

UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

Mirroring the Ambitions and Realities of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union

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BY
ADRIAN VANNAHME

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Policy of the European Union

BY

Adrian Vannahme

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MASTER OF ARTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	II
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	IV
 CHAPTER I	
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY	1
CHAPTER OVERVIEW	4
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY	8
THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION	10
A REVIVAL OF FOREIGN POLICY COOPERATION: THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION	11
THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT	13
SAINT-MALO	16
FROM CFSP TO ESDP	21
 CHAPTER II	
THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE COMMON DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICY	24
HOW DO THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OPERATE?	25
THE CSDP – AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY	34
THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS OF THE COMMON DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICY	38
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY	42
IMPLEMENTING THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY	48
THE CSDP – A MILITARY-CIVILIAN POLICY	54
BUILDING A COMMON STRATEGIC CULTURE	56
 CHAPTER III	
REALITIES AND CHALLENGES OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY	60
EUROPE’S IMMOBILE ARMIES	60
THE BATTLEGROUPS: A SOLUTION?	65
INADEQUATE CAPABILITIES OF THE EU	68
THE FUNDING PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN ARMIES	70
A EUROPEAN SINGLE MARKET – BUT ALSO IN THE FIELD OF DEFENCE?	73
THE INSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE CSDP	80
EUROPE’S LACK OF A COMMON TRADITIONAL STRATEGIC CULTURE	85
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HUMAN SECURITY BASED STRATEGIC CULTURE	88
CASE STUDY: THE CSDP MISSIONS	92
LESSONS FROM THE MISSIONS OF THE CSDP	96

CHAPTER IV 102

NATO, CANADA AND THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: COMPETITION, THREAT OR COOPERATION? 102

AMERICAN VIEWS OF NATO 103

THE EUROPEAN POSITION ON NATO 105

FURTHER ISSUES IN EU-NATO COOPERATION..... 115

CANADA AND THE EU: A LOT OF COMMON GROUND 121

THE CURRENT EU-CANADA COOPERATION FRAMEWORK 124

CANADIAN VIEWS OF THE EU ROLE IN NATO 130

CHAPTER V 135

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY..... 135

BIBLIOGRAPHY 148

PRIMARY SOURCES..... 148

BOOKS..... 151

ARTICLES..... 153

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CHAPTER I

The History and Development of the Common Security and Defence Policy

Since its beginnings with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the European Union has moved far beyond economic ideas of a single market, a single currency or the removal of all trade barriers. The European Union has become more and more politically integrated as member states place a growing number of policy areas previously held nationally in the hands of the supranational and intergovernmental institutions of the European Union. While prior attempts to bring security and defence issues or foreign policy matters into a European Union framework were largely ineffective, the last ten years have shown an important shift in these areas, leading the European Union to adopt not only a Common Foreign and Security Policy but also a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as well as a concise European Union Security Strategy.

This dissertation will argue that while the European Union is becoming increasingly integrated in areas pertaining to defence and has produced a framework for a Common Security and Defence Policy, serious shortcomings prevent the CSDP from becoming an effective military tool in the near to medium future. Over the past 60 years, the European countries have worked to agree a common framework and a common policy on defence. Now the EU must back the rhetoric and institutions which have emerged from this cooperation with capabilities. This thesis will argue that there is a substantial gap between current European defence capabilities and its aspirations in the field and explain which underlying factors contribute to this

gap, despite clear rhetorical commitments to the Common Security and Defence Policy. This gap will need to be overcome if the EU wants to realise its ambitions. It will contrast European Union defence aims, as expressed in European Union publications, with actual European Union defence capabilities and institutions and experiences in the field. This thesis will also analyse whether more fundamental differences regarding strategy or political unwillingness to commit to military action add to the capabilities-aspirations gap.

The conditions for a common defence policy are almost as good as after the Second World War, due to the progressive retreat of US forces from Europe, and the deeper integration between European countries. The reduction of US military personnel in Europe could lead EU member states to take security more into their own hands as reliance on US protection becomes less assured. This does not mean that the US is ‘abandoning’ Europe but rather that US strategic and geopolitical interests have shifted away from Europe. This is illustrated by the substantial reduction of US troops stationed in Europe. Due to the size and state of European forces, coordinated and joint efforts to ensure Europe’s security make more sense from a financial and a security perspective than if for example Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands or Austria each had armies aimed at guaranteeing their own security (which they cannot do effectively anyway). This thesis will assume that cooperation and durable peace between EU member states is a given. In this context, the EU has formulated its Defence and Security policy, which is arguably Europe’s most ambitious project of integration as security has traditionally been an area that has remained under the control of national governments and therefore only reaches an intergovernmental mode of cooperation at the EU level. Nevertheless, the CSDP has set relatively clear goals for itself, which go beyond mere ideas of achieving a defence pact such as

NATO. In fact, the CSDP appears to concentrate on the Petersberg tasks¹ leaving territorial defence completely in the realm of NATO and of the member states. These goals include, but are not limited to, bringing stability to the Union's periphery, becoming a more persuasive and active global player, to improve European military capabilities to such a level as to allow the EU to take on the first two tasks, to build a comprehensive crisis management policy including civilian elements and finally to establish a common strategic culture in Europe that would bring the geopolitical objectives of EU member states closer together.

However, despite excellent conditions to achieve these objectives and a global and European environment favouring the development of a defence policy, the CSDP fails to establish the conditions necessary to the realisation of its own ambitions laid out in chapter two. This work will demonstrate where the greatest discrepancies between aspirations and realities lie and where the CSDP and its participating member states lack the most. These areas will mostly mirror the ambitions that were analysed in the second chapter, in essence, the modernisation of armies, the development of adequate capabilities for the strategic goals the EU has set itself and the development of a common strategic culture. The third chapter will also analyse the conditions underlying the difficulties, which have to be overcome in order to fulfill the ambitions, for example, the lack of a single market in defence matters in the Union or the lack of political will to integrate defence competencies. A case study will illustrate how these deficiencies translate into the theatre of operation and what lessons can be learned from the missions undertaken for the CSDP.

¹ The Petersberg tasks will be discussed in more detail in chapters two and three

The relationship with NATO is also important in understanding the limits or at least obstacles the CSDP might encounter before reaching the dimensions it aims to achieve. One must therefore understand whether NATO and the CSDP are mutually exclusive, competing against each other or even complementing each other. Does the CSDP progress when NATO regresses and vice versa? Which organisation will remain the preferred organisation for self-defence on the one hand and force projection operations on the other hand? Is a work-sharing scenario likely where NATO would take on high-end military operations whereas CSDP would focus on low-end military operations and civilian missions? The fourth chapter will argue that while NATO has weakened politically in recent years, it will certainly not be done away with. One may however argue that the creation of a 'European Pillar' within NATO is becoming more likely. The role Canada has played and could play in the CSDP will also be discussed. This dissertation will argue that Canada often finds itself between a rock and a hard place in NATO and that it should allow itself some flexibility for working with both NATO and the CSDP, separately if necessary. The security values Canada traditionally shares with Europe could help to be the common ground to establish a permanent link between Canada's armed forces and the CSDP.

Overview of the Chapters

The first chapter broadly examines the history of European defence and security cooperation and its institutions since 1945 and looks more specifically at the period from the Saint-Malo summit of 1998 to now, as the Saint-Malo agreement between France and the United Kingdom effectively led to the Common Security and Defence Policy in its current form. This

includes examining relevant treaties, agreements and summits of this period in order to give an account of how the current legal and institutional framework came about. A historical perspective is relevant, because it provides insight into the dynamics of European politics, which are hindering the development of a single strategic culture. It also provides the reader with background and historical information regarding European politics and the balancing of currently 27 national interests at the European Union level, which is discussed in more detail in chapters two and three. Chapter One also outlines the efforts, which have been made to back the Common Foreign and Security Policy with defence elements, i.e. the Common Security and Defence Policy as well as the relationship between Foreign and Defence Policy of the EU.

The second chapter focuses on the major aspirations of the Common Security and Defence Policy by analysing statements of European leaders and European Union officials during summits, as documented in press releases and European Union publications. While the 2010 Headline goals represent imminent and concrete aspirations, this thesis also assesses the objectives aspired to in the European Security Strategy, which states that the European Union needs to be “more active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities.”² The second chapter, therefore, includes not only a description of the current defence institutions of the European Union, but also identifies the forum used for the majority of discussions in the defence realm. The aim of Chapter two is to provide the reader with an insight to the underlying politics and dynamics, which drive and hamper the process of European integration in general and the development of a Common Security and Defence Policy in particular. It focuses particularly on

² Council of the EU. A Secure Europe in a Better World. Brussels: Council of the EU, December 2003, p. 11.

the positions and attitudes of the ‘big three’ of European politics, namely France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and includes an analysis of the traditional French preference for European Defence options and the British turnaround on the Common Security and Defence Policy since Saint-Malo.

The third chapter addresses the conditions that have to be met to build an operational military force for the EU. It analyses the existing institutional framework and the capabilities currently in place for the Common Security and Defence Policy in order to highlight its deficiencies. Furthermore, it assesses the impact of mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and joint research and development programs of European defence firms. Chapter three also outlines the budgetary constraints that limit the development of such capabilities. It focuses on the military aspects of the CSDP as civilian aspects of international mission are largely deemed to be exceeding international standards. One should however note that the EU sees the CSDP as a combination of civilian and military crisis management tools. Chapter three also contains a case study briefly outlining the missions and operations undertaken under the European Security and Defence Policy, in order to draw lessons from these missions. The thesis takes into account which countries are in command for specific Common Security and Defence Policy missions and what in fact constitutes a mission under the European Security and Defence Policy, since the military scope of some missions is not always evident. The third chapter also suggests changes to European Union security thinking and the common strategic culture of Europe that need to occur in order for the European Union to develop its defence aspirations.

The fourth chapter addresses the relationship between the Common Security and Defence Policy and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Canada’s relationship with the Common

Security and Defence Policy will also be considered. It will argue that for the time being, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation remains the primary defence forum, at least in terms of territorial defence and for major operations, as military missions depend largely on the military might of the United States. It examines the divide in strategic thinking in the European Union where key member states such as the United Kingdom or some Central and Eastern European Countries prefer to maintain the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's primacy, whereas others, for example France or Ireland, appear to favour a European option. However, it also explains how and why the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has been regressing as an institution in Europe as European Union defence cooperation has been progressing since the end of the Cold War. It also shows that while large-scale operations remain dependent on US and thereby NATO input, military missions with limited scale can now be carried out by European forces on their own. This makes the creation of a European pillar within NATO an increasingly likely option. Chapter four also offers a section focusing on the issues and opportunities the changes to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Common Security and Defence Policy present for Canada.

This thesis will then conclude with an outlook to the future of European security and defence cooperation. It will address the prospects of a continued European Union cooperation and assess the impact this would have on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation framework. For this assessment, it will draw from previously made arguments and offer a concluding view of the aspiration-capabilities gap of the Common Security and Defence Policy, largely dependent on changes to the strategic culture and the security thinking of Europeans.

The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community

With the Berlin crisis of 1947, the separation of Germany in the late 1940s and the growth of communism worldwide, the United States concluded that all Western European states including West Germany needed to contribute more to their own defences. However, its European neighbours, in particular France, viewed West Germany's rearmament very critically. This resulted in France drafting its own plan for Europe's defence, the European Defence Community (EDC). In 1950, René Pleven, the French President of the Council, today's equivalent of the country's prime minister, issued a proposal for the EDC, in response to American calls for the rearmament of West Germany. The plan aimed to build a transnational European defence force as an alternative to Germany's accession to NATO. It intended to control the military strength of the new German state supranationally in proportion with possible conflicts with the Soviet bloc. The EDC parties were France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries. On 27 May 1952, a treaty creating the EDC was signed. It was, however, never ratified by all parties and thus never came into effect.

The plan collapsed when the French Assemblée Nationale voted against its ratification. Some Gaullists feared that the EDC would infringe on France's national sovereignty. Other conservatives had concerns about the constitutional indivisibility of the French Republic (i.e. subjecting it to some kind of supranational authority) and about the remilitarization of Germany. Communists and other leftists opposed a plan tying France to the capitalist United States, and setting it in opposition to the Soviet bloc. The absence of the United Kingdom from the EDC was also of concern to some parties. In other words, the same parties and ideologies (with the exception of some Gaullists) that opposed the EDC in 1954, opposed the European Constitution

in a referendum over 50 years later. The French National Assembly voted against ratifying the EDC treaty on 30 August 1954 by a vote of 319 “no” to 264 “yes” votes.³ Along with the above ideological issues, important disjuncture between the original Pleven Plan of 1950, and the plan of 1954 lead to its defeat. Many preferred the original plan of Pleven to the draft that went to ratification before parliament a few years later.

The EDC would have established a European military, formed by troops committed to it by national forces. French, Italian, Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg forces would report to their national governments under coordination of the EDC, whereas bureaucrats of the supranational EDC would control the German component. Due to fears of a remilitarised Germany, the EDC member states agreed that the German government would not have control over its own military. Interestingly, in the event that the EDC would fail, the parties agreed to allow Germany to control its own military. Since the EDC was designed as a common defence army, most countries would only have committed territorial defence forces, not capable of engaging into the expeditionary missions it envisages for the CSDP today.⁴ The EDC also provided to put in place common equipment procurements. It would have had a centralised budget, arms and institutions, its structure would have been more integrated and more supranational than the EU is under the Treaty of Lisbon, even in economic matters.⁵ Today, the European Union, NATO and to an increasingly limited extent the Western European Union all carry out some of the functions that were envisaged for the EDC. However, these organisations do not reach the degree of integration and supranationality the EDC would have provided for.

³Tony Judt. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. London: Penguin Press, 2005, p. 245.

⁴ Edward Fursdon. The European Defence Community : A history. London: Macmillan, 1980, p. 201.

⁵ The Government of France. Déclaration de René Pleven sur la création d'une armée européenne. Paris: The Government of France, 24 octobre 1950.

The Western European Union

After the EDC treaty failed to be ratified by the French Parliament, the Treaty of Brussels signatory countries as well as West Germany and Italy agreed to create instead a European security and defence organisation. The Western European Union would be based on the Treaty of Brussels. The 1948 Treaty of Brussels between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom was the first significant European defence treaty signed after the end of the Second World War, and was the first attempt to form an alliance to counter Communism in Europe's periphery. It was originally intended as a mutual defence pact aimed at defending its signatories against a possible new German threat. However, soon after the treaty had been adopted, Western European countries began to recognise that the USSR represented a far greater threat to their security than a recovering Germany, especially since the latter was fully integrated in Western international organisations. The Western European Union however remained weak, lacking the forces, capabilities and reputation it required to be an effective institution. Already then, Europe was having difficulties in agreeing a framework and resources to build a common army on its own. Western European Union member states continued to rely on the United States to guarantee their security against the USSR in order to counter the military power of the USSR. As a result, the EU joined the US initiative to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1949, together with the United States and Canada, which would consist of a system of collective defence obliging its member states to respond if any one of them were attacked.⁶

⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The North Atlantic Treaty. Washington: NATO, 4 April 1949.

Foreign and defence policy cooperation in Europe have always been closely linked as will be illustrated by a more detailed discussion of the relationship between CSDP and CFSP later in this chapter. In the late 1950s, European Community member states tried to create foreign policy cooperation through the Fouchet Plans between 1959 and 1962, which also proved unsuccessful. The creation of a basic European foreign policy was finally agreed on with the European Political Cooperation in 1970, although it only took onto its current form since the creation of the European Union in 1993. The European Political Cooperation can however be considered to have been the predecessor of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

A Revival of Foreign Policy Cooperation: The European Political Cooperation

The European Political Cooperation was the mode of operation of foreign policy coordination in the European Communities until the Common Foreign and Security Policy superseded it through the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the European Communities (EC) member states attempted to give the EC a foreign policy dimension, but such initiatives never left the stage of informal discussions. This changed with The Hague summit of 1969 when governments instructed their foreign ministers, to "study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, within the context of enlargement."⁷ As a result, European foreign ministers drafted the Luxembourg / Davignon report, which put into place an informal intergovernmental consultation mechanism by which

⁷ Council of the EC. The Luxembourg or Davignon Report Part 1.1. Luxembourg: Council of the EC, 27 October 1970.

“member states could achieve politics of scale.”⁸ The European Political Cooperation adopted the intergovernmental mode of operation proposed by the Fouchet Plans and the participation of the United Kingdom guaranteed its Atlanticist nature. This allowed the United Kingdom to influence politics at the European level even though it only joined the European Communities in 1973. The European Political Cooperation also allowed the European Commission to express its opinion in matters affecting its competence. Furthermore, the European Political Cooperation did not have the Paris-based powerful secretariat the Fouchet plans had aimed for. Some countries had been uneasy about such a secretariat, as they feared it could turn into a competitor of the European Commission. The European Political Cooperation was strengthened and amended by the Copenhagen report of 1973 and the London report of 1981. It was codified and formalised with the Single European Act of 1986.

The European Political Cooperation enjoyed limited success. During the 1970s, it attempted mediating and brokering between parties in the Middle-East conflict and helped create the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the predecessor of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). However, the organisation of the European Political Cooperation remained informal and its competencies vague. The intergovernmental mode of operation often proved stifling, thereby limiting its impact on world events. This remains a challenge to European foreign policy until today. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the handling of the Yugoslav Wars from 1991 to 1995 exposed the weaknesses of the European Political Cooperation.⁹ The Yugoslav wars triggered a renewed discussion, and

⁸ R.H. Ginsberg. Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1989, p. 9.

⁹ Council of the EC. Report on European political cooperation. London: Council of the EC, 13 October 1981.

eventually a complete break with past positions of the EU on a common European involvement in Foreign and Defence policy, as European countries failed to prevent or even manage the first Balkan crisis, just beyond its borders. The Yugoslav wars effectively led to the creation of the Common Foreign and Defence Policy, as Europeans saw that the European Political Cooperation was insufficient to coordinate common foreign policy action, while each member state was unwilling to get involved individually in the conflict. The European Political Cooperation never reached the dimensions of the European Defence Community or today's Common Foreign and Security Policy, since most military components remained with the Western European Union and because foreign policy competencies remained in the hands of the EC and defence policy competencies in the hands of the Western European Union.

The Treaty of Maastricht

In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht brought about a new framework to EU external action and to the EU in general. With the end of the Cold War, NATO's original function, the defence against the Soviet Bloc and the Warsaw Pact disappeared. For the US, the collapse of the Soviet Union clearly reduced the centrality of Europe to its security policy as the reduction of its forces permanently stationed in Europe over the past 20 years exemplifies.¹⁰ Other theatres outside Europe, for example the Gulf region and the Middle East gained in strategic importance for the United States. Consequently, calls from Washington for the Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own regional security grew in volume and strength. When the first

¹⁰ Seth Jones. The Rise of European Security Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 11

conflicts across the Balkans broke out, the member states of the European Union realised that its sphere of peace and stability did not extend beyond its borders. Influenced by its inability to agree and cooperate on the Balkan wars, European Union member states signed the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992, which declared “the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framework of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to common defence.”¹¹ The Treaty further requested the Western European Union, which was now referred to as an “integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions on actions of the Union which have defence implications.”¹² The WEU thereby became mostly integrated into the EU. Many functions of the Western European Union were transferred to the EU, and the Western European Union was essentially phased out over the next 10 years.

In the years following the Maastricht Treaty, the Yugoslav conflict worsened. The United States resisted involvement in the Yugoslav civil war under both presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton as they considered it a European problem. European diplomatic efforts to stop the war proved unsuccessful and divisions among the EU member states increased. The United Nations forces had neither the mandate nor the capabilities to prevent the massacres in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. The Dutch and with them the rest of Europe recognised after Srebrenica that the current format of a UN mandate supported and executed by NATO troops was insufficient. The Europeans turned to its transatlantic allies again, which reluctantly agreed to lead NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in 1995. The American intervention was considered an emergency

¹¹ Council of the EU. Article J.4.1 of the Treaty of Maastricht. Brussels: Council of the EU, 1993.

¹² Council of the EU. Article B, Title I. Treaty on the European Union. Maastricht. Brussels: Council of the EU, 1993.

measure Europeans could and should not rely on again in the future. The conflict showed how dependent Europe remained on US military assets and how problematic this dependence was, when the United States was reluctant to get involved in a conflict Europeans had a stake in. Because of their military dependence on the US, the European NATO members decided to create a European pillar within the framework of NATO, which they hoped would strengthen Europe's political cohesion and military capabilities. NATO itself was undergoing a process of reform and redefinition triggered by the end of the Cold War, which not all of its members were convinced it would survive. In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam brought about consensus among EU member states that a common European policy on security and defence matters should be incorporated into the EU framework. The EU and its members had realised that the framework of the Treaty of Maastricht required further adjustments, especially in terms of foreign policy. The Amsterdam Treaty provided for the 'progressive' framing of a common defence policy and, more importantly, incorporated the 'Petersberg Tasks' into the legal framework of the EU. The Petersberg tasks are humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks to be carried out by armed forces that the European Union is empowered to do with recourse to a United Nations mandate. They had been defined at the Petersberg Hotel near Bonn by the Western European Union Council in June 1992. The member states agreed to deploy the whole spectrum of their military and resources under the authority of the Western European Union in approved circumstances or events. As a part of the merger of the Western European Union with the European Union, the Petersberg tasks now form a part of the European Security and Defence Policy. The adoptions of the provisions contained in the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Petersberg tasks were both significant steps in the evolution of the CSDP, but their importance should not be overstated. The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties provided only the framework

for an emerging European security and defence policy. The continued reliance on the United States and the bleak European response to the Yugoslavian crisis stressed the need to add substance to this framework.

Saint-Malo

For half a century, the different attitudes of Britain and France towards serious European defence and security cooperation acted as a substantial obstacle to its development. While France believed that the creation of a capability-backed European defence project would lead to a more balanced and therefore stronger Atlantic Alliance, Britain feared that the opposite would be the case. It was worried that Washington would retreat from Europe and abandon NATO. However, the example of Yugoslavia and Kosovo made the Europeans realise that the United States would not pay their bill in every case. Even the new British Prime Minister Tony Blair had become convinced that the US was no longer willing to play the role of Europe's peacemaker, unless Europe took more responsibility towards its own security. As Blair explained, "We Europeans should not expect the United States to have to play a part in every disorder in our own backyard."¹³ The British Strategic Defence Review of 1998 reflected this view, stressing the "vital role" of the EU, notably through the Common Foreign and Security Policy.¹⁴ In the view of many Europeans, this also entailed that NATO was not the adequate forum of dealing with international matters, let alone some of the Petersberg tasks. For some,

¹³Tony Blair quoted in Cohen, Roger, "Crisis in the Balkans: The Europeans dependent on US. Now, Europe vows defence push", *The New York Times*, 12 May 1999.

¹⁴ Secretary of State for Defence. *Strategic Defence Review* Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, July 1998, point 39.

NATO was limited to being a territorial defence alliance, and the void created by new security conditions of extra-territorial defence had to be filled by other means.

At the climax of the Kosovo crisis, Prime Minister Blair met with his French counterpart Jacques Chirac in Saint-Malo in December 1998. In a joint declaration, the UK and France stressed that the European Union “must have the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces” in order to respond to international crises.¹⁵ The ability to achieve these tasks, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so were deemed necessary for the EU to be able to “take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.”¹⁶ At first, the Saint-Malo declaration only appeared to be an attempt to speed up the process of implementing what had been agreed upon at the Amsterdam summit on the Foreign and Security Policy in 1997, namely, the “progressive framing of a common defence policy.”¹⁷ However, the declaration also appeared to move beyond such statements. While it honoured the collective defence provisions of NATO’s Article five, it did not mention in any way the Berlin-Brussels agreements on NATO’s implicit primacy and the notion that there should not be a duplication of NATO for tasks falling outside of Article five such as in Kosovo. The explicit idea of a European Defence policy within the NATO framework that could make use of separable but not separate military capabilities was also absent. The omission of either of these key issues was unprecedented and therefore a significant redirection of European defence and security politics.

¹⁵ The government of France. Franco-British Declaration on European Defence. Saint-Malo: Government of France, 1998.

¹⁶ The government of France. Franco-British Declaration on European Defence.

¹⁷ Council of the EU. Article 1.3 Treaty of Amsterdam. Brussels: Council of the EU, 1997.

The declaration also asserted that “the Union must have the capacity for *autonomous* action” (emphasis added).¹⁸ The inclusion of the word “autonomous” in this declaration was highly significant since it had never been used before in such a context. France understood “autonomous” in the sense that the European defence initiative should be independent of NATO. Britain however interpreted the word as meaning that the European defence project could develop autonomously but only under the umbrella of NATO. Whereas for France, Common security and defence policy should be mainly a European project, assuming a readiness, when necessary, to make use of NATO assets, for the UK, such cooperation was seen as the best means of maintaining the Atlantic Alliance only with a stronger and more coordinated European presence

While the British Prime Minister’s willingness to sign the Saint-Malo Declaration may well have derived in part from his desire to boost Britain’s role in the EU after its non-accession to the Euro, Prime Minister Blair certainly believed that a move towards enhanced European military capabilities would reduce American criticism about inadequate burden-sharing in international operations, which had intensified during the Kosovo conflict.¹⁹ The Saint-Malo Declaration was adopted bilaterally and outside the EU framework, without first consulting other EU member states or discussing the matter with them. However, it was agreed upon by the two most important European states in military matters and two states holding different views of NATO, the transatlantic relationship and the role of the EU in the world. Perhaps most important was that the Saint-Malo declaration was agreed upon with little or no advance notice

¹⁸ Jean-Yves Haine. “An historical perspective” in Nicole Gnesotto ed. ESDP : the first five years. Paris: EUISS, 2004, p. 30.

¹⁹ Jeannette Ladzik. “The European Security and Defence Policy - History and Challenges” European Policy Brief. London: The Federal Trust for Education & Research, August 2008.

to anyone and that it was agreed at the summit level, thereby giving it more political weight than anything else done since the Berlin-Brussels agreement on developing a European Defence Policy.²⁰ Shortly after the Saint-Malo Declaration, at the June 1999 Cologne European Council meeting, the EU member states built on the declaration to reach an unprecedented level of agreement on the establishment of a European security and defence policy. Germany, who held the EU Presidency at the time, considerably contributed to this success, re-affirming the dynamic trio spearheading most EU actions.

During the Cold War, West Germany had restricted its participation in NATO operations to logistical and financial assistance. It had justified this limited participation through its constitution, which prohibited the use of the Bundeswehr for any purpose other than self-defence according to interpretations by the German Federal Constitution Court. Following the re-unification of Germany in 1990, NATO out-of-area operations and US criticism of Germany's refusal to take part in military action during the 1991 Gulf War grew. German policy-makers were compelled to reconsider the circumstances under which military forces should or could be deployed. Eventually, in 1994 the Federal Constitution Court ruled that the Bundeswehr could participate in military operations conducted within the framework of organisations of collective security or collective defence to which Germany belonged, such as NATO, the UN or the EU provided the Bundestag gave its authorisation. This created for the German government and for German public opinion a radically different set of political and legal assumptions under which to consider the evolution of CSDP and allowed Germany to play a more active role in the shaping

²⁰ Haine. "An historical perspective" in Gnesotto ed. ESDP : the first five years, p. 31.

of a European dimension of defence and security alongside France and the UK.²¹ Even more interesting is the fact that the first major mission approved by the German Bundestag, the mission in Kosovo in 1999, was agreed to under a government of self-proclaimed pacifists (at least the Green Party ran at the time on a pacifist platform). This new stance of Germany also carried over into the EU sphere and can be seen by examining the conclusions of the Cologne council in 1999.

The Cologne Council conclusions state that,


The European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy of security and defence. The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.²²

While this repeats more or less the content of the Saint-Malo declaration, it does take the latter to the European level, making it the first European declaration on defence free of a direct NATO context. It is at this point that the framework which this essay is based on was agreed on and put into place. The table on the following page illustrates how the different frameworks have evolved over the past six decades and how foreign policy and defence policy have become more integrated and more consolidated in recent years. One should note the transition from a number of European communities to the European Union with its pillar structure and the successive reduction of the WEU. The Treaty of Lisbon will bring about the removal of the

²¹ Ladzik, Jeannette. "The European Security and Defence Policy - History and Challenges" European Policy Brief, August 2008. London: The Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2008, p.3.

²² Council of the EU. Cologne Council conclusions Annex 1. Cologne: Council of the EU, 1999.

pillar structure, a further expansion of EU competencies into the foreign and defence policy realm, with the latter being to the detriment of the Western European Union.



From CFSP to ESDP

²³ The dates of this table are the year of implementation.

In order to understand the workings of the Common Security and Defence policy, it is necessary to gain an understanding of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, since the former is closely linked to the latter. Foreign policy has traditionally been more discussed in the EU since the failure of the European Defence Community than defence matters, partly because of the sensitivity of the issue, partly because of the existence of the Western European Union and because most EU/EC member states were committed to NATO. However, the Treaty of Amsterdam substantially reshaped the foreign policy framework of the EU although it did not yet include clear provisions for a defence policy. Articles 11 to 28 of the Treaty on the European Union are devoted specifically to the CFSP. Since then, Title V of the Treaty states that

A common foreign and security policy is hereby established, to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union; to preserve peace and strengthen international security; to promote international cooperation; to promote 'good governance' and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms.²⁴

These goals are, however, only foreign policy statements, not security goals and the institutional tools, such as the Troika format (Representatives from the current and future EU Presidency, the Commission and the Council), the High Representative for the Foreign Policy or Joint Actions, put at the disposal of the Council Secretariat were limited to economic and diplomatic measures. The harshest possible actions the EU could impose at the time were economic embargos.

Following the Saint-Malo summit a few months earlier, the implementation of an independent European security and defence policy was agreed at the Cologne European Council in June 1999. The CSDP was defined at the time as "the establishment of credible operational

²⁴ Council of the EU. Treaty on the European Union, Title V. Brussels: Council of the EU, 1993.

capabilities on which the CFSP could rely.” Its aim was to give the CFSP a crisis management component and to give the CFSP more muscle in international crises.²⁵ The Treaty of Nice of 2003 added further changes to the CFSP framework and its treaty provisions. The Treaty of Lisbon continued to alter the CFSP and CSDP and its modus operandi. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the CSDP is considered an integral part of the CFSP. As such, the CSDP gives the EU the option of using both civilian and military capabilities for conflict prevention and international crisis management. The combination of civilian and military measures is at the core of the reasons why CFSP and CSDP are linked closely. As stated in most major documents concerning the CSDP, including the European Security Strategy, the EU intends to be able to deploy the ‘whole package’ of crisis management tools and to provide a framework that would allow civilian and military elements to operate symbiotically in the field. The CSDP allows for a broader range of capabilities, action and intervention for the CFSP in particular and international or external relations in general. The same principles and procedures that apply to the CFSP govern the CSDP, which uses special additional tools, such as the European Union Military Staff, the Military Committee and specialized agencies such as the European Defence Agency, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter two. It is also noteworthy that decisions on the CSDP are being made by the foreign ministers or the heads of states and not by defence ministers who do however hold preparatory meetings and an advisory role. One should also note that the role of the Commission in the CFSP has increased since the creation of the CSDP because the commission retains certain competencies in regards to civilian missions of the defence policy.

²⁵ Council of the EU. Presidency Conclusions, European Council Cologne. Cologne: 4 June 1999, Annex III.

CHAPTER II

The Aspirations of the Common Defence and Security Policy

The second chapter addresses the aspirations of the EU in regards to its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In order to outline these ambitions comprehensively it is necessary to gain a better understanding of the current structure and decision-making procedures of the Security and Defence Policy as well as of the political dynamics of the European defence realm. This chapter begins by outlining the institutional framework of the CSDP including the agencies and informal bodies associated with it. It then proceeds to explain the decision-making process in defence matters as well identifying the political forum of discussion and decision-making. In its third part, it examines the underlying politics that drive and hamper the CSDP. It will focus on the EU's biggest players in this area, namely France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Only France and the United Kingdom possess significant force projection capabilities, although other European states are beginning to catch up in this regard. The political weight of Germany must also be taken into account, although its military is not quite as developed and modern as that of France and Britain. This allows the reader to understand the mindset of these EU member states, which simultaneously translates into the CSDP's greatest ambitions and constraints. The final part outlines the ambitions and objectives of the CSDP as featured in the 2010 Headline Goals and the European Security Strategy.

How Do the Institutions of the Common Security and Defence Policy Operate?

The Helsinki Council of December 1999 finalised the proposals made under the Cologne Council of the same year and set up the three main bodies that were to run the European Security and Defence policy: The Political and Security Committee, the European Union Military Committee and the European Union Military Staff, which were all declared operational in March 2000. These institutions mirror in effect those of NATO, which is also divided into political structures, for example, the North Atlantic Council, military structures such as NATO's Military Committee and agencies such as the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency. The relationship between NATO and the CSDP is discussed in more detail in chapter four. In addition, while these institutions were created through the summit of Helsinki, the Lisbon Treaty does alter the landscape of the Defence and Security policy. Although the CSDP is not directly affected by the Lisbon Treaty, which was put into place after the Constitution for Europe failed in 2004, the treaty does bring significant changes for the CFSP to which the CSDP is linked. As we have seen in chapter one, CFSP and CSDP are seen as complementary policies, combining civilian and military crisis management tools.

The Political and Security Committee is composed of senior national representatives of each member state as well as a representative of the Commission associated with the EU foreign policy, i.e. from the Directorate General External Relations (DG Relex). Its function is "to monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the CFSP and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the narrower competence over policy."¹ While it does not officially have any decision-making power, the work of the Political and Security

¹ Council of the EU. Treaty on the European Union, Art. 25. Brussels: Council of the EU, 2007.

Committee arguably extends beyond only decision shaping. Often, the Political and Security Committee, along with the Committee of Permanent Representatives, which are in essence the 27 EU ambassadors, and the General Affairs and External Relations Council will work out the details of a policy agreement, leaving the European Council or the External Relations Council itself only to vote on it. Only when the EU ambassadors and foreign ministers cannot find an agreement, the heads of European governments are left to negotiate an agreement. This illustrates how at the institutional level, the EU regards its foreign policy and its defence policy as complementary and inseparable. This is supported by the fact that many individuals sitting on the Committee of Permanent Representative also sit on the political and security committee and other committees and working groups.² Furthermore, due to the lack of division between CFSP and CSDP the responsibilities between some of these committees are not clearly assigned. One must however also note that the EU, based on its attempt and desire to combine foreign policy and defence policy and to produce a more comprehensive approach to crisis management, intends the lack of division between CFSP and CSDP.

Normally the Political and Security Committee advises the Committee of Permanent Representatives, which in turn advises the External Relations Council, which advises the European Council, if necessary. 'Advise' means in this case, that each of these bodies will attempt to work out as many differences as it is possible at their respective level of seniority and government between the 27 member states. In most cases, and in day-to-day operations, the Political Security Committee and the Permanent Representatives will work out most of the details of an agreement with guidance from their respective capitals. Only when matters appear

² Joylon Howorth. Security and Defence Policy in the European Union. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 62.

at a deadlock, the General Affairs Council or the European Council is left to work out a deal or compromise. Having to work through at least three levels of decision-making competencies obviously complicates matters. On the one side, having experts familiar with EU dynamics and the different positions of the member states work out an agreement may be the most efficient approach, as the European capitals do not always understand where and how a compromise between EU member states is possible. On the other side, this mode can complicate and seriously slow down the decision-making process, as the different levels of decision-making can be hard to oversee. In addition, it certainly does not add transparency to the EU decisions. Moreover, all the work of the committees and of foreign ministers may end up in a cul-de-sac should one member state refuse to sign up to an agreement or decision of EU foreign policy. This tendency can partly be traced back to the EU officials favouring integration, which the representatives of the above-mentioned committees are. In recent years the EU has to a certain extent developed a life of its own, separated from the influence of member states, leaving the EU vulnerable to claims of a democratic deficit and lack of transparency. This integrationism draws from neofunctionalist theory. Neofunctionalism argues that the supranational and even the intergovernmental institutions of the EU have taken on a life of their own, thereby driving integration forward to some extent independent of their creators, i.e. the EU member states. The EU institutions reinterpret agreements from EU treaties, summits, presidency conclusions and documents, along with informal practices (the so-called 'acquis') in order to deepen or expand the mandate of EU legislation.³ As such, neofunctionalism is based on the assumption of a reduced role of the nation-state, which is where its problem lies in the field of defence, since the CSDP remains the least integrated of all areas due to the consensus rule, despite the creation of

³ Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen. Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 115.

the above institutions. The CSDP mode of operation is intergovernmental rather than supranational. Intergovernmentalism is subject to the pressures of neofunctionalism to a lesser and less direct extent than areas integrated under supranational EU policies.

While the Treaty of Lisbon does not directly affect the CDSP, it does bring substantial changes to the CFSP and therefore to the overall framework and institutions guiding the CSDP. The reform treaty eliminates the pillar system, thereby integrating EU foreign policy into the general EU framework. It will create the post of a President of the European Union (rather than having rotating presidencies every six months) and a High Representative for Foreign Affairs (in essence a foreign minister) to present a united and more continuous position on EU policies, especially in terms of foreign policy. Replacing the rotating presidencies with a High Representative for Foreign Affairs in office for two years should add much more consistency and predictability to EU foreign policy, both for EU member states and for the EU's international partners. The High Representative will be supported by the EU diplomatic staff. The Union would also gain legal personality, which would for instance allow for a single European representation in NATO, and the European Security and Defence Policy would be upgraded in name to the Common Security and Defence Policy.⁴

The consensus-based framework, along with the uncertainties and administrative paper trails of rotating presidencies, often leads to one country taking matters in its own hands and acting unilaterally, albeit with (tacit) EU support or at least EU assent. The recent case of Georgia illustrates this, as President Sarkozy took the lead by brokering a cease-fire between Russia and Georgia. As Colonel Christopher Larsen of the US army notes:

⁴ Council of the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon. Brussels: Council of the EU, 3 December 2007.

With a rotating presidency, which has no authority on the use of force, the intergovernmental decision making framework becomes even more complex. Taken collectively, EU appears headed toward implementing a decision making system that is hardly a recipe for success. An EU that cannot make timely security decisions will lose global credibility and undermine the security of Europe.⁵

The current system of rotating presidencies certainly does not encourage coherence or urgency to the EU foreign policy and subsequently to its military arm. Also, different responses across the EU member states to the Georgian crisis illustrate that at times of serious crisis, national security can override European solidarity and cooperation. While France might have been acting in the name of the EU in this crisis, its actions still lacked a clear 'EU label'.

The EU Military Committee consists of the Chiefs of Defence of all EU member states or their respective delegates. It gives relevant military advice and makes recommendation to the PSC, while providing directions to the Military Staff. A peculiarity of the Military Committee is that some of its members also sit on the military committee of NATO and are therefore 'double-hatted'.⁶ This can of course cause certain conflict both in NATO and the EU, especially on delicate matters such as the headquarters issue discussed below in more detail. It will also prevent some officials to commit to a European project if they know their government might favour a concurrent NATO project. The Military Staff is in charge of providing military expertise and support to CSDP, especially in regards to missions and crisis management. It is responsible for situation assessments, strategic planning, as well as the identification of resources, including forces and personnel for potential operations. It is part of the Council Secretariat but answers to the Political and Security Committee as well as the European Union

⁵Christopher Larsen. "ESDP – Security or Consequences" USA War College Strategy Research Project. Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 2006.

⁶Antonio Missiroli. "ESDP: How it works" in Nicole Gnesotto ed. ESDP : the first five years. Paris: EUISS, 2004, p. 64.

Military Committee. It is in a way the ‘civil service’ of the Military Committee. The EU Military Committee and EU Military Staff provide the strategic and military expertise needed to plan operations. Although they are subject to the pressures of their governments and rather protectionist defence ministries, the two bodies appear to work in a more coherent manner than the Political and Security Committee or the Permanent Representatives.

Aside from the military institutions of CSDP, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management oversees the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability of the EU. The Committee has a mandate to plan and execute civilian operations and missions of the CSDP under the political control and the strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee.⁷ The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management thereby takes on the combined roles of the Military Committee and the Military Staff for civilian operations, which – as will be noted later in more detail – are also an integral part of the CSDP.

The CSDP also has three autonomous agencies with ad hoc budget and status supporting the four CSDP institutions: the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Union Satellite Centre and the European Institute for Strategic Studies. The European Defence Agency, established in 2004 under a Joint Action of the Council of Ministers, aims "to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the CSDP as it stands now and develops in the future."⁸ It is part of the EU strategy to facilitate implementation of the 2010 Headline goals. Derived from the above goal are four areas the Agency focuses on particularly, namely developing

⁷Seth G. Jones. The Rise of European Security Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 85.

⁸ Council of the EU. Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP on the establishment of the European Defence Agency. Brussels: Council of the European Union, 12 July 2004.

military capabilities, promoting armaments cooperation and creating a competitive EU defence equipment market and working towards more research and technology between EU countries and companies. These goals should logically follow in line with the idea of a European single market, which is already in place in most areas. However, Article 296 of the Treaty on the European Union, established through the Treaty of Amsterdam, specifically exempts the defence sector from the single market provisions of the EU and provides that it be not subject to supervision by the Commission. This is due to member states wishing to keep their defence industries protected under policies such as 'juste retour', discussed in the following chapter, and to retain technologies and intellectual property rights in their own state. The consequence is that cooperation in the defence sector remains bilateral and primarily between defence corporations rather than states. It therefore remains to be seen, whether the EDA will have a significant impact on the bilateral and protectionist framework of defence industries, considering the general reluctance of EU member states to communalise these industries and technologies. This issue will be discussed in detail in chapter three.


The Satellite Centre gathers information through satellite images to help the EU prevent conflicts and provide humanitarian aid. It can also be used for reconnaissance and target acquisition. As such, it stands separate from the Galileo project, which is currently labelled for civilian use only. Galileo will be Europe's global navigation satellite system, comparable to and compatible with GPS and other systems. The Satellite Centre was set up in 2002 to replace the Western European Union Satellite Centre and was part of the agreement that saw the transfer of most functions from the Western European Union to the EU throughout the 1990s. The reconnaissance capabilities of the satellite centre would be much improved if the EU were able to rely on the Galileo satellite system, once it is operational. Unfortunately, its use for military

purposes has been specifically excluded until now.⁹ It can however be expected that this point will be renegotiated or simply neglected. Once the EU realises the usefulness of the Galileo satellites, it may well begin using them for military tasks, too. The Institute for Strategic Studies aims to define and build a common security policy for the EU. It both researches and debates issues, engages in dialogue with other European non-member nations. It also engages in strategic dialogue with Canada and the US in order to improve the transatlantic understanding of strategic goals and issues. The institute also offers analyses to the Council of the EU and to the High Representative for the CFSP while also networking intensively with the European Security and Defence College. The EU defence college is organised as a network that brings together colleges, institutes, military academies and national institutions with a focus on defence and security policy issues.¹⁰ Nevertheless, it is questionable if the Institute can ‘build’ a strategic culture. Many observers have acknowledged, that a (more) common strategic culture is possible and to some even probable. However, the incentive and initiative to such a process would appear to lie with the decision-makers in the field of defence: the member state governments, their defence ministries and to a more limited extent their defence industries, rather than with a think tank. The Institute will certainly be a welcome platform for debate and discussion of defence matters, but ultimately the strategic culture can only be built by acting together, pooling resources, developing capabilities together and undertaking common operations in the field. Below is a chart illustrating the decision-making process within CSDP, including the role of the

⁹ Council of the EU. Council Decision 98/434/EC of 18 June 1998 on the agreement between the European Community, the European Space Agency and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation concerning a European contribution to the development of a Global Navigation Satellite System. Brussels: Council of the EU, 2008.

¹⁰ Council of the EU. Council Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP of 18 July 2005 establishing a European Security and Defence College. Brussels: Council of the EU, 2005.

Secretary General (SG) and the High Representative (HG) after the Treaty of Nice, which remains the current governing Treaty until the Treaty of Lisbon comes into force.



EC	European Communities
DG Relex	Directorate General External Relations of the Commission
CoRePer	Committee of Permanent Representatives
DG-E	Directorate General External of the Council
SG/HR	Secretary General/High Representative
CoP.S and Po. Co.	Political Security Committee
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff

The CSDP – an intergovernmental policy

Although the CSDP and the CFSP have been institutionalised and noted in EU treaties, especially in the Treaty of Lisbon, the CSDP remains based on an intergovernmental rather than a supranational mode of operation. As a purely intergovernmental policy, the CSDP depends on unanimous consensus with no room for any Qualified Majority Voting procedures, when voting occurs in the Councils or any of the bodies mentioned above. According to the Qualified Majority Voting procedure, a majority of member states (two thirds for more important matters) must back a proposal and the countries voting in favour of the proposal must correspond to at least 62% of the total EU population. However, in the intergovernmental, consensus based procedure, member states cannot be outvoted or compelled to contribute to operations against their will (they may only abstain). In the vast majority of cases, policy is made by building consensus. If anyone does not contribute assets or capabilities, there is no operation.¹¹ The most recent example illustrating this is certainly the debate about how to deal with the Russian invasion into Georgia. Eastern European countries, especially those bordering Russia were calling for measures suspending any cooperation with Russia up to even sanctions, whereas countries such as France and Germany who entertain close economic ties with Russia merely wanted strong statements condemning Russia's actions. Consequently, the 27 heads of state adopted a strong declaration in this regards and suspended some cooperation talks at the senior level.¹² These talks have now resumed, only a few weeks after the crisis in Georgia. This

¹¹ Salmon, Trevor C. and Shepherd, Alistair J.K. *Toward a European Army: A military power in the making?* Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003, p. 109.

¹² Ian Traynor. "Georgia: Divided EU prepares to review stand on Russia at emergency summit" *The Guardian*. London: The Guardian, 1 September 2008.

illustrates how finding compromises within the CSDP is still rather close to the 'highest common denominator' policy it is often criticised as.

Furthermore, CSDP related decisions are not legally binding, as they are not firmly anchored in the treaties or relevant 'acquis' (e.g. the treaties of the EU). The institutions and agencies noted above are not included in the treaties, but were set up by Council Conclusions, Presidency Reports or Council Joint Actions. Almost all the necessary resources remain under the control and authority of member states. There is no military integration or a formal Council of Defence Ministers (albeit there is an informal one and they participate in the External Relations Council where required). The relevant decisions are taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers or the European Council, except for the civilian side of CSDP, where the Commission has more power. While the Treaty of Lisbon will bring substantial changes to the CFSP, including the possibility to transfer decision-making procedures to the Qualified Majority Voting modus, these changes have been limited to the CFSP and specifically exclude provisions relating to defence and military matters. However, the provisions place more power into the hands of the High Representative for the CFSP and is likely to give EU foreign policy as a whole and through that CSDP more direction, less ambiguity and clearer goals.¹³ In addition, the permanent structured cooperation discussed below and solidarity clauses regarding terrorism, both of which have also been integrated into the Treaty of Lisbon, will give EU action more coherence and predictability.

The Treaty of Lisbon brings a significant amount of changes to the CFSP, although the treaty does not expand any supranational powers. The treaty does not directly affect the CSDP,

¹³ Antonio Missiroli. "Minding the steps: The Constitutional Treaty and Beyond" in Nicole Gnesotto, ed. ESDP, The first five years. Paris: EUISS, 2004, p. 146.

but due to its link with the CFSP, it will affect it indirectly. The most important change to the CFSP is certainly the creation of the High Representative for the Foreign and Security Policy, a rather complicated formulation the British insisted on. Richard Laming, Director of the Federal Union, the British federalist campaigning organisation notes how the EU ought to function in regards to the CFSP:

At present, the representation of the EU to third countries is divided three ways between the High Representative for the CFSP, the European Commissioner for External Relations and Neighbourhood Policy, and the foreign affairs minister of the member state that holds rotating presidency. Not surprisingly, this can sometimes be confusing. The new treaty contains a modest but significant reform: to bring together the roles of Council representative and Commissioner, and to install that person as permanent chair of the foreign affairs council. This reshuffling of the roles could have a big practical effect. There will be a consistent voice for the European Union – Henry Kissinger's famous request for a phone number to call will now have an answer. Clarity will replace complication, and disruption will give way to continuity.¹⁴

The High Representative will receive support and assistance by the newly created diplomatic service of the EU, constituted of officials from member states' foreign ministries, the Council secretariat and the External Relations directorate of the Commission. The permanent structured cooperation will enable a more flexible application of the intergovernmental policies, the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses should give the Union more coherence. The powers of the European Parliament in regards to the CFSP remain untouched and therefore minor, whereas national parliaments gain more say in CFSP and CSDP matters through the expansion of the principle of subsidiary. Overall, the Treaty of Lisbon will not strengthen the powers of the EU, but will rather make it more centralised, easier to coordinate and to oversee and thus more coherent within the existing framework. This also seems to be the feeling among the leaders of

¹⁴ Richard Laming. "A Treaty for foreign policy" EU Observer. Brussels: EUObserver.com 28 June, 2007.

the member states. President Sarkozy suggested that if the Lisbon Treaty were in force it would have been much easier to build consensus and a common European position towards Russia and Georgia.¹⁵

The decision-making process usually proceeds as follows. Once the profile, desirable goals and objectives and available means of operation have been assessed and agreed with the Council Secretariat providing bureaucratic support and the Committee of Permanent Representatives providing administrative and financial support (based on the work of the Political and Security Council, the Military Committee and its staff), a 'Joint Action' is drafted and finalised by the External Relations Council. The draft joint action is then voted on by the Council and adopted if all members are in favour or abstain. Member states have the possibility to exercise a qualified abstention, which does not impede on the unanimity rule. It allows member states to declare reservations and stand aside. A dissenting member state is not obliged to apply the decision, but it must refrain from any action that might conflict with the Union's action based on that decision.¹⁶ The decision to agree to supply the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon mission with troops as well as the European Union Force (EUFOR) Chad mission, largely run by France are examples, of where the Council made a decision with the tacit abstention of some member states.

Overall, the *modus operandi* of the CSDP is more flexible than the areas covered by the treaties. The current guidelines for mounting and conducting EU operations allow for formations of 'coalition of the willing' in the downstream and operational phases of a mission to run

¹⁵ BBC News. Mark Mardell's Euroblog: Georgia crisis tests EU. From http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/markmardell/2008/08/s_1.html

¹⁶ Asle Toje. "The Consensus Expectation Gap: Explaining Europe's Ineffective Foreign Policy" Security Dialogue. Volume 39 (1), 2008. Oslo: Sage Publications, 2008, p. 131.

missions under the strategic control of the whole EU. CSDP missions even allow for non-EU member states such as Canada to participate in CSDP missions, giving such partners consultation rights in the pre-operational phase and equal footing in day-to-day management of missions on the ground. Special arrangements are in place with Canada, Russia and the Ukraine to facilitate their participation in EU missions. The arrangements regarding Canada and the CSDP will be analysed in more detail in chapter four.

The politics and dynamics of the Common Defence and Security Policy

The third part of this chapter will now analyse the politics that drive and hamper the CSDP, which is just as essential to understanding the way the CSDP functions as its institutional and legal framework, especially since the intergovernmental mode of operation requires building a consensus among now 27 member states.

It has often been argued, that the EU does not move forward unless the ‘big three’, namely France, Germany and the United Kingdom can agree or at least work out a compromise. The same is valid for the CSDP. Although the UK and France have a more active and modern approach to war fighting (e.g. in regards to force projection), the political weight of Germany in deciding on military missions cannot be dismissed. Force projection is the military capacity of a state to conduct expeditionary warfare. Germany does not yet possess such capabilities. In addition, there is a deep reluctance in most European capitals to use force, which is still noticeable in Germany for prominent historical reasons. Germany is only now beginning to shift the orientation of its armed forces from a territorial self-defensive structure to the modern

perceptions of force projection. However, only London and Paris have thought about the demands of larger missions abroad since the end of the Cold War.¹⁷ Their armed forces are the most capable and experienced in Europe and have therefore had the opportunity to develop military doctrines that have been tested in the most dangerous types of operation around the globe. For example, aside from contributing to various military coalitions, Britain sent troops to Sierra Leone in 2000, while France deployed soldiers on its own to the Chad and to the Ivory Coast.¹⁸ Therefore, the CSDP needs France and the United Kingdom to move forward, due to its dependence on French and British capabilities, expertise and experience.

However, France and Britain – while they are allies and converge on most international issues in the same way all European countries do – cannot be said to always be on the same page on foreign policy and defence matters, especially within the EU framework. To simplify somewhat, the French believe Europe must raise its military game to provide a counterweight to the US. The main objective for the British is to be taken seriously in Washington and get a hearing for European views. In their respective approaches, the British have been more consistent. If there has been a British approach to warfare for the past 60 years, it has been to gear military capabilities to the level that is necessary to gain access to Washington's decision-making processes, although the case of Iraq illustrates how little influence the British actually had on US decision makers. France, however, has fluctuated between its readiness to embrace an alliance with the US and its desire to develop alternatives. The problem for the French is that they cannot balance American power on their own, so they need to establish a mission for

¹⁷ Salmon, Trevor C. and Shepherd, Alistair J.K. *Toward a European Army: A military power in the making?* Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003, p. 116.

¹⁸ Steven Everts et al. "A European Way of War" Centre for European Reform. London: Centre for European Reform, May 2004, p. 16.

Europe as a whole. The French have often tried to get other European countries to sign up to this kind of project. Yet, the countries that are inclined to support France do not possess substantial military assets and experience. This strategy looks hopeless unless Britain, Europe's only other serious military power, collaborates with France.¹⁹ While President Sarkozy is now shifting France closer towards NATO and the British position, it is nonetheless fair to say that France and the UK have differing tendencies in their approach to defence matters.²⁰

On the other side, one must also note that for both the French and the British, the improvement of European military capabilities is a necessary condition for further progress – either to convince the Americans that their European allies can bring some hardware to the decision-making table, or else to set the foundations for an alternative to NATO. The Saint-Malo agreement shows the limits of both the British and French positions. Prime Minister Blair agreed that the Europeans should be able to act without the Americans in contingencies involving neighbourhood crises – although he assumed that the US would agree that the EU could use NATO assets. In return, President Chirac accepted that the EU could not credibly expect to duplicate NATO's planning and command capabilities. Therefore, while British and French governments have different approaches to defence and while their goals differ, the means and the way of achieving these goals should inevitably bring the two countries closer together.

After the Iraq war however, France attempted to set up a command centre independent of NATO. The so-called Tervuren initiative of April 2003 – just after the outbreak of the Iraq war – that attempted to set up a command headquarters for EU missions in Tervuren, near Brussels, illustrates how difficult any decision is to reach and implement without full British consent.

¹⁹ Everts et al. Centre for European Reform, p. 20.

²⁰ Thomas Valasek. "France, NATO and European Defence" Centre for European Reform, May 2008, p. 1.

Ironically, Tervuren is the suburb of Brussels where most British and American expatriates live. It is a general illustration of how EU politics work in the field of defence. The initiative seemed to confirm the worst fears of British and American policy-makers, namely that France's ultimate ambition was to build a defence club that excluded Anglo-Saxons and East Europeans, and undermined NATO. Yet the Tervuren initiative made sense to the camps of President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder, who felt that the Blair government had come so close to the Bush administration that it was no longer capable of working constructively on European defence. However, the French and German governments realised that their alliance on its own was not enough to forge effective European foreign and defence policies. They needed the British, too – for their diplomatic and military resources, for their contacts in Washington, and for their influence in Central and Eastern Europe on military issues. Tony Blair also repositioned himself during the summer of 2003. He needed to show European governments that he was, Iraq notwithstanding, a committed European. What better way than to reaffirm his commitment to European defence, an area where Britain's expertise made it a natural leader? Only when Blair began supporting the initiative, did it really start to make progress – at least temporarily. Britain's temporary support for the initiative can also be explained by the partial circumvention of NATO by the US during the Kosovo war. In November 2003 a compromise deal was reached. At a meeting in Naples, EU foreign ministers agreed upon the creation of a small independent military planning cell in the EU Military Staff for EU missions independent of NATO and an EU planning cell in SHAPE to be employed for missions undertaken with NATO or with recourse to NATO assets.²¹ These planning cells are used for the EUFOR mission in Bosnia today. Currently the Tervuren initiative has been put on hold, leaving its status uncertain,

²¹ Lisa Watanabe, "The ESDP: Between Estrangement and a New Partnership in Transatlantic Security Relations," Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Volume 13, Number 1. London: Routledge, April 2005, p. 15.

which however does not mean that it can be considered 'dead' for good, considering the resurrecting character of many EU projects. In addition, the French full return to NATO may strengthen their Headquarters ambitions once again. In essence, France may want something in return for rejoining the military arm of NATO. This could be an increase in size and importance of EU headquarters, which Americans and thereby British may be willing to accept. This is discussed in more detail when relations between NATO and the CSDP are being addressed in chapter four.

In sum, it is fair to say that while France and Britain have different philosophies regarding European Defence, both are favourable to further defence integration through CSDP. Both also understand, that progress will only be achieved if both work together, not only because the CSDP is and will most likely remain an intergovernmental policy based on consensus. Despite differences, France and the United Kingdom along with Germany in a mediating and increasingly active role have been pressing for a stronger EU involvement in military matters.

The European Security Strategy

After each failure, a new ambition arises. After the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo came the first acknowledgment of EU military inadequacies and with it, the launching of the European Security and Defence Policy process at Saint-Malo. After the Iraq war came the EU's first security strategy and a new activism in world affairs. The Iraq crisis had forced the EU to recognise that the Union's power is crippled when it is divided on foreign policy. When Iraq was being discussed at the United Nations, EU member states failed to first define what

constituted a “material breach” under UN Resolution 1441 before handing matters to their representatives at the United Nations. They also did not specify the conditions under which force might be used and failed to lay down a precise timetable for action regarding Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Had the EU done so, it may have been able to foresee events or at least been able to strengthen its position in Washington. Resolution 1441 offered Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" which had been set out in several previous resolutions and was interpreted differently by American and British officials on the one side and French, German and Belgian officials on the other.²² Instead of first discussing a ‘European interpretation’ of the resolution, EU foreign ministers decided to hand over the Iraq issue to the United Nations without discussing the strategic case with each other first. By doing so, they allowed the permanent European members of the UN Security Council, France and the United Kingdom to act as they wished. As noted above, these were the two countries with the most opposite views of the United States and of how to proceed with the Iraqi case.²³ Europeans quickly learned the basic lesson of the Iraq crisis: they no longer could afford an inward looking orientation while America pursued its global agenda that had important direct and indirect consequences for the EU.²⁴ The EU’s enlargement by ten new members in May 2004 also forced it to acknowledge that a Union of 450 million people cannot seclude itself from the rest of the world.

²² United Nations Security Council. UN resolution 1441. New York: UNSC, 8 November 2002.

²³ Jean-Yves Haine. “The Union Inaugural Address” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Winter 2003/Spring 2004, vol. V, no. 1. Georgetown: Georgetown University, 2004, pp. 69-77

²⁴ Jean- Yves Haine. “Idealism and Power: The new EU Security Strategy.” Current History. Philadelphia: Current History, March 2004, p. 109.

Hence came into being the European Security Strategy (ESS) with much broader ambitions than fixing crisis-management capabilities, which the Helsinki and 2010 Headline Goals had intended to do. The aim was to draft a comprehensive security strategy. The strategic analysis of the document is driven by threats, an aspect never addressed as such before by the Union. The European Security Strategy was drafted in the middle of 2003 under the authority of Javier Solana, the EU's High Representative for the CFSP. Javier Solana was NATO's Secretary General before he took on the role of High Representatives. The draft was agreed on by the European Council in Brussels in December 2003 and can be seen in part as a response to the EU failing to agree a common approach to the Iraq war. The Solana document identifies three major threats: failing or failed states, international terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs. In such an environment, the Union recognizes that the traditional line of defence – a state's borders – has become outdated. "The first line of defence now often lies abroad."²⁵

This certainly entails an outward focus from Europe in general and the CSDP in particular. Europe's global ambitions aim at influencing the current world order. As the ESS states, "Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world."²⁶ Indeed, the global aspirations of the EU are illustrated by the numerous use of the term 'global' in the European Security Strategy and the 2010 Headline Goal.²⁷ A paper by Robert Cooper, the Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the EU Council calls for the EU to, "speak softly and carry a big carrot." Cooper

²⁵ Haine. Current History, p. 109.

²⁶ Council of the EU. A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy. Brussels: Council of the European Union, December 2003, p.1.

²⁷ Toje. Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 127.

sees the EU as a new kind of power – liberal, democratic, and voluntarily expanding continuously outward as new countries seek membership.²⁸ The attitude, policies and actions the EU takes will have a big impact on how the multi-polar world develops. Supporters of the CSDP argue that a stronger EU will be in a better position to convince the US, China, Russia and other powers to think multilaterally. In 2009, an economically stagnant Union which is divided over key policy questions and which has an inward focus cannot hope to significantly influence the shape the international system takes. To be able to do this, the EU requires a improved tools for delivering common foreign and security policies, in essence improved capabilities, as well as a unity of purpose among national governments. A central tenet of this would be the formation of a single strategic culture, a point addressed below.²⁹ However, the EU would need to back up these objectives with capabilities, which are currently missing. In addition, while it may be desirable for the EU and much of the Western world to positively influence China and Russia, this may prove difficult in light of Russia's and China's past behaviour and the incapability of the EU to adopt strong foreign policy measures (i.e. in regards to Georgia) and to carry 'a big carrot'.

Europe's global vision starts just beyond its borders and so do potential candidates for the failed states mentioned in the ESS. The Union does not need to look to the traditional trouble spots of the world, such as the Middle East to find areas in which it could become more active. The EU has many unstable and volatile countries just beyond its borders. It should and probably will become more involved in countries such as Belarus, Moldova and Georgia. In contrast, US

²⁸ Toje. Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 136.

²⁹ Charles Grant and Tomas Valasek. "European foreign and security policy in 2020" Centre for European Reform, December 2007, p. 4.

priorities will remain focused on the Middle East and countries such as Afghanistan, Iran or Iraq as well as on conflicts such as those between Pakistan and India. EU officials argue that Washington will be reluctant to become too involved in conflicts around the EU's eastern and southern borders.³⁰ The EU will therefore need to be able to act in its periphery without the United States or at least with only a limited US engagement. Europeans already have experience in working with other Europeans through NATO in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, and through the EU in Macedonia, the Congo and Chad. The number and scope of such missions is likely to grow in the years ahead.³¹ Ironically, the US is currently more represented in Georgia than the EU is on a military and logistical level, although diplomatic efforts of the EU are significant and illustrating of Europe's civilian strength.

Independent of any US involvement in the world, the EU needs to ensure the security, stability and prosperity of its periphery. Otherwise, the EU may find itself being surrounded by countries that are sources of armed conflict, illegal immigration, organised crime and terrorism.³² The CSDP's capability of acting decisively in its periphery is therefore an essential part of the Security Strategy and of the EU's security and prosperity. Security and stability in the EU's 'near abroad' can therefore be considered one of the main objectives of the CSDP. The near abroad is in effect Europe's periphery, which stretches from the Baltic countries to Georgia and Azerbaijan and may even soon include parts of the Middle-East and the Maghreb. To effectively pursue stability in these regions, the EU must however be backed by capabilities and the political will to intervene in crisis situations, which it has been reluctant or unable to do in the past.

³⁰ Everts et al. Centre for European Reform, p. 9.

³¹ Everts et al. Centre for European Reform, p. 63.

³² Everts et al. Centre for European Reform, p. 70.

However, an agreement to launch a mission against piracy in the Gulf of Aden substantiated quickly and is thus a step towards more rapid and decisive EU overseas deployments.

Security and stability in the EU periphery goes along with the objective of countering terrorism, which is another of the main objectives contained in the Security Strategy. It states: “In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand [...]. Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate worldwide: their activities in Central or Southeast Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens [...]. The first line of defence will often be abroad.”³³ The objective is therefore clear. First, however, EU member states have to realise that the terrorist threat comes from both within and outside the EU. The member-states cannot continue to maintain the traditional distinction between external and internal security but must adopt more flexible and generally more outward-looking approach to countering terrorism. In extreme cases, EU member states may wish to deploy force against a state harbouring terrorists that lies beyond Europe’s periphery or against a terrorist group based abroad. The Security Strategy considers global responses as the only effective solutions to terrorism. It sees stronger international regimes and conditional aid and assistance as the best methods to counter WMD proliferation and without excluding the use of force, the paper clearly rejects a strategy of preventive strikes.³⁴ Moreover, while the EU recognises that failed or failing states are a significant origin of instability and lack of human security, it favours working towards improving governance rather than forcing a regime change. A “rogue state”, which is a state considered threatening to the world's peace through its authoritarianism, disrespect of

³³ Council of the EU. European Security Strategy, p. 6.

³⁴ Council of the EU. European Security Strategy, p. 7.

human rights and aggressive behaviour, is a category that does not exist in EU terminology.³⁵

Many of the CSDP missions, based on building good governance and police forces, such as those in Congo, Chad or Kosovo reflect this view. Even in Afghanistan, EU countries appear more concerned with establishing a coherent and secure society as means of stabilising the country, rather than eliminating Taliban fighters. Thus, the scene for EU external action is set as well as the circumstances in which the EU would act outside of its borders, namely to bring security and stability to its periphery, to counter terrorist threats and to prevent the proliferation of WMDs.

Implementing the European Security Strategy

The Security Strategy addresses in general terms the means that need to be in place in order for the EU to be able to act in the situations discussed above and for the EU to be able to pursue its strategic objectives. It states, that the EU ought to be “more active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats.”³⁶ Documents such as the 2010 Headline Goals address the required capabilities in more depth. The CSDP aims at identifying and addressing shortfalls in capabilities, which can affect EU crisis management, including the promotion of a strong and competitive defence industry and technology.³⁷ Europe cannot hope to copy the American approach to warfare with its heavy

³⁵ Haine. Current History, p. 119.

³⁶ Council of the EU. European Security Strategy, p. 11.

³⁷ Antonio Missiroli. “ESDP: How it works” in Nicole Gnesotto, ed. ESDP: The First Five Years. Paris: EUISS, 2004, p. 69.

emphasis on technology and ‘full spectrum dominance’ – the ability to defeat any enemy in every conceivable category of weapons and equipment. The budgetary constraints are simply too great. Europeans should not even aspire to the American doctrine or force structure in their entirety – even if they had unlimited money – because Europe has different strategic priorities, as stated in the Security Strategy.³⁸ What Europe does however aspire to, is the better use of its forces and its compatibility with modern multilateral operations abroad, the so-called force projection, as well as the reduction of duplicate capabilities between member states.³⁹

The transformation of European forces from territorial defence to intervention and expeditionary warfare is thus a precondition to effective European military strength.⁴⁰ The EU member states certainly have the potential to become more important actors in the field of defence. The governments of the EU 27 collectively spend approximately 180 billion Euros a year on defence. For all its weaknesses, the EU remains the world’s second highest spender after the US, which devotes some 330 billion Euros (\$400 billion) to defence.⁴¹ Hence, the issue appears to be how the money is spent rather than how much of it is spent. The current defence structure remains focused on territorial defence and conscript armies as opposed to the force projection adequate for 21st century warfare in many member states.

³⁸ Everts et al. Centre for European Reform, p. 1.

³⁹ Council of the EU. 2010 Headline Goals, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁰ Haine. Current History, p. 11.

⁴¹ Everts et al. Centre for European Reform, p. 3.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) was put into place to address precisely these shortfalls in capabilities and resource allocation. The agency evaluates and reports annually on the member-states' progress towards meeting these commitments.⁴² As Steven Everts note:

Given, that European defence budgets are unlikely to rise a great deal, the establishment of the EDA is intended to lead to more usable and better-equipped troops, thanks to further progress with the conversion of conscript armies designed for territorial defence into smaller, professional forces that can deploy overseas. Long before it joins the EU, Turkey will become an active participant in ESDP, providing large numbers of extra troops for peacekeeping missions. As a European member of NATO, it has the right to take part in any EU mission that is mounted with NATO support.⁴³

Along with the Defence Agency, the permanent structured cooperation of Article 28 TEU gives EU decision-making processes on CSDP more transparency and inclusiveness. The additions to article 28 TEU by the Treaty of Lisbon state that “those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework”.⁴⁴ Its protocols also mention basic criteria for participation in CSDP operations.⁴⁵ These are the following: achievement of a high military operational readiness through national or multinational force packages, the pooling of means and specialising of means and capabilities, participation in the development of major joint or European equipment programmes including the Defence Agency as well as increased

⁴² Council of the EU. Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP. Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2004.

⁴³ Everts et al. Centre for European Reform, p. 71.

⁴⁴ Council of the EU. Treaty of Lisbon. Amendments to Article 28 a. Brussels: Council of the European Union, December 2007.

⁴⁵ Council of the EU. Protocol on Permanent structured cooperation. C 306/153. Brussels: Council of the European Union, December 2007.

cooperation to meet the objectives concerning the level of investment necessary to reach adequate equipment quality.⁴⁶ The permanent structured cooperation opens the way for role specialization, asset pooling, common procurements, and ultimately an effective rationalization of defence efforts throughout Europe.⁴⁷ It however also allows for a two-speed Europe in the field of defence, as following the cooperation is voluntary. We could thus see some European countries becoming more integrated and EU-oriented in their foreign policy, while other states would continue to rely on their own resources or other alliances such as NATO.

Therefore, the smaller European countries, well aware that they will not fight wars on their own, could specialise in military roles that would be useful to the EU (or NATO) through a common defence policy. Certain countries could focus, for example, on mine clearance, antisubmarine warfare, field hospitals, jamming enemy radar, defending troops against hostile missiles, protection against biological and chemical weapons and other specialised tasks. The CSDP aims to help at coordinating these specialisations in a way that will allow the countries to complement each other rather than struggling to maintain the whole range of defence capabilities themselves.⁴⁸ However, the consensus-based mode of operation of EU missions poses a serious problem to the overall feasibility of an operation should a country with important niche capabilities refuse to join such a mission. For instance, air strikes through a CSDP mission (should they ever occur) would place the aircrafts carrying out these strikes at much greater risk if enemy radars were not jammed. If only one country possesses such jamming capabilities and refuses to join the mission, the ability to effectively carry out air strikes would be hampered.

⁴⁶ Antonio Missiroli. ESDP, The first five years, p. 151.

⁴⁷ Haine. Current History, p. 111.

⁴⁸ Council of the EU. Capabilities Improvement Conference Press Release 13802/01 (Presse 414 - G). Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2001, p. 5.

One might therefore conclude that the CSDP needs to become a supranational organisation before niche capabilities can be relied on effectively and so they can be guaranteed when they are needed.

As mentioned above, concrete objective regarding capabilities were clearly set out first in the Helsinki Headline Goals of 2003, which were later renamed and updated to the 2010 Headline Goals. These documents call for a European Rapid Reaction Force in the form of Battlegroups to be deployed in order to achieve the Petersberg tasks, which many of the objectives contained in the headline goals and the Security Strategy refer to. The Petersberg tasks, established in 1992, define crisis management to include peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian and rescue tasks as laid out in Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the European Union.

At the Helsinki European Council of 1999, the EU member states identified rapid-response as an important tool of its crisis management capabilities. Consequently, the Helsinki Headline Goal, which was agreed on at that occasion, set out objectives of member states of being able to provide rapid response elements by 2004. As a result, the EU pledged to develop a rapid response capability, which was christened the Battlegroup concept. Following the EU's realisation that the 2004 deadline for the Battlegroups was not going to be met, the Headline Goal 2010 was agreed on. The 2010 Headline Goals aimed for the development of rapidly deployable Battlegroups by 2007. Each Battlegroup has to be backed up by appropriate strategic lift, be sustainable for at least one year in theatre and possess adequate debarkation assets. The Helsinki Headline Goals originally called for a force that would be "deployable within 60 days," consisting of 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers – approximately equivalent to an army corps along with

its air and navy components – and that would be sustainable for at least a year of operation in the field.⁴⁹ Following the ‘rule of three’ of military operations, which accounts for troop rotation, holidays and such factors, the size of this large rapid response force would in fact had to have been around 180, 000 in order to ensure the deployability and sustainability of 60,000 troops. After the EU realised that the Helsinki Headline Goals would not be fulfilled, the scaled-down 2010 Headline Goals were put into place. The 2010 Headline goals were much more modest (or realistic) in its ambition and called for two Battlegroups of 1500 forces to be deployable at any point in time. Currently fifteen Battlegroups are operational, amounting to 22 500 forces in total, although only two Battlegroups are on standby for immediate deployment at any given time.⁵⁰ There was no more mention of a 60,000 strong force, but it is expected that this number remains a medium to long-term goal, with the current force of 22,500 soldiers in place for now.

A Battlegroup is the smallest possible militarily effective, rapidly deployable, coherent and at the same time credible military force capable of stand-alone operations, which is normally used for early stages of larger operations. The Battlegroups are the EU equivalent (and to some extent successor) of the Eurocorps, created for essentially the same tasks under authority of NATO and the Western European Union. Today, the Eurocorps answer to NATO and the Battlegroups are under EU command. In its standard composition each Battlegroups ought to be about 1,500 forces strong, although its size may vary depending on the type of mission it is being sent on. The Battlegroups are based on the principle of multinationality and may be formed by both a multinational coalition of CSDP Member States (as well as other nations willing to act

⁴⁹ Charles Wolf, Jr. and Benjamin Zycher. European Military Prospects, Economic Constraints, and the Rapid Reaction Force. Santa Monica: RAND, 2003, p. 26.

⁵⁰ Council of the EU. EU Battlegroups Factsheet 2007. Brussels: Council of the EU, 2007.

within the CSDP framework such as Turkey or Canada) or a framework nation for a specific operation. In all cases, interoperability and military effectiveness would be the criteria on which the operability of a Battlegroup would depend.⁵¹ If German military equipment would be incompatible with Swedish equipment, and both nationalities could not find a common language or radio system to communicate with, the effectiveness of a Battlegroups would be severely hampered. A Battlegroup should be associated with locally deployable force headquarters and pre-identified operational and strategic capabilities, such as strategic lift like the A400M and logistics. Member States can also contribute niche capabilities, such as medics or sealift, to the Battlegroups, which they currently do.⁵² For instance, Luxemburg currently provides medical staff and doctors to the Battlegroups.

The CSDP – A Military-Civilian Policy

While the CSDP in general and the ESS in particular put a certain emphasis on military capabilities (a majority of CSDP documents and large parts of the ESS discuss purely military-strategic matters), the EU aims to have the full range of crisis management tools at their disposal. Thus, EU crisis management extends beyond military action to include civilian missions, like police missions or judicial mission.⁵³ Trade policy, economic aid, humanitarian assistance, intelligence analysis and troop deployments are part of the broader CFSP, which is the CSDP's backbone. The relationship between CFSP and CSDP was discussed in the first chapter. Within

⁵¹ Council of the EU. Battlegroups Factsheet 2005. Brussels: Council of the EU, November 2005, p.1.

⁵² Council of the EU. Battlegroups Factsheet 2007. Brussels: Council of the EU, February 2007, p. 2.

⁵³ Antonio Missiroli. ESDP, The first five years, p. 58.

a few years, the foreign minister should be able to call on the member-states to deploy not only 5,000 police officers, but also a further force of 5,000 gendarmes. Gendarmes or Carabinieri are armed police, trained by the military, who can operate in a rougher environment. Acquiring such capabilities is not expected to pose as many issues as developing the military aspect of CSDP, given that the EU's traditional emphasis on civilian missions. This is also demonstrated by the amount of civilian missions the EU has undertaken so far in comparison to the number of military missions.⁵⁴ The EU is also in the process of developing a 'civilian rapid reaction force', consisting of skilled professionals such as judges, prosecutors, doctors, nurses, customs experts, aid workers and engineers, 'ear-marked' and ready to deploy in crisis regions at a few weeks' notice.⁵⁵ Thus, the EU aims to have not only military Battlegroups readily deployable to establish security in parts of the world, but also civilian 'Battlegroups' to ensure stability in the longer term. Since these state-building exercises are traditionally considered the strength of European crisis management, the CSDP's inclusion of civilian elements had to have been expected.

The Civilian Headline Goal outlines the objectives and ambitions of the EU's civilian crisis management capabilities in a manner comparable to the Helsinki or 2010 Headline Goals for the military capabilities. It notes that:

Developing the civilian dimension is part of the EU's overall approach in using civilian and military means to respond coherently to the whole spectrum of crisis management tasks such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces

⁵⁴ For a more detailed discussion of civilian and military missions of the CSDP, please refer to the section in chapter three.

⁵⁵ Everts et al. Centre for European Reform, p. 72.

in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation.⁵⁶

Several workshops and meetings following the declarations of the Civilian Headline goal then outlined specific issues and areas requiring improvement.⁵⁷ These also work out details of the implementation of the Headline Goal regarding coherence of the missions, inter-member state coordination by the Council and the drafting of available and deployable personnel lists.⁵⁸

Building a Common Strategic Culture

European countries have disparate military traditions, have great difficulties finding money for new defence equipment and have sometimes incompatible capabilities as outlined above. Despite these problems, can European governments develop more innovative and ambitious defence policies? This section will argue that it is possible for European defence ministries, backed by their usually pro-European parliaments and heads of state to develop their own distinctive approach to warfare under certain conditions. The EU needs to develop its own robust, common strategic culture. The CSDP aims at building this common strategic culture. “We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention,” stated the Security Strategy. “We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise.”⁵⁹ Too often, that message has been forgotten considering NATO’s inability to persuade

⁵⁶ Council of the EU. Civilian Headline Goal. 15863/04. Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2004, p. 3.

⁵⁸ Council of the EU. Report on Workshop IX: “Required capabilities in Mission Support for ESDP civilian crisis management missions” 13296/1/06 REV 1. Brussels: Council of the EU, 18-19 September 2006, p. 16.

⁵⁹ Council of the EU. European Security Strategy, p. 11.

most EU countries to send troops to the more volatile regions of Afghanistan, where there is a serious war to be fought against the Taliban.⁶⁰ In addition, while western European countries have different military traditions, they also share at least very similar tactical and military training and strategy. However, the same cannot be said about Eastern-European countries, which will need to overcome the Soviet military thinking they have learned until the 1990s. Nevertheless, strategic cultures can evolve. Under gentle pressure from its allies and strong leadership from its governments, Germany has successively abandoned the idea that it should not deploy forces beyond its borders. In 2005, a German even commanded NATO's forces in Afghanistan.⁶¹ Other countries, including such neutral states as Ireland or Austria could follow the German lead. The challenge in Eastern Europe however appears more serious, as a change in strategic and military thinking is more difficult to achieve than a change of the constitution or of statutes.

European governments and especially their electorates share more principles and policies on foreign policy than many realise. Europeans agree on Iran, where they support a policy of conditional engagement rather than the current US policy of isolation (although this position is shifting under President Obama). They agree on a peace process for the Middle East and that the 'road map' offers a way forward towards a two-state solution with Palestinian territories based on the Gaza Strip and most of the West Bank. Europeans also think that if Israel were to keep part of the West Bank it should compensate the Palestinians with land swaps. They are in agreement on all important international arms-control treaties and agreements, several of which

⁶⁰ Charles Grant and Tomas Valasek. "European foreign and security policy in 2020" Centre for European Reform, December 2007, p. 10

⁶¹ Grant and Valasek. Centre for European Reform, p. 11.

the US has rejected. They have common policies on the future of the Balkans, the Kyoto protocol and the International Criminal Court and believe that the United Nations should play a central role in global governance.⁶²

One must also note the impact of the EU's defence institutions even if it remains modest for the time being. By bringing together officials and officers from the various member-states and exposing them to each other's views and ways of thinking, they should – in the long run – forge a more common strategic culture. This has been happening at least on an informal level within NATO as the military staff of member states works, chats and dines together. For many observers, the result is unlikely to be a homogenised, lowest-common denominator culture, although it may start as that, since most EU policies begin in such a manner. The institutions facilitate a transfer of expertise from the more capable nations to the less capable. They can encourage peer group pressure among the various national military elites. The examples of Britain and France have strongly influenced the recent German plan to increase the number of troops that will be available for overseas interventions. The European Defence Agency could also play a crucial role in institutionalising peer group pressure among the national military establishments. It would therefore be helpful if it were allowed publicly expose those governments, which fail to fulfil their pledges on capabilities.⁶³ Currently, such reports remain confidential.

In sum, the aspirations are as follows: First, to bring stability and security to the EU periphery as well as countering terrorism and WMD proliferation where it would be required, although one can expect the EU's periphery to be the first focus. Second, to become a more

⁶² Everts et al. Centre for European Reform, p. 58.

⁶³ Everts et al. Centre for European Reform, p. 61.

active and persuasive global player. Third and most importantly, to bring up European military capabilities to a level that would allow the EU to counter terrorism, to reduce WMD proliferation and to prevent instability in its periphery and in failed or failing states. Fourth, to build a comprehensive crisis management policy including civilian elements and finally to establish a common strategic culture in the EU that would bring the geopolitical objectives of EU member states closer together. The following chapter will address what challenges need to be overcome for the EU to reach these objectives.

Chapter III

Realities and Challenges of the Common Security and Defence Policy

As seen in the previous chapter, Europe's ambitions in the field of security and defence are modest in the medium term, albeit clear and challenging for the EU and its member states. In addition, EU ambitions in defence grow if one considers its long-term goals. Some of these ambitions are encountering obstacles, which relate to the EU framework itself, to the field of defence in general and to its institutional setup and economic or financial regulations of the EU. Other challenges concern the member states themselves and bi- or multilateral relations between member states. This chapter aims to identify what realities the EU faces in the field of defence and which areas are in the most dire need for change, if the ambitions of the CSDP are to be realised. One must note at this point that many of the issues regarding capabilities for CSDP also apply to NATO, since NATO and the EU face similar challenges in the field of defence. Also, most EU members are also NATO members. The relationship of CSDP and NATO and the role NATO plays in the development of the CSDP will be discussed in more detail in chapter four.

Europe's Immobile Armies

The transformation of European forces from territorial defence to intervention and expeditionary warfare is a precondition to an effective European security strategy. As seen in

chapter two, a large number of EU foreign policy documents such as the Security Strategy acknowledge this. However, large parts of military equipment in Europe are relics of the Cold War. The mobility capacities of most EU members are still shaped by conceptions of national territorial defence and by the common approach for the defence of Europe developed in NATO against a possible attack by the former Warsaw Pact. Transport requirements for the European NATO states were and are still dominated by land movement within Europe with less emphasis on strategic transport capabilities. The lack of strategic lift and the maintained concept of territorial defence armies are the two biggest obstacles hampering deployment of EU forces abroad.

The inadequate number of armed forces personnel in Europe illustrates the extent of how the standing armies of EU countries pose a problem for international deployability. Although the cumulative strength of the EU's armed forces is approximately two million, their deployability for international crisis management is a minuscule fraction of this. The EU can barely deploy 100,000 of its two million soldiers abroad, which amounts to less than 5% of collective armed forces of the EU members.¹ Germany for example, despite having a Bundeswehr of close to 300,000 is not in a position to internationally deploy more than 10,000 troops over an extended period of time. The lack of mobility and international deployability appears even more striking in contrast with the that of the United States. The deployability ratio of 5% is ten times worse than that of the US, which can deploy 50% of its roughly two million armed forces around the globe.² Currently, the EU is in fact close to overstretch with European Defence Agency member

¹ The House of Commons Defence Committee. The Future of NATO and European Defence. London: The Stationary Office, March 2008, p. 151.

² International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2008. London: IISS, 2008, p. 79.

states having deployed around 80,000 soldiers or 4% of its armed forces around the globe.³ The explanation for both the inappropriate equipment and the inadequate number of deployable troops is the insufficient restructuring of the armed forces following the Cold War. For the most part, reform efforts to transform the standing armies remain slow and disordered.⁴ France and Britain remain more advanced in terms of international deployability than any other EU member states. Nevertheless, reform efforts are being made. One should note recent reform projects initiated by Germany and many Eastern European countries. Unfortunately, it may well take several years or even decades for the results of such reforms – should they be serious and continuous – to become noticeable. The lack of European military muscle is due to a large part to a shortage of professional soldiers, but also to the lack of equipment to carry out force projection, the most important of which is strategic lift.⁵

In a majority of cases, the deployment of soldiers by EU member states has been dependent on external sources for transport, support, and protection. The capacity for autonomous action of European states remains severely constrained. The current A400M program aims to improve the strategic lift abilities of the EU member states. The following table outlines some of technical specifications of the A400M.

³ International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2008. London: IISS, 2008, p. 104.

⁴ Jean- Yves Haine. “Idealism and Power: The new EU Security Strategy.” Current History. Philadelphia: Current History Magazine, March 2004, p. 111.

⁵ Jean-Pierre Darnis et al. “Lessons learned from European defence equipment programmes” EUISS Occasional paper no. 69. Paris: EUISS, October 2007, p. 17.

Airbus 400M Technical Specifications

DIMENSIONS

Overall Length	147.9 feet/45.1 meters
Wing Span	139.1 feet/42.4 meters
Overall Height	48.2 feet/14.7 meters

PAYLOAD DIMENSIONS

Length (excluding ramp)	58.1 feet/17.71 meters
Ramp Length	17.71 feet/5.40 meters
Width	13.1 feet/3.85 meters
Height	12.6 feet/3.85 meters
Height (aft of wing)	13.1 feet/4 meters

WEIGHTS

Maximum Take-off Weight	136.5 tonnes
Maximum Landing Weight	120 tonnes
Maximum Payload	37 tonnes
Total Internal Fuel	47.7 tonnes

Source: Airbus Military⁶

However, the project faced a number of technical issues and while France and Germany were expected to be the first of many customers to accept A400M deliveries by 2007, current optimistic projections suggest the airplane will not be ready before 2012. Currently, the whole project has been put into questions.⁷ In addition, the A400M is limited to medium size or outsize medium lift with a range of approximately 4000 km when it is fully loaded. This would leave EU member states with the existing significant deficits in heavy lift capabilities and limit EU external military action to a range of roughly 4000km.⁸ It is, however, advantageous that the

⁶ Airbus Military. A400M technical specifications. Airbus Military, 2008. From <http://www.airbusmilitary.com/specifications.html>

⁷ Thomas Bauer. "Mitten im Flug darf man nicht aussteigen" Financial Times Deutschland. Hamburg: Financial Times Deutschland, March 12, 2009, p. 24.

⁸ Airbus Military. The A400M – technical specifications.

A400M can also be used as a tactical aircraft and as an air-to-air refuelling aircraft. Overall, one may conclude that the A400M would represent a significant improvement in medium-size lift and in air-to-air refuelling capabilities. Strategic lift for missions in the EU periphery would be sufficient as long as only medium lift capabilities are required. Nevertheless, the A400M project is in many ways illustrative of EU defence projects. It is a compromise that does not meet all the needs of EU member states, it took too long to develop (its delivery was originally planned for 2007) and it does not present a global or heavy strategic lift capability. Late realisation of compromise or inadequate capabilities often form a problem with EU projects. As the saying goes: ‘a camel is a horse designed by a committee’. Yet, the A400M is a step forward in EU defence capabilities, even if not for the tasks the EU requires most. Furthermore, it is a significant improvement over the Transall C-160 currently in operation.

The shortcomings of EU member states for heavy lift required for most international tasks (even some of those at the lower end of the Petersberg tasks) will remain for the near future. The US has over 200 of such transport planes able to carry the heaviest loads. The Europeans in contrast have only established interim solutions for strategic lift capabilities. The UK has leased five C-17 Globemasters from the US and the 15 EU member states that have signed up to NATO’s Strategic Airlift Interim Solution currently lease six Ukrainian Antonovs An-124.⁹ Even if one considers that Europeans do not have a global commitment comparable to that of the US, this ratio is strikingly low.¹⁰ The present focus upon the A400M capability

⁹ Royal Air Force. “C-17A Globemaster III” Royal Air Force, from <http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/c17aglobemaster.cfm>

¹⁰ Jocelyn Mawdsley and Gerrard Quille. “The EU Security Strategy: A new framework for ESDP and equipping the EU Rapid Reaction Force” Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Brussels: ISIS, 2004, p. 44

represents a degree of over-capacity in one lift area to meet a very specific type of transport requirement, while other types of transport requirement are being neglected or will continue to be insufficient. Global lift and heavy lift will remain underprovided areas in European capabilities. The further development of a cargo version of the A380 for military purposes would easily help to bridge this gap. However, it is highly questionable whether EADS, whose daughter-company Airbus builds the A380, will re-activate the A380 Cargo project and whether enough, if any, EU countries would invest in such heavy lift capabilities.

The Battlegroups: A Solution?

While the A400M was supposed to be a solution to the lack of strategic lift, the Battlegroups aimed at resolving the lack of force projection of EU member states in respects to the its armed forces personnel by creating mobile, modern EU rapid reaction units. However, the Battlegroups face several problems themselves. First, while the 60,000 soldiers envisaged available under the Helsinki Headline Goals appear to be a large number of troops it is in fact about as much as the European Defence Agency members had deployed abroad anyway before the Battlegroups were ready. If one includes all other EU member states the number rises to an average of 70,000 troops in 2003, the year the Battlegroups were created. This suggests that the Battlegroups do not present a quantitative improvement of internationally deployable European

forces at all unless the Battlegroups are deployed and developed in addition to European forces already deployed internationally.¹¹

Given the small size of the EU Battlegroups, the missions that EU Battlegroups can complete cannot be too demanding, and with now only two Battlegroups on stand-by at any given time under the rules of the 2010 Headline Goals, there is little possibility of calling for reinforcements or expanding a mission. As such, the EU will only be able to use the Battlegroups very sparingly and on missions limited in scale. However, if military force ought to become one of the tools for achieving the strategic goals set out in the European Security Strategy, such as counteracting terrorism or stabilising the periphery of Europe, the EU will need far more than two Battlegroups at its disposal to meet these goals. The EU may not have to set up an entire army. It will however need at least more than two Battlegroup brigades on standby.¹² Furthermore, of the 60,000 rapid deployment troops it envisioned, only 20,000 would be actual combat forces. Other troops would be support personnel such as logisticians and specialised forces such as medical staff. This is too small a number if the Union wants to maintain a rapid reaction combat force for relatively large-scale sustained operations. The Union members need to commit more soldiers to achieve a pool of 150,000 to 180,000 troops, according to some estimates.¹³

¹¹ Steven Everts et al. "A European Way of War" Centre for European Reform. London: Centre for European Reform, May 2004, p. 62.

¹² Jan Joel Andersson. "Armed and Ready? The EU Battlegroup Concept and the Nordic Battlegroup" Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies. Stockholm: Sieps, March 2006, p. 46.

¹³ Everts et al. Centre for European Reform, p. 111.

A further issue preventing the Battlegroups to be an effective projective force is that they currently do not have access to airborne and space-based intelligence as not all member states have equal access to the satellite intelligence gathering systems such as Helios or Galileo, should the EU agree to use it for more than only civil tasks. Only France, Germany, the UK, Italy and Spain have signed on to Helios, although the rest have a stake in Galileo. Furthermore they do not all have compatible equipment in the fields of intelligence and telecommunications. Also access to Helios or possible military systems of Galileo need to be guaranteed for a successful operation of Battlegroups in the field.¹⁴ A Battlegroup may have access to the appropriate means of lift into theatre, but if they do not know where to go or are lost upon reaching the area of operation, their effectiveness will be limited and their security jeopardized. Hence, access to such intelligence imagery and data is vital for the successful operation of Battlegroups in the field. In addition, as mentioned in chapter two, the Battlegroups are not interoperable for major military tasks. While each Battlegroup is supposed to be a stand-alone unit, major operations will require them to work alongside, which is only possible effectively if a certain degree of interoperability between the Battlegroups is present. Interoperability is achieved relatively easily for low-end military tasks, which the EU currently undertakes. One only needs comparable and compatible weapons, tactical training, ammunition and communication and radio systems. Compatible air-to-air refuelling systems and high-end technology equipment only needs to be addressed at a second stage. Should the EU wish to realise its ambitions of becoming a more active global player, interoperability between EU member states and between individual

¹⁴ European Defence Agency. Code of best practice in supply chain as approved by the ASD on April 27, 2006 and agreed by the EU member states participating in the European Defence Agency. Paris: European Defence agency, March 2007, p. 352.

Battlegroups must be improved.¹⁵ The often-concurrent equipment policies of NATO and the CSDP, discussed in more detail in chapter four, certainly do no help in achieving more interoperability of equipment between the Battlegroups.

Inadequate Capabilities of the EU

Further issues in the realm of capabilities continue to exist, the most important of which concern interoperability of forces (both between Battlegroups personnel and regular armed forces) and the duplication of equipment and capabilities. Interoperability of EU member states' forces can only be improved on by further integrating capabilities, including the procurement process, the pooling of resources and the expansion of EU-led programs of acquisition. Currently only a few capability categories are at best partially integrated. As a result, full compatibility and interoperability of forces in the field remains limited. The lack of interoperability stretches through the whole range of capabilities, although the most important shortcomings in compatibility occur in the field of electronics and communications systems, which in some cases even prevent basic communication between European nations in the field of operation as different countries use different radio systems.¹⁶ The only comfort or concern one can have in this situation (depending on one's point of view) is that NATO also continues to struggle with problems in this regard despite possessing a longer period of defence cooperation than the EU.

¹⁵ Otfried Nassauer. "Europe's Road towards Military Integration: Understanding the political, institutional and technological developments towards a Common European Security and Defence Policy" BITS January 2000. Berlin: Berlin Information-Center for Transatlantic Security, 2000.

¹⁶ Mawdsley and Quille. Bonn International Centre for Conversion, p. 48.

Integrated headquarters, which could also improve communication and coordination of EU forces, are also a long way from becoming reality, as the example of the Tervuren initiative mentioned above and discussed later illustrates. In addition, national specifications regarding equipment or the procurement process can hamper cooperative programs and interoperability. The example of attempts to make French and British Aircraft carriers compatible illustrates these difficulties.¹⁷

The duplication of capabilities also prevents an effective use of European forces and the transformation to force projection capabilities. Many European governments waste their already limited procurement and development funds on sustaining certain defence technologies and capabilities nationally, often to favour their national defence industries and labour market.¹⁸ These are usually too unsophisticated and too small to be internationally competitive. In addition, too many small procurement programmes for the same capability draw money away from possible specialisations of smaller countries and prevent the allocation of resources to capabilities and structures necessary for force projection.¹⁹ The following table illustrates the amount of scattered defence programmes in Europe in comparison with the United States. The overlap of defence programmes leads to over-capabilities in some areas while neglecting others, which is an even more pressing issue since the budgetary constraints of European armies are significant. The allocation shortcomings due to the duplication of capabilities lead to the third issue, which prevents Europe to pursue its global ambitions: funding of armed forces.

¹⁷ Darnis, et al. EUISS Occasional Paper no. 69, p. 17.

¹⁸ Council of the EU. EU Military Committee Working Group/Headline Task Force. Brussels: Council of the EU, 17 March 2009.

¹⁹ Darnis et al. EUISS Occasional Paper no. 69, p. 24.

Defence Programmes in Europe and the US

System	Europe	United States of America
Land Systems		
- Main battle tanks	4	1
- Armoured fight. vehicles	16	3
- 155 mm Howitzer	3	1
Air Systems		
- Fighter-strike	7	5
- Ground attack-trainer	6	1
- Attack helicopter	7	5
- Anti-ship-missiles	9	3
- Air-to-air-missiles	8	4
Sea Systems		
- Main surface combatant ships	11	2
- Diesel submarine	7	0
- Anti-submarine torpedo	9	2
- Nuclear-powered submarine	2	1
Total	89	27


Source: European Commission, UNISYS, Final report of the study: *Evaluation of the Common Initiative in the context of the Intra-EU Transfers of Defence Goods*, Brussels, February 2005.

The Funding Problem of European Armies

Capability deficiencies can be traced back to what is possibly the first and best-known obstacle to the reform and transformation of European forces, namely the level of overall military spending by European countries. Only a few EU member states have actually raised their defence budgets in recent years. As noted above, the European Security Strategy provides the Union with a new framework that demands more rapid deployability, more flexible units, and more combined joint forces. In addition, the plans for producing the capabilities identified by the 2010 Headline Goals will need funding if they are to be successful.²⁰ In the defence sector, like in all other areas more results (in this case: capabilities) can be only achieved by more input (in this case: money). Some claim that defence budgets would effectively have to be raised to attain better and more adequate capabilities to modernise European armies. However, most of

²⁰ Mawdsley and Quille, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, p. 58.

the European *cognoscenti* remain sceptical that defence budgets can be raised in the context of European political and economic constraints, such as the European stability pact.²¹ Many European governments also have difficulties justifying higher military spending to their electorate. As a result, military claims for additional resources generated by economic growth rank well below competing government departments and economic sectors, such as debt and tax reduction, social or “green” programs. The fact that European defence spending has decreased from 2002 to 2007 supports this view. The following table illustrates how low defence spending in the EU really is, as well as how much more France and the UK (Europe’s two only countries with modernised armies) spend on defence, both in absolute value and in terms of GDP percentages.



When one considers the defence budgets of the past five years, the trend of decline or stagnation of such budgets is obvious. However, both France and Germany have recently vowed to increase their defence budgets for the first time in years. In 2008, France’s defence budget rose slightly from 36.2 in 2007 to 36.7 billion Euros, whereas Germany’s budget rose from 28.4

²¹ Antonio Missiroli. “Defence Spending in Europe: Is Europe Prepared to Pay for Improved Capabilities?” *Analysis no 0*. Paris: EUISS, December 2001, p. 2.

in 2007 to 29.3 billion Euros.²² Given the recent course of the Sarkozy government, one may however expect a more substantial increase of the defence budget for 2009 or 2010 at the latest. President Sarkozy has demonstrated the hawkish tendencies of his predecessor, while approaching matters of defence much more pragmatically (i.e. not always in direct opposition to the United States) which may translate into a more effective use of the budget and of military resources. The current economic crisis may also be helpful to such hikes in defence budgets as they may be part of economic stimulus packages. In some respects, France and Germany have traditionally been considered the dynamic duo of the EU, paving the road for others to follow. Germany and France are generally able to work out a compromise and common positions within the EU. They shared views on Iraq, the EU's energy policy, or the new Mediterranean Union. If other countries follow their lead, EU defence spending might in fact see an important increase over the next years.²³

Besides raising defence budgets, the reallocations of existing government budgets from non-defence to defence purposes could be a second source of funding. Governments could for example reroute funds from public subsidies on agriculture to the defence ministries.²⁴ Given the popular and governmental preference in Europe for civil rather than military public spending, this option would appear to be unlikely to provide the required funds to modernise European armies. A further difficulty in freeing up resources for defence spending is the economic dynamics and rules and regulations of the EU. Due to the EU's financial discipline accepted

²² International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2008, pp. 118 and 124.

²³ BBC News. "French defence to counter terror" BBC News from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7458650.stm>

²⁴ Charles Wolf, Jr. and Benjamin Zycher. European Military Prospects, Economic Constraints, and the Rapid Reaction Force. Santa Monica: RAND, 2003, p. 33.

under the EU stability and growth pact, as well as relatively low rates of economic growth, the members of this pact are under strong pressure not to expand public spending beyond the agreed 3% of a country's GDP. This can have an impact on defence budgets as well as in other areas of public spending.²⁵

In sum, the limited defence budgets of EU member states present a serious challenge to the modernisation of armies across the EU, while at the same time being part of the problem itself. Budget trends of recent years appear to point at no increases of defence budgets, be it from direct budget increases or reallocation of resources from other budgets, although the latest statements of European leaders such as President Sarkozy indicate this trend could be reversed.

Further, the lack of liberalisation of the European defence market poses problems regarding funding, as the lack of competition, the promotion of national champions and the reluctance to share 'sensitive' technologies on an open European market reduce the overall efficiency of the sector and therefore of procurement possibilities. This takes us to another area, which is hampering the development of the CSDP: the European defence sector.

A European Single Market – But Also in the Field of Defence?

Although the EU is considered the most integrated and developed free trade zone of the world, or even a single market, the realities of the defence sector are quite different. The role of European Union institutions has remained minimal in the defence sector, as defence products are

²⁵ Mawdsley and Quille, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, p. 22.

specifically exempted by treaty from the single market rules and regulations through article 223 of the Treaty of Rome and article 296 of the Treaty of Amsterdam.²⁶ Article 296 states, that

“1. The provisions of this Treaty shall not preclude the application of the following rules:

- (a) No Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security.
- (b) Any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material.”²⁷

This allows a member state to invoke that their essential security interests are affected.

Member states are free to resort to this article whenever an economic, technological or intellectual property aspect in their defence sector is affected. However, the European Court of Justice has constantly stated that no general reserve existed under article 296. The applicability of Article 296 has to be demonstrated case-by-case and the onus is on the Member States to provide evidence that recourse to Article 296 is required to protect their essential security interests.²⁸ Nevertheless, the existence of Article 296 essentially leads to the defence industries of Europe not being part of the single market, not being subject to much international competition and not operating in a liberalised market. The Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain adopted in 2006 is aims to be a step towards integrating the EU defence market. The Code of Best Practice was established to orient defence procurements along a code of conduct, which encourages more competition and fair opportunities for all suppliers, regardless of

²⁶ Mawdsley and Quille. Bonn International Centre for Conversion, p. 26.

²⁷ Council of the EU. Article 296 Treaty of Amsterdam. Brussels: Council of the EU, 1997.

²⁸ Commission of the EU. Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts in the fields of defence and security COM(2007) 766 final 2007/0280 (COD). Brussels: Commission of the EU, 2007, p. 2

nationality. It provides a voluntary circumvention of article 296 but reemphasizes, that “no legal commitment is involved or implied” to abide by the Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain.²⁹ Currently, this Code of Best Practice only applies to the EDA member states and it remains to be seen what, if any, the effects of the code will be and whether more non-EDA EU member states will subscribe to it.

The consequences of the general lack of liberalisation are manifold. First, it leads to a lack of transparency of procurement procedures, since spending is kept confidential under the pretext of national interests. Article 296 essentially allows governments to favour national champions in order to promote their own technological and industrial development. It also allows for straightforward protectionism in the defence sector. In addition, procurement agencies are often required to explain their choices to national parliaments who sometimes apply pressure to favour national industries.³⁰ The uncertainty left by the use of article 296 is exceptionally severe in countries of Eastern Europe, which continue to struggle with corruption and political and economic favouritism left from the communist era.

Second, this leads to a lack of interoperability as procurement processes, cycles and technologies remain in the hands of national governments. Considering the 89 procurement programs the EU currently maintains (see table 1), it is hardly surprising that their interoperability is insufficient. Even NATO has been unable to achieve significant progress in this area, despite being 40 years older than the CSDP. Further, defence procurement cycles remain not synchronised, making interoperable equipment harder to procure since new

²⁹ European Defence Agency. Code of best practice in supply chain as approved by the ASD on April 27, 2006 and agreed by the EU member states participating in the European Defence Agency. Paris: EDA, March 2007.

³⁰ Darnis et al. EUISS Occasional paper no. 69, p. 21.

equipment needs to be purchased at different times by different member states from different and often not cooperating procurers. As was already discussed above, these elements also contribute to the duplication of European technologies and capabilities.

Third, the favouring of national defence companies leads to an overall lack of competitiveness of European defence companies. Favouring national champions leads to continued investment into uncompetitive industries and technologies, since governments will attempt to maintain a market for products of national companies, which in turn keeps capital and jobs in the country. In a way, one could compare the EU defence market to the EU mobile phone market before it was liberalised. One can then also imagine what consequences and benefits liberalising the market could have.

Furthermore, current Intellectual Property (IP) legislation does not encourage the sharing of IP since often not only member states governments but also defence companies retain these IP rights and are reluctant to share these or even to engage into cooperative projects with other competitors in the field. The lack of a common European defence market for IP rights hampers the transfer and attribution of IP rights across the EU. The integration of IP markets is currently limited to specific sectors and industries with the defence market remaining exempt until it is not specifically included and becomes part of the single market.³¹ The above, along with stagnating defence budgets, leads to higher prices, slower and sub-standard technological development and insufficient or at best scattered capabilities for many countries. This does not mean that European countries are incapable of producing competitive defence products nationally, as Britain's BAE and the German Krauss-Maffei Wegmann illustrate. However, the number and

³¹ Commission of the EU, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the term of protection of copyright and related rights. Brussels: Commission of the EU, 2006.

importance of such companies remains limited and the duplication of similar projects manifold. The lack of international competitiveness of European defence companies compared to US firms discourages other countries from purchasing defence products from another state, leaving many European states to buy US defence products. The US refuses to buy European defence products for a variety of reasons, one of which is certainly the lack of technological sophistication of European defence products.³² Should European defence products be more competitive, it would encourage at least European states to 'buy European'. Still, one must also note the NATO relationship of many EU member states, which might also affect which products they buy and from whom. This will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

The present approach developing under the CSDP (Code of Best Practice, 'juste retour', etc.) does not favour spending or budgetary convergence or the adoption of standards in spending practices along required capability lines. It also does not address different accounting and reporting procedures. Instead, it focuses on voluntary participation in equipment-based capability programs.³³ This is most obvious under the present European Capability Acquisition Process, which constitutes a combination of these two approaches with – in the words of the EU – “pragmatic” options being designed for member states to “volunteer” their commitment. Member states can then decide to sign up to joint procurement programmes, individual procurement programmes or other options including pooling, leasing and co-ordination of existing capabilities.³⁴ It is however doubtful, that much convergence of defence technologies

³² Burkard Schmitt. *European and Transatlantic Defence-Industrial Strategies. EUISS Analysis 1*. Paris EUISS, January 2002, p.1.

³³ Mawdsley and Quille. *Bonn International Centre for Conversion*, p. 32.

³⁴ Council of the EU. *2386th Council meeting – General Affairs – 13802/01 (Presse 414 - G) – Excerpt*. Brussels: Council of the EU, 19-20 November 2001.

will result from this voluntary approach and that the European defence market will make significant steps forward as long as the decision-making powers remain with national governments and in no aspect subject to the Commission or EU competition law authorities. Such measures can only hope to be successful if EDA membership and participation in the European Capabilities Action Plan was made mandatory for EU countries. European defence companies on the other side have engaged in cooperation and joint ventures and it would certainly be welcome by many that such cooperation be facilitated by the EU.

Furthermore, the so-called ‘juste retour’ arrangements pose a major problem to a possible liberalisation and increased competitiveness of the EU defence market. The ‘juste retour’ work-share arrangements guarantee that a national defence industry must receive work worth the full amount of its government’s contribution to a joint or EU-wide defence programme or operation.³⁵ EU member states have put this principle into place to ensure the security of their defence equipment supply. It has however often been noted, that the more governments and industrial interests are involved, the more difficult the cooperation. The more interests are at stake and the more parties are involved, the harder it becomes to work out a ‘just return of contributions’ (emphasis added) and to then reach an agreement in that regard with all contributing member states. Indeed some have even suggested that ‘juste retour’ is possibly the single biggest obstacle to closer and more effective cooperation on European programmes, which EU governments on limited defence budgets and uncompetitive defence industries cannot

³⁵ Darnis et al. EUISS Occasional paper no. 69, p. 25.

afford.³⁶ The 'juste retour' practice must be abandoned if EU capability development is to take on an effective and coordinated form. It can however be expected that many member states will insist on maintaining the practice and that any headway in this regard will thus be difficult.

However, in 2009 the European Parliament adopted a proposal by the European Commission, which aims at eventually creating a single European defence market for military equipment. This would essentially provide for a mandatory circumvention of article 296, if the article were not abolished (or at least disregarded) altogether. One of the initiatives in the package was a proposal for a number of directives on public procurement in the fields of defence and security. The proposal contains non-binding recommendations for promoting the competitiveness of the defence sector, a binding directive on defence procurement to enhance transparency and allow more European competition in national defence markets as well as a directive on transfers of defence products within the single market. The proposed legislation aims to create "a genuine European market in this sector without sacrificing member states' control over their essential defence and security interests" as current EU procurement rules were "ill-suited to most defence and security equipment."³⁷ The Aerospace and Defence Industries Association welcomed the legislation as a "significant step towards a European defence equipment market."³⁸ However, it remains to be seen whether the European Council will adopt

³⁶ Suzuki, Kazuto. "European Defence Agency and Security Research Programme: Would EU defence industrial policy improve European security?" Paper for EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference. Austin, TX: EUSA, April 1, 2005.

³⁷ Commission of the EU. Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts in the fields of defence and security, p. 5.

³⁸ Euractiv. Parliament paves way for single EU defence market. Brussels: EurActiv.com PLC, 6 December 2007. From <http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/eu-new-defence-procurement-initiative-broadly-welcomed/article-168918>

the package. A directive requires EU member states to achieve a particular result without dictating the means of achieving it, as opposed to EU regulations which are self-executing. All legislation in the EU must be proposed by the Commission, passed by Parliament and eventually adopted by the Council. The Council is usually the most difficult stage for any legislation to pass. Also, the actual impact of these new rules on the defence market remains to be seen, as the wording of the directive is somewhat ambiguous, once again illustrative of a lot of EU legislation in general.

The Institutional Difficulties of the CSDP

Several institutional factors also contribute to the issues the CSDP faces. First, the consensus rule requires a lot of prodding and compromising to reach any kind of decision. It can also be said that it slows the CSDP's development significantly. As Asle Toje notes,

The EU still finds itself unable to deliver the foreign policies expected owing to a lack of decision-making procedures capable of overcoming dissent. The 'consensus-expectations gap', in other words, is a gap between what the member-states are expected to agree on and what they are actually able to consent to. This is not to suggest any ill-will among the member-states, only that the belief in their ability to concur exceeds what the Union is practicably able to deliver. The chief reason for this is that the CFSP is governed by the twin precepts of intergovernmentalism and consensus. The reason why the CFSP is governed by unanimity can be captured in a single word: *sovereignty*. While most member-states would like to carry the weight of 27 states when pursuing their own foreign policy goals, the thought of having foreign policy objectives defined by 26 other states is generally less appealing. This is why the foreign and security policies have been singled out in a separate 'pillar' uneasily tacked on to the European Communities.³⁹

³⁹ Asle Toje. "The Consensus Expectation Gap: Explaining Europe's Ineffective Foreign Policy." Security Dialogue. Vol. 39(1), 2008. Oslo: Sage Publications, 2008, p. 122.

In other words, as long as the consensus rule and the intergovernmental mode for the CSDP is kept, any progress and decision-making in foreign and defence policy of the EU will be slow and always based on compromise, rather than pragmatism. The only remedy to this situation would be transferring foreign and defence policy competencies to the EU, but member states remain wary of doing so due to sovereignty issues and the sensitivity of security interests. First steps in this direction have been taken by moving civilian mission elements into the realm of the Commission, implementing the silent abstention rule and removing the pillar structure under the Treaty of Lisbon. However, much more progress must be made, if such institutional obstacles to an effective CFSP and CSDP ought to be overcome.

Also, the two articles of the Treaty of Lisbon containing clauses for assistance in case of a terrorist attack or an infringement on the territorial integrity of a member state lack specifics regarding their actual implementation, both institutionally and operationally.⁴⁰ The language of the Treaty of Lisbon is surprisingly vague regarding mutual solidarity in case of a terrorist attack considering the graveness of such an event. The EU often has to resort to such vague statements due to its need to find a legal formula acceptable to all 27 member-states. It appears even more astonishing, that a relatively clear clause establishing a mutual defence alliance providing for all EU member states to intervene should one be attacked was present in the Constitution but removed and replaced with the rather vague concept of mutual solidarity in case of an attack under the Treaty of Lisbon. What exactly mutual solidarity means and whether it extends beyond mere declarations remains to be tested in practice and leaves this clause open to criticism. Fortunately, most EU countries will find comfort in the fact that article five of the

⁴⁰ Antonio Missiroli. "Mind the steps: the Constitutional Treaty and Beyond" in Nicole Gnesotto, ed. ESDP : the first five years. Paris: EUISS, 2004, p. 148.

North Atlantic Treaty contains provisions for mutual assistance and defence in case of an aggression.

There is also a more general problem with the CFSP, which requires more detailed adjustments as well as a better convergence of all member states towards a common position. European governments have not yet developed the EU foreign policy with enough detail. However, a coherent foreign policy is a precondition for EU success in the military sphere. European soldiers will never be deployed on CSDP missions if the EU governments cannot agree on their political and strategic objectives. However, one must also note that silent disagreements often exist, even when missions are not being opposed directly. The CSDP does to some extent depend on whether the 27 member states can agree on a common line of foreign policy. If EU governments did agree on a common military doctrine, it would stem from a determination to demonstrate political unity – and not from the need for a doctrine that would provide effective guidance in an actual conflict. Currently, this political unity is difficult to achieve, which translates into foreign policy, which in turn has an impact on defence policy. Therefore, military action is often being limited in scale. Limited military action can however facilitate, intentionally or unintentionally, diplomatic negotiations and stands in contrast to the more direct and robust approach to military action of the United States. The use of force could be better targeted and serving more than just battle-strategic objectives. The EU, rather than forcing peace or a victory or an agreement prefer to even the way to negotiations in a conflict. One may argue that this presents more Clausewitz's continuation of politics than a full-fledged war.

There are also issues with the European Security Strategy. Some observers claim, the EU cannot have a proper security strategy as long as decisions on the use of force rest in the hands of

its member governments. The ESS can capture at any given moment what appears to unite the EU 27 in analytical and policy terms. It is however not a long-term strategy that would give the EU a military and foreign policy blueprint for action such as the National Defence Strategy does for the United States. This is because the security strategy does not emanate from a fully-fledged strategic actor that can wield force on its own account.⁴¹ The EU is not one country and does not yet speak with one united voice, at least in the field of defence and foreign policy.

Consequently, the security strategy is unclear when it addresses the achievement of the objectives and goals it sets out. The strategy proposes that the means to tackle problems such as terrorism or WMD proliferation will be 'preventive engagement' and 'effective multilateralism'. The former tends to refer to the issuing of declarations under the twin banners of 'critical dialogue' and 'constructive engagement'. The latter tends to mean supporting whatever measures have been agreed upon by the United Nations and upon building an international front of support for any military action. There would be no place for unilateralism or 'coalitions of the willing' in EU external action, except from their own midst under the Permanent Structured Cooperation once it is implemented. The European Security Strategy does not offer even the roughest guideline as to how economic and military tools might be applied in order to exert influence, but instead chooses to link itself to United Nations Security Council resolutions and other principled declarations.⁴² This of course makes EU military action dependent on the unpredictable and great power-game forum the Security Council is. The latter will often fail to come to an agreement, leaving the EU without a legal basis for action. The danger inherent in failing to link capabilities to objectives becomes clear in cases where the EU is forced to respond

⁴¹ Everts et al. Centre for European Reform, p. 27.

⁴² Toje. Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, p. 127.

to international events, such as the Darfur crisis or the Georgian-Russian crisis. In addition, such ties to the UN would hamper the quickness of reaction to an international crisis. The uncertainty of how to respond to a crisis can lead to slow responses on the one hand and half-hearted responses on the other. However, the CSDP remains linked to the UN Security Council and is therefore slow and indecisive in responding to a conflict. In sum, effective multilateralism for the EU means subjecting itself to the UN Security Council, which is however an inadequate forum for most conflicts due to the vetoes of the permanent members. This in turn links EU military action to the usual 'great power struggles' it surely wanted to avoid.

Furthermore, at present, there is no consensus in Europe on the purpose or the circumstances in which it is appropriate to use military force and when the EU can be the right body to act internationally. In practice, because countries choose to ignore the UN Security Council or because it is incapable of providing any guidance, the CSDP might not always subject itself to UN rules. There is therefore a risk that, despite the European Security Strategy and its explicit ties to UN resolutions, European governments will not or cannot agree on whether to participate in, or on how to conduct some EU operations. For some countries, an EU brand might legitimise a military doctrine and future operations; but for others it could have the opposite effect. In the latter countries, the EU is sometimes seen as not sufficiently acting in their interests. The indecisiveness of the EU is illustrated by the problems CSDP military missions have faced as discussed *ante*.

Europe's Lack of a Common Traditional Strategic Culture

The arguably biggest institutional and political problem of the EU remains the Union's lack of a defined identity. This makes self-interested behaviour and therefore a clear military doctrine difficult. Both the response to the Georgian crisis and the financial crisis illustrate the range of opinion and political approaches that exist in the EU, then leading the EU to adopt the lowest common denominator policy, e.g. a call that Russia's behaviour was 'inacceptable' or that the response to the world financial crisis must be 'strong and coordinated'. The EU defines itself by values taken to be universal and at the same time characteristic of Europe and aims to define a strategic culture from this as seen by its ties to UN Security Council resolutions. However, it can be argued that the lack of traditional strategic culture in Europe is the biggest single obstacle to better, smoother and deeper military cooperation between the EU member states.

"We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention," demanded the 2003 European Security Strategy. "We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise" it continued.⁴³ Europeans, however remain unwilling to commit to such economically and politically costly operations. NATO's inability to persuade many European governments to send soldiers to the volatile south and east of Afghanistan are one indicator of the problem. It hints at the divide that exists within Europe in regards to using military force in the first place. On the one hand, the British and Eastern European countries appear to possess some political will to engage in dangerous military operations as their commitment to the Iraq war shows, however dubious the reasons for engaging in this war may

⁴³ Council of the EU. A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy. Brussels: Council of the European Union, December 2003, p. 1.

have been. On the other Hand, the Germans along with countries such as Sweden or Ireland appear to lack the will to risk the safety of their soldiers in any context, reflected by national requirements such as a UN mandate and parliamentary approval even for mere peacekeeping missions. The fact that the European Security Strategy does not address the issue of the use of force reflects the diverging positions of EU member states on the use of force and explains the delegation of authority to wage war to the UN Security Council. The divide between the above hawkish and dovish countries can prevent agreements on defence operations, thereby preventing convergence on military strategy. The lack of political unity in the EU continues to present a significant obstacle in the field of security and defence. As Jean-Pierre Darnis from the traditionally pro-EU European Institute for Strategic Studies (the EU think tank) noted:

While EU member states have a security strategy, and are undertaking more operations together, a lack of common doctrine does hinder the development of common requirements, which in turn can slow down the progress of cooperative programs. It is true that EU governments have very different military strengths, and diverse attitudes towards military force. However an increasing number of EU missions each year are likely to encourage EU defence ministries to develop shared ideas on military doctrine.⁴⁴

In how far these EU mission contribute to such a military doctrine is however still open. While the EU has undertaken five military missions to date, their scope remains limited as does the integrationist character of these missions. EU missions are formed around a framework nation or NATO assets, which hints at limited cooperation in the field at best. However, while these framework nations do carry a significant amount of the operational load in each case, all operations also comprise a large amount of military staff from other nations, which undeniably will lead to a better understanding and cooperation during missions.

⁴⁴ Darnis et al. EUISS Occasional paper no. 69, p. 15.

Even if one looks beyond the evident differences on war and the use of force in general, EU countries seem unable to agree to what tasks are comprised by the Petersberg tasks all member states did in principle agree to. There remains some divergence on what the low-end and on what the high-end Petersberg tasks comprise. For instance, whereas Italy and France understand the upper level to include ‘restoring order’ such as in Somalia, for the UK and the Netherlands the upper level was described as ‘crisis management’ such as Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999. In the short term, the relevance for capabilities of such a difference in interpretation might not be so great, because both operations required a dominant US role. However, if the Petersberg Tasks are deemed to include an operation such as Desert Storm and that such a mission should be conducted by EU member states without the US, the level of ambition and thus demand upon capabilities increases substantially. This is true even if EU member states have recourse to NATO assets. It is less problematic at the lower level of the tasks, although an increased emphasis on policing roles within the CSDP may stretch some states’ understanding of what constitutes a lower level operation. These ambiguities need to be addressed and resolved if realistic and accurate policies and mission planning are to be developed by the EU. It would allow the EU to define its exact goals and ambitions in terms of the size and scale of the operations it wishes to undertake.⁴⁵ This lack of agreement on tasks and political will for military action in turn can be traced back to the lack of the EU’s defined self, addressed above.

The most obvious illustration of a lack of common traditional strategic culture remains of course the intergovernmental consensus-based mode of operation of the CSDP itself. If there were – at least on principle – some kind of unity among EU governments of how, when and how

⁴⁵ Mawdsley and Quille. Bonn International Centre for Conversion, p. 37.

much force to use in a given scenario, the consensus-based mode of operation would be much more effective and possibly even obsolete. Open clashes on issues such as the Iraq war or the continued use of Article 296 TEU support this point. As we have seen above the intergovernmental modus operandi is the feature of the CSDP most governments seem the most eager to protect. In addition, the above problems regarding funding, capabilities and the lack of market integration of defence industries point towards the fact that EU governments cannot implement the principles of the CSDP they have agreed on, largely because of their different approaches to strategy and the use of force. It is thus reasonable to conclude that the EU still lacks a strategic culture in the traditional sense although some convergence can be expected as and if EU missions grow in size, importance and number.

The Development of a Human Security Based Strategic Culture

If one does however adjust the theoretical framework of how we think of strategic culture, the argument takes a different direction. Legitimacy of military action is now tied more and more to both ethics and international law and less to Westphalian state interests. The increasingly common use of humanitarian interventions, the underlying principles of which all EU missions subscribe to, has put an emphasis on human security rather than state security. The Barcelona report, published in November 2004, also appears to adhere to this new theoretical framework. The report entitled "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe" outlines the implementation of the European Security Strategy and suggests the adoption of a human security doctrine. The Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, which drafted the report, convened at the request of the High Representative of the CFSP to advise independently on the

capabilities the EU would require to pursue its common security and defence policy effectively. The report focuses on regional conflicts and failed or failing states. In this context, it suggests developing a "Human Security Doctrine" for the EU, which would include "principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity," a "Human Security Response Force," as well as a legal framework that would identify guidelines for interventions and ensuing military operations in crisis scenarios.⁴⁶ These are all elements missing from the current official EU framework, including the Security Strategy. The report claims that "unlike in classic wars where only states bore responsibility, armed forces now have to act within a legal framework that applies to individuals".⁴⁷ The report was drafted upon the request of the EU High Representative and is thus expected to have at least some impact on the future direction an EU security doctrine is to take. It has not yet been adopted by the European Council but in its advisory nature indicates a shift towards more human security thinking.

In addition, more expert reports state that the EU is developing a security policy based on human rights and not on state sovereignty. The reasons such a post-national security framework is developing are economic imperatives for military integration, the increasing absence of existential territorial threat to nation-states and the loosening of the citizen–state social contract, at least on a national basis.⁴⁸ These requirements all appear to apply to the European Union. The EU defines itself as an international actor according to the Copenhagen Criteria. These criteria which were designed to define whether or not a country is eligible to join the EU are also

⁴⁶ The Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities. A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities. London: LSE Press, September 2004, p. 1.

⁴⁷ The Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities. A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, p. 19.

⁴⁸ Janne Haaland Matlary. "When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?" Security Dialogue. Vol. 37(1). Oslo: Sage Publications, 2006, p. 114.

applicable to countries which are already members. The criteria are essentially the adherence to democracy, human rights, the rule of law, the respect of minorities and the application of market economy principles.⁴⁹ If this 'new' security policy is one based on these values rather than on territorial interests and state-to-state conflicts, then the EU is logically at the forefront of this development. These above values contained in the Copenhagen criteria, combined with the integrationist ideas of the EU are accepted by all European states contributing to a framework that would allow ideas of human, rather than traditional security to develop. In this mindset it also makes sense that the security strategy proposed by the German Christian Democratic Union goes beyond calls for countering terrorism, of WMD proliferation to include ecological goals and further human security concepts.⁵⁰ Yet, it remains questionable whether such human security concepts will be accepted by all member states and whether this will translate in official EU documents taking this view.

However, even outside of such alternative considerations of what security entails, the Copenhagen criteria can be interpreted as an attempt to form a security community according to Deutsch's ideal.⁵¹ A security community in Deutsch's view is a region in which war has become very unlikely or even unthinkable.⁵² This thinking is very much in line with the beginnings of the EU and that of its founders. As the Schuman declaration states:

⁴⁹ Council of the EU. Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council. Copenhagen: Council of the EU, 1993.

⁵⁰ CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion. Eine Sicherheitsstrategie für Deutschland. Berlin: CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 6 May 2008.

⁵¹ Karl W. Deutsch; et al. Political community and the North Atlantic area; international organization in the light of historical experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. p. 7

⁵² Andrej Tuscisny. "Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously" International Political Science Review 28 (4). Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2007, pp. 425-449.

The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible. The setting up of this powerful productive unit, open to all countries willing to take part and bound ultimately to provide all the member countries with the basic elements of industrial production on the same terms, will lay a true foundation for their economic unification [...].By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace.⁵³

EU enlargement based on the Copenhagen criteria is part of the construction of such a security community. Enlargement can be seen as part of the EU's security policy based on a neighbourhood policy protecting Western European countries.

In sum, a common strategic culture in the traditional sense is still in the works as illustrated by the institutional, capability, funding and single market issues the CSDP still faces, although the progress made since the CSDP has begun to undertake missions is undeniable. This essay will now attempt to draw conclusions from the increasing cooperation of EU member states in the field and examine whether it leads to a convergence of strategic cultures. One must also note that although the EU lacks a strategic culture in the traditional sense, its strategic culture from a human security standpoint appears to be much more unified than from a national security point of view.

⁵³ Robert Schuman. Declaration of 9 May 1950. Paris: Government of France, 1950.

Case Study: the CSDP Missions

The EU has undertaken 24 missions under the ESDP, of which eleven have been completed as of June 2008.⁵⁴ Of these 24 missions, only six were military operations. Also, the size, range, speed and intensity of these military operations should be taken into account. Of the operations that are currently ongoing or have been completed, only Althea and the EUFOR missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad significantly exceeded the size of a Battlegroup with approximately 7000, 2000 and 4000 active forces respectively.⁵⁵ The dominance of civilian missions is no coincidence. Civilian missions are more ambiguous and hence are less likely to fail. More precisely, their shortcomings can be easier disguised as a partial or even full success. The formulation of their mandates is illustrative in this respect. For instance, it is difficult to imagine any scenario that would allow even the staunchest critics to describe the EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah as an outright failure.⁵⁶ It is mandated to provide a “Third Party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point in order to contribute to the opening of the Rafah Crossing Point and to build up confidence between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.”⁵⁷ Moreover, civilian missions represent a nuanced engagement with little risk of radical positioning, which might otherwise clash with member state agendas. Finally, they are good ‘value for money’, enabling the EU to engage in

⁵⁴ Giji Gya ed. European Security Review no. 39. Brussels: ISIS, July 2008.

⁵⁵ Council of the EU. Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union. Brussels: Council of the EU, January 2009.

⁵⁶ Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite. European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective. London: Routledge, 2007, p. 35.

⁵⁷ Council of the EU. Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP. Brussels: Council of the EU, 12 December 2005.

relatively low budget ventures that nonetheless flag its presence in a given international situation.⁵⁸

Even critics of EU missions have deemed civilian missions to have been successful overall. By many, the EU is still regarded to be a civilian power and, while this may present a criticism of EU military efforts, it is at the same time an acknowledgement that when the EU acts as a civilian power it has usually done so very effectively and successfully. One challenge of the missions will certainly be to prove the EU's ambition to combine military and civilian tools to be able to deploy the 'full package' of crisis management tools at its disposal. As can be seen by the table of page 94, the combination of military and civilian missions does appear to be working quite well, and often a military mission will be succeeded if not accompanied by a civilian or at least a police mission. This has been the case in Congo as well as in Bosnia and Macedonia. However, there remain doubts as to the effectiveness and the planning of the military missions.

It is striking, that when the CSDP did undertake military missions, it relied either on NATO assets or the command capabilities of a framework nation. This is on the one hand due to the lack of EU command headquarters, such as those proposed for Tervuren, and on the other hand due to the need of the EU to have one or more lead nations with a particular interest in an operation in order to undertake a mission. There is not yet a collective political will of the EU as a whole to engage in military operations. Agreement on a particular mission has been difficult to impossible, if one of the major EU nations with adequate command capabilities was not prepared to lead the EU mission through significant staff and capability contributions. The Bosnian military missions were based on the use of NATO assets through the Berlin Plus agreements,

⁵⁸ Xymena Kurowska. "The transformative European Security and Defence Policy: between international refashioning and domestic rise of politics" EU Consent, Brussels: EU Consent, June 2006, p. 9.

discussed in more detail in chapter four. Just as in the case of operation Concordia in Macedonia, operation Althea is able to draw on the command structures of NATO. However, the Council of EU retained the political direction. It delegated some of its responsibilities to the Political and Security Committee and to the EU Military Committee liaising with the operational command in the field. From a political and a prestige point of view, one should note that the field staff report only to the EU and not to their respective national or NATO commands. The EU then transmits the information to NATO.⁵⁹

Unlike in the Balkans, where the EU intervened in a comparatively stable environment – the result of previous NATO operations – its missions in Congo and Chad presented a different picture. Both these missions were undertaken without resort to EU-NATO command arrangements and relied instead on national command capabilities.^{60 61} All three missions, operation Artemis, operation EUFOR RDC and EUFOR Chad were more risky in terms of casualties and complications. The perception on the part of national capitals that on the key issues they are in control of the second pillar has proven instrumental to the development of the CSDP. The member states view the CSDP through national lenses and become active in the CSDP decision-making when a region falling within their interest is on the agenda. Hence, the clichés of France’s dedication to Africa and of the preoccupation with post-Soviet space of the Eastern European members apply.⁶² The Eastern European countries for instance favoured a

⁵⁹ Thomas Karasek. EU military intervention in the Middle-East? The limits of ‘Low Security Policy’. Defence and Strategy 2/2007. Prague: Journal of Defence and Strategy, 2007, p. 44.

⁶⁰ Council of the EU. Council Decision 2008/868/CFSP. Brussels: Council of the EU, 13 October 2008.

⁶¹ Council of the EU. Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP. Brussels Council of the EU, 12 June 2007.

⁶² Kurowska. EU Consent, June 2006, p. 5.

hard line towards Russia in the recent Georgian crisis. Such interventions typically necessitate that the national interest of at least one big member state is affected (with open support or tacit abstention by all other member states), which would have at its disposal not only the required command structures but also sufficient knowledge of local conditions. Military bases close to the area of operations would also be helpful. One example of this was Operation Artemis, the first operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo – a mission planned and led by France. As Thomas Karasek from the Charles University of Prague notes: “If it were not for the post-colonial French interests in Africa, including their continuing military presence and available intelligence and forward bases in the region, the intervention would hardly have been possible.”⁶³ For both Congolese missions as well as the mission in Chad, it was France that was considering and planning a military intervention on its own, before an EU-level compromise was reached. Germany agreed to contribute some troops and to provide command and operational support. The mission was formally based on a UN Security Council resolution and decided upon by an EU Council Joint Action on June 5th, 2003.⁶⁴ As a result of previously developed French planning, the mission was able to progress with notable speed. The first units arrived in the region on June 6 already. As mentioned above, France acted as the ‘framework nation’ for this operation and the mission’s operational headquarters was located at the French general military staff in Paris. The operation consisted of 2060 soldiers.⁶⁵

⁶³ Thomas Karasek. Defence and Strategy 2/2007. p. 47.

⁶⁴ Council of the EU. EU Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP. Brussels: Council of the EU, 5 June 2003.

⁶⁵ Thomas Karasek. Defence and Strategy 2/2007. pp. 45-47.

Lessons from the Missions of the CSDP

Aside from the fact that the EU requires either a lead nation or NATO assets in order for the Union to undertake military missions of limited scale, one can also draw a general ‘pattern of engagement’ from the missions undertaken. The EU prefers to take over (in most cases from NATO) a more or less stabilized area with no major risks to its soldiers for a longer period of time. It will then have no problem in committing a larger military force. Overall, the scope of EU military options is defined on one end by low-risk, long-term, larger peacekeeping operations, and on the other, by medium-risk, short-term peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. This is an indication that European countries remain reluctant to become engaged in potentially high-casualty scenarios.⁶⁶

Only six of the 24 missions have involved more than one thousand personnel and nine have mobilised less than one hundred. Also, although 13 operations are currently underway, the total number of troops involved, namely around 6,000, constitutes less than 0.3 percent of European military manpower and 6% of its internationally deployable forces.⁶⁷ This number stands in contrast with the NATO, UN or other commitments of member states, which significantly exceed the number of troops committed to EU missions. For some observers, the limited scale, location of operations and number of soldiers deployed for EU missions does not show that the CSDP is dysfunctional. It only is the confirmation that for the time being the military capabilities and ambitions of the EU remain modest with no definite intention of

⁶⁶ Thomas Karasek. Defence and Strategy 2/2007. p. 46

⁶⁷ Nick Whitney. “Re-energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy.” European Council on Foreign Relations. London: ECFR, July 2008, p. 39.

drastically altering the current state of affairs.⁶⁸ Within these limited ambitions, Artemis proved the EU capability of launching an autonomous, full-fledged military operation far away from the EU borders; Aceh denoted 'going global' while the Balkans and Middle East operations confirm the EU commitment to sensitive regions in its neighbourhood.⁶⁹ The missions in Chad and Congo appeared to have been well planned and well executed despite their limited scope and strength. For others, an analysis of the missions proved precisely that the CSDP is dysfunctional as well as a lack of commitment of the EU to its global ambitions. The following table shows the deployment of EU missions across the globe, with the exception of the anti-piracy mission Atalanta.

⁶⁸ Thomas Karasek. Defence and Strategy 2/2007. p. 46

⁶⁹ Kurowska. EU Consent, June 2006, p. 3.

more integrated defence market. If the EU had a more integrated defence market, it may be able to produce better strategic airlift and better interoperability. As a result, it would not have to rely on the few countries that possess force projection capabilities to the same extent. The burden of the missions, both in terms of costs and personnel would fall more evenly on all or at least more member states. The Battlegroups should be able to allow more member states to have mobile and force projection forces. However, as noted above their size will limit the theatre they will be able to operate in.

Funding issues not only led to limited capabilities but had direct implications for CSDP operations. Until 2004, the financing of EU operations had no legal or financial framework, leaving the Council to having to agree to a new financing mechanism every time a mission was approved. This created much uncertainty and slowed down the planning for EU missions. In February 2004, the Council established ATHENA, which is “a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications.”⁷⁰ ATHENA was designed to cover a certain costs individual countries have to count on for EU operations, such as costs for setting-up and maintaining field headquarters. It also provides for covering other costs such as transporting and accommodating troops. However, the latter elements still require unanimous agreement by EU ministers on a case-by-case basis. It is estimated that ATHENA has covered less than 10% of the extra costs of EU operations to date, although it has given the financing of CSDP missions more certainty and is expected to be expanded and grow over time.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Council of the EU. Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP. Brussels: Council of the EU, 23 February 2004.

⁷¹ Nick Whitney. European Council on Foreign Relations, p. 46.

In addition, the EU needing a framework nation or NATO to undertake a mission further shows the lack of a common traditional strategic culture. Otherwise, duties and capabilities would be more evenly spread out and divided throughout EU member states and the decision of whether or not to engage on a mission would not hinge on whether one country volunteers to act as the framework nation. One can also argue that more coherence on strategy in as well as off the field would be brought about by a more competitive, liberalised and integrated European defence market, due to more technologies and equipment being shared as cooperation between European defence firms increases. If one looks at the type of operations that were undertaken by the CSDP it would confirm the EU's commitment to a human security based strategic culture. All military missions were undertaken with UN backing and had humanitarian backgrounds. The civilian missions also all have human security elements to them. Therefore, if one accepts the idea of a human security based strategic culture, the EU would clearly be abiding by it and be united under its principles in theory as well as in practice, as the missions illustrate.

The limited scale of the missions shows that the EU is still very cautious in its international commitments, will never interfere with NATO or US operations abroad and prefers to undertake missions with a relatively low risk of casualties for its own forces, hinting also to the lack of political will to become a major international military actor. If the political will of both EU governments and their electorates would be more hawkish, larger scale military missions requiring more funding and involving more risk for the forces involved would not be an issue. Also, more political will could lead to more unity among the member states and eventually to a common strategic culture in the traditional sense. As mentioned above, the ESS is unable to provide a clearer direction in this regard, which translates into practice upon analysis of the EU military missions.

In sum, the missions exemplify which issues are the most pressing for the CSDP.

Currently, low defence budgets, the consensus rule and the lack of integration and cooperation of defence industries across Europe pose the most fundamental problems and carry over into financing mechanisms, planning of missions and the equipment used to execute them.

Inadequate or insufficient capabilities, EU programs such as the Battlegroups, command headquarters and work towards a common strategic culture are only secondary in this regard, as these are based on the development of the three fundamental problems mentioned above.

Nevertheless, in some areas, progress is being made and the military missions, however limited they are, appear to be meeting their objectives.

Chapter IV

NATO, Canada and the Common Security and Defence Policy: Competition, Threat or Cooperation?

The U.S. has been continually reducing its presence in Europe since 1989. American policy on the Ballistic Missile Defence program, climate change, the 'war on terror' and involvement in Iraq have opened up rifts in transatlantic relations. Unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy under the Bush administration has also been a key issue, driving European States away from the US and subsequently NATO. Further complicating the relationship between NATO and the European Union is the fact that 21 of 27 EU member states are also NATO members. Thus, in the realm of security policy, most of NATO's European members have a choice between CSDP and NATO. The existence of CSDP offers NATO's European members an alternative to NATO for their collective security, which can lead to strategic debates within the Alliance.¹ This Chapter will argue that the future of NATO lies at present more in the hands of EU member states than with the United States, although if both work together to reform the alliance, its future may be brighter than it would appear at the moment. Since the Saint-Malo Summit in 1998, the movement towards CSDP has been inexorable, as seen in the first chapters of this essay. The whole process is at the core of the Commission's project for political union. Therefore, it all comes back to the issue of where Europe wants to go and whether or not a political union will be achieved one day. What Europe is for will decide what happens to

¹Stephanie C. Hofmann. "Debating Strategy in NATO: Obstacles to Defining a Meaningful New Strategic Concept" *Politique étrangère* 1/2008. Paris: Institut français des relations internationales, 2008, p. 4.

NATO, since it would define what the CSDP is for and whether the EU will one day consider NATO obsolete or insist on an EU membership within NATO.² This Statement may only be qualified in one point, namely that the will and ability of the US to reform NATO will also have an impact on whether the Alliance or the CSDP becomes a more attractive and benefiting option for European Countries. Currently one may consider a move towards a European Pillar within NATO as a likely scenario, since NATO is years of ongoing stagnation or crises away from becoming superfluous. However, since the EU and with it the CSDP keep growing in importance, it is plausible that EU foreign policy efforts become more coordinated, which will translate into NATO. This chapter will first briefly address the American view of NATO to better understand where its policy clashes with European states regarding NATO and the concept of common security in general occur. It will then discuss the positions of France, Germany and Britain on the role of NATO for these countries, their view of which role the EU should take within NATO and cooperation with NATO in the near future.

American Views of NATO

American views of NATO and the EU can be divided into three categories. First, those who do not think that continental Europeans are useful partners for the US in foreign affairs; second, those who wish to work with Europeans, but exclusively through NATO; and, third, those who think Europeans can be helpful partners and wish to work with them through both the

² Neil Winn. "CFSP, ESDP, and the Future of European Security: Whither NATO?" The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume IX, Issue 2. Providence, RI: Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Winter/Spring 2003, p. 155.

EU and NATO. Working exclusively through the EU with Europeans is not considered to be a viable option.³ The past US administration clearly favoured the second option and its unilateral experiments point at a penchant for more US unilateralism, although President Obama's position has not yet manifested itself, but one can speculate that it lies somewhere between the second and the third option.

Despite recent unilateral tendencies, the US position has been relatively consistent since the end of the Cold War in that it intends to keep NATO as the main forum for consultation and decision-making because the alliance provides Washington with the best political position to influence NATO's operation itself as well as the development of Europe's security and defence dimension. The US government will try to ensure that the command and control resources in NATO, in which they have invested significantly, are not diminished or put to use in ways that do not serve US interests. This does include a separate defence framework of the EU. Washington believes that NATO's defence planning process is a proven method. Given NATO's extensive reforms and the experience of several crises in the 1990s, the US view is that it must be strengthened rather than diversified. Americans do not want new layers of membership inside the Alliance (EU versus non-EU, Atlanticists versus non-Atlanticists) that might complicate NATO solidarity or cause institutional proliferation without adding genuine military capacity.⁴ However, as explained below, France's full return to NATO might lead to the US to accept a compromise possibly with a stronger unified EU role within NATO.

³ Esther Brimmer. "Seeing Blue: American Visions of the European Union" Chaillot Paper no. 105. Paris: EUISS, September 2007, p. 25.

⁴ Alexander Moens. "NATO and ESDP: The need for a political agreement" Canadian Military Journal. Ottawa: Government of Canada, Winter 2000-2001, p. 65.

Although the EU would differ, the US still considers the Union a regional power in terms of foreign and defence policy. As discussed above, despite recent efforts to counter the trend, 'Europe' is often eclipsed by the military strength of the United States and frequently finds it difficult to present a consistent, common position. A journalist once summarized the present international order as follows: "The U.S. fights, the UN feeds, and the EU funds."⁵ This translates into the way in which the United States deal with their European allies in NATO. President Bush expected Europe to contribute to its defence spending to a much greater extent than at present, but expected this to be done in the context of the Atlantic Alliance and, more importantly, under U.S. leadership. The EU's plans for an independent CSDP were perceived by the Bush administration as a threat to its policy hegemony in NATO. It remains to be seen to what extent the Obama administration will reverse this trend and whether US cooperation with Europe will warm again.

The European Position on NATO

Before engaging in the discussion on how Europeans view NATO and the CSDP, one must note that there is no unified European position on an EU-NATO security relationship. France on the one side and Britain on the other represent the starkest contrast regarding the role of NATO and the role of the EU in NATO. It is very likely that from time to time, EU foreign and defence policy, under the lead of Berlin and Paris, will seek to balance or compete with the United States based on past behaviour but only under tacit objections of the United Kingdom. In

⁵ Winn. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume IX, Issue 2, p. 151.

2003, France led the European and possibly the worldwide opposition to Washington's Iraq policy. In addition, France and Germany have been vocal in their desire to lift EU restrictions on sales of military and other sensitive technology to China, thereby going against the strategic and humanitarian objections of the United States. In light of these divergences, the French view the CSDP above all as a European project, which involves under some circumstances making use of NATO. From the French perspective, eroding the US monopoly on political decision-making in NATO is dependent on the EU's ability to reduce its reliance on NATO capacities. At the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels, member states approved the development of a European Security and Defence Identity – an instrument aimed at facilitating European efforts to develop “separable but not separate” capabilities through the Western European Union.⁶ Crisis management operations led by the latter were to be enabled by the US-inspired concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). The idea behind the CJTF was to establish a framework within which NATO could continue to provide the command and organisational means necessary for multi-national, wide-ranging missions that would not always include the entire NATO membership. The Western European Union thus implicitly provided the US with a way of maintaining control over decision-making within transatlantic security arena and enshrined the EU's dependence on NATO or US capabilities, without guaranteeing that those capabilities would be available in the event of a crisis situation. France first played a key role in the acceptance of the Combined Joint Task Forces framework within NATO. Yet, frustrated with their attempts to restructure NATO from within, French policymakers soon shifted their focus away from the Western European

⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/ North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Brussels: NATO, 10-11 January 1994, Paragraph 6.

Union and Combined Joint Task Forces as the appropriate means to strengthen the 'European pillar of defence' and towards the EU.⁷

France believes, the EU should be able to act autonomously, even in the absence of US consent. It supports the development of a fully-fledged European chain of command, full multilateralisation of existing French and British Permanent Joint Headquarters, for example in Tervuren, autonomous intelligence, force projection, 'C3 capabilities' (command, control, and communications systems) and the establishment of a technological and industrial base. The conclusions of the Helsinki summit of 1999 also implied that the EU was preparing for at least two types of capabilities and operations: its own operations without recourse to NATO assets or capabilities and EU-led operations with NATO assets and capabilities.⁸ This was also something France had been pushing for at the time. The double purpose of this new EU competency put into question the agreement NATO had previously affirmed in Washington, namely "our commitment to building the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance."⁹ It might therefore be plausible that France considers the EU and the CSDP to have primacy over NATO rather than the opposite. It is only logical that France favours that the collective defence sub-structure of article five should be the continuation of NATO's traditional structure under the Supreme Allied Commander, who is always an American, in Europe. Article 5 states that,

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or

⁷ Lisa Watanabe. "The ESDP: Between Estrangement and a New Partnership in Transatlantic Security Relations" Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Volume 13, Number 1. London: Routledge, April 2005, p.6.

⁸ Council of the EU. Presidency Conclusions: European Council Helsinki. Helsinki: Council of the EU, 10-11 December 1999.

⁹ Moens. Canadian Military Journal, p. 63.

collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.¹⁰

A second military sub-structure, under a European commander with a direct role for the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee, should then set up a European command and control structure in case of a 'non-Article 5' crisis response operation which the Alliance as a whole might decide should be conducted by a European task force. This European commander would in fact take over NATO's command during such a contingency and he would be supported, if needed, by NATO and US national assets. France suggested that the European command would rotate among Britain, France and Germany for these non-Article five crises response operations. This does however ignore the inadequate capabilities Europe currently possesses, as outlined in chapter three. The American military leadership balked at the notion of creating dual structures. In Washington's view, new force arrangements should be commanded and controlled in a streamlined NATO where one single system of Combined Joint Task Forces for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations would be set up. This way, NATO proper could use them or NATO in alliance with partner countries from Central and Eastern Europe, or NATO could delegate them to an operation under the auspices of the Western European Union. In the latter case, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe could direct an operation set up within the defence planning and command arrangements in NATO. As we will see below however, this position appears to be shifting, since France has now returned to the military arm

¹⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The North Atlantic Treaty. Washington: NATO, 1949.

of NATO and might as such contribute more troops to Afghanistan, while working towards its goals through, rather than against, NATO.

France has been able to find some common ground with Germany on a number of these issues, while Britain has been predictably lukewarm about what its policymakers view as unnecessary duplication.¹¹ Germany, for its part, tends to give equal weight to both the European Security and Defence Identity in NATO and the CSDP and regards them as entirely complementary projects. Accordingly, it has always stressed that the CSDP is not intended to undermine NATO but to complement it. As such, Germany considers the Berlin-Plus agreement, discussed in more detail below, as the basis of the EU-NATO relationship. France also regards the present Berlin Plus-based system as sufficient without a need for improvement. This indicates a tendency by both countries not to intensify relations between the EU and NATO in the near future. French and German concerns are supposedly based on an analysis that if NATO-EU relations should intensify, the United States could force the European Union into the 'back seat' and assume the 'driver's role' in the joint endeavours of the two structures.¹² Although Germany is more Atlanticist than France for a number of historical and political reasons, it has often found itself closer to France than to Britain. The convergence with France has intensified since the Iraq war and as long as President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder were in power. In this regard, Germany's position vis-à-vis NATO is a little uncertain at present, as it seemingly appears to continue to give equal support to the CSDP and NATO under Ms Merkel. France has also recently moved away from its cautious attitude towards NATO to become a full member of

¹¹ Watanabe, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Volume 13, Number 1, p. 14.

¹² Harri Tiido, "The evolution of security 2006–2007: EU and NATO cooperation" Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yearbook 2006. Tallinn: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, p. 18.

the Atlantic Organisation once again. However, in contrast with its traditional position, this leaves France in an ambiguous position regarding preference and adequacy of security forums.

The British, by contrast, see NATO as the best means of safeguarding the Alliance, which will increasingly involve making use of a European instrument for tasks the US would rather not undertake as it focuses its efforts on the Middle East and Asia. In order to keep the US engaged in Europe, Britain believes it has to play a bridging role between its European allies and the US. This implies on the one hand persuading European allies to increase their own military capabilities to achieve a more equal partnership within NATO and on the other hand, communicating to Americans that greater European capabilities need not imply a threat to NATO. The fear of many countries, including Britain, that are opposed to having an EU pillar in NATO, is that they consider the EU to be too divided on such major security issues as Russia or Iraq. They fear that slow and highest common denominator positions of the EU would frustrate the Americans, if it insisted on having its own personality in NATO before it could speak with one voice on key security issues, leading the former to no longer take NATO seriously.¹³ However, if the United States keeps pursuing the unilateral and rather different approach to security they have since 2001, more and more EU states may begin to find the CSDP option increasingly interesting. Furthermore, although Britain often insists it is not in line with the Franco-German positions in foreign affairs, its voting record on the EU Council appears to indicate otherwise. The most recent example that hints at least at some unity within the EU is the signing of a new partnership agreement with Russia and the Ukraine.

¹³ Tomas Valasek. "France, NATO and European defence" Centre for European Reform Policy Brief, March 2008. London: Centre for European Reform, March 2008, p. 5.

Recently, President Sarkozy has shifted France's position and returned France to the military structures of NATO. Britain and the United States would be well-advised to seize on Sarkozy's initiatives, in the hopes for better EU-NATO relations. As we have seen above, Britain and France are vital for issues pertaining to European defence. They are the main providers of troops and among the largest producers and buyers of military equipment. The two countries are the only ones of the EU, which have a truly global, strategic, expeditionary mindset, as well as the forces to back up their ambitions. They essentially invented the CSDP at the Saint-Malo summit in 1998. If these two disagree, little happens in Europe on defence.¹⁴

France probably attached several conditions or at least demands to its reintegration into NATO. French calls to make the EU one party at the NATO table have, however, been resisted by the US which some argue can be expected to maintain its opposition to a 'European Pillar' in NATO. Washington traditionally seeks to preserve the alliance as a grouping of 26 member-states, rather than see it become a forum for US-EU consultations. However, on the question of CSDP and the EU operational headquarters, some French officials believe that the Americans may now help them by leaning on the UK to accept the permanent EU planning headquarters. As it happens, US diplomats have spoken privately to their UK counterparts, urging them to make the necessary compromises with France. This plan may in fact prove successful. The cost of a small number of headquarters staff for the EU – particularly if they are made to work closely with NATO – is a price the US is willing to pay for ending EU-NATO animosities.¹⁵ This move towards headquarters for the EU will certainly help forming a common strategic culture within Europe. With this, the coherence of EU foreign policy can increase. Therefore, a European

¹⁴ Tomas Valasek. Centre for European Reform Policy Brief, March 2008, p. 19.

¹⁵ Valasek. Centre for European Reform Policy Brief, March 2008, p. 4.

Pillar in NATO, which France would favour, appears to be an option now more than ever, although Britain, Denmark and some Eastern European States will need to be convinced, too.

This French emphasis on strengthening the CSDP within the Alliance could yet derail its plans of harmonizing with NATO again. Paris appears to assume, that by offering to return to NATO, it will encourage its allies to sign up to the French vision for European defence. The UK and others would, however, require a lot of convincing. The British welcomed France's return to full participation in NATO, but they remain unconvinced of many French ideas on the CSDP. France's renewed interest in EU operational planning leaves the UK government in a paradoxical situation. It has always wanted NATO and the EU to co-operate closely. Britain now has the best opportunity in a decade to achieve just that, with the presence of the big three in NATO. However, the French return to the military arm of NATO and the prospect of better EU-NATO relations may see the UK to accept a compromise with France on the unloved EU operational headquarters, as explained above. If France succeeded in beefing up the headquarters even by a little, it could ironically put more distance between the EU and NATO. Critics argue that this is because future EU missions would then almost certainly be planned and commanded by the EU rather than NATO. The EU headquarters project might therefore prove to be a dealmaker or a dealbraker, depending on whether the US and the UK accept such a plan.

One must also note that the US and NATO are not completely opposed to at least a partly autonomous CSDP. This is reflected in NATO's existing command and control structure in which the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, who is always a European, plays a key role. The same applies to NATO's defence planning process. There can be an umbrella of NATO defence planning under which CSDP can develop certain aspects without NATO or

American control or domination of that part of the defence planning process. According to the US, connecting CSDP strategic and defence planning into the overall NATO structure provides the best of both worlds, as it would provide the EU with decision and military staff capacity while avoiding institutional drifting. In addition, if the command and control assets are more connected, the process of the EU and NATO sharing assets would be greatly simplified.¹⁶

The Berlin Plus agreements are a step in this direction. The agreements signed in 2002 consist of a comprehensive package of agreements between NATO and the EU. Among other changes, they allow the EU to draw on some of NATO's military assets in its own peacekeeping operations. Under Berlin Plus rules, the North Atlantic Council and the Political Security Committee now do meet, and the meetings of the EU-NATO capabilities group provides a channel of information for the European Capabilities Action Plan. In the field, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe was also the head of the EUFOR mission in Bosnia. Also, the EU now has a representative within the planning cell of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and NATO has one in the EU Military Staff.¹⁷ Later in 2002, mirroring planning cells in the EU Military Staff and in NATO were agreed. Cooperation between CSDP and NATO is however far from perfect, even under the Berlin Plus agreements. If cooperation were seamless, the EU Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force could each be deployed in complementary ways, especially in cases of humanitarian crises where their missions overlap and where one side could enter the theatre as the other reduces its presence. In an ideal world, the EU and NATO would not just collocate but share operational planning headquarters. They both rely on essentially the same pool of military forces. The obvious difference is that Canada,

¹⁶ Moens. Canadian Military Journal, p. 66.

¹⁷ Brimmer. Chaillot Paper no. 105, p. 26.

Iceland, Norway, Turkey and the US are not in the EU and Ireland, Austria, Malta, Cyprus, Sweden and Finland are not NATO members and insist on their neutrality. However, this has not kept the non-EU NATO countries from contributing troops to EU operations anyway, as will be seen by the example of Canada *ante*. The US pledged police officers to the EU mission in Kosovo, and a Turkish plane flew EU peacekeepers to Africa. Therefore, it would make sense for the EU and NATO to use one headquarters rather than two, even if the two are next to each other in Brussels.

Despite the row on the headquarters issue as well as other obvious differences between European countries, it is fair to say that most EU members want more EU decision-making power, planning capacity and operational capability for military crisis management in Europe. With such capacity comes more European influence to determine the strategy and means of military crisis management, including in NATO. In addition, a common military ability would help define stronger shared national priorities in security and defence. With this view, CSDP fortifies NATO while strengthening the EU. For most EU member states, these two goals are not contradictory. A European pillar within NATO would of course present some problems to the Americans. Nevertheless, it is a possible, and according to some even a likely option for NATO's future, as the EU will attempt to strengthen and unify its own voice, while not turning its back on NATO and the US, since the EU and CSDP will remain dependent on their assets and capabilities for some time to come.

Further Issues in EU-NATO Cooperation

The attempts to establish a constitution for the EU certainly were not very helpful in bringing NATO and the EU closer together. Article 40 of the constitution states that, only “until such time” as the CSDP materialises, “the participating Member States shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”¹⁸ No provisions are made for cooperation after the CSDP materialises. Overall, the draft Constitution made it clear that NATO is ultimately superfluous to EU security policy. The Constitution never came into force, after French and Dutch voters had rejected it for reasons not pertaining to the EU. It is however remarkable that all governments, including the “Atlanticist” Danish, British and Eastern Europeans, agreed to the draft proposal. This does point at the will to depart from NATO in the long term. One must however also note that such plans appear highly unrealistic for decades to come, since it may take this long for the CSDP to materialise, provided it can overcome the obstacles described in chapter three. Also, one must remember that EU decisions are often ambiguous and even contradictory. While all countries may have formally agreed to the draft Constitution, it does not mean that they would have implemented it in the same way and that they interpreted the provisions of article 40 in the way outlined above.

The language of the Treaty of Lisbon is less offensive in regards to NATO. Article 28a states that “commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.” Thereby, the EU acknowledges that NATO will remain the primary organisation for the

¹⁸ Council of the EU. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Brussels: Council of the EU, 29 October 2004.

collective defence of the Union. Articles pertaining to collective defence have also been omitted in the Treaty of Lisbon partly for that reason, even though such provisions were included in the Constitution. One must however also note that the wording of the Treaty of Lisbon leaves open the division of labour between Article 5 and non-Article 5 tasks and the creation of a European pillar in NATO. The protocol on permanent structured cooperation appended to the Lisbon document points in this direction by being “convinced that a more assertive Union role in security and defence matters will contribute to the vitality of a renewed Atlantic Alliance” and by recalling that it is “determined to ensure that the Union is capable of fully assuming its responsibilities within the international community”.¹⁹

Another issue the Europeans have in NATO is the lack of willingness of the United States to share their intelligence, their satellite systems and imagery. The only country benefiting from access to such sensitive data is the United Kingdom. For example, while the United States shared its intelligence with its European allies during the missions in Bosnia in most cases, occasionally it did not, frustrating Europeans in their efforts to independently assess the situation. The French also claim that in 1996, when the Clinton administration launched missiles against Iraq in retaliation for alleged substantial movements of the military into Iraq’s Kurdish area, Europe’s Helios satellites showed the troop movement to be minor. Intelligence regarding the war in Iraq appears to have been the climax of such information tensions. Such incidents, as well as France’s distant intelligence relationship with the US, have led to a great deal of suspicion on the part of the French (as well as other countries) concerning the quality of

¹⁹ Council of the EU. Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation established by Article 28a of the Treaty on European Union. Brussels: Council of the EU, December 2007.

and potential access to US strategic data.²⁰ This is one of the factors that led to European efforts to gain independent intelligence capabilities, such as the Helios and the Galileo system (a European GPS equivalent, to be complementary to GPS systems). The positions of Britain, France and Germany regarding the development of autonomous European intelligence capabilities are thus heavily informed by the degree to which each state is integrated into the Atlantic intelligence network. With no privileged access to US satellite data, France and Germany have a greater motivation to boost European imagery intelligence than Britain, although the latter have been supportive of Galileo and Helios. The United States must begin to share its intelligence indiscriminately and more transparently or risk alienating NATO partners as they develop a concurrent European satellite and intelligence system. This would only lead to a deeper rift between the US and the EU in military matters, as each party would risk having the other attempting to either outdo it or prove it wrong in the information gathered. As such, cooperation would strengthen European coherence and solidarity in NATO thereby also indirectly strengthening a European pillar within NATO.

One must however also note that not only the US is opposing the sharing of information with some allies. For purely political reasons Turkey is still opposed to NATO sharing sensitive information with Cyprus and Malta. Malta and Cyprus are both members of the EU, but do not belong to the NATO Partnership for Peace and therefore do not have a security information-sharing agreement with NATO. Since the two EU member states cannot officially participate in the meetings, it is not possible to talk about a relationship between the two structures as a whole. Also, it is widely understood that Turkey has opposed close NATO links with the EU as a way of punishing the Union for having admitted Cyprus while dragging its feet on Turkey's possible

²⁰ Watanabe, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Volume 13, Number 1, p. 16.

accession.²¹ Turkey would need to end this blockade before the EU and NATO can really start cooperating. On the EU's side, Austria, Malta, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden do not belong to NATO and technically remained neutral during the Cold War, whereas France only began to warm to the idea of becoming a member of the military arm of NATO under Sarkozy (and did so in April 2009). None of the above countries has a history of cooperation or coordination with the United States on security issues such as terrorism, Afghanistan, and Iraq.²² Therefore, while Turkey and the US can at times make it difficult for the EU to cooperate with NATO, the same can be said about the EU, when one considers that the aforementioned four countries reject joining NATO. Once again, this represents a challenge to EU-NATO cooperation and has the potential to drive the EU as a whole more towards its own defence policy, and which might also be an obstacle to forming an EU pillar in NATO. As long as member nations in the EU and NATO are not concurrent, it is very likely that their security policies will not be either.

Public opinion in Europe may also lead to further issues in NATO-EU relations. A study by the American Association for Public Opinion Research on public support in the realm of defence illustrates this point. When Europeans were asked whether they supported NATO, a majority answered in the affirmative. The same applied to European opinions in regards to the CSDP, even if support for the European defence project is slightly higher. It is clear that most Europeans want to "have it both ways." However, public opinion does shift in favour of the CSDP, when it is offered as an alternative to NATO. The results of this survey also revealed two

²¹ Valasek. Centre for European Reform Policy Brief, March 2008, p.5.

²² Jeffrey L. Cimbalò. "Saving NATO From Europe." Foreign Affairs November 2004. New York: Council on Foreign Affairs, 2004, p.3.

groups: an “Europeanist” group that included France and Italy, and a more ‘Atlanticist’ group that included Britain and Germany. Nonetheless, even within the Atlanticist group, support for NATO was considerably lower when the EU was offered as an alternative to NATO within the same question. It appears that support for a European policy that would make “decisions about the security of western Europe” does indeed weaken support for NATO’s primacy in these matters. Since the Iraq war, this sentiment has grown, as the example of Britain illustrates. The British are usually unambiguously “pro-NATO,” but the level preferring NATO to the CSDP dropped to 40 percent in 2003 to the advantage of those favouring a European approach to defence and security.²³ If these public sentiments were to translate into practice and into governments adopting corresponding policies, the CSDP would grow in importance in the near future to the detriment of NATO. However, when it comes to matters pertaining to the EU and NATO, governments often follow their own agenda, irrespective of public opinion.

A further area making it difficult for the EU and NATO to cooperate is the lack of compatibility or interoperability of European and American weapons systems, once again with the exception of the United Kingdom, mainly due to BAE’s close relationship with the US military. Since France and Germany saw a major proportion of their defence industry transformed into EADS and other companies, they have a greater incentive than Britain to promote common (European) procurement and to reduce the amount of regulatory frameworks within which European defence firms must operate thereby creating a European defence industrial base. Britain’s defence industry linkages and its special relationship with the US, which involves collaboration on nuclear and conventional weapons programmes, create obstacles

²³ Richard C. Eichenberg. “Having it Both Ways: European Defence Integration and the Commitment to NATO.” Public Opinion Quarterly Volume 67. Lenexa, KS: American Association for Public Opinion Research, 2003, p. 636.

to further cooperation with other EU member states, largely due to the secrecy surrounding shared technology and market interests. It would be in the interest of NATO to bring the industrial bases of Europe and of the US and UK to cooperate to allow their systems to be interoperable. The current state of affairs is, however, that NATO and CDSP concentrate on different capabilities, which are seldom compatible and, therefore, have differing 'shopping lists'. Although both the EU, primarily through the European Defence Agency, and NATO are concerned with boosting the military strength of their respective member states, each institution has given its members a long 'shopping list' of new capabilities needed for military operations. The EU and NATO have failed to fully reconcile those lists. Each organisation is asking the same governments with their limited budgets for slightly different things.²⁴ NATO's list of priorities, the 'Prague Capabilities Commitment' is different from the EU's 'European Capabilities Action Plan'.²⁵ The differences are not massive but they are nevertheless real. Such a policy makes little sense. The member states find it difficult to meet either goal individually, and the EU and NATO only make things worse by asking them to focus on (somewhat) different priorities. At a minimum, both institutions should clearly designate one lead co-ordinator for a given capability in both organisations, as an October 2006 study by the European Parliament proposed.²⁶

²⁴ Valasek. Centre for European Reform, May 2008, p. 2.

²⁵ Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme P. Herd. *Divided West: European Security and the Transatlantic Relationship*. London: The Royal Institute for International Affairs, 2006, p.12.

²⁶ Paul Cornish. "EU and NATO: Co-operation or competition?" Policy Department External Policies. Brussels: European Parliament, October 2006.

Canada and the EU: A Lot of Common Ground

Europe's position towards Canada took some time to evolve. The EU was slow to understand several aspects of the Canadian position on NATO and the European Defence project. Firstly, EU policy makers often failed to perceive the differences between Canada and its more unilateralist, more powerful, southern neighbour. The European Union long misinterpreted Canadian reservations on CSDP, as an obstructive North-American ruse, essentially identical with American reservations and engineered by the US government.²⁷ As a result, Canada's possible participation in CSDP operations was sometimes considered to amount to a North American 'Trojan horse' intended to weaken Europe's security ambitions. Europeans were slow in identifying Canada as a viable partner for two reasons. Firstly, despite the intensity of American-Canadian relations on security matters as well as others, the EU underestimates Ottawa's freedom of action in this field. For some time, this delayed the formalisation of Canada-EU security relations.²⁸ Secondly, European efforts to allow for third-state participation in CSDP operations often focused on non-EU European states; even in first efforts to draw up a cooperation agreement, Europe put Canada in the same category as Russia or the Ukraine.²⁹

Ironically, reservations remain in the EU as to the whether the Canadian forces are sufficiently funded and equipped for Canada to be an able crisis-management partner for the EU.

²⁷ Justin Fraterman. "Canada-EU Cooperation in Military Crisis-Management: Principles, Modalities and Practice" European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 2006/1. London: London School Economics, 2006, p. 1.

²⁸ Markus Kaim. "Canada Warms to ESDP" Transatlantic Internationale Politik 2/2003. Bayreuth: Informationsdienst Wissenschaft e.V., 2003, p. 75.

²⁹ Commission of the European Union. Communication from the Commission on EU-Canada Relations (COM (2003) 266 final). Brussels, Commission of the European Union, 13 May 2003.

Since the Conservative government came to power in 2006 many capability improvements have been announced, which will likely enhance Canada's ability to contribute to peacekeeping and peace-building operations. Ottawa announced that it would spend C\$ 13 billion on renewing and expanding the Canadian forces.³⁰ Hence, as Canada expands and improves its capabilities, the EU will be more interested in having Canada on board with its missions.

The ideological proximity of the EU and Canada is undeniable and there is a lot of common ground to build relations on. Europe's relations with the world's only remaining superpower are colder and less characterized by policy convergence than those it maintains with Canada. One need only to compare UN voting records to see the degree to which this is true: In 2007, the EU-15 had a common position on 52 political and security matters at the UN General Assembly. While the US only voted with Europe on 21 of these resolutions, Canada and Europe were able to find agreement on all but two.

Indeed, Canada has a history of cooperating with the EU and its predecessors. With the signing of the EC-Canada Framework Agreement in 1976, Canada became the first developed nation to conclude a bilateral agreement with the European Community, although the US had informal ties with the institutions of the European Political Cooperation since 1974.³¹ Canada's bilingual officers, the country's lack of colonial history and the overall level of cultural sensitivity exhibited by most of its military personnel are much appreciated by European military

³⁰ CBC News. "In Depth Canada's Military: Canadian Forces in the 21st century" CBC News. April 21, 2008 from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdnmilitary/>

³¹ Paul Buteux. "Canada and Europe: The implications of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union" in George MacLean, ed. Between Actor and Presence: The European Union and the Future for the Transatlantic relationship. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2001, p. 116.

commanders and planners. As Mérand from the Belgian think-tank Royal Institute for International Relations notes:

Canada is part of a North American 'security community.' Even when our strategic interests do not coincide, the Canadian economy depends on trade with the United States, and Washington requires that we invest in the "continental security perimeter." As a result, the little "hard power" that we have is heavily concentrated on the defence of this continent, for example through NORAD. Yet our strategic culture differs substantially from that of the United States. Every Canadian government since at least Lester B. Pearson's has promoted the norms of multilateralism, conflict prevention, development and peacekeeping – in other words, the instruments of "soft power." On this score, we are much closer to the European Union.³²

This remains the constant dilemma of Canada's post-Cold War security debate: Canada's foreign policy values often make it rather European, while its national interest, when defined geographically and economically, makes it rather North American. Attempting to balance Canada's foreign policy values with the calculus, imperatives and constraints of Realpolitik often makes it very difficult for Canada's policy makers to balance its interests in foreign affairs.³³ To avoid having to choose between its strategic culture and its geography, Canada has long favoured multilateral institutions as an international forum of action and discussion. In the security domain, this meant giving strong support to NATO.³⁴ Traditionally, NATO has been the institution of choice for Canada. As Alexander Moens noted,

There will be few Canadian interests in participating even in autonomous EU operations without a NATO role or assets apart from the search and rescue missions of Canadian nationals. In the Helsinki scheme of relations with non-EU members, the EU's

³² Frédéric Mérand. NATO, ESDP, and Transatlantic Security: Where Does Canada Fit in? Studia Diplomatica Volume 49, Number 1. Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations, 2006, p.142.

³³ Fraterman. European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 2006/1, p. 5.

³⁴ The Government of Canada. Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role Of Pride and Influence In The World. Ottawa: Government of Canada, April 2005, pp. 11-16. From <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-en.asp>

political priority is to invite European NATO allies and aspiring EU members. Canada would find itself in a category with Ukraine and, frankly, on the bottom of the list of those to be invited. Even if it were invited, Canada would have a difficult time in the institutional scheme to get its point across the EU table.³⁵

However, things have changed since. Ottawa has shifted its position in regards to its attitude towards the appropriate forum of action and discussion in security matters. As Informationsdienst Wissenschaft, a German independent research institute, remarked:

Ottawa's shift reflects a growing realisation that Canada's traditional focus on conflict prevention, peacemaking, long-term peacekeeping, and civil solutions to what is now called the issue of "good governance" is very similar to the ESDP response to post-cold war regional and global security policy challenges. Canada's foreign policy therefore makes a good match with ESDP, especially with its civilian dimension. With its wealth of experience in United Nations blue-helmet missions, Canada could become an important and reliable partner for the European Union.³⁶

The caveat is that, while it is correct that Canada has a shared cultural affinity with the EU in respect to certain values such as multilateralism, conflict prevention, development and peacekeeping, it needs to be aware that Europeans will also only act when doing so serves their perceived interests, rather than thinking that they will act out of pure cosmopolitan principles. Canada should not refuse any cooperation with the EU as a consequence but it must understand that Canadian interests may not always align with European interests, just as EU interests and Canadian interests do not always coincide with those of the US.³⁷

The Current EU-Canada Cooperation Framework

³⁵ Moens. Canadian Military Journal, p. 63.

³⁶ Kaim. Transatlantic Internationale Politik 2/2003, p. 76.

³⁷ Terry Terriff. NATO, ESDP, and Transatlantic Security: Where Does Canada Fit in? A Response. Studia Diplomatica Volume 49, Number 1. Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations, 2006, p. 150.

One meeting is held per Presidency cycle³⁸ between the EU Troika and its Canadian counterpart. The misleadingly termed EU Troika consists of representatives from the current Presidency of the European Union, the future presidency of the European Union, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. It carries a mandate to speak on behalf of all 27 EU Member States.³⁹ Four meetings per year focus on security and defence issues between Canadian representatives and Political and Security Committee representatives. Also, groups of experts meet on an *ad hoc* basis to discuss a wide variety of issues including non-proliferation, disarmament and human rights, as well as a variety of regional concerns. This framework will of course be altered under the Lisbon Treaty provisions, although any changes should be technical rather than content-based. The frequency of meetings is, if it does change, only expected to increase.

Cooperation between Canada and the CSDP has developed since the creation of the ESDP. Already at the 1999 Helsinki summit, which followed the 1998 Saint-Malo declaration, the Presidency Conclusions stated that “appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow [...] non-EU European NATO members and *other* interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management (emphasis added).⁴⁰ While this statement was originally directed at European non-EU states, Canada soon was included by name into such cooperation possibilities. The Presidency Conclusions from the 2000 Feira European Council stated that “Russia, Ukraine, other European States engaged in political dialogue with the Union and other interested States,

³⁸ Currently six months, after Lisbon the presidency will be held by the President of the EU for two years.

³⁹ Council of the EU. EU Troika visit to Sri Lanka, 7761/08 (Presse 79). Brussels: Council of the EU, 18 March 2008.

⁴⁰ Council of the EU. Presidency Conclusions: European Council Helsinki. Helsinki: Council of the EU, 10-11 December 1999.

may be invited to take part in EU-led operations. In this context the EU welcomes the interest shown by Canada.”⁴¹

In 2000, the first basic rules for cooperation during crisis and non-crisis situations were established. During the routine non-crisis phase, meetings were held once every six months between the Political Security Committee level Troika and appropriate representatives of the Third State. The somewhat vague Presidency Conclusions of the Nice Summit stated that, during crisis situations “such consultations conducted in Troika format or by the Secretary-General/High Representative constitute[d] the framework making it possible for exchanges of views and discussions on potential partners to be held.” Furthermore, third states would be allowed to appoint liaison officers to the EU military staff in charge of planning an operation and to participate fully in the Committee of Contributors “with the same rights and obligations as the other participating States as far as day-to-day management of the operation [was] concerned.”⁴² The Committee of Contributors is the committee in charge of the day-to-day management of a mission off the field. The above broad statements of intent were specified and expanded at the Canada-EU Summit in Toledo in May 2002. Section I of the Presidency Conclusions of the Toledo Summit guides cooperation during non-crisis periods, instructing that consultation on CSDP issues would continue within the “existing mechanisms” which consisted of regular meetings at the Head of State, ministerial, Director-Generals of the Commission and Political Security Committee level. The frequency and modality of these meetings would be based on “considerations of pragmatism and efficiency”, i.e. assessed on a case-by-case basis as required.

⁴¹ Council of the EU. Presidency Conclusion: European Council Santa Maria da Feira. Feira: Council of the EU, 19-20 June 2000.

⁴² Council of the EU. Presidency Conclusion: European Council of Nice. Nice: Council of the EU, 7-9 December 2000.

It was also announced that “important steps to facilitate mutual exchange of practical information on military crisis matters” had been realized by assigning a liaison officer of the Canadian armed forces to the EU Military Staff. If Ottawa’s contribution to the EU-led force was deemed “significant”, Canada would also gain access to the Committee of Contributors and would have the same rights and obligations as any participating EU member states. Furthermore, the EU extended an invitation to Canada to participate in its first ever CSDP operation, the EU Police Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴³ This binds Canada closer into the CSDP network than any other non-EU nation. As the table below illustrates, these agreements have translated into practical cooperation in the field, albeit limited. However, it is noteworthy that Canada has contributed more to some CSDP missions in terms of money and personnel than, for instance, Malta or Cyprus but even more than some of the larger EU member states.

Canadian Participation in ESDP Operations

Time Frame	Location	EU Operation Name	Canadian Operation Name	Number of Personnel	Description
01 Jan 2003 -	Bosnia and Herzegovina	EUPM BiH	n/a	7	6 RCMP officers, 1 Montreal police officer involved in Rule of Law mission
18 Mar 2003 - 15 Dec 2003	FYR Macedonia	Operation CONCORDIA	Operation FUSION	1	Canadian officer prematurely withdrawn due to disagreement over funding of common costs.
12 Jun 2003 - 01 Sep 2003	DR Congo	Operation ARTEMIS	Operation CARAVAN	50	Transport mission involving two Hercules transport aircraft and 50 CF personnel.
02 Dec 2004 -	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Operation ALTHEA	Operation BOREAS	73	Various HQ, support, liaison and observation functions.
30 Apr 2005 -	DR Congo	EUPOL Kinshasa	n/a	1	Best practices training of Congolese Integrated Police Unit

Sources: *EU Institute for Security Studies, Foreign Affairs Canada, National Defence Canada*

Although cooperation since 2003 can be said to have been smooth, there remain some areas, which hamper coordination efforts between Canada and CSDP. First, there was some uncertainty in regards to cost contribution mechanisms to CSDP missions. These have caused

⁴³ Council of the EU. Joint Summit Statement, Canada-EU Summit. Toledo: Council of the EU, 8 May 2002.

some irritation on the part of Canada. For operation Artemis, Canada had to pay 25% of the total costs of the missions for procuring one soldier, for Concordia it contributed 50 soldiers and did not have to pay anything. Canada protested vehemently in the case of Operation Artemis and some cost-sharing agreements were worked out. The result was an informal agreement by which Canada was typically not asked to contribute to these costs, but with the EU reserving the right to request such a contribution should it feel it absolutely necessary to do so. In practice, this meant that Canadian offers of participation were always made conditionally and were only confirmed if the EU's Political and Security Committee agreed to waive Canadian payment of common costs.⁴⁴ Since then, the ATHENA mechanism, which guides costs sharing among the EU member states, has been established to govern cost sharing, also among non-EU states participating in a CSDP mission.⁴⁵ This allows Canada and the EU to foresee the costs of a joint mission more easily.

In addition to the uncertainty in cost-sharing, the Department of National Defence seems to be trailing the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which has been leading most if not all initiatives in the area of Canada-EU cooperation. As the Defence segment of the International Policy Statement illustrates, the Defence Staff remains fixated on the US and NATO.⁴⁶ There is nothing wrong with this except that, when it comes to crisis management, the military will have to develop its own relationship with the Europeans, a relationship that cannot

⁴⁴ Council of the EU. Joint Summit Statement, Canada-EU Summit. Ottawa: Council of the EU, 18 December 2001.

⁴⁵ Council of the EU. Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications. Brussels: Council of the EU, 28 February 2004.

⁴⁶ The Government of Canada. Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role Of Pride and Influence In The World. pp. 11-16. From <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-en.asp>

depend exclusively on formal NATO-EU links. If Canada decides to join an EU operation again, it is important that Canadian soldiers are socialized and comfortable in the EU operational environment. This goes beyond NATO procedures to include the EU's decision-making processes, crisis management philosophy, and social makeup. The challenge is to ensure that Canadian Forces are militarily and culturally comfortable and interoperable in the framework and conditions of their European counterparts. As we have seen above, such interoperability should be easily implementable, based on the common ideas and values Canada and the EU share. However, as long as the Department of National Defence refuses to seriously consider other channels of cooperation with the EU but NATO, interoperability, compatibility and cooperation will not be ideal.

This however, may turn out to be a lost opportunity not necessarily in regards to geopolitical and strategic goals, but rather for the defence industry of Canada. The European Defence Agency, whose purpose is to both foster European procurement programs and bring down trade barriers, should receive special attention by Canada's industry. The agency has become the center of gravity for CSDP initiatives in regards to capabilities, as discussed in chapter two. Most Canadian defence firms such as CAE, General Dynamics, Bombardier, SNC Lavalin or CMC Electronics do some business in Europe, especially but not exclusively with Britain. Clearly, there are untapped market opportunities, especially if or when the European defence market becomes more integrated and liberalised. The Defence Agency could be a valuable ally for these firms to break the historically protectionist European market.

Canadian Views of the EU Role in NATO

Canada is opposed to the CSDP becoming an alternative to NATO. It does however support better cooperation between the EU and Canada as well as leaving open the possibility of a European pillar in NATO. Canada shares a fundamental national interest with NATO colleagues who are not EU members such as Norway, Turkey and Poland to support the American position on NATO by applying diplomatic pressure to ensure that the EU and NATO come to a political agreement linking the CSDP and NATO in terms of decision-making, command and control, and defence planning.⁴⁷ Canada continues to see the Atlantic alliance as the main forum for its European security policy, based on a long tradition of Canadian involvement in Europe. Canada's soldiers fought in both the First and the Second World War in Europe. It participates actively in NATO and well into the 1990s, Canadian military personnel was stationed in Germany. The overriding perception of Canadian governments is that anything that puts NATO unity into doubt is not in the interest of Canada. The Chrétien government therefore stressed at the time, the need to embed CSDP in the Atlantic alliance.⁴⁸ This line of thought has been carried on through both Liberal and Conservative governments. Hence, Canada and the EU agreed that NATO should remain the basis of their collective defence and that both would support the "rapid implementation of permanent arrangements between NATO and the EU."⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Moens. Canadian Military Journal, p. 67.

⁴⁸ Kaim. Transatlantic Internationale Politik 2/2003, p. 75.

⁴⁹ Council of the EU. Canada-EU Joint Statement on Defence and Security, Canada-EU Summit. Ottawa: Council of the EU, December 2000.

However, while Canada first rejected any support to the idea of a CSDP, it shifted its position over time, as exemplified by the series of agreements between Canada and the EU since 2000. Ottawa first shared Washington's reservations that the CSDP could undermine the transatlantic alliance and eventually even transatlantic solidarity. Now it thinks that the CSDP is an opportunity for Canada to redefine its own security role in Europe as well as to branch out its foreign policy and crisis management options. In particular, Canada could make a significant contribution to the CSDP by offering to share its vast experience in United Nations peacekeeping missions. The actual form the CSDP began to take reassured Canadian policy makers. This was because pressure from Atlanticist Member States had forced more independent EU member states like France to temper their ambitions, with the outcome being that the new European defence identity would not be constructed in opposition to NATO or the United States, but rather complementary to the Atlantic alliance. Of vital importance was the acknowledgement that NATO would always maintain the right of first refusal and the conclusion of the Berlin Plus agreements, discussed previously.⁵⁰ In addition, Ottawa pragmatically recognized that the world has a need for more crisis management capacity than is currently available and that the United Nations remains limited in its ability to undertake such tasks. NATO is not able and willing to intervene everywhere, nor will all of its members always find intervention desirable. Since the primary goal of CSDP is not to take on NATO's collective defence role, but rather to allow the EU to effectively execute crisis management operations, Ottawa may sometimes find it more

⁵⁰ Fraterman. European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 2006/1, p.6.

appropriate or expedient to cooperate with the EU, especially when NATO and/or the UN is unable or unwilling to act.⁵¹

Ottawa's repositioning on CSDP and NATO may also be based on the realisation that NATO as an organisation was somewhat stifled by the end of the Cold War, and the resulting fading interest of both Americans and European in the organisation. The US currently perceives the EU, be it under the authority of NATO or the European Security and Defence Policy, as providing at best a means to address issues peripheral to its own focus on international terrorism or the Middle East or as being problems which US prefers not to become involved in. This situation is not likely to change in the near future. Also, a recent proposal to boost NATO ties with countries like Australia, New Zealand and Japan shows that for the US, NATO is no longer about a *transatlantic* alliance.⁵² This indicates the possibility that in future crisis management coalitions, bilateral relations may often be more important than multilateral ones. Politically speaking, NATO will not necessarily be the biggest game in town. NATO has therefore sometimes been described a declining force in world politics in terms of US thinking, both militarily and politically. This could leave Canada in the rather uncomfortable position of being the odd one out. Canada may continue to contribute troops to NATO headquarters and operations, where they will be working alongside many Europeans and a few Americans, but its voice in the North Atlantic Council will matter less because political decisions will have been "precooked" amongst the two giants. It is therefore in the interest of Canada to maintain strong NATO ties to a strong NATO. A separate, autonomous CSDP cannot be accepted by Canada,

⁵¹ Fraterman. European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 2006/1, p. 6.

⁵² Nico Fried. "Merkel lehnt "globale Nato" ab" Süddeutsche Zeitung. Munich: Süddeutsche Zeitung GmbH, 27 March, 2009.

but separable capabilities and independent CSDP action may be favoured by Canada, since CSDP missions currently lie closer to the traditional mandate of Canadian forces.

As we have seen, the state of affairs within NATO and relations between NATO and the EU are currently uncertain and face constant criticism. The Berlins Plus agreements have eased some of the pressure on NATO, but for many they are not sufficient. The US will attempt to maintain NATO as it is, in order to safeguard its policy dominance in the institution. ‘Separable but not separate capabilities’ and more EU capabilities for NATO are the best the US can offer to its allies. The US remains uneasy about an EU pillar within NATO but must return to a more multilateral approach to foreign and defence policy than the rather unilateral path it has taken over the last eight years. The US will have to make some progress in sharing its intelligence, in prodding Turkey to abandon its opposition to Cyprus and in its recent unilateral stance if it wants to re-establish closer ties with Europe through NATO. The Atlanticist countries of the EU generally support the US in accepting NATO’s primacy but agree that certain issues in transatlantic and NATO relations need to be addressed. However, less Atlanticist countries such as France, take a much harder stance on NATO and wish to reduce US policy hegemony within the institution, distinguish between Article five and non-Article five operations, where NATO would only be relevant for the former, and push for a European pillar in NATO if not for an independent CSDP altogether. In light of the return of France to NATO, the idea of an EU pillar will become more likely, also because European countries wish to have it both ways, by expanding the CSDP and maintaining NATO. However, as the CSDP grows, provided it can overcome the obstacles described in chapter three, it will call for a more unified and stronger

voice within NATO. The headquarters issue, should France get its way, may be a step towards such a European pillar in NATO. Canada would be opposed to an independent CSDP and should insist on maintaining the primacy of NATO. It will however also have to accept a growing CSDP within NATO and should establish ties with the CSDP directly. Based on the agreements made since 2000 and the common values Europeans and Canadians share, this should not be a difficult task to accomplish.

Chapter V

Concluding Remarks and the future of the Common Security and Defence Policy

The Common Defence and Security Policy undoubtedly has made a lot of progress over the past ten years. Cooperation in the field of defence has never been as close as it was envisaged under the European Defence Community. After the 1950s, the Western European Union, the European Political Cooperation and the Treaty of Maastricht paved the way to more foreign policy cooperation, but the defence elements were really accelerated only with the Saint-Malo agreements. The development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, based on the achievements of the European Political Cooperation and the Treaty of Maastricht, set the stage for the Common Security and Defence Policy, aided by security uncertainties due to US disengagement from Europe, NATO's difficulties to adapt to what President George Bush called the 'New World Order' and a renewed political resolve of the EU to become more involved in international affairs.

Today, the CSDP is based on principles of intergovernmentalism and decisions depend on a consensus among the 27 EU member states in the European Council. This is the CSDP's greatest advantage and its greatest weakness at the same time. Intergovernmentalism allows for a greater degree of flexibility than a supranational mode of operation. This can be beneficial in the more volatile and unstable realm of foreign and security policy and when decisions need to be reached in a short time frame. Yet, it is almost always very difficult to (quickly) reach an agreement among 27 governments. The potential to rapid and flexible responses is often

thwarted by the difficulties of 27 governments to agree on a course of action. One should also note that little will be achieved if the ‘big three’, the United Kingdom, France and Germany are not on board for a particular decision. For decisions in CSDP – as for most EU matters – agreements between these three are essential, along with cooperation of other militarily important European states, most of which are eastern European. Overall, the balancing of 27 national interests in a forum that cannot agree on the political future and form of the European Union remains a great challenge.

The framework is not expected to change significantly in the near future. Intergovernmentalism will remain the *modus operandi* of the CSDP for years to come, as the Treaty of Lisbon does not alter such provisions.¹ However, through mechanisms such as the permanent structured cooperation, membership in the European Defence Agency, and new provisions contained in the Treaty of Lisbon, should they be implemented correctly, the CSDP will become more integrated into the general EU framework. The former two elements may also stimulate the creation of a two-speed Europe on defence cooperation. We could see some countries as part of a more integrated CSDP based to some extent on Qualified Majority Voting procedures and some countries as part of a less integrated, more intergovernmental and consensus based CSDP for countries that do not wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation or the defence agency. However, there remain doubts as to whether the permanent structured cooperation will be implemented in its entirety, as illustrated by the growing number of protocols being attached to the original document.² Furthermore, the CSDP, in general, would

¹ Council of the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon. Brussels: Council of the EU, 3 December 2007.

² Council of the EU. Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation. Brussels: Council of the EU, 16 December, 2004.

be significantly weakened if the United Kingdom, Germany and France were not part of the same group in the CSDP. While Germany and France would in all likelihood be part of the 'high-speed CSDP', Britain may be more reluctant to give up some of its decision-making power in defence and security matters. The United Kingdom may not only be wary of the more integrated branch of the CSDP because of sovereignty issues and populist concerns, but also because it would jeopardize its close intelligence-sharing, cooperative military relationship with the United States, both bilaterally and within NATO. As noted above, success of the defence agency, permanent structured cooperation and therefore a stronger CSDP will depend on the capability of the big three to agree.

Their capability to agree will depend on a number of factors, although the most fundamental of those are an agreement on a common strategic culture, the political aim the EU and the CSDP ought to take in the long term, and how the NATO-CSDP relationship should be defined. Currently, nobody in Europe attempts to seriously discuss the EU's political future and EU-NATO relations only progress slowly, although NATO's future will depend to a large part on what form and importance the CSDP will take. Should the CSDP remain the small intervention force backed by strong civilian elements it currently is, NATO will continue to remain responsible for any large-scale operation. Should NATO fail to continue its reform the CSDP may grow into a larger, more capable defence policy. However, as we have discussed in chapters three and four, many issues will need to be resolved for this to happen. Either way, NATO will remain the territorial security guarantee for Europe, although it may find itself limited to article five tasks only.

What role the CSDP will take, and with it NATO, partly depends on the political will of European countries to 'get their hands dirty' in the international arena. As discussed in the third chapter, the forces European countries possess and their equipment are not sufficient for the modern expeditionary warfare. While no European country alone possesses or aims to possess capabilities in this area, efforts to increase cooperation both in terms of removing single-market exemptions for defence products and for coordinating procurement and defence technologies so as to achieve better interoperability, remain painfully slow and disjointed. The existing institutional difficulties also mar many efforts in this regard. The only area where some progress and agreement between the big three can be seen to develop is a common strategic culture. The traditional strategic culture of Europe is expected to converge as operations of the CSDP increase in size, importance and number and as European militaries continue their exchanges in the CSDP bodies. If one accepts a human security definition of strategic culture, Europe is already in agreement on strategic objectives of the present and future. Disagreements regarding the definition of the Petersberg tasks and of what military force comprises exactly appear resolvable.³ However, agreement on the role of the CSDP and of NATO will remain unresolved as long as European countries fail to develop the political will to engage into large-scale operations, or alternatively, abandon its global foreign policy and military ambitions for good and be satisfied with its civilian force supported by a limited military, dependent on the US and NATO. The French position is now illustrative in this regard as it takes a rather ambiguous stance of fully supporting NATO again, while continuing to demand concessions by the US to support the expansion of the CSDP.

³ Council of Ministers of the WEU. Petersberg Declaration. Bonn: WEU, 19 June 1992.

An increased political will to act would resolve the issues regarding the European Security Strategy and other strategic documents, such as the Headline Goals. It would help to add clarity to the documents and provide a real security strategy for Europe, rather than a policy paper on what unites the member states at that moment in time. Most importantly however, it would lead to a much better and faster implementation of the goals set out in the Headline Goals and the Security Strategy. Terrorism, failed states, WMD proliferation, energy security and other important strategic objectives could be addressed adequately and with sufficient resources.⁴ The transformation of forces and with it the means to expeditionary warfare especially in its periphery would justify its new outward focus as mandated in the Security Strategy as well as its call for more multilateralism in the actions of its member states and partners (especially the United States). Also, the headline goals and with it the Battlegroups would be realised more rapidly in its entirety (based on the Helsinki objectives), not only to the extent of its scaled down 2010 Headline Goals.

More political will would also help resolve many of the funding issues. It is likely that defence budgets will in fact be increased in the short term. Whether simply raising defence budgets is the best approach to the lack of equipment, strategic lift and transformation of forces is subject to discussion, as seen in the second chapter. Nevertheless, an increase in resources available for defence is necessary if European countries aim to take on larger scale military operations beyond its borders. Strategic lift, especially for heavy equipment and long ranges remains an area of equipment that requires a lot of investment from Europeans, especially if an internal solution, in all likeliness from EADS is sought. Here, the A400M project remains

⁴ Council of the EU. A Secure Europe in a better world: The European Security Strategy. Brussels: Council of the EU, 12 December 2003.

surprisingly uncertain.⁵ Armed forces also need to be trained and transformed to adapt to expeditionary warfare and their equipment adjusted accordingly, which also requires great amounts of additional funding. Constructively rearranging and coordinating defence budgets throughout the EU would however be the more effective and cost-saving alternative for the short and medium term, especially in times of economic crisis, where governments have already committed huge budgets to economic stimulus packages. However, economic stimulus packages may in fact also be beneficial to the defence sector. For instance, parts of the German package will go to upgrading and improving equipment.⁶ Funding is therefore another area where more readiness to finance military upgrading and operations is the basis for larger and more important actions or policies, although results could already be achieved by more cooperation in the military realm and defence equipment policies specifically.

Some areas, such as the coordination of funding cycles can only be resolved through cooperation, although more political will can bring EU countries closer together and add urgency to cooperative efforts. If all member states increase their defence spending but continue to pursue national procurement policies, regardless of other member states, many capabilities will continue to be scarce and interoperability will remain nothing more than an ambition of the CSDP. The same applies to interoperability. If each member state continues to insist on nationally produced equipment or gives preference to NATO equipment compatibility or relies on American equipment, while others choose European equipment, interoperability cannot be achieved – at least at the level of higher scale and more sensitive equipment requiring, for

⁵ Thomas Bauer. “Mitten im Flug darf man nicht aussteigen“ Financial Times Deutschland. Hamburg: Financial Times Deutschland, March 12, 2009, p. 24

⁶ Chris Bryant. “Germany to spend stimulus funds on defence” Financial Times. London: Financial Times Ltd., 1 March 2009 as found on <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ba7aa86-0687-11de-ab0f-000077b07658.html>

example, specific computer technologies. In addition, only intensive international cooperation of governments and defence companies can bring about interoperability in the absence of procurement from the same sources. This currently appears to be the only feasible solution, as countries will insist on continuing to rely on their procurer of choice, for reasons of national or international (transatlantic) political interest. The duplication of capabilities and the thereby associated waste of funding resources can also only be resolved through cooperation. The CSDP member states will need to coordinate and agree on who ought to provide which capabilities, rather than taking matters into their own hands. The development of niche capabilities could be part of this approach, although the availability of such niche resources must be guaranteed independently of possible political objections of a member state. Furthermore, preventing the duplication of capabilities will require a better cooperation of all EU member states in regard to NATO. Some countries have certain capability obligations for their NATO membership, both in terms of what kind of equipment they need to purchase and in terms of what equipment needs to be available for NATO missions. A coordinated NATO membership of EU member states would help prevent duplication of capabilities for EU and NATO purposes. Unfortunately, as long as the European countries cannot agree on a common approach towards NATO, such agreements will prove very difficult.

In sum, higher defence budgets currently appear to be a rather far-fetched objective, since the political will to do so is not there. Goals that are more realistic would be better coordination and more congruence regarding procurement and spending, by increasing the efficiency of spending disciplines of the member states. However, even this is only in its starting stages, as the European Defence Agency has only recently taken up its work. In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon has to come into effect before tools such as the permanent structured cooperation can be

used. There also remain question marks as to whether the EU will accept a two-speed solution to the CSDP.

Another issue that will need to be addressed to achieve the EU's global foreign policy ambitions is the lack of free trade rules for defence products. As mentioned in chapter three, Article 296 of the Treaty on the European Union exempts defence products from the single market in addition to practices such as that of 'juste retour', which are hardly beneficial to a competitive European defence market and thereby competitive European military technologies and research towards these. Mechanisms such as the European Capability Acquisition Process and the Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain have little effect on these restraining rules and practices, as they are not mandatory and for the latter only applicable to European Defence Agency member states. The new directive aimed at loosening the grip of Article 296 on the defence market is now before the Council, but it remains to be seen whether it will be adopted in its entirety if at all. However, it is evidence of the fact that EU member states are aware of the issues the defence markets in Europe faces. The achievement of even a partially integrated European defence market will depend on the ability of EU member states to agree to reduce or eliminate restrictions on defence products. EU countries have been able to agree on refraining from adopting internal as well as external protectionist measures in other sectors, even in the face of recession. However, the defence sector has always been treated as a special case and as a more sensitive issue for reasons of national security. Nevertheless, cooperation and the political will to overcome obstacles to a single defence market are much more possible than in regards to other issues the CSDP faces that require these elements, since establishing single markets and more competitiveness remains the principle strength of EU activities.

The EU and CSDP officials are undoubtedly working towards solutions and agreement on funding issues, the integration of the defence market, force transformation, the relationship with NATO and institutional difficulties. European lawmakers must nevertheless remember not to neglect the civilian elements of CSDP missions. This has been stated and confirmed by the European Security Strategy and the establishment of civilian headline goals along with the military headline goals.⁷ The current policy focuses on the CSDP's weak areas, which are on the military side of conflict management. While it is certainly desirable to do so, the military build-up of the EU cannot happen at the expense of its civilian strength. The US is commonly criticised (often by Europeans) for taking a 'robust' approach to conflict resolution, e.g. by placing a strong emphasis on military force. The CSDP must remember to rely on its current strength in conflict management, which are the civilian elements, while strengthening and expanding its military power. Thereby, the EU would be able to grow in international credibility (by carrying a bigger stick) while retaining its constructive and reconstructive reputation in addressing conflicts (by retaining its big carrot). It might also prevent further radicalisation of other societies and cultures. In sum, the EU should continue to take its current approach to conflict management, but with stronger military elements, allowing for larger scale missions further away from the European continent, if necessary.

As mentioned above, the development of CSDP and of NATO are dependent on one another. Chapters two and three addressed the development and issues of the CSDP, chapter four addressed the development and positions towards NATO as well as the issues that remain.

⁷ Council of the EU. Civilian Headline Goal 2008, Council 15863/04, Brussels: Council of the EU, 7 December 2004.

How NATO evolves, and with it attitudes towards the CSDP will to a significant degree depend on how attitudes of the US towards European defence evolve. Of the three positions towards Europe held by Americans, only two are realistic and were considered in the recent past. Americans support European defence cooperation either exclusively through NATO or through both the CSDP and NATO but never directly and exclusively through the CSDP. The Bush administration appeared to favour the former option, whereas President Obama's position remains to be seen. How American administrations position themselves in regards to NATO and how much 'freedom' they are willing to grant the CSDP and less Atlanticist European countries will have a strong influence on the development of the CSDP. The American position towards NATO has however appeared to be relatively clear and is expected to remain so.

European attitudes towards NATO are more ambiguous. France traditionally is more wary of NATO. It prefers a CSDP forum for foreign policy and military action, with some reliance on NATO assets for large operations. However, France recently returned to the military branch of NATO, probably in exchange for concessions by the US, encompassing for example to drop its opposition to the development of CSDP headquarters. This leaves the current French position as ambiguous and unclear as NATO's, although France's general political position trend favours the CSDP. The UK tends to concentrate on NATO for military action with occasional recourse to the CSDP. It attempts to maintain close ties to the US and the EU at the same time, providing for much ambiguity of its position. Germany takes the middle of the road approach between France and Britain, viewing CSDP and NATO as complementary and each possessing a certain area of competency and expertise. All other European countries generally orientate their positions somewhere along the lines of the big three, most of them in line with the German position. Overall, the EU sees CSDP as complementary to NATO without undermining it for as

long as NATO does not expand into civilian missions. This is reflected in the Berlin Plus agreements that currently govern NATO-CSDP relations. However, the draft European Constitution was rather anti-NATO, and Bush's unilateralism has led to some irritation among those countries willing to support NATO and it remains to be seen whether this trend can be reversed. Furthermore, a NATO official recently suggested that EU member states want a 'modern' force projection approach to conflicts for the CSDP but not for NATO, reinforcing the traditional French position that views NATO as limited by Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty.⁸ The main issues NATO needs to resolve to make it regain attractiveness for Europeans are increased sharing of US intelligence, resolving the issues regarding Cypriote-Turkish relations and improving coordination of procurement and interoperability between EU and NATO capabilities.

What role NATO takes as a result will of course directly affect the areas the CSDP will operate in. Currently it appears rather unlikely that NATO will be seen purely within Article Five, i.e. as nothing more than a defensive alliance. The practice of the past 10 years has indicated a different role for NATO because Europeans continue to rely on US military might for large-scale military operations. Should the CSDP develop the political will and capabilities to engage into larger scale military missions, NATO's importance may fade. Currently this appears unlikely due to the above-mentioned reliance on US capabilities, the state of European force projection capabilities and the bilateral relations to the United States some European countries hold.

⁸ Alberto Bin. "NATO Policy in the Middle East" Bison Papers 13. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 2009.

Which role NATO, on the one side, and the CSDP, on the other, take will influence relations between Canada and the CSDP. Canada and the EU share many values and views on international relations, as their UN voting record, their individual attitudes towards conflict management and their long history of cooperation exemplifies. This is also reflected in the current relations Canada and the CSDP hold, as Canada has more forces involved in several CSDP missions than some EU member states. A number of agreements on foreign and economic policy further illustrate this point. However, the financial uncertainty, partially resolved through the establishment of the ATHENA mechanism, as described in chapter three, remains an obstacle to more and better cooperation. In addition, the Department of National Defence unlike Canada's Department of Foreign Policy and International Trade continues to oppose cooperation with the EU on military matters outside the NATO forum. Canada should and will continue to rely on NATO as the main forum of discussion and cooperation with the EU on defence matters. It should however not rule out bilateral relations with the CSDP in the way the Department of National Defence appears to do. Direct and close relations to the EU, the CSDP and the European Defence Agency can be beneficial not only to Canada's influence in EU policy it has an interest in, but also for business opportunities regarding defence products by companies such as Bombardier.

As the current European Parliament, as well as national election platforms indicate, the CSDP and defence cooperation in the EU is there to stay. The progress made in these fields, especially over the past ten years, is undeniable. The ambitions the EU has are however much greater than the current state of things, as the European Security Strategy illustrates. However,

for several of these ambitions to be realised, many issues need to be resolved. Some results, such as an increased interoperability of national forces, can be achieved through increased cooperation and integration and appear realistic for the near to medium future. Some would however require a strong shift in attitudes and political will to expand the CSDP and the missions it can engage in. As such, NATO will remain the main forum for large-scale military operations for years to come. The EU will need to address its current issues, define itself, set its boundaries, especially geographically, and agree on what role and importance it ought to take as a whole and in the field of defence and foreign policy before the step to becoming a global military actor can be taken.

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