

Community Development in Rainy River First Nations: A Study of Self-
Sufficiency and Land-Culture

by

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Abstract

Due to government intervention the inhabitants of Rainy River First Nations were deprived of the material resources available to many Canadians. In 1914, the federal government established a community reserve that consisted of peoples from eight separate and distinct communities, which directly contravened Treaty Three. The paper (through interviews, observation and textual analysis) provides a critical overview of the community's land claims settlement and reclamation process, and struggle for sustainability in the twenty-first century. In addition, it examines the manner that land-culture, human resources and capital resources may be applied to revitalize the community through community development and economic strategies.

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Gichi miigwech to my committee, peter kulchyski, Wanda Wuttunee and John Loxley.

Dedication

This paper is dedicated to knowledge seekers, diviners of faith and the ever defiant tribes of our Mother Earth.

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List of Copyrighted Material for which Permission was Obtained

Settlement Agreement (January 11, 2005), Rainy River First Nations, pages 32, 33, 37, 38, 39, 40 & 46.

Trust Agreement (March 12, 2005), Rainy River First Nations, pages 47, 48 & 49.

INTRODUCTION

My thesis is *Community Development in Rainy River First Nations: A Study of Self-Sufficiency and Land-Culture*. The study explores the possibilities for community renewal through community development (CD) and community economic development (CED).

Initially, the research topic was inspired by the land claims settlement negotiated between Rainy River First Nations, the province of Ontario and Canada. The compensation package from the 'Settlement Agreement' has provided a substantial capital resource (\$71 million) for the community. This capital infusion, although much needed in the community, is not the economic windfall that some may think. As a community resource, its re-investment requires a long-view of Rainy River First Nations socioeconomic situation, with a focus on personal and professional development for community members.

My research examines many facets of Anishinaabeg land-culture, human potential and capital investment through a social science lens. This study is divided into three chapters, which breakdown as follows.

In the first chapter, I look at the historical significance of land-culture for the Anishinaabeg. Their existence, exploration and settlement of Turtle Island reveals specific lines of inquiry for the study of socioeconomic development on Rainy River First Nations (also known as Manitou Rapids reserve).

In the pre-contact era, the Anishinaabeg, through their creativity and fortitude, survived in a challenging environment. With the influx of European traders throughout

Turtle Island, new economies formed in the fur rich areas of the Anishinaabeg. Initially, the fur trade proved beneficial for traders and hunter-trappers; but, eventually, industrial trapping (i.e., unsustainable methods) and Europe's waning demand for animal pelts resulted in the fur trade's collapse. The economic collapse coupled with the absence of country-foods meant the Anishinaabeg suffered many desperate years in the nineteenth century. After Canada passed the Indian Act (1876), government policy, forced enclosure on reserves and misappropriation of Anishinaabeg territories were the cause of poverty and despair throughout the twentieth century.

Today, the people of Rainy River First Nations do not remember the thrift, resourcefulness and resilience of their ancestors. Rather, cultural dissonance and government interference mark their recent memory of community life. These conditions are in stark contrast to the independence they once enjoyed - living on the land.

The Settlement Agreement (effective January 11, 2005) was intended to address the illegal seizure of Rainy River First Nations lands by Ontario and Canada. Moreover, it and the Trust Agreement were needed to address the pressing issues of poverty and dependency on the reserve. In the second and third chapters, I move the discussion forward to address socioeconomic issues and political concerns on Manitou Rapids.

At the behest of the Ontario government, Canada (in 1914-15) forced seven reserve communities onto Manitou Rapids; a move that created much social upheaval for the Anishinaabeg communities. Until Rainy River First Nations served the government with a legal suit (in 1982), it had refused to act. Despite a formal resolution to the matter,

the negative effects caused by government interference (almost a century ago) remain unresolved.

In light of Canada's deficient policies, the second chapter outlines the Settlement Agreement's main purpose: 1) dispensation of the compensation package to Rainy River; and, 2) establishment of claims implementation process to facilitate additions to reserve (ATR) and maintenance of trust property. Hence, the middle chapter's focus is the claims implementation process, which is based on two primary components: a) land purchase program; and, b) trust property. As it stands, Rainy River First Nations has a forty-year window to purchase land through ATR to take advantage of the Settlement Agreement's 'fast track' legislation. To date, bureaucratic delays, partly due to the complexities of ATR, have made it difficult for the implementation committee and Rainy River First Nations - Land Purchase Committee to acquire suitable claims land.

As part of the Trust Agreement's mandate, the settlement trust has assumed responsibility for subsidizing community services that lack proper government funding. However, the trust's maintenance of services, such as health care, fails to address the design flaws of federal programs. Therein, membership continues to receive inadequate services. It is a common theme in Canada, as community-based organizations have worked to shore-up services with the state's retreat from social welfare since the late 1970s.

My third chapter examines the economic development practices adopted by Rainy River First Nations. Currently, Manitou Forest Products, a sawmill located on Manitou Rapids reserve, is the largest employer of community members. It produces quality wood

paneling for consumers, largely, in the export markets of Ontario, Manitoba and the U.S. Due to its conservative business approach it has remained a viable entity in the lumber industry of northwestern Ontario.

In terms of major investment, Rainy River First Nations, like Canada's corporate elite, is focussed on resource extraction in northwestern Ontario. Through its involvement with the Fort Frances Chiefs Secretariat, Rainy River First Nations has tended to prefer external development (e.g., gold mining) to community-based strategies for economic development. Band council's goal of economic independence, through high stakes development, raises questions about its commitment to community development, and socioeconomic issues in the community.

Like many First Nations, substance abuse is a serious problem, which is significant amongst youth and young adults on Rainy River First Nations. Substance abuse (as a condition of dependency) contributes to unemployment or underemployment, and members reliance on social assistance means their families live in poverty. It is members' dependency issues that negatively impacts the entire community, and diminishes the quality of life on Manitou Rapids. This subject will be discussed at length in the fourth and final chapter.

COMMUNITY BIOGRAPHY

Rainy River First Nations is an Anishinaabeg community with an approximate population of 300 peoples; total band membership, at current, is about 800 peoples. Its southern border is the Rainy River, which flows from Rainy Lake (near Fort Frances,

ON) into Lake of the Woods. The Rainy River establishes the physical and national boundaries of Canada and the U.S.

Over a century ago the river was a source of large sturgeon for the community, but commercial fishing and industrial pollution from upstream decimated the sturgeon population. Shortly thereafter, wild rice grounds suffered a similar fate due to extensive flooding caused by hydroelectric dams. The features of the river, such as rapids, are sacred and spiritual gathering places for the community.

The area is known for its burial mounds, which were constructed by the ancestors of modern Ojibwa peoples. These large earthen hills stand above the natural undulations of rock and grasses along the shore. Certain areas of the region remain heavily forested although these places are in decline due to development.

Whereas trapping, hunting and fishing, as economic activities, once sustained the Anishinaabeg, today, these are more often lifestyle 'choices' for community members. While commercial trapping and fishing, in northwestern Ontario, are not viable economic practices, the forest industry and mining are major economic players in the Rainy River area.

METHODOLOGY

This paper is the product of qualitative research performed in Manitou Rapids. I conducted key informant interviews with seven persons in the community. Interviews, contained in thesis, are cited (as such) and frequently referred to throughout the paper. Initially, the interview process involved scheduling and appointments with several people

to gather details on local businesses and economic initiatives financed by Rainy River First Nations. All persons interviewed had their words attributed to them. I supplemented the interviews with relevant passages gleaned from several documents and correspondence with key figures. This included a review of government legislation, email interviews, news release(s) and corporate prospectuses to aid myself in understanding the political, economic and social conditions at play in the region. All information compiled during field research phase was carefully documented and catalogued for further analysis during the writing phase.

My main concern, as an Aboriginal researcher, was the analysis of socioeconomic conditions on Rainy River First Nations. To do this accurately I adopted (and adapted) the aphorism '(collect and) write what you know,' as a social scientist, first and foremost. In developing the research method, I examined questions like - Does the settlement implementation process establish professional recruitment or training, which are necessary for community development to occur? And - What kinds of economic development are most destructive to the Rainy River ecology?

In terms of positionality, my Aboriginal personhood was an afterthought rather than a major consideration. It struck me that the community (which had suffered greatly for generations) may benefit immensely from the land claims settlement, so I set out to examine its basic 'costs and benefits' for the community, and offer a thorough critique. However, when the negative implications of this critical examination, and other research questions, began to wear on me, it was with traditional cultural practices, like trapping, that I found possible solutions to the community's dilemma. I came to recognize that

these traditions, when combined with modern socioeconomic practices, may provide a buffer from the external pressures of Canada's society.

As the native studies field has greatly expanded in the last thirty years I had access to numerous texts to aid my research. Most documents in the reference list were invaluable to this study, however, there are some notable examples: *Following Nimishoomis: The Trout Lake History of Dedibaayaaninanook Sarah Keesick Olsen*; *The Northern Ojibwa and the Fur Trade: An Historical and Ecological Study*; *Aboriginal, Northern, and Community Economic Development: Papers and Retrospectives*; and *Final Report, August 2007* from the Manitoba Provincial Forum on Trauma Recovery.

My research is heavily influenced by theoretical models (e.g., convergence) with a unique bottom-up approach. The writings of Sheldrick and Shragge have greatly informed my understanding of community economic development "as a community-driven process that combines social, economic and environmental goals to build healthy and economically viable communities" (Sheldrick, 2007, p. 90). Therefore, many views I present in this paper are starkly contrasted with the top-down approach favored by neoliberal theorists and economists.

CHAPTER ONE

Anishinaabeg peoples, as permanent residents, have lived and died along the Rainy River for centuries. A. Hunter (personal communication, February 8, 2010), a member of Rainy River First Nations, shared his thoughts on Anishinaabeg (Ojibwa) history before European settlement:

Well, basically, it's Kay-Nah-Chi-Wah-Nung or Manitou Mounds or Long Sault Reserve, that site over there has seen the most consistent and long-term habitation by Aboriginal peoples going back 10,000-plus years and different groups of indigenous peoples lived there, did ceremonies there, fished there, and it has the largest concentration of burial mounds in North America. So, it was a significant, important cultural and spiritual place to the indigenous peoples that have lived there for over 10,000 years, including ourselves, the Anishinaabeg, and to the people who lived along the Rainy River, which Manitou is part of that, Manitou Rapids [Manidoo-baawitigong]. At one time, the Rainy River Anishinaabeg, or as we know it, Spirit River, Manitou, Manitou Zibii Anishinaabeg, lived along the breadth of the Rainy River.

His synopsis provides a window into the continuity of Ojibwa culture, and their ancestors, in the Rainy River region of northwestern Ontario. Certainly, they shaped the landscape in many ways, as evidenced by the burial mounds of Kay-Nah-Chi-Wah-Nung. However, there is little known about the mounds, and the purpose for internment of the dead in this manner. The senior knowledge keepers familiar with this practice did not relate their cultural knowledge before their passing; and, the exact purpose for burial mounds ended with them. By the late nineteenth century this interruption of cultural history had a deleterious effect on the communities and foreshadowed a more ominous period for the Rainy River Ojibwa in the twentieth century. In terms of day-to-day survival, the Ojibwa developed a country-food economy, based on seasonal activities, that depended on the abundance and diversity of wild game and plants for food and

medicinal purposes. They had to be flexible in the foods (i.e. fauna, flora) sought and consumed and the hunter/gatherer roles, which permitted them to survive. The pre-columbian trade networks that existed prior to the fur trade provided the Anishinaabeg, and adjacent tribes, with goods unobtainable in their own territories.

According to S. Cole (2009), *Rainy River Lives: Stories Told By Maggie Wilson*, Ojibwa men and women, in extended family units, assumed gender roles that were flexible:

Traditional social positions and roles played by men and women in Ojibwe society emerged over millennia in the patterned seasonal quest for subsistence in hunting, fishing and gathering. Roles of women and men were reciprocal. Balance between the tasks performed by women and men created a harmonious society (Klein and Ackerman 1995; Leacock 1978). At the same time, the seasonal and annual fluctuations in the resources on which the Ojibwes [*sic*] depended for subsistence required role flexibility. If the cultural ideal was that men were hunters and women processed the rewards of the hunt to make food, clothing and shelter, it was also accepted that both men and women performed whatever tasks needed to be done to ensure the survival of their families. This flexibility in gender roles was combined with the fundamental Ojibwe respect for personal autonomy of the individual. Women, like men, were considered autonomous persons who possessed decision-making authority over their time, their labour, and the fruits of their labour (Albers 1989; Landes 1938; Leacock 1978). Thus the roles individual women assumed were not contested but were respected as personal choice (pp. Xix-Xxx).

Because of their relative autonomy men and women met the challenge of obtaining adequate food with the most efficient methods possible to conserve energy and avoid confrontation. Although men, as big game hunters, contributed large stores of food to the family group, in times of sickness, women hunted and gathered food items required to sustain the group.

Within the family group, migratory wildlife patterns, weather and natural habitat were an integral part of culture-based knowledge. For the Anishinaabeg these natural motifs represented the experiential knowledge, cultural and spiritual narratives that informed their existence. From birth, a family member would be immersed in Anishinaabeg tenets, which made survival possible.

In *Following Nimishoomis: The Trout Lake History of Dedibaayaanimanook Sarah Keesick Olsen*, H. Agger provides a personal record of the Trout Lake Ojibwa. Agger's text, set primarily in the early twentieth century, was developed from interviews with her mother, Sarah Keesick Olsen. Agger (2008), who adopts her mother's perspective, has detailed Anishinaabeg child rearing methods:

The process of handing down knowledge about the various aspects of the old ways came in the form of experiential instruction that began at an early age for children of the community. Because most of her siblings were into adulthood when she was born, Dedibaayaanimanook's [Sarah Keesick Olsen] circumstance was such that her parents were able to provide her with more time and attention than would otherwise have been possible. In fact, their parenting style was quite similar to that of grand-parenting (p. 117).

This parenting method, which developed children's innate curiosity, demanded a teacher's time and patience; but, a deep bond formed between the parent, as teacher, and child, as pupil. Dedibaayaanimanook's upbringing provided her with "a vast body of knowledge that reinforced what had been given [the Anishinaabeg] by their predecessors. Much of that information related to the animals that co-existed with them" (Agger, 2008, p. 118). Child nurturing through parents, grandparents and relatives, as practiced by Anishinaabeg, was an integral part of their learning process (or life journey) and communal existence. In time, the child, with aid of the parents, grandparents and

extended family, would pass through adolescence into adulthood by experience, ceremony and ritual to be affirmed and reaffirmed throughout their lifetime in stories.

For Anishinaabeg, the synthesis of their earthly existence came down to *aadasookewin*, a narrative form practiced by elders and senior knowledge keepers. These stories performed dual roles, as they provided the context for everyday life in the bush and inspired dreams for listeners around fires at night. Agger (2008) has explained the significance of *aadasookewin*:

All of Dedibaayaanimanook's uncles, particularly Naadowe Robert, Kiiweyaasin William and Jiiyaan Donald, were blessed with the gift of oratory. They were also endowed with an ability for *aadasookewin*, that is, the telling of timeless stories. This particular form of story telling [*sic*] was critical to the people in many ways, not least of which was the preservation of the people's historical identity. Although details changed over generations of telling, the main elements of each story were rooted in fact, no matter how far into the distant past they may have occurred. By preserving the people's journey through time, *aadasookewin* was vital for maintaining the knowledge of who they were as Anishinaabe people (p. 79).

As an embodied practice *aadasookewin* was foregrounded in the many rituals and feasts conducted by Namegosibii (Trout Lake) Anishinaabeg. For example, autumn feasts performed several functions: spirit-beings were honoured, old friendships were rekindled and, generally, community members were reunited, as families prepared to face another winter in isolation. It is important to note that the above passage from Agger refers to the Namegosibii Anishinaabeg who lived near present-day Red Lake, Ontario. However, Rainy River Ojibwa rites and ceremonies would closely resemble those of the Trout Lake Ojibwa in style and purpose. Rainy River First Nations is 278 kilometres southeast of Trout Lake, as the crow flies.

Anishinaabeg cosmology - an intermixture of material and spiritual planes of existence, became integrated with one's identity once adulthood was entered.

Dedibaayaanimanook recalls these 'rites of passage' for Namegosibii Anishinaabeg:

When the Keesicks were still at Jiibayi Zaagiing [Jackfish Bay] one Spring, the comfortable routine of Dedibaayaanimanook's mid-childhood was interrupted by a conversation in which she overheard her parents discussing the subject of her upcoming vision quest. It was around the time of her ninth birthday, about two years after her grandfather had passed on. Immediately, the details of her father's [Dedibayaash] spiritual journey came to mind. She had sat down and listened closely as he began the story of his experiences. Going on such a quest, he explained, was a purely spiritual pilgrimage for the purpose of finding one's life's path. It was intended only for pre-adolescents - never adults - and only for those who were not fearful. He also explained that, long before he himself was born, his own father, Giizhik, had gone to seek out the being known as Gizhe Manidoo, the Loving Spirit. As she listened, Dedibaayaanimanook tried to imagine what it must have been like to visit Manidoo Minis [Spirit Island], the tiny rock-laced island which sits solitary near the middle of Namegosibiing [Trout Lake]. She wondered how it felt to be left alone for all those days without food or drink, long enough for the mundane cares of everyday life to no longer matter. Her father went on to depict nights filled with strange, terrible sounds designed to weaken his resolve as his physical strength faded with each passing day. But, he also explained that, at the same time, it had become increasingly apparent to him that Gizhe Manidoo would give him courage to persevere. Finally, on the sixth day, his father, Giizhik, arrived from Ma'iingani Minis - Wolf Island - where the family had relocated during his absence. Dedibayaash gathered what strength he had left to begin their homeward journey. Although his efforts to keep pace were laboured and he yearned to rest on the sled, his father would not allow him to ride. Hours later, his mother stood waiting for them at Negiishkensikaang, on Ma'iingani Minis. The cup she handed him contained a tiny quantity of water (Agger, 2008, pp. 18-9).

These trials of physical, psychological and emotional fortitude when combined with spiritual conviction served to reinforce the integration of the individual into Anishinaabeg culture. Like the parent-child bond, it was a connection to Creator and, more importantly,

a shared experience with other Anishinaabeg that strengthened familial ties in the community.

For medical reasons, Dedibaayaanimanook was prevented from experiencing her vision quest and, as a consequence, she could not perform the sacred ritual of name giving. But, as an Anishinaabekwe, Dedibaayaanimanook remained responsible for living a good life, which involved strict adherence to codes of conduct, based on Creator's law and kinship ties that generally governed protocol between men and women, marriage and family members.

Furthermore, commitment to the safety and well-being of family, which included relatives and adopted family, was paramount for these bonds maintained cultural unity and ensured survival. An excerpt from Agger (2008) illustrated the importance of duty and responsibility when an ailing relative's family required help:

Dedibaayaanimanook's parents had learned of Netawibiitam John's failing health, and that he was now unable to walk. . . . In response to news that his condition had rapidly worsened, the two young cousins hurriedly prepared to go [to] Gaaminitigwashkiigaag and offer a helping hand to their aging aunt, Gookomens Minogaabawiik. They were to help her with fire wood and any other chores that needed doing. They were told [by parents] to stay for as long as Gookomens need them (pp. 110-11).

The empathy and compassion displayed by the young girls in this anecdote was not unique to this particular family. Rather, it exemplified the compassionate behavior found in aadasookewin of the Anishinaabeg.

Cole (2009) has acknowledged that "[t]raditionally, political organization had been family based, and most decisions were made by consensus. Marriage, divorce, inheritance, and adoption were all considered family matters" (p. Xxxvii). However, the

interruption of the fur trade brought social change to the lives of the Anishinaabeg. Eventually, it would threaten the cultural identity and survival of many tribal peoples.

FUR TRADE - AN 'ENDEAVOUR TO PERSEVERE'

The fur trade system brought remarkable socioeconomic change to the lives of Aboriginal peoples. In the post-contact era, with the exception of war, disease and religious proselytization, no other phenomena had such an immense and overwhelming impact on their material culture(s). *The Northern Ojibwa and the Fur Trade* by C.A. Bishop (1974) detailed this impact:

By the latter date [1821] certain trade items had become essential to survival and trapping, since much of their aboriginal material culture had been replaced gradually by attrition during the previous 200 years. Subsistence patterns involving the food quest had also altered from the preceding era. Competition and overhunting had decimated both the fur bearers and game animals. Subsistence activities took up valuable time, and trade items became more difficult to obtain, although their value in terms of survival increased after the disappearance of large animals. The result was that trapping had become an important subsistence activity, for it was only through the trade in furs that the Ojibwa could obtain items necessary for survival, and in turn, for trapping itself (pp. 184-85).

Ojibwa trappers, and their families, had struggled for modest gains in the early fur trade. Some even experienced a modicum of independence within the trade system, as hunter-trappers. But, for Northern Ojibwa peoples, the early nineteenth century ushered in a period of poverty, social upheaval and starvation. As large game, such as moose and caribou, were severely depleted the balance of power shifted to fur traders and merchant

profiteers. Many of those Ojibwa families, now in servitude to fur depots - suffered chronic malnutrition and died - their spirits left to haunt the abandoned encampments and outposts of this north-west region (of present-day Ontario).

For Bishop the north-west interior was the geographical endpoint for many tribes of Northern Ojibwa but not their hunting and trapping territory prior to the fur trade. Bishop (1974) claimed:

[A]ll the evidence suggests that the Ojibwa at contact occupied an area from the east end of Georgian Bay on Lake Huron to Michipicoten Bay on the northeast shore of Lake Superior. It should be clear then, that according to this interpretation, there were no peoples who could be specifically categorized as 'Northern' Ojibwa prior to the arrival of the White Man [*sic*] (pp. 5-7).

In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the abundance of country-foods in the areas noted above meant Ojibwa migration (as established by Bishop) was due to other factors, such as the pursuit of high-quality fur bearing animals. However, other scholars have theorized "that the prehistoric Ojibwa occupied the same general area in northern Ontario," which is the Boreal Forest region of northwestern Ontario (Bishop, 1974, pp. 4-5).

Bishop's (1974) research, which relies heavily on Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) archival documents for fur trade information, has determined through his study of archaeological data:

[T]he fisheries of this region, especially those near Sault Ste. Marie, were extremely productive and capable of supplying great quantities of food from May through October. All this evidence suggesting a bountiful food supply

near the north shore of Lake Huron and at the east end of Lake Superior lends support to the view that the Ojibwa would have had no need to make extensive migrations either to the north or northwest of Lake Superior into Cree territory in aboriginal times (p. 5).

Bishop believed that upon European arrival in the Great Lake's region, Ojibwa territory was limited to the intersections of Lake's Superior, Michigan and Huron. He contends Ojibwa peoples may have explored the north-west of Ontario on hunting expeditions; but, otherwise, they were situated within the Great Lakes area, as described above.

It is important to note as they expanded into an area, Ojibwa, and other tribes, would recede from an area previously occupied. In this way the hunting groups remained cohesive and, more or less, intact as a tribal 'family'. The vacated area, such as the east end of Lake Superior, was then occupied by another expanding tribe. Of course, war (or feigned aggression), spurred by increases in population density, limited resources and personal ambition, made dispersal from a hunting territory obligatory for the defeated tribe. The following excerpt from Bishop (1974) referred to territorial expansion and trade after the Iroquois wars:

Following the Iroquois wars during the 1640's and 1650's [*sic*] the Ojibwa among other Algonkian groups dispersed to the west and were acting as middlemen to the Siouan Dakota and Assiniboin and to the Cree west of Lake Superior. However, some Cree were on the north shore of Lake Superior in 1660. The evidence seems to signify that the Ojibwa migrated along the northern and southern shores of Lake Superior before they expanded northwards (pp. 308-09).

According to Bishop (1974), the fur trade brought Aboriginal nations into contact as "both the Cree and Assiniboin [in 1670s] were forced to trade through Ottawa and Ojibwa middlemen" (p. 310). Shortly thereafter, the Ottawa and Ojibwa tribes took up trapping to procure trade goods for the corporate depots.

Regardless of the hypothesis to which one submits about the prehistoric location of Ojibwa peoples, by the early seventeenth century, Aboriginal migration, encroachment and aggression were a main feature of the early fur trade. As discussed in Bishop (1974), "It was the fur trade, introduced first by the French and later the English Hudson's Bay Company, that precipitated population movements, competition over game resources, and even warfare during the early centuries of contact" (p. 1). Due to an abundance of animal resources in the Boreal Forest region, the Ojibwa, as fur producers, expanded northward and supplanted the Cree, who did the same to Assiniboine and Dakota peoples. By the 1770s, the Ojibwa were well established in the area that lies north-west of the Great Lake's.

Although the Ojibwa came to accept their economic role as fur producer, they tried to maintain their 'migratory' lifestyle; in this respect, the early trade system afforded a large degree of independence. As Bishop (1974) has explained: "Ojibwa were more interested in hunting for food than for furs. . . . [and] there was no shortage of trade goods for Indians, since if the Osnaburgh post ran short, the Indians would merely go elsewhere" (p. 289). The Ojibwa expected to hunt, fish and trap whenever necessary like their ancestors of the pre-contact epoch. But, they also enjoyed the novelties of the fur trade; and, eventually, a comfortable level of economic interdependence developed

between trader and trapper. Most Ojibwa hunter-trappers chose trade goods, such as hatchets, guns, cooking pots and other accessories for their efficiency and ease of use.

In terms of subsistence, moose and caribou were the major game animals pursued by Ojibwa peoples. One of these large 'deer' provided enough sustenance for several people over the course of a few weeks and the hide was ideal for bush clothing. Bishop (1974) has indicated: "The meat of the large cervines, caribou and moose, either fresh, dried, or pounded, constituted the primary source of food traded [and consumed] by Ojibwa" (p. 232). The moose, especially, had an important cultural significance for Ojibwa hunters and their families. Moose hunting, in particular, demanded the hunters full attention (and resources) and represented an age-old struggle between (hu)man and animal-spirit.

Bishop (1974) has noted: "[A]s food was obtained solely from subsistence pursuits, it appears that two ecological factors of prime importance tended to set limits on hunting group size: population density and the abundance of food" (p. 164). Slowly, Ojibwa hunter-trappers, with access to fresh supplies and new technologies (e.g., firearms, steel traps), began to disturb the ecological balance in the north-west interior through their aggressive pursuit of large game and fur bearers. However, as previously noted by Bishop, due to the immense numbers of deer and fur bearing animals their scarcity was not fully apparent until the nineteenth century.

Whereas French traders allied with the Northwest Company (NWC) had established outposts in Cree and Assiniboine territory (by 1676); HBC traders were slow to position themselves in the north-west interior. In 1690, the HBC established Fort

Severn and York Factory to address the intense competition for furs in the area. "The importance of these posts in attracting Indians is indicated by the Hudson's Bay trader James Knight," wrote Bishop (1974), "who in 1716 at York Factory, reported that the area about the post had been cleared of deer [caribou] for 100 miles around, and, . . . That same summer there were more than 1,000 Indians at the post awaiting the arrival of the ship laden with trade supplies" (p. 311). This example demonstrated how a high concentration of families around fur depots could have a devastating effect on deer populations in a short period. As Ojibwa hunter-trappers disregard for traditional conservation methods grew, animal populations began to slowly decline throughout the Boreal Forest region. Ojibwa hunting groups would radiate out from depots in search of fur bearers and country-foods; and, unsustainable methods became common in their economic practices.

The above example foreshadows the fur trade's future, as basic and supplementary needs of Ojibwa peoples would be met through goods accessible only through trade. In the early phase of trade, Aboriginal trappers, in extended families or large groups, would insist upon luxury items (e.g., flour, tobacco and alcohol) but, by the early nineteenth century, they became wholly dependent on the traders for basic necessities to stave off hunger and starvation.

By the mid-eighteenth century, trapping had steadily grown in importance for the Ojibwa; and, eventually, became a subsistence activity for them. Bishop (1974) outlined the qualities of the trapping economy that took hold in the Boreal Forest region:

Between the resources and the trading companies who sold their products on the world markets stood the Indian producers. In exchange for furs, traders

provided Indians with a variety of goods. In time, many of these goods totally replaced less efficient aboriginal items, so that Indians came to depend upon the trader. However, trade policies were implemented to maximize profits by higher company officials who frequently had little contact with remote interior areas where furs were taken. These policies were often detrimental to the producers who, because of their dependent, or at least semi-dependent position, had little control over policy making. This was the situation that characterized northern Ontario after 1821 (p. 110).

Specifically, fur bearing animals, as raw materials or fur trade products, were thought of as commodities. Pre-contact conservation methods long-employed by Aboriginal peoples had little value under this system, and, simply, were ignored by hunter-trappers, who came to rely on steel leg-hold traps.

By 1810, the beaver population had collapsed in many areas of the north-west interior. Shortly thereafter, the HBC, unchallenged with elimination of the NWC (1821), introduced a 'ready barter system' of trade to replace the debt system. According to Bishop (1974),

The main reason for the introduction of the ready barter system was to eliminate the accumulation of debts against Indians over several years. . . . Once in debt, Indians often became discouraged since their furs were taken to pay old accounts; hence, it became increasingly difficult to get out of debt since a hunter was always at least a year behind in his payments (p. 119).

The hunter-trappers complained about loss of security under this new system; nevertheless, the barter system replaced the debt system. In many cases, old debts were forgiven at depots in the Albany River District. However, within a decade, the HBC was

forced to abandon the strict 'barter' trade policy due to cycles of famine and animal scarcity which spanned much of nineteenth century.

By this time, Ojibwa peoples' primary food source were hare and fish, as overhunting had reduced deer populations to near collapse. Malnourished and physically weak, they tended to remain in close proximity to fur houses sometimes relying on the charity of depot managers. "The changes in subsistence patterns . . . resulted in a marked decrease in the mobility of the Indians who were forced to live in more confined regions where smaller non-migratory animals could be found," as according to Bishop (1974), "Winter hunting groups were necessarily smaller. This seems not to have been necessarily conducive to improved trapping" (p. 284).

Over the course of six decades (1820s to 1880s) hunter-trappers and their families, due mainly to starvation and destitution, became increasingly dependent on European foodstuffs and other store bought goods. The Ojibwa planted gardens of their own with some success. But, generally, their basic needs were met by consuming flour, lard, oatmeal, pork and potatoes from trade stores. In especially desperate times, they were reduced to foraging for roots, tubers and "[s]ometimes the bark of the jackpine was removed to get at the pulpy matter beneath for food" (Bishop, 1974, p. 187).

Some hunters stubbornly held to the belief large game would return to their hunting territories. But, as stories of families starving to death in the bush reached Ojibwa encampments, it was obvious they would survive on small game and store goods indefinitely. To complicate matters, fur bearers, such as beaver, were increasingly scarce while the demand for beaver pelts in Europe had sharply fallen. Hence, Ojibwa had

difficulty acquiring trade goods in surplus, so they were unable to hunt and trap on the land. For the Northern Ojibwa acts of self-preservation became paramount.

A community of note in Bishop's study is Osnaburgh House. It is a former outpost that lies approximately 200 kilometres due east of the traditional homeland of the Namegosibii Anishinaabeg (or Trout Lake Ojibwa). Trout Lake is the home community of Dedibaayaanimanook (Sarah Keesick Olsen), the main subject of Agger's text. Agger (2008) described the Ojibwa peoples' reclamation of culture-based knowledge in the twentieth century:

Dedibaayaanimanook's people pursued their livelihood in ways that were wholistic [*sic*] and self-reinforcing. This was another way of saying that their social and economic systems and structures allowed them to derive their sense of self as Anishinaabe people from all the activities they carried out on a day to day basis and from the methods by which they did so. Trapping and hunting were examples of principal activities that dated as far back as collective memory stretched and beyond. Catching fur bearers was essential for carrying out trade with other nations, and hunting was necessary for personal consumption. The activities were practised [*sic*] in ways that maintained the old customs. In fact, they were all part of the old customs handed down from ancestors, representing the many elements that comprised what it meant to be Anishinaabe (p. 114).

Agger's account of the Trout Lake Ojibwa presents a contrast to Bishop. Bishop has concluded the fur trade system was responsible for significant cultural disruption amongst the Ojibwa of the nineteenth century. Certainly, many Ojibwa violated their ancestor's customary value of conservancy through unsustainable methods practiced during the fur trade's apex. And, many of them died because of their willful neglect of the ecology. However, in the intervening period between the decline of the fur trade and the

early twentieth century, the Trout Lake Ojibwa had recovered (or, in some cases, retained) their old value system.

TREATY THREE HISTORY

Currently, Rainy River First Nations are regulated under Treaty Three as finalized with Canada on October 3rd, 1873. Treaty Three is also referred to more informally as the North-West Angle Treaty; and, negotiations are recorded in another document known as the Paypom Treaty (or Nolin notes), now held by the Grand Council of Treaty Three. The Paypom Treaty outlines the treaty negotiated with the government in a different manner from the official document, which points to some of the general discrepancies in the treaty making process. Also, it highlights the problems inherent to a process that lacked clarity due to inadequacies of translation, political gamesmanship and vastly different world-views of the parties involved in negotiations.

Like many other treaties between Aboriginal peoples and Canada, it is unclear whether the Anishinaabeg signatories were aware of the specific legal details of Treaty Three, at the time, and the government's intention of occupying and holding the land indefinitely for its own purpose. But, leaders of the Ojibwa council were acutely aware of the land's value in spiritual and material terms. It is evidenced in this appeal by Chief Mawedopenais, lead negotiator (from Rainy River), as recorded by a reporter for the Manitoban newspaper:

My terms I am going to lay down before you; the decision of our chiefs; ever since we came to a decision you push it back. *The sound of the rustling of the*

gold is under my feet where I stand; we have a rich country; it is the Great Spirit who gave us this; where we stand upon is the Indians' property, and belongs to them. If you grant us our requests you will not go back without making the treaty (Morris, 1971, p. 62).

This excerpt (as translated by the commission's lead interpreter, James McKay) reflects the council's uneasiness with the commission's approach during negotiations. The Dominion's lead negotiator, Governor Alexander Morris, an astute politician, knew the Ojibwa peoples had suffered greatly throughout the nineteenth century. He would exploit the Ojibwa coalition's apparent weakness by appealing to their material desires for the people. After receipt of their counter-demands, Morris challenged the council's resolve: "For your children, grandchildren, and children unborn, I am sorry that you will not accept my terms. I shall go home sorry, but it is your own doing; I must simply go back and report the fact that you refuse to make a treaty with me" (Morris, 1971, p. 62). At a near stalemate, a 'Lac Seule' Chief, who had begun to waver on the coalition's terms, provided an opening for Morris; and, with that, he quickly divided the chiefs on the matter. The council asked for a recess; sat for an evening and returned in unanimous agreement to enter treaty, pending slight modifications to the commission's terms.

Many have argued - from the Aboriginal perspective, that secession was never their intention in 'treating' with Crown officials. Instead, Aboriginal negotiators preferred to share access to the Creator's land, as according to their beliefs the land was not theirs to part with. Before initial negotiations of Treaty Three, the chiefs and headmen were adamant about the stipulation of right-of-way rather than secession of lands. While the treaty commission, as established by the Privy Council of Canada, felt it necessary "to

make the route known as the 'Dawson Route,' extending from Prince Arthur's Landing on Lake Superior to the north-west angle of the Lake of the Woods . . . 'secure for the passage of emigrants and of the people of the Dominion generally'" (Morris, 1971, p. 44).

As Treaty Three concerned the Dominion's sovereignty, the commission was mindful of the Crown's need to establish legal ownership of lands, and settle it, to dissuade the U.S. Government, and its citizens, from pushing north into Canada. The political expediency of the situation was evident in the commission's pursuit of a deal with strict adherence to extinguishment of Aboriginal title in the region. However, the project of dispossession, as it would be known, had deeper roots in the desire for British North America, as a colony, to provide complete access to English corporate interests. For most of the Dominion's officials were ever mindful of the main reason for Canada, as a legal entity, and pursuit of treaty - the accumulation of resources and wealth for Queen, country and her loyal servants.

From the beginning of negotiations, it was clear the commission's mandate was to acquire the "Ojibbeway" surrender of land as expeditiously and cheaply as possible (Morris, 1971, p. 44). An important circumstance worthy of note: Governor Morris's record indicates treaty papers were drafted shortly following the verbal agreement between the parties. This leads me to believe the papers existed in some form prior to negotiations; and, the Paypom Treaty gives credence to this assertion.

S.J. Mainville compared *articles of treaty* found in Treaty Three, in the federal government's possession, with that of the Paypom Treaty. She noted a major discrepancy

that involved the articles of treaty, or specific terms of Treaty Three, as these articles were not amended to reflect the treaty negotiated and finalized on October 3, 1873. Instead, the articles of treaty from the previous year (1872) are contained within Treaty Three (Mainville, 2007, p. 155). Of course, this explains the ease by which the commission drafted Treaty Three at the remote location on Lake of the Woods.

Moreover, it is difficult to believe that the “Salteaux Tribe of Ojibbeway Indians,” as described by Morris, agreed to secession of land when one considers the Chiefs’ demanded \$125,000 per annum, but agreed the next day to sign for considerably less remuneration (Morris, 1971, pp. 47-8). Obviously, the chiefs and headmen were aware of the commercial value the Dominion placed on the region as a vital route for travel, supply and colonization. Considering the proceedings it is curious a settlement was reached at all, never mind in the span of a day. As legal negotiations are concerned it remains a perplexing turn of events.

The complexity of treaty negotiations are largely missing from Morris's account of events (and that contained in Manitoban newspaper). He cited "jealousies" amongst the chiefs as the main determinant of the difficulties the commission encounters, yet he claims his steadfast bargaining was able to win-over the chiefs to reason in a very short period (Morris, 1971, pp. 47-8). According to Morris (1971),

The spokesman returned to the Chiefs . . . and on their return they informed me that the Chiefs, warriors and braves were of one mind, that they would make a treaty only if we acceded to their demand. I told them if so the conference was over, that I would return and report that they refused to make a reasonable treaty, that hereafter I would treat with those bands who were willing to treat, but that I would advise them to return to the council and

reconsider their determination before next morning, when, if not, I should certainly leave (pp. 48-9).

Apparently, his divisive tactics worked because the Chiefs agreed to most of the commission's preconditions. Again, this is according to the record provided by Morris.

Officially Treaty Three consisted of 55,000 square miles of ceded land containing a population estimate of 14,000 'Indians' from eleven bands in the territory (Morris, 1971, pp. 54-5). The band names are accompanied by the names of their respective signatories (spelled phonetically): 1. North-West Angle, Note-an-qua-hung, Pow-we-sang, Cand-com-igo-wi-ninie, May-no-wah-tau-way-kung; 2. Rat Portage; 3. Lake Seul, Sah-katch-away, ; 4. White Fish Bay (on Lake of the Woods), Pay-ah-be-a-wash; 5. Sha-bas-kang (or Grassy Narrows); 6. Rainy River, Kee-tak-pay-pi-nais, Kithi-gay-lake, Mawe-do-pe-nais, Pa-pa-ska-gin, Kitchi-ne-ke-be-han, Nee-sho-tal, Kee-gee-go-kay; 7. Rainy Lake, Me-kie-sies, Oos-con-an-geist, Go-bay; 8. Beyond Kettle Falls (southward), Muka-day-wah-sin; 9. Eagle Lake, Wah-shis-kince; 10. Nepigon; 11. Shoal Lake, Sha-sha-gance, Sha-win-na-bi-nais.

Mainville's analysis of Treaty Three recognized the unique methods employed by the Anishinaabeg, "The Paypom Treaty or Nolin notes have been said to be the closest account of the *Anishinaabeg* perspective of the treaty because the words used could be more easily translated into *Anishinaabemowin*" (Mainville, 2007, p. 153). Unlike other treaties, the Anishinaabeg negotiators enlisted translators August and Joseph Nolin, for the purpose of recording the treaty proceedings. "Because there is more than one source

of written account, [it] is one of the best examples of treaty negotiations leading to divergent understandings of treaty promises” (Mainville, 2007, p. 153).

Mainville's examination of Treaty Three concentrated on its legal history; while, Agger (2008) has identified the socioeconomic ramifications of adhesion to Treaty Three for Anishinaabeg in Namegosibiing:

Dedibaayaanimanook's father and each of her uncles, elder brothers and male cousins then brought the autumnal feast to a close by sharing their thoughts and plans for the coming winter. Guided by their spiritual power and deeply held respect for all elements that comprised the natural world, they spoke about what lay ahead for them as the remaining people of Namegosibiing [Trout Lake]. They discussed the fact that soon after the Treaty adhesion was signed in 1874, people were strongly encouraged by agents of the wemitigoozhi's [*sic*] government, that is, the Indian agents, to give up all their traditional ways and become settlers on the reserves. They observed that their on-reserve brethren received schooling, housing, agricultural implements, livestock and Christian churches as well as gestures of feigned largesse - such as flower seeds - in exchange for their settlement. But they also noted that buying into such an arrangement resulted in greater loss of traditional Anishinaabe ways, and that the more they accepted, the more autonomy they lost and the more difficult it became to make free choices (p. 81).

Following treaty, life for Anishinaabeg throughout the Namegosibiing region had been irrevocably transformed. Many attempted, with great difficulty, to cope by settling in more remote areas while others attempted to adapt (and adopt) some aspects of Wemitigoozhiwag culture in area townships and reserves.

GOVERNMENT POLICY - INDIAN ACT

Aboriginal peoples, as wards of the Canadian government, were officially defined and categorized by the Gradual Enfranchisement Act of 1869. It, and the Gradual Civilization Act of 1857, were the antecedents of the Indian Act (1876). Historically, the federal government imposed the Indian Act to restrict, limit and confine 'Indians' on reservations for the purpose of colonial expansion, private commerce and assimilation initiatives. Although, many First Nations peoples refute the Indian Act, it remains a salient piece of legislation for Canadian governments and First Nations in the twenty-first century. As Canada's legal template for Indian policy it represents unilateral legislation adopted by a government to maintain an already untenable relationship with First Nations. It is through government inertia, amendments to legislation and bureaucratic slight-of-hand that the dysfunctional relationship has been able to continue for so long. In essence, its many detractors (e.g., First Nations leadership, Aboriginal activists and academic scholars) understand the serious harm that has been done to First Nations bound by the government's self-serving and ill-conceived policy. If reserves were a means of physical control and psychological conditioning of First Nations peoples then sweeping reforms outlined in the Indian Act were meant to contain, blunt and eventually obliterate their cultures during British North America's expansion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Generally, the conventional reason to dissolve the Indian Act, put forth by some critics, would be to rid Canada and its tax base of the 'Indian problem.' In short, this means dismantling Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) and its programming;

and, thereby, cutting government expenditures to First Nations communities. Ironically, when the Department of Indian Affairs, originally a branch of the Department of the Interior, assumed control of Indian health and welfare on reserve, it did so with the intention of distributing meager foodstuffs and medicine to keep costs at a bare minimum. The standard narrative established by Canadian authors (i.e., politicians, public servants and historians), which shortly followed the Indian Act's implementation, was that Canada took control of poor, destitute Indians grudgingly, as the responsibility fell to them as the charitable and righteous champions of progress (and civilization). It is the conflation of narrative, policy and social programming that created the myth that supported overarching regulation of First Nations peoples without challenge.

H. Shewell (2004) acknowledged Canada's use of special committees and public forums to cultivate these myths in society and limit serious dissent from First Nations peoples:

[T]he Special Joint Committee on the Indian Act was not so much a forum to create a new direction in policy, as it was an opportunity for the state to articulate what had already been set in motion. It provided a public arena for the government to share with the Canadian people its individualistic vision of the place of Indians within Canadian society, and it minimized Indians' attempts to speak against it. . . . The committee was itself a tool of state propaganda; it was meant to enlist public consent to the state's agenda. Throughout the hearings there was an underlying patronizing tone toward Indians, a sense that they were being humoured in the manner that adults adopt with precocious children (p. 206).

Initially, the Dominion of Canada developed these lies (which became public policy) out of necessity to justify its displacement, dispossession and extermination of First Nations peoples en masse. Because Indians fell under the powers of a modern,

liberal democracy like Canada such lies were enough to explain historical records, like treaties, which challenged accepted doctrine. At a glance this unofficial doctrine appeared similar to Spain and Portugal's "civilizing mission," first espoused in the fifteenth century to condone the enslavement, torture and killing of Amerindians for strictly economic purposes (Bagchi, 2005, pp. 219-25). And, so, it is with the pen rather than sword that Canada has limited and withdrawn services causing much pain and suffering for First Nations peoples (since the 1930s).

As Shewell (2004) described in *Enough to Keep Them Alive* it was INAC's (then Department of Indian Affairs) refusal to provide the necessities of life for First Nations peoples, which doomed many of them to lives of poor health, severe poverty and premature death. In 1886, the federal government's sentiment toward Indian welfare was aptly summed-up in the House of Commons address by Sir Hector Langevin, MP:

We do not propose to expend large sums of money to give [the Indians] food from the first day of the year to the last. We must give them *enough to keep them alive* [emphasis added]; but the Indians must, under the regulations that have been sanctioned by Parliament, go to their reservations and cultivate their land. They must provide partially for their wants. And therefore, if, by accident, an Indian should starve it is not the fault of the Government nor the wish of the Government (Shewell, 2004, p. 41).

In several instances the government identified "Indian poverty [as] a general 'feature of the race' [which] was defined purely in terms of liberal values" (Shewell, 2004, p. 328). According to Shewell, the government's social theorists purported Indians 'natural' tendency to indolence and immorality as reasons for them not being assimilated into Canadian society. Therefore, the Indian race's 'predisposition' to mental disease explained

the failure of welfare policy and the high frequency of destitution and economic infirmity found on reserves, which suited public servants and elected officials quite nicely for many years.

Subsequently, Indian incompetence was used as a rationale by government to justify its misdeeds involving First Nations land obtained in treaty. However, the discovery of these unlawful land seizures, by First Nations communities, made it necessary to enter a land reclamation (or treaty lands entitlement) process with government. To date, hundreds of claims have been filed by First Nations throughout Canada. The Canadian government, rather than seek a political solution, has chosen to fight many of these claims in court, where much of the litigation remains in limbo. As it stands, very few communities have managed to have their issues addressed by government without legal recourse; however, some communities have had specific grievances addressed by the courts and, eventually, the government.

LAND CLAIMS SETTLEMENT

In December 1982, Rainy River First Nations filed a legal claim against the federal and provincial governments for its misappropriation of reserve land in the early twentieth century. The legal details of the "claim" are outlined in the Settlement Agreement:

'Claim' means all facts, matters and issues arising or resulting, directly or indirectly, from: (i) the invalidity of the surrenders of the Claim Land in 1914 and 1915; (ii) breaches of trust, fiduciary, constitutional, statutory and

common law duties and breaches of Treaty 3 by Canada and Ontario; and, (iii) the mismanagement of the sale of the Claim Land and the improper use of the proceeds of sale of the Claim Land in relation to promises contained in the surrenders of the Claim Land, and all other matters set forth in the Specific Claim submitted by Rainy River to Canada and Ontario in December 1982, including all supplemental submissions (Settlement Agreement, 2005, p. 4).

At the time of the illegal land seizure Canada's government forced Anishinaabeg families from seven reserve communities onto one pre-existing reserve, Manitou Rapids. The seven communities are: Hungry Hall, Little Forks, Long Sault (two distinct communities), Paskonkin, The Bishop and Wild Lands.

Hunter, a former chief of Rainy River First Nations, explained his understanding of the government fraudulence:

When Treaty #3 was signed in 1873, the Rainy River people who lived at Long Sault chose their place where they wanted to live. And, over the years starting in 1914, the Province of Ontario objected to the reserve selection by the native people, objected to the federal government, it was Canada at the time, and they objected on the grounds that they weren't consulted. And, you have to remember, at the time there was, it was illegal for Indian bands to hire lawyers, and it was also illegal for lawyers to work for the Indian people. There was no legal recourse for native people. And, so to make a long story short, Ontario said, 'We want all the lands along the Rainy River.' They wanted to open it up for settlers and farmers and they wanted to give it for free. And [Ontario stated] the only way we'll support the signing of Treaty #3, and ostensibly a choice of the communities that the Rainy River people made, they said to the federal government, is, you move all the Indian people along the Rainy River, and you move them to Manitou Rapids, and that's the only way we'll support this. So in an illegal move, the feds [*sic*] agreed, and all those people that lived at Hungry Hall and Long Sault and Little Forks, five reserves, and the population were forcibly removed from those lands and those communities in Manitou Rapids at the turn of the century, beginning of 1913, all the way up till 1916, it took a, took a while to, to get the native people out of there. And, so that's the history of, of where Manitou Mounds is, and also, it's part of the history of all our communities that lived along the

Rainy River, and this is all tied into the land claim that we filed suit against the governments in 1982 (A. Hunter, personal communication, February 8, 2010).

As a negotiator, for five years, and chief, for two years, Hunter was instrumental in finalizing a land claims settlement for his community; but, by this time it had taken more than two decades for community negotiators and government to reach a settlement.

On May 20, 2005, a formal signing ceremony between the federal government, Province of Ontario and Rainy River First Nations recognized

An outstanding grievance relating to the surrender in 1914-1915 and subsequent sale of 46,269 acres (18,725 hectares) of the First Nations reserve land . . . Under the settlement, Canada and Ontario will provide approximately \$71 million in compensation . . . the settlement also includes a commitment from Canada to set aside up to 46,269 [72 square miles] as reserve land over 40 years for the use and benefit of the RRFNs . . . this replacement reserve land is comprised of provincial Crown Land, while the balance (up to approximately 31,300 acres [12,677 hectares]), will be purchased by RRFNs on a willing-seller/willing-buyer basis over 40 years (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2009, para. 3, 8).

In some ways, this settlement stands as a positive outcome for those involved, it is a contemporary land claims archetype (of sorts), which no doubt will be championed by future government. However, it followed a government fraud that ignored the land rights of the Rainy River Anishinaabeg for ninety years. As Hunter has alluded, Ontario objected to the lands obtained in Treaty Three by the Rainy River Anishinaabeg (of seven communities). The land occupied by the Rainy River peoples represented some of the prime real estate (e.g., agricultural land) in the region; and, these reserves, interspersed along the Rainy River, interrupted the flow of goods and services along a major

transportation route. Like many historical injustices committed by government, the Province of Ontario's intervention resulted in cultural dislocation and material dispossession for these communities relocated to Manitou Rapids. At the time, Ontario and Canada determined this was a better manner of control and an effective form of dispossession.

CHAPTER TWO

After Treaty Three, the Anishinaabeg had been prohibited from hunting and trapping off reserve. This *forced enclosure* (coupled with amalgamation of seven communities on a small area of land) meant the people on the reserve were unable to provide for their basic material needs. Cole's (2009) biography of Maggie Wilson, a life-long resident of Rainy River, has identified various problems with 'forced enclosure' on Manitou Rapids I.R. 11, an area of 5,760 acres:

At the time when Maggie Wilson moved to Manitou Rapids, the people faced many new challenges. The Canadian government was confiscating uncultivated reserve lands for distribution to non-Ojibwe settlers. The Rainy River Ojibwe consolidated into one band and squeezed onto one reserve at Manitou. They never lived in villages of more than forty or fifty people, typically a few related families. Little Forks Reserve, where Maggie was born, was a band of forty-nine people. When bands were consolidated, the Manitou Rapids Reserve suddenly grew to a population of almost three hundred and now comprised several historically distinct political units (p. Xxxvii).

In the ensuing years, the 'forced enclosure' at Manitou Rapids greatly disrupted the political organization(s) and socioeconomic balance of these communities, which created many hardships on the reserve.

Chief J. Leonard (2011) acknowledged the difficult political arrangement on the reserve following amalgamation:

All the way up until 1959 there was actually seven communities in this area, in this place called Manitou Rapids. And, they had a number of chiefs. And, so seven different administrations or tribes if you want to call it, all living in the same area. So, there had to be a lot of working together to make things right because it's hard to have seven chiefs and councils in a small

community. And, that's basically the way they operated. They had headmen, and I don't know exactly how they did it, but they were able to accomplish things (J. Leonard, personal communication, January 12, 2011).

Leonard's anecdote highlights the difficulty of political proceedings, without going into specific details about 'things' accomplished by leadership. Nevertheless, in these conditions, any sense of normalcy would be inconceivable. Interestingly, Rainy River First Nations received financial compensation for land taken by the government but nothing for cultural trauma, which continues to afflict the community (in a variety of forms). I see this as a serious oversight of the Agreement. [Note: cultural trauma is not specifically addressed in this paper. But, the 'On Dependency' section (of third chapter) and the fourth chapter does touch on issues of trauma and its effects.]

Under the Settlement Agreement, Canada and Ontario provided compensation for land seizure and Rainy River First Nations land reclamation project (i.e., purchase of settlement and additional lands for reserve). After deductions for negotiation expenses (i.e., professional services), \$63,782,215 was deposited in trust account and \$1,250,000 in bank account. The community trust will be discussed at greater length in the latter part of this chapter.

Hunter believes the land base provided under the stipulation of 'settlement land' remains one of the outstanding features of this agreement. In section 3.01, titled "Addition of Settlement Land to Reserve" begins:

Rainy River requests that: (a) Canada accept the transfer by Ontario of administration and control of the Settlement Land to Canada; and (b) Canada set apart the Settlement Land, totaling 14,945 acres more or less, as Reserve

pursuant to the Additions to Reserve Policy and this Agreement (Settlement Agreement, 2005, p. 17).

Hunter explained settlement land, as undeveloped or untouched land, is under the control of Rainy River First Nations (with exception of private property on Sphene Lake). However, the legal title of settlement and additional lands, as reserve land, will remain with Canada. In financial circles, there is much about land as an economic resource; but, for the Anishinaabeg, it is vitally important in cultural terms. The settlement lands established under the agreement consist of 'bush, lake and rivers' largely inaccessible by road. An area, such as Sphene Lake, contains waterways, timber, animals and bodies of earth and water, a separate and unique ecology in northwestern Ontario. These are physical entities that inform Anishinaabeg spiritual and cultural existence, past and present. It was chosen for its cultural significance not economic value. With the proper care, it will remain intact as a natural land base for the peoples of Rainy River, for their recreational use, enjoyment and benefit.

CLAIMS IMPLEMENTATION - ADDITIONS TO RESERVE

For Rainy River First Nations, claims implementation has two components: 1) land purchase program; and, 2) trust property. First, I will outline the land purchase program, which is the main objective of the Settlement Agreement. Second, I will provide an overview of the Trust Agreement, which contains specific details about the trust property, and its use by Rainy River First Nations.

Land purchase, under Settlement Agreement, must satisfy two main requirements: request period and purchase area. Claims land must be purchased within the 'request

period,' which is forty years from effective date of the Settlement Agreement (January 11, 2005). During the request period, 31,324 acres of land is to be purchased by Rainy River First Nations for additions to reserve (ATR) in the 'purchase area.' "Purchase Area" defined in Interpretation, Article 1, "means the geographic area within which Rainy River may acquire Additional Land as set out on the map *attached as Schedule 6*" (Settlement Agreement, 2005, p. 8). [Note: the Settlement Agreement ceases to apply to land acquired outside the purchase area and request period. ATR policy, in INAC's Land Management Manual, applies to land purchased outside of purchase area or beyond request period.]

In Rainy River's case, the Implementation Management Office and Land Purchase Committee oversee land acquisition for ATR. N. Cochrane (2011), Implementation Manager, or Claims Implementation Coordinator, explained the initial process: "Part of implementing is finding land, researching land, negotiating with landowners to buy it, and then turning it into reserve. After that, we are in the midst of developing a land use plan also to figure out what we are going to do with the land that we own" (N. Cochrane, personal communication, April 12, 2011).

As Implementation Manager, Cochrane is approached by land owners who, as willing-sellers, are interested in selling their property to Rainy River First Nations. She compiles a list of properties for the Land Purchase Committee to review. Upon review, the Land Purchase Committee selects properties for appraisal by Cochrane, which she conducts with the help of a third-party appraiser. Based on her appraisal the Land Purchase Committee chooses property for ATR. All land purchased by Rainy River First Nations is scrutinized in the claims implementation phase to ensure it satisfies conditions of ATR legislation.

The claims implementation phase is particularly complex for all parties to the Settlement Agreement. This phase of ATR involves environmental assessment, further appraisal, re-purchase by government (if necessary) and transfer of Rainy River First Nations land purchase (to Canada), as outlined in the Settlement Agreement. A list of these legal obligations are found in sections entitled 'Additional Land' - Article 4, 'Additions to Reserves Policy' - Article 6, and 'Implementation' - Article 13.

It is the implementation committee - Rainy River First Nations and government stakeholders - that is entrusted with land assessment, as outlined in sections noted above. Article 13, section 13.05, has provided a general overview of implementation committee representatives:

Within 90 days of the Effective Date, the Committee shall be established comprised of three persons: (a) for Rainy River, one representative named by the Council; (b) for Canada, one representative named by the Ontario Regional Director General of the Department; and (c) for Ontario, one representative named by the Assistant Deputy Attorney General and Secretary for Native Affairs (Settlement Agreement, 2005, p. 63).

As a specific land claims model, the Settlement Agreement, in Article 13, establishes the committee's actors, duties and basic function. Their performance of these duties fulfills the particular legal obligations, as set out in the legislation - Article 13. Whereas, the Settlement Agreement, in Articles 4 and 6, outlines the conceptual design for claims implementation.

It has been necessary to modify the implementation committee's structure to address certain issues with inter-communication, member workload and land assessment.

R. Gladu (2011), former Implementation Manager for Rainy River First Nations, explained some of the practical modifications that were made to the committee:

[They] have quarterly face to face [meetings] or telephone conference calls with this implementation committee, which includes [two] First Nations rep(s), two INAC people, one Ontario MAA [Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs], one Ontario MNR [Ministry of Natural Resources] management (who was also on the negotiations team), one Ontario MNR staff that deals with land titles, and occasionally someone from the Canada Land Surveys. These meetings make sure that the steps continue to happen. Everyone gets a copy at each step. This open process also makes sure that the feds [*sic*] don't blame the province for stalling and vice versa (R. Gladu, personal communication, May 4, 2011).

It is committee members and ministerial associates, who work to apply 'legal' steps of Articles 4 and 6 (in Settlement Agreement), so that land purchased by Rainy River First Nations can become ATR (within a specified timeframe*). However, it is important to note, such modifications reflect a poorly conceived plan for claims implementation, as negotiated in the land claims agreement. But, it remains unclear whether the claims process will evolve and, eventually, outgrow these problems. [*Note: ATR, as conceived in Settlement Agreement, is a *fast track process*, which specifies three to five years for claims land to become reserve. Normally, under ATR policy, found in INAC's Land Management Manual, it is five to ten years for claims land to be granted reserve status.]

For Gladu, federal and provincial partners have worked to make necessary changes to the claims implementation process. According to Gladu (2011), the relationship between the committee and other government agencies has greatly benefited the claims implementation process:

In Ontario there is an extra step because the lands are handled by the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) but the Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs (MAA) is also involved to present each parcel of the additional lands to other government agencies like environment and mining. This process has not slowed anything down and the MAA may be encouraging the MNR to speed up the process and helping them apply for staff funds at budget time (R. Gladu, personal communication, May 4, 2011).

Henceforth, the implementation committee deals with a greater number of government associates to accomplish its job. It is a complex network of partners, or bureaucracy, that negotiators never envisioned when the agreement was designed.

Currently, on the committee, each party is responsible for 'action items' assigned during meetings. As Gladu explained above, Ontario's action items on a particular phase of land assessment may include several provincial associates, who confer with each other to 'iron-out' the necessary details. He maintains, somewhat counterintuitively, inclusion of more ministerial associates enhances the implementation process. Of course, both staff workload and budget (in these departments) will fluctuate over time; so, a higher degree of involvement by others may not seem to impede claims implementation in the short term. Instead, a breakdown in the committee network may be more apparent over a fifteen to twenty year period.

To date, one of the biggest concerns for the committee has been its failure to meet important deadlines. A specific concern is neither settlement nor additional land has become reserve since the Settlement Agreement's inception. Cochrane (2011) offered her understanding of problems with implementation process:

We have to make sure we keep on top of those action items because it slows down [the process]. Technically those Crown lands [settlement land] should have been reserve in 2008, three years ago. Because in our Settlement Agreement we have this thing called a *fast track process* [emphasis added] for ATR, three to five years. Because anywhere [in Canada] normally it's five to ten years to turn a piece of land into reserve. And, we are already beyond that so, we're just like, "What's the hold up?" You kind of have to stay on them, the government (N. Cochrane, personal communication, April 12, 2011).

Cochrane insists federal and provincial partners are responsible for delays in turning settlement and additional land to reserve. However, Gladu (2011) believes Rainy River First Nations representatives have been slow to respond to their government counterparts:

They [federal and provincial members] have a better understanding of each other's issues than we do. We [Rainy River First Nations] have not had any land become reserve since the signing but we are guilty of not responding to their questions or the next steps like we should be if we were in a hurry (R. Gladu, personal communication, May 4, 2011).

Essentially, a huge impediment, in acquiring land for reserve, is the *knowledge gap* that exists on committee. While government representatives, presumably, have the necessary experience to work effectively on such committees, Rainy River First Nations implementation team has not had the experience in dealing with claims implementation. Furthermore, Rainy River First Nations lacks adequate human resources; in other words, it does not have a large pool of qualified professionals at its disposal. And, unfortunately, Canada did not have the forethought to 'catch-up' Rainy River First Nations' Land

Purchase Committee on the complexities of claims implementation prior to start-up of the land purchase program.

LAND PURCHASE PROGRAM

Rainy River First Nations has acquired approximately 4,800 acres of land at fair market value. Its method of land selection is on a willing-seller, willing-buyer basis, as first proposed by the federal government. Technically, this prohibits Rainy River First Nations from 'pre-selecting' properties within (or outside) the purchase area. Instead, property owners approach the Implementation Management Office with the intention of selling their land. Cochrane, as Implementation Manager, compiles a list of prospective sellers for review by Rainy River First Nations - Land Purchase Committee. The committee consists of a band councillor, community member, elder and Cochrane, as acting Implementation Manager (non-voting member). The Land Purchase Committee's decision to purchase land is predicated on Cochrane's appraisal data, ATR legislation and Rainy River First Nations' land purchase plan.

In coming years, ATR progress will be physically rendered using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Global Positioning System (GPS) technologies. Cochrane (2011) has explained her involvement in the map building project, "Recently, like in the last couple of months, I've been taking GIS and GPS training. So, I'm learning how to create our own maps once our property is all bought. So, I can keep track of our properties and what steps they are in the ATR process" (N. Cochrane, personal communication, April 12, 2011).

Most land, purchased by Rainy River First Nations, is suited to farming or livestock grazing. Thus, Rainy River First Nations leases land to farmers to help offset the cost of municipal taxes on additional land. Cochrane (2011) provided further details on land selection process also referred to as the good neighbor approach by the federal government:

We don't select the parcels. It's people that come to us who know we're buying land because the word is out there in the district. It doesn't take very long for the farming community to know what's going on, or the townships. But, also we hold many meetings with the townships, and other townships and reeves and councillors also to keep them informed. Because once we buy property inside their township they lose out on those tax dollars because once it turns into reserve there's no more money there that's going to be coming to them. So, until it turns into reserve we give them (money) like a tax adjustment. So, we end up paying them the amount of taxes that they're going to be losing out in the next five to ten years after it turns into reserve (N. Cochrane, personal communication, April 12, 2011).

As noted by Cochrane, relationship-building with township and municipal officials has been hampered by their exclusion from the original negotiations of Settlement Agreement. More importantly, if municipal government objects to a land purchase (for any number of reasons), it inevitably slows land acquisition for the implementation committee.

Generally, municipalities are concerned about a diminishing tax base, as property purchased by Rainy River First Nations will cease to provide revenue at the time it becomes reserve. The agreement addresses this issue through the 'municipal tax base' component of ATR policy. Under the 'Municipal Tax Adjustment Allowance,' Rainy River has "no legal obligation to compensate a Municipality within which may be set apart as

Reserve in respect of any implications for the annual municipal tax assessment base", however, it must make a lump sum payment to the "[m]unicipality in general accordance with the guidelines set out in the ATR Policy" (Settlement Agreement, 2005, p. 45). Under tax adjustment stipulation (found in sections 6.13-6.17), payment to the municipality does not exceed ten times the annual rate of tax assessment. Both Canada and Ontario, as part of settlement compensation, have provided funds for Rainy River First Nations to reimburse the municipality for its revenue loss.

The municipal tax adjustment (and section 6.12, 'Municipal Considerations') is consistent with the *good neighbor approach* documented in INAC's Land Management Manual. According to the Land Management Manual (2003):

[T]he federal government promotes a 'good neighbor approach' [which] involves First Nations and municipalities sitting down together to discuss issues of mutual interest. . . . There is a requirement to negotiate arrangements in such areas as joint land use planning/by-law harmonization, tax considerations, service provision and future dispute resolution (p. 27).

In the event that Rainy River First Nations intends to purchase land in a municipality, it must notify the municipality. If the municipality accedes to Rainy River First Nations request the two parties must negotiate under the terms of the Municipal Development and Services Agreement (MDSA, as outlined in Interpretation, paragraph 1.01,[ff]). In the case a municipality refuses to enter the MDSA process, and Rainy River has satisfied its obligations under section 6.12, subsection (f), INAC may intervene and "proceed in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement with the process to set apart the land as Reserve for Rainy River" (Settlement Agreement, 2005, p. 43). The municipality may

express the reasons (in writing) for its refusal of Rainy River's request; however, INAC retains a large degree of latitude in determining the veracity of the municipality's claim. Consequently, INAC may override the municipality and force it to deal with Rainy River First Nations.

Despite the work of the Land Purchase Committee, and ATR legislation, as well as use of new survey technologies, there have been ongoing problems with the land purchase program. According to Rainy River First Nations Trust, Financial Statements (2010), no land was purchased in 2009 or 2010 (p. 3). Rather, "[a] cost of \$36,000 was incurred for a 2008 land purchase after it was discovered that GST would not be able to be recovered on the land purchase" (Rainy River First Nations Trust, Implementation of Settlement Agreement, 2010, p. 7). Which means the land purchased by Rainy River First Nations did not meet the necessary criteria for ATR. Such a costly oversight highlights the Land Purchase Committee's (and financial trustee committee) lack of experience in dealing with these matters, a condition referred to earlier as the knowledge gap.

In terms of land purchase, the financial trustee committee, who work closely with the Land Purchase Committee, provides the operating budget for ATR. According to Trust Agreement (2005), "[t]he Financial Trustees have agreed to hold the Trust Property on the terms set out in this Agreement for the benefit of Rainy River and . . . to assist Rainy River in the implementation of the Settlement Agreement" (p. 13). In comparison to community fund trustees, financial trustees control the administration of the trust fund. They are responsible for overseeing land acquisition for reserve, and "the advancement of the interests of and quality of life of Rainy River and its Members through the

preservation, enhancement and application of Trust Property" (Trust Agreement, 2005, p. 13).

TRUST AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

On March 12, 2005, band council created a community trust (or Rainy River First Nations Trust). The settlement trust, as it is commonly referred, is intended to administer the Trust Property (i.e., compensation package) established under the Settlement Agreement. Following its ratification date, band council had six months to establish the Trustee Selection Committee, as per Trust Agreement (or Trust Indenture). According to Rainy River First Nations Trust, Financial Statements (2010), the purpose of "trust" is summarized:

As set out in Section 8 of the Trust Indenture, the Trust has been created to provide supplementary or enhanced health care, educational opportunities, support and assistance to elders, assistance in community development initiatives, cultural heritage, encourage community activities [*sic*] to assist in financing housing and other purposes beneficial to Rainy River First Nations members (p. 5).

From reading this excerpt of the Trust Agreement, it is possible to discern that the settlement trust represents a vehicle for community development and service delivery on reserve. But, more broadly, it is concerned with protection of trust property and overseeing 'expenditures beneficial to the beneficiary'. The beneficiary, in this case, refers to Rainy River, a band within the meaning of the Indian Act, which is the entire Rainy River First Nations membership.

The Trust Agreement (2005) has explained the purpose of the settlement trust:

Expenditures Beneficial to the Beneficiary *will enhance and supplement funding and programs provided by Canada, Ontario or Rainy River* [emphasis added] wherever possible and also preserve, protect and advance the Treaty and aboriginal rights of Rainy River and its members so as to provide benefits from the Trust for all Members whether resident on or off reserve" (p. 13).

Therefore, there is an expectation that the settlement trust will benefit Rainy River First Nations members, and *enhance and supplement* pre-existing government programs which suffer from inadequate funding. The financial resources contained in the trust make it possible for Rainy River First Nations to subsidize such things as healthcare, water treatment and cultural activities. In this sense, the trust operates like an institution, such as First Nations and Inuit Health, to supplement government-designed service programs on the reserve. But, due to design flaws, these programs (e.g., healthcare) have proven to be ineffective in addressing the social, spiritual and material needs of consumers on reserve. For example, public servants of Health Canada developed healthcare programs to operate under certain budgetary constraints, as determined by the federal government's fiscal policy. Consequently, such programs require a complete re-design to provide optimal services for community members. In this case, increased subsidization of ineffective programs through Rainy River First Nations trust does little to address the problem of inadequate healthcare in the community. The Trustee Selection Committee, appointed by band council, consists of seven persons with Rainy River First Nations membership. Four persons must be living on reserve while the other three persons reside off reserve. Elders from the community assist the selection committee in an advisory capacity. Its main duties are to "finalize the eligibility criteria, review the applications received and recommend a List of Trustee appointments to Council" (Rainy River First

Nations, 2005). The band council makes final decisions for selection of community fund trustees and financial trustees to carry out terms of Trust Agreement. Therefore, band council is responsible for important 'executive' decisions in creation of trust committees. Although, the band council, in theory, has no control over trust committees, executive oversight translates into the function of the community fund trustee and financial trustee committees.

Further examination of the governance structure of Rainy River First Nations trust provides insight into the mechanisms of accountability at work. The online document - 'General Role and Responsibilities of Financial Trustees, Rainy River First Nations,' (2005) - summarized the legal responsibilities of financial trustees, as professional administrators and trust caretakers:

Unlike a corporation, a 'trust' is not a legal entity itself, rather a *trust* describes a legal relationship that is created between a beneficiary (the Rainy River First Nations in this case) and a person called a 'trustee,' in this case a 'Financial Trustee' as defined in the Trust Agreement. The Financial Trustees hold legal title to the Trust Property and are totally responsible for the investment management of the Trust funds as well as their due administration and disbursement under the terms of the Trust Agreement. They each accept the obligation *to perform certain significant duties and assume broad responsibilities* [emphasis added] in relation to the administration of the Trust Property to preserve and protect it for the benefit of the RRFNs and future generations of Members (p. 1).

Because financial trustees are obligated 'to perform certain significant duties and assume broad responsibilities,' they have explicit control of trust property and make specific decisions about its use (i.e., resource allocation). It is assumed - with broad responsibilities and control of trust property - also come broad powers, which are largely unchecked by the membership.

The governance structure of the trust committees, as explained in Trust Agreement, indicates the financial trustee committee operates at a level of bureaucratic accountability, and is weak democratically. The conceptual design of the financial trust committee, although less complex, has much in common with the Westminster model of democracy found in parliamentary systems of government:

Under this model, the democratic accountability of the bureaucracy is achieved through the hierarchical organization of the public sector and conventions of responsible government. Accountability is largely viewed as embedded in the hierarchical arrangement of the workplace and the division of labour. Supervisors exercise control downwards through the chain of command while subordinates are accountable to their supervisors for the performance of duties. Accountability, in this context, means that the individual employee must answer to their supervisors for their actions. Control is exercised down the chain of command while accountability is owed upwards (Sheldrick, 2007, p. 94).

In terms of the trust, this hierarchical organization (of governance structure) places the financial trustees at the top and Rainy River First Nations membership at the bottom. Thus, financial trustees, in their role as 'chief' administrators, may be inclined to make technocratic decisions unbeknown to community members. Due to their power and influence, financial trustees are more likely to make decisions based on professional expertise, efficiency and, sometimes, personal bias.

For reasons noted above, factions along family lines have developed within the community. According to Cochrane (2011):

First of all I think they need to have a good team, a good committee team, or workable team. Because that's where all the conflict starts within the two groups. Because there are two groups in the trust there's financial and community fund [trustees]. And the financial [trustees] pretty much have the run of the trust, they're administrators. Chief and council are at arms length.

They do not control the trust. They do not have the power to say, 'Give me twenty grand for, I'm going to build this or I need twenty grand for this program.' They do not have the right to do that, they have to go through the process of applying for that money just like any other person at a bank where you need money. Chief and council do not have that control, and, so, the people that are in these committees need to have their best interests at heart for the community. It's got to be for the people. It can't be solely for their own personal gain. And, it can't be all about family because we're just too close. This community is just too small where [you] just cannot [help but] bump into family (N. Cochrane, personal communication, April 12, 2011).

This perceived conflict of interest, by financial trustees, has created much division within the community. It is necessary for the settlement trust to become a vehicle for community development based on decision-making and full participation of community members. However, as I will explain, a re-alignment of the governance structure is just the beginning in the struggle for social harmony, self-determination and economic independence on Rainy River First Nations.

CHAPTER THREE

Rainy River First Nations members continue to practice traditional subsistence methods such as hunting, trapping and fishing. Generally, the products of hunting and fishing do not enter the market for sale, but money transactions do occur along with informal exchange within the community for these goods and services. For some time, trapping, as a mode of production, has been avoided due to the scarcity of fur bearing animals from over-production, low fur prices (which have recently rebounded), decrease in animal habitat and ecological damage through economic development. The sale of goods from fur trapping and commercial fishing are small in strict economic terms, but the cultural value of these embodied practices remains important for the Rainy River people. For example, trapping does not provide the level of income it once did; but, community members, who continue to trap, are re-expressing their cultural identity. In short, it is a connection to the past and a vital aspect of Anishinaabeg tradition. Also, trapping increases the economic independence of individual members who continue to practice it, in the form of supplemental income.

Necessarily, the chief and council has received a mandate from its membership to provide some of the necessities of life. Food production and building habitable structures are occupations that the Anishinaabeg, at one time, more or less did for themselves. Now, Rainy River First Nations depends on the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation to provide a budget for adequate housing; and, band council works to provide modern amenities for the community. It ensures community members have safe drinking water, garbage pick-up, sewage treatment and housing. Largely, the community's budget for water and sewage infrastructure, education and health are funded via the federal

government. But, Chief Leonard envisions a different future for the people of Rainy River First Nations. According to Leonard (2011), the community must become self-sufficient:

One of the aspirations that I personally have is at some point to be somewhat self-sufficient. Being able to use our revenues from our economic development ventures to offset some of the programming and assist some of the programming. Not to rely on Canada to provide that. And, to some extent we are doing that (J. Leonard, personal communication, January 12, 2011).

On the subject of self-government, he understands, first, the community should approach self-sufficiency to prepare it for self-government at some time in the future. Currently, he, and band administration, are pursuing economic development with commercial corporations off reserve. Leonard believes investment in natural resource extraction, such as forestry and mining companies, will finance community development and lead to self-sufficiency.

In Rainy River First Nations case, I understand community and economic development, as being performed by band council, Rainy River First Nations settlement trust and Canada's government. While in terms of governance structure and accountability, the band council and Rainy River First Nations settlement trust, in theory, operate under the direction of community membership, and act on its behalf. According to Rainy River First Nations website, a schematic diagram - Rainy River First Nations 'Structure for Implementation,' is an hierarchical arrangement with 'Members' overseeing the chief and council, settlement trust and associate committees (Rainy River First Nations Trust, 2005). The diagram outlines the functions and responsibilities of various

trust entities (with those of members omitted). Superficially, the diagram indicates that members exercise control over chief and council, and the settlement trust. However, there is no formal mechanism in place for the general membership (excluding select elders) to exert pressure or control on 'subordinates.' And, no mechanism exists for chief and council, the settlement trust and associate committees to be held to account for their decisions (to general membership) on a regular basis. Rather, band council and the settlement trust represent band members and make unilateral decisions, often, without the specific knowledge of community members.

The following example highlights the lack of transparency and accountability in community governance. Rainy River First Nations, as part of the Fort Frances Chiefs Secretariat, has signed a resource sharing agreement (for a gold mine in northwestern Ontario) to be operated by Osisko Mining Corporation. An 'Elders Forum,' held on August 17, 2011, which excluded general membership, permitted five elders from each community to attend. Despite claims to the contrary in Osisko's newsletter, closed meetings and Osisko's carefully controlled corporate message have hampered full disclosure of the project.

In his text, J. Loxley (2010) has asserted:

In its most general sense the term "community development" [CD] suggests a conscious intervention on the part of a group of people to shape their lives in directions they feel to be desirable. *The implication is that without this intervention broader forces at work in society, many of them economic, would act to the detriment of the people in question, either by bypassing them or by affecting them adversely* [emphasis added] (p. 20).

The above section (in italics) accurately conveys the band council's approach to external kinds of economic development with corporate interests in the region, at least to date. In large part, these business relationships remain undisclosed to Rainy River First Nations general membership, which precludes democratic decision-making on very important matters affecting members.

As it concerns matters on the reserve, Rainy River First Nations undertakes community and economic development through the services and financial resources it provides to community members. The administration, specifically, has made a financial commitment to two annual pow-wows and Kay-Nah-Chi-Wah-Nung cultural centre. The summer pow-wow represents the largest of its kind in the area; and, it is a vital cultural and social event. Recently, the pow-wow moved to a beautiful new site built with community funds and labour. On the other hand, Kay-Nah-Chi-Wah-Nung, also an important cultural landmark, has suffered from poor promotion and it has become a significant financial liability. While salaried employees from Rainy River First Nations continue to operate the facility that includes an impressive interpretive centre, it is maintained for a tourist population that has never materialized. In many ways, these forms of community and economic development are maintenance strategies, which do not revitalize or transform the community in a substantial manner from an economic perspective. [Note: I advocate for specific forms of community and economic development in this paper. I will clearly outline the development I prefer in the latter part of the chapter.]

However, with the recent appointment of a trust administrator and economic development officer there has been movement forward by Rainy River First Nations. An

updated 'Proposal Submission Guidelines' booklet and policy manual was completed in February 11, 2012. And, an economic development corporation has been created with meetings scheduled for October 2012 to establish a strategic plan and budget. But, without question, there is much left to do in terms of community renewal. In fact, important facets of community and economic development are entirely missing from their conception. I have determined through my research the main problem is band administration has not adopted long-term strategies for community and economic development. Since the late 1970s, it has failed to identify clear, achievable economic goals, and implement community development accordingly. This is due, in part, to the lack of managerial and professional capacity on reserve (see *knowledge gap* in chapter two), and Rainy River First Nations accessibility, or lack thereof, to professionals with the necessary experience and qualifications. Consequently, Rainy River First Nations planning, implementation and practice of economic development is not by design, but, rather, out of necessity. Therefore, I believe a community and economic development institution should be established through the settlement trust to promote economic development on reserve.

First, I will acknowledge the current forms of economic development practiced by Rainy River First Nations. Second, I will discuss the problem of dependency in the community; third, I will examine convergence strategy, as a community economic development (CED) approach for Rainy River First Nations; and, lastly, the fourth chapter will outline my conception of CD/CED and provide recommendations.

Over the previous three centuries, Anishinaabeg culture, and economics, has been disarticulated. Certainly, in the past century, culture and economics were ravaged by

government intervention (e.g., residential school). The Rainy River peoples' philosophy, grounded in their sense of 'being' in an unique ecology - with socioeconomic and spiritual relevance, was assaulted by government legislation and its agents of progress (i.e., government representatives). In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Canada's land seizure and forced enclosure of the Anishinaabeg impeded their socioeconomic development; conversely, settlers, newly arrived from Europe, were unobstructed or assisted by government policy. And, unlike the Anishinaabeg, they were invited to develop and exploit Canada's resources by the country's business elite.

In the twentieth century, it was difficult for Rainy River First Nations to succeed because of its lack of resources, small land base, and ineffective, or nonexistent, government programs. So, by the late 1960s, a trio of entrepreneurs chose to strike-out on their own hoping for the best in Canada's burgeoning market economy. Leonard (2011) has described early economic development on Manitou Rapids reserve:

So, it started with a small three man sawmill back in the bush by the garbage dump. And, it kind of grew from there to what we have today. We are fully employed. Sure, there's people looking for work. I don't want to call them unemployables. But, they're the people that say they're looking for work but they are not really looking for work. You know what I mean? If you truly want a job in this community you'll get one fairly quickly (J. Leonard, personal communication, January 12, 2011).

Leonard's perception is this modern landmark emboldened membership and acted as a catalyst for others to seek gainful employment on and off reserve. Undeniably, the trio's entrepreneurial initiative is a positive response to difficult circumstances; but, for the community, over the years its overall impact is negligible. As Leonard acknowledges in

the above passage, there are lingering problems with habitually unemployed and underemployed peoples. These social issues require adequate redress if people are going to re-enter the workforce and contribute to their community. In essence, a community, as I understand it, cannot be healthy unless its members are able to realize their potential and share personal 'gifts.' Also, these same people must benefit socially, materially and spiritually from participation with others. In the community there must be reciprocity and equitable relationships that reinforce personal integrity, and a commitment to something greater than oneself.

In *Like the Sound of a Drum*, P. Kulchyski (2005) related the novel anecdote of an "open door" community in Fort Simpson, NT:

Of particular concern here are those traces, such as the open door, that point in the direction of community, that work towards establishment and continuance of forms of social being that stress the community over the individual. The open door as a feature of everyday community life - practiced unconsciously as a norm of social existence - represents, evokes, and embodies a value that has been entirely erased from the dominant culture, a value exiled with such a totalizing ruthlessness from metropolitan life that its continued existence in this distant context comes as something of a shock that paralyzes many who reach its threshold. This value, foundational to any project of community that deserves the name, is sometimes called "trust" (pp. 130-31).

CD, when most effective, may engender trust in its participants. Loxley (2010), an educator, economist and community economic development practitioner, has considered CD, "[as] a way of involving people more fully in the life of their communities; it generates scope and initiative for participation in economic, social, and cultural life; it

provides a basis for more profound understanding and a more effective use of democratic processes" (p. 19).

But, first, Rainy River First Nations members, who remain alienated from their community, must understand their personal 'worth' and see themselves as positive actors in others lives. Until economically and politically disadvantaged persons are able to unburden themselves, emotionally and spiritually, they cannot fully realize their intellectual abilities and social capacities. Most people will require a variety of resources to regain a sense of hope and purpose. In community, psychological therapies, cultural programs and long-term economic initiatives (to mention a few) are needed for people to recover an healthier sense of self, and begin to form that bond of trust with others. It is this trust bond that was lost many years ago to the people of Rainy River First Nations through government interference (e.g., Indian Act).

In *Elements of a Theory of Community Economic Development*, Loxley (2007) addressed the interrelationship of CED and CD:

[I]t is unlikely that CED will accomplish much if a prior foundation of CD has not been put in place. People living in disadvantaged communities, suffering from poverty for many years, are not likely to be able to embrace CED without many different forms of CD intervention that build self-esteem, nurture self-confidence, provide required organizational development and make possible the emergence of a committed leadership (p. 8).

I believe Loxley's analysis of the CD/CED relationship is accurate, in that, CD theory and praxis necessarily precedes CED. But, much about CD is not based on empirical evidence, which is to say, there is no assurance of its measured success in a community setting (within a capitalist state). And, there is a danger that stakeholder's conception of

CD and CED may little resemble the successful forms that allow everyone to partake in the 'wealth' of the community.

The following sections examine three primary examples of economic development in which Rainy River First Nations is currently involved or awaiting commencement. All three export promotion strategies involve modern staple exports, which "enables communities to earn larger incomes and use larger, supposedly more efficient production methods" (Loxley, 2010, p. 39). I will discuss the relationship of modern staple exports to limitless economic growth and ecological destruction.

CURRENT BUSINESS ON RESERVE

In 1980, Ted Kaemingh and Tom Judson were approached by Rainy River First Nations band council to manage the sawmill on Manitou Rapids reserve. The business plan called for co-ownership of the sawmill plant by managers, Kaemingh and Judson, and Rainy River First Nations. Because the plant was situated on reserve land the owners were exempt from property tax, which sweetened the prospects for the new managers.

Leonard (2011) has explained the sawmill's origin, and subsequent bankruptcy in the mid-1970s:

Basically, what happened is in the early seventies when we built that sawmill, we tried to manage it on our own. It lasted around five years and it went bankrupt because of poor management. The management we had in there was people from the community here, and they weren't educated as managers. Or, they were not businessmen and, so, it consequently went into receivership (J. Leonard, personal communication, January 12, 2011).

The inability of Rainy River First Nations to operate the sawmill exposes the stark socioeconomic reality on reserve. Unfortunately, my research indicates professional development for Rainy River First Nations continues to be a topic of discussion but not one of action. Currently, two construction firms, a propane company and a music-entertainment group have received funding assistance through Rainy River First Nations trust.

Since the 1980s, Manitou Forest Products (MFP) has become a prominent business in the community. In terms of a quasi-private business on reserve, it is the main employer of community members and an important revenue source for the band. It adopts an export promotions strategy, as its timber products are shipped to external markets, primarily in Canada. Loxley (2010) has explained:

Export promotion strategies are advocated because export markets offer communities a much larger market for their products than do local community markets. This enables communities to earn larger incomes and to use larger, supposedly, more efficient production methods. Competing with others for outside markets is also held to promote efficient resource allocation. Earnings from exports then permit communities to buy the consumption and investment goods they need from large-scale producers outside the community (i.e., imports), thereby obtaining goods more cheaply than they could produce themselves (p. 39).

In practice, MFP's export markets have dried-up (to some extent), and lean economic times require the business to carry a heavier debt load. Thereby, its revenues are siphoned off by creditors, which has prevented the adoption of more efficient production methods.

According to Rainy River First Nations fiscal audit, titled Financial Statements (2009): "the First Nation received management fees from related parties of \$659,405 (2008 - \$167,040) comprised of \$605,948 from [MFP] (2008 - \$167,400) and \$53,457 from Long Sault Lumber Co., Ltd. (2008 - \$Nil)" (p. 14). However, these dividends, in 2009, were offset by advances or re-investment to these holdings of \$405,652 and \$453,289, respectively.

Since 1998, MFP has been co-owned by Dale and Kathy Kaemingh (Manitou Lumber), who bought out Ted Kaemingh and Tom Judson, and Long Sault Lumber - Rainy River First Nations, which has 51 per cent controlling interest in the business. It operates with modest profits and, as mentioned, both entities pay dividends to the community's coffers when possible; although, the community also absorbs some of the operating costs and liabilities of MFP.

As plant managers, the Kaemings oversee day-to-day operation (i.e., hiring, accounting, marketing). Most of the sawmill's machinery is electronic (i.e., planers, automated saws), as the cost of computerized machinery is prohibitive. During the difficult economic times, the Kaemingh's and Long Sault have struggled to keep MFP afloat. Currently, the sawmill employs thirty people (at peak times - fifty people), as manual laborers, not including management and support staff. Approximately fifteen community members are employed by MFP with another six employees from other First Nations in the area. Hence, it provides a regular income for men who lack the education, training or desire to work as tradespeople or professionals. Currently, no women from Rainy River First Nations are employed by MFP as manual labour.

Because of MFP's business arrangement, a non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal co-ownership, it is not eligible for finance capital that is normally available to businesses on reserve. These particular circumstances point to reasons for changing the eligibility requirements of federal programs. *The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* acknowledged the need to address the rules and criteria of federal programs and overhaul them if necessary. *The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* (1996) asserted:

Instead of Aboriginal communities having to adjust to the criteria and procedures of distant bureaucracies, the process needs to be reversed. It is the communities that should define priorities and the instruments best suited to meet them. Government agencies should adopt a fully responsive service approach rather than the intrusive role they played traditionally (p. 837).

With necessary changes to government programming, it will allow non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal business partnerships to form for better economic advantage.

As one of two medium-sized sawmills in the Rainy River district, MFP's main product is wood paneling. The paneling consists of white and red pine from the Crossroute Forest of northwestern Ontario, which is harvested at a rate of 25,000 cubic meters per year. This wood is obtained through a sustainable forest license managed by Abitibi Consolidated.

Currently, MFP sells its product locally, regionally and nationally (or internationally to the U.S.). Whereas large sawmill companies sell to wholesale distributors, MFP sells mostly to retailers in local and regional areas, such as Manitoba's

housing supply industry. Since the economic recession, sales to the U.S. have dropped from over 50 per cent to a paltry 10-15 per cent.

Although, MFP production involves processed lumber (wood panelling) rather than raw lumber (modern staple), staple theory may be applied to accurately measure "its forward, backward and final demand linkages" (Loxley, 2010, p. 39). [Note: forward, backward and final demand linkages will be explained in greater detail in the section on convergence approach and CED.]

Staple theory, as a measure of growth and income distribution, conforms to the economic (or export) base technique. Loxley (2010) examined this technique:

[It] is used widely in regional and urban [community] economic development literature . . . This technique makes the assumption that export markets are "the prime mover of the local economy". It then goes on to measure the contribution by calculating the relationship between income (or employment) generated in the export or "basic" sector and total income (or employment) in the form of income (or employment) multipliers (pp. 39-40).

Because it is a crude technique, whose inherent "weakness is that it assumes all other activities to be a function of export activities, which is rarely the case, especially where the state is an active employer or where production for direct use (subsistence) is important" (Loxley, 2010, p. 40), its critics prefer input-output analysis.

In terms of business practice, MFP is a sawmill that has adopted standard practices in an attempt to maintain a healthy profit margin. Which is to say, it is a business operated in the conventional sense that has addressed economic challenges through 'belt tightening' rather than adopting expensive new technology. Its modest

earnings have required such an approach, or rather, made it easier to pursue conventional remedies for falling export income. But, this does not explain the band council's plan, or lack thereof, to find a new management team when the Kaemingh's choose to retire from the sawmill business.

Chief Leonard is non-committal, on the subject of the Kaemingh's eventual departure, and who will manage MFP. Leonard (2011) has explained:

In terms of getting an Indian manager in there, or First Nations manager, we've tried that in the past. But, we still don't have that capability of managing it. If somebody come along [*sic*], one of our community members come along that had that management expertise, and that was interested in that job, we would support that person in a training program. Like we've done it a couple of times over the years but it just hasn't worked out. Hopefully, some day that'll happen (J. Leonard, personal communication, January 12, 2011).

His skepticism about Rainy River First Nations filling the position internally is understandable given the sawmill's previous difficulties with bankruptcy. However, Leonard and band administration should implement a plan to fill the position with a Rainy River First Nations member, First Nations manager or, at least, a suitable candidate of their choosing before the need arises. Moreover, Rainy River First Nations requires a business plan in preparation for full ownership of MFP. The example highlights the administration's inability to be assertive when necessary. Speaking to this, Loxley (2010) acknowledged the "peripheral roles" of band councils in economic development:

Historically, Native institutions have consisted of community-based organizations (e.g., band councils, Metis locals) which were designed to perform functions other than promotion of economic development, . . . which have in part acted as pressure groups for development but which have had, at

best, only peripheral roles in terms of development policy, programming, or implementation (p. 65).

However, Rainy River First Nations, as a tribal council partner, has accepted overtures from mining corporations. But, its involvement, in both mining operations, is similar to participation in government programs offered through Crown corporations and private sector business. Both mining projects are wholly owned by private corporations and land title rests with the corporations (i.e., land surrendered under Treaty Three). They have assured Rainy River First Nations, and other First Nations, that by joining the project - 'select' employment opportunities and modest dividends are attainable. At best, Rainy River First Nations are secondary partners with a small stake in financial returns from these projects. In a premeditated move to head-off opposition to this development, both corporations included the tribal council(s) in preliminary discussions about their gold mining projects.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OFF RESERVE

Currently, Rainy River First Nations, as represented by the Fort Frances Chiefs Secretariat (tribal council), is involved in two mining operations in the Treaty Three region. An investment consortium, Fort Frances Chiefs Secretariat, represents six other First Nations: Naicatchewenin; Mitaaniigamiing; Couchiching; Nigigoonsiminikaanig; Lac La Croix; and, Seine River.

The first operation is Osisko Mining Corporation's Hammond Reef advanced gold project, which is located 23 kilometers northeast of Atikokan, ON. If the "Hammond

Reef Gold Project", or "the Project" as it is commonly referred, satisfies the criteria of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (and numerous other sundry federal acts and regulations), which in all likelihood it will, the dual open pit mine should produce 6.7 million ounces of gold in its lifetime (Project Description, 2011, p. 1). Based on the timeline in "Figure 13: Project Schedule" the mine will be operational by late-2013 and cease operations in 2030 (Project Description, 2011, p. 47).

Initially, Fort Frances Chiefs Secretariat, and Lac Des Mille Lacs F.N., negotiated a memorandum of understanding with Brett Resources Incorporated. However, Osisko Mining Corporation succeeded in a friendly take over of Brett Resources Inc. (on March 22, 2010) and, it became the subsidiary, Osisko Hammond Reef Gold Ltd. (OHRG).

An Osisko Mining Corporation's news release indicates a resource sharing agreement, or impact benefits agreement, was signed on December 10, 2010. In an attempt to fulfill its obligations, as established by provincial and federal regulations, OHRG has employed, "a Director of Aboriginal and Government Relations, based in the local community, to coordinate and implement discussions with the local First Nations. Project presentations have been made to several groups, some Chiefs and Councils and Treaty #3 leaders and community members" (Project Description, 2011, p. 71). So far, the consultation process has been instrumental in facilitating OHRG's relationship with First Nations leadership in the region. As demonstrated in "Table 14: Government Communications", OHRG has carefully orchestrated discussions with high profile leaders, like (former) leader of Assembly of First Nations Phil Fontaine, and provincial and federal ministers in order to bring positive attention to the Project (Project Description, 2011, pp. 73-6). Of course, public relations and corporate communications

are very necessary to the consultation process and, primarily, this involves meeting with officials (and government regulators) of the aforementioned organizations and ministries. Yet, much greater attention is paid to cultivating interest amongst the Aboriginal elite, government regulators and the Fort Frances Chiefs Secretariat than public stakeholders, like band members living on reserve communities.

Loxley (2010) has found in his study of northern Aboriginal communities:

Externally induced crises which, in extreme cases, might threaten the very survival of a community have been cited as an important stimulus to community development efforts. . . . Thus hydro dam and power line construction, oil and gas developments, mining expansion, and the contamination of fisheries by resource extraction industries have all been seen at one time or another in the recent past as threatening to the survival of Native communities (p. 20).

In an ironic twist to the above scenario, Rainy River First Nations leaders, and other First Nations, were 'groomed' by OHRG to accept a devils wager - new development/economic growth or continued dependency on government. Although it might not be framed in those exact terms in public discussions, (or mentioned at all) by mining corporations like Osisko, the project's presentation, and its economic implications, are clear to First Nations leaders, who seek self-sufficiency through increased employment and (some form of) economic development regardless of the ecological consequences.

Osisko's preemptive and proactive method of consultation with the Fort Frances Chiefs Secretariat speaks to its business acumen. At the behest of federal and provincial regulatory bodies, OHRG is implementing an Aboriginal Engagement Program to

provide the chiefs and councils, and membership, with project information. The corporation's news release stated:

Osisko further agrees to provide employment and training opportunities to members of the participating communities. The communities agree to create operating trusts that will be able to receive training and educational funding from Osisko Hammond Reef, as well as accept shares of Osisko Mining Corporation as milestones in exploration and development are reached (Osisko Mining Corporation, 2010).

It is important to note the mine will operate for about fifteen years starting in 2013. Many of the higher skilled jobs are already occupied, or will be shortly. Moreover, unemployed people, on reserve, often lack professional training or higher skill sets required to be tradespeople in Canada's mining sector. Because of time constraints, the likelihood that First Nations members may occupy non- or low-skilled positions is very high.

The passage contained in *The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* (1996) supported these assumptions:

Overall, the levels of employment achieved have been limited in at least two respects. First, the proportion of Aboriginal people employed in industries such as mining, forestry and oil and gas is little better than the proportion of Aboriginal people in the Canadian population - despite the proximity of Aboriginal communities to resource projects, and counting all Aboriginal people employed in the sector, not just those employed by non-Aboriginal companies. Second, evaluation reports consistently conclude that Aboriginal employment is restricted to less highly skilled, lower wage occupations (p. 851).

In many ways, this is like a crown corporation project due to its short timeline, low-skilled job opportunities, ambiguous objectives for community development and absence of institutions (or infrastructure) to deliver community development in a consistent and timely manner.

The ecological component is the most poorly understood feature of the project. Generally, mining and resource extraction companies tend to overlook the environment and overestimate the capacity of safety mechanisms to mitigate (e.g., tailings retention ponds), or prevent, contamination of flora and fauna. For example, all phases of mining are capital intensive, and, eventually, financially lucrative for investors; but, it requires clearing of land, deployment of equipment and buildings, and ore extraction and processing. According to the "Project Description" (2011), in reference to the open pit mine:

On-site infrastructure also includes a [ore] processing plant, an explosives plant, offices and maintenance facilities. Off-site infrastructure will include construction and upgrading of site access and an electrical transmission line that may be constructed by others. Construction is targeted to begin in 2013 (p. 1).

In addition, a tailings management facility along with waste rock area, and other surface stockpiles, are located at the proposed site. According to the 'Project Description', OHRG has passed from exploration phase, or pre-feasibility, into feasibility and environmental assessment/permitting phase (p. 47). And, the project description is currently under the review of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency per federal regulations.

Such invasive methods are extremely detrimental to the immediate and surrounding ecology, as it contaminates groundwater (through fuel spillage and acid leaching), destroys animal habitat and liberates toxic materials, like mercury, in the subsurface. Osisko, as a commercial mining corporation, accepts these risks, and in theory will pay for the cost of cleanup with mine profits. The Fort Frances Chiefs Secretariat and Rainy River First Nations, as associates of OHRG, have chosen economic development and the risks associated with mining. In close proximity to Sawbill Bay, Lynxhead Bay and Marmion Lake of Ontario's Seine River water system, it is difficult to fathom how such a natural area will be 'reclaimed' and returned to its original, pristine condition.

Rainy River Resources Limited is the other gold mining company operating in the Rainy River area. In the exploration phase, it is drilling core samples on land 20 kilometres north of Manitou Rapids reserve at the area known as Blackhawk. RLTC-Redpath Joint Venture is the company contracted to conduct exploration drilling over two years for \$39.3 million. It is a joint venture company composed of RLTC and the Fort Frances Chiefs Secretariat, which performs diamond drilling using two rigs and road construction at the Blackhawk site. According to the corporation's website, "the Rainy River Gold Project is defining an emerging Canadian Gold District, hosting NI 43-101 compliant gold resources of 1.18 Moz [million ounces] in the Measured category, 4.98 Moz in the Indicated category and 2.28 Moz in the Inferred category as of October 10, 2012" (Rainy River Resources Limited, 2013).

Loxley speaks to problematic aspect of development noted above. Loxley (2010) has argued:

The current approach to development in the North is a reflection of how society at large lives in Canada, and indeed, in the industrialized world. There is an emphasis of limitless growth, and here I would disagree with the introductory remarks of the premier [Filmon]. The Bruntland Commission report contains some major flaws - the main one being that it assumes that continued growth and sustainability are compatible and that environmental effects of growth can be managed. . . . [T]here is an assumption that pollution is a necessary price for meeting consumption needs (e.g., the notion that, in the case of the Repap project, bleaching paper is a good thing to do and it needs to be done). So, the problems that Native northerners face come partly from this general approach to development (p. 138).

I believe Loxley's reference to the North, specifically northern Manitoba, may be equally (and accurately) applied to conditions of resource extraction in northwestern Ontario. Also, he understands the state, as a promoter of corporate investment in Canada, is also a major employer of its citizens.

This analogy, too, applies to the administration and support staff of Rainy River First Nations, whose wages and salaries are paid through INAC and other federal agencies. If chief and council refuse to 'toe the line' on a particular issue, it may find itself scrambling to meet budgetary requirements for the upcoming fiscal year. For First Nations, this explains part of the appeal of conducting business with the private mining sector. With the perception of gold mining being especially lucrative aside, First Nations may believe a fair and equitable relationship is achievable with private business (a situation not attainable within government partnerships). In some cases this may be possible, but gold mining's global record of environmental degradation and incomplete development does not bode well for Manitou Rapids desire for economic self-sufficiency and ecological sustainability.

ON DEPENDENCY

Dependency, as noted, is a problem that has characterized non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal relations from the outset of Canada's confederation. Such things as income assistance has become 'normalized' for marginalized peoples in Canada. According to *The Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology*, normalization is

[d]efined as those social processes which pressure individuals to conform to culturally desirable or appropriate norms of behavior, the practice of normalization produces certain ideals or standards against which the members of a society are judged. Through this process, individuals are socialized into believing that certain forms of behavior or self-presentation are acceptable and valuable, while other behavior that transgresses social expectations is not as acceptable or legitimate (Turner, 2006).

An insidious aspect of social normalization in capitalist society, which relates to dependency, is it fosters a desire, or yearning, for the low income earner to acquire possessions (regardless of need). In so doing, an individual, as a low income earner, joins society by exercising his capacity as a consumer. But, he, as an ineffective earner, does not meet society's expectations because of his inability to consume at a particular level, as socially prescribed; and, he is unable to satisfy his desire for material possessions. Often, impoverished people harbour a negative self-image, and feelings of worthlessness, due to their exclusion from mass consumer society. This low self-esteem can have serious consequences for their mental health and quality of life throughout their lifetime.

Paradoxically, even through acquisition of things the consumer's desire is never satisfied due to the fleeting emotions that accompany purchase and consumption. But,

nevertheless, he feels compelled to repeat the behavior to experience that momentary gratification. For someone emancipated from poverty, the conspicuous accumulation of material possessions becomes an achievement. Using common parlance, those peoples - once dependent, use their *disposable income*, or *purchasing power*, to acquire luxuries that are now obtainable. In such a free-spending environment, material things, or luxuries, become symbols of status; and, purchasing power comes to define an individual's personhood and self-worth. Modern capitalism's unwritten contract is emotional and psychological needs-cum-pathologies are temporarily satisfied (or treated) through the habitual accumulation of things. But, such 'needs' are incongruous with a healthy person, community and ecology. Currently, Rainy River First Nations socioeconomic situation mirrors that of other unhealthy communities in Canada, which have been deprived of material resources and peace of mind.

I put the question to Chief Leonard: What do you think needs to change within the community for it to prosper? Leonard (2011) asserted:

Attitude, we have to change the way we think. There's too much enabling going on. And, I've talked to many people about this and I grew up from a very poor family. When I was growing up it was very hard. I can remember saying to myself, 'My kids will never ever go through what I went through.' So, as I've grown older and been able to provide more to my kids, I've overcompensated. And, I think a lot of people in the community, a lot of people, I've spoken to other people from other First Nations and they've done the same thing. They've overcompensated so we're giving our kids constantly. And, we're enabling them to become dependent (J. Leonard, personal communication, January 12, 2011).

He understands that parental oversight parallels the difficulties between administration and band members. Rather than provide services to people, his solution, conversely, is to withdraw them: "We've got to begin to make people responsible for themselves and their actions. And, not rely on the band office to provide these things" (J. Leonard, personal communication, January 12, 2011). But, he forgets extensive programming is necessary to help people break from their dependency. The important question that needs to be asked is: Given the seriousness of dependency in the community, what resources (and forms of development) are required to address the problem? The community, like many others, has not found a sufficient answer to this query.

Substance abuse is an ongoing problem for the community of Rainy River First Nations. E. DeBungee, addictions counsellor for Rainy River First Nations, sees the debilitating effects of substance abuse firsthand. He has seen the progression of substance abuse from alcoholism, amongst adults, to increased drug use by youth in the community. According to DeBungee (2010) drug dependency has become increasingly problematic:

But as the years went on, probably back ten years or so, I started dealing with younger, younger and younger generation. The twenty-year olds and all that. And, that's when I started facing different hardcore drugs like cocaine. Right now we're dealing with 'oxys' [oxycontin], prescription drugs that they use and all that (E. DeBungee, personal communication, May 27, 2010).

According to DeBungee, drug use, especially opiate abuse, has leveled-off in the community; but, it remains a threat to the health and lives of youth and young adults in Rainy River First Nations.

For many trapped in this downward spiral of drug abuse, the pursuit of education and employment has no relevance. DeBungee (2010) explained:

And, now I guess today our young people don't want to work. They'd rather be on welfare. There is a lot of opportunities for them to get a job. Even helping them out and assistance with education. But, they just don't have that motivation. They rather be [*sic*] on welfare and doing nothing here. And, I guess that's how this drug problems accumulated because, like I say you know, there's more [drug use], that's what they're focussed on I guess. You know, they're influencing one another (E. DeBungee, personal communication, May 27, 2010).

For those caught in the throes of dependency (i.e., opiate addiction) there is a lingering apathy that pervades daily life on the reserve. The youth and young adults are unable, or unwilling, to take responsibility for their lives. Instead, they relinquish control to others as they see themselves as ostensibly powerless, or worthless. Consequently, the community's health and welfare workers, as well as friends and family, provide the safety net for drug dependent individuals to keep them alive.

For single mothers the drug problem is especially acute, as DeBungee (2010) has described:

Even welfare too, when they get into welfare, they start buying. They'd rather buy drugs than food. And, you know, that's how bad it is. I mean that's how bad it was [be]cause it's starting to decline now. Because the pills, oh boy, I think this past three years is really way up there. And, now that they're not into the pills they're into the methadone. It's suppose to be a treatment program but that too they're abusing (E. DeBungee, personal communication, May 27, 2010).

People receiving methadone treatment must commit to a daily regimen for an indefinite period. Often, they are unable to maintain employment because of their outpatient treatment, which impedes improvement of their life circumstances.

The breadth of the drug problem on Manitou Rapids has led band council to pass a by-law, which prohibits drug use by Rainy River First Nations administration, support staff and MFP employees. Under the by-law, employees are randomly screened for illicit drugs. Persons in violation of the by-law must attend treatment for a specific duration.

CONVERGENCE APPROACH ON RESERVE

The biggest weakness of the export promotions strategy, as adopted by Rainy River First Nations, is the absence of linkages (and the prominence of leakages) in the community's economy. For example, the local sawmill produces wood paneling for external markets, its source of income. MFP is a major employer of community members (a backward linkage); however, due to the availability and affordability of goods and services in nearby towns, employees spend their money off-reserve (a leakage). Also, the sawmill is heavily mechanized and most, if not all, of the costly machinery is produced elsewhere, another significant leakage. Due to the community's small population, MFP overlooks the community market and exports its product to others with higher levels of consumption. Overall, the absence of community businesses to support MFP, and each other, marks Rainy River First Nations economy as dependent. [Note: convergence approach does not preclude export.]

According to export base theory and staple theory, which may be equally applied to the above example: A diversified economy is able to demonstrate a variety of linkages; whereas, a community with an underdeveloped or dependent economy must contend with variety of leakages. "[L]eakage is a measure of the income flows leaving a region through sources such as migratory labour, servicing of capital imports and immigrants making remittances abroad" (Lamb, 2007, p. 61).

In her discussion of staple theory, L. Lamb (2007) provided an overview of forward, backward and final demand linkages in the hospitality/food industry:

For instance, a community restaurant purchasing food and hiring labour from within the community is creating a backward linkage. A forward linkage is a measure of the extent to which output of a sector is sold as inputs to other sectors of the region. Forward linkages strengthen as the proportion of output that is sold within the community as inputs increases. For instance, a community restaurant that sells its baked goods to local retailers who, in turn, resell them off their store shelves is creating a forward linkage. A final demand linkage is a measure of the extent to which investment in domestic industries is producing goods for consumption, investment or government purchase by the export sector. The greater the proportion of domestic production sold inside the community or region, rather than as exports, the larger the final demand linkage effect will be. For instance, a community restaurant which caters to community residents is creating a final demand linkage. Linkages have a multiplier effect whereby aggregate income is increased by more than the initial investment (p. 61).

The importance of linkages extends beyond a technical understanding of staple theory. Both linkage and leakage, as concepts, apply to broader understanding of economic theory. Moreover, any working model of CED worth implementing demonstrates a number of different types of economic linkage.

C.Y. Thomas, an economic theorist, "observe[d] underdevelopment to be a consequence of increasing divergence and unresponsiveness of domestic production to meeting the needs of local people" (Loxley, 2007, p. 64). Therefore, local economic strategy when strongly influenced by national and international markets contributes to a lack of economic development in the community. The Boreal Forest region remains a hinterland for those corporations who exploit the area, and its people, for raw materials that are transformed into valuable commodities. Remarkably, like the fur trade economy - involving traditional staple production, local resources (e.g, lumber, precious metals) are extracted, primarily, for the benefit of corporations and their share holders.

In northwestern Ontario, local resources, such as gold, are mined and processed by companies with vested interests outside of local economies. Instead of reaping the benefits from these deposits, dependent economies like Rainy River First Nations, in partnership with non-Aboriginal companies, must accede to development criteria established by corporations, which own subsurface rights to gold deposits. These methods of control (long established by Canadian corporations) severely limit the economic opportunities for First Nations communities like Rainy River First Nations.

Curiously, band council and its supporters have hedged their bets on the possibilities of gold mining and external business development. They believe community development and autarky can be achieved through investment in and dividends paid by the mining sector and photovoltaic systems.

W. Wilson (2011) has addressed the financing scheme for solar energy (photovoltaic) systems being encouraged by Ontario's government:

The band has been talking to investors, and then not only that, in Ontario there are thirteen projects right across all Ontario. And, part of the requirements in Ontario is, if there is going to be some energy projects of any kind they have to talk to the First Nations. And, they have to give them the opportunity to be partnerships, or be part of an activity. . . . And, the government is really pushing that Manitou [Rapids] gets involved. Well, Manitou has talked to investors, they're from Germany, and there's probably a need of \$300 million. Well, if you take a look at \$300 million and part of our situation would be that we would require 10 per cent [equity]. So, the rest can be financed . . . The Chief [Leonard] has already met with the four major banks in Canada and they're willing to be part of that (W. Wilson, personal communication, January 13, 2011).

A \$30 million investment raises many questions about the direction and commitment of community leadership, as it pertains to economic development. Although solar energy is envisaged as a growth industry there is enormous risk in proceeding with large investment strategies. There are obvious concerns with potential losses; but, more problematic, is planning and implementation of these kinds of development at the exclusion of others. Investment in a project of this magnitude, which *locks-in* the community's financial resources, precludes other significant kinds of community economic development and social change initiatives. Regardless, Rainy River First Nations participation in the solar energy grid will certainly mean waiting several years for its investment to pay dividends. By such time re-investment opportunities for community development may be limited by changing, or worsening, economic conditions in Canada.

The convergence approach to CED may offer a possibility for Rainy River First Nations to realize a certain degree of economic independence (without ignoring community development strategies). According to Lamb (2007) convergence involves

economic planning of resource use and consumption to meet local needs. Planning involves the organization of the production of goods and services most wanted and most needed by the domestic economy. Small-scale production is advocated because of the linkage possibilities it offers and because the benefits of large-scale production are exaggerated (p. 64).

In keeping with the purpose of CED, "[convergence] strategy focuses on the production of a range of 'basic goods'. In this context the term 'basic goods' means goods which are used extensively in the production of other goods - other intermediate, consumption, or investment goods" (Loxley, 2010, p. 46). [Note: this should not be confused with the economic base technique. Such 'basic goods' create necessary linkages for synthesis of local production with the needs of community.]

Convergence is innovative and challenges misconceptions about economic development, and because of this it will be divisive, certainly in the beginning. However, the absence of economic development on Rainy River First Nations requires a more focussed, community-driven approach; which is, a re-commitment of the community's human and financial resources to CED. According to Lamb (2007) the biggest threat to implementing the approach is withdrawal of government support: "The main challenge to the convergence approach is the requirement of basic and long-term state support, which may be denied if it threatens the private sector or empowers the community to voice its demands and discontents (Shragge 1993)" (p. 66). However, Rainy River First Nations trust has the resources to adequately finance a CD/CED institution of a modest size, which does limit state influence in such a venture. But, to date, the trust's administrators have balked at the kind of CED suggested by Lamb.

A CD/CED institution - subsidized by the settlement trust, should be established to initiate community and economic development on the reserve. Certainly, as a social and economic approach it has the potential to initiate change; and, I believe Rainy River First Nations membership would benefit from a 'transformative' institution in the community.

Loxley (2007) has described a particular kind of CED theory and its potential for *transforming* society,

the [transformative] view of CED, which sees it as a possible alternative for organizing both economy and society. This vision of CED draws its inspiration from socialist or anarcho-syndicalist critiques of capitalism. It accepts the shortcomings of capitalism held by the "CED-as-gap-filling" group and adds to them the lack of economic democracy in capitalism (given private ownership of capital), its patriarchal autocracy and its tendency to recurrent crises and abuse of environmental limits to growth (pp. 9-10).

This kind of CED operates by the logic that the economic system must be sufficiently transformed; therein, innovative strategies to socioeconomic problems may begin to have the intended effect in the community.

CHAPTER FOUR

In the following discussion it is important to be mindful that CD and CED are symbiotic, and can be integrated for greater functionality in a community-based setting. According to Sheldrick (2007), "CED is related to the broader conception of community development, and there are often linkages between organizations that are involved in community development (without an economic component) and community economic development" (p. 90). But, as previously described in Loxley, CD is the requisite foundation for CED, it is the 'footing' on which CED is based.

In the case of social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, many people were attracted by the possibility for immediate change in their lives and the 'radical' ideas espoused by these organizations. People felt compelled to join and 'get-involved' with organizations that were engaged in direct, positive action. But, a CD approach, in the community of Rainy River First Nations, will require considerable appeal to convince its membership to participate in community development programs. For this reason, I believe it is important to introduce community members to CD through a cultural program that focuses on community health and resiliency.

Presently, Rainy River First Nations has two pow-wows annually, which are both funded through the settlement trust. Rainy River First Nations 'Sobriety Pow-wow' and 'Summer Pow-wow' are important community events that bring people together to celebrate Anishinaabeg song, dance and drums. However, some of the fundamental aspects of culture, like language, are being lost as elders pass on. On Rainy River First Nations, Anishinaabemowin is not the prominent language it was a century ago.

Anishinaabemowin language classes, developed by CD workers, are an excellent way for the people of Rainy River First Nations, including those with dependency issues, to regain a sense of identity, and re-connect with their culture. These classes could be expanded to include culture-based knowledge, in Anishinaabemowin, through info sessions on embodied practices, such as trapping, hunting and country-food preparation. Eventually, the program could evolve to include practical instruction, by elders or experienced hunter-trappers, in trapping, hunting and food preparation on the land. Classes could be tailored for groups based on age, gender and language proficiency.

A CD program of this nature, which has general appeal with First Nations peoples, should provide CD workers with a clear indication of people's interest in community development in a short period. Also, they will be able to determine the direction of future CD strategies based on participant attendance and audience demographic. And, CD workers, through close observation and participant feedback, will be able to determine the feasibility of a CD/CED institution on Rainy River First Nations. That is, do socioeconomic or other barriers (on reserve) prevent the implementation of CD programming and CED strategies. Obviously, this CD program, based in the community, is dependent on certain pre-conditions: a) band council supports an organization of this kind in the community; and, b) adequate funding for the organization has been established, at least, for short-term support.

Language classes are one method for building capacity in the community; but, it will be a dismal failure if people see no value or relevance in attending. The mobilization

of community participants is an integral part of community development. Loxley (2010) has explained the role of CD workers, as activists and educators:

[C]ommunity development workers see themselves performing not only an educational role but also one which is best described as a mobilizing role. They see it not only as legitimate but also imperative that they educate and mobilize community groups to form their own organizations to articulate their needs and press their case politically (Loney, 1982) (p. 27).

In order for people to attend meetings, contribute to discussions (i.e., voice concerns) and participate collectively, they must (grow to) feel safe and comfortable in what is, initially, an unfamiliar setting. Generally, community members' fears of being victimized, ostracized and/or publicly ridiculed are major impediments to participation in any sort of public forum, or small classes for that matter. Therefore, CD practitioners must make a conscious effort to ensure that people feel safe and secure, and that members willingly participate in activities within the organization. One of the simplest and most effective ways to do this is to enact a code of conduct that is voted on by participants. Eventually, it will be necessary to develop a list of principles on which the organization is based, but, in the interim, a code of conduct should be sufficient to keep matters civil and moving forward.

In this kind of organization, *democratic participatory decision making* is both fundamental to its operation and a touchstone for membership. Sheldrick (2007), speaking on the origin of CED organizations, has determined:

An important part of the political orientation of CED organizations was a commitment to *democratic participatory decision making* [emphasis added]. Local residents should be involved in setting development priorities and

running both the organizations and the programs delivered. . . . At the same time, the emphasis on participatory decision making also signaled a desire to go beyond the mere delivery of a service. It wasn't enough to simply create jobs, but rather the goal was to involve individuals in a political enterprise with economic consequences. CED organizations, therefore, had the potential to both aid individuals directly, but also politicize them and/or empower them. In this way individuals could be transformed into political actors, rather than be acted upon (p. 88).

Being a fledgling CD organization, I believe it is necessary to avoid involvement in service delivery, as currently undertaken by band administration, the settlement trust and Canada's government. If there is a gap in community services that is within the scope of CD then thought should be given to its undertaking. But, a decision must be predicated on factors such as budgetary requirements, human resources, political implications and the urgency of the problem. For a CD organization, in its infancy, it is necessary that this decision be made by CD workers and/or professional staff.

Certainly, there is a threat that the organization could be overwhelmed by the demands of service delivery on Rainy River First Nations. If it adopts a service delivery role (too early in its existence) and does it effectively, it may be difficult for organizers and staff, due to workload and pressure from the settlement trust or band administration, to pursue social change initiatives. Also, for a new CD organization with other aspirations (i.e., CD/CED institution), there are several drawbacks associated with adopting this role in the community at this juncture.

The settlement trust - having assumed the role of ancillary service institution on Rainy River First Nations, has emphasized job creation and business development programs with similar objectives (i.e., social maintenance) to those of the federal

government. E. Shragge's (2003) research has examined how government institutions have sought to integrate community organizations into the service sector:

Panet-Raymond and Mayer (1997) argue that community groups have used a strategy of "critical cooperation or cooperative conflict" in their relationship with the state and that both radical advocacy groups with their coalitions and institutionalized service organizations co-exist in tension. Thus, community organizations are pulled between two poles. The first pole is to work in opposition by raising demands, mobilizing or representing the needs of their constituency, and pushing for some form of social change. The second, and more common practice, is to become extensions of the state; by receiving government funding, organizations become partners with the state in the provision of services. It is this change that leads me to question the role of the community sector as a vehicle for social justice (pp. 56-7).

On the question of community development, many CD practitioners have adopted the second strategy with the hope of achieving a 'soft' form of social change in the community. Of course, it is a topic of discussion amongst CD workers, and community organizers, who believe these organizations should pursue a form of social change rather than one of service delivery within state partnerships (i.e., cooperative conflict). They believe CD organizations solely engaged in service provision are doing social maintenance, which permits the state to offload its social and fiscal responsibility(s) on the community sector. Conversely, some CD practitioners argue the state's withdrawal from social welfare (since the late 1970s) has made it imperative for organizations to do 'cooperative conflict' in the community.

But, the real-life situation for community organizers is more complicated than the debate about the efficacy of 'social change' versus 'social maintenance'. Due to the technical nature of community organizing, and its excessive workload, these groups are

largely managed by professionals "with university training and those with on-the-job experience," and, often, such organizations represent members, as clients, rather than empower them, as citizens (Shragge, 2003, pp. 57-8). Thereby, the *professionalization* of CD undermines members, who struggle for self-determination, by undervaluing their service in these organizations. In some cases, members work is closely monitored (e.g., quality control) to ensure it meets the organization's standards. In this manner, a members' participation is much like a regular job, in which, the employer fails to recognize the employees unique abilities and desire for challenge and change in the workplace. However, the flip-side of professionalization - unchecked voluntarism, means organizations suffer because people are doing jobs for which they are unqualified or under qualified. Instead, a more balanced approach to CD that includes participant's skill development and capacity building is required. Shragge (2003) has suggested, "[a] constructive tension is needed between an active membership participation and a staff accountable to the organization" (p. 58).

But, striking this balance, as Shragge suggests, is difficult for any CD organization that operates on a budget through a limited partnership with a funding body. In the case of CD on Rainy River First Nations, an organization is dependent on a partner, the settlement trust or band administration, from which it receives subsidies, and the trust may act to limit the democratic and participatory culture of the organization. Like a partnership with the state, the settlement trust could choose to subvert the democratic and participatory processes of the organization by placing contingencies on its future funding.

A large part of CD participation will involve attending classes and studying relevant materials. For community members, education will play a vital role in how any CD project evolves in the community. And, so, prior to implementing CD programs (i.e., politically oriented) it is important that Rainy River First Nations members, as disenfranchised citizens, recognize the full extent of their socioeconomic plight from a historical perspective. Community members, as participants in CD, need exposure to "a systemic, historical view of the causes of regional inequality and community deprivation" that has impacted their lives (Loxley, 2010, p. 27). Thus, CD workers, to inform people about their rights and responsibilities as citizens of Rainy River First Nations, must develop a comprehensive education curriculum. As Sheldrick (2007) has identified,

democracy and participation do not simply happen on their own. Rather, they require considerable work. This is particularly the case in disadvantaged communities, where people have every reason to be suspicious of and distrustful of government, social workers and a host of others whose aim is to help. Here education is critical. Education in this context needs to go beyond simply the development of particular skill sets needed to get a job. Rather it must include an analysis of power and the structures that have contributed to poverty and inequality in the community (p. 100).

CD workers would provide a regular schedule of day and/or night classes, meetings and formal gatherings for participants. In addition, discussion groups and open forums are necessary to clarify the historical content and neo-liberal context of education materials. This is important because it is the state and global corporations, as political-economic entities, which have intervened to diminish the quality of life in the community. Therefore, community members require the theoretical overview and subsequent

discourse to be able to understand and recognize the historical implications of free market capitalism and government policy for their community.

Loxley (2010) has expounded on the market's nature in capitalist society:

[M]any needs are met through the marketplace. Needs are, therefore, often equated with "demands" and are met through the exercise of purchasing power. But there are problems in relying upon market forces to meet needs. To begin with, demand is a function of the level and distribution of income. Low incomes imply a low level of effective demand and hence many "basic" material needs will not be met (p. 27).

As Loxley asserts, in Canada, market forces do not equip low income earners to meet the needs of their families. So, in urban centres, the demand for food banks and soup kitchens has steadily risen over the last twenty years. For people living at a subsistence level, and below, the incidence of poor health and major illness is much greater. Unlike many families in urban centres, the community of Rainy River First Nations has a greater familiarity with hunger and despair, as families there have dealt with intergenerational poverty for over a century.

It is this deprivation that continues to affect many people in the community in a variety of forms (e.g., apathy, dependency). The problem is especially severe in the younger population on reserve. In my interview with M. Medicine-Horton (2010), he was sceptical about the willingness and readiness of younger members to access training programs and employment opportunities:

Two weeks ago I put on a training session for chain saw, brush saw. And, it's for this project over here our campground. And, we have a Hydro One project

going on. Fourteen people went through the training, 'Oh, we want to work, work, work, work. We want to work.' Today's first day of work, ten of them didn't show up. When they decide to show up on Friday and I tell them, 'No you're not going to work!' They're going to go home and bitch and complain to their mommies and daddies and aunts and uncles and cousins. But, that's what I mean, like that's the part that's frustrating. And, I don't know if people are ready [for community development programs] (M. Medicine-Horton, personal communication, May 25, 2010).

For community renewal (and any lasting benefit of social programming) to occur on Rainy River First Nations, CD practitioners must address this apathy and dependency. In certain cases, medical intervention (i.e., substance abuse treatment, mental healthcare) will be necessary for people to recover and participate in CD programs. The following section outlines my recommendations for the community.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT & POLITICAL ACTIVISM

The issue of water health directly affects the people and ecology of northwestern Ontario. Due to increased habitation and industry along the Rainy River, human and animal sewage, as well as industrial run-off (e.g., chemical effluent from pulp and paper mills), has polluted the rivers, lakes and underground reservoirs of the region. For communities, like Rainy River First Nations, that depend on these water sources for their potable water, this is a serious problem.

Rainy River First Nations needs to bring attention to water health through a campaign with a distinct political focus. Therefore, CD participants should be mobilized, as political activists, to address water pollution, and work to prevent (or ameliorate) water

contamination. As activists, participants would attempt to exert pressure on federal and provincial legislators through acts of civil disobedience (i.e, public demonstrations, social media events). Also, a letter writing campaign, to elected officials and media outlets, should be undertaken to bring greater attention to water health. In this campaign, the organization should also examine and delineate the other components of water health, such as: water privatization, diversion of waterways for corporate development (e.g., hydroelectric power) and deforestation, which causes soil erosion and damage to tributaries.

A 'political movement' of this sort requires hands-on participation; and, there is an opportunity for activists to take the lead and coordinate civil disobedience efforts with other like-minded groups. Over the last several years, there have been numerous demonstrations (e.g., mother earth water walk, Grassy Narrows blockade) to bring attention to the water health of the Great Lakes and surrounding area. Thus, Rainy River's CD movement should establish a network with other organizations to learn about the broader struggle for indigenous rights and, therein, strengthen its political position.

In community development turned community activism, participant-activists develop a variety of useful skills for capacity building, which are applicable in a work setting. Community activism requires that a participant: 1) assert himself to perform duties and fulfill responsibilities; 2) use interpersonal skills to work harmoniously with others in a stressful setting; 3) work consistently to achieve an important objective; 4) build a rapport with others to facilitate solidarity (within an activist network); and, 5) promote the water health movement in a positive manner outside the community.

As intimated above, the mobilization of community activists in sufficient numbers is vital to sustaining a CD project with the monumental objective of drastic socioeconomic redesign. This is the case because the reversal of water pollution is dependent upon people's long-term commitment to the cause. In the interim, community members, who are alienated from the political process on Rainy River First Nations, may be re-politicized and inspired through their involvement in the water health movement.

LAND USE - PROTECTION & COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Wholesale land development is the current theme for real estate gurus in Canada. Should Rainy River First Nations follow suit with development of a similar kind? I believe large sections of reserve land must be protected from business interests that would harm its ecology! Therefore, all land development should be carefully considered before it is undertaken. Even common forms of land use, like livestock grazing, should be re-considered based on its ecological impact over several years (e.g., ground water contamination) and close proximity to tributaries. Certainly, water health is an important consideration with any economic development in the Rainy River area.

A land use study - with an ecological focus (e.g., water health), is required to determine how responsible land development should proceed on Rainy River First Nations. In the intervening period, I propose a moratorium on land development for all undeveloped reserve land (or claims land) until adoption of a *land use formula*. Thus, all undeveloped claims land should remain untouched unless there are immediate plans for its use, as determined by the Land Purchase Committee. Claims land, which is developed

prior to purchase and survey for ATR, should lie fallow for a set period of time (a schedule of three to five years after the moratorium is lifted). An exception would be grazing land that has been purchased from a farmer with the intention of leasing it back to him for the same purpose. Once it comes into effect, the land use formula would take precedence and a moratorium on land development would be lifted according to its recommendations. However, given the area's ecological problems, the study may determine that large sections of reserve land should remain undeveloped in perpetuity.

One possible method for land use on Rainy River First Nations - that incorporates a CED approach, is a vegetable farm. Due to the soil's low fertility and the short growing season of northwestern Ontario, it would be a small-scale garden farm. An economy of scope is a significant feature of this CED strategy, that is, vegetable produce is grown for local and community consumption (i.e., final demand linkage); and, it would help offset the high retail cost of vegetables at local retailers.

Typically, garden farming of this sort, as compared to corporate agriculture, is not heavily mechanized, but it does require a tractor(s) and implements to break and plant the soil. But, with low overhead costs as farming goes, it represents a good entry-level enterprise for Rainy River First Nations, a community that has been reluctant to farm. This type of agriculture represents a positive step to break the tradition of non-farming methods for land use; and, a progressive move to address community food security.

During the growing season community members would be employed as farm laborers to operate machinery (backward linkage). As mentioned soil fertility may be an issue, but the decline of water health makes an organic type farm an important

consideration. In organic farming, chemical compounds like fertilizers (e.g., anhydrous ammonia), herbicides and pesticides would not be applied to soil or plants. As well, the garden's need for irrigation would be a chief consideration along with its proximity to waterways.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT & SOCIAL SERVICES

Substance abuse is a serious problem affecting youth and young adults on Rainy River First Nations. Rainy River First Nations treatment services are funded through the National Native Alcohol Drug Abuse Program (NNADAP), a Health Canada initiative. Some of the drug intervention strategies currently being used are: counseling (in-community), methadone treatment for opiate addiction, local twelve-step programs (e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous), inpatient admission for detoxification (off reserve), and follow-up treatment at a facility outside of the community.

I propose a service delivery program - a comprehensive, integrated approach to treatment of substance abuse in the community. It is a community development health model that utilizes two treatment streams for community members, which replace the government subsidized program established on Rainy River First Nations. The core funding for treatment strategies would come from the settlement trust to mitigate government control of substance abuse and mental health services.

The first stream involves augmented treatment services similar to those currently used in the community. While the second stream is predicated on substance abuse being a symptom of mental illness (e.g., psychological trauma, mood disorders, schizophrenia).

When necessary, detoxification and inpatient substance abuse treatment would be available through external facilities.

Regardless of the kind of treatment sought by consumers, they would have the opportunity to contextualize and address their substance abuse through individualized regimens. And, with that opportunity, there is the greater likelihood of significant recovery for the individual.

TRAUMA, SUBSTANCE USE & TREATMENT FOR SURVIVORS

The effects of psychological trauma (i.e., PTSD) may be caused by extreme duress, such as the fear of physical attack or impending death, or witness of attack and/or death. Also, it may be the result of physical attack, or violation of a person's body, as occurs in sexual abuse. The definition adopted at the Manitoba Provincial Forum on Trauma Recovery (2007) described the basis of psychological trauma:

Trauma refers to experiences or events that, by definition, are out of the ordinary in terms of their overwhelming nature. They are more than merely stressful - they are also shocking, terrifying, and devastating to the victim, resulting in profoundly upsetting feelings of terror, shame, helplessness, and powerlessness (Courtois, 1999) (p. 7).

Survivors of psychological trauma are often reluctant to speak about their experiences to anyone. Consequently, physicians and clinical staff have a difficult time in diagnosing and treating people who suffer with severe anxiety disorders. Thus, CD practitioners, from the outset of a mental health program, must be mindful of this treatment barrier and

work to create an atmosphere in the community, which is conducive to self-disclosure by trauma survivors (Manitoba Provincial Forum on Trauma Recovery, 2007, p. 14).

Partly, the failure of treatment services can be attributed to the manner in which people cognitively and emotionally process traumatic events. C. Chandler (2007), keynote speaker - Manitoba Provincial Forum on Trauma Recovery, has explained:

The uniqueness of trauma memory as oppose[d] to our general memory is that when people reflect on those experiences they are not able to put those memories of trauma in the past and so the event becomes a dominant theme in everyday life. This means that the meaning of their lives and their ability to feel joy is directly affected by those past events. They can't put it into the past because they can't comprehend it. . . . When we can't metabolize or comprehend it, it [trauma] becomes overwhelming and beyond belief. When something is incomprehensible it never goes into a narrative, so one of the ways we tell the story is by re-acting it (p. 102).

A trauma survivor's reenactment of past events rather than comprehension of those events, means he cannot re-order a "traumatic memory into an integrated semantic memory (a narrative or story)" (p. 102). Therein, the persistence of traumatic event(s) through memories, felt as negative emotions and oppressive moods, contributes to dysfunctional behaviour and personal crises. Alcohol and drug use is a method of self-medication for trauma survivors to alleviate strong feelings that accompany stressful events in daily life. But, substance use affords only temporary relief from painful emotions while a survivors memories of horrific events may be unceasing.

It is important to note that *psychological trauma* is a complex anxiety disorder (as outlined in the American Psychological Associations's DSM-IV-TR) that follows a person's experience of traumatic events. Such mental disorders, as PTSD, may not be

significant within Rainy River First Nations; and, if psychological trauma is overwhelmingly present in the community it may be very difficult to diagnose those people who suffer from it.

Chandler (2007) has described the inability of trauma survivors to utilize services:

Why is that so important to look at systems and discuss how systems work together? In order to recover from trauma, what we felt that we needed to do was provide trauma specific services. This would give people space and time to tell their stories about trauma. . . . So they have been traumatized with the symptoms but, some parts of them are able to articulate that experience into a narrative. [Whereas] [t]he people that are most profoundly effected are the people that were most severely abused, who endured for the longest period of time, who were young, and who were targeted by those that should have protected them or should have responded in a positive way [*sic*]. That means that people that are least able to utilize and identify trauma services are most profoundly effected (Manitoba Provincial Forum on Trauma Recovery, p. 102).

So this disconnect between trauma survivors and treatment services presents a conundrum for mental health therapists and other health care professionals. However, mental illness in other forms, which may be caused by psychologically traumatic experiences, are observable in people with addictions; and, treatment avoidance behaviours specifically associated with PTSD, are less pronounced for mental illnesses like mood disorders. For example, people with major depression are more likely to seek medical intervention and respond better to treatment. PTSD, major depression and schizophrenia can be characterized as severe and persistent types of mental illness. It is important to note, there are those people with substance abuse issues, who present with relatively minor disorders, that are much more treatable than those outlined above.

Mental illness, as it relates to addiction, produces a psychological crisis for the individual that leaves him unable to cope with daily life. It is a problem for which he refuses to address and seek help. Rather, he learns and adopts unhealthy behaviours (e.g., drug use, gambling, sexual promiscuity) in an attempt to control his emotions and mood. Eventually, the individual's addiction has serious physical and/or psychological consequences that leads to hospitalization or admission in a treatment facility. But, treatment facilities have a high drop-out rate and mixed results when it comes to resolving people's addiction issues. So, many people leave treatment before completing the program, and return to a 'challenging' environment without the necessary coping skills. Also, in post treatment, people with basic coping skills fall prey to environmental stressors and influences (e.g., friends with addictive behaviours) and eventually relapse.

SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAMMING

Initially, people, who suffer with substance abuse, would attend peer support groups in the community. These groups, operated by professional staff, are similar to twelve-step programs, and based on voluntary participation. Anishinaabe beliefs are the principal spiritual component of these services, and staff develop the group curriculum through consultation with Anishinaabeg elders. The initial focus of the group is a person's 'living problem', that is, an inability to live sober without alcohol and/or drugs. Men and women, because of their vastly different life experiences and circumstances, attend separate groups.

Peer support groups serve a dual function, as it provides a consumer with the opportunity to speak with a psychologist and undergo a mental health assessment, if they

so choose. If a mental disorder (e.g., major depression) is indicated by the mental health assessment, a health care practitioner would provide options for the person, such as a follow-up examination, counseling and referrals for individual psychotherapy (or mental health facility). Therein, the individual, through consultation with a health care professional, receives the necessary resources to make an informed decision. If a person chooses counseling for a mental health issue they enter the 'second stream' of treatment services. For those who decide against it they may continue treatment in the first stream, but they have the option to enter the second treatment stream at anytime (based on staff availability and group attendance).

A consumer, based on their treatment stream, attends specified counseling services. For example, the first stream is concerned with abstinence from substance use through self-examination and spiritual exploration using Anishinaabe traditional-moral principles. Therefore, they receive counseling from an Anishinaabeg elder. While the second treatment stream adds the mental health component to the recovery plan. Thus, in addition to meeting with an elder, it is necessary for consumers to meet with a psychologist (or psychiatrist) to examine their mental health issues. Thereby, the second stream asks consumers to explore the underlying cause of substance abuse - mental illness, in an introspective and comprehensive manner. Initially, consumers may find it difficult to express themselves; but, slowly, they would begin to address their psychological problems and substance abuse behavior.

On Rainy River First Nations, a series of education forums would be used to bring greater attention to psychological trauma, mental illness and substance abuse. Although, community members - family and friends of those with mental illness, are familiar with

addictive behaviour, they may lack the knowledge about what services to access, or how to access them. In the case of psychological trauma, family and friends, like health care practitioners, may be desensitized to the plight of trauma survivors due to their repeated exposure to untoward behavior and abusive experiences. Hence, the education component includes public forums followed by several class sessions on psychological trauma, mental illness and treatment regimens (for mental illness and substance abuse). It involves a thorough overview of social conditions that would address the specific concerns of family, friends and consumers. Community education would occur prior to the start of peer support groups to inform people of the availability and relevance of these groups in the community. Moreover, education is meant to de-stigmatize these social issues by creating awareness around them and community discourse. [Note: community education may enable some members to understand their traumatic experiences, mental illness or substance abuse problems, and motivate them to seek treatment.]

As I acknowledged in the introduction, treatment services are integrated rather than parallel, which requires consumers, in either treatment stream, to proceed through ordered steps to avoid repetition and redundancy. For example, a consumer is admitted to counseling after attending a peer support group for a specific period. As well, a consumer goes through an informal screening process, first, to determine if he is committed to the program, and, second, to properly ensure he is prepared for counseling. Also, consumers must demonstrate a willingness to get better by regular group attendance, and, thereafter, applying themselves in counseling, as determined by the group facilitator, elder and physician. As a consumer reaches treatment milestones, he remains within the community

where he has access to all the necessary services and resources (and support of family and friends). Consumers will be expected to leave the community for detoxification (when necessary) or admission to a treatment facility (at their request).

One of the main reasons for discontinuing government subsidized services is the need for integrated treatment services on Rainy River First Nations. Currently, community members may access a system of extended, parallel services at regional health care facilities, in Kenora and Thunder Bay (and elsewhere). However, a regional treatment centre, which offers services for consumers with mental illness and substance abuse problems does not exist in close proximity to Rainy River First Nations and other First Nations in northwestern Ontario.

For this reason, serious thought should be given to developing a regional centre for Rainy River First Nations and surrounding First Nations communities. At present, I believe it is beyond the scope of Rainy River First Nations and the settlement trust to build and operate such a facility, as the cost of building, maintaining and staffing a facility would be prohibitive. However, the Fort Frances Chiefs Secretariat should consider building and subsidizing a health facility for its First Nations clients. Ideally, the facility, which includes a trauma centre, should accommodate mental health programs (both acute and rehabilitation services), and a detox-treatment program for substance abuse.

In closing, I will make these findings available to the general membership of Rainy River First Nations (in written and electronic form). Ultimately, they will determine the saliency and legitimacy of the recommendations, and if change is required

in the community. Also, it is the grassroots membership who will press for change from their political leadership.

CONCLUSION

I had many interesting and challenging experiences during the research phase of my study. The following anecdote - 'Stuck to the Shell of a Turtle', relates an experience I had during the early research phase in Manitou Rapids:

I visited Manitou Rapids' sacred area a short drive from the band office. My purpose for being there was to honour my fore-bearers and gather strength and guidance from the rapids and the place itself.

I carefully navigated over the snow covered rocks down to the rapids to pray. It was shortly before freeze over and the rapids were still babbling their messages from time immemorial. This was my second trip to the area and I was looking for the soothing relief I'd felt from spending time in reflection at this sacred place. In prayer I rhythmically inhaled and exhaled the cool air and felt the exhilaration from standing in a place of safety and healing.

I made my tobacco offering and moved to the head of the turtle to make my second offering. I finished there and scaled the rocks up to where my car was parked. I jumped into my car and pressed the gas pedal, the car's front wheels were spinning on the fresh snow. The car's weight pressed down into the wet, freezing ground. I was going nowhere, except backwards, as I pressed the accelerator and continued to lose traction. I became frustrated as the car continued to spin in circles and creep down the incline it sat on.

Half-an-hour later I sat in a depression closer than I wanted to be to the Turtle's head. Another fifteen minutes of spinning around convinced me I needed to find extra

help to relieve myself and the Turtle. I walked back toward the band office and met a vehicle carrying Karen, her friend Elvis Debungee and his mother. I had sweated with Karen, and met Elvis, the day before. I explained my situation with the Turtle and Elvis made some calls around looking for help. As I listened to one side of the conversation I wondered if anyone was able or willing to come to my aid.

We drove to the scene in Karen's SUV for which I was very welcome because frostbite had begun to envelop my wet feet and legs. Elvis assessed the situation and realized a four-wheel drive of some sort was required. He reached his father on his cellphone, he agreed to drive by. Before long a four-wheel drive truck was pulling me up the Turtle's shell but dangerously close to some trees. A short-time later, a 'gator' arrived to clear a path for the truck which aided in gaining traction on the surface of the slippery shell. The cooperative work of the tandem finally pulled me to safety. I thanked the various parties and paid them for their time and trouble. As for the Turtle I hope it will accept my apologies and future offerings; however, I'm sure I will discover its shell to be much more resilient than my car's transmission. Of course, the Turtle's permanence when compared with a motor vehicle is much more important (in fact it's incalculable while a car is replaceable and impermanent).

After this latest episode the importance of treading lightly on the Turtle's shell has been reinforced (and cannot be overstated).

This anecdote exemplifies the importance of community for the individual. I was presented with a difficult situation, one I could not overcome myself. Life is like that, as

individuals we require the guidance and friendship of others to get through hard times. With the aid of other people, I have been able to pass through the difficulties in my life, but I carry some heavy baggage from these experiences. Hopefully, I can reflect on and understand these experiences, and intervene in other peoples lives in a positive manner.

On that note, I believe community members can benefit by participating in CD initiatives. Some of the recommendations I have proposed: culture-language classes, history-economic education and political activism for water health - can enhance personal growth and capacity building to improve the quality of life in the community. CD practitioners are the professionals, who design and deliver programs, that can provide the knowledge and impetus to do this effectively. However, it is clear to me that social change on Rainy River First Nations will be incremental rather than monumental.

My focus on service delivery programs reflects the belief that transformative social change is desirable but not a pressing concern for the community. The gravity of social problems on Rainy River First Nations requires immediate action - as many people succumb to substance abuse, or mental illness, with little possibility of long-term recovery. Therefore, a middle ground for social change must be established through a synthesis of community development strategies and service delivery programs to foster treatment for acute care clientele and general health in the community.

Rainy River First Nations market-driven orientation with its focus on capital investment off reserve will do little to rectify this present situation. As community developers, many First Nations politicians and administrators are philosophically predisposed to maximization of profit through investment in external corporate ventures.

I have determined this neo-liberal predisposition inhibits 'capacity building' initiatives that are central to my conception of CD/CED.

Before forging ahead with the practice of community development, chief and council, and trust administrators, must be prepared to re-focus and support CD initiatives (like those I have proposed). To do this they need to abandon the belief that Rainy River First Nations' self-sufficiency lay with corporate interests, who are accountable to shareholders not band members. In short, the economic position adopted by band council is incongruous with a healthy, sustainable community.

A strong inspiration for this project is my grandfather, Ed Blackburde. His memory had left me with many questions about the area where he grew up and his ancestors lived. Through my grandfather's family line I am a band member of Rainy River First Nations.

In adulthood, Ed worked as a carpenter and tried to forget much about his formative years in residential day school. He suffered the ravages of alcoholism for many years. As a child, I knew him as an emotionally distant man of few words, but every once in awhile he would surprise me with a humorous story and his boisterous laugh.

I would like to think in his more contemplative moods he still remembered the beauty of Rainy River.

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Appendix

Informed Consent Form

Research Project Title: Sustainable Economic Development on Rainy River First Nation

Principal Researcher: Gordon Blackburne, Native Studies department, University of Manitoba

This consent form, a copy of which will be left with you for your records and reference, is only part of the process of informed consent. It should give you the basic idea of what the research is about and what your participation will involve. If you would like more detail about something mentioned here, or information not included here, you should feel free to ask. Please take the time to read this carefully and to understand any accompanying information.

My research project is a Master's thesis for the University of Manitoba. The working title of the thesis is "Sustainable Economic Development on Rainy River First Nation." My project will focus on developing economic strategies for R.R.F.N. that utilizes land-culture, human resources and capital resources for the benefit of community members in their specific environment. The purpose of this interview is to collect information from you on the topic of community economic development. Your opinion, experience and insight are vitally important to my research. The interview will be recorded on a digital voice recorder and should take approximately forty-five minutes to one hour to complete. However, please do not feel limited by the time constraint. The interview will take place one time only, unless clarification for an answer is required. There is absolutely no physical risk involved with the participation in this project and you may decline to participate at any time (if you feel this is necessary). If you prefer to remain anonymous (although the information collected from you will be kept confidential and secure, regardless) – I will indicate "community member" in the final research paper.

Your signature on this form indicates that you have understood to your satisfaction the information regarding participation in the research project and agree to participate as a subject. In no way does this waive your legal rights nor release the researchers, sponsors, or involved institutions from their legal and professional responsibilities. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time, and /or refrain from answering any questions you prefer to omit, without prejudice or consequence. Your continued participation should be as informed as your initial consent, so you should feel free to ask for clarification or new information throughout your participation.

My contact information: Gordon Blackburde, (204) 482-7140, Supervisor: Peter Kulchyski, (204) 474-6333

This research has been approved by the Joint-Faculty Research Ethics Board, University of Manitoba. If you have any concerns or complaints about this project you may contact any of the above-named persons or the Human Ethics Secretariat at 474-7122, or e-mail: margaret_bowman@umanitoba.ca. A copy of this consent form has been given to you to keep for your records and reference.

Participant's Signature

Date

Researcher and/or Delegate's Signature

Date