

THE IMPACT OF CITIZEN'S MOVEMENTS ON  
COALITION POLITICS IN NORWAY AND SWEDEN.

by

BIRGIR GUDMUNDSSON

A thesis  
presented to the University of Manitoba  
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## ABSTRACT

The thesis raises the question of the significance of extra-parliamentary movements, citizen's movements, on parliamentary and government coalitions in multi-party systems in general and in particular by an examination of two such movements, one in Norway and the other in Sweden. By implication the very question itself challenges much of the theoretical literature on parliamentary and government coalitions as most of these theories view coalitions and the parliamentary condition in isolation from other aspects of political life. This challenge is then taken to its logical conclusion, first through a critical examination of the existing literature and then by an examination of coalition politics in Norway and Sweden.

Theoretically two traditions are identified, a formal, rational decision model approach on the one hand and a typological party system approach on the other. It is argued that the former lacks in explanatory power whereas the latter is more likely to yield meaningful results. Thus a typological party system approach is followed in the examination of the Norwegian and Swedish party systems. Both countries display similar characteristics in terms of their political systems. Among these is an extended period of prosperity un-

der the government of a large social democratic party. The bourgeois parties on the other hand have been faced with government opposition and fragmentation. Another characteristic is the threefold pillars of cleavage: capital, labour and agriculture. This is expressed politically by parties not only of the left and the right but also in separate agrarian/centre parties. Thus in addition to the predominant left-right cleavage there is a cross cutting urban-rural cleavage.

In the seventies there emerged a reaction against the welfare state as it became ever more omnipresent. This reaction was particularly marked among the younger generations. It was expressed in demands for decentarization, scepticism about economic growth and the quality of life in the welfare state. These sentiments, however, are to a considerable degree shared by the more traditional constituencies of the urban-rural cleavage. Therefore there emerges a 'populist urban-rural' cleavage which cross cuts left-right, an alliance of pre-material and post-material demands. Once the EEC issue in Norway and the nuclear issue in Sweden emerge on the political agenda, this alliance of post- and pre-material demands unites in their opposition to them. However as these issues do not readily unfold on the left-right dimension, the political parties, that mainly focus on redistributive questions, are not ready to deal with them and are caught off guard. Thus the citizen's movements that push



these issues to the centre of the national political agenda play a significant role in the break up of old coalitions and the formation of new ones. However, in the late seventies and early eighties there has been increased polarization on the left-right axis and the 'populist urban-rural' cleavage has diminished in significance. The final conclusion is that under certain circumstances citizen's movements can be very important for coalition politics and extraparliamentary movements must be taken into account in the general study of coalition behaviour.

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## Chapter I

### INTRODUCTION

More than 30 years ago, Duverger reminded us not to be "mislead by the analogy of words."<sup>1</sup> Although the word Duverger had in mind was 'a political party', his reminder is even more relevant to the word 'coalition'. The word has been used to refer to a whole variety of phenomena in different contexts which often do not seem to share any common characteristics. Coalitions of some sort occur in most forms of political and social life and are frequently treated as an entity which could and should be studied in its own right. Thus efforts have been made to study tribal coalitions in pre-colonial Africa and coalitions in the United States Congress on the basis of the same basic propositions about coalitions.<sup>2</sup> As the merits of highly abstract theories of coalitions will be discussed in the next chapter, suffice it to say that the focus of this paper's inquiry will be of parliamentary and cabinet coalitions in multi-party systems. Therefore, throughout the text the term will refer to this type of coalition as opposed to other types of coalitions such as coalitions between nation states or tribes in pre-colonial Africa.

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<sup>1</sup> Duverger, 1965, p. xxiii

<sup>2</sup> Southwold, 1970

The theoretical literature of cabinet coalitions can be said to consist of two main traditions. On the one hand cabinet coalitions have been a part of the broader study of parties and party systems. According to this approach certain types of party systems are likely to produce certain types of coalitional configurations. On the other hand, cabinet coalitions have been studied within the framework of formal theories or rational decision model theories. Unlike the party system approach, the rationalist approach bases its explanations of coalitions on the central assumption of rationality and a number of formal propositions. Consequently, rationalist theories are deductive, general, model building theories which derive their abstractions from game-theory and aggregate statistical analysis. As shall be argued in the following chapter, rationalist theories lack in their explanatory power and for the purpose of a useful study of the impact of citizen's movements on coalition politics in Scandinavia a typological approach is necessary. Thus our subsequent study will be guided by a typological approach to theory where citizen's movements and their impact on coalitions is examined within the framework of the particular type of party system that exists in Scandinavia.

While the Scandinavian countries (Sweden and Norway) are an integrated part of the Western world they also display a separate political, cultural and economic heritage which sets them apart and makes them a clearly distinct entity. To

capture and explain this uniqueness - which must be the ultimate goal of scholarly enquiry - it is necessary to dwell on and describe the main components and realities of the Swedish and Norwegian political systems. Further, it is not enough to simply state the actualities of these realities as they manifest themselves today, the past is often just as real as the present.

We shall argue that an understanding of the Scandinavian type of party system is of major significance for any explanation of the coalitions in Norway and Sweden in the seventies and in particular how they were affected by the nuclear and EEC issues.

The main concern of the thesis then, is twofold. First, to assess and explain the significance of citizen's movements on coalition politics in Scandinavia. This will be done by examining the questions of the Norwegian entry into the EEC and the future of nuclear energy in Sweden, which both are examples where citizen's movements played a central role.

Secondly and relatedly, a case will be made for a typological approach to theory through a demonstration of the centrality of the specifically Scandinavian factors for the development of coalition politics.

The discussion will therefore follow the following pattern. To begin with the different theoretical perspectives

on coalitions will be discussed. The following chapter outlines the relevant aspects of the party systems of Norway and Sweden so as to establish a picture of the nature of coalition politics in these countries. Next citizen's movements in general are discussed before moving on to the more specific areas of the EEC issue in Norway and the nuclear controversy in Sweden. Finally, an assessment and explanation of these cases will be given as well as some tentative suggestions about the longer term significance of their impact.

## Chapter II

### THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON COALITIONS.

The study of political coalitions constitutes an important part of the more general effort of explaining political phenomena. Coalitions of some sort are central to any political situation where differences over the allocation of values need to be resolved. To be sure, this is the case in modern liberal democracies where the democratic process itself depends in no small manner on the aggregation and articulation of pluralistic and often conflicting demands. Consequently, a considerable body of literature has emerged on political coalitions and government coalitions in particular. Within the literature there are many different approaches and perspectives which need to be critically examined and evaluated for the purpose of an enlightened and pointed study of coalition politics in Sweden and Norway.



A fundamental question of democratic theory has been how to achieve an effective government which at the same time is 'democratic' or where "citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders."<sup>3</sup> A line of argument that has been derived from this is the one of the 'fusion' of powers between the executive and the legislature. This is the parliamentary system of government. The parliamentary system itself exists in many shapes and forms and is frequently judged against the above dictum of 'more' or 'less' efficient-democratic or responsive-responsible government.<sup>4</sup> The basic characteristic of the parliamentary system - that of the executive's dependence on parliament - has led some scholars to suggest that the parliamentary system potentially produces transient and unstable governments. This is particularly true for the discussion of multi-party parliaments, or parliaments with more than two parties but no single party commanding a majority. The general idea is that parliaments with only two major parties, are somehow inherently more stable than are multi-party parliaments. Thus Duverger suggests that in the case of multi-partyism:

a coalition between several parties, differing in their programmes and their supporters, is required to set up a ministry, which remains paralysed by internal divisions as well as by the necessity of maintaining amidst considerable difficulties the precarious alliance on which its parliamentary majority is based.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Dahl, 1956, p.3.

<sup>4</sup> see Bracher, 1977, for a good discussion of the problems of modern parliaments.

Duverger is here siding with that school of thought which considers the two-party system as superior or more 'natural' than the multi-party system. This is by no means an original idea of Duverger's and has been prevalent among scholars for the better part of the century.<sup>6</sup> However, the normative nature of this notion reflects Duverger's stand in relation to the question of responsible vs. responsive government. Moreover, his stand is open to question and it has come under attacks suggesting that there "simply does not seem to be anything more 'normal' about two-party competition than about the various other competitive patterns involving many parties, one party or even no party."<sup>7</sup>

Having said that, Duverger's influence should not and can not be played down. The significance of his analysis lies not so much in the accuracy or correctness of his thesis as his insightful pioneering work and his shaping to a large extent the agenda for the study of political parties, party systems and alliances. As Epstein points out:

[Duverger]....stands in relation to the theories of party development much as Marx does in relation to broader social theories. There is the same kind of insightful interpretation of political development following from economic class development..... His significance is evident from the fact that he cannot be ignored.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Duverger, 1964, p. 207.

<sup>6</sup> see e.g. Lowell, 1914; Blondel, 1969; Dodd, 1976.

<sup>7</sup> Epstein, 1967, p. 352.

<sup>8</sup> Epstein, 1967, p. 355.

Although the section on alliances in his classic work Political Parties is only a small part of his study, Duverger touches upon many essential factors in coalition behaviour and is able, on the basis of a historical descriptive approach, to make important generalizations. Whereas many of these generalizations are important to our further study a closer look at them is in order.

Duverger draws some general conclusions about the nature of alliances in multi-party systems, and points to a number of factors of particular significance. The most important of these factors are the number of parties and the 'electoral regime'. Other important features are the different 'national traditions' of alliance patterns and 'historical circumstances' such as major crises or war.<sup>9</sup> While the last two factors are quite specific in nature, the first two more readily lend themselves to generalization. The multi-party systems rarely manage without alliances because no single party commands the necessary majority. But the types and nature of these alliances are greatly influenced by the electoral regime. In this respect Duverger suggests that a simple majority second ballot system encourages electoral alliances whereas proportional representation isolates parties at the electoral level but creates a need for alliances at the parliamentary and government level. Thus in proportional representation the formation of parliamentary coalitions

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<sup>9</sup> Duverger, 1964, p. 325.

tions is made "more difficult and the position of government unstable."<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, alliances are greatly affected by the strength and ideological position of the parties, but the relationship however works both ways as the ideology and strength of the parties is also affected by alliances. From this Duverger develops an explicit hypothesis about coalition behaviour. It revolves around the importance of the ideologically central party. An extreme party is likely to be vocal and demagogic when pushing its platform at the electoral level and "many electors are therefore led into giving their votes to those who defend their point of view with the greatest energy....at the electoral level coalitions are dominated by the extremist wing."<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, the more moderate party (or faction) will be more alert to the pluralistic nature and necessities of government, considering the demands and interests of the different parts of society. Therefore it does not have to deviate from its electoral platform once in government. At the governmental level it is the moderate party that dominates.

In the long run it seems that the alliance is finally dominated by the most moderate party: the extremist is compelled to support a certain number of measures in contradiction with its position.... If it refuses to do so the alliance breaks up; if it gives way it eventually assumes a fairly calm and dull complexion.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Duverger, 1964, p. 329.

<sup>11</sup> Duverger, 1964, p. 335.

<sup>12</sup> Duverger, 1964, p. 346.

With respect to the size or strength of parties Duverger suggests that the larger the party the greater the influence it is likely to exercise within the alliance. In cases where the strength of the extreme party puts it in a position of the official leader of the alliance, its policies gradually move towards moderation due to the pragmatic pressures of government responsibilities.<sup>13</sup> What the argument is leading up to is, that the political direction in multi-party systems tends towards the Centre; "...evolution inside alliances irresistibly impels towards the Centre."<sup>14</sup> Not the centre of the alliance but to the centre of the political spectrum in parliament. However, this is a tendency which is countered by the parties at the extremes of the ideological spectrum, which tend to be more rigid and inflexible in their doctrine and willingness to compromise while at the same time they might play a role in the parliamentary configuration.

While the overall theoretical direction of Duverger's argument is to demonstrate the instability of multi-party systems, he identifies areas of study and a framework for analysis important to the further understanding of political coalitions. For the present purposes the role of ideological compatibility, the number of parties and national traditions

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<sup>13</sup> Duverger sees this tendency as a contributing factor to the development of Scandinavian Social Democracy in the period 1919-1939.

<sup>14</sup> Duverger, 1964, p.348.

are of prime interest.

The classification of party systems into two-party systems and multi-party systems has been criticized on the grounds that it has not illuminated anything and has not led to any meaningful insights.<sup>15</sup> However, following Satori one can suggest that the number of parties is of major significance because the greater the number of parties the more complex is the system, particularly with respect to coalition politics. But, the "real issue here is not whether the number of parties matters - it does - but whether a numerical criterion of classification enables us to get hold of what matters."<sup>16</sup> In order to do that one needs to sort out the different cases in a manner which goes beyond a simple numerical classification. The relevance of the parties needs to be determined. Satori suggests two rules to determine relevance. On the one hand those parties can be considered as relevant that are instrumental for the formation of coalition government, no matter how small that party might be. On the other hand those parties should also be counted as relevant which play a significant role in the opposition arena. Conversely, those parties should be regarded as irrelevant that have neither " (i) coalition potential nor (ii) blackmail potential."<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> see e.g. Blondel, 1969.

<sup>16</sup> Satori, 1976, p. 120.

<sup>17</sup> Satori, 1976, p. 123.; Blackmail potential refers to what relevance a party has regardless of his coalition poten-

On the basis of these counting rules Satori is able to divide into more precise categories the traditional three-fold classification into one-party, two-party, and multi-party competition. These classes are: (1) one-party; (2) hegemonic party; (3) predominant party; (4) two-party; (5) limited pluralism; (6) extreme pluralism; (7) atomized. Our present interest lies with competitive systems which would for all intents and purposes exclude the first two from Satori's classification. The other classes represent a greater or lesser degree of fragmentation of the party system which in turn may be seen to reflect either "segmentation or a situation of polarization, i.e. of ideological distance."<sup>18</sup> This pinpoints the limits of a mere counting of parties and suggests that incorporating the ideological spectrum is essential to the appreciation of multi-party competitive systems. "This adds up to saying that we are peremptorily required to pass from the classification to the typology and, thereby, to implementing the numerical criterion with ideology as a criterion."<sup>19</sup> Accordingly, the classes of limited and extreme pluralism can be translated into moderate and polarized pluralism respectively. Cases where the fragmentation of the party system is relatively high but polarization low are of the moderate pluralistic type, and cases with

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tial, i.e. power of intimidation, and refers mainly to anti-system parties.

<sup>18</sup> Satori, 1976, p. 126.

<sup>19</sup> Satori, 1976, p. 126.

high fragmentation coupled with high polarization are of the polarized pluralistic type. These two types of party systems as well as some border cases of the predominant party systems roughly correspond to the more traditional notion of multi-party systems. Coalitions are at the centre of these systems and a brief outline of their main features is therefore of value.<sup>20</sup>

Satori suggests that the turning point between polarized pluralism and moderate pluralism is when the number of parties is around five or six. This borderline is by no means accurate or definite, and should be seen as an approximation, with the emphasis put on around five or six parties. However it is the distinctive features and systemic properties of these systems that are of major interest and need to be discussed.

One of the more distinctive features of polarized pluralism is the presence of anti-system parties. There are considerable differences between anti-system parties, both over time and in terms of their nature, but a minimum common denominator is that they "undermine the legitimacy of the regime it opposes."<sup>21</sup> These parties represent 'extreme' ideologies which suggests that the polity is subject to maximum ideological distance. However, the label anti-system does

<sup>20</sup> Smith, G. 1976, develops a related idea in his typology of multi-party systems, i.e. balanced systems and imbalanced systems.

<sup>21</sup> Satori, 1976, p. 133.



not necessarily mean that the parties function 'outside' the system or are not participating in it. On the contrary they are likely to do both.<sup>22</sup>

A second characteristic of polarized pluralism is that the government is faced with two mutually exclusive oppositions. The opposition is bilateral as opposed to unilateral, in the sense that it opposes the governing party(ies) from both sides. This bilateral character of polarized pluralism creates an important role for the centre which is physically occupied by a party or parties. "Along the left-right dimension the metrical center of the system is occupied."<sup>23</sup> The implication is significant with respect to the direction of competition, which is the third important characteristic of polarized pluralism.

The fact that the centre is physically occupied leaves the centre out of competition with respect to the system at large, and encourages centre-fleeing or centrifugal tendencies and ideological polarization.

The above mentioned traits: a presence of relevant anti-system parties; bilateral opposition; and centrifugal tendencies, constitute the three most important features of polarized pluralism. However, other important factors

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<sup>22</sup> Eurocommunist parties would be a good example of this as their strategic aim is to overthrow the bourgeois system but participate within it for tactical reasons.

<sup>23</sup> Satori, 1976, p.134.

typically follow from these and need some elaboration. Rigid ideological positions and rhetoric - especially of the parties in opposition - and a relative immobility of the party(ies) of the centre, are likely to be found in polarized pluralism. The centrifugal tendency encourages an active and vocal approach from the parties at the poles whereas the centre party(ies) is unable to bid for the extreme parties' voting constituencies without forfeiting its role as the moderate centre party and tilting the balance in favour of either extreme.

In terms of government coalitions the system is centre-based precisely because of its polarization. The centre finds itself in a pivotal position between the extremes and must be included in any possible government majority. The parties of the extremes on the other hand are excluded, almost by definition, from government. The pattern of coalition behaviour that emerges is one of 'peripheral turnover'. Peripheral turnover means that membership in coalitions is essentially restricted to the centre, centre-left, or centre-right; and there are more or less continuous government parties "that change partners in their neighborhood."<sup>24</sup> Consequently one can expect semi-irresponsible or irresponsible opposition - due to the low expectation of entering government - in polarized pluralism.

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<sup>24</sup> Satori, 1976, p.139.

Moderate pluralism borders on polarized pluralism on the one hand and the two-party system on the other. That makes the number of parties vary between 3-5. While the distinction between moderate pluralism and the two-party system is quite subtle the distinction between polarized and moderate pluralism is clear. In a word, moderate pluralism has reversed signs to polarized pluralism. Absence of anti-system parties characterizes moderate pluralism and all the relevant parties are government oriented. Secondly, moderate pluralism has a unilateral opposition where the government is faced with opposition from one side only, either to the left or the right. The unilateral opposition brings forth the third important character of moderate pluralism which is that bipolar alignments of alternative coalitions tend to form.

As mentioned above, the distinction between moderate pluralism and the two-party system is subtle as both systems display bipolar tendencies and unilateral opposition. In essence however, what distinguishes the two is coalition government. Rather than having an alternative set of governments of parties with a majority bent, moderate pluralism functions within the framework of alternative coalitions. Thus, the characteristic traits of moderate pluralism can be summarized in the following manner:

moderate pluralism is characterized by (i) a relatively small ideological distance among its relevant parties, (ii) a bipolar coalitional configu-

ration and centripetal competition.<sup>25</sup>

Polarized and moderate pluralism are 'the principal types of 'multi-party' competition where coalition governments are likely to occur. However, Satori's class of a predominant party system requires some discussion as it overlaps or establishes links between the more traditional notions of a single-party system and multi-party systems. What the class of a predominant party system means is a system where one party consistently wins a majority of seats in parliament enabling it to govern in its own right for extended periods of time. At the same time however, there exists a meaningful competition in the system but the opposition is unable to successfully challenge the governing party. Satori defines the predominant party system in the following way:

A predominant party system is generally qualified by its major party obtaining the absolute majority of seats, with the exception of countries that unquestionably abide by a less-than-absolute majority principle. In these cases the threshold can be lowered to the point at which minority single party governments remain standing and efficient practice.<sup>26</sup>

While the concept of a predominant party system is useful in the classification and typology of party systems in general its usefulness with respect to cabinet coalitions is limited with the possible exceptions of those cases which border on making it into the category. Firstly, the single-party minority governments which are at the same time 'standing and

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<sup>25</sup> Satori, 1976, p. 179.

<sup>26</sup> Satori, 1976, p. 196.

efficient' need to be backed up by an overt or covert parliamentary coalition or as the case might be the lack of such coalitions (i.e. a bilateral opposition which is unable to unite). In other words the threshold Satori establishes is very unclear unless the strength and nature of the opposition is known. However, if one assumes that the opposition is unilateral but fragmented and enjoys a real prospect of coming to power - which seems to be true for the borderline cases Satori discusses -<sup>27</sup> the system is highly fragile and vulnerable. The very moment at which the predominant party is defeated the system changes in nature and becomes either a two party system (if there is only one relevant opposition party) or a system of moderate pluralism. It seems therefore that the concept of a predominant party system is of limited interest for the study of parliamentary and cabinet coalitions. However, given the above mentioned state of the opposition in such systems the concept does draw attention to at least two significant factors which are instrumental in understanding coalitions. First, as Satori begins to develop in his definition, a long lasting pattern of single party minority government highlights the importance of constitutional factors that define the rules of the parliamentary game. Unicameral vs. bicameral houses, the electoral regime, parliamentary committees, and a remiss stage, are in no small manner influential in determining whether a single party can govern with the backing of a narrow majority or

<sup>27</sup> The cases he refers to are Norway and Sweden.

even only a minority of the parliamentary seats. Second, the concept also underscores the importance of political culture. Are the opposition parties consulted and called upon in extra parliamentary settings so as to enhance communications and compromise and decrease the importance of mere parliamentary strength? Or is the decision making process conducted through the show of strength (parliamentary votes)? Clearly such questions influence the parties' decisions whether or not to support a government or even to seek to be included in government at any given time. This is not to say that these factors are not important in moderate and polarized pluralism, they are, but only that in the cases which border on being a predominant party system these factors are likely to play a crucial role and are therefore more readily apparent.

So far the focus has been on the different types of party systems and how the various party systems are likely to produce different patterns of coalition politics. One and two-party competition have for all intents and purposes been left out of the discussion as parliamentary and cabinet coalitions rarely occur in those systems. The underlying theme has been to demonstrate a causal link between party system variables and coalitions. However, coalitions have been studied from a very different angle, namely that of a rational decision making model, which focuses on coalitions as

a sociological phenomena and attempts to throw light on their inner dynamics.

In the last two or three decades a number of formal theories have been developed about coalition formation and maintenance. This may in part be seen as a result of the strife in this period of scholars to be more 'objective' as opposed to normative - to create a positive science of politics. Also, this may in part be seen as a result of the fact that coalitions seem more readily to lend themselves to this kind of approach than do other areas of political enquiry. The differences between the individual theories can be viewed as variations to a theme because they all fall into the same general framework and share a number of fundamental characteristics. It is in order therefore to outline some of these basic propositions before looking at the major representatives of this type of theory.

Formal coalition theories, or rational decision model theories, are deductive theories. They make certain assumptions about reality and build on these assumptions a theory which in turn can generate non-obvious propositions which, preferably, are empirically testifiable. The cornerstone of this line of reasoning is the rational decision making model. According to De Swaan:

This construct [rational decision model] consists of a number of formal propositions; each one may be read as referring to a relevant aspect of the decision-making process in real life. The behav-

behaviour of these actors is inferred from these propositions in combination with the central assumption of rationality, that an actor will choose from among all alternative courses available to him at any given moment the alternative that leads to the outcome he prefers the most.<sup>28</sup>

Thus rationality is defined in terms of an actor seeking to maximize his preferences under conditions where he might be constrained by the preferences of other actors. In addition, in order for an actor to know what available action he prefers the most, he must have complete information as to the consequences of all the moves open to him as well as all the possible moves and their consequences of the other actors involved in the 'game'. On the grounds of this complete information the actors then calculate what is their maximum gain or payoff in that particular situation. The chief motivational factor for the actors entering the coalition game is payoff maximization; and an actor's lack of expediency (in a broad sense) equals his lack of rationality.

In essence these are the basic assumptions shared by the different formal theories. However, one way of classifying them into sub-categories relates to what is regarded as the central motivational assumption, or, what it is that the players are seeking to maximize. That is precisely the overriding theoretical assumption about the objective of the game, and governs the behaviour of the actors in the system. In the theoretical literature, two main streams can be detected. On the one hand there are the theorists that assume

<sup>28</sup> De Swaan, 1973, p. 13.



that the underlying payoff relates to the player's share in the government apparatus, such as the number of portfolios or the patronage they receive. On the other hand there are those that emphasize the significance of policy-distance. Here the players seek to minimize the policy-distance between the prospective coalition partners. The theorists that fall into the first category can be labeled 'minimal winning' theorists and are well represented by Riker (1962), Gamson (1962), and Leiserson (1968). The other theorists may be called 'policy distance' theorists and are well represented by De Swaan (1973). Others, such as Axelrod (1970) would fall somewhere inbetween, as they do not fit either category well.

As the label 'minimal winning' suggests, the concept of a minimal winning coalition<sup>29</sup> - a coalition which would be rendered losing by the defection of one member - plays a crucial role. The reason for this relates to the nature of the coalition 'game', which is a simple n-person game. The payoff is constant and thus the players seek to maximize their share of it by minimizing the number of actors between whom it is divided. Thus, over-sized coalitions are not rational under the constant-sum condition. The theoretical effort of this type of rational decision models concentrates on the number and size (weight) of the actors. Thus Gamson and Riker both come up with propositions that predict the

<sup>29</sup> An alternative term would be minimum winning coalition, but here we shall use minimal winning coalition.

formation of coalitions of minimum size; which is that minimal winning coalition which the least exceeds the effective decision point in parliament (most often 50%+1).<sup>30</sup>

In a word, that is the consequence of the zero-sum condition, where the value of the payoff to a coalition is equal to the loss of the actors excluded from that coalition. Thus the smaller the majority, the more valuable the payoff. Along the same lines, but with a slightly different emphasis, Leiserson (1968) suggests a restricted solution set of minimal winning coalitions that consists of as few actors as possible; which is what he calls the bargaining principle. Or as Leiserson puts it, the bargaining principle states that: "as the number of parties increases there is a tendency for each actor to prefer to form a [minimal winning coalition] with as few actors as possible."<sup>31</sup>

In these 'minimal winning' theories the main focus is on the distribution in a constant-sum game, by an examination of the number and weights of the actors. However the mutual compatibility of the actors - a practically self-evident variable of importance - has been ignored. More recent theorists have acknowledged this shortcoming and generated alternative theories. Thus Axelrod (1970), proceeding from the idea of conflict of interest in a two person bargaining

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<sup>30</sup> The prediction of these two theorists is the same although their reasoning is somewhat different. See e.g. Browne, 1973.

<sup>31</sup> Leiserson, 1968, p. 775.

game, suggests the use of a spatial model for the analysis of political coalitions. The model he proposes is of a one-dimensional policy space; of left-right. From here Axelrod argues that actors that are adjacent or connected on the policy continuum, are more compatible in terms of conflict of interest. By adding the 'minimal winning' requirement, the minimal connected winning coalition is arrived at; a minimal winning coalition consisting of actors that are adjacent on the policy scale. According to Axelrod, these coalitions are more likely to form and more likely to be durable than are other coalitions.<sup>32</sup> Clearly coalitions larger than minimum size could be included in Axelrod's solution set, although the minimal winning condition is essential to his theory as it is with the other type of theorists.

However, this 'minimal winning' theorizing compares unfavourably with the actualities of coalition politics in the real world, where under-sized and over-sized coalitions form frequently. The theorists that rely solely on size but ignore policy compatibility are particularly vulnerable to this kind of observation, and it seems reasonable to suggest that defining the coalition 'game' as constant-sum is theoretically and conceptually unfruitful. Rather, as indeed Axelrod begins to recognize, the value of the payoff should be seen in terms of agreement on policy and intra-coalition harmony. The point is then, as Browne has suggested:

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<sup>32</sup> Axelrod, 1970, p. 171.

Hence, the object of attaining membership in some winning coalition is not to participate in the distribution of the payoff, but rather it is to determine what the payoff is to be. And since the content of the payoff will be defined by the agreement which can be produced by the bargaining partners, players seeking to maximize their benefits in coalitions will minimize the distance (preference disagreement) among partners in a winning coalition.<sup>33</sup>

This is exactly the concern of policy distance theory which seeks to incorporate policy distance into the framework of the rational decision model, making use of the concepts and categories advanced by the other theories. In policy distance theory - unlike the other theories - the overriding theoretical assumption relates to policy but not size. Hence the payoff is defined as the proximity of a coalition's policy to an actor's most preferred policy or party programme. Because of this - still well within the framework of utility maximization - the theory does not necessarily predict minimal winning coalitions and unnecessary actors may well be included in the solution set. The solution set itself is established in the following manner. All the possible winning coalitions are ranked on a policy scale from left to right, and then it is determined which coalitions the individual actors prefer the most. The solution set is derived from those coalitions in the preference matrix which are not dominated, or those coalitions where there exist no other coalition in which all the members would be better off if formed.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Browne, 1973, p.73.

On the whole, rational decision model theories have not been successful when put to an empirical test.<sup>35</sup> However, the theories that examine policy do far better than those that concentrate on size. In particular, Axelrod's minimal connected proposition is the only one of the afore mentioned ones which has a modest claim to success. The reason for the poor performance of the rational decision model theories in general may be seen as a result of their formal character. In view of the greater importance of policy over size born out by the empirical findings, policy distance theory demonstrates the limits of formal rigidity. De Swaan recognizes this point when he passes the following judgement.

In one word, policy distance theory is much too precise; a pseudo-precision, apparently, because the nature of the data does not allow such numerical manipulations.<sup>36</sup>

Inspite of their APPARENTLY objective character and because they are drawn from the abstract and universal maxims of rationality, these theories will never escape the implications of their basic assumptions. The rationality maxim reduces political phenomena to utility maximization of self centered groups or individuals. Even before the theories

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<sup>34</sup> De Swaan, 1973, p.104

<sup>35</sup> See, Browne, 1971, 1973, tested against data from 13 parliamentary democracies. Also De Swaan, 1973, tested against 90 situations in 9 different countries.

<sup>36</sup> De Swaan, 1973, p.286.

have reached the operational stage, a definite outlook has been established on the nature of politics. Furthermore, the theorist's personal outlook - even though it is not in an immediate partisan sense - is incorporated into the theory through his assumption about what it is that is being maximized. But, this is not to say that the formal deductive approach or any other approach for that matter, could avoid projecting a definite political outlook. Rather, what is being underlined is that labels such as 'objective' or 'scientific' that have sometimes been associated with this approach,<sup>37</sup> mainly through drawing parallels with the methodology of the natural sciences, becomes precarious when the subject and object of scholarly inquiry is - unlike in the natural sciences - the same. When the assumptions of formal deductive theories are operationalized, further compromises have to be made about reality. Some of these compromises might go a long way in accounting for the poor performance of these theories in the empirical tests. First, the actors in these theories correspond to political parties or more precisely, to the parliamentary parties. Furthermore, for the purposes of the theories, the actors are considered as unitary entities. Internal divisions that might exist within the political parties are ignored to the point where there actually occurs an organizational split, and then the splinter group becomes an independent actor with a life of its own. It is also a question of 'either/or' when it comes to

<sup>37</sup> See for example Riker, 1962.

membership of coalitions. There is no room for actors that are not members of a coalition while they might tacitly give it their support. Second, in those theories where policy compatibility is considered at all, cleavage conflict is reduced to one policy dimension where policy differences are quantitative differences and qualitative differences of principle are ignored. Third, the parliamentary system tends to be treated in isolation from other aspects of social and political life such as interest organizations, citizen's movements, foreign influences, etc. The parliamentary condition is seen as a self-contained system that basically only changes once in a while, mainly after elections. If the situation changes dramatically due to external influences, such as during war time, the theories are suspended, but pick up again once normalcy returns. They are ahistorical and the actors have no memories nor learning experiences and resume in every instance as if it were the first one, motivationally dictated by utility maximization. Finally, the theories are indiscriminatory of countries and political cultures. They apply to Sweden and Norway and USA and Japan. The only political culture they recognize is the one of individuals rationally maximizing gain, and consensus and compromise are irrational nonsense unless derived from such a maxim.

Clearly, the two approaches outlined above are very different, one emphasizing the importance of the party system in explaining coalition formation and government durability, but the other utilizing game-theoretical or utility maximization models in the study of coalitions. The focal point is different, one abstracts from actual political behaviour or the party system whereas the other explores the phenomena in view of their inner (rationalist) logic and proceeds to make empirical statements about coalitions. It has been suggested that these two approaches are not incompatible and the rationalist framework can be supplemented by the party system approach and vice versa.

To work out an accommodation between these approaches was the preoccupation of Lawrence Dodd (1974, 1976). He sets out to examine the 'conventional wisdom' of the inherent instability of multi-party systems and consequently his thesis concern cabinet durability. Arguing within the general framework of a game-theoretical model he proposes a theory which can be summarized as follows:

1. Cabinet durability in multi-party parliaments is determined by the coalitional status of the cabinet in power. Minimum winning cabinets will be quite durable; oversized and undersized cabinets will be more transient.
2. The coalitional status of the cabinet that forms in a parliament is determined by the bargaining conditions



that exist in parliament. Two relevant conditions are: (1) information certainty; (2) the apriori willingness of the parties to bargain. As these conditions vary within parliament or between parliaments, the coalitional status of the cabinets will vary.

3. The bargaining conditions that exist within a parliament are influenced by the nature of the parliamentary party system. Three relevant party system characteristics are fractionalization, instability and cleavage conflict.<sup>38</sup>

In spite of the apparent centrality of the concept of minimal (minimum) winning coalitions to Dodd's thesis, its relevance only relates to the durability of cabinet coalitions. He does not suggest that this type of coalitions - except under very definite circumstances - are more likely to form than other coalitions. In other words, the overriding motivational assumption is for the parties to maximize their ministerial positions by entering a minimal winning coalition, which in turn is restrained by the bargaining conditions. There is therefore a general tendency towards minimal winning coalitions as they are the most desirable. Dodd's version of rationalist theory does therefore not seek to predict specific outcomes as the earlier theories but to account for the deviance from minimal winning status. Thus there are really two different theories or aspects to his

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<sup>38</sup> Dodd, 1974, p.1198.

theory, one that deals with the formation of coalitions and another that deals with coalition maintainance. The coalitional status of a cabinet - which is another way of saying what coalition will form - is determined by the two bargaining conditions: the apriori willingness to bargain, and information certainty. In essence this is Dodd's theory of coalition formation. If the coalitional status of a cabinet is minimal winning the coalition is likely to be durable. In essence this is Dodd's theory of coalition maintainance.

Clearly, the bargaining conditions are central to Dodd's theory and need to be discussed further.

First, the condition of information certainty also plays an important role with the earlier rational theorists. But, unlike them Dodd does not assume information certainty and identifies two party system variables that affect the degree of information certainty the actors possess. Looking at this from the rational decision model point of view, one can say that the rationality postulate has been relaxed, in the sense that a rational choice in high degree of information certainty is not the same as a rational choice in a low degree of information certainty.

On the other hand the party system variables are adopted from the party system approach. Fractionalization in Dodd's terminology refers to the number of relevant parties and their relative strength. The relationship between fractionalization and information uncertainty is such that the

greater the number of parties and the more complex their power relations, the more difficult it is for the individual parties (leaders) to keep track of the relevant information, i.e. the moves of the other parties in the bargaining process. Similarly, as fractionalization increases it becomes more difficult for the individual parties to follow the internal cohesion of the other parties and thus possess complete information about their parliamentary strength or weight. Hence, paraphrasing Dodd slightly: 'As parliamentary fractionalization increases, consequently, the completeness as to information should decrease.'<sup>39</sup>

Party system stability refers to a continuous pattern over a period of time in the strength and identity of the relevant parties. The relationship between party system stability and information certainty is parallel to that of fractionalization and information certainty. A consistent pattern of partisan politics over an extended period of time is likely to make it easier for the individual parties to assess the reliable parliamentary strength of all the other parties. Also a consistent pattern like this is likely to make information about prior moves more complete. Thus, here too, the relationship can be stated as: 'As the stability of the parliamentary party system increases, the completeness of information as to weights and prior moves should increase.'<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Dodd, 1976, pp. 63-64.

Clearly, together these two party system variables might supplement each other and combine to have greater impact on information certainty than they might separately.

The second bargaining condition, that of the apriori willingness of the parties to bargain is influenced by the intensity and types of cleavage conflict in the polity. The relevant cleavages are the criteria that divide the community into subgroups with different political preferences.<sup>41</sup> The political parties position themselves on the most salient cleavages and draw their voting constituency from the respective subgroups. In representing their cleavage constituency the political parties are faced with a plurality of interests and points of view which forces them to compromise and fend off demands while articulating their own positions. Thus Dodd suggests, following Lipset and Rokkan, that:

No party can hope to gain decisive influence on the affairs of the community without some willingness to cut across existing cleavages to establish common fronts with potential enemies and opponents.<sup>42</sup>

However, the willingness to strike bargains is restricted as the parties can not frustrate the interests of their cleavage constituency. "The cleavage system is thus both a major source of the quest for power and, at the same time, a major

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<sup>40</sup> Dodd, 1976, pp. 65-66.

<sup>41</sup> see e.g. Taylor and Ray, 1977.

<sup>42</sup> Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 5.; quoted by Dodd, 1976, p. 56.

constraint on the behaviour that is possible in that quest."<sup>43</sup> The cleavage system in a given polity can contain a number of salient cleavages, some of which might cross cut each other. However, while recognizing that, Dodd chooses to focus on a one dimensional spatial continuum running from left to right. Here then the ideological rigidity/flexibility of political parties is seen as a major element in the apriori willingness of the parties to bargain.<sup>44</sup>

The theory of the formation and maintenance of coalitions consists therefore of the interaction of the bargaining conditions and how they account for the deviations from minimal winning coalitions. This variance can be summarized into four main types:

Firstly, in polarized, fractionalized, and unstable party systems with low information certainty and apriori willingness to bargain, undersized cabinets are likely to form. Ideological rigidity coupled with information uncertainty do not constitute favourable conditions for any coalition formation. Consequently, due to the minority status of the government it should tend to be unstable as it is more desirable to be included in a minimal winning coalition.

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<sup>43</sup> Dodd, 1976, p. 58.

<sup>44</sup> Bracher, 1973, e.g. has stressed this point in his discussion of Weimar Germany.

Secondly, in depolarized, fractionalized, and unstable party systems experiencing a high degree of apriori willingness to bargain, oversized cabinets are likely to form. The lax ideological distance between the relevant parties and willingness to strike bargains account for the parties' desires to be included in government. However, the uncertainty as to what constitutes a workable majority facilitates unnecessary parties to be included and thus increase majority certainty. Moreover, these cabinets should tend to be transient as over time the information certainty might increase and the oversized cabinet abandoned in favour of a more desirable minimal winning one.

Thirdly, in polarized, defractionalized and stable parliaments, with low generalized apriori willingness to bargain but high information certainty, cabinets that come close to minimal winning status will tend to form. However, depending on the degree of polarization a variation occurs because inspite of the information certainty extreme polarization will produce minority cabinets as the parties are unable to share a common ground. On the other hand, if the polarization is more moderate, minimal winning coalitions are plausible and should be durable.

Fourthly and finally, minimal winning coalitions should occur in party systems which are depolarized, defractionalized, and stable, and with high degree of apriori willingness to bargain and information certainty. Furthermore, this type of party system should experience stable coalitions.

Although Dodd's theory is unquestionably a major improvement on earlier rationalist theories it is still flawed with many of the same misconceptions as its predecessors. In spite of the restrictions of the bargaining conditions he still assumes that the overriding motivational axiom is the maximization of portfolios and hence to be included in a minimal winning coalition. This is his fundamental theoretical assumption around which his whole theory of coalition formation and maintenance revolves. Although the validity of this assumption is highly questionable even on the basis of a quick impressionistic glance at the universe of actual cabinet coalitions, one can suggest as Lubbert does that:

It can be argued that the value of assumptions should be judged primarily not by the extent to which they confirm to what we know about reality but the empirical success of the hypothesis deduced. From this perspective, assumptions are intended not to reflect reality but to abstract it, thereby enhancing the prospects for parsimonious theory.<sup>45</sup>

However, even if such a judgement is made on the basis of the empirical evidence, we are still required to reexamine the assumptions as the empirical success of Dodd's theory is, though not insignificant, modest.<sup>46</sup> Dodd's theory is subject to many of the same criticisms as earlier rationalist theory. Not only is the basic theoretical assumption weak, but the very pursuit of parsimony, of abstraction, robs the

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<sup>45</sup> Lubbert, 1983, p. 240.

<sup>46</sup> See, Dodd, 1976; Also Lubbert, 1983.

theory of much of its explanatory value. Lubbert makes this point forcefully and suggests that a theory of cabinet coalitions should accept as a premise that parties and party leaders have multiple and often conflicting goals, only one of which - albeit an important one - is to be included in (minimal) winning coalitions. Furthermore, the point needs to be stressed that parsimonious theories such as earlier rationalist theory and Dodd's version of rationalist theory have had modest success, and that necessarily discredits the explanations they provide for the outcomes they predict correctly. Because the explanation is cast in abstract universal maxims and yet leaves many (sometimes most) cases unexplained "it is possible that the outcome occurred because of reasons primarily or even entirely unrelated to the postulated explanation."<sup>47</sup>

Two more points need to be stressed in relation to rationalist theory in general and Dodd's version of it in particular. First, as we pointed out earlier, cleavage conflict is reduced to a quantitative scale spanning from left to right but differences of principle are all but ignored. Dodd places the parties on the salient cleavages in the polity, which for the purposes of his theory becomes the question of left-right. Secondary cleavages may not be 'salient' all the time but may cross cut left-right and temporarily become significant for coalition politics.

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<sup>47</sup> Lubbert, 1983, p. 241.



Second, while Dodd recognized the importance of party system variables, including cleavage conflict, he does not seem to expect them to systematically vary across political systems.

Lubbert has suggested that many of the shortcomings and indeed 'shortcuts to theoretical understanding', can be overcome with a typological approach to theory. In this sense, he is conceptually much closer to what we have called the party system approach. He proposes that different types of political systems will display different party configurations and together these features and preferences will produce certain types of results.

The key to such an approach is to find the chain of causality that runs from the distinctive features of the political system type to the relative importance party leaders assign to their conflicting goals and from this system-prioritized set of goals to a certain evaluation of the prevailing set of policy preferences and then, in consequence, to the government formation outcome.<sup>48</sup>

The implication is, then, that only a partial theory is possible. Rather than subscribing to abstract 'explanatory' propositions and models which are derived from aggregate statistical analysis and game-theory, our approach needs to be guided by abstractions derived from actual political behaviour. Such an approach will be adopted in the following study of Norway and Sweden. Accordingly, the characteristic features of the Norwegian and Swedish political systems must

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<sup>48</sup> Lubbert, 1983, p. 246.

be identified before a meaningful discussion of the impact of citizens movements on coalition politics can take place.

### Chapter III

#### POLITICS IN NORWAY AND SWEDEN.

In this chapter the Scandinavian party system will be discussed with particular reference to coalition politics. The discussion will be divided into three broad areas each of which logically flows from the preceding discussion of coalition theory. These areas are; first the constitutional rules which to a large extent determine the character of the setting; second, the cleavage system or the dimensions of conflict; and third, the actors themselves and their inter relations. In this way a general background picture of the Swedish and Norwegian political system should emerge against which the further analysis can take place.

### 3.1 RULES.

In 1809 Sweden adopted a constitution based on the principle of the separation of powers. This constitution was formally in force until 1975, though it changed over the years having been amended several times. "The 1809 constitution could be described in general terms as a variation of the classical separation of powers pattern to suit Swedish circumstances and traditions."<sup>49</sup> Hence, under this constitution, a joint legislation of the King and parliament was required in the fields of civil and criminal laws, matters regarding the Church, and criminal laws for the military. The field labeled 'economic legislation' was to be the King's domain, with parliament, the Riksdag, only able to make suggestive presentations. But as Elder points out:

What has in fact happened is that successive governments have made use of the power given to them by the Constitution to transfer matters from the category of 'economic' to that of joint legislation without needing to resort to constitutional amendment.<sup>50</sup>

The introduction of parliamentarianism and the politicization of cabinets did, however, come fairly late in Sweden, and only after a drawn out struggle between the monarchy, aristocracy, officials, and landowners on the one hand and the forces of liberal democracy on the other. It was with the coalition government of the Liberals and Social Democrats in 1917-21 that parliamentary government is generally

<sup>49</sup> Elder, 1970, p. 120.

<sup>50</sup> Elder, 1970, pp. 120-21.

seen to have been firmly established. After that, active intervention of the King into political affairs ceases to be of major importance. The year 1921 saw the extension to universal franchise and "the monarchy in Sweden has evolved into a modern constitutional monarchy bound by the rules of the parliamentary game."<sup>51</sup> The 1975 constitution even took away from the King the power to appoint the prime minister and passed that responsibility over to the speaker of the Riksdag.<sup>52</sup>

The Norwegian constitutional development followed the same general pattern as did the Swedish in that there was a gradual evolution from the separation of powers to the unconditional acceptance of parliamentary principles. However, the lack of Norwegian national sovereignty during the period when the constitution was adopted accounts for the significance attached to it as a symbol of national identity.<sup>53</sup> The Norwegian constitution was adopted on May 17th 1814 by the assembly that declared independence from Denmark, marking the beginning of the brief period of independence before the Union with Sweden was established. This constitution has, technically, remained in force ever since, although inevitably often amended. The nationhood symbolism of the constitution is for example reflected in names given to parliament

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<sup>51</sup> Elder, 1970, p. 34.

<sup>52</sup> Elder, Thomas, Arter, 1982.

<sup>53</sup> Elder, Thomas, Arter, 1982, p. 101; Andren, 1980, pp. 48-50.

and its divisions; Storting, Odelsting, and Lagting, all of which bring back the prouder moments of Norwegian history in the early middle ages. Paradoxically, in the long run, the Union with Sweden served to facilitate the power of the Storting, because it was the chief domestic power against foreign dominance. "From a constitutional point of view the national struggle against Sweden and the Union was between the Storting and the King. In both respects the Storting finally emerged as a victor."<sup>54</sup>

Probably the single most important constitutional consideration with respect to coalition politics is the organization of parliament and the electoral system. Together these influence the actors' resources and determine the conditions for the formation and maintenance of winning coalitions. Essentially, Elder's, Thomas', and Arter's general observation about Scandinavia holds true for Sweden and to a lesser degree for Norway.

Commonly.... in Scandinavia PR was seen to provide a bulwark for the ruling non-socialist groups against the rapidly rising forces of social democracy, and was accepted by the Social Democrats in exchange for franchise and other concession. At the same time it stabilized the political balance to the extent that it helped to maintain the identity of the various non-socialist parties.<sup>55</sup>

Before switching to PR, both Norway and Sweden had a single-member plurality system of representation. In 1909 the Belgian de'Hont method of proportional representation was

<sup>54</sup> Andren, 1980, p.49.

<sup>55</sup> Elder, Thomas, Arter, 1982, p.144.

adopted in Sweden, a method which yields in favour of the larger parties. In Norway (1913) the same method was introduced in 1921. The reason why PR was introduced more than a decade later in Norway than Sweden relates to the early resolution of the suffrage question in Norway or before proportional representation appeared on the political agenda. The then existing double-ballot plurality system encouraged co-operation between the Liberals and the Conservatives but was disadvantageous to the rising Labour Party.

By the early fifties both Norway and Sweden abandoned the de'Hont method in favour of the St Laue method, which diminishes the practical attractiveness of electoral cartels but encourages parties to keep a distinct identity.<sup>56</sup>

The Norwegian Storting is bicameral, the two divisions being the 'Lagsting', consisting of one-quarter of the present 155 members and the other being the 'Odelsting' consisting of the other three-quarters. This structure of the Storting was laid down in the 1814 constitution. The rationale for the bicameral system was to ensure that two separate sets of debates on any legislation would take place. However, in Scandinavia as a whole, the more general reasons for the creation of a second chamber, such as the federal principle, or the existence of powerful aristocracy at the time of formation of parliament, have been practically non-

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<sup>56</sup> Elder, Thomas, Arter, 1982, p. 146; Hardarson, 1980.

existent.<sup>57</sup> Thus there are no specific regulations determining the membership in either division, but the members are divided according to the parties' relative strength in parliament. Effectively, then, the division of the Storting is an artificial one which has prompted some scholars to label it as a 'modified unicameralism.'<sup>58</sup>

Before 1970, the Riksdag was bicameral, consisting of an Upper House of 151 indirectly elected members for a period of eight years, and a Lower House of 233 members directly elected for a period of four years. The rationale for this division was that through the Upper House local and regional interests were to be integrated into national politics, the Upper Chamber being elected by the provincial and major city councils. The two chambers were co-equals in the legislative process. However, because of its indirect election and its eight year term in office, the Upper House could be seen to reflect public opinion up to eleven years back. Clearly this irritated parties which had been gaining strength over an extended period of time, and demands for change became increasingly vocal during the post war period. Following a lengthy debate a constitutional commission was established in 1954, and it gave its report in 1963 presenting a draft of a new constitution. This draft in turn was given to a government appointed committee for evaluation, and in

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<sup>57</sup> Elder, Thomas Arter, 1982, p. 120.

<sup>58</sup> Elder, Thomas, Arter, 1982, pp. 119-22.



1967-68 the Riksdag passed partial reforms based on the committee's recommendations. "In addition to the codification of parliamentarianism, the bicameral system was replaced by a unicameral one. The representation at all levels was to be elected by direct elections on the same occasion."<sup>59</sup> Instead of the 380 members of the two co-equal chambers, there now were only 350 members in the unicameral parliament. Out of this total, 310 were to be distributed between the territorial constituencies on the usual pattern, but the forty remaining seats were to be supplementary or additional seats distributed among the parties on a national basis in order to achieve greater proportional representation. These additional seats are allocated to the parties according to a method called 'jamkad-uddatal' method, "in order to balance the deviations from a fictitious national proportional representation."<sup>60</sup> Finally, a threshold was established for parliamentary representation in that a party needed to obtain 4 percent of the national votes cast in order to win a seat in parliament, or, failing that at least 12 percent of the votes cast in any single constituency. That, however, did not qualify that party for a share in the allocation of adjustment seats.

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<sup>59</sup> Forsell, 1971, p. 202.

<sup>60</sup> Forsell, 1971, 202.

Unlike Sweden, Norway does not have a poll of additional seats and bases its representation entirely on the territorial constituencies. However, extra weight is given to the sparsely populated constituencies and thus for example in some Northern provinces there are three times fewer votes behind a member of parliament as there are in Oslo.<sup>61</sup>

The electoral reforms in Sweden radically changed the framework for 1970 elections, although they did not result in any major changes in the party system as such. However, after the 1973 election, the Riksdag found itself in an awkward situation as both the major blocks in parliament, the socialist and the bourgeois, won an equal number of seats, 175 each. The Social Democrats remained in power, supported in a vote of confidence by the Communists. Much of the less significant legislation had to be decided by the drawing of lots, but on the more important issues the Social Democrats had to seek support and compromise with some of the bourgeois parties in order to carry their bills. During this period of stalemate, it was decided to reduce the number of seats in the Riksdag to 349, with 310 elected from the territorial constituencies and 39 supplementary seats.

Another important feature which this situation highlighted was the long standing importance of parliamentary committees in the Riksdag. In the literature on legislatures, numerous arguments are provided for the importance of a

<sup>61</sup> Valen and Katz, 1964.

parliamentary committee system and how they affect the performance of the legislative process. As Olson points out, the committee system makes parliament more efficient through its division of labour and often has a decisive say in how and if certain bills are processed.<sup>62</sup> However, in addition to this and perhaps more importantly for the maintainance of cabinet and government coalitions, the parliamentary committee system functions as a stabilizing factor in the parliamentary setting. Committees, particularly standing committees, can prove important in overcoming counter-productive partisan conflict. Committee members who often have similar preferences in terms of areas of interest and expertise get to know each other in an informal setting where 'business-like' procedures can more easily be adopted than in a public plenary session.

In Norway there are some ten major subject-specific standing committees. They vary in size from 9-16 members, and their composition reflects the relative party strength in the Storting. The committees have come to play a significant role in parliament as a bridge between the two chambers, because every committee is, in essence, a miniature refelction of the party strength in the Storting. Thus the committee system helps overcome some of the inefficiencies that are generated by the artificial division of parliament into two chambers.

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<sup>62</sup> Olson, 1980, p.331.

In the unicameral Riksdag, committees are also of major importance and preceding any plenary discussion there is a compulsory committee stage. Elder, Thomas and Arter acknowledge this point when they argue:

This ensures that proposals can first be considered in private and in an informal arena rather than in a plenary session, and it also ensures considerations of the proposals or objections of minority groups or individual Members, not least because a committee has an obligation to consider and report on matters referred to it and cannot simply ignore them. A further indication of the strength of Riksdag committees is their independent right of initiative on matters within their domain: they are thus able to operate as a source of new proposals and specialized knowledge independent of the executive.<sup>63</sup>

Thus the parliamentary committees function as brokers between government and opposition, a function which became very apparent during the 1973-76 electoral term in Sweden.

Apart from the parliamentary committees there exist other mechanisms that facilitate pragmatic as opposed to partisan politics in Norway and Sweden. Commissions of inquiry are frequently used in the formation of legislative projects, especially in Sweden. There is a long standing tradition that goes back to the 1920s, of including in these bodies opposition MPs, thus giving them a considerable say in the formation of public policy. The reports of the commissions of inquiry are then brought through a 'remiss' stage where they are circulated among interested public agencies and organized groups for comment. This practice has facilitated a

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<sup>63</sup> Elder, Thomas, Arter, 1982, p. 131.

certain degree of consensus among the political parties and during the long period of majority rule by the Labour and Social Democratic parties, it "helped making major political confrontations rare in both Norway and Sweden."<sup>64</sup>

Finally, an important rule with respect to coalition politics is the length of the electoral term. In both systems mid-term elections are extremely rare. In Norway parliament's electoral term is fixed at four years. In Sweden, mid-term elections are discouraged by the condition that such elections must be additional to the regular elections. Before the electoral reforms in the late sixties the electoral term used to be four years but has since been three years. These conditions are furthermore important in explaining why minority governments occur as the result of the break up of majority coalitions - a phenomenon particularly marked in the seventies in both countries.

### 3.2 CLEAVAGE CONFLICT.

In the discussion of coalition theories it became apparent that cleavage conflict is instrumental in any discussion of coalition politics. Thus, for example, De Swaan points out the significance for coalitions of the "compatibility of the parties' stands on the relevant issues, the 'ideological

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<sup>64</sup> Elder, Thomas, Arter, 1982, p. 183.

distance' from each other."<sup>65</sup> Similarly, one of Dodd's bargaining conditions, 'the apriori willingness of the parties to bargain', rests upon the notion of cleavage conflict.<sup>66</sup> The party system approach too, places ideological polarization at the centre of its classification of party systems.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, common to most theories of coalitions, or those which consider policy positions in the first place, is their basically 'Downsian' uni-dimensional approach. One policy dimension, the left-right cleavage, is seen to be of primary importance. Thus the application of these theories to Scandinavian reality depends on the primary importance of the left-right cleavage.

Sweden and Norway have multi-party systems. In their tentative suggestion of a Scandinavian model of a party system, Berglund and Lindstrom propose a five party system which unfolds on a left-right cleavage, where class is the single most important determinant of voting behaviour. The five parties continuously present in the party system are, from left to right; Communist Party, Social Democrats, Agrarian/Centre Party, Liberal Party, and Conservative Party.

If this is the Scandinavian model, it might have been generated on Swedish data alone. So well does Sweden comply with the above criteria. There are five and no more than five major parties in Sweden, none of them of an ethnic and/or religious

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<sup>65</sup> De Swaan, 1970, p. 426.

<sup>66</sup> see above.

<sup>67</sup> see e.g. discussion on Satori above

variety.<sup>68</sup>

With respect to other parties entering the electoral arena, only the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has consistently stood in elections, but it has been unsuccessful at the polls winning only between 1-2 percent of the popular vote.

Norway on the other hand does not comply as well with this model as Sweden. There have been long standing regional differences in Norway, conflicts between the forces which contrast and resist the process of urbanization and central nation building on the one hand and those that represent this development on the other. More specifically, the Southern and Western parts of Norway have been the strongholds of this resistance whereas polarized class politics tend to dominate in the East and North. Thus there exist a pervasive cultural urban-rural cleavage in addition to the left-right one.<sup>69</sup>

The most notable deviation from the five party model is the Christian People's Party which has been consistently represented in the Storting in the post war era. Apart from the stronger influence of the urban-rural cleavage and the Christian People's Party, further deviations from the model occurred with the emergence of the Socialist People's Party in the early sixties and the populist anti-tax party on the

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<sup>68</sup> Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, p. 18

<sup>69</sup> For an extensive discussion of Norwegian cleavages, see Valen and Rokkan, 1974a; Olsen, 1983.

right in the early seventies.<sup>70</sup>

The literature on Swedish politics repeatedly recognizes one primary cleavage or policy dimension on which the parties unfold, and that is left-right. It appears that the parties as well as their voting constituencies have little doubt about the ranking of the parties on this cleavage. The Communists and the Conservatives occupy the far left and right respectively and the other parties unfold in between them.<sup>71</sup> However, this is not to say that there are no secondary cleavages in Sweden. On the contrary, as Berglund has pointed out:

The left-right cleavage has always coexisted with an array of secondary dimensions. Some of them cut right through the political parties and provide perfect textbook examples of overlapping membership theories. Other are all but superimposed on the left-right and become virtually undistinguishable from it. And few, if any, correlate with left-right so as to undermine the case in favour of a unidimensional approach to Swedish politics.<sup>72</sup>

Examples of secondary cleavages are; the communist - non-communist, religious and moral, and urban-rural cleavages. These cleavages are either superimposed or have no correlation with left-right, or, they may cross cut left-right and can be classified according to their relationship to the primary cleavage.

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<sup>70</sup> See below, section on actors.

<sup>71</sup> Sarlvik, 1974.

<sup>72</sup> Berglund, 1980, p.22.



In Sweden, the communist - non-communist and the religious and moral cleavages are examples of a superimposed and no correlation with left-right respectively. All of the parties have been equally successful in capturing the votes with ties to the non-conformist churches. It is therefore not meaningful for the parties to politicize morally loaded issues, and if such an issue arises on the parliamentary agenda, Members are not bound by party line. Similarly, in spite of the relative isolation of the Swedish Communist Party, opposition to it increases the further one goes to the right on the left-right continuum. Neither of these cleavages undermine a uni-dimensional approach to Swedish politics.

In Norway, the communist - non-communist cleavage is also superimposed on the left-right continuum. However, the religious and moral cleavage is more problematic as the existence of a specifically Christian party shows. Furthermore, the religious and and moral cleavage is reinforced by the urban-rural cleavage as the rural population, particularly in Western Norway, tends to be more religious, whereas the population of the major industrialized urban centres tend to be secular and morally liberal.

In both countries the urban-rural cleavage cross-cuts left-right. The Conservatives and the Social Democrats constitute the main representatives of the forces of urbanization, centralization, and industrial development, while the

middle parties have a more 'conservative' stand in this respect. However, in the post World War Two era, left-right has dominated in political conflicts and at least not before the early seventies, can the primacy of left-right be disputed. Furthermore, even on the left-right cleavage, the intensity of conflict has not been great making for a relatively smooth and simple system of cleavage conflict. This relative smoothness and simplicity of cleavage conflict has led some scholars to argue for the diminishing importance of ideology in these countries - the end of ideology discussion.<sup>73</sup> Others have characterized Norway and Sweden within the framework of consensual vs. adversary democracies. Thus it is the contention of Elder, Thomas, and Arter, that the characteristics of a consensual democracy emerged in these countries following the Great Depression and the Second World War. Briefly, these characteristics are expressed along three dimensions. First, a 'low level of opposition to the rules and regulations for conflict resolution'. Second, 'a low level of conflict about the actual exercise of power' (or intensity of cleavage conflict). Third, 'a high level of concertation in the gestation of public policy'.<sup>74</sup>

It can be safely suggested that in the period from the Second World War and up to the early or mid seventies, Norway and Sweden met this criteria of consensual democracy.

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<sup>73</sup> Tingsten, 1973.

<sup>74</sup> Elder, Thomas, Arter, 1982, p. 20-21.

Following Peterson and Valen, Elder, Thomas, and Arter have argued that the seventies witnessed a decline in consensus. The sharpening of divisions have occurred both on the left-right and on secondary cleavages. More specifically, with respect to "governmental versus private control of the economy; industrial growth and centralization versus environmental control and decentralization; conservatives versus liberals on cultural and moral questions."<sup>75</sup> At the same time, there was an increased tendency for the secondary cleavages to cross-cut left-right, resulting in unusual alliances between political parties.

This point will be discussed at length in the next chapter, and for the present purposes suffice it to say that the saliency of the left-right was temporarily undermined.

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<sup>75</sup> Elder, Thomas, Arter, 1982, p. 185.

### 3.3 ACTORS.

In the discussion of coalition actors, the main unit of analysis is most often the political parties, as the parties are the chief players of the coalition game. Although the term party embodies a whole variety of organizational and sociological types as Duverger has pointed out,<sup>76</sup> it is in order for the present purposes to accept Epstein's pragmatic approach which accepts what ever is known as a party "as such provided that it participates in the electoral competition."<sup>77</sup> However, although the theories discussed in the previous chapter regard the parties as unitary entities, a simple distinction between different levels of party organization is necessary. Following Valen and Katz, one can distinguish between the parliamentary party and the membership organization. Though interrelated and constituting one party, the two branches are organizationally distinct. The parliamentary party or caucus, consists of all representatives elected to parliament, and at the local level similar caucus formations are replicated. In Norway and in Sweden there is a high degree of party cohesion in the parliamentary party on issues of importance. One reason for this cohesion relates to the group processing of major policies within the party. Most often, issues that involve principles are decided by the election programme or by the party's national

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<sup>76</sup> Duverger, 1964.

<sup>77</sup> Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978.

congress and the caucus is bound by these decisions. However, inbetween national congresses and election programmes the parliamentary party must consider a whole range of questions and determine the party's stand on different issues and whether they should be considered a matter of principle.<sup>78</sup> The national congress is the supreme body of the parties and it decides on policies, organizational matters and selects leaders. There is, therefore, considerable integration between the to sub-divisions of the parties by virtue of their organizational structure, although informal relations may vary between parties and over time. An example of these integration tendencies is the party Chairman and the central leadership.

The tendency to combine in one person the leadership of the parliamentary party and of the membership organization is a pattern which we find in most Scandinavian parties. Not only the chairman but also a few other central leaders hold prominent positions in the party's parliamentary activities. This device is one means of integrating the subsystems represented by the parliamentary party and the membership organization.<sup>79</sup>

However, this integration is never complete and serious divisions may emerge, especially when the definition of a party principle is not altogether clear, as shall become apparent in later sections of the paper. To regard the parties as unitary entities for the purpose of coalition theory can therefore be precarious.

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<sup>78</sup> Valen and Katz, 1964, p. 49.

<sup>79</sup> Valen and Katz, 1964, p. 54.

We will now turn to a party by party description of the Norwegian and Swedish political spectrum, starting with the socialist block and then move on to the bourgeois parties.

### 3.3.1 The Socialist Camp.

Urbanization and structural economic changes that took place in the last part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th in Sweden and Norway, vastly enlarged the number of labourers. This growth in the working class coincided with the struggle for liberal rights, and a better organization of the labour movement. In 1887 and 1889 respectively, the Norwegian and Swedish Social Democratic parties were founded. Until the beginning of the Russian revolution these parties were the only political expressions of the labour movement. The ideology of the Social Democrats of this period strongly resembled the one of the German party; the Scandinavian parties adopting with minor changes both the Gotha programme of 1875 and later the Erfurt programme of 1891. However, although the parties began as revolutionary parties, they did not exclude the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism and, in the Swedish case in particular, pragmatism and reformist policies were characteristics of the party from its earliest days. "The party programmes - the great absolute programmes of principles - were no more

of an Absolute Law a hundred years ago than today.<sup>80</sup> The practical political agenda was simultaneously dominated by the effects of concentrated and rapid industrialization and increased demands for liberal democracy. Social Democrats, therefore, once committed to equal and universal suffrage had to develop a strategy for the parliamentary arena. However, this gradual development to the right and adoption of pragmatic parliamentary socialism and the compromises of party principles it called for, did not go uncontested in the parties. In particular, the impact of the First World War and the Russian Revolution highlighted the divisions within the socialist camp. Thus while the Swedish party split in the wake of the Russian revolution when the left wing broke off and formed its own party, a radical faction came to power in the Norwegian party (1918) and temporarily prevented a similar split in Norway. By the mid twenties the division of the socialist camp, into a large social democratic party and a small communist party was established in both countries.

The Communist Party in Sweden originated in the split of the Social Democratic Party in 1917. To begin with the new Swedish Left-Social Democratic Party was hardly revolutionary and its "constitution was anything but Leninist."<sup>81</sup> From

<sup>80</sup> Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978.p.29.

the very outset a somewhat confused ideological character of the party was apparent. There was a majority revolutionary faction but that was by no means the only one and more reformist tendencies existed. In essence the opposition to the SDP leadership was the main uniting force of the Left Social Democrats. This is demonstrated in the fact that Hoglund - a central figure in the new party - was already seeking compromise between the factions by the second congress in 1918, with his attempt "to define the party as both revolutionary and parliamentary."<sup>82</sup> It was this division within the party which kindled the first split which occurred over the question of Comintern membership in 1921. Comintern membership had been decided upon during the third party congress and after a trial of strength between the two wings the majority opted for membership and subsequently expelled the right wing. The right wing then joined the SDP after a short period of trying to maintain themselves as an independent Left Socialist Party. The Majority faction on the other hand established itself as the Swedish Communist Party.

In Norway too, it was the relationship with Comintern that spurred the creation of the Communist Party. The Labour Party had joined the Comintern following the First World War, but the party's relationship with the International was by the early twenties becoming increasingly strenuous.

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<sup>81</sup> Sparring, 1973, p. 64.

<sup>82</sup> Sparring, 1973, p. 65.



At the 1923 congress of the party the membership question was resolved in favour of opting out. This split the party and the minority faction subsequently formed the Norwegian Communist Party.

In both countries during the inter war period the development of the Communist parties was thoroughly intertwined with the development of the Soviet doctrine and both "followed the Comintern into the grave."<sup>83</sup> The parties suffered losses in terms of organizational strength during the twenties and thirties, relegating them to a mere shadow of what they had been when they first split with the Social Democrats. The Swedish party experienced two more splits during this period, all following the same pattern of a right wing faction being purged after confrontation with Comintern and then trying to maintain itself as a Left Socialist Party before eventually joining the SDP. As these splits demonstrate the Swedish Communist Party was extremely sensitive, as indeed was its Norwegian counterpart, to the changes and developments of the CPSU doctrine. In the period 1921-28 the parties supported the policy of a 'united front'. In 1928-34 their support was equally enthusiastic for the policy of 'social fascism' portraying the Social Democrats as the worst enemy of the working class. Then in 1934-39 the 'popular front' line becomes the order of the day and the Social Democrats were seen to be of immense value to the

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<sup>83</sup> Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, p.44.

working class in the struggle against fascism. And, with the non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany, that line was also adopted.

Gilberg argues that there are three factors that may account for the failure of the Communists to capitalize on the depressed economic conditions of the thirties. First, the submission to Moscow and the policies of the CPSU. Second, the overwhelming presence of powerful Social Democratic parties. Third, unfavourable political culture where the organization of the working class predated the formation of communist organizations.<sup>84</sup>

During the Second World War, the Communist parties temporarily gained some ground, pursuing basically nationalistic policies advocating cooperation with other political groups in a broad anti-fascist front. This is reflected in their electoral following in the 1944 elections in Sweden and the 1945 elections in Norway when the parties polled an all time high of 10.3 and 11.9 percent respectively. However, this success did not last and the parties quickly returned to their pre-war predicament of loyalty to the CPSU and limited fortunes on the domestic political scene. In the fifties and early sixties major events shook the international communist movement, including the Swedish and Norwegian parties. The death of and disclosures on Stalin, coupled with the events in Hungary in 1956 thrust to the forefront all of the Commu-

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<sup>84</sup> Gilberg, 1979.

nist parties' fundamental problems: their relation to Moscow; the ideological foundations and definition of democracy and democratic socialism; in short the justification for the existence of the Communist parties as separate organizational entities. Furthermore, the Chinese challenge to Soviet hegemony in the sixties, further undermined the leadership role of the Soviet Union and facilitated ideas of polycentrism and national roads to socialism. These traumatic developments activated the divisions not only within the Communist parties but within the radical left as a whole, and the development in the two countries takes a somewhat different course.

In post-war Norway the Communist Party has been smaller than its Swedish counterpart.<sup>85</sup> Thus its prospects of influencing the party system have been markedly less than those of the Swedish party. Furthermore, this partially at least, accounts for the much more limited range of ideological discussion in the Norwegian party which left unarticulated that part of the socialist block which fell inbetween the Stalinist position and that of the Labour Party. This gap was filled with the emergence of a Socialist People's Party in the early sixties, an actor which has become permanent in the Norwegian political spectrum. A comparable development did not take place in Sweden, where the Communist Party was

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<sup>85</sup> Some estimates say as much as five times smaller in terms of organizational strength. Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, p.47.

able to articulate diverse ideological positions and thus generate a more meaningful debate. By the late sixties, the Swedish Communists had more or less divorced themselves from their Stalinist past, emphasizing independence from Moscow, a Swedish democratic road to socialism and closer cooperation with the Social Democrats. According to the Party's new image its name was changed in 1967 to 'Venstrepartiet Kommunistarna'. It should be added however, that in some respects this change in the party was more apparent than real, as sizable portions of the membership base - particularly in the Northern parts - was still very pro-Soviet and resented the direction in which the Party was going. However, it was not until 1977 that the tensions between these two factions reached the point of an organizational split, when the pro-Soviet faction established itself as a separate party, the Communist Workers Party.<sup>86</sup>

This is however, not the only significant schism of the radical left. The relatively unorthodox and pragmatic positions of the Swedish Communist Party and the Norwegian Socialist People's Party has contributed to the atomization and "mind boggling array of abbreviations" on the Swedish and Norwegian radical left.<sup>87</sup> A complex welter of small political organizations exist on the far left in both countries, mainly various maoist groups, radical student bodies

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<sup>86</sup> Sparring, 1973, pp. 99 ff.

<sup>87</sup> Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, p. 78.

and Trotskyites. Although these groups are numerically insignificant, their social composition enables them to have influence beyond what their size would suggest. This stems from the fact that for the most parts, these groups consist of students, teachers and professional people, who are generally more vocal and active than, say, much of the traditional communist cadre who are mainly working class people. Thus these groups have shaped the agenda of discussion on the left to a considerable degree.<sup>88</sup>

The Communist parties have been permanent actors on the Swedish and Norwegian parliamentary scene, although they constitute the smallest parliamentary parties. However, the parties have at times, particularly the Swedish one in the early seventies, enjoyed more weight than its parliamentary size reveals. With the relative decline in Social Democratic support at the time, the Swedish Communist's support was needed to defend the Social Democratic government in a vote of confidence. Potentially, this could have enhanced the bargaining position of the Communists, as it indeed did, but they party was faced with a predicament which limited the credibility of their threat to withdraw support. The predicament was that putting pressure on the Social Democrats could mean turning out of office a socialist government in exchange for a bourgeois one. Out of the two evils, the Communists clearly favoured the Social Democrats. Thus the

<sup>88</sup> For an insightful discussion of the Scandinavian Far Left in the seventies, see Tarschys, 1977.

overall role of the radical left and the Communist parties in parliamentary politics has been marginal compared to their powerful rival, the Social Democratic parties. The Communist fate can be summed up by saying that they have been caught in a situation where the shifts and turns in the International Communist Movement and their Social Democratic rivals have hindered them in becoming an attractive alternative on the left.

The Social Democratic and Labour parties of Sweden and Norway emerged in the second decade of the century as the single largest parties in these countries. Both made their decisive breakthrough in the thirties when they managed to poll some 40 percent or more of the popular vote and their electoral strength has since stabilized around that mark. Both parties have during the post-war era been in power for extended periods of time and as a rule their ideological development has been one of pragmatic application of general egalitarian principles through extensive use of welfare policies. However, there are important differences between the parties, especially with respect to their histories and traditions. The Swedish Party accepted early on the pluralistic framework of parliamentary politics and cooperation with burgeoise parties, or 'ministerial socialism', but it took the Norwegian party almost two decades longer to follow the

same path. This difference can in part be explained by the variation in the timing of electoral reforms in the two countries. The Swedish party joined in coalition with the Liberals fighting the Conservatives for democratic reforms, whereas in Norway the rising Labour Party was faced with a coalition of Liberals and Conservatives.<sup>89</sup>

The early electoral strength of the Labour and Social Democratic parties is a function of their superior organization operating in an environment of a rapid expansion of the non-primary sector. Class was the single most important determinant of party identification and cross cutting cleavages were of secondary importance. Furthermore, the Social Democrats were instrumental in the extension of democratic rights and combined it with the struggle for economic and political advances for the working class.

The crucial waves of political mobilization, in short, coincided with a period of accelerated industrialization and meant that the electoral support could be activated by a conventional appeal to class interests.<sup>90</sup>

The pragmatic and reformist policies that caused the split in the Swedish party in 1917 continued to dominate the party's agenda. Once the far left elements had become organizationally separate the way was cleared for a moderate stand and participation in parliamentary politics. Following the First World War the Social Democrats engaged in a coali-

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<sup>89</sup> See section on rules.

<sup>90</sup> Elder, Thomas, Arter, 1982, p.36.

tion government with the Liberals, principally on the platform of constitutional reform - the abolition of the estates and the extension of the franchise to the adult male and female population. The SDP had thereby become a realistic alternative as a governing party within the new order of parliamentarianism. This was reflected in the party's ideological discussion and policies. For a party that was approaching a position of political power, a programme that was based on more or less dogmatic conceptions of Marxist determinism regarding the emancipation of the proletariat was neither logical nor feasible. A programme of action was needed as well. In the twenties the solution to this problem was the adoption of a general theoretical socialist position - mainly one of socializing the means of production - coupled with more pragmatic short term policies. In the course of the twenties, the idea of class struggle gave way to more immediate demands for compromise and agreements. As Tingsten puts it:

During the whole of this period (1920-1932) tendencies to a weakening of the concepts of socialism and socialization [of the means of production] can be traced.... Social development thus spoken of did not mean, as earlier, an intensified conflict eventually leading to a decisive victory of the proletariat. On the contrary, it meant increased free competition within the framework of the existing system - mainly through cooperation and trade agreements.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Tingsten, 1971, p. 339.



Correspondingly, the idea of socialization of the means of production was effectively shelved during the twenties without causing major complications - probably a consequence of favourable market conditions that followed the immediate post-war crises. However, the turning point came with the Great Depression or more specifically in 1933.<sup>92</sup>

In Norway, unlike Sweden, it were the radical elements that triumphed in the Labour Party immediately after the First World War. In 1918 the radical faction of the party gained control and subsequently the party became a member of the Third International. The moderate wing, including the majority of the party's Storting members, split and formed the Social Democratic Workers Party. However, the Labour Party's membership in Comintern was subject to certain conditions set up by the Labour Party, such as that the party would retain its name and organizational structure.<sup>93</sup> The Labour Party's affair with the Comintern soon turned sour. At the 1923 congress the party split and the minority faction remained in the International as the Communist Party. This did, however, not mean the end of Labour's radicalism, and distrust of parliamentary democracy continued to be

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<sup>92</sup> Rustow, 1955; Tingsten, 1973; Castles, 1975.

<sup>93</sup> This radicalization of the Labour Party has been the subject of many intellectual inquiries but there is no clear cut explanation readily apparent. Structural economic explanations are unconvincing as the Swedish and Norwegian experiences are too similar. Leadership qualities probably played a significant role as Berglund and Lindstrom point out. Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, p.32-35.

prevalent throughout the twenties. The official posture of the party was radical in this period and it considered itself a communist party right up to 1927, when it was reunited with the Social Democratic Workers Party. This scepticism of parliamentary democracy is partly due to the instability of governments during the twenties. The bourgeois parties, agreed on the evils of socialism in general and the Labour Party in particular, but were unable to form a united government due to their disagreement on matters of temperance and language.

The antagonism between the non-socialist parties caused frequent cabinet crises - between 1920-28 six crises occurred. This unstable political situation created feelings of mistrust in the parliamentary system even in the non-socialist camp.<sup>94</sup>

Labour founded its first cabinet in 1928, on a relatively radical platform. This acquaintance with governmental power turned out to be a short one. It only lasted for about two weeks, when the party had to resign not least because of pressures from the banking community. As Berglund and Lindstrom have pointed out this experience did anything but foster Labour's confidence in the potential of parliamentary democracy.<sup>95</sup> However, as in Sweden, the Great Depression marked a turning point in the development of Social Democracy.

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<sup>94</sup> Valen and Katz, 1964, p.29.

<sup>95</sup> Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, p.38

In face of deteriorating economic conditions the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the Norwegian Labour Party had to confront the pressing question of how to analyze and deal with the crises situation. In Sweden measures that appeared to tackle the crisis immediately were adopted. On the basis of a welfare oriented interventionism - an elementary part of social policy - the Social Democratic leadership developed a basically short-term policy which integrated the problem of unemployment into a larger scheme of deficit financed public projects. But there were also alternative positions put forth which favoured a much more radical socialist option - extensive socialization of the means of production and eventually the emancipation of the proletariat - though these were outside the mainstream of party opinion and proved unsuccessful. Both lines, the pragmatic and the idealistic and radical one had some representation within the parties but once prosperity returned after the crises the whole issue of radical socialization was, for all intents and purposes, dead. In this way the birth of modern Social Democracy may be seen to have occurred with the adoption of the crisis programmes. Tingsten's summary of this resolution in Sweden brings forth the essence of this point:

From the beginning Swedish Social Democracy was socialist in the sense that taking over the means of production was its basic idea. Other more accessible ideas, however, were those which were considered to be more important from the point of view of political activity....and there was a considerable gap between theory and practice. It is only in the latter years that a levelling has taken place, in that demand for socialization has been removed even from the larger perspective, the

ideological debate. To the extent that at present the possibilities of socialization measures can be seen, they are seen from the perspective of the general welfare ideology that replaced socialism that was characterized by the theories of Marx.<sup>96</sup>

The clarification of the ideological equality of the Swedish and Norwegian parties was expressed in the respective crises programmes, but Social Democracy needed a partner to be able to carry it through. Both parties were by the early thirties what one might call the 'natural' parties of government, in that their pivotal situation enabled them to strike bargains with any of the middle parties and form a winning coalition while any other coalition combination would need the participation of all the bourgeois parties to be winning.<sup>97</sup> In many respects the Agrarian parties were the most natural allies, as structural changes in the economies had created problems for the agricultural sector and these problems were reinforced by the Depression. In Sweden the SDP and the Agrarians came to an agreement in 1933 and in Norway Labour and the Agrarians followed suit in 1935, and in both countries the crises programmes were instituted through a red-green coalition. The cooperation between the parties did not take the form of a formal government coalition right away in Sweden and not at all in Norway. Rather, the Social Democrats and Labour had the support of the Agrarians for the crises programmes in exchange for certain concessions to the agricultural sector. These crises programmes - typical

<sup>96</sup> Tingsten, 1973, p. 341.

<sup>97</sup> Rustow, 1955.

for the ideological resolution of Social Democracy -were founded within the framework of the 'new economics' and took the form of deficit financed public work schemes to counter unemployment; social welfare; and subsidies to agriculture to provide a floor for declining rural income.

Thus, the Great Depression marked a turning point in the history of the Social Democratic and Labour parties and in the party system in general. These parties became dominant in party systems and have invariably polled over 40 percent of the popular vote, with the exception of the 1973 and 1981 elections in Norway. Furthermore, both parties have, in the post-war era been the parties of office - the establishment parties so to speak. The Swedish Social Democrats have held governmental power either by themselves or as a senior coalition partner since 1932, with the most notable exception of 1976-82. The Norwegian Labour Party ruled in a majority government from 1945-61 and in a minority government (with a brief interruption in 1963) from 1961-64, and again from 1971-81 (still with a brief interruption in 1972).

Throughout the post-Great Depression era the policies of the parties have been variations to two general ideological themes. On the one hand there is a search for security for the individual from various pitfalls of society; commitment to full employment and comprehensive welfare legislation are examples of this. On the other hand, there has been a persistent dedication to egalitarianism, an aspect of Social

Democracy from its very beginning. Egalitarian reforms in the educational system in the fifties and sixties in Sweden and commitment to industrial democracy in both countries are examples of this. The two ideological themes are closely interrelated as the search for security is incorporated in the more general objective of equality.<sup>98</sup> The emphasis on equality and security continued to dominate the policies of Social Democracy during its terms out of office, in the sixties and seventies. Indeed, there was in the late sixties renewed interest in the quality of the welfare state following the realization that the system, rather than equalizing the income distribution in general, transferred income from one point of an individual's life to another.<sup>99</sup> Also, questions were raised about the economic democracy in the workplace. This criticism, Rosenblum argues, arose as a consequence of the consistent pursuit of egalitarianism at the political level within the framework of a capitalist economy. Making this point for the Swedish case he argues;

Although the egalitarian goals of the Swedish Social Democratic Party and labour unions have been constrained by forces of industrial capitalism, tensions have been generated which are reflected in the socio-political attitude of rank and file supporters....The ideology of egalitarianism and the persistence of structural inequalities have generated inevitable tensions in Sweden.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Castles, 1975, pp. 180 ff.

<sup>99</sup> Rosenblum, 1980, pp. 269-70.

<sup>100</sup> Rosenblum, 1980, p. 270.

In view of this, the Social Democrats' emphasis on equality and industrial democracy comes as no surprise. The most dramatic expression of this in Sweden was the introduction of the so-called 'worker's funds' scheme,<sup>101</sup> which was created at the initiative of the National Federation of Labour (L.O.). The basic idea is that profits of larger firms would be taxed and the revenue thus generated would go to union controlled funds who in turn invested in company shares. In this way a larger proportion of resources would be put to investment while at the same time it would have 'positive' effects on the distribution of wealth.<sup>101</sup> The significance of this is, although the original L.O. proposals have been moderated, that the Social Democrats are highly responsive to its working class basis and open to socialist reform experimentation. Bearing in mind the pragmatic undertones described above, the party is therefore still willing to take on some new ideological confrontations.

The traditional voter constituency of the Social Democratic and Labour parties has been the blue-collar workers. "In particular, the middle aged and older cohorts of blue-collar workers, together with pensioners, have been the bastions of Scandinavian social democracy."<sup>102</sup> However, since the sixties there has been a change in the composition of the labour force as the service industries have expanded.

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<sup>101</sup> Rosenblum, 1980, p. 272

<sup>102</sup> Elder, Thomas, Arter, 1982, p. 77.

The Scandinavian social democrats took steps to meet the changing realities by modifying their rhetoric and historical jargon, and began for example to refer to 'wage earners' instead of 'workers'. The attempts of the Labour and the Social Democratic parties to become 'catch-all' parties was, however, not unproblematic and a number of factors counter this type of development, two of which shall be mentioned here. First, the parties risked alienating their blue-collar support base, and the emphasis on industrial democracy and the workers funds scheme may be seen as attempts to counter that. Second, the parties, being the 'parties of office', were unable to generate programmatic renewals that went beyond the resolution of the redistributive questions of the welfare state of which they were the administrators. Thus the social democratic 'administrators' failed to appeal to the younger generation.

Put another way [social democracy] did little to excite the imagination of a generation that simply assumed the security and prosperity that social democrats had had a large hand in creating. In fact, the youth in Sweden at least began increasingly to challenge the twin gods of growth and materialism and seek alternative sets of values in the ecology movements. The very achievement of social democracy, in short, became electorally counter-productive as more spurned the social bureaucracy, corporatism, even 'new totalitarianism', imputed to it.<sup>103</sup>

In the seventies the Social Democratic and Labour parties lost some ground in terms of electoral following. The Labour Party faced an all time low in the 1973 elections and came

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<sup>103</sup> Elder Thomas, Arter, 1982, p.81.



below the 40 percent mark again in 1981. The Swedish Social Democrats were voted out of power in 1976, but have regained power, emerging victorious in the 1982 elections. The turmoil and developments in the seventies will be discussed at length below, but we shall presently continue our discussion of the political parties.

### 3.3.2 The Bourgeois Block.

The non-socialist parties emerged in their modern form roughly in the same period as did the socialist parties. Unlike the socialist block however, the bourgeois block has not had any one dominating party and their relative size has changed over the years. Division and governmental opposition has characterized these parties over extended periods of time. The predicament of the non-socialist parties has been that of overcoming their internal disagreements and form a government alternative to Labour and Social Democracy. Thus situations have occurred where the non-socialist parties have united and proposed, that given the parliamentary majority in elections, they would join in a coalition government. This was for example the case in Norway in the mid-sixties and the party system resembled more a two-party

competition than a multi-party competition.<sup>104</sup>

Like the Social Democrats, the Agrarians emerged as a result of the rapid social and economic changes Sweden and Norway were undergoing around the turn of the century. Urbanization and electoral reforms were seen by many farmers to be disadvantageous to their economic and political interests. This fear was for example expressed in demands for protectionism. In the first decade of the century there was a tendency to suppress domestic agricultural prices, a policy mainly pursued by the representatives of the urban - industrial elite. Protection for cheap imported grains was therefore an important issue for the agricultural sector. Following the introduction of PR in Sweden in 1901-09, which was potentially damaging to the declining number of rural votes, expressions of organizational and political solidarity of farmers began to emerge. Two national farmers organizations were established, partly reflecting a difference in the degree of radicalism in the North and the South. Northern farmers tended to be more radical, probably because they were generally poorer. This radicalism was shaped in a vision of a moral as well as an economic justification of small farming, of a co-operative 'geheimschaft'. In the

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<sup>104</sup> Gronnings, 1970, p.66 ff

South on the other hand

a dissident agrarian faction joined forces with a separate agrarian movement in the Skane region in 1915 to form a second farmer's party 'Jordbrukarnas Riksforbund', which contained many larger landowners and landless 'gentlemen', and was rather rightist in complexion. When this in turn merged in 1921 with the original Agrarian Party (whose name, 'Bondeforbund', was retained) the result was an initial loss of support, and it was not until the 1930s that the party achieved its best [pre-war] success with over 14 percent of the vote.<sup>105</sup>

Thus during the first decade or so of its existence the party polled about 11 percent of the popular vote and kept close relations with the farmers organizations. The ideological profile of the party during this period has been described as basically "cheeseparing and parochial."<sup>106</sup>

The Norwegian Agrarian Party started out as the political branch of the Economic Organization for Norwegian Farmers. In 1918 it was established as a political party and was in essence a coalition of former rural Liberals in the Western part of Norway and and Conservatives from the East. This coalition had emerged largely in response to the radicalization and urban orientation of the Liberals and the commitment to free trade of the Conservatives.<sup>107</sup> Though the party initially adopted highly nationalistic and conservative policies, its support base was relatively diverse from the be-

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<sup>105</sup> Elder, Thomas, Arter, 1982, p. 42.

<sup>106</sup> Elder and Gooderham, 1978, p. 227.

<sup>107</sup> Elder and Gooderham, 1978, p. 228

ginning.<sup>108</sup> In the early twenties the party was supported by both the small and medium sized farmers in the South-West and the larger producers in the East. In the course of the twenties and thirties however, the party's support declined in the former constituency while it increased in the latter.

As mentioned in the previous section, the agricultural sector in Norway and Sweden faced difficulties in the twenties which were drastically reinforced by the Great Depression. The agreement the Swedish Agrarians struck with the Social Democrats in 1933 coincided with their rising electoral fortunes. At the same time the party assumed a special place in the Swedish political spectrum by becoming unquestionably the party to the immediate right of the Social Democratic Party. Thereby, according to their own classification, they were the true party of the centre between the socialist and bourgeois camps, "reserving to itself on occasion the position to cross the bourgeois-socialist divide."<sup>109</sup> The Swedish Agrarians maintained this centre position well into the post-war era and in the fifties (1951-56), once again formed a coalition with the Social Democrats. However, that coalition broke down over the question of supplementary pension funds, a question that dominated Swedish politics in the latter part of the fifties. In the sixties and seventies Swedish politics became in-

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<sup>108</sup> Elder, Thomas, Arter, 1982, p. 41.

<sup>109</sup> Elder and Gooderham, 1978, p. 229.

creasingly polarized, and the party moved more firmly into the bourgeois camp.

In face of the difficulties in the agricultural sector generated by the Great Depression the Norwegian party followed the example of its Swedish counterpart and came, somewhat reluctantly though, to an accommodation with Labour in 1935. Though no formal coalition was formed the alliance was, from the Agrarian standpoint a trade-off to secure protection for agriculture, such as price regulations to name but one. However, the Norwegian party has had difficulties in finding its place in the political spectrum. Thus for instance in the fifties it closely cooperated with the Conservatives and on several occasions these two parties produced joint electoral lists. Since then the party has been torn between different strategies: whether to go it alone and support any feasible proposals for agriculture; whether to seek a three party coalition of the centre, a position highly visible in the early sixties; or, whether to joined a coalition of all the non-socialist parties. This last alternative prevailed in the sixties and up to the emergence of the controversial EEC issue.

In the post-war era there has occurred a rapid decline in the rural population - the principal base of support for an agrarian interest party. Thus in 1950 the percentage of the population engaged in farming, forestry and fishing was 25 percent in Sweden and 27 percent in Norway. By 1970 it had

declined to 8.1 and 11.6 percent respectively.<sup>110</sup> Although these developments were instrumental for the evolution of the Agrarian parties, a point of qualification is in order. The electoral strength of the Agrarian parties was not so much a function of the size of the rural population as its nature. This relates to the voter constituency of the parties within the agricultural sector.

The salient point is that the Scandinavian Agrarians were never catch-all parties within the agricultural sector; rather, they relied on a core constituency of generally medium-sized farm proprietors which was declining more slowly than that of smallholders, labourers and the rest of the agrarian population. Indeed, industrialization, in tending to attract non-independent agricultural elements away from the land, was electorally less injurious to the Agrarian parties than was the structural rationalization of farming (i.e. the amalgamation of holdings into larger, more viable units) for this attacked the foundation of their support base.<sup>111</sup>

Having said that, this population shift from rural to urban areas profoundly affected the Agrarian parties in that they constitute the single most important reason for the parties' attempts to 'modernize' themselves. In other words, the parties attempted to change their predominantly agrarian image and seek to appeal to a broader base of the electorate. In this task the Swedish party can be seen to have been quite successful, much more so than its Norwegian sister party. By 1968 the Swedish party had almost doubled its 1956 vote and was at its electoral peak in 1973 when it obtained some 25.1

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<sup>110</sup> Elder and Gooderham, 1978.

<sup>111</sup> Elder, Thomas, Arter, 1982, p. 70.

percent of the valid votes cast.<sup>112</sup> The success of the Swedish party is even better illustrated when the composition of its vote is examined. In the 1956 elections, when the party polled a post-war low of 9.4 percent of the votes cast, some 75 percent of the parties votes came from the farming community and only 2 percent from industrial workers. At the peak of the party's electoral strength in 1973 the party was supported equally by both categories, or, 21 percent of the valid vote from each.

The success of the Norwegian party is a very different story. Its electoral fortunes rose in the fifties, sixties, and early seventies, but modestly. From 1949 to 1973 the party only increased its share of the votes by 3.1 percent, from 7.9 to 11.0 percent. The party has almost completely failed to attract the urban vote and in the 1969 elections the party obtained its highest urban support or only 3.6 percent as opposed to 13.3 percent of the rural votes cast. The party's urban electoral strength has since been dwindling and was practically wiped out in the 1977 elections.<sup>113</sup>

The Agrarian's desire to change and adapt to new circumstances was reflected in their decisions to change the parties' names to Centre Parties. The name change came about in 1957 in Sweden and two years later the Norwegian party fol-

<sup>112</sup> see Appendix I, Table 1.

<sup>113</sup> Elder and Gooderham, 1978, p.225.

lowed the example of its Swedish counterpart. Though the name changes as such are perhaps not of exceptional significance, they were symbolic expressions of the discussion and concerns that had been taking place in the parties in the preceding decade. In Sweden the 1956 elections provided the main impetus for rethinking the party's position in the Swedish political spectrum and the subsequent name change. On the one hand the cooperation with the Social Democrats did not seem to bring the party any political benefits and clearly it was not electorally rewarding. On the other hand the Agrarian-Social Democratic coalition had in the early fifties changed the electoral law and greatly decreased the desirability of the formation of electoral cartels, thereby discouraging them from entering into such arrangements with the non-socialist parties.<sup>114</sup> In Norway on the other hand, the name change came at a time when the party was contemplating the possibility of the emergence of a 'third force of the centre', that is a coalition of the three middle parties, in which they hoped to assume a leading role. Furthermore, the example of the Swedish party was probably also of importance in the Norwegian decision.

With respect to policies, the Centre parties can be said to have 'modernized' mainly through a reformulation of their traditional policies, by giving them wider application, and seeking to appeal to the urban strata as well as the rural.

<sup>114</sup> See section on rules above; also, Elder and Gooderham, 1978.



Initially, in Sweden, the appeal was made to small business men. This was born out in the party's stand on the issue of supplementary pension funds and its opposition to jeopardizing the "small business man's chance to amass capital."<sup>115</sup> Also, the parties' long standing opposition to the centralization of power, a position that has ever since been a 'registered trade mark' of the Centre parties, was given increased significance.

Elder and Gooderham identify three tendencies brought up by the 1970 policy programme of the Swedish Centre Party.

1. An attempt was made to radicalize in order to appeal to the urban working class. This was done through emphasizing equality of income; industrial democracy, e.g. workers representation on the governing boards of firms and self governing work groups; and, radical educational reforms such as having advanced students helping shape teaching and the curriculum.
2. The value of unrestricted economic growth was questioned and the emphasis put instead on decentralization and the quality of life. This involved a variety of things ranging from ecological/pollution questions to protection against computerized personal data. More specifically the party was for increased local self government as opposed to provincial government which was seen to be more or less a branch of the

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<sup>115</sup> Elder and Gooderham, 1978, p.221.

central national administration.

3. There was a continuation of the traditional agrarian policies. Although this section is not emphasized as much as the other two, there are reinforcing statements about income equality between agriculture and industry.<sup>116</sup>

A comparable development did not take place in the Norwegian party. The thrust of the party's policy considerations have remained geared towards the agricultural sector. Consistently the party has focussed on a relatively narrow range of issues and only in the late seventies did urban and industrial questions begin to receive some attention. True, the party has focussed considerably on environmentalism and decentralization problems, but such discussion has had agricultural undertones. The party was opposed to the EEC membership, and temporarily gained in the early seventies. However the Norwegian party was never able to exploit this issue to the same extent as did its Swedish counterpart the nuclear and decentralization issues. Thus it may be suggested that the failure of the Norwegian party to radicalize in the critical period in the early seventies, party at least, accounts for the difference in electoral fortunes of the two Centre parties.

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<sup>116</sup> Elder and Gooderham, 1978, p.221.

Thus the Centre parties enjoyed their greatest electoral fortunes in the 'protest elections' of the early seventies although their success was of quite a different magnitude. The Norwegian party has been losing support in the course of the seventies and it only received 6.7 percent of the votes and 11 seats in the Storting in the 1981 elections. Similarly the success the Swedish party had in the early seventies did not last, and the 1979 elections saw the Conservatives overtake them as the largest non-socialist party. The explanation for the decrease in the Centre vote in the latter part of the seventies may be found in the increasing importance of the left-right cleavage. With tough economic conditions the parties must be seen to have efficient and decisive economic policies as politics become more polarized and the Centre parties inevitably suffer from such development.

The origins of the Liberal parties of Norway and Sweden can be traced back to the latter part of the nineteenth century. In Norway a Liberal Party was formed in 1883/4 in opposition to the ruling professional bureaucracy that was closely associated with the centres of foreign domination. Liberalism was therefore instrumental in the rise of parlia-

mentarianism, and the increased powers of the Storting.<sup>117</sup> Similarly, in Sweden a Liberal Union Party was formed in 1900, when a group of moderate independents joined forces with a group of enfranchised liberals in parliament. The main force of unification of the Swedish Liberals was the quest for democratic reform and the establishment of liberal democracy. Not only was early liberalism politically linked to the suffrage movement but also organizationally as it rose to national significance through the Universal Suffrage Association of Sweden.<sup>118</sup>

Peculiar to Scandinavian liberalism was its farmers constituency, a phenomenon particularly pronounced in Norway. Swedish liberalism was on the other hand mainly an urban, small town phenomenon, but did have a residual rural constituency and tension between the two wings was a visible characteristic from the earliest days.<sup>119</sup> Thus it was a relatively diverse social base that made up the two parties.

To a large extent the Liberal associations with their heterogeneous clientele were 'unholy alliances' of sorts so much so that it would be inappropriate to speak of a Liberal 'movement' at all. The sometimes successful attempts at reconciling and uniting urban radicalism and rural or peripheral down-to-earth realism epitomize the major contradiction.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> see section on rules above.

<sup>118</sup> Rustow, 1955.

<sup>119</sup> Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, p. 49-50.

<sup>120</sup> Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, p. 49.

In general terms the urban component can be said to have supported parliamentarianism on secular and rationalistic grounds; increased defence expenditure; and the consumption of alcohol as a purely private matter. The rural component on the other hand was molded in the protestant non-conformist faith and regarded principles of Christian ethics such as equality, pacifism, and temperance to be of great importance.<sup>121</sup>

Elder, Thomas, and Arter have pointed out that whereas the Liberal Parties were largely responsible for important political advances such as democratization, constitutionalism, and responsible government, they neglected the social and economic aspects of liberalism.<sup>122</sup>

However, once the political aims had been achieved by the early twenties, the parties seemed exhausted. The internal divisions and factional struggles surfaced and culminated in splits. The question of prohibition split both the Norwegian and the Swedish parties in the early twenties, and, again in 1933 a splintergroup in Western Norway broke off and formed the Christian People's Party.<sup>123</sup>

It can be argued that the splits and disunities within the Liberal parties in the twenties were decisive in determining their future development, because this was the time

<sup>121</sup> Rustow, 1955.

<sup>122</sup> Elder, Thomas, Arter, 1982, pp. 50-51.

<sup>123</sup> see discussion below

when the parameters of the present party system were being fought out. Furthermore, at a time of accelerated urbanization and industrialization the Liberals lacked a social and economic reform programme, thereby surrendering the growing constituency of blue-collar workers to the Social Democrats. In Sweden the Liberal Party's share in the votes cast dropped from 19.1 percent in 1921 to just over 11 percent in 1932.<sup>124</sup> Thus in 1934, when the Liberal factions merged again, the Party found itself in opposition to the Red-Green coalition. In a sense the Liberals had missed the boat. In Norway too, the Liberals found themselves in opposition to the Red-Green alliance in the mid-thirties and, excluding the war time grand coalition, they remained in opposition up to 1963.

Ironically though, the twenties can in retrospect be seen as the heydays of Scandinavian liberalism and in particular Swedish liberalism. In Sweden the Liberal Party occupied a pivotal position in the political turmoil of the time.

governments of the left, right and centre formed in quick succession, yet no group could rule without Liberal support. Time after time, therefore, demands for strong army by Conservatives and for active welfare policy by the Socialists were wittled down until they met the Liberal's criteria of economy.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Berglund, 1980.

<sup>125</sup> Rustow, 1955, p. 91.

But this changed with the Great Depression and the Liberal's fate was to become an opposition party, a position which lasted until the 1976 bourgeois coalition. At the same time both the Norwegian and the Swedish parties have become firmly entrenched in the bourgeois block.

While the Norwegian Liberals failed to make impressive electoral inroads following the Second World War, the Swedish party emerged relatively strong, making it temporarily the largest non-socialist party. Both parties attempted to make their programmes less abstract and supplement the more traditional liberal notions with social liberalism. Though only successful in Sweden, the hope was to become more attractive to salaried employees, civil servants and professionals in both higher and lower positions. By the mid-sixties some 35 percent of the Swedish Liberal support came from these categories. However, the single largest category of supporters was the one of small business men and enterprisers, constituting some 34 percent of the Liberal vote.<sup>126</sup> Still - social liberalism or not - the party lost ground in the early sixties which can be explained in part at least by "defections among the working class sympathizers. The party's opposition to the supplementary pension scheme probably was the single most important cause."<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Sarlvik, 1969.

<sup>127</sup> Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, p. 53.

At this juncture it might be interesting to note a dilemma Berglund and Lindstrom have pointed out with respect to Scandinavian liberalism in general and Swedish liberalism in particular. There is a strong radical tradition within liberalism which appears from time to time. At the same time this radical tendency is opposed by an equally strong or stronger tendency of conservatism. The defection of one (1) Member of the liberal parliamentary party to the socialist camp on the question of pension funds - which enabled the reform to be carried in parliament - may be seen as an example of this dilemma. Furthermore, in Norway this division surfaced forcefully in the early seventies over the EEC issue, culminating in a split where the pro-EEC faction formed its own party, the New Peoples Party, before the 1973 elections. Thus, the divisions that characterized liberalism in the twenties have survived, albeit latently, and have surfaced at critical times of political development.

The Liberal parties have during the seventies shrunk to become the smallest non-socialist parties. Unlike the Centre parties - particularly in Sweden - the Liberals were unable and unwilling to capitalize on secondary cleavages. However the parties have been instrumental in the bourgeois coalitions of the sixties in Norway and the seventies in Sweden. It is however an open question whether this coalition experience was beneficial to the Liberals. The 1982 elections in Sweden saw the Liberal Party lose heavily. The party only



received 0.3 percent more votes than the Communist Party. Similarly, in Norway Liberal support dropped from 9.4 percent in 1969 to just over 4 percent throughout the seventies. This decline of the Liberal parties can in part be explained in terms of a middle party being caught up in increasingly polarized politics.

The Conservative parties in Norway and Sweden, the parties furthest to the right in the political spectrum, developed like the other parties into their modern form when the process of democratization was fought out in the decades around the turn of the century.<sup>128</sup> In Sweden the rise in the liberal-socialist movement and its struggle for universal suffrage and liberal democracy caused the conservative elements - the possessors of political and economic privileges - to organize in their opposition. The Conservatives believed in an organic structure of society with a fixed hierarchical stratification and that society in general and the ruling class in particular had nothing to gain by increased politicization.

The state, however, should provide for at least a minimum of social security for the poor and destitute - in other words, a Social Authoritarian Conservatism as opposed to a variety of Malthusian

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<sup>128</sup> In Norway the Progress Party has been to the right of the Conservatives, since its emergence in 1973. See below.

theories.<sup>129</sup>

Opposition to the liberal-socialist campaign for democratic reform was therefore the main rallying point of early conservatism.

Ideologically similar, the Norwegian Conservatives constituted themselves as a political party in the late nineteenth century and was primarily based on and the spokesman of higher civil servants and bureaucrats. However, after the dissolution of the Union with Sweden the party changed and elements of the entrepreneurial community became increasingly apparent in the party's social fabric. Subsequently, the party adopted an economically liberal policy, which has characterized it since.

By 1904, the Swedish Conservatives had organized themselves on a national scale and proceeded to do so in parliament. However, the conservatives remained a rather diverse ideological grouping with a loose organizational structure. Common to early Scandinavian conservatism was their apprehension with the modern political party and it was slow to take advantage of it for its own purposes. This is demonstrated by the fact that in the early days of Swedish conservatism there existed separate organizational 'parties' for the Upper and Lower Houses of the Riksdag.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, p.63.

<sup>130</sup> Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978, p.63. See also Rustow, 1955.

Organizational solidification of the conservatives and the rise of the Conservative Party, came earlier in Norway than Sweden. In both countries, however, the formation of Agrarian parties and the departure of the agrarian constituency was instrumental in this development, as it greatly reduced factionalism and made for a more unified conservative force. In Sweden, this development into a modern political party was slow and as Berglund and Lindstrom have pointed out it was not until the early fifties that the Swedish party "became a membership party in the proper sense of the word."<sup>131</sup>

Ideologically the Conservative parties have changed over time and developed through different phases; from representing faith in initiative and freedom of the individual to a pragmatic liberalism in the post-war era. The social profile of their support base is primarily composed of businessmen, industrialists, and the administrative and bureaucratic elite. Sarlvik points out that in the sixties 46 percent of the Swedish party's votes came from a category he calls 'big enterprisers, professionals, and salaried employees in higher positions', while only 6 percent came from the working class.<sup>132</sup> With minor variations the same holds true for the Norwegian Party.<sup>133</sup> Thus it comes as no surprise that

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<sup>131</sup> Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978.p.64.

<sup>132</sup> Sarlvik, 1969.

<sup>133</sup> Berglund and Lindstrom, 1978.p.108.

the Conservatives, particularly in the larger cities, are defenders of the 'free enterprise system'. Oddly enough, the Conservatives have on occasion found themselves siding with the Social Democrats in some economic controversies. "In a sense though, both parties [Conservatives and Social Democrats] represent the forces of industrialization, urbanization and even secularization."<sup>134</sup>

It is difficult to detect any long term trends in the electoral following of the Conservative parties. In Sweden the twenties constituted the heydays of the Conservative Party's support when it polled one-fourth of the popular vote - a position which it is approaching again in the late seventies and early eighties. During the period in between the party's support has fluctuated, averaging just under the 15 percent mark in the post war era. In Norway on the other hand the Conservative Party has been somewhat stronger, polling on average some 19 percent in the post-war period up to the seventies, but has been gaining from the mid-seventies onwards. The increase in polarization which has seen the decline of the parties of the middle in the seventies has conversely seen the Conservatives rise. In both Norway and Sweden, the Conservatives now constitute the largest non-socialist party, second only to the Social Democrats and Labour in parliamentary strength.

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<sup>134</sup> Berglund, 1978, p.66. Also Olsen, 1980, makes this point.

Two more parties need to be discussed, the Christian People's Party and the Lange anti-tax Party or Progress Party. Both these parties are found in Norway but parties of similar nature have not been successful in Sweden.

The Christian People's Party was formed in 1933 as a splintergroup from the Liberal Party. This split signified the growing discontent of the revivalist Low Church constituency, especially in the South-Western part of the country, with the Liberal's increased secularization and moderate stand on temperance. The revivalist tradition in Norway, which emerged as a reaction to the submission in the nineteenth century of the church to the state, had managed to establish itself as a church within the church and aimed at converting the nation to active living personal faith. To this end it established missionary societies that operated in different parts of the country, and even abroad.<sup>135</sup> Prior to the Second World War the Christian Peoples Party remained a highly localized phenomenon, mainly confined to the 'bible belt' areas in the South-West. However, immediately following the the War, the party emerged nationally and has since been approximately equal in strength to the Agrarin/Centre party. The support base of the Christian People's party as might be expected, comes from people with ties with organ-

<sup>135</sup> Elder, Thomas Arter, 1982, p.55.

ized religion and temperance and while the party has maintained its support in its stronghold in the South-West it has managed to do well among the urban middle classes.<sup>136</sup>

The Norwegian Christian People's Party has had some influence beyond the national boundaries, and in Sweden for instance attempts have been made to emulate the Norwegian example, but that has not been successful.

The Progress Party or the Anders Lange Party, emerged on the political scene in the 'protest elections' in 1973. This party was a replication of sorts of the Danish Progress Party lead by Glistrup. The chief characteristic of these parties' platforms was their anti-tax policies. This may be seen against the background of increased tax burdens demanded to finance the expanding welfare state. The Norwegian Progress Party polled some 5 percent of the popular vote in 1973, which is impressive, although not as spectacular as the 15.9 percent its Danish counterpart initially polled. With the leader, Lange, dead, the party disappeared from the parliamentary arena after the 1977 election but reemerged in the 1981 elections and polled 4.9 percent of the valid votes cast. It is too soon to tell whether the Progress Party will become a permanent actor in the political spectrum in Norway. However, the increased polarization that has occurred in the late seventies suggests that the far right needs an or-

<sup>136</sup> Valen and Rokkan, 1974, p.300.

ganizational expression outside the Conservative Party as the conservatives may increasingly begin to appeal to the more moderate constituencies of the middle parties.

## Chapter IV

### CITIZEN'S MOVEMENTS IN NORWAY AND SWEDEN.

As did the rest of the advanced industrial world, Scandinavia experienced a high rate of economic growth following the Second World War and up to the early seventies. Simultaneously there occurred structural changes in the economies of these countries with a dramatic decline in the agricultural sector and allied pursuits.<sup>137</sup> Typically the period was characterized with almost "continuous full employment....and has given rise to an average annual growth rate of 4-5 percent in real income".<sup>138</sup> Politically there existed a consensus on the maxims of economic policy where priority was to be given to continuing economic growth. To be sure, this consensus was not entirely complete and differences existed on the particulars of distributive questions "but because of the consensus on fundamentals the social partners could 'safely afford to bicker.'" <sup>139</sup> Dahrendorf, referring to post war Western Europe in general, speaks of a right-wing social democracy, or a 'social demo-

<sup>137</sup> see above on Centre Parties

<sup>138</sup> Uhr, 1977, p. 237

<sup>139</sup> Lauber, 1983, p. 332



cratic consensus':

It found its political expression in a combination of four attitudes.... in economic policy this attitude never doubts the need for growth by increases in productivity while gladly accepting the preestablished harmony between improvements in both the work situation of workers and increases of production. In terms of social policy, the dominant motive is one of equality, usually equality of citizenship rights rather than equality of incomes or general social position.... Politically, these social democrats accept democratic institutions as a means of change, indeed.... they have become their most persuasive advocates. Finally, in the realm of values and culture in the widest sense, such social democrats are the main proponents of rationality....from bookkeeping through bureaucracy to science and technology.<sup>140</sup>

To be sure Dahrendorf's concept of a 'social democratic consensus' is figurative in the sense that it does not exclusively refer to parties labeled 'social democratic', but it is more than figurative for the countries studied in this paper considering the dominance of the social democrats and the fit of the concept to Scandinavian post war society<sup>141</sup>

Although Scandinavia experienced a growth consensus in the decades following the war, this consensus began to break down in the seventies. Two factors are of major importance for this increased polarization. On the one hand it was the economic depression and on the other it was the emergence of what Berger calls "anti-politics", or social movements outside of and in opposition to the established realm of the 'social democratic consensus'.<sup>142</sup> The intension of the fol-

<sup>140</sup> Dahrendorf, 1979, pp. 106-7

<sup>141</sup> see discussion of SDPs above.

lowing chapter is to demonstrate that while polarization stemming from distributive conflicts is likely to create coalitional configurations along the left-right continuum, this continuum is upset and disturbed by the 'anti-politics' element.

Two specific cases have created somewhat similar results in Norway and Sweden, the EEC membership question and the nuclear energy controversy respectively, and can serve as examples of these social movements. First, however, the general characteristics of the social movements need to be set out.

Social movements, citizen's movements, single-issue movements, citizen's initiatives, are all terms that have been used to describe an upsurge in political activity at the grass-root level in the seventies and eighties.<sup>142</sup> What has been regarded as novel about this phenomenon is that through ad hoc organization, outside of the conventional channels of interest articulation and aggregation and direct participation, these movements seek to influence government policies.

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<sup>142</sup> Berger, 1979.

<sup>143</sup> Berger (1979) and Dahrendorf (1979) use the term social movements; Olsen (1983) uses citizen's initiatives; Rochon (1983) uses citizen's movements; Tesh (1984) uses single-issue movements.

To borrow a metaphor from Olsen, these movements are "organizational tents" as opposed to the "organizational palaces" of the political parties and interest groups<sup>144</sup>

Although these tenets are common to most of the discussion of these movements, precise definitions by the different authors vary somewhat, thus establishing a need for an explicit definition for the present purposes. Olsen provides a broad definition of what he calls 'citizen's initiatives:

The term....refers to collective political behaviour organized outside standard established institutions.... The time perspective is limited - typically an initiative focuses on a specific issue or situation and dissolves when a decision is made or circumstances change.... Citizen's initiatives lack the characteristics of formal organizations, e.g. standard operating rules, role differentiation linked to carriers, clear membership criteria and permanent staff of their own.<sup>145</sup>

This definition brings forth many essential features of citizen's movements, but it is a broad one because it incorporates both movements which gain national significance in influencing an issue of major consequence as well as a highly localized issue where, say, a locality is pushing for the pavement of a street or the building of a community centre. Clearly the difference between the two is important. On the one hand there is an issue which has limited implications beyond the municipality while on the other hand a dimension emerges which can potentially influence political power relations in society at large. Rochon identifies this distinc-

<sup>144</sup> Olsen, 1983, p. 31.

<sup>145</sup> Olsen, 1983, pp. 13-14.

tion and suggests a differentiation between a 'citizen's committee' and a 'citizen's movement' for the local and national dimensions respectively. As the present analysis fall within the realm of national politics, and parliamentary and government coalitions in particular, it is useful to honour this distinction. Rochon suggest the following definition.

A citizen's movement is a form of organized, collective protest that operates outside the conventional channels of participation. A citizen's movement develops a political strategy to change policies that are expressions of fundamental aspects of social relations<sup>146</sup>

The basic difference between this definition and Olsen's is that a citizen's movement needs to 'express a fundamental aspect of social relations', thus ruling out citizen's committees. Apart from that both distinguish citizen's movements from organized interest groups and political parties on the one hand and sporadic mass demonstrations or riots on the other.

At a very general level the reasons for the emergence of these citizen's movements outside the established channels of representative institutions relate to a different vision of politics to which these institutions were unable to respond or respond to in time. In particular have political parties been seen to be unresponsive to the political undercurrents in society at large. This is largely due to the

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<sup>146</sup> Rochon, 1983, p. 353.

steadily increasing welfare commitments of the 'social democratic consensus', causing the state to expand into different sectors of society and increasingly govern the everyday life of citizens. As the role of the state becomes more comprehensive, the more complicated becomes the mediation between the competing interests in society, blurring the conception of the 'public interest' as well as the mechanisms by which it is achieved. "And under conditions of ambiguity, fewer people will be willing to delegate decisions to representatives or experts."<sup>147</sup> In this sense then, the citizen's movements can be seen as a reaction to the highly bureaucratic, specialized, and hierarchical welfare state of which the political parties and the major interest groups have become a thoroughly integrated part. Thus Berger argues that the new transparenance of the state and the perception of a relative autonomy of politics in combination with the inflexibility of the established representative institutions are key contributions to the emergence of citizen's movements.

The principal manifestations of these shifts can be found in the anti-state values of virtually all new political movements of the Right and the Left in Europe today.<sup>148</sup>

Dahrendorf identifies three broad directions of reaction to the increased transparenance of the welfare state.<sup>149</sup> These

<sup>147</sup> Olsen, 1983, pp. 34-35.

<sup>148</sup> Berger, 1979, p. 112.

<sup>149</sup> Dahrendorf 1979; see also Berger, 1979.

are: a reactionary tendency; a terrorist or revolutionary tendency; and a 'quality of life' tendency - "that is, those who want to turn back the wheel of history; those who want to abolish (or see abolished) the existing institutions with no concern about the price or indeed the future; and those who are dreaming of a different world, a different quality."<sup>150</sup>

Clearly, these three directions have little in common beyond being a reaction against the expanding role of the state, and relate in a very different way to the party system and indeed to the very concept of citizen's movements as defined above. Rochon argues that the relationship between citizen's movements and the party system can take at least three different forms. Firstly, the movement may form its own party, of which Anders Lange's party in Norway is an example.<sup>151</sup> Secondly, one or more political parties may make the goals of the movement central to their own platforms. The Centre Party's firm stand on nuclear energy in Sweden can serve as an example of this. Finally, the movement may operate outside of and in relative isolation from the party system.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> Dahrendorf, 1979, p.112.

<sup>151</sup> see discussion on Norway above.

<sup>152</sup> Rochon, 1983, p.361.

Returning to Dahrendorf's suggestion of a threefold direction of reaction to the increased transparenance of the state, it can be argued that by and large the frustrations associated with the reactionary tendency have been absorbed by the conservative parties. True, there are important exceptions such as the Lange Party in Norway, which polled an impressive 5 percent of the vote in the 1973 elections. On the whole though, the reactionary tendency has found expression in political parties to the right of the spectrum, pushing for less government expenditure, decreases in taxation and so forth. Because the reactionary tendency unfolds on the left-right continuum the political parties and the party system - which indeed developed and froze along this dimension <sup>153</sup> - have been able to articulate and respond to it. The overall effect then, is to increase polarization on the left-right cleavage; a polarization which is also generated by the redistributive questions that appear with economic decline. For the most parts this reactionary tendency has not developed into or been made use of by citizen's movements.

Similarly, the second tendency, of 'anti-systemism' or terrorism, has not found its expression in citizen's movements. This is not surprising as this type of reaction exists in secrecy in the sweatholes of society and enjoys limited popularity, especially in Scandinavia.

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<sup>153</sup> see Lipset and Rokkan, 1967.

The third tendency, that of 'quality of life', has on the other hand been more consequential in terms of citizen's movements. This dimension has often been associated with the ecological movement although it has much broader connotations than simply environmentalism. Decentralization and questions about the very value of economic growth, or what might be labeled 'post-materialist' demands figure prominently in this approach. However contradictory demands for simplicity and cynicism about economic growth may be coming from citizens living in superabundance and affluence, there is, as Dahrendorf points out:

a force in the demands for a new quality of life, which the administrators of the social democratic consensus fear for good reasons. This force cannot only cost the consensus parties votes, but it aims at their very core, at the assumptions on which the consensus is based. It is about changing the subject and the quest for something new - small wonder that government and opposition, trades unions and employers are united in condemning it.<sup>154</sup>

What Dahrendorf is here describing is not any single citizen's movement, but rather a general tendency of scepticism about the welfare state and the accomplishments of the 'social democratic consensus'. Particular citizen's movements in turn may draw heavily on this tendency - which is complementary to their very nature, to function outside the traditional channels of representative institutions. In other words this tendency transcends the agenda of the growth consensus and raises questions which the political parties have

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<sup>154</sup> Dahrendorf, 1979, p.114.



problems coming to terms with.

The significance of this tendency is magnified where there is, as in Scandinavia, a latent urban rural cleavage which is reactivated by the 'quality of life' tendency. This urban-rural cleavage has been diminishing in importance in the post-war period, but finds an ally in the 'quality of life' tendency, even though the two come from a very different perspective. Together these forces can, for different reasons, unite on a number of issues but the agreement is limited by the very difference in reasoning and the ideological standpoint behind the position taken. Thus there emerges a cleavage that does not unfold on the left-right dimension, but is a combination of the more traditional urban-rural conflict and the new avant garde 'quality of life' tendency: a combination of post- and pre-material demands. Because this cleavage does not address distributive questions, which have been the preoccupation of politics in the post-war period, the political parties of the growth consensus have been slow in responding to it while citizen's movements have become a major channel for the articulation of its demands. Furthermore, citizen's movements are in many respects better suited for this than are political parties because they have a lax organizational structure, and fade away once the issue has been resolved. In this way a whole range of difference can exist within the movement on the fundamentals of human society while at the same time agree-

ment exist on a particular issue. This characteristic of the citizen's movements accounts for their strength in that it enables them to articulate demands along the 'populist urban-rural cleavage', but at the same time it accounts for their weaknesses in that in the longer run they are unlikely to withstand the cross pressures with the left-right dimension where the political parties have a relatively clear stand. The salient questions of the distribution of material goods remain within the domain of the political parties. This is in line with Olsen's observation about Norway's citizen's movements or initiatives that:

Protests have focussed on the quality of and direction of life in an advanced welfare state more than on economic production and the distribution of material benefits, which has been the major concern of the representative institutions.<sup>155</sup>

To sum up the main points of the preceding argument it can be said that the post-war growth consensus began to falter in the early seventies on two fronts. On the one hand there was the emergence (or reemergence) of a 'populist urban-rural cleavage', which was critical of the value of economic growth, centralization, and the quality of life achieved by the 'social democratic consensus'. It is along this dimension that articulation through citizen's movements is most pronounced. On the other hand, there occurs at roughly the same time polarization over the distribution of material goods during times of economic decline. While the

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<sup>155</sup> Olsen, 1983, p.24.

representative institutions remain committed to economic growth, "most of them have moved away from the 'social democratic consensus' to the left or the right; thus they disagree about the distribution of sacrifices necessary for further growth."<sup>156</sup>

Clearly, crosspressures are bound to arise between the two dimensions and it is this interaction which we will now turn to and examine how a citizen's movement can influence the party system so as to be of significance for coalition politics at the parliamentary and government level. The cases examined are the EEC issue in Norway and the nuclear energy issue in Sweden.

#### 4.0.3 The EEC issue in Norway.

The question of Norway's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) became a major dividing issue in Norwegian politics in the early seventies. Norway and the EEC had reached an agreement on the terms of Norwegian membership in January 1972, but because of the dispute and controversy over the issue the membership question was put to a facultative referendum. The referendum took place in late September

<sup>156</sup> Lauber, 1983, p. 345.

of 1972, and the membership was rejected by the majority of voters, 53.5% opposed but 46.5% voted for membership.

The question of EEC membership dates back to the early sixties, and was therefore not entirely new when it became a major issue in the seventies. However, in the sixties the issue failed to attract any significant attention although it was hotly debated in 1962, when Norway first applied. In 1962, three-fourths of the Norwegian parliament, the Storting, voted for applying for membership. The decision to apply for membership followed the British example but the whole issue faded into the background when de Gaulle vetoed Britain's entry. Again in 1967 Norway followed Britain's lead and applied for membership, and again de Gaulle's veto cut off any further developments. During this period the membership question never came to the forefront in elections and only when the membership application was once again renewed in June 1970 did the issue surface.

The reason why EEC membership did not emerge as a major issue before 1970 relates to the power relations between the two major blocks of the party system. The two blocks - Labour on the one hand and the four bourgeois parties on the other - were of approximately equal strength in parliament during the sixties and a small swing either way could tilt the balance.

As was demonstrated in the earlier discussion on Norway, one of the main characteristics of Norwegian post-war political conflict was that it was cast in the language of a socialist vs. non-socialist majority government, so much so that the party system in many respects resembled a two party competition. The dominant theme within the bourgeois block was to demonstrate unity and that there was a viable government alternative to Labour. The bourgeois coalition which had been in power since 1965, could not afford to confront the EEC issue because of the different positions of the member parties. Similarly, Labour, aware of the potential divisiveness of the issue on the left, was unwilling to confront it, particularly not as an election issue. As Hellevik and Gleditich point out:

Through a mixture of chronological accident and unwillingness on part of the political parties to face the issue in an election, the EEC issue never formed a part of a general election campaign before the referendum.<sup>157</sup>

Thus it is not until the summer of 1970 that the EEC membership appeared on the national political agenda, and soon after that the 'Popular Movement Against Norwegian Membership in the EEC', the FOLKEBEVEGELSEN emerged as the locus of EEC opposition. The issue quickly picked up momentum and as early as by the end of 1970, opinion polls indicated that a majority could not even be found for continuing negotiations.<sup>158</sup> Thus the very way in which the whole issue and

<sup>157</sup> Hellevik and Gleditich, 1973, p.230.

<sup>158</sup> Hellevilk and Gleditich, 1973, p.228

eventually the referendum question were posed helped creating two distinct positions, the pro- and anti-membership groups. To be sure, this was somewhat out of the ordinary for the Norwegian voter, who in parliamentary elections is accustomed - because of the multi-party system - to choose from a number of alternative stands. Also, the seven political parties faced the same dilemma for they too had to take a position on the issue. This would not have proven a major problem if the issue had unfolded along traditional party lines, but the controversy turned out to be more complicated than that. The membership question cut across the parties and for some of them, notably the Labour Party, the Liberal Party and the Christian Peoples Party, internal struggle was generated. The Centre Party, the Socialist People's Party and the Communists were practically unanimous in opposing membership while the Conservatives and the leadership of the Labour party supported membership. Valen has argued that because the EEC issue emerged as a choice between only two alternatives instead of seven different variations of party stands, the campaign took on a peculiar nature.

For one thing, the political parties were less active and less visible than in ordinary elections, while huge ad hoc organizations, established by opponents and supporters of full membership, played a predominant role in the campaign. These organizations mobilized the support of political parties as well as the support of a variety of more or less well-organized political and social groups.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> Valen, 1973.p.215.

The fact that the political parties kept a low profile during the controversy can be explained in terms of the earlier discussion of the emergence or reemergence of a 'populist urban-rural' cleavage. Although in some respects the EEC issue is indeed a foreign policy issue, it had implications for practically every aspect of domestic politics as well. One of the themes of the 'populist urban-rural' cleavage is the reaction against the expanding role of the state, its hierarchical and specialized structures, uncontrolled economic growth and concentration of power with the central administration. Integration into a supranational body such as the EEC, a superstate in Brussels beyond the state in Oslo, clearly only adds to these features and reinforces the salience of such sentiments. The 'populist urban-rural' cleavage therefore crystalized in a sense in the EEC issue. The political parties and the party system are unable to respond to this exceleration along a new dimension, rigidly bound in a left-right outlook. The significance of this is born out when the most unusual bedfellows of the opposing camps are examined. On the one hand there is a confusion on the left-right axis where the Centre Party joins with the parties to the left of Labour in opposing membership, while the traditional rivals, Labour and Conservatives emerge as the principal supporters of membership. On the other hand there is a marked division between the higher echelons of the parties who tend to favour membership and the rank and file who tend to oppose membership. Both of these elements point to

the parties' problems in coping with the issue and hence their low profile.

The parties that took a firm stand against membership were the Communists, the Socialist People's Party and the Centre Party. That is not surprising when the EEC issue is viewed in terms of the 'populist urban-rural' cleavage where the avant garde left finds common ground with the more traditional sentiments of the rural communities. The composition of the vote of the different camps in the referendum demonstrates this point.

In sparsely populated fishing communes only 20.8 percent voted "yes"; in other sparsely populated communes (largely agricultural), the corresponding figure was 34.5 percent. In densely populated rural communes (predominantly industrial), 41.5 percent voted "yes", while the comparable figure in urban and suburban communes was 56.6 percent. These average figures for groups of communes clearly indicate that support for EEC increased with increasing urbanization.<sup>160</sup>

Not surprisingly, the main constituency of the Centre and Christian parties is in the rural areas, some 70 and 50 percent respectively.<sup>161</sup> Thus the membership question was carried in the urban areas with ca. 60 percent in favour whereas it was defeated in the rural areas where only some 30 percent voted for membership.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> Valen, 1973, p. 216.

<sup>161</sup> Pierce, Valen, Listhaug, 1983, p. 58.

<sup>162</sup> Pierce, Valen, Listhaug, 1983, p. 58.



However, in the cities it was the far left that opposed membership. The Socialist People's Party and the Communists unanimously came out in opposition to membership. Here the 'quality of life' scepticism of the radical left coalesces with the peripheral elements - culminating in an alliance between the radicals of the cities and the farmers and fishermen of the country side. Discerning a general trend in Norwegian citizen's initiatives Olsen suggests that:

The citizen's initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s in several respects represent a continuation of the historical tension between a central nation-building and two countercultures - one based on the protection of traditional values, especially an orthodox evangelistic world view, against the evils of modern urbanized and secularized life; the other based on a radical vision of, and desire for, major changes in Norwegian society.

In the struggle against Norwegian membership in the EEC these two countercultures joined forces against the post World War II economic and political establishment and succeeded in face of vastly superior resources.<sup>163</sup>

To suggest as Olsen does, that it was the 'economic and political establishment' that was the principal supporter of membership, brings forth the point that there was a gap between the political elite on the one hand and the citizen's at large on the other. That the establishment by and large came out in favour of an issue which was then defeated in a popular referendum illustrates this difference. Hellevik and Gleditch present data that suggests a variance of such magnitude between the higher and the lower levels of the political parties so as to substantially underrepresent the lower

<sup>163</sup> Olsen, 1983, pp. 24-25

ones. In the near unanimous NO-parties, deviations from the party line are entirely unrepresented at the parliamentary level. The same holds true for the Conservatives. But in the other parties, Labour, Liberal, and the Christian the split extends all the way to the top. This internal division is particularly noticable in the Labour Party, "where the difference between one level and the next is more consistent and the size of the gap between top and bottom greater than in any other party."<sup>164</sup> Some 46 percent of the Labour vote voted against membership as opposed to only 16 percent of the Labour parliamentary party. Similarly, in the other parties, though to a lesser extent, the tendency was for the membership opposition to be underrepresented. The marked underrepresentation of EEC opponents goes beyond what could be accepted as normal for a minority position in a hierarchical representative institution.

It is a majority of opponents who are underrepresented at the top of the Liberal and the Christian People's parties and to some extent in the Labour Party.<sup>165</sup>

Hellevik and Gleditich go on to argue that this underrepresentation signifies a clash between direct and indirect democracy - between the establishment and the grass-roots, and is demonstrative of the centre-periphery nature of the con-

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<sup>164</sup> Hellevik and Gleditich, 1973, p.231. It should be noted that there were regional differences in the attitudes of Labour voters to the EEC. The Northern areas were for example much more anti-EEC than other parts of the country.

<sup>165</sup> Hellevik and Gleditich, 1973, p.231.

flict. It is a centre-periphery conflict in two ways. Horizontally in the sense that the further the physical distance from the centres of power - from the establishment - the greater the opposition to the EEC. Vertically in the sense that the lesser the involvement in the central party hierarchies and the closer to the grass-roots of the parties, the greater the opposition to the EEC. This is in line with Olson's notion of the alliance of the two countercultures, and can also be seen in light of the populist urban-rural cleavage. That the established parties and the party system - which tends to be structured into a socialist vs. non-socialist camps - was not ripe for the EEC issue is in itself demonstrated in the internal divisions of the parties and the strange bedfellows it made for, as well as the fact that it were pro- and anti- ad hoc movements, not the parties, that mobilized support and opposition on the issue. However, this point is also demonstrated in the shifts in government coalitions that occurred as a result of the issue.

When the EEC issue surfaced as the focal point of political debate in 1970, a blow was struck to the consensus within the four party bourgeois coalition, and eventually the coalition broke down in 1971. The gap between the coalition partners, and the Conservatives and the Centre Party in particular, could no longer be concealed by keeping the issue in the background. In other words, the agreement between the coalition partners which had primarily been along the left-

right axis, broke down because of disagreement on a cross cutting cleavage which now emerged in the forefront. The result was that a Labour minority government under T.Bratteli took over and governed until the referendum. Thus there was a direct causal relationship between the downfall of the bourgeois majority coalition and the EEC issue. Furthermore, once the results of the referendum became known, the Labour minority cabinet resigned and a caretaker minority coalition of the parties that had opposed the EEC - Liberals, Centre, and Christians - came to power until the 1973 elections. The prime mandate of this coalition was to tie up the loose ends in the EEC dispute and negotiate future relations with the Community.<sup>166</sup>

In the period between the referendum and the 1973 elections, the EEC issue remained at the centre of political controversy and kept on confusing and upsetting traditional allegiances within and between the political parties. In the socialist camp the anti-EEC faction of the Labour Party broke off from the mainstream and established a group of their own, the 'Workers Information Committee'. The Socialist People's Party and the Communists joined forces with the splintergroup from the Labour Party and formed the Socialist People's Election Alliance. Thus the forces to the left of the leadership of the Labour Party merged and formed a unit-

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<sup>166</sup> The Liberal members of this coalition were the anti-EEC faction in the Party. See above on the split in the Party.

ed front against the EEC.

At the centre of the political spectrum, it was the Liberal camp which suffered divisions which reached an organizational split. It was pointed out above that there were different positions on the EEC within the Liberal Party, divisions that extended all the way to the top echelons of the party. After the referendum the pro-EEC faction broke away and formed a new party, the New People's Party. Thus on the centre-left of the political spectrum there was a completely new line-up, with a united front to the left of Labour but increased fractionalization at the centre. Furthermore, to complicate the picture even further, Anders Lange's Party emerged at the right end of the spectrum, postulating its anti-tax policies.

The results of the 1973 elections marked a turning point in Norwegian post-war politics and the changes and swings that occurred were the greatest in recent history. Valen and Martinussen summarize the results of the elections in the following manner:

1. The Labour Party suffered a severe setback.
2. The left wing Socialist Election Alliance obtained 11 percent of the total vote, an increase of about seven percentage points for the participating parties over their showing in 1969.

3. The socialist parties which had consistently won a majority of votes throughout the post war period, declined to 47 percent. In parliament, however, Labour and the left-wing Socialist Election Alliance obtained 78 seats....Labour subsequently formed a minority government.
4. Among the non-socialist parties, both the Liberals [both parties] ....and the Conservatives declined by more than two percentage points, while the Agrarian/Center and particularly the Christian People's Party increased their share of the vote.
5. The Lange anti-tax party obtained 5 percent of the vote and four seats in the new Storting.<sup>167</sup>

Valen and Martinussen go on to hypothesize that the emergence of the anti-tax party and the decline in the moderate socialist vote might have signaled a discontent with the welfare state. With particular reference to the 1973 elections they state: "The hypothesis that the election results of 1973 reflected growing distrust of the welfare society certainly deserves to be investigated.... However, it is our contention that the major factors influencing the 1973 election outcome emerged from the special circumstances of that election, particularly the EEC dispute."<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>167</sup> Valen and Martinussen, 1977, pp. 41-42.

<sup>168</sup> Valen and Martinussen, 1977, p. 41

Implicitly at least, Valen and Martinussen seem to make a distinction between the growing distrust of the welfare society on the one hand and the EEC issue on the other. However, in view of our previous argument about a 'populist urban-rural' cleavage this distinction is not so clear and the two can be seen to be interrelated. The urban radicals and the rural farmers and fishermen, or to borrow once more Olsen's notion of the two countercultures that joined forces against the economic and political establishment, were precisely the forces that defeated the EEC membership in the referendum and also that came out as the winners of the 1973 elections. In this sense then the alignments on the 'populist urban-rural' cleavage crystallize in the EEC issue where the reaction against the increased transparance of the welfare state and its centralization of authority, materialize in an alliance between post- and pre-material demands for decentralization. To be sure, this goes a long way in accounting for the decline in the Labour vote and is consistent with how social background variables relate to electoral changes. The rural population moves from the Labour Party to the Centre and Christian parties and the younger radicals with higher education go to the Socialist Election Alliance.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> Valen and Martinussen, 1977, p.71

As for the Lange anti-tax party, its success clearly demonstrates the discontent on the right with the welfare state, and in particular with the incapability of the Conservatives to bring about tax reductions when they were members of the bourgeois coalition. As such it does not unfold on the 'populist urban-rural' dimension and is of a different nature than are the other decentralization elements. At a general level, however, the common denominator is the scepticism about the role of the state.

It should have become apparent from the above discussion that the EEC membership question caught the Norwegian party system off guard, and is accountable to a large extent for the transformation and volatility that took place in the early seventies. As for the rest of the seventies, the more traditional pattern of party configuration seemed to be reestablishing itself, only to be upset again in the 1981 elections. The long reign of minority governments since 1971, first by labour and now by the Conservatives seem to have marked the end of non-socialist majority coalitions. In so far as the EEC issue was instrumental in bringing down the last of such coalitions in 1971, a single-issue in conjunction with a citizen's movement can be very important for coalition behaviour. However, before going into a more explicit discussion of the implications of this issue and citizen's movements for coalition politics in Scandinavia, it



is in order to look at the nuclear energy issue in Sweden so as to establish a comparative base for analysis.

#### 4.0.4 The nuclear issue in Sweden.

Unlike in Norway, dramatic political conflicts did not occur over the EEC in Sweden. Sweden never applied for full membership in the Community, but wanted to negotiate special relations with it. The overriding concern from the Swedish standpoint was not to undermine her neutrality by participation in a supranational organization.<sup>170</sup> The agreement that was finally reached in the early seventies failed to attract controversy but at about the same time another issue was making its way onto the Swedish political agenda; the question of the future of nuclear energy in Sweden. In the course of the seventies this issue was to become of particular significance and only after contributing to the end of more than forty years of Social Democratic ascendancy and the split of a bourgeois coalition, was it resolved in a referendum in 1980.

The discussion of nuclear energy and its potential use appeared as early as the 1950s in Sweden. The foreseeable rise in energy demand that accompanied economic growth,

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<sup>170</sup> see for discussion of Sweden and the EEC; Stalvant, 1973.

along with the fact that Sweden is poor in terms of energy resources such as coal or oil made the nuclear alternative particularly attractive as a source of cheap and reliable energy source. Thus nuclear power was to become a major component in the future of Swedish economic growth, decreasing the dependency on other countries for energy supply by exploiting the rich uranium resources in Sweden herself. Through organized project development in the nuclear field, both private investors and the government envisioned the creation of an industry of major significance for domestic energy supply and with potential for the export of advanced technology. The nuclear program can be said to have begun its operation with a reactor in Agesta near Stockholm in 1964, and soon plans were made for larger reactors for the sole production of electricity.<sup>171</sup> By the early seventies, Sweden had one of the most ambitious civilian nuclear program in the world, with several units in order, the objective being to meet the rapidly growing energy demand and eventually help replacing imported oil.

Before the first unit became operable, the Central Electricity Planning Board envisioned twenty-four units by 1990. Breeder reactors were considered as the next step and plans were made for the complete fuel cycle.<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> This was a 10 MW heavy water reactor, and can be seen as the forerunner of the later reactors who all were light water reactors. Agesta was therefore not typical of later developments.

<sup>172</sup> Johansson and Steen, 1981, p.4.

The nuclear industry was becoming an established reality. Swedish industry had developed its own design of reactors and uranium mining and milling was in operation. For the longest time, the role of nuclear energy failed to be politicized and was treated as a technical question contributing to and furthering the consensus goal of economic growth and expansion of the welfare state. Nuclear power was thus an integral part of the establishment's vision of Sweden's future energy solution: a part of the 'social democratic consensus'.

However, a challenge occurred in the early seventies to the consensus on nuclear energy as the environmental concerns emerging in the international community made themselves felt in Sweden. Different environmental groups, individuals, and organizations, began to raise questions about the desirability and safety of nuclear power. Originally the main criticism focussed on two issues: First, the safety of nuclear reactors during their normal operation was questioned. Second, the potential use of plutonium from these plants for the construction of nuclear weapons was a cause of concern.<sup>173</sup> The bringing of the issue on the national political agenda is often associated with the work of Bjorn Gillberg of the MILJOCENTRUM (Environment Centre) and that of Birgitta Hambraeus, a Centre Party MP who brought the issue into parliament. Mrs. Hambraeus initiated a private bill

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<sup>173</sup> Daleus, 1975, p. 28.

in the Riksdag, and in the spring of 1973 nuclear energy was debated for the first time in parliament. The result was a decision that:

No decisions to build more nuclear power plants should be taken before new, comprehensive material, including information about research results and development trends, has been brought to the attention of Parliament.<sup>174</sup>

However, under the existing program, allowance had already been made for eleven reactors, although there was a moratorium on further expansion of the nuclear program, pending an organized general national discussion on the subject. The government initiated a gigantic study program on nuclear power in the spring of 1974. Eleven official study organizations administered the program which was principally financed through government funds. The declared purpose of the program was to involve the public on the issue and seek its opinion, thus making the decision making process more democratic. Critics, however, have suggested that the whole program was supposed to pave the way for the government's energy bill which was forthcoming in 1975.

All in all some one hundred thousand Swedes participated in the study program, but it is questionable whether it actually facilitated the government position of continuing the nuclear program.<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> Parliamentary preliminary records, 1973:147; quoted by Daleus, 1975.

<sup>175</sup> Daleus, 1975, p.32; Abrahamson, 1979.

Once the issue had been raised it exploded and became one of the most hotly debated issues in Swedish politics. The kernel of the opposition to nuclear energy came from the various environmental groups as well as from high profile individuals who had aired their views on cultural and environmental issues. Public opinion in 1974 seemed to swing to a 'holding back' position on the nuclear program, as a SIFO (an official survey institute) poll indicates where some 59 percent of respondents opted for such a stand.<sup>176</sup>

Peter James has argued that environmental consciousness has deep roots among the Swedish people and stems from the development patterns of the social, economic and political infrastructures of Swedish society.

Sociologically, such feelings can be accounted for by the traditionally dispersed nature of settlement patterns, and the very recent urbanization. They have been powerfully reinforced by modern patterns of second homes in the country, to which urban dwellers retreat as much as possible in the summer months. This was given political expression as long ago as the turn of the century in movements whose aim was to gain free access for all to the Swedish countryside, and continued, especially in the form of concern of the environmental consequences of hydro-power developments. Today, it helps to explain the very broadly based membership composition of the environmental movements.<sup>177</sup>

The broadness of the membership base of the opposition to nuclear energy is demonstrated in the way in which the different factions pictured the nuclear energy free society. In this respect, two subgroups can be identified. There were

<sup>176</sup> Daleus, 1975, p.32.

<sup>177</sup> James, 1979, p.501.

those who emphasized the danger of nuclear power and advocated a 'low energy society' which would rely on renewable energy sources, but they did not necessarily see radical societal changes beyond that accompany this alternative. The other group saw the 'low energy society' in terms of a socialist society and elaborated more on the ways and means by which this society was to be achieved.<sup>178</sup> The anti-nuclear movement was therefore largely responsible for the nuclear energy question receiving initial visibility. However, in the course of the controversy the direct impact of the movement diminished in significance due to internal schism. As Abrahamson points out:

What had been a very efficient and reasonably unified environmental movement in the early 1970s had split into two warring factions [1975-76]. One of these essentially withdrew from the nuclear arena and the other proved incompetent to participate effectively in the formation of policy.<sup>179</sup>

Although this became the temporary fate of the anti-nuclear movement - it recovered before the referendum - it had been a major actor in putting the nuclear question on the political agenda. At an early stage the ball was thrown into the court of the political parties and parliament and that was also where most of the decisive battles were fought.

In Sweden as in Norway one can detect the emergence of a 'populist urban-rural' cleavage, although the rural tradition was much weaker in Sweden and this new dimension is

<sup>178</sup> Daleus, 1975, pp.31-32.

<sup>179</sup> Abrahamson, 1979, p.34

somewhat different in the two countries. Still, similar configurations are created by the EEC issue as were by the nuclear issue in Sweden. This becomes clearly apparent when the positions of the political parties are examined. Two of the five political parties rallied under the opposition banner, the Centre Party and the Communists. The Conservatives committed themselves early on to a pro-nuclear stand and so did the SDP. The Liberal Party found itself in between the two, opting for a moderate nuclear program. Thus again one gets the peculiar alliance of the far-left and the centre on the one hand and of the moderate socialists and the conservatives on the other. However, unlike Norway, Sweden did not experience fragmentation of the party system due to internal splits in the political parties. There were divisions, to be sure, especially within the SDP, but those divisions and deviations from the party lines were by no means as severe as with their Norwegian counterparts.

The Social Democratic government moved ahead with an energy policy package in the spring of 1975. The content of this energy bill - in essence the policy of the SDP - was said to reflect the results of the study program initiated the year before. The bill included measures to drastically reduce the growth in energy consumption, from the existing 4.5 percent to 2 percent by 1985 and to zero by 1990. The government was to take firmer control over the oil trade, and ambitious steps were taken in the research and develop-

ment of alternative energy sources. Also, in addition to the eleven reactors that had been allowed in 1973, allowance was made for two more, raising the total number of reactors licenced to operate by 1985 to thirteen. Thus with this bill the debate which had been taking place in society at large was brought into parliament. The party alignments in parliament followed predictable lines. A majority of 192 members came out in favour of the government bill. These were the Social Democratic and Conservative members, a coalition that was, for some concerned Social Democrats, somewhat embarrassing.<sup>180</sup> Opposing the government bill were the 98 votes of the Centre Party's and Communist MPs. The Liberal Party abstained, as it had suggested a different number of reactors and refused to support any other proposition.

Passing the bill in parliament did not mean an end to disputes over energy policy in general and nuclear power in particular. With elections forthcoming in 1976, the electorate was still deeply divided on the issue and opinion polls indicated that the majority of Swedes were against the further development of nuclear energy.<sup>181</sup> Furthermore, the leader of the Centre Party Thorbjorn Faldin, declared his party's categorical anti-nuclear energy stand and sought to make it the main issue of the election campaign. The emphasis the Centre Party put on the nuclear issue forced the

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<sup>180</sup> Daleus, 1975, p. 33.

<sup>181</sup> Daleus, 1975, 33



leaders of the other political parties to devote considerable time to it as well. Thus in the election campaign all other political controversies were "upstaged by the nuclear power issue".<sup>182</sup>

The elections in 1976 marked a new era in Swedish politics. The balance between the two blocks of the party system tilted in favour of the bourgeois parties, thus ending more than forty years of Social Democratic government. Observers of the 1976 election have pointed out that the nuclear controversy was largely responsible for the marginal votes that might have saved the Social Democratic government. Two reasons are offered as to why this would have been so. First, the priority the nuclear issue received during the campaign drew attention from other policy areas where the Social Democrats had hoped to gain from. These were mainly social policy areas, such as the extension of the minimum paid vacation from four to five weeks, stronger bargaining power for employees in industrial relations, and more leisure time for families with small children. The second reason why the nuclear issue might have been decisive for the election outcome was that for over a year previous to the election opinion polls had been showing a decline in the Centre Party's support, a decline which the party was able to counter by capitalizing on the nuclear issue.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> Sarlvik, 1976, p. 122.

<sup>183</sup> Sarlvik, 1977, p. 124.

There had not been, since the twenties, a coalition situation where the SDP was dispensable. There was therefore much at stake for the bourgeois parties to be able to demonstrate that they were a credible government alternative to the Social Democrats. Faldin, as the leader of the largest non-socialist party and potential prime minister, lead the coalition negotiations. Predictably, the disagreement on energy policy and particularly on nuclear power, became the single most important obstacle in the coalition formation process, whereas reasonable agreement existed on other policy areas. The bargaining situation was both tough and tense and lasted for several days. As one writer somewhat ironically observed:

The nation was apprehensive. Fear gripped the hearts of the needy and the industrialists alike: Would the social programmes be summarily dismantled? Would the technological infrastructure be demolished by the anti-nuclear, neo-Luddite forces and Sweden revert to a nation of sheep farmers, fishermen and coastal raiders.<sup>184</sup>

The three parties did come to an agreement - an agreement that was conspicuously vague on energy policy - and a coalition government was formed under the leadership of Faldin. With respect to energy policy, all major decisions were, for all intents and purposes, postponed. The policy that was to replace the 1975 bill of the Socialist government was to be formulated through two channels; a 'Swedish Energy Commission' and what became known as the 'Stipulation Act'. The Commission, which was supposed to work out a comprehensive

<sup>184</sup> Abrahamson, 1979, p.31.

program, began work in the Spring of 1977 and finished in the Spring of 1978. The report of the Energy Commission was largely unfavourable to the anti-nuclear position. Although the Commission was divided, the majority favoured an energy policy which allowed for a continued nuclear expansion in the 1980s, but no further growth beyond that. However, it was the Stipulation Act that became the immediate declaration of the government on nuclear power. The Act was passed in April 1977, and the most relevant parts of the Act state that before an additional reactor was put into operation it:

Shall have presented a contract that adequately provides for the reprocessing of spent fuel and also shall have shown how and where the highly radioactive waste resulting from reprocessing can be deposited with absolute safety, or,

Shall have shown how and where the spent but not reprocessed nuclear fuel can be finally stored with absolute safety.<sup>185</sup>

The Act therefore formulated the whole question of nuclear power as a technical problem of waste management. When the Act was passed, there were six reactors already on line and four more under construction. The eleventh reactor (out of the thirteen allowed by the 1975 energy bill) was not yet under construction, but parts of it were being manufactured. This reactor, the FROSTMARK 3, was the new line in Swedish reactor manufacturing and was believed to have considerable export potential.

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<sup>185</sup> Johansson and Steen, 1981, p.7.

The nuclear industry quickly responded to the Stipulation Act, and began to develop a waste management program that could demonstrate that the reactors under construction would meet the necessary requirements. This project became known as the 'Nuclear Fuel Safety Project', KARNBRENSLESAKERHET, or KBS. In late 1977, an application was filed with the government for an operation of a reactor under the conditions of the Stipulation Act. The government ordered specialized panels and agencies to undertake a review of the KBS application, a review that took several months to complete. When the results of these reviews were analyzed it became clear that the KBS project did not meet any reasonable interpretation of the Stipulation Act. The problem was that an 'absolutely safe' storage site had not been found, but such a site - with the desirable rock characteristics - was only assumed to exist and could be found in the future. Thus the government refused to give its permission, the implication being, however, that the KBS scheme would be satisfactory if an adequate site could be found.

It appeared in the Fall of 1978 therefore that the government had passed its most difficult test by reducing the politically controversial issue of nuclear energy to a technical problem of finding a storage site with certain rock characteristics. The coalition partners had compromised their positions, but the Centre Party in particular had made significant concessions from its election platform. Thus,

for example it was gradually beginning to accept the ten reactors already on line and under construction. However, the agreement was a shallow one and the question of the additional reactor, FROSTMARK 3, had not been resolved. Pressures were mounting from the nuclear industry to give the go-ahead for FROSTMARK 3. Furthermore, it was recognized by all parties that stopping the FROSTMARK 3 project would, for all intents and purposes constitute the end of domestic nuclear industry. On the other hand it was equally clear, that demand for electricity had dropped considerably since the original estimates had been made and the additional energy generated would not be needed. At the same time the Centre Party was coming under attacks from the various environmental groups who accused them of having given in to the pro-nuclear forces and in these quarters the party and its leaders were loosing face. Thus the question of continued construction and government funding of the FROSTMARK 3 created powerful pressures and divisions within the Faldin coalition. Faldin and his party categorically opposed the continuation of FROSTMARK 3, suggesting that failing an agreement in the government, the matter should be put to a national referendum. However the SDP, the Liberals, and the Conservatives did not favour the referendum option. The coalition could not come to any agreement on the issue and broke down in October 1978. As the Swedish constitution discourages mid-term election, a minority government ruled for the rest of the electoral term. The government that replaced

the Faldin coalition was a Liberal cabinet under the leadership of Ola Ulsten. The Liberal administration adopted a sympathetic attitude towards the nuclear industry and opted for - with the implicit and/or the explicit support of the SDP and the Conservatives - a twelve reactor program. This position was to a large extent based on the majority report of the Energy Commission and only reduced the number of reactors allowed for in 1975 by one.

The anti-nuclear movement in general and the Centre Party in particular seemed to have lost momentum. The nuclear issue had been raised as a moral question, as a value judgement on nuclear energy and the industrial society it represented, but not merely as a question of the relative hazards of alternative energy systems. There was, therefore, much symbolism in the nuclear debate in Sweden. Here too, as in Norway, the more traditional concerns of rural sentiments, that typically find expression in the Centre Party, find an ally in the post-material, 'quality of life' scepticism of the welfare state. Baranaby captures this point when she seeks to explain the broad base of the anti-nuclear movement:

Many saw nuclear power as the symbol of a society seeking economic expansion at any price. They see it pointing the way to a centralized, rigidly-controlled society in which human initiative and spontaneity are subjugated to the demands of highly complex and dangerous technology. In their eyes, the people long to break out of this pattern and to reestablish smaller communities in which human relationships can thrive. Small scale technology fits into this vision: the idea of living in harmony with nature calls for the use of rene-

wable energy sources.<sup>186</sup>

Thus the opposing camps were very different in nature. On the one hand there was the establishment, postulating the rationality of government bureaucrats and technical experts. On the other hand there was a large number of citizen's, typically founding their discourse on value judgement. In the course of the controversy, as the anti-nuclear concerns were brought into parliament - principally by the Centre Party - these concerns were expressed as specific criticism of an already existing nuclear program. Thus this criticism necessarily received a technical character, although based on value judgement. As soon as the issue was expressed as a technical problem, which was the case in the Stipulation Act, the anti-nuclear forces were meeting the establishment on its own terms, they were caught in a system with its own inner logic which favoured the establishment. As Abrahamson points out:

Faldin was embedded, however, in a system the logic of which inevitably led to nuclear power. That system does not permit dealing with ethical issues or with questions of value; everything must be expressed as a technical choice, not one of values. Consequently his concerns were diminished to a list of technical deficiencies. These in turn were further distilled into the key issue - which, almost by chance, ended up as the management of high level radioactive wastes.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Barnaby, 1980, p.59.

<sup>187</sup> Abrahamson, 1979, p.34.

The early dissolution of the Faldin coalition; the unfavourable report of the Swedish Energy Commission; and the position of the Liberal administration, which was supported by the SDP and the Conservatives; seemed by late 1978 to have, in essence, defeated the anti-nuclear movement. However, the issue was not dead. The Harrisburg accident - a radiation leak at the Three Mile Island in the United States - in March 1979, had profound influence in Sweden. Shortly after the accident occurred, Faldin renewed his suggestion of putting the matter to a national referendum. Then, in early April there was a major policy reversal in the Social Democratic camp when the former prime minister, Olof Palme, declared his support for a referendum, adding that a halt should be put on any further decisions regarding new reactors for a period of one year, while the Harrisburg incident was studied. The same day, the serving prime minister, Ola Ulsten, heavily dependent on SDP support in the Riksdag, joined Palme in his call for a referendum. There was disagreement between the parties as to the date when the referendum should be called. The Centre Party and the Communists wanted it to coincide with the general elections coming up in 1979. That was not a surprising position as the Harrisburg accident had highlighted all the concerns the Centre Party had been warning against and the nuclear issue could therefore be expected to further its position in the elections. However, for the very same reasons the other parties did not find this an attractive proposition. The SDP in



particular did not want to bring the nuclear issue into the election campaign, realizing that many of its supporters, especially the younger ones, had reservations about nuclear energy. On the contrary, the decision by the Social Democrats to go for a referendum was an obvious move to keep the nuclear issue out of the election campaign by providing a once-and-for-all forum to debate it - after the elections. Accordingly the referendum date was set for March 1980. This move can be said to have been almost a complete success, as the nuclear issue was hardly debated at all during the 1979 election campaign.

The elections were close and the bourgeois parties managed to maintain a narrow majority in the Riksdag. The Conservatives gained dramatically, receiving 73 seats as opposed to their previous 55. The Centre Party on the other hand suffered a loss of 22 seats bringing their parliamentary strength down to 64 seats. Apparently, the nuclear issue was completely divorced from the campaign and did not play a major role in determining party choice. Rather, the question of which parties could form a non-socialist coalition seemed more important to the voters.

The Swedes' first demand is for a government which can govern; not one which will do away with nuclear power. So far, they have not had one which has been able to do both. (Or, some would argue, either).<sup>188</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> Barnaby, 1979, p. 44.

It had been the nuclear issue which struck the fatal blow to the Faldin coalition, but now it seemed that this issue would be determined once and for all in a referendum. The non-socialist parties joined in a coalition, again under the leadership of Faldin. Disagreements still existed on energy policy, the dividing lines being the same as before. However, the SDP and the Liberals had gradually become to accept the twelve reactor program and no further expansion beyond that. Instead resources were put into the research and development of alternative energy sources. This 'softening' on nuclear power is reflected in the RADRUMSLAG or the 'time for reflection act' which was passed in May 1979 under the Liberal administration and stated that no new plants could be started before June 1980 (after the referendum).<sup>189</sup>

The very way in which the referendum question was posed also illustrates that even the pro-nuclear forces were taking environmental considerations into account. Thus the 'yes' alternative meant a completion of the reactors already under way but an eventual reassessment and facing down of nuclear energy in 25 years time - or as Barnaby chooses to call it: to 'do away with it but not yet'.<sup>190</sup> In spite of a vigorous campaign put on by the anti-nuclear forces before the campaign - largely through the 'Peoples Campaign Against Nuclear Power', an umbrella organization for some 45 dispa-

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<sup>189</sup> Abrahamson, 1979.

<sup>190</sup> Barnaby, 1980.

rate anti-nuclear groups - the voters opted for the 'yes' alternative on election day. The voters faced three choices in the referendum. The anti-nuclear position supported by the Centre Party and the 'Peoples Campaign Against Nuclear Power', called for a stop to further construction and a phasing out of nuclear energy in 10 years. The Social Democrats and the Liberals opted for the completion of six reactors under the supervision of the state and the municipalities, and a phasing out in 25 years. Industry and the Conservatives proposed the completion of the six reactors but without state and municipality control. The combined 'yes' vote amounted to just over 58 percent, 39.4 percent voting for the Social Democratic - Liberal option and 18.7 percent for the Conservative one. On the other hand some 38.6 percent voted for the anti-nuclear alternative.<sup>191</sup> Although the nuclear program was approved by the referendum, it was equally clear that there existed widespread and serious concerns about nuclear energy as the future energy solution. Thus it can be said that the climate in which the nuclear debate was conducted had changed significantly since it was first brought up in the early seventies. The position of the major parties, and the SDP in particular had moved in a direction of consciously depoliticizing the issue. James identifies this point when he in 1979 suggests that:

Present indicators are that the debate of the last few years has created an approximate consensus over the future of nuclear power in Sweden. This

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<sup>191</sup> Nilkin and Pollak, 1983, p. 187.

is to allow, on economic grounds and to overcome the difficulties of transition, existing reactors and those in an advanced state of construction to be used; but to reject for environmental reasons, any further development, instead putting large amounts of resources into the development of renewable energy sources and conservation.<sup>192</sup>

Clearly there had been a major change in the way in which the nuclear energy question was viewed from only ten years earlier, when it was seen - without controversy - as the future energy solution. Although the issue remains on the political agenda after the referendum and the 'Popular Campaign Against Nuclear Power' keeps up its fight against nuclear power, the issue has moved upstage and does not play a central role in Swedish politics, at least not with respect to coalition politics.

However, the controversy over nuclear energy was a direct contributor to the shifts and changes that occurred on the political scene in the seventies. The end of Social Democratic rule is, partly at least, due to the issue and thus the ensuing bourgeois coalition and also its downfall. Thus the nuclear issue was significant in creating the coalition situation which led to the formation of the Fälldin I government and it also turned out to be the issue which brought about the dissolution of that historical coalition. The question whether this was an isolated incident or whether a single issue of this kind is likely to have more far reaching consequences in the future remains unanswered. The simi-

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<sup>192</sup> James, 1979, p. 506.

larities of Sweden's and Norway's experiences of the nuclear and EEC issues respectively necessarily raises the question of the Scandinavian party systems' susceptibility to single issues and citizen's movements.

## Chapter V

### CONCLUSION.

In view of the preceding discussion it may be suggested that citizen's movements can significantly affect coalition politics. The examples of the anti-EEC movement and the anti-nuclear movement in Norway and Sweden demonstrate this. In Norway the downfall of the bourgeois coalition in 1971, the emergence of the caretaker coalition in 1972, and the changed line-up before the 1973 elections, can be directly traced to the EEC issue. Similarly, in Sweden, the nuclear issue was a major contributor to the fall of the Social Democrats in 1976 and thus for the formation of the first bourgeois coalition in recent history, as well as the dissolution of that very coalition in 1978.

However, it has become equally apparent that citizen's movements emerge as a response to the lack of response on behalf of the major political parties and the party system to certain kinds of issues. These issues are 'new' in that they have not been dealt with within the existing configuration of the parties and they might not even have been resolved within the parties themselves. Coalitions confine

themselves to a limited range of problems and deliberately leave out the issues that would jeopardize either party unity or the coalition. In both Norway and Sweden this agreement is easier to reach on economic and social questions, or problems that relate to the left-right continuum than on the urban-rural axis. Therefore coalition building concentrates on problems that unfold on left-right, while other issues are kept in the background. The EEC issue in Norway during the sixties is a perfect example of this, as the issue never came to the forefront of the political agenda of the coalition. Similarly, the Faldin I. coalition sought, through the Stipulation Act, to depoliticize the nuclear issue. Successful coalitions therefore depend on keeping such issues in the background and failing that, a can of worms has been opened and success turns into failure. Thus, once an issue receives a high enough profile, it creates a sense of urgency which forces it to be processed in some manner by the political system. It is here that the citizen's movements become significant. By popular involvement and organization outside the traditional channels of representation these movements are able to exert pressure on the parties and the party system to deal with issues which they are not ripe for. As a result the parties encounter difficulties both internally and with respect to their position viz a viz other parties.

To be sure, not all issues will receive high enough profile to be of importance to the party system and parliamentary and government coalitions. However, in the examples discussed above this was definitely the case. The reason for this is that while the left-right cleavage remains the single most important cleavage in Norway and Sweden, a secondary cleavage emerges or reemerges in the seventies.

We have explained the 'unusual' alliance patterns created by the EEC and nuclear issues by suggesting that it epitomizes divisions on a 'populist urban-rural cleavage' which emerged in the forefront and cross cut the more familiar left-right continuum. Borre, in his study of Scandinavian electoral instability, argues that since the fifties increasing electoral instability can be detected in these countries, culminating in the 'protest elections' of the early seventies.<sup>193</sup> His explanatory hypothesis relates to the age of the party system and its (in)ability to face new challenges. According to Borre, the Scandinavian party systems - founded in the first decades of this century - have been largely successful in maintaining economic growth and allocating its benefits to the disparate social groups. Thus there has developed with the established parties a tradition of pragmatism and a bid for the marginal votes of the centre. "Yet a generation later these parties begin to show signs of leaning too much on this tradition and to respond slowly to new ideas." Like

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<sup>193</sup> Borre, 1980.



elephants they turn around slowly'".<sup>194</sup> Clearly Borre's argument runs parallel to our contention of a 'social democratic consensus' and the faltering of that consensus through what we have called 'anti-politics'. Furthermore, as Borre points out, this view suggests that party systems undergo generational cycles, and periodically new parties and/or movements need to be accommodated and adjustments made in the older parties. The reason is, Borre argues, that:

The voters who identify with the leading parties in the flourishing phase of the system tend to make the system immune against competition from outside for the period until these voters have been succeeded in the electorate by other voters, to whom older parties have no particular superiority over new parties. At the same time the old parties get accustomed to the idea that they rule the nation and they turn their attention towards each other's maneuvers rather than toward movements in the public.<sup>195</sup>

Thus the consensus prior to 1970 on nuclear energy in Sweden and the unwillingness of the parties to bring the EEC question to the forefront in Norway, may be seen as an area where the older parties had become 'immune against outside criticism'. The significance, however, that the issues received can not be altogether accounted for merely by the anti-politics element or generational cycles that emerged in the seventies. The urban-rural cleavage which has been present in the systems from the beginning and is represented in the existence of of Centre Parties is particularly significant as the 'populist urban-rural cleavage' is in a sense

<sup>194</sup> Borre, 1980, p. 161.

<sup>195</sup> Borre, 1980, p. 162.

its legitimate offspring. The efforts of the Centre Parties to 'modernize' in the previous decade signify an attempt to capitalize and exploit the emerging discontent with the social democratic consensus via the traditional urban rural cleavage. Thus a fertile seedbed was already in place when the anti-politics element emerged on the political scene. It is therefore the combination of post-material and pre-material demands; the 'populist urban-rural cleavage' that accounts for the significance of the EEC and nuclear issues in coalition politics.

The Centre Parties, established parties in the party systems, exploited and articulated the rising environmental and decentralization concerns that emerged in the late sixties and early seventies, more so however, in Sweden than in Norway. This was, as we saw, not surprising given what the parties stand for and the structural changes that had been taking place in the post-war era. Simultaneously, the very same process of structural transformation and economic prosperity was creating what we have called the 'quality of life' tendency, or what in Borre's terminology can be called a generation that does not see the established political parties as superior to alternative political organizations. Both these elements crystallize in the opposition to the nuclear energy question and the EEC issue and it is unlikely that either of them by themselves would have had a comparable impact. Thus it is the interaction between the two which

explains the way in which these issues were able to dramatize coalition politics in the seventies. Initially, in Sweden, it was the anti-nuclear movement which was responsible for bringing the issue to the forefront. It was the Centre Party that rode the anti-nuclear wave into the leadership of the Faldin I. coalition. Then, once leading the coalition and faced with the practicalities of maintaining agreement the Centre Party was forced to make significant concessions and compromises. However, the Party could only go so far in ignoring the pressure from the anti-nuclear movement without completely discrediting itself and that was not far enough to save the coalition. In other words, the technical solution to a political problem which temporarily seemed to have resolved the situation in 1978, did not prove sufficient in face of the pressures brought to bear by the 'populist urban-rural' cleavage.

Similarly, in Norway the FOLKEBEVEGELSEN put on pressure to resolve the EEC issue and which led to the dissolution of the bourgeois coalition in 1971. It was also the FOLKEBEVEGELSEN which constituted the locus of opposition to the EEC in face of the divisions within and between the political parties right up to the referendum. The idea of a bourgeois majority coalition in Norway could not either cope with the pressure of a populist urban-rural cleavage.

At this juncture the question needs to be addressed whether or not the 'populist urban-rural' cleavage consti-

tutes a permanent dimension in Scandinavian politics or whether it is a more transient phenomenon. In the course of the paper we have repeatedly recognized the rapidity of economic structural changes and how this resulted in visible urban-rural contrasts, most clearly represented in the particular character of the Scandinavian multi-party system as it developed and 'froze' in the pre- WW II era. These urban-rural contrasts, however, manifest themselves not only in occupational and economic differences, but also in cultural, moral and political outlooks that persist far beyond the objective conditions they sprang from. Gordon Smith argues for a Western European trend towards a 'British type of urban homogeneity.' In particular he suggests that "the particularities of a specifically 'rural' outlook are likely to disappear in the development of urban society."<sup>196</sup> And with more direct reference to Scandinavia he continues:

With declining farm populations, a pure agrarian party is likely to become an anachronism, and this is partly conceded in the name change to Centre.....The old-type rural-urban conflict is losing its basis - a substantial farm population; increasingly issues are nationalized in the context of urban society and although the outcroppings of older conflict persist, they give way to the problems of imbalance. But this division is no longer a urban-rural split: it is a debate about the attraction of new industry and the rate of urbanization....<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> Smith, 1976, p.25.

<sup>197</sup> Smith, G. 1976, p.29.

To be sure, Smith is correct in suggesting a long term trend towards homogeneity, and prior to the seventies this was definitely the case. However, the increased significance of the urban-rural conflict in the seventies through becoming a 'populist urban-rural' conflict adds a new dimension to this development and there can be little doubt that its cross-cutting effect was of major significance for coalition politics. To that extent, the evidence runs counter to Smith's contention. On the other hand the development in the late seventies and early eighties points to the increased importance of left-right and greater polarization along this dimension. That in turn suggests that the 'populist urban-rural' cleavage was a temporary phenomena created by definite Norwegian and Swedish (Scandinavian) circumstances, i.e. the Scandinavian type of party system structured around three main pillars of cleavage, capital, labour, and agriculture; clearly identifiable 'establishment' party(ies); and rapid economic growth and prosperity coupled with structural changes. Therefore it seems reasonable to suggest that the populist urban-rural cleavage was indeed a temporary thing. The alliance of post- and pre-material demands, the 'populist urban-rural' cleavage which crystalized in the opposition to nuclear energy and the EEC, began to disintegrate once the nuclear issue was resolved in the referendum. Thus the nuclear issue provided a rallying point for a whole range of similar but not identical positions but in face of cross pressures from the left-right cleavage in declining economic conditions, the

'populist urban-rural' cleavage disappears from the centre of the national political agenda and ceases to be of significance for coalition politics.

# Appendix A

## ELECTIONS IN NORWAY AND SWEDEN

TABLE 1

Elections to the Swedish Riksdag (the Lower House)  
1932-1982, percentages of valid votes cast.(a)

	Con.	Centre	Lib.	Soc.Dem.	Com.	Others
1932	23.5	14.1	11.7	41.7	3.0	6.0 (b)
1936	17.6	14.3	12.9	45.9	3.3	6.0 (b)
1940	18.0	12.0	12.0	53.8	3.5	0.7
1944	15.9	13.6	12.9	46.7	10.3	0.6
1948	12.3	12.4	22.8	46.1	6.3	0.1
1952	14.4	10.7	24.4	46.1	4.3	0.1
1956	17.1	9.4	23.8	44.6	5.0	0.1
1958	19.5	12.7	18.2	46.2	3.4	0.0
1960	16.5	13.6	17.5	47.8	4.5	0.1
1964	13.7	13.2	17.0	47.3	5.2	3.6
1968	12.9	15.7	14.3	50.1	3.0	4.1
1970	11.5	19.9	16.2	45.3	4.8	2.2
1973	14.3	25.1	9.4	43.6	5.3	2.4
1976	15.6	24.1	11.1	42.7	4.8	1.7
1979	20.3	18.1	10.6	43.2	5.6	2.2
1982	23.6	15.5	5.9	45.6	5.6	3.8

(a) After 1970 the Riksdag became unicameral

(b) The 'Kilbom' group of the Communist party.

TABLE 2

Party distribution of seats in the Swedish Riksdag 1932-1982  
(a)

	Con.	Centre	Lib.	Soc.Dem.	Com.	Others
1932	108	54	47	162	2	7 (b)
1936	89	58	43	178	5	7 (b)
1940	77	52	38	209	4	-
1944	69	56	40	198	17	-
1948	47	51	75	196	11	-
1952	51	51	80	189	9	-
1956	55	44	88	185	9	-
1958	61	54	70	190	7	-
1960	58	54	73	191	7	-
1964	59	54	69	191	10	1
1968	55	60	61	204	4	-
1970	44	71	58	163	17	-
1973	51	90	34	156	19	-
1976	55	86	39	152	17	-
1979	73	64	38	154	20	-
1982	86	56	21	166	20	-

(a) After 1970 the Riksdag became unicameral

(b) The 'Kilbom' group of the Communist party.



TABLE 3

Elections to the Norwegian Storting 1930-81, percentages of valid votes cast.

	Con.	Lib.	Lab.	Centre	Cr. PP.	Com.	SPP	Others
1930	30.0	20.2	31.4	15.9	-	1.7	-	0.8 (a)
1933	21.8	17.1	40.1	13.9	0.8	1.8	-	4.6 (b)
1936	22.6	16.0	42.5	11.6	1.4	0.3	-	5.7
1945	17.0	13.8	41.0	8.1	7.9	11.9	-	0.3
1949	18.3	13.1	45.7	7.9	8.5	5.8	-	0.7
1953	18.6	10.0	46.7	9.1	10.5	5.1	-	-
1957	18.9	9.7	48.3	9.3	10.2	3.4	-	0.2
1961	20.0	8.8	46.8	9.4	9.6	2.9	-	0.1
1965	21.1	10.4	43.1	9.9	8.1	1.4	6.0	-
1969	19.6	9.4	46.5	10.5	9.4	1.0	3.5	0.1
1973	17.4	6.9	35.3	11.0	12.3	-	11.2(d)	5.9 (c)
1977	24.8	4.6	42.3	8.6	12.4	0.4	4.2(d)	2.7
1981	31.6	4.5	37.3	6.7	9.3	0.3	4.9	5.2 (e)

(a) Workers Democratic Party; National Liberals

(b) Workers Democratic Party; National Liberals; Commonwealth Party

(c) New Peoples Party; Anders Lange Party

(d) The Socialist Electoral Alliance

(e) Progress Party (Anders Lange Party)

TABLE 4

Party distribution of seats in the Norwegian Storting  
1932-1982

	Con.	Lib.	Lab.	Centre	Cr.PP.	Com.	SPP	Others
1930	41	33	47	25	-	-	-	4 (a)
1933	30	24	69	23	1	-	-	3
1936	36	23	70	18	2	-	-	1
1945	25	20	76	10	8	11	-	-
1949	23	21	85	12	9	-	-	-
1953	27	15	77	14	14	3	-	-
1957	29	15	78	15	12	1	-	-
1961	29	14	74	16	15	-	2	-
1965	31	18	68	18	13	-	2	-
1969	29	13	74	20	14	-	-	-
1973	29	2	62	21	20	-	16 (d)	5 (c)
1977	41	2	76	12	22	-	2	-
1981	54	2	65	11	15	-	-	4 (e)

(a) Workers Democratic Party (1); National Liberals (3)

(b) Workers Democratic Party (1); National Liberal Party (1);  
Commonwealth Party (1)

(c) New Peoples Party (1); Anders Lange Party (4)

(d) The Socialist Electoral Alliance

(e) The Progress Party (Anders Lange) (4)

Tables 1-4 are adopted from: Berglund (1980);  
Elder, Thomas, Arter (1982)

Berglund and Lindstrom (1978); Keesing's Contemporary  
Archives vol. XXIX (1983); Logue (1982)

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