

Islamism and Islamic Terrorism:
A Politicized Civilizational Reaction to Threatened Cultural Identity

by

Joëlle Nicole Saltel

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
The University of Manitoba
in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Studies
University of Manitoba
Winnipeg

Copyright © 2007 by Joëlle Nicole Saltel

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

COPYRIGHT PERMISSION

Islamism and Islamic Terrorism:

A Politicized Civilizational Reaction to Threatened Cultural Identity

BY

Joëlle Nicole Saltel

**A Thesis/Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University of
Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirement of the degree**

MASTER OF ARTS

Joëlle Nicole Saltel © 2007

Permission has been granted to the University of Manitoba Libraries to lend a copy of this thesis/practicum, to Library and Archives Canada (LAC) to lend a copy of this thesis/practicum, and to LAC's agent (UMI/ProQuest) to microfilm, sell copies and to publish an abstract of this thesis/practicum.

This reproduction or copy of this thesis has been made available by authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research, and may only be reproduced and copied as permitted by copyright laws or with express written authorization from the copyright owner.

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
<i>Historical and political context: themes and concepts</i>	1
<i>Outline of thesis</i>	5
<i>Methodology</i>	6
CHAPTER TWO	10
Introduction	10
Islamism	12
<i>History of Islamism</i>	12
<i>The definition of Islamism</i>	22
<i>The difference between Islam and Islamism</i>	25
<i>Important concepts in Islamism</i>	26
<i>The Islamists</i>	28
<i>Influence on Islamism</i>	34
Culture and Identity	37
<i>Culture and Identity in International Relations</i>	37
<i>Clash of Civilizations</i>	39
Islamism and Terrorism	44
<i>Definition of Terrorism</i>	45
<i>Islamic Terrorism as an extreme form of conflict</i>	46
<i>Analysis of Terrorism in International Relations</i>	48

Conclusion: A Paradigm Shift in International Relations	49
CHAPTER THREE	52
Introduction	52
Recent Change of International Conflict	55
<i>Discussion on conflict and the Clash of Civilization</i>	55
<i>Islamism as a source of International Conflict</i>	60
Relating Islamism to Globalization	66
<i>The Rise of an Ideology</i>	66
<i>The Threat of Globalization</i>	72
<i>Responses</i>	75
The Most Important Political Movement of the Twenty-First Century	81
<i>September 11, 2001: Creating Greater Division in the World</i>	81
<i>Islamism as an Alternative</i>	83
Conclusion: Preventing the Clash	85
<i>Global Cultures</i>	85
<i>The Role of International Relations</i>	88
CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION	91
<i>Review</i>	91
<i>Results and Analysis</i>	94
<i>Future Considerations</i>	100
BIBLIOGRAPHY	103

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I sincerely want to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. George MacLean for his patience and guidance during the development of this thesis. I would also like to acknowledge the faculty members and staff of the Department of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba for their unconditional support and dedication throughout this process. I am also grateful to Dr. Raymond Hébert and Dr. Titiana Arcand from the Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface for encouraging me to pursue Graduate studies in 2002 – merci!

I would also like to recognize my friends and family who stood by me throughout the years and who provided much needed emotional support. Merci à mom, dad et Sylvie. A special thanks goes out to Stéphanie Leclercq, Diane Boyd, Lawrence Price, Daniel Bérubé and Dr. Philippe Lagacé-Weins for giving me their honest opinions, feedback on several chapters and help in general. Thanks to all the members of the Dead Politics Society (Joseph, Sunny, Denys, Amanda and Wilson) for pushing me along even long after you had already finished!

Finally, I would like to thank my wonderful partner and husband, Mathieu Allard for all his advice and encouragement. Without you, this would not have been possible. "Love is not looking at each other, but looking out together at the world." (Antoine de St. Exupère)

ABSTRACT

This thesis identifies how Islamism is a politicized civilizational reaction to threatened cultural identity due to globalization. By clearly defining Islamism, relating this new political movement to cultural identity and identifying the subtleties that exist within, this research suggests that the field of International Relations is currently witnessing a paradigm shift.

This thesis also answers key questions about the current international political situation by examining the causes of international conflict spurred on by Islamism and Islamic terrorism from a cultural/civilizational standpoint. While Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" theory has had an impact on the emergence of Islamism, the entire phenomenon of globalization is identified as the main threat and has generated extreme reactions, expressed only by a small faction of Islamists. Hence, what is actually occurring is a clash between civilizations and globalization and not a clash between civilizations *per se*.

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

Historical and Political Context: Themes and Concepts

In 1993 Samuel P. Huntington re-ignited the cultural debate in the field of International Relations with the release of his controversial article entitled “The Clash of Civilizations.” Along with the later release of his book with the same title, Huntington argued that culture, as a reference for identity, has become an important factor in everyday politics, both domestically and internationally. Huntington went on to assert that the end of the Cold War has obligated people and entire societies to identify themselves with cultural particularities instead of ideologies. Therefore, in Huntington’s main argument, local and regional cultural identities have become, in a broad sense, civilizational identities, from which different civilizations would clash and conflict would inevitably arise. Huntington then suggests that cultural divisions will be the main source of conflict:

The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the more powerful actors in world affairs but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.¹

Political Islam and Islamic terrorism, within the parameters of the concept of “Islamism,” is an obvious example of the phenomenon of a movement creating international conflict that resulted from a threat to a group, or civilization. As defined by prominent authors, such as Graham Fuller, John Esposito, Daniel Pipes and Martin Kramer, Islamism is understood as a modern political movement based on important

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (1993): 22.

principals of Islam, otherwise known as political Islam,² but it is nevertheless necessary to distinguish between Islam as a religion and Islamism as a political movement. And just like all other modern political movements, Islamists can be moderate or extreme; Islamic terrorism is the most extreme form of this political movement, usually supported and promoted by extreme Islamists and Islamic fundamentalists.

Identity in the post-Cold War era is more culturally infused than in the past. However, this newly recognized cultural identity is not the leading cause of conflict. Although culture is an important political force in domestic and international politics, it is the threat to cultural identity that leads to conflict. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era and in the recent years following the September 11th attacks, Islamism holds that the main challenge to civilizational/cultural identity world-wide has been the universalisation of standards and norms through the process of globalization or what it is alleged by Islamists to be: Westernization and Americanization:

Furthermore, beneath the rugged international political surface which characterizes the post-11 September world order lies another smoldering fire called globalization, which is itself posing a devastating socio-economic challenge to the Muslim world. Political Islam, therefore, assesses the power of the New Rome not only in terms of its sophisticated firepower and huge military legions but also in terms of its capacity to change the political economy of the Muslim states, in its own image. On both fronts, the United States emerges as Islam's main enemy. All the more so when it is so closely allied to the Middle East state of Israel.³

If universalisation and its imposed system of values influence every aspect of existence, then Islamic terrorism within the context of Islamism can be perceived as an extreme reaction to threatened civilizational identity. In fact, Martin Kramer believes that

² "Is Islamism a Threat?: A Debate," *Middle East Quarterly*, (December, 1999).

³ Anoushiravan Etheshami, "Islam as a political force in international politics" in *Islam in World Politics*, eds. Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud, (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 48.

Islamism emerged solely as a response to modern Western ideologies.⁴ This interpretation of Islamism provides a useful insight for understanding how civilizational identity plays an important role in international politics, as it identifies Islamism as a malignant form of the civilizational debate and the “clash of civilizations” as a self-fulfilling theory.⁵

This thesis explores cultural identity as a cause of conflict within the context of the civilizational debate and the resulting civilizational paradigm. The thesis takes Huntington’s argument one step further by demonstrating through Islamism that it is the *fear of loss of identity* and not cultural identity itself that leads to conflict. In so doing, the contribution of this thesis is the examination of cultural and civilizational identity itself. The fear of loss of identity is understood as the reaction to the potential loss of a group or civilization’s way of life and values. By studying the Islamic civilization throughout the world and how it has reacted to the fear of the loss of their identity, this thesis identifies Islamism as the most malignant form of the civilizational conflict.

When Islamism emerged as an important phenomenon, theorists and scholars faced the challenge of explaining it from a different theoretical approach since realism, which holds that states are the primary actors in International Relations, and previous theories could no longer be applied to this particular situation; states were no longer the only nor the most “powerful” actors in International Relations. Current common frameworks often neglected culture and identity because it was deemed to be a domestic issue: “In the neorealist world, social and cultural factors are relegated to the domestic

⁴ “Is Islamism a Threat?: A Debate,” *Middle East Quarterly*, (December 1999).

⁵ Jonathan Barker, *The No-Nonsense Guide to Terrorism*, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2003), 108.

realm, where they remain irrelevant to the workings of international relations.”⁶ In this particular case, extreme Islamism and terrorism were used to reject the current structure, usually strongly imposed by Western society, but from outside the structure itself. New theories also needed to account for the fact that terrorism was also precipitated by the confinements of this same structure itself. But throughout this debate remains the importance of identity and culture, which in this case, has led to what is now known as a civilizational Islamic collective consciousness based on traditional principles of the umma (community or nation).⁷

The practical significance of this analysis is its contribution to our understanding of current international conflict through extreme Islamism – Islamic terrorism – as a reaction to threatened cultural identity. Although terrorism is not a recent phenomenon, it is has become the modern-day warfare tactic of choice for non-state actors and globalization has played a significant role in promoting its uses. While war has traditionally been between states or between opposing groups within a state, today’s opponents are no longer confined to any geographic borders from within or outside the state. This aspect of international conflict has changed and the new actors can now be characterized as culturally diversified groups or civilizations, fighting to maintain their identities or widen the scope of their influence globally.

⁶ William E. Connolly, *Identity Difference – Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 85.

⁷ Ahmad Shboul, “Between rhetoric and reality: Islam and politics in the Arab world,” in *Islam in World Politics*, eds. Anthony H. John & Nelly Lahoud, (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 171.

Outline of Thesis

This thesis identifies how civilizational reactions to threatened cultural identity can lead to conflict. By posing the argument that threatened cultural identity is the cause of potential conflict, this thesis will clearly disassociate the “vehicle of conflict with the source of conflict,”⁸ allowing for a more objective examination of Islamism.

Chapter Two explores the existing literature on Islamism and cultural identity theory, including the civilizational theory according to Huntington and other prominent authors. R.B.J. Walker has argued that culture is an important element in International Relations theory and has long been neglected or considered irrelevant to help comprehend the interaction among all international actors.⁹ By trying to identify the fundamental principals of Islamism, the root causes for Islamic terrorism reveals itself as more than just the debate over ideology and Islam. This chapter will establish the definitions of culture, civilization, and the most extreme form of Islamism leading to international conflict, Islamic terrorism, while also looking at the impact of the Clash of Civilizations debate on existing literature and particular international situations. The link between culture and Islamism will also be closely identified.

Chapter Three examines the recent change of international conflict and its primary actors and how the Islamic civilization has reacted to threatened cultural identity. While globalization allows for an unprecedented exposure of culture and an increased fear of the unknown, the proliferation of causes of conflict within these conditions will be investigated, thus relating Islamism to globalization and its cultural threats. This chapter

⁸ Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 202.

⁹ R.B.J. Walker, “The Concept of Culture in the Theory of International Relations” in *Culture and International Relations*, ed. Jongsuk Chay, (New York, Westport & London: Praeger, 1990).

determines that Islamic terrorism is a reaction to both threatened civilizational identity and globalization, which consequently creates greater division in the world. It will also identify Islamism as the most important civilizational political movement of the twenty-first century. This section also looks at possible ways to prevent the “Clash” (according to this new interpretation of culture and conflict) and thus minimize various acts of terrorism. Unlike Huntington’s reluctance to accept pluralist solutions, these sorts of approaches could become useful in minimizing the ignorance of difference, and therefore diminishing potential conflict.

The conclusion, Chapter Four, will elaborate the major findings, the implications of these findings and possible future directions. Whichever way this political movement develops, extreme Islamism represents a malignant form of the cultural/civilizational debate and its success or failure of warding off imposed foreign values will undoubtedly influence other “potential” civilizations to also attempt to defend their identities. Unless all international actors find a significant way to deal with cultural difference, without giving globalization free reign to impose mostly western ideals, perpetual vicious cycles of civilizational upheavals will continue to occur, and culture will remain the most emotionally charged component of international politics throughout the world.

Methodology

The thesis examines the literature on culture and identity in International Relations theory. This includes the writings of Doyle, Falk, Smith, Walker, and others, as well as Huntington’s “civilizational debate” and the reaction from his many critics. It explores the political movement of Islamism. It will also show that many common

elements exist among these bodies of work, revealing their links and mutual influences. In fact, culture as an element of international theory has been gaining importance in recent years. Culture in International Relations theory, including conflict in reference to Huntington's argument, and globalization in its various forms will be presented. Many theorists agree that conflict has changed. By basing his argument on Mayne's conclusion that "animosity among ethnic groups is beginning to rival the spread of nuclear weapons as the most serious threat to peace that the world faces,"¹⁰ Huntington argues that the end of the Cold War has obligated peoples to identify themselves within cultural particularities instead of on terms of ideology. Therefore, "[g]lobal politics began to be reconfigured along cultural lines"¹¹ and international conflict followed suit. Terrorism, an extreme form of Islamism produced primarily by non-state actors, is prominent in today's society and is inevitably linked to globalization's threat to cultural identity.

This study is a critical analysis mostly based on the examination of secondary sources. Because of the theoretic complexity of the topic at hand, primary data and interviews have not been used in this study. The main documents consulted for this research are generally articles and texts from specialized journals (such as *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *Journal of Peace Research*, *World Press Review*, *Review of International Studies*, *Harvard International Review*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Middle East Quarterly*, *Politique étrangère*), books and on-line resources, with the limited use of international newspapers and recent publications, such as articles from different universities or authors' personal websites.

¹⁰ David R. Davis & Will H. Moore, "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior," *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1997): 171.

¹¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York, Touchstone, 1996), 35.

Furthermore, a variety of different literatures were consulted in order to provide a general overview of influential academic and non-academic works, from both the Western and Islamic civilizations. While it can be argued that Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" and other authors cited do not necessarily reflect a certain academic standard, their influence in both conventional and academic circles cannot be denied. Essentially, Huntington initiated an important debate within popular Western culture, but the value of his argument within this thesis lies in the re-interpretation of the aspect of the source of conflict. This analysis also included other conventional literature (such as the controversial author Daniel Pipes and others) in order to attempt to provide a better understanding of common misperceptions of Islamism within the Western world. While these literatures created difficult obstacles to overcome within this research, they nevertheless created the opportunity to explore an interesting aspect of Huntington's original thesis. Nonetheless, this work remains a product of the literatures consulted, and as a result, it provides a unique interpretation of current international conflict from a Western perspective.

In summary, this work compliments the existing literature on culture and its relationship to international conflict and Islamism in the realm of International Relations. The practical utility of this study promises to help answer key questions about the current international political situation by examining the causes of international conflict spurred by Islamism and Islamic terrorism from a cultural/civilizational stand-point. Being able to understand conflict in all its forms, from different perspectives and its many possible causes will allow all international actors, including states, international organizations, trans-national groups or even entire civilizations to better comprehend these new cultural

divisions in the world. While trying to identify and understand the root causes for Islamic terrorism through the emergence of Islamism, this study links the proliferation of Islamic terrorism not with the religion of Islam but with the fight for self-preservation and cultural survival of the entire Islamic civilization itself.

CHAPTER TWO

Introduction

In recent years, the field of International Relations has been faced with the challenge of trying to explain the re-emergence of Islam and its political mutation, Islamism. Political Islam has developed into a broad political movement touching almost every aspect of life, ranging from culture to geography, from religion to identity, from freedom to freedom fighters. Islamism deals with culture because it makes claim of a higher grouping of peoples under the Islamic civilization, with all its history and past accomplishments. But Islamism also deals with geography because of the high concentration of adherents that originate from traditional Muslim countries of the various Asian and Middle Eastern areas. However, Islamism and its extreme form, Islamic terrorism, also has surpassed the confines of geography by often targeting Western targets, though many acts of terrorism do not result from the specific will of any particular nation-state. Islamism deals with religion based on the fact that Islamists wish to implement and develop complete Muslim societies based solely on Muslim law, the Sharia. But Islamism also deals with identity because it aims to unite all Muslims under one state while assuring that Western influences do not penetrate its borders. Theoretically, national, cultural or ethnic identity has no importance within Islamism because of the importance it places on a religious common identity. Islamists strive to achieve freedom in states that have long been controlled by foreign or homegrown oppressors. While the terrorists see themselves as "freedom fighters," the means used have come short of achieving the goal of gaining freedom for them and for the Muslim people at large.

Because of its very nature, Islamism has taken International Relations theorists by surprise. It is undeniably difficult to understand a concept that touches such a wide range of theoretical areas since no one theory can fully grasp Islamism's implications.

Nevertheless, important elements can be identified: national identity is less important for Islamism, Islamism is often equated to socialism, and Islamism is a response to the current modern situation. In order to understand these statements, specific terms and their definitions must be explained, including culture, civilization, conflict, and terrorism.

Section one of this chapter will identify major concepts and ideas pertaining to Islamism. This section will establish a practical definition of Islamism, while underlining the important difference between the religion of Islam, and Islamism. By identifying major concepts, this section will determine the influence of major theories such as socialism and nationalism on the development of Islamism.

Section two will explain why culture and identity are important to help understand Islamism and Islamic terrorism. This section will examine the role played by culture and identity in the International Relations literature, while identifying the importance of the 'Clash of Civilizations' theory as a significant element to help to understand the recent emergence of Islamism as a malignant form of the civilizational debate. Within this same context, Islamism and Islamic terrorism can also be understood as a civilizational reaction to threatened cultural identity.

Section three will focus on understanding Islamism in its most extreme form, Islamic terrorism. This section will identify potential causes of terrorism while establishing the link between international conflict and terrorism. Because of this connection, Islamic terrorism is identified as the most extreme and dangerous form of

Islamism even while it represents only a small faction of the entire movement. This section will also include a broader analysis of terrorism within the International Relations context.

The last section of Chapter Two will explore the impact of the civilizational paradigm on the entire field of International Relations studies, while taking into account how the Clash of Civilizations is developing into a malignant self-fulfilling theory.

Islamism

The History of Islamism

Islamism finds its origin in the mid-twentieth century. Its emergence is linked to the 1967 Six-Day War and the on-going Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where religious identity became an important factor within the Middle East. In contrast to most other mainstream changes occurring in the Middle East and within Muslim nations during the post-war period, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict brought about the question of “who are they and who are we?” Elsewhere, traditional Muslim governments were searching for ways to keep up with developed nations and attempted to modernize and thus, secularize their countries. However, in Israeli occupied territories formerly known as Palestine, being a Palestinian also most often meant being a Muslim and Islam offered a way to bring together the Palestinian people under a united front. Lacking official representation within the new Israeli structure, Palestinians searched for ways to improve their political plight to no avail, which eventually led to violent conflict, Islamic terrorism and full-out war. Violence and terrorism consequently became an important channel of political opposition within the region, supported by other Muslim nations, including Syria, Jordan, Iran and Iraq. But a political movement had also been born. Palestinians and other

sympathizers wished for an answer to the predicament of the Muslim-Palestinian people and they supported a Muslim solution. There was now a venue in which Islam could be expressed politically. Although based on the religious teachings of Mohammed and traditional structures of Muslim societal governance, Islamism is mostly political in nature. During the 1960s, the religious beliefs of an entire historical civilization became a political ideology.¹

Mohammed was the first religious leader of Islam but above all, he also became the political ruler of his followers. The ideal Muslim society was based on his religious and political rule, where religion and politics would never be separated and both would be under the divine rule of God. Although the ideal was never fully re-created, the idea of a one Muslim state ruled by Muslims has never fully disappeared.² Even today, many Muslims and especially Islamists believe that all Muslim countries should be united under one umbrella state.

Throughout the many years since its inception, the religious teachings of Islam became widespread in most of the Middle East and parts of Asia and Africa. Because of the proselytizing nature of Islam, although originally intended for Arabs, it was never expected to be an exclusive religion. One of the main roles of Islam was to spread the Prophet's teachings and consequentially, Islam "created a world civilization, polyethnic, multiracial, international, one might even say intercontinental."³ Race, ethnicity and what would later be known as "nationality" was never an obstacle to becoming a Muslim and a

¹ Daniel Pipes, "Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism," from the *Centre for Strategic and International Studies* June 30, 1998 [Internet]; available from www.danielpipes.org/article/954; accessed 4 October 2004.

² Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. (New York: Random House, 2004), xxi.

³ *Ibid.*, 6.

common civilization with common goals, morals and virtues, was conceptualized. However, as a result, religious and political teachings went hand in hand and could not be easily separated. Although easily accepted by Muslims, opposing groups or civilizations felt threatened by Islam's control over religious and political life and as Islam spread throughout many regions, so did the threat to its political unity. Muslims everywhere were often called upon to defend their beliefs and use whatever means necessary to protect the Islamic civilization, often including primitive forms of terrorism.

Like all other religions or civilizations, Islam's past is not without violence, but the origins of the politicized Islam can also be linked to its historical militancy. During the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, militant Islam came into being when Assassins, "extremists" of a Shiite Muslim sect, began killing who they perceived to be the enemies of Islam: the Christian Crusaders attempting to conquer parts of the Middle East and "Muslim rulers, whom they saw as impious usurpers."⁴ What is now known as terrorism became an effective tool early within the history of Islam and to this day the effectiveness of early Islamic militancy never fully left this civilization's collective consciousness: "In this sense, the Assassins are the true predecessors of many of the so-called Islamic terrorists today."⁵

Since its primitive beginnings, terrorism in the Middle East and throughout Muslim countries around the world has persisted but it has also drastically changed. Its persistence derives from the religious promise of the creation of an almost utopian Islamic state, where martyrdom and a prosperous eternal after-life are offered as compensation to the ones willing to sacrifice their lives to achieve this goal. The nature of

⁴ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. (New York: Random House, 2004), 144.

⁵ Ibid.

the changes of Islamic terrorism derives from technological advancements and the advent of globalization. Advanced weaponry and mass communications ultimately have altered the traditional foundations of terrorism and some forms of political Islam have adapted their tactics in order to benefit from these changes. From the time of the Assassins, Islamic terrorism took on the form of the assassination of one or several individuals in order to attain certain political ends. In the 1960s and 1970s, Islamic terrorism involved the hijacking of planes and the attack on specific targets in the name of Palestinian ethno-nationalism. The most prominent example was the kidnapping of 12 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic games in Munich, Germany. In the wake of September 11, 2001, suicide bombers, by striking big crowds and symbolic targets, are willing to take their own lives in the name of Islam, in the hopes of martyrdom. Even today, many terrorist attacks still occur within Muslim countries and it is not always conducted against foreigners or Westerners, but often against fellow Muslims who are seen as having allegiances with enemies of Islam. Militant Islam, however, has flourished, even today, often because of the goal of recreating the once mighty Islamic transnational state or civilization, even though “[...] a triumph of militant Islam would be unlikely to bring a return to traditional Islamic tolerance.”⁶ In fact, what today’s Islamists are fighting for will unlikely be achieved if militant means, such as terrorism, are used. The result they are trying to achieve has been overshadowed by the means used to attain their goals.

Historically, militant Islam and the early stages of political Islam developed initially during the eighteenth century out of a reaction to Western forces invading and imposing certain habits and customs contrary to prior Islamic teachings. Violent

⁶ Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 115.

confrontations and opposition movements soon became the most efficient way to publicly show disapproval for the new colonial authorities.⁷ With the start of post-colonialism and the departure of Western imperial forces after the First World War, Muslims, who had previously been politically united under the former Ottoman Arab states, were forced into the confines of a new geo-political reality: the creation of the secular nation-state came into existence all over the Middle East as it had in Europe. The West agreed that the former colonies “be given a formal independence, but under the tutelage or ‘mandate’ of imperialist states.”⁸ Although Western thought and more specifically, the notion of political freedom⁹ (democratic principals of popular representation, freedom speech and free markets) had a huge impact on the political development of these new nation-states, many Muslims eventually rejected secular nationalism. Instead, they presented “a religious alternative,”¹⁰ a supranational ideal of Islamic nationalism. In predominantly Muslim parts of the world, nation-states inadequately reflected specific ethnicities since Islam had always regarded this identity as a secondary consideration. Since the beginning of Islam, Muslims were brought up to consider themselves above all Muslims and to hold no other allegiance but to Allah. Indeed, this rise of Islamic nationalism, and its subsequent pan-Arabism, offered Muslims everywhere alternative ways of identifying themselves and this initiated the creation of the Islamic civilizational consciousness: “[...] the new states encouraged by the imperialist powers had developed a sub-nationalist existence of their own, based on a combination of modernity and

⁷ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. (New York: Random House, 2004), 133.

⁸ Tariq Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*. (London & New York: Verso, 2002), 80.

⁹ Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 56.

¹⁰ Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 46.

local/regional histories and traditions.”¹¹ Nevertheless, Muslims still identified themselves first and foremost as Muslims rather than citizens of their newly imposed states, regardless of their race or ethnicity. The concept of the umma, or community, is a fundamental notion in Islam that places the importance of a transnational solidarity among all Muslims around the World and reduces the importance of all other identities. The umma is the ultimate goal for Muslims, where all adherents of Islam would be united within this common community and where the only way to identity ones self would be as a Muslim. Muslim Brotherhood and its associated network in South Asia, Jama’at-i Islami, are concrete manifestations of the umma that have appeared throughout the twentieth century, although it is crucial to note that important schisms have occurred within Islam itself. Different sects have emerged and often have created significant conflicts among fellow Muslims. However, recently Islamists have transposed the idea of the umma in the political realm and they have sought to establish a pan-Islamic political unity of the umma, where all Muslim nations would be united under one supra-nation, under the political banner of Islamism. They have even gone as far as to claim “the division of the umma into local national states directly contravenes the intent of Islam and is hence illegitimate.”¹² Nevertheless, attempts of establishing a real working umma have been precipitated by Muslim nations deliberately working closer together in the realms of common security and economic trade.

According to Lewis, in the early twentieth century the new ideologies had a great impact on the people of the newly formed Muslim nations. Still within the confines of trying to identify their own unique form of nationalism based solely on Islamic ideals,

¹¹ Tariq Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*. (London & New York: Verso, 2002), 112.

¹² Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 150.

Italian and German fascisms were often accepted as potential models to follow. The Ba'ath parties in Syria and Iraq later adopted Nazi ideologies that developed and thrived throughout the Second World War. German and Italian national unification in the late Nineteenth century undeniably served as an example to follow for these newly created Muslim states. However, fascism, and later the Soviet adaptation of Marxism – both unique ideologies – served as significant illustrations of denunciation of American ideal and Western capitalism.¹³

The end of the Second World War also brought about new developments for the Arab world that helped the emergence of Islamism as a political movement. The creation of the Jewish state of Israel forced many changes upon the Muslim Palestinian population, which was viewed sympathetically from many Muslims from around the World. Thousands of people, both Muslims and Jews, were required to leave their traditional homelands. Muslims and especially Arabs rallied in support of their Palestinian brothers to help rid it of its enemies or in the very least, control the region of and around the newly imposed Jewish state, which was heavily supported by the American government. Indeed, many false assumptions surrounded the creation of Israel and many Middle Eastern leaders, alongside with the media, attempted to use Israel as a tool to convince the Muslim people that the West was invading their lands: “[t]he newspapers had denounced [Israel] as a Western creation, a permanent dagger in the heart of the Arab world [and they believed that] anti-Arab discrimination was embedded in the structures of the new state and at every level.”¹⁴ Consequently, Israel’s presence

¹³ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. (New York: Random House, 2004), 71.

¹⁴ Tariq Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*. (London & New York: Verso, 2002), 88.

was believed would eventually lead to the destruction of Middle Eastern customs and erodes fundamental Islamic values. The final results of the Six-Day War also did not help this misconception since more Palestinians were now under Israeli-controlled territories and this devastating loss for neighboring countries did not boost morale.

After the end of the World War II, Muslim countries also saw the emergence of Arab socialism.¹⁵ According to Roy, Islamism took on the form of an alternate third world ideology, often borrowing and sharing ideas with socialism. Attempts at modernizing, industrializing and secularizing had failed in most countries and most citizens now found themselves worse off than during the Ottoman Empire or previous regimes. Turkey is an exception to the secularizing of the Muslim state. Modern Turkey's founder, Ataturk, succeeded in accomplishing what most other states, such as Iran and Egypt, had failed to do. The Egyptian Revolution and Iran's White Revolution both had modern and secular ideals but were unsuccessful in their attempts to modernize their societies because of their subordination of "Islam to a broader secular framework."¹⁶ Nevertheless, states were now forced to deal with the social unrest of their societies and socialism was thought to be an appropriate solution. Various forms of Arab socialism were adopted in the Middle East since this ideology seemed to correspond with the Muslim concern of community, or the umma. It was also compatible with the anti-Western, anti-American sentiment that had been developing throughout the region since the American intervention in toppling the government during the Shah's White Revolution in Iran and the creation of Israel. Policies of national health care and national

¹⁵ Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 62.

¹⁶ Roy R. Anderson, Robert F. Seibert & Jon G. Wagner. *Politics and change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and Accommodation*, 6th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001), 155.

education were put into place by various governments and national concerns were at the forefront of political rhetoric. Yet, Arab socialism transformed itself into Arab nationalism where, under Egypt's Nasser's leadership, a single united Arab nation became the ultimate goal: one language, one religion and a modern Islamic civilizational consciousness. However, as quickly as it came about, Arab nationalism or pan-Arabism was unsuccessful and the movement ultimately expired along with Nasser's death. But the idea never completely died and it subconsciously became an important building block of modern Islamism.

During the Cold War, the Middle East and many Muslim countries, like other third-world nations, became important areas of conflict and confrontation between the West and the Soviet Bloc. Both sides tried to gain political ground in the Middle East but "the Muslim world also learned to play the West off against the Soviet Union, expanding its own room for maneuver and gaining benefits from each side."¹⁷ The end of the Cold War changed how the Middle East was able to operate and was increasingly inundated by Western culture and technology. Islamism became a backlash against the dominant ideology of the West.

Other forces also influenced the emergence of Islamism, including the principles of Marxism itself. By following Marxist ideology, many Muslim societies under Soviet rule were forced into atheism and the collapse of the Soviet Union reignited religious movements throughout the Muslim world. Imposed secularism in Soviet occupied states was not easily tolerated, especially since it had been forced upon them by a foreign, non-Muslim authority. During this era, on-going tensions precipitated and promoted the

¹⁷ Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 8.

formation of the Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and it offered yet another alternative to secular communism and nationalism in the Middle East.¹⁸ Although mostly successful in the Arabian Peninsula, the Wahhabi movement became influential throughout the Muslim world because of Saudi Arabia's economic wealth. The relative success of the Wahhabi movement, combined with the fact that Saudi Arabia was perceived to have replaced the Soviet Union as the main opponent to the West, led many leaders and countries to allow a politicized religious revival within their states. The inklings of a Saudi-funded, trans-national Islamic community was born from within this religious revival and its effects could be felt within all spheres of culture, social and mostly political life.

The fall of the Berlin Wall, the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War changed the ideological bi-polarity that the world had been accustomed to for fifty years. Islamism now had an opening for international recognition as a viable political alternative for Muslim states but it did not gain much media attention in the West until the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. While Islamist extremists had already been active throughout the world, their existence had been largely ignored by the West, although many scholars had already predicted the importance they were to play in twenty-first century international politics. In spite of this, the events of September 11th do not fully explain the entire phenomenon of political Islam or even Islamic terrorism.

¹⁸ Tariq Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*. (London & New York: Verso, 2002), 85.

The definition of Islamism

Islamism is a political ideology based on the fundamental teachings of Islam. Graham Fuller and other prominent authors such as Martin Kramer, John Esposito, and Daniel Pipes describe Islamism or political Islam as a modern ideology, created as an effort to solve modern problems.¹⁹ By trying to counteract the effects of modernity, Islamism can be seen as a product of modernity itself. And like all other twentieth century ideologies and infamous “isms,” different forms and levels of Islamism can be observed, from moderate, fundamentalist and extreme, from democratic to terrorist. Regardless of its nature, “in some countries the ideological conflict has developed into a bloody struggle for political dominance.”²⁰ Originally considered a broad international movement, it took over domestic politics in many Muslim regions and became a quest for political power. Islamism proved helpful in mobilizing Muslims who previously had been uninterested in secular politics.

Consequentially, Islamism is for some the political representation of some sort of desire to live in a true trans-national Islamic society, based on the teachings of the Koran and ruled by the laws of the Sharia. Indeed, Islamism embodies a return to the fundamentals of Islam, where religion and politics are never separated. Of equal importance is this back-to-the-basics also requires the eventual creation of a trans-national Islamic community where “the requirements of loyalty to trans-national Umma and to Islamic solidarity override those of loyalty to the nation-State in which a Muslim

¹⁹ “Is Islamism a Threat?: A Debate,” *Middle East Quarterly*, December, (1999).

²⁰ Bruce W. Nelan, “The Dark Side of Islam: With terror, Muslim radicals declare war on Arab states that stray from the religious path”, *Time* [Internet]; available from <http://www.time.com/time/nation/printout/0,8816,174514,00.htm>; accessed October 4 2004.

is resident of which he or she is a citizen.’²¹ Following historical patterns, (the rise and fall of great empires and civilizations), many Muslims and Islamists believe it is now time for this civilization to regain its rightful position in the World as the most important and influential civilization. Incidentally, Islamism in all its forms is believed to be, by many Muslims, the only philosophy capable of achieving this ultimate goal.

However, for others, Islamism is a response to an increasingly modernized and globalized world, where economic and social conditions are continuously getting worse, especially for non-Western and non-industrialized states. Threatened Muslims adhere to Islamism as a response to uncontrollable world change and Western dominance and they see it as their only way of achieving a pious and prosperous life. Indeed, the Islamists’ mistrust of the Western world is also maintained by the fact that Western leaders often supported and funded authoritarian regimes within Muslim societies. Islamism has become the political solution to social changes in Muslim societies and a counter-reaction to Western dominance and manipulation.

For the small minority, Islamism is a call to arms, the so-called sixth pillar of Islam,²² where extreme Islamists believe that it is their duty to Allah to rid the world of Islam’s evil oppressors. Indeed, the extreme form of Islamism is intimately linked to Islamic terrorism, most often fueled and funded by fundamentalists. On behalf of the average discontented Muslim, these extreme Islamists are willing to fight and kill

²¹ B. Raman, *International Islamism* [Internet]; available from <http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper163.htm>; accessed 4 October 2004.

²² The religion Islam is based on five important pillars: Islam’s creed, “There is no god but God and Mohammed is His Prophet”; five daily prayers and special Friday prayers; the importance of charity; the observance of Ramadan; pilgrimage to Mecca. For some Fundamentalist Muslims, Jihad (Holy War) has been added as a sixth pillar of Islam, although since it is not explicitly written in the Koran, it remains open to interpretation. (Smith, Huston. *The World’s Religions*. New York, Harper Collins Publishers, 1991, 221-270) Jihad can be interpreted as the inner holy war present within each human being or the complete elimination of Islam’s enemies.

whomever they perceive as the enemy, be they individuals or entire nations or civilizations.

Ultimately, many Western scholars believe that Islamism is a threat to the Western way-of-life, and to freedom and democracy itself because it is “yet another twentieth-century radical utopian scheme.”²³ Daniel Pipes compares Islamism to Marxism or fascism because like these two previous ideologies, Islamism has many totalitarian tendencies, with its eagerness to change and control every aspect of society, from the political sphere to the private sphere. Some authors, such as Francis Fukuyama, even go as far as to rename Islamism as “Islamofascism,”²⁴ one more ideology offering yet another way to rule and dominate un-wealthy and un-educated Muslim populations.

Wolfgang Günter Lerch places Islamism into three different common groupings.²⁵ First, religion and politics cannot be separated. This grouping holds that “Islamism,” a Western invention, does not exist. According to the Islamists of this group, Islamism is a Western term that Western scholars used to explain how Islam and politics are connected. A second grouping offers the explanation that Islamism is a reaction to unfavorable social conditions in many Muslim countries. These Islamists claim that Islamism “has nothing to do with religion and Islam,”²⁶ where people of the Muslim faith are reacting to harsh situations. Lastly, some believe that Islamism is the manifestation of a cultural revolution, where young Muslims reject the imposed cultural influences of the Western

²³ Daniel Pipes, “Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism,” *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, June 30, 1998 [Internet]; available from www.danielpipes.org/article/954; accessed 4 October 2004.

²⁴ Tariq Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*. (London & New York: Verso, 2002), 310.

²⁵ Wolfgang Günter Lerch, “Unholy terror: Islam’s fanatical fringe,” *World Press Review*, 49, January (2002): 8.

²⁶ Ibid.

World. However, Islamism appeals to a wide range of Muslims, perhaps an indication that Islamism is still in the midst of defining itself.

Finally, according to Graham Fuller, Political Islam or Islamism represents the first amalgamation of modern and Islamic political thought, offered to the Muslim people as the only viable alternative to tyrannical regimes and authoritarian governments.²⁷ By retaining the best of “both worlds,” Islamism is a pragmatic Muslim solution to modern-day issues.

The Differences Between Islam and Islamism

Islamism and Islam are not synonymous. Islam means “submission to Allah,” which in itself has political implications in regards to allegiance. Should an average Muslim citizen be loyal to only God, he or she will hold no loyalties to any other leader or political ruler. This is problematic for many Muslims because of today’s modern state structure. However, Islam deals mostly with personal spiritual matters, while Islamism deals with establishing a new Islamic public order and political state structure.²⁸

Islam is largely based on the teachings of both Judaism and Christianity and sees itself as a continuation and the pinnacle of all monotheist religions. Tariq Ali argues that all three monotheist religions “began as versions of what we would today call political movements,”²⁹ and therefore Islam has the intrinsic habit of concerning itself with matters of politics. All religions have provided a link between the spiritual and material world, and according to Graham Fuller, “the moment religion finds some resonance among the

²⁷ Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 7.

²⁸ Daniel Pipes, “Islam and Islamism – Faith and Ideology,” *National Interest*, Spring 2000 [Internet]; available from www.danielpipes.org/article/366; accessed October 4, 2004.

²⁹ Tariq Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*. (London & New York: Verso, 2002), 24.

public on political issues, it is a sure sign that some need is not otherwise being met effectively by existing political means.”³⁰ In spite of this, deeply influenced by the religion, Islamism or political Islam is not manifested or practiced as an ideology by all of today’s one billion adherents.³¹ Many people of the Muslim faith undeniably believe that politics and religion can and should be separated. These people are referred to as secular Muslims, often openly denounced and victimized by certain fundamentalist sects. According to the fundamentalists, secular Muslims have been too greatly influenced by Western values and the reason that they “lag behind the West” is “because they are not good Muslims.”³² Yet, for many believers, “Islam is not just a religion; it is also a political ideology, an economic theory; a treatise of statecraft and a training manual for the jihad.”³³ Nevertheless, religion and politics have rarely been separated until the creation of current social and political structures. Even though religion is still present in modern-day political affairs, Islamism is not a religion just as Islam is not a universally accepted political movement.

Important concepts in Islamism

Islamism, like any other ideology or political framework, tries to promote a certain set of important ideals or common ideas. Inspired by Islam’s glorious past and tremendous accomplishments, Islamism’s most prominent ideal is the creation of the trans-national Islamic society. Since the decline of the Islamic civilization, which

³⁰ Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 13.

³¹ Daniel Pipes, “Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism,” *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, June 30, 1998 [Internet]; available from www.danielpipes.org/article/954; accessed 4 October 2004.

³² Daniel Pipes, “Islam and Islamism – Faith and Ideology,” *National Interest*, Spring 2000 [Internet]; available from www.danielpipes.org/article/366; accessed October 4, 2004.

³³ B. Raman, *International Islamism* [Internet]; available from <http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper163.htm>; accessed 4 October 2004.

according to Pipes is directly related to Napoleonic invasions of Egypt,³⁴ Muslims have been trying to achieve or re-establish the perfect Islamic society. This ideal has been subconsciously ingrained in every Muslim's mind and remains the ultimate goal for all sects, despite their inherent differences. As previously mentioned, the concept of the umma underlines the importance of this Islamic ideal but it had previously remained away from the political arena. The umma was often interpreted as a genre of camaraderie or brotherhood where fellow Muslims would form alliances and refrain from fighting or going into war with each other. From this, Islamists retained the importance of the umma and called for a greater political, trans-national umma. It remains uncertain whether the Islamists honestly believed in this ideal or if they used it as a means to achieve their own goals: the Islamists themselves are "often urban mainstream professionals ... interest in coming to power, as all politicians want to come to power."³⁵ By using "spiritual" vocabulary and references to the umma, all the while encouraging methods of terrorism, Islamists have seen the discontent of the average Muslim as an opportunity to gain and maintain political control and have a say in the global political playing field. In doing so, they have managed to overthrow what was the common trend of secular politics and have gained much local as well as international recognition as the leaders of the underdeveloped Muslim world. By using religion and the concept of the umma to achieve social and political rights in their political platforms, Islamists have gained much support in many states and religion has become a force to be reckoned with in everyday politics.

³⁴ Daniel Pipes, "Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism," *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, June 30, 1998 [Internet]; available from www.danielpipes.org/article/954; accessed 4 October 2004.

³⁵ Bruce W. Nelan, "The Dark Side of Islam: With terror, Muslim radicals declare war on Arab states that stray from the religious path," *Time*, October 4, 1993 [Internet]; available from <http://www.time.com/time/nation/printout/0,8816,174514,00.htm>; accessed October 4 2004.

In spite of this, scholars such as Daniel Pipes argue that “Islamism has few connections to wealth or poverty; it is not a response to deprivation.”³⁶

Another important aspect in Islamism is its anti-Western, anti-American sentiment, common in most Islamic and Muslim nations. The cultural and political dominance of the West around the world, most often led by globalization, has been used to the Islamists’ advantage in their fight to implement Islamism as a viable political movement. The three main arguments that most Islamists use against the West, or primarily against America, are: the Americans maintained a military presence in Saudi Arabia, the holiest land, during the Gulf War; the 1991 Gulf War itself; and American economic support of the Jewish state of Israel.³⁷ Islamists claim that these acts committed by the West are the main motivations behind all the terrorist attacks and the anti-Western sentiment, often propelled by Islamic media. This widespread anti-Western sentiment has also created, along with the umma, an effective method of rallying Muslim citizens together in a common political fight to try to improve their everyday lives, their societies and the trans-national Islamic civilization.

The Islamists

In order to understand Islamism, its leaders and followers must be clearly identified. Are Islamists, either mainstream or from extreme factions of political Islam, simply to be described as fundamentalists or are they merely political opportunists? Islamists are sometimes difficult to identify as mainstream or extremist due to their

³⁶ Daniel Pipes, “Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism,” *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, June 30, 1998 [Internet]; available from www.danielpipes.org/article/954; accessed 4 October 2004.

³⁷ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. (New York: Random House, 2004), xxvi.

apprehension to reveal their identities or being caught and imprisoned by the very opponents they are trying to overthrow. Generally, Islamists tend to be mostly moderate in nature, usually independent and not state-sponsored; only a small percentage of extremists have resorted to terrorism in the name of Islamism: "For the most part, they are not members of some grand conspiracy sponsored by a state apparatus, but loosely organized, grass-roots militants who use similar terrorist methods and get money and weapons from the same like-minded sources."³⁸

The common element to all Islamists is the importance they give to Islam in the political realm, mostly due to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism: Islamism tends to be fundamentalist in regards to the nature of Islam itself, yet fundamentalists can be either politically moderate or extreme in nature. Tariq Ali believes that the emergence of fundamentalism is an international phenomenon, not only affecting the Middle East and Muslim countries but Western states as well. However, he blames American imperialism as the main cause of this "religious revivalism with a political edge" since it has often silenced the sufferings of Muslims around the world while interfering with internal affairs, which has caused "all the other (political) exit routes to have been sealed off."³⁹ Islamic fundamentalism can be viewed as a political reaction to oppression and to the right of self-determination and self-government.

Indeed, many different forms of fundamentalisms have emerged throughout the world and the political reaction of Islamic fundamentalism, Islamism, "includes a critique of the excesses of modernity, of authoritarian governments, and socio-economic

³⁸ Bruce W. Nelan, "The Dark Side of Islam: With terror, Muslim radicals declare war on Arab states that stray from the religious path," *Time*, October 4, 1993 [Internet]; available from <http://www.time.com/time/nation/printout/0,8816,174514,00.htm>; accessed October 4 2004.

³⁹ Tariq Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*. (London & New York: Verso, 2002), 307.

inequities; a call for greater political participation; and a reassertion of religion in private and public life.”⁴⁰ However, the fact remains that while Islamism is largely anti-Western, the whole of the Muslim world remains open to Western advances and technologies.

The extreme faction of Islamic fundamentalism has but a small percentage of adherents. However, due to its violent nature, it is the form of Islamism that gets most of the attention. Propelled mostly by adherents of fundamentalist Islam, “the main proponents of extremist fundamentalist ideology are not religious leaders (known as Imams) but rather have risen from the ranks of the religious jurists (known as mullahs) who are proponents of the strict application of Islamic law or Shari’a.”⁴¹ These mullahs, in turn, promote and finance violence and terrorism, as justified means to achieving the perfect Islamic state, culture and civilization, as prescribed by the Koran.

According to Burmeister, Islamic fundamentalism and the literal interpretation of the Koran themselves pose no threat, but they lay the foundation for extremist interpretations of Islamic law.⁴² On the other hand, it is important to stress that not all Islamists are fundamentalists and not all Islamic fundamentalists are Islamic extremists and terrorists. Different types of Islamists use different ways to achieve their goals: “the more moderate Islamists plan to use non-violent means to transform their host countries into Islamic states.”⁴³ Nevertheless, the extreme Islamists have had an enormous impact on their local and national policies, especially in regards to the de-secularization and re-

⁴⁰ “Is Islamism a Threat?: A Debate,” *Middle East Quarterly*, December, (1999).

⁴¹ Col. B.S. Burmeister, “The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism – over or under-rated as a threat to (South African) National Security” [Internet]; available from http://www.mil.za/CSANDE/CISupp/TrainingFormation/DefenceCollege/Researchpapers2000_02/burmeister.htm; accessed 4 October 2004.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Daniel Pipes, “Islam and Islamism – Faith and Ideology,” *National Interest*, Spring 2000 [Internet]; available from www.danielpipes.org/article/366; accessed October 4, 2004.

Islamisation policies that have drastically changed the political landscape of many Muslim and Middle Eastern states. In fact, the Islamists' main goals have been to eliminate any of the secularizing reforms implemented in the twentieth century.⁴⁴

Contrary to popular belief, the Taliban and Osama bin Laden's Al-Qa'ida are not the only extreme Islamic factions. Many exist throughout the world, some of them often state-sponsored. However, these particular organizations are often linked to one particular event, dating back to the Cold War, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan:

Practically all the Islamic extremist and terrorist movements of today, whether they be in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Central Asian Republics (CARs), the Chechnya and Dagestan areas of Russia, the Xinjiang area of China, the J&K State of India and in Southern Philippines were born out of ideas conceived in the battle-fields of Afghanistan of the 1980s and spread from the mosques and madrasas of Pakistan subsequently.⁴⁵

Lewis writes that there are three main forms of Islamic extremisms that can be found today: Al-Qa'ida and similar cells and groups from around the world, the Saudi state's official religion of Wahhabism, and the ruling Iranian hierarchy. Each of these extreme forms of Islamism has had an enormous impact in spreading similar Islamic ideals across Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

From the fields of Afghanistan, Al-Qa'ida has successfully managed to establish smaller regional chapters around the world, including in the West. While the exact number of members is difficult to identify, Al-Qa'ida's popularity is constantly expanding and its attractiveness to the average Muslim is increasing. It has also learned to use modern tools, technology and mass media, such as Al-Jazeera, to advance its

⁴⁴ Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 106.

⁴⁵ B. Raman, *International Islamism* [Internet]; available from <http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper163.htm>; accessed 4 October 2004.

causes and increase its popularity. While elusive in nature, Al-Qa'ida secretly trains young Muslims from around the world to attack enemy targets with suicide bombs, while offering promises of martyrdom. At the same time as developing advanced networks to offer training and assistance to new recruits, Al-Qa'ida has also created a complex financial system with an economy resembling that of a small state,⁴⁶ in order to offer monetary compensation to the families of these professionally trained suicide bombers. Their main goal originally was to ward off the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan but since the Gulf War it has become a struggle to diminish the presence of American troops and their subsequent cultural and economical influences in the Middle East. The Americans have been portrayed by Al-Qa'ida as enemies of Islam and have since become their ultimate target abroad and within their own lands.

Saudi Arabia's official religion of Wahhabism has also had a significant impact on the development of extreme Islamism. Saudi Arabia's role in regards to extreme Islamism has been to provide funding with its oil money for the Muslim fundamentalist doctrine. Consequentially, the Wahhabi doctrine has spread around the world with the help of Saudi-funded private Muslim schools in areas such as Chechnya, Egypt, and other areas of the Middle East. It is also suspected that Saudi-funded institutions have even been established within America, thus, like Al-Qa'ida, endorsing a global network of extreme Islamism. Disproving of immoral Western influences, Wahhabism promotes a return to the basics of Islam, which has resulted in one of the most fundamental forms of Islam known today. Therefore, because of its unlimited wealth and "because of its unique

⁴⁶ Jonathan Barker, *The No-Nonsense Guide to Terrorism*. (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2003), 40.

role in Islam as the custodian of Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia has become a centre of pan-Islamic activity.”⁴⁷

Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran has maintained an important and powerful stronghold in the Middle East and the ruling Iranian hierarchy is recognized as the authority of the Shiite faction of Islam. While its influence is mostly limited to within its borders, Iran was the first Muslim nation to completely reject secularism. This idea has been influential for other Islamists hoping to achieve the same result within their own states. By serving as a concrete example for others, Iran’s influence has not been as pronounced as the other factions of extreme Islamism; however, its fundamentalist values have spread throughout its neighboring countries and since the fall of Saddam’s Iraq, Iran has sent some of its citizens and military personnel to help the ousted Iraqi Shiites in their attempts to regain power within American occupied Iraq.⁴⁸

Regardless of the recent developments of extreme Islamist factions, the last fifty years of the twentieth century also saw “a large proportion of educated Muslims [...] embrace modernity.”⁴⁹ While trying to work within the current framework to achieve their perfect society, not all Islamists have resorted to extreme measures. By trying to reject the violent nature of these three previous examples of extreme Islamism, moderate Islamists have developed their own unique form of Islamism. Nevertheless, Islamists do not reject the fundamental principle of bringing back religion in to their day-to-day life; moderate Islamists have sought peaceful and often democratic ways to improve their

⁴⁷ Roy R. Anderson, Robert F. Seibert & Jon G. Wagner. *Politics and change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and Accommodation*, 6th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001), 321.

⁴⁸ Zaki Chehab, *Inside the Resistance: The Iraqi Insurgency and the Future of the Middle East*. (New York: Nation Books, 2005), 184-187.

⁴⁹ Tariq Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*. (London & New York: Verso, 2002), 15.

societies. Even Islamic feminist groups have emerged in Turkey and Egypt to allow Muslim women a more important role in governance and politics in general. However, the difference between moderate and extreme Islamists rests almost entirely in their varying interpretations of the Koran. Extreme or fundamental Islamists focus on Islam's great past history and tend to promote the "narrow, literal and intolerant interpretation of Islam"⁵⁰ while the modern or liberal Islamists are open to change and diversity by allowing "contemporary interpretations of the Koran and the Traditions."⁵¹

Influences on Islamism

Socialism and nationalism have influenced the emergence of Islamism and all its different forms. The emergence of political Islam is said to be an extension of socialist ideology since the end of the Cold War, and Islamism is a form of socialist Islam, since socialism contains many similar ideals to the message professed by the religion of Islam. Before the fall of the Soviet Union, socialism offered a way to improve social and economic conditions. However, after it had failed, another ideology had to be created to replace the void left by socialism.

According to several authors, such as Ali and Roy, similarities exist between socialism and Islamism. Where socialism tried to offer certain equal rights to the working class communities of the third world, Islamism promotes and seeks to reform these same rights with an Islamic twist. Both ideologies promote the improvement of conditions for a majority of the impoverished population. These ideologies recognize that only a minority of people may achieve comfortable economic and financial conditions and Islam, like Socialism, tries to eliminate the inequalities. In this case, the capitalists have been

⁵⁰ Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 51.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 49.

replaced with foreign influential economic forces, most often the Americans or Western civilization, and the proletariat have been replaced with the average, impoverished and uneducated Muslim.

Nevertheless, even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Middle Eastern nations had developed what is now called Arab socialism. By imitating the final stages of Marxist theory, the final goal of Arab socialism would be the creation of a pan-Islamic state. However, alongside Arab socialism emerged Arab nationalism, also based on the Arab or Middle Eastern unity of Muslim states.

European imperialism played an important role in the development of Arab nationalism. When imperial forces imposed the creations of states after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, local internal pressures from within the borders of the late Empire fought for Arab unity, as an opposition to the imposed borders. Although unsuccessful, Egypt had the most influence on the shaping of nationalism in the Middle East, and under Jamal al-Nasser's leadership, they promoted specific principles: "the elimination of imperialism and its traitorous Egyptian agents; the eradication of feudalism; the destruction of monopoly and the domination of capital over the government; and the establishment of social justice."⁵² Also referred to as Nasserism, this unique mix of Arab socialism and nationalism became an important ideological tool during the 1967 war between Israel and Egypt. Fighting for all Muslims and for a united Arab nation, Egypt found support in its Middle Eastern neighbors, but the Israeli army nevertheless quickly defeated Egypt. This humiliating defeat resonated throughout the Arab peninsula and the Middle East and the occupation of Palestine brought further turmoil to the region.

⁵² Marvin E. Gettleman & Stuart Schaar, eds., *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*. (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 289.

Egyptians were quick to blame socialism and three years later, Nasser died and along with it, Nasserism. Arab nationalism minus the socialist aspects continued to be a guiding force yet, if Israel had not existed “it is likely that Arab nationalism would have been replaced with each country defending its national interests.”⁵³

Nationalism as an ideology, and as a Western-imposed state system also affected the development of Islamism. In many ways, Islamism became a pan-Islamic nationalism, not so much based on the concept of a nation but on a belief in Islam. William Pfaff argues that Islamism is a reaction to failed secular nationalism and to dictatorships bestowed by previous socialist movements.⁵⁴ Islamism is now trying to remedy the situation in which millions of Muslims unwillingly find themselves, while also trying to recreate the idea of the pan-Islamic nation.

Islamic fundamentalism is a form of “national” resistance, an assertion of political autonomy and independence vis-à-vis the western powers, and an attempt to reclaim a jeopardized cultural independence and wholeness, in which statehood or nationhood is merely a means to an end.⁵⁵

The main elements that unite Muslims under one common identity are now Islam and their universal disapproval of Western economic and cultural interference. Although Muslim nations do suffer from internal conflict, it is argued that Muslim nations have seldom attacked one another, apart for the Jordan-Syria tensions, the Libya-Egypt conflict, the Iran-Iraq War and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This tendency demonstrates how, despite national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or sectarian differences, Muslims worldwide are willing to overlook them and focus on their common uniting elements.

⁵³ Tariq Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*. (London & New York: Verso, 2002), 113.

⁵⁴ William Pfaff, *The Wrath of Nations: Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 129.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 128.

Nevertheless, this is still widely debated in the academic world, and scholars such as Fox and Pipes ask themselves if Muslims would realistically be able to put aside their differences to achieve peace and cooperation.

Culture and identity

Culture and Identity in International Relations

The main theoretical element behind Islamism is a question of identity. This is why Islamism has taken on such an important role in many of today's societies. Several authors, such as Samuel P. Huntington and Jonathan Sacks, argue that the fall of the Soviet Union transformed International Relations during the twentieth century from politics of ideology into politics of identity.⁵⁶ For those who chose to identify themselves with Islam, "[it] is not only a matter of faith and practice, it is also an identity and a loyalty - for many, an identity and a loyalty that transcend all others."⁵⁷ Not only does Islam offer a religious identity but also its entire history differentiates itself from any other historical civilization, also offering a unique cultural identity.

Cultural identity, difficult to empirically observe, has several distinct meanings. Culture is a way to live and thus, a way to think. The values system associated with one's culture gives meaning to their identity but can also be used as instrument of domination by emphasizing differences. Culture can, at the same time, unite and divide peoples and societies.

⁵⁶ Jonathan Sacks, *The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations*. (London, New York: Continuum, 2002), 10.

⁵⁷ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. (New York: Random House, 2004), 17.

Although important events of the first half of the twentieth century were based on cultural or ethnic identity, such as the rise of Nazism in Germany and Italy, the second half was characterized by a world-wide conflict of two competing ideologies: capitalism and communism. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the competition between these ideologies ended and people from around the world attempted to redefine their identities. For over fifty years, culture had been a neglected element to identity. Indeed, culturally and ethnically based nationalism has often been “equated with fascism and was felt to be morally untouchable.”⁵⁸ However, the post-Cold War period saw a revival of cultural identity not only as a response to increased global heterogeneity and diversity but also as an attempt by International Relations scholars to understand the difficulties surrounding these demographic changes.⁵⁹ Globalization led to increased interaction between different peoples of different cultures and the physical borders of states have not been a deterrent to this interaction. Consequentially, the state as a detrimental element of the international system has lost some of its relevance. Regions from all over the world have experienced an unprecedented shift of loyalties from the state to the “supra-national continental regionalisms able to accommodate sub-national ethnic identities and cultural differences,”⁶⁰ or what is commonly referred to as a civilization. Although civilizations have existed for millennia, not since the treaty of Westphalia and the creation of the nation-state have they played such an important political role. By working within the already established international system, “civilization[s] constituted a collective identity that gave a deeper meaning to the association between the various states within this

⁵⁸ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*. (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), 213.

⁵⁹ Y. Lapid & F. Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publ., 1996), 10.

⁶⁰ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*. (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), 216.

system.”⁶¹ Although the political importance and significance of civilizations remains disputed, certain authors such as Huntington have predicted that the next important international conflicts will occur between different civilizations.

Clash of Civilizations

There are many differing opinions in regards to the Clash of Civilizations theory and its impact on International Relations theory. Since the growing popularity of interest in Islam as well as in political Islam, many authors have asked whether we are experiencing the civilizational clash as predicted by Huntington. Fuller argues that the Islamic terrorism and the subsequent reaction from West have, in turn, reinforced this perception.⁶² Indeed, many events and particular situations seem to indicate that Huntington’s prediction has in fact happened. However, there is also the possibility that certain actors have taken advantage of this idea, making the “Clash of Civilizations” a malignant self-fulfilling theory: “[m]any have interpreted the ‘war against terrorism’ as a civilizational conflict. Huntington himself is not of this view.”⁶³

As described by Huntington in “The Clash of Civilizations,” culture, as a reference for identity, has become an important player in everyday politics, domestic or international. By referring to Mayne’s conclusion that “animosity among ethnic groups is beginning to rival the spread of nuclear weapons as the most serious threat to peace that

⁶¹ Y. Lapid & F. Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publ., 1996), 98.

⁶² Graham E. Fuller *The Future of Political Islam*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 10.

⁶³ Tariq Ali. *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*. (London & New York: Verso, 2002), 307.

the world faces,”⁶⁴ Huntington re-affirms that the end of the Cold War has placed the importance on culture instead of ideology.⁶⁵ Indeed, Huntington also argues that local and regional cultural identities have become, in a broad sense, civilizational identities, from which different civilizations would clash. To prevent conflict between the different civilizations at an international level, Huntington’s formulates the solution of the creation of a universal civilization, where there would be a fundamental change to world order.

Another major theme in Huntington’s work is the identity crisis that has been spurred on by modernization and the end of the Cold War, for it was no longer “what side are you on?”⁶⁶ but “who are you?” that went beyond the state or national identity. In light of this new identity, Huntington affirms that states from different identities, often trans-nationally grouped into civilizations, are more likely to be in conflict than states from the same civilization and there exists several factors contributing to the clash. He also identifies a number of civilizations according to geography, history and commonalities shared by certain groups of people and cultures.

According to Russett et al., the significance of the Clash of Civilization theory as a paradigm has importance consequences: “[t]he Clash of Civilization paradigm is a big idea with immense implications for policy. Similar to other big ideas, it has the potential to become not just an analytical interpretation of events, but –if widely believed– a shaper of events.”⁶⁷ Western and Islamic scholars have tried repeatedly to argue the

⁶⁴ David R. Davis & Will H. Moore. “Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior,” *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1997): 171.

⁶⁵ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, (New York, Touchstone, 1996), 19.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 126.

⁶⁷ Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, Michaelene Cox. “Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No.5, Sept. (2000): 589.

irrelevance of Huntington's theory and renounce the "Clash of Civilizations." While it might not have been intended to become a paradigm, the clash of civilization theory has had an enormous impact on International Relations as a whole because it is now being used to benefit both the West and the Islamic civilization. Indeed, the natural course of this theory has been altered by those whom now use it to advance their own goals and motives. Despite the fact that Huntington undeniably was trying to create a new way to understand International Relations based on civilizations, opposition from other scholars could have prevented it from becoming a paradigm. However, political leaders are using it to defend their actions, thus causing it to become an applicable theory and paradigm within itself. While a civilizational approach was needed to understand certain aspects of the new international reality, it may have also increased or worsened the conflict itself. Still, whenever any references regarding Islamism or any conflict involving or within Islamic nations are made, the Clash of Civilization theory is often mentioned. And September 11th made everybody, including scholars, re-evaluate whether Huntington was right.

Huntington's new "paradigm" remains highly controversial and is still debated today. But the civilizational level of analysis is not necessarily a valid approach to understanding the emergence of Islamism or its more violent form, Islamic terrorism. Cox argues that civilizational awareness is not a fundamental component of people's identity and therefore cannot directly lead to the propagation of the Islamic political movement or to the extremism related to it:

Most people do not think of themselves in the course of a normal day's activities as belonging to a civilization. [...] And when politicians evoke civilization, it is usually when they want to arouse their constituents against some demonized

enemy. The everyday manifestation of civilization is not in a feeling of belonging. It is in the almost unconscious, taken for granted, common sense that expresses a people's shared idea of reality.⁶⁸

Nevertheless, cultural commonality does facilitate cooperation and cohesion among people and this has been seen within the Islamic civilization. With political Islam, the civilizational identity has been reinforced by the geographical proximity of its followers and its common culture. And, as previously stated by Cox, the concept of civilization has been used to rally Islamists against a common enemy. But, the existence of civilizational commonalities among states or nations does not necessarily prevent conflict. Islamic civilization is a clear demonstration that it is not immune to conflict within its own borders.

Many contradictions and critiques exist of Huntington's theory of the Clash. Senghaas admits that culture is an important factor in conflicts but argues that the beginning of the conflict is often "incited by socio-economic factors."⁶⁹ Indeed, this has been demonstrated by the fact that Western culture, values, and technology have often been accepted and embraced by other civilizations. This demonstrates how many of Huntington's general assumptions are often not universal.

Also, as demonstrated by the Islamic civilization, geographic proximity is neglected in the Clash of Civilization theory: "Neighbors are more likely to be both culturally similar and prone to conflict."⁷⁰ Indeed, although very similar, states from within the larger Islamic civilization have and continue to be in conflict with each other.

⁶⁸ Robert Cox, "Civilizations and world order" in Robert Cox with Micheal G. Schechter, *The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections of Power, Morals and Civilization*. (London: Routledge, 2002), 176.

⁶⁹ Dieter Senghaas, "A Clash of Civilisations – An Idée Fixe?" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 35, No. 1 Jan. (1998): 128.

⁷⁰ Errol A. Henderson & Richard Tucker, "Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict" in *International Studies Quarterly* 45, (2001): 326.

Their similarities, even within states themselves, have not managed to erase long-held religious, cultural or ethnic disparities that have led to clashes. Furthermore, even if the majority of ethnic conflict has been involving Islamic groups, these conflicts have also mostly been within the civilization itself⁷¹: “Clash of civilizations will become the clash within the civilization where ‘the battle will not be between the West and the Muslim World ... It is essentially a battle between Muslims.’”⁷²

Although Huntington re-affirms the importance of the state as the principal actor in the current international system, he also downplays the role of the nation; the nation and not the civilization is the largest cultural identity group. Although contradictory to what is preached by Islam, nationalism has an impact on individual identity, within the framework of Islamism and it continues to influence the development of Islamism within the different states. While Huntington tends to neglect the nation-state, Henderson and Tucker suggest that the impact of culture should be studied at the state level because, although civilizations exist, they are not independent political entities:

Since civilizations are more or less ideational constructs rather than political agents, they are devoid of decisions-making power or control over political or economic resources. By comparison, states ‘can mobilize their citizens, collect taxes, issue threats, reward friends, and wage war; in other words, states can act;’ moreover, nationalism is a tremendously powerful force precisely because it marries individual cultural affinities to an agency – the state – that can actually do something.⁷³

⁷¹ Jonathan Fox, “Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 4, July (2001): 467.

⁷² Daniel Pipes, “Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism,” *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, June 30, 1998 [Internet]; available from www.danielpipes.org/article/954; accessed 4 October 2004.

⁷³ Errol A. Henderson & Richard Tucker, “Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict,” *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (2001): 333.

Along the same lines as Huntington, Davis and Moore's "Ethnicity Matters" argue that transnational ethnic alliances have an enormous impact on states and the entire international system itself. "A transnational ethnic alliance is said to exist when two states contain members of the same ethnic group"⁷⁴; therefore, if a civilization is spread among many states, members of this civilization will try to help each other socially, economically, and politically thus exerting an important influencing international relations. However, these authors claim, contrary to Huntington, that ethnic attributes are not the major cause of international conflict and that they are only somewhat important.⁷⁵

It is important to note that Huntington developed the clash of civilizations theory to help understand the future role of civilizations, leaders, states and civilizations themselves. It has perhaps mistakenly come to be accepted as a paradigm to help explain and sometimes justify certain political actions that have inevitably led to more conflict. While it remains an imperfect theory, the clash of civilizations has offered a new way of examining Islamism and understanding its recent successes. It has also underlined the importance of finding an alternative framework used to analyze Islamism as a whole since current frameworks have been ineffective at explaining its emergence and proliferation around the world.

Islamism and terrorism

As previously mentioned, not all Islamists are terrorists; however, Islamic terrorism is the most extreme form of Islamism and the two are perceived to be synonymous. This perception is widespread because it is often endorsed by fundamental

⁷⁴ David R. Davis & Will H. Moore, "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, (1997): 172.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 174.

Islamists as one of the only successful methods to achieving their ultimate goal, the umma. Indeed, terrorism is not a new phenomenon within Islamic civilization and historical uses of terrorism have served as a link between the past and the present to justify its usage. As a result, terrorism has become a part of Islamic civilization's cultural baggage, thus legitimizing it and making it an important – but not essential – part of the Islamic identity.

Definition of terrorism

Terrorism's definition tends to be highly controversial. Variations of this definition exist throughout different institutions, governments and states, each of whom have added their own interpretational motivations to terrorism, whether it is economic, political, cultural or religious. Amir Taheri defines terrorism as the “deliberate use of violence outside the internationally recognized norms of war, and for the purpose of provoking fear in the service of a political cause,”⁷⁶ but also, “terrorism is what terrorism does.”⁷⁷

However the use of the word “terrorist,” the one who implements terror, remains a highly pejorative term also full of moral implications, most often used to define the aggressor; a “terrorist” would never call himself a terrorist. For the lack of a better term, a “terrorist,” unquestionably convinced of his motivations to produce terror, would often rather be called a fighter for rights, justice, equality, identity, and better socio-economic conditions.

Theoretically speaking, the reasons to use terrorism as a means to attain a certain end indicates how desperate people must be. Historically, terrorism was used as a last

⁷⁶ Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Islamic Terrorism and the West*. (London: Hutchinson, 1987), .3.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

resort to implement change, usually with the assassination of an important state official or political figure. The death of this person would bring about political change, and the terrorists, depending on their goals, could then be part of the change by taking-over or they could let the system renew itself with the arrival of a new political reality.

Sometimes, the terrorists wanted to be part of the change and other times, they were just the spark needed to initiate the change since they had no personal political motivation to pursue.

Contrary to most previous terrorists, today's extreme Islamists are far less motivated with the outcome of their attacks and they have resorted to attacking civilians at large, instead of attacking one specific person or institution. They have consciously started terrorizing the general population in order to put pressure on governing forces. Usually unhappy with the current situation, modern terrorists use these methods to display their discontent with a certain government or society as a whole. Striving to achieve what they consider to be a "good" society, they often realize that their goal is not possible or easily attainable but they remained convinced that change should be brought about. They believe that terrorism, in any form, is the only solution. However, Islamic terrorists should be clearly understood as a small extreme and radical faction within the larger movement of Islamism.

Islamic terrorism as an extreme form of conflict

Modern-day terrorism is not easily understood for the simple fact that its goals and objectives are not clearly identified. Potentially motivated by the injustices caused by modernity and imposed Western values, Islamic terrorists have resorted to extreme tactics with the purpose to destroy current society or in the very least, create disorder. Islamic

terrorists question a reality that has been imposed on them. Islamic terrorism is a rejection of structure but from outside the structure itself; these extremists attempt to smash the system and create something else, often without specifying what the outcome should be. Modern-day Islamic terrorists are not even preoccupied with “what should be” but rather, they are convinced that “what is” is a threat and has to be destroyed.

From another point of view, even if the extremists were demanding something specific, certain theorists suggest that Western society would not even be able to understand their demands because of its refusal or inability to see things from the Islamist perspective and not from within a Western stand-point. Therefore, the Islamic terrorist’s demands seem incomprehensible to the common Westerner who, in turn favors the ideals of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”

Generally, terrorism is also considered an extreme form of conflict because it puts into question every mainstream structure that modernity has ever created over the years. Terrorist attacks create disorder and states and governments are unsure how to react to these occurrences since they cannot be considered “normal” aggressions of war. States are unable or uncertain how to retaliate since their aggressors are not other states and cannot even be easily identified. Consequentially, states therefore feel vulnerable and try to resort to previously used tactics to unsuccessfully defend themselves. By doing so, states miss out on the message that terrorists are trying to send: the current structure of today’s Western society is not universally accepted. Terrorists also attempt to resist the universality of what is considered a “good” society according to Western standards, since it often differs from what their perception of reality is. Nevertheless, Islamic terrorists do

not represent international state actors, but a network of organizations extending across many borders.

Analysis of terrorism in International Relations

Terrorism and an increase in violence could be caused by a weakening of the state as the dominant actor in International Relations. According to authors such as William W. Connolly and R.B.J. Walker, the decreasing role of the state and its sovereignty is affecting the “stability and order” of what modern International Relations is based on:

In acknowledging the role of non-state actors in international relations, the discipline loosens its hold upon claims for the sovereign state. The space for universal assertions is comprised by the inability to express with certainty what is to be included or excluded; boundaries cannot be steadfastly maintained. Thus, claims to power and authority by the state become ambiguous.⁷⁸

Connolly goes on to argue that the state reacts with self-protecting measures by enforcing certain social injustices and by trying to re-assert its dominance. International non-state conflict (terrorism) is therefore a result of the growing gap between the state and non-state actors, in terms of power and influence. By further destabilizing state sovereignty, terrorists try to eliminate the injustices but they also try to assert their own power and influence within the international context.

Another viewpoint of terrorism lies in the realm of democracy and representation. As argued by Benjamin R. Barber, terrorism is a reaction to the terrorist’s “fear of modernity and its costs.”⁷⁹ According to Barber, terrorists have misunderstood the true value behind democracy and the American attempt to “make the world a better place” by

⁷⁸ Molly Cochran, “Postmodernism, ethics and international political theory,” *Review of International Studies*, 21 (1995): 241.

⁷⁹ Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism’s challenge to democracy*. (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001), xv.

imposing concepts of freedom and justice around the world. Barber explicitly blames an aggressive neo-liberal ideology not democracy itself for precipitating modern-day terrorism.

Contrary to Barber, other theorists criticize democracy as a social construct used to maintain power, either domestically or internationally. As previously mentioned, US foreign policy and its “democratization” of other states have been viewed as a hidden means to maintain hegemonic power. Furthermore, democracy, in all its guises, is deemed as manipulative and fraudulent. In regards to International Relations, Islamic terrorism is a reaction against this fraudulent representation transmitted by the US and terrorism consequently becomes an “effort to subvert representation and deny legitimacy.”⁸⁰ Along these lines, Islamic terrorism then becomes a reaction against the imposed structures of democracy and all elements of society associated to it.

Conclusion: A paradigm shift in International Relations

Samuel Huntington is often criticized for not clearly stating that he wanted to create a new International Relations paradigm. However, Huntington allows his theories to be indeterminate and interpretable.⁸¹ Indeed, Huntington does suggest that International Relations should use a new approach, the civilizational approach, to understand current international events and movements such as Islamism and Islamic terrorism. While never disputing the importance or the validity of civilizational identity, Huntington, according to Gismondi, acknowledges that identities and everything

⁸⁰ Pauline Rosenau, “Once Again Into the Fray: International Relations Confronts the Humanities,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1990): 100.

⁸¹ Mark David Gismondi, “Civilisation as Paradigm: An Inquiry into the Hermeneutics of Conflict,” *Geopolitics*, Vol. 9, No.2 (summer 2004): 409.

surrounding them is “constructed in concrete and unique social contexts.”⁸² This, in turn, explains how civilizations themselves are constructs sometimes used in a malignant way, thus alluding to how the Clash of Civilizations has become a malignant self-fulfilling theory.

But, while theories and paradigms allow for a better understanding of conflict and political phenomena, they also allow for the questioning of everything that was previously considered the truth. And by questioning everything we can start to partially comprehend Islamic terrorism and political Islam as an international theory and political alternative. Islamism thus avoids being recognized as a product of anarchy initiated by radical Muslim fanatics and rather becomes a product of modernity itself; a reaction to what is perceived to be unfavorable conditions spurred on by globalization.

Yet, Islamism, like civilizational identity, is open to interpretation and is socially constructed. Recently, certain adherents to fundamental Islam and extreme Islamists have significantly changed what it means to be Muslim. Suicide bombers, hijackers and terrorists are “tied to a construction or interpretation of what it means to be a politically active Muslim.”⁸³ Because of this, the entire civilization has been forced to re-evaluate what it means to be a member of the greater Islamic civilization. Indeed, cultural interpretations of identity have helped to understand how, conversely, the concept of the civilization is also been used negatively to promote the deformation of the ideal of the umma. And while the sense of belonging to the umma is based on a false interpretation, the Clash of Civilizations clearly has been a malignant self-fulfilling theory used to benefit only a certain few Islamists. On the other hand, the Clash of Civilization also has

⁸² Mark David Gismondi, “Civilisation as Paradigm: An Inquiry into the Hermeneutics of Conflict,” *Geopolitics*, Vol. 9, No.2 (summer 2004): 407.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 415.

served to help certain Western leaders who wish to spread the notion that the enemy is from within Islamic civilization, or is Islamic civilization itself.

Nevertheless, Islamism is a concrete representation of the beginning of a paradigm shift within International Relations. But unlike most other concepts and theories, it offers no solutions. In this context, Islamism allows for a different understanding of world events, but it is crucial to recognize that the effects of a civilizational paradigm on the interpretation of political movements may have enormous impacts in and on the future.⁸⁴ A civilizational paradigm might be used to nourish the pre-conceived notion that the West and Islam are indeed in a civilizational clash, thus contributing to the fear of a threatened cultural identity, which in turn, intensifies the conflict and aggravates the clash itself.

This chapter provided the theoretical foundations behind the emergence of Islamism as a politicized civilizational movement. While Huntington's Clash of Civilizations theory offers one of many interpretations of international events, the next chapter identifies the confrontation between the Islamic civilization and globalization as the source of current international conflict.

⁸⁴Mark David Gismondi, "Civilisation as Paradigm: An Inquiry into the Hermeneutics of Conflict," *Geopolitics*, Vol. 9, No.2 (summer 2004): 420.

CHAPTER THREE

Introduction

The world is faced with a different kind of political ideology, one that has been spurred by religious, cultural and identity issues. The confusion surrounding Islamism is proving to be more than the theoretical understandings of the Muslim world. It is also a practical approach to dealing with the larger international occurrence now known as globalization. Along with the political ideology of Islamism, its concrete manifestations, although varied in many cases, have often become violent and deadly in the form of Islamic terrorism. Although the foundation of Islamism is based on decades of internal development within the Islamic world, the ideology itself has only been recently internationally recognized; thus, it has only recently been deemed a phenomenon worthy of outside evaluation.

Islamism is a civilizational reaction to threatened cultural identity. Islamists and the average Muslim from within the scope of the Islamic civilization have had to contend with imposed changes to cultural norms, often initiated in the Western world and from within the United States. Because of this phenomenon, spurred on by increasing transcontinental exchanges and globalization, Islamic social, cultural and religious beliefs and practices have been questioned and traditional identity is no longer a *fait accompli*.

Threatened by globalization in many forms (Americanization or Westernization), the political nature of Islamism stipulates that the adherents must fight for self-preservation and cultural survival if they are to endure and re-establish historical supremacy. Contrary to Huntington's argument, the source of conflict is perceived by Islamism adherents to be linked to the entire Islamic civilization's fear of losing their

cultural identity, rather than cultural identity itself. Thus, the case of Islamism demonstrates that clashes between civilizations are aggravated when a dominant actor seeks cultural supremacy over another. While extreme Islamism and terrorism are a reaction to globalization perceived as Western cultural dominance, Islamic terrorism is also proving to be a true structural systemic threat to the West itself and a malignant form of civilizational conflict.

Nevertheless, Islamism can be perceived as a reaction to threatened civilizational identity due to globalization. Depending on the situation, reactions to globalization can vary from acceptance, adoption or rejection, and Islamism has by far been the most serious and extreme reaction. For some supporters of Islamism who believe that globalization has threatened the very core of the Islamic civilizational identity, Islamism has been given credibility as the only viable political alternative, where terrorism is often the only vehicle used to articulate the discontent.

The problem that accompanies the sudden spread of Islamism also lies in the fundamental nature of Islamism, where the recreation of the umma (community or nation¹) is the most desired result.² The umma, Islamism's ultimate political and religious goal as described in Chapter Two, does not leave room for any other variant of political ideologies, which in turn inevitably leads to conflict and in extreme cases, terrorism. Islamism is therefore an uncompromising ideology that cannot peacefully co-exist with globalization, or any of its elements.

¹ Ahmad Shboul, "Between rhetoric and reality: Islam and politics in the Arab world," in *Islam in World Politics*, eds. Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud, (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 171.

² Carl L. Brown, *Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 85.

In fact, Islamism cannot be fully understood until it is put in the context of globalization. It is most likely that if globalization's impact were lessened or if globalization had not existed at all, Islamism would have taken a completely different path. However, regardless of the historical, social and political events that led to this politicization of Islam, the emergence of Islamism was probably inevitable because of the strong common subconscious desire to re-create the umma.

Section one of this chapter will discuss Samuel Huntington's argument on a new type of modern conflict; a civilizational conflict, commonly known as "The Clash of Civilizations." Within this concept and framework, this section will identify Islamism as a new source of international conflict while demonstrating that globalization is the main threat challenging Islamic cultural and civilizational identity.

Section two will look at the intimate connection between globalization and Islamism, thus linking the rise of Islamism to the threat of globalization but also linking the proliferation of Islamism to their shared similarities of being contemporary movements with significant political consequences. This section will analyze other reactions to the same phenomenon, identifying why the roots of the movement of Islamism has led to rejection of globalization.

Section three will argue that Islamism is one of the most significant political ideologies of the twenty-first century. In presenting how the events of September 11th changed the perception of the importance of Islamism in the West, this section will look at the importance of the civilizational component in Islamism and how Islamism is considered an alternative ideology.

In the final section, the international system will be associated with its pluralist reality, recognizing the need to prevent the clash and diminish potential international conflict. This section will contend that the traditional “clash of civilizations” should be replaced with the clash between civilizations and globalization itself, thus requiring International Relations theory to re-identify its role within this new bi-polar reality.

Recent Change of International Conflict

Discussion on conflict and the Clash of Civilizations

Samuel P. Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations” explored a new way to look at post-Cold War conflict. By evaluating the transitional period towards the end of the Cold War, Huntington concluded that the fundamental nature of twentieth century conflict was changing and that the previous ideological narrative was no longer dominant in international politics. He argued that identity was being expressed to represent ethnicity, race and religion, all elements pertaining to culture, and that states stemming from different heritages would more likely be in conflict than those who share a greater cultural similarity. He regrouped states of similar characteristics in larger transnational civilizations, defined not as concrete political entities but as “[...] millennial heritages.”³ Indeed, these civilizations do not hold any real political authority but “[...] as a new civilizational awareness emerges, discord and conflict are deemed to be increasing.”⁴

The Clash of Civilizations theory can be summed up with six major suppositions, as described in the 1993 article:

³ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of World Economy: The States, Movements and the Civilizations: Essays by Immanuel Wallerstein* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 162.

⁴ Giacomo Chiozza, “Is There a clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International conflict Involvement, 1946-97,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 39.6, (2002): 714.

First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. [...] Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilizations' consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. [...] Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. [...] Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. [...] Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. [...] Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. [...] The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization.⁵

While these proposals were controversial and precipitated debates all over the world, several scholars questioned the validity of the Clash of Civilizations theory and Huntington's interpretation of potential future conflicts: "could it be that civilizational differences are not direct causes of conflict, but have important indirect effects?"⁶ Other elements were also found to be lacking in Huntington's argument, such as the role of the state and the emergence of Islamism as a political ideology, which cast doubt on the significance of his contribution: "The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power."⁷ While he did address the question of the Islamic civilization, he did not explore how Islamism is

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, 72.3, (1993).

⁶ Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, Michaelene Cox, "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No.5, Sept. (2000): 600.

⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 217.

the political manifestation of a reaction to a threat from another, more powerful, hegemonic phenomenon.

Subsequently, in the following article "If not Civilizations, What?" Huntington conceded that while his first thesis might have been lacking certain important elements, he nevertheless insisted that his argument offered a new way to understand potential future conflict. In terms of changing fault lines between states and shifting political loyalties, Chiozza endorsed Huntington's contribution to better understanding conflict:

This perspective differentiates the Clash-of-Civilizations (CofC) thesis from other current arguments about the emergence of nationalism and ethnic movements, for Huntington's argument is not just about the emergence of particularistic identities, be they national, ethnic, or religious. It is a novel argument about shifting loyalties: away from the nation-state and towards larger identity groups that transcend national boundaries.⁸

Nevertheless, Huntington remained unwavering with his convictions that cultural differences lead to conflict. While numerous studies and researchers have demonstrated that Huntington's arguments are not an accurate reflection of international reality, Russett, Oneal and Cox suggest that "Huntington's thesis that cultural differences produce conflict has deep roots in social psychology, [where at] its heart is the distinction between the in-groups and the outsider, with in-group cohesion attained by nurturing conflict with those that are different."⁹ In addition, the possibility that civilizations "shape the patterns of security arrangements, political institutions, and economic practices that constitution much of international behavior and condition who fights whom"¹⁰ should be

⁸ Giacomo Chiozza, "Is There a clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International conflict Involvement, 1946-97," *Journal of Peace Research*, 39.6 (2002): 712.

⁹ Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, Michaelene Cox, "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No.5 (Sept. 2000): 585.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 586.

explored, to allow for a better theoretical understanding of the power of identity itself within the realm of civilizational debates.

However, it is difficult to maneuver through the interpretation of the Clash of Civilizations when Huntington states that the cultural identity inevitably leads to conflict. Indeed, he opened the door to malignant justifications of conflict based on the civilizations debate, thus exemplifying how "Huntington's paradigm could become in effect a self-fulfilling prophecy."¹¹

While the Clash of Civilizations theory does hold merit, "Samuel Huntington was only half right,"¹² and many elements seem to be missing in order to explain what is actually occurring in the international system. Nevertheless, according to the results in Tuscisny's research, "the clash of civilizations seems to be a real and important phenomenon,"¹³ worthy of further development. By focusing on one civilization in particular (the Islamic civilization) and exploring the emergence of Islamism as a trans-national civilizational political movement, it becomes evident that Huntington's theory comes up short. Although his second supposition does stipulate "the world is becoming a smaller place,"¹⁴ he underestimated the effects of globalization on the interaction between civilizations themselves. Cultural identity differences have always existed and there are no concrete conclusions that can be stated to indicate an increase or decrease in conflict. It is problematic when a group of similar heritage (either intranational or international) feels threatened by another group with a different heritage. In the case of the Islamic

¹¹ Sato Seizaburo, "Clash of Civilizations or Cross-Fertilization of Civilizations?" *Japan Echo* (1997): 47.

¹² Ronald Inglehart & Pippa Norris, "The True Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Policy*, 135 (March/April, 2003): 62.

¹³ Andrej Tuscisny, "Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer, and Bloodier?" *Journal of Peace Research*, 41.4 (2004): 497.

¹⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, 72.3, (1993).

world, the threat is perceived to originate from the Western world, but in fact comes from the phenomenon of globalization: “the biggest problem facing the world today stems from the West’s determination to have its own standards of civilization recognized as universally valid by the rest of the world.”¹⁵ It is nevertheless important to clarify that differences do exist between the phenomenon of globalization and the Western civilization itself. They are not synonymous even though they are generally perceived to be one and the same. Huntington’s “West versus the rest” could be replaced with “globalization versus anybody who opposes it.” Globalization has originated from and has been integrated into the West, and therefore it is difficult to differentiate between the two.

For some, globalization entails the Westernization of the world (Latouche 1996), while for others it involves a cover for the ascendancy of capitalism (Ferguson 1992). Some see globalization as generating increasing homogeneity, while others see it producing diversity and heterogeneity through increased hybridization.¹⁶

Whereas globalization is not easy to define, it is often associated with Westernization because these two phenomena do look alike. But differences exist. Globalization tends to encourage multi-directional interactions, while “Westernization, on the other hand, tends to be a one-way street, meaning that one region attempts to dominate and control other regions in the name of globalization.”¹⁷ Even though globalization is multi-directional, it does not mean that all actors influence each other equally: “[...] globalization is bringing about the devastating destruction of local traditions, the continued subordination of

¹⁵ Lee Harris, *Civilization and its Enemies: The Next Stage of History* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 46.

¹⁶ Douglas Kellner, “Globalization and the Postmodern Turn,” *The UCLA Graduate School of Education & Information Studies* [Internet]; available from <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/dk/globpm.htm>; accessed 13 March 2007.

¹⁷ Mona Miasami, “Islam and Globalization,” *Global Policy Forum* [Internet]; available from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/cultural/2003/0808islam.htm>; accessed 14 March 2007.

poorer nations and regions by richer ones, environmental destruction, and a homogenization of culture and everyday life.”¹⁸ Consequently, globalization is subtle, not as confrontational as Westernization, and most often threatens cultural and social norms through economic means: “It is in the realm of culture that globalization is most visible and apparent.”¹⁹ Hence the reaction of many within the Islamic civilization was to precipitate the creation of the political movement of Islamism to offset the influences of globalization. However, the Islamists do not distinguish between globalization and Westernization. It is this negative perception of globalization, based on radical views and violent tendencies, which make Islamism problematic.

Islamism as a source of international conflict

By recognizing Islamism as a transnational political movement, the concrete manifestations of Islamism can also be identified as a source of major international conflict. While these concrete manifestations of Islamism are easily discernable, Islamism itself is nevertheless difficult to define. A deeper examination reveals that Islamism is neither the religion of Islam nor the representation of the entire Islamic civilization; Islamism materialized out of the need for a new kind of society politics; Islamism does not automatically involve terrorism; and Islamism, either peaceful or violent, is a true systemic threat to the West but also to the Islamic civilization itself.

¹⁸ Douglas Kellner, “Globalization and the Postmodern Turn,” The UCLA Graduate School of Education & Information Studies [Internet]; available from <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/dk/globpm.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 March 2007.

¹⁹ Ibid.

Islamism is not Islam. Islam is a religion “controlled by dogma and driven exclusively by religious imperatives,”²⁰ while Islamism “broadly refers to those who are committed to applying an ideological vision of Islam in the socio-political sphere.”²¹ While Islam has influenced the political framework of Islamism, these two terms are not synonymous and should not be confused:

The epistemology of Islam is skewed by the imprecision of the terms used to designate its trends and tendencies. [...] For many non-Muslims across the globe, Islam itself has come to be seen as synonymous with Islamism in its radical manifestation and so with terrorism.²²

Consequently, not all Muslims are Islamists but by definition, all Islamists must be Muslims. These two terms also differ enormously in terms of goals: “While Islam seeks to teach humans how to live in accord with God’s will, whereas Islamism aspires to create a new order.”²³

In addition, Islamism does not represent the political ideals of the entire Islamic civilization. However, this movement has demonstrated its capacity to be transnational, to cross borders and to unite peoples of similar cultural and religious heritage. Although Islamism does exhibit civilizational characteristics, many Islamists find themselves outside of the Islamic civilization’s geographical borders and within the Western world, while many who inhabit its borders do not adhere to the political leanings of Islamism. Therefore, regrouping Islamism and the Islamic civilization into one category is an inaccurate representation of the actual situation, leading to confusion and

²⁰ Gilles Kepel, “Islamism Reconsidered: a Running Dialogue With Modernity,” *Harvard International Review* 22, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 27.

²¹ Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud, “The world of Islam and the challenge of Islamism” in *Islam in World Politics*, eds. Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 14.

²² *Ibid.*, 17.

²³ Daniel Pipes, “Islam and Islamism – Faith and Ideology”, *National Interest* (Spring 2000): 4, available from www.danielpipes.org/article/366; accessed 4 October 2004.

misunderstanding but also contributing to the misrepresentation of the civilizational debate itself. Therefore, Islamism has become a source of international conflict partly because of this malignant representation of the Clash of Civilizations theory.

Islamism rose out of political desperation: "Politicized religious movements are the responses of those who feel desperate and desolate in the current geopolitical crisis. The problem that they experience is not with God but with politics..."²⁴ Indeed, there was a strong portion of the Islamic world that believed they needed a political world and a type of society politics to represent their religious beliefs and practices: "[...] what we are witnessing is not a religious revival in the Muslim world but the inclusion of religion in political life after decades of separation."²⁵ In many areas of the Muslim world affected by the Cold War, religion was prohibited in public political life. Even if structured religion barely survived during this time, it had nevertheless provided essential social services that were otherwise not being met by the current political structure. This safety net offered by religion created the basic framework from which future political movements would emerge in the post-Cold War era. John Esposito argues that Islamism is but one of many such political movements inspired by religion that "includes critiques of the excesses of modernity, of authoritarian governments, and socioeconomic inequities; a call for greater political participation; and a reassertion of religion in private and public life."²⁶ Yet, along with this post-Cold War era came the emergence of new threats to religious movements such as globalization and Westernization:

²⁴ Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 80.

²⁵ Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Islamic Terrorism and the West* (London: Hutchinson, 1987), 232.

²⁶ "Is Islamism a Threat?: A Debate", *Middle East Quarterly* (December, 1999): 13.

The so-called 'resurgence of Islam' in the political life of the Arab world (and other Muslim countries) can only be appreciated against the background of specific historical junctures and socio-economic and political circumstances. These have included a heightened sense of cultural and intellectual alienation. Contributing factors to this alienation are the impact of Westernization, the failure of modernization and development projects under the post-independence nationalist ruling elites, and the ideological poverty of most secular political parties in the Arab world.²⁷

These new threats reinforced the need for a stable political homegrown ideology and Islamism therefore emerged from the need for a different type of society politics throughout the Muslim world. While a new political ideology itself was not a source of international conflict, the problem arose out of the different interpretations of the means to implement Islamism since "neither the fundamentalist nor the modernist had a clear enough method."²⁸ For the Islamic fundamentalists and extremists, terrorism became a justifiable means used to achieve their end goal of the umma, within the framework of Islamism.

Islamism does not promote terrorism as the only means used to attain the end goal and contrary to popular belief, terrorism is only used in extreme cases. However, "certain Western and Israeli writers and politicians [...] have gone out of their way to 'prove' that Islam and terrorism are synonymous and that Islamic politics inevitably lead to violence and terror,"²⁹ which has reinforced the misconception that terrorism and Islamism are synonymous. Yet, the extreme factions of Islamists believe that the only way to change the system is to smash and destroy the existing structure with violence. For all factions of

²⁷ Ahmad Shboul, "Between rhetoric and reality: Islam and politics in the Arab world" in *Islam in World Politics*, eds. Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 187.

²⁸ Fazlur Rahman, *Islam & Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 142.

²⁹ Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Islamic Terrorism and the West* (London: Hutchinson, 1987), 1.

Islamism the goal is the umma and the “substitution for the laws of men those of God”³⁰ in order to neutralize the imposed changes stemming from globalization. While “the more moderate Islamists plan to use non-violent means to transform their host countries into Islamic states,”³¹ the means for extreme Islamists differ enormously and are based on violence and terrorism. Their use of terrorism is a deliberate decision, based on their own unique interpretation of Islam, which they see as a universalist ideology that will eliminate the injustices in the world: “Inspired by this conviction, they approach Islam with a view to molding it according to their aspirations and political agendas, and use it as a justification for the use of terror as a political weapon.”³²

In addition to the variations of Islamism itself, Islamic terrorism is also different from any other form of terrorism because of its common goals shared with all Islamists, extreme or moderate, but more specifically because of the deadly means most often employed:

First, it rejects all the contemporary ideologies in their various forms; it sees itself as the total outsider with no option but to take control or to fall, gun in hand. [...] The second characteristic that distinguishes the Islamic version from other forms of terrorism is that it is clearly conceived and conducted as a form of Holy War, which can only end when total victory has been achieved. [...] What is demanded, in other words, is not even a negotiated surrender, but the enemy’s total annihilation. [...] The third specific characteristic of Islamic terrorism is that it forms the basis of a whole theory both of individual conduct and of state policy. [...] This attitude of exclusivism prevents Islamic fundamentalists from forming even tactical alliances with other movements sharing many of their more important objectives.³³

³⁰ Fabio Altman, “The Muslims Are Coming: A real world menace, or just a bogeyman?” *World Press Review*, 41 (May, 1994): 8.

³¹ Daniel Pipes, “Islam and Islamism – Faith and Ideology”, *National Interest* (Spring 2000): 5, available from www.danielpipes.org/article/366; accessed 4 October 2004.

³² Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud. “The world of Islam and the challenge of Islamism” in *Islam in World Politics*, eds. Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 16.

³³ Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Islamic Terrorism and the West* (London: Hutchinson, 1987), 6-9.

Lastly, it is the conflicting means and not the end goals of Islamism that lead to international conflict. And it is because of terrorism and extremists that Islamism is recognized as a true threat to the West and the rest of the non-Muslim world: “[...] West European peoples and states now see a cultural threat from the South replacing the ideological threat from the East.”³⁴ The misconception that follows is that the threat originates from the religion of Islam: “Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, the collapse of the USSR and the 9/11 attacks, Islam has been seen by many observers as the main threat confronting the West (including Russia).”³⁵ While these impressions are erroneous, Islamism and Islamic terrorism do represent an actual structural systemic threat to the West. By either democratic or violent means, Islamism challenges existing structures and strives for political change. Yet, some scholars will argue that the ideology of Islamism is not a threat unless terrorism is used; in which case, the only threat possible is physical damage to infrastructure and human life while the political institutions remain intact: “Islamism is a passing, and badly misperceived, revivalist movement which poses little danger to the West, and is in actual fact a vital part of the cultural renewal of the Third World Peoples.”³⁶

But Islamic terrorism remains problematic because while it threatens to destroy Western authority, it risks also destroying existing structures within the Islamic world: “[...] it cannot be overemphasized that far from being a movement that concerns only the West, ‘Islamism’, as a political current and in all its forms, is also recognized as

³⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, “If not Civilizations, What? – Paradigms of the post-Cold War World-Response,” *Foreign Affairs*, 72.5 (1993).

³⁵ Oliver Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 16.

³⁶ Anoushiravan Etheshami, “Islam as a political force in international politics” in *Islam in World Politics*, eds. Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 31.

problematic by Muslims in general.”³⁷ Ultimately, the destruction of structures within the Islamic world could also prompt international conflict by unleashing violent civil clashes requiring greater international intervention and participation. In the end, conflict is inevitable but it will not be solely provoked by inter-civilizational unrest; the impacts of globalization must also be taken into account.

Relating Islamism to Globalization

The Rise of an ideology

Islamism is the ideological result of a transnational community’s struggle to maintain its identity and ward off foreign influences. Unlike many other ideologies, Islamism deals mostly with cultural identity and has developed because of the threat towards the larger Islamic cultural identity:

It is curious how classical liberalism, Marxism, and modernization theory downplayed the importance of culture and local forms of social association, positing the inexorable advance of the modern economy, technology, and politics which would supposedly level out and homogenize all societies and culture, producing a world global culture. Both capitalism with its world market and communism with its international socioeconomic system and political culture were supposed to erode culture differences, regional particularities, nationalism, and traditionalism.³⁸

As a consequence, the study of these theories often never considered the potential political impacts religion and culture could have on International Relations and on international politics. Today, the world is dealing with the costs of this deliberate neglect of culture and identity. Scholars and academics are left trying to explain why this initial

³⁷ Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud. “The world of Islam and the challenge of Islamism” in *Islam in World Politics*, eds. Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 14.

³⁸ Douglas Kellner, “Globalization and the Postmodern Turn,” The UCLA Graduate School of Education & Information Studies [Internet]; available from <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/dk/globpm.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 March 2007.

neglect happened and why Islamism is finding itself to be not only a Muslim-world occurrence but also a trans-national global phenomenon.

The rise of an ideology is not a problem *per se*. It is more the political consequences of its influence that can become problematic. However, according to R.B.J. Walker, the problem with Islamism lies in its “assumptions of cultural superiority,”³⁹ as is often the case with other political movements and ideologies. Islamism’s umma inadvertently becomes the only worthy goal that Muslims and non-Muslims alike should struggle to achieve and there is limited room for any kind of variation. The umma ultimately represents a whole community’s attempt to turn in on itself, a kind of large-scale self-preservation mechanism. However, similar to communism and fascism, Islamism also attempts to spread its influence beyond all borders and thus, like many religions, becomes violently proselytizing in nature. The result develops into a self-glorified ideology with violent tendencies.

As mentioned in Chapter Two, Islamism has many historical similarities to communism and fascism. Like the modern ideologies of communism and fascism, Islamism is struggling between the consolidation of power and the desire to make the world a better place. Today’s Islamism is trying to change society and find viable political solutions but has almost lost sight of the umma, even though it still lingers in the collective civilizational subconscious.

However, ideologies always have a tendency to evolve according to their particular situations. Just like Soviet Communism was unsuccessful in following original Marxist theoretical principles, Islamism has surpassed its theoretical boundaries and has

³⁹ RBJ Walker, “East Wind, West Wind : Civilizations, Hegemonies, and World Orders in Culture” in *Culture, Ideology and World Order*, ed. R.B.J. Walker (Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1984), 2.

become an uncontained ideology without clearly defined parameters: "We become unable to analyze its true characteristics, the reasons for its emergence, its present objectives, and the strengths and the weaknesses that will cause it to grow still more or decline."⁴⁰

What began as a clear and comprehensible philosophy set out to re-create the umma, has led to a different form of Islamism where the original ideals have been adapted by political leaders and younger generations: "A generation now separates us from Islamism's beginnings in the 1970s, and the utopian visions of that era have been replaced by concrete realities."⁴¹ This new type of Islamism in turn affects the administration of states, thus linking political ideas to public policy. As a result, Islamism has become an ideological and political framework used to convince people of what must be done to survive, where everything revolves around maintaining and spreading its influence.

Originally, the emergence of Islamism was a solution to a regional problem within the borders of the Islamic civilization. However, it then became apparent that the regional problem was directly linked to an outside threat that was found everywhere in the Muslim world: "Islamism itself has been in part a response to secularizing trends that have been viewed as a foreign importation. It has also been a response to perceived problems in Egypt, the Arab world and the wider Islamic world."⁴² Islamism was no longer a local issue and became an international phenomenon with international implications. As a result, the problem is recognized as the rise of an ideology, which is a

⁴¹ Gilles Kepel, "Islamism Reconsidered: a Running Dialogue With Modernity," *Harvard International Review* 22, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 22.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ahmad Shboul, "Between rhetoric and reality: Islam and politics in the Arab world" in *Islam in World Politics*, eds. Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 181.

reaction to an outside factor or threat and Islamists identify globalization as the main threat.

Ideological rhetoric has a tendency to mobilize people towards a common goal. In the case of Islamism, the goal is the political umma. However, the methods for achieving this goal are not clearly identified and some Islamists have resorted to extreme and violent means to attain their goal. In the process, an illegitimate form of political change through violence and terrorism has now become a legitimate means to achieve their goal. Even though extreme Islamism and Islamic terrorism are but a small faction of the broader movement of Islamism, its violent nature has not improved the likelihood that Islamism will attain its goal of the umma. Moreover, the negative perception of globalization and its threat to identity, even among moderates, is so widespread that peaceful change seems impossible even to them.

The dilemma therefore becomes a clash between the “globalizers,” the ones who push forward globalization, and the unwillingly “globalized.” Indeed, we have seen the creation of a new kind of clash, where the phenomenon of globalization is opposed to Islamism and terrorism, and where Islamism exists, so do poverty and a deep sense of threatened religious and cultural identity. This current situation has also been reinforced by the Bush Administration’s “you are either with us or against us” mentality. But as previously mentioned, both the Islamic civilization and the Western world have used this fabricated “us versus them” approach, reinforced by the Clash of Civilizations theory, to identify the enemy and to achieve their own political ends. For Islamists, the West is a threat to the Islamic civilization through the process of globalization and its menace to local customs, traditions and identities, but Islamism is a threat to the West because of

terrorism and the “threatening” social beliefs, allegedly opposed to liberty, prosperity and freedom.

According to Manuel Castells, the outcome of Islamism is still yet to be seen, as it is not clearly a social movement or a political movement. What is certain is its “capacity to change minds, to challenge dominant values, and to alter global power relationships...”⁴³ Consequently, Islamism is a movement in development and it has already demonstrated the capacity to influence both the social and the political spheres. But, regardless of its fundamental social or political nature, the effects in both the social and political sphere largely differ and the consequences of Islamism cannot be ignored.

In the social sphere, Islamism has given way to religious fundamentalism, extremism and even religion-backed and state-sponsored terrorism. Islamic terrorism represents a most extreme form of conflict and disorder that social Islamism can create and the extreme Islamists understand and utilize it effectively. These methods of terrorism will most likely continue to be the “destructor” of choice for the foreseeable future. Like most acts of modern terrorism, Islamic terrorism has been used as a public means to announce intent; in a Marshal McLuhan fashion, the “medium is the message” and the act of terrorism itself becomes an indication of social discontent. Although Islamic terrorism has become an effective tool at pronouncing a political opinion, it has proved unsuccessful in producing the umma. As a result, moderate Islamists have attempted to turn to more political avenues for achieving their goals. However, the political aspect of Islamism is in its infancy stage of development, and it continues to evolve. Islamists have only recently started to use politics and governance as a means to,

⁴³ Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997), 22.

either legitimately or illegitimately, gain power and impose Islamic values and extreme, fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia law. Recently, many self-declared Islamists now hold positions of power in several areas. Depending on the nature of the political regime, the Islamists are not always the leaders of states but they can be members of opposition political parties, associations or brotherhoods who exert enormous amounts of influence within their own borders but also in other neighboring nations, through financial assistance or in human resources. Peter Kloos argues that globalization has even influenced the development of specific political regimes, in the sense that regimes are now transnational, surpassing borders.⁴⁴ Indeed, it is this trans-national alliance among Islamists that has fashioned the international political nature of Islamism, somewhat based on notions and ambitions of self-preservation and fighting off the enemy. Nevertheless, self-preservation objectives have influenced a new kind of self-determination movement. Unlike small ethnic minorities seeking to create a separate state based on ethnicity or a common culture, Islamism is leading to a transnational movement of self-determination, based on the religion of Islam and the ideal of the umma. Threatened identity has led to a loss of sense of community, which has spurred on a reverse form of nationalism at an international level. Although self-preservation is the Islamic civilization's attempt to protect itself, this form of Islamic self-determination, or pan-Islamism, stipulates that their common goals cannot be attained or maintained if the movement is not transnational.

While Islamism is a reaction to globalization, globalization itself has nevertheless proved useful in actually “[promoting] universal projects such as the idea of national and

⁴⁴ Don Kalb, Marco van der Land, Richard Staring, Bart van Steenbergen, Nico Wilterdink, eds., *The Ends of Globalization: Bringing Society Back in* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2002), 285.

peoples' self-determination.'⁴⁵ And despite the fact that Islamists wish to separate themselves from globalization, it is nonetheless effective in helping to promote their own goals of self-determination:

Movements for self-determination generally do not wish to disengage from global developments, indeed they use incorporation in more global networks as a resource against a dominant national state that is reputed to be ruled by different territorial and cultural interests.⁴⁶

Fundamentally, this demonstrates how Islamism is a reaction to a negative perception of globalization, but most importantly, how it even uses globalization to achieve its own goals. As a result, it is plausible to think that the perception of the threat of globalization far outweighs the actual danger, and although there is a real feeling that people's core identities are being threatened, current "Islamic identity is [a] "(re)constructed"⁴⁷ notion used to achieve a political end.

The Threat of Globalization

Globalization can be seen as a threatening wave of homogenization sweeping across the world, where economic, technological, cultural, social and political⁴⁸ spheres "transcend state boundaries":⁴⁹ "[Globalization] claims that we are now living in one borderless world where the national and global divisions that once existed are progressively disappearing in favor of free exchange and cooperation to the common

⁴⁵ Don Kalb, Marco van der Land, Richard Staring, Bart van Steenbergen, Nico Wilterdink, eds., *The Ends of Globalization: Bringing Society Back in* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2002), 16.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴⁷ Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997), 17.

⁴⁸ John Baylis & Steve Smith, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics, 2nd edition: An Intro to International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 9.

⁴⁹ Janine Brodie & Sandra Rein, eds., *Critical Concepts: An Introduction to politics, Third Edition* (Toronto: Pearson – Prentice Hall, 2005), 353.

good of all humanity.”⁵⁰ However not everyone agrees on what is considered the “common good of all humanity”; what is considered good for one nation, society or civilization is usually not considered desirable for another and this highlights the existing apprehension towards globalization: “Theories about the inevitability of social, political, and economic change toward globalization and homogenization underestimate the resiliency of local identity and cultural difference in the developing world and the Islamic world in particular.”⁵¹ Islamism is therefore a reaction to globalization.

The Islamic world is not the only “civilization” faced with this uncontained global threat, although “globalization has not been experienced everywhere to the same extent.”⁵² Nevertheless, the Islamic world is the most obvious example of where globalization has been extremely problematic and has spurred extreme reactions: “the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East is inter-related with the exposure of this part of the world of Islam, which perceives itself as a collective entity, to the processes of globalization...”⁵³ In terms of technological advancements, globalization has been beneficial for the Islamic world. The problem mostly identified by Islamists is the challenge globalization poses to its culture identity.

Globalization allows for an unprecedented exposure of culture and increased contact and interaction among cultures. Yet, this interaction exposes whole societies to unfamiliar customs and traditions, which enhance fear of the unknown. In the case of Islamism, the fear of the unknown drives the ideology, which in turn leads to the

⁵⁰ Don Kalb, Marco van der Land, Richard Staring, Bart van Steenberg, Nico Wilterdink, eds., *The Ends of Globalization: Bringing Society Back in* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2002), 4.

⁵¹ Deborah L. Wheeler, “Global Culture or Culture Clash: New Information Technologies in the Islamic World – A View From Kuwait,” *Communication Research*, Vol. 25 No. 4 (August 1998): 359.

⁵² John Baylis & Steve Smith, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics, 2nd edition: An Intro to International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 17.

⁵³ Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997), 17.

escalation of the conflict. Consequentially, Islamists see Islamism as the only way to protect local identity, and preserve the wider trans-national Islamic distinctiveness. In this case, instead of promoting universalization, globalization has “triggered identity movements leading to the creation of localized, cultural-specific, identities.”⁵⁴ In the Islamic world, Muslims are caught in the middle of various technological advances driven by globalization and loyalty to their religion⁵⁵ and the umma. It inevitably becomes increasingly difficult to live with globalization since it is now often linked with modernity, a framework that is at its core rejected by Islamists. In fact, the link between globalization and modernity is strongly reinforced by the common belief that “...globalization is just modernity at more accelerated pace.”⁵⁶ Yet, the rejection of globalization by Islamists and its link to modernity is also intensified by the fact that globalization is often - if not always - also linked to Westernization and Americanization. Furthermore, these terms are often used synonymously, and the difference between their exact meanings remains blurred in the West as much as in the East and within the Islamic world. The assumed link between globalization, Westernization and Americanization rest upon the impression that globalization is an American-backed phenomenon, largely supported and encouraged by other Western nations, scheming to attain and maintain world domination.

However, while Islamism rejects both modernity and globalization, it nevertheless becomes a product of both phenomena. Islamists have produced their own version of

⁵⁴ Don Kalb, Marco van der Land, Richard Staring, Bart van Steenbergen, Nico Wilterdink, eds., *The Ends of Globalization: Bringing Society Back in* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2002), 282.

⁵⁵ Asaf Hussain, Robert Olson & Jamil Qureshi, eds., *Orientalism, Islam and Islamists* (Brattleboro: Amana Books, 1984), 72.

⁵⁶ Dwight N. Hopkins, Lois Ann Lorentzen, Eduardo Mendieta & David Batstone, eds., *Religions / Globalizations: Theories and Cases* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2001), 48.

globalization: pan-Islamism. This homegrown brand of global Islamism enormously resembles mainstream globalization in that, like globalization, Islamism in its fundamental nature, aims at converting the world towards its own ideals: “In their efforts to build a way of life based purely on the Shar’i laws, Islamism strain to reject all aspects of Western influence—customs, philosophy, political institutions and values. Despite these efforts, they still absorb vast amounts from the West in endless ways.”⁵⁷ With what seems to be an amalgamation of irreconcilable ideas, extreme Islamism becomes both a reaction to and an imitation of the larger phenomenon of globalization:

Terrorism turns out to be a depraved version of globalization, no less vigorous in its pursuit of its own special interest that are global markets, no less wedded to anarchist disorder than are speculators, no less averse to violence when it serves their ends than marketers avers to inequality and injustice when they are conceptualized as the “cost of doing business.”⁵⁸

Thus, Islamism in its extreme form, Islamic terrorism, is problematic precisely because of its reaction to globalization and because of its imitation of globalization and the conception of a new ideology and framework. Nevertheless, other parts of the world have also had to deal with globalization and have often shown different reactions and varied responses.

Responses

The reactions towards globalization are not always clear-cut and precise. States can accept all aspects of globalization, by embracing all its positive elements (technology), and tolerating its negative impacts (the irreversible environmental impacts

⁵⁷ Daniel Pipes, “Islam and Islamism – Faith and Ideology”, *National Interest* (Spring 2000): 5, available from www.danielpipes.org/article/366; accessed 4 October 2004.

⁵⁸ Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism’s challenge to democracy* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001), xx-xxi.

of technological and industrial development). Others can choose to only tolerate certain elements of globalization. Finally, some states reject globalization all together:

The explosion of regional, cultural, and religious differences in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia – as well as explosive tribal conflicts in Africa and elsewhere – suggests that globalization and homogenization were not as deep as its proponents hoped and critics feared.⁵⁹

While some states officially endorse globalization, its citizens protest against it.

And while some states officially promote globalization, their policies do not reflect public endorsement. Furthermore, while certain states publicly refuse to recognize the influence that globalization has within its borders, globalization is still evident, especially in the area of technology and mass communications. In the case of many states in the Islamic world, the official response to globalization has been rejection. Nevertheless, while globalization is multi-directional, it has still managed to exert a significant amount of influence because it cannot be stopped at any physical border.

Globalization is said to have introduced to all parts of the world foreign products with international trade, foreign ideas with mass media and international communications, and foreign people with easier and more accessible international travel. All of this has led to the introduction of foreign morals and values (or, according to some, lack thereof): “To make matters worse for the Arab state, adoption of production techniques from the West has entailed accepting the decentralizing force of globalization – in that they cannot be controlled centrally.”⁶⁰ This situation is what has led to the perceived threat to the common cultural identity of the Islamic world, which has then led

⁵⁹ Douglas Kellner, “Globalization and the Postmodern Turn,” The UCLA Graduate School of Education & Information Studies [Internet]; available from <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/dk/globpm.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 March 2007.

⁶⁰ Anoushiravan Etheshami, “Islam as a political force in international politics” in *Islam in World Politics*, eds. Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 44.

to this ultimate rejection of globalization. Even though globalization is said to encourage multi-lateral interaction on all fronts, the reality is that globalization is mostly one-sided and only beneficial to industrialized and Western nations or non-Western elites. The trouble lies in the fact that globalization has allowed for an unprecedented exposure of all cultures to all corners of the world, but mostly Western culture has managed to have a permanent influence on the lesser-developed areas.

What remains contradictory is Islamism's own use of globalization and modern technologies to benefit its own proliferation. Regardless of whether or not states should give in to these global tendencies, Islamism's refusal to accept the global reality has led to conflict and confrontation on all fronts. Nevertheless, globalization's biased promotion of Western values has contributed to the current international state of affairs and the development of an extreme ideology in the Islamic world.

Whichever way different societies and states have chosen to deal with globalization, certain common elements can be identified "due in part to the massive economic and political changes of these moments in history, an experience that has been shared by many around the world."⁶¹ Globalization has been felt around the world, although it has often been felt differently and the reactions to it have varied: "The global age demands a degree of conformity from all those engaged with it, but that does not mean that all traditional cultures will be tamed in the same way."⁶² But many authors (including Huntington) recognize a common international despair over secular nationalism after the end of the Cold War, which encouraged the blending of politics and

⁶¹ Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 73.

⁶² John Baylis & Steve Smith, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics, 2nd edition: An Intro to International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 467.

religion.⁶³ Within the borders where religion was forbidden, the end of the Cold War initiated a religious revival in places where normal political processes were unsatisfactory in fulfilling political duties and guaranteeing certain social standards, religion stood up to the challenge and became an important force in the political arena. In other words, where there was a gap in politics, religion came to fill in the void. However, globalization also played an important role in promoting the religious aspect: "Globalization has accelerated both this process of the creation of the religious and the increase in the awareness that religion itself was not, could not, and will not be abolished."⁶⁴ Indeed, there has been a resurgence of the importance of the religious in politics in many different places.

While the blending of religion and politics clearly describes the political movement of Islamism, important differences do exist within other parts of the world. Nowhere else does this situation exist, even in Asia or in Africa,⁶⁵ where globalization has also had an enormous impact. In both these areas, the variables that have led to the creation of Islamism as a political movement against globalization are different. Indeed, although cultural identity plays an important role, there is a lack of cultural cohesion; one common culture does not exist and cannot serve as a uniting force to help ward off foreign influences. The lack of a common religion within Asia and Africa is also a missing element. Thus, religion and culture are necessary elements that have led to movements such as Islamism as the defender of cultural identity.

⁶³ Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 73-75.

⁶⁴ Dwight N. Hopkins, Lois Ann Lorentzen, Eduardo Mendieta & David Batstone, eds., *Religions / Globalizations: Theories and Cases* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2001), 46.

⁶⁵ Not including areas on these continents (Egypt, Somalia, Morocco, Lybia, etc.) where Islam is the dominant religion.

Nevertheless, in Asia, modernization and globalization have still been important areas of concern and they have had to find a uniquely Asian solution that focuses on the economic advantages of development. In spite of this, the biggest concerns also rest upon the fear of the erosion of traditions and cultural norms and values:

The leaders of China, Malaysia, and Singapore react to Western developed countries' demands for human rights and open markets by appealing to 'Asian values' and 'Asian modernization' not because they oppose modernization nor because they are confident of the superiority of 'Asian values' and 'Asian modernization' but because, in promoting industrialization, they need to protect their own industries, which are less competitive than those of developed countries, and because they fear that the rushing tide of modernization will sweep away the traditional order and exacerbate dislocation.⁶⁶

In sub-Saharan Africa, civil and local conflicts, extreme poverty and the HIV/AIDS epidemic have been the main areas of concern. Although a united pan-African reactionary movement would seem to be a likely consequence to these unfortunate circumstances, the African continent does not have a common religion nor does it have an important common civilizational history serving as a uniting force in its collective consciousness. Comparatively, many African countries' main goal is basic survival and although political corruption, poverty and disease exists within the Islamic civilization, regular citizens are not so much fighting for their life as much as they are fighting for cultural survival and perhaps even cultural and moral superiority, as preached by the religious and political leaders. Nevertheless, religious revivalism, such as Islamism, has still had an impact on Africa. It is indeed in the North African states where poverty and HIV/AIDS are less of an issue, and where religion is more homogenous that Islamism has had the strongest influence. Whereas other countries like Kenya, Sudan and Mali have

⁶⁶ Sato Seizaburo, "Clash of Civilizations or Cross-Fertilization of Civilizations?" *Japan Echo* (1997): 47.

not embraced Islamism even though there is a significant Islamic presence precisely because of their socio-economic struggles.

Other parts of the world, including the West, have also reacted to globalization in many different ways and these reactions demonstrate how globalization is as threatening to the West as it is in the East:

[...] There has also been a significant eruption of subcultures of resistance that have attempted to preserve specific forms of culture and society against globalization and homogenization. Most dramatically, peasant movements in Mexico, guerilla movements in Peru, labor unions in France, students in Britain and the United States, environmentalists throughout the world, and a variety of other groups and movements have resisted capitalist globalization and attacks on previous rights and benefits. Seven dozen people's organizations from around the world have protested World Trade Organization policies and a backlash against globalization is visible everywhere.⁶⁷

Ultimately, because of the many converging factors, Islamism is a unique political manifestation that will most likely never be reproduced. Yet, globalization is still problematic elsewhere and will remain problematic until viable alternatives can be found. But homogeneity, assimilation and the threatened loss of cultural identity cannot be ignored and can lead to nothing but conflict. While authors like Samuel Huntington promote a common global culture, and while globalization endorses one global culture, other continents and civilizations' reactions show a different reality: "The varieties of response to the globalization process clearly suggest that there is little prospect of a unified global culture, rather there are global cultures in the plural."⁶⁸ Contrary to Huntington, the solution therefore is not found within globalization and does not rest

⁶⁷ Douglas Kellner, "Globalization and the Postmodern Turn," The UCLA Graduate School of Education & Information Studies [Internet]; available from <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/dk/globpm.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 March 2007.

⁶⁸ Mike Featherstone, ed., *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity* (London: Sage, 1990), 10.

upon global unity. In fact, this type of scenario then opens up the door to a different sort of clash; a clash between civilizations (or “global cultures in the plural”) and the entire movement of globalization itself.

The Most Important Political Movement of the Twenty-First Century

September 11, 2001: Creating Greater Division in the World

The events of September 11, 2001 were not the first international manifestations of extreme Islamism, but for the West it was the first indication of a major ideological shift in international relations: “[...] so the purpose of 9/11 was not to create terror in the minds of the American people but to prove to the Arabs that Islamic purity as interpreted by radical Islam, could triumph over the West.”⁶⁹ Until then, the West had been satisfied with observing from afar what seemed to be a regional manifestation of religious revivalism and fundamentalism. Although the West had been previously identified as an enemy, it had never realistically considered itself anything but a political and ideological scapegoat used by Islamic leaders in domestic politics to achieve public support. Indeed, blaming the United States and the West for all evils was a common practice in many areas of the world but seldom had anybody ever convincingly threatened its ideological supremacy since the Soviet Union. But after September 11th, the rules had changed; Western hegemony had been directly challenged and the opponent could no longer be identified as a rogue state but as a transnational/civilizational movement with a corresponding ideology and a multitude of impoverished followers willing to fight and die for their cause.

⁶⁹ Lee Harris, *Civilization and its Enemies: The Next Stage of History* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 12.

Unlike previous eras of bi-polarity, such as during the Cold War where opposing states fought an ideological battle for supremacy with occasional hot conflicts on the sidelines, Islamism and the West are fighting much more than a simple ideological battle; the West is being confronted on many different sides: religion, culture, morality, law. Nevertheless, the resulting “War against Terrorism” that was launched by the United States and supported by several other Western states shortly after September 11th introduced the framework in which this new battle ought to be fought. Undeniably, the West is fighting a full-scale military war against an enemy that cannot be easily identified or contained within state borders. And while the West refuses to recognize Islamism as anything other than something that has to be destroyed and eliminated, Islamism as a political movement continues to gain strength and Islamic terrorism remains for the extremists its tactic of choice.

The West has wrongly perceived Islamism of exclusively being a terrorist movement. While it has yet to achieve political maturity, and while having to contend with radicalism and corruption, Islamism possesses many necessary components of a conventional political ideology with a corresponding political system: It aspires to protect the Islamic civilization from invading forces and influences; it aspires to provide for its citizens and encourages them to prosper; it has a common civilizational goal it wants to achieve – the umma – and it offers a viable political alternative to Western-imposed institutions. This ideology’s potential, or what the West perceives as a threat, is what makes Islamism an important political movement of the twenty-first century. But what will also give it special status as a twenty-first century political ideology is its civilizational component. Although the influence of Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations

theory remains controversial, it's influence on Islamism cannot be neglected. The Clash of Civilizations theory is often recognized as a malignant self-fulfilling prophecy used only to the advantage of dishonest religious and political leaders, but whether the perceived threat to cultural identity is a fabrication or a real danger, Islamism has managed to exert significant political influence in many states in the Muslim world. Seldom has an ideology had such an international/transnational impact on global affairs and this fact, within itself, makes Islamism an important political civilizational movement.

Islamism as an Alternative

The civilizational perspective of Islamism grew out of the need to find an alternative to what is perceived to be Western-imposed systems and ideals. The regions that had not benefited from globalization and the implementation of Western ideals actively questioned why Western political beliefs and institutions were presented as their only options. The problem with Western systems was that they did not take into account local evolutionary political differences or regional histories, while also completely ignoring that many of these areas suffered from an enormous lack of industrial and technological development:

The assessment of a vocal majority in the Muslim world has resulted in the condemnation of past ideologies. The failure of socialism, Marxism, liberalism, Western capitalism in military, economic, political and social fields encouraged the search for a different ideological framework for political movements.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ Kaleem Kawaja, "Islamism is a viable political system." *IndianMuslims.info* [Internet]; available from http://www.indianmuslims.info/articles/kaleem_kawaja/articles/islamism_is_a_viable_political_system.htm; accessed 15 March 2007.

If any ideology were to compete with or oppose the West, it had to be a movement that would unite many different states and cover a large territorial space. Given the role that common civilizational history and cultural identity (including the religious aspect) played in the Islamic civilization's subconscious, it became the main building block of political Islam.

The end of the Cold War came at an opportune time for the development of Islamism. Soon after, Huntington launched the civilizational debate and the Islamic world seemed to be the perfect example of a civilization opposing the West. But Islamists also took advantage of the changes that were occurring in the international system and precipitated the process of Islamism as the opposing ideology to Western dominance. On the surface, extreme Islamism does not seem to be a practical or a legitimate alternative for the Islamic civilization; however, it is nevertheless laying the groundwork for the recruitment of followers while also seeking international recognition for the entire Islamic world.

Despite the fact that Islamism has not been concretely identified as an ideological alternative to the West in International Relations, it has effectively filled in the political void that was left by communism after the end of the Cold War.

An act of violence on the magnitude of 9/11 can only have been intended to further some kind of political objective. What this political objective might be, or whether it is worthwhile – these are all secondary considerations. Surely people do not commit such acts unless they are trying to achieve some kind of recognizably political purpose.⁷¹

Moreover, Islamism is not likely to disappear because in the Islamic world, Western-imposed systems are not an acceptable option. With no end in sight for

⁷¹ Lee Harris, *Civilization and its Enemies: The Next Stage of History* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 3.

globalization, moderate alternative ideologies that will meet the Islamic world's needs are unlikely: "[...] there is absolutely no political policy that we could adopt that would in any way change the attitude of [Islamists]."⁷² Indeed, Islamism is a legitimate political ideology regardless of its violent components. But, an extreme faction of Islamists has hijacked the movement. And if it is to gain support from the moderates, it must lose its violent tendencies, but it has yet a long way to go. Recent events in Egypt clearly demonstrate why it is important for Islamic movements to give up violence:

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood scored 20% of the vote [during the last election], despite an official ban on their party [...] The Muslim Brotherhood is the core movement of Islamism in many respects. They campaigned on a slogan of 'Islam is the answer.' Some Egyptians are entranced because the Muslim Brotherhood has given up violence. They voted for the brotherhood out of frustration, as a protest vote, or because they, like Iranians before 1979, really believed the promises of reform and democracy.⁷³

Nevertheless, the emergence of Islamism is a clear example that nations, states and even civilizations must be allowed to find their own solutions, to create an alternative that best meets their own individual needs rather than following transplanted Western systems.

Conclusion: Preventing the Clash

Global Cultures

Acknowledging and accepting the reality of a diverse international situation can prevent future clashes between civilizations. The world is a plurality of cultures that exists within and across state borders. While many cultures, states or civilizations may try

⁷² Lee Harris, *Civilization and its Enemies: The Next Stage of History* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 16.

⁷³ Ami Isseroft, "Islamism – The Tsunami of the future?" MideastWeb Middle East Web Log [Internet]; <http://www.mideastweb.org/log/archives/00000415.htm>; accessed 15 March 2007.

to assert their dominance, the development of any common universal identity is virtually impossible. Westerners and Islamists alike must recognize this fact.

Nevertheless, globalization and modernization are making individuals more alike since they are exposed to the same kind of information and immigration is now widespread. But at the same time, this homogenization is making people from many different ethnic backgrounds want to re-affirm their own cultural identities, just as described by Benjamin Barber in his work "Jihad vs. McWorld" and reiterated by Cris Toffolo: "The very processes responsible for generating an increasing homogenization of cultures globally also are producing exaggerated and antagonistic forms of cultural difference."⁷⁴

Toffolo therefore suggests that it is not the existence of common cultures regrouped in civilizations that is the catalyst for conflict but the current state system that largely increases ethnic and cultural conflict.⁷⁵ The traditional state system restricts what would seem as natural cultural associations and transnational ethnic groupings, especially in the areas where political borders were drawn up by imperial forces that did not take into account ethnicity, race or religion. On the other hand, "[...] the state's evaporation or dissolution, which some people think is now happening with 'globalization,' would not solve the problem."⁷⁶ Even though the state system might be urging these clashes, it could also serve as a tool to diminish Islamic civilizational unrest:

A second school of 'Islamic internationalists,' consisting largely of modernist intellectuals, attempts to find some accommodation between Islamic ethical ideals and prevailing international realities. Their argument tends toward the conclusion

⁷⁴ Cris E. Toffolo, ed., *Emancipating Cultural Pluralism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 9.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

that while the unified umma is a goal to work toward, the conditions of modern life require acceptance of the utility, if not the morality, of the state system.⁷⁷

As the West learns how to deal with the questioning of the role of the state, the cornerstone of modern international politics, the Islamic civilization is also learning how to assert its place and establish its importance within the current international system: "The current period of transition could renew the grand historical tradition of Islamic civilizations, which for centuries drove their own destinies yet showed great adaptability in the face of global change."⁷⁸ While Islamism sometimes demonstrates moderate tendencies, Islamism is perceived as being mostly proselytizing, extreme and violent. But if that perception was to change, Islamism's threat to the Islamic and Western worlds might diminish:

If the major powers stopped regarding terrorism as primarily a military matter, they might begin working together to change the conditions that give rise to terrorism. A promising start would be joint efforts to reduce the number and size of the ungoverned and chaotic areas of the globe, improve the conditions of living in the world's megacities and diminish other sources of social crisis.⁷⁹

The reality of this situation demonstrates that Islamism will have a lasting global impact, affecting not only relations between different international actors but also the domestic and foreign political policies of states worldwide. This in turn gives the political movement of Islamism centre-stage on the international political and ideological forefronts. However, Islamism should not strive to become the only dominant ideology in its attempts to defeat any other universal threats.

⁷⁷ Sohail H. Hashmi, "International Society and Its Islamic Malcontents," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 20 (Winter/Spring 1996): 23.

⁷⁸ Gilles Kepel, "Islamism Reconsidered: a Running Dialogue With Modernity," *Harvard International Review* 22, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 27.

⁷⁹ Jonathan Barker, *The No-Nonsense Guide to Terrorism* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2003), 138.

The Role of International Relations

If international conflict is to be understood, it is up to International Relations theory to explain its origin. While theory cannot eliminate the conflict, it can lead to a better understanding of it. In the current state of international affairs, Islamism and its extreme factions have been identified as the source of most situations of conflict in the world. However, by looking at Islamism in this broad manner, the distinction between the source of conflict and the vehicle of conflict⁸⁰ is not easily discernable. It is clear that terrorism, the vehicle of conflict, cannot be recognized as the source of conflict, in the sense that terrorism does not happen regardless of external motivations and influences. In this case, the source of conflict is identified as threatened cultural identity due to globalization and terrorism is the reaction and the end result. Nonetheless, it is up to International Relations theory to acknowledge Islamism as a genuine ideological occurrence, offering a new way to understand the world from an Islamic perspective.

Furthermore, International Relations must continue to acknowledge the importance of culture in interactions between states and it must recognize the existence of actual and factual groupings of peoples of similar heritages – civilizations. Culture has often been considered of marginal importance but in some areas of the world, cultural identity has become more important than political identity and political affiliations. While civilizations may not yet hold significant political power, in the sense that they cannot be compared to what is customarily known as the state, in the realm of identity, civilizations play an important role that helps define entire clusters of the world population. And since cultural and civilizational identity are becoming important factors in international

⁸⁰ Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 202.

politics, the civilization's influence and importance cannot be overlooked. However, "some critics have argued that policy and rhetoric built on the idea of a clash of civilizations will tend to produce such a clash: the theory becomes self-fulfilling."⁸¹

The growing misperception of globalization also has to be re-considered as an important factor in international politics today. The link between globalization and Islamism needs further evaluation because until all the international actors learn how to understand globalization, they will not know how to respond to Islamism.

Finally, Islamism has to be accepted as a real political movement and it should not be perceived as a tool used to advance the cause of Muslim fanatic fundamentalists. International Relations must continue to encourage a theoretical and ideological dialogue between all international actors or the bi-polar conflict between globalization and Islamism will become an ultimate fight to the death, where one will indisputably have to prevail over the other:

The familiar paradigms of a 'clash of civilizations', *hakimiyya* versus *jahiliyya*, and 'Islam versus the West', need to be exposed as sterile and destructive, in both intellectual and socio-political terms. Ways of creative convergence between modernity and Islam need to be explored within a context of common humanity, taking into consideration that large parts of the world's population are neither Muslim nor Western.⁸²

This scenario of the clash of civilizations is not acceptable and would potentially lead to ultimate world war and increased world conflict. On the other hand, Islamism's theoretical framework has to demonstrate it is a viable political alternative. Just like any other ideology, its primitive forms are often considered radical and illogical. Islamism is in its infancy stage but it must eventually disassociate itself from terrorism and it must be

⁸¹ Jonathan Barker, *The No-Nonsense Guide to Terrorism* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2003), 108.

⁸² Ahmad Shboul, "Between rhetoric and reality: Islam and politics in the Arab world" in *Islam in World Politics*, eds. Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 188.

allowed to grow and evolve if it is ever to be considered one of many real and credible alternatives for moderate Islamists and Westerners alike.

CHAPTER FOUR CONCLUSION

Review

Islamism is a reaction to a threatened cultural identity, and is dedicated to the political and cultural self-preservation of peoples of Islamic background. Because of the intrinsic religious and cultural nature of Islamism, “especially in areas of the world where modernization is a synonym for Westernization, [Islamism has] served as a liberation struggle against what its supporters perceive to be alien ideologies and foreign powers.”¹ Islamism is thus a politicized civilizational reaction to threatened cultural identity due to globalization.

The reason why Islamism promotes the complete rejection of globalization can be found at the roots of the movement itself. Chapter Two has identified important elements that help understand the nature of the movement, also known as Political Islam. Islamism is a relatively recent development, generally based on Islamic religious beliefs, that takes into account the recreation of a geopolitical umma. While Islamism has been greatly influenced by other political movements such as socialism and nationalism, the umma, Islamism’s ultimate goal, does not leave room for any variants of other political ideologies. The root of the movement therefore stipulates that Islamism is a non-compromising ideology that cannot co-exist with globalization. While Islamism is not Islam, the desire to recreate the umma and strong anti-western sentiments are common beliefs to Islamists, whether they are moderate or part of the small extreme faction.

¹ Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 66.

By providing a breakdown and overview of major concepts dealt with in this study, Chapter Two also examined the fundamental principals of culture and identity, while exploring the civilizational “paradigm” and its relationship to conflict. Within the field of International Relations, cultural and even civilizational identity is now an important political issue, requiring further consideration. While the debate continues on how the Cold War era generated a type of “cultural neglect,” Huntington’s Clash of Civilization’s theory has forced scholars and politicians from around the world to reconsider culture as an important factor in modern-day international politics, thus leading to the creation of a new international paradigm.

Chapter Two also presented the distinction between Islamism and Islamic terrorism, disassociating the “vehicle of conflict with the source of conflict.”² Islamic terrorism, an extreme form of international conflict, is a symbolic and systemic rejection of structure. As a critical factor in International Relations, terrorism in general, and more specifically Islamic terrorism, could be a consequence of the weakening of the state and the questioning of imposed democratic principles, such as political representation. Whereas Islamists and Westerners alike are using Huntington’s conclusions to further their own political objectives, the civilizational approach is proving to be a dangerous and malignant self-fulfilling theory.

Chapter Three demonstrated how one civilization developed a political ideology to counteract the effects of globalization and had, in turn, a huge impact on interaction between different international actors but also on international conflict itself. This chapter took Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations one step further by explaining how

² Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 202.

international conflict has changed: as described by the realist perspective, conflict is no longer only between competing or neighboring states, nor is it between civilizations of different cultural heritages, as alleged by Huntington. While the Clash of Civilizations theory has influenced the emergence of the civilizational political movement of Islamism, today's real clash is between civilizations and globalization. Indeed, because of this particular reality, Islamism then itself becomes a source of international conflict, "to the extent that Islamism is a threat to existing regimes in the Muslim world-and thus threatens to affect the Western world as well."³

Globalization and Islamism share many important similarities even if Islamism was originally believed to be a reaction to globalization. Chapter Three explored this important link between globalization and Islamism: "The Muslim state now finds itself under attack not only by the forces of transnational political Islam, but also by the very forces which are shaping the international system – the forces of globalization."⁴

Globalization has fundamentally threatened the political system the world is accustomed to. States inside their imposed borders are losing the legitimacy and power to control what is happening within their own jurisdictions. Often when politics is unable to answer the fundamental needs of a nation or people, religious-inspired movements (an important component of cultural identity) offers solutions. While Islamism is not Islam, this political ideology inspired by religion has offered a unique Muslim approach to a people who feel the very core of their identity is being threatened. Generally, other civilizations have shown varied reactions to the same phenomenon of globalization, but there is a

³ Arnold Hottinger, "The Real Perils of Islamism: How a Minority Can Prevail" in *World Press Review*, (41, May, 1994), 13.

⁴ Anoushiravan Etheshami, "Islam as a political force in international politics" in Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud (eds.), *Islam in World Politics* (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 44.

common concern over secular nationalism. Within the Islamic civilization there has been an innovative blending of politics and religion, allowing the transnational ideology of Islamism to be considered a viable political alternative opposing globalization and Western dominance. Although September 11th was not the first public manifestation of extreme Islamism or Islamic terrorism, it openly challenged Western hegemony, thus currently making Islamism the most important political movement in development.

Chapter Three concluded by suggesting that the field of International Relations needs go beyond current frameworks to consider the important role played by culture in order to properly understand the ideology of Islamism. Despite the fact that international conflict will never be completely eliminated, allowing Islamism to be legitimately accepted as an alternate ideology can lessen its effect.

Results and Analysis

This thesis attempted to make the link between Islamism and globalization by exploring identity through a cultural and civilizational approach. By looking at the nuances, this thesis has presented a different interpretation of Islamism as a whole in the hopes that this new approach will promote a better understanding, to reduce the risk of a real "Clash of Civilizations," as predicted by Huntington.

The focus of this thesis has been on radical and violent tendencies of Islamism and the negative perception of globalization, which is mostly expressed by only a small faction of extreme Islamists. Because Islamism challenges globalization and globalization threatens cultural identity, both these occurrences have led to significant confrontations throughout the world. This thesis tries to understand the cause of international conflict

and how it has changed; what was otherwise considered an illegitimate form of political change (terrorism) is now accepted by many as a legitimate tool to voice political discontent. Even though terrorism is not a new phenomenon, it is even surpassing war as the type of conflict likely to occur in many regions. Fundamentally, understanding why terrorism is being used can help minimize the initial confrontation that might be in turn producing the terrorism itself. Conflict cannot be totally eliminated, but it can be understood in the hopes of preventing further outbreaks.

The first step is to understand the political ideology of Islamism and to recognize the difference between Islamism and Islam itself. Confusion exists about the role that Islam plays in producing and encouraging terrorism and confrontations with the West. The extreme factions of Islamists are hurting the reputation of the religion because these political actions are vehemently and maliciously perpetrated in the name of Islam. The outcome therefore increases the misconception that all Muslims are Islamic terrorists, which have led to domestic policies of racial profiling in many Western states and to a generalized apprehension of any state from within the borders of the Islamic civilization. The confusion surrounding Islam also makes Islamism difficult to categorize as a political movement. Even though Islamism can be considered a modern political ideology, it is inherently opposed to modernity because of its interconnectedness with globalization. These concepts cannot be reconciled, and this also serves as a catalyst for this multifaceted confrontation.

Another important concept is the idea of the civilization. A civilization is based on a given population sharing a similar cultural heritage, and other civilizations may also find themselves in confrontation with globalization. However, Huntington's

interpretation of “civilization” is greatly restricted to the common denominator of religion. By basing his theory on the growing number of adherents to Islam, Huntington believes that religion is the ultimate and deciding factor in civilizational upheavals, as demonstrated by Islamism within the Islamic civilization. Unfortunately, no other civilizational movement has of yet proved Huntington wrong on this particular aspect. However, as demonstrated in this thesis, what is actually occurring is a clash between civilizations and globalization, not a clash between civilizations *per se*. This new interpretation does not refute the important role played by civilizations in the international sphere but specifies that the situation is far more complex than originally suggested by Huntington.

This analysis also distances itself from the misconceptions that religion is the primary cause of conflict. Indeed, religion remains one of many significant factors in shaping cultural identity. Nevertheless, cultural identity as a whole is an important element to consider in political interactions. As suggested by numerous authors, cultural identity has replaced political identity in the post-Cold War era. However, political identity struggles are still taking place in many parts of the world and the importance of the Right-Left debate remains vital in many areas, such as Latin America. On the other hand, cultural identity is easier to understand than political beliefs because it is something learnt from birth and becomes inherently subconscious. Indeed, this demonstrates how it is easier to manipulate people with rhetoric related to culture rather than politics. Hence, political identity and political beliefs are more malleable than cultural identity, thus guaranteeing support from the populace for political leaders who make reference to cultural elements. Culture and cultural identity, then, are social constructs used as

political mechanisms. While identity is always in evolution, culture is manipulated by those in power to create a false sense of belonging, which in turn creates a false sense of duty and commitment towards a greater civilization.

Controversial authors such as Irshad Manji claim that citizens from within the Islamic civilization willfully embrace Western culture.⁵ If the average Muslim does not fear the loss of their culture, it could be suggested that the leaders, clerics, and mullahs are the ones evoking the fear of loss of cultural identity in order to ensure control over their own territories. Loss of cultural identity generates a loss of control over the citizens of these states. In addition, globalization leads to the loss of the state structure, also considered a type of control, which in turn promotes the fabrication of a hyper-Islamic state.

This thesis also identified similarities with ethnic and/or religious nationalism. Indeed, there is a direct connection between nationalism and Islamism in the means used to gain political support. However, Islamism has surpassed nationalism because it has gone beyond any geographical borders, where there has been the emergence of a truly trans-national movement. This justifies the usage of the civilizational approach when looking at Islamism since it is a political ideology moving beyond the structure of the state. However, the trans-national characteristic is specific to Islamism. There is a fundamental difference between the manifestations of Islamism as a trans-national civilizational movement, where no individual state dominates, and the Western civilization, which is mostly dominated by certain states, or more specifically, the United

⁵ Irshad Manji, *The Trouble with Islam Today – A Wake-Up Call for Honesty and Change* (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2005).

States. Undeniably, this explains the misunderstandings that exist among the specific terms of Americanization, Westernization and globalization.

Because of this misinterpretation, globalization has played an important role in the creation of the concept of civilizations and the self-realization of the Islamic civilizational consciousness; globalization has also played an important role with the emergence of political Islam itself. Even if Islamists view globalization as the same as Westernization, this thesis asserts that while many resemblances do exist between these two terms, globalization is a much larger phenomenon and does not only encompass the Westernization of political institutions or values; globalization is an all-encompassing bi-directional occurrence affecting all areas unevenly.

In the realm of International Relations, the civilizational approach has led to changing paradigms, where states are no longer the primary actors. Nevertheless, many states have not been able to adapt to the changing dynamic of international interactions for fear of losing supremacy over the international system. Additionally, some states have been unable or unwilling to accept the changing realities of the international structure, and during times of conflict have continued to identify their enemy with particular states. The American-led War on Terrorism is a prime example of an international confrontation between a few Western allies and a non-state actor. In this situation, the so-called enemy will most likely never be defeated, primarily because the tactics used do not take into account the primary causes of the initial conflict. All international actors, including states, should try to better understand why terrorist organizations and movements of extreme Islam are resorting to terrorism. The answer lies beyond the structures of the modern state; therefore the response should not be conducted

through traditional methods of war. While extreme Islamism and terrorism are true threats to the West, the West's reaction to Islamism is increasing the use of these violent tendencies.

Within the field of International Relations, the civilizational approach offers a wider outlook, allowing for a more tangible interpretation of international conflict. Nevertheless, globalization has precipitated the notion of "one global civilization," which has in turn exacerbated international reactions, including the Islamic civilization's reaction of the creation of Political Islam. But this is not the only reason for the emergence of Islamism and other underlying causes are based on differences with the Western world on morality and judgment. Islamism is in part a reaction to the fear of losing longstanding traditions threatened by globalization (wrongly perceived to be Westernization), but it also a reaction to the fear of being ruled by foreign powers, through what is considered by the Islamists as a new form of imperialism.

Consequently, Islamism attempts to offer an alternative to foreign rule and extreme Islamism also tries to squash unfamiliar structures through terrorism. Although the theoretical end goal of Islamism is the political umma, it cannot be a universal all-encompassing political system as desired by many Islamists. The umma can only exist when it learns to co-exist with other international systems. It can be one of many different systems, if the followers of Islamism and the citizens making up the Islamic civilization choose it.

Nevertheless, extreme Islamism's means to the end are not justifiable, although neither is the creation of a "one-civilization" world. In the case of extreme Islamism, terrorism is the means and not the end but even the Islamists find it hard to differentiate

between the two. While it is crucial to distinguish the moderate from the extreme Islamists, they are both part of the whole system of Islamism, even though they are different in methods yet similar in goals. However, Islamism has been constantly associated with the small extreme faction who favors the use of terrorist methods for achieving their goals, thus leading to the lack of voice for the moderates. The negative perceptions of globalization even among the moderates within the movement of Islamism lead to the conviction that change is impossible without extreme measures and terrorism becomes the only solution and defense against invading values and ideas.

Future Considerations

This study presents an analysis of Islamism's reaction to globalization. It has provided a new understanding of the emergence of Islamism, but it is unknown how this movement will develop and if it will maintain the goal of recreating the umma. Indeed, even in its early stages of growth, Islamism is varied in its applications. This thesis has focused on the dynamics between the extreme and moderate tendencies within the movement. But as time goes on, Islamism could branch out even more; for instance there are the beginnings of a feminist Islamic movement:

The concrete modes of political socialization that Islamism has engendered have helped invalidate the very ideological percepts on which it is founded. Thus the "veiled militants," women who demanded the application of *shari'a*, have been in many cases the first generation of women, speaking out in the public sphere, outside the home. But in the process they have clashed with the "bearded militants," men who have been anxious to confine women to a supporting role in their political missions. Some of these women, particularly in Turkey and Iran, have begun to elaborate an "Islamist feminism" in place of the chauvinism prevalent in the movement.⁶

⁶ Gilles Kepel, "Islamism Reconsidered: a Running Dialogue With Modernity," *Harvard International Review* 22, no. 2 (Summer 2000), 26.

But what a feminist Islamic movement might entail and what the political ramifications might be are still left to be determined. Indeed, as new players will decide to either embrace or reject the ideology, Islamism may divide its supporters whether along socio-economic lines or even among sectarian factions; instead of reuniting members from the greater Islamic civilization, Islamism could become a divisive force within its regions, thus creating more conflict and chaos.

The practical application of Islamism also needs to be studied further: how will this ideology be permutated into concrete political action and policy? This debate is current taking place in states within the span of the Islamic civilization yet several states, such as Egypt and Turkey, face great resistance in accepting Islamism as the rule of the land; an affinity to secularization still prevails.

Within this entire debate, there is also the question of cultural identity. Only time will tell if the threat to cultural identity will remain the driving force behind the movement of Political Islam. Unless there are major structural changes within the international system itself, culture and identity will likely remain the most emotionally charged component of international politics throughout the world, where other civilizations will start playing a more important role in regards to uniting peoples of similar heritages.

While the Islamic civilization feels threatened today, other civilizations will undoubtedly also have to contend with the effects of globalization; it is just a matter of time before another group of states or continents start violently demonstrating their refusal to accept imposed norms. By looking at other similar movements also opposed to the West and to globalization, such as the Latin American leftist movement, there are

indications that opposition to globalization is becoming monumental in scale.

Nevertheless, there are significant differences between what is happening in the Islamic civilization and what is happening in Latin American, including their unique political strategies:

...The Venezuelan government offered cheap oil to US citizens after the New Orleans Disaster. [...] The importance of this offer is that it reveals a sharp awareness of the necessity to appeal directly to US citizens. This is one of the big differences between the political strategy of the new movements in Latin America and the Islamist rebellions elsewhere.⁷

Nevertheless, the “Clash of Civilizations” debate is the starting point of this research, but it must not be used as an explanation for international conflict. What is currently happening is more clearly reflected by a “clash between civilizations and globalization,” and Islamism has become a trans-national political movement representing an entire civilization.

Islamists have embarked on a notable odyssey – the effort to make their past civilization, based on a framework of Islamic culture, relevant as an element of future development. [...] If Islamists cannot rise to this challenge, they will be soon supplanted by other political forces that do have something to offer.⁸

Just like Soviet communism offered an alternative to western political structures, Islamism provides an alternative to foreign rule and imposed ideals. If, like Soviet communism, Islamism fails to provide a strong and sustainable political option in an area of the world that has historically been surrounded by political turmoil, it will quickly be discredited and will inevitably be replaced by another political movement, causing yet more international conflict.

⁷ Tariq Ali, *Pirates of the Caribbean: Axis of Hope*. (London: Verso, 2006). 75.

⁸ Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 213.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ali, Tariq. *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*. London & New York: Verso, 2002.
- _____. *Pirates of the Caribbean: Axis of Hope*. London: Verso, 2006.
- Altman, Fabio. "The Muslims Are Coming: A real world menace, or just a bogeyman?" *World Press Review* 41 (May, 1994): 8-10.
- Anderson, Roy R., Robert F. Seibert & Jon G. Wagner. *Politics and change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and Accommodation* 6th edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001.
- Anonymous. *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror*. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc., 2004.
- Arseneault, Michel. "Dessine-moi une solution." *L'actualité*, 15 mars 2006, 46-48.
- Asani, Ali S. "So That You May Know One Another: A Muslim American Reflects on Pluralism and Islam." *The Annals of the American Academy*, 588 (July 2003): 40-51.
- Ashley, Richard K. "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War." *International/Intertextual Relations*, Lexington books, 1989.
- Asser, Martin. "Egypt: A permanent emergency?" *BBC News* [Internet]. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/6481909.stm. Accessed 27 March 2007.
- Aysha, Emad El-Din. "Huntington's Shift to the Declinist Camp: Conservative Declinism and the 'Historical Function' of the Clash of Civilizations." *International Relations*, Vol. 14 (4), (2003): 429-452.
- Badie, Bertrand et Marie-Claude Smouts. *Le retournement du monde. Sociologie de la scène internationale*. Paris : Presses de Sciences Po et Dalloz, 1999.
- Barber, Benjamin R. *Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's challenge to democracy*. New York: Ballantine Books, 2001.
- Barker, Jonathan. *The No-Nonsense Guide to Terrorism*. Toronto: Between the Lines, 2003.
- Baudrillard, Jean. *Les stratégies fatales*. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1983.

- _____. *Power Inferno – requiem pour les Twin Towers, Hypothèses sur le terrorisme, La violence du mondial*. Paris : Éditions Galilée, 2002.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. *Globalization: The Human Consequences*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998.
- Bawer, Bruce. *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within*. New York: Doubleday, 2006.
- Baylis, John & Steve Smith (eds.). *The Globalization of World Politics, 2nd edition: An Intro to International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Berman, Sheri. "Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society." *Perspectives on Politics* 1.2 (2003): 257-272.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish. *In Defense of Globalization*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Bibby, Reginald W. *Mosaic Madness*. Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, 1990.
- Boroumand, Ladan & Roya Boroumand. "Terror, Islam, and Democracy" in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13 No. 2 April (2002): 5-20.
- Braudel, Fernand. "The History of Civilizations: The Past Explains the Present." *On History*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980.
- Brodie, Janine & Sandra Rein (eds.). *Critical Concepts: An Introduction to politics, Third Edition*. Toronto: Pearson – Prentice Hall, 2005.
- Brown, L. Carl. *Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
- Burmeister, B.S. Col. "The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism – over or under-rated as a threat to (South African) National Security"[Internet]. Available from http://www.mil.za/CSANDF/CJSupp/TrainingFormation/DefenceCollege/Researchpapers2000_02/burmeister.htm. Accessed 4 October 2004.
- Caffentzis, George. "Oil, Globalization, and Islamic Fundamentalism: Sept. 11 massacre rooted in Middle East crisis, globalization." *The CCPA Monitor*, Vol. 8 No. 7 (December 2001-January 2002): 1-8.
- Caldwell, Christopher. "Bordering on What?" *The New York Times Magazine*, 25 September 2005, 46-51.

- Campbell, David. "Violent Performances: Identity, Sovereignty, Responsibility." *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. Editors Y. Lapid & F. Kratochwil. Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publ., 1996.
- Camroux, David. "Huntington: Scénarios controverses pour le future." *Études* (juin 1996): 735-746.
- Castells, Manuel. *The Power of Identity*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997.
- Chebel, Malek. "Un dieu, une loi, un prophète." *Le Point*, 21 juillet 2005, no. 1714, 50-51.
- Chehab, Zaki. *Inside the Resistance: The Iraqi Insurgency and the Future of the Middle East*. New York: Nation Books, 2005.
- Chiozza, Giacomo. "Is There a clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International conflict Involvement, 1946-97." *Journal of Peace Research* 39.6 (2002): 711-734.
- Chomsky, Noam. *Middle East Illusions*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Chouet, Alain. "Violence islamiste et réseaux du terrorisme internationale." *Politique étrangère* 68 (Fall/Winter 2003): 643-661.
- Chow, Rey. *Ethics after Idealism: Theory-Culture-Ethnicity-Reading*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998.
- Cochran, Molly. "Postmodernism, ethics and international political theory." *Review of International Studies* 21 (1995): 237-250.
- Connolly, William E. *Identity Difference – Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.
- Cox, Robert. "Civilizations and world order." *The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections of Power, Morals and Civilization*. Editors Robert Cox with Micheal G. Schechter. London: Routledge, 2002: 51-79.
- Davis, David R. & Will H. Moore. "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior." *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1997): 171-184.
- De Certeau, Michel. *Culture in the Plural*. Translated by Tom Conley. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.

- Der Derian, James. "The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations." *International/Intertextual relations*. Lexington books, 1989.
- Dieckhoff, Alain. *La nation dans tous ses états*. Manchecourt : Flammarion, 2002.
- Dougherty, James E. & Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. *Contending Theories of International Relations – A comprehensive Survey*. 5th ed. Toronto: Longman, 2001.
- Doyle, Micheal W. & G. John Ikenberry (eds.). *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.
- "Egypt allows new political party." *BBC News* [Internet]. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/6689025.stm. Accessed 24 May 2007.
- "Egyptian Brotherhood mass arrests." *BBC News* [Internet]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/6364689.stm. Accessed 14 March 2007.
- "Egyptian MPs in protest walk-out." *BBC News* [Internet]. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/6463757.stm. Accessed 19 March 2007.
- "Egyptians vote on major reforms." *BBC News* [Internet]. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/6494247.stm. Accessed 26 March 2007.
- Ellwood, Wayne. *The No-Nonsense guide to Globalization*. Toronto: New Internationalist Publications Ltd & Between the Lines, 2001.
- Etheshami, Anoushiravan. "Islam as a political force in international politics." *Islam in World Politics*. Editors Anthony H. Johns Nelly Lahoud. London & New York: Routledge, 2005.
- "Europe needs Turkey, says Straw." *BBC News* [Internet]. Available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/4227744.stm>. Accessed 9 September 2005.
- Evangelista, Matthew. "Domestic Structure and International Change." *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*. Editors Micheal W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, 202-228.
- Falk, Richard. "Culture, Modernism, Postmodernism: A challenge to International Relations." *Culture and International Relations*. Editor Jongsuk Chay. New York: Westport and London, Praeger, 1990.

_____, Lester Edwin J Ruiz & R.B.J. Walker (eds.). *Reframing the International: Law, Culture, Politics*. New York: Routledge, 2002.

_____. *Revolutionaries and Functionaries: The Dual Face of Terrorism*. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1988.

Fatah, Tarek. "Why are we Muslims so silent on Darfur?" *The Globe and Mail*, 3 May 2006.

Featherstone, Mike (ed.). *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. London: Sage, 1990.

Feldman, Noah. *After Jihad – America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003.

_____. "Power Struggle, Tribal Conflict Or Religious War?" *Time*, 6 March 2006, 23-24.

Fox, Jonathan. "Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (July 2001): 459-472.

"French critic of Islam in hiding." *BBC News* [Internet]. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/5393892.stm>. Accessed 30 September 2006.

"Full transcript of bin Ladin's speech." *Al Jazeera* [Internet]. Available at <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/79C6AF22-98FB-4A1C-B21F-2BC36E87F61F.htm>. Accessed 11 November 2004.

Fuller, Graham E. *The Future of Political Islam*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Garnett, John C. *Commonsense and the Theory of International Politics*. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1984.

Gettleman, Marvin E. & Stuart Schaar (eds.). *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*. New York: Grove Press, 2003.

Gismondi, Mark David. "Civilisation as Paradigm: An Inquiry into the Hermeneutics of Conflict." *Geopolitics*, Vol. 9, No.2 (summer 2004): 402-425.

Gray, John. *Al Qaeda and what it means to be modern*. New York: The New Press, 2003.

Green, Richard Allen. "Bush's language angers US Muslims." *BBC News* [Internet]. Available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/Americas/4785065.stm>. Accessed 14 August 2006.

- Greenberg, Jeff, Tom Pyszczynski & Sheldon Solomon. *In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror*. Washington: American Psychological Association, 2003.
- Griffiths, Martin. *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*. London: Routledge, 1999.
- Grillo, R. D. *Pluralism and the Politics of Difference: State, Culture, and Ethnicity in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
- Guzzini, Stefano. "The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 10-4 (2004): 533-568.
- Halpern, Orly. "Tourism, not terrorism, anchors Bedouin culture." *The Globe and Mail*, 27 April 2006, A15.
- Harris, Lee. *Civilization and its Enemies: The Next Stage of History*. New York: Free Press, 2004.
- Harrison, Lawrence E. & Samuel P. Huntington (eds.) *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
- Hashmi, Sohail H. "International Society and Its Islamic Malcontents." *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 20 (Winter/Spring 1996): 13-29.
- Helliwell, John F. *Globalization and Well-Being*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002.
- Henderson, Errol A. & Richard Tucker. "Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 45, (2001): 317-338.
- Henley Paul. "'Islamist conspiracy' fear in Turkey." *BBC News* [Internet]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/programmes/crossing_continents/5301682.stm. Accessed 4 September 2006.
- Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
- Hopkins, Dwight N., Lois Ann Lorentzen, Eduardo Mendieta & David Batstone (eds.). *Religions / Globalizations: Theories and Cases*. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2001.
- Hottinger, Arnold. "The Real Perils of Islamism: How a Minority Can Prevail." *World Press Review* 41 (May 1994): 12-13.
- Huntington, Samuel P. "If not Civilizations, What? – Paradigms of the post-Cold War World-Response." *Foreign Affairs* 72.5 (1993): 186-195.

_____. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72.3 (1993): 22-50.

_____. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, New York, Touchstone, 1996.

Hussain, Asaf, Robert Olson & Jamil Qureshi (eds.). *Orientalism, Islam and Islamists*. Brattleboro: Amana Books, 1984.

Inglehart, Ronald & Pippa Norris. "The True Clash of Civilizations." *Foreign Policy* 135 (March/April 2003): 62-70.

"Is Islamism a Threat?: A Debate." *Middle East Quarterly* (December 1999); also available on the *Middle East Forum* website [Internet]. Available from <http://www.meforum.org/article/447>.

Isseroft, Ami. "Islamism – The Tsunami of the future?" *MideastWeb Middle East Web Log* [Internet], Available from <http://www.mideastweb.org/log/archives/00000415.htm>. Accessed 15 March 2007.

Johns, Anthony H. & Nelly Lahoud. "The world of Islam and the challenge of Islamism." *Islam in World Politics*. Editors Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud. London & New York: Routledge, 2005.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. *The New Cold War: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Kawaja Kaleem. "Islamism is a viable political system." *IndianMuslims.info* [Internet]. Available from http://www.indianmuslims.info/articles/kaleem_kawaja/articles/islamism_is_a_viable_political_system.html. Accessed 15 March 2007.

Kalb, Don, Marco van der Land, Richard Staring, Bart van Steenbergen & Nico Wilterdink (eds.). *The Ends of Globalization: Bringing Society Back in*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2002.

Kellner, Douglas. "Globalization and the Postmodern Turn." *The UCLA Graduate School of Education & Information Studies* [Internet]. Available from <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/dk/globpm.htm>. Accessed 13 March 2007.

Kepel, Gilles. "Islamism Reconsidered: a Running Dialogue With Modernity." *Harvard International Review* 22, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 22-27.

- Khan, Noor. "Jihad versus West goes on despite death of top Taliban commander: Mullah Omar." *The Canadian Press* [Internet]. Available at <http://www.cbc.ca/cp/world/070515/w051504A.html>. Accessed 15 May 2007.
- Kibble, David G. "Understanding Islamic Fundamentalism." *Military Review*, Vol. 75 Issue 5 (1995): 40-46.
- "La progression des islamistes." *L'actualité*, 1 avril 2006, 17.
- Lahoud, Nelly & Anthony H. Johns (eds.). *Islam in World Politics*. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Lapid, Yosef & Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.). *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. Boulder & London: Lynne Rinner Publishers, 1996.
- Lamert, Charles (ed.). *Social Theory: The Multicultural and Classic Readings*. Boulder: Co., Westview Press, 1999.
- Lerch, Wolfgang Günter. "Unholy terror: Islam's fanatical fringe." *World Press Review* 49 (January 2002): 6-13.
- Lewis, Bernard. *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. New York: Random House, 2004.
- _____. *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Lodhi, Aasiya. "Turkish toil brings new form of faith." *BBC News* [Internet]. Available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/4788712.stm>. Accessed 6 June 2006.
- Maalouf, Amin. *In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong*. Translated by Barbara Bray. New York: Penguin Book, 2002.
- McLauchlin, Beverly. "The Civilization of Difference." *Lafontaine-Baldwin Symposium 2003 Lecture* [Internet]. Available from http://www.operation-dialogue.com/lafontaine-baldwin/e/2003_speech_1.html. Accessed 15 June 2004.
- McLean, Iain & Alistair McMillan. *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Mahajan, Gurpreet. *The Multicultural Path: Issues of Diversity and Discrimination in Democracy*. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002.
- Manji, Irshad. *The Trouble with Islam Today – A Wake-Up Call for Honesty and Change*. Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2005.

- Mathews, Gordon. *Global Culture / Individual Identity: Searching for Home in the Cultural Supermarket*. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Mazarr, Michael. "Culture and International Relations: A Review Essay." *The Washington Quarterly* 19.2 (1996): 177-197.
- Mead, Walter Russel. *Power, Terror, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.
- Miasami, Mona. "Islam and Globalization." *Global Policy Forum* [Internet]. Available from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/cultural/2003/0808islam.htm>. Accessed 14 March 2007.
- Morris, Benny. *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.
- "Mubarak son offers 'Arab vision.'" *BBC News* [Internet]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/5361322.stm. Accessed 19 September 2006.
- "Muslims debate 'clash of civilizations.'" *BBC News* [Internet]. Available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2260338.stm>. Accessed 9 September 2005.
- "Muslim women debate more rights." *BBC News* [Internet]. Available from <http://bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/6160846.stm>. Accessed 20 November 2006.
- Murphy, Craig N. & Roger Tooze. "Getting Beyond the 'Common Sense' of the IPE Orthodoxy." *The New International Political Economy*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991.
- Nelan, Bruce W. "The Dark Side of Islam: With terror, Muslim radicals declare war on Arab states that stray from the religious path." *Time*, October 4 1993 [Internet]. Available from <http://www.time.com/time/nation/printout/0,8816,174514,00.htm>. Accessed October 4 2004.
- "New Egypt Muslim Brothers arrests." *BBC News* [Internet]. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/6445489.stm. Accessed 14 March 2007.
- Newman, David (ed.) *Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity*. London: Frank Cass Publishing, 1999.
- Nomani, Asra Q. "Wafa Sultan – A Daring Voice Calls For a New Islam." *Time*, 8 May 2006, 62.

- Pfaff, William. *The Wrath of Nations: Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993.
- Piotte, Jean-Marc. *Les grands penseurs du monde occidental: L'éthique et la politique de Platon à nos jours*. Québec : Éditions Fides, 1997.
- Pipes, Daniel. "Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism." *Centre for Strategic and International Studies* (June 30 1998) [Internet]. Available from www.danielpipes.org/article/954. Accessed 4 October 2004.
- _____. "Islam and Islamism – Faith and Ideology." *National Interest* (Spring 2000) [Internet]. Available from www.danielpipes.org/article/366. Accessed October 4 2004.
- _____. *Militant Islam Reaches America*. New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003.
- "Poll sees hope in West-Islam ties." BBC News [Internet]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/in_depth/6369529.stm. Accessed 19 February 2007.
- Prentiss, Craig R. *Religion and the Creation of Race and Ethnicity: An Introduction*. New York: New York University Press, 2003.
- Rahman, Fazlur. *Islam & Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition*. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982.
- Rainsford, Sarah. "Turkey's secularism 'threatened.'" *BBC News* [Internet]. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/6554099.stm>. Accessed 13 April 2007.
- Raman, B. *International Islamism*; available from <http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper163.htm>; Internet; accessed 4 October 2004.
- Rauf, Feisal Abdul. *What's Right with Islam: A New Vision for Muslims and the West*, with a foreword by Karen Armstrong. New York: Harper Collins, 2004.
- Reynolds, Paul. "Al-Qaeda jihad vs US 'long war.'" *BBC News* [Internet]. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/4943842.stm. Accessed 6 June 2006.
- _____. "Iraq war allies remain in step." *BBC News* [Internet]. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4830032.stm. Accessed 6 June 2006.

- _____. "Preventing a 'clash of civilizations.'" *BBC News* [Internet]. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3578429.stm>. Accessed September 6 2005.
- Ritzer, G. *The McDonaldization of Society*. Thousand Oaks: California, Pine Forge, 1993.
- Roeder, Philip G. "Clash of Civilizations and Escalation of Domestic Ethnopolitical Conflicts." *Comparative political Studies*, Vol. 36 No. 5 June (2003): 509-540.
- Rosenau, Pauline. "Once Again Into the Fray: International Relations Confronts the Humanities." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1990): 83-110.
- Ross, Marc Howard. "Internal and External Conflict and Violence – Cross-Cultural Evidence and a New Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 29 No. 4 (December 1985): 547-579.
- Roy, Oliver. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.
- _____. *The Failure of Political Islam*. Translated by Carol Volk. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- Russett, Bruce M., John R. Oneal, Michaelene Cox. "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No.5 (Sept. 2000): 583-608.
- Sacks, Jonathan. *The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations*. London, New York: Continuum, 2002.
- Said, Edward W. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1994.
- Saint-Blancat, C. "Islam in Diaspora: Between reterritorialization and extraterritoriality." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 26, no.1 (March 2002).
- Sardar, Ziauddin. *The Future of Muslim Civilisation*. London: Croom Helm, 1979.
- Sargand, Payenda. "Pain of Afghan suicide women." *BBC News* [Internet]. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6196716.stm. Accessed 7 December 2006.
- Schneider, Peter. "The New Berlin Wall," *The New York Times Magazine*, 4 December 2005, 66-71.
- Seizaburo, Sato. "Clash of Civilizations or Cross-Fertilization of Civilizations?" *Japan Echo* (1997): 44-49.

"Self-doomed to failure: A Special Report on Arab development." *The Economist*, July 6, Vol. 364, Issue 8280 (2002).

Sen, Amartya. "Does Globalization Equal Westernization?" *The Globalist* [Internet]. Available from <http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=2353>. Accessed 13 March 2007.

Senghaas, Dieter. "A Clash of Civilisations – An Idée Fixe?" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Jan. 1998): 127-132.

"Sharia stoning for Nigerian man." *BBC News* [Internet]. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/6666673.stm>. Accessed 17 May 2007.

Shboul, Ahmad. "Between rhetoric and reality: Islam and politics in the Arab world." *Islam in World Politics*. Editors Anthony H. Johns & Nelly Lahoud. London & New York: Routledge, 2005.

Sinanovic, Ermin. "Post-Islamism: The Failure of Islamic Activism?" Review of *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, by Oliver Roy. *International Studies Review*, 7 (2005): 433-436.

Smith, Anthony D. *Nationalism and Modernism*. London & New York: Routledge, 1998.

_____. *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.

_____. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1986.

Smith, Huston. *The World's Religions*. New York, Harper Collins Publishers, 1991.

Smith, James M. & William C. Thomas (eds.) *The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors*, Academy, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001.

Sterba, James P. (ed.). *Terrorism and International Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Swerdlow, Joel L. "Global Culture." *The National Geographic* 196.2 (August 1999).

Taheri, Amir. *Holy Terror: Islamic Terrorism and the West*. London: Hutchinson, 1987.

Tibi, Bassam. "Démocratie et democratization en Islam: la quête d'un Islam éclairé et les contre-forces de l'autoritarisme et du fondamentalisme religieux." *Revue internationale de politique comparée*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1995): 285-299.

- Toffolo, Cris E., ed. *Emancipating Cultural Pluralism*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.
- Townshend, Charles. *Terrorism – A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Turabian, Kate L. *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*. 6th ed. Revised by John Grossman and Alice Bennett. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- Tusicisny, Andrej. "Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer, and Bloodier?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41.4 (2004): 485-498.
- "UN urges freedoms for Arab women." BBC News [Internet]. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/6216896.stm. Accessed 7 December 2006.
- Waardenburg, Jean-Jacques. *L'Islam dans le miroir de l'occident*. Paris & The Hague: Mouton & Co. Publishers, 1962.
- "Wahhabi opponent killed in Iran." BBC News [Internet]. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/6241120.stm. Accessed 26 June 2007.
- Walker, R.B.J. *Culture, Ideology and World Order*. Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1984.
- _____. "The Concept of Culture in the Theory of International Relations." *Culture and International Relations*. Editor Jongsuk Chay. New York, Westport & London: Praeger, 1990.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. *Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the changing world-system*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- _____. *The Politics of World Economy: The States, Movements and the Civilizations: Essays by Immanuel Wallerstein*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Waltz, Kenneth. *Man, the State and War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
- Weber, Cynthia. "Flying Planes Can Be Dangerous." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 1.1 (2002): 129-147.
- Wheeler, Deborah L. "Global Culture or Culture Clash: New Information Technologies in the Islamic World – A View From Kuwait." *Communication Research*, Vol. 25 No. 4 (August 1998): 359-376.

White, Jonathan R. *Terrorism*. Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomas Learning, 2002.

Whittaker, David J. (ed.). *The Terrorism Reader*. London: Routledge, 2001.

Williams, Raymond. *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, rev. ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.