

A Common Defence for Europe

by

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Abstract

One of the major analytical shortcomings regularly made by EU and NATO experts today lies with exclusively seeing the European defence project as a post-World War II (WWII) phenomenon and the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as mainly a post-Cold War product. No analyst has so far seriously explored the idea of European defence predating WWII and the 20th century. Instead, since 1999 one frequently reads and hears about the 'anomalous,' 'elusive' CSDP suddenly complicating transatlantic relations. But the CSDP is hardly an oddity or aberration, and it is certainly not as mysterious as some might suggest. Drawing extensively from primary sources and predicated on an overarching evolutionist approach, this thesis shows that the present CSDP is an ephemeral security and defence concept, only the latest of its kind and full of potential. Drawing its deepest ideational roots from the (pre-)Enlightenment era, the CSDP leads to a pan-European defence almost irreversibly. A common defence for Europe is quite possible and, due to the growing impact of the exogenous (multipolar) momentum, can be realized sooner rather than later even without a full-fledged European federation.

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When it comes to the substance of this particular work, Dr. Fergusson's merit is threefold. First, by posing the lucid question "What is this 'beast' CSDP?," he not only spotlighted the subject of this thesis early on, thereby helping me to focus on its true essence and prospects, but he also inspired me, in his own authentic way, to write much beyond what is necessary to fulfill the formal requirements of a Master's degree in Political Studies. Second, his consistent, well-informed, and, at times, friendly advice was quite instrumental in that it helped me organize my pre-existing knowledge and thoughts about the EU/CSDP project. Finally, through numerous meetings Dr. Fergusson managed to get me, as he loves to say, "out of the weeds" of various discussions about ephemeral and/or less important issues relative to CSDP capabilities, operations, and strategic culture. Therefore, he is the one to be credited the most for the incorporation

into this thesis of a separate chapter (Ch 3) revealing the EU's emerging strategy for security and defence along with intermittent reminders of the underlying transatlantic tensions (the Anglo-American vs. the Franco-German model).

In this context, I would also like to thank the two other members of my examining committee, Professors Stephan Jaeger and Royce Koop, for taking the time to read and reflect on this relatively lengthy graduate work and for their helpful suggestions on how to improve the final text. As for contributions by members of the CSDP expert community, what is noteworthy here is the fact that in 2012 I benefited from a brief intellectual exchange with preeminent experts such as Frédéric Mérand and Jolyon Howorth.

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Given that a significant portion of the research, discussion, and arguments incorporated into this thesis is predicated on my previous professional experience, at this point I cannot but express my sincere gratitude to my former employer, Macedonia's Secretariat for European Affairs. Between 2005 and 2009, the latter gave me an unmatched opportunity to explore the CFSP/CSDP phenomenon from within a vanguard government structure and a recognized 'EU cell.'

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To Igor Todosiev

A bosom companion who was larger than life

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INTRODUCTION

When looking at the European Union's strategic rise over the past two decades, one is very likely to ask oneself: "What is this 'beast' CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy)? Where does it really come from, and where exactly is it heading to?"

Fifteen years have passed since the CSDP's formal inception with its pre-2009 form the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) and more than twenty since the EU security and defence policy was inaugurated in Maastricht with the backing of the now-defunct Western European Union (WEU).¹ Today, just as then, the contemporary prototypes of common European defence puzzle far too many relevant observers, from various academics and policy makers to some of the world's top strategists.

Those insufficiently familiar with the CSDP, a great majority including mainly the general public, are thought to be "either [ignorant of]...or...bemused by" the idea of European defence and how the latter has materialized in practice, especially in the post-Cold War world.² Meanwhile, the privileged 'few' who know what this complex strategic enterprise is all about are compelled to tell essence-capturing metaphors whenever presenting it to a broader audience. One such metaphor, for instance, depicts the CSDP as a unique, diversified, and potentially harmonious "jazz band," known and understood only by a limited group of "connoisseurs."³

1. Prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 the CSDP had a less elaborate form known as ESDP. The latter was formally established by the European Council following the December 1998 Saint-Malo declaration on European defence autonomy.

2. Borja Lasheras *et al.*, *European Union Security and Defence White Paper: A Proposal* (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010), 2, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07075.pdf>.

3. Ibid.

Unfortunately, this ‘band’ continues to be downplayed and ridiculed by the well-established orthodox ‘bands’ and the reason is always the same: its endemic incoherence, distinct approach, and lack of real capabilities. More essentially, however, people have been troubled by the ambiguous and somewhat esoteric narrative created by CSDP insiders and those within the broader EU orbit. The majority of non-EU strategists, be they NATO-minded or simply preoccupied with regional issues and national security priorities away from Europe, do not really know what to make of the present CSDP. In wavering whether and/or how to set their minds on it, they tend to (mis)perceive its ephemeral form as “a mere [historical] anomaly”⁴ and an “elusive” politico-military phenomenon with debatable prospects.⁵

But the CSDP is hardly an oddity or aberration, and it is certainly not as mysterious as some might suggest. It is enough to note that many secondary sources on European security and defence and the leading experts in the field occasionally fail to distinguish between the European Council and Council of Ministers of the European Union, or between Single European Act and Maastricht Treaty, or between the latter and the Lisbon amendments. Prone to terminological errors and conceptual inconsistencies, CSDP intellectuals are sometimes no more helpful in informing the public than is a superficial journalist, an unenlightened politician, or an analyst whose primary research interest lies far from Brussels.

4. Hanna Ojanen, “European Defence: Functional Transformation Under Way,” in *European Security since the Fall of the Berlin Wall*, ed. Frédéric Mérand, Martial Foucault, and Bastien Irondelle (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 149-50.

5. Alexander Moens, “NATO’s Dilemma and the Elusive European Defence Identity,” *Security Dialogue* 29, no. 4 (1998): 463-75; Simon Duke, *The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP* (Basingstoke, UK/New York, NY: Macmillan Press Ltd./St. Martin’s Press Inc., 2000); and Alexander Justice Moore, “Too Much Information: Europe’s Successful Security Regime and its Elusive European Rapid Reaction Force,” *Defense Concepts* 5, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 72-93; and Kees Homan and Jan Rood, “The Elusive European Army,” *Clingendael Opinion*, December 13, 2013, <http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/elusive-european-army?lang=nl>.

The widespread lack of comprehensive and nuanced knowledge of the several decades-old EU fundamentals, as well as of the various elements and echelons within the Union's security and defence establishment, should normally be dispiriting. Yet, the irritating perplexities surrounding the EU/CSDP project have always been a great alibi in this regard, while also instigating fear and hyperbolic thinking.

Thus, on the one hand, one could still hear whinging from orthodox circles that the CSDP "is a complicated subject," purportedly the most repulsive in the field of strategic and security studies, and that "it is hard for American observers (even for European ones) to get a firm grip on these developments and their implications"⁶ since there is "only a limited number of people on both sides of the Atlantic [who] have penetrated to the heart of the issue."⁷

On the other hand, the "'heroic' claims" of the CSDP as a hazardous and potentially uncontrollable "military monster" also cannot be entirely suppressed.⁸ For their geopolitical essence, the enduring fear of a German-led Europe, has been stored in neither more nor less than the Pentagon's and the US intelligence community's sub-consciousness. Furthermore, while authors like Howorth make reasonable efforts to refute such claims by stressing the particularly complex EU structure and decision making in the sensitive realm of security and defence, the fact is that the EU/CSDP's restlessly evolving institutional conglomerate has become quite impressive. For the impressed Europeanists, the current absence of a hard-power disposition on the part of Europe is not an issue whatsoever; the sheer magnitude and potential of a "wiring

6. James Thompson, foreword to *The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO's Companion – or Competitor?*, by Robert E Hunter (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2002), iv.

7. Hunter, *NATO's Companion – or Competitor?*, 5-6.

8. Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 90-91.

diagram” as massive as the present CSDP seems to be a sufficiently good reason for optimism.⁹

No doubt, the CSDP has grown into a kind of social octopus, constantly spreading its tentacles, both functionally and geographically. Rather than being a true military monster, it currently bedevils great powers as a politically unpredictable and socially entangled aggregate.¹⁰ But why is this aggregate, which has recently been well researched by European security experts falling under the ‘constructivist’ banner, so relevant in geostrategic terms? Is it just because it is that grandiose?

The present CSDP is actually just a minor part of an evolving pan-continental medium that encouraged the promotion of the idea of common European defence long before the post-WWII European integration. Yet, even so, it features a rich societal dimension presently embodied in an asymmetric defence and security network. Inspired by this large and yet growing web, Frédéric Mérand puts forward an important perspective of “CSDP as a social field.”¹¹ According to this “3 in 1” perspective (institutionalist/structuralist/balance of power) and concomitant approaches predicated on organization and social networks theories, what has lately been perceived as a ‘dead’ CSDP (2009-2013) is actually quite the contrary; a lively social ‘beast’ apparently impossible to destroy.¹²

9. George Robertson, “Sécurité et Interdépendence,” *Politique Etrangère*, no. 4 (1999): 863-66, quoted in *Ibid.*, 62; and speech, “NATO at Fifty” Conference, RUSI, London, March 9, 1999, <http://nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990309a.htm>, quoted in *Ibid.*, 62.


10. See Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, eds., *Europe Deploys: Towards a Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, Egmont Paper 49 (Brussels: Academia Press/Egmont –The Royal Institute for International Relations, 2011), 12, <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/ep49.pdf>.

11. Frédéric Mérand, “Is CSDP Dead?” (presentation, 28th Political Studies Students’ Association (PSSA) Conference, “20 Years of Western Military Intervention: Protecting Whose Right(s)?,” University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, February 2, 2012).

12. *Ibid.*; Frédéric Mérand, Stephanie C. Hofmann, and Bastien Irondele, “Social Networks in the European Security and Defense Policy” (presentation, 10th Congress of Association Française de Science Politique, Grenoble, France, September 2009), <http://www.congresafsp2009.fr/sectionsthematiques/st21/st21merand2.pdf>; and “Transgovernmental Networks in European Security and Defence Policy,” in “Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European

As might be assumed, the ‘beast’s’ size, growth and transgovernmental processes can be generally scrutinized on two interrelated levels. First, there is the elaborate anatomy of the Brussels-based mechanism as illustrated by the chart below.

Figure 1. 2014 CFSP/CSDP Mechanism



Security and Defence Policy,” ed. Sophie Vanhoonacker, Hylke Dijkstra, and Heidi Maurer, special issue, *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)* 14, no. 1 (2010): Art. 5, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-005a.htm>.

LEGEND

1. **The President of the European Council**, sometimes mistakenly referred to as “President of the European Union” (no such office/title exists though) is elected for a once renewable, two-and-a-half-year term. Having replaced the presidency rotation system within the European Council, this high office ensures the preparation and drives forward the work of all EU summits.

2. **The Council of Ministers of the EU (a.k.a. “the Council”)** may refer important and contentious matters to **the European Council** for a unanimous decision. Most observers, from EU outsiders to top strategists, regularly confound “the Council” with **the European Council** without realizing that such practice is technically incorrect. Under the treaties, “the Council” is a short reference only for the ministerial formations in Brussels.

3. **The European Council (EC) is the EU’s highest political institution** (formerly referred to as “the highest political organ”). It identifies the Union’s strategic interests and objectives, defines general guidelines mainly through conclusions and declarations (and ex common strategies), and takes seminal decisions.

4. **The Council of Ministers of the EU**, which tends to be seen as the “upper house” of EU legislature—the European Parliament being “the lower”—is the Union’s greatest decision maker in quantitative terms. Hence, most of Brussels’ implementing decisions regarding the CFSP/CSDP are taken at this level (since 1992, the Council has implemented the EC’s strategic guidelines via common positions [CELEX/Eur-lex code E], joint actions [CELEX/Eur-lex code E], and decisions sui generis [CELEX/Eur-lex code D]). In this context, it is always good to reiterate that no legislative (legally-binding) acts are adopted in the field of the CFSP/CSDP (formerly known as “pillar two”). Unanimity remains the predominant decision-making principle in the broader realm of the CFSP and apparently the sole rule *apropos* the CSDP. Yet, having gradually penetrated into the strategic domain, most notably after Lisbon, qualified majority (QMV) now applies to decisions concerning the EU’s defence institutional set-up.

5. **COREPER** does the massive preparatory work (the agenda) for all Council meetings except those of the Agriculture Council. By working in two different formations, it decides upon both highly political (COREPER II) and more technical (COREPER I) issues.

6. **The PSC/COPS** is the heart and engine of the whole mechanism. It provides indispensable liaison between the top political and decision-making echelon and the lower diplomatic, strategic, and operational levels. More specifically, it monitors and analyzes the international situation providing the Council with valuable input and strategic advice. With regard to crisis management, the PSC is responsible, under the Council’s authority, for political control and strategic direction of all CSDP operations. In this context, it seeks and receives military advice from **the EU Military Committee (EUMC) which is assisted by the EU Military Staff (EUMS)**. Based on such input, the PSC discusses and evaluates the available strategic-military options as well as the Operation Concept and the Operation Plan (OPLAN) before submitting them to the Council. When the time comes to launch a military operation, the PSC sends the Council a recommendation based on the EUMC’s advice and its own assessment. Once the operation kicks off, the PSC takes mission-relevant decisions under the Council’s authority. For its patient search for consensus in a club-like atmosphere and its pro-active role in EU foreign policy, the PSC is rightfully considered the strongest Europeanist cell within the CFSP/CSDP complex. It is therefore often cited as an exemplar of *esprit de corps* and the most powerful generator of European strategic culture.

7. **The EUMC** gives strategic-military advice (opinions, recommendations) to the PSC and **the HR for FASP/VP (the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission)**. Its permanent **Chairman (CEUMC)**, who presides over both **MilRep (Military Representatives)** and **CHOD (Chiefs of Defence)** meetings, represents it at many EU and NATO levels including the EU Council of Ministers. It should be underlined here that the EU’s “highest military body [has been formally] set up within the Council,” rather than within the EEAS as might be wrongly inferred from the illustration above. In this sense, **only its Chairman can be considered part of the EEAS’s structure**.

8. Led by a three-star general, **the EUMS** assists the EUMC and maintains **the EU cell at SHAPE** (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe).

9. **The EEAS** is mainly made up of former employees of the Council’s Secretariat and the Commission and specialists from the national foreign ministries. In 2012, this hybrid diplomatic service employed **a total of 3611 people**. Of these, **1643 were permanent staff**. The **remaining 1968 were just temporary employees** such as nationally seconded experts, contract agents, and local delegation staff. The staff ratio between the EEAS headquarters in Brussels and EU Delegations was 1551 to 2060. Being a large, pervasive body, the EEAS encompasses **the Union’s crisis management (civil-military) apparatus**, also referred to as “**Security Policy and CSDP Structures**.” However, with an annual budget as low as €487.5 million, the EU foreign service cannot even get close to its US counterpart.

10. Four completed CSDP operations are somehow regularly missed by those drafting CSDP mission charts and listings. These are the EUMM in former Yugoslavia, which actually began as EUCM W. Balkans as early as 1991, then, the EUSR BST Georgia, which ended in February 2011, as well as the missions that preceded EULEX Kosovo and EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the EUPM and EUNAVCO respectively. Even the official EU portal (the EEAS’s website <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/>) does not provide accurate information in this regard.

Given the above, by the end of 2013 the EU had actually launched a total of 33 missions, not 29 as would be counted if one were to consult the EEAS’s website and other official sources. Of the 33, 17 had been completed and 16 were ongoing. As is well known, one CSDP operation (EUFOR Libya) was decided upon in April 2011 but was never launched. In recent years, the total number of civilian and military personnel deployed on CSDP missions has remained about the same, that is around 7000. For *instance*, at one point in 2012, the total (international and local) staff of EU civilian and military missions was 7707 (3956 and 3751 respectively).

2014 brought about three new CSDP missions: the combat-ready EUFOR RCA and the civilian EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUAM Ukraine. Thus, **the total number of missions in the CSDP crisis management portfolio now comes to 37 (36+1)**. Of these, less than one third (10+1, five completed and five ongoing) can be deemed pure military endeavours and a couple or so have occasionally been considered integral (e.g. the EU support for AMIS II, the EU SSR Guinea Bissau, and perhaps the EUSEC RD Congo). The remaining 23 to 26 missions have all received a “civilian” label, albeit some of them, namely “*those few... very limited in scope and size (all... between 40 and 50 strong)*,” were or have been reinforced by adequate military expertise. A rare graph displaying all CSDP missions hitherto can be found at <http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-chart>.

*After Croatia’s admission to the EU and the recent elections, **the European Parliament** has been made up of **751 Members**.

There are **over 150 different committees, sub-committees, and working groups at this level.

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Nevertheless, what definitely deserves thorough attention from an analytical and policymaking aspect is the much broader and highly intertwined CSDP web that spans across the old continent encompassing as many as four categories of entities and interests:

- European and US defence industry groups and credit insurance magnates;
- the national governments primarily of “the big three” (UK, France and Germany), their foreign and defence ministries, specialized departmental/ministerial bodies, offices, programs, and projects, as well as their parliaments and political parties;
- the Brussels-based CSDP mechanism and its ties to NATO committees and military command structure; and finally
- NGOs, informal expert groups, quasi-official and intergovernmental think tanks, and Europe-wide military associations.¹³

Today, as the world faces an emerging security environment the ‘beast’ is rendered all the more invisible next to a revitalized NATO. Coping with logic and irony at the same time, Berlin might finally realize that “It Is High Time” to boost the EU/CSDP’s own *raison d’être*.¹⁴

Unfortunately, today one cannot even get a straightforward academic answer about the true nature and prospects of European defence. While, on the one hand, the expert

13. See Mérand, Hofmann, and Irondelle, “Social Networks;” “Transgovernmental Networks;” and Sophie Vanhoonacker, Hylke Dijkstra, and Heidi Maurer, “Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy: The State of the Art,” in “Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy,” ed. Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra, and Maurer, special issue, *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)* 14, no. 1 (2010): Art. 4, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2010-004.pdf>.

14. Andreas Schockenhoff and Roderich Kiesewetter, “Strengthening Europe’s Ability to Act in the Area of Security Policy: It is High Time,” German Bundestag Policy Paper, Berlin, May 30, 2012, <http://www.johannes-varwick.de/rauf/gsvp-papier-englisch-8-6-12.pdf>.

community has recognized the need for more flexible, pluralistic, and hybrid approaches to exploring and theorizing CSDP in order to peel away the crust and disguise of this delicate phenomenon, on the other hand, the bulk of CSDP-related research remains buried in the past 20 to 30 years. For instance, in analyzing European security in general and CSDP in particular, the newer generation of European security thinkers, often debatably subsumed under the constructivist banner, displays respectable research pluralism, including a phenomenological approach to the very notion of security.¹⁵ By cautiously invoking Thomas Khun's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, they even claim leadership in "a soft paradigmatic shift" inspired by Europe's unique strategic setting as opposed to the old laws of power politics still governing the Eurasian chessboard and other parts of the world.¹⁶ This paradigmatic shift, they admit, may be exceptional and thus far limited to the currently "in-flux" European strategic studies.¹⁷ Nonetheless, apart from problems related to theoretical fragmentation vis-à-vis practical research priorities,¹⁸ this 'new-wave' expertise on European security and defence shows little evolutionist sense, failing to track the roots of CSDP all the way back to the early days of the Cold War let alone the pre-Dunkirk period.

It is also problematic that constructivists exploit *per definition* mainly the first two Waltzian levels of analysis.¹⁹ Attempting to demonstrate a more holistic research pattern, they focus *inter alia* on individual threat/risk perceptions, securitized low politics, a

15. See Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, eds. *European Security*.

16. Frédéric Mérand, Bastien Irondelle, and Martial Foucault, "Theorizing Change in the European Security Environment," in Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, *European Security*, 12-21.

17. Ibid.

18. See Martial Foucault, Bastien Irondelle, and Frédéric Mérand, "The Dynamics of European Security," in Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, *European Security*, 303-7.

19. In his 2012 presentation entitled "Is CSDP Dead?" Mérand's argument for the CSDP's survival and further rise is largely based on structural theories. Being one of them, the realist doctrine of the balance of power emphasizes the relevance of the exogenous momentum in an emerging multipolar environment and thus pushes EU members towards pooling their strategic resources.

Europe-wide societal dimension of security, as well as national variables and strategic cultural divergences.²⁰ It would not be far from the truth to say that challenging the dominant paradigm in strategic and security studies has limited prospects. Europe underwent a minor supranational revolution as early as 1951 and today their object of focus is actually a maturing body politic entering a realist, multipolar context.

On top of all, realist stereotypes about Europe's internal mess and incapacity, which now flourish thanks to the financial and socio-political turmoil all across the old continent, quite ironically, prevent their holders and many others from showing a better appreciation of the *multipolar moment*. They actually prevent many from figuring out that, the lessons learned from its internal crisis, in addition to the unfolding *exogenous momentum*, are rather an opportunity for Europe. It is good, yet insufficient to see in this context how the community of critical security thinkers, with their soft, rich, and reflexive approach, engage reconstructed and adapted (neo)realists in explaining as many aspects of European security as possible.²¹ Therefore, the result is a pile of short-sighted, often repetitive analyses on CSDP distracted by consequences and ephemeral problems rather than *permissive* causes.

Although European defence and security can be quite a frustrating theme, CSDP is neither a doomed ontological anomaly, nor a totally new, 'post-modern' actor as,

20. See Frédéric Mérand, "Soldiers and Diplomats: The Institutionalization of the European Security and Defence Policy, 1989-2003" (PhD diss. University of California at Berkeley, 2003); "Is CSDP Dead?," Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, eds., *European Security*; Mérand, Hofmann, and Irondelle, "Social Networks;" "Transgovernmental Networks;" Vanhoonaeker, Dijkstra, and Maurer, "Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy;" Bastian Giegerich, *European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and Defence Policy*, Düsseldrofer Schriften zu Internationaler Politik und Völkerrecht 1 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006); *European Military Crisis Management: Connecting Ambition and Reality*, Adelphi Paper 397 (Abingdon, UK: Routledge for IISS, 2008); and Christoph O. Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

21. For some (neo)realist studies on the subject see Sten Rynning, "European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture," *Security Dialogue* 34, no. 4 (December 2003): 479-96; "Geopolitics and the Atlantic Alliance," in Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, *European Security*, 173-92; and Stefanie von Hlatky and Michel Fortmann, "Nuclear Weapons in Today's Europe: The Debate that Nobody Wants," in Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, *European Security*, 82-101.

respectively, orthodox analysts and constructivists would like to believe in order to win the debate over each other. As an ambitious attempt at profoundly explaining the nature and prospects of the EU's CSDP, this thesis, drawing heavily on primary sources and based on a hybrid evolutionist approach, addresses three fundamental questions: where does the CSDP really come from, what is its present status, and where exactly is it heading to?

GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE PROJECT: FROM THE EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The ambitious establishment in the late 1990s of what is now referred to as CSDP generated an immense amount of literature on EU-NATO relations in general and European defence and security in particular. The primary value of this literature remains in its effort to explain what the CSDP is all about and where this evolving enterprise is heading. Nevertheless, the bulk of the accumulating transatlantic and CSDP-specific readings have been much better at chronologically describing the European defence and security integration since the great wars than revealing the CSDP's essence and ultimate prospects.

One of the major analytical shortcomings regularly made by EU and NATO experts today lies with exclusively seeing the European defence project as a post-World War II (WWII) phenomenon and CSDP as mainly a post-Cold War product.¹ No analyst has so far seriously explored the idea of such defence predating WWII and the 20th century. Instead, since 1999 one frequently reads and hears about the 'anomalous,' 'elusive' CSDP suddenly complicating transatlantic relations. This is rather surprising for two reasons. First, the idea of European (con)federation, which predates even the

1. See for instance Michael Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation: Asset or Threat to NATO?* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 1; Hunter, *NATO's Companion – or Competitor?*; Jolyon Howorth, "Why ESDP is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance?," in *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy*, ed. Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 221; *Security and Defence Policy*, 4, 11-14, 33-60, quoted in Ojanen, "European Defence," in Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, *European Security*, 149; Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler, "The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy," in Howorth and Keeler, *Defending Europe*, 3-21; and Independent Task Force, *European Defence: A Proposal for a White Paper* (Paris: EU ISS, 2004), 22, 37-45, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/wp2004.pdf>.

Enlightenment, has been examined not only by the introductory literature on Eurointegration and advanced studies on the EU's future but, first and foremost, by the much older and pervasive International Relations (IR) literature. Second, looking back in order to shed additional light to an important politico-military phenomenon at present entails no paradigm shift. On the contrary, a profound, evolutionist approach to the European defence phenomenon is useful and consistent with both orthodox IR and Strategic and Security Studies (SSS) and the newer, mainly European and Canadian approaches to CSDP aligned with a critical tradition.

This is not to say that existing CSDP knowledge is wrong. It is just that such knowledge, while growing steadily, is still insufficient to provide complete and concise responses when challenged by a simple question: "What is this 'beast' called CSDP?" Hence, experts are quite right to say that "the existing layer of theoretical work [on CSDP]...is still rather thin."²

There are always good reasons to avoid exploring the link between today's CSDP and the early Enlightenment conceptions of a European body politic based on common defence. Unfortunately, in so doing, the expert community has deprived itself of a genuine source for thoroughly understanding the CSDP's deepest historical and socio-cultural roots and, more importantly, the potential direction of the now very complicated and rather ambiguous defence and security architecture within the EU.

Of course, when it comes to SSS, a good reason for not thinking of CSDP in the context of some federalist peace projects drafted during the Renaissance and subsequent Enlightenment is their predominant political engineering short of explicit strategy and coherent military thought. Besides, even the general literature on Eurointegration seldom

2. Ojanen, "European Defence" in Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, *European Security*, 149.

digs deep inside history to quote Eurocentric calls by Voltaire or Erasmus, and instead repeats the cliché regarding the well-known contribution of Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, and other EU founding fathers.

In order to reveal where the CSDP truly comes from and to, once and for all, put an end to superficial views of it as an irregular post-Cold War construct, this chapter attempts to stir up and complement the debate on the pre-1989 evolution of the European defence project in two ways: first, by challenging the standard perception of such project as a post-WWII phenomenon, and second, by revisiting the process of its implementation during the Cold War. Two Enlightenment works deserve a mention in this context, though the original Europeanists of the Renaissance, such as Henry IV and his minister the Duke of Sully, are arguably the first to have offered hints on a common defence within a strong European *foedus*: *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* by Charles-Irénée Castel Abbé de Saint-Pierre, originally published in 1713, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's summary critique of Saint-Pierre's peace plan.

Both draw attention to quintessential issues relative to the composition, role, and use of armed force in a united Europe.³ Given the subsequent development of liberal and fascist versions of the concept of united Europe, the author also feels intrigued to touch upon the mainly implicit treatment of the idea of European defence during the fascist-modernist era (1860-1945). Finally, while recapitulating the milestones and stressing the

3. See Charles-Irénée Castel Abbé de Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*, tome I (Utrecht: Antoine Schouten/Marchand Libraire, 1713), <http://archive.org/stream/projetpourrendr00saingoog#page/n339/mode/2up>; *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*, tome II (Utrecht: Antoine Schouten/Marchand Libraire, 1713), <http://books.google.ca/books?id=3XlbpGP3vgC&pg=PA217&dq=Projet+Pour+Rendre+La+Paix+Perpetuelle+En+Europe+Tome+2&hl=en&sa=X&ei=IsgqUs3eJtCuyAGE-IDoBg&ved=0CDsQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false>; *Abrégé du projet de paix perpétuelle, Inventé par le Roi Henri le Grand, Approuvé par le Reine Elisabeth, par le Roi Jacques fon Successeur, par le Republics et par divers autres Potentats* (Rotterdam: Jean Daniel Beman, 1729), <http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?u=1&num=30&seq=5&view=image&size=100&id=ucm.5323838993&q1=Commissaires>; and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe and the State of War*, trans. and ed. C. E. Vaughan (London: Constable and Company Limited, 1917; repr. on demand, BLTM Books, 2011).

related Europeanist and Atlanticist aspects of Europe's defence integration during the Cold War, this chronological analysis (unlike most works on the subject) elaborates in greater detail the somewhat overlooked European Defence Community (EDC) project of the 1950s.

1.1. The Eurocentric Strategic Thought of Saint-Pierre & Rousseau

In attempting to devise institutionalist strategies to save the old continent from renewed carnage in a balance-of-power age, Saint-Pierre (1658 - 1743) and Rousseau (1712 - 1778) produced more than just political schemes for establishing a Christian Commonwealth in Europe. Integral to their (con)federalist vision of a peaceful and united Europe is their thinking on a common European defence. Such military thought, albeit scattered throughout their seminal works, provides at least implicit responses to some of the most pressing issues faced by the complex and incoherent CSDP today.

Within a broad discussion on establishing a Grand European Alliance, including *inter alia* twelve fundamental, eight important, and eight useful articles, as well as five articles as part of the abbreviated version of his peace project, Saint-Pierre outlines the Alliance's defence pillar. On a decision-making level, there is a War Committee as one of the four standing subsidiary bodies attached to the Alliance Senate that is responsible for politico-strategic direction and control of Allied troops.⁴ The Allied (confederal) military force coexists with limited national troops, guarding mainly Europe's eastern and southern frontiers at peace and led in war by an Allied commander-in-chief ("Généralissime") who should have no direct connection with sovereign families or

4. Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle*, tome II, 302-3.

formidable legal authority.⁵ In addition, the national contingents in soldiers and money are to be governed by the principles of equity and proportionality.⁶

Like all the crucial proposals in Saint-Pierre's plan, the role and posture of the Alliance's troops, as well as the advantages of a supranational defence system in general, are explained through a careful examination of possible objections and counter-arguments. The functions of effective deterrence and common defence against external aggression are arguably among the least debatable advantages of the Grand Alliance project, even in the context of allied peripheral states. Whereas no sovereign is allowed to take up arms, except against declared enemies of the Alliance, all of them are bound to defend compliant sovereigns in case of an external attack. Though the Alliance is primarily envisioned as a status quo design that guarantees by constitution the hereditary thrones of all acceding and loyal members of the Alliance without regularly interfering in a sovereign's internal affairs,⁷ Saint-Pierre is nevertheless cautious enough to put forward both preventive and punitive arrangements against potential deviations. In terms of prevention, no prince is allowed to keep more than 6,000 troops at peace,⁸ and all sovereigns may be checked by Alliance Commissioners to be routinely sent to inspect their declared revenues and armies, to witness their political conduct, to notify about a potential military build-up, as well as to investigate and prevent cases of local contempt and conspiracies.⁹ For worst-case scenarios such as local rebellions against sovereign courts or aggressive princes undermining the Alliance in various ways Saint-Pierre

5. Ibid., 294-96, 303, 308-9, 316-19.

6. Ibid., 309-10, 311-16; and Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle*, tome I, 345-48, 373-74. Here, Saint-Pierre proposes a dual formula: financial contributions to the common budget as a proportion of national revenues and economic might and national military contingents of absolutely equal size.

7. Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle*, tome I, 291.

8. Ibid., 331, 373-74.

9. Ibid., 364-72; and Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle*, tome II, 308-9.

assigns the Allied force a punitive, interventionist role.¹⁰ This role is not merely internal and defensive, for performing it may also require power projection against non-allied parts of Europe and its immediate neighbourhood to promote Grand Alliance security, enlargement, and continental peace.

More specifically, Christian Europe is to be “une Alliance offensive et défensive.”¹¹ Provided that it unites at least 14 European powers (or more precisely, 14 votes), such an Alliance, while evolving, has a legitimate right and obligation to wage war against the rest of Europe’s Christian rulers who refuse to join and are thereupon considered enemies.¹² Moreover, it upholds the right to take up arms against all the “Mahometans voisins de l’Europe” who have refused to sign with it “des Traitez de Ligue offensive & défensive” and thereby guarantee Europe’s peace and security.¹³ After integrating the Turks, Moroccans, and Algerians as its associate members (“Associez”),¹⁴ the Alliance should work towards spreading its model into other regions such as Asia (“Union Asiatique”).¹⁵ In this sense, if some of its neighbours are at war with each other, they can count on its *bona fide* services (mediation, arbitration, and guarantees) to address all ongoing quarrels and future issues.¹⁶

One of the most prominent arguments recurring throughout Saint-Pierre’s work is the financial savings benefit inherent to a common defence system and posited as “Avantage I.”¹⁷ Saint-Pierre repeatedly asserts that the Grand Christian Alliance, by its very existence, would render a drastic decrease in national military spending, with ordinary

10. Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle*, tome I, 290, 293-95, 326-27, 330-31, 368-69; and *Abrégé du projet de paix perpétuelle*, 30, 79, 107.

11. Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle*, tome I, 282, 285.

12. Ibid., 282-3; and *Abrégé du projet de paix perpétuelle*, 140-41.

13. Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle*, tome I, 283, 285.

14. Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle*, tome II, 312.

15. Ibid., 316-19.

16. Ibid., 308.

17. Saint-Pierre, *Abrégé du projet de paix perpétuelle*, 107.

(peacetime) costs cut by up to half (e.g. in France) or greater and wartime budgets totally eliminated for most of the time.¹⁸ Perhaps the strongest advantage of his project works for the princes' real interests: increased revenue and an extended list of civil expenditure among other things.

Rousseau's interpretation and subsequent critique of Saint-Pierre's peace concept does not deviate far, if at all, from the grand-strategic solutions' enshrined in such concept. In his 'own' work of five articles, which very much correspond with the "cinq Articles fondamentaux" from the condensed version of Saint-Pierre's plan,¹⁹ Rousseau endorses Saint-Pierre's general idea of European defence. On a political level he preserves the concept of *Diète* (Diet), whose decrees, if resisted by an allied power or local rebels, "shall...be enforced by a federal army."²⁰ Such army is made up of national contingents and is mainly responsible for guarding Europe's frontiers against external aggression. With obsolete internal basing and anticipated budget savings, the defence of Europe's periphery is readily strengthened through new and reinforced borderline fortifications.²¹ In case of foreign invasion, the federal troops deployed along European borders respond to the call, while the heart of Europe remains at peace. In Rousseau's thought, Europe's federal army and borders have a profound strategic meaning as they are also envisaged to be the military "école de l'Europe," particularly in time of war, where military genius is to be cultivated and European military art nurtured.²²

18. See for instance Ibid., 1-10, 21-22, 30-32, 37-38, 45, 76-77, 107, 109-10, 127, 209-10. According to Saint-Pierre (*Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle*, tome II, 318-19), a subsequent project for an Asian Union, which, he thought, could be more feasible than a European equivalent, would render obsolete even markedly diminished, regular defence spending.

19. See Ibid., 4, 21-35.

20. Rousseau, *Lasting Peace*, 12, 66, 82. By drafting a near-equivalent to Article IV of Saint-Pierre's abbreviated plan Rousseau carries forward the idea of a justifiably hard-handed Union launching interventions against all public enemies "proscribed" or "put to the ban of Europe." Ibid., 63.

21. Ibid., 82-83.

22. Ibid., 83-85.

In terms of defence economics, Rousseau reaffirms Saint-Pierre's claim for the intrinsic quality of the Grand Alliance to eliminate national wartime spending and halve princes' ordinary military costs in favour of more popular agendas.²³ Like his predecessor, he also alludes to a common budget ("frais communs") for federal defence projects (fortresses, garrisons).²⁴ In this sense, what is genuinely piquant from a present Anglo-American perspective, notably in the context of the EU/CSDP's future and the possible forging of a Eurasian (Paris-Berlin-Moscow) geopolitical axis, is how the two French thinkers entertain Russia and Turkey in their respective projects: while Christian Russia is seen as a natural part of the envisaged European Union and its common defence system, Ottoman Turkey is placed among the Union's associate members; plus, as clearly specified by Saint-Pierre, both empires are required to contribute to the non-border/non-troop portion of the Union's regular budget much greater absolute amounts than those projected for France, Spain, and England.²⁵

Given the above, what somewhat distinguishes Rousseau's work is a sound geostrategic assertion rather than a theoretical difference. Rousseau conveys his lengthy argument against dangerous desires for self-aggrandizement and "the folly of conquests."²⁶ As an unrecognized muse of the defensive realist tradition, he outlines the limitations of power and the indestructible balance of power as he refutes the claim that a single state, whether individually or as part of a coalition, could possibly conquer the whole of Europe.²⁷ While proving the inherent futility in any Napoleonic attempt, he also sends a message to ambitious European rulers who would still prefer traditional alliances

23. See Ibid., 81-83, 89-90.

24. See Ibid., 83, as well as the corresponding pages of the original French versions of Rousseau's work.

25. For details on these projections see Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle*, tome II, 309-19.

26. Rousseau, *Lasting Peace*, 76.

27. See Ibid., 51-55, 69-70, 75-76, 78-79, 87.

along with the idea of conquering Europe. No partial collective defence pact could be as strong and trustworthy as a Europe-wide military power,²⁸ because the latter “combines the advantages of the small and the large... to hold its neighbours in awe...” and “...make the foreigner think twice before attacking...”²⁹ After parsing two possible scenarios (invasion or peace) for Europe’s military security, in the face of potential skeptics, Rousseau seals the near-absolute value of a common defence for Europe:

“There is no Power in the world now capable of threatening all Europe; and if one ever appears, Europe will either have time to make ready, or at the worst, will be much more capable of resisting...united in one corporate body...”³⁰

1.2. (Proto-)Fascism & the Idea of European Defence³¹

The lack of a holistic analysis on the present form(s) of European defence also stems from differences, gaps, and even scientific inhibition in addressing the “Janus-face[d]” fascist-modernist era.³² It is unclear how many of today’s transatlantic thinkers are prepared, if at all, to correct at least partially their flawed assumptions and methodology in exclusively explaining the ‘post-1945’ European defence, by connecting the CSDP to what has been, since the Nuremberg trials, unanimously stigmatized by the civilized world as the darkest period in human history.

The 1990s British Euroskeptic studies pointing to “The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea”³³ has been criticized even by their own conservative ranks as a product

28. Ibid., 70-72.

29. Ibid., 39, 84.

30. Ibid., 86.

31. The author recognizes that, within its broadest cultural and ideological reach, (proto)fascism is to be primarily linked to the overall Eurointegration process rather than the European defence project as such.

32. Azar Gat, “Introduction: ‘The Janus Face’ of Fascism,” in *A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War*, bk. III, *Fascist and Liberal Visions of War*, Part I, “Fascist Modernism and Visionaries of Machine Warfare” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 523.

33. John Laughland, *The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea* (London, Warner Books, 1997). See also Rodney Atkinson, *Europe’s Full Circle: Corporate Elites and the New Fascism* (Newcastle-upon-

of both an analytical temptation driven *inter alia* by the apparently “striking resemblance” between the old, liberal idea of united Europe and the propagandistic Nazi conception of “Europe for the Europeans” and “a remarkable lack of knowledge” about the practicable and determinative pan-Europeanist thinking developed in the aftermath of WWI thanks to the neoliberal, forward-looking personas of Monnet, Arthur Salter, Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, Aristide Briand, and Gustav Stresemann among others.³⁴ Given the clear liberal-fascist demarcation line, almost no EU or NATO expert today is willing to excavate details from a ‘forbidden’ historical sequence dogmatically construed in diametric opposition to the spirit of Eurointegration. Simply put, with a historically unmatched track-record of destruction, the fascist real-time experiment after the 1920s, rather than proto-fascism as a broad, cultural phenomenon that began as early as the 1860s, provoked a global ‘ban’ on anything that has to do with it.

Nevertheless, some of the finest western minds recognize the (proto)fascist intellectual flirt with positivism, modernism, and Europeanism and thoroughly elaborate on its strategic implications.³⁵ It is evident from the mid-19th century on, with fascist orientation towards science and technology, innovation, industrial efficiency, futurist mechanized warfare, military professionalism, specialization, technocratic elitism, as well as Euro-centrism within universalism (world government).

The allusive point here is not that the military arm of today’s CSDP is conceived of as a highly professional ‘firefighting’ force with a nearly global reach. Nor is it that the

Tyne: Compuprint, 1996); Rodney Atkinson and Norris McWhirter, *Treason at Maastricht: The Destruction of the Nation State* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Compuprint, 1994); and Ashley Mote, *Vigilance: A Defence of British Liberty* (Petersfield, Hampshire, UK: Tanner Publishing, 2001).

34. Christopher Booker and Richard North, *The Great Deception: The Secret History of the European Union* (London: Continuum, 2003), 4-30.

35. See relevant chapters in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); and Gat, *History of Military Thought*, bk. III, Part I.

post-1999 European defence autonomy has been sometimes accused of being an elitist project promoted by a fringe group of Brussels-based planners. Nor is it about Hitler and his generals making Napoleonic attempts at conquering Europe. Years before Duce and Hitler rose to power, there were strategic thinkers intellectually close to, or within the fascist orbit that saw Europe united, under a single defence system.

Just as any other, more or less complete political ideology, fascism ends with a definition of the desirable form of human society. For fascists, desirable largely meant a vital, futurist, machine-age, industrially efficient, emotionally coherent, supranational, and well-regulated, technocratic society of a highly qualified but unreflective working class, led by managerial elite.

Within these lines, H.G. Wells (1866-1946), a British strategist of futurist warfare, depicts his imagined world state rising from the ashes of the old, modern society. One might think of such fascist universalism as having nothing to do with post-1951 Europe and its increasingly omnipresent *Acquis Communautaire*,³⁶ unless familiar with Wells' actual vision:

“...the new civilization...would possess a regulated economy...would exercise a far-reaching control of the environment, including bio-molecular engineering of plants, and would organize society and education with the view of promoting general happiness.”³⁷

A more Eurocentric view of a world state is held by J.F.C. Fuller (1878-1966), a British Imperial Army officer known for three eccentric points in his resume: his long-term immersion in Aleister Crowley's occultism in addition to his wide-ranging interests and personal experiences of Indian spiritualism, his strategic writings on the future of war during the interwar period that earned him a spot among the world's finest strategists of

36. While its full meaning remains debatable, *Acquis Communautaire* refers to EU law and related principles.

37. Gat, “‘Janus Face’ of Fascism,” 526-29.

advanced mechanized (land/tank) warfare, and finally, his controversial decision, after retiring in 1933 with the rank of major-general, to join Sir Oswald Mosley's fascist movement.³⁸ Indignant towards the "uncontrolled materialistic order" of the "old," "sick," industrial civilization prone to war, in his appeal for a more harmonious, well-regulated (fascist) order, Fuller calls for a "free trade...European integration, and unity, as well as the establishment of a just world state."³⁹ The fact that British fascists had already contemplated a supranational Europe when Hitler and his collaborators across the old continent took advantage of the propagandistic potential of European idea indicates that the (proto)fascist version of such idea predated Nazi instrumentalization. Regardless, after fascism capitulated in 1945, it was the fear of a possible Nazi resurrection in a 'neo' form and resurgent German militarism that provided the original foundation of the European defence project in leaving the realm of fanciful ideas.

1.3. Atlanticism & Pragmatism (1947 – 1984)

The formal implementation of the European defence project began in 1947. Until the revival of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1984, which was largely based on the idea of a separate European security identity (ESI) that should rely less on the US strategic guarantee, everything that pertained to European defence cooperation, including even the ambitious effort to establish a supranational defence community in the early 1950s, mainly occurred under fear of possible German resurgence and revenge and the systemic constraint of the Cold War.⁴⁰ This gave little space and relevance to European

38. Azar Gat, "J.F.C. Fuller and Future Warfare," in *History of Military Thought*, bk. III, Part I, 531-60; and Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 602.

39. Gat, "J.F.C. Fuller and Future Warfare," 553.

40. Behind the ESI idea was also a fear, sustained by western European leaders from the late 1970s through the late 1980s and related to the possibility of the US not remaining fully committed to Europe in case of a Soviet invasion.

strategic self-perceptions. As a result, the economically and strategically underprepared and US-reliant western Europeans were reactive in their leaning towards Washington and subsequently NATO rather than reflective of their own strategic independence.

In the immediate postwar years, and less intensely later, western allies feared German revanchism. As the disagreements over the administration of occupied Berlin between the West and the Soviet Union within the Four-Power Council rose, and the Cold War steadily emerged, the Soviet menace began dictating events and western decisions.⁴¹ The residual fear of the Nazi factor (German aggression) alone determined the signing of the March 1947 Franco-British Treaty of Dunkirk, and thereupon, coupled with rising concerns of communist expansion, led to the March 1948 Treaty of Brussels to extend the mutual defence obligation among five western European states (the UK, France, and the Benelux countries).

Perceived as the bulwark against both a potentially resurgent Germany and Soviet expansion, the Brussels Pact established *de facto* what was later to become officially known as Western European Union, while *de jure* providing one of the strongest collective defence arrangements ever.⁴² Under the Pact, and apart from the major Consultative Council which initially also coordinated economic and cultural issues, the five-member alliance could set up subsidiary bodies. The allies early envisaged a Military Committee to draw up defence plans,⁴³ and by September 1948 they created a full-fledged military arm embodied in the Western Union Defence Organization (WUDO).

41. Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 1.

42. Article IV of the original Brussels Treaty (Article V in the 1954 Modified Brussels Treaty) stipulates: "If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." Western European Union, Modified Brussels Treaty, Paris, October 23, 1954, <http://www.weu.int/>.

43. Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 1.

By the time this proto-WEU structure was put into function in the late 1948, the communist threat (1948 coup d'état in Prague and the Soviet blockade of Berlin) had already “altered the focus.”⁴⁴

Nevertheless, as noted by Sir Michael Quinlan, “nothing substantial was done, before...the [WEU] concept was overtaken” by the North Atlantic Treaty in the following year.⁴⁵ Since the WUDO provided a prudent template for the NATO military command structure, its resources were soon integrated in the North Atlantic Alliance to boost the latter’s initial operational capabilities. In the coming years, the US continued to endorse the ongoing shift in western threat perception,⁴⁶ thus facing its western European allies with a tough choice soon after WWII to rearm their former enemy, Germany, against the rising, monolith threat of the Soviet Union.

The sensitive issue of how to rearm West Germany in order to contain the Soviet Union puzzled western allies in the coming decade, eventually leading to proposed and attempted solutions on two, relatively different levels: the WEU/NATO framework and the European Communities (ECs). As for the first level, Germany in NATO was an inconceivable option for many in Europe, particularly France, at least until 1955 when the Germans did finally become part of the North Atlantic Alliance thanks to their negotiated inclusion in the WEU the previous year. The emerging WEU, though deprived of much of its strategic relevance by NATO’s coming to existence, seemed to be a more acceptable framework to give Germany a second chance in the name of western strategic interests. Moreover, after the failure of the EDC project in August 1954, the WEU, which

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid. Quinlan writes:

“...pressure from the United States rapidly highlighted the question [the Soviet threat], soon further emphasized by the outbreak of the Korean War...”

needed a more visible role for the future, became the only feasible option and door to NATO.

Having been prepared during the Nine-Power Conference in London (September 28 - October 3, 1954), the so-called Paris Arrangements designed to modify the original Brussels Pact and enable enlargement, were formally signed on October 23, 1954. As a result, the Modified Brussels Treaty opened the door for two former enemies (Italy and Germany) to become members of both the WEU and NATO.⁴⁷ Under the amendments, the enlarged alliance was also officially rebranded into the “Western European Union” and the existing Consultative Council supplanted by the Council of WEU, responsible to report yearly to the WEU Assembly.⁴⁸ The regular business of the organization was subsequently taken up by the Permanent Council and the Secretariat-General, which assisted the WEU Council on a wide range of issues.

Militarily, the WEU forces were placed under NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Based on the logic and force levels stipulated in preceding documents, such as the failed Treaty instituting the EDC (TEDC) and the secretive Special Agreement annexed to it, maximum strength and number of formations were determined for all WEU land and air forces placed under SACEUR in peacetime on Europe’s mainland, as well as for a German naval contribution to NATO.⁴⁹ As the Bundeswehr was the main focus, in addition to the SACEUR’s regular inspections, the WEU was assigned a complementary, monitoring role for the following decades. With a new Agency for the Control of Armaments attached to it, the WEU was actually reduced

47. As a NATO founder, Italy had already been a NATO member for 5 years when it acceded to the WEU in 1954.

48. Western European Union, Modified Brussels Treaty.

49. Western European Union, Paris Agreements, Protocol No. II on Forces of Western European Union, Paris, October 23, 1954, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/we004.asp#2.

to a watchdog whose inspections of armaments manufacture and stockpiles were “confined to the mainland of Europe,” not to Germany alone.⁵⁰

The fear of German rearmament and militarization did not entirely disappear after German NATO membership in 1955. Instead, while refusing to become a second-class ally and the major European battlefield in case of a physical clash between the blocs, German leadership looked at the nuclear option quite favourably. However, it was President Eisenhower’s 1954 New Look policy with an increased reliance on nuclear deterrence that not only shifted US and NATO military strategies at the time, but eventually alleviated German concerns.⁵¹

Between the fall 1950 and the summer of 1954 the western allies also nurtured hopes that the much-needed, inclusive solution to European defence integration could perhaps effectively emerge from the newly initiated and purportedly more authentic Eurointegration process based on supranationalism. Following Monnet’s early vision of a united Europe and the subsequent Schuman Declaration (May 9, 1950), on April 18, 1951, the leaders of the six founding countries of the future ECs established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).⁵² The ECSC was invaluable for a post-war Europe not least politically and economically. Strategically, unlike NATO and the proto-WEU structure, the ECSC managed to absorb Germany at an early date and, with the unique Cold War setting already in place, provided an alternative way to integrate the Germans into western strategic schemes, while also keeping an eye on its strategic behavior through an indirect control of a key part of the western European defence industry.

50. Western European Union, Paris Agreements, Protocol No. IV on the Agency of the Western European Union for the Control of Armaments, Paris, October 23, 1954, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/we006.asp.

51. Lawrence Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” in Paret. *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 744. The New Look policy is credited for having prevented more serious German nuclear adventures by employing the concept of *extended deterrence*.

52. The so-called Six included France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.

Declared industrial and economic benefits aside, it was a public secret that one of the major purposes of such a revolutionary move was the creation of an anti-cartel agency to prevent coal and steel *Konzernes* which could potentially make another Hitler in the region. Though sometimes criticized for failing to deliver on this note, the ECSC, through its powerful High Authority, did possess the tools to impose control over the production, sales, and end-use of what came out of western European mines as a militarily relevant resource, and, by its very nature, helped instill confidence among historical rivals as a way to prevent an undesirable military build-up. As an unprecedented and promising enterprise pooling western European coal and steel resources in an increasingly heated Cold War atmosphere, the ECSC also encouraged the Six to pursue the creation of an anti-Soviet EDC more urgently.

On October 24, 1950, French Prime Minister René Pleven came up with an ambitious plan for imposing a supranational, western European authority over defence matters. This plan, which *de facto* was an elicited Franco-Europeanist response to the growing US pressure for German rearmament,⁵³ originally envisioned the creation of an integrated European force, 100,000 personnel strong. In addition, there were to be common institutions, including a European defence minister, joint armament and equipment programs under the latter's authority, and a common defence budget.⁵⁴

Aiming to prevent Germany from building large formations, Pleven proposed force integration and intermingling at a very low level (uncharacteristic for the Cold War), with

53. See P.M.H. Bell, *France and Britain, 1940-1994: The Long Separation* (Abingdon, UK/New York: Routledge, 2014), 115-17, 122-24.

54. "The Plan for an EDC," Cvce.eu, last updated May 14, 2013, <http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/803b2430-7d1c-4e7b-9101-47415702fc8e/29a4e81c-c7b6-4622-915e-3b09649747b8>; Luke Coffey, "EU Defense Integration: Undermining NATO, Transatlantic Relations, and Europe's Security," Heritage Foundation Report, Washington D.C., June 6, 2013, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/06/eu-defense-integration-undermining-nato-transatlantic-relations-and-europes-security>; and EPSC and Michel Barnier, "In Defence of Europe: Defence Integration as a Response to Europe's Strategic Moment," EPSC Strategy Notes, Issue 4, Brussels, June 15, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/epsc/pdf/publications/en_strategic_note_issue_4.pdf.

homogenous, national battalions as basic units.⁵⁵ Though such small “national building blocks” may have seemed to better serve the idea of a single European army,⁵⁶ the proposal was nonetheless far from both true federalism and military-tactical pragmatism. First, geographic limitations aside, Pleven’s plan demanded that the future European force be comprised of “the whole of the rebuilt West German army together with parts of other NATO European armies,” namely, the Six.⁵⁷ As such, it was discriminatory towards Germany right from the outset, as the others were allowed to keep separate national forces in the name of national sovereignty and/or post-colonial obligations.⁵⁸ Second, command and control (C²) problems would have emerged from merging low-level, national, military units. For these reasons, once the Truman administration began seeing the European army project as “the only game in town” and “the only available instrument for achieving the entire complex of US policy objectives in Europe,”⁵⁹ it decided to throw its thrust behind Pleven, but insisted upon significant amendments to the original plan.⁶⁰

Between late 1950 and the adoption of TEDC in May 1952, US pressure forced France not only to agree on a single, integrated European force with no discrimination against Germany and no considerable national armed forces for any of the Six,⁶¹ but also to make successive concessions regarding the level of integration, size, and number of formations of such a force. The French first yielded before the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSC) position, which favoured the rebuilding of German divisions, and by accepting a

55. Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 2; and Bell, *France and Britain, 1940-1994*, 116, 123.

56. Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 2.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. John S. Duffield, “The New Look and NATO’s Conventional Force Posture, 1953-55,” in *Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 101.

60. Washington’s greatest concern with the EDC project was the time of finalizing it that is the possibility of delaying the urgently needed German rearmament. See Duffield, *Power Rules*, 47, 66-74, 101-8.

61. See European Defence Community (Signatories), *Traité instituant la Communauté européenne de défense*, Articles 6, 10, and 11, Paris, May 27, 1952, <http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/2af9ea94-7798-4434-867a-36c4a256d0af/en>.

compromise that a revamped German military should consist of regimental combat teams or brigade groups.⁶² In more general terms, this meant pooling of “national brigade groups of about 5,000 men” and brigade-level integration of the future European force.⁶³ Then, in late July 1951, during the EDC Conference in Paris, the participants released an interim report that called for the establishment of an EDC featuring a European force of 20 divisions of between 600,000 and 700,000 personnel. In November, the EDC Conference came to a final agreement for generating a Euro army of as many as 43 division-size units, so-called “Groupements,” consisting of 14 French, 12 German, 12 Italian, and five Benelux divisions for a total of 400,000 troops.⁶⁴ It was this latter concept that was included in the Draft TEDC signed on May 27 the following year.

TEDC envisioned “une communauté de défense, de caractère supranational,” with “des institutions communes, des Forces armées communes et un budget commun.”⁶⁵ Similar to the ECSC, the new defence community was to be run by four institutions: a supranational, nine-member Commissariat (less powerful than the ECSC High Authority but headed by a President who could temporarily, in case of emergency, assume special powers), a Council, a Common Assembly, and a Court.⁶⁶ The Commissariat was to be responsible for “action and control” (i.e. aspects of strategic C²),⁶⁷ directing and overseeing the establishment of European territorial military organizations and commands, as well as the process of force (contingents) generation in each EDC

62. Duffield, *Power Rules*, 47.

63. Bell, *France and Britain, 1940-1994*, 116, 123; and Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 2.

64. Duffield, *Power Rules*, 66.

65. European Defence Community, *Traité instituant la Communauté européenne de défense*, Article premier.

66. *Ibid.*, Articles 8, 19-67, 123; and “Plan for an EDC,” Cvce.eu.

67. European Defence Community, *Traité instituant la Communauté européenne de défense*, Protocole Militaire, Articles 5-6, 19. A Central Command was to be established under the Commissariat.

member,⁶⁸ deciding upon transfer of units between territorial commands,⁶⁹ appointing both senior and lower military ranks (e.g. all commanders of multinational units), plus high-level civilian posts,⁷⁰ administrating and/or regulating recruitment, employment, personnel status, promotion, materiel, and mobilization,⁷¹ establishing a common military doctrine, education, training, and discipline,⁷² preparing and overseeing the execution of joint armament, equipment, logistic, and infrastructure programs,⁷³ providing liaison and coordination with EDC members, third countries, NATO, and other international organizations,⁷⁴ and, quite importantly, deciding on an irregular (interventionist) use of fractions of the integrated European Defence Forces (EDF), mainly with the consent of the SACEUR along with a notification to or approval by the Council.⁷⁵

Under the related Military Protocol, the EDF was to consist of three types of land groups (infantry, armoured, and mechanized), each set differently to encompass a maximum of about 13,000 peacetime or 15,000 wartime personnel, as well as air and naval equivalents.⁷⁶ These formations or portions thereof, while bound by the EDC/EDF's "exclusively defensive" role,⁷⁷ were to be allowed, under certain conditions, to be deployed within "the [broader] Euroatlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer,"⁷⁸

68. Ibid., Articles 77 and 78bis, and Protocole Militaire, Articles 6-7 and 10.

69. Ibid., Protocole Militaire, Article 9.

70. Ibid., Article 31.

71. Ibid., Articles 73 and 75, and Protocole Militaire, Articles 11-14 and 21-25.

72. Ibid., Articles 74, 76, and 79, and Protocole Militaire, Articles 15-20 and 26-28.

73. Ibid., Preamble, Articles 87, 89, and 101-11, and Protocole financier, Articles 6 and 22.

74. Ibid., Article 32.

75. Ibid., Articles 10, 12-14, and 120.

76. Ibid., Protocole Militaire, Articles 1-3.

77. Ibid., Article 2.

78. NATO, North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6, Washington D.C., April 4, 1949, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

or even beyond,⁷⁹ and moreover, to be employed as an instrument of both domestic and overseas intervention.⁸⁰

Nevertheless, in line with US demands, the EDC was designed to be a complementary and efficient arm of NATO. The EDF were formally to be placed under the SACEUR, who was not only to be entitled to ensure their operational capability (organization, equipment, training, readiness) *a priori*,⁸¹ but would have also had the right to give consent to any foreign (out of the EDC's European territory) stationing and/or interventionist use of individual EDF formations.⁸² Ultimately, the SACEUR was to be given full powers over the use of EDF in war.⁸³

Eventually, this first real and so far most ambitious project for a common European defence failed in the lower house of French parliament. For various reasons, not least a fear of unacceptable loss of national sovereignty, on August 30, 1954, the French National Assembly rejected the EDC and thus buried two intimately related projects at once—the EDC and the subsequently planned European Political Community (EPC) as an overarching federal framework.⁸⁴

Regardless, the EDC legacy has three lessons. First, the North American NATO allies have a history of official support when it comes to the most ambitious European

79. European Defence Community, *Traité instituant la Communauté européenne de défense*, Articles 10, 13-14, and 120, and *Protocole relatif aux engagements d'assistance des Etats membres de la Communauté européenne de défense envers les Etats parties au Traité de l'Atlantique nord*.

80. *Ibid.*, Articles 10, 12-14, and 120.

81. *Ibid.*, Article 18, and *Protocole relatif aux relations entre la Communauté européenne et l'organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique nord*.

82. *Ibid.*, Articles 10, 13-14, and 120.

83. *Ibid.*, Article 18(2).

84. See Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 2; Duffield, *Power Rules*, 66, 101-8; and European Defence Community, *Traité instituant la Communauté européenne de défense*, Article 38. Article 38 demanded that the Common (EDC/ECSC) Assembly, while examining possibilities for certain institutional improvements, pay particular attention to the following *principle*:

“- the definitive [EDC] organization which will replace the present provisional organization should be designed so as to constitute one of the elements of a subsequent federal or confederal structure based on the principle of separation of powers and including, in particular, bicameral representative system.”

designs, though such support has never been decoupled from their grand-strategic calculus. Second, in its uneasy search for a strong and more independent Europe with an even stronger and more influential France, French policy has established itself as a vividly ambiguous factor, balancing between European federalism and national sovereignty, and calls for an autonomous and powerful European strategic enterprise and desires for national role and influence. Finally, the most instrumental lesson, quickly learned by the Six following the EDC's failure, has been the recognition that, whatever they do, the Europeans should forget about instant unification via a constitutional leap and concentrate on gradual integration that one day might bring about the level of political unity necessary for creating a common defence.⁸⁵ Reflecting David Mitrany's integrationist logic of functionalism, this lesson was soon dully implemented by Monnet *et al*, whose work was in return formally articulated as "neofunctionalism" by Ernst Haas. The resultant spillover effect finally reached in the security realm by 1986 as well as in the defence realm six years later in Maastricht.

After the EDC project failed, it was the British leadership and engagement that helped rectify the situation by convening the London Conference at which the WEU arrangement was quickly devised.⁸⁶ With the new NATO-WEU architecture in place, no "coordinated European defence" was possible until the fall of the Berlin Wall.⁸⁷

Under the Cold War shadow and with NATO's supremacy over European military security, European defence integration drastically slowed down. It was still present under

85. On October 14, 1982, while presenting the Genscher - Colombo plan before the European Parliament, one of the plan's authors (Emilio Colombo) reiterated the lesson:

"History has taught us that European Union cannot be attained by moving too fast and forcing the pace."

Booker and North, *Great Deception*, 201.

86. Duffield, *Power Rules*, 76. See also Bell, *France and Britain, 1940-1994*, 113-18, 120-25.

87. Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 37.

the aegis of NATO, whose umbrella actually helped it to survive, but assumed minor, bilateral and multilateral forms, often outside the formal NATO-WEU framework. In general, the ambitious attempts towards a compact European defence were downgraded to a great deal of flexible defence cooperation. The end-product was ephemeral groupings and almost no authentic European defence entities. Further, on the alternative ECs level, there was no continuity in political initiatives when it comes to defence, and from the early 1960s European defence and security was placed on the margins of a larger political project.

Although the WEU proved instrumental in addressing western priorities, such as the promotion of economic cooperation among Western European allies, Eurointegration, full integration of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO, settlement of the Saar issue, arms control and confidence-building, as well as consultation of the Six with the UK,⁸⁸ it nevertheless contributed little towards the idea of common European defence. The WEU's Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) for instance, prior to its unanimous dissolution in 1989, achieved little in terms of standardization and joint military procurement.⁸⁹ Also, after 1972/3 the WEU entered an interval of passivity, and it was certainly an underachievement for such organization to be what Quinlan identifies as “an intermediate organization...for necessary compromise,” “a second-best choice on which opposing inclinations could agree - rather than an object of positive enthusiasm,” and a “useful forum” of choice only when western European diplomats felt uncomfortable to deliberate elsewhere.⁹⁰

88. “History of WEU: WEU from 1955 to 1984: The Saar, Arms Control, the UK and the EC Six,” Western European Union, accessed December 23, 2011, <http://www.weu.int/>.

89. Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 3-4.

90. Ibid., 12, 25. The French wanted the ECs instead of NATO, while the Brits preferred quite the opposite.

In effect, European defence integration was seriously handicapped from within. Indeed, there was cautiousness not to add to Washington's burden-sharing concerns via some form of divisive, 'European-caucus' behavior.⁹¹ But there was also the problem of divergent national military structures and strategic cultures, a constitutionally and politically constrained Germany, a skeptical UK, particularly under Margaret Thatcher, and a Gaullist France that compelled allies to choose between Paris and Washington.⁹²

US concerns with European contributions to the Alliance as well as the developments and perceptions in the aftermath of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks on strategic arms limitation (SALT), ironically, set the stage for further European defence and security integration. The burden-sharing problem was, and has remained a powerful driver. The sustained, though not always credible US threat, as embodied in the Mansfield amendment, to withdraw US forces from Europe unless the Europeans assumed more responsibility for their own security, did not merely produce *ad hoc* defence initiatives.⁹³ Most notably, it helped Europe begin entertaining the idea of its own strategic role.

Until well into the 1990s, when the WEU definitely ceased to be viewed as a viable alternative to a more authentic European defence enterprise, there had been at least *four* streams of European defence cooperation: common doctrine, standardization and interoperability, capabilities and (joint) equipment procurement, and combined, joint forces.⁹⁴ Though each instance was meant to be a NATO enabler, the majority were

91. Ibid., 14-15.

92. Ibid.

93. For the implications of the Mansfield amendment for European defence cooperation see Ibid., 5-7.

94. A concise account of this can be found in Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 4-11.

bilateral and multilateral initiatives either with ‘a short expiry date’ or subject to transformation.

Unlike the WEU’s SAC, the 1953 FINBEL (later FINABEL) project, which is still intact and dedicated to doctrinal harmonization of European armies, materiel standardization, and land warfare studies,⁹⁵ managed to attract the attendance of senior army officials, but entailed no attempt at creating joint forces.⁹⁶ As already mentioned, the US/NATO deterrence strategy after 1954 proved crucial in preventing Germany from eventually acquiring the A-bomb. Eisenhower’s New Look was however less successful in putting an immediate stop to a tripartite European collaborative effort (1956-58) among Germany, France, and the UK aimed at developing a European-controlled deterrent.⁹⁷ After De Gaulle abruptly terminated this joint endeavour, as Quinlan notes, there were no notable Franco-British nuclear initiatives in the following decades.⁹⁸ Instead, only a sporadic dialogue between the two governments, mainly after 1980, and a few French hints on “a European framework for nuclear capability” emerged.⁹⁹ In fact, it would not be until the new millennium that Paris and London would eventually come together on nuclear terms, thus making a small step towards a possible European deterrent.¹⁰⁰

95. See “About Finabel,” FINABEL, accessed March 12, 2012, <http://www.finabel.org/>. The “FINBEL” acronym derives from the names of the grouping’s founding members—France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. With the 1956 German (*Allemagne*) membership, it became “FINABEL.” Aiming at “developing a joint European understanding of defence matters,” FINABEL has survived over the decades. Today, it claims to be “an apolitical, informal and autonomous organization” closely related to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Air Group (EAG), and NATO.

96. Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 3-4.

97. For more details see *Ibid.*, 4-5.

98. *Ibid.*, 4.

99. *Ibid.*, 4.

100. See Franco-British Summit, Declaration on Defence and Security Cooperation, London, November 2, 2010, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-france-summit-2010-declaration-on-defence-and-security-co-operation>.

De Gaulle's swift end to the tripartite nuclear project as well as the Franco-British nuclear relationship in the following years, did not alleviate US concerns with European proliferation in general and possible German nuclear armament in particular. Quite the contrary, the close personal ties between the French president and German Chancellor Adenauer after the inception of the Fifth Republic (1958), in addition to the successful French nuclear test in 1960, forced the US to remain concerned about the nuclear question. Mindful of the possible implications of both European dissatisfaction with a US-controlled extended deterrent and the growing doubts in the credibility of such deterrent, Washington promptly picked up the idea of Harvard Professor Robert Bowie in proposing a sea-born, European-managed Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) built around five US strategic submarines (SSBNs) armed with 80 *Polaris* submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).¹⁰¹ While supported by three US administrations in a row (1960-1966), this concept went on to transform from a benevolent and generally appreciated US solution against a possible German nuclear adventure to a US 'deterrent' against a Gaullist counter-proposal seeking to fuse the French nuclear strike force with German conventional capabilities.¹⁰² Furthermore, the long-standing British reservation towards the MLF eventually evolved into an advocacy for an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF).¹⁰³

In conclusion, the most ambitious project for European military integration in the aftermath of the EDC's failure revealed mainly the national preferences of European

101. Evgeny Kuznetsov, "Multilateral Force Debates," European University Institute, Florence, 2004, p. 2, published online October 11, 2013, <http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/937a5818-7fea-47da-944e-11114da4e0a3/en>.

102. See Ibid., 2-3. As for the military aspect of transformation, before it faded away in the mid 1960s, the MLF concept had substantially changed due to Washington's idea to use surface ships instead of nuclear submarines.

103. See Ibid., 4. This alternative proposal combined elements of the original and modified versions of the MLF concept. What is more, it entailed the employment of British *Polaris*-armed submarines and *Vulcan* aircraft, as well as US *Minuteman* intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

capitals as opposed to a vigorous cooperation towards a common nuclear deterrent.¹⁰⁴ On the other side of the Atlantic, despite the creation of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1966 and the specific Gaullist distance from both NATO and the ECs, the narratives about old concerns survived. In a time when the European integration was advancing at best only in the economic realm, US leaders were surprisingly able to imagine a less centralized European federation which, by virtue of controlling "all of its external security functions, including defense," would inherit at least the existing French deterrent and potentially get Germany the long-sought nuclear capability through the back door.¹⁰⁵

Subsequently, the most promising European capability-driven initiative happened in the wake of the 'small earthquake' caused by the 1969 Mansfield amendment. A dinner of NATO European defence ministers in 1968, endorsed by UK defence minister Denis Healey and his German counterpart Helmut Schmidt, led to a 1970 defence establishment called the EUROGROUP. This cautiously devised European caucus within NATO delivered three important effects: first, the 1971 European Defence Improvement Program (EDIP) worth more than a billion US\$ over five years in capital acquisitions, which included improvements to NATO communications and aircraft survival measures, new *Jaguar* aircraft for the UK, and *C-130s* for Belgium, and supplements to the NATO infrastructure fund; second, relatively improved communications with Washington that clarified European contributions to the Alliance, and third, numerous working groups (on communications, logistics, medical support, training) later absorbed by the WEU.¹⁰⁶ In

104. See *Ibid.*, 1, 5.

105. *Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings, Day 1, Before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, 90th Cong. 5-6 (1968) (Statement of Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State), [http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.\\$b643615](http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.$b643615).

106. Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 5-7; and IISS, "The EUROGROUP in NATO," special issue, *Survival* 14, no. 6 (November 1972): 291. West Germany's share in the NATO infrastructure fund was over 40%.

the new US-USSR arms control context, EDIP did end up as a one-time miracle, rendering the overall EUROGROUP effect to be no more than modest.

Yet, there are three aspects to be observed. First, the UK role in creating the EUROGROUP may be viewed as the first shift of British foreign and defence policy vis-à-vis NATO. As a precursor of common European defence and UK contributions thereto, in autumn 1968 Healey stated:

““The military security of Western Europe is likely to depend for as far as I can foresee on America’s commitment to collective defence through NATO...But there are areas of cooperation open to the European members of NATO which may not always be open to the same degree for the United States; the geographical unity of Europe itself creates certain common interests which can only be fully exploited in common policies.””¹⁰⁷

Second, the negative image that European defence capabilities projected across the Atlantic became a strong driver of defence integration. Third, European groupings within NATO in particular laid the grounds for establishing more autonomous European entities at a later date.

Mainly for economic and industrial reasons, military procurement was arguably the most attractive cooperative domain for European governments.¹⁰⁸ In this regard, Quinlan identifies two different phases. First, during the early years, Europe pursued joint production and logistic support of military systems based on already developed American systems such as *F104*, the *Hawk* surface-to-air and *Sidewinder* air-to-air missiles, and the *F16*. Next, the leading European arms exporters entered a new, ambitious phase of full-cycle collaboration from concept, through design development, testing, and production, to in-service support. The largest joint endeavor during the Cold War sequence of this otherwise still active phase was undertaken by the UK, Germany, and Italy with the

107. IISS, “The EUROGROUP in NATO,” 291.

108. See Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 9.

development of the *Tornado* multirole combat aircraft, the Cold War predecessor of the *Eurofighter Typhoon*.¹⁰⁹ The European preference for joint military acquisitions, despite a number of perceived disadvantages, subsequently resulted in armament agencies being formed and transformed over the decades. The high-level EURONAD (European National Armament Directors), a genuine part of the EUROGROUP that kept the French policy engaged within NATO, was first constituted in 1976 as Independent European Program Group (IEPG, partially delinked from NATO/EUROGROUP to satisfy France), and later integrated in the WEU as Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). Serving as little more than contact cells with no track record in running collaborative projects of their own, the role played by these transient entities in European joint procurement should not be overstated.¹¹⁰ But, what is important is that they not only shed light, apart from French sensitivity to US domination, on one aspect of French interest and importance in European defence matters, but also established the basis for a single, prolific armaments institution, which was eventually realized with the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004 complemented by the Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière d'armements (OCCAR) and other research and development (RD) actors.

During the Cold War, Europeans were also keen on pooling together parts of their military forces in greater, European-only formations, both within and outside NATO.

These include the British-Dutch Amphibious Force, the Dutch-Belgian joint maritime

109. Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 9-10. Besides the *Tornado* project, which is now commonly viewed as one of the greatest symbols of European defence cooperation during the Cold War, the second phase has consisted of many bilateral initiatives. These include but are not limited to: the *Jaguar* attack aircraft, various helicopter designs such as *Wasp*, *Puma*, and *Gazelle*, the *Martel* air-to-surface missiles, the co-production of the German *Leopard* tank, and the joint Franco-German procurement of *Atlantique* maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and *C160 Transall* transports. Towards the mid 1980s, Spain joined three of the original *Panavia Aircraft GmbH* partners, plus France, in pursuing the next-generation European fighter aircraft (the *Eurofighter Typhoon*). Discontent with how this new collaborative effort was unfolding, the French eventually opted out and focused on developing their own aircraft design (the *Rafale*).
110. *Ibid.*, 11.

mine countermeasures (MCM) forces, as well as units more formally linked to NATO such as the corps-level Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (LANDJUT, part of NATO's former Allied Forces Northern Europe command - AFNORTH) and the multinational Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN).¹¹¹ Regardless of their formal status, these combined joint formations were all declared to the North Atlantic Alliance, as are many of the present-day European multinational units despite the existence of CSDP. Nevertheless, with the establishment of the controversial 1988 Franco-German brigade,¹¹² Europe was set to acquire a more independent strategic orientation. In the post-1989 world, Old Europe, while progressively re-coupled with 'New Europe,' built a largely asymmetric web of cooperation in common doctrine and interoperability, military procurement, and combined joint forces. Resembling a model of a pan-European differential integration, also known as "variable geometry,"¹¹³ this collaboration has since relied on all existing and emerging strategic frameworks (NATO/WEU, bilateral/multilateral, the EU/CSDP), with some preference being given to European-only initiatives and agencies.

Though widely supported prior to West German integration into NATO, the Communities (ECs/EC/EU) level,¹¹⁴ quite understandably, has never been preferable as a potential defence platform from an Anglo-American perspective. During the Cold War,

111. For more details see *Ibid.*, 8-9. The US Navy occasionally took part in the STANAVFORCHAN MCM squadron.

112. Owing to the Gaullist political stance since 1966, the French component of this brigade was not declared to NATO. This was sufficient to raise doubts in Washington and Ottawa followed by a media-driven debate on a Euro army.

113. "Differential/differentiated integration" or "variable geometry" (an alternative expression borrowed from mathematics and mechanical engineering) refers to the broadest and most overarching EU concept of flexible and adaptable integration. By implying differences in both integration speed and destination, the concept allows for different groupings ("tiers") and "cores" of EU members, and ultimately all individual EU governments (e.g. in its *a la carte* version), to simultaneously pursue more or less Europe in different policy domains, thereby giving the overall integration enterprise an incompact, largely asymmetric, amoeba-like shape.

114. In 1967, the three sectoral ECs merged into a single European Community (EC) which later transformed into a political union.

this level was no more than alternative, relied upon, if at all, only when the NATO-WEU framework proved impossible to advance western strategic interests mainly due to French concerns.

Regardless, the Six, and successively, the Nine, Ten, and Twelve were largely responsible for failing to devise a common European defence (policy) prior to 1992. In the early days, when they had all the US support they needed, France could not swallow the EDC's imperfectness. Thereafter, for almost four decades, it proved difficult for EC leaders to attach the issue of European military security to their predominantly economic, communitarian arrangement. NATO's recognized and needed supremacy was the generic reason for such failure, yet far from being the only one.

In the early 1960s, Gaullist national pride and its futile quest for more France within purportedly more Europe advocated a contradictory and counterclockwise version of an embedding political design; a fully united, yet fully intergovernmental Europe in a time when the supranational Communities began yielding significant results. Nonetheless, while promoting the Gaullist vision of a "Union of European peoples," the Fouchet Plan of October 1961 at least urged the adoption of common foreign and defence policies as principle aims of such Union.¹¹⁵ Lacking similar wording, the revised draft submitted by the Fouchet Committee in January 1962 was unfortunately worse from a common defence perspective. It made a step back by tasking the future Union merely to "reconcile, coordinate and unify the policy of Member-States in spheres of...foreign policy...and defence." Also, unlike the original draft, the remedial plan explicitly committed the future European Parliamentary Assembly to holding deliberations on

115. European Communities (The Fouchet Committee), Draft Treaty on European Political Union (Fouchet Plan I), Preamble, Title I, Articles 1 and 2, November 2, 1961, <http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/485fa02e-f21e-4e4d-9665-92f0820a0c22/en;jsessionid=441BD693160E8706492434D58977AEB5>.

foreign policy and defence, only upon request by the summit-level Council, and only on such questions “on which the Council asks its opinion.”¹¹⁶

The 1963 Elysée Treaty may have been praised as the enabler of the Franco-German axis and main engine behind Eurointegration, but its three-pronged defence component consisting of common military doctrine, elite personnel exchange, and armaments cooperation was simply too symbolic.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, the underlying Franco-German rapprochement was restrictively bilateral in that De Gaulle firmly opposed British involvement through the ECs/EC. As such, the Franco-German tandem proved unable to induce a serious discourse on high politics and hard security at the Community level. Moreover, after the failure of the Fouchet Plan, EC leaders sought ways to make the broader political project work, so at best, common defence (policy) was viewed as a remote implication rather than project focus. The quest for European Political Cooperation (EPC), which gradually defined what would be later called European Council, began in 1969 after De Gaulle left the scene, and went on to occupy European attention for the next two decades.

It took a second British shift, namely, Lord Carrington’s appeal for a concerted European action in the field of international security inspired by the Community’s impotence in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the rising Iranian theocracy, as well as continuing doubts about the US commitment to Europe’s security, for EC leadership to finally introduce the security narrative at this level. In 1981, as a moderate alternative to Altiero Spinelli’s constitutionalism, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and

116. Ibid., Articles 2 and 7; and Draft Treaty on European Political Union (Fouchet Plan II), Articles 2 and 10, January 18, 1962, <http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/c9930f55-7d69-4edc-8961-4f12cf7d7a5b/en>.

117. See Franco-German Summit, Treaty on Franco-German Friendship, II Programme, Defence, Paris, January 23, 1963, <http://www.fransamaltongvongeusau.com/documents/dl2/h6/2.6.3.pdf>.

Emilio Colombo proposed a gradualist concept of Europe that sought less veto-based decision-making, a common foreign policy binding on all EC members, and European defence independent of NATO. Albeit consistent with the London meeting of October 13, 1981, which had agreed to formalize the European diplomatic cooperation through secretive, Gymnich-style meetings and troika action,¹¹⁸ the proposed concept was eventually rejected. The failed Genscher - Colombo initiative nevertheless led to the 1983 Stuttgart Declaration that called for the establishment of what would later become known as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).¹¹⁹ Drawing partly from the 1985 Dooge Committee Report, the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), which formalized both the EPC and the status of the European Council as the Community's organ but not an "institution," went further, demanding that member-states pursue "closer cooperation on questions of European security" and "maintain the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security."¹²⁰ Yet, armaments cooperation aside, Europe's military security remained NATO's complete monopoly at least until Maastricht, when the Twelve, albeit deeply divided between Europeanists (France) and Atlanticists (UK),¹²¹ forged a historical compromise to create, in what may be deemed the first EU constitution, the CFSP as a basis for a future common defence (policy).

118. A Gymnich-type meeting refers to a closed, unofficial meeting whose deliberations remain secret. The idiom comes from *Gymnich Schlos*, a German federal government reception building known for having hosted many important, high-level meetings in the past. See Booker and North, *Great Deception*, 200-1. Consisting of the incumbent EU presidency, its predecessor, and its successor, the EC/EU Troika rose from obscurity at the onset of the Yugoslav wars.

119. European Community, Solemn Declaration on European Union, Preamble, points 1.4.2 and 3.2, Stuttgart, June 19, 1983, <http://www.eurotreaties.com/stuttgart.pdf>. The declaration used descriptive wording to refer to the future CFSP. It literally called for strengthened foreign-policy coordination among EC members, "including on the political and economic aspects of security."

120. European Community, Single European Act, Title III, Article 30(6), OJ L 169, 29.06.1987, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:11986U/TXT>.

121. See Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 16-17; and Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 37-38.

1.4. Conclusion

One of the major analytical shortcomings regularly made by EU and NATO experts today lies with exclusively seeing the European defence project as a post-World War II phenomenon and CSDP as mainly a post-Cold War product. No analyst has so far seriously explored the idea of such defence predating WWII and the 20th century. Instead, since 1999 one frequently reads and hears about the ‘anomalous,’ ‘elusive’ CSDP suddenly complicating transatlantic relations.

Yet, if one is to illuminate the CSDP’s essence and ultimate prospects, a greater sense of history is required. Only a few chosen words summarizing the paradox of Europe’s enormous integrative potential and its equally great proneness to war might be sufficient to ruin the myth of the irregular and vague CSDP:

“The Powers of Europe constitute a kind of whole, united by identity of religion, of moral standard, of international law; by letters, by commerce, and finally by species of [indestructible] balance which is the inevitable result of all this ties...”¹²²

Normally, it should not take a thorough study of Rousseau or Saint-Pierre in order for one to realize that there has been no grand secret behind the recent European civil-military ascendance, only a gradual reification of an old, (pre-)Enlightenment idea of political union and common defence, mainly under the dictate of powerful exogenous forces as from the mid-twentieth century, and based on a dense, social, and institutional fabric available since the Romans.¹²³ At one point, that fabric inspired even (proto)fascists to think more in Eurocentric terms, though their idea of united Europe,

122. Rousseau, *Lasting Peace*, 40.

123. Mérand, Irondelle, and Foucault, “Theorizing Change,” in Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, *European Security*, 15-16, 19.

potentially under a single defence system, significantly diverges from the liberal vision of European body politic and common defence.¹²⁴

After Dunkirk, the European fabric has only become thicker and tighter including dozens of new-born, European-only, strategic as well as political entities. Due to Europe's enduring predisposition to strategic emancipation, even during the Cold War phase of Atlanticism and pragmatic conformism (1947-1984), there was an underlying tension between Europeanist (mainly French) defence initiatives and the strategic preferences of Anglo-American NATO allies. Soon after the WEU's revival in 1984, as the exogenous momentum tectonically changed leaving a strategically inferior Europe to be partnered by a hyper-powerful US unipole for awhile, before cementing it in between delayed multipolar pressures, it was inevitable to see the rise of a more authentic European defence enterprise wrapping up the great political design.

From this perspective, it is inconceivable how so many strategists have blindly followed (even today) the neofunctionalist idea of "special different functional contexts," which is genuinely Haas' concept implying that the special domains of security and defence are immune to supranational integration, treating the ESDP/CSDP, as soon as it showed up in late 1990s, as "a mere anomaly"¹²⁵ and moreover, downplaying its role by often comparing it to either traditional military alliances (NATO) or multilateral crisis management tools (UN).¹²⁶

124. The author is well aware of the many disappointed Europeans as well as non-Europeans today poised to compare the EU model with H.G. Wells' fascist concept of "regulated economy" and "far-reaching control of the environment."

125. Ojanen, "European Defence," in Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, *European Security*, 149-50.

126. For a view of EU/CSDP as a future "genuine alliance" supplementary to NATO see Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, "Security and Defence in the Enlarged Europe," in *What Ambitions for European Defence in 2020?*, ed. Álvaro de Vasconcelos, 2nd ed. (Paris: EU ISS, 2009), 157-58,

http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/What_ambitions_for_European_defence_in_2020.pdf. For an early, distorted perception of CSDP as a "multilateral opportunity" uninfected by American influence see Alexander Moens, "NATO and ESDP: The Need for a Political Agreement," *Canadian Military Journal* 1, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 67,

As clearly shown in this chapter, the CSDP is all but a post-Cold War anomaly. As a matter of fact, even those who celebrate their orthodox, 'neo-neo' research pattern against the apparent paradigmatic shift driven by an influx of critical perspectives within European strategic and security studies could and should readily recognize where the CSDP comes from, as well as its state-alike common defence potential, without dramatically deviating from their ontological framework and methodology. The embedding nest of the presently intergovernmental CSDP has always been a sort of confederative arrangement, though sui generis, among well-established nations, and incomplete. Since 1951, this arrangement has grown all the more supranational despite early Gaullist obstructions and subsequent challenges mainly posed by ECs/EU national publics. As a curiosity, in the midst of the Cold War, when the US/NATO-guarded ECs were unable to move forward politically let alone strategically, top US leaders were able to imagine a common defence for Europe.

THE RISE OF CSDP & ITS CURRENT STATUS: DEVELOPING A SOCIAL 'BEAST' RATHER THAN A MILITARY RIVAL

In the changing strategic environment towards the end of the Cold War, NATO was slowly beginning to be viewed as an insufficient option for Europe's security needs. Lord Carrington's appeal in 1980 for a concerted European engagement in the field of international security helped resurrect the long inactive WEU. Though revived as a UK favourite that had historically leaned towards the US/NATO and a capabilities first philosophy, the WEU temporarily assumed the role it lacked for decades as the spearhead of a more authentic European security and defence enterprise.

By the mid-1980s, the WEU leadership had *two* clear principles in mind that would eventually define the future of European defence: first, the broader European construction would "remain incomplete" without its own strategic pillar, which implied both a capability and an identity, and second, it could afford no military adventures of its own independent of Washington.¹ Therefore, parallel to its search for increased self-reliance, the revived WEU sought to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance which remained "the foundation of Western security."² In effect, by developing what would be eventually termed European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), the WEU, generally backed by the US/NATO, sought to 'straddle the fence' and satisfy both the Europeanists and Atlanticists simultaneously.

1. See WEU Council of Ministers, Rome Declaration, October 26-27, 1984, <http://www.weu.int/>; and Western European Union, Platform on European Security Interests, intro., para. 2, sect. I, para. 4, and sect. II, paras. 2-3, The Hague, October 27, 1987, <http://www.weu.int/>.

2. WEU Council of Ministers, Rome Declaration.

However, the US and UK-endorsed German reunification in 1990 could not but ironically add weight on the Europeanist side. As a result, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty made a historical breakthrough by envisaging within the EU framework “the eventual framing of a common defence policy” as well as a remote possibility of common defence!³ For years after Maastricht, the EU’s ‘common defence policy’ was but a reference to a non-operational part of an EU treaty clause rendered as such due to a series of *ad hoc* improvisations within the WEU-NATO-EU triangle. Nonetheless, following the major post-1992 developments at Amsterdam, Saint-Malo, Cologne, Helsinki, Santa Maria da Feira, Nice, Laeken, Brussels, and Lisbon, as well as achievements under WEU and NATO auspices, the autonomy-seeking European security and defence enterprise has definitely undergone a process of consolidation within a single framework.

Since the turn of the millennium, this enterprise has been evolving exclusively within the EU, albeit under different successive names (CEPSD/CESDP, ESDP, and finally CSDP),⁴ insisting on a comprehensive and global strategic approach, steadily improving its operational portfolio and capabilities, and looking forward to its prospects in the realm of collective/common defence. Of course, concerns about the currently 27 different political and military authorities beneath the CSDP umbrella (Denmark excluded) remain relative to both structural incoherence and the CSDP’s final look. Yet, the EU through its CSDP has indeed become a global strategic actor, which, after more than a decade of transatlantic unease concerning its rise and autonomy, is generally accepted across the

3. European Union, Treaty on European Union, Preamble and Articles B and J.4(1), OJ C 191, 29.07.1992, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT&from=EN>. Article J.4 embedded the defence coordination among member-states within the CFSP, which from 1993 to 2009 constituted the so-called EU pillar two.

4. The term “ESDP” as such was adopted later than the respective autonomist security and defence concept. In the immediate period following the 1998 Saint-Malo declaration on European defence autonomy, Brussels interchangeably used trial references such as “Common European Security and Defence Policy” (“CESDP”) and “Common European Policy on Security and Defence” (“CEPSD”). As noted by Robert Hunter, one of the reasons why these name and acronym variants starting with “C” were into circulation at the onset was the fact that they were “easier to handle in some EU languages than ESDP.” Hunter, *NATO’s Companion – or Competitor?*, 3-4, 4n4.

Atlantic as a complement, rather than a threat to NATO, at least for the foreseeable future.

Under a refreshed strategic calculus, and in the context of the eternal issue of burden-sharing, Europeans are now being urged to become more serious about their defence capabilities, regardless of the framework.⁵ While this reflects western strategic interests, Washington's concerns are primarily directed towards European military capacity, and a persisting gap in critical Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) capabilities, particularly in the domains of strategic air- and sealift, disembarkation assets, command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (C⁴ISTAR), stand-off weaponry and precision guided munitions (PGMs), attack helicopters, and electronic warfare. Washington has also witnessed dropping European defence budgets, a shying away from more traditional strategic thinking, a perpetual lack of political will, and, by extension, a lack of internal coherence. The CSDP's post-natal military stagnation (2009 – 2013) and failure to demonstrate a truly autonomous military capacity, especially following the 2011 Arab Spring, has only reinforced a US perspective to perceive the CSDP as merely empty rhetoric, and certainly no threat to NATO.

Contrary to this perception, the right question is not whether the CSDP's military dimension is a serious one, but what kind of a strategic actor the EU is likely to become. To grasp its future, one should neither focus on specific capability measures, nor simply speculate about the future. Rather one needs to examine closely the overlooked or downplayed aspects of the present CSDP and its immediate precursor, the ESDI. To this

5. See Thom Shanker, "Defense Secretary Warns NATO of 'Dim' Future," *New York Times*, June 10, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/world/europe/11gates.html>.

end, this chapter examines the underlying autonomist tendency in the 1980s and 1990s process of European defence integration, and especially those conceptual, integrationist, and armed force-related elements that led to official proclamation of European defence autonomy by 1999.

It also captures, through a chronological interpretation of key security and defence developments, a parallel consolidation trend in which the present CSDP emerged from Europe's entangled security institutional knot of the 1990s. This outcome would enable the EU to become an autonomous strategic actor as well as a global security provider, according to its leadership. The aim is not to suggest that the evolving EU/CSDP will eventually challenge NATO, and thus Atlanticist interests. Rather, it is to reveal its relatively independent nature vis-à-vis other strategic frameworks, to provide a general overview of its institutional and, to some extent, capability upgrade over the years, and to showcase the current state of affairs in the European defence project which renders the current CSDP a social rather than "a military monster."⁶

2.1. The WEU's Revival & the Idea of ESI/EDI/ESDI (1984 - early 1990s)

The thirtieth anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty was marked by the WEU's revival at a summit meeting in Rome in 1984 of WEU ministers. Mindful, like Denis Healey and Lord Carrington before them, of "the specifically European geographical, political, psychological and military dimensions,"⁷ they expressed "determination to make better use of"⁸ "the dormant...military structure."⁹ In the following years prior to

6. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 90.

7. WEU Council of Ministers, Rome Declaration.

8. Ibid.

9. Center for Defense Information, "European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)," *The Defense Monitor* 29, no. 1 (2000): 1-3, <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/5669/uploads>.

the 1991/2 Maastricht milestone, they went on to adopt 17 more key documents. One established, for example, the WEU Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Paris, and another a WEU Satellite Center (SatCen) in Torrejón, Spain.¹⁰ This quest for a distinctly European security and defence enterprise was initially, and occasionally even later, referred to as European Security Identity (ESI), a general and conveniently short reference that is/was nonetheless absent in this form from the key post-1984 WEU texts.¹¹ In spite of that, it was obvious that the WEU's newest attempts were aimed at establishing a broader political and strategic identity for the old continent.¹²

In this sense, the WEU, as well as the particular British position on ESI, never hid the fact that military security (defence) was to be at the core of such identity, albeit to be cultivated within the broader Alliance. Accordingly, the WEU 1987 Hague Platform called for “a more cohesive European defence identity [EDI] which will translate more effectively into practice...”¹³ This call was matched by a series of important developments. First, building on the 1963 Élysée legacy, President François Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1987 announced the establishment of the Franco-German Security and Defence Council, which laid the groundwork for a more dynamic strategic partnership, and subsequently created the Franco-German brigade, which became operational in 1991.¹⁴ Second, in 1987/8 WEU nations committed MCM vessels to the Persian Gulf during the final year of the Iran-Iraq War, which filled a significant US capability gap. Finally, in 1990/1, the WEU played a major role in implementing UN

10. See “Key Texts of Reactivation of WEU,” Western European Union, accessed July 21, 2011, <http://www.weu.int/>.

11. As a general reference, “ESI” covered, *inter alia*, the ‘softer,’ political and economic aspects of security.

12. See “History of WEU - Reactivation of WEU: From the Rome Declaration to the Hague Platform (1984-1989),” Western European Union, accessed December 23, 2011, <http://www.weu.int/>; WEU Council of Ministers, Communiqué, para. 6(2), Brussels, April 23, 1990, <http://www.weu.int/>; and Communiqué, sect. 3, para. 1, Paris, December 10, 1990, <http://www.weu.int/>.

13. Western European Union, Platform on European Security Interests, intro., para. 4.

14. For more information see “History of HQ EUROCORPS,” EUROCORPS, accessed November 24, 2011, http://www.eurocorps.org/pdf/eng/History_of_the_Eurocorps.pdf.

sanctions against Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait by deploying 39 naval vessels, which accounted for three quarters of the total embargo force to the Gulf during the Gulf War.¹⁵

Having emerged just before the end of the Cold War, the ESI and its integral defence dimension (EDI) were initially built and shaped along the lines of Western Europe's security interests in three domains: deterrence and defence, arms control and disarmament, and East-West cooperation.¹⁶ In the first domain, the building of ESI/EDI required "a major European contribution" to the Western strategy of deterrence and defence by assuming "a major responsibility...in the field of conventional and nuclear defence" and completing the broader Eurointegration project.¹⁷ Such European share in the common defence of the West presupposed "retaining strong defences,"¹⁸ especially in the conventional realm,¹⁹ and "maintaining defence readiness and military capabilities...without seeking military superiority."²⁰ As a second enabler, the EC-led Eurointegration process was expected to spread finally into the most sensitive policy realms and produce *inter alia*, mutual coordination in security and defence matters, expanded bilateral and regional military cooperation, which would encompass intensive armaments cooperation and developing a technologically advanced European defence industry, and a concerted policy on select crises outside Europe.²¹ The second domain of action envisaged active and comprehensive arms control and disarmament efforts "consistent with the maintenance of the strategic unity of the Alliance" but not precluding

15. Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 21.

16. See Western European Union, Platform on European Security Interests; and WEU Council of Ministers, Communiqué, Luxembourg, April 28, 1987, <http://www.weu.int>.

17. Western European Union, Platform on European Security Interests, sect. II, para. 4, and sect. IIIa, paras. 3-4.

18. WEU Council of Ministers, Communiqué, para. 5, Luxembourg.

19. Western European Union, Platform on European Security Interests, sect. IIIa, para. 3; and WEU Council of Ministers, Communiqué, para. 4, Luxembourg.

20. Western European Union, Platform on European Security Interests, sect. II, para. 1.

21. Ibid., sect. IIIa, para. 4.

closer European defence cooperation.²² An important complementary tool in this context, as well as in the following domain, was the policy of “genuine détente.”²³ Hence, in the third domain, the WEU was dedicated to “mak[ing] full use of the” Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.²⁴

Beyond this, there were many organizational and other elements to undergird the emerging European identity in security and defence. The WEU Assembly for instance, could spur relevant debate as “the only European parliamentary body mandated by treaty to discuss all aspects of security including defence.”²⁵ Furthermore, WEU leaders approached joint evaluation of critical security and defence developments by ordering reports on ‘the politico-strategic implications of...research programmes on strategic defence systems,’ notably ballistic missile defence, and by considering joint studies on other important security topics (e.g. the Mediterranean) as a basis for further reflection.²⁶ Ultimately, as part of the WEU’s internal restructuring,²⁷ common analytical and intelligence/C⁴ISTAR capacities (WEU ISS, WEU SatCen) were set up quite early.

However, with fall of the Berlin Wall, the building and cultivation of ESI/EDI had to be fundamentally adapted as the WEU found itself “at the crossroads of three developments:” the creation of the EU which had to acquire its own defence component, NATO’s adaptation to both the post-Cold War world and a greater European role within the Alliance, and “the growing significance...of events...outside Europe.”²⁸ The first development was openly endorsed by the WEU Paris Communiqué of December 1990:

22. Ibid., sect. II, para. 5.

23. Ibid., sect. I, para. 5.

24. WEU Council of Ministers, Communiqué, paras. 5-6, Luxembourg.

25. Western European Union, Platform on European Security Interests, intro., para. 5.

26. WEU Council of Ministers, Communiqué, paras. 15-16, Luxembourg.

27. See for instance Ibid., para. 17.

28. WEU Council of Ministers, Communiqué, sect. 3, Paris.

“the building of Europe...will have to acquire a defence dimension.”²⁹ On the other hand, the emerging crises within and beyond Europe, along with the opportunities of the new, unipolar setting, allowed for the introduction of the concept of crisis management (or the so-called ‘forward defence’) into the western strategic narrative, which eventually overshadowed territorial defence as a traditional and primary function of the state.

Against this background, renewed Franco-German military cooperation was elevated to the European level with the decision to make the Franco-German brigade the nucleus of a combined, corps-size European force. The creation of EUROCORPS within the WEU initially appeared alarming to the US and Canada,³⁰ even though the endeavor was less ambitious than the failed EDC project of the early 1950s and purportedly less capable than an equivalent NATO formation.³¹ This was quickly addressed through long-standing European and WEU practice to the relative satisfaction of both Europeanists and Atlanticists with the November 1992 Franco-German declaration that the EUROCORPS would be available for Article 5 operations and other NATO crisis management missions.³² Even so, the EUROCORPS represented a historically unparalleled integration of European forces, with the French role at the center, a permanent peacetime headquarters (HQ), and approximately 80,000 personnel. The EUROCORPS, in effect, was a clear evidence of the European self-image of their actual capabilities and, along with similar joint

29. Ibid.

30. See David Lord, “Defending Europe: A New European Army Would End Canada's Already Diminished Commitment to Defend the Old World,” *Gazette*, October 26, 1991, B.3, ProQuest (163464271). The Anglo-American concerns were actually first raised with the very creation of the Franco-German brigade.

31. Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 23.

32. Thanks to this declaration and the subsequent EUROCORPS-NATO agreement (January 1993), Atlanticists’ fears of potential decoupling were successfully mitigated. Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 24; and Hunter, *NATO’s Companion – or Competitor?*, 17n11.

force initiatives by the mid-1990s, established a relatively new trend in the transatlantic defence relationship.³³

By the time the EUROCORPS and the EU's decision to annex the WEU as a temporary operational arm of its nascent, CFSP-embedded common defence policy were framed within another round of debate on the European pillar of the Alliance, ESDI was formally established as both a reference and reality. On June 27, 1991, in Vianden, Luxembourg, WEU ministers noted that ESDI "was emerging within the twelve and WEU" and "agreed that European Political Union implies a genuine European security and defence identity and thus greater European responsibility for defence matters."³⁴

In the following decade, the latent competition between what had essentially been an Atlanticist version of ESDI and the apparently more authentic and differently styled processes of security and defence integration within the newly created EU produced terminological and conceptual confusion even among experts.³⁵ Were ESDI and the EU's subsequent ESDP basically two faces of the same medal, as many realists and Atlanticists claimed at the time? If not so much, where and when did the former start and end vis-à-vis the latter? Was ESDI actually a broader, instrumental Atlanticist concept designed as such, and subsequently insisted upon, so as to secure *a priori* NATO/US control over European security and defence developments, and to eventually help put the EU's

33. For an early account of the EUROCORPS' political and military aspects see Helmut Willman, "The European Corps – Political Dimension and Military Aims," *RUSI Journal* 139, no. 4 (August 1994): 28-33; WEU Assembly (Zierer Defence Committee), *The European Corps*, 39th ord. sess., doc. 1400 (Paris: Imprimerie Alenconnaise, 1993).

34. WEU Council of Ministers, Communiqué, Part 1, paras. 1-2, Vianden, Luxembourg, June 27, 1991, <http://www.weu.int/>.

35. ESDI was a genuine WEU-NATO design, both as a term and as a concept. Regardless of the framework (the WEU, NATO, the EU), Atlanticists tended to use the term in a generic, 'all-European' sense as a means to impose the(ir) concept upon the old continent and, especially, the EU. Also, as hinted by Hunter, they arguably adopted and mainstreamed the term as such in order to imply a new, previously non-existent identity derived from NATO. It was only later, when the EU was irreversibly establishing its ESDP, that US/NATO officials occasionally referred to ESDI in a more modest fashion, namely "to denote NATO's part of the relationship" with the EU. Hunter, *NATO's Companion – or Competitor?*, 3-4, 4n4.

anticipated strategic component fully under Alliance aegis? These questions have remained puzzling to date, despite the fact that the ESDP/CSDP has been running on an autonomous track, relatively separate from NATO, for over 15 years now.

A clarification attempt in this context may be easily perplexed or misguided by the post-1984 WEU declarations. Take for instance the already mentioned Hague Platform and Paris and Vianden Communiqués. They all referred to the concept of ESI/EDI/ESDI and the broader, EC-led Eurointegration as mutual enablers, and they all backed (particularly the Paris and Vianden Communiqués) the idea of a future EU with its own security and defence component. Yet, this component was not to represent the entire ESDI, as one might expect or suddenly think while reading, say, the WEU Vianden and Bonn documents,³⁶ but only a part of it as a broader, fluid, and somewhat vague Atlanticist matrix. Therefore, any present temptation to view ESDI as a some generic term and an ‘all-European’ sectoral integrationist concept fully covering the EU’s security and defence dimension (but also the now-defunct WEU and the whole European pillar of NATO, including the non-EU European allies, and, *in ultima linea*, the CSCE or OSCE since 1995),³⁷ reflects merely a once dominant Atlanticist perspective and intention.³⁸

As Robert Hunter and other former senior NATO officials have themselves recognized, there are notable differences between the WEU/NATO-sponsored, ‘all-inclusive’ ESDI and the subsequent autonomist forms of ‘ESDI’ within the EU, both

36. The Vianden and Bonn Communiqués seem to refer to ESDI in a narrow sense, namely as an equivalent to the security and defence dimension of the yet-to-be-established EU. The Bonn document, in particular, called for “Complementarity between the European security and defence identity and the Atlantic Alliance,” WEU Council of Ministers, Communiqué, Bonn, November 18, 1991, <http://www.weu.int/>. This suggests that most of the WEU leaders at the time, while accepting the Atlanticist reference that implied a NATO-derived “identity” rather than an autonomous entity, nurtured a Euro-centric perception of ESDI.

37. OSCE stands for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

38. See Hunter, *NATO’s Companion – or Competitor?*, 3-4, 4n4.

terminological (semantic, symbolic) and political.³⁹ Thus, while at the turn of the millennium ESDI, CEPD, CESDP, and ESDP were all basically seen by Atlanticists as terms of art (for they all purportedly designated more-or-less the same strategic phenomenon and relationship, but each was preferred by either the WEU/NATO or the EU for different reasons), the E letter, which stands for European, in each of these acronyms, was perceived as implying two different meanings: in the case of ESDI, it was seen as a symbol of openness towards all European allies and security institutions and an unequivocal recognition of US/NATO primacy, whereas in CEPD, CESDP, and ESDP, it did not have such a broad political connotation alluding chiefly to an EU-centric policy that could potentially impose access limits to non-EU actors and could reproduce itself via discretionary (autonomous) strategic decisions.⁴⁰

As for the temporal distinction, ESDI was a much earlier phenomenon than usually perceived. It was brewing at the end of the Cold War under WEU auspices and eventually spilled out in the 1990s in the form of the EU's CFSP and a related treaty clause on a common defence policy, the start of the WEU's integration into the overarching Union, the EUROCORPS, NATO's Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, the CSCE's transformation into OSCE, and all the subsequent WEU combined joint force initiatives and military operations. As such, albeit poured out from an Atlanticist mold, it had to do more with Europe than with NATO. Today, however, ESDI is regularly seen as a phenomenon that came to prominence within the WEU-NATO framework only after 1992/3 and lasted as a reference until a few of years after the 1998 Saint-Malo

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., In August 2001, notes Hunter, a senior NATO official stated that
“ESDI has a broader connotation than...ESDP and definitely includes all European members of NATO, which unfortunately is not so clear (and in the view of some clearly not so) for ESDP.”

declaration on European defence autonomy, According to Howorth's restrictive interpretation, ESDI was nothing but an ill-fated WEU-NATO experiment that existed roughly between 1994, when the Alliance launched its CJTF concept in favour of the increasingly autonomist WEU and EU, and 1999, the year when ESDP was institutionalized.⁴¹

2.2. ESDI between the WEU, NATO, & the EU (1992 – 2003)

A broader insight into the interplay between the WEU, NATO and the EU within what has been sometimes referred to as the 'schizophrenic'⁴² triangle of the 1990s is crucial to understanding key trends in an earlier phase of Europe's quest for defence autonomy,⁴³ the building blocks of the future ESDP/CSDP, and how the EU has finally emerged as the destined locus of European defence and security.

The US and NATO have had a long-standing objective of preventing factual European defence autonomy by means of Atlanticist assimilation of all emerging and successive forms of ESDI. Thus, in the 1950s, US diplomacy made sure that in case of success, the ambitious EDC project would develop within the NATO orbit. After the project failed, the WEU was so fashioned as to become an inferior yet conducive NATO arm. Later, for instance, in the case of the EUROGROUP, Europe struggled for a more prominent strategic role within the Alliance while being cautious to avoid unnecessary divisions.

41. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 8, 10, 13.

42. Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 38. The Independent Task Force uses the term "schizophrenic" to describe the hybrid European security landscape of the early 1990s.

43. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 38.

However, what happened in the course of the 1990s were more assertive European military initiatives in a row, which expectedly raised concerns across the Atlantic. The more Europe's quest for an autonomous strategic role intensified via both the WEU and the EU, the greater the NATO (US) paranoia became. Eventually, to mitigate persistent concerns of non-EU NATO allies (mainly US, Canada, and Turkey), all significant, European-only, defence initiatives, including today's ESDP/CSDP, have been linked to NATO via special arrangements and thus kept somewhat open to non-EU allies.

First, as already noted, the EUROCORPS was declared to NATO soon after its inception, albeit remaining primarily answerable to the then WEU, and entered into formal relationship with the Atlantic Alliance as early as January 1993. Second, by approving the CJTF concept at their January 1994 summit in the context of both adapting NATO to new roles and reflecting the emerging ESDI,⁴⁴ NATO leaders intended, *inter alia*, to prevent more serious and detached military activities exclusively within the WEU which had earlier decided on creating combined, multipurpose forces for crisis management.

WEU ministers had convened in the Petersberg Castle (June 19, 1992) near Bonn, Germany, in an attempt to strengthen, as envisaged by the 1991 Maastricht Declaration, the WEU's operational role and its organic ties with both the EU and NATO.⁴⁵ The resultant *Petersberg Declaration* urged WEU states, in addition to their overlapping collective defence commitments under both Article V of the Brussels Pact and Article 5

44. See North Atlantic Council, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, Brussels, January 10-11, 1994, paras. 1, 9, and 26, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940111a.htm>.

45. Under the 1991 Maastricht Declaration, WEU was assigned an ambivalent, bridging role: "...WEU's relations with European Union...The objective is to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union...WEU's relations with the Atlantic Alliance...The objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance..." Western European Union, Declaration on the Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, sect. A, para. 3, and sect. B, para. 4, Maastricht, December 10, 1991. <http://www.w eu.int/>.

of the Washington Treaty, to set up appropriate C² structures and generate multinational, multi-service, and multi-purpose military units under WEU command in order to be able to meet the organization's novel *Petersberg tasks*: humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management of combat forces, including peacemaking.⁴⁶ Also, at the time of the definition of these tasks, WEU nations had already pursued limited, coalition-based, military operations, though with a great reluctance and unsystematically.⁴⁷ Once introduced in this context, the CJTF concept was carefully crafted as a flexible, transformational, Alliance-wide mechanism for force packaging and interventions in a variety of contingencies, rather than as an exclusive WEU tool.⁴⁸ Thus, with the CJTF HQ made available to both NATO and the WEU, a new buzzword emerged: "separable but not separate" capabilities.⁴⁹

Third, as soon as a joint structure for rapid operational land (EUROFOR) and naval (EUROMARFOR) forces was forged within the WEU in 1995, NATO looked forward to

46. WEU Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, sect. II, Bonn, June 19, 1992, <http://www.weu.int/>. In terms of C², the document envisaged the creation of a WEU Planning Cell responsible for strategic and contingency planning, recommending C³ arrangements, including standard operating procedures for selected headquarters, and keeping updated force registers (lists of units and combinations of units available to the WEU).

47. Towards the mid-1990s, despite the already initiated trend of formation of WEU-answerable multilateral units, the WEU had "no forces, no command structure, and only a rudimentary planning cell." Thus, by the end of the decade the organization's operational record remained quite modest consisting, in the broadest sense, of the following engagements: participation, via its members, at the close of the Iran-Iraq War, large-scale maritime support by WEU nations for the UN embargo on Iraq in 1990/91, WEU warships dispatched to the Adriatic, plus non-military presence on Danube, to back the arms embargo on former Yugoslavia, a small police contingent in Mostar, Bosnia, a post-conflict mine clearance mission in Croatia, and finally, the 1997 Italian-led Operation ALBA in Albania. Having been part of a large-scale effort by a 31-member coalition, the WEU nations' Gulf engagement would eventually prove to be their most robust military endeavor prior to the Kosovo war. In this context, what is characteristic and regularly emphasized is the WEU's successive failure during the 1990s to build a consensus on launching a true, WEU-led military intervention (e.g. Bosnia, 1992, Rwanda, 1994/5, Albania, 1997). See Roger H. Palin, *Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects*, Adelphi Paper 294 (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, repr. 2013), 8; and Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 21-22.

48. The CJTF was designed as an instrument for assembling and rapid deployment of NATO forces, sufficiently flexible to allow for third-country participation and C² arrangements tailored on a case-by-case basis. As such, it had three specific purposes: to prepare the Alliance's force structure for out-of-area crisis management, to facilitate NATO contingency operations towards the East, and to develop and strengthen ESDI by enabling the WEU to maintain the forces answerable to it at a high level of readiness and pursue its own operations. See North Atlantic Council, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, para. 9; Charles Barry, "Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice," in *NATO's Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance*, ed. Philip H. Gordon (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), 203-19, quoted in Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 42; and Palin, *Multinational Military Forces*, 7-8.

49. North Atlantic Council, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, paras. 6 and 9.

absorbing at an early date these significant European capabilities intended for potential interventions in the Mediterranean.⁵⁰ NATO primacy was also reaffirmed through the principle of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) having “the first call on forces,” which was worked out as part of the 1996 WEU-NATO grand bargain.⁵¹

Faced by a series of autonomist European defence initiatives, NATO (US) was compelled to negotiate with the WEU as the “executive agent” of ESDI regarding the latter’s role within the Atlantic Alliance.⁵² Building on “twin initiatives” (George Bush/Bill Clinton – Jacques Chirac) since 1991,⁵³ and taking advantage of the recently approved and completed NATO CJTF concept, ‘The Grand Bargain’ of the 1996 Berlin and Brussels NATO summits laid down a concise WEU-NATO framework for the future development of ESDI based on seven key principles.⁵⁴ First, there were to be WEU-led operations, including planning and exercise of forces and command elements. Second, due to the WEU’s lack of C² capacity—but also as a way to protect its primacy—NATO undertook to do contingency planning for WEU missions, draw up illustrative scenarios, and conduct military exercises. Third, the C² for WEU missions was to rely upon multinational European command arrangements, with a European HQ and dual-hatted officers designated from within the NATO integrated military command structure. In this context, Deputy SACEUR (DSACEUR), a European, was now regarded as the main planner and strategic coordinator of all WEU endeavors relying on NATO resources.⁵⁵

50. See North Atlantic Council, Press Communiqué, M-NAC-2 (95)118, para. 9, Brussels, December 5, 1995, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c951205a.htm>.

51. Hunter, *NATO’s Companion – or Competitor?*, 17.

52. Ibid., 13.

53. Ibid., 14-15.

54. Hunter, *NATO’s Companion – or Competitor?*, 13-19.

55. The negotiations on the so-called European command options were heavily burdened by fears of decoupling and “two NATOs.” Remembered in this context is the US-France row over the post of the Naples-based Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces South (CINCAFSOUTH).

Fourth, the WEU could make use of the newly established CJTF concept, including the Combined Joint Planning Staff as a centralized CJTF HQ, for mounting interventions promptly and efficiently without duplicating C² arrangements. Fifth, NATO, largely meaning its individual members, would identify assets and capabilities for WEU-led missions, and release them upon WEU request in the wake of a contingency, provided that consensus had been reached within the North Atlantic Council (NAC), monitor their use during a WEU operation, and, if necessary, in case of a concurrent crisis, recall them. Sixth, WEU-led missions having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities were bound to remain open to all non-WEU European NATO members, including in terms of planning and C². Finally, NATO remained the essential security and defence forum for western allies, having “the first call” on declared European forces. In this spirit, the allies agreed to pursue common security objectives through the Alliance wherever possible and to maintain complementarity and full transparency between NATO and the WEU, including through joint consultations regarding contingencies.⁵⁶

Instead of being remembered as an “elegant” deal sealing ESDI within NATO and settling, once and for all, the basic debate on the European pillar of the Alliance, these principles and their specific implications caused a serious transatlantic (US vs. France) rift and an endless quibble over details.⁵⁷ According to Hunter, the substantial failure of ‘The Grand Bargain’ was partly a function of the ‘devil in the details,’⁵⁸ rather than of the imperfect principles as such.

56. For more details on ‘The Grand Bargain’ see Hunter, *NATO’s Companion – or Competitor?*, 13-19; Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 22; North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, M-NAC-1(96)63, Berlin, June 3, 1996, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm>; and Final Communiqué, M-NAC(DM)-2(96)89, Brussels, June 13, 1996, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-089e.htm>.

57. Hunter, *NATO’s Companion – or Competitor?*, 21-28.

58. Ibid.

The seven key principles are actually still valid and useful, though underutilized, as they subsequently helped devise the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements and the broader EU-NATO framework for permanent relations. In addition, the 1996 bargain was in a sense a myopic deal relying, to a large extent, on an ‘expiring’ (WEU) framework. Soon after the deal was reached, the Atlanticist concept of ESDI, along with its long-term advocate and embodiment, the WEU, would yield before the emergence of a more authentic form of European security and defence. The subsequent transposition of the 1996 principles into the newly emerging EU/ESDP-NATO framework was no guarantee whatsoever that the ESDP would develop fully within the Alliance since EU leaders saw NATO as merely one of the options that can be relied upon in EU-led military crisis management.

Whatever the mutual scope for cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic, the WEU-NATO deal on the future look of ESDI contradicted the underlying process towards a European defence autonomy and institutionalized European strategic dependence on NATO (US) in spite of constant calls for a greater European share in western military endeavors. This deliberate contradiction, accompanied by no significant US concessions in favour of a greater European (French) role in the NATO military command structure, was the proximate determinant of French strategic motives in the late 1990s and, in effect, of the Saint-Malo outcome.

Even so, post-Saint-Malo European defence autonomy, as embodied by what came to be known as ESDP, could not have been seriously delinked from NATO at this stage. There was little choice in the aftermath of Saint-Malo but to develop a full-fledged EU/ESDP-NATO strategic partnership based on existing WEU-NATO (ESDI) kit. On

March 17, 2003, High Representative (HR) for CFSP/ESDP Javier Solana and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson concluded a comprehensive framework for EU-NATO permanent relations, which also included Berlin Plus as a set of legally non-binding agreements and protocols providing the EU/CSDP with assured access to NATO resources for military crisis management.⁵⁹

Regardless, the underutilization of the optional Berlin Plus in EU military campaigns since 2003 as well as the ESDP/CSDP's relative deviation from Madeleine Albright's "3(+1)Ds" (no decoupling, duplication, and discrimination, plus no delinking) is indicative in two respects.⁶⁰ First, NATO (US) has long ago lost its battle for fully incorporating the European security and defence effort within the Alliance, though it refused admitting such failure in the immediate post-Saint-Malo years. On the other hand, with the CSDP constituting a tool for wielding (intra-)EU influence, cooperatively linked and fairly complementary to NATO, US strategy as well as actions by other non-EU allies (Canada, Turkey) could have a considerable impact on the direction in which Brussels will be taking the present or any perspective form of European defence.

With the war(s) in former Yugoslavia having presented itself as a major, distinctly European, yet peripheral challenge, there arguably could not have been a better experiment for Europe's strategic weight, a 'baptism by fire' for Brussels,⁶¹ and a

59. As an adaptation of the WEU-NATO grand bargain, the Berlin Plus package consists of seven components and their secret annexes: an agreement on secure information exchange based on reciprocal security protection rules, assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led military operations, availability of NATO assets and capabilities such as HQ and communication units, strategic transports, and ISTAR (e.g. AWACS, targeting specialists), procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities, terms of reference for the DSACEUR and NATO European command options, arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing capability requirements, and consultation arrangements in the context of EU-led operations relying on NATO resources.

60. In her well-known *Financial Times* article of December 1998, Albright called on EU leaders to avoid decoupling, duplication, and discrimination against NATO. Yet, in a subsequent account of the US perspective on ESDP, Hunter suggests the existence of a fourth "D" (no delinking). Hunter, *NATO's Companion – or Competitor?*, 33-44.

61. Since it was introduced by Roy Ginsberg in the context of CFSP/CSDP, the biblical expression 'baptism by fire' has become a frequently used metaphor for the EU's first military operational experiences.

potentially strong individual driver of the EU's strategic rise. From Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, through Kosovo, however, Europe as a whole failed to pull its weight, and the exclusive 'hour of Europe' so confidently predicted by former Luxembourg Foreign Minister and President of the EU Council Jacques Poos evaporated.⁶² In that sense, the feeble EC/EU Troika engagement in the early days of the Yugoslav crisis, showing merely a discrepancy between Brussels' desire to act as a great power and its lack of robust diplomatic and military capabilities, could mark no turning point for the emerging EU on the international stage.

The EU's apparently elusive ambition from Maastricht, to formulate eventually a common defence policy which might further lead to a common defence, would not change the dominant perception of it. Having absolutely no collective military instruments and operational capabilities to pursue its prospective defence policy, the emerging Union was compelled to make the WEU an integral part of its own development. Title V of the Maastricht Treaty regulating CFSP was clear: the EU could take various strategic (foreign policy, security, and military) decisions in the form of Common Positions and Joint Actions, and on its request, the WEU, "which is an integral part of the development of the Union," should "elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications."⁶³ Even though the WEU's new status as the defence component of the EU was not intended or understood as implying a relationship of subordination or integration,⁶⁴ the overarching union was steadily

62. Holly Wyatt-Walter, *The European Community and Security Dilemma 1979-1992* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 213.

63. European Union, Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J.4(2).

64. Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 25.

assuming, at least *de jure*, a decision-making role in European strategic affairs, while reducing the WEU to its temporary implementing tool.

Prior to Amsterdam (1997), and in the aftermath of Maastricht, it seemed possible for the EU to move decisively forward in acquiring its own set of military capabilities by fully integrating the WEU's operational dimension. To this end, at Noordwijk (1994), WEU foreign and defence ministers discussed "the formulation of a common European defence policy," and particularly implications for *operational capabilities*, "in the longer term perspective...within the European Union, which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance."⁶⁵ The referent document under ministerial scrutiny, which contained preliminary conclusions and recommendations on a common European defence policy, as well as related operational considerations, was planned to evolve into a comprehensive Common European Defence Policy Statement and serve as both a WEU input to the forthcoming Amsterdam intergovernmental conference (IGC) in 1996 and a basis for establishing "an effective Common European Defence Policy...in the years to come."⁶⁶

By the Spring 1995, the WEU could already note with satisfaction a new stage in the development of its organizational platform and operational capabilities in line with the Noordwijk, Kirchberg, and Petersberg guidelines. A consultative Politico-Military Group (PMG), an analytical and early warning Situation Center (SITCEN), a military intelligence section in the Planning Cell, and other rapid response (RR) support structures were established. New multinational forces (primarily) answerable to the WEU

65. WEU Council of Ministers, Noordwijk Declaration, paras. 5, 21, and 35, November 14, 1994, <http://www.weu.int/>. At Noordwijk, WEU ministers urged, *inter alia*, for the quick creation of a WEU RR capability in the form of a *Humanitarian Task Force*.

66. Ibid., para. 5.

(FAWEUs) were being created, the WEU SatCen was given permanent status, approaches to procuring and processing satellite imagery were examined, and progress with a view to the organisation's humanitarian RR and evacuation roles was actively pursued.⁶⁷ In addition, prior to the conclusion of the Amsterdam IGC in June 1997, and apart from the follow-up to the June 1996 'grand bargain,' the WEU intensively worked on special concepts and various capabilities for autonomous WEU interventions.⁶⁸

Nevertheless, in Amsterdam these WEU capabilities were not migrated to the EU framework. The intended EU-WEU merger, which also implied transferring the WEU collective defence commitment under EU aegis, simply did not happen.⁶⁹ Even the new, Labour government in London was initially unwilling to make such a radical move on this issue.⁷⁰ Moreover, the follow-up activities derived from the NATO-WEU bargain, as well as the sensitive attitude of EU ex neutrals (Ireland, Denmark, Austria, Sweden, and Finland) proved to be another temporary obstacle.⁷¹ Instead, as the 1997 WEU Paris Declaration suggests, the Europeans focused on finding the right *modus operandi*: practical arrangements in the context of Article J.4(2) of the Maastricht Treaty regarding the EU's potential requests to have the WEU implement its decisions in the defence realm, while also seeking to identify "the possible content of the common defence policy."⁷²

But, despite all hindrances, Amsterdam brought about three important strategic advances for the EU. First, as assuming of the entire set of WEU operational capabilities

67. See WEU Council of Ministers, Lisbon Declaration, "Common Reflection on the New European Security Conditions," paras. 3-31, May 15, 1995, <http://www.weu.int/>; and Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 20-22.

68. See WEU Council of Ministers, Paris Declaration, paras. 21-34, May 13, 1997, <http://www.weu.int/>.

69. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 120.

70. Ibid. and Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 26.

71. Moore, "Too Much Information," 77.

72. WEU Council of Ministers, Paris Declaration, para. 8.

and RR support structures by the EU remained an actively pursued option, the Treaty of Amsterdam further elucidated the EU's superior decision-making role vis-à-vis the WEU and the potentially maximal participation of its member-states in the planning and C² of WEU military operations in cases where the latter avails itself to the former.⁷³ Second, the Petersberg tasks were transposed into the EU framework, with the WEU still remaining the slated provider of operational capability for implementation.⁷⁴

This transposition was a historical milestone. It revealed the EU's concrete military ambition and *de facto* inauguration of ESDP as the core of CFSP a couple of years before the ESDP concept formally emerged and became a major transatlantic theme. Interestingly, although this ESDP prototype was clearly meant to grow into an applied security and defence policy, prior to Saint-Malo no one, notably Washington, seemed to be concerned. There was no debate on a Euro army, and transatlantic harmony was maintained not least of all because the EU had a long way to go to acquire defence autonomy and real capabilities. Also, the part of the EU's single institutional framework (SIN) responsible for CFSP/ESDP was bolstered by the introduction of HR for CFSP/ESDP, with EU special representatives appointed by the EU Council of Ministers to critical regions and flash points, and other relevant instruments.⁷⁵

However, even before the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force (May 1, 1999), on December 4, 1998, the EU defence giants, UK and France, proclaimed European defence

73. See European Union, Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Article 1, item/amendment 10, and Protocol on Article J.7 of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 340, 10.11.1997, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:11997D/TXT>; and Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 17(1) (ex Article J.7[1]), OJ C 340, 10.11.1997, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11997M/TXT&from=EN>.

74. See European Union, Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 1, item/amendment 10; and Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 17(2) (ex Article J.7[2]), 1997.

75. See European Union, Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 1, item/amendment 10, and Declaration relating to Western European Union, sect. A, para. 7.

autonomy at Saint-Malo, In their *Joint Declaration on European Defence* Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Chirac addressed three interrelated aspects: an autonomous EU defence (in general), adequate institutional build-up, and the creation of a credible EU force alongside a competitive European defence industry. More specifically,

“The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage [and]...must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. ...the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication...Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.”⁷⁶

In effect, the old, Atlanticist narrative about ESDI was effectively over, despite Washington and NATO’s subsequent attempts, notably through then US State Secretary Albright, at sustaining the traditional ESDI discourse. After Saint-Malo, numerous transatlantic experts have attempted to identify the drivers and rationale behind the event, usually by identifying one or more proximate reasons and motives. The full truth, however, lies a bit deeper: ESDP/CSDP came about due to a cumulative set of political (complete integration, European identity, national interests or partial benefits), economic (common defence market, European defence industry interests), (geo)strategic (post-Cold War environment, the new Balkan wars, other growing outside pressures, the need for capabilities and burden-sharing in NATO), socio-cultural, and, of course, personal factors, many of which came to prominence prior to 1989.

In the end, the consolidation trend that began in 1992 should have eliminated every illusion that a non-EU framework could better host the collective European defence effort

76. Franco-British Summit, Joint Declaration on European Defence, Saint-Malo, December 4, 1998, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-en-f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html.

in the 21st century. The WEU's post-1984 role may have proved indispensable in the revival and advent of the European defence project. However, this organization stood no chance in an increasingly EU-dominated European environment. NATO, on the other hand, could not possibly change its image as an insufficient security option for Europe, regardless of its post-Cold War transformation and struggle to legitimize its new role(s) in order to retain its purpose and primacy.⁷⁷

2.3. The Rise of ESDP/CSDP & its Current Status (1999-Present)

Towards the end of the post-Amsterdam process (1997-2000), as NATO (US) was still hoping to complete and operationalize ESDI within the Alliance, EU leaders stunned their non-EU allies in two steps. After discretionarily deciding on European defence autonomy in Saint-Malo, they first failed to take NATO's (US, Canadian, Turkish) numerous concerns more seriously,⁷⁸ at least until after the June 1999 Cologne European Council. Later on, in Helsinki, they inaugurated the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) concept which at that stage, with Bosnia and Kosovo as powerful reminders, sounded much more formidable than it has since proved to be the case.

Also, in the immediate aftermath of Saint-Malo was NATO's (US) obdurate and obstinate refusal to recognize unequivocally the emergence of a distinct, EU-specific, strategic entity, initially documented as CEPSP or CESDP,⁷⁹ later on consistently

77. There is a broad consensus and complementarity among transatlantic experts regarding the reasons that prevented ESDI from further developing within a non-EU framework. Quinlan for instance, explains the inferiority of each of the three considered Atlanticist alternatives to ESDP/CSDP: ESDI within the WEU and backed by NATO under the 1996 'grand bargain,' ESDI fully within NATO, or simply greater European national contributions to the Alliance's common defence. See Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 31-32; and Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 13.

78. For a detailed account on NATO/US concerns with ESDP see Hunter, *NATO's Companion – or Competitor?*, xviii-xxiii, 30-34, 38-40, 41n15, 45-48, 50-51, 54-61, 63-65, 64n3, 67-70, 98-108, 149-61; Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 43-45, 63; and Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 50-51.

79. The Vienna, Cologne, and Helsinki Presidency Conclusions of December 1998, June 1999, and December 1999 respectively, introduced the compound label "Common European Policy on Security and Defence" (CEPSP).

referred to as ESDP, and more recently rebranded as CSDP. This was in addition to the widespread skepticism in high-level circles across the Atlantic. Acknowledging at NATO's April 1999 Washington summit the EU's striving for autonomous action in the field of defence, while also hoping that such autonomy would be limited to decision-making/strategic C² and in principle reliant on its readiness and operational resources,⁸⁰ NATO (US) remained fairly ignorant of the essence and full implications of the Saint-Malo milestone,⁸¹ thus feeding various misperceptions of the emerging ESDP. To preserve NATO primacy and its role in European affairs, as well as its relationship with a key ally, the US was even keen to back cautiously Turkey's unrealistic demands for privileged access to ESDP.⁸²

Even though for most non-EU allies, the US in particular, a modestly capable ESPD was "a second-order matter,"⁸³ for political reasons and lacking of profound understanding of ESDP's nature, they all wanted a role in the project.⁸⁴ Canada for instance, which had long feared the possibility of being pushed into NATO's political "corner" by a more coherent ESDI,⁸⁵ and whose Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) had therefore early expressed Ottawa's interest in European-led crisis management (WEU-led military operations, 1997),⁸⁶ was welcomed

"Common European Security and Defence Policy" (CESDP) was another name variant used in the Cologne and Helsinki documents. These trial references circulated until "ESDP" was finally 'filtered out' around 2000 as a standard denomination of the EU security and defence policy.

80. See Hunter, *NATO's Companion – or Competitor?*, 53-54. In November 1999, the European defence autonomy was duly acknowledged by the US Congress (Ibid., 60).

81. See Ibid., 33-34, 39n11, 53, 99.

82. See Ibid., 40. The EU-Turkey impasse over ESDP prolonged the regulation of EU-NATO relations until 2002/3.

83. Ibid., 38.

84. See Ibid., 35. As Hunter notes, ESDP bothered Washington and other non-EU allies for its intrinsic political nature and its possible long-term deviations. In this sense, US/NATO concerns with ESDP were (and still are) predicated on a couple of contradictory fears: first, a fear of "more Europe," meaning a politically coherent and militarily assertive EU acting independently while doing ever more on defence, and second, a more realistic fear of "less Europe," meaning a strategically indifferent, demilitarized continent underutilizing its potential and thus doing poorly as a NATO partner.

85. Lord, "New European Army."

86. WEU Council of Ministers, Paris Declaration, para. 30.

to participate in ESDP by the June 2000 Feira European Council but only as a third country, “other interested State,” and “other prospective partner.”⁸⁷

Obtaining a more objective understanding of the Union’s political existence and evolving defence autonomy is long overdue. Through the well known quartet of summits in Cologne, Helsinki, Santa Maria da Feira, and Nice, within less than two years (1999-2000), the EU set out its basic ESDP framework, including initial guidelines for permanent cooperation with NATO. At Cologne, EU leaders agreed on ESDP’s politico-strategic matrix. This was followed by the outlining of the new policy’s military dimension and ambition (ERRF) in Helsinki. By early 2000, the cornerstone ESDP institutions, the Political and Security Committee (PSC/COPS), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS), were put into function as interim agencies before being fully institutionalized by Council decisions and confirmed by the Treaty of Nice the following year.⁸⁸ This rapid institutional build-up and attainment of operational capabilities was basically enabled by the Union’s rich institutional legacy as well as the capability achievements within the WEU.⁸⁹

Mapping ESDP’s politico-strategic matrix, the June 1999 Cologne European Council mandated a necessary duplication with NATO in the political and C⁴ISTAR segments in

87. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Annex I, Santa Maria da Feira, June 19-20, 2000, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei2_en.htm#an1.

88. Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 63.

89. See Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 63-67, 190. As Howorth thoroughly explains, as many as nine CFSP/ESDP organs were inherited from the pre-Saint-Malo EU/CFSP framework. These were the European Council, the Council of Ministers of the EU (the Council), namely the latter’s foreign ministerial formation known as General Affairs Council (GAC) prior to 2003 and General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) from 2003 to 2009, then, the rotating EU Presidency, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the Political Committee (PC) which later became the PSC/COPS, the Council’s General Secretariat, the European Commission including its Commissioner for External Relations, the Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX), and a Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, furthermore, the European Parliament with its relevant (sub)committees, and finally, the EU’s HR for CFSP/ESDP assisted by the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit and other DGs within the Council’s Secretariat. These organs, together with the subsequently integrated WEU crisis response structures and the “‘intensive intergovernmentalism’” generated by “epistemic [security] communities” across the EU, served as a platform for erecting a multilevel ESDP mechanism.

creating a brand new set of early warning (intelligence, satellite surveillance, analytical), strategic and policy planning, decision-making/C², and logistic (strategic transport) structures and capabilities. At the same time, based on both a preliminary agreement reached in Amsterdam two years earlier and a requirement for “a personality with a strong political profile” formally imposed by the December 1998 Vienna European Council,⁹⁰ former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana was appointed Secretary General of the Council of Ministers of the EU and, ex officio, HR for CFSP/ESDP.⁹¹ Until the end of his second term as HR (2009), Solana was supported in carrying out his duties by an insufficiently systematized but markedly effective Council Secretariat whose internal, politico-administrative dynamics was all but orthodox in a Wilsonian/Weberian sense.⁹²

As regards other early institutional solutions, the existing General Affairs Council (GAC⁹³) was envisaged, in line with the Saint-Malo declaration, to hold defence ministerial meetings. This would eventually be realized three years later in February 2002, when EU defence ministers meetings were approved under GAC auspices in the form of both regular meetings *de facto* co-attended by EU foreign and defence ministers and informal sittings.⁹⁴ Furthermore, in addition to the planned new or reinvented political and strategic-military organs (PSC, EUMC, EUMS), a Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), an EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS), and an EU Satellite Center (EU SatCen) were to fully integrate the WEU’s respective crisis management functions and

90. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 65; and European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Vienna, December 11-12, 1998, para. 73, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00300-R1.EN8.htm.

91. Solana also assumed a third office, Secretary-General of the WEU, as a clear indicator of the WEU’s ensuing integration into the single EU framework. Hunter, *NATO’s Companion – or Competitor?*, 65-68, 70-71, 74-82.

92. Hylke Dijkstra, “Solana and His Civil Servants: An Overview of Political-Administrative Relations,” in *The High Representative for the EU Foreign and Security Policy: Review and Prospects*, ed. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Carolin Rüger (Baden-Baden: NOMOS Verlag, 2011), 65-86.

93. For details see Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 63-64.

94. Ibid. 75.

operational capabilities.⁹⁵ Widely anticipated, yet comparatively less prominent at this point were the EU's *premier* provisions on ESDP's inclusiveness outlining general Modalities of Participation and Cooperation with non-EU NATO allies and third countries. In terms of defence capabilities, the Cologne Report on CEPD (ESDP) routinely listed some of NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) priorities ("deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility and mobility") and, despite Washington's concerns, looked at various sources (national, multinational, the WEU, and "assured access" to NATO assets) in what seemed like a self-interested, utilitarian fashion.⁹⁶ The Cologne institutional blueprint was later fully elaborated in Helsinki, Feira, and Nice.⁹⁷

Perceived as a replica of Saint-Malo, with a predominant politico-bureaucratic focus and poor safeguards for NATO's primacy, the Cologne summit was disappointing to non-EU allies in many ways.⁹⁸ First, what was seen as copying of the highest structures of the Atlantic Alliance and indicative of a potential rivalry extended the already considerable US concerns in the lead-up to Helsinki.⁹⁹ Second, the EU's initial preoccupation with ESDP institution-building, just like its subsequent attachment to a 'soft,' comprehensive (civil-military) strategic approach, became yet another subject of sarcasm within NATO circles.¹⁰⁰

95. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Annex III, "European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence" and "EU Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence," Cologne, June 3-4, 1999, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm; Hunter, *NATO's Companion – or Competitor?*, 64-65; and WEU Council of Ministers, Marseille Declaration, November 13, 2000, <http://www.weu.int/>.

96. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Annex III, Cologne, 1999.

97. Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 48.

98. See Hunter, *NATO's Companion – or Competitor?*, 55-58, 67-68.

99. Hunter, *NATO's Companion – or Competitor?*, 67.

100. Nonetheless, many legitimate transatlantic concerns were implicit in Lord Robertson's legendary teaser suggesting that, unlike political will and real capabilities, complex structures and "wiring diagrams" do not solve security crises. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 62.

Partly in response to NATO's (US) calls for reconciliation of the Cologne guidelines with what had been earlier agreed by the NAC in Washington, the December 1999 Helsinki European Council's agenda consisted of *three* major themes: real military capabilities, non-military crisis management, and more detailed and open EU-NATO arrangements.¹⁰¹ On the face of it, this *means-oriented event* could have been lauded on both sides of the Atlantic. Instead, the Finish 'moment of truth'¹⁰² rather felt shocking to the broader Alliance since EU leaders announced ESDP's high military ambition; the so-called Helsinki/2003 Headline Goal (HG) revealing their intention to create a corps-size ERRF (50,000 - 60,000 troops, 100 ships, 400 aircraft, and 40,000 reserves) based on a Bosnian or Kosovo scenario.¹⁰³ Moreover, as part of this original HG, the European Council called for the rapid development of "collective capability goals" in the priority areas of C², intelligence, and strategic mobility "also identified by [a previous]...WEU audit."¹⁰⁴ This notional EU force instantly awoke the old, speculative debate on a European army, precipitating a new, second expansion of media sensationalism on the topic in less than a decade, despite explicit rebuttals by Brussels of any prospects for an EU federal defence force and Washington's awareness of the ERRF's lesser military capability as compared to equivalent US/NATO units.¹⁰⁵

101. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Annex IV, Presidency Reports, Annex 1 to Annex IV, "Presidency Progress Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence," and Annex 2 to Annex IV "Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union," Helsinki, December 10-11, 1999, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20European%20Council%20-%20Annex%20IV%20of%20the%20Presidency%20Conclusions.pdf>.

102. Hunter, *NATO's Companion – or Competitor?*, 63.

103. Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 51, 53. The ERRF concept is said to have been initiated by Richard Hatfield.

104. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Annex IV, Helsinki, quoted in Hunter, *NATO's Companion – or Competitor?*, 65.

105. See Hunter, *NATO's Companion – or Competitor?*, 65-68; 94, 96. Although the extreme positions in the "asset vs. threat" debate have been silenced after the adoption of EU-NATO permanent arrangements (Berlin Plus) in 2003 and the EU's recognition of the Alliance's "right of first refusal," certain transatlantic unease has remained to date. Center for Defense Information, "European Security and Defense Identity," 2.

After determining at Feira the EU's initial civilian crisis management ambition,¹⁰⁶ in late 2000 in Nice the European Council rounded up the fundamentals of a comprehensive ESDP. Specifically, on this occasion the EU leaders adopted the documents detailing the composition, competences, and operation of the *permanent* political and strategic-military structures that were yet-to-be fully formalized. Further to this, they also elaborated the Helsinki HG with regard to forces, strategic capabilities, and a progress review mechanism, defined the capabilities required for civilian crisis management, laid down the EU's cooperation and consultation arrangements with NATO, non-EU European allies and EU candidates, as well as "other potential partners," and confirmed (the EU Council's "decisions of principle" regarding) the oncoming inclusion into the Union of WEU knowledge/analytical resources and hi-tech capabilities.¹⁰⁷

The following year, the Treaty of Nice, along with relevant Council decisions, authoritatively sanctioned the major institutional developments in ESDP since 1999. As a result, the reinvented PSC now featuring a new name and ambassadorial composition, emerged from obscurity to become a pivotal nexus in the nascent, multilevel CFSP/ESDP mechanism, responsible for, among other things, "political control and strategic direction of [all] EU crisis management operations."¹⁰⁸ Also, the comprehensive ESDP was enabled by the introduction of the long anticipated flexibility clause (*enhanced cooperation*)¹⁰⁹ in the civilian portion of CFSP/ESDP as well as penetration of the

106. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Annex I, Santa Maria da Feira.

107. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Annex VI, Presidency Report on the ESDP, Nice, December 7-9, 2000, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00400-r1.%20ann.en0.htm.

108. European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 25(7), OJ C 325, 24.12.2002, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12002M/TXT>. The PSC/COPS is a diplomatic upgrade of the former Political Committee (PC). As a genuine product of the 1980s' EPC, the PC was a pre-2000 advisory body in charge of monitoring the international politico-security situation and delivering opinions to the Council accordingly. It consisted of senior experts (political directors) from the national foreign ministries rather than diplomats.

109. See Ibid., Articles 27a, 27b, 27c, 27d, 27e.

qualified majority voting (QMV) rule into pillar two.¹¹⁰ In the immediate post-Nice period, the Union first took over the WEU SatCen and ISS, and then, after the long pursued single EDA was finally created in 2004, unified the WEAG and the Research Cell of the Western European Armaments Organization (WEAO) with the latter.

This was a turning point in the gradual process of recasting the EU's purely civilian role. The completion of ESDP's basic institutional framework, the declaration of its full operational capability (FOC) in 2003,¹¹¹ as well as its first operational efforts in the Balkans and Africa were all helped by the 9/11 tragedy and the subsequent US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.¹¹² Towards the mid-2000s, as evidenced by the success of its first civilian and military endeavors, the militarized Union had already established a minimum platform for effective, low-to-medium-scale crisis management, thus allowing itself to further focus on strategy, doctrinal coherence, ambition, and developing its strategic and operational capabilities in both the civilian and military realms.

Towards the end of 2001 EU leaders managed to initiate a constitution-making process that inevitably led to further defence integration. The 2001 Convention on the Future of Europe and its final product, the subsequently failed 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), introduced multiple mechanisms for strengthened defence coordination between EU members and more efficient ESDP, while also envisaging a

110. See Ibid., Articles 18(5) and 23(2); and Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Article 207(2), OJ C 325, 24.12.2002, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12002E/TXT>. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice in 2003, the appointment of both the HR for CFSP/ESDP (since 2009, HR for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy [FASP] and Vice President [VP] of the European Commission) and EU Special Representatives has formally been subject to the QMV rule.

111. The ESDP/ERRF officially became fully operational (covering the full range of Petersberg tasks) in May 2003, a year and a half after being declared "capable of conducting some crisis management operations" (initial operational capability - IOC). Council of Ministers of the EU, Declaration on EU Military Capabilities, 9379/03, Presse 138, para. 2, Brussels, May 19-20, 2003, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Declaration%20on%20EU%20Military%20Capabilities%20-%20May%202003.pdf>; and European Council, Presidency Conclusions, sect. I, para. 6, and Annex II, Declaration on the Operational Capability of the Common European Security and Defence Policy, sect. A, Laeken, December 14-15, 2001, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-01-18_en.htm.

112. See Hunter, *NATO's Companion – or Competitor?*, xviii, 150-51, 163-72, 173-74, 176.

structural upgrade of the latter under the new name CSDP. First, the TCE sanctioned the EU's growing civil-military ambition exemplified, among other things, by a new, *expanded* and more elaborate definition of Petersberg tasks. This expanded definition, by including the three new, generic ESDP missions (joint disarmament, security sector reform [SSR]/military advice and assistance, and counter-terrorist support to third countries) concomitantly promoted by the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), as well as explicit references to "conflict prevention" and combat-inclusive "post-conflict stabilization," made a whole new symbiosis of strategic tasks in the course of which the Union could employ military assets, civilian tools, or both.¹¹³

Second, three new mechanisms were envisioned as specific enablers of future EU/CSDP military interventions: a start-up fund intended for the smooth financing of substantial, preparatory activities for such interventions,¹¹⁴ a permanent structured cooperation in defence (PSCD) as an opportunity for those able and willing to fulfill certain (according to the Draft TCE and prior to the Anglo-Franco-German compromise in the Fall of 2003, "higher") military capability criteria with more binding commitments in this area with a view to the most demanding missions,¹¹⁵ and, a separate mechanism for generating *ad hoc* coalitions of the willing within the Union framework, and particularly upon UN requests.¹¹⁶

113. European Union, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Article III-309, OJ C 310, 16.12.2004, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:en:HTML>.

114. Ibid., Article III-313.

115. Ibid., Articles I-41(6), III-312. The PSCD was initially feared as a perfidious Franco-German concept aimed at creating a leading and potentially exclusive core in security and defence modeled on the Euro/EMU project. It was therefore dubbed "security and/or defence Eurozone." European Convention, Final Report of the Working Group VIII - Defence, CONV 461/02, WG VIII 22, Brussels, December 16, 2002, p. 19, para. 54, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=CV%20461%202002%20INIT>, quoted in Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 80. For details on the evolution of the Draft TCE text, the related Anglo-Franco-German bargain of 2003, and the eventual elimination of "higher [criteria]" from the final draft see Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 79-82. Howorth, however, does not mention that "higher criteria..." was erased only partially, with Article I-41(6) TCE creating ambiguity by preserving the said wording.

116. European Union, TCE, Articles I-41(5) and III-310.

Third, the Convention proposed a few constitutional innovations for the CFSP/CSDP mechanism, notably a Union Minister of Foreign Affairs to be backed by a diplomatic service (European External Action Service – EEAS),¹¹⁷ and the office of a President of the European Council.¹¹⁸ Fourth, in line with the Constitution's communitarian spirit mirrored by the envisaged elimination of the EU's three-pillar structure, further expansion of the 'QMV-based' decision making was approved.¹¹⁹ In this sense, even though today it is still believed and argued that CFSP remains intergovernmental and its core CSDP exclusively based on consensus, the fact is that QMV has been applicable (albeit not actually applied) by default even in relation to the set-up, operation, and/or control of some EU defence mechanisms or institutions (e.g. EDA, the start-up fund, PSCD).¹²⁰

Obviously, there has been a growing tension between the well known, post-1992 treaty clause banning QMV-based EU decisions on military and defence matters and more recent concepts and treaty provisions allowing for QMV to apply not only to the broader CFSP institutional set-up, but also to typical defence institutional matters that can

117. Ibid., Articles I-22, I-25(2), I-27(2)(3), I-28, and III-296.

118. Ibid., Articles I-22, I-24(2), and III-295.

119. Whatever stipulated in the treaties in terms of decision-making procedure, in practice the EU/CSDP is constrained by a consensus-building culture. As clarified by Ramses A. Wessel, all CFSP/CSDP decisions are more or less consensual, and the act of voting is regularly avoided during their adoption. One of the reasons for such continuing practice is the fact that the rare, post-Maastricht attempts at taking EU decisions by QMV have been blocked by the UK. Ramses A. Wessel, *The European Union's Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective* (The Hague/Boston/London: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 142.

120. See European Union, TCE, Articles I-23(3), I-25, III-300, III-311(2), III-312(2)(3)(4), and III-313(3); Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Articles 1 and 2, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT>; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 45(2) (ex Article 28D[2] TEU), 18 (ex Article 9E TEU), 41 (ex Article 28 TEU), and 46 (ex Article 28E TEU), OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT>; and Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Articles 189 (ex Article 172bis TFEU) and 222 (ex Article 188R TFEU), OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT>. It is noteworthy here that the QMV rule was made applicable to procedural CFSP matters and implementing CFSP measures as early as 1992. Driven by this logic, in the mid-1990s, the Council wrongfully included the QMV option in some CFSP measures with clear military and defence implications (Joint Actions on anti-personnel mines). Wessel, *Legal Institutional Perspective*, 142, 142n283; and "Initiative and Voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy: The New Lisbon Rules in Historical Perspective," University of Twente Paper, p. 16 (16n21), accessed January 23, 2011, <https://www.utwente.nl/bms/pa/research/wessel/wessel75.pdf>.

be by no means fully prevented from “having military or defence implications.”¹²¹ Given the degree of nominal penetration of QMV into the broader CFSP/CSDP realm, the paramount unanimity rule seems to have been somewhat compromised. While the latter remains rigidly applied in practice, to the whole corps of CFSP measures and not least to quintessential military-operational decisions, on a formal level, EU primary law makers have begun to exclude from its scope institutional matters in security and defence as well as strategically relevant policies other than CSDP (e.g. European Space Policy - ESP).¹²²

Fifth, the post-9/11 war on terror context and the resultant US strategic shift towards Asia presented a great opportunity for the ESDP/CSDP narrative to spread into the realm of homeland security and defence. As a result, the EU Constitution included a couple of future-oriented, solidarity clauses in case of major internal and external (military) security challenges respectively.¹²³ Under the so-called Solidarity Clause, in the event of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster within the EU, member states are

121. European Union, Treaty on European Union, Article J.4(3); TCE, Article III-300(4); and Consolidated Version of the Treaty of European Union, Article 31(4) (ex Article 23 TEU), 2012.

122. For the ESP see European Union, TCE, Article III-254; and Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, Article 189 (ex Article 172bis TFEU), 2012.

123. Both clauses were the product of long and uneasy negotiations and both came from the original Franco-German idea of a single, general clause on solidarity against all sorts of threats (internal and external) and binding all EU members. In addition, the collective defence clause was also inspired by a narrower Franco-German concept for structured cooperation and mutual assistance among certain member states participating in a leading strategic core referred to as “European Union of Security and Defence” (EUSD, see further analysis). These original Europeanist ideas, which were to help “franchir une nouvelle étape dans la construction de l’Europe de la Sécurité et de la Défense,” were early dropped/blocked as such. However, in line with the politics of the day, which was largely determined by the transatlantic rift over the Iraq War, they eventually led to the formulation of two separate treaty clauses: one on solidarity in case of more serious internal contingencies and other against external military threats and armed aggression. The initial, preliminary versions of these two clauses found their place in the July 2003 Draft TCE. Inspired by the original EUSD concept, the collective defence clause was initially conceived just like the former, as a special case of PSCD (“closer cooperation in mutual defence” between willing and able EU members) based on an explicit commitment for mutual military aid. As noted by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig, “a Franco-German proposal aimed to incorporate the WEU mutual defence clause into the EU, through the mechanism of enhanced cooperation since an automatic defence obligation in the Treaty would have been opposed by the neutral Member States.” Reunion des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement d’Allemagne, de France, du Luxembourg et de Belgique sur la défense européenne, Déclaration commune, Bruxelles, 29 avril 2013, <http://www.bruxelles2.eu/defense-ue/defense-ue-droit-doctrine-politique/declaration-de-bruxelles-fr-all-be-lux-29-avril-2003-le-texte.html>, quoted in Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 81 (see also pp. 117-24); European Convention, Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 850/03, Articles 40(7) and 42, Brussels, July 18, 2003, <http://www.constitution-europeenne.info/an/conventionan.pdf>; and Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig, “The EU’s Mutual Assistance Clause: First Ever Activation of Article 42(7) TEU,” European Parliamentary Research Service Briefing, Brussels, November 2015, pp. 2, 9, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572799/EPRS_BRI\(2015\)572799_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572799/EPRS_BRI(2015)572799_EN.pdf).

bound to provide mutual support by coordinating their activities within the EU Council, whereas the Union as a whole “shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States,” to assist the affected national government upon request.¹²⁴ For its own part, the collective defence clause, often referred to as Mutual Assistance/Defence Clause, states:

“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.”¹²⁵

Obviously, the Constitution incorporated a weaker version of Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty (WEU), avoiding in its final text an explicit reference to military aid.¹²⁶ Nonetheless, having been subsequently assumed by the Lisbon Treaty, this is a valuable legal and anticipatory framework and the scope formally provided by “all the means in their power” is more than sufficient for leading CSDP nations, if/when needed, to show determination to defend the homeland of all Europeans.¹²⁷ In effect, the CSDP now offers a sort of *strategic insurance policy* which, intended for the period until the establishment of common defence as it is, could help Europe to come to its own security needs in case of a suddenly ineffective NATO (US) umbrella.

124. European Union, TCE, Articles I-43 and III-329.

125. Ibid., Article I-41(7). The rest of para. 7 ensures NATO primacy:

“Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.”

126. Unlike the 2004 TCE, the July 2003 Draft TCE offered a strong mutual defence clause, almost equivalent to the WEU’s Article V in envisaging “assistance [among participating EU members] by all the means in their power, military or other.” European Convention, Draft TCE, Article 40(7).

127. The EU collective defence arrangement was adopted in order to provide both an anticipatory framework for all willing member states while awaiting the common defence system and a formal protective umbrella for EU ‘neutrals.’ At the time, NATO (US) was concerned with the implications of an outright transfer of the WEU’s Article V into the EU framework. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 117-24; and Hunter, *NATO’s Companion – or Competitor?*, 21-28.

The transatlantic rift over the Iraq war in 2003 brought to the surface tensions among western allies, ideological differences between Brussels and Washington in terms of strategic approach, Europe's visible frustration with the Bush doctrine and the latter's implications for US strategy,¹²⁸ and intra-EU division between old Europeanists and UK-led Atlanticists now joined by Donald Rumsfeld's 'New Europe.' The Europeanist response to this transatlantic schism came on April 29, 2003, during the controversial Four-Party Summit (France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg) which proposed "le concept d'Union européenne de sécurité et de défense (UESD)" (European Union of Security and Defence - EUSD) as a leading strategic core modeled upon the Eurozone.¹²⁹ Several of the above discussed security and defence concepts, notably PSCD and the solidarity clauses, were strongly promoted by this so-called 'Chocolate Summit,'¹³⁰ and like most of the key summit proposals, made their way, first in the July 2003 Draft Constitution, where some of them preserved their original, non-Atlanticist, British-disputed form, and then in the final constitutional text.¹³¹

Launching multiple initiatives for "nouvel élan" for ESDP and a more capable Europe, with some irresistible even to London (e.g. armaments agency, improved RR capability),¹³² the 'Chocolate Summit' was problematic mainly for two ideas: permanent EU Operations Headquarters (OHQ) as a fairly unacceptable, 'greater evil' and the

128. See Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 29-35; and Leo Michel, "NATO and the United States: Working with the EU to Strengthen Euro-Atlantic Security," in *The Routledge Handbook of European Security*, ed. Sven Biscop and Richard Whitman (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013), 255-56, 267n4, 267n5, 267n6.

129. Reunion des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement d'Allemagne, de France, du Luxembourg et de Belgique sur la défense européenne, Déclaration commune, quoted in Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 81.

130. Carmen Gebhart, "The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate: Recalibrating ESDP Planning and Conduct Capacities," *CFSP Forum* 7, no. 4 (July 2009): 11, http://www.carmengebhard.com/CFSP_Forum_vol_7_no_4.pdf.

131. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 79-83, 117-24.

132. Reunion des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement d'Allemagne, de France, du Luxembourg et de Belgique sur la défense européenne, Déclaration commune.

EUSD's "mutual defence pact" as a 'lesser evil.'¹³³ With no explicit reference to "collective/mutual defence," the summit declaration considered the respective concept on two different levels. On a Union level, a mutual assistance obligation against all risks was proposed in the form of a "clause générale de solidarité et de sécurité commune...permettant de faire face aux risques de toute nature envers l'Union."¹³⁴ In parallel, an adapted version of this general solidarity clause was envisaged for the prospective EUSD core, urging future EUSD participants to "prendront l'engagement de se porter secours et assistance face aux risques de toute nature."¹³⁵ In the political climate of the day, this was rigidly interpreted as the old Europeanists aiming to forge a narrow "mutual defence pact" within a potentially exclusionary EUSD grouping.¹³⁶ What inevitably followed was an Anglo-Franco-German bargain and trade-offs to reconcile the differences.¹³⁷ In the end, while the strict EUSD concept was dropped as such, its essence as a PSCD prototype, its associated proposals regarding military capabilities development (e.g. joint armament programs, doctrinal harmonization and European military training, pooling & sharing, improved RR capacity, OHQ, European Air Transport Command [EATC] and Fleet, multinational mobility and logistics command [the future Movement Coordination Centre Europe - MCCE]), as well as the rest of the key tenets (e.g. reformulated Petersberg tasks, EDA, mutual solidarity) of the Chocolate Summit's vision for "la construction de l'Europe de la Sécurité et de la Défense" have since been

133. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 81; and Gebhart, "Recalibrating ESDP Planning," 11-12.

134. Reunion des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement d'Allemagne, de France, du Luxembourg et de Belgique sur la défense européenne, Déclaration commune, quoted in Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 81.

135. Ibid.

136. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 81-82.

137. Ibid., 82-83.

embraced by the Union,¹³⁸ with many of them having already been incorporated into the treaties.

As for the second, much bigger challenge given that the idea of a full-fledged EU OHQ and permanent contingency planning has always been the most painful spot in the EU/CSDP - NATO relationship,¹³⁹ the summit proposal for “le renforcement des capacités européennes de planification opérationnelle” by establishing in Summer 2004 a Tervuren-based Operational Planning Cell as “un noyau de capacité collective” could not have resulted in anything but compromise.¹⁴⁰ A Civil-Military Cell was subsequently created within the EUMS, responsible for a “primarily symbolic,” stand-by, non-24/7 EU Operations Center (OPCEN) based on a so-called “core staff” (four officers).¹⁴¹ Only recently (since 2012) has Brussels activated the OPCEN in order to coordinate (rather than command) its CSDP military operations and capacity-building (SSR) missions in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel.¹⁴²

From the time prior to the failure of the European Constitution (2005) to the Lisbon recovery (2007-09), as the ESDP operational portfolio grew, the Union focused on developing its military and civilian capabilities. First, towards the mid-2000s, although the Helsinki HG (ERRF) “neither met, nor abandoned [sic],” ESDP planners embarked on devising a new, numerically more realistic (yet qualitatively better) RR concept.¹⁴³

138. Reunion des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement d’Allemagne, de France, du Luxembourg et de Belgique sur la défense européenne, Déclaration commune.

139. See Hunter, *NATO’s Companion – or Competitor?*, 41n15, 98; and Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation*, 63.

140. Reunion des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement d’Allemagne, de France, du Luxembourg et de Belgique sur la défense européenne, Déclaration commune.

141. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 82; and “The Activation of the EU Operations Center,” EEAS, Brussels, May 22, 2012, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/factsheet_opscentre_22_may_12_en.pdf.

142. “EU Operations Centre Horn of Africa and Sahel,” EEAS, Brussels, June 2015,

http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-operations-centre/docs/factsheet_eu_opcen_23_06_2015.pdf.

143. Giegerich, *European Military Crisis Management*, 12-17; and Gerrard Quille, “The European Security and Defence Policy: From the Helsinki Headline Goal to the EU Battlegroups,” European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies Note, Brussels, September 12, 2006, p. 18,

Recalling the ‘Chocolate Summit’s’ appeal “d’améliorer la capacité européenne de réponse rapide,”¹⁴⁴ and encouraged in particular by the success of the subsequent French-led Operation Artemis in RD Congo, they swiftly turned their attention from the existing ERRF concept, whose potential employment in a future crisis was apparently becoming all the less likely, to the growing need for smaller, battalion-sized, theater-entry units at a very high readiness. It is important to remember that this move was a pragmatic, efficiency-driven adaptation in a continuing unipolar context and not an end to Europe’s long-term pursuit for a robust ERRF capability. Thus, from November 2003 to June 2004, the UK, France, and Germany worked closely together in developing the new battlegroup (BG) concept.¹⁴⁵ This partly innovative concept,¹⁴⁶ which has sometimes been wrongly perceived as an alternative to the ERRF, was first agreed on by the EUMC and the Joint Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers’ Council in April and May 2004 respectively.¹⁴⁷ A month later, it was incorporated in a new HG 2010 redefining the EU’s military ambition, which now required an EU capability for rapid and concurrent interventions “predominantly” under a UN mandate.¹⁴⁸ The basic purpose of the

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede030909noteesdp/sede030909noteesdp_en.pdf.

144. Reunion des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement d’Allemagne, de France, du Luxembourg et de Belgique sur la défense européenne, Déclaration commune.

145. As noted by Quille, the concept “was endorsed by Germany in February 2004.” Quille, “European Security and Defence Policy,” 17.

146. The BG concept is not entirely original for it “draws on [sic] standard NATO doctrine: e.g., the NATO Response Force ‘land component’ is a land brigade configured tactically with 5 battle groups.” Quille, “European Security and Defence Policy,” 18n3.

147. Quille, “European Security and Defence Policy,” 15-17; and Council of Ministers of the EU, ESDP Presidency Report, Annex I, “Headline Goal 2010,” Brussels, June 15, 2004,

<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010547%202004%20INIT>, quoted in Giegerich, *European Military Crisis Management*, 17.

148. Giegerich, *European Military Crisis Management*, 17; and FINABEL European Land Forces Interoperability Center, Report, “European Union Battle Group Manual: Guidance for Operational Preparation and Tactical Use,” FINSEC N° 27953, Brussels, June 27, 2014, p. 8, http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/siteassets/english/nbg15---eng/2014.study_fq5_en.pdf.

unexpectedly vague HG 2010 was to make the Union,¹⁴⁹ by the end of the decade, capable of delivering a quick and decisive response in “a fully coherent” fashion “to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union.”¹⁵⁰

In line with the EU’s traditional vision of flexibility, the BG concept has allowed for the creation of custom-tailored BG formations by either a single EU nation or a group of EU members (plus candidates) led by a Framework Nation.¹⁵¹ The EU BG represents a mobile, multinational, battalion-sized infantry force, about 1,500 personnel strong, “reinforced with combat support and combat service support elements,” deployable within five to 10 days of a Council decision, subordinated to the command of a deployable Force Headquarters (FHQ) and a non-deployable OHQ (not part of the BG package), initially sustainable for 30 days, and extendable up to 120 days (see *Figures 2* and *3* below).

149. For the vagueness and ambiguity of the Petersberg tasks, as well as of the HG 2010, which was initially planned to “define” them rather than “loosely expand” them, see Quille, “European Security and Defence Policy,” 15-17.

150. Council of Ministers of the EU, ESDP Presidency Report, Annex I, quoted in Giegerich, *European Military Crisis Management*, 17; and Quille, “European Security and Defence Policy,” 16. As detailed by Quille, the HG 2010 was accompanied by an *implementation program* with *nine* specific milestones: to establish during the second half of 2004 an EUMS civil–military cell including a non-permanent, stand-by OPCEN, to establish the EDA “during 2004, to work *inter alia* on correcting the ECAP capability shortfalls...to implement by 2005 EU joint coordination in strategic lift (air, land and sea) as a step towards achieving full capacity and efficiency in strategic lift by 2010...to transform (in particular for airlift) the European Airlift Co-ordination Cell into the European Airlift Centre by 2004 and to develop (between some member states) a European airlift command by 2010...to complete by 2007 the establishment of EU Battlegroups, including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and disembarkation assets...to acquire the availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort by 2008...to improve communications at all levels of EU operations by developing appropriate compatibility and network linkage for all communications equipment and assets (both terrestrial and space) by 2010...and to develop quantitative benchmarks and criteria for national forces committed to the Headline Goal in the field of deployability and...multinational training.”

151. The EU BG is not an *a priori* fixed force package but rather a sufficiently regulated ‘empty’ framework to be filled in as needed and desired by its creators who might want to add to it, for instance, a mountainous or an amphibious element. When/if employed, the BG is additionally adjusted in terms of C² by the appointed Operation Commander.

Figure 2. EU BG Concept Basic Features





Figure 3. BG Reaction Time (Express RR: NLT 10 Days)



Designed to meet the full range of Petersberg tasks, it is typically defined as “the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package, capable of stand-alone operations, or of being used for the initial phase of larger operations.”¹⁵² As projected by the HG 2010, the EU managed to obtain one BG on stand-by (initial operational capability - IOC) in 2005 and achieved FOC two years later.¹⁵³ From 2007 to 2012, with two BGs on stand-by at any time,¹⁵⁴ the Union was

152. Council of Ministers of the EU, “The European Union Battlegroups,” *ESDP Newsletter* 3 (January 2007): II, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ESDP_3_final.pdf; and FINABEL European Land Forces Interoperability Center, “European Union Battle Group Manual,” 10.

153. Council of Ministers of the EU, “European Union Battlegroups,” I-II.

154. The stand-by period is six months. Each BG pair on stand-by covers one semester, either Jan-Jun or Jul-Dec.

reportedly prepared to launch two military missions nearly simultaneously anywhere in the world.

Unfortunately, over the past few years Brussels has failed to meet this ambition, with one of the two BG spots frequently remaining vacant during stand-by periods. What is more, for various reasons, the BG capability has remained unemployed to date, despite being currently backed by a ‘pool’ of over two dozen certified EU BGs.¹⁵⁵ The outcome of this has been a long review process which has clearly identified the potential solutions (e.g. expanded and guaranteed financing, more flexibility through modularity) to the key financial and technical issues relative to the use of EU BGs.

Also, in the mid-2000s, the growing number of ESDP civilian missions and Brussels’ search for the right balance within the comprehensive strategic matrix raised the question of civilian planning capabilities. This was basically a consequence of an interesting paradox at the time. While the ESDP’s civilian crisis management output overshadowed gradually its inherent and concomitantly growing military dimension, the Union’s civilian planning capacity in the context of ESDP “lagged far behind” its strategic-military C² (“the military strand” was, and perhaps still is, believed to dominate the ESDP/CSDP by design).¹⁵⁶ As a result, a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and a Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) were established next to the EUMS in 2007 and 2008/9 respectively,¹⁵⁷ despite the fact that some experts, notably those in favour of the ‘civilian power Europe’ concept, considered this a delayed move.

155. Even so, due to enthusiasm among Europe’s militaries and significant contributions by non-EU CSDP partners (e.g. Turkey, Macedonia, Croatia in 2012, Ukraine), the number of declared EU BGs having taken stand-by duties since 2005 continues to rise. If in 2012 there were ‘only’ 21 to 22 BGs with at least one rotation in their portfolio, today that number is about 30.

156. Gebhart, “Recalibrating ESDP Planning,” 8-10.

157. Ibid., 12-13.

The European Constitution, which, given the account of gradual EU achievements since 1951, was not exactly to be a ‘constitutional leap,’ formally failed at European referenda. Taking over the bulk of the 2004 constitutional contents and applying a terminological ‘make-up’ to it, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, among other things, strengthened ESDP and rebranded it as CSDP almost as completely as envisaged by the failed Constitution. The failure to implement an outright *communitarization* of what used to be known as EU pillar two (CFSP/CSDP), did not, however, prevent the transposition of crucial constitutional provisions into the Lisbon Treaty. Thus, while the evolving, post-Maastricht constitutional matrix is known to have preserved the EU’s ultimate strategic intention to establish a common defence, one key Lisbon change, assumed from the failed Constitution, has passed largely unnoticed. Thanks to the *replacement* of a single word in the traditional common defence policy clause, a common defence for Europe is no longer an option that “might” eventually come to life, but a clear end-goal that “will” be realized after a single European Council decision.¹⁵⁸

2.4. The Multilevel CSDP Mechanism: Post-Lisbon Trends & Interplay

Ever since the ESDP prototype became the core of CFSP under the Treaty of Amsterdam and, thus, of the former second pillar, the EU foreign policy and diplomatic action regarding the political aspects of security, meaning the broader CFSP, has shared basically the same institutional and decision-making arrangement with the Union’s newly established security and defence enterprise. In that sense, the largely intergovernmental procedure pertinent to CFSP in general has also been applicable to CSDP. There is one

158. European Convention, Draft TCE, Article 40(2); European Union, TCE, Article I-41(2); Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 42(2) (ex Article 17 TEU), 2012. See also Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 121.

big difference though. Since the old, pre-1999 set of major EU institutions responsible for CFSP could not have entirely covered an emerging strategic enterprise which, on its own part, included two dimensions, civilian and military, it had to be subsequently bolstered by various analytical, defence, civilian and integral crisis management structures. The cumulative result has been a sizable, *multilevel* CFSP/CSDP mechanism.

Procedurally, there is also a notable difference between the CSDP and its broader matrix. While, on a formal level, many EU foreign and security policy measures have become subject to QMV as a default option, the Union's "decisions having military and defence implications,"¹⁵⁹ save as some concerning the CSDP's institutional framework, remain the bastion of consensus, both *de facto* and *de jure*. Thus, European security and defence is still an exclusively consensual matter, regulated by legally non-binding acts. The intergovernmental, national, voluntary, and bottom-up principles and approaches continue to dominate this sensitive domain. One can readily find them at the lowest levels, for instance, in the way EU BGs are generated, drilled, and certified. That said, CSDP's current status may not be an exact match to what was envisioned by the failed Constitution, however, the latest amendments have surely injected some added value to its autonomous defence profile.

With the latest Lisbon reinforcements, the CSDP mechanism has gained an enhanced political echelon as well as a brand new EEAS on a sub-political, strategic, and operational level (see Introduction, *Figure 1*). The European Council, the EU's highest, summit-level political authority often confused even by experts with the Union's main decision-maker, the legislative Council of Ministers (the Council), has finally become an

159. European Union, Treaty on European Union, Article J.4(3); Treaty of Lisbon, Article 1, items/amendments 34 and 56; and Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 31(4) (ex Article 23 TEU), 2012.

“institution” instead of “organ” within the Union’s SIN.¹⁶⁰ Its new President, so far as it is empowered by the amended treaties, may not deserve the technically incorrect reference “President of the EU,” but the short existence of this office has arguably prevented more Kissingerian comments (“Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?”)¹⁶¹ despite largely dealing with non-CFSP/CSDP aspects of EU business.¹⁶² In addition, since the Lisbon Treaty’s coming into force, the rotating, six-month EU Presidencies have remained functional within the Council but have lost much of their importance both as a driving force of the Union in general and as a promoter of CFSP/CSDP in particular.¹⁶³ Meanwhile, the Council itself has seen an increased amount of CSDP-related work, producing *inter alia* consecutive conclusions on civil-military capabilities. It currently deals with security and defence issues through both its formal, foreign ministerial composition called *Foreign Affairs Council*, which is nonetheless co-attended by national defence ministers twice a year, and a separate defence formation which is yet to be formalized. Given recent initiatives, it is only a matter of time before the CSDP will get its own *Defence Council* (formation) along with an integrated (civil-military) command structure including a full-fledged OHQ.¹⁶⁴

160. European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Title III, Article 13, 2012. The European Council whose earliest roots lie in the EC summits of the late 1960s was created in 1974 under its present name. However, it was not until the adoption the 1986 SEA that the EC/EU’s highest authority was formally recognized as such. From the SEA’s entry into force in 1987 to 2009 the European Council was formally treated as “organ” rather than “institution.”

161. Marcin Sobczyk, “Kissinger Still Lacks a Number to Call Europe,” *Emerging Europe* (blog), *Wall Street Journal*, June 27, 2012, <http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingEurope/2012/06/27/kissinger-still-lacks-a-number-to-call-europe/>.

162. For the idea of “de facto division of labour” between the European Council President and the HR for FASP (ex HR for CFSP/ESDP) see Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 87.

163. Jörg Hillmann, introduction to *Military Capability Development in the Framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy*, ed. Jörg Hillmann and Constantinos C. Hadjisavvas (Nicosia: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Cyprus, 2012), ix, <http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/MilitaryCapabilitiDevelopment.pdf>.

164. See Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 41, 75-77, 106, 108; and Lasheras *et al.*, *Security and Defence White Paper*, 9.

On the other hand, *two* major EU institutions, which have thus far played, so to speak, lateral roles in CFSP/CSDP are likely to continue to strengthen their participation in the formulation of EU security and defence policy. For most of the past two decades the European Commission's role has been, as a post-2001 treaty line reads, “fully associated with” the work in this sensitive realm,¹⁶⁵ usually, by providing expert feedback upon Council's request. However, having accumulated various technocratic skills over the decades, the Commission has recently become a self-driven, reliable source of expertise regarding the economic, industrial, energy, environmental, or even cyber and outer space aspects of security and defence.

In 2011, the Barroso II Commission (2010-2014) decided to channelize this expertise for the sake of the Union's defence industry and strategic autonomy by creating under its auspices a Defence Task Force (DTF).¹⁶⁶ Set up the following year on the initiative of the then Commissioner Michel Barnier and other EU leaders, the DTF produced the seminal 2013 Communication “Towards a More Competitive and Efficient Defence and Security Sector” and the 2014 Implementation Roadmap “A New Deal for European Defence.”¹⁶⁷ In this sense, heads of relevant Commission Directorates-General (DGs) have openly conceded that their former chief José Manuel Barroso

“[had] committed the Commission, to do all it can, within its competencies, in order to develop the single market and industrial base in the European defence sector.”¹⁶⁸

165. European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 27, 2002.

166. Julian Hale, “EU to Establish Defense Policy Task Force,” *Defence News*, November 7, 2011, accessed September 23, 2015, <http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20111107/DEFSECT04/111070302/EU-Establish-Defense-Policy-Task-Force>

167. European Commission, Communication, “Towards a More Competitive and Efficient Defence and Security Sector,” COM(2013) 542 final, Brussels, July 24, 2013, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52013DC0542>; and Report/Implementation Roadmap, “A New Deal for European Defence,” COM(2014) 0387 final, Brussels, June 24, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52014DC0387>.

168. Daniel Calleja Crespo and Pierre Delsaux, “The Role of the Commission in the field of the EU's Military Capability Development,” in Hillmann and Hadjisavvas, *Military Capability Development*, 9.

Due to these and similar efforts, the Commission's visibility in CSDP and JHA/AFSJ¹⁶⁹ has considerably increased as of late, particularly following the production of a few topical (sub)strategies on specific security and defence challenges.¹⁷⁰ Given the potentially destructive implications of the Union's democratic deficit, the subtle rise of the Commission's contribution to CFSP/CSDP must be followed by a growing role for the European Parliament which has hitherto been only a modest "political compass" for the EU's security and defence enterprise.¹⁷¹ This is frequently alluded to or explicitly emphasized in official EU statements and semi-official proposals for a CSDP white paper or a global European strategy.¹⁷²

The Parliament espouses an "ambitious vision" of the CSDP and its own role in the latter, using as usual its budgetary prerogatives to help raise the level of EU ambition in terms of military capabilities.¹⁷³ Since 2009, its Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) has been particularly active, dealing with a wide range of issues. Amid a debt crisis, the Parliament is looking favourably at the option of wielding influence on national

169. JHA and AFSJ stand for Justice and Home Affairs and Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, respectively. These largely overlapping concepts refer to a policy domain formerly known as EU pillar three.

170. See European Commission and HR for FASP/VP, Joint Communication, "Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace," JOIN(2013) 1 final, Brussels, February 2, 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf; European Commission, "Efficient Defence and Security Sector," Communication, European Energy Security Strategy, COM(2014) 330 final, Brussels, May 28, 2014, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/publication/European_Energy_Security_Strategy_en.pdf; and Communication, "A European Agenda on Migration," COM(2015) 240 final, Brussels, May 13, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf.

171. Arnaud Danjean, "European Parliament's Responsibilities towards the EU Military Capability Development," in Hillmann and Hadjisavvas, *Military Capability Development*, 7.

172. See Ibid.; President of the European Commission, 2012 State of the Union Address, Plenary Session of the European Parliament, Strasbourg, September 12, 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-596_en.htm; "2012 State of the Union Address: President Barroso Calls for a Federation of Nation States and Announces Blueprint for Deeper Economic and Monetary Union," President of the European Commission, accessed October 5, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/archives/2012/09/20120912_1_en.htm; and EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy: Securing European Influence in a Changing World*, EGS Report (Rome/Warsaw/Madrid/Stockholm/Brussels: EGS Project, 2013), 20-21, <http://www.europeanglobalstrategy.eu/about>.

173. Danjean, "European Parliament's Responsibilities," in Hillmann and Hadjisavvas, *Military Capability Development*, 7-8.

legislatures so that the latter exercise tighter budgetary control in order to force national governments into smart defence spending and collaborative projects.¹⁷⁴

As for the system's main axis, the former HR for CFSP/ESDP and the non-destined Union Minister of Foreign Affairs, now called High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (FASP), has entered the Commission's realm as its Vice President (VP) responsible for full coordination of the EU's external action. The powerful HR for FASP is also permanent Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council, Head of the EEAS and especially of the autonomous EDA, exercising supervision over such structures as the PSC Chair or the EU Intelligence Center (INTCEN). Regardless of the great increase in formal authority, as expected in advance, former HR for FASP Catherine Ashton and the incumbent Federica Mogherini have hardly managed to overcome the aura of their exceptionally successful predecessor Javier Solana, whose other name was "Mr. for CFSP/ESDP" or "Mr. Europe." After being criticized for her fondness towards the CFSP's 'softer,' diplomatic dimension (e.g. the appointment of a human rights representative) and consequently held accountable for the CSDP's three-year military stagnation, practically, until the launching of a training mission in Mali, in April 2013 Baroness Ashton finally managed to boost the EU's prestige by pulling out a purported "historic" success for the future of Kosovo and the Balkans.¹⁷⁵

Over these years, there has been internal dynamics within some CSDP structures, and most notably the PSC, conducive to generating the basis of a European strategic culture and thus formulating a more coherent EU security and defence policy.

174. Ibid. As conveyed by Danjean, the Parliament's 2011 report on the implications of the financial crisis for the European defence sector called for rationalized defence spending by avoiding duplication and overcapacity rather than increasing funds.

175. "Serbia and Kosovo Reach Landmark Deal," EEAS, April 19, 2013, accessed May 4, 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/190413_eu-facilitated_dialogue_en.htm.

Encouraged by these synergic processes that run parallel to the gradual transfer of national, security and defence functions to the Union level, many CSDP experts have become ‘godfathers’ of “supranational intergovernmentalism,”¹⁷⁶ “transgovernmentalism, if not supranationalism” featured by a “trend of low politicization of security and defence,”¹⁷⁷ “coordination” (coordination + integration),¹⁷⁸ “intensive transgovernmentalism,”¹⁷⁹ “supranational intergovernmentalism, multilevel governance, administrative fusion or Brusselisation,”¹⁸⁰ denationalization and Europeanization of foreign policy, defence, and security,¹⁸¹ as well as of the entire “externalization...Europeanization, Brusselisation, Commonization, Socialisation, [and] Solanaization...towards [creating] a European Strategic Identity.”¹⁸² Building on such integrationist potential, yet mindful of all the existing hurdles, in their 2010 study on European security in a global context, the International Institute for Strategic Studies

176. Jolyon Howorth, “The Political and Security Committee: A Case Study in ‘Supranational Inter-Governmentalism,’” *Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po* No. 01, Centre d’études européennes at Sciences Po, Paris, 2010,

<http://www.ies.be/files/documents/JMCdepository/Howorth.%20Jolyon.%20The%20Political%20and%20Security%20Committee.%20A%20Case%20Study%20in%20the%20E2%80%98Supranational%20Intergovernmentalism%E2%80%99.pdf>. Like other observers, Howorth is impressed by the PSC helping generate a supranational strategic culture for the EU:

“The normative socialisation processes which inform the work of the PSC have succeeded to an appreciable extent in allowing a trans-European strategic culture to begin to stamp its imprint on one of the EU’s principal foreign policy projects. A supranational culture is emerging from an intergovernmental process. The PSC has emerged, to a significant degree, as script-writer for ESDP.”

177. Ojanen, “European Defence,” in Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, *European Security*, 159, 165.

178. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 31-32.

179. Ibid., 63-66, quoted in Ojanen, “European Defence,” in Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, *European Security*, 165.

180. Mérand, Hofmann, ad Irondelle, “Social Networks.”

181. Michael Aktipis and Tim Oliver, “Europeanization and British Foreign Policy,” in *National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanization*, ed. Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill (London/New York: Routledge, 2011), 34–47; Frédéric Mérand, *European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), quoted in Ojanen, “European Defence,” in Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, *European Security*, 159; Robert Dover, *Europeanization of British Defence Policy* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2007); Paul Williams, Draft Paper, “The Europeanization of British Foreign Policy and the Crisis in Zimbabwe,” London School of Economics Workshop, London, June 5, 2002,

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/EFPU/EFPUworkshop2002/paper%20-%20Williams.pdf>; and Reuben Wong, “The Europeanization of Foreign Policy,” in *International Relations and the European Union*, ed. Christopher Hill and M. E. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 134-53.

182. Joachim Alexander Koops, *The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU’s “Effective Multilateralism” towards NATO and the United Nations* (Brussels: VUBPRESS Brussels University Press, 2011), 133, 203-4, 224n118, 431. See also pp. 9, 14, 34, 35, 37-38, 44, 47-48, 72n22, 90, 99, 199, 203, 205-16, 218, 234, 270-71, 273, 275, 278, 300, 303, 311-12, 319, 322, 325, 338-39, 348, 355-56, 358, 361, 368, 376-78, 382, 389, 434, 452-53, 456, 458, 461-62, 465, 467, 475, 483, 485-86, 493.

(IISS) fellows recommend that EU members pursue maximal coordination and common approach to defence and security.¹⁸³

No doubt, the Brussels-based CFSP/CSDP mechanism and its Europe-wide network have grown into a kind of social octopus, constantly spreading its tentacles, both functionally and geographically. On a political level, between 1993 and 2010, this mechanism has generated over 2000 preparatory and legally non-binding measures in the broader CFSP/CSDP realm.¹⁸⁴ While the treaties allow no adoption of legislative acts in the CFSP/CSDP domain, there have been many EU Regulations and Directives touching upon security and defence matters.¹⁸⁵ As for the operational level, two facts are to be taken into consideration. First, the CSDP's crisis management portfolio, which is regularly criticized for being generally fragmentary and quite modest on the military side,¹⁸⁶ with many individual endeavors relying on no more than 20 to 50 personnel, has been steadily growing. Since the CSDP attained FOC in 2003, the Union has launched a total of 38 CSDP operations (excluding EUFOR Libya), 12 of which have been pure military endeavors. Second, between 1993 and 2006 the Council sent as many as 25 special envoys (EU Special Representatives, formerly known as Special Representatives of the Council) to the world's most problematic regions and flashpoints. Only in Macedonia, the place where CSDP was not quite baptized by fire, the Union tested the

183. Bastian Giegerich, ed., *Europe and Global Security* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge for IISS, 2010).

184. Check Eur-Lex, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/advanced-search-form.html?qid=1451707492806&action=update>.

185. See for instance Council of Ministers of the EU and European Parliament, Regulation (EU) No. 512/2014 of 16 April 2014 Amending Regulation (EU) No. 912/2010 Setting Up the European GNSS Agency, OJ L 150, 20.05.2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2014.150.01.0072.01.ENG; Directive 2009/43/EC of 6 May 2009 Simplifying Terms and Conditions of Transfers of Defence-Related Products within the Community, OJ L 146, 10.06.2009, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32009L0043>; Directive 2009/81/EC of 13 July 2009 on the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Certain Works Contracts, Supply Contracts and Service Contracts by Contracting Authorities or Entities in the Fields of Defence and Security, and Amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, OJ L 216, 20.08.2009, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32009L0081>.

186. See Giegerich, *European Military Crisis Management*.

efficiency of its 'softer' CFSP dimension with six different diplomats in the first decade after the country's 2001 conflict, which accounted for almost a quarter of the total number of Special Representatives dispatched worldwide by 2006 . Given all this, rather than being a true military monster, the CSDP currently bedevils great powers as a politically unpredictable and socially entangled aggregate full of potential.¹⁸⁷

2.5. Conclusion

Contrary to the conventional (neo)realist perception of the present form of European defence, the right question is not whether the CSDP's military dimension is a serious one, but what kind of a strategic actor the EU is likely to become. To understand its strategic rise over the past two decades and to grasp its future, one has to trace back the highly entangled European security and defence developments at least to the early 1980s. This was a time when Western European leaders, faced by a changing strategic environment, began actively seeking *self-reliance* (i.e. a capability and a strategic identity) within NATO.

Accordingly, this chapter elaborates *two* parallel and intertwined trends in the late process of European defence integration: Europe's *quest for strategic autonomy* which began in the early 1980s, if not even earlier, and has practically continued to the present day, and the *post-Maastricht consolidation* of its security and defence enterprise within a single institutional framework (the EU).

In the Cold War phase of the autonomist tendency, central was the evolving idea of what would eventually (in the early 1990s) become known as European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). Given the strategically impotent European Community at the

187. See Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 12.

time, it was the now-defunct WEU that emerged as the primary promoter and vehicle of ESDI, which, albeit Europe-oriented, was basically a vague and broadly interpretable Atlanticist concept. As such, ESDI could hardly survive the oncoming *esoteric* battle with its post-1998 Europeanist alternative, the ESDP/CSDP. The latter is a quite distinct concept not only temporally and terminologically but also politically.

The consolidation trend that started as early as 1992 should have eliminated every illusion that a non-EU framework could better host the collective European defence effort in the 21st century. Nonetheless, with the EU entering the strategic equation without any operational capabilities of its own and ESDI simultaneously endorsed as such by Washington and NATO (with the aim of ‘locking’ it permanently within the broader Atlanticist [WEU-NATO] framework), the post-Maastricht outcome could be nothing but a so-called ‘schizophrenic’ triangle prone to *ad hoc* improvisations concerning European security and defence. A deeper insight into the interplay within this temporary security triangle is helpful not only in terms of clearly identifying the parallel autonomist and consolidation trends, as well as their points of cross-fertilization, but also for revealing many of the building blocks of the future ESDP/CSDP and the way the latter emerged from a complex security institutional knot to help the EU to become gradually the locus of European security and defence.

By the turn of the millennium, the EU had finally created its own, authentic form of ‘ESDI,’ initially documented as CEPSP or CESDP, later on consistently referred to as ESDP, and more recently rebranded as CSDP. Despite NATO’s (US) initial refusal to recognize unequivocally the emergence of the new, comprehensive strategic entity, the post-Saint-Malo years saw a rapid defence institutional build-up on the part of the Union,

complemented by an unconvincing capability development process and a hasty declaration of a FOC. By the mid-2000s, the militarized Union had already established a minimum platform for effective, low-to-medium-scale crisis management, thus allowing itself to further focus on strategy, doctrinal coherence, ambition, and developing its strategic and operational capabilities in both the civilian and military realms.

The post-2001 constitution-making process, which, in spite of the UK's stiff position, included an initiative for embedding security and defence matters into the EU's predominant communitarian matrix, brought about further advancement of ESDP, including in the realms of homeland security and collective defence. The problems created by the subsequent rejection of the European Constitution were swiftly addressed through a smart application of the old concept of gradualism and discreet building of a strong, centralized Europe, namely as conspired by Monnet as early as prior to the EDC's failure. Thus, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty enabled a *silent communitarization* of CFSP/CSDP as part of clear, long-term vision of common defence.

Despite all odds, the EU has somehow managed to become a nearly global strategic actor, generally accepted across the Atlantic as a potential asset rather than threat to NATO, at least for the foreseeable future. As such, it has recently been urged to acquire real, sophisticated capabilities in order to meet the requirements of high-intensity warfare in the 21st century. Its CSDP has in time grown into a social and institutional 'beast' apparently impossible to destroy. After Lisbon, there has been a great scope for further advancement of this complex enterprise by exploiting the new treaty mechanisms. Regardless of the modest profile of the CSDP's military arm at present, EU strategists are much more likely to maintain the high level of ambition in the years ahead, while also

fostering the CSDP's overall development in line with the ultimate goal of common defence, than opt for any backward, US/UK/NATO-favoured option.

A COMMON STRATEGY FOR EUROPE IN THE 21st CENTURY

For many, there is no such thing as European strategy, much less a European strategic culture, only national strategic narratives struggling to come together based on a few common denominators. To a considerable extent, such an attitude is due to fact the emerging CSDP strategic narrative, whose existence is sometimes denied even by the most pro-CSDP experts,¹ has been plagued with incompleteness, insufficient clarity of purpose, scope, and priorities, as well as conceptual and material fragmentation. Indeed, the existing elements of CSDP strategy,² notably the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and its numerous subsequent addendums, while providing fundamental guidance for the CSDP, incorporate too much of a soft-power approach that is mainly conducive to civilian crisis management (CM). Having had no visible strategic-military dimension other than practically limited military CM, they not only avoid the organic connection between external security and traditional homeland defence,³ but they also lack a precise geographical and functional focus.⁴ As such, these strategic documents fail to provide a reliable link between Europe's vital interests and its foreign and security policy.⁵

1. See Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 12, 15, 34.

2. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 11.

3. Jean-Paul Perruche, "Which Strategy for CSDP?," Egmont Special Security Brief No. 26, Brussels, June 2011, pp. 1-2, <http://aei.pitt.edu/32094/1/SPB26-Perruche-strategy-for-CSDP.pdf>; and Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 21, 23.

4. Sven Biscop, "The European Security Strategy: Now Do It," in *Europe: A Time for Strategy*, ed. Sven Biscop, Jolyon Howorth, and Bastian Giegerich, Egmont Paper 27 (Brussels: Academia Press/Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations, 2009), 5, <http://aei.pitt.edu/10883/1/eg27.pdf>.

5. Perruche, "Which Strategy for CSDP?"

The desired outcome, according to leading CSDP thinkers, is an overarching yet well-focused civil-military strategy for CSDP accompanied by a detailed capabilities development roadmap.⁶ However, while experts tend to look fondly even at a much more encompassing common European strategic concept devised along the lines of a grand strategy and thus aptly termed a European External Action Strategy,⁷ the question remains whether today's EU is sufficiently politically mature to make real progress on this issue.

After the 2007 Sarkozy - Bildt initiative, which called for an in-depth European strategic review, faced intra-EU resistance, the CSDP community sought an effective means (e.g. new sub-strategies) to implement the existing ESS.⁸ The 2008 Report on the Implementation of ESS could not forgo updating and reinforcing the EU's otherwise 'fully relevant' security strategy.⁹ Then, in the wake of what was perceived as a temporary stagnation (2009-2013) of the military CSDP,¹⁰ experts began alerting Brussels that it was finally "Time for Strategy," at least via tough implementing decisions in EU capitals and quick acquisition of military capabilities.¹¹ Howorth, Sven Biscop, and others had even made a "Case for an EU Grand Strategy."¹²

6. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 3 (see also 8, 11-13, 33).

7. See Reflection Group on the Future of the EU 2030, *Project Europe 2030: Challenges and Opportunities* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010), 37-52 (see in particular p. 45), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3210249ENC.pdf; and J. J. Andersson *et al.*, *The European Security Strategy: Reinvigorate, Revise or Reinvent?*, Occasional Paper No. 7 (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2011), 4, 29, 31-32, <http://www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/79289.pdf>. See also note 12 below.

8. See Sven Biscop, Jolyon Howorth, and Bastian Giegerich, introduction to *Europe: A Time for Strategy*, ed. Biscop, Howorth, Giegerich, 3; and J. J. Andersson *et al.*, *European Security Strategy*, 23.

9. European Council, Report on the Implementation of the ESS, "Providing Security in a Changing World," S407/08, Brussels, December 11, 2008,

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf; and J. J. Andersson *et al.*, *European Security Strategy*, 23.

10. Mérand, "Is CSDP Dead?"

11. Biscop, Howorth, and Giegerich eds., *Europe: A Time for Strategy*.

12. Jolyon Howorth, "The Case for an EU Grand Strategy," in Biscop, Howorth, and Giegerich, *Europe: A Time for Strategy*, 15-23; "The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain?," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48, no. 3 (2010): 455-74; Sven Biscop ed., *The Value of Power, the Power of Values: A Call for an EU Grand Strategy*, Egmont Paper 33 (Brussels: Academia Press/Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations, 2009),

The criticism against the lack of a lasting and credible vision for CSDP,¹³ which is seen as a major reason for the EU's unconvincing conduct in the area of security and defence, has continued to date, encompassing an increasing number of calls for a brand new strategic concept. In this sense, a 2010 proposal for an EU security and defence white paper argues that, despite "some tactical achievements [of CSDP and]...valuable experience of learning on the job as an EU-27," there is still a "pervading sense of a lack of direction."¹⁴ It is interesting how the authors of this proposal, Lasheras *et al.*, take the EU's present security and defence policy. For them, such policy is "C[ommon]SDP" only in name, whereas in practice, it is yet to outgrow its pre-2009 ESDP stage, potentially by 2020.¹⁵ A similar tone has been struck by CSDP insiders who realize better than anyone that "the Union has a long way to go to establish a [real] strategy for CSDP."¹⁶

General (ret.) Jean-Paul Perruche for instance, gives seven specific reasons, aside from the omnipresent lack of political will, as to why a true CSDP strategy is still missing:

- divergent national views of the EU's notional finality and ultimate politico-strategic goal;
- the CSDP's full institutional immersion into the broader CFSP (ex EU pillar two) resulting in an indistinctive, low-profile security and defence policy with limited

<http://aei.pitt.edu/11832/1/ep33.pdf>; Sven Biscop and J. J. Andersson eds., *The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe* (London: Routledge, 2007); and Sven Biscop and R. Coolsaet, "The World Is the Stage: A Global Security Strategy for the European Union" (lecture, European Consortium for Political Research Conference, Marburg, September 18-21, 2003).

13. Andrea Frontini, "Ensuring the EU's Future as a Security Provider: Five Recommendations for the June European Council's Session on CSDP," EPC Commentary, Brussels, June 23, 2015, 1,

http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_5714_ensuring_the_eu_s_future_as_a_security_provider.pdf.

14. Lasheras *et al.*, *Security and Defence White Paper*, 2.

15. *Ibid.*, 5 (5n5), 7, 26.

16. Perruche, "Which Strategy for CSDP?," 1.

competences and resources and prevented from considering purely defence matters;

- different national foreign-policy objectives and, hence, an incoherent, less-than-global CFSP, dependent, in terms of responsiveness and efficiency, on the geographical proximity of contingencies to Europe;
- poor definition of EU foreign-policy priorities amid continuing ‘turf wars’ between the European Commission and the Council’s (ex) CFSP/CSDP structures, despite the recent establishment of EEAS as an inter-institutional bridge;
- disproportional allocations in favour of the Commission’s share in EU external action with no due regard for the Union’s strategic-military priorities;
- 27+ (Denmark presently excluded) national strategic narratives and the gap between them and the declared EU/CSDP ambition; and finally
- the lack of visibility of CSDP operations, including as a result of a common inclination for media promotion of national efforts during combined expeditionary endeavors.¹⁷

Given all these shortfalls, some of which are endemic, the EU can neither agree on the desired strategic-military effects of CSDP, apart from prevention which is expressly stated in plenty of EU documents, nor properly plan for action and assets. Therefore, recommends Perruche, those in charge should first take a look at the white papers of all EU members, notably France’s and the UK’s, as well as the Lisbon Treaty’s

17. Ibid. As pointed out by Perruche (p. 2), in 2011 the Commission’s budget for external action amounted to €5.7 billion, whereas the CFSP as a whole had to rely on miserable €400 million.

permissiveness regarding the Union's defence remit, and then see what can be done on European level for the sake of a stronger CSDP.¹⁸

Concomitant to Perruche's recommendation of June 2011, the Egmont Paper No. 49 proposed a sound and truly comprehensive strategy for CSDP.¹⁹ Written by some of the finest CSDP experts this thoughtful proposal goes beyond just drawing contours of a future CSDP concept. It first concisely identifies Europe's "core regions and issues of focus," then elaborates on five new illustrative scenarios to be added to the EUMS contingency planning, and finally discusses the implications for CSDP capabilities.²⁰

Nonetheless, what has captured analysts' attention over the past few years is Germany's still-reluctant struggle to come out of the Franco-British shadow in the strategy realm and to take the lead in shaping the CSDP's future. In a 2011 policy paper entitled "Strengthening Europe's Ability to Act...It is High Time," a couple of Bundestag members urge for a strong CSDP based on "greater European commonality" and a coherent strategic approach.²¹ Normally, a parliamentary submission containing a conventional appeal for coherence, closer security cooperation, and deepening military integration within the EU is destined to ignorance and oblivion. But this one came out of Berlin, from two competent, Atlanticist-oriented members of the Bundestag and nine other German security experts, who decided, in the most difficult period for post-Maastricht Europe (politico-economic downturn, criticism against both the European strategic lethargy in general and the CSDP in particular, especially following the initial phase of the Arab Spring) to revive some old, EDC-reminiscent ideas. Their concept of

18. Ibid., 3.

19. See Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*.

20. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*.

21. Schockenhoff and Kiesewetter, "Strengthening Europe's Ability to Act."

“(partially) integrated armed forces” that could be deployed on a “unanimous decision of the European Council (or NATO Council),” while significantly conformist, nonetheless added up to the post-2010 Franco-German (Sarkozy-Merkel) impetus for further transfer of national sovereignty to Brussels.

The EU’s formal quest for an overarching and coherent strategy for CSDP began in late 2012, with the then European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and his colleagues deciding “to put defence back on the agenda.”²² Having been finally launched by the seminal, defence-dedicated European Council of December 2013, the much-needed strategic review process is now well underway under the leadership of the HR for FASP and other relevant EU institutions.

In summary, given that EU members “have not yet acquired the habit of thinking strategically” and that there is currently no single coherent strategic document to (re)direct the largely “reactive, ad hoc, [and] ill thought” CSDP effort,²³ it is hard to claim existence of the inconspicuous. Yet, a European strategy for security and defence does exist, at least in a fragmented, embryonic form,²⁴ freed from explicit Machiavellian and Manichean tone, open to successive upgrade through supplements and reviews, and facing the challenge of implementation in a time of dramatic changes of the global security environment rather than a need for thorough change.²⁵ It has been sourced even constitutionally (EU treaties), yet it could be plausibly assailed on various grounds—virtually anywhere from its debatable cultural matrix to its modest military output.

22. Frontini, “Five Recommendations,” 1.

23. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 7-8

24. See Kjell Engelbrekt and Jan Hallenberg eds., *The European Union and Strategy: An Emerging Actor*, 2nd ed. (London/New York: Routledge, 2010), 47-50, 56, 63, 69-70.

25. Biscop, “European Security Strategy,” in Biscop, Howorth, Giegerich, *Europe: A Time for Strategy*, 5. Biscop prudently infers:

“If the EU today is not the global power that it could have been, it is not because its strategy is not valid, but because it has been half-hearted in implementing it...It is not sufficient to *have* a strategy—one must then also do strategy.”

That said, this chapter seeks to reveal in much detail the contours and major components of the emerging CSDP (civil-military) strategy. It does so by drawing from a variety of EU, NATO, quasi-official, and unofficial sources. After emphasizing the Union's long-standing global ambition, today's strategic environment is examined, notably the multiplying outside pressures on Europe with their anticipated stimulative impact on the CSDP. Section three then clarifies the utilitarian and normative orientation (aims, interests, values) of any EU strategic concept for security and defence, followed by section four which lays out the three core tasks assigned to the CSDP in this century while also providing insight into the Union's priority regions and issues as well as the illustrative scenarios that underpin EU military crisis management. In so doing, the analysis borrows from the structure of relevant documents, such as NATO's latest strategic concept and a May 2013 proposal for a European Global Strategy (EGS),²⁶ in order to establish an analogical framework for analysis. Accordingly, the rest of the chapter fleshes out the CSDP's own domestic, regional, and global functions. Considering the extremely delicate nature of the subject matter and the required analytical length, the principles, instruments, and capabilities needed for implementing such a comprehensive strategy are to be discussed separately.

3.1. High Level of Ambition: A Quest for a Global Role since the 1950s

The elaborate debate on what kind of actor or power the EU represents has been around for more than half a century.²⁷ In recent years, given the steadily evolving and

26. NATO, Strategic Concept, "Active Engagement, Modern Defense," Lisbon, November 19-20, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm; and EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*.

27. As a major international actor and an emerging global power the Union has been perceived in a plethora of ways. Over the decades, there have been consecutive conceptualizations of Europe's power as different as "a [peace and] security community" (in the 1950s), "(post-colonial) economic" (in the 1960s), "civilian" (in the 1970s), "[potential]

politically unpredictable CSDP,²⁸ experts and officials have increasingly contemplated as to whether or not the Union should be deemed a global power, or even a “manifold [super]power”²⁹ destined to achieve “greatness”³⁰ (albeit “not...in a sense of a new hegemon,”³¹ nor “in any traditional, great power sense”).³² Like many related controversies in the past, this has been a “highly polarized” discourse despite the inevitable expert acknowledgment of the Union’s cumulative capabilities.³³

Nonetheless, what is important to bear in mind when touching upon such, mainly conceptual dilemmas are a few indicative facts. First and foremost, the EU’s global ambition long predates its strategic maturation in the post-Cold War years. Today, few if anyone recall that the foundation stone of a global Union was laid as early as 1954, with none other than Washington D.C. hosting the then ECSC’s first-ever diplomatic representation abroad.³⁴ Second, ever since the ESDP/CSDP’s formal inception in 1998/9, if not even earlier, the EU has aspired to “grow into its new role as a global player in crises and equip itself with the necessary means.”³⁵ Third, in its prolonged

military” (in the 1980s), “a failing security actor with a ‘clear capability-expectation gap’” (during most of the 1990s), “diplomatic, transformative, and normative,” or simply “returning civilian power” (in the late 1990s), then, “post-modern” and “neo-colonial” (at the turn of the millennium, in the context of the Union’s norms-based functioning and enlargement, and in light of 9/11), “soft power plus” or “civilian...with teeth,” that is “integral/comprehensive” (after 2003), “[prospective] superpower” (occasionally, for instance around 1991/2 and in the immediate aftermath of Saint-Malo), “an asset or threat [to the US/NATO]” (in the lead-up to the 1991/2 Maastricht events, as well as from Saint-Malo up until 2003), “supranational” (all along), and most recently, “inter-organizational,” “multilateral,” “integrative,” “trans-governmental,” and so forth. For most of these conceptualizations see Joachim Alexander Koops, *European Union as an Integrative Power?*

28. See Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 12.

29. Fabian Krohn, “The European Union: A Quiet Superpower in the Making,” Atlantic Community Research Paper, October 9, 2009, http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/The_European_Union%3A_A_Quiet_Superpower_in_the_Making.

30. Howorth, “EU as a Global Actor,” 456.

31. Krohn, “Quiet Superpower.”

32. Howorth, “EU as a Global Actor,” 456.

33. Ibid., 458.

34. European Commission DG for External Relations (James Moran and Fernando Ponz Canto), *Taking Europe to the World: 50 Years of the European Commission's External Service* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004), 3, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/docs/50_years_brochure_en.pdf.

35. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Regarding Financing Civilian Crisis Management Operations, Brussels, November 29, 2001, <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52001DC0647:EN:HTML>.

pursuit for an adequate strategy for the CSDP, which one day will end up with both a concise strategic review for a truly comprehensive CSDP and an overarching global strategy covering all relevant aspects of the Union's external action, the CSDP community has relentlessly paraphrased the famed argument enshrined in Javier Solana's ESS:

“A union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP)...is inevitably a global player.”³⁶

Hence, given the origins of post-WWII European defence integration and the EU's strategic rise over the past two decades, it is essentially wrong to think of the (future) CSDP as a functionally and/or geographically limited enterprise. Both the EU and its strategic arm have been intended to become more-or-less global, with the former already being so by its very nature. Quite another issue are the constraints imposed on Europe by the current strategic environment, notably Washington and London's discomfort with any move by Berlin and/or Paris in either a federalist or more authentic Franco-German (intra-continental, Eurasian) direction.

In this sense, those, mainly Anglo-American “hawks” and hardcore Atlanticists, who have, over the years, persistently insisted on a more capable yet NATO/US-constrained EU/CSDP may well have lived in self-delusion. The same goes for moderate Europeanists and naive Atlanticists who entertain ideas of asymmetric division of labour, and who thus still buy into the belief that the West's prime political organizations and the

36. European Council, European Security Strategy “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” Brussels, December 12, 2003, p. 1, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, quoted in Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 258.

world's top security providers can make an impressive defence tandem of 'a senior lieutenant' and 'a junior partner.'³⁷

3.2. Europe's Uneasy Security Environment & the Impact of the Exogenous Momentum

The post-Cold War strategic environment is typically described as one of diverse and multifaceted threats, which are also "less visible...less predictable," "interconnected, and viral."³⁸ Perhaps more than any other geopolitical entity on this planet, Europe can feel the proliferation and diversity of the twenty-first-century security challenges in its entirety. Being an inherently complex, post-modern structure, the EU is currently facing an extremely broad set of challenges encompassing both endogenous constraints and external pressures.

With a plethora of domestic problems presently on its back, the EU has never seemed more fragile and more vulnerable. The unprecedented debt crisis since 2010, the occasional, post-9/11 terrorist attacks designed to instigate fear and reform, and the frequent natural disasters constitute just a minor part of what the Union is facing today in the context of preserving its domestic tranquility and way of life. Its stability and prosperity are being and will be further impaired by as many as seven different categories of internal problems.³⁹ These problems are frequently cited nowadays as many of them

37. See for instance Jason Naselli, "Goodbye to EU Prestige Thinking: Redefining the CSDP," Atlantic Memo No. 35, November 28, 2011, <http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/goodbye-to-eu-prestige-thinking-redefining-the-csdp>; and author, e-mail message to Jason Naselli, February 24, 2012.

38. European Council, European Security Strategy, 3; and James R. Clapper, "Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community," intro., Washington, D.C., March 12, 2013, <http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2013%20ATA%20SFR%20for%20SSCI%2012%20Mar%202013.pdf>.

39. These seven categories are as follows:

- well-known structural and other frailties stemming from the very nature of the European construction and affecting the EU's supranational governance on a daily basis (e.g. endemic incoherence, divergence of

are seen not merely as having security implications, but in existential terms. In short, the Union's structural inability to act as an efficient democratic federation, most especially in the security and defence realm, and the systemic issues with its socio-material well-being (some of which have been stimulated from outside) have compelled it to face the greatest crisis since its inception. Having hitherto produced a considerable amount of individual and collective frustration, consequent bilateral tensions, as well as quarrels about 'winners' and 'losers' in the grand European project, this generic, Europe-wide crisis has opened the space for

- political and religious radicalization on both national and European levels, and

national narratives, a large EU bureaucracy, the democratic deficit of European institutions, the idiosyncratic problem known as "a lack of political will," and particularly demonstrated by national capitals in the context of their common efforts for greater investments in European defence);

- systemic problems with Europe's social and material well-being, some of which have been foreign-stimulated (e.g. regional development issues, the crisis of Europe's model of social market economy in light of the demographic decline, massive foreign trade deficits and sovereign debt crises reproducing a Europe-wide financial, economic, and political downturn, national recessions including, in some cases, a severe depression, surging poverty and unemployment especially among the European youth);
- resultant frustration, bilateral tensions, and quarrels about "winners" and "losers" in the grand European project (e.g. Greeks vs. Germans and vice versa), a transnational class conflict (anti-elitism, anti-globalism, the revival of Marxism), and of course, a center-periphery schism alternatively perceived as an emerging split between the poor, indebted European South and the rich and powerful Northwest);
- the rise of nationalism, national-populism, extremism, and xenophobia in European politics (more room for radical ideologies, entities, and trends, far-left and ultra-right parties and movements emerging as political and parliamentary factors on both national and European levels and demonstrating sovereignism, Euro-skepticism, anti-elitism, and anti-globalism as their common denominator, neo-fascism and neo-Nazism as a special threat closely related to ethno-national and racial discrimination, controversial anti-immigration policies, and an increasingly prominent xenophobia, including Russophobia, a perceived crypto-fascism within certain European governments and among the Western elite in general, as well as a home-grown religious fundamentalism partly intermingled with the global Islamist network and quite conducive to foreign instrumentalization);
- a legacy of ancient inter-state and intra-state disputes (territorial, inter-ethnic, and religious quarrels, and related separatisms, secessionisms, and irredentist efforts);
- more imminent disintegration threats such as the possible exit of Greece and Britain from the Eurozone (GREXIT) and the EU (BREXIT) respectively, as well as some currently mobilized secessionisms; and finally
- key internal security threats such as home-grown terrorism, increased penetration of Islamic fundamentalism and jihadist networks (Salafists /Wahhabists) in key Western European countries (Austria, Germany, France, Belgium) as well as the Balkans, a lack of control and an immense uncertainty over the ongoing return of the so-called "foreign terrorist fighters" from Maghreb and Middle East battlefields, furthermore, organized crime, cyber crime, subversive actions and political manipulation of extremist groups by foreign intelligence services, and on top of all, the unprecedented, post-2014 migration waves towards Europe which are widely seen as an exemplar of semi-organized use of a jumble of desperate refugees, economic migrants, and infiltrated terrorists as a demographic, cultural, and even physical weapon against the old continent's traditional substrate.

- more imminent disintegration threats such the GREXIT, the BREXIT, and some currently mobilized secessionisms.

Amid such delicate and precarious internal developments, the Union's further existence has become increasingly debatable, with some anticipating even a Yugoslav break-up scenario. Given the potential EU fragmentation through externally orchestrated and emotionally charged conflicts, the emerging continental trends of radicalization and violence pose the greatest threat to the Union's long-term survival. No doubt, the peak of this threat comes with the most dangerous forms of nationalism (neo-fascism/neo-Nazism, secessionist, separatist and irredentist ethno-nationalism) and Islamic fundamentalism (Salafism/Wahhabism). Being largely conducive to foreign instrumentalization, these extremist forms might ultimately challenge EU order by reproducing small paramilitary formations and employing an effective combination of terrorist and guerilla tactics against government forces.⁴⁰ Therefore, in addition to a preventive action coordinated at EU level, tackling this threat might require, as a last-resort response, a CSDP-assisted use of military force on a national level.

Unfortunately, as the Union's image as "an anchor of stability" is deteriorating further,⁴¹ Brussels continues to downplay the magnitude and implications of its domestic problems and security risks. First, whereas outsiders systematically sharpen their focus on what is happening inside Europe, pointing bluntly to all critical issues, from structural

40. The capacity of some of these extremist forms to (re-)produce paramilitary units and employ terrorist and guerrilla tactics in pursuing their political end-goals has already been well documented in the EU neighborhood. As a matter of fact, one does not have to look farther than the Balkans (e.g. Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) to comprehend the pattern of the potential violent attempts at EU destabilization (largely incriminated extremists attacking civilian members of a certain minority or the predominant majority, as well as government facilities and security forces). In the worst case scenario for Europe, groups such as the neo-Nazis, Grey Wolves, and Salafists in Germany, or the Muslim Brotherhood of Southern France, which have long been manipulated by non-European (and European) power hubs via internal agents of influence, could suddenly intensify their activity by launching terror campaigns against 'the others,' as well as against the respective national establishments and security forces.

41. European Council, Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 1.

frailties and socio-economic contradictions to the rise of nationalism and the Jihadist threat, CSDP strategists seem to be somewhat ignorant of the endogenous security dimension. Their ongoing contemplation of relatively remote civil-military ways of preserving the Union's internal order during crises (e.g. making use of the constitutional opportunity for CSDP military assistance in case of terrorism [including cyberterrorism⁴²] or natural disasters) while needed, may suddenly prove to have been in vain. Second, EU internal security experts apparently understand that "Many of today's security concerns originate from instability in the EU's immediate neighbourhood and changing forms of radicalisation, violence and terrorism;" yet, on a formal level, they display a sort of mainstream indifference towards the various concrete groups of political extremists and religious fanatics active on Union territory, with the support of both domestic and foreign intelligence services. As a logical outcome, relevant EU documents address the said endogenous dimension in more general terms, for instance, by focusing on "terrorism [extremism], organised crime and cybercrime" as "core priorities" and purposefully avoiding country-specific details.⁴³

However, the dedicated strategic note produced by the European Commission's in-house think tank in consultation with Michel Barnier in June 2015 is a promising hint, suggesting that the Union is at least aware of the urgent need to confront the growing threats to its internal cohesion.⁴⁴ Calling for a Joint Framework to Counter Hybrid Threats to be prioritized and delivered by the end of 2015, this paper, despite its

42. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 20; and Council of Ministers of the EU, EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, 15585/14, Brussels, November 18, 2014, p. 3, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede160315eucyberdefencepolicyframework/sede160315eucyberdefencepolicyframework_en.pdf.

43. European Commission, Communication, "The European Agenda on Security," COM(2015) 185 final, Strasbourg, April 28, 2015, pp. 2, 13, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf.

44. EPSC and Barnier, "In Defence of Europe," 9.

seemingly Russophobic connotation, implies political readiness to neutralize *all* foreign meddling in EU affairs through (cyber) espionage, cultural propaganda, and targeted extremist proxies. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that, unless the Union falls victim to its own irreparable problems in an absolute sense, its future will be determined by a growing number of external challenges whose stimulating impact on the CSDP is now being particularly expected.⁴⁵

First, emerging multipolarity has brought about uncertainty to all actors on the international scene. In that sense, there have recently been dramatic changes in Europe's strategic and geopolitical environment reinforcing the calls for a "stronger" EU/CSDP.⁴⁶ Pursuing strategic independence vis-à-vis the US and "effective multilateralism,"⁴⁷ the EU faces many dangers as well as opportunities. Speaking in general, the Arab Spring, a once seemingly promising process, has prolonged and deflected over the past five years, leaving the Union's "Neighbourhood in Shambles."⁴⁸ In addition, the resurrection of the Ukraine crisis in the Fall of 2013 and "the return of geopolitics' to its historical cradle" delivered a major blow to the "ludicrous [theoretical] cliché about the old continent's purportedly 'diminished' geostrategic importance" after 1989.⁴⁹ As a result, the whole of Europe is now in crisis, encircled by "a ring of" instability and embroiled in conflict.⁵⁰

The continuing struggle of the US-led West to preserve the unsustainable post-Cold War

45. For the CSDP's mainly "exogenous" "bases" see Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 45-46.

46. Council of Ministers of the EU, Council Conclusions on CSDP, 8971/15, Brussels, May 18, 2015, p. 2, para. 1, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/05/18-council-conclusions-csdp/>.

47. European Council, European Security Strategy, 9.

48. Bertelsmann Stiftung (Rosa Balfour *et al.*) ed., *The EU Neighbourhood in Shambles: Some Recommendations for a New European Neighbourhood Strategy*, BS Policy Report (Gütersloh/Berlin: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015), <https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/the-eu-neighbourhood-in-shambles/>.

49. Hristijan Ivanovski, *Beefing up the NGO Sector in Central and Eastern Europe: How to Legitimize a Re-Boost of Western Geopolitics with Civilian Means?* CDSS Policy Report (Winnipeg, MB: CDSS, 2014), 16-17, http://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/2014_CDSS_POLICY_REPORT_BEEFING_UP_THE_NGO_SECTOR_IN_CEE_FINALMAX.pdf.

50. European Council, European Security Strategy, 8.

order, and thus its global predominance, including through a “reconstruction of a Cold War ambient,” is already costing Europeans too much.⁵¹ The cost is likely to grow as the geopolitical game is inexorably spreading both within and beyond Europe, with many in the West pretending to ignore the creation of a parallel, BRICS-led world.⁵²

Second, while currently no political entity in the world is formally considered adversarial by the multilateral EU, and there is indeed a low (if any) probability of large-scale aggression against Union territory (e.g. the Baltic), the recent revival of the conventional military threat cannot be ignored. Despite the nearly global economic downturn since 2008, rising actors and regions around the globe continue to invest significant resources in defence, already collecting the fruits (nuclear modernization, advanced weapon systems [e.g. robotics and unmanned platforms, ballistic and anti-ship missiles], special warfare capabilities) of their long-term armament programs. In particular, this trend has allowed for Russia’s ongoing resurgence through Eastern and South Eastern Europe, including its controversial annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and its further involvement in the Ukraine using so-called special or hybrid warfare techniques. Seen from a western perspective, the annexation of Crimea, which initially included a silent *blitzkrieg* invasion by no-insignia Russian SOFs (“the little greens”), was not only a flagrant violation of international law, but it was also a game/rule changer; an unprecedented infringement of a European state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the post-Cold War world, quite different than the humanitarian case in Kosovo.

Apart from the disquieting process of modernization of its nuclear triad, Russia has demonstrated the recent advancement of its conventional capabilities, not least via public

51. Ivanovski, *Beefing up the NGO Sector*, 16-17.

52. BRICS stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

ceremonies and events (e.g. Victory Day parade, air shows, international defence and security fairs), but also by conducting high-readiness drills, including in its Western and Central Military Districts, amassing force along its western frontiers in response to developments in the Ukraine and related US/NATO maneuvers, and carrying out multiple incursions or near-incursions into EU and/or NATO territory. On September 30, 2015, Moscow's assertiveness culminated with its first military intervention beyond the former Soviet space since the end of the Cold War. Just a week later, four Russian small-to-mid-size warships from the Caspian fleet (one frigate and three corvettes) launched 26 Kalibr precision cruise missiles against Islamic State targets, some 1,500 km away in Syria.⁵³ Many of those who witnessed the compelling nighttime missile launch scenes on October 7, 2015, remember that day as the day when the Russians made not only a perfect replica of the media coverage of the legendary Tomahawk attacks during the Gulf War, but also history by putting a spectacular end to the remains of unipolarity as such.⁵⁴

On its own part, China continues to grow its air and naval power with a view to securing the modern Silk Road routes. It has recently deployed its first expeditionary combat force in Mali and has already reached the eastern Mediterranean waters thanks to its joint naval exercises with Russia.⁵⁵ Beyond the emerging Sino-Russian axis, a number of other regional powers have been pursuing an intensive military build-up. In the chaotic

53. "4 Russian Warships Launch 26 Missiles against ISIS from Caspian Sea," Russia Today, October 7, 2015, <https://www.rt.com/news/317864-russian-warships-missiles-launch/>.

54. Miroslav Lazanski, "Russian Navy Entered War" [in Serbian]. *Politika* (Belgrade), October 7, 2015, <http://www.intermagazin.rs/miroslav-lazanski-ruska-mornarica-usla-u-rat/>.

55. John Reed, "China's 'Combat Troops' in Africa," *National Security* (blog), *Foreign Policy*, July 15, 2013, http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/15/chinas_combat_troops_in_africa?wp_login_redirect=0; Elizabeth Wishnick, "Russia and China Go Sailing: Superpower on Display in the Eastern Mediterranean," *Foreign Affairs*, May 26, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-05-26/russia-and-china-go-sailing>; and Franz-Stefan Gady, "China and Russia Conclude Naval Drill in Mediterranean," *Diplomat*, May 22, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/china-and-russia-conclude-naval-drill-in-mediterranean/>.

Middle East for instance, over the past decade Saudi Arabia's defence budget has increased by 112%!⁵⁶

Third, the global shift in economic and military power is only one of the latest additions to what EU/CSDP planners see as an “exponential increase in global threats and the volatility of our neighbourhood.”⁵⁷ In 2003, the ESS identified five “Key Threats” to European security: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.⁵⁸ In 2008, the ESS's supplement, the so-called Implementation Report, incorporated a slightly modified set of five major challenges. Influenced by the momentum, CSDP planners first downgraded and/or reordered some of the already identified key threats, namely, by merging terrorism with organized crime and placing WMD at the top, and then added ‘post-modern’ challenges such as cyber security, energy security, and climate change. Five years later, in light of the prolonged Arab Spring, the HR for FASP/VP's seminal CSDP Report emphasized intra-state/civil conflicts as an emerging threat emanating especially from the neighbourhood.⁵⁹

In addition, EU strategic documents have presented and annotated numerous other global challenges, such as anti-globalist sentiments “of frustration and injustice,” the rise of “non-state groups,” civil wars, interdependence and vulnerability, Europe's energy dependence in particular, poverty, diseases, AIDS, hunger, malnutrition, criminality, economic failure,⁶⁰ the ongoing insecurity in some of Europe's neighbouring maritime

56. EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 3.

57. Ibid., 6.

58. European Council, European Security Strategy, 8.

59. HR for FASP/VP, “Preparing the December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence: Final Report by the High Representative/Head of the EDA on the Common Security and Defence Policy,” Brussels, October 15, 2013, pp. 1, 5, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_02_en.pdf.

60. European Council, European Security Strategy, 2.

regions and the risk of instability in others,⁶¹ “the growth in maritime piracy” as “A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention,” the anticipated strife for natural resources, most notably water,⁶² and since lately, the unprecedented migration crisis and related border control issues. Finally, the new multipolar reality has brought about geopolitical tensions even within the incoherent West. In particular, “the unprecedented and yet growing US-Germany divide is threatening to scuffle the multi-decennial transatlantic link.”⁶³

3.3. Securing Europe’s Interests & Values

Today, the EU is a project about power, not peace.⁶⁴ As a unique and highly ambitious supranational actor which has largely outgrown its original purpose (peace, reconstruction, and development) the Union has a set of shared interests and values to promote globally. Hence, as asserted by both the Maastricht Treaty and the quasi-official 2013 EGS, its “principle aims” are

- world-wide peace
- “the wellbeing of its peoples,” and
- global promotion of its common values.⁶⁵

61. Council of Ministers of the EU, EU Maritime Security Strategy, 11205/14, Brussels, June 24, 2014, p. 4, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202014%20INIT>; and Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union (Directorate B, Policy Department, Timo Behr et al.), *The Maritime Dimension of CSDP: Geostrategic Maritime Challenges and Their Implications for the European Union* (Brussels: European Parliament/SEDE, 2013), 10-58, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/433839/EXPO-SEDE_ET\(2013\)433839_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/433839/EXPO-SEDE_ET(2013)433839_EN.pdf).

62. European Council, European Security Strategy, 3, 5.

63. Ivanovski, *Beefing up the NGO Sector*, 23.

64. Tony Blair, “The Case for Europe is Power, not Peace,” EurActiv, June 3, 2014, <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-elections-2014/blair-case-europe-power-not-peace-302571>.

65. European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 3 (ex Article 2 TEU), 2012; and EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 3, 6.

The realization of these aims, even if only at home, requires “an ambitious international agenda.”⁶⁶ In that sense, the CSDP shall, as part of the broader CFSP, and in conjunction with other EU external action instruments, contribute towards these higher aims. It shall do so by pursuing the EU’s logically derived vital interests, regardless of the current lack of consensus over its role and prominence within the Union’s global strategy.⁶⁷ In particular, the CSDP can, by its very nature, play a key role in securing three of the Union’s six “vital interests” outlined by the EGS:

- security and resilience;
- “A neighbourhood of democracy, human rights and the rule of law;” and
- unimpeded access to natural resources.⁶⁸

Securing the Union’s vital interests, which includes the protection and global promotion of its common values, requires following of concrete strategic objectives.

Therefore, under the Maastricht Treaty and its subsequent amendments, the CFSP/CSDP aims to

- reinforce the European identity, its independence, and global visibility;
- “strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;”
- safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, security, independence, and integrity of the Union;
- “assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters;”

66. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 6.

67. See Frontini, “Five Recommendations,” 2.

68. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 3, 6-7. The other three “vital interests” are Europe’s eco-soc development, “Minimal constraints” on the so-called four freedoms (the global flow of people and ideas, capital, goods, and services), and “Just and effective governance systems at a regional and global level.” The accessibility of natural resources is actually considered as part of the broader interest for sustainable environment.

- “preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;”
- “consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;”
- “promote international cooperation,” multilateralism, and “good global governance;” and
- complement, if necessary, the rest of EU external action instruments in fostering economic, social, and environmental development and globalization, as well as in “improv[ing]...the sustainable management of global natural resources.”⁶⁹

This cumulative constitutional set of foreign-policy and security objectives is not the only day-to-day compass for today’s CSDP. On its own part, for instance, the recent EGS imposes 11 “strategic objectives” and additional guidelines, many of which are relevant for the CSDP’s strategy, conduct, and prospects.⁷⁰ Yet, in a sea of dull and excessively broad (quasi)official formulations, CSDP planners operate with a much leaner set of vital interests and strategic objectives emphasizing the defence and security aspects of the EU’s survival:

- “Defence against any military threat to the territory of the Union;”
- “Open lines of communication and trade (in physical as well as in cyber space);”
- security of supply (“energy and other vital natural resources”);
- “A sustainable environment;”

69. European Union, Treaty on European Union, Preamble and Article J.1(2); and Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 21(2), 2012.

70. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 3, 8-21.

- “Manageable migration flows;”
- “The maintenance of international law,” starting with the UN Charter; and
- preserving the Union’s decision-making autonomy.⁷¹

This very much facilitates the prioritizing of regions and issues under the CSDP.

3.4. Core Tasks, Priority Regions & Issues, & Illustrative Scenarios

The common (mis)perception of CSDP as a relatively open, multilateral CM instrument focused on the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and parts of Africa has never been more than an Atlanticist stereotype. Like every stereotype, this one is not totally incorrect. It rather offers an incomplete truth, especially when considered in light of the CSDP’s past and intended development.

Since its formal inception in 1998/9, the CSDP has gone from being nominally the West’s auxiliary expeditionary tool to overlapping with NATO even in areas beyond international military CM. Functionally, today’s CSDP resembles modern national (primarily Western, interventionist-oriented) militaries as well as NATO itself, developing unevenly in three standard domains of civil-military activity: defence and deterrence, international peace-keeping in the broadest sense, and domestic emergency response and disaster relief. Having this in mind, outsiders and anti-globalists are tempted to portray the CSDP as a “simulacrum” and “extended hand” of NATO, and they often do so, paying no attention to the former’s authentic Europeanist dimension of which mostly Washington, London, and Ottawa fear. Of course, Atlanticists would not buy this position, despite the fact that their public comments on the direction of European defence developments almost never lack venom and degrading sarcasm. For some pro-NATO

71. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 3-4.

pundits, the CSDP has never actually developed within the Alliance, and even if it did so occasionally it is now way off the desirable concept. In the eyes of hard-power advocates, the CSDP remains all too soft, with mainly theoretical advancement in two of the functional domains.

Regardless, the three general CSDP functions and strands of development have been established by EU treaties and a large set of political measures and strategic documents. When/if logically combined with three geographical criteria (home, regional, and global) within the framework of the EU's global strategic imperative to "shape events" and "lead a renewal of the multilateral order,"⁷² they reveal **the core CSDP tasks** in this century:

- assistance to homeland security and (preparing for) continental defence;
- conflict prevention and CM in the broader EU neighbourhood; and
- effective multilateralism and global contribution to peace and security.

Clearly, there is a stunning similarity to NATO's core tasks.⁷³ But this has little if anything to do with drawing analogies from the Alliance's 2010 Strategic Concept. The evolving CSDP simply defies the way most observers see it, namely as a policy exhausted by the Petersberg tasks.⁷⁴ Of course, unlike its engagement in the neighbourhood, which can be viewed as its flagship and, most likely, enduring mission, the rest of its key functions, or parts thereof (homeland defence, global military operations), are currently less visible as they are yet-to-be developed beyond a reflection or planning phase. Therefore, one must not let be carried away by the knowledge of the

72. European Council, Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 8-9, 26. Just as a curiosity, if the 2003 ESS mentions "multilateral/ism" five (4+1) times, its supplement, the 2008 Implementation Report, does so as much as 13 times.

73. See NATO, "Active Engagement, Modern Defense," 3, 14, 19, 23. NATO's three core tasks have been formulated as follows: "Defence and Deterrence," "Security through Crisis Management," and "Promoting International Security through Cooperation."

74. Even extra-expanded as it has been since 2007, the concept of Petersberg tasks could barely match the core CSDP tasks on a regional and global level.

CSDP's current priorities, which are, no doubt, firmly related to (out-of-area CM, and mainly in) the Union's neighbourhood.⁷⁵

Speaking of priorities, Europeans still lack a clear-cut common vision on “where to concentrate their security and defence projection.”⁷⁶ Geography-wise, they seem either unwilling, for flexibility and propaganda reasons, or unable, due to various constraints, to prioritize smaller regions and specific countries. Yet, they have thus far shown to have much more than a general idea of where they should actively deploy via the CSDP. Based on their overall effort in the context of CSDP, **the following regions and issues** ought to be singled out:

- EU territory;⁷⁷
- the Western Balkans;⁷⁸
- “The Eastern Neighbourhood (the Baltic to the Black Sea),”⁷⁹ and in particular the Southern Caucasus;⁸⁰
- the Gulf/the Middle East;⁸¹
- “The Southern Neighbourhood (the Dardanelles to Gibraltar),”⁸² notably the Maghreb;
- Sub-Saharan Africa, with a particular focus on West Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn;

75. The ESS and its 2008 supplement, the Implementation Report, consider the neighbourhood a second “strategic objective” out of three; the other two being “Addressing Threats” and “An international Order Based on Multilateralism.” European Council, European Security Strategy, 6-9; and Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 6-10.

76. Frontini, “Five Recommendations,” 1.

77. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 6.

78. HR for FASP/VP, “Final Report,” 1, 5.

79. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 4.

80. European Council, European Security Strategy, 8.

81. Ibid., 8; HR for FASP/VP and European Commission, “Climate Change and International Security,” Paper to the European Council, S113/08, Brussels, March 14, 2008, p. 7,

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf; and Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 4.

82. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 4.

- anti-piracy and maritime security (key sea lines of communication, transit routes, and approaches to Europe, as well as natural resource basins, notably “the European sea and subsea basins” such as the eastern and southern Mediterranean, then, the Gulf of Guinea,⁸³ the Gulf of Aden, the West Indian Ocean, and the rest of “the crucial zone from ‘Suez to Shanghai’”);⁸⁴
- Central Asia,⁸⁵ but also parts of South Asia such as Afghanistan;⁸⁶
- the Arctic, including maritime security and control of the Northeast Passage (NEP), the Barents Sea, the future Transpolar Sea Route (TSR), as well as the adjacent North Atlantic;⁸⁷
- any other part of the world if threatening the Union militarily or otherwise;
- “Collective security under the UN, notably” R2P;⁸⁸ and
- cyber security and defence.⁸⁹

83. Council of Ministers of the EU, EU Maritime Security Strategy, 4. The Union does not hide its global maritime ambition, focusing virtually on all important maritime regions and basins beyond the Pacific and the South-East Indian Ocean:

“The Strategy covers the global maritime domain. The network of shipping lanes between continents is of particular importance, as well as some maritime areas because of their strategic value or potential risk for crisis or instability. Therefore, the EU should seek to strengthen and support its regional responses to maritime security.

...

This Strategy takes particular regard of each of the European sea and subsea basins, namely the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the North Sea, as well as of the Arctic waters, the Atlantic Ocean and the outermost regions.”

84. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 4, 19; Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, *Maritime Dimension of CSDP*, 14, 25.

85. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 4.

86. European Council, European Security Strategy, 1, 4-8; and Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 7.

87. Andreas Maurer *et al.* “The EU as an Arctic Actor? Interests and Governance Challenges” (Report on the 3rd Annual “Geopolitics in the High North” [GeoNor] Conference and Joint GeoNor Workshops, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, December 2012), 6, 11, 13, 16, 18, 24, 28-33, 35-38, 43-45, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/Mrr_GeoNor_Conference_Report_1212.pdf; Council of Ministers of the EU, EU Maritime Security Strategy, p. 4; European Parliament, Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the EU Strategy for the Arctic (2013/2595(RSP)), para. 11, Strasbourg, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-0236+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>; and Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 19.

88. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 4, 19; and Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, *Maritime Dimension of CSDP*, 19-21. R2P stands for “Responsibility to Protect.”

89. Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 5; HR for FASP/VP, “Final Report,” 16-18; European Council, Conclusions, EUCO 217/13, Brussels, December 19-20, 2013, pp. 5-6, para. 11, <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-217-2013-INIT/en/pdf>; and Council of Ministers of the EU, Cyber Defence Policy Framework.

The above is just a slightly stretched priority list compared to the one(s) presently envisaged by CSDP planners. As such, it clearly reflects the gradual expansion of the EU's strategic focus beyond the immediate ("traditional") neighbourhood,⁹⁰ namely over a "vast area... where [the Union]... can exert the fullest and most comprehensive form of engagement."⁹¹ This so-called strategic neighbourhood, where Brussels is seeking to apply "a broad range of policies in a structured, long-term fashion," and which is therefore seen as a major test for the EU/CSDP's credibility, includes "also broader areas that are functionally linked to vital European interests (see *Figure 4*)."⁹² Consequently, the Union "must plan and prepare" for the regions and issues "where our vital interests are most directly at stake." This, inter alia, means 24/7 "early warning and prevention" and "permanent contingency planning for" the prime targeted geographical area without "disregard[ing] other regions and issues."⁹³

Figure 4. EU Strategic Neighbourhood



Source: Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Netherlands, 2014
<https://www.defensie.nl/documenten/brochures/2014/06/27/infographic-eu-battlegroup>

90. The EU's immediate or traditional neighbourhood is comprised of 16 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)-participating countries, Russia as a special case, and the yet-to-be integrated Western Balkans. Bertelsmann Stiftung ed., *EU Neighbourhood in Shambles*, 4n3.

91. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 11.

92. Ibid., 3, 10.

93. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 3-4.

That said, the controversy over the Union's long-term desire for having a standing OHQ and permanent contingency planning is far from over, with the instinct for preserving US/NATO primacy still being stronger than the rationale for addressing the EU/CSDP's lack of C² capacity. Since 2004, EU military CM, namely the predominant portion of the military CSDP, has relied on three secretive "concurrency suites" built upon five generic illustrative scenarios:

- separation of parties by force;
- stabilization, reconstruction, and military assistance;
- conflict prevention;
- assistance to humanitarian operations; and
- evacuation in a non-permissive environment.⁹⁴

A simple cross-comparison of these five scenarios reveals that EU forces are generally expected to be deployable within five to 10 days of a decision to launch (IOC), to places as remote as 15,000 km from Brussels, and sustainable for at least two years. Furthermore, according to the logistics concept for CSDP military operations, the EU soldier should be able to operate in the most demanding environments, with little or no host-nation support, harsh conditions, challenging terrain, and severe climate.⁹⁵ As for the requirements of more demanding scenarios, such as separation of parties by force or conflict prevention, EU troops should be able deploy on short notice, especially their quick reaction, theater-entry elements, to places within 10,000 km from Brussels, with separate plans for action at 4,000 km and 6,000 km, and reach FOC within two months of

94. Giegerich, *European Military Crisis Management*, 19-21; Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 23; and EEAS (EUMS), *EU Military Rapid Response Concept*, EEAS 02168/4/14 REV 4, Brussels, January 8, 2015, pp. 16-17, para. 37, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede160415militaryrapidresponse_/sede160415militaryrapidresponse_en.pdf.

95. Giegerich, *European Military Crisis Management*, 21.

a decision to launch. In contingencies requiring lower-scale engagement yet high readiness and prompt reaction, such as evacuation or humanitarian assistance, the proper deployment should take place within maximum ten days of a decision to launch, at as far as 15,000 km from Brussels. Finally, when it comes to large-scale peacekeeping or post-conflict reconstruction and institution-building, including military advice and training, two benchmarks are of cardinal importance: two-year sustainability at the minimum and FOC attained within 90 days of a decision to launch.⁹⁶

Nonetheless, as the global demand for military crisis management continues to grow along with the complexity and urgency of individual contingencies (e.g. Ukraine, Syria), the readiness requirements for Western militaries evolve. Thus, concomitantly with the ongoing reform of the NATO Response Force (NRF),⁹⁷ whose so-called Spearhead Force is said to be partly deployable “within a few days” (i.e. “within 2 to 3 days”) of a NAC decision,⁹⁸ or even, as interpreted by global media, on a 48-hour notice, the CSDP military planners have raised the bar for some warfighters (e.g. BG members, commandos, evacuation teams) under the EU flag. The new EU Military Rapid Response Concept (MRRC) reaffirms the standard military response time (no later than [NLT] 60 days of a Council decision) and divides the RR timeline in three: generic RR (NLT 25

96. Ibid., 19-21.

97. In response to Russia’s resurgence and growing instability in the Middle East as well as along its southern flank, since 2014 NATO has been implementing a Readiness Action Plan. The key element of the Plan’s Adaption Measures is the transformation of the division-size NRF into a more robust (up to 40,000 troops) yet more responsive and capable formation. The reform also envisages the creation by 2016 of a so-called Spearhead Force (original name: Very High Readiness Joint Task Force – VJTF) whose interim version is already up and running. For more information see North Atlantic Council, Wales Summit Declaration, September 5, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?selectedLocale=en; Statement by the NATO Defence Ministers on the Readiness Action Plan, Brussels, February 5, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_117222.htm?selectedLocale=en; and “NATO’s Readiness Action Plan,” NATO, October 2015, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_10/20151007_1510-factsheet_rap_en.pdf.

98. North Atlantic Council, Wales Summit Declaration, para. 8; and Statement by the NATO Defence Ministers on the Readiness Action Plan, para. 4.

days); express RR (NLT 10 days), and emergency RR (NLT 5 days).⁹⁹ The emergency reaction time requires either pre-positioned EU forces and assets or such “with an immediate global reach capability.”¹⁰⁰

In this context, while it is true that the EUMS’s contingency planning has been “short of [many formal plans not least of] collective defence,”¹⁰¹ CSDP experts have thus far, on a think-tank level, examined and proposed a number of illustrative scenarios beyond the official five. Some of these relate to internal security and certain aspects of homeland defence (such as collective military assistance in consequence management after a chemical or biological attack but excluding collective defence operations against conventional armed aggression). For instance, the 2004 EU ISS proposal for a white paper on European defence scrutinizes the EU’s ability to respond to five demanding contingencies: large-scale peace-keeping, humanitarian intervention, regional warfare, out-of-area counter-terrorism, and homeland defence.¹⁰² With regards to the latter, the authors pinpoint to the evolving functional link between the CSDP as an instrument for, mainly, forward protection of EU interests and the Union’s internal security (covered by JHA/AFSJ policies), civil protection, and territorial defence: “Conflict prevention may also be considered as extending into the realm of homeland defence,” they say.¹⁰³

More recently, leading EGMONT fellows have proposed five brand new illustrative scenarios, thus pushing for an update of the EUMS’s somewhat obsolete contingency planning. Inspired by the fast-changing strategic reality (which, as captured by the 2008

99. EEAS (EUMS), *Military Rapid Response Concept*, pp. 22, 24, paras. 48-53. The express RR time was introduced in 2004/5 “primarily for EU Battlegroups.”

100. *Ibid.*, 23, 24, para. 54. The emergency reaction time is not a totally new requirement. Ever since they introduced the ERRF concept in 1999 CSDP strategists have kept in mind that some quick-entry, battalion-size ERRF elements must be able to move within 48 hours of a relevant political decision. See Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 104.

101. Giegerich, *European Military Crisis Management*, 22.

102. Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 93-98, 113-14.

103. *Ibid.*, 113.

Implementation Report, renders energy security, cyber security, and climate change major challenges for the EU) and the fact that some CSDP operations, such as the vanguard and ongoing EUNAVFOR Atlanta, have long been implemented outside the formally adopted scenario framework, they draw attention to the necessity of immediate planning for maritime security, cyber security, support operations, counter-terrorism, and internal security.¹⁰⁴ This is also implied by the 2015 EU MRRC, which, although basing the RR requirements solely on “the [5] agreed illustrative scenarios,” nonetheless recapitulates all the threats, contingencies, and scenarios recognized as such by EU institutions and strategic documents but formally still excluded from or lacking the proper treatment in EU military planning.¹⁰⁵ In this context, during the 2012 Cypriot EU Presidency, EU maritime security and capabilities were particularly examined and their importance underlined on both political and technical level.¹⁰⁶

In sum, Brussels has yet to release a strategy paper containing a sort of official list of geographical and functional priorities for the CSDP. In a broader functional sense, what it has formally prioritized since late 2012 are three domains of CSDP development: operational performance and global visibility, capabilities, and European defence industry.¹⁰⁷ Drawing from these broad domains, each of which represents a separate “cluster” of priorities, former HR for FASP/VP and EDA Director Catherine Ashton set

104. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 3-4, 23-4.

105. EEAS (EUMS), *Military Rapid Response Concept*, p. 17, paras. 38-41. The missing scenarios include the “situations” envisaged by the ESS (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organised crime), the “range of... threats and challenges” identified by the ESS’s supplement, the 2008 Implementation Report (cyber security, energy security, climate change and piracy), as well as the Council’s recognition of “the importance of networks in today’s globalized world and the need for the EU to engage in all domains – land, air, maritime, space and cyber.” The MRRC, furthermore, reaffirms some of the emerging threats (“cyber, maritime, illegal migration and border management”) to be properly covered by future EUMS planning.

106. See Demetris Eliades, preface to *Military Capability Development*, ed. Hillmann and Hadjisavvas, i; and Thomas de Maizière, preface to *Military Capability Development*, ed. Hillmann and Hadjisavvas, iii.

107. See European Council, Conclusions, EUCO 205/12, paras. 20-25, Brussels, December 13-14, 2012, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134353.pdf; Conclusions, EUCO 217/13, pp. 1-10, paras. 1-22; and HR for FASP/VP, “Final Report,” 4-27.

out five capability-oriented imperatives: preparedness for a decisive CSDP action in the neighbourhood, “including through direct [and robust] intervention,” power projection ability based on “credible civilian and military capabilities of the right type,” engaging with partners, improved RR capacity so as to be “able to engage all 5 environments (land, air, maritime, space and cyber),” and further application of the comprehensive approach, notably to capability development.¹⁰⁸

Apart from a clear set of priorities, it is reasonable to expect that future strategic planning for the CSDP will be based on an updated or a brand new set of illustrative scenarios. These would take into account emerging challenges, such as migration inflows and Arctic security developments (possible militarization, the growing need for polar search and rescue – SAR),¹⁰⁹ and might eventually reflect Europe’s natural responsibility to defend its own territory.

3.5. Homeland Security & Defence

While the CSDP is most likely to remain “above all exogenous,”¹¹⁰ “it does have a complementary role to play in” the EU’s internal security, as well as prospectively, in collective defence.¹¹¹ This role, which is the product of a gradual and somewhat stealthy practice of conferring security and defence functions to Brussels,¹¹² has been justified on three premises: first, the fading delimitation of internal and external security,¹¹³ which, on a policy-making level, necessitates “to bring together all internal and external dimensions of security” and “to further reinforce the links between” the CFSP/CSDP and

108. HR for FASP/VP, “Final Report,” 2-27.

109. Maurer *et al.* “EU as an Arctic Actor?,” 6, 11, 13, (18), 24, 28 (29-30), 31-33. 36-38, 43-44.

110. Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 45-46.

111. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 4.

112. See Ojanen, “European Defence,” in Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, *European Security*, 164.

113. HR for FASP/VP, “Final Report,” 1.

JHA/AFSJ;¹¹⁴ second, the strategic implications of America's Asia-Pacific pivot for Europe,¹¹⁵ and third, the need not only to reassure formally non-allied EU members against a theoretical possibility of external aggression, but also to start considering genuine defence matters (e.g. maritime surveillance and security, military assistance to contain uncontrolled migration, hard-power responses against future large-scale terrorist attacks, the continent's military security in light of the revival of the conventional threat on its eastern periphery) within the EU framework.¹¹⁶ These are, of course, partially contradicted by an Atlanticist postulate formulated in line with the enduring Anglo-American interest to limit the CSDP, both functionally and geographically, and perhaps, to eventually permit its evolution into common defence under transatlantic (NATO or other supra-structure) control, while generally boosting European military capabilities and commitment:

“Europe is not now and will not in the future be able to guarantee European security on its own; it requires the support of the USA. This fact must be set in the context of the increased attention being paid by the USA to Asia.”¹¹⁷

The inherent Euro-Atlanticist dichotomy still fosters an ambiguous practice whereby EU leaders, on the one hand, avoid designating the lead framework for “coordinating and streamlining...European security cooperation,”¹¹⁸ and on the other, increasingly insist on the EU/CSDP “as a primary channel through which its member-states manage global shifts.”¹¹⁹

114. European Commission, “European Agenda on Security,” 4, 10. For instance,

“Enhanced coordination and cooperation between Coast Guard Functions performed at national level reinforces maritime security” (Ibid., 10).

115. HR for FASP/VP, “Final Report,” 2; and Schockenhoff and Kiesewetter, “Strengthening Europe's Ability to Act,” 1-2.

116. Perruche, “Which Strategy for CSDP?,” 1-2; and Biscop and Coelmont, *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 21.

117. Schockenhoff and Kiesewetter, “Strengthening Europe's Ability to Act,” 1.

118. Frontini, “Five Recommendations,” 2.

119. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 4.

That said, even though EU/CSDP primacy in defence is, at best, a remote possibility, its Lisbon precursors, notably the clauses on “solidarity” (in case of natural and man-made disasters, including terrorism) and “mutual assistance” (against armed aggression), are all the more in focus. Ever since 2009 there has been a broad consensus among EU strategists and security experts for immediate and more complete use of the Lisbon “opportunities” for the CSDP.¹²⁰ Being “a window of opportunity,”¹²¹ the Solidarity Clause (SC, Article 222 TFEU¹²²) should help elaborate the CSDP’s domestic interventionist role. For a start, it should inspire Brussels “to coordinate and pool Member States’ disaster response capabilities and to prepare scenarios for contingencies within the borders of the EU where an auxiliary military role is called for.”¹²³ Such planning and preparations have lately gained on urgency as recent acts of terror on European soil and the reincarnation of old geopolitical tensions, including within the West, suggest that the SC could be invoked for the first time sooner rather than later.

Quite intriguingly, the SC remained inactive following this year’s Paris terror attacks, despite the fact that it is meant exactly for such sort of “man-made disasters.”¹²⁴ Moreover, on November 17, 2015, just four days after the second and more devastating terror campaign in the French capital was launched, reportedly by followers of the Islamic State, President François Hollande invoked for the first time the EU’s Mutual Assistance/Defence Clause (MAC/MDC, Article 42[7] [ex Article 17] TEU). Official and conformist explanations aside (these, however, correctly put “the emphasis on the

120. European Council, Conclusions, EUCO 217/13, p. 2. See also Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 20, 27; and “Think-Tank Process for a European Global Strategy,” EGS Project, accessed July 23, 2015, <http://www.europeanglobalstrategy.eu/about>.

121. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 20.

122. The communitarian Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) was formerly known as Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) and EU pillar one.

123. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 20.

124. European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 222 (ex Article 188R TFEU), 2012.

political [non-operational] nature of the act”),¹²⁵ this historical precedent, which was preceded and followed by a significant Franco-Russian rapprochement, is not just an expected demonstration of French national pride by straightening up what has been seen as a debatable Europeanist orientation in the post-Mitterrand period. It is also a message to Washington and the Atlanticist lobby within the EU that ‘political’ pressure has limits.

Regardless, the aftermath of both the *Charlie Hebdo* and *Friday the 13th* massacres reaffirmed the necessity of military assistance (light infantry at the very least¹²⁶) when responding to large-scale and/or high-profile terrorist attacks. Also, recurrent internal crises in the immediate neighbourhood, notably in some EU candidate countries, show that such assistance would be indispensable in case of future violence and anti-government actions by terrorists or paramilitaries within the EU.¹²⁷ So far, in terms of disaster management coordination, the Union has developed appropriate legislation, guidelines, and coordination hubs (e.g. the 24/7 EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre; the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, COSI),¹²⁸ while also conducting risk assessments (e.g. “on explosives in air cargo”) and recommending “more joint field exercises.”¹²⁹

125. Cîrlig, “First Ever Activation,” 8.

126. Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 96.

127. No doubt, the German and European strategists have received the message conveyed by George Friedman’s latest books, interviews, and lectures. His respective, long-term prognoses are illustrative of the disparaging perception and implicit contempt by many in Washington for the European Union as such. Particularly controversial in this context are Friedman’s remarks that the Europeans live in “an unsustainable entity” with which the Americans “no longer have a relationship,” that Europe is very likely to be engulfed by civil wars in the foreseeable future (e.g. Catalonians vs. Spain), or possibly even by “a major international war...along the fault line between Russia and the European peninsula” (e.g. in Ukraine or other parts of Russia’s “Near Abroad” such as Georgia and the Baltic, or in the Balkans); and that they “will [simply] return to humanity,” “have their wars...their peace...live their lives.” George Friedman, “Europe: Destined for Conflict?,” speech, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, February 3, 2015, YouTube video 01:12:29, <http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/event/europe-destined-for-conflict>.

128. COSI stands for *le Comité permanent de coopération opérationnelle en matière de sécurité intérieure* (English: Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security).

129. European Commission, “European Agenda on Security,” 9.

The opportunity presented by the unseen refugee and migratory influx from Africa and the Greater Middle East has already been seized by the European Commission. On December 15, 2015, the Commission announced the creation of a European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG, an old idea), based on the current FRONTEX Agency, yet with a triple budget, its own hi-tech equipment and assets, and relying on a reserve pool of 1,500 personnel for intervention teams.¹³⁰ The new EBCG Agency has been conceived as a centre of excellence with a mandate to assist in the protection of the most burdened sections of the EU's external borders, including by intervening in both EU member states (under certain circumstances even without the consent of the respective national government) and third countries (upon request by or in cooperation with the local authorities). As for domestic contingency planning, since 2008 the EUMS and other EEAS bodies have been urged to draft many additional illustrative scenarios, including for cyber security and defence. As clarified by the 2015 EU Cyber Policy Framework, future cyber attacks on the Union may trigger (depending on the nature and effects of the cyber crisis) the SC or even a collective defence response under the MAC/MDC.¹³¹

The MAC/MDC vests territorial defence responsibility in the EU/CSDP, allegedly, without prejudice to NATO. Such constitutional competence, while subject to clear legal and real-world constraints in favour of NATO primacy, nonetheless allows for CSDP collective defence operations in specific cases, at least in theory (e.g. armed aggression against a 'neutral' EU member such as Finland or Cyprus, and "where/when NATO as a

130. "European Agenda on Migration: Securing Europe's External Borders," European Commission, Strasbourg, December 15, 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6332_en.htm; and European Commission, "A European Border and Coast Guard to Protect Europe's External Borders," news release, December 15, 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6327_en.htm.

131. Council of Ministers of the EU, Cyber Defence Policy Framework, 3, 3n2. The Policy Framework is clear enough: "In order to deal with the effects of a cyber crisis, relevant provisions of the Treaty of the EU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU may be applicable, as appropriate" (in the related footnote, an explicit reference is made to Articles 222 TFEU and 42[7] TEU).

whole is not engaged”). Therefore, the legal dilemma that puzzles even the finest CSDP experts in this context is ultimately false: there is no formal ban on the EU/CSDP getting involved in collective defence with a view to protecting its members in the absence of appropriate US/NATO response. Thus, “Legally [and theoretically] speaking, the EU today can launch any [kind of] operation,” with no exception!¹³²

The continuing US/NATO domination aside, this makes a solid platform for brainstorming and preparations for a common continental defence. Two trends deserve particular attention. First, whereas the post Cold-War transatlantic discourse continues to describe the US/NATO as “unique and essential”¹³³ “primary,”¹³⁴ “key,”¹³⁵ “core,”¹³⁶ “bedrock,”¹³⁷ “hard,”¹³⁸ “fundamental,”¹³⁹ “critical,”¹⁴⁰ and even “indispensable,” “supreme,” “ultimate,”¹⁴¹ and “irreplaceable,”¹⁴² without whose support Europe “will not...be able to guarantee [its] security,”¹⁴³ the vague idea of European army and common defence has not lost relevance. To the contrary, due to the compelling security aspects of Europe’s prolonged, multidimensional downturn (proxy civil wars in Ukraine

132. Biscop and Coelmont, *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 23. Unlike the author, Biscop, Coelmont, and their colleagues argue as follows:

“Legally speaking, the EU today can launch any operation, with the sole exception of operations linked to the collective defence of the territory of the Member States, but including combat operations in the context of crisis management.”

133. NATO, “Active Engagement, Modern Defense,” 4, 9.

134. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 4; and Martin Stropnický, quoted in Alessandra Flora *et al.*, “UK, Central Europe Frown at Juncker’s European Army,” EurActiv, March 25, 2015, <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/uk-central-europe-frown-junckers-european-army-313221>.

135. European Council, Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 11.

136. European Council, European Security Strategy, 9; and Flora *et al.*, “UK, Central Europe Frown.”

137. Bruno Waterfield, “David Cameron Fights off EU Army Plan,” *Telegraph*, December 19, 2013, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10528852/David-Cameron-flies-to-Brussels-determined-to-fight-EU-drones-programme.html>.

138. Alyson J.K. Bailes, “NATO and the EU in the North: What is at Stake in Current Strategy Development?,” abstract, *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, no. 23 (2010), http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/NATO_EU_North.pdf.

139. European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 42(7) (ex Article 17 TEU), 2012; and WEU Council of Ministers, Rome Declaration.

140. European Council, European Security Strategy, 9.

141. EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 4.

142. *Ibid.*, 13.

143. Schockenhoff and Kiesewetter, “Strengthening Europe’s Ability to Act,” 1-2.

and Syria, Russia's resurgence via these countries and other neighbouring regions, a chaotic and totally destabilized eastern and southern neighbourhood, and an unprecedented refugee and migration crisis as a result) the latter has lately seen vocal support even by top EU leaders (see Chapter 4). This precedent, which seems to be forcing the common defence topic into the mainstream, hardly reconciles with routine "EU-NATO compatibility and complementarity" declarations. On a more practical level, senior CSDP experts and officials have pressed for a more independent CSDP which is to be "prevented [neither] from acting in the area of defence" nor from "discussing defence issues."¹⁴⁴ Their core argument is that the artificial decoupling of security and defence competences is "schizophrenic" and "detrimental to the relevance of CSDP."¹⁴⁵ Therefore, they infer, the MAC/MDC "merits a thorough reflection on the long-term future of European defence."¹⁴⁶

An example of such reflection is the homeland defence scenario drafted by a high-level Task Force under EU ISS auspices as early as 2004.¹⁴⁷ Elaborated in the aftermath of 9/11 and in a US/NATO-dominated context, this scenario does not refer to a conventional armed aggression by a third state or a coalition. Rather, it envisions a WMD attack on the Union by a non-state actor and involving biological weapons (small pox). Even so, it is a noteworthy sample of brainstorming for several reasons. First, it envisions an SC-covered contingency where "the aim is to provide a collective [CSDP] military contribution to the operations required," "mostly in support of civilian authorities."¹⁴⁸ Second, it *de facto* combines two scenarios (prevention of an attack/protection of critical

144. Perruche, "Which Strategy for CSDP?," 1-2; and Biscop and Coelmont, *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 21.

145. Ibid.

146. Biscop and Coelmont, *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 21.

147. See Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 93-98, 113-14.

148. Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 94, 113.

infrastructure and consequence management) and thus helps identify a number of EU capability shortfalls in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) protection, ISTAR, notably imagery, signal, and human intelligence (IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT), SOFs and counter-terror units, as well as air and missile defence.¹⁴⁹ Third, though concerned with preserving Europe's internal order and consequence limitation, rather than operationalizing a highly-militarized collective defence response, this particular scenario includes important aspects of military defence (e.g. air defence, protection of critical infrastructure, SOF engagement) without disregarding possible involvement by state actors (state-sponsored terrorism). In this sense, according to the Task Force, the adequate response "could well involve a substantial portion of armed forces," both general-purpose troops and special units.¹⁵⁰

Fourth, mindful of the variance and the broadly interpretable character of the contingencies covered by a homeland defence scenario, the Task Force looked at the applicable EU law at the time and considered the relevance of both the SC, which was admittedly tailored for large-scale terror scenarios, and the MAC/MDC.¹⁵¹ Fifth, the comprehensive elaboration of the scenario included several creative (albeit not entirely original) proposals to address the lack of EU-level coordination and analytical capacities, disaster response (civilian and military) formations and assets, and appropriate C². Explicitly proposed were "Collective EU police, civil defence, and military (ERRF) assets," to be dispatched, in case of crisis, to the most critical and capability-deficient EU regions, as well as "an EU-style National Guard, or Territorial Army" "alongside the

149. Ibid., 98.

150. Ibid., 97.

151. Ibid., 113. Featuring some strong external aspects, this scenario excludes neither a potential involvement by state actors nor EU/NATO collective defence operations upon a potential WMD attack on Europe. In practice, as demonstrated by 9/11 and the latest Paris attacks, a 'domestic' contingency with a strong external dimension is very likely to provoke some form of collective defence response through either NATO or the EU.

standing ERRF capabilities” as an obvious hint of a future, two-tier or multi-tier common defence system.¹⁵² This was complemented with suggestions for “some form” of integration between the CSDP and JHA/AFSJ on a decision-making level,¹⁵³ the creation, in that context, of “a ‘European Security Council’” as well as equivalent, national-level advisory bodies on domestic security modeled on the former French presidential-level *Conseil de sécurité intérieure* (now part of the *Conseil de défense et de sécurité nationale – CDSN*) and bringing together “military defence, civil defence and domestic security organizations,”¹⁵⁴ a necessary “post of coordinator responsible for civil and homeland defence” (which subsequently led to the creation of the post of EU Counterterrorism Coordinator),¹⁵⁵ “large-scale advance simulation and exercising,”¹⁵⁶ and last but not least, the establishment of “a Homeland Defence capability, bringing together the collective assets of the Council and the Commission, [and] including a military component with a European equivalent of the [US] Northern Command.”¹⁵⁷ In conclusion, the Independent Task Force recommended that “Priority must be given to homeland defence,” despite Europe being less vulnerable to a biological WMD attack compared to the extremely fragmented US in an administrative sense.¹⁵⁸

152. Ibid., 97.

153. Ibid., 97-98, 113.

154. Ibid.

155. Ibid., 114.

156. Ibid., 97.

157. Ibid., 98. The members of the Independent Task Force further explain:

“Such a command would handle the military aspects of European-wide contingency planning and exercising against scenario V [homeland defence] threats, and could be, if needed, entrusted with the implementation of the corresponding collective measures.”

158. Ibid., 127.

3.6. Comprehensive Security Engagement in the Strategic Neighbourhood

The CSDP is a compromise-based strategic enterprise constrained in delivering upon its core tasks by NATO's existence, Europe's lack of coherence and unitary military capacity, and a number of complex twenty-first-century challenges. As such, it rests on "a wider modern [European] definition of security" that goes beyond traditional military security to include "internal, functional [e.g. economic, energy, environmental], and human dimensions."¹⁵⁹ Having been reflected in the EU's regional engagement ever since 2003, this concept of comprehensive security, as well as methodologically, the EU Comprehensive Approach to security in general and CM in particular, is now being elevated as the framework and leitmotif for CSDP operations in the strategic neighbourhood.¹⁶⁰ Such tendency of "Taking Comprehensive Security Responsibility in the Strategic Neighbourhood" entails two lines of action at strategic and operational levels:¹⁶¹

- preparedness "to undertake autonomously the full spectrum of civilian and military missions...in keeping with international law, when and where this is necessary to protect vital European interests;"¹⁶² and
- parallel and consistent use of non-CSDP instruments and measures such as CFSP diplomacy and sanctions, covert intelligence operations, development aid, trade,

159. Bailes, "NATO and the EU in the North," 9-10.

160. Building on the 2008 Implementation Report, which called for "Greater engagement with our neighbourhood," the 2013 EGS urges Brussels to take "Comprehensive Security Responsibility in the Strategic Neighbourhood." Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 10-11; and EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 10-14 (12).

161. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 12.

162. Ibid., 12.

and energy cooperation, including under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),¹⁶³ (pre-)accession dialogue and negotiations, and similar.

“The full spectrum of...missions” refers to the Petersberg tasks; a concept that is still vague in some aspects. Regardless, expanded and elaborated as they have been since 2003, these tasks cover “nearly every hypothesis except collective self-defence.”¹⁶⁴ Laid down constitutionally like never and nowhere before, they “include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.”¹⁶⁵ Each of these tasks may be carried out as appropriate, by using either civilian or military means, or both, thereby rendering an integral CSDP endeavour, and all of them “may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”¹⁶⁶ The humanitarian and rescue tasks, for instance, may support consequence management following terrorist attacks. Thus, together with other, non-CSDP segments of the EU external action, the humanitarian aid policy in the first place, they represent a sort of ‘external Solidarity Clause’ ensuring a global disaster role for the Union.¹⁶⁷

As for the Union’s ambition in terms of concurrency and specific type of CSDP missions to be executed (mostly) in the strategic neighbourhood, one should take note of the Council’s 2008 Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities:

163. In this context, and despite the well-known ‘turf wars’ in Brussels, the EEAS is urged to work with the Commission “to bind strategic thinking and the foreign and security toolbox to the traditionally Commission-led packages of the ENP.” Bertelsmann Stiftung ed., *EU Neighbourhood in Shambles*, 8.

164. Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 51-52.

165. European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 43 (ex Article 28B TEU), 2012.

166. Ibid.

167. See European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 21(2), 2012. For the “central role” of disaster relief “in the external as well as internal dimension of the Union” see Kristian Cedervall Lauta, *Disaster Law* (Abingdon, UK/New York: Routledge, 2015), 90-91 (91n84).

“In order to rise to current security challenges and respond to new threats, in the years ahead Europe should actually be capable, in the framework of the level of ambition established, inter alia of deploying 60 000 troops within 60 days for a major operation, within the range of operations envisaged in the Headline Goal 2010 and in the Civilian Headline Goal 2010, of planning and conducting simultaneously a series of operations and missions, of varying scope: two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations, with a suitable civilian component, supported by up to 10 000 troops for at least two years; two rapid-response operations of limited duration using inter alia EU battle groups; an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals (in less than ten days), bearing in mind the primary role of each Member State as regards its nationals and making use of the consular lead State concept; a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission; a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days; around a dozen ESDP civilian missions (inter alia police, rule-of-law, civilian administration, civil protection, security sector reform, and observation missions) of varying formats, including in rapid-response situations, together with a major mission (possibly up to 3000 experts) which could last several years.”¹⁶⁸

Mindful of the EU’s relative greatness in terms of population and total defence spending,¹⁶⁹ ever since 2003 CSDP planners have pushed the Union “to sustain several operations simultaneously,” while also focusing on integral (civil-military) endeavors which are deemed “of particular value.”¹⁷⁰ According to the elaborated level of ambition in 2008, several means 15 to 20 CSDP operations at the same time! Of course, the EU has met this ambition only in some nominal aspects (17 ongoing CSDP ops. at present, see *Figure 5*), mainly by maintaining a large number of tiny civilian missions across three different continents (Europe, Africa, and Asia) and thus surpassing the UN CM portfolio, But that does not prevent it, while searching, just like NATO, for the

168. Council of Ministers of the EU, Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities, Brussels, December 11, 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/104676.pdf, quoted in Council of Ministers of the EU, “EU Civilian and Military Capability Development Beyond 2010,” Brussels, December 7, 2010, pp. 2-3, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st17/st17127.en10.pdf>.

169. Whereas in 2003/4 the Union had 25 members and over 450 million citizens, with a total defence spending of €160 billion, in 2015 the respective numbers are 28, 500+ million, and €210 billion. See European Security Strategy, 1; and EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 3, 11.

170. European Council, European Security Strategy, 11.

appropriate mix of tools and capabilities,¹⁷¹ to believe that it is “particularly well equipped,” namely “with a comprehensive toolbox,” to deal with multifaceted situations (e.g. proliferation, terrorism, failed states, regional conflict, reconstruction, corrupt governance) in the strategic neighbourhood.¹⁷² To the contrary, when stating that it is “well placed to defuse conflict through mediation and address the root causes of conflict beyond its borders,”¹⁷³ Brussels also proudly asserts that it “can bring to the international stage the unique ability to combine, in a consistent manner policies and tools ranging from diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, development and justice.”¹⁷⁴

Faced by harsh criticism for its feeble response to the Arab Spring and related crises and apparently eager to change its inferior position to the US, in 2013 the EU finally prioritized the development of its power projection capability along the following lines:

“The Union must be able to act decisively through CSDP as a security provider, in partnership when possible but autonomously when necessary, in its neighbourhood, including through direct intervention. Strategic autonomy must materialize first in the EU’s neighbourhood.”¹⁷⁵

This is fully in line with the ESS, which back in 2003 called for the development of a European “strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention.”¹⁷⁶ Also, as clearly shown by the above-mentioned capabilities declaration, the overarching ERRF goal (deployment of 60,000 combat troops) has never been given up. It has only been overshadowed by the CSDP’s present focus on less ambitious (mostly low-to-medium scale) efforts and a fragmentary CM profile. This is important because only if the Union were able to undertake “a corps level deployment” at any one

171. NATO, “Active Engagement, Modern Defense,” 7-8 (para. 4b), 14 (para. 17), 15 (para. 19); and HR for FASP/VP, “Final Report,” 2.

172. European Council, European Security Strategy, 7; and EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 15.

173. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 15.

174. European Council, Conclusions, EUCO 217/13, p. 3, para. 5.

175. HR for FASP/VP, “Final Report,” 2.

176. European Council, European Security Strategy, 11.

time and sustain it “for at least one year,” “over and above ongoing operations,” only then it “would be [actually] able to deal with every eventuality.”¹⁷⁷

However, Brussels’ long-term rhetorical insistence on “the full spectrum/scope of missions,” its apparent enthusiasm for decisive, hard-power responses in the neighbourhood, and the silent preservation of the Helsinki ERRF goal are still expressions of political symbolism rather than an ambition assertively translated into practice. While the EU continues its dedicated work on defence capabilities so as to be ready for large-scale combat operations in the future, its military intervention is unlikely to compete in quantitative terms with that of the US or any other great power (e.g. Russia as of lately). In the years ahead, the bulk of EU civil-military effort in the strategic neighbourhood is set to follow three recently established trends:

- strengthening the “regional perspective” and developing differentiated, tailor-made (macro-)regional security strategies for all major regions to the East (e.g. the Middle East) and South (e.g. the Mediterranean, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa),¹⁷⁸ while also increasingly including critical maritime domains (e.g. the Gulf of Guinea).¹⁷⁹
- creating clusters of direct and indirect interventions in each region in focus (see *Figure 5*), and establishing coordination and networking across regions as well as between individual CSDP operations and missions; and
- perfecting the indirect response to crises as a sound, complementary component of EU intervention, implemented chiefly via various capacity-building CSDP


177. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 4-5.

178. HR for FASP/VP, “Final Report,” 5.

179. Council of Ministers of the EU, EU Maritime Security Strategy, 4.

missions and more specific SSR efforts (e.g. military training and advice, but also equipping).¹⁸⁰

Figure 5. Clusters of CSDP Interventions (the Horn of Africa & the Sahel)



Source: EEAS/European Commission, October 2015
<http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/>

Obviously, the Union wants and is able to act as a smart power in the real sense of the word. Unlike the US for instance, it tends to ‘occupy’ regions, hearts, and minds not only by a permanent forward presence and robust intelligence activities via over 130 EU Delegations worldwide, and even more national agencies on the ground, but also by deeply structured cooperation with, and normative direction of local authorities and societies, as well as by what an MI6 agent would qualify as taking advantage of an unmatched contextual knowledge of world regions and issues.

180 .European Council, Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 4; HR for FASP/VP, “Final Report,” 4, 7; and European Council, Conclusions, EUCO 217/13, p. 3, para. 7.

Thus far, the CSDP's task to intervene in the strategic neighbourhood has been performed within an established politico-normative framework dubbed liberal internationalism.¹⁸¹ Accordingly, the EU empire believes that "The best protection for [its]...security is a world of well-governed democratic states,"¹⁸² especially "a ring of" such states along its borders;¹⁸³ those unwilling to cooperate as part of the international community shall pay a certain price.¹⁸⁴ This means there are important precepts for EU leaders and CSDP planners to follow (albeit some of them are occasionally dropped for pragmatic reasons), and which can also serve as selection criteria as to when, where, and how to intervene.

First and foremost, mainstreaming human rights issues in the field of CFSP, including CSDP missions, is an absolute imperative for Brussels.¹⁸⁵ Such an axiomatic, people-oriented approach consistent with the human security concept is to help ensure both legitimacy and a truly global reach of EU diplomacy and interventions. Second, in the wake of the Arab Spring, EU brass became somewhat receptive of what they had apparently abhorred for so long: the Bush doctrine of regime change. Thus, in an inciting speech at the 2011 Munich Security Conference, the then President of the European Council Van Rompuy backed "freedom fighters" and, moreover, to the pleasure of all militants and anti-authoritarian opposition movements in the EU neighbourhood, hinted

181. See Robert Cooper, "The Post-Modern State," in *Reordering the World: The Long Term Implications of September 11th*, ed. Mark Leonard (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2002), 11-20, <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/36.pdf>; and "The New Liberal Imperialism," *Guardian/Observer*, April 7, 2002, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/apr/07/1>.

182. European Council, European Security Strategy, 10.

183. *Ibid.*, 8.

184. *Ibid.*, 10.

185. See European Council, Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 10-11.

that Brussels was finally willing to give up its controversial preference for political “stability” in favour of a long-term quest for “sustainability.”¹⁸⁶

Third, while pursuing, alongside other EU external policies, regional stability through sustainability, all future CSDP effort in the strategic neighbourhood is likely to be based on intelligence-based region and country “differentiation” and aimed at “transformational change;”¹⁸⁷ the reason being the emerging Euro-Atlanticist doctrine whereby there is no such thing as “heterogeneous [EU] ‘neighbourhood,’” but rather various “neighbourhoods” as well as “neighbouring maritime regions” requiring “a much more nuanced, targeted and sensitive posture.”¹⁸⁸ In this sense, the CSDP’s broader regional role is not just to “help reform countries’ police and military forces,” but also to bolster its own joint intelligence capacity and, if necessary, to handle countries and regions “unwilling to cooperate with” and/or integrate in the EU.¹⁸⁹ Finally, mindful of all domestic constraints and various conservative, national-patriotic, and sovereignist elements abroad, as well as of the role of public opinion and mass media in a globalized world, Brussels insists on “maintaining public support” for its ambitious regional and

186. President of the European Council, “Supporting the Fight for Freedom,” speech, 47th Munich Security Conference “Towards a Euro Atlantic Security Community,” February 5, 2011, PCE 029/11, p. 2, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119199.pdf. See also European Council, Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 2, 12.

187. Bertelsmann Stiftung ed., *EU Neighbourhood in Shambles*, 3, 5, 8-9, 12; and EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 11.

188. Bertelsmann Stiftung ed., *EU Neighbourhood in Shambles*, 3, 5, 8-9; and Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, *Maritime Dimension of CSDP*, 25. One way to develop a differentiated posture is through regional, country-specific, and thematic strategies. This is exactly what Brussels has been doing for years, producing numerous documents, from the once-adopted Common Strategies (e.g. on Russia, Ukraine, the Mediterranean region), today’s “concept of macro regional strategies” (e.g. on the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Adriatic and Ionian maritime region, the Baltic Sea, the Arctic [e.g. the multilateral “Northern Dimension” policy]), to various thematic papers, reports, and declarations (e.g. on anti-terrorism, non-proliferation, cyber security and defence, security aspects of climate change). As noted by the author in the 2014 CDSS Policy Report, these sub-strategies “have become a CFSP/CSDP standard.” European Council, Conclusions, EUCO 205/12, abstract and p. 11, para. 23; HR for FASP/VP, “Final Report,” 5; and Ivanovski, *Beefing up the NGO Sector*, 17.

189. Bertelsmann Stiftung ed., *EU Neighbourhood in Shambles*, 3, 5, 12.

global agenda, especially when it comes to preparing, launching, and conducting CSDP operations.¹⁹⁰

Having all this said, preventing conflicts and managing crises primarily in the neighbourhood will certainly remain the most prominent CSDP task. The EU's civilian and military "assistance is increasingly in demand,"¹⁹¹ not least because of the "dramatic growth...in missions" in the post-Cold War period.¹⁹² More important, the CSDP is indispensable for achieving the Union's regional end-goal: "Establishing the neighbourhood as the basis for a global role."¹⁹³

3.7. Effective Multilateralism & International Security

In keeping with its grand-strategic commitment to building "an effective [UN-centric] multilateral system" the EU has been developing its own cooperative security dimension.¹⁹⁴ Though perhaps less conspicuous than its renown NATO equivalent,¹⁹⁵ this dimension is far more fluid and thematically broader. It stretches beyond the CSDP's civil-military contribution to global peace and multilateral governance encompassing more than a wide range of security activities under the CFSP banner and within the Union's interior JHA/AFSJ framework (see *Figure 6*).¹⁹⁶

190. European Council, Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 12.

191. *Ibid.*, 9.

192. Giegerich, *European Military Crisis Management*, 7-8.


193. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 10-14.

194. European Council, European Security Strategy, 9; and Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 11-12.

195. See NATO, "Active Engagement, Modern Defense," 23, 25, 26. NATO's cooperative security dimension, which actually represents the organization's third core task, features three pillars: "Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation," "Open Door" policy, and "Partnerships." Central to the third pillar and the Atlanticist vision of united Europe has been the successful Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.

196. In the broadest sense, the EU's cooperative security dimension encompasses relevant bilateral and multilateral aspects of its trade, development, humanitarian, enlargement, neighbourhood, environmental, and energy policies. These non-CFSP/CSDP and mainly external policies have indirect but significant impact on international security. Take for instance EU enlargement, which is the conceptual equivalent of NATO's "Open Door" policy, only much more limited in geographical scope (due to Article 49 TEU concerning the accession of new EU members) and much more delicate and demanding as an integration process. Hence, the Union's non-CSDP security activities, which are in

Figure 6. EU Multilateral Approach to International Security



As for the CSDP alone, its global multilateral role derives from three interrelated elements. First, the EU is not formally precluded from intervening beyond its strategic neighbourhood. To the contrary, while focusing on hotspots and theaters of operations in radius of about 6,000 kms from Brussels, it does not “disregard other regions and issues.”¹⁹⁷

This planetary vision, which permits the Union to act in an integral fashion (including militarily) even in areas under ‘exclusive’ US competence, such as Latin America and the Far East/Asia-Pacific, has been translated in the strategic planning for the CSDP. As already noted, some of the EUMS’s post-2004 scenarios envisage potential CSDP military action up to 15,000 km from Brussels. Another credible reminder of the implementation of this vision, besides the analogue illustrative scenarios drafted for the civilian CSDP, is the 2005 CSDP monitoring mission that helped post-tsunami peace building in Aceh. Conducted at 9606 kms (5969 mls) from Brussels, in a volatile region of North Indonesia, this nominally civilian mission has been the farthest CSDP endeavor

principle carried out in close coordination with regional and global partners, include but are not limited to arms control and non-proliferation measures, a thorough anti-terrorist effort, natural resources extraction control and oversight, notably the fight against the so-called “conflict diamonds,” preventive diplomacy and mediation, human rights issues and action against genocide and ethnic cleansing, and targeted sanctions.

197. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 3-4.

thus far.¹⁹⁸ As such, it foreshadowed the EU's "own 'pivot to Asia'" seven years before the latter was actually announced and six years ahead of Washington's proclamation of "America's Pacific Century."¹⁹⁹

That said, future long-range CSDP deployments should not come as a surprise. While it is reasonable to expect that the bulk of them would fall into short-term low-scale CM in support of the United Nations response against threats to international peace and security,²⁰⁰ consideration is to be taken of possible EU-US/NATO tensions and the ultimate implications of Brussels' fondness for UN-mandated collective security operations, including R2P.²⁰¹

Second, the EU's civil-military CM has been designed to be relatively open, both institutionally and operationally. Its deliberately inclusive character, which is primarily in favour of the CSDP's own visibility, legitimacy, and effectiveness,²⁰² has led some to (mis)perceive the CSDP "as a new, multilateral opportunity" freed from a US dictate and comparable to 'soft' UN intervention.²⁰³ Whether 'soft' and multilateral or much more than that, the EU/CSDP has welcomed third party involvement in its global CM efforts since well before the adoption of EU-NATO permanent arrangements (Berlin Plus) in 2003. Speaking in general, pursuant to European Council guidelines and strategic

198. The mission included military personnel in a civilian capacity.

199. Pierre Minard and Eva Pejsova, "CSDP's New Partners: East Asia," EU ISS Alert No. 39, Paris, September 2014, p. 1, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_39_CSDP_partners_in_East_Asia.pdf; and Hilary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, November 11, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century.

200. See European Council, European Security Strategy, 11.

201. See Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 4, 19; and Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, *Maritime Dimension of CSDP*, 19-21.

202. For more information on "The drivers" of CSDP partnerships see Thierry Tardy, "CSDP: Getting Third States on Board," EU ISS Brief No. 6, Paris, March 2014, pp. 2-4, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_6_CSDP_and_third_states.pdf.

203. Moens, "NATO and ESDP," 67.

documents adopted between 1999 and 2003, CSDP partners have been offered a couple of mutually beneficial prerogatives:

- participation in security and defence consultations with Brussels in both a “routine non-crisis phase” and an “operational phase;” and
- concrete contribution to EU CM operations while theoretically enjoying “same rights and obligations” as the participating EU members in their day-to-day management.²⁰⁴

Although EU candidates and non-EU European NATO allies have been given precedence in this context, especially in the early stages of the CSDP’s development, EU CM has seen a plethora of other participants, Illustrated by numbers, CSDP deployments have hitherto benefited from 29 non-EU contributors (or about 40 if one takes into account the pre-accession contribution by most of the 13 post-2004 EU members), including apparently unlikely partners such as Chile, Singapore, Thailand, the particularly distant New Zealand, and others.²⁰⁵ Of the so far 38 CSDP missions and operations no more than a few have been carried out as EU-only, such as the ongoing EUMM Georgia, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUNAVFOR MED.²⁰⁶

Furthermore, despite the fact that the numbers of outside and total contributors per operation have significantly dropped since the ‘baptizing-by-fire’ period, the CSDP

204. There are plenty of referent documents on this topic. See for instance European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Annex I, Santa Maria da Feira.

205. For more information and non-exhaustive lists of third party involvement in CSDP operations see Tardy, “Getting Third States on Board;” and Panos Koutrakos, *The EU Common Security and Defence Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 192-93.

206. In this context, while most third-country contributions have been limited to “less than 20 staff,” some CSDP partners deserve being singled out. Canada, Turkey, Norway, and Switzerland are the first that come to mind as they have become regular participants in EU CM, with nine, six, eleven, and eight relevant deployments thus far, respectively. Other countries have timely responded to capability or force generation gaps in the wake of particular CSDP operations. For instance, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, and Cyprus helped close the gap in airlift capabilities during Operation Artemis. More recently, Georgia has been praised for providing 100 troops to EUFOR RCA. Tardy, “Getting Third States on Board,” 1- 2, 4; Giegerich, *European Military Crisis Management*, 7-30; and Francois Ducrotté, “EU Mission to the Central African Republic – EUFOR CAR Bangui (Part II),” *ISIS Europe Blog*, accessed September 15, 2015, <https://isiseurope.wordpress.com/2014/02/25/eu-mission-eufor-car/>.

partnership circle has been steadily enlarging.²⁰⁷ It currently counts 31 countries that can be divided into four institutional and/or geopolitical groupings: EU candidates and aspirants (8) accompanied by Switzerland as an EFTA member, non-EU NATO allies (6) plus Australia and New Zealand as “part...of the ‘global West,’”²⁰⁸ the majority of BRICS (3) with China and India “yet to participate,” and a variety of other African, Asian, and Latin American partners (13).²⁰⁹ Seen from a broader perspective, the circle is even larger with several governments cooperating on an ad hoc basis with Brussels on counter-piracy in the context of EUNAVFOR Atalanta.²¹⁰ To date, 17 of the 31 formal partner countries have signed a so-called Framework Participation Agreement (FPA); the key instrument in the post-2004 process of institutionalization of CSDP partnerships.²¹¹ These FPAs make just a small portion of the body of law generated in a CSDP context, with the latter currently incorporating about 100 agreements.²¹² Beyond this, many security and defence dialogues have been developed with partners (e.g. the Panel on CSDP within the Eastern Partnership).²¹³ What is more, by taking advantage of another aspect of the CSDP’s inclusiveness on a tactical level, five European partners, one of

207. See HR for FASP/VP, “Final Report,” 4, 6-7. In 2013, Baroness Ashton noted this trend drawing attention to “an increased number of security and defence dialogues with partners.”

208. Pierre Minard, “Partners from a Large Island: Australia and CSDP,” EU ISS Alert No. 24, Paris, April 30, 2015, p. 1, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/partners-from-a-large-island-australia-and-csdp/>.

209. For a comparison see Tardy, “Getting Third States on Board,” 2-3. As in Tardy’s analysis, EU candidates and non-EU NATO allies can be rightly considered a single Western geopolitical grouping.

210. The EU has been coordinating its maritime effort off the coast of Somalia with at least 12 countries. Four of them (Russia, Malaysia, Philippines, and South Korea) are already formal CSDP partners unlike the remaining eight (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Egypt, the Seychelles, India, China, Japan) which are yet to acquire such status. See “Partner Countries Involvement in CSDP Mission and Operations,” EEAS, accessed June 20, 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/csdp_partnership_2000px.pdf.

211. This includes all EU candidates and aspirants (5+3) and all non-EU NATO allies (6) at the present, plus Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Columbia, and South Korea. For a comparison see Tardy, “Getting Third States on Board,” 1-2.

212. For detailed information on the legal dimension of CSDP operations see Koutrakos, *Common Security and Defence Policy*, 183-209; and Tardy, “Getting Third States on Board.”

213. HR for FASP/VP, “Final Report,” 4, 6-7.

which has recently become an EU member, have contributed troops and military assets to five different EU BGs.²¹⁴

In spite of this, Brussels' enthusiasm and past effort to materialize the Euro-Atlantic buzzword "working/engaging with partners"²¹⁵ seem to have been insufficient to build a highly credible partnership network in defence and security. Compared to NATO's PfP program, CSDP partnerships are said to be "limited in scope," "loosely institutionalised," and thus of "little visibility." Moreover, they have proven to engender, by their very design (which places the EU in a sort of superior position protecting its decision-making autonomy at all times), "regular [partner] complaints" based not only on procedural issues and impracticalities (e.g. late access to operational planning documents) but also on a feeling of subordination and restricted freedom of engagement.²¹⁶ In response to such criticism, relevant CSDP structures are now "looking into ways to address the problem" fully aware that there can only be palliative remedies for inherent shortfalls. Thus, whilst the EEAS is focusing on the idea of "privileged cooperation with a selection of third countries," expert(s) from the autonomous EU ISS are proposing maximization of the impact of all CSDP partnerships by upgrading their predominantly "technical" nature to a political level.²¹⁷

The above is to serve as a prelude to the third determinant of the EU/CSDP's multilateral approach to global security: differentiation and qualitative gradation of its security and defence partnerships. This applies at two levels: partner countries and partner organizations. At level one, the Union aims at building special all-encompassing

214. See Tardy, "Getting Third States on Board," 2.

215. HR for FASP/VP, "Final Report," 2-3, 5.

216. Tardy, "Getting Third States on Board," 1-2, 4.

217. Ibid., 4. See also European Commission, "European Agenda on Security," 4.

ties with ‘the Big Four’ consisting of Turkey, Russia, China, and the US,²¹⁸ while also engaging in a more-or-less privileged way other important democratic actors such as India, Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and South Africa.²¹⁹ These targeted strategic partnerships are quite distinct from one another, including with regard to the CSDP. Looking, for instance, at the top echelon, unlike China and Russia, Turkey and the US are “singled out [primarily by Atlanticists]...as crucial partners in the EU’s efforts to combine its regional and global ambitions.”²²⁰ Ankara, as well known, has long been facing what it considers an unacceptable Franco-German proposal for a privileged partnership with a sound CSDP component instead of a full EU membership.²²¹ Moving apparently away from the traditional concept of EU-Turkey relations, the balanced, Euro-Atlanticist EGS urges Brussels to agree on “an enhanced political partnership” with the Turks “even before [their] EU accession.” Such “renewed partnership” should *inter alia* bring about “deeper cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy, including for example a cooperation agreement between

218. See EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 3, 10-14.

219. See Ibid., 12-4; European Council, European Security Strategy; Daniel Kliman and Richard Fountaine, “Global Swing States and European Strategy,” EGS Project, accessed June 22, 2015, <http://www.globalstrategy.eu/>.

220. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 13.

221. For more information on this controversial proposal and the Turkish reaction to it see Saban Kardas, “Merkel and Sarkozy Call for Privileged Partnership Angers Turkey,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6, no. 92 (May 2009): n.p., http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34983#.VhBatvIViko; and Ecehan Sakarya, *Privileged Partnership: Is Turkey the Ugly Duckling? An Analysis of Privileged Partnership Proposal and Franco-German Discourses on Turkey's EU Membership* (Saarbrücken, Germany: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2012). See also Schockenhoff and Kiesewetter, “Strengthening Europe’s Ability to Act,” 1-2, 8-9. It is hard to overlook the fact that the Franco-German offer is fully consistent with the traditional vision of Europe espoused over the centuries by Sully, Saint-Pierre, Rousseau (see Chapter 1), Tsar Alexander I, and many others, including today’s conservative Europeanists and Continentalists. According to such vision, Europe should remain a Christian fortress treating its immediate neighbourhood mainly as an instrumental buffer zone and integrating the neighbouring Mohammedan powers only to the extent necessary to preserve its own peace and welfare. It follows without saying that contemporary, US/UK-backed Turkey, just like the Ottomans once, could hardly hope to enjoy more than an associated status in a European body politic and defence.

Turkey and the European Defence Agency...enhanced participation in EU civilian and military missions [and] A shared approach to the strategic neighbourhood...”²²²

As for renewing and strengthening the Union’s special bond with its “only global partner,”²²³ expectations are running high on both sides of the Atlantic, yet in a somewhat divergent way. Whereas the continental, German-led Europeanists are increasingly pushing for an EU/CSDP-US/NATO partnership on equal footing, the still predominant Euro-Atlanticists are struggling to preserve the US/NATO paternalistic grip over Europe in general. Against such background, the process of reinventing the world’s “deepest bi-continental association” in the form of ‘a new Atlantic community’ is well under way, with the currently negotiated Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) being envisioned as “the first building block.”²²⁴ What remains to be added once/if this block has successfully been put in place is a “more robust” politico-security component based on an “overarching transatlantic compact identifying security priorities and establishing new forms of burden- and responsibility-sharing.”²²⁵ Such EU/CSDP-US/NATO meta-arrangement “would require the creation of a high-level political consultative mechanism” (“Atlantic Community Council,” see *Figure 7*) composed of “the presidents of the United States, the European Council and the European Commission and, when relevant, the secretary general of NATO.”²²⁶

222. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 3, 10-11; and Schockenhoff and Kiesewetter, “Strengthening Europe’s Ability to Act,” 1-2, 8-9.


223. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 3.

224. *Ibid.*, 3, 12, 18.

225. *Ibid.*, 13.

226. *Ibid.*, 3, 12-13.

Figure 7. *The Prospective Transatlantic Compact*



Turning to level two, CSDP partner organizations can be divided in at least three echelons. No doubt, positioned at the very top are the UN and NATO, two security actors with whom the EU seeks to build “an inter-organisational epistemic community” that would eventually share “a common inter-organisational strategic culture.”²²⁷ Just below the perceived strategic triumvirate operate the OSCE and the Council of Europe as European organizations of “particular significance,”²²⁸ especially when there is a need for ‘softer’ security cooperation that puts an emphasis on the humanitarian dimension of a given crisis, while also enabling covert intelligence activities. The third echelon has been ‘reserved’ for non-European regional integrations (the African Union, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, and others) that can “make an important contribution to a more orderly world.”²²⁹

This type of ranking, which often pops up implicitly in relevant documents, pinpoints to the prudential asymmetric character of “effective multilateralism.” Such character is destined to be controversial, not least because of the absence of any appropriate link to rising security actors such as “the Russian NATO” or the China-led Shanghai

227. Koops, *European Union as an Integrative Power*, 312, 351, 374.

228. European Council, *European Security Strategy*, 9.

229. *Ibid.*

Cooperation Organization (SCO).²³⁰ Seen from a purely geostrategic perspective, it reflects an excessively pro-Western posture, which is not quite ideal for an actor occupying a central position in the world and aiming to prosper in “a new age of empires” as a global multilateral power.²³¹ Moreover, its politico-technical expediency is pervasive, putting even the closest CSDP partners at a relative disadvantage.

Theoretically, effective multilateralism can be viewed as “the EU’s own, distinct and more demanding [i.e. advanced] version of [the 1990s’ concept of] ‘interlocking’ or ‘mutually reinforcing institutions.’”²³² In practice, however, the EU/CSDP has largely demonstrated “shrewd inter-organisationalism,” not to say opportunism, “advancing [mainly] its own” capabilities, operational performance, and “geltung”/actor significance.²³³ There is an abundance of evidence in this context, from the fact that the Union has asked for NATO’s assistance through Berlin Plus on no more than two occasions (out of about 13), and only in the early, critical stage of the CSDP’s development, to “the severe adverse effects” (“resource drain,” “prestige rivalries”) that the EU BGs had on the UN Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which was therefore terminated in 2009, to the EU/CSDP’s further “gravitational pull” and discreet competition with NATO that had entailed certain marginalization of the NATO Response Force up until the beginning of the current Ukraine crisis.²³⁴

230. “Russian NATO” is a common reference to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

231. Hristijan Ivanovski, “The Emerging World and Bülow’s Geopolitical Vision: No (Use of) ‘Experiments’ with Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy in the 21st Century,” CDSS Commentary, Winnipeg, April 2013, http://www.iaffairscanada.com/wp-content/uploads/CDSS-commentary_The-Emerging-aWorld-and-B%3%83%C2%BClow%C3%A2%E2%82%AC%E2%84%A2s-Geopolitical-Vision_Final-1.pdf.

232. Koops, *European Union as an Integrative Power*, 64, 82, 90, 187. For NATO’s, OSCE’s, and the UN’s versions of this concept see Ibid., 59, 61-64, 82, 90, 177, 187, 286, 420.

233. Ibid., 11, 14, 25, 39, 49, 142, 386, 391, 394, 426, 430, 438, 441, 490; and Joachim Koops and Johannes Varwick, “The European Union and NATO: ‘Shrewd Interorganizationalism’ in the Making?,” in *The European Union and International Organizations*, ed. K.E. Jørgensen (London/New York: Routledge, 2009), 101-30.

234. Koops, *European Union as an Integrative Power*, 16, 179, 249-52, 278, 352, 395, 412-13, 421, 424, 429, 438. In this context, it can be argued that even genuine European military formations have become victims of the CSDP’s

Thus, although the Union in principle “support[s] all...UN peace-keeping operations,” including through its CSDP (e.g. DRC, Chad, the Central African Republic, Sudan/Darfur, Kosovo, Somalia, and Mali),²³⁵ it is often accused of having capitalized on the UN mandate without equally reinforcing the UN or any other security institution. Having early accepted the role of logistical depot for EU military crisis management, NATO is particularly sensitive to this issue, especially as it still remains the supreme guarantor of European security. For all the accommodations made by the Europeans in terms of preserving NATO primacy, and for all the EU/CSDP - US/NATO coordination over the past 12 years, the Atlantic Alliance does not feel comfortable sharing the same theater with the EU, even if the latter has deployed just a complementary CSDP civilian mission.²³⁶

Unfortunately, these and similar concerns will be hard to address in the future as they also relate to a subtle element of superiority. Take for instance the ultimate goal of the post-modern EU empire: consolidating itself and gradually imposing its own model on other macro regions, including North America!²³⁷ So, with effective multilateralism ultimately aiming at “region [and institution]-building” as well as “inter-regionalism,”²³⁸ the CSDP has a large role to play in indirect responses to crises. Under the trendy umbrella concept “capacity building,” the CSDP is to provide civil-military backing (expertise and advice, assets, operational support) to both “partner organisations [e.g. the

advancement. For instance, following the introduction of the EU BG concept, the EUROFOR was dissolved having been first temporarily transformed into a BG.

235. European Council, Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 11.

236. EUPOL Afghanistan has been the first and thus far the only CSDP mission deployed in a theater subject to NATO intervention

237. See Cooper, “The Post-Modern State” in Leonard, *Reordering the World*, 11-20; “The New Liberal Imperialism,” Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, *Maritime Dimension of CSDP*, 22; and EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 3, 16-7.

238. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 3, 16-17; and European Council, Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 11.

UN, the African Union] and third states [e.g. “in South Asia, Africa, and our southern neighbourhood”].”²³⁹

3.8. Conclusion

A European strategy for security and defence does exist, at least in a fragmented, embryonic form. One way to think of it is to see it as analogically comparable to the UK constitution: not being a single compact document does not make it non-existent, but rather a strategy in a material sense, developing steadily, albeit unevenly, in three standard civil-military domains.

This chapter thus deconstructs the myth about ‘the lack of strategic vision/thinking’ on the part of Europe. Indeed, European peoples may have been underinformed or utterly resistant, and their leaders reluctant, often demonstrating insufficient commitment along with infamous incoherence. But, there has hardly ever been such issue as a lacking vision among CSDP planners. Over the years, and through a number of documents predicated or complementing the currently reviewed ESS, they have laid the grounds for a comprehensive strategic concept, global in scope and comparable to NATO’s in multiple respects. On a think-tank level, they have even managed to produce a quasi-official grand strategy whose value nonetheless remains debatable given that such an effort should have perhaps followed the formulation of a full-fledged CSDP white paper.²⁴⁰

Hence, the essential dilemma here is not the existence of something yet-to-be adopted in a concise form, but rather the latter’s nature and prospects. As argued throughout this chapter, the emerging European strategy for security and defence is a

239. HR for FASP/VP, “Final Report,” 2-3; and European Council, Report on the Implementation of the ESS, 4.

240. Heather A. Conley, “Reflections on a European Global Strategy,” EGS Project, accessed June 22, 2015, <http://www.globalstrategy.eu/>; and Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 128.

product of compromise reflecting inevitably the dialectical tension between Europeanism and Atlanticism. Assuming that the EU will survive beyond the ongoing crisis, strategists around the world are presently keen to discern which elements, Europeanist (homeland security and defence, global civil-military engagement based on an autonomous approach) or Atlanticist (a functionally and geographically limited CSDP as a junior partner fully committed to a subsidiary role, complementary crisis management in the EU neighbourhood, and aggressive liberal internationalism instead of a more moderate and, perhaps, more rational approach to global governance), will predominate in the future CSDP and grand-strategic documents. That is, to what extent Berlin will take control of itself and Brussels by further suppressing Washington and London.

Since the Franco-German-led EU continues to walk the road of ambiguity insisting on greater strategic emancipation, all options are open. To realize what the future may hold it is enough to recall a couple of points recently made by Stratfor CEO George Friedman: “Should it choose to do so [Europe]...could become a military rival to the United States.”²⁴¹ “Now, whoever can tell me what the Germans are gonna do is gonna tell me about the next 20 years of history.”²⁴²

241. George Friedman, “Europe in 2013: A Year of Decision,” Stratfor Geopolitical Weekly, January 3, 2013, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/europe-2013-year-decision?utm_source=freelistf&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20130103&utm_term=gweekly&utm_content=title&elq=676993626f3d48c8a3a52d58eb9f295d.

242. Friedman, “Europe: Destined for Conflict?”

TOWARDS A COMMON DEFENCE FOR EUROPE: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?

So, what is the CSDP all about? One can hardly rely on the flashy, stereotypical euphemisms disseminated by the creators of European strategic culture, whether ‘constructivists’ or adapted orthodox strategists. These are fully immersed in the story they tell about a new, European way of war by a new, distinct actor, namely a ‘post-modern’ normative empire and a unique security provider seeking to project stability as well as power, mainly in its proximate neighbourhood, but also further afield, as the best way to defend its global interests and post-Westphalian nature against the (pre)modern ‘jungle’ out there, while normally contributing to “a better world.”¹ On the other hand, (neo)realist skepticism of the perplexing CSDP ‘paper tiger,’ which will purportedly never be able to demonstrate military prowess unless derived from a full-fledged federation, is intrinsically limited and no alternative at all.²

Obviously, EU/CSDP planners have put in an incredible effort to produce both a common denominator for 27+ strategic cultures and a perceived alternative to US

1. See Cooper, “The Post-Modern State” in Leonard, *Reordering the World*, 11-20; “The New Liberal Imperialism,” European Council, European Security Strategy; Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 13-15, 20-21, 24-35; Mary Kaldor and Marlies Glasius eds., *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* (London: Routledge, 2006), quoted in Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 201-2; Helen Dexter, “New War, Good War and the War on Terror: Explaining, Excusing and Creating Western Neo-interventionism,” *Development and Change* 38, no. 6 (2007): 1055-71, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00446.x; High Level Task Force, *Reshaping EU-US Relations: A Concept Paper*, (Paris/Berlin: Notre Europe-Jacques Delors Institute, 2010), http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Etude75-EU-US_Relations-en_01.pdf; Lasheras *et al.*, *Security and Defence White Paper*, 4, 7, 13, 34; and HR for FASP/VP, “Final Report,” 2-4.

2. See Rynning, “Towards a Strategic Culture,” 479-96, quoted in Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 181-82.

strategy.³ As a result, the CSDP narrative has been predominantly institutionalist (liberal) and constructivist.

This is not to suggest that the world has not changed since the establishment of the European Community as its first supranational structure and that Brussels still lives in the heyday of European integration. Nor is it to imply that the current CSDP narrative is anachronous and totally flawed. On the contrary, the present CSDP indeed is a sort of a nascent, politically incoherent, administratively entangled, strategically hybrid (comprehensive/integral/civil-military), delicate, and fairly post-modern phenomenon. Strategically and militarily, it is mainly a forward-postured, expeditionary firefighting entity, widely perceived as less battle-oriented and reluctant to pursue large-scale high-intensity endeavors.⁴ In terms of strategic culture, it is mostly inspired by a soft-power approach and the principles of humanitarianism, liberal internationalism, multilateralism, inter-organizationalism, and UN supremacy. While presently compatible with NATO, the CSDP is designed to be both a legitimate global governance tool seeking to project stability as well as power, primarily within the ring around Europe, and an auxiliary booster of EU homeland security and defence. Its military dimension was recently stagnant, until the operation in Mali, and is still elusive to many, particularly across the Atlantic.

As for the future, it is difficult to predict which specific road the CSDP will take over the long term. Mindful of this, Howorth maintains a cautious and largely conformist

3. For a summary of the European perspective on US strategy and the controversial Bush doctrine see Independent Task Force, *European Defence*, 29-35. For the EU's post-2003 effort towards shaping a distinctly European strategic paradigm see Kaldor and Glasius eds., *Human Security Doctrine*, quoted in Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 201-2; and Dexter, "New War," 1058.

4. See Stefano Silvestri, "The Gradual Path to a European Defence Identity," in Vasconcelos, *European Defence in 2020?*, 80. Referring to the still passive EU BGs, Silvestri states:

"It is easy to imagine how difficult is for the EU to deploy anything identified from the beginning with the word 'battle.'"

stance, describing the CSDP as being set over the mid-term to evolve “along the pathway, implicit in its infancy, natural in gestation, unique in genre, and sui generis in purpose.”⁵

According to the overarching evolutionist approach of this thesis, and based on the concepts, trends, and findings presented in the previous chapters, it is plausible to see the present form of European defence merely as a transient stage. Like its pre-2009 ESDP prototype, the former ESDI, or some earlier precursors, today's CSDP is merely an ephemeral concept to be superseded, at a proper time, by a more advanced form, if not by the common defence itself. However defined, the CSDP's present status and strategic orientation does not undermine the underlying, long-term trend captured in this thesis. It took centuries for the (pre-) Enlightenment idea of common European defence to turn into a practical, long-term process of European defence integration. CSDP belongs to the late phase of that process. Aside from historical patterns, whatever the ‘post-modern’ character of CSDP currently is, it would face serious pressures in an emerging era of empires, as well as resistance should it insist on softly reproducing post-Westphalian structures beyond Europe or copying US Wilsonianism in boots in its own way. Plus, in the new multipolar era, the EU/CSDP framework would certainly remain inefficient unless further adapted to a state-like pyramid, which does not have to be a full-fledged federal state as suggested by (neo)realists. In any case, the need for further centralization and rationalization (streamlining, non-duplication) is long overdue in the EU in general and the CSDP in particular.

EU leaders are very much aware of this as they expect the issue of political and strategic coherence to become much more pressing in the coming years;⁶ hence their

5. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 12.

6 See EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 3-6.

increasingly frequent depiction of CSDP as “the weakest link/spot” in the Eurointegration project,⁷ followed by calls for “a change in mindset” and “a paradigm change.”⁸ In other words, the EU’s organizational post-modernism, with all its horizontal structures, networks and detached cells, can hardly escape Robert Michels’ “oligarchical tendencies” and modern centralist hierarchy if it is to produce efficiency and a credible civil-military output.⁹ The application of the principle of bottom-up initiatives and voluntary contributions to European defence (participation in CSDP operations, force generation conferences, the creation and use of BGs, adding air, land, and naval modules to BGs from single-service RR mechanisms) is likely to be revised in this context, even though the creators of European strategic culture still take pride in this, basically forced solution as a precedent, quite distinct from the respective practices in NATO and national defence systems.

Unlike its essentially Atlanticist ESDI alternative, the post-1992 EU security and defence policy has always been about constructing a full-fledged common defence with all the contemporary civil-military attributes. Common defence is actually part of a consistently reaffirmed EU treaty clause which has nonetheless evolved after Maastricht. As such, over the past two decades, it has silently transformed from a remote constitutional option which “might in time” come to life (1992) to an assertive strategic

7. CEPS Task Force, *More Union in European Defence*, CEPS Report (Brussels: CEPS in co-op with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2015), 1, <https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/TFonEuropeanDefence.pdf>; and Daniela Vincenti, “EPP Leaders Bang Drum for European Army,” EurActiv, October 17, 2015, <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/epp-leaders-bang-drum-european-army-318571>.

8. Vincenti, “EPP Leaders Bang Drum;” and EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 6.

9. Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (New York: Collier, 1962).

goal that “will” come true “when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides.” (2003/4, 2007).¹⁰

Unfortunately, this constitutional concept has long been a taboo in public appearances of EU leaders, of course, with a few, notable exceptions involving mainly Franco-German officials and security experts.¹¹ Typically associated with the vague idea of European army, which has until recently been denied by Brussels,¹² the notions of common defence and common Union defence policy are yet to be examined within a serious, comprehensive, and creative debate. So far, the incoherent CSDP community has not found enough strength and courage to free itself from national defence reflexes and ‘NATO first’ instincts in order to approach the subject more seriously. Instead, looking at the CSDP’s ambitions and prospects in a ten-year perspective (2020+), there has been, at least until recently, a relatively strong and soothing consensus among the first-echelon EU/CSDP experts that there is neither present likelihood nor evident necessity of a European army rising on the horizon.¹³

Quite understandably, today’s mainstream CSDP narrative avoids taking into account what George Friedman identifies as 20-year cycles that (can) turn the world on

10. European Union, Treaty on European Union, Preamble and Articles B and J.4(1); and Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 42(2) (ex Article 17 TEU), 2012.

11. See for instance Stefan Nicola, “Analysis: EU Dreams of Common Army,” United Press International, March 27, 2007, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2007/03/27/Analysis-EU-dreams-of-common-army/UPI-48511175029802/. Given that the concept of European army has been part of their party program for years, the German Social-Democrats (SPD) have arguably gone the farthest in challenging the taboo.

12. Since 1989, the ideas and speculations on a European army have sensationally been circulated by media and observers in at least three consecutive waves. For the EU’s official and reiterated claim in the aftermath of Saint-Malo that the ESDP/ERRF was not meant to grow into a European army see European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Annex VI, Presidency Report on the ESDP, Annex I to Annex IV, “Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration,” Nice, 2000; Presidency Conclusions, Annex II, “Declaration on the Operational Capability of the Common European Security and Defence Policy,” Laeken, December 14-15, 2001, p. 27, http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/background/docs/laeken_concl_en.pdf; and references to Alain Richard, a former French defence minister, in Hunter, *NATO’s Companion – or Competitor* (especially p. 94n2).

13. For pre-2010 expert skepticism towards the idea of a European army in a strict sense or the building of such force in the foreseeable future, see Trevor C. Salmon and Alistair J.K. Shepherd, *Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003); Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 39-42; Vasconcelos, *European Defence in 2020?*, 19, 45, 83, 91, 94, 98-99; 156; and Ojanen, “European Defence,” in Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, *European Security*, 169.

its head.¹⁴ If applied to the CSDP's prospects, Friedman's 'law' on totally unexpected tectonic shifts in world politics would imply the examination of two extreme scenarios: CSDP as a military monster in the hands of an EU hegemon and an EU break-up. While the former seems unlikely from present perspective, the latter does not seem as impossible as it did only a few of years ago. However, given that underlying this work is an assumption of long-term EU survival, it is useful to identify the future CSDP trends having in mind the established, post-2012 CSDP priorities (operational effectiveness and global visibility, capabilities, and European defence industry).

First, a global strategy for CFSP/CSDP is to be delivered by the summer of 2016.¹⁵ This document, while expected to identify the CSDP priorities much more clearly than its predecessors, to foster a European strategic culture, and to enable stronger and more resolute CSDP action in the future,¹⁶ will most likely, given the broad CFSP framework, fail the expectations of selective orthodox strategists. In any case, the EU will have to wait for both its first concise white paper on defence and its official grand strategy covering its entire external action. The future may also bring about rebalancing of the EU's predominantly institutionalist/constructivist orientation if CSDP strategists managed to act upon and replicate their belief that "the EU's soft power must be matched by collective hard power and a more efficient use of our €210 billion yearly defence spending."¹⁷

Second, whatever the possible future changes or adaptations of the CSDP strategic narrative, those predisposed to disliking the Union's comprehensive approach should get

14. George Friedman, *The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century* (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 1-10 (3).

15. European Council, Conclusions, EUCO 22/15, Brussels, June 25-26, 2015, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2015/06/25-26/>.

16. EPSC and Barnier, "In Defence of Europe," 9; and CEPS Task Force, *More Union in European Defence*, i.

17. EPSC and Barnier, "In Defence of Europe," 11, quoted in Vincenti, "EPP Leaders Bang Drum."

used to it. Unlike powerful exogenous forces, no amount of theoretical Kaganism¹⁸ will ever make Europe assimilate its own thinking and way of war. Featuring both a moral and utilitarian dimension, the “unique and distinctive” comprehensive approach has always been praised by EU leaders as being “ahead of its time.”¹⁹ As such, it is most likely to be further cemented in the European strategic conception. Consider for instance the recent recommendation by Solana and its high-level reflection group for using “the military [CSDP] as a catalyst for an integral approach to the performance of the [Petersberg] treaty tasks;”²⁰ just another major call for translating “theoretical comprehensiveness [as] a widely admitted strength of the EU...into actionable practice.”²¹

Third, seeing the underutilized post-Lisbon treaty mechanisms as “a roadmap to common defence,”²² the Franco-German-led grouping will continue, despite British reluctance, to push for establishing within the Union a comprehensive form of PSCD originally known (following the 2003 ‘Chocolate Summit’) as UESD/EUSD but today also referred to as European Defence Union (EDU).²³ According to the Continentalist

18. See Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” *Policy Review*, no. 113 (June-July 2002): 1-28, <http://www.hoover.org/research/power-and-weakness>; *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003); and “On Power and Weakness,” Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., March 30, 2012, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/03/30-europe-kagan>.

19. Council of Ministers of the EU, Council Conclusions on CSDP, 8971/15, Brussels, May 18, 2015, p. 2, para. 2, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/05/18-council-conclusions-csdp/>; and Javier Solana, Preface to *European Defence in 2020?*, ed. Vasconcelos, 7.

20. CEPS Task Force, *More Union in European Defence*, i.

21. Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 5, 11-12.

22. EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 6-7.

23. See *Ibid.*, 7-8; Vincenti, “EPP Leaders Bang Drum;” Peter Foster and Matthew Holehouse, “Merkel ‘Expects Cameron to Back EU Army in Exchange of Renegotiation,’” *Telegraph*, September 12, 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/11861247/Merkel-expects-Cameron-to-back-EU-army-in-exchange-for-renegotiation.html>; Ursula von der Leyen, quoted in Jack Doyle, “Our Goal Is an EU Army Says Germany’s Defence Chief: Fears Country Will Back Commission Chief’s Call for Force So It Is Taken More Seriously on World Stage,” *Daily Mail*, May 4, 2015, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3066687/Our-goal-EU-army-says-Germany-s-defence-chief-Fears-country-commission-chief-s-call-force-taken-seriously-world-stage.html>; CEPS Task Force, *More Union in European Defence*, ii; and Jean-Claude Juncker, “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change,” Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission, Strasbourg, July 15, 2014, p. 10, http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelines_en.pdf. PESCO is another name/acronym for PSCD.

vision, this opt-in, multilateral structure should become “a vector of the EU as a global actor.”²⁴ Once established, it would not only constitute a leading defence core ready for greater cooperation on various projects (e.g. joint armament, training), but could moreover lead to deeper integration among participants including the creation of permanent OHQ and (partially) integrated armed forces, which could further assume responsibility for the more demanding CSDP tasks and thus represent the EU globally.²⁵

Fourth, PSCD or not, the US/NATO can no longer hope to keep EU military planning under one transatlantic roof.²⁶ The old controversy aside, the EU’s lack of permanent contingency planning is all the more viewed as “absurd,”²⁷ and all major continental EU members (including even Poland to some extent) are in favour of establishing a Brussels-based, standing OHQ based on the existing EU OPCEN.²⁸

Fifth, as EU members continue to cooperate on capabilities development within both the EU and NATO, in various ways (bilateral, multilateral, under EDA, OCCAR, or NATO agencies), and through four different forms (joint development and procurement, pooling and sharing/smart defence, specializing, reducing redundancies), *three* projects are crucial for the CSDP’s future. Starting with the recently most debated, a “thorough review” of the BG concept is expected to make the so-far-unemployed EU RR units more flexible and readily deployable in various contingencies.²⁹ Experts here focus mainly on two solutions: modularity, meaning ‘opening up’ the current BG concept, though the

24. EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 8.

25. Ibid.; and Juncker, “New Start for Europe,” 10.

26. For such continuing and futile hopes see Judy Dempsey, “Time to End the EU-NATO Standoff,” Carnegie Europe, December 8, 2014, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=57423>; and Coffey, “Undermining NATO.”

27. Elmar Brok, quoted in Flora *et al.*, “UK, Central Europe Frown.”

28. See EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 4; Flora *et al.*, “UK, Central Europe Frown;” CEPS Task Force, *More Union in European Defence*, i; Waterfield, “David Cameron Fights off;” and Foreign Ministers Meeting, Joint Communiqué on the Common Security and Defence Policy, Paris, November 15, 2012, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/121114_Outcome_proposal_Final.pdf, quoted in Coffey, “Undermining NATO,” n3.

29. EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 2, 8-9.

latter is internally flexible to some extent, and tailoring it as required by a given crisis, including by adding additional land, naval, and air elements (modules), and addressing (by revising/upgrading the Athena mechanism or via innovative instruments) the financing issues regarding both potential BG deployments and other joint CSDP operations.³⁰

The second important line of capability development concerns Europe's most critical and long-standing shortfalls relative to strategic enablers and ISTAR. Based on the HR for FASP's 2013 CSDP Report and the subsequent European Council conclusions, the Union has prioritized work on air-to-air refueling (AAR), where the aim is to acquire, on a multinational basis, a sufficient number of multirole tanker transport (MRTT, A330) aircraft by 2020, hi-tech dual-use capabilities in areas such as strategic airlift (ongoing acquisition of A400M), remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS, 2020-2025), and governmental satellite communications (SATCOM, 2025), and facilitated access to high-resolution satellite imagery (HRSI).³¹ Priority has also been given to cyber defence, notably to "realistic deliverables" such as training and exercise, protection of EU/CSDP infrastructure, HQ, missions and operations, civil-military cooperation, and dual use RD/RT projects.³²

In light of the recent spy scandals among western allies and the underlying US-Germany divide, part of this work has, along with instinctive statements by EU officials, raised concerns in London and Washington, with some openly accusing Brussels of creating its own, powerful intelligence service in order to counteract the US and the

30. See EEAS (EUMS), Military Rapid Response Concept, 26-30; and Niklas Novaky, "EU Battlegroups after the Central African Republic Crisis: Quo Vadis?," *European Geostrategy* (blog, Vol.6, No. 26), April 2, 2014, <http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/04/eu-battlegroups-central-african-republic-crisis-quo-vadis/>.

31. HR for FASP/VP, "Final Report," 16-18; European Council, Conclusions, EUCO 217/13, pp. 5-6, para. 11.

32. HR for FASP/VP, "Final Report," 18; European Council, Conclusions, EUCO 217/13, p. 6, para. 11; and Council of Ministers of the EU, Cyber Defence Policy Framework.

latter's 'omnipresent' National Security Agency (NSA).³³ However, despite the official British and NATO opposition to the Union's pursuit for collectively owned ISTAR capabilities, which has been justified in a sense that "there can be no question of" the EU or NATO owning military assets,³⁴ the EDA-backed "budding cooperation" on a European, medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) moves forward.³⁵

The rationale behind all these moves on the part of Brussels is simple: the EU wants full strategic independence from the US over the long term.³⁶ Take for instance its decennial effort regarding the development and acquisition of dual-use next-generation space-based platforms (high-resolution earth observation satellites in particular). The Europeans are set to replace, by 2025, five current constellations of 12 satellites with state-of-the-art systems. Aside from proving its technological edge, some aspects and features of the EU's ongoing space programs (*Galileo* plus *EGNOS*,³⁷ *Copernicus*, and the space-related RD/RT component of *Horizon 2020*, all costing about €12 billion only for the period 2014-2020) are likely to provide it with strategic advantage over the other space powers. Complemented by *EGNOS*, Europe's first endeavour in the field of

33. See Bruno Waterfield, "EU Planning to 'Own and Operate' Spy Drones and an Air Force," *Telegraph*, July 26, 2013, <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/bruno-in-brussels-eu-unplugged/brusselsbruno/367/>; and "Brussels Demands 'EU Intelligence Service' to Spy on US," *Telegraph*, November 4, 2013, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10425418/Brussels-demands-EU-intelligence-service-to-spy-on-US.html>.

34. Waterfield, "David Cameron Fights off." It should be noted here that the EU/EDA is already in possession of some rare military assets such as a mobile laboratory for investigating artifacts of road-side bomb explosions. In the past, this capability was deployed to Afghanistan under a French lead. See EEAS, "Capabilities: The European Defence Agency Delivers Capabilities for Operations," *CSDP Newsletter* 11 (Winter 2010-2011): 25, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/110131_CSDP_Newsletter_gp_cwi_final.pdf.

35. EPSC and Barnier, "In Defence of Europe," 6; and Brooks Tigner, "EDA Kept to Indirect Role in MALE Initiative," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, July 14, 2015, <http://www.janes.com/article/53008/eda-kept-to-indirect-role-in-male-initiative>.

36. As the Brussels-based *Telegraph* correspondent put it:

"The[se] controversial proposals are a major move towards creating an independent EU military body with its own equipment and operations, and will be strongly opposed by Britain."

Waterfield, "Spy Drones and an Air Force."

37. *EGNOS* stands for European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service.

satellite navigation, *Galileo* is defined as a European version of the US Global Positioning System (*GPS*) and the Russian *GLONASS*, yet with two reported distinctions: greater precision and accuracy than that of the *GPS* (as far as Europe is concerned), with a “guaranteed global positioning service...under all but the most extreme circumstances,” and “better coverage” of Northern Europe and the Arctic due the specific positioning and orbital inclination of its satellites.³⁸

Besides *Galileo*, the EU’s and Germany’s declared interest in Arctic economic development and environmental security, as well as in polar maritime safety and SAR,³⁹ is also to be served by the European Commission-run *Copernicus* program. Known as *Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES)* prior to 2012, *Copernicus* encompasses a space segment of highly-capable *Sentinel* satellites, two of which have already been launched and are now providing high-resolution radar and optical imagery for land and ocean services. Once completed after 2021, the *Sentinel* constellation will provide user services in as many as six different domains including security.⁴⁰

All these space-related projects are geared at implementing a long-term vision that predates the formal establishment of ESP in 2007.⁴¹ According to such vision, the EU needs “autonomous access to space” and a “powerful space policy to face global challenges.”⁴² Its continuing attempt to absorb the European Space Agency (ESA) is

38. Maurer *et al.* “EU as an Arctic Actor?,” 31-32.

39. See Ibid. (in particular 17-20, 22-23, 32-33); and European Commission and HR for FASP/VP, Joint Communication, “Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: Progress since 2008 and Next Steps,” JOIN(2012) 19 final, Brussels, June 26, 2012, p. 2, http://eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/docs/join_2012_19.pdf.

40. See “Copernicus Programme Services,” Copernicus.eu, accessed November 23, 2015, http://www.copernicus.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Copernicus_Programme_Services.pdf.

41. See Council of Ministers of the EU and ESA Council, Resolution on the European Space Policy, May 22, 2007, http://esamultimedia.esa.int/docs/BR/ESA_BR_269_22-05-07.pdf.

42. European Commission, “EU Needs Powerful Space Policy to Face Global Challenges,” press release, April 26, 2007, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-575_en.htm?locale=en.

therefore inexorable,⁴³ and despite current difficulties, there is no reason to believe that Brussels will not eventually be as successful as with its past incorporation of the WEU.

The third crucial capability-related initiative is yet to be realized. As lately proposed by Barnier, Solana, and other high-profile CSDP strategists, the future PSCD/EDU should be underpinned by a ‘European Defence Semester’ modeled on the existing economic equivalent in order to guide and harmonize, through a genuine peer-review process, the participants’ national defence planning, budgets, and capability requirements.⁴⁴

Sixth, the ongoing work on defence and dual-use capabilities is only one way to stimulate the European defence industrial complex, quite insufficient for now. In order to maintain the competitive edge of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), CSDP planners have been pressing for the only three viable solutions: major joint capability development initiatives, a fully integrated European defence market, and increased and more structured spending on defence RD/RT. As for the first, mindful of the current lack of “significant armaments programmes in Europe,”⁴⁵ European Commission analysts (in consultation with Barnier) propose “ambitious projects” as part of the future PSCD-based EDU, such as “an integrated European Medical Command or a joint Helicopter Wing that would build on ongoing...(EDA)

43. See ESA Director General and the ESA Directors, *Agenda 2011* (Noordwijk, The Netherlands: ESA Communications, 2007), 25, 29, <http://www.esa.int/esapub/br/br268/br268.pdf>.

44. EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 8, 10; and CEPS Task Force, *More Union in European Defence*, ii. In 2011, Biscop, Coelmont, Howorth, Giegerich, and others proposed a similar concept, namely “a *Permanent Capability Conference* as a durable strategic-level platform for harmonization of national defence planning.”

“The Ghent Initiative therefore has to be a long-term process, and has to create a platform to launch new capability initiatives. This can be set up as a ‘permanent capability conference’ where the willing Member States engage in a durable *strategic-level* framework for systematic exchange of information on national defence planning, as a basis for consultation and top-down coordination, on a voluntary basis. This functions in effect as a peer review mechanism of national defence planning: provided with a bird’s eye view of all participants’ plans and intentions, Member States can then reliably assess the relevance of their national capabilities.”

Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 5, 27.

45. EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 6.

helicopter initiatives,” pooling and sharing in the areas of “logistics, transport, energy or other support services to generate positive spillover effects,” and “the creation of an air mobile rapid reaction capacity to complement the current Battlegroup concept.”⁴⁶

However, European strategists know quite well that if in the emerging multipolar era Europe is to compete with actors with a unitary military capacity in order to preserve its comfort and well-being (which implies decreasing the capability gap vis-à-vis the US in both technological and quantitative terms and avoiding a long-term scenario where the EDTIB would become inferior to its Russian, Chinese, or Indian counterparts, some of which are currently lagging by 10 years behind the former), even the most vigorous collaborative efforts would not suffice. Hence, the ultimate problem solver for the CSDP lies in fully opening up (towards one another) and fusing the 27+ national defence markets.

That said, in the years ahead Brussels will, regardless of the residual national protectionisms (e.g. a privileged status for the national aerospace and defence giants, indirect state aid and subsidies, “use of offset requirements” and other ‘smart’ circumventions of EU rules), continue to insist on a truly common European defence market.⁴⁷ Such level of integration can be attained only by full implementation by EU members of the Union’s regulatory framework on security and defence procurement and intra-Community defence transfers. The desired finality in this area is the formation of “world class transnational European groups” as superior regional and global aerospace and defence magnates (e.g. *BAE Systems*, *EADS/AIRBUS Group SE*, *Thales*, *KMW*, *Finmeccanica*), each backed by a network of highly-specialized small and medium

46. Ibid., 8.

47. Ibid., 6, 11.

enterprises (SMEs), as well as numerous private and university-based centres of excellence.⁴⁸ The ironic resemblance of such regional EDTIB clusters to a model of centrally planned, command economy could nonetheless present a real politico-psychological barrier, especially in those (post-communist) member-states with growing nationalism and anti-globalist sentiments.

Seventh, there already are clear indications that the post-2003 process of rebalancing the CSDP in functional terms is slowly moving away from legal texts and declarations to become more palpable in practice. More than eight months prior to the French historic invocation of Article 42(7) of TEU, the above-mentioned group of CSDP strategists led by Solana recommended that the Union should “Focus on a contribution to territorial defence complementary to NATO” and autonomous interventions in the strategic neighbourhood.⁴⁹ Obviously, the CM-oriented CSDP will be increasingly encroaching on ‘exclusive’ NATO territory in the future.

Finally, the EU/CSDP’s ongoing or intended “strategic upgrade” as explained hitherto must go hand in hand with procedural reforms and further defence institutional build-up.⁵⁰ This involves all three to four levels of the CFPS/CSDP mechanism (see *Figure 1*). First, recognizing the need for “improve[d] high-level decision-making” and “a top-down approach,”⁵¹ CSDP strategists recommend as follows: the introduction of a

48. Council of Ministers of the EU, Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities; European Commission, “Efficient Defence and Security Sector,” and EDA, A Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, Brussels, May 14, 2007, http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/strategy_for_the_european_defence_technological_and_industrial_base.pdf.

49. CEPS Task Force, *More Union in European Defence*, i. This was reaffirmed in a strategy paper adopted by the European People’s Party (EPP) Congress less than a month before the tragic Paris events:

“Moving beyond CSDP’s focus on post-conflict and low-intensity missions to being able to conduct territorial defence and higher intensity [sic].”

Vincenti, “EPP Leaders Bang Drum,” and Oli Smith, “European Leaders Admit EU ARMY Developing ‘Much Faster than People Believe,’” *Sunday Express*, October 17, 2015, <http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/612710/European-leaders-EU-ARMY-close-to-reality-Juncker>.

50. CEPS Task Force, *More Union in European Defence*, ii.

51. Ibid., ii; and EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 8.

biennial, defence-dedicated European Council meeting,⁵² a regular Defence Council,⁵³ at least within the future PSCD/EDU,⁵⁴ and to be preceded by an informal “ministerial forum for consultation and decision-making,”⁵⁵ “upgrading [SEDE]...to a fully fledged Committee,”⁵⁶ and strengthening the overall role of the European Parliament given its prospective exercise of political control over an integrated European armed force. This pursued “high-level political engagement” is also to take other forms (e.g. *ad hoc* initiatives, financial reforms).⁵⁷ For instance, in the field of EDTIB and capabilities development, there has been a “Call for an industry/government/institutions summit,” whereas in terms of budgeting there is awareness of the need to “Substantially increase levels of common funding for EU operations and elaborate alternative funding options for EDU member states (joint financing, trust funds).”⁵⁸

Below the CFSP/CSDP’s highest political echelon, Brussels faces a long-term need to “sharpen political coordination.”⁵⁹ Here, experts consider two general and self-evident solutions: first, greater coordinating power for the HR for FASP/VP, who should, among other things, moderate the future PSCD/EDU activities, ensure their consistency with those of EDA, EEAS, and the European Commission (e.g. on internal security, hybrid threats, defence market, RD/RT), and help preserve the CSDP’s overall coherence,⁶⁰ and second, a strengthened EEAS as a whole, with a greater coordination capacity vis-à-vis the Commission realm, clear responsibilities and chains of commands relative to EU

52. CEPS Task Force, *More Union in European Defence*, ii.

53. Ibid.; and EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 8.

54. EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 8.

55. CEPS Task Force, *More Union in European Defence*, ii.

56. Ibid.

57. EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 8.

58. CEPS Task Force, *More Union in European Defence*, ii.

59. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 3, 18-19.

60. Ibid., 19; and EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 8. According to the quasi-official EGS, the HR for FASP should also be permitted to make “a more assertive use of the scope of initiative.”

Delegations, and especially in crisis management,⁶¹ and what is more, an overarching joint intelligence architecture built around “a real *Intelligence Fusion and Analysis Centre*.”⁶²

Hence, at the operational level, progress has been sought in more developed, technically better equipped, and information-gathering EU Delegations,⁶³ as well as in EEAS-tied EU Special Representatives who “should be given greater responsibility to coordinate the EU’s presence in third countries.”⁶⁴ Priority is accordingly given to “The ongoing deployment of security experts in EU Delegations in...[ENP] countries and other targeted non-EU countries.”⁶⁵ Furthermore, Brussels is exploring the possibility of making “full use of the expertise of...law enforcement officials seconded to non-EU countries” and “posting EU agencies’ liaison officers and magistrates in key third countries.”⁶⁶

Despite the sensible and refined attitude of European publics and far-right and -left parties (Euroskeptics, anti-globalists, anti-imperialists, Russophiles), the EU officialdom generally upholds the idea of common European defence. It is very important to note that the official claim by Brussels in the course of the 2000s that CSDP was not meant to grow into a federal defence force concerned only the EU’s post-1999 defence capability development process, mainly the ERRF concept, not an eventual political decision on

61. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 18.

62. Ibid., 21; and Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 30-31. This powerful joint intelligence infrastructure has been envisioned “to serve as a secondary ‘failsafe’ net to those Member States with strong and widely present national...intelligence services” as well as to provide “access to prime information” for the others. It is to be based on the evolving INTCEN, which has “replace[d] the scattered poles of intelligence within the institutions,” but also on common ISTAR assets (RPAS, SATCOM), more developed and better equipped EU Delegations for HUMINT, SIGINT, and analytical purposes, “pooling of regional expertise within the EU system,” common threat assessments and perceptions, and “long-term trust-building efforts among national services.”

63. European Commission, “European Agenda on Security,” 4-5; EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 3, 18-19; and Biscop and Coelmont, eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 31. One aspect of the EU Delegations’ functional development refers to expanded consular services.

64. EGS Project, *Towards a European Global Strategy*, 19.

65. European Commission, “European Agenda on Security,” 4.

66. Ibid., 4-5.

common defence.⁶⁷ Although the common defence and single army concepts are not necessarily equivalent, the few successive, official promises by Brussels not to create a European army (may) have never been more than a soothing message; a temporary conformism reflecting Europe's unpreparedness and lack of determination to make such a radical strategic move.

In this sense, while the majority of top-tier CSDP experts still avoid or cautiously address the belittled Euro army issue, none of them ventures to deny the possibility of establishing a common European defence over the long term.⁶⁸ In their more or less ambiguous responses, they recognize such possibility at least implicitly.⁶⁹ This is also shared by neofunctionalists who draw attention to the gradual transfer of national sovereignty in security and defence to the EU level,⁷⁰

Things have unfolded rapidly and become clearer over the past few years. The global financial and economic crisis, along with the outcome of the Arab Spring, arguably ended the unipolar moment. Amid a deep Eurozone debt crisis and a river of socio-political problems all across Europe, Franco-German leaders (Chancellor Angela Merkel and former President Nicolas Sarkozy) suddenly saw an opportunity for further EU centralization. Meanwhile, referent proposals for a white paper on CSDP have addressed the question of EU collective defence more comfortably than their predecessors.⁷¹ On top of that, in his 2012 State of the Union address before the European Parliament, President

67. See European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Annex VI, Presidency Report on the ESDP, Annex I to Annex IV, "Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration," Nice, 2000; and Presidency Conclusions, Annex II, "Declaration on the Operational Capability of the Common European Security and Defence Policy," Laeken, 2001, p. 27. The EU's official denial read: "This [process] does not involve the establishment of a European army" and "The development of military capabilities does not imply the creation of a European army."

68. See Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 39, 41; and Vasconcelos ed., *European Defence in 2020?*.

69. See Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 39, 41; and Henry Bentégeat, "What Aspirations for European Defence?," in Vasconcelos, *European Defence in 2020?*, 99.

70. See Ojanen, "European Defence," in Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, *European Security*, 169.

71. See Lasheras *et al.*, *Security and Defence White Paper*, 7; and Biscop and Coelmont eds., *Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP*, 19-21.

of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso re-launched the old, euphemistic idea of “a European federation of nation-states” (yet “not a superstate”) vindicated in the 1990s by famous Europeanists such as former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer.⁷² In a blunt speech, based on the premise that in a globalization era, “size matters” and the pooling and “sharing of sovereignty,” which “means more power, not less,” is a prerequisite for Europe to resist multipolar pressures and play its full role on the global stage, Barroso called for a number of important things, including “a political union, with a coherent foreign and defence policy,” CSDP capabilities, notably deployability, and a “truly collective defense planning,” insisting on

“a common approach to defense...because together we have the power, and the scale to shape the world into a fairer, rules based and human rights' abiding place.”⁷³

Since Barroso also announced that in early 2014 the Commission was to “present its outline for the shape of the future European Union,”⁷⁴ it is quite clear what Brussels, as opposed to London, has been aiming at, not least in terms of defence.

This is not to claim with high confidence that immense changes are about to follow in the EU, which will revolutionize CSDP. Given the historically proven success of the gradual Eurointegration under NATO (US) auspices,⁷⁵ it has always been hard to imagine the EU suddenly and radically shifting its conformist orientation and low defence profile by pursuing a hard-power strategy or a rapid military build-up. Moreover, European security experts have early realized that in the absence of a monolith threat, truly “serious

72. President of the European Commission, 2012 State of the Union Address; and “Fischer’s Reassurance against EU ‘Superstate’ Convinces Few,” The European Alliance of EU-Critical Movements (TEAM), accessed December 22, 2010, <http://archive-info.com/page/792797/2012-11-29/http://www.teameurope.info/node/36>.

73. President of the European Commission, 2012 State of the Union Address.

74. Ibid.

75. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy*, 258; and European Council, *European Security Strategy*, 1.

extended crises,” or a complete US withdrawal from Europe, the Union will continue to develop its CSDP capabilities slowly and steadily.⁷⁶

However, while the prolonged and multifaceted turmoil in Europe may not be exactly one of those serious extended crises necessitating an urgent military build-up, it has nonetheless compelled the Europeans to think more strategically about both CSDP and the EU as a whole. As a result, they are now being expected to finally embark on devising a concise CSDP strategy and addressing their most critical capability shortfalls. With a slight delay, the December 2012 European Council announced that its meeting in late 2013 would be dedicated to defence, which was to mark exactly eight years since the last such CSDP event (2005). On this occasion, the HR for FASP/VP was duly tasked to draft a CSDP report as part of the extensive preparatory activities for the 2013 defence summit. Having been released a few months prior to the summit, the said report, which elaborated upon three already prioritized areas of CSDP development, helped the European Council not only to establish specific CSDP priorities for the period ahead but also to mandate a thorough strategy review process led by the HR. This mobilization in Brussels at least partially, at an institutional level, confirms the thesis on the EU’s crisis-induced militarization.⁷⁷

Whatever the outcome of the EU’s current, crisis-induced dedication to CSDP, the Union will still have a long way to go to forge a common defence system. Until then, it will rely primarily on the NATO’ (US) umbrella. Unlike the majority of transatlantic experts, Henry Bontégeat is one of those who do not shy away from openly discussing the

76. Moore, “Too Much Information,” 72-6.

77. For the impact of crises on the EU’s political conduct and militarization see Ibid.; and Joschka Fischer, “Europe 2030: Global Power or Hamster on a Wheel?,” in *Europe 2030*, ed. Daniel Benjamin (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2010), 10, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/press/books/2009/europe2030/europe2030_chapter.pdf.

CSDP's long-term prospects in the field of collective defence; the long-standing bastion of NATO primacy. What is particularly impressive, however, is the way this French strategist apparently naively reveals an ironic situation; a potential long-term advance of the CSDP, ultimately on NATO's (US) account, and under NATO's own patronage! As he claims,

“...it would most likely be towards the very end of that process [before the European Council takes a decision establishing a common defence for Europe] that any missions would be carried out under the Lisbon Treaty's mutual assistance clause. Article V of the Washington Treaty, which binds us strongly together across the Atlantic, gives us the time, if we want it, to plan such mutual assistance with all the realism such a step requires.”⁷⁸

After all, if one is to believe in Europeanist predictions on the subject, being decades away from realizing an ancient, (pre-) Enlightenment idea could actually mean less than twenty years.

In an essay published in a 2010 Brookings Institution booklet entitled *Europe 2030*, while displaying a somewhat atypical pessimism regarding the EU's enlargement and global strategic role in a the mid-term perspective, Joschka Fischer makes an intriguing statement,⁷⁹ largely overlooked by those drawing on his 'dim' scenario.⁸⁰ Apart from pinpointing the real possibility of the incoherent and slowly militarizing EU remaining a “hamster in a wheel” in the next couple of decades, Fischer is confident that a common defence for Europe is possible sooner rather than later even without a coherent EU foreign policy let alone a full-fledged European federation:

“I doubt that Europe's malaise can be overcome before 2030... While the partial creation of a common defense system, along with a European army, is

78. Bentégeat, “What Aspirations?,” in Vasconcelos, *European Defence in 2020?*, 99.

79. Fischer, “Hamster on a Wheel?,” in Benjamin, *Europe 2030*, 1-10.

80. See for instance Gerald Knause, “A Proposal for Breaking the Macedonian Deadlock: A Matter of Trust,” European Stability Initiative, June 17, 2010, <http://www.esiweb.org/rumeliobserver/2010/06/17/a-proposal-for-breaking-the-macedonian-deadlock-the-issue-of-trust/>.

possible by 2030, a common foreign policy is not...At some point, crises and acute threats may force the Europeans to grow up quickly. Despite the financial crisis, Europe today does not lack economic strength, but rather the political will to act in unison.”⁸¹

Fischer’s argument for the feasibility of common defence prior to 2030 has been supported by the latest developments within and around the EU. Regardless of the continuing validity of his empathetic inference that at present “almost everything argues against Europe’s emergence as a world power,”⁸² the crisis shaking the old continent amid rising multipolar pressures presents a rare strategic opportunity recognized by many in Brussels, Berlin, and Paris. Having the potential to trump all other factors, over the past two to three years the growing outside pressures have actually led to a historic precedent; for the first time since 1992, top EU officials have self-initiatively brought up the common defence topic in public calling resolutely for the creation of a Euro army and/or related (e.g. intelligence, C², border guard) institutions.

Thus, in the Fall of 2013, shortly after the US-Germany spying scandal went public, Viviane Reding, the then EU Justice Commissioner and VP, proposed the setting up of “a European Intelligence Service by 2020” as “a counterweight” to the NSA.⁸³ This proposal and related developments (e.g. the US/NATO-backed UK opposition to further defence integration) heated up the atmosphere in the lead-up to the defence-dedicated, December

81. Fischer, “Hamster on a Wheel?,” in Benjamin, *Europe 2030*, 10. The belief that a European army is possible even before the execution of a true CFSP/CSDP might be confusing to many. The explanation, however, lies in the fact that in the current constellations leading Europeanists see the potential common defence system as a prerequisite for a real CFSP/CSDP, needed as soon as possible, rather than as an ultimate consequence of the Eurointegration. As recently clarified by the European Commission chief:

“Such an army would...help us to form common foreign and security policies and allow Europe to take on responsibility in the world.”

Beat Balzli, Christoph B. Schiltz, and André Taube, “Halten Sie sich an Frau Merkel. Ich mache das!,” *Welt am Sonntag*, March 8, 2013, <http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article138178098/Halten-Sie-sich-an-Frau-Merkel-Ich-mache-das.html>, quoted in Erik Kirschbaum and Adrian Croft, “Juncker Calls for EU Army, Says Would Deter Russia,” Reuters, March 8, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-defence-juncker-idUSKBN0M40KL20150308>, and “Juncker: NATO Is Not Enough, EU Needs an Army,” EurActiv, March 9, 2015, <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/juncker-nato-not-enough-eu-needs-army-312724>.

82. Fischer, “Hamster on a Wheel?,” in Benjamin, *Europe 2030*, 10.

83. Viviane Reding, quoted in Waterfield, “EU Intelligence Service.”

EU summit at which Martin Schulz, the speaker of the European Parliament, made clear that the majority of Members of European Parliament (MEPs) were in favour of “a headquarters for civil and military missions in Brussels and deployable troops.”⁸⁴ A few months later, Jean-Claude Juncker picked up where Barroso left off by promoting the idea of European army during his campaign for the presidency of the European Commission.⁸⁵ In March and June 2015, as a new Commission chief, Juncker called for the creation of such army quite emphatically and in a seemingly Russophobic manner,⁸⁶ thereby triggering an avalanche of reactions in the transatlantic world.⁸⁷ The inevitable British and broader Atlanticist outrage, displayed even by exponents of the ‘pro-Putinist’ Euroskeptical clique, basically meant one thing: a fear of the growing influence of the Continentalist lobby spearheaded by the leadership of the currently most powerful political force in Europe, the European People’s Party (EPP).

Of course, EPP leaders and other leading Continentalists (e.g. German Social Democrats, Liberal MEPs in favour of militarization) harbour no illusion that they will manage to create a European army exactly tomorrow.⁸⁸ German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen for instance, while welcoming Juncker’s proposal last year, noted the

84. Martin Schulz, quoted in Waterfield, “David Cameron Fights off.”

85. See “2014EP INTERVIEW Jean-Claude Juncker: I Hope CVM Will Be Phased Out by the End of My Presidency,” by Florin Stefan, Agerpres, May 5, 2014, <http://www.agerpres.ro/ep-elections-2014/2014/05/05/2014ep-interview-jean-claude-juncker-i-hope-cvm-will-be-phased-out-by-the-end-of-my-presidency-13-36-33>.

86. See Balzli, Schiltz, and Taube, “Halten Sie sich an Frau Merkel,” quoted in Kirschbaum and Croft, “Juncker Calls for EU Army,” “NATO Is Not Enough,” EurActiv, and Honor Mahony, “EU Commission Chief Makes Case for European Army,” *EUobserver*, March 9, 2015, <https://euobserver.com/political/127914>; and EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe.”

87. See Georgi Gotev, “Armée européenne: une bonne idée ou une idée allemande?,” *Huffington Post*, March 17, 2015, French edition, <http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/georgi-gotev/armee-europeenne-une-bonne-6878476.html>; Flora *et al.*, “UK, Central Europe Frown,” and “An EU Army to Face Russia? Who Do You Think You Are Kidding, Mr Juncker? - Nigel Farage,” YouTube video, 05:32, from a European Parliament session held on March 11, 2015, posted by “europarl,” March 11, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NiUtdZyL_Mk. Quite expectedly, the fiercest and most dramatic critique came from the leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP).

88. See Sarantis Michalopoulos, “No European Army Now, Says S&D VP,” EurActiv, October 21, 2015, <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/no-european-army-now-says-sd-vp-318719>; Foster and Holehouse, “EU Army in Exchange of Renegotiation;” Leyen, quoted in Doyle, “Our Goal Is an EU Army,” and Flora *et al.*, “UK, Central Europe Frown.”

necessity “to strengthen the European Defence Union” (which is yet to be formally established in a PSCD format) as a prerequisite for the formation of a European military force over the long term.⁸⁹ Yet, as recently pointed out by EPP President Joseph Daul, the EU militarization process will be developing “much faster than people believe.”⁹⁰

Thus has come the long-awaited official acknowledgement by Brussels contradicting all the previous disclaimers and academic reservations regarding the EU/CSDP’s ultimate goal. Concomitantly with the latest EPP Congress at which a three-step strategy was adopted (establishing a permanent OHQ, assuming “territorial defence and higher intensity” tasks, and replacing “the current patchwork of bilateral and multilateral military collaboration” with PSCD, which is to include a European medical command and, possibly, joint border and coast guard capacities),⁹¹ some piquant and largely overlooked facts about the common defence project were brought to light for the broader public. First, the Euro army concept is part of the common political platform of Germany’s ruling CDU/CSU - SPD coalition;⁹² and second, “for many years,” it has been enshrined in both the CDU’s and SPD’s party programs.⁹³ There is one problem, though; none of these political programs, nor any of the previously mentioned official appeals, has ever been accompanied by an explanation as to how exactly Brussels thinks to create

89. Leyen, quoted in Doyle, “Our Goal Is an EU Army.” See also “NATO Is Not Enough,” EurActiv, Mahony, “Case for European Army,” Kirschbaum and Croft, “Juncker Calls for EU Army,” and Flora *et al.*, “UK, Central Europe Frown.”

90. Joseph Daul, quoted in Vincenti, “EPP Leaders Bang Drum,” and Smith, “EU ARMY Developing.”

91. Vincenti, “EPP Leaders Bang Drum.” For the basis, see EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe.”

92. Gotev, “Armée européenne;” Flora *et al.*, “UK, Central Europe Frown;” and Foster and Holehouse, “EU Army in Exchange of Renegotiation.” CDU, CSU, and SPD stand for the Christian Democratic Union (German: Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands), the Christian Social Union (German: Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern), and the Social Democratic Party (German: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) of Germany, respectively.

93. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, quoted in Flora *et al.*, “UK, Central Europe Frown;” Gotev, “Armée européenne;” and Foster and Holehouse, “EU Army in Exchange of Renegotiation.” As reported by Gotev *et al.*, in a 2015 interview for the Berlin-based *Tagesspiegel*, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said:

“For the SPD, the long-term goal of a European army is a major policy matter and has been part of the party program for many years.”

a common army, arguably without the UK and within a limited PSCD/EDU framework,⁹⁴ and what the future common defence system would/should look like.

As for the latter, so far, there are just a few discernible parameters; one of them being the envisaged dual (defensive and offensive) role for Europe's future integrated military force. According to the Euroskeptics, such role, which is to be a contemporary concretization of an old Continentalist vision through a simultaneous orientation towards territorial defence and higher-intensity crisis management,⁹⁵ is "aggressive."⁹⁶ Another interesting parameter is the anticipated supranational parliamentary control of the future European army.⁹⁷

Hence, the specific question of how the EU's future common defence system would be organized in terms of major institutional components, force structure, level of integration, the role of national militaries, posture vis-à-vis NATO, and similar, is largely speculative and beyond the scope of this work. However, it would be useful to conclude this work by touching upon some of the existing theoretical conceptions in this context.

Since the idea of a single European army is not quite popular, nor perhaps feasible outside a wishful continental nation-state,⁹⁸ the current CSDP thinking is dominated by creative speculation on various versions of a two-tier common defence system. In this

94. The present Conservative government in London categorically rejects further political and defence integration at an EU level. Thus, in the run-up to the UK's planned EU referendum, the willing and able EU nations seem to have no other choice but to start integrating their armed forces through PSCD without expecting British participation in the short term. However, given the UK's status and predominant opposition to the Euro army project, Berlin and Paris have been forced into a bargain. While they understand the sovereigntist Brits feeling oversaturated with supranational policies—hence the UK's desire to renegotiate its current EU status and to avoid further political integration—they expect the same understanding from London. "If you want favours, you have to give favours," reads the newest Continentalist saying. Although this may sound as a blackmail, Chancellor Merkel has not refrained from pushing Prime Minister David Cameron to support the Euro army project, at least by making no obstructions to the PSCD/EDU initiative, and in exchange for reasonable concessions on the part of Brussels. See Foster and Holehouse, "EU Army in Exchange of Renegotiation;" and Vincenti, "EPP Leaders Bang Drum."

95. See Vincenti, "EPP Leaders Bang Drum;" and Smith, "EU ARMY Developing."

96. Smith, "EU ARMY Developing."

97. Brok, quoted in Flora *et al.*, "UK, Central Europe Frown;" and Foster and Holehouse, "EU Army in Exchange of Renegotiation."

98. See remarks by Polish General Stanisław Koziej, quoted in Flora *et al.*, "UK, Central Europe Frown."

sense, referent proposals on the future of CSDP have been put forward ranging in ambition from subsidiarity as a weaker form of shared competence between the EU and national governments over defence matters⁹⁹ to a greater military centralization at the EU level formally endorsed by national constitutions.¹⁰⁰ Some of these proposals might become feasible sooner rather than later as they approach a two-tier common defence, with tier one represented by common/collective European assets such as a highly specialized ERRF intended mainly for expeditionary warfare and tier two comprising of the remaining national militaries which could be timely reduced to territorial defence functions. Although tier one could well be considered a European army, especially if it is embodied in a highly integrated ERRF made of professional, EU-recruited soldiers, the two-tier conception nonetheless stands in contrast to the idea of a single European army embedded in a compact, single-tier defence system.

The latter is beyond discussion because common defence is not likely to be single defence, at least not in a strict sense. Even the defence systems of political nation-states and full-fledged federations (e.g. the US, former Yugoslavia) are often made of two distinct tiers—highly specialized, multipurpose federal forces and territorial defence guards. As a conclusion, softer, less centralist conceptions of a two-tier, common defence whereby tier one is built of national contingents and (potentially) reversible common

99. See Silvestri, “Gradual Path” in Vasconcelos, *European Defence in 2020?*, 83. Silvestri argues as follows: “...it [the desired CSDP development] is also incompatible with the present complete exercise of national sovereignty over defence matters. A process of progressive shifting of sovereignty from the national to the European level should be endorsed, applying the principles of subsidiarity to the defence and security field. We can imagine the possibility of a partial or total reversibility of the committed assets to national control, should any imperative need arise (something like the Falklands War for example). However it will be increasingly difficult to imagine major national contingencies that will not receive full European support, especially if and when important military assets and foreign policy commitments will be managed in common.”

100. See Fotios Moustakis and Petros Violakis, “European Security and Defence Policy Deceleration: An Assessment of the ESDP Strategy,” *European Security* 17, no. 4 (2008): 421-33, quoted in Ojanen, “European Defence,” in Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle, *European Security*, 169. The authors propose the inclusion of ERRF in national constitutions.

assets placed under supreme European C² are already on the cards among EU/CSDP strategists.¹⁰¹ As for a stronger version of two-tier common defence, Nikolas Kirrill Gvosdev provides an interesting (he calls it “modest”) sketch of a “Pan-European Defense” inspired by the former Yugoslav system of people’s defence, notably the role of the once formidable Yugoslav People’s Army as opposed to the territorial defence(s) of the ex Yugoslav Republics.¹⁰²

Regardless, the EU constitutional concept of common defence hides a vast field of potentialities. Common remains **a mysterious buzzword** which, so far as EU jargon is concerned, does not necessarily mean single or exclusive. First, in EU business, distinction between common and single does exist, reflecting the struggle between the idea of preserving national sovereignty and the supranational tendency. Second, as a pervasive attribute, common is nonetheless associated with all sorts of EU policies, from those being truly single and falling under the exclusive competence/jurisdiction of Brussels (e.g. common commercial policy/external trade), policy domains subject to shared competence and, hence, run by both EU institutions and national governments (e.g. Common Agricultural Policy - CAP), to the remaining bastions of intergovernmentalism and national sovereignty such as the CFSP and CSDP itself. In other words, Europe’s future common defence could be anything, including even a stronger, federalist variant.¹⁰³ In the absence of an official, *a priori* explanation of the meaning of *common* defence, one has to wait for the concept to be consensually reified

101. See Silvestri, “Gradual Path” in Vasconcelos, *European Defence in 2020?*, 83; and Saryusz-Wolski, “Defence in the Enlarged Europe,” in Vasconcelos, *European Defence in 2020?*, 156-58.

102. Nikolas Kirrill Gvosdev, “A Modest Proposal for Pan-European Defense,” Atlantic Community, September 14, 2011, http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/A_Modest_Proposal_for_Pan-European_Defense.

103. Drawing on John Roper’s understanding of ESDP as “the organization of the activities of the armed forces of the member-states in common,” in his 2003 doctoral dissertation Mérand mentions a “stronger version of common defence.” Mérand, “Soldiers and Diplomats.”

by EU leaders. The latter, however, despite their intensifying calls for a European army, or at least for more Europe in security and defence, are still unsure of the final destination and whether and to which extent they will manage to deliver on the constitutional clause on common defence:

“Where are we heading? Towards more common development of capabilities and an increased ability to act together as crisis managers in our neighbourhood? Towards standing soldiers with the double EU and national flag? Or towards a deeply integrated model, as initially foreseen by the European Defence Community in the 1950s, based on common armed forces, common armament programmes, a common budget and common institutions?”¹⁰⁴

Clearly, Europe may never get the chance to build a common defence like the one imposed by US Constitution and described by Samuel Huntington as “a dynamic, multivariate process” of shaping a national defence policy and linking strategic programs (force planning, arms control and non-proliferation, industry, technology, space).¹⁰⁵ But it is quite possible, if not likely, for the EU’s future defence, which would inevitably reflect the *sui generis* character of its embedding structure, to be more advanced, at least in politico-institutional terms, than the one developed by NATO over the past 65 years. Therefore, Euro-Atlanticist authors like Jacek Saryusz-Wolski whose idea of “a fully-fledged European defence” does not seem to go much beyond the traditional concept of military alliance (only based on common foreign policy and the idea of Synchronized Armed Forces Europe - SAFE), and who, thereby, sees the EU/CSDP merely as a yet-to-be, supplementary, NATO-like *foedus*,¹⁰⁶ should be more appreciative of the fact that the

104. EPSC and Barnier, “In Defence of Europe,” 4.

105. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics*, new ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

106. Saryusz-Wolski, “Defence in the Enlarged Europe,” in Vasconcelos, *European Defence in 2020?*, 156-58. See also Schockenhoff and Kiesewetter “Strengthening Europe’s Ability to Act,” 2, 4-6, 8. These two German Atlanticists insist on the concept of “(partially) integrated [European] armed forces,” “the deployment of which would...be subject to the unanimous decision of the European Council (or the NATO Council).”

EU has always been a sort of confederative arrangement with a broad political horizon as opposed to NATO's purely intergovernmental nature and profile as a traditional alliance. What is more, looking at the horizon, it is easy to realize that the latent tension between the Continentalist (Franco-German, traditional, Jesuit, land power) and Atlanticist (Anglo-American, ultra-liberal, Free-Masonic, thalassocratic, sea power) narratives is far from definitive.

To put it in a nutshell, the present CSDP is an ephemeral security and defence concept, only the latest of its kind and full of potential. Drawing its deepest ideational roots from the (pre-)Enlightenment era, the CSDP leads to a pan-European defence almost irreversibly. A common defence for Europe is quite possible and, due to the growing impact of the exogenous (multipolar) momentum, can be realized sooner rather than later even without a full-fledged European federation.¹⁰⁷ Provided that the EU overcomes the current crisis and its relations with the US remain about the same, it is reasonable to anticipate such an outcome in a time of continuing outside stimuli and strategic pressures, most especially on Europe's eastern and southern frontiers.

107. The author, however, recognizes that some extremely unfavourable scenarios can 'reverse' this process. A sudden EU break-up, as lately anticipated by many, from controversial political advisors and pundits such as Sam Vaknin, newly Russophilic Balkan politico-military commentators such as Miroslav Lazanski, to world-wide anti-globalists and theorists of conspiracy, whose imagination goes as far as to predict even a shrunken, Vienna-headquartered Germanic Union as an EU successor, would simply discontinue this historical process, albeit only temporarily. On the other hand, a less gloomy and much more likely scenario, such as the one envisioned by the CIA and publically promoted through Stratfor's long-term forecasts, would be truly obstructive as it would render the old continent even less coherent, internally unstable, and practically divided into four 'Europes:' a demographically and economically declining Western and Central part ('Old Europe') as the best way to contain the German rise, a galvanized, Polish-led Eastern Europe ('New Europe'), which is expected to be increasingly nationalistic and Russophobic, closely related to Washington, and fully submitted to US/NATO strategy, the separate British isles and their connection to a self-centric Scandinavia, and finally, a largely destabilized Southern Europe, including in the first place the hybrid Balkan 'territories' full of dangers and opportunities for every actor in the emerging multipolar era. See Stratfor, "Decade Forecast: 2015-2025," February 23, 2015, <https://www.stratfor.com/forecast/decade-forecast-2015-2025>.

ANNEX

A List of Annotated Acronyms

AAR	Air-to-air refueling
ABM (shield)	Anti-ballistic missile (shield)
ACA	Agency for the Control of Armaments (1954 – mid-1980s; part of the former WEU)
ACA	Allied Command Atlantic (1952 – 2003; one of NATO's two former strategic commands; headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, and succeeded by ACT)
ACE	Allied Command Europe (1951 – 2003; one of NATO's two former strategic commands; headquartered at SHAPE, Mons, and responsible for NATO operational forces in Europe; succeeded by ACO)
ACO	Allied Command Operations (2003 – present; one of the Alliance's two strategic commands at present, headquartered at SHAPE, Mons, and responsible for all NATO military operations globally; evolved from ACE)
ACT	Allied Command Transformation (2003 – present; one of NATO's two strategic commands at present, headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, and in charge of the Alliance's continuing reform; evolved from ACA)
ADS Group Ltd.	<i>Aerospace Defence Security Group Ltd.</i> (a UK-based trade organization representing and advancing the interests of British aerospace, defence, and security industries globally)
AFNORTH	Allied Forces Northern Europe (1952 – 1993/4; the northernmost NATO command at the time, located at Kolsås outside of Oslo)
AFSJ (JHA)	Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (1997 – present; a concept referring to a post-1992 policy domain under non-exclusive EU jurisdiction; from 1997 to the Lisbon Treaty's entry into force in 2009, the said domain, albeit originally singular and known as Justice and Home Affairs [JHA], was divided in formal and procedural terms between the so-called EU pillars one (made of the European [Economic] Community and encompassing, <i>inter alia</i> , EU policies relative to European citizenship, judicial cooperation in civil matters, asylum, immigration, and visa issues, as well as border control) and three (judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters)
AGS	Alliance Ground Surveillance (a joint capability initiative pursued by NATO ever since the 1990s; the related ground surveillance assets [an airborne segment made of <i>Global Hawk</i> UAVs and linked to various C ² ISR systems, plus ground stations] are now being acquired by 15 allies; by the end of 2018,

	such assets are to be collectively owned and operated by the Alliance on behalf of all its members)
AIDS	Acquired Immune Efficiency Syndrome
ANF	Atlantic Nuclear Force (1960s; UK-proposed alternative to the MLF)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations (1967 – present)
AU	African Union ([1963 – 1991 – 1999 –] 2002 – present)
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System (NATO; the most renowned segment of the Alliance’s collectively owned capabilities)
<i>BAE Systems plc.</i>	<i>British Aerospace Systems plc.</i> (1999 – present; a merger of <i>British Aerospace [BAe]</i> and <i>Marconi Electronic Systems [MES]</i>)
Benelux	Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg (1944 – present; a geopolitical grouping and a politico-economic union)
BRICS	Brazil. Russia. India, China, and South Africa (an economic and geopolitical grouping; held their first formal summit in 2009)
BG (concept)	Battlegroup (concept)
BFU	British Union of Fascists (1932 – 1940)
BREXIT	Britain’s (potential) exit (from the EU)
C²	Command and control
C³	Command, control, and communications
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy (EU)
CBRN	Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CDM	Capability Development Mechanism (2000s – present; EU/CSDP)
CDM	Council of Defence Ministers (EU; originally envisaged in the 1998 Saint-Malo declaration but more practically initiated three years later [February 2002]; yet-to-be formalized as a Council formation)
CDSN	<i>Conseil de défense et de sécurité nationale</i> (2010 – present; evolved from the former French presidential-level <i>Conseil de sécurité intérieure [CSI]</i>)
CDU	Christian Democratic Union (German: <i>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands</i> ; 1945 – present)
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CEPS	Centre for European Policy Studies (1983 – present; a Brussels-based think tank, one of the leading within the CFSP/CSDP orbit)
CEPSD	Common European Policy on Security and Defence (a preliminary name for ESDP circulated in late 1998 and throughout 1999)
CERN	<i>Centre/Organisation européenne pour la recherche nucléaire</i> (1954 – present)
CESDP	Common European Security and Defence Policy (another ‘trial’ reference for ESDP that emerged in the aftermath of Saint-Malo)

CFR	Council on Foreign Relations (1921 – present; one of the foremost US think tanks)
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy (1992/3 – present; conceptualized in the early 1980s; initially led to EPC; a wider policy domain featuring the ESDP/CSDP as its core ever since 1997/9; known as EU pillar two prior to 2007/9)
CHOD(s)	Chief(s) of Defence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (1947 – present; preceded by the so-called Office of Strategic Services [OSS])
CINCAFSOUTH or CINCOSOUTH	Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (1951 – 2004 – present; head of what was, prior to 2003, known as NATO’s “major subordinate command” (AFSOUTH); based in Naples and in charge, <i>inter alia</i> , of the Alliance’s southern wing; With the 2004 reorganization of AFSOUTH as Allied Joint Force Command [JFC] Naples, the post was re-designated accordingly; the ‘new’ Commander JFC Naples is responsible for planning, preparing, and conducting military operations within the SACEUR’s area of responsibility [AOR])
C²ISR	Command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
C⁴ISTAR	Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (2000 – present; part of the EU/EEAS’s CM apparatus)
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force (1994 – present; a concept initiated at the January 1994 NATO summit and further elaborated in Berlin two years later)
CM	Crisis management
C-M Cell	Civil-Military Cell (an integral planning cell established within the EUMS in accordance with the April 2003 Tervuren Declaration [the ‘Chocolate Summit’] as a compromise between the Franco-German proposal for a permanent European OHQ and the UK’s staunch opposition to such idea)
CPMD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (2008/9 – present; one of the EU’s CM planning structures integrated into the EEAS; merged planning components of both the military and civilian CSDP; unifies, on a strategic level, EUMS and CPCC functions; made of former DG E VIII staff and other personnel)
COARM	Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports (EU; part of the EEAS’s security policy and CM segment)
CODUN	Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Control (EU; part of the EEAS’s security policy and CM segment)
CONOP	Working Group on Non-Proliferation (EU; part of the EEAS’s security policy and CM segment)
COPS	<i>Comité politique et de sécurité</i> (the French name for PSC; see below)
COREPER	<i>Comité des représentants permanents</i> (English: Committee of

	Permanent Representatives; convenes in two different formations [COREPER I and II] and prepares the agenda for the meetings of the EU Council of Ministers)
COSI	<i>Comité permanent de coopération opérationnelle en matière de sécurité intérieure</i> (English: Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security; 2007/9 – present)
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (2007/8 – present; one of the EU’s CM planning structures integrated into the EEAS; its very existence has addressed some of the former C ² problems relative to the CSDP’s civilian arm; a civilian equivalent of the EUMS; serves as an OHQ for all CSDP civilian missions; made of ex DG E IX personnel and additional cadre; fully absorbed the former Police Unit)
CSCE	Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (1972 – 1995; evolved into OSCE)
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy (2007/9 – present; an upgraded and renamed version of ESDP based on the 2007 Lisbon amendments)
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization (1992 – present; sometimes referred to as “Russian NATO”)
CSU	Christian Social Union in Bavaria (German: Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern; 1945 – present)
DCI	Defence Capabilities Initiative (NATO)
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
DG(s)	Directorate(s)-General (organizational units in EU secretariats and support structures)
DG C	Directorate-General C (a unit in the General Secretariat of the EU Council of Ministers responsible for foreign affairs, enlargement, and civil protection)
DG E VIII	Directorate-General E VIII (a unit in the former Directorate-General E [External and Politico-Military Affairs] of the Council Secretariat responsible for the politico-defence aspects of crisis management; absorbed by the CMPD in 2010)
DG E IX	Directorate-General E IX (a unit in the former Directorate-General E [External and Politico-Military Affairs] of the Council Secretariat responsible for the civilian aspects of crisis management; its staff and resources were subsequently split between the CMPD and the CPCC)
DG RELEX	Directorate-General for External Relations (a former DG of the European Commission merged into the EEAS in 2010)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (1951 – present; NATO; also known, since 2003, as Deputy Head of ACO)
DSG 2.1	A policy coordination unit under the Deputy Secretary-General (DSG) in charge of political affairs (planned as part of the new EEAS structure)

DSG 2.2	A strategic planning unit under the Deputy Secretary-General (DSG) in charge of political affairs (planned as part of the new EEAS structure)
DTF	Defence Task Force (EU; first proposed in 2011; formally created under the European Commission the following year)
EAC	European Airlift Centre (2004 – 2010; preceded by the EACC and succeeded by the EATC)
EACC	European Airlift Co-ordination Cell (2001 – 2003/4; succeeded by the EAC)
EADS	European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (2000 – present; a merger of <i>Aérospatiale Matra S.A.</i> [France], <i>Construcciones Aeronáuticas S.A.</i> [CASA, Spain], and <i>DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG</i> [DASA, Germany]; rebranded in 2014 as <i>AIRBUS Group SE</i>)
EAEC or Euroatom	European Atomic Energy Community (1957 – present; part of EU pillar one between 1992 and 2007/9)
EAG	European Air Group (1995 – present)
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (1997 – present; NATO; evolved from the post-1991 North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC])
EATC	European Air Transport Command (2010 – present; established by France, Germany, Belgium, and Netherlands as a permanent strategic airlift command centre; located at Eindhoven Airbase, the Netherlands; evolved from EACC and EAC)
EBCG	European Border and Coast Guard (the creation of this border force, based on the existing FRONTEX Agency, was announced by the European Commission on December 15, 2015)
EC	European Community (1965/7 – 1992; a common reference for the three merged Communities after 1965/7, and especially for the EEC)
EC	European Council (1960s – 1974 [incepted] – 1986 [formally established as an EC “organ”] – 2007 (finally sanctioned as one of the Union “Institutions”) – present)
EC	European Commission ([1951 –] 1957 – 1965/7 – 1992 – present)
ECAP	European Capability Action Plan (early 2000s; launched by the 2001 Laeken European Council in order to address capability shortfalls in the context of meeting the Helsinki HG)
ECs	European Communities (a common, post-1957 reference for the ECSC, EAEC/Euroatom, and EEC; especially relevant prior to the 1965/7 merger of the three Communities and used even after the creation of the EU in 1992)
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community (1951 – 2002; part of EU pillar one after 1992)
EDA	European Defence Agency (2004 – present)
EDC	European Defence Community (a failed project of the early

	1950s)
EDF	European Defence Forces (the EDC's core under the TEDC)
EDI	European Defence Identity (yet another concept/designation emerged in the context of the WEU's post-1984 quest for a more authentic, European security and defence enterprise; part of ESI as a broader concept; clearly referred to in the 1987 Hague Platform on European Security Interests)
EDIP	European Defence Improvement Program (NATO; 1971 – 1976; worth more than a US\$ billion)
EDTIB	European Defence Technological and Industrial Base
EDU	European Defence Union (a shorter reference for UESD/EUSD recently used by Europeanists)
EEAS	European External Action Service (2007/9 – present; the EU diplomatic service which has absorbed and integrated the Union's CFSP/CSDP structures and crisis management tools; operational since 2010)
EEC	European Economic Community (1957 – present; part of EU pillar one between 1992 and 2007/9)
EFTA	European Free Trade Association (1960 – present)
EGF or EUROGENDFOR	European Gendarmerie Force (2007 – present; established by France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain; comprising currently of six full members including Romania, which joined in 2008; just like the EUROCORPS, a subject to an international treaty [the Treaty of Velsen])
EGNOS	European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (2005/9 – present; the first pan-European satellite navigation system; serves as a supplement (a satellite-based augmentation system) to the US <i>GPS</i> , the Russian <i>GLONASS</i> , and the EU's <i>Galileo</i>)
EGS	European Global Strategy (a May 2013 proposal)
EMF	See EUROMARFOR below
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy (EU)
EP	European Parliament ([1951 – 1957 – 1965 –] 1976 – 1992 – present)
EPC	European Political Community (a 1950s project, failed alongside the EDC)
EPC	European Political Cooperation ([1970s] – 1980s – 1992; EC/EU; the product of post-1960 attempts at creating a European political union; evolved from a concrete 1969 initiative for structured cooperation in the field of foreign affairs; established as a formal EPC structure within the then EC between 1986 and 1992)
EPP	European People's Party (1976 – present; Europe's most powerful political group over the past decade; currently holding the greatest number of seats in the European Parliament)
EPRS	European Parliamentary Research Service (an EP-housed think tank)

EPSC	European Political Strategy Centre (established and operating under the auspices of the European Commission)
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force (1999 – present; a concept envisioning a corps-size EU military force made of 50,000 to 60,000 troops, 100 ships, 400 aircraft, and 40,000 reserves; initiated by Richard Hatfield and based on a Bosnian or Kosovo scenario; though somewhat forgotten due to a shift in military strategy and the creation of more mobile RR formations (EU BGs), the concept remains an integral part of the EU’s strategic-military ambition)
ESA	European Space Agency (1975 – present)
ESDC	European Security and Defence College (2005 – present; a network of European institutions designed to offer prestigious strategic education and training for EU forces and civilian personnel, while also generating common doctrine and strategic culture)
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity ([1980s] – 1991 – 1999; the original and mainly Atlanticist product of the quest for ESI/EDI; the combined terminological expression “European Security and Defence Identity” first appeared in the WEU’s Vianden Communiqué (1991); NATO quickly adopted the new jargon (the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept of 1991 refers to “a European identity in security and defence”) and fully recognized the respective concept by its January 1994 summit; succeeded by the distinct, Europeanist ESDP in 1999)
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy (1998/9 – 2007/9; evolved from the Atlanticist ESDI)
ESI	European Security Identity or European Strategic Identity (a general, post-1980s concept encompassing EDI; refers to a broad security/strategic identity for Europe, including inevitably a defence/military component; pursued by the revived WEU after 1984; the exact terms/acronyms “ESI” and “EDI” cannot be found in the post-1984 WEU declarations and communiqués)
ESS	European Security Strategy (EU; 2003 – 2016?)
ESP	European Space Policy (2007 – present; EU)
EU	European Union ([1951 – 1957 – 1965 – 1986 –] 1992 – present)
EU BG(s)	EU battlegroup(s) (2004/5 – present)
EUCAP Sahel Mali	EU Capacity Building in Sahel Mali (2014 – present)
EUFOR RCA	EU Force en République centrafricaine (English: in the Central African Republic; 2014-15)
EU INTCEN	EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (evolved from the EU SITCEN in 2012)
EU ISS	EU Institute for Security Studies (2001 – present; evolved from the WEU ISS)
EUMC	EU Military Committee (2000/1 – present)
EUMM Georgia	EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (2008 – present)

EUMS	EU Military Staff (2000/1 – present)
EUNAVFOR Atlanta	EU Naval Force Atlanta (2008 – present)
EUNAVFOR MED or Operation Sophia	EU Naval Force Mediterranean (2015 – present; Operation Sophia is an alternative designation, pertaining especially to the second phase of this counter-smuggling maritime interception effort)
EU SatCen	EU Satellite Centre (2001 – present; evolved from WEU SatCen)
EUSD	European Union of Security and Defence (see UESD below)
EU Sit.Room	EU Situation Room (1999 – present; currently part of the EU INTCEN)
EUROCORPS	A European Corps (1992 – present; a multinational, corps-size formation featuring a permanent peacetime HQ and 80,000 manpower at the maximum; originally created as a WEU tool by five “framework nations:” France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Spain; evolved from the 1988 Franco-German brigade, which became operational in 1991; made available to NATO in 1992/3; currently available to both NATO and the EU, and of course, the UN; recently engaged in Afghanistan; the sixth ISAF mandate was given to HQ EUROCORPS; considered a prototype of a common European defence; a legal entity, the only European military unit (along with EUROGENDFOR) that is subject to an international treaty (the 2004 Treaty of Strasbourg); in 2008, proposed by the European Parliament to become a standing EU force, that is the nucleus of a future ERRF, under a permanent EU command; proven C ² expertise in joint CM operations; certified by NATO in the segment of deployable RR FHQ (land component); evaluated and certified as part of the 2010 NRF; under post-2000 arrangements with the SACEUR, keeps its HQ open to non-EU NATO allies (associated nations); currently undergoing a process for the inclusion of Poland as its sixth framework nation, as well as for the incorporation of the US, Italy and Romania as associated nations; led by a three-star general who has a great operational autonomy; not to be confused with the idea of “Eurocorps” proposed by former European Commissioner Michel Bernier; the latter’s proposal refers to an integrated (civil-military) EU RR mechanism composed of national and regional units specialized in dealing with natural and man-made disasters including terrorism.
EUROFOR	European Rapid Operational Force (1995 – 2012; a former multinational land force, 12,000 personnel strong; founded by France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain in the context of developing European (WEU) capabilities for Petersberg tasks; initially answerable to the WEU but subsequently available to the EU/CSDP as well as for operations under UN aegis; shared the same strategic and organizational framework with EUROMARFOR – both were placed under the CIMIN, a high-

	level, inter-ministerial committee composed of the CHODs and political directors of the founding states).
EUROMARFOR	European Maritime Force (1995 – present; a multinational naval, air, and amphibious force created by France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain in the context of developing European (WEU) capabilities for Petersberg tasks; deployable as both a Task Group and a full-fledged Task Force built around an aircraft carrier; initially answerable to the WEU, but now primarily available to the four troop-contributing nations and the EU/CSDP, as well as for operations under UN aegis; used to share joint structures with EUROFOR)
EUROGROUP	European Group (1970 – 1994; originally created within NATO; by 1994, most of its functions were absorbed by the WEU; not to be confused with the present-day Eurogroup [the ex Euro X or Euro XI], which refers to a more recently formalized finance ministerial meeting of the Eurozone members within the Council of Ministers of the EU, as well as to an informal, summit-level gathering [heads of state and/or government] within the European Council).
EURONAD	European National Armaments Directors (1970 – 1976; a senior body, part of the EUROGROUP, which kept the French engaged within NATO; constituted in 1976 as a so-called Independent European Program Group [IEPG], yet, partly delinked from NATO/EUROGROUP in order to satisfy France; later on, integrated in the WEU as a Western European Armaments Group [WEAG]; which was nonetheless closed in 2004/5).
EURO-X (or EURO XI)	(EU; a term used for the ministerial or summit-level meeting [within the EU Council of Ministers or the European Council respectively] of the once 10/11 Eurozone members; precursor of the present-day “Eurogroup”)
FAWEUs	Forces answerable to the WEU (a jargon term used within the WEU between 1992 and 1999, namely during the quest for a more authentic ESDI; applied to all national and multinational units at the WEU’s disposal)
FBEAG	Franco-British European Air Group (1995- present; the original name of EAG)
FHQ	Force Headquarters (deployable)
FIN(A)BEL	France, Italy, Netherlands, (<i>Allemagne</i> i.e. Germany), Belgium, Luxemburg (1953 – present; one of the earliest European defence entities; renamed FINABEL after the 1956 German membership; presently comprising of 16 EU members; specialty: doctrinal harmonization and standardization of European land forces)
FOC	Full operational capability
FPA(s)	Framework Participation Agreement(s) (EU/CSDP)
FPI-S	Foreign Policy Instruments Service (EU; a Commission service integrated in the EEAS)

GAC	General Affairs Council (1992/3 – 2003; the pre-2003 name of the foreign ministerial formation of the EU Council in charge of the then CFSP/ESDP)
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council (2003 – 2007/9; the pre-2009 title of the foreign ministerial formation of the EU Council in charge of what was then still referred to as CFSP/ESDP)
GeoNor	“Geopolitics in the High North” (a Norwegian research program)
GLONASS	<i>Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema</i> (Russian, Latin script) (English: Global Navigation Satellite System; 1982 – present; Russia's version of GPS)
GMES	Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (1998 – present; a European Commission-run space program established in 1998 through the so-called “Baveno Manifesto” and renamed in 2012 as <i>Copernicus</i>)
GNP	Gross national product
GPS	Global Positioning System (1978 – present; US)
GREXIT	Greece’s (potential) exit from either the Eurozone or the EU as a whole
HG(s)	Headline Goal(s) (1999 – present; EU/CSDP capability development plan[s] and benchmarks)
HQ	Headquarters
HR for CFSP/ESDP	High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy (1997/9 – 2007/9; evolved into HR for FASP/VP)
HR for FASP/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission (2007/9 – present; a post-Lisbon upgrade of the post of HR for CFSP/ESDP)
HRSI	High-resolution satellite imagery
HUMINT	Human intelligence (intelligence gathering)
ICBM(s)	Intercontinental ballistic missile(s)
IEPG	Independent European Program Group (1976 – 1992/3; evolved into WEAG)
IGC	Intergovernmental conference
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies (1958 – present; a preeminent London-based think tank, one of the leading within the CFSP/CSDP orbit)
IMINT	Imagery intelligence (intelligence gathering)
INF	Intermediate-range nuclear force(s)
IOC	Initial operational capability
IR	International Relations (academic discipline)
IRBM(s)	Intermediate-range ballistic missile(s)
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (2001 – present; a NATO-led mission in Afghanistan mandated by the UN Security Council Resolution 1386)

ISTAR	Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff (US; 1942/7 – present)
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs (1992 – present; overlapping with the post-1997 AFSJ concept)
JNA	Jugoslo/avenska Narodna Armija (the original name of the Yugoslav People's Army [YPA; see below] in Macedonian [Latin script] and Serbo-Croatian)
KFOR	Kosovo Forces (1999 – present; a NATO-led peace-keeping force deployed to Kosovo pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 1244)
KMW	Krauss-Maffei Wegmann GmbH & Co. (1931 – present)
KSC	Knowledge, Skills, Competences
LANDJUT	Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (1962 – 1993 – 2002; a corps-level NATO formation; prior to 1993, subordinated to the then AFNORTH command)
MAC/MDC	Mutual Assistance/Defence Clause (Article 42[7] [ex Article 17] TEU)
MAE	Military and Aerospace Electronics (a UK-based conference & exhibition)
MALE (UAVs)	Medium-altitude long-endurance (UAVs)
MCCE	Movement Coordination Centre Europe (2007 – present; an international military logistics and mobility control centre located at Eindhoven Airport, the Netherlands)
MCM (forces/vessels)	Mine countermeasures (forces/vessels)
MCMFORNORTH	Mine Countermeasures Force North (NATO, present)
MD	Managing Director(s) (2009/10 – present; EU; heads of EEAS regional or thematic desks)
MEP(s)	Member(s) of the European Parliament (elected since 1979)
MERCOSUR or MERCOSUL	Mercado Común del Sur (Spanish) or Mercado Comum do Sul (Portuguese) (English: Southern Common Market; 1991 – present)
Mi6	Military Intelligence, Section 6 (1909 – present; UK)
MLF	Multilateral Force (1960 – 1966; a NATO concept for a European-managed, seaborne, multilateral nuclear force; first proposed in 1960 by US Secretary of State Christian Herter based on an earlier idea of Harvard Professor Robert Bowie; originally planned to be built around five US SSBNs armed with 80 <i>Polaris</i> SLBMs)
MPA	Maritime patrol aircraft
MRRC	Military Rapid Response Concept (EU)
MRTT (aircraft)	Multirole tanker transport (aircraft)
NAC	North Atlantic Council (1949 – present)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949 – present)
NEP	Northeast Passage

NETMA	NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (evolved from two former organizations, the NATO Multirole Combat Aircraft Development and Production Management Agency [NAMMA] and the NATO EFA Development Production and Logistics Management Agency [NEFMA]).
NGO(s)	Non-governmental organization(s)
NLT	No later than...
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group (1966 – present; NATO)
NRF	NATO Response Force (2003 – present)
NSA	National Security Agency (1952 – present; US)
OCCAR	Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière d'armements (English: Organization for Joint Armaments Cooperation; 1996 – present)
OHQ	Operations/operational headquarters
OPCEN	Operations Centre (2004/7 – present; EU; created within the EUMS as a stand-by, non-24/7 OHQ based on a so-called “core staff” (four officers); activated and enlarged since 2012)
OPLAN	Operation Plan
PC	Political Committee (1986/7 – 2000/1; a former EPC/EU CFSP body; originally created as a monitoring and advisory body [international trends and security] within the EPC, and then continued its mandate under the CFSP between 1992 and 2001; composed of the political directors of EC/EU national foreign ministries)
PfP	Partnership for Peace (1994 – present; NATO)
PGMs	Precision guided munitions
PMG	Politico-Military Group (1995 – present; WEU/EU; a consultative body established in 1995 to support the work of the then WEU Council; today, an expert group within the new EEAS structure closely related to the PSC and its work; chaired by a representative of the HR for FASP/VP)
PSC	Political and Security Committee (2001 – present; a crucial EU CFSP/CSDP/crisis management body; evolved from the PC, which was a pre-2000 advisory body in charge of monitoring the international politico-security situation and delivering opinions to the EU Council accordingly; yet, unlike the PC, it represents an ambassadorial composition; alongside the HR for FASP/VP, one of the central links in the multilevel CFSP/CSDP mechanism; the main generator of European strategic culture)
PSCD/PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (2007/9 – present; an EU flexibility instrument designed to enable closer cooperation in the area of defence and security among willing and able EU member-states; introduced by the 2001 European Convention and its ill-fated European Constitution of 2003/4; yet to be used: PESCO is just another name/acronym for PSCD)

SAC	Standing Armaments Committee (1955 – 1989; WEU)
SSR	Security sector reform
QMV	Qualified majority voting
RD/RT	Research and development/research and technology
RMA	Revolution in military affairs
R2P	Responsibility to Protect (1990s – present; a liberal interventionist concept)
RPAS	Remotely piloted aircraft systems
RR (force[s], structure[s], timeline[s])	Rapid reaction/response (force[s], structure[s], timeline[s])
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute (1831 – present; the first independent think tank in the field of defence and security founded by the Duke of Wellington)
SAC	Standing Armaments Committee (1955 – 1989; WEU body)
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe (WWII – present; a NATO command post since 1949)
SAFE	Synchronized Armed Forces Europe (a more recent concept proposed by the European Parliament, indicative of the potential extent of the future European defence integration; meaning more than the currently incoherent CSDP, which continues to rely on national assets, and much less than a single European army)
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (1969 – 1979)
SAR	Search and rescue
SATCOM	Satellite communications
SC	Solidarity Clause (Article 222 TFEU)
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization (1996 – present)
SEA	Single European Act (1986/7; a constitutive treaty, part of the EU primary law)
SEDE	European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence
SEEBRIG	South-Eastern Europe Brigade (1999 – present; a multinational peace force formed as a result of broader interests for regional cooperation in the Balkans)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (1951 – present)
SHIRBRIG	Standby High-Readiness Brigade (1996 – 2009; UN)
SIGINT	Signals intelligence (intelligence gathering)
SIN	Single institutional framework (EU)
SITCEN	Situation Centre (1995 – 1999 – present; WEU/EU; originally created within the WEU along with other RR support structures [e.g. a PMG, a military intelligence section in the Planning Cell]; following the establishment of ESDP in 1999, and before the integration of the WEU's operational resources into the EU, the latter obtained its own Joint Situation Centre under Javier Solana; between 2005 and 2012 the Centre was widely known as EU SITCEN; having become part of the EEAS, in 2012, the SITCEN was reorganized and rebranded as “EU Intelligence

	Analysis Centre” [INTCEN])
SLBM(s)	Submarine-launched ballistic missile(s)
SMEs	Small and medium enterprises
SOFs	Special operations forces
SPD	Social Democratic Party (German: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands; 1875 – present)
SSBN(s)	Strategic submarine(s) (a US Navy hull classification symbol for nuclear-powered submarines carrying SLBMs)
SSS	Strategic and Security Studies (academic field)
STANAVFORCHAN	Standing Naval Force Channel (1973 – 1998; a former NATO MCM formation predominantly made of European forces; replaced by MCMFORNORTH)
TCE	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (adopted in 2004 but failed to pass the subsequent ratification process)
TEAEC	Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (1957 - present)
TEC	Treaty establishing the European Community (same as TEEC and TFEU; under the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, the TEEC was amended and renamed TEC; duration and relevance of this formal title/acronym: 1992/3 – 2007/9)
TECSC	Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951 - 2002)
TEEC	Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957 – present)
TEDC	Treaty instituting the European Defence Community (signed 1952, failed 1954)
TEU	Treaty on European Union (1992 – present; better known as Maastricht Treaty)
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (same as TEEC and TEC; under the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, TEC was amended and renamed TFEU; currently relevant title/acronym)
TSR	Transpolar Sea Route (future)
TTIP	Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (ongoing negotiations)
UAV(s)	Unmanned aerial vehicle(s)
UESD	l'Union européenne de sécurité et de défense (2003 – present; English: European Union of Security and Defence; an emerging EU defence concept introduced by the 2003 ‘Chocolate Summit,’ modeled on the Eurozone and feasible via the post-Lisbon PSCD mechanism; could be deemed a special (comprehensive) case of PSCD; shortly called EDU)
UK	United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
UKIP	UK Independence Party (1993 – present)
UN	United Nations (1945 – present)
VJTF	Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (2014 – present; the latest NATO force concept envisaging the creation by 2016 of a

	highly-capable RR force of up to 40,000 personnel; refers, in other words, to the NRF's future core alternatively known as the Spearhead Force; a key element of the Alliance's ongoing reform)
WEAG	Western European Armaments Group (1993 – 2005; evolved from the IEPG)
WEAO	Western European Armaments Organization (1996 - 2006)
WEU	Western European Union (1948 – 1954 – 1984 – 2001 – 2011)
WEUCOM	Western European Union Communications Network
WEU ISS	WEU Institute for Security Studies (1989 – 2001; migrated into the EU and became EU ISS)
WEU SatCen	WEU Satellite Centre (1991/3 – 2001; integrated in the EU as EU SatCen)
WKC	Watch-Keeping Capability (2007/8 – present EU; established within the EEAS/EUMS to monitor and provide support to CSDP missions and operations)
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction
WUDO	Western Union Defence Organization (1948/49; the military arm of the proto-WEU structure; subsequently absorbed by NATO)
WWI	World War I (1914 – 1918)
WWII	World War II (1939 – 1945)
YPA	Yugoslav People's Army (1945 – 1992)

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¹ Given its source (EU ISS), this book may also be considered in the category of think-tank publications (see below).

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