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CONVERGENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES:

THE GREEK CASE

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CHAPTER I

Political parties are popular subjects of research among social scientists. There are many scholars who have done a great deal of academic work analysing the institution of political parties from political, sociological, economic, historical and psychological perspectives, on national or on cross-cultural levels. This is not surprising. There is no doubt that political parties are the major social institution through which political action occurs in developed and in most underdeveloped political systems.[1]

As Roy C. Macridis observes,

> "It is generally taken as axiomatic that no political system can exist without political parties."[2]

In fact, all types of political systems rely on political parties: democratic pluralist societies, to articulate and aggregate demands; "totalitarian societies" to mobilize support; traditional societies in a transitional period, to create and "structure new norms of behavior."[3] Almond and Powell go on to observe that political parties are now found almost universally around the world and that this empirical fact is be-

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[1] Curtis Michael, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introductory Essay in Political Science (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968), p. 135.

[2] Roy C. Macridis, Political Parties (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 9.

[3] Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 74.

yond serious dispute;

> "Totalitarian or democratic, developed or
> modernizing, large or small, modern nations
> have turned to the political party as an
> essential institution of the political system."[4]

Political parties are essential institutions of any system not
only because they affect the socio-political environment but also be-
cause they reflect to a large extent changes within society. This is
very clear today, with the complexity of our society imposing close inter-
relations among the institutions of the system.

In fact one can distinguish a recent important development of
political parties, which began to take place after World War II. This
contemporary stage of development has to do with the convergence of the
nature of this institution.

> "After World War II, and more notably in
> the last decade, all political parties of
> the Western world and of the industrially
> advanced societies began to display some
> novel characteristics; they began to lose
> their ideological character. All parties
> became brokers of a society that because
> of progressive industrialization became
> divided into many social, professional,
> occupational, and interest groups. There-
> fore, parties become both more represent-
> ative and reformist; they deal with ad hoc
> problems and search for ad hoc solutions;
> that is to say, they become programatic.
> No longer is an attempt made to resolve
> issues by an appeal to total solutions
> involving the economic or social structure
> of the society, but rather by careful com-
> promises and incremental changes. The
> ideologue in favor of the manipulator and
> the visionary leader in favor of the cau-
> tions representative."[5]

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[4]Ibid., p. 915.

[5]Roy C. Macridis, op. cit., p. 13.

This recent development of political parties will be the major focus of our work. Given the significant role of the institution in our society, it is not only interesting but worthwhile to examine and analyse it. Furthermore, given the ever-changing nature of human society this piece constitutes not only a study of political parties in general but also a sort of case study of this institution in the context of the present. More concretely we will analyse the recent development of political parties in Greece, in an effort to examine the relevance of the concept of convergence in this case.

A Brief Background to the Development of Political Parties

We first encounter some sort of party in the Greek "polis", where citizens formed groups to support political leaders in the "agora". Apparently these never took the form of well organized parties. They were rather spontaneous gatherings of people with the same interests who were authorizing a statesman to represent their interests; in exchange for this they offered to him their votes.

During medieval times the social and political structure did not allow any formation of political parties. In fact, only a small group of privileged citizens affected the process of policy making while the majority of people had no opportunity to contribute to this process. It was this absence of mass participation in politics which prevented the development of political parties. However, in the Italian city-states as well as in the Byzantine Empire, there were some political factions, which had the form of political parties.[6]

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[6]Bakojannis, P., Parties in the Representative Democracy in per. "Syntagma", Vol. 2 (Athens, Sakoulas, 1976), p. 616.

Between the 13th and 17th centuries some forms of political parties emerged which were synonymous with a cabal or had special relationships with the monarch.[7] In fact, given the political structure, their main function was to provide administrators for the governmental apparatus. This was due to the fact that the number of administrative positions increased a great deal as time passed and consequently the monarch's capacity to deal with them declined proportionately.

The decline of monarchial authority under the pressure of revolutionary movements and the extension of the franchise were important factors in the development of political parties. However, one can identify the first stable representative groups in England during the 17th -18th century:[8] Tories and Whigs. These two parties adapted to the ideas of accepting each other's functions and existence and limiting their competition in the polls, at all times remaining far from violence.[9]

The greatest development of political parties occurred in the decades preceding the end of the nineteenth century and was bound up, as Maurice Duverger observes,

> "...with the rise of parliamentary groups and electoral committees.... The more political assemblies see their functions and independence grow, the more their members feel the need to group themselves according to what they have in common, so as to act in concert."[10]

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[7] Roy C. Macridis, op. cit., p. 10.

[8] Bakojannis, P., op. cit., p. 617.

[9] Ibid., p. 618.

[10] Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1967), pp. xxiii-xxiv.

In other words the parliament was the predecessor of political parties and not the political parties of the parliament as one might find logical.[11] Thus it is obvious that the entire development of political parties is linked with democracy, that is to say with the extension of popular suffrage and parliamentary prerogatives. This does not mean that Duverger and other scholars, who underline this important factor, disregard the role of other organisations which originated outside parliament in the activities of social organisations. Duverger does take into consideration the interrelations between the groups which originated in parliament and those which did not. According to him, as the suffrage was extended, it became necessary to organize the electors by means of committees capable of making the candidates known and campaigning on their behalf. Generally speaking, first there was the creation of parliamentary groups then the appearance of electoral committees, and finally the establishment of a permanent connection between the two: a political party.

It is generally accepted that outside of parliament, many different organizations have encouraged the creation of political parties. Many parties, with a social reform orientation have their origins in trade unions (e.g. the British Labour party). Other parties have originated through churches and religious sects (e.g. the Anti-Revolutionary party in Netherlands by the Calvinists).[12] Others, mainly left wing parties, have emerged from various student groups. Illegal and consequently clandestine groups, unable to function on the parliamentary plane, tend

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[11]P. Bakojannis, op. cit., p. 617.

[12]M. Duverger, op. cit., p. xxxi.

to change into political parties when the legal ban is lifted (e.g. the Russian Communist, the French Mouvement Republican Populaire).[13] Finally, political parties have also been formed by the actions of industrial and commercial groups (e.g. the Canadian Conservative Party.)[14]

There are other causes for the emergence of political parties, which seem to us to be more relevant today, since parliament is unlikely to play this kind of role after all these years. Kay Lawson indicates some of these other origins of political parties[15]: They originated inside other parties as in the case of "Manifesto" in Italy from the Communist Party (P.S.I.) in 1969; political parties rise can also be linked to several types of crises: legitimacy crises—when the existing governmental system and its rules for electing leaders seem to be challenged, as in the case of the emergence of pro-monarchist parties in Greece after the ousting of monarchy; participation crises—when changes in the patterns of economic system demand the admittance of new strata into the process of political decision-making, as in the case of the parties of "arabic-socialism" mainly in Syria and Iraq; crises of territorial integration as in the case of E.T.A. in Spain.

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[13] M.R.P. (People's Republican Party) became a party after the end of "Resistance" in 1945. Ibid., p. xxxiii.

[14] The Canadian Conservative party emerged in 1854 as E.H. Underhill demonstrates, from the activies of the Bank of Montreal, the Grand Trunk Railway and Montreal "big business". E.H. Underhill in "Encyclopedia of Political Science", cited, ibid., xxxiv.

[15] Kay Lawson, The Comparative Study of Political Parties (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), p.226.

In conclusion, we should point out that all these patterns of the origins of political parties cannot be isolated from each other. Given the complexity of society there cannot be exclusive patterns for the rise of political parties. For example, we cannot say that the emergence of E.T.A. in Spain or the other separatist groups originate exclusively in crises of territorial integration. Apparently there were other economic, social, political and psychological reasons for the rise of these parties. That is, in the process of the emergence of a political party there can be a combination of factors contributing to this process.

Constitutional Status

Despite the long history and the obvious importance of political parties as an institution in any political system, there has been considerable hesitation on the part of written constitutions to recognize political parties. In fact it was only after World War II that the European constitutions started to contain positive recognition of the political parties. The vanguard of this recognition, though not clearly so, was the Italian constitution in 1948. One year later the Constitution of the German Federal Republic recognized political parties as the main factor in the formation "of the political will of the people" and consequently "they may be freely formed" (Article 21).[16] Article 4 of the constitution of the Fifth Republic (Octover 4, 1958) contains a similar regulation.[17] In Greece the constitutional recognition of

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[16]Steven Muller (ed.), Documents on European Government (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 22.

[17]Lowell G. Noonan, France: The Politics of Continuity in Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1970), p. 472.

political parties took place only very recently. In 1975, for the first time in Greek constitutional history, the new constitution recognized political parties as an institution of democracy (Article 29).

This constitutional development marks a considerable step forward toward the legitimacy of political parties. There had previously been a strong detestation of them, a reaction which is certainly as old as the history of political parties. It was not only rooted in historical or political reasons such as the preservation of monarchies, since the rise of political parties and the proliferation of parliaments had meant the disappearance or at least limitation in monarchal powers.

It was also rooted in theoretical - philosophical writings of the 16th - 19th centuries. Thomas Hobbes(1588-1679) argued that the civil rights of citizens must be "united as a person by a common power"; the will of the "common power", the sovereign will must include and involve the will of everyone, so the will of one citizen was compounded "of the forces of all the citizens together."[18] Later on, Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) claimed that the citizens must obey only the law of society, which has been accepted by them officially in the social contract. It is obvious that in theories like these there is no room for legitimacy of political parties which would not only divide the citizens but would also ruin the whole society since the citizens would no longer obey only the social contract. Furthermore, these theories along with the divinity of the state in the Hegelian system, the use of nationalist theories and a static, abstract consideration of the "common good" created a hostile

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[18]Sheldon, S. Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1960), p. 276.

climate for the legitimacy of political parties.

In contrast, the development of political parties is a healthy institution of society since they legitimate the structure of the society, which is based on a multiplicity of interests. Furthermore, through out their structure, functions and ideology, political parties facilitate the legitimate expression of these interests.

Structure - Functions - Ideology

Structure, functions and ideology are the main criteria in the determination of the type of political party. In fact, the latter reflects the general traits of structure and the functions; simply, the ideology and the program of a political party cannot be separated from its structure and functions.

Structure

As in so many other cases, scholars approach the question of the structure of political parties in different ways depending on the purpose of their analysis. This fact along with the number of peculiarities of the issues, as a result of the complex socio-political environment, make the codification of the structure of political parties problematic. However, for the purpose of this work, some effort has to be made.

The study of party structure has been dominated by Maurice Duverger's analysis. Two classification schemes are developed by Duverger: The first is based on party organization and the second on party membership.

On the horizontal plane, Duverger makes the distinction between the direct party in which the members themselves form the party's community without the help of other social groupings, and the indirect party which

is made up of the union of the component social groups, e.g. British Labour Party, Belgian Catholic Bloc. Direct parties are the rule and indirect parties the exception. Despite this distinction, there are some indirect political parties, as in the case of the British Labour Party, which could be transformed into a mixed party over time.[19]

On the vertical plane, a party is made up of several basic elements, or small groups dispersed throughout the community, which are linked by coordinating institutions. Each party has its own structure, and their basic elements have their own particular form. Four main types of basic elements can be distinguished: caucus, branch, cell and militia.

The caucus parties are dominated by a small close group of experts or notabilities. The caucus is recruited by tacit cooption, which functions in a fairly large geographic area and yields considerable power due to the influence of its members. Its activities reach their peak during election times. Neumann calls these parties "parties of individual representation" and claims that they are characteristic of a "society with restricted political domain and only a limited degree of participation."[20] Between elections, the activities of caucus are limited and the caucus can enjoy its "absolutely free mandate" to decide only according to the members' conscience. The notion of free mandate, though well rooted in theories of representative government obviously suffered greatly with the rise of lobbies and of party discipline in legislatures.

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[19]Maurice Duverger, op. cit., pp. 5-17.

[20]Sigmund Neuman, Modern Political Parties (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1956) p. 404.

Generally speaking, there is a decline of this type of party organization, but caucus parties still occupy an important place in the present day structure in the parties of the right in most countries.

Initially the caucus was characteristic of the Conservative or Liberal parties but later the Labour party though in a different form was organized on a caucus basis. Today the English Conservative party, the North-European Liberal and Conservative parties as well as the French parties of the Right and the French Radical party are organized on the basis of the caucus.[21]

The branch parties are more extensive groups, which recruit members from the masses in order to increase numbers and represent the masses. The activities of this kind of party are regular even between elections; they deal not only with election tactics but also with political education; and they function within a smaller geographic area than the caucus parties. In fact, these are what Neumann calls "political parties of integration."[22]

The branch type organization is a socialist invention. The socialist parties both direct such as the French Socialist party as well as in-direct such as the Belgian Workers' party are organized on a branch basis. However, the branch became an interesting example of contagious

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[21]Maurice Duverger, op. cit. p. 21.

[22]Sigmund Neuman, op. cit. pp. 404-405.

organization since the Conservative or Centre parties, though more in theory than in practice have adopted the branch system (e.g. Belgian Christian Social party).[23]

The cell type political parties have an occupational rather than a geographically based structure. The cell unites all party members who work in the same place, and is quite a small group of about fifteen to twenty members; the area based cells, if any, are of lesser importance. These units are strong ones, in their hold on membership, due to their permanent nature, every day contact between members, and their concrete working place basis. However, this latter point may tend to minimize the importance of wider political issues.

The cell type party was an invention of the Russian Communist party, which first used it for clandestine action, and was subsequently imposed on other Communist parties. Duverger argues that the choice of the cell as organizational basis entails a profound change in the very concept of a political party. Instead of a body intended for the winning of votes, for grouping the representatives, and maintaining contact between them and their electors, the political party becomes an instrument of agitation, propaganda, discipline, and if necessary, clandestine action, for which elections and parliamentary debates are only of secondary importance.[24]

The militia type political parties are organized as a kind of private army; the members are enrolled along military lines and subject to

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[23]Maurice Duverger, op. cit., pp. 24-27.

[24]Ibid., pp. 35-36.

the same discipline and training as soldiers. Some members constitute
a kind of active army, while others remain in reserve. The whole struc-
ture is based on very small groups which build up into pyramids to form
larger and larger groups. Although the militia organization is funda-
mental to some parties, no political party has ever existed exclusively
on this basis; they usually exist side by side with other organizational
elements—often cells.[25]

The militia organization is a fascist creation, and is even further
removed from electoral and parliamentary action than is the cell type.
"Ordine Nuovo" in Italy is a good example of contemporary militia organ-
ization.

In addition to the above basic structural features of political
parties, there are other classifications based on the party organiza-
tion: personality parties, "parties of democratic centralism". A per-
sonality party is one which is centered around a single man and which
lives and dies with him. The leader dominates the whole structure of
the party and his principles and aims guide the party's activities. This
type of party is usually mass based and covers a very wide spectrum of
ideologies and attitudes; most commonly, it has a populist character.
Peron's party in Argentina is a good example of this type of party.

The parties of "democratic centralism" are most commonly the
communist parties and other marxist groups. Despite the common origin
of this structure, which is the theoretical work of Lenin as well as the
history of the Third International, one can easily note the basic dif-
ferences among the organization of these parties; these differences are
not only based on the different conditions under which the communist

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[25]Ibid., p. 39

parties act, but are also rooted in the different, often controversial, interpretation of Marxist _Weltanschauung_.

The above categories of party structures used to be one of the main criteria for the determination of a party's orientation; the right wing political parties had structures quite distinct from the left wing and vice-versa. Today though it does not seem that this is the case. Very often we encounter difficulties of categorization when using these criteria. Political parties no longer follow distinct structural patterns. For example, as we noticed above, the branch party is an invention of the left but it is now common among the right wing as well. Furthermore, no one today can say that democratic centralism is the main characteristic of communist party structure since there are communist parties which have rejected the notion in practice, such as the Communist Party of Spain and the Italian Communist Party (P.C.I.).

In conclusion, we observe a significant convergence of party structure, the determination of political parties is no longer possible by looking at party structure.

Functions

As we indicated above, the functions of political parties are one of the criteria in the determination of the type of political party. As in the case of structure, there is no general agreement among scholars. Thus, a codification of the functions of political parties is not a simple problem.

However, the main functions of political parties can be considered[26] as political recruitment, political socialization, interest articulation and interest aggregation.

In most political systems, political parties are the chief agents of political recruitment at all levels of the political apparatus. Political parties provide the leadership personnel for the various governmental offices. The selection of candidates as part of this function helps the voters to orient their preferences and make real choices. However, as Peter Merkl observes, one can easily argue that this ideal choice is limited by the prior selection of the parties.[27] In the few political systems where there are no political parties or where political parties have no power to affect the process of political recruitment, political recruitment is performed by other social institutions such as trade unions, military or legal pressure groups, which underlines the importance of this function for any political system.

The function of political socialization, performed by political parties is in many senses the basis for their every other function. Political socialization involves the social integration of individuals into society and the body politic. Political parties throughout their activities (electoral procedure, response to the issues, political programs) transform the private citizen; they integrate him into the community. They are the major agents which make the private citizen a

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[26]Neuman Sigmud, op. cit., pp. 396-400. See also Peter H. Merkl, Modern Comparative Politics, (Illinois, The Dryden Press, 1970), pp. 272-284; Michael Curtis, op. cit., pp. 139-140; Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 73-112.

[27]Peter H. Merkl, op. cit., p. 273.

"zoom politicon" (political animal); a man whose aims are adjusted and correlated to the needs of society.

This function of political socialization apparently is the major prerequisite of political participation, and political participation in its turn is the main prerequisite for the realization of other functions of political parties. For example, we cannot imagine how a political party can select leadership in the course of its political recruitment function without any political participation even if the political participation is for form's sake and not essential to the whole process.

The next major functions of political parties are interest articulation and interest aggregation. Every political system has some way to processing needs, demands and attitudes, and this is called interest articulation. It may be performed by many different substructures in the system, for example, mobs, business groups, labor unions, political parties, etc. Political parties though are usually, but not always, the major agents in the performance of this function; in the societies where the development of political parties is at a very low level, other institutions undertake the social responsibility of interest articulation.

It is obvious that the interest articulation function is linked with interest aggregation; the function which involves the convergence of needs, demands and attitudes into general policy alternatives. Thus, one can consider the two functions as parts of the "policy process" in Easton's model of political analysis. If we adopt this to the level of political parties, articulation and aggregation must simply be viewed "as different ends of the same continuum."[28]

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[28]Kenneth Janda, A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties, p. 92 in Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics (California, Sage Publication INC., 1970).

Apparently, political parties, in order to achieve their goals, have to articulate and aggregate social interest. No party can achieve its goals without social support; consequently, articulation and aggregation of interests are fundamental functions. This fact and the difficulty of clearly distinguishing the "borders" of these functions have created disagreement among scholars on the role and definition of these functions. For the purpose of this work we will treat them as logically separate, defined in terms of expressing interests (articulation) and gathering interests (aggregation).

Apart from the main functions of political parties referred to above, many scholars consider the brokerage of ideas as an additional function. In fact, in some indirect ways, this is true; and takes place most of the time independent of their intentions. Of course, there are parties which act according to a very concrete ideological framework. This framework very often forms the party's Weltanschauung, which in its term is imposed upon the society by the activities of the political parties.

Furthermore, in addition to the fact that some political parties become "brokers of ideas" explicitly in the process of their activities, some others, without a clear ideological program, perform the same function implicitly. It must always be kept in mind that every part of a political party's activities and structures contain value judgment based on their ideology; consequently, their activities reflect their ideology which is diffused to the society.

The above categories of functions are performed, more or less, by the whole spectrum of political parties. However, there is another category of functions, which are said to be performed only by certain

types of political parties.

A good example is that of political parties in those new states without any set political behavior norms. These parties can be the chief forces of modernization. They can shape the government, provide the main link between the different social and economic groups, and they can also constitute the chief agent of political education and socialization. Finally, by breaking down various forms of traditional behavior, the political parties of these countries can be the binding force in communities divided by groups based on tribal affiliation, religious denomination or national origin.[29]

The Marxist political parties are another type of political party which are content to perform some distinct functions. These functions, theoretically, are not only distinct from the functions of the liberal or conservative parties but also are the distinguishing factors of the parties of the left Marxist political parties are the political expressions of working class. Their main goals are the formation of the proletariat into a class, the overthrow of bourgeois domination and finally the conquest of political power by the proletariat. It is obvious that the working class parties have to undertake some particular functions, in order to correspond to the above aims.

Consequently, under democratic conditions revolutionary-marxist parties oppose the established order as such. They do not aggregate the largest number of common interests but underline points of discontent, which can serve their goals. However, obviously the marxist communist parties do not exist in a vacuum; they have to compete and preserve their

[29]Michael Curtis, op. cit., p. 140.

existence in a given system.

In fact, there are not distinct functions for the different types of political parties; functions are no longer distinguishing characteristics of political parties. A radical convergence has taken place. The left still tries to express the working class interest but the working class is not the only class they want to have affiliated with them. At the same time, the right wing has started to respond more and more to working class attitudes. In France, for instance, the governments started to respond more and more to Labour.* Furthermore, the left has not only reduced the activities of its main function - to organize the proletariat into a class and overthrow the bourgeois domination - but they also perform functions which were dinstinct to the right wing parties. For instance, in the interest aggregation function the communist parties have reached the point of not only trying to represent the working class but also other social classes and strata such as the middle class, small business, even the national bourgoisie, but interposing them in their strategic goals.[30]

Ideology

As we noted above, the recent convergence of political parties at the structural and functional level is reflected on the ideological - programatical level. Ideology used to be one of the determinant criteria for the type of political party. However, today it does not seem that this is the case. The ideological convergence of political parties become clear not only through the change in their program but also in their

[30]Santiago Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State (Athens, Themelio, 1977), p. 62.

*Suzanne Berger, The French Political System (N.Y. Random House, 1974) pp. 117-118.

political practice.

A brief look at France and Italy is enough to see that at times the policies of the biggest parties (Communist and Right Wing) are hardly distinguishable. In these countries, where the Communist parties are the strongest in the "non-socialist world", the policies of the major parties tend to be identical. For example, the Italian Communist Party has in fact the same policy as the Christian Democratic Party on the major issues of the E.E.C., NATO, terrorism[31] as well as on minor every day problems as in the case of "self reduction in 1975.[32] In France during the campaign for the European parliament, the Gaullists and the Communists both followed the same pattern by exploiting the traditional French xenophobia! As the "Washington Post" observed, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish between Communist and Gaullist electoral propaganda.[33]

Furthermore, the "Bad Godesberg"[34] among the parties of the Second International has become routine; the examples also of the communist parties which abandon traditional communist principles such as "the

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[31]Pavlos Nerantzas, After election developments, ANTI, Athens, Vol. 137 p. 26-27.

[32]The dramatic increase in the cost of living (25% of inflation and widespread unemployment) at the beginning of 1975 met a strong people's reaction in the form of "self-reduction"—i.e., the refusal to comply with price increases of essential services. The Communsit party's reaction to this was in fact the same as the governmental one which was condemning the "self reduction" as an outbreak of "civil disobedience." (Bruno Ramirez: The Working Class Struggle Against the Crisis: Self-Reduction of Prices in Italy, in Zerowork Political Material 1, New York, December, 1975).

[33]The Washington Post, June 1, 1979.

[34]"Bad Godesberg" was the name of the city where, in 1959, the German social democrats during their conference denounced Marxism.

dictatorship of the proletariat" and the "democratic centralism" as basic principles of their organization, are not insignificant (P.C.I., P.C.S.). At the same time the cases in which the parties of the right are following interventionist policies, despite their initial principles, are not uncommon any more (France, England).[35]

The Recent Development: Convergence

It is obvious that the above indications lead us to the conclusion that today we are facing the convergence of political parties at all levels, which in fact make political parties look alike. However, we have to note that these indications do not demonstrate the disappearance of parties functional, structural, ideological - programmatical differences but rather indicate that in practice the political parties in modern societies tend to act in very similar ways.

Many scholars have examined this particular phenomenon of political parties and have contributed interesting analyses to the already rich literature on political parties. However, there is a great variety of approaches among these analyses, as the scholars usually stress only one aspect of this development.

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[35]A. King notes: "A Conservative government rescues Upper Clyde Shipbuilders and nationalizes part of Rolls-Royce; Labour Government picks up the pieces after the collapse of Court Line, a privately owned airline and holiday company that was not particularly important in the national economy. Public is still public; private in 1975 is also public." A. King, Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970's, in Political Studies, Vol. 23, 1975, pp. 287-288.

For example, Robert Michels, at the beginning of the century, in his "Political Parties", tried to apply his idea of the "iron law of oligarhy" of any large scale of organization to the organization of political parties. For Michels, in all political parties there is a near monopoly of power by the officers and this oligarchy of power can take only conservative forms which make parties look alike:

> It is far from obvious that the interests of the masses which have combined to form the party will coincide with the interests of the bureaucracy in which the party becomes person-ified. . . The interest of the body of employees (that is, the party officials) are always con-servative.[36]

Simply, Michel's thesis of the "iron law of oligarchy" is a statement about what must happen in groups — and in this case, in political parities — which initially are democracies.[37]

More recently Ralph Miliband, in his The State in Capitalist Society, approaches the issue from a quite different perspective. First, he tries to prove the co-ordination and in fact unification of the right wing parties in their effort to control any dynamic of the left wing movement.[38] Secondly, he focuses his analysis on the left wing

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[36]Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 18.

[37]John D. May, "Democracy, Organization, Michels," in The American Political Science Review, Vol. LIX 1965, p. 419.

[38]Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Quartet Books, 1977), p. 80-106.

parties by referring mainly to the Communist ones' where he applies
Gramsci's notion of "hegemony".[39] Miliband argues that the ideological
predominance of the dominant classes in civil society over the subordinate
classes (hegemony) infiltrates the activities of the left wing parties.
Consequently the left cannot really serve its own purposes and in this
sense serves the goals of the right. Miliband claims that the result
of this "hegemony" is the creation of a "national supra party consensus"[40]
which alienates party differences.

In addition to the above indicative analyses there are many others,
which have dealt with the issue. Moreover, we think, that these demon-
strated convergences of the political parties can be considered as an
effort of the institution to adapt itself to the economic, social and
political changes of the environment in which it acts.

Convergence: Adaptation

In fact, political parties have been affected by the unprecedented
development which the developed countries have been undergoing since the
end of the World War II. State intervention in the economy caused all

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[39]"Hegemony: an order in which a certain way of life and thought
is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout the
society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing
with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political
principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual
and moral connotations." (Gwynn Williams, "Gramsci's Concept of Egemonia",
in Journal of History of Ideas, 1960, Vol. 21, No. 4, p. 587, from ibid.,
p. 162 footnote.

[40]Ibid., p. 163.

the major transformations which have taken place in these societies. The state ceased to be a constitutional liberal one, which operated as a "neutral" component of the society. It initiated not only policies which radically affected the whole of society (distribution, redistribution), but it became one of the major — if not the major — sector of the economy.[41] This growth of the state eventually resulted in the growth of the state apparatus. The public services became highly specialized requiring a large number of experts, and the bureaucracy or rather the significance of bureaucrats in the structured modern state became an unquestionable fact.

A similar tendency can be detected within the world of business. We could say that the trademark of modern society has become big business. Technological developments and the concentration of economic power into a small number of economic units has led to the formation of big enterprises. Another main feature of modern society is the huge "service sector".

These two developments, the growth of state apparatus and the expansion of the services in the level of private sector, have caused major social changes; the most notable of which may be the creation of a huge middle class strata. In this process the scapegoats of imperfect economic competition — small businessmen — have contributed significantly. The members of this middle class, which is the biggest social strata in modern society, illustrates the heterogenuous nature of this class; its major trait being a wide mixture of values, norms and attitudes.

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[41]See Appendix I.

The "middle class ideology" is not distinct in and of itself; and is formed in every day contact with the socio-economic environment.

Furthermore, the above developments played an important role on the level of ideological process. The state's intervention in society has singled it out as the major agent of socialization within society. The state, as an institution, is the representative of the status quo and consequently it operates accordingly. The maintenance of the status quo becomes the major trend of socialization through the agents, which are operated by the state: the mass media, and the educational system. The "middle class" ideology is most widely propagated because of the size of this strata. This "middle class ideology" supplements the ideological framework of the western societies.

Political parties, as all other institutions of society, had to adapt themselves to the new developments of the economic, social and political environment. Thus an adaptation of the parties of all political spectrums took place, and has taken place on all levels of political parties: functional, structural, programmatical-ideological.

Before examining the details of this adaptation, it will be useful to examine the common goal of all political parties which, in fact, makes this adapation a prerequisite for their continued existence. Any political party, apart from its ideological trends, intends to take over the government, and it uses certain strategies to reach this goal. The name of the game in western democracies is: elections. This acceptance of the electoral race as the only way to gain power, was not accepted by the mainstream of Communist parties. Today, though, the major Communist parties in the capitalist European countries (P.C.I. - P.C.F.) have accepted not only in theory but in practice a strategy towards "a new

model of socialism" through "the electoral race and representative insti-
tutions".[42] This general acceptance of the "rules of the game" in the
above mentioned social framework determines the nature of the party's
adaptation.

At the structural level, the tendency of adaptation is quite clear.
Political parties adapt their structure to the new developments of the
social environment. The nature of the modern state (bureaucratization,
high expertise, etc.) has an effect on party structure. Given their
main political goal - to gain power through the electoral procedure -
political parties must display not only their approval of these changes
to the electoral clientele but also their capability to correspond to
the complexities of the governmental apparatus.

Thus, political parties must provide political figures who are ex-
perts in all sections of the state's activities. The complexity of the
issues of modern society require specialized analyses in many different
fields. Such complexity cannot be dealt with in abstract and general
analyses by the traditional politician who could deal only with general
administrative problems. This necessity, though, bureaucratizes the
whole structure of the parties since the majority of the membership not
only cannot follow the highly specialized analyses but cannot even stay
informed on the issues. Consequently, the role of the membership of the
party is reduced to that of financial, electoral supporter. Thus, then,
political parties are led to a de-democratization of their structure.

Furthermore, at the functional level we can note the same trend
of adaptation. The attitudes of the society without concrete orientation,

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[42]Santiago Carrillo, op. cit., p. 165.

as we explained above, determine the functions of the political parties in the electoral market.

The main function of political parties has become the aggregation of interests. Simply because the more interests a party can combine, the more votes it gets. Of course, the social stratification of these societies facilitates the realization of this function. The class differences are not apparent as they used to be for two main reasons. First, the tremendous development of productive forces during the last decades resulted in a greater accessibility of the income classes to the goods and commodities they could not enjoy before. Secondly, it is because of the size and role of the middle class as we explained above.

Apparently the functional and structural adaptation of political parties had had significant effect on their ideologies. As we stated above there are incidents, which indicate this tendency of adaptation at the programmatic - ideological level. In other words, the goals, functions and structures of political parties in fact make up their ideological framework and determine their ideological borders. Simply stated, two political parties, which exist in the same social environment, cannot have similar or sometimes identical goals, functions and structures and be completely different ideologically. Obviously, under the above consideration, the emerging ideology is nothing but the ideology of "middle class".

In conclusion, we have to say that the above observations, on the contemporary tendencies of political parties, cannot lead to the conclusion that the political parties in western democracies are the same. The purpose of this analysis is to underline the process of adaptation which political parties have been undergoing in their efforts to respond to the

environmental developments and mainly to show that the nature of the
economic, social and political environment facilitates the above analysed
tendency of political parties to look alike or rather act similarly.

This idea of adaptation is very similar to Otto Kirchheimer's
approach on the transformation of Western European parties. Kirchheimer
argues that the main stream of this transformation leads to the emerg-
ence of a catchall "people's" party; simply, to a party which tries to
embrace as many social strata as it can for the sake of getting votes.
Given this assumption and the fact that Kirchheimer's model more or less
follows the pattern of our analysis, we can easily apply it to the case
study we are going to undertake.

Although Kirchheimer's analysis does not refer to the role of the
state in the transformation of political parties, it underlines the same
facts stated above. For him, the old-style political party of individual
representation became an exception after World War II. This old-style
political party ("mass integration party") is transforming itself into
a catch-all "people's" party since the conditions which produced it --
"harder class lines and more sharply protruding denominational structures"
-- no longer exist.[43] Kirchheimer includes the parties of the left in
the same realm of transformation. He claims that they are still trying
to hold their special working class clientele but at the same time they
try to embrace a variety of other classes.[44] Kirchheimer looked to
electoral reasons for the explanation of the modern party practice of
reaching as far as possible over a wide spectrum of potential clientele.[45]

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[43]Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of Western European Party
Systems", in R.C. Macridis and B.E. Brown, Comparative Politics: Notes
and Readings, 3rd edition, p. 268.

[44]Ibid.

[45]Ibid., p. 271.

Even "if the party cannot hope to catch all categories of voters, it may have a reasonable expectation of catching more voters in all those categories, whose interests do not adamantly conflict".[46] On this point we can say that he agrees with A. Downs' argument that a political party "always organizes its action so as to focus on a single quantity: its vote margin over the opposition in the test at the end of the current election period."[47]

Kirchheimer goes on and explains the phenomenon of the party transformation into "catch-all" ones. His explanation is based first on the "present conditions of the spreading of the secular and mass consumer-goods orientation" which places obstacles in the clarification of class lines and secondly, on the de-ideologized orientation of modern society.[48] In other words, Kirchheimer argues that the widely spread out consumerism has broken down the apparent borders of classes and this fact facilitates the above changes of political parties. Furthermore, he notes that de-ideologization "in the political field involves the transfer of ideology from partnership in a clearly visible political goal structure; into one of many sufficient, but by no means necessary motivational forces operative in the voter's choice.[49] It is obvious that these arguments are similar to our own. However, there is quite a significant difference.

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[46]Ibid., p. 270.

[47]A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 174.

[48]Otto Kirchheimer, op. cit., pp. 271-272.

[49]Ibid., p. 271.

Kirchheimer does not relate these two arguments; he cannot see that the
de-ideolization results from the absence of clear class stratification,
which was the base of "ideolization". Furthermore, he does not explain
the role of the state in the whole process. As we explain above, the
state cannot be considered neutral in any social process.

However, the above remarks are not intended to minimize the value
of Kirchheimer's model on party transformation. In fact, his codifica-
tion of these changes is very useful in testing whether or not the parties
in our case are moving towards a catch-all formation. This involves:

> 1) Drastic reduction of the party's ideological
> baggage. . . . 2) Further strengthening of top
> leadership groups, whose actions and omissions
> are now judged from the viewpoint of their con-
> tribution to the efficiency of the entire social
> system rather than identification with the goals
> of their particular organization. 3) Downgrad-
> ing of the role of the individual party member,
> a role considered historical which may obscure
> the newly built-up catch-all party image. 4) De-
> emphasis of the classe gardee, specific social-
> class or denominational clientele, in favor of
> recruiting voters among the population at large.
> 5) Securing access to a variety of interest
> groups.[50]

Kirchheimer's observations are very obvious. For example, party's de-
ideolization becomes quite apparent when we look at their programmes;
sometimes it is really difficult to distinguish the differences between
them and only during election campaigns are differences created on major
foreign and military issues, especially between the major parties of the
left and the parties in power (e.g. Italian Socialist Party).[51] The

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[50]_Ibid._, p. 272.

[51]_Ibid._, p. 276.

decisive role of the leaders becomes very clear whenever we refer to the
leader instead of to the party, and happens even with the Communist parties
although Kirchheimer initially seems to exclude these parties from the
whole process of transformation. In fact, not only the names of Giscard
d'Estaing, Andreotti, Rimonde Barre, but also the names of Mitterand,
Marchais, Carillio, Berlinguer, are used as substitutes for the names of
their parties.[52] This tendency in its turn minimizes the role of party
membership not only at the level of the very bottom mass membership, but
also at the middle level of member activists. On the one hand, this fact
eliminates meaningful membership participation in party activities, and
on the other hand, with a combination of the fourth and fifth factors
determines party functions. Thus, the selection of the leaders and the
struggle to secure the support of as many interest groups as possible has
become the main activity of political parties. This limited nature of
party activities should be seen in contrast to the complexity of the
political system in modern society. Consequently, the role of political
party is reduced automatically and its position becomes more "limited
than would appear from its position of formal preeminence.[53]

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[52]In 1976, during Carillio's visit to Greece, the slogan "Berliguer-
Carillio-Dracopoulos (leader of the pro-Euroco-munist Greek "Communist
Party of the Interior") Marchais" was very popular in the Eurocommunist
section of the Greek left.

[53]Kirchheimer, op. cit., p. 278. For an interesting analysis from
another perspective on the role of the parties today, see: Nicos Poulanzas,
The Crisis of Political Parties, Mont Diplomatique, Sept., 1979.

In conclusion, although Kirchheimer notes that the rules deciding the outcome of "catch-all mass party competition are extremely complex and extremely aleatory",[54] it is clear though that his observations on party transformation arise from party competition for votes in the electoral market.

Harold Hotelling in his analysis of the rules of stability in oligopoly markets, provides an approach which can apply to an examination of the electoral market, as he indicates in the conclusion of his analysis.[55] In his model (see Appendix No. I) the position of the entrepreneurs can be seen as that of the political parties which compete in the electoral market of a certain country.

In the following pages we will use the theoretical framework outlined above to examine the recent developments in the Greek political parties.

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[54]Ibid., p. 272.

[55]Hotelling claims that the duopoly market organization militates against social welfare, generally speaking, because it militates against ideal product differentiation. Consequently his model explains the reason why the platforms of the Republican and Democratic parties are too similar; why "our cities become uneconomically large and the business districts within them are too concentrated. Methodist and Presbyterian churches are too much alike; cider is too homogeneous." C.E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory (Richard O. Irwin, Inc., 1972), p. 344.

CHAPTER II

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of Chapters II and III is to introduce the case study
to the reader. In this chapter we will deal with the pre-history of the
present day Greek political system. We think that such a reference is
very useful for the purpose of this work. Firstly, the reference to the
previous party systems will make the comparison much easier and event-
ually the convergence of political parties will become clear. Secondly,
the analysis of the political environment will help us to examine the
major factors which have influenced the recent development of the Greek
party system.

The periodization of history is rather a difficult job, since any
period of history is just a few links in the chain of the historical
process. However, some times a fragmentation of history becomes neces-
sary for a better understanding of the whole process. A useful starting
point for an examination of Greek contemporary history can be found in
the year 1936. In 1936 a dictatorship was established in the country,
ending the life of the old political and party system, since it was fol-
lowed by the foreign occupation of the country, the dramatic events of
the civil war and the definite break down of the old structure. Thus,
the first period we will analyse is from 1936 when Metaxas' dictatorship
took place, to 1949, when the civil war ended with the victory of the
"national" forces. These were years of instability and the orientation of
the party system.

The period from 1949 to 1967, which is the period between the end
of the civil war and the military coup, can most likely be characterized
as the period of stability. It is the period in which post-war Greece

developed its political institutions and the party system took a form, which has influenced to a certain degree in today's system.

The dictatorship (1967-1974) is a period that has to be examined separately, since it is the most significant factor contributing to recent developments in the political and party system. In fact, the dictatorship broke down the old party system and fostered the development of new political attitudes which eventually led to a convergence of the political spectrum and party system after 1974.

In this chapter we are going to deal with the first two periods — from 1936 to 1949 and from 1949 to 1967. We will examine party alignments on the major issues of the period —foreign relations, the constitutional and legal framework, the military and the monarchy. We will also examine the main traits of the party system as well as the functions and the structures of the major political parties. This section will be very useful to our subsequent analysis since it will make it easier for us to identify the development of the party system and to examine the recent convergence of political parties.

The years of Instability (1936-1949)

In August 1936, Prime Minister, Ioannis Metaxas, overruled the constitution and established the dictatorship, which is now known as the "regime of August the 4th". Metaxas an authoritarian, fascist, pro-German type of politician with a military background, not only could not solve the problems of the country but also generated many more. Metaxas responded to the pre-existing political instability with a dismissal of parliament, anti-democratic legislation, attacks on civil rights, official

terrorism against any organized (i.e. political parties) and non-organized (i.e. individuals) opposition. To the economic problems of the country, he responded with an increase of foreign influence by signing new contracts for loans (350 million drachmas from Germany and 4 million from England) and by allowing foreign technocrats to decide on the country's economic policies.[1] When Italy attacked Greece in October 1940, the Athens regime was one of the most authoritarian and fascist in Europe.

It was the Greeks who achieved the first victory of the Alliance forces against axis; and soon after, the Greek army was in an offensive position. The people were united as never before, as were the political leaders, and they were not defeated until the German invasion. As we noted above, political parties, which were trying to survive underground was fairly clear: national unity to fight the threat to the country's sovereignty. A letter written by imprisoned N. Zachariodes, leader of the Communist Party, about the war is a very good example of the predominant spirit of national unity in the country.[2]

The occupation of the country was extremely hard on the people. The country was divided between the Germans, Italians and Bulgarians and it had no control over its own resources. Famine became an every day phenomenon and along with executions and percecution the tragedy was complete.

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[1] Nicos Svoronos, History of Modern Greece (Athens, Themelio, 1976) pp. 131-132.

[2] In this letter issued on October 31, 1940. Zachariades wrote: "To this war which is directed by Metaxas' government, everyone has to give all his energy, without any reservation." From: Text on the History of the Communist Party. (Athens, Social Publishings, 1978) pp. 191-192.

In spite of the difficulties described above, (political suppression and the lack of any political organization and political parties), it did not take long for the appearance of the first resistance groups. Due to the strong nationalist Greek tradition, the resistance movement developed very rapidly. The role of the political parties, with some exceptions was very limited. However, we can distiguish two major trends of the political spectrum in regard to the resistance movement. The left — communist and non-communist — as well a liberal fraction which would be characterized as radical, stayed in the country and joined or formed resistance groups and organizations. The majority of the liberal politicians, though, who had come from the old Venizelos' Party as well as the politicians around the government and the Royal family left the country and formed a government in Cairo. Another relatively small right wing fraction remained in the country and co-operated with the German and Italian conquerers.

It was inevitable that the alignment of the political spectrum would change. Instead the old division between democratic or Venizelian and promonarch or popular, the terms left and right were introduced into Greek political life. Due to the increasing influence of the left and particularly the intensive activities of the Communist Party, polarization became a fact. Thus, the people at the time were to identify the right with the politicians who were abroad and who supported the monarch, and the left with the groups which formed the "National Liberation Front" (E.A.M.) in the country.

Several events which took place mainly after the beginning of country's occupation until the end of the civil war contributed to the above described political alignment. Thus, a brief reference to these

events must be made.

In September 1941, the Socialist Party, the People's Democratic
Party and the Communist Party along with other small underground resis-
tance groups founded the "National Liberation Front" (Ethnikon Apeleft-
erotikon Metopon - E.A.M.). E.A.M. very quickly became the predominant
political group. This, of course, does not mean that there was an ab-
sence of other resistance groups such as the "Union for National and
Social Liberation" (E.K.K.A.) and the "National Democratic Greek Assoc-
iation" (E.D.E.S.) but rather that E.A.M. was indisputably the most
popular.[3]

E.A.M. from the first moment of its foundation was the vanguard
of the resistance, and its assistance to the anti-Axis alliance was very
significant. Furthermore, it liberated some regions and established
local governments. Its administration was based on democratic principles,
which were cited in the "Code of People's Self-Management and Justice".
E.A.M. finally established the "Provisional Committee for National Liber-
ation" (P.E.E.A.). The committee, whose president was Alexandros Svolos,
a university professor, was regarded as the legitimate government of the
country since the official pre-existing administration was abroad and
had no representatives or other presence in the country.

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[3] In a German report on the "political situation in Greece from
June 4 to July 3, 1943", we read: "90% of the population is against the
Axis forces and is ready for an open insurrection... E.A.M. is a main
organizer and the main body of the resistance struggle. The majority
of resistance groups are controlled by it. On the political level it is
dominant not only because of its strong leadership but also because it is
very active. E.A.M. is the major enemy of the occupational forces...".
From Nicos Svoronons, op. cit. p. 141.

Political polarization became a fact and the situation was to be followed by dramatic events. The attitudes of the two fractions of the political spectrum made the differences, more radical and unbridgeable. It is obvious that when a fraction has a clear program of changing the pre-existing order into a People's Republic (Laokratia) as E.A.M. had, and the other was planning to prevent any radical change by imposing the pre-existing regime — Royal Republic — the only thing which can be achieved is a deadlock.

However, when the victory of the alliance forces became visible the two fractions — the democratic resistance movement in the country and the pro-monarch government — started to approach one another. This approach was carried out mainly by political personalities and not by particular parties. Although there was not a total absence of political parties it was obvious that the existence of strong resistance groups as well as the definite polarization of the political spectrum did not allow enough room for the pre-existing party system.

In August 1943, E.A.M., E.K.K.A., E.D.E.S. and personalities from the old political parties announced that the "constitutional issue", was one of the major problems which had to be solved by a referendum. King George II agreed to the proposal and finally the two parties came to an agreement, according to which a government of national unity was to be formed (Lebanon, May 1944). A few months later E.A.M. and E.L.A.S. — the military section of E.A.M. mainly controlled by the Communist Party — signed a new agreement according to which they agreed that they would not attack Athens and that they would accept the idea of British military "assistance" (Kazert, September 1944).

General Scobie, who was the general commander of the alliance

forces — mainly British — in Greece, asked for a complete disarmament

of E.L.A.S. before the 10th of December. The representatives of E.A.M.

in the government resigned and E.L.A.S. strongly defended the attacks of

the British and pro-monarchist forces. Athens became a battle-field for

more than a month. Churchill himself visited Greece in an effort to

cool down the situation. Finally, an agreement was achieved (Varkiza,

February 12, 1945). The agreement, which was under British guarantee,

anticipated the democratization of the military and the police as well

as the creation of the best possible conditions for the referendum and

the elections. Damaskinos, archibishop of Athens was appointed as vice-

roy.

However, the agreement was never put into practice. Ultra right

wing terrorism became an every day phenomenon.[4] Under these conditions

a free, democratic election or referendum was not possible. The British

though, put tremendous pressure on the government for an election and

referendum on the "constitutional issue". Many ministers resigned and

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[4]In June 1945, the leaders of the political parties of the centre
— Sofoulis (liberal), Kafadaris, Tsouderos (prime minister of the pro-
monarch government in Cairo), Plastiras — announced: "...established
by the extreme right wing terrorism is spreading out every day and the
life of the non pro-monarchist citizen becomes difficult. These actions
do not even allow us to think about free referendum and election... The
terrorist groups of the right, which partially use German equipment as
a result of their collaboration with Germans during the occupation not
only are not under the control of the police but also they work together
to squeeze any democratic expression..." Ibid. p. 143.

the "Popular Party" (Laiko Komma) won an easy victory in <u>the election</u> <u>held on March 31, 1946.</u>[5] The majority of E.A.M.'s parties did not participate in the election in an effort to show the unfair nature of the competition. Thus, it became obvious that the problem of polarization of the political forces which was a result of the historical facts during the foreign occupation of the country could not be solved peacefully.

Terrorism reached its peak and by September the referendum turned in favour of the monarchy (September 1, 1946).[6] As a result of this situation, a significant number of old E.A.M. members started to form guerrilla groups in an effort to confront the organized terrorism. These groups formed the "Democratic Army of Greece" (October 28, 1946) and a little later they established the "Provisional Government of Free Greece" (December 23, 1947).

The civil war began again much more cruelly than before. The crimes committed on both sides are beyond description. The British government informed the U.S. that it could not uphold its commitments to Greece. Truman declared that "...(the) U.S. (will) have to help Greece in order to preserve its democratic regime" (March 12, 1947). This marked the beginning of American influence in Greek politics. The American assistance was decisive in the result of the war and the insurrection was defeated by the nationalist forces led by General A. Papagos (Fall 1949).

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[5]See Appendix III.

[6]See Appendix IV.

We do not dispute the responsibily of the Communist Party for this, the second insurrection. However, it would be unfair if we did not also point out that a great deal of the responsibility, perhaps the greatest, has to be assigned to the right wing forces, which should have had more respect for the rules of a democratic system rather than making policies on the basis of revenge against the left.

The outcome of the civil war led to a further deterioration of the political life and the party system in Greece. For many years after the end of the war Greece did not manage to build a democratic, non-discriminatory, non-authoritarian, healthy party system. The polarization, with its simplistic logic of "black and white" in politics, though in a differnt mode, continued to be the dominant characteristic of the Greek political scene. Even after the end of right wing domination, in 1963, its consequences continued to be a dominant factor in the political environment. As a matter of fact, today's politics cannot be said to be untouched by the events of the above described historical period; many references to it, though for different reasons are still being made by whole spectrum of political parties.

1949-1967 DEVELOPMENTS

The Country's Situation

If we want to be accurate, short phrases such as "broken country", or "tragedy" are not adequate to describe the situation of Greece after the end of the civil war. War and the Axis occupation had left the

country prostrate.[7] Civil war made the depth of the disaster immeasur-

able. According to official statistics during the civil war, 41,970

from the "Democratic Army" and 15,000 from the national army had been

killed;[8] and the material damage was estimated at 3.5 billion drachmas,

in current currency. The poor economy became poorer and the limited

economic infrastructure—transportation system, housing, tools and agri-

cultural equipment—had been destroyed. The administration was essent-

ially non-existent. The balance of payments was totally uncontrolled

and governmental expenditures were 18 percent more than revenues by the

end of the civil war.[9]

In addition to the above situation, the lack of strong political

institutions and the dissension of the two sections of the population com-

pleted the picture of political instability. Thus, the various govern-

ments and political parties had to deal with these problems: first the

restoration of the country and second the creation of a strong state

apparatus by consolidation of the "status quo", which had been challenged.

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[7] In the terrible winter of 1942, less than a year after the begin-
ning of the occupation, some 450,000 Greeks died of starvation alone.
J.P.C. Carey and A.G. Carey, The Web of Modern Greek Politics, (N.Y.
Columbia University Press, 1968) p. 131.

[8] "In March 18, 1952, the newspaper "Elefteria" wrote that the
deaths due to the civil war were 154,561. In fact, there were many more.
In this total are not included some thousands, who were killed by right
wing terrorist groups and the 5,000 executed officially, as member of
E.A.M. and some thousand patriots who died in exile or in the prisons
10,15 or 20 years later!" Nicos Psyroukis, History of Contemporary
Greece, (Athens, Epikerotita, 1976) Vol. I p. 400. See also: T. Papa-
konstandinou, Political Education (Athens, Kabanas Hellas, 1970) pp.
454-456.

[9] Ibid., p. 241.

Consequently the parties' alignments had to respond to these issues. We will follow the major issues of the period — foreign relations and dependency, the constitutional and legal framework, the role of the military and the role of monarchy — which were related with country's vital problems. Thus, we will be able to examine the parties' positions on environmental developments as well as the process of the parties' alignment.

Before we go on, a general observation on the political spectrum must be made. Despite the pressure of the "winner" right wing on the "loser" left, there were some incidents of de-polarization and overcoming of the previous political situation. The fact that the left was for a long time illegal provided an opportunity for the emergence of the forces of the centre. In fact, the centre legitimized the peculiar democratic regime of the period, since a democratic system cannot be acceptable without opposition. Thus, the previous political division, between right and left, changed into "nationalist" or "right", and "democratic" which has been tried by the right came to be identified with the left. When, finally the left gained legal expression the polarization of the political spectrum did not disappear but it was significantly reduced.

Foreign Relations and Dependency

The new foreign influence in the country started, as we noted above, with Truman's declaration on Greece (March 12, 1947) and took its official form with the "Greek-American agreement for an application of Truman's Dogma in Greece". (June 20, 1947).

It is not difficult to see that the main formation of foreign influence was an economic one; every other influence on the country such as political, cultural, military came as results of foreign economic influence. The economic influence, during this period, was realized in two ways: through foreign, mainly U.S.,aid[10] and direct investments.

It is commonly believed that only direct investment can turn an independent country into dependent one. However, economic aid consolidates the status of direct investments and generally helps to control a country at almost every other level — political, military and all of which are necessary for the stability of other investments.

It is rather pointless to dispute the size of U.S. aid to post-war Greece (Appendix V). However it is necessary to make some basic remarks. A disproportionate amount of the economic aid was in the form of military assistance. It was necessary for the U.S. to sell its outdated military equipment to a poor country in order to rid the U.S. of this technologically inferior equipment.

Furthermore, the dramatic situation in Greece at the time certainly cried out for other more productive governmental expenditures. In addition this kind of development resulted not only in the military dependence of the country of the U.S. but also in the political dependence as well. Apparently, Greece,by following a dependent economic road,lost its flexibility not only at the level of internal planning but also at the level of external affairs and international relations. The fear of a possible withdrawal of the flow of U.S. aid which could stop the previous rate of growth led the government to follow U.S. foreign policy (e.g. N.A.T.O., Korea expedition).

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[10]See Appendix V.

Greece was not unfamiliar with the issues concerning <u>foreign in-</u>

<u>vestments.</u>From the establishment of the kingdom to 1930, foreign invest-

ments had reached 610 million gold franks.[11] However, after the end of

the civil war the increasing American influence through foreign invest-

ment was intensified. The legal system played an exceptionally signif-

icant role in the promotion of policies in favour of foreign investment.

In the 1952 constitution,there is an act which provides for "the protec-

tion of foreign capital". By October of the following year,Act 2687

emerged under which foreign capital was very well protected.[12] This was

only the beginning of a series of legal provisions and a series of

special status contracts, namely Act 4171 in 1961, and the contract with

Pechiney-Niarchos in August 1960 .[13]

It is obvious that these legal provisions were a great attraction

for foreign capital; and in this case the flow of capital was not exclus-

ively American. A lot of capital from other countries was invested in

Greece during this period, although American investments still had a dom-

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[11]In 1947, the Greek government announced that from 1831 until
1938 the flow of foreign capital into the country had reached the amount
of 850 million gold franks (excluding the country's international loans),
610 million was invested in various enterprises as direct or portfolio
investment. The annual return on these investments was 130 millions.
J. Meynaud, <u>Political Powers in Greece</u>, (Athens, Byron, 1966) p. 429.

[12]This important act dealt with: a) annual returns on the foreign
capital 10% can leave the country b) the transfer out of the country of
profits and interest 12% in the first case and 10% for the latter c)
facilitating tax regulations d) the managment and foreign employees of
the foreign companies obtaining special status.

[13]From the time the 2686 act was put into practice in 1953 until
the end of 1963, the Greek ministry of finance approved 341 applications
for foreign investment in the country; the 341 applications represented
Ibid., pp. 431-433.

inant or rather the dominant position among foreign investments in the country.

One does not have to pause too long to understand how destructive these investments were not only economically but also politically and socially. A relatively poor country like Greece, under these circumstances cannot plan its economy according to its social needs since foreign capital is invested in most profitable sectors and not in those most desirable for the "social good".[14] Furthermore, economic planning based on foreign investment does not secure control over a country's resources.[15a] Any possible effort to control national resources would have to put limits upon foreign capital and would consequently discourage such foreign investment, which would in turn delay development. In addition, the local governments in some cases promised to provide infrastructure to attract foreign investors.[15] Furthermore, foreign capital enjoyed not only a special status — due to its origins — but also the benefit which accrued to local capital e.g. certain tax concessions. Thus, local investments had to develop under circumstances in which they had to compete with corporations, which had highly developed technology and enormously greater capital.

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[14] The allocation of foreign investment was: 300 million dollars to secondary industry, 40 million to mining, 34 to the shipping industry, 12 to tourism and only 16 million to agriculture or fishing. Ibid. p. 433.

[15] The contract with "Pechiney-Niarchos" is very typical of this kind of contract. Karamanlis' government provided roads along with electric power to the industry which exclusively exploited country's bauxite. The price the industry pays for the energy it gets, is nine times less than the regular price the other industries pay. The Public Enterprise of Energy loses 350 million drachmas every year.

[15a] For both these points see: Richard G. Lipsey et. al. Economics (N.Y. Harper and Row Publishers, 1979) pp. 408-419. Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (N.Y., Monthly Review, 1967) pp. 281-298.

Another negative aspect of foreign investment was administrative

corruption. As Jean Meynaud notes there was always something suspicious

behind the signing of big agreements on foreign investment in the country.

The corruption at times reached the level of the prime minister (e.g.

Karamanlis in the case of Pechiney-Niarchos investment) or more commonly

high level civil servants. These facts created a feeling of distrust

toward the government and the administration generally.[16]

In summary, the flow of foreign capital to Greece during this

period was very destructive. Of course we do not deny the fact that in

the course of foreign capital's activities large sections of the popula-

tion benefitted to a certain degree. However, we have to point out that

the small wealthy sections of the population became richer, were exposed

to different consumer behavior and to a different imported life style.

The damage was absolute at the level of the structure of the economy.

In its 1964 report O.E.C.D. stated that the preservation of the rate of

growth and of exchange stability appeared to be closely linked to "the

behavior of foreign capital, public or private in the Greek economy".[17]

Other forms of foreign influence.

Foreign influence in Greece, after the end of the civil war did

not stop at the economic level. It is quite wrong to believe that for-

eign economic influence can exist without any influence at other internal

structural levels, such as political, cultural and military.

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[16]Ibid. pp. 452-454.

[17]O.E.C.D. (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment) 1964 Report p. 34.

The post war governments in order to control the "communist threat" had to accept U.S. aid and foreign capital; apparently they needed a certain rate of growth to keep social discontent under control and foreign capital was the only visible and easy way to achieve this. Consequently, the government's orientation remained pro-U.S. In order to survive in power, they had to secure the flow of foreign capital since the only other visible solution required a radical change of the social and political order.

Foreign cultural influence came as a natural result of economic dependency and political domination. After the end of the civil war and the beginning of the cold war, there was a clear effort to reorient the political culture, and social attitudes and way of life generally. American films were imposing a western, American, "ideal" life style, while many scholarships were available from the U.S. for Greek graduates to attend North American universities.[18]

U.S. influence and finally U.S. control of the military and police started as a consequence of dependence on supplies and it developed through educational exchanges, common projects and participation in international organizations. It is obvious that if an army acquires its equipment from one source exclusively it eventually becomes dependent on this source technologically, strategically and ideologically. A large number of Greek police and military officers participated in a series of educational programs in the U.S. and the headquarters of N.A.T.O. in Ismir and in Germany. The alienation and finally the corruption of Greek military and police under these circumstances now appears to have

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[18]Jean Meynaud, op. cit. pp. 410-413.

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been inevitable.[19]

Constitutional and Legal Framework

The legal system was not only important for the achievement of the economic goals of the government but was also of great significance for governmental efforts to consolidate the political and social status quo, which had been challenged seriously by the left. Thus, the legal system over the period in question was dominated by the idea of containing people's political attitudes. It is not the purpose of this work to refer to these legal acts in detail but a brief reference to them must be made in order to discuss one of the determining factors in the political spectrum at the time.

This authoritarian, anti-democratic legal expression of the system started with Act 509 (December 27, 1946) under which the Communist Party was banned. The appeals to this act had to be heard by regular or special military courts. The governments of the period, using the excuses of the possible resurgence of civil war had "frozen" some of the civil liberties in the 1952 constitution. This excuse of civil war and in fact its continuation long after its actual end[20] was used by various governments to introduce laws which defeated the nature of the "democratic" regime assigned by the constitution.

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[19]It is well-known that George Papadopoulos, the leader of the coup in 1967 was an agent of C.I.A. since 1954. Source: New York Times, August 2, 1974 (Section 1, p. 2).

[20]"Council d' etat" recognized officially the end of the civil war in 1962, "only" thirteen years after the actual event.

In fact, there were two categories of laws: the old and the new. In the first case the governments put into effect some previously existing laws; for example, the "Metaxian" law referring to spying[21] according to which many people were sentenced to death, during peacetime, on the basis of just an accusation. In the second case the government introduced new laws, which were aimed at manipulating people's political attitudes. For example, the law by which the idea of "certificate of social beliefs" was introduced.[22] According to this act, anyone, who wanted to find a job in the private or public sector had to obtain a "blank" certificate. It is a fact that people who were involved in the civil war had a hard time finding jobs unless they had signed a certificate of repentance.

Obviously, these kinds of policies not only influenced people's political attitudes but also contributed significantly to the shaping of people's political beliefs. It is amazing and disturbing how the political beliefs of the masses can shift from one side to a quite opposite one in a fairly short period of time following well organized manipulation.

The Military

The role of the military was not of limited significance in the political developments of the period under examination. Of course, military involvement in Greek politics is a routine rather than an exceptional

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[21]This is the 375 act of December 1936.

[22]This is the 516 act of January 1948. See also Appendix VI.

phenomenon. During this period military influence in politics can be distinguished first in the form of direct political intervention, second in organizing military-political organizations and third in organizing para-military groups.

The political influence of the army starts from the so-called "political education" it gives to the soldiers during their military service.[23] The attitudes of the military, as we briefly noted above, were defined by its relations to the U.S. and N.A.T.O. as well as to the monarchy. Thus, the political socialization they were providing was nothing but pro-Western, pro-N.A.T.O. propaganda as well as the idea of unquestionable support for the monarch, who was commander general of the army. This propaganda had one very clear orientation: anti-communism. The military never hesitated to label any democratic citizen a "communist". The whole political climate, resulting from the civil war and the defeat of the leftist movement contributed to this political socialization of the citizens. Furthermore the unstable political situation apparently necessitated actions like this and helped to legitimize the army's activities.

Apart from this rather indirect intervention of the military into politics there were other incidents of direct involvement. This direct involvement had only one goal: to support the monarchy or to change a certain situation in favour of the right wing governments of the time. In May 1951 a militant group of army officers tried to stage a coup and establish a military government. General Papagos, a political leader favoured by the U.S., disagreed and eventually managed to prevent the

[23]We have to keep in mind that military service is compulsory in Greece. All males, with no exception have to serve in the army for more than two years some time between the ages of 19 to 28.

coup. The army officers, who were involved in its preparation did not receive any serious penalty. In addition there were a series of other military involvements in the country's politics, especially during elec- toral campaign periods; it would be redundant to note that these activities were exclusively in favour of the right and its leader at the time.

The second type of military interference was no less important nor effective than the previous one. This form of the involvement entailed the establishment of clandestine military organizations whose goals could not easily be characterized as military. The dominant clandestine mili- tary organization was I.D.E.A.,[24] which was established by young officers of the army in 1943 in the Middle East. This organization though un- official or rather underground, became very strong and eventually a legit- imate organization since it had semi-official discussions with the leaders of the whole spectrum of political parties in August of 1947. Further- more, at the same time the heads of I.D.E.A. started almost regular meetings with the director of military affairs of the U.S. embassy.[25]

I.D.E.A's goals were aimed at both military and political issues. By obtaining key positions in the army, officer members pushed non-members either to join the group or to resign. In its declaration, I.D.E.A. made its political aims clear and these were nationalist, anti-communist oriented, and were to be realized even with a "dictatorship of I.D.E.A." since the corruption of politicians was taken for granted by the organiza- tion.[26] After eighteen years, in 1967, I.D.E.A. carried out its threat

[24]"Sacred Bundle of Greek Army Officers".

[25]D.K. Paralikas, I.D.E.A. and A.S.P.I.D.A.: roots and ramifications (Athens, 1978) pp. 34-35.

[26]In I.D.E.A.'s declaration of July 7, 1949, Ch. VI. Ibid. pp. 36-39.

and the result was a "dictatorship" which as we will see led to bloodshed, stagnation and national calamity.

Finally, the military, using as an excuse the "communist threat", promoted the creation of the para-military organization: T.E.A. ("Battalions of National Security"). There were well organized armed groups of civilians with an ultra anti-communist orientation. They dominated the rural area by terrorizing the people on the basis of their political beliefs. These groups were very active and "influential",especially during the electoral campaigns of the period.

The above facts are far from indicating that the Greek military over the period 1949-1967 was neutral or indifferent to the course of the political development. On the contrary, the army was a very significant factor in Greek politics, and always acted in favour of the social and political status quo.

The Monarchy

The Greek monarchy has an important tradition of political involvement. The Glücksborg dynasty, which was imposed on Greece in 1863 by Britain, never managed to limit itself to its constitutional role.[27] After the end of the civil war the monarchy did not do anything to escape from this "bad habit". On the contrary,over this period, royal involvement in politics became more intense and better organized.

The constitution of 1952 defined the monarchy's position in the state apparatus by constitutionalizing the idea that "kings reign but do not govern". However, the constitution did not describe the royal duties

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[27]The only exception to this was the reign of King George A', who in practice respected the democratic institutions of the country.

in the system strictly enough. For example, article 29 says that "the

king does not hold formal responsibilities and he is an inviolable person"

while article 30 allows some political activities for the monarch, given

the agreement of the ministers. This lack of clarity in the constitution

fostered royal involvement and influence in the political life of the

country. The actual royal influence on politics entailed an indirect

involvement through social activities as well as a direct involvement

which at many times took the form of open violation of the constitution.

A significant part of royal indirect involvement in politics took

place in the course of the activities of the "Royal Foundation" or as it

more commonly called the "Queen's Foundation". The foundation was sub-

sidised by funds collected by governments through an indirect taxation

system; thus, the "Royal Foundation" was funded by tax-payers. According

to the constitution, though, no-one could check and control the wealth

of the foundation except the members of the royal family. It was esti-

mated that about 10 million dollars was used from the national budget

annually for this purpose.[28]

The consequences of an institution such as this are obvious. The

crown, using tax payers' money, could demonstrate its philanthropic feel-

ings and at the same time create its own "clientele"   among the people

who worked in the foundation as well as among the people who benefitted

from the activities of the institution.

In addition, the crown in Greece managed to maintain groups of

loyal supporters at all levels of the governmental machine as well as in

the business lobby. As Professor Meynaud notes, this promonarchist lobby,

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[28]J. Meynaud, op. cit. p. 341.

which through family relations had strong international connections could
be called "royal party".   The politics of this lobby aimed at the con-
solidation of the regime by supporting any government, party or individ-
ual   who was   loyal to royal institutions, which was identified with the
preservation of the status quo.   At this point, we have to note that the
crown in Greece was constantly supporting the major right wing parties —
"Greek Rally" and "National Radical Union".   However, the "royal party"
had close links with the politicians of the centre — "Union Centre" — not
only those on the right wing of the party, such as Petros Garoufalias and
Stefanos Stefanopoulos,but also on the left,with such members as Ilias
Tsirimokos.[29] In conclusion, we could say that the main characteristic of
this kind of crown politics was secrecy and plotting.

As long as the political situation did not indicate danger, the
crown did not take open political initiatives.   It limited its activities
within the above framework and only occasionally intervened by giving
anti-communist talks and lectures or by trying to reach some kind of inter-
national agreement in the absence of the government's representative who
was in charge.[30]

However, by 1963, in the monarchy's opinion, the stability of the
political situation was destroyed when the "Union Centre" of George
Papandreou, a moderate liberal with no intention of changing the constitu-
tion, won the election.   The crown did not approve of this election re-

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[29] Ilias Tsirimokos was one of the leaders of E.A.M. and had very
close relations with the left.

[30] In March 1963, King Konstantine gave a very strong anti-communist
lecture to the leadership of the Greek church.   Later on and during
Chruchill's funeral he tried to reach an agreement with Dean Rusk, U.S.
Secretary of State, on the Cyprus problem.   Ibid. p. 343.

sult or the popularity of Papandreou's government which achieved 52.72

percent of the popular vote in the following year's election (Feb. 1964).

In reality, though,the monarchy had nothing to fear since there was no

danger of consitutional reform. However, "ocasione data" the king openly

attacked the prime minister. In the summer of 1965, King Konstantine

did not approve the replacement of the minister of defence. The king had

no right to do this and his reaction was considered an open violation of

the constitution. The violation became clearer when the king considered

Papandreou's letter to him as a resignation and gave the mandate to

George Athanasiadis-Novas, a pro-monarchist politician of the governmental

party.

By this time the political storm had broken. The crown had become

deeply involved in politics. Like his grandfather, King Konstantine

"believed his power to dismiss was absolute", and included the right to

force the resignation of a prime minister and government of which he dis-

approved,even though it had a majority in parliament.[31] Many historians

of this episode claim that the king's mother, Frederika, was the major

organizer of the whole incident.[32] Even if we accept this observation

as not far from the truth, we cannot interpret history using exclusively

personal motivations of the protagonists on the political scene. Appar-

ently, the crown wanted to maintain for its

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[31]J.P.C. Carey - A.G. Carey op. cit., p. 202.

[32]From D. Paralika op. cit., pp. 61-62.

own benefit its unwritten privileges as the major regulator or rather
manipulator of the political system of the country.[33] And it was this
royal tendency for political involvement in politics, which made the
institution one of the most important issues of the period, one which could
not be ignored by an political party or politician.

The Major Party Alignments

Before we pursue the development of our thesis it is necessary to
refer to the major alignment of the political spectrum with respect the
above analysis of the major issues — foreign relations, constitutional and
legal framework, the military the monarchy — as well as to the major
characteristics of the party system during the period 1949-1967. This
brief analysis is necessary in order to identify the recent development
of the Greek party system. To put it differently, only an understanding
of the previous party system can provide us with a full comprehensive
analysis of the recent convergence which in fact is part of the hypo-
thesis of this work.

The right wing alignment on the major issues of the country is not
difficult to identify, since right wing political parties — "Greek
Rally" and "National Radical Union" (E.R.E.) — were in power for over a
decade, during the period examined above (Nov. 1952 - Nov. 1963). Thus,
if we follow the governmental policies of the period we can figure out
the major right wing alignments.

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[33] Jean Meynaud, Political Powers in Greece: The Royal Deviation
from Parliamentarianism (Athens, Byron, 1974) p. 78.

However, we can say that when people referred to the right they
had a certain idea about the political implications of the term. The
right wing parties in fact put in practice the foreign policies of the
country. They were openly pro-western, pro-American and believed that
the development of the country could be achieved by importing capital
and basing the economy on the almost absolute adoption of the free-enter-
prise system. Although the majority of the right wing was pro-parliamen-
tarian and had accepted a democratic way of ruling, they never hesitated
to introduce anti-democratic authoritarian legislation. Their aim was
quite clear: the squeezing of the left and the control of the political
attitudes of the people in the long run. Furthermore,the right had very
close relations with the army. In fact, the first right wing leader, who
tried successfully to unify this part of the political spectrum was
General Papagos. However,the good relations between right wing parties and
the military were not only based on personal or historical reasons. Their
relations were far more deep rooted, mainly in the structural needs of
the state after the civil war. The right won against the socialist forces
in 1949, but its victory was not an easy one; it had to be backed by the
U.K., and the U.S. as well as the local supporters of western policies
knew that the international as well as the internal-social-balance of power
could not be secured without a strong and politically influential army.
To put it differently, a strong and not politically indifferent army in
Greece was not only in the interest of the U.S. foreign policy but also
of a vital importance for the internal political powers which were inter-
ested in the maintenance of the "status quo". Thus, as we will see, the
army and the police often intervened throughout the period, in favour of
the right wing parties, sometimes under the guidance of prom-

inent right wing politicians - as in the elections of 1958 or 1961. Further-
more, the right had identified its policies as being loyal to the monarchy.
We would not be wrong if we were to argue that the right wing parties of
the period were pro-monarchist. Understandably, the crown was always in
favour of the right wing, since whenever it intervened in politics, it did
so in support of the dominant right wing party. In fact, the relations
between the crown and the right wing parties did not stop only at the
support one another. It went far beyond this level with the
almost direct intervention of monarchy in party issues as in 1955 when
the king appointed Karamanlis successor of General Papagos in the leader-
ship of "Greek Rally".

These were the major alignments of the right over the period. At
this point, we have to point out that the right tried, not unsuccessfully,
to identify its policies with the notion of nationalism. Anyone who
critized the right for its policies could easily be labelled anti-nation-
alist, that is, against the national interest, or even traitor.

The policies of the Centre parties are more difficult to identify.
The centre did not manage to establish a strong political formation until
1961, when a plethora of small liberal social democratic and even conser-
vative groups were unified under one formation, the "Union Centre".
Thus, the idea of the centre in the context of the Greek political spec-
trum was very vague and often contradictory.

However, there was an apparently significant characteristic of the
parties of the Centre - their strong opposition to right wing rule. In
fact, though, this basis of opposition was not a qualitative difference
between the two fractions. The Centre during this period had no objection
to the exclusive western orientation of the country's external relations,

and had no different understanding about the economic development of the country, other than the one based on the flow of foreign aid and capital. Furthermore, the majority if not the entire centre was not against the monarchy as an institution, and did not object to the foreign influence in the army.

Although there was no difference between the orientation of the political alignment between the centre and the right wing parties, there was a clear difference in the way the two fractions wanted to apply their policies. The centre was much more moderate, less provocative and willing to follow the constitution. For instance, they wanted the crown to act according to the constitutional framework; the army to "stay in the camps" and not get involved in politics, and put some kind of limits on the way the foreign capital was flowing. But the most important difference in the tactics of the two fractions were in their policies toward the defeated of the civil war — the left. The centre was against repressive legislation, the discrimination on the basis of political beliefs, displacements and imprisonments which were introduced by the right wing governments. Over all, the centre, despite its quantitative differences with the right, never reached the point of crucial, essential qualitative difference. The trading of politicians between the two fractions is a very good example of the depth of differences between the centre and right wing parties during the past civil war area.

The left, as we noted already, was the big loser of the civil war. The banning of its major political organization — C.P. — as well as a lack of legitimation, as a result of the violent anti-communist propaganda, were some of the crucial problems of integration of the left part of the Greek political spectrum. The notion of left wing during the period was

associated with the "United Democratic Left" (E.D.A.), which was established in 1951 mainly by communists and left socialists. Despite its diverse membership, the party was largely controlled by the underground Communist Party, due of course to the C.P.'s organizational experience and international support.

The political alignments of the left were qualitatively different from the other two major fractions of the political spectrum. However, their policies were not particularly radical. To make this point schematically clear, we would not be mistaken if we were to say that E.D.A.'s policies at the time would not be characterized other than as moderately social democratic in the context of today's Greek political spectrum.

Of course, E.D.A. opposed quite clearly the imposed model of economic and political development of the country. They were against the development of one-dimensional — only with the west — international relations as well as the restriction of the democratic civil rights in the country. On the issue of monarchy, E.D.A. had a position very similar to that of the Centre: no objection to the institution itself but rather a desire to keep crown's activities under constitutional control.

In conclusion, we can say that the major party alignments during the 1949-1967 period are quite different from today's developments of the Greek party system. We will deal with the details of this development in the next chapter but for a better understanding of this convergence of the party system in Greece, we will deal with a quite characteristic phenomenon: the organizational structure of the political parties.

Today's political parties feel very concerned about their organization and structure — at least in theory. In fact, they try to create permanent structural bodies, and function like regular conferences, permanent

local offices and steady membership etc.[34]   However, that was not the case

for the parties — with an exception of E.D.A. — during the period under

examination where parties' organizational structure was based upon a very

peculiar and primitive institution: "Kommatarchis".[35]

"Kommatarchis" were local or regional agents of M.P.'s or candi-

dates who happened to be influential in the area and consequently could

influence the whole constituency.   The party which could

control or even "buy" the influence of these people was ahead of the other

which happened to lack the services of these men. Most commonly though,

"Kommatarches" were affiliated with politicians and not with the party

itself; thus, they used to travel from one party to another according to

politicians' desires. Given the lack of other party structures, Kommat-

arches became very powerful, especially during electoral periods.

This main trait of the parties' organization during the period

under examination is almost totally absent today. The parties tried to

build up stronger permanent structures so that this old or rather primi-

tive style of organization is falling out of fashion even in some isolated

areas in the country side. This fact is an additional argument for the

understanding of the recent development - convergence - of the Greek party

system.

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[34]For more details see Chapter III and IV.

[35]Litterally the word means leader (head) of a party. But it has
finally come to mean the local agents of a party, since in fact they were
more than vital for parties' electoral surviving.

THE ELECTIONS

The Electoral System and the Electoral Conditions

Before we pursue an examination of the development of the party
system through the electoral procedure a brief reference to the electoral
system and electoral conditions must to be made. Thus, not only will the
developments of the period under examination be more comprehensible but
also the major differences with the present period will be more identify-
able.

The electoral system plays an important role in political develop-
ment and particularly in the development of the political parties of any
system. In Greece, during the period under examination, the electoral
systems influence on the political process was very significant.

The constitution of 1952 does not contain the electoral system of
the country. It just states that electoral procedure will be defined by
another bill. This hesitation to constitutionalize one of the most vital
elements of any parliamentary system shows that the ones who worked out
the constitution wanted to be free to adjust the electoral system to their
needs every time an election was held.

Basically, the electoral system can be defined as a proportional
one. We would, though, be mistaken if we considered it a truly democratic elec-
toral system, since there were restrictions put upon it which have made it
less democratic than any majoritarian one. Firstly, there were restric-
tions made upon participation in the second and third distribution of
seats. For example, a political party in order to be eligible to partic-
ipate in the second distribution of seats must have had a certain propor-
tion of votes cross country; the required proportion was much higher a

coalition of two or more parties.[36]

The intentions of lawmakers were apparent: on the one hand the reinforcement of the position of the strong party, which usually was their own one — "Greek Rally" or E.R.E. — and on the other a discouragement of organized opposition by the formation of coalitions among the smaller parties. Moreover, this kind of electoral system had a significant influence on voting behavior by creating the idea of the "lost vote".[37]

Furthermore, there were some other factors in the electoral system which to a great degree influenced the electoral conditions generally: the notion of the eligible voter and of constituencies' definition.

In Greece there were two different conceptions of the notion of "citizen": one was relative to permanent residence and the other relative to voter eligibility. All Greeks had the right to vote — with the exception of the people who had lost this right because of their activities during the civil war. However,Greeks were eligible to vote only in the constituency in which they were registered as permanent residents and not in the constituency in which they happened to live during the election. Thus, people who had left their initial residence had either to go home and vote or to undertake a bureaucratic procedure in order to transfer their "electoral status". The first solution was rather expensive, while the second one took a long time. Usually,people did not bother to apply for a transfer of their electoral status during a non-election period.

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[36]This restriction ranged from 15 to 25 percent and from 25 to 40 for a party or a coalition respectively.

[37]This is commonly used in Greece; it expresses the popular feeling or rather attitude to vote for the possible winner since a vote for a smaller party could not make any difference.

Under two conditions,this issue would not significantly influence
the electoral results. Firstly, if the governments did not consider the
applications according to the political beliefs of applicants, discourag-
ing the "democratic"[38] ones and facilitating the pro-government ones.[39]
Secondly, if the mobility of the population was not so pronounced. In fact,
after the civil war,a radical urbanization took place in the country. As
a result of this 42.11 percent of the population in 1961 in Athens had
"no electoral right" in the place of their permanent residence.[40]

Moreover, a kind of "gerrymandering"[41] characterized the definition
of the electoral constituencies of the country. In 1946, there were 36
electoral ridings and in 1958 this number was increased up to 55. In the
course of this increase the governments' intentions became clear: They
wanted to spread out their support as much as possible and to achieve a
major concentration for their opposition. The split of the Piraeus con-
stituency in two is a very good example of this; the government tried to
isolate the "red" influence of the Piraeus suburbs.

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[38]The term was used quite commonly to characterize any neutral or
anti-government - right wing - citizen.

[39]J. Meynaud, Political Powers in Greece, op. cit. p. 63.

[40]Ibid., p. 59.

[41]"Gerrymandering": The drawing of the legislative district bound-
ary line in order to obtain partisan or factional advantage. Gerrymander-
ing is engaged in by partisan majorities in state legislatures when they
are drawing up congressional and state legislative districts. The objec-
tive is to spread the support for one's own party over many districts and
to concentrate the support for the other party in a few districts. Jack
C. Plano et al, Political Science Dictionary (Hinsdale, The Dryden Press,
1973) p. 172.

Another defining factor of the elections was the institution of "acting governments", which in fact was a constitutional custom rather than a constitutional order.[42] During the period under examination, 1949-1967, six elections took place under these "acting governments" (1950, 1952, 1958, 1961, 1963, 1964) and only two under the existing "political" government of the time (1951, 1956). "Acting governments" were "non political" governments, which were in charge of the normal electoral procedure as well as of current issues of the state. In other words, the "acting governments" were intended to guarantee unbiased, free, democratic elections.

Once more, we should not be misguided by the democratic image of the institution. These governments were usually appointed by the crown and the previous government. Apparently the purpose which was served by them was to tailor elections for the exclusive benefit of the government — usually right wing — which had appointed it. The government of K. Dova in 1961, is a very good example of this pattern: the 1961 election was called an "electoral coup" by both the centre and the left as well as by foreign observers.

The above description detailed the political environment in which elections were held and the political parties developed. Even the most subjective observer could classify this as an ideal type. There is no historical experience which can prove that government parties, in a democratic system, do not take advantage of their power in order to increase political parties try to explain the electoral result by referring to this fact, although these parties tend to act the same way if they ever

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[42]This constitutional custom appeared in Greece for the first time in 1867 — before the election of 1868.

get into power. However, it seems to us that these kind of incidents were so extensive in Greece during the period under examination, that not much of an effort has to be made before one can challenge the legitimacy of electoral results.

Of course, there are some excuses offered for the situation by the administration. The destruction of the governmental machine in some historical instances (e.g. Metaxas' dictatorship, foreign occupation, civil war) seems to be the major excuse for these "mistakes". But such a concentration of anti-democratic activities is rather excessive. Thus, even if we do not ignore these excuses, which are reasonable to a certain degree, it is difficult to avoid the explanation that everything was set up deliberately. This framework was built up by a small minority of the population, who have always been afraid of a free, democratic expression of people's will, especially whenever this can challenge the "status quo", which works to their own advantage.

These major characteristics of the electoral conditions are not to be found in the post-dictatorship period. This period, as we will see, is characterized by much more democratic habits and an overall radicalism, which has contributed to the phenomenon of the parties' convergence, which we are just about to examine.

Election of March 1950

A few months after the end of the civil war a new election was announced and in January 1950 a government was formed by I. Theotokis, as "acting government" in charge of the election.

Although the number of seats was reduced from 354 to 250 the number of political parties or groups, which participated, increased from 27 to

44.   The major antagonists, though, remained the Popular and the Liberal parties. The winners of the election (Appendix III) became the parties of the centre (i.e. Liberal, National Progressive Union of the Centre, Party of G. Papandreou), while the Populists, by not forming a coalition emerged from this race much weaker.

But it became obvious fairly quickly that this result could not secure a strong government. Within the period of eighteen months five governments, based on coalitions of the parties of the centre, were formed. Eventually two major developments emerged from this situation, which were very significant in the process of the party system during the period under examination.

The first has to do with the emergence of a new party of the right. Marshal Papagos decided to resign from the military and become involved in politics. Papagos skilfully manipulated the influence of his strong personality and his prestige as leader of the Nationalist forces during the civil war, to unify all the right wing parties and groups and establish a new party called "Greek Rally" ("Ellinikos Synagermos E.S.). Despite the Rally's attacks against both Liberals and Populists and its effort to create a supra national party image for itself, Papagos' party was generally made up of monarchists and conservatives in sympathy and not much of a difference could be seen between the new party and the old Popular one.[43]

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[43]J.P.C. Carey et al. op. cit. p. 150

The other development took place on the left of the political
spectrum. After the legal banning of the Communist Party there was no
political expression for the communists in the country. They also could
not find political expression among the parties of the centre since the
latter's policy was not decisively radical. In addition, some of the
left wing leaders indicated the necessity of a coordination of the poli-
tical activities of the radicals in the country. Thus, after the announce-
ment of the next election (June 30, 1951) many communist and non-communist
personalities and activists were attracted by the idea of a new party of
the left. Finally, in August 1951 a new party named "United Democratic
Left" ("Eniea Demokratiki Aristera" -E.D.A.) was formed. From that time
until the military coup in 1967 the left of the country was organized in
E.D.A.: from moderate socialists to communists.

The political instability of the country, as well the differences
in the leadership of the political parties of the centre[44] caused the
proclamation of a new election, in September 9, 1951 — much earlier than
it was due.

Election of September 1951

The two major characteristics of this election were the changes in
the electoral system and party participation. The electoral system
changed from a simple proportional to a "modified proportional" one.

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[44]One of the major issues of the disagreement among the leaders of
the centre was the issue of amnesty to the defeated of the civil war.
General Plastiras wanted to take this step in order to unify the nation,
while S. Venizelos and G. Papandreou were strongly against such a policy.
Apparently, the two leaders, since they had the king's promise of no
political involvement, supported the royal policy on the issue. J. Meynaud,
op. cit., p. 89.

Some restrictions were placed on the representation of small parties and additional flexibility was given to the administration in order to add some extra seats to the initial 250, to make up for distributional problems. The radical reduction of the number of political parties, which participated in this election is the other significant difference from the last election. In 1951 there were only nine participating parties in contrast to forty-four in 1950. Apparently the electoral system and the emergence of the new parties — which in fact were the creation of other smaller parties — were the major factors of this development. Definately, a movement towards a smaller multiparty system had started at the time.

The results (Appendix III) were in favour of the "Greek Rally", which had managed to skillfully manipulate the military vote.[45] However, it did not obtain enough seats (114 out of 257 seats) to form the government. Thus a government was formed by General Plastiras, as leader of the two strongest parties of the centre — "National Progressive Union of the Centre" and the "Liberal Party" — which had gained 131 seats.

Plastiras had a rather hard time in office as he was under pressure from Papagos, the Crown and Americans to prevent any implementation of his promises for amnesty. In March 1952, despite international protests, Nicos Belojannis, the leader of the Communist Party, was sent to the firing squad. Plastiras lost the confidence of the left and the resultant election was inevitable.

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[45] Ibid., p. 93.

Election of November 1952

The acting government of D. Kiousopoulos was in charge of the election. Papagos and Plastiras agreed to introduce an electoral system different from the previous one in order to have strong and viable government. The U.S. played the key role in this agreement since the American ambassador in Athens managed to convince the two leaders that a majority system of voting was the most acceptable for the U.S.[46]

Papagos' party, by promising to forget the past as to assist in the liberation of Cyprus from British occupation, was the big winner of the election (Appendix III). In fact, the imposed electoral system worked in favour of the Rally, which won 247 seats out of a total of 300, squeezing out in an unprecedented manner the other two fractions of the political spectrum: the centre and the left. The result of this election was of great significance in the development of the Greek party system, since the dominant right wing party — although with another name and leader — remained in power until Papandreou's victory in 1963.

Papagos remained the leader of the "Greek Rally" until his death (October 4, 1955). Using his strong personality, Papagos introduced a sort of "Bonapartism" into Greek politics: the ignoring of parliament and the other political parties; the obedience of M.P.'s to the leader, and the strengthening of executive power. This pattern is followed even today, by the leader of the political parties, as we will see below.

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[46]The American ambassador believed that the large sums of American aid permitted "greater American involvement in affairs which would have otherwise been considered strictly domestic" and that the introduction of a "simple proportional" electoral system would be disruptive to the flow of the American aid into the country. Theodore A. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and N.A.T.O Influences (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966) p. 52 also J.P.C. Carey et al. op. cit., p. 153.

After Papagos' death and before any official election for party's
leadership the king appointed Konstantine Karamanlis, a less prominent
member of the cabinet as prime minister and eventually as leader of the
party. It was a surprising choice, the reasons for which are not yet
clear. Some observers argue that the crown considered Karamanlis willing
to accept the "logical" solution for the Cypriot issue that is according
to the British plans.[47] People's rumours at the time implied that
Karamanlis had some kind of personal influence over Queen Frederika.
However, whatever explanation can be given,we must admit that the yet
little recognized Karamanlis was to be so strong a prime minister that
he was able to guide country's fortunes uninterrupted from 1955 until
1963, which is a record length of time in Greek politics.

Karamanlis' main goal was to maintain the strength of the right in
the coming election, which was due on February 19, 1956. In the course
of this effort Karamanlis founded a new party, "National Radical Union"
("Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi", E.R.E.). E.R.E. managed to be supported
by both Rally and the old Popular Party. Karamanlis also introduced a
new electoral system, which fit the needs of this party. The new system
was extremely complicated and was a combination of majoritarian and pro-
portional systems. According to Professor Meynaud the intention of the
government was clear: to push all right and centre parties to the forma-
tion of two big anti-communist political formations.[48]

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[47]J. Meynaud, op. cit., p. 93.

[48]Ibid., p. 96-98.

Election of February 1956

The results of the election (Appendix III) were those intended by Karamanlis' government. The "National Radicals" with almost one percent less of the popular than the "Democratic Union",[49] got 33 seats more than the actually most popular party!

During this session the Karamanlis government faced a lot of problems arising mainly from the Cypriot struggle for independence. Apparently Karamanlis could not ignore the people's strong attitudes in support of the Cypriots, while at the same time he had to respond to the country's international commitments, which were far from agreement with the patriotic trend for "Union" (Enosis) between Cyprus and the mainland. In 1957, Karamanlis did not react strongly against U.S. and N.A.T.O. pressure to accept the installation of nuclear missile bases on Greek soil. He only asked for postponement while the parties of the centre and the left were against the idea.[50]

Finally, in the spring of 1958 Karamanlis lost on a vote of confidence in parliament when sixteen M.P.s, including two of his cabinet ministers, withdrew their support of the government. Karamanlis resigned and a new election was announced for May 11, 1958. An active government was formed by K. Georgakopoulos, president of the Greek Red Cross, and intensive discussion and negotiations started on the electoral system. Ultimately, both Karamanlis and G. Papandreou, who meanwhile had become

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[49]The "Democratic Union" was a calition of almost all the parties of the centre and E.D.A.

[50]J.P.C. Carey et. al. op. cit., pp. 160-161.

leader of the Liberal Party, agreed to introduce a "modified proportional" system. The intentions of this electoral system were no different from the previous one: beneficial for the two strongest political parties, aiming at the creation of two strong, anti-communist oriented, political formations, and a squeeze of E.D.A.

Election of May 1958

The electoral system did not work out according to the expectations of the parties which introduced it. Although Karamanlis' party was again the winner of the election and retained a strong majority in parliament, E.D.A. had an unprecedented result and, with a little under a quarter of the total votes, became the leading opposition party.

At this point we have to note that the electoral behavior of Greeks more often is influenced by international issues related to the country than by strictly domestic ones. E.D.A. with clearly nationalist policies, on the country's international alignments — Cyprupt"unity" with the mainland and protesting against the establishment of U.S. missile bases in the country — exploited this basic characteristic of the Greek electorate. This characteristic of the Greek voting behaviour, as we will see, is still dominant despite significant changes in the political environment in the country.

Another outcome of this election was that Karamanlis consolidated his position as the dominant figure of the right. Under his leadership the right wing was to be united during almost the entire period under examination. However, in spite of this strength, he was very upset because of the strengthening of the left. Thus, he decided to hold an election and use the international situation (the Berlin crisis) against the left.

At the centre of the political spectrum a rather interesting development took place. The parties of the centre were facing big problems since, although they were the majority just seven years before,they had not even managed to survive as the leading opposition party in this election. Thus, great efforts for unity among these parties took place after 1958. The leading figure in these efforts was Georgios Papandreou. Finally, as Professor Meynaud claimed, under his leadership and the intensive activities of American officers[51] a new party was established, "Centre Union". All the parties of the centre, as well as some small right wing ones, swallowed their differences and were unified. This party, despite its contradictions, was to play a very significant role in contemporary Greek politics.

Among the left there were no significant developments. After the failure to unify all "democratic political forces" against the right, E.D.A. decided to form a coalition with the "National Agricultural Party". This electoral coalition, "Pandemocratic Agrarian Front of Greece" (Pandemocratikon Agrotikon Metopon Ellados, P.A.M.E.),aimed at the concentration of some centre-left personalities in an organization, in order to confront the open attacks of the government against E.D.A. as well as the consequences of the "dual struggle" — against the right and the left — of Papandreou's party.

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[51]Professor Meynaud claims that the American interest in the creation of a new strong party of the centre was not only based upon the American uncertainties about the usefulness of Karamanlis' party but also that this interest was reflecting the changes in the American administration taking place at the time. J. Meynaud, op. cit., p. 107.

Finally, the next election was announced for October 9, 1961 and K. Dovas, a miliatry man, was appointed as prime minister of the acting government. The electoral system remained basically the same. The election of 1961 though, was to be one of the most biased in Greek political history.

Election of October 1961

From the first moment, it became clear that E.R.E. was anxious to win the election by any means. Thus, it organized its electoral campaign as if it were a military operation. The activities of the army the police and other "underground" right wing groups during the campaign are beyond description; beating, threats, terrorism and even assassinations along with political propoaganda became the every day activities of these institutions. This right wing organized campaign was called "Periklis" and the objective was the re-election of E.R.E.[52] Many prominent members of the junta, who organized the coup in 1967, were the chief organizers and executives of this plan.[53]

Moreover, the contribution of the acting government to the above described operation was not insignificant. It worked on the voting registration lists in such a manipulative way that not only was the outcome accommodating to E.R.E. on the procedure of seats' distribution but also

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[52]The general order was the use of "beating or money" in order to elect the "Blue" (E.R.E.) and not the "Yellow" (Centre Union) or the "Red" (E.D.A.). D. Paralika op. cit., p. 96-99.

[53]George Papadopoulos was the co-ordinator of the operation (Periclis) Ibid., p. 99.

reached the point where many dead or unknown people or immigrants were able to vote in this election![54]

As it was expected, E.R.E. won the election,obtaining 176 seats in the new parliament. The coalition of "Union Centre and "Progressives' Party" got 100 seats, and the left (P.A.M.E.) dropped in power gaining only 24 seats. (Appendix III.)

Karamanlis was again the strong personality who formed the new government. This time,though, although he was holding a stronger major- ity in the parliament,he had much harder time than before. The Americans had already installed military bases in the country and most importantly the opposition never forgot how it lost the election.

Shortly after the election,Papandreou announced his policy: "unyielding struggle" against E.R.E. and its effort to build a "right wing state". E.D.A. itself was already practicing a fairly similar policy. Finally, the assassination of Gregoris Lambrakis, a left wing M.P. and the indisputable involvement of the crown, some cabinet ministers and right wing terrorist groups changed the existing balance of power. The election became inevitable and it was to be held on November 3, 1963, only six months after Lambrakis' murder.

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[54]Nikos Psyroukis, op. cit. Vol. III p. 231-232. For a better understanding of the condition of this election see: "Black Bible" of the "Union Centre" (Athens, 1962), "Black Bible" of E.D.A. (Athens, 1962), Babis Georgoulas, The Election of 1961, (Athens, 1974) and Nicos Psyroukis op. cit. Vol. III, pp. 217-237.

After the king's failure to present a right wing partisan govern-
ment as a legitimate acting government[55] the chairman of "Arios Pagos" —
the Greek supreme court — was appointed as prime minister. S. Mavromichalis,
the new prime minister, formed a rather generally accepted government and
tried to make some temporary changes in the leadership of the army and the
police force. in order to make up for the partisan character of this in-
stitution.

Once more the electoral system was   the centre of intensive de-
bate among the political parties. Finally, an agreement on the issue was
achieved and the four participants — E.R.E., "Union Centre", E.D.A. and
"Progressives' Party" — had to compete in an electoral system, which was
not very different from the previous one.

Election of November 1963

The result of this election, which was characterized by political
observers as the least biased election since the Second World War, showed
that a shift in the balance of political forces had started in the
country (Appendix III). This time Papandreou's party was the winner with
138 seats in parliament. E.R.E. gained only 132 and E.D.A. 28.

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[55]Initially the king appointed P. Pipinelis as prime minister, but
his pro-monarchist background and the partisan history of some of his
cabinet ministers resulted in Papandreou's disapproval. The incident re-
sulted in the resignation of some honest members of his cabinet (e.g.
K. Rokas, a law school's professor) and the collapse of the whole effort.
J. Meynaud, op. cit. pp. 116-117.

It was obvious that a majority government was out of the question. Papandreou, who had meanwhile been appointed prime minister, had two choices: either to form a coalition government or to form a minority government. Finally, he preferred the latter,since the first one could defeat his policy of "dual struggle" and consequently it could challenge his credibility.

Papandreou's government managed to get the vote of confidence in parliament using E.D.A.'s support. However, he made it clear that there was no visible possibility of cooperation with the left. The outcome of this commitment was the announcement of a new election in an unpredictably short period of time (February 16, 1964). Apparently,Papandreou was rather sure about the result of the coming election since he had refused the royal proposal for a coalition government between E.R.E. and "Union Centre".[56] Two main reasons led him to this conclusion: first, the apparent increase of this popularity after the announcement of new policies beneficial to students and peasants, and, second, the problems of E.R.E. Karamanlis left the country shortly after the election and went to Paris. Apparently, his irresponsibility — he left under another name, without any previous official notice — as well as the problem of finding a successor were not working to the advantage of the National Radicals.

There were no changes at the level of political parties. The only difference was that the "Progressive Party",following the opportunism of its leader, Markezinis, formed a coalition with E.R.E. The election was to be held under the same electoral system and under the government of I. Paraskevopoulos.

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[56]Ibid., p. 120.

Election of February 1964

The result of the election justified Papandreou's decision to go
to the polls as soon as possible. "Union Centre" not only won the major-
ity in the parliament, with 171 seats, but also won an absolute majority
of the total vote with 52.72 percent. E.R.E., with P. Kanelopoulos as
new leader, showed significant losses by gaining only 107 seats while
E.D.A. dropped to 22. (Appendix III.) Apparently, the attraction of
Papandeou's welfare policies and a withdrawal of E.D.A.'s candidates from
some constituencies played an important role in the results.

Papandreou abandoned the Karamanlis program of attempted austerity
and tried to put into practice some of his welfare policies. Within a
year after the election, government expenditures rose by 18.5 percent.
From this amount,some 40 percent was attributed to increases in long-frozen
wages and salaries. A significant proportion went to the budget of the
public education program, which increased by an all-time record of 36
percent. The most costly government plan, however, was the one of sub-
sidies of crops. At the same time,though, Papandreou's government was
facing very serious financial difficulties. When Union Centre took
office there was already a deficit in the balance of payments,and
the flow of American funds into the country practically stopped, since
the special relationship with the U.S. had ended by the beginning of
1964. Thus, Papandreou had eventually to follow the economic develop-
ment policies of his predecessors which were based on the flow of the
foreign investment into the country.[57]

[57]J.P.C. Carey et. al. op. cit., pp. 183-185. For a better under-
standing of the issue see also Nicos P. Mouzelis, Modern Greece:
Facets of Underdevelopment (London, The MacMillan Press Ltd. 1979)
pp. 118-125.

Finally, Papandreous'policy on the Cyprus problem[58] as well as
his efforts to democratize the institutions of the country brought him
into an open confrontation with the non-parliamentarian forces of the
establishment, the monarchy and the military. This situation did not
take long to appear. When Papandreou tried to democratize the army, a
"left-wing conspiracy" called A.S.P.I.D.A., was announced. Andreas
Papandreou,the prime minister's son and one of the most radical participants
of the "Union Centre", was accused of being the political leader of the
plot. This plot was never proven to exist. The majority of scholars,
reporters and politicians agree that the whole issue was part of the con-
spiracy of the Greek C.I.A., which led to the coup in 1967. The apparent
aims of the secret services of the army, whose chief officer was G.
Papadopoulos, were to "cleanse" the military of the democratic officers
in order to create the proper conditions for their future activities.[59]

Papandreou, forseeing the possible consequences of the situatior,,
particularly after the open provocations of the military against the
stability of the political system,[60] decided to confront it by taking over
the ministry of defence and cleaning up the mess. The king, though, did

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[58]Papandreou resisted the American pressure and assisted, at least
diplomatically, archibishop Makarios who was trying to keep his country
united and independent.

[59]Nicos Psyroukis, op. cit. Vol. III. pp. 253-260.

[60]In an effort to legitimize their plans for the future, the Greek
C.I.A. organized some provocations and accused the left (E.D.A.) and its
"colaborators" ("Union Centre") as being responsible: By the end of 1964
they put mines in an area where a local celebration was going to take place,
the result of this was that many people were killed and injured. A few
months after that, Papadopoulos organized a sabotage in the military
equipment in Evros. D. Paralicas op. cit., pp. 177-186. N. Psyroukis
ibid., pp. 250-251.

not approve of this minor change in the cabinet. Papandreou, believing

that as prime minister he had the power to decide who was to constitute

his cabinet, considered the king's reaction as an insult to himself and his

party, which was representing the people's mandate. So he told the king that

he would present his formal resignation the day following the discussion.

Two hours later it was announced that the king had given the mandate to form

the new government to G. Athanasiadis - Novas, a promonarchist member

of Union Centre.

This was the beginning of the end of the limited and chronically

ill Greek democracy (July 1965). It is not the purpose of this work to

analyze the details of this crisis,[61] but the events which followed showed

that it was the same people who had built the "guided democracy" that in

the end created the coup. In fact, the royal attack against the only le-

gitimate government of the country was an informal dismissal of the con-

stitution and democratic institutions. It was, in addition, the green

light for the open and formal dismissal of the democratic regime, which

followed. The hurricane was coming and no one was able to stop it.

Conclusion

Before, we analyse the facts which led to the military coup by

1967, it is worthwhile to summarize the major characteristics of the

electoral procedure of the period under examination 1949-1967. The fact

that some of the major features are not to be met in the context of today's

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[61]See: J. Meynaud, The Royal Deviation from Parliamentarianism,
op. cit., pp. 55-65. D. Paralika, op. cit. pp. 187-188. N. Phyroukis,
op. cit., Vol. III, Ch. 4.

political system gives us a better understanding of the nature of the
convergence of the Greek party system.

In brief, we saw that, during this period, unbiased elections were
rather an exception; after the political change in 1974 the elections were
rather typically marked by un-biased procedure. After 1974, as we will see, the
manipulation of the military, police or public service vote does not seem
to have been the case, while manipulation or even intervention of these insti-
tutions into the electoral procedure was generally the rule in the elections
between 1949-1964. Furthermore, the constitutional custom of "acting
governments" which was rather a rule in the pre-dictatorship area and the
focus of arguments between the fractions of the political spectrum, has
not been put into practice in the post-dictatorship area. We saw, also,
that the whole electoral procedure was characterized by an intensive anti-
communist, anti-left propaganda (e.g. illegal communist party, terrorism
against the left, Union's Centre "dual struggle" policy). Today, though,
the legalization of the communist parties as well as the experience of
the dictatorship have helped to move the electoral procedure away from
this kind of pattern.

However, another major characteristic of this period is that the
electoral system seems to be still vital issue. In fact the manipulation
of the electoral system for the benefit of the party which is in power
is still the focus of argument among the political parties as we will see
in the next chapter.

THE YEARS BEFORE THE HURRICANE

The "royal coup" very soon had to face the people's reactions. Huge demonstrations were organized protesting the king's violation of the constitution. The slogans "114",[62] "Democracy", "Papandreou" became the musical background of the protest movement in Athens and in big cities during the hot summer of 1965. The people from the first moment attacked the "traitors" government and did not hesitate to openly criticize the crown. In fact,the people using slogans like "People don't like you (the king),get your mother (Frederica) and run away" were challenging the nature of the regime. However, the leadership of both the Union Centre and E.D.A. not only had not even thought about it,but had also tried to manipulate the masses in order to cool down their radicalism.[63] Under these conditions of growing mass political discontent,where violence was not an unknown phenomenon, a series of "royal governments" tried to control and stabilize the system.

Fairly soon it became clear that the attainment of stability would not be an easy task. The government of Athanasiadis-Novas failed to get a vote of confidence, and the new government of Ilias Tsirimokos, three weeks later (August 29, 1965) met the same fate. Professor

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[62]"114" was the last article of the 1952 constitution, which stated that "the preservation of the present constitution is due to the patriotic feelings of Greeks". The proclamation of this article by the people was an open accusassion against the king's lack of patriotic feelings.

[63]From personal contacts we had with members of E.D.A. and especially with its youth organization — "Democratic Youth: Lambraki" — it became clear that, at the time, there were arguments between the leadership and mostlikely the young membership of the party because of the imposed moderate policies. A good example of that was the case of Sotiris Petroulas, one of the leaders of student movement, who was assassinated, by the police during a demonstration.

Meynaud says that the immorality of   political ethics at the time is

beyond   description; money and promises for ministerial portfolios,

aiming for the bribery and split of Union Centre were distributed by the

crown. So, they made the Greek political scene look like an oriental

flea market.[64]

Finally, a government formed by S. Stefanopoulos, a prominent

right wing member of Union Centre, managed to get a   vote of confidence

from   parliament (September 25, 1965); 70 percent of his cabinet

ministers were members of E.R.E.   This government,despite its slim

majority in parliament (152-148),was to stay in office for fifteen months.

This period was characterized by "wait and see" policies and also a

"looking forward" to the next election attitude. At the end, the con-

tinuous splits in the Union Centre led the National Radicals to believe

that they might possibly better their position by going to the polls

again, since,although they formed the largest part of the government,they

were not always consulted in government decisions. Thus, they decided

to withdraw E.R.E.'s support of the government,and requested a transition

government to hold elections within the next six months.

Meanwhile,incidents marking the preparation of the coup became

more frequent.[65] During the Stefanopoulos session, Papadopoulos' fraction

of I.D.E.A. not only managed to gain control of some key positions in the

army but also organized open provocation against the system,condemning

the "communists and their collaborators". Despite the fact that the army

made its intentions clear, it seems to us that there was very little con-

[64]J. Meynaud, The Royal Deviation from Parliamentarianism, op. cit.,
pp. 63-64.

[65]Solon Gregoriadis, History of Dictatorship, (Athens, Kapapoulos,
1975) pp. 11-40.

cern for the possibility of this development. Their major concern was the

forthcoming election. Andreas Papandreou and Ilias Iliou, a moderate

left wing intellectual and spokesman for E.D.A. in parliament, were some

of the exceptions to this rule.[66]

Twenty-four hours after the resignation of the Stefanopoulos

government,the king appointed I. Papaskevopoulos as the new prime minister

in charge of the new election. This government managed to get the par-

liamentary support of the two biggest parties. However, due to its part-

isan character and the complications of the A.S.P.I.D.A. trial,this gov-

ernment did not survive more than fourteen weeks. The political situation

had reached a deadlock, and rumors continued to spread that the king and

high officers of the armed forces might attempt a coup and royal dicta-

torship.[67] Finally, P. Kanellopoulos - leader of E.R.E. and a man highly

respected even by his political opponents - formed a government and

announced an election for the 28th of May 1967.

By this time, there was little doubt in anyone's mind that Papand-

reou's party would win an unprecedented victory.[68] However, this was never

to happen; the hurricane arrived right "on time". On April 21, 1967 a

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[66]Andreas Papandreou in his Democracy at Gunpoint (Athens, Karanasis, 74) says that he was even psychologically prepared for the coup (pp. 32-34). Ilias Iliou, on June 6, 1965, in one of his talks in the parliament pre- dicted the coup and named its leader. From Solon Gregoriadis, op. cit., p. 21.

[67]It has been historically proven that the king and the top mili- tary officers — named "big Junta" — were organizing a military coup as well. General Zoitakis, though, informed Papadopoulos' Junda about their plans. See documentary letter in D. Paralika, op. cit. p. 223.

group of colonels — well known as "little Junta" — organized and executed

a military coup, which dismissed the leftovers of a sick or rather "guided

democracy".

In this chapter, we examined the pre-dictatorship Greek political

system as well as the developments of the party system in the period. In

the next chapter will examine the dictatorship and its influence upon the

recent developments of the political parties.

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[68]At the time, both the Greek and American Intelligence private
popularity polls gave to Union Centre somewhere between 58-62 percent
of the vote. The German magazine "Stern" predicted 55 percent,and S.
Konstantopoulos, the editor of the pro-fascist paper "Free World has
since written "the victory of the centre-left was a sure thing." From:
George Mylonas, Escape From Amorgos, (N.Y., Charles Scribner's Sons,
1974) pp. 17-18.

CHAPTER III

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we will examine the dictatorship and the post-
dictatorship era, in Greek politics.   We will examine the
cause the nature and more extensively,the political consequences of the
regime established after the 1967 coup. As we will see,the dictatorial
regime of 1967-1974 played an important role in the radical changes of the
political and party systems which took place after the fall of the regime
in 1974.

To put it differently, the dictatorship was the major factor in
the recent developments of the political spectrum, which entailed radi-
calization and a shift of political attitudes to the left. This develop-
ment of the political environment resulted,as we will see, in an adapta-
tion of the political parties in the country to new conditions. This
adaptation in its turn led to a significant convergence of party
alignments. Thus, after a brief examination of the dictatorship and
its consequences,we will examine the development of the parties converg-
ence through the electoral procedure and their alignment on the country's
issues.

THE DICTATORSHIP: 1967-1974

An explanation

It did not take long for the colonels to take over the whole struc-
ture of power in the country. In fact, less than five hundred officers
managed over night to impose their will upon more than ten thousand mil-
itary officers and eight million Greeks. Perhaps the "achievement" is
amazing but not inexplicable.

In the previous chapter, we traced all the steps in the establishment of the Greek post-war state. It became clear that the major factors in the political system - the crown, the right wing parliamentary leadership and the army - had established a peculiar parliamentary decomcracy. In this peculiar and complicated system the army, of which the back bone was the powerful group of I.D.E.A., was the dominant force. The army had won the civil war, its representatives, (e.g. Marchal Papagos), became involved in politics,it backed the campaigns of its favoured right-wings political parties,and generally was the main consolidator of the monarchy and the system as a whole.

When Papandreou took office,he made a half-hearted attempt to put some limits on army's dominant position in the structure of Greek politics. But he was not willing to attack the structure of power, to "deliver an effective blow to the para-state or to challenge to power of the army".[1] Nevertheless, Papandreou's moves of slight liberalization combined with growing political unrest, which sustained the army, threatened the balance of power between the triarchy of army/parliament/ crown. Thus, we reached the point where the members of this triarchy were trying, in different ways, to maintain the existing balance of power: the parliamentary right-wing leadership — Kanellopoulos, E.R.E. — accepted the risk of an electoral confrontation with their challengers; the crown decided to organize a coup to secure its own position in the state's structure;and,finally,the army, feeling the most threatened from the situation, organized and executed the coup.

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[1] Nicos P. Mouzelis, Modern Greece, op. cit., p. 126.

This approach does not ignore other factors in the dictatorship such as the influence of the U.S. in its attempts to strengthen the South-East wing of N.A.T.O. in order to be ready for the forthcoming developments in Middle East;[2] or the conflict between domestic capital and international or comprador capital, which was seeking to intensify the dependent capitalist development of the country.[3] We think that these factors played significant roles in the whole process, but their influence could not be realized if there was an absence of the above described conditions in the infrastructure of the Greek state. Moreover, these factors themselves could not explain some details of the emergence of the dictatorship such as the distinction between "big" and "little junta" and the preference of the C.I.A. for the latter.

An explanation of the above questions will not be possible if we do not examine the system of promotions in the Greek army. After the civil war, the army had to expand rapidly, standards were lowered and the training period shortened so that new officers could be produced in large numbers. When this procedure reached its peak, the top posts were filled and the lower level officers had to wait many years for promotion. This conflict of interest between low and top officers had become clear well before 1967, when 200 captains had formed an association for the

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[2] The six-day war, which took place shortly after the coup in Greece, is not unrelated to the establishment of the Greek pro-American regime. The U.S. wanted to secure the international balance of power in the area for their own advantage before they pursued any other operations in Middle East.

[3] This explanation is given by Poulanzas for the rise and fall of the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships see: Nicos Poulantzas, The Crisis of the Dictatorships (London, N.L.B., 1976), pp. 40-67. T. Papakonstandinou, a theoretician of the colonels'regime, wrote that one of the major causes of the "revolution" was to "intensify the economic development ...which had been destroyed by previous political anarchy". Theophilaktos Papakonstandinou, Political Education, (Athens, Kabanas Hellas, 1970), pp. 220-21, 224.

advancement of their professional interest.[4] In these terms one can

understand why the Papadopoulos group found such fertile ground among the

junior officers and why it is not surprising that the C.I.A. preferred

the "little junta".[4a]

The Regime

There is no doubt that the dictatorship, which carried out the

plan called "Promytheus", was sponsored by the American foreign services,[5]

in which C.I.A. had an dominant position.[6] Consequently, the nature of

the new regime was to be exclusively, pro-American and pro-Western.

However, the colonels never talked about their origins. They

called their conspiracy "revolution" and provided the "existing red

threat" as their excuse. Accusations concerning the corrupted political

process prior to the coup, intensive nationalist and "patriotic" broad-

casts became everyday propaganda by the regime. However, the dictator-

ship did not manage to mobilize mass political support, in contrast to

what happened in Chile, where the generals managed to organized a massive

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[4]N. Mouzelis, op. cit., p. 128.

[4a]It would be much easier for the regime to consolidate its power.

[5]Apart from C.I.A., the American embassy in Athens, the Common
Committee of American military aid (JUSMAAG) were considered as important
factors in the American influence in Greece. S. Gregoriadis, op. cit. p.29.

[6]Jianni Katri, The Genessis of Neo-Fascism in Greece (Athens, Pap-
azisis 1974) pp. 41, 54-55. See also: A. Papandeou article in "Sunday's
N.Y. Times (JUly 1968), from S. Gregoriadis op. cit., D. Paralika op.cit.,
Section 40.

social campaign in support of their effort to overthrow Allende and "save the country from Marxism".[7]

Due to the general consensus that the coup would never happen, the dictatorship did not immediately face an organized resistance movement.[8] In fact, we would argue that for the first couple of years of the "revolution" there was a general passivity in the political situation; people seemed to be convinced that the "anomaly" of the past was over.

As the time passed, though, the real face of the regime became clearer.   The imposition of martial law and its consequences were obvious to everyone.   Political parties were banned, the mass media were put under the absolute control of the government and generally any manifestation of freedom and civil rights disappeared. On top of this, hundreds of civilians were put in jail or were sent into exile, where of course, the conditions could hardly be claimed as decent. Psychological and physical tortures of every kind[9] were every day routines,

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[7]James Petras, Chile after Allende: A Taste of Two Coups, in Paul M. Sweezy and Harry Magdoff (eds.), Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Chile (N.Y. Monthly Review Press, 1974), pp. 161-169.

[8]The exception to this rule was the case of Iraklion, Crete, where the regime faced a massive reaction by the people - mainly youth - on the same day the coup took place (April 21, 1967). Another indication of the general consensus that the coup d'etat would never occur is that "Avgi" - E.D.A.'s official newspaper - on April 21, 1967 published and editorial article by the title "Why we are not going to have a dictatorship".

[9]See: Torture in Greece: The First Tortures' Trial 1975, Amnesty International Publication 1977 and Solon Gregoriadis op. cit. pp. 307-320.

given to the prisonsers as examples of the established "new order".

Thus, the regime,using any imagineable vicious methods, managed
to organize an unprecedented authoritarian state machinery. However, al-
though the political achievements of the "revolution" were different from
those of the previous political formations, the economic policies of
the regime followed the logic of the economic model they had inherited.
Spilios Papaspiliopoulos,a prominent Greek economist, claims that it is
a myth that colonels' economic policies were radically different from
those of their predecessors.[10] In fact, the dictatorship created the
right political conditions which were able to bring to fruition the
process of dependent development that had started before the coup. The
colonels did not initiate it, but given their capacity to eliminate by
force any attempt to disturb this process, they pursued it with ruthless
consistency.[11]

The resistance

These policies of the regime were soon faced with resistance act-
ivities. As we noted above,there was no preparation for the coup among
the people, so at the beginning the resistance movement took a spontan-
eous and sporadic course.   Many groups without any political affilia-

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[10]Papaspiliopoulos emphasized this point in an article in Le Monde
Diplomatique October 1974 and also in one seminar in Athens (December 1975).

[11]Between 1963-1967 under democratic conditions employees increased
their share of the total income of enterprises from 37.9% to 40.2% while
between 1967-1970 this share dropped to 33.4%. Sources: National accounts
1960-71. From: S. Gregoriadis, ibid., p. 349.

tion but with concrete anti-dictatorial goals appeared. It is character-istic that the emergence of these types of groups took place — with very few exceptions — well before the intensive anti-dictatorial activities of organizations which were sponsored by the official parties.

Due to different factions in the right-wing,the reactions of this part of the Greek political spectrum were quite diverse. A significant number of politicians and activists supported the regime openly. This is not surprising if we remember that the colonels themselves had backed right-wing governments many times in the past. The fanatic pro-monarchists organized resistance groups based on marine officers only when the king was expelled by the regime. A third fraction, which included mainly what in Greece is called the "parliamentary right-wing", had well defined anti-dictatorial attitudes. This group, due to its nature — mainly intellec-tuals, M.P.s, reporters — and its ideological orientation, organized a sort of "paper war" against the regime and tried to mobilize international diplomatic support by publishing information material in several European capitals. Finally,another fraction was playing the role of mediator be-tween the "revolution" and the old politicians of E.R.E.[12] There were also sporadic reactions against the regime quite peculiar in nature, as in the case of today's prime-minister Karamanlis,[13] which do not fit in

[12]The case of George Averof, today's minister of defence, is the most profound of this kind. "Anti" (Athens, November 1979) Vol. 138 pp. 17-23.

[13]In fact Karamanlis' position was very obscure. In his interview for Le Monde (November 29, 1967), he criticized, though not severely, the dictatorship. There are accusations, which have never been denied, that Karamanlis made a secret trip to Washington (Spring 1967) where, as Saults-berger wrote, he advised the State Department to organize the coup. From: D. Paralika, op. cit., pp. 215-217. Finally, he was one of the very few politicians who did not react to the Polytechnic School massacre (November 1973).

any of the above mentioned categories of right-wing resistance against
the dictatorship.

The reactions of the Centre to the regime were totally different.
The leftovers of "Union Centre" tried to organize a massive resistance
movement. Under the circumstances and due to various, usually contradic-
tory ideological trends in the party, these goals were never realized.
Instead, various groups of activists of politicians either formed small
marginal organizations or joined bigger resistance groups, with a wider
political and ideological perspective.

The resistance of the traditional left — the Communist Party —
had more complicated traits. During the first couple of years after the
coup, the Communist Party was busy with internal quarrels which finally
led to a split (Spring 1968).[14] Consequently, serious resistance activ-
ities of both parts of the C.P. only appeared later, although an organ-
ization named "Patriotic Liberation Front" (P.A.M.) had been founded by
a number of other left wing personalities. A resistance organization
with some serious activities backed by the "orthodox" C.P. appeared only
in 1971-72 and reached its peak during the students revolt in November
1973.

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[14]The split resulted in the "emergence" of two parties: Communist
Party of the interior and C.P. of the exterior. The terms "exterior"
and "interior" are derived from the existance of two polit bureaus; one
in the country and the other abroard. Finally, the C.P. of the exterior,
though the minority, dropped its subtitle and managed to be recognized
as the official, "orthodox" Communist Party of Greece. The other fraction,
which even today keeps its title, gradually lost power as it was becoming
more and more pro-Eurocommunist oriented in contrast to the pro-Moscow
orientation of the "official C.P."

Meanwhile, a series of small left-wing organizations appeared.
Plethora, diversity and the use of dynamic methods of resistance were
the main traits of these groups. The failure of liberalism to organize
the radical movement in the mid 60's, the limited activities of the of-
ficial left as well as the influence of the radical movements of the
late 60's were the reasons for the emergence of these groups. Apparently
the Greek radical movement had to undergo its "May" in a period when only
anti-dictatorial content could be given to the emergence of new ideas
and formations. However, although these groups carried out outstanding
resistance projects in that they were formed by and composed of students
and intellectuals, they failed to mobilize mass movement against the co-
lonels.

In fact, this inability of the movement to mobilize the masses in
the struggle against the regime was the biggest defect in the whole
spectrum of resistance organizations. Even the big organizations such as
the "Democratic Defence" (D.A.), the"Panhellenic Liberation Movement"
(P.A.K.) or the "Patriotic Liberation Front" (P.A.M.) never managed to
increase their membership to more than a couple of hundred in or outside
the country. People did not seem to want active resistance to the regime;
at least that was the case for the first five to six years.

The fall

During the 1967-72 period the junta did not face any serious econ-
omic problems and despite growing inequalities and mass migrations, the
standard of living improved.[15] Apparently this fact, along with the dif-

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[15]Nicos Mouzelis op. cit., p. 130.

ficulties of action, prevented the people from active participation in
the resistance movement. Only the impact of the world's economic crisis
in 1972-1973 managed to make clear the irrationalities of the system
since the economy due to its dependent character started to suffer from
severe inflation, and to generate social discontent. Of course, Papado-
poulos tried to build up some kind of security valve by a slight lib-
eralization of the regime. However, the acceleration of social protest
was faster than the governmental response and the operation failed quickly.

The political discontent reached its peak during the revolt
at the Polytechnic School in Athens (November 1973). For the first time
a great number of people joined the students' movements, which had carried
out a series of resistance activities the previous year. The revolt or
rather the revolts — since the Athens insurrection was followed by similar
activities in all big cities — made it clear that a significant proportion
of the population had become aware of the causes of the country's evil.
Along with slogans like "Down with Papadopoulos", "Democracy", "Tonight
Fascism is Dying" or "Tonight it is going to be Thailand"[16] other slogans
appeared: "Down with Americans", "Down with N.A.T.O.", "N.A.T.O. - C.I.A.
- Betrayals". The slogans and generally the attitudes of the insurrec-
tionists were indications that people had started a shift to the left,
since people who would not call themselves left-wing were using radical
slogans, which had not been used by E.D.A. Finally, might be expected,

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[16]A couple weeks before the Athens revolt another student insur-
rection in Thailand managed to overthrow Field Marshal Thamon Kittikachorn's
dictatorship. The insurrectionists of the Polytechic School, making a
simplistic analogy, believed for a moment that the same development was
not impossible in Greece.

the insurrection resulted in retaliatory massacres and extensive govern-
mental terrorism. However, the event marked the beginning of the end of
the regime.

Shortly after, fighting internal to the junta resulted in the fall
of Papadopoulos and the rise of Ioannides. This development indicated
that an accelerated process of structural instability had begun. The case
became even more clear when the foolishness and miscalculation of the
Ioannides administration brought the Greek army to the brink of a dis-
astrous war with Turkey; a war which both materially and politically it
was not prepared to fight. The growing discontent,in combination with
the general military recruitment, necessitated by the call to war, if led
to an actual war could lead to a situation not only of army dominance,
but even one in which the given social order could be threatened.

This became fairly clear not only to the U.S.[17] but also to the
general staff, whose immediate response was to disassociate itself from
junta. The leaders of the armed forces "forgot" their disagreement and
their initial opposition to the parliamentarians and turned to Karamanlis
for exactly the same reason that both the "big" and "little" juntas had
decided to put an end to the growing power of parliament seven years ago:
in order to preserve their position in the power structure of the country.
The size and nature of this compromise became clear when Karamanlis was
sworn in by the junta's archbishop, infront of the last junta's president
— Gizikis — and the junta's armed forces leadership.

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[17]The U.S. awareness and influence over the political developments
in Greece at the time became clear when Kissinger, four days before the
political change "predicted" the coming event. (News item from the Greek
program of the "Voice of Germany".)

THE POST-DICTATORSHIP ERA

The new environment

After the political change in July 1974, the political environment, as expected, changed completely. The colonel's regime was a decisive experience for the Greek political and party system. However, this does not mean that today's system is totally different and has no roots or relation to the pre-dictatorial one.

This first observation one could make about the post-dictatorial polical environment is that the political attitudes have been radicalized. The pre-dictatorial propaganda that the communists, the left and their collaborators were the main cause of the country's problems had been totally destroyed. The fact that the junta as well as the civilians who co-operated with it were made up of prominent members of the right-wing made it more than clear where the threat to democracy came from.

Furthermore, the left and the intense democratic resistance movement against the military regime as well as the torture that members of these groups suffered, resulted in the legitimization of this part of the political spectrum. The legitimation of the left before the coup was unpredictable and out of the question by any stretch of the imagination. The right-wing government had built a rigid anti-communist general consensus, which would not allow any kind of acceptance of the left.

The changes of the political attitudes in the post-dictatorial Greece were not limited only to the legitimization of the left but were extended to some other levels presenting qualitative convergence in regard to the pre-dictatorial political consensus. The development of strong anti-American, anti-N.A.T.O. feelings along with the emergence of

anti-fascist and even anti-right-wing feelings are some of the major developments in this process; the process which had started during the dictatorship and channelled the whole political environment toward the left.

The governments, the political parties, all the institutions of the political system had to face the above described new developments. It was indisputable that the political climate in the country had changed; the institutions of the country had to correspond to the convergence. Before we deal extensively with the case of political parties it useful to discuss the other developments in this process.

The first incidence of change in the political climate was the formation of the "national unity" government right after the political change. Although the initial set up excluded the left and the communists, the government managed to be presented — with the use of some social-democrats — as a real government of "national unity". The fact that well-known right wing politicians had to sit in the same cabinet with people with whom they were fighting before the coup facilitated the emergence of the new consensus.

The policies of the government of "national unity" as well as the election, which was held four months after the fall of dictatorship — despite, once more, the tricky electoral system — showed that significant changes had occurred on the Greek political scene. The announcement of the withdrawal of the country from the military section of N.A.T.O., the legalization of the communist parties and the left, a mini reform in the education system, the realization of academic freedom were some of the policies initiated which indicated the above described changes in the political climate.

Furthermore, the creation of new political parties, which tried to disown any kind of affiliation with pre-dictatorship political formations, the holding of free and unbiased elections as well as the referendum on the monarchy and the avoidance of the right-wing government intervention (Appendix IV) were definite confirmations of the post-dictatorial convergence of the political environment in Greece: a shift to the "left".

Of course, this analysis does not aim to prove that the immediate post-dictatorial conditions in Greece were ones of the "ideal" type of democracy. We have just tried to point out that the experience of the dictatorship created in the context of Greek politics, an unprecedented, democratic political environment which in its turn, as we will see, caused the party system's adaptation to it. In fact, after the first year of democracy the government started to put limits on the pre-existing freedom in several sectors. Thus, a series of "anti-labour", "anti-student" and "anti-civil rights" legislation appeared. However, this was not to destroy the previous image of the political climate; the shift of the post-dictatorial political environment to the left was definite.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE

The framework

Before we analyse the origins, the nature and the policies of the major political parties in some detail, a brief description of their constitutional position and their development through the electoral procedure must be undertaken.

The 1975 consitution, due to the change in the political environment, recognized the legitimate role of political parties. In Article 29, it is stated: "Greek citizens possessing the right to vote may freely found and join political parties, the organization and activity of which must serve the free functioning of democratic government". The same article raises the possibility of the financial support of the parties by the state. However, and despite the positive implications of the article, there are some restrictions on the free activities of parties as well as some limitations on their membership. For example, the law, which defined the preconditions of the financial support of the political parties, states that the government can control not only the budget but also the activities and nature of the political parties which are covered by this act. Apparently, in this case discrimination against opposition parties is the most possible consequence of the practising of this act.

Moreover, the constitution prohibits the participation of civil servants in political parties. Apparently, this statement contradicts the democratic principle of equal rights among all people in the country and defeats the initial idea of the legitimization of political parties, and implies that membership in a party is rather a "bad" thing. The counter argument to this claims that this part of article 29 can be considered as "lex specialis" but this is rather a "jurisdictionalistic" trick, which takes away the fundamental principle of any legal system: the convincing force of the law (cogency). However, despite these constitutional restrictions on parties' membership, the fact that for the first time the political parties were recognized as legitimate social institutions resulted in an overall increase in the parties' activities and encouraged the development of their membership.

The electoral procedure, as always, played a significant role in the development of political parties. Since the political change in July 1974, two elections have taken place, on November 17, 1974 and November 20, 1977.

Election of November 1974

This election, which was held only four months after the junta's overthrow, presented some peculiarities. The appearance of a plethora of political parties and groups, the free conditions under which it took place, the unprepared organization of many of the participants and the participation of the Communist parties for the first time since World War II were the main traits of the first post-dictatorship election.

After the political change, an unprecedented number of political groups and parties appeared.[18] Most of them were the underground resistance groups, which had to be adjusted to the new democratic conditions. Every political group and political party tried to present itself not only as a totally new formation,[19] which had nothing to do with the pre-dictatorship parties, but also as affiliated with the "heroic resistance activities" of some well-known previously underground groups or personalities.

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[18]After the political change 56 left-wing "parties" and groups appeared. From this a total of 21 organizations were challenging the vanguardism of the Communist Party.

[19]The "Union Centre" can be excluded from this rule, since by believing that it was possible to give birth to the old party and achieve the victory of 1964, it tried to maintain its affiliation with its origin. However, the "new element" in the party was expressed by the "New Forces", a social democratic group of intelectuals, which joined the party.

The conditions of the competition, unlike what had happened before, were quite free. Maybe things were not ideal because of the psychological pressure upon the electorate, which can be summarized in the slogan, popular at the time, "Karamanlis or the tanks". The whole climate, though, can be characterized as democratic. Furthermore, the legalization of the communist parties and their participation in the competition completed the picture of the democratic conditions of the election.

The bad organization of the political parties was another trait of this election. In fact, at the time, the political parties had no structure or organization, thus the basis of the competition became eventually the leadership. This was the major complaint of all parties - with the exception of Karamanlis's party - because Karamanlis' prominance as "savior" of the county foreshadowed the result.

Once more the electoral system was one of the major arguments among the political parties. Karamanlis, with the excuse that the country needed strong government, introduced an idiomorphic, "modified proportional" electoral system. The members of the "Union Centre - New Forces" in the government of "National Unity" did not oppose the system and the proposal passed easily. Apparently, the "Union Centre" was hoping to gain the same support as before 1967, so the electoral system would work to their own advantage. This calculation became clear when the system did not work according to their expectation, then they blamed Karamanlis for the whole outcome, ignoring their vote in the government, which introduced the system.

The result of the election, which ended a longer than nine year

period of non-elected governments in the country, was not unexpected

(Appendix III). Karamanlis' latest party, "New Democracy", swept the

election by gaining 220 seats out of a total 300. The "Union Centre -

New Forces", far from realizing their hopes and without any distinct

differences from the "New Democracy", got only 60 seats due to the

party's traditional influence. Andreas Papandreou's creation,

"Panhellenic Socialist Movement" (PA.SO.K.), due to its extremely

radical policies and despite its attraction for the radicalized youth,

got only 12 seats. Finally, the left, despite its unbridgeable chasm,

which became clear even during the campaign, managed to "be unified"

under the name of "United Left" and gained 8 seats.

Konstantine Karamanlis formed the government with no problem what-

soever. However, one year before the expiry of his mandate, he

announced a new election. The official reasons given for his precipi-

tate move were that such fundamental national issues as the ongoing

E.E.C. negotiations and Greece's differences with Turkey could only be

dealt with effectively by a government enjoying a renewed popular man-

date. Nevertheless, the real reason seems to have had more to do with

the growing economic crisis of the country[20] and the indisputable

strengthening of PA.SO.K.

Election of November 1977

There were no major changes in the electoral system this time.

Some minor alterations, which were introduced, were aiming to

[20]Nicos Mouzelis, On the Greek Elections, "New Left Review" No. 108.

strengthen the two major parties at the expense of the smaller ones. However, significant developments took place among <u>the political</u> <u>parties.</u>

Firstly, Karamanlis tried to reduce his personal domination in the "New Democracy." Apparently, he realized that the right wing had to be organized like a party of principle and not a party of personality. Thus, he tried to affiliate his party with the big right wing European parties and to introduce structures similar to theirs. Furthermore, very much unlike what had happened before, Karamanlis drew a line, though not very clearly, between his party and the extreme right; he understood quite quickly that this was the only way to capitalize on the accelerated decay of the "Union Centre."[21] The obscure policies of "Union Centre" which did nothing to clarify the differences between the party and "New Democracy" were of a great assistance in the Karamanlis movement to the left.

Secondly, Papandreou's party tried to become more "realistic." PA.SO.K., controlled almost completely by its leader, made an apparent effort to become a "good radical" party. Papandreou, who was surprised with the poor results of his party in the last election, tried to create a more moderate image for his party. Thus, without dismissing the party's major slogans, Papandreou started gradually to use a more moderate phraseology, to have more direct contacts with the government

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[21]Shortly after 1974 election a major split took place in the party and the "New Forces" left the party. At the same time a struggle for the leadership started as if it would solve basic contradictions in the party.

and to control every single aspect of the party. It was obvious that he was hoping to gain more than any one else from the dying "Union Centre" because of the relatively common origin of the two parties.

Finally, the left this time was represented by two formations - if we do not consider the numerous so-called ultra leftist groups and organization. The "Communist Party of Greece," which meanwhile managed to strengthen its position, ran as such, refusing to form any kind of coalition. The Communist Party of the Interior, along with E.D.A.,[22] "Socialist March",[23], "Christian Democracy"[24] and "Socialist Initiative"[25] formed a coalition named "Alliance of Progressive and Left-Wing Forces."

The result of the election was not unexpected. "New Democracy", due to the growing economic problems and despite its disaffiliation from the extreme right, dropped to 172 seats (Appendix III). Papandreou's party, PA.SO.K., which better exploited political developments almost doubled its strength by getting 25,33 of the

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[22]E.D.A.: has nothing to do with the pre-dictatorial organization. Perhaps a small proportion of membership is the same but the policies are completely different. In loose terms we could characterize it as a left wing social democratic party.

[23]"Socialist March" is a new left type of organization; initially was formed by a marxist group of intellectuals and students which was expelled from PA.SO.k; soon though a number of independent left groups and individuals joined it.

[24]"Christian Democracy" is a group of socialist-oriented (non-marxist) group. Nicos Psaroudakis, its leader, is the significant figure in the organization.

[25]"Socialist Initiative" is a small group of progressive intellectuals who had previously been members of "Union Centre" under the name "New Forces;" the group is affiliated with many social- democratic parties and particulary with S.P.D.

popular vote and 93 seats in parliament! The "Union Centre," which was named "Union of the Democratic Centre" after the split with the "New Forces", which had problems of integration, got only 15 seats. The C.P., by being the best organized and having clear policies, became the big attraction for the left of the country and managed to gain 11 seats. In contrast, the "Alliance," which could not convince in its left orientation and due to its diverse composition got only 2. The extreme right, much better organized now under a "new" party named "National Front," due to Karamanlis' unwillingness to put officially under his party's umbrella pro-monarchists and dictatorship's sympathizers managed to get 5 seats. Finally, a regional organization formed by "Union Centre's" renegades in 1965 ended the competition with 2 seats.[26]

"New Democracy," having the majority in parliament had no problem in forming the government. However, this time the political conditions were not so easy for the government; the opposition had been strengthened. Furthermore, the economic situation in the country, after a partial recovery in 1974, started to indicate its sickness, the major symptom of which was increasing inflation. Karamanlis, in order to dismiss the bad impressions of his government, and trying also to show his move to the centre of the political spectrum, appointed T. Kanellopoulos, member of the Centre and K. Mitsotakis, leader of "Neo-Liberal Party," as ministers of finance and economic coordination

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[26]Eventually this party, named "Neo-Liberal Party," joined "New Democracy" since its leader, K. Mitsotakis, became minister of economic coordination in 1978.

respectively. At the same time, New Democracy started facing leadership problems, since Karamanlis planned to move to the presidency and the structure of the party was not strong enough to produce a new leader. Thus, the party seemed to be involved, as we will see, in an intensive effort to build some kind of organization, capable to respond to the problem.

PA.SO.K. did not seem to have major problems. Despite its internal problems, Papandreou managed to maintain the party united around his strong personality; the big gains in the election as well as the growing influence of the party were strong enough arguments to cover up the rest of the problems.

A series of new splits, the problem of leadership, and the lack of clear ideological and political orientation are some of the problems the "Union of The Democratic Centre" faced after the election and still faces today. These symptoms of decay are indications of the coming final collapse of this party. In fact, on the one hand the development in the "New Democracy" and on the other, PA.SO.K.'s policies, do not really leave any room in the political spectrum of the country, for this party.

The left, with no major changes, appears to be taking its final form. Thus, it becomes more and more clear that the "orthodox" C.P. has managed to attract the majority of the left of the country, while the C.P. of the interior along with other non-dogmatic, independent left-wing parties and organizations will not be able to survive in an effective form.

Overall, we would say that, from the above analysis, it becomes

rather clear that the Greek party system is turning into a "two and a half" party system. The "New Democracy" and PA.SO.K. will play the major roles in the emergence of this polarized system while the Communist Party will retain its marginal political influence.

In the previous pages of this chapter we examined the causes and the nature of the dictatorship. We also saw the influence of the authoritarian regime on post-dictatorial political development; the radicalization of people's political attitudes, and the movement of the whole political system to the left. Furthermore, we noticed that this change in the political environment had an effect on the functions of the political institutions. The free and unbiased nature of the electoral procedure, the apparent neutrality of the army, the legitimation of the left and the new stands of the political parties are some indicative traits of the adaptation of the political institutions to the radicalization of the environment.

In the following pages we will deal specifically with the development which took place at the level of political parties. We will examine what were their steps towards their adaptation to the new environment and their effort to survive to the new conditions of the electoral market. In fact, the latter will help us to formulate our hypothesis around this issue of convergence of political parties which is the main focus of this work.

NEW DEMOCRACY

When he returned to politics, Karamanlis' goal was to establish a new party. The changes in the attitudes of the people, the problem

with the monarchy which had been put forward and the need for a strong majority in the next parliament were his major considerations. Thus, he declared that his creation "New Democracy" was a totally new party, had no origins in any of the previous parties; that it was not to the left, right or centre but rather a national front where even a socialist could find expression; that it had no relation to the dictatorship and had no political line on the monarch issue. It was obvious that Karamanlis on the one hand wanted to keep the right wing unified by taking a neutral position on the monarchy issue and on the other hand by keeping away the extreme right from his party to present it as broadly as possible.

However, regardless of the electoral success of "New Democracy", this was not the case. Karamanlis' party was the successor of E.R.E., which had been given birth by "Greek Rally," which in its turn was the "child" of the old "Popular Party" (Figure 2). The membership of the party, Karamanlis' political background - he was a member of Popular Party, prime minister with the "Greek Rally" and founder of E.R.E., and finally the fact that no other political party challenged the hegemony of the "N.D." as the dominant party of the right do not allow any legitimacy for the argument that "New Democracy" was really new.

However, despite this, we do not mean to imply that Karamanlis' party is not different from its predecessors. In fact, "New Democracy" is a party with many innovations, which can be distinguished at structural, functional and political levels.

In a form similar to that of E.R.E., New Democracy has tried to organize itself on a permanent basis. The constitution of the party

anticipates an organization at three levels: central, regional and local. The development of a constitutional structure - with which we will deal in detail in the next chapter - by Karamanlis' new party is an unprecedented[27] phenomenon not only for its predecessor right wing parties, but also for any other party of the previous period of the Greek political history, with the exception of the C.P. and E.D.A.

At the same time, elections were no longer the only function of this party. New Democracy has started to participate in many social activities, which used to be exclusive activities of the left or of the parties of the centre (e.g. students movement, women's organizations, cultural groups).

At the political level, the differences between New Democracy and previous right wing parties are more profound. We already mentioned some of the new policies of this party, which in fact were the governmental ones, since the party has been in power more than five years now. The significant reduction of anti-communist propaganda, the legalization of the Communist parties, the inauguration of new relationships with the so-called socialist countries[28] and the announcement - even though it has never been put in practice - of the withdrawal from the military section of N.A.T.O. are some of the most

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[27]The preparatory conference of "New Democracy" in Chalkidiki (April 1977) despite its amateur trait was the first conference of any party of the right or the centre in Greece after the second world war.

[28]During his latest tour for the improvement of the international relations of the country, K. Karamanlis visited among other countries both the Soviet Union and China (Fall 1979).

impressive political innovations of this party. Furthermore, although Karamanlis' party "believes in a free enterprise based economy" it states at the same time that whenever profits in the economy are the result of "privileges and a monopolistic situation" state intervension is "economically and morally inevitable;" thus "the expansion of the public sector" is not seen to be working against the initial idea of a "free market economy."[29] It is obvious, if we look at the predictatorial period, that New Democracy's policies were not only unacceptable to the right wing parties but even to the parties of the centre.

In these developments the role of Karamanlis is more than dominant. He is the founder of the party and the decisive factor in any aspect of it; New Democracy is almost identified with its leader. The answer to the question of what makes Karamanlis the key factor in his party lies in his strong personality and his ability to exploit circumstance.[30] The main characteristic of Karmanlis' career is that the expansion of his political influence and consequently his promotion happened under anomalous circumstances. In 1955, after Papagos' death, with the assistance of the crown, he became the leader of the right and in 1974, due to political chaos in the country and the hesitation of other leaders, returned to the country and took over the situation, after eleven years of self-exile, as an "ethnarch" and

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[29]Political Positions of Konstantine Karamanlis: From his speeches and Declarations, July 1974-May 1976 (New Democracy's Publication), p. 13.

[30]Pavlos Bakojannis, Anatomy of Greek Politics (Athens, Papazisis, 1977), p. 132. A good example of this is the use of his picture on the ballot as symbol of his party, in the 1974 election.

"saviour."

Although Karamanlis is not exceptionally well educated - he obtained a degree in Law - and using his indisputable manoeuvering ability managed to establish himself as "Pater Patriae." During the 1974 electoral campaign, talking to the people he said: "... you invited me here to save the country ..." Almost everything in the government operates according to his will and he exercises almost dictatorial power within cabinet.[31] He very often speaks like an authoritarian leader and uses terms such as "my government", "after my order..." and other such phrases all in the first person. The strong tradition of "personality parties" in Greek politics, a mystical fear of his colleagues as well as a hesitation on the part of the opposition parties to criticize him openly, have facilitated Karamanlis' domination over his party and the Greek political scene.

PA.SO.K.

The increasing radicalism after the fall of the colonels, could not be expressed by the traditional left due to such problems as poor organization and anti-communist propaganda. In contrast the new Panahellenic Socialist Movement (PA.SO.K.) displayed a tremendous sensitivity to mass attitudes.

PA.SO.k., in fact, was a creation of Andreas Papandreou, who made his first declaration less than two months after the political change

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[31]For example the cabinet meeting took place two days after they announced the deminution of the charge imposed on the leaders of the 1967 coup d'etat.

(September 3, 1974). The "declaration of September the 3rd," despite

its abstract and loose nature was to establish the first mass socialist

party in Greek history. From the beginning, PA.SO.K. appealed not only

to the radicalized social strata but also to a great number of indepen-

dent left-wing individuals, who were hoping that the creation marked

the renewal of the Greek left. Thus, PA.SO.K. originated in the left

fraction of the old Union Centre as well as in a number of left wing

groups, which had emerged during the dictatorship.

PA.SO.K.'s dynamic appearance in Greek politics received an

excellent reception from the people and the electorate. It achieved a

rapid and very promising structural growth and in the first election

after the dictatorship its gains were not insignificant - 13.58 per-

cent.

However, Papandreou, who from the first movement was the decisive

figure in the party, was not satisfied. In fact, he was shocked by the

results of the 1974 election.[32] Thus, he decided to modify the

radical image of this party. Papandreou foresaw the decay of the

Centre and tried to capitalize on it. He knew that his party because

of its origins had more to gain from the dying Centre, whose problems

we will analyze below.

Papandreou due to his dominant position in the party and his

political abilities did not have difficulties in organizing and

executing this plan of the moderate convergence of his party. Firstly,

he condemned and expelled from the party the left-wing

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[32]The unofficial expectations were the PA.SO.k. could get
about 30 percent of the popular vote. In fact, Papandreou had
organized a press conference to announce his program as leader of the
opposition.

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members of the central committee, in an effort to get rid from the membership of all those who could put some limits on his domination upon the party. Secondly, he introduced a constitution in which the leader became the only source of power in the party.

Thus, Papandreou managed not only to present a more moderate image for his party, since the left wingers were no longer around, but also to be constitutionally free to express the party's policy according to the circumstance and not to a permanent political line. This process of deradicalization by PA.SO.K., which started at the beginning of 1975, became clearer during the 1977 electoral campaign. The principle of "democratic procedure" in the party had disappeared. The nationalist element of the party's anti-imperalist policy became so intense that the role of the country's social structure was ignored. The deep class analysis of Greek society, which had been promised, was replaced by the simplistic terms "privileged" and "unprivileged" social strata. The previous hostility against capitalism and foreign capital[33] was replaced with declarations that PA.SO.K. will try to attract foreign investments which though "are going to be used for the development of the Greek economy."[34] These are strong indications that PA.SO.K. is moving to the centre. This of course does not mean that PA.SO.K. will eventually become a typical liberal party; it rather means that although PA.SO.K. is following quite radical policies on

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[33]During the 1974 campaign, even the slogan "down with capital" was used by PA.SO.K.'s supporters.

[34]PA.SO.K. electoral program 1977, p. 2.

on some major issues (eg. NATO, EEC), it is at the same time is trying
to represent more moderate policies in order to be more competitive in
the electoral market.

It is indisputable that Andreas Papandreou has played a decisive
role in this process. If Karamanlis' role in New Democracy is funda-
mental, Papandreou's position in PA.SO.K. is vital. Papandreou is the
only Greek political leader whom the people call by his first name.
Although this at first appeared as a necessity in order for him to be
distinguished from his father, it has become a term in Greek politics:
"Andreism." Papandreou's dominant role in the party had led many
scholars to characterize PA.SO.K. as a typical case of a populist
party, which has much in common with the populist Latin American
parties.

UNION OF THE DEMOCRATIC CENTRE (E.D.I.K.)

The Union of the Democratic Centre emerged directly from the old
predictatorial Union Centre. The party, though, since 1974, has faced
problems and has never been able to even come close to its old
strength.

One of the most important problems that this party faced was that
of leadership. George Mavros, an old liberal member, who was appointed
as leader in 1974, could not manage to overcome the problems of inte-
gration; and Ioannis Zigdis who took over after the failure in the 1977
election has not managed to maintain and has even helped undermine the
unity of the party.

But even though party's leadership problem was a significant one,
its policies were a more vital one. After the political change in

1974, the centre never had any clear policies on any issue. A continuous "flip-flop" between New Democracy's and PA.SO.K.'s policies became the political trait of the party. The diverse membership of the party as well as the above explained developments of the other parties could not leave any room for independent, clearly distinguishable policies. Thus, the party was to be squeezed by the two other major parties and to face a series of splits[35] which predicated its final disappearance.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

The Communist Party of Greece tends to be an exceptional case of a communist party. It is a typical case of an "orthodox", pro-Moscow oriented C.P. The Party, which participated in the 1977 election, as such, after many years, do not seem to face any significant problems. Its structure is given (i.e. a Stalinist application of the idea of "democratic centralism"), its strategy is subordinated, as ever, to its "internationalist" commitments and its ideology is subsumed under the stagnant, monolithic, unexaminable terminology of "Marxism-Leninism."

However, the Communist Party, despite its inflexibility, has managed to organize the majority of the Greek left. The organizational experience, the apparent reformist nature of some of the other parties of the left "helped" this process. The Communist Party faced and is

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[35]From the 15 M.P.s the party had in 1977, today it has only 5. Some of them became independent and others joined the "Party of Democratic Socialism" (KO.DI.SO), a new insignificant social-democratic party.

still facing a series of internal problems and rebellions. The strong organization, though, and the "electoral success" of the party absorbs these reactions, which mainly focuses their efforts on the democratization of the party.

Thus, under the circumstances the electoral ability of the party is limited and it cannot grow further. The radical image of PA.SO.K. and C.P.'s dogmatic rigidity do not by any means help the expansion of its influence. The fact is that despite the radicalization of the political environment the C.P. has not managed yet to reach the gain of the pre-dictatorship. E.D.A. is nothing but a supporting argument to our statement.

CONCLUSION-HYPOTHESIS

In this chapter, we have examined the recent developments of the Greek political system. As we have seen, a totally different political environment has developed since the fall of the colonels' regime and although the new environment is rooted in the historical developments of the country, it is far from similar to the pre- dictatorial era. Apparently the experience of the dictatorship bequeathed some radical characteristics to the system, which in their turn have influenced the development of political parties. This new development of the political parties is nothing other than their adaptation to the new circumstances.

Thus, we saw the effort of the right-wing New Democracy to present a radical image for itself, and PA.SO.K., which initially appeared with an extremely radical face, started to reduce its radicalism for the

sake of its electoral development. Meanwhile, the leadership and integration problems of the party of the centre facilitated this process and left room for competition between these two major parties for the electoral clientele of the dying Union Centre. Consequently, this process has not only resulted in the development of a two or rather two and a half party system - with New Democracy and PA.SO.K. as the main participants and the Communist Party as the minor contributor to it - but also in the phenomenon of the convergence of the two major Greek political parties. The latter phenomenon, which has taken place through the adaptation process at all levels of the institutions, will be the main focus of our project.

To put it more clearly, our hypothesis is that there is an ultimate tendency towards convergence of the two major Greek political parties, New Democracy and PA.SO.K., which is a result of the converging developments at the structural, functional, political and ideological levels of these institutions.

In fact New Democracy and PA.SO.K. have acted like the two monopolies in Hotelling's economic model (Appendix II). In other words, both parties, after obtaining the support of a certain portion of the electorate, have undertaken some changes and adjustments in order to compete for the in-between, undecided or uncommited - mainly the former clientele of the party of the centre - segment of voters. The changes undertaken by these two parties are very similar to Kirchheimer's model of political parties (see Chapter I) - though drawn from a different case study, which among other points entails: "the strenghtening of leadership;" the avoidance of explicit ideological affiliation; and the

effort "of recruiting voters among the population at large", minimizing

the role of social classes in society. The latter, of course, has been

necessitated and facilitated by the growing magnitude of the middle-

class, which, as we explained briefly in Chapter I, tends to spread its

attitudes to the whole society and develop a unilateral ideology and

social consensus.

In the following chapters, we will elaborate in detail upon these

developments of both, New Democracy and PA.SO.K. In other words, we

will examine the adaptation process and the changes the two

institutions have undergone at the structural, political and

ideological levels, which define their overall movement towards

convergence.

CHAPTER IV

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we will test our hypothesis at the structural and functional levels. More concretely, we will examine the tendency to convergence of the two major Greek political parties - New Democracy and PA.SO.K. - as it can be seen from their structures and functional activities. As we explained in the previous chapter, this convergence takes the form of adaptation to environmental developments.

In order to understand this phenomenon of convergence, we must compare the functions and structure of these two parties today with those of their predecessors; thus, we will make clear that a movement towards the convergence of New Democracy and PA.SO.K. took place. However, we do face some methodological problems: PA.SO.K. in contrast to New Democracy did not originate, as we described above, from one single political formation, it is rather a product of the left fraction of the predictatorship Union Centre as well as of other independent groups of the resistance movement (See Figure 2). Thus, a comparison of this party with its "ancestors" is virtually impossible and rather dangerous in terms of its scientific credibility.

We will overcome the problem by comparing the structural and functional image of this party when it appeared in 1974 and today's actual situation. Of course one could argue that the less than six years history of PA.SO.K. does not give us enough ground to talk about the convergence of this party. However, the unprecedenteal rapid evolution of the political system and the historically unique development of PA.SO.K. legitimize our approach. Our examination of

New Democracy does not face this problem since the party originated directly from the pre-dictatorial National Radical Union (E.R.E.): thus we will examine the structural and functional innovations of New Democracy comparing it with E.R.E.

In brief, our main focus in the examination of the structural changes will be the questions: is there a "strengthening of top leadership groups, whose actions and omissions are now judged from the viewpoint of their contribution to the efficiency of the entire social system rather than identification with the goals of their" party? And is there any tendency to "downgrade the role of the individual member" in these parties?[1] On the question of leadership we will examine the leaders of the two parties K. Karamanlis and A. Papandreou; their social backgrounds, their education, their nominations and their roles in the process of policy-making.

In the examination of the functions of these parties our focus will be on the question: is there a tendency to de-emphasize "the class gardee", specific social-class or denominational clientele in favor of recruiting voters among the population at large and securing access to a variety of interest groups?[2] In fact, this question will provide a guideline in the comparison of political recruitment, political socialization, interest aggregation and interest articulation as the major functions of the two parties.

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[1] Kirchheimer, op.cit. p. 276. For further analysis see chapter 1.

[2] Ibid.

STRUCTURE

E.R.E. and New Democracy

Both parties, E.R.E. and New Democracy, as we noted elsewhere, are creations of K. Karamanlis. Consequently, the personality of the leader, around whom the party is or was built, is a decisive factor in the structure of both parties. However, the changes of the political environment defined, as we will see, the differences at the constitutional and actual levels of the two parties.

E.R.E. with its establishment in January 1956, introduced a "provisional constitution" according to which the party had to be organized. However, this "provisional" organization was never fully put into practice and finally remained dead law for the party. The party, according to its constitution, was organized in two levels, national and peripheral. However, from a total of nine bodies, which were anticipated for the administration of the party of the national level, only three ever performed their functions. They were the Leader, the General Secretariat and the Party Caucus. The rest of the anticipated functions were never performed or were substituted by the governmental apparatus. The bodies anticipated by E.R.E.'s constitution were the General Assembly, the Leader of the party, the General Council, the Executive Committee, the Research Committees, the Financial Committee, the Supreme Board of Control, the General Secretariat and Party's Caucus (i.e. party's M.P.s).

New Democracy, in contrast to its ancestors centralized organiza-
tion, tried to organize, according to its constitution (October '74),
at three levels: national, peripheral and local. It was obviously the
effort of the dominant right wing party after the dictatorship to build
a mass party, which could respond to the new political attitudes of the
society. Attitudes such as intensive politicization and participation
of the people in the life of the parties as well as radicalization
required new political formations and could not be dealt with by the
old forms of centralized and bureaucratized political formations. Of
course, we do not claim that this effort on the part of New Democracy
to move away from the old organizational patterns was fruitful and
successful. However, the constitutional recognition of the need of the
party to undertake forms and patterns previous followed by the left
(i.e. E.D.A.) defines the structural developments of New Democracy in
comparison to E.R.E.

Furthermore, New Democracy, in contrast to what happened in
E.R.E., although it is a governmental party, tries to actualize its
constitution. All the four bodies of the organization at the national
level, anticipated by party's constitutions General Assembly, Leader,
Administering Committee and Financial Committee, have been put into
practice.

In E.R.E., the Leader, the Party's caucus and the General Secre-
tariat were the only constitutional bodies, which performed some func-
tions; in fact the first two operated as decision making apparatuses
and the third one as an executive apparatus. The role of the Leader
was a dominant one. He was director of the ideological and political

struggle of the party; he was its permanent representative and the main vehicle of the party's caucus. It is clear, however, that in the constitutions there were very loose definitions of leadership functions; there is also an absence of regulation defining the leadership's electoral procedure. This lack and the importance of the functions performed by the "leader of the Party" made clear the intentions of the founder and the limitations of this party; K. Karamanlis founded and organized his party on the basis of his personality without any intention of forming a mass based party with a permanent structure.

The leader was not only the head of party's caucus but according to actual practice was the decisive policy making influence on this body. K. Karamanlis followed the "bonapartism" of his predecessor - Papagos - and did not allow any disobedience or argument in the party's caucus; using his strong personality as well as the threat of an opposition victory, he managed to organize the party's M.P.s like an army.

Finally, the General Secretariat which was assigned to perform all sorts of functions for the party was replaced by the governmental machine. It was obvious that the organization of the bureaus such as propaganda, research, leaders etc. could rely on the various ministries to undertake their functions since this party was in power for the greater portion of its life. In brief, we could say that E.R.E.'s national organization was highly centralized and dominated by its leader. Even if someone were to argue that the constitution of the party did not anticipate such a personality party, the actual life of the party easily defeats this argument. The National Radical Union (E.R.E.) was a typical case of a personality party.

In spite of <u>New Democracy's</u> origins, it does not seem that this party follows the pattern of its predecessor. Although the party is a creation of the same person, K. Karamanlis[3], it seems that he tried to establish a more permanent mass organization, not only constitutionally but also in reality. Of course this party, due to its ideological orientation remains highly centralized and dominated by its leader but, as we will see, there are qualitative differences between this and E.R.E.'s organization.

New Democracy's constitution at the national (central) level anticipates four administering bodies: the General Assembly or Congress, the Leader, the Administration Committee; and the financial committee. At first glance these bodies of party administration look very much the same as those of E.R.E's. However, a difference lies on the actual practice of these bodies.

The General Assembly in the hierarchy of the collective or non collective bodies has the highest standing. It is composed of the leader, party's M.P.s., the members of the administration committee, the former M.P.s, party candidates in the previous election, representatives of the peripheral organization of the party (i.e. a number of party members not greater than the country's electoral constituencies) and finally by representatives of the youth of the party and in contrast to what had taken place previously within E.R.E., New Democracy has, so far, organized two congresses.

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[3]The fact that K. Karamanlis is the founder of New Democracy becomes constitutionally explicit in the first paragraph of the first article of the party's constitution.

Article 4 of the party's constitution defines the functions of the congress which among others include: the election of the party's leader - something which was totally absent from E.R.E.'s constitution, the approval or disapproval of the leader's political program, and the election of the party's other collective bodies. Of course, it is obvious that these functions of the party's major collective body are centred around the leader. The operation of such a large collectie body unprecedented in the history of liberal and right wing parties, as well as the constitutional anticipation of elected leadership, define the qualitative differences of this party from E.R.E.

Another conclusion which can be drawn from this part of New Democracy's organization and particularly from the anticipated composition of the General assembly is that there is an apparent effort to "downgrade" the role of the individual member. We saw that this collective body is composed to a large extent of personalities who are important and influential not in the party's structure but rather in the society as a whole. There is no comparison between the magnitude of M.P.s, former M.P.s or candidates to the simple active member. The rationale behind this tendency is clear: the development of the party's image to the public, which makes it more competitive in the electoral market.

The role of leader, as mentioned above, is very important and since we are referring to the same person, K. Karamanlis, in both cases, E.R.E. and New Democracy, we will deal exclusively with his personality below. The role of the two other bodies is described in articles 6 to 9 of party's constitution. The administration and the

financial committees, in contrast to what happened in E.R.E., not only operate on a regular basis - and not only during electoral campaigns - but are also elected by the party's congress.

To sum, both E.R.E. and New Democracy possessed a national structure highly organized around their leader K. Karamanlis. However, there are some qualitative constitutional and actual differences which show the efforts of the dominant right wing party in Greece to escape from a strict personality party and to form a mass based one.

The same tendency can be seen at the level of the peripheral organization of the party. This level of comparison between the two parties is the only one possible since E.R.E.'s organization did not specify any structure at the local level. New Democracy, following E.R.E.'s constitution, has established its organization at the peripheral level (such as at the level of electoral constituencies) while E.R.E. did not manage, except in electoral periods, to put into practice its loosely defined "political centres." Of course, in both cases the actual influence of these bodies in the process of decision making in the party was insignificant. Their main function was the organization of election campaigns through political recruitment and polemical propaganda. The decisions took place at the top leadership levels and were in fact made by the leader.

Of course, the constitutional and actual interest of New Democracy in establishing an organization at the local level displays the party's concern for decentralization. Although this tendency can be considered a step forward and as qualitatively different from E.R.E., Karamanalis' party still remains a highly centralized personality party.

Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PA.SO.K)

PA.SO.K. presents a totally different constitutional form from that of New Democracy. At the first glance, it becomes clear that the party's goal is to establish a mass democratically based organization; in fact, one of the party's four principles was: democratic procedure.[4]

Thus, in its constitution published in May 1976, the description of the duties of the organization's bodies begins from the bottom and goes to the top, from the membership to the leader and the Executive Secretariat. Thus, in contrast to what happens in New Democracy, PA.SO.K. is organized at three levels, local, peripheral and national or central. In fact, the organization at the local level is recognized as the basis of party's structure.[5] It is the basis because it is seen to have decisive input into any proposal of any hierarchical collective body of the party. The neighbourhood or labour locals according to the constitution, decide on the party's candidates, policies, organization central committee and leader.

This constitutionally recognized importance of PA.SO.K's member-

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[4]The four principles or rather goals stated in the party's "Declaration of September 3rd 1974" were: "National Independence", "People's Sovereignty", "Social Emanicipation" and "Democratic Procedure".

ship is a result of a party's fundamental promises that the organiza-
tion would follow the structural patterns of a movement and not of a
party. This attitude is clear even from the party's title. PA.SO.K.
does not call itself a party but a "movement." The theoretical assump-
tion behind this policy is that a party has a clear, well defined
"weltanschauung," which in its turn defines or rather determines every
party activity. In contrast, the notion of movement does not pre-
suppose a well-defined theoretical framework but rather a very loose,
mass based structure which in the course of its activities and contact
with the environment will develop a complete theoretical and political
understanding of any issue.

Although it appears from the above description that a
decentralized pattern is followed by PA.SO.k. and that the role of the
"individual member" is not "downgraded", this is far from being applied
in practice. In a pamphlet which was produced by PA.SO.K.'s "Research
and Enlightenment Centre" and in which the "Duties of Members" are
defined, we can see that a blind devotion of the members to what have
emerged as the "Movement's principles" is introduced. The pamphlet, in
fact, introduces some of the principles of the most authoritarian -
Stalinist - form of democratic centralism. In parts it refers to the
decision making process and to the realization of these decisions,
flavoured by some Maoist understanding of the development of "socialist
consciousness."[6]

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[6]Member's Duties: Achievement of Socialist Consciousness.
(Athens, Research and Enlightenment Centre of PA.SO.K.).

Furthermore, the actual life in the party displays a totally
different image, with an artificial militancy among the members, a lack
of any real access to the process of policy making, full obedience to
the president - A. Papandreou - and, in fact, a withering away of the
role of the members. Thus, local organizations, instead of being the
heart of party structure as they are recognized in the constitution,
have become groups with a relatively low profile between two elections
and with a high rate of activity during the electoral campaigns. This
process of downgrading the local level of the party's organization and
consequently of the individual member has become quite clear since all
the series of splits which the party underwent from 1975 to 1979.[7]

At the peripheral level, PA.SO.K. is organized in 'Peripheral
Committees", which in fact are the electoral constituencies. These
bodies, whose purpose is to establish the links between the locals and
the top leadership (central committee and President), maintain a
political and disciplinary control over the locals. They have the
right not only to create but also to dismiss any local in their
constituency on political grounds. Furthermore, the actual functions
and even the way they have been set up indicate that the major concern
of the constitution and party leadership generally was to organize a
centralized body in each constituency capable of running the electoral

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[7]By the spring of 1975, due to Papandreau's manoeuvres, more
than forty percent of the members of the Central Committee and in fact
the most prominent ones were kicked out or had resigned. Discussion of
the incident was stricken from the agenda of the local organizations
across the country. The locals who dared to discuss the issue were
forced to leave the party. Almost the same pattern was followed during
the split in the winter of 1977 among the youth and in 1979 one
prominent member of the Executive Secretariat (Politic Bureau) resigned
over this issue.

campaigns. Apparently electoral growth became more important than the actual structural development of the party.

Articles 47 to 59 of PA.SO.K.'s constitution refer to the National Conference, which is the highest body in the party's hierarchy. The Conference, which can be convened by the President or the Central Committee, does not assemble regularly but rather according to the needs of the party. The party's needs are defined not by the local organizations but by the top leadership, in contrast to what happens in New Democracy where the conference is constitutionally required to be held every two years. The National Conference votes on the framework of the party's policies, elects the Central Committee and the President of the Movement.

The "Central Committee of the Movement" is designated as the top body of the party between national conferences. However, in the constitution there were no political functions assigned to it other than those which are directly or indirectly relevant to elections. Of course, this collective body, which can reach a total of eighty members, elects the "Executive Secretariat" and the Committee of Financial Control and in addition organizes the various "committees of the movement." However an overall examination of these structural regulation shows that the orientation of these activities is focused upon the organization of electoral procedure.

Although PA.SO.K.'s constitution devotes only one paragraph (article 60) to the role of the president in the party it becomes clear not only from the constitution but also from the actual life of the party that the role of the president. A. Panandreou

significant but vital. The "President of the Movement" is not embodied

in any of the collective bodies of the organization. In the

constitution, we often see expressions such as "the Central Committee

and the Presidents", "the Executive Secretariat consists of the

President and eight members" (Article 68), and so on.

In other words, the President of PA.SO.K. "represents the Movement

at all levels of activity in the country and abroad. He chairs the

Executive Secretariat; addresses the Central Committee and Executive

Secretariat on the ideological and political life of the Movement; and

takes a position on emergency political issues..."[8] In spite of this

practical importance, he virtually remains out of the control of any

collective bodies of the party.

In conclusion, in the description of some of the organizational

characteristics of PA.SO.K., we must note that the party gives

importance to organizing youth as well as labour. In fact, PA.SO.K.,

due to the unprecedented influence it had upon youth - particularly

students - embodies its youth organization in the party's formal

structure. The youth organizations of the movement participate equally

in the party's life at all levels. Of course, as we will see, the

rationale behind this policy is to embody and control this radical part

of the Movement to absorb deviations, radical critiques of the

leadership and potential splits. Finally, PA.SO.K.'s organization of

labour has the same position as that of local clubs and organizations.

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[8]From PA.SO.K.'s Constitution: Article 60.

Conclusions

If someone were to read only the official constitutions of the two major Greek political parties - New Democracy and PA.SO.K. - he would quickly reject the idea of the convergence of these two parties. New Democracy is organized around a constitution which clearly leaves almost every power in the hands of the "Leader". PA.SO.K. has adopted a more complicated structure which tries, through a fairly tight schema, to create a decentralized and more democratic organization. In fact, these tendencies of the two parties become apparent even from the length of their constitutions: the centralized structure of New Democracy does not require more than twenty four articles to be described, while PA.SO.K.'s decentralized but complicated organization is described in a long constitution of eighty five articles.

However, if we were to end our analysis at the formal image of the structure of these parties we would get at the very least a misleading understanding of their similarties and/or differences. Every serious political analysis must go beyond the formalities of the surface. Only an analysis which examines the reality, without of course disregarding the official formations, will have a chance of gaining a complete understanding of the issue.

Thus, although New Democracy has developed a structural image quite different from its ancestor - E.R.E. - which is unique in history for the right wing parties, in reality it still remains a party highly centralized around its "leader." Despite the innovations

New Democracy has undertaken, it is a personality based party. Of course, this does not minimize the importance of the party's ability to develop according to the changes of the political environment, such as the effort to build a permanent organization independent of the governmental apparatus, and in which the individual member has some input.

On the other hand, PA.SO.K.'s actual organizational life displays certain pecularities which work against its initial idea of a democratically organized party. These peculiarities can be summarized in the decisive influence of the President of the party in the policy making process. The President of PA.SO.K., far from being "primus inter pares" has established a strong elite around himself, which he uses to legitimize his decisions and fulfill the bureaucratic needs of the organization. This, as we mentioned above, became clear during the series of the internal crises of the "Movement", as well as from the shift of the party towards more moderate politics (see below, chapter V), where the role of the individual members was essentially non-existent. Thus, in PA.SO.K., a process has begun towards not only the strengthening of the top group around the President, which is recruited on the basis of its social impact,[9] but also towards a defeat of the initially designed decisive role of the individual member.

In brief, a deep analysis of the structure of the two major Greek political parties leads us to the conclusion that we are confronting two different kinds of processes which will eventually lead to the structural convergence of these two parties. On the one hand, New

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[9]The Executive Bureau of the "Movement" is composed mainly of well-known professors, prominent M.Ps. and personalities, who are admired by the public because of their scientific or heroic (during the dictatorship) background.

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Democracy, although it basically remains a personality based partly and its "Leader" K. Karamanlis plays the decisive role in party's structure attempts, in contrast to what was happening with its ancestor party, E.R.E., to establish a less centralized and more democratic party structure. On the other hand PA.SO.K., although from its inception it declared its desire to establish a democractic, decentralized, non-personality based party where the individual members were to be the basis of every activity has moved toward the establishment of a personality based party around its "president", A Papandreou. Thus, we would not be mistaken, if we were to argue that the "Leader" of New Democracy has the tendency to become a "President: while the President of PA.SO.K. acts as a "Leader". This, in fact, highlights the convergence of the two major political parties of Greece.

The significance of the leadership in the structure of both New Democracy and PA.SO.K. requires an examination of the leader of these two parties. Thus, we can achieve not only a better understanding of their structure but also the political nature of these institutions.

The Case of Konstantine Karamanlis

Born in 1907, Karamanlis was the first Greek from Macedonia ever to attain the office of prime minister. He was the eldest son in a middle class family. When his father died young, Karamanlis had to take over the responsibility for his family. Thus, Konstantine's difficulties in his confrontation with reality eventually became his

first "Political" experiences; the responsibilities he had to deal with
at the time accelerated the development of his maturity.

In spite of these circumstances, young Konstantine managed to
get to Athens, where he studied law at the University of Athens. After
obtaining his law degree he started to practice as a lawyer in the town
of Serres, not far from where he was born, in 1932.

His political career was launched in 1935, when at twenty eight
years of age, he was elected to Parliament as a Popular Party member
for the Serres constituency. He was re-elected in 1936. During
Metaxa's dictatorship (1936-1941) and the Axis occupation of the
country, he stayed out of politics.

After World War II, Karamanlis was re-elected to Parliament and
served in various ministries in different cabinets.[10] However, he
came into prominence through his post as minister of public works in
Field-Marshal Papagos' government from November 1950 to October 1955.
After Papagos death, the Crown appointed Karamanlis as prime minister,
and he eventually became the leader of the Greek Rally. But when he
consolidated his position as prime minister, he decided to found a new
party and exercise his power with a new popular mandate. At the
beginning of 1956, he announced the establishment of the National
Radical Union, which was to remain in power for almost eight years
(from February 1956-November,

[10]His first cabinet post, at the age of 29, was Minister of
Public Works in the government of Konstantine Tsaldaris, from November
24, 1946 to January 24, 1947. He continued in the same post in the
Maximos government, which followed (January 24 to February 17, 1947).
He was Minister of Transport from May 7th to November 18, 1948 and
Minister of Social Welfare in the Sofoulis government from November 18,
1948 to June 30, 1949, a post he continued to hold in the Diomides
government from June 30, 1949 to January 6, 1950. On September 13,
1950 he took office as Minister of National Defence in the government
under S. Venizelos. He resigned from that post, together with other
Popular Party ministers, on November 3, 1950. From: Democracy in
Greece: The First Year. (Governmental Publication).

1963).

As prime minister and leader of E.R.E., Karamanlis followed,
in fact, his predecessor's pattern of dealing with issues. He was very
authoritarian, egocentric, and conservative, and generally continued
the Bonapartist mode of administration which was introduced by Papagos.
He organized his party on a personal basis, and the party caucus had to
follow his decisions as if they were a military company. Karamanlis is
one of those political leaders who cannot stand any opposition even if
it comes from friends; he also cannot see himself having any other role
than that of being in the office. Thus, a few months after he lost the
1963 election, he left the country to live in Paris for almost eleven
years.

When, in 1974, the military regime collapsed, a significant frac-
tion of the army officers turned to the politicians for solutions to
the country's chaotic situation. Karamanlis' personality proved to be
the most appropriate. His experience in combination with the conserva-
tive nature of his strong and influential personality, was a guarantee
that he would be able to handle the problems and preserve the "status
quo".

Karamanlis responded well to the expectations. In 1974, he
announced that it was his duty to create a broad and "live" political
front: the New Democracy.[11] New Democracy has been in power since
then, and Karamanlis has been its undisputed leader. As we demonstrated
above, he tried to present a very new image for his party; the rumour

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[11]Declaration of New Democracy. From: P. Bakojannis, Anatomy
of Greek Politics. (Athens, Papazisis, 1977) Appendix p.268.

that Karamanlis had enriched his experience with European - democratic - ideas was widespread and very well accepted. Furthermore, the political, structural and functional innovations of the new party in comparison to E.R.E., as we mentioned, verified the new image of the dominant right wing political expression.

However, Karamanlis remained almost the same. He is the "God" of the party; he defines its policies; he deliberately decides on any issue without the agreement of the collective bodies of the party; and he is beyond any control. His leadership has not been officially approved by anyone. New Democracy belongs to him. In other words, even if we consider the party's innovations seriously we cannot claim that Karamanlis is not the key person in any process which is going on inside it at any level. Karamanlis can be identified with New Democracy and vice versa, despite the collective initiatives which were introduced lately around the question of his succession.

Karamanlis' strength is based on his manoeuvering ability. He has used it brilliantly not only to survive during unstable situations but also to emerge from them the big winner. Thus, Karamanlis has established his personality in the Greek political scene in a such a manner which makes him so publicly respectable that even his enemies cannot challenge him. The latter becomes clear to anyone who follows the question period in Parliament. The opposition always attacks the ministers, the civil servants and the partisan politics of the government but never the Prime Minister, who, in fact, has appointed all these people to their positions. Thus, phrases like "I did not mean to question you Mr. Prime Minister" or "I don't question your intentions but ...."

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pattern has been followed by the media, and this, in combination with the above describe traits, make Karamanlis' role not only dominant in his party but have also created a supra-national, supra-partisan picture for the leader of the dominant right wing political party.

The Case of Andreas Papandreou

The leader of the Panbellenic Socialist Movement, Andreas Papandreou, was born on the island of Chios in 1919, while his father George, the well-known liberal leader, was serving as a prefect of the area. His background was to be not only different from the other prominent leader but also quite diverse and some times even controversial.

He gained his first education at the American College of Athens - an American private highschool - and then entered the University of Athens, where he studied law. By the end of 1936 he had to leave the country due to a real threat of possible arrest for his alleged activities in the attempted overthrow of the dictator Metaxas. He fled to the United States where he lived for the next twenty years. He studied economics and finally emerged with a doctoral degree from Harvard University. He became an American citizen and, during World War II, served in the United States Navy and as technical adviser at the 1944 financial and monetary conference at Bretton Woods. Later on, he held professorships in various American Universities, and finally went to the University of California as professor and head of the the department in 1955.

By 1959, Papandreou responded to an invitation from Karamanlis' government to come to Greece to become chairman and scientific director of the Centre of Economic Research of the Academy of Athens. At the same time he served as economic adviser to the Bank of Greece. His growing prestige as the "genius son of the old-man (G. Papandreou)", as well as the posibility of the Union Centre winning the 1963 election made him resign his posts to enter politics in 1962.

A. Papandreou was first elected to the Greek parliament in 1963, as an M.P. from his father's home city, Patra. He served as Minister to the Prime Minister's Office and Deputy Minister of Economic Coordination.[13] His political inexperience and some radical policies he tried to introduce led him to resign from government for a few months. When he returned in the April of 1965, he became the centre of the notorious A.S.P.I.D.A. case.

On April 21st, 1967 he was arrested and incarcerated by the military junta. He was later permitted to leave the country, and became an active apponent of the dictatorship while he was in exile. In 1970, he founded the Panhellenic Liberation Front (P.A.K.), which soon after became one of the strongest resistance organizations among the Greek population abroad. Papandreou was the chairman of the National Council of P.A.K. until after the fall of dictatorship, when he announced the establishment of PA.SO.K.

Thus, Papandreou, having been the founder of PA.SO.K., remained its unchallenged leader. As in the case of New Democracy and Karamanlis, there was never any formal nomination procedure for his appointment. He was simply accepted as the President of his party.

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[13]The Ministry of Economic Coordination was and in fact still is the most important part of the Greek governmental apparatus.

Papandreou's political and ideological background is not only "versatile" but often controversial. During his highschool years he was involved in a Trotskyist Anti-Metaxian group, where he became a front-liner and even the leader of the small fraction of the group in his college. During his time in the United States, his political stand became much more moderate; in fact he worked in the team of young technocrats around J.F. Kennedy. Papandreou presented the same image when he first returned to Greece in 1959. Gradually, though, he became more and more radical, especially an national issues, and particularly on issues related to Greece's relationship to the West. His increasing radicalism, though, was always within the framework of the liberal Centre Union. Professor Meynaud, writing about young Papandreou's politics at the time, claims that he had "pro-Kennedian tendencies and (that) the assassinated President of the United States approved of his involvement in Greek politics".[14]

This gradual tendency towards radical-left politics became clear during the dictatorship when he became President of P.A.K. Thus, in 1973, the former Union Centre M.P. talked about "the end of the bourgeois democracy in Greece"[15] and stated that the ultimate goal of the resistance movement was the "liberation of the country from foreign occupation".[16]

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[14]J. Meynaud, Political Powers in Greece (Athens, Byron, 1974) p.290.

[15]A. Papandreou. Proposal of P.A.K's leader in the political seminar of Bisburg. (July 28, 1973). From: From P.A.K. to PA.SO.K. - speeches, articles, interviews of A. Papandreou. (Athens, Ladias, 1976). p. 49.

[16]A Papandreou. Interview to "Apogevmatini" (Sept. 6, 1973) Ibid. p. 57.

After the dictatorship, Papandreou tried to maintain a radical image for himself and his party. The phraseology he used, the style of his campaign and even his clothing advertised his radicalism. Thus, PA.SO.K. managed to become the most prominent expression of the radicalism which resulted from the dictatorship. As time went by and after PA.SO.K. got only 13.58 per cent of the vote in the 1974 election, Panpandreou decided to limit his radicalism. This process towards PA.SO.K.'s politics of realism entailed a series of initiatives taken inside the party, such as the expulsion of the left wing membership and the introduction of a constitution which freed the President from any real control and so on, and efforts to change the radical image of the party's symbols. As people used to say, "now Papandreou has become a serious politician, he wears his tie!"[17]

It does not take much effort to prove that Papandreou's role in PA.SO.K. is more than dominant; it is clear already from the above description of constitutional arrangement of the party. However, it will be useful to stress that his domination over every party policy is facilitated by the influence he holds over the Greek people. His strong personality and their general admiration for his academic background have led many people - even party members - to call themselves pro-Andrea and not pro-PA.SO.K.; the term "Andreism" is much more common than the term "Pasokism". Thus, not only within the party but also among the public Andreas Papandreou has identified himself with PA.SO.K. perhaps even in a more provocative manner than Karamanlis has done with New Democracy.

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[17]A good example of this process is that Papandreou is no longer addressed as "Comarade President" but simply as "Mr. Papandreou" or "Mr. President".

This observation does not imply by any means that the public
feeling towards Papandreou is the only factor in the personification of
PA.SO.K., as it is presented from its structure, not that the develop-
ment of this process in the party was the only reason for Papandreou's
public image. We mean rather, that there are two different but
dialectically related processes which lead to the same end: PA.SO.K.
equals Papandreou and vice versa.

FUNCTIONS

Political Recruitment

The function of political recruitment of the two major political
parties presents some peculiarities, due to historical and social
reasons. One must try to answer the question "is there any tendency to
de-emphasize classe gardee or specific social-class in favor of
recruiting voters among wider fractions of the population?' by
comparing the political recruitment function of political parties. In
this regard, one must consider that Greek political parties never
practiced class politics. Also due to the fact that the Greek politi-
cal system is relatively new, nobility and kinship patterns were hardly
followed in the process of this function. Finally, the composition of
Greek society does not leave room for distinct performance of the func-
tion of political recruitment by any institution. Because, quite
simply, the huge middle class strata and its dominant mentality does
not allow political parties to recruit on a class-basis.

Thus, the only basis of a comparison between New Democracy and

PA.SO.K. which can be achieved in this regard is between their methods of political recruitment and not on the basis of the composition of this recruitment. Also, even on that basis there is not much difference between two parties or between the dominant mode of political recruitment in today's party system and the previous one.

For example, if we tried to compare E.R.E. and New Democracy in this regard, in order to examine if there has been any tendency to change, there would not be much difference. There is, of course, an adaptation to the new needs of the political system but there has not been a qualitative change. In both cases, the basic criterion is how much the candidates, the M.Ps. and the party bureaucrats, etc., can contribute to the administration of the governmental apparatus and, through this ability, can attract more voters to the party. Thus, E.R.E. used to recruit its leadership mainly from professions which had some sort of social influence and prestige, such as lawyers and doctors. In fact, Greek political life is dominated by graduates of law schools.

New Democracy, although using the same criteria in its function of political recruitment, had to consider the changes in the political environment. The first was the expansion of the Greek state during and immediately after the dictatorship[18] along with the new international committments of the country, which required more specialized technocrats than law school graduates, who are experts only in constitutional and administrative law. The second relevant change was that after the dictatorship, the prestige of youth was quite

[18]See Appendix I.

high, due to the struggle of the young people against the military regime. Finally, the public was very sympathetic towards the "heroes of the Resistance movement" and this factor too could not be disregarded.

Thus, Karamanlis' party tried to recruit young technocrats who to some degree could be considered to have anti-dictatorship attitudes. These particular technocrats with European academic backgrounds are most commonly experts in Economic European Community issues, Greek membership in which was of the most important goals of New Democracy policy. Of course, the party had some problems to display many of its members as activists against the dictatorship, since the right wing had never taken radical initiatives against the military regime, but by holding power and by using the media, New Democracy managed not only to build this image for some of their prominent members but also to invent such favorable images for some other members of the party who had collaborated with the junta.

Generally, PA.SO.K. followed the same pattern of political recruitment. However, it found it much easier to recruit youth and members of the anti-dictatorship struggle. PA.SO.K.'s central committee is also based on the academic reputation of its members who are mainly professors or persons with post-secondary education. The only difference from Karamanlis's party, which one can identify is that PA.SO.K. managed to recruit former military officers, who had left the military during the A.S.P.I.D.A. case or who were expelled from the army by the junta because of their democratic attitudes. The latter is a unique phenomenon among all the Greek political parties today; apparently this has to do with some

policies, which will be analyzed below.

In conclusion, we would say that the obvious similarities between New Democracy's and PA.SO.K.'s political recruitment function are not a result of any direct covergence of these two parties but are rather a result of the parties' efforts to adapt themselves to new elements in the political environment. If this process leads to an indirect convergence of the two major Greek political parties, the result is very different from their intentions.

Political Socialization

The function of political socialization is not performed by any political party in a distinguishable way; it is instead performed in the course of their activities. For example, a party's activities during an electoral campaign or a party's policy over the capital punishment issue dictates a certain type of political socialization not only directly to the party membership but also indirectly to the general public. Thus political socialization becomes the outcome of any party activity.

Keeping this consideration in mind, we will examine this function of the two Greek major political parties. In an examination of the changes between E.R.E. and New Democracy, we would not be mistaken if we would say that despite the difficulties of the definition of political socialization as a function of political parties, there is a definite difference between these two parties. E.R.E. followed two basic guidelines in its performance of political socialization: anti-communism linked with monarchism, and the idea that the

to voting every four years. E.R.E., since its establishment followed

the main right wing path of political socialization based on intensive

anti-communist propaganda; almost every single problem of the country

claimed to be a result of communist conspiracy or was justified by the

"Northern Danger".[19]

Of course, the civil war provided some ground for the

legitimization of this socialization, which was closely linked with the

stress on the importance of the crown in the peaceful political

development of the country. E.R.E. tried to socialize the people on

the basic belief that the "bad Communists" could only be confronted by

a population united around the King, who was the leader of the army and

had the support of our "great friend abroad" (the U.S.). The result of

this idea was the identification of nationalism with these policies and

the image of a pure nationalist as the fanatical follower of them. The

idea of the role of the citizens in a democratic system as part of

E.R.E.'s function of political socialization was exposed rather by its

organizational pattern than by distinct initiatives - i.e. the highly

centralized structure of the party along with the widely held belief

that politics will be looked after by those who carry the mandate of

representation. This type of socialization is not, once more,

unaffected by the civil war. E.R.E. apparently wanted to limit

intensive activities of the people in politices which had led to a

tremendous increase in the influence of the left over the country's

politics during the 1940's.

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[19]For many years, right-wing governments threatened the people
by saying that the Russians or the Bulgarians would invade the
country.Ttion, it was said, would take place with the cooperation of
local communists, who were represented a terrible beasts with long hair
and crooked teeth.

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New Democracy, due to environmental developments, followed a
completely different pattern in its function of political socializa-
tion. The dismissal, by the experience of the dictatorship, of the
argument that the evils of the country came from the left and the
legalization of the Communist Parties did not leave much room for clear
anticommunist patterns of political socialization. Furthermore, the
antimonarchical and the anti-U.S. public attitudes could not aid the
reestablishment of the same pattern of political socialization.
Finally, the creation of several social organizations and the increase
of participation in public affairs after the dictatorship in its turn
did not assist the continuation of E.R.E.'s political socialization
function. New Democracy still has a conservative input in the process
of political socialization although this never takes the form of open
anti-communism. Of course, if someone tries to analyse this input from
a radical point of view, it is possible to point out an anti-communist
input of the party into the political socialization process, but this
is far from being as important as it used to be.

Today, New Democracy's input into the political socialization
process has a conservative character, but it has also taken quite
different forms. Thus, if E.R.E.'s conservative input into in the
process of political socialization was anti-communist, pro-U.S. and
promonarchical, New Democracy's input has been one of moderation, sum-
marized in the statement that both extremes of the political spectrum
are wrong, and that pro-western or rather pro-European policies are
preferable, summarized in the statement "Greece belongs to the West".
Furthermore, New Democracy, in contrast to its predecessor advocated
the active participation of the people in politics, and tried to put

this into practice by introducing a more democratic structure for the party. However, as we saw above, the actual performance of this structure is far from encouraging people's participation in politics.

<u>PA.SO.K.'s</u> input into the process of political socialization, though aiming the same goals - to increase its influence -, appears different from that of New Democracy. PA.SO.K. provides political socialization based on radicalism and nationalism. The symbols which are used by Papandreou's party are anti-rightwing and anti-imperialist; however, the political analysis provided never goes deeper than identification of the right wing with the prominent personalities linked to it, rather than into an effort to analyse it on a social-class basis. For example the "unprivileged" non compradore, part of population rather than the working class is supposed to combat imperialism. It is obvious that PA.SO.K. is attempting to represent a wider section of the population and in fact to attract voters not only from the liberal or the other left camp but also from the right wing itself. Furthermore, it is clear that the image provided of the non comprodor, under-privileged section of the population is intended for the same purpose - that of widening the influence of the party.

Another aspect of PA.SO.K.'s input into the political socialization process is its intensive politicalization and the idea of an active role for the people in politics. In other words, PA.S.O.K. internalized the existing political attitudes after the fall of the military regime, which were tending towards massive popular participation in politics. Although PA.S.O.K. has a consistent policy in terms of its proclamations on the subject, its actual life gives us a fairly inconsistent picture. As we above explained, bureaucratization, along

with the dominant role of the Leader in the party's organization discourages people from active participation. Thus, in reality PA.SO.K. defeats the idea of mass participation in politics and fosters the idea that the experts can do everything themselves.

In summary, the two major Greek political parties - may have adapted their activities to the new post-dictatorship environment, but their goals are nothing other than the increase of their voting support. In the process of political socialization, they still have some basic differences in addition to the similarities which in fact underline their convergence process. Thus, New Democracy has a conservative and a pro-western input into the political socialization process, while PA.S.O.K.'s input has a radical and an anti-imperialist character. Despite these basic differences, the two parties look similar in the promotion of the idea of mass participation in politics; however in practice they both advocate quite the opposite.

Interest Aggregation - Interest Articulation

The contribution of the political parties to the process of interest aggregation and interest articulation functions displays some peculiarities, due to some characteristics of the Greek political culture. Firstly, we have to point out once more that class politics were never the case for the whole Greek political spectrum, with an exemption of the Communist Party. Every political organization always tried to represent the interests of the "people" or more often of the

"nation". This process was facilitated by the very loose borders of
Greece's political classes, the huge size of the middle class and
generally by the middle class mentality, which is imposed not only by
the numerically powerful middle class, but also by the nature of the
structure of the Greek economy.[20] Secondly, the most important
issues for Greeks traditionally are the ones which deal with the
international relations of the country.

It therefore becomes obvious why the political parties had to
adapt these characteristics and not display major differences in the
performance of their functions. Of course, we must not forget that the
interest articulation function of both parties tends to benefit a
certain part of the population, but this is an assumption which we are
not going to deal with at this point. We will examine these functions
of New Democracy and PA.SO.K. strictly in terms of their formal
performance.

The interest aggregation and interest articulation functions of
New Democracy can be examined as governmental ones for Karamanlis party
has been in power since its establishment. Thus, the government tries
to aggregate the interest of "all parts of the nation" and to
articulate them in a manner which would serve the entire population.
Expressions such as "the interest of all productive classes" are not
unusual in the interest aggregation process and also in the formulation
of policies. In other words New Democracy tries to aggregate and arti-

[20]The structure of the Greek economy is based on trade among
small or often very small businesses, which are often owned by people
who are officially registered as workers or peasants. For example, it
is not an uncommon phenomenon for a person who cultivates a small piece
of land to own a grocery store and work in the new construction
development of his village at the same time. Apparently, within this
type of economic structure it is impossible to create distinguishable
class burders.

culate the interest of the widest possible section of the population.

PA.SO.K. on the other hand, though from an apparently different ideological perspective, does the same thing: aggregates and articu-lates a wide spectrum of interests. PA.SO.K., due to its radicalism, cannot address "all productive classes" and overcomes the difficulty by addressing almost all classes and social strata separately.[21] The peak of the kind of effort was reached when PA.SO.K. advocated itself as the "Movement of the non-privileged Greeks". It is obvious, as we will analyze in detail in the next chapter, that this notion of "underprivileged" contains the entire population; for example, a person who lacks ownership is underprivileged in comparison with a small shopkeeper and at the same time a millionaire can consider himself unprivileged in comparison to a billionaire and so on.

In brief, both New Democracy and PA.SO.K., aim to attract the widest possible spectrum of voters, and so their performance of the functions of interest aggregation and interest articulation end up as quite similar. Of course, this process is facilitated not only by socio-economic conditions but also by the political traditions and customs of the society.

Conclusions

An overall analysis of the functions of the two major Greek political parties shows that their adaptation to the social and

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[21]"We believe that the new political movement expresses the desires and the needs of the simple Greek . . . the Movement belongs to peasants, workers, artisans, wage workers, white collar workers, youth . . . " From: PA.SO.K. Declaration of basic principles and goals.

political environment has led them to very similar practices. The consequences of this kind of performance are fairly similar too: an apparent de-emphasis on class politics and an effort to embrace the entire population. This process contributes to the ultimate convergence of the two parties.

In other words, in this chapter we saw that the adaptation of New Democracy and PA.S.O.K. to the environment leads the two parties to a convergence of their performances at the structural and functional levels. Whether this is true in the case of the political and ideological levels is something which will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we will test our hypothesis by examining the policies and ideologies of the two major Greek political parties. In other words, we will examine how the two parties have adapted their policies and ideologies to the radicalization of the political environment which was bequeathed by the historical experience of the dictatorship. Then, by comparing their policies we will see how their adaptation has eventually resulted in their covergence at the political and ideological levels.

Again, as in the previous chapter, we will compare New Democracy with its ancestor, E.R.E., then we will examine PA.SO.K's changes since its establishment, and finally we will analyse the programmatical similarities and differences of these two present-day major political parties. Thus, we will be able to see and understand not only the changes and the adaptations of the individual parties but also to define the tendency towards convergence.

Of course, it is clear that we cannot deal with every single issue in the programs of these parties. For this reason, we have divided the issues into two major categories, internal or national, and external or international. In the "internal" category, we will examine the social and economic policies of the parties as well as their attitudes to the role of the military in the political system. In the latter category, we will examine the parties' general directions on the international relations of the country and also their policies on the E.E.C. and the country's relations with the Dolk

is rather redundant to say that we will dwell not only upon the proclamations of New Democracy and PA.SO.K. but that we will extend our analysis beyond this point to the actual practice of these parties; since reality is always defined by actual facts, not only by verbal pronouncements.

In the second part of this chapter we will deal with the phenomenon of the convergence of New Democracy and PA.SO.K. at the ideological level. In other words, we will examine, analyse and compare the ideologies of both these parties as they derive from their proclamations, their practice, their structure, functions and generally their stand in the present social and political environment, as well as their notion of the ideal government. This ideological examination will also examine the internal party ideology, based on empirical observations. The ultimate goal of this analysis is the examination of the tendency of these two parties towards the formulation of similar ideologies or rather an assimilation of their ideologies in a manner which cannot be defined on a qualitative basis.

In this effort there are some methodological problems which have to be overcome. First, neither New Democracy nor PA.SO.K. have clear, well-defined ideological proclamations. All their ideological stands derive from their actual activities and policies on specific issues, and from the every loosely defined positions of the parties in the political spectrum such as "right-wing" and "socialist". Thus, we will virtually have to personally construct the ideological framework of both parties from the ideological implications of their actual life. Secondly, due to the above difficulty, the relatively short background

of PA.SO.K. and the often controversial positions taken by Papandreou, it is extremely difficult to define this party ideologically even if we look for a broader definition.

In fact, there is a debate among European scholars around the sociological and ideological foundations of PA.SO.K. The phenomenon of this "Movement" could easily be the topic of a thesis in itself. This party calls itself socialist, but does not belong to the socialist international; it often does not hesitate to advocate marxism as its "basic ideological tool" but more often "forgets" to mention the class structure of the Greek society; it talks about "self-management" and at the same time sees Kadafi's country as the most democractic in the world; it condemns Eurocommunism as reformist, and at the same time choses for itself a "parliamentary" or more often "democratic road to socialism"; and within three years - between the 1974 and 1977 elections - it managed to almost double its popularity, and today challenges the government. Thus, instead of analyzing the phenomenon from the beginning, we will examine the future possibilities of this party, trying at the same time of course, to identify the most dominant ideological perspectives of the party, based mainly on a limited amount of empirical data.

Finally, we must note that the analysis in this part of the chapter, due to its more or less abstract nature and the limited availability of data has to depend upon the author's normative understanding of politics. Thus, a certain amount of bias is guaranteed and the reader's indulgence is requested.

E.R.E. and New Democracy

We do not have to extend our analysis on E.R.E.'s policies too much since the party was in power for almost eight years in the pre-dictatorial era and we have examined this period in detail previously (Chapter II). However, a short examination focusing upon the internal and external policies of the ancestor of New Democracy has to be made in order to understand the development of this party over this period of time.

Before we highlight E.R.E.'s and New Democracy's economic and social programs from a comparative perspective, we must clarify that possible differrences between these two parties are most likely not as a result of the parties' development themselves but rather from a radical change of the environment. Simply stated, economic conditions in Greece from 1956 to 1963 were totally different from those in the post-dictatorship period. For example, in the predictatorship period the country's infrastructure was the governmental priority, while in the post-dictatorship period the primary goal of the government became the rapid development of the country, which would increase the country's qualifications for full membership in the E.E.C.

The main thrust of E.R.E.'s economic policy was that the government had to undertake all the spending to build up the country's infrastructure, which in addition to social and political stability would be the main attraction to foreign investors. Thus, the country's industrial development had to depend almost exclusively on foreign investment, which in fact obtained special status, as we noted in

Chapter II. E.R.E. believed that the country's economic development,
which would result in an increase of exports and investments, should be
based on the principles of a "free market economy". Karamanlis' party
at the time argued that the role of the state had to be limited to the
level of assistance of private enterprises and initiatives.[1]

Although New Democracy still believes in a "free market economy",
this does not exclude "an increase of state control over the country's
economy"[2] and in fact this is the dominant policy followed by the
government so far: expansion of the public sector. Furthermore, New
Democracy, unlike its ancestors, states that " . . . private initiative
(in the economy) cannot be legitimized without a simultaneous partici-
pation of the majority of the people in the distribution of the
national product."[3].

Unlike E.R.E.'s generalities, New Democracy makes its economic and
social policies quite clear. ". . . first, the development of the
structure of the economy in a such a manner that will make it generally
competitive particularly on the European continent; and second, the
realization, without any high risks, of a modern welfare state which
leads to social justice!"[4]

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[1]J. Meynaud, _Political Powers in Greece._ (Athens, Byron, 1974)
pp. 257-258.

[2]New Democracy: Declaration.

[2]Ibid.

[4]K. Karamanlis speech in an electoral campaign. Patra. November
10, 1974, in _Political Positions of Konstantine Karamanlis_ from his
speeches and declarations: July 1974 - May 1976 p. 17.

In spite of all these "radical" innovations by Karamanlis, the government still bases its hope for the rapid economic growth of the country on foreign investment. The proclaimed state intervention has not by any means a "socialist character" since this might stop the flow of investments and cause "the collapse of our (country's) economy".[5] Thus, government intervention in the Greek economy takes the form of state capitalism, which is limited to areas in which risks are high and rates of profit low; the sectors with high profits are left to private initiative.

The policies of E.R.E. and New Democracy on another important issue of Greece's internal policy, namely the military, differ quite radically. As we saw in chapter II, the armed forces played anything but an indifferent role in the political system and while E.R.E. was in power, the military was often used for strictly partisan purposes.

Today, Karamanlis' party, very much unlike E.R.E., tries to keep the army out of the country's politics. New Democracy charged the responsibility of the military coup to the ambitions of a small minority of officers and called for a "reconcilitation of the army with the people". The idea or rather the slogan of "reconciliation of the army with the people" was adopted by all political parties in post-dictatorship Greece. It was to be based "on the people's trust of the army" and on the "highly nationalistic beliefs of the officers", which implied "an absolute abstention from politics and very high discipline".[6]

5K. Karamanlis speech in Larisa November 3, 1974.

Thus, New Democracy made clear its desire to keep the army out of politics or rather away from direct involvement in politics.[7] After the elections of 1974 and 1977, and a referendum on the monarchy (December 1978), New Democracy has quite consistently followed its proclamations on the issue, while this is far from the case with E.R.E., which, as we saw, often used the army for its own partisan purposes.

In addition to this difference on the role and the position of the military in the political system. New Democracy differs from its ancestor quite radically in its over all view of the military. E.R.E. for example, although it had given priority to the country's defence, did not want to increase military expenditures and in fact wanted to be assisted by the foreign military aid, particularly by N.A.T.O.[8]

On the contrary, New Democracy, due to the tensions with Turkey, has increased military expenditures, even if this is to some extent at the expense of spending on social welfare.[9] At this point we must remember that Greece no longer receives any military support, since it has withdrawn its military forces from N.A.T.O. Thus, the basic difference between two parties becomes the different attitude toward

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[7]Someone can easily argue that the widespread slogan: "Karamanlis or the tanks" during the 1974 election was an involvement of the army in politics. However, the slogan, which emerged from part of a moderate left-wing political fraction and to some degree was exploited by the campaign's organizers, cannot be considered as military involvement in politics since there was no structural link to New Democracy whatsoever.

[8]J. Meynaud, op.cit., pp. 256-7.

[9]New Democracy, Electoral Program, 1977, p.21.

military expenses E.R.E. wanted limited military expenditures subsi-
dized mainly by foreign aid and N.A.T.O., while New Democracy supports
the expansion of the military expenditures by reducing other public
expenditures.

Another area in which the differences between the two parties
becomes more than apparent is in their external policies. The basis of
E.R.E.'s external policy was unquestioning support of N.A.T.O. and of
U.S. policies. Of course, Karamanlis' old party also maintained a
general position against the uncontrolled armament of the two blocs.
However, when E.D.A. and other independent left-wing groups brought the
issue forward and organized anti-armament campaigns, E.R.E.'s govern-
ment reacted adversely.[10] Furthermore, on the issue of relations
with the eastern bloc or the so-called socialist countries, E.R.E.
followed very inflexible and cold-war-based policies. E.R.E. always
considered Buglaria as an enemy ready to attack the country and never
bothered to change Greece's official policy against Albania.[11]

In regard to relations with other countries, E.R.E. declared that
it intended to develop the country's relations with Turkey and Yugo-
slavia as well as to better organize the traditionally good relations
with the Arabic countries. However, over the eight years of E.R.E.'s
government, a realization of these declarations never took place and
Greek foreign policy followed a pro-Western pattern almost exclusively.

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[10]The governments of K. Karamanlis severely attacked the
growing "Peace Movement" at the beginning of 60's. In fact, the leader
of the organization was killed by governmental agents in Salanika
during a demonstration.

[11]At the time, Greece was formally in war status against
Albania.

On the contrary, New Democracy's external policies are so different from those of its ancestor that it would be difficult for someone to believe that there is any relationship between these two parties, even if one considers that the internal political structure and the international balance of power have changed considerably over time. These policies are based on three basic principles, "National independence, the country's security and National Dignity", which must be protected not only through international agreements but also by "national strength".12

The leader of New Democracy, Karamanlis, has defined the concrete goals of external policy, based on the above noted principles: "Firstly, organic participation of Greece in the United Europe . . . Secondly, the development of peace and co-operation in the Balkan area . . . Thirdly, friendship with all nations which have the same attitude . . . Fourthly, development of peculiar relations with N.A.T.O. for the betterment of the country's security . . . And, fifthly, the maintenance of foreign military bases in Greece if they at the same time serve the defensive interest of Greece"13.

It is obvious that E.R.E.'s faithful and unquestioning attachment to the U.S. and N.A.T.O. have been replaced by New Democracy's orientation to Western Europe and the questioning of N.A.T.O. Karamanlis' party, which refers less and less often to the U.S., claims that the E.E.C. and its ultimate goal - the idea of a United Europe - is the only way "to overcome the world's crisis" at all levels and "secure the freedom of the individual, the freedom of people, as well as (democratic) power and development".14

12K. Karamanlis, speech in Salonika, October 27, 1974.

13K. Karamanlis, speech in the Parliament, April 17, 1976

14K. Kar

Apart from the apparent switch of external policies of today's dominant right wing party from pro-U.S. to pro-Europe, New Democracy has introduced a new criterion for the international relations of the country. Today, in contrast to E.R.E., the criterion for international relations is the democratic nature of the regimes with which Greece can co-operate. E.R.E. followed a non-discriminatory policy on the issue and maintained relations with any Western or pro-Western country. The fact that Karamanlis states today that "only the close co-operation of the democratic countries would help to overcome the world's crisis,"[15] though the fact that it is not followed very strictly gives us some idea of the degree of difference between E.R.E. and New Democracy.[16]

Furthermore, an essential difference between the two parties is their policy towards the rest of the Balkan countries, which happens to have different socio-economic structure, as well as towards the Arabic world. In the place of the hostile attitude of E.R.E. towards the so-called socialist countries of the Balkan peninsula, New Democracy has developed promising relations and, in contrast to the timid relations with the Arabic countries, really genuine ones.

During the past five years, Karamanlis has made several visits to the capitals of the Western European countries and also to almost all the capital of the so-called socialist world.[17] Although many of

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[15]Ibid.

[16]At this point, we think that it would be rather redundant to restate that these innovations are one of the results of the radical changes in political attitudes in the country.

[17]During his first year as Prime Minister after the dictatorship, Karamanlis met with President Tador Zhivkov of Bulgaria (in Sofia), with President Nikolai Ceoucecu of Romania (in Boukourest), and with President Tito of Yugoslavia (in Belgrade). In the fall of 1979, on another tour, he met with Brezhnev in Moscow, with Janos Kadar in Budapest, and with the Chinese leadership in Peking.

these visits did not extend beyond their official and symbolic charac-
ter, this does not mean that they were intended as such. In a speech
during the conference of Balkan states in January, 1976, Karamanlis
himself recognized this fact: ". . . despite the technocratic nature of
this conference, (I think) it responds to the historical necessity
. . . we have to start multilateral co-operation with faith and
enthusiasm . . .".

The tendency towards the development of close relations was
mirrored in the case of relations with the Arabic world. Thus,
Karamanlis not only declared that apart from the traditional links with
these countries, Greece belongs naturally in the area of Middle East
and North Africa" and that the country has to develop such links at all
levels.[18] In fact, in contrast to what had happened with E.R.E.'s
policy, this policy started to materialize. Apart from the top
leadership visits to some of the countries - like Egypt and Libya - a
series of other bilateral meetings and conferences of the top officers
of Greece and these countries have taken place.

But of all the innovations, the most radical and surprising one
for the successor of E.R.E. is its decision to withdraw the country
from N.A.T.O. In fact, the "peculiar relation of the country" with the
Alliance became, as we saw, one of the five basic principles of the
external policy of New Democracy's government. In August, 1974, Greece
announced its withdrawal from the military section of N.A.T.O. The
decision was taken after Turkey's invasion of Cyprus and initially

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[18]K. Karamanlis, Programatic Declaration, December 11, 1974.

took the form of protest against the "weakness and passivity" of the Alliance to realize their mutual commitment to the member countries and "to prevent conflict between them"[19]. For those who think that the action taken had the characteristics of blackmail, an immediate answer comes from Karamanlis' statement: "Our decision (to withdraw from N.A.T.O.) was not a short-run manoeuvre, and furthermore it did not have blackmail-type intentions . . . It was an understanding of the pitiful reality . . ."[20].

At this point, we have to note that New Democracy's government has not really followed its decision very strictly. Of course, it actualized the decision to a certain degree by recalling the Greek army officers from N.A.T.O.'s headquarters and by abstaining from various military exercises of the Alliance. However, Greek territory has been used many times in the past five years for military exercises by N.A.T.O. and some Greek army officers have acted as observers of these activities. Nevertheless, no one can dispute that even the minimum action taken is not a qualitative change by the dominant right wing party and is an indication of its convergence towards more "radical" (centre) policies.

Finally, the recently introduced "radicalism" of New Democracy reached its peak in external affairs with the questioning of the status of the American military bases in the country. In its electoral program, New Democracy states that "after the termination of foreign privileges in the country, we will keep under national control the

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[19]Democracy in Greece: The First Year. Governmental publication, p. 76.

[20]K. Karamanlis, Interview with W. Germany's Radio. May 14, 1975.

military interests"[21]. This last policy was definitely a result of internal reaction to the American bases in the country; in fact, a series of demonstrations and pressure groups were organized around the issue especially in areas where the presence of foreign military personnel was taken as an insult to the local population (such as Krete).

New Democracy, under nationalistic internal pressure, tried to advertise its foreign policy as "independent".[22] However, it appears that, despite the above described "radical" innovations in the foreign policy of the dominant right wing party, this is hardly the case. K. Karamanlis has made it clear that "Greece belongs to the West"; and he goes on to state that he rejects any "non aligned" policy as being dangerous: " . . . in an epoch where violence dominates the world, the country, without anyone's solidarity, can much more easily become the victim of an attack, particularily in sensitive areas like ours . . ."[23]

At this point, one could argue that there is a contradiction in the proclamation of New Democracy's foreign policy, because it is rather difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between "non-aligned" and "independent" foreign policy. We would argue that it is rather difficult for a country to be a member of any international alliance and at the same time not to be influenced by the general policy of this alliance and have an independent policy. Of course,

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[21]K. Karamanlis, speech in Parliament, December 14, 1974.

[22]That is the term which is constantly used in the governmental publication Democracy in Greece: The First Year.

[23]K. Karamanlis, speech in Parliament, April 17, 1976.

there are always the cases of countries which, although they are full members of some alliance, still have some sort of flexibility on various issues. However, this flexibility can never reach the point of challenging the very nature of the policies of the alliance and reach the stage of independence Karamanlis himself tried to clarify this apparent contradiction in his party's foreign policy: " . . . we should not mix up the notion of independent with a non-aligned (foreign) policy . . . Greece, like other countries which belong to international alliances, undertakes independent (foreign) policy, as Holland and France do or any other country - I would even say as Romania does . . . "24

To conclude, we would say that, despite the inconsistent and often controversial policies of New Democracy or the new, more flexible and "radical" face for the dominant right wing party, Karamanlis' party today has taken initiatives which would never have been anticipated by any observer who is familiar with E.R.E.'s policies. New Democracy's internal and external policies are quite different from those of its ancestor. Of course, as in the case of the structural and functional innovations, the apparent tendency towards more "radical" policies of that party were a result of changes in the political environment after the experience of dictatorship. However, this does not minimize the ultimate result of these policies, which defines the party's movement to the centre of the political specturm and eventually the movement towards convergence.

24Ibid.

PA.SO.K.

The rapid organizational development of PA.SO.K. as a socialist party is a unique phenomenon not only in Greek political history but also in world's history of socialist movements. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement which appeared only two months before the 1974 election with a radical but vague program has managed, after a series of manoeuveurs, not only to become the leading opposition party but even to challenge the domination of New Democracy in the country's politics. The flexibility which is granted to the party, since it is in opposition, the manoeuverability of its leader and finally its apparent electoral opportunism make an examination of the development of its policies over the past five years a rather difficult task.

However, for the purpose of this project, we will try to outline its major policies as they derive not only from party's proclamations[25] and Papandreou's speeches but also from the actual practice of that party. Thus, we will be able to identify PA.SO.K.'s inconsistencies and eventually describe its movement towards an adaptation to the electoral market which, in fact, in its turn defines the degree of the party's convergence towards more moderate policies.

Before we describe the development of PA.SO.K.'s policies on socio-economic, military and foreign affairs issues - as we did with New Democracy - we must make a general observation: PA.SO.K. documents as well as Papandreou's speeches are usually very abstract, quite polemical and likely to have a negative form. This makes PA.SO.K.'s political standing very flexible and the job of the analyst extremely difficult. Obviously, the negative and abstract character of its

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[25]We have basically used the "Dec

policies provides PA.SO.K. with flexible "ammunition" and the ability

to accept and reject at the same time quite diverse policies. Thus our

bias in the analysis of its policies is here an inevitable evil, more

than in any other part of this work.

The external policies of Greece which can be summarized as the

country's dependence upon N.A.T.O. and the multinational corporations

(which in fact are behind the Alliance), are for PA.SO.K. the reason

for every social, economic and even political evil of the

country.[26]. This domination of the country's external politics

over every single aspect of the Greek political environment is

fundamental for PA.SO.K.'s analysis and runs throughout its entire

program and appears as almost the exclusive cause of every problem.

The same consideration had taken place in the party's initial analysis

on social and economic issues.

Papandreou's party in its founding declaration made it clear that

its ultimate goal was socialism, which at the economic level would mean

the squeezing of the huge gap between income and the "cessation of the

exploitation of man by man".[27] For the realization of this aim and

the final "social liberation" of man PA.SO.K. argues that multi-

nationals and foreign capital are not only undesirable but must be

eliminated.

As soon as the first difficulties of communicating with the masses

became apparent, with the low percentage of the popular vote won in

1974 election, this extreme radicalism was rapidly reduced to reach   8v

the point, in 1977, where: "The primary goal of PA.SO.K. will be . . . a self-supporting (autonomous) national development, which will allow us overcome the peripheral development of our economy and establish a new and balanced economic structure".28

Obviously this marks a change in PA.SO.K's policies and an apparent movement towards moderate policies since "self-supporting national (economic) development" is not by any stretch of imagination necessarily even close to socialism. Furthermore, the idea of "the cessation of exploitation of man by man" has been changed to the aim of the "reduction of the uneven distribution of income and the ensuring of a minimum standard of living for all Greeks".29 Finally, PA.SO.K. states that the main tool for such a goal will be the fiscal policies of government, which again marks another compromise, as its previous position called for the total breakdown of the existing economic order and the establishment of socialism. In other words Papandreou's party today considers the state as the major or rather the basic vehicle in its effort to make "changes," in contrast to its previous idea of " . . energetic people's participation in the economic, social and cultural planning of the country."30

PA.SO.K. compromises have not stopped at this level, but have even extended to its fundamental position against foreign capital in the country. Thus, in place of its hostile position against foreign

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28PA.SO.K. Electoral Program, 1977, p. 2.

29Ibid, p. 2.

30PA.SO.K. Declaration of September 3, 1974.

capital in its 1974 Declaration[31] is the assurance that "PA.SO.K.

will continue to strive for foreign investment . . . " in its 1977

electoral program. It is obvious that with such a statement PA.SO.K.

is trying to expand its influence to the people whose interests to a

certain degree are linked with the activities of foreign capital in the

country.

Finally, PA.SO.K., despite its position in favour of the "gradual

socialization of some sectors of the (economic) infrastructure",

believes that private economic initiative (business) will be "the basic

promoter of the country's development".[32] Although PA.SO.K. states

that there will be every effort made to avoid the development of mono-

poly capital, this policy could hardly to be called socialist.

The point which is being made here is not that PA.SO.K. has aban-

doned all its policies for socio-economic reforms but rather that it

has changed all the policies which were implied a qualitative challenge

to the existing system. Papandreou's party is still concerned about

some social and economic reforms and indeed has quite a lengthy

analysis on health problems, agrarian reforms, the transportation

system, etc. However, apart from its vagueness and lack of any

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[31]"National Independence . . . is identical with the deliverance of our economy from monopoly foreign capital as well as from the indiginous comprador one, which shapes our economic, social, political and cultural life not according to the people's interests but according to the economic aligarchy". PA.SO.K, Ibid.

[32]PA.SO.K. Electoral Program, 1977, p. 3.

concrete information as to how all these policies are to be achieved, PA.SO.K.'s major characteristic is no longer the breakdown of the existing structure - as it was in the Declaration of September 3, 1974 - but rather reforms within the context of the system. To put this somewhat differently, PA.SO.K.'s economic and social policies today look rather similar to the ones introduced by New Democracy in 1974, since, as we will see below, New Democracy would not, at least in theory, have much difficulty in accepting these policies.

On the military issue, we find PA.SO.K.'s policy much more consistent and very much the same as that of New Democracy. Papandreou's party from its original appearance gave great importance to the army and in any given change never forgot to state that the military coup in 1967 was a result of the conspiracy of a very small number of "crazy officers".[33] Thus, according to PA.SO.K., the development of normal, democratic conditions in the country called for reconciliation between the people and the army, which was summarized in the slogan: "The Army with the People".[34] Apparently PA.SO.K.'s intention was not only to reduce the hostile attitude of the people towards the army and the police, after the fall of the dictatorship, and eventually reach some sort of reconciliation between the two, but also to develop a nationalistic image for itself and extend its influence among the army officers.

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[33]The term was used by Papandreou in his testimony in the trial against the leaders of the dictatorship. During this trial Papandreou made it as clear as possible that a handful of "crazy officers" were responsible and that there would be no condemnation of the military organization as a whole.

[34]A. Papandreou, speech in Corfu, August 8, 1975. From A. Papandreou, Towards a Socialist Society (Athens. Ehmi. 1977), p. 52

PA.SO.K. maintains that the army after the experience of dictator-
ship can and must play a neutral and disinterested role in the
political system. Papandreou has repeatedly stated that "the army is
psychologically ready" to materialize his party's belief that: "the
army belongs to the Nation".35

It is obvious that PA.SO.K.'s policies on the military are rather
inconsistent with the idea of a "socialist movement" which it tries to
preserve for itself. It seems to us that Papandreou's party has not
only forgotten the prehistory of the Greek military as well as its
dependency upon N.A.T.O. and the U.S., but also the role of the army in
a capitalist society according to socialist ideology.

Apprently, it is not enough for someone, with socialist ideas, to
state that "the army belongs to the nation", if at the same time its
whole structure is not national; as in the case of the Greek army
which, as we saw in Chapter II, is dependent upon foreign powers and
international organizations. Furthermore, it seems to us that
PA.SO.K.'s policy on the military misses the most fundamental point of
socialist understanding of the society that the army, as any other
institution of the system, cannot belong to the "nation" because the
nation, from a socialist point of view, is divided into social classes,
which are in a never ending struggle, and this division is reflected in
all the institutions including the army.

This peculiar or rather strange attitude of PA.SO.K. towards the
military along with its non-class-based radicalism, has led many

35Ibid., p. 2. See also: A. Papandreou's speeches in Athens,
January 7, 1976, and September 9, 1976, and interview in "Vima" March
10, 1977. Ibid., p. 159

scholars to claim that Papandreou's party is another edition of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party. This argument is well supported by Papandreou's personal contacts with top military officers as well as by PA.SO.K.'s close relations with the so-called Arabic socialist countries (Libya and Syria). But we will deal in detail with this approach to the "phenomenon of PA.SO.K." below.

On the foreign policy issue, in its 1974 Declaration, Papandreou's party stated that in order for the country to achieve its "national independence" it had to get rid of its subordination to foreigners. Their analysis at that time described Greece's status as colonial and consequently necessitated a total disconnecting of the country from the western alliance and the qualitative socio-economic reform of the country; that is, in PA.SO.K. terms "social liberation": ". . . (Our) national liberation is inseparably linked with . . . the redeeming of our economy from the control of foreign monopoly capital as well as from indigenous compradore capital . . . For this reason, social liberation and socialist transformation is the corner stone of our Movement".[36]

Today, PA.SO.K. still maintains its initial position in favour of national independence. However, in its 1977 electoral program it no longer maintained the position that the goal of national independence is "inseparable from socialist reform". This apparent compromise of its spolicies is accompanied by brief, simplistic statements on the concrete issues of the foreign relations of the country. Furthermore, it seems rather clear that the party no longer maintains the position that the country's status is colonial.

36PA.SO.K. Declaration of September 3, 1974.

A definition of the orientation of PA.SO.K.'s foreign policy stops at the statement of an independent foreign policy; it has never alleged that its policy is one of non-alignment. PA.SO.K. believes in total withdrawal from N.A.T.O. and in the revocation of any existing bilateral agreements with the U.S. It argues that these relationships were the cause of "nation's tragedies" (dictatorship and Turkish invasions of Cyprus), thus any further connection with the west and its leading forces is an invitation to new national problems.

Papandreou extends this same logic much further and lumps all the Western European countries and particularly the E.E.C. together into the enemy camp. However, even on this most important issue in Greek politics, where PA.SO.K. leads the opposition[37] the party has displayed remarkable changes, which if nothing else constitute a more moderate image for it.

Before the 1977 election, PA.SO.K.'s policy towards the E.E.C. was extremely radical if somewhat simplistic. It was opposed totally to Greece's membership in the Community and its dominant slogan was: "No to Europe of the Monopolies, yes to Europe of the People". The basis of such a policy was obviously very simplistic and was character- ized by a symbolic sentimentality, which was not based on any serious analysis: "Without the relief of our country from neo-colonial fet- ters, which are made by the U.S. and Western European monopoly capital through N.A T.O. and the E.E.C. ... it is impossible for the people to

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[37]From the political parties and the organizations which par- ticipated in 1977 election only PA.SO.K., the Communist Party of Greece (see: Chapter III footnote 14) and Socialist March (See: ch. III foot- note 23) oppose the country's membership in the E.E.C. During the debute on Membership in parliament, PA.SO.K.'s M.Ps. left the house and, although the C.P. had prepared speeches, its M.Ps. followed immediately.

become sovereign . . ."[38]. The summary of such a simplistic analy-
sis, which in fact identified N.A.T.O. and E.E.C. was given by the dom-
inant slogan at the time: "E.E.C. - N.A.T.O. - C.I.A.: the same gang".

At time passed, PA.SO.K.'s policy on the E.E.C. took an in-
creasingly moderate form, without of course any change in the basic
position of the party against the country's membership in the communi-
ty. Thus, the 1977 election program of PA.SO.K. states: ". . . the
right solution (to the issue) is not (full) membership, but rather the
building up of a special agreement, Norwegian style, with the
E.E.C. . ."[39] there is not government which can decide on the issue
"without the concrete mandate of the Greek people, which can be given
only by an unbiased referendum".[40]

In other words, PA.SO.K. still opposes the idea of Greece as the
10th member of E.E.C., even after the final agreement in May, 1979.
However, the background of this position is no longer its initial,
vague but radical, analysis on the issue. In fact, it is opposed to it;
in the summer of 1979 Professor K. Simitis, a member of the executive
secretariat of the party, was forced to resign from his post, because
he used the old slogan: "No to Europe of the Monopolies - Yes to Europe
of the People".

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[38]A. Papandreou, article in Exormisi (semi-official paper of
the party) in September 5, 1975. From: From P.A.K. to PA.SO.K. (Athens,
Ladias, 1976), p. 155.

[39]PA.SO.K. Electoral Program, 1977, p. 2.

[40]Ibid., p. 2.

Despite the general opposition of Papandreou's party to all inter-
national relations which are oriented to the West, PA.SO.K. does state
that its external policy is not a policy which leads to isolation.
"Greece", according to PA.SO.K, "must be a country which belongs to
Europe, to the Balkans and to the Mediterranean simultaniously."[41]

PA.SO.K., unlike New Democracy, does not identify Europe with the
Western Eruopean countries. It claims that this identification is
unacceptable and that a rational alliance with Europe would entail not
only the West but also the East, after the breakup of both N.A.T.O. and
the Warsaw Pact. In the place of these offensive military organiza-
tions, PA.SO.K. believes that all European countries must develop a
"collective security system" based on their common cultural tradition:
this "European policy should not have as a goal the development of a
new super power"[42] but rather the development, through close
co-operation, of a "Federal Socialist Europe."

In the other major areas of international interest, PA.SO.K. seems
to accept, although with a different emphasis, the policies of New
Democracy. It supports the development of a good relationship with the
Balkan countries at all levels, as well as with all the countries of
the Mediterranean Sea. Papandreou has often visited the Balkans and in
fact his party is well recognized and supported by all these countries,
particularly by Yugoslavia, from which PA.SO.K. seems to have borrowed,
though with some alterations, its "self-management" based socialist
program.

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[41]Ibid., p. 1.

[42]Ibid.. p. 2.

When PA.SO.K. talks about the development of good relations with the Mediterranean countries, it also refers to the Arabic states of the area, since it considers Europe as a separate issue in its international politics. Papandreou's party not only supports the government's friendly policy towards the Arabic countries, but has also tried to develop close relations of its own with almost all of them and particularly with the so-called socialist ones. Papandreou himself, as well as the party's delegations have visited these countries often during the past five years. In fact, there are very good relations between PA.SO.K. and the Ba'th Socialist Party of Syria, Algeria and the green country of Kandafi. This fact, along with the implicit or explicit admiration of PA.SO.K. for these parties, reinforces in turn the argument that the "socialist movement" in Greece is another version of the Ba'th Socialist Party.

In summary, PA.SO.K.'s external policy can be easily characterized as strongly nationalistic. Indeed, this nationalist element became much more intense since it developed a much more moderate image for these policies, by disconnecting them from internal social and economic reforms. PA.SO.K. is against the West, against the East, against the social-democracy of the North, sympathetic to, but often critical of the Balkans and the Arabic countries and indifferent to the non-aligned nations! These peculiar and often contradictory policies with their apparently strong nationalistic elements have been summarized in one of the party's main slogans: "Greece to the Greeks".

New Democracy - PA.SO.K.: Convergence

From the analysis above, it becomes clear that radical changes have taken place in the programmes of the two major Greek political parties. These developments display an apparent tendency towards the covergence of these two parties: New Democracy's programmatical positions are rather incompatable with its predecessors, due to a series of "radical" innovations, while PA.SO.K.'s revolutionary radicalism of 1974 has become reformism within the framework of the system.

The socio-economic policies of both parties present some differences which are not of a fundamental type. PA.SO.K.'s main goal, after it abandoned its initial aim for a "society without exploitation", has become the development of a self supporting (auto-dynamic) national development, while New Democracy's basic goal is the development of a competitive economy through the initiative of a "modern welfare state" whose goal is social justice. For the realization of these vague goals, it seems that both parties, though with a different emphasis, agree that the role of the state has to be dominant. New Democracy's program has stated that "state intervention is not only economically but even morally obligatory"[43] in order to prevent the development of monopolies, which in the long run lead to business recession and social instability, in turn threatening the foundations of democracy. PA.SO.K. from another point of view seems to maintain a similar position: it starts from the observation that the Greek economy is already dominated by monopoly capital and argues that state intervention

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[43]New Democracy: Electoral Program, 1977, p. 13.

is required to relieve it from this defect; in fact, Papandreou's party
goes on to states that in its ideal economy private initiative will
continue to play a basic role.

Of course these similarities between the two parties do not lead
to the conclusion that New Democracy and PA.SO.K. have no differences
on social or economic policy. But, rather, it makes clear that both
parties believe in state intervention in the economy as well in the
positive role of private enterprise in it. However, each party
stresses both principles to a different degree: New Democracy's pri-
ority is private initiative, while in PA.SO.K.'s economic model the
state's economic activities occupy the key position. In other words,
in both cases we have to deal with Keynsian policies: where New Demo-
cracy's Keynsianism would be characterized as "conservative" and
PA.SO.K.'s as "radical", the latter of course is far from being even
close to its initial positon for qualitative reform of the system (that
is, a socialist economy).

This difference, in the degree of state intervention between the
two parties becomes obvious from the different emphasis which is given
to social welfare policies. PA.SO.K., in contrast to New Democracy,
refers in detail to its social welfare plans. Papandreou's party, by
being in opposition, feels free to critize the government's social
policies and to speak out about the new public health system, the
development of a public housing program, development of the existing
educational system, improvement of the transportation system and so on.
At this point, we must point out that these explicit social policies
used to be associated with left wing politics in the pre-dictatorship
period. Thus, today, PA.SO.K. by supporting these policies tries to
maintain its radical image.

Regarding the role of the army, as we saw above, there is not much difference between the two parties. Both New Democracy and PA.SO.K. want the army to stay out of politics and to create for it a supra-national or rather a nationalist image. Neither New Democracy nor PA.SO.K. seems to accept the implications of the seven year military dictatorship; they both "forget" the control of the army by ultra right-wing elements and their international connections[44] as well the well established conservative, anti-communist, traditionally anti-democratic military ideology. Thus, the two parties in their effort to purify the army, attributed the military coup to a small number of officers - often called crazy - and not to the whole military structure, which can in reality generate anti-democratic activities.

As we mentioned above, PA.SO.K. and New Democracy try to display an intense nationalism in their policies on the military. However, this nationalism, as the main approach to the military, is not based on the same principles. For New Democracy, this nationalism is usually based upon the "Greek-Christian tradition", the victorious and heroic past of the nation etc. It is obvious that his approach tends to strengthen the ideological status quo which often takes clear pro-Western and anti-communist forms.

On the other hand, PA.SO.K.'s nationalism on the issue goes beyond this stress upon tradition and the historical compliments; it takes an intensely anti-foreign character. To PA.SO.K., everything from abroad is bad, corrupt and anti-national; this is the basis of the party's "independent foreign policy" and its opposition to the Western or any other military alliance. Apparently, Papandreou believes, that the

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[44]See Chapter II.

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army, despite its inherently conservative ideology, can play an important social and political role based mainly upon its nationalistic ideology, and that the only action necessary is to channel this nationalism in another direction. Thus, Papandreou never forgets to mention other similar historical experiences such as those in Libya, Syria and even Portugal, in order to justify his peculiar position on the issue.

The major differences between the two parties can be found on international issues. There is an apparent difference in the orientation of New Democracy and PA.SO.K.: New Democracy has a clear pro-Western orientation summarized in the slogan: "We belong to the West" and PA.SO.K. a nationalistic, often chauvinist, orientation, which can be summarized by the statement "Greece (belongs) to the Greeks". Although their orientation is different, both have stated that their ultimate goal is the development of an independent foreign policy for the country and neither forget to "consult" the people's attitudes and to consider the new developments of the foreign policies of the country.

Thus New Democracy, despite its orientation, stresses the fact that its goal is an independent foreign policy and that relations with Europe as well as the re-arrangement of the Greek - U.S. relationship have taken place strictly on the basis of the "national interest". With such explanations, Karamanlis' party obviously tries to approach the section of the population which, due to the dictatorship, has developed anti-Western attitudes. At the same time, PA.SO.K., along with its strong opposition to the pro-Western orientation of the government, has not forgotten to consider the real facts of external policy constitute concrete obstacles to PA.SO.K.'s aims, as well as the internal concerns about its own image. Some examples of such obstacles are: that in spite of PA.SO.K.'s opposition to the EEC, Greece will be full-member of the E.E.C. by the beginning of 1981; furthermore it will be

extremely difficult to materialize its anti-Western position on the foreign military bases issue; and finally, there is a sympathetic, but conservative portion of the population which quite possibly interprets the party's policies to imply undesirable communist alliances. Thus, Papandreou has reduced his initial rigid oppositon to E.E.C. membership to the possibility "of a special agreement with the Community" and reached the point after the 1977 election of saying that the status of the U.S. bases in Greece will be examined at the time he assumes office.

In conclusion, the external policies of New Democracy and PA.SO.K. exhibit the most intensive differences which exist between these parties; more so than in any other area of their politics. However, both parties in their effort to develop a more flexible image for themselves and to attract larger numbers of followers often come out with statements which reduce the original rigidity of their policies. This phenomenon defines the convergence of these two parties at that level, which of course has not reached the point where the external policies of New Democracy and PA.SO.K. have become indistinguishable.

Over all, a careful analysis of the programs of the two major Greek political parties leads us to the conclusion that significant developments have taken place in both parties - New Democracy and PA.SO.K. - which define the nature of their convergence at that level. New Democracy has developed policies which are hardly even similar to its ancestor - E.R.E.; these policies define the "radicalization" or rather the movement of the party towards the centre, a position which was occupied in the pre-dictatorship era by the Union Centre. On the

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other hand, PA.SO.K., in an extremely short period of time, has taken almost the same steps but in the opposite direction. Papandreou's party appeared on the Greek political scene with a radical program and policies which on some issues overlapped with those of the Communist Party.[45] In fact, although it began as an independent, anti-imperialist, socialist movement whose main goal was a "free socialist Greece", PA.SO.K. gradually reduced its radical arguments and deleted those parts of its initial program which might remind people of its original radical, revolutionary image.

As we underlined in the previous chapter on structures and functions, this apparent convergence of the two parties is hardly inexplicable. Both New Democracy and PA.SO.K. responded to the post-dictatorship radicalization of the political environment. Their response was motivated mainly by their goal to maintain and expand their electoral influence, and this became more intense as the party of the centre, which naturally stood between the two parties in the political spectrum, began to collapse.[46] These observations on the developments of the two parties do not imply by any stretch of the imagination that New Democracy and PA.SO.K. have become identical and that there is no longer any difference between them. Our goal was simply to outline the movement of both parties towards the centre, which in its turn defines the nature of their convergence at the programatical-political level.

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[45]For example, PA.SO.K. is the only party among today's parliamentary parties, which had participated, along with a mosaic of "ultra-leftist" organizations, in the first anti-imperialist demonstration in post-dictatorship Greece, although the event was banned by the police.(October 1, 1974)

[46]For an explanation of the party of the centre's decay, see Chapter III, p. 120-121.

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political level.

Ideology

After an examination of the structural, functional and

programatical-political convergence of New Democracy and PA.SO.K.,

their convergence at the ideological level becomes self evident.

However, an effort to prove that this phenomenon has ultimately taken

place with regard to the ideologies of these parties has to be made.

In the course of this analysis, ideology will be defined as the outcome

of the combination of parties declarations, practice (which includes

the internal as well the public functions of the parties), stands on

the present economic, social and political environment and finally

outlook on the future or ideal society.

The focus of this analysis will be an examination of the process

of "closing up" of the ideological gap of the two parties. At this

point, we must note that an examination of Kirchheimer's original point

that in the process of party's transformation there is a "drastic

reduction of ideological baggage" is rather inappropriate in the Greek

case. Ideology in the context of Greek political culture was never a

predominant trait of differentiation between the political parties; if

any clear reference to ideology ever took place, it always remained in

a negative form and never went beyond the simplistic division of the

political spectrum into left, right and centre or, as very recently,

into right-wing and socialist.

New Democracy

The ideological implications of the structure and the organization of New Democracy are not so clear since the party has not yet fully organized according to its constitution and as we saw above, we can only talk about the structural tendencies of this party. Today, Karamanlis' party, very much unlike its ancestor, is trying to build a mass organized party: a party with a regular membership and certain decentralized functions assigned not only to the leadership but also to the rank and file.

This tendency indicates that New Democracy is trying to escape from the ultra conservative image of its ancestor where the leaderhsip had full control of party mechanism. If we assume that the more to the left in the political spectrum, the more important the role of the individual member becomes (at least in theory), then New Democracy has definitely taken some steps towards the centre ideologically. This ideological development, derived from the party's structure, has not meant the complete abandonment of conservative ideology and under- standing of politics, but rather indicates the apparent convergence of the party. Consequently, despite the practical initiatives taken at the structural levels towards the development of another ideological image, in the party's declaration we read "New Democracy" is a system through which the few and the well-known (members) guide, and in last analysis serve - the majority and the unknown (people), instead of ruling over them."

In its function of political recruitment, New Democracy has displayed a clear tendency towards modernization, which in its turn

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indicates an ideological movement towards a more radical position. In
the previous chapter, we saw that New Democracy's political recruitment
has changed radically in comparison to E.R.E.'s performance of this
function, Karamanlis' party has a definite preference for more
technocratically oriented recruitment in contrast to E.R.E., which used
to recruit on the basis of general knowledge.

This preference of New Democracy, is not innocent of ideological
purpose. Apparently the party has developed a different position on
the role of the government. It now believes that the role of the
government in the state must be more active - we saw in other part of
this chapter the political implications of this ideological development
- and consequently new political recruitment was needed. Thus, the
ideological implication is the commitment of New Democracy to Keynesian
politics in contrast to E.R.E.'s idea of a noninterventionist role for
the state.

The function of political socialization is performed by New Demo-
cracy in a totally different fashion from that of E.R.E. The intense
anti-communism displayed in this function by E.R.E. has been replaced
by a fight against both extremes: the right and the left. Thus, New
Democracy is trying to present itself as a party with a centre
ideology, as being the best solution between what it calls the "extreme
left" and the "extreme right". In fact, the party has been
particularly successful in this effort, which can be seen partially in
the unprecedented decline of the Union Centre and the development of
the extreme right-wing party (See: Appendix III), caused to a certain
degree by this ideological development of New Democracy.

Overall, despite these ideological implications the question
remains: What is New Democracy's ideological stand? An effort must be
made to answer this question, although, as we noted above, in Greek
politics a positive ideological declaration on the part of the
political parties is rather rare. There are, however, some ideological
hints in the declaration of New Democracy.

New Democracy in its 1974 declaration states that "New Democracy
consists of experienced and healthy, and also new progressive and radi-
cal political powers, which are focused towards the same aim: To
materialize in Greece the name of the party - to give to the country a
new democracy."[47] This apparent progressiveness of the party has
gone beyond this broad definition of democracy and argues that "modern
democracy" has to be "revolutionary", in order to be dynamic and
adjustable to the constant development of modern society.[48]

If someone were to argue that this "radical" ideological declara-
tion more or less defines the party's ideological convergence with
PA.SO.K., he would not be mistaken. Because, in fact, this notion of
democracy has even been extended to social issues. As Karamanlis has
stated, one of the main goals of modern democracies is "the achievement
of social democracy . . . and the just distribution of the national
product."[49]

However, despite these "radical" ideological developments in New

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[48]K. Karamanlis, Address to Giscard D'Estang, September 19,
1975.

[49]New Democracy, Declaration (introduction).

Democracy, the party still remains a conservative, right-wing political expression. Of course, the tendency towards the centre exists, as a result of party's effort to respond to the increased radicalism in the political environment. But the conservative commitments, which will keep the conservative part of the electorate under the party's control, have not been abandoned. This dual ideological tendency of the party becomes quite clear even from the party's declaration, in which we read: "New Democracy is the movement, which chooses and preserves from tradition only what time has proven correct and useful. And it progresses continuously with big, encouraging but also safe steps, to new and ever improving conditions."

The Unique Case of PA.SO.K.

As we noted elsewhere, the appearance, the structure, the functions, the performance and the efficiency of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement in the Greek political spectrum is a unique phenomenon. Its unique character derives not only from its unprecedented development but also from the complexity of its ideological framework. In fact, PA.SO.K. has generated an intense discussion on the problem of its ideological stand, since the term "socialist" which it picks for its ideological identification, due to its obscurity, is totally inadequate.

Furthermore, the unacceptability of the "socialist" character of Papandreou's party goes beyond the lack of clarity of the term socialism; it mainly derives from its structure, functions and

policies. In the examination of PA.SO.K.'s structure, we saw that, although the party has denied the pre-dictatorial dominant clientistic pattern of organization and constitutionally has tried to develop a mass based and democratically organized party, the actual organization is far from being close to this ideal. The excessive domination of its structure by the ever appealing and strong personality of A. Papandreou, has minimized the rank-and-file membership influence in the decision and policy making process. Thus, PA.SO.K's socialist implications are hardly found at the structural level since very little differs in its internal authoritarian character from that of the right-wing New Democracy.[50]

The same conclusion concerning PA.SO.K's ideological character can be drawn from an examination of its functions. This is not only because there is an apparent similarity of its functions with New Democracy but mainly because PA.SO.K. in the performance of its functions does not seem to consider any of the socialist ideological assumptions. Its stress upon the electoral game, as a means for the development of its influence, with a direct effect upon the party's function of political recruitment as well as the exclusive reference to the "people" and to the "nation" with an effect on interest aggregation and interest articulation functions are very good example of PA.SO.K's failure to materialize any aspect of socialist ideology on that level.

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[50]It has even been claimed that, although the centre Union is by no means a democratically run party, in its internal command structure it is less authoritarian than that of PA.SO.K (On this point see: P. Bakojannis, Anatomy of Greek Politics, (Athens, Papazisis, 1977) pp.150-162.

There is no difference in the ideological conclusion which can be drawn from PA.SO.K's political program. As we saw above, Papandreou's party, although it appeared on the Greek political scene as a revolutionary socialist party, has gradually "modified" its politics. Thus, although today's PA.SO.K. maintains some of its initial political aims it has become a party which wants to realize its radical program within the framework of the system. Consequently PA.SO.K. went from being a party aiming for the qualitative change of the system to an organization seeking only quantitative reforms.[51]

A good example of the abandonment of socialist principles by PA.SO.K. is its present-day external policies in comparison with the previous ones; although the party still maintains, more or less, the same anti-western attitudes, it no longer links these policies with internal social issues. The same phenomenon can be seen in its socio-economic policies, where it maintains the anything but socialist policy of "private initiative" as the basis of the party's economic reforms.

Thus, it becomes clear from the party's structure, functions and policies that the Panhellenic Socialist Movement is not a socialist party. But then the question remains: what is the ideological stand of PA.SO.K.? Every analyst, who has rejected the idea of a socialist PA.SO.K., must go beyond this negative confrontation, in an effort to define positively the nature of the party.

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[51] The terms "qualitative" and "quantitative" define the two different kinds of social reforms: A "qualitative" reform or change aims to transform the essence and the basic philosophy of a system, to change the base on which the whole social, political and ideological subsystems has been built, while a "quantitative" reform aims to change the way the system operates, without touching the nature or the philosophy of the base.

In fact, there are two tendencies among scholars who have dealt with the ideological nature of PA.SO.K.: the first sees PA.SO.K. as a typical case of a populist party[52] and the second argues that there are strong elements in Papandreou's party which make it look like the Ba'th socialist parties (Syria, Iraq).[53] Since there is no agreement on the issue, an effort to analyse the two arguments must be made; but before that we will examine what constitutes the major components of populism and "Bathism".

The notion of populism is rather difficult to define since there is no unity in the content of the programmes of the various populist movements which have appeared throughout history. Thus, an effort toward the definition of populism must be rather descriptive and based mainly upon the unity of situations under which populism emerged. It has been historically observed that populism usually emerged as a response to various problems, which derived from economic development and political authority.[54] Consequently, the major characteristics and policies of populist movements derive from the confrontation of the problems posed by modernization.

Trying to summarize the more common characteristics of the populist movements, we would say that there is an emphasis on

[52]For the support of this point see: A. Elephantis and M. Kavouriaris "PA.SO.K. Populism or Socialism" in Politis, October 1977; S. Papaspiliopoulos "The Political Forces in the Next Election" in Anti, November 1977; N. Mouzelis, "On the Greek Elections" in New Left Review, No. 108

[53]For the support of this point see: P. Bakojannis, op.cit. pp. 192-200; Document of "Socialist March" in Socialist March July 10, 1978.

[54]Angus Steward, "Populism: The Social Roots" in G. Ionescu and E. Gellner (eds), Populism (London, the Macmillan Co., 1969) p.180.

external policies, intense nationalism, response to the current or anticipated problems of economic development, an ideological synthesis of traditionalism and modernism and, finally, the dominant role of a charismatic leader.[55]

Historically, populist movements usually appeared in societies or communities, which are or are in the process of becoming aware of being peripheral to centres of economic or political power. Therefore, an overemphasis on the external influence and the emergence of nationalism seem to be more than natural, even inevitable. This nationalism of the populist movement usually identifies "the nation" with "the people" as a whole. In such a combination of populism and nationalism there is an extensive series of organizations embracing all aspects of social activity (trade unions, women's association, youth groups etc.).[56]

Some of the basic arguments of the populist movement are usually based on "the decision to industrialize the country of the region and on the current or anticipated consequences of industrialization"[57] Given the dependent character of this economic development, the populist movements concentrate their reaction against the social strata, while the new, locally based, entrepreneurial bourgeoisie in its turn becomes the key factor in the development of the movement itself. The case of the Peronista movement in Argentina is the most striking of this type.[58]

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[55]Ibid. pp.181-193

[56]Ibid. p. 183

[57]Ibid. p. 185

[58]Helene Graillot, "Argentina" in Jean-Pierre Bernard et al., Guide to the Political Parties of South America (Middlesex, Penguin. 1973), p. 38

This understanding of the cause of the social problem in combination with the nationalist element of populism makes its ideology quite confusing since it eventually becomes a synthesis of traditionalism and modernism. This confusion stems from the fact that the populism is nationalist-against foreigners which gives rise to traditional attitudes and at the same time requires economic development, which stimulates the modernistic element of the ideological formulation of these movements. The tendency toward traditionalism is usually expressed in a hostility to European institutions and culture, and often takes the form of xenophobia.[59]

Finally, it has been historically observed that populist movements usually emerge under the leadership of a charismatic leader. The leader acts as the umbrella for various ideological tendencies in the party and is the dominant personality in the party's structure and in the process of decision making. Due to the dominance of the leader, after the leaders death, the populist movement or party disappears or is divided and becomes inadequate. The cases of the agrarian populist movement led by Stamboliisky in Bulgaria (1908-1923) and the Peronist movement in Argentina (1943-1955) are typical of this kind.

Although the ideological origins of Bathism lie in the middle 40's, the first serious Ba'th[60] movement developed in 1952 mainly in Syria but soon spread out to other Arabic countries. The Arabic Socialist Ba'th movement, although it maintains some special features of its own, has basically the same ideological characteristics as populism.

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[59]Angus Steward, op. cit. p. 190

[60]The word Ba'th can be translated as meaning revival, resurgence or renewal.

The Ba'th parties in their functions, very much like the populist movement, present a clear nationalist, anti-foreign political attitude. They overemphasize their nationalism since it has "proved itself to be a powerful instrument for liberation from colonialism..."[61]. Bathism attributes the internal problems to colonial powers and generally to foreigners, who use "the absurd thesis...of so-called internationalism"[62] to corrupt the unity and the nationalist feeling of the Arab nations. This hostility to foreign powers often takes extreme forms as in the case of rejection of parliament as one of the "fundamental institutions of the social superstructure of Western society";[63] thus for Ba'th parties, everything European is associated with corruption and is unacceptable.

In addition, Bathism like populism leads to some intense frustrations concerning economic development, which are displayed its basic contradictory ideological framework: traditional vs. modernism. The Ba'th party feels that one of its major goals must be "rapid economic growth" which has to be achieved after the sweeping away of "... outdated economic modes of production..."[64] However, at the same time, it does not forget to state that "it is only by restructuring the old socio-cultural framework of Arab society that we can hope to reduce the time-lag inherent in the building of a truly modern society."[65]

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[61]Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, The Ba'th Party: Some Basic Theoretical Consideration (Madrid, November 1977) p. 11

[62]Ibid. p. 64

[63]Ibid. p. 92

[64]Ibid. p. 26

[65]Ibid. pp. 25-26.

However, despite the above described clear similarities between Bathism and populism, there are also some important differences. These are the differences in the patterns in leadership, the lack of mass based organizations and finally the significance of the army in achieving power by the Ba'th parties.

While the common pattern for leadership in the populist movement is a charismatic leader, the Ba'th parties did not follow this pattern. In the case of the Ba'th movement, it is the ideology which comes first and then the leader,[66] while in the populist movements, the leader plays the fundamental role in the development and the maintenance of the party.

In addition to this, the Ba'th parties are not characterized by an extensive mass organization, which embraces various expressions of the social movement. On the contrary, a basic characteristic of these movements is their centralization and eventually their bureaucratization round a collective leadership, which has close links with the military. In fact, this latter, in our understanding, constitutes the last but very important difference between these movements. The Ba'th parties, unlike the common trend of the populist movements, make their position quite clear that the army can and must be a "revolutionary force in the service of the people,"[67] but they also use the military as the base structure in the administration of the countries in which they seized power.

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[66]The first Ba'th party was born in Syria after the union of the Ba'th Party and the Socialist Party in 1952. Soon, though, Bathism transcended the national fronties and became powerful in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and the Persian Gulf States.

[67]Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, op. cit., pp. 54-55

All these additional characteristics and the fact that Bathism appeared as a social, political and ideological movement only in the Arab countries make the whole phenomenon a rather unique case. However, in our understanding, this does not mean that we cannot consider Bathism as a peculiar, regional expression of populism.

Considering the main characteristics of populism and Bathism and keeping in mind the above described structural, functional and political stands of PA.SO.K., is not difficult to prove that Papandreou's party exhibits traits of both populism and Bathism and in fact is nothing other than a Greek version of these two movements.

Of course, it is always possible for an analyst, who is not very familiar with the phenomenon PA.SO.K. to argue that this party is rather a new case of social democratic expression in the Greek political scene. However, it seems most unlikely that this is the case if we consider that : PA.SO.K. has no organic or other links with the social-democratic parties of Europe, which are concentrated in the schema of the Second International; Papandreou often attacks European social-democracy as implementing the aims of European capitalism;[68] and the structural characteristics and, most importantly, the role of the leader in PA.SO.K. are hardly found in the structure of European social democracy. These considerations have led the majority of analyses to not even consider this option as the ideological and political framework of Papandreou's party.

On the contrary, PA.SO.K. maintains almost all the above described platforms of populism as well as essentially Bathist attitudes towards the military. These platforms can be summarized as follows: a) an overemphasis on the external factor in the country's politics.

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68 A. Papandreou, "Our Differences with S...... from A. Papandreou...

PA.SO.K. has a mechanical understanding of the country's problems: everything is attributed to the dependency of the country upon N.A.T.O., the U.S. or the E.E.C. lately; this tendency to identify external enemies as the source of all evils and misfortunes has led to anthropomorphic view of imperialism and dependence which in its turn contribute to the illusion that once the external enemies are eliminated, all problems will be solved; b), a strong nationalist attitude, which never goes beyond the consideration of the nation as a whole. This attitude often takes chauvinistic forms[69], and gives a tremendous ideological flexibility to the party, which is able to talk even about marxism[70] without the risk of being labelled as a communist or traitor to the nation; and, c), the extensive and vital role of the leader in party's structure as well as the intensive involvement of it in an extensive network of social organizations and movements (for example, students and women).

In addition, with regard to the membership and electorate appeal, Papandreou's party managed to attract social strata, which are outside the centres of intensive industrial development, such as agricultural and artisanal producers, small shopkeepers, white collar workers, and soon, in other words "the social arena par exellence for the development of populism".[71] The bad effects of the imposed intensive   8v

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[69]During the crisis of the Greek-Turkish relationship, due to Turkey's violation of the Greek territorial waters, A. Papandreou attacked Turkey vigolously and argued that Greece should declare war against Turkey forgetting once more to make any further distinction other than the one implied: good innocent Greeks

industrial development on these strata finds political expression in the protest program of PA.SO.K., whose charismatic leader plays the role of the ideological umbrella for this diversity.

If these platforms were the only ones of Papandreou's party we would easily argue that the party is a typical case of left - due to its radical image - populist party. However, as we saw, PA.SO.K. has a peculiar attitude towards the military. These types of policies can be only found in the policies of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party.

In fact, PA.SO.K. appears very much like the Bathist parties, which attribute a significant role to the army for the realization of their programs. This is the conclusion, which derives from the direct reference of PA.SO.K. to the issue and the various slogans "the army with the people" as well as from Papandreou's effort to develop his influence among the military officers. Of course, it has not yet been made clear if this policy attributes an important role to the military in the realization of its policies or simply aims to develop the military's consent to the party's plans, given the historical experience of the dictatorship. If we care to speculate on the question and base our answer on the historical experience of theBa'th movement, we would say that although the military role was not intended to be the basis for the actualization of their policies, it has eventually become almost the exclusive structure upon which the Ba'th governments materialize their policies.

To summarize, we must state that PA.SO.K.'s ideological stand as it derives from party's structure, functions and policies is a combination of radical populism and Bathism. Of course this statement does not underestimate the complexity of the phenomenon and the

other supporting as well as counter arguments. However, there is a conclusion in our analysis, which is rather clear and positive: PA.SO.K. is no longer a socialist party. Although Papandreou's party appeared as a political expression aiming at the transformation of Greek society, it has gradually become an organization whose ideology can no longer be called socialist.

CONCLUSION

In the first part of this chapter, we examined the programmatical and political adaptation of both New Democracy and PA.SO.K. to the radicalization of the political environment. We saw that the developments of the two parties at that level have defined their movement towards the centre of the political spectrum and have eventually led to the process of their ultimate convergence. In other words, we followed the steps which have been taken by the two parties in their effort to attract more electoral support through changes in their political program.

To be more specific, on the one hand, New Democracy, responding to the widely spread "radicalism" has introduced policies, which can hardly be compared to those of its ancestor - E.R.E.; on the other hand, PA.SO.K., which appeared with an extreme, even revolutionary political program had to compromise its socialism and move in its turn towards the centre of the Greek political spectrum. These movements, though from different directions, have, as we noted elsewhere, resulted not only in the squeezing and the practical disappearance of the party of the centre, but also in the establishment of a new extreme right-wing one whose power is consistently growing.

Thus, following the above described analysis, the programmatical political convergence of New Democracy and PA.SO.K. becomes a definite fact. However, once more we must point out that with such a deduction, we do not mean that the two parties have become identical; we have rather tried to outline the process, or better, the tendency towards their ultimate convergence at that level.

Finally, in the last part of this chapter, we examined the ideological implications of both parties, as they derive from their structure, functions, and policies. The conclusion we drew from comparisons at that level is no different from the conclusions previously reached during our analysis at the other levels. New Democracy, in every aspect of its activities, has managed to develop a more "radical" (central) image for itself; an ideological image significantly different from that of its ancestor. On the other hand, PA.SO.K., without abandoning totally its socialist slogans, has significantly reduced their validity as socialist priniciples able to be the basis for a fundamental transformation of the system. This type of ideological development entails the creation of a radical, nationalistic, loosely defined, populist ideology, which without being identical to its major counterpart operates within the same framework.

In other words, we are confronting phenomena in which the structural, functional and political convergence of both New Democracy and PA.SO.K. have resulted in the same development at the ideological level. This, again, does not mean that the two parties have developed the same ideology; it rather means that both New Democracy and PA.SO.K.

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are involved in a convergence process, through which their ideological

gap is closing. This process defines the convergence of the two

parties at the ideological level, which along with the developments at

the structural, functional and political levels defines their overall

convergence.

CONCLUSION

The intensive political life, the massive and free challenging of some of the previously predominant patterns of the Greek administration (such as the one sided, pro - U.S. external policy and anti-communism), and the legal recognition of political parties for the first time on the Greek political scene, were some of the phenomena which framed the political developments in the post-dictatorial Greece. In fact, due to the nature of these and other incidents, these political developments have been identified as radical.

Futhermore, the appearance of a new right-wing political party - New Democracy - which not only stated that it had no relation to any previous political formation but also which had very little in common with its actual ancestor - E.R.E. - and the establishment of PA.SO.K. as a radical socialist party which, as soon as it discovered its overestimation of the nature of the radicalism of the environment, started to reduce its initial type of socialism, led us to the conclusion that an interesting development has occurred among the political parties. These developments were seen to outline the movement of the two parties towards the centre, a phenomenon which defines the tendency towards the ultimate convergence of both institutions.

Thus, from these observations, we have formulated our conclusion: that the two major Greek political parties - New Democracy and PA.SO.K. are in a process of convergence. This phenomenon, which can be evidenced at the structural, functional, programmatical - political and ideological levels of the

Thus, in order to prove our hypothesis, we had first to outline the historical developments before the 1967 military coup. We examined (Chapter II) the significance and the consequences of the civil war. We saw the development of quite oppressive institutions within the system, such as the military and the police, which along with the increased U.S. influence in the Greek politics became the main characteristics of the system. Similar too was the situation of the political parties during the period. The dominance of personality-based right-wing parties, the limited activities of all the parties, which mainly focused their activities on the electoral game and the parliament, and finally the banning of the Communist Party, were some of the most striking characteristics of the system during the period 1949-1963.

Finally, we saw how the rising liberal opposition to the status quo had resulted in an organized overreaction on the part of the establishment. The rigidity of the fundamental principles of the system became apparent when the military tanks violently stopped the until then "democratic", though often anomalous, political process.

A brief examination of the dictatorship (Chapter III) showed us the radical effects of the experience, not only upon the political socialization of the people but also in the formation of new political parties. The accusations of the pre-dictatorial right-wing governments that the evils of the country were the left and "the northern enemy" went quickly out of fashion, while at the same time the belief that the dictatorship was a result of the dependency of the country upon the U.S. and the conspiratory right-wing establishment, gained ground.

Furthermore, the inability of the liberal and the traditional left-wing to organize an effective resistance movement along with the above factors were the easily predictable outcomes in the post-dictatorship political scemata. The esoteric, egocentric and often sectarian policies of the traditional left during the period allowed enough room for the appearance of a series of small but energetic radical groups and organizations, which after the fall of the military regime did not find expression in the pre-existed parties, but did form one of their own; in fact, the majority of these diverse organizations participated in the formation of PA.SO.K. On the other hand, the right wing, due to the "radical" developments of the political environment, had to get organized into a "new" political party which could not only present a radical image for itself, but also had to deny any sort of ties with any previous right-wing formation.

Thus, by the fall of 1974 two new political parties had appeared on the Greek political scene, New Democracy and PA.SO.K. On the one hand, New Democracy, although it appeared right-wing, managed to introduce such structural, functional, political and ideological innovations, as gave it very little in common with its ancestor E.R.E. These innovations, such a trend towards a more permanent structure in the party, a drastic reduction of anti-communist propaganda, the withdrawal of the country from the military section of N.A.T.O., etc., definitely defined the party's movement towards the centre of the political spectrum. On the other hand, we saw that although Papandreou's party appeared to be a real socialist party which was willing to transform the society into "a free and socialist" one, it started to compromise

its initial radicalism. In fact, this party, as soon as it discovered that it had overestimated the diffused radicalism and that its immediate support was not what they expected, adopted a more "pragmatic", realistic, and "non-sectarian" image. The expulsion of the left wing of the party, the anti-democratic measures introduced in its structure, the ultimate disconnection of the independence of the country from internal social factors and, finally, the development of a catch-all, nationalist, loosely defined populist ideology are some of the most significant developments which this party has undergone. These developments define not only the decision of the party to work within the system's framework but also its movement towards the centre.

In our question concerning what makes two parties act as described above, Hotelling's analysis on the behavior of two monopolies in the market (Appendix I) is of great assistance. As in Hotelling's model, the two enterprises have to change location to move toward the centre in order to increase their sales in the middle of the market, just as the political parties have to move towards the centre in order to be more competitive in the electoral market. The latter assumption has run throughout the entire project and is our primary assumption.

Pursuing our analysis and keeping in mind our assumption in chapter IV, we examined the structural and functional development of the two parties, New Democracy and PA.SO.K. In order to understand the recent changes of New Democracy at these levels, we had to compare it with E.R.E. From that comparison it became quite clear that the new party has radically changed its structure and functions; very little if nothing has remained the same between the structure and the functions

of these two parties. Following this, we examined the case of PA.SO.K. In the examination, it became quite clear that the party had undergone a rapid reduction of its initial radicalism at the structural and functional levels.

Furthermore, we tried to compare the structures - with a particlar emphasis on the leadership question, due to the circumstances - and the functions of the two parties. In order to test our hypothesis of the convergence of the two parties at these levels, we had to examine some of the questions O. Kirchheimer addresses in his "catch-all party" model. The reason for this kind of approach is to check how much and to what extent the developments of the two parties have resulted in a convergence to the same point. Thus, we saw that both structures of the parties have strengthened the leadership groups and particularly the leaders themselves, while that of the individual party member has been downgraded. Furthermore, at the functional level, despite the differences between them, the two parties have displayed a de-emphasis on class politics and have clearly tried to secure access to a variety of social groups.

Of course, as we noted above, the similarities displayed by the two major Greek political parties at the structural and functional levels do not lead us by any means to the false conclusion that there are no differences between the two parties at these levels. They rather outline the tendency between the two parties towards their structural and functional convergence.

The same kind of observation emerged from our analysis at the beginning of the fifth chapter, where we examined the development of

these parties at the programmatic-political level. Here again, as at the previously examined structural and functional levels, we first saw the unprecedented political changes of New Democracy in comparison to E.R.E. The new dominant right-wing party has very little in common with its ancestor; it has had to introduce radical policies and programs on various issues which would never have been pursued or even declared by the pre-dictatorial right-wing. Economic policies which declare restrictions on foreign investment and on development of "monopolistic situations," policies towards the military which seek to make it indifferent toward the democratic procedure and, finally, the open challenging of the previous unquestioned pro-western or rather pro-U.S. policies define the radical developments of New Democracy and its movement to the centre of the political spectrum.

At the same time, we examined the programmatical-political developments of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement. At that level more than any other, it became clear that this party has significantly reduced its initial radical image. The transformation of its initial hostility towards foreign capital and often capital in general into a promise for stimulation and support of foreign investment, the replacement of its absolute opposition to the country's membership in the E.E.C. with a Norwegian type of agreement, the introduction of autonomous economic development, instead of the previous declaration of the elimination of exploitation, as party's major goals, are some of the most striking examples of this phenomenon.

In the overall comparison of the developments of the two parties at the political level we confirmed once more, our hypothesis. New

Democracy has taken significant steps towards centralist policies while PA.SO.K. has totally rejected the idea of challenging the system and moves every day more and more towards moderate (centre) policies. Thus, the overall tendency of the two parties towards their ultimate convergence has been well confirmed at this level.

At this point it seems to us that we must say that the above analysis of the convergence of the two parties of the political level is particularly vulnerable to the accusation of bias. This is because the nature of the data, which, due to the great amount of selectivity, contain not only the danger but rather assures a certain amount of personal bias. Unfortunately, there is nothing that can be done about this other than to argue on the basis of scientific trust and also to state that we have tried to be objective without pretending or forgetting that we cannot be impartial.

. The same general comments apply to the analysis of the ideological developments of both New Democracy and PA.SO.K. In this part of our analysis, we confronted a particular problem which can be identified as the overall ideological obscurity of the two political parties. However, in spite of this difficulty we managed to, more or less, define the ideological patterns of these parties by drawing ideological conclusions from their structural functional and political performances.

On the one hand, we saw that New Democracy through its activities has managed to put forward a "radical" (centre) ideological image which is fundamentally different from that of its ancestor. On the other hand, PA.SO.K. along the same pattern has definitely achieved the reduction of its initial socialist ideology and the development of an

ambiguously obscure ideology, which no longer aims its reforms at the breakdown of the existing economic, social and political order but rather within it. These ideological developments of the two major Greek political parties define their convergence at that level, without any implication for their ideological identification somewhere at the middle of the ideological spectrum. However, we would not take any big risk if we would argue that we are confronting a process which sooner or later will lead to such a result.

Despite our efforts to be as analytical as possible, there are some areas of our subject which need further investigation; some of these were left out of our analysis for subjective - lack of space and time - as well as for objective reasons. In the first category, for example, we would indicate a need for a further examination of the sociological impact of the political parties and particularly the role of the growing size and influence of the middle-class strata upon the above described developments; in fact, in the first chapter we referred to the question but did not really elaborate upon it seriously. In the second category lies the question of the future political behavior of New Democracy as the party of opposition along with the coming developments of PA.SO.K. as the party gradually - if the prognostications are accurate - approaches power. This kind of research can be considered as a continuation of the present project, which for obvious reasons could not be pursued right now.

In conclusion, we would say that for those who are concerned with or fight for an honest expression of people's needs, a true representation of the non-alienated attitudes of the oppressed people and the

ultimate creation of an organization capable of contributing to the development of a new, non-alienating or exploitive humanist society, the above described recent development of the Greek political parties and particularly that of PA.SO.K, is a rather disappointing and depressing fact. Soon there will no longer be any qualitative or even quantitative choice for the oppressed or the oppressing, the alienated, the poor or the rich, the unhappy, the apathetic citizen, voter, us. But this is only a small part of the rapidly expanding crisis of our entire society. "This crisis," as Gramsci has brilliantly stated, "consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interegnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear."

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I[1]

Growth of the State Measured
by State Expenditure. Percent of GNP.

United Kingdom

1910	12.7%
1937	25.7%
1951	44.9%
1961	42.1%
1971	50.3%
1973	50.5%

Italy

1910	11.34%
1930	14.49%
1951	19.78%
1972	40.00%[2]
1975	40.77%

France

1910	11.36%
1932	12.38%
1949	13.82%
1961	20.27%
1972	36.70%[2]
1976	40.00%[2]

Germany

1910	7.95%

For the years before World War II
we cannot find comparable data
because of the huge military
expenditure.

West Germany

1951	11.86%
1961	14.39%
1972	38.00%

Greece

1927	19.74%
1937	18.65%
1951	15.36%
1961	18.17%
1967	20.94%
1970	21.60%
1975	45.77%[3]

1. Sources: European Historical Statistics 1750-1970 (New York: Columbia Press, 1975), OECD. For Greece, I used the O.E.C.D.'s volume on Greece, June 1977 (Tables A and D).

2. The percentage is measured according to G.D.P. (Gross Domestic Product).

3. For a better comparison we must consider the tremendous growth of the military expenditure after the political change in 1974.

APPENDIX II

In economic terms, Hotelling's model can be stated as follows.
At first he makes some assumptions about the conditions of the market.
These assumptions define the behavioral basis of the buyers, that is,
the preference of buyers is based on the prices and transporation cost
only.

Accordingly, Hotelling assumes that buyers are uniformly distributed
along a defined market of a certain length, say L (see Figure 1):

Figure 1

For simplicity, we speak in terms of duopoly and the two firms are
located at points A and B; there are buyers situated to the left of A
and situated to the right of B. Obviously, given the buyers criteria,
A would never set his price so high that the buyers to his left would
find it less expensive to purchase form B. A and B have their "sheltered"
markets, of a and b respectively. Therefore the A and B entrepreneurs
are competing for the "in between" part of the market (x and y). Thus
for any particular prices the $x + y$ part of the market will be divided
by a point such as P; A's profit will be $P_A(a+x)$ and B's will be $P_B(b+y)$
where P_A and P_B are the prices of A and B respectively. This formation
consists of a short-run stable equilibrium, under profit maximization
conditions.

In the long-run, though, this model yields some interesting developments. A has incentive to more as far toward B as possible, thereby expending the "sheltered" market to his left. On the other side, B has a similar incentive. Consequently, they will both locate in the center of the market, M in Figure 1. Finally, stability is established in the oligopoly market and that is the seller's location, M.

The political implications of the model can easily be drawn. If we replace A and B entrepreneurs with A and B political parties and the market L with the electoral one, the prices P with the programmes (ideology) of the A and B. Thus, in political terms the electoral profit of A and B would be $P_A(a+x)$ and $P_B(b+y)$ where x and y will be the gained voters, a and b standard support (followers, memberships, etc.), and P_A and P_B the adaptation of the program to the electoral market.

As in the economic terms, so in its political application the model leads to the conclusion that the final locations of A and B will be not only very close to each other but also very close to the centre of the market.

APPENDIX III

Election of March 31, 1946

Parties[1]	Leaders	Votes	%	Seats
UNITED NATIONALIST FRONT		610.995	55.12	206
Popular Party	Mavromichalis P.			
	Theotokis John.			
	Tsaldaris K.			
National Liberal Party	Gonatas St.			
Reformist Party	Alexandris Ap.			
Panhellenic National Party	Sakellarious Al.			
Patriotic Union				
Monarchist Party				
Reconstruction's Party				
Social Radical Union				
Political Team Embros.				
NATIONAL POLITICAL UNION		213.721	19.28	68
Venizelos' Liberals	Venizelos S.			
Democratic Socialist Party	Papandreou G.			
National Unite Party	Kanellopoulos P.			
Democratic Union				
LIBERAL PARTY	Sofoulis Th.	159.525	14.39	48
NATIONAL PARTY OF GREECE	Zervas N.	66.027	5.96	20
UNION OF NATIONALISTS		32.538	2.94	9
Nationalist's Party	Tourkovasilis Th.			
People's Agrarian Party	Paboukas G.			
UNION OF AGRARIAN PARTIES	Milonas Al.	7.447	0.67	1
Independent		12.036	1.08	2
Others		6.207	0.56	0
	Total	1.108.473	100	354

[1] The total number of the political parties
which participated in the election was 27.

Election of March 5, 1950

Parties[2]	Leaders	Votes	%	Seats
POPULAR PARTY	Tsaldaris K.	317.512	18.80	62
LIBERAL PARTY	Venizelos S.	291.083	17.24	56
NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE UNION CENTRE		277.739	16.44	45
Party of Progressive Liberals of the Centre	Plastiras N.			
Democratic Progressive Party	Tsouderos E.			
PARTY OF GEORGE PAPANDREOU	Papandreou G.	180.185	10.67	35
DEMOCRATIC FRONT				
Union of Democratic Left	Sofianopoulos 1.			
Socialist Party-Union of People's Democracy	Svolos Al.			
Party of Left Liberals	Grigoriadis N.			
INDEPENDENT POLITICAL FRONT		137.618	8.15	16
Party of Greek Renaissance	Kotzias K.			
	Maniadakis K.			
Party of Nationlists	Tourkovasilis Th.			
FRONT OF NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION		88.979	5.27	7
National Unite Party	Kanellopoulos P.			
Popular Progressive Party	Papadopoulos N.			
Panhellenic Party	Sakellariou Al.			
NATIONAL PARTY OF GREECE	Zervas N.	61.575	3.67	7
FRONT OF PEASANTS AND WORKERS		44.308	2.62	3
Rally of Peasants & Workers	Baltzatzis Al.			
Agrarian National Progressive Party	Milonas Al.			
NEW PARTY	Markezinis S.	42.157	2.50	1
Others		83.432	4.94	0
Total		1.688.923	100	250

[2] The number of the participant parties was 44.

Election of September 9, 1951

Parties[3]	Leaders	Votes	%	Seats
GREEK RALLY	Papagos Al..	624.313	36.53	114
NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE UNION CENTRE	Plastiras N.	401.379	23.49	74
LIBERAL PARTY	Venizelos S.	325.390	19.04	57
UNITED DEMOCRATIC LEFT	Admin. Committee	180.640	10.57	10
POPULAR PARTY	Tsaldaris K.	113.8.6	6.66	2
Others		623.06	3.71	0
Total		1.708.904	100	258

Election of November 16, 1952

Parties[4]	Leaders	Votes	%	Seats
GREEK RALLY	Papagos Al.	783.541	49.22	247
UNION OF PARTIES		544.834	34.22	51
National Progressive Union				
Centre	Plastiras N.			
Liberals	Venizelos S.			
Socialist-Union of People's				
Democracy	Svolos Al.			
Independent		56.679	3.57	2
Others		206.753	12.99	0
Total		1.591.807	100	300

Election of February 19, 1956

Parties[5]	Leaders	Votes	%	Seats
NATIONAL RADICAL UNION (ERE)	Karamanlis K.	1.594.112	47.38	165
DEMOCRATIC UNION		1.620.007	48.15	132
Liberal Democratic Union	Venizelos S.			
Liberals	Papandreou G.			
Democratic Party of Working				
People	Svolos A.-Kartalis G.			
United Democratic Left	Pasalidis I.			
National Progressive Union				
Centre	Papapolitis S.			
Agrarian and Labor Party	Baltatzis A.			
Popular Party	Tsaldaris K.			
Independent		31.022	0.92	3
Others		119.220	5.55	0
Total		3.364.361	100	300

[3] The total number of the participant parties was 9.
[4] The participants were 8.
[5] The participants were 12.

Election of May 11, 1958

Parties	Leaders	Votes	%	Seats
NATIONAL RADICAL UNION (ERE)	Karamanlis K.	1.583.885	41.17	171
UNITED DEMOCRATIC LEFT (EDA)	Pasalidis 1.	939.902	24.43	79
LIBERAL PARTY	Venizelos-Papandreou	795.445	20.68	36
PROGRESSIVE AGRARIAN DEMO-CRATIC UNION		408.787	10.62	10
Progressive Party	Markezinis S.			
National Progressive Union				
Centre	Papapolitis S.			
Peasants' and Workers' Party	Baltatzis S.			
Democratic Party of Working People	Alamanis S.			
UNION OF POPULAR PARTY		113.358	2.97	4
Popular Party	Tsaldarisk-Kanellopoulos P.			
Popular Social Party	Stefanopoulos St.			
Party of Nationalists	Tourkovasilis Th.			
Reformist Party	Katzamanis S.			
Democratic Reformist Party	Ketseas Th.			
Others		6.408	0.13	0
Total		3.847.785	100	300

Election of October 29, 1961

Parties	Leaders	Votes	%	Seats
E.R.E.	Karamanlis K.	2.347.824	50.81	176
UNION CENTRE-PROGRESSIVES PARTY	Papandreou G.- Markezinis Sp.	1.555.442	30.66	100
PANDEMOCRATIC AGRARIAN FRONT OF GREECE				
E.D.A.	Pasalidis 1.	675.867	14.63	24
National Agrarian Party	Admin. Committee			
Others		41.550	0.90	0
Total		4.620.683	100	300

Election of November 3, 1963

Parties	Leaders	Votes	%	Seats
UNION CENTRE	Papandreou G.	1.962.079	42.04	138
NATIONAL RADICAL UNION	Karamanlis K.	1.837.377	39.37	132
UNITED DEMOCRATIC LEFT	Pasalidis 1.	669.262	14.34	28
PROGRESSIVES PARTY	Markezinis Sp.	173.981	3.73	2
Others		24.472	0.52	0
Total		4.667.176	100	300

Election of February 16, 1964

Parties	Leaders	Votes	%	Seats
UNION CENTRE	Papandreou G.	2.424.477	52.72	171
E.R.E.-PROGRESSIVES P.	Kanellopoulos P:-			
	Markezinis S.	1.621.546	35.26	107
E.D.A.	Pasalidis 1.	542.865	11.80	22
Others		9.951	0.22	0
Total		4.598.839	100	300

Election of November 17, 1974

Parties	Leaders	Votes	%	Seats
NEW DEMOCRACY (N.D.)	Karamanlis K.	2.670.804	54.37	220*
UNION CENTRE-NEW FORCES	Mavros G.	1.002.908	20.52	60*
PNAHELLENIC SOCIALIST MOVEMENT	Papandreou A.	666.806	13.58	12*
UNITED LEFT (E.A.)	Admin. Committee	464.331	9.45	8
Others		107.507	2.08	0
Total		4.912.356	100	300

* After the bi-elections of April 20, 1975 the distribution of seats in parliament became: N.D. 216 EK-ND 61, PA.SO.k. 15.

Election of November 20, 1977

Parties	Leaders	Votes	%	Seats
NEW DEMOCRACY	Karamanlis K.	2.146.687	41.85	172
PA.SO.K.	Papandreou A.	1.299.196	25.33	93
UNION OF THE DEMOCRATIC CENTRE	Mavros G.	613.113	11.95	15
NATIONAL FRONT (E.P.)	Stefanopoulos St.	349.851	6.85	5
COMMUNIST PARTY OF GREECE	Florakis Ch.	480.188	9.36	11
ALLIANCE OF PROGRESSIVE AND				
LEFT-WING FORCES				
C.P. of the Interior	Drakopoulos Ch.			
E.D.A.	Iliou I.			
Socialist March	Central Committee			
Socialist Initiative	Magakis G.			
Christian Democracy	Psaroudakis N.			
NEO-LIBERAL PARTY	Mitsotakis	55.560	1.08	2
Others		45.487	0.89	0
Total		5.129.884	100	300

APPENDIX IV

Referendum September 1, 1946

		Percentages
Registered voters	1.921.725	
Overall vote	1.664.920	86.6
Vote for king's return	1.136.289	68.2
Vote against king's return	524.771	31.5
Wasted votes	3.860	0.3

Referendum December 8, 1974

		Percentages
Registered voters	6.244.539	
Overall vote	4.719.787[1]	75.6
Vote for a "Republic"	3.245.111	69.18
Vote for a "Constitutional Monarch"	1.445.875	30.82
Wasted votes	28.801	

[1] The low turn-out can be explained by the fact that the registration lists had not been revised since the 1963, in addition to which the electorate had been at the poll three weeks before.

APPENDIX V

From October 1944 to June 1964 a total of 3.984 million dollars
was given to Greece by the U.S. This aid had the following
distribution:

	In million $
Military expenses	2.144
Public investments and proejcts (Agrarian Bank)	851
For the National Budget	732
Value of the given agrarian surplus	133
Spending money by the U.S. administration in Greece	124
Total	3.984

From October 1944 to the end of 1963 a total of 411.8 million
dollars was given to Greece by various European countries.

Million Dollars

| Countries	Aid	Loans	Total
Great Britain	180[1]	40.3	220.3
Germany	12	128.7	140.7
France	–	31.1	31.1
Canada	7.2	2	9.2
Italy	2.4	6	8
Belgium-Luxembourg	1.1	–	1.1
Netherlands	1	–	1
Total	203.7	208.1	411.8

[1] From the total of 180 million dollars of the British aid a 152 was
spent for military purposes and only 28 for non-military.

APPENDIX VI

Every citizen who had "suspicious political beliefs" could not:

1 - Work as a maritime worker (2686 act, 1953)

2 - Work for the government

3 - Get any secondary education in any of the universities in the country (Royal Order, April 4, 1951)

4 - Work as a blue or white collar worker in the public enterprises of Communication of Power of Water (512 act/48)

5 - Work at his or her farm if it was close to the borders. In fact this was 1/3 of the Greek farmers (Decision 10188/2/36a, 1951 by Ministry of Defence)

6 - Work as a porter (1254, October 29-31, 1949)

7 - Get a driver's license or plate for his or her car (1478 act, 1950)

8 - Be a priest

9 - Emigrate abroad

10 - Get an engineering degree (Resolution by Minister of Industry, April 7, 1954)

11 - Work as a bus driver (Royal Order, June 11, 1954)

12 - Be compensated as dismembered during the war (Resolution by Minister of Defence and Minister of Internal Affairs: 159066/0/380, 1950)

13 - Work in industries which were considered strategic for the national defense and economy

Resource: Nicos Psyroukis. History of Contemporary Greece (Athens. Epikerotita, 1976) vol. I, II.

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FIGURE 2   ORIGINS OF THE GREEK POLITICAL PARTIES*

POPULAR PARTY (1920)

LIBERALS (1911)

C.P. (1918)

GREEK RALLY (1951)

Liberal Groups, E.P.E.K. Personalities of the Centre, Concervative anti-E.R.E. organizations e.t.c.

Independent Social-ist Groups. Non-communist member-ship of E.A.M.

E.R.E. (1956)

E.D.A. (1951)

Extreme rightwing groups, Pro-mon-archists, Pro-fascists

UNION CENTRE (1961)

Cristian   (1956)
Democracy

National Democra-tic Union (1974)

C.P.   C.P. of the interior   E.D.A.

NEW DEMOCRACY (1974)

Union Centre | New Forces (1974)

Independent Left-wing groups and or-ganizations, which emerged from the resistance movement against the Dictatorship

National Front (1977)

Socialist Initiative (1976)

Rigas Ferreos B. Panelladiki (1978)

Socialist March (1975)

Union of Democra-tic Centre (1976)

PA.SO.K. (1974)

*Only the ones, which ever ran alone or in a coalition and won a seat in the Parliament. In brackets the year of establish-ment.

KO.DI.SO (1979)

Neo-Liberal Party (1974) (It joined N.D. in 1978)

☐ Party   ═══ Strong links

〰☐ Groups, Organizations ───── Weak links