Civil-Military Relations: The Case of Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis

By

Bill E Featherstone

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Abstract

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was an unprecedented event and turning point during the Cold War. This thesis examines the relatively unknown Canadian military involvement in the crisis, and why it has remained so for the past fifty-eight years. Canadian reaction and involvement centres around the hours after President John F. Kennedy's television address to the world on October 22nd, 1962, as the United States (US) military went into defense readiness condition three (DEFCON 3) alert, where 5 is 'normal', and 1 indicates 'nuclear war is imminent'.

The complication and nexus of this thesis, starts when the Canadian Minister of National Defence (MND) Doug Harkness, went to Prime Minister (PM) John G. Diefenbaker to request a comparable alert status for Canadian Forces, and was denied. Harkness subsequently advised his Chairman (CCOS) and the three service military chiefs (COS) to 'quietly' prepare, as he continued for the next two and one-half days to seek authority to match the American alert status. Diefenbaker finally agreed to match the US military alert status on October 24th, 1962, after they went to DEFCON 2, but he only agreed to match DEFCON 3.

Since then, Harkness has been continuously scapegoated for putting the military on full alert without authority. This became the alleged breakdown in civil-military relations (CMR) that appears to have also tainted the Canadian military. There is little to substantiate an actual breach of CMR here, other than at the highest levels of military leadership.

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Preface and Acknowledgements

This work is the culmination of many years wondering about the silence and controversy surrounding Canadian involvement in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, and what actually happened. A disclosure for this thesis is required. This author's personal involvement during the crisis as a Sonar Operator in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) on board HMCS Kootenay DDE 258, an anti-submarine destroyer escort must be mentioned. Sometime in the Spring of 1962, Kootenay, part of the 5th Canadian Escort Squadron consisting of five destroyers, was under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) duty orders. This was a consortium of various NATO allies that devoted parts of their respective fleets, from a six month to one-year rotational commitment. All of these ships maintained an eight-hour sailing notice with limited shore leaves during their duty period. In late September and into October 1962, Kootenay and other available RCN ships had just completed an intense NATO simulation, Exercise FALLEX,[1] which included elements of the United States Navy (USN). The express purpose was to "test the ability of NATO and National Command to operate efficiently under conditions of transition from peace to war involving nuclear attack."[2]

On the 23rd of October 1962, the morning after President Kennedy's speech, all available operational vessels of the RCN began to prepare for what appeared to be a possible war. On the 25th of October at 10:00 local time, the fleet went to four-hours sailing notice, provisioned and armed.

[1] Haydon, Peter T. (1993). *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*. Toronto, ON: Canadian Printco Ltd. (p. 270).
[2] Ibid., (p. 95).

The Canadian military had just gone to the equivalent of US DEFCON 3.[3] (See Table 1)

At about 12:00 (18:00Z[4]) local time, we sailed and proceeded to station off the coast of Nova Scotia and the Eastern Seaboard of the United States.[5] This was an unprecedented situation and everyone was seriously concerned about the final outcome. We were at sea tracking Soviet submarines up and down the Eastern Seaboard of the North Atlantic until the end of November, except for an intermediate short period of about five hours to re-fuel and provision the ship in Halifax. Everyone knew the gravity of the situation. It resembled to the many exercises we had done over the years to prepare for war.

Closed up in the Sonar Control Room (SCR) in the fall of 1962, we listened intensely for the return echo from the hull of our target submarine, or the distinct buzz of a torpedo. Thankfully, there was never the latter. We had many Soviet submarine contacts, a mere 30-50 miles off the coast of Nova Scotia during those months of October and November. From the preceding months since basic training in 1960 and throughout the Cold War, we were in almost constant anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises, or actual surveillance. These tasks in the SCR had become second nature. We had detected many unknown contacts prior to the crisis, but knowing allied traffic at the time, one suspected they may be Soviet, but never this close to the North American East coast. These contacts were very different and there was little doubt of their origin. Our main task was surveillance and tracking Soviet submarines off the Canadian and American coast to enable the USN to fulfill their function enforcing the naval blockade of Cuba

[3] The Canadian equivalent to DEFCON 3 is 'Ready' State of Vigilance. The circumstances around this and the War Books became a critical point in the state of CMR and is central to the argument of this thesis.
[4] Z or Zulu time is Greenwich Mean Time, which is a military standard.
[5] Haydon, Peter T. (1993). *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered.* Toronto, ON: Canadian Printco Ltd. (p. 142). See also Doc 3, 4 & 6, CANCOMARLANT Signals, (pp. 242-243, 245). As noted above, all times in official communication are given in 'Zulu'.

in the Caribbean. These explicit functions were tasks in which both countries had expertise and multiple hours of exercise perfecting under the auspices of NATO.

After the crisis ended, and the autumn of 1962 turned into the winter, and the following months into years, it was as if nothing had happened. The silence in Canada was deafening. After a few years it became a faded memory and at times one wondered if it had been real. There was a feeling amongst those of us who had been participants, that the whole affair had become hushed up, but for reasons that were unclear. The situation went from the highest of intensity to absolute quiet. Sometime around 2002-2004, it started to become common knowledge among those of us who still cared that those submarines we had been chasing had nuclear tipped torpedoes.[6] Canada had no nuclear weapons at that time. Who knows what the reaction of Canadians might have been had they known. More importantly, would the Canadian forces have been appropriately and expediently armed? From time to time, certain events related to the crisis and the pending nuclear threat at sea we faced still trigger some adverse response in me. These responses have been difficult to deal with at times, but it happens less frequently now as time moves on.

There are three events over the years since the crisis that have persuaded me to pursue this thesis about the Canadian military's involvement in the Cuban missile crisis, especially the RCN's role. The first of these events involved the Captain of HMCS Kootenay during the Fall of 1962, Commander "Pat" Ryan. He was in and out of the SCR constantly during the crisis, checking first-hand the status of suspect submarine contacts. We encountered each other a few years later, after a subsequent posting for both of us to HMCS Gatineau, a sister ship to

6 Haydon, Peter T. (2007). "Canadian Involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis Reconsidered." *The Northern Mariner*. Vol.17 (2), [pp. 39-65], (p. 64). **Also,** McNamara, Robert S. *The Fog of War*. http://freedocumentaries.org/documentary/the-fog-of-war.

Kootenay. In 1965, I left my full-time sea-going duties as a Sonar Operator and secured an opportunity to become an Avionics Technician in the Fleet Air Arm of the RCN. I was based out of HMCS Shearwater, the RCN Naval Air Base, near Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. By this time, the Cuban missile crisis, only three years past, seemed essentially ancient history which no one talked about. In 1964, Commander Ryan (also a Naval pilot) had received his fourth ring, becoming a full Captain, and was posted to HMCS Shearwater as the new base Commanding Officer.

As I took up my new duties at HMCS Shearwater, I recall thinking it a remarkable coincidence that he and I would share three postings in just four years. For the time being, I let it go. One particular afternoon, probably the summer of 1966, returning to VX-10 Squadron hanger after lunch, a staff car pulled up beside me and Ryan stepped out from the back seat. I began looking all over myself to see if something was out of order in my working dress. While I do not recall the exact conversation, we did exchange salutes and Ryan asked me if we had known each other before. He obviously recognized me. I knew where this was going and replied with my rank, name and something to the effect, "Yes sir, SCR on Kootenay, fall 1962 and later on the Gatineau." He acknowledged this and commented, relating how busy and tense it had been during the "Cuban mess," as I recall him referring to the period. He and I had a moment there on the roadway by 'Hanger Row'. A few more words were exchanged: what I was doing now and when I had transferred to the Fleet Air Arm. We saluted, he got back into his staff car and drove away. I never spoke to him again, but often wondered years later what his driver and the other person in the back seat with him thought, or if there was any discussion. I am leaning towards, not that much. Captain David Hugh 'Pat' Ryan passed away at age 79 on 4th December 2002.

The second event was many years later, around 1997 when I came across Commander (Retd) Peter T. Haydon's book, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*.[7] What struck me particularly while reading his account of the crisis was an incident he details from 7th November 1962, when the crisis had been significantly reduced, though still a critical situation. Haydon notes, from previously classified documents, of HMCS Kootenay having sonar contact with a submarine[8] close to a group of Soviet fishing trawlers, 40 miles off Cape Cod. An RCN CS2F Tracker aircraft and a USN P2V Neptune aircraft were in the area and also had contact with the sub. The fishing trawler fleet was a tactic the Soviets used to provide surface support for their submarine fleet, as these were essentially classed as 'civilian' vessels and were able to enter foreign ports for supplies. Shortly after 12:00 pm local time that particular day, two of the trawlers charged Kootenay in an attempt to drive her off the contact.[9]

What ensued I recall vividly, but it took nearly forty years to piece together exactly what happened. I was off watch from the SCR and having a well-deserved break in the cafeteria when all of a sudden everyone in the cafeteria found themselves thrown up against the port bulkhead. Commander Ryan had taken a 'hard starboard' evasive action to avoid an international crisis, beyond the current one, which we were just hoping to get through. Kootenay and the accompanying aircraft maintained contact with the sub. There was something cathartic reading about this incident in his book after having a passing acquaintance with it the first time, three decks below the Bridge, all those many years ago.

[7] Haydon, Peter T. (1993). *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered.* Toronto, ON: Canadian Printco Ltd.
[8] This contact, later de-classified, was disclosed as (Echo) E -58, a Soviet FOXTROT Class patrol submarine.
[9] Haydon, Peter T. (1993). *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*. Toronto, ON: Canadian Printco Ltd. (p. 168).
Haydon's note #41, is the CANCOMARLANT message of the incident and is on page 174 of his book.

His book remains today, the seminal study of Canadian involvement in the crisis. I have been in touch with Peter Haydon recently and am very grateful for his encouragement towards the central topic of this thesis, regarding civil-military relations during the crisis. He has told me in our conversations, he wished he had covered this topic in more depth, but really ran out of time. He seemed pleased that finally someone was taking up the task.

The third event was actually more recent. Rear-Admiral John Newton, Commander Canadian Maritime Forces Atlantic (Halifax) (2013-2017) was giving an address to Fleet staff at an event in 2013, shortly after taking up his post. I read about the event, and his address was posted on the Maritime Command Atlantic web site. He related in that speech about the forgotten 'lost generation' veterans of the Cold War. His comment struck and stirred many memories, as I had never heard of my generation referred to as such. I sent him an email of thanks for not 'forgetting' and related my experiences during the Cold War and the Cuban crisis. He replied a few days later that he had shared my experience with his ailing father, who found some comfort and respite from hearing another old sailors' story. His father was also a 'lost generation' veteran and coincidently was serving on HMCS Swansea, an escort frigate (9th Escort Squadron) during the crisis. Admiral Newton has recently retired, and he and I are in contact from time to time.

There has been a substantial body of work written about the crisis, but from an American, not Canadian perspective. There are differing opinions about the state of the Canadian civil and military commands at the time and yet, much of the detail regarding this period is unknow or just pure conjecture, as most of the principal people have since passed on. It is unclear in much of the Canadian literature about who said what and when it was said. For example, Tony German in *The Sea is at Our Gates,* notes that Vice-Admiral Harry Rayner, Chief of Naval Staff (CNS)

during the paralysis in Ottawa, was only able to tell his Maritime Commander Atlantic, Rear-Admiral Ken Dyer, "…do what you have to do.*"*[10] [11] Whether or not this was the actual conversation between Rayner and Dyer is unclear, but it certainly could be implied.

Admiral Dyer was extremely anxious about the lack of orders from Ottawa. He had only to look out of his Flag Office window to see the Soviet trawler fleet periodically coming into Halifax harbour for supplies.[12] Their support role of the Soviet submarine fleet was well known and understood. He was not about to have his fleet caught in Halifax harbour with a potential war looming in front of him, the ghosts of Pearl Harbor from 1941 were still very clear in every naval commander's mind.[13]

To meet the immediate crisis and perhaps give himself some cover, Dyer simply carried on the Canadian portion of the Joint NATO exercise FALLEX 1962 that the USN had obviously pulled out of. These joint operations were exclusively anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises, and the Canadian portion, labeled MARLEX, could be conducted under Dyer's sole authority.[14] It was deemed, "…just another exercise that went into the books as 'CUBEX'*,*"[15] thus removing any spectre of recognition from the Government of Canada.

The Cuban missile crisis stands out as a significant and critical turning point for nuclear strategic thinking, during the Cold War and since. Two prominent American authors, Graham

[10] German, Tony, Commander RCN (Retd) (1990). *The Sea is at Our Gates*: *The History of The Canadian Navy*. Toronto. ON: McClelland & Stewart Inc. (p. 266). German was the Captain of HMCS Mackenzie during the crisis, however, she was newly commissioned 6th October 1962, and was doing sea trials as the crisis erupted.
[11] Peter Haydon notes in his appendix (p. 271) of German being the Commanding Officer of HMCS Mackenzie during the crisis.
[12] German, Tony, (1990) *The Sea is at our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy.* Toronto. ON: McClelland & Stewart Inc.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Haydon, Peter T. (1993). *1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered.* Toronto, ON: Canadian Printco Ltd.
[15] German, Tony (1990). *The Sea is at our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy*. Toronto. ON: McClelland & Stewart Inc. (p. 273).

Allison and Philip Zelikow wrote the following about the crisis in their book, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis:*

> The Cuban missile crisis stands as a seminal event. History offers no parallel to those thirteen days of October 1962, when the United States and the Soviet Union paused at the nuclear precipice. Never before had there been such a high probability that so many lives would end suddenly.[16]

There are so many people to thank for their assistance and encouragement going forward with this project. What started as a simple thought after my encounter with Captain Pat Ryan in Shearwater in 1966 is now completed. I must thank Commander Peter Haydon, RCN (Retd) for his detail and the insight he has provided regarding Canadian involvement in the crisis, there is no other body of work that chronicles the crisis from such a detailed perspective. Also, thank you to Rear-Admiral John Newton, RCN (Retd) for not 'forgetting'. His words and the relationship he shared with me about his father, enlightened a perspective I had never previously considered. The research of Dr. Brad Gladman and Dr. Peter Archambault regarding the Canadian Government War Books has been most helpful and enlightening.

There are many more people to thank for their help and assistance in this project. My thesis advisor, Dr. James Fergusson has given me so many great ideas regarding structure and has prevented me from going down rabbit holes, thus keeping me focussed on the end project. Asako Yoshida from the Elizabeth Dafoe library and her help with research has been invaluable. The Political Studies Grad Student Committee, Dr. Andrea Rounce, Dr. Andrea Charron, and Dr. Sarah Hannon, and their seemingly endless support for all of us grad students, has been most encouraging. To all of my Professors throughout my venture into academia, a most heartfelt

[16] Allison, Graham & Philip Zelikow, (1999). *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd Edition.* New York, NY: Addison Wesley Longman Inc. (p.1).

thank you. The Political Studies Department Head, Dr. Royce Koop and his staff have been particularly helpful over the last several years of my study, sorting out what was important for me to know, and what was not. To my classmates and colleagues, you have kept me challenged and fooled into thinking I was young again. It has, however, been most invigorating and I am most grateful to you all. Also, the myriad of faceless folks at Library and Archives Canada, who just never give up wanting to assist people.

Lastly but certainly not least, a huge hug and thank you to my wife Dana Beljanic, who has been my rock. I could not have done this without her love and unrelenting support, encouraging me from the very beginning of this venture. She has been with me all the way, often reminding me when it was time to stop, and eat something.

B.E.F.

Introduction

After the televised speech and warning to the Soviet Union from President John F. Kennedy on the 22nd of October 1962, US forces elevated alert to US DEFCON 3 from DEFCON 5. The next question that begs to be answered is: what were the factors that led to the chaos that swept through elements of the Canadian military leadership and the Conservative government leadership of Prime Minister (PM), The Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker in Ottawa at that time? (See Table 1). The chaos noted here during this period was almost exclusively in the halls of Parliament and Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ). In spite of this, the operational forces and particularly the antisubmarine warfare activities off the eastern seaboard of the Atlantic proceeded and were performed without fail.

More specifically, this thesis examines and determines the veracity of the accusations against the Hon. Douglas Harkness, Minister of National Defence (MND) at the time, for putting the military on full alert without formal authority. These accusations have remained as such, and this analysis doubts their validity. These charges go to the heart of what has been alleged over the years as a breakdown in civil-military relations (CMR). Without a doubt, there were issues of CMR during this period, but before examining any alleged concerns, it should be kept in mind, that the essence of CMR is fundamentally maintaining civil control over the military. There is little evidence from the events at the time to suggest that the military had gone rogue, or abdicated their subordination to civil authority.

The examination of these specific concerns is a narrow time frame, from the hours after Kennedy's speech on the 22nd of October until the 24th of October, when Diefenbaker finally allowed the Canadian military to match the US DEFCON 3 alert status. It was not announced, however, until the following day on the 25th of October 1962. The context of the period gives

rise to the following: Was the military acting without civilian control (on their own), or was there an element of formal civilian authority in place for their actions? This thesis concludes that those issues of CMR attributed to the MND Doug Harkness, for directing the military to any notion of alert prior to the PM's approval, are completely incorrect. The majority of culpability rests with the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff (CCOS), Air Marshall Frank Miller and his service chiefs (COS) for their lack of competence regarding the status of the Department of National Defence (DND) War Books. None of this, however, absolves the PM and Cabinet for their lack of inquiry about military capability, or for their lack of visible military support towards the US for two and one-half days.

There has been much written and debated around these principal arguments regarding the Cuban missile crisis and Canadian involvement during the last fifty-eight years. At the time of the crisis, the Canadian military understood their joint operational responsibility in concert with the American military. Both nations had the elements of continental security and defence well exercised and established, and yet for two and one-half days the Canadian forces were unable to bring their alert system to match the US alert status of DEFCON 3.

The insubordination controversy surrounding the crisis for Canada came about when Harkness went to the PM to get permission to match US DEFCON 3.[17] There was some confusion here, which will be discussed further, but ultimately Harkness felt he needed to get the PM's approval first before taking any action. He was summarily refused and perplexed with Diefenbaker's denial. It has been widely asserted that Harkness allegedly put the Canadian

17 Harkness, Hon. Douglas, (1977). "The Harkness Papers." *The Calgary Herald*, October 19th, 1977. https://www.newspapers.com/ (by ancestry)

military on an un-authorized alert until he was able to secure authority for a formal alert. The evidence shows that that allegation is completely incorrect.

The literature has also been mixed on exactly where the fault lay for all the confusion. The preponderance of it stems from un-substantiated opinions from various authors that the DND War Books had been withdrawn for revision and therefore, authority for any provisions within them now required the PM's approval .[18] The *progressive revision* process instituted in 1948 suggests otherwise.[19] The War Books were never intended to be withdrawn but were designed to be left in force until revised and re-issued. Gladman and Archambault contend that neither the civil nor the military leadership completely understood the status of the War Books, or the pending revisions in the Fall of 1962. These proposed revisions were only to clear up some of the language around distinctions of alerts and the circumstances of transition (authority) from one stage to a higher stage.[20]

Unfortunately, since then, Harkness has been an easy target for the allegations against him. His actions have been seen as entirely binary; either scapegoated for insubordination, or praised for bravery by putting the military on alert. The evidence shows that neither is correct. A secondary question, equally important as the first one then arises. Why has the Canadian military and the government been so noticeably silent over all these years about Canadian involvement in the crisis? Has it been a concerted effort to just forget the past, cover up the neglect, or both? Through this silence there has been little to no recognition given to the Canadian soldiers, sailors and air force personnel who were actively involved in the effort to deal with the crisis.

[18] Haydon, Peter, (1993). *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*. Toronto, ON: Canadian Printco Ltd. (pp. 95-96). **Also**: Ghent, Jocelyn M. (1979). "Canada, the United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Pacific Historical Review*. Vol. 48 (1), [pp. 11-32].
[19] LAC, RG 2, Vol. 2750, File: CDC – Vol. VI, "Memo for Cabinet Defence Committee: Gov. War Book." Sep, 1948.
[20] Gladman, Brad & Peter Archambault, (2015), "Advice and Indecision, Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Canadian Military Journal.* Vol. 23 (1), Article 2. [pp. 11-32], (p. 27).

Those harrowing months of October and November 1962 have been documented extensively in the United States. There are multitudes of American published journals, books, documentaries and even a movie, *Thirteen Days.*[21] President Kennedy's brother Robert, who was the American Attorney General at the time, wrote his own striking chronicle of the crisis also called *Thirteen Days*.[22] Documented Canadian participation in the Cuban missile crisis is conspicuous by its absence from most literature, other than from a handful of Canadian authors.

Most of the authorship about Canadian involvement in the Cuban missile crisis is centred around a misleading thesis that the War Books had been withdrawn for revision prior to the crisis. This thesis examines recently obtained literature regarding the War Books and concludes that there is nothing to indicate that they had been withdrawn for revision. In fact, it was just the contrary. The bibliography listed covering all of the subject matter of this thesis is substantial, but not exhaustive. There are *Canadian Hansard* documents from the period that were examined, and key documentation from the *Library and Archives Canada* (LAC) related to the Government War Books of the period.

It should be noted that when Peter Haydon wrote his book, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,* which has been widely quoted on the subject, he also noted that the War Books were not available at that time to the public.[23] The recently acquired LAC documents related to the War Books provide quite a different understanding of what possible action was available for the military during the first 48 hours of the crisis. *The Harkness Papers* written from Harkness' perspective shortly after the crisis, and later published in 1977, are also an important account of

[21] *Thirteen Days, (2000),* https://www.imdb.com/title/tt00000146309/
[22] Kennedy, Robert F. (1968). *Thirteen days: A memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
[23] Haydon, Peter T. (1993). *The Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered.* Toronto, ON: Canadian Printco Ltd. (p. 110). Haydon's footnote #22, "The government war books of that era are not open to the public.".

the events from the critical days, from the 22nd to the 25th of October.[24] Curiously, however, Harkness never mentions the War Books, or their status in any of his subsequent writing.

Canada was inextricably and seamlessly drawn into the conflict by the very bilateral defence agreements it had with the USN. The RCN and the USN had been training extensively for just these express situations since shortly after World War II. The facts of the Canadian military cooperation with the US military on these matters was not unknown or secret, only the content and parameters of the exercises were.

The tensions over the preceding years of the Cuban crisis, since the start of the Cold War (1949) between the Soviet Union and the Western Alliances were palpable. The speech from Kennedy on October 22nd, 1962, seemed to be the culmination of all of these years of tension. It was certainly revealing of the extreme gravity of the Soviet missile threat facing North America, but it was hardly surprising to anyone paying even marginal attention to the events leading up to this point during the Cold War.

Chapter One examines Civil-Military Relations in theory, from early history and the development of the officer corps in the armies of Europe from the 17th Century onwards. It details some of the conventional theories of CMR, as they have applied to successive Western militaries up to the end of World War II. Any serious discussion about CMR has to include, as a basis, the work of Samuel P. Huntington.[25] This chapter details Huntington and beyond, as it examines other theorists and some of their work. It is important to understand the theory of CMR and how these relationships should function, to understand what occurs when they

[24] Harkness, Hon. Douglas, (1977). "The Harkness Papers." *The Calgary Herald* and simultaneously in *The Ottawa Citizen*, October 19, 20, 21 & 22, 1977. https://www.newspapers.com/ (by ancestry).
[25] Huntington, Samuel P. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Inc.

breakdown. To analyse the breakdown that occurred with Canadian CMR in the Fall of 1962 requires some basic theory and understanding, to compare against this uniquely Canadian case.

The basics of CMR absolutely imply subordination of the military to a legal, civil authority. The civilian leadership should have an expectation that the military leadership will be sensitive to the political imperatives of any given current situation. Concurrently, the military leadership should also have a similar expectation that the political leadership will exhibit a high degree of executive competence with any decisions regarding military engagement. In this regard, one concern is whether or not the actions from the 23rd to the 25th of October under Rear-Admiral Ken Dyer of the Maritime Command Atlantic constituted a violation of CMR. Dyer was merely continuing the Canadian portion of the FALLEX Exercise, with complete and full authority, as the USN had recently dropped out. There is little to suggest a breakdown of CMR here.

Chapter Two begins the examination of the Cuban Missile Crisis in general terms. There has been such a plethora of literature about this period, it would not serve any useful purpose to simply re-hash all the current literature. However, this chapter begins with a short history about the US and Cuban relationship since the late 19th Century and how that underpinned the tensions leading up to the crisis, that continues in some measure today. The Cuban, American and the Soviet Union interactions in the region provides a more global perspective of the beginnings of the crisis. Much of this context was derived from the current American historical perspective.

The Canadian context for the Cuban crisis is the fundamental basis for this thesis. As such, this section is rather extensive, as it details the Canadian political response and the military action resulting from the Cuban crisis. This became a domestic crisis unto itself. The rather

unknown intervention of Howard Green, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and his embassy staff in Havana during the crisis, is covered here. Green had developed some serious concerns about the Cuban embracement of Soviet communism. External Affairs and the Canadian Embassy in Havana played a critical role during the crisis, providing surveillance of Soviet movements on the island.

As a background to the overall context, this chapter also examines the history of one of the more specific political and military relationships that Canada entered into in 1957-58, the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).[26] Critical to this examination is Diefenbaker's conflation of NORAD being a function of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO). This association was central later to his issues with Kennedy about not being sufficiently consulted prior to the crisis.

NORAD did not have an easy evolution. Since the end of the Second World War, there was always the thought in Canada and the US, that some form of continental defence was essential. Technology in aviation alone meant that North America would never again have the advantage of vast oceans acting as a buffer. The threat of a Soviet air attack with nuclear bombs over the Arctic became increasingly concerning with the development and enhancement of nuclear technology. NORAD's existence was the outcome of these concerns.

To better understand Canadian reaction during the crisis, chapter two returns to the beginning days of the Diefenbaker administration in 1957. The election, succession and transition from the Liberal government of Louis St Laurent to the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker, was not without considerable issues. This was the first Conservative government the country had elected since R.B. Bennett in 1930. Although Diefenbaker had been

[26] The NORAD title was changed to North American ***Aerospace*** Defense Command in March 1981, to better reflect the realities of evolving technology.

in elected office since 1940, he had no experience in government or leadership. This became the birth, if not the expansion, of Diefenbaker's angst with the military, and particularly the US.[27] Among many other issues with transition, one in particular had major complications. To receive the fully drafted bi-national NORAD agreement to sign, having not been privy to the substantive consultations was problematic. There is ample evidence that Diefenbaker was particularly unhappy, confused or both about what NORAD meant to Canada-US relations. His primary concern seemed to be a perceived loss of Canadian sovereignty. He and his eventual (1959) Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green both had a very convoluted perception of how NORAD and NATO interacted.[28]

It became clear very quickly during the early days of transition, that regardless of what strategy of war was ultimately decided, it was imperative to have some early warning capabilities. This meant radar surveillance on Canadian soil.[29] The NATO alliance between the US and Canada was a critical, legal element in the formation of NORAD in 1957-58 and more importantly, the later issue of joint prosecution of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The complications of NORAD and the lack of a clear, unequivocal commitment from the Canadian government about nuclear weapons put a tremendous strain on the Canada-US (CANUS) relationship.

Defence agreements and alliances between the US and Canada, were not new. They went back as far as the original Treaty of Washington concluded in 1871.[30] A successful reparation

[27] Robinson, H. Basil, (1989). *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs.* Toronto. ON: University of Toronto Press.
Basil Robinson was a career civil servant in Dept of External Affairs starting in 1945, until assigned as special liaison officer to the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) in August 1957. He served there until his appointment in 1962 to Washington, DC, as Deputy head of mission at the Canadian Embassy.
[28] Jockel, Joseph, T. (1987). *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958.* Vancouver, BC: University of BC Press, (pp. 105-117).
[29] Ibid.
[30] Not to be confused with the later 'North Atlantic Treaty' also often referred to as the Treaty of Washington, 1949.

agreement against the United Kingdom (UK) for damages during the American Civil War (1860-1865) was finally agreed to. This treaty, although not a defence or alliance agreement in similar terms as NORAD/NATO, did formalize peaceful relations between the UK and the US, and more importantly, Canada and the US.[31] The framework and experience of alliance building between the two countries has had a long history and became the backbone of the NORAD agreement. Although not an integral function of NORAD, the USN and the RCN, through their NATO alliance guidelines, had in 1962, and still have a unique, overall military relationship that functions in concert with other NATO nations and all joint agreements.

The Cuban Missile Crisis and Canada is covered in more detail in *Chapter Three*. The Canadian War Books are critical to the discussion of CMR in Canada throughout this thesis and are covered in some detail in this chapter. The War Books' issue raised the notion of a CMR breakdown during the crisis, posited by numerous authors, that they had to be withdrawn for revision. There is little to substantiate this notion, and this is a subject of considerable focus.

The Harkness papers are also covered in this chapter. As a first hand accounting of what occurred during the first forty-eight hours, they are crucial to understanding his perspective, as Harkness sought for two and one-half days to secure an equivalent alert status with the US from the PM. His interaction with the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff (CCOS), Air Marshall Frank Miller and the chronology of the events that becomes apparent is detailed.

Some of the narrative of the crisis from a few other authors is discussed in this chapter. Their positions on Canadian involvement in the crisis are detailed here also. It is remarkable, when contrasted with the facts, how much of what they have to say is completely wrong. The

[31] Messamore, Barbara J. (2004). "Diplomacy or Duplicity? Lord Lisgar, John A. Macdonald and the Treaty of Washington, 1871." *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History.* Vol. 32 (2), [pp. 29-53].

chapter ends with an overview of Maritime Command (MARCOM) Atlantic and Pacific and the operations being carried out during the first few days of the crisis, and after the PM's release to match US DEFCON 3 , with the Canadian equivalent 'Ready' State of vigilance on the 25th of October.

Chapter Four is the conclusion of this work and examines the aftermath of the crisis, the lessons learned, and why it is still important to examine those harrowing moments during the Cold War after all these years. "It has been said, that those who do not learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat its mistakes. The Cuban Missile Crisis remains a great case study of Canadian civil-military relations…"[32]

All of this was occurring during a significant period of change in Canadian defence administration policy, that from the available literature, appears to have complicated matters considerably. This was the waning period of the 'Command Era' style of defence administration that had been around since the end of World War II. It emphasized military (command) concepts of decision making, with clear distinctions between command and administration. It emphasized a heavy reliance on command experience in the design and execution of government policy. Around 1957 and the Diefenbaker election, policy started giving way to the new 'Management Era' of defence administration. This was a structured process, based essentially on scientific management; a new concept drawn from civilian business models. Fundamentally, this was designed to replace the military function of decision making, with a civilian structure, that was organized with concepts of functional unity and business management theories.

[32] Haydon, Peter, (2012). "The Cuban Missile Crisis 50 Years Later." *Canadian Naval Review*. Vol. 8 (3), [pp. 10-14], (p. 14).

Canadian CMR in the context of the Cuban missile crisis is also examined here. The basis and placement of the break-down in Canadian CMR during the crisis was not that succinct, or easy to place. The reality regarding the state and functionality of Canadian civil and military command during the crisis, have a rather complicated aspect. The autonomous service command structure at the time under the CCOS did not support a joint command and control mechanism. A joint command and control process was not implemented until after the Pearson Liberals came to power in 1963 and the published *1964 White Paper on Defence* by MND Paul Hellyer. The dysfunction noted likely accounts for differing opinions about the placement of blame for the chaos, and possibly some of the un-substantiated claims of the War Book status and ultimately CMR breakdown.

In retrospect, it appears that Diefenbaker was more concerned with Kennedy the person, than the seriousness of assisting in the defence of North America, or indeed the salvation of humankind. The Canadian civil leadership (Cabinet) finally realized the seriousness of the situation, although most of them initially had expressed an underlying view of American exaggeration of the events. Concurrent with that at least half of the Diefenbaker cabinet, including the PM, were obsessed with what they perceived to be Kennedy's lack of consultation with Canada about US plans in the prosecution of the crisis. These obsessions began to decrease as the tension increased and the seriousness of what was occurring started to take hold. By the 23rd of October, the entire cabinet appeared to be solidly behind Harkness, except Diefenbaker. The military leadership, on the other hand, appeared to be frozen with indecision.

Douglas Bland points out that the changing defence policies initiated in the late 1950s placed both military and civilian principles in policy decision making positions, "…it [became]

unclear who was superior to whom."[33] The Diefenbaker and subsequent Pearson governments both sought to have more control of the military, which was thought to be far too command oriented. The new management style of defence administration certainly promised to provide that desired change. As time would show, however, these new policies tended to go too far. In their infancy, as the crisis was looming, there was simply insufficient time for effective implementation. The chaos of the Cuban crisis in Ottawa completely exacerbated the problem.

The conclusion ends with a short section on Further Study and Research. In the course of research for this thesis, many elements related to various aspects of CMR came to light. Invariably, they had little to contribute to this work and therefore are parked in this last section for further work.

The defence administration issues and the debacle of the Cuban missile crisis, eventually contributed to the fall of the Diefenbaker Conservative party in February 1963, with an election in April, bringing the Pearson Liberals into power.[34] The Liberal government of Louis St Laurent initially had been as ambivalent about nuclear issues as Diefenbaker was in 1957, but now under Pearson they seemed to change their tune somewhat after five years of Conservative wrangling of the issues, and re-gaining power. Politics will do that to you.

[33] Bland, Douglas L. (1987). *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947-1985.* Kingston, ON: Ronald P. Frye & Co. (p. 11).
[34] Ibid., (pp. 22-23).

Chapter One
Civil-Military Relations

Fundamentally, civil-military relations (CMR) is a term ascribed to the relationship between a legal civilian government and its armed forces. Functionally, this relationship is normally described as the military leadership being subordinate to the civilian leadership. These relationships can also have various levels of control and subordination, depending on the form of government. In democracies, it implies civilians elected to government. In an autocracy, this may mean authority coming from a single dictator. In a single party state, it suggests control from the party. The general common assumption, regardless of form of government, however, is that the military should not act without some higher authority.[35]

The benchmark for any academic study of CMR is undoubtedly Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*: *The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*.[36] His book came at a very tumultuous period of the Cold War and the politics of the day were not universally accepting of what he had to say. Huntington separated civil and military elites into what he called two 'spheres' of responsibility, each professing and acting within their respective expertise and not unduly interfering with one another. This was viewed initially as being far too restrictive in terms of the reality of relationships.[37] It did, however, gain some traction and as time moved on, it actually spawned several iterations of civil-military relations. According to Huntington, through a process of maintaining the professionalism of the military officer corps,

[35] Bland, Douglas, (2000). "Who decides what? Civil-Military Relations in Canada and the United States." *Canadian American Public Policy*. Vol. 41 (1), [pp. 1-32].
[36] Huntington, Samuel, (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[37] Huntington's theory had little room for consultation between the military and the civil sphere. They were more explanatory on how CMR should function, but not what really constitutes a breakdown. These came later, when other commentators began using his theory as the basis for their own.

their subordination to civil control and authority could be ensured. This he referred to as the 'objective' model and more traditionally, the normative theory of CMR.[38]

This analysis is not an exhaustive study of CMR, as the purpose of this chapter is to provide only a broad perspective of CMR theory. Principally, this analysis is to assess thinking about the normative theory of CMR as a basis to understand the CMR issues in the Canadian case during the Cuban missile crisis. Most of the literature about CMR comes from the American experience, with some cases stemming from the Canadian experience as well.

Early Theory

M.S. Anderson describes in his book *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618-1789*, the necessity for states to have more control over the military and most importantly, to embrace the equally evolving nature of the officer corps of the 17th and 18th Century. This was the beginning of the eventual professionalism of the officer corps in Europe. These events, however, only started to receive some recognizable traction in the last few decades of the 18th Century.[39]

The officer corps of the period Anderson describes was far removed from anything that would remotely resemble today's officer corps. Officers of the 17th and 18th Century were almost exclusively from the noble classes within their respective countries. In some cases, they were generally educated, but not with any particular military standard. Often their commissions were inherited and, in some cases, such as in Britain, they could be purchased. When the state issued a call to arms, which was frequent, these officers and their houses of nobility were called

[38] Huntington, Samuel P. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, (p. 83).
[39] Anderson, M.S. (1998). *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618-1789.* Guernsey, Channel Islands: The Guernsey Press Co. Ltd.

upon to raise their own regiments and were funded to supply them accordingly. This was a business arrangement with the government, which included all manner of graft and corruption. "At this level, war was a private rather than a state enterprise."[40]

This was also a form of civil control by which the officer and his subordinate regiment were in turn subordinate and had loyalty to the crown. It was rarely transparent, however, from the pike man to the Crown. The regimental soldiers of the period often saw their loyalty only up to the commanding officer of the regiment. In many cases, he would have also been their 'master' in civilian life.

There were other situations when some regiments often included mercenary soldiers from other countries to make up the numbers required. Sometimes these regiments were exclusively mercenary. A different loyalty came with these armies, that went only as far as the person commanding was willing or able to compensate them for their services. This was an entirely different sense of civil-military relations, as subordination to the command authority could be rather thin. This was not the loyalty commonly thought about today.[41]

There was no concerted effort towards seriously employing state control of the military until further development of the professional soldier. Huntington,[42] describes the evolution of the professional soldier as a process of three phases that occurred from 1800 until about 1875. The three phases he describes were: 1) the elimination of aristocratic prerequisite and title for entry into the professional ranks; 2) the requirement for a basic education and professional

[40] Anderson, M.S. (1998). *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618-1789.* Guernsey, Channel Islands: The Guernsey Press Co. Ltd. (p. 47).
[41] It was not unheard of for mercenary forces to change sides during battle, if the outcome appeared to be changing, or a more lucrative price for their services appeared to be available to them.
[42] Huntington, Samuel T. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

training; and 3) the eventual provision of this type of training in institutions operated by the military.[43]

Huntington notes the origins of professionalism as essentially starting on August 6th , 1808 when the Prussian government abolished class preference and opened the officer corps and commissions to all men, regardless of their status. Prussia was the first country to institutionalize military professionalism by official statute of the officer corps. It took much longer for Britain to shed its aristocratic qualifications. It was not until 1871 that the purchase of officer commissions in Britain was totally abolished.[44]

This evolution of the officer corps did not occur immediately. It took decades, but it is important to note where and how it began. Any notion of CMR and the officer corps during the period that Anderson describes is primarily recognizable only in hindsight. It did not resemble anything of how the officer corps is viewed today. Rebecca Schiff in her book, *The Military and Domestic Politics : A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*,[45] also raises an important distinction from the history of civil-military relations, with a reference to Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian general and theorist from the early 19th Century, and his notion of CMR.

> …he [Clausewitz] makes a fundamental distinction between a civilian body that makes war policy and a military body that executes that policy. In sum, the art of war is subordinate to political policy making, that guides the decision to go to war.[46]

Another interesting period in this evolution of CMR is illustrated by the circumstances at the end of the American Revolution (1775-1783). The revolutionary civilian Congress in 1775 had appointed George Washington, a civilian with military experience, as the Commander of the

[43] Huntington, Samuel T. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (p. 39).
[44] Ibid., (p. 43).
[45] Schiff, Rebecca L. (2009). *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations.* New York, NY: Routledge.
[46] Ibid., (p. 27).

Continental Army. Washington had wanted a British-style professional military, but the civilian Congress did not agree and therefore opted for a system of two armies. One was developed and trained into the standing Continental Army, to face the overwhelming British regular army. The other was a regular militia, more like a civilian reserve unit to protect against domestic attacks, such as Native American and slave revolts.[47]

At the conclusion of hostilities in 1781, the Continental Army was paid off and demobilized. Washington subsequently surrendered his military commission of his own volition on December 23rd, 1783. Washington was of the view that civilian control of the military was a vital element of congressional authority. This fledging nation soon began the process of developing the United States Constitution, which was finally ratified in 1788.

In March 1789, the new Constitution became law, with the First Congress of the United States of America. In April they elected George Washington as the first President of the United States. From that point on, the American President, by virtue of the office, became the (civilian) Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces. As such, the military was now firmly subordinate to civilian authority. That model has been in place in the US since that time.[48]

Generally, issues of CMR in the US did not become that evident until after World War II and the beginning threats of nuclear war, as the Cold War developed between the Soviet Union and the West. These issues concerned the dramatic difference between conventional and nuclear war in relation to the potential rapid transition from relative peace into nuclear exchange. The expanse of oceans was soon no longer an insurmountable obstacle. North America was vulnerable from all sectors by long range bombers and later, intercontinental ballistic missiles

[47] Schiff, Rebecca L. (2009). *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations.* New York, NY: Routledge, (pp. 49-63).
[48] Ibid.

(ICBM). These concerns demanded exacting CMR. Civil-military relations theory was sorely out of date and Samuel Huntington provided that in 1957.

Huntington

Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* is continually referred to in most contemporary literature about CMR, but again, not always in absolute terms. It is, however, the point where even today others draw their own distinctions and theories. To paraphrase from the preface of his book, Huntington suggested two important measures of a theory. One is to the degree that theory can or cannot explain all relevant facts of a premise. The second and most important, he posits, is the degree to which the theory can explain those facts better than any other theory. He famously stated: "The study of civil-military relations has suffered from too little theorizing."[49]

When Huntington wrote *The Soldier and the State,* there was already growing concerns in the American military regarding civil control and authority. The concerns during this period of the Cold War, primarily had to do with decisions to maintain a large active peacetime military force in the face of a growing Soviet threat. In the past, US militaries were generally small, often disbanded after a major war, such as the Civil War. As such, there was no manual for direction of decision making, procurement and planning. [50]

His book was timely for the early period (1950s) of the Cold War. It became the text from which all discussions regarding American CMR developed. Essentially, Huntington saw civilian control of the military as a function of minimizing the political power of the military. In Western society, this dynamic is expressed as the actions of the military being subordinated to

[49] Huntington, Samuel T. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, (p. vii).
[50] The work of Kohn (1994) and Desch (1998) suggest CMR concerns in the US military from the end of WW II. These are noted here, but are really items for further study.

the political purposes of a duly elected constitutional government. Huntington viewed this function being carried out in two broad categories: one 'objective' and the other 'subjective'.

Objective control, also referred to as 'normative theory', and favoured by Huntington, subscribes to a process of willing military subordination to the legitimate political power within the state. In this, Huntington essentially separates civil and military elites into what he calls two 'spheres' of responsibility, each professing and acting within their respective expertise. He is careful to note that these two spheres ought not to unduly interfere with one another, but still share a common purpose of fulfillment of the state's goals.

According to Huntington, the main essential for any civilian control is to minimize military political power. Objective control is thus achieved by two main factors: "…by professionalizing the military [and] by rendering them politically sterile and neutral."[51] The result of having the lowest possible level of military political power, compared to civilian groups, has the effect of preserving military power for the professional officer corps. This of course is the extreme, and no one is completely 'sterile and neutral'. From the objective perspective, however, the officer corps can functionally be subordinate to the wishes of the civilian state that has secured legitimate political authority.

The limits of military political power are effectively set, but most importantly, without any reference to the political power of other civilian groups. This becomes the essence of objective control, that is defined: "…as a single concrete standard of civilian control which is politically neutral and which all social groups can recognize."[52] Objective civilian control is the

[51] Huntington, Samuel T. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (p. 84).
[52] Ibid., (p. 84).

actual maximizing of the military profession. Within the framework of the above definition, this in reality becomes the distribution of political power between military and civilian groups, which ideally produces professional attitudes among the officer corps. "The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism, [whereas] the essence of subjective control is the denial of an independent military sphere."[53]

Huntington describes subjective control of the military, as a method of maximizing the civilian power of a particular civilian group or groups, with respect to their relationship to the military and exercising dominance over their function. Fundamentally, taken to the extremes of maximizing civilian power, it also minimizes military power in all aspects of their function. This would still be a method of civil control of the military. However, such a heavy hand on the military leadership would undoubtedly have undesirable consequences. The outcome of this form of civilian control is manifested by the inability of the military leadership to function effectively as a partner in a civil-military relationship.[54] Subjective control also has the perspective of some level of conflict between civilian control and the need for military security of the nation.

The dichotomy in subjective control is seen in the activities of some civilian groups that insist that increased security threats merely increase military imperatives against such threats. This in turn makes it more difficult to assert civilian control, while the effort to increase subjective civil control actually reduces effective military security. This thought process, taken to an extreme, problematically posits that the reduction of military power is the catalyst to preserving peace.[55]

[53] Huntington, Samuel T. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, (p. 83).
[54] Huntington posits that subjective control in effect removes the spectre of a professional officer corps. This in turn negates any notion of responsibility, let alone 'shared' responsibility.
[55] Ibid., (pp. 84-85).

All forms of civilian control of the military have varying degrees of control. In the most extreme form of subjective civilian control, the military is simply subdued by the civil authority. They have marginal ability at best, to perform and carry out the functions of government policy. Huntington states: "…civilian groups [that try] to minimize the risks of war by reducing the power of the military frequently encourage exactly what they are trying to avoid."[56] [57]

Huntington notes the importance of observing the differences between the military professional ethic and civil political ideologies that struggle for co-existence in any civil-military relationship. He suggests there are a variety of civilian groups that are always in a struggle for power of some significance. Within these many groups, there are also a variety of ethics and ideologies. These are not new ideas, as these very concepts exist in every political party or civilian led group. When examining the common notion of CMR, Huntington raises the point that given the variety of these civilian ethics and ideologies, it is completely impossible to suggest a continuum of military values at one end and civilian at the other.

He posits that there is only one military ethic, that is "concrete, permanent, and universal."[58] This notion suggests, that there is a common ethic present in most militaries, that has negligible variances other than perhaps some cultural or ethnic differences. As Huntington suggests, there is no one civilian ethic or mind-set, but there can be several civil or political ideologies. They all refer to that which is non-military. The relationships can be difficult to define, as the ideologies can vary to such a degree.[59] Given the consequences of subjective

[56] Huntington, Samuel T. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, (p. 85).
[57] A subdued or weakened military (subjective control) is often seen by belligerents as vulnerable and unlikely able to respond to attack or invasion.
[58] Huntington, Samuel T. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, (p. 89).
[59] Ibid., (pp. 89-90).

civilian control and reduction of military power, it is not that difficult to imagine the chaos that could ensue in the military sphere with different civilian political groups all vying for power.

Thus, Huntington's objective civilian control has become the preferred normative theory of CMR that has evolved over the decades.[60] Objective control is a process of civil and military elites separated into two spheres of responsibility, in which the military is willingly subordinate to the legitimate political power. Key in this relationship is the civil and military leadership functioning within their respective sphere. Also noteworthy in the functioning objective civilian control of the military, is that neither sphere should unduly interfere in the other's function but share a common purpose in carrying out the state's goals. This is the benchmark for objective CMR, set by Huntington, as the evolution of CMR theory and implementation has continued. As stated previously, subjective civilian control still brings the military into a subordinate relationship, but hardly willingly.

Beyond Huntington

Suzanne Nielsen's review of Huntington essentially argues for the continued relevance of *The Soldier and the State.* Her review, written in 2012, had the benefit of CMR issues and the debate in the US that had come at the end of the Cold War and through the early-mid 1990s. Critics abound regarding Huntington,[61] but Nielsen is clear to remind them that Huntington had set the stage for all their arguments.[62]

[60] The premise that Huntington sets here, is that the military ethic does not vary substantially from nation to nation. Civil control is universally desired, but can vary by process and implementation, given many different civil political ideologies and ethical norms. Objective control in broad terms fits these dichotomies.
[61] Feaver, Janowitz, the most prominent critics, and others critical of Huntington's suppositions about CMR, accordingly, need to heed Nielsen's admonishment about the basis of their arguments.
[62] Nielsen, Suzanne, (2012). "American civil-military relations today: the continuing relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's The Soldier and the State." *International Affairs.* Vol. 88 (2), [pp. 369-376], (pp. 369-370).

Her own critique is more in terms of the reality and changes that have occurred during the passage of time since Huntington wrote the book. She notes, that the profession of arms is something that the US Army has struggled with and had actually launched a study in 2010 to examine what this meant and how it was relevant at the time. An example of relevance that she shares,[63] is around two Huntington statements that military expertise is:

> …universal in the sense that it is not affected by time or location [and that it is important that] military professionals be permitted to develop their expertise…without extraneous influence. [64]

Although the general nature of these statements has some validity[65], Nielsen notes they are problematic for the current debate she was discussing about US defence policy in 2012.

Using the above Huntington quote, Nielsen points out a problem in the first portion of the quote *'…universal [and] not affected by time or location'*. This is hardly valid when one thinks about the difference, for instance, between the US officer corps and that of Jordan (her example). These two countries could not be farther apart in their officer corps focus or function. There is a functioning, but different CMR in both countries. On the latter point *'…without extraneous influence'*, she notes, for example, the experiences of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) invasions. These revealed, that although the US military was quite capable of executing the task of invasion, they severely lacked and required 'extraneous' assistance in the post-invasion environment.[66] [67] A narrow focus on expertise with the first point and no expertise on the second

[63] Nielsen, Suzanne, (2012). "American civil-military relations today: the continuing relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's The Soldier and the State." *International Affairs.* Vol. 88 (2), [pp. 369-376], (p. 371).
[64] Huntington, Samuel T. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, (pp. 13 & 57). (Emphasis added))
[65] Huntington's theories of CMR were viewed mostly as absolutes, all valid in theory. In practical application, with varying degrees of implementation, they can present some problems. This is the essence of Nielson's review of his work and of many of his critics, both pro and con.
[66] Nielsen, Suzanne, (2012). "American civil-military relations today: the continuing relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's The Soldier and the State." *International Affairs.* Vol. 88 (2), [pp. 369-376], (pp. 371-372).
[67] The US military were completely unable to handle the occupation and prosecution of the post-invasion process. They had no particular exit plan, as they wrongly assumed the Iraq civilian population would embrace them as liberators. The US military also did not know how to handle the defeated Iraqi military, as they now became the new insurgents.

point, created a problem for the US military of being handicapped in achieving the nation's political purposes. Nielsen muses, that *The Soldier and the State* may someday become irrelevant, but that has not occurred yet, nor is it on the horizon. Any meaningful discussions regarding CMR must still include Huntington.[68]

The notion of 'professionalism' is problematic as a universally understood attribute. Almost without exception, it is understood quite differently by other nations, in the context of a 'professional military'. Different nations profess different cultural norms, that affect their view of what a professional officer corps should look like or how they should perform their function. Having said that, the Huntington notion of professionalism as the stimulation for subordination also becomes problematic.[69] This seems not to account for how CMR works in other countries, where professionalism is often viewed differently or in some cases rejected outright.

For instance, Britain had a long history of CMR functioning albeit with some issues in a society that, until World War II, had no use for officer professionalism. Britain was insistent of having a 'gentleman-officer corps' that shunned any thought of being professional. The military had a certain antiquity about its training and decorum. Underpinning all that was an extreme sense of overall loyalty to the sovereign and the government. The feeling was, that any notion of a professional officer corps would erode their sense of duty. It has evolved since then, but at the period between the wars and up to the mid 1940s, CMR functioned reasonably quite well in Britain, without any notion of a professional officer corps.[70] Douglas Bland in his article, *A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations*, notes that the reason for this functioning CMR in

[68] Nielsen, Suzanne, (2012). "American civil-military relations today: the continuing relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's The Soldier and the State." *International Affairs.* Vol. 88 (2), [pp. 369-376], (p. 376).
[69] Huntington, Samuel T. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, (pp. 81-85).
[70] Kerr, Elizabeth, (1997). *Imagining War: French and British Doctrine*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Britain was the harmony and shared responsibility between politicians, civil servants and the military.[71] [72]

In a further Bland article (2000), he noted that much of the early theory and discussion regarding CMR, prior to Huntington, had been mostly about ensuring or preventing issues of a *coup d'état* in states. Most discussions would revolve around something such as: "No coup? No problem, and so no further discussion [was] required."[73] Consequently, other issues, such as the composition and functionality of the military as it evolved and its relation to the norms of CMR, were often overlooked.[74] The attitude became; if it wasn't broken, there was no need to fix it. With the emergence of new democracies around the world, a rekindled interest and discussion about CMR started to emerge.

As Bland and Schiff[75] both note in their works, most of the literature on CMR is from the US and it has a tendency to suffer from considerable ethnocentric bias. This being the case, it has a rather narrow focus of description. The structures of normative CMR, as per Huntington, are relatively easy to define and understand. The problems with universality are with the concepts that are more culturally explicit of those broader western democracies. In this case, specifically, they are American. These are described differently by different authors of the subject, but essentially, they encompass the sharing of responsibility between the players

[71] Bland, Douglas L. (1999). "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces & Society.* Vol. 26 (1), [pp. 7-26], (p. 12).
[72] Both Kerr and Bland expound about the uniqueness of the British case against officer professionalism. This was a case of different cultural norms, from the one expressed from Huntington's perspective. The British officer sense of duty to the Crown superseded any notion of professionalism.
[73] Bland, Douglas L. (2000). "Who Decides What: Civil-Military Relations in Canada and the United States." *Canadian American Public Policy*. Vol. 41 (1), [pp. 1-32], (p. 3).
[74] The 'norms' of CMR, being those that were professed by Huntington.
[75] Schiff, Rebecca L. (1995). "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance." *Armed Forces & Society.* Vol. 22 (1), [pp. 7-24].

according to shared "…principles, norms, rules and decision making…"[76] These concepts are not always universally understood, nor accepted in all countries. There needs to be a bridge to bring theory into practice in other countries.

Bland, puts forth the view of the cornerstone of the regime theory of civil-military relations:

> A Westminster-based, liberal democracy; that is, a civil-military regime in a liberal democracy defined as a political arrangement in which the people are sovereign, and where legitimacy for any action of the government rests with the people. [further noted] the regime theory of civil-military relations asserts [that it is] maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military offices.[77]

Through time and the notion of professionalism, the officer corps has gone beyond the simple acceptance of obedience to civil authority, and has thus evolved to be replaced:

> With a deeply embedded fidelity to the concept of civil control. But the assumption is overshadowed by an inherent, everlasting anarchy [that] the civil authority has legitimacy, but the armed forces have guns[78]

The underlying point, and the nature of 'professionalism' as perhaps Huntington meant it to be, is that CMR works in mature democracies not because it is imposed but rather because of the officer corps' acceptance of civil authority as a high value in a liberal democracy.

> "…they [the officer corps] value above all else a liberal democracy, which they believe cannot exist without civil control of the armed forces."[79]

The normative theory of strict separation between civil and military spheres (Huntington) was challenged in depth by Rebecca Schiff in her article *Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance*. Implied throughout her work is a notion of 'shared responsibility' that appears in much of Douglas Bland's work.[80]

The fundamental function of any notion of CMR is to reduce the possibility of domestic military intervention into the politics of the state. Her overall critique is based on the fact that the

[76] Bland, Douglas L. (2001). "Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces & Society.* Vol. 27 (4), [pp. 525-540], (p. 526).
[77] Ibid., (p. 526).
[78] Ibid., (p. 529).
[79] Ibid., (p. 529).
[80] Bland, Douglas L. (1999, 2000 & 2001).

current theory of CMR was "historically and culturally bound to the American case."[81] The separation of the military and civilian institutions is what Schiff refers to as "…the American standard of military professionalism."[82] This is the standard that Huntington professed also, without actually calling it that. By extension, Schiff's main criticism is that this is the model that has also been exported to other emerging democracies, when their "…standards, histories, and cultures of professionalism [are] quite different from the Western norm."[83]

Schiff notes then current American literature about civil-military relations, in particular Huntington, make no mention of the cultural factors, such as values, attitudes and symbols that inform society and the military of their respective roles. She argues there exists three distinct partners in this arrangement: the military, the political elite, and the citizens. As such, each of these entities in society have specific institutional and cultural considerations. 'Concordance' as an achievable goal is an agreement or 'sharing of responsibility' between each of the three partners. She also suggests that there are four specific indicators that have to be considered for a resulting concordance: social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style.[84] [85] Douglas Bland concurs with Schiff regarding cultural metrics. He states: "Culture may not only inform the civil view of civil-military relations, but it might also condition the military's view of the issues and their responses to them."[86]

[81] Schiff, Rebecca L. (1995). "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance." *Armed Forces & Society.* Vol. 22 (1), [pp. 7-24], (p. 10).
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid.
[85] All underlines are mine.
[86] Bland, Douglas L. (2000). "Who Decides What? CMR in the US and Canada." *Canadian American Public Policy.* Vol. 41 (1), [pp. 1-32], (p. 3).

Her central argument is that the current American assumption regarding CMR, and presently in place, is that the civil and military spheres must have distinct and defined relationships. In this, civilian institutions have to be in control over a professional military to prevent domestic military intervention. This American model has just assumed within this normative model the inherent existence of distinct cultural and institutional characteristics of the military, the political elite, and its citizens. Her point is that, this 'model' has failed to describe these characteristics.

The current normative model described does not differentiate between the political and the citizenry. Schiff insists that there are significant cultural and institutional differences between these two that can vary dependent on the country. She notes that concordance theory is not an attempt to replace what is 'reasonably' functioning in the United States. To the contrary, Schiff's concordance theory is simply a process of examining the institutional culture of each of the players in the relationship prior to imposing a CMR philosophy onto another nation.

By finding a shared responsibility or concordance of agreement on how they should function she posits that the likelihood of domestic military intervention is minimized. It does this by examination of the current normative CMR using a different metric (concordance). The evolving nature of civil-military relations has been a form of revolution in military affairs (RMA), but only in terms of practice and process. The preponderance of literature on the subject, which is housed within a "…Western liberal [democratic model], led by the United States…,"[87] always points towards civil control and military subordination.

Interestingly, one of Huntington's more recent works, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,* has some of the new thinking that has emerged more recently

[87] Bland, Douglas L. (2000). "Who Decides What? CMR in Canada and the United States." *Canadian American Public Policy*. Vol. 41 (1), [pp. 1-32], (p. 4).

regarding culture and its implication in foreign policy. In this recent work of his, he reminds and admonishes the United States to be more circumspect regarding international institutions. He specifically warns the US: "In the emerging world of ethnic conflict …[about promoting] the false, immoral and dangerous Western belief in the universality of Western culture…"[88] These ideas were absent from his work in the 1950s, but even he had evolved his thinking by 1996.[89] These concerns that Huntington expressed here are essentially the concerns raised subsequently by Bland, Schiff and Nielsen in their work.[90] They do not distract from his fundamental, normative theory of objective civil control, rather they bring the nature of CMR into a more modern state.

The process and dynamics of CMR that the Canadian and American military went through at the end of the Cold War and the early 1990s was completely un-precedented. After decades of intense nuclear threat, that now appeared to have lifted, the West was facing completely uncharted waters. Primary among these concerns was what to do with and ensure containment of all the nuclear weapons in the world. Much of the CMR discussion then began to revolve around 'external' versus 'internal' threats to the military, and how 'objective' and 'subjective' control described what was occurring at that point in time. In retrospect, the Cold War was an intense cultural upheaval. Some have suggested that the transition from World War II to the Cold War should have been instructive of how the transition from the Cold War to its end should be manifested. However, there was no manual for direction on how to proceed. There were similarities perhaps, but this transition was from one war almost immediately into another

[88] Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Inc. (p. 310).
[89] Huntington contrasted his seminal work of 1957 in further work as CMR evolved in 1961, a discussion in: *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in Int'l Politics.* **Also:** In 1977, as a co-editor with Goodpaster, *The Soldier and the State in the 1970s.* He never stopped reviewing his original thought processes.
[90] Bland discusses these issues in three of his articles (1999, 2000 & 2001). Also, Schiff (1995 & 2009), and Nielsen (2012).

'cold' as it was. There was equally nothing to instruct going from the threat of nuclear annihilation to relative unknown peace, and what to do with all those nuclear weapons. There are instructive lessons about CMR to be had from real situations and from the end of the Cold War. In the case of concordance and shared responsibility, Huntington's objective theory, modified for more modern times, still applies relative to the universality of CMR.[91]

Generally, in any healthy civil-military relationship, there is an expectation of executive competence from the civilian leadership that they fully examine the dynamics of policy under consideration and inquire of the military capability that may be required to fulfill that policy. No less onus should be expected from the military leadership to understand fully the policy imperatives of the nation and keep the civilian leadership informed regarding the nature, rules of engagement and limitations of the forces at their disposal.

Issues of CMR clearly existed at the highest levels of the Canadian political/military leadership in Ottawa in October 1962. However, there is an over whelming narrative in current literature that the breakdown in CMR rested almost solely on the political or civil leadership. The evidence suggests the contrary. Diefenbaker, in particular, but also his cabinet, certainly have to share a portion of the burden. They never inquired as to the military capability at their disposal for two and one-half days. The military leadership, on the other hand, appears to have been given a pass. Evidence shows that the military had full authority to elevate the alert status to match the US but, for unknown reasons, chose to be silent and defer to the Prime Minister. The military leadership had the larger burden in its failure to advise the civil leadership of their own responsibility and capability (See Table 1).

[91] There are a number of items from this paragraph that perhaps deserve more examination in further work.

This was more of an inverse from conventional CMR where these breakdowns were at the highest level of leadership, both civil and military. The expectations of executive competence from the civil and the military leadership were not met. There was certainly a lack of rigour on the part of the military leadership for not investigating the War Books and the status of them. Huntington's normative theory of objective civil control was in place. The problem was that the civil sphere and the military sphere appeared to have diverged and forgotten the principles of shared responsibility and competence.

The similarities between Canadian and American culture and thought are not in dispute here. There is, however, a certain uniqueness regarding each country's citizens as each share a common un-defended boarder and yet many things are the same. The militaries of both nations have functioned primarily seamlessly within their respective alliances. As such, CMR theory and functions are essentially the same in each country also.

Chapter Two
The Context of the Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban missile crisis did not start all of a sudden. There had been growing concerns during the late summer months of 1962 about Soviet military activity in Cuba, leading up to the discovery of 'offensive' missile bases around the 15th and the 16th of October. During the month of September, the Soviet Union had been insistent after several warnings by the US that it was only supplying defensive military equipment to the Cuban government for their own defence.

On the 22nd of October, President Kennedy addressed the nation, indeed the world, as he stressed emphatically that all offensive weapons in Cuba must be dismantled and removed. He further stated that any other shipments of these weapons to the Caribbean would encounter a naval blockade and be turned back. This was viewed as the epicentre of the crisis and the most significant strategic turning point for the Cold War.

This chapter is a general examination of the crisis and context of how the three principle players: the US, Cuba and the Soviet Union, each interacted with the issues they faced. Each nation had significant concerns interacting with each other that finally rose to a global perspective in 1962. As the tensions increased, the US and the Soviet Union faced off when it became apparent that the Soviet Union had commenced the installation of nuclear missile bases pointed towards North America in Cuba. With a glimpse towards the spectre of mutual annihilation, they finally paused. After much tense diplomacy, each backed off towards détente.

The Canadian context for the crisis is introduced in this chapter with an examination of Prime Minister Diefenbaker's Conservative government coming into power in 1958. This was just as the NORAD agreement was being signed, and just prior to the Castro ousting of Batista in

1959. Diefenbaker could hardly have been unaware of the global perspective of this and what it could potentially entail. Clearly, these events had an effect on his characterization of the US and his demeanor as the missile crisis unfolded in October 1962. These events will begin to be addressed in this chapter and to a greater extent in *Chapter Three.*

The United States, Cuba and the Soviet Union

A short history of US and Cuban relations sets the context of the American angst over this region of the Caribbean that was present long before the missile crisis. American concern over Soviet expansion into Cuba actually had its roots in the 'Monroe Doctrine' delivered to the nation by US President James Monroe in 1823. This policy basically was an admonition towards Europe, that any expansion into the Western Hemisphere would be viewed as dangerous to American peace and safety.[92] This doctrine was further expanded in 1904 by President Theodore Roosevelt to include specifically the Caribbean. It basically stated that the US had the right to, "…restore order in any Latin American nation that failed to conduct its affairs to US satisfaction."[93] This was part of the context of why the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba, was viewed by the US as being entirely provocative.

In 1898 the US declared war on Spain and at the end of that quick victory, Spain ceded Cuba, the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico over to the United States. In 1902, Cuba received a version of independence, with the US obtaining a permanent lease for a naval base at Guantanamo Bay. Within that agreement, the US Platt Amendment stated that the US retained the right to intervene in Cuba's economic, and political affairs if the US disapproved of Cuban

[92] Canada, DND, "Confronting the Essence of Decision: *Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis*." [Gladman & Archambault] Ottawa, ON: DRDC-CORA TM, 2010 -250 (Nov. 2010), (p. 34).
[93] Roberts, Priscilla, (2012). *The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Essential Reference Guide*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC – CLIO, (p. xi).

conduct. This was an uneasy relationship and US troops came back to the island a few times to restore order. A military coup in 1933 brought in the new government of Ramon Grau and the Platt Amendment was rescinded. Other changes of government came twice. First, by Fulgencio Batista, and second, when he was finally overthrown by Fidel Castro in January 1959.[94]

The missile discovery on Cuba was not just seen by the US as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. It also had the potential of undermining the hegemony of the United States as a 'Great Power'. The US determined that for them to not react as they did to the missile discovery would only embolden other nations of a perceived lack of resolve from the US.[95] The ultimate response of the US should not have come as any surprise. The troubled history between the two nations had a long past.

The seeds of what culminated as the crisis in October 1962, however, really have a beginning after the ousting of Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista, and the takeover by Fidel Castro and his revolutionaries in 1959.[96] The original Castro rebel organization, called the 'July 26 Movement', got its name from the July 1953 Castro raid against the Batista army. They were defeated and Fidel and his younger brother Raul were imprisoned and later exiled to Mexico.[97] They both returned to the mountains of Cuba in 1956. This was when Fidel became better known to US intelligence, which eventually led to a very complex relationship between the US and

[94] Roberts, Priscilla, (2012). *The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Essential Reference Guide*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC – CLIO, (pp. xi-xiii).
[95] Canada, DND, "Confronting the Essence of Decision: *Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis*." [Gladman & Archambault] Ottawa, ON: DRDC-CORA TM, 2010 -250 (Nov. 2010), (pp. 34-35).
[96] Fursenko & Naftali, (1997) *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964.* New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc.
[97] Ibid., (p. 6).

Batista, and later with Castro.[98] In the latter days of the revolution and the take-over of the government, there was a majority of anti-communist elements within the July 26 Movement.[99]

Initially the US had hoped that Batista could reform himself, but that did not materialize. At one point in late 1958, "…the CIA actually met with some potential leaders of a new regime that hopefully would include neither Batista nor Fidel Castro."[100] Nothing came of this attempt either, or it was just forgotten. During the first three months of the Castro take-over, his new regime started rounding up former Batista officials. After a series of pseudo trials, reports emerged of some 500 of these officials being executed by the new regime. This became extremely troubling to the US and other countries, including Canada. There was considerable ambivalence from the US towards this new Castro regime, particularly after the execution of the Batista officials.

What was characterized initially by Castro, on his 'Operation Truth' visit to the US in April 1959, as an anti-communist regime soon began to fade. Castro saw his visit to the US and Canada as an opportunity to set the 'truth' about how the new regime would vindicate the atrocities of the previous one. Although he was initially treated as a 'rock star', his primary mission to educate the US of his good intentions essentially failed.[101] While Fidel was masquerading around on his tour of American cities and institutions, his younger brother Raul, being a secret member of the Cuban communist party (PSP), was seeking support and assistance

[98] Initially, the US favoured Castro over Batista, but that all vanished shortly after the revolution in 1959.
[99] Fursenko & Naftali, (1997) *"One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964.* New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc. (pp. 5-19).
The split elements, pro and anti- communist, were suspect of where their true alliances may rest. The facts about these alliances were not entirely known by US intelligence, which when they were attempting to co-opt some pro-democracy elements, the scheme mostly collapsed
[100] Ibid., (p. 7).
[101] Ibid.

from Nikita Khrushchev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev was the head of the ever-powerful Politburo, where all the major decisions for the party and state were made. This is where the roots of the Soviet and Cuban relationship started to take hold even though there had been much open courting over the previous year.[102]

Castro insisted throughout his 'Operation Truth' visit to the US, to any and all that questioned him, that his new regime was against all forms of communism. Unfortunately, there were already rumors surfacing that Moscow had approved Czechoslovakian shipments of weapons to the liberation of Cuba in 1958. No Soviet weapons were involved, only World War II German or Czech weapons. This of course gave the Soviets deniability.[103] From the early days of the Castro regime until the discovery of nuclear missile sites in Cuba, tensions continued to increase between the US and the Cuban/Soviet alliance. The conversion of the Castro regime to communism was gradual in many respects. Raul Castro was convinced in the early 1950s of the merits of communism. Their rebel lieutenant Che Guevara had clearly declared himself as a communist by 1957, which put him at odds at the time with Fidel. However, by 1960 and the threat of an American invasion, Fidel himself made the final transition. He had nationalized all foreign institutions on Cuban soil, with the curious exception of Canadian banks.

It was actually one of the worst kept secrets that the US entertained plans overthrow of this new regime.[104] It all came to a head in April 1961 when the US backed invasion at the Bay of Pigs by 1,800 Cuban nationalist exiles failed miserably. At the time of the missile crisis, the

[102] Fursenko & Naftali, (1997) *"One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964.* New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc.
[103] Ibid., (pp. 11-12).
[104] Ibid.

full extent and influence of Soviet connections to Cuba were not as well known to the US. It was only later revealed just how complex and involved these connections were.[105]

There were several other plans and plots to overthrow the Castro regime and assassinate Castro. One of these was a Guatemalan plan, with deep CIA input, called Operation Condor and launched in June 1961. It involved only a few individuals but never actually became operational and finally disappeared.[106] Another plan of significance was Operation Mongoose started later in November 1961. This was a fully CIA backed covert operation designed to inject the elements of internal revolution into Cuba and if the opportunity came, to assassinate Castro. Obviously, Mongoose was also unsuccessful. It became clear to the US and CIA operatives that any success from internal sabotage to overthrow Castro would require a further significant level of a direct US military involvement. After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, Kennedy was not amenable to an invasion or involvement of any sort.[107] In retrospect, it should not have been surprising about the concerns Khrushchev and Castro had regarding the determination held by the US and the Organization of American States (OAS) forces against Cuba.

At the same time of the missile crisis, the US also had serious concerns regarding Canada. These concerns were political and centred around Canadian voiced concerns about US-Cuba policy relationships. This was also associated with the continuing, albeit restricted, trade policy that Canada had with Cuba. Canada was not a member of the OAS and in January 1962,

[105] Fursenko & Naftali, (1997) *"One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964.* New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc.
[106] Ibid., (pp. 134-137).
[107] Allison & Zelikow, (1999) *Essence of Decision: Exploring the Cuban Missile Crisis, (2nd Edition).* New York, NY: Addison Wesley Longman Inc. (pp. 84-86).
[Both Allison & Zelikow and Fursenko & Naftali, cover the US backed covert operations against Cuba in considerable detail].

US led trade related embargoes against Cuba were adopted by the OAS.[108] This began to complicate the US-Canada relationship as Canada continued to trade with Cuba, although by now restricted to only non-strategic goods.[109]

Diefenbaker and the Canadian Context

The chaos that ensued in Ottawa, during the Cuban missile crisis actually had its roots five years previously when John Diefenbaker became Canada's thirteenth prime minister in June 1957 with a minority Progressive Conservative government.[110] This was his "first time … in government office, since his election to the House of Commons in 1940."[111] It was also the first Conservative Government since R.B. Bennett in the 30s. There were few Conservatives around who knew the machinations of forming, let alone leading a government. Diefenbaker was an enigma to most people around him. He had no experience at leading a government, but was savvy enough to know that it would be vitally important to surround himself, as much as possible, with knowledgeable people. This presented a dilemma for him as there were not very many people that he trusted implicitly. Thus, upon taking office in June 1957, he declared himself Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.[112]

The United Nations (UN) was somewhat of a double-edged sword for Diefenbaker. He could cite its accomplishments from time to time, but the problems of the Soviet veto since the Korean War were a concern for him, as they were with most leaders. In 1945, Diefenbaker, a

[108] Allison & Zelikow, (1999) *Essence of Decision: Exploring the Cuban Missile Crisis, (2nd Edition).* New York, NY: Addison Wesley Longman Inc. (pp. 84-86).
[109] Canada did not join the OAS until 1990. The US has continued with sanctions against Cuba, however, Canada has never done so.
[110] Robinson, H. Basil, (1989). *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs.* Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
[111] Ibid., (ix).
[112] Ibid., (pp. 36-37).

Conservative party backbencher, had been at the founding deliberations in San Francisco as an observer.[113] Whenever an occasion called for it, he was always ready to relate those experiences in glowing and proud terms.[114] The downside of the UN's founding for Diefenbaker was that his Liberal predecessor Louis St Laurent had served as Minister of External Affairs under Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King and was also present. He was an active delegate for the founding conference of the UN in 1945. If this was not enough angst for him, he now had St Laurent as his official Opposition Leader. In January 1958, however, Lester B. Pearson, who had been the Minister of External Affairs for Louis St Laurent, took over as the Liberal Opposition Leader after St Laurent retired. Pearson had a long history in foreign affairs and had taken up the torch of UN action as one of the architects of the UN peacekeeping mission during the Suez Crisis. In 1956 Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.[115]

During the election campaign, Diefenbaker had been harshly critical of the Liberal party's Suez policy as he tried to garner support from the pro-British and pro-Israel Canadian vote. However, he was now the PM. He had to find his way through the politics of what was a rather envious record of the 'Liberal' Department of External Affairs. People around him knew how he felt about Pearson's reputation as an international statesman. He was never openly critical, but it was widely known that he neither wanted, nor needed to be reminded of Pearson's international reputation. It became his Achilles heel in that he could never really control his attitude towards Pearson.[116]

[113] Robinson, H. Basil, (1989). *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs.* Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
[114] The characterizations of Diefenbaker's political and public nuances are here as background to his demeanor leading up to the Cuban missile crisis.
[115] Robinson, H. Basil, (1989). *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
[116] Ibid., (pp. 6-9).

The Department of External Affairs (DEA) were keenly aware that Diefenbaker had some reservation about its approach to foreign affairs, as he had some initial reluctance to seek their advice. In the long run, however, he also knew that the department would be vital to the government's collective success. Finally, a number of questions began to emerge in those critical first few months. The prognostications from the election campaign soon gave way to the reality of governing. Diefenbaker's opinions were not being readily communicated to DEA staff and thus were unable to be thoroughly analyzed. It became apparent that he was unable to transition effectively from campaign mode to governing mode. The old Commonwealth was not the new Commonwealth and it was unclear where he stood on foreign policy and other issues that may be coming before the UN. His support for NATO was welcomed, but his outspoken communist vitriol was concerning to the department as officials felt this might put Canada outside of any meaningful political role in potential East and West relations discussions.[117]

Rumors were rampant about his distrust of the DEA in general. The questions became: How did he envision his role in foreign affairs? How did this relate to the duties of the secretary of state for external affairs? How would these matters be handled in cabinet? These and a myriad of other concerns faced not only the DEA, but other government agencies as well.[118] It was in the midst of all this uncertainty at foreign affairs that Diefenbaker finally gave up his 'acting' position and decided to appoint Sidney Smith as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in September 1957. He called another election in 1958 and obtained the majority government he so openly wanted with "208 out of 265 seats in the House of Commons, the biggest majority up to that time in Canadian history."[119]

[117] Robinson, H. Basil, (1989). *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. (p. 8).
[118] Ibid., (pp. 1-9).
[119] Ibid., (p. 44).

Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA) Sidney Smith died suddenly in March 1959. Diefenbaker again took up the reigns of acting secretary, much to the chagrin of the DEA. Eventually, he appointed Howard Green to the post four months later in June. Green was a staunch anti-nuclear proponent, and Diefenbaker was appreciative of his support on these and other NORAD matters coming to light.[120]

Green as SSEA, had argued vociferously with American officials defending Canada's trade policy with Cuba, but he was also instrumental in introducing early restrictions on strategic goods not being in the trade mix. After a NATO ministerial conference in 1961, he started to have a change of focus regarding Cuba that does not appear to have been shared by Diefenbaker. He told an assistant: "…it was of the utmost importance, that we cease treating the Cuban problem as one of trade or relations with Cuba, but rather as a highly sensitive issue in Canada / US relations."[121] Green had felt previously that government scepticism regarding American Cuba policy made sense, but he felt this was no longer the case. He now observed with deep concern, that the Cuban government was becoming more communist oriented and threatening with recent Soviet influence. As these sentiments continued, Green was instrumental in quietly 'allowing' the Canadian ambassador to Cuba George Kidd to advise the Americans on information observed regarding the build-up of Soviet troops and arms during the summer of 1962.[122] These surveillance functions of the Canadian embassy became equally as important after the crisis in assisting to verify the withdrawal of weapons and personnel.

[120] Robinson, H. Basil, (1989). *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
[121] McKercher, Asa, (2012). " The Most Serious Problem? Canada – US Relations and Cuba, 1962." *Cold War History*. Vol.12 (1), [pp. 69-88], (p. 75).
[122] Ibid., (p. 79).

The fact that Green and his External Affairs officials assisted the US prior to the crisis and throughout was largely overshadowed by Diefenbaker's rhetoric and persistent noise regarding the lack of consultation. During a luncheon in Nassau, Bahamas in December 1962 with Diefenbaker, President Kennedy went out of his way to praise the Canadian Embassy staff in Havana for their role during the crisis. [123] These are facts that many Canadian historians have largely ignored. Diefenbaker never mentions these events in his memoirs, and one is left wondering of how much he was actually aware.

In the weeks leading up to the crisis, even though Canadian political leaders did not know the full extent of what was unfolding, there was certainly awareness of the tension between the US and the Soviet Union over Cuba. There was little from the government in response to questions raised by the opposition in this regard, but overall Hansard reflected rising tensions.

Diefenbaker had a monarchist devotion to the British Crown, which fed into his distrust of American foreign policy and world hegemony. His view of international affairs was primarily that of enhancing Canada's role in the Commonwealth. Most other aspects of international relations were secondary in his view. There was also a sense of latent pragmatism in his private views regarding international relations that he would rarely profess openly.[124] Diefenbaker was, however, entirely aware of the international importance of fostering a good working relationship with Dwight D Eisenhower, whom he greatly admired, when he became PM in 1958. He never had such a relationship with the next President, John F. Kennedy, who was young, admired and catholic.

[123] These events as noted by McKercher, regarding the Can. Embassy in Havana and the Nassau meeting with Kennedy. They are referenced by his retrieved LAC documents: RG 25, vol.5352, file 10224, Havana to Ext., Oct.1962. & MG31 E83, vol. 6, file 12, Memo, 'Bahamas Meetings'. Points discussed with Pres. Kennedy at luncheon, Dec 21, 1962.

[124] Robinson, H Basil (1989). *Diefenbaker's World: A populist in Foreign Affairs.* Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. (p. 15). While Diefenbaker tended to react intuitively in private, he was not normally quick at reaching important decisions within Cabinet.

A complication, that exacerbated the political tension between the United States and Canada, occurred in May 1961 when Kennedy visited Ottawa. This was of course the infamous 'Rostow Memo'.[125] Walt Rostow, a White House policy advisor had given Kennedy a briefing note entitled 'What we want from the Ottawa trip'. It had several references 'to *push* Canada towards increased commitments' in accordance with US and other global positions. The memo was discovered by staff cleaning up after their meeting. Obviously, it should have been returned as the US delegation had requested, but Diefenbaker held onto it as trophy and trotted it out from time to time as if he had something over Kennedy. Needless to say, he was completely obsessed with Rostow's several insertions of the word '*push*'.[126]

As this episode played out over the following year, and the buildup of tensions in the Caribbean increased, nothing positive was forthcoming in the political relationship between the US and Canada. The American response to finding offensive nuclear weapons under process in Cuba just gave Diefenbaker more fodder to complain that Kennedy should have consulted with him much earlier as the crisis was developing. There is some truth to that expectation but given the course of events of the previous year, it is difficult to imagine any different response from Kennedy. Diefenbaker's behaviour was not what Kennedy expected from a trusted ally.

Understandably, Kennedy thought Canada would step up to the plate, as the evidence of missiles and increased military activity in Cuba became clear. Evidence of their dislike for each other on the eve of the crisis was palpable but Kennedy never imagined that Diefenbaker would question the aerial photographic evidence of Soviet missile installations on the island. By

[125] Robinson, H Basil (1989). *Diefenbaker's World: A populist in Foreign Affairs.* Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. (p. 206).
[126] The following are several of the instances in Robinson's book regarding the 'Rostow memo', (pp. 207-208, 246-247, 250, 267, 269-270). It would appear this incident was clearly beyond an obsession with Diefenbaker.

insisting that the UN investigate the American allegation, Diefenbaker was oblivious to the fact that this had the potential of playing directly into the Soviet hands. First, it suggested some disbelief was evident, and second, it showed an apparent split in the NATO alliance. The issue of sovereignty, for which Diefenbaker was completely fanatical about, he saw as an aspect of nationalism. This became converted by his rhetoric into a form of anti-Americanism. Any notion of national interest and security, such as treaty obligations, seemed lost.[127]

The spread of Soviet power and communist influence in Europe and other non-aligned regions of the world, seemed a vital concern of Diefenbaker, and yet he personally seemed ambivalent to the increase of Soviet influence in Cuba and the potential threat that it meant to North America. On top of this, his trade policy with Cuba, which completely frustrated the US, he simply viewed as a Canadian sovereign right. He was never able to connect the optics of how Canada's Cuban trade policy was mistakenly viewed in other Latin American countries, "… [as] political support for Castro's regime."[128] This of course also played into the Soviet Union's propaganda as a division of policy and thought between Canada and the US.

There were potential consequences of these optics as the missile crisis heated up. The dichotomy, however, was that Diefenbaker was a firm supporter of Canadian partnership and participation in the NATO alliance and he also welcomed American political and military leadership throughout the free world. But as Basil Robinson and many others point out, there was a caveat he was quick to invoke, "… [as long as American leaders] did not take Canadian support for granted."[129] It was almost as if he felt he was holding the wild card.

[127] Robinson, H. Basil, (1989). *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs.* Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
[128] McKercher, Asa, (2012). "The Most Serious Problem? Canada – US Relations and Cuba, 1962." *Cold War History.* Vol.12 (1), [pp. 69-88], (p. 76).
[129] Robinson, H. Basil, (1989). *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs.* Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. (p. 4)

Diefenbaker and NORAD/NATO

To understand more fully the complexity of Diefenbaker's mindset during the Cuban missile crisis, an examination of his handling of the almost completed NORAD agreement, now before him and the Conservative government in 1957, is appropriate. Apart from the general external affairs issues, the crux of Diefenbaker's problems in his first year as prime minister were rooted in the transition of the almost completed NORAD agreement, now deposited into the lap of the Conservative government.

This section concentrates on the handing over of that file to Diefenbaker until it was finally completed in May of 1958. It is an accounting of how distrusting and dysfunctional he became of the Canadian military and of the US. This of course had implications down the road for Canada's response to the Cuban missile crisis as the CMR breakdown manifested in the Canadian civil and military leadership in Ottawa.

During the last few years of the St. Laurent Liberal government, significant progress had been finalized towards the completion of the NORAD agreement. In December 1956, the ad hoc study group among many other things, determined that the title for the new commander would be, *Commander-in-Chief, Air Defense Canada-United States,* (CINCADCANUS) and should report directly to the *US Joint Chiefs of Staff* (CJCS) and the *Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee,* (CCSC). [130] They in turn, reported to their respective political authorities. This was modified later in August 1957 that the reporting relationship would now be, to each nation's single chief of staff, rather than a committee. [131] Similarly, they would also report to their

[130] Jockel, Joseph T. (1987). *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958.* Vancouver, BC: University of BC Press. (p. 102).
[131] Goette, Richard, (2018). *Sovereignty and Command in Canada-US Continental Air Defence, 1940-57.* Vancouver, BC: University of BC Press. (p. 188).

respective civilian authority. Key to this was: "…the Deputy CINCADCANUS who would not be of the same nationality … this position would always be held open for a Canadian…"[132]

The RCAF and the US military would retain command over their respective forces, including logistics, training and personnel functions. All these plans were in place and subject to approval by the JCS and the CCSC, which they did on the 6th and the 18th of February 1957 respectively. Final approval from the US Office of the Secretary of Defense came on the 17th of March.[133] The NORAD agreement the Liberals had almost completed never reached the *Cabinet Defence Committee* (CDC) as a general election call came on the 10th of June 1957. Why it was never approved by the Liberal government between March and June is a question without any reasonable answer, except that perhaps the Liberals wrongly assumed they would be back in power.

Three separate references related to NORAD discussions between the 22nd and the 24th of July 1957 are characteristic of Diefenbaker's leadership style and lack of rigor regarding NORAD. The general concern was summed up by Basil Robinson:

> The circumstances in which Diefenbaker committed his government on 1st August 1957, to the approval of what became known as NORAD – the North American Air Defence Command – provide an example of the perils of inexperience. They also portray [Diefenbaker] in an uncharacteristic stance, for while he tended in private to react intuitively to new developments, he was not normally quick in reaching important decisions.[134]

One reference to note about this NORAD event came from Douglas Bland:

> For his part John Diefenbaker seemed lost in the international forum and paid scant heed to defence issues, at least initially. General Foulkes[135] recalls that the NORAD agreement was carried to Diefenbaker by the Minister one afternoon and returned in less than an hour, approved by the Prime Minister.[136]

[132] Jockel, Joseph T. (1987). *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958.* Vancouver, BC: University of BC Press. (p. 102).
[133] Ibid., (p. 103).
[134] Robinson, H. Basil, (1989). *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. (p. 15).
[135] General Charles Foulkes was CCOS from 1951 to 1960.
[136] Bland, Douglas L. (1987). *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947-1985.* Kingston, ON: Ronald P. Frye & Co. (p.22).

Both Joseph Jockel [137] and Robinson mention the above incident in essentially the same manner as Bland. All three share the same surprised response at how inconsequential the NORAD agreement seemed to Diefenbaker at the time. They also share the same thoughts about Diefenbaker first hearing about the pending NORAD agreement in June 1957 from Minister of National Defence (MND) George Pearkes[138] as they were on their way to London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting. On return to Ottawa, MND Pearkes informed Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff (CCOS), General Charles Foulkes that Diefenbaker had given tentative approval to the air defence recommendations. Even so, Diefenbaker had been in office for only two weeks and had not received any detailed briefing on the plans.[139]

CCOS General Foulkes had his office draft a memorandum on the 22nd of July 1958 that would precede the final authorization of the NORAD agreement.[140] Chairman Foulkes seemed to be aware of Diefenbaker's resistance to advice. As a result, Foulkes knew what would be required to facilitate the finalization the NORAD agreement. The Foulkes memorandum was submitted by Pearkes and Diefenbaker (cabinet). It described the authority of the newly created CINCADCANUS. His memo explained the context of the Canada-United States bilateral defence co-operation and how that related to NATO.

Foulkes' memorandum, however, went much further than it should, as it stated that the Air Defence Commands would be in line with other commands in NATO. This was not what the NORAD ad hoc study group concluded, nor what the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) intended. In

[137] Jockel, Joseph T. (1987). *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958.* Vancouver, BC: University of BC Press.
[138] General George Pearkes, V.C. (Retd) was MND from 1957 to 1960.
[139] Robinson, H. Basil, (1989). *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs.* Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Pres, (p. 18). **Also** Jockel, Joseph T. (1987). *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958.* Vancouver, BC: University of BC Press , (pp. 105-106).
[140] It is not clear what the purpose of the memo was, other than to 'satisfy' Diefenbaker's obsession with NORAD being part of NATO.

fact, quite the contrary. The joint headquarters had been designed to prevent precisely it being like any other NATO command. [141] Jockel notes that this was clearly not for American eyes and Foulkes probably thought it was safe only going to Cabinet. It is unclear why he characterized his memorandum this way, except perhaps to placate Diefenbaker and Pearkes and to ensure the document got signed.

Somewhere in the chaos of the NORAD / NATO conflation, Diefenbaker discovered the existence of the *Canadian-US Regional Planning Group* (CUSRPG). He seized upon this group, that existed only on paper, as the linkage between NORAD and NATO. He was insistent that NORAD was simply an arrangement within CUSRPG which he declared had been NATO - oriented for several years.[142] Thus, by default, in his mind, NORAD became an extension of NATO. In reality, by 1954, the CUSRPG had all but stopped functioning. The concern of having critical strategic information available to other NATO nations was completely out of the question for the US JCS and the CCOS.

Diefenbaker's conflation of NORAD being part of NATO, was also complicated by the fact of NATO being "…[one of] the core elements of Canadian defence policy." [143] The relatively slow-moving aspects of NATO as a military function, and being an integral part of Canada's defence policy, the misinformed perception of Diefenbaker was that any potential nuclear threat would be a gradual transition through each stage. The Cuban crisis proved to be anything but gradual. It was immediate and all encompassing. To confront the threat facing

[141] Jockel, Joseph T. (1987). *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958.* Vancouver, BC: University of BC Press, (pp.105-106).
[142] Ibid., (pp. 97, 111-112).
[143] Haydon, Peter T. (1993). *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*. Toronto, ON: Canadian Printco Ltd. (p. 219).

North America Canadian defence policy was unprepared for the rapid transition from relative peace to the significant nuclear threat now facing North America.

At the time of the NORAD implementation during July 1957 Diefenbaker, in his acting position as Secretary of SSEA, never once consulted any officials at the DEA before signing his approval of the Foulkes memorandum. This was unfortunate, as the Department had been part of the ad hoc study group back in December 1956 when the initial report was approved. Undoubtedly, they would have been completely aware of the detail and circumstances of the report and how it may impact the final acceptance of NORAD. However, they were never consulted by Diefenbaker.[144] The new cabinet also never acted upon the draft memorandum, and on receiving the approval on the 24th July 1957, Chairman of the Chiefs Foulkes began the process and preparation of a press release announcing the new air defence agreement.[145]

The US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles was informed of Canadian approval when he visited Ottawa on the 27th July. There was yet to be a Cabinet Defence Committee formed, so the only action the cabinet could approve at a meeting on the 31st July, was an order-in-council approving Air Marshal Roy Slemon as the first Canadian Deputy Commander of NORAD as part of the new combined operational command system. This resulted in a proposal that only had partial cabinet approval. On the 1st of August 1957, MND Pearkes and his American counterpart, the US Secretary of Defense Charles Erwin Wilson announced the agreement.[146]

[144] Jockel, Joseph T. (1987). *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958.* Vancouver, BC: University of BC Press, (pp. 105-107).
[145] There are some CMR implications attached to CCOS Foulkes, and his methods of 'coercing' the PM and cabinet towards final signing and approval. Material for further study.
[146] Ibid., (p. 106).

The order-in-council appointing Slemon as Canadian Deputy Commander became misconstrued as a form of operational authority.[147] On the 12th of September 1957, NORAD went into operation without actual formal cabinet approval.[148] This must have been an embarrassment to the Diefenbaker government, although it is never mentioned as such. Final terms of reference and diplomatic notes were completed and signed on the 12th of May 1958, and NORAD became formally established. [149] "…[the negotiators ensured] that the notes [had] no structural links between NORAD and NATO."[150] [151] This preceding quote is in stark contrast to how Diefenbaker characterized the development of NORAD. In his memoir he states: "We felt, however, that Canadian interests would be more fully protected by confining NORAD to a NATO context. Indeed, we insisted upon it."[152] It would have been highly improbable for Diefenbaker to have had the NORAD insight that he professed to have in his memoirs, or as suggested in this quote, given only two weeks in office, and part of that being at a Commonwealth conference in London.

Ironically, Chairman Foulkes wrote to Jules Leger Under Secretary of State for External Affairs in November 1957 re-enforcing this conflated view suggesting that, "Canada should simply assume that NORAD was already part of NATO."[153] Leger warned his new minister,

[147] This OIC appointment of Slemon was actually only to approve his salary. It became (unsure why) viewed as the operational authority for NORAD, however, there was never a full cabinet approval. Material for further study.
[148] Ibid., (p. 109).
[149] There have been questions raised regarding a potential CMR violation, of NORAD being functional in 1957, prior to the exchange of notes and without cabinet approval until 1958. Material for further study.
[150] Jockel, Joseph T. (1987). *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958.* Vancouver, BC: University of BC Press, (p. 116).
[151] This notation about the negotiated notes shows the clear intention about ensuring no link existed between NORAD and NATO. However, the next footnote shows the temerity of Diefenbaker in spite of the evidence in front of him.
[152] Diefenbaker, John G. (1977). *One Canada, Memoirs...The Tumultuous Years 1962-1967, (Vol III).* Toronto, ON: Macmillan of Canada Ltd. (p. 27).
[153] Jockel, Joseph T. (1987). *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958.* Vancouver, BC: University of BC Press, (p. 112).

Sidney Smith, that this claim from Foulkes and Diefenbaker would ultimately fail, as there was only a nominal relationship between CUSRPG and NATO not as full as Diefenbaker professed. Furthermore, a quote from US NORAD principals: "…the US military are not prepared to implement such a concept at the moment."[154] [155]

Diefenbaker talks about this NORAD/NATO connection throughout his memoirs. It becomes his mantra and the point for his insisting that he should have been 'consulted' before Kennedy's address to the world on the 22nd of October 1962. He maintained this view well after leaving office.

The other complication between the US and Canada was the lack of any movement on the acquisition nuclear weapons for Canada. This had been an ongoing problem going back to the previous Liberal government. This new Conservative government in power, was unable to move the discussion either. Ironically, the new continental defence agreement between the US and Canada (NORAD) had joint command structures and was predicated on eventually having nuclear weapons systems in place. These concerns were the backdrop leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.

[154] Jockel, Joseph T. (1987). *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958.* Vancouver, BC: University of BC Press, (p. 112).
[155] Leger had heard this from his US counterpart and put it in his memo to Secretary Smith.

Chapter Three
The Cuban Missile Crisis & Canada

Chapter Three is more specific in context about the crisis and covers the elements that shaped the response and dysfunction of the Canadian military and civilian leadership. Principally, the status of the DND War Books are at the centre of all the discussion regarding CMR and the chapter starts at that point. The Harkness Papers follow and give history the only first-hand anecdotal account of the first two and one-half days of the crisis. There is nothing in his papers that gives rise to the unfounded allegation that MND Doug Harkness ordered the military to an un-authorized alert. Other narratives over the years have also mis-characterized the nature of the War Books and likewise have wrongly accused Harkness. They are covered here also.

The chapter concludes with a short description of RCN/RCAF operations in the Atlantic and the Pacific conducted in cooperation with US military forces. This was a functional carry-over from the exercise FALLEX (Atlantic) until the 25th of October 1962 when Canadian forces were finally staged to 'Ready State of Vigilance' - the equivalent of US DEFCON 3 (See Table 1).

There was nothing to substantiate the widely held notion that the War Books had been withdrawn for revision prior to the crisis (22nd of October). Therefore, the notion of them being withdrawn necessitated that the 'Ready' state could not be undertaken except by approval from the PM. The 'Ready' state was finally allowed to proceed two and one-half days later on the 25thof October 1962, however, not until Diefenbaker was made aware that the US had just gone

to DEFCON 2 from DEFCON 3 signally an increased state of tension between the US and the USSR.[156]

DND War Books

The status of the DND War Books became a critical issue during the first 48 hours of the Cuban missile crisis. Shortly after the end of World War II, Canadian civil and military leadership began developing strategies to deal with the looming threat of nuclear war. They started with the old World War II Government War Book in the hope that it could be modified. These plans soon became increasingly more complex for every department. Thus, there became a series of Government War Books, and the framework documents for all subordinate departments. They were all similar but each had specifics for various departments.[157] The DND War Book represented strategic requirements for civilian and military leadership during the Cold War and how they would make the transition from relative peace to nuclear war. There were many unknowns here as the only experience was that of World War II with a transition from peacetime to a conventional war. The complexities and speed of nuclear war execution were relatively unknown. This gap in strategy became more evident during the crisis, as joint command and control of the military appeared to be mostly non-existent.

The DND War Book defined the levels of alert status and who was responsible in terms of authority to move through each level. These levels were specifically ordained to put military mechanisms in place that could address threats that were constantly in flux. The first War Book in 1948 had the concerns of constantly changing threats as the Cold War loomed and the nuclear

[156] The chronology of these events are widely detailed by numerous Canadian authors and are indisputable. It was, however, not announced in the House of Commons until the 25th of October (Hansard).
[157] Gladman, Brad & Peter Archambault, (2015). "Advice and Indecision: Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Canadian Military History*. Vol. 23 (1), Article 2. [pp. 11-32].

threat became evermore present. Unable to keep pace with this constant change, DND started the process of *progressive revision*.[158] This was designed to keep the War Books in service, as imperfect as they may be at the time, until a new revised one could be issued.[159] The literature shows the process as a series of revisions (1955, 1959, 1961, 1962) to the War Books obviously the latest dated one being the current one in force. The latest War Book at the time of the Cuban crisis was the 9th January 1962 version.[160]

In 1958, due to newly developed knowledge regarding the speed at which a nuclear conflict could escalate, the Joint Planning Committee of the COS instituted two new staged States of Military Vigilance[161] discrete, and the ready state. Both could be put into force by the CCOS. The purpose of these new states was to provide a pre-condition of readiness, prior to the commencement of war and prior to the three formal alert levels: simple, re-enforced, and general, currently in the War Book. They were designed to bring quickly the forces to a more heightened level of readiness during an international crisis prior to any formal alert which could only be declared with the approval of the PM and Cabinet.

In 1961 and 1962, the War Books were further amended to clarify other portions[162] and an *Appendix 'A'* was attached to that revision to reinforce the detail for the states of military vigilance. The War Books served to conceptualize the issues of impending war by determining the relative authority of those individuals in the chain of command. These persons would be

[158] LAC, RG 2, Vol. 2750, File: CDC – Vol. VI, "Memo for Cabinet Defence Committee: Gov. War Book." Sep. 1948.
[159] Gladman, Brad & Peter Archambault, (2015). "Advice and Indecision: Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Canadian Military History*. Vol. 23 (1), Article 2. [pp. 11-32], (pp.20-21)
[160] Ibid., (p.24), **Also**: LAC, RG2, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents, Vol. 2752, File D-1-6-1, "Memo to Cabinet: Revised DND War Book." 9 January 1962.
[161] LAC, RG 24, DND Records, Vol. 549, File 096 103 v.3, Joint Planning Committee to the COSC, "CF States of Increased Military Vigilance, 23 December 1958."
[162] LAC RG2, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents, Vol. 2752, File D-1-6-1, "Memo to Cabinet: Revised DND War Book." 9 January 1962.

responsible for implementing the levels of military alert as the threat of war increased. The Cold War and the shifting dynamics of nuclear war seemed to heighten these concerns.

The following table illustrates the broad equivalence between *US States of Alert* (DEFCON) and the *Canadian States of Vigilance* in October 1962. There are numerous conditions and elements of transition within each state of vigilance that the War Book details as an indication of each current phase. Within that, there are some minor overlap between conditions. The difference between *Reinforced* and *General* is difficult to compare with DEFCON 1 exactly. Canada never went beyond the 'Ready State'.

Table 1. Canadian & US Alert Comparisons

Canadian States of Vigilance	Conditions	Canadian Authority	US Equivalent
--	Normal or Lowest State	--	Defcon 5
Discreet Phase	Increased Intelligence Watch	CCOS and COS	Defcon 4
Ready State	Increase in Readiness Above Normal Readiness	CCOS and COS	Defcon 3
Simple Alert	Next Step to nuclear War	PM and Cabinet	Defcon 2
Reinforced>>General	Nuclear War is imminent	PM and Cabinet	Defcon 1

The Harkness Papers

The crisis did not become a critical factor for the Diefenbaker government until the morning after President Kennedy's televised speech on the 22nd of October 1962 at the regular cabinet meeting. American forces had been placed on DEFCON 3. Immediately after the speech

Minister of National Defence Doug Harkness found himself now making an appeal for the Canadian military to match the US alert. There are differing versions of what transpired in Ottawa those first few days following Kennedy's speech.

Doug Harkness' account of the events from 22nd to 25th October are anecdotal although firsthand. He wrote them shortly after the events of 1962. Subsequent second hand accounts are simply a version of Harkness' account, and mostly conflates his putting the military on full alert without proper authority. His account was first published in the *Calgary Herald,* on October 1977.[163]

> I wrote this account chiefly for historical reasons, so that when historians came to write their assessments of the period, the facts would be available to them. The publication of Mr. Diefenbaker's third volume of his memoirs caused me to decide to publish the account I had written in 1963 at this time. His story is a combination of omissions, misrepresentations and fanciful inventions that I believe I owe it to those involved and to the Canadian people to set the record straight for the period from the Cuban missile crisis to the fall of the government in February 1963.[164]

According to Harkness, within an hour of Kennedy's speech on the 22nd of October the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff (CCOS) Air Marshall Frank Miller received formal notice that US forces had moved to DEFCON 3. Miller went to Harkness's office:

> He asked for authority to put our forces on the same stage of alert (in the Canadian system and 'Ready' state of military vigilance).
> I [Harkness] told Miller to order the Chiefs of Staff to put their forces on the 'Ready' State of alert, but we both decided the best course would be for me to clear this action with the PM first. [165]

Obviously, there must have been more discussion that transpired between Miller and Harkness regarding states of vigilance or alert that is not recorded in the published Harkness papers. Further documentation, however, from Gladman and Archambault suggest that during their discussion Miller did tell Harkness that the revision giving the MND authority to issue such

163 Harkness, Hon. Douglas, (1977). "The Harkness Papers." *The Calgary Herald* and simultaneously in *The Ottawa Citizen* October 19, 20, 21 & 22, 1977. https://www.newspapers.com/ (by ancestry)
164 Ibid., *Calgary Herald,* 19th October 1977.
165 Ibid., *Calgary Herald,* 19th October 1977.

an alert had not yet been approved.[166] If Miller was thinking he meant a General alert; the equivalent of US DEFCON 1, or at minimum 2. That provision still remained with the PM. This is only conjecture as it seems clear that Harkness was not suggesting a general alert. He notes clearly in his papers about only seeking the 'Ready' state. Regardless, Miller's push-back against Harkness did effectively confuse them both and: "…obfuscate the fact that the CCOS [Miller and the service chiefs] already had that specific authority first granted them by the 21st December 1959 amendment to the 1955 DND War Book and continuously since then to act." [167] (See Table 1). Had the crisis escalated to a nuclear exchange the failure of the CCOS to act may have resulted in charges of dereliction of duties had there been enough people left alive to invoke the charges.

Nothing was preventing Miller and his COS from issuing a 'Ready' state of vigilance other than the wrath of Diefenbaker. Ironically, at the time of the amendment giving the CCOS authority for the 'Ready' State of Vigilance (1958-59), Miller had been the Deputy Minister of National Defence.[168] One would think he should have been aware of the War Book revision as he would have had to sign off on it at minimum. On top of this, Miller's approach neglected his other responsibility of not informing Harkness of the content of the War Book. One can perhaps give Harkness a minor pass for not knowing exactly the status of the War Books, but the CCOS at minimum, should know explicitly the parameters of his and his staff's authority.

Miller was certainly aware of some pending amendments evidenced by his remarks to Harkness. At this point, however, doubt was sown and according to the Harkness papers they

[166] This documentation referred to by Gladman & Archambault is from LAC MG 32, Papers of Douglas Harkness, vol. 57. "The Nuclear Arms Question…" Harkness likely didn't think it was important enough, at the time, to include in his newspaper accounting of the events.
[167] Gladman, Brad & Peter Archambault, (2015). "Advice and Indecision: : Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Canadian Military History*. Vol. 23 (1), Article 2. [pp. 11-32], (p. 28).
[168] LAC, RG2, Records of the Privy Council Office, Cabinet Defence Committee, Records of these meetings show Miller's Attendance as Deputy MND.

both felt they should seek the PM's approval before proceeding. The opportunity for Miller to fulfill the obligations of his position vanished at that moment.

This was an unfortunate conflation of the content and nature of the still in-service DND War Book. As previously noted, the War Books provided, as they had since 1959, the CCOS and the COS the authority to proceed to the 'Ready' state, without Cabinet approval.[169] (See Table 1). Why they did not proceed remains an open and speculative question. [170]

Harkness then telephoned Diefenbaker, met him at his office to discuss the situation and detailed the action Miller and he were recommending. There does not appear to be any discussion between Diefenbaker and Harkness about the War Book, its status and why Miller and he had deferred this decision to the PM. It is also unclear if Diefenbaker would have known much about the War Books if anything. Nevertheless, Diefenbaker felt it required cabinet approval and they would discuss it the next day. Harkness notes: "…I went back to my office and discussed with Miller…what actions we could take without declaring a formal alert."[171]

The next day (23rd of October), at the regular morning cabinet meeting, the situation was fully discussed and debated. Harkness concluded from the meeting that there seemed to be growing consensus with most of the Cabinet supporting his argument. Diefenbaker argued against it as he thought it would alarm the public unnecessarily. Consequently, nothing conclusive came out of that meeting and another day went by without an alert. Harkness stated:

> Following the cabinet meeting I again met with the chiefs and ordered them to put into effect all the precautions [preparations] we had discussed, but in as quiet and unobtrusive way as possible.[172]

[169] Appendix "A" To Memorandum to the Cabinet Defence Committee, 18th December 1961.
[170] Miller's push-back to Harkness could suggest he thought Harkness meant a 'General' alert, in which he was correct by stating, that authority was still with the PM. However, Harkness' papers clearly state, he asked about 'Ready' state and Miller appears to never follow up.
[171] Harkness, Hon. Douglas, (1977). "The Harkness Papers." *The Calgary Herald*. 19th October 1977. https://www.newspapers.com/ (by ancestry).
[172] Ibid., (There is nothing in this statement to indicate Harkness ordered any type of 'Alert').

There is no mention of the crisis in Hansard at all for the 23rd of October. Harkness did convince Diefenbaker to convene a special cabinet meeting the following day, on the 24th of October to discuss the Cuban crisis in more detail. From the Harkness memoir, the PM had some very harsh words for Harkness as he tried to present his case. Again, Harkness noted that the cabinet appeared to be fully with him, but Diefenbaker apparently exclaimed loudly that he would not be forced into any such action. This meeting also ended without a decision but later Gordon Churchill Minister of Veterans Affairs approached Harkness at which he stated:

> The Cuban affair shook the confidence of a number of the cabinet in the prime minister and the faith of all in him was, I believe never restored to what it had been. As an example, Gordon Churchill said to me in regard to the Wednesday cabinet meeting that the country just could not afford to have the prime minister in that position at a time of crisis --he refused to act when action was absolutely essential.[173]

When Harkness returned to his office later that morning (24th of October), Miller had further correspondence from NORAD that US forces had increased alert to DEFCON 2[174] as the US shipping blockade around Cuba went into effect. NORAD Command was urgently requesting that Canada go to a formal alert. Harkness immediately took this information to Diefenbaker and after considerable discussion he finally received approval for a 'Ready State of Vigilance' alert, not DEFCON 2, but equivalent to DEFCON 3. Miller was informed and he phoned his Chiefs and the 'Ready' state of alert was sent out. (See Table 1).

Later that same day when the House met at 2:30 pm, Diefenbaker, speaking in the House of Commons, offers nothing in support of the US, nor does he advise the House of the military measures taken. [175] However, a question from the Liberal defence critic, Paul Hellyer directed to

[173] Harkness, Hon. Douglas, (1977). "The Harkness Papers." *The Calgary Herald*, 19th October 1977. https://www.newspapers.com/ (by ancestry)
[174] DEFCON 2, (Next step is nuclear war)
[175] Canada, *House of Commons Debates* (Hansard), October 24th 1962, (p. 869).

Harkness regarding the "effectiveness of North American defence," brought the following response from Harkness:

> Mr. Speaker, we have taken certain precautionary military measures which will have the effect of improving the capability of the armed forces to respond to any situation that may exist.[176]

Nothing is announced until the next day (25th October), when the PM gives a flamboyant and grandiose statement in the House, fully supporting the US, as if the previous two and one-half days did not exist, and informing the House that action was taken.[177] The tragic issue facing the Canadian military at this point was that with the potential for a nuclear war, now imminent, there was still no nuclear weapons available for Canadian forces.

Other Voices

Jocelyn Maynard Ghent in *Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,*[178] clearly lays out the complete disconnect between Diefenbaker and Kennedy during the crisis. She points out that the root of these problems actually started with the Canadian attitude toward communist governments, especially Cuba. Many Canadians felt, "…they shared with Cuba the status of an economic satellite to American industry."[179] This of course contributed to the ongoing angst on the part of the Americans as Canada continued to trade with Cuba. From 1961 through 1963, Americans continued to be particularly concerned about what they viewed as a Canadian lack of cooperation in what was clearly, a severe threat to the hemisphere.

Ghent suggests that neither country really understood the other's position on Cuba. The US saw the Soviet build-up of military power on the island as a threat, and expected Canada's

[176] Harkness, Douglas L. (1962). *House of Commons Debates* (Hansard), October 24th 1962, (p. 884).
[177] Diefenbaker, John G. (1962). *House of Commons Debates* (Hansard), October 25th 1962, (p. 911).
[178] Ghent, Jocelyn M. (1979). "Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Pacific Historical Review.* Vol. 48 (2), [pp. 159-184].
[179] Ibid., (p. 160).

support in containing Cuban communism. As noted, none of the increasing Soviet activity on Cuban soil was particularly secret. Canadian officials were certainly aware of it. It was, however, stated by the Soviet's that it was entirely 'defensive'.

As Ghent again states: "Canadians tended to view American fears as yet another exaggeration to the potential Cuban threat."[180] This was also the view held initially by the Diefenbaker cabinet which quickly changed. Diefenbaker was banking on the Canadian public to share his perspective, but in the end, he grossly miscalculated the popularity of Kennedy. The Canadian public were particularly upset with his taking almost three days to support fully the American forces at the onset of the crisis.[181]

The American government was intent on blocking communist penetration into the western hemisphere, and that meant as many sanctions as possible. Canada did participate in a strategic embargo, such as on the sale of goods that may find some military function in the future. As Ghent notes, however, Canadians in general felt some kinship with Cuba as also being a somewhat economic slave to American industry.[182] As Castro expropriated American property in Cuba, some Canadians saw this simply as a small economy freeing itself from excessive foreign investment. The failed US backed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, in an attempt to over-throw Castro did nothing to enhance relations between Canada and the US.

Ghent's article has been widely read and referenced by many authors including Haydon. She also notes an informal agreement set up at NORAD, during its inception, that in the event of a crisis, the President and the Prime Minister would consult about the "risks and repercussions"

[180] Ghent, Jocelyn M. (1979). "Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Pacific Historical Review.* Vol. 48 (2), [pp. 159-184], (p. 162).
[181] Haydon, Robinson, Ghent et al…
[182] Ghent, Jocelyn M. (1979). "Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Pacific Historical Review.* Vol. 48 (2), [pp. 159-184], (pp. 160-162).

of joint military proposals for action.[183] Diefenbaker certainly was aware of some form of consultation that he felt he was entitled to receive, but it is unclear if what Ghent posits here is what he expected, or if it was under his conflation of NORAD/NATO. Regardless, at this stage of the crisis, it was common knowledge that the PM was very disturbed that this had not occurred.

Unfortunately, Ghent also contributes to the confusion with her conflation of the Canadian War Books status during the crisis, and the response of the civil-military leadership. She states: "Although the correct procedure to follow was *open to question*, Harkness and his senior military advisors were in immediate agreement on the necessity for an alert."[184] This is a troubling statement because there was nothing 'open to question' regarding the War Books or procedure. There was some discussion between Harkness and Miller, previously noted, regarding what action perhaps needed to be taken. Whether it was immediate or fully agreed upon as she states is not that clear from Harkness' account. Ghent may have just been speculating regarding the discussion or actions. Unfortunately, however, that only pushes further un-substantiated positions. She further states:

> The old war books, which were no longer in use, gave authority to the Prime Minister and his cabinet. The new war books, not yet approved by cabinet, gave it to the Defence Minister. [185]

Her characterization of the 'old' and the 'new' War Books is also incorrect. They were never referred to as such. They were continuous as they had been since 1948 with *progressive revisions* to allow existing versions to remain in force, until the revisions were complete.[186]

> Harkness decided therefore that he must consult Diefenbaker. Telling the Chiefs to 'get ready,'

[183] Ghent, Jocelyn M. (1979). "Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Pacific Historical Review*. Vol. 48 (2), [pp. 159-184]. (pp. 167-168).
[184] (p.168, Italics are mine).
[185] Ibid., (p. 169).
[186] Recent documentation received from LAC supports the 'progressive revision' process, Re: LAC, RG 2, Vol. 2750, File: CDC – Vol. VI, "Memo for Cabinet Defence Committee: Gov. War Book." (Sep 1948).

> he left to confer with the PM, completely confident that the matter would be a mere formality. Diefenbaker, however, refused to give an alert until Cabinet could meet and discuss the situation the next morning [23rd October]. Believing that he has no other recourse, Harkness returned to the Chiefs of Staff meeting and authorized the alert on his own.[187]

This is also not correct. Harkness never ordered an alert of any kind. His direction to the Chiefs of Staff never went beyond 'get ready as unobtrusively as possible'. Her article never mentions the 'Ready state of vigilance', but only talks about an alert in very general terms, which is also concerning.

Ghent also links no reference to the Canadian equivalent to US DEFCON 3. In keeping with many others who have commented on Canadian involvement in the crisis, she seems completely unable to make the distinction between the "Ready' state of vigilance and the three stages of 'General' alert. She is not alone in her conflations and misrepresentations of what occurred regarding Canadian response during the crisis, but she does appear to be one of the first (1979). She is quoted in most subsequent articles regarding Canada's role in the crisis, including Peter Haydon, in which he also pushes the withdrawn War Books narrative. It is very likely that Ghent, as one of the originators of these wrongly stated War Book facts set the stage from which other authors seem to have simply carried the errors forward.

A more recent account of Canadian involvement crisis comes from Erika Simpson in her *NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics*. She deals with the Cuban missile crisis in four pages.[188] Most of what she says in those few pages is simply wrong. One of her endnotes for this section states: "Harkness had gone ahead and put the Canadian Forces on equivalent alert status to US DEFCON 2 without receiving Diefenbaker's approval."[189] She

[187] Ghent, Jocelyn M. (1979). "Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Pacific Historical Review*. Vol. 48 (2), [pp. 159-184], (p. 169).
[188] Simpson, Erika, (2001). *NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics.* Quebec City, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, (pp. 118 – 122).
[189] Ibid., (her endnote #66, p. 281).

states two references for this assertion, one being the 'Harkness Papers' in the *Ottawa Citizen*, and the other, an alleged comment Harkness made in a letter to Brig-Gen J.A. Clark in November 1962,

> …we began immediately to take precautionary military actions and within approximately forty hours of the President's announcement, we had reached the same state of readiness in our air defence forces as those of the US…[190]

These assertions of hers are incorrect. The Harkness papers do not mention the Canadian military going to any alert status, prior to the PM giving authority, let alone DEFCON 2.

The alleged Harkness comment in the letter to Clark ironically is confirmation of what he stated in his papers. Doing the math, approximately forty hours after Kennedy's speech would put the timeline around the late morning of the 24th of October. This would be when, upon hearing the new information that the US had now gone to DEFCON 2, Diefenbaker begrudgingly told Harkness to proceed and issue the Canadian alert, but only to equivalent DEFCON 3. These facts are clear in the Harkness papers and hardly ambiguous. Using the Harkness papers as one of her sources makes it clear that she either did not read them, or grossly misunderstood them. It brings into question, her entire body of work. The misinterpretation of these events by all these authors is very troubling to say the least.

In his 1977 memoirs, Diefenbaker appears to have had some awareness of the 'alert' controversy surrounding Harkness as he states: "As to the popular notion that [the MND] Mr. Harkness, under the influence of the Canadian military and the United States Pentagon, engaged in a clandestine authorization of a full alert on 22nd October. I [Diefenbaker] do not believe it to

[190] Simpson, Erika, (2001). *NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics.* Quebec City, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, (her endnote #66, p. 281).

be true."[191] Apart from getting the date wrong (it was 23rd October) and so many other errors in his book, this does, however, seem to be an attempt at obfuscating what Harkness actually did. Basil Robinson notes the fact about Harkness and the chiefs of staff informally bringing the military to a "state of maximum preparedness short of declaring the formal alert". Robinson's choice of words here are significant. He states further: "Whether Diefenbaker knew this…is a point of some interest."[192]

Robinson notes further that Bob Bryce Secretary to the Cabinet recalled that Diefenbaker had a very keen sense of what was going on, and preferred to just let things happen informally at that time. Robinson suggests that it was very unlikely that he was completely unaware of what was occurring during the crisis.[193] Diefenbaker was, however, silent in his memoir as to what directions Harkness actually gave to the CCOS on the 23rd of October. It is more likely that the PM had no comprehension of the drama unfolding before him. He clearly knew nothing about the War Books or the provisions within.

What becomes clearer through all the situations the Conservative government became involved in was consistent indecision from Diefenbaker on all matters, large or small. These became extremely difficult matters for government staff and committees to deal with. They had no idea of the reaction that might be coming and/or implementation to be taken.[194] Diefenbaker's demeanor on the political stage as a leader is well documented as being consistently indecisive.[195] He was, however, a rather effective Member of Parliament since his

[191] Diefenbaker, John G., (1977). *One Canada: Memoirs…The Tumultuous Years, 1962 to 1967 (Vol. III)*. Toronto, ON: Macmillan of Canada Ltd. (p. 88).
[192] Robinson, H. Basil (1989). *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs.* Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, (p. 288)
[193] Ibid., (p. 288).
[194] Ibid.
[195] Robinson, Jockel, Haydon, Ghent, et al.

first election in 1940 defending the oppressed and marginalized, at times vociferously. A decisive leader he was not.

At the height of the crisis, the disconnect between civil authority and CCOS and field command/ operations was palpable. There are no records of meaningful dialogue amongst the leadership until the 25th of October when the authority to match DEFCON 3 was given. The problems between Diefenbaker and Kennedy were highly political, and at that point, primarily had to do with Canada's refusal to put its military on alert in concert with the US. Further to that, Diefenbaker had been insulted that he was not sufficiently consulted by Kennedy regarding the pending blockade of Cuba.[196] The consultation process was something Diefenbaker perhaps had some reason to expect. His reaction and obsession with it, however, completely clouded his judgement and ability dealing with the overall crisis.

As Jockel states: "The Canadian government saw the right to be consulted on matters of war and peace as the *quid pro quo* for NORAD's establishment."[197] Jockel further quotes a portion of the NORAD agreement, which states:

> The two governments consider that the establishment of integrated air defence arrangements increases the importance of the fullest possible consultation between the two governments on all matters affecting the joint defence of North America, and that defence cooperation between them can be worked out on a mutually satisfactory basis only if such consultation is regularly and consistently undertaken.[198]

By 1962, this consultation process was almost non-existent and had thus become the mantra of the NORAD critics. Canada and the United States did not see each other in the same light as far as a partnership was concerned. Jockel notes the critics saying, "…influence in military alliance

[196] Haydon, Robinson, et al.
[197] Jockel, Joseph T. (1987). *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958.* Vancouver, BC: University of BC Press, (p. 128).
[198] Ibid., (p. 128).

is roughly proportional to the power of the nation-state, and the US considered Canada a small, minor power."[199]

It is unclear if Diefenbaker had any detailed knowledge of Howard Green's initiated activities at the Canadian embassy in Cuba and their surveillance efforts around Soviet and Cuban military movements during the summer of 1962. It is clear, from the evidence presented, that Diefenbaker abdicated his responsibility in terms of his waiting for almost three days to show political or military support for the US after the 22nd of October.

The impact Diefenbaker's actions had on the overall CMR within the military-civil command leadership seemed to freeze everyone in Ottawa with inaction. The bi-national component of the alliance between the US and Canadian forces, however, provided a clear understanding and knowledge of the potential threat facing the continent. Canadian field forces simply had no direction from the Ottawa civil or military leadership during the first forty-eight hours of the crisis.

Diefenbaker had issues of distrust of the military, dislike of Kennedy and no meaningful understanding of NORAD/NATO functionality. These were not the sole reasons for his delay in giving the authority to match the US alert, although they were contributary. The greater issue was the military leadership not understanding, not knowing, or simply ignoring what was available to them. Miller effectively telling Harkness he could not carry out the order that was asked of him and his reason is rather stunning. There is no real explanation for his response to Harkness or his lack of action.

[199] Jockel, Joseph T. (1987). *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958.* Vancouver, BC: University of BC Press,

MARCOM Atlantic, Halifax October 1962.

What is not widely reported is that operationally, Canadian forces personnel at all levels went about doing the jobs they had been trained to do. The operational integration of maritime command RCN and RCAF NORAD forces in the field with USN and USAF forces responded as designed. They fulfilled their mutual obligations by prosecuting the Soviet submarine threat as it presented itself and maintained a high NORAD alert watch throughout the crisis. The Canadian Navy and the maritime component of the RCAF were a particular force in the tracking and surveillance of the Soviet submarine fleet during this period, as this was precisely their practised and exercised NATO responsibility.

There was a marked distinction between Kennedy's speech on the 22nd of October, and the alert experienced on and after the 25th of October. The 'action stations' experience after the 25th of October was far from any exercise previously experienced. Fundamentally, this thesis corrects the erroneous allegations of un-authorized action by Canadian forces prior to the Canadian alert matching US DEFCON 3 announced on the 25th of October 1962.

From a Naval perspective, some ships and aircraft were already at sea towards the end of FALLEX 1962. The American forces had just pulled out for obvious reasons. Some ships of the USN, not withdrawn to the Caribbean just yet, remained on station in the area to continue submarine surveillance with the RCN, but not in an 'exercise' mode as per their command instructions.[200] Those RCN ships that did not require fuel and provisions were directed by Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) Admiral Rayner to remain at sea and finish their portion of the exercise,

[200] The joint USN/RCN function of the ASW operations was seamless throughout the period. Fundamentally, there was little difference between an 'exercise' and reality. For the RCN, while deployed at sea, prior to the alert being given, they continued with MARLEX, an ASW exercise, under the full authority (through the CNS) of MARCOM Atlantic, Rear-Admiral Kenneth L. Dyer.

renamed MARLEX, which Admiral Dyer, Maritime Commander (MARCOM), had full authority to do.

The rest of the Fleet remained back in Halifax. After Kennedy's address on the 22nd of October in anticipation of what may be coming all available vessels 'quietly' prepared by fueling and provisioning. They sailed at 18:00 local time on the 25th of October[201] after authority to match US DEFCON 3 was given. It should be noted here that during the Cold War, whenever RCN ships were at sea, regardless of being on exercise or not, ASW activity and surveillance was always carried out. The watch or duty stations were in a more relaxed mode than any alert state, but there was never a down time until arriving in port someplace.

On the West coast, MARCOM Pacific Esquimalt was commanded by Rear-Admiral E.W. Finch-Noyes. There was only marginal activity in the Pacific some 250 miles off the west coast. One suspected Soviet submarine contact was being tracked by joint USN-RCN ASW forces. Nonetheless, MARCOM Pacific was under the same alert process. All elements of the Canadian Armed Forces were ready. How long this state would continue, or what the final outcome would be, was at this point, unknown.

[201] Haydon, Peter T. (1993). *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*. Toronto, ON: Canadian Printco Ltd. (pp. 242-243). These are signals from CANFLAGLANT showing ship and sailing status on 25th October 1962.

Chapter Four
Conclusion

It is important to conclude this thesis with a look back at what has been determined through these pages. The issues described here occurred within a very short time frame. From President Kennedy's speech in the early evening of the 22nd of October 1962 until about mid-day on the 24th of October, a period of about forty hours elapsed. In that short time, Canadian CMR, from the military leadership perspective, collapsed. Diefenbaker's responsibility as the Prime Minister also collapsed, as he refused to bring Canadian forces to a comparable alert of US DEFCON 3 and only relented when the US raised their alert to DEFCON 2.

The surrounding events of this period are described in this final chapter as outcomes from the Canadian leadership in-action in terms of potential consequences had the circumstances of pending war materialized. There are always lessons to be learned, particularly from failed or absent defence policy. These are touched on briefly, but clearly deserve further study. Canadian government relative silence regarding involvement in the crisis is also analysed, but unfortunately reasons are only speculative at best.

The last part of the chapter gives a brief synopsis for future study of various elements that have been brought into focus through this thesis. Particularly the evolution of the War Books of 1962 into a new format called *Comprehensive Approach* is considered. Civil-Military Relations has also had a dramatic philosophical revolution that is characterized now as *Pragmatic Control*. Both of these new approaches to older issues require considerable further study.

From an operational perspective, joint Canada-US military exercises had been going on for some time. The irony of this joint relationship was that it had no political bias or perspective. Both Canadian and US military worked seamlessly through all the political turmoil between Ottawa and Washington in the prosecution of North American defence. The operational

integration that had saved the day during the crisis was part of the joint planning and training that had existed between the US and Canadian forces since World War II. "In continental defence, close working relationships existed without any threat to the sovereignty of either partner. But this was not understood in Ottawa."[202]

Unfortunately, these joint policies started to become completely problematic for Canadian politicians when Diefenbaker came into power in 1957. They saw it simply as a threat to maintaining traditional civil control of the military.[203] The 'Command Era' defence philosophy was characterized by "…military concepts of decision making and administration [and] a reliance on subjectivity based on [the] experience [of the senior military leadership]…"[204] It began to unravel in the beginning of the 1960s. "By 1962, faith in the direction of defence policy and how it was being administered had almost completely broken down."[205] The new 'Management Era' designed to replace the previous policy was based on the current business practices of the day and had already started to get traction by the outbreak of the crisis.

The Royal Commission on Government Organization (RCGO)[206] was convened in 1960, and chaired by J. Grant Glassco. Known as the 'Glassco Commission', it was tasked with recommending new processes designed to replace the military way of management with a civilian one. The content of the Glassco Commission is quite beyond the scope of this thesis and

[202] Haydon, Peter T. (1993). *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered.* Toronto, ON: Canadian Printco Ltd. (p. 218).
[203] Ibid.
[204] Bland, Douglas L. (1987). *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947-1985.* Kingston, ON: Ronald P. Frye & Co. (p. 5).
[205] Ibid., (p. 23).
[206] Canada, *Royal Commission on Government Organization* (RCGO). Ottawa: (Queens Printer 1962). (The Glassco Commission).

is noted for further study at the end of this chapter. Nonetheless, the concepts of a military chain of command management of DND affairs was clearly on the way out by1962.

Canadian CMR Context

In 1962, the theories of civil-military relations were not as developed as they are now. In the senior Canadian military leadership, the essence of functionality between the civil sphere and the military sphere were rather novel. The notion of who reported to whom was understood as the military being subservient to civil authority, but the mechanics of how that should function was not that well understood or exercised. Huntington's theories of 'objective' and 'subjective' control were only five years old and other variations were yet to come. Effective CMR demands a serious respect for the spheres of responsibility that the civil and military leadership should have including inherent knowledge about and within their respective roles.

In the case of the Cuban missile crisis there was an onus on the PM and his Cabinet to investigate fully and understand the capability and limitation of the military forces at their disposal. There was an equal responsibility for the CCOS and the COS to advise the PM through the Minister of National Defence of what those limitations in capacity might be. Dialogue between the two spheres was critical for any expectation of sensitivity from the CCOS about the political prerogatives currently in play, or conversely, executive competence from the civil leadership. The above, for all intent, and purposes, is a version of Huntington's objective theory of civil control that was absent.

In 1962, the crux of the problem, for the CCOS and the COS absolutely meant thorough knowledge of the status and operational content of the DND War Books. There was an imperative duty for strategic communication between the civil and military leadership to ensure

coherence of duties and responsibilities . This of course supposes a healthy and shared understanding of the responsibility of each other's role that was obviously absent.[207]

Evidence shows that very little of the above occurred, from either the senior civil or the military leadership. There is much to suggest that Diefenbaker rarely, if ever, inquired as to the nature of the military at his disposal, let alone its limitations. His autocratic style of leadership being caustic and bombastic seemed to freeze everyone around him into a state of in-action. The facts, widely documented, are that Diefenbaker rarely sought, nor seemed to want any military advice. Some commentary has suggested that Diefenbaker's reticence regarding advice gave Harkness and the CCOS no choice but to proceed without authority. As noted previously, Harkness never went beyond his own authority; of directing the CCOS to quietly prepare until proper authority to proceed could be obtained. The notion is completely ridiculous. There is no exoneration for proceeding to any action or engagement absent of authority. Authority is the essence of CMR.

CMR implications had little to do with the 'quietly preparing' instructions that Harkness directed the CCOS and the COS to carry out. It had more to do with the CCOS's particular request to at least attempt to provide advice. There is no evidence that the military leadership made any such attempt to fulfill those obligations. It would appear from the literature that there was only dialogue between Harkness and CCOS. There does not appear to be any 'inquiring' from the Cabinet or Diefenbaker of military limitation, or capacities. It is equally unclear if there was any military advice being put forth to Cabinet.

[207] The civil-military relationship parameters noted here and in other places, are paraphrased primarily from the work of Roi & Smolynec (2010) "Canadian civil-military relations: Int'l leadership, military capacity, and overreach." The CMR principles were as valid for Diefenbaker & Miller et al in 1962 as they are in today's defence policy. They are irrespective of the politics.

Harkness was certainly trying to advise the PM, but without much success, of the extreme gravity of the situation, and the necessity for the Canadian military to match the US DEFCON 3 alert status. Initially, matching the US alert state seemed to be of secondary concern for the Cabinet as they seemed to have more pressing issues with not being consulted by Kennedy prior to the 22nd of October. Some of them, with Diefenbaker and Howard Green's prompting, had further concerns about a generally felt US exaggeration of the crisis. This all changed at the Cabinet meeting of the 24th of October, except for Diefenbaker. After the meeting and the revelation about the US proceeding to DEFCON 2, Diefenbaker finally relented, but only to the equivalent of DEFCON 3, the 'Ready' state of vigilance (See Table 1).

Harkness, although technically a member of Cabinet and a civilian, was also a World War II veteran and knew the capabilities, command functions and limitations of the military, most likely better than most of his colleagues. Whatever advice or recommendations that may have been suggested to the PM and Cabinet, it would appear it fell on deaf ears.

Harkness talks about his ongoing dialogue with the CCOS and the COS in his papers and one is left with a feeling that this was an amical relationship of some trust and respect. He appeared clear about what were his roles and duties.[208] The one exception is when Miller pushed back against Harkness' first inclination to match the US alert with the 'Ready' state of vigilance. There is little doubt that there was some question in their minds about what was available to them for action. This had never been done before, and a simple solution, perhaps, was to pass the responsibility to the PM. Why the doubt was there in the first place, is the fundamental question. There does not appear to be an unequivocal answer.

208 Harkness, Hon. Douglas, (1977). "The Harkness Papers." *Calgary Herald,* 19th October 1977. https://www.newspapers.com/ (by ancestry).

Having an answer, such as the War Books being withdrawn, was the easy one. It certainly put the CCOS and the COS in a position of relinquishing their authority and not having to make a decision. If this was so clear and unequivocal, as so many authors suggest, then, Harkness' (and others) silence about it is problematic. Having all this ambiguity about the War Books and frustrated notions of who had or did not have the authority to act made Harkness and the military easy targets for the accusation of going to full alert without authority.

There was certainly abdication on the part of the PM and the Cabinet for initially allowing the lack of consultation from Kennedy about the crisis to cloud their obligations as a sitting government in the face of an international crisis. The breakdown within the civil sphere of responsibility is very clear, evidenced by the PM's inaction from the beginning of the crisis. From the military perspective, the evidence was not so clear. Whether the CCOS and the COS had full knowledge of their obligations within the War Books is unknown and speculative only. Ignorance is never an excuse and theirs is undoubtedly the greater fault.

Nonetheless, the CCOS and the COS chose not to investigate their options which is very troubling and is an abdication of their responsibility. Both the civil and the military sphere have culpability from a civil-military relations breakdown perspective. How much blame each element should take on has been debated ad nauseum. The lack of rigour exhibited by the military leadership for not acting on the War Book provisions implies a greater burden of responsibility on them. It created an un-necessary domestic crisis in the face of a potential international catastrophe. Concurrently, it exacerbated the delay of Canadian support for the US.[209]

[209] Gladman, Brad & Peter Archambault, (2015). "Advice and Indecision: Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Canadian Military Journal.* Vol. 23 (1), Article 2. [pp. 11-32].

Findings

Most of the literature about Canadian involvement in the Cuban missile crisis centres around an assortment of accusations against the MND Doug Harkness for ordering the military into an alert without proper authority. Those accusations are completely without merit. Central to those accusations is the controversial status and operational content of the Canadian War Books during the crisis. The notion of having no War Book in service during a revision process makes no sense at all. Even more illogical is that during an active crisis, such as the Cuban missile crisis, not having a War Book to direct operations is completely counterproductive.

Significantly, there is also no evidence that the DND War Book was ever withdrawn. In fact, evidence indicates that the War Book was still valid, and in force. It is true there were some revisions pending that had not yet been approved by the Cabinet Defence Committee, but they were only concerning descriptive elements for clarification between military vigilance and general alert. [210] There is ample evidence of previous years of *progressive revision* going back to 1948, and never withdrawing the War Books.[211] They remained in service and were just re-issued periodically with the new revisions. Throughout the crucial first few days there does appear to be confusion, but never a mention of the War Books being withdrawn.

There is also no evidence that Harkness ever ordered the military to any formal alert status beyond his authority. The common reason being [touted] shortly after the crisis and since, was that because of the PM and Cabinet delay in ordering the 'Ready' State of Vigilance, Harkness then felt it necessary to order the alert on his own. This position, however, is entirely

[210] Gladman, Brad & Peter Archambault, (2015). "Advice and Indecision: Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Canadian Military Journal.* Vol. 23 (1), Article 2. [pp. 11-32].
[211] LAC, RG 2, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents, Vol. 2750, File VI, "Memo for Cabinet Defence Committee: Government War Book." September 1948.

predicated on the supposition that the War Books had indeed been withdrawn, and Harkness therefore felt compelled to go to a full alert status. This is nonsense; none of this is correct, but this is the narrative that seems to have attributed the bulk of the responsibility onto Diefenbaker. Although the PM had some culpability here as final authority on all matters, the larger responsibility should be placed upon the CCOS and the COS. They had the sole authority, as per the War Book, to issue the 'Ready' phase and did not do so. To emphasize this further, Harkness never went beyond 'quietly preparing' until authority could be obtained from Diefenbaker.

It would be particularly naive to think that the Cabinet was completely unaware of the circumstances unravelling in Cuba. There is ample evidence of parliamentary discussions and debate regarding the building tensions in the Caribbean.[212] By 1962, however, there was already an ever-widening gulf between the Canadian military and the civilian leadership. Douglas Bland talked about this in terms of the beginning transition from the 'command era' to the 'management era' of defence policy.[213] Haydon in his book relates the problem during this period as a dysfunctional command and control with little meaningful communication between the civil and military realms. Both describe essentially the same issues. Regardless of the characterization of the defence policy and problems at the time, CMR had become the central casualty for the civil and military leadership.

Harkness was finally able to press the Cabinet Defence Committee to approve the pending War Books revisions on the 25th of October, after authority to match DEFCON 3 was

[212] Canada, *House of Commons Debates* (Hansard), October 1962, (Various entries throughout the month of October 1962).
[213] Bland, Douglas L. (1987). *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947-1985.* Kingston, ON: Ronald P. Frye & Co.

given.[214] Seemingly unexpected, one part of this War Book revision had an unusual provision not initially noticed. It now stated that the MND must obtain approval from the PM, before proceeding to the 'Ready State of Vigilance'. This of course took away the previous CCOS authority (which they never exercised) and had been in place since 1959. Gladman and Archambault point out that this illustrated the "Canadian strategic culture" of the era, and spoke volumes regarding Diefenbaker's distrust of the military. This revision effectively negated the sole purpose of *progressive revision* in the War Books in place since 1948. This sole purpose of which was to facilitate, "…for speed and decisiveness in response to [a nuclear] attack."[215] Another level of authority for the 'Ready states of vigilance' hardly seemed prudent, but it was after the fact.

Two events at that time give some indication that the War Books were still in service and not withdrawn. The first of these occurred on the 24th of October (the day before the revision approval), in a memo from Cabinet Secretary Bob Bryce to US Ambassador White in Ottawa in which he informs the US Secretary of State, in Washington that Cabinet had authorized the RCAF (NORAD only) to 'Ready' state of military vigilance, equivalent to DEFCON 3.[216] Clearly, if the War Books had been withdrawn prior to the crisis (as many have suggested) this communication could not have occurred until at least the next day, the 25th of October, when the Cabinet Defence Committee approved the revisions for the DND War Book.

The second event took place on the 25th October and is noted in the diary of Air Vice-Marshal M.M. Hendrick, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff. He noted on that day that his staff had

[214] LAC, RG 2, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents, The 137th meeting of the CDC, 25th October 1962.
[215] Gladman, Brad & Peter Archambault, (2015). "Advice and Indecision: Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Canadian Military Journal.* Vol. 23 (1), Article 2. [pp. 11-32], (p. 25).
[216] Ibid., (p. 27). **Also**, a telegram from Ambassador White to the Secretary of State, 24th October 1962.

gone over the War Book sections pertaining to the Air Force with the Minister.[217] They may have just been previewing the new revisions or examining their content after they were applied. Regardless, the key point here is that he recorded nothing to indicate withdrawn War Books, or of them being returned to service.[218] One would think that might have been important to note if that were the case.

This all brings about the unknown discussion between Harkness and Miller. They both would, or should, have been aware of the status of the War Books, and yet there is no comment from either about the War Book's status. As noted earlier, upon hearing that the US has gone to DEFCON 3, Harkness directed Miller immediately to go to the 'Ready' state of vigilance. Miller pushed back and questioned if Harkness had authority to do that.[219] It could be speculated that the unprecedented nature of the crisis, a nuclear exchange looming, and the unpredictable, autocratic characterization of Diefenbaker's style of leadership, may have stymied any decision-making advice from the military. This scenario appears particularly evident in the lack of any exchange or dialogue between the military and the cabinet. There is, however, no excuse for this response even if it were valid.

From the information available, there was literally nothing being offered in the form of advice or direction from the military leadership. At this point, they all appear to have 'deferred' up the command structure to the PM and cabinet. The irony of the situation is that Harkness is left with trying to secure authority for a matching alert status to DEFCON 3 from a very contentious PM when the facts seem to be overwhelming that the CCOS and the COS already had that authority but chose to sit on their hands.

[217] Ibid., (p. 26). **Also**, DHH, 79/469, Folder 26, Air Vice-Marshal M.M. Hendrick Papers, Daily Diary, 25th October 1962.
[218] The timeline of the two events described by Gladman & Archambault, clearly have the WB still in service.
[219] Clearly, on the face of this response from CCOS Miller to Harkness, rests more implications of a CMR violation.

Haydon contends that a complete breakdown in the command and control aspects of the Canadian military exacerbated the ability of the military to function.[220] There may be an element of truth to that statement in terms of the civil and military leadership in Ottawa, which he curiously fails to mention. He tends to absolve the military far too much and place the majority of responsibility on Diefenbaker and the Cabinet.

Harkness and Miller were perhaps confused, as possibly were others in the command and control structure, but it is unclear if that was because they thought the War Books had been withdrawn for revision. It is equally unclear why the CCOS and the COS chose not to exercise their collective authority to go to the 'Ready' state of vigilance. It is possible that Miller thought they needed to have the 'General' alert, rather than the 'Ready', which would not have been his nor Harkness' decision to make. These suppositions are only conjecture as no record exists of this possibility.

The breakdown in CMR was instigated from two positions. One was "Diefenbaker's refusal to acknowledge the importance of military issues outside domestic politics."[221] By isolating himself from the military, he was unable to conceptualize the big picture of military and defence strategy. These shortcomings changed the nature of the civil contractual obligations in the objective CMR equation. This had the effect of "…widening the gulf between society and the military."[222] Civil executive competence from a CMR perspective did not exist.

The other direction had more to do with military culture that had existed since the early 1960s, with roots going back several decades. The Canadian officer corps, in its isolation, had developed this singular sense of 'service branch identity' that in normal peacetime functioned

[220] Haydon, Peter T. (1993). *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered.* Toronto, ON: Canadian Printco Ltd. (pp. 218-221).
[221] Ibid., (p. 220).
[222] Ibid.

reasonably without incident. In a period of crisis, however, such as was happening in the Fall of 1962, any singular identity in the officer corps brought complete dysfunction. There was no sense of cohesion in the senior military leadership between the three COS and their individual staffs. Each of the three services had a tenacious grip on their individual identity and saw their service survival as more critical than anything else. There was no functioning as a unified leadership to determine the joint actions available to them (i.e. effective command and control). The Cuban crisis just exacerbated the whole matter, and Diefenbaker's position regarding the crisis only deepened these problems. These elements contributed in their own unique way to the chaos that consumed Ottawa during the crisis.

After more than half a century all of the main players from the crisis have passed on. There will always be some debate regarding culpability. However, clearly the CCOS and the COS did not exercise any competence in the discharge of their duties and responsibility towards the civil leadership. This could have had serious potential implications had a nuclear exchange actually occurred; Canadian forces would have been completely leaderless.

There are insufficient facts to exonerate the civil or military leadership. From the civil side, principally the PM, there was certainly a lack of executive competence by his apparent vacillations for almost three days before finally ordering the 'Ready' state of vigilance. There is also no evidence from his memoirs that Diefenbaker had much, if any, knowledge about the War Books or their content. He was likely unaware that the CCOS had authority to proceed to 'Ready State'.

The charges against Doug Harkness for putting the military on full alert without authority have no merit. The preponderance of evidence suggests that he did not order any alert. Rather, he ordered 'precautionary preparations' for the eventual *Simple, Re-enforced, or General* alert he

was confident would come. If he had placed the forces on a higher state of alert, he would have been wrong because of the contractual elements of CMR. The War Book was clear; only the Government of Canada (the Cabinet) could issue any of the three alert states: *Simple, Re-enforced, or General*. If Harkness was guilty of anything, it may have been for not fully understanding the provisions and current status of the DND War Books. This is hardly worth the vitriol he has so unjustly received all of these years.

Knowing the current status of the War Books was not his primary role. It was, however, the abdicated role of the CCOS and the COS to keep the civil leadership fully cognizant of all resources at their disposal. They did not follow through.

Douglas Harkness deserves exoneration for what he has been so vilified for since 1962. The individuals that have castigated him for acting without authority do not seem to have a full grasp of the facts. Even those individuals who have praised him for his courage have also got it wrong. They wrongly suggest that he was justified in ordering an alert because Diefenbaker abdicated his responsibility. That is not what the evidence shows. Even if it were true, it would be wrong because that is not how issues of CMR are resolved in a democratic society.

It is clear from the Harkness papers that upon returning to his office after talking to Diefenbaker and not receiving the go-ahead for an equivalent alert to the US, he was quite un-willing to go beyond 'preparing' quietly. Harkness is reported to have commented several times in later years that when Diefenbaker finally gave him the go ahead, he is alleged to have opined that he never told Diefenbaker that he had already done so. This is not consistent with his own accounting of events at the time, nor in his papers. Others have felt this may have been a bit of a

'jab' at Diefenbaker as they had both fallen out of grace with each other. This appears to be nothing more than political sparring during and after his resignation in 1963.

With regards to why Canadian involvement in the crisis has not been more readily discussed, the facts suggest the following. Had the crisis developed into a nuclear exchange, which certainly appeared imminent at the time, the CCOS and the COS may have found themselves in quiet a different predicament; one of dereliction of duties for not carrying out a critical function of the CMR equation. They had an onus to advise the PM through the MND of the full capacity, capability and limitations of the military. This did not happen. It became much more expedient to call the Canadian involvement an 'exercise' (CUBEX), and thus avoid the embarrassment and scrutiny of the whole situation, from a Canadian perspective.

The command and control structure of the Canadian military in 1962 was still reminiscent of World War II. There was no such thing as a central command that could oversee operations and provide effective control over the complete military. This really meant that there was no mechanism to coordinate strategic information about what was known concerning the looming crisis.[223] These facts had the makings of a particular disaster that thankfully did not occur from an operational perspective. The restructuring elements from the 1964 White Paper[224] were a positive step towards addressing some of these issues, particularly with the integration of the military command structure of the armed forces, under a single "Chief of Defence Staff and single defence staff."[225] This had the appearance of addressing the command and control problems. However, although beyond the scope of this paper, it tended to go too far over time.

[223] Haydon, Peter, (1993). *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered.* Toronto, ON: Canadian Printco Ltd. (pp. 206-207).
[224] Canada, DND, 1964 Defence White Paper (Ottawa: Queen's Printer), (pp. 17-20)
[225] Ibid., (p. 19).

Over the next thirty years it began to look more like a form of subjective civilian control; [226] a top down suppression by civil authority towards any notion of military power or control.

Different personalities can often influence the course of events for any given situation. However, in the context of the Cuban missile crisis, the lack of rigour and a solid national security strategy for the military and civilian entities indicated a complete breakdown of CMR at the highest levels. When examining the perspectives of the American versus Canadian civil strategy, there is no comparison. While the American methodology had flaws, they tenaciously tried to understand their adversary's position and perspective, which in turn helped them to define their course of action and options. No such strategy existed in the Canadian psyche. Canada's decision was to quibble over the lack of prior consultation and other issues, such as sovereignty. [227] How Canada was able to get it together in just two and one-half days was a testament to Harkness being able to initiate preparations for the pending action and authorization that he was convinced would be forthcoming, and within his authority.

The Canadian government response during the first forty-eight hours of the crisis was a complete "lack of understanding of the nation's central vital interests – the unity of the Western alliance [NATO] against the Soviet threat, the centrality of the Canada-US relationship [NORAD] and the need to respond swiftly…"[228] Unfortunately, much of the literature regarding the crisis, particularly Canadian, tends to conflate the veracity of what actions were

[226] Huntington, Samuel P. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (pp. 80-81).
[227] Gladman, Brad & Peter Archambault, (2015). "Advice and Indecision: Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Canadian Military History.* Vol. 23 (1), Article 2. [pp. 11-32], (p. 31).
[228] Canada, DND, "Confronting the Essence of Decision: *Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis*." [Gladman & Archambault] Ottawa: DRDC-CORA TM 2010-250 (Nov. 2010). (p. 34).

available and what actually occurred. Tony German in his book gives a rather fancified opinion of the general consensus after the fallout from the Cuban crisis:

> In the democratic tradition, military action stems from government policy alone. By that token, perhaps one Minister of the crown and two Canadian Admirals were wrong. But they acted in line with the defence agreements in place since 1940.[229]

The evidence presented here shows that German's quote is also incorrect. However, it does indicate how he and so many other authors tend to excuse insubordination under the justification of correct reasoning for the circumstances. This is a dubious rational at best. It has become the justification in much of the literature about the crisis, as a mechanism for apportioning the majority of CMR breakdown blame onto Diefenbaker and giving the military a pass.

Indeed, there was considerable justification to point to Diefenbaker and his lack of competence as the PM. However, most commentators fail to mention the lack of rigour exhibited by the CCOS and the COS for not exercising their own responsibilities.[230] At minimum, they could have investigated further what options were available. There is no evidence they did any such thing. This became a blatant dereliction of duty with potential for more serious consequences. By flying under the radar, they were saved by the fact, or luck, that the crisis did not proceed beyond the threat level.

Future Research

Certainly, within the broad area of CMR, how the Canadian military instructs and deploys its available resources in the prosecution of military action is of vital concern. Canadian defence policy, training and procurement have tremendous impact on how the Canadian military

[229] German, Tony, (1990). *The Sea is at Our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy*. Toronto, ON: McClelland & Stewart Inc. (p. 273).
[230] Canada, DND, "Confronting the Essence of Decision: *Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis*." [Gladman & Archambault] Ottawa: DRDC-CORA TM 2010-250 (Nov. 2010).

prepare or effectively prosecute any modern civil prerogatives. The recent debacles in the Middle East, specifically Afghanistan, are testament to these concerns and require further examination.

The Canadian public will likely never know the exact reasoning behind the relative silence surrounding Canadian military operations during the Cuban missile crisis. The lessons to be learned from military engagement and preparation have evolved several times over in the last fifty years and they continue to do so. Theories regarding CMR have also evolved and there are distinct and separate elements of shared responsibilities in these relationships: "The real challenge in Canadian civil-military relations is [to be able] to cope with the widely varying requirements for political control in conditions of peace, crisis and war."[231] [232]

As alluded to, there are numerous elements within the realm of CMR in Canadian defence policy since the end of the Cold War that deserve more scrutiny and study. These most certainly involve significant personalities in the CAF and specific policy imperatives. CMR is most certainly a system of policy prerogatives, instructed through various and sometimes successive defence policies. Undoubtedly, how well CMR functions, or not, depends almost entirely on the principals involved. Obviously, these factors are not fixed and can show marked variability with different personalities.

Certain instances of CMR emerging from this thesis clearly deserve further study. General Charles Foulkes was the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff at the time of Diefenbaker's government coming into office in 1957. As such he was heavily involved with the

[231] Graham, Ross, (2002). "Civil Control of the Canadian Forces: National Direction and National Command." *Canadian Military Journal.* Vol. 3 (1), [pp. 23-29], (p. 27).
[232] The elements that Graham discusses in this article, although some years back, include much of the concerns still being discussed today, about diversity, demographic make-up etc. in Canadian society, and how these should be reflected in the military. He also notes that for effective CMR, dealing with the above, senior officers must be able to function in both military and executive management roles. Tasks not readily thought about in 1962.

implementation of the NORAD agreement. It is certainly evident that he exceeded his authority by being complicit in supporting Diefenbaker's claim of NORAD being part of NATO, and using his knowledge and influence to coerce the PM to sign and finalize the agreement before final cabinet approval.

Civil-military relations have evolved considerably since 1962. Much of this, however, is quite beyond the scope of this thesis. Fundamentally, CMR has become increasingly influenced by the context of the war or conflict being waged. A relatively new process, *Pragmatic civil control* [233] [234] proposes an integration of all available resources into a more collaborative process between the civil and military leadership. This concept provides new perspectives towards areas such as strategic deterrence, engagement activities and the waging of both large and small conflicts. These evolved elements of CMR have their roots stemming back to the errors made during the Cold War. The fundamental aspects of Huntington's objective theory of CMR have not changed appreciably; only the implementation methods have evolved.

Unfortunately, recent history reveals that successive governments in Canada do not appear to have remembered all of their past errors. Knowledge of the past concerns, at times, seems apparent, however, implementation of solutions is always another matter. History reveals that whenever civil and military principals diverge from their fundamental roles of policy and implementation, problems and ultimate chaos can ensue. The following case of General Rick Hillier is an example of that.

[233] Frei, Brian, Col. (Retd), (2019). "The Evolution of Canadian Defence Policy through Pragmatic Control Theory of CMR." *Canadian Military Journal.* Vol. 19 (4), [pp. 16-24].
[234] Travis, Donald S. (2017). "Saving Samuel Huntington and the Need for Pragmatic Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces & Society.* Vol. 43 (3), [pp. 395-414].

In 2006, Hillier was appointed as the new Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). He started out in his new role as a defence policy advisor and principle decision maker for the pending Defence White Paper. This role, quite out of the ordinary for a CDS was under the direction of the Minister of National Defence (MND) Bill Graham, and Prime Minister (PM) Paul Martin. Later, he began discussions, all well documented, with the PM and the MND about CAF deployments to Kandahar, Afghanistan. They clearly indicated something far less than sincere, as later revealed, regarding capacity and capability for those proposed missions.[235] There is much more to examine here.

The DND War Book situation in 1962 was complete chaos; not the War Book itself, but the implementation had complications. These topics occupy considerable interest touched upon in this thesis, however, they will require further study and research beyond this work. The War Book concept functioned reasonably well from 1948 until the Cuban missile crisis. Where it found itself after that in successive Canadian governments, needs to be explored. Since the end of the Cold War and more recently, the War Book concept has evolved into a series of similar concepts that has now been established as the *Comprehensive Approach*.[236] [237] Similar to the evolving concepts of CMR, this 'new' approach proposes a collaborative sharing of the major dimensions of decision making, along the stages of authority and responsibility for the escalation of military activity as may be required. As the name suggests, it is complex and comprehensive. The underlying concept, however, is inclusion of all active, available and necessary resources.

[235] Stein, Janice Gross & Eugene Lang. (2008). *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*. Toronto, ON: Penguin Canada Books Inc, (pp. 178-209).
[236] Gladman, Brad & Peter Archambault, (2015). "Advice and Indecision: Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Canadian Military History*. Vol. 23 (1) Article 2. [pp. 11-32], (p. 19)
[237] Dion, Eric, (2017). *Synergy: A Theoretical Model of Canada's Comprehensive Approach.* Bloomington, IN: iUniverse.

This is to put forward the most 'comprehensive' foot towards the most successful outcome available in carrying out of government policy.

The 1964 White Paper on Defence was mentioned briefly in this thesis and it was instrumental in changing Canadian defence policy from that moment onward. The catalyst for this coming change in defence policy was the Royal Commission on Government Organization (RCGO).[238] It was appointed and chaired by J. Grant Glassco in September 1960 and released its findings in 1962.

From the 1964 White Paper on Defence, "… a need for a strong staff group which is essentially civilian in character, outside the framework of the Armed Forces."[239] This was a key finding and direct quote from the Glassco Commission. This focus was a foundational element of the new management structure instituted into DND from the 1964 White Paper. The Deputy Minister was to oversee this new staff group that was to assist in the administration of the Canadian Armed Forces thus removing any command administrative duties from the CCOS. A quote from the Glassco commission reveals: "…the military character of this group [CCOS] raises doubts as to the reality of civilian control if the minister places excessive reliance upon it."[240] [241]

The 1964 White Paper restructuring, among other things, was clearly intended to prevent the debacle of the Cuban missile crisis from ever happening again. It has been commented on

[238] Canada, *Royal Commission on Government Organization*, Ottawa: (RCGO). (Queens Printer 1962). (The Glassco Commission).
[239] Canada, DND, 1964 Defence White Paper (Ottawa: Queen's Printer 1964), (p. 20)
[240]The Glassco Commission. Vol. 4, Jan 21, 1963. (p. 76). [From MA Thesis, by John C. Hood (1975). Defence Policy and Unification of the CAF: An Analysis. Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON.] https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd/1515

and studied several times since then. In the context of today, it really requires a fresh examination.

The command structure instituted in that White Paper was considerably changed from that which was in place at the time of the Cuban missile crisis and even prior to that. The new structure abolished the CCOS and installed a singular Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) overseeing each of the three service branches: Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian Air Force and the Canadian Army and the critical element missing during the Cuban crisis: the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC). This command structure has gone through several iterations since, but essentially the similar frame work has been maintained. Unification of the RCN, RCAF and the CA into a single Canadian Armed Force (CAF) unit with little to no distinction between each; was the most controversial part of that White Paper. This has all but disappeared, except at the broad administrative level. Each of the three services have had their individual identity restored, with their own distinctive uniforms and rank structure firmly in place again.

At this point, it is unclear where any further study may go. It would have a common theme, however, based on CMR and what has evolved since the Cuban missile crisis. Each of the areas noted here have defence policy concerns and some have evolved more than others. It would also be important to examine some of the more significant CMR concerns from the past. The thesis touched on a few, but going forward, they need to be examined in more detail.

Final Thoughts

What has been written by many during the last several decades about Canadian involvement in the Cuban missile crisis is mostly irresponsible for not being further scrutinized.

It cannot be re-written, nor should it be. It was written with the knowledge that was available at the time, albeit in many cases without sufficient care. Unfortunately, after all this time, there are still questions that remain un-answered. The new narrative expressed through this thesis of culpability and pointing back to the questions posed in the introduction are based primarily on newly acquired material. None of the parameters of normative CMR seem to fit. This has become a novel inverse CMR, characterized by an abdication of responsibility from both the senior civilian, but primarily the military leadership.

From a purely personal perspective, there is a rather unapologetic, self-serving, partial catharsis that rises from these pages that what we did as young men and women nearly sixty years ago was important and critical in the defence of North America. This was not the exercise 'CUBEX' as it has repeatedly been referred to in numerous volumes. As noted earlier, prior to the authority finally given on the 25th of October, this was the extension of the Canadian portion of FALLEX that became MARLEX which Admiral Ken Dyer had full authority, as MARCOM, to continue submarine surveillance with those ships already at sea. After the 25th of October, the rest of the fleet proceeded to station. Submarine surveillance was a task normally carried out by Maritime Command during the Cold War while at sea, regardless of the state of affairs. The Cuban missile crisis merely accentuated the seriousness of it.

Even though the alert state was different, the complete operation was forever dubbed CUBEX (an exercise) and no further substantive investigation was pursued. Examining the subject matter, Canada and the Cuban missile crisis, and writing this thesis has been an extremely fulfilling task. A more complete fulfillment could only be obtained from the Canadian civil and military senior leadership rising to the challenge, lifting the veil and acknowledging what has been declared on these pages as being significant. Canadian UN peace - keeping

missions during the Cold War and since have all received well deserved significant acknowledgement of the combined efforts of the CAF involved. Surely, Canadian military involvement in the Cuban missile crisis deserves no less.

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