INTERNATIONAL REGIMES:

A STUDY OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)

by

SEE SENG TAN

A thesis

presented to the University of Manitoba

in partial fulfilment of the

requirement for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Political Studies

Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada 1992

ISBN 0-315-78025-8

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: A STUDY OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONALS (ASEAN)

BY

SEE SENG TAN

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents	Pages
Abbreviations	iii
Introduction	1
Chapter one: Roses, Regions, and Regimes: Regime Theory and ASEAN	6
Subheadings:	
Introduction	6
A Third World Perspective of Security	9
Region, Regionalism and Southeast Asia: The Case of ASEAN	11
Regime Theory: The Case of ASEAN	16
Regime Characteristics	18
Theoretical Approaches to Regimes	22
Conclusion	35
Endnotes	37
Chapter two: Regional Reconciliation: The Evolution of ASEAN	47
Subheadings:	
Introduction	47
Southeast Asian Regionalism Before 1967	51
Regional Reconciliation Reconsidered	56
Regional Reconciliation Reinforced	64
Conclusion	74
Endnotes	76
Chapter three: Security Regimes: The Case of ASEAN Political-Security Cooperation	85
Subheadings:	
Introduction	85

Security Regimes 88
Intra-ASEAN Conflict Management 94
Intra-ASEAN Security Cooperation 105
Conclusion 113
Endnotes 120

Chapter four:
Regimes and Complex Interdependence:
The Case of ASEAN Economic Cooperation 131

Subheadings:
Introduction 131
Complex Interdependence 135
Intra-ASEAN Economic Cooperation 145
Conclusion 156
Endnotes 170

Conclusion 180

Bibliography 187

Subheadings:
Books 187
Journal Articles 191
Monographs and Papers 194
Reports 196
Documents 197
Newspapers & Periodicals 198

Appendices 200

ABBREVIATIONS

ACMR	:	Air Combat Manoeuvring Range
AFTA	:	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AIC	:	ASEAN Industrial Complementation
AIJV	:	ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture
AIP	:	ASEAN Industrial Project
AMDA	:	Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement
APEC	:	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASA	:	Association of Southeast Asia
ASEAN-CCI	:	ASEAN Chamber of Commerce and Industry
ASEAN-ISIS	:	ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
ASEAN-PMC	:	ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference
BBC	:	Brand-to-Brand Complementation
CSBM	:	confidence and security-building measure
CENTO	:	Central Treaty Organization
CEPT	:	Common Effective Preferential Tariff
CPM	:	Communist Party of Malaysia
EAEC	:	East Asian Economic Caucus, formerly EAEG ('G' for Grouping)
ECAFE	:	(United Nations) Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
EEZ	:	exclusive economic zone
FPDA	:	Five Power Defence Arrangement

IPTN	:	Indonesia's Nusantra Aircraft Industry
MAPHILINDO	:	Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia entente
MFN	:	Multi-Fibre Arrangement
MNC	:	multi-national corporation
NAFTA	:	North American Free Trade Area
NGO	:	non-governmental organisation
NIE	:	newly industrialised economy
NIEO	:	New International Economic Order
PTA	:	Preferential Trading Arrangement
RIC	:	regional industry club
SEATO	:	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SIJORI	:	Singapore-Johor-Riau (growth triangle)
SLOC	:	sea lane of communication
UNCLOS	:	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
ZOPFAN	:	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of regionalism is a topic of continuing interest in the study of international relations. Theories of regionalism which deal with regional cooperation and integration have been engendered as a result of this scholarly interest. Mostly suited to the study of regionalism among developed or industrialised states, such theories do not generalise well when used in particular for the study of regionalism among developing states. In essence, many Third World regional groupings are found to evince relatively low levels of cooperation and integration when measured using Western-originated concepts and standards of regionalism. As a result, students (and practitioners) of Third World politics remain largely sceptical over these theories. As will be noted in the following discussion, many Third World specialists have eschewed subjecting Asian data to Western expectations.

This is true in the case of regionalist efforts in Southeast Asia. In many cases, rhetoric and declarations regarding (in most instances) economic cooperation are usually not supported with concomitant action: a case of 'many words but few deeds.' And if cooperative programmes do get started, many either fold along the way due to the compromising and/or reneging actions of states, or are watered down during the preliminary stage of planning and bargaining to the point of ineffectiveness. The most significant obstacle appears to be the unwillingness of states to replace the primacy of national goals, interests and priorities with regional or collective goals, even if they stand eventually to benefit from the latter. This is especially true of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the regional organisation of interest in this discussion. Formed in 1967, ASEAN for long has displayed generally low levels of economic cooperation between member states. However, cooperation at the extra-regional dimension has been impressive, as shown by the Association's achievements

at international fora, such as the United Nations and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

The ending of the Cold War has brought about a relaxation of tensions in the Southeast Asian regional system. On the economic front, there appears to be a growing protectionist trend that began in the mid-1980s, as evidenced by the ongoing problematic negotiations at the Uruguay Round of GATT talks. This does not bode well for ASEAN countries in their continuing efforts to sustain high economic growth rates. Western states are also redirecting their energies to economic cooperation as shown by the formation of regional trade blocs. Such pressures for change are leading the ASEAN states to reconsider the fundamental purpose of their organisation. While it remains unclear if ASEAN will begin to strengthen itself by increasing substantially the level of trade and industrial cooperation between member states, ASEAN leaders themselves are nevertheless reemphasising the importance of their organisation with regard to their individual national needs. In this respect, it would be misleading of observers to seek after hints of supranationalism in ASEAN's agenda for the future. The Association therefore should not be regarded as an autonomous regional organization seeking to advance supranational ideals, but as a vehicle for the realisation of national interests. As such, the present emerging signs of increasing ASEAN economic cooperation, such as the Singapore-Johor-Riau industrial growth triangle and the imminent conversion of the ASEAN region into a free trade area, are best viewed in this light. Similarly, concomitant increases in political and security cooperation have to be viewed in the same manner. In essence, it behooves the interests of this discussion to address ASEAN in terms of its institutional utility to member countries.

Regime theory may thus provide a more appropriate conceptual framework for

the study of ASEAN regional dynamics. This discussion does not purport to test rigorously the validity of one or more regime formulations. Instead, it seeks to suggest the usefulness of particular aspects of various formulations and approaches for examining political-security and economic cooperation in ASEAN. At present, ASEAN evinces at best the characteristics of an 'incipient' (i.e., weak or immature) international regime. The current signs of optimism and change within the organisation, as indicated by increasing cooperation among member states, suggest that ASEAN is starting along the progressive track towards regime maturity. This discussion argues, premised on ASEAN's past performance and philosophy, that such optimism and change is cautious at best. Nevertheless, these present changes, as shown by the progress made at the recent fourth ASEAN summit held in Singapore, represent the most fundamental and sanguine of the lot in the history of ASEAN regional cooperation and regime dynamics. The unique opportunity accorded ASEAN to establish a new 'regional order' in a currently stabilised Southeast Asia only serves to underscore the significance of change and regime strengthening at such a time.

Chapter one examines the utility of several conceptual approaches to regimes, as compared with theories of regionalism and international integration, to the case of ASEAN. These conceptual approaches in general can be divided into the rationalist (or positivist) and cognitive approaches. It appears that ASEAN at present, as subsequent discussions will also show, continues to function as an incipient regime.

Chapter two examines briefly the evolution of ASEAN from its inception in 1967 to the present. It may be argued in broad fashion that the Association progresses generally through spurts of sudden change. Critical periods include 1975-76, when ASEAN began to take cooperation more seriously in response to the communist threat; and the mid to late 1980s, when broad economic (and later political) changes

compelled the Association to reconsider its status. In this respect, ASEAN evinces a capacity for adapting to changing conditions in order to better meet new environmental challenges and demands. In essence, ASEAN has to preserve and ensure institutional relevance to avoid being marginalised in international politics.

The following two chapters discuss various forms of regional cooperation and interaction between and among member countries. (See Chart under Appendices). Chapter three examines the political and military-security aspects of ASEAN cooperation, namely, the modes of conflict management and forms of security cooperation. Robert Jervis' concept of a security regime, which emphasises the cognitive component of regime theory, provides the conceptual framework for this discussion. The evolution of security cooperation between member countries recently reached an important juncture, namely, the deliberate inclusion of security issues in the formal ASEAN agenda. This, however, does not imply that the Association is poised to become a formal defence organisation, nor that member countries will readily participate in complex multilateral forms of security cooperation. Significant bilateral conflicts continue to plague inter-member relations, which may prove injurious to efforts to achieve more ambitious cooperation.

Chapter four examines the economic aspects of ASEAN cooperation, namely, previous and newly emerging patterns of trade and industrial relations between member countries. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's model of regime creation, maintenance, and change within an environment of 'complex interdependence' is employed as the conceptual basis for this chapter. This model comprises both rationalist and cognitive components in its analysis of regime dynamics. The field of economic cooperation in ASEAN, as in security cooperation, has similarly been accorded a significant boost. This is evident in the collective determination to

establish the regional free trade area by the year 2008. Regional impediments to cooperation still exist in sufficient measure to hinder progress, such as economic nationalism. Nevertheless, as in political-security cooperation, 'learning' among member states has helped to reduce obdurate views regarding regional cooperation. This has served essentially to produce positive expectations and, consequently, behaviours among members.

The conclusion summarises the key points of the discussion and focuses on several insights pertinent to the use of regime theory in the study of ASEAN regional cooperation. It is suggested that regime theory provides a useful set of conceptual categories in which to locate the study of patterns of ASEAN cooperation. From the discussion, it is evident that regional norms influence significantly the expectations and behaviours of ASEAN member countries. In this respect, the 'intersubjective' quality of the ASEAN international regime is unmistakable. As such, it would appear that a rationalist regime epistemology is insufficient for the purposes of this discussion. In other words, the study of ASEAN regional cooperation benefits more richly when a combination of both rationalist and cognitive aspects of regime theory are used.

CHAPTER ONE: ROSES, REGIONS, AND REGIMES: REGIME THEORY AND ASEAN

The last decade has brought fundamental changes to global power configurations that have remained largely static since the end of the second World War. Concomitantly, modifications are being made to the study of international security as the world's industrialised states, long entrenched in a heavily institutionalised and paradoxical nuclear standoff, grapple with attempting to accommodate the expanding definition of security to include economic, social, environmental and other concerns to the traditional singular military component. On the other hand, member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), along with much of the Third World, generally define security in holistic or comprehensive terms.[1]

The world's disappointing experience with collective security approaches, such as the short-lived League of Nations experiment, has prompted students and practitioners of international politics towards less ambitious programmes during the post-World War Two period. For example, in the 1950s, regionalism started to gain prominence as a plausible avenue for securing "peace in parts," as the title of a leading scholar's book suggests.[2] The formation of the European Economic Community in 1957 (now European Community) has engendered a proliferation of regionalist theories which do not generalise well where regionalism among developing states is concerned. In addition, some of these theories have been found wanting as the European experiment floundered in the 1970s in the wake of reemerging egocentric statism. Nevertheless, the regionalist vision has shown a powerful resilience over the years as evinced by theories of complex interdependence and international regimes.[3]

Scholars of Third World politics, however, remain largely sceptical over the use of such regional paradigms. The case of ASEAN, a grouping comprising Third World states in various stages of development, is no different; much of the published work on the Association tends largely to be empiricist in orientation with minimal attempts at theorising.[4] A well known student of Asian politics has noted that many of his colleagues "have been unwilling ethnocentrically to subject Asian data to Western expectations."[5] Another has observed, perhaps somewhat in exaggeration but nonetheless in truthfulness, that "little or nothing of the evidence on which present theoretical understanding rests has been drawn from Southeast Asian experiences."[6] The poor history of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation, not to mention integration, would suggest the limited usefulness of functional theories.[7] Conversely, frameworks which stress the cooperative element - meaning the expression of some form of regional solidarity in the global polity and the concomitant ability to control the use of force within a grouping's region[8] - are of some use in the study of an organisation such as ASEAN.

Since its entry into the realm of theoretical discourse, the regime concept has had to face some rather strong criticism. This discussion does not purport to test in rigorous fashion the operational viability of international regime theories. Instead, it seeks to suggest the usefulness of such theories as conceptual tools for the study of political, security and economic cooperation among ASEAN states. Further qualifications, however, are in order. Most definitions of regime focus on key characteristics such as the notion of regularity in behaviour, the existence of principles and norms, and the convergence of players' expectations in given issue areas in international relations.[9] Difficulties arise where broad definitions are concerned, for, as others elsewhere have argued, the existence of patterned behaviour is often

mistaken to represent a regime in operation.[10] It therefore behooves any attempt to study regime dynamics in Southeast Asia, a region notorious for its high incidence of both inter-state and intra-state conflicts, to eschew making such mistakes.

Second, formalised agreements and nominal membership in institutions do not automatically constitute regimes. For example, Hampson has argued that the inability of ASEAN to achieve goals of economic and security cooperation (the latter refers specifically to the frustrated venture of establishing a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia) displays at best an immature regime.[11] In this sense, the notion of a partial or 'proto' regime or, in another case, an 'incipient' regime[12], would be of particular use to the purposes of this discussion.

This chapter discusses briefly (1) the factors that affect the Southeast Asian conception of regionalism, (2) regionalism and regionalist theory with respect to Southeast Asia, and (3) the relevance of regime theory to the ASEAN experience. It would appear that the Southeast Asian condition is such that obstacles created by regional immaturity and juvenile 'statehoodism' can and will hinder the best intentions and efforts at cooperation and collaboration. As such, the visible outcomes of ASEAN dynamics indicate at best an 'incipient' regime. In addition, there are signs to suggest that the Association, in response to pressures for change in an increasingly decentralised and multipolar world, is moving gradually towards greater maturity as an international regime in the ongoing collective effort to establish a viable regional security. It should be remembered that while intentions are necessary, they however do not constitute a sufficient condition to support the argument that change is taking place.

A Third World Perspective of Security

The Western world's conception of security lies very much in the realm of military security. National security is almost exclusively taken to mean defending the territorial integrity of the state from external aggression, although there have been recent attempts to include a gamut of other factors in addition to the military component to an expanded concept of security. The following view is largely reflective of the latter concern as expressed in scholarly literature:

> Power comes not just from the barrel of a gun. It is thus possible to define the meaning of security in relation to social, cultural, economic, and ecological processes, as well as to geopolitical threats from foreign powers. Hence, for example, peace researchers insist on the need to break down artificial distinctions between security and development.[13]

Third World countries, however, have never had to deal with such conceptual difficulties in terms of security, and ASEAN is no exception. The security problematic of developing states necessitates their accommodating both the "hardware" (i.e., military) and "software" (e.g., legitimacy, nation building, economic development) components of security. National security thus involves both external as well as internal elements. In essence, there can be no security without development; conversely, there can be no development without security. This in no way suggests that threats from external aggressors, or threats to state legitimacy, are unimportant or nonexistent; on the contrary, these serve to reemphasize the significance of preserving regime legitimacy.[14] Ayoob, in noting the preoccupation most Southeast Asian leaderships seem to have for dealing with internal threats to the security of both their statist structures and regimes, contended that "where external threats do exist they often attain saliency primarily because of the insecurities and conflicts that abound within Third World states."[15] It has also been argued that the demise of Cold War

global politics has accentuated the internal aspects of security concerns in Southeast Asia and has in fact redirected a growing preoccupation with external threats back to internal ones.[16] In the majority of these cases, even the ability and at times the will of incumbent regimes to fulfil the basic functions of statehood are often in question. Buzan, for example, has contended that:

> Very weak states possess neither a widely accepted and coherent idea of the state among their populations, nor a governing power strong enough to impose unity in the absence of political consensus. The fact that they exist as states at all is largely a result of other states recognising them as such and/or not disputing their existence.[17]

Thus, it is not too difficult an exercise in appreciating the predominant reality of conflicts being the rule rather than the exception with respect to regional dynamics in the Third World. To this extent, development, although inextricably linked (and undeniably crucial) to security, in effect becomes a priority of secondary importance relative to the all-encompassing objective of security. Thus, socio-economic development is seldom considered an autonomous goal that deserves to be fulfilled independent of security considerations.[18] The successful attainment of legitimacy and development is predicated upon the singularly significant condition of stability. In short, Southeast Asian leaderships seek to obtain what some scholars have termed 'durable stability' in order to pursue their legitimation and development designs.[19] It is against this backdrop of mostly moribund Third World economies that the impressive economic performance of the ASEAN region in the 1980s stands out in stark contrast.

In essence, the major distinction between the developed and developing worlds rests on the crucial variable of time. Regional relations between industrialised states enjoy the benefit of a substantially long (and at times checkered) history of active interaction. Conversely, Third World states, the majority of whom came into existence

only in the present century as the direct result of decolonisation, find themselves struggling with a heavily compressed time frame for the complicated task of state making. In addition, the incessant impact of international forces, whether military, political, economic or technological, only serves to exacerbate already present complications.[20] As such, it comes as no surprise that Third World regionalist experiments, when subjected to Western scrutiny, do not quite measure up to the latter's expectations.

Region, Regionalism and Southeast Asia: The Case of ASEAN

> What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet as a rose.[21]

Students and practitioners of politics and other fields have for long struggled to accept the odd distribution of mainland and archipelagic territories approximately east of India and south of China as a geographical or political 'region.' There was little to suggest any hint of regional identification prior to 1945. The wartime (for all countries) and colonial (for some countries) experiences notwithstanding, there was little common historical experience, nor cultural and ideological homogeneity, of which to speak. In short, much of the area was considered to constitute "merely a place on the globe where certain groups of people, holding little in common, live contiguously to each other."[22]

The Second World War affected the notion of a 'Southeast Asia' in several significant ways. Language and perception of theatres of war and mass production of innumerable maps cultivated the view of Southeast Asia as a region. Also, the growing acceptance and use of the region's adopted name in effect aided its legitimation. Most importantly, wartime Allied and postwar American interest in Southeast Asia as a major policy arena accorded the region a strongly political connotation. Political

events continued to shape the region, such as the ill-fated Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) which came into existence in 1954. The very name itself proved to be a misnomer, for SEATO's purview covered a wide expanse of territory stretching from most of Southeast Asia to include the general area of the Southwest Pacific.[23] The Indochinese conflicts, beginning with the Vietnam War, in essence enforced a cordon sanitaire which divided the region by ideology and politics. Such a polarisation of the region's states into the communist camp (the Indochina states) and the capitalist camp (the ASEAN states), with Myanmar (formerly Burma) being the odd man out, in effect consolidated the perception, both indigenous and international, of distinct subsystems within the larger Southeast Asian region.

Whatever the antecedents which led to the growing acceptance of a Southeast Asian region, it became evident that there existed a 'rose', whether known as Southeast Asia or something other. The gradual development of a sense of regional identification among the Southeast Asian states during the gestation phase was undoubtedly aided by their common postwar experiences, such as the low levels of economic development, a somewhat pervasive communist influence, and a common mode of agricultural production.[24] These common problems in essence created among the Southeast Asian leadership an awareness of shared dilemmas which resulted in incessant corporate efforts at communication and consultation in order to devise much needed solutions. The few early attempts at regional cooperation, such as the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) which provided much of the groundwork for the later appearance of ASEAN, and the pan-Malay entente MAPHILINDO, reflected the common desire among some of the region's states for finding such a solution. The Indochina states, which practised in their own fashion an enforced regionalism, arguably had a similar mission.

The rigorous nature of regionalist theories and standards of measurement notwithstanding, ASEAN constitutes by far the most successful and comprehensive of the gamut of Southeast Asian regionalist experiments. Not all, however, are convinced. Hans Indorf, a long time observer of the Association, has argued:

> High praise for [ASEAN's] diligence cannot assuage the concern for the ultimate motif. Have the multitudinous activities on behalf of ASEAN become just self-serving projects rather than being regarded as building blocks for the implementation of a concept of regionalism in all its manifestations? Has ASEAN itself become a mere project? The absence of a plan for institutional progression, linked to an evolutionary time-table, fosters doubts in the minds of foreign observers.[25]

A distinction should be made between regional integration, which the conceptual paradigms of European regionalism purport to measure, and regional cooperation, which in essence constitutes one of the elementary steps on the path towards the creation of a larger consolidated community. There are several approaches within the ambit of integrationist theory, such as the pluralist, transactionalist, federalist and neofunctionalist models. For the pluralist model, cooperation is essentially limited to 'high politics,' such as national security and foreign policy matters. This theme is evident in the works of Karl W. Deutsch, whose conceptualisation of international community consists of a positive interplay between the values of national self-determination on the one hand, and international peace and security on the other.[26] Formal institutional change is not emphasized; rather, the teleological attainment of peace and security becomes the sole basis of integration. Successful amalgamation results in the formation of what Deutsch has called a 'pluralistic security community.'

The transactionalist approach also postulates the establishment of a security community as the end goal of regional integration. Integration is measured by the degree of 'closeness' within a particular community similar to Deutsch's notion of 'mutual responsiveness' and congruence of perceptions regarding common needs and

goals.[27] While variables such as friendship and trust are significant, the level of integration is largely measured by the rate of transactions (hence its name) in the form of trade and mail flows, supranational group formations, and others. The latter aspect indicates a federalist bend in the theory's orientation. The federalist approach argues that, by sheer force of political will, political actors who share common goals and needs can in effect produce a fundamental merger among themselves leading to a supranational entity.[28] While the federalist notion inevitably conjures up the image of a leviathanesque authority, its designers in fact envisage a separation of powers between the supranational government and constituent states such that both parties share complementary but independent powers.[29]

Finally, the neofunctionalist agenda postulates a seeming blend of the above ideas. Society is regarded as a pluralistic community comprised of political actors with competing interests who nevertheless co-exist within a constitutional system, much like a democracy as defined by Western standards. The crucial variable involved is the functionalist-inspired 'spill-over' concept which, through an incremental process of decision-making, gradually shifts political activity among the ruling elites towards regional integration.[30]

In the case of ASEAN, the more complex and ambitious an integration theory, the less predictive power it will hold for analyzing the level of integration in the grouping.[31] The neofunctionalist and federalist models will probably have the least success due to their emphasis on the supranationalist component. ASEAN has continued to be highly decentralised in terms of its organisational character. The neofunctionalist notion of incrementalism, which is highly suggestive of some form of evolutionary learning among ruling elites, offers some use to the study of intra-ASEAN dynamics in the Association's formative years. While little of substance was

accomplished during that period, the practice of regular consultation helped to remove existent suspicions and distrust within the grouping of mostly nascent states. Functional theories (as noted above) have not had very much success either. Ostensibly designed as a regional vehicle for economic cooperation, ASEAN does not have a lot to show in thirty or more years of existence as an economic organisation. Part of the reason lies in the lack of complementarity in the ASEAN economies (excluding Brunei and Singapore). Although the manufacturing sectors of these economies have developed to a substantial degree, their exports remain largely primary in nature.[32] There is, however, some evidence in the form of increasing multilateral industrial cooperation that suggests the possibility of fundamental change in the future context of ASEAN economic cooperation.

The less ambitious pluralist paradigm may be more appropriate for a loose grouping such as ASEAN. When the Association was established in 1967, its founders clearly had in mind as an underlying political goal the attainment of peaceful and stable relations among their respective member states. Although several prominent ASEAN voices have in the past called for an increase in the level of intra-organisational security cooperation, the general consensus is however clearly against the idea of converting the Association into a formal defence alliance.[33] ASEAN's role in the search for regional peace is thus similar to what Miller has called the 'peace' role of a regional organisation, which involves essentially "controlling the forceful settlement of conflicts among its own members" by means of "its peace-keeping machinery and diplomatic techniques."[34] In this sense, ASEAN fits the description of a Deutschian, pluralistic security community.

The lack of generalisability of the above discussed theories highlights clearly the disparity between words and deeds. ASEAN, comprised mostly of nascent states, is

no different from other Third World regional organisations (or groupings of developed states for that matter), in that lofty rhetoric is the rule rather than the exception. Paying lip service to vaunted goals such as economic cooperation - an endeavour problematic even for developed states as the troubled history of European regionalism would suggest - can serve indirectly to legitimise the national sovereignty of such nascent states. Two things invariably stand out. First, it is evident that ASEAN leaders lack the political will to subsume their respective national interests under broader regional or collective ones. Second, it is also evident that regional integration has not been an item of priority much less a goal on the Association's agenda in its more than twenty years of regional experience. Along these lines, one scholar has argued that "ASEAN should not be regarded as an autonomous regional organization seeking to advance supranational ideals but as a vehicle for the implementation of national functions."[35] As such, regional cooperation, not integration, should reasonably provide the basis for a theoretical focus on ASEAN.

Regime Theory: The Case of ASEAN

Academic interest in international regimes is in essence a logical extension of interdependence theory. Ironically, the interdependence concept gained strength in the face of neorealism[36] which emerged from the growing disenchantment with regional integration theories. Clearly, neorealism has had an influential impact on some of the more recent formulations of regime theory. Much of the earlier work acknowledged the intellectual debt to interdependence by focusing on expanded conceptions of national security and interest, and the importance of non-state actors and international organisations.[37] Later work, however, espoused the view that states are unitary and rational actors.[38]

The copious literature on international regimes offers a variety of definitions describing general to specific patterns of behaviour among states. Krasner's oft-quoted definition states that regimes are "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations."[39] This definition lends a normative dimension to international politics as compared to a more general definition that "a regime exists in every substantive issue-area in international relations," which possibly overemphasizes the normative consensus in international politics.[40] Even then, this definition has been criticized for its lack of precision for it does not permit one to separate regimes easily from the rest of international politics.[41] The generous latitude afforded by the same definition can thus accommodate narrow conceptions, such as internationally agreed arrangements and international organisations, and broad ones (a la Susan Strange) that encompass the structuralist view of outcomes being influenced by systemic distributions of power.

The fundamental question crucial to the study of regimes deals with what Krasner and others have referred to as the 'epiphenomenal' quality of regimes.[42] In short, are regimes merely manifestations of the distribution of power (i.e., regimes as dependent variables) or do they exist to influence behaviours and outcomes (i.e., regimes as independent variables)? The structuralist position adopts the former view; the Grotian perspective the latter.[43] A third position, the modified structuralist approach, takes the middle ground between the first two approaches by incorporating elements of realism such as importance of the state and state power, and the significance of regimes as causal factors in and of themselves. Much of the more recent work on regimes fall into the third category.

Regime Characteristics

Keeley has listed six essential considerations concerning the appearance and sustainability of international regimes: formation, organisational form, strength, scope, allocational mode, and actors.[44] Formation refers to the structure of regimes, which can be either contractual, imposed or spontaneous. The nature of world politics being anarchic (meaning the absence of an overarching world authority), one tends to assume the contractual model - complete with 'explicit' norms and principles - to be the most common form. This is made all the more convenient due to the tangible presence of international organisations which some have termed 'universalist regimes'[45]; in this sense, formation can in certain instances be used interchangeably with organisational form. Most regimes, however, are more likely than not to exhibit some hint of an administrative apparatus for the purpose of dispute settlement or information collection and sharing. Contractual regimes are viewed as voluntary and benevolent and may comprise a dominant actor within their ranks. Conversely, imposed regimes require a dominant actor or an oligarchy of actors in order to work. More often than not, such regimes give the impression of malevolence and coercion although certain imposed regimes reflect a benevolent quality.[46] Finally, the adherence to universally accepted laws, customs and conventions by the majority of states lends credence to the notion of spontaneous regimes. The Concert of Europe that prevailed from 1815 to 1823 serves as an excellent example of a spontaneous regime.

Strength refers to the degree of compliance with regimes rules, which is related to the processes of regime creation and erosion. Most regime formulations, such as the structuralist approach, are essentially concerned with power. Conversely, the cognitive approach views strength in terms of factors such as learning or adaptation, and social purpose.[47] Scope refers to the range of issues regimes cover, whereas allocational

mode refers the means used for the distribution of resources, such as a market-oriented or an authoritative mode of allocation. For example, the Group of 77's proposal for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) favours an authoritative mode as opposed to a free enterprise system, the latter of which the Group views as benefiting only the developed states. The final consideration deals with the type of actors mostly likely to be involved in regimes. The earlier work on regimes, which relied heavily on interdependence premises identifies both private, state and non-state actors while the later state-centric work naturally focuses on states per se.

ASEAN's organisational form is highly decentralised. Although a central secretariat exists and operates in Jakarta, Indonesia, it plays a limited role in the Association's policy development and implementation. It would seem that the contractual model best describes ASEAN. The Indochinese bloc was clearly an imposed regime with Vietnam serving as the coercive hegemonic power. The highly conflictual nature of relations between Southeast Asian states, largely the combined result of inveterate animosities and paranoia common to nascent states, suggests the absence of a spontaneous regime. Conversely, one can argue that a successful regime, or even a successful regional organisation, is characterised not so much by the decrease in the number of disputes as in the ability and will of member states to engage in peaceful means of dispute settlement.[48] Jervis, as will be discussed in the third chapter, has argued that the Concert of Europe embodies a security regime.[49] It should be noted that while the Concert did not eradicate conflict completely, it did serve to regulate it.

In terms of regime strength, a prima facie view of ASEAN suggests that members do not often comply with regime rules. The incessant efforts of these countries to circumvent the rules of various intra-ASEAN economic programmes

support such a conclusion.[50] The state of extra-ASEAN cooperation, however, presents a somewhat different picture. In the political realm, ASEAN since 1978 has displayed a strong sense of unity in leading the diplomatic world's corporate condemnation of Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea (now Cambodia). Similarly, the Association's mostly solid performances in past international economic fora and the strong ties it enjoys with dialogue partners allude to an evident sense of compliance with regime rules. The case of the International Civil Aviation Policy's decision in 1977 to introduce inexpensive airfares between Australian and European destinations to the exclusion of ASEAN carriers proffers an interesting example.[51] Singapore, which stood to lose the most from this decision, took the lead in presenting the Association's collective appeal. In what turned out to be an ill-conceived move, the Australian carrier Quantas attempted to isolate Singapore by negotiating with the other ASEAN carriers, except Singapore's, a deal to reduce fares on the Australia-ASEAN routes. The other ASEAN states refused the offer and chose instead to rally around one of their own in an impressive display of solidarity.

With regard to regime scope, the Association's original mandate provides for a wide range of areas available for cooperation. ASEAN countries are called "to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields."[52] While ASEAN was designed ostensibly as a vehicle for such forms of cooperation, the inherently political nature of the organisation was quite evident. In essence, it took the coming to power of communist governments in Indochina beginning in 1975 to galvanise the Association into action. At present, committees are basically divided into economic and non-economic ones. The economic arm deals with a wide array of issues ranging from trade, tourism, industry, banking and finance, natural resources,

energy, agriculture, food, transportation, and others. The non-economic arm handles areas such as science and technology, culture and information, and others.[53] Conversely, security cooperation, while substantial, does not evince the same degree of formalisation. Cooperation is expressed in predominantly bilateral forms in issues ranging from combined military exercises, exchanges of intelligence and personnel, and collaboration among various ASEAN law enforcement agencies.[54]

The Association clearly espouses a capitalist mode of allocation. This of course did not stop it from supporting the establishment of the NIEO.[55] ASEAN states have benefited tremendously from the market-oriented approach of the liberal international economic order. All member states (except the Philippines) registered respectable rates of economic growth for the latter half of the last decade which in overall terms outperformed even those of the Asian Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs), making ASEAN the fastest growing region in the world. (See Table 1 under Appendices.) ASEAN thus views with more than a little trepidation the present trend of the international political economy: the pessimistic state of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the concomitant push towards global protectionism; and, the movement towards regional trade blocs.[56] However, intra-ASEAN trade and industrial cooperation have certain constraints deemed necessary in order to accommodate the different stages of socio-economic development of member countries. As such, the ASEAN region has not yet been converted to a free trade area due to past intransigence. The recent change in leadership attitudes, as shown by the trend among ASEAN states to switch to export-oriented strategies of industrialisation, is certainly a positive contribution to the ongoing deliberations to develop the ASEAN region into a free trade zone by the year 2008.[57]

Theoretical Approaches To Regimes

There are generally four main approaches to regime formulation: structuralist, strategic and game theoretic, functionalist[58], and cognitive. The first three approaches are state-centric; the fourth hearkens back to the cardinal points of interdependence, such as the importance of non-state actors. The structuralist approach is the most widely employed explanation of regime dynamics. The notion was first broached in works such as Kindleberger's seminal study, World in Depression, although the a priori connection between structural power and regime creation and maintenance was made by Keohane and Nye.[59] The theory of hegemonic stability, which developed out of this linkage, contends that the presence of a hegemonic actor in world politics is essential. The hegemon's participation would lead to collectively desirable outcomes for all states. Similar to the discussion on regime form, there are two views of hegemony, namely, benign and malign. The first postulates that a benign hegemon is one which is willing to provide the necessary collective goods somewhat at its own expense because all states will benefit as a result from a well ordered but decentralised system. The malign, or coercive, hegemon enforces regime rules with both positive and negative methods in what is essentially a centralised system.

Borrowing from the structural determinism of neorealist thought, the structure tends to influence the behaviour of states "toward a common quality of outcomes even though the efforts and aims of agents and agencies vary."[60] Intentions and subjective self reflection on the part of human agents do not matter so much as the systemic distribution of power. Power, in this case, is regarded as a relational not absolute concept. Structural explanations, however, have been criticised for reifying state power and power distributions. It has been argued that hegemonic stability theory is not sustainable as a result of the difficulties of power analysis and its neglect of domestic

political factors.[61] Indeed, it is questionable whether a hegemon is even required in regime operation. As Keohane has opined, "The dominance of a single great power can contribute to order in world politics, in particular circumstances, but it is not a sufficient condition and there is little reason to believe that it is necessary."[62] To realist critics of regime theory, the problem with hegemonic stability theory as Keohane has so well articulated is no problem at all. To them, balance of power may well constitute the necessary and sufficient condition for order. The notion of regimes is thus regarded as naive and misguided as it diverts attention away from the analysis of power which, in their view, should constitute the major concern of students of world politics.[63]

Game theory is increasingly being used to explain how cooperation can evolve under anarchic conditions without an overarching world authority to enforce compliance among states. The usefulness of such an approach rests on its ability to distinguish between cooperation in general, which can occur even in the absence of a regime, and cooperation that arises because of regime dynamics. Actors in international politics (i.e., states) are regarded as "self-interested utility maximizers."[64] States go through a continuous process of selecting among available alternatives in such a way as to maximize their own welfare. In this sense, even the most anarchic behaviour in the international system can be described as being guided by a self-help philosophy.[65] Outcomes that emerge as a result of the interaction of states making independent and unconstrained decisions thus do not indicate regime activity even if those decisions are contingent on other states' decisions and actions. An international regime exists only when the patterned behaviours resulting from the interaction between states are constrained and premised on joint decision making.[66] As such, a game theoretic approach would not consider an arms race as a regime.

Stein has identified two kinds of 'dilemmas' faced by states, namely, common interests and common aversions.[67] Explained within the context of a Prisoners' Dilemma paradigm, individual rationality and independent decision-making will lead to suboptimal outcomes at best. States thus have a common interest to constrain their individuality and independence in order to deal with common problems. For example, the interwar period was largely characterised by so-called 'beggar-thy-neighbour' policies which led to the collapse of the international economy. The creation of an international trade regime in the form of the GATT during the postwar period can be viewed as an attempt by free world states to deal with a dilemma of common interest. As such, active collaboration among states is required.

Conversely, the dilemma of common aversions describes a situation where states gain by cooperating to eschew particular outcomes perceived by all involved as aversive. Traffic conventions can be regarded as regimes of common aversions, such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation's insistence that all flight control centres must have enough English speakers on duty to direct pilots who do not speak the language native to the state whose airspace they happen to be crossing.[68] In this case, the particular common aversion to be avoided would be a possible air disaster. However, only coordination, not collaboration, is required for such regimes to work. The game theoretic approach is useful in that it can produce cooperation under anarchic or realist conditions. It would seem, however, that under assumptions of complex interdependence, the argument that a condition of dilemma drives states to jointly make decisions becomes somewhat tenuous, as the very existence of an inextricably linked network of regimes and transnational relations endemic to developed states already constitutes a powerful facilitator of cooperation.[69]

The functionalist approach also assumes state-centricity and views states as

utility maximizers motivated by self-interest. Picking up where hegemonic stability theory left off, it is primarily concerned with explaining why regimes tend to persist even in the absence of a hegemon as the relatively good health of the international trade and monetary regimes amid the purported decline of American hegemony would suggest. The strongest argument made in this respect comes from Keohane.[70] Borrowing from microeconomic theory, Keohane has contended that world politics is characterised by institutional deficiencies that restrict mutually advantageous coordination not unlike an imperfect market. Specific features of the system's structure impose transaction and information costs that create barriers to effective cooperation between states thereby causing, as it were, market failure. Regime formation is contingent on the existence of sufficient complementary or common interests in order that agreements benefiting all regime members can be effected.[71] International regimes can help to ameliorate structurally imposed problems by reducing transaction costs and facilitating the decentralised making of rules necessary for regime operation.[72] Keohane has distinguished between a conventional 'control-oriented regime' and an 'insurance regime.' The former refers to the preservation of some form of control states hold over each other's behaviour in the regime by means of institutionalised arrangements. Control-oriented regimes help to order patterned behaviour within the regime (internal regularity) and without by regularising behaviour between member states and non-member states (environmental regularity). Conversely, the notion of risk sharing is cardinal to insurance regimes.[73] A state faces risks specific only to itself and gains a stronger measure of control over its environment by being part of a larger entity. Third World countries may join groupings for this reason.

While the functionalist formulation differs in form from the functionalism of regional integrationist theories, it contends that some manner of spill-over may occur.

This approach, however, does not explain why regimes emerge in certain issue areas but not in others. In the same vein, the approach is hardpressed to explain why some regimes tend to develop impressive forms of institutionalised expression, such as international organisations, but not others. In addition, the contention that market failure is essentially suboptimal suggests a strong liberal bias inherent in the Keohane-ian formulation not unlike that found in the original functionalist formulations.[74] The assumption that states are self-interested utility maximizers presents a possible conundrum. If states participate in regimes strictly as a means of maximizing net benefits for themselves, it would naturally mean that successful regimes are more likely to be spontaneous in nature rather than contractual as the latter involves the element of obligation.[75]

Finally, the cognitive approach contends that the study of regimes illustrates the range of past and future choices concerning international cooperation and collaboration in a context of evolving self-understanding, or what Haas has termed 'evolutionary epistemology.'[76] This approach thus differs fundamentally from the others discussed above in that it constitutes a deviation from realist premises such as state-centricity and sole power considerations. In this respect, others have argued elsewhere that the individualist ontology of the rationalist legacy of realism contradicts essentially the 'intersubjective' nature of regimes.[77] In other words, an intersubjectivist epistemology is necessary in order for the potential of regime theory to be fully realised. Issue areas are not unambiguous and static but may in effect change over time via the input of new knowledge. As such, the prospects of "complex learning" or "changing conceptions of self and interest" in security regimes are characteristic of regime learning.[78] While other formulations suggest that states possessing consensual values will logically move on to cooperation, the cognitive approach argues that cooperation

is not inevitable as new information may expose new incentives for states to defect.[79] The structural emphasis on power is regarded as incomplete in that the form of world order has been overstressed at the expense of the content. For example, the dimensions of common ideology and social purpose are also identified as equally important configurations in world politics.

Ruggie has argued that there has existed a common social purpose among the developed states since the end of the Great Depression of the 1930s to eschew the market failure of that period by ensuring the maintenance of a liberal economic order; in essence an 'embedded liberalism.[80] As such, the intermittent breaking of regime rules by states (i.e., cheating) is not to be regarded as a gross aberration but rather as a minor hiccup comfortably accommodated by the regime concerned. The cognitivist approach criticises the notion of self-interested utility maximization for ignoring the historical context in which states are situated (a la Antonio Gramsci and others), which clearly is of importance in determining the actions, knowledge and purposes of states.

The notion of a hegemon-ruled regime does not describe the Southeast Asian regional system. The hegemonic stability theory can only accommodate a single system but not rival subsystems within a larger system. For example, the theory examines primarily regime operation in international capitalist systems while neglecting bipolar systems.[81] In the case of Southeast Asia, the region was largely bipolarised until the recent ending of the Cold War. The Indochinese bloc approximated the description of a malign hegemonic regime with Vietnam clearly playing the role of the hegemon. Conversely, there is no clearcut hegemon, at least in the classic realist formulation of a militarily and economically powerful country, in ASEAN. (See Table 2 under Appendices.) Indonesia, by virtue of its sheer geographical and population size, and vast economic potential, constitutes the natural

candidate. In effect, the significance of Indonesia to the region's security is such that any indigenous effort at regionalism, if it is to succeed, has to consider Jakarta's involvement. But Indonesia remains the poorest ASEAN member based on per capita Gross National Product (GNP). Singapore, the smallest but economically the most powerful of the lot, is neither dominant in power nor possesses the will and design to be a hegemon.[82] Emmerson has postulated the notion of 'balanced disparity,' or stability without hegemony, in order to describe the ASEAN regime.[83] The Association evidently does not form a hegemonic system and in fact offers support for Keohane and Nye's contention that regimes can thrive in the absence of a hegemon. One can perhaps argue that the other ASEAN countries perceive and recognise the legitimacy of Indonesia as a regional leader, as evidenced by concessions such as the locating of the ASEAN Secretariat at Jakarta and the appointment of an Indonesian as the first Secretary-General.[84] Singapore's decision to defer to Indonesia the lead in establishing diplomatic relations with China is also indicative of such a recognition.[85]

One problem with Keohane's model of hegemonic stability lies in the strength of the realist critique, for one can argue that organisational dynamics reflect strong balance of power tendencies.[86] For states such as Malaysia and Singapore, the formation of ASEAN was an opportunity to corral Indonesia which from 1963 to 1966 ran a campaign of Confrontation (under the leadership of the charismatic Sukarno) against the former. Singapore, even as a member of ASEAN, espoused a self-styled 'poison shrimp' policy during the 1960s and 1970s which served as a caveat for neighbouring states that harboured expansionist designs. In this sense, it may be argued that such a contrived or manipulated balance strongly resembles a security regime, or at least an incipient security regime.[87]

The game theoretic approach emphasizes the importance of joint decision

making and constrained behaviour as indicative of regime dynamics. It has sometimes been alleged that the style of negotiation is what clearly distinguishes ASEAN diplomacy from others. In particular, the twin notions of musjawarah and mufakat (unanimity and consensus) constitute the most important elements with the former being the process by which the latter goal is to be reached.[88] As such, ASEAN has managed to present successfully its corporate interests in international economic and diplomatic fora largely because of having had arrived at some manner of unanimous agreement regarding common interests. The significance to which the member states accord these notions is clearly evidenced by the unusual degree of ill feeling engendered within the Association at Malaysia's recent move to propose the formation of an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) without first consulting its ASEAN colleagues.[89] Kuala Lumpur's unilateral initiative was regarded by several ASEAN officials as having come close to rupturing the spirit of harmony within the regime.

Interestingly, ASEAN as a regime expresses both forms of 'dilemmas' depending on the different issue areas. As a regime of common interest, the Association continues to argue collectively and vociferously against the rising trend of Western protectionism which evidently does not augur well for the former. ASEAN's participation in the continuing North-South dialogue and the creation of the NIEO derives largely from its joint approach strategy in relations with developed states. For example, the unsuccessful bid by the Association to obtain the agreement of dialogue partners for the implementation of Stabex Schemes to stabilise its export earnings served essentially as the impetus for its identifying itself with the common push by developing countries for global institutional reform.[90]

On the intra-regional front, the small but ongoing trade and industrial cooperation has involved substantial negotiation at policy level between member

states.[91] The growth triangle established between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore which emphasizes industrial complementarity and economies of scale illustrates the growing levels of linkage between ASEAN countries, as does the current move to convert the region into a free trade area. However, it seems evident that ASEAN leaderships tend to prefer coordination as opposed to collaboration even when dealing with matters of common interest.[92] As two ASEAN observers have argued:

> It must be made clear at the outset that there is no single policy that emerges from any particular meeting. What we perceive as an ASEAN policy is actually some form of a synthesis or amalgam of the policies of the different members so that a common stand is projected. Thus the components of the resulting ASEAN policy maintain their identity while encompassing the general thrust, allowing each member to diverge within a certain acceptable boundary.[93]

As such, contrary to the game theoretic formulation, regimes of common interest (especially incipient regimes) could possibly operate by coordination.

ASEAN has also shown the behaviour of a common aversion regime especially in its stance against Vietnam. It is however debatable whether the member states in fact shared the same strategic perspective regarding the enormity of the Vietnamese threat and the attendant response toward Hanoi. Indonesia, for one, was evidently less concerned about Vietnamese expansionism than Thailand owing to its insular position as an archipelagic state. In addition, Indonesia has incessantly shown a predilection for indirectly supporting nationalist movements in contrast with its vitriolic hatred for communists as seen by its identification with Algeria.[94] This, however, has not hindered ASEAN's effort to coordinate a common public stand against Vietnam. In the issue area of traffic conventions, the role that ASEAN has played as a regime maintaining the safe passage of ships plying sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) within the ASEAN region is evidenced by the coordination between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in protecting shipping in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. A

comprehensive package of measures, such as the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), which involves a system to route ships through the straits and keeping the waters free from pollution and accidents, has kept the Straits free from such mishaps for the past ten years.[95]

One of the strengths of the functionalist approach rests on its identifying specific structural features that obstruct effective cooperation among states and which lead to market failure, such as transaction and information costs. One scholar has highlighted several impediments or costs to greater economic cooperation among ASEAN states.[96] There appears to be a lack of market information among ASEAN states regarding products, regulations, tariffs for industrial sectors, and others. Thus, there is a need for the establishment of a basic infrastructure of personal networking and the proper dissemination of information between national governments and private business, and vice versa. Often, these objectives can be achieved via developing regional training and research and development (R&D) facilities. In addition, networking also helps to create trust and understanding among both state and private actors. For example, ASEAN Regional Industry Clubs (RICs) have proved extremely useful in facilitating networking among both sets of actors and reducing information costs.[97]

ASEAN also evinces the characteristics of both control-oriented and insurance regimes. In terms of the former, inter-member relations are guided by institutionalised arrangements such as the ASEAN Declaration, the ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. There is thus a relatively high degree of regularisation in the Association as evidenced by the largely peaceful manner member states adopt in dealing with ongoing territorial disputes. For example, the conflicting claims of both Malaysia and the Philippines over the territory of Sabah (as will be discussed in the

third chapter), which eventually led to the collapse in September 1963 of the ill-fated ASA, have not hurt ASEAN as much as the latter's early critics had initially thought. However, the inveterate Malaysian attitude of treating the Philippines' claim as a 'non-issue' does not bode well for inter-member relations. This reflects an unhealthy proclivity of ASEAN states - an attitude common among Third World countries - to remain intransigent on issues of territorial dispute at the expense of regime harmony.[98] ASEAN as a control-oriented regime also regularises the relations of member states with non-member states, such as dialogue partners.[99]

The notion of an insurance regime is of much use to a grouping such as ASEAN. Nascent and/or small states tend to group together whether for purposes of strengthening both state and regime legitimacy or simply to eschew being gobbled up by a larger expansionist enemy. An insurance regime also serves the political utility of providing low cost insurance for states not willing to embark on ambitious agendas for cooperation. ASEAN's very longevity despite poor economic cooperation suggests that the Association serves as a low cost insurance regime to its member states. As one scholar has argued, ASEAN in its first decade "achieved no more than a modest performance as a basis for continued existence."[100] For example, Singapore's decision to join ASEAN was premised first on its interest at improving regional relations at a relatively low cost because the leadership felt it wiser to explicitly link the state's fortunes to the region rather than to perpetuate its undesirable image as a 'third China.' Second, Singapore's expulsion from the Malaysian Federation in 1965 left it with little option but to join ASEAN for reasons of pure survival and the need to strengthen ties with its larger neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia, who also happen to be the main proponents of ASEAN.[101] In this sense, Indorf has correctly argued that it makes more pedagogical sense to study ASEAN from the perspective of

institutional utility rather than institutional growth.[102]

The significance of the cognitive approach to regimes lie in its focus on the process of evolutionary learning, the importance of non-state actors and its ability to transcend mere power configurations. For an incipient regime such as ASEAN, the process of learning and adaptation among the leaderships (in essence elite 'networking', as it were) has served admirably as a confidence-building measure. In the same vein, the former premier of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew has argued that the most valuable achievement of the Association rests on the understanding and goodwill created at the regular meetings which "helped to lubricate relationships which could otherwise have generated friction."[103] However, ASEAN leaders are becoming aware of the significance of "socializing the idea of ASEAN" into the hearts and minds of their own populations and the need to encourage wider participation among the people themselves.[104] This brings to mind Deutsch's notion of the social learning process integral to the cultivation of mutual responsiveness needed to build a viable security community. Deutsch's model, however, does not take into account the factor of generational change which could conceivably contribute to the developmental process.

In the case of developing countries, where the lack of political institutionalisation essentially makes leadership a personal rather than an institutional phenomenon, the success of regional cooperation depends very much on the strength of personal ties between leaders. The current state of Malaysian-Singaporean relations illustrates this point. The cautious albeit stable relationship has largely been held together by the strong personal ties between the two premiers Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad. On the other hand, interaction at the level of public opinion paints a less congenial picture.[105] The growing attempts by national governments to cultivate among their societies a sense of regional identity are occasionally

circumscribed by ethnocentric societal perceptions. This underscores the uncertainty regarding the impact of future changes in leadership on the stability of intra-ASEAN relations. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the transfer of power in the Philippines between Ferdinand Marcos and Corazon Aquino did not modify in any fundamental way Manila's stand on ASEAN.

The theory also states that the possession of consensual values does not automatically ensure cooperation due to the impact of new information which can produce fresh incentives for states to defect. Such a contention, as critics would argue, is aptly borne by the example of ASEAN's poor state of economic cooperation even with its adoption of a consensual style of negotiation. Consensus is but a necessary albeit insufficient condition as ASEAN's experience suggests that other necessary incredients include a viable and reasonably ambitious programme for cooperation and the attendant political will to see it through. In short, as a former Singaporean diplomat has argued, the Association does not any longer have the "time or patience for platitudes."[106]

The importance of the historical context in determining the decisions and actions of countries can be seen in the various phases of ASEAN's history. For example, the first decade of its existence served as a period solely for the establishment of trust and confidence among member states. Regional cooperation as part of a serious agenda was introduced only at the first ASEAN summit held at Bali in 1976 due to the growing need to strengthen the member states against communist influence. Finally, aside from pure power considerations, there is the element of a common social purpose, or the content of world order. Ruggie has introduced the concept of embedded liberalism to describe the common social purpose among free world states to maintain a liberal world economic order. In the case of ASEAN, it may

be argued that there exists among member states a social common purpose to establish and maintain what ASEAN leaders themselves have referred to as national and regional 'resilience' respectively[107]; in short, an 'embedded resilience.' National resilience refers to qualities of self-sufficiency and resourcefulness which regional cooperation would help to promote and realise in each of the member states. According to President Suharto of Indonesia, the attainment of regional resilience would naturally be predicated on the attainment of each member state's individual resilience.[108] However, the poor state of ASEAN economic cooperation alludes to the shortcomings in such thinking, such as willingness to cooperate as translated into an active and viable regional cooperation - a condition germane to successful regionalism.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to establish the usefulness of regime theory in providing a broad conceptual framework for the study of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. Although ASEAN displays regime-like qualities, the organisation at present constitutes not so much a mature regime as an incipient regime. This argument will become more apparent in subsequent chapters dealing with ASEAN political, security and economic cooperation.

From the foregoing discussion, it would seem that regional cooperation is best examined from the perspective of ASEAN's utility to each member state rather than the organisation's growth in terms of levels of cooperation and integration. In this sense, the criticisms of the Association as "all talk and no action" or as "a soap bubble, glistening on the outside but being empty inside,"[109] while valid in some respects, tend to miss the crucial point that ASEAN, by its very existence, was in

effect redirecting the flow of Southeast Asian history. There is increasing consensus among countries today which still differ in their strategic perspectives but, at the same time, have grown accustomed to viewing themselves as parts of a collective entity. In the words of Tilman, a long time student of ASEAN:

> A dominant theme of Southeast Asia's history has been the rich variety of differences found from country to country and within the borders of each country, but for the states of ASEAN this seems to be yielding to a second historic theme, adoption and adaptation at an international level of political and social forces emanating from each of the countries individually.[110]

ENDNOTES

1. See, for example, Muthiah Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," in Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, Jusuf Wanandi and Sung-joo Han, eds., Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global (Berkeley, CA.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California Press, no date).

2. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (Boston, MA.: Little, Brown, 1971).

3. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence, 2nd. edition (Boston, MA.: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1989); Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1983).

4. The scholarly study and debate of European regionalism widely uses theoretical concepts for examining processes of regional integration and regime formation. Conversely, students of ASEAN rely less on such for analysis, preferring instead journalistic sources.

5. Donald K. Emmerson, "ASEAN as an International Regime," Journal of International Affairs, vol. 41, no. 1 (Summer/Fall 1987), p. 2.

6. Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia (London: MacMillan Press 1982), p. xiv.

7. This refers in particular to the original functionalist theories of David Mitrany and the later neofunctionalist ideas of Ernst Haas and others. These ideas introduced the notion of "spill-over" effects, whereby collaboration on one area (economic and technical) literally spills over to another (political). For further reading, see David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago, IL.: Quandrangle Books, 1966); Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1964).

8. See, for example, Lynn H. Miller, "Regional Organizations and Subordinate Systems," in Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, eds., The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentics-Hall, 1970), pp. 362-363.

9. Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1, 61.

10. Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization, vol. 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987), p. 493.

11. Fen Osler Hampson, "Building a stable peace: Opportunities and limits to security co-operation in Third World regional conflicts," International Journal, vol. XLV (Spring 1990), p. 467.

12. Ibid., p. 458; Paul Buteux, Regimes, Incipient Regimes and the Future of NATO Strategy, Occasional Paper no. 6 (Winnipeg, MB.: Programme in Strategic Studies, University of Manitoba, 1989).

13. R. B. J. Walker, "Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics," Alternatives, vol. XI (1990), p. 4. Robert S. McNamara made a similar contention when he argued that "security is development." Quoted in Bernard K. Gordon, "Politics and Protectionism in the Pacific," Adelphi Papers, no. 228 (Spring 1988), p. 13.

14. Regime here is used in the conventional sense to mean a government in power. Confusion in the various usages of the term is well articulated in Susan Strange, "Cave! hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis," in Krasner, op. cit., pp. 343-345.

15. Emphasis added. Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2 (January 1991), p. 263.

16. Stephen Chee, ed., Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia: Institutional Aspects (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p. 2.

17. Barry Buzan, "Peoples, states, and fears: The national security problem in the Third World," in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, eds., National Security in the Third World: The Management of External and Internal Threats (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), p. 19.

18. Although security and development are fundamentally connected to each other, the criticism that many Third World states continue to stress military buildups over socio-economic development somewhat glosses over the factor of perceptions and uncertainties endemic to the Third World.

19. Kusama Snitwongse and Sukhumbhand Paribatra, eds., Durable Stability in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987).

20. Ayoob (1991), op. cit., p. 271.

21. William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene 2. The analogy first appeared in Donald K. Emmerson, "'Southeast Asia': What's in a Name?" Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. XV, no. 1 (March 1981), p. 9.

22. Bernard K. Gordon, "A Political Region in Southeast Asia," in Cantori and Spiegel, op. cit., p. 131.

23. Ibid.

24. Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 16-17.

25. Hans H. Indorf, "ASEAN in Extra-Regional Perspective," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 9, no. 2 (September 1987), p. 86.

26. Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, (Princeton, NY.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 3.

27. Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), p. 38.

28. See, for example, Carl J. Friedrich, Trends in Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 72.

29. Pentland (1973), op. cit., pp. 147-148.

30. Ibid., p. 101.

31. The attempts to generalise regionalist and/or integrationist theories to developing regions have almost exclusively been centred on African and Latin American examples, such as the Andean Group and its Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). See, for example, Nye (1971), op. cit.; Ernst Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Pattern of Political Integration: Projections and Unity in Latin America," in W. P. Davison, ed., International Political Communities (New York: Praeger, 1966).

32. The impact of the world recession during the mid-1980s has led to a significant change in attitudes and thinking among ASEAN leaders on privatization and deregulation. The shift is most prominent in Malaysia and Indonesia where the previous import-substitution bias has largely given way to export-oriented strategies. These changes have raised hopes in ASEAN regarding the future of intra-organisational economic cooperation. Pacific Newsletter no. 6, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore), January 1991, p. 3.

33. Straits Times (Weekly Overseas Edition), March 9, 1991.

34. Lynn Miller, "The Prospect of Order Through Regional Security," in Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., Regional Politics and World Order (San Francisco, CA.: W. H. Freeman, 1973), p. 51.

35. Hans H. Indorf, ASEAN: Problems and Prospects, Occasional Paper no. 37 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975), p. 5.

36. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory in International Politics (Reading, MA.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

37. Seminal studies in this area include Keohane and Nye (1989), op. cit.; John Gerard Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," International Organization, vol. 29, no. 3 (Summer 1975).

38. See, for example, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NY.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

39. Krasner (1983), op. cit., p. 2.

40. Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins, "International regimes: lessons from inductive analysis," in ibid., pp. 61-91.

41. Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions," World Politics, vol. 39, no. 1 (October 1986), p. 107.

42. Krasner (1983), op. cit., p. 5.

43. This refers to the positivist, or what some have called "skeptical realist," perspective of world politics which follows the path established by Hugo Grotius, the Dutch international jurist whom many regard as the founder of the international law tradition. For further reading, see Hedley Bull et al., eds., Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); or Bull's writings in H. Butterfield and M. Wight, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

44. James Keeley, "The Latest Wave: A Critical Review of Regime Literature," in David G. Haglund and Michael K. Hawes, eds., World Politics: Power, Interdependence and Dependence (Toronto, ON.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada, 1990) pp. 555-557.

45. International organisations such as the World Bank or the United Nations (UN) do not automatically constitute regimes as some form of consensual validation is required.

46. One can argue, as the theory of hegemonic stability (discussed below) does, that the postwar liberal economic order is possible only via the presence and input of a dominant and benevolent power such as the United States. See, for example, Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," International Organization, vol. 39, no. 4 (Autumn 1985), pp. 574-614.

47. These theoretical approaches are discussed below.

48. The mechanism for such a task is available in the form of an ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Articles 13 through 17 of the Treaty provide the guidelines for the "pacific settlement of disputes" among signatories (ASEAN states and Papua New Guinea, which has observer status in the Association). See ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia, 24 February 1976.

49. Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in Krasner, op. cit., p. 179.

50. The evolution of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation will be discussed in chapter four.

51. M. Rajendran, ASEAN's Foreign Relations: The Shift to Collective Action (Kuala Lumpur: Arenabuku, 1985), p. 153.

52. The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), 8 August 1967.

53. Jorgensen-Dahl (1982), op. cit., p. 47.

54. Please refer to chapter three.

55. Rajendran (1985), op. cit., p. 155.

56. Farm subsidies remain the major debilitating obstacle at the Uruguay Round. At present, the only thing that has widespread agreement is that it would be disastrous to end the year without some form of an agreement. Globe and Mail, October 21, 1991. Prominent American economists at the recent American Federal Reserve's annual summer conference expressed concerns over the potential capability of regional trading blocs to block trade instead of liberalising it. Straits Times, August 27, 1991.

57. Scholars increasingly view the upcoming ASEAN states as strong economic contenders in the near future. See, for example, Steven Schlossstein, Asia's New Dragons: The Dynamic Emergence of Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia (Chicago, IL.: Contemporary Books, 1991). ASEAN's old/new goal of developing a free trade area within fifteen years may be too ambitious considering the many obstacles that still remain intact. Far Eastern Economic Review, November 14, 1991.

58. Functional here refers to a particular form of explanation and should not be confused with the functional paradigms of regional integration theory discussed earlier in the paper.

59. Charles Kindleberger, World in Depression (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1973); Keohane and Nye (1989), op. cit.

60. Waltz (1979), op. cit., p. 74.

61. For example, Keohane and Nye's contention that power is not fungible under the conditions of complex interdependence underscores the outmoded traditional conception of power (as noted above). The collapse of the Soviet empire as a result of economic overstrain exemplifies this point.

62. Keohane (1984), op. cit., p. 46.

63. Strange (1983), op. cit.

64. Young (1986), op. cit., p. 118.

65. Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 26. Also, see Stein, "Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world," in Krasner, op. cit., pp. 115-140.

66. Stein (1990), op. cit., pp. 28-29.

67. Ibid., pp. 32-40.

68. Ibid., p. 43.

69. Haggard and Simmons (1987), op. cit., pp. 505-506.

70. Keohane (1984), op. cit. Also, see Keohane, "The demand for international regimes," in Krasner, op. cit..

71. Ibid., p. 152.

72. See, for example, Keohane (1984), op. cit., chap. 6. Also, see Kenneth Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," World Politics, vol. 38 (October 1985), pp. 16-18.

73. Keohane (1984), op. cit., pp. 167-168.

74. For example, in chapter 11 of After Hegemony, Keohane expands upon his argument using a cosmopolitan perspective and emphasizes what he perceives to be the poverty of realist analysis.

75. Young (1986), op. cit., p. 119.

76. Ernst B. Haas, "Words can hurt you; or, who said what to whom about regimes," in Krasner, op. cit., pp. 23-59.

77. Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," International Organization, vol. 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753-775.

78. See especially Joseph S. Nye, "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," International Organization, vol. 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 371-402; and Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics, vol. 40 (April 1988), pp. 340-344. Jervis' conception of a security regime will be discussed in chapter three.

79. Haggard and Simmons (1987), op. cit., p. 510.

80. John Gerard Ruggie, "International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order," in Krasner, op. cit., p. 198.

81. Haggard and Simmons (1987), op. cit., p. 503.

82. In the case of Brunei, its enormous wealth and small size makes it somewhat similar to Singapore in terms of power. However, given its less advanced economic structure and military as compared with Singapore's, it may not be able to mount a viable challenge as a potential hegemon. In any case, Brunei's close ties with Singapore show the logical affinity between the relatively small but strong states in a regime such as ASEAN.

83. Emmerson (1987), op. cit., pp. 5-9.

84. See Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat.

85. Diplomatic ties were finally restored when Jakarta and Beijing normalised relations in August 1990 with Singapore close behind Jakarta's heels. Far Eastern Economic Review, November 15, 1990.

86. Singapore, for example, clearly maintains a balance of power orientation in terms of foreign and defence policies and the common world view of the leadership. The former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, is a self-professed realist while the former Foreign Minister, S. Dhanabalan, has a reputation among diplomatic circles for expressing hawkish views. Also, see Obaid ul Haq, "Singapore's Search for Security: A Selective Analysis," in Chee, op. cit., pp. 114-140.

87. Refer to chapter three.

88. Musjawarah means "a leader should not act arbitrarily or impose his will, but rather make gentle suggestions of the path a community should follow, being careful always to consult all other participants fully and to take their views and feelings into consideration before delivering his synthesis conclusions." Jorgensen-Dahl (1982), op. cit., p. 166. This somewhat fits the idea of a "constrained" pattern of inter-state relations.

89. President Suharto of Indonesia was particularly upset at Prime Minister Mahathir's decision to first moot the idea during a speech honouring Premier Li Peng of China. The EAEG proposal originally envisaged forming a trade bloc between East Asian states to counter rival blocs such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the European common market but has since been diluted to a caucus for "discussing issues of common concern to East Asian economies." Concomitantly, the name has since been changed to East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). Far Eastern Economic Review, October 24, 1991.

90. Rajendran (1985), op. cit., p. 154.

91. In an international ASEAN conference held in Bali, Indonesia in 1990 jointly organised by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia) and the Asia Society (United States), Goh Chok Tong, Singapore's present PM, recalled his previous experiences in intra-ASEAN negotiations on economic cooperation where he and his ASEAN counterparts would be "wrangling late into the night" to come up with common positions acceptable to all.

92. This, however, may be changing as a result of pressures for change (e.g., global protectionist and regionalist trends) and, more importantly, the acceptance among ASEAN leaders of the need for change, as shown in part by the shift in economic strategy of ASEAN states. For example, Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong has argued that ASEAN states "must abandon out-of-date thinking that they are primarily competing against each other" - a sentiment echoed by other ASEAN leaders. Straits Times, June 25, 1991.

93. Pushpa Thambipillai and J. Saravanamuttu, ASEAN Negotiations: Two Insights (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p. 13.

94. Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 91. Also, Indonesia has harboured inveterate suspicions regarding China and possibly saw Vietnam as a buffer of sorts.

95. Straits Times, September 17, 1991. Also, see Lau Teik Soon and Lee Lai To, eds., The Security of the Sea Lanes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Singapore: Heinemann Asia for Centre of Advanced Studies, National University of Singapore; and Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1988), p. 121.

96. Evans Young, An Indigenous Agenda for ASEAN Economic Cooperation, pp. 26-31. Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, March 21-23, 1986.

97. Ibid., p. 26.

98. The current call to establish an institutional mechanism for settling bilateral and multilateral disputes among East Asian states sounds hollow in the face of the occasional unwillingness of ASEAN states to use mechanisms available in the Association, such as the Treaty of Amity, to resolve disputes. The recent territorial dispute over the island of Pedra Branca between Malaysia and Singapore may provide the test case needed for still unresolved and future disputes. This will be discussed further in chapter three. Straits Times (Weekly Overseas Edition), October 19, 1991. Private interview with Dr. Chin Kin Wah, political scientist, National University of Singapore, July 1991.

99. The United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the European Community. As well, the Soviet Union and China, both which were invited to the July 1991 ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC), have applied for dialogue status. Straits Times, July 17, 1991.

100. Quoted in Frank Frost, "Introduction: ASEAN since 1967 - Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments," in Alison Broinowski, ed., ASEAN into the 1990s (London: MacMillan Press, 1990), p. 7.

101. Shee Poon-Kim, "A Decade of ASEAN, 1966-1977," Asian Survey, vol. XVII, no. 8 (August 1977), pp. 755-756.

102. Indorf (1975), op. cit., p. 5.

103. Quoted in Shee (1977), op. cit., p. 758.

104. Indorf (1975), op. cit., pp. 33-34.

105. Refer to chapter three.

106. Private interview with Dr. Chan Heng Chee, political scientist and former Singapore Permanent Representative to the UN. In this respect, the agreement reached at the recently-concluded ASEAN Economic Ministers' Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in October 1991 contains a major flaw. In anticipation of arriving at the goal of free trade in fifteen years, the ASEAN-4's (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) decision to keep agriculture exempt from the aim of free trade exposes a hypocritical logic: the ASEAN-4 are members of the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters which has served as an effective lobby for farm-trade liberalisation at the GATT talks. Far Eastern Economic Review, November 14, 1991.

107. ASEAN Review, no. 36 (April 1977), pp. 73-74.

108. Leifer (1989), op. cit., p. 4.

109. Indorf (1987), op. cit., p. 90.

110. Robert O. Tilman, Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions of External Threats (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1987), p. 33.

CHAPTER TWO: REGIONAL RECONCILIATION: THE EVOLUTION OF ASEAN

This discussion seeks to review and examine the development of ASEAN as an international organisation since its formation in August 1967. In broad terms, three phases can be distinguished from the history of the Association. The first phase covers the period from its inception to the first ASEAN summit held at Bali, Indonesia in 1976. The second phase covers the period from that first summit to the closing stages of the Cold War. The third phase comprises the ongoing period. Interspersed within these phases are significant moments which may be regarded as 'quasi-watersheds' or crisis points intrinsic to the evolution of the ASEAN international regime. ASEAN may appropriately be described as a creature of instinct and reaction, adapting and responding to changes and pressures for change in the global and regional environments. While one can surmise from the previous chapter that evolutionary learning took place during the course of a phase before a crisis point was reached, it would seem that visible expressions of change in ASEAN tended to occur invariably as a response to a crisis. The Association's evolution as an international regime thus resembles a slow incremental process punctuated by crises which served to accelerate the process.

Writing in 1977, Shee has argued that ASEAN was "the product of a combination of common fears and weaknesses, not of common strength."[1] The Association's formation reflects the shared consensus among regional states of the need to pool together to collectively resolve common problems faced by all, with the immediate challenge being that of regional reconciliation. The first summit in 1976 took place primarily as a response to what ASEAN leaders considered to be a crisis

brewing in Indochina as a result of communist successes there. The summit constituted the first attempt by ASEAN states at effecting economic and political cooperation via a much needed overhaul of the institutional structure. In this respect, it may be taken to denote a deliberate move towards the strengthening of the ASEAN regime. However, as was evident from the first chapter, political cooperation flourished largely at the expense of economic cooperation because of member countries' continued penchant to regard the Association as a low cost insurance regional entity which bore little or no threat to their respective national interests.

For long, ASEAN was criticised as a 'single issue' organisation with the Indochina issue being its singular preoccupation. The invasion and occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnam in 1979, constituting another crisis point, in effect galvanised the ASEAN states to oppose Vietnam for fear of their facing a similar fate as their former non-communist Indochinese neighbours. ASEAN's efforts to prevent Vietnam's acquiring legitimacy as de facto regional hegemon by default, which could well have happened as a result of inaction on ASEAN's or someone else's part, were born largely of the realisation that responsibility for the region's security rested primarily with Southeast Asians themselves.[2] ASEAN's preoccupation with the Indochina issue saw the Association's energy and attention being consumed by political-security, not economic, concerns. Economic cooperation was thus relegated to a priority of lesser significance. Regional power configurations, however, have since somewhat changed. The normalisation of ties between arch rivals Vietnam and China in 1991, by all measures a significant contribution to the current peace process in present-day Cambodia (Kampuchea), has in essence brought to resolution the most important issue on the ASEAN agenda.[3] This and other significant developments are leading the ASEAN states to reconsider the fundamental purpose of their organisation. The

Association's security managers are only too painfully aware of the opportunity accorded their organisation in which to play a leading role in establishing lasting peace and security in the region.[4]

The anticipated transformation of ASEAN has been aided along by the transformation within ASEAN countries. Crucial developments in the mid-1980s such as falling world prices of primary commodities, global recession and the growing trend of Western protectionism led some ASEAN states to restructure their economies. Countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand opted for export-oriented industries in order to remain competitive. Such radical transitions, born largely of necessity not choice, logically primes the ASEAN region for increased trading and industrialisation among member states and with extra-regional states. The question remains, however, as to the extent of change to which ASEAN would be willing to subject itself. In other words, the fate of Southeast Asian regionalism would again be decided by national interests. The fourth ASEAN summit held in Singapore in early 1992 is significant for it represented the formal articulation of the Association's new agenda and response to still another common crisis. ASEAN leaders, however, continue to emphasize the importance of the organisation with regard to their respective national interests. In this respect, the newly enhanced mandate and executive powers of the ASEAN Secretariat do not connote any grand supranationalist design in the European mold. Nevertheless, this potential 'watershed' could be the most important one yet for it involves moving ASEAN beyond the Indochina issue to include the delineation and development of new areas of political and, more importantly, economic cooperation.

Ultimately, it behooves this discussion to view the Association as an incipient regime rather than a mature regime. For ASEAN, the inevitable tensions arising from

the contradiction between its formal role as a corporate body for expressing collective interests and as an essential vehicle for serving the individual national interests of member states are but the legacy of a history of inveterate animosities. Territorial, racial and ethnic disputes comprise the rule rather than the exception within the group of mostly nascent states. Yet, as already noted, the common concern of these states for a stable regional order has led to the agreement to establish a regional organisation to manage regional relations. From this vantage, the inherently political nature of ASEAN is quite evident even as the organisation's original mandate has ostensibly been economic.[5] As such, the concern with regional reconciliation as seen in ASEAN's incessant desire to eschew exacerbating differences between its member states has led invariably to an all too common response to difficult decisions: stepping back whenever member states adopt conflicting positions on crucial but contentious issues and deferring decisions to a subsequent date. In the words of Fifield, "As decisions [in ASEAN] are made by unanimous consent, the tendency to procrastinate, to postpone, is well established when unanimous consent is not possible and, in effect, the veto exists."[6]

The significance of the fundamentally modified international and regional post-Cold War environments thus lies in the fact that ASEAN, in order to avoid being marginalised in international political and economic decision-making, can ill afford the cautious progress that has served it so well in the past. In this respect, the question of institutional growth leading to integration - a perennial concern among critics of ASEAN - at the present stage of the Association's development as an international organisation and regime is of less importance relative to the dire need to establish a clear sense of direction and purpose in its future agenda. Current indications of expanded cooperation may, if at all and cautiously at best, be viewed as the primer or

precondition for possible future integration.

Southeast Asian Regionalism Before 1967

Regionalism and regional cooperation in Southeast Asia flourished in the postwar years. Early regional attempts originated largely as a result of external power involvement with the impetus provided by non-Asian powers such as Britain and the United States. One scholar went so far as to suggest that "throughout post-colonial South-east Asia there has never been a time...when external forces with competing interests have not been attempting in some way to shape a regional balance deemed to have global significance."[7] Of greater relevance to this discussion are the later attempts of the 1960s which tended to reflect an indigenous quality.

Among what are today the ASEAN countries, Malaysia and Singapore were British colonies during the immediate postwar period while Thailand and the Philippines were ensconced in a security cum economic relationship with the United States. The most significant regional organisations to emerge from this early period were the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), established in 1947, and the Commonwealth-initiated Colombo Plan.[8] In addition, two significant security arrangements came into being during this period: SEATO, formed in 1954 with American support; and, the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) of 1957, which was eventually replaced by the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) in 1971. Thailand and the Philippines were the only Southeast Asian members of SEATO while the FPDA comprised of Malaysia and Singapore along with Britain, Australia and New Zealand.[9]

By the 1960s, there arose indigenous initiatives at regionalism as it became increasingly evident that the Western powers harboured plans to partially disengage

from the region. Western assurances of support were tempered by the growing belief among the non-communist Southeast Asian leaderships that "the benevolence of outsiders is uncertain in the event of major security challenges."[10] Institutionalised attempts, however, such as ASA and MAPHILINDO (which are comprised of Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia) were fraught with disagreements and conflicts as their respective member states struggled to deal with the enmeshed dynamics of European decolonisation, new-found independence and regional interactions in their new capacities as sovereign states. Given these circumstances, the relative absence of armed conflict between the new neighbours was, as some have noted, "quite remarkable."[11] Although most if not all Southeast Asian peoples have had their intermittent periods of rivalry, the regional experience with internecine strife was largely localised in Indochina. However, the paranoia common to nascent countries invariably complicated regionalist aspirations and plans. In the words of the eminent Thai statesman Thanat Khoman:

> To correct the situation, the erstwhile colonial aloofness and isolation must be overcome and a new sense of regional solidarity and partnership would have to be forged so as to bring those nations together in a movement toward regional cohesiveness and collaboration. If such an objective can be reached their individual weakness and impotence will gradually be heard and their weight noted on the international forum.[12]

Such angst strained bilateral relations between Indonesia and the newly-formed Malaysian Federation from 1963 to 1966 in what has come to be known as the period of Confrontation. Largely a mixture of loud threats, hastily organised incursions by air and land, and half-hearted naval and trade blockades on the part of Indonesia, Confrontation could be regarded as a contemporary expression of Indonesia's past hegemonic inclinations as attested by the historical kingdoms of Majapahit and Sri Vijaya.[13] As the charismatic Indonesian strongman Sukarno expressed in 1945:

> I have on one occasion in my life dreamt of a pan-Indonesia, which will include not only Malaya and Papua (New Guinea) but also the Philippines.... I myself am convinced that the people of Malaya feel themselves [to be] Indonesians, belonging to Indonesia and as one of us....Indonesia will not become strong and secure unless the whole Straits of Malacca is in our hands.[14]

At about the same time, Malaysia and the Philippines also met head on in a diplomatic collision over the province of Sabah (former North Borneo) to which both countries had laid claim.[15] These incidents (as discussed later) would prove to be both the boon and bane of Southeast Asian regionalism.

The increasing concern among the non-communist Southeast Asian leaderships for the establishment of some form of regional organisation as a prophylactic against the communist threat originated possibly with the first Malaysian premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman. The Tunku made the link between regional cooperation and containing communism (and thus the implicit connection between security and development) when he stated in 1961, "Is it not obvious...that if we do not get together...in the economic sphere...we shall always be the prey and the prize of those who seek power by world domination?"[16] The agreement for a common defence did not preclude security cooperation although Indonesia, as a leading non-aligned country and vitriolic critic of SEATO, remained emphatic in its refusal to be a part of any regional military alliance.

The eventual common decision by the architects of regionalism to stress economic cooperation stemmed in essence from the realisation that a broadly based organisation could only be formed if it refrained from adopting an aggressive anti-communist posture and consequently alienating neutral states such as Burma (now Myanmar). The perceived relevance of economic development to regional security was premised on the belief that poverty is the primary cause of political discontent as it

conduces the conception and development of revolutionary forces.[17] Indeed, the most urgent and endemic of security challenges facing the nascent non-communist countries was that of internal subversion supported by foreign aid and influence.[18] As such, the shift from a strict security focus to an economic one did not in any way reflect a compromise of anti-communist sentiments on the part of the progenitors such as the Tunku but rather a switch to alternative ways of combating the communist threat. Concomitantly, the common desire to improve the socio-economic welfare of the region also served as an important though less prominent motivation for regional cooperation.[19]

Although ASA, formally established in 1961 and comprising Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, lasted about six years it began floundering at the height of the Sabah dispute. In addition, having two SEATO members in ASA did little for regional legitimacy as the organisation had to endure criticisms, mostly from Indonesia, that it proved nothing more than another Cold War organisation and thus an American lackey.[20] Conversely, MAPHILINDO lasted as briefly as two weeks from inception to dissolution during 1963. The brainchild of Macapagal, the latter organisation pandered largely to the pan-Malay vision and ambitions for a greater Malay confederation among Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, which have as majorities large populations of Malay origin. The fragile nature of the assumed sense of community among their similar peoples became evident when Indonesia and the Philippines subsequently challenged the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia which included the controversy-tinged region of North Borneo.[21] The Confrontation effectively obliterated any hope of the organisation's revival. In essence, the MAPHILINDO call to work "together in closest harmony but without surrendering any portion of their [members'] sovereignty" was jeopardised by states being overzealously

protective of their sovereignty at the expense of institutional integrity.[22] The Sabah dispute and the Confrontation also debilitated ASA to the point of ineffectiveness and later, oblivion, although certain developments at the closing stages of its formal existence engendered hopes for a possible revival. The leadership change in Manila, which saw Ferdinand Marcos come to power at the end of 1965, helped to assuage diplomatic wounds between Kuala Lumpur and Manila. Similarly, in Indonesia, the Sukarno-inspired Confrontation began dissipating in the face of increasing local disgruntlement with and opposition to the President's leadership. Sukarno was eventually replaced by General Suharto in 1966 who advocated regional reconciliation rather than his predecessor's strident nationalism.[23] The organisation, however, had by then deteriorated beyond repair.

Both attempts at regional reconciliation failed to achieve their common goal of regional peace largely due to the lack of a sense of mutual respect and equality among states involved. In this respect, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971 constituted an attempt by the ASEAN states to redress the problem:

> Recognizing the right of every state, large or small, to lead its national existence from outside interference in its internal affairs as this interference will adversely affect its freedom, independence and integrity.[24]

In terms of contribution to regional cooperation, ASA proved relevant in facilitating the later formation of ASEAN; more importantly, it laid the foundation for the style and substance of Southeast Asian regionalism to the present day. In essence, ASA's institutional framework reflected the indigenous preference for informality and decentralisation in regional organisation. There did not exist the formal, treaty-based structure with the supranational connotations reminiscent of Western organisations. Conversely, MAPHILINDO, compromised from the very beginning, proved significant

in transplanting its quintessentially Indonesian emphasis on regional self-reliance in the management of security to ASEAN's agenda.[25] The lesson learnt from both regional experiences centred largely on a common concern: the support and participation of Indonesia, the largest and most populated state in the region, was integral to the success or failure of regional organisation in Southeast Asia.

Regional Reconciliation Reconsidered

Although ASEAN was officially established in 1967[26], its evolution as an international regime received the first substantive boost when the succession of communist victories in Indochina compelled the Association to upgrade its institutional machinery for the sensible accommodation of political, security and economic cooperation between member states. One scholar noted that ASEAN responded to the pressures wrought by changing circumstances with "an unusual determination and cohesion in purpose."[27] One condition for change as stipulated in the second ASEAN summit at Kuala Lumpur in 1977 was for the founding Bangkok Declaration to remain as the Association's 'basic document.'[28] The following year, however, saw some significant changes being made to the organisation's structure; changes which in effect altered the Declaration via imparting considerably more flesh to the skeletal framework than had originally been envisaged. The reorganisation was regarded by some observers as having provided ASEAN a firm foundation not a mere face lift.[29] This section examines the events leading to this first high point.

The failure of ASA and MAPHILINDO did not deter hopes for regional cooperation but instead defined clearly the parameters necessary for a viable regionalism. The role of Indonesia's Suharto in this respect proved significant in facilitating cooperation, such as his touted 'good neighbour' policy.[30] Rejecting the

radicalism of his predecessor yet not identifying too closely with the capitalist bloc, Suharto steered Indonesia on a moderate path that recognised the advantages of participating in a new regional organisation that accorded Jakarta the role of senior partner. Suharto's incessant insistence on consensual decision-making within the Association did much to allay regional fears of resurgent Indonesian adventurism a la Confrontation. As noted in the preceding chapter, other ASEAN member states clearly accepted Indonesia's implicit leadership as evinced by the decisions to locate the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, the appointment of an Indonesian as the first Secretary General of the Association and the holding of the first ASEAN summit at an Indonesian location. Similarly, Indonesian-inspired concepts of security have been enshrined in several key documents, including the ASEAN Concord which declares, "Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience."[31]

The formation of ASEAN clearly reflected regional anxieties over the burgeoning communist threat even if founding documents made no specific mention of such a priority. However, the declaratory affirmation that "all foreign [military] bases are temporary and remain with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned" connoted the Association's recognition that the regional presence of friendly external powers, at least for the time-being, was a desirable thing.[32] In addition, ASEAN represented the realisation among its members that successful regional reconciliation could not be predicated on a bilateral basis as shown by the Sabah dispute or Confrontation. It was hoped that the Association could thus provide the much-needed indigenous mechanism for the settlement of differences and conflicts between member states. In short, ASEAN countries regarded their organisation as a convenient institution for the minimisation, if not the resolution, of ethnocentric and collective

fears and insecurities. This was to be achieved via 'collective political defence,' which refers to the ability of the organisation to consolidate and strengthen its member states' bargaining positions in the face of external threats or internal criticism.[33]

ASEAN in its first decade did not progress very far in terms of visible regional cooperation as a result of competing national interests. In effect, the Association until 1976 did not possess the institutional machinery necessary for facilitating economic cooperation between member states. This seemingly unproductive period, however, proved useful in the political sense by 'lubricating' relations between member states.[34] In this respect, ASEAN facilitated the building of confidence among member countries via interaction on a regular basis. However, hindrances to regional cooperation and solidarity were evident as a result of the diversity of perceptions and interpretations on what regional security meant and the role of ASEAN in achieving that goal.

For example, Indonesia and Malaysia, as predominantly Muslim states with large Chinese minorities, regarded China as the most significant source of external threat. Indonesia incessantly stressed the longstanding policy of nonalignment and its corollary of self-reliance. For Indonesia, ASEAN provided the ideal framework where the former could legitimately express its aspirations as regional leader without causing undue distress to neighbouring countries. Malaysia, although emphatically pro-Western under Tunku Abdul Rahman's leadership, shifted gears in the 1970s and emphasized regional neutrality and maintaining equidistance from major powers under its second premier, Tun Abdul Razak.[35] In 1974, Malaysia became the first ASEAN state to successfully seek rapprochement with China. Malaysia regarded the Association as an indigenous machinery useful for resolving bilateral differences and establishing clear ground rules for both regional and extra-regional actors in Southeast Asia.[36]

Singapore, conversely, favoured a balance of power approach and welcomed the Western military presence as a countervailing influence to Vietnam and its Soviet patron, which Singapore considered to be the largest threat to regional security, not China. For example, former Prime Minister Lee argued in explicit power balancing terms during the Bali summit for the continuation of the Western military presence.[37] ASEAN provided tiny and highly insecure Singapore with the opportunity to strategically link its interests to those of its regional colleagues and in effect to dissuade suspicions that its predominantly Chinese population rendered it (as noted in the first chapter) a 'third China.' In addition, with its two Muslim neighbours as major adherents of the Association, Singapore could ill afford to antagonise either Indonesia or Malaysia given the unpleasant experiences of Confrontation with the one and secession with the other. As an Indonesian diplomat observed in 1969, "Malaysia and Indonesia had a lot in common and there is no alternative for Singapore but to cooperate (by joining ASEAN.)"[38] Even then, the fear of being attacked by purported friendly states led to Singapore's abstention (as opposed to rejection) on the United Nations resolution condemning Indonesia's intervention in civil strife in East Timor in 1975.[39]

Similarly, Thailand's perception of regional security was informed by its balance of power perspective. Consistent with its traditional pragmatic and highly adaptative approach to foreign policy, Thailand, as a SEATO member, maintained an aggressive anti-communist stance only to reverse it to a policy of accommodation and detente with communist states upon the advent of the Sino-American rapprochement in 1972. As such, Thailand's membership in ASEAN indicated a shift from depending solely on the United States to an indigenous, consensual approach in dealing with regional security. Conversely, the Philippines continued to identify strongly with

American security interests although Manila found the abrupt switch in Washington's policy towards Beijing initially to be a little bewildering.[40] Nevertheless, Sino-Philippine relations have since remained cordial. In fact, the Filipino commitment to ASEAN stemmed not so much from security reasons as economic ones.[41] In this respect, the Association's leaderships affected the style and substance of foreign policies in inherent and fundamental ways. The ASEAN countries have for long confounded external observers as to the contradictory nature of their regional security perspectives, as evidenced by the aspiration for establishing a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) while concomitantly seeking Western assurances of continuous support. It could perhaps be argued that, in the case of the ASEAN (and other developing), countries, the search for regional security in the modern era of non-alignment and North-South conflict necessitated the deliberate downplaying of strong ties that exist between the former and their various powerful patrons in the developed world.[42]

Several significant developments which occurred within ASEAN's first decade pressured the loose grouping for change. These changes in essence linked regional organisation in an inextricable way with security as ASEAN struggled to keep afloat in a turbulent sea of bilateral conflicts that, somewhat ironically, brought its member states together but threatened subsequently to split the nascent organisation apart. One such nagging concern was the revival of the Sabah claim by the Philippines between 1968 and 1969. It may however be argued that pressures for change which kept the Association united in effect increased, not reduced, feelings of insecurity and uncertainty among member states. Nevertheless, they served an important purpose in accelerating the pace of regional reconciliation and regime formation in ASEAN.

In 1967, Britain summarily declared its decision to withdraw its military forces

east of Suez by the mid-1970s. A subsequent decision by London accelerated the expected completion of the withdrawal process to 1971.[43] While this did not come as a total surprise to Malaysia and Singapore, it did create a certain degree of consternation, especially for Singapore which had yet to develop a credible local defence. A brand new Five Power Defence Arrangement, which in essence shifted the burden of ensuring Malaysian and Singaporean security to the states' themselves, replaced the former Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement. This development was closely paralleled in both timing and content by the reappraisal of American security policy in Asia beginning in the late 1960s. The outcome of such a reassessment, codified as the Nixon Doctrine of 1971, emphasized American-assisted build-ups among the noncommunist Southeast Asian states. In essence, the ASEAN states were encouraged to establish an indigenous regional defence arrangement.[44] This proposition was rejected by ASEAN for fear of compromising the Association's credibility and programme for regional reconciliation. There, however, was evidence in 1975 that some ASEAN members, notably the Indonesians, were interested in combining military with economic cooperation. In fact, Jakarta proposed the formation of a 'joint council' for security cooperation. This idea was similarly rejected as a matter for explicit ASEAN cooperation by leaders such as Singapore's Lee and Philippines' Marcos.[45]

Other surprises followed in rapid succession. The touted Sino-Soviet split in 1969 did little to impart relief to the ASEAN countries as communist threats have invariably been viewed in terms of their origin not monolithic aggrandizement. The Association regarded the split with grave concern as it feared the strong possibility of Southeast Asia being ravaged by rivalry between the communist giants. For example, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's proposal for a new collective security system in the

region was perceived by ASEAN leaders as an effort to 'encircle' China.[46] ASEAN's consternation at these developments was further exacerbated by the subsequent unanticipated Sino-American rapprochement. The Arab-generated oil embargo of 1973, followed by the global economic recession, created additional problems. Finally, the communist victories in Indochina in 1975 proved the most cataclysmic of pressures for change by adding a new urgency to regional concerns. It may even be argued that its timing proved significant in stemming a conspicuous drift among the member states as a result of differing strategic perceptions. In essence, the foreboding spectre of the Vietnamese "tiger squatting on our (ASEAN) doorstep" fuelled the realisation that the bickering member states needed each other more than ever before.[47]

Still, ASEAN's response to these events, which ranged from sober to hysterical concern, was not without a measure of optimism. Ghazalie Shafie, a senior Malaysian official, argued that:

> A time of challenge is also a time of opportunity. The question is whether we [Southeast Asians] can surmount the challenge and turn it into an opportunity - an opportunity to reach out for the first time, fashion for ourselves an arrangement that would...regulate relationships between countries of Southeast Asia and the external powers.[48]

Malaysia's response to the British withdrawal crystallised as an ambitious proposal for the neutralisation of the Southeast Asian region, namely, the ZOPFAN concept. The proposal drew the qualified support of Indonesia but marked scepticism on the part of Singapore and Thailand; bluntly put, it "did not constitute a true meeting of ASEAN minds."[49] Other member states, apart from being annoyed at Malaysia's presumptuous unilateralism, criticised the proposal's implicit stress on the dependence on external power involvement to ensure the region's neutrality. This clearly contradicted the ASEAN principle that the primary responsibility for regional security lay with Southeast Asians not foreigners.[50] Incorporated eventually in 1971 as official ASEAN

doctrine, the ZOPFAN Declaration clearly failed to create an impact on the security policies of its own ASEAN originators as shown by the concern among member states for the possibility of a total Western withdrawal which would in effect create a dangerous power vacuum in the region. One scholar has opined that as long as foreign bases are retained in the region, "ZOPFAN will remain very much in the realm of wishful thinking."[51] Its significance rested on the fact that ASEAN's inherent nature as a political creature was becoming apparent and even openly acknowledged, and this was largely confirmed by the Association's subsequent response to the Indochinese development.

If ZOPFAN represented an explicit early manifestation of ASEAN's political nature, then the promulgations of the 1976 Bali summit represented the first significant blueprint for formal ASEAN political and economic cooperation. Two major agreements were produced: the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. The Declaration reiterated the goals and aspirations of the original founding document and, for the first time, made overt reference to security concerns by stressing the "continuation of co-operation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests."[52] This essentially meant that bilateral military-security cooperation between ASEAN countries was to continue without the organisational ambit. The Concord achieved another 'first' by including provisions for economic cooperation in five key areas, such as establishing large scale industrial projects, intra-regional trade liberalisation and joint approaches to world political and economic problems.[53] The Treaty was equally if not more ambitious in object. It sought to provide an institutional mechanism for the pacific settlement of disputes in the region via expanding cooperation in several fields with intent to furthering regional economic

development, peace and stability. Armed with an enhanced mandate, ASEAN embarked on a two pronged approach to achieving those aims, namely, via efforts to promote trade among member states and efforts to secure closer relations and increased market access with major trading partners such as the United States, Japan and the European Economic Community.

Given the innumerable centrifugal tendencies in ASEAN, some scholars have suggested that the Association's continued existence in effect constitutes a success.[54] If anything, the fragile nature of intra-ASEAN relationships, rather than creating irreconcilable differences among member states, raised awareness of the need to dissipate tensions and to resolve disputes. As the former Singapore Foreign Minister Rajaratnam has argued, ambitious progress in ASEAN could not be obtained unless the member states first "[ran] the gauntlet of political difficulties."[55] The gauntlet, however, would prove to be long, tedious and seemingly endless.

Regional Reconciliation Reinforced

The events of the subsequent years after the 1976 Bali summit provided an excellent showcase for the paradoxical performance of ASEAN. The Association projected itself as a bulwark against the communist tide in Southeast Asia and in so doing displayed in large measure the strength and unity of which it was evidently capable. Conversely, the member states continued to reflect a poverty of commitment to some of the Association's stated aims and objectives, namely, economic cooperation. Ironically, the communist victories in Indochina contributed not insignificantly to these antithetical developments. First, the communist threat (as noted earlier) galvanised an almost moribund ASEAN to decisive self-rejuvenating action. Second, it rendered the ASEAN region strategically important in the Western perspective. Nevertheless, such strategic

importance was expressed essentially in the form of enhanced bilateral trade relations between individual ASEAN countries and their Western counterparts at the expense of intra-regional trade.

The desire of ASEAN for regional reconciliation via peaceful means of conflict settlement did not translate into practical reality where Vietnam was concerned. This failure could well be attributed to the differences in threat perspectives and interpretations among ASEAN states which continued to plague the Association. In this respect, Vietnam served as the litmus test for consensus and unity in the organisation. In essence, Vietnam found ASEAN's prescriptions for regional order, such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, to be unacceptable and clearly regarded the Association with suspicion and mistrust befitting what the former considered to be an American-sponsored organisation. As Leifer has argued, these prescriptions "served primarily as a symbolic focus for solidarity among subregional (ASEAN) partners."[56] In addition, the fact that three ASEAN countries enjoyed close diplomatic ties with China did not help to convince Vietnam of ASEAN's sincerity.[57] Inherent contradictions such as these in effect compromised the Association's chances for peaceful relations with the region's most powerful military state. There, however, was temporary cause for optimism when Vietnam displayed a softening of attitude towards its ASEAN neighbours and even hinted at possible cooperation towards the realisation of the Association's declared ZOPFAN goal. Vietnamese premier Pham Van Dong stated in 1977 that:

> The policy of setting up such military blocs as ASEAN in Southeast Asia has failed and passed forever. The relationship of friendship and co-operation among countries of this region must be established on a new basis, in a new spirit.[58]

Such optimism proved spurious when Vietnam invaded Kampuchea at the end of 1978. The attack clearly shocked the ASEAN leaderships which had begun somewhat

erroneously to view Vietnam as a waning threat. The Association's response was immediate and in concert. The ASEAN foreign ministers issued a five-point joint statement which "strongly deplored the armed intervention," calling for "the immediate and total withdrawal of the foreign forces from Kampuchean territory."[59] ASEAN proved instrumental in the formation of the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea (CDGK), thereby denying the Vietnamese-backed regime the right to represent Kampuchea in international fora. Events which aided to elicit international support for ASEAN's case included the flood of refugees from Indochina both by land and sea, and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Both developments strongly suggested strongly of a growing Soviet-Vietnamese condominium which threatened points southeast and southwest of Asia and, by implication, the entire Asian regional order. ASEAN in essence came to symbolise, not without some Western help, the bastion of Western-style capitalism in communist-infested East Asia.

Ironically, ASEAN's purported finest hour also turned out to be its biggest hindrance. Clearly, diplomatic cooperation superseded economic cooperation during this phase. In fact, it was possible that the Association's Kampuchean policy became counter-productive towards regional security because it bifurcated the region into antagonistic camps and damaged the prospects for peaceful coexistence and cooperation. It also contributed to an increase in militarism among the ASEAN countries, thereby risking a potential war with Vietnam of which ASEAN was in no shape or form to conduct.[60] More fundamentally, the hope of building regional resilience via peaceful means was evidently at stake. Although divergent strategic perspectives continued to plague the Association, these however were generally kept in check as member states sought consensus and compromise rather than face a breakup. For example, Indonesia willingly subordinated its own agenda for regional order to

Thailand's security interests so as to preserve organisational cohesion.[61] In other words, inevitable differences between member states were being reconciled as the ASEAN regime became increasingly more important in the calculation of national interests. In the words of Stubbs, ASEAN "has become a key factor in the foreign policy of each member state."[62]

In all fairness, the international prestige accorded ASEAN was not unsubstantial and its members certainly benefitted from the Indochina issue. The ASEAN economies experienced remarkable expansion during this period and are still expanding, rendering the ASEAN region the fasting growing region economically in the world today. Intra-regional trade, however, suffered as a result of disinterest and the lack of political will. As one ASEAN observer has noted:

> The economic importance of the association...could be said to derive more from the rapid growth and development performance of some of its member economies than the collective strength and cohesion of the association itself."[63]

ASEAN's very success thus exposed inadvertently the destitute nature of the Association in terms of organisational substance; in short, ASEAN appeared to be a single issue organisation. As one scholar has argued, "ASEAN's achievement was one of political damage limitation" and nothing very much more.[64] This revelation became increasingly evident as the Cold War came to a close upon the collapse of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s. To suggest, however, that ASEAN's institutional poverty, its success in regional reconciliation notwithstanding, was sufficient reason for the Association to consider change would be fallacious.[65] There were other equally significant pressures for change which compelled ASEAN to continue its process of adapting and modifying in order to better meet new challenges. The uniqueness of the situation faced by the Association at this critical juncture compared with previous crisis points lay in the plethora of crises and challenges,

political and economic in nature. ASEAN is thus left with little choice but to respond in a fundamental and an effective fashion. The ASEAN leaderships evidently recognised the dire need for their Association to evolve and adapt to these changing circumstances or risk facing possible organisational irrelevance, or worse, demise. In the words of a Singaporean cabinet member:

> With the end of the Cold War, we cannot assume that the Western powers will continue to woo ASEAN. ASEAN must re-assess itself. If ASEAN is inward-looking, then our strategic importance to our traditional dialogue partners, including the United States, Japan and the European Community, may very well diminish. We need to transform the substance of both ASEAN and our relations with the major economic and political powers.[66]

The end of the Cold War thus constituted one such powerful pressure for change that left ASEAN with little room for posturing and procrastination. The downfall of international communism removed the cardinal motivation for American military involvement in Asia and created doubts among friendly Asian countries as to their sponsor's commitment to the region. On its part, Washington reiterated its long term interest in the Asia-Pacific region even as American forces began pulling out of their Philippine bases. As one American official stressed recently:

> Our (the United States) adaptation to new circumstances must not be interpreted as withdrawal. America's destiny lies across the Pacific, our engagement in the region is here to stay.[67]

The fundamentally transformed international milieu, with the Soviet Union less the military superpower and more the ailing economic dinosaur, meant the consequential redrawing of political configurations in Southeast Asia. Vietnam quickly sought rapprochement with China, thereby bringing about the anticipated and long cherished resolution of the Cambodia imbroglio.[68] As such, the primary motivation for cooperation in ASEAN has moved beyond the political to include the economic as Vietnam and Laos (and possibly even Cambodia and Myanmar) gradually transform

themselves into market economies.[69] In fact, it may equally be argued that ASEAN's raison d'etre, until now solely political, has largely been changed to the economic.[70] In this respect, for the first time in its history, the Association has an opportunity to transcend its subregional status to a truly regional one. However, although such developments have in effect stabilised temporarily the Southeast Asian region, the area remains highly volatile due to the diffuse nature of threats and conflicting interests which until recently were largely subordinated to the regional bipolar confrontation. In this respect, the heavily contested oil-rich Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea constitute at present the most significant potential flashpoint.[71] (See Diagram 1 under Appendices.)

Closely related to the first crisis is the concomitant redirecting of Western energies to regional economic cooperation, as evinced by the formation of economic blocs or what Garten has referred to as 'superblocs.'[72] These superblocs include the European Community and its impending product, capital and labour market integration after 1992; and the anticipated North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada and Mexico. These developments, in tandem with concern over the potential collapse of the problematic Uruguay Round of GATT discussions, have evoked fears of a future quasi-Orwellian world divided into three exclusive regions. For example, as Lee Kuan Yew stated at a recent Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference:

> All countries present today (at the conference) have grown faster because of the GATT-IMF multilateral free trade regime. It is in all our interests to keep open the system of free and fair trade. Indeed APEC countries should set themselves up as examples of good GATT abiding citizens of the world and oppose the formation of trading blocs.[73]

The IMF managing director, in a recent address to the Uruguay Round negotiations at Brussels, argued in a similar vein:

> If at some point in these negotiations you, as governments, believe you are faced with the choice between greater trade liberalization and, one might say, greater prudence, believe me there is no choice, because prudence dictates liberalization. All experience shows this to be true: the interest of the world economy lies in open trade.[74]

The imperative of ASEAN economic cooperation can hardly be ignored at this point as easily as it had been in the past. More fundamentally, in the light of larger Asian regional entities such as APEC or even the recently created East Asian Economic Caucus, ASEAN clearly faces the possibility of being passe if it remains devoid of imagination, innovation and a whole lot of political will. As an ASEAN representative to APEC contended, "We are more concerned about ASEAN, and we want to strengthen ASEAN."[75]

The third significant pressure for change concerns the rise of Japan as an important player in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN states constitute that part of the region with which Japan is heavily entwined economically via aid, trade and investment linkages. The ASEAN region supplies much of the raw materials needed by Japanese industries; at the same time, the huge ASEAN market in terms of population size and potential purchasing power for Japanese goods renders the region highly attractive to Japan.[76] Similarly, although the United States remains the major export target of the ASEAN states, exports to Japan have been rapidly increasing due to the presence of Japanese multinational corporations.[77] Japan, however, has found an ASEAN that is mostly high in rhetoric but low in substance to be a frustrating business partner.[78] As such, Japan has largely been hesitant to deal with ASEAN as a corporate entity, emphasizing instead bilateral relations with member states. In addition, there remains the question of a possible renewal of a Japanese military presence in the region in the wake of the American withdrawal. There is widespread concern in ASEAN that the voluntary or enforced non-participation of the United

States in any future security alignment in Asia may well lead to the rise of Japan - in particular a rearmed Japan - as an unwelcomed hegemon in the region. A politically as well as economically strengthened ASEAN could serve as a countervailing influence in the event of such a development. In essence, the Association's rather cool response to a recent Japanese proposal to institutionalise the role of the ASEAN-PMC as an annual conference on regional security could be viewed in this light.[79] Nevertheless, peaceful coexistence with a Japanese superpower should not be ruled out. As Lee has argued, "If they (ASEAN countries) can now accept the soroban (the Japanese abacus), they may yet learn to live with the Samurai sword."[80]

The fourth pressure for change has its origins in the mid-1980s. The ASEAN region, as noted earlier, has achieved such rapid economic growth that it has easily supplanted the four East Asian 'dragons' as the fasting growing region in the world.[81] The dynamism of the ASEAN countries rests intrinsically in the fundamental transformation in economic strategies of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Largely buoyed by Japanese investment, these states have increased their manufacturing bases, converted to export-oriented industries and raised not unsubstantially their respective per capita incomes.[82] The long adherence to an import substitution strategy, which has hampered ASEAN economic cooperation for a long time, was discarded as world recessionary pressures brought about by the collapse of commodity prices for oil, gas, minerals and agricultural products overstrained primary-based economies. Such economic success has accorded the ASEAN states with a new sense of confidence. However, given the impending difficulties of the increasing trend of Western protectionism (as shown by some intransigent Western positions at the Uruguay Round) and of the prospect of restricted access to regional economic blocs, it behooves ASEAN to reconsider economic cooperation among its members. There also

is concern over the possibility of an early recovery for the American economy to which the ASEAN economies are closely wedded.[83] Improved cooperation could well help ASEAN to eschew serious economic trouble in the event of a prolonged American recession.

The third ASEAN summit in 1987 gave the Association an opportunity to address some of the earlier pressures. The summit endorsed several progressive plans to advance economic cooperation, the most significant of these being the decision to widen the ambit of the Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) system to encompass fifty percent of intra-ASEAN trade.[84] In the political sphere, efforts to resolve the Sabah dispute came to naught. The summit in effect did not endorse any major changes to ASEAN's character, organisational structure or future directions; it did, however, prove useful in reaffirming the Association's corporate identity. First, the summit, which was held in Manila, proceeded along at a time when the Philippines was experiencing domestic political problems. Second, the other ASEAN states for the first time arranged in 1988 a 'mini-Marshall Plan' of up to $10 billion in funds to bolster the Philippine economy.[85] Such modest gains were in accordance with the classic ASEAN stance for cautious and unambitious advances in regionalism.[86]

It was against this historical preference for cautious incrementalism that the achievements of the recent Singapore summit stood in stark contrast. There were significant early indications that forewarned of impending change. For example, one ASEAN official commented at the 1991 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Kuala Lumpur:

> At past ASEAN meetings, there would be ritualistic pronouncements on ASEAN economic co-operation. This time, there were concrete ideas like the Free Trade Area proposal on the table. I foresee that these ideas will crystallise into decisions at the summit (the fourth summit in Singapore).[87]

The significance of the Singapore meeting rested on efforts to provide the much

needed nuts and bolts of active cooperation, especially in the long neglected field of economic cooperation. In what clearly was a response to the challenge of increasing global economic regionalism, ASEAN countries committed themselves to establishing an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by the year 2008.[88] This commitment translated as the formulation of a dual track approach, namely, a landmark framework agreement defining areas for enhanced economic cooperation and a tariff-reduction agreement (the Common Effective Preferential Tariffs scheme, or CEPT), the latter of which required ministerial level participation in its implementation. Some member states, such as Malaysia and Thailand, underscored their commitments by preliminary pledges to reduce tariffs.[89] A contradictory but equally important decision arrived at the summit affirmed the 'six minus X' principle of ASEAN cooperation: members which are able to move faster on the CEPT could conceivably reduce tariffs on a bilateral or multilateral (as opposed to an ASEAN) basis if and when agreement between them was effected. In this respect, the optimistic progress of the Singapore-Johor-Riau growth triangle (as will be discussed in the fourth chapter), provides a precedent and example of successful sub-ASEAN economic cooperation.

In the same vein, the summit proved to be a watershed where ASEAN security cooperation was concerned. For the first time in the Association's history, security issues were included in the de jure ASEAN agenda.[90] The Singapore Declaration stated that "ASEAN shall seek avenues to engage member states in new areas of co-operation in security matters."[91] These avenues were to comprise internal and external approaches. the former referred to the growing bilateral (and possible future multilateral) security linkages and ambiguous allusions to an ASEAN security forum (albeit not alliance, as ASEAN leaders were quick to point out); the latter included attempts to elevate the status of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast

Asia[92], and the enhancement of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference as a multilateral forum for regional security concerns in addition to its economic purpose.

Finally, the summit also produced a significant overhaul of institutional arrangements in ASEAN. The Association's heads of government were mandated to meet on a formal basis every three years along with existing annual meetings between senior officials.[93] The ASEAN Secretariat, once a cosmetic appendage, was accorded new powers, such as a Secretary-General who would be appointed on merit, given ministerial status and possess an enhanced mandate.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a broad overview of the causal events leading to the formation of ASEAN, and environmental changes and pressures for change which have paradoxically threatened to unravel the organisation but have also provided the needed impetus for it to strengthen and unify itself. Although ASEAN's doctrine implies that regional resilience is predicated on national resilience, one can argue that the Association's historical experience suggests strongly that the inverse of that logic is equally if not more true. This is clearly shown in ASEAN's efforts to adapt and respond, though often in ineffective and inappropriate ways, to major crises such as the communist successes in Indochina and the subsequent Vietnamese threat. The fear of being attacked and overwhelmed by more powerful predators due to the lack of national resilience has led the ASEAN states to unite and build regional resilience. In this way, national sovereignty and independence could therefore be preserved and subsequently enhanced.

In this respect, ASEAN cooperation continues to be sought after by member states because of the utility proffered by the organisation. In other words, each

ASEAN state, in idiosyncratic ways and for ethnocentric reasons, desires to remain in the Association and contributes to its unity and cohesion in order to ensure its own economic and political security. It is exactly in this light that current and future ASEAN cooperation should and must be viewed. As such, it remains to be seen whether ASEAN countries will participate in active cooperation with the commensurate will and effort required to translate the recent summit developments into actual successes. In retrospect it may be argued, given the continued emphasis on the primacy of national interests in the regional endeavour, that ASEAN's achievements to date represent fundamental breakthroughs of a nature never before realised in the ASEAN experience.

ENDNOTES

1. Shee Poon-Kim, "A Decade of ASEAN, 1967-1977," Asian Survey, vol. XVII, no. 8 (August 1977), p. 755.

2. See, for example, Leszek Buszynski, "ASEAN: A Changing Regional Role," Asian Survey, vol. 27, no. 7 (July 1987), p. 765.

3. Veteran watchers of Chinese foreign policy observed that the atmosphere at a recent four-day summit in Beijing in November 1991 between senior leaders of China and Vietnam "seemed markedly warmer than normal diplomatic interchange between peacefully coexisting neighbours." Far Eastern Economic Review, November 21, 1991.

4. For example, the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) has been established as a multilateral security forum. The Sunday Times, June 9, 1991. In essence, the concern of ASEAN security managers is with the strategic location of the Southeast Asian region, which renders it a highly important factor in the security considerations of major global and regional powers. ASEAN, as the primary regional actor of Southeast Asia, can thus play a significant role in influencing the pattern of regional order. Lianhe Zaobao, January 23, 1992.

5. A good discussion dealing with the political nature of ASEAN is one by Michael Leifer, "Problems and Prospects of Regional Cooperation in Asia: The Political Dimension," The Indonesian Quarterly, vol. 4 (1976), pp. 92-104.

6. Russell H. Fifield, National and Regional Interests in ASEAN: Competition and Cooperation in International Politics, Occasional Paper no. 5 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1979), p. 49.

7. Michael Leifer, "Conflict and Regional Order in South-east Asia," Adelphi Papers, no. 162 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 1.

8. Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia (London: MacMillan Press, 1982), pp. 9-10.

9. SEATO served as the institutional structure for the Manila Pact of 1954 for containing the spread of communism in Asia (i.e., containing China). Created via the inspiration of the United States and backed by American military capability, SEATO was eventually disbanded in 1977. The Manila Pact, however, has not been revoked and Thailand and Philippines remain signatories. See Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 28.

10. Sheldon W. Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Security (Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1982), p. 3.

11. Guy J. Pauker, Frank H. Golay, and Cynthia H. Enloe, Diversity and Development in Southeast Asia: The Coming Decade (New York: McGraw-Hill for the 1980s Project Studies/Council on Foreign Relations, 1977), p. 22.

12. Khoman, the former Thai Foreign Minister and subsequently Deputy Prime Minister, played an integral part in the formation of ASEAN. Quoted in Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States (New York: St Martin's Press, 1978), p. 265.

13. For an excellent discussion of historical patterns of conflict in Southeast Asia, see Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). The purpose of Confrontation, as articulated by Sukarno, was to ganjang (literally meaning to crush) Malaysia.

14. Quoted in Bernard K. Gordon, "Regionalism and Instability in Southeast Asia," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ed., International Regionalism: Readings (Boston, MA.: Little, Brown, 1968), p. 108.

15. The Sabah incident will be discussed in chapter three.

16. Quoted in Jorgensen-Dahl (1982), op. cit., p. 16.

17. This thinking became integral to subsequent regional efforts among the non-communist Southeast Asian states. ASEAN has this conception enshrined implicitly in the founding ASEAN (or Bangkok) Declaration: "To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations."

18. For a good discussion on the sources of regional and domestic conflict in Southeast Asia, see Leifer (1980), op. cit., pp. 1-13.

19. The socio-economic well-being of the non-communist Southeast Asian peoples, at least in the view of the leaderships, is intrinsically interrelated to the security of the region. This paper intends to demonstrate this relationship, and thus the emphasis on regional security.

20. Morrison and Suhrke (1978), op. cit., p. 269.

21. The Indonesians were understandably uncomfortable with the sudden redefinition of territorial boundaries which would necessitate their sharing of land borders with Malaysia in the

Borneo region. The then newly created Federation of Malaysia comprised of Peninsula Malaysia, Singapore and the Borneo lands of Sabah and Sarawak. Present-day Malaysia differs from the former federation only in that Singapore is obviously no longer a part of Malaysia.

22. Taken from Paragraph 6 of the Manila Accord, one of the three founding documents of MAPHILINDO. Quoted in Jorgensen-Dahl (1982), op. cit., p. 26.

23. Sukarno's regime survived an aborted coup engineered by Indonesian communists (PKI) in 1965 but Sukarno was unable to maintain his presidency. The success of the Indonesian military (ABRI) in nullifying the internal communist threat led to the rise to power of General Suharto, whose "New Order" regime remains the incumbent government in Jakarta until this day. Shee (1977), op. cit., p. 754.

24. Taken from the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (Kuala Lumpur Declaration), 27 November 1971, Kuala Lumpur.

25. The influence of the radical rhetoric of Sukarno's non-alignment on MAPHILINDO was inevitable. This thinking clearly had some impact on the foreign policy orientation of post-Sukarno Indonesia. The Indonesian-inspired notions of national and regional self-reliance and the Malaysian-sponsored idea of regional neutralisation, both which remain pertinent to the official ASEAN conception of regional security, are prime examples of such an impact. See the ASEAN Declaration and the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration.

26. ASEAN's founding states comprised Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei became a member in 1984 upon achieving independence.

27. Hans H. Indorf, ASEAN: Problems and Prospects, Occasional Paper no. 38 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975), p. 21.

28. Fifield (1979), op. cit., p. 48.

29. He Xi An, "Dianding jiangqiang jichu de Yaxian Ji Feng Huiyi," Singapore Monthly, no. 111 (March 1976), pp. 36-37.

30. The movement away from Sukarno's ideological grandiosity was achieved largely through the rise of the military to the heights of political power in Indonesia. As such, although Indonesia is regarded by most as Muslim in nature, Suharto has in fact effectively squelched Islamic political power in his country. As academic Din Sjamsuddin argued, "Depoliticizing Islam is part of a political engineering effort by (Suharto's) New Order...based on

the belief that Islam which is politically strong will become a threat to the people in power. Jakarta Post, August 14, 1991. Also see Lau Teik Soon, "ASEAN Diplomacy: National Interest and Regionalism," Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. XXV, nos. 1-2 (January-April 1990), pp. 119-120.

31. Taken from the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, 1976, Bali, Indonesia.

32. See the ASEAN (Bangkok) Declaration.

33. This term is associated with Thanat Khoman. See Morrison and Suhrke (1978), op. cit., p. 275.

34. The adjective was used by the former Singaporean premier Lee Kuan Yew in 1972. M. Rajendran, ASEAN's Foreign Relations: The Shift to Collective Action (Kuala Lumpur: Arenabuku, 1985), p. 23.

35. In the case of Malaysia (or the more historically correct Malaya), there was the Emergency period, a China-sponsored communist insurrection that lasted from 1948 to 1960 and composed of predominantly Malayan Chinese. This experience could very well have convinced Razak that the only way to ensure regional security was to obtain guarantees from external powers of their noninvolvement in Southeast Asia. See Noraini Haji Abdullah, "Leadership in Malaysia: Security Perceptions and Policies," in Mohammed Ayoob and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Leadership Perceptions and National Security: The Southeast Asian Experience (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), pp. 143-146.

36. Malaysia shares common borders with four ASEAN member states, namely Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. Problems that have occured in the past include the uncertain delimitations of territorial boundaries such as that between Malaysia and Thailand, or conflicting land claims such as the Sabah dispute. Also, there is the potentially high risk issue involving Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), which include rights to fishing waters and natural resources. Currently, the most significant flashpoint could well be the fight over control of the oil-rich Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. (Refer to chapter three for a discussion of these issues.) See chapter three in Hans H. Indorf, Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Bilateral Constraints Among ASEAN Member States (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984).

37. ASEAN Review, no. 1 (March 1, 1976), p. 6.

38. Adam Malik, the former Indonesian Foreign Minister. Far Eastern Economic Review, December 4, 1969.

39. Shee (1977), op. cit., p. 757.

40. Tilman (1987), op. cit., p. 93.

41. Brunei has been left out at this stage of the discussion as it did not play a role in the formative years of regional organisation.

42. For the purposes of survival, weak states often develop paradoxical policies that include assertions of sovereignty, independence and non-alignment on the one hand, and the maintenance of close military and economic ties with major powers. See, for example, the speeches and writings of Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, the former Singapore Foreign Minister, in Chan Heng Chee and Obaid ul Haq, eds., S. Rajaratnam: The Prophetic and the Political (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 290-296. Also, see Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2 (January 1991), pp. 233-256; and Mohammed Ayoob, "The Third World in a System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 1 (1989), pp. 67-79.

43. Jorgensen-Dahl (1982), op. cit., p. 75.

44. Simon (1982), op. cit., p. 5.

45. It should be noted that bilateral security cooperation outside the ambit of explicit ASEAN cooperation was clearly flourishing. Also, it is interesting to note that the idea of a formal defence forum was recently mooted again, this time at the 4th ASEAN summit in Singapore by both the Indonesians and the Filipinos. Refer to chapter three.

46. Rajendran (1985), op. cit., p. 24.

47. Thanat Khoman. Quoted in Tilman (1987), op. cit., p. 1.

48. Quoted in Rajendran (1985), op. cit., p. 25.

49. Leifer (1989), op. cit., p. 59.

50. Ibid., p. 57.

51. Lau, op. cit., p. 121.

52. Emphasis added.

53. See Part B of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, 24 February 1976, Bali, Indonesia.

54. See, for example, Richard Stubbs, ASEAN at Twenty: The Search for a New Consensus (Toronto, ON.: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1988), p. 1.

55. Rajaratnam to the Singapore Parliament in 1967. Quoted in Jorgensen-Dahl, op. cit., p. 111.

56. Leifer (1989), op. cit., p. 75.

57. Malaysia, as noted above, established formal ties with China in 1974. The Philippines and Thailand followed suit in 1975. Indonesia, however, opted to wait on the basis that detente with China offered no clearcut guarantee for Indonesian security. Singapore, in deference to Indonesia, also chose to wait to normalise diplomatic ties even though early on it had established economic ties with China. Straits Times, February 5, 1976.

58. Far Eastern Economic Review, January 13, 1978.

59. See the Joint Statement of the Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Current Political Development in the Southeast Asian Region, Bangkok, 12 January 1979.

60. Tim Huxley, "ASEAN Security Cooperation - Past, Present and Future," in Alison Broinowski, ed., ASEAN into the 1990s (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), p. 90. It would seem , however, that the rise in militarism continues today even after the Vietnamese threat has sufficiently waned. A news report noted that Asian states seemed bent to "resist the growing sentiment among the industrialised countries in favour of worldwide cuts in defence spending." Far Eastern Economic Review, November 7, 1991. This can possibly be attributed to the incessant uncertainty (albeit in a temporarily stabilised region) due to the increase in diffused threats. See chapter three for a more elaborate discussion.

61. In essence, Indonesia favoured a policy of detente with Vietnam, and in fact made several unsuccessful overtures towards the latter. Thailand, conversely, regarded itself as a security buffer to contain an irredentist Vietnam. Geographical proximity, of course, played an important role in affecting strategic perspectives, with Thailand understandably perceiving the threat in an enhanced way compared with Indonesia's more subdued view. ASEAN unity was displayed when all member states cast their fortunes with that of Thailand. ASEAN foreign policy (if one could call it that) with regard to Indochina in reality reflected Thai foreign policy.

62. Stubbs (1988), op. cit., p. 1.

63. Srikanta Chatterjee, "ASEAN Economic Cooperation in the 1980s and 1990s," in Broinowski, op. cit., p. 58.

64. Leifer (1989), op. cit., p. 125.

65. Lee, for example, identified this motivation for change as "the desire to do something, to 'get on with it'," and quite correctly argued that there clearly exist other reasons for change. Lee Tsao Yuan, ASEAN: Where Do We Go From Here? Some Thoughts on Economic Cooperation, Report no. 2 (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1991), pp. 1-2.

66. Taken from the Opening Statement by Mr Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Singapore, at the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 19 to 20 July 1991. Singapore Government Press Release No. 38/Jul 09-1/91/07/19, p. 3. In the same vein, Brunei's Sultan Bolkiah has echoed similar views regarding the need for ASEAN to strengthen itself intra-regionally as well as extra-regionally. Lianhe Zaobao, January 28, 1992.

67. Richard Solomon, the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, made this point during a visit to Auckland, New Zealand in 1991. Straits Times, August 7, 1991.

68. Vietnamese leader Vo Van Kiet's whirlwind tour of three ASEAN states (Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore) in October 1991 signalled essentially a brand new era in ASEAN-Vietnamese relations. Their immensely improved ties pointed to a highly plausible future development: Vietnam's entry into ASEAN. The pace of Vietnam's integration, however, will be dependent on the progress of the Cambodian peace process. Far Eastern Economic Review, November 14, 1991.

69. Straits Times, August 12, 1991; The Sunday Times, August 11, 1991.

70. This view is increasingly being recognised and adopted by both government and the media. See, for example, Lianhe Zaobao, January 26, 1992.

71. Six Asian countries, all characteristically littoral, have made similar claims on the Spratlys: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. Already, there have been exchanges of gunfire in the region among the navies of China and Vietnam. Straits Times, July 18, 1991. The current trend of increased military spending in the ASEAN states clearly indicates their concern over existing threats. Far Eastern Economic Review, November 7, 1991.

72. Jeffrey E. Garten, "Trading Blocs and the Evolving World Economy," Current History, vol. 88, no. 534 (January 1989), p. 15.

73. Taken from the Joint Statement of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, July 29-31, 1990. APEC members include the ASEAN countries, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, South Korea and Japan.

74. Excerpts of remarks by Michael Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, to the Meeting of the TNC of the Uruguay Round at the Ministerial Level in Brussels, on 4 December 1990. IMF Survey (10 December 1990).

75. Asian Wall Street Journal, August 29, 1991. In light of these growing challenges to ASEAN's capacity for institutional relevance, new strategies have arisen in ASEAN thinking. The Association's leaders have increasingly referred to concepts such as 'growth poles' (which will be discussed in chapter four), and 'concentric rings.' The latter refers to the notion of positioning ASEAN at the core of larger entities, such as the ASEAN-PMC multilateral security forum, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference, and the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). This, the leaders argue, will ensure that (1) ASEAN remains a viable and vibrant institution, and (2) that ASEAN will not be marginalised in international politics and economics.

76. Lee Poh Ping, "ASEAN and the Japanese Role in Southeast Asia," in Broinowski, op. cit., p. 174.

77. Ibid., p. 2.

78. See, for example, the special report on Far Eastern Economic Review, December 3, 1987.

79. The Asian Wall Street Journal, July 29, 1991.

80. Lee (1990), op. cit., p. 176.

81. The Asian Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs), or dragons, comprise Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. Refer to Table 1.1 for the economic growth rates (GDP) of these countries for the years 1985-90.

82. See, for example, the special report in The Economist, November 16, 1991; Far Eastern Economic Review, November 21, 1991. For a more detailed discussion of the process of economic restructuring in these countries, see Geoffery B. Hainsworth, "Indonesia: On the Road to Privatization?" Current History, vol. 89, no. 545 (March 1990), pp. 121-124, 134; Clark D. Neher, "Change in Thailand," Current History, vol. 89, no. 545 (March 1990), pp. 101-104, 127-130; Steven Schlossstein, Asia's New Little Dragons: The Dynamic Emergence of Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia (Chicago, IL.: Contemporary Books, 1991).

83. The Asian Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1991.

84. Frank Frost, "Introduction: ASEAN since 1967 - Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments," in Broinowski, op. cit., p. 25.

85. Ibid., 26.

86. One interesting development in during this period came in the form of an agreement to contain and remove non-tariff barriers among ASEAN states. See the Memorandum of Understanding on Standstill and Rollback of Non-Tariff Barriers Among ASEAN Countries, Manila, December 15, 1987.

87. The Straits Times, July 25, 1991.

88. AFTA differs from previous trade liberalisation schemes in that it, for the first time, reveals the serious intent of ASEAN member countries by comprising a time table, and a cogent and coherent purpose for economic cooperation. Lianhe Zaobao, January 29, 1992. The AFTA concept is largely Thai in origin. Lianhe Zaobao, January 26, 1992.

89. For example, Thailand promised to make immediate tariff cuts on all manufactured goods, whereas Malaysia pledged to cut tariffs for 121 manufactured products and 586 agricultural products to 20 percent from 1993. Straits Times, January 29, 1992.

90. See, for example, Lianhe Zaobao, January 27, 1992; Straits Times, January 29, 1992.

91. See The Singapore Declaration, Singapore, January 28, 1992. Lianhe Zaobao , January 29, 1992; Straits Times, January 29, 1992.

92. ASEAN is actively seeking the commitment of all Southeast Asian countries, especially the Indochina states, to the Treaty. In addition, it hopes that the UN will grant official recognition to the Treaty. Straits Times, January 29, 1992.

93. Lianhe Zaobao, January 29, 1992.

CHAPTER THREE: SECURITY REGIMES: THE CASE OF ASEAN POLITICAL-SECURITY COOPERATION

This chapter seeks to provide a broad conceptual analysis of political and military cooperation in ASEAN through the use of the notion of a 'security regime.'[1] The first chapter alluded to the utility of regime theory in general and the usefulness of the notion of an incipient regime to the ASEAN case in particular. The second chapter provided a brief overview of the evolution of the Association as an international organisation. It was argued there that certain qualitative improvements were, with qualifications, discernable as ASEAN progressed from the divisive 'single issue' grouping it remained for most of its formal existence to its present manifestation as an organisation committed to a credible and extensive programme of regional cooperation. This does not imply that the Association has already come of age as a security regime but it does suggest that ASEAN appears to increasingly adopt the characteristics of a security regime in attitude and action.

In the case of regional political and security cooperation among Third World states, two contending conceptual frameworks stand out in particular, namely, 'autonomous' and 'hegemonic' regionalism. Autonomous or 'small state' regionalism is usually defined in terms of non-alignment with, equidistance from, or antipathy towards the great powers.[2] Autonomous groupings may aspire to collectively establish a joint security role against commonly identified threats. The majority, however, place relatively little emphasis on the development of security cooperation as opposed to the pacific settlement of intra-regional disputes.[3] One scholar has argued that this form of regionalism is essentially impractical due to the inherent paradox in the search for security.[4] First, for all their well-intentioned goals and efforts, small and weak

countries simply do not possess the adequate strength to ensure regional security and welfare. Second, and consequently, such states are naturally attracted to the security that these same great powers provide but from which they generally desire to disassociate. As such, a grouping of small states is more often than not an aggregation of weaknesses, not strengths. This is due largely to several factors, such as the non-complementary nature of their assets; their divergent strategic interests; and, the paranoia and apprehension common to their nascent and inchoate natures.

Conversely, hegemonic regionalism refers to arrangements which involve small states clustered around great or hegemonic powers from whom they derive their security. Liska contends that such arrangements not only benefit small states but that great powers also stand to "profit from having dependable allies within their strategic area."[5] Alliances such as these have included SEATO and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Hegemonic regionalism, however, is essentially predicated on the assumption that a congruence in strategic perception exists between both patron and client states. In the case of SEATO, such an assumption proved spurious because its Southeast Asian member states perceived intra-regional threats, manifesting as both domestic and inter-state conflict, to be significant; whereas the United States sought to contain the expansionist drive of the Soviet Union and China. CENTO, on the other hand, failed essentially due to its inability to accommodate changing global political conditions. The 1960s proved to be a detrimental period for Cold War alliances as superpower detente and Western domestic opposition to great power involvement and intervention in the Third World became the norm.[6]

From the foregoing discussion, it would seem that neither autonomous nor hegemonic regionalism provides an adequate premise for the study of political and security cooperation among developing countries. As such, the notion of

'omnibalancing,' as opposed to that of balance of power, may be conceptually useful in this respect. As one scholar has argued:

> Omnibalancing agrees with the central assumption of balance of power - that threats will be resisted. But it departs from balance of power in explaining Third World alignment decisions as a result of the Third World leadership's need to counter all threats. Thus, whereas balance of power focuses on the state's need to counter threats from other states, omnibalancing considers internal and external threats to the leadership.[7]

A grouping such as ASEAN is no exception. The Association has ostensibly promoted itself as an autonomous organisation; however, existing security linkages with great powers remain entrenched and even strengthened as in the case of the Five Power Defence Arrangement already discussed in the second chapter.[8] The first two chapters alluded to the inherent political role of ASEAN and the substantial bilateral security ties between member states that are conducted outside the de jure ambit of ASEAN cooperation. The Association, however, has incessantly emphasized that it is not a military alliance, for fear of compromising its conciliatory approach to regionalism.[9] Yet, new challenges to regional security have arisen as a result of the current withdrawal of American forces from the Philippines and the rise of China and India as regional powers. ASEAN's recognition of such new uncertainties is clearly reflected in the recently enunciated Singapore Declaration, which (as noted in the second chapter) has essentially expanded the mandate to include security cooperation - as opposed to the previously held view that such cooperation is to be conducted on a strictly non-ASEAN basis. In the light of such developments and ASEAN security cooperation in general, the notion of a security regime may provide useful conceptual suggestions for the purposes of this chapter. Two significant security-related issue areas will be discussed, namely, conflict management and security cooperation between ASEAN countries. The chapter will conclude with an examination of regime characteristics in these issue areas.

Security Regimes

Jervis' conception of a security regime refers essentially to "principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate."[10] Such norms and expectations qualitatively transcend other norms that seek only to facilitate cooperation born out of short-term self-interest. This is not to deny that participants in a security regime do not adhere to the primacy of national security and welfare. In this sense, self-interest transcends its self-seeking nature to assume broader implications in the form of an 'enlightened' self-interest: a state is secure if other states are equally secure. Security regimes are thus dependent on the strength of commitment among all its participants to reciprocity of action[11] and the concomitant belief that conflicting positions can in fact be reconciled by shared interests, including that of preserving the regime. Other common interests include avoiding war and establishing the durable stability required for achieving regime and national goals.

The conditions intrinsic to the formation and development of a security regime differ somewhat from those pertinent to economic or communications regimes largely due to the 'security dilemma.' The politics of security retain an inherent paradoxical logic that creates a dilemma because defence policies designed primarily to increase the security of one state invariably and inadvertently threaten or decrease the security of other states. In short, high politics are essentially 'zero-sum' in nature. This in no way suggests that politics of a non-security nature do not evince such dynamics; clearly, the mercantilist trade policies endemic to the inter-war period between the European states or the protectionist clashes of recent GATT rounds among member states displayed attitudes and behaviours closely resembling the above problematic.

Security issues, however, often involve greater competitiveness than economic

and other issues. In conflicts which may well culminate in displays of military prowess, the stakes involved are invariably higher. Minor mistakes in policy-making and execution can produce major consequences for the erroneous state in question. The uncertain and precarious nature of security issues is shown in the difficulties involved in the measuring of one's own security and in the monitoring and detecting of another's actions. As one scholar has observed, states "habitually shape their reactions to the power of other states in accordance with their answers to the question 'What are they likely to do with their power?' as well as the question 'How much power do they have?'"[12] In addition, both offensive and defensive strategies in security politics often manifest themselves in the same behaviour, namely, the recourse to armed conflict whether for the purpose of attacking or deterring others.[13]

On the other hand, conflicts involving non-security issues generally lead to less severe consequences. Qualifications, however, are in order. Students of politics remain indebted to Marxian thinkers for their recognition of the linkage between economic relations and violence. Lenin's theories of imperialism, for example, contend that capitalism's insatiable appetite for foreign markets led to the enforced colonisation of lands by Western capitalist states and, by implication, hostilities between major powers as they contested each other for colonies. More recently, the increasing significance of the Asia-Pacific maritime environment in view of the dynamic East Asian economic region has engendered much concern for the maritime security of the region.[14] The Southeast Asian littoral states (as noted in the preceding chapters) share a similar concern for their own maritime backyard where, given the maze of overlapping claims over territory and the exploitation of marine and sea bed resources, the possibility of armed conflict between claimants cannot be ruled out.[15] These concerns essentially reflect the expanding conception of security. In this respect, ASEAN, as an

international regime concerned with regional security and inter-state cooperation encompassing the political, economic, scientific, technical and cultural fields, constitutes a veritable, albeit incipient, security regime.

Four conditions have been suggested as intrinsic to the formation and preservation of a security regime.[16] First, potential regime participants must possess a clear preference for, and desire to establish, a regulated environment where mutual restraint and constraints on unilateral actions are expressedly the rule not exception. A state which espouses objectives incompatible with those of others, and unwilling to regulate its behaviour or attenuate its threatening actions, will find it exceedingly difficult to form or be a part of a security regime. In this sense, a malign hegemonic regime, such as the former Comecon bloc or the Indochinese 'special relationship' between Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, does not constitute a security regime.

Second, the states must regard war and the individualistic pursuit of security as costly affairs involving the loss of lives, revenues and resources. This does not suggest that states totally reject war; in fact, states participating in a security regime may well regard war as one of several institutions for managing international or regional security. Bull, for example, has argued that states regard war "as an instrument of state policy and a basic determinant of the shape of the international system."[17] Such states, however, will form security regimes for the purpose of imposing certain limits on fighting. In this sense, the regime seeks to regulate or moderate, not eliminate, conflict. It has been suggested that the Concert of Europe constitutes an excellent example of a security regime.[18] While the Concert did not completely eliminate conflict, it regulated it by relegating war to a less, if not the least, desirable option in favour of statecraft and diplomacy. In the words of the former British Foreign Secretary, Castlereagh, Concert politics adopted "an open and direct mode of

intercourse in the conduct of business."[19] As such, consultation and cooperation served as the preferred method of conflict resolution for the Concert regime. However, it may be argued that a state's individual efforts to increase its security may not necessarily decrease that of others especially if such efforts are perceived by the latter to enhance the overall security of the group; that is, the strengthening of the respective individual units contributes to the regime's synergy.

Third, these same states must believe that others place the same value on mutual security and cooperation as they themselves do. If a state perceives itself to be confronted by others possessing hidden agenda which threaten its security, it will not seek a regime with those same states. Israel's inveterate failure to establish peaceful relations with its Arab neighbours (except Egypt), is indicative of disagreement between states concerned regarding solutions to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East region. The 1969 Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security system (as mentioned in the second chapter) was viewed with suspicion by ASEAN as an attempt to 'encircle' China and plausibly even to exclude the United States from the region.[20] The complexity of this particular condition derives from its psychological nature as the premises of decision-making rest largely in the realm of belief and perception. More often than not, security regimes are rejected because states are incorrectly perceived by others as aggressors when in fact the opposite is true. This alludes to what others have elsewhere referred as the requisite quintessential 'intersubjective' values necessary for regimes to function successfully, such as converging expectations among members (or potential members).[21] It thus remains the misfortune of states located in regions where internecine strife is common to overestimate the purported aggressiveness of other states at the expense of having in place a viable security regime.

Fourth, even if states seek to maintain the regional status quo, a security regime would not form if even one state regards territorial expansion as the only route to ensuring its security. The preemptive quality of such a condition differentiates it from the case whereby a state or group of states advocates expansionism premised on megalomaniac intent. Caesarian Rome or Hitlerian Germany fall essentially into the latter category. Conversely, the Soviet Union, as 'post-revisionist' Cold War students may well argue, fit the bill of the former.[22] In other words, the Soviet objective to establish a security buffer between the capitalist states and itself indicated its recognition and acceptance of the status quo; in short, expansion was sought to ensure its security. In this respect, Vietnam, even as a status quo power, remained unreconciled with ASEAN (which the Vietnamese for long regarded as a Western proxy), due to its expansionist designs vis-a-vis Indochina. Such a perspective, as Jervis has argued, "may be a reflection of something close to paranoia, perhaps brought about by long experience with strong enemies."[23]

After the security regime has begun functioning, it becomes a force in its own right by providing the impetus for its participants to ensure its continued existence. Jervis has suggested four ways in which state behaviour can be influenced by the regime.[24] First, the very expectation among member states that the regime can and should continue to function accords the regime a self-fulfilling and self-perpetuating dynamic crucial for the latter's maintenance. More often than not, as in the case of the Concert, the absence of other viable alternatives enhances the significance of the regime and thereby its preservation. This does not suggest that regime maintenance is thus predicated on some form of mechanistic or automatic self-determinism but that regime participants contribute to the process of maintenance by their expectations for and attendant investments in the regime via praxis. States persuaded of the utility of

the regime will be less likely to defect and more willing to invest in it via accepting significant short-term risks and sacrifices in the expectation of long-term benefits. In this respect, preservation of peace and stability becomes important with regard to expectation, because the increased likelihood of war can only produce defections. This is similar to the notion of a 'pluralistic security community'; that is, regime participants conduct their relations with each other on the basis of expectations of peaceful change.[25] The success and survival of regimes, however, do not depend solely on participant expectations and intentions; in short, intentions should not be equated with outcomes. Nevertheless, these psychological variables remain cardinal to the object of regime maintenance in the sense that they constitute the very stuff of what Haas (as discussed in chapter one) has called 'evolutionary epistemology.'

Second, regime participants are discouraged from forcibly modifying or attempting to modify the status quo in anticipation of the greater opposition they will face from their fellow participants. Expansionist or aggressor states that do not belong to a security regime face opposition primarily from their intended target state(s). Conversely, regime states stand to face opposition from others in the regime who may not be immediately affected by the former's aggressive behaviour. In essence, such behaviour may be regarded within the regime as aberrant or deviant in nature and in contradiction to regime norms and accepted behaviour.

Third, the regime permits the development and cultivation of reciprocity among participants which in turn strengthens the regime. The fear that making concessions can be perceived easily by others as indications of weakness, which may lead to expectations of further concessions, constitutes a major impediment to cooperation among states.[26] Reciprocity is exercised when states moderate their demands and individualistic pursuits on a unilateral basis. In fact, 'reciprocity' is a misnomer

because in order for a security regime to successfully operate, states often have to make concessions without knowing whether or which others will reciprocate.[27]

Fourth, the security regime eventually evinces a certain degree of institutionalisation. This does not suggest that such institutionalisation must necessarily manifest itself as some form of organisational structure equipped with a formal machinery or supranationalist framework. Neither does this imply that a singularly coherent and complete policy perspective must necessarily evolve out of the institutionalist cauldron. In essence, institutionalisation may well be expressed simply as the amalgamation of several different perspectives that entail the alignment or coordination of national policies as opposed to detailed collaboration among states to produce a single overarching policy. In this respect, the cognitive regime framework proves to be a more feasible approach. As one scholar has put it, institutionalisation refers to "the process by which norms and rules acquire value and legitimacy;"[28] in other words, it serves as a socialising process through which regime identity and interests are internalised by regime members. As such, institutionalisation becomes the dependent variable by which regime strength - complex adaptational learning and changing conceptions of self and interest - can be measured.[29]

Intra-ASEAN Conflict Management

As noted in the first two chapters, ASEAN was created with the purposeful intent of providing its member states with a mechanism for the peaceful mediation of inter-state conflicts that largely took the form of territorial disputes. The provision of a multilateral framework for the settlement of bilateral differences emanated from the realisation among member states that existent bilateral channels meant for the same purpose were no longer able to function in any effective and meaningful way owing to

undue stress caused by events such as the Confrontation and the longstanding Sabah dispute. In establishing the organisation, it was hoped that these fractious bilateral relationships could be restored via the multilateral mechanisms. Paradoxically, the success of regional cooperation in turn depended, according to the Malaysian foreign minister, on "an interlocking network of cordial bilateral relations."[30] In other words, bilateralism in effect preconditioned the regional environment for subsequent multilateralism by providing the necessary, albeit insufficient, foundation for the task of assuaging regional hurts and building trust and confidence among neighbours.

The ASEAN format thus encouraged the development of a set of behaviourial norms and principles that served as a guide to which member states could adhere. Although the formative years of the organisation did not produce tangible economic results, they served the political purpose of facilitating peaceful inter-member interaction. Such interactive dynamics had been lacking essentially owing to ASEAN being a nascent grouping comprised of nascent states (except Thailand). The ensuing process of evolutionary learning and adaptation between states, or more accurately between leaders, proved useful in helping to sensitize themselves to each other's unique problems. The significance of leadership (or what some have referred to elsewhere as the undefinable 'X' factor[31]) in the process of norm-building is rather obvious when one considers the political longevity of some of the ASEAN leaders, such as Indonesia's President Suharto or Singapore's former Prime Minister Lee. The success of the Association is largely dependent on the stability afforded by the political systems of its respective member states. The lack of public comment by ASEAN leaders on the Philippine political struggle in 1986 which witnessed the downfall of the Marcos regime connoted the others' adherence to the norm of non-interference in each other's internal affairs; conversely, it reflected their common

anxiety for the health of the security regime. In these respects, it appears at present that the dominance of incumbent leaderships and power elites in the ASEAN states is assured at least for the foreseeable future.[32]

The significance of durable political stability to ASEAN raises the question of the need for stable successions of power and, by implication, system and regime legitimacy. It may be argued that the rise of the technocratic class to the highest echelons of the power structure in the ASEAN states has led to the supplanting of leadership by bureaucratic institutions.[33] This does not imply that the gradual paring down of ideological content from the ASEAN-styled development process is necessarily a bad thing for it equally suggests the implementation of rational, expert and stable decision and policy making to areas integral to development, such as trade, industry, finance and investment. The overthrow of the Marcos regime raises fundamental questions concerning the survivability of these authoritarian capitalist structures which have served ASEAN so well.[34] Similarly, the recent spate of public anger and violence in Bangkok over military chief Suchinda Kraprayoon's decision to assume the Thai premiership lends credence to such a view. The success of the Thai public, albeit with the diplomatic intervention of the Thai monarch, in coercing Suchinda's abdication and eliciting promises of imminent constitutional change, suggests that the Thais (and, by implication, the ASEAN region), have crossed the rubicon into a new era of democratic reform. This, however, may be too premature a prognostication. For example, in the case of Thailand, the military's stranglehold over key areas of domestic infrastructure, such as transportation and communications, remains as intransigent as ever.[35] The Thai king's consequent invitation to the former caretaker premier, Anand Panyarachun, and his team of technocratic leaders to form yet another interim administration perhaps points to the capacity of the administrative

state to engender and provide durable stability. Ultimately, it remains in the best interests of the ASEAN members as essentially administrative states to sum up the requisite political will to engage in self-adaptation and self-reform in order to build and maintain consensus and legitimacy in their rapidly changing societies.[36] In this respect, the case of the Philippines notwithstanding[37], Thailand serves as the litmus test for this daunting task.

The multilateral setting thus discouraged unilateral or individualistic displays of extreme behaviour and regulated extravagant demands among states; in other words, the ASEAN meetings in and of themselves served as confidence-building measures.[38] As a result, such useful norms were clearly preferred over previous interactions of a largely adversarial, not conciliatory, nature - norms which would perpetuate and maintain the regime. For example, the Association's founding declaration of 1967 intimated that the concerns of its member states lay in the cultivation of norms considered imperative for conflict management, such as the mutual respect of each other's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the "fostering [of] good understanding [and] good neighbourliness."[39] The ZOPFAN Declaration of 1971 made reference to the aims and objectives of the United Nations by calling on all signatories to abide "by the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, abstention from threat or use of force, [and] peaceful settlement of international disputes."[40] Likewise, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of 1976 reiterated and expanded on these norms in its promulgation of these five principles, namely, mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations (read ASEAN states); the unassailable right of every nation to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion; non-interference in the affairs of one another; the settlement of differences and disputes by peaceful

means; and finally, the renunciation of the threat of the use of force.[41]

Such norms have largely kept the ASEAN region free of overt violence. This does not deny that widely divergent views among member states exist nor that bilateral disputes continue to hamper and frustrate the regionalist process. What is evident, however, is that the ASEAN countries are clearly committed to a programme of regional reconciliation which stresses the pacific settlement of intra-regional conflicts and disputes. In this respect, conflict has largely been regulated. And again, the notion of a 'pluralistic security community' can equally be of use here as it emphasizes the conduct of inter-state relations based on peaceful change. These norms have at present taken on an enhanced significance in view of the anticipated accession of Vietnam and Laos to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in the not too distant future.[42] Nonetheless, the prospect of a new Southeast Asian order has also invoked ambivalent responses. As a former Malaysian foreign minister has intimated, "ASEAN is already bristling with differences."[43]

The decision-making process and negotiating style of the Association itself is ultimately one of the settlement of issues in a 'consociational' way within a grouping of friends and neighbours, not adversaries.[44] ASEAN negotiations occur within an environment of apparent cooperation rather than actual conflict and antagonism; paradoxically, negotiations also take place within a context of conflicting and shared interests. This alludes to a quintessentially ASEAN method of decision-making which emphasizes the value of consensual bargaining. As Lee Kuan Yew stated:

> We have made progress in an Asian manner, not through rules and regulations,but through musjawarah and consensus. We have developed a mutual appreciation for differences in culture, and learned to make allowances for differences in style.[45]

In this respect, although the role of ASEAN in the Cambodian imbroglio proved integral to building much needed international cohesion, the inability of the member

states to reconcile their divergent strategic perspectives with respect to external threats (as discussed in chapter two) reflected the Association's greater difficulty in achieving convergence when dealing with extra-ASEAN conflicts which do not directly involve one or more member state(s). Nevertheless, it can be argued that the importance of the Association as a factor in the foreign policies of member states was gradually but evidently increasing.

Two bilateral conflicts have served as litmus tests for this mode of conflict management, namely, the Sabah dispute and Malaysian-Singaporean differences. The first conflict saw the actual involvement of other member states as participants in the mediation process. The second conflict has thus far been confined to interactions between the contestants. Its importance, however, rests in the potential threat it poses to the ASEAN security agenda in general and Malaysian-Singaporean political, security and economic cooperation in particular. Ultimately, other member states may be invited to mediate if and when bilateral channels collapse.

The Sabah dispute stands out among the several competing boundary claims because of the seriousness and the amount of land involved; and its ignominious distinction as the dispute which effectively crippled the regional organisation known as ASA. In this respect, it revealed to a large extent the possibilities and constraints evident in ASEAN's ability to mediate internal disagreements. The essence of the dispute rests in the conflicting interpretation of an 1878 agreement which the Philippines insisted merely provided for a lease, and not a transfer of sovereignty, of the Sabah territory to Britain initially and Malaysia subsequently.[46] Various reasons have been suggested to explain the Philippine claim. These include, inter alia, President Macapagal's idiosyncratic aims and the country's ethnocentric desire to demonstrate its independence from the United States. Security concerns also came into

play, as evidenced by a 1963 communication between Macapagal and American President Kennedy.[47]

Ferdinand Marcos' presidential tenure, which began in 1965, was characterised by amicable ties with Malaysia in the early stage. The amity, however, was short-lived owing to the Corregidor incident of 1968. Apparently, Muslim insurgents were being trained on the island of Corregidor for the alleged purpose of armed infiltration into Sabah. The tenacity of the claim, while never officially renounced, eventually abated due to the lack of international sympathy for the Philippine cause. Sabah's voluntary participation in the Malaysian federation clearly indicated the underlying futility and irrationality of the Philippine claim.[48] The claim received another blow with the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine which emphasized defence burden-sharing responsibilities and, by implication, self-reliance on the part of allies and aligned states.

It was evident that ASEAN proved less prominent relative to Sabah in Manila's policy calculations. It can be argued that the Philippines quite possibly perceived its security-based ties with the United States as sufficient guarantee for its own security requirements. The Association only became a viable alternative in the Philippine conception of regional security owing to uncertainties brought about by the Nixon Doctrine. The other member states sought to distance ASEAN from the Sabah dispute for fear of consigning the organisation to a quick demise not unlike the ASA experience. In essence, the dissolution of ASEAN would indicate that member states no longer held the conviction that regional reconciliation is an attainable goal. While the fear of confronting the Sabah imbroglio as an explicit ASEAN matter evidently contradicted the Association's purpose (that is, as a regional mechanism for dispute settlement), it can be argued that the grouping then was in an embryonic stage, and

organisational norms were not yet well established. Nevertheless, by 1968, the dispute eventually found itself on the ASEAN agenda where both claimant states were persuaded by other ASEAN states to moderate their increasingly hostile behaviour on behalf of the welfare of their nascent Association.[49] Ironically, in the same year, the complete collapse of diplomatic ties between the disputants led to the unofficial retraction of the Philippine claim. This happened primarily because the severity of the threat to the ASEAN's existence impaired the Philippines' relations with the other member states - a cost Manila was not prepared to incur. The Association thus provided its Philippine member a face-saving device for gradually reassimilating into the ASEAN community and reestablishing friendly relations with others. One scholar has argued that ASEAN mediation proved so "successful" that the consultative processes and arbitration procedures used were largely adopted as parts of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.[50] The unresolved dispute remains in a state of indefinite diplomatic limbo, as suggested by a 1987 statement from the Malaysian foreign office: "The Malaysian Government would prefer to leave the question of dropping the claim to the Philippines, as and when it is ready to do so."[51]

The uneasy but largely non-violent relationship between Malaysia and Singapore never quite came as close to tearing the organisational fabric of ASEAN as did the Sabah dispute, although on occasion it rivalled the latter's intensity. Unlike the Sabah dispute, other ASEAN states have not yet been called to serve in mediation. Nevertheless, its potential for disrupting ASEAN cooperation constitutes a source of concern for others as well as those involved. Singapore was unceremoniously ejected from the Malaysian federation in 1965 owing largely to political differences between the Singapore and Kuala Lumpur leaderships. Since then, the relationship has been characterised by mutual suspicion and tension. Historical and ethnic factors have

continued to compete with, and hinder intermittently, bilateral efforts to improve political and security cooperation between the two states.

On the part of Singapore, the immediate need to ensure its basic security requirements upon achieving independence proved immense due to the precarious nature of its relations with its closest neighbours, Indonesia and Malaysia. Lee Kuan Yew alluded bluntly to such a concern in 1966: "Your neighbours are not your best friends..."[52] This led to an intensive military build-up as part of a self-styled 'poison shrimp' policy which, by all purposes and intents, was perceived with growing concern from Malaysia's perspective. One Malaysian Cabinet member reminded his national audience in 1989 that Singapore continues to view Malaysia "as a threat to [its] existence" and that Singapore's offer of military facilities to the United States may thus be construed as a purported 'deterrence' directed against Malaysia.[53] In the same vein, the Malaysian armed forces chief alluded to the threat perception, "Do not forget that a small nation can be stronger than and threaten or invade a bigger country which is weak."[54] Another senior official, however, argued that Singapore, as a consequence of its geostrategic significance and physical vulnerability, is compelled to develop a credible defence capability for obvious security purposes.[55]

Several incidents reflected the tenuous nature of Malaysian-Singaporean relations. The 1986 visit to Singapore by President Chaim Herzog of Israel evoked widespread protest in Malaysia. These included criticisms of Singapore's insensitivity towards Muslim communities in the region and the apparent damage inflicted on ASEAN solidarity and bilateral ties. One Malaysian minister even compared Singapore's position in ASEAN with that of "a wolf in sheep's clothing."[56] This was followed by the purported uncovering of a Singaporean espionage network in Malaysia in 1989.

Two equally provocative incidents occurred in 1991 which exacerbated the situation. First, it was alleged that Singaporean artillery practice fire landed just off the coast of the state (or province) of Johor on July 28. This incident was summarily resolved upon verification by both states that the Singapore military was not responsible for the explosions.[57] Second, Malaysia and Indonesia held a joint military exercise in an area not too far from the Singapore-Johor border over an August weekend that coincided with Singapore's national day celebrations. This incident provoked a flurry of protests from Singapore concerning the 'insensitivity' of both participant states vis-a-vis the timing of the exercise. (See Diagram 2 under Appendices.) Also, it was alleged (by Singaporean critics), that the exercise could well have been a test of Singapore's military preparedness and the resolve of the state's leadership under the novice premier Goh Chok Tong.[58] The situation assumed a farcical quality when the Singaporean military, presumably in response, conducted a huge reservist mobilisation exercise on the same weekend which in turn prompted a reciprocal outcry from the Malaysian public at Singapore's insensitivity. There, however, were cautions on both sides against undue alarm and overreaction. Likewise, Indonesia responded by insisting that the armed forces of all three countries continue to "maintain a close relationship."[59] Clearly, the political fall out from this series of stormy episodes continues to plague the relationship as seen by the Malaysian public's criticism of Goh's attempt to draw lessons for Singapore from the recent Gulf War.[60]

The bilateral conflict also involves the element of territorial disputation. The issue of the sovereignty of Pedra Branca island, which is sought after not so much for itself as for the oil-rich waters surrounding it, has embroiled both states in a diplomatic tussle since 1979 when the Malaysian government published a map that evidently included the island within its jurisdictional ambit. Singapore, conversely,

claims de jure ownership of the island dating back to the 1840s.[61] The situation has not been assisted much by the fact that the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which both Malaysia and Singapore have signed but have not ratified, is largely subject to varying interpretations regarding issues of maritime boundaries and exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Both countries agreed in 1981 to a formal exchange of ownership documents which has yet to take place owing to the lack of response on the part of Kuala Lumpur to Singapore's numerous overtures and reminders. The matter was again referred to during the fourth ASEAN summit, where both prime ministers agreed as before to effect a document exchange. It was reported recently in the Straits Times that Kuala Lumpur will contact Singapore shortly to set a suitable date for bilateral discussions to resolve the issue.[62]

While the problematic relationship has not affected seriously ASEAN cooperation, it nonetheless complicates security relations between the two states. This does not augur well for the Association's new goal to formalise security cooperation between its members. Similarly, it may prove equally injurious to ASEAN's enhanced economic mandate by stifling the growing patterns of economic cooperation. ASEAN has evidently benefitted over the years from its astonishing ability to distinguish between intra-member bilateral relations and regional cooperation. In this respect, the grouping's leaderships have wisely separated bilateral security cooperation from the ambit of explicit ASEAN cooperation. It is thus a measure of the strength of the ASEAN states to continue maintaining their not insignificant security linkages in the face of such differences. The tradition of close consultation between respective leaders has evidently assisted in resolving misunderstandings before they assume more serious proportions.[63]

Intra-ASEAN Security Cooperation

Until recently, the rejection of ASEAN as a de facto military alliance has not in any way hindered the proliferation of bilateral (and impending multilateral) security linkages between member states which have been described by the Indonesian military chief as an "ASEAN defence spider web."[64] The notion of a defence organisation did not fit the original security goals of the Association; that is, to collectively assist in the defeat of the common threat of communist subversion. As noted in the preceding discussion, the failure of SEATO suggested that, in the case of ASEAN, an overt defence arrangement did not only bring with it Cold War connotations but was highly questionable in its ability to deal effectively with the problem of internal subversion. The advent of Vietnam as the regional hegemon in the 1970s provided ASEAN with an explicit external enemy. As Acharya has noted, Vietnamese actions proved catalytic in persuading the Association's leaders to "rethink their position on collective security."[65] Even then, the legitimacy of ASEAN as a veritable defence organisation would still have been suspect if only for the asymmetry of military power in the region. A comparison of current force levels between ASEAN and Vietnam (see Table 3 under Appendices), with the latter having begun force reductions since the end of the Cold War, still reflects the discrepancies.

The inherent paradox in intra-ASEAN security cooperation lies in the fact that bilateral ties have evolved to the point where they now clearly affect the fundamental goals of ASEAN as a grouping and its role in the maintenance of regional security. As Weatherbee has argued, these linkages can no longer be dismissed lightly as "not [being] functionally part of the ASEAN political community."[66] In essence, it only needed the requisite elements of a crisis and the attendant collective political will to take the next step of formalising multilateral cooperation, both of which have been

provided for by the unexpected early departure of American forces from the Philippines. The apparent ease by which the ASEAN leaderships effected the necessary shift in strategic perspective during the Singapore summit is a measurement and affirmation of the extent of existing security cooperation.[67] Proposals mooted during the summit include calls for the establishment of a intra-regional 'defence forum' or 'defence co-operation panel'[68] for consultative purposes in addition to the formally endorsed ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) as the ASEAN-led multilateral security framework for the region.

These proposals quite likely do not suggest any intention or pretence on the part of the grouping to be a bona fide military alliance. They also evince the continuation of balance-of-power thinking among ASEAN states; that is, some manner of an ASEAN defence arrangement is necessary in order to "fill the security vacuum" upon the withdrawal of American forces from Southeast Asia.[69] Nevertheless, power balancing remains an insufficient mechanism and has to be used in conjunction with alternative institutions such as ASEAN-PMC multilateral framework. It may, however, be argued that the latter institution guarantees to a certain extent the involvement of external powers in what amounts to a more complex balancing context.[70]

Bilateralism was accepted almost from the beginning as the norm for security cooperation in ASEAN. As a former Malaysian official has argued:

> The limitation of regional cooperation within a formal framework should not prevent countries of the region from trying to forge the closest possible links on a bilateral basis with one another.[71]

Bilateralism in effect endured as the primary form of security cooperation in ASEAN. Lee Kuan Yew's 1982 proposal of 'trilateral' and even 'quadrilateral' modes of security collaboration found little support then among the other ASEAN states for fear of having their organisation labelled as an alliance. Contrary to the longstanding

ASEAN discomfort against formalised multilateralism in security matters, many if not all of such forms of bilateral cooperation exhibited some degree of institutionalism.

The various expressions of security cooperation can essentially be distinguished into two categories. First, early cooperation generally assumed the form of bilateral counter-insurgency efforts. These included cooperative ventures to curb transnational communist (and other) threats and the exchange of intelligence on subversive elements. For example, Thais and Malaysians have for long collaborated on border security cooperation to root out elements of the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM) from the southern Thai jungles. Malaysian-Indonesian cooperation along the Kalimantan-Sarawak border has encompassed even broader security implications including smuggling, drug-trafficking and counterfeiting beside the ubiquitous problem of communist insurgency.[72] These arrangements, however, have not been without political difficulties, as exemplified by Thai sensitivities towards the accordance of 'hot pursuit' rights of Malaysian forces into Thai territory during the 1970s and 1980s. This situation was ironically reversed in the early 1980s when Thailand sought similar rights in its campaign against Thai Muslim separatists.

Intelligence-sharing, on the other hand, is conducted at both bilateral and multilateral levels beginning in the late 1960s with the deteriorating Indochinese situation and the domestic communist problem among ASEAN states. There remains to this day little official acknowledgement of multilateral intelligence activity in ASEAN cooperation although independent comments by leaders have shown otherwise. For example, President Marcos alluded in 1976 to the fact that ASEAN states have been exchanging information "for the past four years."[73] Perhaps the strongest indication of the strength of intelligence linkages is the Malaysian-Singaporean link which began soon after the conclusion of Confrontation and has

continued even during the most serious periods of bilateral strain.

The second category of forms of cooperation has been engendered largely as a response to the intensification of external threats, particularly that of Vietnam. The collapse of communist insurgencies in the aftermath of the Cold War has led to a discernable shift in security priorities of ASEAN states from primarily counter-insurgency concerns to conventional defence doctrines. Concomitantly, this has been met with a proliferation of conventional forms of military-security cooperation including combined exercises and training. Others have speculated elsewhere regarding the prospects for developing an indigenous regional arms industry as a form of ASEAN security cooperation.[74] (See Table 4 under Appendices.) In the case of joint exercises, the greater number of maritime and air exercises compared with land exercises reflects the said shift towards conventionalism; at the same time, it also indicates the incessant existence of political suspicions and sensitivities inherent in intra-ASEAN bilateral relations. However, the recent increase in the number of land exercises, such as those in 1989 between Malaysia and Singapore (i.e., Semangat Bersatu exercise), and in 1991 between Indonesia and Malaysia (i.e., Malindo Darsasa 3AB exercise), also suggests that long held taboos concerning the presence of friendly but potentially hostile foreign troops in one's own territory may finally be breaking down. One noteworthy 'building block' of ASEAN security cooperation rests in the positioning of Indonesia at the centre of the ASEAN 'spider web' of links as evinced by its extensive participation in bilateral arrangements. This clearly reflects the importance of Indonesia as the bona fide ASEAN leader in encouraging and sustaining this security mosaic. Similarly, the significance of Malaysia's role in ASEAN security cooperation as co-initiators with Indonesia of such links should likewise not be overlooked. As Weatherbee has opined, "the de facto Malaysian-Indonesian security

alliance" constitutes the "strong core" (and thus a second 'building block') of these same links.[75] Malaysia's emphatic involvement in strengthening these ties is understandable considering its unenviable distinction of being the sole ASEAN state to share common borders with all other member states.[76] In this respect, security cooperation in general and joint military exercises in particular have assumed a greater significance in the wider arena of intra-ASEAN conflict management in that they serve essentially as a useful confidence and security-building measure (CSBM). As Singapore's top military officer has intimated, ASEAN bilateral exercises help to "build links with our (Singapore) neighbours, overcome suspicion and promote cooperation."[77]

A third albeit less plausible 'building block' lies in the gradual proliferation of interlocking bilateral security ties between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Although the development suggests the possible emergence of a 'triangular' defence relationship, this does not seem possible prima facie owing to the cautious Malaysian-Singaporean relationship and the occasional hiccup in Malaysian-Indonesian ties. In the latter case, the 1990 execution of an Indonesian national for drug-related offenses in Malaysia, which evoked widespread protest in Indonesia, led the Indonesian defence minister to caution that the long touted 'special relationship' between the two countries cannot be taken for granted.[78] Nevertheless, given all the difficulties that can easily hinder the development of trilateralism, the respective leaderships have increasingly alluded to the concept as a useful way of expanding security cooperation between the three states in particular and ASEAN in general. For example, Singapore's foreign minister, in reference to the possible establishment of trilateral security ties between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, has spoken about the 'indivisible security' of the three states by virtue of them "living cheek by jowl with each other."[79] Similarly, the

Indonesian defence minister has also recently proposed the development of three-way defence ties among the same states.[80] This possibly suggests the recognition among Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore regarding the need to ensure the security of the proliferating economic linkages as manifested in the SIJORI industrial growth triangle.

In this respect, if the notion of triangular security cooperation becomes a reality, ASEAN, perhaps for the first time, will have effected the transition towards attaining a mature regional (or more appropriately subregional) resilience at least within the sub-ASEAN triangle encompassing political, security and economic cooperation. The preceding chapters discussed the multidimensional nature of the national security challenge facing ASEAN states and suggested that these states have to adopt (or have adopted) a comprehensive approach to security. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are the three members of ASEAN which have articulated formal doctrines of comprehensive security.[81] Indonesia, since 1973, has formally emphasized its doctrine of ketahanan nasional (or national resilience; also an ASEAN-endorsed concept) whereas Singapore has a well articulated 'total defence' philosophy.[82] Similarly, Malaysia has also espoused a multidimensional security policy.[83]

Other significant bilateral arrangements include the area of military training. The first form of training comprises the interaction of military personnel, such as the educating of senior and middle level officers in advanced war colleges; and that of junior officers and other ranks in education and training programmes. The second form involves cooperation on field training facilities. While the preceding paragraphs have discussed the 'Indonesia-centric'[84] nature of bilateral exercises, the same can be said of Singapore when it comes to training areas.[85] The most recent manifestation of this cooperative form is the joint development by Indonesia and Singapore of the Air

Combat Manoeuvring Range (ACMR) in east Sumatra.[86] As in other bilateral arrangements, these forms of cooperation have assisted largely as CSBMs for the forging of ASEAN cohesion.

The long-term ASEAN goal to develop regional self-reliance and self-sufficiency suggests that cooperative arrangements should also include arms acquisition, production and standardisation among member states. Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have all, at one time or another, called for the establishment of a combined arms factory and a regional 'war reserve contingency pool.'[87] There is, however, little evidence of any visible trend towards such joint production arrangements. Interestingly, Indonesia and Singapore, ASEAN's most prolific arms producers, have found in ASEAN an enthusiastic and absorptive market for arms exports.[88] There appears prima facie to be some evidence of standardisation of weapons systems and equipment among ASEAN states. For example, in the case of fighter aircraft, four member states currently possess F-5 jet fighters; three states possess A-4s; and another three states have F-16s. Similarly, four states are equipped with French-built Exocet missiles.[89] Upon closer examination, these existing patterns are more the result of coincidence rather than corporate strategy. As Huisken has contended, the patterns may well be the by-product of 'interactive arms acquisition' - the phenomenon of states competing to procure the latest and best in armaments.[90] Divergent threat perceptions coupled with prestige concerns clearly play a crucial role in engendering the build-up. This suggests that constraints which limit the building of trust and confidence among ASEAN members with regard to their respective military capabilities and intentions still exist. For example, it has been suggested elsewhere that Singapore's decision to acquire the F-16 during the 1980s in order to "maintain a technological edge over neighbouring air forces" provided the impetus for a mini arms

race among ASEAN states.[91]

Nevertheless, changes to existent patterns appear to be forthcoming. In conjunction with the current focus on closer security cooperation, recent developments suggest that ASEAN states may well be headed towards a conscious effort at standardisation and pooling of technological facilities. Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia have opted to procure Hawk fighter aircraft in which the Philippines and Thailand have also displayed interest.[92] The emphasis on joint ventures in aircraft production, as in the case of bilateral cooperation between British Aerospace and Indonesia's Nusantara Aircraft Industry (IPTN) in producing the Hawks, have prompted suggestions on the possibility of a future production centre to supply and service the entire ASEAN region.[93] Such thinking remains strictly speculative in nature. More importantly, however, these developments seem to mark a shift away from the recent patterns of procuring expensive and sophisticated weaponry. First, it may be argued that collective fears of an ASEAN arms race have brought about moderation in the defence policies of member states. This concern is reflected in a recent United Nations study on disarmament.[94] Second, budgetary concerns also comprise a significant impetus among ASEAN states to modify their expenditure patterns. Two important antecedents include the ongoing American recession and the concomitant concern with growing signs of overheating among the ASEAN economies as an inevitable consequence of their unparalleled economic growth of the past several years.[95] As Table 5 (see Appendices), suggests[96], the increased spending of Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore from 1986 to 1988 clearly reflects the rising militarism in the ASEAN region. However, the overall decrease in spending in 1989 (except for Malaysia), somewhat supports the preceding conclusion. It remains unclear as to the manner of form and substance which future security cooperation will eventually

assume. Although ASEAN now possesses the requisite mandate for multilateral military-security cooperation, it seems likely in the case of intra-grouping cooperation that bilateralism, at least in the foreseeable future, will remain the cardinal premise upon which more ambitious forms of cooperation, if and when necessary, can be built. While it is not the aim of this study to speculate on future arrangements, it seems plausible to suggest from the preceding discussion that the prevalent concern of ASEAN military establishments (as opposed to diplomatic rhetoric), lies more in enhancing consultation and cooperation, not building formal defence pacts.

Conclusion

The primary conceptual objective of this chapter has been to identify patterns of ASEAN political and security cooperation which possibly reflect the dynamics of a security regime. In this respect, the suggested 'principles, rules and norms' that govern and moderate the behaviours of the ASEAN states in intra-ASEAN conflict management and security cooperation were examined. Through their interactions, the Association's members have displayed a partiality toward the reciprocity of consensually validated norms, the avoidance of war or the use of force, and the establishment of durable stability in the region in order to pursue national and regional goals. This, of course, has not always been the case. Does ASEAN then, by all intents, purposes and more importantly, practices, qualify as a security regime?

The very formation of ASEAN reflects the explicit preference among its member states for establishing regulation and restraint within an environment known largely for excessive displays of violence. Yet, notwithstanding the Indochina region, force or threats of force have hardly if at all been used in the ASEAN region. This does not imply that existent bilateral conflicts, such as the Sabah dispute and the

cautious Malaysian-Singaporean relationship, are insignificant and thus can be discounted. Instead, the foregoing discussion suggests (in view of the means of diplomacy as proposed by Morgenthau), that ASEAN states have volitionally eschewed the use of forceful measures in inter-member relations.[97] In this sense, ASEAN states have continually emphasized the use of peaceful means to resolve conflicts and disputes. It may be argued that the initial lack of military power with which to inflict violence could have contributed to their behaviour. The current state of intra-ASEAN relations, conducted in a region already well-endowed militarily, suggests that the ASEAN states have committed themselves to avoid violence in their interactions with each other.

This implies that the member states are similarly committed to the moderation of individualistic pursuits of security. This is true in that these states are committed to regional organisation as a consequence of their lack of confidence in dealing with regional, especially security, issues on a unilateral basis. Nonetheless, it is also true of ASEAN that regional goals are not permitted to supersede national interests if and when the two diverge. Where the individualistic pursuit of security is concerned, ASEAN states are in fact encouraged to unilaterally increase their security and economic power as long as their behaviours are in agreement with organisational norms and do not threaten the fundamental aims and purposes of the organisation. In effect, such unilateral efforts to ensure national security are perceived to augment regional security. It is in this light that President Suharto, in his opening remarks at the Singapore summit, reiterated the need for ASEAN to remain faithful to its original aims of building national and regional 'resilience.' The schizophrenic logic is an unmistakable feature characteristic of regionalism premised on the modern state as the basic unit of analysis and ASEAN does not constitute an exception.

The notion that ASEAN states fully perceive each other to place the same value on mutual security and cooperation has to be qualified. The incessant strain between Malaysia and Singapore is informative in this respect. The recent spate of problems suggests that suspicions and mistrust still exist in good measure in bilateral ties. The Malaysian military chief clearly alluded to the strength of such perceptions when he contended recently that both Malaysia and Singapore would enjoy better relations in the future if both countries were 'sincere' in their dealings with each other.[98] Yet, the presence of such fears has not hindered the participation of both states in ASEAN. In this respect, as in other bilateral conflicts, regional organisation and (by implication) security regime have been sought by ASEAN states essentially for the purpose of regulating and possibly even eradicating such internecine strife. It may thus be argued that these states recognise and accept occasional conflict among themselves as inevitable of interaction between nascent entities. This is clearly evinced by the cautions from both Malaysian and Singaporean quarters against undue alarm and overreaction where relations between both states become strained. Thus, the continuation and expansion of bilateral security cooperation between them serve the essential purpose of building confidence and trust within the broader context of conflict management and in underscoring the norms and procedures of the regime. As noted in the preceding chapters, ASEAN has provided an expedient institution whereby members have been accorded ample opportunities to interact and learn about each other.

In the same way, the incessant concern among ASEAN states in issues of territorial integrity and sovereignty reflects their nascent nature. This is exemplified by the Sabah dispute. One telling incident, with respect to the paranoia of regime members when one of their own resorts to territorial expansion as a means of ensuring

national security, is that of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor by force in 1975. Singapore's abstention on the UN resolution condemning the act revealed its fear of being 'Timorised.'[99] (The other ASEAN states voted against the resolution.)

In the case of Southeast Asia with its convoluted mix of nascent states, inveterate history of internecine conflict, and invariable interference by external powers. ASEAN, in the absence of other viable alternatives, can essentially be considered a successful institution. Even if the foregoing discussion on the requisite conditions facilitating the establishment of a security regime suggests that ASEAN does not quite satisfy fully the given theoretical assumptions, its member states evidently perceive it important enough to be maintained. The organisational objective of regional reconciliation cannot be obtained without cost to ASEAN states; nevertheless, the same states have not defected from the regime. In effect, they have invested not insubstantially in the regime by means of political and military, if not economic, inputs. Clearly, their expectation of peaceful change within ASEAN is integral to the maintenance of the security regime.

In this sense, their incessant concern with preserving durable stability in the region in order to ensure regional security is compatible with the goals of the regime. For example, ASEAN has long adhered to its policy of 'constructive engagement' to bring about change in Myanmar. There is, however, an emerging consensus within the Association that the Rohingya refugee problem, which is potentially destabilising to the region, is sufficient concern to merit a possible change in policy towards the Rangoon government.[100]

Arguably, the Sabah dispute may be said to provide an example of the strength of collective opposition and disapproval within a regime to discourage a state's attempt to forcibly change the status quo. This does not imply that the threat of

collective punishment and condemnation by other ASEAN states drove Manila to shelve indefinitely its claim, for the Association possessed neither the military finesse nor the political will to enforce punitive measures on the deviant member. As noted in the preceding paragraphs, ASEAN has elected to eschew the use of force or threats of force as a tool of diplomacy in intra-ASEAN relations. As such, coupled with its ostensible economic raison d'etre, any use of economic factors as sanctions could in one way or another compromise or possibly even destroy the entire rationale of the Association.[101] The Philippine decision to unofficially retract its claim grew out of its recognition of ASEAN as the bona fide vehicle of regional security. In addition, as one scholar has argued, the multilateral setting afforded by the organisation essentially provides less opportunities for disruptive tactics such as the playing of one member against another.[102]

In this and other respects, perhaps the most significant achievement of ASEAN regional reconciliation to date is the development and cultivation of reciprocity among member states which consequently strengthens the security regime. The norms and procedures governing the Association's programme of conflict management have already been discussed earlier. The importance of ASEAN bilateral security cooperation in encouraging reciprocity should likewise not be overlooked. For example, the ASEAN norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states also implies that regime members are obligated to deny insurgents from other states sanctuary. As such, border security cooperation and intelligence-sharing between ASEAN states for handling insurgency and subversion serve to complement and affirm the said norm.[103] As such, ASEAN security cooperation is essentially rooted in reciprocity. This does not suggest that the Association's defence concerns are premised on formal obligations because ASEAN clearly does not constitute a military alliance.

Member states, however, participate in security collaboration based on the expectation of reciprocal assistance to be accorded as and when a threat is presented; in other words, bilateral cooperation rests on declaratory not formal commitments.[104]

ASEAN is equipped with an organisational structure that critics have long dismissed as mostly cosmetic in nature. In this respect, the Singapore summit constitutes a watershed in that fundamental modifications have been made to moribund structures, such as the ASEAN Secretariat. In what appears to be an attempt to strengthen the organisation to better accommodate new global and regional challenges, future ASEAN Secretaries-General will be appointed on merit, accorded ministerial status and have an enlarged mandate.[105] The ASEAN security regime does not possess a coherent and complete single foreign policy, owing to the ubiquitous nature of the divergent strategic outlooks of member states. Nonetheless, as already discussed in preceding chapters, ASEAN has on occasion displayed an innate pragmatic ability to amalgamate different, and at times conflicting, perspectives into a distinctive 'ASEAN stand' that has allowed it to respond to common challenges with a common voice.

More importantly, it may be argued that the ASEAN security regime shows a considerable degree of institutionalisation with respect to its increasingly well-entrenched norms and values concerning security (and, in general, regional) cooperation.[106] The level of formalisation and converging expectations among ASEAN countries vis-a-vis bilateral security cooperation clearly attest to such a view. In essence, the strength of the ASEAN regime is seen in its inherent dynamism and capacity for self-adaptation in response to global environmental challenges. In this sense, evolutionary, or adaptational, learning is clearly visible in the member states' acceptance of changes in the rules of the security regime. This is exemplified by the

progress from the longstanding view that security cooperation should be conducted only on a non-ASEAN basis, to the current view which openly embraces the same issue as bona fide, de jure ASEAN cooperation.[107] As such, a 1990 Association communique which described President Suharto's emphasis that:

> ASEAN, in facing these global changes, needed to maintain a commensurate capacity for dynamic adaptation and to preserve a clear and unified purpose[,]

and the following corporate comment from ASEAN foreign ministers that:

> [I]t was imperative for ASEAN, in taking cognizance of the above developments (i.e., recent global changes), to adopt a more flexible and forward looking approach to prepare itself for the challenges of the 90s, and in particular to strengthen itself and intensify intra-ASEAN cooperation[108]

clearly alludes and attests to the institutional strength of the ASEAN security regime.

In conclusion, ASEAN, with its somewhat blemished track record in regional reconciliation, does not quite measure up as a fully-fledged security regime although it certainly possesses many features characteristic of such a regime. In this respect, the Association at this present juncture constitutes essentially an incipient security regime. However, considering ASEAN's newly earned sense of confidence and direction, its prospects for attaining maturity as an international regime has certainly been enhanced.

ENDNOTES

1. In this chapter, 'security regime' is defined according to conditions discussed in Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1983), chapter four.

2. See, for example, Ronald J. Yalem, Regionalism and World Order (Washington, DC.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), p. 23.

3. Amitav Acharya, "Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 29, no. 1 (1992), p. 8.

4. George Liska, Alliances and the Third World, Studies in International Affairs no. 5 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press for The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins University, 1968), pp. 50-54.

5. Acharya (1992), op. cit., pp. 7-8.

6. See, for example, Shai Feldman, "Superpower Security Guarantees in the 1980s," in the special issue on Third World Conflict and International Security, Adelphi Papers, no. 167 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), pp. 34-44.

7. Emphasis in the original. Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2 (January 1991), p. 233.

8. See also Amitav Acharya, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defence Community'?" Pacific Affairs, vol. 64, no. 2 (Summer 1991), p. 172.

9. The Philippine Foreign Minister, Raul Manglapus, recently described ASEAN's twenty-five year phobia with overt security discussions when he called military cooperation an "almost-taboo subject," and that the Association for long was "sweeping security issues under the carpet." Straits Times, January 25, 1992.

10. Jervis (1983), op. cit., p. 173.

11. Reciprocity in this sense refers to the predictability of actions and reactions and the reduction of transaction costs that are produced as a result of cooperation.

12. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 64.

13. Ibid., p. 175.

14. See, for example, Lau Teik Soon and Lee Lai To, eds., The Security of the Sea Lanes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Singapore: Heinemann Asia for the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1988).

15. Michael Leifer, "The Security of Sea-lanes in Southeast Asia," in Robert O'Neill, ed., Security in East Asia, Adelphi Library 9 (London: Gower for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), p. 166.

16. Jervis, op. cit., pp. 176-177.

17. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 187-188.

18. Jervis, op. cit., p. 178.

19. Ibid., p. 179.

20. See, for example, Leszek Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia (New York: St Martin's Press, 1986), chapter 2.

21. See, for example, Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State," International Organization, vol. 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753-775.

22. See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History, vol. 7, no. 3 (Summer 1983), pp. 171-190.

23. Jervis, op. cit., p. 177.

24. Jervis, op. cit., pp. 181-184.

25. Paul Buteux, Regimes, Incipient Regimes and the Future of NATO Strategy, Occasional Paper no. 6 (Winnipeg: Programme in Strategic Studies, University of Manitoba, 1989), p. 10.

26. The power of perceptions with regard to concessions as the cause of many erroneous policies is well discussed in Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), chapters 4 and 5.

27. Perhaps 'reciprocity' should be replaced by the naive and subjective word 'trust', although "sophisticated" theorists may well balk at such a suggestion!

28. Roger K. Smith, "Institutionalisation as a Measure of Regime Stability: Insights for International Regime Analysis from the Study of Domestic Politics," Millenium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 18, no. 2 (1989), p. 229.

29. The rationalist (or, if so desired, behaviourist) definition of regime strength, i.e., the degree of compliance with regime rules, has been left out here owing to the greater relevance of the cognitive approach to this particular conception of institutionalisation. In this sense, rationalist epistemology may well be inadequate for the study of international regimes owing to the latter's 'inescapable intersubjective quality' and 'inherent contestability,' as characterised by the emphasis on norms and converging expectations. Ibid., p. 228.

30. Ahmad Badawi. Straits Times, January 17, 1992.

31. See, for example, Khong Cho Oon, "Leadership and National Security: The Search for Institutional Control," in Stephen Chee, ed., Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia: Institutional Aspects (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p. 14.

32. The same political parties that have controlled Malaysia (i.e., the national coalition comprising the predominant United Malays National Organisation) and Singapore (i.e., the People's Action Party) since their gaining independence remain as the respective governments. In the case of Indonesia, Suharto recently was elected for a record fifth term as President. Fidel Ramos, Cory Aquino's choice to replace her as Philippine President, was also successful in his bid and will quite likely continue Aquino's policies. Far Eastern Economic Review, June 18; June 25, 1992. The case of Thailand is discussed below.

33. Chan, for example, has alluded to the phenomenon as the creation of an "administrative state" in which politics becomes an unwelcomed intrusion. Chan Heng Chee, "Politics in an Administrative State: Where Has the Politics Gone?" in Seah Chee Meow, ed., Trends in Singapore (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1975), pp. 51-68.

34. Chan has also argued that Marcos' downfall and the consequent rise of populist politics are significant to the Southeast Asian region "not only because together the phenomena represent a break with the past, but because they question the political model and political style that have become acceptable in the ASEAN region." Chan Heng Chee, "After the Philippines: The Political Health of ASEAN States." Paper presented at a seminar on "ASEAN Trends and Perspectives," organised by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia, for Shell Companies, in Singapore, June 23-25, 1986, p. 3.

35. Far Eastern Economic Review, June 25, 1992.

36. The notion of Western-style openness and participatory democracy for long has been anathema in Southeast Asia, including the non-communist states. Emerging signs, however, strongly suggest that this may well change. The Philippines, as noted, has somewhat shifted to a populist brand of politics as evinced by the Philippine Senate's denial of a new base lease to the US in response to the broad nationalist anti-American sentiment. In Indonesia, there have been increasingly calls within the Golkar-controlled Parliament for more liberal reform. Although Suharto has long sought to contain such liberal thinking, his recent indirect criticism of the Indonesian military's (ABRI) actions in East Timor (ABRI, as the country's premier institution, has never before had its actions questioned) suggests that Suharto desires to limit the political influence of ABRI as a possible prelude to future change. This, however, is debatable. Far Eastern Economic Review, August 15, 1991; Asian Wall Street Journal, December 30, 1991. In the case of Singapore, the 1991 general election results (a record four seats fell to opposition parties) reflected public interest in broadening the democratic system. Asian Wall Street Journal, November 11, 1991.

37. The euphoria and attendant hope at the rise of the Aquino administration has largely dissipated in the past few years to be replaced in part by disappointment and disillusionment among the Filipino people. The desired economic miracle has not arrived, poverty remains as endemic as ever, while patronage politics continues as an inveterate presence in Philippine political life.

38. See, for example, Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, "The Significance of ASEAN," World Review, vol. 19, no. 3 (August 1980), pp. 56-57.

39. Listed in the preamble to the ASEAN or Bangkok Declaration, 1967.

40. The ZOPFAN Declaration, Kuala Lumpur, 1971.

41. Others have similarly argued elsewhere concerning the preservation, and by implication perpetuation, of certain organisational norms. For example, in a recent address at the UN, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas said, "ASEAN cooperation is firmly grounded in mutual respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, equality and national identity of all States in our region. ASEAN cooperation is equally based on such fundamental principles as non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, abstention from the use or threat of force in the settlement of disputes, and peaceful co-existence and mutually beneficial cooperation among States with differing political and economic systems." Disarmament, UN Regional Disarmament Workshop

for Asia and the Pacific (New York: Department of Disarmament Affairs, UN, 1991), p. 13.

42. Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 November 1991; Straits Times, January 23, 1992.

43. Far Eastern Economic Review, January 30, 1992.

44. The notion of consociationalism may be used here as it deals with the consensual style of elite bargaining. Originally used within the context of a state polity, it has been adapted here to suit international relations. Elite dominance is essential to the success of such a form of decision making. In this sense, one can regard the ASEAN security regime almost as a grand alliance of state elites, not unlike the European Concert. Stephen Chee, "Consociational Political Leadership and Conflict Regulation in Malaysia," in Stephen Chee, ed., Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia: Institutional Aspects (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p. 57.

45. Lee Kuan Yew in his opening address at the 15th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Straits Times, June 15, 1982.

46. Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 191.

47. "North Borneo [Sabah]...is vital to the security of the Philippines...it is only eighteen miles from the nearest Philippine island...control of the northern tip...by an unfriendly power would constitute...a dealy threat...We [the Philiipines] are opposed to placing North Borneo under the authority of any country on the Asian mainland...whose territorial integrity is itself under threat by communist domination." Quoted in Hans H. Indorf, Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Bilateral Constraints Among ASEAN Member States (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), p. 25.

48. Adam Malik, Indonesia's foreign minister, was reported to have made this assertion. Jorgensen-Dahl (1982), op. cit., p. 200.

49. Jorgensen-Dahl (1982), op. cit., p. 207.

50. Sheldon W. Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Security (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 38.

51. Part of a statement by Abu Hassan Omar, the former Malaysian foreign minister. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, vol. 20, no. 4 (December 1987), p. 16.

52. Quoted in Obaid Ul Haq, "Singapore's Search for Security: A Selective Analysis," in Chee, op. cit., p. 121.

53. Ahmad Badawi, Malaysian foreign minister, making those remarks during his tenure as defence minister. Straits Times (Weekly Overseas Edition), September 2, 1989. Interestingly, Indonesia apparently does not regard the Singaporean action as a threat, although Indonesian Foreign Minister, Alatas, has made clear that its support of Singapore in no way implies any desire on its part to pander to Washington. Lianhe Zaobao, January 28, 1992.

54. Straits Times, September 17, 1992.

55. Najib Tun Razak, the current Malaysian defence minister. Sunday Times, August 8, 1991.

56. Quoted in Amitav Acharya, A Survey of Military Cooperation Among the ASEAN States: Bilateralism or Alliance? (Canada: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, 1990), p. 34.

57. Straits Times, October 9, 1991; Sunday Times, August 11, 1991.

58. Straits Times, August 10, 1991.

59. Straits Times, August 13, 1991.

60. Goh essentially remarked that it was not enough for states to be rich and economically powerful; at the same time, they have to be adequately prepared militarily to defend themselves. Again, Singapore's commitment to regionalism, and its status as a regional partner, was questioned. Far Eastern Economic Review, November 15, 1990.

61. Since 1852, Singapore has been actively administering the island by its operation of the Horsburgh Lighthouse which it built the same year. Straits Times, October 19, 1991.

62. Straits Times, March 21, 1992.

63. In this respect, President Wee Kim Wee of Singapore, speaking at the 4th ASEAN summit, pointed to the urgent need to resolve inter-member problems as a necessary prelude to more ambitious cooperation. Lianhe Zaobao, January 28, 1992.

64. General Try Sutrisno, the ABRI chief. Straits Times (Weekly Overseas Edition), December 9, 1989.

65. Acharya (1990), op. cit., p. 7.

66. Donald Weatherbee, "ASEAN Regionalism: The Salient Dimension," in Karl Jackson and M. Hadi Soesatro, eds., ASEAN Security and Economic Development, Research Papers and Policy Studies No. 11 (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1984), p. 266.

67. In this respect, an article written prior to the ending of the Cold War concluded with this observation: "It would seem that ASEAN needs another major crisis to bring its members even closer. There is no telling what sort of crisis might erupt in the future and how it would affect the potential for ASEAN security co-operation." Khong Kim Hoong and Abdul Razak Abdullah, "Security Co-operation in ASEAN," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 9, no. 2 (September 1987), p. 138.

68. As noted in chapter two, there have been previous calls - even from Indonesian military quarters - for the creation of a "joint council" for defence cooperation among ASEAN states.

69. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, former Indonesian foreign minister. Straits Times, August 22, 1989. The anxiety of ASEAN leaders over the removal of US military bases from the Philippines is quite evident. For example, the Philippine Defence Secretary, Renato de Villa pointedly referred to the impending creation of "a complex web of tension" in the Asia-Pacific region as the direct consequence of the American pull-out. Potential flashpoints include the Korean peninsula and, especially for Southeast Asia, the heavily contested Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Bangkok Post, September 4, 1991.

70. It would seem that the U.S. Pentagon is in agreement with such a perspective. A recently-leaked confidential document called Defence Planning Guidance, which essentially constitutes the Pentagon's blueprint for the post-Cold War world, noted with concern the rise of Asian powers such as India. It concluded that, in the case of Asia, the U.S. "must maintain our status as a military power of the first magnitude...acting as a balancing force and [preventing the] emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemon." Far Eastern Economic Review, March 26, 1992.

71. M. Ghazalie Shafie. Quoted in Acharya (1990), op. cit., p. 5. In this sense, ASEAN remains faithful to its '6 minus X' principle upon which most of intra-ASEAN cooperation in all conceivable areas is based. This principle will be discussed more fully in chapter four as it was introduced primarily in the context of ASEAN economic cooperation, although it can be argued that the priniciple has since assumed a broader significance to ASEAN cooperation in its totality.

72. See, for example, the discussion on Malaysian-Indonesian security arrangements, Foreign Affairs Malaysia, vol. 5, no. 2 (June 1972).

73. Quoted in Acharya (1990), op. cit., p. 20.

74. See, for example, Chandran Jeshurun, ed., Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989).

75. Quoted in Acharya (1991), op. cit., p. 22.

76. The Malaysian-Philippine security relationship has not evince much progress since its inception owing to the recurrent Sabah dispute. However, recent developments suggest otherwise, such as the recent agreement between Kuala Lumpur and Manila to conduct joint military exercises and exchange military know-how in the near future. If and when consummated, this exercise would constitute a 'first' between the two countries. Straits Times, September 10, 1991.

77. General Winston Choo. Quoted in Amitav Acharya, ISEAS Trends, no. 10, June 30, 1991.

78. Benny Murdani. Straits Times (Weekly Overseas Edition), January 27, 1990. Malaysia and Indonesia have also been attempting to resolve two potentially destabilising issues. First, both states have agreed to conduct talks regarding the disputed islands of Sipadan and Ligitan off the Sabah coast. The problem, as in the Malaysia-Singapore dispute over Pedra Branca, is one of defining maritime boundaries. Indonesian foreign minister Alatas has said, "We are determined not to let the two-island issue blow up. It is not such a big deal." Second, there is the problem of separatist rebels in the Indonesian province of Aceh and the movement of Acehnese to Malaysia. Thus far, Kuala Lumpur has shown a willingness to cooperate with Jakarta in dealing with this issue. Far Eastern Economic Review, July 11, 1991.

79. Wong Kan Seng. Quoted in Acharya (1990), op. cit., p. 23.

80. Murdani. Straits Times, August 3, 1991.

81. The Philippines and Brunei have yet to articulate a formal security doctrine while Thailand's concept of total defence remains poorly thought out and codified, and have by all intents and purposes lost formal standing. For an excellent discussion on comprehensive security policies of ASEAN states, see Muthiah Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," in Robert A. Scalapino et al., eds., Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global (Berkeley, CA.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, no date), pp. 50-78.

82. "Working with One Accord Towards Total Defence," Pioneer (Singapore Armed Forces Newsletter), February 1984, p. 5.

83. See, for example, Datuk Musa Hitam, "Malaysia's Doctrine of Comprehensive Security," Foreign Affairs Malaysia, vol. 17, no. 1 (March 1984), pp. 94-99.

84. Acharya's term, (1990), op. cit., p. 24.

85. For training purposes, Singapore maintains army training camps in Thailand, Taiwan, and Brunei, the last of which have been described by Lee Kuan Yew as the "most valuable single facility [for the Singapore military] which will be difficult to duplicate elsewhere." Singapore also maintains a fighter aircraft detachment at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. Straits Times, August 22, 1986.

86. All other ASEAN member states have been offered the use of this range upon its completion. Straits Times, August 16, 1991.

87. For example, General Maradan Panggabean of Indonesia and General Saiyud Kerdphol, respectively. Acharya (1990), op. cit., p. 26; (1991), op. cit., p. 169.

88. 56 percent of Indonesia's total defence exports goes to ASEAN states in comparison to Singapore's 57 percent. However, ASEAN total defence production constitutes less than 2 percent of total Third World arms production. Yoshinori Nishizaki, "A Brief Survey of Arms Production in ASEAN," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 10, no. 3 (December 1988), p. 282.

89. Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the Third World 1971-85 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 338-351; World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook, various years (London: Taylor and Francis); The Military Balance, various years (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies).

90. See Ronald Huisken, Limitations of Armaments in Southeast Asia: A Proposal, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 16 (Canberra: The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University).

91. Far Eastern Economic Review, December 5, 1991.

92. Indonesia's problems with its F-16s contributed to its current decision whereas Malaysia dropped plans to purchase Tornado jets in favour of the Hawk. Singapore will probably not purchase the Hawk; instead, it will continue to concentrate on its homegrown upgraded version of the A-4 Skyhawk. Far Eastern Economic Review, July 25, 1991.

93. Ibid.

94. UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (1991), op. cit., pp. 224-244.

95. The average growth rate of the ASEAN economies have generally slipped from 5.9 percent in 1990 to 5.3 percent in 1991. Nonetheless, this still makes ASEAN the most vibrant region in the world. The slowdown is the combined result of the effects of the American recession, infrastructural bottlenecks (especially among

the ASEAN-4) and simply the 'catch-22' situation of cyclical adjustment to years of overheated growth. See, for example, the special Asian economic reports in Asian Wall Street Journal, October 14 and 21, 1991.

96. For further reading on defence expenditure patterns of ASEAN states, see, for example, Chin Kin Wah, ed., Defence Spending in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987); and Guy J. Pauker, Security and Economics: The Military Expenditures of the ASEAN Countries, Paper prepared for the 2nd US-ASEAN Conference on Economic Development and Political Stability: Alternative Scenarios for the 1980s. Berkeley, CA, May 2-4, 1983.

97. The other means being compromise and persuasion, both of which are intrinsic to the ASEAN style of negotiation and bargaining (i.e., musjawarah and mufakat). Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th edition (New York: Alfred A. Knorpf, 1967), p. 521.

98. Straits Times, September 17, 1991.

99. Shee Poon-Kim, "A Decade of ASEAN, 1967-1977" Asian Survey, vol. XVII, no. 8 (August 1977), p. 757.

100. As a result of the repressive policies of Myanmar's ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the Rohingya Muslims of the Burmese state of Arakan are gradually being forced across the border into Bangladesh. ASEAN fears the possibility of a spill-over into Thailand. Far Eastern Economic Review, March 26, 1992.

101. Jorgensen-Dahl (1982), op. cit., p. 176.

102. Ibid., p. 236.

103. Acharya (1992), op. cit., p. 17.

104. Ibid.

105. Straits Times, January 29, 1992.

106. In this sense, th discussion takes the view of John Ruggie that international regimes can be regarded primarily as a level of institutionalisation. John G. Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," International Organization, vol. 29, no. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 557-583.

107. Krasner, op. cit., pp. 2-5. The ASEAN security regime has effected essentially a change of rules while preserving its set of guiding norms and principles. The regime, in this case, has not been changed. Refer to chapter four for a discussion on the notion of 'meta-regimes.'

108. Both passages taken from the Excerpts from the Joint Communique of the Twenty-third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, July 24-25, 1990, under the headings Opening Address and Review of the International Situation, respectively.

CHAPTER FOUR: REGIMES AND COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE: THE CASE OF ASEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION

The strategic impact of global economic changes in recent years has certainly not been lost on the member states of ASEAN. In describing the state of incessant flux, one American commentator has contended that "the prime reality of contemporary global politics is change, in many areas and many dimensions."[1] As noted earlier, the 1980s has proved to be a period of economic dynamism for the ASEAN region unsurpassed by most parts of the world. The second chapter discussed the significant pressures for change that drove ASEAN states with primary-based economies such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand to industrialise and to adopt an export-oriented strategy.

Further pressures have since modified the global environment and threaten to stifle the high growth patterns of these countries. The ASEAN states have clearly benefitted enormously from the industrialised West's sponsorship during the Cold War years. There was a prevalent need at the time to create a viable capitalist model as a credible alternative to communism among Asian states. This situation has dramatically changed since superpower hostilities dissipated near the turn of the decade. This has essentially led to the redefinition of Western strategic priorities in the face of the fast disappearing Soviet threat and the increasing attention to the need to put Western economic houses in order to better meet current economic challenges. In this respect, the end to global bipolar confrontation, while clearly having brought peace to international relations in general, has paradoxically ushered in a new period of 'geoeconomics'[2] - inter-state or inter-region economic competition - which can potentially create international instability. As one scholar has put it:

> Looming in the future...are industrial and technological rivalries that may turn out - unless we can find some way of preventing it - to be equal or even greater intensity than the ideological and territorial ones of the past.[3]

The implications of these developments to the case of ASEAN are several fold. First, it is evident that ASEAN states can no longer rely on the unequivocal support of the West that they formerly enjoyed. Ultimately, they will be regarded by Western countries as economic competitors as much as allies or aligned states. One of the earliest indications came in the form of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), which covers textile and clothing concerns exogenous to the GATT framework. Originally conceived as a vehicle for facilitating transition in the Western industrialised states in their response to burgeoning inexpensive exports from the NIEs such as South Korea and Hong Kong, the arrangement has since become a veritable trade barrier to ASEAN economies eager to obtain access to Western markets.[4] The incessant efforts to reintegrate these items into the GATT system, coupled with the impressive range of items and issues germane to the ASEAN case currently being negotiated at the Uruguay Round, have thus far proved disappointing to the ASEAN countries.

The rise of the global economic imperative also leads to the second major implication. The refocusing of Western energies to economic issues has largely been manifested in the de facto emergence of regional trade blocs, as evinced by Eurocentrism and the impending North American free trade bloc. The concern and frustration of the ASEAN states in response to their being denied access to Western markets is evident from the following remark by Lee Kuan Yew in 1990:

> Asians will feel that they have been quarantined into the Japanese Yen bloc so that they can be excluded from the markets of prosperous European and Americans, that the Whites have changed the rules just as Asians have learnt to compete and win under those rules.[5]

The third implication derives by way of the other two in the sense that ASEAN

has essentially been forced as an organisation to engage in a serious soul-searching exercise to reconsider its goals and future direction. As noted in the preceding chapters, the rapid changes in the international and regional environments somewhat exposed the Association as a 'single-issue' grouping and the destitute nature of its economic programme. The political differences that until now have made regional economic cooperation such a difficult undertaking are still far from being completely resolved; however, the anticipated resolution of the Cambodia imbroglio and the growing disenchantment with communism as a philosophical imperative even among Southeast Asian communist countries have transformed ASEAN's raison d'etre from a political to a mostly economic one. As a result, the Association is again being encouraged to turn its sights back to economic cooperation. Conventional wisdom has long suggested that ASEAN cooperation has largely been compromised by significant obstacles, such as the non-complementary nature of ASEAN economies, or the absence of political will among the leaderships to subordinate their respective national interests to broader regional ones.[6] These views are increasingly being challenged today. The ASEAN economies (except those of Brunei and Singapore) were strictly competitive not complementary, as long as they remained primary-based. The recent turn to industrialisation has positioned the ASEAN economies in different stages of industrial development that create, for the present, significant opportunities for exploiting economies of scale, such as the SIJORI growth triangle. It also would appear, as shown by the breakthroughs at the recent Singapore summit, that the requisite political will can be and has in fact been summoned.

These developments suggest, in a world poised on the brink of continental division into economic regions, that ASEAN can and should develop its own regional market if merely for the sake of its own survival. The joint decision at the Singapore

summit to establish in the near future an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) can be regarded as a coherent and tangible expression of the ASEAN leaderships' committed response to the common challenges facing them. In addition, greater success in regional economic cooperation is imperative in order for ASEAN to maintain a strong voice in international economic fora, such as GATT, or even the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

The overall objective of the preceding chapters has been to present regime theory as a useful analytical tool in the study of ASEAN regional cooperation; likewise, this chapter seeks to meet a similar objective with respect to ASEAN economic cooperation. The foregoing discussion suggests, in the light of recent developments, that a qualitative improvement can be detected in both attitude and action on the part of ASEAN countries such that some features of Keohane and Nye's concept of 'complex interdependence'[7] are becoming increasingly visible in terms of convergent expectations among member states and the reality of inter-member economic (and arguably political) linkages.[8] These indications suggest that complex interdependence, unlike its theoretical predecessors (i.e., regional integration), may prove conceptually to be more relevant to the study of patterns of ASEAN economic cooperation. This chapter will examine the concept's theoretical features and briefly discuss some viable and even successful expressions of ASEAN economic cooperation and their implications. It will conclude with an analysis of regime dynamics in economic cooperation. In essence, the current state of the ASEAN economic programme, with the recent Singapore summit as a reference point, has reached a significant watershed in terms of participants' expectations and actions. Even then, this discussion seeks to approach the subject not so much via the study of economic integration as via the study of regional interactions among interdependent economies.[9]

Complex Interdependence

According to Keohane and Nye, interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects among states or among actors in different states.[10] Put in another way, "interdependence is to many pluralists what balance of power is to many realists and what dependency is to many globalists."[11] Such reciprocal effects, while not necessarily symmetrical in nature, often if not always involve costs (i.e., the vulnerability of one state to another), as an interdependent relationship leads invariably to the restriction of state autonomy. This is evident in the contemporary international system as reflected by the proliferation of trade, financial and technological relations between not only the industrialised countries but also between North and South. International institutions, such as the GATT and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provide structure and, in a sense, order to the growing global interdependence.

By contrast, 'complex interdependence' is altogether a different concept from interdependence. In essence, it refers to an ideal situation in which a group of states enjoy multiple channels of contact that serve to link societies together; there is an absence of a hierarchy of issues; and military force is largely ineffective as an instrument of state policy.[12] It therefore behooves the interests of this discussion to view complex interdependence not as a description of de facto reality, but as an ideal framework. Similarly, the realist perspective is to be regarded as an idealised situation with respect to the actual conditions of world politics.[13] Nye has even argued elsewhere that realism is 'impoverished' as a theory to explain the intents and motives causing states to pursue interests, due to the employment of power as its sole parameter of definition.[14] Complex interdependence thus addresses the conditions under which realist assumptions are sufficient or need to be supplemented by a more complex model of change. It does not represent a rejection of realism as much as an

attempt to build upon the latter's foundations. As one scholar has argued:

> National sovereignty, the nation-state as key actor, and the centrality of strategic security problems are still relevant, but they have to be seen in conjunction with a much enhanced level of interdependence both between national economies and between state and society.[15]

Most real situations, as such, will likely reside somewhere between these two extremes.

In this respect, international regimes are "sets of governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence."[16] This does not imply that interdependence would necessarily lead to cooperation among countries; however, it suggests that interdependence preconditions the environment for possible cooperation as a means to overcome interdependence-related costs. For example, Haas does not rule out cooperation among members within an environment he has described as 'turbulent':

> [T]he number of actors (in the international system) is very large. Each pursues a variety of objectives which are mutually incompatible; but each is also unsure of the trade-offs between the objectives. Each actor is tied into a network of interdependencies with other actors that are as confused as the first. Yet some of the objectives sought by each cannot be obtained without cooperation from others.[17]

Neither does this suggest that state power is rendered obsolete as a result of interdependence. More significantly, there appears to be a close relationship between patterns of interdependence and patterns of potential power resources in a given issue area. As such, the notion of complex interdependence essentially marries the realist and liberal (or Grotian) perspectives together in an integrated analysis. As already discussed in the first chapter, the regional integration theories of the late 1950s until the early 1970s - generally liberal in tradition and orientation - have devoted not inconsiderable attention to system processes. On the other hand, the elegance of structural realism, or neorealism, is marred by its singular focus on system structure. The study of international regime dynamics in ASEAN, a grouping of nascent

countries grappling with issues of national sovereignty and regime legitimacy, and whose member states are highly susceptible to transnational forces, such as ethnicism, necessarily entails the examination of both structural and process components.

As the foregoing discussion noted, one condition of complex interdependence is the network of multiple channels which connect societies. Such channels, both formal and informal in nature, include interstate, transgovernmental and transnational relations among the various actors involved. The increasingly polyarchic (and heterogeneous) nature of world politics necessitates the development of numerous points of contact at various levels of political, economic, social and cultural significance involving state and non-state actors. The multinational corporation (MNC), which constitutes probably the most visible vehicle for the internationalisation of the global economic system, exemplifies a transnational actor with its own extensive network of channels.[18] Growing international social mobility and mass communications also serve to link societies together. The impressive state of global communicative interaction has led to one scholar's visualisation of the world system and its attendant linkages as a 'cobweb.'[19]

The lack of hierarchy among issues constitutes the second condition. Such a situation, inter alia, essentially means that 'high politics,' or political-security issues, do not dominate the agenda of international relationships in a consistent fashion. In this respect, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs becomes unclear. The policy agenda in this case is an amalgamation of pluralistic interests. As the former American Secretary of State Kissinger stated in 1975:

> [P]rogress in dealing with the traditional agenda is no longer enough. A new and unprecedented kind of issue has emerged. The problems of energy, resources, environment, population, the uses of space and the seas now rank with questions of military security, ideology and territorial rivalry which have traditionally made up the diplomatic agenda.[20]

And even Morgenthau, in response to the 1973 oil crisis, made reference to what he then perceived to be an unprecedented divorce of military and economic power based on the control of raw materials.[21] This development also reflects a growing trend in contemporary national politics, especially among industrialised pluralistic societies: foreign policy is increasingly being drawn into the arena of domestic political debate. The dominant Keynesian economic philosophy of the postwar years prompted the expansion of the state's role in the economy and society to provide, for its citizenry, not only security but socio-economic well-being. As such, governments increasingly face demands from sectoral interests for support in dealing with international changes. In other words, there is a growing interdependence between state and society.[22]

The third condition involves the decreasing importance of military force as an effective instrument in international politics. This again is particularly evident in the conduct of interstate relations among the Western industrialised countries. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has evolved, since its inception in the immediate postwar years, into a veritable, pluralistic security community where the use of military force in dispute settlement is non-existent (except for Greece and Turkey). In short, painful costs are often exacted as a result of employing force. Also, as the Vietnam War has shown, there will usually be strong domestic popular opposition to state involvement in prolonged military conflicts.[23]

This is not to deny that force still plays a significant role in contemporary international relations, nor that the military-security component continues to be an integral part in national security concerns. Martin has argued that the persistence of Western efforts at sustaining substantial military build-ups, despite the increasing demands from domestic quarters for larger shares of the economic pie, attests to the continued belief in the usefulness of military force.[24] Military conflicts at present,

however, seem largely confined to the Third World region. Even then, one scholar writing in 1989 has contended that "there is a clear trend towards declining superpower military involvement (in the Third World)."[25] The authors of complex interdependence have also laboured at length to address the context-specificity of their concept by allowing that certain fundamental issues, such as the oil question, can serve as the catalyst for igniting military conflagration.[26] The recent Gulf War, with qualifications, could well have been fought by coalitional forces in order to preserve strategic oil reserves in the region. One scholar has summarised it well:

> [T]he threat and use of force are not likely to disappear any time soon from inter-state relations (but even advocates of force) will continue to recognize the dangers attending the use of force and will employ it as little as possible in their inter-state relations.[27]

Several distinctive political processes arise from these conditions or characteristics of complex interdependence. The first of these involves the changing nature of linkage politics. The lack of a clear hierarchy of issues essentially means that goals tend to differ in terms of each issue, owing to the plethora of interests and actors involved. As such, the distribution of power is largely determined by issue areas. The realist prediction that powerful military and economic states will dominate a variety of organisations and issues is less likely to occur in the world of complex interdependence due to the declining utility of military force and the concomitant decoupling of issue areas. In short, military power is no longer fungible.

On the other hand, there is an increase in the employment of other instruments of linkage, such as international organisations and other transnational actors and flows.[28] For example, the UN has often been used by developing states as an available and inexpensive means to articulate and obtain their interests, such as UNCTAD's call in 1974 to establish an NIEO. Multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank (as radical perspectives such as dependency theory would claim[29]), have

increasingly, or always, been employed by industrialised states to subordinate the interests of poor and weak states in order to preserve their control of the capitalist world economy. In a somewhat similar vein, Gilpin has contended that American MNCs are essentially "expressions of an American economic expansionism and therefore could not be separated from the larger foreign policy objectives of the United States."[30] Even then, the differentiation of issue areas in complex interdependence would mean that international hierarchy may gradually be eroded, as state and non-state actors discard traditional linkage strategies and seek after new ones.

The second process to gain greater significance is the setting and control of the agenda. As the foregoing discussion noted, the foreign policy agenda is increasingly becoming open to domestic political debate. The traditional assumption that the agenda is primarily determined by shifts in the balance of power is not valid in complex interdependence due to the lack of a clear hierarchy among issues. The growing complexity of actors and issues in world politics, the decline in the usefulness of force, and the disappearing dichotomy between foreign and domestic policy (or between state and society), serve to complicate the process of agenda formation. International and domestic problems created by pressures of strategic economic changes, environmental degradation, and others; combine to affect the agenda. Similarly, changes in the distribution of power within issue areas also influence the agenda. For example, the oil crisis of 1973-74 proved effective at reforming the agenda at both national and transnational levels: what was once considered 'low politics' became significant in the foreign policies of industrialised states, while the broader agenda of North-South trade matters also changed as a result of the OPEC-controlled oil prices and enforced oil embargo, and the increased stature and power of the OPEC countries in the eyes of the West.[31] This development also suggests, on a

micro-level, that asymmetrical interdependence within a bilateral relationship may have little or even no bearing whatsoever on the ability of one state to influence the other. For example, Canada, although weaker than the United States both militarily and economically, has on many occasions emerged as the victor in both bilateral and trilateral disputes.[32] Finally, there is increased politicisation of issues both domestically, as the preceding discussion has shown; and internationally, as states that are gaining in strength via complex interdependence seek to impose linkages of their own.

The third process concerns the changing nature of transnational and transgovernmental relations. One condition of complex interdependence, the proliferation of multiple channels of contact between societies, continues to render less coherent the distinction separating domestic and international politics. The growing global 'cobweb' essentially means that attitudes, and decision and policy-making of governments and domestic groups would be significantly affected by both organised and non-organised forms of communications on a transnational scale. This invariably leads to the formation of transnational and transgovernmental coalitions in particular policy issues; in short, transnational politics.[33] This is evident in the responses of countries toward the challenge of global economic trends, as when countries increasingly move toward the formation of regional economic blocs; and of global ecological preservation, as when state and non-state actors met in Rio de Janiero, Brazil recently to plan international strategies to resolve common environmental problems. More importantly, these developments highlight the ambiguities surrounding the notion of 'national interest'; likewise, the theoretical proposition that state behaviour can essentially be explained in terms of self-interest needs to be addressed in the light of complex interdependence.

Finally, the growth of multiple channels of contact, delinkage of multiple issues and the rising significance of transnational political bargaining serve to increase the importance of international institutions. International organisations can aid to facilitate the processes of complex interdependence by establishing the international agenda, providing an interactive forum within which transnational coalitions will form, and according weak and poor states a congenial arena in which to articulate demands and pursue linkage strategies. Under complex interdependence, international organisation refers essentially to a particular variant of world political structure manifested in the form of multilevel linkages, norms and institutions; not formal institutions per se.[34] As Claude has argued:

> It is perhaps necessary to stress...the distinction between international organizations and international organization. Particular organizations my be nothing more than playthings of power politics and handmaidens of national ambitions. But international organization, considered as an historical process, represents a secular trend toward the systemic development of an enterprising quest for political means of making the world safe for human habitation.[35]

Given the conditions and corresponding processes of complex interdependence, how do international regimes, which constitute frameworks wherein relationships of interdependence operate, change with respect to dynamic international forces? As discussed in the second chapter, ASEAN has shown itself at critical times to be a creature of instinct and reaction, responding to pressures for change by reforming its attitudes, perceptions and behaviours in conformity with the global and regional contexts. In order for regimes to arrest the trend of disintegration brought about by technological and economic change, the ability to adapt to new conditions is an imperative asset. Keohane and Nye have proposed four basic models of regime change, namely, the economic; overall power structure; issue structure and international organisation models.

Three conditions remain intrinsic to economic process model. First, the burgeoning effects of technological advances and growing economic interdependence renders existing international regimes obsolete. Second, as noted in the preceding discussion, the state's increasing role in the economy and well-being of its inhabitants necessitates an incessant vigilance at improving the national economy and socio-economic conditions. Third, the strategic economic impact of international trade and capital flows means that regimes have to engage in self-rejuvenation in order to participate effectively in, and to benefit from, the process. It, however, is obvious that the economic model fails to account for political-security interests which have hindered, and continue to hinder, regime change.

The overall power structure model displays a certain elegance in its explanation, namely, regime change occurs in corresponding fashion to structure change (i.e., changes in the power of states). As such, regimes are maintained by hegemonic leadership.[36] In this respect, international economic regimes are direct reflections of the structural distribution of military-security power. The model, however, proves to be weak at explaining the changes in the international monetary system in the early 1070s, such as the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Although the United States remained at that juncture the world's foremost military power, it could not sustain its role as the anchor of the global economic system. The non-distinction among issue areas cannot account for the contradiction in the American case. The model also ignores the implications of transnational actors and multiple levels of interactive communication due to its singular concern for power considerations.

The issue structure model contends that different issue areas reflect different power configurations that are buffered from overall distributions of economic and

military capabilities.[37] Traditional patterns of linkage politics are no longer possible under the circumstances; in short, power is simply not fungible. Regime change takes place when regime rules governing behaviour within the issue area are challenged, whether unilaterally or collectively. The weaknesses of this model lie, first, in the extent that linkages of issues are successful; and second, the continued singular focus on power and not other forces. More importantly, as Stein has argued, "the viability of an issue-area approach to the study of international politics is itself context-dependent."[38] As such, the question of linkage becomes more difficult to resolve.

The international organisation model assumes, upon the successful establishment of a set of networks, norms and institutions, that such a system would be difficult to unravel or rearrange.[39] States that possess power, whether in an overall capacity or within a particular issue area, would find it difficult to unilaterally enforce their will if their actions clash with entrenched patterns of behaviour and norms within the existing structure. Although nascent regimes are established and organised largely in accordance with distributions of power and capabilities, the set of networks and institutions would influence (and regulate) actors' abilities to appropriate their capabilities. Such a situation as described would naturally be tenable only under complex interdependence.

As noted in the foregoing discussion, the conceptual relevance of complex interdependence is enhanced by its consideration of both structure and process components of the international system: structure is accounted for by the two power-related models, while process is covered by the international organisation model. The authors of complex interdependence have argued that their concept is not meant to be viewed as a theory, but as a 'thought experiment' on an imaginary situation wherein

the basic assumptions of realism are overturned.[40] As such, their goal is not so much to amalgamate all models in order to produce a theory that can generalise well. Rather, they have adopted a context-specific approach where models may be combined in a variety of ways to explain specific situations and circumstances. The case of ASEAN, a regional experiment comprising mostly historical regions and societies recast as nascent states at varying levels of development, proffers a unique study that may well benefit from the use of the concept.

Intra-ASEAN Economic Cooperation

As noted in the earlier chapters, ASEAN economic cooperation, for the most part, has gone the way of platitudes. This was due to the deep political undercurrents that have served to stymie the best intentions and plans. As a former Malaysian cabinet member expressed bluntly in 1990:

> As we (ASEAN) look at our past achievements, the one point which stands out clearly in ASEAN's score-sheet is that it has been more successful in forging political co-operation and enhancing its political role...than it has in the socio-economic fields.[41]

Although economics has been considered from the beginning as the sole viable foundation upon which ASEAN was to be built, the national leaderships of member states had until recently been paying only lip service to economic cooperation. Organisational inertia, produced and sustained by the incessant shortage of political will among the Association's leaderships, effectively consigned many an idea and project to a quick demise. The presence of innumerable political tensions among member states, as discussed in the third chapter, have served essentially to augment existent structural and perceptual difficulties. These obstacles have hindered efforts at trade liberalisation and increased coordination of industrial strategies of member states.

First, the majority of ASEAN economies have been competitive rather than

complementary in nature. It does not help matters that these primary-based economies also belong to the four larger and more influential ASEAN members, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand (the ASEAN-4). Competition has been especially intense in commodities such as rubber and palm oil, with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand waging ferocious price undercutting wars among themselves.[42] In addition, the ASEAN states (except Singapore) are all richly endowed with natural resources; however, their secondary industries more or less have produced the same commodities.[43]

Second, the differences in the levels of economic development and economic philosophies among the member states have proved invariably to be difficult obstacles to overcome. As one scholar has contended, "the ASEAN economies exhibit a mixture of the characteristics of the economies of the 'North' and the 'South.'"[44] Singapore for long has emphasised an export-oriented approach to industrial development, whereas Indonesia has preferred import substitution. For example, Indonesian sensitivities concerning the protection of its infant industries led to Jakarta's refusal, in contravention of prior agreement, to grant preferential access to the products of the ASEAN Industrial Project (AIP)[45] allocated to Singapore (i.e., diesel engine plants), owing to its own existing production of the same. Discrepancies in developmental levels were such that even during the critical few years immediately following its independence, Singapore, by 1969, had already achieved a per capita GDP of US$829 - nearly two and a half times that of its nearest ASEAN rival, Malaysia.[46] Such an impressive economic performance relative to that of its ASEAN neighbours created perceptual gaps between them with regard to economic cooperation. These differences precipitated conflicts of interest in preliminary sessions leading up to the first ASEAN summit of 1976, in Bali, where Singapore's insistence on the eradication

of trade barriers among ASEAN countries and the creation of a free trade area proved premature for ASEAN's thinking on regionalism. In fact, the Singaporean position on the issue during the Bali talks has been described by an official present at those sessions as 'overkill.'[47] The clash prompted Adam Malik, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, to criticise the then Singaporean premier, Lee, as 'a salesman' who sought to elevate the business aspect of ASEAN at the expense of other areas.[48] And even as recently as 1987, Suharto and Lee, anxious to preserve group unity, agreed not to invoke the subject of free trade and common markets at the third ASEAN summit to be held in Manila the following year.[49]

The lack of political will to overcome this distinct set of problems also points to another unique condition endemic to the ASEAN case. The Association, quite unlike other Third World regional economic groupings in Africa or Latin America, shares between its members three different sets of colonial ties, namely, Britain (for Malaysia and Singapore); the Netherlands (for Indonesia) and the United States (for the Philippines). In essence, the numerous economic relations that have survived the colonial period meant that national attentions and energies were continually being focused elsewhere, and not on regional cooperation. These relational patterns were subsequently accentuated in significant measure during the 1970s by other patrons, especially the United States, following a renewal of ideological confrontation in Southeast Asia. ASEAN and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region in general enjoyed above-average intensities with respect to the United States.[50] Also, the burgeoning growth of Japanese investment in the region provided additional incentive against intra-ASEAN trade. Table 6 (see Appendices), reflects the disparities in the trading patterns of ASEAN states. The data suggest, as one ASEAN observer has noted elsewhere, that "with the possible exceptions of Singapore and Thailand,

ASEAN's past growth can be attributed more to favourable external conditions, than to conscious internal efforts."[51] However, as examined in the introduction to this discussion, rapidly changing global and regional circumstances have warranted the need for ASEAN to fundamentally reappraise its goals and present conditions.

Several expressions of economic cooperation to date have shown good promise in their promotion of substantial market sharing and resource pooling among the ASEAN economies. The majority of these arrangements do not require the active participation of all member states, only their agreement, for implementation. The operating principle for such forms of ASEAN (or more correctly, sub-ASEAN) cooperation is known as the 'six minus X' principle.[52] The obvious contradiction with respect to project participation is again characteristic of the behaviour of developing countries (and even developed countries), which seek to circumvent projects that are not advantageous to themselves without forfeiting the benefits of regime membership or subsequent project participation. These cooperative expressions include (1) the Preferential Trade Arrangement; (2) the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture Agreement; (3) the ASEAN Industrial Complementation Agreement and its more recent and successful counterpart, the Brand-to-Brand Complementation scheme; and (4) the Singapore-Johor-Riau (SIJORI) growth triangle. Notwithstanding their past or even present difficulties, these expressions can well serve to facilitate ASEAN's transformation from a pseudo-economic organisation into a strong regional vehicle for ushering in, and sustaining, an ASEAN free trade area.

The notion of trade liberalisation and preferential treatment in trade was first mooted in the early 1970s, but the Preferential Trade Arrangement (PTA) concept only made its appearance in 1977 after the Bali summit. The PTA currently provides for all ASEAN states to grant fifty percent discounts on existing tariff rates for ASEAN

products on its list, of which about 20,000 items had been listed by 1986.[53] Mostly, the PTA applies to:

> basic commodities particularly rice and crude oil, products of the ASEAN industrial projects, products for the expansion of Intra-ASEAN trade; and other products of interest to contracting States.[54]

However, most of these listed items to date are minor and possess little trade potential; in fact, many appear to be sourced outside of the ASEAN region. In this respect, and as one scholar has argued, any increase in intra-ASEAN trade which the PTA may generate is quite likely to be concentrated only in a few product categories.[55] These inherent contradictions are reflective of the behaviour of developing countries seeking to develop their fledgling manufacturing and industrial bases behind some form of protectionism, and ASEAN states are no exception. Indeed, Article 12 of the PTA even provides a list of emergency measures designed to prevent so-called 'serious injury' to domestic producers facing import competition.[56]

In response to pressures for change, ASEAN has opted for greater trade liberalisation. The 1988 Manila summit produced the agreement to extend PTA to fifty percent, as opposed to the then current rate of five percent, of intra-ASEAN trade in the next five years.[57] This development has now been augmented by those of the 1992 Singapore summit, which include the Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT)[58] scheme scheduled for implementation at the beginning of 1993. The CEPT brings to the PTA list a potpourri of items once considered too sensitive for inclusion, such as manufactured goods, processed agricultural goods and, more importantly, capital goods[59] (e.g., industrial machinery); the last item of which would see thousands more added to the existing number of three thousand already listed.[60] The CEPT plays an integral role in the broad effort towards establishing a free trade area (i.e., AFTA). Certainly, its sector-by-sector approach to tariff reduction is more

ambitious and far-reaching as compared with the item-by-item approach of the PTA, the latter approach to which has often been referred as 'padding,' or the process of adding items - most of them irrelevant - to the PTA.[61] Indonesia's contribution to these significant developments reflects a fundamental shift in Jakarta's inveterate thinking on economic cooperation. Although the usual reservations over quick tariff cuts were expressed at the Singapore meetings, the Indonesian leadership rather unexpectably expressed confidence that, given ASEAN's current progress, AFTA might even be achieved before the stipulated fifteen year deadline.[62] These developments come at an opportune time even as intra-ASEAN trade appears to be on the increase.[63] Although the PTA may not quite constitute a prestigious programme of cooperation, it serves the important purpose of reducing information imperfections and transaction costs which, as Keohane has argued elsewhere, all too often hinder international cooperation.[64]

In essence, the basic framework for market sharing and resource pooling has been provided for by the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture Agreement (AIJV). The AIJV, implemented in 1983, accords preferential treatment for products sourced from firms that are jointly established by at least two ASEAN states. The better track record of AIJV relative to those of its cousins is largely predicated on its allowing extra-ASEAN involvement. In other words, the requirement of total ASEAN ownership has been waived in order to facilitate greater flexibility in industrial collaboration among players in the ASEAN private sector.[65] The margin of preference accorded to ASEAN importers of AIJV products, previously set at seventy-five percent, was increased in 1988 to ninety percent. The following year saw the agreement by member states to accelerate the implementation of AIJV projects by the private sector via the removal of any undue bureaucratic obstacles faced by them.[66] The AIJV concept has

not been exploited to its fullest potential and it remains to be seen as to how far it can eclipse other ASEAN schemes. Nonetheless, its conceptual foundation appears to be one that would increasingly find greater relevance and support in the near future simply because it accommodates the best of both worlds: foreign investment through the continuation of extra-regional ties, and intra-ASEAN cooperation.

As noted in the foregoing discussion, the AIP only requires equity participation.[67] The ASEAN Industrial Complementation Agreement (AIC), conversely, extends ASEAN industrial collaboration beyond that to include the development of horizontal linkages in certain industries in order for them to achieve greater economies of scale. The concept was first mooted in 1976 and only received the blessing for implementation in 1981. Designed to promote meaningful resource pooling among member states, the concept was well received by those involved. One of the first projects stemmed from the automotive industry which focused essentially on the production and distribution of automotive parts in the ASEAN countries. However, the project began to unravel as a result of disagreement among member states on the allocation of products among themselves.[68] The subsequent decision by member states to develop their own automotive industries independent of the AIC effectively squelched the project.[69] These domestic industries were established in collaboration with MNCs from outside the ASEAN region; in other words, dependence on bilateral relations with industrialised partners continued to wreck havoc on intra-ASEAN cooperation. A 1987 ASEAN standing committee report had this to say:

> Noting that the aggregate value of intra-ASEAN trading involving the first AIC package (i.e., automotive) was accounting for no more than one per cent of total intra-ASEAN trading, consultations would be held with the ASEAN private sector to look at the problems that account for the slow progress of the AIC scheme and to identify possible solutions to these problems.[70]

The decision to consult with the private sector proved significant in the

subsequent implementation in 1989 of the Brand-to-Brand Complementation (BBC) scheme. The BBC permits the movement of components (in this case, automotive parts again) made by firms in one ASEAN state to their subsidiaries in other ASEAN states at a substantially reduced tariff rate.[71] The BBC constitutes an improvement over the AIC in that the former appropriates the advantages of economies of scale with far greater efficiency than does the latter. In a sense, the AIC, after its faux pas, has been given a new lease of life through the BBC. Thus far, the member states involved in the scheme include Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. The scheme's success points to an important implication for existing and future cooperation, namely, the role of the private sector in taking the initiative. It would appear that private enterprise, if and when accorded the opportunity, can bring about market integration in the ASEAN region far more effectively than the programmes designed solely by the national governments. Both, however, have equally important roles to play. As others have argued elsewhere:

> The roles of government and of the private sector are co-operative and need not be mutually exclusive...Infrastructural bottlenecks, skills development, and basic needs are best resolved by government. Only then can the true benefits of private sector be achieved. On the other hand, the true entrepreneurial functions of spotting market opportunities, organizing factors, and taking the risks, is best left to private sector companies.[72]

The ASEAN states (just as many of their East Asian capitalist counterparts), as others put it, have telescoped "centuries of Western progress into a few decades of planned change" in their efforts to catch up with the industrialised world.[73] This accounts for the fact that the role of the state in the economy is substantially greater in developing countries today than it was in industrialised countries at a comparable level of industrial development. As such, ASEAN states have had to learn to keep themselves at arm's length where market integration is concerned. Two concepts can be borrowed

from the neofunctionalist theories of regional integration, as discussed in chapter one, to account for this phenomenon. First, horizontal cooperation within the regional private sector may well have spilled over into the government arena, as shown by the qualitatively different attitudes and actions at the fourth summit in Singapore. Second, 'learning' - in this case a positive variant - appears to have occurred among the ASEAN leaderships.

Similar lessons have also been learnt where the SIJORI growth triangle is concerned. The close geographical proximity of Indonesia's Riau islands, Malaysia's state of Johor, and Singapore with their distinct comparative advantages and factor endowments comingle to provide international and regional investors a unique mixture of resources, expertise and global linkages. One ASEAN observer went as far as to describe the mood with regard to the acceptance and promotion of the growth triangle concept as nothing short of 'euphoric.'[74] (See Diagram 3 under Appendices.) The comparative advantages arising from the differences in factor endowments are complementary, not competitive, in nature; as such, economies of scale can be captured in both manufacturing and service sectors. In what might be termed as vertical integration, the three nodes of the triangle each offer a distinct tier of resource. In this respect, there have been increasing references made to the notion of 'growth poles' in the incessant search for feasible economic models for the region.[75] As such, certain aspects of the structuralist 'centre-periphery' dichotomy can be borrowed to provide some conceptual relevance.[76] In a similar vein, the so-called 'wheel' illustration might also be used.[77] Singapore naturally constitutes the most well-developed node in the triangle and can thus be considered the centre or the wheel's hub, while Johor and Riau make up the periphery or the wheel's spokes. Economic benefits are distributed through a 'trickle-down' process from centre to periphery; from

hub to spokes.

Singapore, for example, provides high quality human capital and a well developed infrastructure; Johor has land and semi-skilled labour; and Riau provides abundant land and low-cost labour. Table 7 (see Appendices), illustrates the differences in land and labour costs of all three places. In the case of manufacturing, the establishment of a wide base straddling all three nodes and exploiting available advantages provides an incentive for MNCs to consider not just individual ASEAN states for investment opportunities, but in effect the region as a whole. The successes accrued by the SIJORI triangle can in essence cause further expansion to other contiguous areas by way of triggering a self-perpetuating and self-augmenting growth process. Singapore's Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, has spoken of an East Asian 'crescent of prosperity' as a macro-version of the growth triangle.[78] The Philippines, for example, has already expressed desire to be part of a growth triangle.[79] Similarly, other possible growth triangles have been proposed for the region, such as the Penang-Medan-Phuket link (involving Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand), and the Kalimantan-Sabah-Philippines link (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines).[80]

The SIJORI concept has certainly not been without its difficulties. Operating problems during the early phases of implementation include bureaucratic and procedural hassles in all three countries that have served to obstruct labour mobility, and infrastructural lags in Johor and Riau which have created both inter-state and, surprisingly, domestic bottlenecks in the movement of goods and labour.[81] For example, the licensing process in Batam Island in the Riau region, where the bulk of industrial activity occurs, is slow compared to those of Singapore and Johor. And in what appears to be a strange twist of concerns, the private sector has been issuing complaints regarding labour shortages in Riau, a region noted for its comparative

advantage in labour-intensive industry.[82] In the case of Johor, operating a duty-free zone within its provincial borders has been a difficult process. There have been problems of 'leakages,' in the form of smuggling and circumvention of administrative controls, between Johor and other Malaysian states (or provinces) directly contiguous to itself. In this respect, implications of both positive and negative natures tend to be magnified in Johor - as compared with Singapore and Riau - due to the large portion and population of peninsula Malaysia of which Johor occupies.[83] As such, the potential social problem of equitable distribution of wealth in Malaysia has intrinsically been enhanced as a direct consequence of the growth triangle.

One major criticism of SIJORI is that, in relational terms, it does not constitute a true expression of trilateral cooperation as much as it does two separate expressions of bilateral cooperation - both in which Singapore is a partner.[84] The economic link between Malaysia and Indonesia is still essentially underdeveloped. There is thus an urgent need for triangle participants to sum up sufficient political will to commit themselves to establishing a veritable trilateral union as a signal to foreign investors of the serious intent of all three states. This points to another conceptual conundrum. As noted earlier, one of the significant lessons learnt thus far by ASEAN is the effectiveness of depending on the initiative of private enterprise, not of government. Should governments then intervene to provide infrastructure and facilitate policies in regions which lack trade and investment links, in the hope that private sector investment would consequently flow in? Also, the emphasis on Singapore's sophisticated infrastructure and global links as cardinal to the triangle's success engenders the question; namely, can the growth triangle's success be replicated elsewhere? Others have argued in the affirmative; that is, the spread of economic growth is in effect a universal trend.[85] Growth poles that exploit comparative

advantages have sprung up, such as those between Hong Kong and China (i.e., Hong Kong-Shenzhen-Guangdong), and between Taiwan and China. The structuralist argument has also often been employed in the general critique. For example, comments that Singapore would stand to gain the most at the expense of the peripheral regions abounded when the growth triangle concept was first mooted in 1989.

In summary, there are several important implications evident from the preceding discussion of viable patterns of economic cooperation among ASEAN states. Appreciation for the initiative of the private sector has been increased. In this respect, the notion of growth poles, in essence that of governments supporting existing development structures and processes rather than starting brand new initiatives, has been nothing short of revolutionary in ASEAN thinking on economic cooperation. ASEAN leaderships have also begun incrementally to view economic cooperation in absolute, not relative, terms. Member states have long held the view that all ASEAN activities must benefit all members equally.[86] In other words, the fact that every member stands to gain something is sufficient reason to cooperate. For example, one Indonesian senior official has argued that the question of who stood to gain the most should not even be an issue in SIJORI discussions.[87] These developments all mark a fundamental shift in the Association's orientation towards regional economic cooperation. This suggests that the grouping has never been more ready than at the present for bolder and more ambitious endeavours in regional cooperation.

Conclusion

The primary conceptual objective of this chapter has been to identify features of ASEAN economic cooperation which possibly reflect the characteristics and dynamics of complex interdependence. In this respect, several patterns of economic cooperation,

and their attendant implications to ASEAN cooperation in general, were examined.

Interdependence is a common theme among the ASEAN states due to the high levels of sensitivity and vulnerability each member state feels relative to its ASEAN neighbours. Indeed, the regional environment in Southeast Asia has always been invariably 'turbulent' and 'confusing.' Both cold and hot wars have continually circumscribed opportunities to establish durable peace and stability in the region. In such a highly interdependent environment, ASEAN has stood out as a region which has recognised the benefits of cooperation as the means by which to reduce regional turbulence and confusion. As the Singaporean President expressed during a recent visit to Indonesia:

> By working together with other ASEAN partners, we can create an environment free from conflict and conducive to economic growth.[88]

However, as evident from the preceding discussion, ASEAN economic cooperation has had a dismal history of innumerable setbacks and compromises. Even then, there are emerging patterns of complex interdependence that suggest qualitative changes in attitudes and actions have been taking place.

In the course of over two decades of regional organisation, ASEAN has established quite an impressive network of multiple channels that continues to grow at a prolific rate. ASEAN's very creation itself reflects the common desire among member states to deal with regional conflicts by establishing a multilateral forum for regular interaction and communication among themselves. The range of transgovernmental channels and number of contacts have been nothing short of impressive. Although formal interaction between heads of government have been restricted to four major summits[89], meetings at cabinet level have occurred on a regular basis. Except in 1970 and 1975, ASEAN foreign ministers have met annually (i.e., ASEAN Ministerial Meetings), while economic and trade ministers have met on

more than twenty occasions (i.e., ASEAN Economic Ministers' Meetings).[90] Other transgovernmental channels include the ASEAN Inter-parliamentary Organisation; the ASEAN Task Force, whose mandate it is to study ways to strengthen the institutional structure; the ASEAN Standing Committee; the Senior Officials' Meetings; and numerous other middle level interactions dealing with varied issues ranging from strategic resource protection[91] to harmonisation of custom procedures and documents across ASEAN countries.

An ASEAN Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI) has also been established for the purpose of providing a regional forum where governments and the private sectors can interact. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have also played an active role in ASEAN affairs, such as those in regional banking and academic circles. For example, there was the recent creation of an academia-related NGO known as the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, which brought together national 'think tanks' from all member countries.[92] Indeed, ASEAN does not suffer from the lack of contact, or from the lack of available channels linked at different levels. As one scholar has remarked:

> The impression is one of feverish activity where, in the name of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), hundreds of government officials, businessmen and academics attend hundreds of regional meetings of committees and commissions, where thousands of pages are produced, printed, co-ordinated and disseminated, where reciprocal visits abound among political leaders, cultural groups and animal breeders, and where thousands of working hours are spent to evolve ideas for potential future activities.[93]

It appears that ASEAN, for all its hyper-activism, may in effect have substituted complexity, as a self-serving end in itself, for meaningful economic cooperation. Conversely, complexity may not be such a bad thing if it is viewed as a significant aspect within the wider ambit of institutionalisation. Under Huntington's conception of

political institutionalisation, complexity, as characterised by the "multiplication of organisational subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of subunits,"[94] strengthens a political institution's capacity to retain the loyalty of its members and adapt to the loss of any one of its functions. In a similar vein, complexity can serve the very same purpose for an international regime such as ASEAN.[95] In a sense, the self-serving functions of Association activities may well provide the impetus for the self-perpetuation and self-preservation of the ASEAN regime. As Jervis has contended, a (security) regime that has begun functioning becomes a force in its own right by providing itself with a dynamic for regime maintenance.[96] Huntington also has argued that organisation will triumph over function; in essence, the regime will come to be valued more for its own sake than for the functions it performs.[97]

The failure of ASEAN as an economic organisation stems largely from the underlying political currents and tensions that have debilitated economic cooperation. The continued emphasis of national interests over regional goals means that political-security issues have incessantly occupied the foremost position on the ASEAN agenda. There appears, as seen in preceding discussions, to be a growing significance in economic issues due to strategic changes that have occurred in recent years in the global environment. The perceived impending division of the world into economic blocs has essentially forced economics to the forefront of ASEAN concerns. Malaysia's Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamed, in articulating a rationalisation for strengthening ASEAN economic cooperation, has called for the Association to "speak with one voice" against what he perceives to be the corporate rejection of international free trade by the condominium of developed countries.[98] As such, the once distinct hierarchy of issues in ASEAN is gradually becoming less so. Foreign policy in

ASEAN states (in this respect, foreign economic policy), is becoming less the sole prerogative of governments as private enterprise, academia, the media, and other societal sectors have joined in the debate.[99] As noted earlier, the input of the private sector in decision making with respect to economic policy has been significantly enhanced as a result of the SIJORI growth triangle experience. This in no way suggests that political-security issues are any less important than before. The formal expansion of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference mandate to include regional security issues alludes to the latter's continued significance, even as ASEAN gradually approaches a state not unlike complex interdependence. As others have argued elsewhere:

> The rhetoric of interdependence and symbols of economic and ecological security are likely, however, to be imperfect substitutes for the traditional military security imagery.[100]

As the third chapter has shown, the employment of force or threat of force in intra-ASEAN relations is diminishing. Thus, military force is increasingly viewed by ASEAN states as an ineffective instrument for conflict management. Rather, ASEAN itself constitutes the manifestation of like-minded states that have decidedly eschewed violent force as an option in the process of regional reconciliation. This has led some to classify ASEAN as a pluralistic security community.[101] Again, this does not imply that ASEAN states reject military force per se. On the contrary, all member states at present continue to sustain high levels of militarism such that there has been growing concern with what appears to be a small-scale regional arms race. In essence, the high potential in the Southeast Asian region for 'turbulence' necessitates such behaviour.

As intra-ASEAN relational dynamics continue to increasingly evince the characteristics of complex interdependence, one would expect, in accordance with complex interdependence thinking, that the nature of linkage politics will gradually

change. The lack of a clear hierarchy of issues makes it difficult for powerful states, or groups of states, to maintain successfully traditional patterns of linkage.[102] The growing ability of weaker states to win in bilateral disputes where there is explicit asymmetrical interdependence also renders traditional linkages obsolete. In matters of ASEAN conflict management, transnational bodies, such as the International Court of Justice, have been employed with inconclusive results.[103] ASEAN itself has proved its usefulness as a vehicle for regional reconciliation, and thus as an alternative instrument of linkage. However, in the unique case of ASEAN, conceptual analysis is complicated by the fact that there is no clear hegemon among member states. In addition, the grouping is made up of nascent states grappling with problems of national identity and independence. As discussed in preceding chapters, the grouping's situation, which comprises a potentially powerful Indonesia and a tiny but economically and militarily strong Singapore, can best be described as a 'balanced disparity.'

Yet, in the field of economic cooperation (as in other areas), the other ASEAN states have in effect deferred to Indonesia as the regional leader. Long referred to as the 'reluctant regionalist,'[104] Indonesia has constituted ASEAN's biggest single obstacle to economic cooperation. Similarly, in matters of international diplomatic relations, other ASEAN countries have, with varying lengths of patience, accommodated Indonesia's slow rapprochement with China that has come to be known as 'slowboat diplomacy.'[105] In military-security affairs, the impetus behind the preservation of ASEAN as a non-military organisation lies again with Indonesia.[106] In a sense, Singapore's formal offer of the use of its military facilities to the United States in the wake of the latter's withdrawal from its Philippine bases became regionally palatable especially after Indonesia agreed to the continued presence of

American troops in the region.[107] Thus, it may be argued that while ASEAN's current shift in favour of intensified economic cooperation has largely been due to the pressure of global economic and socio-political forces, the significance of Indonesia's conferring of blessing to the new initiatives obtained at the Singapore meetings should not be understated. In this respect, President Suharto's call in Singapore for ASEAN to faithfully adhere to its original aims of building national resilience may even be interpreted as an indirect caveat against unbridled economic regionalism.[108] As such, notwithstanding the increasing patterns of complex interdependence, it would appear that linkage politics and strategies in ASEAN still retain much of their usual flavour and style.

As noted in the preceding discussion, foreign economic policy among ASEAN states is no longer the sole preserve of the foreign ministries. Agenda formation within the Association is increasingly becoming the common responsibility of governments, NGOs and other interest groups. This also points to the changing nature of transnational and transgovernmental relations, as evidenced by the formation of transnational coalitions for the purpose of making and advocating regional policy. For example, in business and financial matters, regional coalitions comprising government and private sector representation include the creation of a banking council, a finance corporation, and a chamber of commerce and industry within the ASEAN institutional framework. In what amounts to joint efforts to combat social and natural problems, transnational agreements have been established for the provision of mutual assistance on natural disasters and the regulation of controlled substance abuse. Even an ASEAN Food Security Reserve Agreement has been implemented.[109] On the external front, ASEAN policy-making has benefitted from the input obtained from UN appraisals, dialogue partner interactions and non-ASEAN NGOs.

In this respect, it is interesting to note that even in the realm of security matters, which has essentially been monopolised by national governments, the creation of viable confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) in East and Southeast Asia (e.g., the ASEAN-PMC multilateral security forum) has largely been due to the initiatives and efforts of NGOs, such as the 1987 Vladivostok Conference and the 1991 Round Table discussions in Kuala Lumpur.[110] Such responses essentially reflect the impact of global strategic changes which not only complicate but in effect reform the regional agenda. As noted earlier, ASEAN's very raison d'etre has been changed from the political to the economic in response to international changes.

However, it may be argued that while agenda formation in ASEAN has been affected by the growing number of actors, it assumes a somewhat different form from the idealised situation under complex interdependence. As discussed earlier, the state (i.e., the technocratic or administrative state) plays a heavily accentuated role in ASEAN economies and societies. Entire societies are therefore socialised to the concept of comprehensive security; in other words, entire populations are mobilised to participate in the process of nation-building.[111] As one scholar has argued:

> The nation, it is believed, can only be consolidated once it has become a developed economy. This is a belief which projects the consolidation into an endless future, for the concept of a developed state is determined by what happens in the most economically advanced areas of the world. But this shift or emphasis is one way in which nationalist theory is likely to liquidate itself and shunt the energies of men into the more familiar paths of economic development.[112]

In this sense, regional cooperation continues to be the handmaiden of national interest. ASEAN states are today being driven to consider economic cooperation again because of changing conditions which challenge economic nationalism - for long the ideological underpinning of certain ASEAN states - as a viable alternative. For example, the growth rates of member states plunged drastically in 1986 as a result of

global economic changes, forcing ASEAN states to reappraise their economic strategies.[113] Two implications can be gleaned from this discussion. First, the process of agenda formation in ASEAN, while obviously expanding in terms of actor representation and participation, appears however to be indirectly 'controlled' and 'guided' by the state toward its logical ends; namely, regional and consequently national (economic) security. Second, the impact of global flux appears to play a fundamental role, perhaps more than anything else, as a factor affecting the ASEAN agenda. As discussed in the second chapter, international crises, such as the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, have proven to be most effective in bringing about change in the Association.

These implications were clearly evident in a recent case involving ASEAN's response to a transnational challenge to its agenda. ASEAN states were told by the European Community (EC) that their requests for more trade and aid could well depend on their human-rights records, and their efforts to put pressure on the military government in Myanmar to improve its human-rights record.[114] ASEAN successfully countered on both fronts and managed to obtain an agreement with the EC upon making only minor concessions. In the case of Myanmar, ASEAN refused to forego its strategy of 'constructive engagement.' However, as noted in the third chapter, a potential regional destabiliser in the form of the Rohingya refugee exodus from Myanmar has caused the Association to seriously consider changing its Myanmar policy.

Notwithstanding the ambiguous trends in ASEAN that appear to contradict some of the propositions of complex interdependence, the importance of ASEAN as an international organisation is undeniably on the increase. This has come about as a consequence of growing multiple channels of contact between ASEAN societies, the

rising significance of the economic imperative, and increasing transnational political bargaining. The utility of ASEAN as an instrument of linkage in intra-ASEAN relations has already been discussed. Concomitantly, the role of ASEAN in the international arena has similarly been enhanced in a world situation approximating complex interdependence. Growing global interdependence has rendered traditional linkage strategies less useful; weak states, consequently, have appropriated alternative linkage instruments to obtain benefits. In this respect, a coalition of weak states utilising those same instruments can perhaps obtain even greater benefits. As one scholar has contended:

> It can therefore be seen here that the value of ASEAN in the eyes of nations with whom ASEAN has relations would increase considerably when ASEAN deals with these nations as a single actor. Effectively, ASEAN nations would collectively be able to yield more systemic power.[115]

As such, ASEAN's role as an important actor in international fora, such as the UN and the GATT, would be strengthened if the organisation itself is strengthened. International organisations do not only offer themselves as mere arenas of linkage by which states can elicit benefits from other states. They can in fact be used as both a tool and arena of linkage for the same purposes.

In conclusion, given the conditions and corresponding processes of complex interdependence, the ASEAN international regime has essentially been changed from a de facto political-security regime to a economic-security regime. Two qualifications, however, are in order. First, this is not to suggest that the political imperative is no longer important. On the contrary, the new reality of geoeconomics appears, quite suspiciously and by all intents and purposes, to be mostly geostrategic in nature. Also, given ASEAN's nature as a grouping of states seeking regional cooperation as a means to satisfy national interests, ASEAN thus remains a political creature even as its

raison d'etre is economic. This leads to the second point. There is a certain measure of ambiguity as to whether an actual regime change has taken place (i.e., one regime collapses and is replaced by a new one with new principles and norms), or whether a change of rules and decision-making procedures within a regime has been effected.[116] The notion of a number of 'sector-specific' regimes co-existing under the umbrella of a 'meta-regime,' the latter of which contains the general principles, norms and set of governing arrangements; may be helpful in this case.[117] In this respect, it may be argued that ASEAN constitutes the meta-regime in that the principles and norms that govern behaviour among member states have essentially remain unchanged. These include the continued importance of building national resilience, a consensus approach, and/or mutual respect and cooperation. For example, President Suharto has recently reminded his fellow ASEAN leaders that efforts to improve and strengthen the Association should be "consistent with its basic principles." He also pointed out that, given the rapid global changes and attendant challenges, ASEAN must determine to "re-assert its ideals and objectives."[118] This means that ASEAN in principle has not changed; only its agenda has. As Jeshurun has argued, concerns regarding the possible extinction of ASEAN as a result of the inability to secure a raison d'etre are nothing more than a distorted profile of what the organisation really constitutes:

> (ASEAN is) a gathering of like-minded Southeast Asian nations who do not feel sufficiently confident to deal with regional...issues on a unilateral basis.[119]

The four models of regime change under complex interdependence will likely be unable, in their separate capacities, to explain fully regime change within the ASEAN meta-regime. But they do offer some conceptual relevance when combined variously. The weaknesses of the economic model, namely, lack of power considerations, have already been noted. In the case of ASEAN, regime 'obsolescence'

may not have been the consequence of technological advances and growing economic interdependence as much as the grafting of another regime to the existing one; that is, the merging of the economic with the political-security. ASEAN fears of an imminent restructuring of the international free trade regime by the West have certainly increased the vigilance of member countries to maintain their high economic growth rates and sustain the levels of economic development.[120] The idea that the strategic impact of global economic flows causally leads to a regime changing and re-equipping itself in order to better reap benefits, best fits the description of recent developments in ASEAN.

As discussed in the first chapter, the theory of hegemonic stability (i.e, the overall power structure model) is not useful because ASEAN lacks a regional hegemon. Nevertheless, the fact that member states defer to Indonesia as the perceived regional leader is significant. The change from a political to an economic regime did not result because Indonesia suffered from an erosion of power, but from changes in world politics. Indonesia, however, 'permitted' the smooth transition from one regime to another by converging its interests with those of other member states.

The issue structure model helps to explain how an economic regime has been generated as a result of the reforming of regime rules governing behaviour within an issue area. The previous economic 'regime,' with its mostly divergent expectations among members concerning economic cooperation, was transformed into the new regime bent on more ambitious cooperation because some significant ground rules had been changed. ASEAN states have learned via the BBC scheme that the role of private enterprise in taking the initiative is integral to success in joint economic ventures. The governments have learned via the SIJORI growth triangle concept that, rather than starting brand new initiatives of their own, they should tap into existing developmental

structures and processes and build upon those foundations. And finally, ASEAN corporately has realised that gains from economic cooperation do not have to benefit all member states in an equal fashion. Such a misguided sense of egalitarianism, born not of altruism but of egoistic self-interest, has for so long hurt rather than helped ASEAN.

Finally, it would appear that the still growing system of networks, norms and institutions that flesh out the ASEAN international organisation is not something that can be dismantled or rearranged easily. It is doubtful if any ASEAN member state would wish to unilaterally challenge the entrenched patterns of behaviour and norms within the existing regime structure. This is not to suggest that there would not be the occasional act of free riding or cheating among members. Indeed, the ability of the ASEAN international regime to survive the many crises and challenges by adapting and reforming reflects the collective desire of its members (or, more appropriately, its transnational and transgovernmental actors) to continually maintain and strengthen their regime. The challenges presented in a world of complex interdependence demand that this be so. The conceptual contradictions within ASEAN with respect to complex interdependence, as discussed in this chapter, suggest that balance of power thinking still remains significant in ASEAN regional dynamics. In this respect, the Association's present incipient state as an international regime is quite evident.

Nevertheless, a growing optimism within ASEAN today regarding the inevitability of increasing regional cooperation is characterised by the following comment:

> The pace of economic integration to date has been dictated by millions of decision(s) being made everyday by individual businesses and consumers, and I firmly believe that the process of Asia's economic integration will continue regardless of political issues and regardless of the fate of formal inter-governmental cooperation.[121]

Such a view echoes the sanguine tone of the liberal regional integration theories of the past. Indeed, the current expressions of economic cooperation, as Falk and other idealist scholars would probably concur, may well be parts of the long shadow cast by the future.[122] However, the inherently cautious nature of ASEAN regionalism to date suggests that such high optimism, while welcomed, is still a tad overly hopeful.

ENDNOTES

1. Cited in Chin Kin Wah, "Changing Global Trends and Their Effects on the Asia-Pacific," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 13, no. 1 (June 1991), p. 1.

2. Ibid., p. 8.

3. Frederick Lister, "The Role of International Organizations in the 1990s and Beyond," International Relations, vol. 10, no. 2 (November 1990), p. 102.

4. Hans Christoph Rieger, "Into the Nineties: Global Economic Challenges and the Southeast Asian Response," in Sharon Siddique and Ng Chee Yuen, eds., Southeast Asian Affairs 1991 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p. 26.

5. "A Region at the Crossroads," Asiaweek, August 10, 1990, pp. 24-25.

6. See, for example, Bernardo M. Villegas, "The Challenge to ASEAN Economic Cooperation," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 9, no. 2 (September 1987), p. 122.

7. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd. edition (Boston, MA.: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1989), p. 23.

8. In a somewhat non-academic fashion, the earlier chapter's discussion on ASEAN military-security cooperation and linkages, i.e., the ASEAN 'spider web,' connote a sense of complex interdependence even within the area of security cooperation. It was noted there that these linkages evinced some degree of institutionalisation even as they were considered (before the Singapore summit), as strictly non-ASEAN matters. If one accepts John Gerard Ruggie's conception of international regimes as essentially a level of institutionalisation, then ASEAN clearly constitutes, as discussed in chapter three, a security regime. John Gerard Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," International Organization, vol. 29 (Summer 1975).

9. This distinction, according to J. Martin Rochester, is what separates regional integration from complex interdependence. See his "The rise and fall of international organization as a field of study," International Organization, vol. 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986), p. 793.

10. Keohane and Nye, op. cit., p. 8.

11. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1987), p. 209.

12. Ibid., p. 249.

13. See, for example, Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425. Wendt argues that the term 'anarchy' does not accurately describe the structure of the international system. Rather, the twin notions of a self-help world and power politics are the result of process; i.e., 'anarchy' is essentially a cognitive concept, deriving primarily from state and non-state actors' ideas about how the world works.

14. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," World Politics, vol. 40, no. 2 (January 1988), p. 239.

15. Hans W. Maull, "The Strategic Impact of World Economic Changes," Adelphi Papers, No. 237 (Spring 1989), pp. 63-64.

16. Ibid., p. 19.

17. Ernst B. Haas, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration," International Organization, vol. 30, no. 2 (Spring 1976), p. 179.

18. See, for example, David H. Blake and Robert S. Walters' chapter on MNCs in The Politics of Global Economic Relations, 3rd edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987), pp. 90-138.

19. John W. Burton, World Society (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

20. Quoted in Keohane and Nye, op. cit., p. 26.

21. Hans J. Morgenthau, "The New Diplomacy of Movement," Encounter, vol. 43 (August 1974), p. 56.

22. See, for example, Maull, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

23. Keohane and Nye, op. cit., p. 29.

24. Laurence Martin, "The Role of Military Force in the Nuclear Age," in Laurence Martin, ed., Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1979), p. 13. This view is largely supported by the recent behaviour of states vis-a-vis militarism. As chapter three already noted, the U.S. Pentagon noted in an internal document that the U.S. "must maintain our status as a military power of the first magnitude (in post-Cold War Asia)." Far Eastern Economic Review, March 26, 1992. And even in the case

of Canada, its military budget has consistently been on the increase, from $4.39 billion in 1980 to a projected $12.46 billion in 1993 (not including Gulf War expenditures). However, this given figures do not reflect real terms. Globe and Mail, March 31, 1992.

25. Jose Thiago Cintra, "Regional Conflicts: Trends in a Period of Transition," Adelphi Papers, No. 237 (Spring 1989), p. 108.

26. Keohane and Nye, op. cit., p. 29.

27. Lister, op. cit., p. 103.

28. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

29. Blake and Walters, op. cit., pp. 49-52.

30. Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. xii.

31. Keohane and Nye, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

32. Keohane and Nye, op. cit., pp. 180-191.

33. Ibid., p. 34.

34. Ibid., p. 54.

35. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York: Random, 1956), p. 405.

36. Refer to chapter one for a more detailed discussion of hegemonic stability theory and its usefulness with respect to the ASEAN case.

37. Keohane and Nye, op. cit., pp. 49-54.

38. Arthur A. Stein, "The Politics of Linkage," World Politics, vol. 33 (October 1980), p. 81.

39. Keohane and Nye, op. cit., pp. 54-58.

40. Ibid., p. 254.

41. Daim Zainuddin, ASEAN Economic Co-operation: Agenda for the 1990s (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), p. 7.

42. Sahathavan Meyanathan, ASEAN Commodities: Co-operation or Competition, ISIS Research Note (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1986), p. 9.

43. Amina Tyabji, "The Six Asian Economies: 1980-88," in Alison Broinowski, ed., ASEAN into the 1990s (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 33.

44. Srikanta Chatterjee, "ASEAN Economic Co-operation in the 1980s and 1990s," in Broinowski, op. cit., p. 67.

45. The AIP refers to the establishment of large-scale industrial projects that would be jointly financed and owned by all the ASEAN countries. AIP products would be accorded preferential access within ASEAN under the Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA). Each member country would be allocated a specific AIP of which the host country would finance 60% of the equity output with the other 40% coming from the other member states.

46. Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 136.

47. Sudomo Annuar, "Bali hangover," ASEAN Review, vol. 1 (March 15, 1976), p. 13.

48. New Straits Times, February 5, 1976. This reference is taken from Malaysia's premier English-language newspaper, and should not be mistaken for Singapore's English-language paper, The Straits Times.

49. Private discussion between the two leaders on February 6, 1987. Hans Christoph Reiger, ASEAN Economic Cooperation Handbook (Singapore: ASEAN Economic Research Unit, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p. 23.

50. For an excellent discussion of trade patterns between the U.S. and the rest of the Asia-Pacific region, see Augustine H. H. Tan, "American Influence on Asian-Pacific Trade and Development," in Lau Teik Soon and Leo Suryadinata, eds., Moving into the Pacific Century: The Changing Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: Heinemann Asia for the Centre of Advanced Studies, National University of Singapore; and the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1988), pp. 38-77.

51. Bernado M. Villegas, "The Challenge to ASEAN Economic Cooperation," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 9, no. 2 (September 1987), p. 125.

52. 'Six' refers to the six ASEAN states; prior to Brunei's entry into the Association, the principle was known as 'five minus one.' Lee Kuan Yew originally proposed this principle in 1982 as the reasoning behind Singapore's decision to forego its allocated AIP (diesel engines) after Indonesia refused to grant preferential access, as discussed above. 'Six minus X' was the follow-up proposal of Singapore's Foreign Minister Dhanabalan. ASEAN Newsletter, no. 15 (May-June 1986).

53. Chatterjee, op. cit., p. 65.

54. Chapter 2, Article 4 of The Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (ASEAN PTA), Manila, 1977.

55. Gerald Tan, Intra-ASEAN Trade Liberalisation: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. XX (June 1982), pp. 321-331.

56. See especially points (1) and (2) of Article 12 of the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements, Manila, February 24, 1977.

57. Far Eastern Economic Review, December 3, 1987. The summit, held in the following year, made official the proposals. See also Donald K. Emmerson, ASEAN Under Pressure. Background Paper prepared for the 3rd ASEAN Summit, Manila, December 14-15, 1987. An Asia Society Media Briefing (NY.: The Asia Society, 1987).

58. The origins and initiative of the CEPT lie essentially with the Indonesians. In this sense, the pace ASEAN economic cooperation appears to be dictated by Jakarta. The concept was formally adopted in 1990 as a prelude to the 1992 summit. See especially point number 12 of the Joint Press Statement of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers, Denpasar, Indonesia, 29-30 October 1990.

59. The planned inclusion of capital goods to the CEPT will in effect double the scope of the CEPT. Currently, manufactured and processed agricultural goods, which originally made up the CEPT, account for about 35% of intra-ASEAN trade. The inclusion of capital goods will raise trade levels significantly. Straits Times, January 27, 1992.

60. Straits Times, January 23 and 24, 1992.

61. See, for example, Tan Kong Yam, Toh Mun Heng and Linda Low, Asia and Pacific Economic Cooperation. Prepared for a Regional Symposium on Asia and the Pacific organised jointly by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and the International Center for Economic Growth (ICEG), September 2-3, 1991, Singapore. Unpublished study.

62. Ibid.

63. The recent rise in intra-ASEAN trade became so voluminous that trade movement had to be shifted from the trans-Pacific shipping routes, most of them underutilised due to the American recession, to ASEAN regional shipping routes. Asian Wall Street Journal, September 2, 1991.

64. Keohane has argued that market failures are caused by factors attributable to the structure of the system and the institutions, or lack thereof, that characterise it. Robert O. Keohane, "The demand for international regimes," in Krasner, op. cit., p. 151. See also Evans Young, An Indigenous Agenda for ASEAN Economic Cooperation. Paper prepared for the 1986 Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, March 21-23, p. 3.

65. The current ceiling on the non-ASEAN share of equity is 50%. Rieger, op. cit., p. 44. See also Emmerson, op. cit.

66. Rieger (1991), op. cit., pp. 44-45.

67. The ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP) will not be discussed in this chapter for reasons stated above, i.e., they have shown themselves to be more problematic than promising in terms of ASEAN economic cooperation. For a detailed examination of the subject, please see chapters four and five of Marjorie L. Suriyamongkol, Politics of ASEAN Economic Co-operation: The Case of ASEAN Industrial Projects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

68. Chatterjee, op. cit., p. 69.

69. Villegas, op. cit., p. 121.

70. Annual Report of the ASEAN Standing Committee (1986-1987), p. 37.

71. Rieger (1990), op. cit., p. 29.

72. Sree Kumar and Lee Tsao Yuan, "A Singapore Perspective," in Lee Tsao Yuan, ed., Growth Triangle: The Johor-Singapore-Riau Experience (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Institute of Policy Studies, 1991), p. 30.

73. Quoted in Basu Sharma, Aspects of Industrial Relations in ASEAN, Occasional paper no. 78 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p. 13.

74. Rieger (1990), op. cit., p. 30.

75. Ibid., p. 29.

76. See, for example, Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 8, no. 2 (1971), pp. 81-117.

77. Professor David Leyton-Brown of York University referred to this model of development in his paper, "International Trade and Security," presented at the 8th Annual Political Studies Students' Conference, University of Manitoba, January 23-25, 1992.

78. Rieger (1990), op. cit., p. 30.

79. Lianhe Zaobao, January 27, 1992.

80. Mari Pangestu, Hadi Soesastro and Mubariq Ahmad, Intra ASEAN Economic Cooperation: Is There a New Perspective? ISEAS-ICEG Regional Symposium on ASEAN and the Pacific, September 2-3, 1991, Singapore. Unpublished study.

81. Kumar and Lee, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

82. Jakarta Post, August 6, 1991.

83. Yuhanis Kamil, Mari Pangestu and Christina Fredericks, "A Malaysian Perspective," in Lee (1991), op. cit., pp. 62-63.

84. Mari Pangestu, "An Indonesian Perspective," in ibid., p. 108.

85. See, for example, the introductory foreword by K.S. Sandhu and Tommy Koh to Lee (1991), op. cit.

86. Rieger (1990), op. cit., p. 30.

87. Sunday Times, June 23, 1991.

88. President Wee Kim Wee, who serves as head of state for Singapore. Straits Times (Weekly Overseas Edition), November 23, 1991.

89. Not including the innumerable private and formal meetings between ASEAN leaders, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

90. Rieger (1991), op. cit.

91. A total of nine energy sectors was identified in the Programme of Action approved in 1990 as potential areas for closer and enhanced economic cooperation among ASEAN states. See point number 10 of the Joint Press Statement of the Ninth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Energy Cooperation, Manila, 15-16 November 1990.

92. Many of the proposals put together by this NGO, the ASEAN-ISIS, became ASEAN policy during the 4th summit in Singapore.

93. Hans H. Indorf, "ASEAN in Extra-Regional Perspective," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 9, no. 2 (September 1987), p. 86.

94. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 17-18.

95. For an adaptation of Huntington's concepts to the analysis of international regimes, see Roger K. Smith, "Institutionalisation as a Measure of Regime Stability: Insights for International Regimes Analysis from the Study of Domestic Politics," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 18, no. 2 (1989), pp. 227-244.

96. As discussed in chapter three. There is no deliberate intention here to reify international regimes.

97. Smith, op. cit., p. 236.

98. Speech by Mahathir at an international conference on ASEAN hosted by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of Indonesia and the Asia Society, in Bali, Indonesia, March 4, 1991.

99. See, for example, the publication by the ASEAN-ISIS (academic NGO), A Time For Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit (Jakarta: ASEAN-ISIS, 1991). Jusuf Wanandi, the director of Indonesia's Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), has similarly called upon ASEAN leaders in 1991 to speed up security dialogue regarding the setting up of a security order in Southeast Asia, and the need for regional arms control discussions. Jakarta Post, August 6, 1991.

100. Keohane and Nye, op. cit., p. 238.

101. See, for example, Amitav Acharya, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defence Community'?" Pacific Affairs, vol. 64, no. 2 (Summer 1991).

102. The EC's recent failure (Luxembourg, May 31, 1991) to elicit from ASEAN an explicit concession to improve its human-rights record as a precondition to greater trade and aid benefits from the EC is a good example of the failure of a traditional linkage strategy. This situation is discussed again below.

103. Chapter three discussed the Sabah dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines, and the Pedra Branca dispute between Malaysia and Singapore; both of which have involved or will involve the ICJ.

104. ASEAN Review, no. 1 (February 16, 1976), p. 12.

105. Ibid.

106. Indonesia essentially feared that others would regard ASEAN as another Cold War organisation. Justus M. van der Kroef, "National Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Perceptions in Indonesia," Orbis, vol. 20 (Summer 1976), pp. 487-488.

107. Lianhe Zaobao, January 29, 1992.

108. Straits Times, January 28, 1992.

109. See, for example, Rieger (1991).

110. The ASEAN-ISIS has already been listed as an academic NGO that has influenced regional policy in fundamental ways. Private interview with Associate Professor Lau Teik Soon, political scientist at the National University of Singapore, July 7, 1991.

111. See, for example, Muthiah Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," in Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, Jusuf Wanandi and Sung-joo Han, eds., Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global (Berkeley, CA.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California Press, no date).

112. K. R. Minoque, Nationalism (London: B.T. Batsford, 1967), p. 29.

113. Villegas, op. cit., pp. 124-125.

114. Straits Times, June 1, 1991.

115. Chong Li Choy, Open Self-Reliant Regionalism: Power for ASEAN's Development, Occasional paper no. 65 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1981), p. 47. The 'single actor' image, however, may be illusory as discussed in the previous chapters.

116. See Krasner's distinctions concerning the two types of change. Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 2-5.

117. Smith, op. cit., p. 237.

118. Straits Times, January 28, 1992.

119. Chandran Jeshurun, "ASEAN after the Bush visit: Decisiveness or Procrastination?" Trends, no. 3 (January 26, 1992), p. 3.

120. In this sense, while the West (read the United States) has argued that the impending North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will not result in other countries being shut out, or that the NAFTA states (U.S., Canada and Mexico) will not look only inward; this is debatable owing to the inherent contradiction of such an argument. Any trade bloc that liberalises trade among its members, even though it does not intentionally raise trade barriers to imports from third countries nor divert trade, is in fact being discriminatory. This is so because any liberalisation of trade that is not completely multilateral is in essence discriminatory. Ironically, when the concept of an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) was being considered, the Americans rejected that idea precisely for the same reasons that they were being criticised for with respect to NAFTA. New Straits Times, January 19, 1991; Tommy

Koh, External Relations, Singapore: The Year in Review (1990). Conference papers (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1991).

121. Victor K. Fung, "Intra-Asian Economic Cooperation: Inevitable or Impossible?" Businessweek, Symposium of Asian Executives, Hong Kong, October 3, 1990.

122. Richard A. Falk commenting on the nature of the 'Grotian quest.' See his foreword in C.S. Edwards, Hugo Grotius, The Miracle of Holland: A Study in Political and Legal Thought (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1980).

CONCLUSION

The overall objective of the preceding discussion has been to examine the usefulness of the concept of international regime to the case of ASEAN regional dynamics. The validity of regime theory has not been tested in any rigorous fashion; in essence, that is not the intent of this discussion. Nevertheless, several insights can be drawn from this study. These insights, however, do not constitute in any sense a definitive conclusion on the utility of regime theory to the study of regional cooperation among developing countries.

This thesis has examined briefly rationalist and cognitive models of international regimes. The usefulness of certain aspects of the rationalist, or state-centric, models was clearly evident, while that of other aspects remained inconclusive. Hegemonic stability theory identified the need for a regional pivot or anchor, if not a hegemon, to which other ASEAN member states could orientate and consequently engage in the process of regional reconciliation. This role has been, and continues to be, fulfilled by Indonesia. The game theoretic approach helped to shed light on the bargaining strategies involved in ASEAN regime dynamics, such as the consensual negotiating style intrinsic to the ASEAN experience. The functional model recognised the importance of regular interaction in reducing transaction and information costs, and in establishing patterns of predictability and reciprocity in inter-member relations.

Other aspects of the rationalist models did not fare as well due, in large part, to the unique conditions endemic to the ASEAN situation: a turbulent region of nascent states at various stages of socio-economic development, each with a distinctive historical and ideological experience. The conceptual difficulties are compounded by the diffuse nature of threats, internal as well as external, facing these states, and the

problem of national and regional paranoia arising from the former. As such, the years of ASEAN institutional experience did not evince the high degree of converging expectations commonly found in strong or mature regimes.

On the other hand, the cognitive models have clearly identified the changing conceptions of self and interest among ASEAN member states, as a result of their having learnt from innumerable and regular interactive experiences. This learning process was described in the second chapter, which examined the ability of ASEAN to adapt to changes in the global and regional contexts. Strategic flux included changing structural power configurations, such as Vietnam's ascendancy as a regional military power during the late 1970s; or changes in global economic trends, such as the broad shift to geoeconomics arising from the conclusion of the Cold War. These constituted essentially crises to which ASEAN has had to respond in appropriate ways in order to maintain its institutional relevance. In this respect, present circumstances compel the Association's member states to acknowledge in greater measure the importance of their organisation as a regional vehicle through which to advance their national goals. To this extent, it thus may be argued that there has been a growing convergence of interests and, concomitantly, of expectations among members.

This was evident in the latter chapters on ASEAN political-security and economic cooperation, respectively. Qualitative improvements were noted in the expectations and behaviours of member countries with respect to regional cooperation, even those of national governments long accustomed to pessimistic perceptions of cooperation, such as that of Indonesia. Long held, intransigent views which debilitated meaningful economic cooperation for much of the Association's existence are gradually replaced by positive expectations regarding cooperation. In a similar vein, the long held taboo surrounding the issue of formal security cooperation on an

ASEAN basis has been removed. All this, however, does not suggest that member countries are in any way ready for political cum economic integration a la Eurocentrism. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that current regional cooperation is Southeast Asia has adopted an impetus and vitality that, until now, have been almost foreign to the ASEAN experience. The strategic impact of global flux notwithstanding, the years of regular interaction and learning within the Association have aided to develop in member states an enhanced propensity for consultation and cooperation rather than unilateralism.

Nevertheless, the significance of the strategic impact of dynamic environmental changes cannot be easily overlooked. In the case of ASEAN, where the collective regional interest is invariably subordinated to national interests, institutional initiative for reform assumes a lesser priority on the institutional agenda. As such, organisational change becomes intrinsically dependent on changing conditions; in other words, ASEAN, for the most part, functions as an instinctive creature by reacting to change rather than being an initiator of change. An Indonesian minister, speaking in 1990, referred to ASEAN's behaviour in this way:

> It is difficult (for ASEAN as) a group to prepare ourselves for such drastic changes. In times like this, we must come together, act quickly and adroitly, adjusting our goals and strategies appropriately. Unfortunately, we are limited to actions which are often nothing more than reactions, ones which help us to cope in the short term.[1]

In light of the foregoing discussion, it may be argued broadly that the study of ASEAN regional cooperation has benefitted from the use of conceptual categories from regime theory. This set of categories provides coherent frameworks into which various aspects of ASEAN cooperation, such as political-security and economic issues, can be situated. In this respect, the distinction between 'meta-regimes' and issue regimes, as discussed in the fourth chapter, is of particular use to the ASEAN case. As

noted earlier, the principles and norms of the ASEAN international regime have remained unchanged even as rules governing behaviour in issue areas have. This is evidenced by recent modifications to perceptions, expectations and behaviours with respect to regional cooperation. These principles and norms continue to reflect the inherent statist assumptions upon which the Association was built. It may be argued that these statist-inspired norms, which constitute the cornerstone of the ASEAN regionalist experiment, will weather future winds of global economic and socio-political change as successfully as they have had on previous occasions. The growing effects of transnationalism, and the decreasing distinction between state and society, will undoubtedly continue to strain the conservative parameters of these norms. Nevertheless, as contended in the preceding chapters, ASEAN remains an imperfect paradigm of regional cooperation, designed primarily for the purpose of advancing the national goals and aspirations of its respective member states. As one scholar has argued:

> Transnational actors and domestic politics may affect the timing and particular characteristics of a regime; but in the present world, states are still the dominant international actors, and their preferences and power relations shape evolutionary patterns of collaboration.[2]

As such, changes within the ASEAN meta-regime reflect in essence changes in the pattern of regimes that form over time under certain circumstances. In this sense, the sets of conditions and circumstances which characterise the environment at different times play a significant role in affecting the pattern of regime dynamics. This notion has been strongly alluded to in scholarly literature which utilises the historical materialist framework propounded by Marx and other Marxist thinkers, such as Antonio Gramsci and the present-day scholar, Eric Hobsbawn.[3]

The longevity of ASEAN's norms and principles - indeed, that of the Association itself - points to a second implication. The convergent expectations of

member countries and the concomitant dynamism of the organisation mean that the ASEAN regime will likely not disappear; instead, it will constantly remould itself in order to meet the demands of its changing milieu. In this respect, institutionalisation, as opposed to the degree of compliance with regime injunctions, becomes a measure of regime stability and strength.[4] In essence, it may even be argued that the preliminary exercise of Southeast Asian norms for regionalism occurred in the several years prior to the formation of ASEAN, and subsequently reinforced in the following years until the present. This was alluded to in the examination of the Association's origins, as discussed in the second chapter.[5] As others elsewhere have noted, "Indeed, it is possible to...argue that norms need not 'exist' at all in a formal sense in order to be valid."[6] As such, the 'intersubjective' quality and 'inherent contestability' of regimes in general suggest, the violation of norms by member states notwithstanding, that other factors are equally, if not more, important for consideration when assessing the stability and strength of the ASEAN regime. In the words of two scholars:

> Precisely because state behavior within regimes is interpreted by other states, the rationales and justifications for behavior which are proffered, together with pleas for understanding or admissions of guilt, as well as the responsiveness to such reasoning on the part of other states, all are absolutely critical component parts of any explanation involving the efficacy of norms. Indeed, such communicative dynamics may tell us far more about how robust a regime is than overt behavior alone.[7]

This in no way implies that ASEAN, as viewed through the conceptual lens of cognitive regime theory, has already come of age as an international regime. It, however, suggests that rationalist epistemology, with its 'behaviourist' connotations, fares poorly when it comes to identifying the intersubjective nature of regimes. Conversely, when rationalist and cognitive components of regime theory are used in combination not so much as amalgamated theory, but as a 'thought experiment' a la Keohane and Nye[8], the ASEAN regime begins to evince a certain level of maturity.

This suggests that ASEAN's current incipient state may not last for long. However, given the Association's unchanged norms, one is compelled to argue to the contrary.

In conclusion, it would appear that the ASEAN international regime does influence behaviours and outcomes of member states in some ways; conversely, its very existence provides a dependent measure of its own stability. Thus, it is evident from this discussion that the notion of regime refers in essence to a dynamic process. As such, the question of whether regimes serve as dependent, independent or intervening variables becomes irrelevant; indeed, regimes appear to be all these things and more. Nevertheless, this study suggests strongly that regime theory serves as a more useful conceptual tool in comparison with other theories of regionalism with respect to regional cooperation in general.

ENDNOTES

1. Opening Address by H.E. Radius Prawiro, Coordinating Minister for Economy, Finance, Industry and Development Supervision, Indonesia, for Sixteenth ASEAN Council on Petroleum (ASCOPE) Meeting, Jakarta, 6-8 September 1990.

2. Mark W. Zacher, "Toward a Theory of International Regimes," in Robert L. Rothstein, ed., The Evolution of Theory in International Relations: Essays in Honor of William T.R. Fox (Columbia, SC.: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), p. 133.

3. See, for example, Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York, NY.: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 204-254; "The Crisis of World Order and the Problem of International Organization in the 1980s," International Journal, vol. 35 (Spring 1980), pp. 370-395.

4. See again Roger K. Smith, "Institutionalisation as a Measure of Regime Stability: Insights for International Regime Analysis from the Study of Domestic Politics," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 18, no. 2 (1989), pp. 227-244.

5. Many of ASEAN foundational conceptions of regionalism were adopted from its moribund predecessors, ASA and MAPHILINDO.

6. Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," International Organization, vol. 40, no. 2 (Autumn 1986), p. 768.

7. Emphasis in the original. Ibid.

8. The conceptual basis of Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd. edition (Boston, MA.: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1989).

BIBLOGRAPHY

Books

ASEAN Law Series. Multilateral Treaties Between ASEAN Countries (Singapore: Butterworth Asia, 1986.)

Ayoob, Mohammad & Samudavanija, Chai-Anan. Leadership Perceptions and National Security: The Southeast Asian Experience (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989).

Azar, Edward E. & Moon, Chung-in. National Security in the Third World: The Management of External and Internal Threats (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988).

Blake, David H. & Walters, Robert S. The Politics of Global Economic Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1987).

Brzoska, Michael & Ohlson, Thomas. Arms Transfers to the Third World 1971-85 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Broinowski, Alison. ASEAN in the 1990s (London: MacMillan Press, 1990).

Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan Press, 1977).

Cantori, Louis J. & Spiegel, Steven L. The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

Chan, Heng Chee & Haq, Obaid ul. S. Rajaratnam: The Prophetic and the Political (New York, NY.: St. Martin's Press, 1987).

Chee, Stephen. Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia: Institutional Aspects (Singapore: Intitute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991).

Chin, Kin Wah. Defence Spending in Southeast Asia, 2nd edition (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990).

Claude, Inis L. Power and International Relations (New York, NY.: Random House, 1962).

-------. Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York, NY.: Random House, 1956).

Davison, W.P. International Political Communities (New York, NY.: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966).

Deutsch, Karl W. et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NY.: Princeton University Press, 1957).

Falk, Richard A. & Mendlovitz, Saul H. Regional Politics and World Order (San Francisco, CA.: W. H. Freeman, 1973).

Friedrich, Carl J. Trends in Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York, NY.: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).

Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1987).

Gordon, Bernard K. The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

Haas, Ernst B. Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1964).

Haglund, David G. & Hawes, Michael K. World Politics: Power, Interdependence and Dependence (Toronto, ON.: Harcourt Brace Javanovich Canada, 1990).

Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1968).

Ikle, Fred Charles. Every War Must End (New York, NY.: Columbia University Press, 1971).

Jeshurun, Chandran. Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989).

Jorgensen-Dahl, Arnfinn. Regional Organization and Order in Southeast Asia (London: MacMillan Press, 1982).

Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NY.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

-------. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York, NY.: Columbia University Press, 1986).

Keohane, Robert O. & Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 2nd edition (Boston, MA.: Little, Brown, 1977).

Krasner, Stephen D. International Regimes (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1983).

Lau, Teik Soon & Lee, Tai Ho. The Security of the Sea Lanes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Singapore: Heinemann Asia for Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1988).

Lau, Teik Soon & Suryadinata, Leo. Moving into the Pacific Century: The Changing Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: Heinemann Asia for Centre for Advanced Studies, National University of Singapore; and Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1988).

Lee, Tsao Yuan. Growth Triangle: The Johor-Singapore-Riau Experience (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies & Institute of Policy Studies, 1991).

Leifer, Michael. ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia (London: Routledge, 1989).

Mann, Richard I. Batam: Step by Step Guide for Investors (Toronto, ON.: Gateway Books, 1990).

Martin, Laurence. Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

Minogue, K. R. Nationalism (London: B.T. Batsford, 1967).

Mitrany, David. A Working Peace System (Chicago, IL.: Quandrangle Books, 1966).

Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations, 4th edition (New York, NY.: Alfred A. Knorpf, 1967).

Morrison, Charles E. & Suhrke, Astri. Strategies for Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States (New York, NY.: St. Martin's Press, 1978).

Nye, Joseph S. International Regionalism: Readings (Boston, MA.: Little, Brown, 1968).

-------. Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (Boston, MA.: Little, Brown, 1971).

O'Neill, Robert. Security in East Asia (Brookefield, VT.: Aldershot, Hants, 1984).

Pauker, Guy J.; Golay, Frank H. & Enloe, Cynthia H. Diversity and Development in Southeast Asia: The Coming Decade (New York: McGraw-Hill for 1980s

Project/Council on Foreign Relations, 1977).

Pentland, Charles. International Theory and European Integration (London: Faber & Faber, 1973).

Rajendran, M. ASEAN's Foreign Relations: The Shift to Collective Action (Kuala Lumpur: Arenabuku, 1985).

Rieger, Hans Christoph. ASEAN Economic Cooperation Handbook (Singapore: ASEAN Economic Research Unit, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991).

Rothstein, Robert L. The Evolution of Theory in International Relations: Essays in Honor of William T.R. Fox (Columbia, SC.: University of South Carolina Press, 1991).

Russett, Bruce M. International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology (Chicago, IL.: Rand McNally, 1967).

Scalapino, Robert A.; Sato, Seizaburo; Wanandi, Jusuf & Han, Sung-joo. Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press for Institute of East Asian Studies, no date).

Seah, Chee Meow. Trends in Singapore (Singapore: Singapore University Press for Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975).

Siddique, Sharon & Ng, Chee Yuen. Southeast Asian Affairs 1991 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991).

Simon, Sheldon W. The ASEAN States and Regional Security (Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982).

Snitwongse, Kusuma & Paribatra, Sukhumbhand. Durable Stability in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987).

Stein, Arthur A. Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1990).

Tilman, Robert O. Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions of External Threats (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1987).

Viotti, Paul R. & Kauppi, Mark V. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New York, NY.: Macmillan Publishing, 1987).

Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA.: Addison-Wesley,

1979).

Yalem, Ronald J. Regionalism and World Order (Washington, DC.: Public Affairs Press, 1965).

Journal Articles

Acharya, Amitav. "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security community' or 'defence community'?" Pacific Affairs, vol. 64, no. 2 (Summer 1991), pp. 159-177.

-------. "Regional military-security cooperation in the Third World: A conceptual analysis of the relevance and limitations of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 29, no. 1 (1992), pp. 7-21.

Ayoob, Mohammed. "The security problematic of the Third World," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2 (January 1991), pp. 257-283.

-------. "The Third World in the system of states: Acute schizophrenia or growing pains?" International Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 1 (1989), pp. 67-79.

Buszynski, Leszek. "ASEAN: A changing regional role," Asian Survey, vol. 27, no. 7 (July 1987), pp. 764-786.

Chin, Kin Wah. "Changing global trends and their effects on the Asia-Pacific," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 13, no. 1 (June 1991), pp. 1-16.

Cintra, Jose Thiago. "Regional conflicts: Trends in a period of transition," Adelphi Papers, no. 237 (Spring 1989), pp. 94-108.

David, Steven R. "Explaining Third World alignment," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2 (January 1991), pp. 233-256.

Emmerson, Donald K. "ASEAN as an international regime," Journal of International Affairs, vol. 41, no. 1 (Summer/Fall 1987), pp. 1-16.

-------. "'Southeast Asia': What's in a name?" Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. XV, no. 1 (March 1984), pp. 1-21.

Feldman, Shai. "Superpower security guarantees in the 1980s," Adelphi Papers, no. 167 (1981), pp. 34-44.

Gaddis, John Lewis. "The emerging post-revisionist synthesis on the origins of the

Cold War," Diplomatic History, vol. 7, no. 3 (Summer 1983), pp. 171-190.

Galtung, Johan. "A structural theory of imperialism," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 8, no. 2 (1971), pp. 81-117.

Garten, Jeffrey E. "Trading blocs and the evolving world economy," Current History , vol. 88, no. 534 (January 1989), pp. 15-16, 54-56.

Gordon, Bernard K. "Politics and protectionism in the Pacific," Adelphi Papers, no. 228 (Spring 1988).

Haas, Ernst B. "Turbulent fields and the theory of regional integration," International Organization, vol. 30, no. 2 (Spring 1976), pp. 173-212.

Haggard, Stephen & Simmons, Beth A. "Theories of international regimes," International Organization, vol. 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 491-517.

Hampson, Fen Osler. "Building a stable peace: Opportunities and limits to security co-operation in Third World regional conflicts," International Journal, vol. XLV (Spring 1990), pp. 454-489.

Indorf, Hans H. "ASEAN in extra-regional perspective," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 9, no. 2 (September 1987), pp. 86-105.

Jervis, Robert. "Realism, game theory, and cooperation," World Politics, vol. 40 (April 1988), pp. 340-344.

Jorgensen-Dahl, Arnfinn. "The significance of ASEAN," World Review, vol. 19, no. 3 (August 1980).

Khong, Kim Hoong & Abdullah, Abdul Razak. "Security co-operation in ASEAN," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 9, no. 2 (September 1987), pp. 129-139.

Kratochwil, Friedrich & Ruggie, John G. "International organization: A state of the art on an art of the state," International Organization, vol. 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753-775.

Kroef, Justus M. van der. "National security, defence and foreign policy perceptions in Indonesia," Orbis, vol. 20 (Summer 1976), pp. 461-495.

Lau, Teik Soon. "ASEAN diplomacy: National interest and regionalism," Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. XXV, no. 1/2 (January-April 1990), pp. 114-127.

Leifer, Michael. "Conflict and regional order in South-East Asia", Adelphi Papers, no. 162 (1980).

-------. "Problems and prospects of regional cooperation in Asia: The political dimension," Indonesian Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 2/4 (1976), pp. 92-104.

Lister, Frederick. "The role of international organizations in the 1990s and beyond," International Relations, vol. 10, no. 2 (November 1990), pp. 101-116.

Maull, Hans W. "The strategic impact of world economic changes," Adelphi Papers, no. 237 (Spring 1989), pp. 62-73.

Nishizaki, Yoshinori. "A brief survey of Third World arms production," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 10, no. 3 (December 1988), pp. 269-293.

Nye, Joseph S. "Neorealism and neoliberalism," World Politics, vol. 40, no. 2 (January 1988), pp. 235-251.

-------. "Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes," World Politics, vol. 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 371-402.

Oye, Kenneth. "Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies," World Politics , vol. 38 (October 1985), pp. 1-24.

Rochester, J. Martin. "The rise and fall of international organizations as a field of study," International Organization, vol. 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986), pp. 777-813.

Ruggie, John G. "International responses to technology: Concepts and trends," International Organization, vol. 29, no. 3 (Summer 1975), pp. 557-583.

Shee, Poon Kim. "A decade of ASEAN 1967-1977," Asian Survey, vol. XVII, no. 8 (August 1977), pp. 753-770.

Smith, Roger K. "Institutionalisation as a measure of regime stability: Insights for international regimes analysis from the study of domestic politics," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 18, no. 2 (1989), pp. 227-244.

Snidal, Duncan. "The limits of hegemonic stability theory," International Organization, vol. 39, no. 4 (Autumn 1985), pp. 579-614.

Tan, Gerald. "Intra-ASEAN trade liberalisation: An empirical analysis," Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. XX (June 1982), pp. 321-331.

Villegas, Bernado M. "The challenge to ASEAN economic co-operation,"

Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 9, no. 2 (September 1987), pp. 120-128.

Walker, R.B.J. "Security, sovereignty, and the challenge of world politics," Alternatives, vol. XI (1990), pp. 3-27.

Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is what states make out of it: The social construction pf power politics," International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

Young, Oran R. "International regimes: Toward a new theory of institutions," World Politics, vol. 39 (October 1986), pp. 104-122.

Monographs & Papers

Acharya, Amitav. A Survey of Military Cooperation Among the ASEAN States: Bilateralism or Alliance? (Toronto, ON.: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, 1990).

Buteux, Paul. Regimes, Incipient Regimes and the Future of NATO Strategy, Occasional Paper no. 6 (Winnipeg, MB.: Programme in Strategic Studies, University of Manitoba, 1989).

Chan, Heng Chee. After the Philippines: The Political Health of ASEAN States. Paper presented at a seminar on "ASEAN Trends and Perspectives," organised by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (Malaysia) for Shell Companies, Singapore, June 23-25, 1986.

Chong, Li Choy. Open Self-Reliant Regionalism: Power for ASEAN's Development, Occasional Paper no. 65 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1981).

Emmerson, Donald K. ASEAN Under Pressure. Background paper prepared for the Third ASEAN Summit, Manila, December 14-15, 1987 (New York, NY.: The Asia Society, 1987).

Fifield, Russell H. National and Regional Interests in ASEAN: Competition and Cooperation in International Politics, Occasional Paper no. 57 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1979).

Huisken, Ronald. Limitations of Armaments in Southeast Asia: A Proposal, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 16 (Canberra: The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National

University, 1977).

Indorf, Hans H. Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Bilateral Constraints Among ASEAN Member States (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984).

-------. ASEAN: Problems and Prospects, Occasional Paper no. 37 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975).

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies & International Institute of Strategic Studies. Regional Security Developments and Stability in Southeast Asia. Papers presented at an International Conference organized jointly by ISEAS and IISS (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1980).

Jackson, Karl & Soesatro, M. Hadi. ASEAN Security and Economic Development, Research Papers and Policy Studies no. 11 (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press for Institute of East Asian Studies, 1984).

Koh, Tommy. External Relations, Singapore: The Year in Review, Conference Papers (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1991).

Liska, George. Alliances and the Third World, Studies in International Affairs no. 5 (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press for The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1968).

Meyanathan, Sahathavan. ASEAN Commodities: Co-operation or Competition, ISIS Research Note (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1986).

Pangestu, Mari, Soesastro, Hadi & Ahmad, Mubariq. Intra ASEAN Economic Cooperation: Is There a New Perspective? Paper prepared for a Regional Symposium organised jointly by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and the International Center for Economic Growth (ICEG), Singapore, September 2-3, 1991. Unpublished study.

Pauker, Guy J. Security and Economics: The Military Expenditures of the ASEAN Countries. Paper prepared for the Second US-ASEAN Conference on Economic Development and Political Stability: Alternative Scenarios for the 1980s, Berkeley, CA., May 2-4, 1983 (Berkeley, CA.: Rand Corporation, 1983).

Sharma, Basu. Aspects of Industrial Relations in ASEAN, Occasional Paper no. 78 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985).

Stubbs, Richard. ASEAN at Twenty: The Search for a New Consensus (Toronto, ON.:

Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1988).

Tan, Kong Yam; Toh, Mun Heng & Low, Linda. Asia and Pacific Economic Cooperation, Paper prepared for a Regional Symposium on Asia and the Pacific organised jointly by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and the International Center for Economic Growth (ICEG), Singapore, September 2-3, 1991. Unpublished study.

Thambipillai, Pushpa & Saravanamuttu, J. ASEAN Negotiations: Two Insights (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985).

Young, Evans. An Indigenous Agenda for ASEAN Economic Cooperation. Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, March 21-23, 1986.

Zainuddin, Daim. ASEAN Economic Cooperation: Agenda for the 1990s (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990).

Reports

ASEAN. Annual Report of the ASEAN Standing Committee 1986-1987 (Indonesia: ASEAN Secretariat, 1987).

Asian Development Bank. Asian Development Outlook, various years (Manila: Asian Development Bank).

Far Eastern Economic Review. Asia Yearbook, various years (Hong Kong: Review Publishing Co.).

International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, various years (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies).

International Monetary Fund. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1988 (Washington, DC.: International Monetary Fund, 1988).

Lee, Tsao Yuan. ASEAN: Where Do We Go From Here? Some Thoughts on Economic Cooperation, Report no. 2 (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1991).

SIPRI. World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook, various years (London: Taylor & Francis).

United Nations. Disarmament, UN Regional Disarmament Workshop for Asia and the

Pacific (New York, NY.: UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, 1991).

World Bank. World Development Report, various years (New York, NY.: World Bank).

Documents

Agreement for the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat, Bali, 24 February 1975, ASEAN Documentation Series (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat).

Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement, Manila, 16 February 1977, ASEAN Documentation Series.

ASEAN Declaration (The Bangkok Declaration), Bangkok, 8 August 1967, ASEAN Documentation Series.

ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS). A Time for Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit (Jakarta: ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies, 1991).

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Singapore, 30 July 1990 (Singapore: Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Complementation, Manila, 18 June 1981, ASEAN Documentation Series.

Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Bali, 24 February 1976, ASEAN Documentation Series.

Dismantling Trade Barriers IMF Managing Director addresses Uruguay Board, Brussels, 4 December 1990. Excerpts of remarks by Michael Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, IMF Survey (10 December 1990).

Joint Communique of the Twentieth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 15-16 June 1987, Twentieth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Speeches/Joint Communique (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat).

Joint Communique of the Twenty-Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, 24-25 July 1990 (Singapore: Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Joint Press Statement of the Ninth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Energy Cooperation, Manila, 15-16 November 1990 (Singapore: Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Joint Press Statement of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers, Denpasar, 29-30 October 1990 (Singapore: Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Joint Statement of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 29-31 July 1990 (Singapore: Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Joint Statement of the Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Current Political Development in the Southeast Asian Region, Bangkok, 12 January 1979, in M. Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia (Routledge, 1989), documentary appendices.

Memorandum of Understanding on Standstill and Rollback of Non-Tariff Barriers Among ASEAN Countries, Manila, 15 December 1987. ASEAN Economic Co-operation Handbook (Singapore: ASEAN Economic Research Unit, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies).

Opening Address by H.E. Radius Prawiro, Coordinating Minister for Economy, Finance, Industry and Development Supervision, Indonesia, for Sixteenth ASCOPE Meeting, Jakarta, 6-8 September 1990 (Indonesia: ASEAN Council on Petroleum).

Opening Statement by Mr Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Singapore, at the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 19 to 20 July, 1991. Singapore Government Press Release No.: 38/Jul 09-1/91/07/19.

The Singapore Declaration, Singapore, 28 January 1992. Lianhe Zaobao, 29 January 1992; The Straits Times, 29 January 1992.

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia, Bali, 24 February 1976. ASEAN Documentation Series.

Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (The Kuala Lumpur Declaration), Kuala Lumpur, 27 November 1971. ASEAN Documentation Series.

Newspapers

Asian Wall Street Journal

Bangkok Post

Jakarta Post

Lianhe Zaobao (Singapore)

The New Straits Times (Malaysia)

The Globe and Mail

The Straits Times (Singapore)

The Straits Times (Weekly Overseas Edition)

The Sunday Times (Singapore)

Periodicals

ASEAN Newsletter

ASEAN Review

Asiaweek

Businessweek

Far Eastern Economic Review

Foreign Affairs Malaysia

ISEAS Trends

Pacific Newsletter (Singapore: ISEAS)

Pioneer (Singapore Armed Forces)

Singapore Monthly

APPENDICES

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF GROWTH RATES OF REAL GDP BETWEEN ASEAN AND ASIAN NIE ECONOMIES, 1985-1990 (IN PERCENTAGES PER ANNUM)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
BRUNEI	-6.2	-7.0	N/A	N/A	2.7	N/A
INDONESIA	2.8	3.0	4.8	5.7	7.4	6.0
MALAYSIA	-1.0	1.2	5.3	8.7	7.6	8.3
PHILIPPINES	-4.0	1.5	4.7	6.2	5.9	3.0
SINGAPORE*	-1.8	1.8	8.8	11.0	9.2	8.0
THAILAND	4.0	3.5	8.4	12.0	12.2	9.5
HONG KONG	N/A	11.9	13.8	7.3	3.6	3.0
SOUTH KOREA	5.4	9.9	11.1	11.0	6.1	9.0
TAIWAN	4.3	11.6	11.0	11.2	7.6	5.2

NOTE: * SINGAPORE IS AN ASEAN MEMBER AND ASIAN NIE.

SOURCE: ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK (MANILA: ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, VARIOUS YEARS); FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, ASIA YEAR BOOK (HONG KONG: REVIEW PUBLISHING CO., VARIOUS YEARS); INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE (LONDON: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, VARIOUS YEARS).

TABLE 2

ASEAN: DISTRIBUTION BY WEALTH, AND AREA AND POPULATION SIZE

	WEALTH	SIZE	
	1988 PER CAPITA GNP (US $)	AREA (SQUARE KM)	POPULATION (MIL)
BRUNEI	N/A	5,800	8.3
INDONESIA	440	1,948,000	189.4
MALAYSIA	1,940	330,400	17.9
PHILIPPINES	630	300,000	66.1
SINGAPORE	9,070	625	2.7
THAILAND	1,000	513,000	55.7

SOURCE: FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, ASIA 1991 YEARBOOK (HONG KONG: REVIEW PUBLISHING CO., 1991); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990 (NEW YORK, NY.: WORLD BANK, 1990).

TABLE 3

COMPARISON BETWEEN ASEAN AND VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES, 1990

	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
BRUNEI	3,400	550	300	4,250
INDONESIA	215,000	43,000	46,400	304,400
MALAYSIA	105,000	12,500	12,000	129,500
PHILIPPINES	68,000	25,000	15,500	108,500
SINGAPORE	45,000	4,500	6,000	55,500
THAILAND	190,000	50,000	43,000	283,000
TOTAL ASEAN	626,400	135,550	123,200	885,150
TOTAL VIETNAM	900,000	40,000	12,000	952,000*

NOTE: * - EXCLUDING ABOUT 15,000 IN LAOS, 3000 IN CAMBODIA AND 100,000 IN THE AIR DEFENCE FORCE.

SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE 1990-1991 (LONDON: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, 1990).

TABLE 4 BILATERAL MILITARY EXERCISES IN ASEAN

COUNTRIES INVOLVED	TYPE OF EXERCISE	NAME OF EXERCISE	YEAR STARTED	FREQUENCY
INDO/MAL	ARMY	KEKAR MALINDO	1977	ANNUAL
		TATAR MALINDO	1981	
		KRIPURA MALINDO	1981	IRREGULAR
INDO/MAL	AIR	ELANG MALINDO	1975	ANNUAL
INDO/MAL	NAVY	MALINDO JAYA	1973	ANNUAL
INDO/MAL	ALL	DARSASA MALINDO	1982	IRREGULAR
INDO/SING	ARMY	SAFAKAR INDOPURA	1989	ANNUAL
INDO/SING	AIR	ELANG INDOPURA	1980	ANNUAL
INDO/SING	NAVY	ENGLEK	1975	ANNUAL
INDO/THAI	AIR	ELANG THAINESIA	1981	ANNUAL
INDO/THAI	NAVY	SEA GARUDA	1975	IRREGULAR
INDO/PHIL	NAVY	PHILINDO	1972	IRREGULAR
MAL/SING	ARMY	SEMANGAT BERSATU	1989	ANNUAL
MAL/SING	NAVY	MALAPURA	1984	ANNUAL
MAL/SING	AIR	AIR THAMAL	1981	ANNUAL
MAL/THAI	NAVY	THALAY	1980	IRREGULAR
MAL/BRU	NAVY	HORNBILL, ETC.	1981	(?)
SING/THAI	AIR	SING-SIAM	1981	BIENNIAL
SING/THAI	NAVY	THAI-SING	1983	ANNUAL
SING/BRU	NAVY	PELICAN	1979	ANNUAL
SING/BRU	ARMY	LANCER/ SINGA-HUTAN	(?)	ANNUAL

NOTE: BRU (BRUNEI), INDO (INDONESIA), MAL (MALAYSIA), PHIL (PHILIPPINES), SING (SINGAPORE), THAI (THAILAND).

SOURCE: AMITAV ACHARYA, A SURVEY OF MILITARY COOPERATION AMONG THE ASEAN STATES: BILATERALISM OR ALLIANCE? (CANADA:CENTRE FOR

INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, YORK UNIVERSITY, 1990), P. 38.

TABLE 5

COMPARISON OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURES OF ASEAN STATES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 1985-1989

COUNTRY	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
INDONESIA	1.97	2.40	1.98	1.98	1.79
MALAYSIA	3.23	3.66	5.03	3.98	4.17
PHILIPPINES	1.43	1.73	2.51	3.28	2.37
SINGAPORE	5.82	5.88	6.53	6.24	6.16
THAILAND	3.94	3.76	3.85	3.11	3.14

NOTE: BRUNEI OMMITTED DUE TO INSUFFICIENT DATA.

SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE (LONDON: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, VARIOUS YEARS).

TABLE 6 ASEAN: INTRA-ASEAN AND EXTRA-ASEAN TRADE PATTERNS, 1987 (IN US$ MILLION)

COUNTRY	PARTNER	EXPORTS	%	IMPORTS	%	TOTAL	%
BRUNEI	USA	15	0.8	101.8	7.8	116.8	3.8
	JAPAN	1084.4	60.4	45.1	3.5	1129.5	36.5
	ASEAN	390.3	21.7	495.2	38.2	885.5	28.6
INDO-NESIA	USA	3335	20.2	996	9.4	4301	16.1
	JAPAN	7242	43.8	3423	33.4	10665	39.8
	ASEAN	1296	7.8	704	6.9	2000	7.5
MALAYSIA	USA	2972	16.6	2376	18.7	5348	17.5
	JAPAN	3504	19.5	2750	21.7	6254	20.4
	ASEAN	4337	24.1	2642	20.8	6979	22.8
PHILI-PPINES	USA	2060.4	36.2	1539.4	22.2	3599.8	28.5
	JAPAN	980.4	17.2	1148.5	16.6	2128.9	16.9
	ASEAN	505.4	8.9	659.7	9.5	1165.1	9.2
SING-APORE	USA	7000	24.5	4778	14.7	11778	19.3
	JAPAN	2597	9.1	6662	20.5	9259	15.1
	ASEAN*	6043	21.1	5826	17.9	11869	19.2
THAILAND	USA	2119.5	18.8	1619.7	12.5	3739.2	15.4
	JAPAN	1666	14.7	3376.3	26	5042.3	20.7
	ASEAN	1540.2	13.6	2029.5	15.6	3569.7	14.7

NOTE: * SINGAPORE'S DATA DO NOT REFLECT TRADE WITH INDONESIA.

SOURCE: ALISON BROINOWSKI, ASEAN INTO THE 1990S (LONDON: MACMILLAN, 1990), PP. 48-49.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK 1988 (WASHINGTON, DC.: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1988).

TABLE 7

COST COMPARISON BETWEEN JOHOR, RIAU AND SINGAPORE

	JOHOR	RIAU*	SINGAPORE
LAND (US$/SQ. METRE)	4.08	2.3	4.25
LABOUR (US$/MONTH)			
UNSKILLED	150	90	350
SEMI-SKILLED	220	140	420
SKILLED	400	200	600

NOTE: * RIAU'S DATA REFLECTS LAND AND LABOUR COSTS IN BATAM ISLAND, WHERE MOST OF CURRENT INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE.

SOURCE: RICHARD I. MANN, BATAM: STEP BY STEP GUIDE FOR INVESTORS (TORONTO: GATEWAY BOOKS, 1990).

DIAGRAM 1

THE SPRATLY AND PARACEL ISLANDS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA


Disputed seas
China
Taiwan
Vietnam
Thailand
Paracel Islands
Philippines
Macclesfield Bank
South China Sea
Spratly Islands
Sabah
Malaysia
Sarawak
Indonesia
Areas claimed by more than one country
0 200 400 km

DIAGRAM 2

LOCATION OF THE MALINDO DARSASA 3AB MILITARY EXERCISE INVOLVING INDONESIAN AND MALAYSIAN TROOPS, AUGUST 1991


Johor
Joint military exercise launched at the Army Training Centre here
South China Sea
Batu Pahat
Kota Tinggi
Ulu Tiram
Johor Baru
Straits of Malacca
0 10 20 30 kilometres
SINGAPORE

DIAGRAM 3

THE SINGAPORE-JOHOR-RIAU INDUSTRIAL GROWTH TRIANGLE


NEGERI SEMBILAN
MELAKA
JOHOR
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Straits of Melaka
Johor Bahru
SINGAPORE
Bengkalis
Padang
Rangsang
Tebingtinggi
Karimun
Kepalajerih
BATAM
BINTAN
Mapor
Tanjungpinang
Bulan
Buru
Combol
Rempang
Poto
Mantang
Galang
Numbing
Telang Besar
Galang Baru
Sugi
Citlim
Kundur
Meranggung
Mendol
RIAU ISLANDS
Sebangka
Lingga
LINGGA ISLANDS
Singkep
Berhala Strait
SUMATRA

CHART

EXAMPLES OF REGIONAL COOPERATION AND INTERACTION DISCUSSED

POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC	SECURITY (BILATERAL COOPERATION)	ECONOMIC
SABAH DISPUTE	COUNTER-INSURGENCY	PTA
MALAYSIAN-SINGAPOREAN RELATIONS	INTELLIGENCE-SHARING*	CEPT
	JOINT EXERCISES	AIC
	MILITARY EXCHANGES	BBC
	TRAINING AREAS	AIJV
		SIJORI GROWTH TRIANGLE

NOTE: * MULTILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION