

EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES
FOR A CITY DEVELOPMENT AGENCY

CENTREVENTURE & WATERFRONT DRIVE
REDEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE IN WINNIPEG

By

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Bachelor of Architecture (Beijing Polytechnic University, 2001)

A Practicum submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
of
The University of Manitoba
In partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

MASTER OF CITY PLANNING

Department of City Planning
University of Manitoba
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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

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Abstract

In 1999, CentreVenture Development Corporation, the City's arm's-length development agency, was established as the vehicle to implement the concepts of CentrePlan, a comprehensive vision intended to direct Winnipeg's downtown revitalization. The Waterfront Drive Redevelopment Initiative (WDRI) was launched by CentreVenture in 2004 and represents a significant milestone in the renaissance of downtown Winnipeg. This research explores general strategies that can enable a better implementation for a development agency. Seven strategies were identified through studying North American and European cities. In order to answer the research question "what implementation strategies CentreVenture needs for its implementation regarding the vision of 'CentrePlan'", the key informants from CentreVenture, the government sector, downtown organizations, and the private sector, participated in the interviews. Through analyzing interview findings, a list of key issues was identified that were considered as impacting CentreVenture's operations. These key issues are the foundation to created four principal suggestions, including clarifying the mandate and authority, enhancing stakeholder participation, skills for a seasoned CEO, and understanding market dynamics. It is expected that the research will provide CentreVenture, policy makers, downtown organizations and other involved players with a better understanding regarding implementation strategies. Furthermore, these recommendations are expected to not only benefit the on-going projects in Waterfront Drive, but bring ideas on how to better implement at future sites and projects.

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Preamble:

The redevelopment of downtown Winnipeg has been a slow and at times an unsatisfactory process. Mixed results have been produced over a period of decades. Downtown redevelopment continues to be one of foremost importance to those concerned about the future of the city. This research was inspired by Winnipeg's ongoing downtown redevelopment process, and, in particular, the key role of CentreVenture. In 1999, the CentreVenture Development Corporation (CV) was established as the City's arm's-length development agency and was provided with the necessary resources to achieve the *CentrePlan* vision. *CentrePlan* was approved in 1995, developed through an intensive public consultation process. This document functioned as a comprehensive vision to direct and guide the work to revitalize Winnipeg's downtown. CentreVenture works as a public-private partnership to spur the downtown revitalization (CV Working Draft, 1999). Regarding the outcome of CentreVenture's efforts, significant improvement has occurred¹. The agency's current residential-commercial projects along Waterfront Drive appear to be influencing the downtown area. In the agency's eighth year of operation, it is timely that research is undertaken to examine its implementation, especially regarding Waterfront Drive Redevelopment Initiative (WDRI).

¹ CentreVenture's past achievements includes condominiums along Waterfront Drive, the construction of MTS Centre and the new Manitoba Hydro tower along Portage Avenue, the establishment of Red River College's Princess Street campus and attracting businesses such as Giant Tiger and Mountain Equipment Co-op downtown, some of the initial projects, such as a seniors' housing complex on Cumberland Avenue, a new skateboard park at The Forks and a series of artists' workspaces on Main Street.

The high visibility of urban waterfront areas makes these locations attract more attention. The high profile of such locations means that waterfront projects are “magnified intersections of a number of urban forces” (Marshall, 2001). Simply, the economic and political stakes (and hence the design stakes) tend to be higher in the urban waterfront than in other areas (Marshall, 2001). At the same time, Millspaugh, the creator of the public-private partnership development corporation for Baltimore’s Charles Centre and Inner Harbor redevelopment plans, related that joining private and public sectors as partners is a universally acknowledged need for any high-risk, high-profile development such as a waterfront development project (2001). The features of waterfront redevelopment projects require all the players to reconsider the strategies and skills which are needed in this delivery mechanism. The context for this practicum considers a number of waterfront redevelopment projects in North America and European cities in order to identify the crucial strategies a partnership agency needs to undertake in achieving its objectives.

This research is delivered in five chapters. Chapter 1 states the proposal, providing background information and identifying the research questions and the objective of the practicum, along with the scope and significance of the practicum. Chapter 2 is a literature review, aiming to build a working framework for the further study. By reviewing experiences in eight example cities, seven implementation strategies were provided coupling with a brief introduction of *CentrePlan*, *CentreVenture*, and *WDRI*. The research methods that will be employed for gathering information throughout the research process are introduced in Chapter 3, along with the discussion of the research limitations. The fourth chapter reports the interview findings. The analysis of

these findings and the table of interview conclusions are also provided in this chapter to support the following conclusion. Chapter 5 sets out the conclusions and recommendations, and suggests directions for further research derived from the entire research.

1.2 Historical Background:

Inner city revitalization poses perhaps the most complex challenge to policy-makers, urban planners, and others involved. The complexity is reflected in the broad content inherent to these areas which not only refers to the geographical meanings, but involves much more dynamic content combining environmental, economical, and social issues. Following early periods of rapid growth, Winnipeg has experienced decades of inner city decline and at the same time continues to explore its own ways to solve the problems of downtown deterioration. The significant improvement includes: the Manitoba Centennial Concert Hall in 1967, the Winnipeg Convention Centre Complex in 1975, and the Trizec Development and concourse. A series of by-laws and document were created, such as the "Downtown Winnipeg" in 1969, the "Historical Buildings By-law" in 1977, and the *CentrePlan* in 1994. Many agencies were also established, i.e., the North Portage Development Corporation in 1983, The Forks North Portage Partnership in 1994, and Downtown Winnipeg and Exchange District BIZ. Winnipeg Core Area Initiative (CAI) is a multi-million dollar tri-government urban revitalization strategy launched in 1980's. The efforts of seeking effective approaches on Winnipeg's downtown revitalization appear to be never ending (Klos & Douchant, 1998).

However, considerable data illustrates that a number of distressed conditions continued to prevail in Winnipeg's inner city, and in some cases –unemployment, poverty and criminal offences – worsened over the decade (Layne, 2000). “What is missing is something that will bring them (myriad of organizations working for downtown revitalization) together, coordinate activities, focus all of the efforts to revitalize downtown” (CV Working Draft, 1999). Most of the projects CV was involved in during its early years have been of a commercial or institutional nature, and housing emerged as a more important priority later (CMHC-CV, 2002). The Waterfront Drive Redevelopment Initiative (WDRI) is a residential-commercial project launched by CV in the heart of Winnipeg. The centre location ensures the project's significant impact on Winnipeg's inner city revitalization. The first phase of WDRI includes over 170 residential units and more than 36,000 square feet of commercial space. This project provides an ideal case to study CV's operation and the outcomes.

1.3 Objectives of study:

This research aims to contribute to the comprehension and appreciation of implementation strategies that help a city development agency achieve its objectives. The case chosen for this topic is CV's current residential infill project, Waterfront Drive Redevelopment Initiative (WDRI). By answering the general question of “what strategies can enable a city redevelopment agency to offer a higher quality of living in waterfront redevelopment”, the document is intended to set up a framework for the following research. Furthermore, the answer of this question leads to the research question: “what are the strategies that CV needs in its WDRI for a better implementation regarding the

vision of *CentrePlan*. This research aims to identify *which ways CV can operate more effectively in WDRI in order to better realize the vision of CentrePlan*. Regarding this objective, questions driving the research compose the following three tiers:

Research Question Tier One – In examining the experiences in eight example cities in North American and European cities, what are the general *strategies* that an active city development agency needs in operating waterfront redevelopment? What are the general *objectives* these waterfront redevelopment agencies have in their master plans? The answer of these two questions set up a working framework that guides the following research. Both the objectives and the strategies act as the key measurement on evaluating CV's efforts in WDRI. The fundamental assumption is that by effectively applying these strategies, a city development agency will have better implementation to realize its plan.

Research Question Tier Two – Regarding WDRI, what are the *objectives* CV has in terms of realizing the vision of *CentrePlan*? What are the key *strategies* applied by CV in its operations? These two questions are the products of the analysis and discussion of Tier One. This section takes a further step on exploring CV's particularities. The goal is to explore CV's operation in WDRI in regard to the circumstances in which this agency exists.

Research Question Tier Three – Regarding WDRI, what are the key *strategies* CV needs to better implement the vision of *CentrePlan*? What are the limitations and strengths CV has in the realization of the vision of *CentrePlan*? Tier Three is the conclusion based on the previous two tiers. Due to Winnipeg's particularities, the strategies that help CV to better realize the vision of *CentrePlan* cannot be blindly copied

from other example cities. The process of exploring CV's limitations and strengths is crucial for better implementation now, and in the future.

1.4 Limitations

This study is intended to come up with practical suggestions for a city redevelopment agency's effective implementation. The case study is that of CV and its current project, WDRI. Since WDRI is an on-going project, it was anticipated that new information about CV's operation and the advancement in WDRI would become available as the study proceeds. The main approach to keeping the research updated relied upon checking the local media, mainly Winnipeg Free Press, on a daily base. Due to the limitation of time and other resources, any new information becoming available after August 1st 2007 is not discussed in this study. Regarding the possibility that crucial information may be released after this date, the information would be included in the oral defense and revised final document.

Due to the particularities of the examples of other development agencies in North America and Europe, the strategies concluded in the Chapter 2 Literature Review, may overlap but not totally cover the items applicable to CV. Consequently, this chapter's content would be complemented by further research. This working framework provides a principal guidance for the study. The comprehension of CV's unique characteristics with the understanding of other agencies' experiences provided a sound context for the research questions.

Another limitation is due to the broad range on choosing examples of waterfront redevelopment agencies. Winnipeg is a middle size city with less than 700,000

populations. However, the study of other examples was not limited to the cities that fall in the similar population and size range. During the literature review, it is found that most accessible documents focus on the cases that took place in large metropolitan areas, such as Boston, New York, London, Toronto, and Baltimore. Some waterfront redevelopment cases are also found in Calgary, St. Paul, and Minneapolis to counterbalance this limitation.

1.5 Scope of the Study

This practicum focuses on the issues of practical strategies and how these strategies enable redevelopment authorities to achieve their objectives. The research covers a large scope touching every aspect of a development agency's operation. The goal is to provide a comprehensive background for the strategy analysis and the final suggestions, since in the real world implementing issues are all connected to each other. Also, it is hoped that, through this comprehensive context, important practical planning knowledge will be connected that largely benefit the researcher's planning study.

Meanwhile, this background involves many issues not directly related to strategy implementation. These issues are outside of the study scope and will not be discussed in depth. These issues include connections between mixed-use and affordable housing, features and functions of public-private partnership, particular design criteria for housing projects, and detailed financial and economic related issues. Also, the research concerns the strategies applied in an effective plan implementation process. Therefore, this document does not deal in depth with matters of political leadership or with the inner workings of local government strategy making process. It is not about policy making or

the influence of cooperation among different levels of governments. While such issues are important they are outside the scope. Instead, the document explores the strategies that contribute to coalition building with governments and other local communities.

1.6 Assumptions

The fundamental assumption this practicum makes is that, for inner city waterfront redevelopment authorities, a successful plan-implementation relationship can be achieved by implementing certain strategies. In other words, the strategies concluded from successful experiences may be the missing link in the chain of unsatisfactory results of Winnipeg's downtown revitalization activities. Through adopting these strategies, CV can better realize its objectives and long-term vision.

The second assumption is that, although each case has its own particularities, there are common rules that can generally improve the outcome of city redevelopment agencies' implementation. The strategies identified from other agencies are helpful and can be used as reference for CV's operation. Furthermore, though discussing and analyzing these strategies, a set of strategies especially for CV could be created.

1.7 Significance of the Proposed Research

In November 2006, CentreVenture approached the second expiry of its mandate (the first was in 2002). During the past seven-years of operation, significant improvement has taken place in the downtown area. This is evidence of the agency's achievements. This research, studying CV's methods, operating process, and outcomes, is

intended to benefit all of the players involved by providing practical suggestions for the agency.

The conclusions and suggestions for CV's better implementation are supported by broad research. The related study extends from a general literature review to key informant interviews. Since studies in this field are rare, the results of the research per se will be an important reference for a city redevelopment agency's implementation. Additionally, the suggestions and recommendations are also valuable for CV's long-term development, especially at the point that the research was undertaken, when the future of CV was being decided.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Background: Waterfront and Waterfront Redevelopment

The decline of waterfront areas is the result of the growth of nineteenth-century cities from “industrial” to “post-industrial”. Waterfront has historically been the staging point for the import and export of goods. The wealth of cities was based on their ability to facilitate the need of industrial capital to access waterfront resources. However, our information-saturated, service-oriented economic systems no longer rely on the industrial and manufacturing operations of the past. The post-industrial city deals with processing the services rather than manufacturing, intellectual capacity rather than muscle power, and dispersed office environments rather than concentrated factories. The redefined relationships of transport and industry have shifted the transportation function away from previously historic waterfronts (Marshall, 2001).

The consequences of this passage are clear and weighty: firstly obsolescence, then the abandonment of vast industrial areas, with the relative problems of deterioration of both a physical and social nature of the urban fabric (Bruttomesso, 2001). Many cities have reacted to this state of affairs with programs of regeneration and revitalization. They have understood that sustaining the growth must be interpreted as an opportunity for re-launching the urban economy, for trying out new objectives and new challenges. In the 1970s and 1980s, urban waterfront redevelopment projects were among the most prominent examples of physical planning and urban renewal (Hall, 1990; Gordon, 1997). The idea of redeveloping waterfront areas to realize inner city revitalization has been

adopted broadly – New York, London, Boston, Toronto, Baltimore, Vancouver, and Sydney just to name few in the English-speaking world.

Today, we think of the waterfront as an urban amenity, a special place in the city. The changing nature of waterfront functions and the role of transportation have brought a new theme, of high-quality, high-density residential developments. The effectiveness of waterfront redevelopment projects in the face of revitalization heavily relies on the contribution of residential and relating commercial developments. More users, including residents, visitors and workers, result in greater indigenous demand for facilities in this area so that a growing number and diversity of uses can be supported, day and night (Bromley, Tallon, & Thomas, 2005). Residential and commercial developments compose main ingredients of inner-city waterfront redevelopments. Sustainability can be realized by drawing more people to live and work in these areas.


By reviewing literature, this chapter builds up a working framework on the general objectives and strategies of an active waterfront agency. Following this, the document explores the plan-implementation relationship between *CentrePlan* and *CentreVenture*, coupled with the background introduction on *CentreVenture*'s organizational features and WFRI. Based on the previous information, a discussion is provided on how *CentreVenture*'s work reflects the experiences of other cases. Finally the research direction is related.

2.2 Principal Issues: Objectives and Strategies

In the case of any development framework, a master plan and its implementation consist of the basic elements. The implementing strategies are the determinant elements

in achieving the objectives. In this section, an active waterfront redevelopment agency's objectives and implementing strategies are concluded from reviewing eight waterfront redevelopment cases: Battery Park City Authority in New York; London Dockland Development Corporation; Charlestown Navy Yard in Boston; the Harbourfront Corporation in Toronto; the river district redevelopment in the city of Calgary, and cases in Baltimore, St. Paul, and Minneapolis. The tactics applied in each of these cities, then, are grouped into seven implementation strategies. These seven strategies set up the framework for the follow up research. The Flow Chart 1 shows the process of creating the seven strategies.

Figure 1: Eight Example Cities to Seven Strategies



The eight cities are: New York, London, Boston, Toronto, Baltimore, Calgary, St. Paul, Minneapolis

2.2.1 Waterfront Authorities' Plan Making and Objectives

“The visibility of waterfront areas makes these sites the stages upon which the most important pieces are set. The urban waterfront provides possibilities to create pieces of city, offer decency and hope as well as functionality, and can give some notion of the urban ways of living. In these possibilities, urban development is not just for profit, or personal aggrandizement, but for the benefit of humanity and the planet as well. It is on the urban waterfront that these visions of the city are finding form.”

R. Marshall, 2001

The first question is that what plan making process can produce suitable objectives for waterfront redevelopment. Through reviewing literature, the features of

good plan making are summarized into four items: (1) A plan grows from a strong public process and a diverse, multi-disciplinary bureaucratic process; (2) A plan addresses different aspects of redevelopment at once and coordinate projects to make them bolster each other; (3) A plan seeks sufficient and diverse funding; (4) A plan allows future adaptation and makes implementation learning and updating. Obviously, the success of a plan can only be proved by the action it guided. These four items are concluded from both the achievements and the lessons waterfront agencies learned in their actual practice.

Regarding the five waterfront redevelopment examples, their objectives can be sorted into three tiers: (1) physical environment improvement tier, (2) economic development tier, and (3) social equity tier. These three tiers of objectives are considered to be consistent with each other, and when they are properly coordinated, are able to bolster each other. The issue of conflicts among these objectives is important², but outside of this paper's scope.

Obtaining a high quality in both function and aesthetics is the start-up objective to a waterfront redevelopment. The abundant port area with underused constructions is the eyesore that caused the public's negative attitude towards the site. The first issue waterfront redevelopment encounters is to significantly improve the run-down area by providing sound infrastructure services, well-designed public spaces and streetscape. The improvement not only illustrates a governments' resolution on changing the existing situation, but also gives the public the confidence to looking forward to a better future of the site. Both of the elements are prerequisites to attracting investment from the private sector in the future. What should be mentioned is the high cost, consisting mostly of

² As to the reuse of urban waterfront, planners and designers ask questions: "Should commercial expansion be favored or multiple civic needs addressed, especially those which private initiative does not readily achieve?" (Alex Krieger, 2001)

capital investing, on achieving this objective. Government funding and political support are necessary for any achievements at this stage.

It can be argued that the primary objective for waterfront redevelopment agencies is the pursuit of economic development. Under this objective, the agencies' functions are focused on using increasingly scarce public funds to maximize leverage in attracting private investment and new developments to the site. All of the case studies are highly similar on sustaining economic development by launching residential and commercial projects³. Even though stunning results have been achieved in these cities, Gordon pointed out that, since the costly environmental improvement, waterfront redevelopment is not a profitable real estate venture, and being financially fruitful should not be the objective for the quasi-independent public waterfront agencies (1997). From the perspective of market development, the pursuit of economic development reflects agencies' duty on cultivating the market to a level that someday, it can attract investors without providing subsidy and partnership.

The objectives on offering a higher quality of living for the public generally reflect the grand expectations with considerable self-reflection about the very nature of contemporary urbanism. The main themes which have appeared are: affordable housing, mixed-use, public access, and employment. They show the desire of transferring the benefit of redevelopment to more people. In all the cases, a waterfront redevelopment is not profitable venture to its sponsoring government regarding the vast capital investments in the start-up stage. The advantage of a successful redevelopment is largely non-

³ The Battery Park City Authority of New York City has attracted 2500 medium- and high- income housing units with a major office complex (BPCA, 1990); London Dockland Development Corporation developed over 17,000 new homes and 24 million sq ft of commercial space (LDDC, 1991); Boston Redevelopment Agency redeveloped half of the Charlestown Navy Yard with 1000 housing units and 2 million sq ft of commercial uses (Gordon, 1996).

financial and symbolic; however, it can significantly increase the land and property value of the site and bring impact to the surrounding areas. A stabilized market, in a chain, demonstrates that there is a public return on the cost of buildings and infrastructure. In a long run, the public return is interpreted as objectives on realizing affordable housing, mixed-use community, well-designed accessible space, and more employment opportunities. The themes found in other redevelopment examples. To WDRI, the objectives are supposed to be defined by *CentrePlan*, and may not be exactly the same.

2.2.2 The Effective Strategies Derived from the Example Cities

In this section, seven strategies are concluded from the literature review in several city examples. Each strategy is followed with the detailed tactics that have been demonstrated effectiveness in their waterfront redevelopments. These tactics intends to bring a clearer picture to help understand the conceptual strategies. It is difficult to determine at this stage that all of the tactics would be applicable in WDRI. Since all the strategies are practically related to each other, it is important to consider them as a part of a system, rather than as an isolated one that can function well by itself.

A. Having A Capable Delivery Mechanism:

- An agency should be a quasi-independent public authority (out of the government's departments) that has substantial local control. (Gordon, 1997)
- An agency should start with an active board and a small staff led by an entrepreneurial chief executive. (Gordon, 1997)
- An agency should include local business leaders on the board
- The Board of Directors should have terms of office which are staggered and longer than the regular electoral cycle (Gordon, 1997)
- Embodying a decentralized, community-based decision-making and delivery mechanism. (Stewart, 1992)
- Having approaches on transferring development benefits to offer public well being (Gordon, 1997)

B. Keeping Good Relationship with Government

- Establishing good connections to different levels of government at the start-up stage
- Maintaining good relationship with local government by co-opting the local leadership , adding local business leaders, and recruiting trusted local consultants for key agency positions (Gordon, 1997)
- Making the financial demands continually foreseeable and acceptable to smooth the relationship with sponsoring governments (Gordon, 1997)
- Minimizing the start-up cash cost to government (also see strategy G)
- Producing visible progress toward redevelopment is viewed as a success by politicians, especially in the first several years (Gordon, 1997)

C. Building Consensus & Coalition with Local Groups:

- Developing an explicit and regular program of communication with all the affected groups about the plan and implementation (Layne, 2000)
- Implementing a monitoring and evaluating system (Beasley, 2005)
- Dealing with the opposition groups to reach a general agreement; keeping good relations with local residents by protecting their interests (Gordon, 1997)
- Cultivating reasonable expectations; the desire to achieve instant results should be resisted except the smallest steps. (Gordon, 1997) (TWC Manifesto)
- Private sector should be initially involved in a redevelopment project (Gordon, 1997) (Filion, 2004)
- Public and private sectors should be integrated for joint action and mutual benefit (Beasley, 2005)

D. Having Capacity of Being Flexible:

- Being capable of quickly adjusting programs to a significant ideological change in the controlling party (Gordon, 1997)
- Being capable of foreseeing the general trends of local property market and taking opportunities (Gordon, 1997 finance)
- Being capable in adding new roles to its mandate to fix the ever-changing environment. (Gordon, 1997)(Beasley,2005)
- Adopting a flexible plan to make the implementation able to incorporate learning and updating (Beasley, 2005)

E. Choosing Suitable Projects and developers:

- Involving well designed public open spaces in projects. (Gordon, 1997)
- Avoiding completely private projects to guarantee public access, which should be the hallmark of all projects along waterfront areas

- Building water's edge sites first; avoiding reserve sites close to water's edge. Future construction here may arouse resistances in the public.(Gordon, 1997)
- Promoting mixed-use along waterfronts (Manifesto)
- Developing housing for small, high-income, professional households is a profitable and relatively simple action for agencies (Gordon, 1997) (Bromley, Tallon, Thomas, 2005)
- Pre-qualifying developers who were undercapitalized or without the appropriate experience

F. Building Up Credibility by Incremental Efforts

- Establishing and demonstrating agency's credibility by improving the image of the waterfront (Gordon, 1997)
- Creating small success to establish an early market when infrastructure development was under way (Gordon, 1997)
- Providing a speedy development approval process to react in time to the market condition and to accelerate private investment in the site. (Gordon, 1997)
- Being thoughtful to make the necessary arrangement for the future users, such as appointing senior officers to protect interests of early residents(Gordon, 1997)

G. Effective financial Tools on Finding Public Capital

- Community revitalization levy (CRL) or tax increment financing (TIF): municipalities, counties, or designated development agencies borrow against future property tax revenue to pay for the public improvements needed to help generate those revenues.
- Government subsidies or funding: Governments provide up front cash to recover some infrastructure costs through fees as development occurs
- Strategic use of City-owned land
- Negotiating a line of credit from banks

In order to give these strategies more credibility, Table 1 "The City Examples and Applied Strategies" (See Appendices) was provided. This table clearly identified what tactics have been applied in each city. It is also marked out whether the application is a successful experience or a lesson. Through the study of example cities' waterfront development experience, the crucial role of a champion or visionary person(s) is also noticed. In each of the city examples, they are the precursors who elevated discussion

regarding the opportunities, painted the visionary picture and mobilized the human resources very early on in the process. Without this person(s), ideas stay ideas. Regarding the important role these visionary persons played, the last row of this table, “The City Examples and Applied Strategies”, showed these precursors’ positions and names.

At this point, it can be expected that more application approaches and concerns will be identified in the field-research phase through interviews and the further review of literature. The following section analyzes how an agency applies these strategies in the implementation stage.

2.2.3 The Relationship between Objectives and Strategies

A. Having A Capable Delivery Mechanism

Regarding the success of waterfront redevelopment projects, the importance of a properly functioning agency cannot be more heavily emphasized. These authorized agencies are all set up in certain forms of a public-private partnership or a development coalition. A capable waterfront redevelopment agency should, from a top-down approach, have substantial and overall right of control with sufficient human resources and fiscal and political supports. From the bottom-up approach, agencies ought to be democratic, representing good will with a solid foundation and empowering local communities. All of the cases studied show that the absence of any of the content listed above eventually lead to regrettable results for the agency.

With clearly defined objectives, a waterfront agency initiates all of the renewal actions, guides the direction of development, bridges all of the players in the field, and sticks to the goal. More and more public-private partnership organizations working in waterfront renewal agree that it has become more time-consuming, more costly, and

therefore more risky and difficult (Millspaugh, 2001). Setting up a solid delivery mechanism in the start-up stage is crucial for the agency's long-term development. The agency should have privilege on quickly accessing the applications of government permits to process projects, have substantial local control that insulates key activities from the inefficiencies of local politics, as well as have powerful business leaders with deep understanding on urbanism and local market conditions. A successful agency is the combination of all of the above features.

Regarding the objectives of waterfront redevelopment, the key to a "delivery system" (public-private partnership agencies) is to have a mechanism "that is able to conduct business like a private entity for the sake of speed and efficiency, but which also remains subject to the policy and fiscal control of the publicly elected officials" (Millspaugh, 2001). Generally, waterfront redevelopment agencies are privately managed bodies with an entrepreneurial nature. They are provided with public assets and the authority to operate business activities on these assets. Therefore, this delivery system ought to be the implementation without surrendering any of the essential features of the public process. This form of benefit transfer reflects the fundamental rationale for creating a non-profit partnership agency which has been given resources and authorities to manage public assets, and representative of public interests.

B. Keeping Good Relationship with Sponsoring Governments

Obtaining strong support from sponsoring governments is the life line and the biggest asset to redevelopment agencies. It ought to be clarified that the "sponsoring government(s)" discussion in literature review part refers to any level of government, the city or the state or the provincial where it applies. Among all the cases, land assembling,

struggling for control of a site and debating about its future use, characterizes the start-up stage of waterfront redevelopments. Successfully resolving these oppositions from different landowners mostly relies on sponsoring governments' work. Also, it is the sponsoring governments which provided the substantial start-up grants needed for capital works and operating subsidies during the establishment of agencies. In terms of agencies' detailed daily work, obtaining strong support from governments is essential in assisting investors go through a range of official policy procedures and committees, as well as in processing the dialogue between the government and the private sector in each individual project. Building political and technocratic consensus is the top priority for agencies among the chain of its tasks.

Although sponsoring governments initiated waterfront redevelopments, appoint agencies' boards, and financially support agencies' actions, their supports should not be considered as assured things. Gordon emphasized the time-consuming nature of waterfront redevelopment that inevitably makes these kinds of projects span several electoral cycles. The original politicians who supported a project would eventually moved on to other places or be defeated, so managing a changing political environment with the sponsoring government, local elected officials and even nearby residents is the issue agencies must deal with. From the study cases, redevelopment agencies will encounter great difficulties if the change in government accompanied by a significant shift in ideology. However, when this ideological gap was narrow, a change in the controlling party brought little impact to agencies.

Relationship building with sponsoring government(s) is a delicate work that can be affected by many elements. Based on previous experience, some lessons learned by

redevelopment agencies should be highlighted: First of all, the lack of visible progress toward redevelopment could exacerbate an agency's troubles during the program review. "Politicians typically consider the absence of significant developments after several years as evidence of an authority's failure" (Gordon, 1996); Second, an agency may incur the wrath by impending financial demands, especially after a change in controlling government. An example is the LDDC (London Dockland Development Corporation). During its first 6 years, LDDC created spectacular and highly visible result, however, its CEO run into trouble with the new Minister when asking for a large new infrastructure investment. This CEO was criticized as "not managing the relationship with his banker" and forced to retire later. Finally, the agency ended up with a new CEO and substantially reduced freedom of operation.

Building good relationships with governments and mobilizing local development coalitions need a delicate work. Normally the strategies that agencies use to develop a coalition with governments and other players are economic development and the urban blight arguments. The economic development argument has broad appeal for both sponsoring government and tax-payers. This argument envisions an increasing property tax base supported by the usual cost-benefit and fiscal-impact studies. The second rational for waterfront redevelopment was the symbolic 'abandoned doorstep' argument described by Peter Hall (1991). For instance, derelict central waterfront property was a high profile affront to the civic leaders, blighting cherished 'postcard' views of the city in New York and Toronto (Gordon, 1997). The visual impact of high-profile abandoned buildings can always mobilize the redevelopment activities.

C. Building Consensus & Coalition with Local Groups

Waterfront authorities function as facilitators to coordinate and liaise with all of the players, including controlling governments normally city government, other community development corporations, social service agencies, foundations, banks and churches. According to the existing literature, each of these actors plays important role in turning around inner-city neighborhoods (Zielenbach, 2000). Substantial trust and reliable response from each of them is essential for authorities' success.

Sharing the same expectations and vision in the long run is essential for consensus building. Agreement on objectives within each sector as well as between sectors forms substantial public-private partnership for a waterfront redevelopment agency. Millspaugh related four elements to a successful public-private partnership. These are the generic lessons derived from the author's twenty-five years of experience as a developer: (1) the common objectives that were realized by each sector, which form substantial public-private partnerships for economic development; (2) a Master Plan of land uses agreed upon by both sectors; (3) a realistic Business Plan for the achievement of the concept in the Master Plan based on a realistic projection of market demand and of the availability of public and private funding sources; (4) the plans and timetable have a consensus of support from the community at large (2001).

Most plans for inner-city revitalization envision social benefits that will be brought back by redevelopment projects. However, setting up ambitious goals with limited financial and organizational resources will result in a negative image from the public when the aims cannot be achieved. At the very least, this incompatibility would mislead agencies to lose focus of their work. Sponsoring governments and their

waterfront agencies need to set reachable objectives for each redevelopment phase. The benefits in social equity, such as affordable housing, employment increasing, and education, need to be considered precisely in the stage of plan making.

D. Having Capacity of Being Flexible:

As mentioned in the previous part of this paper, waterfront redevelopments last decades as well as span several political and economic cycles. Being flexible is the key capacity for an agency to survive and lengthen its tenure. The strategies of being flexible include the intention of adjusting the original work focus to new fields as well as adding a new mandate to the original ones. This adjustment reflects the nature of the ever-changing world in which a waterfront agency exists. Although some strategies applied could be argued as opportunism, from a long-term perspective, this capacity enables an agency build up its strength and also contributes to the general objectives of waterfront redevelopment.

According to the studied cases, the key element of being flexible is having the capability to change roles and adjust the mandate. The two main reasons that cause the adjustment are (1) a significant ideological change in the controlling party, and (2) local market trends. Regarding the first reason, Gordon related that “an election which produced a change in the governing party that controlled a redevelopment agency could create difficulties for the authority, especially if the change in regime was accompanied by a significant shift in ideology...A change in the controlling party had less effect on the agency when the ideological gap was narrower...A change in regime also had little effect upon an agency if the same party remained in power” (1996).

To the second reason, Gordon pointed out that private investment in large-scale urban waterfront redevelopment projects was dominated by trends in the local property markets. Also, Weiss related that the political and regulatory activity that affects real estate development is also tied into the market cycle, as new constraints respond to public dismay over the excesses of the boom periods (1991). For waterfront agencies, including planners, cultivating the sensibility on local market trends helps to avoid obvious shortage of knowledge about the cyclical nature of private investment.

E. Choosing Suitable Projects and Developers:

Waterfront agencies should be deeply aware of what kinds of developments can eventually lead to their objectives. The features of these suitable projects are reiterated in many articles. Bruttomesso systematically listed these features into six items that produce improved results for the operation as a whole: (1) Opening up the waterfront to the public; (2) Development of accessibility to the waterfront; (3) Limitations on vehicle traffic; (4) Upgrading waterborne transport; (5) Emphasizing the unusual nature of this urban zone by highlighting the environmental and urban features of the waterfront; (6) Ensuring the quality of the water in the recovered waterfront zones (2001).

Creating accessible open space is not only a crucial element on the improvement of the physical environment, but also highly valued by the public and governments. Well-designed parks and waterfront walkways provide immediate amenities, establish agencies' credibility, help to attract investments, and generate positive attitudes toward the future. In 1999's Urban Waterfront Manifesto (TWC 1999), under the development section, it is emphasized that: "Public access to and along the urban waterfront should be the hallmark of all projects, including residential developments. This means physical and

psychologically welcoming access. Visual access to the water likewise should be a pervading objective” (Manifesto, 1999). It is safe to say that providing high quality open space along waterfront areas is fundamental for economic development and also establishes a bright future for finally realizing the objectives of social well being.

Multi-functional and mixed-use development along waterfronts should also be pursued since filling this area with mono-housing developments is not sustainable. A diversity of uses needs to be included along waterfronts, from passive parks to vibrant commercial attractions. People of all income levels and cultures should feel welcome. Distinctive places for children as well as the elderly should be included. Furthermore, in seeking sustainability, a residential population contributes to sustain the local economy by making frequent use of all kinds of services, day-and-night. (Bromley, Tallon, & Thomas, 2005)

The suitable developers should be qualified, especially financially qualified, proponents whose abilities are compatible to the project. It is rewarding for agencies attracting many more proposals than they anticipated. However, proponents who lost sometimes took their objections to the press as well as to the agency’s political masters, bringing a negative impression to the public and even hurting the redevelopment coalition at a certain point of time in the future (Gordon, 1997). Agencies should eliminate those applicants who would be rejected later due to the limited capability. The incrementally changing environment begins to attract small developers first. Local large developers are often not interested in the early waterfront projects because they may be busy in the suburbs (Gordon, 1997). Larger commercial developments usually have taken longer to

start because large developers need to ensure the credibility of the agency and envision the future success.

F. Building Up Credibility by Incremental Efforts:

The achievement of waterfront redevelopment cannot be separate from an agency's strong credibility, which is the result of incremental efforts in its operating process. There are several tactics mentioned in the study cases to smooth the operation and avoid potential troubles: providing speedy approval process, establishing early market in the sites, protecting local residents' rights, and site image improvement.

A speedy process on getting development permits is the evidence to prove agencies' internal efficiency. A speedy process is crucial to finally put construction on the site and helps developers gain a better position in property market cycle. Past experience shows that a six-month delay in getting the approval could lead to five years of postponed construction since the local real estate market can significantly influence the developers' action. Through creating and shaping a potentially vibrant market for the sites, agencies begin to gain credit in the society, as well as attract private investments. Many techniques are applied, for example, providing lower land prices for popular precincts, permitting high-demand housing developments, and providing sufficient services for the new residents, i.e., permanent day care, schools, recreation centers, health clinics, and significant local retail.

G. Effective financial Tools on Finding Public Capital

Since the huge capital costs for land acquisition, site clearance and infrastructure that are required much earlier than private investment begins, bridging financial gap is a crucially important element for the success of waterfront redevelopment. Among all the

cases, at the start-up stage there is no exception that every project needs huge amount of capital support from government subsidies to cover these fees. A question arise from this phenomenon is 'Could waterfront projects have proceeded without the government grants?' D. Gordon clearly indicated that "Any government that is considering a role as the sponsor of a redevelopment agency should understand that revitalizing an urban waterfront is an expensive proposition, requiring substantial up-front grants" (Gordon, 1997).

The financing techniques differ from case to case, depending on the market dynamics in each city. Public authority borrowing was somewhat looser in the early ages of waterfront renewal from late of 1960s to 1980s. The success BPCA (New York State's Battery Park City Authority) is largely benefited from receiving grants at key times (i.e., when it faced bankruptcy in 1979 the state provided \$49M. in bridging financing from 1980 to 1986) and effectively using full faith and credit of New York State. The state's "moral obligation" and supportive federal tax policy provided a strong implication that BPCA are backed by the State. As a result, the market did not ask the agency to directly secure its bonds as to other financially independent agencies⁴. Since late 1980s, the approval of these kinds of borrowing requires to obtain the AAA bond ratings (Gordon, 1999).

⁴ "The agency negotiated a lone of credit from two banks to fund its first year's planning activity, and then drew \$5.1 M. in New York State appropriations from 1969 to 1972. The BPCA repaid the state from the proceeds of its \$200 M. bond issue in 1972 and essentially operated from the remainder until its brush with bankruptcy in 1979. The state provided another \$49 M. in bridge financing from 1980 to 1986, when the big revenues from the World Financial Center deal began to kick in..... If the market had really believed that the BPCA was a financially independent agency, not backed by the state, it might not have bought the 1972 bonds, or might have demanded a higher interest rate to compensate for the risk of default." (Gordon, 1997)

The River District revitalization in Calgary faced same financing gap when it was launched. "... much of the area is undesirable for developers because of environmental concerns from past industrial and rail uses, and the need for extensive infrastructure upgrades raising roads and sites above the flood plain, upgrading and relocating utilities" (the City of Calgary website). The financing strategy for The River is a combination of Federal and Provincial support. A Community Revitalization Levy (CRL) allows for the education portion of the incremental property tax in a designated redevelopment district to be dedicated to redevelopment program in the area. The duration of the redevelopment district and the community revitalization finance tool will generally be up to 20 years; development fees let the City covers some infrastructure costs through fees as development occurs; and the strategic use of City-owned land will be realized through selling or leasing these lands to provide financing for the district. Such use of these lands, and/or redirection of the sale or lease proceeds, requires special consideration from Calgary City Council.

2.3 CentrePlan, CentreVenture, and Waterfront Drive Redevelopment Initiative

Under this section, this document explores the plan-implementation relationship between *CentrePlan* and CentreVenture, coupled with the background introduction on CentreVenture's organizational features and WFRI.

2.3.1 *A Development Framework: CentrePlan and CentreVenture*

CentrePlan determines a vision for the future of downtown development and forms the basis for a series of strategies that will incrementally build towards this vision. CentreVenture was created to lead and encourage downtown business investment and

development. The agency represents a non-profit entrepreneurial corporation, a unique public-private partnership with the City of Winnipeg and the Province of Manitoba. *CentrePlan* is the precursor of CentreVenture and is the fundamental plan that guided CentreVenture's mandate and activities. *CentrePlan* and CentreVenture form the relationship of a master plan and its implementation, a development framework.

The establishment of CentreVenture was strongly supported by the Downtown Task Force, a report created by Economic Development Winnipeg (EDW merged with Tourism Winnipeg in 2002 to form Destination Winnipeg), which was aimed to implement concepts reflected in *CentrePlan*. The Task Force emphasized that "...a sustainable Downtown Development Authority... to provide leadership in the planning, development, coordination, and implementation of projects and activities in the downtown...*CentrePlan*" will play a vital role in developing CentreVenture's physical plan, development strategy, and priorities." (Task Force Report, 1998) The formal news release on April 26, 1999 from the City also confirmed CV's work focus and its relationship with *CentrePlan*. "CentreVenture would adopt the vision of *CentrePlan* as its focus for downtown improvement". In CentreVenture's mandate, the agency adopted the development boundary confined in *CentrePlan* Development Framework (1999), a coordinated plan that conveys the vision of *CentrePlan* in a more easily understandable form with pictorial and graphic images.

In terms of residential and commercial development, CentreVenture's mandate maintains high congruency with *CentrePlan*. *CentrePlan* emphasized that "a successful downtown requires that people live in the heart of the city ... improvements in public transportation and improved services are important factors in encouraging people to live

downtown.....one of the top priority battles for all downtowns is the fight to recruit new businesses and retain existing ones.” (*CentrePlan*, p18 & p30). These demands were precisely documented in CentreVenture’s top three working priorities in its start-up stage, published in “Change is in the Air Downtown” in BOMA Manitoba Commercial Leasing Directory 2002 (CV website):

- Business Development: to jumpstart the economic engine
- Infrastructure: to enhance the downtown’s ability to attract people and investment
- Housing: to animate the downtown after-five and on weekends

CentreVenture approached its mandate expiry date in November 2006. On June 21st, Mayor Sam Katz and the Executive Policy Committee (EPC) voted to extend the agency’s mandate for three more years. CentreVenture’s mandate continues to lead and encourage business investment and development downtown, and to enhance the use of heritage buildings and land in the downtown area. Once the three-year plan is complete, CV has suggested it would consider disbanding or merging with other downtown agencies such as the Forks North Portage Partnership, or simply letting the free market take over (Welch, 2007 Jan.13) The Forks North Portage Partnership is another development organization holding missions on revitalizing the Forks and north portage, the top two destinations of downtown Winnipeg.

2.3.2 CentreVenture’s Mandate and Its Organizational Features:

In 1999, Winnipeg’s City Council established CentreVenture based on the principal recommendation of the Downtown Winnipeg Task Force to implement concepts reflected in the “*CentrePlan* Development Framework” (1999). It has been clearly defined that CentreVenture’s mandate is to lead and

encourage business investment and development downtown, and to enhance the use of heritage buildings and land in the downtown area. A detailed mandate has been declared in the Mayor's report on April 26, 1999⁵. The same information can also be found in the EPC's recommends in the following City Council meeting (Please refer to Appendix C). City Council enabled CentreVenture to adopt a public-private partnership approach that would capitalize on the expertise of the private sector and the policy development strength of government. CentreVenture is an advocate for the entrepreneur to help get a development project rolling by lending a hand to the dialogue process between government decision-makers and the private sector (Stenning, BOMA 2003).

CentreVenture is a public funded organization, and it is required to report annually to the Executive Policy Committee and City Council. In the agency's inception, the City of Winnipeg initially provided \$3 million in seed capital to establish the agency's Urban Development Bank ⁶. In June 2002, regarding the agency's achievement, Winnipeg City Council renewed CentreVenture's mandate to 2006 and also approved an additional \$7 million deposit to fuel Urban Development Bank activities. Until then, the total investment from the City of Winnipeg reached \$10 million. The Government of Manitoba made a \$1.47 million contribution to the agency, including the amount devoted to the Urban Development Bank, and continually provides \$250,000 to

⁵ "CentreVenture would be responsible for assisting in the retention and expansion of existing business, pulling together new business opportunities, encouraging new development, enhancing retail, and facilitating cultural development... Besides business development, CentreVenture's other priority would be the historic re-development of the downtown heritage district... The CEO would be supported by a person skilled in heritage buildings revitalization. CentreVenture would encourage public and private conservation and redevelopment of heritage areas. The CEO would have a mandate to maintain the historic and cultural character of these areas, through the adaptive re-use of heritage buildings. The CEO would also have a mandate for re-development by putting together new business opportunities, assembling grants and matching tenants to buildings." (CV working Draft, 1999 April 26)

⁶ http://www.centreventure.com/inc_urban.html

the bank annually. Since 1999, CentreVenture also received \$250,000 a year in operating funds from the city and this grant will continually be provided until 2009.

Based on the fiscal resources, CentreVenture has three main instruments to use in terms of catalyzing housing projects: the Urban Development Bank, the downtown Heritage Tax Credit, and the marketing and development of surplus city-owned properties. "The purpose of the Urban Development Bank is to offer gap financing, mortgages and loan guarantees for small and medium-size projects. The Downtown Heritage Tax Credit is meant to stimulate capital investment in the conservation and adaptive reuse of historical buildings in the heart of the city" (CMHC, 2002). Under the Asset Agreement with The City of Winnipeg, CV has the authority to market surplus city-owned properties for sale and redevelopment. The agency also helps facilitate projects through non-financial means. Annitta Stenning, CV's former President and CEO, concluded that, "We're succeeding because we can help solve problems in various ways. In some cases, our solutions are financial in nature. Others may involve a change of process or policy and involve our partners at the City." (BOMA 2003)

CentreVenture is run by a volunteer, private-sector board of directors, with a chair (originally the Mayor, but now a leading business person) in addition to the members from business communities. The Mayor would appoint members of the Board, subject to Council ratification. This board provides CentreVenture with the necessary political leadership link and broad support from the private sector. Mayor Sam Katz is the current honorary chair on the board. The Board would appoint the President & CEO. On February 26th 2006, the chair of the board of CV announced Ross McGowan, a well-respected Winnipeg landscape architect, hired as President & CEO of the agency. Mr.

McGowan is the sixth person in this position since Annita Stenning, the first CEO left more than three years ago to become the City of Winnipeg's top administrator.

2.3.3 Introduction of Waterfront Drive Redevelopment Initiative

Waterfront Drive Redevelopment Initiative (WDRI) is the residential-commercial project launched by CV in 2004. Unlike the urban waterfront sites in the example cities, Winnipeg's Waterfront Drive did not function as an important industrial port zone for transportation in last century. In Winnipeg, the use of the river and waterfront was superseded quickly by the railway, along the riverfront and on adjacent lands to the study area – the Forks. However, the shared similarities are the centre location with underused land and constructions. Most recently, this area featured large gravel parking lots and the backs of warehouses. In general, properties appeared neglected, many with broken windows or chain link fencing protecting the perimeter (Preliminary Management Strategy, 2001).

The Exchange District of Waterfront, which meanders along the Red River from Lombard to Higgins, offers significant views and access to the Red River. In the summer of 2000 CV developed a concept plan for this area, a scenic drive through the Exchange District. This plan was made possible by a \$9.1 million contribution from the three levels of government in 2002. In February 2004, as the final paving was being done on the freshly created Waterfront Drive, the WDRI was announced and the agency requested proposals for the six tracts totaling about 2.5 acres along the site. Before the announcement, CV had worked with the City for months on mapping underground infrastructures and other issues to make the growth possible. In June 2004, out of the 19 proposals submitted from local developers, five of them were sifted out by the agency.

At the same time as the proposal request, the city of Winnipeg and CV, together, created a comprehensive information package for evaluating developers' proposals for the west side of Waterfront Drive, from Lombard Avenue to Higgins Avenue. Developers and their design teams were required to use this brief, Waterfront Drive Expectations for New Development, to guide their proposals. In this brief, the City indicated the vision for the development:

"To encourage the development of a thriving, pedestrian-oriented, mixed-use residential neighborhood that conserves and strengthens the unique identity of this historic warehouse precinct. Valued features include: the picturesque river edge, rare views of the downtown skyline, massive stone and brick warehouses, and narrow, angled streets and covered alleys that recall the time when this area was the commercial centre of Winnipeg."

Waterfront Drive Expectations for New Development 2004

This package not only outlined development criteria in terms of the setting, the site, and the building, but also indicated the design and development review process in a transparent manner. Based on the criteria, successful developers are not those providing the highest bid, but the ones that can maximize the site's potential, promise quality construction and deliver magnificent urban design (Nealin, 2004). At the same time, the agency appropriately assessed the land in order to maximize values of other East Exchange properties. "We intend to be strategic in our decision-making on the purchase and use of this valuable land," says Ron Margolis, CentreVenture's chief executive officer.

Finally, five Winnipeg firms, Streetside Development Corporation (a member of the Qualico Group of Companies), Sunstone Resort Communities Corporation (an affiliate of FWS Construction Ltd.), Sherwood Developments Ltd., Friesen Tokar Architects, and, the Ship Street Group (a joint venture of Freedom Developments Ltd.

and Streetside Development), emerged as the successful candidates among 19 proposals submitted (WFP, Sep. 23). According to Laurie Nealin's article published in CentreVenture's official Website, there is a total of \$48.5 million dollars invested in over 170 residential units and more than 36,000 square feet of commercial space in WDRI. Please see Table 1 for more details of each project. Please see Table1 "Waterfront Drive Redevelopment Initiative Projects List" for more detailed information of these four projects.

However, in terms of selection process, CentreVenture was criticized for not consulting City Council and lacking public consultation on what kind of development should go onto Waterfront Drive. The condos were priced too high for the most likely market of downtown residents, including students and early-career professionals. In the Winnipeg City Summit 2006, "attainable housing" (as opposed to affordable housing) was used often in discussions. The need for appropriate housing for all sectors of society was echoed by summit participants.

In order to provide a clear view on how the WDRI proceeded, Table 5 "Operation Timeline in Waterfront Drive" lists the important dates and operations since year 2002 (See Appendices).

2.4 Discussion and Direction for Research

In the previous part of this chapter, the seven strategies were listed out coupling with the analysis of their application in several example cities. The related information of *CentrePlan*, CentreVenture, and Waterfront Development projects was also provided. This section intends to combine the general implementation knowledge with CV's

particular operation to come up with the direction for the further research. At the end, a list of questions is given to clarify what information the follow up interviews need to focus on.

2.4.1 Discussion and direction for research

Regarding the four features of good plan making, the strengths of *CentrePlan* are obvious. Firstly, it is an agreement representing all of the partners. Its creation involved sufficient public input. Secondly, *CentrePlan* is a comprehensive master plan that established a vision, developed strategies, and put in place an Action Plan. However, *CentrePlan* may fall short in seeking sufficient and diverse funding, as well as being a master plan evolved in the implementation over time. Since its creation and publication in 1995 and 1996, *CentrePlan* has just been reviewed once in 1999. Result of this revision is the *CentrePlan* Development Framework that largely guide CV's mandate. Except CentreVenture's Working Draft in 1999, this master plan is rarely found in any other document.

In the light of WDRI's specific conditions, we must look at CV's objectives to answer if the three tiers of physical, economic and social objectives existed, and whether *CentrePlan* has substantially evolved over time to guide the implementation. During the research, three documents are highlighted on guiding the developments along waterfront: one is "the Exchange District Waterfront & Scenic Drive (2000)", the second is "the Preliminary Management Strategy Report (2001)", and the third is "Waterfront Drive – expectations for new development (2004)".

The first document is a concept plan aimed to create a scenic drive through the Exchange District. This plan can be seen as a recovery initiative that converted the

abandoned yards into Winnipeg's most imageable urban landscape. As a result, the initiative attained sufficient support and received a \$9 million funding under the Canada-Manitoba Infrastructure Programs (These programs are implemented by Western Economic Diversification Canada and Manitoba Infrastructure and Transportation through a joint federal-provincial infrastructure secretariat). This initiative elevated the status of Waterfront Drive redevelopment in City Council's agenda and confirmed the City of Winnipeg's commitment to advancing this initiative. However, this plan is very much project focused. There is no evidence showing *CentrePlan* guided it.

The second document was based on a companion study for the development of the East Exchange, with an emphasis on private investment. This document proposed a series of recommendations to improve the existing planning tools and procedures to better address development in the Exchange District. In light of WDRI, this Strategy Report represents CV's opinion on waterfront developments:

"CentreVenture recognized that the proposed waterfront development will provide the type of neighborhood that is capable of supporting Downtown living. It was understood that a neighborhood park, safe and attractive, with new investment opportunity for commercial and residential development, will allow the mix of attractions necessary to sustain revitalization."

"Preliminary Management Strategy Report (2001)"

Also, the Strategy Report provided some consideration for new in-fill development (residential, office, and commercial/entertainment), but they primarily focused on dealing with the linkages of the existing buildings, infrastructure and services. Similarly, *CentrePlan* did not mention in this document. The third document was created for the developers and their design teams to guide their proposals. The City used this brief as design criteria to evaluate development proposals. The opinion in the Strategy Report

was precisely reflected. However, there is no evidence showing that *CentrePlan* played any role in creating this document.

According to the three documents, the objectives of WDRI can be categorized in the physical environment improvement tier and the economic development tier. Encouraging mixed use, especially involving more attainable housing in the site, can be argued as transferring development benefit to a broader field, but the specific objectives in this regard is very vague. The City and CV's concerns of suitable mixed use forms for Waterfront Drive are especially important in applying the strategy "finding suitable projects and developers".

To a substantial plan-implementation relationship, it remains uncertain of what role *CentrePlan* plays in CV's current implementation. The previous study shows that relationship was there at the time of CV's establishment. Also, contribution from the three levels of government funding for improving Waterfront Drive proved the commitments. However, regarding *CentrePlan*'s absence in all of the three documents and its disappearance from the public sight, the questions are if *CentrePlan* is still in the position. According to the articles released in the Winnipeg Free Press, a new plan "Heat of Gold" is under the way to the agency. This change brings more questions. It is crucial to know what grant vision is driving CV or is there one, what the differences are between the new and the old? These information needs to be found in the interviews.

Seven strategies that enable waterfront agencies to achieve their objectives have been discussed in previous sections. These strategies set up a working framework to analyze CV's operation in WDRI. Through the detailed study on CV's organization

features and its WDRI, it is safe to say that all these strategies have been more or less applied in the agency's operation. This section intends to point out the direction of further research through comparing features of the effective strategies with CV's operation in its WDRI.

Regarding the features derived from other cases, CentreVenture has a good organizational base. To begin with, the agency holds necessary authority and has substantial local control in conducting development projects. CV has an active board with members come from local business leaders. In the 1999 Work Draft, CV has been defined as "a unique private/public sector partnership-an entrepreneurial Authority... a lean, green, development machine." The most current CEO is the development manager and joint venture partner of the Ship Street Village condos on Waterfront Drive.

However, CV's decision-making and delivery mechanism need to be explored in the further research. This mechanism determines if the agency could adopt an approach on transferring development benefits to a broader field. Regarding this issue, an outstanding feature that CV differs from other cases was found. The agency, since its reception, has a Mayor serves as Honorary Chair. It can be a debate that if this feature shows CV's delivery mechanism strength. CV needs to balance its independent (the entrepreneurial nature) and the public accountability (having access to manage public assets). While the connection to civic political leadership can open channels and provide continuity, it runs the risk of political control. Due to the shortage of similar study cases in light of this issue, more information is needed in the following interviews to find out whether the current arrangement properly balanced the flexibility with accountability. Meanwhile, WDRI was criticized for not involving enough public consultation and

community-based decision-making. The critics include that the agency did not have a public consultation process in housing the five developers, and the selling prices of most condos are above the average amount of other similar units in the city. These issues also need to be clarified in the follow up interviews.

Overall, CV's relationship with governments can be mirrored in WDRI. Waterfront Drive Redevelopment Initiative's prerequisite project, Waterfront Drive project, is initiated by CV and the City and is made possible under the \$500,000 grant and the \$9 million funding from the Canada/Manitoba Infrastructure Agreement. CentreVenture has been provided with necessary human resources as well as fiscal and political supports in this project. The substantial support is essential especially due to the fact that Winnipeg's downtown housing programs generally are suffering from the lack of fiscal support (WFP Sep, 21).

However, the recent city audit released some serious concerns. According to Winnipeg Free Press article "City agency floundering" (Dec. 11, 2006), the agency was criticized about losing its momentum and, as a result, some credibility, after the first mandate. The same article also pointed out that "the successful relationships built up in CentreVenture's early days have fizzled; the agency has become risk-averse and developers and downtown boosters have no idea what it's up to; the necessary presentations and press coverage on informing the agency's work have disappeared from public's sight." (WFP, Dec.11) Regarding the two sides of the story, the further research needs to answer what elements help CV build a good relationship with the governments. The question can also be raised as what actions the governments highly value to CentreVenture.

CV has move in a new direction by targeting Portage Avenue and Main Street. The plan adopted to direct this new action is the *Heart of Gold*, which is released to the public at the very beginning of 2007. "We believe that it's more difficult to do Portage and Main, but there's more visual and psychological impact... Let's focus attention on doing things that will make the most difference in a relatively short period of time, three years." said Hodgert, who co-authored the plan with board member Ida Albo (M.A.Welch, WFP Jan13). The *Heart of Gold* outlines clear, quantifiable goals for CV in its three-year mandate. Portage Avenue and Main Street: about six spots chosen in part; nine parks and public spaces; and three parkades (WFP Jan.13, 2007 a6). This focus transfer somewhat reflects Mayor Katz's speech in his Campaign several month ago. In October 25th's WFP (Campaign Platforms), Mayor Katz wanted CV to place a high priority on redeveloping Central Park and other downtown green spaces, which has never been the agency's working priority before.

The adoption of this new plan opened the debate at least in two fields: building consensus and coalition with local groups, as well as having capacity of being flexible. Regarding the first issue, CentreVenture's operation has long been criticized as the lack of public input. Based on the previous study, consensus and coalition building are largely rooted in effective communication and participation programs. Similarly, comments of the new plan come from the both sides. Some comments in the Press already criticized that the creation and approval of *Heart of Gold* is short of any public input or discussion, and the new plan veers away from CV's traditional focus – housing has generally taken a backseat in the agency's mandate (WFP Jan.26, 2007). At the same time, positive comments releases that the new action CV took is winning praise broadly. Business

leaders, City Councilors and downtown advocates applauded the plan and hope councilors approve the new plan soon (WFP Jan14, 2007). It remains to find out CV's operation of the new plan's creation and if the plan represents a common expectation to the site.

Based on the features derived from other cases, it is also crucial to find out if CV has any communication programs with other groups in the long run, what form(s) they take, and what the response and outcomes these programs led to. Particularly to WDRI, if any opposition groups existed and how CV dealt with the situation.

Regarding the second issue, having capacity of being flexible, CV's adopting the new plan is a test for the features derived from other cases. The two main reasons that cause objectives adjustment are significant ideological change in the controlling party and local market trends. It can be argued that CV's work focus change somewhat reflects the ideology change from the sponsoring government, but no evidence show this is a political intervention in CV's strategies. Did local market trends play a significant role in CV's work focus transfer is the key question in need of further study. Through the interviews of people with hands-on experience, new information may become available.

In terms of choosing suitable projects, two issues should be highlighted, the design criteria of mixed use as well as housing market feasibility. Firstly, the City's and CV's expectations for Waterfront Drive functioned as the design criteria in WDRI. This document generally reflected the opinions that Bruttomesso concluded from successful waterfront redevelopment practice (see p16). Obviously, CV and the City share a correct understanding on the contributions that accessibility and mixed-use may bring to waterfront sustainable growth. However, as to the exact forms of mixed use that may

reflect Winnipeg's long-term market trends, neither CV nor the City showed a clear opinion in the criteria. The unclearness reveals the uncertainty on both sides of CV and the City in what are the proper mixed-use forms for downtown Winnipeg. A sustainable mixed-use project is not simply putting everything together to accommodate diverse functions, but an intelligent combination that reflects long-term market trends. The form of mixed use differs from city to city, depending on the particularities of local market trends and the needs for development flexibility. Through interviewing informants from several sectors, their concerns on the suitable mixed-use form for Winnipeg downtown would be detected.

Secondly, the experience of previous urban waterfront redevelopments suggests the incorporation of housing projects for small, high-income, professional households for general waterfront redevelopment agencies. This suggestion considered the difficulties that an agency may encounter in the local housing market, as well as the limited urban services that waterfront area could provide for future residents. In the City Summit 2006, the prices of residential projects along Waterfront Drive are criticized as too high for the most likely market of downtown residents, including students and early-career professionals. The successful sales of new luxury condos and commercial spaces can be viewed as proof of achieving in-front economic objectives. However, the issue remains of how the agency can successfully incorporate these high-end condos with more attainable houses with the consideration of housing market situation.

The previous study demonstrates how a city agency built up its credibility with the help of waterfront redevelopment. However, this situation does not apply to WDRI. At the beginning, with the help from the City and the provincial government, a \$9 million

project has launched to accelerate the process of WDRI. This factor made for a smooth process in the early stages. Plus, CV has its already established necessary credibility from well recognized achievements in downtown. However, CV has been criticized for losing its credibility since the second mandate. The absence of leadership role, short of communication and cooperation with other downtown agencies, and ignoring public consultation are listed as top issues the agency need to deal with. What needs to be emphasized is that CV's credibility-building cannot be achieved by the success of one or two projects. Achievements are necessary, but they must come from the public desire. Through the interview, we can understand what actions other groups want CV to do. These opinions truly contribute to the credibility-rebuilding.

According to CMHC's report in 2002, CV has three financing tools to broker deals with the private sector: the Urban Development Bank, the downtown Heritage Tax Credit, and the marketing and development of surplus city-owned properties. Among these tools, the Urban Development Bank and Heritage Tax Credit aim to catalyze housing projects. The Urban Development Bank is CV's major financing tool on assisting promising projects go ahead that would not financially qualified from conventional sources. It takes the forms of gap financing, loan guarantees, and forgivable loans.

Cooperating with the City, CV administered the Downtown Heritage Tax Credit, which is meant to stimulate the conservation and adaptive reuse of heritage buildings. The tax credit was provided to investors at the base of 50 percent of the net private investment made in eligible work. The maximum \$250,000 could be provided per building and may last over ten-year period. Investors may use this credit to pay municipal

property or business taxes. The Heritage Tax Credit provided a way to increase the City's tax base and also improve the overall situation the derelict heritage buildings have in downtown Winnipeg. However, the application of this financing tool has been halted and there is now a pool of monies (14 million) that can be drawn on for various objectives. It is necessary to confirm this amount and if any is being used to replace or perform in same way as the Heritage Tax Credit.

2.4.2 Guiding Questions for interview questionnaires

Through the analysis in this section, the questions needed to be answer in further research are listed below. These questions set up the guideline to design the interview questionnaires. For the sake of conducting interviews, some of the questions may not show in the same order or sentences in this list:

- What role *CentrePlan* plays in CV's current implementation?
- What grant vision is driving CV or is there one?
- What are the differences between the new plan (*Heart of Gold*) and the agency's previous work focus?
- Does having a mayor chair the board properly balance the flexibility with accountability?
- Did the agency have sufficient public process in housing the five developers?
- What are CV's concerns on having more attainable houses in downtown?
- What are the elements helping CV build a good relationship with the governments?
- What are the actions the governments highly value as relationship building?
- Did the creation of this new plan involve sufficient public input?
- Does the plan represent a common expectation from the general public?
- Does CV have any communication programs with other groups in the long run? What form(s) they take? What the response and outcomes these programs led to?
- To WDRI, are there any opposition groups existed and how did CV deal with the situation?
- Did local market trends play a significant role in CV's work focus transfer?


- What are the general concerns on the suitable mixed-use forms for Winnipeg downtown?
- How can the agency successfully incorporate these high-end condos with more attainable houses, with the consideration of housing market situation?
- What are the actions that truly contribute to the agency's credibility-rebuilding?
- Is there now a pool of monies (14 million) that can be drawn on for various objectives?
- Among this money, if any is being used to replace or perform in same way as the Heritage Tax Credit?

3 RESEARCH METHODS

3.1 Research Instruments

This research is an in-depth study of the successful implementation strategies for waterfront redevelopment authorities. These strategies are the ones that can effectively support CV for a better implementation. Three main instruments were applied. They are coupled with site document, photos and graphics. The Flow Chart 2 below illustrates the entire research process:

Figure 2: Research Process



3.1.1 Literature review

Under this section, the fundamental information was collected for the follow-up key informant interviews and analysis. Through studying the waterfront redevelopment experience in eight example cities, considerable success stories and lessons are identified. The tactics applied in each of these cities were therefore grouped into seven strategies.

These seven strategies set up the framework for the following study. Information about CentreVenture, *CentrePlan*, and WDRI is also provided in this part of the study. However, due to the limited resources in regard to these aspects, the study in literature review part can only provide a brief introduction. The literature review was an on-going process and additional information was added as the research progressed.

3.1.2 Key Informants Interviews

The research largely relied on the key informant interviews to collect key information of CV's operations. Individual informants from four different sectors who were involved in some fashion with the work of CV were interviewed. The purpose of interviewing individuals from different sectors (CentreVenture, the government sector, development organizations and institutes, and the private sector) is to gather information that would support a comprehensive understanding to each question (see Appendix A for Interview Questionnaires). Also, comparing the opinions from different perspectives benefited the follow-up analysis.

In the questionnaires, each question was listed with probes and goals aiming to evoke more responses from informants (for the detailed interview questions please see Appendix A). All of the questions were open-ended, allowing participants to raise the relevant concerns that may not have been anticipated by the researcher. The interview questions were grouped into three sections:

- (a) WDRI's plan making and objectives. Due to limited resources, this section is intended to complete the missing part from the literature review;
- (b) Proving the effectiveness of the strategies: Rating the importance of each strategy in WDRI's implementation, also, finding out the success stories of applying the strategies in WDRI. New strategies may be discovered in this step;

(c) Challenges: The challenges CV is facing. These challenges include and exceed the areas of applying strategies. This section aims to gain insight into the experiences of participants, going beyond the collection of facts.

Eight persons participated in the interviews. Each informant's responses were recorded in a written format or taped and then transcribed and entered as data text of on the computer. The entire interview process lasted about four weeks. What needs to be clarified is the interviewees from the government sector include both the City department and the provincial government. The particular level of government does not identified in the analysis due to the confidential issues.

Many adjustments were made during the interviews to better collect information. These adjustments are reported in the Appendix B "Research Method Reflection". The detailed information is also included in this document regarding how the interviews were carried out, why the adjustments were necessary, and what results the new approaches led to.

3.1.3 Analysis

All comments from the interviews were collected and grouped into four categories in order to discover the key issues. The four categories are: the features that strengthen CV's application, the features that weaken CV's application, the opportunities for application, and the threats for application. A "Table of Interviews conclusion" was created based on this classification to show the features of each strategy, as well as the environment for CV applying such a strategy (see Table 3). In additional, a list of key issues was identified based on this table. The goal of providing this list is to support rational and practical recommendations that focus on the most concerned issues towards CV's operation. This list is the basis for creating the final recommendations.

Also, Site documentation, photos and graphics are included in the study process to support the above research methods.

3.2 Discussion on Limitations of the Research

Regarding the research methods applied in this study, two limitations exist due to the availability of resources. To begin with, as understood through the literature review, CV's operation seems to operate under a fair degree of 'secrecy' and confidentiality. This secrecy shows in the difficulties in obtaining the agency's key official documents, the delay of putting important information on publication, and the lack of public debate concerning relevant issues about the agency and the WDRI. This limitation inevitably impacts the present analysis of CV's operation and the operating outcomes. Interviewing key informants will partly complement the shortage brought by this limitation. However, it cannot obtain a broader view from the public in an integrated way.

Secondly, the interviewees are not required to directly identify the shortcomings and errors in the agency's operations. The questions for informants focus on the success stories of strategy application. Although the third section gives the informants opportunity to express their own insights and opinions from personal experience, there are not any questions or probes directing them to specifically discuss the 'unsuccessful part'. I assumed that this information would be expressed by the informants during the process of the interviews. There was no concern of the informants being afraid to be open and to share their information.

4 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

The information in this section is grouped under the seven strategies to be consistent with the previous studies. Under each strategy, the qualitative analysis and findings are provided. In each of the section, the basic information of interviews is given at the beginning, i.e., the participated sectors and the key questions asked. Then the comments from the interviews were outlined explicitly and objectively for the following analysis. Furthermore, all of the issues are discussed, coupling with the knowledge obtained from the literature review. The analysis aims to clarify and unpack the perceptions embedded in the interviewees' comments. The goal is to provide summarized and qualified evidence for the recommendations and conclusions in Chapter 5. At the end of this section, a table of conclusion is added to give a concise summary of this chapter.

4.1 'Having a capable delivery mechanism'

In this part of the questionnaire, the interviewees came from the government sector, downtown organizations, and CV. The questions asked differ slightly among interviews to fit each informant's background. All the questions focus on whether having a mayor chair the board shows CV's operation strength, and furthermore, if this mechanism properly balances CV's flexibility and accountability. The opinions regarding these issues are diverse.

Some positive comments were expressed. One interviewee indicated that this arrangement per se is a good idea because CV still needs to represent the public interests,

and the business CV deals with is eventually for the interests of the citizens in this city, not simply to maximize economic benefits. Another interviewee pointed out:

“I may criticize it at that time (CV’s establishment), but after all this time, I think it (having the Mayor chair the board) is reasonably positive... it is not a right or wrong thing to do. It depends on the personality ... (having the Mayor chair the board) probably is not the best thing to do, but I do not think it will hurt anything since he (the former Mayor) is such a person active on downtown revitalization.”

Another interviewee also expressed “It purely depends on the personality. The then Mayor initiated CV and stepped out of its way to make things happen with his limited power. Without his efforts, none of what you see in Waterfront Drive will happen”, “This arrangement would be reasonable considering the then Mayor and the CEO hired”, another interviewee related.

Some interviewees expressed that the Mayor did not really do any substantial work on the board. As with the name, honorary chair is not a solid position. Mayors neither attend meetings nor are involved in micro-development decision makings, “To me, having a mayor serving on the board is a good idea. It just does not count in any actual operation... I think this is good; otherwise, the balance would have been broken”. This opinion coincides with the information from a CV’s staff, “The Mayor does not attend the meetings. He is not a voting member of the board... He cannot act independent to political interests... The Mayor does not sit there and have a vote, but a representative from his office is available to us.”

Having a mayor’s representative serving on the board is considered to be a better approach by other interviewees, “A mayor can have trusted persons serving on the board to represent his will and guide development direction. Honorary means he is not actually playing any concrete roles on the board. It just shows the agency has been approved by

him and has his support.” According to CV’s staff, when the organization grew stronger and the board was more established, the then Mayor stepped away and handed on the authority. According to CV staff’s views, there are way more benefits in this than interferences:

“This is symbolic but with practical benefit. He is there to support what we need through the specific government. When we need city’s cooperation, the connection is there. We couldn’t be that effective if we do not have good connection with the Mayor and the city. We can be way quicker to get things done. We can turn around things much quicker, and needn’t go through the regular city channel.... It is beneficial for us to have the flow of information going directly back and forth to the Mayor’s office. They know where we going and we know what they want... There was a while the connection with the city hall was not there. Mayor’s representative was not attending the meetings. It is a lot difficulty to do something without the connection”.

This arrangement’s downsides were also highlighted. A frequently mentioned one is that mayors are typically very strong persons and the board could be dominated by them. The Mayor may think his vision is the right visions and no one else has a vision. Also, having a mayor chair the board may create some difficulties for CV, when they deal with the provincial government. Other levels of government may be reluctant to provide financial support since they may think it is the Mayor’s agenda. None of these opinions and concerns was raised by CV’s staff.

Based on the literature review, the feature of a capable and effective delivery mechanism for a city development agency is an agency that “is able to conduct business like a private entity for the sake of speed and efficiency, but which also remains subject to the policy and fiscal control of the publicly elected officials” (Millspaugh, 2001). Regarding the complexity of a development agency’s delivery mechanism, little

information can be located in the literature review part. However, having a mayor serving as a board member is a distinction differentiating CV's board from other city examples. The impact of this feature becomes the focus of this section.

The most obvious strength of having a mayor serving on the board is the substantial practical benefit in an agency's operation. A Mayor's support brings the essential resources CV needs to enable its speed and efficiency. The business CV is doing cannot be achieved by a private entity because market forces alone would not make it happen. Due to the high risks, redeveloping derelict lands and buildings can be unprofitable and consequently unattractive to private investors. Leveraging private investments for these properties cannot be successful without political supports financially and administratively. Accessing these resources is essential to achieve the development goals.

It is also found that this strategy can become extremely effective when a mayor has a strong personal commitment on what the agency is doing. Otherwise, having a mayor serving on the board can be symbolic and may not necessarily result in financial and administrative supports. The substantial supports can only be secured when a mayor holds the same belief on what the agency is doing, but not by simply assigning a board position for a mayor. A CentreVenture staff member said:

"There was a while the connection with the city hall was not there. The Mayor's representative was not attending the meeting. It is a lot more difficult to doing something without the connection."

Although having a mayor chair the board may bring CV a better image to the public as a public agency, the benefit is very limited. Since representing the public ought to be realized by adopting a more open process through involving public consultation,

simply having elected persons taking positions on the board does not make things different. Furthermore, involving people from different sectors on the board and having diverse voices in the decision making process better represents the public interests.

Meanwhile, there are some worries regarding this strategy. Mayors are strong persons and their involvement may impact agencies' decision making or alter its work focus. A potential danger in this strategy is that a mayor may take the agency to the direction under his political will or make the vision he believes in as the agency's mandate, without considering other's inputs. For CV's board, since the Honorary Chair is not a voting position, political will cannot directly become involved in the decision making process. Most interviewees related that having the Mayor's representative attending the meetings is a more practical approach, not only because the Mayor is not always available, but it avoids the strong intervention.

The other problem this strategy may bring is the difficulty of gaining support from other levels of government. Comparing with the considerable support from the City, the resources CV obtained from the provincial government are relatively rare. An interviewee related, "This is my own read. Provincial government is reluctant to provide financial support since they may think it is the Mayor's plan". To remove the misunderstanding, what a development agency can do is to apply more transparent operation process and establish communication channels.

However, the understanding of a proper delivery mechanism cannot be limited by analyzing one tactic. Having a mayor chair the board is an effective tactic, but the issue is much more complex. The interviews reveal that the complexity needs to be considered with broader structural issues, i.e., the pros and cons of a public-private

partnership, board composition and appointment procedures, decision-making authorities, and issues of accountability and transparency. The further analysis regarding delivery mechanism is presented in section 5.4.1.

4.2 ‘Keeping good relationship with governments’

The interviewees from downtown organizations, the government sector (both the provincial and the local governments), and CV reported in this part of the questionnaire. Five interviewees participated. A series of questions were raised. Each of them was asked one to two of the questions below.

- How important is this strategy for CV?
- What efforts does a government highly value as relationship building?
- What did CV do to keep a good relationship with the City?
- How can CV be more financially independent?

CV’s staff highly valued the importance of keeping good relationship with the City. According to them, the government ought to be identified as politicians and administration. In brief, financial supports rely more on politicians and the day-to-day work relies more on administration. The agency needs to keep good relationships with both to be effective in their work. Meanwhile, an interviewee from the government sector said “I do not highly rate this strategy. I am sure, when the agency does a good job to its mandate and well represents the public benefits, it will go forward in its way, regardless the good or bad relationship with government”. According to the interviews with local organizations, the informants pointed out that substantial efforts and outcomes form the foundation of a good relationship.

A CEO's leadership style, attitude in how to process projects and the belief in downtown are other elements emphasized by several interviewees. A CentreVenture's staff commented:

"You cannot have a person heading up this agency without good relationship with all the government and other members. The Mayor and the City Council, their feeling on if the CEOs were effective or not are crucial. This is a very hard position that needs to keep good relationship with all the people: administration, politicians, all the diverse groups in downtown and also gains their respects. It is personality driven."

The success achieved during the first CEO's term is well recognized, "(This CEO) has good relationships with government, very well on interpersonal skills, and holds the attitude that can make things work in right ways..."; "(the new CEO) is a landscape architect with entrepreneurial nature. He knows the planning process and the importance of public process. He is good on making things happen".

Along with these opinions, the roles that CV's board plays in relationship building are also mentioned. According to CV's staff, the board is the ultimate decision making body. Some interviewees indicated that the board and its CEO play crucial roles in continuing the mandate. They need to get the mandate to the top of politicians' agendas and gain substantial supports. Otherwise, the agency would lose its spotlight and even be deemed as unnecessary someday. A strong leader ought to have the ability to sell their mandate to politicians and convince them as to what they needed.

CV's board is criticized by an interviewee as:

"Naturally (the board) is more entrepreneurial and does not want to involve government in their business, treat other groups as competitors, and cannot think in a collaborating way."

It is understood that the cooperation between the board and CEOs is crucial, "As a CEO, one of the tasks is to deal with the relationship with board members and take

direction from them. They have strong personalities and you need to know how to keep your work direction”.

According to the literature review, making financial demands foreseeable and acceptable is very important for good relationships with governments. This opinion was shared by a government officer, “this is definitely important. Money distribution is what we do everyday and this is a very sensitive issue. The agency gained a huge amount of money to launch its works and this is also a commitment to make things happen. I do not mean the government cannot help, but when an agency always came back to ask for money and cannot provide a transparent process, it really causes a bad relationship”.

However, regarding the question of whether CV needs to be more financially self-sufficient, a different opinion arose. An interviewee argued:

“CentreVenture is a public sector response agency, so the public should pay for it, you do not want the private sector to pay them. CV just asked for administration money from the city and I think it is fine. The money they are supposed to be using is from the urban development bank. As to CV’s mandate, they do need a huge amount of money to encourage development and the private sector would not do that... CV needs to have public money and they need to do good business to roll that money back in”.

The previous experience confirmed that maintaining good relationships with governments is a life line for development agencies. From the action of initial land-assembly to assisting developers to go through a range of policy procedure, every step forward is dependent on local government’s cooperation. Consequently, development agencies ought to work hard to improve the relationship. Due to the time-consuming nature of the redevelopment projects, without considerable efforts, the original tie to a

sponsoring government would eventually wear thin in the ever-changing political environment.

The questions brought to the interview aim to find out CV's success stories and lessons in applying this strategy. It has been discovered that in its nearly seven-year's operation, CV was not only greatly benefited from having a good relationship with the City, but also learned lessons when the connection was gone. It is found that these opposing results were caused by the features of the agency's decision making body and staff.

A CEO's leadership style, attitude in how to process projects and the understanding of downtown, are the elements highlighted during the interview. These features can be very personal and cannot be judged as right-or-wrong. CentreVenture's first three years of operations are recognized as CV's golden age. During this time the agency received substantial supports from the City financially and politically. The then CEO can be considered as a good example. Interviewees described this CEO as "having amazing interpersonal skills and conversation skills" and "strong-minded". The current CEO also received positive comments in his work. He has years of both public and private development experience. Since he held the position, the City has passed new housing incentives which can be seen as significantly supporting CV's work. Obviously, both of the CEOs are good at building a good relationship with the City. Importantly, both CEOs highly value public process and consultation. They have consciously involved government and other groups into the operation process. Although the decisions may not represent everyone's interests, people are generally satisfied since they are informed on what the agency is doing.

Beyond a CEO's style, CV's board plays an even more important role in the relationship building activities. Unlike the positive comments for CEOs in the interviews, CV's board is generally targeted by critical comments. These comments focus on three areas: the lack of diverse background on the board members; a tendency to focus on business issues and ignoring the importance of public process; and not caring about having good relationships with other groups. Another issue which came to attention in the interview is the board's recruitment decisions in its second mandate. If an agency's recruitment decision cannot be recognized as suitable by its sponsoring government, this movement will largely harm the relationship. There is no evidence to prove that CV's board have had a similar experience, but the frequent change of administration in its second mandate and the lack of connection with the City at the same time cannot be considered merely a coincidence.

On the other hand, since CV's CEO takes direction from its board, the consistency between the board and its CEO is crucial in relationship building activities. The board and its CEO ought to share the same attitude on how to proceed with projects. The lack of consistency could not only damage relationships with the sponsoring government, but bring challenges to an agency's daily operating work. Although there is no explicit concern regarding the boundaries between the role of the board and a CEO, this issue is very important and deserves a further discussion in Chapter 5.

Keeping financial demand foreseeable and acceptable is another crucial element in the relationship building activities. The increasing financial demands, especially with a steep rise, will damage or even destroy the relationship. A sponsoring government normally provides significant funding to launch waterfront redevelopment. Due to scarce

capital resources, it is difficult for any sponsoring government to commit to such support over a long period of time. Also, a waterfront redevelopment could fortunately be on the top of a politician's agenda, but can never be the only priority. Limited resources are a problem faced by every one. What a development agency can do is to find multiple resources to fill financial gaps, and setting up these alternatives also needs political support from sponsoring governments.

The Urban Development Bank and other tax rebate programs, including the latest "Multi-family/Mixed-use Dwelling Grant Programs", provide great financial flexibility to developments. These financing alternatives help soothe the urgencies to a certain extent, and meanwhile, the danger of abuse exists. CV ought to be very careful in balancing the nature of its public agency with the needs of bigger returns. Utilizing alternative financing tools is a significant approach to meet the development needs, but improper uses, especially in selecting proper projects to subsidize, may also become a potential threat harming ties with the public and the City.

4.3 'Building consensus & coalition with local groups'

All of the interviewees responded to this part of the questionnaire. It is intended to find out if CV has a communication program in WDRI, if interviewees understand CV's goals in WDRI, and are there any opposing groups in WDRI. With interviews proceeding, some supplementary questions were added to obtain further information. To each interviewee, one to two questions were asked:

- What is the impact of lacking of communication programs?
- What are the forms of communication taking place?

- How did CV deal with the opposing groups?

Regarding the first question, five out of seven interviewees responded “No” (CV’s staff did not participate in this question). In 2006’s city audit, CV has been criticized for lack of clarity over its responsibilities, as well as being short of consultation and communication with other groups. There is no surprise that similar criticisms were found among downtown organizations, private groups and government sectors. Generally, the interviewees’ comments reflected the city audit findings:

“The process is less transparent...especially its financing situation has never been released.”

“There is no public input in what they wanted to achieve in Waterfront Drive.”

“They deal with public land and run by public money, if the public has no access to know what they are doing, I think that is a real problem.”

These severe criticisms generally point to the operations of CV’s second mandate. The attitudes appear to be more optimistic as to CV’s inception and the current situation.

Along with this criticism, a new opinion was raised. The nature of making deals (doing business) usually is a negotiation within a small group in private, with no release of information to the public at the early stage. This new information was added to the next interview to probe for more information:

“(Regarding the nature of deal making), we do not need to know how they make deals with investors (provincial government also runs business in credit or tax rebate with the private sector), but there would be an open process, a transparent framework, such like their goals, regular news release of the business, and the financing tools they have...”

The issue came back to the original criticism, the lack of open process. Another interviewee also emphasized that “they (CV) did sufficient work to leverage money and

create economic development, but are these all we want in such a significant area? As a public agency, do they represent the public?"

Among these criticisms, two other interviewees' comments stand out and give credit to CV's communication program. An interviewee from the private sector was of the opinion that the communication is happening in a very casual way: "(with the new CEO) the communication will be even more... he wants CV to help us to market these spaces (commercial spaces in WDRI), to promote the ideas to the business people". As reported in a WFP article regarding the new actions in Waterfront Drive, the open houses CV held in March gave WDRI's investors a lot of confidence (McNeil, 2007 March 19).

Another interviewee related that,

"The dialogue among us (downtown agencies) is on-going. There are some levels of discomfort at times but it does not mean one group annoys another by not doing something. I think it is very important for CV and us to be on the same page."

The same interviewee also indicated that the forms of the dialogue are diverse. It can be dinners once a month to generally talk about issues or meetings on a particular project. Furthermore, this interviewee added:

"But it depends on the personality of CEOs. The person on the job needs to be conscious to reach out for communication. If this person is not interested to take it (communication programs), this will cause the problem."

The communication activities CV had in its start-up stage were generally recognized as effective. Some mentioned that meetings with other key members from the Planning department, North Portage Partnership, Downtown and Exchange District BIZs were held regularly.

Regarding the questions inquiring about the goals that CV aims to achieve in Waterfront Drive, all the interviewees pointed to the lack of communication, that they do not have channels to know CV's goals. Two interviewees commented:

"To me, the objectives CV has in Waterfront Drive is financing economic activities and marketing the city's surplus land. I think they did good job in terms of immediate actions. That's what I saw, and I do not know if they have any objectives more than this";

"I do not know if CV has a master plan for Waterfront area".

According to the literature review findings, properly dealing with opposing groups is crucial for building consensus among local groups. Land assembly normally causes conflicts in waterfront redevelopment projects. To Winnipeg, the land assembly in WDRI has been done by the city and the North Portage Partnership before CV's establishment. However, this does not mean that WDRI is applauded by everyone. According to CV's staff, business owners and residents located west of the sites were affected by the projects. They used to have open sightlines and direct access to the river, while the new development has since terminated their views and direct access to the river. CV consulted the adjacent property owners and let them submit their proposals one month in advance before announcing request for proposals from other developers. "None of them (property owners west of the site) ended up being chosen, but they may have been chosen theoretically and without going to the public process", a CV staff said.

In the interview with CV's staff, one opposing group was mentioned. "The only one that was really negative to the development is the Prairie Housing Co-op", a non-profit housing group currently accommodating many seniors and people with disabilities. This building, located at 113 Market Avenue, is directly behind the current Excelsior

Towers. According to the data provided in the website of Prairie Housing Co-op⁷, there are currently 27 suites in the renovated Downtown warehouse. Neither the residents nor the property owner own the land in front of them. The Excelsior's two eight-floor towers have been built between their properties and the river. "WDRI is a public-centered driven initiative, if you do not buy the land and invest, and then you do not have the right to have it (to determine the land use)". The same interviewee also argued "to a real project, you always get some unsatisfied ones, doesn't matter what you do. Overall people think it is a great initiative".

Another conflict CV encountered is with Nygard International Village. The limited information gained from interviews is that Nygard wanted the site, which already had been assigned to The Strand and The Excelsior, to become the atrium entrance leading to its proposed large-scale project, Nygard Village. According to Nygard Village's all-inclusive concept, this project would offer all Nygard fashion lines and other top brands under one roof, and interconnect the buildings ultimately to accommodate condominiums and commercial enterprises. This restoration and transformation into Nygard Village was expected to be a \$70 to \$80 million investment (P8, BOMA 2006). However, Nygard's conceptual plan came to CV after the proposal deadline and at that time they did not own some of the buildings involved in the proposal. Nygard did not accept any alternatives CV suggested and withdrew. The process dealing with this conflict lasted a full year. A CV's staff member commented in regard to the Nygard initiative:

⁷ Prairie Housing Co-op website:
<http://www.lifelease.ca/MB%20Registry/Projects/Prairie%20Housing%20Cooperative.html>

“It is more like a concept... they (The Strand project’s developers) will be there, they will live there. Their heart and soul are there... It was not our choice. We have ended a legal agreement with them (these developers). We have to go forward... We tried everything, alternatives, to make the deal with Nygard. They did not get everything they wanted and walked away.”

According to the findings in literature review (Chapter 2), building consensus and coalitions with local groups requires that a development agency implement a regular and explicit communication program, apply a monitoring system, cultivate reasonable expectations, as well as properly deal with opposing groups. The interview questions were therefore designed to explore CV’s operation according to these criteria.

Firstly, a CEO’s efforts in maintaining communication with other groups can greatly strengthen the relationship. The positive comments towards CV’s CEOs are largely related to their appreciation in communicating with other organizations. Many positive comments in the interviews were directed towards the diverse communication forms with other groups the first CEO applied. Although the latest CEO recently took charge of the agency in April 2007, some events he conducted or was involved with, have already been noticed and applauded by other groups. In the case of a communication program, the forms can be very flexible and diverse, i.e., regular meetings, occasional phone calls or gatherings with key players, workshops, open houses, as well as reports and news releases. Through an explicit communication program, the agency can gain trust and understanding from the public.

Secondly, some improper attitudes towards cooperating with other groups may cause the lack of communication, and furthermore, largely weaken the coalition-building activities. CV’s board was criticized as treating other development organizations as

irrelevant groups, or even as competitors, rather than potential allies. It is understood that this attitude resulted in the reluctance to open communication channels. In terms of CV's mandate, the lack of having communication programs will block the agency's own information channels, and even bring harm to its business. The Downtown BIZ, the North Portage Partnership, Destination Winnipeg, CV and other downtown groups, while having different mandates and jurisdictions, combining resources or at least, organizing to offer less resistance, would seem to be a better way for each of them to do a better job.

Cultivating common expectations with other local groups is a task in which CV ought to invest more effort in the future. Communication is about informing others and not necessarily obtaining agreements. Sharing common expectations asks for more convincing efforts. CentreVenture needs to let others understand the agency is working towards a common goal. Having more people living in downtown is a common aspiration among the public, but the approaches to realize this can be very different and full of controversial issues. People need to know what the agency is working on, what the immediate goals are and what the long-term objectives are, especially when CV's activities in the area are substantial and numerous. More important, CentreVenture needs to involve more outside voices when making plans. Having common expectations means people agree with the plan and also support the way CV approaches it.

A common expectation represents the general public's desire, rather than an individual agency's idea. This feature makes it possible that different organizations agree with and support each other. The key is to identify what the common expectations are for Waterfront Drive and let everyone know the agency is working on these. At this point (July 2007), the issue of adopting an open process with more public consultation is back

on the table. Regarding the discontent expressed in the interviews, this advancement could go a long way to address most of the issues. Although the issues are so diverse, and impact different aspects of CV's operation, better communication between the agency and the general public is always crucial to ease troubles.

In terms of more effectively building consensus and coalitions with local groups, an important opportunity that CV can take advantage is to better cooperate with other downtown organizations. Some interviewees, who are in key positions with these downtown organizations, presented the desire that all the development agencies, regardless of their differences, can work on the same page and be more effective in revitalizing downtown. Through adopting a more open process, all the organizations will have a better understanding among each other. There will be less resistance and better cooperation, and consequently a more effective operation for all of them. Of course, this result requires not only CV, but each agency working for downtown revitalization to be open-minded and willing to take action.

4.4 'Having capacity of being flexible'

Informants from all the four sectors participated in this part of the questionnaire. Seven interviewees responded to the questions. The questions here were driven by two themes: i) the capacity of adjusting working foci, and ii) responding to the local market trends in an ever-changing world. This part of the questionnaire intended to find out the following information:

- Is *CentrePlan* the guiding force for CV's operation?
- What are the causes for the change?

- Did local market trends play roles in this change?
- How did CV respond to market changes?

In regard to the first question, three among five interviewees, directly answered “No”. The two others did not answer in the same way, but neither thought *CentrePlan* is guiding the downtown revitalization activities today. The comments of all respondents indicate that the city and the planning department fall short on creating a vision for downtown development:

“The problem is that there is not a comprehensive plan for Exchange District. The City needs to give CV the direction on its work that can match the vision representing the interests of the public.”

It is emphasized that what is urgently needed is a vision or plan for Winnipeg’s downtown, a vision generation body, and an evaluation for previous downtown activities in terms of *CentrePlan*’s vision. In addition, all the participated interviewees agreed that CV was not mandated as a planning agency.

Although the interviewees have the opinion that creating a vision for the entire downtown redevelopment is not CV’s duty, the agency is still responsible for not providing a comprehensive plan or business plan for their work: “I did not see a clear vision of CV and sometimes CV’s vision was clouded by focusing on one issue and did not take in the larger context”. In a desirable form of creating the vision, one commented:

“The right way is that the City Council created Plan Winnipeg and *CentrePlan*; CV takes the direction and relates to these two plans.”

Interviewees from the government sector indicated the need for updating *CentrePlan* and also pointed out the limitations that this downtown master plan has: “a vision is useless if we do not have an implementation plan to support it, and that is where

CentrePlan falls short. The process to create *CentrePlan* is right. This plan still shows what the public wants for the downtown”.

Since CV's new plan *Heart of Gold* was released in February 2007, this plan is also considered in the questionnaires. By probing that this new plan was created under the new Mayor's term, all interviewees from government sector and CV indicated that the change has nothing to do with political will. A CentreVenture staff member related:

“It (creating *Heart of Gold*) is not so much related to the Mayor. It is not about leadership change. Our mandate has ended and we need to come up with a new plan to keep on going. Of course, Mayoral change is a difference...Since the market and other situation changed, we need to involve these changes and come up with new mandate. We keep our mandate updated.”

Criticisms of CV in this issue also focus on the lack of public consultation and input. It was considered that the new plan *Heart of Gold* is the decision made by CV board members, without going through sufficient public consultation process.

Also, some interviewees expressed doubt about the continuity of CV's new work focus. Some argued that the latest mandate involved some items that differ from CV's previous priority of housing. They worried that this key issue of housing will be ignored in the new mandate. Moreover, the disconnection between *CentrePlan* and the *Heart of Gold* is evident. Due to the reason that *CentrePlan* has been already replaced by the new plan, interviewees did not reflect deeper in this aspect.

Interviewees from CV and the private sector were asked about the impact of local property market trends. The information from the private sector on the local housing market is critical:

“The currently Exchange District housing market still significantly depends on governments' subsidies. In the future, as long as there are more people

living here, it will be market force driven eventually. Now we are all pioneers.”

Interestingly, a developer, in responding to the question about the downtown housing market, pointed out that he was not quite clear on the housing demand in Waterfront Drive or Exchange District. What the developers in WDRI are doing is to create, but not react to, housing market which currently depends on government subsidies heavily. The same interviewee also expressed that what CV did in Waterfront Drive responds more to its mandate (the mission of providing more housing) but not to the market. Regarding CV’s working focus change, this interviewee also stated his concern that housing development may not be included in the top priority in CV’s agenda, “I think perhaps other agencies are taking housing projects from CV. I think this transfer is a mistake”. According to the interviews, the private sector is optimistic on WDRI and the future success of these projects, “it is a good investment and it should turn out profitable, as it is now”.

CV’s staff were asked how they predicted or reacted to the housing demand in Exchange District. Unlike private developers’ view, CV’s staff thinks the market element is crucial to their work. The market element actually directs what they are doing. Since no downtown housing supply-demand analyses were available to be accessed during the research, the question focused on how market trends are perceived. “More ears on the ground. Developers and their investments will tell us. If it (the high-end condos in WDRI) does not make economic sense, no one wants it. It is kind of interaction with the market”.

Having the capacity to be flexible is a key element that helps an agency survive in the ever-changing world. Based on the findings from studying example cities, two

main reasons causing a development agency to adjust its work focus are, the change of political will and property market trends. Interestingly, according to findings in the interview, neither of the two reasons played a major role in CV's adoption of a new plan, the *Heart of Gold*. From CV's perspective, unlike in the case studies, the agency did not see any determinant political impact under the new Mayor's governing. This opinion also has been supported by an interviewee from the government sector. The *Heart of Gold* is created by CV's board based on its understanding of the new downtown situation. As one CV staff said, it is an update in mandate to make the agency go forward. It is safe to say that political will did not play an important role in the new plan creation.

If fitting into the new government's ideology is not the motivation that promoted CV to adjust its work focus, at least this new plan reflects key concerns in the current political environment. So what are these concerns? Obviously, attracting more people to live and work in downtown is a common expectation, and this is every city government's priority. However, to achieve this goal many issues need to be tackled. According to the articles in WFP for the last eight months to August 1st, 2007, the issues that attract more attention related to Portage and Main, central parks and green spaces, and housing redevelopment. The current Mayor also included downtown housing supply and green spaces in his campaign promises last year. These hot issues are generally in the new plan. Compared with CV's previous mandate, the lack of consistency is evident. This phenomenon partly reveals the understandings that the current city government has towards revitalizing downtown. The *Heart of Gold* plan reflects the issues the current politicians and city government valued most. CV's work direction adjustment makes its mandate closer to the current politicians' ideologies.

CentrePlan was adopted in 1995 as the right direction for Winnipeg's downtown revitalization. However, without having a substantial implementation plan to support, *CentrePlan* did not become the development guideline for the current city government. As *CentrePlan* fell out of the position to guide downtown renewal, it did not play any role in the adoption of the new plan; neither CV nor the City mentioned it in creating and approving the new plan. CentreVenture's new work focus can still relate to *CentrePlan*'s goals because of this master plan's comprehensiveness. Consequently, the loss of influence of *CentrePlan* gives the agency more space for changing its work focus. Some may criticize the opportunistic nature of this strategy. However, in terms of survival skills, CV's new work direction demonstrates its capacity to adjust its mandate to fit with the new political environment.

Due to the opportunistic element in the nature of this strategy, being flexible to fit into the ever-changing world unavoidably brings some controversial issues. First of all, whether the decision making process of adjusting the work direction involves sufficient public participation or not. Based on the information from interviews, CV's previous work, especially its second mandate, falls short on this point. Secondly, whether the new work focus reflects the agency's advantages or not. In the case of a public-private partnership agency, its tangible assets and intangible resources are the results of years of endeavors from many players. Properly utilizing these to create maximum benefit for the public is the agency's responsibility. So far, it is too early to declare that the *Heart of Gold* plan fully matches CV's strengths. The new housing incentives, the historic building renovations at Portage and Main, and the environment improvement in downtown area are typical activities for a downtown development agency to undertake.

Although the market elements are emphasized by CV's staff, interviewees from the private sector did not take it as a fateful influence. The development of the downtown housing market largely depends on government subsidies. Seeking public funding to cover the financial gap in housing developments is the way private investors currently depend on. In other words, instead of the supply-demand situation of local property market, investors see government subsidies as a much more important factor to determine whether to invest their money or not. In the case of the private sector's one-off investments, long-term market trends are not the issue they need to worry about. Gaining subsidies is far more reliable and less risky, significantly decreasing impacts of the local property market to developers. Under these conditions, only CV needs to be proactive to the market trends, because its goals are both locating profitable projects and sustaining the development momentum. This does not infer that the private sector does not take any risks. However, without sufficient public funding so far, nobody can ensure a profitable housing development in the downtown.

Meanwhile, CV has little room to be flexible in reacting to the market. From the interview, CV staff has many concerns about the unpredictability of market trends. These concerns relate to the costs of the development. Whether it is the increase in interest rates or the lack of qualified labour resources, project costs will increase and thus the risk in investing. If the private sector does not want to take on extra risk, CV has to find ways to bridge the financing gap in order to move developments forward. CV has limited resources to do this. The new tax rebate is not enough for creating more affordable housing in downtown. Plus, the downtown housing market is still too weak to draw big developers from profitable suburb developments without heavy subsidies. At the same

time, the lack of sensibility for market trends could be another potential weakness. CentreVenture needs a sound approach in detecting market changes which could allow it to be more proactive in handling business.

In terms of reacting to market trends CV also had some successful experiences. According to a WFP article, there are two features which can be concluded from CV's current actions: starting from small developments and choosing ones that will make big visual impacts. Obviously, small developments, such as offices and retail spaces, are easier to subsidize and less risky for investors, especially when stronger market demands are foreseeable. Also, triggering more private-sector developments through utilizing limited resources is a smart way to do business. These two features coincide with the success stories from the example cities reported in Chapter 2.

Regarding the analysis above, the changes in the political environment and the unpredictable property market trends can also be considered as the threats to CV's operations. These elements are out of a development agency's control and threaten its survival. Having capacity for being flexible to fit into the ever-changing environment is an unavoidable issue every agency encounters. The application of this strategy will be continually controversial.

4.5 'Choosing suitable projects and developers'

All the key informants participated in this part of the questionnaire. The questions focus on i) whether the current projects will lead to mixed use and ii) what kinds of mixed use do they want to see in the future. With interviews proceeding, more questions were added for a clearer understanding of this strategy:

- Is there any criteria applied to sifting developers?
- What elements hinder the linkage between Waterfront Drive and The Forks?
- Is there any suggestion for CV to do a better job in choosing suitable projects?

Most of the interviewees recognize the success CV achieved in WDRI: “I think WDRI is a good project that the public, the arms-length agency, and the private sector work together to make things go forward”, “Waterfront Drive now looks nice. Many functions are already accommodated there. It is kind of mixed use as we can see at this time”. Along with these positive comments, some worries were expressed. Several interviewees argued that without public financing and government subsidies, mixed use eventually will not happen. An interviewee said:

“Some rental projects are on the place (Exchange District). Individual developers do not believe in rental building. The rental market has been so low; you cannot build new buildings or renovate any thing for it. Government subsidies are needed. To me, I know very few subsidies are available. If developers can make more money from condos, why would they worry about doing rental? There is more work for government to provide more mixed housing there.”

Some critiques from interviewees were related to the new condo projects. First, the project’s scale is relatively small and the impacts are very limited in the context of Exchange District renewal. Achievements, such as street beautification, did not extend to a broader area. This opinion was expressed by several interviewees. Their opinions were also coupled with the miscarriage of Nygard Village project which would bring a much bigger scale of mixed use to the site. Secondly, the design guidelines were not solid enough for individual buildings. Some projects are criticized as not being cutting-edge design. The eight-storey Excelsior cut the linkage that the buildings to the west had to the River. “There should be higher buildings behind and lower buildings in front. The huge

wall on the back (of The Excelsior) cut the linkage with land behind. The land now is useless. I think they could get it done better by controlling over the scale of each project", one interviewee said. Thirdly, regarding the situation that the high-end condos are steps away from the existing properties of low income people, a question arose what the new and the old being compatible. There is no consideration of integration among these projects.

One interviewee felt that many issues in WDRI are due to the absence of a long-term plan for the Exchange District, a more solid plan to put more affordable housing downtown.

"We do not have a quantifiable plan to guide the implementation for Exchange District and this shortage led to many issues... We need a comprehensive plan, involving affordable housing, more public spaces and space for kids, on how the Exchange District should look like, not just Waterfront Drive. It is wrong to just pull out a piece of an area and disregard the entire downtown, and CV has tools and resources to stimulate the creation of a comprehensive plan."

Regarding the future of realizing mixed use along Waterfront Drive, every interviewee was of the opinion that having more people living in Downtown, and more housing projects, are determinant elements. Other functions like retail or offices are secondary. Moreover, the future of commercial development on the site is very unpredictable since the success depends on whether the current retail will be profitable and whether the property value will increase in the future: "As more people are living here, it will grow by itself. We cannot control it. Nobody has any control", an interviewee from the private sector added.

Also, some interviewees expressed the hope for linking Waterfront Drive with other nearby areas in a systematic way. One interviewee said:

“I would love to see more development on the northern part, like Alexander Dock, a systematical linkage between The Forks and Waterfront Drive. When these spots are linked together by well-designed parks and roads, more people will recognize the Exchange District and come here. If this linkage will be realized in the near future, I think the whole investment for CV is worthy”

The argument that CV tends to rush into the decision making process, as pointed out in other sections, was also mentioned here. Several interviewees expressed that the action CV took in WDRI reveal the agency's urgency on moving things forward. Some interviewees said: “It seems like CV was desperate to make things happen...”, “They want mixed use, but they also want the projects go ahead at whatever the cost is”, “CV was so afraid that some of them (developers) will walk away”.

In the suggestions of how CV deals with this situation, no direct responses were found in the interviews. However, the importance of adopting a comprehensive plan and involving public input were again emphasized at this point: “(As an entrepreneurial nature agency dealing with public assets) CV needs to be more careful on operating public process and public input”. Meanwhile, CV cannot ignore the importance of developing plans. Without this plan, operating in a strategic way is impossible. Such a plan can make every piece of land be developed under the same vision and helps to match them together within a bigger picture. An interviewee related:

“To WDRI, CV needs to take some time working with the planning department on the plan, the vision, and get it approved. CV should be very conscious to do that. Without these, you will seem to be doing things on people's back. CV did some of that (consultation), but not enough. They need to take a little more time on planning side.”

In the interview with CV's staff, the question about the criteria on choosing qualified developers was raised. In WDRI, developers need to demonstrate their qualification. CV and the chosen developers have a development agreement which states

that if they cannot complete the projects CV has the right to reacquire the land. Apart from this, no more information was provided in the interview with CV's staff.

Choosing suitable projects and developers is a determinant element for the success of waterfront redevelopment. According to the interview findings, the features in WDRI can be grouped into what Bruttomesso (2001) concluded to produce improved results (see 2.2.2 subsection E). Overall, CentreVenture's achievement of this project is outstanding. WDRI provides a well-designed public space and ensures the public accessibility to the site. The landscape along Waterfront Drive distinguished the unusual nature of this historic zone by a well-designed green space, the Steven Juba Park. Waterfront Drive not only provides an alternative for the existing traffic system, but also delicately considered traffic control by applying roundabouts, traffic signs and many pavements. All these results have been well recognized by interviewees. Meanwhile, the project was criticized in its other aspects. They can be seen as the elements that weaken the application of this strategy.

The Excelsior was criticized as cutting the linkage that the property to the west has to the water. To the narrow linear shape of the WDRI, there is little space remaining for the project after the 20 feet set back. In addition, at the time of negotiating developments, the downtown rezoning had not yet been adopted and there was no clear set back requirement in the 1988 by-law for this area. Without the set back space, the west side of the Excelsior is just a few steps away from the parking lot behind it (Please refer to Figure 5). A problem raised is the visual interference from the parking lot. The developer chose to use a two-storey high solid wall on the west side, which blocks views.

This resolves the privacy issue within the building, but totally blocks the linkage between the adjoining properties to the west and the water. It is also argued that the eight-storey high two tower construction is physically too big for Waterfront Drive, being much higher than the buildings behind and the other WDRI projects.

Linkage to the riverside can be seen as a scarce resource that all the residents in the area want to enjoy. Although the first row from the water's edge has the most accessibility to this resource, those residents living behind were used to considering the linkage as their justifiable right. Cutting the linkage will lead to a certain level of disharmony among the residents. Normally, in cases of waterfront redevelopment, the site close to water edge was planned to be built first to avoid such issues. However, this is not applicable to WDRI. In three of the example cities, site residents formed blocking coalitions with other civic groups around the open spaces issues. Some water-edge areas which had been planned for high residential constructions then changed to public open spaces. No evidence was found in the case of WDRI to prove that the existing residents were opposed to the project, but its exclusiveness definitely brought a negative impression. Furthermore, the situation that high-end condo projects largely block the view of low-incoming residents may raise some issues. A vibrant waterfront area asks for diverse groups of people living and working here. Well-designed projects can help them live in harmony.

Some interviewees also related that the accomplishment of WDRI did not extend to a broader area to trigger bigger urban renewal actions. Many interviewees expected much more than the current results. Waterfront Drive is a unique area. On its west side is the Exchange District, one of the most historically intact turn-of-the-century commercial

districts on the continent, and Winnipeg's contemporary cultural and commercial nucleus. On its east side is the Red River, a major river on the Canadian Prairies with heritage importance. The redevelopment in this area ought to be considered at a larger scale, as a key part to leveraging the entire downtown revitalization, rather than as individual housing projects. However, the momentum this site has at this point did not expand to the adjacent area.

The problems above are understood to be the result of the lack of solid development guidelines based on a sufficient public process. Developing design guidelines and quantifiable development plans which represent public opinions is key to choosing suitable projects and developers. As has been discussed in other sections, CV fell short in this aspect. Without a clear vision, WDRI has become an "okay project" but not a stunning one that this unique site deserves. Through interviewing people from different sectors, it is safe to say that CV has achieved in many of their project what cannot be done by other organizations. It can also be argued that some mixed results, such as the miscarriage of the Nygard Village proposal, could not have been done better by other agencies if put into the same situation. However, vague design guidelines and lack of public process resulted in a less than stunning project in Waterfront Drive.

Linking other destinations, such as The Forks and the northern portion of Waterfront Drive, by well-designed parks and roads was discussed in the interviews. This linkage is key to extending the development momentum CV achieved in WDRI. The current residential development is relatively isolated. This situation increases the risks that the project cannot interact with the surrounding environment to attract more people. Obviously, WDRI is such an attractive site largely because it is located so close to these

desirable places. Meanwhile, the growing resident population in WDRI will significantly increase usage of the surrounding facilities and furthermore attract more visitors. Realization of this complementary result requires CV's full cooperating with other downtown organizations.

The lack of a comprehensive plan for downtown revitalization is still the biggest threat for CV in choosing suitable projects. CV was not created to be a planning agency and creating such a vision is not included in the agency's mandate. However, the importance of having such a plan to guide CV's work is evident and the agency has the capability to stimulate the creation of such a plan. Additionally, insufficient government subsidies coupled with unpredictable market trends is another major threat. According to the study of the example cities in the literature review, a high risk market can be relatively balanced when necessary government subsidies are provided, and a profitable market needs less or even no subsidies to attract private investors. This dilemma gives CV little room on choosing developers and projects. Or worse, CV may feel it even has to keep developers from walking away.

4.6 'Building up credibility by incremental efforts'

The interviewees from the government sector, downtown organizations, and the private sector participated in this part of the questionnaire. In last year's city audit CV was criticized as losing its momentum and some of its credibility. This is the theory for questions designed in this section. Through asking the question "what action does CV need to take to contribute to its credibility building?" it is expected to find out which aspects interviewees consider ought to be enhanced in CV's future work.

Interviewees' opinions focus on the following three aspects: clarifying the objectives within the bigger picture of the downtown redevelopment and taking the commitment, involving public input and adopting a more transparent process, as well as continuing to broker deals to renovate derelict buildings in downtown. The first aspect has been discussed in the section 4.3 and section 4.4. CV did not have a vision for the entire downtown redevelopment. Although it is argued that creating this vision is not CV's obligation, CV has the resources and tools to stimulate the creation of such a long-term plan. It is important for CV to take leadership role in downtown revitalization activities. To some interviewees, taking this commitment also means putting more affordable housing in place through providing government subsidies and utilizing public financing tools.

The second opinion has been frequently emphasized in several interviews. The desire of involving more public input and adopting an open process can be found in every interview conducted. One interviewee argued that better communications does not mean CV has to agree with others, but the issues should be brought to the public. The creation of *Heart of Gold* was pointed out by an interviewee as involving a certain level of public consultation. This action earns positive comments:

"It is a good step forward. I am encouraged by the new CEO who has years of experience in consulting, design, development in downtown area. CV should go back to the public to ask what the agency needs to do for them and what the public really want."

Another interviewee added:

"I think the new CEO and staff understand the planning process better. They start to do annual meetings among us."

However, others still argued that the new plan is short of sufficient public consultation. An interviewee related:

“The work focus in this new plan is very important and timely for Winnipeg. However, CV needs to inform local groups on why they changed work focus; especially if it is a dramatic change.”

Another interviewee argues that the new plan loses some of its credit at the beginning due to the lack of consultation. However, this interviewee also agreed that the work focus in this new plan is very urgent for revitalizing Winnipeg’s downtown.

Many interviewees expressed that what CV achieved proved that the agency is the right vehicle for marketing the City’s surplus lands and buildings, and the agency should continue doing what they are good at. This opinion is especially strong from the private sector:

“CV did some marvelous jobs. Without this agency, none of these projects could happen. It is important CV continues to broker deals... they need to promote these (derelict buildings in downtown) piece by piece. This is what CV needs to focus on – connecting people’s needs and developers...they are a good broker on finding ways to connect the buildings, developers, money, and ideas.”

Meanwhile, some interviewees argue that high-end condos and lofts projects can be done without or with little help from CV since the exclusive selling price can make the projects per se profitable. It is important to note that public financing should not focus on benefiting these kinds of products.

CentreVenture was criticized as losing some of its credibility in last year’s city audit. Since the fall of 2006, the situation proved that the agency is rebuilding its credibility. All of the four tactics applied in other example cities that help agencies smooth operations were found in CV’s work: providing a speedy approval process, site

image improvements, protecting local residents' rights, as well as establishing an early market on the site (See strategy list in section 2.2.2). In particular, the two open houses CV conducted in March 2007 inspired interest in the commercial components of WDRI among the local business community. It is reported that about 300 people attended the first open house and another 1000 showed up for the second one (McNeil, 2007 March19). It has been well recognized by the agency that having a residential critical mass to trigger commercial development is crucial. Also, the commercial development in the four Waterfront Drive projects is described as "a work in progress" by the new CEO. CentreVenture aims to provide products and services which the residential tenants want and need. Matching people's needs, businesses, and ideas is what the agency is doing in WDRI.

Meanwhile, three concerns have been pointed out by some interviewees. These comments partially indicated the concerns for the agency's future work. These include: clarifying the objectives and taking commitment, involving public input, as well as continuing to broker deals. These issues are involved in the agency's day-to-day work, and the lack of any of them will damage the rebuilding of its credibility. Firstly, CV needs to inform the public of what it is going to achieve. This should smooth the operations rather than hinder. Dealing with businesses in a secret way, as the most focused criticism, it makes the agency seem disdainful and unwilling to communicate with other groups. This situation causes major dissatisfaction. However, it does not necessarily mean people oppose CV's agenda. Most of the interviewees hold positive attitudes towards CV's current work and they want to see more success in the future.

CV's board needs to clarify its objectives to the public not only because it is a public agency, but its future success requires support from the public.

If notification is the first step, then taking public opinions into decision making is a step further. A question arising from the interviews is whether the accomplishment in WDRI represents exactly what the public wants for this area. Although the question per se is out of this paper's research scope, it signifies doubts about CV's work direction and even its motivation. This comment may be harsh, but doing things behind people's backs is the last impression a public agency wants to make. The good sign is, according to its current operation, CV is involving more voices from the business community because their opinions count in the commercial success in WDRI. In terms of building credibility, involving voices from diverse sectors is an important step CV ought to take. A comprehensive planning process will make the procedure more time consuming. However, without a clear direction, the faster the work proceeds the worse the result may be.

All the interviewees agree that CV has outstanding capability to market derelict buildings and vacant lands, leverage private investments, and turn eyesores into useful resources, which are crucial actions for downtown revitalization. In its new mandate, CV should continue utilizing its unique resources to connect people's needs with buildings and developers. In the *Heart of Gold*, however, CV's foci have changed to Portage and Main, nine public parks and three parkades. Although leveraging private investment to renovate buildings is still involved in the intervention in Portage and Main, the new plan seems to be moving the work focus away from the key issue of creating more attainable housing projects in downtown. This is the reason that some worries were raised about this

new plan. Having more residential properties and people living in downtown is fundamental for downtown revitalization, and all the other issues can be secondary. It is both the City and CV's decisions whether the agency will maintain the focus.

Stimulating the creation of a comprehensive plan for downtown will help the agency rebuild its credibility. Several interviewees pointed out the urgency of creating such a plan. Although it is not CV's obligation, most of the interviewees expressed that CV has the responsibility to bring the issue forward, draw all the players work together, and accelerate the creation of the plan. The support from the planning department and city hall are crucial. Unlike *CentrePlan*, this new plan ought to be not only a master plan with concepts, but have a realistic business plan with a monitoring and evaluation system to ensure successful implementation.

4.7 'Effective financial tools on finding public capital'

This part of the questionnaire was asked only in the interview with CV's staff. However, some information was provided by a couple of interviewees from other sectors. The goal of this section was to find out what financing tools and resources CV has and how the agency utilizes these tools to bridge financing gaps in housing projects. Some important information was pointed out. On January 1, 2003 the new City of Winnipeg Charter (replaces the City of Winnipeg Act of 1972) provided the City of Winnipeg with the authority to set up TIF (tax incremental financing). Before, the City did not have the authority to do this. Now, the city government has the authority to set up financing tools to stimulate housing development. While a common tool in U.S. cities, few Canadian cities have this resource.

Also, the question of whether or not CV still utilizes Heritage Tax Credit as its financing tool was asked in the interview. CV does not run this program any more. The City gave CV the power for two years to run it and now the program has expired.

“Now (to heritage building rehabilitation projects) we just walk with developers to go through City Council. It (the Heritage Tax Credit) is actually tax forgiveness for a number of years (not financing). They do not need to pay their municipal taxes and it is general a ten years tax forgiveness.”

Another CV's staff added:

“If a developer wants to leverage the future tax credits so they will have the money upfront to do the development, we will provide financing against those credits. So we will give developer cash upfront and their tax credits will be refunded through us to the city to pay the loan. So, we finance that, rather than doing outright grants because the City does not have many resources on it.”

Some other financing tools were also mentioned. Since the article in WFP on April 3rd 2007 released the two new housing incentives, these were discussed in the interview. CV is going to have a new multi-family grant which could work very much like the expired heritage tax credit (CV is waiting for the city to approve this). For the new TIF zone, the discussion focused on what the differences are between the financing approaches other cities have adopted and Winnipeg's new one. Unlike the TIF in other cases, the money for area improvement will come from the increased tax which is gained from already improved property value. Developers or existing property owners need to get the property value increase first, and then the increased tax will be diverted to improve the area. The City will not commit any money to the area. However, since the report was not yet tabled at City Council, CV was obliged not to discuss further information on it at the time.

In the interview with CV staff, four assistance programs were mentioned that help stimulate capital investment in the heart of the city. They are: The Downtown Heritage Tax Credit; the Urban Development Bank which may take forms of bridge financing, loan guarantees, mortgage financing, and subordinated debt; the Multi-family/Mixed-Use Dwelling Grant Programs; and Tax-Increment Financing Zone. At the time of interview, the last two housing incentives had not yet been unveiled by the City. According to the limited information from the media and CV staff, except for the Urban Development Bank, the other three programs are either expired or no longer managed by CV. The two new housing incentives are expected to be conducted by the City. At this point of time, the information about by what forms CV will be involved in the programs is not accessible. The article released in WFP on May 5 2007 described the details of how the Multi-family/Mixed-Use Dwelling Grant Programs will work, and so far there is no equivalent information found about the Tax-Increment Financing Zone in the media.

Forgivable tax and forgivable loans are the most straightforward assistance programs to support development. Through these programs, cash is directly provided by the sponsoring government. Including CV, all the study cases show that this kind of assistance only appeared at the beginning of redevelopment. At this stage, the coalition was built up and there was general agreement that something had to be done about the derelict waterfronts. Since cash is often in short supply for development projects, these assistances are normally one-off programs which ended when the money dried up. The supply amount heavily depends on the financial situation of the sponsoring government and the powers of the implementation agency, as shown in Table 2 "Start-up Funding for four agencies". CV applied two programs that belong to these assistance programs:

forgivable loans under the Urban Development Bank program and the Heritage Tax Credit. As mentioned in the above section, the Heritage Tax Credit is a two-year program and has been already expired. Information about the Forgivable Loans is found in CMHC's document in 2002. This program was supported by a \$500,000 grant from the City in 2002 to stimulate housing development in the Exchange District.

Besides forgivable tax and loans, financing is the most adopted assistance program in all of the cases. Unlike forgivable tax and loans, providing financing to development needs more resources than just up-front cash. Issuing bonds or bank credit always involved in the program. For instance, BPCA (Battery Park City Authority) negotiated a line of credit from two banks to fund its first year's activities in 1969. Also, utilizing the faith and credit of the sponsoring government is an effective way to find start-up capital. BPCA repaid the appropriations from New York State by the proceeds of its \$200 million bond issue in 1972. This was an unusual success in the financial history of urban renewal. If the market had really believe that the agency was a financially independent agency, not backed by the state, it might not have bought its bonds, or might have demanded a higher interest rate to compensate for the risk of default (Gordon, 1997). CV has its own pool of money, proceeds from the previous commercial venture, to finance development. The \$14.7 million in the Urban Development Bank can be drawn from for its new plan. Although CV encourages financing applicants partnering with traditional lenders like banks and credit unions, there is no evidence found that the agency sought any capital from other resources other than the City and provincial government.

Forms of financing tools differ from project to project depending on particular situations. A significant financing tool is the Tax-Increment Financing. Since 1980's, TIF became so popular that it has become the first economic development tool in US (Krohe, 2007). This tool has been by far the biggest contributor to downtown. In US, finding many major building projects that are not financed in part by it is hard. TIF allows future property tax revenue pays for the public improvement needed to help generate those revenues. However, along with its popularity, some controversies raised. Some argue that TIF shortchanges other government agencies by diverting tax revenue over the course of years to pay off the TIF debts. The fund for TIF was drawn from the overall budget that governments use for supply public services like police and fire. Also, TIF is not ideal for some developments, such as business attraction and retention incentives because they are to the benefit of companies, which do not always stay put, rather than land, which does (Weber & Goddeeris, 2007). According to limited information from WFP, this financing tool may not work in the same way in Winnipeg like it does in other cities. If Winnipeg's TIF program will focus on housing program and only use the refunds created from new developments, it will avoid the potential abusing problems this tool has in other cases.

“How it would work: First, the city sets a property-tax benchmark for buildings and lots within a designated area of downtown Winnipeg. When owners renovate or otherwise improve those properties, the resulting tax increases from future assessments are diverted from city coffers and funneled back into other improvements in the immediate area, which can include more renovations by the same developer.”

“Downtown housing incentives set” WFP April 3, 2007

4.8 The Table of Conclusion

Please refer to Table 3: Table of interviews Conclusion

The previous section analyzed the features of each strategy arising from the interviews, with full regard to CV's specific implementation environment. So far, the seven strategies were discussed one by one to systematically present all of the related concerns. A conclusive table helps draw these features into one page in a concise way. This table provides a direct way to understand the interaction among all the features. Obviously, the strategies and the related issues in this paper are diverse covering a broad field of CV's implementation. By creating this table, the key elements that bring influence to several strategies can be highlighted; the connections among these key elements can be identified as well.

The first item, and the most prominent, is a CEO's leadership style. The person in this key position largely defines the possibility of the agency's success. In the case of building a fine relationship and obtaining the trust from the local government, this person is at the front edge. A CEO's understanding on how to move downtown revitalization activities forward is very influential to the agency's operating style. This understanding can be reflected in the agency's principles, i.e., what does the agency value most in decision making, who will benefit from these decisions, and how to conduct the business toward the goals. Furthermore, actions guided by these principles will decide the agency's operating style: how accessible the information could be to the public, by what ways to cooperate with other groups, to which level diverse voices will be involved in the decision-making process. It does not mean the agency's success and failure are all

decided by its CEO's leadership style, but it is safe to say it defines the agency's operating style.

Having a more transparent operating process is another crucial item that appears in the analysis of several strategies. Although this item did not arise as an important one in case studies, it is regarded as the top concern in the interviews. Adopting transparent process is a determinant item in every aspect of CV's operation, from the relationship building with governments to creating communication programs with other groups, from the decision making in each individual housing project to creating the new plan. Unlike a CEO's style, adopting a more transparent process is a systematic operation and CV's board plays important role. This leads to the third outstanding item, CV's board. The attitude of taking others as irrelevant groups or competitors rather than potential partners makes CV gaining many criticisms. Also, the board's decisions on several CEO recruitments made a negative impact to the connection with the City in the agency's second mandate. The lack of open process and a close-mind board can be seen as a pair that intensifies the impact of each other.

The fourth outstanding item is the concerns relating to the insufficient public consultation in creating the new plan. It can be argued that the lack of public consultation is the main reason that the interviewees from other sectors doubted the agency's future success. A doubt expressed regarding the lack of public consultation, was whether or not the new focus would lead CV away from the key issues in downtown revitalization. How the other sectors read the intention of CV's current actions is important, not only for the consensus and coalition building, but for CV's credibility building activities. Many interviewees expressed that what they expected from CV is to accomplish the work that

others cannot achieve, by utilizing its unique resources to tackle the housing supply problem in downtown.

The above concerns present a significant opportunity for CV's implementation. The willingness of partnering with each other and integrating limited resources appeared in the interviews. Winnipeg's downtown is not big enough to have so many separated organizations. The ideology of cooperation becomes more and more popular among the key players. CV has much more opportunities to make the right things happen if it can effectively take advantage of this opportunity.

The threats focus on two items: the lack of a long-term plan to guide the comprehensive development process, and the impact from unpredictable market trends. It can be argued that the first threat makes CV lack of a clear long-term vision in conducting business. However, adopting a transparent process can significantly decrease the damage of this threat. The second threat is very common for all the development agencies. It could largely restrict CV conducting business, but not the fundamental reason for unsuitable decisions.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Research Questions Revisited

After addressing the findings and analysis, it is time to revisit the original research questions to connect all of them. This section discusses how these questions are answered, what changes and advancement arose during the research process, and how these new issues relate to the research.

This research is driven by the question, “what are the strategies that CV needs in its WDRI for a better implement regarding the vision of *CentrePlan*. This question was raised in the environment that for years the redevelopment of downtown Winnipeg has produced mixed results. CentreVenture was created to take the leadership role to improve the situation, and furthermore, to realize the vision of *CentrePlan*. As explained in section 2.3.2, CV’s operating style has been criticized by the public in several aspects.

Before addressing the research question, a general question is needed to be studied in advance: what strategies can enable a city redevelopment agency to offer a higher quality of living in a waterfront redevelopment project? Eight North American and European cities, which had undertaken waterfront development projects, were looked at. While the particular situation in each city may present diverse answers, it was assumed that effective strategies and related features in one city can be help in a different context. This thinking directed the research to identify seven implementation strategies, which formed the framework for the follow-up study.

After answering the general question, the research considered CV and its WDRI. In order to answer the research question, we must look at CV’s particular situation. The

goal of the interviews was to collect information not otherwise accessible. The questionnaires for each sector were designed considering the seven strategies. Through conducting interviews, the information about CV's success stories and lessons in applying these strategies was collected. The comments from the interviewees were then analyzed and grouped to create the key issue list. The listed issues revealed the top concerns the interviewees held towards CV's operation. All four recommendations were therefore provided in regard to these key issues. By providing this result, the research question "what are the strategies CV needs in its WDRI for a better implementation regarding the vision of *CentrePlan* can be answered properly.

Meanwhile, since the fall of 2006, significant signs of improvement in CV's operation are evident. Two changes ought to be highlighted here. Firstly, the agency, after seeming to drift for years, developed its new plan *Heart of Gold*. The research analysis found that the earlier lack of explicit guidelines limited the agency's effective implementation. The *Heart of Gold* plan is publicly available and has become the guideline for the agency's third mandate. *CentrePlan* no longer guides the direction of CV's activities in Winnipeg's downtown revitalization. At the same time, the new plan brings new issues that lead to some new concerns in terms of strategy implementation. These concerns are discussed in the section 5.4.

Secondly, a new CEO has started to deal with crucial issues, such as involving diverse voices and adopting a more transparent operating process. This change brings many opportunities to the agency. According to the interviews, the activities the new CEO has initiated have largely changed the previous negative image towards the agency's operational style. A CEO's working style largely influences the agency's

operation. The skills a seasoned CEO needs for a better implementation are further analyzed in section 5.4.3.

5.2 Other Issues that Arose

Due to the particularities of CV and downtown Winnipeg, three new issues arose that have not been identified in other cases. These issues are addressed separate from the previous section in order to keep the analysis focus on strategy implementation. These new issues are reported in this section to show the complexity of CV's operational environment.

Whether being more self-sufficient financially is suitable for CV is the first issue. If financial demands have the potential to destroy a relationship with government, it is reasonable to seek a way that will minimize the financial demands. One interviewee, whose organization adopts a public-private partnership mechanism and is financially self-sufficient, was asked during the interview to provide some suggestions towards this issue. The interviewee did not think that their operational model was applicable to CV's situation. Their organization is "very much an operational agency...we need to operate and maintain these properties...development is part of our mandate" and CV is "set up for development". In other words, one of CentreVenture's key tasks is to sell the City's surplus lands to create development momentum in downtown, but not to manage these lands to become self-sufficient in the long run. Not only CV cannot be self-sufficient, some argued that being self-sufficient is not suitable for a public agency dealing with business with the private sector. Due to the limited financial demands (currently CV receives from the City \$250,000 administration fee annually), interviewees felt this support from the City was suitable.

The second issue is about the lack of responsibility for overall direction on the City's part. This opinion is particularly strong when CV's current administration demonstrates a better capability in adopting a transparent process. "The current staff has better understanding in planning and urban issues, they value the public process and consultation..." said an interviewee. Some interviewees related that CV's operation style, especially during its second mandate, was more or less due to the lack of a vision, which is the City's obligation. Fortunately, according to the latest information (late August 2007), CentreVenture has taken the lead in renewing *CentrePlan*. According to one of CV's stakeholders, the Winnipeg Downtown BIZ, at a recent meeting of all the downtown groups, renewing *CentrePlan* has been identified as a priority for the City and CV should take the lead to stimulate the creation immediately. Some work has already been taken regarding this direction.

Regarding how to extend WDRI's success, some interviewees indicated that extending the infrastructure improvements to link other destinations and providing more subsidies is the way to increase momentum to revitalize downtown. Then the question is what elements hinder such a desirable activity? In a later interview, it was pointed out that improving the linkage has long been a part of some downtown organizations' agenda. Currently some advancement is being made for a transportation plan to link the new Human Rights Museum, The Forks, and other destinations. As one staff from a downtown organization stated, "We think about those things. We always do. The individual politicians are difficult to deal with. That's the challenge". Consequently, this final issue makes us consider if CV should take the leadership role in moving the work forward.

5.3 Directions for Further Research

With the research proceeding, five questions arose waiting for further study. The thorough study for these questions will be left for future researchers to explore. These are introduced with some suggestions on how the further research should be done, and the possible information sources.

The first issue is how CV can stimulate the creation of a master plan for downtown revitalization. As analyzed previously, the responsibility of creating such a plan is with the local government and its planning department. However, the lack of this master plan largely threatens the agency's performance. Possibly, the research could start from the study of the city government's activities (including planning department) and authority in the plan creation process, as well as the contribution CV can make. This issue is urgent for Winnipeg's downtown revitalization.

The second issue is how CV can be more effective in cooperating with other downtown organizations, especially in enlarging its success in WDRI. Downtown Winnipeg has several development organizations contributing to revitalization in different aspects. Regarding the comprehensiveness of waterfront redevelopment, CV will unlikely achieve high success without increased cooperation with other players. How to take the leadership role is important for CV's future operations. The key here is to integrate the limited resources and to offer less resistance. Considerable work is needed to be done to explore each organization's work focus, unique resources and strengths, the overlapping parts among these organizations, and even ways to merge them. Although this issue is not as pressing as the first, the lack of collaboration is a potential threat to every player involved in downtown revitalization activities.

The third issue is whether the outcomes in WDRI allow the residents have a higher quality of living. This question ought to be answered from several perspectives. What are the elements people highly value in living in a mixed-use and socially mixed community? How to create a housing project that is compatible with the existing physical and social environment? What design criteria ought to be included to guide the project in the right direction? The study of the residents' satisfaction can be conducted after all the residents moved in and have experienced living in the site. So far, it is still early to make solid conclusions in this regard.

The fourth is a deeper understanding of the financial tools CV is applying. It is crucial to understand the way each tool works, its limitations and potential problems, and how to avoid abuse government funding or public assets. This research needs the support of certain expertise in economic and financing fields. Due to the uncertainty of the information from current media, the research needs more solid information to proceed. Also, the impact that these financial tools will bring to downtown will be more evident in the near future. These outcomes are important evidence for the study of these financial tools.

The fifth issue is a general need for more research to gain better understanding of similarities and differences among cities in regard to effective implementation processes. During the research, it is difficult to find information on the implementation experience of medium or small size cities. There is considerable research on the cities of Boston, Toronto, Vancouver, and London. The accounts of redevelopment in these cities have featured large scale land use projects and investments, sophisticated design cultures,

integrated planning projects with high capacity and clear role of planning department, as well as the appreciation by key politicians for innovative planning.

However, in a medium size slow growth city, having a different economic development pace, the redevelopment foci and concerns are not the same. Top development issues that this type of city may focus on would be: attracting qualified developments, establishing better planning approaches, providing more affordable housing projects, and obtaining better support from governments. Regarding the similarities and differences among cities, the influence these elements may bring to each implementation strategy needs to be articulated. To a redevelopment agency, fully considering a project's particularity and understanding each strategy's features are crucial to achieve effective implementation.

5.4 Recommendations for a Better Implementation

According to the analysis of the seven implementation strategies in this paper, the problematic issues in CV's performance are revealed and considered. The four recommendations are provided:


- Clarifying the mandate and authority;
- Enhancing stakeholder participation;
- Skills for a seasoned CEO;
- Understanding market dynamics.

The researcher has the opinion that advancement in these four aspects will significantly improve the agency's performance and the effectiveness. Since this research process lasted nearly two years, some of these suggestions have been applied, or are starting to be addressed by CV. A more positive outcome is appearing. Related comments obtained in

the interviews have confirmed that the agency is gaining recognition for this improvement.

The following figure illustrates the analysis process resulting in the four recommendations.

Figure 3: Analysis Process



5.4.1 Clarify the mandate and authority

A capable delivery mechanism is fundamental for effective implementation. The question of whether or not to have a mayor chairing the Board of Directors is an important issue, but what constitutes a proper delivery mechanism is far more complicated. The top concerns identified from the interviews, i.e., accountability, the decision-making process, and involving public input, are all related to the structural issues in CV's delivery mechanism. In order to gain a deeper understanding towards CV's delivery mechanism, we need to look at its authority and the mandate.

To answer this question, we need to look back to the government documents in CV's inception. It has been clearly pointed out in Chapter 2 that CentreVenture is a vehicle to achieve the vision of *CentrePlan*. To be more specific: "Its mandate would be focused in two areas: one, the Central Business District, to lead and encourage business investment and development in the downtown; and two, the National Historic Sites with a

mandate to preserve and enhance the use of heritage buildings and land in the downtown area”(Report of the EPC 1999). This mandate is coupled with the resources that the City of Winnipeg provided: \$250,000 in start-up funds; establishing funds to stimulate funding from public and private sectors; transferring City-owned properties.

The information on CV’s board composition and appointment procedures is characterized by superficial description. In the EPC report dated May 12, 1999, the structure of CV was briefly outlined as “That the Mayor nominates the membership of the Board of Directors, subject to Council ratification. The Mayor or designate would chair the board. The board would appoint a CEO... ”. It is mentioned in one of the Appendices that “a Board of Directors of 7 citizen members be drawn from people with the appropriate knowledge and resources...”. No further information was found in defining “the appropriate knowledge and resources”. This document also mentioned “That the Board report semi-annually to Council through the Executive Policy Committee, and table an annual report, within 120 days of year end (beginning in the year 2000)” (Report of the EPC 1999). Similarly, the related information is rare in other government documents regarding CV’s operation.

The most detailed information regarding CV’s decision making process was found in the Mayor and the Chief Administrative Officer’s working draft report on April 26, 1999. In this document, a chart of CentreVenture-Organizational Structure was outlined on Appendix 4 (See Appendix D). There are four important messages revealed in this chart. Firstly, a small *CentrePlan* group would merge with the CentreVenture Board. It has been realized that *CentrePlan* was lacking in resources to implement its plan and it was suggested that CV’s board would coordinate the work of *CentrePlan*

project groups. Secondly, CentreVenture would build partnerships among the many groups who have a stake in revitalization. This partnership was later emphasized as “between the business community and our government”. There is no information to be found here that related to stakeholder participation. Thirdly, the board would report to EPC annually. There is no information found that allows CV to provide a copy of annual reports to other groups. Finally, the City’s staff would support CentreVenture’s mandate by forming a Downtown Improvement Team. This team would be the primary point of contact for CV at the City and would be working to expedite the regulatory process.

Surprisingly, in CV’s report dated May 5, 1999 (see Appendix E), the agency suggested a series of indicators to evaluate its working results:

“Once CentreVenture is created, they will have to come forward with specific objectives, timelines and outcomes for Council approval. However, there are some key indicators that would tell us whether we are achieving results in this initiative. These indicators could include: the value of business taxes paid by downtown businesses; total assessed value of all downtown properties; the number of residents living in the downtown; number of employees working downtown; street level activity (pedestrian counts at key intersections in day and evening); building permit activity; vacant warehouse space. The City would benchmark indicators such as these and monitor progress to ensure that we are achieving results.”

- The CentreVenture Report dated May 5, 1999 (page 12)

It is safe to say, at CV’s inception, the agency had intended to address transparency issues in a very limited level. However, there are no recommendations or regulations addressing this suggestion in the available government documents.

This decodes some of CV’s operational style, especially during the second mandate. It is safe to say that CV was given a clear mandate by the City, but issues related to building a proper delivery mechanism were and continued to be neglected. Few regulations were provided to enforce the implementation process. Especially regarding

issues like board composition and appointment, and transparency and accountability, little information can be located. These issues directly determine whether a development agency's delivery mechanism is seen to be proper or not. The lack of establishing necessary regulations from the City's side can be considered as the top issue.

Addressing these issues is largely out of a redevelopment agency's authority. However, a series of practices can be applied to significantly improve an agency's accountability. An organization with a proper delivery mechanism usually demonstrates the following practices. This list also comprises the recommendations for CV's future operation:

- Holding an annual general meeting which is open to the public
- Making available audited financial statements
- Developing a strategic plan through stakeholder input
- Reporting that plan back to the public/stakeholders
- Having open and transparent hiring practices
- Having open and transparent board appointments
- Clarifying boundaries between the role of the board and the role of CEOs

5.4.2 *Enhancing stakeholder participation*

The lack of sufficient stakeholder participation is one of CV's most noticeable shortcomings. This feature partially reflects a common problem most public-private partnerships have in North American cities. Normally, these partnerships are used by the government to financially leverage the private sector's capital to own and operate assets. They are commonly in the form of a contract between government administrators and the private sector, not including the general public, especially when the area is not a residential community (Brown, 2004). Unfortunately, it is typical that most partnerships

do not include sufficient citizen input, and the legislation of redevelopment agencies normally neglects public participation.

As a public-private partnership created by the City of Winnipeg, CentreVenture's situation is very similar in terms of neglecting stakeholder participation. This neglect from the City's side is reflected in CV's initial report dated May 5, 1999 (see Appendix E). This report was submitted to the City Council meeting on May 12, 1999 for the approval to create CV. In this report, the partnership was defined as "a development corporation to work with the private sector and with government to spur the revitalization of downtown" (page 7). Regarding the definition of stakeholders, this document provides limited information. Besides the three levels of government clearly defined as key partners, only the Downtown BIZ (page 9) in promoting the CBD, and the Exchange District BIZ (page 11) in promoting this area, are defined as partners and stakeholders.

Clearly, CV is funded by public assets. Then, the question is if public money is used to finance the agency, what obligations to the public go along with that? The absence of public participation in both CV's documents and the government's regulations are expected to eventually harm the agency's implementation. Much evidence for this has arising in the interviews. For instance, the adoption of the new plan lost some of its credit in the community at the very beginning. Although the tasks of addressing Portage and Main, the public space and parking in the downtown are considered to be urgent for current downtown revitalization, the tremendous change without sufficient stakeholders' input makes people question the consistency between the new plan and CV's mandate.

Furthermore, CentreVenture has accrued large capital resources in the Urban Development Bank through successfully marketing the public properties. This money is to be used in the tasks addressed in the new plan. The allocation of this money then becomes a very sensitive issue. How the public and the government read the intention of this new plan is vital for CV's operations. Without sufficient general public input, the agency is taking the risk of being viewed as abusing public assets. CV is run by taxpayers' money and therefore advocating and demanding what the public desire for a better quality of life is the agency's top task.

Stakeholder participation is one of the important means of adopting a transparent decision making process. CV must show its accountability in negotiating the best for the people and involving diverse voices in its operation. As mentioned in previous sections, this process can be realized by many forms, i.e., regular news releases, publishing annual reports, workshops and open houses. The application of these communication forms ought to be regulated in the agency's principles. In some city examples in Florida, the application, such as annual report and implementation plan, is enforced by statutory rules. The Florida League of Cities demands that these documents must be submitted to some taxing authorities, the state, and several state agencies (Brown, 2004). However this policy does not allow for increased participatory levels for all stakeholders.

Previous experience shows that the lack of a holistic planning approach to redevelopment is one of the main reasons causing the neglect of the stakeholder participation. The urgency of adopting a holistic planning approach for the downtown has been emphasized repeatedly in the interviews. Normally, conducting this planning approach is costly so only government has the necessary resources. However, some

successful experiences show that involving more stakeholders in the plan making process does not have to be that pricey. The Charrette Planning Process is one option for development agencies like CV.

This method “has the potential to save a great deal of money by reducing the potential for rework or disgruntled stakeholders later in the redevelopment process... (a Charrette Planning Process is) cost efficient because it is holistic and creates an environment for every one to work together” (National Charrette Institute, 2004). The Charrette Planning Process is usually conducted through a workshop, public hearing, or a visioning event. Through this way, the administrative cost can be largely decreased (Brown, 2004). However, additional human resources and increased staff time are necessary, and they differ from case to case. More detailed information about the administrative feasibility of this method, as well as how to plan a successful charrette can be found in both of the website of the National Charrette Institute and Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation⁸. A few of the many benefits of this planning process are listed below:

- Allows greater community involvement to ensure that citizens’ desires are met
- Ensures that redevelopment plans are in the best interest of its tax paying citizens
- Improves the trust building between citizens and public agencies
- Makes a redevelopment agency accountable by implementing a community created plan
- Provides more supports from the local decision makers’ efforts

The Charrette Planning Process is ideal for development agencies since it is initiated in the beginning of the redevelopment planning process, dealing with stakeholders of the

⁸ National Charrette Institute (NCI): <http://www.charretteinstitute.org/>
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC): <http://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/> Please search “Sustainable Community Planning Development: Design Charrette Planning Guide 62779”.

respective community. In projects like WDRI, adopting a charrette is suitable since this approach “focuses on specific issues and details of a given site in relation to the surrounding community and ecosystem”, and “using the broad concept and goals of sustainability to focus and guide directions” (Croften, 2002). CentreVenture and the City can learn the successful experiences from other example cities.

5.4.3 Skills required for a seasoned CEO

According to the interviews, all the key informants agree that a seasoned CEO is crucial for CV’s effective implementation. This person’s understanding of planning and downtown revitalization directly reflects the agency’s working style. Several interviewees pointed out that CV’s shortcomings in performance, such as the lack of a communication program and a comprehensive planning process, are more or less due to the then CEOs’ understanding on downtown revitalization. If a person in this key position did not value the planning process, it is no wonder that the public input was neglected in their work, especially when no regulation exists to enforce the right actions. CV needs a seasoned CEO who has sufficient experience in both public and private development process, and is well versed in development activities in Winnipeg.

Regarding CV’s initial official document, the CEO’s mandate is clearly defined: “The CEO would pursue economic development in the CBD and encourage private sector investment”, and “The CEO would have a mandate to maintain the historic and cultural character of these areas (Exchange District), through the adaptive re-use of heritage buildings. The CEO would also have a mandate for re-development by putting together new business opportunities, assembling grants and matching tenants to buildings” (Working Draft 1999). Obviously, the CEO’s mandate is a more detailed transcript for

the mandate of CentreVenture. The person in this position largely determines the success and failure of the agency's operations.

During the interviews, many specific features were identified as crucial skills for a seasoned CEO. The following list concludes all of the skills. A seasoned CEO ought to have experience with:

- Downtown Revitalization with an understanding of:
 - Urban design and planning principles and practices
 - Market dynamics
- Community and stakeholder engagement practices
- Board development practices
- Strategic planning skills
- Being a relationship builder with both government and local communities

Overall, a balance among these skills creates an ideal package for this position. The lack of any of the above skills will make a CEO unsuitable or unqualified in this position. This requirement may be high, but the lessons that CV learned in its second mandate proves that this measure is necessary for such an important position. It was pointed out in the interviews that, during the second mandate, some of CentreVenture's CEOs had strong business backgrounds but little or no planning experience. While this background may be a great benefit in terms of understanding market dynamics and smart timing of investment, a business mind alone cannot appreciate the obligations and responsibilities of a public-funded organization.

According to some comments from the interviews, CV tended to treat other organizations or groups as potential competitors rather than stakeholders, and the agency was closed on what they were doing. This phenomenon can be related to the CEO's working style and skills. There were no official channels provided by CV to regularly communicate with local groups and the public. The nature of doing business is one of the

new issues mentioned in the interviews. Obviously, interviewees understood that deal-making is about secret negotiation within a small group and then the news is released after the deal has been made. However, none of the interviewees considered this to be a suitable approach for CV due to the agency's public nature.

Board development practices are a skill which needs to be emphasized in regard to CV's situation. The Board of Directors is the ultimate decision making body. It was described in the interviews that the board was involved too much in front-end operation activities. According to CV's organizational structure, the Board of Directors is the body which provides vision and strategic direction, but is not too involved in the micro-decision making process. Literally, a CEO can say "No" to the board in terms of detailed operating activities. The first CEO was described as having a "strong-mind" and being "powerful" by the interviewees. According to their comments, this description is largely because this CEO took the lead and also balanced the relationship with the board. For a new CEO, the test is to keep the consistency with the board and, at the same time, take the leadership role.

The first CEO's leadership style can be concluded as highly valuing the planning process, regularly informing and involving diverse groups in the agency's activities, and having outstanding interpersonal skills that help to build good relationships with the government. The current CEO is well versed in the development activities in Winnipeg, having both public and private professional planning, design and development experience. He is a landscape architect, employed as community and landuse planner for a number of years in the Winnipeg's Planning Property & Development Department. He has years of experience in private consulting related to development projects, and is (2007) president

of the board of the Urban Development Institute Winnipeg Division. The activities the current CEO conducted demonstrate good understanding of the operating process. These two CEOs have certain skill packages featured by their own strengths. The outcome of the first CEO's work has been well recognized. With the progress of the new plan, it is expected that there will be more challenges for the current CEO.

5.4.4 *Understanding market dynamics*

Understanding the complexity of market forces is crucial for development agencies, in terms of undertaking timely development activities and better utilizing public resources. This suggestion was mentioned in the above subsection. Understanding market dynamics ought to be an essential feature not only for an executive officer, but the organization as a whole. Market dynamics ought to be one of the crucial elements that influence a development agency's decision-making activities. The lack of this understanding can bring fatal problems. The example city cases showed that some agencies learned lessons in hard ways. They could not detect the trends of the local real estate market and prepare a compatible development plan accordingly. The waterfront redevelopment agencies in London, Toronto, and Boston were somewhat overwhelmed by developers' demands for building more projects along waterfront areas that had languished for years. This happened in the mid-1980's which was the peak of the housing market in these cities. The agencies became a bit greedy and tried to amend development plans that had been designed years before. All three agencies enlarged proposals which took much longer than expected, and therefore missed market opportunities (Gordon, 1997).

Interestingly, during the research, little information was found relating to the studies or analysis of Winnipeg's downtown housing market dynamics. CentreVenture's report, "Winnipeg Downtown Housing Implementation Strategy 2003-2006", had never been publicly released. From the limited information that Mallin revealed in his WFP article, this report suggested "the best target would be the ownership market because most of what currently exists is modest rental units with few alternatives for those who want something more upscale" (WFP, 2006 Sep.21). Since there is no further information to support this suggestion, few conclusions can be drawn based on this. Through interviewing key informants, some key conditions of the current housing market in downtown Winnipeg were identified. These can be grouped into three aspects.

Firstly, there is a huge financial gap in the downtown housing market. According to some interviewees, the gap is from \$25,000 to \$50,000 per unit. At the end of the day, this gap can only be covered by public money through all financing and political means. Secondly, more people are considering purchasing condos or lofts in the downtown. Due to the area's unique amenities and the expectation of a renaissance, downtown housing is becoming a popular option for an increasing number of empty-nesters and young professionals. Thirdly, the cost of development is increasing at a rapid pace. The increase is caused by several reasons. CentreVenture's staff emphasized that this was due to cost of the construction materials and the lack of qualified labour people. Other interviewees also mentioned the increasing property tax. Obviously, there are opportunities and more difficulties for CentreVenture to conduct an economically successful housing project in the future.

As analyzed in the previous section, the private sector's investments in downtown are largely oriented by government subsidies and funding programs. The market force alone can hardly make a housing project happen. So far, without sufficient public funding, nobody can ensure a profitable housing development in the downtown. It does not mean that the private sector does not take risks in investment. But, under the circumstances, CentreVenture is the first one needing to be very proactive in the market. Obviously, CentreVenture's goals are not just locating profitable projects, but more importantly to sustain the development momentum. How to achieve this goal by utilizing limited public resources is a challenge for CV. Unlike the private sector's one-off investment, a sustained development momentum needs to be supported by a long-term plan, and by fully understanding local market dynamics.

According to the interview with CV's staff, it is safe to say that they have recognized the importance of this issue. However, their work continues to be primarily reactive rather than proactive. "This element actually directs what we are doing, if the market does not work we can shift resources to the places that work", a staff person related. Regarding the question of how to detect market dynamics, CentreVenture did not provide a sound way. Their information on market trends largely depends on the outcome of developers' investment activities. This can be risky in a fast-changing market. CentreVenture needs a more sound approach for detecting market dynamics. This approach ought to allow it to be more proactive in handling business, as well as help to trigger bigger success by utilizing limited resources. Cultivating the sensitivity of market dynamics and considering this element in the context of long-term plan-making are what CV needs to pay more attention to in its future work.

Finally, no one implementation strategy will alone prove to be highly effective. A development agency can only be successful when all of the strategies are comprehensively applied. The better these strategies are applied the greater the potential for a more effective operation. The seven general strategies and their tactics are fundamental for any development agency's implementation. The above four suggestions are raised based on the thorough analysis of these strategies and their tactics, while fully considering CentreVenture's actual operating environment. These four suggestions are essential for CV to have better implementation in its future mandate. A development agency's effective implementation is an on-going topic that influences all the stakeholders in urban renewal activities. It is hoped that the insights provided in this research will contribute to a better understanding to this topic.

5.5 Waterfront Drive Revisited!

After identifying the four recommendations for CV's operation, a further question appears in this research: what would be the differences had the recommendations made here been applied in the WDRI? I think it is important to draw a picture to show how the recommendations could help CentreVenture to improve the implementation. This is my own imagination of some of the possibilities if these recommendations had been applied in the WDRI. The most important advancement that can be expected is a more transparent operating process. With a CEO who is well versed in the development processes and activities in Winnipeg, more deliberate work would be done for stakeholder participation and outreach. A direct result is the creation of a clear

vision for the site that arose from sufficient public process and represented what the public wanted for Waterfront Drive. A broad coalition with other local groups would have formed to allow the opportunities of enlarging the benefit of one project to a much wider area.

With such a vision, CentreVenture would have a clear picture on the future of the site, and therefore would have created a strategic development plan. This would allow CV to have time and means for choosing qualified proposals, rather than rushing to make things happen that may lead to the regret of missing better opportunities appearing later. CentreVenture's work will be appreciated by the City for properly implementing the plan, although it may slow the redevelopment pace.

Then, more detailed issues can be addressed in better ways. For example, regarding the requirements for mixed use and having solid design guidelines and performance measures for proposals, it is more rational to determine the percentage that each function can occupy in the project in regard to the composition of housing styles. Some issues that occurred in the WDRI can be avoided by adopting higher design standards. For instance, the envelope of each building will be well controlled; the new projects need to be more considerate on integrating the current social groups in the site; and the possibilities of transferring the benefit to a broader area. All of these improvements would provide the residents with a higher quality of living that are features of a healthy environment, a prosperous economy, and social well-being, in other words, a more sustainable urban life.

CentreVenture will better understand the relationship between market forces and the timing of the development activities. Regarding the unfriendly market situation for

promoting affordable housing projects, the agency may have more opportunities to better utilize the public resources available.

Beyond the Waterfront Drive initiative, more projects around this area are expected to be launched in the future, i.e., the Alexander Dock, the further north area along Red River, and the opposite shore in St. Boniface, just name few. The future projects, although having their own particularities, share many common features with WDRI. All are waterfront redevelopments, will be developed in Winnipeg's political and economic environment, will impact the same stakeholders of downtown renewal, and most important will be implemented through a public-private partnership approach. It is expected that the four recommendations provided in this paper can definitely help to result in better implementation and a better quality of life at Waterfront Drive and elsewhere in the future.

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Appendix A: Interview Questionnaires

QUESTIONNAIRES #1 – The Government Sector

(1) WDRI's objectives and mandate:

To your knowledge, do you think CV has the potential to do more/ better along Waterfront Drive on achieving these objectives?

(2) Proving the effectiveness of the strategies:

I would like you to rate the importance of each one in terms of realizing the objectives mentioned above.

STRATEGIES	Very important	Somewhat important	Medium	Not very important	Not important at all
1. <i>Having A Capable Delivery Mechanism</i>					
2. <i>Keeping Good Relationship with Government</i>					
3. <i>Building Consensus & Coalition with Local Groups:</i>					
4. <i>Having Capacity of Being Flexible:</i>					
5. <i>Choosing Suitable Projects and developers:</i>					
6. <i>Building Up Credibility by Incremental Efforts</i>					
7. <i>Effective Financial Tools on Finding Public Capital</i>					
Can you think of any other strategies not listed here?					

(3) Proving the effectiveness of the strategies:

<p>1. <i>Having A Capable Delivery Mechanism :</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> As the City's arms length agency, CV needs to balance its independent and the entrepreneurial nature with the public accountability (having access to manage public assets). Do you think having a mayor serving as Honorary Chair shows CV's strength of its delivery mechanism?
<p>2. <i>Keeping Good Relationship with Government</i></p> <p>I do not have any question at this time in this section for you. But I am very interested in any information that you think is of important.</p>
<p>3. <i>Building Consensus & Coalition with Local Groups:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you think CV has an explicit and regular program of communication with all of the affected groups? If not, what's the impact of this shortage you can see in downtown revitalization? Is there any opposing group to CV's implementation in WDRI showed up? If so, do you know how did CV deal with it and what are the outcomes?

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you think the objectives CV set for itself in WDRI are achievable?
4. Having Capacity of Being Flexible: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Is CentrePlan still the guide and driving force for its downtown activities?
5. Choosing Suitable Projects and developers: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you think the current projects along Waterfront Drive will eventually promote mixed-use and attract more attainable housing in the site and furthermore in downtown Winnipeg?
6. Building Up Credibility by Incremental Efforts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What action do you think CV needs to take to contribute to its credibility rebuilding (not limited in WDRI)?
7. Effective Financial Tools on Finding Public Capital I do not have any question at this time in this section for you. But I am very interested in any information that you think is of important.
Any other success stories or lessons in your mind?

(3) The challenges that CV is facing

- What elements do you think may hinder the agency from an effective implementation?
 - Internal elements to the agency:
 - External conditions:
- Agency has its own mandate and timing to do certain work regardless the big picture.

QUESTIONNAIRES #2 – A Downtown Organization

(1) WDRI's objectives and mandate:

To your knowledge, do you think CV has the potential to do more/ better along Waterfront Drive on achieving these objectives?

What do you want to see happen along Waterfront Drive in the future, say the next three years?

(2) Proving the effectiveness of the strategies:

I would like you to rate the importance of each one in terms of realizing the objectives mentioned above.

STRATEGIES	Very important	Somewhat important	Medium	Not very important	Not important at all
1. <i>Having A Capable Delivery Mechanism</i>					
2. <i>Keeping Good Relationship with Government</i>					
3. <i>Building Consensus & Coalition with Local Groups:</i>					

4. <i>Having Capacity of Being Flexible:</i>					
5. <i>Choosing Suitable Projects and developers:</i>					
6. <i>Building Up Credibility by Incremental Efforts</i>					
7. <i>Effective Financial Tools on Finding Public Capital</i>					
Can you think of any other strategies not listed here?					

(3) Proving the effectiveness of the strategies:

<p>1. <i>Having A Capable Delivery Mechanism :</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> As the City's arms length agency, CV needs to balance its independent and the entrepreneurial nature with the public accountability (having access to manage public assets). Do you think having a mayor serving as Honorary Chair shows CV's strength of its delivery mechanism? Does the current arrangement properly balance the flexibility with accountability?
<p>2. <i>Keeping Good Relationship with Government</i></p> <p>I do not have any question at this time in this section for you. But I am very interested in any information that you think is of important.</p>
<p>3. <i>Building Consensus & Coalition with Local Groups:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you think CV has an explicit and regular program of communication with all of the affected groups? If not, what's the impact of this shortage you can see in downtown revitalization? Do you think the objectives CV set for itself in WDRI are achievable?
<p>4. <i>Having Capacity of Being Flexible:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Is CentrePlan still the guide and driving force for its downtown activities?
<p>5. <i>Choosing Suitable Projects and developers:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you think the current projects along Waterfront Drive will eventually promote mixed-use and attract more attainable housing in the site and furthermore in downtown Winnipeg?
<p>6. <i>Building Up Credibility by Incremental Efforts</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What action do you think CV needs to take to contribute to its credibility rebuilding (not limited in WDRI)?
<p>7. <i>Effective Financial Tools on Finding Public Capital</i></p> <p>I do not have any question at this time in this section for you. But I am very interested in any information that you think is of important.</p>
<p>Any other success stories or lessons in your mind?</p>

(4) The challenges that CV is facing

- What elements do you think may hinder the agency from an effective implementation?
 - Internal elements to the agency:
 - External conditions:

QUESTIONNAIRE #3 – The Government Sector

(1) WDRI's plan making and objectives:

To your knowledge, do you think CV has the potential to do more/ better along Waterfront Drive on achieving these objectives?

What do you want to see happen along Waterfront Drive in the future, say in the next three years?

(2) Proving the effectiveness of the strategies:

<p>1. <i>Having A Capable Delivery Mechanism</i> As the City's arms length agency, CV needs to balance its independent and the entrepreneurial nature with the public accountability (having access to manage public assets).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Do you think having a mayor serving as Honorary Chair shows CV's strength of its delivery mechanism?• Does the current arrangement properly balance the flexibility (entrepreneurial nature) with accountability?
<p>2. <i>Keeping Good Relationship with Government</i> To a city development agency, one of its priorities is to maintain good relationships with its sponsoring government. Since its inception, CV attained substantial support from the City.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Do you think continually making financial demands foreseeable and acceptable is important to the government?• What efforts CV did that the City highly valued as relationship building?
<p>3. <i>Building Consensus & Coalition with Local Groups:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Does CV have an explicit and regular program of communication with all of the affected groups? If not, what's the impact to the agency's operation?• Do you think CV would benefit more in WDRI if it adopted a monitoring and evaluating system in its implementation?
<p>4. <i>Having Capacity of Being Flexible:</i> To me, it seems like under Katz's governing, CV's work focus changed to a new field.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Does CentrePlan still function as CV's guide and driving force for downtown activities?• If CentrePlan was CV's guide of its previous activities, does it now use the "Heart of Gold"?

5. Choosing Suitable Projects and developers:
 From the research I found that a sustainable mixed-use project is not simply putting everything together to accommodate diverse functions, but an intelligent combination that reflects long-term market trends.

- What kind of mixed use form do you think are proper for downtown Winnipeg?
- Do you think the projects in Waterfront Drive will eventually promote mixed use and attract more attainable housing projects in the site and further more in downtown Winnipeg?

6. Building Up Credibility by Incremental Efforts

- What actions do you think CV needs to take to contribute to its credibility rebuilding (not limited in WDRI)?

7. Effective Financial Tools on Finding Public Capital
 I do not have any question at this time in this section for you. But I am very interested in any information that you think is of important.

Any other success stories in your mind?

(3) Proving the effectiveness of the strategies:

I would like you to rate the importance of each one in terms of realizing the objectives mentioned above.

STRATEGIES	Very important	Somewhat important	Medium	Not very important	Not important at all
1. <i>Having A Capable Delivery Mechanism</i>					
2. <i>Keeping Good Relationship with Government</i>					
3. <i>Building Consensus & Coalition with Local Groups:</i>					
4. <i>Having Capacity of Being Flexible:</i>					
5. <i>Choosing Suitable Projects and developers:</i>					
6. <i>Building Up Credibility by Incremental Efforts</i>					
7. <i>Effective Financial Tools on Finding Public Capital</i>					
Can you think of any other strategies not listed here?					

(4) The challenges that CV is facing

- What elements do you think may hinder the agency from an effective implementation?
 - Internal elements to the agency:
 - External conditions:

- Are there any other challenges you are aware of that CV needs to deal with in its third mandate?

QUESTIONNAIRE #4 – The Government Sector

(1) WDRI's plan making and objectives:

To your knowledge, do you think CV has the potential to do more/ better along Waterfront Drive on achieving these objectives?

What do you want to see happen along Waterfront Drive in the future, say in the next three years?

(2) Proving the effectiveness of the strategies:

<p>1. <i>Having A Capable Delivery Mechanism</i> As the City's arms length agency, CV needs to balance its independent and the entrepreneurial nature with the public accountability (having access to manage public assets).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do you think having a mayor serving as Honorary Chair shows CV's strength of its delivery mechanism? • Does the current arrangement properly balance the flexibility (entrepreneurial nature) with accountability?
<p>2. <i>Keeping Good Relationship with Government</i> To a city development agency, one of its priorities is to maintain good relationships with its sponsoring government. Since its inception, CV attained substantial support from the City.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do you think continually making financial demands foreseeable and acceptable is important to the government? • What efforts CV did that the City highly valued as relationship building?
<p>3. <i>Building Consensus & Coalition with Local Groups:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does CV have an explicit and regular program of communication with all of the affected groups? If not, what's the impact to the agency's operation? • Do you think CV would benefit more in WDRI if it adopted a monitoring and evaluating system in its implementation?
<p>4. <i>Having Capacity of Being Flexible:</i> To me, it seems like under Katz's governing, CV's work focus changed to a new field.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does CentrePlan still function as CV's guide and driving force for downtown activities? • What's the long-term vision the City has for Exchange District – downtown area? • If CentrePlan was CV's guide of its previous activities, does it now use the "Heart of Gold"?
<p>5. <i>Choosing Suitable Projects and developers:</i> From the research I found that a sustainable mixed-use project is not simply putting everything together to accommodate diverse functions, but an intelligent combination that reflects long-term market trends.</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you think the projects in Waterfront Drive will eventually promote mixed use and attract more
6. <i>Building Up Credibility by Incremental Efforts</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What actions do you think CV needs to take to contribute to its credibility rebuilding (not limited in WDRI)?
7. <i>Effective Financial Tools on Finding Public Capital</i> I do not have any question at this time in this section for you. But I am very interested in any information that you think is of important.
Any other success stories in your mind?

(3) The challenges that CV is facing

- What elements do you think may hinder the agency from an effective implementation?
 - Internal elements to the agency:
 - External conditions:

QUESTIONNAIRE #5 – CentreVenture

(1) WDRI's plan making and objectives:

To your knowledge, do you think the objectives above generally represent the goals CV aims to achieve along Waterfront Drive?

(2) Proving the effectiveness of the strategies:

<p>1. <i>Having A Capable Delivery Mechanism :</i> As the City's arms length agency, CV needs to balance its independent and the entrepreneurial nature with the public accountability (having access to manage public assets). CV has a very active board which leads the agency to be successful in many cases.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you think having a mayor serving as Honorary Chair shows CV's strength of its delivery mechanism (substantial benefit)? Does the current arrangement properly balance flexibility with accountability?
<p>2. <i>Keeping Good Relationship with Government</i> Since its inception, CV has attained significant support from government.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does CV have good relationship with the City? What did CV do to maintain this relationship? What did CV do to smooth out the relationship with sponsoring governments when there was conflict?
<p>3. <i>Building Consensus & Coalition with Local Groups:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What kinds of local groups CV needs to cooperate with in WDRI (i.e., other redevelopment organizations or agencies.....)? What are the strategies applied? What are the outcomes? Is there any opposing group to CV's implementation in WDRI? If yes, how does CV deal with it and what are the outcomes (opposing groups: normally public landowners or port agencies reluctant to lose centrally located properties. But to WDRI, the land

<p>assembly has been done by the city beforehand)?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> During my research I found it is kind of difficult to access the detailed information in how the agency operates projects. To my understanding, as an entrepreneurial nature body, CV operates in business ways to make projects move forward. Regarding the nature of deal making, any idea on balance the two (informing public vs. business ways)?
<p>4. <i>Having Capacity of Being Flexible:</i> To me, it seems like under Katz's governing, CV's work focus has changed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> From your point of view, is CentrePlan still the guide and driving force for your downtown activities? If CentrePlan was the principle in your previous activities, do you now use the "Heart of Gold"? To your knowledge, are principles the same or have they changed, if so, in what ways? Did local market trends play a significant role in CV's work focus transfer (i.e., if warehouse rehab is not the top priority for CV, does that mean the market demand has decreased, or is there any other reasons)?
<p>5. <i>Choosing Suitable Projects and developers:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To the site "the Strand" builds up, I know Nygard Village also proposed their plan. To my knowledge, that would be another kind of mixed use (maybe more commercial activities, more visitors to the site.....) if realized. What is the consideration on choosing "the strand" instead of Nygard (who offers more money)? Is this project still on? Beside the quality of the proposals (criteria in the expectation document), are there any considerations on the capability of developers? Especially in terms of if they are too small, have appropriate experience and under-capitalized.
<p>6. <i>Building Up Credibility by Incremental Efforts</i> I do not have any question at this time in this section for you. But I am very interested in any information that you think is of important.</p>
<p>7. <i>Effective Financial Tools on Finding Public Capital</i> First of all, I want to confirm some information I got in my previous research. To my knowledge, CV has two important financing tools: the Urban Development Bank and the downtown Heritage Tax Credit.</p> <p>I have heard that CV has had a program named "Test housing money" that funded three downtown warehouse rehab projects (social, senior housing). It is kind of government subsidized social housing project. Could you provide more information regarding this program?</p>
<p>Any other success stories in your mind?</p>

(3) Proving the effectiveness of the strategies:

I would like you to rate the importance of each one in terms of realizing the objectives mentioned above.

STRATEGIES	Very important	Somewhat important	Medium	Not very important	Not important at all
1. <i>Having A Capable Delivery Mechanism</i>					
2. <i>Keeping Good Relationship with Government</i>					
3. <i>Building Consensus & Coalition with Local Groups:</i>					
4. <i>Having Capacity of Being Flexible:</i>					
5. <i>Choosing Suitable Projects and developers:</i>					
6. <i>Building Up Credibility by Incremental Efforts</i>					
7. <i>Effective Financial Tools on Finding Public Capital</i>					
Can you think of any other strategies not listed here?					

(4) The challenges that CV is facing

- What elements do you think may hinder the agency from an effective implementation?
 - Internal elements to the agency:
 - External conditions:

QUESTIONNAIRE #6 – The Private Sector

(1) WDRI's plan making and objectives:

To your knowledge, do you think CV has the potential to do more/ better along Waterfront Drive on achieving these objectives?

What do you want to see happen along Waterfront Drive in the future, say in the next three years?

Which part is missing in terms of mixed use and social mix?

(2) Proving the effectiveness of the strategies:

1. <i>Having A Capable Delivery Mechanism :</i> I do not have any question at this time in this section for you. But I am very interested in any information that you think is of important.
2. <i>Keeping Good Relationship with Government</i> I do not have any question at this time in this section for you. But I am very interested in any information that you think is of important.
3. <i>Building Consensus & Coalition with Local Groups:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do you think an explicit and regular program of communication is important for your business? What's your experience in WDRI? • Is there any opposing group to CV's implementation in WDRI? If so, do you know

<p>how does CV deal with it and what are the outcomes?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To your understanding, what objectives did CV set for its WDRI? Do you think these objectives are achievable? Why?
<p><i>4. Having Capacity of Being Flexible:</i> To me, it seems like under Katz's governing, CV's work focus changed to a new field.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Did local market trends play a significant role in CV's work focus transfer? Do you think CV did a good job in reacting to local property development trends in WDRI?
<p><i>5. Choosing Suitable Projects and developers:</i> From the research I know that a sustainable mixed-use project is not simply putting everything together to accommodate diverse functions, but an intelligent combination that reflects long-term market trends.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What mixed use forms are proper on reflecting Winnipeg's long-term market trends? Can you see more attainable housing projects will be attracted to downtown Winnipeg in the future?
<p><i>6. Building Up Credibility by Incremental Efforts</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Did CV provide a speedy development approval process in WDRI to react in time to the market conditions and to speed up private investment in the site? What else do you think is very important for CV to do to build up its credibility? Is there any consideration for the future residents and users from CV or your company?
<p><i>7. Effective Financial Tools on Finding Public Capital</i> I do not have any question at this time in this section for you. But I am very interested in any information that you think is of important.</p>
<p>Any other success stories in your mind?</p>

(3) The challenges that CV is facing

- What elements do you think may hinder the agency from an effective implementation?
 - Internal elements to the agency:
 - External conditions:

QUESTIONNAIRE #7 – The Private Sector

(1) Proving the effectiveness of the strategies:

- Having A Capable Delivery Mechanism :*
I do not have any question at this time in this section for you. But I am very interested in any information that you think is of important.

<p>2. <i>Keeping Good Relationship with Government</i> I do not have any question at this time in this section for you. But I am very interested in any information that you think is of important.</p>
<p>3. <i>Building Consensus & Coalition with Local Groups:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In order to build consensus between developer/ designers and CV, do you think explicit and regular communication is important? What kinds of communication you think is necessary to achieve development objectives? • To the document 'waterfront drive expectation', the criteria the city and CV set for evaluating proposals, are there any other features you want to see happen but not fully mentioned in this document?
<p>4. <i>Having Capacity of Being Flexible:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do you think local property market trends played significant role/ influenced the application in WDRI? • It seems like housing is no longer the top priority in CV's new plan. Did local market trends play a significant role in CV's work focus transfer (the housing market in ED is growing up and become more and more mature)?
<p>5. <i>Choosing Suitable Projects and developers:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What do you want to see happen along Waterfront Drive in the future, say in the next three years? In terms of mixed use & social mix, • What mixed use forms are proper in Waterfront Drive?
<p>6. <i>Building Up Credibility by Incremental Efforts</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What do you think is very important for CV to do to build up its credibility?
<p>7. <i>Effective Financial Tools on Finding Public Capital</i> I do not have any question at this time in this section for you. But I am very interested in any information that you think is of important.</p>
<p>Any other success stories in your mind?</p>

(3) The challenges that CV is facing

- What elements do you think may hinder the agency from an effective implementation/ challenges?
 - Internal elements to the agency:
 - External conditions:

QUESTIONNAIRE #8 – A Downtown Organization

(1) Proving the effectiveness of the strategies:

<p>1. <i>Having A Capable Delivery Mechanism</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CV has a mayor serve as Honorary Chair and this does show some practical benefit. What advantage and disadvantage you can see in this arrangement? What's the delivery mechanism of your organization?

<p>2. Keeping Good Relationship with Government To a city development agency, an important way to maintain good relationships with its government is to make financial demands foreseeable and acceptable. To my knowledge your organization is financial self-sufficient and at the same time sponsors a series of programs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are there any strategies CV can apply to help it being less financially dependent to the city? (Your organization can lease The Forks Market, does this mean you own part of the property?)
<p>3. Building Consensus & Coalition with Local Groups:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are many different organizations in downtown, like BIZs, partnership, CV. So, do you think it is important to have an explicit and regular program of communication among these organizations? (Different mandate but overlap in certain areas; having cooperation will be more effective... what are the barriers to do so? The magazine I found in their front desk.) Do you think CV would benefit more in WDRI if it adopted a more open process (monitoring and evaluating system) in its implementation?
<p>4. Having Capacity of Being Flexible: I do not have any question at this time in this section for you. But I am very interested in any information that you think is of important.</p>
<p>5. Choosing Suitable Projects and developers: To my understanding, if The Forks and Waterfront Drive can be linked into one system in transportation, landscape/ scenery walking, even residential projects, more people will be attracted to downtown.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can you see any possibility that The Forks and Waterfront Drive can be linked and promote each other? Could you identify the elements hinder it? CV was criticized of making some decisions in a rush, or eager to moving things forward without a proper long-term vision. I am wonder if there were similar challenges in the development of The Forks? Could you provide any suggestions?
<p>6. Building Up Credibility by Incremental Efforts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What actions do you think CV needs to take to contribute to its credibility rebuilding (not limited in WDRI)?
<p>7. Effective Financial Tools on Finding Public Capital I do not have any question at this time in this section for you. But I am very interested in any information that you think is of important.</p>
<p>Any other success stories in your mind?</p>

(2) The challenges that CV is facing (challenges)

- What elements do you think may hinder the agency from an effective implementation?

Appendix B: Research Method Reflection

Conducting the interviews is not only for collecting information, but also a process of learning research methods. As discussed in the document Chapter 3, many previously designed questions were modified during the interviews. In this section, the detailed adjustments to questionnaires will be listed. Also, the considerations in doing these changes and the lessons learned will be provided. Eight interviewees participated in the research. Except for one interviewee's declaration on no information needed, all the seven persons received four documents through email preceding the interviews. These documents included 'Study Brief', 'Self-intro', 'Consent Form', and 'Questionnaire Outline'. The process of interviews occurred over four weeks since the middle of March, 2007.

Generally, eight interviews were organized into two parts: the pre-interview introduction and the formal interview part (the questionnaires). The pre-interview aimed to provide interviewees with a general understanding of the research context. This step helped to set the whole interview framework. Three actions in this part included: expressing researcher's gratitude to the interviewee for participating in this research; requesting interviewees to sign the Consent Form and setting video recorder; and briefly introducing the background of this research, the three objectives and seven strategies derived from the literature review part. For introducing the study background, the objectives and strategies were recited with some supplementary explanations of their meanings. However, after two interviews, it was found that interviewees could not immediately grasp the linkage between the objectives and strategies. Later, some

explanation of plan-implementation relationship was added to this part. This change allowed interviewees to have a clear direction in responding to the questions.

The questionnaire adjustments were all based on reflection on the previous interviews. These adjustments helped the researcher better control the interview process and probe opinions. The adjustments include five aspects: adding new information and questions, deleting irrelevant ones, combining relating questions, altering the ways of asking questions, and changing the order of asking questions. Since interviewees came from four different sectors, the questionnaires were designed separately for each. In this way, the questionnaires reflect the interviewees' differences on the knowledge focus and subjective evaluation. The questions modified refer to both the previous interviews in the same sector, but also were influenced by the information obtained from other sectors. So, the adjustments were not done in a linear way, but reflected the network as interconnections among all the questions.

- The Questionnaire Table 1 "Rating the achievement CV did in terms of the three objectives" was deleted. The goal of putting this table in the very beginning was to set the context for the following questions. However, in the pre-interview part this goal had been achieved. Also, this table's function was to generally evaluate CV's work. But, at this time the information would be too vague for anyone to make a reliable evaluation. It was also found that providing some examples helped interviewees understand the framework better and quicker. So more detailed information was provided in the pre-interview part. For example, the physical environment improvement always refers to site improvement (street

beautification, providing infrastructure and underground services...) and the vertical development.

- After the fourth interview, the Questionnaire Table 2 “Ratings for the importance of each strategy” was deleted. Without discussing all of the strategies first, interviewees could not have an explicit concept of each strategy. Meanwhile, adding more information in the introduction part would require too much time and also overlap with the following discussion. The first adjustment was to place this rating table at the end of interviews. However, the information obtained through this table has some limitations. As to a valid quantitative analysis, the amount of data is crucial, but there will not be more than ten interviewees for this research due to the limited resources and number of agents involved. That means less than or equal to three for each sector. This would significantly decrease the reliability of the analysis result. However, this table was used in interviewing CV’s staff. Interestingly, all the seven strategies were rated ‘very important’ after discussing all of the content.
- Both the questions in the section one “WDRI’s plan making and objectives” were deleted after a couple of interviews. The first question, ‘Do you think CV has the potential to do more/ better in WDRI’, was deleted because it is a yes-or-no question and will not lead to more information. For the second question, ‘What do you want to see happen along WD in the future’, it was too vague to bring any valuable information. Interviewees normally rephrased what was mentioned in the

introduction part. Later, some hints were added to probe more information. However, interviewees would directly skip to some details that they considered important. These details were always related to a certain question which will be asked in the later part. The experience of conducting these interviews is that once the responses began interviewees would not follow any order, but thoughts continued in their mind. Any effort to rearrange the order was an awkward interruption. This situation brought some difficulties regarding controlling the process and also led to some omitted questions. Normally, after the whole conversation, interviewees' expectation for this area had been fully discussed. There was no need to bring up this question again.

- Under the strategy "Building consensus & coalition with local groups", having an explicit and regular communication program with other groups is the key point to explore. Although almost all the interviewees agreed that CV needs a more open process in its operations, some new opinions appeared. These opinions related to the business nature of making deals, CV's rush in making decisions, and the agency's financial dependence on the City. They opened the discussion on why CV did not have a more open process, and furthermore whether these barriers can be overcome.

The risk of providing more information is that too many details may lead questions to other directions. Interviewees tended to extend a topic to the field they thought important but not relevant to the research. In order to avoid this shortage, the researcher needed to ask two or more questions before the topics

went too far. These additional questions would help open interviewees' minds and keep the focus on the issue (please see the Questionnaires).

Another difficulty was to discuss this strategy with CV's staff that is sensitive about the critique. The lack of a transparent process is the most mentioned criticism towards CV's operation. Obviously, directly asking why they did not improve the process likely would not obtain positive responses. The experience was that asking about their considerations could gain more positive responses. For instance, for the Nygard Village project, to find out the decision making process is an important issue under this strategy. Some other opposing groups were also mentioned during the discussion. There was more information obtained than originally expected in this section. This was a better way to conduct the interview with CV's staff. However, the resistance to answer certain questions can not be removed due to obvious reasons.

- A new point of information that appeared during the interviews is the Nygard Village project which would have been located along Elgin Street, had The Strand development not been approved. This new information introduced three new issues: the decision making process in terms of having open process; choosing suitable projects in terms of desired mixed use forms; and the ways of dealing with opposing groups. New questions were added under strategy 3 and 5 for CV' staff and private sector questionnaires.

- In the interviews with the government sector, the two questions were switched under section 2 “Keeping good relationship with government”. In the first interview it was found that the question about financial demand to the government largely limited interviewees’ minds in answering the second question, “what the City highly values as relationship building”. Results of the second interview proved this change to be correct, as more information was obtained after the adjustment.
- Clarifying key words in questions was very important to help interviewees better understand the intention of each question. There were several instances here. Section 6, asking about how CV rebuilt its credibility. This question was derived from the 2006’s city audit. In this document, CV was criticized as losing its credibility caused by its performance during its last mandate. Section 5 asked about what mixed use forms are suitable for WD. The experience was that was easier to conduct discussion when mentioning affordable housing, different income groups in downtown (social mix), and local services people needs. One of the questions in section 3 asked about how to deal with opposing groups. Some explanations were added on what opposing groups are in other cases to probe their thinking regarding Winnipeg’s situation.
- It was also very important to keep questionnaires updated to reflect the most current situation. There are two examples. First, Winnipeg Free Press published an article about CV’s new action in Waterfront Drive on March 19 2007. In this

article, CV's action on bringing more local business to the site was highlighted. The article included information on what kind of mixed use CV admires and about two workshops conducted by CV in involving the public to their work. In section 5 asking about proper mixed-use forms for WDRI, the questions were adjusted based on this news. There was no significant increase in terms of probing more information after adding this. However, interviewees always showed more interest in the interviews and tended to provide more related information.

In another interview, a magazine named 'URBANITE' come to my attention. This magazine was initiated by a private company and was produced in conjunction with the Downtown Winnipeg BIZ, The Forks North Portage Partnership, and CentreVenture. Since the communication and coalition among downtown organizations is an important issue to explore, this magazine provided timely information. In the up-coming interview, this magazine was mentioned to assist the discussion of diverse communication approaches. There was much detailed information provided.

- Two questions under "The challenges CV is facing" at the end of questionnaires were combined into one. It was found that the meanings of the two questions were very close to each other: the elements hindered CV's current operation and other challenges in the future. Also, a combined question helped open a broader field for interviewees to express their opinions. I found the experience of chopping a question into several phases to probe more information can not work well at the end of interviews. At this stage, it was better to bring up a broad question and then

ask interviewees to clarify their opinions. The reason is that interviewees have gone through all the discussion and had a clear picture on the topic. It is much easier for them to converse with the researcher or even to handle some interruptions.

- A significant adjustment was made to the final interview. The first reason for adjustment was that this person was the third interviewee from this sector, so no much new information was showing up. Secondly, the interviewee's position is a counterpart to CV's CEO. He would likely provide very valuable opinions as a 'craft brother' or competitor. Although the first interviewee was in the similar position, it was important to deal with the initial questions rather than bringing up more specific questions at that time.
- In section 1, questions of "what his organization's delivery mechanism is" and "what suggestions he can make on balancing the flexibility and accountability" were added. In section 2, since his organization realized financially self-sufficient, the questions focused on how they accomplished this goal and if this model can be applied in a certain way to CV. Questions in section 3 aimed to explore what communication forms were taking among the downtown organizations. In the previous interviews, some interviewee signified that a more formal linkage between The Forks and Waterfront Drive is very desirable for Winnipeggers. In section 5, the possibility and barriers of realizing this linkage were asked. Also, some questions related to the critiques that CV is short of public consultation in

the decision making process were added. Along with these questions, suggestions on how to deal with the situation were asked at the end. It is safe to say that many valuable opinions would not have been obtained by the original questionnaire.

Some lessons and limitation of conducting the interviews need to be emphasized at the end. Firstly, it is better to do a straightforward statement than to ask indirect questions for setting up a context or background. A vague question can largely confuse interviewees and interrupt their connection with the researcher. This is especially important at the beginning of interviews. Secondly, for a specific question, providing a lengthy introduction will exhaust interviewees' attention. This way could be considered as providing too much information at once that always confuses interviewees. They may just pick up some words and form new questions. The answers may be away from the point.

Another lesson is to clarify each question and each word that matters. It may be time-consuming to do so, but researchers need to make sure that all the questions make sense to interviewees. For a comprehensive academic study, it is not realistic to assume that everyone is on the same page with the researcher who has already studied the topic for a while. Finally, as to all eight interviewees, none of them had a strong background or knowledge on Winnipeg's downtown housing market. Plus, relevant documents on the housing market trends in Winnipeg have not been found during the literature review part. These elements largely confined the acquisition of relevant information for providing a more sound and thorough analysis towards this issue.

Appendix C:

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE POLICY COMMITTEE

DATED MAY 12, 1999

On motion of His Worship Mayor Murray, the Report of the Executive Policy Committee, dated May 12, 1999, was considered.

CentreVenture - Downtown Revitalization File EP-1.2.3 (Vol. 1)

542 -1. On April 26, 1999 the Mayor and Chief Administrative Officer released a working draft report entitled "CentreVenture: A new approach to Downtown Revitalization". The report recommended creation of a new downtown development corporation - CentreVenture, to provide entrepreneurial leadership in the resurgence of the downtown. This is the City's response to an earlier report released in December 1998 by Economic Development Winnipeg's (EDW) Downtown Task Force.

The EDW Downtown Task Force, chaired by John Loewen, presented 10 recommendations to revitalize the downtown. The primary recommendation was the formation of a "sustainable Downtown Development Authority...to provide leadership in the planning, development, coordination, and implementation of projects and activities in the downtown".

The report presented by the Mayor and Chief Administrative Officer takes the concept a step further by providing a name, a conceptual outline and an implementation strategy for a new Downtown Corporation.

CentreVenture would be staffed by a small responsive team. Its mandate would be focused in two areas; one, the Central Business District, to lead and encourage business investment and development in the downtown; and two, the National Historic Sites with a mandate to preserve and enhance the use of heritage buildings and land in the downtown area.

CentreVenture would adopt the vision of CentrePlan as its focus for downtown improvement. The new Corporation will have a small Board of Directors with the Mayor as Chair. The Board would appoint the Chief Executive Officer and within three months, a Business Plan for CentreVenture would be presented to Council for approval.

The Executive Policy Committee recommends:

- I. That a downtown development corporation, named CentreVenture, be formed to provide leadership in downtown development, said corporation to be established as a public-private partnership and be provided with the necessary resources to achieve the CentrePlan vision.
- II. That the CentrePlan vision document become the umbrella policy document which provides the vision for CentreVenture and that the activities and responsibilities of CentrePlan be merged with CentreVenture.
- III. That the Corporation be comprised of:
 - a. A Business Development function, created to encourage private sector investment in the downtown, with a focus on the Central Business District (Portage and Broadway).
 - b. A Historic Redevelopment function, created to encourage public and private redevelopment of heritage buildings, with a special focus on the two National Historic Sites and the Forks.
- IV. That the City of Winnipeg endorse the creation of CentreVenture as follows:

- i) That the Mayor or his designate Chair the Board of Directors comprising the following citizen members:
Ida Albo Cheryl Ashton
Brad Hughes
Duane Shuttleworth
David Asper
Gary Hilderman
Lloyd McGinnis
- ii) That the Board appoint a Chief Executive Officer;
- iii) That a business plan and budget be submitted to the City for approval by Council in September, 1999.

V. That Council re-allocate \$250,000 in start-up funds for CentreVenture from the WDA for the balance of the 1999 fiscal year (Strategic Initiatives).

- VI. That the Board report semi-annually to Council through Executive Policy Committee, and table an annual report, within 120 days of year end (beginning in the year 2000).
- VII. That the establishment of an endowment fund or funds for economic development, including housing, arts and culture and historic development through a re-allocation of the City's commitments to the WDA be approved. The intention of these funds is to stimulate other levels of funding in the public and private sectors.
- VIII. That transferring City-owned properties and heritage buildings or other options be explored to provide CentreVenture with access to assets, to create an asset mix to attract investment.
- IX. That as part of the formation of the new development corporation, a review with the other two levels of government be undertaken concerning the mandate of the Forks/North Portage Partnership.
- X. That the mandated area of CentreVenture be defined by the CentrePlan Boundary Map, requiring an amendment to the Downtown Zoning By-law (By-Law No. 4800/88).
- XI. That the City of Winnipeg Administration conduct a review of the legal and financial implications of CentreVenture, including an asset management strategy, within the first three months.
- XII. That the Proper Officers of the City be authorized to do all things necessary to effect the intent of the foregoing.

(Copy of attachment referred to in the above clause is on file in the office of the City Clerk.)

Moved by His Worship Mayor Murray,
Adoption of the clause.

In amendment,

Moved by His Worship Mayor Murray,
Seconded by Councillor Eadie,

That recommendation IV. i) be amended by adding the words "for a one (1) year term to expire on June 1, 2000:" after the word "members".

May 13, 1999

Report of the Executive Policy Committee dated May 12, 1999

In amendment,

Moved by Councillor Angus,
Seconded by His Worship Mayor Murray,

That Recommendation No. I be amended by adding the words "subject to a Council approved business plan," after the word "and" in the last line thereof.


The amendment proposed by Councillors Angus and His Worship Mayor Murray was put and declared carried.

The amendment proposed by His Worship Mayor Murray and Councillor Eadie was put and declared carried.


The motion for the adoption of the clause, as amended, was put and declared carried.

Appendix D:

CentreVenture – Organizational Structure



Appendix "A" referred to in Clause 1 of the Report of the Executive Policy Committee dated May 12, 1999



May 5, 1999

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To Members of City Council:

We are pleased to provide you with our response to the Downtown Development Task Force Report that was tabled at the Executive Policy Committee in January.

Plan Winnipeg has highlighted the need to make the downtown "an attractive, distinctive, and vibrant place", and has further stated that "the City shall prepare, implement, and periodically review a downtown plan in consultation with the business community" (Plan Winnipeg...toward 2010). CentrePlan has played a vital role, providing a plan and a vision for the downtown. Over the past several years, there have been a number of organizations, reports and initiatives focussed on revitalizing our downtown.

It is now time to build on that momentum and move forward.

We want to publicly thank the authors of the Downtown Task Force Report who gave considerable time and leadership addressing the pressing need to renew our downtown. This report is our response to their findings.

Winnipeg's downtown is its heart. And, like a heart, it must be healthy if the city as a whole is to be fit and strong. Those elements that make up the downtown— the streets and buildings, the people and activities— merge to fashion the image that Winnipeggers hold of their city. It is also the image visitors take home with them. As a result, our reputation as a city rests with our downtown....A healthy downtown requires a long-term commitment to a vision and a plan. Isolated projects and short-term programs do not meet that requirement. The foundation of a long-term commitment must be a coherent concept, both to protect existing investment and to direct growth. A Plan can provide for a vibrant downtown only if it is based upon a consensus of all downtown interests.

Plan Winnipeg....toward 2010

the message


We are in agreement with the principal recommendation of the Task Force; we endorse the creation of a unique private/public sector partnership—an entrepreneurial Authority—that would provide leadership in sustaining and creating business opportunities downtown (we have provided a response to all 10 Task Force recommendations in Appendix 1). In this report, we will take the recommendations of the Task Force a step further, providing a conceptual outline and implementation strategy to create a new development corporation.

In the recent discussion of Council's priorities, downtown revitalization was identified as a major priority. We acknowledge that there are many ways of implementing the renewal of our downtown. We believe creating CentreVenture is the best vehicle for driving revitalization. The Task Force Report concluded that there is a great deal of consensus for an Authority among downtown stakeholders—stakeholders believe that what has been missing in all of our efforts downtown is an overall implementation body that provides strategic leadership and has access to the necessary resources. The model we are proposing today achieves that goal. We look forward to your ideas as we continue to work together to revitalize the downtown.

Sincerely,



Glen Murray
Mayor



Gail Stephens
Chief Administrative Officer

the challenge

Everyone wants to do something to improve the downtown and to make it a vibrant, active place that is a source of pride for Winnipeggers. The citizens, City Council, other levels of government, and the private sector are committed to improving the downtown. In the past, there have been many attempts to make revitalization happen with a number of important initiatives (see appendix 2 for a history of downtown development). Why is revitalization so important for the downtown?

The health and vitality of downtown Winnipeg is important for those who live and work there, but also for the entire city and province. A stronger downtown protects property values in surrounding residential neighbourhoods. Economic gains in the downtown spin off benefits for the city as a whole. The province benefits as well. Winnipeg represents more than 60% of the population of Manitoba and is the economic engine of the province. The renewal of the downtown produces a domino effect on the city and provincial economy. As the EDW Task Force report concluded, "Downtown revitalization must be viewed in a broader context. It is of critical importance to both the City of Winnipeg and the Province of Manitoba".

"Explore the possibility of creating a downtown planning and development corporation...a downtown development corporation with a broader geographical mandate would be in a better position to make decisions which would likely benefit all of downtown."

- CentrePlan Action Plan, 1997-99

the challenge

The downtown is the symbol of our community's economic health, our quality of life and our history. A revitalized downtown retains and creates jobs and strengthens our tax base. The downtown is a great place to develop and nurture small business, which continues to be the strength of our City's economy. By focussing cultural, niche retail, knowledge based business downtown, resources can be used more strategically. A thriving downtown becomes a tourist attraction with the historic buildings, location, unique businesses, amenities and events. The downtown provides a place for people to gather, which reinforces our sense of community and pride.

Our downtown contains many of these characteristics; however, everyone agrees that the goal of a revitalized downtown has not been realized. As an Economic Development Strategy report in 1990 stated: "We must accept that our city is defined in the minds and the experience of our visitors by what they see in the downtown area. Downtown Winnipeg must continue to develop as a vibrant, interesting urban centre. Our image, and therefore our competitive position, will undoubtedly be influenced by the impressions created within ten blocks of Portage and Main. Planning and coordination are essential." There are a myriad of organizations currently working on different aspects of improving the downtown. We applaud the work they have done to provide leadership and energy to renew downtown. They have said that what is missing is something that will bring them together, coordinate activities, focus all of the efforts to revitalize downtown. We agree. We believe that a new development corporation which takes on this leadership role is the best way of meeting this challenge.

the city of winnipeg's role

The City of Winnipeg has a major responsibility to meet the challenge in the downtown. Both Council and the administration must clearly define their roles, so that the community, including the private sector, other levels of government and stakeholders know where we stand.

As the primary public sector leader in the downtown, we must focus on our public responsibilities. This means that Council must continue to develop and approve policy for the downtown, while the administration's role would be to ensure action by focusing on user-friendly, efficient, quality public services and amenities in the downtown. However, we believe that attracting and finalizing business deals should be handled through an entrepreneurial group. What is needed is a pro-active group to support private sector investment and partnerships—a development corporation to work with the private sector and with government to spur the revitalization of downtown.

the rationale

There are a number of reasons we believe that creating an entrepreneurial development corporation is the best route. Successful downtown development is realized when the public and private sector focus on what they do best. The public sector can focus on public improvements in the downtown, such as sidewalks, green spaces, streetlights, and planning. A development corporation can address those areas best left to the private sector, particularly pro-active business recruitment. Led by a dynamic Chief Executive Officer dedicated to the downtown, the corporation should be a small, focussed team providing a seamless link between the private sector and the investment communities. The experience of the Lowertown Redevelopment Corporation in St. Paul is a solid example of this approach. They levered over \$428 million in investments with seed money of approximately \$10 million. Return on investments has allowed the Corporation to be self-supporting. There are other examples of cities that have taken this approach with similar results—Edmonton, Denver and Cleveland to name a few.

The experience in other jurisdictions also underscores the importance of the private sector becoming a key partner in making a development corporation a success. The private sector must continue to demonstrate a willingness to become partners in downtown revitalization. They need to provide significant investment by looking for opportunities to expand, committing to the downtown and locating in the downtown as a top priority. Without a true partnership between the private sector and public sector, the goal of revitalization will not be realized.

the approach

A new development corporation, CentreVenture, would be the driving force for downtown revitalization in Winnipeg. It would adhere to the vision and direction provided by CentrePlan and focus its work in four areas in the downtown: business investment; housing; cultural and intellectual capital; and sustainable development. CentreVenture would also work to enhance the physical appearance of downtown by encouraging the adaptive re-use of historic buildings, while supporting new construction, sensitive to the downtown's history. With a clear mandate and management ability, CentreVenture would build partnerships among the many groups that have a stake in revitalization. It would also provide a focal point for promotion of the downtown by marketing the downtown's assets to customers, potential investors, new businesses, local citizens and visitors. CentreVenture would lead economic development in the downtown by strengthening the economic base by attracting and retaining businesses through brokering deals and facilitating investment. CentreVenture would target activities and sectors in areas in the downtown, consistent with CentrePlan.

Initiatives would be developed to encourage people to live and work downtown, with further incentives for those who have already made that commitment. To be successful, it would need to go beyond the classic economic development approach, seeking quality opportunities that tap market niche and potential by creating a mix of businesses and building use that is sustainable.

CentreVenture would work closely with the City of Winnipeg to ensure that improvements to public spaces are initiated strategically, either to complement or to stimulate private sector investments. CentrePlan's physical plan for the downtown should be the guide for this work. In short, Centre Venture would be a lean, green, development machine to spark the revitalization of downtown.

the new vision for Downtown Winnipeg

CentreVenture would be the focal point for downtown development and ultimately the catalyst for growth and opportunity. CentreVenture would be staffed by a small, responsive team, led by a CEO, with a specific mandate to govern the area as defined in the CentrePlan Boundary map (see Appendix 3). Driven by what's best for the City, the CEO would be an active agent for the downtown, looking for business possibilities and partners. CentreVenture would focus its resources in two primary areas: the Central Business District (CBD) - primarily Portage Avenue and Broadway and the City's historic centre: the National Historic Site (NHS) (including the Forks site, the Exchange District, Chinatown and North Main).

■ The Central Business District

CentreVenture would have a strong focus in the Central Business District, pursuing economic development in this area and encouraging private sector investment. CentreVenture would be responsible for assisting in the retention and expansion of existing businesses, pulling together new business opportunities, encouraging new development, enhancing retail, and facilitating cultural development. The CEO would pursue economic development in this area and encourage private sector investment. The CEO would be assisted by the Economic Development officer in the EPC Secretariat, who would provide a key role in building partnerships and developing existing and emerging industry sectors.

the new vision for Downtown Winnipeg

For example, working with the Manitoba Innovation Network, CentreVenture would provide leadership and lever resources to create a "cyber-village" to create a new downtown for the new digital economy. Winnipeg's reputation in this field is growing; building a strong telecommunications infrastructure would attract new entrepreneurial firms operating in the information industry, digital media, the Internet, and cultural and knowledge-based businesses. Within this context, there is an opportunity to create residential initiatives that encourage people to live and work downtown. This would be consistent with the CentrePlan vision and their physical plan.

The Province has an important role in this district, with the provincial government campus, including the Legislative Buildings, other historic buildings and our financial district. Given that the focus in this district is primarily business, CentreVenture would have to establish a strong link to the Province through the Economic Development Board of Cabinet and the Department of Industry, Trade and Tourism. We would invite dialogue with the Province to become a key partner with CentreVenture, to work together to find and secure investment. The Downtown BIZ would be a key stakeholder in promoting the area, working closely with CentreVenture.

the new vision for Downtown Winnipeg

■ The National Historic Site (NHS)

Besides business development, CentreVenture's other priority would be the historic re-development of the downtown heritage district. A city's historic character is the cornerstone of revitalization. With the designation of a National Historic Site by the Federal government, the City has the opportunity to strengthen the historical character of the downtown. The CEO would be supported by a person skilled in heritage buildings revitalization. CentreVenture would encourage public and private conservation and re-development of heritage areas. The CEO would have a mandate to maintain the historic and cultural character of these areas, through the adaptive re-use of heritage buildings.

The CEO would also have a mandate for re-development by putting together new business opportunities, assembling grants and matching tenants to buildings. There is a great need to increase the number of people living downtown. Increasing the housing options in this area would be a priority. With the designation of the Exchange District as a National Historic Site by the federal government, the City has the opportunity to strengthen the historical character of the downtown.

the new vision for Downtown Winnipeg

Ideally, the federal government would be invited to play an important role as partner with CentreVenture, similar to what it has done in Lunenburg, Ottawa and Quebec City, and also as investor. The Exchange District BIZ would be a key stakeholder in promoting this area, working closely with CentreVenture. The mandate of CentreVenture in this area would encompass the North Main Task Force. Enriching and sustaining the arts, culture and festivals downtown would continue to be a key priority, and CentreVenture would provide support to stabilize existing cultural activities, while seeking new opportunities.

■ The Downtown Improvement Team

The City's staff would support CentreVenture's mandate by forming a Downtown Improvement Team. The team would be led by a senior manager with planning and customer service expertise reporting directly to the Chief Administrative Officer. The Manager would form a network of inter-departmental connections to focus on improving the public infrastructure downtown by examining transportation flows, creating pedestrian amenities, initiating safety programs, developing parks and creating green spaces. This team would coordinate departmental resources, provide needed information, and ensure a quick response to emerging opportunities. As well, the Team would help solve problems that hamper business and community development and would be the primary point of contact for CentreVenture at the City. The Manager would be the single point of accountability dedicated to getting things done. Currently, there are a myriad of rules and regulations in the downtown that can hinder opportunities.

the new vision for Downtown Winnipeg

The Downtown Improvement Team would be an action-oriented group, working to expedite the regulatory process downtown and to simplify the system. They would assist the CEO by working on the necessary zoning and other regulations to capitalize on opportunities. They would also ensure that the City of Winnipeg's role in fulfilling Centre Plan's vision and physical plan is carried out in a strategic, coordinated fashion. This team would take the lead in the public sector to create the kind of excellent public spaces and amenities that would bring people downtown. (See appendix 4 for Organizational Structure).

■ Achieving Results

How will we know that CentreVenture has been successful in revitalizing the downtown? Once CentreVenture is created, they will have to come forward with specific objectives, timelines and outcomes for Council approval. However, there are some key indicators that would tell us whether we are achieving results in this initiative. These indicators could include: the value of business taxes paid by downtown businesses; total assessed value of all downtown properties; the number of residents living in the downtown; number of employees working downtown; street level activity (pedestrian counts at key intersections in day and evening); building permit activity; vacant warehouse space. The City would benchmark indicators such as these and monitor progress to ensure that we are achieving results.

the key questions

■ The role of existing organizations

A process for consultation with other organizations has already begun. Clearly, CentreVenture would need to build on and utilize their expertise. However, CentreVenture must take the lead and be the primary force in downtown for creating investment and opportunity.

Within that mandate, what follows is a brief discussion about the potential role of the following organizations: Economic Development Winnipeg (EDW), CentrePlan, Portage Avenue Property-Owners' Association (PAPA), and the Forks/North Portage Partnership. The Exchange BIZ and the Downtown BIZ would continue in their existing mandates. Both organizations would be key partners in downtown re-development.

■ Economic Development Winnipeg (EDW)

The mandate of Economic Development Winnipeg is to continue to focus on the City as a whole. There are a number of initiatives that EDW is involved in including the Mid-Continent Trade Corridor, and other international opportunities. EDW would continue in this capacity and would act as a resource to CentreVenture. Its working committees that are currently focussed on the downtown would be merged with CentreVenture.

*the key questions***■ CentrePlan**

CentrePlan has been the keeper of the vision for the downtown and has provided an excellent physical plan of what the downtown should look like. CentrePlan has often been hindered by lack of resources to implement its plan. A smaller CentrePlan group would merge with CentreVenture. It would be responsible for keeping the plan current and for coordinating the work of CentrePlan project groups.

■ Portage Avenue Property-Owners' Association (PAPA)

This agency is currently focused in the Central Business District. CentreVenture's mandate would now encompass PAPA, and work would begin immediately to use their expertise and advice and integrate their functions within the new mandate.

■ Forks/North Portage Partnership

The City of Winnipeg would request that the Provincial and Federal governments negotiate with the City the mandate of the Forks North Portage Partnership, with the intention of replacing it with the new development corporation, CentreVenture.

*the key questions***■ Funding - Assets and Funds**

CentreVenture must have access to City assets in order to do business. City Council will have to make critical decisions about transferring City-owned assets or other options. This could involve transferring ownership of property assets related such as heritage buildings. Or, the City could provide access through options to purchase, right of first refusal, leases, air-rights parcels or other vehicles. We believe that for CentreVenture to be effective, it will have to be able to expedite decisions. The assets of Forks North Portage Partnership could provide a significant source of revenue for downtown revitalization.

To create CentreVenture, there would need to be start-up funds. Through a business plan, CentreVenture would identify sources to become self-sufficient over time. In the interim, we believe that there is an opportunity to re-allocate WDA funding to achieve this. We also believe that WDA funding could be re-allocated to create three funds that CentreVenture would manage: a Heritage Foundation fund, a charitable fund that could receive endowments and donations (in partnership with the Winnipeg Foundation); an Economic Development Fund; and a third fund, the Arts and Cultural Development Fund, which would ensure the advancement of current arts and culture activities and initiatives that bring people downtown. These three funds would provide seed money to lever investment, while providing a lasting foundation. In the long-term, we would like to see every public sector dollar lever significant private sector investment. CentreVenture would seek charitable status from the federal government.

the key questions

■ The First Three Months

To start the process, the Mayor would chair the board and nominate candidates, subject to Council ratification. A not-for-profit corporation would be set up. The Corporation would operate in a more independent role than past organizations. It would be goal-oriented, dedicated to meeting targets set by Council. Dialogue would begin with the provincial and federal governments to determine funding commitments and their role. The Board would be drawn from people with the appropriate knowledge and resources to support CentreVenture's priorities. The Board would hire the CEO. Within three months of appointment, the CEO and board would table with Council a business plan, including a management plan, an asset management strategy, funding sources and a detailed agreement between CentreVenture and the City of Winnipeg.

■ Council's Role

Council's role in the long-term would be to approve the annual business plan of CentreVenture, approve City commitments to specific projects, and participate in ongoing working groups on specific initiatives, particularly as they relate to constituency concerns. The Board would also report twice a year to EPC and Council; firstly, on progress against their business plan, and secondly to approve CentreVenture's Annual Report and business plan. These links would provide ongoing dialogue between Council and CentreVenture and would ensure accountability.

the key questions

■ Administration's responsibility

The administration will prepare a comprehensive report to identify all the changes needed to facilitate the creation of CentreVenture and the Downtown Improvement Team. Upon approval from Council, the administration will immediately begin work on the feasibility of transferring assets, and setting up development funds.

■ The Anticipated Benefits

We believe there are significant benefits for the City of Winnipeg to establish a new development corporation. A dynamic, entrepreneurial CEO would be focussed solely on revitalization. We expect to see more aggressive support for the retention and expansion of existing commercial businesses and residential initiatives. The history of our downtown would come to life through the preservation and adaptive re-use of heritage buildings. New employment opportunities would emerge. The proposed model clarifies and improves the partnership between the business community and our government. The public sector would be focussed on improving our public infrastructure, as well as more quickly enabling new opportunities. The private sector would increase investment and development in the downtown. It allows the public and private sectors to focus on what they do best.

Table 1: Waterfront Drive Redevelopment Initiative projects list

NAME	DEVELOPER(S)	PRICE RANGE per UNIT	PRIVATE INVESTMENT	AMOUNT OF RES. UNITS	SELLING CONDITIONS OF COMMERCIAL SPACES	SELLING CONDITIONS OF RESIDENTIAL UNITS
Ship Street Village	The Ship Street Group (Freedom Developments Ltd. & Streetside Dev.)	\$360,000-\$550,000	\$4.5 MILLION	8 UNITS	N/A (All units are townhouses scaled like small warehouses with open-concept floor plans.)	By Sep.2006, seven of all the units have been sold out. The available one is selling for \$375,000
Excelsior (two towers)	Sherwood Developments Ltd.	\$289,000-\$698,000	\$17 MILLION	48 UNITS	Street-level space will be of commercial usage	By Christmas 2006, the first tower is expected to be full. Sales of the second tower will start in 2007
The Strand	Dev. Team: Friesen Tokar Architects & Peter Thiessen	\$180,000-\$600,000	\$6 MILLION	15 UNITS	1500 sq.ft. of commercial space on the ground floor; 7500 sq.ft. on the second as the new office for Friesen Tokar Arch.	By Jan.2005, about half of the units has been committed to qualified buyers
Sky Waterfront Condos (three buildings)	Streetside Dev. & Sunstone Resort Communities Corp.	\$189,900-\$501,900	\$26 MILLION	107 UNITS	10600 sq.ft. commercial/retail space	Sales began in Sep. 2006 Construction began in Spring 2007

Resources:

- Ian Tizzard "Rebirth on the river" Winnipeg Free Press special section 5, Saturday, Sep. 23, 06 p.F3
- The 'News Releases' at CentreVenture's official website http://www.centreventure.com/media_news.html
 - The Strand News Release April 10th, 2006
 - Ship Street Village News Release June 14th, 2005
 - Sherwood Development News Release May 10th, 2005
 - CentreVenture News Release August 24th, 2004

Note: For the latest information, please check with companies websites at:

www.friesentokar.com; www.sunstonegroup.ca; www.sherwooddevelopments.com; www.shipstreetvillage.ca

Table 2. Start-Up Funding

Source	Timing	Nominal Amount	Total (1992 US\$)
BPCA			\$60.5 million \$658,000/acre
Bank Line of Credit	1969	\$0.6 million	
NY State Grants	1969-72	\$5.1 million	
Bond Issue	1972	\$196 million (net)	
NY State Grants	1980-86	\$49.2 million	
LDDC			\$1,276 million \$217,000/acre
National Grants	1982-92	915 million	
National Loans	1982-85	0.9 million	
Major Infrastructure Grants (not included in the total)	1984-92	393 million	
HARBOURFRONT CORP.			\$153 million \$1,670,000/acre
Federal Land Assembly	1972-74	\$54.4 million	
Initial Operating Subsidy	1972-78	\$11.3 million	
HC Operating Grants	1978-86	\$29.5 million	
HC Capital Grants	1978-87	\$17.8 million	
Special Recovery Grants	1983-85	\$22.4 million	
BRA			\$14.8 million \$141,000/acre
Mass. EDA Grant	1977-78	\$5.4 million	
Federal BOR Grant	1978	\$2.1 million	
Boston Public Works	1978	\$1.6 million	
Developer Loan	1979	\$1.7 million	
UDAG	1979-82	\$3.1 million	

Table 3: Table of Interviews Conclusion

	Features that strengthen strategies' application	Features that weaken strategies' application	Opportunities for application	Threats for application
1. Having a capable delivery mechanism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Substantial practical benefit, i.e., financial and administration supports 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The mayor has strong commitment to the agency • The mayor keeps the agency's independence consciously 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The strong intervention from a mayor
2. Keeping good relationship with gov.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a CEO's leadership style • the board's leadership style • having alternative financing tools • substantial efforts in creating improvements • the consistency between the CEO and its board 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unacceptable financing demands • Different opinions on key position recruitment from gov. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • using financial tools to aggressively pursue capital return and profit
3. Building consensus & coalition with local groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a CEO's leadership style in keeping communication with other groups • sharing common expectations with others 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the attitude of treating others as irrelative groups or competitors but not potential partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • other development organizations' willingness of cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the lack of a comprehensive plan • The pressures of moving forward
4. Having capacity of being flexible in the ever-changing world	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • adopting a plan that reflects the public's key concerns • a sound approach in detecting market trends • tactically utilizing limited resources to conduct business 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the new plan is lack of consistency • the new focus does not represent the public opinions 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the changing political environment • unpredictable market trends

5.Choosing suitable projects and developers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • adopting successful design features • financially qualified developers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the lack of a solid development guideline • the lack of a planning process to create such a guideline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • working with others to extend the current success to a broader area 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the lack of a comprehensive plan • insufficient gov. subsidies
6.Building up credibility by incremental efforts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the substantial efforts • stimulating the creation of a comprehensive plan for downtown • the CEO's leadership style in involving more voices into the planning process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the lack of a clear vision • the lack of a sufficient public process • The potential of diverting work focus from the key issue. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The lack of a comprehensive plan
7.Effective financing tools on finding public capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the board's and CEOs' powerful leadership • partnering with traditional lenders like banks • utilizing the faith and credit of the sponsoring government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • diverting funds that might have been spent on public services into one particular district or even into the pocket of developers and retailers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • coalition with all players • general agreements of the development vision were reached • strong financial and political supports from the sponsoring gov. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the lack of support from sponsoring gov.

Table 4: The eight city examples and applied strategies

	Boston	New York	London	Toronto	Minneapolis	St. Paul	Baltimore	Calgary
A. Having A Capable Delivery Mechanism								
• Substantial local control.	+ *	+	+	+		+		
• An active board, a small staff led by an entrepreneurial chief executive.	+	+	+	+				
• Including local business leaders on the board		+	- *	+				
• Terms of office staggered and longer than the regular electoral cycle	+	+	+	+				
• Decentralized, community-based decision-making and delivery mechanism					+			
• Approaches on transferring development benefits to offer public well being	±	+	+					
B. Keeping Good Relationship with Government								
• Good connections to different levels of government	+	+	+	+	+	+		
• Co-opting the local leadership , adding local business leaders, and recruiting trusted local consultants for key agency positions	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
• Making the financial demands foreseeable and acceptable			-					
• Minimizing the start-up cash cost	+	+	+	+				
• Producing visible progress toward redevelopment		-	±					
C. Building Consensus & Coalition with Local Groups								
• Explicit and regular program of communication					+		+	
• A monitoring and evaluating system							+	
• Dealing with the opposition groups		-	-	-				

& relations with local residents								
• Cultivating reasonable expectations	—		—					
• Private sector should be initially involved		+		+				
• Public and private sectors should be integrated	+	+	+	+			+	
	Boston	New York	London	Toronto	Minneapolis	St. Paul	Baltimore	Calgary
D. Having Capacity of Being Flexible								
• Quickly adjusting programs to a significant ideological change				+				
• Foreseeing general trends of local property market and taking opportunities	—	+	—	—				
• Adding new roles to the mandate				+				
• Adopting a flexible implementation plan						+		
E. Choosing Suitable Projects and Developers								
• Involving well designed public open spaces	—	+	—	+	+	+		
• Avoiding completely private projects	—	+	—		+	+		
• Building water's edge sites first				—				
• Promoting mixed-use along waterfronts	+	+	+		+			
• Cooperating small, high-income, professional households in housing projects	+	+	+	+				
• Pre-qualifying developers	+	+	+	+			+	
F. Building Up Credibility by Incremental Efforts								
• Improving the image of the waterfront	+	+	+	+	+			
• Establishing an early market	+	+	+	+	+			
• Providing a speedy development approval process	—	+	+	—			+	
• Making the necessary arrangement	—	—	—	—				

for the future users								
G. Effective Financial Tools on Finding Public Capital								
• Community revitalization levy (CRL) or tax increment financing (TIF)								+
• Government subsidies or funding	+	+	+	+	+	+		+
• Strategic use of City-owned land								+
• Negotiating a line of credit from banks		+						
The Precursors of Redevelopments	The then Mayor, White		The then Mayor, M. Thatcher	The then Mayor, J. Sewell	Architect, J. Nouvel	Architect B. Thompson	The then Mayor	The then Mayor, D. Bronconier
	Boston	New York	London	Toronto	Minneapolis	St. Paul	Baltimore	Calgary

Notice:

* “+”: the example city has successful experience in applying this tactics

* “-”: the example city falls in short on applying this tactics


* “±”: the example city has both successful experience and lessons in applying this tactics

The blank cells due to the shortage of relevant information

Table 5: Operation Timeline in Waterfront Drive

2002	The construction in Waterfront Drive began (sponsored by the Canada-Manitoba Infrastructure Programs)	
2003		
2004	February	Announcement of WaterFront Drive Redevelopment Initiative and requested proposals
	June	Five developers were chosen & Waterfront Drive officially opened
2005	Spring	The construction of WFDRI began
2006		
2007		
2008	The expected completing date	

Figure 1: Eight Example Cities to Seven Strategies



The eight cities are: New York, London, Boston, Toronto, Baltimore, Calgary, St. Paul, Minneapolis

Figure 2: Research Process





Figure 3: Analysis Process



Views of Waterfront Drive Projects



Figure 4: A view of the Excelsior from the Waterfront Drive



Figure 5: The Strand under construction



Figure 6: The frontage of the Excelsior

Views of Waterfront Drive Projects' Environment



Figure 7: The west side of the Ship Street Village




Figure 8: The parking lot to the west of the Excelsior




Figure 9: The site of the Sky Waterfront Condominiums


Views of Waterfront Drive Projects' Streetscape



**Figure 10: The roundabout
along the Waterfront Drive**




**Figure 11: A walk trail in the
Stephen Juba Park**



**Figure 12: The pumphouse to
the west of the Waterfront
Drive**

Figure 13:
Waterfront Drive Redevelopment Initiative Site Map



Resources:
 The background geographic map is from GoogleMap, the Waterfront Drive landscape design and sites locations are from the draft of Canada-Manitoba Infrastructure Program, the City of Winnipeg, and CentreVenture on February 24, 2004.