THE EFFECT OF TARGET COMPETENCE ON WITNESSES OF WORKPLACE INCIVILITY

by

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Abstract

The role of witnesses to mistreatment in the workplace is a relatively unexplored domain of the aggression literature. This thesis project integrates deontic justice (Folger, 2001; 2012) and scope of justice (Mitchell, Vogel, & Folger, 2012) theories in order to test a theoretical model of witness intervention behaviours in response to incivility. These two studies examine the effect of target competence on third-party witness behaviours towards both the target and perpetrator of incivility. In Study 1, the main effects of perceived target competence on witness behaviour are investigated through the use of confederate actors within a live laboratory study. In Study 2, a more comprehensive test of the theoretical model investigates the indirect effects through which target competence influences witness responses. Results indicate that a target's perceived level of competence affects the extent to which a witness helps the target, confronts the perpetrator, and remains passive. Implications are discussed.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

The Effect of Target Competence on Witnesses of Workplace Incivility

Chapter 1: Introduction and Theoretical Background

Workplace incivility is defined as ambiguously harmful verbal and non-verbal low-intensity behaviour (Andersson & Pearson, 1999). This form of workplace mistreatment, which an estimated 71% (Cortina, Magley, Williams, & Langhout, 2001) to 96% (Porath & Pearson, 2010) of employees report experiencing, involves "acting rudely or discourteously", with a disregard for others in violation of workplace norms of respect (Andersson & Pearson, 1999, p. 455). Incivility has many negative outcomes, such as decreased job satisfaction, higher turnover intention, and decreased psychological and physical well-being (Bowling & Beehr, 2006; Cortina et al., 2001; Hershcovis, 2011).

While witness reactions to workplace mistreatment have received some attention in recent years, most of this research has focused on the witness' personal experience, such as decreased overall well-being (Glomb, Richman, Hulin, & Drasgow, 1997; Miner-Rubino & Cortina, 2007; Pearlman & MacIan, 1995), mental health (Lim, Cortina, & Magley, 2008), performance (Porath & Erez, 2009; Raver & Gelfand, 2005), and greater job withdrawal (Miner-Rubino & Cortina, 2007). The limited amount of witness-focused research is troubling given that 56% (Glomb, 2002) to 99% (Porath & Pearson, 2010) of people report witnessing workplace incivility. Building on this witness focused research, Reich and Hershcovis (2015) examined how witnesses react towards perpetrators and targets, and found that witnesses tend to punish perpetrators, and may also attempt to support targets.

In the present thesis, I expand on this research by examining the extent to which target characteristics influence these witness reactions. In particular, I examine target competence, because it is a malleable trait upon which most targets have some degree of control. Researchers

have found that targets often possess certain characteristics (e.g., high neuroticism, low agreeableness; Milam, Spitzmueller, & Penney, 2009), suggesting a possible relationship between target characteristics and workplace incivility. While research has identified a number of characteristics common across targets of aggression, it is unclear how these traits influence third-party perceptions of mistreatment. As such, researchers have yet to determine the role that target characteristics play in the responses of individuals who are present, but not directly involved, in the interaction between the target and perpetrator. This is a relationship worthy of study, because the way in which witnesses perceive a target will likely determine their attitude towards the mistreatment, and their subsequent behavioural responses. Thus, I am interested in whether, why, and when target characteristics influence *witness* reactions. For instance, do witnesses perceive that certain targets are more or less deserving of uncivil treatment?

The present study examines the extent to which target characteristics influence witness reactions towards perpetrators and targets of incivility. The purpose of the present study is three-fold: (1) To understand how a specific target characteristic (target competence) might influence witness reactions towards both the perpetrator and the target, (2) to understand the mechanisms that explain these relationships, and (3) to understand the extent to which witness characteristics moderate these relationships.

This study aims to test a model that integrates the deontic model of justice with theory on scope of justice. Drawing on O'Reilly and Aquino (2011), I propose a relationship between target competence versus incompetence, and witness responses to incivility towards those targets, positing that how witnesses perceive the target will affect their behavioural responses. I examine both cognitive (perceived justifiability) and affective (moral outrage, state empathy) mechanisms to understand how target characteristics influence witness reactions, arguing that

when witnesses perceive incivility as unjustified, this will lead them to become morally angry towards the perpetrator and more empathetic towards the target, resulting in more active behavioural responses. I also posit that the relationship between target characteristics and justification will be moderated by the degree to which an individual holds both an empathic concern for the welfare of others and a moral identity as central to his or her self-concept. I predict that witnesses with high moral identity or trait empathy will be less likely to justify the mistreatment, leading to greater levels of moral outrage and state empathy, and resulting in an increased likelihood of engaging in active behavioural responses, (e.g., punishing or confronting the perpetrator, aiding the target), and a decrease in avoidant responses (e.g., passivity). Overall, I expect to find that target characteristics will influence witnesses' perceptions such that incivility towards certain targets will be seen as more negative, and this will be reflected in witnesses' behavioural responses.

The present study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, workplace incivility is a multifaceted social behaviour that we cannot fully understand by considering only the perpetrator-target dyad. This narrow focus neglects the role of anyone within the workplace who is not directly involved in the conflict but may indirectly affect it or be affected by it (Reich & Hershcovis, 2015). As such, it is uninformative to examine behaviour within an isolated framework that does not take into account the social context. Hershcovis and Reich (2013) argued that witness-focused research is valuable in that it provides the opportunity to directly examine how aggression, or mistreatment, plays a role in affecting the social context in which it occurs. Second, in addition to expanding our understanding of workplace mistreatment, how others perceive prevalent workplace behaviours such as incivility, and how they choose to act, can have broad implications for interpersonal workplace relationships and organizational

functioning. Since organizations are comprised of several small social networks, understanding responses to deviant workplace behaviours, such as incivility, will aid in maintaining cooperation and repairing the employee relationships that are integral to overall organizational functioning, productivity, and efficiency. Third, numerous findings suggest a relationship between certain target characteristics (e.g., Milam et al., 2009) and being targeted with incivility. I suggest that how witnesses perceive a target will also influence *witness* reactions and perceptions. As a result, research that examines the effect that target characteristics have on witness perceptions and responses to incivility has a wide range of implications at both the interpersonal and organizational level.

In summary, this thesis will help to inform existing theory on third-party reactions to mistreatment by examining both *when* and *why* witnesses respond to incivility in the way that they do. Further, understanding the associated risk factors will inform training programs that help with prevention and target coping.

Deontic Reactions to Workplace Mistreatment

Skarlicki and Kulik (2005) posited that third-party observers care about employee mistreatment for two main reasons: 1) out of concerned self-interest, and 2) because mistreatment exhibits a violation of moral and social norms (Umphress, Simons, Folger, Ren & Bobocel, 2013). While a target's characteristics may affect a witness' ability to achieve certain goals within a group setting, self-interest alone does not adequately explain why witnesses of mistreatment are often motivated to action, even when they are not personally affected (Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). Thus, I focus on the latter reason in this research. In particular, I am interested in target characteristics because understanding witness perceptions of targets has the potential to shed light on why, and under what circumstances, witnesses will move beyond passivity and

towards direct, observable action. I will explain competence, the target characteristic that will be the focus of this study, in further detail at a later point. However, the reason for my focus on competence is to examine a non-static characteristic over which targets and managers have some degree of control (e.g., through training and effort), and that is germane to effective organizational functioning.

Andersson and Pearson (1999) assert that civility, the antonym of incivility, is not only functional but also holds moral implications based on "love of thy neighbor". As respect and courtesy are expected in social interactions, particularly in a work environment, incivility represents a violation of this basic social norm.

Deonance theory (Folger, 2001; 2012) suggests that people can, though are not always, bound by 'ought to' norms, or social obligations, even if they are not consciously aware of it. Moral judgments are considered by deonance theory within the context of reactance, a psychological state under which individuals resist any reduction or diminishing of their freedoms in a certain situation (Folger, 2001; 2012). Reactance makes the assumption that people believe they have the freedom to engage in any kind of behaviour, and will aim to protect this freedom (Folger, 2001; 2012). Deonance, on the other hand, deals with 'non-free' behaviours, such as incivility, and the manner in which moral norms act to restrict these so-called freedoms that individuals believe they possess. Mistreatment such as incivility breaches an individual's expectations of what behaviour is appropriate within a particular social context (Mitchell, Vogel & Folger, 2012). At the most basic level, deontic theory argues that individuals care about injustices such as incivility simply because caring about such behaviour is 'right'. Consequently, I expect that witnesses will experience a negative reaction to incivility because it is in direct opposition to what they believe to be just. Having outlined the deontic reaction that results in a

gut-feeling negative response to incivility, I will now discuss cognitive theory, which provides a more in-depth analysis of the internal processing of moral judgment as a whole.

Cognitions of moral judgment. Deonance theory explains why witnesses experience negative reactions to mistreatment; however, the origin of deontic reactions remains in question. Although we might expect that evaluating the morality of a situation is a multi-step process requiring conscious reflection, evidence suggests that this is not always the case. For example, in a moral judgment study (Haidt, Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000), researchers asked participants to make a moral judgment about a number of situations (e.g., incest). Participants responded to these situations with unsupported statements (e.g., "It's just wrong!"), indicated that they knew a situation was wrong but could not figure out why, and found themselves in dead-end arguments (e.g., could not explain why the situation was wrong). These immediate reactions to immoral situations suggest that moral judgment may often be a quick and intuitive process, rather than a well-informed analysis. This concept is explored in O'Reilly and Aquino's (2011) theory of morally motivated third-party reactions to workplace injustice.

O'Reilly and Aquino (2011) argued that witnesses to mistreatment do not need to engage in complex cognitive processing to be motivated to action, because these actions are the result of automatically elicited moral intuitions. Moral intuitions are defined as "the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment", without knowingly going through the formal steps of evaluating morality, such as searching for evidence and coming to a conclusion (Haidt, 2001, p. 818). Consistent with Haidt (2001), I argue that incivility elicits a moral intuition within witnesses that does not require complex reasoning and judgment. Simply put, incivility occurs within a social context – the workplace – which values respectful and courteous treatment towards coworkers. The intuitive sense of "something unfair just happened" after witnessing

incivility is based on observing a behaviour that reflects a disregard for the social obligations inherent within an organization.

O'Reilly and Aquino's (2011) model does not, however, assume that intuitions alone are responsible for witness reactions to injustice. They argue that when a moral violation occurs and witnesses are unable to find reasons that support their intuition, their motivation to intervene will be lacking. For a witness to feel motivated to act, more cognitive processing has to occur.

To further explain the processes behind motivating individuals to act, O'Reilly and Aquino turn to self-regulatory theory (Carver & Scheier, 1998, 1999; Higgins, 1997, 1998), which identifies approach and avoidance as two key motivational forces. An approach goal orientation, which is a prerequisite for strong behavioural outcomes, is based on the need to "reduce the discrepancy" between an individual's current and desired state (O'Reilly and Aquino, 2011, p. 533). This orientation is the result of emotion cognition concordance, a state in which individuals believe their feelings are warranted. In other words, a witness will be motivated to punish the perpetrator or aid the target when they experience cognitive discomfort as a result of witnessing incivility, while being cognizant that mistreatment in the workplace should not occur in the first place, and have determined that they have reason to believe their thinking is justified. On the other hand, an avoidance goal motivation occurs as a result of attempting to avoid a detrimental event or outcome (O'Reilly & Aquino, 2011). An avoidance goal orientation is the result of nonconcordance, in which individuals cannot reasonably conclude that the mistreatment they have perceived has actually occurred. According to O'Reilly and Aquino's model, this type of avoidant orientation would be responsible for a witness' lack of motivation to act.

The level of intensity with which an individual experiences justification may vary

however, and with this in mind, I will now move onto a discussion of two individual-based *witness* traits that I expect to moderate the relationship between target characteristics and justification.

Moral identity and trait empathy as moderators. If incivility represents a violation of norms within a sociocultural context, why don't all witnesses act to restore morality? O'Reilly and Aquino (2011) propose that a *witness'* own character can influence his or her reaction to uncivil treatment. In their model, O'Reilly and Aquino (2011) explain the variation in witness behaviour using moral identity. Those that score high on moral identity hold the belief that they are moral people as particularly central to their self-concept (Blasi, 1984). From a cognitive perspective, individuals who score high on moral identity have their identity as a moral person, and its associated beliefs, as highly salient when they are making a moral judgment. Thus, although both witnesses who score high and those who score low on moral identity are likely to have a moral intuition about workplace mistreatment (because it violates a societal norm), their behaviour may differ greatly. An individual who values morality as the most significant part of their self-concept is less likely to respond to incivility with passivity, as doing so would be inconsistent with how they perceive themselves. In contrast, individuals who do not value morality as strongly may be more likely to justify the mistreatment and thus fail to intervene, as this behaviour would not be so clearly at odds with their core self-concept. Therefore, individuals who score high on moral identity are more likely to attempt to restore morality in some way.

Similarly, highly empathetic people may be more likely to attempt to restore the morality of a situation. Although a consistent definition of empathy is not used in the literature, it is generally regarded as including both an emotional reaction consistent with another person's feelings, and a general concern for a person's wellbeing (Batson et al., 1997; Vitaglione &

Barnett, 2003; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus & Gordjin, 2003). Thus, when an individual witnesses an uncivil interaction, this may make empathetic concern for others, and a view of oneself as empathetic, highly salient. Empathetic people should, then, be less likely to justify incivility, particularly since they are able to identify strongly with the target and vicariously experience the target's feelings. Therefore, similar to high moral identity witnesses, those high in trait empathy should be more likely to engage in active, rather than passive, behaviours that are consistent with their beliefs and feelings.

With these arguments in mind, I posit that moral identity and trait empathy will influence the cognitive aspect of moral judgment, in that justification of the mistreatment will create cognitive dissonance, due to an inconsistency between a high moral identity and empathetic individual's beliefs and actions. In other words, a witness high in moral identity will be less likely to justify incivility because doing so would be making a choice that is in direct opposition to a strongly-held belief system that values justice and fair treatment for all people, regardless of circumstance. Similarly, an individual high in trait empathy should be less likely to justify incivility since, by definition, they have the tendency to experience and hold concern for the welfare of a target. Having described a cognitive mechanism of moral judgment (justification), and individual witness traits that may affect it (moral identity and trait empathy), I will now move onto an affective explanation of moral judgment.

Affective moral judgments. Thus far, I have discussed the cognitive aspects of moral judgment. However while cognitions play an important role in moral judgment, mistreatment typically evokes strong emotional reactions that help determine subsequent behaviour. Moral outrage is "anger provoked by the perception that a moral standard – usually a standard of fairness or justice – has been violated" (Batson et al., 2007, p. 1272; Hoffman, 2000; Montada &

Schneilder, 1989). It is a temporary state that includes several discrete and related emotions (O'Reilly & Aquino, 2011), and O'Reilly and Aquino (2011) identify moral outrage as the primary factor in determining which goal orientation is activated. Notably, moral outrage differs from regular anger, as it is in direct response to an immoral occurrence and is fueled by a belief that morality has been violated. Consequently, a perception of injustice is the trigger for an emotional response involving moral outrage. Additionally, I propose that when behaviour is perceived as unjust, this can also trigger an empathetic emotional response. I will now move onto an explanation of the connection between justification, moral outrage, and state empathy.

Justification, moral outrage, and state empathy as serial mediators. Shortly after experiencing an initial gut feeling of injustice, witnesses are likely to attempt to make sense of it. It is during this assessment process that witnesses make a judgment about whether the behaviour was just or unjust. If they decide the behaviour is, in fact, unjustified, they will be more likely to experience an affective response, such as moral outrage and empathy. This is based on deontic theory, which identifies a link between the experience of anger and perceived injustice as an emotional reaction to a moral violation (Folger. 2001; O'Reilly & Aquino, 2011). As such, for moral outrage and empathy to be activated, an individual must feel that an injustice has occurred, and witnesses will only perceive the mistreatment as an injustice if they believe it is unjustified.

Moral outrage is a strong driver in motivating individuals to reestablish a standard of fairness and justice by either making it up to the target, or hurting the perpetrator as retribution (Batson, Elklund, Chermok, Hoyt, & Ortiz, 2007). While witnesses may feel that incivility is unjustified, unless their reasoning is attached to a strong emotional response, they will be unlikely to move beyond passivity. As a result, I expect moral outrage to act as a link between justification and witness intervention behaviours. In particular, I believe that moral outrage will

play a large role in motivating witnesses towards direct, observable action that will act to restore the morality of the situation, such as perpetrator punishment, confrontation, and target aiding.

Although O'Reilly and Aquino (2011) only propose moral outrage as a motivating force for witnesses, consistent with the deontic model discussed previously, witnessing one person mistreat another also has the potential to elicit feelings of empathy. Empathy is an "other-oriented emotional response" associated with how one perceives another's welfare (Batson, 1991, p.105), and can include feelings such as sympathy and compassion (Batson et al., 2002). A number of researchers (e.g., Coke, Batson & McDavis, 1978; Galinsky, Ku & Wang, 2005) have successfully induced empathy using perspective taking tactics to improve attitudes towards stigmatized individuals and groups, such as the elderly (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) and ethnic minorities (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Johnson, 2010), as well as between co-workers and customers (e.g., Axtell, Parker, Holman and Totterdell, 2007). Indeed, research has found that an increased feeling of empathy also increases readiness to help a person in need (Batson et al., 1991). Regardless of whether an individual is high in empathy as a general dispositional characteristic, by witnessing someone mistreat another, feelings of empathy that are specific to the situation can move witnesses towards action. However, in order for witnesses to truly experience empathic concern, they must first regard the target as a target.

Scope of Justice

Thus far, I have drawn on deonance theory to help explain why target characteristics might influence witness' behavioural reactions to workplace incivility. However, this theory assumes that a witness believes a target has experienced mistreatment in the first place. In addition, the deontic model does not take into account how targets themselves influence moral decision-making in a witness. While moral identity helps to explain why some witnesses may

not *act* to restore justice, it does not consider the possibility that in some witnesses, incivility may not cause an adverse reaction in the first place. In other words, it is possible that even high moral identity individuals may fail to respond in the face of incivility, simply because the target of mistreatment is not seen as a target at all.

Mitchell, Vogel and Folger (2012) suggest that under certain circumstances, incivility is not necessarily counternormative because the target falls outside the witness' "scope of justice". Scope of justice refers to a "psychological boundary" under which individuals gauge the extent to which a particular person or group is deserving of fair and just treatment (Mitchell et al., 2012, p. 2). Individuals outside of a witness' scope of justice may suffer "exclusionary practices", which include a wide range of mistreatment, from hostility and incivility, to more severe forms, such as human rights violations (Tepper, Moss, & Duffy, 2011). As Opotow and Weiss (2000) argue, norms and moral rules about fair treatment dictate how we act towards those within our scope of justice, while those on the outside of this psychological boundary may be regarded as "expendable, undeserving, exploitable, and irrelevant" (Opotow, 1990, p. 1).

Scope of justice theory explains that witnesses might experience negative gut reactions to incivility, but remain unmoved because targets are not deserving of their moral concern. Mitchell et al. (2012) describe moral concern as the product of a cognitive process in which witnesses assess targets for their 'deservingness' of mistreatment. Deservingness is grounded in the "should counterfactual", or the belief that the target is entitled to better treatment because of their status, role or characteristics (Mitchell et al., 2012). That is, *should* this target be treated differently?

I argue that while witnesses may feel that workplace incivility is negative because it violates a basic social norm (deontic reaction), some targets are more or less deserving of

mistreatment based on their characteristics or behaviours, which may, in turn, lead to their exclusion or inclusion from a witness' scope of justice.

There are a number of characteristics that could potentially influence witness perceptions, evaluations, and subsequent actions. In this thesis, I argue that witness behaviour towards an incompetent target will be less favourable as compared to a competent target. Competence was chosen as a characteristic for two specific reasons. First, it is a characteristic that is relevant and applicable to the workplace. An employee's perceived level of competence is salient to other employees, and likely plays a large role in the opinions and evaluations of others. Second, unlike sex, race, age, or experience, competence is an unstable characteristic over which most individuals have a certain degree of control. While employees cannot fully control how others see them, they do have control over the impression they give with regards to preparedness, organization, and effort.

In sum, based on the arguments in this section, I propose that certain target characteristics, specifically incompetence, facilitate a witness' moral disengagement from the mistreatment, thereby allowing him or her to justify the incivility to a certain extent, and thus exclude the target from their scope of justice. In the next chapter, I draw on the theoretical arguments in this chapter to derive my specific study hypotheses.

Dependent Variables

To examine the effects of target characteristics on witnesses of incivility, I examine four primary behavioural outcomes, three of which have been identified by O'Reilly and Aquino (2011). First, I define passivity as witnesses observing, but failing to visibly respond, to the incivility in an observable manner. This is consistent with the arguments outlined by O'Reilly and Aquino (2011), in which witnesses cannot substantiate the feeling that an immoral act has

occurred, and will be unlikely to leave the relative risk-free comfort of remaining as a bystander. Second, I examine indirect and direct perpetrator punishment as a witness' attempt to restore justice by acting retributively towards the perpetrator to make him or her 'pay' for how he or she has treated the target. This is reflected in a number of direct and indirect observable actions. Direct perpetrator punishment would include behaviours such as turning the incivility back onto the perpetrator through the use of rude jokes or passive-aggressive remarks. Indirect perpetrator punishment would involve behaviours such as ostracizing the perpetrator or giving him or her the silent treatment. Third, some witnesses may attempt to call out the perpetrator in a non-deviant manner that may not easily fall under the usual category of punishment. For example, a witness may calmly address the perpetrator directly, and inform them that their behaviour is unacceptable. I have labeled this form of non-deviant direct perpetrator-focused behaviour as perpetrator confrontation. The last behaviour, aiding the target, is a prosocial response that includes target-focused behaviours aimed specifically at alleviating or preventing the negative effects of the mistreatment, by showing concern for the target's well-being or defending the target against the perpetrator's attacks. With these witness responses in mind, I will now move onto a discussion of how the focal independent variable in this study, target competence, might influence witness perceptions of mistreatment.

Chapter 2: Hypothesis Development

Hypotheses

Based on the preceding theoretical argumentation, I focus on one main target characteristic to examine its effect on witness reactions to both the target and the perpetrator. I posit that witnesses will regard mistreatment towards a competent target more negatively, as compared to mistreatment towards an incompetent target. This is based on a two-fold argument

that mistreatment of a competent target is seen as 1) immoral, and thus more difficult to morally justify, and (2) detrimental to the group's performance. A competent individual performs well, and demonstrates his or her skill and knowledge in a manner that is beneficial to the group. As a result, mistreating a competent individual is a blatant violation of moral norms (i.e., they are not doing anything "wrong"). In some cases, mistreatment of a competent co-worker who is vital to the team's success will have the end result of hindering the group's productivity. Conversely, an incompetent target, who is ill-equipped and unprepared for the task at hand, may be "inviting" criticism due to his or her poor performance. In addition, the target's incompetence can hurt the group's performance. In this case, mistreatment towards him or her may be seen as somewhat deserving, and less immoral. Thus, it is reasonable in the witness' mind to justify the mistreatment. I believe that mistreatment towards a competent target will activate an approach-goal orientation (i.e., leading to punishment of perpetrator, confrontation of the perpetrator or helping of target), while mistreatment of an incompetent target will activate an avoidant-goal orientation (i.e., leading to passivity). Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H1: Witnesses will be more likely to indirectly and directly punish the perpetrator (H1a), confront the perpetrator (H1b), and aid the target (H1c), and less likely to remain passive (H1d), when the target is competent than when the target is incompetent.

The mediating effects of justification, moral outrage, and state empathy. I examine a cognitive and an affective mechanism within the context of a serial mediation model to explain the relationship between target characteristics and witness reactions. First, based on the deontic model described above, O'Reilly and Aquino (2011) argue that following a moral intuition, witnesses will engage in more complex sensemaking to determine if the mistreatment against a target is justified. Based on their assessment, an approach or avoidance goal will be activated,

resulting in either a more passive response (if the witness is unable to find adequate support for his or her reaction to the incivility), or an active intervention (if he or she has reasonable evidence to suggest that the incivility is unjustified). I posit that when witnessing mistreatment of an incompetent target, witnesses will lack the necessary evidence to confirm that incivility towards him or her is necessarily unjustified, resulting in a more passive response. Second, based on scope of justice arguments discussed in Chapter 1, I argue that justification will influence how an individual chooses to react to incivility. In Bandura's (1999) theory of moral disengagement, moral justification is one of three cognitive mechanisms that might allow witnesses to restructure the incivility in their cognitive space to decrease the perceived harm to the target. According to Bandura, this justification may even lead the witness to believe that the mistreatment is somehow beneficial. In the case of workplace incivility, it is possible that uncivil treatment is a form of criticism that the target "deserves", particularly if they appear to be performing poorly, as in the case of an incompetent target. I posit that moral justification is one cognitive mechanism that allows a witness to exclude a target from his or her scope of justice.

As discussed earlier, a deontic reaction to incivility is also likely to evoke negative emotions based on moral grounds. The distinguishing characteristic of moral outrage is that it is preceded by an appraisal of the situation, which determines that a moral principle has been violated. Moral outrage is considered to be a strong driver in motivating individuals to action as an attempt to restore justice (Batson, Elklund, Chermok, Hoyt, & Ortiz, 2007). Additionally, empathy can lead to improved attitudes towards stigmatized groups, and increased likelihood of action on behalf of these groups (Batson et al., 2002; Hodson, 2008). Based on these arguments, I posit that justification is the cognitive mechanism engaged during the appraisal process. Following the assessment of a situation as 'just' or 'unjust', moral outrage and empathy will be

evoked, motivating witnesses to respond. In particular, when people perceive the incivility as unjust, they are likely to become angry and empathetic, and are therefore more likely to punish the perpetrator, confront the perpetrator, aid the target, and less likely to remain passive. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H2: Justification and moral outrage, in sequence, will mediate the relationship between target competence and indirect and direct perpetrator punishment (H2a), confronting the perpetrator (H2b), aiding the target (h2c), and passivity (H2d). Specifically, increased target competence will be related to decreased justification, which will be related to increased moral outrage, which, in turn, will be related to an increase in active witness responses and a decrease in passive witness responses.

H3: Justification and state empathy, in sequence, will mediate the relationship between target competence and indirect and direct perpetrator punishment (H3a), confronting the perpetrator (H3b), aiding the target (h3c), and passivity (H3d). Specifically, increased target competence will be related to decreased justification, which will be related to increased state empathy, which, in turn, will be related to an increase in active witness responses and a decrease in passive witness responses.

The moderating roles of moral identity and trait empathy. Witnesses of mistreatment may engage in a range of behaviours, from complete passivity to direct action. Although the deontic model asserts that witnesses tend to react negatively to mistreatment because it is unjust, and scope of justice theory explains why we may or may not perceive targets as deserving of incivility, neither fully explains the wide range of possible behavioural outcomes of witnesses. Consistent with O'Reilly and Aquino's (2011) model of witness reactions to workplace mistreatment, I examine moral identity as a potential moderator of the above relationship. When

an identity is particularly salient, it can enhance or debilitate various behaviours (Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000; Shih, Pittinksy, Ambady, 1999). These behaviours are likely the result of whether or not an individual can find reasonable support for justification of the incivility. When moral identity is salient due to exposure to an immoral situation, it should promote the likelihood of intervention by high moral identity witnesses. A witness who has a high moral identity is more likely than someone with a low moral identity to have a reaction to incivility based on a desire to remain consistent with his or her belief of being a moral person. Consequently, an individual with a high moral identity will have difficulty justifying incivility towards targets, regardless of whether or not they are competent. Therefore, the degree to which third-party witnesses hold a moral identity will influence their perceptions and actions in response to witnessing incivility. In other words, the stronger an individual's moral identity, the less likely they are to justify incivility towards a target.

Lastly, I believe that trait empathy will have the same effect as moral identity, for if an individual perceives himself or herself as a highly empathetic person, he or she should aim to act in a way that maintains this self-concept (O'Reilly & Aquino, 2011). In other words, the degree to which individuals regard themselves as empathetic should influence the extent to which they justify incivility. As such, a highly empathetic person should be less likely to justify incivility. I hypothesize that:

H4: Moral identity will moderate the relationship between target competence and justification, such that when moral identity is high, the link between target competence and justification will be weaker.

H5: Trait empathy will moderate the relationship between target competence and justification, such that when trait empathy is high, the link between target competence and

justification will be weaker.

Chapter 3: Study 1

Methods

Participants and procedure. Study 1 was a lab study designed to test the direct effects between target competence and witness responses. Specifically, I aimed to run a preliminary test of H1a and H1c, which predict the relationship between target competence and punishment and aiding behaviours, using live actors. The study included 134 participants recruited in-class and online, registered in the Asper School of Business subject pool. Participation in research studies is not mandatory, but students can receive up to two bonus participation credits per semester by participating. Participants were run in groups of 3-6, including confederate actors. Each trial was randomly assigned to a competent or incompetent condition with either the two male actors or the two female actors (e.g., each session was labeled competent female/male or incompetent female/male). The actors in each trial were the same sex to avoid potential power confounds that might influence outcomes (e.g., if a male perpetrator mistreated a female perpetrator). Although participants were scheduled and run at the same time, I measured each participant's individual responses independently, as participants were not permitted to speak to one another for the duration of the study. Among the group of participants, there were two confederate actors who, along with the real participants, signed a consent form and received verbal instructions from the researcher. Photos of all four confederate actors were pre-tested using a snowball sample of raters who assessed the actors' attractiveness and competence. There was no significant difference between the actors on these measures (see Appendix 2).

As a cover story, participants were told that the study had two purposes: 1) to help come up with ideas for how a food truck company could be successful on campus, and 2) to examine

the effects of room temperature conditions on evaluations that individuals make. Each participant was “randomly” given a nametag with a letter on it (A-E). Participants were told that in order to fulfill both purposes of the study, students would either be “randomly” assigned as Idea Evaluators, or Idea Generators. Idea Generators were responsible for brainstorming marketing ideas for the food truck company, while Idea Evaluators were asked to watch the brainstorming, and then fill out an evaluation on the Idea Generators after the brainstorming session. To assign the roles, the researcher picked two letters from an envelope, and the participants with these two letters were Idea Generators, while the other participants were Idea Evaluators. Once the first round of the idea generation was complete, and evaluators finished their evaluations, the participants were told that the researcher would pick two more letters, and those participants would take turns as Idea Generators.

The Idea Generator roles were always assigned to the confederate actors, who read an article on food truck success tips out loud, took a few minutes to write down individual ideas, and then engaged in a brainstorming session (see Appendix 1 for the script). Consistent with the workplace incivility scale, which includes items such as “put you down or was condescending to you”, and “paid little attention to your statement or showed little interest in your opinion” (Cortina et al., 2001), the uncivil perpetrator sighed rudely at the target, laughed at the target’s comments and ideas, checked his/her cell phone during the interaction, and disregarded ideas. In the incompetent condition, the target was unable to think up any relevant and interesting ideas, did not write down anything during the individual brainstorming, and became easily flustered and confused by the task, while in the competent condition the target brought forth a number of applicable ideas, wrote down lots of ideas, and did not appear flustered or confused by the task.

While each aspect of the interaction between the perpetrator and target was scripted, the

majority of participants perceived the scenario as authentic. To gauge suspicion of actors, participants were asked in the survey "what do you think is the purpose of this study?" 15 participants indicated in their answer that they suspected actors, eight of which passed the manipulation check. In debriefing, the majority of those who indicated that they suspected actors expressed that they still felt discomfort while watching the interaction, thus I did not exclude those individuals from the analysis. However, I conducted a MANOVA to determine whether there was a significant difference in responses between those who suspected actors and those who did not, and there were no significant differences on any of the measures.

Once the brainstorming was complete, the actors left the room while the researcher came back to distribute surveys. The participants were seated next to one another, but separated by cardboard dividers so that they could not easily communicate with one another or view one another's responses. Once the evaluators had finished their surveys, they were asked for general feedback on the first round of the idea generation, and then debriefed on the purpose of the study, and the use of confederate actors. Before they left the lab, participants were asked to sign an agreement of non-disclosure in which they agreed not to share the purpose of the study with any other students.

Measures

Perpetrator punishment. This variable was operationalized using point allocation and visual feedback tasks (See Appendix 3). Although this exact visual feedback has not been used in previous studies, past research has used the exchange of images to operationalize participant behavioural responses (e.g., Maass et al., 2003). By choosing to send aggressive or supportive images, participants are demonstrating an intention to support or hurt the target by improving or decreasing their affect (e.g., participants who receive an aggressive image will feel poorly, and

this is a way to punish the confederate who mistreated the target). Emoticon images were chosen because they are a common and familiar way of communicating one's feelings, which increased their plausibility as a form of communication within the context of the study. Participants were able to select up to five aggressive images to send to the perpetrator. There were a total of 30 possible images to choose from, including 10 aggressive, 10 supportive, and 10 neutral images. Visual feedback scores were calculated by adding +1 for each supportive image chosen, -1 for each aggressive image chosen, and 0 for each neutral image chosen by the participant. The lower the score on all these measures, the more indicative of punishment. Participants were also given the option to select a smiley face expression, which represented their level of approval or disapproval of the perpetrator (on a scale of 1-7).

I also measured punishment using a point allocation operationalization. Participants were given the option to take away up to two bonus participation marks (for a total of zero total points). Point allocation was chosen by participants on a .25 point increment scale, in which they could choose to take away up to two points, or allocate up to two extra points.

Target aiding. This was operationalized using the same point allocation and visual feedback measures described above. If participants helped the target, they gave the target up to an extra two bonus participation marks (for a total of four participation marks). Participants could also send a positive smiley-face expression, and could choose up to five supportive images to send the target. The higher the score on all these measures, the more indicative of helping behaviour.

Control variables. I controlled for the sex of the confederate actors and of the witnesses because gender role expectations make it more acceptable for men to be aggressive and women to be incompetent (e.g., Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tampkins, 2004).

Manipulation checks. Participants were asked to rate the Idea Generators' competence as demonstrated by their performance on the task.

Results

Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations appear in Table 1. I collected data from 134 participants. Four participants that were run in the first time slot of the study were removed after I made changes to the study design and script to make the competence manipulation stronger. One participant was removed because he knew one of the actors. One participant was removed because he did not complete the last page of the survey. To assess the manipulation, I ran a t-test to determine whether there was a significant mean difference in perceived competence of the target between those in the competent and incompetent condition. Results showed a significant difference in the scores for the competent condition ($M = 7.11$, $SD = 1.75$), and the incompetent condition ($M = 4.80$, $SD = 2.32$); $t(1,126) = 6.37$, $p < .001$. There were no sex effects, and thus I excluded sex as a control variable in my analysis.

The sample included 128 participants, with 62 in the competent condition, and 66 in the incompetent condition. In my analysis, I included perpetrator punishment and target aiding dependent variables, as measured by point allocation and visual feedback (means and standard deviations appear in Table 2). Thus, I was able to directly test the witness behaviours predicted by H1a (punishing the perpetrator) and H1c (aiding the target). To test my hypotheses, I conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), which was significant, $F(6, 121) = 5.31$, $p < .001$.

Punishment behaviour towards the perpetrator was nonsignificant (visual feedback: $F(1,121) = .35$, $p = .55$; point allocation: $F(1,121) = .20$, $p = .65$; smile feedback: ($F(1,121) = ..02$, $p = .90$), and thus results did not support H1a. Hypothesis H1c was supported, as there was

a significant relationship between competence and target aiding, wherein witnesses were more likely to help competent targets than incompetent targets via smile feedback, $F(1,121) = 30.32$, $p < .001$ (Competent (M = 5.39, SD = 1.12); Incompetent (M = 4.17, SD = 1.37)) and point allocation, $F(1,21) = 11.34$, $p = .001$ (Competent (M = 1.38, SD = .81); Incompetent (M = .79, SD = 1.11)). Visual feedback towards the target was nonsignificant, $F(1,121) = .46$, $p = .50$ (Competent (M = .65, SD = 1.59); Incompetent (M = .45, SD = 1.59)).

Study 1 Discussion

Findings from Study 1 supported my hypothesis with regards to target-related behaviour (H1c), such that participants helped an incompetent target less than a competent target. It seems that witnesses might regard incompetent targets as more deserving of incivility, and this is reflected in the extent to which they attempt to help competent targets. Consistent with scope of justice theory, it appears that a target's perceived level of competence can push him or her outside the boundary of a witness' consideration of fair treatment.

H1a (punishment of perpetrator) was not supported. These results showed that witnesses in the competent condition did not significantly punish the perpetrator more in the competent than the incompetent condition. It may be that participants were unwilling to punish the perpetrator out of fear of retaliation, in particular if they were chosen for the role of the Idea Generator in the next round. Indeed, punishing the perpetrator may be generally more risky than helping a target, and this perception is likely to affect how witnesses respond to workplace incivility. The pattern in the data, although nonsignificant, indicated that witnesses punished perpetrators more in the incompetent than in the competent condition, which runs contrary to predictions. This may have interesting implications for how the witness perceives the target and the perpetrator, however I am not able to draw any conclusions based on this data.

I also measured likability of the target in this study (Reysen Likability Scale, 2005) (α = .80) in order to determine whether this might influence the findings. When controlling for likability of the target, the overall MANOVA is still significant, $F(6,76) = 4.06$, $p = .001$, although perpetrator punishment behaviour runs contrary to my hypothesis. However, as liking correlates very highly with target competence (see Table 1), and any target trait or uncivil treatment will affect a target's likability, I did not include this variable as a covariate in my final analysis.

A major strength of this study is with regards to its use of confederate actors and its ability to measure behavioural responses. By using confederate actors, I was able to ensure that participants were witnessing an actual case of incivility, and that the uncivil interaction remained relatively consistent across all participants. As a result, participants were placed in a genuinely uncomfortable situation in which they were likely to experience authentic emotional responses. Through the use of questions that directly tapped into punishment and aiding behaviours, I was also able to measure witness responses in a manner that decreased demand characteristics.

The primary limitation of this study is that I was not able to examine the mechanisms (indirect effects) through which target competence affects witness behaviour, as doing so would compromise the perceived spontaneity and authenticity of the uncivil interaction between the confederate actors. However, I aimed to address this weakness in Study 2 through the use of an online vignette study. Secondly, as it was not practical to run participants individually, it is possible that group effects may have been a contributing factor to witness responses. Specifically, participants may have engaged in diffusion of responsibility with regards to perpetrator punishment if they felt that the perpetrator would be punished by other witnesses.

Lastly, it is possible that the findings of this study might not generalize to a working adult population. Although many of the ways that individuals respond to witnessing incivility may hold constant in a variety of situations, the workplace itself consists of unique dynamics (e.g., power, friendships) that can influence third-party responses, but that cannot be easily replicated in a lab setting; as such, results may have differed within a working adult sample. In Study 2, I aimed examine the cognitive and affective processes through which witnesses respond to uncivil treatment.

Chapter 4: Study 2

Methods

Participants and procedure. Study 2 was designed to test the specific indirect relationships proposed by my model. Participants consisted of 156 students from the Asper School of Business who completed an online survey questionnaire in which they imagined that they were engaged in a group brainstorming project with two other individuals. The brainstorming group consisted of Alex, with whom they have already worked, and a new co-worker, Taylor, with whom they are not familiar. To familiarize themselves with Taylor's background, they received her/his résumé, which was identical across conditions with the exception of GPA, and a comment from a previous employer portraying Taylor as competent or incompetent (male/female conditions were alternated and presented to participants randomly to control for gender effects) (See Appendix 4 for the résumés).

In the competent condition, the employee's résumé included a high GPA (3.8/4), as well as a recommendation from the previous employer, which read:

> Taylor is highly organized and maintains a consistently high standard of work. (S)he has many strengths, and knows how best to contribute to a group and how to take initiative.

> As you can see, (s)he has an extremely strong résumé, and I am confident in recommending him/her based on the level of competence (s)he demonstrated working in my organization.

In the incompetent condition, the employee's résumé included a low GPA (2.8/4), and a comment from the previous employer, which read:

> Taylor is often disorganized and does not maintain a consistent standard of work. She does have certain strengths, but is not always sure of how best to contribute to a group or how to take initiative. As you can see, she has a strong résumé, however I am not confident in recommending her based on the level of competence she demonstrated working in my organization.

During the description of the group's brainstorming, Taylor was described as either well-prepared and organized for the meeting (competent condition), or disorganized and flustered (incompetent condition) (see Appendix 5 for the scenarios). In both conditions, Alex treated Taylor with incivility, acting rudely and shooting down his/her ideas. Participants then responded to a number of questions related to the variables of interest in this study.

Measures

Indirect and direct perpetrator punishment. Indirect punishment was measured using adapted items from the Workplace Ostracism Scale (Ferris et al., 2008), which included items such as "[I would probably] stop talking to Alex at work", and "[I would probably] leave the area when Alex entered the room" ($\alpha = .96$). Direct punishment was measured using items adapted from the Workplace Deviance Scale (Bennett & Robinson, 2000), such as "[I would] make fun of Alex" and "[I would] curse at Alex" ($\alpha = .97$).

Perpetrator confrontation. This variable was measured using 3 adapted items from Fitzgerald's (1990) Coping with Harassment Questionnaire. A sample item is "[I would] ask [Alex] to leave [Taylor] alone" (α = .81).

Target aiding. Target aiding was measured using two scales. The first included interpersonal items from the Organizational Citizenship Behaviour Checklist (OCB-C; Fox et al., 2009). A sample item is, "[I would] go out of my way to give Taylor encouragement or express appreciation" (α =.69). The second scale included affective and instrumental support items adapted from Ducharme and Martin (2000) (α =.89 and α = .92, respectively). A sample affective item is "[I would] feel close to Taylor", and an instrumental item is "[I would] pitch in and help Taylor."

Passivity. I measured passivity using a minimization scale adapted from Cortina and Magley (2009), which gauges the extent to which a witness will minimize the severity of the situation (α = .91). Sample items include "[I would] tell myself it wasn't important", and "[I would] just ignore it".

Justification. This mediator was measured using three self-constructed items (α = .90). A sample item is "I can imagine that Alex had good reason to treat Taylor that way".

Moral outrage. Moral outrage was measured using four moral outrage items adapted from Beugre's (2012) Deontic Justice Scale. Sample items include "I feel angry when I see Taylor being unfairly treated", and "I feel mad when I see the injustices done to Taylor" (α = .92).

State empathy. I measured state empathy using an adapted version of Davis' (1980) Interpersonal Reactivity Index (α = .84). A sample item is "I didn't feel very much pity for [Taylor]."

Moral identity. This moderator was measured using the full set of items from the Self Importance of Moral Identity Scale (SIMI; Aquino & Reed, 2002) (α = .77). This measure lists a number of desirable traits (e.g., compassion, caring) and asks the respondent to rate a number of statements on a scale of 1-7, with each item categorized as "internalized" or "symbolized". A sample internalized item is "It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics", while a symbolized item is "I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics".

Trait empathy. I measured trait empathy using an adapted version of Davis' (1983) empathy and perspective taking scales, (α = .77). A sample item is "When I someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective of them."

Manipulation check. Participants responded to four items to ensure that they understood Taylor's level of competence. Sample items include "Taylor is competent", and "Taylor is suitable for this task."

Items for all scales are reported in Appendix 6.

Results

Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations appear in Table 3 and an organized summary of all results appears in Table 4. My initial sample consisted of 158 undergraduate students registered in the Asper School of Business subject pool. Prior to collecting data, I did not establish a cut-off point for data collection. However, in case there were gender effects in which I would be required to treat target gender as a condition (e.g., competent/incompetent female/male), I aimed to have 30 participants in each cell (e.g., 4 cells; 120 total participants). I decided to continue collecting data after this point to account for those who did not pass attention check questions and would be excluded from analysis. After removing those participants who did

not pass the two attention check questions, the sample consisted of 105 students with 52 in the competent condition and 53 in the incompetent condition. There were no gender effects, and thus I did not include this variable in my analyses.

To test hypotheses H1a (direct and indirect perpetrator punishment) I conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with deviance and ostracism as dependent variables. Since these variables do not correlate with other variables in my model, I ran these separately from other dependent variables. The overall MANOVA for punishment variables was nonignificant, $F(2,102) = .34$, $p = .72$; therefore, H1a was not supported. Next, I tested H1b (confrontation), H1c (target aiding), and H1d (passivity) using a MANOVA of these dependent variables. The overall MANOVA was only marginally significant, $F(5,99) = 2.14$, $p = .07$, failing to support H1b-d. However, the primary purpose of Study 2 was to examine indirect relationships, and consistent with the argument for testing indirect effects in the absence of a direct effect (Hayes, 2009), I moved on to examine the indirect effects and moderated mediation hypotheses. To test my hypotheses, I conducted a series of mediation and moderation analyses using Haye's (2012) PROCESS macro (Models 6 and 1). I used 5000 boot-strapped samples to calculate the point estimates of the indirect effects in addition to confidence intervals.

Hypothesis 2 and 3 predict that justification and moral outrage, and justification and state empathy, in sequence, will mediate the relationship between target competence and perpetrator punishment (H2/3a), confrontation (H2/3b), target aiding (H2/3c), and passivity (H2/3d). To test H2/3a-d, I ran Model 6 of Haye's PROCESS macro, which tests the effect of competence on punishment through serial mediators justification and moral outrage, and justification and state empathy. Next, I ran Model 1 of Haye's PROCESS macro to test the moderation relationship of Hypotheses 4 and 5. These hypotheses predict that moral identity and trait empathy, respectively,

will weaken the relationship between the IV (target competence) and the first mediator (justification). Because H2 and H3 test the indirect relationship between target competence and witness behaviour as mediated by justification and moral outrage, and justification and state empathy, I proceeded to first test the relationship between competence and serial mediators that are common across H2 and H3.

First I examined the path from the IV (competence) to the first mediator (justification), which indicated that target competence was negatively associated with justification, (b = -.36, β = -.24, SE = .14, p = .01, (95% CI [-.644, -.081]). The second path, from the first mediator (justification) to the second mediator (moral outrage) also showed a negative relationship (b = -.48, β = -.51, SE = .08, p < .001, (95% CI[-.632, -.319]). Next I tested the relationship between justification and the second serial mediator (state empathy), and found a significant negative relationship (b = -.50, β = -.52, SE = .08, p < .001, (95% CI[-.664, -.342]). Finally, I proceeded to examine the relationships between my mediators, DV's and indirect effects.

First I tested the relationships between moral outrage and perpetrator-focused DV's (punishment and confrontation) and the indirect effects. To test H2a (punishment), I examined the relationships between moral outrage and punishment DV's (ostracism and deviance), neither of which were significant, and the confidence intervals for the indirect effects of competence on punishment through justification and moral outrage included zero (Deviance: 95% CI[-.005, .088]; Ostracism: 95% CI[-.038, .111]). These results did not support H2a. To test H2b (confrontation), I first examined the relationship between moral outrage and confrontation and found a significant positive relationship (b = .54, β = .48, SE = .11, p < .001, (95% CI[.315, .757]). Analyses revealed a significant indirect effect (point estimate = .09, SE = .05), and the

95% confidence intervals excluded zero (95% CI [.022, .219]), supporting H2b (see Figure 1). The residual direct effect of competence on confrontation was not significant, b = -.06, p = .65.

To test H2c, I first examined the path between moral outrage and target aiding behaviours (see Figures 2, 3 and 4). Results from the mediation model indicated that moral outrage was positively associated with all target aiding behaviours, including OCB (b = .39, β = .44, SE = .09, p = .0001, (95% CI[.206, .579]), affective support (b = .35, β = .39, SE = .09, p < .001, (95% CI[.168, .533]) and instrumental support (b = .31, β = .31, SE = .11, p =.006, (95% CI[.087, .526]). Next, I examined the indirect effect of competence on target aiding through justification and moral outrage, and results demonstrated a significant indirect effect of competence on target aiding including OCB (point estimate = .07, SE = .04), affective support (point estimate = .06, SE = .03), and instrumental support (point estimate = .05, SE = .04), and the 95% confidence intervals for all target aiding behaviours excluded zero (OCB: [.015, .170]); Affective support: (95% CI[.019, .179]; Instrumental support: (95% CI [.000, .212]). The residual direct effects for OCB (b = .18, p = .12), affective support (b = .20, p = .07) and instrumental support (b = .03, p = .81) were not significant. Thus, results indicate an indirect effect of target competence on target aiding behaviours through justification and moral outrage, supporting H2c.

For H2d, the relationship between moral outrage and passivity was nonsignificant, and the confidence interval for the relationship between competence and passivity through justification and moral outrage included zero (95% CI[-.086, .039]), indicating a lack of indirect effects, and failing to support H2d.

Hypothesis 3 made predictions with regards to the same witness behaviours outlined in Hypothesis 2, but with empathy towards the target acting as a serial mediator with justification. I

found that state empathy did not have a significant relationship to ostracism, and the confidence interval for the indirect relationship between competence and ostracism included zero (95% CI [-.031, .121]). While there was only a marginally significant relationship between empathy and deviance (p = .06), there was a significant indirect effect of competence on deviance through justification and empathy (95% CI[.004, .094]) partially supporting H3a. To test H3b, I examined the relationship between state empathy and confrontation, and found that there was a positive association (b = .25, β = .24, SE = .12, p < .05, (95% CI[.013, .490]). I then tested the indirect relationship between target competence and confrontation as mediated by justification and state empathy (point estimate = .03, SE = .02), and the 95% confidence interval (95% CI [.004, .184]) excluded zero (see Figure 1). The residual direct effect of competence on confrontation was not significant (b = .01, p =.96). Thus, similar to H2a, while H3a (perpetrator punishment) was not fully supported, results showed a significant indirect effect of competence on confrontation through justification and state empathy, supporting H3b.

Regarding H3c, when I tested the relationship between state empathy and target aiding behaviours, results from the mediation model indicated a positive association between state empathy and all target helping behaviours including OCB (b = .32, β = .37, SE = .09, p = .001, (95% CI[.133, .506]), affective support (b = .49, β = .56, SE = .08, p < .0001, (95% CI[.323, .651]), and instrumental support (b = .33, β = .35, SE = .11, p = .003, (95% CI[.114, .538]) (See Figures 2, 3, and 4). I found significant indirect effects of competence on all target aiding behaviours through serial mediators justification and state empathy, in support of H3c (OCB: point estimate = .06, SE = .03, 95% CI[.014, .163]); affective support: point estimate =.09, SE = .05, 95% CI[.021, .202]); instrumental support: point estimate = .06, SE = .04, 95% CI [.011, .190]). The residual direct effects were not significant for OCB (b = .18, p = .11), affective

support (b = .15, p = .10), and instrumental support (b = .02, p = .88). Thus, results supported H3c.

To test H3d (passivity), I examined the path from state empathy to passivity which indicated a negative association (b = -.29, β = -.36, SE = .11, p = .01, (95% CI [-.518, -.070]) (see Figure 5). Next, results indicated an indirect effect of target competence on passivity through serial mediators justification and state empathy, (point estimate = -.05, SE = .05; 95% CI [-.174, -.001]). The residual direct effect was not significant (b = .14, p = .33). Thus, results support H3d.

Lastly, I proceeded to test the effects of my moderators (moral identity and trait empathy), on my first mediator (justification). H4 and H5 predicted that moral identity and trait empathy, respectively, would weaken the relationship between target competence and justification. I began by mean-centering my predictor variables, and then I ran Haye's (2012) PROCESS Macro (Model 1) (see Figures 6 and 7). There was a statistically significant interaction between moral identity and target competence, ΔR^2 =.05, b = -.73, β =-.23, p = .02, and a marginally significant interaction between trait empathy and target competence, ΔR^2 =.03, b = -.38, β =-.21, p = .06. The 95% confidence interval for moral identity and trait empathy, respectively, excluded zero at the moderate (mean) and high (+1SD) level (Moral identity: (95% CI M: [-.650, -.097], +1SD: [-1.125, -.318]); trait empathy: (95% CI M: [-.645, -.085] +1SD: [-1.035, -.236]). Thus, results ran contrary to my predictions, indicating that the relationship between target competence and justification was strengthened by moral identity, and likely by trait empathy as well . As such, witnesses with medium and high levels of empathy and moral identity were less likely to justify incivility towards a competent target, strengthening, rather than weakening, the link between justification and competence.

Study 2 Discussion

The purpose of this study was to build on Study 1 by examining the indirect effects through which a target's perceived level of competence influences witness responses to incivility. Results largely support the theoretical model with regards to justification, moral outrage, and empathy acting as mediators of the relationship between target competence and witness behaviours – in particular, confrontation, target aiding, and passivity. Thus, individuals are more likely to help a competent target, and more likely to confront a perpetrator when he or she mistreats a competent target, particularly when they feel that the behaviour is unjustified, and when they experience heightened moral outrage and empathy.

Hypotheses with regards to confrontation and deviance were supported in Study 2, with people engaging in more of these behaviours in the competent condition, although perpetrator behaviours were nonsignificant in Study 1. However, the pattern of findings in the Study 1 data runs contrary to hypotheses and is at odds with perpetrator findings (confrontation and deviance) of Study 2. The nonsignificant pattern of perpetrator punishment in Study 1 suggests that those who witness mistreatment towards an incompetent target are more likely to punish the perpetrator. In contrast, Study 2 finds that witnesses are more likely to confront and act deviant towards perpetrators who mistreat competent than incompetent targets. Since Study 1 findings are nonsignificant, no firm conclusions can be drawn, however, were this pattern to hold true in future studies, this would have some interesting implications. One explanation for this inconsistency between these results may lie in the relationship between the target and perpetrator. In Study 1, both participants appear to be complete strangers, tied together only by their participation in the study and their enrollment in a business course. As such, the uncivil behaviour of the perpetrator towards the target, a complete stranger, may be particularly

disturbing to witnesses when the target is already a poor performer. Moreover, while witnesses may feel justified in failing to help an incompetent target based on task performance, there is no set precedent for ability or performance in the lab, and mistreatment of an incompetent target may be regarded as particularly unacceptable. In contrast, in Study 2, the target and the perpetrator are two co-workers, with one of whom the witness has previously worked. The perceived relationship between the witness and the perpetrator, and the perpetrator and the target, therefore, may influence a third-party response such that incivility towards a competent target is particularly unjust. Moreover, in the workplace, there is an expectation of competence, which may lead third parties to feel further justified in punishing a perpetrator who mistreats a competent employee. Thus, Study 1 and Study 2 may give insights into how witnesses might respond to incivility under different circumstances (e.g., with or without a pre-existing relationship). However, as I was only able to measure direct relationships between competence and witness behaviours in Study 1 without investigating the role of cognitive and affective mechanisms, a true comparison of the studies is difficult.

The results from Study 2 also suggest that moral outrage and empathy do not serve as strong enough motivators for witnesses to engage in some punishment behaviours towards the perpetrator. There was a significant range restriction of perpetrator punishment responses, which may explain the lack of overall multivariate effect. The mean level of deviance was 1.55 with a low standard deviation of .55, and reports of ostracism were also low, with a mean level of 1.76, and a standard deviation of .74. These results suggest that participants were highly unlikely to report such perpetrator-focused intentions.

Further, I also found that moral outrage did not lead to a decrease in passivity. Although O'Reilly and Aquino (2011) argue that moral outrage is a pre-requisite for active responses to

incivility, its presence might not necessarily predict a lack of active responses (i.e., passivity). Lastly, the results indicate that moral identity and empathy strengthened, rather than weakened, the relationship between target competence and justification. This ran contrary to my predictions, and may suggest that the presence of a complicating factor, perhaps with regards to the perception of competence as a moral issue in and of itself. I will address this possibility in the general discussion below.

The primary strength of this study is its internal validity. Although I was not able to confirm that a target's perceived level of competence directly caused specific witness responses, the results indicate that the extent to which a witness perceived the incivility as justified led him or her to experience specific affective responses, leading to an increased or decreased likelihood of engaging in target aiding, passivity, or confrontation. As such, I was able to test the indirect relationship within my model to help explain *why* competence influences witness responses.

In terms of study limitations, the main limitation relates to ecological validity. For example, it is unlikely that in a real-world job situation, a previous employer would agree to give a negative recommendation to another employer about the employee they have recently hired (as in the incompetence condition). Thus, witness responses on this online survey may have been influenced by whether participants perceived the written scenarios as realistic. In addition, as this study aims to make a contribution to the workplace aggression literature, the findings should be considered in light of the fact that I used a student sample. Were this study conducted with a diverse sample of working adults, it is possible that responses may have differed from those presented in the present thesis. However, it may not be the nature of the participants (e.g., students versus working adults) that would result in different responses to witnessing incivility, but rather the relationships between the target and perpetrator. For example, if this study had

been conducted among members of a class group project, it is likely that students would respond in a manner consistent with those of working adults. It should be noted that an organization is a network comprised of several complex relationships and dynamics, including friendships, interdependency of employees, and power, that are likely to play a role in how witnesses respond to mistreatment. Due to the nature of a laboratory study, it was not possible to authentically replicate these relationships in order to test their effects on third party responses. Future research could examine the impact of workplace dynamics on witness responses to mistreatment among employees in the workplace.

Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion

General Discussion

These two studies demonstrate that both target and witness characteristics can help predict third-party responses to incivility. Consistent with my hypotheses about target-focused behaviour, in both studies I found that individuals punished incompetent targets more than competent targets. This finding suggests that target characteristics play an important role in witness responses, in that they influence the extent to which behaviour is perceived as justified. The evaluation of targets as deserving or undeserving of incivility has the power to elicit affective responses that can motivate witnesses towards certain actions. This suggests that the degree to which a witness perceives a target as competent or incompetent can facilitate his or her exclusion from the witness' scope of justice. Thus, an incompetent target, seen as undeserving of fair treatment, may lead the witness to experience less anger or empathy. While an incompetent target may fail to evoke the necessary affect responsible for motivating witnesses towards helping, it appears that a lack of empathy, rather than a lack of moral outrage, is primarily responsible for passivity on the part of the witness.

Perpetrator-focused behaviour, on the other hand, may be a more complex phenomenon. Consistent with my hypotheses, in Study 2, individuals confronted and were deviant towards the perpetrator who mistreated a competent target, while some perpetrator punishment in both studies was non-significant. These findings may suggest that different relationships and dynamics between targets and perpetrators influence how witnesses choose to respond. Moreover, it is possible that a lack of main effects in Study 2 indicate that it is primarily the mechanisms (i.e., justification, moral outrage, and empathy) that drive the effect, rather than target competence itself. While Study 1 shows a direct relationship between target competence and witness behaviour, Study 2 demonstrates that when witnesses see incivility as unjustified, they become more angry towards the perpetrator, and empathetic towards the target, and are therefore more willing to act. However, to make a direct comparison between the findings of the two studies, it might have been necessary to measure justification and affective responses in Study 1.

Furthermore, while affective responses to incivility, such as anger and empathy, may be sufficient to elicit a more constructive response, other conditions may need to exist to evoke deviant responses. These might include situational factors, such as perceived organizational justice, workplace climate, or frequency/history of uncivil behaviour, or dispositional factors, such as witness impulsivity and sense of justice. Likely, both situational and dispositional factors contribute to a witness' proclivity towards engaging in deviance. It is also possible that when witnesses experience anger specifically rooted in the belief that a moral standard has been violated, this prevents them from engaging in behaviour that may be perceived as immoral in and of itself. These potentially "immoral" behaviours, such as yelling at the perpetrator, excluding him or her from activities, and engaging in repeat incivility, are all undesirable behaviours that

may be regarded as “wrong”, particularly in a workplace context. Therefore, in the presence of moral outrage, to engage in these behaviours may run contrary to belief-tied emotions experienced by the perpetrator.

Further to the discussion on nonsignificant perpetrator-focused behaviour, participants in Study 1 may have feared counter-retaliation by the other participants for engaging in punishment behaviours. Although participants were assured that their responses were not attached to their name, and that idea generators would not receive feedback until after the study, they may have been concerned that by punishing a perpetrator, they might receive similar treatment in return. Such a concern for self and well-being is likely to occur in the workplace, and many witnesses may perceive the risk of intervening as greater than the potential benefit, particularly in the face of an ambiguous behaviour such as incivility.

With regards to the lack of main effects in Study 2, it is also possible that a competence manipulation is simply not strong enough to directly evoke specific behaviours in a vignette study. For example, a participant in an online setting may read about a competent or incompetent target, but this description may not be powerful enough to directly determine how he or she behaves, without taking into account specific cognitive and emotional processes. While not directly influencing behaviour, however, participants can read about a competent or incompetent target, cognitively process the scenario, and report on their feelings and expected response, resulting in an indirect effect of target competence on subsequent confrontation, aiding, and passive behaviours.

Lastly, I also posited that, based on moral identity theory, individuals with a high level of moral identity and trait empathy should be less likely to justify incivility, as this is at odds with their beliefs and self-concept. However, in Study 2, I found that rather than weakening the

relationship between competence and justification, moral identity and empathy strengthened it. As a result, high and medium-level moral identity individuals were less likely to justify uncivil treatment of a competent target than an incompetent target. I offer two possible explanations for these findings. First, the theory of moral identity itself may be too idealistic. An individual who considers himself or herself as highly moral is not immune to biases, fear of punishment or retaliation, misperceptions, and poor judgment. Incivility is ambiguous by nature, and thus the risk of intervening on behalf of a target is great. Therefore, individuals who regard themselves as highly moral may still experience a discrepancy between their thoughts and actions, in which case they are likely to justify mistreatment as a means of relieving this cognitive dissonance. Second, incompetence, which can compromise the success of another person or group, may be perceived as immoral in and of itself. In this case, those with a high moral identity or high trait empathy may find it easier to justify mistreatment when they believe that targets themselves are engaging in immoral behaviour (incompetence), as compared to moral behaviour (competence).

Implications and Future Directions

This study makes a number of contributions to the field. With the pairing of two studies, I was able to test a theoretical model, as well as gauge real-life responses in a lab setting. Theoretically, these studies address the gap that exists in the workplace mistreatment literature in two key ways. First, they expand characteristic-focused research by investigating the effect that target and witness characteristics have on witnesses of incivility. Second, they take the perspective of third-party witnesses, paying particular attention to how their attitudes towards the perpetrator and target are affected by the presence of certain target characteristics, and in turn, how they choose to respond. These studies also highlight some possible limitations of applying moral identity theory to complex human behaviours in the workplace.

From a theoretical perspective, just world belief theory (Lerner, 1980) may play a moderating role as an additional witness characteristic. Just world belief, or the assumption that people get what they deserve, is a cognitive mechanism that witnesses may utilize in order to justify incivility towards the target and subsequent inaction. If a witness has high belief in a just world, he or she may perceive the target as having done something to deserve the uncivil behaviour. For example, a witness with belief in a just world may see an incompetent target as particularly deserving of uncivil treatment. As such, a witness who scores high on this characteristic will believe the behaviour is justified, failing to evoke moral outrage and state empathy, and finally leading to a passive, rather than active, response. In some cases, belief in a just world may even lead witnesses to punish the target, if they believe that the target generally deserves mistreatment.

From a practical standpoint, this study provides useful information for both employees and organizations to consider in responding to and preventing mistreatment. While a target of incivility is never deserving of mistreatment, it is important from both a practical and theoretical perspective to understand the risk factors associated with certain characteristics that can influence others' perceptions and make some individuals more likely to become targets. As such, future research could expand the focus to other target and witness traits and behaviours, in addition to the influence of organizational factors and relational dynamics.

However, a number of questions might arise when researchers and organizations consider witness intervention; namely, is it always good to intervene? More specifically, how does witness intervention affect targets in both positive and negative ways? In encouraging witness intervention, it is necessary to establish that such intervention is desired and advantageous to the target of mistreatment. A greater understanding of the effects of intervention, and perceptions of

intervention by both targets and perpetrators, can further inform the study of witness behaviour, and would be a valuable direction for future research. Moreover, an investigation of the subsequent effects of intervening on the witnesses themselves will help to deepen understanding of what consequences, such as counter-retaliation on the part of the perpetrator (or even the target), could impact witnesses and influence their future behaviour. Further research that considers the multidimensionality of workplace mistreatment, as it relates to the causes and effects of third-party behaviours, reflects the questions that pass through witnesses' minds when they weigh the risks and benefits of intervening on behalf of a target.

Strengths and Limitations

The previous findings should be considered in light of a number of limitations. Unfortunately, I was not able to test my complete theoretical model in Study 1 because there was not a feasible manner in which to measure justification or situation-specific emotions in the lab without giving away the purpose of the study. As such, I am not able to directly compare the results from Study 1 and Study 2. However, each study was designed to address the limitation of the other. Specifically, I was able to gauge real-life responses to incivility in Study 1 that were not possible in Study 2, and I was able to investigate the mechanisms through which witnesses respond to incivility in Study 2, which was not practical in Study 1,

Study 1 also utilized confederate actors, and as a result, there was likely some inconsistency from session to session. In some cases, the manipulation may have been weaker or stronger, though this is a limitation of all in-lab studies, particularly those that make use of actors. Additionally, I was not able to directly measure explicit or verbal witness responses, as participants were asked to remain silent throughout the brainstorming so that they did not influence others' responses. However, some participants tried to express their discomfort with

the situation, and may have influenced other participants' responses, although there was not a way to reliably measure this. Due to time constraints and practicality, I could not run participants alone, thus it is possible that certain responses are the result of peer influence.

In both Study 1 and Study 2, I did not include a control condition with regards to incivility. As such, the effect of incivility on witness responses was not clear, and it may be possible that witnesses would respond negatively to an incompetent individual regardless of uncivil treatment. Recent research by Hershcovis and Reich (2015) demonstrated that witnesses can respond to incivility by helping the target or punishing the perpetrator; therefore, I opted to focus only on the competence manipulation. However, to rule out the possibility that witnesses would react the same way in the absence of incivility, future research should design a 2x2 study which tests the interaction between civil vs. uncivil and competent vs. incompetent conditions.

Lastly, it is possible that social desirability affected witness responses in both studies. In Study 1, since participants were not anonymous, they may have been responding in a manner that was consistent with how they thought they should behave. This may have swayed their responses in either direction, such that when witnessing the incivility, they may have felt that it was more socially desirable to help or punish the confederate actors, or in contrast, they may have failed to respond because they were unsure whether responding was socially acceptable. In Study 2, although participation was online, it is possible that social desirability affected responses, particularly with regards to deviance and ostracism. Deviance and ostracism are considered undesirable behaviours, and as such, even if participants are inclined to engage in these behaviours, they may have been hesitant to report it. However, these concerns for responding in certain ways are consistent with a genuine workplace setting in which witnesses take a risk by choosing to respond to mistreatment in a manner that they believe is acceptable.

Conclusion

Despite the recent research attention to workplace incivility, we know very little about witness reactions. It is important to address this gap because incivility occurs within a social context, and witnesses have a potentially significant role in influencing target outcomes. These two studies examine witness responses both theoretically and practically. Study 1 examined genuine in-person responses in relation to target competence, but at the expense of testing the mechanisms through which these responses operate. Study 2, on the other hand, tested a theoretical model, but by compromising generalizability to a real-life setting. Together, the findings from this research can inform us with regards to why, how, and under what circumstances witnesses react in constructive and destructive ways. Furthermore, it is the hope that this research can help organizations and individuals to anticipate and identify effective responses to cope with, and forestall, further mistreatment.

Table 1

Study means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for Study 1

	M (SD)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Target Competence	1.51 (.50)	-									
2. Points Allocation (Perp)	.79 (1.19)	.03	-								
3. Points Allocation (Target)	1.08 (1.02)	.29**	.20*	-							
4. Visual Feedback (Perp)	.14 (1.70)	.06	.25**	.08	-						
5. Visual Feedback (Target)	.53(1.59)	.05	-.05	.20*	.19*	-					
6. Smile feedback (Perp)	4.11(1.64)	.01	.57**	-.07	.37**	.15	-				
7. Smile feedback (Target)	4.77 (1.39)	.44**	-.07	.62**	.04	.31**	-.04	-			
8. Target likability	3.14 (.93)	.43**	-.09	.58**	.06	.34**	-.05	.4**	-		
9. Confederate sex	1.51 (.50)	-.04	.16	.07	.17	.15	.10	.07	.06	-	
10. Witness sex	1.53 (.50)	-.10	-.09	-.05	-.21	-.00	-.03	-.06	-.04	-.09	-

Note: *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

Table 2

Descriptive statistics by condition for Study 1

Condition	Point allocation (p)	Point allocation (t)	Smile feedback (p)	Smile feedback (t)	Visual feedback (p)	Visual feedback (t)
Competent target (n = 55)	.73 (1.18)	1.38 (.81)	4.13 (1.64)	5.39 (1.12)	.23 (1.76)	.65 (1.59)
Incompetent target (n=29)	.83 (1.21)	.79 (1.11)	4.09 (1.65)	4.17 (1.37)	.05 (1.67)	.45 (159)

Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
Note: Point allocation max = 2, min = -2. Smile feedback max = 7, min = 1. Visual feedback max = 5, min = -5.

Table 3

Study 2 means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for Study 2

	M (SD)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Competence	.50 (.50)	-														
2. Justification	2.35 (.75)	-.24*	-													
3. Moral outrage	3.57 (.69)	.26**	-.54**	-												
4. State emp	3.34 (.72)	.27**	-.56**	.68**	-											
5. Moral ID	3.75 (.48)	-.07	-.03	.03	.17	-										
6. Trait emp	4.35 (.72)	-.06	.01	.07	.17	.54**	-									
7. Confront	3.37 (.77)	.12	-.38**	.54**	.40**	.02	.05	-								
8. Deviance	1.55 (.55)	.05	.11	.11	.1	-.23*	-.18	-.03	-							
9. Ostracism	1.76 (.74)	-.02	.08	.05	.09	-.31**	-.23*	.02	.56**	-						
10. Aff. supp	3.16 (.62)	.29**	-.38**	.50**	.61**	.20*	.22*	.48**	.12	.16	-					
11. Instr. supp	3.64 (.68)	.11	-.20*	.33**	.35**	.28**	.24**	.31**	-.15	-.09	.37**	-				
12. OCB	2.81 (.62)	.25*	-.26**	.47**	.42**	.01	-.02	.42**	.08	.10	.61**.	.38**	-			
13. Minimize	2.60 (.76)	-.05	.42**	-.26**	-.41**	-.09	-.09	-.41**	.16	.05	-.26**	-.06	-21*	-		
14. Liking	3.21 (.73)	.50**	-.42**	.29**	.38**	.12	.02	.18	.04	-.07	.46**	.13	.39*	-.09	-	
15. Target Sex	1.50 (.50)	.03	-.13	.06	.09	-.02	.08	-.09	-.09	-.02	-.01	.06	-.02	.02	-.07	-

Note: *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

Table 4

Summary of findings

Hypothesis	Mediator/Moderator	DV	Operationalization	Result
H1a	-	Perpetrator punishment	Point allocation/visual feedback	Unsupported
H1b	-	Perpetrator confrontation	Confrontation measure	Unsupported
H1c	-	Target aiding	Point allocation/visual feedback	Supported
H1d	-	Passivity	Minimization measure	Unsupported
*H2a	Moral outrage	Perpetrator punishment	Ostracism/deviance measures	Unsupported
*H2b	Moral outrage	Perpetrator confrontation	Confrontation measure	Supported
*H2c	Moral outrage	Target aiding	OCB, instrumental and affective measures	Supported
*H2d	Moral outrage	Passivity	Minimization measure	Unsupported
*H3a	State empathy	Perpetrator punishment	Ostracism/deviance measures	Partially supported
*H3b	State empathy	Perpetrator confrontation	Confrontation measure	Supported
*H3c	State empathy	Target aiding	OCB, instrumental and affective measures	Supported
*H3d	State empathy	Passivity	Minimization measure	Supported
H4	Moral identity	Justification	SIMI measure	Significant in opposite direction
H5	Trait empathy	Justification	Empathy measure	Significant in opposite direction

Note: All hypotheses share target competence as an independent variable.
*Hypotheses include justification as first mediator



Figure 1. Indirect effect of target competence on confrontation in Study 2. All solid lines indicate a statistically significant relationship, and all dotted lines indicate a nonsignificant relationship, at the .05 level. Mediation tested using Haye's PROCESS macro (Model 6), and moderation tested using Model 1. Confidence intervals below figures are associated with indirect relationship of IV on DV through serial mediators. Confidence intervals for the paths between individual variables can be found in results section for Study 2. Betas above the line between IV and DV indicate total effects, and betas below the line indicate direct effects.



Figure 2. Indirect effect of target competence on affective support in Study 2.



Figure 3. Indirect effect of target competence on instrumental support in Study 2.



Figure 4. Indirect effect of target competence on organizational citizenship behaviour in Study 2.



Figure 5. Indirect effect of target competence on passivity in Study 2. Moral outrage n.s., and thus not shown.



Figure 6. The moderating effect of moral identity.



Figure 7. The moderating effect of trait empathy.

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Appendix 1

Competent condition is in bold.
Incompetent condition is in italics.
Experimenter/perpetrator dialogue in regular font (consistent across conditions).

Experimenter: [Describes instructions for study and assigns roles].
Idea generators, your question to answer is: How can this food truck company, who is competing with all the other food services on campus, be successful at the U of M? What should they do to attract people to their business? Please come up with five ideas on your own, write them down on the paper provided, and then share with the other generator and discuss your ideas. Do you understand your role?
Target: Got it.
Target: I don't really get it.
Perpetrator: [Laughs]
Experimenter: It will make more sense when you look at the paper on the table. There is an article about food trucks, and some graphs about the food truck company. Take a few minutes to read through the article out loud, so that the evaluators have a chance to hear the information, and think up ideas on how to improve the market share of the food truck among young adults. OK?
T: Yup.
T: [looks confused] I guess.
P: [laughs again]
target reads article out loud
[Target mispronounces word in article. Perpetrator laughs.]
T: Okay, sounds like we're supposed to brain storm some marketing ideas.
P: Yup.

[Target and perpetrator work individually on their own for a few minutes, writing down approximately five points, and referring to the information sheet provided. In the incompetent condition, the target does not write any ideas and looks around the room aimlessly. In the competent condition, he/she focuses and writes several ideas].

T: Okay, are you ready?
T: Um… are you… ready?
P: Yup.
T: Okay, well I'm a marketing major so that should help.
T: Okay, well I'm a marketing major but I have no idea how that will that will help with this.
P: [laughs]
T: [laughs uncomfortably] Okay, so let's look at this chart they've given us. This chart is showing the market trends by product and by age for food trucks in Winnipeg.
T: [laughs kind of stupidly like "yeah I know I'm an idiot"] Ok, so let's take a look at this chart they've given us. I don't understand this chart. Is it showing the market trends by product?
P: The arrow is going up for young adults. Looks like they're buying more crappy food than healthy food… not really a surprise.

T: Yes, it looks that way. Since they want to set up a food truck on campus, I wonder if the food truck could try to appeal to the Generation Y'ers to try to sell more healthy options. That might increase their sales.
T: Arrow is going up so isn't it the other way around…oh no, never mind. Yeah, it looks that way I guess. I wonder if the food truck could like, I don't know, try selling healthy food. For like… what are they called… Generation Y…. or X? …Z? Could be worth a shot to increase profits? Or was it market share? I don't really know the difference.
P: (starts getting slightly annoyed) Ok, so, they're selling mostly junk food, and you think they should… sell more health food options. (seems unimpressed)
T: [Looks at list of ideas for inspiration] Yeah, you're probably right. They are trying to increase sales to their target market and it seems like they don't carry much good food. It's all chips and pop and candy. But, in our marketing class we learned about health trends taking over the younger generation. University students are a lot more health conscious than they might have been even five or ten years ago. But on campus there's a big age range. There's students, professors, visitors. Since the food truck wants to sell on campus, it seems as though they might increase sales if they just increase their variety of products, by including both healthy and unhealthy options, which would target this portion of the market.
T: Yeah, you're probably right. They are trying to increase sales to their target market and it seems like they don't have much good food. It's all chips and pop and candy. But, in our marketing class we learned about health trends... I think. But on campus there's a big age range. There's students, professors, visitors. Since the food truck wants to sell on campus, it seems as though they might increase sales if they just increase their variety of products, by including both healthy and unhealthy options… so I guess they should target this portion of the market?
P: But… the junk food is selling. What portion of the market do you mean? Okay, whatever. I think they should consider giving discounts to students or provide a loyalty card…like every 10th meal is free or something. It will increase loyalty and awareness.
T: Good idea. And it will also encourage people to go back.
R: Good idea. So… I guess… maybe it will also encourage people to go back?
P: Yeah.
T: There's also so few options for food on campus. We're pretty isolated. What we do have is all pizza, subs, and fries. If this food truck could offer something different, like maybe Mexican… tacos, enchiladas, burritos… or even Middle Eastern food, falafels, donairs…
T: There's also so few options for food on campus. We're pretty isolated. What we do have is all pizza, subs, and fries. Maybe they should sell… something different.
P: Okaaay… I agree that we're pretty isolated. But if students like pizza and stuff, how do you figure a food truck company that doesn't have any of that will make money?
T: Not everyone will want different kinds of food, but there's enough students on campus that I think offering a different type of food could be a hit. The school already sells a lot of boring, tasteless wraps and sandwiches, but-
T: Not everyone will want different kinds of food, but there's enough students on campus that I think offering a different type of food… I don't know. The school already sells a lot of boring, tasteless wraps and sandwiches…?
P: [interrupts] But I thought you just said the problem with campus food is that there aren't any healthy options.

T: Well, these are just ideas. Like I said, one idea could be to increase healthy food options for this food truck. Maybe that could mean offering good tasting healthy food like soups, big salads, vegetarian bean and rice bowls. Another idea could be to offer a different type of food, beyond burgers and fries.
T: Well, these are just ideas. Like I said, one idea could be to increase healthy food options for this food truck…. Like salads? Maybe that could mean offering good tasting healthier food like… oh I don't know... Another idea could be to... oh never mind, I can't think of anything else.
P: [sighs] I don't think people are really going to buy a salad when they could buy fries at the same food truck. Can I give another idea?
T: Um, sure.
T: Um, sure.
P. The food truck should be open later hours, so that students have somewhere to get food when they're on campus late, studying. Students want to grab a quick meal when they're on campus, but nothing is open late.
T: Right, so you're thinking the food truck should capitalize on what it already knows people want.
T: Right, so… I don't really get it…. Do you mean that the food truck should… capitalize on what it already knows people want?
P: Yup. [looks down at page disinterestedly]
T: Well, I think we might be done. We've come up with some good ideas.
T: Ok well… that's all I've got.
P: [laughs]
T: We're done then.
T: Are we done? We've maybe come up with some… okay ideas.
P: Yeah, maybe… Maybe you guys can come up with better ideas than, like, Mexican food…
[generators get up to go get the researcher, leave the room]

Appendix 2

Pilot test results

A paired-samples T-test was conducted to compare attractiveness and perceived competence of female and male actors before running the study.

For female actors, there was a non-significant difference between ratings of attractiveness, $t(31) = .80$, $p = .43$, (M(actor 1) = 7.5, SD = 1.24; M(actor 2) = 7.31, SD = 1.38) and competence, $t(31) = -.80$, $p = .43$, (M(actor 1) = 6.94, SD = 1.29; M(actor 2) = 7.10, SD = 1.68).

For male actors, there was a non-significant difference between ratings of attractiveness, $t(24) = .26$, $p = .80$, (M(actor 1) = 5.56, SD = 1.50; M(actor 2) = 5.48, SD = 1.90) and competence, $t(24) = - .50$, $p = .63$, (M(actor 1) = 6.30, SD = 1.27; M(actor 2) = 6.41, SD = 1.34).

Appendix 3

Smile Feedback


















Appendix 4

Competent resume

TAYLOR JONES RESUME
Troy Avenue
Toronto, ON ### ###
(555) 555-5555
#####@yahoo.com

EDUCATION:

Lake University, Newton, ON
Bachelor of Arts (Honour's), May 2009

- Major: Social Work. Minor: Community Health
- Overall GPA: 3.8/4

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Toronto Care Facilities, Toronto, ON **09/2010 – 01/2012**
Community Health Director

- Interviewed and hired facility managers, care-givers and social workers
- Coordinated care-giving activities
- Managed a network of 30 local care facilities including, managers, staff, and counselors

Lake University Student Care Advisor, Newton, ON **08/2007 – 5/2009**
Financial Counselor

- Counseled and supported students with school-related problems
- Provided advice and care for students in need of emotional support
- Developed university social justice and student care policies

REFERENCES AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST

Incompetent resume

TAYLOR JONES RESUME
Troy Avenue
Toronto, ON ### ###
(555) 555-5555
#####@yahoo.com

EDUCATION:

Lake University, Newton, ON
Bachelor of Arts, May 2009

- Major: Social Work. Minor: Community Health
- Overall GPA: 2.8/4

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Toronto Care Facilities, Toronto, ON **09/2010 – 01/2012**
Community Health Director

- Interviewed and hired facility managers, care-givers and social workers
- Coordinated care-giving activities
- Managed a network of 30 local care facilities including, managers, staff, and counselors

Lake University Student Care Advisor, Newton, ON **08/2007 – 5/2009**
Financial Counselor

- Counseled and supported students with school-related problems
- Provided advice and care for students in need of emotional support
- Developed university social justice and student care policies

REFERENCES AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST

Appendix 5

Competent – female

This afternoon, you, Taylor and Alex are working on a project together. Everyone has been asked to prepare a number of slogans to bring to the table. Taylor briefly presents a number of interesting and applicable ideas that she generated while preparing for the meeting. It is clear that Taylor has taken the time to prepare for the meeting and that she has a good grasp of the task at hand. After brainstorming about 20 slogans for a new marketing campaign, the team decides to narrow down the ideas. Taylor starts by recommending three slogans as the best of the bunch.

Alex says to Taylor, “it seems like you just picked your own three slogans! What makes you think you know what is best for this campaign?” You notice that at least one of the slogans was not Taylor’s. Alex continues to cast glances at Taylor, and laughs at slogan #2, which was one of Taylor’s ideas. Alex declares it a “stupid” slogan that will be ineffective. Alex instead proposes a different slogan. The three of you agree to replace slogan #2 with the new slogan and the team begins to prepare a pitch to your boss for each slogan.

Incompetent – female

This afternoon, you, Taylor and Alex are working on a project together. Everyone has been asked to prepare a number of slogans to bring to the table. Taylor presents a couple of uninteresting and inapplicable ideas, which she briefly describes. It is clear that Taylor has not taken the time to prepare for the meeting and that she does not have a good grasp of the task at hand. After brainstorming about 20 slogans for a new marketing campaign, the team decides to narrow down the ideas. Taylor starts by recommending three slogans as the best of the bunch.

Alex says to Taylor, “it seems like you just picked your own three slogans! What makes you think you know what is best for this campaign?” You notice that at least one of the slogans was not Taylor’s. Alex continues to cast glances at Taylor, and laughs at slogan #2, which was one of Taylor’s ideas. Alex declares it a “stupid” slogan that will be ineffective. Alex instead proposes a different slogan. The three of you agree to replace slogan #2 with the new slogan and the team begins to prepare a pitch to your boss for each slogan.

Appendix 6

Measures

Minimization items (Cortina & Magley, 2009)

1. Tell yourself it wasn't important
2. Just try to forget it
3. Just ignore it
4. Assume the person meant no harm/meant well

Workplace Ostracism Scale (Ferris et al., 2008)

1. Others ignored you at work.
2. Others left the area when you entered.
3. Your greetings have gone unanswered at work.
4. You involuntarily sat alone in a crowded lunchroom at work.
5. Others avoided you at work.
6. You noticed others would not look at you at work.
7. Others at work shut you out of the conversation.
8. Others refused to talk to you at work.
9. Others at work treated you as if you weren't there.
10. Others at work did not invite you or ask you if you wanted anything when they went out for a coffee break.
11. You have been included in conversations at work (reverse coded)._
12. Others at work stopped talking to you._
13. You had to be the one to start a conversation in order to be social at work._

Workplace Deviance Scale (Bennett & Robinson, 2000)

Interpersonal Deviance

1. Made fun of someone at work
2. Said something hurtful to someone at work
3. Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark at work
4. Cursed at someone at work
5. Played a mean prank on someone at work
6. Acted rudely toward someone at work
7. Publicly embarrassed someone at work

Organizational Citizenship Behaviour – Checklist (Fox et al., 2009)

1. Helped co-worker with personal matter such as moving, childcare, car problems, etc.
2. Covered a co-worker's mistake
3. Lent a compassionate ear when someone had a work problem
4. Bought Girl Scout cookies or other fundraising items from a co-worker (or their child)
5. Lent a compassionate ear when someone had a personal problem

6. Lent money to a co-worker
7. Lent car or other personal property o co-worker
8. Changed vacation schedule, work days, or shifts to accommodate co-worker's needs
9. Helped a less capable co-worker lift a heavy box or other object
10. Brought candy, doughnuts, snacks, or drinks for co-workers
11. Gave a written or verbal recommendation for a co-worker
12. Went out of the way to give co-worker encouragement or express appreciation
13. Defended a co-worker who was being "put down" or spoken ill of by other co-workers or supervisor

Instrumental/Affective Support Scale (Ducharme & Martin, 2000)

Affective support:

1. Your coworkers really care about you
2. You feel close to your coworkers
3. Your coworkers take a personal interest in you
4. You feel appreciated by your coworkers
5. Your coworkers are friendly to you

Instrumental support:

1. Your coworkers would fill you in while you're absent
2. Your coworkers are helpful in getting job done
3. Your coworkers give useful advice on job problems
4. Your coworkers assist with unusual work problems
5. Your coworkers will pitch in and help

Deontic Justice Scale - Moral outrage items (Beugre, 2012)

1. I feel sad when I see others being unfairly treated.
2. It bothers me when I see that others are not fairly treated.
3. I feel saddened by injustices done to others.
4. I am concerned by unfairness done to others.

Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002)

1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.
2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am.
3. A big part of my emotional well-being is tied up in having these characteristics
4. I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics.
5. Having these characteristics is not really important to me.
6. Having these characteristics is an important part of my sense of self.
7. I strongly desire to have these characteristics.
8. I often buy products that communicate the fact that I have these characteristics
9. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics

10. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these characteristics.
11. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these characteristics
12. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my membership in certain organizations=
13. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these characteristics

Reysen Likability Scale (2005)

1. This person is friendly.
2. This person is likable.
3. This person is warm.
4. This person is approachable.
5. I would like this person as a coworker.
6. I would like this person as a roommate.
7. I would like to be friends with this person.
8. This person is physically attractive.
9. This person is similar to me.
10. This person is knowledgeable.

Fitzgerald Coping Responses to Harassment Scale (Fitzgerald, 1990)

1. I would tell them to stop mistreating this person.
2. I would stand up stand up to them on behalf of this person
3. I would make clear that they are out of line.

State empathy (adapted from Interpersonal Reactivity Index, Davis, 1980)

1) I felt like of protective toward _____.
2) I didn't feel very much pity for _____.
3) I felt tender concern for _____.
4) _____'s misfortune did not disturb me a great deal.

Trait empathy (adapted from Davis, 1983)

1. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective of them.
2. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.
3. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.
4. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.
5. Sometimes I don't feel sorry for other people when they are having problems.
6. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.
7. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.

Justification (self constructed scale)

1. I can imagine that Alex had good reason to treat Taylor that way.

2. Alex's behaviour toward Taylor was justified.
3. Alex treated Taylor the way Taylor probably deserved to be treated.