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THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHARACTERISTIC.

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## The Doctrine of the Characteristic.

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J. O'Brien, B. A. LL. B.

" ' I have broken the law. I have sworn falsely. I have lied and I must lie more. But I have done well,' said the Minister." (1) These words mark the close of a short story in a recent magazine.


The Minister is to be married to a woman who does not love him. The evening before the appointed day a homicide escaped from ~~the~~ prison, <sup>and</sup> who had been convicted under an assumed name seeks asylum in the Minister's house and from the account he gives the Minister discovers him to be the lover of his intended bride. Presently the latter enters mentions the escape and, divining that the escaped man is in the house, urges that the searchers be notified. This the Minister opposes. The fugitive overhearing the conversation comes forward, mutual identification follows and the girl gives evidence of an utter love for the outcast. Soon the searchers reach the house but the Minister saves the situation by swearing that he has not seen the hunted man. Further, he renounces all claim to the woman and he himself unites her in matrimony to his rival and puts them in a position to get away out of the State. Neglecting the excuse the murderer pleads in mitigation of his deed, we will address ourselves to the main problem raised by the conduct of the Minister—a problem which in one form or another presents itself over a great portion of the field of literature.

That problem in broad outline may be formulated thus: How can a story like this come within the pale of the aesthetic consciousness? Again, we might ask; How is it that we lend our sympathy to such a result? — On what basis can the Minister be justified and how does it come about that society is not dissolved through the prevalent teaching of the merits of individual action at variance with general principle and law? Such questions involve moralistic categories and hence are incidental to our inquiry which lies primarily in the field of aesthetic; if however these questions may be resolved and if their principle has a common root with the principle which determines the aesthetic question, then the aesthetic solution will be still further justified being shown to be consistent with the rationality which underlies all things and all aspects of things.

In seeking a solution for the problem how <sup>are</sup> stories such as the one indicated can come within the realm of aesthetic we shall be led briefly to unfold the growth and development of the aesthetic consciousness and to penetrate to and discuss the

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(1) The trying of James Sharrow, by C.C. Andrews,  
The Strand Magazine, March 1913.



transcendental substrate in the idea of the beautiful as that idea is understood by the modern world. In its strict and philosophical meaning the term transcendental properly implies the mind's limitation to phenomena and involves the universal forms of pure perception, - Space and Time - as the medium under which all knowledge must be apprehended. In a looser but somewhat parallel sense, however, the term may be applied to that which gives to any phenomena or phenomenal group its determinant character - its enveloping medium - and without which such phenomena could not be for us that which it is. Using the term then in this latter and looser sense the purpose of this thesis is to discuss the transcendental substrate in the idea of the beautiful as that idea presents itself in the modern world distinguished from the ancient world.

The philosophy of the beautiful is termed aesthetic. Now beauty exists in perception and except as related to perception or imagination things cannot be said to have beauty. Beauty is such for mind; the human consciousness therefore is a factor to be considered in any study of the beautiful and the development of this consciousness as a world-consciousness in relation to nature and the domain of art is the material mainly on which philosophy must bring its categories to bear if it would give a satisfying theory of aesthetic. The world-consciousness moves forward in great though not well defined sweeps each advance including in part and in part negating the stage from which such advance is evolved. The objective mind therefore carries with it a certain tinge of the part which forms as it were a progressively modified transcendental medium under and through which the present and all the future must be apprehended.

Among moderns Kant was the first philosopher to sketch a theory (2) which though in general Outline only and defective in part yet constitutes the frame of true aesthetic science and liberates it explicitly, as in practice it had already been liberated implicitly, from the limitations which had been imposed upon it by ancient thinkers.

Kant's problem came to him as an inheritance from his treatment of the understanding and the will. Having in the Critique of Pure Reason, (3) demonstrated that space and time are pure perceptions or forms by which the mind arranges the data of sense, Kant proceeded to show that everything which comes to the mind must come under one or both of these forms, that in the domain of understanding everything that emerges in consciousness has been formed in these moulds and colored by these media and that therefore we do not know things as they are in themselves but only appearances which Kant terms phenomena. Being strictly limited by its very nature and constitution to a knowledge of phenomena only the mind as understanding can never attain to the knowledge of a real

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(2) Kant's Kritik of Judgement, translated by J. G. Bernard  
D.B. Trinity College, Dublin.

(3) Watson's Extracts from Kant, and Philosophy of Kant  
Explained. Caird's Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant.

Noumenal world and hence there can be no theoretical (valid) Knowledge of God, Freedom or Immortality. But though man's knowledge is limited to the phenomenal world and though man himself belongs to that world on the side of desire operating through the law of causality yet, as Kant had established the Authority to all phenomena of the "pure", original unchangeable consciousness" which he terms the transcendental unity of apperception, it follows that man is justified in viewing himself as participating in the super-sensible or noumenal world which is the condition or reality behind the world of sense. As so participating he believes himself free and though on account of the limitation already stated this freedom can never be established theoretically yet it may be defended provided there can be demonstrated a causality under which man acts and which is not the causality of phenomena. In the Metaphysics of Morality and the Critique of Practical Reason, therefore, Kant proceeds to defend the freedom of the will as a noumenal causality belonging to the intelligible world which gives laws to the world of sense. We are led to the idea of freedom by the consciousness of the moral law as an objective fact. Through the theory of the Kingdom of ends and the categorical imperative Kant shows that there exists a moral law or system which not only is not subject to sense but which issues its commands even in opposition to the solicitations of sense.

The fact then that man prescribes to himself a moral order, which could have no meaning unless he were free to realize it in the world of sense, compels us to posit Freedom. Everything in the world of phenomena being subject to natural causality a moral order would be a contradiction unless the will were free. The fact of a moral order therefore compels us to infer Freedom as a postulate of the practical will. Again, that the summum bonum or union of happiness to virtue may be attained reason compels us to postulate the existence of God as the only cause adequate to bring this about. Finally, man by reason of his finitude can attain moral perfection only by an endless progression, which seen as a whole in intellectual perception satisfies the Infinite Being; and this fact requires for its completion the Immortality of the Soul, which is the third postulate of the practical reason. The three postulates—God, Freedom and Immortality—are thus assigned to the vacant realm beyond the confines of the theoretical reason or understanding. Inasmuch however as the objects of these postulates being outside phenomena are not capable of demonstration and have for us only a certain moral certitude it follows that the ~~two~~ realm—the sensible and the super-sensible—are fixed by negation, the one outside the other. To find some bridge for the "gulf" which he himself admits as dividing these regions of knowledge Kant seeks a mediation in the Critique of Judgment. With the Critique of Judgment we reach the crux of the problem on its philosophical side.

This critique proceeds on the ground that "there are three absolutely irreducible faculties of the mind"—Knowledge, feeling and desire. The first of these faculties has a priori laws prescribed to it by understanding, the last by the practical reason; and hence feeling (i.e. of pleasure and pain) which stands between the two must have its a priori principle in judgment, which mediates between understanding and reason. If freedom be not a contradiction then nature must be harmonious to the attainment within it of the ends prescribed by the laws of freedom. "There must be a principle which unites the supersensible that is involved practically in the conception

*Substrate of nature with the supersensible*



of freedom." This principle Kant finds in the aesthetic and the teleological judgment.

Now as subsuming particulars under universal transcendental laws or categories the judgment—then called determinant—needs no principles ~~by~~ those of the understanding; but the judgment when reflective or proceeding from particulars to universals and dealing with modes of nature requires a principle and this principle in its most general form is that nature is conceived of as if its order were due to intelligence or, in other words, that nature is purposive. This principle as general and fundamental to all experience is transcendental and a priori; as however it lays down a law not for nature but for the manner in which we reflect on nature it is <sup>a</sup>subjective and not a constitutive principle.

Now the purposiveness of nature may be distinguished as either aesthetical or logical. In the former nature is viewed as purposive subjectively or for the mind, in the latter purposive objectively or in the form of its organic beings as adapted to ends; and corresponding to these two modes we have respectively the aesthetic judgment and the teleological judgment. The aesthetic judgment or judgment of taste is immediate for it depends on the feeling only of pleasure or pain in the contemplation of an object which feeling unlike conditions such as space and sensation does not enter into our knowledge of the object; the teleological judgment operating through a conception of the character of the object is mediate, is founded on a judgment of the understanding and as such is free from the feeling of pleasure or pain in the mere contemplation of the object.

How freedom could be the ground to determine an effect within the world of phenomena and in accordance with its causality was a problem insoluble for the theoretical reason though such <sup>a ground</sup> was required by the practical reason. Judgment through its a priori principle points to a supersensible substrate underlying nature whereby nature is made conformable to our intelligence. In judgment then the two realms find their meeting-point. The pleasure involved in the aesthetic judgment is a pure (i.e. non-sensuous) pleasure arising from the mind's satisfaction with the harmony of its faculties; the object is felt to be adapted to the reflective judgment and as such is denominated beautiful. The aesthetic judgment includes the idea of the sublime which arises through the mind's sense of adaptation to the form or uniform of the object; for whereas at first in respect of its ~~sensuous~~ limitations the mind is pained by its finitude in presence of the object, yet in its moral greatness as a free agent it reacts against this feeling and asserts its superiority to anything in nature.

In the *Analytic of the Beautiful* Kant determines its nature by a method corresponding to the four groups of categories deduced in the *Transcendental Analytic*. As to quality the judgment of taste is a subjective judgment implying merely the feeling of the mind in contemplation of the object and is marked off from the pleasant and the good by being disinterested. The pleasant as such is related to desire and the good whether viewed as a means or as in itself (moral good) involves the conception of an end and hence both imply an interest in their object.

again, as to quantity the judgment of taste is individual and subjective; but since this subjectivity is stripped of the sensuous element of interest the judgment is also subjectively-objective-in the sense that we feel compelled to judge that the same satisfaction will be felt by everyone. The judgment rests upon direct perception not upon conceptions; beauty is not in the object but in the mind's satisfaction with the harmony of its own faculties which the object calls into play. The free play of our faculties is the ground of the judgment which is not preceded by the feeling of pleasure but followed by it and this free play ensues when the faculties are freed from the necessity of constituting the object under a conception. Hence we posit the universality of the judgment, because the faculties of knowledge operate identically in all men.

Further, as to relation the judgment of taste rests upon a formal or subjective adaptation of purposiveness only in the object and hence is free of interest which accompanies the idea of an end. It is a priori, operating somewhat similarly to the feeling of reverence in the practical reason; the aesthetic satisfaction arises from the consciousness of the harmony of our faculties. Continued contemplation leads to no definite knowledge of the object; the mind merely increases its delight in the beautiful object by dwelling on and reproducing it. The aesthetic judgment being free of interest must be free also of sensuous charm or emotion; being immediate it can depend neither on external nor internal purposiveness (end) of the object, as such would involve knowledge gained through a conception-hence the idea of beauty is distinct from the idea of perfection.

Finally, as to modality the judgment of taste is subjectively universal and necessary; this is so because all minds being subject to the same feeling as accompanying knowledge which feeling is communicable we are entitled a priori to posit a common sense, meaning thereby a common feeling.

In the Analytic of the Sublime, which idea, ~~emphasizes~~ out of the mind's reaction against the form or formlessness of the object when something of tremendous magnitude or power, Kant traces the similarity and dissimilarity between the sublime and the beautiful emphasizing that the idea of the sublime is not so fruitful as the idea of the beautiful because it does not require us to apply the conception of purpose to nature.

Kant established for all time the great structure of true aesthetic theory; he differentiated clearly between the realm of beauty on the one hand and the fields of the understanding of sensuous pleasure and of moral satisfaction on the other; above all he establishes the beautiful as the connecting link between the two worlds of the sensible and the supersensible-the position is impossible unless there is a unity immanent in both.

But though the true ground is attained it is yet left, formally at least, lacking in concreteness. In delimiting the sphere of beauty Kant so sharply draws the line separating it from elements of sensuous or moral import as to leave the idea largely an abstraction; moreover his insistence that beauty is subjective-though he stretches this determination to a subjective-objectivity though he does not

objectivity leaves beauty largely void of content. But, though this is so formally, Kant yet in effect admits an objective element and though he does not solve the antithesis he opens the way which indicates its solution.

By relating the judgment of taste to knowledge-in-general seen as the condition of the free play of faculty and by assigning to it communicable feeling, Kant indirectly admits a concrete content while his doctrine of dependent beauty--where the strict limit of purposiveness without a purpose (end) is overstepped--even though such beauty is qualified as "impure" introduces, especially in the Ideal, a significant import within the lines of beauty proper for the result is to indicate a unity which may not be severed between reason and beauty. Kant defines the Ideal to be "that archetype of taste which certainly rests on the indeterminate idea that reason has of a maximum but which cannot be represented by concepts but only in an individual presentation," and he refers this Ideal to a judgment of taste which is in part intellectual. Now the only being who can determine his purposes by reason is man, hence man has the purpose of his existence in himself and therefore man alone of all objects in the world is capable of furnishing an Ideal, that is in the human figure. And this Ideal at its best is not the normal ideal or average archetype of the race but that which expresses "the highest purposiveness"--goodness of heart, purity, strength, peace, etc.--to be made "Visible as it were in bodily manifestation." This Ideal requires a union of pure ideas of reason with great imaginative power, even in him who wishes to judge of it, still more in him who wishes to present it."

Through the partial inclusion of the Ideal in the realm of beauty the Characteristic finds definite lodgment and, though as yet allowed within narrow limits--to be only "correct" (i.e. participating in the rational, rather than in the sensuous) and not "pure" all that is now wanting is a deeper synthesis of beauty and reason in order that the Characteristic may receive justification as the central element in the modern sense of beauty.

Kant himself implicitly approaches this synthesis. Genius is posited as necessary to the production of the beautiful in Art, and among the faculties that constitute genius there is placed spirit, or the animating principle of the mind in the realm of aesthetic<sup>spirit</sup>. It is the faculty of presenting aesthetical ideas and as such ideas cannot be fully represented by any concept of reason they are so far the counterpart of rational ideas by which no intuition, (representation) can be adequate. Following this view Kant develops a theory of symbolism under which for a concept of reason that cannot be adequately represented a representation of comparison is supplied according to the mode of procedure of the judgment in the schematism of the understanding--e.g.. a living body to symbolise a constitutional state and a machine to symbolise an absolute one,--the basis being a similarity in the rules by which we reflect on the symbol and the thing symbolized respectively. And he comes to this conclusion,--"The beautiful is the symbol of the morally good." It is not too much, then, to say that his account of beauty through it stands in formal attractiveness yet carries with it the concreteness of an import involving all that was to be developed by his successors.



Schiller developed the deeper sense that lay implicitly in the theory of Kant; (4) Hegel gives him the credit for "the great service of having broken through the Kantian, subjectivity and abstraction of thought. (5)" Starting with the proposition - "It is through ~~the~~ beauty that we arrive at freedom," he declares the art of the beautiful to be an instrument for the ennobling of character and the incarnate form of triumphant truth; the idea should be deduced from the simple possibility of a nature both sensuous and rational. Man exhibits two impulses, the sensuous and the rational-the former binding him to matter, the latter seeking to free him from it, to lift him from the unity of magnitude in which he was enclosed to the unity of idea which keeps subject all phenomena. These impulses though contrary are not if properly balanced contradictory for they are not contradictory in the same objects; they therefore require to have limits sent them by the free act of the ego. Now the instinct of play unites and harmonizes the two other instincts. The ~~sensuous~~ <sup>on</sup> instinct has for its object life, the moral instinct ~~shape~~ <sup>shape</sup> or form but the play instinct living form or in other words beauty. "Beauty weds the two opposed conditions of feeling and thinking" - though these are contrary to each other and can never be one. But the strivings of the two impulses tend to delimit the sphere of each and thus to secure their autonomy; hence when the soul passed from sensation to thought it traverses neutral ground where the distinctions cease, and the state of the mind in this ground is denominated aesthetic. In the aesthetic state the mind recovers its freedom as well from the activity of the will as from the passivity of the sensuous, and the extent of the fulness to which the mind is so moved is the test of the relative value of the aesthetic feeling. Beauty conducts us into the world of ideas without taking us from the world of sense.

In brief, Schiller raises the beautiful from the isolation in which Kant had left it, and reconciles the sensuous and the rational in man through the aesthetic judgment in which these sink themselves and which therefore marks the meeting point of both and indicates a reality in which the finite and the infinite have their ground. The beautiful which is the matter of the aesthetic judgment is thus the expression of the totality of Man's being and as such is truly objective and not merely subjectively so as Kant had contended. Schiller founds this objectively on his theory of aesthetic semblance (chiefly of fine art) and the play impulse. ~~He~~ Schiller nobly indicates the part that beauty plays in the humanizing process. The aesthetic impulse emancipates man; it softens his manners, <sup>by moral influence</sup> develops feeling for the beautiful. Schiller represents man as "ennobling by beauty and suppressing (in the passion of love; <sup>the beautiful impulse is played by nature</sup> and again he says "Of all the inclinations that are decided from the feeling for the beautiful and that are special to refined minds none commends itself so much to the moral sense as the ennobled instinct of love; none is so fruitful in impressions which correspond to the true dignity of man. To what an elevation does it raise human nature; and often what divine sparks does it kindle in the common soul; ~~It~~ It is a sacred fire that consumes every egoistical inclination and the very principles of morality are scarcely a greater safeguard of the soul's chastity than love is for the nobility of the heart;" - and again "Love draws its source from the seat of liberty-Pure spirit can only love, but not esteem; the senses know only esteem but not love."

(4) Schiller's Essays Aesthetical and Philosophical (including the Aesthetical letters) London, Geo Bell and Sons 1900.  
(5) Hegel's Aesthetic-Introduction.



For Schiller the form (i. e. beauty) is derived from "the

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The Characteristic may be defined generally as expressiveness or significance. Aesthetic import in the presentation, the revelation of the idea, the representative, the representation of that which is individual.. In philosophical terms it may be described as the suggestion in sensuous form of an aspiration which no such perception can adequately and completely contain.

the suggestion of the symbolic center of

of the same unit and system. Hegel gave this thought greater definiteness

... principle when it has ceased to do its work, and through which it passes over into a new positive carrying with it something of the previous form and better adapted to carry on the same work viewed as in a connected system or world movement. According to Hegel in true art the Idea and the form in which it is embodied must be internally united and fused into one thus attaining the Ideal. The Idea is not foreign to matter but is in it potentially. The Idea must not be abstract but concrete and determined by particularization; only from the truly concrete Idea can the true shape be generated and the fusion of the two is the ideal. Hegel's Idea is the concrete world process, and its early stage is in its indistinctness or "vicious untrue Determinateness" -- it gives rise to the symbolic form of art. In eloquent language Hegel figuratively describes the operation of the Idea at this stage when it does not find the shapes adequate to itself. "It proceeded to exaggerate the natural shapes and the phenomena of reality into indefiniteness and disproportion, to intoxicate itself in them to seethe and ferment in them, to do violence to them to distort and explode them into unnatural shapes and strives by the variety, hugeness and splendor of the forms employed to exalt the phenomenon ~~at~~ the level of the Idea." These aspects are found in the primitive art of the East; "the inadequacy of shape to idea remains insuperable; this period of art is marked by "aspiration, disguised mystery and sublimity." This type by negation passes into the classical art form where the idea reveals itself in the shape peculiar and conformable to itself. i.e. the human form. The content is the concrete spiritual or the truly inner self; the subjective notion finds the shape which the absolute or original notion invented. The shape is purified that it may express a content adequate to itself; again, the Spiritual meaning of content "must be qualified to express itself completely in the physical form of man without projecting into another world beyond the scope of such an expression in sensuous and bodily terms." Mind under this form is therefore specified as a particular type of mind or human mind, and is not as absolute and external. Now, this defect by negation dissolves the classical form and prepares the way for the romantic form of art. In the romantic form of art the Idea again ceased to have union with its reality, but this disparateness is on a higher plane than in the symbolic form. The limitation of art to the expression of mind as human mind is now removed; mind in the romantic concrete universality.

form is mind in its essence as the definite

The romantic form of Art, therefore, is one of deeper significance than the classical, and this significance agrees with the distinction between the Christian view of God as Spirit and the Greek belief in the gods which form the appropriate content in classical art. The Greek view had for its latent content the union of the divine with the human. This content was not explicit; the Greek god was the subject of sensuous imagination, his shape was the shape of a man and in power and being he was individual and limited.

The difference between latent and self-conscious knowledge is vast as seen in the distinction between animals and men. Immediately therefore that the union of the human and the divine is raised from the state of latent to that of self-conscious knowledge the true medium for the reality of the content becomes self-conscious, inward intelligence and the new content is freed from the necessity of sensuous representation; on the contrary the representation must be absorbed into the content. The union of the human with the divine becomes self-conscious in Christianity which points to God as Spirit or mind, not as particularized but as absolute in spirit and in truth. The object of art is now "free, concrete, intellectual being" revealing itself as spiritual existence for the inward (=spiritualized) world of spirit. Now must art address itself to the inward (spiritualized) mind, to the heart and feelings as spiritualized. The Idea must now reveal itself. In the medium of spirit and feelings as perfected in itself; external existence becomes contingent, the reconciliation is inward (=spiritual.). Hence romantic art by reason of its greater perfection as compared with earlier forms "withdraws itself from any adequate union with the external element" Here Hegel's position is correspondent to Schiller's view that beauty is truth in its nudity.

Hegel next points the difference between the Greek god in himself-contained isolation and the Christian God negating his abstractness by becoming a to-and-fro between his unity and himself and his revelation of himself in the individual and thereby realizing himself concretely in the subjectivity of the community. This realization through dispersion therefore reveals itself now as particular spiritual being, whence the manifold subjectivity with its passion, action and incident, human feeling and will becomes the object of artistic representation. Wherefore painting and music, and poetry by reason of their flexibility become the appropriate vehicles for this form of art; of these poetry is the most spiritual and the highest type.

Hegel was the last of the great transcendentalists and not unworthy to be placed close to Kant himself. The work of all subsequent inquirers in the field of aesthetic, including the investigations and deductions of Ruskin (6) is but an elaboration of ideas already noted as included in the system of German thinkers from Kant to Hegel. On that account no further exposition of modern thought is required for our purpose but it will be well here to note in passing the status in practice and in theory of aesthetic among the Greeks. On this point it will not be necessary to add much to the view given us by Hegel.

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(6) Ruskin-Modern Painters; Stones of Venice, etc.

The deepest distinction between ancient and modern aesthetic arises from the oneness of the Greek mind. This with its cause has already been noted in our statement of Hegel's theory. Schiller, perhaps more plainly, puts it thus: "It is humanity alone which to the Greek contains all the idea of beauty and of perfection. Never for the Greek is nature purely physical nature and for that reason he does not blush to honor it; never for him is reason purely reason, and for that reason he has not to tremble in submitting to its rule. The physical nature and moral sentiments, matter and mind, earth and heaven melt together with a marvellous beauty in his poetry" (Grace and Dignity.) This reposeful spirit is shown among other ways in what Schiller calls the play-impulse as indicated in their art. "They effaced from the brow of their gods the earnestness and labor which furrow the cheeks of mortals, and also the hollow lust that smoothes the empty face. They set free the ever serene from the chains of every purpose of every duty, of every care." And again in speaking of one of their creations Schiller says. "While in ecstasy we give ourselves up to the heavenly beauty, the heavenly self-repose awes us back."

The Greek had not that high spiritual ideal that sense of opposition between spirit and phenomena to be overcome only, through the realization of absolute spirit or the divine in the ~~the~~ individual subjectively. Neither Plato (7) nor Aristotle (8) explicitly rises above the view that restricts beauty to the formal or to the element of unity in variety, and though these great thinkers did inestimable service through their formulation of a principle within which later developments of aesthetic are must move, yet their theory was encumbered by three outstanding fallacies from which aesthetic on its reflection side was not formally freed till the time of Kant. These fallacies are that art is imitative of nature (in Plato imitative of the second reality) and therefore inferior to reality, that it is related to man as commonplace reality only, and finally that beauty is based on moralistic considerations instead of being independent of through co-ordinate with morality as springing from a common root.

It is true that in the works of these philosophers there are contained ideas and views which contradict their formal trend and which are the shadowy outlines of great truths yet to be made clear. It is equally true that in practice the Art of Greece had gone beyond the merely formal and had embodied a type of mild characterization; we must conclude from such sculptures as that of the Venus dei Medici (Florence Uffizi) (9) and the Aphrodite of Cnidus, after Prazziteles (Rome-Vatican). But though in the works of the Great Masters of Greece there is shown the grey dawn of the principle that has attained its full meridian in the modern world yet for want of a pregnant informing principles their art could not rise ~~from~~ above the limitations of the formal.

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- (7) Plato-Republic, Laws, Phaedrus, Philebus.
  - (8) Aristotle-Poetics Politics, Rhetoric.
  - (9) Gardiner's Handbook of Greek Sculpture.

Kant in his Critique of Judgment in treating of the Ideal of beauty says that while we consider some products of taste as exemplary and copy models yet the taste consists in judging of the model itself; hence; "the highest model, the archetype of taste is a mere Idea which everyone must produce in himself; and according to which he must judge every object of taste, every example of judgment by taste and even the taste of everyone." Hence before a radical departure in the field of aesthetic could occur there must be a leaven working in the world-consciousness and contributing implicitly to the formation of a changed and expanded Idea or archetype of taste; this leaven Hegel finds in Christianity.

For ages before philosophy had furnished an adequate theory in the system of Kant and elaborated by his successors the modern art-consciousness had been flowering forth into a mass of concrete material and there had developed the sense of a beauty altogether antedating of that which had influenced the ancients. We must now consider the generating force which furnished the principle for this trend of the world-consciousness.

Christianity is at once the originator and the great outstanding fact of the modern world. All systems and modes of thought whatever that survive or have existed are in some degree or other deduced from or colored by the doctrines of Christianity, and if faith in Christ were to die out of the world yet the world could never shake itself clear of His influence.

Let us for a moment consider Christ in the correct historical setting and perspective which presents Him to us in His person, work and influence as the greatest figure this world has seen. As man how humanly and simply human He was; He loved the noble architecture of the Temple, He loved those at whose home He was wont to visit, He wept at the grave of His friend; as generous as He was sympathetic He rewards the personal kindness done Him with the gift of God (Luke VII, 36-50); that He might enter into the joys, sorrows and confidences of men He came among them "eating and drinking" (Matt. XI-19) His compassion knew no bounds (Matt. VI-34, XIV-14, XX-34, Mark VIII-2, etc.) and His mercy was never appealed to in vain.

Christ as man suffers fatigue, hunger, the deeps of sorrow (Matt. XXVI-38) and even death itself. He teaches the most complete brotherhood of man (Matt. XXIII-8-12, Mark LX-35) and in His divine no less than in His human capacity He associates Himself unreservedly, nay submerges Himself, in this brotherhood making the recognition of Himself in our fellow man the basis of the final judgment and right to heaven—"For I was an hungred and ye gave me meat; I was thirsty and ye gave me drink; I was a stranger and ye took me in, naked, and ye clothed me; I was sick, and ye visited me; I was in prison, and ye came unto me.—Verily I say unto you, inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me," (Matt. XXV-35-40).

Again, Christ shows the fine spirit and mettle of the manly man; we see that he calls Herod by his right name, (Luke XLII-32)



we find Him angry with hypocrites ( Mark 111-6) and indignant at the money changers, direct at all times and uncompromising in his teachings-"Think not that I am come to send peace on earth/ I came not to send peace but a sword," ( Matt. V-34.) How shall men conceive in its fulness the true balance of such a character?

Superadded to this most perfect manhood, lying behind it and sustaining it, was the essence of Divinity-hence the clear assurance, the marvellous miracles, the strength that calmed the sea, the infinite reconciliation, the authority which confirmed his teaching. In the person of Christ we find God manifesting, nevertheless in the flesh and through the feelings of a man, the true ideal of man in God or of the perfect man whose will must be fused into and coincide with the will of God. Such a transcendent character infinitely surpassing the largest conception of the Greeks-presents in itself aspects various enough to give rise to diversity of interpretation since it involves the whole problem of reconciliation of the flesh and the spirit, but there is a possibility that this diversity will be much increased by the nature of Christ's law for here we have a problem-as between the law of God narrowly considered and the example of Christ which must be reconciled by each individual in his own practice.

Let us take one instance as illustrating this problem; In John VIII. 5-11 we read that when the Jews brought to Christ a woman who had sinned, quoting the law of Moses that she should be stoned, and asking him-what sayest thou? He replied, "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her." He then stooped down and wrote on the ground, doubtless to avoid humiliating his questioners, whereupon the accusers departed and as the sacred narrative continues. "When Jesus had lifted up Himself, and saw none but the woman, he said unto her, Woman, where are those thine accusers? hath no man condemned thee?"

She said, No man, Lord. And Jesus said unto her, Neither do I condemn thee; go and sin no more." In Matt. XII, 1-3 we have the law rationally interpreted in a bold free construction regarding the sabbath day but in the case cited nothing whatever is said about or against the law while an example contrary to it is allowed to have effect. It is to be noted also that Christ repeatedly insists on the importance of the law (Matt. V, and X-IV, 17) and the seriousness of sin ( Matt. XVIII, 7-9), makes the keeping of the commandments a condition of life ( Matt XXII-17) and collects His talents with usury (Matt. XXV-27).

Now the power and fruitfulness of Christ's Word lies in this antithesis between example and law which requires for its solution the deepest synthesis of the Christian consciousness and involves the possibility of a living progressive development. No law can formulate Christ's doctrine nor dogma as such fully set it forth for in its inner excellence and spirit it must have elastic and flexible in the feeling of the individual heart in the Christ-like conscience and accountable subjectivity of the individual; "The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation neither shall they say, Lo here! or lo there! for behold the Kingdom of God is within you," ( Luke XVII - 20 & 21).

This is what Hegel has in mind when in philosophical language he describes the Christian God as a to-and-fro-revealing himself in the individual and thereby realizing himself concretely

in the subjectivity of the community and we have seen that Hegel derives from this realization the multiplicity of particular spiritual being with its manifold of passion, action and incident, human feeling and will which now becomes the object of artistic representation. Here we find a great and radical advance on Greek theory and even on Greek practice. Henceforward the type of art must be romantic, and the Characteristic in its varying forms must be at the heart of artistic utterance; the multitudinous problems arising from the infinite combinations which are possible in the web of life must have full expression. Henceforward, too, beauty will be co-ordinate with moral law as springing from the same root; we have seen it developed philosophically that beauty is the expression of the same immanent rational principle which lies alike at the root of nature and freedom or morality. These positions have become possible because there was a Christ who left man neither to the rigid shackles of a law (as the Hebrews) nor to his own arbitrary caprice (as the Sophists) but who worked out a mediation in the free movement of the individual autonomous will acting within the law and under the sense of accountability which must come from seeking the good of self in the highest good of all other selves. Of "things new and old" Christ brought forth his treasure (Matt. XIII-52); not alone in the domain of morality does he speak to us but through the perception of beauty as well, whether it be of grace in limb or feature, the glance of soulful eye or the glory of sunny ringlets. Wherever that perception is given to us we may seem to hear the Voice sounding through the centuries, "Be of good cheer; it is I; be not afraid."

With the spread of Christianity the new spirit entered into and began to transform the art-consciousness. It made itself felt in the coloring, the chivalry and the aspirations of the middle ages. For centuries it sought to shadow forth Christ Himself, the Virgin and the Saints. It welled up in Dante and Shakespeare. In multitudinous forms it reveals itself in the movements and interests of the later centuries. Speaking of chivalry an historian says, "The fascination of sex and loveliness was again joined to that of celestial dignity, and the homage of chivalry was blended with that of religion" (10). The problem of the reconciliation of the flesh and the spirit affected this age profoundly.

The Ecce Homo by Guido Rœni (1575-1642) (11) is characterized by a strength-an abidingness-in the features as enduring as the ribs of earth itself; the face is overcast with the dull grey tone of agony; the uplifted eyes speak of an infinite knowledge with an infinite purpose and power in reserve. It is the soul of all things that speaks through this countenance; there is nothing at all to equal it in any Greek conception not even in that of Hercules or Prometheus.

Again in the Immaculate Conception (Murillo, 1618-1682) (11) we are struck by the marvellous grace and dignity of the figure in its robes of white and blue surrounded by clouds of admiring cherubs. The head is magnificent; the face combines feminine loveliness with adequate dignity softened however by the rapture which shines from every feature. The hands, the throat and the pose of the whole figure are in keeping with the sublime idea of the composition.

(10) Macaulay-Images.

(11) Famous paintings reproduced in color-Cassell & Co., 1913

The presence is bathed and suffused in ;

" The light that never was on sea or land,"

The consecration, and the poets dream,"

The Greeks never conceived anything to compare with this. Let us cite another example of romantic art-the painting by Lark Leighton ( 1830-1896) (11) "and the sea gave up the dead which were in it." Figures appear rising clothed in flesh but some yet dead; among them is a man clasping in his right arm his wife to whom life has not yet returned and in his left a boy who is beginning to be restored to animation. The man's face is turned upward as he gazes into the sky dark with clouds but with ~~the~~ glow of a dawn behind them. The look on the face is full of the mystery of the grave and bright with the hope of the resurrection. Again, we feel that the Greeks accomplished nothing to compare with this.

Kant in speaking of aesthetical attributes shows that the imagination emulates the reason in the effort to reach a maximum and hence presents ideas to sense "with a completeness of which there is no example in nature," and such ideas are aesthetical because they "arouse more thought than can be expressed in a concept determined by words." Art of every kind including poetry and rhetoric must possess these aesthetical ideas. Now the teaching and examples of Christ and the most pregnant texts of scripture are of such a nature as to possess the attributes required by Kant and so also is any solution illustrating deeply any feature of this teaching. Again, Schiller says suffering must be expressed to represent moral freedom as triumphing over natural force, hence the pathetic which enters into beauty and which has two conditions, v.g. suffering to interest our sensuous nature and moral liberty to interest our spiritual nature. Now the magazine article cited at the commencement of this thesis displays suffering and moral liberty in sharp relief; moreover it displays the Christlike conception of self-sacrifice. It is this well within the boundary of aesthetic and it is within that boundary by reason of the Characteristic. Morally it can work no wrong for the principle of the autonomy of the will does not justify any person in imitating the Minister's action per se, but on the contrary obliges him in the light of Christ's doctrine to choose his own course, for which he will be strictly responsible, whenever he finds himself in any similar situation.

The doctrine of the Characteristic explains to a large extent the phenomena of love as it exists in the Christian world. We have seen what stress Schiller puts on the effect of beauty in ennobling this passion. When we reflect then that aptitude to attraction in its nature varies as the variety of the subjectivity and add to this <sup>the</sup> psychological fact pretty generally admitted that in love it is not the whole person that attracts but some particular feature (i.e. as embodying the Characteristic) -eyes, hair, head, figure, etc., we may account partly for difference of opinion in this direction.

That beauty is greatest which carries the greatest Characteristic and shadows forth the deepest import. It may be of a lovely brow crowned with bright curls and lighted by blue eyes deep with the wonderful significance of a sympathetic and cultured nature, or again it may be of some other type or feature; or yet again it may indicate antitheses of the flesh and spirit but with the spirit in control as in the case of blooming and redundant beauty; but in every case whatever it is the revelation of the divine shining through the veils of sense. To appreciate characteristic beauty fully requires a special aptitude in the percipient.

The doctrine of the Characteristic greatly enlarges the sphere of beauty for not to speak at all of its realization in animal forms and in animate nature—there are few people who have not some feature or trait that may be pronounced beautiful. The noblest characteristic is that which carries with it a pure and idealizing influence boding forth infinite beauty revealed through a fine soul and through some feature of its earthly vesture. Happy the man to whom such beauty has been once vouchsafed and in whose being it has awakened a sentiment for he may enshrine the memory in his heart as a guiding presence of his life and find therein the transfiguration of his nature.