doesn’t want to include any pants, she doesn’t want to include any pastels, or he looks tired today, it must be what he is wearing, or gray doesn’t look good on him.’ So our people are very apparel conscious (maybe it is colour) and I recognize that. So in order to ensure that they are focused on the issues, and not on what I am wearing, I try to match what they are looking for.”

iii. Directed at Opposition Team

Dress to Impress the Opposing Team: All negotiators interviewed in this study discussed the importance of dressing to impress the opposing team. Negotiators want the other team to believe they are professional, competent and serious, and they dress in a manner which they believe supports this image. Two negotiators discuss the impression they hope to invoke and the clothing choices they make to support this presentation, below:

"I think particularly from an employer's perspective or an employer's point of view, it is important that you portray a business-like image. An image that you know what you are doing, that you are serious about the business at hand and you approach it in all of those ways. I think part and parcel of that is being dressed in a business-like way."

"I want to be perceived as professional. I would always wear a shirt and tie. Normally a jacket, not a ... blue power suit but a casual but nice suit or jacket. You're not looking to give the [image of] "I am a Bay Street lawyer," "I am wearing a \$1,500 suit." That is not the image people are looking for or not the image I am looking to portray. But well dressed, respectful."

When asked "How come you don't want to look like a Bay Street type?," this negotiator responded, "Because that to me isn't what our people want. It's too slick and then they don't relate to too slick. My image is more friendly, affable, but I hope confident." Clearly, the negotiator must balance the impression management necessities of both audiences.

Some negotiators go beyond simply presenting a professional image. They dress to overwhelm or intimidate the opposing team, and gain control of the negotiating process. (See “Dressing to Overwhelm,” below.) This strategy is mentioned here because it usually involves an extension of traditional ‘professional’ clothing strategies.

Negotiators also take clues from the responses of their own team regarding the impact of dress: “I know from my group that if someone on the other side isn’t appropriately dressed by their standards, then they don’t take what they say as significant.” This suggests a necessity of dressing to ensure the other side construes what you are saying as significant, a strategy that could aptly be called “dressing up your message.”

This strategy is highly portable to other environments. Numerous studies have examined audience reactions to a confederate wearing different sets of clothes. A better dressed person is more likely to be: followed when crossing the road against a “don’t walk” notice, helped if asking the way, or responded to when asking social survey questions (Lambert, 1972). A well dressed female was able to obtain coffee at a snack bar without money, and to draw money from a bank where she had no account (Little, unpublished study). In each case, the person who has dressed in a manner that impresses receives greater cooperation or

capitulation from the people with whom he or she is dealing. The negotiator realizes this tendency and capitalizes on it.

Manipulation of Clothing: Getting Down to Business: While retaining the same articles of clothing, negotiators may manipulate their apparel to achieve a particular impression with the opposing team. The most common example of this is the “look” typically characterized as “getting down to business.”

Negotiators will alter their physical presentation of self, shifting from the pure formalism of the conventionally worn suit to a more informal presentation that signals a willingness and preparedness to work effectively with the opposing team. The formal, conventionally worn suit is characterized by the tie being done up, the jacket on, and all buttons done up. The negotiator signals that he (typically a “he” in this case) is prepared to “get down to business” by taking the jacket off, undoing the tie and the top button of the shirt, and rolling up his shirtsleeves. No longer encumbered by the physical and symbolic restrictions of the formal suit, the negotiator now conveys an ability to “get his hands dirty,” move with greater flexibility, and “relate as a person who has to work together with others to get a job done.” Women negotiators will also use the signal of removing the jacket, although it appears to a lesser degree than with male negotiators, citing a greater necessity of maintaining an appearance of professionalism at all times.

Descriptions by negotiators of such clothing manipulations, and associated impressions, include: "I would certainly [employ] the earnest hard working look, loosen the tie, roll up the sleeves," "Take your jacket off, [and] roll your sleeves up when you are really ready to play ball," and "I have the shirt sleeves rolled up kind of look, which says 'okay, we are really ready to do business, let's get down to it.'" While this type of clothing manipulation may be used at any stage in the collective bargaining process where the negotiator wants to convey the impression he or she is prepared to get down to work, it typically is implemented when a "deal is close."

Part of this presentation includes conveying an impression of workman-like sincerity. Negotiators describe this look as "earnest," "dedicated," and "salt of the earth." The strategy involves convincing the opposing team that all participants are human, that underneath these uniforms we are really the same, and that we have a job to do together, so let's do it.

Signaling and Prompting Change through Clothing: A significant change in the negotiator's appearance sometimes is used to notify the other team that a major shift has occurred. The shift in clothing is meant to mirror a shift in position or in the in-group's perception of the negotiation. It may also be used to prompt or support potential change from the opposing team. By making a change in

appearance, a negotiator will try to inspire a change in negotiations: “something has changed, maybe we should sit up and take notice.”

As one negotiator indicated,

“I am more inclined to become conscious of dress when we are involved in substantive negotiations ...if they have seen me at the table dressed half casually for eight months, the day I come in wearing a suit, or a shirt and tie, I am probably conveying to them that in our camp something has changed, or we sense that your camp is now ready to change. Are we right?”

This negotiator adopts an appearance he considers consistent with a professional working relationship – with “getting the job done” – when he wants to signal that change has occurred and it’s time to get serious, or when he wants to prompt or encourage a potential or perceived change in the opposing team’s position. This strategy could be entitled “Dress Serious to Get Serious.”

Signaling Displeasure through Clothing: We’re Not Here to Work, So Why Dress Up?: A negotiator may alter his or her clothing in order to signal displeasure with how the negotiation is proceeding. This is considered particularly effective if the negotiator has retained a fairly consistent and formal image during the preceding negotiations: the change is more obvious when it is in stark contrast to previous patterns of dress. With this strategy, the negotiator hopes to give the following impression to the opposing team: ‘when bargaining was moving forward in an effective manner, I came here dressed to work, but

since negotiations now seem to be stalling, I might as well come here dressed casually, because you are not serious about our discussions.'

As one labour negotiator states,

"Because it is so different, you can dress down and sometimes give the impression that you have given up. That there just isn't hope and you're hanging around, but basically you have given up and you don't have hope. Sometimes that happens."

The negotiator hopes to impress upon the opposing team that they must alter their current stance if bargaining is to get back on track: the current position is untenable and not worth serious consideration.

Dressing to Overwhelm: Dressing to overwhelm involves expressing through your clothing that "I am in control here." While this strategy can be used at any point in negotiations, interviewed negotiators generally consider it only at the outset of bargaining. When using this strategy, a negotiator will begin negotiations by showing that he or she is the dominant force in the room, and should be respected. One negotiator employs this strategy in the following manner:

"What I like to do is I start out dressed very conservatively, business wise, suit and tie. I like to wear lots of gold, lots of diamonds, custom made shirts, custom made suits, cuff links, have my shoes shined, the whole nine yards so that I come in looking like a million dollars...I hope that the image I am conveying is the image of corporate ownership."

Gradual Dressing Down: Alignment of Dress with the Opposing Team to

Develop Rapport: After starting out with a professional, business-like image, a negotiator can employ the strategy of attempting to gradually align his or her dress with that of the opposing team. In this case, the direction of the change is typically to less formality. Beginning with a professional image is a necessity; the negotiator must serve notice that he or she is a serious practitioner of negotiation, and that his or her side is professional and capable.

In the case of a management negotiator, there may also be a necessity of acknowledging to the other team, through clothing, that the negotiator is, in fact, an agent of the employer. Without this initial acknowledgment, the union team might reject any attempt to display commonality among the teams. Once it is acknowledged, however, the negotiator can begin to slowly convince the opposing team that he or she shares much with them.

Clothing is a key way to communicate this commonality.

“What I like to do is I start out dressed very conservatively, business wise, suit and tie...Then from there I will let my clothing standards decline. I start coming in more and more casual and I do it very deliberately, I may wear a suit one day and take my jacket off because it is warm in the room. As we are working during the day I may roll up my sleeves and loosen my tie and unbutton my top button. From there it might progress to an open necked shirt and casual pants, right down to a short sleeved golf shirt. It seldom goes beyond that. But the image that I hope to convey as I down grade my clothing, is that I am trying to work with them to identify ways of reaching our mutual goal...and...to put the union bargaining committee at ease. Certainly I want to convey the

impression that management is trying to work with them not against them."

A negotiator can employ this strategy to attempt to have the opposing team begin to relate more to him or her than to their own negotiator. An opposing negotiator may feel he or she has to conform to certain dress expectations that do not necessarily match the clothing selections of his or her own team. Alternatively, they may be unaware of the importance of dress. In either case, a negotiator can attempt to undermine the authority of the opposing negotiator, and begin to have that team identifying more with him or her than with their own negotiator.

"...you will find quite often that the union representative, the bargaining agent...are the ones who usually have to conform, they are conforming with the dress code set in their offices so that, as an example...they wear a shirt and tie all the time because it is expected of them in their offices and as a result I am firmly convinced that I fit in better with their bargaining committee than they do because they are the outsider... the negotiator is the one who is giving off the vibes of being very reserved and stand-offish with their dress. I find it is generally the bargaining agent or union representative, if they are hired or that is their paid job, who are usually the last ones to understand what has happened. They dress, they conform to a whole different code based on something outside the bargaining room. I only have to conform to the code that I am trying to establish at the table. They seem to ... believe it is an expectation of their members to see them coming in looking like a professional. I, as a professional, turn around and start relating to their bargaining unit members through my appearance and I think it takes me a long way towards getting an agreement more than it hinders me... I don't care what [the opposing negotiator] says as long as I can see the heads nodding in an affirmative manner...If their heads start nodding then I am doing my job because they are relating to what I am saying. And they will convince him in the back room that my position isn't that bad."

If this dramaturgical strategy is successful, the negotiator who employs it will potentially acquire a number of new supporters for his or her bargaining position, or at least develop a more accepting environment for the presentation of proposals.

iv. Directed at Both Teams

Making the First Impression: All negotiators interviewed agreed it is important to begin negotiations with clothing that conveys a sense of competence, professionalism, and control. Most also suggested that clothing should convey respect for the parties involved and for the process itself.

Even if a negotiator is planning to shift to more casual attire in the near future, he or she will still ensure the “opening night” dress code is adhered to:

“Maybe for the opening exchange and proposals, yes I would want to dress quite professionally, but normally I wouldn’t think in terms of that little drama unless and until I sense that an agreement is within reach or that both parties were now ready to play ball.”

Maintaining Formal Dress Throughout Negotiations to Indicate Discipline:

This strategy involves using clothing to create the impression that your negotiating team is highly disciplined and in control. Through maintaining the same professional appearance throughout the negotiating process, some negotiators try to convince the opposing team that their minds, their planning,

their position, and their resolve are as disciplined as their choice of clothing. This impression management may also be directed at the negotiator's self and his or her team.

As one management negotiator suggests,

"As I have often told my negotiating committees, whether it is 9:30 in the morning, 9:30 in the evening, 2 o'clock in the afternoon or 2 o'clock in the morning, we will have our suits on, we will have our ties on and the ties will be done up. A shirt won't be loosened. And that will apply Monday through Friday or Saturday or Sunday or whenever a period of time in a 24 hour day or a 7 day week that we are negotiating, that is the image that we are going to maintain. A crisp, business-like, in-control or under-control image, we know what we are doing, we are confident in our image...I think it creates a certain image for the people that we are dealing with. It inspires them in terms of them believing that we know what we are doing and we mean what we say. And it also inspires ourselves in terms of building up our psyche and confidence in ourselves to do the job at hand."

Avoiding Overdressing: Negotiators want to present a professional, confident, capable image, and typically this involves dressing in a formal manner. However, they do not hold onto this image at any cost. If a negotiator believes such apparel is clearly incongruent with the expectations of participants or the issue under discussion, he or she will often "dress down" in order to appear aware and part of the environment. There is a desire not to create an impression of purposeful intimidation through clothing. As the Jobs Unlimited negotiator indicated, using remarkably dramaturgical language, formal dressing in that bargaining environment would be "over-acted and over-dramatized to the point

where I would have been behind the eight-ball because of what I was wearing.”

This negotiator further explains,

“I don’t think that, if at the bargaining table there is a degree of intimidation from one side or the other, you are going to have a very good round of negotiations. The opportunity to get the quality language and the quality of understanding that you want to derive from that session is not going to be there because it is going to be motivated by something else.”

Once again, the message conveyed by clothing is considered quite powerful, and clothing choices must be carefully and consciously contemplated.

Negotiating Over Dress to Ensure Equal Dramaturgical Playing Field: In the normal course of bargaining, negotiators will dress to assist their overall presentation. In a long session of bargaining, as day changes into night, a negotiator or her team may wish to change from more formal attire into something more comfortable. However, they will not want to do so if it means acquiring a dramaturgical disadvantage. If one group wants to make a clothing shift that otherwise might result in a disadvantage, it is considered necessary to “neutralize” dress by coming to a common understanding among both negotiating teams of what constitutes appropriate apparel for a specified bargaining session.

For example, if one team wants to “dress down” for a particular session, and they are not trying to convey a particular message by doing so, they will often try to

come to an agreement with the opposing team concerning how everyone will dress. As one respondent relates,

“At the bargaining table I know there will be times when, for example if we were meeting, everyone would be dressed up for meetings during the day and then if we go back after supper or late at night we would talk to the other side and sort of say, okay, its casual dress tonight. So it’s almost like a mutual understanding that you come to that everybody dresses down. I guess you could look at it as trying to be more comfortable but in terms of coming to a mutual understanding it might be the power thing that you didn’t want to have one group have the advantage over the other just because of the way they dressed. I don’t know, it might just be subconscious doing that but I am aware of the fact that when I go to certain meetings I feel more powerful by what I wear. And suits can be intimidating so if we were there, and our team dressed down in jeans and the other team dressed in suits, that can be intimidating so it is sort of like a mutual understanding that after hours everybody gets more relaxed and everybody is still on equal footing. And even as a team, you sort of make an announcement as a team, ‘We’ll dress down tonight guys,’ or ‘This is dress up time.’”

v. Directed at Constituents

Dress to Impress Constituents: Most negotiators want to dress to provide a particular impression to the group they represent. Even if the negotiators are unlikely to come into direct contact with constituents² during the negotiation period, they nonetheless take this group into account in their presentation of self. Practically, other members of the negotiating team may go back to their peers

and comment on the appearance of the negotiator. However, the desire to dress to impress constituents goes beyond this potential in-group surveillance. Negotiators internalize their role of group representative to the degree that they want to dress in a manner considered appropriate by the group. As one labour negotiator indicates,

"I was portraying an image. I was there representing [my group] so I had to look the part. How I dressed was important, I was representing them, so I wanted to make sure the professional image was there, the professional look. So, I was conscious, very much, of what I wore."

² Labour constituents include union members, actives, non-actives, and specific components of the membership. Management constituents include managers, owners, shareholders, and specific departments or areas of the organization.

II. USE OF PROPS FOR IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT

1. CHARACTERISTICS:

Relevant to dramaturgy, props are instruments to enhance expression of meaning. Within this analysis, props will be considered to be environmental in nature: objects and equipment in the environment which the negotiator may employ to convey meaning. The props may either be already present in the bargaining setting, or be brought into the setting by the negotiator or other participants. Props are manipulatable by actors and usually physical in nature³. They are used to express nuances of attitude and feeling, and to convey a desired message.

Props can include both common, everyday instruments such as napkins, magazines, pipes, pens, pencils, papers, and briefcases, as well as situation-specific instruments such as flip charts, graphs, bargaining research documents, and industry-specific equipment. The everyday instruments are typically imbued with the desired meaning by the negotiator in the course of bargaining; i.e., the prop takes on the temporary meaning desired by the actor, or serves the

³ Although not exclusively. For example, overhead and computer-generated projections may also be considered props, as may empty spaces or the lack of particular objects. While each of these examples may be said to have some form of physical element, they are distinct from the more material objects typically associated with 'props.'

temporary purpose he or she assigns it. This meaning or purpose is not inherent in the prop, and different meanings and purposes may be assigned to the prop at different times. Situation-specific props typically have an inherent meaning or message. For example, a graph may communicate certain information relevant to negotiations. This meaning is more immutable and is difficult for the negotiator to alter, although the meaning may be used to achieve different purposes at different times; i.e., the graph may be used in two separate circumstances to try to achieve two different contract clauses. Similarly, the graph may be used at one point to justify a position in bargaining and at another point to demonstrate the negotiator's team is well prepared.

Clothing, which may be considered a prop, is addressed separately, due to the rich data associated with this dramaturgical category, and to the theoretical distinction between clothing and other props. Clothing is a *body* prop continually attached to the actor and, in many ways, directly associated with the actor and her/his self, while other props, as mentioned, may be considered *environmental* props – props external to the actor which the actor may bring into use as necessary.

2. STRATEGIES

This section describes strategies relevant to the dramaturgical category of props, including how the strategies are implemented, and the functions or reasons toward which such actions and techniques are directed.

Strategies are ways in which actors behave in order to influence and have a particular effect upon audiences. In the context of this study, *actors* refers to bargaining team members and, in particular, team leaders or chief negotiators. *Audience* primarily refers to the opposing team, although strategies will sometimes be directed at one's own team, the self, or constituents.

Note Taking by Team – To Convey Vigilance: Note taking is the strategy of taking notes of what the opposing negotiating team says during bargaining. Note-taking by the team is usually initiated at the request of the negotiator: he or she assigns one or more members of the team to copy down the proceedings, including what was said, when it was said, and who said it. This may appear to be instrumental in nature, providing a record of discussions for later perusal. Negotiators acknowledge this instrumental benefit, but say it is rarely used, and only a minor component of the picture. Instead, they cite dramaturgical reasons for employing this strategy. It serves notice to the opposing team that they

cannot attempt to “slip one by” this team, and that the team is organized, competent, and serious about bargaining.

As one negotiator indicates, “It serves a couple of things. It does provide a record which we rarely go back to, but more importantly it lets the other side know that, okay, this is critical, they mean business here, so they are taking everything down.”

Another negotiator remembers implementing this strategy when she was a member of the team, rather than the leader:

“...that would be our role to take notes. It would almost be a form of non-verbal communications. We were communicating something to them very strongly that we were watching every word that they were saying and they were doing the same thing. They would be taking notes of every word that we said so even that is a form of, almost a subtle form of intimidation, sort of a non-verbal tactic as well. It was the fact that you need the notes, but it also creates an air of being watched and we watched the ‘non-verbal’ of the other team members of their team just as they watched us.”

This negotiator relates not only the impression she meant to convey (watchfulness), but the feeling evoked by the opposition employing the same strategy (subtle intimidation).

Note Taking by Negotiator – to Signal Significance: As discussed above, note taking is the strategy of taking notes of what the opposing negotiating team says during bargaining. While team note taking is a constant, note taking by the

negotiator is usually implemented when the negotiator wants to send a specific signal to the opposing team. By writing down something the other side has said, the negotiator signals something important has happened, that he or she may be interested in some aspect of the latest proposal, or may have some possible response forthcoming in the future.

The following negotiator makes considerable use of this strategy:

"I don't take everything down, but when I make a note - and I do it consciously - it is to send a message to the other side. I want them to think, 'I don't know what he has written but there is something that he liked or didn't like about what we just said.' I use writing and note taking by myself as a means to provide a message for the other side. I want them to learn that he is writing for a purpose because he doesn't write on every issue, that there is something there that is a benchmark because he wrote something down. Sometimes it is just to throw them off."

This same negotiator will use note taking as a convenient means to segue into a caucus, a substrategy that might be entitled, "Note Taking to Caucus," As he describes, the use of note taking

"[may be simply] to get out of a discussion leading up to what will take us back into our caucus room ... I may jot a note down to myself that this has gone on for 20 minutes and it records for my own use, but also for the other side, the indication that there is something significant that may just be the end of the conversation."

Presumably the negotiator has written something down that the team must now discuss in caucus, whereas in reality the negotiator was looking for a simple means to justify a caucus, and created one through the use of this strategy.

Closing of Notebook to Signify Withdrawal and Displeasure: Note-taking can be used to send a message to the opposition. In the case of team note taking, it signifies vigilance. In the case of negotiator note taking, it suggests significance. The cessation of note taking also sends a message: there is nothing worthwhile being said by the opposition. This strategy is manifested most clearly by the closing of the notebook. The negotiator is usually the person to implement this strategy, although sometimes the remainder of the team will follow suit.

By closing the notebook, the negotiator has made it impossible to record what the opposition is saying. Without specifically saying so, the negotiator has pronounced judgment on whatever the opposition is proposing. The use of this strategy allows the negotiator to communicate his or her position "out of turn;" that is, before the opposing negotiator has finished speaking. It also permits an extremely strong communication without resorting to verbal accusations that might result in a highly negative environment detrimental to productive negotiations.

This strategy is implemented rarely, and only at key junctures in bargaining. In fact, it will not be utilized in every set of negotiations. Overuse of such an aggressive strategy will result in the opposition characterizing the negotiator as difficult to work with, and will weaken the efficacy of the tactic. The strategy is

most successful when it follows a long pattern of seemingly calm and reasonable behaviour. Ideally, negotiations will not deteriorate to the point that this strategy is necessary.

Closing of one's books may be used as a somewhat less severe alternative to walking out of negotiations. In fact, it may be characterized as an interim stage between full involvement and walking out. Solely in terms of note taking, it is the final stage. Each action or stage, as practised by a negotiator, sends at least two types of messages to the opposition: 1. how involved in the proceedings the negotiator currently feels, and 2. whether the opposition's current statements or proposals are considered significant or worthy of respect. These actions, and the messages associated with each, are as follows:

<u>Stage</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Involvement Of Negotiator</u>	<u>Implied Significance of Opposition Statements</u>
1	Note Taking	High	High
2	Poised for Note Taking	High	Not High
3	Pen down	Low	Low
4	Closed books	Very Low	Very Low
5	Walking Out	None	None

One negotiator describes the strategy of closing his notebook, and the impression it is meant to convey, as follows:

“...at very dramatic times of the bargaining ... the closing of my book is used. So they can keep talking, but I am not writing a damn thing down and I am not paying any attention, I am just paying them the minimum courtesy that I feel possible. I am here, but I am not taking notes.”

Note the negotiator indicates this strategy does not convey as severe a message as walking out – the negotiator is still at the table, at least in body. The negotiator may wish to save walking out for a later point in negotiations, or to impress upon the opposition that he or she is close to doing so.

Treatment of Opposition Documents: Negotiations typically produce a significant number of documents. These documents include papers produced by the negotiation teams, such as proposals regarding clauses, changes and contract language, and external papers relevant to bargaining, such as research, position papers, financial information, and statistical data.

The documents produced by a negotiation team often express their positions and beliefs regarding the ongoing negotiations and various bargaining issues. This provides an ideal opportunity for negotiators to use the documents as props. If they wish to express respect for a proposal, they can show respect for the document upon which it is written. If they wish to show displeasure with a proposal, they can treat the document in a negative manner.

One negotiator describes possible document treatments, when faced with a negative proposal, as follows:

"You might well be making curt gestures with your hands, talking about the document that has been put in front of you without having it in front of you. You might just take it and lay it aside while you're saying you're going to give this a close look here, but body language is saying you just chucked it to the bottom of the heap or something."

Some negotiators believe that only positive impression management should be practised on opposition documents. They feel it is counterproductive to treat opposition documents in a negative manner; that such activity may result in the development of ill feelings, endangering the negotiation process. Additionally, these negotiators believe an apparent rejection or lack of respect toward opposition proposals may result in similar treatment of their own proposals. As one management negotiator states,

"I suppose one might be tempted ... when you see what's on them to probably want to burn them, but, no I think you have to take the position that obviously they feel that these are important issues to them and treat them with the same respect that you would your own proposals. Because often times we go in with proposals that are clearly causing union rank and file concerns and we wouldn't want them burning them or ripping them in front of you, or mistreating them in any way, or putting more coffee stains on them than they have to. So, no, I think again, it comes back to that issue of showing respect for people and for their issues and their property."

Similarly, a union negotiator indicates: **"I tend to think of them as documents to be respected. I don't run around waving them. You are not likely to agree with them, but you make a mistake to belittle them or denigrate them."**

The Use of Props to Reinforce a Message: A number of props are used by negotiators to reinforce a message. For example, when making a series of aggressive points, a negotiator might wield his pen like a sword, symbolically 'stabbing' the opposition with each newly expressed fact. Similarly, a negotiator may reinforce her/his statement that s/he best understands the needs of the workers by having a stack of research papers on the subject piled in front of her/him. In fact, virtually any instrument in the bargaining room can be used in this manner, depending on the circumstances and the message the negotiator is trying to convey. Smoking, and several other varieties of prop manipulation, will be used to illustrate this dramaturgical strategy.

Smoking is often no longer permitted around the bargaining table; however, most interviewed negotiators have experienced a smoking-friendly negotiation environment, and the dramaturgical possibilities it represents. Smoke, and its manipulation, can be used to reinforce a message the negotiator is trying to convey.

The smoke can be exhaled to coincide with the verbalization of discussion points, providing a visual punctuation of whatever message the negotiator is trying to communicate. In addition, a sense of suspense can be developed, as the opposition team becomes accustomed to the dramaturgical pattern and awaits

the next stage in the presentation. This form of socialization can serve to develop the strategizing negotiator as the centre of the process – the person who needs to be listened to in order to achieve an agreement.

Other types of punctuation include raising or changing the voice at the conclusion of each point, ticking points off on one's fingers, or, in a heated moment, pointing one's fingers at the opposition or hitting the table. Some of these means of punctuation may invite argument or develop ill will; blowing smoke is particularly useful as it can be more easily presented as inadvertent, while achieving the same end.

One negotiator describes his use of smoking as follows,

“You are taking it out on the puff and you exhale largely, as you are trying to make those points. In fact, at [one negotiation] I set off the fire alarm twice in one of my board rooms because I actually stood up to make a point and blew out smoke into the smoke detector.”

The negotiator must coordinate his or her presentation to ensure the smoking and the verbal message are timed appropriately. The verbal presentation of each point is emphasized by the visual cue of the exhaled smoke, and by the accompanying time delay. The use of this strategy lends some credence to the supposition that negotiating is “all about smoke and mirrors.”

While smoking is no longer permitted within many bargaining rooms (although not without exception), the same principles can be used with other types of props or body language. Each verbal point could be emphasized by taking a drink of water, by turning a page in one's binder, or by any other action that serves to demarcate and dramatize a point.

The Use of Props to Indicate a Position or Belief: Props may be used to punctuate, or reinforce, a verbal message, but they may also be used in isolation to communicate a particular message, i.e., props have a communicative function independent of whether the negotiator is actually speaking.

A number of props are used by negotiators to indicate positions or beliefs. In fact, virtually any instrument in the bargaining room can be used in this manner, depending on the circumstances and the message the negotiator is trying to convey. Smoking, and several other varieties of prop manipulation, will be used to illustrate this dramaturgical strategy.

Smoking can be used to express several different messages. A long drag on the cigarette can be used to show consideration of an issue or an opposition argument, particularly if accompanied by a furrowed brow. The striking of a match can be accomplished in a forceful, abrupt manner in order to indicate disagreement or frustration. As one negotiator indicates, "Its funny, when more

people smoked and I used to smoke, I think that was an effective prop. The way in which you light a match to light a cigarette could show extreme frustration.”

Without actually speaking his or her position, a negotiator can convey how he or she feels using props. Using props can allow the negotiator to communicate a message without getting into an unproductive debate, and to expand the repertoire of techniques for conveying a particular position.

It may also provide a subtext to a spoken position. The negotiator may say that she or he feels a certain way about a position, but use available props to indicate a completely opposite belief. This can be useful when stating agreement or disagreement to an opposition proposal. In the case of agreement, converse use of props suggests agreement is not wholehearted, and is a major concession. In the case of disagreement, converse use of props suggests the disagreement is not a matter of anger or inflexibility, but rather a simple expression of a reasonable position. In the later case, prop use might be used to show the fair and open nature of a negotiator, while the negotiator simultaneously rejects an opposition proposal. For example, offering beverages to the opposition or treating their documents with reverence while turning down their latest proposal. The hope is to have the message of rejection transformed or at least mitigated by the concurrent transmission of a more palatable message using props.

Buying Time to Respond Through Prop Manipulation: Sometimes a negotiator requires time to develop an appropriate response to an opposition question or proposal. Manipulation of props allows a negotiator to develop a response without conveying the impression that the delay is due to lack of preparation or the validity of the opposition's position. The delay is due to the prop.

One negotiator relates how one of his colleagues has a signature technique to buy time, "[He's] great because whenever he is stuck for an answer he has to light his pipe. And he will fumble around for his pipe, and fumble around for a match and you know damn well that all the time he is trying to think of a response for you."

Displaying Disinterest/Implausibility through Prop Manipulation: A negotiator can indicate he or she finds opposition ideas, proposals or explanations implausible through prop manipulation. By busying themselves with props while the opposition is presenting its proposal, negotiators using this strategy attempt to convey that it is not worthwhile to listen to the message.

Virtually any physical object present at negotiations can be used in this manner, e.g., doodling with pen on paper, adjusting piles of paper, fixing eyeglasses,

adjusting clothing, and playing with pens. The key is to be more visibly engaged in prop manipulation than in listening to the opposition.

A particularly subtle use of this strategy involves conveying disinterest with a prop manipulation inherent in the bargaining process, i.e., doing something which might conceivably have to be done at some point during negotiations, but timing it so it coincides with the opposition's presentation. This allows the strategizing negotiator to remain blameless while still conveying his or her message. The opposition cannot complain without looking bad, but will generally interpret the message in the desired manner, fulfilling the goal of the strategizing negotiator.

The following example of prop manipulation makes such an appeal to negotiation necessities:

“A briefcase is another prop, now that I think of it. Someone can be talking and trying to tell me a story and all of a sudden I am looking for the unfindable thing at the bottom of my briefcase. It's somewhere to go to convey a message that 'I am not buying what you are telling me here.' Keep talking. I won't even let them know and after awhile I want them to think, 'What is he looking for? Why is he down there?' It gets them off their track...The negotiation isn't at the bottom of the briefcase, it is still in the proposals and what is written down, but all these things influence the environment.”

This above negotiator manipulates his briefcase not only to indicate the implausibility of the opposition argument, but also to make the opposing team lose concentration – to throw them off their train of thought.

Signifying Displeasure by Denying Access to Equipment: A negotiator may wish to signal to the opposition that he or she is displeased with the current position or proposal they are espousing. One means of doing this is to deny the opposition access to equipment or other objects present at the bargaining table, such as staplers, extra paper, food, and water. The benefit of this strategy is that it sends a 'silent message' – a message that is usually 'heard' and understood by the opposition, but which is unlikely to descend into an unproductive and overly aggressive argument. The denied object becomes imbued with meaning – it represents the displeasure of the strategizing negotiator.

This strategy appears most likely to be employed at an early stage in negotiations. If the negotiator believes the opposition is acting in an unreasonable manner near the outset of bargaining, he or she will wordlessly deny the opposition access to equipment. The negotiator does not want bargaining to deteriorate into angry, inflexible behaviour at such an early juncture, so he or she avoids direct verbal conflict, and employs a less confrontational, but almost equally clear, means of expressing his or her position. Body language is another means of expressing this displeasure. Denial of access to equipment is usually seen as a more severe response than most body language, and will not be employed unless the situation is considered highly inappropriate. It is an expression of strong displeasure.

One negotiator's strategic use of a 3 hole punch provides an illustration of this tactic:

"...we have a 3 hole punch and we usually have it on the table because all the proposals will be written down, and everyone has a copy and they will be explained from the paper. If I know that the other side doesn't have a 3 hole punch and I am pissed off at them, I will say lets get the puncher away so that when they come in something that they were used to last time isn't there anymore. I haven't said anything, I don't have to say anything. They will look for it and it is not on the table. I don't know what they think other than, I don't care what they think other than they didn't give us the hole puncher and on some level they are able to connect, 'well, there is no hole puncher.' And we have done the same thing with donuts. If you want some of our donuts go ahead, but if we have a fresh batch there, being asinine, I won't make the offer. I mean they are so petty when I talk about them in isolation, but I think they go a large way to create a perception of what the environment is in that room. You can't say early in the negotiations that we are really pissed off at how you came across the table last time, your position was insulting, it was insensitive, it was so far off the mark. If we say that and there are 63 other issues we have to discuss, it just is going to leave you on a slippery slope from that point on so trying to keep the degree of politeness there, you get the 3 hole punch out and then they will get the message...It was a matter of trying to influence the environment."

Cessation of Prop Use to Demonstrate Withdrawal from Bargaining and

Displeasure with the Opposition: Numerous props are used in the course of bargaining, for both instrumental and expressive purposes. Props can be actively manipulated, and how and in what circumstances they are used helps to imbue the props and their use with meaning. Props may also be passive, but not necessarily inert, i.e., while a passive prop may be physically dormant, it may simultaneously be symbolically active. The negotiator may attempt to send a message by avoiding the use of props.

The use of equipment such as documents, notepads, pens, calculators and computers is commonplace at the bargaining table, and considered part of an ongoing bargaining process. This strategy involves ceasing use of such equipment in order to send a message that your team does not believe negotiations are proceeding forward in a normal or constructive fashion. By stopping to use the equipment involved in bargaining, the negotiator and team symbolically demonstrate they have withdrawn from the process. This strategy may be implemented after an opposition proposal or move is considered offensive, or as a sign that the entire process has ceased to function effectively.

The following example of this strategy occurs in the following context: negotiations have broken off, and one side has requested a meeting in order to present new ideas or facts. The interviewed negotiator's team has been asked back to the bargaining table:

"You've had a break off and you have left the table and are working with the conciliator and the conciliator calls to see if you would bring your team back together. The other side wants another meeting. Coming into that meeting still wearing your street clothes. Not taking your files out. Everyone keeps their briefcases closed and you sit there with a blank note pad in front of you while they speak. You're telling them we doubt very much you're going to save anything, or saying anything which is going to alter the decision that we have already made."

Through refusing to manipulate the equipment necessary for negotiations to operationally proceed, the strategizing team attempts to show they are not

engaged in the current process and they doubt the value of the opposition's message.

III. BODY LANGUAGE: THE USE OF NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION FOR IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT

1. CHARACTERISTICS:

Body language, or non-verbal communication, refers to the use of the body to communicate certain messages. Gestures, stances, and facial expressions fall within this dramaturgical category. Negotiators make considerable and often sophisticated use of this category of strategies, both through control of their own body language and through observation and interpretation of the body language of other participants, in particular the opposition.

This section describes variations in the use of body language and other defining aspects of this dramaturgical category.

Two primary aspects of negotiation-oriented body language have been identified and explored: 1. Variations in body positioning at the bargaining table, and 2. Controlled versus spontaneous body language. Additional distinctions are discussed within the context of these two major categories.

i. **Body Positioning at the Bargaining Table:** Negotiators believe it is essential to be aware of one's own body language in the course of negotiations,

and to observe the body language of the opposition team. Different body positions and gestures are considered to be imbued with different emotions and messages. This section addresses body positioning.

Negotiators consciously employ a variety of body positions to convey an impression of self, and observe the opposition's body positions for signs of their beliefs and reactions regarding various bargaining proposals. While there is some variation, most negotiators ascribe certain attitudes to specific body positions. There are two primary clusters of body positions, that may be termed *Open Body Language* and *Closed Body Language*.

Open Body Language: Open Body Language is characterized by the individual leaning forward with arms open and hands visible (usually placed on the table). This cluster of body positions suggests that the individual is open, reasonable, attentive, and interested. The individual in this body configuration is considered receptive to new or reasonable ideas, is fully involved in the discussion, and has a positive perspective concerning present negotiations. Negotiators employ this body language to convey this positive, receptive image, and similarly interpret the presence of such body language in the opposition.

One negotiator describes his positive body positioning as follows:

“On the other hand, if I come a little closer to you and open my arms and I appear both physically and facially that I am listening

and interested in what you are saying, you will be much more favourably impressed I think. In terms of collective bargaining, I make a point of in fact trying to legitimately and sincerely listen to people ... and I try to use my body in such a way that it enhances that idea to people."

Another negotiator indicates his interpretation of similar body language expressed by the opposition: "If I see somebody on the table like this [negotiator leans forward with hands open on table], they are listening to what I am telling them."

William James studied and named this particular body positioning the "approach" posture: an attentive posture communicated by a forward lean of the body. Three other primary postures emerged in his research: withdrawal, expansion, and contraction. Withdrawal is a negative posture communicated by drawing back or turning away; this last posture is similar to the Closed Body Language position discussed below (Argyle and Trower, pg. 15).

Knapp indicates that there will be a reduction of conversational distance when we want to win the approval of another person. For example, Rosenfeld's female subjects seeking approval maintained a mean distance of 57 inches from the other person, while those trying to avoid approval maintained a mean distance of 94 inches. When the negotiator leans in, he or she is minimizing the distance between him or herself and the opposition (Knapp, pg. 129).

Patterson also discusses how people perceive others who are closer versus farther apart from them. The most distant position receives significantly less favourable ratings. Closer people are often seen as warmer, liking one another more, and more empathic and understanding (Patterson, 1968). Negotiators want to achieve such a positive conception in the eyes of the audience, believing that a better rapport and positive emotional connection with the opposition is more likely to lead to opposition concessions. Open body language by negotiators, including leaning in, makes use of these generalized interpretations of human proxemics.

Some negotiators will attempt to display a position that is similarly open, but less forthright and more relaxed. Similar to the classic position discussed above, the negotiator will have their hands visible and arms uncrossed. However, they will lean back from the table somewhat in order to indicate a casual, comfortable perspective. These negotiators believe that if all parties can be made to feel comfortable and relaxed, a better environment for achieving agreement is created. Some negotiators, however, might hesitate to use this body position for fear it would signal a lack of involvement or interest. One advocate of this body position discusses his rationale as follows:

“...sitting back is a bit more laid back and suggests, ‘we have time to talk about this,’ or ‘rest easy, my mind isn’t made up, I can be convinced,’ but it’s two-way and I am trying to convince you as well. This contrasts with body language where you lean forward, maybe bang the table, ... just really trying to make the point and leaning across the table more towards that person to make that point. So I

guess the leaning back is a little bit of an assurance that you are open. At the same time, obviously you are not trying to present the image that you are a pushover either. There is that balance I think."

Closed Body Language: Closed Body Language is characterized by the individual leaning back from the table with arms crossed. This cluster of body positions suggests that the individual is closed, unwilling to listen, angry or displeased, and disinterested. The individual in this body configuration is considered unreceptive to new or reasonable ideas, is uninvolved in the discussion, and has a negative perspective concerning present negotiations. Negotiators occasionally employ this body language to demonstrate rejection of a particular idea or proposal, but primarily they watch the opposition for evidence of closed body language. When encountered, it is interpreted as a signal of negativity and unreceptiveness.

Examples of such body language and associated interpretations are recounted as follows: "If there is somebody sitting there leaning back and they have their legs crossed, they are skeptical. If they have their arms folded they are not buying it. Crossed arms are a sign that you are not getting in, crossed legs, etc.," and "I also look for body language coming from the other side of the room. I mean, when I see people's arms folded, their legs crossed and they are leaning back in the chair, or they take their glasses off, it is time to quit the talking and start with the jokes. I will get their attention back."

Another form of negative body language involves the hands not being visible to the opposition team, usually by keeping them under the table. This action is considered a sign of dishonesty – that the person has something to hide. A negotiator tries to avoid using this body language, and views with skepticism the statements of the opposition when they deliver their message in this manner.

As one negotiator describes,

“I don't keep my hands under the table because that is one of the signs that somebody may not be telling you the truth. I like to keep my hands folded. I like to keep them open when we are talking about money, I try to do that very consciously...I don't want to have my hands under the table when I am saying this is all the money we got. I want to have my hands on the table, folded, in plain view. Because that conveys a much stronger feeling. You don't play cards with people who have their hands under the table, it is that simple.”

ii. Controlled vs. Spontaneous Body Language

Negotiators are conscious of the necessity to control their body language whenever possible and interested in the nature of the body language of their opposition. They are generally aware of, and focused on, the differences between, and presence of, controlled versus spontaneous body language.

Controlled Body Language: In the context of negotiations, controlled body language is body language employed by negotiators as part of a cohesive

performance. It is body language designed to present a certain message desired by the negotiator. It is described by negotiators as “conscious,” “purposeful,” and “under control.” It is proactive in nature. Negotiators hope to maintain control over their own body language and that of their teams, and to ascertain when the opposition fails to maintain dramaturgical discipline and loses control over their body language.

Spontaneous Body Language: Spontaneous body language may be described as body language without intent. It may present a message, but it is not a message that the negotiator has planned to present. It is described by negotiators as “uncontrolled,” “natural,” and “instinctive.” It is reactive in nature. Negotiators hope to limit opposition observation of their own spontaneous body language, and to maximize the possibility of observing spontaneous body language in the opposition. Negotiators believe spontaneous body language has not been ‘massaged’ by the opposition, and provides insight into the real positions and beliefs they hold. It may also be characterized as a form of leakage of hidden beliefs – a source of unadulterated reactions and feelings.

2. STRATEGIES

This section describes strategies relevant to the dramaturgical category of body language, including how the strategies are implemented, and the functions or reasons toward which such actions and techniques are directed.

Strategies are ways in which actors behave in order to influence and have a particular effect upon audiences. In the context of this study, *actors* refers to bargaining team members and, in particular, team leaders or chief negotiators. *Audience* primarily refers to the opposing team, although strategies will sometimes be directed at one's own team, the self, or constituents.

Concealing Beliefs through Control of Body Language: During bargaining, the default perspective of negotiators is to conceal the beliefs of the team regarding the ongoing negotiations. While impression management will be practised by the negotiator, and will occasionally be endorsed by the negotiator for other team members, the basic strategy for both negotiator and team is to conceal what one is feeling. This strategy is designed to ensure the opposing team receives little insight into the beliefs and “bottom line” of the team.

As one negotiator indicates,

"I encourage my committee...only use facial expressions selectively. There are some people that you can read like a book, and I don't think that it is helpful through the bargaining process if they can read you like a book. What is the game all about then if everyone knows what you are thinking and doing – let's just do it."

Negotiators want to maintain this discipline whether listening to opposing proposals, or presenting their own. If an issue is not of great import to a team, but the negotiator wishes to present it as essential, it is key that the real beliefs regarding the matter are not on display. As one negotiator says,

"I have been asked to argue some pretty ridiculous positions but I don't go in there with this smirk on my face. I am paid to argue this so, even if I think it is a piece of baloney I put on the expression of poker face. Keep things close to your vest ... I don't like giving anything away on my face because I know that once you give it away you never get it back. I use the example with my own committee, we are saying this is a real big issue for us, don't have three of you jumping out the window. Fight off those yawns. We are trying to do something here, whether it is in defense of a non-movement on our part or to advance our own position. So when I am explaining why that is so important for us, lets at least have a look of importance around us. I try to be unreadable in regard to facial expressions."

Surveillance of Opposition: While it is considered essential to conceal your own feelings, it is of equal import to gain as much understanding as possible of those held by the opposing team. As a result, all negotiators interviewed purposefully watch for reactions and clues from the opposing team. The entire team is often charged with this task, while at other times certain members will be detailed to implement the strategy.

As one negotiator relates, "I tell my committee to look at their facial expressions...I encourage our people to recognize that the job is to find what the other side is thinking, and to keep what you are thinking away from them."

Another confirms,

"The skill is trying to hide your natural body language, but being able to read it in others as to how well they are either accepting or not accepting what it is you have done or what you have had to say. I basically find that it is not too hard to get a sense as to how the other group is reacting to what you have to say because [of] something as simple as sitting there with your arms crossed versus sitting and leaning forward, lapping up what you have to say."

This latter negotiator relates two signs and associated interpretations: arms crossed means rejection of your position, leaning forward means acceptance.

Surveillance of the opposing team allows the negotiator insight into their positions. If the opposing negotiator expresses a particular position at the bargaining table, but if the body language of his or her team does not appear to support this position, it will be useful to try to make use of that lack of support, and try to gain a shift in the opposition position. Similarly, a negotiator can advance his or her own position, and then watch for clues in the reaction of the opposing team, gaining an idea of whether they are amenable to the proposal. As one negotiator states, "It is often interesting to be at the bargaining table speaking and to look down this line of shirts or skirts on the other side and find that half of them are nodding their heads and half of them are shaking their heads when you are speaking."

Since the opposition negotiator will probably have a high degree of dramaturgical control, it is considered essential to practise surveillance on the entire opposing team. Even when the team is trying to maintain dramaturgical discipline, it is likely that one or more members will give themselves away in some manner. Argyle and Trower address the issue of observance of people practising deception. They indicate that people often give away their true feelings in a fleeting expression, before instituting dramaturgical discipline and controlling it. Moreover, inconsistencies between non-verbal cues presented by the same person should be examined; i.e., "a false smile is detectable when it is switched on and off too quickly, or it appears around the mouth, but not the eyes, which may be narrowed as in anger" (Argyle and Trower, pg. 39). They also indicate Ekman and Friesen have shown that people control their mouth effectively, but not the area around the eyes and forehead.

Negotiators employing this strategy hope to observe body language by the opposing team that discredits their officially projected bargaining position. This strategy is consistent with Goffman's dramaturgical principle of *communication out of character* (Goffman, pg. 169). This principle involves performers mistakenly or inadvertently disclosing information damaging to their performance. Negotiators are aware of the potential for such communication, and practise comprehensive surveillance to maximize its detection.

Inducing Response in the Opposition - The Silent Look: Silences can often speak more eloquently than the spoken word. This strategy involves simply looking at the opposing negotiator and not saying anything. People, being inherently social, want to receive recognition from others. If the negotiator is not giving them this recognition, they may become uneasy and try to say something the negotiator will accept and respond to, thereby enhancing his or her position. An alternative perspective on this involves the common desire to fill empty conversational space. By staying silent, the opposing negotiator or team may be drawn into continually talking, perhaps revealing more of their bottom line than they would want to.

One respondent describes this strategy as follows:

"I learned early ... a human trait that a lot of people ...demonstrate in bargaining. Over the simplest things I want, I just find saying nothing and looking at a person is quite a powerful tool. It makes people feel very uncomfortable and you can't be accused of doing anything because you are not doing anything, simply letting the air time play. They become uncertain, get off their game a bit, and maybe say something they weren't yet prepared to say, if only to fill up that air time."

An additional benefit of the silent look strategy is noted by the negotiator: it can be quite an effective strategy without costing the negotiator anything, because little fault can be found with it by the opposing team. It may make them uncomfortable, but they cannot claim there is anything technically wrong with it.

Generating Opposition Good Will by Eye Contact: Negotiators will make heavy use of eye contact, not only with their counterpart, but with all members of the opposing team. This eye contact is designed to include everyone as important in the process, and to show opposing team members that the negotiator is “open like a book,” and has nothing to hide. In both cases, eye contact serves to improve the perception the opposing team has concerning the negotiator.

One negotiator describes this strategy in the following manner, “My tactic is, I try to include everyone with eye contact on the other side and I want to treat them in a way that they are going to trust me. I want to win them over, to allow them to feel comfortable and not talk right through me.” Eye contact is considered by this negotiator to enhance the communication environment.

As Knapp indicates, visual contact occurs when we want to signal that the communication channel is open (Knapp, pg. 298). Listeners seem to judge speakers who make greater eye contact as more persuasive, truthful, sincere and credible. Beebe (1974) found that increased ‘gaze’ resulted in higher audience ratings for the following characteristics: skilled, informed, experienced and honest, friendly and kind. Wills (1961) found that speakers rated as sincere had approximately three times the amount of eye contact as those who were

rated as insincere. With a potential for the opposition to feel more positively about the strategizing negotiator, there is a strong incentive to capitalize on this trend. (See Knapp, pg. 307.)

Signaling Agreement/Disagreement by Varying Eye Contact: Negotiators will reward or punish the opposing team with eye contact, depending on whether they are hearing something they like. By looking away when someone is saying something he or she does not like, the negotiator signals that the speaker is going down the wrong track. Conversely, the negotiator will try to encourage speakers who are communicating a positive message, through eye contact and increased involvement in what the speaker is saying.

One negotiator discusses the spectrum of eye contact as follows:

“If someone is saying something I don’t like, I don’t look at them. So they get the message that what they are saying isn’t making any sense to me and they can run their tape out and I will listen and won’t interrupt them, but I am not going to give them the credence by making eye contact with them. Whereas if someone is saying something that I like then I will be much more interested. So that is a non-verbal tactic that I know I use very consciously.

Signifying Importance through Eye Contact: A negotiator can signify the importance of what he or she is talking about in a variety of ways, including simply stating the importance, speaking slowly and dramatically, and body language such as leaning forward and locking eyes in a steady gaze. This strategy focuses on eye contact.

When trying to convey the importance of a particular issue, a negotiator will be careful not to look away when presenting it. To look away in the middle of speaking can send the message that the negotiator is not completely certain of the position, or that something else in the room is more important or interesting than the position, and merits looking at.

An interesting variation on this strategy is to direct one's eyes not only to the opposing negotiator's eyes, but also to his or her pen and paper. By looking down at the opposition's pen and paper, the negotiator gives the opposition a clue that the current discussion is important, and should be recorded. As one negotiator indicates,

"I have even known myself to look at their pen and look at them and communicate - 'why aren't you writing this down?' Communicating that this is very important without saying this is very important, without saying here is the substance we are talking about here."

Watching for Signs of Boredom: Negotiators want to keep the opposing team engaged in the process. If opposition team members are not paying attention to your arguments, you are unlikely to convince them to support your position. Therefore, it is important to keep watch for signs that opposing team members are becoming disinterested.

Negotiators mention signs such as sighs, looking at watches, starting to read materials (particularly non-negotiation materials), blank stares, slouching in chairs, and doodling on papers. One negotiator describes the relevance of doodling as follows:

“They are doodling excessively to the point where you have these great floral arrangements on their pads and I find that irritating when I look across the other side. I realize then that we better change our tack, because if that person is important in my belief to getting them to agree with us, and they are not interested, we can't achieve our goal. I don't always hold the chief negotiator as the person who is going to make the decisions.”

If signs of boredom are present, the negotiator will generally change tactics to try to get the opposition more involved in the discussion. It is sometimes possible, however, to use this boredom as a form of leverage when the opposition caucuses. If the disinterested opposing team member can be convinced to some degree that the position of the negotiator is inoffensive, they may attempt to convince fellow team members of the benefits of agreeing and moving on to more important proposals (see Part V, “Bargaining Teams,” Section 2, “Strategies,” “Getting an Advocate on the Opposing Team”).

Leaving the Table and Engaging in Other Activities When the Opposition is Presenting to Show Withdrawal, Disinterest: A negotiator will use body language at the bargaining table to convey various messages to the opposition. Similarly, a negotiator may walk out of the bargaining room to protest the current

state of negotiations. Interim proxemic possibilities exist, including remaining in the room, but removing oneself from the table.

A negotiator can indicate he or she finds opposition ideas, proposals or explanations implausible or irrelevant by leaving the table and engaging in other activities while the other side is presenting. By removing themselves from the traditional bargaining setting (the table), negotiators using this strategy attempt to subtly infer that the opposing message is unworthy to be listened to. The opposition message is insufficient to retain the full interest and involvement of the strategizing negotiator. This strategy may be directed at the opposition, at one's own team, or at both parties.

Part of the power of this strategy is that it effectively eliminates, or at least reduces, the presence of one side of the interaction – the audience. The opposition requires an audience upon which to practise impression management – someone to convince of the veracity of its position. By removing yourself from the equation, you remove the opportunity for the opposition to achieve a convincing performance.

The key to this strategy is to leave the table, but if some level of good will is to be maintained, the negotiator must provide an alternative reason, other than disinterest, for leaving. Virtually any activity may be engaged in, including

obtaining refreshments, looking for something in one's jacket, and getting additional supplies. An even more powerful and distinct message is sent if the activity has no instrumental component – no purpose even vaguely related to bargaining. Such activities might include getting up to look out the window or to grab a magazine for later perusal.

Negotiators will usually not resort to this later, more severe variation. This variation would generally be implemented when the opposition has acted in a highly offensive manner. However, most negotiators in this situation might instead opt for a more direct strategy, such as verbally stating their position, closing their notebooks, or walking out of the room. The strategy of getting up and leaving the table is usually not used when a battle is at hand; it is more appropriate when conveying the irrelevance of the opposition's current discourse.

Without specifically saying so, the negotiator has pronounced judgment on whatever the opposition is proposing. The use of this strategy allows the negotiator to communicate his or her position "out of turn;" that is, before the opposing negotiator has finished speaking. It also permits a fairly strong communication without resorting to verbal accusations that might result in a highly negative environment detrimental to productive negotiations.

The following example of this strategy is directed at both the opposing team and the negotiator's own team:

"Coffee breaks are a prop, a technique. We use those all the time. I will go [from the table] and it might fall into non-verbal communication. I have left the table, but not the room, while the other side is making a point, to go refill my water or something, gone out of view, gone off stage while the employer is still going on but I know what is going on around the table isn't going to be important to how we move. It might be important to creating some relationships on another level, but as far as I am concerned there is nothing important I need to hear there even though the conversation may be directed toward me and I will get up and say keep talking and I will walk around to get a cup of water or something letting them believe that I am intent and listening, but I am taking a break because I think that what is going on here isn't valuable to me and my committee knows that if I am intense about something I am not up walking around the room. It is sending them a message here that okay we are just going to let them string it out a bit without being impolite by asking to leave, we just don't have to listen...Yeah, I will tell you I am interested but my body language tells them that I am not...I am here but I am not here."

Leaving the table and moving about the bargaining room may be used as a less severe alternative to walking out of negotiations. In fact, it may be characterized as an interim stage of body language between the full involvement represented by leaning forward in one's chair and the lack of involvement represented by walking out. Each action or stage, as practised by a negotiator, sends at least two types of messages to the opposition: 1. how involved in the proceedings the negotiator currently feels, and 2. whether the opposition's current statements or proposals are considered significant or worthy of respect. These actions, and the messages associated with each, are as follows:

<u>Stage</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Involvement Of Negotiator</u>	<u>Implied Significance of Opposition Statements</u>
1	Lean Forward	High	High
2	Sit Upright	Moderate	Not High
3	Lean Back	Low	Low
4	Leave Room	Very Low	Very Low
5	Walking Out	None	None

Walking Out – To Protest: One of the most severe strategies a negotiator can implement is to leave the bargaining room – walking out. This strategy typically involves picking up all materials off the bargaining table and departing the room with your team. Essentially, by leaving the room, the negotiator serves notice that the interaction is no longer serving any useful purpose; the negotiation has deteriorated to the point that it is either irrelevant or insulting to remain, and our team is leaving. The negotiator who implements this strategy usually hopes to break through whatever impasse may currently be in place, and to engender a strong desire within the opposing team to rehabilitate the negotiations through making a positive shift.

One negotiator talks about the implementation of this strategy as follows:

“I say, look, I think this discussion is over. We have presented our position and our argument. You come back and tell us the same thing over and over again. I thought bargaining was an opportunity for both sides to show flexibility. We have shown you our flexibility and you are using arguments you used three weeks ago. Until you

come up with a better argument, we have nothing more to say and as a matter of fact, it is 7:15pm, we are going home. The response I want to get back is, 'Oh, well, don't leave the building, let us know where you are going to be at. Go down and have a coffee and let us think about it again.' It is just a matter of lobbing the ball back in their court, but with a bit more red hot on it. Look, you have had your play with this. We are not playing around any more."

Like many powerful strategies, "walking out" can only work if it is used sparingly.

If a negotiating team is constantly leaving the room, the impact of this strategy is lost quite rapidly. Ideally, the negotiator who implements this strategy has a history of "good table manners," and acting reasonably during collective bargaining. If this is the case, then surely something quite unreasonable must have happened to inspire the negotiator to leave the bargaining table.

Negotiators acknowledge the importance of employing this strategy rarely, and even then only at key junctures in the negotiation. As one negotiator confirms,

"I have gotten up and left the room and I save that one. I don't even use that ... on every bargaining session because then I think it becomes a tactic like I might use with my children. You pick your spots when you are going to show an emotional ogre so that it doesn't compare to the regular fabric." And, "I am always very very careful playing the balance between not using a good tactic on an issue, that I won't be able to use it for something down the road or, in the bigger picture, I don't want my name as a negotiator damaged, with people saying that he always throws a little tantrum. I want my tantrums to count."

All elements of the performance must be aligned for it to succeed, and all members of the team must support the message of protest implicit to the strategy. The negotiator must have a look of resolve and displeasure, and

perhaps anger. The team is usually accorded some flexibility in their appearance, as long as they use their body language and props to demonstrate dissatisfaction with the current state of negotiations. This can include exasperation, frustration, anger, and disbelief. As one negotiator states,

“We sort of look mad, and I am struggling not to smile. We all look mad. We just pick up our stuff and go and make sure you take everything with you because chances are you are not going back. We have had a few times where people have left stuff in there and had to go back in to get it.”

The respondent laughed when describing the scenario of going back to retrieve props, and indicated the strength of the strategy was diluted somewhat by this embarrassing and inconsistent element. The “struggle not to smile” suggests the sometimes purely dramaturgical nature of this strategy, although negotiators sometimes are truly angry with the proceedings when they elect to walk out.

Walking Out - to Force Re-Evaluation of Team Priorities: Occasionally a negotiator will feel that a negotiating team has developed an over-emphasis on a particular issue, and would prefer not to expend effort bargaining on behalf of the team's position. If discussion fails to resolve the dilemma, and the matter is considered important enough to the negotiator, he or she may endeavour to force the team to see the ramifications of their position. One way to achieve this is through playing the team's wishes out to their logical conclusion, and making the issue into a bone of contention in the bargaining session. If an impasse is reached, the negotiator then threatens to walk out over the issue. The

seriousness of leaving the room causes team members to consider whether the issue at hand is truly as important as they thought.

One negotiator implemented this strategy in the following manner:

“Sometimes I am pissed off at my own team and we will have a caucus and I will say okay, lets go back in there if that is your position and we will put it on the table with them. And I will think to myself as I am walking across the hall to that room that the minute the opposition starts throwing any resistance up against this position, [I'll leave the room.] I have used it that way so that my own committee will say to me, ‘We are not walking out over that, why are you out here doing that?’ [To which I respond,] ‘Well, look at the position of you guys, are you willing to reshape your own position?’”

By threatening to walk out of negotiations based on the issue at hand, the negotiator has successfully influenced his team to reconsider the importance of the issue. They must ask themselves, “Is it really worth the trouble?”

IV. BARGAINING REGIONS

1. CHARACTERISTICS

Region, in the context of this study, refers to the physical location in which labour/management bargaining occurs. Characteristics of the bargaining region will be addressed below under the headings of location and setting, referring to the macro and micro elements of region, respectively.

i. **Location:** Location refers to the macro elements of region: the city, neighbourhood, or building in which the negotiation occurs. The dramaturgical advantages and disadvantages of locations are weighed in location selection, including both the potential effect on negotiations, and the symbolic nature of the location for outside observers.

For most negotiators, the ideal location for bargaining is an environment that benefits their team. The offices of the in-group are particularly favoured. The use of in-group offices allows one's team to feel comfortable with the surroundings, and provides immediate access to resources which may assist in the team's performance. Such a location may give the in-group a dramaturgical

advantage; the familiarity may limit the stress on one's team, and allow the team to make maximum use of available props. Conversely, such an environment may cause the opposition to be somewhat uncomfortable, put their performance under stress, and limit their opportunities to make use of the available (and naturally unfamiliar) props.

Because of the power differential created by using one group's premises, it is usually necessary to agree to meet in a setting that does not noticeably favour either group.

If the opposition does not wish to negotiate on the negotiator's premises, or if the premises will not support the space or operational requirements of bargaining, then the second best solution is to bargain in neutral territory. In fact, some negotiators assume it will be impossible to achieve a setting advantage, and focus on not being at a disadvantage. As one negotiator describes,

"Prefer so it is on neutral turf. A lot of times it could be in a government building, but it wouldn't be in a hospital. Sometimes we have had them at hotels. Sometimes at the public utilities board where there is a board room available... so it would sort of be neutral ground. A lot of times it was at a place that neither one of us had to pay."

The negotiator quoted above points out that both strategic leverage and economics play a role in setting selection.

ii. Setting: Setting refers to the micro elements of region: the room(s), furniture and props present at the bargaining location, in which negotiations are prepared for and conducted. The dramaturgical advantages and disadvantages of settings are weighed during location selection, although negotiators will alter a particular environment so that it exhibits the setting qualities they seek.

There are two key environments considered necessary for successful negotiations: a bargaining room, where the face-to-face negotiations between labour and management occur, and caucus rooms, private spaces where each team can separately retreat to discuss and to prepare strategies.

The Bargaining Room: While many different seating arrangements of the participants are possible, and the merits of each are debated by negotiators and theorists, in almost all cases the participants are arrayed as follows:

“...in terms of the set up of the room, we are usually sitting across the table from each other at a long table. We set it up so [the negotiator] is sitting at the centre and the president is sitting next to him and then the team members are on either side and usually the chief negotiators from each side sit across the table from each other.”

This results in a configuration where the two teams, labour and management, are facing each other across a table, with the negotiators at the middle on each side. Facing each other across the table is consistent with a competitive environment. Sommer (1965) and Cook (1970) conducted research in the United States and

United Kingdom, respectively, regarding the seating configurations considered appropriate for a variety of tasks. Respondents were presented with a variety of possible seating arrangements around both a rectangular and a round table, and a series of tasks to conduct at the tables. The tasks were conversation, cooperation, co-action and competition. They were then asked to indicate their preferred seating arrangement for each task. In both countries, respondents preferred to sit across from one another in the case of competition. Results from this study confirm this trend: negotiators also prefer to sit across from one another during the generally adversarial task of collective bargaining.

The setting must be functional in terms of comfort and access to materials, but it must also be dramaturgically functional. If the table is not long enough or if barriers to vision are in place, it may be impossible to see the opposition team, and to assess their facial expressions and body language. If the setting does not allow the entire negotiating team to sit together, individual members may not feel fully a part of the team, and will be less able to align their performances. Generally speaking, the setting can serve either to enhance or detract from the performance, and negotiators want an environment that assists their presentation. One negotiator describes her experiences as a team member, and how she felt when the setting did not allow clear demarcation of the teams or sufficient surveillance of the opposition:

“I know that a few times when we had a large number of team members and when our team was bigger than their team and there

weren't enough chairs to fit around the table, and some of our team members had to almost sit on their side. I remember I was in that situation once. I didn't like it. For one thing, you couldn't see their faces and there was a sense that you wanted to be on our side, and if you were creeping towards the other side of the table you sort of felt like you were on their side ... It was just because they had screwed things up. It just shouldn't be. There should be employer and union, two separate sides and it was sort of a little joke between us sometimes that we are almost on their side. I liked it when we were on opposite sides and I think that a lot of it was being able to see their faces, to watch their reaction if they had any and I guess it fostered a sense of being together, that this is your group that you work with."

Both in-group solidarity and opposition surveillance are enhanced by an appropriate setting.

The bargaining room is a front stage region; it is here that the actors (negotiators and their teams) conduct performances for their audiences (generally the opposition team).

Caucus Rooms: Caucus rooms are private rooms to which each team can separately retreat when they want to discuss issues which they do not wish the opposition to overhear, to prepare new negotiation strategies, or to develop a common team front for potentially disparate individual views. It is a back stage area, generally inaccessible to the opposition.

The caucus area is typically distinct from the bargaining room, but is normally found within the same building or location. It is usually a separate room which

only in-group members are allowed to enter, and contains equipment to assist in discussion and deliberation, such as a flipchart, paper, pens, and, in some cases, computers and extensive research materials.

The room is normally removed enough from the bargaining room to minimize opposition access, but is close enough to allow for easy movement back and forth between the two settings. Such proximity helps to ensure that negotiations proceed in a timely manner, allows deputations to be sent from one caucus room to the other, and, even when negotiations break down, permits a team that has retreated to the caucus room to be summoned back to the bargaining table.

Clear demarcation of back and front stage areas, as well as confidence in the privacy of the bargaining room are important factors for negotiators when selecting a bargaining location and setting. They do not want the opposition to have access to their backstage regions, nor do they want any uninvited eavesdropping or surveillance of any negotiation activity. Negotiators want to retain control over the environment to ensure they do not have to deal with any surprises, and can implement their bargaining strategies without consideration for other potential audiences. Audiences other than the opposing team might require a completely different message and a completely different performance from the negotiator. It is important to have an environment that is conducive to

effective impression management; failure to achieve such an environment can destroy one's performance.

The following story depicts the potentially severe outcome of such a failure:

"I was involved in a round of negotiations for the Red Cross [in the same time frame as our negotiations with the Provincial Government]. Meanwhile, Union ABC was meeting the Provincial Government team on a provincial basis in an adjoining meeting room. The acoustics were so poor that I could hear the voice of the chief negotiator on the government side [in the other room] while I was involved in my own Red Cross negotiations. We had a concurrent round going with the same government negotiator ourselves. They had a proposal on both our table and the ABC table that was similar. Their chief negotiator advised ABC that [our union] had already agreed to this which was a blatant inaccuracy and even though I was at Red Cross negotiations I heard him say that. I got up and excused myself, went around the corner and walked in on their round of negotiations and set the record straight. [There was] laughter from the chief negotiator. It was probably better than embarrassment, but ABC appreciated it. The chief negotiator looked a bit like he'd been caught in the act. It was sort of a friendly dare type. Could have a hee haw at his own expense while he was probably wishing he could be wringing my neck."

2. STRATEGIES

This section describes strategies relevant to the dramaturgical category of regions, including how the strategies are implemented, and the functions or reasons toward which such actions and techniques are directed.

Strategies are ways in which actors behave in order to influence and have a particular effect upon audiences. In the context of this study, *actors* refers to bargaining team members and, in particular, team leaders or chief negotiators. *Audience* primarily refers to the opposing team, although strategies will sometimes be directed at one's own team, the self, or constituents.

One might assume the setting of a negotiation to be static; an immutable environment only relevant as the physical location in which bargaining takes place. However, the elements of a setting may not only be capitalized upon, but also manipulated. Argyle (1975, pp. 303-304) indicates that social behaviour not only occurs within a certain space, but also includes the actual manipulation of said space, both through the movement of objects and furniture and by architectural design. Sommer (in Argyle, 1975, p. 304) shows that it is possible to alter the social interaction within a room by moving the furniture. A nursing home had long rows of chairs lining the walls. By moving the chairs into groups around tables, Sommer was able to increase the amount of social interaction.

Similarly, furniture can be arranged in an office setting to create status differences or barriers, and to invite either cooperation or competition (Argyle, 1975, pg. 304).

Since variations in setting produce varying social outcomes, the negotiator may utilize the bargaining setting to achieve a particular effect upon his or her audience. Strategies relevant to bargaining regions are detailed below.

Conceding the Good Side of the Room to the Opposition in the Expectation of Negotiation Concessions: One strategy regarding setting involves choosing to sit on the less preferred side of the table. At first appraisal, this tactic might appear to place the strategizing negotiator at a disadvantage. In fact, that is precisely the message the negotiator wishes to convey when utilizing this subtle, unusual strategy.

The traditional pattern of negotiations is to trade off concessions, each side giving something up to the other. By allowing the opposing team to sit on the good side of the room, the negotiator has conceded something to the opposition before negotiations have even begun. The opposition team is under pressure to give something in return. The negotiator employing this strategy has given up the preferred seating arrangement in the hope it may influence a concession in negotiations.

The key to this strategy is to negotiate just as effectively and with as much conviction on the weak side of the room as on the strong. The negotiator must not feel personally weaker as a result of this strategy, nor, ideally, should the team. Simple awareness of the strategy and its goals serves to mitigate the impact on self.

One negotiator indicates,

"I liked being boxed in, physically feeling boxed in or having it appear that we are boxed in so that the other side gets the sense that "they are here to do work. Now we have got them." It allows them to feel that we have the union in a position in as small as you think the room would be. I am looking for any advantage at all at the table and I don't minimize the impression that the other side is sending that they have the upper hand on us, that they [we] have the bad side of the room. I don't mind doing it, and I don't mind telling my committee. They complain, "why do we always have to sit over there on that side of the room" and I say, "I had my reasons" and it is too hard to explain to them, but I want the other side to think, "Ah jees, we are better, they don't even care where they sit," but that is exactly what I want them to think and if they are thinking that way, it opens up a vulnerability to them. We think that we are something less than they are. Now there is something for me to manage in there because we will never gain the upper hand if they think we are totally dominating. I don't mind being dominated in that oppressed sense around something as simple as the meeting room itself."

The negotiator in the example is willing to be dominated concerning the meeting room, and believes accepting this disadvantage provides him with a bargaining advantage. Conversely, if he had the preferred side of the room, it might convey that his team has the upper hand, and the opposition might be more reluctant to

give in on the actual issues. In such a case, the opposition might feel the negotiator is already getting the best of them, and they would want to put an end to this domination, bringing the proceedings to a more equitable state.

The negotiator in the example also wants the opposition to underestimate him and his team, and to feel comfortable and at ease in negotiations. If this message is successfully conveyed, the opposition may underprepare for negotiations, or be more flexible than if they were wary.

By taking the poor side of the table, the negotiator assumes a subordinate role regarding setting. This strategy may be used by either labour or management, although the two sides may react somewhat differently. Labour team members may feel superior if management implements this action, but they also may feel it is somewhat strange – which may raise suspicion. Management team members are more likely to feel comfortable with labour taking the worse side, feeling pleased that the traditional relationship between management and labour is being maintained at the bargaining table. One labour negotiator describes the impression he attempts to give to the management team, and his perception of the impression they receive, as follows:

“I like the employers to feel as comfortable as they possibly can and I know from an employer's point of view they are most comfortable when they are behind a desk and the employees are on the other side of the desk. Well, here we don't have a desk with the big fat chairs on one side and the subordinate chairs on the other side. But I like them to think that in this room that is the way it

is being set up. But they are still in their role, not so much their role, but they feel that they are not stripped down here, that we are respecting you guys as the managers. But it gives them a sense of false security – ‘ha,ha, we are sitting on this side, we get the good chairs.’ It’s not a question of chairs, but I like them thinking that way. So then to be able to come out from around that and say ‘Now that you are nice and comfortable, we have some real difficult issues here, and are you comfortable?’ I don’t mind them feeling, I think their sense of advantage becomes their disadvantage with me over something like room selection or seating selection. Maybe that allows me and my committee to respond to them. It doesn’t put us in a hole, it doesn’t put us behind the eight ball, they are comfortable over there, we don’t need to be on the good side to show them that we are equal here, so we are playing to their insecurity here. They like to feel that way and what not, and where we play even or pull ahead of them will be on our issues.”

Colonizing: Entering the Room first to Display Ownership: Negotiations are usually conducted in a neutral location, providing neither team the advantage of their own environment – their ‘home court.’ This neutrality, and its accompanying lack of advantage, can be partially mitigated by laying claim to the selected bargaining location. One means of accomplishing this is to arrive at the bargaining table before the other team. Arriving first allows a team to ‘colonize’ the territory, laying claim to it with their physical presence and their props, such as jackets and papers. This strategy is designed to make the late arrivals feel they are entering into the other group’s territory, and to develop the same uncertainty they might have in the proprietary environment of their opposition. As one negotiator indicates, “I would rather be in there first...I find that if you’re there first it is like taking ownership. It’s our room and they are coming to us, even though it might be the agreed upon common room.”

Making the Opposition Face the Window to Reduce Their Concentration: A negotiator can use the setting to assist his or her presentation. One means of doing so involves the positioning of the opposition in relation to any windows in the bargaining room. In this case, the negotiator sits with his or her back to the window, forcing the opposition to sit on the side of the table facing the window. The primary reason suggested for implementing this strategy is to reduce the concentration of the opposing team. If the light is shining in their eyes, or if something interesting is happening outside, the opposition team may be less able to focus on what is being said at the table. Statements that might be interpreted negatively by the opposing team may be presented without opposition if their focus is elsewhere. Arguments by the opposition negotiator are also more likely to fall on deaf ears within his or her own committee.

One negotiator provides an elaborate analysis of this strategy:

"I guess I like to have them staring out the window. Particularly when it is the union presenting a position. I have the union people being able to stare out the window and look at the birds. It helps to distract them from what is being said. I don't like them to pay too much attention to what their negotiator says. I like them to pay more attention to their eyes. If the sun is shining in it is hard, they are busy with other things. They are not concentrating on what is being said. And quite often it is good when you are saying something that isn't particularly pleasant or they may not want to hear, it is good to have them sitting where there are other things on their mind as well...I will move around...for instance, I want to say something where I may not find it too palatable for them, I might time it so there is sun shining through the window or something like that and I will sit in front of the window, not unlike what you are,

sitting with your back to the window and tell them what they want to hear, the sun is shining through, a bunch of birds are flying around or something. They are doing other things. They may have a 60/70% focus on what I am saying but it is not 100%. I don't want them to be able to pick holes in what I am saying and it is possible that they do if they are totally focused. They understand the dynamics of the place of business so it is quite possible that the business agent wouldn't understand all of that so things may slide past him. If I can get it to slide past the rest of his committee as well, that is a benefit to me. I can always say we discussed it, you didn't have any questions when I brought it up the other day, what's the issue. What's a really strong factor for me is making sure that if there is a window in the room I get my back to it."

Argyle and Trower (1979, pg. 57) also suggest that the visual aspects of situations are important. They state that "If one person can see better than the other, or if the other is better illuminated, the person who can see better is more comfortable, while the other feels uncomfortably self-conscious. This is why interviewers and managers often place their desks so that they sit with their backs to the window." The manipulation of setting to achieve a certain effect upon the audience is found in many avenues of life.

Gaining Access to the Opposition Backstage: Negotiators want to find out what the "bottom line" of the opposition is – what they are willing to accept on any given issue. The bottom line is usually not on display in face-to-face negotiations; negotiators hope to achieve more than the bottom line of and for their team. The bottom line may be revealed in later stages of bargaining, but negotiators will try to uncover the opposition position as quickly as feasible. Knowledge of the opposition bottom line provides an extreme advantage: the

negotiator knows he or she can profitably keep pushing to that point, and, depending on ongoing negotiations, beyond. In some cases, the search for the opposition bottom line may include trying to gain access to the backstage, or private, communications of the opposition.

Lyman and Scott (1967) identify three types of territorial encroachment: violation, invasion, and contamination. Violation involves the unwarranted and unsanctioned use of another's territory, invasion involves an attempt to take over another's territory, while contamination involves the defiling of another's territory by what we leave behind.

There are several strategies designed to gain access to the opposition's backstage – to acquire access to their performance preparations and bottom line positions, despite opposition efforts to remain consistent in their performance in front of your team and to deny your team access to their backstage regions. These strategies include: 1. Entering Opposition Backstage Regions; 2. Surveillance of Opposition Actions at the Margins of Bargaining; 3. Watching for Incidences of 'Talking Out of School' by Opposition Team Members. Each of these strategies primarily falls within Lyman and Scott's category of violation – the unwarranted and unsanctioned use of another's territory. While entering backstage regions could aptly be characterized as an invasion, Lyman and Scott's conception of invasion has a potentially permanent nature, while

negotiators are attempting something more akin to guerrilla warfare or a surveillance mission.

a. Entering Opposition Backstage Regions: A negotiator may attempt to gain access to the opposition's backstage regions through direct means. The clearest example of this strategy is the entering of the opposition's caucus room, but it can also include entering or otherwise accessing any spaces, props, or discussions which the opposition considers private and backstage.

Rarely will a negotiator resort to illegal activities, such as breaking into the caucus room after hours to garner secrets while the opposition is elsewhere. None of the negotiators interviewed had taken such extreme measures; however, it was fairly common to avail oneself of presented opportunities. For example, if a negotiator or team member goes to the opposition room to summon them to bargaining, it is considered good strategy to quickly try to gather as much information as possible through this brief access to the opposing back stage. Of course, since the negotiator has typically announced his presence through knocking, the opposition quickly presents an image consistent with the front stage. It is, nonetheless, the hope of the visiting negotiator that the opposition may "miss something" in the quick transition from back stage discussions to performance. Key information may be written on a flip chart, papers or a blackboard; cliques or subgroups within the team may be in evidence; divisions

between certain team members, and perhaps the issues over which the divisions revolve, may be apparent.

A negotiator may even use other pretences to enter opposition backstage regions. For example, one negotiator interviewed indicated she had faced an opposing negotiator who would continually manufacture reasons to come to her caucus room in the hope of catching them unawares.

Entering opposition back stage regions is not limited to the caucus room, however. A negotiator may try to glimpse what is written on the papers of the opposition, or to overhear a private discussion held at the back of the bargaining room. If private documents are left behind in the bargaining room, it is also possible to read or photocopy these documents, providing insight into opposition positions and beliefs. However, this is a practice which not all negotiators would condone, indicating the power that culture exercises over negotiation strategies.

One management negotiator describes his experience with an attempted use of this strategy as follows:

Sometimes with props you set your stuff down in front of you. I used to spend a lot of time doing labour relations in [another province]. If you left the room, you would never leave your papers on the table in a million years because the other side, by the time you got back, would have all your stuff Xeroxed. Very much a 'take no prisoners' attitude. The first time that I was negotiating in Manitoba, a union asked for a caucus and we said sure go ahead. Their spokesperson left all his papers in front of the chair he had

been sitting in, and he walked out. I waited for the door to close, then I jumped up and I said, 'Holy Christ, we just hit the mother load here!' Everybody looked at me as though I was trying to steal the nails off the cross that had Christ on it. 'What are you doing?' they asked. I said, 'What do you mean, what am I doing, trying to get information!' 'We don't do that in Manitoba,' [they replied]. I said, 'You don't? You're crazy.' I might as well have raped somebody's mother. It was amazing. But in any other jurisdiction, maybe not any other, but I know for a fact in [my previous province] we would have had that stuff Xeroxed and copies for everybody. They are not stingy with information over there. But here they don't do that."

b. Surveillance of Opposition Actions at the Margins of Bargaining:

Once bargaining has begun, negotiators require dramaturgical discipline from their team. The strategy is usually to have one transmitter of the team's message (the negotiator), and many receivers of the opposition's message (the team). One transmitter helps ensure that a single message is sent, and serves to limit the possibility that the opposition will be able to identify a lack of solidarity or will be able to acquire any backstage information. However, the negotiator who arrives in the bargaining room first has the opportunity to watch the opposing team before they take their places at the bargaining table. Because the session has not yet formally begun, the opposing team may not yet be exercising dramaturgical discipline. As one negotiator states, "they might not have put on their poker face." The negotiator who utilizes this strategy may be able to pick up clues regarding the opposition team, their attitudes, and the relationship among and between the individual members. Questions such as "Do they have solidarity among the team members concerning the issue at hand?," "Are there alliances or divisions between certain team members that may be exploited now

or in the future?,” and “What is their attitude entering into the session today – are they open or defensive?” may be answered.

In the following example, a labour negotiator describes why he likes to arrive in the bargaining room first:

“I prefer to sit with my back to the window so they will get the glare off the window and I can always see them from when they come in to when they leave. I like to be there first which is easy with the [employer]. Just to see what they are like when they come in. Who comes in with who. Whose there, whose not there. What their general mood is. For the most part they are pleasant, sometimes they are not. Sometimes they are overly pleasant. We watch who sits where and near who. Who seems to be close on their team. It becomes important if you have figured out where people sit on different issues and where your support may or may not lie. You need to have a sense of it because you are always bumping into these people alone, whether it is in an elevator or in a washroom. You find yourself always testing. You never know where stuff will come from, or what they will tell you.”

c. Watching for Incidences of ‘Talking Out of School’ by Opposition

Team Members: Negotiators are very careful to control the communications of their team members at the bargaining table, to ensure a consistent message that reveals precisely what he or she intends to reveal – nothing less and nothing more. They institute an atmosphere of dramaturgical rigor, and team members strive to remain conscious and in control of the messages they convey. In fact, usually the team members try to convey little or no message at all to the opposition, relying on the negotiator to act as spokesperson.

In the bargaining environment, many of the beliefs and positions of a team are only openly discussed within private, backstage regions, solely with in-group members. However, when team members are away from the dramaturgical rigor of the bargaining table, they sometimes become more likely to reveal previously hidden beliefs and positions. Negotiators watch for such incidences of 'talking out of school,' as a means of accessing the backstage of the opposition. Surveillance of the opposition negotiator in this regard is considered fruitless; negotiators are characterized as too experienced to reveal anything inconsistent with the front stage message, except for the purpose of achieving their team's objectives. But individual team members may be inexperienced and have goals or beliefs divergent to those of other team members. In either case, they are more likely to talk once the dramaturgical rigor is relaxed, and may speak in a manner inconsistent with the message at the table, providing the team using this strategy with information normally consigned to the backstage within the context of negotiations.

One labour negotiator describes the use of this strategy as follows:

"One thing I find is that the non professionals seldom keep their mouths shut when they are away from the table and they are very seldom consistent. Usually every round of negotiations they have different representatives of employers there. Those employers go back into the workplace and talk to employees who are my members and you might hear how somebody feels about particular issues. Now depending on the sophistication of the other side, it would be a great way to deal us misinformation, but if you know that a particular individual is sympathetic to a particular proposal and you have learned that away from the table or even if the person

has suggested to some of their co workers, have spoken in terms of the refinement of the proposal that would make it more palatable, you use that information and you might when you are at the table, speaking about that proposal the next time instead of making eye contact with the chief negotiator who is on the other side, you might be making eye contact with the person who you know is sympathetic to your cause on this particular issue so you might talk to different people at different times.

Manufacturing a Backstage for the Opposition to Gain Access to – Leading the Opposition Astray with False Clues: In negotiations, information is power. One of the most valuable types of information is knowledge of opposition positions, strategies and bottom lines. As discussed in “Gaining Access to the Opposition Backstage,” negotiators may sometimes try to uncover information about the opposition through gaining access to their private communications. It is assumed that the front-stage, bargaining room performance is dramaturgical in nature and may not reflect bottom line positions of the team, while backstage discussions and information are open and uncensored, providing a clearer picture of the bottom line. Negotiators sometimes use this assumption as the foundation of a strategy of misinformation. A false backstage may be created for the opposition to gain access to, engendering the belief that they have encountered uncensored, objective data regarding your own bottom lines or strategies.

If successful, this strategy may serve to strengthen the position presented at the bargaining table, or result in the opposition expending unnecessary effort when they should instead be focusing on their own strategies and positions. The use of this strategy is often remembered fondly by negotiators, particularly when it has resulted in a prying team becoming hampered by their overly inquisitive ways.

One negotiator describes a specific use of this strategy as follows:

“...there was one time... I think we had something like a flip chart and decided to leave it there so that they would see what we were talking about. But it wasn't really what we were talking about, so it was almost trying to lead them on a false trail...usually when we use flip charts we take everything down, we don't leave anything. I remember saying, 'Why not leave it there, they might start getting worried.'”

Providing opposition access to a false backstage can also be an opportunity to present the opposition with a more severe position than might be performed at the bargaining table, or to deliver a message that might not be supportable, and, therefore, too risky to discuss front stage. One labour negotiator enjoyed using this strategy to present the possibility of a strike in response to a management salary proposal:

“We were talking in terms of multiple year package with fours in it [percentage salary increases] and I had done up a dummy sheet on a flip chart with 7s as I recall in it, and deliberately waited to be walked in on and I can remember I had a dummy sheet up, the word strike there [on top of] a column in the middle and x's looking like I was polling the team after a particularly insulting proposal from the other side ... we had no intention of striking nor had we

polled ourselves or whatever, but decided to have a giggle at their expense.”

When asked whether this strategy was successful, the negotiator replied that he achieved his aim, but that it is always difficult to know the precise cause for a shift in the opposition's position. He was clearly pleased with the use of the strategy, however, and characterized it as part of a series of strategies all designed to achieve the same end:

“They moved away from the offensive proposal when we were doing the dummy poll. Whether it was a factor or not, I don't know. We never responded to it. They called us back and indicated that they recognized that it wasn't well received and they were going to rethink their position and offer us something else. Now whether seeing the strike thing, or whether the body language or verbalization at the table conveyed it or whether one helped the other we don't know.”

V. BARGAINING TEAMS

1. CHARACTERISTICS

One of the key dramaturgical principles expounded by Goffman is that of performance teams. A team is a group of individuals who must cooperate if a given projected definition of the situation is to be maintained (Goffman, pg. 104). As indicated in the introduction, this concept is extremely relevant to the analysis of labour/management negotiations. In such bargaining, each side is typically represented by a team. The two teams, union and management, each attempt to project a definition of the situation that protects or improves its interests. The union and management teams are inherent in the bargaining process, and offer numerous and valuable opportunities for analysis. What may be even more interesting, however, are the other teams that develop in the labour/management bargaining environment: *The Two Negotiators* and *In-Group Confidants*. Each of these four types of teams is discussed below.

Union Negotiating Team: The union negotiating team typically consists of a chief negotiator and multiple team members. The chief negotiator is a professional negotiator, often the business manager, CEO or executive director of the union, or sometimes an outside professional such as a lawyer. Team

members are drawn from the membership, and are usually selected in some democratic fashion. Union negotiating teams are often structured so that various geographic divisions and membership groups are represented.

Often the President of the union is on the team, and is sometimes ascribed equal status to that of the professional negotiator. In such cases, both people are assigned the role of "chief negotiator." However, the professional negotiator is still typically the central figure, with primary responsibility for developing strategies and ensuring the success of negotiations.

Management Negotiating Team: Like the union team, the management negotiating team typically consists of a chief negotiator and multiple team members. The chief negotiator is a professional negotiator, often the vice-president or director of human resources for the company or organization, or sometimes an outside professional such as a lawyer. Team members are drawn from throughout the company, and are usually assigned the role by superiors. Team members are often quite senior in the organization, and are selected to represent a wide cross-section of departments or functions.

Occasionally the CEO or President of the company is on the team, and is sometimes ascribed equal status to that of the professional negotiator. In such cases, both people are assigned the role of "chief negotiator." However, the

professional negotiator is still typically the central figure, with primary responsibility for developing strategies and ensuring the success of negotiations.

The Two Negotiators: Observers of labour/management negotiations might assume the only two teams present are the union negotiating committee and the management negotiating committee. In fact, other key teams, other configurations of the participants, often exist. One of the most intriguing results of this research is the identification of a team comprised of the two negotiators.

At first appraisal, two opposing negotiators might be thought to be among the last possible people who would join together as a team. They are in an essentially adversarial relationship, often with opposing goals. However, they do share a common role, with common duties, responsibilities and challenges.

For each negotiator, the only other participant in the bargaining process who can fully understand what he or she is going through is the opposing negotiator. This shared perspective allows a bond between the two to develop. Shared history can also provide fertile ground for the development of this bond: some negotiators continually negotiate against the same person. The members of their own team may change, the members of the opposing team may change, but the opposition negotiator often remains the same. Equally important, the two negotiators have primary responsibility for ensuring a viable agreement is

achieved. As such, if there are barriers to agreement that might be removed by negotiator teamwork, there is incentive to do so. The negotiator may also require the understanding of the opposing negotiator when implementing a strategy or taking a stance desired by his or her team. In this case, the negotiators act as a team to present a convincing performance to both sides.

Off-stage talks are often an essential component of the relationship between the negotiators. However, these talks do not inherently require a joint performance between the two negotiators; the talks may simply be another venue for negotiations, or an opportunity to share information. A certain degree of teamwork may be required, but not a joint performance. Remarkably, however, such joint performances do occur, with one or both of the negotiating teams as the audience.

The joint performance may involve preparation in the off-stage region, or it may develop on-stage, at the bargaining table, based on a common understanding of the issues.

One respondent expresses the bond or commonality between the two negotiators in the following manner,

“...there would be times I might be conveying anger with my body language with abrupt motions of my hands, handling paper work or whatever while I am staring face to face with the chief negotiator for [the other side] that I have known for many years hoping to God he

can see the twinkle. The other actions would be for his team to the left and to the right. I mean who are the two individuals who in any round of negotiations whose professional success or failure depends on a win-win scenario in that round of negotiations. I often feel more of a commonality of interest with the chief negotiator on the other side than I do with my own team and I feel confident that in many situations that individual feels the same in response to me."

As indicated, the negotiator feels a "commonality of interest" with the opposing negotiator, and will even provide this negotiator with clues regarding his strategies at the bargaining table (in this case, through a "twinkle" in the eye).

The same negotiator suggests the necessity of working together to manage the process so that negotiations go smoothly and the needs of both teams are met (see also "Covert Joint Direction of the Bargaining Process"):

"But you both have players on both sides of you who once this is over may never do it again. Yet I can't make a move unless I have consensus on my side of the table and he can't make a move unless he has consensus on his side of the table. If you have got a good rapport with the other negotiator the language is probably more for his team than it is for him."

While the creation of a negotiators team can have a highly significant impact on negotiations, it should be noted that the development of such teams rarely occurs in the course of a single negotiation period, except in a very rudimentary manner. Only through trust and understanding can such a team develop. As one negotiator notes,

"If you are dealing with an inexperienced negotiator or a negotiator that you don't know that well or may know in another environment,

maybe you have done a dozen arbitrations against the guy, but you have never faced him as a negotiator before, you are probably taking a shot gun approach. At this stage of negotiations there is nobody on the other side of the table who is my friend."

In-Group Confidants: The final team identified by this study may be referred to as "in-group confidants." A straightforward view of negotiations would suggest that negotiators are on their guard in front of the opposition team, and at ease and open in front of their own team. This is generally true, but the existence of a team comprised of the two negotiators suggests the picture is not so simple. Even within his or her own team, the negotiator often develops a group of confidants who may be trusted to a greater degree, and who are communicated with more openly. Sometimes these team members act as surrogates for the negotiator, raising points that the negotiator would like to have brought forward, but would prefer not to do so him/herself in order to maintain an image of impartiality. At other times, such in-group confidantes may be used to help develop strategies to convince the remainder of the team regarding a particular course of action.

In other words, not all team members are created equal. Or, more accurately, not all team members are provided full access to the negotiator's backstage regions.

In-group confidantes are not limited to team members; they may include other negotiators not involved in the present negotiations, people in the organization with previous experience in bargaining, or trusted consultants.

It should be noted that such teams are typically developed to at least some degree, but that negotiators vary in their creation of such teams. Some negotiators have regular confidants, while others will develop confidants depending on the issue at hand, or the stage in bargaining. A minority of negotiators will be equally open with all members of their team. In most such cases, this does not include a full divulgence of beliefs and positions, but rather providing the same degree of limited access to all team members.

2. STRATEGIES

This section describes strategies relevant to the dramaturgical category of teams, including how the strategies are implemented, and the functions or reasons toward which such actions and techniques are directed.

Strategies are ways in which actors behave in order to influence and have a particular effect upon audiences. In the context of this study, *actors* refers to bargaining team members and, in particular, team leaders or chief negotiators. *Audience* primarily refers to the opposing team, although strategies will sometimes be directed at one's own team, the self, or constituents.

One Transmitter, Many Receivers: Negotiators almost universally arrange their team to maximize impression management benefits. This takes the form of having one spokesperson, the negotiator, thereby maximizing control over the message of the team, and reducing the possibility that anything about the team's position is revealed without a conscious decision to do so. The other members are instructed not to talk except in specific circumstances, and to control their body language and facial expressions. While these team members are not to transmit any messages (i.e., they are not to actively practise impression management), they are to act as receivers or an audience to impression

management. Multiple eyes may be more likely to pick up certain impressions given or given off by the opposing team.

These practices could be called “Concealing of Our Beliefs,” and “Surveillance of Opposing Team.”

Matching Team Size for Impression of Equal Strength: Most negotiators do not want their bargaining committee to be much smaller than that of the opposition. There are practical interactional necessities involved in this desire: negotiators want sufficient team members to observe the body language and reactions of the opposition. However, there is also a desire to ensure that enough members are present to give the impression of equal strength. This is a particularly interesting predilection given the fact that only one spokesperson is normally required for each team. While a certain number of participants are needed for surveillance of the opposing team, most negotiators indicated that one person could adequately observe several members of the opposition. One of the main reasons to include more team members than instrumentally needed is to present an image of solidarity and strength.

More people are considered of greater strength, and a common message from a larger group of people is stronger evidence of group solidarity. That is, it is not simply the negotiator who holds the stated views, it is everyone present at the

table. Often the participants are fairly diverse in terms of the departments or organizational areas they represent. The implicit message is “if all of us can agree to this course of action, it must be for the best.” But if the other team has greater numbers, and greater implicit solidarity, one’s team is placed at a disadvantage – a clearly dramaturgical disadvantage.

As one management negotiator states, adhering to this practice was:

“Just the way it was supposed to be. You had to equal their numbers...to impart that image that you [aren’t] outnumbered. It was also thought that you covered the water to [ensure] anybody who knew anything about the collective agreement was there so you wouldn’t have to pause or make a phone call or whatever.”

This negotiator indicates that the image of strength is important, but that having more people, if they are the right people, also means having greater informational resources.

Dramaturgical considerations sometimes must take second billing to economic considerations. While some negotiators would prefer to have the number of people necessary to show equal strength, the cast must be reduced if appropriate fiscal resources are unavailable. As a management negotiator relates,

“The union tables have typically tended to outweigh our team in numbers. Probably some years ago we used to pay more attention to that, load up our side of the table more, but more recently and it might have had to do with downsizing and restructuring, and actually cutbacks in management, that there wasn’t as many

management available, people had to stay and run the shops. And beside which, why did we need all these people there really. Other than the negotiator and two or three key people you can always get in touch with others if you need advice on operational requirements or something like that."

Getting an Advocate on the Opposing Team: In the course of bargaining, the negotiator is continually trying to convince the opposing team of the veracity of his or her position. Whenever the negotiator faces the opposing team, there is the opportunity to practise impression management concerning various bargaining positions. However, the performance generally comes to an end when the two teams break off into caucus, retreating backstage. Ideally, the negotiator would like to have someone to argue his or her position backstage with the opposing team. As such, it is very valuable to try to develop advocates on the opposing team.

Negotiators are always trying to convince the opposing team in its entirety to adopt their perspective; however, negotiators recognize this is not always possible, and instead often focus on acquiring one or two advocates, sometimes on an issue by issue basis. It may even be too much to expect the advocate to fully endorse the position of the negotiator, but simply having someone who can see the validity of your position can serve to weaken opposition to your proposal.

One negotiator describes the use of this strategy in the following manner:

“It is all part of finding out who the people are, what their influence in caucus is and what their interests are in these issues. Sometimes you may be able to pull in someone who is totally disinterested into an issue. They may not be the person who is at the centre of the decision, but because they haven’t shown any interest at the bargaining table, you guess that back in their caucus they are also not interested in it. But if you can frustrate that person to a point where they go back into caucus and say, ‘Look, I am getting sick and tired of hearing about this, lets make a decision about this. What they are saying doesn’t sound bad to me, can’t we just do it?’ and their caucus may need someone like that who is outside that core perceived power group to kick start that process. So, on different issues, always aware of wanting to know who has the power and who is not listened to, and are some so far on the peripheral that it doesn’t matter what they say.”

In this case, the negotiator has focused on a team member who appears to have little interest in the issue at hand, and tried to convince him of his position to the degree that the selected person will attempt to move his or her own team to agreement. The selected person places comparatively low import on the issue, so if he can be made to believe the opposition proposal is relatively reasonable, he might prefer to have his own team simply agree with it, rather than continue to waste time debating this unimportant issue. If successful, the negotiator will have gained an advocate in the opposition team’s caucus for the issue under consideration. Of course, it is also possible to gain an advocate in more direct manner, convincing one or more team members that your position is of benefit to them.

Changing Team Member Seating to Avoid Infiltration: As discussed in “Getting an Advocate on the Opposing Team,” and “Divide and Conquer,”

negotiators will attempt to infiltrate the opposition team and decrease team solidarity. Decreased solidarity among the opposition increases the possibility of achieving one's bargaining goals. One strategy to avoid this involves changing the seating arrangements among your team.

By changing where team members sit, the negotiator lessens the possibility of the opposition successfully targeting certain team members as possible allies. By varying their locations, it becomes more difficult for opposing individuals to develop intimacy with the team members of the strategizing negotiator. If a dyad or other subgroup within the team is forming, particularly one that might harbour views more sympathetic to the opposition position or otherwise in contrast with the in-group's official position, the development of this team weak link may be forestalled by sitting them apart from one another. The team must present a consistent performance if the performance is to succeed, and the opposition must not gain allies for its performance.

One negotiator depicts his use of this strategy as follows,

"I will get my people to spread themselves, if it is a long, long table, if the negotiator on the other side is getting too chummy with my people or I sense they are getting too chummy or they've identified a group of [my team members]. They may be thinking that 'okay, these two are thinking differently than the rest of the committee,' or you sense that they are sensing that. I will get my committee to change their seats, split them up, move them around on our side of the table because I find it very distracting to our objective if the employer thinks they are on to something with our group. I will just ask them routinely, don't sit in the same seats."

Divide and Conquer: Negotiators want their teams to be united, lending a greater strength to their position at the bargaining table, and ensuring a strong group of advocates for the agreement when it is eventually concluded. Conversely, negotiators will sometimes attempt to divide the members of the opposing team. If the opposing team can be brought into dissension, they may be unable to develop a strong, unified position. A weaker or inconsistent stance from the opposing team may allow the negotiator to more easily achieve his or her own bargaining objectives.

In order to incite division, a negotiator must ascertain the differing priorities and objectives of individuals on the opposing team. There are several paths by which to develop this understanding, including: 1. In early stages of bargaining, watching how opposing team members respond to various contract proposals, and developing a sense of how each individual is likely to respond on a range of issues, 2. Personal knowledge of the participants, and their beliefs regarding different issues, and 3. Consideration of the roles and positions held by the participants outside of the negotiation arena, and extrapolation of their beliefs based on same. Each of these methods allows precognition regarding the potential division, but the opportunity may also present itself "on the spot," as negotiations proceed. Negotiators suggest being prepared to take advantage of such unforeseen and unpredictable opportunities.

One negotiator suggests that the average opposing team will have a diverse composition, providing opportunities to take advantage of natural divisions. His experiences will be accessed to illustrate the stages and elements of the "Divide and Conquer" strategy. As he states,

"I very overtly exploit [the variances in their caucus]. I believe that in most negotiations where it is a workplace involved, there is going to be operational issues and there is going to be policy issues that have to be negotiated. For example, I am not interested beyond the introductory pleasantries of hearing someone who is an operational person from the employers side, tell me what their view of the policies are. They don't have any influence over the policy and similarly, the policy people, the people from the Department of Health and the Department of Finance telling me the virtues of something as technical as the 12 hour shift or something about the operations. Certainly they can talk about the impact on sick leave and what not, but I recognize going in that the other side are coming from different places and it is very easy in the structure that we bargain in to identify those just by where the people come from. With the VP of Nursing and the VP of Human Resources from the same hospital, I can take any issue and have them fighting amongst themselves on it in 10 minutes because of the conflict between nursing issues and the human resource issues."

In any case, once the possibility of inciting division is perceived, the next stage is to bring the area of dissension to the surface. There may be, in certain circumstances, some benefit to simply seeding general dissension among the opposing team. However, the ideal scenario is to expose dissent in an area which the negotiator may be able to capitalize on in bargaining. When bringing forward an issue for discussion, the negotiator using this strategy will consider whether there is any opportunity to expose or inflame a division on the opposing

team. If so, this is often accomplished by talking around the issue in a general manner, bringing forward various possible viewpoints, rather than through a straightforward presentation of a proposal. The negotiator hopes to draw out the differences in belief among the various team members, rather than giving them something they can automatically unite against. In doing so, the negotiator does not directly point out the possibility of dissension in the opposing team; this is left for the opposition to figure out for themselves. A direct statement of that nature would probably result in a "closing of the ranks" against the negotiator, nullifying the utility of the strategy.

As a case in point, one negotiator describes a successful attempt at exposing and inflaming dissension on the opposing team:

"Our committee will [sometimes] walk away from a day and say that we didn't get anything today. And I will walk away and say man, we had a great day. I know what is going on in their caucus. The director of nursing is all pissed off what the human resource [person] responds to my question so they're back in their caucus trying to work that out. I may want to fuel that dissension with them in a talking debate, what would be unearthed as a taunt, but across the table [I'll talk] of what the implications might be this way and the director of nursing might say, yeah that is exactly what I think. So I tell my committee, just watch how they respond to some of my comments because we want to learn what is going on in their caucus. They are not going to tell us, but it is going to be very critical to what steps we are going to take next if we know whose hard and whose soft on issues and that is what makes it very important on our side so when we walk out of our caucus that we are galvanized and there is no cracks."

This negotiator has played the objectives of the director of nursing against those of the human resources director, and further notes the importance of his own team being highly cohesive.

Having, it is hoped, crystallized and openly communicated the varying and disparate views the opposition might hold (the “Divide” element of the strategy), the negotiator can now move on to supporting his or her own team’s position on the matter (the “Conquer” element). It may be useful for the negotiator employing this strategy to have a caucus before presenting his or her own position, allowing the opposition some time to debate and fight among themselves. Alternatively, the position can be presented immediately after the discussion. In either case, the position of the strategizing negotiator is then presented as a logical compromise to the contrasting positions of the divided team. If everything works as planned, the opposing team will embrace the negotiator’s proposal as a positive solution to their internal debate. Not only will the negotiator have achieved a bargaining objective, he or she will be viewed as assisting the opposition in their time of need. A subtle and masterful strategy when employed successfully.

To conclude the series of examples, the negotiator describes an attempt to complete the strategy as follows:

“Yes, [I will try] to create factions of their side and if I nail the creative fraction in their position it makes our position look like a

great compromise. If I can sell both the nursing side and the human resource side or the payroll side and say hey, this is a great compromise, you guys seem to be off on this but here is something that I think would satisfy both of you. Depending on the complexity of the proposal it may be a long term strategy in the course of a set of negotiations.”

Telling Opposition Team Members They Know Best: Taking the Negotiator out of the Equation: Negotiators at times attempt to create or magnify divisions within the opposing team, in order to weaken their solidarity and the strength of their positions. This strategy is discussed in “Divide and Conquer.” A related strategy focuses on dividing the opposition negotiator from his or her team, while simultaneously stressing the commonalities between the two negotiating teams and the deep understanding which the opposing team has of the issues.

In Goffman’s conception, teams must act in cohesion in order to carry out a convincing performance (Goffman, pg. 104). By separating the team from its primary spokesperson, the negotiator employing this strategy reduces the dramaturgical potential of the opposition. A further elaboration of this strategy involves the strategizing negotiator attempting to create a performance team comprised of opposition and in-group team members, and excluding the opposition negotiator. The negotiator successfully implementing this strategy, through his or her performance, influences the opposition team members to be more responsive to his message – a message based on commonality of interest.

By stressing the deep understanding possessed by opposition team members, the negotiator hopes to move the opposing team from an adversarial position to a position based on the issues and their impact within the workplace. By strengthening their self-image, and suggesting they have the clearest understanding of the issues at hand, the negotiator begins to carve a new role within negotiations for the opposing team. The opposition negotiator is subtly characterized as having little or no understanding of the issues in the workplace, because he or she is simply not present at the worksite – unlike the members of both bargaining committees. The opposition negotiator, and sometimes even the strategizing negotiator, is painted as ill suited to debate the issue at hand. The negotiator then presents several facts as ‘self-evident’ – that the opposing team will hopefully agree with – and that ideally reflect the likely experiences of the opposing team members and the messages they have received from others in the workplace. The opposing negotiator, who might not want to have negotiating decisions made on this basis, is thereby neutralized. The team is subtly shifted from being a bargaining-oriented team to being a workplace-oriented team. With a workplace orientation, the opposing team may make decisions based on the good of the workplace, rather than on achieving bargaining objectives. Since their negotiator is not part of their workplace, he or she is denied entrance to the team, and his or her opinion is considered of less relevance.

One labour manager in health care discusses his use of this strategy as follows:

"I had one of my opposing negotiators say to me that his biggest problem was trying to get his committee not to say things like, 'But [respondent's name] was saying that's the right thing, he is making sense.' He said he had to spend a lot of his time in caucus saying 'No, he is not making sense.' I said, 'I remember that time [opposition negotiator's name] because I realized then that you were out of sync with your committee.' [I'd achieve that] by placating them, saying, 'You guys, you're the manager, you're in the hospital 365 days a year, you know what it is like in the hospital and when I tell you that this happens during the night shift, you know what happens during the night shift and you know better than I, you know better than [your own negotiator.]' That is self depreciating, I always use that. You come across with the idea that, 'You know better than that, I am not telling you anything new. I am not telling you anything you don't know. This isn't anything that radical to you and it may be radical to [your negotiator] because [he] doesn't work on a daily basis with the people who were working here like you people do. You are the ones who know and wouldn't it work better this way.' So it is a matter of separating the negotiator away from the people who I see as the chief decision makers. So he has to fight with them in caucus which is a beauty...I just say to myself, its their contract, its their salary, not mine and I am not going to pretend to ever know or feel as intently about these issues as they do. I think the management negotiators make that mistake. They take on these issues as their own issues. As soon as I see that happening and I have seen it happening on the other side, particularly with people who are new to a sector and they come in or they've farmed it out to a lawyer on the outside and I think, ha,ha, he doesn't have a clue. He may know the bargaining process but he doesn't have a clue of the culture here and I can't wait to set him up against that person on his own committee. All the while, the objective comes back to the basic thing, trying to convince them to seeing it your way and they see the two [departmental] directors saying '[He's] right,' so what [he] is saying is exactly what the [staff] tell us and the [staff] themselves are telling us here [at the bargaining table] and they have a way that will make our life easier - so what if board of management and the government and people that [their negotiator] represent don't think so - they are not there at the workplace."

The negotiator quoted above has successfully supported opposing team members taking on the role of independent decision makers. Simply because

the negotiator, the board, and the government have a differing point of view, does not mean the team members need to adhere to the party line if they know better.

Covert Joint Direction of the Bargaining Process by the Negotiators:

Negotiators may use off-stage or sidebar discussions to advance possible solutions to ongoing difficulties, or to present offers that he or she would be unwilling to present during formal negotiations without pre-knowledge of the opposition reaction. In addition, however, negotiators may use off-stage discussions to facilitate the orderly and constructive development of negotiations, i.e., one negotiator may give the other negotiator notice of certain issues to avoid or to mention, members of the team who need special attention, and ways to phrase issues for greatest acceptance. In other words, a negotiator will sometimes assist the opposition negotiator with his or her impression management strategies. This strategy will be used to avoid unnecessary barriers to a successful agreement. Typically, this strategy must be accepted and employed by both negotiators; the flow of information will dry up rather quickly unless both sides are being benefited.

Negotiators do not view this strategy as problematic; they are circumventing possible problems by eliminating them before they occur. If the two teams are set into adversarial ways, they may remain in deadlock unless the two

negotiators take steps to help each other navigate the minefield of positions and beliefs held by the opposing team. The negotiators are providing the support and clues necessary to achieve a successful interaction between the two teams. Nonetheless, those negotiators who employ this strategy generally do not inform their team members when they do so. The team is considered insufficiently versed in the realities of negotiation, and too set in their own positions, to support such an open sharing of information with the opposition. The negotiator generally fears the ramifications of his or her team finding out about the use of this strategy, but feels it is essential to successful management of the negotiation process. At most, the negotiator who employs this strategy will tell his or her team that a sidebar discussion concerning some of the issues was held.

One negotiator describes the covert joint direction of the bargaining process as follows:

“...if you have a solid lengthy background between the two chief negotiators ... although there is a certain amount of play acting that goes on, you’re probably confiding in each other as to when you’re going to be play acting and why you’re play acting ... this is the stuff I can get fired for probably. I’m quite used to negotiating with one individual...[we have a long] history...he would be quite frank with me as to where the problem areas were on his team and who had to be stroked and what to avoid and I would be equally frank with him. The two people in the room who wanted an agreement more than anyone else would be the chief negotiators. We are not staying in hotels, away from town having a good time. We are working in between so we want to get it over with.”

The example above clearly illustrates how two negotiators can at times act as a team, particularly if they share a long enough history to have developed trust. They share the duty of primary responsibility for achieving an agreement, and a depth of understanding concerning the process. Nonetheless, most negotiators would not advise implementing this practice unless one is confident in his or her relationship with the opposing negotiator. See also Section 1, Characteristics, "The Two Negotiators."

No Decision Making without All Team Members Present – to Increase Solidarity: In the course of a negotiation, external demands sometimes make it difficult or impossible for certain team members to be present. It is usually possible to discuss issues outside of the expertise of the missing member, and therefore it is possible to make decisions and reach agreement regarding these issues. Such a pattern would be the most logical from the perspective of efficiency. However, a negotiator may refrain from making any decisions without all members present in order to increase team solidarity. By refusing to decide anything of significance without the person in question, the negotiator attempts to convey the importance of the missing member.

There are three distinct audiences for this strategy. First, the individual in question is made to feel essential to the team. Second, the in-group team is taught that all team members are important, and that someone who must miss a

bargaining session will be supported by the team. In both cases, the aim is to increase team solidarity, and to strengthen dedication to each other, to team goals, and to the team's message. The third target of this strategy is the opposition team, with the goal of giving the impression of strong team solidarity. With such solidarity, the opposition team will hopefully assume there is little chance of uncovering any weak link in their position or presentation.

One negotiator describes the implementation of this strategy as follows:

"For us as a group it was very important that as many be there as possible to make decisions. We had instances for example where we couldn't get leave. They couldn't get anyone to replace ... That's fine, the team isn't meeting [was the response], which really makes you feel good because they won't meet without you and a lot of that was the principle more than anything because they could have easily talked of things [outside of the missing person's expertise], we weren't going to talk about [his or her] proposals that day but it was the principal of it."

It should be noted, however, that most negotiators who mentioned this strategy would not implement it under certain conditions. Negotiators do not want to bring negotiations to a standstill unless absolutely necessary. For example, if the external demands of the missing team member were lengthy in nature, negotiations would not be put on hold. Self-imposed absences are more likely to be ignored than externally-imposed absences. If the absence is due to the actions of the opposition, negotiators are particularly likely to implement this strategy. To accept an absence caused by the opposition is considered tantamount to allowing the opposition to reduce team solidarity. It is an

admission that your team will permit the other team to take actions that reduce your solidarity and that you will not respond.

For example, one labour negotiator describes a scenario where the employer has not taken steps to ensure that a labour team member could be present at bargaining:

"The employer has an onus to get me off work so why should I be disadvantaged and not be part of the team because every time you meet it is a team building, a cohesiveness. Its talking things through or making sure you're comfortable with decisions ... even if the decision is made around the table and has nothing to do with me or the group I represent...There were times when people were sick and sometimes we said look, its different, someone had something on or they couldn't make it for a day so we would go on without them, but we wouldn't go on if a person couldn't get leave because an employer wouldn't let them off. That was a power thing."

VI. BARGAINING PERFORMANCES

1. CHARACTERISTICS

As stated at the outset, one of the major aspects of dramaturgy as outlined by Goffman is "performance." Goffman says that performance refers to "all the activity of an individual which occurs during a period marked by his continuous presence before a particular set of observers and which has some influence on the observers" (Goffman, pg. 22). This fairly encompassing definition allows this section to act as a residual category in which we shall present a number of ingenious devices used by negotiating individuals and teams in the course of their bargaining.

2. STRATEGIES

This section describes strategies relevant to the dramaturgical category of performance, including how the strategies are implemented, and the functions or reasons toward which such actions and techniques are directed.

Strategies are ways in which actors behave in order to influence and have a particular effect upon audiences. In the context of this study, *actors* refers to bargaining team members and, in particular, team leaders or chief negotiators. *Audience* primarily refers to the opposing team, although strategies will sometimes be directed at one's own team, the self, or constituents.

Minimizing Importance of Favourable Proposals and Actions by Opposing Team: Almost all negotiators emphasize the necessity of minimizing the importance of favourable proposals and actions by the opposing team. At times during bargaining, the opposing team may make an offer that the negotiator's team views quite favourably and would gladly agree to. However, if the negotiator has a highly positive response to the opposition action, the opposing team may interpret that to mean something significant has been offered and a reciprocal offer is deserved. A positive response may result in the negotiator's team having to give up something they otherwise might have kept. Faced with this circumstance, the negotiator attempts to achieve the impression that the

offer at best is neutral, and is perhaps even distasteful in some way. The offer is described in terms of the difficulties it presents, rather than its benefits. Body language and facial expressions are employed to show the negotiator is struggling with it. The ultimate expression of this strategy is when the negotiator will convince the opposition that his or her team, after much debate, has given in to the demand, but they expect the opposition to give them something of equal value in the future.

As one negotiator states,

“...sometimes you don’t want them to know that this is something that I am really happy about because you want to come back and say well it is not really good enough but sort of reluctantly we are prepared to go along with that. Meanwhile inside you are just going ‘yes!’”

Another negotiator confirms this strategy as follows:

“I don’t generally display any emotion when I receive something. What I will do is I will skim it over when I receive it. I may ask questions for clarification purposes and I may even zero in on that area that I think we have achieved a major concession in, and ask questions about it like, “Can you explain your understanding of this language to me so that I can try and understand how you see it working?” and then we will go into a caucus and I will break off with my team and say, “Okay, we’ve got it,” then come back and say [to the opposition] “Well, okay, I guess based on your explanation of that proposal, we can accept that and we are prepared to live with it and see if it will work.”

The negotiator conveys the impression the team is almost doing the opposition a favour, when in fact they are quite pleased with the development and view it as a concession.

If the expressive side of negotiations was considered irrelevant to the outcome, then negotiators would simply expose their true feelings regarding opposition actions. Instead, they carefully mete out measured reactions, minimizing the strength and sometimes changing the direction of the response to a given issue.

Delaying/Expediting Negotiations for a More Favourable Environment:

Much of negotiation research involves the comparative power of the two sides and how this influences the outcome of the negotiation. The dramaturgical perspective, as applied to the field of negotiations by the author, emphasizes the interactional skills and techniques of the negotiators. However, dramaturgy need not deny the existence or relevance of power. In fact, dramaturgical techniques may be employed to place one's team in the maximum power position available.

The negotiator may be able to predict when the conditions for a good agreement are most likely to be present. For example, in the private sector, a management negotiator might want to conclude an agreement before the company he or she represents receives a massive new business contract, increasing the company's ability to afford a costlier settlement. In the public sector, a management negotiator might want to delay completion of negotiations until after an election, to reduce the possibility of labour unrest that might prove embarrassing to the current government. The union negotiators facing these two scenarios might

want the precise opposite, in order to maximize their own leverage at the bargaining table. If government is about to bring in new labour relations legislation, one side or the other may wish to either take advantage of the new legislation, or to avoid its new requirements. Similarly, if other negotiations within the particular industry are underway, one side or the other may wish to either wait or not wait for the conclusions of these negotiations, depending on whether or not they believe the precedence created will aid their cause.

Many more strategies were identified to delay negotiations than to expedite them. "Filibustering" involves talking about a particular issue ad nauseum, a strategy sometimes employed as a delaying tactic in the Parliament of Canada. "Focus on Minor Issues" involves placing emphasis on less relevant issues during the first stages of bargaining, in the hope that more favourable conditions will be present before the major issues are discussed. "Request for More Information" involves continually asking for more detailed information regarding certain proposed clauses, or ramifications of same. "Request for In-Group Deliberation" involves appealing to the necessity of reviewing the negotiations with the in-group. This strategy may be used on site at negotiations, in the form of lengthy or unnecessary caucuses, or more globally. In the latter case, the negotiator will appeal to the need to access the beliefs of a wider range of constituents. In the case of management, this might mean individual employers or managers, and in the case of labour, this might mean the membership as a whole or perhaps local

leaders. Finally, "Request for Postponement" is a less incremental tactic, involving a direct request for postponing the negotiations until a later date. Various reasons may be advanced for the delay, but the reasons must be highly defensible. A postponement request may appeal to role necessities. For example, labour negotiators might cite the need to prepare for their upcoming annual meeting of the membership, or management negotiators might cite the need to prepare the budget for the upcoming year. If the request has direct relevance to negotiations, it will usually be considered more acceptable.

All of these strategies involve sustaining a performance designed to delay negotiations, without having to actually provide the real reason for the delay. In fact, with most of the strategies, the ideal is to give the impression that no delay has occurred and that negotiations are simply proceeding in a normal fashion, perhaps a bit slower than usual, but nonetheless moving forward. Negotiators indicate it is difficult to fully sustain this performance with an experienced opposition negotiator, as they are probably equally aware of the external conditions. However, at the very least, the negotiator should try to maintain the performance to the degree that the process of negotiations is not undermined, i.e., the performance must be convincing enough that the opposition negotiator does not feel insulted by the crudeness of the manipulation.

One negotiator describes his experiences with delaying tactics as follows:

“...there is an awful lot of play acting where one side or the other has gone to the table with a mandate of delaying or dragging it out possibly because of other rounds of negotiations that the government side is involved in – they may not want yours to come to a head in the short term. Possibly the government may be unsure of its economic outlook for the coming year and they might simply be waiting to see how their revenues are going to be or whatever so we spend an awful lot of time at the bargaining table not involved in substantive negotiations.”

Another negotiator describes her experiences with this strategy, and some of the criteria for deciding whether to delay or to expedite:

“Another technique is for us to start negotiating before everybody else so we lead the way or to negotiate after the other groups. So if we start before, we are the lead agreement and with what we know about the public support for [our group], its sometimes good to be the lead agreement because you will get the power to get what you want and then sometimes we follow everybody else because it is good to have everybody else out of the way so you can ask for a little bit more for [our group] because they have that public support and you might get it because everybody else has settled...Sometimes it just depends on the climate. Sometimes we want to be the lead agreement, sometimes we don't want to be. It depends on what is happening out there politically, what the members are like, if there is not a lot of support for the other group sometimes it is better to be behind everyone else because they are all settled and if it is going to be a confrontation between government, then we would rather be in a confrontation with government by ourselves. And if you are the lead agreement, a lot of times the other groups can catch up so they can be in the confrontation with you. Essentially we don't want to be in confrontation with government with anybody else. If we want to do it we want to do it ourselves.”

Sometimes, however, a direct and forthright appeal to the actual reason for the requested delay will be made. For example, in the public sector, the need to delay until the government sets its budget for the upcoming year, providing

context to the negotiations. This technique will prove unsuccessful unless both teams recognize the benefits of doing so. It may be possible to implement, but, without such consensus, negotiations will be started off in a negative manner.

The power lies with the negotiator who wants to delay, which may explain the preponderance of strategies designed to achieve this aim. If someone wants to drag out the proceedings, whether in a subtle or crude manner, he or she will be able to do so. The opposition negotiator can try to move negotiations forward, but if the delaying negotiator is either skilled or obstinate enough to resist these overtures, the delaying negotiator will win the day. Of course, over-reliance on this strategy may create ill feelings, so the negotiator must consider and weigh this versus the benefits of the delay. Ideally, both good relations and the delay will be achieved.

Negotiators who wish to expedite contract bargaining face a more difficult challenge. The slower team largely determines the pace of negotiations. As a result, the only way to move forward quickly with any certainty is to agree to proposals put forward by the opposition. By limiting the time available, the expediting negotiator limits his or her opportunities to employ negotiating strategies and to achieve a better settlement. Even so, at times the negotiator may believe this is preferable to entering into the less favourable bargaining conditions believed to be imminent. Generally speaking, the expediting

negotiator will try to get to the bottom lines of each team quicker, rather than compromising excessively on his or her own positions. This may be accomplished through a brisk, crisp presentation of proposals, through predicting the information requests of the opposition, and through extensive preparation of positions and proposals.

Using Good Bargaining Table Etiquette to Reduce Barriers: When possible, most negotiators employ “good table manners” at the negotiating table, although they will not do so at all times. Many negotiators find the opposing team may expect negotiations to naturally be highly adversarial. Simply by proceeding in a manner that is polite and respectful, this strategy can result in the opposing team putting down its defences and considering the position of the negotiator to a greater degree. In an adversarial environment, they might automatically reject the entire position of the negotiator, but, in an environment where the negotiator is being reasonable, they become more open to judging the negotiator’s ideas on the basis of merit.

One negotiator describes his experience with this strategy as follows:

“I have always found they are more willing, generally speaking, to respond to it and there is nothing more successful for me in a day than to have someone in their committee who hasn’t spoken a word actually say, ‘Well, I think that I can’t agree with all of your opinion or your position, but I can agree with some of it.’ And I go away from there saying, ‘Oh, boy the door is open.’ It is through what my mother used to call good manners across the table. I know initially when I started, I had people say to me, both on my team and on the

other team, and even to this day around the bargaining with the [employers], they just came out of a round with another bargaining agent and after the first day with us said, 'Jees, these are a whole lot different than I expected them to be.' And I said, 'Why,' and he said, 'Well, you haven't sworn yet and don't all union guys swear?' And I said, 'Well, you had one experience with one person and it doesn't have to be done that way.' And I thought, I have him already. I got him in one day. So they are going to do it my way which is a disarming tactic."

Not only has this negotiator made inroads simply by being polite and by contrasting his approach with that of other negotiators, he has also gained control of the general bargaining process. The bargaining is being conducted in the way he chooses, giving him the benefit of having his preferred bargaining style and a subtle control over the negotiations.

Appeals to Technology to Express Strength of Position or Reinforce Position: In modern Western society, technology is revered. This reverence can be utilized to influence the negotiation process. If technology can be used to support your position, it will be lent considerable strength. A negotiator who is facile with technology, and can employ it as part of a performance to demonstrate the validity of the presented position, may gain an advantage in bargaining.

One management negotiator provides an illustration of this use of technology:

"The best example I can give you is, I had \$15 million ... and I had to allocate that... on a per capita basis to every union in the province. And so I did a spreadsheet and in that I had all the

unions, all the union related people, all the non union people, I had their numbers and I knew what their payroll was. So then I extrapolated that and said okay, if there is [x people from one union, and x people from another union], this is how much of the pot we need and then it was all equal. I had to go to a board meeting and I had to give the board this data. [The data] wouldn't reconcile across the bottom or down the side because I was out in my calculations. Quite simply, I didn't have time to do it. But I thought, what the hell. Let's just see where this goes. I ran off copies for everybody, handed them out, told them what we were going to do and they all stared at that information and there wasn't a single question. [They thought:] The computer. It can't be wrong. I mean, I don't understand it, but the computer did it so it must be right. So you can imagine the position that the union was in. Supposedly learned people are sitting there saying, well, I am not picking a fight with that computer."

Many people believe technology is infallible – if a negotiator can demonstrate that her or his position is derived from technology, then the position is imbued with the same infallibility. Sometimes this error-free image can be so strong that it holds even if the facts presented are entirely wrong.

However, it is preferable to use technology to reinforce a strong position, rather than to advance an essentially insupportable position. Often negotiators are aware of the strategies that other negotiators employ, and the use of technology should not stretch credibility. As one labour negotiator says,

"I was beginning to get a little angry that they would even put that kind of stuff forward...I find a lot of times if people are trying to say something that is not true or trying to stretch the truth, they think that putting it in a graph or on a overhead legitimizes it."

On-site technology might include computers, calculators and graphs (products of technology), while off-site technology would encompass the on-site technology as well as industry specific machines and measuring devices.

Asking for More Than You Expect/Asking for More than Your Bottom Line:

It is a basic strategy of negotiators, almost a rule, to ask for more than they expect to receive. Once the bottom line of the in-group has been determined, negotiators will magnify the proposal in their direction of preference. If they are hoping to slightly reduce a specific benefit, or the scope of a particular contract clause, they will propose a major reduction. If they are hoping to slightly increase a specific benefit or the scope of a particular contract clause, they will propose a major increase.

This magnification achieves several purposes. It strengthens the message which the negotiator is trying to convey. It provides the negotiator with an excess in one area that s/he may attempt to trade for something else in another area as negotiations proceed. Finally, and as a result of these first two purposes, it increases the possibility that the real expectations of the in-group will be achieved. By starting at a magnified position, even if negotiations proceed in an unfavourable manner, and concessions are made, it may be possible that the concessions are such that the bottom line position is still attained.

One labour negotiator discusses this strategy as follows,

“...always ask for more and that is purely technique ... you know you are going to get beaten down, but ... and I think - this is my perception - ...there is [currently] less of a tendency to ask for the sky in that you are more realistic in asking for more. If you want to get a 2% increase, before you would ask for 14%, but now you might ask for 6%. That is totally my perception. It seems that we are a bit more realistic in what more we ask for because you know that ...the negotiation process is that you are going to come down so you sort of say, what can we live with, what do you want. Okay, you want 2%, what will we ask for. Well you might ask for 4%.”

The negotiator indicates that the amount more that is asked for is fairly fluid. Fluctuations may depend on economic considerations, cyclical trends, and the perceived habits of the opposition negotiator. While the magnitude or extent may vary, an extra amount beyond the bottom line will typically be requested.

This type of dramaturgical strategy is a form of information control, involving the expression of information and positions based on the need to convey a certain impression to the audience, rather than a simple expression of perceived instrumental requirements.

Refusing Gifts and Favours from the Opposition to Avoid Incurring a Debt:

At times, one team may offer certain gifts or favours to the other team. While this can serve to create a convivial atmosphere around negotiations, some negotiators would prefer to achieve this atmosphere through other means. They

fear that accepting such offers from the opposition may result in the incurring of a debt.

Although the offers may have nothing directly to do with negotiations, the acceptance of gifts or favours may have high symbolic significance. By accepting a gift, one may feel a certain degree of pressure to give something in return. Negotiators wish to avoid feeling any such debt at the bargaining table, because team members may try to repay it in an inappropriate manner, such as through bargaining concessions. To forestall this possibility, these negotiators will refuse any such offers from the opposing team. However, if a friendly offer is made, it is considered important to refuse it in an equally friendly manner, perhaps offering a suitable reason, unrelated to negotiations, for the refusal.

One labour negotiator prepares his team for this strategy as follows:

“I always suggest to my committee, if you want your tea or coffee when we are going into a room that the employer has been in, fill your cups up here. Small thing. Maybe it is a very small thing, but we don't have to get a cup of coffee from them. It's a nice gesture, but we can turn around and say no thank you, we have our own.”

When asked what the impact of accepting the coffee would be, the negotiator replied, “It is not your coffee we want...[The opposition], they get entrenched in sandwiches - ‘we gave them coffee, we gave them donuts, what the hell more do they want?’” Although technically irrelevant to negotiations, such gifts are accorded considerable symbolic significance by this negotiator. He wishes to

avoid the symbolic significance of accepting gifts from the opposition. He does not want to incur any debts that might end up being paid back, in some subtle manner, at the bargaining table.

Boring the Opposition into Agreement: If negotiations were only about the logic and acceptability of each side's positions and proposals, it would not matter how those positions and proposals were presented. They would stand or fall on their own merit – the opposing team would assess the arguments and decide if they can agree. However, negotiations are not only about content, they are also about presentation. If a negotiator can convey a proposal in an uplifting or interesting manner that excites the opposition, agreement may be more likely. Similarly, a negative or angry style of presentation may make the opposition more guarded and more likely to reject one's proposals. This section addresses an unusual variant on this theme: boring the opposition into agreement.

By presenting his or her case in a dull, repetitious, lengthy manner, the negotiator employing this strategy hopes to bore the opposition into agreement, or into giving up on their position. The strategy is expertly and entertainingly explicated by a negotiator as follows:

"I know that when they are asking us to respond to their position I go into a monotone voice that sends a very clear message to them that, 'Oh God his response is so boring.' Maybe I have two or three points that I want to raise with them to reflect their position or refute their stand by simply taking them on a goose chase and creating the image for them that 'Oh God, we better stop talking about this.'

When in fact it is their position that they want me to be talking about! So I try to bore them out of their own position. Move them off their position by [them] saying, 'Jeez, if we have to listen to him again, is it that important?' I know I use that and I will even say, 'Look, I have already said this to you once, you insist that we keep responding, so you already have heard what I have to say, do I have to say it to you again?'...and they say, 'No, that's okay,' and then think 'What else is there for us to do?' You have to take it off the table or I will beat you up with my boring speech again."

Delaying Debate Until Emotional Venting Process is Complete: The manifest purpose of negotiations is to discuss and debate various contract issues, with the goal of coming to consensus and agreement. However, a latent purpose of negotiations is to provide a venue for the two parties to express their feelings and concerns related to the workplace and about each other, regardless of whether they are relevant to bargaining. If the need for emotional venting is extensive, most negotiators indicate that little advance will be made in bargaining until the emotional concerns are expressed.

While it is possible to respond in kind to the emotional statements of the opposition, the interviewed negotiators suggested it was generally better to let the venting run its course. To directly confront each emotion or concern advanced would cause negotiations to rapidly deteriorate, particularly since the issues are sometimes irrational and/or nearly insolvable due to such things as differences in philosophy, workplace personality conflicts, or constraints impacting both labour and management. When both sides require venting, it is preferable to let each side 'have the floor' for an extended period of time, rather

than continually interjecting comments that might lead to vigorous argument and implacable bargaining positions.

Negotiators utilizing this strategy attempt not to be 'drawn in' to unproductive emotionally-based arguments. They hold off on entering into issue-based debate, and on their own presentation or bargaining performance. Instead, they adopt a stance of calm listening, displaying interest in the beliefs of the opposition. At times, acknowledgement or sympathy may be expressed, but at no point should an admission be made that might damage one's bargaining position. Solutions may be advanced, but more likely the appropriate venues for addressing each issue will be identified. Contrasting beliefs may also be presented, but typically as alternative perspectives, rather than the only 'truth.' Generally, negotiators who use this strategy focus more on listening, and less on talking. They wait until actual negotiations have got underway to make their points.

One management negotiator provided a comprehensive depiction of this strategy, including his rationale for employing it:

"Part of the process in my view is to recognize that, from the union perspective, some part of the negotiations is an opportunity for what I call allowing them to vent. And what I mean by vent is, aside from the business agent, the formal representative of the parties, the negotiating committee is usually made up of rank and file employees that by some process or another the union selects to be on that negotiating committee. And in most cases those employees don't have the opportunity to sit across from senior representatives

of the employer and talk to them eyeball to eyeball as equals and in fact, give them hell from time to time. Tell them that the way they are managing the operation is dumb or stupid or totally ridiculous or whatever the case may be. Collective bargaining provides that opportunity. So as an employer representative you have to recognize that for some part of the negotiations you have to allow an opportunity for union people to vent. To get those things off their chest, to say things that they wouldn't otherwise get an opportunity to say. Often times that happens at the beginning of negotiations and you watch for that and we will go with that flow. It is a matter of timing to say okay, the venting has started through two or three meetings and now it seems to be playing out. Now we will go to the next stage of the process and get down to some serious business. We have gone through that essential emotional stage of the process and now let's get on to the next stage of it."

When asked what he does during this stage of the process, the negotiator responded:

"Often times it is important to just simply listen. Obviously you can't just sit there and say nothing for three subsequent meetings in a row, but by and large your role in that particular stage of the negotiations is to do more listening than talking. You can respond, but the majority of words are coming from the other side. It is their turn. If right at step one you recognize that it is a venting process, then you do let them carry on. That is not to say that they don't ever say anything that gets you going because, for example, they are going to address 20 different issues in their minds, some of which aren't even on the bargaining table, but they just want a kick at the cat because it has been bothering them for whatever period of time. They say something amongst those 20 that runs totally contrary to what you subscribe to, it might create a reaction. But again, if you go right back to square one you realize, or at least I realize that, in my view, venting is a part of the collective bargaining process. You have to recognize that it is there, what it is, and let it happen without putting too many obstacles in their way because that is a process that you have to go through in order to get to the next stage."

Most negotiators would prefer that this strategy was never required – they would like to get right to negotiating, avoiding potentially dangerous and unpredictable venting. The need for venting is instead felt by the team members – the people who must work together in the workplace. Also, sometimes the emotional outbursts do provide an opportunity to receive less-censored information relevant to bargaining positions

Interviews suggest the union team may be somewhat more likely to require venting because often the job positions or workplace environment of the labour team members do not permit easy access to management. Negotiations may represent the first time that labour team members have had the opportunity to express their concerns to managers face-to-face. Long-standing workplace issues may be expressed regardless of relevance to bargaining.

Workplace power may influence the frequency of venting. While on occasion management will also vent, the lower workplace power typically held by labour may cause union team members additional need to engage in this practice. At the bargaining table, the power differential is not so apparent, and the low workplace power group feels freer to state concerns.

It should not be assumed, however, that the low power group is always labour – physicians, university professors, and professional athletes are examples of

labour groups with extensive power within their environment. Any labour group may develop greater workplace power due to external variables, such as supply and demand, or to strategies such as attempting professionalization of the occupation or gaining control of industrial practices.

This strategy of waiting and listening is for negotiators encountering emotional venting from the opposition. Most negotiators prefer their own team to refrain from emotional outbursts. Instead, they use their emotions as a tool in bargaining. For example, using an emotional, personal story to illustrate the implications of a particular policy or contract clause under consideration.

Timing of Concessions: As bargaining proceeds, or even at the outset, a negotiator may realize he or she is willing or likely to make a concession in a particular area. However, negotiators will not reveal this willingness to the opposition until they believe the concession will have maximum leverage. In fact, it may never be revealed at all. But if the negotiator has decided that making the concession would be worthwhile, he or she will time the offer to occur at the best possible juncture in bargaining.

This strategy is based on information control: known information is presented or withheld based on dramaturgical considerations. Information is wielded much

like a prop, and presented when it will create the most favourable impression on the opposing team.

Specifically, the negotiator will control the flow of information surrounding the potential concession so that the issue is not resolved until such time as he or she has identified the appropriate time of concession, and subsequently makes the relevant offer to the opposition. Depending on how negotiations are proceeding, the concession may be made either soon after it is decided upon, or it may be held in reserve for future use. Reasons to concede early include: 1. showing good faith, 2. 'getting the ball rolling,' as one negotiator suggested, and 3. reducing the likelihood of an impasse. Reasons to concede later include: 1. being able to more accurately judge the worth of the concession, 2. breaking an impasse, and 3. allowing the concession to be packaged with other concessions to indicate major movement by the negotiator's team. Another major reason to concede, which may result in either early or late revelation, is the negotiator's expectation of receiving a concession from the opposition in the near future. The negotiator hopes the opposing negotiator will mirror his or her behaviour.

Many of the interviewed negotiators addressed the issue of timing, but one management negotiator in particular went into significant detail, addressing the rationale behind both early and late concession-making. Excerpts from his discussion of this issue follow:

"I certainly will not concede anything and everything because it is there to concede at any given time. I do believe that giving somebody a nickel on a Tuesday might buy you less than giving it to them on a Friday and there is nothing significant about the days except 4 more days have gone by. Or, you may be trying to create a momentum in the negotiation itself that may call for making a number of concessions at a particular point in time to create kind of a 'we are really moving along now let's get going' feeling. So that kind of thing...I have always viewed my job as a chief negotiator as managing a negotiating process...I may be doing that to create an impression that there is real movement here. If I give them a nickel a week over the next 3 weeks and that nickel may not be money, it might be something else, it may not have nearly as much effect on the process of the negotiation than if I give them 3 nickels on a Friday afternoon. Particularly if we are meeting on a Saturday morning. They may feel a greater obligation to advance towards our positions as a result of seeing the significance of what we have done. And that is the whole thing, issues of time. I think timing is one of the essential features of successful negotiation. Most people make the mistake of moving too much, too soon, or too little, too late. I think that is very common in negotiations. It is so pervasive in the whole process...It is not even something that you can design in advance...[you need to] get a sense of what the priorities and strong interests are of the other side and that might inform what and how much you move on a particular set of items and when you move on them. First of all, at the beginning of most negotiations, you don't know where the wheat is and where the chafe is. It takes time to get to the point where you really know and sometimes a chafe issue may be a really important issue to the other side. Or sometimes an issue on the table that is causing you fits is a minor thing to the other side. You don't know that until the process has a chance to move along. The more the two sides convey information to one another, the more you get a sense of the understanding of the ebb and flow of the negotiation and that more informs what you will do and when you will do it. Too little, too late can cause an entrenchment on positions that would be maybe greater than it would have been had there been more movement earlier...that is an example, give too little, too late and you convince the other side that you are not serious about an agreement. They get further entrenched in their positions and it is harder to unblock that impasse."

Controlling Contract Language by Controlling Documentation: Bargaining proposals and agreed-to clauses are recorded on paper. The paper produced is the written representation of the interim stages and final results of negotiations. Often, each side has its own record of proceedings. However, if one side can gain control of this process, it can gain a subtle control over the wording of clauses, and, therefore, of the contract.

The negotiator employing this strategy must convince the opposition of the 'logic' of his or her team assuming control of the documentation necessary to collective bargaining. As such, the negotiator must conduct a performance that suggests that the rationale for gaining control is solely based on instrumental factors such as the availability of equipment or the possession of the appropriate documenting skills. Streamlining and increasing the ease of negotiations is the stated goal. In reality, the negotiator using this strategy hopes to gain control of the wording of the contract. The negotiator's performance at the bargaining table must keep this ulterior motive hidden if the strategy is to succeed.

Both sides normally begin by producing their own set of proposals and documentation. This usually continues unless one team can break the pattern without arousing the suspicions of the opposition. Several strategies to accomplish this were identified: 1. demonstrating superior facility with, or access to, on-site documentation equipment, 2. predictive documentation, and 3.

assuming control of documentation production through superior speed or volume. If one team can show they are the more logical team to write up the proceedings, they may convince the opposition to allow them to handle the documentation.

Becoming the primary source of documentation for negotiations is a major victory. Control of the paper produced means greater control of the wording. Control of the wording means control of the language used in the contract. Contract language can be subtly framed to favour one's own team and constituents. An advantage has been gained through control of an essential bargaining prop – the documentation.

As mentioned, one means of gaining control of bargaining documentation is to establish your suitability for this role through demonstrating superior control of, or access to, the technology of documentation. By demonstrating an ability with, or access to, such on-site equipment as computers, printers and photocopiers, a negotiator may be able to convince the opposition to allow them to produce the documentation, thereby gaining a considerable advantage. As one labour negotiator states,

“...I found over the last number of years... that he or she who knows the computer controls how things go. And having a computer at the table was a prop, but a useful one. You come to an agreement on something, it matters who drafts it up because you rarely agree on the exact language and the person who has control of the technology, it is a big advantage...[For example], you and I agree that weekend premiums will be paid to [staff] and we agree it will be 50 cents an hours or \$1.50 per hour, whatever it is

and I say, I will write it up. There is a lot of different ways that you can write things up. You can write it up in such a way where we define what the weekend is, we don't define what the weekend is, or we just say on a weekend. You can define the hours or throw in exceptions or make sure it is wide open. You can write it vaguely or you can write it very specifically. And it matters. What I find happens is that when the employer writes things up, they are always looking to be, I don't want to say to be more specific, but if they are giving you something they are always looking to cover where it doesn't apply and sometimes that is okay, but mostly it isn't. So I like to have that control and if need be I like, if I go into an arbitration case, if it is being tested, to be able to say that I wrote that. This is what I intended...this is what the parties meant versus I let you draft it and I signed it. Its sort of an authority thing - from time to time it turns out to be helpful...Sometimes you have it [the computer] in the room. Always in the caucus room...We have had our technology in the room whereas the [employer] has had it back at the office and we could do it almost immediately versus it being quite a run around for them to do it. So they have tended to say okay, so we will do it."

The negotiator cited above explicates two of the benefits of successfully appealing to technology in order to gain control of the documentation process. First, the wording may be framed in a manner beneficial to the strategizing negotiator's constituents. Second, during the life of the contract, when uncertainty exists concerning how a particular clause should be interpreted, it allows the negotiator to claim authority over the meaning of the clause in question. In fact, this strategy assists the negotiator in future impression management, perhaps during arbitration or grievance hearings, permitting him or her to assume an authoritative role.

The second identified strategy to gain control of bargaining documentation is 'predictive documentation.' Predictive documentation involves proactive action by the negotiator. Before coming to an agreement at the bargaining table, the negotiator implementing this strategy must consider the likely outcome of discussions and develop documentation representing the conclusions of this deliberation. The negotiator must predict what will happen and write up the results beforehand.

In successful use of this strategy, when the predictive documentation is essentially accurate, it is difficult for the opposition to refuse the documentation without appearing obstinate. The strategizing negotiator has placed them in the position of agreeing to use the prepared document, or appearing unreasonable. Of course, the document, while reflecting the spirit of the agreement, is worded in a way to subtly reinforce the preferred contract interpretation held by the strategizing negotiator's team and constituents. With today's technology, predictive documentation can almost be practiced right at the bargaining table.

Another, diluted version of this strategy, more likely to reflect the agreement but less likely to be accepted by the opposition, is to write the agreement up either during or immediately following discussions. With a short enough time delay, the strategizing negotiator may be able to position him or herself as the de facto documenter. This variation is aided by, and very similar to, the first strategy

listed, “demonstrating superior facility with, or access to, documenting equipment.” In this case, it is more accurately ‘pre-emptive’ than ‘predictive.’

One negotiator summarized the strategy of predictive documentation as follows:

“I would do it in advance on the off chance that things played out the way you thought and say, ‘here it is.’ Or you reach a deal and [say] ‘I will write up the memorandum.’ I’ll draft the agreement and with the technology today you can almost do it, I don’t know if on-line is the term, but you can do it in a way that we never really dreamed of it being possible 15 years ago or 20 years ago.”

The third strategy is to assume control of documentation production through superior speed or volume. By quickly inundating the opposition with elaborate and useful documentation, including revised proposals and contract drafts, the strategizing negotiator positions him or herself as the provider of all updates and as the chronicler of the proceedings. If people from both sides begin to rely on the negotiator’s documents, the battle has been won. The negotiator’s documents have taken on the image of bargaining ‘minutes,’ rather than one side’s version of events. This documentation is often extensive enough that it may be necessary to produce it after negotiations have been halted for the day. Nonetheless, access to and facility with technology is once again important to the successful implementation of this bargaining tactic.

One management negotiator (gleefully) discusses the benefits of this strategy in detail:

"I work very hard at getting them to use my paper. I want them working from my pieces of paper. I just completed a set of negotiations back in the fall ... where I refused to acknowledge their proposal. I provided them with a whole collective agreement based on our proposals and the humorous part of it was that our system of numbering was different than theirs and when we first got started it was our Article 11, your Article 13, etc. As they agreed to more and more of our stuff, because it was so close to their own, then I would turn around and cut and paste and I had issues agreed to and issues outstanding. So then, every session they would have our original proposals, issues agreed to in another package, and issues still outstanding. Could you please check over these agreed to items and make sure that we haven't made a mistake and then initial them and give them back and then we will move on to these outstanding items. By the time we were finished, and I don't know that it has ever happened before because the person I was negotiating with has been around a long time, he was extremely frustrated and finally he ... threw up his hands and said, 'We will use your numbering system.' As soon as he said that we were working from our paper. And I guess I forced him into it because I was flooding them with paper. Every morning, here's more packages. I got a box full of proposals. You were packing shit like this to a bargaining session and in the meantime they are still carrying their binder full of proposals. We got a whole collective agreement that didn't address any of their proposals. The language was very similar to theirs and in some cases identical, but it was off our document. So, I don't know if you consider that a prop or not but it certainly is working things to your advantage. I don't know how many trees we cut down to do it, but...as long as they are working off my documents I don't have to deal with theirs. The advantage to that is, most likely they are going to agree to a proposal or a variation of our proposal. And my proposals are definitely going to have a built in bias toward the employer. Is there an immediate advantage? Maybe not, but maybe when you get to an arbitration someday on a particular clause, there is the language and it is biased in favour of the employer and it helps you in arbitration. I want stuff in that agreement that is focused on management even if it is management giving up its rights. I want management to say these are the rights we give up, not the union saying that these are the rights that management has agreed to give up. There is a subtlety and it makes you feel good."

Use of Time: Allocating More Time to an Issue In Caucus Than Necessary to Indicate Serious Consideration of the Issue: In a purely instrumental world, negotiators would not consider the use of time as a strategy, and would instead simply perform the necessary tasks, completing them in whatever amount of time was required. Time would be measurable, but not meaningful.

However, social actors do impute meaning to the length of time a task takes. Negotiators make use of this during bargaining. One time-based strategy involves taking longer than might be necessary to review an issue or proposal of the opposition when caucusing backstage. By taking longer than might instrumentally be required, the negotiator hopes to signal to the opposing team that they are seriously considering the issue at hand. The negotiator hopes this will convey a respect for the issues of the opposing team, will result in the opposition feeling the issue has been appropriately considered and may now be dropped from bargaining, and will engender a similar respect and consideration for the issues of his or her own team.

The following description by a labour negotiator aptly evinces the dramaturgical elements of this strategy:

“The use of time is a most dramatic one. So we may say, ‘Let us take 20 minutes to think this over,’ and, always using time, we may know we only need 30 seconds or we may already know what the answer is. I want them to think that we are really seriously considering their proposal here because I may have something on the table that I also want them to seriously consider. My committee

will say, 'Well, it has been 45 minutes.' I will say, 'That is okay, we said 30, I want [the opposition] to know we are having a real debate on this.' On a given issue it may give the other side the false hope that they are getting somewhere. Then I can come in and play the neutral bad cop or the good cop saying, 'We have gone through this and we are an hour and 15 and we felt it would be 30 minutes, but our coffee was late. No, no, we were really serious, we had a real good debate on this and when all the dust settles, we are not as torn on the issue, but really don't see the value of it.' I know from our committee's perspective, that is important to hear for the other side because they know when they come into bargaining they are not going to get everything that they want. They know that they want to have everything they have proposed seriously considered and all it may take is an extended coffee break in their own caucus. We go back to them and say we really seriously considered this. And I know that they do the same thing to us, but they don't know when it is real and when it is not real. So when they walk away from the day they say, 'You know, we put it on the table and we talked to the union about it and they took it back to the room and it took them an hour to come back and say no. I think we can move on, I think we had enough.'"

C. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

I. CONCLUSIONS

The primary purpose of this research was to determine if labour/management negotiations are dramaturgical. By interviewing labour/management negotiators, numerous characteristics and strategies associated with the dramaturgy of negotiations emerged in the categories of region, team, clothing, props, body language and performance. Examples are provided throughout the preceding pages. Labour/management negotiations are indeed richly dramaturgical.

A summary and discussion of results is included below. Results are grouped by the six dramaturgical categories employed in Part B, "Data and Findings: The Dramaturgy of Labour/Management Negotiations." Additional conclusions appear at the end of this section.

Use of Clothing for Impression Management: Negotiators characterize clothing as intensely dramaturgical. For a high majority of respondents, every clothing selection during negotiations is guided by dramaturgical considerations. Numerous characteristics of clothing and its use are identified in this study, including degree of formality, team alignment of formality, alignment of the

uniform and the message, humour in clothing, and colour selection. Additional issues addressed related to this category include, 1. gender-based dress strategies and 2. the tension between dramaturgical effect and physical comfort.

Sixteen specific clothing strategies are identified. While most of the dramaturgical strategies discussed in this thesis are directed at the opposing bargaining team, clothing strategies are directed at multiple audiences. The sixteen clothing strategies are grouped by intended audience: the self, the negotiator's own team, the opposition team, both teams, and constituents.

Clothing strategies directed at the self are designed to bolster one's confidence for negotiations. Clothing strategies directed at one's team are generally designed to either 1. meet team clothing expectations (expectations typically focus on professionalism, but not exclusively) or 2. increase and demonstrate team solidarity. Clothing strategies directed at the opposition team are designed to either 1. convey positive characteristics of the negotiator, such as professionalism, capability, and approachability, or 2. send a specific signal regarding ongoing negotiations, such as displeasure, preparedness to "get down to business," a changed attitude, or the need for change by the opposition. Clothing strategies directed at both teams have multiple goals: the same strategy may be designed to instill solidarity and confidence in one's own team while concurrently conveying positive characteristics to the opposition. For

example, a negotiator may have his or her team maintain formal dress throughout negotiations both to develop an in-group perception of professionalism and solidarity, and to indicate discipline and capability to the opposition. Finally, clothing strategies directed at constituents are designed to ensure the dress expectations of the represented group are met.

Use of Props for Impression Management: Within the bargaining environment, negotiators make use of objects and equipment to convey meaning. Props are manipulatable by actors and usually physical in nature. Props can include both common, everyday instruments; such as pens, papers, magazines, and briefcases, as well as situation-specific instruments; such as flip charts, research documents, and industry-specific equipment. The former variety is typically assigned a meaning by the negotiator, serving the temporary purpose he or she intends, while the latter typically has an inherent meaning or message that the negotiator incorporates into his or her performance.

Ten specific prop strategies are reported in this study. Actions involving props include note-taking, the closing of one's notebook, treating opposition documents in a certain manner (either positive or negative), denying the opposition access to equipment, and ceasing prop use.

Props are typically employed to achieve one of two primary goals: 1. reinforcing a message or 2. indicating a position or belief. In the first case, the prop is used to emphasize or bolster the negotiator's verbal message; in the second case, the prop use forms the entirety of the message. Additional goals include conveying vigilance, withdrawal, displeasure, respect, disinterest, and significance.

Body Language: The Use of Non-Verbal Communication for Impression Management: All of the negotiators interviewed believe the use and surveillance of body language is an essential element of negotiations, often even more significant than the spoken word.

Two primary aspects of negotiation-oriented body language have been identified and explored: 1. variations in body positioning at the bargaining table, and 2. controlled versus spontaneous body language.

Negotiators believe different body positions and gestures are imbued with different emotions and messages. Two main clusters of body positions were identified: *open body language* and *closed body language*. Negotiators employ open body language to convey a positive receptive image, and similarly interpret the presence of such body language in the opposition. Closed body language is considered indicative of a negative, unreceptive stance. Negotiators only

occasionally employ this body language; instead, they watch the opposition for evidence of this body positioning.

Controlled body language is purposeful body language employed by negotiators as part of a cohesive performance, while *spontaneous body language* is uncontrolled and reactive in nature, a leakage of unadulterated reactions and feelings. Generally, negotiators hope to control their own body language while watching the opposition for signs of spontaneous body language.

Ten specific body language strategies are identified. Body language employed by negotiators includes the use of eye contact, open and closed body positions, leaving the table to engage in other activities, and walking out of the bargaining room. Negotiators expend considerable effort in maintaining control of their own and their team's body language to ensure "nothing is given away" to the opposition – a "poker face" body language configuration is employed. Similarly, equal or greater effort is expended in surveillance of opposition body language.

Body language strategies are designed to conceal positions and beliefs from the opposition; identify the "bottom line" of the opposition; induce the opposition to respond; generate good will; signal agreement, disagreement, level of importance, withdrawal, and disinterest; identify the presence of boredom or

interest; protest opposition actions or positions; and force a re-evaluation of team priorities.

Bargaining Regions: In the context of this study, region refers to the physical location in which labour/management bargaining occurs. Herein, bargaining region is divided into location and setting, referring to the macro and micro elements of region, respectively.

Location refers to the city, neighbourhood or building in which the negotiation occurs. Negotiators prefer an environment that favours their team. However, due to the opposing interests of the two teams, a neutral environment is usually selected.

Setting refers to the room(s), furniture and props present at the bargaining location, in which negotiations are prepared for and conducted. Two key environments are considered necessary for successful negotiations: a bargaining room, where the face-to-face negotiations between labour and management occur; and caucus rooms, private spaces where each team can separately retreat to discuss and prepare strategies. The bargaining room may be characterized as front-stage, the place where the actor (the negotiator) conducts his or her performance before the intended audience (the opposition). The caucus rooms may be characterized as backstage, a private location where

negotiators can prepare their performances, openly discussing and debating issues with his or her team members.

Eight specific region-oriented strategies and substrategies are identified. Actions related to bargaining region include entering opposition backstage regions, surveillance of the opposition at the margins of bargaining and in other environments, manufacturing a false backstage for the opposition to access, conceding the good side of the room to the opposition, entering the room first, and ensuring the opposition must face the window in the bargaining room.

Negotiators believe access to the opposition backstage will provide information concerning the opposing team's bottom line. There is a widespread desire among negotiators to gain access to the backstage of the opposition, and to ensure the opposition does not gain access to one's own backstage. As a result, many region-oriented strategies focus on these goals. For example, some negotiators will try to lead the opposing team astray by providing them access to a false backstage, while others will practise extensive surveillance of the opposition outside of the bargaining room, i.e., before they feel the necessity to put their "game face" on. Region strategies also may be designed to display ownership of the bargaining room, reduce the concentration of the opposition, or induce concessions.

Bargaining Teams: Teams are a central element of labour/management bargaining. Union and management are both represented by a team, and, in each case, the team must work together to project a common definition of the situation. Less predictable, however, are the other teams that develop in the labour/management bargaining environment: *The Two Negotiators* and *In-Group Confidants*.

One of the most intriguing results of this research is the identification of a team comprised of the two negotiators. The development of this team is typically based on shared history, similar roles, and the need to circumvent problematic people or circumstances. Negotiators acting as a team will sometimes meet off-stage to share information, or, more remarkably, conduct joint performances at the bargaining table, with one or more of the negotiating teams as the audience.

Within his or her own team or from several identified outside sources, a negotiator often develops a group of confidants who may be trusted to a greater degree than are the remaining team members, and who are communicated with more openly. Not all team members are considered equal.

Eight specific team-oriented strategies were identified. Actions and strategies related to teams include having only one spokesperson, having multiple observers of the opposition, matching team size, changing team member

seating, identifying and magnifying divisions within the opposing team, ensuring all team members are present during decision making, and covert joint action by the two negotiators.

Team-oriented strategies are generally designed to maintain the solidarity and strength of one's team, and to weaken and divide the opposition. A single spokesperson ensures that one common message is sent, changing the seating plan helps to reduce the possibility of infiltration through the development of inter-team familiarity, matching team size conveys an impression of equal strength, and making sure that everyone is present for decision making increases solidarity. Conversely, undermining the authority of the opposition negotiator, gaining an advocate on the opposing team, and leveraging natural divisions within the opposition all serve to weaken the opposing team. Similarly, posting multiple observers allows the detection of unguarded reactions. But not all team-oriented strategies are adversarial in nature; covert joint action by the two negotiators is designed to effectively manage the negotiation process to ensure an agreement is reached in a timely and acceptable manner.

Bargaining Performances: Goffman describes performance as all of the activity by an individual that has some influence on the observing audience (Goffman, pg. 22). This inclusive definition allows the section on performances to act as a residual category for the remaining strategies identified.

Eleven strategies, and a variety of substrategies, are included within the bargaining performance category. Many of the strategies may be grouped into two major categories: 1. the use of time, and 2. information control.

Strategies involving the use of time include: delaying or expediting negotiations for a more favourable environment, timing concessions to achieve the maximum effect, and increasing the amount of time allocated to discussing an issue to indicate it has been seriously considered.

The timing of concessions may also be termed a form of information control: wielding information much like a prop, offering or withholding it based on dramaturgical considerations. Asking for more than your team's bottom line and minimizing the importance of favourable proposals by the opposing team are other strategies involving information control. In each case, the negotiator expresses his or her information and positions based on the need to convey a certain impression to the audience, rather than simply expressing the instrumental requirements of his or her team.

Other strategies involve 1. using good "table manners" at the bargaining table in order to reduce barriers between the teams, 2. appealing to technology to convey an impression of capability and to reinforce one's position, 3. refusing gifts and

favours to avoid incurring a debt, 4. allowing opposing team members to vent emotion before entering into debate with them, and, one of the most entertaining strategies identified, 5. boring the opposition to such an extent that they agree with your position rather than subject themselves to further discussion on the matter.

Additional Conclusions: A secondary goal of this research was to determine if the interactional skill of the negotiator is a major factor in the determination of the negotiated outcome. Every negotiator interviewed expressed the importance of the dramaturgical talents and bargaining skills of the negotiator. This is in stark contrast to most theoretical perspectives on bargaining, which place emphasis on elements such as position in the exchange network and the comparative power of the negotiating parties.

Negotiators interviewed felt that the skills of the negotiator, including impression management abilities, are highly relevant to the success of negotiations, and to the achievement of bargaining objectives. The most common conception is as follows: while external factors, such as the economic environment and the comparative power of the parties, provide the general range of possible agreements, the skill of the negotiator will determine where in that range the eventual agreement actually occurs. This conception may form the basis for a model of the bargaining process and its potential outcomes.

It was postulated at the outset that, much like a performer in the theatre, the negotiator is consciously aware of many of the performance strategies he or she employs. The ready understanding of dramaturgical concepts, and the high priority placed on interactive abilities in determining negotiated outcomes, suggest that negotiators have a high degree of interactional awareness.

II. FUTURE RESEARCH

A range of different bargaining strategies have been identified and categorized. However, the study is exploratory in nature and it is clear that numerous additional strategies beyond those listed herein are employed by negotiators. Additional exploratory work would be valuable. In fact, the database for this project alone is sufficient to provide for several more theses. The author of this thesis decided to concentrate on characteristics and strategies relevant to the heart of bargaining: the face-to-face group interaction of the bargaining table. Exploratory work can be profitably conducted in other areas of bargaining strategy, such as 1. the impression management practised on external groups in order to affect the opposition at the bargaining table, and 2. coercive strategies employed in negotiations.

The exploratory work represented by this and subsequent analysis could eventually be generalized to a larger population of negotiators. It would be exceedingly difficult to conduct such in-depth interviews with a large-scale sample; it might be advisable to take the specific strategies identified herein and present them as part of a closed-ended questionnaire.

Other future research that would prove valuable includes: 1. Developing a chronological or process-oriented perspective on dramaturgical negotiation strategies: are the strategies likely to occur in a particular order, or at certain stages in negotiation?, 2. Research devoted to examining the strategies in terms of their purpose, rather than their particular type or category of strategic activity, and 3. Exploring the differences between the strategies typically employed by labour and management, and within traditionally blue and white collar negotiation environments (herein, the emphasis was on strategies that crossed such boundaries, and on ensuring a diverse source of bargaining tactics).

Finally, a word of advice for those attempting further research in this area. One of the most time-intensive aspects of this particular project has been the development of an interview sample group. There were a number of barriers to this goal which are useful to review. First, as representatives of significant organizations, labour and management negotiators are very busy and under major time constraints. Second, they must be assured of the confidentiality of

their sensitive bargaining information. Third, as “insiders,” they are, to greater and lesser degrees, aware of negotiating research and need to feel confident concerning the relevance of the work and their ability to contribute to the process. The author endeavoured to gather together a group of negotiators, an interesting and lengthy process that spanned half a year and involved multiple contacts for most individuals. Conducting the interviews has been equally time-consuming, sometimes requiring multiple visits. This has proved a challenge given the busy worklives of high-profile negotiators. For future research of this nature, early contact and a well-planned education process are essential. Such a process was effective, if time-consuming, in this case. Participants need to become acquainted with the idea of detailing their negotiating “secrets” and perceptions. This challenge presents an unusual opportunity for growth, and perhaps triangulation, for the researcher: one is forced into learning and applying negotiation tactics in order to successfully navigate these particular waters.

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Appendix A

Dramaturgical Analysis of Labour/Management Negotiations

Dramaturgical Principle: _____

Respondent	Principle Exhibited?	Description of Performances Exhibiting the Principle	Remarks Regarding Propositions
1	Yes / No		
2	Yes / No		
3	Yes / No		
4	Yes / No		
5	Yes / No		
6	Yes / No		
7	Yes / No		
8	Yes / No		
9	Yes / No		
10	Yes / No		