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SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK

PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT  
IN  
SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES:  
AN OVERVIEW AND BASIC MODEL

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OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF SOCIAL WORK

By

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IN  
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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of  
the University of Manitoba in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
of the degree of

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## Abstract

Social service agencies with which the writer has had experience have been largely based on Weber's bureaucratic model. This fact is at least partly responsible for several organizational shortcomings, in terms of quality of service to clients, and treatment of staff. The goal of the thesis was to develop an alternate model capable of ameliorating those shortcomings.

Several concepts were examined in order to develop a foundation for the different model: the etymological distinction between work and labour, probability theory as it applies to the social sciences, and logical positivism and the concept of verstehen theory as they apply to decision making and the accumulation of knowledge. Alienation and burnout and their "opposites" as they apply to agency staff, organizational citizenship, power and the types of compliance generated by its use were also found to be useful.

A case is made that an agency organized such that direct service staff have an important role in decision making would also be taking into account several other important considerations: burnout and turnover would be reduced because staff would have a wider variety of tasks to perform, and would have more aspects of work, as opposed to labour, in their jobs. Such a model would also take into account the limits of rationalism and the important role of values in decision making. It is posited that job satisfaction and service delivery would both improve if a participatory model were adopted.

A model, essentially of a collegial nature, but also with provision for client and community participation, is proposed as the best way of

taking the above considerations into account. The guiding principle is that decisions be made, whenever possible, by those staff most directly affected, because those staff have better information and a greater stake in making good decisions for themselves and their clients. Coordinating positions are rotated, so that all staff have an opportunity to perform some administrative functions.

Finally, there is an examination of problems such an organization might encounter, including tyranny of the group, false participation, high overhead and low productivity, and morale.



If you take a flat map  
And move wooden blocks upon it strategically,  
The thing looks well, the blocks behave as they should.  
The science of war is moving live men like blocks.  
And getting the blocks into place at a fixed moment.  
But it takes time to mold your men into blocks  
And flat maps turn into country where creeks and gullies  
Hamper your wooden squares. They stick in the brush,  
They are tired and rest, they straggle after ripe blackberries,  
And you cannot lift them up in your hand and move them.  
--A string of blocks curling smoothly around the left  
Of another string of blocks and crunching it up--  
It is all so clear in the maps, so clear in the mind,  
But the orders are slow, the men in the blocks are slow  
To move, when they start they take too long on the way--  
The General loses his stars and the block-men die  
In unstrategic defiance of martial law  
Because still used to just being men, not block-parts.

From John Brown's Body

Stephen Vincent Benét

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## Preface

What follows is not a dispassionate examination of an idea. It is the examination of an idea from a point of view. Although the idea has been considered carefully, and from several perspectives, it is still very much a point of view. In order to facilitate your understanding of this thesis, a brief account of its origins is in order.\*

The topic was chosen as a result of my experiences as a line worker in a social service agency for almost a decade. After going back to university, and having completed the necessary coursework, all that remained between me and my degree was a thesis. I was able to arrange a part time position, working nights, in order to have enough time to write it. It turned out that although the pay was for a part time position, the workload was not. Efforts undertaken by staff of the agency to work with management to resolve the problem came to nothing. The final straw came in August, 1977. On one particularly hectic weekend, I worked continuously for a period of twenty-five hours, and had to come in for another five hours the next day to write reports. A request for monetary compensation was rejected. Several staff, including myself, ended up going outside the agency in an attempt to have the matter resolved. The County Court decision written by Jewers, C.C.J. (cited in chapter four), is one result of that effort, which, from my perspective, was successful. The administration thought otherwise, and, almost three years after it all began, three learned

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\* For a theoretical justification of such an approach, see chapter four.

justices of the Manitoba Court of Appeal had occasion to unanimously agree with "... the learned trial judge that the plaintiffs are entitled to the benefits of The Employment Standards Act ..." (Huband, et al., 1980, p. 14).

My thesis was still not getting written, however. It was becoming increasingly clear that as long as I was working there, it never would. I requested a leave of absence, which was denied. I resigned. As a result of financial aid from my parents and my wife's parents, it was possible to work full time for several months on this thesis. There were still interruptions, however, now caused by the legal proceedings.

Grant Reid, my advisor, wisely suggested that a major consideration in the selection of a topic should be that it was interesting. This is the result. I hope it will be of interest to others, too. If it turns out that it is useful, it will have served its purpose.

My debts are numerous, and of several types. Foremost is that owed to Martha, my wife, and Jon and Chris, our children. Without their emotional support and encouragement this thesis would probably never have been completed. After that, it gets a bit less clear as to the proper order in which acknowledgements should be made, because all those listed below, whether by name or by category, played important roles in the development and completion of it. The contribution of Martha's parents, and my own, were more than just financial, and are especially appreciated. The same is true of Olive L. Crocker, in whose professional footsteps I have followed. Perhaps someday my shoes will fill the imprints more completely.

Numerous individuals from the School of Social Work have been of assistance over the years (this process took a bit longer than it was

supposed to). In addition to the current committee of Len Kaminski, Brad McKenzie, and Paul Phillips, whose assistance was invaluable, I owe a special debt to Grant Reid, who is at the present time hospitalized and therefore unable to continue as the main advisor. Without his suggestions I would still be wallowing out there somewhere around chapter three. I have also benefitted considerably from my association with Addie Penner, Joe Ryant, Bob Van der Krabben, Lois Emery, and Baird Poskanzer.

In addition, I want to thank my former co-workers, supervisors, and administrators for their respective roles in the development of this thesis. Their contributions have been many and varied.

Finally, a word of appreciation to my current employer is in order. Although that particular organization is not patterned after the model proposed here, it has recognized that its staff do have certain kinds of expertise, and makes use of it. Ultimately, it is the clients that benefit.

Responsibility for the ideas, and the errors, remains, of course, mine.

Sept. 11, 1980

Bert Crocker

## INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a means to an end: a proposed model for a more effective form of social service agency. The means themselves warrant some comment, however. Means for the achievement of almost any end carry with them certain assumptions regarding those means, quite apart from the ends themselves. It is sometimes possible to successfully avoid making those assumptions explicit, as, for example, is done when the optical system in the telescope used to look at the stars is taken as a given. There are times when it is not possible to do this, however. One of the most famous examples was provided by the initial Hawthorne studies, which proved conclusively that levels of illumination were not responsible for variations in production.<sup>1</sup> There is still disagreement over what was proved, however (Blumberg, 1973, pp. 14-46, and Carey, 1970, pp. 352-369).

Unanticipated consequences are not necessarily bad, although it is often assumed they must be. They are, by definition however, unanticipated, which makes planning difficult. On the other hand, if the premise is accepted that everything is connected in some way to everything else, and that it must all be dealt with explicitly, this thesis will never be completed. The attempts to resolve this dilemma have led to others, which in turn have led to still more dilemmas. This has suggested a format for some portions of the paper.

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<sup>1</sup> It had initially been assumed that the level of illumination was somehow responsible for the amount of production, and the experiments were undertaken merely to determine how large the effects were, and in which direction.

There is a further consideration regarding means which must be made explicit; what Lovejoy calls " . . . diverse kinds of metaphysical pathos" (1960, p. 11). Any word or term used to describe anything carries with it connotations that evoke a certain "mood or tone of feeling" in the mind of the person using or reading that term. There are four types. The first is the ". . . pathos of sheer obscurity, the loveliness of the incomprehensible . . ." (p. 11). This is an assumption that because the reader does not understand exactly what it means, it must be profound. The second is the ". . . pathos of the esoteric" (p. 11). This is the excitement and happiness sometimes felt when being initiated into the secrets of previously hidden mysteries. It is usually a sudden process, similar to the lifting of a veil or the making of a great leap of faith. The third is the ". . . monistic or pantheistic pathos" (p. 12). We have not yet discovered why, but people get more excited about the number "one" than any other number. It could be that it is an emotional reaction to getting away from problematic discontinuities which accompanies the realization that things which were previously kept separate in our minds are in some way merely different aspects of the same thing. Regardless of why, it remains true that ". . . when a monistic philosophy declares, or suggests, that one is oneself a part of the universal Oneness, a whole complex of obscure emotional responses is released" (p. 13). The fourth is the "voluntaristic" pathos, which is ". . . the response of our active and volitional nature, perhaps even, as the phrase goes, of our fighting blood, which is aroused by the character which is ascribed to the total



universe with which we feel ourselves consubstantial" (p. 13).<sup>2</sup> These have, as Lovejoy emphasized, very little to do with the scientific treatment of ideas. They have had a considerable impact on history, however.

This thesis is an attempt to consider several propositions apart from their metaphysical pathos aspects. Such a consideration is not an attempt to ignore the role of values, which are important when any aspects of social service agencies are being considered. Reactions to a theory or proposition can be based on the intellectual merits of the theory, on their lack, on the values on which the theory is built, and on the metaphysical pathos aspects. The latter could perhaps best be conceptualized as reactions to values. If these can be dealt with separately, it should be possible to deal with them more fruitfully.

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<sup>2</sup> "Consubstantial" is a metaphysician's term that means "unified".

## CHAPTER ONE

Towards The Family of Man

There are several themes that reappear throughout this thesis. This chapter serves to lay some foundations for them, in order that their later development and application is anchored. Foundations are important, and in a time when so much is uncertain, there would appear to be value in setting out the extent of that uncertainty in order that a method of approaching it can be developed.

That process begins in this chapter. The concepts "work" and "labour", (there is a difference), and "faith" and "reason", (there are limits to both), are discussed, and their contributions to the prevailing western view of man are explored, on the premise that social service agencies, based as they are on public funding, cannot afford to exist in ignorance of those views.

Hannah Arendt has pointed out that many Indo-European languages make a distinction between what in English are termed "labour" and "work". These are words with different etymological roots and meanings, even though they are usually held to be synonymous today. The "... Greek language distinguishes between *ponein* and *ergazesthai*, the Latin between *laborare* and *facere* or *fabricari*, French between *travailler* and *ouvrer*, the German between *arbeiten* and *werken*." In each case, the first in the pair connotes pain and trouble, and is also used to describe the process of giving birth (1958, p. 80). The two have in each case survived over many centuries, a result which is attributable to their differing connotations.

Labour is what is connected with producing perishables, such as food, in order to survive. Labour is usually difficult, is filled with repetition, just as life itself is cyclical, and is essentially private; it occurs in the household. These activities were essentially static for thousands of years, until the beginning of the industrial revolution.

Work refers to the process of making things of relative permanence; buildings, tools, other objects of use. It constitutes, collectively, that which sets us apart from the other animals. The products of work, used properly, do not disappear, although they might wear out with use (pp. 136-137). Perhaps the best opposition of these two terms was by Locke; "The labour of his body and the work of his hands . . ." (1823, pp. 353-54).

The role of work and labour cannot be considered in isolation from the role of thought in any attempt to understand how we came to have the world view we have. Thinking, by itself, like labour, never produces tangibles. Work, the production of goods, requires some degree of thought. A carpenter cannot make a table without some mental picture of what a table is. Thoughts cannot be recorded without first being remembered and then being written, a process which involves work. Thus, thought can be conceptualized as one aspect of a work process, or as being similar to labour, depending on whether it is recorded and on its subject. Thought in relation to a subject of lasting value would have aspects of work, if it were written down or otherwise recorded. Thought in relation to a subject more closely associated with labour could be conceptualized in terms of that labour (Arendt, 1958, pp. 90, 91, 301, 302).

Thought on a subject of lasting value which is not recorded or shared with anyone would not be characterized as being related to work or labour. This could be thought of as "stunned contemplation", in contrast to "systematic expostulation", and described what happened when a person would stand or sit, apparently thinking, without afterwards discussing it with anyone or recording it (pp. 300-304).

The inter-relationships among labour, work and thought over the last twenty-five hundred years are revealing. They help explain the dilemmas (which are at least in part conceptual dilemmas) that accompany social work today. In order to facilitate the examination, this set of inter-relationships has been divided into six categories. These are not airtight compartments, however.

1. Contemplation; the role of contemplation in life
2. The Nature of the world; is it revealed or knowable
3. The world as mortal or immortal
4. People as mortal or immortal:  
if they are immortal, is it individually or as a race
5. Immortality: is it achieved by acting or by dying
6. Is freedom from slavery or life more important

#### The Classical Era

The Greeks distinguished between stunned contemplation and systematic expostulation (p. 300-304). The Greek ideal was the former. Aristotle preferred the term "speculative reason" (Politics, 1333a). This ideal was embodied in Socrates, who would stand in a trance for hours; in at least two documented instances, for over a day, actively thinking a problem through. He never wrote a thing. Systematic

expostulation had a more utilitarian aspect to it, and was more easily transmitted.

Both forms of contemplation were thought to deal with aspects of a world "out there", which could be revealed to man, but not derived by him (Lovejoy, 1960, pp. 25-26, 37-38). A good example is the Cave Allegory in book VII of Plato's Republic, which tells the story of the man set free from his bonds returning to tell his companions still tied up in the cave that what they had been watching all their lives were merely shadows on the wall cast by the real events behind them (Bloom, 1968, pp. 193-96).<sup>1</sup>

Making a chair, for example, would have the effect of ruining the perfect hypothetical form of the chair that existed "out there" by reifying it (Arendt, pp. 301-303). It was obviously a necessity to have such imperfect representations in the world, but from the Greek perspective it was a mixed blessing. This contradiction partly accounted for the Greek disdain for both labour and work (Aristotle, 1277b - 1278a, and Arendt, pp. 12-13). The other aspect of Greek disdain for work was that by accepting employment one give up two of Westerman's freedoms (see chapter three, below).

The Greeks posited an immortal world (Arendt, p. 18).

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<sup>1</sup> For students of philosophy, it is worth noting at this point that it is with this allegory that Plato turned his contemporaries' view of the world around, for no necessary reason. Homer, in The Odyssey, when describing the descent of Odysseus into Hades (Book XI), describes the dead as pale, shadowy figures living underground with "strengthless heads", while it is the living who are out in the strong sunlight, the clear air, the fresh breeze (Butcher and Lang, 1928). Plato put the men in the cave, and the body became the shadow of the soul. Philosophers were to arbitrarily flip-flop concepts like this, at will, until the time of Galileo (Arendt, p. 292).

People were perceived as highly mortal. After death, spirits were shadowy figures going about aimlessly (see footnote two). The emphasis was on the individual, not on the race or collectivity. Odysseus was able to distinguish quite clearly and to recognize easily the spirits in Hades on his visit.

Immortality could only be obtained by heroic undertakings while alive (Arendt, p. 19). Politics was perceived as a particularly fertile area, in which, with a little help from the gods, it was possible for a man to make his mark (pp. 18-20, 314). It should be kept in mind that in this particular context, "immortality" is being used as synonymous with "fame".

Freedom was much more important than staying alive. The Greeks had a great deal of contempt for slaves, especially those captured in battle, because they had chosen to stay alive rather than kill themselves to avoid slavery (Arendt, p. 316). Aristotle found it necessary to attribute to slaves a "slavish nature" in order to account for this otherwise inexplicable behavior (Politics, 1254b).

#### The Pre Modern Era

In the pre Modern or early Christian era, stunned contemplation was abolished. Contemplation, if entered into at all, was directed towards the wonders of heaven and eternity (Arendt, p. 304). Thought was devoted to the here-after, and preparation for comprehension of the ultimate truths that would be revealed there was a legitimate pursuit. Labour was important insofar as staying alive was concerned (Arendt, p. 317). Work was a two-fold concept, consisting of the relatively mundane making of tools for use in labouring and for the provision of basic

needs on the one hand, while on the other, it was often engaged in as a sign of dedication to the greater glory of God. Most great sculpture and architecture had religious themes.

The world was held to be un-knowable: people should not and could not fathom the mysteries of the world or of the universe. If people wanted something to study, they should study something relatively simple, like mankind; people were deemed incapable of understanding the finer workings of the universe. Thus, we have Alexander Pope's famous lines from "An Essay on Man":

Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;  
The proper study of Mankind is Man.  
Plac'd on this isthmus of a middle state,  
A being darkly wise, and rudely great:  
With too much knowledge for the Sceptic side,  
With too much weakness for the Stoic's pride, for  
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest,  
In doubt to deem himself a God, or Beast;  
In doubt his mind or body to prefer,  
Born but to die, and reas'ning but to err;  
Alike in ignorance, his reason such,  
Whether he thinks too little, or too much;  
(Davis, 1966, p. 250)<sup>2</sup>

Pope was a Catholic, and Catholics tended to take a stronger

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<sup>2</sup> There is no disagreement among different, even contrasting interpretations of Pope's work that this is in fact an accurate summation of the prevailing spirit of the time. Edmunds regards Pope's "Essay on Man" as a mirror of its times, notable mainly for its originality of phrasing (1921, pp. 94-95). White takes the position that much of Pope's "Eassay on Man" is a knowledgeable foray into the issues of his day. His discussion ends with the conclusion that Pope's statements on the matter represent a carefully chosen middle ground from among the prevailing sentiments of the day (1970, p. 84). White cites other authors from the same period to bear this out, among them one John Norris who wrote in about 1697, "And yet is there anything more Absurd and Impertinent in this, than in the present Supposition, to have a Man, who has so great a Concern upon his Hands as the Preparing for Eternity, all busie and taken up with Quadrants, and Telescopes, Furnaces, Syphons, and Air-Pumps?" (p. 88) [*Italics in original*].

anti-intellectual and anti-scientific stand than did the Protestants of the day. Nevertheless, the government in England at that time was Protestant, and no harm came to Pope for his writings.

The world has held to be mortal. Catholic and Protestant alike agreed that the second coming was immanent.

People, on the other hand, were seen as having immortal souls, and immortality was achieved merely by an individual living out his life.

For the Christian 'glad tidings' of the immortality of individual human life had reversed the ancient relationship between man and the world and promoted the most mortal thing, human life, to the position of immortality, which up to then the cosmos had held. (Arendt, p. 314)

Life was definitely more important than freedom from slavery. Suicide, the honourable Greek alternative to slavery, was now a worse crime than murder. The suicide, not the murderer, was refused a Christian burial (p. 316). The Greek contempt for the slave who had chosen life over freedom was now ridiculous (Arendt, p. 316).

### The Modern Age

The modern age was slow to begin. It was only a partial reversal of the Christian era. In retrospect, it began when Galileo saw four moons circling the planet Jupiter. The idea that the earth was not the center of the universe was already almost two thousand years old when Galileo published his observations, but the Church had been able to maintain, in the absence of the observational proof provided by Galileo's telescope, that Copernicus' theory was just a simpler way of computing planetary orbits; that it was a mere mathematical convenience, while reality was different. It is possible that the Church was, by



this time, hypersensitive about this question, because a supernovae, an exploding star so bright it could sometimes be seen even during the day, had been seen in 1572, in direct opposition to the Church's doctrine that the heavens were fixed, unchanging, and eternal. Whatever the reason for the hypersensitivity, Galileo paid dearly. He was arrested, tortured, and, even after he recanted in 1633, was put under house arrest until in 1642 he died, blind and broken. (In November of 1979, the Church began the process of revoking his excommunication, and though this writer has not confirmed it personally, a report has circulated that his book has been removed from the list of prohibited works.)<sup>3</sup>

Pure contemplation remained out of the question in the modern age, while thought was regarded as being closely connected to working (Arendt, p. 292).

The world came to be viewed as knowable through experiment; through thought and work. This led to much activity in the scientific world.

The question of whether the world was immortal or mortal became less important for doctrinal purposes, because it became a question the

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<sup>3</sup> In retrospect, it would seem that an easier course for Galileo would have been to follow the practice of Copernicus, who published posthumously. A dominican Friar, Giordano Bruno, was burned at the stake around 1580 for advocating Copernicus' theory and saying the universe had an infinite number of suns. Galileo must surely have known this. We must therefore acknowledge his courage as well as his contributions to knowledge.

answer to which could be determined by discovery.<sup>4</sup> Modern philosophers have debated at length over whether the world is even real (Arendt, p. 320).

The question of whether people are mortal or immortal is also open. This question becomes, in the Modern Age, intimately connected with that of how immortality is achieved; by living or by dying, and also with that of which is more important; freedom from slavery or staying alive. Concepts held to be truths were very few.

#### Limits to Faith

Descartes could find no way to prove that people exist on earth but to note that he experienced certain mental processes. "I doubt-hence I think, I think, - hence I am" (Fromm, 1955, p. 61). (Also see Sibley, 1970, p. 347, and Arendt, 1958, p. 273-80.) Given this amount of difficulty in proving that people exist, any proof of the existence of God became impossible, and people began to channel their efforts towards proving that God was good (Arendt, p. 281). With Pascal and Kierkegaard it became clear that there had to be a separation of reason and faith,

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<sup>4</sup> The answer to this question would be along two dimensions at the present time. If by "the world" one means the earth, the answer would be that the world could be immortal, if man himself refrains from the use of doomsday machines. If by "the world" one means the universe as a whole, the answer is not in yet. If there is enough matter in the universe, it will eventually cease expanding, contract and go through another "Big Bang", and the nature of the new universe will be determined by the ratio of photons to nuclear particles during the first few seconds (Weinberg, 1977, p. 44-100). If there isn't enough matter, the universe will expand indefinitely, and it may never pass out of existence, though life will, because of entropy. A corollary of one unified field theory is that matter spontaneously turns into light at an exceptionally slow rate. This is being tested at the present time in a salt mine beneath Lake Erie (Sulak, 1979). If it turns out to be true, the answer will be that the world and the universe are ultimately mortal.

and that faith was not knowable by reason, although reason could help illuminate aspects of faith once it was found. The adherence to a religion, therefore, had to become a personal matter. There are limits to faith, as Pascal noted wryly when he observed that the Church's condemnation of Galileo's heretical views did not prevent the earth from turning, and limits to reason (Hazelton, 1974, p. 112). The limits to reason will be discussed at the end of this chapter and in chapter four.

Pascal concluded that although it was not possible to use reason to prove the existence of God, it was possible to use reason to prove that belief was the best choice. To do this he applied the principles he had developed when he invented probability theory.<sup>5</sup> The result became known as Pascal's Wager, which is as follows: each person must decide whether or not to believe in God, for not to decide is in fact a decision. If a person decides to believe in God and acts accordingly, and if God exists, he will gain eternal blessedness. If a person decides to believe in God and God does not exist, he will gain damnation. If a person does not believe in God and God does not exist, he gains nothing and loses nothing. Given that the outcome lasts for eternity, the odds suggest belief (Baker, 1934, p. 132). Even coming from a man who was profoundly religious, (he carried, sewn in his robe, a paper upon which he had written the details of his own encounter with God), this was a bit upsetting, and modern writers taking a pro-God

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<sup>5</sup> Pascal also did important work in geometry, and after proving that a vacuum could exist, contrary to the theological teachings of the day, he used the principles involved to invent the barometer. He also invented the world's first public transportation system, in Paris (Baker, 1934, and Patrick, Vol. 1, 1947).

point of view often go to great lengths to show that Pascal really didn't mean a person should actually make such a gamble; that it was just a figure of speech (Baker, p. 131). Those taking an athiestic point of view point out that the odds are actually quite different: that Pascal left out several factors in his equation, such as (on the basis of Old Testament revelations that "The Lord thy God is a jealous God" and says "Thou shalt have no other gods but me.") choosing the wrong god; or that God (on the basis that God is no fool), will punish a person who believes simply because he wants to benefit personally from that belief (Scriven, 1966, p. 151).

Kierkegaard took Christian thinking to its logical conclusion when he rejected " . . . all proofs of Christianity because they cannot lead to anything better than an approximation to a knowledge of the truth, whereas what is really essential is to face the Paradox and make one's choice"<sup>6</sup> (Patrick, 1947, Vol. II, pp. 301-302).

Immortality of the spirit was no longer regarded as susceptible of proof, although some people believed it to be the case, and many more claimed to believe. The only sense in which it could be said that people were immortal was as a species (Arendt, p. 321).

From this, it follows that life is most important. Under such a system, there is no justification for suicide under any circumstances,

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<sup>6</sup> Most of what Kierkegaard wrote can only be understood in the context of everything else he wrote. For a beginning understanding, in addition to Patrick's cited work, of what Kierkegaard meant by the term "Paradox" see Rhode, 1963. (At the back, there is a "Small Kierkegaard Glossary" (p. 155-163) which can be better understood after reading the rest of the book.) The Paradox results from the juxtaposition of the idea that there is an eternity somehow connected with God, who is eternal, with the idea that it is only through an incarnated god, Jesus Christ, that we can know God: eternity has manifested itself in time.

although any hedonistic system of belief has such a justification (Arendt, p. 311).

A good deal of attention is now paid to the idea of freedom, now used not in the sense of freedom as opposed to slavery but as freedom to do as one pleases. C.B. MacPherson called it "possessive individualism", and characterized that which made man human as freedom from dependence of the will of others; freedom to enter into voluntary associations, the benefits of which are his, not society's. Society is seen as a series of market relations, and society can only limit an individual's freedom when his curtails the freedom of others. Political society is contrived to protect individual property and maintain the orderly transactions of individuals as proprietors of themselves (1962, pp. 263-64). MacPherson characterizes the work of Hobbes as the clearest and most complete expression of this view-point. As such it warrants at least a cursory look.

Thomas Hobbes lived from 1588 to 1679. After taking a degree at Oxford, and tutoring William Cavendish, he travelled to Europe, where he met Galileo. There, he also learned of the 47th proposition of the first book of Euclid, (something now taught in eighth or ninth grade), which states that in a right triangle the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides. This made such an impression on the man that he determined to try to use mathematical methods in solving other sorts of problems too (Sibley, 1970, pp. 344-345). His version of society was, as a result, a bit mechanistic. Hobbes saw states as being the result of men banding together and giving power to a sovereign because each man was afraid of being killed by every other man. It was life in this "natural" state which Hobbes

characterized as being "nasty, brutish, and short" (Sibley, p. 349). The sovereign was given the power to rule as he saw fit, but each individual retained the right to resist if the sovereign wanted to kill him. The two guiding principals within those limits were that peace was to be preferred to war whenever possible, as one's chances of death were greater in battle, and that each person should be allowed as much liberty in his dealings with others as those others would be willing to allow in their dealings with him (Sibley, pp. 350-351).

MacPherson suggests that Hobbes' one flaw was that he failed to see that his proposed society " . . . generated a degree of class cohesion which made possible a viable political authority without a self perpetuating sovereign body" (MacPherson, p. 265). In other words, a king was not necessary. This would appear to fly in the face of Hobbes' reality. If Hobbes had said this, he would have been beheaded. Merely because he did not accept the doctrine of "divine right of kings" he had to flee to Europe several times during the Civil War period in England (Sibley, p. 345, 352). Hobbes argued that he owed allegiance to whomever was in power, and ultimately was able to get along with the Stuarts after the restoration, just as he had with Charles II before (Sibley, p. 345).<sup>7</sup> The flaw would appear to lie in the fact that one cannot enter into a series of contracts with people from whom one fears death. Contracts, or any other sets of mutual expectations, must be based on an element of trust, which could not exist in such a situation. The question of how Hobbes' primitive man, each distrustful of the other,

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<sup>7</sup> It was just those anxious periods of transition that were a bit touchy.

could even make a contract to start civil society in the first place would seem to be the primary flaw in Hobbes' thought. The question of class cohesion occurring is something which the theory cannot explain because of this flaw (Sibley, p. 356). While the question of the necessity of a sovereign body, whether self perpetuating or otherwise, might be derived from the development of class cohesion, it seems safe to say that Hobbes, if he were asked, would deny the connection as if his life depended upon it.

Individualism became increasingly perceived as a source of fragmentation of the potentialities of human existence. Fulfilment came to be seen as possible only within some form of community (Goodwin, 1974a, p. 54). This perception also contributed to the view expressed above, that immortality came to be viewed as a species phenomenon.

#### Limits to Reason

The limits to reason noted by Pascal, above, are not always understood. They are basic, and warrant some comment. It is impossible to know some things. A very clear example which will never be contradicted is that we will never know what preceded the big bang. As mentioned earlier in a footnote, the nature of the present universe was determined by the ratio of photons to nuclear particles a certain time shortly after the big bang, and is in no way dependent on what went on previously. Whatever that was, it is lost forever (Weinberg, 1977, p. 146).

These limits to reason, as they apply to physics, were discovered empirically in the late nineteenth century. Maxwell borrowed statistical methods from the social scientists of the time because he found that he

could best explain events at a molecular level by using calculations based on probabilities, using large populations. At this time, around 1870, there was no theoretical justification for this approach, but better results were obtained with it than by using other models. By the early twentieth century a theoretical justification was developed. Einstein's Special, and, a few years later, General Theories of Relativity declared the impossibility of two people, each moving with respect to the other, ever knowing which one, if either, was really standing still, or ever being able to determine which one's watch was showing the "correct" time: it was all relative. In 1926, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle showed mathematically that it was impossible to simultaneously find out the exact speed and exact location of an atomic particle; that the very act of measuring either speed or location caused unpredictable changes in the other aspect. It was no longer possible to speak of causality in physics. The world was in an uproar. Many people in the scientific community objected to the idea of having to use probability theory. Einstein was one of the most violently opposed to this idea, even though he was partly responsible for introducing this necessity. Einstein spent much of the rest of his life working on trying to disprove Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which remains as firmly entrenched as ever.<sup>8</sup>

From this summary of the modern age comes a dilemma, perhaps even a contradiction. If the physical world is knowable, then work,

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<sup>8</sup> The writer recently found a fascinating book, The Dancing Wu Li Masters (Zukav, 1979), that treats this subject in greater, though nonmathematical, detail. Zukav also makes a case that there are some interesting similarities between western physics and eastern mysticism.



particularly that work connected with science, will create optimism. This will be manifested in the feeling that no problem is too great for our scientists to solve, (given enough time and money). If, on the other hand, staying alive is the highest goal, labour will be more important. The emphasis will be on each person looking after his own needs, and the outlook of philosophers will be rather bleak. Hobbes' characterization of life as being nasty, brutish, and short fits this perspective quite well.

The problems relating to the nature of man and the relative importance of staying alive as the highest good have been considered by large numbers of people for thousands of years, while it is only recently that the parallel questions in science relating to causality, probability, and what is knowable have gained prominence. Newton, Faraday, and Einstein, as well as numerous other people have devoted many years to these problems, much of it to the most central question of all, the attempt to establish a unified field theory that accounts for gravity, electro-magnetism, and the weak and strong atomic forces. Perhaps they are pursuing a physicists version of the "monistic pathos", and their efforts will be unsuccessful. Since Heisenberg, in any case, " . . . the curious discrepancy between the mood of modern philosophy, which from the beginning had been predominantly pessimistic, and the mood of modern science, which until recently had been so buoyantly optimistic, has been bridged. There seems to be little cheerfulness left in either of them" (Arendt, p. 273).

It is generally accepted that one conclusion following from consideration of the ideas presented in this chapter is that most people in the western world pay at least lip service to the idea that everyone

belongs to the same family of man. Western nations have abolished slavery. Divine right of kings is a doctrine that has historical significance only. Ownership of property is no longer a prerequisite for citizenship.

It is as a result of this conclusion that there exists a discipline known as social welfare, which addresses the implications of the question raised by Romanyshyn: "Am I my brother's keeper?" (1971, p.3) Many other people have also dealt with that question, and it is not proposed to consider it further here, except to say that social workers, including this writer, have tried to make their answer a resounding "yes". The way in which the answer to Romanyshyn's question is implemented has real implications, because it is difficult to do a good job of delivering social services if the deliverers are feeling constantly overworked, frustrated in their efforts to be of real help, or are part of a system that has lost sight of its (and society's) answer to that question because of its concern with other problems.

It is a premise of this thesis that social workers, just as much as clients, are unable to function effectively in such situations, and that more effective service delivery can be achieved by applying the implications of the answer to Romanyshyn's question to the staff of social service organizations as well as to its clients.

The second conclusion, which emerges from the discussion on the preceeding page and from the explanation of why probability theory is the best way of approaching science, is that a probabilistic approach is going to be as necessary in social work as it is in physics: if Maxwell borrowed statistical procedures and probability theory from the social scientists of a century ago, it is time to reclaim them. This is a

theme which will be explored in chapter four.

This chapter has defined the difference between work and labour, and followed the changing views on the relative importance of work and labour prior to the industrial revolution. It has also followed some of the major developments in man's views on the nature of the world, the nature of man, and the nature of the relationship between man and the world and man and man.

It was seen that life was the most important, that there are absolute limits to what is knowable, and that probability theory is the best way of approaching those limits. These themes will be considered further in other chapters.

The foundations of a theme of particular importance, the relationship between work and labour in a social service organization have been laid in this chapter. The paradoxical tension between, on one hand, the view that life is the highest good, with its implications regarding the dominance of labour, rather than work, and, on the other, the effects of continuous labour, as opposed to a mixture of work and labour, on people engaged in the delivery of social services, will reappear throughout the following chapters.

## CHAPTER TWO

Work, Labour, and Alienation

The development of the industrial revolution served, by lessening the distinctions between work and labour, to reduce the visibility of the paradox just mentioned. This chapter is an examination of that process, and a treatment of its result, alienation.

## Work and Labour

Prior to the modern age, the distinction between labour and work was quite clear. The linguistic distinction which reflected that difference in the pre-Christian era has already been touched on. In the early Christian or Pre-Modern era the same distinctions were observed. The Guild system, which developed during the Middle Ages, and survived into the Renaissance, reflected this distinction. Although departures from the ideal did occur, there was still the commitment to high standards of craftsmanship, or work, for which the worker received a fair price. The guilds themselves were responsible for ensuring adherence to these standards by their members. Labour, primarily in the forms of keeping households going and agricultural production, was the lot of the vast majority of the population. The unproductive superstructure is not of concern here.

The point of emphasizing this distinction between work and labour is to show that one of the results of the industrial revolution was that this distinction could often no longer be made. At the same time that machines took over some of the most back-breaking labour, manufacturing

jobs were systematically broken down into increasingly small components, too small to have meaning, which in turn were ultimately taken over by another machine. It was impossible to have pride in the finished product if one's own daily contribution was putting four thousand nuts on four thousand bolts and tightening them to a specified value. The end result, Arendt asserts, was threefold. (1) Almost all types of employment were reduced to what one did to "make a living" (1958, p. 127). (2) There was much concern with the perversion of means and ends, with a definite tendency for all ends to become means to other ends (p. 145-159). (3) Manufactured goods, such as cars and buildings, were treated as consumables, much like food; planned obsolescence was the strategy employed (p. 125, 134-135).<sup>1</sup> One result of all this has come to be known as "alienation."

### Alienation<sup>2</sup>

Alienation is an idea with a long history, which has had a variety of meanings attached to it. Barrett maintains that human existence creates alienation, or homelessness, that systematic exploration of any

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<sup>1</sup> This aspect has also been noticed by other commentators. Willy Loman, in *Death of a Salesman*, says, "Once in my life I would like to own something outright before its broken! I'm always in a race with the junkyard. I just finished paying for the car and it's on its last legs. The refrigerator consumes belts like a goddamn maniac. They time those things. They time them so when you finally paid for them, they're used up" (Miller, 1958, Act Two). Vance Packard devoted a whole book to the "... systematic efforts being made to encourage citizens to be more careless and extravagant with their nation's resources, and what these efforts imply" (1960, p. 7).

<sup>2</sup> This section has benefitted from the suggestions and criticisms of both Grant Reid and Len Kaminski, members of the advisory committee. I wish to thank them for their assistance while at the same time pointing out that I must be held responsible for the shortcomings.

idea or field of knowledge will never explain why the universe exists in the first place, and that humans will therefore always be subject to mystery, and hence, alienation. He goes on to state that any utopian social scheme, where what we usually think of as "alienation" would no longer occur, would make humanity truly and completely alienated ". . . from its own being." We would then be, "Creatures of a void without knowing it" (1976, pp. 34-43, quote is from p. 43).

Given the acceptance of his definitions, Barrett is absolutely correct, but all that he has really said is that we will never know why the universe exists, that we can never know why the universe exists, so we may as well stand back and enjoy the ever deepening mystery. This is what Lovejoy would call ". . . the loveliness of the incomprehensible" (p. 11). It may be profound, it may even help some people feel better (to the extent that they are susceptible to this particular variety of metaphysical pathos, and to the extent that this variety of metaphysical pathos is therapeutic), but it will not offer a method of conceptualizing and reducing discomfort for the rest of us. Marx, who borrowed the term from Hegel and other German romantics, had the latter use in mind when he employed the term "alienation" to describe aspects of the world he lived in (Israel, 1971, p. 23-29, and Wegner, 1975, p. 173).

Once the industrial revolution was under way, and enclosure had driven most people off the land (in England), or, (in North America), masses of immigrants were looking for the means of subsistence, all they had to sell was their labour, which Marx later referred to as "labour power". Typically, the purchasers of the labour power were factory owners. Employees worked under a division of labour scheme, and the

owner of the factory was entitled to the finished goods, which were sold at the maximum possible price. Under these conditions, labour power became a commodity, something that could be exchanged for money (Marx, 1962, pp. 85-87, 350-352). The best phrasing of the phenomenon this writer has found appeared in Wage Labour and Capital. The distinction between labour and work is not made in the English translation, and this writer does not know German well enough to make inspection of the original feasible.

But the exercise of labour power, labour, is the worker's own life-activity, the manifestation of his own life. And this **life-activity** he sells to another person in order to secure the necessary means of subsistence. Thus his life-activity is for him only a means to enable him to exist. He works in order to live. He does not even reckon labour as part of his life, it is rather a sacrifice of his life. It is a commodity which he has made over to another. Hence, also, the product of his activity is not the object of his activity. What he produces for himself is not the silk that he weaves, nor the gold that he draws from the mine, not the palace that he builds. What he produces for himself is wages, and silk, gold, palace resolve themselves for him into a definite quantity of the means of subsistence, perhaps into a cotton jacket, some copper coins and a lodging in a cellar. And the worker, who for twelve hours weaves, spins, drills, turns, builds, shovels, breaks stones, carries loads, etc. --does he consider this twelve hours' weaving, spinning, drilling, turning, building, shovelling, stone breaking as a manifestation of his life, as life? On the contrary, life begins for him where this activity ceases, at table, in the public house, in bed. The twelve hours' labour, on the other hand, has no meaning for him as weaving, spinning, drilling, etc., but as earnings, which bring him to the table, to the public house, into bed. If the silk worm were to spin in order to continue its existence as a caterpillar, it would be a complete wageworker. (Marx and Engels, 1950, p. 77) [All italics in original.]

Marx saw man as having the potential to be an active and creative being, who was unable to function that way under a capitalistic system (Israel, 1971, pp. 64-65). Marx's view holds alienation to be an objective characteristic of a society based on property relations,

especially private ownership of the means of production. It has little to do with an individual's subjective feelings; it is held to be true even for those who are victims of false class consciousness. Indeed, a case could be made that a person under these conditions who is subjectively estranged is less alienated than a person who never becomes aware of the alienating conditions of his life (p. 80-81). For the present writer's purposes, this presents a problem. If an individual does not subjectively perceive himself to be alienated, and denies that he is alienated when told that he should feel alienated, the only sense in which he can be defined as alienated is in the sense that he lives in a considerably less than ideal state. This is analgous to Barrett's conception, above, which sees alienation as resulting from peculiarities in the universe. It is interesting, it may be of use in deciding on ultimate goals, but it will not be of value in helping to decide what alternatives might be of value for a person such as the hypothetical individual mentioned above who, when told he is alienated, denies it, but who is nevertheless dissatisfied.

This is not to be construed as a denigration of Marx's thought on the subject, which was very complex. Marx's conception of alienation had four aspects to it.

Man becomes:

- a. Estranged from nature and
- b. Estranged from himself and his activity, or labour, which in turn causes
- c. Alienation from his existence as part of the human species, and
- d. The "estrangement of man from man"

(Marx, 1961, p. 74-77).



Meszaros summarizes it quite succinctly. ". . . Marx's concept of alienation embraces the manifestations of 'Man's estrangement from nature and from himself' on the one hand, and the expressions of this process in the relationship of man-mankind and man and man on the other" (1970, p. 15). [Italics in original.]

This great complexity, which has given rise to so much thought on the subject, has ultimately made it necessary, if the time limits for the present work are to be even minimally adhered to, to cast elsewhere for a more practical form of the concept for purposes of this thesis. The complexity is so great, in fact, that scholars of Marx's alienation cannot even agree among themselves on the question of whether Marx proposed one theory of alienation or two. Israel states flatly, "Marx has two theories of alienation." (p. 11), and goes on to explain the development of each. Meszaros maintains the opposite; that Marx never changed any of his connotations of the term (p. 227), and that there is no justification for viewing the "young Marx" who wrote the Manuscripts of 1844 as being any different from the "mature Marx" of later publications (p. 228).<sup>3</sup>

Marx's conception of alienation does, however, identify social structures as being contributing factors to alienation, which is a step in the right direction. It also posits that changing certain social conditions would help solve at least some aspects of the problem for large numbers of people.

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<sup>3</sup> The debate is an intense one. In reference to two of his protagonists, Meszaros states, ". . . and Daniel Bell willingly contributes his share of hot air to keep Tucker's balloon flying" (p. 228).

Erich Fromm has provided a more recent development of the idea that alienation stems from social structures. In The Sane Society he writes:

What kind of men, then, does our society need? What is the "social character" suited to twentieth-century Capitalism?

It needs men who co-operate smoothly in large groups; who want to consume more and more, and whose tastes are standardized and can be easily influenced and anticipated.

It needs men who feel free and independent, not subject to any authority, or principle, or conscience --yet willing to be commanded, to do what is expected, to fit into the social machine without friction. (1955, p. 110)

Quite properly, Wegner warns us against the danger of using terms such as "alienation", "self-estrangement" and "mental illness" to attach specific responsibility for the undesirable state of affairs on the unfortunate individual involved. Wegner then goes on to criticize Fromm's The Sane Society as a book which does exactly that (1955, p. 175-176). As has already been shown, Fromm can hardly be considered guilty of that offence, although as Szasz has repeatedly pointed out, psychiatry has tendencies in that direction. Wegner also criticizes Fromm for basing his treatment of alienation on a specific set of human needs: relatedness, transcendence, rootedness, a sense of identity, and the need for a frame of orientation and devotion (p. 175).<sup>4</sup> Wegner's own position is that it is improper to build a sociological theory on the basis of posited human needs or characteristics, as that is something which is inherently untestable (p. 178-190). While this may be true for an individual, it is not true for a population. Wegner inadvertantly says as much in his proposed method of getting around the

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<sup>4</sup> Fromm defines and develops these terms on pp. 30-66 of The Sane Society.

"problem". He states:

Alienation as a social science concept requires conceptualizing the individual as a personality rather than positing a set of human ideals or basic needs. Each individual, as a result of his total history of experiences, acquires motives, values, a self image, and other characteristic attributes which we call personality. (p. 178)

To argue that human behavior induced by value seeking is different from the same behavior induced by need satisfaction is to argue over a question of semantics which results, in this writer's perspective, from confusions of scale.

It is indeed awkward to describe individual behavior on the basis of human needs. The number of needs required to explain each aspect of that person's behavior is limited only by the time and imagination of the list maker, and some of the lists have become quite long and imaginative as a result. The situation is clarified if it is remembered that the social sciences, like the physical sciences, are based on probabilities, and that beyond certain limits, (which are clearly defined in physics by Heisenberg's uncertainty principal and are only implied in the social sciences), one can only speak in terms of probabilities of an event being observed within a certain time period or within a certain area.<sup>5</sup> To invoke either a need satisfaction explanation or a value seeking explanation inside of those parameters will result in errors of prediction a certain percentage of the

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<sup>5</sup> It may be worth mentioning (or repeating,) in this context that physicists have long ago admitted to this same subjectivity. It was this very subjectivity that was responsible for the name of the theory which forced this admission: Einstein's Theory of Relativity. Physics has progressed more since physicists were able to accept this fact of the universe than it ever had previously. Perhaps social scientists will benefit from following the example.

time.<sup>6</sup> If the behavior being predicted is dichotomous; turning left or right, or believing in one God or none, we will still be right fairly often, but this has become a function of probability rather than a statement about the real world.

Seeman (1959), in an article which is now famous (Wegner, p. 176), summarizes five usages of the term "alienation".

1. Powerlessness, which was described extensively by Marx, and also commented on by Weber. It involves a separation along any of the following dimensions, all related to the ability to control outcomes.

- a. The distribution of power as seen by an "objective" observer,
- b. The observer's assessment of what he sees by some ethical standard, or
- c. The "subjective" discrepancy between what an individual perceives and what he wishes were the case (p. 784).

2. Meaninglessness, which occurs when the "individual's minimal standards for clarity in decision-making are not met" (p. 786). This is related to the ability to predict outcomes.

3. Normlessness, which is derived from Durkheim's term "anomie", a term which has become almost as overworked as "alienation", and which

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<sup>6</sup> Alderfer (1977), in an article written specifically to answer some of the confusions regarding need theory evident in an earlier article by Salancik and Pfeffer (1977), gives quite a thorough analysis of the questions; though in different terms than are used above. Need theory is covered in greater detail in chapter six. Alderfer takes, and justifies, the position that although a finished need theory has not yet been arrived at (p. 660), need theories can be valid constructs (p. 662). The main obstacle seems to be a reluctance on the part of social scientists to admit to their own subjectivity (p. 669). The question of subjectivity is discussed in chapter four.

initially implied an almost opposite approach: a breakdown or loss of effectiveness of the social norms which regulated individual conduct. This could ultimately effect an individual's functioning, but it would be seen as an effect rather than a cause (pp. 787-88).

4. Isolation, which arises when an individual assigns ". . . low reward value to goals or beliefs that are typically highly valued in the given society" (p. 789). [*Italicized in original.*]

5. Self-Estrangement, the ". . . loss of intrinsic meaning or pride in work . . ." (pp. 789-790). Seeman points out the difficulties in trying to explain this term, but falls into his own trap. He states, "One way to state such a meaning is to see alienation as the degree of dependence of the given behavior upon anticipated future rewards" (p. 790). [*Italics in the original.*] This writer would point out that to the extent something is a reward it is by definition completely dependent on the activity. Perhaps he meant to say, "... congruence between given behavior and anticipated future benefits." While this statement can be derived from "self-estrangement", it could also be derived from many other statements, which emphasizes the difficulty in using this particular definition of the term.

Wegner's criticism of Seeman is that all of Seemans definitions have in them an implicit model of man (p. 176). This is tantamount to denying the validity of a need theory explanation of the phenomonon, an explanation which can in fact be justified, as shall be shown in chapter six. Wegner's definition, which proposes to solve that "problem", is as follows: "Alienation is a negative orientation involving feelings of discontent and cynical beliefs toward a specific social context" (p. 177). The present writer has already remarked on the similarity between

value seeking behavior (which is what will presumably emerge from the feelings of discontent embodied in the individual's personality), and behavior described in terms of a need satisfaction explanation. We have come full circle. The present writer has decided to use this definition for this thesis, not because it is value free, or because it embodies a personality theory, but because it allows for a determination by the individual in question of what the problem is, in a specific context, in a way that does not imply mal-adjustment on the part of the individual.<sup>7</sup>

If there are, as Marx and others noted, individuals whom we think should be alienated but who do not agree, this definition, by itself, will run into problems. Those problems can be resolved if a probabilistic approach is utilized. This would take the form of a statement (after appropriate research has been conducted and base lines established) to the effect that a certain percentage of all individuals who live at or below the poverty line for a certain number of years, or who have jobs of a certain type, or no jobs at all for a designated period of time, will become alienated, as evidenced by certain rates and/or combinations of alcoholism, wife abuse, convictions for violent offences, divorce or desertion, or certain medical problems.

Such a formulation would not allow for the prediction that a specific individual will become alienated within a certain length of time, just as physicists cannot now, and will never be able to, determine which specific radioactive atoms within a chunk of matter will

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<sup>7</sup> It is emphasized that this proposed definition is adopted for this thesis only. Other definitions would be better in other contexts.

decay within a given time period. They can predict very accurately however, what proportion of the original mass will decay within any specified time period, which is informative and useful. These are the requirements for knowledge, as shown on p. 86 below.

This treatment does allow for the determination of specific points where discontent exists, which would suggest:

1. That people who would deny the applicability to themselves of the global definition would admit being alienated in one specific context or another, and

2. That the process of definition of the appropriate specific context would suggest where to look for a solution for that specific problem area

At least part of the complexity of the concept "alienation" is accounted for by the fact that in English and French, a single term is used to refer to that which, in German, (the original language for these concepts), is referred to by two etymologically and definitionally distinct terms, "Entausserung" and "Entfremdung" (Torrance, 1977, pp. xi and xv). Entausserung refers to renouncing or relinquishing a claim, a possession, or a liberty, usually in favor of some other specified or unspecified person or persons (p. xi). Entfremdung refers to ". . . a process, or condition, by which people become or are strangers or enemies to one another" (p. xiii).

Although Wegner's definition is certainly not the most complex one the writer has found, it is not antithetical to the finer points mentioned above, and its adoption makes it possible to use the term "alienation" to suggest appropriate targets for organizational change. By some careful maneuvering, the writer has avoided the Charybdis of

conceptualizing alienation as a characteristic common to everyone but about which no one individual can do anything. He has chosen instead the Scylla of a more limited definition which is capable of providing specific findings suggestive of specific interventions. As Kon points out, the intellectual task involved in dealing with this approach is in some respects more difficult (1969, p. 167). Nevertheless, by pursuing such a course, it has been possible to develop a usage for the term that has a specific context, that can suggest specific targets for organizational change, and which can be measured.

On the problem of measurement, Wegner suggests two possibilities. One would be to identify people who are discontent " . . . because of the features of a social situation, rather than those who are unhappy because of problems of physical and psychological health, personal tragedy, interpersonal conflicts, and other reasons" (p. 179-180). This could be done, though not easily, by a survey using scale items that are specific for the factor being studied. The second possible way would be to use observational techniques " . . . which focus on behavioral expressions of withdrawal and hostility which do not seem to characterize the individual in other contexts..." (p. 180).

Having previously established the difference between work and labour, this chapter treated briefly the role of the industrial revolution in blurring that distinction in many occupations; a blurring which gave rise to the concept of alienation.

Alienation itself was treated, and a definition chosen which will be suitable for use later on without being too much at odds with the intent of some of the original work on the subject.

In the process, an allusion was made to the validity of need theory



explanations of human behavior, and the usefulness of probability theory in relation to the social sciences was demonstrated. Both of these subjects will receive more attention in later chapters.

## CHAPTER THREE

Organizational Citizenship and Burnout

Social work training and education acknowledge that organizations have a tendency to preserve the status quo. This is not a new phenomenon. Sibley, writing of sixteenth century Europe, noted:

For a thousand years, scholars and leaders of the Western world had been constructing an ideology defending class differentiation, feudalism, sharp distinctions between laity and clergy, and private property, despite a doctrine of natural law which, at least until Aquinas, had held that pure nature would exclude class gradations, serfdom, ecclesiastical hierarchies, and private ownership of material goods. (1970, p. 327)

Since that time, in their attempts to reduce inequities, people have developed strategies and theoretical justifications to deal with political organizations as citizens. Such a strategy is needed to deal with economic organizations, including social service organizations. Organizational citizenship is the concept of choice. Its development follows.

## Citizenship

Citizens, people other than a single ruler or a small council, who had a voice in making decisions of the state (in this case the city-state or polis) first appeared in Greece. T.H. Marshall says of those who possess the status of being a citizen, "All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed" (1950, pp. 28-29). What is endowed varies from place to place and from time to time.

The Athenian ideal was that a citizen should be entirely free to devote himself to the affairs of the state. This meant, ideally, that

he should not be tied down with labour, he should not have to work, and he should not even have to worry about supervising the day to day activities of the household (Arendt, 1958, pp. 28-29). To be a citizen was more than just being free; it ". . . meant both not to be subject to the necessity of life or to the command of another and not to be in command oneself" (Arendt, p. 32). [*Italics in original.*] That is what Aristotle meant when he said ". . . the life of the freeman is better than the life of the despot; for there is nothing grand or noble in having the use of a slave, in so far as he is a slave; or in issuing commands about necessary things" (Politics, 1325a).

This freedom is rather different from our own concept of freedom: it applied only to a few men who were citizens, who spent their time as warriors and/or councillors, depending on the current political situation and the age of the man in question (Politics, 1329a). Each citizen had his household, in which he was absolute ruler, and whose decisions, even to the point of exposing infants and selling children, could not be appealed.<sup>1</sup> Wives, other family members, and slaves all functioned to free the citizen from necessity. An individual needed to be quite wealthy, then, in order to be a citizen, as quite a retinue was necessary. Craftsmen did not qualify as citizens, as they were not free.<sup>2</sup> By accepting employment they were relinquishing, for the duration of their employment, two elements of their freedom, as the next

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<sup>1</sup> Exposure of infants was a Greek form of population control. Newborn babies were placed, naked, on the rocks until they died (of exposure).

<sup>2</sup> This treatment reflects Greek ideals. It should be remembered that there were often deviations from the ideals, many of them major.

sentence explains. Westerman, working from records of the manumission of about a thousand slaves carved into the sacred stonework at Delphi, points out that the concept of freedom was held to consist of four elements, the first two of which are rights, the second pair being privileges:

1. Legal status as a protected member of the community
2. Immunity from arbitrary seizure or arrest
3. The privilege of working at whatever one wants to
4. The privilege of free movement (1945, p. 216)


It must be kept in mind that labour and work were not despised because only slaves were engaged in them. The reasoning was the other way around. It was deemed a necessity to possess slaves " . . . because of the slavish nature of all occupations that served the needs for the maintenance of life" (Arendt, p. 83). Aristotle vigorously justified slavery, but manumitted his own slaves when he died (Sibley, 1970, p. 95). This was not a contradiction, but merely a logical response to the fact that he would no longer need assistance. With remarkable foresight, Aristotle states that if ". . . every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, . . . if . . . the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves" (Politics, 1253b). Freed from necessity of the sort that slaves can ameliorate, we have in fact freed our slaves.

More recently, T.H. Marshall has set out what he considers to be the three elements of citizenship; civil, political, and social. The civil element subsumes most of Westerman's components of freedom, although with different terminology, and the modern institution most

closely connected with it is the court system. The political element refers to participation in civil government, either as an elector or as a member of a governing body, while the social element refers to ". . . the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and the social services" (1950, p. 11).

Marshall specifically mentions the right to own property in his civil element, which implies certain economic rights. (Westerman did not mention property ownership as an aspect of freedom because Greek slaves could own property, and this did not differentiate slaves from anyone else.) Marshall does not suggest however, that those economic rights extend to a person's place of employment.

The type of organization most studied in terms of citizenship is the political state. Perhaps the best place to look for insight regarding the potential impact of its citizenry upon the organization is in those disciplines that deal with organizations; political science and sociology. Rather than review all writings of political scientists and all writings of sociologists who have studied organizations of one sort or another and who have touched on the role of members, it is proposed that only two of the more pessimistic be examined. Of the writings of political scientists, surely the work of Robert Michels would qualify as highly pessimistic. His only work still in print is Political Parties, first published in 1911 in German, and translated into English in 1915. Most people know very little about him. Those that only read his book Political Parties see him as an elitist, which he was for part of his



life. He was more than that, however. Michels researched and wrote Political Parties only after spending the period from 1902-1905 as a socialist devoted to spreading his ideas, and those of his party, on the perfectability of man, the injustice of war, women's rights, national self determination, and class struggle (Mitzman, 1973, p. 269). From 1905 until about 1912, and culminating in Political Parties, he spent his time fighting the tendency of the German Social Democratic party to become more and more opportunistic as it got closer to gaining power. This necessitated a "...tortuous revaluation of his early beliefs...", particularly because these groups, more than most others, placed a high value on personal freedom, and democracy (1973, p. 269). The only way he could justify his revision of his beliefs was to revise his basic conceptual framework. He adopted a concept of historical law instead of his earlier foundation in natural law; i.e., "What was dominated what should be" (1973, p. 269). [Italics in original.] Mitelman points out that there was no necessary reason for him to adopt that particular framework; that "...the intellectual influences to which Michels submitted were accepted only because, in providing a new theoretical framework for his values, they helped him to abandon views that his own experience had shattered ..." (1973, p. 270).

Gouldner suggests that Michels chose to study European Social Democratic parties because he wanted to see if they had problems with bureaucracy and a lack of democratic control (1955, pp. 496-507). The pattern of Michels' writing would suggest that Mitelman is correct; that he already knew there was a problem and was involved in trying to understand the nature of it. He was not, in all probability, trying to cloak his findings in metaphysical pathos, as Gouldner suggests (1955,

p. 503), but was merely giving vent to his own depression. A review of what he wrote is helpful in understanding this point. It is not denied that Michels wrote the statements often attributed to him:

. . . every system of leadership is incompatible with the most essential postulates of democracy (Michels, 1959, p. 400).

. . . oligarchy depends upon . . . the tactical and technical necessities which result from the consolidation of every disciplined political aggregate (p. 401).

The formation of oligarchies within the various forms of democracy is the outcome of organic necessity, and consequently affects every organization, be it socialist, or even anarchist (p. 402).

. . . it seemed necessary to lay considerable stress upon the pessimistic aspect of democracy which is forced on us by historical study (p. 405).

The democratic currents of history resemble successive waves. They break ever on the same shoal (p. 408).

It is probable that this cruel game will continue without end (p. 408 ).

From the general tone of these excerpts, which are the most widely known, it is often concluded that the iron law of oligarchy is a fact of life. To a certain extent, this is correct. Those observers who focus on the statement ". . . it seemed necessary to lay considerable stress upon the pessimistic . . ." will notice that Michels does not explain why it is necessary to place the emphasis where he did, and tend to conclude that he is giving vent to his own depression. To a certain extent, they too, are correct. Mitzman points out that much of Michels' popularity continues because he has captured and purveyed a sort of metaphysical pathos; that political conservatives focus their pessimism on more orthodox theorists like Mosca and Burckhardt, tending to avoid Michels because of his earlier involvement in European Social Democracy,

while some political liberals, such as Conze, seem not to want to understand him. They turn his theoretical arguments into semantic ones by stating that democracy is measured by things like elections, and if we have elections, we must be living in a democracy (1973, p. 268).

Everyone will at times feel as pessimistic as Michels must have been, and very little questioning of the metaphysical pathos aspect of his work goes on. In this context, the review of what Michels wrote, began above, must be continued. He observes that although in a large organization there must always be the leaders and the led, the leaders will be much more attentive to the wishes of the led if the led are intelligent and well educated, able to see the ramifications and implications of certain actions, while when the led are not able to foresee the implications, they are relatively powerless vis-a-vis their leader: that to the extent the led are able to offer intelligent commentary in a democratic organization there will be an ". . . enfeeblement of oligarchic tendencies" (1959, pp. 405, 406). [Quote is from p. 405.]

Finally, it is important to quote the complete thought the first part of which appeared above, and which often appears in isolation. "The democratic currents of history resemble successive waves. They break ever on the same shoal. *They are ever renewed.* [Italics added] This enduring spectacle is simultaneously encouraging and depressing" (p. 408). This statement, if considered carefully, is not as depressing as it first appears. Those waves will continue to come, and in the process will erode that shoal. Waves of knowledgeable democrats will erode the shoals of oligarchy better than will waves of ignorant democrats.

The Tennessee Valley Authority was established by the U.S. congress



in 1933, as part of the New Deal legislation. As with all New Deal legislation, enacted during the height of the depression, a major goal was the creation of employment. In addition, the T.V.A. had a specific mandate to develop certain resources in a river basin (rather than in a political jurisdiction such as a state), to integrate that development with the needs of the inhabitants of the area, and to do so with their cooperation; to do so democratically (Selznick, 1953, pp. 4-6).

Selznick examined the T.V.A. after it had been in operation about ten years, in 1942-43. The war intervened, and he did not get the analysis completed until 1947 (pp. v-vi). Selznick points out that his inquiry ". . . was based on the assumption that no prior personal commitment to the T.V.A. as a political symbol ought to interfere with a realistic examination" (p. 4). This does not mean he began in a vacuum, however. Selznick states quite clearly that the inquiry ". . . began with certain ideas about the nature of the administrative process . . ." (p. 4). He elaborates on these assumptions in his conclusion. He states that observable organizational behavior is held to be explained when it may be interpreted as a response to specified organizational needs. It is necessary that the interpretation be confirmable, but Selznick does not explain how confirmation can be carried out (p. 252). Those needs

. . . are organizational, not individual, and include: the security of the organization as a whole in relation to social forces in its environment; the stability of the lines of authority and communication; the stability of informal relations within the organization; the continuity of policy and the sources of its determination; a homogeneity of outlook with respect to the meaning and role of the organization. (p. 252)

In Selznick's view, human action in an organizational setting involves two components. The first is an attempt to accomplish the

organizational goals. This is done through methods set out by the organization, or organizational instruments or tools (pp. 253-255). Certain pre-requisites must be met before the tools can be used: these are the organizational needs mentioned above, which comprise the second component. If members are committed to the organizational goals, they are inevitably committed to the organization's tools, and hence to the organization's needs (p. 255). There is a difference between the organizational goals and the organizational needs. There will be times when the difference will be a fairly large one. The necessary commitments to divergent, sometimes incompatible aspects of the organization may lead to unanticipated consequences and a "... deflection of original goals" (p. 259).

Selznick's book is a description and analysis of how those deflections occurred at the T.V.A., culminating in a set of observations on the nature and theory of formal and informal co-optation of nominally democratic organizations. His conclusions are not optimistic:

In general, therefore, we have been concerned to formulate some of the underlying tendencies which are likely to inhibit the democratic process. Like all conservative or pessimistic criticism, such a statement of inherent problems seems to cast doubt upon the possibility of a complete democratic achievement. It does cast such a doubt. The alternative, however, is the transformation of democracy into a utopian notion which, unaware of its internal dangers, is unarmed to meet them. (p. 265)

Gouldner points out that this argument rests on hidden assumptions, and suggests that the appeal of the argument is to those who are susceptible to its metaphysical pathos. He points out that "...there seem to be few places in either the Eastern or Western worlds in which there is a real and present danger of the '...transformation of democracy into a utopian notion'" (1955, p. 505). Selznick chose to

focus on those aspects of bureaucracy that "...emphasize constraints, the limitation of alternatives imposed by the system upon its participants.", and states that "... this will tend to give pessimistic overtones to the analysis, since such factors as good will and intelligence will be de-emphasized" (p. 252). Gouldner asks why we can't also look at those aspects which tend to foster good will and intelligence; to ask if there are situations where unanticipated consequences can perhaps have good connotations and be useful or beneficial to an organization (p. 505).

. . . for each of the organizational needs which Selznick postulates, a set of contrary needs can also be posited, and the satisfaction of these would seem to be just as necessary for the survival of the organization. (p. 506)

He suggests that if an organization's environment is too secure, stultification and corrosion can set in (p. 506). Interestingly enough, Selznick, in passing, mentions the same problem (p. 259). For Selznick's need for homogeneity of outlook regarding the meaning and role of the organization Gouldner postulates that without some heterogeneity of outlook an organization will not find the tools or the flexibility to cope with changes in the environment (p. 506). (H.A. Simon also made some contributions in this area, which will be referred to later in the chapter.)

Selznick's study dealt with the process of co-optation of people in the areas it served who would otherwise be in a position to prevent the T.V.A. from reaching its goals for those people. If that is the case, can it not be said, with Gouldner, that there is "...a need that consent of the governed be given -- at least in some measure -- to their governors?", and that, "This would appear to be an organizational

constraint that makes oligarchies, and all separation of leaders from those led, no less inherently unstable than democratic organization" (p. 506). [Italics in original.] Gouldner's position is that Michel's iron law of oligarchy is only one side of the phenomenon: "There cannot be an iron law of oligarchy . . . unless there is an iron law of democracy" (p. 506). This iron law of democracy does not exist in isolation any more than does the iron law of oligarchy or Selznick's posited organizational needs. Their importance lies in the fact that they direct our attention in a different direction; towards growth, change, how organizations deal with challenges, and above all, to the fact that leadership cannot exist in a vacuum.

In a world where change is a fact of life, the organizations that value internal security, continuity, and stability are the ones that will not be able to survive in anything approaching a meaningful way. The social scientists studying those organizations only in terms of the iron law of oligarchy have given in to their own despair, and have thereby reinforced the despair of others.

Instead of telling men how bureaucracy might be mitigated, they insist that it is inevitable. Instead of explaining how democratic patterns may, to some extent, be fortified and extended, they warn us that democracy cannot be perfect. Instead of controlling the disease, they suggest we are deluded, or more politely, incurable romantics, for hoping to control it. Instead of assuming responsibilities as realistic clinicians, striving to further democratic potentialities wherever they can, many social scientists have become morticians, all too eager to bury men's hopes. (Gouldner, p. 507)

### Organizational Citizenship

If Gouldner's advice is to be followed, and attempts are to be made to further the democratic potentialities inherent in organizations, the

concept of citizenship must be extended beyond the three areas suggested by T.H. Marshall. William Evan has proposed the additional category of organizational citizenship, where-in members, (employees), are entitled to have certain specifically delineated problems handled by the establishment of due process norms, which would serve to resolve conflicts within an organization (1975, p. 55). Implicit in the concept of "due process" are the propositions that all sides will be heard and that the merits of all positions will be fairly evaluated. Organizational due process would be analagous to the mechanisms of due process that operate in other areas of society, and rests on the supposition that private organizations, in power of dismissal, have power analagous to the political state's power of life and death over an individual (1975, p. 56).<sup>3</sup>

#### Problems

There are some problems with Evan's formulation; most are in the edifice he builds in the second half of his article and do not require attention here. Of some importance in relation to this essay, however, is Evan's failure to mention the point made by G.D.H. Cole, that in politics the citizen is most interested in what occurs at the national and international levels, while in the work place, the worker or industrial citizen is most concerned with what is going on around him (1957, p. 19). In a footnote, Evan states:

The institutionalization of due process norms and organizational citizenship both entail an increase in the level of formalization of organizational structure which, in turn, may involve

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<sup>3</sup> The Catholic Church for example, can excommunicate a person, and the results, which last for eternity, we are told, are therefore even weightier than the state's power of capital punishment.

unanticipated costs in performance as well as in adaptability to change. (p. 77)

The present writer would contend that the degree of increase, if any, in formalization of organizational structure would be at least partly dependent on the size of the organization in question. It could very well be the case that a change in the type of formalization of organizational structure would occur without a change in size or in degree of formalization; that the change would be in the method used to determine the type of formalization deemed necessary, or in the method of implementing that decision. Ultimately, these are empirical questions. Of the two potential disadvantages of organizational citizenship, the second, concerning limitations on adaptability, will be dealt with first, as it can be covered very quickly.

### Solutions

Organizational citizenship provides for several different types of input from front line personnel, as well as from other staff. In a social service agency, if a change in the outside environment occurs, one of the first groups of people who have to deal with that change are the front line personnel. Thus, in a welfare office, the first people who will become aware of lay offs in a particular sector of the economy will be line personnel, not top level management. In a hospital emergency ward, the first people to become aware of an airplane crash in the vicinity will be the people administering medical attention and support services, not the top management. Similarly, if the demand for services from a child welfare agency increases drastically for a short period of time, it will be front line personnel who first become aware of the problem. This is in partial contrast to (for example) an

automobile assembly plant where total production figures must come from somewhere nearer the top, and are related to the level of sales. Problems in that same plant relating to shortages of components or subassemblies, however, would often be noticed initially by line personnel or first level management. Adaptability would be increased, not decreased, by a structure which permitted front line personnel to make decisions on how work should be done.

The first suggested limitation, unanticipated costs in performance, is not stated completely enough for thorough consideration. There may in fact be additional costs to an organization that implements a form of organizational citizenship, but it does not require much imagination to determine what most of them will be. The major problems would be that front line personnel will end up spending too much time in meetings discussing administrative issues, and that they will also become bogged down in the minutiae of administrative work. These can be dealt with in two ways. The first would be to adopt and enforce a directive that the total amount of work done in meeting service delivery needs must not drop, although it may be done differently, the penalty being that inefficient agencies will not receive funding. This would encourage participation in the direction of finding fairly specific answers to fairly specific problems instead of endless theorizing. The section below dealing with decision making theory (in terms such as maximizing, satisficing, and mixed scanning) covers this aspect in greater detail. The second way of dealing with the question of increased costs is to remember that such activities will help employees develop skills in several different areas; they will become more versatile. Benefits will accrue as well

as costs. Greater individual versatility will result in an increase in the ability of an organization to respond to changes in its environment; it is an asset to the organization. Human Resource Accounting is one way that has been proposed for taking these sorts of assets into account when evaluating an organization.

Human Resource Accounting was first proposed by Likert, who distinguished among causal variables, such as leadership, intervening variables, which include "...attitudes, morale, loyalty, and motivation,..." and end result variables, consisting of profit or other measures of output (Craft and Birnberg, 1976, pp. 2-3). Likert argued that most managers and organizations are evaluated only on the basis of short run end result variables, and tend to ignore the intervening variables. This has two effects. Ignoring intervening variables means ignoring costs incurred in building and maintaining an organization with members who are able to function at a high level. In addition, "... spurious earnings achieved by liquidating some of the company's investment in the human organization are not charged against the operation and used in evaluating which system of management works best" (Likert, 1961, p. 86., cited in Craft and Birnberg, p. 3).

There are problems with H.R.A. Some of them are accounting problems which stem from differences in judgement among economists over which accounting procedures would be most easily adapted to human resources. Is an outlay based approach using historical costs of investment in people best, or would an outlay based approach using replacement costs be more realistic. Others advocate an inflow oriented approach using present economic value of human resources (Craft and Birnberg, p. 5). Other problems are more basic, such as how



to put a dollar value on human qualities (Rhode, Lawler and Sundem, 1976, pp. 17-19). An outlay based approach using historical costs does not immediately solve the problem but once reasonable approximations are made on the dollar values to be assigned, it becomes the most objective method: two accountants can arrive at about the same conclusions about the kinds of human resources present in a given organization and what changes in those resources are occurring, without appearing capricious (Craft and Birnberg, p. 11).

Craft and Birnberg are basically pessimistic about H.R.A. They conclude that it would be "... unlikely that H.R.A. will be recognized by the accounting profession as having legitimate value in external accounting reporting" (p. 12). As critics, they concede there are nevertheless two useful applications of H.R.A., "...as an aid in personnel management operations analysis (e.g., turnover cost analysis, training cost analysis, costing out selection procedures, and the like) and in evaluating managerial performance, especially in *service-oriented industries*" (p. 12). [Italics added.]

In view of these problems, Rhode, Lawler and Sundem are on the whole rather critical of H.R.A. They summarize their view in these words:

Overall, then, the work on H.R.A. has been concerned with showing whether it is operationally practical. In short, the literature has shown that H.R.A. can in some form be presented. It has not been shown that such accounting is meaningful or worth doing. The usefulness and cost-benefit effects of accounting for human resources simply have not been demonstrated. (1976, p. 22)

An interesting reversal has occurred. As mentioned above, Likert suggested that managers and organizations are presently evaluated only on short run end result variables, and tend to ignore intervening

variables. He proposed to establish Human Resource Accounting to take intervening variables into account. Rhode et al., however, state:

H.R.A. may not be particularly compatible with traditional authoritarian management; it will become common only when superiors begin to value their subordinates' skills and to practice participative management. Although managers give lip service to democratic management, they tend to behave in traditional ways. (p. 23)

Rhode, et al. are suggesting, in other words, that H.R.A. can only be a result, not a cause; that it can only be regarded as an end result, not as an intervening variable which would have some influence on end results. There does not appear to be any necessary reason for this reversal; certainly, no justification for it appears in the work of Rhode, et al.

Within the actual limits set by problems relating to measurement mentioned by these critics, it would therefore be reasonable to suggest that H.R.A. might, at least partially, serve two functions. First, in a qualitative and rudimentary way, by putting sharp increases or decreases in staff turnover, sharp increases or decreases in staff development budgets, significant changes in the type and number of interventions by regulatory bodies such as employment standards divisions, labour boards, or the courts into a larger, more meaningful perspective, it would serve to alert management, staff, and boards of directors that there may be a problem.

Secondly, narrowly defined quantitative measures would enable decision makers to utilize accounting procedures to examine much smaller units of an organization for indications of what solutions may be appropriate for a specific problem. This usage might not be practical until further refinements have been made in accounting

definitions and procedures, although progress would appear to have been made recently. Lawler cites studies that have included actual costing and which have reported finding that often an organization must spend five or more times the monthly salary of an employee when it must replace him (1977, p. 169). The cost of employee turnover to clients is perhaps even greater. The only research evidence this writer could find was indirect, but perhaps not without value. In a study of the relationship between work load and errors in eligibility determination in a financial agency, Baker and Vosburgh found a relationship between reduction in the number of errors and increases in the number of social workers hired two years previously (1977, pp. 165-167). Much of what social workers do is much less tangible and much more difficult to judge as correct or incorrect than determination of eligibility for financial services, and is probably correspondingly more difficult to do "correctly". If, on the basis of the study by Baker and Vosburgh, one takes the position that it will be two years before a social worker is practicing in a relatively error free manner, the importance of keeping staff turnover as low as possible becomes readily apparent.

#### Burnout

There is a further consideration of particular importance to social service organizations which is directly affected by having staff with greater versatility; the problem of staff burnout. Burnout is defined by Daley as "...a reaction to job related stress that varies in nature with the intensity and duration of the stress itself" (1979, p. 375). Maslach characterizes its manifestations as occurring when the affected individual either resurrects job related stress at home or when he begins to make a sharp distinction between personal life and

work, distancing himself from clients by spending less time and working less intensely with them, and by stereotyping situations and going "by the book"; becoming a petty bureaucrat (1976, pp. 16-18). Freudenberger has written often on the subject.<sup>4</sup> Freudenberger points out that people working in what he calls alternative institutions must fight a battle on three fronts, which tends to induce burnout fairly quickly in comparison to what might happen in traditional business settings. Staff must contend with the ills of society, with the needs of the clientele, and with their own personality needs (1975, p. 73). (The writer would maintain that the same factors would be operative in most social service agencies.) In other respects, Freudenberger defines the problem much as Daley and Maslach have done. Pines and Kafrey elaborate on the relationship between the last two of the three fronts mentioned by Freudenberger, pointing out that the social service professions have as a major component the provision of help to others through the disciplined use of oneself; that in contrast to social relationships, where the giving is basically reciprocal, or in business or manufacturing enterprises where the major focus is on a more concrete entity which is made, sold or serviced, the giver of social services is giving of oneself, and replenishment becomes a major problem (1978, pp. 499-500, p. 504). Anne Minihan, editor in chief of the journal Social Work, adds two other factors: social workers' inability to realize their objectives, and their "...belief that they lack control over their own activities and the operation of their workplace" (1980, p. 87).

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<sup>4</sup> He seems to have a penchant for quoting himself. In one article, (1975) he cites six works. All were written by himself.

[*Italics in original.*] Especially in their perceived lack of control over their own activities, she asserts, they are much like their clients, and suffer from the same feelings of hopelessness (p. 87).

There is a surprising amount of unity among writers on the subject when suggestions for amelioration of the problem are made. Kadushin states, "The supervisor can supportively help to reduce stress impinging on the worker or remove the worker temporarily from a stressful situation" (1976, p. 222). Freudenberger suggests ten preventive measures, ranging from better screening when hiring staff in the first place, rotating functions so that every person will occasionally have a change, and limiting overtime, to encouraging people to get more exercise (1975, pp. 80-81). Maslach recommends regular vacations, physical exercise, and cites research she did which shows the importance of low staff client ratios. Of critical importance, she asserts, is the provision for what she calls "time-outs". These are not coffee breaks, but rather opportunities for the professional worker to choose less stressful work on a voluntary basis while other staff take over for awhile. If this is done on a planned basis, Maslach asserts, it does not come at the cost of service to clients, and therefore does not have the negative connotations of escapism. Maslach found that "time-outs were possible in well-staffed agencies that had shared work responsibilities, flexible work policies, and, most importantly, a variety of job tasks for each professional, rather than just a single one" (1976, p. 20). Maslach, in her treatment of the question of hours of work, ties it to this last point; staff whose duties were solely concerned with services to clients were more prone to burnout than were

administrative personnel, regardless of the length of the work day. She suggests that this is why many people return to school for more training; so that direct contact with clients will be limited, and they won't be in a position where they will be "...forced to become callous in order to stay sane" (p. 20). A better method of handling this problem, she submits, would be to structure jobs so that there would be a wider variety of work responsibilities, and more access of staff to support groups; formal or informal groups where problems can be discussed, ideas can be exchanged, and stresses shared (p. 20).

Pines and Kafry did research on what they term "occupational tedium", which is defined as "...a general experience of physical, emotional, and attitudinal exhaustion. The experience is characterized by feelings of strain and 'burnout', by emotional as well as physical depletion, and by negation of one's self and one's environment" (1978, p. 499). "Tedium" would actually seem a rather mild word to use in this context. Of particular importance for this thesis were their findings from a sample of 129 social service professionals in the areas of external work characteristics, or properties of the work environment, and organizational variables, or the quality requirements of the job. External work characteristics included work relations, or how well an individual gets along with others on the job, work sharing, or sharing of responsibilities via mechanisms such as peer counselling, shared caseloads, and teamwork, support, which an individual could expect to receive from someone else in the organization in times of difficulty, time out, as defined by Maslach, above, and social feedback, which relates to the quality of support in one's environment and particularly to the sense of achievement and meaning

derived from one's work; it would be provided by colleagues and supervisors. Organizational variables included caseload size, job level, and work schedule. Satisfaction with pay was also included in this category (1978, pp. 501-503). All five of the external work characteristics were negatively correlated with tedium, at the .05 level. Caseload was positively and significantly correlated with tedium. Homemakers and supervisors had higher job satisfaction, while social workers, (the middle group in the job level question,) had the greatest tedium, largely because they had the most administrative and paper work to do. (This was elicited via the work schedule question.) Pay was not significantly related to tedium (pp. 503-506).

On the basis of these findings, it is possible to suggest that it would be particularly valuable to have versatile staff in a social service agency; that in addition to the greater flexibility they would impart to the agency, they would benefit the agency and themselves by being better able to cope with the perennial problem of burnout, a problem that is already seen as a costly one. If H.R.A. methods were utilized, and the full scope of the problem become known, it would be recognized as even more costly. If a social service agency with worker participation in management could run at all efficiently, it would, if H.R.A. techniques were used when comparing it to a conventional agency assessed by the same yardstick, provide cheaper service, because of its greater adaptability and greater resistance of its staff to burnout.

At the risk of belaboring the obvious, the writer would point out the connection between the work-labour distinction and the methods of reducing burnout. The conditions that lead to burnout are those which are similar to those which constitute labour; seeing one client after

another, performing the same limited range of functions with or for each one because the social worker is constrained by one or more of several considerations such as budgetary restraints, agency mandate or excessive workload. The client does not usually express gratitude; there is usually no reason for the client to feel grateful, as clients must often fight for even limited service. Those who genuinely feel grateful for what little they receive must be very deprived indeed.

If the workload is restructured so that burnout is less likely to occur, we find ourselves looking at conditions much closer to those which constitute work; clients are still seen, but not in an endless stream. There are other jobs staff can perform which, even though they are demanding in their own right, constitute a change. This enables staff to keep their work in better perspective. Work done under these conditions will have a much higher potential for being regarded by both client and worker as meaningful. Under such conditions the psychological rewards inherent in doing a good job become operative. When this is the case, the worker-client relationship will not be so one-sided, and clients will more often be in a position to express gratitude. Even when that doesn't happen, however, there will still be more supports available from the work place; from other staff.

This chapter began with a review of the concept of citizenship as it applies to political jurisdictions. It was seen to be a concept with potential for application to organizations.

In view of the often pessimistic evaluation of the potential for the productive involvement of citizens, works by two well known and reputable scholars were examined, works which were not particularly optimistic in their outlook with respect to the potential for truly



democratic institutions to occur. It was shown that a careful examination, with appropriate consideration for the perspectives of the authors, allowed room for optimism; that if there is an iron law of oligarchy, there must also be an iron law of democracy.

Organizational citizenship was suggested as the best approach to furthering these democratic potentialities, although not an approach without problems, which were characterized as being unanticipated costs in terms of performance and limitations on adaptability. It was shown that if anything, adaptability would be enhanced, and that if a complete accounting were made, through some form of Human Resource Accounting which would include staff training and turnover costs, and credit the organization with the resulting assets, there would be no a priori justification for such assertions.

Burnout in social service agencies was examined, and tactics for reducing it enumerated. It was suggested that some of them, such as having a wider variety of jobs for each worker to do, and "time-outs", when changes in job responsibility would occur, are congruent with the work aspect of the work-labour dichotomy. If, in addition, administrative tasks were used to provide greater work variety, more versatile staff would be developed, and turnover could be reduced. H.R.A. would show this as a credit to the organization.

## CHAPTER FOUR

Power, Knowledge, and Values; Their Roles in Decision Making

One of the questions raised when efficiency is considered is that of how decisions are made. This chapter is a consideration of decision making. Decision making is critically affected by the power relationships in an organization. It is also influenced, hopefully, by the kinds and amount of information available. The role of values is directly related to the choices that are made about information and how it is used, although that relationship is not always recognized. The first of these closely related subjects to be addressed is that of power.

## Power

Max Weber defined "power" (or, in German, "Macht",) as "...the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests" (1968, p. 53). "Domination" or "authority", (in German, "Herrschaft"), is the probability that a command with a given specific context will be obeyed by a given group of persons (p. 53).<sup>1</sup>

Power is tied to the individual, or the personality of the individual, while authority is associated with social

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<sup>1</sup> There seems to be no single English word which adequately conveys the meaning. Parsons at one point recommended "imperative

positions or roles. Dahrendorf suggests that authority could be thought of as legitimate power (1959, p. 166). This formulation implies that it is a one way street, that power originates at the top and filters down. To a certain extent, this is the case, particularly in instances that are examined over the short run, without regard to long term considerations. Over longer periods of time, and over short periods of time if the analysis is done carefully enough, it will be found that there are reciprocal aspects of power. Aristotle noted that if the master does not adequately look after the slave, and the slave perishes as a result, the master perishes with him (1278b.)<sup>2</sup>

In their study of the phenomenon, Lasswell and Kaplan define power as "...participation in the making of decisions" (1950, p. 75). They conclude that power is a deference value; that when one has power one is considered by others when they are planning activities. They identify three aspects of power: weight, the degree of participation in decision making, scope, the values controlled, and domain, those persons over whom power is exercised (p. 77). Neither objects nor ideas constitute power by themselves. Power comes into

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control," and later went on record as favoring "leadership". "Domination" stresses the context in which a leader has power over his followers, while Weber was, in most instances, concerned with legitimation. Roth and Wittich choose to use "Domination" when concerned with the force aspects of the concept, and "Authority" when concerned with the legitimacy aspects (Weber, 1968, pp. 61-62). It may be worth noting at this point that Weber, too, is talking in terms of probabilities.

<sup>2</sup> Again, it should be noted that this was the ideal, and that departures from it were common. There does not appear to have been any legislation setting out minimum standards for treatment of slaves, and the life expectancy of slaves in the Greek silver mines was about eighteen months.

existence only when others value something one controls access to enough so that they are willing to obey one's orders in return (p. 77).

This formulation makes the origin of power explicit, and allows a fuller consideration of its implications. It makes it possible to distinguish "...between power as a value and the values over which power is being exercised" (p. 77). One may have power over wealth, or economic power, without being wealthy. The separation of ownership and control in an industrial setting is an example of this. It answers more explicitly the question of what can happen to someone who resists the exercise of power, or to someone who, for whatever reasons, fails to comply adequately; i.e., sanctions of varying severity, depending on the seriousness of the failure to comply (p. 76). Thus, in most political jurisdictions the failure to pay a parking ticket is not grounds for capital punishment, and in most economic jurisdictions, dismissal or blacklisting, which are in some ways economic analogs to capital punishment, are not usually invoked when a file is lost or misplaced, or when constructive criticisms of administrative practices are made. Lesser penalties, more in keeping with the actual seriousness of the offence, are used. These penalties would be determined by weighing the probabilities mentioned by Max Weber, in at least an implicit way, to determine what sanctions, in addition to pre-existing norms and loyalties, will be necessary to raise the probabilities of compliance to an acceptable level. It allows for explicit consideration of the limits of power and the division of power.

Power can be limited by the power of others, by technical factors, and by social order considerations (Lasswell and Kaplan, p. 95). Thus,

technical factors such as limits on transportation capacity and limitations on speed and reliability of communications have played important roles in military campaigns in the past. Social order considerations are related to those entities or institutions that are commonly regarded as legitimately beyond the scope of interaction. Our society considers freedom of religion to be such a consideration, within certain fairly specific limits, such as one wife per husband. Similarly, we concur with Prime Minister Trudeau's statement that the "... state has no place in the bedrooms of the nation.", provided that one's sexual proclivities do not run to homicide. Finally, it allows for the consideration of the role of consent in power relationships. "Coercion by consent" is perhaps verbally a paradox, but this concept does allow for consideration of the perspective of the person over whom power is being exercised. In anything but naked power, there is an element of choice involved.

Laws are enforced by deprivations of life or liberty: the element of coercion is certainly present, and we speak therefore of power, not merely influence, of the legislator and magistrate. Nevertheless, that there be laws (and even these particular laws), and that the laws be enforced, may well be a matter of general consent. (p. 99)

Lasswell and Kaplan assert that maintenance of power in the domain in question depends on adherence to the doctrines that legitimate the power (p. 121). They are primarily concerned with the political

domain, and cited three authors to make their point.<sup>3</sup>

In the political arena, especially in the western world, there are a number of competing factions. Their views may be only slightly different, but each wants power, and at least the appearance of legitimate rule will be adhered to. There will, of course, be exceptions, such as the involvement of the CIA in domestic affairs in the U.S., or mail openings by the RCMP. These situations, once they become known, will usually be rectified; by amending the legislation if by no other means.

In the economic realm, particularly in the private sector, there also will be competing firms and the appearance of legitimacy. As well, there will be price fixing schemes and occurrences such as the recent Love Canal incident with the Hooker Chemical Company.

In social service organizations there are not quite as many constraints. Such organizations tend to be monopolistic; often the only way one can be served by a different agency is to move to its catchment area. Boards of directors typically do not have a great amount of expertise in the kinds of services given by their agencies. Social work staff perceive themselves to be bound by professional codes of ethics which often have within them an emphasis on confidentiality and a corresponding emphasis on resolving problems that may arise within the boundaries of the organization. Those codes of ethics do

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<sup>3</sup> "No power could stand if it relied on violence alone, for force is not strong enough to maintain itself...." Mirriam

"The strongest man is never strong enough to be always master...." Rousseau

"Even the tyrant must sleep."

Hobbes (p. 121)

not govern the profession, however, because they are not binding on the individuals practicing that profession, nor are they binding on the employing agency. The potential exists for a legitimate emphasis on confidentiality to be turned into a conspiracy of silence.<sup>4</sup> Services are often "free", or on a "token fee" basis, which tends to remove an avenue for the expression of dissatisfaction by clientele that is normally available in the economic sphere.

This is not to say that all social service organizations are examples of naked power. Most of them are led and staffed by people who have their own internalized standards of what constitutes appropriate behavior, and do the best they can with the often very limited resources available. There are not as many checks and controls as exist in most other forms of enterprise, however, and the head of a social service organization can choose the sources of information being

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<sup>4</sup> The situation in Manitoba with respect to social workers is as follows: social workers who wish to may join the Manitoba Institute of Registered Social Workers, which was incorporated under an act of the legislature. That act, unfortunately, has virtually no power to govern the practice of the profession. If a member is found to have acted unethically, he may be suspended or expelled from the MIRS. His employer is not obligated to fire him, and he can still call himself a social worker, though not a "registered social worker". In contrast, physicians or lawyers, in order to practice their professions, must be members in good standing of their respective professional bodies (Jewers, C.C.J., 1979, pp. 5-6).

This situation acts in two ways. Because the MIRS cannot govern the conduct of social work practitioners, it has a corresponding inability to govern the conduct of agencies. One large social service agency in the province has taken advantage of that fact by implementing a directive that any items appearing in its weekly bulletin, which sets out procedures and policies, are not to be divulged to non-employees, on pain of dismissal. A client can no longer be assured of finding out what guidelines are being used in his particular situation, let alone how they are being interpreted, and the MIRS has no power to change the situation (personal communication from a necessarily confidential source).

received at will. Accountability becomes rather attenuated in these circumstances. This poses inherent limitations on organizational flexibility, as well. In such situations, power considerations tend to over-ride interests of principle, not because the power holder has become corrupt, but because it becomes difficult after awhile to separate the two (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950, p. 147). This point is important in the context of this thesis, because it is one of the mechanisms that operates to produce a phenomenon that many people have noticed; those who have been excluded from a share in the power have also been excluded from a share of the benefits (p. 96). Aristotle commented on another, somewhat more direct and wilful mechanism that property owners employed in his time, which achieved the same end.

For the stronger they are, the more power they claim, and having this object in view, they themselves select those of the other classes who are to be admitted to the government; but, not being as yet strong enough to rule without the law, they make the law represent their wishes. (1293a)

Anatole France reportedly observed that, "The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, or steal bread" (Lasswell and Kaplan, p. 129).

Power in organizations is not a zero sum concept; the total amount of power can vary in response to other factors. Tannenbaum, who operationalizes the concept of "power" as the "amount of control in an organization", cites evidence of this from studies he has done in unions and in industrial settings. He suggests that when there is broader participation in decision making in an organization, the total amount of control is increased because it has become part of many more of the face to face interactions that exist, rather than existing solely in the formal chain of command (1966, p. 96-97, 99-100). Guest



and Fatchett note that when workers become involved in task performance decisions, organizational goals will be accepted more readily (1974, p. 16). This is not the most usual way of viewing power, but it is in keeping with the definition made by Laswell and Kaplan, however, and is completely compatible with Weber's definition as well. The relationship was characterized by Jaques as paradoxical.

With democratic mechanisms through which all members are enfranchised, in the sense of having a say in policy, the authority of those in managerial roles is both questioned and yet upheld by those whom they control. The more far-reaching the control exercised by the consultative system, the more complete the authority invested in the executive system. (1951, p. 263)

Caplow has examined both the benefits and the dangers that may arise as a result of this paradox (1964, p. 156-159).

That this paradox exists in the real world, and is not the result of only theoretical considerations, was made abundantly clear to this writer by Denhardt. His findings reflected the "workings" of the paradox, but he published his study without ever "discovering" the paradoxical nature of the concept of "authority". In order to explore the question of the interrelationships between the organization and the individual, Denhardt tested two hypotheses: "...that more open styles of organizational leadership will result in increased worker involvement, especially as measured in terms of perceived personal fulfillment", and that "...workers exposed to more 'democratic' forms of management will prove to be socialized in the direction of greater deference to organizational authority" (1970, p. 173). Both hypotheses were confirmed. Worth noting is the fact that the deference to authority question was posed in the context of "...respect for legitimate authority..." in the organization (pp. 174-178). Denhardt then turns

the meaning of the second hypothesis completely around, stating, "This statistically significant relationship tends to support a conclusion that persons working under newer forms of administration are not primarily taught the value of democratic participation, but are in fact made more deferent to organizational authority. The result is apparently simply a potentially more obedient citizen of organization" (p. 178). He concludes, "Once again, the real winner is not the employee, but rather the organization, not the individual, but the group" (p. 179).

Denhardt, failing to recognize the paradox, succumbs to the metaphysical pathos of the incomprehensible, stating that his findings "... suggest that the dilemma of personality and organization can never be fully resolved as long as our vision is restricted to the study of organizations in preference to the study of man" (p. 179). (Shades of Alexander Pope!). The key to the resolution of Denhardt's difficulty lies in the way the question of deference to authority was posed. Instead of defining "deference" in the context of legitimate authority, measuring it in that context, and then applying the results to a preconceived scheme in which organizational authority stems from somewhere "out there", two realizations must be made. Most individuals are likely to regard themselves as a "legitimate authority" to which deference is in order. An employee who honestly believes that he has participated in making a decision, and who concurs with that decision, will have much more faith in the validity of that decision and will be quite likely to carry it out. That is what democracy is all about. Secondly, persons working in such a situation will already be working within a context of democratic participation, and will therefore be more

deferential to organizational authority, i.e., themselves. That is the reason for the paradox. The authority, or, in the terminology of Lasswell and Kaplan, the power, is diffused throughout the organization and is consequently seen to be legitimate power, with the result that fewer organizational resources must be used to ensure compliance.

The significance of this point cannot be over-emphasized. People with a direct stake in the outcome will work more efficiently than those with none. The lack of such an investment is what gives rise to the often-heard phrase, "I don't know, I just work here."

Certainly, one must be careful to distinguish genuine and significant participation from what Mulder terms "false participation", the delusion of imagining oneself to be significantly involved in decision making on matters long since decided by others. The danger of false participation is that most people are smart enough to figure out fairly quickly what is going on, and will be reluctant to contribute in other potentially useful ways in the future (1971, p. 36). Lawrence writes of a visit to a plant where an engineer confided that his "trick" worked every time. Into a proposed plan he was presenting he would place a fairly obvious error. Someone would catch the error, the engineer would immediately accept the correction, and the group, pleased to have "participated", would end up accepting the whole package. Lawrence found out later, after further investigation, that many of the engineer's colleagues did not trust him, and that there was subtle, but nevertheless real and entrenched resistance to the man's ideas. Genuine participation, Lawrence concludes, "... is based on respect" (1969, p. 174).

Education also plays an important role in defining the nature and

distribution of power. Mulder cites Brockmeyer's 1968 research to the effect that 90 per cent of active participants in workers' councils in Yugoslavia were specialists with higher education (1971, p. 33). Blumberg finds that Yugoslavian employees with more education and skill are more likely to be participants in workers' management than their less skilled, less educated counterparts (1973, p. 227). Garson states that better educated workers "... are more interested and competent in democratic work organizations" (1974, p. 12). Guest and Fatchett report a similar pattern in the United Kingdom (1974, pp. 204-205). Not surprisingly, Hage and Aiken, in their analysis of the distribution of power as they measured it in sixteen health and welfare organizations in the United States noted a positive correlation, ( $r=.68$ ), between highly trained staff and "... wide participation in decision making" (1967, p. 84).

As most staff presumably acquire the bulk of their education before joining their respective organizations, any arguments of causation would be more plausible if made in the direction that education has the effect of increasing the capability of staff to participate in management, rather than the reverse.

These thoughts are presented, not because of an elitist bias on the part of the writer, but because if a start in participatory management is to be made somewhere, it makes sense to choose an organization where it is more likely to succeed--or fail--on its merits rather than because of extraneous factors. One characteristic that it would appear useful to select for would be relatively high levels of education of front line staff. Social service agencies would fit that requirement.

### Decision Making Strategies

No consideration of power can be completed without mentioning decision making theory, which deals with the roles of values, knowledge and power in planning.

The traditional view of rational man (or economic man if money is the standard unit of measurement being considered,) is that when enough information has been acquired, it will be possible to make the "best" decision, and that such a decision can be confirmed by someone else acting as an independent observer. Such a view has at least two major problems. The most basic problem is that there are limits to reason, as pointed out in chapter one. The secondary, but still monumental other problem is that it is beyond the capacity of a human, or any group of humans, to comprehend all the data that could actually be collected on the alternatives to any major decision. Hoos has documented the manifestations of this problem in the social services. Much of Hoos' work in this area was done in California in the late sixties, a time when the aerospace firms had a lot of unused computer time. They began doing consultation work for the social services sector, collecting and processing massive amounts of information, which only served to cloud issues and alternatives to the point of complete incomprehensibility. Typically, the result of any given study was the generation of so much data that another study was recommended to clarify and sort out which data were of greater significance on the basis of still more information. The only problem actually solved was what to do about the unused computer time (1969, pp. 47,51, and 1972, p. 152). Simon calls this second point the **principle of bounded rationality**:

The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world--or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality. (1957 p. 198)

Indeed, as Simon points out, if the future were predictable and people were completely rational, organizations of any sort would not be necessary (p. 199).

One of the first propositions to take into account the weaknesses of rationalism was incrementalism, or "muddling-through." This view seems to be more accurately viewed as a strategy than a theory, and seems to have originated in actual practice and was only labelled afterwards. Instead of attempting a comprehensive survey and an exhaustive evaluation of all information, only alternatives which differ in minor ways from existing policy are considered, and deciding on means for implementing policies is a similarly truncated exercise. Its chief claim to fame is that it works, at least in some aspects, and was probably used in an implicit way long before it was ever described systematically (Etzioni, 1968, p. 270). There are some important shortcomings to incrementalism, however. It is incapable of taking value considerations into account. It is locked into a close relationship with the status quo and existing centers of power, and cannot consider innovations a society may need (pp. 271-273).

Simon seems to have been one of the first theorists to look at the limits of rationality and of incrementalism. He introduced the concept of "satisficing", which involved, instead of the rationalistic goal of maximizing, merely finding a course of action that was "good enough" (1957, pp. 204-204). It does not deal explicitly with the question of values, as he was primarily interested in building models that were

capable of being utilized in computer studies. Implicit in the concept of satisficing are the ideas that values will determine the direction in which computers are instructed to look for satisficing decisions (p. 205), and that this is an area in which computer intelligence can complement human intelligence (p. 256).

Etzioni developed a "Mixed-Scanning" approach to decision making theory which combines rationalistic and incremental elements in such a way that each compensates for the weaknesses of the other. Resources to be expended in information gathering are divided into two or more categories, one for a highly detailed, rationalistic examination of certain sectors, and one for a less intensive examination of other sectors, whose importance is less direct. Based on the acquired information, fundamental decisions are periodically made about main alternatives and values, which are modified between major reviews in incremental ways as indicated by short term needs. Decisions on how to allocate resources between detailed information gathering and less detailed scanning are made on the basis of the relative importance of the two in a specific situation. All decisions except the periodic fundamental ones would be made on the basis of satisficing rather than maximizing (1968, pp. 388-390). Each of the two aspects of mixed scanning counteracts the shortcomings the other would have in isolation: "... incrementalism reduces the unrealistic aspects of rationalism by limiting the details required in fundamental decisions, and contextualizing rationalism helps to overcome the conservative slant of incrementalism by exploring longer-run alternatives" (p. 390).

The themes just examined; the unknowability of the future, man's limited rationality, and the impossibility of maximizing are found in

the real world. Noll, writing of social planning considerations of U.S. energy policy states "... we can never boil down the number of plausible future states of the world to a sufficiently small and homogeneous group that a single policy clearly dominates..." (1976, p. 269). As a result of this and other uncertainties in the world, he suggests that "... one should not expect any decision-making process to be identifiably optimal" (p. 271). White, in researching the usefulness of economic models for specifying the conditions under which citizen involvement in politics will occur, ends her essay with the conclusion that, "... economic models are most valuable in serving a diagnostic function, and any substantive changes in our collective life will emerge from elsewhere" (1976, p. 276). Mintzberg, reviewing some of Simon's more recent work, mentions a distinct lack of progress in using computer based information handling procedures in what are known as "nonprogrammed decisions" (judgement decisions). Optimization techniques in decision making are still at much the same level they were in Simon's 1960 treatment of the same problem, notwithstanding significant improvements in computer technology and capacity over the last twenty years (Mintzberg, 1977, pp. 345-345).

The literature on computers in social work and social service agencies would seem to be an area that would demand some consideration of the questions of limited rationality, the unknowability of future events, the role of probability theories in several areas of social work such as direct services and program development, and the impossibility of maximization. Boyd, et. al., in a review of the literature on computer technology in social work, never even hint that these issues are raised (1978, pp. 368-371). Schoech and Arangio,



discussing the increasing convergence of the fields of computer technology and human service, avoid the issue entirely. That their failure to discuss these issues is characterized by this writer as "avoidance" rather than "omission" is intentional, as they had an ideal opportunity to at least mention it in the context of their summary of what computers are actually capable of. After brief commentary under the heading "Diagnosis" comes the heading of "Therapy and Counselling", under which is found the following: "... individuals with thoughts of suicide were interviewed by a computer, which was able to predict suicide attempts more accurately ( $p < .01$ ) than experienced clinicians" (1979, p. 98). Therapy involves the making of judgements on less than perfect knowledge, of managing as best as one can with what is available; of satisficing, as opposed to optimizing. Surely, if there were ever an ideal place to begin the discussion, this would be it. The critical reader will by now have realized that the words quoted above do not actually belong under the heading selected by Schoech and Arangio. Instead they should be placed under the heading of "Diagnosis." Therapy and counselling, as they are commonly understood, would refer, not to prediction, but to the activities one would engage in to keep the prediction, (or diagnosis), of suicide from coming true. Jaffe, describing a study of child placement decisions made by computer, seems to implicitly recognize the issue, as his first paragraph is devoted to skirting it. He borrows a definition of social work offered by Greenwood in 1955, which characterizes social work as a technology (rather than a science or an art or a combination of the two), of "... trying to achieve controlled changes in natural relationships via relatively standardized procedures which are scientifically based" (1979, p. 380).

He concludes by offering his belief that science, technology, and art can be synthesized, but does not offer any suggestions on how it can be done or what the result would look like (p. 384). Of the three subjects, limited rationality, the unknowability of future events, and the role of probability theory in social work, only one, limited rationality, was mentioned in the "Special Issue on Conceptual Frameworks" of Social Work (Sept, 1977). It reprints a working definition of social work practice from 1958, which mentions that "... knowledge of man is never final or absolute ..." (Brieland, 1977, p. 344). It does not mention why.

This writer was able to locate only one work that dealt at all with the question of probability theory in social service organizations (Miller and Pruger, 1977). It utilizes microeconomic theory considerations to show what benefits social work can gain from microeconomic production theory (p. 171). They assert that the relationships between workers' actions and the results of those actions are probabilistic, rather than deterministic, and that "... it will always be that way" (p. 175). The focus of the Muller and Pruger article is elsewhere, so they do not show why this is the case. The situation they describe in their article is an ideal one to use for the explanation, however. Because social service organizations are complex places, Miller and Pruger must introduce certain simplifications to make calculation of their proposed measure of productivity possible. Among the simplifications introduced are several that anyone who has ever practiced social work would find amusing:

- (1) "... a state of harmony prevails over the agency."
- (2) "... every direct service worker diagnoses and treats any

given client in exactly the same way.

- (3) all "... direct service workers are technologically competent...."
- (4) ignore the "... eligibility determination process, coordination between units, referrals, and the registering of demands by clients" (pp. 173-175).

All of these assumptions are made so that the model will be simple enough to allow calculations to be made. In the process of doing so, the simplifications create obvious inaccuracies. If the simplifications are reduced or removed, the calculations become more complex, and errors of measurement (such as errors in measuring differences between workers, errors in measuring the amount of dissonance in agencies,) are introduced. Also to be considered are changes in the values caused by the very act of measuring. If, for example, one is measuring dissonance in the agency, there are two possible ways of doing it. One way would be to devise a method that would measure it indirectly (introducing unknown variations in the results), or it could be done directly, by observing (which would cause changes in behavior) or by asking questions of people. Assuming (which is dangerous) that people answer honestly, it might be the case that the very act of asking about dissonance brings up long forgotten problems, and the level of dissonance will be increased. It might also be the case that individuals given a chance to discuss dissonance will seize the opportunity to get it "off their chest," and a lessening of the dissonance will occur.

While it will undoubtedly become possible to make calculations that are more accurate than those discussed by Miller and Pruger, there will ultimately be a limit to the accuracy of those calculations. A point

will be reached where the very act of measuring one or another of the variables along one dimension will cause unpredictable changes of the variable in question along that dimension or another dimension. Beyond this point, probability theory will be the only available method of handling data and making predictions at the lowest levels of consideration in the social sciences, individual behavior and behavior of small groups. The writer has never seen this mentioned explicitly in the social work literature. It is the implicit basis, nevertheless, for the justification of concern by social workers with social welfare considerations. Thus, Richan and Mendelsohn state, "... interventions geared to altering human functioning without any regard to altering the environment within which that functioning goes on are doomed to failure" (1973, pp. 174-175). This is analogous to the situation that exists in physics, discussed in chapter one. At the present time, one of the major problems in research in the social sciences is to devise methods to reduce changes brought about by the very act of measurement.

### Values

If an accumulation of facts is not by itself capable of generating answers, what is lacking? This writer would assert that values must also be considered. There would seem to be at least two levels at which values are important. The most familiar is probably the level which deals with social work practice and the traditional social work values such as confidentiality, client self-determination, etc. These values, and value conflicts, are of vital concern to the practice of social work. They have been addressed at length elsewhere and it is not proposed that further attention be given them here. Almost nowhere has

it been possible to find any treatment of values at a more basic level within the social work practice literature.<sup>5</sup> The question the present writer proposes to address is the question of how values are related to facts, and how both are related to knowledge and ultimately, behavior, in so far as knowledge influences organizational behavior.

It is commonly held that values interfere with facts, and that a science deals only with the latter. Social work, which must somehow come to grips with values, facts, knowledge, and behavior, has not paid much attention to logical positivism, the philosophical school responsible for the commonly held belief mentioned in the preceding chapter. Logical positivism, which began to be developed fifty to sixty years ago, was the outcome of a group of philosophers who came to be called the Vienna Circle, who wanted to radically transform philosophy as it then existed in order to be able to consider some of the then recent developments of physics, some of which were mentioned in chapter one. Indeed, without the sort of considerations that were defining characteristics of logical positivism, such as, "Algorithmic reconstruction, operational interpretation of terms, testability, [and] falsifiability of predictions ...," (All of which serve in various ways to make it possible to formulate propositions which are specific enough to be tested in the real world and rejected if they can be disproved,) twentieth century science could not have developed (Hanson, 1969, pp.

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<sup>5</sup> Social welfare policy work has recognized the role of values in policy formulation for some time. Titmuss writes about development of value framework (1968, p. 135). Pinker's treatment is in terms of normative models (1971, p. 97ff).

=57-84. Quotation is from p. 70).<sup>6</sup> Scriven put the revolutionary changes brought about by logical positivism into perspective quite clearly: "... there comes a time in the affairs of science and philosophy when nothing is so valuable as hardheadedness. Positivism brought that hardheadedness to philosophy, and perhaps to some parts of science, at a time when it was needed .... We must pay tribute to the revolutionary while avoiding the mistake of deifying his doctrine" (1969, pp. 208- 209).

There are at least three basic problems with logical positivism as it applies to the behavioral sciences: the doctrine of operationalism (which deals with putting propositions into terms which can be related to the real world), the value-free ideal of behaviorists, and deductivism (the doctrine that a proper scientific explanation of the phenomenon under consideration should consist of deductions from general empirical laws applicable under certain conditions) (Scriven, p.

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<sup>6</sup> Instead, we would still be grappling with the concept of Fitzgerald Contraction, which is similar in some ways to Einstein's prediction that objects shrink in the direction of travel at speeds approaching the speed of light, but which is defined in such a way that it is in principle (as well as in fact) impossible to test. Given the impossibility of dealing "scientifically" with such a concept, it is no surprising that other avenues were explored. Someone turned to verse with this result:

There was a young fellow named Fiske  
Whose fencing was strikingly brisk;  
So fast was his action  
Fitzgerald Contraction  
Reduced his rapier to a disc.

197).<sup>7</sup>

The doctrine of value-free science must be discussed further, however, as it is directly related to the role of values in social work. Scriven maintains that it is based, in retrospect, on four logical mistakes. The first is the assertion that the distinction made between the facts of any given case and the evaluations based on those facts could be made into a context-free distinction. Thus, it has been found that in the case of intelligence tests or olympic runners, distinctions are made between performances. The different evaluations we place on these performances cannot be reduced to an ultimate set of facts or an ultimate set of values; "... many statements which in one context clearly would be evaluational are, in another, clearly factual" (p. 199). The second mistake arose from the supposition that matters of fact (such as which kinds of medicine heal certain medical conditions) cannot be handled in such a way that judgements can be made about "... the superiority of something for someone without a kind of ineradicable subjectivity coming into the picture" (p. 200). The statement that when a certain medical treatment has been performed, good has been accomplished, "... is itself just a fact about human health, although also a value statement" (p. 200). The third mistake sometimes made was the failure to distinguish statements about moral values from value statements in general. Scriven concedes that the validation of moral

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<sup>7</sup> Scriven gives a clear, brief account of these problems, along with citations for more detailed treatments in the work cited above (pp. 198-207). Interestingly, he maintains that operationalism was not important in physics, in opposition to Hanson, *op. cit.*

statements presents special difficulties. He nevertheless maintains that the logical positivists, who generally failed to distinguish between the two kinds of statements about values, made the mistake of holding that some value claims, such as the statement that the special theory of relativity has more merit than Newtonian mechanics, could be constructed solely as an instrumental, as opposed to an ultimate, or end, factual claim, or either sort of value claim, rather than a combination fact and value statement. In so doing they have failed to realize that there is not any good way of showing that all claims are not in some way instrumental; that "ultimate facts" and "ultimate values" are both elusive. If we juxtapose the idea that a statement can be both a fact and a value, as shown immediately above, with the idea that all claims can be viewed as having instrumental aspects, it becomes necessary to either accept or reject all claims about everything because they can all somehow be put into the same category, that of claims about instrumental facts (pp. 200-201). It makes more sense to treat moral values as a separate, and much more difficult category which requires special consideration. The final mistake made regarding value-free science was the "... suggestion that value claims were not really statements at all, but simply expressions of an attitude..." (p. 201). In other words, these claims had no cognitive content or only an incidental cognitive content. Close inspection has revealed such statements themselves to be value claims. There "... is no possibility," Scriven concluded, "that the social sciences can be free of value claims in general or of moral value claims in particular, and the arguments which suggested that, for their own good they should be, were themselves metascientific value claims" (p. 201).



On close examination, it can be seen that even physical laws which are usually regarded as absolute, such as Boyle's and Pascal's laws regarding gases, or basic principles of economics, are not particularly empirical, and it is not even important whether they are or not. These laws or principles are adopted because they are informative (Scriven, p. 206). The present writer would point out that this is a good example of Simon's concept of "satisficing" at work. These principles and laws were at some point found to be close enough to the "real thing" so that it was informative to adopt them. The idea of "successive approximation," so useful in calculus, is another manifestation of the successful use of the concept of "satisficing".

Having ruled out causality in predicting outcomes in favor of probability, having determined that there is no such thing as value-free science, what remains: how do we get knowledge? The doctrine of "Verstehen theory," that empathic insight can be valuable for social scientists, has been around for a long time. Scriven suggests that it can apply to the physical scientists too (p. 201). Thus, in the physical sciences there is the example of Archimedes jumping from his bathtub, shouting "Eureka!" In the social sciences, Scriven gives the example of determining what outcomes will result from bombing a city. It is possible to predict that certain outcomes will occur, and that certain others will not. It is possible to predict that either the inhabitants will be demoralized or that they will show an increased determination to resist. It would be foolish to predict that the bombing will result in a change in the way certain words are pronounced (pp. 202-203). There are too many intervening factors to do more than give probabilities of the outcomes of demoralization or resistance.

After the fact, however, the psychologist or historian knows which result occurred, and his task is to explain why it occurred. Such an explanation is informative, which is all that is necessary for knowledge, as was suggested in the preceeding paragraph. It can be seen, then, that knowledge can be obtained by empathy, by observation, and by inference, although empathy is not completely distinct from observation or inference (p. 203).

Social science literature dealing with values and facts exists, although often it is rather implicit. Mintzberg calls it "soft data," and relates it to what happened in Vietnam. He asserts that McNamara wanted to be told about concrete facts such as the number of tons of chemicals needed to defoliate a jungle rather than the will to resist of the people involved. He suggests that hard facts were used to support military goals, while larger considerations were excluded from the analysis because they were supported only by soft data (1977, p. 348).

Social work administration literature on the relationship between facts and values and its implications for practice is rare. Steiner acknowledges the importance of values (he uses the term "value premises") in policy development, stating that prescriptive conclusions (plans) are the result of combining descriptive premises (facts) and value premises (values) (1976, p. 75). Steiner also points out, very perceptively, that when value premises are ignored, it is difficult to reach any prescriptive conclusions: that often the factor perceived to be lacking is descriptive premises, and attempts are made to obtain more and more information, of higher quality (p. 74). This would further explain why the phenomenon noted by Hoos, *op. cit.*, is such a difficult one with which to deal. Steiner ignores the interrelationship

of fact and value mentioned by Scriven.

The only work found by the present writer that dealt with the relationship between science and social work practice warrants some comment. This writer does not quarrel with Vigilante's last paragraph, which discusses humanitarian values and their influence on practice, concluding with the statement that social workers " ... must conduct extended investigations of values, but we must approach this task with a new scholarly, if not 'scientific,' seriousness, rather than with simplistic religious devotion" (1974, p. 115). Much of the rest of the article appears to be more an example of how not to conduct a scholarly investigation of anything. Vigilante begins by suggesting that social workers are "professional moralists," the "conscience of the community" (p. 107). This writer has seen little evidence of that. Vigilante then suggests that because of the hazards connected with a strong concern about values, there is a temptation to seek "... an escape route through logical positivism ..." which social workers should not accept, "... no matter how academically 'cool' (prestigious) that action may be" (pp. 107-108). He drops the theme of logical positivism at this point for a page or so, then returns to it, stating that, "Logical positivism, the objective scrutiny of available facts pointing toward factually revealed conclusions is science. Knowledge has become a value in itself, rather than knowledge for the social good" (p. 110). Nowhere is there any indication that anything but logical positivism is dominant in the scientific world, let alone the philosophical world. As has already been shown, logical positivism has been discredited on several counts. The perceptive reader will by now have wondered about the phrase, "... knowledge for the social good." Has Vigilante found a monolithic body of

knowledge somewhere that works only for social good? If so, he has saved it for another publication; it does not appear in this one. Somewhat later is found the statement, "If the nation's present moral crisis can be related to dominance of logical positivism at the expense of community values it is no surprise that social work is especially effected, given its fundamental reliance for its purpose and function on values that are not subject to 'scientific' proof" (p. 113). This writer would point out that if logical positivism rejects anything unverifiable, social work could not possibly, from Vigilante's perspective, be affected, "... given its fundamental reliance for its purpose and function on values that are not subject to 'scientific' proof" (*op. cit.*). Almost at the end of the article comes a hint that those involved in the natural sciences are turning away from logical positivism (p. 113). This should have been set out near the beginning.

The second theme mistreated by Vigilante is also related to values. It is the question of individualism and how it is related to a sense of community. Goodwin, cited in chapter one, above, also addressed this question, as did C.B. MacPherson with his notion of "possessive individualism" (1962, Chapter VI). Vigilante seems never to have found MacPherson's work, however. Vigilante states,

Goodwin concludes that "there can be no moral conduct<sup>8</sup> without community" [note that he does not say "without God". His argument is not mystical, since values are mystical]; "not only does the rise of individualism deny the values of community, it

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<sup>8</sup> Vigilante added the italics, but failed to mention that fact.

suffocates freedom, enforces an illogical effort to turn science into values--a second absurdity."<sup>9</sup> (Vigilante, 1974, p. 110)

A comparison of the preceeding with what Goodwin actually write is revealing. Goodwin wrote, "There can be no moral conduct without community. God is the creation of a collective humanity" (Goodwin, 1974b, p. 40). Notice that Goodwin does bring God into it, contrary to the assertion by Vigilante. This writer was unable to find the last half of Vigilante's alleged quote from Goodwin anywhere in the three parts of Goodwin's article. Vigilante concludes that the role of values in social work will ultimately be decided by the individual practitioner in daily practice, and by the educator in the classroom (p. 115). Let us give thanks that the values will not ultimately be determined by Vigilante's article.

This chapter began with an examination of several aspects of power. It was shown that organizational power does not have to be a monolithic entity; that it can be divided, spread, or shared. It was shown that the exercise of power is based on assessments of probabilities, and that it is limited by the power of others, by technical factors, and by social order considerations. Maintenance of power is dependent on adherence to the doctrines that legitimate that power. Power was seen not to be a zero sum concept. Power perceived as legitimate is complied with more willingly than power whose legitimacy is questionable. Evidence was cited that legitimacy is enhanced when power is perceived to be at least partly held by oneself, and that this is as true at the bottom of organizational structures as it is at the

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<sup>9</sup> Vigilante adds a footnote designation of "10" here, which cites Goodwin's January 28, 1974 article, p. 40.

top. Education apparently increases the capacity of individuals to participate meaningfully in management.

It was shown that complete knowledge is not obtainable, and that a decision making strategy that did not consider this fact would be doomed to become an endless information gathering exercise. Alternate strategies, concluding in a discussion of "Mixed Scanning" were discussed. The usefulness of probabilistic approaches when such strategies are used was discussed.

Finally, the role of values in decision making was examined, and it was seen that value free "facts" do not, and cannot, exist. There is nevertheless a way in which knowledge can be gained, through the use of *verstehen* theory, or empathic insight. The criterion for what constitutes knowledge in this circumstance is that of usefulness. One treatment of those themes found in the literature of social work was examined, and suggestions for change were made, in the light of the treatment given these themes in this thesis.

## CHAPTER FIVE

Organizations: Benefits, Goals, and Compliance

Social Service Organizations have certain peculiarities which set them apart from most other types of organizations. If the application of the concepts mentioned in the last chapter is to be efficient, development of the unique characteristics of a social service organization is necessary. Perhaps the most fruitful way to begin this process would be to examine an organizational typology that allows us to separate social service organizations from other types of organizations. Such a typology exists. It was prepared by Blau and Scott and is a classification on the basis of *cui bono* or "who benefits." This typology is then used as an aid in understanding problems of social service organizations. Compliance, a central problem, is then discussed. Finally, it is noted that several of the themes and concepts developed in this and preceeding chapters seem to have several common implications.

**Cui Bono**

The *cui bono* typology outlines four groups of people that can be identified with respect to any organization: (1) the members, or rank and file participants; (2) the owners or managers of the organization; (3) the people who, though not in the organization, are in regular contact with it, such as patients, customers, students, clients, or alleged law breakers; (4) the public-at-large, or the members of the society in which the organization operates (1962, p.

42). By identifying members of any one of these four groups as the main beneficiaries of the activity of the organization it is possible to delineate four types of organization. It is important to remember that the remaining three groups may also derive benefits from the organization, but to a lesser extent. Blau and Scott term those organizations where the membership is the primary beneficiary **mutual benefit organizations**; those where the owners or managers are the primary beneficiaries, **business concerns**; those where a client group is the primary beneficiary, **service organizations**; while those where the public-at-large is the primary beneficiary are designated as **commonweal organizations** (p. 43). Each of the four types of organization is characterized as having its own quite specific problems.

Mutual benefit associations are prone to the problem of "... maintaining internal democratic processes" (p. 43). This can be further broken down into two components, membership apathy and tendencies towards oligarchical control. Most organizations have a few very active members while the rest are characterized by various degrees of apathy. Participation tends to become limited to those few active members. In times of crisis, such as a strike by a union, the needs for flexibility and fast decision making facilitate this oligarchical tendency even though participation by rank and file members actually increases (pp. 45-47). This process does not exist in a vacuum, however. It is counter-acted, especially when the leadership of the organization is perceived to be not acting in the best interests of the membership, by the "iron law of democracy" referred to earlier, originally proposed by Gouldner (Blau and Scott, p. 48, and Gouldner,



1955, p. 506).

Business organizations are primarily concerned with "... operating efficiency--the achievement of maximum gain at minimum cost ..." (Blau and Scott, p. 49). This definition, in the opinion of the present writer, is in need of qualification. While the existence of monopolies and cartels does not negate Blau's assertion, it serves to draw attention to the fact that if maximization is sought at all, it is sought carefully. Profits can be increased by increasing output or by increasing the price per unit. Similarly, there are sectors of industry where it must be born in mind that short term gains at too high a level may trigger long term losses as the result of increased regulation. This writer would argue, with Simon, that as long as future events are unknowable, and as long as it is impossible to actually quantify each variable and calculate each contingency it is only possible to approximate an optimum outcome. Instead of optimizing or maximizing, most organizations, most of the time, pursue a path of satisficing, whether they realize it or not (Simon, 1957, p. 204). In addition, business concerns must also take into account certain externally imposed limits, such as child labour laws, or environmental regulations (Blau and Scott, p. 50).

Service organizations, including social service agencies, are instituted in such a way as to make that part of the public which is in direct contact with it the prime beneficiary. Although clients often know what they want when they approach a social service organization, they cannot be expected to know in detail what is best for them. The providers of the service are therefore obligated to act in the best interests of the client (pp. 51-52). This can become quite

complicated.<sup>1</sup> Blau and Scott point out that conflicts also occur between what clients want and what clients "need" by some "objective" standard (p. 52).<sup>2</sup>

From the standpoint of the organization, therefore, the problems in a service organization are tendencies, on one hand, for staff to become too preoccupied with the organization by either becoming overly concerned with their own careers and status or with administrative techniques which finally become ends in themselves, or, on the other hand, for staff to allow clientele the sole right to determine the nature of the service provided (Blau and Scott, p. 52). (There are some qualifications that must be made with respect to this last statement in so far as it applies to social service agencies, which will be dealt with shortly.)

Commonweal organizations usually provide protective or administrative services for a nation or sections of a nation. Examples would include taxation departments, military and police forces, and research functions (as opposed to teaching functions) of universities (p. 54). The main issue is external democratic control. The public must be able to control the ends served by such organizations. When

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<sup>1</sup> For example, if a parent is depressed and sometimes abusive towards a very small child, and claims to need the presence of the child before improvement in the depression can occur, but it is not safe for the child to be with that parent, how are the best interests of the child served? How are the best interests of the parent served? How does one decide what the "best interests" are? Which individual or group constitutes the "client"?

<sup>2</sup> Should a doctor yield to pressures and describe penicillin for a viral infection such as a cold, when there is no risk of bacterial complications? Should parents of an unruly child who approach a child welfare agency for placement of the child in a foster home be given family counselling instead?

the target group of such an organization is people, those people often find themselves excluded from the benefits provided to others by the commonweal organization. Prisoners, who are locked up for the protection of the public, for example, cannot be expected to benefit from the experience. (The situations of prisoners who are recipients of rehabilitative services would be analyzed in terms of the service organization portion of the typology) (pp. 54-57).

Several phenomena can be explained through utilization of the *cui bono* typology. By comparing the problems listed as being typical for the service organization with other categories of the typology, it can be seen that the first portion of the first problem listed for service organizations (staff being too concerned with furthering their own career and status) is analagous to the main goal of the mutual benefit association. We are not, therefore, going to be able to deal with pure types. This makes analysis more complicated, but at the same time it provides indications about where to look for problems. In this instance, identifying a problem of one type of organization as being related to the main goal of a different type of organization may also be of use in deciding where to look for a solution.

### Application of *Cui Bono*

#### To Problems of Social Service Organizations

Social service organizations are staffed with people who have spent a significant proportion of their lives acquiring the necessary education and training. They generally expect to be spending an even longer part of their lives working in such organizations. It would be

unreasonable to expect these people to not have any aspirations for their careers: if these people have been able to plan their lives sufficiently to get the education and acquire the job, they are likely to view the world as a place where at least some aspects of their lives are (or should be) susceptible to planning, to control by the individual in question. If a significant proportion of staff in an agency become preoccupied with their own careers and status, so that their organizational peers, their clients, or other members of the organization come to view it as a problem, it might also be usefully viewed as a symptom; a reaction to their perception that an appropriate degree of control over their professional lives is lacking.

It would seem reasonable to propose that the above factor is significant in the genesis of staff associations, employee associations, and in some cases, unions among such groups as nurses, teachers, social workers and ambulance attendants.<sup>4</sup>

Considerations mentioned in chapter three in connection with Human Resource Accounting, the work done by Baker and Vosburgh, and the treatment of burnout appear to be relevant in the quest for an appropriate equilibrium between the undesirable extremes of making the client group the primary beneficiary to the detriment of the staff of an organization, and of making the staff the primary beneficiary. There should be benefits to both; clients of an agency should receive at least the assistance they are entitled to from staff who are

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<sup>4</sup> In Winnipeg, ambulance attendants have been quite actively involved over the last few years in initiating standards of service and upgrading their qualifications. These activities are simultaneously (and quite clearly) related to careers and status as well as to actual service delivery.

knowledgeable, competent, and concerned. As was shown in chapter three, the way to develop, and keep, such staff is to treat them like people; to ensure that opportunities for replenishment are available, and to have some method of recognizing the increased value to the agency, and ultimately to clients, of an employee who is, and remains, knowledgeable, competent, and concerned.

The second portion of the first problem cited for service organizations, the making of administrative techniques into ends in themselves, is analagous to the main goal of business concerns. To understand this clearly, it must be kept in mind that the main goal of General Motors, for example, is to make money; a minimum of twenty percent return on investment per year. The business organization is set up solely as a mechanism to limit variability; to reduce the chances of getting into a situation where the outcome cannot be predicted (McNeil, 1978, p. 65).<sup>5</sup>

Administrative techniques produce known limitations to the potential range of responses that would otherwise have to be reviewed each time a decision is called for. On the average, the benefits to a business organization from faster reaction time and greater predictability that result from having standard operating procedures outweigh the costs in terms of the limits to flexibility that come with them (Simon, 1957, pp. 197-199). The current troubles of Chrysler show

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<sup>5</sup> Students of World War II will recall that the German division of G.M., Opel, produced tanks and trucks for the **Wehrmacht** to counter those produced by the U.S. and Canadian divisions of G.M. for the Allies. After the war, G.M. was reimbursed by the U.S. Government for bombing damage done to Opel division factories. Had Hitler won, G.M. would still have come out of the war with a profit.

what happens when this process does not work properly.

A biological analogy may set out the problem more clearly than anything else. Most people are aware of the reflex arc that exists in humans. Certain types of nerve impulses (such as those resulting from touching a hot stove) trigger a reaction as soon as they reach the spine, and it is only later, after the impulse has reached the brain, that the individual is fully aware of what was done and why. The advantage of such an arrangement is that the duration of the burn is reduced to a minimum, and there is less tissue damage. An organization, too, can respond more quickly if there are reflex arcs, or standard operating procedures. Many situations an organization will be required to deal with will have a number of common elements, will easily fit into one of a number of potential response categories, and can be handled routinely, with a report going up to the "brain" or administrative section in due course.

Complications can arise, however, which result in the reflex arc or the standard operating procedure becoming a liability. Anyone who has tried to do emergency repairs on a hot automobile engine or remove one of several items from a crowded oven is aware, perhaps acutely aware, that when rapidly extricating one's hand after touching a hot spot one may encounter a second hot spot and a second burn. In an organization, there are situations which do not fit nicely into predetermined categories, and which need individual consideration if appropriate organizational responses are to be found. This will necessarily mean that more time must be spent dealing with those situations, and they will be more costly to the organization. In a business organization the tendency would be to develop a different standard

procedure or not to handle those types of situations at all. Thus, most Ford dealers, if given the chance, will refer Volkswagen owners elsewhere for major repairs, and most social service agencies, if left to their own devices, will specialize or have specialist units or departments. This problem occurs at several levels within organizations.

At the level of clients approaching an agency, if staff are confronted with a wide variety of problems, there will be uncertainty about how to handle some cases. This, in turn, affects relationships within the organization, particularly when criteria for what constitutes a successful intervention are vague and the pressure to succeed is high. The temptation is to concentrate on the similarities a case might have with other cases, and lose sight of what might be major differences. From there it becomes a minor matter for the organization to establish categories of service. The instrumental value, using categories of problems to differentiate the types of activities required in order to give appropriate service, becomes a terminal value. Categories of services are established, and if they exclude people from service, it will be seen as regrettable, but not something that can be changed. "Displacement of goals" is the name

given by Merton to this phenomenon (1968, p. 253).<sup>6</sup>

In the relations between a social service organization and the community the displacement of goals can occur, too. The writer has not had access to instances which could be documented, so an actual illustration cannot be given. Hypothetically, however, if there were an agency where increases in funding had been at or below the level of inflation for a number of years, and where, as a result, a number of services had had to be curtailed, perhaps services such as hiring summer staff so that caseloads would not go virtually untended when regular staff went on holidays, one would expect to see the people in charge of public relations talking to the press about doing the best they could with what was available. If, instead, the public relations personnel announced a significant budgetary surplus and denied that levels of service were any lower, it might be concluded that displacement of goals had occurred: an instrumental value, spending the smallest amount of money possible consistent with (the final value of) providing service in accordance with the agency mandate, has become the

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<sup>6</sup> The classic case in Winnipeg occurs when a family on welfare has children who are taken into care by the child welfare authorities, who then proceed, as required by law, with an application for guardianship of the children in question in family court. The parents, as required by law, notify welfare of the absence of the children, and welfare, as required by law, either reduces the rent budget or closes the case and refers the remainder of the family to a different welfare program, depending on the circumstances. The parents then must move to smaller, often much smaller, quarters. At court, even if the original problem is solved, the judge is in the predicament of not having a home available to which the children can be returned. The parents are not eligible for money for larger accommodations until they actually have the children with them. Somebody must go beyond the established procedures if a resolution is to be found. Typically, a target date is set after several rounds of consultation among the judge, a prospective landlord, welfare and child welfare personnel. On that date the family budget is increased, the family moves, and the children are returned. It can be quite a stressful time.



final goal.

In the area of organizational leadership, goal displacement occurs as well. This is one of the mechanisms by which Michels' iron law of oligarchy operates. Michels, *op. cit.*, documented the process of leaders discovering the psychological gratification inherent in many aspects of leadership roles and then using the powers of office to remain in office, either by co-opting younger, ambitious members perceived as having leadership potential or by purging them.

Consideration of the problem of preoccupation with administrative concerns has resulted in consideration, from a slightly different perspective, of the concept of "the limited usefulness of rationalism" discussed in chapter four. The same chapter also dealt with alternative concepts to this concept, "satisficing" and "mixed scanning."

Application of these concepts in social service organizations facilitates a useful perspective on administrative considerations. In as much as social workers are supposed to regard each client as being unique anyway, it might be useful to conceive of each staff person as a separate "brain," which, under most circumstances, can handle a fairly wide variety of situations, and may even find challenge and stimulation in doing so. Although organizations exist because some situations are too complex or too big for any one person to handle, the function of the organizational hierarchy is often best served merely by devising an appropriate method of connecting a specific client with a specific worker. The remainder of the helping process can occur without direct inputs from the organization as a whole. Restated in terms of satisficing and mixed scanning, the argument reads as follows: certain information is useful to a social worker in working with a client.

That is why there are intake forms in most social service agencies. There is a point beyond which the cost of getting further information outweighs the benefits to be gained from that information, and a point beyond that where further information is useless, regardless of the price.

Social work is at least partly the art of being sensitive to the question of which information might be promising in helping to find and implement a solution to the presenting problem, and focusing on a few specific areas rather than using all the available time to gather more information. General information gathering behavior is curtailed when "enough" information is gathered, not when "all possible" information has been obtained. Satisficing rather than optimizing behavior has occurred; a mixed scanning approach (combining information with other aspects of the situation in order to determine a course of action) is used rather than the completely rationalistic one of gathering information endlessly in the belief that if enough information has been gathered the "solution" will present itself. There is a place in social work for discovery as well as deduction.

It is easier for an individual staff person to provide ongoing service to a client than it is for a whole organization to do so by having different staff persons involved at different times. This is one reason why individual social workers have caseloads, and why people complain of feeling fragmented, when, for example, they must deal with a series of workers. Clients tend to end up resenting being treated in assembly line fashion, and social workers who are forced to provide "service" in this way tend to burn out.

In a social service organization which is running smoothly,

preoccupation with administrative techniques will not be a problem. Such a statement is tautological, perhaps, and not useful by itself. It does, however, provide a useful diagnostic tool. If preoccupation with administrative techniques is occurring, it is likely that the organization is having problems. Given the reasons discussed for having techniques or organization in the first place, we are directed, in searching for a solution, to look at the questions of predictability and narrowing the field of alternative courses of action; the question of how decisions are made.

If a social service organization had competent staff, who are well versed in what the organization or the larger system can provide, the larger organization may not know every detail about every case as it occurs. In this respect there is uncertainty and a lack of immediate information by the larger organization about specific cases, while simultaneously it is known that regardless of how much any specific administrator knows about what specific front line personnel are doing, a good job is in all likelihood being done. (There would still be administrative checks and balances, standards of service delivery, etc.)

The alternative is to use staff to gather information which is passed up to a higher supervisory or administrative level where decisions are made, which are then passed back down, and implemented. The organization as a whole knows more about what is going on, but more time is spent gathering and transmitting information with less time available for providing direct service. Because it is physically impossible to record and transmit all existing information in any specific situation, and also impossible for an administrator to grasp

all the details of many, different, situations, the information will, of necessity, be in a summarized form. Commands, too, will be general, and will need to be elaborated on and interpreted as they proceed downwards through the hierarchy. They will often be found not to fit very well with the specific problems at hand (Patti, 1974, p. 376, and Caplow, 1964, pp. 252-253). As perceived from a position at or near the top, such an organization can appear to be a model of rationality; information about new situations is given to administrative personnel, who apply yardsticks and make decisions. As seen by first level staff and clients at the bottom of the organization, the reasoning behind any given decision may appear incomplete, perhaps capricious, because the mechanisms and criteria on the basis of which decisions are made are not understood. Having a firsthand knowledge of their own situations, rather than summarized versions, and not being able to understand why a specific decision was made, people near the bottom of the hierarchy begin to wonder whether reasoning was the process used in decision making. From such a perspective, an organization can appear to be more Kafkaesque than anything else (Canovan, 1974, p. 33). Where decisions are not understood, they are less likely to be universally accepted. In such situations it becomes necessary to have more organizational resources allocated for rule enforcement (Hage and Aiken, 1967, p. 83). This has further consequences for members of the organization as there are fewer resources left for service delivery. Zand has demonstrated that the outcome is self-reinforcing: where people in an organization do not trust each other, the types of managerial decision made, the manner in which they are made and the quality of the decisions all differ in a spiral process, which, once started, either in the

direction of greater or lesser trust among organizational members, is difficult to stop (Zand, 1972, pp. 235-36).

By juxtaposing consideration of the problem of preoccupation with administrative concerns with the treatment of the concept of the limited usefulness of rationalism in chapter four, it can be seen that while neither is susceptible to a final optimum solution, the latter concept can contribute to the resolution of the preoccupation with administrative concerns. That resolution would be one utilizing the concept of satisficing. It would, of necessity, be an ongoing process, involving new responses to changing environmental and organizational conditions at several different levels. The considerations covered in the preceeding three pages and in chapter four would suggest, however, that a willingness within the organization to accept guidance from front line staff with respect to problem solving efforts would be useful, and that a corresponding willingness to provide for fairly high levels of autonomy for front line staff in day to day work would also be beneficial.

The second problem mentioned by Blau and Scott is letting clients have "too much" control. Blau and Scott assert that "... professionals must not become 'captives' of their clientele and surrender to them the power to determine the nature of the service furnished" (p. 52). While this may be true in some organizations, it is only part of what has long been a problem in agencies in which social work is practiced. Perhaps characteristically, other parts are often stated in isolation, too, as they are in the chapter heading "Client Self-Determination" in The Casework Relationship (Biestek, 1957, p. 100). Biestek does recognize limitations in his conceptualization of the principle of

self-determination, which he defines as

. . . the practical recognition of the right and need of clients to freedom in making their own choices and decisions in the casework process. (p. 103)

Biestek points out that caseworkers have an obligation to facilitate the "right and need" for self-determination, which is nevertheless limited by the capacity of the client for appropriate decision making, by moral and civil law, and the ". . . function of the agency" (p. 103). Further complications are introduced as the number of possible priorities is increased. Billingsley reports finding four different types of orientation on the basis of reactions to six possible pairs of conflicts over four subsystems, as follows:

. . . (1) client needs vs. agency policies; (2) client needs vs. professional standards; (3) client needs vs. community expectations; (4) agency policies vs. professional standards; (5) agency policies vs. community expectations; and (6) professional standards vs. community expectations. (1964, p. 402)

Whittington proposes a set of eight "ideal types" of social worker orientation within an agency, six of which have as their focal point some aspect of client rights, client needs, client demands, client behavior, organizational requirements, or community considerations (1977, p. 76). Whittington proposes that the eight orientations are not mutually exclusive; that an individual practitioner will develop a repertoire, and will utilize various orientations depending on the situation (p. 91).

The writer does not propose any further exploration of the field of worker orientation, as it is a separate field beyond the scope of this paper. By now, however, it should be clear that the problem of worker orientation can be defined in several ways, and that there

cannot therefore be any single final resolution to this problem; the way in which the problem of who is controlling whom is being dealt with in a specific agency at a specific time will be a result of the ongoing interaction of a number of factors. Under these circumstances, predictions about specific outcomes are beyond the scope of current knowledge. *Verstehen* theory, mentioned in chapter four, would still allow for a rigorous consideration of the several elements of the problem, however.

Until this point, this chapter has consisted of an explanation of the *cui bono* typology and a consideration of problems of social service organizations outlined by Blau and Scott in terms of the goals of other types of organizations which together constitute the typology. The usefulness of the typology is demonstrated by the fact that although Blau and Scott did not propose it use for that purpose the typology can nevertheless be used in that manner. It has been shown how social service organization problems (1a) and (1b), preoccupation with one's own status and with administrative techniques, correspond to the main goals of mutual benefit associations and business concerns, and how problem (2), letting clients have "too much" control, could be construed as an analysis of service organizations in terms of the degree to which their goal of making the client the primary beneficiary of certain services is actually met, and how it is met. So far, however, there has been little mention of the fourth type of organization, commonweal organizations. A continuation of the process outlined above, the application of the main goal of commonweal organizations to social service organizations, shows that the list of problems of social service organizations given by Blau and Scott was

too short. The new problem "generated" is that of the nature of the relationship of the social service organization to the larger community, a problem recognized insofar as it applies to individual staff persons, by Billingsley and Whittington, *op. cit.* Recognition of the problem as being system wide, rather than of an individual nature, however, is an important step, as it has implications for how it can better be understood as well as for what possibilities may exist for dealing with it.

There are many similarities between social service and commonweal organizations, just as there are similarities between social service and mutual benefit associations and business organizations. Social control activities, which comprise one of the functions fulfilled by commonweal organizations, constitute a major area of overlap with many social service agencies. In addition to rehabilitation and/or preventive objectives, many social service organizations are specifically mandated to provide some form of social control. Funding patterns and levels are often such that the social control functions predominate, at the expense of treatment (Kadushin, 1976, p. 218). A comparison of similarities and differences of police and military organizations with social service agencies is therefore useful.

Planning and decision making are top level activities in military and para-military settings. Members are recruited when they are still quite young, and are put through a training period which is designed to break down old attachments and perspectives and replace them with officially sanctioned ones. The methods used are fairly widely known. Of particular interest is the fact that each police department and military organization trains its own new members. Training is seen as



being far too important to be left to an outside organization. It is deemed necessary to promote loyalty to the profession (of being a policeman or soldier) through the orientation. There is a pronounced emphasis on following orders.

There is greater variability in the degree of centralization of planning and decision making in social service organizations. Members are trained elsewhere, often at schools of social work, which are usually affiliated with universities, and join the organization only after receiving their training. The initial orientation has a greater emphasis on educational, as opposed to training, aspects, and less emphasis on resocialization. Training and education are more broadly based, often on a foundation of humanities or liberal arts courses. There is a greater emphasis on developing the ability of individual students to analyze situations and engage in decision making on other than a binary basis.<sup>7</sup> Problem solving and innovation are encouraged. There are provisions for individuals to learn in fields that are of interest to themselves.

The end result of putting a person trained in this manner into any organization will be a state of affairs where professional and bureaucratic considerations will make competing claims on an employee's loyalty (Kadushin, p. 220). There will be times when the organization will insist that clients' needs be met "... within the framework of structured approaches imposed by the agency ... even over the worker's

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<sup>7</sup> This is not intended to minimize the importance or difficulty associated with some binary decisions, such as whether or not to shoot, which people such as police officers are called upon to make, sometimes on very short notice. Such decisions are often very difficult, and the consequences can be very great.

own estimation of the needs of the client" (Billingsley, 1964, p. 403). This implies that there will be mechanisms to encourage compliance.

### Compliance

The sociological study of compliance goes back at least to Simmel (1896, pp. 167-189 and 392-415). While closely related to questions of power and authority, it has the advantage of "... taking into account the effects of the cathectic as well as the evaluative impact of directives on the orientation of the lower participants" (Etzioni, 1961, p. 16). In other words, study of the modes of compliance makes it possible to consider how people feel about doing what they are supposed to do as well as the extent to which it will be done, the latter being something covered by the study of power. This is an advantage because it allows for consideration of methods of generating compliance that are less wasteful, that consume a smaller proportion of the organizational resources, leaving a larger share for service delivery. Etzioni notes that in most organizations there are a number of inherent psychological gratifications for members occupying higher positions in the hierarchy, and proposes, therefore, that a study of compliance will be most informative if it deals with questions of organizational control among the "lower" participants, people designated as customers, clients, inmates, employees, etc. (pp. 16-17).

Etzioni suggests that the compliance relationship is the combined result of the power applied by the organization to lower participants and the involvement by the lower participants in the organization (p.

12). Power is characterized as being of three types:<sup>8</sup>

Coercive power, which is based on the use of force or the threat of force;

Remunerative power, which is based on control over material resources and fringe benefits;

Normative power, which rests on the "... allocation and manipulation of symbolic rewards and deprivations ..." (p. 5).

Involvement in the organization is characterized as also having three dimensions:

Alienative involvement, the term used by Etzioni to designate the state of having intense negative feelings regarding one's involvement with the organization. It is the attitude typically found among prisoners of war and inmates of prisons (p. 10). The writer shall use the phrase "Intense Negative Involvement" when referring to this type of involvement with an organization.<sup>9</sup>

Calculative Involvement, which refers to either a negative or

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<sup>8</sup> It should be noted that Etzioni's definition of power is compatible with that of Lasswell and Kaplan, used in the preceeding chapter.

<sup>9</sup> Etzioni intentionally used the term "Alienative Involvement" to utilize the associations it was imbued with during and since the time of Marx (Etzioni, 1961, p. 9). Because there are so many associations that have developed since Marx's time, and because Marx himself used the term to refer to no less than four aspects of a phenomenon, it would be more precise to avoid use of the term here. To do otherwise would be to acquiesce in (depending on whether one feels Etzioni is being obscure or profound) one of the first two types of Metaphysical Pathos referred to in the introduction.

positive orientation that is of low intensity. Such an orientation is characteristic, for example, of the relationship between merchants who have ongoing business contacts.

Moral Involvement, which "... designates a positive orientation of high intensity" (p. 10). Such an orientation is characteristic of a committed church member, or an enthusiastic member of a political party. The term refers to the orientation of an individual in relation to the organization. It does not refer to the evaluation of the propriety of actions by an observer (p. 10).

By considering power applied to lower participants and the type of involvement of those lower participants together, it is possible to generate nine theoretical forms of compliance.

		INVOLVEMENT		
P O W E R		Intense Negative	Calculative	Moral
	Coercive	1	2	3
	Remunerative	4	5	6
	Normative	7	8	9

(Etzioni, 1961, p. 12)

The nine theoretical types will not appear with equal frequency, however. It would be clearly wasteful to use coercive power on a dedicated member of a research team. Such a practice would not only necessitate wasteful use of organizational resources, it would quickly create a situation of intense negative involvement which would in turn necessitate continuation of the practice. The situations of the six

blocks other than blocks 1, 5 and 9 are all similarly incongruent (p. 13). Although they will sometimes be found, they will generally be transitional. The more effective types are the three congruent types, in blocks 1, 5, and 9, which Etzioni terms "coercive," "utilitarian," and "normative," respectively (p. 14).

Provision is also made in Etzioni's analytical classification for organizations to have dual compliance structures in which the primary compliance structure can be supplemented by a secondary one, or in which two compliance structures can alternate over time (pp. 40-41). Thus, professional organizations are characterized as having mainly normative controls with utilitarian compliance structures of a secondary nature: if a professional's training and socialization do not ultimately shape his pattern of compliance in the proper way, his license to practice is suspended (p. 51). In a public school, the predominant normative compliance pattern is buttressed by coercive compliance activities in the form of corporal punishment (p. 45). In either case, if excessive use is made of the secondary mode of ensuring compliance, the organization is distracted from its main task, and organizational effectiveness will be lower (p. 77-86).

Etzioni asserts that there are three combinations of organizational goal and compliance structure which are effective; organizations which serve order goals tend to have coercive compliance structures, organizations with economic goals tend to have utilitarian compliance structures, and organizations which serve cultural goals will tend to have normative compliance structures (p. 87). Organizations which have order goals, but which are prohibited from using coercive compliance structures, such as social service agencies, will

be subject to "strain" toward a congruent type (pp. 86-88).

Socialization into the organization would appear to be one mechanism that facilitates the development of normative compliance as the congruent type in social service organizations.<sup>10</sup> It would also tend to imbue the organization with a certain resistance to change.

Social service agencies are usually not concerned with economic goals, and calculative involvement will therefore be of little use in securing compliance. Staff in such organizations also must deal with unpleasant situations that are in some ways analogous to situations faced by military organizations, although the level of physical danger is much lower. Removing children from abusive parents, turning down prospective adopting parents, helping separating couples deal with child custody arrangements, either as part of therapy or in a court setting, holding up the mirror of reality to wonderful but unrealistic plans, or providing enforcement services in the correctional field are all examples of situations where the level of discomfort experienced by the employee is sufficiently high that calculative involvement could not be presumed to apply. Normative or coercive involvement are the remaining possible modes. There are only a few cases (such as where an employee might be subpoenaed to give evidence in court) where coercive compliance can be utilized on employees in social service organizations. For the remainder, normative compliance will be the only type capable of supplying motivation. The findings of Pines and Kafry, mentioned near the end of chapter three, that the level of pay was not

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<sup>10</sup> The writer is indebted to Grant Reid for this observation.

related to occupational tedium, would tend to support the prediction arising from Etzioni's study of compliance, that utilitarian involvement would not be predominant in social service agencies. If it were, occupational tedium in social service organizations would decrease with increases in income level. A second observation that would also tend to uphold these predictions is related to the perceptions staff share with each other regarding order goals: they are seldom talked about, although everyone knows they are there.<sup>11</sup> Finally, a clue to the predominant type of involvement in social service organizations, and, indirectly, the type of compliance structure, is provided by two observations. Most social workers within the writer's experience, when asked what it is about their job that provides satisfaction will answer with something related to knowing they are providing a needed service or that a client's expression of appreciation makes it worthwhile. Secondly, most people involved in the practice of social work become quite upset when a client commits suicide. This is clearly a sign of

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<sup>11</sup> The writer was once present when a police officer was addressing a large gathering of child welfare social workers on the subject of the finer points of police-child welfare cooperation after normal working hours in a certain county of Ontario. The officer (apparently having noticed that social workers, sometimes, when in a situation that seems to be getting a little out of hand, suggest that if people do not calm down it may become necessary for the police to be called) stated that he found it quite effective to tell intoxicated parents that if they did not stop drinking he would call the local CAS representative. The loudness of the uproar following his statement was matched only by its instantaneity. He had obviously hit upon an issue to which everyone in the room was already sensitized. The social workers maintained that they were each there to "help," not to be used as "enforcers," although most were willing to concede that their respective organizations were not always as careful to maintain this distinction as they were personally. The police officer maintained that child protection workers, like police officers, had two functions, only one of which the social workers present found pleasant to discuss.

normative involvement. Utilitarian involvement would be associated with suggestions that no practitioner or mode of treatment will always be successful regardless of how hard the practitioner tries.<sup>12</sup> Coercive involvement would be associated with the perspective that a suicide should not be of any particular concern; a practitioner does what is supposed to be done, and outcomes are not of concern.

There are no simple solutions to the inherent problems associated with compliance structures in social service organizations. Social service organizations with dual or multiple purposes will tend to develop dual compliance patterns, even though they tend not to be efficient. Some alleviation of this inefficiency would occur if a greater emphasis could be placed on normative compliance structures. If a greater emphasis on normative compliance structures were to occur, it would also facilitate development of something more than a merely intellectual recognition of the fact that many social problems have a social genesis. If the problems were addressed at that level, it would obviate the need for many of the treatment and control functions of many agencies.

In terms of the differentiation between work and labour, it seems to the writer that normative compliance, associated as it is with transmission and development of cultural values, has the potential to embody within it many of the elements of work. Coercive compliance structures, on the other hand, are more closely associated with order goals, and have a greater similarity to the never ending, but

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<sup>12</sup> The common practice of saying things of this nature to a practitioner upset by the suicide of a client is therefore an attempt to dilute normative involvement with the utilitarian variety.



necessary, aspects of labour. A look at compliance structures from this perspective suggests that normative involvement would be increased by implementing the same sorts of changes suggested in the last few pages of chapter three; changes which would reduce the potential for burn out would also be of value in reinforcing normative compliance structures.

An important consideration, if there were to be such changes, would be their effect, or their potential effect, on the overall performance of the organization. Caplow has developed an analytical system which, though it has flaws, does consider inter-relationships of several aspects of organizations in their environments. Caplow's work makes a good starting point, therefore, for consideration of the effects alteration of the compliance patterns might have on a social service organization.

As in any industrial setting, the purpose of having some form of leadership in a social service agency is to maintain, or perhaps increase, organizational effectiveness. Organizational effectiveness has been defined by many authors. Caplow lists four component parts in his definition, which is closely related to those of other authors. **Stability**, which he initially defines as maintenance of status differences, **integration**, which is the maintenance of "... the mutual influence resulting from symbolic communication between a pair of organizational positions.", **voluntarism**, the maintenance of valences, which are, (in the singular), the "... measure of the desire of an interacting pair to interact with each other....", and **achievement**, or the maintenance of activities, which are a measure of purposes and output (Caplow, 1964, pp. 121, 102-104). Later in his

work, Caplow elaborates on this definition.

The advantage of utilizing Caplow's formulation is that his more elaborate definition of stability is in two parts, only one of which is necessary in a social service organization. This juxtaposition of the two parts is useful when considering questions of organizational compliance in social services organizations.<sup>13</sup> Caplow states: "Stability is a measure of an organization's ability to conserve or increase the status of its positions, or, in other words, to maintain its own structure" (p. 121). The supposed connection between the first part of the definition, the "... organization's ability to conserve or increase the status of its positions ...," and the second part, "... the organization's ability to maintain its own structure," is improper, insofar as it is applied to social service agencies. It stems from uncritical acceptance of the idea that vast differences in status are necessary for stability. There is reason to believe that Caplow knows differently; he is one of those cited in chapter four in the context of the paradoxical relationship between authority and democracy. Caplow defines status as the quantitative difference between the ability of A to modify the behavior of B and the ability of B to modify the behavior of A (p. 102). Status is thus nothing more, in Caplow's usage, than a term to designate power differences. In chapter four, it was shown that power is not zero sum concept. Clearly, the total amount of status can vary, and, as Caplow points out, the amount of power needed

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<sup>13</sup> It should be pointed out that Caplow was not addressing himself specifically to social service organizations, and this weakness is not to be construed as a criticism of Caplow, unless the contradiction also holds true in other settings, a question the writer is not qualified to comment on.

to generate compliance is related to factors other than the size of difference in the amounts of power (p. 110).

In Caplow's development of his system, he seems to use the first part of his definition of stability. If stability is increased in an organization, i.e., if there is an increase in the status differences, Caplow asserts that integration will drop, voluntarism may go up or down, and achievement will go up (pp. 121-124). Caplow treats status as a zero sum concept, however, so that differences in status are impossible. He proposes an alternation scheme to solve this problem; If one level is well integrated, the levels immediately above and below it will be less well integrated (p. 167). If, however, the second aspect of the definition of stability is used, this alternation, although it may still occur, is not a necessary component of the scheme.

If the second part of the definition of stability is considered, a different set of factors is brought into play; if voluntarism can be increased, fewer organizational resources will have to be expended on stability, because integration would increase. There would be more organizational resources left for achievement.<sup>14</sup>

Caplow's scheme is based on the supposition that behaviour can be controlled by supervisors. He cites work done by Blau in a public employment office which showed "... that the introduction of new performance indices changed the behavior of his subjects in the direction desired by the supervisors who installed the new system" (Caplow, p. 146). Caplow makes some interesting prescriptions, which

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<sup>14</sup> This is in contrast to the proposed inter-relationship of these variables using Caplow's definitions (except for stability), developed by Caplow (pp. 121-124).

will be mentioned shortly. Prior to doing so, however, a brief look at the work of Blau, which was used as a basis for Caplow's formulation, is in order.

Blau first published The Dynamics of Bureaucracy in 1955. It was a systematic study of a state employment agency and a federal agency which enforced certain laws governing business practices. He got his information by spending three months as an observer in each agency (Blau, 1963, p. 32). Harry Cohen, apparently a student of Blau, replicated the study of the employment agency ten years later. Instead of going in as an observer, however, he worked there for three years, and published his findings in his Ph.D. dissertation entitled "The Demonics of Bureaucracy" (Blau, 1963, pp. vii, 32). The new information which came to light was published in Blau's 1963 edition, and was in some cases much different from what was reported in the 1955 edition. Instances in which new interpretations were advanced to supersede old ones occur on pages 32, 33, 34, 50, 51, 55, 56, 95, 96, and 97 of the 1963 edition. Comments on pages 33, 34, 50, and 51 deal explicitly with instances where front line staff engaged in practices counter to policies, and, in some instances, counter to policies for which earlier practices had already been redesigned to correct for their evasion. These were, in other words, instances where supervisors found themselves unable to control the behavior of their subordinates. There is even mention made of Cohen's finding statistics recorded at the time when Blau was observing in the same organization which had subsequently been altered (Blau, 1963, p. 52 in footnote).

Having developed the inter-relationships referred to above, and acting on the (erroneous) assumption that even very small variations in

behavior can be controlled by supervisors, Caplow addresses the question of how the degree of integration and voluntarism in an organization can be increased. This can be accomplished, he asserts, by:

1. Raising the level of interaction between unequals above the level technically required by the program of activity. Among the devices used are conferences, formal and informal consultation, group decision-making, periodic appraisals, and suggestions systems
2. Reinforcement of primary groups by encouraging conversation at work, free choice of associates, homogeneity of individual characteristics, opportunities for group recreation, collective expressions of preference, and barriers against other peer groups
3. Development of communication channels between top management and the rank and file, by such means as house organs, grievance systems, internal public relations, meetings, training films, personalized correspondence, and open-door policies
4. Enforcement of loyalty to the organization's symbols and ideology by close surveillance
5. Development of favorable environmental conditions and fringe benefits that offer comfort and security as rewards for continued participation (p. 159)

The first three deal with normative compliance, and do not warrant further comment. The fifth deals with utilitarian compliance, which, although it might promote some inefficiency, is not antithetical to the predominantly normative tone of the prescription. The fourth, however, does not belong in a social service organization. It is as close to coercive compliance as it is possible to go without using physical force, and is inappropriate in any organization that has as its purpose some sort of normative or cultural goal. As Etzioni (*op. cit.*) pointed out, utilization of such techniques erodes the value of normative and utilitarian compliance structures, forcing increased

reliance on coercive compliance structures.

A premise of most treatments of compliance seems to be that employees must be made to do the bidding of others; that there is an inherent contradiction between accountability and meaning in a job. Because most people prefer being employed, they will usually submit to the implications of that premise. Alienation and burnout set in shortly thereafter.

A participatory agency would be more likely to structure jobs so they would be interesting. Interesting jobs are more likely to be done well than are dull ones. Because work quality is difficult to enforce, a participatory agency would have a clear advantage where considerations of work quality are important. Because people are willing to do interesting jobs for somewhat less money, a participatory agency would have added potential to be more cost-efficient than its oligarchical counterpart even if worker productivity were reduced, although it will be suggested in the next chapter that worker efficiency would increase in a participatory agency.

In addition, a participatory agency would not have a vested interest in trying only to deal with the social consequences of economic problems, when it is clear that present social service organizations cannot even come close to doing that. A participatory organization would have enough flexibility to be able to raise larger, economic and social welfare policy issues instead of, as problems increase and budgets decrease, claiming publicly that an increasingly effective job is being done while privately putting ever-increasing pressures on staff.

This chapter has consisted of a consideration of social service

organizations from several sociological perspectives; who benefits from the activities of the organization, what implications the form of involvement of an employee in the organization has for that organization, and how organizational compliance is secured. It was shown that the *cui bono* typology can help clarify organizational problems. Preoccupation with one's own careers was linked to a corresponding perception of lack of control. Displacement of goals was examined in terms of limitations on knowledge and the common organizational objective of reducing variability in the environment. Excessive control by clients was seen to be only part of a larger set of inter-related phenomena. A "new" problem, the nature of the relationship between the social service organization and the community, was discussed.

The relationship between types of power and forms of compliance was examined, and three effective types of compliance were delineated. The superiority of normative compliance in situations where complex tasks are involved was established. It was suggested that job situations where there were normative compliance structures were also the ones that would tend to have a satisfactory balance between work and labour. There would seem to be a confluence among basic social work values concerning the right of all people to some degree of self-determination and the inherent dignity of all people, with the implications of the suggested methods for dealing with limitations to knowledge, and the practical differences arising from having employees perform work as well as labour.

## CHAPTER SIX

People in the Workplace

If there is, as was suggested in chapter five, a confluence between basic social work values, proposed strategies for dealing with less than perfect knowledge, and the more gratifying nature of jobs involving work as well as labour, there will be certain implications for how jobs are structured and agencies organized. There are several areas of inquiry that illuminate these inter-relationships. This chapter examines three: Job Attitude theories, Need Satisfaction theories, and the relationship between productivity and job satisfaction. It closes with a more detailed look at the confluence mentioned in the last chapter, with special attention to the etymological problem social work is faced with in defining the profession as one more indication of how difficult a problem social workers face.

## Job Attitudes

Even before the turn of the century, research was being carried out on job attitudes. A review of that literature up to 1957 by Herzberg, Mausner, Peterson, and Capwell treated several thousand publications, and found only "... much disagreement and confusion in the field" (Herzberg et al, 1959, p. vii).

Herzberg, Mausner and Snyderman, as a result of reviewing much raw data, thought they detected two different streams of answers, not related to each other, depending on whether the investigator was asking what the employee liked about his job, or was asking what was disliked.



From this, they developed the notion of job "satisfiers" and job "dissatisfiers," which formed the basis of their own theory (Herzberg et al, 1959, p. 7). In contrast to Maslow's hierarchy and similar schemes, Herzberg found that there were several factors, usually related to tasks at work, which were responsible for feelings of satisfaction in relation to employees' jobs, called "motivators." These tended to be related to successful performance on the job, opportunities for professional growth, and so on. In the presence of these factors, an employee would feel satisfied about his job. In their absence, instead of feeling dissatisfied, the employee would merely feel neutral. The second group of factors were termed "hygiene" factors, and referred to the conditions which surrounded the job. These included "... supervision, interpersonal relations, physical working conditions, salary, company policies and administrative practices, benefits, and job security" (p. 113). When these factors went below an acceptable level, the result was job dissatisfaction. When these factors were raised to an optimal level, there would be no dissatisfaction, but, because it was the "motivators" that were responsible for satisfaction, there would be only a minimal effect on positive attitudes (p. 114).

After building such an innovative theory (Herzberg was not a modest psychologist), the suggestions he makes for organizational improvement are a bit timid and not particularly original. Of the problem of finding the right person for the job, Herzberg et al state, "We wish to shift the emphasis from personality to the attempt to match an individual's work capacity with work he will be needed to do ... Of course, there should be some recognition of the fact that in

many jobs at high levels there are numerous combinations of abilities and temperaments that will lead to success in the same job for different reasons" (p. 134).<sup>1</sup> In relation to supervision, they suggest that the supervisor's most important goal is to get new insights so that he "... may effectively plan and organize work" (p. 135). This writer cannot help wondering if it would not be a powerful motivator for front line staff if the supervisor were to get help from the workers in planning and organizing the work. Herzberg *et al* flatly state that there is no room in our economy for individual participation in the setting of goals, conceding only that there may be some value in allowing individuals to decide how to meet their goals (pp. 136-137). It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Herzberg *et al* failed to explore all the implications of their theory.

It may be as a result of this incompleteness that the "two factor" theory, although replicated in a number of studies, was not the object of universal acclaim. Dunnette *et al*, in at least two publications, vigorously attacked Herzberg and his work, stating,

It seems that the evidence is now sufficient to lay the two factor theory to rest, and we hope that it may be buried peaceably. We

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<sup>1</sup> Compare this with what Münsterburg wrote shortly after the turn of the century:

"... still more important than the naked commercial profit on both sides, is the cultural gain which will come to the total economic life of the nation, as soon as every one can be brought to the place where his best energies may be unfolded and his greatest personal satisfaction secured. The economic experimental psychology offers no more inspiring idea than this adjustment of work and psyche by which mental dissatisfaction in the work, mental depression and discouragement, may be replaced in our social community by overflowing joy and perfect inner harmony" (Münsterburg, 1913, p. 309).

believe it is important that this be done so that researchers will address themselves to studying the full complexities of human motivation, rather than continuing to allow the direction of motivational research or actual administrative decisions to be dictated by the seductive simplicity of the two factor theory (Dunnette *et al*, 1967, p. 173).

Herzberg was not ready to allow his theory to be laid to rest; at least, not peaceably. He wrote another book in its defense. In rebutting a paper by Wernimont and Dunnette, he accuses them of a procedural fallacy which is a "... classic illustration of the psychologist's penchant for trying to find out if someone has six toes without taking his shoes off" (Herzberg, 1966, p. 152).<sup>2</sup>

Both sets of authors agree that employees' views about their jobs can be characterized in terms of about sixteen dimensions: (1) achievement, (2) recognition, (3) work itself, (4) responsibility, (5) advancement, (6) possibility of growth, (7) supervision, (8) company policy, (9) working conditions, (10) interpersonal relations with peers, (11) interpersonal relations with subordinates, (12) interpersonal relations with superiors, (13) status, (14) job security, (15) salary, and (16) personal life. The issue is whether these dimensions could be divided into motivating factors (1-6), and hygiene factors (7-16) (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 95-96), or whether "... certain job dimensions--notably Achievement, Recognition, and Responsibility--seem uniformly to be more important for both satisfying and dissatisfying job events and that certain job dimension--notably Salary, Working Conditions, Company Policies and Practices, and Security--are relatively less important" (Dunnette *et al*, p. 169). Methodologic-

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<sup>2</sup> It should be remembered that Herzberg is himself a psychologist.

ally, the problem is the validity attributed by Herzberg *et al* to results obtained by a method involving an employee's recounting specific events and doing a content analysis on those stories (Dunnette, *et al*, p. 173), as opposed to the information Dunnette *et al* obtained by questionnaire, the questions having been paired for equal desirability by introductory psychology students, phrased in the present tense although the respondents were supposed to be thinking about events from the past, and applied in a way such that the individual would at times be forced to choose between two statements, neither of which would be relevant (Herzberg, 1966, p. 151).

It seems sufficient to conclude that the two factor theory has not been laid to rest, although it may not yet have been proven. Because the elements that go into the two competing theories are the same, it would appear to be sufficient for the writer to adopt those elements for use in this paper without adopting either perspective: the elements alone will be useful in conceptualizing aspects of different organizational structures. The larger issue raised by adopting the sixteen elements, in either a one factor or a two factor format, is that of the acceptability of a need satisfaction explanation of behavior. This question was mentioned, but not discussed, near the end of chapter two.

### Need Satisfaction Theories

There are two basic bodies of theory that are commonly referred to as need satisfaction theories: need theory and expectancy theory (Alderfer, 1977, p. 658). Generally the two are seen as complementary, as each treats areas not covered by the other (pp. 658-659).

Expectancy theories hold that the motivational force for any

action is the sum of the products of values associated with that action and the probabilities of all those values which are associated with the outcome(s) of that action. Performing an act produces an outcome. All outcomes have values (or valences), which can vary in sign and magnitude, and probabilities of being associated with the act in question. "The force on a person to perform the act is the sum of the valences times probabilities for all outcomes associated with the act" (p. 659).

Need theories have two classes of terms, satisfactions and desires, and deal with questions of "... how satisfaction affects desire and how desire influences satisfaction" (p. 660).

Need theory is concerned with subjective experience of individuals in complex environments (p. 660), while expectancy theory is based on the view that people are "... subjectively rational" (pp. 659-660).<sup>3</sup> There is an area of overlap between the two types of theory. The use of need theory is one way of arriving at values for valence terms in expectancy theory equations, although not the only way (p. 659).

There are confusions about need theories which, combined with a reluctance to consider the idea that psychological needs can be considered basic components of human beings, have resulted in a reluctance on the part of many individuals to accept the validity of

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<sup>3</sup> This term is not defined by Alderfer. The writer assumes it refers to the fact that, because the future is unknowable, outcomes cannot be predicted, and any universally acceptable idea of rationality is therefore difficult to come by. If the term refers to something else, the writer would draw attention to this as a limit to rationality that must be considered anyway.

need theories. This second point, being more basic, will be considered first.

Harlow and Harlow exposed infant monkeys to both bare wire and terry cloth covered surrogate parents. They demonstrated clearly that normal development in monkeys is dependent on physical contact with a parent figure (1962, pp. 136-146). There exist large bodies of literature on work done in the areas of maternal deprivation and sensory deprivation which serve to demonstrate that people, too, have psychological needs of a very basic sort. Theories which allow for the consideration of these needs have the potential to be informative.

Salancik and Pfeffer, who are critical of need theory models, display two basic misconceptions in their treatment of the subject. These misconceptions, if clarified, make a need theory tenable.

The first problem is their view that needs are to be thought of as "... relatively stable characteristics of persons" (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977, p. 430). This concept is then developed in the direction of needs being used as explanations (in the sense of excuses), for behavior--my needs made me do it. Thus, a need theory can "... make it acceptable not to change" (p. 438). The initial premises do not lack validity. To a certain extent, needs do govern behavior. Salancik and Pfeffer have reached their conclusion as the result of assuming that because all people have needs, they must all have the same needs, needs which do not vary over time. Thus, Alderfer points out that if one individual has not eaten for two days, and another just finished eating, the desire of the first individual for food will be higher than that of the second (p. 661). We should not object if the best explanation of the first individual's food seeking behavior is related

to his need for food. As far as change is concerned, that is easily seen to be a separate issue: in most individuals, once a need has been met, a change in behavior will occur. People will continue to eat for as long as there are people, but that is not the same as stating that people, because they need food, will eat continuously.

The second problem in the treatment by Salancik and Pfeffer is that of disconfirmability. They offer a detailed explanation of why need theories are in principle very difficult to disprove, and therefore cannot be shown to be related to observable phenomena in the real world (pp. 438-439). (This is the problem that the Fitzgerald Contraction Theory had.) Alderfer points out that part of their argument results from confusion among the terms "disprove," "disconfirm," and "refute" (p. 662), and suggests that while need theories, just like many other theories in the social sciences, may not explain all of the observed variance (and are therefore not susceptible to a proof by symbolic logic), they can still make predictions which can be either confirmed or disconfirmed (p. 662).<sup>4</sup> To the extent that a theory cannot account for all the variance, it may be incomplete. That does not make it wrong (p. 665). It may still be informative.

An important area of incompleteness is the interrelationship between power and its distribution in an organization and the ability of people in the organization to satisfy some of their needs. This area would constitute a complementary field of analysis, rather than an addition to need satisfaction theory itself. Pruger concerns himself

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<sup>4</sup> This is analogous to Boyle's and Pascal's gas laws mentioned in chapter four.

with certain aspects of this subject. After examining the ways in which organizations are structured in order to enhance predictability (at least as viewed from the top), he offers suggestions on how social workers, by understanding organization theory, can become good bureaucrats. Although Pruger's suggestions are offered in order to help the social worker "... maintain his vitality of action and independence of thought" (1973, p. 27), his specific advice, essentially, is to lower one's expectations that one's own needs will be met: don't expect anything to happen quickly (p. 27), conserve energy (p. 29), resign one's self to not being appreciated (pp. 29-30), do one's paper work quickly, before reminders are sent out that it has not been done (p. 30). He suggests that the optimal course of action is to find an unmet "need" (pardon the anthropomorphism) that the organization has, and develop competence in that area (p. 30). Social workers are, in other words, to forget about satisfying their own needs, or, at best, find satisfaction in discovering and exploiting loopholes (p. 29). Pruger's concluding words, viewed in his stated context of vitality and independent thought, are rather anticlimactic: "If social workers must be bureaucrats--and they must--they might as well be good ones" (p. 32). Gouldner's words, initially mentioned in the context of political systems, take on a disconcertingly prophetic ring in this context.

Instead of assuming responsibilities as realistic clinicians, striving to further democratic potentialities wherever they can, many social scientists have become morticians, all too eager to bury men's hopes. (1955, p. 507)



### Productivity and Job Satisfaction

Implicit in the preceding has been the assumption that there is a positive correlation between job satisfaction and job effectiveness, or productivity. Such an assumption warrants comment, for it is by no means accepted by all investigators, Münsterberg's remarks, above, notwithstanding. Martin, after reviewing the literature, claimed there was no positive correlation between the two (1969, p. 42), although he was careful to point out that this did not mean they could not appear together. He ended his article, however, by citing work by Viteles which showed that supervisors who established, by various means, that they valued their subordinates as individual people had units with better production records than those who concentrated more directly on higher production (Martin, 1969, p. 45). The writer shall take the position that because social work involves, as it does, the carefully controlled use of the personality of the individual practitioner, it would be valid to assert that Viteles' findings, even though not obtained in a social work setting, would seem to apply to social service organizations. If the proposition is accepted that dissatisfied staff will tend to leave sooner than satisfied ones, and is combined with the evidence of Baker and Vosburgh, *op. cit.*, that it takes two years to develop a relatively error-free practitioner, Viteles' findings will most certainly be valid over any significant period of time. Human Resource Accounting would allow for the quantification of this relationship, and make it possible to develop it into a criterion for use in evaluating management practices.

### Participation and Job Satisfaction

Neither Herzberg et al or Dunnette et al discussed

participation in the running of an organization as an element relating to job satisfaction. This question is one that has been discussed increasingly, both in Europe and in North America. Predominantly, the interest has been in the industrial sphere, and has appeared in writings related to business administration, labour-management relations, and as a concern of labour unions. Social service agencies have been almost exempt from this interest.

Denhardt, cited in chapter four, found greater perceived worker fulfillment as a result of greater participation in decision making (p. 176). Blumberg (1973) devoted chapters 2, 3, 5, and 6 to studies showing the positive relationship between work satisfaction and decision making by line workers. Hunnius reported mixed findings in a Yugoslavian study, and noted that in Yugoslavia, self management was unilaterally imposed from the top (1973, pp. 299-303). Schuler reconciled conflicting findings relating to job satisfaction in high and low authoritarian workers on the basis of the nature of the job: he found that in jobs with a high degree of repetitiveness, only workers with a low authoritarian outlook experienced high job satisfaction as a result of participation in decision making. In jobs with low repetitiveness, jobs which called for many different behaviors and much problem solving activity, job satisfaction was directly and positively related to participation in decision making, even when the workers (subordinates) were of the high authoritarian type, i.e., when they were people who were normally content to let others make the decisions (1976, pp. 320-325).

Social work, at least as it would be practiced in a burnout resistant agency (see chapter three), would be a low-repetitive job,

which, according to Schuler's analysis, would be more gratifying to pursue in an agency which provided for participation by its staff in decision making. Perhaps it is the lure of autonomy which makes private practice as appealing as it is, despite the original and continuing concerns of social work with the plight of the poor, who are really not in a position to pay for services received. The organization that provides for greater job satisfaction, by allowing greater participation or by other means, will facilitate the development of normative and utilitarian compliance patterns. This will allow the organization to use resources otherwise needed for the generation of coercive compliance, or of something close to it, for actual service delivery.

#### Convergences

We have seen that we live in a world with few absolutes. Christianity, the nominally dominant religion in the Western world, rests on faith. Science, including both physics and the social sciences, is built on probability theory. Man is less than rational because it is impossible to consider all the ramifications of his actions; not even all possible courses of action can be adequately considered in many cases. Artificial means must be employed to narrow the numbers of options and their implications to within manageable limits. That is why there are organizations. It is only by using organizations that any given portion of the world can be made predictable enough so that human enterprise can deal with it. Enough groundwork has now been laid so that two key questions, "What type of organization do we want?" and "How can it be efficient?" can now be addressed quite succinctly.

Thomas Hobbes, in the early 17th century, was one of the first Western thinkers in modern times to address himself to the first question. He rejected the rule of kings on the basis of divine right, proposing instead a doctrine of contract (Sibley, *op. cit.*, p. 345). The question of efficiency would not be formally addressed for almost two centuries.

Max Weber built his theories of organization on the basis of the success of the armies of Cromwell and of some of Cromwell's contemporaries in Europe. Prior to that time, it had been the practice for opposing sides to maintain well organized formations until right after the first charge of a battle. Everyone would then rush around trying to capture important people who could be held for ransom, which, when paid, went to enrich personal coffers, not those of the army. The innovation developed by Cromwell *et al* was that instead of trying to capture ransomable people, they found it more efficient just to kill them (Gerth and Mills, 1946, pp. 256-257). All that was required to implement this innovative practice was a higher degree of discipline; it made the outcome of the battle, and the way in which it would be fought, more predictable. Weber was impressed by this, and it became the foundation for his concept of bureaucracy. Weber liked his new theory of bureaucracy because it emphasized the machine-like qualities of human activity, as well as providing enhanced predictability, at least as viewed from the top. Thus, in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft he wrote:

No special proof is necessary to show that military discipline is the ideal model for the modern capitalist factory ... organizational discipline in the factory is founded upon a completely rational basis. With the help of appropriate methods

of measurement, the optimum profitability of the individual worker is calculated like that of any material means of production. On the basis of this calculation, the American system of 'scientific management' enjoys the greatest triumphs in the rational conditioning and training of work performances. The final consequences are drawn from the mechanization and discipline of the plant, and the psycho-physical apparatus of man is completely adjusted to the demands of the outer world, the tools, the machines--in short, to an individual 'function.' The individual is shorn of his natural rhythm as determined by the structure of his organism; his psycho-physical apparatus is atuned to a new rhythm through a methodical specialization of separately functioning muscles, and an optimal economy of forces is established corresponding to the conditions of work. This whole process of rationalization, in the factory as elsewhere, and especially in the bureaucratic state machine, parallels the centralization of the material implements of organization in the discretionary power of the overlord.

The ever-widening grasp of discipline irresistibly proceeds with the rationalization of the supply of economic and political demands. This universal phenomenon increasingly restricts the importance of charisma and of individually differentiated conduct. (Gerth and Mills, pp. 261-262)

After reading a fair amount about the peaks and valleys of the personal and professional life of Max Weber, the writer was unable to find any reference to his ever having worked at anything other than teaching and academic research. While both can be very arduous, they both entailed, in late 19th and early 20th century Germany, a fair amount of individual autonomy, especially for a person of independent means. It might be for this reason that Weber did not become concerned with the implications his work on bureaucracy might have for those people near the bottom of the hierarchy, or develop an appreciation for the kinds of information such people would come to acquire about the workings of their organization. To this day, the watchword in organizations even loosely based on a bureaucratic model has been control. It is not by accident that insubordination will get a person fired much more quickly than incompetence; insubordination has far

greater implications for predictability.

Weber's work, both by itself and as it has been adapted by various organizations, including social service organizations, is not particularly well suited to creating the kind of conditions which are conducive to meeting the needs of either clients or staff. It negates the model of man upon which our society is based. Another problem associated with using a traditional bureaucratic model, or a variation of it, in a social organization, is that it doesn't work particularly well. This was a main subject of the preceding chapter.<sup>5</sup>

If we return to the etymological distinction between work and labour, social work can be found sitting firmly on each side. In English, it is "social work," while in French, it is "*travail du sociale*." In English, we call ourselves workers; in French, labourers. The cleavage is apparent in more than just the title. Social workers are equipped in school for activities such as helping people change their long term patterns of functioning: providing individual counselling, engaging in family therapy, or participating in the alteration of some aspect of society. All of these have certain connotations of work. When they get into the field, they become crisis workers who are fortunate if they can keep one step ahead. They become administrators who are co-opted into a structure that is predictably lethargic. They become social planners for governments that are more

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<sup>5</sup> See, especially, Blau's work, and the observations of Canovan, Hage and Aiken, and Zand. Etzioni's writing on dual compliance structures and Caplow's elaborate treatment of organizational stability were both inspired by the persistent problems faced by bureaucratic organizations. In addition, Blau, Heydebrand, and Stauffer found many problems created by using a "centralized authority structure" to administer the delivery of professional services (1966, p. 184).

often than not on the cutting edge of creeping conservatism, which usually cuts back. Workers don't "burn out." Labourers do. So do social workers.

It is proposed that many of the concepts developed in this thesis would, if used as guiding principles of a social service organization, contribute to an organization which would be capable of meeting the human needs of clients and staff to a higher degree than do traditional organizations, and also of doing so more efficiently. It will obviously not be possible to concentrate only on the "work" aspects of the profession. To voluntarily accept only the "labour" aspects would be to deny the principles and values of social work.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

An Alternative Agency Design

One implication of the use of the concept "organizational citizenship" is that this last chapter could better be written by those people working in specific agencies. No matter how desirable or beneficial certain changes might be, their unilateral development poses certain risks: people will ultimately want some independence, even when their dependence has been of a benign nature (Beer and Driscoll, 1977, p. 403). Remembering this will facilitate the development of an appropriate perspective for the consideration of what follows. What follows is a collection of related ideas, based on concepts discussed earlier. Some of them have already been tried, and have been found to work well (Weber and Polm, 1974, p. 229).<sup>1</sup> The rest would appear to have validity too. Anyone attempting to implement anything discussed here would be well advised to consider what modifications might be necessary for any specific setting. Each situation is unique, and what is to be sought is not just participation, nor a certain type of organizational structure. There must be "... congruence between the structure of an organization and the style of management" (Lawler,

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<sup>1</sup> Some parts of the model agency proposed in this chapter are borrowed from an article by Shirley Weber and Donald Polm (who collaborated in describing two county welfare agencies in the U.S. which independently developed quite similar patterns of participatory management and organizational structure). This is mentioned at the outset, in addition to showing that not everything in the chapter is speculation, to explain that most references to Weber in this chapter will be to Shirley, not Max.



1977, p. 203).

The discussion has four sections; a brief outline of the proposed structure, followed by a more detailed treatment of the activities, inter-relationships and perogatives of the different parts, including commentary from and about the relevant literature. The third section is a treatment of problems, and is followed by concluding remarks. There will, of necessity, be some overlap. While all of this is discussed in terms of a private agency, much of it would apply, with some modification, to a public one, too.

#### STRUCTURE

There would be units in the proposed agency, but no supervisors. Functions traditionally handled by supervisors would be carried out by management specialists, whose duty it would be to perform specific management functions, such as arranging for the training of new staff or evaluating staff performance. Their activities in each area would serve the whole agency, rather than a specific unit. They would work with committees of staff people, rather than on their own. In a large agency, there would be a need for an intermediate, or second level of management to coordinate the activities of the management specialists. There would be a director having overall authority in the day to day running of the organization, answerable to the board of directors. The board would be constituted such that delegates from both a staff council and a client council would be represented, as well as the community at large and funding bodies. In short, while there would be some differences, the overall structure would still be recognizable to most social workers. The guiding principle would be that decision

making power necessary for the performance of any specific duty be vested in or near those people responsible for the carrying out of that duty.

## HOW IT WORKS

### Home Units

Weber and Polm describe the origins and some of the functions of units without supervisors. The basic function they mention is that home units would provide a basis for work flow accountability (p. 302). Once implemented, many aspects of this function could be delegated to a clerk or a computer, and it would not take vast amounts of professional staff time. The remaining administrative tasks within the home unit would be handled on a rotating basis, each person taking them for, say, a three month period, which would coincide with quarterly staff council meetings.

A home unit would also provide a structural entity with primary group characteristics; it would serve as the anchoring point and provide the basis for a system of representatives to the staff council. As in the Weber and Polm model, front line social work staff would be autonomous. There would be no supervision. Competence would be assumed. Knowing when to consult would be a skill each worker would also be assumed to have (Weber and Polm, p. 301).

In addition to the above functions of home units they would serve as a forum for peer consultation and as discussion, planning, and decision making bodies for work related matters such as choosing delegates to the staff council and to specialist committees. The members would receive delegates' reports and inform their delegates

about their own views on relevant issues. They would also have a role in dismissal of employees (see section on hiring and firing).

### The Generalist Specialist Question

Weber and Polm propose the adoption of a generalist social worker doing generic social work as a basic part of their model (p. 301). They are describing welfare offices. While such a division of the workload might work quite well in such an office, it is the writer's position that the generic social work aspect of the model might require alteration in certain situations, because other types of agencies have to deal in depth with a wider range of situations. In practice, a property of the generalist doing generic social work model is that any client walking in has an equal chance of being seen by any social worker, who would be free to use any recognized social work methods (p. 301). This might prove unduly limiting in some situations. For example, if it were decided that there would be merit in starting to work with a selected group of diabetic paraplegics or abusive parents, such a group could not be arranged without altering at least one of these assumptions. Similarly, any given social worker in an agency providing services to clients with various medical problems could hardly be expected to provide the same quality of service to all as could be provided if some degree of specialization were present. There is a large body of knowledge dealing with the question of how different medical conditions affect people and their families with which no one

person could be expected to maintain familiarity. Specialization and questions relating to the degree of specialization should be acknowledged as an issue apart from questions relating to participation in management, although the two are related.

Worker specialization is a subject that has received much attention, and it is not possible to do justice to it here. A few comments are in order nevertheless. Hanlan offers a short but insightful history of the development of social service agencies and the roles of social workers in them which touches on both the question of specialization and that of bureaucracy (1971). His argument is that by the 1930s, bureaucratization had come to social work, especially in the public agencies, and that as a result (1) supervisors became responsible for exercising administrative control over social workers, and (2) social workers were required to perform a variety of tasks in a framework where criteria other than casework skills were used to determine the division of labour (pp. 195-196). The end result was a displacement of goals (see Robert Merton, cited in chapter five). Serving people was replaced by serving the agency (Hanlan, p. 197).

Hanlan argues that a private entrepreneurial model for provision of social services won't work, and cites existing varieties of private medical and legal services as proof. This means that social services will have to continue to be provided by some sort of formal organizations (p. 197). He suggests a division of labor on the basis of the skills and interests of each social worker in relation to current service needs rather than on the basis of history or preconceived ideas about agency needs, with greater worker autonomy and tenured positions once satisfactory performance has been demonstrated (pp. 198-199). He

concludes:

If commitment to clientele is really the primary professional concern, then one way of meeting that commitment is to make the agencies and staffs more responsive to the needs of the client. Unless social workers are to forsake the present for some future social work utopia, they will need to address themselves to some of the mundane, day-to-day, agency-based features of services to clients. This plan will require increased knowledge and awareness of the caseworker's professional self as a source of organizational resistance and a subtle defender of the agency status quo as well as awareness of oneself as an agent of psychological and social change. Thus, casework beyond bureaucracy will require not only debureaucratized agencies but also caseworkers who are beyond becoming bureaucrats. (p. 199)

Even without attempting to read too much into such a short statement, it seems clear that Hanlan is making several proposals. While arguing for specialization, he is not suggesting that specialties should be so narrowly defined as to preclude the ability of each social worker to work for social change. Inasmuch as social change is seldom accomplished by individual social workers, some sort of grouping together would be required. One such possible grouping (although not necessarily the only one,) might be the agency, providing that social workers can develop the ability to address themselves to some of the everyday issues involved in running agencies. If it turns out that adoption of Hanlan's set of propositions is also better for the social workers, as this writer is arguing, it is an interesting, though not necessarily surprising, convergence.

### Management Specialists

Individual staff persons would work with the relevant first line management staff, or management specialists, in handling normal workload questions and in resolving day to day problems.

There would be several different management specialist functions. Their services would be given on an agency-wide basis. In a large agency, each management specialist could assume one task area. In smaller agencies, each management specialist might be responsible for several areas. Weber and Polm list four such areas:

1. **Operation specialists** are assigned the responsibility for work assignments, work flow, and work load management
2. **Program specialists** are assigned responsibility for program and methods consultation and for program review of services in a cluster of program areas. The primary purpose is to measure the quality of services provided throughout the department
3. **Staff performance specialists** are assigned the responsibility for evaluating performance of individual workers. Input to the evaluation comes from case performance reviews, operations, and program reviews. This method of collecting information about a worker's performance throughout the year from a number of sources provides a much broader factual and objective evaluation than was formerly possible
4. **Training specialists** are assigned the responsibility for training new workers and for staff development programs (p. 303)

To these, this writer would add:

- 4a. An extra dimension to the job of the training specialists, that of **Personnel specialist**. This person would be responsible for coordinating service needs with requests for transfers, and would, with his committee (which will be dealt with shortly), do preliminary screening of new applicants for employment, forwarding a short list to the home unit for a final decision
5. **Community relations specialists**. While this function could be subsumed in another first level management position in a small agency, it is worthy of separate attention in any case. Any social service organization will need to be able to relate effectively to the public, on a number of levels. This is an area of expertise most social workers do not have to deal with very often, but when a case hits the newspapers there is a fairly immediate need for a high level of expertise. On a more planned basis, there is a need for ongoing public education which is often neglected except when a crisis has occurred and it is already too late. Having a specialist to provide supports and consultation to workers engaged in this area, as opposed to having a person higher in the administration to handle all requests for information from the press would be an effective way of dealing appropriately with requests for publicity without the danger of someone near the top of the administration feeling compelled to make unrealistic promises as the result of much pressure from the media and not enough information.

This person would also have contact with other agencies to minimize gaps between their programs, and to avoid needless duplication of services.

6. **Support staff specialists.** These people would probably not be social workers, but would be knowledgeable about social work, and would be able to judge the effects of proposed service changes on the ability of clerical and accounting staff to meet the requirements of their jobs. Most support staff do have thoughts about such matters, and constitute an often overlooked resource

### Intermediate Management

In large agencies it may be necessary to have management coordinators as the next level above management specialists, to keep things from getting confused. If there were six management specialists, for example, three of them, the community relations, support staff, and training specialists, would work with a coordinator of supplemental inputs, while the other three, operations, program, and staff performance specialists, would work with a coordinator of service delivery. Such individuals would also be in a good position to assist with the preparation and submission of budgets. In smaller agencies, these positions would not be required. Where they exist, the incumbents would be responsible to the director.

### Director

The director would be primarily an employee of and responsible to the board. The director would work in conjunction with the coordinators, if any, and with the management specialists, to develop and implement new programs, and to assist in budget preparations. The director would also represent the agency in the community when it is necessary that a single individual be given that responsibility. The

director, in conjunction with the management specialists' committees and the management group, would assist in the development and implementation of new programs, and in the modification of existing ones.

Home units would also be able to meet with the director periodically. Such meetings, in addition to being a useful vehicle for solving problems, would serve to inform line staff of problems being encountered by the agency in its environment as well as to inform the director of specific problems being encountered by staff.

In general, the director's role would be more that of resource person, coordinator, and conciliator than that of primary decision maker. The director's job would be to help the organization function smoothly, rather than to make all decisions, which then have to be passed on by some people and carried out by still others.

There would have to be some provision for a procedure analagous to closure if a deadlock was reached, but such a procedure would have to be used sparingly.

The director would also participate in dismissal procedures. The incumbent would have a six year term of office, which would be non-renewable. There would be provision for prior removal under certain circumstances (see section on hiring and firing).

#### Management Specialist's Committee

The work of each management specialist would be augmented by a small committee of line staff people, perhaps one from each home unit, or, in large agencies, one from every second unit. These groups would meet with the management specialists to work on current problems. The



specialists would have the time to compile reports reflecting the deliberations of their committees in those cases where material is to be forwarded to higher management for development of agency-wide policies, but there would not be a requirement that other than basic policies by agency-wide. Particularly in an agency where several different services are provided, or widely varying groups of clients are served, each unit would be charged with developing its own best ways of providing services.

Provision for management specialists' committees would provide for what Dachler and Wilpert term "direct participation" (1977, p. 12). Direct participation will be addressed more fully in the third section (on problems), as part of the solution to a morale problem identified by Weber and Polm.

#### Management Group

The director, coordinators (if any), management specialists, and one representative from each home unit would constitute the management group, which would meet, perhaps weekly, to discuss, plan, and propose solutions for problems submitted to it for consideration. Issues the resolution of which promise to require changes in procedures or policies would be discussed in meetings to which representatives of those most directly affected have been invited. These representatives to a management group meeting or series of meetings would be sought from the staff council and client council, who would have voting rights, and from staff at large and representatives from other affected agencies, who could make presentations but not vote. The total voting strength of staff and client council representatives would be one

third the total number of the management group, divided equally between them: if the management group consisted of twelve people, the staff council would be able to send two voting representatives, and so would the client council. This would have the effect of providing significant input without hamstringing the management group.

#### Staff Council

To a maximum of thirty, at which point a different representational scheme would have to be devised, 20 per cent of line staff would be elected to a staff council; some as officers, the rest as members. The staff council would establish committees and conduct quarterly meetings of all staff. Council and committee meetings would be on a scheduled but time limited basis; if more meetings were needed, the schedule would be revised rather than having numerous or endless emergency meetings. The staff council would also send delegates to the board of directors, who would have all the privileges and responsibilities of any other board member. Delegates would **not** be members of the staff council executive, and would be chosen from the ranks of all support staff as well as social work and other professional employees. As representatives of the staff council at board meetings, delegates would be able to address themselves to any issue related to agency

functioning.<sup>2</sup> The staff council would be able to affiliate with or become a labour union if they found it expedient to do so. This might be particularly vital if certain management personnel were trying to prevent or subvert a participatory relationship.

#### Client Council

The client council would be composed of any current clientele of the agency choosing to participate. They would meet regularly, send delegates to the board of directors as full voting members, and have an input into the management group. The only requirement would be that the members be current clients, as clients have a unique perspective that changes when they become former clients.

Client input would be useful to the agency for two reasons. Client views on the quality of services "...broadens the range of indexes that attempt to identify 'agency effectiveness'" (Giordano, 1977, p. 35). Clients are uniquely aware of their own behavioral or attitudinal changes (if any) resulting from involvement with the agency. Secondly, clients do not have as great a stake in presenting the agency in a favorable light (*Ibid.*).

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<sup>2</sup> The Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy deals at length with the issue of employees on boards of directors of private corporations, and recommends the institution of such a practice (Bullock, 1977). This issue is somewhat more complicated than boards of social service agencies because of secret negotiations between corporations over joint ventures, takeovers, and other dealings which could adversely affect the stockmarket situation of a company if information leaked out prematurely. For a treatment of the pros and cons of this question in British industry, see the majority report, chapter 3 (1977, p. 21 ff), and the accompanying minority report. For a treatment of the same question in the context of German Co-Determination, see the selections by the West German Trade Union Federation and by Helmut Schauer in Workers' Control (Hunnius et al, eds., 1973, pp. 194-224).

O'Donnell and Chilman point out that there are benefits for the participants and the recipients of services as well. Such participation is helpful in:

1. Reducing the feeling of being "...alienated from the institutions that purport to serve them"<sup>3</sup>
2. Providing "...poor people with an opportunity to influence the decisions affecting them"
3. Improving "...communication between low income persons and other persons in the community"
4. Providing participants with "...an opportunity for socialization into the ways of the community at large" (1969, p. 2)

Giordano is concerned only with the implications of client evaluation of social service agencies. Not surprisingly, she finds problems with client participation in this activity. The foremost problem is client powerlessness in relation to the agency which results in different questions being asked of clients than would be the case if clients were involved in helping to write the questionnaire (pp. 35-36). Giordano's second problem is that in agency originated studies, a response is sought for items which may be meaningful to the agency but not particularly relevant to clientele (p. 36). This writer would suggest that participation could be expected to provide a focus on client concerns, as well as some influence, and would, if perceived in that light, be a valuable addition to the functioning of the agency.

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<sup>3</sup> Although the term "alientated" is not defined, the context in which it is used suggests a meaning of "separated".

As with any proposed solution, however, it brings with it certain new problems. O'Donnell and Chilman suggest that these include, in some cases, clients' feelings of being uncomfortable in a strange setting, feelings of being unable to win acceptance for their ideas because of not being as articulate as other members, poorer clothing, a fear of being manipulated, and a fear of not being able to deal competently with complex issues (pp. 5-6). Additional problems would be encountered in an agency providing services for the mentally retarded. From any perspective, there will also be problems with recruitment, and how to handle tendencies towards formal and informal co-optation (p. 6). Richards and Goudy distinguish between client participation and citizen participation, and assert that notwithstanding the above problems, the former occurs more frequently than the latter, but that neither has become very common (1977, pp. 67-68).

There is room for some optimism, however. Most of the problems mentioned above would be particularly pronounced when one or two "token" members are being considered. By having a council composed solely of clients, a lot of the feelings of inadequacy in relation to other groups would not occur. Discussing matters in the client council first, and sending informed delegates to the board or management group meetings would alleviate some of the fears of being inarticulate and of being manipulated.

Thus, if initially there are willing (though perhaps anxious) client participants, it should be possible to create an environment, the client council, which will make participation psychologically rewarding enough so that people will continue long enough to acquire skill in the tasks involved and, with that skill, a degree of self

assurance. While it is true that some of the questions to be addressed will be complicated, there are areas in which clients would have some expertise, such as being able to judge the potential effects of certain forms of service delivery on self image, or whether or not or to what extent addition or withdrawal of a service might change the potential for improvement in client functioning.

A second reason for optimism also stems from the numbers proposed. Block voting of client council representatives at the board of directors level would be possible, and would allow for peer reinforcement in board meetings. O'Donnell and Chilman cite instances where this has occurred, with beneficial results (p. 6). Such participation has the potential to be disruptive. Campbell observes, however, that clients are not likely to be antagonistic "...unless those who traditionally hold power in the target system attempt to co-opt, subvert, or disregard participation initiatives" (1980, p. 155).

There is also a theoretical argument in favor of client involvement in social service agencies. It stems from the concept of "debureaucratization" mentioned by Blau and Scott (op. cit., p. 223). "Bureaucratization" is the state of affairs resulting from a preoccupation with administrative requirements and problems, a variety of the "displacement of goals" phenomenon discussed in chapter five.

Blau and Scott cite a number of studies, including one in a social service agency, which suggest that the dependence of staff on clients has a debureaucratizing effect; that staff in such situations consider more carefully the needs of each individual client rather than uniformly applying predetermined administrative criteria. Blau and

Scott mention the difference in degree of bureaucratic behavior between public welfare workers and child welfare workers in the same county agency, and cite the greater consideration the latter gave their clients, who were foster parents, compared to the treatment given welfare recipients, as a demonstration of their claim. They mention that this is just one study, and caution against unquestioning acceptance of it as proof of the applicability of the principle and its workings in social service agencies (pp. 232-233). In addition, this writer would dispute the assertion that foster parents are truly clients of the agency. They are actually collaterals. With respect to social service agencies, perhaps the only valid comment is that the hypothesis that debureaucratization occurs in agencies when there is staff dependence on clients would appear to have external validity; it would seem to apply. It cannot be regarded as proven.

Finally, two remarks are in order. Motivation, including motivation for participation, is learned (Mulder, op. cit., p. 35). Some initial efforts to find and keep client representatives will need to be made before the psychological rewards can occur: people, like pumps, sometimes need priming. O'Donnell and Chilman suggest that two years of participation will produce knowledgeable, confident, and influential participants (p. 6). Utilization of a separate client council would have the potential to reduce that time considerably. Thus in Yugoslavia, where participation is a way of life, it "...offers an important means of protecting the interests of citizens and guaranteeing their involvement. Social policy experts in Yugoslavia believe that it is this involvement that protects the fabric of society" (Perlmutter, 1974, pp. 230-231). Secondly, implementation of

any sort of client participation may take more time than it would to establish some of the other proposals in this chapter. It would not be required that client participation begin at the same time or develop at the same rate as other aspects of the proposed system, and need not delay its implementation.

### Board of Directors

The board would have a maximum of 28. The following four groups would each contribute twenty-five per cent of the total number:

1. Client council
2. Staff council
3. Community at large
4. Funding bodies and, (where they exist), local social planning organizations

Such a system of allocation is a bit complicated, but it would address several concerns. Members of the first two groups would contribute to a structure capable of providing participatory management. Members of the community at large; lay people, particularly prominent citizens and their spouses, have traditionally served as a mainstay of many boards, and some have a real concern for such agencies and their problems, as well as expertise in certain areas. Including members of a social planning organization would address a problem mentioned by Adams *et al*; the fragmentation of community services and the lack of coordination between them (1971, p. 242). Such a planning organization would itself have significant proportions of people knowledgeable about agencies and clients, and would be able to offer advice, knowledge, and reason to other board members. The



inclusion of representatives of funding bodies would provide financial accountability. In addition to providing the funding bodies with a voice in deciding how money is to be allocated, the process would be of educational value to those same representatives and therefore of incidental benefit to the agency when they take back to their own organizations not only new information on how the agency is efficiently using its money, but also a better perspective on the functioning of social service agencies as stop gap measures, and the necessity of coming to grips with more basic problems, like poverty and racism.

Ultimately, the value of having a board composed of several groups, each with some internal diversity, is that numerous viewpoints would be aired, most of which would have at least some meritorious aspects. It would be difficult for such a board to divide into two deadlocked camps, thereby increasing the odds that any given issue will be decided on its merits. Terms of office would be for three years, renewable once. One third of the members in each of the four groups listed above would be elected each year. Decisions would be by simple majority.

When questions relating to salary scales of staff are being decided, staff council representatives would participate until the time of voting, but would have to leave the room when voting began.

#### HIRING AND FIRING<sup>4</sup>

##### Line Staff

Line staff vacancies would be filled in a two stage process. The

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<sup>4</sup> The contents of this section could have been provided in each of the sections dealing with individual employees. It was decided to put it into a separate section to facilitate comparisons.

personnel specialist would conduct screening interviews and construct a short list of candidates. This would be forwarded to the home unit seeking to fill a vacancy. The home unit or its designated representatives would conduct a series of second interviews, after which the final selection would be made by the home unit. Although such a process would not automatically eliminate all nepotism, it would put added emphasis on the principle of hiring on the basis of merit. People working together in a home unit would be faced with extra work if a new employee were not capable, and this would be the only required incentive. Once basic competence has been demonstrated, an employee would enter a category offering a certain amount of stability. While not the equivalent of tenure, it would nevertheless prevent sudden, capricious dismissal (Hanlan, *op. cit.*, p. 199).

Dismissal of a person granted such security could still occur, if the employee failed to meet the existing standards of service delivery. Notice of the deficiency would first have to be given, so that attempts to remedy the problem could be made. Home units, being most directly affected, but also knowing the employee better than other people in the agency, would have to decide whether or not to dismiss an employee. The decision would be made by secret ballot, with a simple majority vote being required.

#### Management Specialists

Perhaps the best way of initially staffing these positions in an agency making a transition from a more traditional structure would be to place former supervisors into them. After that, management

specialists would be elected by line staff for three year terms.<sup>5</sup> There would be a maximum of two terms in any one position. A management specialist would be able to move from one specialist position to another, and it would be expected that they would also periodically take positions as line staff, as well. There would be some provision in the pay structure so that there would not be wild fluctuations in pay as the result of such moves; perhaps a system along the lines suggested by Tracy, which would be based on how well a person is doing in relation to how well the job could be done (Tracy, 1972, p. 71). People would then be more inclined to take the job because they find it interesting and think they can do it well rather than because they cannot afford to turn it down.

There would be provision for recall anytime after one half the term of the incumbent has expired. A statement of intent would have to be given, setting out specific reasons why recall was being considered and an opportunity to correct those shortcomings would then have to be provided, except in instances where illegal acts, such as fraud, or violations of a fiduciary relationship have occurred. Recall would be by secret ballot. Fifty per cent of those staff voting, plus one, would be required for a vote of dismissal. Only line staff "under" the specific management specialist in question would be eligible to

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<sup>5</sup> There may be value in stipulating that all these positions would be filled at the same time and that the director could veto up to one third of them.

vote.<sup>6</sup>

The provision for the recall-free first half of the term is to provide for situations where initially unpopular decisions will not have immediate beneficial results, and to provide a "safe period" for new incumbents who have not had managerial experience to develop their abilities. Time is a necessary factor in such situations. Instances involving illegal activities or violation of a fiduciary relationship could result in dismissal at any time.

#### Management Coordinators

Management coordinators, where such positions are necessary, would be filled by a two stage process. The director would put together a slate, which would be voted on by staff. Vacant management coordinator positions would be filled by those with the highest number of votes. The terms of office would be for six years, and timed to start halfway through the three year tenure of the management specialists. A maximum of two consecutive terms would be allowed.

After two years, either the director or any five staff could recommend dismissal. Reasons would have to be given, and, except where illegal or unethical behavior is involved, so would an opportunity to rectify the shortcomings. Voting would be by secret ballot. All staff could vote. The decision would be made by fifty per cent of those

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<sup>6</sup> It should be remembered that in most cases each management specialist is responsible for a specific function for the entire agency, so that in all but the largest agencies, all line staff would participate in such balloting. In agencies large enough to require two or more staff performance specialists, for example, only those line staff working with that specialist would have a vote.

staff voting, plus one, with the provision that the director either agree to dismissal or abstain. If the director chose to retain the management coordinator in the face of a majority vote to dismiss, the effect of the vote would be to prohibit a second term of office.

### Director

The director, by virtue of the direction of accountability, would be hired by the board. The term of office would be for six years, and would be non-renewable. There would be provision for earlier recall after two years. Reasons would have to be given and, except where illegal or unethical behavior is involved, so would an opportunity to rectify the shortcomings. Recall would be by a simple majority of the board of directors.

### Problems

Implementing an organizational structure with functions as listed above would not mean that all problems would be abolished. Some of the same problems agencies presently face, such as budgets and demands for service, would still exist. There would also be new problems. This last section is a treatment of some of the principle new problems which can be foreseen.

### Tyranny of the Group

This is perhaps the most difficult problem to treat in the abstract, because ultimately its manifestations will depend, more than any of the other problems, on the nature, circumstances and composition of a specific work group.

As set out by Mulder, the problem is that while in a traditional organizational framework an individual can circumvent, ignore, or re-interpret directives that come down from on high, and in some cases may actively collude with fellow employees to do so, such subversion is more difficult when it is one's fellow employees who have participated in the formulation of those policies. Staff then have something of a stake with respect to the degree of adherence to them (Mulder, op. cit., p. 36). In other words, this is the other side of the combination of two previously mentioned factors; the greater commitment to a solution which contains one's own suggestions or those of one's peers, and the greater total amount of power potentially present in such a system (see chapter four). Ultimately, the question can only be addressed in terms of the observation made by Lord Acton: "Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely." There is no guarantee that tyranny of the group will not emerge, but it is possible to adjust the odds a bit by emphasizing cross cutting interests and experiences and arranging for the power to be spread around a bit. The difference education makes in the quality of participation has already been discussed.<sup>7</sup> One of the reasons it has this effect is that it provides for exposure to more interests and experiences. Social service agencies are composed of people who are, on the whole, well educated. In addition, the educational process for social service agency staff contains a specific component that deals with human values. The need to treat all people like people is strongly

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<sup>7</sup> See Michel's comments, in chapter two, and the comments on education in chapter five.

emphasized. It can also be anticipated that Steiner's emphasis on making value premises explicit, and developing a consensus on value premises (see chapter four), will facilitate an appropriate respect for the concerns of others as well as providing better results.

### False Participation

False participation was defined and discussed briefly in chapter four. A major theme in descriptions of social service organizations is that of limiting the amount or the kind of participation that is acceptable. Thus, Hirsch and Shulman (1976), in an article enticingly entitled "Participatory Governance: A Model for Shared Decision Making," deal with a definition, prerequisites, the role of knowledge in decision making, and the necessity for trust, all in the context of a hospital social service organization. This is all revealed to be useful, when used properly, as a foundation "...that enables staff to accept with confidence the director's assessment that a specific matter is not negotiable" (p. 441). True participatory governance would, in the writer's mind, utilize the staff as well as the director in deciding which issues should be negotiated, at what level in the organization, and which, if any, should be delegated to be the sole responsibility of the director. It turns out that the authors are both in upper management positions (p. 443).

Grenier (1971), discusses aspects of staff development of the Illinois Department of Corrections Juvenile Division in essentially a self-contradictory manner, making it difficult to know exactly to what extent he is committed to participation. He states:

...management needs to guarantee each employee a voice in

his activities, to help him become fully informed, to offer experiences and education that foster personal and job development in agreement with the organization's philosophy. Then, the employee, as a responsible person, is able to move in constructive ways. (p. 189)

There are sections devoted to open communication, including recognition of the fallibility of those in power and how this problem can be handled, and the value of staff participation (pp. 189-190).

This is interspersed with statements such as:

It is unrealistic to expect results from a training program that promotes beliefs and practices alien to those of management--no matter how desirable other professional workers consider such beliefs and practices. Staff development properly has no identify except that of the organization's management; it is a supplement or extension of management and exists only to support the objectives of the administrators. (p. 188)

One is reminded of Henry Ford's dictum to the effect that his employees on the assembly line could paint Model T cars any color they wanted as long as it was black.

Management by Objectives, an increasingly popular form of management in social service agencies, is not the same as worker participation in management. Although the two are not incompatible, it is not appropriate to equate them, either. Raider emphasizes the differences repeatedly (1976, p. 525, and 1977, pp. 242-243). Raider also asserts that any form of effective management in a social service agency must involve professional workers in decision making regarding their work and encourages a general shift in decision making to lower levels within the organization (1976, p. 525). A clear idea of the practical differences between MBO and worker participation in management is provided in the account by Spano and Lund of some of the practical difficulties encountered when MBO was installed in a hospital social



service unit (1976, pp. 267-276). Tosi et al doubt that the methodological issues associated with establishing that the introduction of MOB induces significant changes have been resolved to the point where a definite conclusion can be made on the subject (1976, pp. 276, 299, 300).<sup>8</sup>

It would not seem possible to produce a better criterion for use in distinguishing between genuine and false participation than that of control. The appearance of participation is not being proposed as therapy for staff. Actual participation based on a sharing of power, and observable in actual outcomes, is being proposed as a better way of

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<sup>8</sup> This article is as useful as any the writer has examined in providing a practical demonstration that there is an analog of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle at work in the social sciences. Tosi et al go to exceptional lengths to discuss the methodological weaknesses of various methods, including their own, of measuring changes and attributing causality. They make the reader acutely aware of the inter-play between factors; how an increase in sensitivity or reliability in measurement in one area will contribute to a corresponding decrease in another. In addition to comments that explicitly cover aspects of this phenomenon, on pp. 279, 280, and 287, consider the following two excerpts:

Thus the analysis of causality based on cross-lag correlations, static correlations, and dynamic correlations suggests all positive causal influences where such influences are justified, while the analysis of impact correlations suggests that all such causal influences should be negative. But both analyses are based on the same reasoning. The contradiction in the data suggests that one cannot draw valid causal inferences from either analysis. (p. 283)

Mathematically, the effect of instability on static, cross-lagged, dynamic, and impact correlations is indistinguishable from the effect of error of measurement, and instability and measurement error, sum together in a single error term. Thus a model that includes both and assumes no real change will make the same major predictions as the model built on unreliability alone, so will fail to fit our data for the same reasons. However, the existence of significant transient factors makes the coefficient of equivalence--reliability--useless for eliminating the effect of error by correction for attenuation and the like. (pp. 288-289)

running a social service agency.

### High Overhead and Low Productivity

Perhaps the most easily perceived problem that any participatory system would encounter would be that of finding enough time between meetings to get the work done. Savas points out that in a social service agency, just as in any other organization, the important output measurement is the extent to which the job gets done, and that in connection with outputs, this should not be confused with the number or kind of inputs that are utilized (1976, p. 155).<sup>9</sup> Effectiveness is the amount of work done compared to how much work there was to do, and efficiency can only be calculated when inputs and effectiveness are known. Multiple measures of effectiveness would have to be utilized in a social service agency (p. 155).

Staff would have to make a conscious effort to keep meetings short. This is not impossible. There exists a body of knowledge on how this can be done.<sup>10</sup> It should also be remembered that not everyone will be meeting to decide about everything. Most decisions would be made by small groups of those most directly affected. It could turn out that meetings, an input, could result in greater effectiveness, in which case there would not be a loss of efficiency

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<sup>9</sup> Savas gives the example of a city sanitation department, which has the objective of keeping the city clean. The department is more likely to report on how many tons of garbage it collected, an input, without reporting on how much was left behind (1976, p. 155).

<sup>10</sup> The Manitoba Civil Service Development and Training branch, for example, offers workshops on the subject.

even if the amount of time spent on meetings was somewhat greater.

There are countervailing advantages which would be enjoyed by a participative management system as well. There are numerous small innovations which can only be perceived by those line staff engaged in doing a specific job, which could be more readily implemented in such an agency. Not so much time would have to be spent reporting a situation to a supervisor, who would likely need to ask further questions of clarification before giving a decision, which then has to be communicated downward again. In conventional organizations, there are areas in which numerous informal arrangements evolve despite the resistance of management. That is why work-to-rule campaigns are effective. If everyone always worked exactly according to the rules, most organizations would have long since ceased to function.

The cybernetic principle behind the statements in the preceding paragraph is Ashby's principle of requisite variety, which states, "If stability is to be attained, the variety of the controlling system must be at least as great as the variety of the system it controls" (McEwan, 1971, p. 186). Pyramidal organizational structures inherently lack the requisite variety because they lack enough channels with which to convey information. When such an inadequate control system attempts to control an organization of greater variety, the result is that it accumulates a vast amount of information which is essentially useless because it cannot be put into a meaningful perspective (McEwan, p. 187). This is one mechanism which contributes to an explanation of why Simon's principle of bounded rationality is true, and is also of use in understanding the findings of Hoos, both mentioned in chapter four.

The greater ability of autonomous workers to respond quickly to

changes in the environment would also promote efficiency and effectiveness, because, in a home unit setting, where most decisions are made within the unit, the controlling system is synonomous with the controlled system, and the amount of variety would be the same in each case.

Vanek, an economist of high repute, though he is not widely known in this country, has developed the principles of an economic theory of participatory management, or as he terms it, of labor managed economies (1970 and 1977). He has also published work which explains what he has discovered as a result of his efforts and that addresses some of the social implications of them (1971). It is beyond the scope of this paper to treat his theories, and beyond the knowledge of this writer to judge his work. Several interesting points remain, however. Vanek claims that economies based on his General Theory of Labor-Managed Market Economies are efficient in absolute terms and more efficient than other existing systems (1970, p. 403). He states that the Yugoslavian economy, which has some of the same characteristics as Vanek's ideal type (1971, p. 39), had a better annual real per capita growth of income rate than any other country in the world except Japan during the period 1952-1964, and better than any other second or third world country: 8 per cent, as opposed to 8.6 per cent for Japan, and 2

percent for the United States (pp. 46-47).<sup>11</sup> Even those economists who disagree with Vanek are unable to refute his work.<sup>12</sup>

Perhaps the most useful closing comment with respect to this problem would be to suggest a trial by fire. If, after a participatory system has been implemented and stabilized, it is less efficient than a conventional agency to operate, the funding bodies would request it to revert to its former system and withdraw their funding if it failed to comply. A legitimate comparison between a traditional agency and a participatory one would have to include human resource accounting procedures in both organizations to take into account the lower costs as a result of staff turnover and burnout that a participatory agency would be expected to incur, and which would offset possibly slightly greater day to day operating costs.

### Morale

It could be expected that an agency in transition would have some morale problems. Denhardt, Blumberg, and Schuler were each cited in chapter xix in relation to their findings of better morale in participatory organizations. Cole's report, cited in chapter three, that workers are most concerned with what is going on around them would imply that there would be an increase in morale if workers would do

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<sup>11</sup> Vanek uses these statistics to show the greater efficiency inherent in a self managed economy, where wages and capital investments are paid out of operating surplus. If there were not enough surplus to maintain a high rate of capital investment, wages, even if initially higher, would quickly stagnate. (1971, pp. 47-50) It is not being suggested that in a participatory social service organization the rate of wage increases should be higher than the rate for the rest of the economy.

<sup>12</sup> Personal Communication with Dr. Paul Phillips, Department of Economics, University of Manitoba, November 1979.

something about their concerns. It would also be expected that home units, by virtue of their primary group characteristics, would encourage development of more trusting relationships, which are positively correlated with morale (Zand, 1977, pp. 232-235). Sherwin suggests that an important element when a decision is made to leave the company, which he designates "payroll turnover," is often a lack of "position turnover," or the changing of jobs within the company, and that keeping a person in one job for long periods of time stifles commitment to the organization as well as retarding the development of new skills. He suggests that accidental "payroll turnover" is not the best way to create "position turnover"; that there should be provision for more flexible job assignments, which would increase commitment to the company, or morale (1972, p. 43). Sherwin's proposed alternative is that jobs be made to include a wider variety of challenges, that there be temporary assignments, that people report to various people for different aspects of their jobs, and that temporary administrative structures be established to deal with emerging problems; they would deal with that specific problem and then disband (pp. 44-46). That something similar to most of these ideas has already been proposed can be taken as an indication that morale problems, and burnout, will, on the whole, be reduced in a participatory agency.

#### A Final Question

The first part of this thesis dealt predominantly with ideas that have contributed to western thought about man, both in relation to the world around him as well as in relation to other men. This was followed by a consideration of various aspects of organizational theory

and the relationship of people to organizations. It has ended with a proposed alternate structure for social service agencies that takes into account the distinction between work and labour and allows for the attainment of the same goals, but in such a way that more work is done by front line staff, and less labour.

The challenge can be put more bluntly. Vanek's theories on participatory economies produce a convergence in the resulting social institutions with what Pope John XXIII proposed in Mater et Magistra. He cites, specifically, paragraphs 23, 53, 75-77, 82, 84, 91, and 117 of that encyclical, which deal with mutual problem solving between workers and employers, subsidiarity (affirmation of the appropriateness of the involvement of the larger community in matters that private enterprise cannot deal with), workers' ownership of shares in their firm, sharing of profits with workers, work structures which are compatible with human dignity, and worker participation in management in average sized and large enterprises (Vanek, 1970, p. 6 and Pope John XXIII, 1961, pp. 418-442).

Traditional social service agencies use western ideas of the nature of man and the high value of human life as a rationale for their existence, but do not follow the implications of those ideas in their structures. They opt, instead, for a bureaucratic model derived from an organizational innovation which made war more predictable and death of the participants more likely. That same bureaucratic model has been adopted and refined by the business community because it has made certain other outcomes, such as enrichment of the owner, more probable. Because of the different fundamental value systems between social service agencies and business organization, (improving the quality of

life of those in need of same as opposed to enriching the owners), there would not seem to be any type of organization that has fewer obstacles to overcome in order to make the transition from a traditional bureaucratic management style to one utilizing participation by staff in decision making. The benefits to be realized in terms of better staff morale and more effective provision of services would appear to be worth the uncertainties associated with any transitional period. Is it not worth trying?



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