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AN EXPLICATION OF HEIDEGGER'S EXISTENTIAL

ANALYTIC: BEING AND TIME, DIVISION ONE

by

GARY SEEPISH

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to explicate Heidegger's treatment of the "question of Being" and show, in an extensive way, his analysis of the "question of what it means to be". The paper will be limited to Heidegger's demonstration of his position that a genuine understanding of what it means to be is grounded in a vague and unexamined understanding of Being. Wherever applicable, Heidegger's position will be viewed in terms of the history of philosophy especially in light of Descartes. The paper will be explicative rather than critical.

As it is a human existence which asks the question of Being and experiences the vague awareness of Being, Heidegger will make explicit the vague awareness that one has of his own existence. Existence will not be treated as an object but as a process and activity of existing. This paper will attempt to show not what kind of thing a being is but what it means to be at all. For Heidegger, as will be shown in the existential analytic, for a human existence to be means to care.

For Heidegger, the object of his inquiry is referred to by the term "Dasein". Heidegger uses the ontological term "Dasein" to designate that particular being which has an understanding of Being. Strictly speaking Dasein is not

translated as human reality or as human existence ("Réalité humaine"). To do so would be to view Dasein from the ontic perspective which is to see Dasein as an object. Dasein, as an inquirer into its ownmost Being, is open to possibilities. Etymologically, "Dasein" can be translated as "to be there" (Being-there), or as "to be here" (Being-here).

The difficulty in understanding Heidegger is due to the fact that he approaches the traditional problems of philosophy in unfamiliar and nontraditional terms. He does this because he feels that the traditional way of formulating the problem is, itself, an impediment to the solution.

Heidegger gives a phenomenological description of various modes of existence which elucidates what is first and foremost in our consciousness where consciousness is the means by which we become aware of our own existence and of the world. Using the descriptive insights of the phenomenological method Heidegger illuminates the full range of human experience in what he calls the "existential analysis".

The existential analysis is an analysis of existence from the perspective of transcendental awareness. For example, in discussing the concept "world" Heidegger does not approach the world as an objective entity of cosmology or as an object of knowledge of epistemology, but rather, he asks and answers the questions of what it means for a human being to be in a world and how the "world" becomes meaningful and in what ways it is meaningful to me.

Heidegger asks what it means to be one's self, to be one that understands, and to be one who is afraid.

The investigation of the existential analytic proceeds from the point of view of "everydayness" or "inauthenticity". As this description is insufficient in reaching a fundamental ontology Division Two reinterprets the entire existential analytic in terms of temporality and time. "Dasein and Temporality", however, will not be dealt with in this paper.

The existential analysis of the self should not be viewed as an entirely different analysis from the one presented by the working out of the question of what means to be. The significance of the ontological question cannot be viewed apart from the person who asks the question. Only man can become aware and concerned with what it means to be and Being is realized only through the self-reflecting consciousness of human existence. The existential analysis, as the first step in understanding Heidegger's philosophy, is both an analysis of man and an inquiry into the meaning of Being. At this point both are inseparable and constitute the subject matter of ontology.

Before proceeding into the existential analytic Heidegger makes two points concerning Dasein in regard to "existence" and "mineness".

What does it mean to say that the essence of Dasein lies in its existence? or that in order for something to be as Dasein, it must have existence? In the first place, the term "existence" is used by Heidegger to apply only to the

human person. Strictly speaking "things" other than Dasein, such as dogs, carrots, and carbon, are not said to have existence. Dasein is said to exist because only Dasein reflects upon his own existence in terms of possible ways of existing. To the extent that Dasein is aware of his own to-be, however vague this awareness, Dasein is.

"Existence" for Heidegger implies a "standing out" and it is only Dasein that can stand "out" of its milieu and observe itself. This unique characteristic of observing itself in self-reflective consciousness is, for Heidegger, the essence of Dasein. Existence does not refer to an object among objects or to something living, but, rather, existence refers to Dasein's awareness that it is. This awareness of self-reflection is presupposed in Metaphysics which claims to tell us about reality and ourselves. Heidegger's fundamental ontology is an attempt to go beyond Metaphysics by showing how it is possible, in the first place, to reflect upon oneself. The initial working out of the ground for the possibility of self-awareness gives rise to the existential analytic.

The subject of the existential analysis is "in each case mine". Heidegger points out that Dasein as mine indicates the availability of the subject matter. Also, my consciousness reflecting upon my own existence gives rise to principles which are of a rational nature and, as such, are universal and apply to every Dasein.

More important is the notion anticipated by the terms "in each case mine" or "my own". Heidegger will later

discuss the significance of, and differentiate between, authentic and inauthentic existence. Authentic existence is characterized by an awareness on the part of Dasein of its own self whereas inauthenticity is characterized by Dasein's loss of the awareness of its own self. As inauthentic, Dasein is aware of a self that is determined by "others" and is not its own.

I. Being-In-The-World In General As The Basic State of Dasein

To Be In A World

Heidegger begins his descriptive analysis of Dasein's Being with the most general a priori existential of all called "Being-in-the-world". At first, Heidegger will present a skeletal view of the existential structure of Dasein by proceeding from that existential¹ which is most general and which reflects the general awareness of the way in which the world presents itself to Dasein (Being-in-the-world) to that which is the most characteristic -- that specific existential that most adequately reveals to Dasein its own existence (care).

Initially "world" means the place in which one is. It is the case that I find myself in something -- a world.

¹Kant claimed that a priori knowledge is that which is known prior to experience and it is that which makes experience possible. For Kant the categories, like cause and substance, were a priori because they were not derived from experience but experience itself depended on them as a condition of its possibility. The a priori refers to knowledge derived from reasoning and has the marks of universality and necessity. The categories are the a priori characters of the being of things other than man. The existentials are the a priori characters of the being of Dasein. The existentials are necessary ways in which the mind operates in viewing itself. For Heidegger the term a priori existential refers to that which is already there in experience as a condition of its possibility. It cannot be directly derived from experience. Existentials are not properties but ways or modes in which it is possible for Dasein to be.

The limits of the world may be the limits of my yard or my community as reflected by a primitive awareness of a self-reflecting consciousness or world may have a more specific meaning as "to be of use". Other ways in which "world" has meaning are the personal modes of self-existence, such as, fear and the awareness of possibilities.

Being-in-the-world is to be regarded ontologically and not ontically. To show this emphasis is put on the preposition "in" in the phrase "Being-in-the-world". On the ontic level the meaning of "in a world" is discovered through experience. On the ontological level the meaning of "in" is that which makes possible the feeling of familiarity that we have with the world and which makes us feel "at home" in the world. Ontologically "Being-in" does not indicate the space-time location of physics.

The ontic categories of space and time do not exhaust the meaning of my Being-in-the-world. I am not one who simply exists in space and time. What is needed is an a priori explanation regarding how modes of existence such as alienation and feeling at home in the world are possible in the first place. My surroundings, environment (Umwelt), are not simply there, but they affect me and I affect them. It is an a priori fact that as a Dasein I must have a world to dwell in (to be in).

As human beings we have relationships with other human beings as well as with things. We are aware of these relationships and they affect us. To the question, What is the capacity within us that makes it possible for us to

relate in the first place? Heidegger answers: it is a prior capacity of the a priori existential Being-in-a-world.

If Heidegger is correct in his view that Being-in-the-world is an existential a priori then some of the problems which have long concerned philosophers are "eliminated".¹ The ultimate presupposition of knowledge is Being-in-the-world. The basis of epistemology is the subject-object dichotomy. However prior to the distinction between the knower and the known, is the fact that the subject can relate to an object. That the subject can relate to an object is made possible in that the subject has a world in which the object can occur.

¹Two examples of such problems are the mind-body problem and the problem of the reality of the external world.

II. The Worldhood of the World

The world as environment: A description of the "world"
that we are in a priori

In examining our daily existence we find that we handle "things" which we have invested with value. The primary ways in which we relate to and use the "things" in the "world" are as utensils. These utensils which are in relation to Dasein always have the characteristic of "being something for the sake of _____". For example, glasses are for the sake of seeing, a pen is for the sake of writing, and a car is for the sake of conveying me. The "for the sake of" ("in-order-to") always refers beyond itself to something else; for example, glasses refer to seeing.

Heidegger claims that there are at least two modes in which the world can present itself. As the world presents itself in two different ways Dasein can relate to the world in at least two different modes.

One way is a primordial relationship with the world and that is to use it. The world is available to us and when we do not think about things in the world as objects but as functions Heidegger defines this attitude of seeing the world as "ready-at-hand" (zuhanden). Things ready-at-hand and things as utensils refer to something beyond themselves;

that is, they refer to the work that has to be done. The work that has to be done, in turn, refers to something else. The final reference is a project which according to Heidegger refers to existence itself. As will be shown later, it is the care of existence for itself to which all the references are made.

The second way is not a primordial relationship but a derived relationship. To see things in the world as objects, as something that occurs independent of its function or use, is to see the world as present-at-hand (vorhanden).

When a carpenter works in his shop and picks up a saw or a hammer he does not think of the saw or the hammer as a scientific object. The carpenter uses his equipment without necessarily thinking about it. On the other hand science presents us with a picture of the world as a kind of receptacle in which many different objects occur. The scientist views objects independent of their function, value, or use.

In our everyday concerns entities within the world can announce themselves in three main ways. An instrument can break down and become unusable; it can be missing when it is urgently needed and not be "to hand" at all; and something may "stand in the way" preventing us from using our instrument. In all three cases the thing ready-at-hand changes to a thing present-at-hand and we become conscious of it independent of its use. In all three cases when the breakdown occurs we become aware of the purpose of our endeavours, we become aware of the totality of the work and

in this way "the world announces itself". In much the same way Heidegger will show that in anxiety a breakdown of existence occurs and we become aware of our existence. Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, makes things around himself significant as he occupies himself with projects that indicate a concern for his own being. This concern that Dasein has for himself presupposes an understanding of Dasein. As the ontological concept of "worldhood" means the particular aspect of Dasein's Being-in-the-world, and as Dasein is Being-in-the-world as a particular aspect of existence, then, this concern that Dasein has for himself also presupposes an understanding of the world as it exists. In order to use things in the world Dasein must understand the world as such and the world is thus that which is understood. The worldhood of the world is constituted by the system of significant relations that Dasein assigns to itself.

Both ways of viewing the world are legitimate ways of relating to the world and neither one is to be disparaged. Both ready-at-hand and present-at-hand are in-the-world and the "in", as pointed out, means something different in each case. Heidegger feels that to see the world only as present-at-hand is erroneous because it leads philosophers to claim that only the scientific methodology can work out a rational description of the world. This "objectivity" interprets human existence simply as another object in the world of objects. That attitude of mind which views the world as made up of objects is, no doubt, the best attitude for

science, but it is not necessarily the best attitude for philosophy.

The attitude that views the universe as merely present-at-hand is a derived attitude and not primordial, and in principle is insufficient to adequately explain human existence. As it is secondary and its methodology cannot exhaust the possible ways of viewing the world, it cannot be the methodology which reveals ontological truth.

For Heidegger, using something and thinking about something as an object are two different activities of the mind. Neither activity will exhaust one's awareness of the world. Heidegger shows that there is more than one activity in which the world can be viewed. The world can be viewed as: (1) ready-at-hand; (2) present-at-hand; and (3) an existential of the self in which the different views of ready-at-hand and present-at-hand are incomplete ways of seeing.

Heidegger will discuss in subsequent sections an expanded view of seeing where I "see" the world of my fellow man neither as things to use nor as objects but as a way of "seeing" in which I see myself as Being-with.

Definitions of the Modes of "Seeing"

Heidegger places much emphasis on the three different modes of "seeing". When I view the world as equipment I employ "circumspection". Circumspection belongs to concern as a way of discovering what is ready-at-hand. When I view

the world of other Daseins I employ "considerateness", and when I "look at" myself (knowledge of self in all its implications), I employ "transparency". Tentatively "circumspection" (Umsicht) means a "looking around"; "considerateness" (Rucksicht) means "looking back"; and "transparency" (Durchsichtigkeit) means a "looking through". In all words the word sicht, "sight", occurs. The point of all this nomenclature is to show that Dasein relates to the world ontologically in many different ways.

In order to understand the importance of the distinction between the ready-at-hand and the present-at-hand it may now be wise to view these distinctions in the context of the history of philosophy with particular reference to knowledge as grounded in the subject-object relation.

Descartes argued that the mind could come to know, through reason, objective reality. For him the intellect was able to directly apprehend substances that went to make up the furniture of the universe. What was apprehended by the senses (accidents, appearances) was not necessarily real, yet what was known by thought had to be real.

This rationalistic view was countered by the empiricist tradition of which David Hume was an outstanding representative. Hume's position was that an unaided intellect could not apprehend reality at all and thus there was no basis for Descartes' claim.

Thus two traditions were established in what seemed to be two extremes: the rationalist saying that the mind

knew the thing-in-itself, and the empiricist saying that the mind knew nothing at all except its own ideas. The former over-emphasized the powers of reason while the latter underestimated reason.

Kant attempted a synthesis of both points of view in his analysis in which he retained Hume's view that the intellect could not grasp the thing-in-itself (noumenon) and the view that the intellect could apprehend the a priori structure of appearance.

For Descartes the object was simply there to be known and the subject, whose intellect fully grasped the object, did not affect the nature of the object as it was known. Statements about the world were true if they corresponded to the state-of-affairs in the real external world. Here we have a situation in which the mind, a system of ideas, is a separate entity from the world, a system of things. Subject and object, which are now separate and viewed as an "inside" and an "outside" respectively, somehow must be mediated by language, whose statements in turn must be verified. This view may be called the identity of forms or Isomorphism.

In Kant's epistemology, a knowable phenomenon is constituted both by the mind and the object, each of which contributes to the process of knowing. For Kant, being able to know something is possible only when you have the activities of the subject conjoined with the data presented by the object through the senses. This means that the knower influences or characterizes the object or thing known.

Here we have a situation which emphasizes the structure of the knower as a sine qua non for knowledge. The structure of the knower affects the known object to the point that it makes the object as an object for the intellect possible. Descartes' substances are not known directly by the mind as reality but rather "substance" is now seen as a category of our mental operation. Notions like substance and cause are not knowable as external appearances but are ways in which the mind necessarily views objects. In order for the mind to view objects it must use the categories. Is it possible to have an activity of the mind which does not view things as objects and does not use the categories? Heidegger replies in the affirmative and here departs from Kant.

For Heidegger there is no a priori way to show that the view in which the world is seen as made up of objects is the only way to view the world. As previously pointed out, this view of seeing the world as made up of objects is a derived view and not the only way of relating to the world, viz., the scientific way.

In relating to things in the world as ready-at-hand and present-at-hand, not only do I impose my own concepts upon the data, to make the data intelligible, but my own character as a human being affects the way I relate to the world in other modes. For these reasons it can be seen why an investigation into the meaning of Being-in-the-world is prior to any metaphysical or scientific description of the world in which I as a Dasein find myself.

As with Kant, Heidegger disagrees with, and finds unacceptable, Descartes' view of the world precisely because he, too, presupposes that Dasein relates to the world only in one way and has not fully examined the basis of that relationship. It is with Descartes that the ontological perspective is lost and that the notion of the world as made up of substances is made possible.

For Heidegger the view that expresses the notion that the mind relates to the world by building concepts that interpret the objects in the world is not an essential one. Heidegger is going to argue that man's essential way of relating to the world is one of care (Sorge). Ultimately, all ways of Being-in-the-world are only different modes of caring. Before he shows this he first discusses the various existentials of Dasein that provide the basis for caring. One way of caring is the objective-scientific view of the world, but, as with the other ways of caring, it too must be grounded in a total view of the world. Any view of the world which limits itself either to the ontological or to the scientific will of necessity overlook many ways of Being-in-the-world which are in themselves genuine and meaningful.

Dasein and Space

The notion of space arises for Dasein in the situation in which Dasein sees things as "close" or as "far away". It is a "felt" space. Heidegger illustrates this by

the example of one who is walking down the street and who sees a friend of his approaching. Objectively speaking the sidewalk is much closer than the friend. However Dasein feels a "closeness" to a friend that he does not feel to the sidewalk of which he may not even be aware. Heidegger draws far-reaching implications out of this ordinary event. The implication is that the space involved in our world of concern is primordial; it is prior to the notion of space as the distance between related objects. To speak of Dasein's spatiality is not to view space as in Dasein or as Dasein in space but to note that to be in space is a necessary way that Dasein is in the world..."as Dasein's own spatiality is essential to its basic state of Being-in-the world"¹.

The modes of spatial awareness either "thought" or "felt" by Dasein presuppose Dasein as already in a world. For Heidegger being-in-space is a part of Being-in-a-world. That Dasein is able to use things in the world as equipment ready-at-hand, available and near in a particular place in a system of relations, is possible only because of the existential a priori of spatiality which Dasein has. Spatiality is a mode of Dasein's Being-in-the-world.

¹Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962). p. 148.

III. The Who of Dasein

Heidegger now answers the question, who is this Being-in-the-world and how does he exist in the world? He now gives a description, not an "evaluation", of the different modes of the self. He tentatively outlines the difference between the authentic self and the inauthentic they-self.

The investigation of the self is undertaken in order to assist in the establishing of a ground for the question of the meaning of Being by deducing the structure of existence.

It is a fact that I am conscious. I am aware that I exist and this awareness presents me with the significance of my own being. However, I can ask: Does it matter that I exist; is it significant? Does my existing make any difference?

In considering the significance of my existence I may imagine what it would be like not to exist. From one point of view my consideration would be absurd because as non-existing I would not be able to know anything at all. However the question is very significant because in entertaining this question I realize that my existence is not a necessary existence and it is an existence which is always in jeopardy. Although I recognize the meaninglessness

in attempting to know what it is like not to be, I am confronted with the fact that at any time my existence can cease to be. I see and realize not-being as a possibility for me and it is this realization which is significant. Does being aware of one's possibility of non-being make any difference to a person or does it not? It is conceivable that it may, for in knowing that I can cease to-be (being) I may take precautions to prevent as well as I am able an accidental demise. Yet we can ask: Is it possible that I can never become aware of the possibility that I may cease to-be at any time? or: In experiencing this awareness of this terrible possibility of ceasing to-be, can I attempt to forget about it by submerging it in my life's activities? Heidegger will examine the two different modes of self: the self which is aware of its non-existence, and the self which does not seem to be aware of the possibility of not being.

For Heidegger, not to be aware of the possibility of non-existence is to cover up the significance of existence. Because of this "cover-up" the analysis begins with that mode of Being-in-the-world which submerges its own self-awareness. To this mode of being, the inauthentic they-self, is contrasted that mode of being which is aware of the significance of being and is called the authentic self.

To understand the question of Being one must also be aware of possibilities, since the significance of Being lies in the realization that for all the ways of Being-in-the-world there is the ineluctable possibility of not-being. It is only after all of Dasein's possibilities are shown that

Heidegger's notions of both freedom and truth can be grounded. Also Dasein, who is in one particular actual mode, can question why he is as that mode and not as any of the other ways of being that are open to a Dasein. What determines Dasein's mode of Being-in-the-world? The only way to account for such determination is through Dasein's mode of Being-in-the-world which is at bottom an either/or decision between the authentic and inauthentic modes.

Either I am determined in my mode of being by the "they" (inauthentic) and I am not taking cognizance of the significance of Being (Being as an issue for me); or as a Dasein I attempt to determine my own (authentic) Being (Being is an issue for me). As authentic, Dasein is aware of the possibility of its not-being and as such is aware of its own finitude. Dasein's finitude is the ontological ground of Dasein's temporality and awareness of time.

In his analysis Heidegger holds that it is impossible to have an analysis of the self starting from a Cartesian "I" which is naked and lonely, so to speak. The primordial "I" or self is always and already a part of a world and a world in which other Daseins are also given. Now if, as Heidegger argues, the total given is a consciousness or a self already involved with a world as Being-in-the-world, then there is no problem of "other minds" because "other minds" are equally primordial with one's own "mind".

In arguing that Dasein is always a self within-a-world and a self with-other-people Heidegger is not forgoing the philosophic attempt to clearly distinguish and limit the

boundaries of the self. The issue here is between the inauthentic and authentic, where the authentic self is by its very being a Dasein which is its own self distinguishable from others. Heidegger's manner of distinguishing and clarifying the self is not in the context of a lone, isolated self and others in a world where subject and objects are separate. Rather Heidegger's context is one of Dasein as Being-in-the-world where the authentic self is a self already in a world and already in association with others. The point to be made here is not that the inauthentic self is alone and that the authentic self is with-others, but rather, that authentic Dasein is in a mode of awareness of others as well as the self and that inauthentic Dasein is in a mode such that in dealing with others Dasein loses sight of the self.

Through the analysis of the world as equipment (ready-at-hand) Heidegger shows that there are other Daseins who also use the world as equipment. The primordial relation to the world as ready-at-hand contains within it the primordial relationship of being with others in the world. The primordial relationship of sharing the world with others may be illustrated with the following example. In walking through my neighbour's yard I am careful not to step on his flowers. As equipment these flowers are of service to another Dasein, my neighbour, and by not trampling them I recognize that this is so. Heidegger asks what makes my concern for my neighbour possible? In order to express concern I must first have the capacity to do so. This

capacity is then prior to my act of concern. That I am able to express this concern is made possible by the existential a priori Being-with. Being-with is an a priori dimension, a mode of Being-in-the-world, of Dasein. My awareness of another Dasein's use of the world as equipment is made possible only because as a Dasein I am essentially being-with. "Being-with is such that the disclosedness of the Dasein-with of Others belongs to it; this means that because Dasein's Being is Being-with, its understanding of Being already implies the understanding of Others."¹

As a Dasein my mode of being in relating to other Daseins is ontologically different from the mode in which I relate to the world as equipment. The possibility of relating in a unique way to other Daseins is the sine qua non of being a self. This is to say that Being-with is an a priori existential. In regard to the existential a priori it may help to note that as the Kantian categories of cause and substance are not the result of abstraction from experience, so also is it the case with Heidegger that his existentials are not the result of abstraction from experience.

The They-Self

Heidegger states that it could be that the "who" of everyday Dasein just is not the "I myself". In a sense, in my everyday self, I am not I. In order to explain this "I am not I", Heidegger again takes up the distinction

¹Heidegger, Being and Time. p. 160.

between the authentic and inauthentic modes of the self. He will explain that when I lose my "I" it is not to some other Dasein that I lose it but I lose it to the "they", a mode of Being-in-the-world of the self.

It is not an original idea to realize that one has a tendency to lose one's independence and knowledge of oneself in the everyday endeavours of one's existence. It was Socrates who exhorted the Greeks with "know thyself" and he saw this motto written on the walls of Apollo's temple at Delphi. As we already know, Heidegger has introduced two different modes of Being-in-the-world: the mode in which I am aware of myself is the self-mode, the authentic; and contrasted to this is the mode in which I have lost track of the self and is called inauthentic.

These experientially grounded modes of being are important only to the extent that they can throw light on the relationship between Dasein and his possibilities. Later Heidegger will show that the possibility to not-being (death) is one of the most revealing modes of Dasein as authentic being.

At the moment Heidegger is concerned with the mode of existence in which Dasein, and Dasein only, is responsible for losing the view of his self. He points out that the meaning of the "they" (das man) is not to be taken as standing for "others" but that the "they" is a characteristic of a mode of Dasein's existence. "Others" can represent relationships that occur in both authentic and inauthentic modes. In the analysis of everyday existence one way of

Being-in-the-world is to be inauthentic in that one loses self-awareness and capitulates to the impersonal mode of the "they". The "they" is grounded in the actual. The contrasting way of Being-in-the-world is the authentic mode in which one is aware of the self and this authentic mode is grounded in the possible.

The analysis of the two different modes results in a description of some basic characteristics of Dasein. From this analysis Heidegger will seek out the ontological ground which will be discussed in the next chapter. Thus far authentic existence is chiefly characterized by Dasein's awareness of possibilities. Heidegger will next discuss the term "Verstehen" which means "understanding". Understanding is the facility by which Dasein becomes aware of possibilities.

IV. Being-In As Such

Heidegger has now used two terms "authentic" and "inauthentic", to designate various modes of existence. The inauthentic mode is grounded in actuality. The authentic mode is grounded in possibility. The inauthentic mode of existing is always a possibility for authentic Dasein and authentic Dasein can be actual. Tentatively, authentic existence can be defined as Dasein acting in accord with self-conscious awareness, and inauthentic is tentatively defined as Dasein not acting in accord with self-conscious awareness. How this self-consciousness is possible in inauthentic and authentic existence is the subject of the next section.

For Heidegger, Dasein is genuinely aware of the self only when Dasein sees itself as having possibilities. To see oneself only as an actual entity is to see oneself as an object, which is basically to see the self as something else. (Dasein is not an object but a "process"). Heidegger will argue that authenticity is grounded in possibility whereas inauthenticity is grounded in actuality. Heidegger will show how Dasein becomes aware of its actual determined existence and, also, how Dasein becomes aware of its possible free existence.

Not only am I aware of what I am now, but I am

also aware of what I could be. "I could be" in the sense of being something that I am not now. Although I am now aware that I am now sitting at my desk writing I can imagine myself vacationing at the beach with my friends. I can utter a meaningful contrary-to-fact sentence. I am aware that I exist in such a way as to be actual. I am also aware that I exist in such a way as to have possibilities. The problem becomes one of explaining how I can exist in such a way as to have two modes of existing, the actual and the possible. The question does not indicate a merely logical or linguistic study revolving around logical or semantic differences between indicative sentences and contrary-to-fact conditionals. What is being brought up for consideration is, in what manner is my actual existence meaningful to me and in what manner is my existence as having possibilities meaningful to me?

We can illustrate this last question with the following examples. I have been arrested and put into prison. My arrest was due to an unfortunate error which I know will be disclosed at my trial. The possibility of my freedom is much more important to me than the actual state in which I find myself. On the other hand, to the leader who has just won an important battle the present actual state of having won is more important than his earlier sense of uncertainty which allowed for the possibility of defeat. In speaking of the North African campaign Churchill said, "Up to Alamein we survived. After

Alamein we conquered."¹

Possibility is not only significant in the sense of the future. Many times we find ourselves in situations or in places where we ask of ourselves, 'Why did I come here?' or, 'Why did I do it?' To ask these questions indicates alternate possibilities and a greater concern for what might have been the case than for what is actually the case now. Our existence is meaningful not only because of what is but also because of what might be or might have been.

Our existence is such that at one time we emphasize the actual and at another time we emphasize the possible. It would seem that a complete philosophy would be one in which both modes of existence, the actual and the possible, were accounted for. If one begins one's account using the language and the thought structures important to the scientific pursuit of the actual, one finds that one cannot go beyond a description of what exists to a description of what might exist or does not exist. Alternately, concentrating on those faculties of mind which tell me what is only possible I cannot get to the actual, because there is no activity of mind which can separate the actual from the possible. Some empiricist theories have attempted to show that the same apparatus which describes the actual is capable of revealing the possible. Some rationalist theories have attempted to show that those faculties which reveal to us possibility can also tell us what the facts are.

¹David Thomson, *Europe Since Napoleon* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 737.

However, both come across as exceedingly weak when attempting to reduce the "possible" from the "fact" or the "fact" from the "possible."

Another tack is to construct a system which will account for both the realm of the possible and the realm of the actual. However, to separate the faculty by which we know the possible from the faculty by which we know the actual results in the problem of dualism. However I do not experience myself as having one life of the actual and another life of the possible. What I am aware of is one life with both the actual and the possible and this awareness genuinely affects my life. The problem is not one of merely describing the two different modes, but one of showing how they do relate and what they are based upon.

Heidegger begins his analysis of Dasein in "everydayness" as it is here that both modes reveal themselves in their total significance. Both modes are equiprimordial and one cannot be reduced from the other. Heidegger will first describe the two modes under "state-of-mind" (actual) and "understanding" (possible) and in a later section will show how they are unified under a more general concept -- the existential called "care". As Heidegger proceeds phenomenologically he first analyzes the two modes of Being before proceeding to care as the ultimate existential. Care will be revealed after this part of the analysis is complete.

Possibility As Prior To Actuality

Aristotle says that "...actuality is prior in substantial being to potency...."¹ As far as his metaphysics is concerned actuality is prior to possibility. Is not Heidegger going against the grain of the metaphysical tradition exemplified by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas?

That possibility is prior to actuality is a principle that runs throughout Being and Time. In becoming aware of possibility one does not need a prior actual experience. Later Heidegger will show that possibility is the means by which one can achieve the transcendental perspective.

In holding that possibility has priority over actuality Heidegger indicates, in part, his disagreement with the metaphysics of Aristotle and Aquinas and his attempt to go beyond these traditions. The traditional metaphysical view holds that act is prior to potency and that actuality is prior to potentiality. Nothing can be unless first grounded in act. Heidegger's criticism of this is that the ultimate base of metaphysics as represented by Aristotle is beings, things that are, and not what it means to be. Once reality is restricted to mean all the existing beings in the world then the "actual" is more real than the possible. Heidegger does not admit to this restriction and is not bound by its limitations. As this

¹Aristotle, "Metaphysics", The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1966). p. 830.

paper progresses it is hoped that one can make sense out of the dictum that possibility is more meaningful than actuality. In understanding the meaning of Being this dictum is crucial.

Authentic Dasein is a Dasein who recognizes the possible mode of existence as more significant than the mode of existence which is actual. This does not mean that the actual mode is not important, far from it. One who conducts his life in an "unrealistic" manner and who is "blind" to reality cannot be said to be authentic.

Perhaps the following example would help our understanding of authentic Dasein. My job involves collecting large sums of money which I return to my supervisor. As my supervisor is a thief he attempts to have me embezzle sums of money. Embezzling the money goes against my conscience. However I do it because I do not want to lose my job. I may even tell myself that I must do it. In this state of inauthenticity I do not entertain any notions of there being possible courses of action open to me other than stealing. Before I stole, stealing was one "possibility" for me. However, I may not have been aware of this because I viewed my supervisor's suggestion so uncritically that I viewed it simply as a matter of course. Had I entertained another possibility, that of not stealing, I perhaps would not have committed a crime. I was not aware of possibilities and it is this lack of awareness of possibilities which makes me exist inauthentically. A possibility is "something" which is not the

case actually. It is an awareness that things need not be in the way that they present themselves.

The Disclosure of the "Here" in Dasein's "To-Be-Here"

Heidegger points out the two ways in which Dasein becomes aware of himself in a world. (1) Through state-of-mind, a mode of existence that reveals the "facticity" of Dasein where Dasein realizes the givenness of the world and Dasein's own thrownness, and (2) through that mode of existence, viz., understanding, that discloses to Dasein its own existence. In this mode Dasein becomes aware of possibilities which are Dasein's own. We shall now consider the analysis.

State-of-Mind

Heidegger first considers that mode of awareness by which the actual is made significant, that is, state-of-mind. The "state-of-mind" or "the state in which one is to be found" belongs to the essential character of Dasein. The state-of-mind is an a priori existential by which Dasein has moods and it has three characteristics; (1) disclosure of "thrownness", (2) disclosure of Being-in-the-world-as-a-whole, and the (3) disclosure that what Dasein encounters in the world "matters" to Dasein. This third characteristic is most important as it leads into the notion of fear. Later we shall see an analysis of fear, where fear is an example of how state-of-mind reveals the actual mode of the

"here".

Dasein is always to be found in a mood. However this "mood" is not to be taken as an occasional attitude of mind that psychologists talk about. Mood will be discussed with "being-attuned".

It is the case that I "find myself" in a situation that I did not choose. I did not choose to be born nor did I choose the circumstances which go to make up my life-situation. I was not consulted as to this state-of-affairs but was thrown into it to make the best of it. There are many things unalterable in my existence. In my moods I can either overlook these unchangeables or meet them. My attitude towards the unalterable may be pro or con, and what is does matter to me. This mode of awareness of the actual, of what is, is called the state-of-mind.

The state-of-mind discloses to me my state of "thrownness". The term "thrownness" means that to some extent, at least, we are determined by conditions and circumstances over which we have no control. However, Dasein has other characteristics which resist and offset the effects of his thrownness. Each of the three characteristics of state-of-mind are marked by the term "disclosure". "To be disclosed" does not mean "to be known as this sort of thing" as Heidegger points out.¹ The state-of-mind discloses the actual "here" of Dasein through one of its moods and the disclosure is never complete. Moods do not

¹Being and Time. p. 173.

reveal all that there is to be known about Dasein's given circumstances. State-of-mind reveals the fact that Dasein is in a world, not why or for what purpose. The "why" and the "purpose" remain as something unknown about Dasein's actual state in the world.

A non-white person in white society experiences discrimination and prejudice because of the colour of his skin. Not having chosen the colour of his skin, he may, in a genuine moment of anguish, question the fact that he was not born white. He may even attribute his state of affairs to "fate", "fortune", or "luck". Apart from physiological considerations the question, "Why was I not born white?" is a meaningless one. However the mode of existence which gives rise to such a plea is meaningful and genuine, and plagues the anguished person's consciousness. "Fate", "fortune", or "luck" is not acceptable as a form of explanation for one's state-of-affairs in the rational inquiry into causes. However, such notions are meaningful in terms of our feelings and attitudes towards the conditions we find ourselves in. Fate is a characteristic in one of the ways I exist, in one of the ways I view the world, and it points to this disturbing lack of comprehension that we have about the "given" in our conditions. The fact of being non-white has a terrible power that necessarily reveals a part of what man is. This fact is a mode of existence whether the non-white accepts his pigmentation or attempts to deceive himself about it.

Heidegger speaks of "being-attuned" which is related to "mood". Dasein lives either in or out of "tune" with the world and the various ways Dasein exists as tuning are called moods. It is an oddity that in seriously reflecting upon one's existence the influence of mood breaks down. This does not happen by accident, as Heidegger argues that mood "discloses Dasein in its thrownness...in the manner of an evasive turning away."¹ How can this be? How can a mood reveal something (disclose it) by not revealing it, by "turning away"?

I have the habit of smoking cigars which I consider bad. My inability to overcome this bad habit causes me moods of guilt and depression in which I feel sorry for myself. I become captivated with my own self-pity, under the influence of a mood, I have directed my attention away from my real concern which is to rid myself of this bad habit.

However, a critical examination of my self and my weaknesses can raise the possibility of overcoming this inherent pessimism which prevents me from further realizing myself. Mood reveals my existence as it is in thrownness by emphasizing the actual, by turning my "gaze" away from considering my possibilities, which is characteristic of the inauthentic self.

As ways in which I become aware of myself, moods, whether of elation or depression, turn my attention away

¹Being and Time. p. 175.

from my existence and turn to the consideration of my circumstances -- my "world". "In every case Dasein always has some mood."¹ Never can I completely get rid of moods nor can moods get rid of me.

Because moods are always with us to some extent, mood cannot become a characteristic of authentic existence or inauthentic existence. It is not the case that authentic existence is "moodless" and inauthentic existence "mood-dominated". One who is unaware of the inevitable or "fallenness" cannot be said to be authentic. "A state-of-mind is that existential which implies a disclosive submission to the world out of which we can encounter something that matters to us."² In one mode of awareness, state-of-mind, Dasein is submissive to the world. Although authentic existence cannot completely free itself of the influence of state-of-mind, it can go beyond the state-of-mind. State-of-mind, as mentioned before, was not a phenomenon that could be added on to an explanation of man under the heading of "feelings". For Heidegger, state-of-mind is a primordial term and stands in the same light in regard to Dasein as cognition and reason.

The analysis of state-of-mind as an existential of Dasein has revealed that when Dasein becomes aware of itself in a world (its "here") this awareness is itself influenced by the unalterability of facts. All Daseins

¹Being and Time. p. 173.

²Being and Time. p. 177.

relate to the world with some awareness that the world is such as to present them with unalterable facts.

State-of-mind is not a psychological account but rather a very important factor in human existence. Even the dispassionate methods of science have for the scientist a mood of tranquillity.

Both the actual and possible modes are significant for Dasein. Dasein's existence becomes aware of the actual mode through the disclosure of state-of-mind. (Later, Heidegger will argue that Dasein becomes aware of the possible mode of existence through understanding.) The state-of-mind is not only a mode of being that discloses inauthentic existence; it is also present in moments of authentic existence. State-of-mind reveals that the world matters to Dasein.

Heidegger argues that prior to an occurrence of any fact there must be a mode of existence which would make that fact significant for Dasein. If this were not the case then no fact would matter to Dasein and, as such, there would be no facts. Since there are facts there must be the prior mode which is an existential, and as an existential is a priori. The existential a priori of the state-of-mind not only shows Dasein as it is as a Being-in-the-world -- "The mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something"¹ -- but

¹Being and Time. p. 176.

it also discloses that Dasein is concerned with the world. "The fact that this sort of thing (what is encountered within the world, the actual, the facts) can "matter" to it (Dasein) is grounded in one's state-of-mind; and as a state-of-mind it has already disclosed the world -- as something by which it can be threatened, for instance."¹

Heidegger uses "fear" as an example of how state-of-mind can function and reveal the actual mode of the "here". Heidegger will later contrast fear with anxiety.

Fear

"Fearing, as a slumbering possibility of Being-in-the-world in a state-of-mind has already disclosed the world, in that something like the fearsome may come close."² Fear, in an actual case, reveals what has always been there, namely, a way of Being-in-the-world so that part of it can threaten us (Dasein).

Fear is not to be seen as an occasional moment of weakness but rather as the vehicle of an important disclosure. What is disclosed is that to-be is an issue for Dasein. One cannot explain fear unless one realizes that fear is only possible because it matters to Dasein to-be. "That which fear fears about is that very entity which is afraid -- Dasein."³

¹Being and Time. p. 176.

²Being and Time. p. 180.

³Being and Time. p. 180.

Fear is a specific mode of attunement. Fear has three aspects: "fear of", "fear itself", and "fear for".

In fear as "fear of" what is disclosed is other beings in the world as something definitely to be feared. This may be a thing or a man which poses a threat from a definite direction. Prior to Dasein's experience of fear as "fear of" Dasein must have already become aware of a whole system of relations, i.e., a neighbourhood, from which something fearsome can approach.

In "fear itself" Dasein discloses something as threatening. Dasein discovers something as fearful because Dasein is not indifferent but in a mode which is open to fearfulness and is threatened by it.

Existential attunement is the required condition for Dasein's ability to be open, approachable, and affected by whatever may come to him from the world. Attunement has already thrown Dasein open to the possibility of being affected in various ways. For example, something like fear could never be experienced by Dasein if Dasein were not already "fearful" and capable of being afraid.

In fear as "fear for" Dasein is always afraid for himself. Dasein has built a world for himself out of his concern for himself and his ability-to-be. Any threat to Dasein, to his property, or to his friends strikes at Dasein as Being-in-the-world.

Fear as a specific mode of attunement discloses the self of Dasein as already thrown into a world of other beings upon which he is dependent.

Heidegger has asked the question: How is fearing possible? He answers that fearing is possible because Dasein has state-of-mind as one of its existentials. State-of-mind reveals that I have a mode of existence which is determined by a concern for what is.

Understanding

There are two ways in which Dasein becomes aware of itself in the world. The first way is through the state-of-mind, a mode of awareness by which the actual is made significant. This has been discussed above. Heidegger now turns his attention to the mode in which Dasein becomes aware of possibilities. That mode of existence which reveals to Dasein its existence is called understanding.

For Heidegger the analysis of understanding provides the basic foundation of fundamental ontology. Heidegger has insisted that Being and Time is an interpretation of the question of existence. It is in this section that Heidegger will discuss "interpretation".

The notion of "understanding" is very important in Heidegger's work for these reasons: it explains how Dasein is aware of possibilities; it becomes the basis of a theory of interpretation; and it provides the rationale for holding the priority of possibility over actuality which conflicts with some "epistemological" theories such as those of Aristotle and Aquinas.

"State-of-mind is one of the existential structures

in which the Being of the 'here' maintains itself. Equiprimordial with it in constituting this Being is 'understanding'. A state-of-mind always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has its mood. If we interpret understanding as a fundamental existential, this indicates that this phenomenon is conceived as a basic mode of Dasein's Being."¹

In the above quoted passage Heidegger claims that understanding is an existential. As an existential it is an a priori. As an existential a priori it reveals a manner in which Dasein exists. Understanding is not restricted to man's cognitive powers. The term "understanding" not only tells how we think but how we are and that thinking is a function of Being. First, understanding reveals to Dasein the structure of Dasein's existence, and only upon this existence-structure does Dasein use understanding in a purely cognitive way.

Understanding reveals to Dasein its mode of Being-in-the-world. It does this by making Dasein "able to be" ("to be able to be"). This potentiality-for-Being must not be understood in the Aristotelian sense.²

¹Being and Time. p. 182.

²Heidegger claims that Aristotle's metaphysics uses for its frame of reference the subject-object dichotomy of science. Within Aristotelian metaphysics the being of things is studied from the point of view of things present-at-hand, that is, ontically. The meaning of the term "potentiality", for Aristotle, is grounded in the scientific inquiry of an entity and calls to mind categories and facts. Heidegger's inquiry into the meaning of what it means to be in ontological, makes use of existentials, and is factual. The term "potentiality" for Heidegger must be understood in

What does it mean "to be able to be"? As a person I am aware that I have an ability to be. I am not merely a piece of furniture present-at-hand in the universe. My own existence is a possibility which stretches out before me, which I am concerned about, and over which I have some control. My state of Being-in-the-world is made up of the fact that I exist and also my ability to exist. This points to the fact that, unlike rocks and desks, I am conscious of myself. To speak of one's ability to exist is not simply to say that that which exists can exist since whatever is actual is necessarily possible. To speak of my ability to exist does not simply mean that I recognize that my actual existence entails the logical possibility of myself.

According to Heidegger I am aware of possibilities and this awareness is possible because I have possibilities. Understanding is rooted in one's ability to be. "Dasein is such that in every case it has understood (or alternatively, not understood) that it is to be thus or thus. As such understanding it 'knows' what it is capable of -- that is, what its potentiality-for-Being is capable of. This 'knowing' does not first arise from an immanent self-perception, but belongs to the Being of the 'there', which

the context of the inquiry into the meaning of Being and not as an inquiry which seeks to determine the essence of things. According to Heidegger, after Plato and Aristotle, the history of philosophy accepted an attitude that resulted in the loss of the question into the meaning of Being.

is essentially understanding."¹ The cognitive mind does not first abstractly consider possibilities and then apply them to life's situation, for one could still ask how these possibilities were known in the first place.

Heidegger argues that before you can know possibilities you must first have possibilities. It is also the case that you may have possibilities and not know them. "Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of."²

Heidegger asks: "Why does the understanding... always press forward into possibilities?"³ He answers that it is because the understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call "projection". The function of understanding is projection -- throwing forward.

Let us recall Heidegger's interpretation of "world" and the notion of "for the sake of". In relating to the world as ready-at-hand the notion of the "for-the-sake-of" occurs, which in turn explains "projection".

The relation of ready-at-hand means that one first relates to the things in the world as use or equipment. The world of Dasein is a world for Dasein's own sake. I use the equipment of the ready-at-hand to accomplish tasks which I have set out to do. However, before the world can

¹Being and Time. p. 184.

²Being and Time. p. 184.

³Being and Time. p. 184.

be viewed by Dasein as one of service, Dasein must see the equipment as presenting itself to Dasein for the sake of what Dasein is about to do. In this way the world becomes significant as it presents itself in light of my projects and my possibilities. Both the ready-at-hand and the present-at-hand are for my sake as, in the latter, one pursues a scientific course to increase one's knowledge which in turn lies at one's disposal.

If Heidegger is correct in his analysis of the world then the world does not only present itself as simple, actual things but also as possible ways of service. In a sense my world, which is made up of my projects, is always a future world, a world not yet realized.

Understanding operates by projecting before Dasein its own possibilities. This is possible because Dasein has possibilities. The world presents itself to Dasein not only as a clustering of simple objects but, more importantly, as a network of possibilities at my service. The world presents itself most significantly not as actualities but as possibilities. It is not the choosing of one possibility over another which makes me free; rather, it is because of the fact that I am free that I can consider and choose possibilities. "As projecting, understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities."¹ The point of the analysis is to show that the ability to have possibilities is not something extra in

¹Being and Time. p. 185.

a world made up of actual objects present-at-hand.

Traditional epistemology sees the cognitive functions of the mind as operating separately from considerations of freedom and capability of choice. Heidegger challenges this view by holding that Dasein can exist in the world in various modes. Dasein can become aware of these possible ways of existing, which generates the purely cognitive function of understanding. The cognitive functions of understanding can be traced to the existential properties of Dasein.

Let us illustrate this point with the following example. I am writing with a black pen. I can ask if it is necessary for this pen to be black and answer that it is not. This pen could have been red. I know that the colour black of the pen is not necessary because I can think of the pen as having a different colour. It is the case that the pen is black but it need not be black. I know it is contingently black because I am capable of thinking in a way that is not determined by what is the case. On the other hand the circle that I am thinking of necessarily has 360 degrees. This is the case because I cannot think it otherwise, say 180 degrees, and still be talking about a circle. The limits of what I can do as Dasein determine the laws of logic. By "can" is meant "to be able". The analysis of how reasoning operates shows that the rules of correct thinking are compatible with and do not exceed Dasein's ability to think. That is to say that what I can do with my cognitive powers, an ability, is prior to the

specification of the principles of reasoning. These "abilities" occur with cognitive awareness which is part of Dasein's being. The determination of logical structures and rules is grounded upon the possibilities of Dasein.

In sum, the cognitive faculties of understanding are grounded in and are secondary to the existential aspects.

Understanding operates by projecting possibilities. Projection is an existential of Dasein which brings to mind our own possible ways of existing. This is an essential characteristic of Dasein. Understanding projects the entire range of Dasein's own possibilities, that is, Dasein itself. Dasein is more than what it is factually but no more than what it is factically. Dasein's factual existence is the ontic present-at-hand and is limited to the actual fact apart from possibilities. Dasein's factical existence is ontological and takes into account possibilities. The factical-ontological account of Dasein's existence considers the meaning of Dasein in terms of Dasein's projects. As there is more to me in terms of my possibilities than there is in terms of my actuality, a much fuller account of Dasein results when Dasein is considered in terms of Dasein's looking-ahead.

An important point in this analysis is that possibilities are known because of our having possibilities. This places knowing (thinking) and existing (being) in a very close relationship.

How is it that possibilities become known to Dasein? Possibilities become known neither through pure

cognition (thinking presupposes possibility and cannot be the result of it) nor through experience (we can experience only actualities). Rather it is the existence-structure of Dasein itself which makes possibilities available. Possibility belongs to the very makeup of the existence of one who thinks. I am able to think of possibilities because I have possibilities, and these possibilities constitute, in part, that which I am as Dasein.

If Heidegger's account is correct then we cannot have a purely cognitive account of epistemology. Plato and Kant felt that reason unaided could tell us what to be, the ideal, while reason through the senses told us what is. However neither succeeded in building bridges between the two realms. For Heidegger the problem of bridging the gap between the "ought" and the "is" does not even exist.

Heidegger builds into his philosophic account of Dasein's mind Dasein's own existence. As "existence" is included in the account of how thought is possible there is no hiatus to be overcome in what the mind conceives abstractly and what is lived and experienced in Dasein's existence. Heidegger points out that "understanding" in German means "to have control over", and what one has control over is one's own existence.

Thus far we have seen that awareness brought about by "state-of-mind" and awareness brought about by "understanding" are equally primordial. That I am in a world, such as it is, and that I exist in such a way as to have

possibilities, are both equally revealed to me as Being-in-the-world, as a person, and as a self; neither one is reducible in terms of the other. As a Dasein I find myself "thrown" into a world and confronted by unalterable facts which are not the less meaningful because I happen to be an authentic or inauthentic existence. In spite of the influences that my state-of-being may have, such as oppression, subjugation, and depersonalization, I cannot escape from my freedom nor deny the reality of my possibilities.

Thus far Heidegger's analysis of what it means to be here in a world has been entirely phenomenological, that is, a "description" of his interpretation of the manner in which the two modes of existence are revealed through self-reflection. An analysis of the ontological grounding comes in Division Two of Being and Time where time is the important factor in the explication.

At this point one may not be satisfied with Heidegger. He has said that understanding is a projection of possibilities. Surely when I understand something I do more than project possibilities. Also Heidegger has argued that the existential characteristics of understanding are prior to the cognitive. We can ask how understanding operates cognitively. How do I come to understand a problem? How does one account for the epistemological role of understanding? Heidegger attempts to answer these questions in his description of understanding as interpretation.

Understanding as Interpretation

Heidegger does not approach his explication of understanding by first accounting for how one knows possibilities and from there giving an account of how these possibilities apply to one's existence. Rather, Heidegger has first given an account of how one's possible ways to-be reveal themselves in self-awareness, and only then does he proceed with an account of how this mode of existing, to-be-able-to-be, is revealed as meaningful assertions. To use a phrase, my existence precedes my "knowing" of it. This is why Heidegger has first discussed the mode of existence as possibility before "interpretation".

For Heidegger, understanding without interpretation is incomplete. I cannot be aware of possibilities that I do not have and in all cases I am somehow aware of the possibilities that I do have. Interpretation does not latch on to understanding as something extra. Interpretation is not something that understanding does only in special circumstances.

Interpretation as a function of understanding manifests what we are as existing beings. This occurs simply because we exist, and to exist as Dasein means, in part, to interpret. As we saw in the previous section, understanding operates by projecting possibilities. Interpretation as a function of understanding works out this projection. Interpretation works out whatever understanding projects. "Interpretation...is the working-out of possibilities projected

in understanding."¹

Interpretation works out and makes explicit only what is within the range of self-awareness. In English, "interpretation" is normally used to refer to the act of interpreting things that one has previously seen or heard (O.U.D.). In giving an account of interpretation Heidegger focuses on the ability of the mind to make manifest and explicit what is already, in some way, within Dasein's experience. As Dasein is Being-in-the-world, what is to be interpreted will be the world as seen as environment and as it is available to us. Environment was previously discussed as the mode of the ready-at-hand which is already given to Dasein.

In order to reveal how Dasein, through understanding's projection of possibilities, makes explicit and reveals what is to be interpreted, Heidegger discusses three points in relation to interpretation: (I) the as-structure, (II) the fore-structure, and (III) meaning.

I The As-Structure

In the view of the world as ready-at-hand there is much equipment to be used by us. If I claim, for example, that a nail-puller, as a nail-puller, must pull nails I am interpreting the nail-puller and, more specifically, I am stating my relation to the nail-puller, which is all that the term "nail-puller" signifies. Interpretation makes

¹Being and Time. p. 188

significant the as. When I state the as-structure of anything, the nail-puller for example, I am pointing out the purpose for which I use something. When I see that something does not function as a nail-puller, i.e., it does not pull nails, I know that it is not really a nail-puller no matter how much it may look like a nail-puller. When I say that it is not a nail-puller I make explicit what is understood in the everyday primordial way in which I deal with nail-pullers.

The as-structure of our understanding is based on the view of the world as ready-at-hand and not as present-at-hand. Seeing the world as ready-at-hand means that we use what is in the world as equipment for our own purposes. The nail-puller is used in order to pull nails; in the world as ready-at-hand equipment has its "in-order-to". A doorknob is there in-order-to-open-a-door, a chair is there in-order-to-sit-upon, and a raincoat is there in-order-to-keep-out-the-wet. It is only because I am familiar with doorknobs, chairs, and raincoats that I can interpret equipment as equipment in terms of its in-order-to. This points out that the particular meanings of things are not "added on" to objects in an abstract and uncaring manner. Heidegger points out that the more I consider a thing (as object) and do not use it, the greater is the degree to which I lose its proper meaning. "In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a

value on it..."¹ In interpreting something I do not add on an external meaning to an experience; rather, I make clear what is already there. What is already there in the world is constituted by the manner and purpose for which I use equipment. Interpretation is the articulation of the object as an in-order-to, which is to emphasize the thing (nail-puller) as a thing (nail-puller). It is the articulation of the as-structure as it is projected by understanding.

II The Fore-Structure

To interpret means to make explicit the as-structure. This requires that certain aspects of that which is interpreted be already in advance of the actual interpretation. Because I am already familiar with doorknobs as something to open doors with, I can interpret a doorknob as a doorknob in terms of its in-order-to-open-a-door. Heidegger grounds his "interpretation" in the fore-structure which is made up of (1) a fore-having, (2) a fore-sight, and (3) a fore-conception.

Fore-Having

Let us consider the following example. I am in a great hurry to go someplace and I wish to use my car. To me the car, as a whole, is a form of conveyance and I do

¹Being and Time. p. 190

not in any way view any of the car's parts with significance. Granted that each particular part of the car is important to the successful operation of the car, I, in my haste, have no concern for this. If nothing goes wrong I at times am so preoccupied with what I want to do that I do not even see the car as a car nor, at times, do I ever remember driving it after I have gotten to my destination.

"The ready-to-hand is always understood in terms of a totality of involvements."¹ My total relationship to all the parts and functions of the car as equipment for my conveyance is summed up in this account by the term "fore-having". Even before I interpret, I have an aggregate of ways in which I can relate to the car which is interpreted in terms of its specific in-order-that. The various ways of relating to the car become clearer when a breakdown occurs and forces me to see the as-structure of the various relationships. When I discover that the car will not start I immediately become aware of the car as a car which is not functioning properly, and I direct my attention to the possible sources of trouble which would not have caught my attention had everything been in order. The starter motor, the battery, the carburettor, and the ignition all make sense to me in the context of the car's purpose which is to convey me. When I check the battery for problems the battery is already in context. The context within

¹Being and Time. p. 191.

which the battery is significant is already in the more general context of the car's significance. It may also be noted that the car's significance is already in a much broader significance. Confronted by this breakdown, what is foremost in my mind is the car's ability to get me to my appointment on time. The significance of the battery is grounded in this ability. I become aware of the battery as battery, ignition as ignition, etc., because of the car's failure to function. "Fore-having" means that in interpretation Dasein must necessarily have a prior awareness of the purpose and functions of the parts before the as-structure becomes explicit.

Fore-sight

When I became aware of the fact that my car would not start, my attention was drawn from the broad function of the car as a means of conveyance and directed to the more specific functions within the car. I am able to do this because I have knowledge concerning how the various parts contribute to the car's operation. In attempting to locate the problem I already know the limits of my concern, viz., the ignition system. This first step in isolating the problem is called "fore-sight". "This fore-sight 'takes the first cust' out of what has been taken into our fore-having..."¹ Both fore-sight and fore-having are seen as prior to the specification of the as-structure. Upon

¹Being and Time. p. 191.

becoming aware of the stalled car I have already a point of view, a fore-sight, which guides me even before I attempt a solution to the problem. As a moment in the development of interpretation, fore-sight makes the articulation of the as-structure possible.

Fore-Conception

As with fore-sight, fore-conception is that which guides us in our interpretation of phenomena. Earlier we saw that fore-sight directed our attention to a more specific and limited area of concern in which the problem was to be solved. Whereas fore-sight directs our attention, fore-conception allows us to conceive the as-structure; it functions by making the as-structure explicit. Fore-conception is that disposition of mind which leads me to interpret the car's not starting to an electrical problem. That is, fore-conception articulates the as-structure and this articulation was set up previously by fore-sight. The thoughts which run through my mind may be that the car is not functioning as a car because it won't start, the starter is not functioning as a starter because it is not getting an electrical charge from the battery, and the battery is not functioning as a battery because it has no charge; it is dead.

The whole import of the analysis of fore-structure is to demonstrate that fore-structure is not a purely cognitive function of the present-at-hand but rather fore-

structure is grounded in Dasein's involvement in the world as ready-at-hand. Interpretation is the articulation of the as-structure as projected by understanding.

III Meaning

It was shown that a nail-puller, as a nail-puller, had to pull out nails. We can say that the meaning of a nail-puller is to pull out nails. For Heidegger, meaning is understanding becoming aware of the as-structure. One understands the meaning of an act as that act in terms of its purpose or use. If I understand the meaning of a handshake I understand the handshake as a handshake. That is, in terms of its purpose which is to demonstrate friendship. The explication of meaning is not focused upon words but rather upon Dasein.

This is an odd way of looking at meaning as in English speaking countries it is usually held that only words or propositions have meaning. In order for something or an act to have a meaning it must first be articulated in a proposition. Heidegger argues that word-meaning is a derivative form of existential meaning and discusses this in the next section on assertion and interpretation.

Heidegger discusses the term "meaning" under the general heading "The existential Constitution of the 'here'." This locates the discussion of meaning as part of the "here" of Dasein in its primordial Being-in-the-world. This means

that Dasein is a person in the world who makes use of the tools and equipment in it. This familiarity with the world is at times demonstrated when Dasein can see various ways in which Dasein makes use of the world. This focusing in on part of the world reveals to Dasein the specific manner in which a thing is used; its as-structure. My awareness of how I make use of the world is meaningful. The projection of possibilities in terms of the as-structure gives rise to meaning. Meaning is, in this way, a mode of my Being-here-in-a-world. As such, meaning indicates a condition of Dasein and not a reference to words or sentences.

In the existential analytic meaning is to be found in understanding as projection. When one articulates projections and interpretations one does not "add on" meaning to the understanding but rather it is meaning's a priori characteristics which makes possible articulation in the first place. One does not articulate and then find meaning in this articulation but rather one first has meaning and then expresses that meaning verbally.

Meaning is grounded in the ready-at-hand and not in the present-at-hand. As Dasein is the ground for its own explanation only Dasein, which is aware of possibilities and views the world as ready-at-hand, can have meaning. Dasein and only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless. Only the world other than Dasein can be absurd where absurd is understood as totally outside the realm of possible meaning.

As Heidegger says, "Meaning is the 'upon-which' of a projection in terms of which something become intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a

fore-sight, and a fore-conception."¹

In other words the structure of meaning is, (1) that specific way in which Dasein relates to the world by viewing it as ready-at-hand and, (2) the fore-structure, that which is already there. Before something can have meaning its specific use or function for Dasein must be made explicit. This something is not in the mode of present-at-hand and as such, is not conceived abstractly. As this something is in the mode of ready-at-hand it is already a mode of Dasein's using. Dasein's specific use of equipment is revealed to Dasein by Dasein in terms of its function for Dasein.

Let us illustrate this with an example. Peter loves Heloise and kisses her as a gesture of his affection. Heloise reflects as to the meaning of this kiss. What did the kiss mean? The kiss was a gesture of affection and this is its meaning. This activity was engaged in by Heloise. It was in the context of Peter's already existing love that the meaning was made manifest to Heloise. The significance of the act was interpreted by Heloise and the act was done for the sake of Heloise. The "kiss" is not the affection and the term "kiss" by itself cannot be analyzed to show the meaning of what happened. The meaning of the kiss is structured on something which is already there and the kiss is interpreted by specifying that which was already there.

For Heidegger an epistemological inquiry is not capable of a sufficient analysis of meaning. Meaning does

¹Being and Time. p. 193.

not apply primarily to words and sentences; Heidegger argues that meaning is a way of existing, a way in which Dasein is able to be. In this way is meaning very much a part of the ontological inquiry.

Heidegger holds that the structure of interpretation is circular; however, he does point out that it is not a vicious circle. Before an inquiry, I have a vague and general awareness of what is to be inquired into. The inquiry or interpretation makes more explicit and clear what I was previously vaguely aware of. A description of the "making-explicit" and how it takes place was intended in the analysis of interpretation.

Heidegger's remarks on circularity and interpretation are to play a key role in his treatment of the question of Being.

Heidegger places the ground of interpretation and meaning in readiness-at-hand rather than in presence-at-hand because he does not want to allow that understanding and meaning can occur apart from Dasein's existential awareness. If by "objective meaning" one understands a meaning significance totally devoid of subjective existential influences then Heidegger would deny that it is possible. To take as our model the scientific view of the structure of knowing is to be misled.

The most important point to come out of this part of the analysis is that by grounding meaning and interpretation in readiness-at-hand Heidegger has made possible the way that the meaning of "being" (to be) can be inter-

preted. If interpretation is in all cases the making explicit (the articulation) of the as-structure projected by understanding in a particular mode of existence, then the mode of existence itself is also available for interpretation. The "as-structure" is moved from a particular way of Being-in-the-world to the question of existence as existence.

Assertion as a Derivative Mode of Interpretation

For Heidegger meaning is primordially a matter of existence and not of judgements and propositions. Later Heidegger will also ground truth, not in a list of true propositions, but in existence as well.

Judgements and assertive or propositional meaning all derive their meaning from, and are grounded in, existential meaning. In deriving the meaning of judgements or propositions the as-structure is shifted from the world as ready-at-hand to the world as present-at-hand. The shift is a change from seeing something as it is used to seeing it removed from its use as it is known theoretically. In the order of ready-at-hand the "as" is called "hermeneutical" and in the order of the present-at-hand the "as" is called "apophantical". The hermeneutical "as" occurs when I view my nail-puller as a thing to use which removes nails. The apophantical "as" occurs when I view the nail-puller as an object out of its environment and attribute certain characteristics to it. To limit one's analysis of language

strictly to the apophantical is to close off not only the hermeneutical "as" in its existential significance but also to shut out the possibility of a fundamental ontology.

In his analysis of "assertion" taken together with our understanding of meaning and interpretation Heidegger seeks to show that the existential significance of meaning comes first.

Assertion is significant in the following three ways as it means: (1) pointing out; (2) predication; and (3) communication. Heidegger defines "assertion" as "a pointing out which gives something a definite character and which communicates."¹ (1) When I "assert" that the nail-puller is too heavy I do not mean this theoretically, but rather I say it in the context of my using it as a tool which is the primary meaning of the nail-puller. (2) Predication means to give something a definite character. Predication is the same as pointing-out only in a much more delimiting sense. Assertion, then, points out and points out a definite characteristic. What is pointed out in predication is not a representation but an actual characteristic of a thing ready-at-hand. (3) "Communication is letting someone see with us what we have pointed out by way of giving it a definite character...That which is shared is our Being towards what is asserted."² I communicate, not a theoretical concept, but the way in

¹Being and Time. p. 199.

²Being and Time. p. 197.

which I relate to a thing as ready-at-hand. When I declare that the nail-puller is too heavy I have pointed out, from among many things, the nail-puller, and I more specifically state and more directly attend to the fact that it is too heavy by the predicate. I share with my listener my inability to handle the nail-puller with ease. In doing all this I do not simply join, by use of the copulative, an indifferent object "hammer" to a theoretical characteristic of "heaviness".

Thus far Heidegger's description of assertion is grounded in the primordial realm of the ready-at-hand and he asserts that, even after the shift from the hermeneutic to the apophantical, it must never be understood as isolated from its existential roots.

Heidegger's analysis of assertion to this point is incomplete and will be more fully explicated in his discussion of truth in Being and Time.

Language

Heidegger argues that the basis of language is not grammar or logic but "discourse or talk". "Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding"¹ and is hence of existential significance. Talk or discourse is an essential characteristic of Being-in-the-world-with-others and, as such, is the basis of language and is expressed in language. Discourse is the

¹Being and Time. p. 203.

meaningful articulation of Being-in-a-world as disclosed by state-of-mind and understanding. Here Heidegger has shifted the locus of truth from propositions to that which grounds propositions, that is, existence.

Dasein as Being-in-the-world relates to the world in an existential manner and this relation is formally expressed in sentences. In this way sentences are derived and grounded in the existential and cannot themselves be the basis of human communication. Talk is the existential ground and talk is expressed in language. Language is used and is ready-at-hand. When language becomes interpreted theoretically in the manner of words and sentences a shift occurs and it becomes present-at-hand.

Heidegger approaches the analysis of talk and language in much the same way he handled meaning and interpretation. In both cases he has drawn out the underlying mode of existence as preparatory to any possibility of an adequate discussion on formal relations and theoretical meaning. Heidegger is arguing that language is grounded in the existential talk which reveals that the purely formal aspects of speech are derivative. In presenting his analysis of talk and language Heidegger is, as he did with meaning and interpretation, laying the groundwork for his theory of truth.

Activities such as "hearing" and "keeping silent" belong essentially to the description of talk as the basis of language. In the give and take of human beings relating to each other, communication involves talking and listening.

In listening, one does not hear noises which are later interpreted as something meaningful. To do so is to theorize and to shift the "talk" to a formal study of sentences. Talk then becomes present-at-hand where I pay attention to the indifferent character of words where previously I heard a message in the ready-at-hand character of language. To abstract the words in a theoretical manner is to leave out much of what occurred in the communication, namely, the existential context.

"Because discourse is constitutive for the Being of the 'there' (that is, for states-of-mind and understanding), while 'Dasein' means Being-in-the-world, Dasein as discursive Being-in, has already expressed itself. Dasein has language."¹ As communication language is "already there"; it makes explicit our talking. "Man shows himself as the entity which talks."² Heidegger points out that talking is a sharing, which is more than an examination of what is simply articulated can reveal.

Heidegger's analysis of "talk" completes his interpretation of what it means to be "here" in a world. Heidegger has discussed the significance of Dasein in a state of "thrownness" and Dasein in a mode of becoming aware of possibilities. Both modes of awareness, state of mind and understanding, are significant for Dasein, which is never simply actual or simply possible. Language, which is

¹Being and Time. p. 208.

²Being and Time. p. 208.

grounded in existential talking, makes explicit to Dasein both modes of awareness. Before Heidegger turns to the final and unitary existential, care as the Being of Dasein, he completes his discussion of the "they".

Falling and Thrownness

Dasein's "fallenness" is the general characteristic specified by (1) idle talk, (2) curiosity, and (3) ambiguity. "Fallenness" has no moral or theological significance. As "fallen" Dasein has become absorbed in the everyday concerns of inauthenticity and as such has lost self-awareness. Inauthenticity is ontologically significant in that it shows, upon analysis, that from which Dasein has fallen, viz., authentic Dasein. Dasein, in the mode of existence called "fallenness", is unaware of the import of what it means for Dasein to be able to be.

Idle Talk

Idle talk is the manner in which Dasein, as inauthentic, articulates a subterfuge by camouflaging the genuine use of language, which is to reveal the significance of what it means to be. At times we realize that in conversations we do not even "talk" to one another, which gives rise to the notion that there is another mode of language in which conversation is discourse and genuine. In speaking about language which is insincere Orwell describes it as "designed to make lies sound truthful and murder

respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind."¹ Heidegger points out at first what is readily available, the inauthentic. Once we understand the structure of the inauthentic mode then the structure of the authentic mode can be revealed.

Curiosity

Curiosity is an existential attitude toward the world and people that is articulated in idle talk. It is neither a passing whim nor a psychological problem, but belongs essentially to Dasein as Being-in-the-world.

Curiosity is an aspect of fallenness in that curiosity contributes to Dasein's absorption in the everyday concerns of inauthenticity. In seeking to lose itself in a world of constant but idle activity and in order to escape from the responsibilities that are a condition of the authentic self, Dasein, by means of idle curiosity continually seeks out new things not in order to understand them but to provide Dasein, in its everyday existence, with new possibilities of delivering itself over to a world free of ontological considerations.

Ambiguity

For those who have mastered the techniques of idle

¹George Orwell, "Politics and the English Language", Inside the Whale and Other Essays (London: Penguin Books, 1964). p. 157.

talk and curiosity, the loss of the self in inauthentic attitudes seems a necessary consequence. Ambiguity, like idle talk and curiosity, belongs essentially to Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Tranquillity characterizes ambiguity, and tranquillity can be seen in the man of science as he concerns himself with indifferent objects in the world. Heidegger does not deny the importance of science; he is merely pointing out that a man who views himself as a purely cognitive calculator is in the inauthentic mode.

Heidegger is not "moralizing". He presents insights into the human condition. These insights into the inauthentic moments of Dasein reveal the structure (fallenness) of how Dasein avoids confronting the ontological question. Although there are many insights which would be beneficial to psychology they are incidental to the main purpose of Heidegger's analysis, which is to throw light on the dimensions of what it means to be, the Being question.

In discussing Dasein's "fallenness" Heidegger shows that the phenomenon of inauthenticity is not merely a vague and general feeling of alienation, but a very definite way of Being-in-the-world which is open to inquiry, and that an analysis of these modes can be done. In the analysis of Dasein's "fallenness" four points emerge.

(1) Dasein's "fallenness" as modes of the everyday "they-self" is characterized by: (a) Idle talk which is the articulation of inauthentic existence; (b) Curiosity as the way in which Dasein inauthentically looks about himself in

a world of interesting but indifferent objects; and

(c) Ambiguity as the manner in which our own self-awareness is hazed over by such limited ways of (a) talking and (b) seeing.

(2) In discussing the inauthentic mode of the "they-self" Heidegger seeks only to describe it and not to evaluate it as loathsome or as despicable and something to be ashamed of. Inauthenticity is accounted for in order that inauthenticity and authenticity be contrasted as progressive moments in the search for the meaning of the Being-question.

(3) Tranquility is that mood which characterizes the mode of inauthenticity. For Heidegger the model of knowledge is not that of the neutral investigator, the accurate knowledge of the computer, or the encyclopedic knowledge of someone who has all the facts. That this is so is because "knowledge of all the facts" is knowledge limited to the ontic actual mode of existence which has tended to "cover-over" knowledge of one's possibilities, and as such is out of touch with the fundamental question of what it means to be able to be. All the ontic knowledge, which is inauthentic, cannot give us an understanding of ontological knowledge, which is authentic.

(4) By starting his analysis with Dasein in everydayness Heidegger shows that inauthenticity is just as real as authenticity.

The preceeding analysis of the existentials has shown that the "different modes of existence on the part

of Dasein...open up different perspectives, project different modes of Being for the thing to be. The possibilities (modes of Being) of things projected by Dasein are relative to the possibilities (modes of Being) into which Dasein projects itself. As Dasein understands -- discloses and acts out -- its own Being, so it understands -- discloses and acts towards -- beings in its world."¹

¹Laszlo Versenyi, Heidegger, Being, and Truth
(New Haven and London, 1966). p. 27.

V. Care As The Being Of Dasein

Heidegger must now establish a single unifying existential which grounds all the others. Not to do this is to leave his analytic with a series of different kinds of existentials, important in themselves, with no apparent purpose in general. If there is going to be a significance for the existentials, starting from the broadest existential of Being-in-the-world and focusing in on the existentials of the self, they must be grounded in one mode of existence that describes Dasein as Dasein. As meaning makes explicit the as-structure, Dasein, if it is to be meaningful, must be articulated as Dasein.

A more important reason for seeking a single unitary existential in Dasein is that if Dasein were not structured on a unitary phenomenon there would be no ground for going beyond the simple listing of Dasein's existentials. Heidegger would lose the avenue to the ontological ground upon which the analysis of everydayness ultimately rests.

The single unifying existential not only links but makes possible Division Two of Being and Time. The abundant phenomenological description of human existence is a preparatory analysis, not merely to provide an existential account of Dasein, but to reveal the ontological ground. As is shown in Division Two, the ultimate ontological

ground of Dasein's existence is time conceived of as temporality. However, in order later to reveal the Being of Dasein as time, Dasein must first be discussed essentially in terms of existence. To do this there must be a singular existential which unifies Dasein and which will allow it to be subjected to the same kind of analysis as the other existentials.

In considering the other existentials Heidegger always subjected them to the same formula: What does it mean to-be in such-and-such a way? Heidegger now asks: What does it mean to-be Dasein.¹ It is the case that in considering each of the existentials Heidegger did tell us what it meant to be Dasein, but always as Dasein in a particular mode of existence, such as, to-be in a world and to-be with others. Dasein must be articulated in regard to its as-structure if we are to know what it means to be Dasein. If we know what it means to be Dasein then the ontological ground of what it means to be can be analyzed.

Heidegger analyzes the phenomenon of dread (anxiety, Angst) and from out of this examination shows that the unifying existential of Dasein is care. Heidegger's choice of dread as that existential whereby the unifying concept of Dasein is shown to be care is not arbitrary, as his argument will attempt to show.

Dread is interpreted in two ways. Dread is a turning

¹In keeping with Heidegger's distinction between an inquiry into the meaning of Being as opposed to an inquiry into essences it would be more appropriate to ask not 'What is Dasein?' but rather 'How is Dasein?'

away from the self and a confrontation of the self. In turning away "that from which we are turning away" is revealed. "In turning away from it, it is disclosed 'there'."¹ Perhaps the following fictitious example, taken from a range of experiences possible for all people, will illustrate the state of affairs called, but not exhausted by, the term "dread".

I have a friendship with another person which makes a specific demand of me. The friendship is such that I recognize a certain obligation, which is difficult for me to carry out, on my part. Confronted by this obligation I turn away, I avoid it. My friend asks me from what I turned away. I reply that I turned away from that which constituted the obligation. It was not because I did not know what my obligation was that I turned away, but because I knew all too well what constituted that obligation. It was in the face of the obligation that I trembled and turned away. Previously my friend and I shared an oath that if one of us was dying and suffering with no hope of life to come, the other would bring about a gentle and easy death. It was in the face of this obligation that I trembled and turned away. It was here also that I learned what terrible burdens could be involved in oath taking. As a youth I had no realization of what I was doing and did it readily. Heidegger wishes to point out that in some cases it is only in situations where I do turn away from something, in this

¹Being and Time. p. 229.

case a commitment, that I grasp its genuine character.

The above example seeks to illustrate what Heidegger means by dread and it is not meant as an analogy of dread.

Dread, existentially examined, reveals the authentic structure of self. We shun knowledge of ourselves and this shunning is "dreadful". Dread exposes our unique self, for in dread we come face to face with our self.

Heidegger will phenomenologically analyse the phenomenon of (1) dread, which discloses the unifying and primordial existential of Dasein, which is (2) to care. Once the existential structure of Dasein has been determined the entire inquiry can be shifted from the analysis of everydayness to the ontological point of view which is time.

Before moving into Division Two, where the ontological ground of caring is shown to be time, Heidegger analyzes (3) "reality" and (4) "truth" from his own unique point of view.

Dread

In the experience of dread the world loses its familiarity and normal significance. An uncanny and weird feeling creeps over me and I find a certain strangeness in once familiar places and relationships. At times I feel as though the "machinery" of my existence has broken down, that I do not belong, and that I am not at "home" in the world. Under such conditions we find ourselves reflecting

upon our own existence. The concerns of our everyday undertakings fall into the background and our existence leaps up into our view as naked as a newborn baby. We gain a new awareness of ourselves apart from our everyday concerns.

These experiences are not occasioned by an entity within the world, and thus do not seem to be really "experiences" at all, at least, not in the sense we are accustomed to. We have the vague awareness that this "uncanny" experience continually lurks in the shadows of our concerns, in the background so to speak, and no matter how we busy ourselves in the foreground of our daily concerns we cannot fail to be influenced by these "experiences". The terms we use, such as "dread", "anxiety", "Angst", to reflect the meaning of the phenomenon, are not as important as the phenomenon itself. What is important is that, for Heidegger, dread is the vehicle which removes us from a concern for the things around us and allows us to reflect upon our own existence. It is of the utmost importance because it focuses on our existence and bears directly upon the inquiry of what it means to be.

In his phenomenological approach Heidegger, in analyzing dread, contrast it with fear. He says, "The only threatening which can be 'fearsome' and which gets discovered in fear, always comes from entities within-the-world."¹
 "That in the face of which one has anxiety is not an entity

¹Being and Time. p. 230.

within-the-world."¹ As described, dread is not the same as fear, because fear always has a definite object that is feared, whereas dread has no specifiable object at all. What bothers me in my state of dread is "nothing". By "nothing" is meant no-thing. What bothers me is my existence, as Heidegger says, "Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious."²

When one is in a state of dread one is bothered by "nothing". Heidegger takes this notion of "nothingness" quite seriously and gives it existential significance. The term "nothingness" in English is usually used in such a way as to have no substantive referent.

By reflecting upon his own possibilities a human being gains an awareness of the fact that he is going to die. This awareness constitutes a unique experience in that ordinary experiences are always associated with the on-going event of one's existence. For example, I anticipate that tomorrow I will read a book. My awareness of what I will do tomorrow goes along with the assumption that I will be here tomorrow, in fact, to read that book. However, in anticipating death, my awareness of the limits of existence gives rise to an experience which is unlike all others. I anticipate an experience which is, in principle, incapable of being experienced. By the term "nothingness" Heidegger means something which is existent-

¹Being and Time. p. 231.

²Being and Time. p. 232.

ially significant but which is at the same time totally incapable of being the object of an experience.

Ontically there is no such thing as a nothingness. No metaphysical properties can be applied to it. However, it cannot be denied that a person, in contemplating the termination of his existence and the possibility of his ceasing to be, experiences an unusual kind of awareness.

"Death" and "nothingness" are not two different terms with the same meaning or significance. In a sense one can anticipate the experience of dying and the experience of having life snatched from one, and as such "experience" a certain "fear". Awareness of the possibility of being able not to be is quite different. For Heidegger the "not", the "nothingness", looms large in its existential significance but has no metaphysical referent.

Dread is the existential which reveals to us nothingness. Dread, as a state-of-mind, is the mode of what is, the actual. To the extent that dread is seen as state-of-mind, it reveals how we "are" in the world. We "are" in the world as thrown and dread brings us face to face with our own thrownness. "Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about -- its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities."¹ In dread we are aware of our Being-in-

¹Being and Time. p. 232.

the-world as alien to us. We are no longer at home in the world and can get no consolation from the "world" nor from Dasein-with of Others. Dread individualizes. As an individual I become aware of my possibilities. Now we see about what it is we are dreading. We dread being able to be ourself -- our authentic existence. Dread forces us to choose between being genuinely ourselves as revealed in our being-able-to-be or to turn away from authentic existence and rest fettered in the security of the averageness of the many. Here, in the tranquility of everydayness, Dasein can gain sanctuary from the awesome self which makes it choose. In dread Dasein cannot avoid confronting the self; Dasein can only turn away. In dread "there lies the possibility of a disclosure which is quite distinctive; for anxiety individualizes. This individualization brings Dasein back from its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being. These basic possibilities of Dasein (and Dasein is in each case mine) show themselves in anxiety as they are in themselves, undisguised by entities within-the-world, to which, proximally and for the most part, Dasein clings."¹ This is dread manifesting the difference between the world and the self.

The primordial meaning of dread, "uncanniness", is to feel "not-at-home". The inauthentic they-self was described as Dasein's state-of-being comfortable in the

¹Being and Time. p. 235.

unexamined and uncritical life of the "they". Dasein is at home in the everyday they-world. However, dread sweeps away the security of being-at-home. Dread, in its uncanniness, makes us feel no longer at-home. Feeling no longer at-home I am forced to attend to my own Being and not to that mode of existing called the "they".

Dread focuses, more than any other existential, on my existence. Thus Heidegger views dread as the best way to isolate and describe that existential which uniquely manifests Dasein as Dasein.

Heidegger does not claim that dread is the only avenue to the authentic self. It is merely an example, the best example, which most readily gets us to the primary existential of Dasein. Dread reveals many important aspects of the analytic which other existentials do not. Consciousness can become aware of itself as itself by setting Dasein apart from its surroundings and presenting it with the choice of how to be. Heidegger has shown that dread is a genuine possibility for Dasein.

The primordial existential of Dasein is care as shown by the analysis of dread.

Care

Care as the Being of Dasein means that for one to-be is to-care. Everything that I do -- my projects in the world, reflecting upon myself and my predicaments -- are all ways of caring. During the times I care the most

my existence reveals itself most profoundly. When I care deeply, as in love, terror, courage, or guilt, my unique existence manifests itself.

Heidegger, in the existential analytic, gives the following reasons why care is the Being of Dasein and says what care means.

In the analysis of everydayness and falling Heidegger showed that Dasein was in a mode of fallenness. In the mode of fallenness Dasein's falling was a turning away from the self by opting for the cares and interests of the inauthentic world of the they-self. Fallenness indirectly reveals a kind of care on the part of Dasein. In opting for involvement in the they-self Dasein expresses a kind of care for that particular way of Dasein's Being in the world.

In opting for involvement in the they-self, that very mode of Being in the world gives Dasein no opportunity for reflecting upon this involvement. It is part of the manner in which Dasein exists as the they-self not to entertain questions concerning the self but, rather, to dismiss such questions. We have seen how the phenomenon of dread wrenches Dasein from its complacency in the they-world and forces Dasein to reflect upon the self. Dread individualizes Dasein by isolating it from the world and from others. Although dread cannot force upon Dasein authentic existence, it does present authentic existence as a possibility for Dasein. Heidegger's analysis of dread as that which isolates existence prepares the way for

considering Dasein as Dasein.

We have seen the analyses of Dasein reveal existentials such as Being-in-a-world, Being-with, and Being-in, all of which express Dasein's relation to things other than itself. Three existentials in Heidegger's analytic are dominant. (a) Understanding is the mode of awareness by which the self, as able to be, the possible, is made significant. (b) State-of-mind is the mode of awareness by which the self, as actual, is made significant. (c) Fallenness reveals in the mode of fallenness, the manner in which Dasein absorbs itself in the idle-talk, the curiosity, and the ambiguity of inauthentic existence. This threefold character of the self; understanding (existentiality), state-of-mind (facticity), and fallenness (Being-fallen), will constitute the primary existential of Dasein as care.

In reviewing the threefold characteristics of Dasein, Heidegger succinctly expresses what has been said up to now. "...anxiousness as a state-of-mind is a way of Being-in-the-world; that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world; that which we have anxiety about is our potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Thus the entire phenomenon of anxiety shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world. The fundamental ontological characteristics of this entity are existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen."¹

¹Being and Time. p. 235.

In terms of the meaning of Dasein as Dasein, Heidegger discusses the three following existentials;

(a) understanding, (b) state-of-mind, and (c) fallenness.

(a) Existence. -- Understanding is the projection of possibilities. In terms of the self, understanding projects before itself its own possibilities, because Dasein has these possibilities and is these possibilities. Understanding is applicable to both authentic and inauthentic existence. In authentic existence understanding projects possibilities which make one's own Being significant. In inauthentic existence the understanding, unmindful of the self, projects possibilities which make the Being of the "they" significant. This aspect of what it means to be as an issue for Dasein is called Being-ahead-of-itself. The structure of Being-ahead-of-itself does not refer to that which is not yet the case but, rather, to those actual qualities that make the future significant for Dasein.

(b) Facticity (State-of-mind). -- Being-ahead-of-itself designates not a freedom to act arbitrarily but a recognition of one's state in the world limited by that world. There are things about me which I cannot alter, as I cannot alter some things in the world. I have been thrown into the world without having had any choice in what kind of person I wanted to be or to look like, and without having had a say in determining what kind of world I find myself in. Hence Dasein can be further and more explicitly characterized as Being-ahead-of-itself-

already-being-in-a-world. Besides having possibilities, I have an actuality which limits me. My existence is factual because understanding always has a state-of-mind. My possibilities are essentially determined by my facticity.

(c) Fallenness (mode of fallenness). -- Fallenness means that Dasein as Dasein is occupied with everyday inauthentic events. Fallenness is not an occasional attitude but belongs essentially to Dasein as Dasein. Heidegger calls this preoccupation with the concerns of daily life Being-alongside.

Heidegger states that the existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole is "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)"¹ For Heidegger this Being fills in the signification of the term "care". Care means to be ahead of oneself already involved with entities within the world. Care can be caring about (concern) something as in, I care about flowers, cars, movies, and television. Also, care can be caring for someone as in, I care for my wife, my family, and my friends.

Heidegger's care is primordial and cannot be reduced to wishing, hoping, willing, urging, etc., etc. Rather these phenomena are grounded in care. All the existentials that Heidegger has used to describe Dasein's self such as Existentiality, Facticity, and Fallenness are

¹Being and Time. p. 237.

also grounded in care.

Reality and Worldhood

The distinction between ready-at-hand and present-at-hand has already been drawn. It was noted that any attempt to develop metaphysics out of the view of the world as present-at-hand, where things are a collection of objects, is mistaken. Reality, as indicated by traditional metaphysics, consists of objects that are present-at-hand in the world. To limit one's view of reality in this way is to overlook another genuine and meaningful way of viewing the world which is even more primary than present-at-hand. It follows from the view of reality, where reality is an aggregate of objects that Dasein, too, should be present-at-hand in the world as any other object. Heidegger interprets reality not as the presence-at-hand of objects but as care. To interpret Dasein, the world, and reality as objects is to involve oneself in insurmountable problems such as the existence of the external world and the problem of other minds. Heidegger, in keeping with his distinction between ready-at-hand and present-at-hand, interprets reality and the world, as care. Dasein's primordial existential is care most generally understood as Being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world, Being-with, and Being-in are existentials which express three ways in which Dasein relates to things other than self and which as existentials are based on

care. To direct one's view to reality is to exercise a particular mode or way of existing. Reality, then, is based on care. Reality is not to be understood in an ontical sense but as a mode of Dasein's interpretation of the world.

In his second meditation Descartes uses a ball of wax to show what he means by substance and accident. The essence or substance of the wax is its pure extension. What the wax feels like, its colour, its smell, and its shape are "accidents". Descartes' analysis makes no mention of how the wax is used or what purpose it serves. According to Heidegger, using the wax is the primary way in which we relate to it. Descartes' ultimate meaning of the material wax is to occupy a space, to be extended. The meaning of material substance for Descartes is to take up space and constitute the objects of the universe. Material substance is viewed merely as present-at-hand, as objects of thinghood here, as furniture in the universe. In order for objects present-at-hand to become of use or purpose as ready-at-hand, another substance, a thinking substance, must bestow or add on value to objects. Referring specifically to the sixth meditation Descartes says, in his synopsis of the six meditations, "Here I show that the mind (or soul) of man is really distinct from the body, and that nevertheless it is so tightly bound and united with it that it forms with it what is almost a

single entity."¹ The word "almost" which occurs in the latter part of the quote is small and simple, but its impact on the history of philosophy has been great, as the dualism of mind and body has given rise to such theories as interactionism, double aspect theory, occasionalism, parallelism, and a plethora of others.² This state-of-affairs has been named the "mind-body problem".

By the term "world" Heidegger has included present-at-hand, which Descartes does, and other far more immediate and primary ways of relating, which Descartes does not. As present-at-hand and ready-at-hand are two different and genuine ways of relating to the world, neither one by itself can exhaust what is in the world.

Heidegger has shown that the world exists as a mode of Dasein whose most basic existential is care. In the existential analytic we learned that there was no possibility of an isolated or pure subject. This is due to Dasein already having a world by its very constitution as expressed by the a priori Being-in-the-world. To "prove" the existence of a world is to misunderstand the nature of this existential. In turning our attention to reality we are, in fact, considering a mode of Dasein's Being-in-the-world which is essentially care. Hence, reality is based on care.

¹Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur (Bobbs-Merrill, 1960). p. 74.

²Richard Taylor, Metaphysics (Prentice-Hall, 1963). p. 13.

This particular emphasis on reality means that reality is dependent on man's existence. This is so because reality, which does not mean real things, is a mode of existence and, as such, the phenomenon of reality cannot occur without Dasein. However, this is not to say that the existence of the material world is contingent upon Dasein. What is said of reality here can be said of Being, that is, that only as long as there is a Dasein is there Being, a to-be. This points out that only a self-conscious entity can know what it means to be.

Substance and reality are two modes of Dasein's relating to the world and to itself. As such they are derivative from Dasein and Dasein cannot be described or defined solely in terms of them.

Theory of Truth

In discussing truth Heidegger is not concerned with establishing a criterion for truth. The discussion is primarily devoted to the essence or meaning of truth. Heidegger is interested in finding out not only when something is true but what truth is as such, its essence. The ways in which truth can be recognized, its criterion, is derived from the nature of truth. In discussing the criterion of truth Heidegger finds the correspondence theory of truth to be the most amicable in regard to its presuppositions and his interpretation of truth's essence.

For Heidegger the essence of truth is disclosure.

He interprets the Greek word for truth, "alethia", to mean "unhiddenness".

In our experience we find what Heidegger refers to as "unhiddenness". In others (or in ourselves) we have experienced role-playing where someone hides behind a mask, like the early Greek actors, and pretends to be what he is not, that is, other than he actually is. This is a deception which does not allow others to get to know the "true" picture of that person. That person remains obscure and his self lies hidden not only to others but even perhaps to himself. In other cases we know of a person who does not hide behind masks or role-play and we say that our awareness of him is a true one. We know him as he is. Here "truth" means something like revealing, opening up, disclosing, nakedness. James Joyce called his insights into what truth is, "epiphanies", or manifestations.

In explaining what he means by truth as unhiddenness, and arguing that such a view of truth is primordial, Heidegger begins with an analysis of the traditional theory of truth as correspondence.

He points out that Aristotle and Aquinas emphasized that truth is the correspondence of the mind with the thing, and both located truth in judgments. Heidegger asks how this correspondence is to be interpreted. It cannot be a one-to-one correspondence. My idea of a cat is not furry, nor is it, like the cat, heavy. It cannot be a representation that bridges the idea and the thing known, because in asserting a proposition I do not point out a

representation but the thing itself. When I say that the nail-puller is heavy I am not joining two concepts, heaviness and nail-pullerness, by a copula, but rather am pointing out how I relate to the tool and the difficulty that I have.

A man with his back to the wall says that the picture hanging there is tilted. The man does not say that a representation is tilted but that the picture itself is askew. According to Heidegger the phenomenon of confirmation is the basis of correspondence. In the traditional theory of correspondence something was shown to be true because its truthfulness was demonstrated or confirmed. When the man turns around and sees the picture hanging crooked on the wall his previous claim has now been confirmed. According to Heidegger the very basis of the traditional theory of truth as correspondence is "to show itself as it is". To say that the man's "idea" of the picture being askew corresponds to the "fact" that the picture was askew meant in the traditional theory that the observance of the fact would confirm the statement. "To show itself as it is", or confirming, is the ground of the traditional correspondence theory of truth. To be true means to be uncovering.

The simple criterion of correspondence is not as important and primordial a characteristic of truth as is "how something shows itself".

Truth as Uncovering: "To say that an assertion 'is true' signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in

itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, 'lets' the entity 'be seen' in its uncoveredness. The Being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as Being-uncovering. Thus truth has by no means the structure of an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense of a likening of one entity (the subject) to another (the Object)."¹ The truth of knowing something is evident when that which is known is demonstrated. If I say, "The painting on the wall behind me is crooked" the truth of this proposition demonstrates itself when I turn around and see the picture hanging crookedly. The judgment is a demonstration, a showing, and not a syllogistic proof, of "what is". The judgment is confronted by that about which it is a judgment. What is demonstrated or shown is not a correspondence between the intellect and the thing but solely a discovering of the disclosedness of the being the judgment is about. The object itself is shown as it is in itself -- in its identity. The truth of a judgment is confirmed and based on being discovering, i.e. disclosing that which is as it is. Being-true is understood as being-discovering.

In its first and most real sense truth refers to Dasein and not to objects. If truth is an uncovering it must be a characteristic of Dasein. Only in the sense that an entity is uncovered can it be said to be true. It is Dasein which uncovers and discloses. In his chapter called

¹Being and Time. p. 261.

"Being-in-as-such" Heidegger has sketched out in his analysis how Dasein uncovers and discloses. In that chapter Heidegger interpreted Dasein in terms of the three existentials: state-of-mind as thrownness, understanding as projection, and the mode of fallenness as fallenness. Heidegger, in discussing truth, turns our attention to the role that Dasein plays by mentioning the analysis of thrownness, projection and fallenness.

The "definition" of "truth" is "uncoveredness". Dasein is "Being-uncovering". "Being-true as Being-uncovering, is a way of Being for Dasein...The most primordial phenomenon of truth is first shown by the existential-ontological foundation of uncovering."¹ As an entity that uncovers, Dasein is an entity "in the truth". Dasein uncovers itself as factual, that is, limited by the actual; as existential, that is, understanding projecting its own possibilities; and as fallen, that is, closed to its own possibilities by the concerns of everydayness. For the most part, in fallenness, Dasein does not reveal itself but is "closed-off" and "covered up". With fallenness Heidegger introduces the notion of untruth. Dasein as fallenness is in "untruth". Truth as uncoveredness must always be wrested from entities which get snatched out of their hiddenness. "The factual uncoveredness of anything is always, as it were, a kind of 'robbery'."² In a way, the truth is a

¹Being and Time. p. 263.

²Being and Time. p. 265.

violation of the way in which states of affairs normally are. It was shown in the existential analytic that the normal state of affairs was everydayness and inauthentic existence out of which the basis of authenticity was glimpsed. In inauthenticity Dasein avoids areas which may expose and reveal Dasein's true self. With this in mind one can realize where the true self lies hidden by noticing what it is that Dasein avoids, viz., responsibility, commitment, freedom.

In regard to the phenomenon of truth Heidegger holds that truth belongs to Dasein primordially, that Dasein is both in truth and in untruth, and that propositional truth is a derived form of truth as uncovering.

The Kind of Being Which Truth Possesses: It has been pointed out that truth is an existential of Dasein and, as such, truth is a characteristic of Dasein. The being of truth is contingent upon Dasein's existence, and without Dasein there can be no truth.

To say that truth depends on Dasein is not to say that Dasein "determines" what is the truth or that Dasein can arbitrarily assign truth values. The point is that because truth is defined in terms of an unhiddenness which has been disclosed, and since Dasein is the only entity that discloses, then truth can only exist as a mode of Dasein's existence.

The entire import of the existential analytic rests upon Heidegger's unique way of viewing truth. If truth were not intimately a part of human existence then

Heidegger's analysis would not be "true". The self-reflective activity of Heidegger's hermeneutic interpretation is rendered as possibly true because truth for him is an essential characteristic of Dasein's coming to be aware of itself through the disclosure of Dasein's actuality, possibility, and fallenness. The existential analysis culminates in the awareness that the disclosure of Dasein as Dasein is the foundation of truth.

To be aware of oneself as being exposed and disclosed is what truth itself means. That truth lies in being disclosed, and revealing oneself as one exists, has all been meticulously argued for, in the entire existential analytic, from the point of view of everydayness. Heidegger's own philosophizing is made possible by an account of truth as a phenomenon. Truth as phenomenon also opens up an avenue of inquiry into what it means to be which has been closed by the traditional views of reality.

VI. Conclusion

Heidegger has sought to analyze the nongeneric meaning of Being as such. Division One of Being and Time is primarily devoted to a preparatory examination of the Being of man. Division Two, which is not the subject of this paper, is devoted to a higher kind of analysis of existence which follows from Division One and which is needed to achieve a truly fundamental ontology.

In Division One Heidegger has attempted to thematize the vague awareness that one has about Being. As we have seen, one's vague awareness of what it means to be as Dasein is grounded and intimately connected to Being as such. The process whereby Dasein becomes Dasein has been delineated by a set of disclosures which has revealed a set of interconnecting structures called existentials. This process, called the existential analytic, has not only demonstrated what it means for Dasein to be Dasein, but has also provided a set of clues as to the nature of things other than Dasein and, more importantly, it has served to point to the nature of Being itself.

Dasein's Being has a reflexive characteristic which makes the understanding of its own being in its various modes possible. In being aware of itself as existence Dasein is aware of its understanding-of-Being.

A fuller treatment of the understanding-of-Being was to have been undertaken with the addition of a division three for Part One and a proposed Part Two. To date division three and Part Two have not appeared in print.

For Heidegger the crucial feature of Dasein is its relatedness to itself -- the reflexive characteristic of Dasein's self-awareness. It is in the phenomenon of self-awareness that Dasein's reflexivity is manifested. For Heidegger, in keeping with the phenomenological tradition and in direct opposition to Descartes, one becomes aware of oneself at the same time one becomes aware of something other than oneself. Self-awareness is always mediated; one becomes aware of oneself while standing in relation to something else.

In discussing that which mediates self-awareness Heidegger goes beyond the ontic level of Newtonian nature and seeks something ontologically more basic than Kant's categories and pure forms of sensibility. In working this out Heidegger reveals and describes things as they are in themselves, as well as the phenomena that make experience of these things possible.

Dasein is the name given to the interrelated, equiprimordial elements which constitute the phenomenon of self-awareness. Heidegger has distinguished between the actual, empirical awareness of oneself on the one hand, and the structures of Dasein which make this empirical awareness possible on the other. The former relates to the ontic level of Newtonian nature. The

latter relates to the ontological moments of Dasein which is constituted by mediated self-awareness in its structural possibility. Here, in being aware of itself (existence), that of which Dasein is aware is its understanding-of-Being. Thus Dasein's being is its understanding-of-Being.

We have seen that, with the exception of Dasein's existence and the existence of other Daseins, things within one's world have as their mode of being either "present-at-hand" or "ready-at-hand". The former refers to the being of things as viewed from within the structure of Newtonian nature and is understood ontically. The latter refers to the being of things as viewed from within the structure of use and purpose (equipment) and is understood ontologically. The being of things in their mode of "ready-at-hand" serves the mediating function for self-awareness on the ontological level.

We have seen that self-awareness through the process of mediated self-reflection is constituted by three basic components: "state-of-mind", "understanding", and "discourse" ("talk").

For Heidegger one's world is the necessary condition for the possibility of one's experience. One can experience something only in terms of one's world. One's world is the mediator of all knowledge with the single exception of that knowledge which is knowledge about one's world itself. As one cannot know the world except in terms of the world itself, knowledge of the world must be immediate rather than mediated. State-of-mind, specifically as

mood, is the primary source of this immediate knowledge.

We have seen how the mood of state-of-mind functions by disclosing Dasein's "thrownness" -- the bare fact that one exists without the knowledge of a reason or of a purpose for one's being.

One's moods also disclose one's "Being-in-the-world" as a whole where "Being-in-the-world" indicated the fundamental structure of Dasein. In the analysis of what it means to be here in a world, the here was shown to function in the same way as "Being-in-the-world". Dasein's self-awareness always includes an awareness of something other than itself. Dasein is a being whose being is in-the-world as always enmeshed in the structures of its concern. While enmeshed in the world of its own concern, Dasein comes to distinguish itself from the objects of its concern by means of that world of concern. In this way Dasein becomes itself explicitly as self-awareness which discloses to Dasein Being-in-the-world as a whole which makes it possible, in the first place, to direct oneself towards something. Intentionality is thus grounded in reflection.

Moods disclose the state in which one is to be found as 1) one's encounter with oneself in the fact that one is and 2) the structure of Dasein in terms of which experience takes on cognitive dimensions. Moods reveal both one's world, which is a constitutive element of the structure of one's Being, and the simple awareness of oneself as existing. Thus moods have the important task

of revealing Dasein's Being. For Heidegger the most fundamental mood is that of anxiety, which brought Dasein to its most primordial encounter with itself as Dasein.

In becoming aware of something other than oneself, one becomes aware of something as actually or potentially useful for one's purpose. Things ready-at-hand get their meaning significance from one's purposes. It is in light of one's purposes, then, that things ready-at-hand have a cognitive interpretation which is a functional one and only a functional one. Yet in order to have a purpose one has to be aware of oneself, and self-awareness was shown to be mediated by something other than oneself where the 'other' was constituted by things ready-at-hand. Heidegger introduced the notion of "understanding" as that which projects a basic purpose for the self. In terms of understanding projecting a basic purpose for the self, the self becomes aware of itself, while at the same time providing a ground within which things other than self are perceived in their character as equipment and as functional. Understanding's act of projecting a purpose belongs to the essential character of Dasein, and in part constitutes that situation whereby Dasein becomes Dasein. In some sense the act of understanding must precede man. The act of understanding provides a frame of reference, a world, in terms of which experience can become meaningful.

The last thing to be considered in Heidegger's explication of the phenomenon of self-awareness is its final constitutive factor, "Rede" or discourse. As we have

seen, the doctrine of self-awareness holds that before one can become aware of oneself, one must at the same time become aware of something other than oneself. This doctrine presupposes that the "self" can find itself in the presence of something which is other than itself. "Rede" or discourse performs this function. Discourse brings to the foreground and manifests that which otherwise is hidden and renders it "discussable". Discourse discloses and fixes into language that which can be meaningfully articulated and thus conceptually understood. It does so in such a way that everything which is said about it is drawn from discourse itself. Discourse, for its part in self-awareness, provides the necessary ground upon which Dasein, as Dasein, comes upon itself. Discourse is a principal factor in the process whereby the self is brought into an awareness of something which is other than self and which determines the other in order that it become an object of cognition. As discourse belongs essentially to Dasein as constitutive of being-in-the-world, only Dasein can be meaningful, whereas all else is absurd or meaningless.

Taken together, discourse, understanding, and state-of-mind are the factors involved in the process called self-awareness. In being aware of something, one must be aware of it in terms of one's Being-in-the-world as a whole, where awareness of one's world acts as the necessary mediator for all experience.

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