

The autoethnography of violence by the Sudan Police Forces in the Darfur Region,  
1980- 2000:

A Quest for a peace-oriented policing paradigm

By

Richard Boli

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of

The University of Manitoba

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

of the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Joint Master's Program in Peace and Conflict Studies

University of Manitoba/University of Winnipeg

Winnipeg

## Abstract

This study analyzes several facets of the Sudanese police forces using a transformative change approach from Peace and Conflict Studies, namely storytelling as peacebuilding (autoethnography). While I have conducted this study to raise awareness about widespread violence in Darfur, Sudan, it is critical to assess how storytelling affects social identity and structural violence and whether such autoethnographic accounts could help achieve new horizons for desired realities. The thesis discusses my experiences as a senior police officer in the Sudanese police force. It then analyzes some of my narratives, which cover critical themes concerning the social reorientation of theology and its impact on police institutions. It also establishes three analytical categories: (1) distribution of power, (2) social stratification, and (3) effectuating violence. Throughout the thesis, I examined how an Islamic theological orientation in the Sudanese police institution fostered contested images of policing and squandered an opportunity to promote peace in Sudan. It considers the relationship between peace-oriented community policing and police identity, arguing that community policing will resolve the role of theology in the Islamization of police forces in Sudan. The findings of this study, based on structural violence, demonstrate a shift in police agency and police identity that corresponds to the struggle for nation-building. This shift in police identity is inextricably linked to the level of violence, group classification, and membership in two Sudanese social structures: Sheikh and Indigenous.

**Keywords:** Police forces, autoethnography, structural violence, Islamic theology

## Acknowledgements

I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation and gratitude to Dr. Eliakim Sibanda, my thesis supervisor, Dr. Andrew Woolford and Dr. Karen Magro, my thesis committee members, for their assistance in completing my master's research project. My gratitude also goes to Dr. Hamdesa Tusso, who assisted me in getting started on my thesis. Indeed, I will never be able to express how grateful I am to Dr. Sibanda, for his guidance and ongoing support throughout the writing process. Dr. Woolford and Dr. Magro have my heartfelt gratitude and thanks for their generous and kind advice all the way to the end of this journey. Undoubtedly, their expertise and knowledge helped sharpen my skills and abilities to effectively engage in this scholarly endeavor. Despite their busy schedules, Dr. Sibanda, Dr. Woolford, and Dr. Magro always made time to respond to my emails, as well as offered helpful suggestions that consistently improved my thesis writing. Above all, I would like to thank Susan Durham, the Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) program coordinator, for her administrative assistance and advice throughout my studies.

Moreover, it was my family that motivated me to complete this thesis. For that, I am grateful to all of them, including Mae-Emily, Evet, Joshua, Daniel, and Trina, for their patience and sacrifices. Finally, I would like to pay tribute to my late mother, Clementina Nyoka Laila Lobugo, who passed away about ten years ago. She was, without a doubt, my most potent academic motivator. I adore you all.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ABSTRACT</b> .....	II
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</b> .....	III
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS</b> .....	IV
<b>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</b> .....	VI
<b>CHAPTER 1</b> .....	1
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM .....	4
CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH: THE HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DARFUR REGION AND THE SUDANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT .....	9
PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT SUPPRESSION OF VIOLENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE.....	12
PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES' CONTRIBUTION TO PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTIONS .....	15
<b>CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW</b> .....	20
<b>THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE INSTITUTION</b> .....	20
<b>CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY</b> .....	34
THE THESIS METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES .....	34
Approach .....	34
Procedure for data collection.....	35
Data organization procedure.....	36
Analyses of data.....	38
REFLECTIONS ON MY AUTOETHNOGRAPHICAL METHODOLOGY .....	40
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY .....	41
POSITIONALITY .....	43
<b>CHAPTER 4 – STORYTELLING AND INTERPRETATION</b> .....	45
MOTIVATION AND TRAINING ON A PERSONAL LEVEL: MY AUTOETHNOGRAPHY.....	45
Direct knowledge of a new policing strategy .....	49
Joint operations: An account of crowd control.....	52
AUTOETHNOGRAPHY INTERPRETATION: CONTEXTS FOR POLICE REORIENTATION.....	54
A SYNOPSIS OF POLICE'S SOCIAL REORIENTATION .....	60
The distribution of power .....	60
Social stratification and violence.....	61
CONSTRUCTING A THEORY OF POLICE VIOLENCE.....	62
<b>CHAPTER 5 – ANALYSIS, PERSONAL EXPERIENCE, POLICE, AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE</b> .....	66
THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER WITHIN THE SUDAN POLICE INSTITUTION .....	66
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND FAITH POLICING. ....	71

INSTITUTIONALIZING A <i>SHEIKH-TYPE</i> POLICING IDENTITY .....	75
ACTUALIZATION OF VIOLENCE IN DARFUR: ENACTING INEQUALITY.....	80
PEACEBUILDING AND COMMUNITY-POLICING STRATEGIES.....	90
An Interactive community policing paradigm (ICPP).....	95
<b>CHAPTER 6 – FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>100</b>
RESEARCH FINDINGS .....	100
CONCLUSION .....	102
<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>104</b>

## LIST OF TABLES

<b>TABLE 1: SUDAN POLICE ACTORS AND VIOLENCE STRATIFICATION (1950s-2000s).....</b>	<b>88</b>
--	-----------

## LIST OF FIGURES

<b>Figure 1: SOCIAL REORIENTATION OF POLICE THEMATIC REPRESENTATION. 60</b>	
---	--

### **List of Abbreviations**

AfDB	–	African Development Bank
AU	–	African Union
CCSD	–	Central Committee of Sudanese Darfur
CRF	–	Central Reserve Forces
CPF	-	Community Police Forces
DLF	–	Darfur Liberation Front
DPA	–	Darfur Peace Agreement
GOS	–	Government of Sudan
IDPs	–	Internally Displaced Peoples
INGOs	–	International Non-Governmental Organizations
JEM	–	Justice and Equality Movement
MTC	–	Military Transitional Council
NISS	–	National Intelligence Security Services
PACS	–	Peace and Conflict Studies
SLA/M	–	Sudan liberation Army/Movement
SPS	–	Sudan Police Services
UN	–	United Nations
WAEC	–	West African Economic Community

## Chapter 1

Much has been written about police forces' functions, structures, professional paths, and ethics (Ibrahim, 2020, 2018; Berridge, 2013, 2012; Beswick, 1995; Potholm, 1969). While these studies on policing contribute to our understanding of police issues, they do not highlight the contextual factors that lead to violent police forces, especially in postcolonial societies, including Sudan. This thesis contributes to the debate on peace and conflict in postcolonial societies in Africa, including the critical role of the police institution in postcolonial peacebuilding. The role of institutions in peacebuilding is critically important in understanding the nature of postcolonial societies. Through negotiations, actors construct institutions that create commonly generalized expectations and performance interpretations that gradually alter future interactions and negotiations (Galtung, 1969; Tolbert & Barley, 1997). In these interactions, the symbolic validity of organizational reforms underscores the idea that police organizations are not institutionalized by their practices but rather by the state (Crank & Langworthy, 1992; SAHRD, 2013).

Throughout its history, the Sudanese police have been subjected to several institutional reforms, and these developments have helped them to develop a professional doctrine (Berridge, 2013; Ibrahim, 2020). As the Sudanese police force continued to reform, it increasingly became highly centralized, attracting its professional character. This characterization was effectively used to uphold loyalty under the purview of professional doctrine in the form of the Sudanese police oath, constructed to signify the Sudanese police's allegiance to the state. Police doctrine has long been divided into three categories: state servants, people servants, and God servants (Ibrahim, 2020; Ibrahim, 2018a; Vaughan, 2013). This doctrine became very specific because of the introduction of Sharia Law (allegiance to God) in 1983, during which police roles and responsibilities were altered. In essence, the police became militarized and theologized through

their professionalization. There are also two aspects of the Sudanese police institution that I believe are highly relevant and warrant further consideration: first, the sequence of police recruitment, training, and practices that characterize police directives and orders constructed within an Islamic theological framework and their potential application to quantify police violence, which is even more critical today, nearly half a century later; and second, the police failed to reduce violence in all its forms. The reason for this failure is that, despite valuable efforts to highlight various forms of professional police training and their ties to successive Sudanese regimes, the police were unable to counter structural violence in policing successfully. Thus, this thesis asks: how can Sudan achieve peace when the police perpetrate violence? To answer this question, I conducted an autoethnographic investigation to gain a new perspective on violence within the Sudanese police force.

The general context of my thesis investigates the structure and operations of the Sudanese police. I used my personal story as the lens through which I made sense of the excessive use of violence by the Sudanese police forces. As such, my personal experience as a police officer became intertwined with the story of the Sudanese police force. Indeed, I used a critical storytelling inquiry methodology based on autoethnography to establish a link between structural violence, the institutional environment, and peace (Ellis et al., 2011). When used in a conflict context, the autoethnographic framework has a distinct advantage because it connects the personal, cultural, social, and political realms. As a result, autoethnography is concerned with storytelling about our personal lives, which provides powerful insight into universal life experiences. Autoethnography employs reflexivity to highlight the interactions between social structure and lived experiences (Adams et al., 2017). In doing so, my stories expose Sudanese police institutional realities, focusing on various themes that I derive from these realities

(Wilkens, 2017). More importantly, it inspired me to tell my story and support it with data from secondary sources. Indeed, autoethnography allowed me to share my personal experiences, perspectives, and observations as a commissioned police officer regarding structural violence in Darfur. In this thesis, Sudan's Darfur region serves as a case study for my research on police brutality throughout Sudan (Khartoum and Juba). The misuse of authority and force in the form of arbitrary detentions, arrests, beatings, and killings of civilians in the Darfur region instilled fear and silence in the population, particularly among Sudanese in Darfur (Amnesty International, 2014; Ibrahim, 2020). Considering this, I contend that Sudan's Islamic theological ideology is necessary to maintain a culture of violence within the Sudan Police Forces. To address the violence, I propose a model of peace-centred community policing for regulating law enforcement tasks. My thesis seeks to answer the following questions: How did Sudan's police forces allow for increased violence and rights repression over the last two decades? Are the police merely a political tool? How can the police system be changed to allow for peacebuilding and reconciliation? Furthermore, how can the police better serve the people of Sudan, particularly in Darfur?

Six chapters make up this thesis. Chapter One is an introductory chapter that briefly introduces the study's central themes. In addition, chapter one discusses the historical context, including the evolution of police in Europe, Africa, and Sudan; previous attempts at achieving peace; and the Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) dedication to long-term peace. The second chapter, or the literature review chapter, includes a summary of pertinent literature on structural violence, including the relationship between structural violence and police institutions. This chapter also includes relevant literature on autoethnographic inquiry, such as constructive storytelling. As a result, it serves as a preliminary foundation for investigating institutional

organization, abuse of power, and the police. The third chapter discusses the study's methodology and the research tools used, such as Thematic Network Analysis. The fourth chapter is about storytelling and interpreting my autoethnographic reflections. It also discusses three significant themes that emerged from the autoethnography. Chapter five focuses primarily on analyzing the themes and talks about power imbalances, social stratification, and violence, which are indispensable factors in promoting violence. It also includes strategies for peacebuilding and community policing. In the sixth, the conclusion chapter, I summarize the study's findings and their significance.

### **Statement of the problem**

The Sudanese government has historically pursued authoritarian policies regarding the organization and practice of law enforcement. Internal political strife compelled the government to implement an oppressive policy on police matters (Potholm, 1969, p.139). As a result, the government adopted two opposing policing models: authoritarian peacekeeping and bureaucratic, allowing the Sudanese police to engage in coercive behaviour. Both models emphasize centralized management and a militarized style of operations (Ibrahim, 2018b, p. 179).

Sudan's governance of these policing models has undergone significant changes over the past few decades. Between 1905 and 1908, the police force was centralized, and then it was decentralized to protect the unstable and fragile colonial state. Regional governors subsequently oversaw police administration. When the police were first centralized and then decentralized in 1908, they were armed with military equipment. Public order and public laws were established in 1908 and 1910, respectively, and the Police College, based in Khartoum, was established to improve crime investigation (Ibrahim, 2018a, pp. 277–279). On the other hand, the

decentralization policy has led to chaos and power struggles between police agencies from different provinces. To address the situation quickly, the Nimeiri government set up the main police headquarters in Khartoum and passed the Police Act of 1979.

Conversely, the police contributed to the regime's protection against opponents from nationalist movements. On April 6, 1985, Jaafar Neimari, who spearheaded a coup on May 25, 1969, was overthrown by a popular uprising, leading to general elections by the interim Military Transitional Council (MTC), the interim government. One of the MTC's top priorities was to unify the police forces under a single ministry led by the Ministry of Interior. However, six years later, the police have been reorganized under military command, led by the head of state. As a result, the committee recommended that all armed forces affiliated with the Ministry of the Interior be merged and brought under one roof. The MTC committee justified its recommendation by stating that it would be more efficient to unify these forces.

It is worth noting that the practice of policing in Darfur has a long colonial history. For example, throughout colonial times from 1909 to 1956, French and British police forces and local authorities used excessive force to restrict movement along the Darfur and Chad borders (Vaughan, 2013). Sudanese traders, for instance, complained to Sudanese government officials in 1945 about being whipped until they bled and being forced to spend the entire day kneeling in the sun (Vaughan, 2013, p. 188). Police brutality continued to persist unabated. In 1956, 700 families in Kosti, Sudan's Blue Nile Province, staged a riot against a private company called Joda for the nonpayment of cotton products. The police reacted violently against the rioters, which claimed the lives of 100 farmers and three police officers. The police arrested 281 farmers, of whom 195 died while in detention (Ibrahim, 2018a, p. 281).

Nonetheless, the most significant change in Darfur's excessive use of force in policing occurred in 1999, precipitated by ethnic tensions (Ibrahim, 2018b). The government enacted the 1999 Police Reform Acts that empowered police officers to use excessive force and allowed them to be involved in militia operations in the Darfur Region. For the first time in Darfur, the policing policy used the term "enemy," designating armed groups as legitimate targets (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 288). This facilitated police operations against Darfuri insurgents on a large scale. By establishing a military-style police force, policing entered a new era in the region. In addition, as tensions rose in 2003, the government issued emergency decrees establishing specialized courts in Darfur. This court used coercion, the death penalty, and other barbaric, inhuman, degrading, or punitive treatment of civilians (Amnesty International, 2004, p. 1-3).

The Darfur Region witnessed eight initiatives, including three in 2004, aimed at promoting peace. Through the Darfur Conflict and the Protocol on Humanitarian Aid in Darfur, these peacekeeping efforts started in 2003 in N'Djamena, Tchad. In 2004, a complete cease-fire was established. Darfur signed the Doha Reconciliation Agreement in 2011—an agreement that started with the unfinished Darfur Document for the Peace Process by the Sudanese Government and Justice Liberation Movement (National Legislative Bodies/National Authorities, 2012).

However, according to international peacekeeping data on Darfur, there were eighty-eight incidents of rioting between January 2008 and April 2009. The data also suggested that the Sudanese police have used excessive force and arrested and killed hundreds of people. In these instances, the government denies legal representation, protracted arrest, incommunicado detention, and media censorship to non-combatants (Amnesty International, 2014). Sudanese

citizens were arrested and detained for one month without due process, including opposition parties, human rights defenders, journalists, and academic activists.

Law enforcement authorities in some regions of Darfur did not allow everyone to exercise their right to free assembly (Duursma, 2017). Furthermore, four separate protests took place between 2012 and 2014. The epicentre of the uptick in protest in 2012 was Nyala in Southern Darfur. When the police fired live bullets on a crowd of protesters during the protest, twelve were killed, including ten under 18, and 80 were wounded (Amnesty International, 2014).

Over the years, the UN police have significantly restored peace and safety in Darfur through civilian protection. The international community has launched several community initiatives for police reform in the region. Human rights police officers were trained (both males and females). As part of UN efforts to reform the Sudanese police force, the UN held two human rights training sessions in El Fasher, North Darfur. The goal was to strengthen and professionalize Sudan's police forces (Ibrahim, 2018b).

This context reveals the vigorous enforcement of law and order by successive Sudanese regimes, primarily controlling and exploiting local populations. Under all these different regimes, the police forces were charged with this responsibility. Sudan's national government often used centralized policing to consolidate its power by tackling political or social turmoil at all levels (Ibrahim, 2020). These measures had a significant impact on the police structure and command. They resulted in the establishment, simultaneously with military-police command, of civilian and volunteer police forces. Therefore, the organization and duties of these police forces were based on a centralized military policing model characterized by absolute obedience to a higher command (Ibrahim 2020). These police forces aided this transformation by reporting to

the Minister of Interior, who received orders from the President's Office. As a result of the new changes, the Sudanese police forces are seriously participating in the broad military campaign in Darfur against rebel groups (Ibrahim 2018).

The connection between Sudan's police and violence originated in colonial times when the police were not reformed (Berridge, 2012). The British administration and the police were strongly influenced by sectarian conflicts (Berridge 2012). The British had formed a class of police forces that were more likely to commit crimes, as was evident in the dependence of the colonial state on Khatmiyya and Shayqiyya to practice violence in the dominated areas of Khatmia (Berridge, 2012). As was often the case in local conflicts, the use of force by state agents was seldom impartial and exacerbated tensions (Berridge, 2012). In 1956, for example, Shyqiyya police murdered 194 Baggara detainees in Sudan's Kosti Barracks. They were killed to retaliate for the death of Shaygyya, which happened during a riot in Kosti. This incident was influenced by the ethnic rivalry between the Shaigi and Baggara, the two religious orders that previously dominated Sudanese politics (Khatmiyya and the Ansar). In 1956, the police had devolved into a tool to monopolize violence by the central government (Bestwick, 1995, p. 70-74). On behalf of one ethnic group, the colonial state allowed the Sudanese police to use violence, knowing that they had no resources to control their police forces, dominated by the Shaygyya (Berridge, 2012). Despite the colonial state's lack of faith in the Sudanese police forces, they continued to supply them with weapons, ushering in a new armaments policy for the Sudanese police force (Berridge, 2011).

The Sudanese police went on strike to establish an independent, professional, and non-military police force (Berridge, 2011, pp. 123–126). They rebelled in 1951 to protest the

dismissal of their eleventh member, who had attended a strike meeting in 1951. Those protests included demands to improve their pay, employment terms, and living conditions. However, the colonial administration of Sudan opposed the grievances put forward by the police to limit the expansion of the Sudanese police and delinked it from reformist movements (Berridge, 2011, p. 125-126). The Sudanese police forces remained loyal to the colonial state despite the tenuous relationship. Between 1956 and 1964, the police put down any resistance against the state. Hundreds of farmers were charged and arrested in this incident (Berridge, 2011). As a result, the Sudanese police have become a critical component in maintaining peace and order in the modern Sudanese national state, especially when responding to severe political crises.

To conclude, successive Sudanese governments have pursued authoritarian law enforcement organizations and practices. For example, during the April 1985 uprising against the Nimari regime, police officers were armed with military equipment. The policy of police armaments was later used by the police in Darfur, where they actively engaged in the military.

### **Context of the research: The history of the conflict between the Darfur Region and the Sudanese Central Government**

Although the Darfur conflict dates to 2003, it started much earlier in the 1980s during tribal and ethnic politics in western Sudan (Mohamed, 2009, p. 16). The Fur and Masalit Africans, a group of nomadic farmers in northern Sudan, alleged that the government had teamed up with other ethnic groups to displace them from western Darfur. As a result, they (the Fur and Masalit African groups) argued that the government had forced them to take up arms to protect their homeland. In order to resolve the conflict, a peace treaty and a dialogue process were launched in 2005 (Mohamed, 2009, p. 11-14). Ironically, the peace agreement ignored tribal fighters, even

though they are at the heart of the region's violent condition. Thirteen years later, in 2003, a conflict broke out between groups of people in Darfur who believed that the government had taken their resources and given them nothing in return. The conflict resulted in armed conflict. In response to the rebellion, the Sudanese government sent forces and was ordered to put down the rebellion by any means necessary (Human Rights Watch 2015). In these offensive military operations, the government formed and supported the Janjaweed militia to combat the Darfur rebels' various functions.

Meanwhile, the two rebel groups demanded that the Sudanese government give them equal representation and eliminate the economic disparity. As a result of this conflict, tens of thousands of people have been forced to flee their homes in Darfur's arid region, where most of the land is desert. Some people have sought refuge in neighbouring countries, while others are dispersed in disease-ridden refugee camps in Darfur. This conflict stems from Sudan's colonial history.

Anglo-Egyptian forces annexed Darfur in 1916, dividing it into five federal states: the Central, Eastern, Southern, and Western states (de Waal, 2005). The states are covered by a semi-arid plain, which appears insufficient to support the development of a large and complex kingdom. The Daji people live in the Marrah Mountains (Jebel Marrah), Darfur's first kingdom (Ohanesian, 2015). Following years of worsening drought, tensions were exacerbated by a long-standing rivalry over scarce water and land, primarily between Arab nomads and Black African farmers (Mohamed, 2009). Furthermore, the current conflict in 2003 was sparked by political and ethnic intolerance among the Darfur tribes (Totten & Markusen, 2006, pp. 9–11). As a result of the tensions, 300 Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) rebels took over Gulu, a Darfur town, on February 26, 2003.

This led to the demand for self-determination by the Darfurian rebels (de Waal, 2005). They also advocated the separation of church and state (religion and politics). They further condemned the government's use of Arab tribes to fight Darfur's black citizens. Eventually, the Darfur conflict's various functions joined the DLF, albeit with slightly different demands. They begged for justice on behalf of all Sudanese citizens. The government has annihilated any credible opposition in recent years by exploiting ethnic conflict and using its police forces to silence Darfuri dissidents (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

The government has mobilized all its military, police, and proxies to resolve the issue, including Janjaweed, the Khartoum-backed Arab militias that have waged a violent counterinsurgency against the Darfuri opposition groups and innocent civilians (Amnesty International, 2014). In the Darfur region, the police and their auxiliary forces were critical in enforcing law and order, especially after the government institutionalized military-style operations within police roles and responsibilities. For example, from 1999 to 2014, the government directed the deployment of the People's Defense Force (PDF) and the Community Police Force (CPF) in Darfur to assist with military operations (Ibrahim, 2018b, p. 288).

Many people were killed due to the operations, and over two million were internally and externally displaced. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) were recruited in large numbers to fight for the Janjaweed (Human Rights Watch, 2015). The Janjaweed's counterinsurgency resulted in occasional executions and massacres of civilians. These situations drew international attention and necessitated several rounds of peace talks between 2010 and 2014, which yielded very few dividends due to Khartoum's divided opposition parties and aerial bombardment campaigns. The Sudanese government and the insurgents viewed each other with hostility, suspicion, and contempt (Mohamed, 2009, p. 27). The government was concerned that meeting the rebels'

political and economic demands would lead to similar requests from other marginalized groups and communities throughout Sudan (Mohamed 2009). Before the peace agreement of 2005, the government took the necessary steps to apprehend alleged rebel suspects and bring them to justice with harsher punishments (Mohamed, 2009). Emerging factors in Darfur have made all these government roles critically crucial in positioning themselves in the conflict arena. Even before the rebels took up arms against it, the government allowed itself to become a party in intergroup conflicts (Human Rights Watch, 2015, p. 34).

These intergroup conflicts date back to the 1960s in Sudan's history. Significant developments occurred in Sudan's contentious debate over the primacy of Islam in guiding social order between 1955 and 1985 (Abu Alhassan, 1996). Indeed, during peaceful times from 1972 to 1985, the Islamic constitution diverted government attention, preventing them from resolving the Sudanese people's most pressing issues in the fields of development and human welfare (Abu Alhassan, 1996). An ambitious political and legal reform program began in 1983 and culminated in a democratic uprising in 1985, which laid the groundwork for *Shariah* (Islamic law) in Sudan (Sachs, 2018, p.642). Thus, Sudan's subsequent regimes have continued to apply the same Islamic law (the *Shariah*) to govern the country (Abu Alhassan, 1996).

### **Previous attempts at suppression of violence and establishment of peace**

Most current and previous peace efforts in the Darfur conflict have taken various paths, demonstrating the importance of short-term interventions. In Darfur, eight peace measures have been tried to achieve stability, including three in 2004 and three in 2005, 2006, and 2009. The Republic of Chad, led by Idris Déby, made the first attempt at peace. This initiative was critical in establishing humanitarian assistance in Darfur in 2003. After a year, the Nigerian government

convened three rounds of talks during President Olusegun Obasanjo's civilian administration (Africa Center, 2015). The previous three rounds of peace talks in 2004 resulted in a formal ceasefire and the deployment of humanitarian agencies from the United Nations in the Darfur region. A year later, two peace initiatives were launched. They included the creation of a platform for peace talks between the Darfur warring factions. In 2010, the warring parties signed the Doha Peace Declaration for Darfur, bringing them to the negotiating table. (<https://unaid.unmission.org/Doha-document-unity-Darfur>).

An agreement was signed on May 5, 2005, in Abuja, Nigeria, between the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the government (Mohamed 2009, p. 11-14). The parties in the peace process agreed to a ceasefire, an equal distribution of power, and ongoing negotiations. According to Chapter 4 of the Darfur Peace Agreement, all stakeholders in the Darfur conflict must engage in peacebuilding processes that include building relationships, ensuring justice and equality for all Darfurians, and restoring communal peace. As it turned out, however, the 14th Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) did not clearly define the (DPA)'s specific mechanisms by which to implement its outcomes.

On the other hand, a Darfur-Darfur Consultation was designed to re-establish relations and find a suitable solution, but a referendum on the area's future was not included in the plan (Mohamed, 2009). The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue sought to restore brotherly relations between the two conflicting parties by finding an acceptable solution for all. The 14th Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) prioritized hostility between the warring parties through security arrangements and power and wealth sharing. By July 2010, it was expected that this would lead to establishing democratic processes for the people of Darfur to decide their

destiny (Mohammed, 2009). However, by emphasizing power struggles along tribal and ethnic lines, the DPA did more harm than good to the Darfur crisis. The region is in a state of lawlessness, with everyone pitted against everyone else. The failure of the DPA to sign a peace agreement in 2006 was due to three main factors: 1) the unwillingness of the negotiating parties to negotiate; 2) the international community's hasty resolutions; and 3) the mediators' inability to engage in effective negotiation (Mohamed, 2009).

Three steps have been identified as obstacles to making the DPA ineffective. These were: a diplomatic deadline, the positions of the parties, and the pressures placed on the mediators (Nathan, 2006). By the end of 2005, the United Nations Security Council had proposed a comprehensive agreement that called for the conflict to end by 2006. Nevertheless, the rebels ignored it since any concrete action did not back it up. The agreement's deadline passed, but the DPA remained unsigned. The rebels in Darfur refused to sign it because it contained significant mistranslations (Mohamed, 2009). It was apparent that during the Abuja peace talks, the parties engaged in the talks mistrusted each other (Mohamed 2009). This situation was exacerbated by the rebels' divisions, which then rendered the agreement virtually impossible for the movements to accept unanimously.

Furthermore, there was no guarantee of funding from the international partners for the Darfur peace talks (Mohamed, 2009). Diplomatic deadlines had a significant negative impact on the Darfur conflict mediation process (Mohamed, 2009). Such diplomatic deadlines have indirectly contributed to the conflicting parties' refusal to engage in a negotiated settlement of the crisis in Darfur. If anything, it made it impossible for the mediators to communicate meaningfully with the people of Darfur and other significant stakeholders that were not

represented during the peace talks (Mohamed, 2009). The African Union (AU)'s diplomatic deadline prevented the conflicting parties from engaging in effective mediation and the ability to take ownership of the DPA. All along, Darfur's civil society has had no say in shaping the DPA's content or having the opportunity to view the document. Thus, the parties were unable to impose any conditions on the government.

### **Peace and conflict studies' contribution to peacebuilding and conflict resolutions**

What are the most effective mechanisms for analyzing and rebuilding shattered relationships and reorganizing institutions and systems? These issues have received much attention in peace studies. Two suggestions predominate in conflict resolution, resulting in dual processes and interventions, namely the analysis of violence and processes of transformation and non-transformation (Sandole et al., 2009). According to Byrne and Senehi (2009), conflict exists and can be resolved from interdisciplinary perspectives. As Boudreau (2009) also argues, "an accurate disciplinary study of human existence in societies is incomplete without an accurate and interdisciplinary understanding of constrained and contested human agency" (p. 131). This agency can be found in any social system, including culture, religion, geography, and other forms of social existence. Although human life is independently configured, it is fundamentally indistinguishable from sociological phenomena such as belief systems, geology, and other socioeconomic aspects (Boudreau 2009). Most of the aspects of the agency are locally constructed so that it is embedded in local contexts. Boudreau further believes that the sociological processes that explain violence are often mediated by constructed social factors (p. 132).

Although Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) generates several core concepts useful for theory development, the concept of identity can also easily apply to ethnic conflicts (Cook-Huffman 2009). This concept of identity serves as a foundation for understanding social conflict, and it provides an answer to broader questions about attitudes and violence (Schellenberg, p8-9). Based on concerns about the existence of groups, Kelman delves deeply into the role of identity in conceptualizing ethnic conflicts (p. 171). For example, to fully explain identity conflict, one must explain basic human needs that cause prolonged social conflict (Cook-Huffman, p.22–24). Nonetheless, identity as an analytical unit is not a static concept (Cook-Huffman, p.25). Cook-Huffman emphasizes the importance of addressing identity type, behaviour, and consequences such as violence (p.25). We can significantly reduce generality by closely examining identity and violence (Cook-Huffman, p. 19–20). Identity as a process, which is conflict-driven by identity, security, and a sense of justice, can be a step forward for analyzing violence (Kelman, 2009, p.181–182).

Interventions to reduce violence based on institutional reforms can only go so far. According to Zagar (2009), multi-diversity countries require developing a diversity management strategy. In studying the 1990s Balkan crisis, Zagar proposes an "international integral diversity management strategy, bringing together external and national partners (p.465). The strategy's goal is to promote inter-communal interactions and relationship-building. Reform and external interventions are part of the structural and institutional change strategy and are critical to international structures (p. 467). For example, in long-term peace initiatives, economics, training, and institution building have been implemented (p.469), and the role of other communities has been assigned (p.470).

Rebuilding relations and networks of interactions is also a starting point for transformative change through communication design (Broome, 2009, p. 185). This concept emphasizes rebuilding relationship empathy, which refers to feelings about other people's situations to connect with them socially (p.184-186). In terms of its context, this interaction creates a peaceful environment, reduces differences between groups, and facilitates a process of meaningful engagement with others. It is an approach consistent with the development of peacebuilding interventions aimed at rebuilding relationships that also has the potential to resolve conflicts and bring about sustainable peace. By applying the concept to the Sudanese police force's use of violence, for example, brings the police, community, and state together to share their unique visions and subsequently develop concrete action plans for the police and what the future holds for the institution. Relational empathy can help people and communities develop tolerance and harmony in this capacity (Broome, 2009). However, engaging in capacity-building activities is not an easy task because it requires consistency, commitment, and transparency.

Conversely, it takes time and effort to change and build community relations. Ryan (2009) identifies three key transformation elements (the nature of change, the grassroots location, and the time required) and contends that the lack of clarity that clouds transformation is to blame for any short-lived intervention (p. 304). Galtung believes that transformation is not the relationship itself but the lack of theorizing about relationships in terms of power imbalances and defining violence in terms of structural violence (p.512). Consequently, peace researchers are guilty of failing to contextualize relationships in the realm of structural violence in peace analysis (p.12). In this way, Galtung raises the issue of configuring relationships and interaction in the social science discipline.

Furthermore, and most importantly, the tenets of conflict theories are based on assumptions. A well-known assumption known as "liberal economies" is one of the variables that could prevent or promote intervention in peacebuilding efforts (Gurkayna et al., 2010, p.293). Regardless of the presence of spoilers, the concept of the peacebuilding economy could ultimately be controlled by the state (Leatherman and Griffin, 2009, p. 354). This assumption has been widely criticized as the root cause of conflict through inequality, globalization, and other factors (Paffenholz, 2015, p. 281). However, this perception has been based on institutional and political landscapes (p.492). Examining these assumptions reveals the limitations of some peace interventions. According to Byrne et al. (2009), there have been visual examples of how financial assistance has positively impacted Northern Ireland and helped build peace (p.491). Indeed, monetary assistance has directed resources to promote institutional reforms. As a result, while this type of assistance has produced excellent results, it has not healed damaged relationships in peacebuilding (Byrne et al., 2009).

Consequently, several variables in peacebuilding are found to be unsuitable for transformational change (Paffenholz 2009). The transforming approach to peacebuilding is guided by three factors: macro-political analysis, the nature of relations, and the determinants of causal relations (Paffenholz, p.274). Because the program's impact may be linked to external actors rather than local people, such macro-policy interventions tend to ignore the micro-level voices of local people at the decision-making level (Gurkauna et al., p.295). Gender mainstreaming, or women's leadership within family and community structures, has traditionally been overlooked in peacebuilding interventions, especially at the decision-making level, which would help achieve societal transformational change (Snyder, 2009). Arthur (2009) also claimed that human memory is vital in achieving transformative change and that it can regenerate past

societal events and create critical voices for people to represent themselves (p. 372–374). Because macro policies disregard the significance of these micro-transformative change initiatives, they tend to marginalize them in peace interventions, making their use optional (Snyder, 2009).

Restoring relationships and interaction networks is, in essence, a starting point for real change. Rather than focusing on state macro peacebuilding, which minimizes the importance of conflict resolution at the micro societal level, social science should thoroughly investigate the micro-level analysis of the relationship between structural violence. Although peacebuilding is guided by macropolitical analysis, the nature of relationships, causal relationship determinants, and gender mainstreaming have historically been overlooked in peacebuilding interventions (Snyder, 2009, p. 362-363). Indeed, social psychology approaches to conflict analysis are critically important as they can be used to extend Boudreau's concept of human agency. In this regard, Kelman (2009), for example, has successfully employed processes such as "collective needs and fears, inter-society processes, and interactive processes" for macro and micro social-psychological change analysis (p.181). In other words, the "perceptual process" that can create and formulate images of violence becomes ideally suited for understanding structural violence (Kelman, p. 175). This suggests that PACS's contribution is closely attuned to an approach that highlights conflicting relationships, which in turn is exacerbated by images of structural violence that tend to exist within societal structures and institutions.

## Chapter 2 – Literature Review

### **The relationship between structural violence and the police institution**

Johan Galtung reconceptualizes violence, drawing attention to its presence within social structures (Galtung, 1969). Galtung focuses on two dimensions of violence: physical and structural. First, both structural and physical violence have significant negative repercussions. Second, dealing with structural violence is the most effective way to alleviate pain and suffering. Galtung's work on violence provides researchers with strategic questions to commence their research regarding violence in society. Strategically, researchers should begin to ask questions around violence and reality, including the need to distinguish between ideas and objects. In other words, how do practices interact with the concepts we have named? In this regard, peace and conflict research must address the interdependence of physical and structural violence. What is much more relevant is to realize that the ability to reduce unnecessary death and suffering in a conflict in society begins with eradicating all forms of violence.

The concept of systemic violence has had a significant theoretical impact on peace and conflict studies. Theoretically, Galtung emphasizes that direct and systemic violence concepts are inseparable and that supporting both conceptions of violence in peace research is necessary and appropriate (Galtung, 1969). Intriguingly, he developed two distinct concepts in his theory of aggression: physical violence and structural violence. In an institutional setting, *physical violence* is defined as "any institutionalized practice or procedure that disproportionately affects disadvantaged individuals or groups" (Epp & Watkinson, 1997, p. xv). This definition can be applied to police activities and practices that are institutionally organized to repress protesters, including shootings of protesters and other forms of violence. This repression method frequently

involves practices that appear to be legitimate but are indirectly oppressive through illegal arrests and detention of dissidents.

However, structural violence is qualitatively distinct from physical violence. According to many studies, physical violence is the most visible and tangible manifestation of violence. These studies also show that structural violence is an abstract form of violence (Galtung, 1969; Parsons, 2007). Researchers must establish a causal link between direct and systemic violence before they can conceptualize violence as structural violence. By doing so, it would no longer escape our notice due to its apparent concealment (Galtung, 1969). In his book, *Violence and Peace*, Galtung defines *structural violence* as a gap between what is and what could be found when an institutional societal structure denies people the opportunity to reach their full potential (Galtung, 1969, p. 168). This structural violence has severe ramifications for how the power structure is designed to benefit specific groups and, at the same time, marginalize others. He also asserts that researchers must focus on the harmful effects of this structural violence. The informal harmful effects include people dying due to a lack of access to medical care and other critical services. As a policy, structural violence reveals a domestic strategy in which the state offers police reforms both openly and covertly. This policy reform primarily consists of directives aimed at directing police officers to engage in violent domestic repression and systemic violence (Ibrahim, 2018, 2020).

Regardless of the enigmatic nature of structural violence, its effects will cause misery for people in its various manifestations (Galtung, 1969, p. 170). For example, police brutality in Russia exposed the institutionalization and internalization of systemic violence throughout the criminal justice system. It also showed the presence of direct violence practices such as arbitrary detention, physical abuse, and coercion that were used to instill fear in drug users (Sarang et al.,

2010). The research indicated that the Russian justice system and police forces had abused opioid addicts' rights to a safe healing environment. For example, street police operations have revealed an increase in drug users' sense of danger and proclivity for arrest, imprisonment, or incarceration, related to their high risk of sharing syringes (p. 816).

Derrienic (2016) questioned the context-specific nature of violence and asserted the absence of an objective standard capable of classifying any act of violence in society as violence. Additionally, he dismissed the notion of the potential of people's ability to use their livelihood assets to enjoy healthy living and prosperity. These issues complicated the pursuit of the theoretical concept of violence in research projects (Derrienic, 2016, pp. 362–367). Additionally, other authors have reached a similar conclusion regarding the definition of aggression. Perhaps the most significant contribution of scholars of violence has been the notion that the number of deaths and the frequency with which individuals die is a proxy for an individual's capacity to earn a living (Galtung & Høivik, 1971, p. 73). Parsons (2007) and Martin (2013) took very different approaches to quantify violence despite the critique. Dominance, coercion, and inequality were required to calculate aggression in a social relationship.

In analyzing the repercussions of violence, Barnett (2008) believed that systemic violence could have consequences, some more severe than others. Barnett poses questions about which forms of systemic violence should be investigated and how they should be resolved. For instance, in some African contexts, instances of direct violence are sparked by systemic violence embedded in police enforcement procedures that force officers to choose which laws to enforce (Potholm, 1969). Ibrahim (2018a) also noted that the Sudanese government used a religious perspective, Islam, to reform the police, which resulted in more police recruits from specific ethnic groups. The police force's collective responsibility is to uphold the community's highest

ideals and protect Islam's public moral image. As a result, civil and democratic principles were rejected (Ibrahim, 2018b), and numerous police officers have been mobilized to lead a campaign against Darfur rebels who oppose these Islamic values. In this regard, law enforcement and religious-based social morality contribute to structural violence, resulting in direct abuse.

Boudreau (2009) contended that human conflict is caused by challenges and struggles created by contested, constrained, or challenged people in their agency. He also suggested that these competing human agencies do not occur in a vacuum but rather in physical locations (p. 131–132). Boudreau's (2009) arguments were based on the premise that two continuum constraints are associated with the contested human agencies: the first is related to social markers in the social context. For example, in the Sudan Police Force, Islamic religious practices have emerged as social markers. As a result, these social markers influenced the Sudan Police Force's policing phase while maintaining a challenging and contested environment in which police actions were influenced.

The other continuum is concerned with the outcomes of the competing agencies, i.e., conflicts. The progression of conflict caused by contested human agencies is an essential explanatory aspect of the conflict continuum that falls within the non-violence to violence continuum in this context. He added that the most intriguing aspect of the conflict continuum highlights a latent conflict at the far end of the continuum, which is used to denote structural violence as conflict. The third aspect of human constraints stands out as its diversifying agency. Boudreau warned against overlooking cultural diversity when analyzing contested human agencies (p. 133).

The contested human agencies are not the only explanatory mechanism raised by Boudreau to understand violence. Ontological site is also essential because it defines human agencies in

geographical location, cultures, and other social phenomena that constitute human relations (p.135). This ontology means that some constraints usually considered essential as social markers and are embedded in the conflict continuum are always found within human ecological existence. Within this ontological site, we must consider another related problem. Furthermore, the constraints found in the ontological sites allow us to make sense of the final analysis provided by Boudreau (2009). The existence of the contested ontological sites has several consequences. First, the history of the human agencies in a particular location increases the chance of violence being acted upon and accepted by other people. Second, when researching human agencies, one must consider the existence of arbitrary power to ascertain the security of groups (Boudreau 2009). In this way, the theory of contested human agencies allows us to dig deeper into constraints that have always existed in social structures.

A recent research study correlating contested and ontological human sites with social learning for understanding violent behaviours have shed more light on how violence is learned in a social setting (Cosme, 2021). The analysis of norms and social context in the development of aggressive behaviour by Cosme (2021) clarifies the concept of violence. Cosme made two crucial distinctions in his analysis of the relationship between learned behaviour and social structure that could help us understand how violence is acquired. Violent behaviour can be learned through active participation in violence or by observation. In a social environment, active and observational learning are not the same in understanding structural violence. On the other hand, observation is more critical because people are exposed to a learning environment where they develop a certain mindset. In this way, the individual and the environment are inextricably linked (Cosme, 2021).

According to Cosme, the principles of behaviour, learning, and cognition are the keys to studying violence. This framework for observational learning of aggressive behaviour is as follows: the existence of memory filtering by images and symbols of aggression; the modified memory; a conducive social environment for learning and practicing the modified memory. According to Cosme's analysis of social learning and understanding violence, we should consider the importance of autoethnography inquiry into the salient observations in the social environment to determine the relevance of violence and social norms. For example, new cadets and other police officers in Sudan's police forces have participated in social learning contexts that have altered their understanding of violence (Ibrahim, 2020).

Soares et al. (2018), state coercive powers at the macro level are the source of police violence. As micro-level representatives of the state, police officers were granted these powers. Their investigation also looked into police violence related to the legitimate and illegitimate use of force. Violence and its meaning in police institutions were the focus of this context. Precisely, legal and disciplinary practices often serve as the basis for determining when force is reasonable or unreasonable. However, within the government's coercive powers, loyalty and other disciplinary norms are the ultimate standards for defining what constitutes ethical or unethical use of violence. The police views on police violence justified their actions, but they were unconcerned with the harm they caused to the community they served. These views within police agencies tend to advocate violence as a regular occurrence because violence is suppressed and defined by the police and the state (p.176-177).

This analysis of police structural violence necessitates the definition and framing of several processes, including the social contract of police work, limiting the officer's ability to refrain from violence. This contract means that the state has control over the management and practices

of police violence. Furthermore, the policing terminology appears to be entirely professional, ensuring that those police agents have a positive public image. A collaborative and segmented approach is required for responsibility diffusion in law enforcement agencies and new norms. As a result, police abuse and disregard for human rights rise as violence permeate the police force. Thus, police officers and the police institution may engage in harmful actions against civilians (Soares et al., p.179).

### **Autoethnographic inquiry**

Autoethnography inquiry is a method for connecting autobiographies and individuals with the cultural, social, and political realms (Ellis et al., 2014, p. 254-255). Researchers write concrete stories about our lives because they believe that stories about specific lives can help us understand human experience in general. The methods used to research and write these stories combine social science methods with the aesthetic sensibilities of the humanities, ethnography, and literature.

In the 1980s, sociologists, anthropologists, communication researchers, and others working in oral history, performance ethnography, and feminist research began to advocate for forms of personal history, subjectivity, and reflexivity in their work (Ellis et al., 2014, p. 255-256). The term "self-ethnography," coined by anthropologist David Goldschmidt in the late 1990s, did not catch on. Heider (1975) argued that cultural members value telling their own stories, whereas Goldschmid (1977) argued that all ethnographic works contain individual traces. As an anthropologist, Hayano (1979) described the ethnography of his "own people." In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Robert Bochner and Reed-Danahay (Ellis et al., 2011) founded the Ethnographic Alternatives series. They published essays on the significance of personal stories in

theory, and their work demonstrated how and why researchers should draw from personal experiences.

In autoethnography, social scientists adopt the dual identities of academics and individuals to tell stories about specific aspects of their experiences (Ellis et al. 2014, pp. 260–261). Some of the fundamental principles of personal experience include highlighting alternative voices in terms of storytelling and creating resiliency. These principles can serve as guidelines when considering other people's narratives for a self-ethnographic project. This prospect of autoethnography invites readers to immerse themselves in the experience of others, feeling it with their bodies, emotions, and minds. In this thesis, I have described my interactions with the police force by critiquing the Sudanese police force's practices and management in the Darfur Region.

Autoethnography is about sharing knowledge through storytelling and exposing power in society (Senehi, 2009). "The sole purpose of storytelling is the production of knowledge" (Senehi, 2002, p. 203). The knowledge gained through storytelling has several applications in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. One of the significances of storytelling is that it is the most effective way to access subjective truths about people's realities (Senehi 2009). Furthermore, it confers authority, gives everyone a voice, and involves everyone in the process of knowledge production. For example, my stories about Sudanese police have helped me engage my mind and heart in peacebuilding initiatives, which have proven to be a powerful tool for social change and peace. In this way, time and memory are central to this research study.

Autoethnographic knowledge, in theory, has a dual narrative model, which is critical for a research study (Smith, 1980). The dual nature of autoethnographic knowledge consists of content and discourse, emphasizing a context of systemic violence. In structural violence, the content of

the knowledge refers to policies and changes, whereas the discourse is a framework for putting the content of the knowledge into practice. These two types of autoethnographic knowledge appear in various contexts (Clark & Rossiter, 2008; Crites, 1971; Verhagen, 2019). Verhagen (2019) investigated storytelling in communication by using past, present, and future tenses (Shifting Tenses) to explain the autoethnographic content and discourses. Crites (1971) used the concept of experiencing conscious awareness to explain his perspective on the meaning of storytelling, which is the memory and recollection activities of consciousness to reload images stored in memory; Clark & Rossiter (2008) used critical storytelling in adult education. These researchers stressed the importance of autoethnographic knowledge as a powerful descriptive research tool, which has helped illuminate my personal, social, cultural, and historical memories gained throughout my personal and professional lives.

Autoethnography extends beyond substance and discourse to include problem-solving in any social setting, particularly when people mutually share their stories (Smith, 1980). In this sense, the story is invented to benefit those who listen while someone else informs them of their own (Senehi, 2002, pp. 206-208). This autoethnographic account of storytelling relates to research on several levels: self and ethnic (Adams et al., 2017). Sharing and exploring stories is a significant benefit of research projects (Adams et al., 2017; Méndez, 2014). For example, Senehi (2002) suggested that peace can be achieved when storytelling is used to confront systemic and structural violence.

In contrast to destructive storytelling, which emphasizes coercive power and dishonesty, constructive storytelling promotes healing and emancipation. Building storytelling thus fosters collective power and common recognition, as well as open dialogue and insightful opportunities (Senehi, pp.43-46). While Senehi's account of storytelling does not directly address the issue of a

researcher acting as a storyteller in her research, it does allude to the concept of self-ethnography as a valuable tool in conducting a narrative study. My autoethnographic accounts relate to constructive and knowledge production through storytelling in an institutional context like the police or Sudanese police.

Emblazon and Carpenter (2017) suggest that autoethnography can aid in the connection between culture and story. This possibility allows the author to make explicit social, political, or cultural points or rely on the readers to make their connections in interpreting the author's work. The connection is an excellent opportunity for the author to discover their inner voice. In this way, autoethnography examines cultural, social, and political issues by delving deeply into one's own experiences (p.28)."

There are three types of writing content to consider when transforming personal experiences into cultural, social, and political realms (Emerald and Carpenter 2017, p. 25). The story we tell about ourselves is frequently the primary source material we use in the field (Emerald and Carpenter, p. 28-31). The field text serves as a vehicle for revealing one's true self while also reflecting on one's place in the community and the social structures that exist within it. Autoethnographic research begins with a field text that places our own experiences in context with the rest of the world. After documenting the story, the researcher then moves on to the interim texts (P. 31–33). The interim text initiates the analysis process by reducing the data being generated in the field text to its most basic units. It makes no difference which theoretical lens the autoethnography employs as long as it aids in answering the research question. The research concludes with texts that present the field and interim texts to its readers (P. 33–34). Two approaches are commonly used to combine analysis and discussion throughout the autoethnography and for evocative descriptions. These approaches illustrate the process of how

autoethnography transforms our personal stories, which are based on our lived experiences, into research.

### **Institutional contexts and police organizations**

The focus of institutional autoethnography analysis has recently shifted to the impact of police department organizations on systemic violence (Ibrahim, 2020; Ibrahim, 2018a; Sarang et al., 2010). According to institutional theory, behaviour is context-dependent and influenced by an institutional organization (Clemens & Cook, 1999). This theory makes a case for the importance of institutions by arguing that organizations respond to societal forces by enforcing certain organizational practices and that these practices reflect the definition of the organizational setting as offered by the ruling class (Paauwe & Boselie, 2003).

As a result of this debate, research into the role of institutions in understanding violence and the state is ongoing. Violence was widely accepted as an essential component of any institution and critical to state survival (Weber, 1921). A state is defined by Weber as "a human community that successfully claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a governed territory" (p. 1). Understanding how institutions legitimize violence was Weber's central point about institutions and their role in perpetrating violence.

By its very nature, the state employs three distinct types of authority to legitimize institutional violence: conventional or traditional, charismatic, and adherence to rules (Weber, 1921, p. 2). In traditional authority, the monarch commands conventional authority. In addition to the conviction in the validity of monarchy rules, there seems to be functional competence founded on rationally conceived regulations. Finally, charismatic dominance is based on heroism or other individual leadership qualities. These three types of dominance and authority structures are critical in state institutions that require public administration and submission to those in

positions of power. The state links human capital, monetary incentives, and social honour in this context. This link facilitates collaboration between state personnel and law enforcement to maintain state supremacy through coercion. As a result, policymakers and law enforcement officials can delegate executive authority to the institution's management.

In this institutional context, a political union emerges where administrative workers, including law enforcement officers, regulate the material means of administration entirely or partially. In Sudan, for example, the police force had developed a culture in which the government exerted tight control over its management to enforce the state's monopoly on violence (Ibrahim, 2018b, pp. 275-276). This portrayal of the institution as a collaborative partnership with the police poses specific challenges to the organizational structures and policies that foster institutional harmony (Ibrahim 2020).

Thus, bureaucratic principles become the primary unit of measurement for violence. In this instance, institutional indicator research may provide a framework for investigating institutional normative behaviours, such as coercive measures that legitimize the state's monopoly on violence (Zucker, 1987, p. 444). Coercive measures consist of authoritative laws enacted by states to maintain control over other institutions via a highly bureaucratic administrative mechanism (Weber, 1921; Zucker, 1987). Notably, the institutional theory assumes that the institutional system's effectiveness depends on actors rationalizing their behaviour to maximize performance. In this case, the social context in which actors operate determines the efficacy of their behaviour. A search for successful police reforms in the United States, for example, revealed numerous instances of systemic structural violence where the ineffectiveness of the police organizations highlighted the influence of state actors in the bureaucracy shaping the police force. This intrusion lent the police credibility and empowered them to commit acts of

violence (Crank & Langworthy, 1973). Indeed, police credibility is founded on due process, laws, regulations, staff qualifications, and collaborations between police and other organizations for the sole purpose of protecting the state (p. 346-349).

Worden & McLean (2017) argued that apparent discrepancies exist between police department tasks and police reforms because police bureaucracies and reforms are configured differently so that institutional reforms alter the relationship between the institutional environment and the police department (p.16). In a police-citizen relationship, for example, police officers' roles are primarily based on "loyalty" and "individualism," whereas departmental changes are motivated by public pressure from both formal and informal actors (p.16). According to Worden and McLean (2017), putting police under internal and external pressure could result in forced legitimacy, leading to institutional violence. The main interest in considering police standards and expectations, police attitudes toward citizens, management styles (civilian and military command styles), and the role of the executive branches in providing guidance, resources, and leadership are the best measurements for understanding institutional violence.

Despite the institutional setting's benefits, there is a scarcity of comprehensive research that can track post-colonial organizations and practices, as well as the systemic violence that exists within them (Crank & Langworthy, 1973). A substantial body of literature on institutional organization has emerged in Western developed economies, establishing a link between systemic violence and institutional organization. However, the police organizational structures in Darfur, Sudan, have received insufficient attention. As a result, a personal narrative is critical in shedding light on some underlying concepts.

The work processes of the police are frequently based on a proportionate, contingent basis, in which every action is viewed as a predictable response to harmful and only unintended behaviour (Soares et al., 2018). According to socio-moral and psychological views on police violence, people internalize moral principles, values, and behaviour codes (Soares et al., pp. 176–177). This process leads to self-regulation, where people are not conducting themselves in a way that violates previously socialized moral values. However, it is then that we realize how incomprehensible the police institution operates, and this is mainly the case when the police use violence. Police officers know that violent action is better than inaction, minimized or ignored.

## Chapter 3 - Methodology

### **The thesis methodology and procedures**

My epistemological standpoint is constructivist. Baldwin (2016) defines three pillars of constructivism as "... social construction of social reality; social construction of knowledge; and interaction between the first two" (p. 140). My history, experiences, and current institutional structure have shaped my worldview. All these factors influence how my experiences and surroundings shape my interpretations of reality. Because of my understanding of the universe, I am fascinated by meanings. In other words, reality, in my opinion, is subjective, and there is no absolute truth. Based on my interactions with the Sudanese police institutional environment, that orientation allowed me to create meaning for my own stories.

### **Approach**

To write this thesis, I adopted the autoethnographical approach. I believe that this is the appropriate approach because it allowed my personal stories to be integrated into the research study. Autoethnography consists of three main elements: auto, which refers to the self; ethnic, which is part of a culture; and graphic, which combinedly means writing. To tell my story, I relied on my personal experiences and memory. Memory is necessary for auto-ethnography because it allows the author to share their experiences with others. Indeed, I have shared my story to tell the story of the Sudanese Police Force's past practices, which influenced the present and future of the Sudanese police. Hence, this thesis examines police institutional organization through autoethnography (storytelling) and demonstrates how police institutional agency and activities influenced Darfur, Sudan. The autoethnographic critical storytelling inquiry

methodology connects structural violence, the institutional environment, and peace (Ellis et al., 2011). The framework is helpful in conflict situations because it connects personal, cultural, social, and political realms (Ellis et al., 2014). My autoethnographic account demonstrates how the Sudanese police's systematic organization influenced my decisions, actions, and work results through management, reform methods, and procedures that significantly impacted systemic violence and the institutional environment.

### **Procedure for data collection**

The primary data collection methods for this thesis are autoethnography and documentation research. I used my previous employment experience as a police officer in Sudan to critique the country's police force and its ethnocentric cultural practices. In other words, I studied an organization and its group culture, in which I was previously a member. Despite having complete access to my own stories and experiences, which I shared in this study, I did not use the names of colleagues and friends with whom I had worked. More importantly, I used my insider knowledge of Sudanese police forces and policing in general to my advantage during this research.

To fully comprehend the depth of the topic under study, I supplemented primary and secondary sources with an autoethnography data collection strategy when conducting documentation research. Because specific observations may be omitted from the autoethnographic inquiry, I collected texts, including those derived from Sudanese police organizations and practices, as well as literature from multilateral organizations in Africa, including the African Union (AU), the West African Economic Community (WAEC), and the African Development Bank (AfDB). In addition, I conducted a preliminary online search of the archives of the United Nations (UN) and other international non-governmental organizations

(INGOs), which yielded many papers, policies, and studies on the Darfur conflict and systemic violence. Furthermore, I used the keyword "structural violence" to find several peer-reviewed articles and books in public and private libraries. Finally, I examined several documentary sources, including videos about missing Sudanese boys, such as *God Grew Tired of Us* and *They Poured Fire on Us* (Anderson, 2005).

Being fluent in Arabic and English gave me an opportunity to conduct this research in both languages. In most cases, I discovered translations of Arabic literature. My search included keywords such as "structural violence", "Darfur", "Conflict", "community policing", "Communities", and "Peace initiatives". With my Arabic linguistic skills, I was able to access and obtain literature from Khartoum University and other universities, magazines, and books in Arabic to become acquainted with various perspectives on the nature of policing in Sudan. Then I looked for English and peer-reviewed versions of this Arabic literature. Indeed, numerous Arab perspectives have illuminated alternative perspectives that I found quite interesting. While autoethnography has contributed to various interpretations of facts, primary and secondary data have helped solidify these interpretations.

### **Data organization procedure**

In this study, I organized data from texts and narratives using thematic network analysis. The thematic network has two dimensions: data management and data extension, which allow for the extraction of value from massive amounts of data (Attride-Stirling, 2001, pp. 390-394). This method reduces knowledge to a manageable level (Attride-Stirling, 2001, p. 392). Thus, thematic network analysis is a technique for pre-processing data analysis through coding to generate themes ready to analyze.

Informed by Attride-Stirling's insights, I integrated data from literature and personal accounts into this study and coded them as systemic violence in police brutality and Sudanese government attempts to reform the police and regulatory policies. These are processes by which the Sudanese government and its law enforcement agencies seek to legalize coercion to achieve a political goal. A few codes have been added and some removed as the coding progresses. The newly chosen codes were then translated into problems that generate themes. I did, for example, write 'institutional organization and police.' It is important to note that each selected document contained multiple themes. As a result, I have generated a slew of codes based on the related themes.

Following that, I began organizing the data using the themes that had been created. First, the operational climate and the police, among other topics, were investigated, and then abstract themes were generated. These abstract themes distilled the institutional context of Darfur, Sudan's police, and systemic police violence into a single term. Coding was then essential for organizing my data into themes to identify commonalities. Any negative theme that did not fit anywhere have not been dismissed, as it helped advance the thesis's subject matter. According to Attride-Stirling (2001), the final stage of generalization is a single abstract theme. At this point, the Peace and Conflict Studies' theories and approaches helped me develop specific concepts and abstracts for each theme. In a nutshell, I wrote summaries and descriptions of the themes that were ready for analysis due to this meticulous coding process.

To provide textured examples of systemic violence incorporated into the Sudanese police force's organization, I first coded sections of my autoethnography separately for analysis purposes. The most critical accounts of my autoethnographic reflections were then classified. As

I selected and coded a subset of my reflections, I refined the coding criterion. Following that, I compared my observations to theoretical sources from social and structural violence theories to generate new themes for further investigation.

### **Analyses of data**

The purpose of the study is to identify specific patterns derived from personal stories and secondary data and link them with the relevant Peace and Conflict Studies theories. I analyzed existing data through inductive and deductive approaches to provide a better structure that is richly descriptive. This study examined the police and structural violence at two distinct levels (individual and macro levels). I examined my story individually, focusing on my police academy training, management styles, crowd control, riot control techniques, and other law enforcement techniques such as arrest, detention, and due process. The autoethnographic reflections aided me in discussing four areas pertinent to my work with Sudanese police forces. First, I discussed the police force's institutionalization of a new system that shaped the personalities of recruits and officers. Recruit restructuring, theological and dominance connotations, group dynamics, and a unified religious bias were all raised as issues. Second, the investigation focused on contested police behaviors, actions, and new rules of engagement that governed police interactions and guided them to a new way of thinking. Reorientation, corporations, and faith-based collective thinking aided in the development of these behaviors. The third focus of my stories was forming a new structure in auxiliary public police, Muslim officers and cadets, and volunteers to aid in the defense of a system. Finally, my investigation concentrated on the police's new identity, contributing to the perpetuation of inequality. The discussion focused on the interaction between the police and religion, the crime reporting system, and policing categorization based on Islam.

These four issues were extracted solely from my autoethnographic accounts aided by Thematic Network Analysis.

In the analysis, which was on a macro level, I combined secondary data with insights from my stories. The analysis focused on the Police Acts from 1979 to 1999, paramilitary operations and regime representation, and crowd and riot control on the macro level. Essentially, I was concerned with institutional policies, regulations, and procedures. I discussed the process of nation-building in Darfur and Sudan through historical literature, where a specific type of policing was discovered and discussed. This level of analysis delved into police leadership styles and structures as well. As a result, the topics of dominating relationships and actualizing violence were expanded upon. Most of the issues raised in my stories were supported by contextual and historical data analysis, which appeared to point to structural violence.

I collected, reviewed, and analyzed the data all at the same time. I examined patterns and trends in the Sudanese government's efforts to reform the police force, including police, acts, legislation, and procedures, and my account of these institutional processes and their consequences, using the vast data I collected. I also looked at tensions and contradictions in the development of the Sudanese police force. After becoming acquainted with the concept of structural violence, I focused on inconsistencies in Sudanese police practices (Attride-Stirling, 2001, p. 394). Then, to identify emerging themes, I meticulously studied these contradictory observations, constantly comparing them to relevant literature and history, as well as my own stories. Then, to shed light on broader issues of reorientation, violence, recruitment, theology, and dominance, I clarified, summarized, and identified patterns within Sudanese police institutional organizations. Some of the original texts from my stories and secondary texts were

used to develop new perspectives on Islam and policing. Finally, in an early stage, I used coding to summarize patterns derived from police patterns and trends to provide detailed explanations of Sudanese police organization and operations. Furthermore, I used my reflexive notes to document opportunities and challenges that arose during the research.

In a related vein, I had scheduled several virtual meetings with my thesis supervisor and my thesis committee members to discuss the status of my thesis writing and other related topics. With the help of this qualitative analysis and the recommendations of my research committee, I was able to investigate the current challenges and opportunities in Darfur, Sudan's institutional police system, which has contributed to the region's lack of stability.

### **Reflections on my autoethnographical methodology**

To counter any threat of political or social disorder, Sudan's government imposed centralized and militarized police administration modes. One suggestion is to increase training in tactical disengagement and conflict de-escalation. I was one of the 52nd batch officers admitted to the Police Commission Police College in Khartoum, Sudan, in 1985. The Police Force hired 185 cadets for this batch. We went through two years of training, the first of which was dedicated to militarized training. Even though the second-year curriculum was heavily focused on laws and police work, we were not taught human rights. As a second lieutenant, I was assigned to a police station in a Khartoum urban neighborhood. Two years later, I was reassigned to war zones in the country's south.

In Sudanese police forces, there was systematic discrimination, with northern Sudanese Muslims being preferred to work in the force (in most cases). Certain officers manned most

Sudanese police departments' specialized Security Reserve Units, while others, including myself, were assigned to community police stations. Our assignments, promotions, and development were overseen by the Ministry of the Interior's Department of Officers Affairs. As a result, many dedicated Muslim police officers were assigned to the National Intelligence Security Services (NISS). The NISS's training, recruitment, and orientation were based on dominance over perceived enemies or insurgents.

My thesis contains a detailed reflection on the prioritization of Sudanese police policies and practices. It also revealed the external pressures placed on community policing, which influenced police routines and activities. Finally, the story shed some light on several issues to demonstrate the motivations and justifications for law enforcement activities, which could serve as a counter-voice for peace in Darfur. Individuals suspected of being insurgents were arrested and imprisoned without due process for months, disappeared, and demonstrations were violently suppressed. For the last two years, I have recorded and kept detailed journals of my life experiences while working with the Sudan Police Force. I also kept some journals noting my promotions and mobility from various regions of Sudan.

### **Limitations of the study**

The study relied solely on secondary data and ignored grassroots representation. It could have missed out on people's micro-experiences and personal contacts. I was constrained by both time and resources when conducting this research. I used secondary data to support my autoethnography in the discussion phase. The discussion section included accessible texts, papers, policies, and other online resources on peace, police, and systemic violence in Sudan,

focusing on Darfur. Given that the study's goal is to incorporate alternative perspectives on the police and structural violence in Darfur, relying solely on secondary data may have limited the study's depth; other perspectives might not be directly reflected. Fortunately, there is a strong Darfur community in Winnipeg, with members who have witnessed and experienced police brutality in Darfur, Sudan. I met with several Darfur community members and discussed my thesis with them. Most of them confirmed the situation of police violence that I discussed in my thesis.

Furthermore, I worked tirelessly to establish an exhaustive search for textual repositories, allowing me to examine materials that I would have missed otherwise to conduct autoethnographic research on Darfur's peace-building narrative. Furthermore, critics chastise autoethnography for being an unscientific method devoid of scientific rigor (Ellis et al., 2011). According to Ellis et al. (2011), when properly implemented, autoethnography approaches, such as the one I used in this study, are just as robust as other approaches. The authenticity of my experience as a police officer who worked for years with the Sudan Police lends credibility to this article. "Narrative and life are inextricably linked, and thus the primary appeal of narrative as a method is its ability to render personal and social experiences in a relevant and meaningful manner" (Connelly & Clandinin, 1990, p. 10). Furthermore, the story I told has been confirmed by examining related texts and documents investigating the same subject. During my autoethnography writing, I frequently referred to journals I kept as a law enforcement officer in Sudan. I have also discussed my story with three colleagues with whom I graduated together from the Police College in Sudan to compare notes and ensure that my stories are accurate and complete. My critical perspective on issues that others face was the most noticeable difference.

## **Positionality**

As a researcher who worked in the Sudanese police force and shared my personal experience as a third-party researcher, I had to adopt a more personal dimension to emphasize the country's police force's achievements and failures in achieving peace. I worked as a senior management police officer for the Sudanese government between 1987 and 1997. While I tried to be objective in this study and portray the perspectives of Sudanese communities and police, I believe my background, particularly my critical reflections, influenced the process of expressing myself as an insider. As an insider, I may be in a "middle-ground position," which can be perplexing (Creswell, 2013).

When it comes to having a voice in qualitative research, researchers are frequently overlooked. Other research inquiries do not consistently recognize this methodological and reflexive layer. Much of my positionality is vital to this study because it stems from my experience managing materials and exercises at police college and the outcomes that led to my advancement in management roles. These events shaped my personality and experiences, as well as those of others.

To recap, through autoethnography (storytelling), this thesis examined police institutional organization and demonstrated how police institutional agency and activities influenced the conflict in Darfur, Sudan. Autoethnography and document research were used to collect data for this thesis. Alternative perspectives on methodology have shed light on Islam and the police, which is quite intriguing. Thematic network analysis was used to organize data from autoethnography and texts for the study. It also looked at the documentary evidence, such as videos about missing Sudanese boys. This study's analysis phase took two distinct paths

(individual and macro levels). Individually, I examined my police academy training, management styles, crowd control, riot control techniques, and other law enforcement techniques, while the macro-level was concerned with institutional policies, regulations, and procedures. My authenticity enhances the credibility of this study as a police officer who worked for twelve years with the Sudanese Police. Indeed, positionality is essential to this research because it stems from my experience managing a police force. As an insider, I may be in the middle ground.

## Chapter 4 – Storytelling and interpretation

### **Motivation and training on a personal level: My autoethnography**

This chapter discusses my time in Sudan from 1985 to 1997 as a member of the Sudanese Police Force. Additionally, it discusses policing and community safety to assist me in conceptualizing structural violence in policing. The chapter also examines the environment that contributed to the excessive use of force and the factors that facilitated its existence, as well as discusses how Sudanese police forces organize and express their identities. I will discuss the contradictions inherent in understanding Islam and its role in shaping Sudanese policing in the pursuit of a new societal order. I will be using interpretive perspectives on my stories, illuminating major themes that may emerge because of my storytelling.

I was born and raised in Juba, the former regional capital of Southern Sudan. My parents were both Christians from South Sudan who were born and raised in Sudan. Since I was a child, I have enjoyed and grown in confidence through soccer. I had hoped to begin my professional career with a first division team in Juba. When I was younger, my passion for soccer distracted me from politics, but I frequently went to the roadside to greet Sudan's president at the time, Gaafar Nimeiri. My admiration for Nimeiri stems from two factors: first, he agreed to sign the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Treaty; and second, he facilitated my father's return from exile in Uganda because of the agreement.

Regardless of my political leanings at the time, I believed in the concept of a law-abiding society governed by the rule of law. This vision of a law-abiding society guided my decision to work in law enforcement. When I was a child growing up in Hai Kosti, Juba, the proximity of a

police station to our home inspired me to pursue a career in law enforcement. Every day, I saw officers who were confident in their ability to perform their duties, regardless of the obstacles they encountered on the job. As a child, I imagined them to be superhuman, immune to insults and oblivious to threats directed at them because they frequently encountered difficulties, particularly in separating physical fights that would occur in the Kosti Market. I believed it was difficult and exhausting for these officers to strike the appropriate balance incident by incident, particularly when customers in the Malakia market fought over every issue.

In 1985, as a South Sudanese officer, I joined the police force. My father, a retired police officer, bolstered my confidence. Among other South Sudanese candidates, I was chosen to sit for additional exams in Sudan's capital, Khartoum. My elder brother, who was also chosen for the police force, failed the Arabic proficiency examination. I joined the Sudanese police after completing the selection process and began training at the Police College and High Institution in Khartoum, which is now known as Rabat University.

As a cadet, I was required to follow strict protocols, including self-control and self-discipline, as part of my training to become a police officer. I shared four hostels with other cadets at the college and was required to follow strict protocols, including self-control and self-discipline. I was assigned to the fifth platoon in batch 52, a number assigned to our cadets in 1985, when I enlisted as a cadet in the Sudan Police Force. After that, I began a rigorous 24-month training program at Khartoum's Police College and High Institution, commonly referred to as the Police Training Academy. Cadet training was offered exclusively in Arabic. A typical college day starts before dawn and ends when the sun sets in the evening. Numerous hourly program-related tasks, such as standstill parades, were completed. My possessions were seized,

my hair was shaved, and I was issued khakis and white clothing to symbolize my transition from civilian to the commanding officer. This physical transformation mirrored the internal transition from cadet to officer.

The first day of college was devoted entirely to altering our civilian appearance and behaviour and reorganizing our minds in a particular way. It began with three months of military-style training (with no contact with anyone outside the college), which included rigorous physical fitness. We started our day four hours after midnight and trained for eighteen hours a day. Each day of training included running, military marches, and hands-on instruction in a variety of military and physical activities. In the evenings, however, we would spend our time performing personal chores such as cleaning our quarters and preparing for the following day's activities. I received 2,400 hours of military-style training over two years.

Eventually, I realized that the two years of intense mental and physical stress were a means for me to comprehend and obey a command structure that would prove contentious later in my professional career as an officer. I spent the last two years at a police academy, where I was exposed to the stressful command structure that requires obedience to one's superiors. I believed that the military-style training I received as a police officer provided me with insufficient mandates to exercise discretion, as well as insufficient anti-bias training, conflict resolution, and other approaches that could have assisted me in mitigating violence. The rigours of military-style training overshadowed the benefits of my academic studies, which emphasized critical thinking abilities. Thus, the militarized training had conditioned me to believe in a strict police hierarchical structure in which the Director of Police and other managers were vastly more powerful figures at the top of the police hierarchy. The hierarchical power structure stifled

critical thinking and self-expression. One was to follow the orders of the "superior" officers. I had no idea the three months of training were a paradigm of subjection. Regardless of the command structure's shortcomings, as a cadet, I learned to listen for and respond to orders when necessary, during celebrations or situations involving potential crowd violence. The skills I acquired were instrumental in my development as a police officer. Our training was enhanced with interactive components to meet the requirements for police officers.

The learning environment at the police academy was highly interactive and experiential. The training included scenario development, role plays, lectures, and presentations, as well as a practicum. Academically, I completed two semesters totaling twenty-four months, with an emphasis on the conceptual and theoretical justifications and explanations for criminal behaviour. The criminal justice system, criminal codes and procedures, crime scene investigation, police and police ethics, and emergency planning were all covered during this training. However, the training curriculum omitted legal reviews of international laws and policies, which would have enabled me to identify gaps and differences in law and policy relating to foreign norms and standards. In other words, the Cadets' curriculum lacked a course on international human rights. However, a strong emphasis was placed on Islamic Sharia law and its associated evidence codes. Police officers received a limited and prescribed "education."

I had assumed incorrectly that religious considerations had no bearing on police organization. We were surprised one day by an inspection of several training officers, all of whom were Muslims. One of my colleagues began murmuring Quran verses, which drew the officer's attention. The officer inquired as he approached, "Do you believe we are malicious? Are our heads horned?" I used to believe that if a Muslim could use religion to punish another

Muslim, religion had no bearing on Sudanese law enforcement. I realized how naive I was about religious tolerance in the Sudanese police after three months in college. At the Police College, practicing my Christian faith, including Sunday worship service, private prayer, study, and Scripture reading, was a challenge.

On the other hand, I had two distinct experiences involving police training and religion. The college had a mosque in which my Muslim coworkers, including trainers and instructors, performed five daily prayer pillars. My Christian colleagues and I requested permission to leave campus for a prayer, which was initially denied but was later granted on a conditional basis. Each Sunday, we were permitted to leave the college for five hours to pray. Regardless of the approval, an officer on duty had complete discretion to deny us access to church on Sundays. Despite the college's religious intolerance, the training went smoothly. After 1,400 hours of academic training, the college administration assigned me to a police station in Bahari. During the field work, I overshadowed officers performing routine police duties under the supervision of senior officers. I was promoted to lieutenant in the Sudanese Police Department after completing the Cadet Training Program.

### **Direct knowledge of a new policing strategy**

I should clarify several contexts in the history of the police, including the intervention of the Jaafar Nimari regime in 1969 and Omar al-Bashir's coup in 1989, both of which centralized and militarized Sudanese police. In 1985, Jaafar al-Nimari imposed Sharia Islamic Law as the supreme law in Sudan, reshaping state institutions along religious lines. I joined as a police cadet at the Police College in Khartoum, Sudan, during this contentious and fractured period in Sudanese history.

After completing the cadet training program, I was hired by the Khartoum Province Police and assigned to the Shergi Police Station in southern Khartoum. After three years on the force, Omar al-Bashir of the National Salvation Front successfully staged a military coup in Sudan in 1989, altering how we police officers performed our duties and responsibilities. At the Shergi Police Station, everything was running smoothly. I became aware of the following events occurring within our jurisdiction. The first thing I noticed was semi-mobile Public Police (Shorta al-nejaam al-aam) stations in residential areas. I later discovered that these police officers were recruited from Omar al Bashir's party and among regime supporters. The primary function of these public police forces was to reinforce the community's religious spirit and a culture of good behavior within the jurisdiction. Second, it started as a rumor, but after a few days, I read a message at our station announcing the termination of over 200 police officers. The message made no mention of the reason for the dismissals, only that they were due for early retirement. However, I was not one of those arbitrarily dismissed by the government. Finally, the government unified police forces by combining them with other autonomous regular forces. I recognized that the regular police force, the Public Order Police, was incapable of carrying out the assignment. I realized that the regular police force, including Public Order, Customs, Prison and Reformation, Civil Defense, Wildlife, Passport Protection and Immigration, Nationality and Identity, and the Central Reserve Police, were all part of the police forces being centralized under one command.

As a police officer who had enforced the law extensively and used force in the process, I was perplexed by the merger's rationale. At best, I must emphasize that the consequences of this new police structure were ineffective because they were formed by civilians who lacked a fundamental understanding of the strategic and operational mandates used by trained police

officers. When it came to using force in conflict resolution situations, they lacked practical experience dealing with crowd control. During our joint operational meetings, I stated that implying that police shootings are justified was counterproductive. To assess a situation and act appropriately, a police officer must be able to make critical decisions. On the other hand, regular police forces should be more concerned with the abuse of authority. These civilian forces, however, had no idea how to de-escalate a conflict through nonviolent means.

One evening, I spoke with my senior officer, who had previously worked at the Shergi Police Station before I arrived, about police profiling of specific individuals in our jurisdiction, which appeared to be the norm. He advised me that I would gain a complete picture of the situation if I observed police practice at the station. Indeed, after a while, I noticed the station's charge-room (Makatab Balaqat) filled with officers from a particular ethnic culture in northern Sudan) with a homogeneous culture and language (Islam and Arabic). They were the first point of contact for the public, whether detained or responding to citizen complaints. Additionally, they performed specialized criminal and administrative tasks, such as maintaining filling station records (detention of suspects and other legal processes). I became aware of the station's criminal intelligence unit compiling surveillance reports on specific southern Sudanese individuals as I continued to work in Shergi. Among these groups were Eritrean refugees and other families suspected of criminal activity regularly. Regrettably, these ethnic groups' perceived criminality was based on their ethnic origin, beliefs, and political affiliations. The Eritrean refugees felt intimidated by the constant surveillance and profiling practices. The intelligence report states that the station developed an action plan called Kasha, which translates as "profiling and arbitrary arrests." As a member of the Kasha operation's operational team, an officer on duty oversees the station's charge room for suspect treatment. The presence of pro-Islam activists in

the station's charge room and Kasha's execution by predominantly Arab-Muslim station officers established profiling and surveillance of non-Muslim groups within our jurisdiction as a norm.

### **Joint operations: An account of crowd control**

The ethnic conflict in the Darfur Regions, as well as high rates of armed robbery, had influenced how the police dealt with crime in Khartoum's neighborhoods. As the Islamic government in Khartoum imposed extreme measures on police officers, security situations deteriorated in Darfur and the country's southern parts. Numerous residents of Darfur and Juba arrived in Khartoum. Most of them settled in the city's south, particularly in Mayo and Soweto, a Shanti town (south of Khartoum). Armed robberies had increased in southern neighborhoods. In a case I investigated, a minister was ambushed in the Suba Araadi area, and two armed robbers were apprehended in the Mayo area. Additionally, an Eritrean refugee was killed and dumped along *Sahafa Shereq* (East) Road. There had been numerous robberies and murders in the neighborhood. The Khartoum Province Police launched a campaign against illegal weapons possession in May 1990.

Subsequently, the Khartoum Province Police issued an order instructing all police officers in the province, including those at my station, Shergi Police Station, to be on standby. Later, the province informed police officers on standby to march to Mayo, south of Khartoum, at 4:00 a.m. to join police officers from other stations in surrounding and seizing Mayo and its surroundings. Other police forces arrived at Shergi Station at 9:00 p.m. At six a.m., I began searching homes along with officers under my command in the targeted areas for illegal weapons. Search warrants were not required in 1989 due to an emergency declaration. The investigation into illegal arms

possession began as I searched home after home for illegal weapons. After three hours, officers arrested individuals for illegal alcohol brewing.

Mayo was well-known for its illicit alcohol brewing. Additionally, the area has been primarily populated by displaced people fleeing the southern civil war and those affected by famine and ethnic cleansing in Darfur. I noticed that officers under my command and other officers began beating and arresting people for having alcohol (even if the alcohol was consumed in the individual's home). Technically, the officer's behavior shifted our mission away from searching for illegal arms and toward illegal brewing, which is prohibited under Islamic Sharia Law. Officers fired live ammunition during the process at individuals suspected of having alcohol and those fleeing their homes. As a result, numerous civilians were beaten and compelled to sit in the sun. Human rights violations appeared to be on the rise. Excessive use of force increased civilian arrests, injuries, and displacement. Excessive force was also evident during my work in war-torn areas of Southern Sudan.

I was transferred a few months later to Juba, South Sudan, a conflict zone. Juba was a government-run garrison town, with citizens prohibited from leaving the town. The Sudanese army had complete control of the city under these circumstances. Military intelligence has been critical in arresting and detaining civilians. In 1992, a police intelligence report stated that schoolchildren in Juba were protesting. Protesters gathered at the University of Juba and marched through the Modoria Roundabout, Malakia Police Station, and the Wazarat Ministry offices. These protesters in Juba City in 1991 were protesting the government's educational policy, which placed a premium on Arabic instruction in schools. When the protesters entered

my jurisdiction (Malakia Station), I led a team of 25 police officers in peaceful pursuit behind Al-Sabah Children's Hospital.

Personnel from the People's Defense Forces (PDF) deployed in Juba to support military operations arrived armed from their homes in Hai Malakal. My force, which had accompanied the protesters, trembled in fear as the PDF shouted "Allah Akhbar," which translates as "God is Great," while pointing their weapons directly at the crowds. They suddenly opened fire with live ammunition on the protesters. The force under my command also began firing in the air. The situation spiraled out of control. The crowds fled for their lives. Because I did not command the People's Defense Force, they were unconcerned about my efforts to enforce proper crowd control methods. As a result, indiscriminate shootings occurred. I was fully aware that, had I not intervened, innocent lives would have been lost. I immediately ordered the officers under my command to cease firing with a hand microphone, and the People's Defense Force did so abruptly. Twenty-five students were injured due to the use of force, and five were hospitalized in Juba. Despite the shootings and injuries, protesters gathered and marched to the offices of the ministers. I directed my force to return to the station at 4 p.m. Since only a few officers discharged their weapons, I conducted investigations to ensure that each officer faced consequences.

### **Autoethnography interpretation: Contexts for police reorientation.**

Contexts such as the police academy, religion, and management structures are critical in interpreting instances of structural violence within the Sudan police force. In Sudan, the police have developed a general understanding of their work at the Police College and High Institution through indoctrination. The presence of the indoctrination provided a context conducive to

incursive interaction among cadets and other officers within the institution of the police. In this institutional context, my fellow cadets and I kept interacting as dictated by police training. Consequently, our interpretation of ourselves corresponded with our image as police officers. This image of the police was acquired through college training and was based on lived experiences that could be described and observed in a real social context. For example, I joined the Sudanese police and began training at Khartoum's Police College and High Institution, which is also known as the National Ribat University. My and other cadets' primary goal in training were to militarize our behavior and to restructure our minds.

The restructuring of minds, however, was linked to a religion, which was embedded in the training contents. The contents of the police training covered criminal justice, the criminal code and procedures, crime scene investigation, policing and police ethics, and emergency planning. It also focused on Islamic Sharia law and its subsidiary codes, including evidence. The practice of including these codes into police training went beyond the college level, incorporating them into police practices. In essence, cadets who graduated from college were required to work in stations to demonstrate these skills and theological knowledge. The incorporation of religious instruction into training was thus the one-of-a-kind way the Sudan police force was organized. For example, in one of the police stations I worked for, I observed that there were many volunteer police forces present in residential areas. I learned that these untrained police officers were recruited by Umar Al Bashir's party and supporters of the regime. Their primary function was to strengthen the religious spirit of the community and the standard of good behaviour within the jurisdiction. Thus, a new role for the Sudan police emerged.

The new police role has reoriented the police and has led to discrimination within the police. Regardless of where they came from, the recruits, being adamant about their religion reoriented themselves towards the new police role. Although some were religious people who became police officers, others were indoctrinated while working for the police. As a result, the Sudanese police have become a religious-based organization. As the role of religion in policing grew, the Arabic language took on a more symbolic meaning of exclusion. For example, my older brother, who also applied to be a police officer, failed the Arabic language proficiency exam. He, unlike me, had never attended an Arabic school in Juba. Although the Sudanese government allowed English to be the primary language of instruction in schools in the south, the Sudanese police would not accept Sudanese citizens who did not speak Arabic.

Aside from Arabic, Christians were not afforded the same level of religious freedom at the police academy. Muslim cadets had received particular attention during police training and on the job. Certain religions have been suppressed because they are incompatible with the Islamic nature of the police system. For instance, it has become difficult for me to live out my Christian faith. When my fellow Christian cadets and I were scheduled to leave college for prayer, we were denied. Nevertheless, my colleagues, college teachers, and training students performed five daily prayers at the college's mosque. Consequently, Muslim cadets were given an advantage over fellow Christians.

As the role of religion in policing grew and other religions were marginalized, the Sudanese police established two parallel police structures: the regular police structure and the volunteer police structure. The “regular police structure” is a catch-all term for those police officers drawn from across Sudan that are trained at the police academy and other rank-and-file

institutions. On the other hand, the volunteer police structure, known as the Popular Defense Forces (PDF), consists of civilians recruited to supplement the regular police forces. They relied heavily on a complicated and muddled structure within various law enforcement agencies. As a result of my experience as a police officer exposed to various security situations, I realized that the volunteer structure of policing was a secondary police structure comprised of like-minded religious individuals. Furthermore, in the Shergi police station charge room, where I was deployed, I noticed that all the officers belonged to a specific ethnic culture in northern Sudan, with a unified culture and language (i.e., Islam and Arabic). The PDF was also stationed in Juba to assist military operations. The two structures of policing have been commonly practiced; thus, they centralized relationships between command and obedience.

In the context of command, obedience was built on asymmetrical relationships between officers. Indeed, relationships between cadets and other police officers reorganized the policing structure and were maintained by loyalty, while being hierarchically structured by the two parallel policing systems in the Sudanese police institution. This hierarchical relationship centralized obedience and provided a channel for implementing reforms through legislation and policies. Indeed, obedience to the hierarchy of command began with militarized training at the police academy and evolved into a synthesis of military and academic training that was critical in defining relationships among police officers. For instance, the relationship I witnessed involved top-down directives that assisted the police and their subsidiary stations in reorienting social values based on obedience through the dominant religious relationship. As a result of this relationship of domination, I became aware of new roles and the structures of policing in Sudan. Therefore, the militarized training subjected me to a strict police hierarchical structure in which


the Director of Police and other managers were vastly more powerful figures at the beginning and end of the police structure.

This asymmetrical command structure in turn has complicated reporting practices in the criminal justice system. Despite the Sudanese police forces' criminal justice practices being taught at the police college, religious beliefs influenced arrests, investigations, and incarcerations. At Shergi police station, for example, I began to realize that the station's criminal intelligence unit, managed mainly by Muslims, periodically generated reports on specific individuals from southern Sudan, who were predominantly Christians, including refugees from Eritrea. Unfortunately, these ethnic groups' perceived criminality was based on their religious beliefs. These practices, in fact, were distorted by the religious beliefs of some police officers.

Furthermore, the Sudanese police were reoriented to focus not only on the surveillance of non-Muslims but also on creating enablers who instilled fear in people. In an environment of fear, the police used religion to justify the profiling and surveillance of non-Muslims within communities. The central idea is that power was more concentrated in Muslim police officers' social circles than others. Further, the state created new forces that acted as enablers to enforce Muslim officers' dominance. In addition to professional enablers, the state collaborated with the Sudanese police forces to establish multiple layers of enablers. For example, to create unified police forces, the government merged the police forces with other autonomous regular forces. The actions of enablers fostered an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, impeding a return to a peaceful means of conflict de-escalation. As a result, the use of force revealed a significant amount about the excessive use of violence.

The use of violence by the Sudan police force was precipitated by targeting areas inhabited by predominantly non-Muslim citizens. The police set the stage for the use of force on Khartoum's southern outskirts. Many people from Darfur and Juba arrived in Khartoum, and many of them settled in the city's south, particularly in Mayo. Sudanese police profiled people in Mayo because they were Christians. In addition, the volunteer police forces established mini-police stations in these residential areas of southern Khartoum, which resulted in high incidences of arbitrary arrests of civilians, known in Arabic as "*Kasha*." These Kasha were carried out primarily by Arab-Muslim officers engaged in the profiling and surveillance of non-Muslim groups within our jurisdiction.

In conclusion, the autoethnography interpretation of Sudanese police highlighted three themes: 1) the professionalization of religion, 2) dominance in interpersonal relationships, and 3) the actualization of violence. These themes arose from the contextual factors in which the Sudanese Police Forces based their new police forms and structures. The contextual factors included the Police College and High Institution, training materials, and asymmetrical police structures. Hence, the Sudanese police forces' social reorientation embedded exclusionary processes, which underscored the process of an excessive but different use of violence that is structural violence.

**Figure 1****Social reorientation of police thematic representation****A Synopsis of police's social reorientation**

The role of theology in the Islamization of the police force helps to understand how religious and civil/state orders overlap and influence one another. It delves into policing recruitment, training, and practice in Sudan. The suspense here is between power distribution and police social stratification, which results in structural violence.

**The distribution of power**

The interpretation of my story has resulted in a fundamental central theme: the reorientation of theology toward policing. The thematic network's key finding is that inequality, because of social stratification and violence, is an essential factor in the social reorientation of the Sudan Police institution. The organizing theme of professionalizing faith is fundamentally related to the

distribution of power within Sudan's police and the state. In this context, theology (Islamism), police training, and practices are critical for recognizing the imbalance of power in the police institution.

### **Social stratification and violence**

Group dynamics dominate relationships within the social order. The concept of relational dominance is rooted in police structure and behavior, which emphasizes leadership and management stratification within the police organization. Theological and dominance connotations and implications primarily link policing to violence. This violence exemplifies the power disparity within the police force. Most importantly, it serves as a stark reminder of the police force's widespread presence of existing violence enablers. In this context, theology establishes a new social order within the police institution by creating multiple structures and rankings. Faith and criminology allow us to understand the social order as a tool for imaging a new Sheikh-style policing. The tension between identity and policing is critical in conceptualizing theology's social reorientation in Sudan's social order. The central conflict is between 1) professionalizing religion and 2) renationalizing police institutional dominance. These two strands combine to form the third and most crucial strand, effectuating violence. As a result, a new policing identity emerges, further entrenching society's inequality. Thus, understanding the complexities of the Sudan police institution's social reorientation requires understanding structural violence. This entails an understanding of physical violence, social stratification, and identity categorization.

### **Constructing a theory of police violence.**

Social stratification, religious values, and identity configure practices within police institutions. Identity theory asserts that various identities fully reflect human relations based on group memberships to build a platform for the social reorientation of theology (Cook-Huffman, 2009; Taifel, 1980). The boundaries between various identities on this platform are constantly shifting, resulting in new identities. It is interactive rather than static. These group dynamics define group (or cross-cutting) standards of belonging based on group bias. Individuals identify with their group because they consider themselves members. Individuals, groups, and collective behaviours can be distinguished using this identification process. As a result, group dynamics justify group comparisons. Sudanese police forces, for example, have fostered and developed a new mindset and enforcement techniques that allow multiple enablers to exercise total power. As state leaders pushed for police reform, faith-based beliefs became a divisive tool for group identification process, Sudanese police management and leadership became more systemic and interactive.

Religion takes shape within social networks due to the interaction and systemic leadership, forming prejudices and fostering group cohesion (Tajfel, 1980; Brown, 2000). The religions and ethnicities of individuals and groups are essential components of the police force because they shape how officers act and perceive others. These determinant factors must exist within the police institution to foster a new social reality. Police officers in Sudan self-identify in three ways: positively, negatively, and through self-imagination. In this way, relationships are stratified hierarchically within the self-identification process to institutionalize change, with some groups having a higher status than others, creating a new social order (Galtung, 1969).

Most of the time, the new social order is permeated by religious values. While the various top-level interactions within a police organization may be incompatible, religion is a backdrop for increased ambiguity in policing, resulting in an additional command structure (new auxiliary police units). The new command structure works alongside regular or paramilitary police forces in a lower-level police system, and this structure represents a more significant shift in the police force. In this context, religion (Islam) takes precedence over all other considerations. This classification system is used in every city, rural area, town, and small city where police officers must be present. As a result, the value of religion within the police force has had a significant impact on the work of the police force (Ibrahim, 2018b).

Thus, in collaboration with police forces, religion's identity-building function contributes to maintaining the police environment, including actors, systems, structures, and ranking. This environment facilitates communication between Islamic-faith management at the college level and police precinct levels, and everything in between. As a result, Islam has contributed to creating a unified communication channel within the police force. As a result, coordination between the country's leader and police executive managers is critical in managing and enforcing the ethics and operations of police forces. In essence, the value of religion in the police institution is a precursory factor to violence within the police institution.

Other factors play a significant role in the spread of police violence. The Head of State and police chiefs, who command the regular and auxiliary police forces, are among them. The Head of State is the highest-ranking official in police management, followed by the police chief. Both the highest-ranking officers and lower-ranking officers delegate authority. Each actor operates within the confines of his or her own system (Galtung, 1969, p. 176). The Head of State, for

example, operates within the confines of his government ideology, whereas the Chief of Police operates within the confines of police acts and laws enacted by the Head of State. The head of state is the most powerful actor in these interactions. These actors are arranged hierarchically within the police system.

The social stratification and group dynamics of the police force, combined with a uniformly religious bias, provide a lens through which to examine the Sudanese police force's excessive force. When a police force is unequal, widespread injustice and miscarriages of justice are almost certain to persist in society. By consolidating power into small groups within the Sudanese police, this newly formed structure and practice benefit specific segments of the force and population. This division of the police force enables the recruitment of more civilians and law enforcement officers, many of whom have increased authority and power due to their group affiliation.

The value of religion, police interactions and relationships, and police management stratification have fueled the social reorientation of Sudanese police institutions, allowing for a violent environment within Sudanese police forces. Power distribution, social stratification, and violence were all relevant to the inequality promoted by Sudanese policing. This discourse on the initiation of violence within the police institution was a lived experience. First, I considered the Sudanese police force, with whom I had spent more than a decade working. As I depicted in my story, groups within the police force and their enablers have always defined themselves favourably in Sudan's complex, contentious, and contested agencies. I was forced to navigate perilous and unpredictable situations in which self-expression and critical analysis of the ruling elite were forbidden.

In conclusion, conflicting selves are standard in social settings such as police departments, where identity concerns and power distribution are paramount. Functional relationships between police and the public are an effective tool for studying social behaviour and intergroup conflict in this context. The police-police relationship, on the other hand, complicates the social reorientation. In the analysis section, the concepts of structural violence are used to reflect the explanatory notions of power distribution, social stratification, and violence. These three ideas are intertwined with structural violence. According to my autoethnography, an institution's internal identity conflict was built into the structure. In summary, this thesis contends that Sudan's Islamic theological ideology is necessary for the Sudan Police Forces to maintain a culture of violence and inequality.

## **Chapter 5 – Analysis, personal experience, police, and structural violence**

The discussion in this chapter is based on my experiences in the Sudanese Police Force, as described in chapter four. My autoethnography as a Sudanese police officer revealed religious bias in the force's hiring, training, and police procedures. Sudanese police officers are often said to be biased toward their religion when establishing rules of engagement. To highlight structural violence predicated on notions of power distribution, social stratification, and violence, I supplemented my observations with contextual information related to historical and analytical perspectives on the Sudanese police. This chapter also proposes community-based policing as a conflict resolution strategy, considering my reflexivity and the contextual realities. The idea that faith (Islam) is vital in forming a police officer's identity and function, influencing leadership and creating intergroup comparisons within the police force is discussed. The chapter begins by critically examining the issues of power imbalance, social ranking, and violence in the Sudanese police force. Then, it moves on to a different terrain, focusing on police and policing in Darfur, Sudan. The chapter concludes with a synopsis of a peacebuilding and conflict resolution strategy known as community policing.

### **The distribution of power within the Sudan police institution**

Specific skillsets and abilities are essential to effectively managing incidents for which force may be required, and these skillsets and abilities must be built on advanced training to boost skills and confidence (Rajakaruna et al., 2017, pp. 516–518). The Sudanese Police Force instituted a system to shape recruits' and officers' personalities. This institutionalization has combined a religious bias in the recruitment process and group dynamics, producing a solid religious bias in the Sudan Police Force. From my personal experience, Sudanese police

academies are critical for educating and professionalizing recruits and seasoned officers. The training that police officers receive sets boundaries on human actions. Sudanese culture, religion, and character are intertwined with the development of cadets' behavioural traits, policing tactics, and other perceptions of them as police. Many of the systemic religious building blocks of the police social order were well-suited to Muslim police officers within the police after two years of training and drills. This religious restructuring of the cadets serves as a link between the development of small groups and the ejection of unwanted members (Taifel & Turner, 1979). The police cadets were not the only deceptive link; volunteerism has also become a facet of policing.

The government hired new officers (volunteers) to assist in the defense of the system, creating a new structure that included recruiting more Muslim civilian auxiliary police officers and cadets. This structure is frequently aided by social networks constructed by actors and systems (Galtung, 1969). The state enlisted citizen volunteers to assist with public safety. The goal was to create two distinct levels of police command and organization. Notably, the newly established structure benefits specific Sudanese police forces and some populations by consolidating power within the police force. Many civilian volunteers were recruited, many of whom had more authority and power (Ibrahim, 2018b, p. 288). These volunteers, known as Auxiliary Public Police Forces, have complete authority over law enforcement agencies. They have given the police a new mission distinct from previous practices. Its mission is to transform Sudanese society and spread Islam. Indeed, Muslim officers and cadets now lead the Sudanese police force.

Islam and Arabic have become more central to the police force in most cases. Volunteerism in Sudanese police forces, therefore, has shifted police missions and fragmented the police into two forces: regular and volunteer. Religion has exacerbated the fragmentation of the police structure. Boudeau (2009) explains that religion as a social marker has constrained the development of Sudanese police structures and systems in various ways (Boudreau, 2009). As new volunteer forces emerged, Islamic-based policing practices became prominent, particularly in injustice and criminal law enforcement. In other words, religion (Islam) takes precedence over all other factors in shaping communication between the police departments, precincts, and everything in between. It became necessary and safe to be a member of a religious group during the Islamization process of the police department. Furthermore, policing, whether by police or non-police officers, favoured Muslims significantly. As a result, non-Muslim marginalization and enablers with power within the institution became a reality. Although profiling was widely used in criminal justice practices in Sudan, innocent civilians were constantly subjected to mistreatment due to police surveillance influenced by the Islamic faith. Eventually, police began to accept aggression as a tool for surveillance.

Muslim officers and cadets now dominate Sudan's police force. Thus, my autoethnographic inquiry into the Sudanese police force identifies the following key point: Muslim officers and cadets now lead the Sudanese police force. The Sudanese police's perception of their past training impacts their lives and obscures the link between self-image and religious beliefs. The importance of police academies in educating and professionalizing new and experienced officers cannot be overstated. Indeed, the Sudanese police force became divided into two hierarchies, each with its own set of rules. Islam and Arabic were integral to the Sudanese police's new identity in the recruitment process.

Conversely, there is a widespread belief that the Sudanese police have experienced and witnessed violence throughout their history, and these observations have served as a solid foundation for developing a professional doctrine (Ibrahim, 2020). One observed behavior of the Sudanese police force is that it is highly centralized, which provides a clear picture of its professional characteristics. The Sudanese police oath is one of the professional ethics of the Sudanese police's allegiance to God. For many years after the country's independence, the oath was taken to characterize the police in three ways: as servants of the state; as servants of the people; and as servants of God (Ibrahim, 2020). It was revealed in 1983 that the introduction of Sharia (Islamic Law) into the police oath triggered the allegiance to God; policing was intended to be primarily an act of adherence to God. In essence, allegiance was primarily a social and political marker, as it was used to aid the government while also professionalizing the police.

Besides religion, the military regimes in Sudan from 1958 to the 1980s forced the police in Sudan to follow a military model of policing. They used the Criminal Investigation Department's and its political branches' power to monitor and suppress political opponents (Ibrahim, 2018, p. 282). To reinvent and professionalize the police, the May regime in the 1970s abandoned socialism in favor of Islamism (Ibrahim 2020, p. 5). Sharia law also requires police officers to serve under Sharia law. Sudanese police officers have also been forced to maintain strict work ethics since the 1980s. The new religion-based ethics have been imposed as the highest reference standard for police professionalism.

In the case of police officers, the institutionalization of police professionalism necessitates a broader context of police as servants of the state and God, both of which are inherent in the establishment of enforcement powers. This broader context leads to a consciousness process in

which police officers behave as if they were indoctrinated by religious belief values (Ibrahim, 2020). From my experience, police officers are vulnerable because they operate in a dichotomous manner, characterized by organizational policies and police knowledge influenced by Islamic Law. Hence, a contradiction occurs when police officers seek different goals motivated by religion and are organized and interact in multiple layers of systems. This contradiction, loyalty to the state, defines the highest positions attained in the Sudanese police force, where the police oath institutionalizes religious symbols and doctrine (Ibrahim, 2020).

The new Sudanese police force's professional doctrine supports the view that behaviour is a learned process based on police officers' experiences and observations (Cosme, 2021). As a result, recruiting new officers and training them at the college level is part of a social learning context in which recruits are assigned acceptable police work behaviours. In the case of police officers, it appears that they receive entirely technical and professional training to ensure that they maintain a positive image as state agents. This characterization of the police is not uncommon because the Sudanese police force has undergone three types of reforms throughout its history, involving three agents: the state, the people, and God. It should also be noted that historical evidence points to an aggressive process within the police force influenced by religion and ethnicity. It is evident from police officers' observations and experiences that aggressive behaviour is a learned process that profoundly impacts relationships.

Finally, several factors, including religious bias and the formation of Muslim actors, supported the unequal distribution of power within the Sudan Police Force. There is a solid religious bias in the recruitment process and group dynamics of the Sudanese within the police. Muslim officers and cadets now lead the police institution. This actors' formation was spurred by

volunteerism, which has become a facet of law enforcement work in the country. It is now up to Muslim officers and cadets to lead Sudan's police force and reform Sudanese society.

Moreover, social stratification was facilitated by actors and structures in the police system, upheld by a religious factor. Sudan Police College brought all law enforcement actors together under one roof to educate and professionalize both new and experienced officers. Because of this development, Sudanese police officers have been forced to display their solid religious affiliation at work, in their homes, and in public. Consequently, the police system's stratification has reorganized actors and structures within the police force to lead to inequality (Galtung, 1969, p. 175).

### **Social stratification and faith policing.**

The Islamic faith has become a central phenomenon in the Sudanese police forces, displacing traditional police values. The police included religious instruction at the college and precincts, and officers were required to follow and abide by theological instruction. This instruction created contested relationships mediated by various social factors such as religion and geographical location, undermining human agency (Boudreau, 2009, p. 133). Human agency in the context of policing refers to officers' self-imagination and actions to achieve specific goals, and it manifests itself in the relational dimensions of unequal distribution of power (Boudreau, pp. 135–136). This contentious relationship has potentially raised questions about how Sudanese police forces allowed violence to spiral out of control. For example, the lack of control, which has led to the excessive use of force, came about when the police created a new relationship with the government to establish multiple enablers (public police forces) with a monopoly on force

and power (Berridge, 2013). As a result of the newly formed relationship, Sudanese police officers formed a self-image manufactured in the Sudan Police College.

The Sudan Police College as an institution was critical in reorienting officers toward policing in Sudan because it framed officers' self-image, which defined police officers' future actions. This statement is consistent with the idea that contested relationships are uniquely located in a specific location (Boudreau, p. 131). Sudan's police, for example, maintained multiple locations (police stations) across the country's provinces. Cadets who have graduated must demonstrate their acquired skills and theological knowledge to work in these locations. The Sudan police reoriented cadets and police officers within these locations. The police used religion to facilitate reorientation. The police professionalized their members through a subsystem of religion by doing so. The Sudan police were always the medium rather than the initiators of professionalizing through faith.

Sudan's military regimes-imposed Sharia (Islamic law) in a country where Islamic religion and politics polarized public opinion about the police. It disastrously shifted the police's role from law enforcement to that of the custodian of society's moral religions (Berridge, 2013, p 542). Successive Sudanese regimes, for example, enacted several public order laws to regulate public spaces to establish Islamic policing. These laws have harmed girls' freedom of social and political association in Sudan (Abbas, 2015). In fact, between 1992 and 2002, the National Salvation regime established a morality police in Sudan to monitor social morality and cleanse Sudanese society (Abbas, 2015, p. 356). In addition, a council was formed, consisting of the regular police, military, and representatives from the Popular Police. Proponents of Islamic-style

policing have begun to argue that a new police identity based on faith is more effective than a traditional police force (Amnesty International, 2014).

Professional faith in Sudanese police has altered officer self-identification, police forms, and actions. As I described in my story, self-definition in Sudan was complicated and contentious, with police and their religious enablers defining themselves and their actions within the police institution. These newly defined enablers exercised their agency in a social setting, such as a police institution rife with competing policing forms. Consequently, functional relationships within religious enablers are valuable for investigating social behaviour and intergroup conflict in the Sudanese police forces.

Before 1992, when the Interior Minister established a technical committee to reorganize the police force under the new regime, religion was already infused in the Sudanese police (An-Na'im, 1997). The Committee advocated for merging the internal police forces into a "United Police" force. Throughout the process, the new police force was integrated into Sudan's secret police force, the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) (Berridge, 2013). These Islamic and militarized forces were critical in suffocating the regime's opposition; this fusion of religiously motivated police forces needed to be professionalized to reorganize Sudanese society, resulting in overlapping responsibilities. In Sudan, *Sharia* (Islamic Law) is the primary or sole reference for all police functions, including those beyond other police responsibilities (Ibrahim, 2018b). In this context, Islam as an ideology was viewed as the gold standard in Sudanese police work. Notably, this type of police professionalization was widely used in the Sudan police force, with officers' agency and actions associated with structural violence.

Aside from religious enablers, the Sudanese regular police force was sidelined due to incompatibility with the newly formed Sudanese policing system (Berridge, 2011). Muslim cadets had easy access to police resources throughout their training and deployment. Faith-based groups within the police employed discrimination and frequently emphasized socially constructed realities of religion and policing. Based on my work with Sudanese police forces, the new reality of combining faith and law enforcement has resulted in the development of new methods of profiling and surveillance that target specific groups, including potential criminals. Islamic values have aided in the classification of officers. It also served as a conduit between group formation and exclusion (Taifel & Turner, 1979). On a personal level, the Islamic faith helped establish a distinct police identity for certain protected groups within the police force. It reinforced exclusionary processes by perpetuating and encouraging discrimination on an organizational level. Thus, the Islamic nature of the Sudanese police system has incorporated criminal justice, law enforcement, and faith.

Therefore, the Sudanese police forces were dependent on and intertwined with the Islamic faith to help them monopolize the professionalizing faith, leaving no doubt which groups had the power. To reposition power, the police also included religious teachings at the college and in the workplace, and they sought to assure officers' allegiance (Ibrahim, 2020). A commanding exchange of subordination and manipulation of public orders accompanied the demands for loyalty. As a result of these events, the relationship within the police force became strained to the point where my colleagues and I had personal conflicts with each other. When it comes to societal change, the government imposes a specific religion on police institutions, and police approach policing differently. Because of this, it has been discovered that Sudanese law

enforcement has done differential profiling and surveillance. This surveillance technique resulted in the formation of collective groups based on religious relationships.

In summary, the Islamic faith has evolved into an organizational tool, uniting all Muslim officers in Sudanese police forces. This unit had intense interaction to establish a new relationship with the government and have a monopoly over force and power. Professional faith in Sudanese police has facilitated these interactions and altered officer self-identity, police forms, and actions. Thus, Islamic values have contributed to the social stratification of officers. These socially structured faith-based officers used discrimination within the police, where the socially constructed realities of religion and policing were frequently emphasized.

### **Institutionalizing a *Sheikh-type* policing identity**

As evident in my autoethnographic accounts, the police have changed their character, which has influenced their structures, policies, and classification systems for their members. My reflections on policing in Sudan focused on reorientating the police under the banner of the Muslim faith, which resulted in an imbalance of power and the formation of new police structures. However, this relational context is meaningless without discussing Sudanese identity formation and how these identities manifest themselves in the Sudanese police system.

In Western Sudan, organizing relationships and identities both stemmed from group formation. Darfur's social landscape has shifted dramatically due to a series of events and stories that have shaped the region's current situation (de Waal, 2005). Since 1600 B.C., the people of Darfur have developed a unique relationship that is entwined with identity formation and conflict. This relationship began with reconstructing relationships and establishing a network of

Western Sudanese elites (Idris, p.325). At the time, Darfur was defined by two opposing identity structures—indigenous and newcomers (Muslim Sheikh)—and the sociopolitical landscape of Darfur recognized and defined these two structures politically.

The indigenous tribal structure was entirely based on a maternal system. This system sought to keep Sheikhs out of the societal structure as they were considered corrupt. It should be noted that the Sheikhs, who were significantly influenced by Arab and Islamic culture, were an alienated outgroup of the indigenous population. These preferences for collective identity became more antagonistic in mobilizing their form of structure, leading to the gradual rise of Muslim elites as a dominant force (de Waal, 2005). Militarism and religious conflicts developed into a shared framework for forming identities among the Darfur elites because of the tenuous collective links between these groups. The disputed structural formation in Western Darfur has been replicated in the Sudanese police system.

There was an institutionalized link between the Sudanese police system and violence established. From the 1920s to the 1950s, the indigenous identity structure was inextricably linked to colonial and military rule's bureaucratic and manipulative nature (Berridge, 2011). During this era, *Shayigiyya*, an ethnic group living on the Nile's riverbank, was the first Sudanese collective group to be prominent in the identity formations of the Sudanese police forces. As a precursor to group identification, the Shayigiyya were represented by the police and the Sudan army forces. However, in the 1950s, the configuration of the Sudanese political landscape began to change, and multiple national identities started incorporating an educated Sudanese class of nationalists into the police force. Subsequently, the colonial state began fragmenting police

officer assignments by placing educated officers in the cities and rank-and-file officers posted in rural areas.

Indeed, a requirement for identity formation stemmed from tensions between Sudan's various racial, religious, and ethnic groups, as in Darfur, about group identification. The justification for the group comparison was motivated by the muddling of a society's values through theological beliefs derived from the chaos created by Sudan's history of Arabization. Based on group identification, this value was necessary for identity conflict to exist within an institution (Burton 1987 and 1990; Azar 1990). For example, in this context, indigenous and Sheikh identities serve as tools for personal safety, group recognition, and social status within society. Therefore, the Sudan Police Force's role established unique relationships that highly appealed to the Islamic faith. In Sudan, the term "Islamist" refers to a conscious commitment to a specific Islamist political ideology; it expresses the determination of a Northern Sudanese ethnic group to retain control over as much of Sudan as possible (O'Fahey, 1996).

However, the police department made several nationalistic attempts to mend its relationship with the public. In October 1964, its collective identity formation based on Islam was revisited. The police issued two key documents (Police Commissioner-General orders dated November 22, 1979, and June 9, 1980) (Berridge, 2011). This act foreshadowed the police taking on a new character and identity based on Sudan's 1973 constitution (Ibrahim, 2018a, pp. 3–4). Combined with 2007 Police Director-General Order No.58/2007, these documents created an enticing prospect for strengthening national ties between the police and the populace. What happened after that honed the Sudan police character, which was effectively subordinated to Sudan's successive military regimes. Since 1976, a significant portion of the police force has been tasked

with carrying out military operations against its citizens. This situation questions the type of national identity that the police were tasked with developing as a new image.

The newly formed police collective image reverted to the Sheikh's Arabized and militarized identity in Western Sudan. As a result, the police were divided into multiple security forces within the police (William Berridge, 2013). The Sheikh police, who serve as vigilantes, uphold Islamic morals. Furthermore, the government hired many new police officers, most of whom subscribe to the Sheikh identity, including a well-known public order unit police officer tasked with fighting rebel groups. It is worth noting that, following the 1989 coup, the new regime established a consultative council in charge of establishing the well-known Public Defense Forces (PDF). Moreover, the government established a unified police policy in May 1991, encompassing police forces, prison forces, firefighters, wildlife, and customs, compelling disparate police forces to merge under the Sheikh mode of policing. Surprisingly, the newly formed identity has changed its responsibilities and duties, and it also served as a pretext for erasing the previously constructed image of the nationalist police force. Most importantly, the state defined the mission objective of the Sheikh mode of policing as assisting in the country's Sharia value reinforcement.

In essence, Sudan's nation-building process permeated the police force, resulting in a new perspective on the relationship between organized violence and institutions. Slavery and Islam elevated Arabism to a higher status and superiority over other cultures in ancient Sudanese history, so that being an Arab implied being liberated and, ideally, claiming Arab ancestry (Bereketeab 2017, pp. 169–173). For example, Nubian tribes in central and northern Sudan participated in the Arabization process and self-identified as Arabs. As a result, people from

northern Sudan assumed Islam and Arab identities. It was also observed that the colonial state respected these identities and emphasized local status through educational policies (Bereketeab, 2017, p. 172). Despite protests from excluded groups, they prioritized Arab identity for management positions in South Sudan, Darfur, and, more recently, Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile. The process of nation-building has had severe consequences for the Sudanese police forces.

On the other hand, in post-independence Sudan, a new nation-building process was incorporated into the police environment (Bereketeab, 2017). By imposing their common identity and interests on the police force, Sudanese who worked for the British colonial administration gained influence over the public sphere. These groups, the ruling elites of the State of Sudan, were predominantly Arab at the time of the imposition. After independence, they lived along the Nile Basin in Central Sudan. However, after the country's independence, the Sudanese police established a different image with the slogan, "the police are for the people." Three years later, the slogan has changed. As a result, a thorough investigation was conducted to determine the police's mandates and missions. Eventually, the police reaffirmed that they were for the people. The state implemented Police Acts at the turn of the century (1900), the early twentieth century (1910), the 1920s, and the 1930s to change the Sudanese police force's identity (Ibrahim, 2018b).

In highlighting the organizational awareness of faith, the identity formation paths necessitated intergroup identification within the police from the colonial era to the current Sudanese police system, with two distinct groupings (indigenous and Sheikh) serving as identity maintenance strategies. Later, it became clear that the Sheikh's faith-based identity dominated the

new Sudanese police force's self-imagination. Consequently, power was invested in the Sheikh identity paradigm of policing. In this context, the intergroup comparison reinforced this behaviour because the Sudanese police force was forced to embrace the new structure and system within the police. The Sheikh mode of policing prioritized certain spiritual variables while ignoring others. This result was one of the inevitable aspects of structuring relationships within the police. The newly formed police mode has tremendously impacted the Sudanese police command and leadership structures.

In conclusion, Sudanese society's social order created a linear order, ensuring that Sheikh-style policing ranked higher than other actors in Sudan. The Police Force adopted this strict understanding of identity characteristics. As a result, there was a power imbalance and new police structures—the Indigenous and Sheikh identities—within the police force. Eventually, the contours of Sudan's political landscape began to shift in the 1950s. The Sheikh mode of policing was used to create police forces, which served as a pretext for erasing the previously constructed image of the nationalist policing structure. This police structure was tasked with enforcing Sharia values and upholding Islamic morals. The Sheikh mode of policing prioritized certain Muslim officers. This prioritization was an unavoidable consequence of structuring relationships within the police.

### **Actualization of violence in Darfur: Enacting inequality.**

Sudanese police officers are reorganizing their command structures to encourage bargaining and concessions between police and government officials. Within the restructuring process, actors emerge at the district and state levels as indicators of hierarchically commanded inequalities (Galtung, 1969, p. 176). This reality was true of the Sudanese police, which has

demonstrated some cultural forms of identity since 1976, including hierarchical ranks, uniforms, and customs akin to military traditions. In Sudan, law enforcement operations were conducted per military customs to create order within the police.

The police in Sudan have a long history and an uncomplicated management structure, with the Police Director-General occupying a position of prominence (Ibrahim, 2020, p. 2). In Sudan, police leadership has two dimensions. On the one hand, a leadership style is used to professionalize the police. On the other hand, the militarized leadership style was used to manage the government, including political and executive control of the state and the public. This leadership style was explicitly required to demonstrate flexibility and managerial skills to gain the support of influential people. These leadership styles aided in the professionalization of cadets at the Sudanese police college and, as a result, facilitated their participation in policing activities in police stations and localities. In 1985, officers were recruited from all parts of Sudan, including Southern Sudan. Most of these officers graduated from college as Lieutenants and were promoted to leadership positions in the Sudanese police force during their service. At this time, police roles and responsibilities were delegated to this professionalized leadership domain, which was free of political influences. However, this was not the case at the highest levels of management.

To demonstrate their strong desire to control the police politically, successive Sudanese governments either created a linking system in reforms or acted as an initial stage to influence the police leadership style (Berridge, 2011). Sudanese police have also learned not to overestimate their government's support. Efforts, aided by Police Commissar General Orders issued in 1979 and 1980, stated unequivocally that police officers were to carry out their duties

under Sudan's 1973 Constitution supervised by the state. Due to the relationship between Sudanese police and the state, the status of leadership structures created leadership rankings. The multiple rankings of leaders within the Sudanese police drew lines as to who oversees the force. Moreover, there are religious beliefs that dominate the Sudanese police. A small group now performs most policing duties, and they tend to distribute power ethnically and religiously (Sheikh-based identity).

The police force has become a breeding ground for unequal power distribution. The police governance profile was skewed toward ethnocultural and Islamic officers from North Sudan, frequently promoted to higher positions. For example, after a police school was established in Darfur in 1940, Yahya Umran, a local native police leader, became the head of the police force. Additionally, Amin Ahmed Hussein and six other Sudanese officers were appointed to Superintendent of Police Headquarters and senior police positions, including Sudan's Criminal Investigation Department (Berridge, 2011, pp. 128-129). Most of these senior Sudanese police officers were assigned to supervise the provincial police because of the increased likelihood of British officers from Khartoum and the Northern Province. From an ethnic standpoint, the Shayqiyya, an "Arab" ethnic group from the Sudan River area, dominated the police force's leadership. When the invading army left the country in 1821, the Shayqyya were integrated into the Egyptian army for the first time (Berridge, 2011, p. 46). Furthermore, before and after Sudan's independence in 1956, two religious families dominated Sudanese police leadership: the Ansar, led by the Mahdi family and the Khatmijya (Berridge, 2013). The two ethnic factions represented the powerful and wealthy religious aristocracy, particularly Gezira (Beswick 1995, p. 62).

During the Jafar Numieri regime (1969–1984), the police had six Director-Generals; four Generals of Police, Mahmoud Bukhari, Ali Mohammed Sadiq, Gessem Al Ghaliq, Ibrahim Almekki, and Makki Hussein Abu; and two Lieutenant Generals, Abdulla Hassan Salim and Issa Yassen Ibrahim (Police, 2013). Following an uprising in 1984, Lt. Generals Faisal Mohammed Khalil and Ibrahim Ahmed Abdu Alkarim led the Sudanese Police Forces. Eight director-generals led the police force three years later during President Umar Al Bahir's nearly three-decade reign. All these police leaders had two things in common: Shayiggya, Dongola, Ansar, and Khatemyia residents. They also had a common religious denominator—Islam. The leadership profile accurately depicts that the actors in this scenario were ethnically and religiously bound together in the police environment.

Eventually, Sudan's police's ethnocultural and faith-motivated leadership became rooted in familial and political ties, which served as an effective model for satisfying family and friends. The police have been drawn into the political realm (Berridge, 2013, p. 858). In the 1960s, at Atbara, Sudan, the police became impartial, siding with the government against the unions. For example, an underground organ of the communist movement frequently exposed undercover agents working in communities and spying for the police.

For managing the police, the leadership style embraced military-style policing. One aspect of leadership styles concerning police reform is that the police can be managed hierarchically (Ibrahim, 2020). The Sudanese police have operated in a military style in terms of rank and uniform since 1976, and it has established Central Reserve Forces (CRF) to address workforce and resource constraints. The CRF, on the other hand, has grown to become the country's most significant police force (Ibrahim, 2018a). During the same year, Sudanese police officers

displayed various cultural forms of identity, including Sheikh and indigenous identities. The Sudanese police developed a hierarchical two-tiered management structure delineating police professionalism at the lower level of policing and state-associative leadership due to prejudicial leadership experiences. As a result, Sudanese police officers who preferred military-style command reluctantly accepted political power. The militarization of leadership created inequity within Sudan's police force, resulting in structural violence.

Structural violence in an institution can be seen through the Sudan Police Force's hierarchical lines of leadership. Each level fluctuates between higher and lower classes, where systems create structures and levels (Galtung, 1969, pp. 175–176). The nature, location, and ranking of the Sudanese police leadership styles are inextricably linked via two interconnected systems: the police and state systems. While they were drawn in a hierarchical order, they are all equally significant. For example, in this system of interactions, the police system is divided into professional Sudanese police officers and top managerial officers, who are also professional officers. Due to the state's proximity, the top leadership police officers are structured higher in the police leadership chain that connects the police to the state. A contradiction may arise in this police leadership system when it is obvious which level is the highest. Sudan's police force is dominated by ethnocultural, and religious groups affiliated with small northerners. These police officers are ethnically related and adherents to the Islamic faith. Due to the militarizing leadership, the police commissioner is considered the highest-ranking officer in the system, headed by the head of state. This hierarchical leadership style favours the centralization of power, reinforcing inequality within the police force and during its operations.

Although the levels and leadership styles of the actors are essential, the consequences of aggressive behaviour may lead to structural violence, whether physical or non-physical violence (Cosme, 2021; Galtung, 1969). In the case of policing, the Sudanese state has historically tightened its grip on the police to combat unrest by instituting a centralized police administration mode. When the state is threatened by armed conflict and violence, it frequently relies on military-style leadership from the police to restore order (Ibrahim, 2018b). The Sudanese police officers, however, did not favour this style of leadership, but the government frequently forced it upon them by enacting Sudanese Police Acts that sought to maintain political control over the police (Berridge, 2011; Ibrahim, 2018b). To maintain control, Sudan has recently pursued a policy of denying access to its citizens. The government widely used policies, such as denying non-combatant access to lawyers, prolonging detention, holding them incommunicado, and censoring newspapers, to instill fear in non-combatants. Repression is frequently used to supplement this policy. According to Ohanesian (2015), there was widespread disregard for protestors' human rights, with some being beaten, humiliated, and even killed. As such, the government has squandered Sudanese political party members and activists, including journalists and students, in any democratic process in Sudan. For example, in May, the National Intelligence Security Services (NISS), formed by police and military officers, postponed a Sufi symposium titled "Current and Future Prospects" at Khartoum's Friendship Hall, including Shari Al-operations Hawadith in Kassala State in June. Shari Al-Hawadith is a non-profit organization that provides medical assistance.

As part of the government's ongoing internal repression, a more significant number of Sudanese citizens were detained for three years beginning in 2014 (Amnesty International, 2014). Madiha Abdala, the former editor of Al-Midan newspaper, was found guilty in May 2014

by the Khartoum Court for publishing an article about the conflict in Western Sudan. Dr. Mohamed Yasin Abdalla, a former chairman of the Sudanese Doctors Central Committee, was detained alongside Dr. Hassan Karar, a former Central Committee chief doctor. Both doctors faced life in prison on two charges.

The repression did not go unnoticed. The international community has scrutinized Sudanese police for repressive policing (Amnesty International, 2014). The international community blamed the government for the deaths of twenty-four people during the protests, while several police officers chased the protesters to Omdurman Hospital, firing tear gas and live bullets in the process. With the help of the government and other local organizations, there have been committees set up by the international community. The committees discovered the following: Since the protests began on September 23, one hundred seventy-five demonstrators have died due to gunshot wounds, including at least fifteen children (African Center, 2013). In these instances, the Sudanese security forces used excessive and disproportionate force. On September 25, the NISS arrested and detained two physicians in Kosti. The two detainees were detained arbitrarily and tortured. In another instance, the bodies of four Al Jazeera University students were discovered in an irrigation channel, prompting another investigation commission. However, the government did not release the findings.

The cover-up of the repression was planned. Despite persistent reports of security forces murdering and injuring protesters, the Minister of Justice rarely condemned wrongdoing (Amnesty International, 2014 report). In some cases, the government of Sudan (GOS) announced the formation of a committee to investigate alleged violations of human rights during protests. Between December 2012 and October 2013, Sudanese Justice Minister Mohamed Bushara Dosa

publicly announced the formation of four investigative committees into the alleged excessive police force. The police investigation convened these committees, overseen by the Khartoum Governor and the Ministry of Justice, who issued their final report on police misconduct. However, they withheld public disclosure of other committees' findings. At the time, eighty-four cases remained open, but no police reports had been filed in any of them. Only one of the eighty-four criminal cases filed by victims' families has been opened. Police officers' hierarchical leadership, allegiance, religion, and violence reproduce structural violence in the Sudanese police by ranking within the police structure (Galtung, 1969).

As shown in Table 1, the indigenous and Sheikh police modes are responsible for the reproduction of aggression, which is critical in understanding excessive use of force. In addition, the Indigenous and Sheikh (Arabized Newcomers) identities have historically surfaced in the Sudanese social context. Gradually, they have been incorporated into police institutions. Accordingly, the level of violence varies in response to allegiance to indigenous or Sheikh modes of policing. The Sudanese government has attempted to use the police to maintain allegiance to the state and the Islamic religion. In this context of state and religion, Islam establishes actor ranking and allegiance, which leads to a higher level of violence. Excessive violence increases as the Sudanese police forces transition from indigenous to Sheikh modes of policing. In this scenario, in indigenous and Sheikh modes, the social context determines a collective police identity bias because it contributes to dichotomous images of policing while also facilitating group comparisons within the police department.

**Table 1****Sudan Police actors and violence stratification (1950s-2000s)**

<i>Social context</i>	<i>Group membership</i>	<i>Actor ranking</i>	<i>Allegiance</i>	<i>Level of violence</i>	<i>Mediating factor</i>
<i>Indigenous structure</i>	<i>Muslim/non-Muslims</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>State/People</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Tribal</i>
<i>Sheikh structure</i>	<i>Muslims</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>God/State</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Islam</i>

The police have a long and illustrious history in modern Sudanese history, with several leadership styles (centralized and decentralized) having been tried in vain within its institutions (Ibrahim, 2018). According to Korostelina (2009), police institutions may encourage the complexity and need for group differentiation based on perceived competition between social identities and interests, thus amplifying the system's and actors' roles within and outside the police institution (p. 103). The presence of Islam in law enforcement has encouraged multiple identities within the force. The infiltration of the multiple identities and centralized leadership styles demonstrated how Sudanese police forces instilled a new attitude and used a wide range of control and powerful policies to promote violence. As a result, the Sudanese police have become a fetish for state officials. In the background of the analysis, the Sheikh policing model is critical for police action because it shapes a police officer's identity and function while also influencing intergroup comparisons within different agencies.

To summarize, the relationship between police and violence reveals fundamental truths about Sudanese policing. The analysis revealed that the social order imposed on the police took the form of two different exclusive agencies and various categorizations denoting the system's various levels of positioning. The Sheikh's police mode is pervasive in contemporary Sudanese police, and as a result, Sudanese police officers are religiously defined. Furthermore, within the police system and structure, the two structures (indigenous and Sheikh) had an asymmetrical hierarchy. Historically, the indigenous policing structure had a higher ranking, followed by a decline in its status, whereas the Sheikh policing structure was declining. However, the Sheikh's ranking status has recently gained prominence within the police system, resulting in the establishment of a new social order.

Regardless of the societal fabric on which Sudanese police forces were built at the time, indigenous and Sheikh-oriented forms of policing in Sudan were consistently violent. The levels of violence were heightened by marginalizing other identities, the presence of enablers, and the abuse of power within the police institution instigated by the Sheikh structure. The state established new police forces to facilitate the system's power-seeking behaviour. It collaborated with Sudanese police forces to create an enabler network. The government merged police forces with other autonomous regular forces to create a unified police force. This new policing highlights the critical nature of the institutional relationships at the individual and organizational levels that are often contested and defined by self and others. In other words, the police force is involved in a long-lasting conflict over Sudanese nation-building and identity.

Finally, the findings of this study show unequivocally that the Sudanese police forces have evolved into a tool of political power through the establishment of new values, the manipulation

of spaces, and the payment of state loyalty. The use of force by the Sudanese police forces is motivated by a deeply ingrained and contentious historical relationship that has shaped the fabric of Sudanese society. As a result, any peace-building strategy must address the contentious relationships fostered by the two modes of policing.

### **Peacebuilding and community-policing strategies.**

The police are the state's domestic agents, and as such, they are empowered to use force to exercise their official duties. Police forces have various sources of legitimacy, all of which are intertwined with the state. Police can engage with the local population and earn their trust to be effective as state agents. In the context of police-community relations, the role of the police is becoming increasingly important. The peacebuilding community policing paradigm should be focused on restoring the relationship (Hampson & Lederach 1998). Lederach claims a "tipping point" at which society can transition from ongoing broken relationships to peace. To make matters even more straightforward, he claims that, while transcending violence in the context of peacebuilding is a difficult task, it is doable because relationships, imagination, and trust are all prerequisites for new police-community relations. In this way, the transition to a community policing model necessitates the use of creativity and risk-taking by city officials and heads of other public agencies (Coyne & Nybors 2019).

Attempts to incorporate community policing have not always been fruitful. Despite the government's efforts to reform the Kenyan police in the early 2000s, police credibility remains low (Gjelsvik 2020). The hallmarks of the national police service are a professional and people-oriented police service and policing a society. Recently, a faction of the Kenyan police force has come under fire for allegedly abusing its power to spy on citizens and alleged attempts to affect

public opinion. The decline in public support for policing by consent has resulted in this concept losing momentum, particularly in the community. People and organizations can hold the police more accountable than ever before, and they must go out of their way to seek out the perspectives of those who will not offer their support willingly. Tackling ethnic minority community policing is problematic because it involves intertwining police and community issues.

Sudanese police forces have undergone two community-based conflict management strategies, both sanctioned by the state, to instill societal values in the country. According to the community policing typology, security is created through top-down and bottom-up policing strategies, with the former subject to state sanction and the latter subject to societal control (Wisler 2008). For example, while working at the Shergi Police Station, I observed an increase in the number of semi-mobile public police (Shorta al-nejaam al-aam) stations in our jurisdiction (Boli storytelling, p 46). As a public police force tasked with the primary responsibility of strengthening the community's religious faith and moral values, these officers were recruited from members of Umar Al-Bashir's party. The state recruited this top-down community police force and granted them the police powers of search and arrest.

When the Sudanese police enacted Section four of the 2007 Police Act, which envisioned bottom-up community policing in Sudan, the top-down policing strategy was phased out (Bashir 2016, p.25). The act defines who is qualified as a police officer, including volunteers, semi-volunteers, community gatekeepers, and those who can perform police duties and responsibilities. As a result, bottom-up community policing evolved into a strategic plan to purify Sudanese society under Islamic standards (Bashir p. 26). Because of bottom-up

community policing, religious movements have been institutionalized as auxiliary police. Similarly, the two Sudanese community police strategies could have been trapped in an almost entirely ministry-centered approach. However, that system has failed in post-conflict countries (Coyne and Nyborg 2020, p. 31). President Jaffar Naimiey's regime instituted top-down community policing in Sudan in 1976. The government was heavily involved in restructuring all institutions, including the security apparatus. Al-Bashir's regime implemented the second wave of community policing in the Sudanese police force in 2007. This wave emphasized bottom-up community policing, resulting in the proliferation and institutionalization of Islamic vigilantism, community gatekeepers, and public auxiliary forces. As a result, the state coordinated both community-based strategies. The state's control of community policing management jeopardized the community's and the police's collaborative role in providing security and safety.

However, a genuine transition to community policing as a process will necessitate creativity and risk-taking by city officials and heads of other public agencies. Change in the police force has failed because department executives have failed to recognize the importance of structural support for behavioral change (Williams, 2006, p. 120). Transformative change is implemented by instituting new habits, procedures, and policies. Integrating community policing into the regular policing process is critical to mitigating communities' risk (Easterly, 2001; Smith et al., 2007). To rebuild the police, the community must be built from the ground up; police departments must recognize and reward employees while placing less emphasis on quantity rewards; and community policing should emphasize a commitment to service and be carried out at the local police academy to train recruits.

While the concept of community policing sounds appealing, it can sometimes produce sporadic peace in communities if not thought through well. The term "community" has no meaning because communities as stakeholders are barred from initiating, implementing, and evaluating any issues that police should address. This approach is genuine if it is a state-police community program. If the Sudanese police forces had considered transformative community engagement principles, it might have helped them reduce the excessive use of force. This model will shift the nature of police interactions from transactional to transformative. Relationship values like appreciative inquiry and reflective listening, combined with approaches like reciprocal engagement as a capacity-building and process-building mechanism, can address community tensions (Reimer et al., 2015).

It would be naive to believe that there are no positive social relationships among Sudanese police officers. However, it is necessary to rebuild those relationships and realign the interests of groups. As a result, the following mechanism for police-community engagement is proposed:

- Create consultants with the assistance of stakeholders (businesses, for-profit and non-profit organizations, government agencies, social services, indigenous leaders and their institutions, police agencies, and any other groups present in the neighbourhood).
- Stakeholders must ensure that officers are promoted to senior positions after participating in several storytelling events and demonstrating mastery of constructive storytelling to ensure the application of storytelling in policing.

- Storytelling should be incorporated into the police officer training syllabus at the police academy and work manuals. There should be a focus on problematizing officers' experiences through constructive storytelling.

Then, because the Sudanese police command and structures are based on transactional relationships, the new police-community-based paradigm can repair the police institution by changing police-police and police-community relationships. However, before this initiative can bear fruit, two conditions must be met in this new paradigm: cultivating transformative relationships and deconstructing the police-state relationship. Genuine change occurs when a community owns its future rather than becomes a passive recipient of services. As a result, in building relationships through a peacebuilding community paradigm, the dismantling of state control over the police is critical.

Internal and external agencies play a role in policing, peacebuilding, and community policing driven by civil society (Greener, 2011; Wisler, 2008). The following points show how the community-policing paradigm can move forward. Rather than beginning with a governmental approach alone, community-driven activities are best absorbed into government ministries, combining civil society-led approaches with state or ministerial capacity building. In addition, creating a high-impact campaign within civil society organizations has the potential to improve the police image. Finally, new allies emerge as more communities and police officers become acquainted with the program. Gradually, a consensus emerges, assisting in defining engagement activities that will later be considered a standard operating procedure for police.

Therefore, the connection that police have to community building is needed. The nature of policing determines the nature of the police. Interacting with local populations helps foster trust

and better relationships among community members and represents state authority. As such, one initiative that falls squarely within the realm of peacebuilding and policing is the localized community policing approach. In this approach, communities train their members as community officers, intending to bridge gaps between the police and the broader society at the micro-level of engagement. Such community initiatives can resolve a broader range of community-policing issues. It, thus, enables policing strategies that resonate with the local population, boosts police institution credibility, and fosters broader police-community relations.

### **An Interactive community policing paradigm (ICPP)**

Innovative practices for interactive conflict resolution rely on redefining behaviour and organizational change, among other things (Fisher 2009, William 2003). Interactive problem solving can structurally correct the internal role of theology in the Sudanese police (Fisher 2009, p. 331). This change process varies depending on the type of change and the purpose pursued by the Sudan police force, such as new routines, organizational structures, and behaviours (William, p. 121–122). The new routines must begin by abdicating responsibility for structural changes from the Sudan Police Chief Executive. This policing model fails unless government officials and other leaders from the public, civil society sectors, and the Sudanese community play their part in upholding the change.

Since the interactive community policing initiatives require an overseer, a civil-society-driven approach to police engagement should be entrusted with facilitating the police's internal structural changes. The goal of the overseer (civil society) is to encourage better police behaviour and performance while also acting as a middleman in interactive resolutions. This peacebuilding community endeavour should begin gradually in citizen–police consultation

processes as an initial phase of innovative community policing efforts. Competitive mediators, preferably non-police mediators, should initiate the processes. Third-party intervention can define the police and the public's behaviours to create a memorandum of understanding and mutual trust (Fisher, p. 332). It can also redefine new police routine deliverables and the transactional culture of policing, the use of force, and police management (Skolnick & Bayley, 1988, p.18-20).

Police organizational deliverable performance can aid transformative partnerships. Aside from restructuring a hierarchical command, community policing also restructures the performance of effective policing. The qualitative performance of community-oriented police officers is highly valued in community policing (Skolnick & Bayley, 1988). If police officers participate in Henna-dye events such as weddings and child circumcisions, they can help transform Sudan. This transformation can only be measured by citizens' willingness, participation, and happiness in police-community reciprocal management. It is critical to understand that people today are more interested in jobs that involve police and citizens. More importantly, victims are rebuilding their lives after being victims of crimes. These community policing performance measurements increase citizens' sense of efficacy in combating crime and pave the way for neighbours and police to build trust. Finally, there is a stronger sense of collaboration with the police. Hence, evaluating and rewarding the quality of community police performance contributes to the growth of peace-oriented community policing.

In community policing, liaison between the police and the public is critical (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988). If the police are looking for public support and cooperation, community policing must be viewed as public relations. Many times, tensions between police and citizens arise

because of the police failing to maintain a formal liaison with the public. It is, therefore, safe to assume that a police force that does not consult with the community will be ineffective. To effectiveness, police forces must establish a network of liaison officers and councils with communities; cultivate contacts in those communities by developing programs to meet community needs, and frequently develop educational programs that will increase their colleagues' knowledge and sensitivity in dealing with communities and other crime prevention organizations (p. 11). This efficiency will ensure the public participates in the development of police operations by injecting community strategic priorities into police tactical approaches to crime prevention.

Overall, police should form formal committees and advisory boards to advise community peace operations. Some cities' police departments have recently launched initiatives to establish special consultative committees at the station level (Skolnick & Bayley, 1988, p. 11–12). These organizations aim to encourage public participation, assess public opinion of police services, and disseminate information to help officers perform their duties more efficiently. In addition, each police station has its consultative committee, specifying roles for local station commanders (Skolnick and Bayley, p. 10-13). First, local police commanders must publish an analytical framework report that provides an account of policing in their jurisdiction. It is also possible to form a police officer–citizens consultative committee. In this joint committee, the police are reminded of the importance of staying in touch with citizens to prevent and detect crime. Finally, it is also critical to establish a directive consultative committee to oversee how laws, police actions, and minority groups' interests and positions are aligned with community issues and priorities. According to the police–public liaison perspective, citizens observe police operations and ensure that they are conducted fairly and legally.

The reciprocal community engagement formed by the community-police consultations and accountability is the starting point for the dynamic process of engaging effectively with communities. The reciprocal police–community policing means that the usual police practices based on transactional relationships must give way to a range of approaches that are more transformational, such as police–public advice-giving committees. To initiate a dynamic process of community policing, transactional relationship building between the police, the public, and other crime-prevention institutions can play a vital role (Reimer et al., 2015, p.59). "Partners who work transactionally tend to operate within established norms, structures, and power dynamics" (Reimer et al., p. 59). So, transactional relationship building helps break power dynamics. Gradually, a transformative partnership must be built through consultations. As a result of this dynamic, reciprocal police-community engagement, partners will know each other's needs, goals, perspectives, and priorities.

Eventually, the transformative partnership will increase the value of the relationship and provide a sense of social support and safety while creating a new social network (Reimer et al., p. 54). In Sudan, police officers can engage in transformative change by participating in henna-dyeing events such as weddings and child circumcisions. During the circumcision ceremony, henna is applied to the children's hands and feet. Sudanese communities value the henna tradition because it signifies responsibility towards one's family and community. Many rules and regulations govern henna festivals as a transactional form of relationship-building. The henna event is expected to draw many family members and well-wishers. While the newlyweds are filled with joy and excitement, they wear brand-new, high-quality clothing. Sandalwood, musk, and local perfumes protect newlyweds from hostility and the evil eye. By utilizing the partner consultation approach, the police can become partners in their local jurisdictions' early stages of

henna-dye celebrations. In this existing community asset-building, the Sudanese police forces in local jurisdictions will participate in inclusive traditions and improve the quality of their relationships and create new social networks.

It is crucial to have robust police–public relationships when policing communities. Police departments must establish a network of liaison officers and community councils. Some police departments' organizations sought to increase public participation, assess public opinion of police services, and disseminate information to assist officers in carrying out their duties. In Sudan, police officers can participate in henna-dyeing events such as weddings and child circumcisions to effect transformative change.

In summary, interactive problem-solving at the organizational level can structurally correct the internal role of theology in the Sudanese police force. The new routines must begin with the Sudan police chief executive abdicating responsibility for structural changes. New proposed community policing initiatives have positive impacts on the police. Consequently, community members could share critical information with the police and involve them in their social activities. These community policing performance indicators boost citizens' sense of efficacy in combating crime and pave the way for neighbours and police to establish trust.

## Chapter 6 – Findings and conclusion

### Research findings

This study's findings, which are based on my autoethnography, suggest that the Sudanese policing system is highly specialized in terms of recruitment, training, and practices. The study also addressed the significant influence of Islamic religious doctrines on the Islamization of the Sudanese police forces. The recruitment process and religion formed a central finding of this study by contributing to our understanding of how religious and civil-state directives overlap and influence each other. In this context, the institution of the Sudanese police forces demonstrated that these various processes could embed violence. These findings reinforced Taifel and Turner's (1979) conceptualization of distinct sets of social identity categorizations, such as identity preference and group bias, as well as Boudreau's (2009) conceptualization of human agency in a contested relational context. These ideas are encompassed by Galtung's (1969) theory of structural violence, which served as the primary theoretical lens for this thesis.

The thesis identified the pervasive presence of the Sheikh form of policing in contemporary Sudanese police forces. Instead of indigenous structural agencies, membership in Sheikh-style identity policing was based on Islamism. In this context, the identity of the Sudanese police has become religiously defined. For example, it was used to determine prayer times, access to Islamic rituals at the police college and other police spaces, and limit access to worshipping spaces for officers from different religious faiths. While accessibility could be determined through practice, it interfered with recruiting and forming new Islamic public police forces in Sudan's police force.

The two structures (indigenous and Sheikh) had an asymmetrical hierarchy within the police system and structure. Historically, the indigenous policing structure had a higher ranking, followed by a decline in status, whereas the Sheikh policing structure declined. The Sheikh ranking status has recently gained prominence within the police system, and this new police system has resulted in establishing a new social order.

Regardless of the societal fabric upon which Sudanese police forces were formed at any given time, the level of violence in indigenous and Sheikh-oriented police orientations in Sudan was consistently high. As part of the police convergence process, Sudan's police force, for example, was divided into two parallel command structures. During the Sheikh's policing orientation, there was also a stable structure and a subsidiary-unfriendly structure. The command was muddled and complicated across multiple law enforcement agencies due to the convergence and subsidiary structure, leading to increased violent incidents.

All these factors contributed to the conceptualization of the dominance relationship in Sudanese police forces. The findings also established the significant influence of the Muslim faith on the justice system, which frequently highlighted the socially constructed realities that existed within the police structures. Religious contexts heavily impacted the interactions within the two-tiered police structure. Thus, the use of violence by the Sudanese police forces enabled the marginalization of other identities, the presence of enablers, and the abuse of power within the police institution. The state established new police forces to facilitate the system's power-seeking behaviour. It collaborated with Sudanese police forces to create an enablers' network. The government merged police forces with other autonomous regular forces to create a unified police force.

In essence, the study emphasized the importance of relationships at the individual and organizational levels. When these relationships are contested, they aid in defining the self and groupings. In other words, the police force is involved in a long-running conflict over Sudan's efforts at nation-building. These findings support the notion that an Islamist theology of modernity shapes modern Sudanese history. This theology defines modernity as a Muslim experience defined by "*ibtıla*," which translates to "experiencing life as a perpetual challenge posed by God to test Muslims" (Ibrahim, 1999). The politicization of religion and its aspiration for nation-building exacerbated identity crises outside the institution and facilitated an environment of increasing violence and repression of human rights as many police officers followed the "*ibtıla*" path (Ibrahim, 1999).

Broadly stated, the findings of this study show that Sudanese police forces have evolved into a tool of political power through the establishment of new values, the manipulation of spaces, and loyalty to the state. This police reality is typically defined by social identity and institutional structures that privilege and discriminate against specific groups. In this regard, the use of force by the Sudanese police forces is motivated by a deeply ingrained and contentious historical relationship that has shaped the fabric of Sudanese society.

## **Conclusion**

This study demonstrated that understanding the nature of postcolonial societies requires understanding the role of institutions in peacebuilding. Several institutional reforms have been implemented in Sudanese police forces throughout their history. Indeed, police roles and responsibilities were altered in 1983, specifically with the introduction of *Shari'a* (the Islamic Sharia Law – allegiance to God). Moreover, the Sudanese government passed the Police Reform

Acts in 1999 that militarized the police in Darfur and authorized police officers to use excessive force. Consequently, the roles of Sudan's police forces have changed dramatically over the last few decades.

Based on my autoethnography and literature on structural violence, the findings of this study also revealed a shift in police agency and identity that corresponded to the struggle for nation-building. Thus, integrating an Islamic theological orientation within the police force fostered contested images of policing and mixed reactions towards promoting sustainable peace during the Darfur Crisis in Sudan.

This thesis further discovered that police recruitment, training, and practices characterized police directives and orders constructed within an Islamic theological framework. This characterization quantifies police failure to reduce violence in all its forms. The reason for this failure is that, despite valuable efforts to highlight various forms of professional police training and their ties to successive Sudanese regimes, the police were unable to counter structural violence in policing.

Besides the roles of the institutions, the role of theology in the Islamization of the police force contributed to a better understanding of how religious and civil/state orders overlap and influence each other in Sudan. It also showed that tension between power distribution and police social stratification within the police has resulted in structural violence. Theology, police training, and practices illuminated the police institution's power imbalance in that context.

## REFERENCES

- Abbas, A. A. G. (2015). The gendering of spaces and institutions of Islamic sovereignty in contemporary Sudan. *The Arab Studies Journal*, 23(1), 352–366. Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44744911>. Accessed on November 20, 2020.
- Adams, T. E., Ellis, C., & Holman J. S. (2017). A brief history of autoethnography. *The International Encyclopedia of Communication Research Methods*. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118901731.iecrm0011>. Accessed 23 January 2021.
- Ohanesian, A. (2015). “ Men with no mercy ” *Rapid support forces attacks against civilians in Darfur, Sudan*. <https://www.hrw.org>. Accessed on 05 June 2020.
- Africa, C. G. (2015). The chaos in Darfur. *International Crisis Group*. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/home-africa-sudan>. Accessed on 20 June 2020.
- African, C. (2013). Over 170 dead, including 15 children. *African Center for Justice and Peace Studies*. <http://www.acjps.org/wp-content/uploads/>. <https://www.acjps.org>. Accessed on 25 August 2021.
- Amnest International. (n.d.). The specialised criminal courts in Darfur. <http://web.amnesty.org/topic/sudan>. Retrieved on 20 May 2021
- Amnesty International. (2014). Excessive and deadly: The use of force, arbitrary detention and torture against protesters in Sudan.. Retrived August 6, 2020.
- Amnesty International. (2004). AI Indext. AFR 54/154/2004. December 2004 EXTERNAL. <http://web.amnesty.org/top/sudan>. Accessed on September 2020.
- An-Na'im, A. (1997). Reforming Islam: Sudan and the paradox of self-determination. *Harvard*

*International Review*, Spring 1997, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring 1997), Pp. 24- 27, 64, 19(2), 24–27, 64. Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42764027>. Retrieved on 04 April 2021.

Arthur, P. (2009). Memory retrieval and truth recovery. In J. Sandole, Dennis; Byrne, Sean; Sandole-Straoste, Ingrid; Seneh (Ed.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (pp. 369–382). Routledge.

Attride-Stirling, J. (2001). Thematic networks: An analytical tool for qualitative research. *Qualitative Research*, pp. 385–405. <https://doi.org/10.1177/146879410100100307>. Retrieved on 15 May 2020.

Barnett, J. (2008). “Peace and development: Towards a new synthesis.” *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 45, no. 1, Sage Publications, 2008, pp. 75–89, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307084924>. Retrieved on 15 January 2021.

Bereketeab, R. (Ed.). (2017). State building and national identity reconstruction in the Horn of Africa. Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39892-1>. Accessed on 10 January 2021.

Berridge, W. J. (2011). “What the men are crying out for is leadership”: The Khartoum Police strike of 1951 and the battle for administrative control. *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2011.543797>. Accessed on 13

Berridge, W. (2013). Sudan’s security agencies: Fragmentation, visibility and mimicry, 1908–89. *Intelligence and National Security*, 28(6), 845–867. Accessed on 25 October 2020.

Berridge, W. (2012). “Guarding the guards”: The failure of the colonial state to govern police violence in Sudan, ca. 1922-1956. *Northeast African Studies*, Volume 12, Number 2, 2012

(*New Series*), Pp. 1-28 (Article), 12(2), 1–28. Stable URL:

<http://www.jstor.com/stable/1143860>. Accessed on 03 August 2020.

Berridge, W. (2013). The Ambiguous role of the popular, society and public order Police in Sudan.

*Middle Eastern Studies*, 49(4), 528–546. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2013.798308>.

Accessed on 15 October 2020.

Bestwick, S. F. (1995). The black hole of Kosti: The murder of Baggara detainees by Shaigi Police

in Kosti barracks, Sudan 1956. *Northeast African Studies*, 1995, *New Series*, Vo. 2, No. 1, pp.

61-83. Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41931191>. Retrieved on 10 December 2020.

Boudreau, T. E. (2009). Human agonies: Interdisciplinary inquiry into ontological agency and

human conflict. In Sandole, D.; Byrne, S.; Sandole-Staroste, I.; Senehi, J. (Ed.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*. Routledge.

Broome, B. (2009). Building relational empathy through an interactive design process. In Sandole,

D.; Byrne, S.; Sandole-Straoste, I.; Seneh, J. (Ed.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (pp. 184–199). Routledge.

Byrne, S.; Irvin, C.; Fissuh, E. (2009). The perception of economic assistance in Northern Ireland

and its role in the peace process. In J. Sandole, D.; Sandole-Straoste, I.; Seneh, J. (Ed.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (pp. 475–494). Routledge.

Clark, M. C., & Rossiter, M. (2008). Narrative learning in adulthood. *New Directions for Adult and*

*Continuing Education*. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ace.306>. Accessed on 06 July 2020.

Clemens, E. S., & Cook, J. M. (1999). Politics and institutionalism: Explaining durability and

change. *Annual Review of Sociology*. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.441>. Retrieved

on 25 September 2020.

- Connelly, F. M., & Clandinin, D. J. (1990). Stories of experience and narrative inquiry. *Educational Researcher*, 19(5), 2–14. <https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189X019005002>. Retrieved on 05 August 2020.
- Cook-Huffman, C. (2009). The role of identity in conflict. In Sandole, D.; Byrne, S.; Sandole-Staroste, I.; Senehi, J. (Ed.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (First, pp. 19–31). Routledge.
- Cosme, G. (2021). A social learning: Understanding of violence. *Academia Letters*, June 2021. <https://doi.org/10.20935/AL1019>. Accessed on 06 June 2021.
- Crank, J. P., & Langworthy, R. (1973). An institutional perspective of policing. *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* (Vol. 83, Issue 2). <https://doi.org/10.2307/1143860>. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.com/stable/1143860>. Retrieved on 16 July 2020.
- Creswell, J. (2013). Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approach. In Research design. *Nurse Researcher*, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 82–83, doi:10.7748/nr.12.1.82. s2. Retrieved on 10 January 2020.
- Crites, S. (1971). The narrative quality of experience. *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 39(3), 291–311. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jaarel/XXXIX.3.291>. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.com/stable/2083256>. Accessed on 06 July 2020.
- de Waal, A. (2005). Who Are the Darfurians? Arab and African identities, violence and external engagement. *Affairs*, 104(415), 181–205. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adi035>. Retrieved on 05 June 2020.

- Derriennic, J-P (1972). Theory and ideologies of violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp.361-374. URL : <http://www.jstor.org/stable/422517>. 9(4), 361–374. Retrieved on 30 June 2020.
- Duursma, A. (2017). Counting deaths while keeping peace: An assessment of the JMAC’s field information and analysis capacity in Darfur. *International Peacekeeping*, 24(5), 823–847. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2017.1383567>. 23 December 2020.
- Ellis, C. and Adams, E. (2014). The purposes, practices, and principles of autoethnographic research. *The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 1st ed. Oxford University Press, 2014. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199811755.013.004. Retrieved on 20 January 2021.
- Ellis, C., Adams, T. E., & Bochner, A. P. (2011). Autoethnography: An overview. *Historical Social Research (Köln)*, Vo. 36, No. 4. Center for Historical Social Research. Retrieved on 10 June 2020.
- Emerald, E., and Carpenter, L. (2017). Autoethnography: Is my own story narrative research?” *Narrative Research in Practice*, Springer Singapore, 2016, pp. 27–46, doi:10.1007/978-981-10-1579-3\_2. Accessed on 03 June 2021.
- Epp, J. R., & Watkinson, A. M. (1997). Systemic violence in education: Promise broken. In *Education and culture: Critical factors in the formation of character and community in American life*. Retrieved on 3 July 2020.
- Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 6, No. 3, (1969), pp.167-191. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/422690><https://doi.org/10.1080/10632921.2015.1103673>. Retrieved on 30 June 2020.

- Galtung, J., & Höivik, T. (1971). Structural and direct violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, 8(1), 73–76. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002234337100800108>. Retrieved on 20 July 2020.
- Green, B. K. (2011). Statebuilding, peacebuilding, police and policing in Solomon Island. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 6(2), 30–42. Accessed on 20 December 2020.
- Human Rights Watch 2015. (n.d.). “Men with no mercy” *Rapid Support Forces Attacks against Civilians in Darfur, Sudan*. <http://www.hrw.org>. Retrieved on 15 September 2020.
- Ibrahim, A. (2020). Police professional doctrine in Sudan: Establishment and development. *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice*, 100414. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcj.2020.100414>. Retrieved on 03 July 2021.
- Ibrahim, A. M. E. (2018b). The police of the Sudan. *The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles*, 91(3), 275–294. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032258x17726702>. Retrieved on 02 July 2021.
- Ibrahim, A. A. (1999). A theology of modernity: Hasan al-Turabi and Islamic renewal in Sudan. *Africa Today*, Vol. 46, No. 3/4, Summer/Autumn 1999, Pp. 195-222, 46(3/4), 195–222. Retrieved on 15 February 2021.
- Kelman, H. (2009). A social-psychological approach to conflict analysis and resolution. In Sandole, D.; Bryne, S.; Sandole-Staroste, I.; Senne, J. (Ed.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (pp. 170–183). Routledge.
- Korostelina, K. V. (2009). Identity conflict: models of dynamics and early warning. In Sandole, D.; Bryne, S.; Sandole-Staroste, I.; Senne, J. (Ed.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (pp. 100–114). Routledge.

- Leatherman, J.; Griffin, M. (2009). Ethical and gendered dilemmas of moving from emergency response to development in “failed” states. In Sandole, D.; Byrne, S.; Sandole-Straoste, I.; Seneh, J. (Ed.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*. Routledge.
- Martin, G. (2013). *Understanding terrorism: Challenges, perspectives, and issues* (4th Edition). SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Méndez, M. G. (2014). Autoethnography as a research method: Advantages, limitations and criticisms. *Colombian Applied Linguistics Journal*, 15(2), 279.  
<https://doi.org/10.14483/udistrital.jour.calj.2013.2.a09>. Accessed on 03 May 2021.
- Mohamed, A. A. (2009). Evaluating the Darfur peace agreement: A call for an alternative approach to crisis management. *Uppsala University and Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala*.  
[www.pcr.uu.se](http://www.pcr.uu.se). Retrieved on 10 August 2020.
- Nathan, L. (2006). *No power, no peace: The Darfur peace agreement*. [www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org). Retrieved on 10 September 2020. Retrieved on 29 February 2021.
- National Legislative Bodies / National Authorities. *Sudan: Doha document for peace in Darfur (DDPD)*, 2012, 14 July 2012, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a8430814.html>. Accessed on 03 July 2020.
- Paauwe, J., & Boselie, P. (2003). Challenging ‘strategic HRM’ and the relevance of the institutional setting. *Human Resource Management Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-8583.2003.tb00098.x>. Accessed on 10 January 2021.
- Paffenholz, T. (2015). Unpacking the local turn in peacebuilding: a critical assessment towards an agenda for future research. *Third World Quarterly*, 36(5), 857–874.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1029908>. 10 July 2020.

Parsons, K. A. (2007). Structural violence and power. *Peace Review*, 19(2), 173–181.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/10402650701353612>. Accessed on 05 December 2020.

Andreson, P. (2005). They poured fire on Us from the sky: The true story of three lost boys from Sudan. *www.kp.org/*. Retrieved on 15 May 2020.

Police, S. (2013). Sudanese police forces leadership (1954-2009). *http://sudaneseonline.com*.

Retrieved on 30 May 2021.

Potholm, C. (1969). The Multiple roles of the police as seen in the African context. *The Journal of Developing Areas*, 3(2), 139–158. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4189556>. Retrieved on 20 July 2020.

Rajakaruna, N. ; Henry, P. J., Cutler, A. & Fairman, G. (2017). Ensuring the validity of police use of force training. *Police Practice and Research*, 2017 VOL. 18, NO. 5, 507–521, 18(5), 507–521. Accessed on 13 March 2021.

Reimer, L.; Schmitz, C.; Janke, E.; Askerov, A.; Strahl, B.; Matyok, T. (2015). Transformormative change: An introduction to peace and conflict studies. *Lexington Books, Lanham: Boulder, New York, London*.

Ryan, S. (2009). Conflict transformation: reason to be modest. In Sandole, D.; Bryne, S.; Sandole-Sarste, I.; Senehi, J. (Ed.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (pp. 303–327).

Sachs, J. (2018). Seeing like an Islamic State: Shari‘a and political power in Sudan. *Law & Society Review*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (2018), pp. 630-651. Accessed on 15 December 2020

SAHRD. (2013). *Institutionalising the Police State: Jammu and Kashmir Police Bill* (Vol. 48,

Issue 13). Retrieved on 17 May 2021.

Sarang, A., Rhodes, T., Sheon, N., & Page, K. (2010). Policing drug users in Russia: Risk, fear, and structural violence. *Substance Use and Misuse*, 45(6), 813–864.

<https://doi.org/10.3109/10826081003590938>. Accessed on 20 July 2020.

Senehi, J. (2002). Constructive storytelling: A peace process. *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 9(2), 41–63. Retrieved on 01 March 2021.

Senehi, J. (2009). Building peace: storytelling to transform conflicts constructively. In Sandole, D.; Byrne, S.; Sandole-Staroste, I.; Senehi, J. (Ed.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (pp. 201–214). Routledge.

Smith, B. H. (1980). Narrative versions, narrative theories. *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 7, No. 1, On Narrative (Autumn, 1980), pp. 213–236. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/134185>. Retrieved on 08 July 2029,

Smith, J. G., Holt, V. K., Durch, W. J., & Center, S. (2007). From Timor-Leste to Darfur: *New Initiatives for Enhancing UN Civilian Policing Capacity*. Accessed on 01 March 2021.

Soares, M., Barbos, M., & Matos, R. (2018). Police officers' perspectives on State (Police) violence: A socio-moral and psychological-driven study on disengagement. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 6(1), 174–204.

Snyder, A. (2009). Gender relations and conflict transformation among refugee women. In Sandole, D.; Byrne, S.; Sandole-Staroste, I.; Senehi, J. (Ed.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (pp. 45–58).

Taifel, H.; Turner, J. (1979). *An integrative theory of intergroup conflict* (S. Austin, W. C.;

Wonchel (Ed.)).

Tolbert, P. S., & Barley, S. R. (1997). The links between action and institution. *Organization Studies*, 18(1), 93–117. Retrieved on 15 June 2020.

Tottens, S., & Markusen, E. (2006). *Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the atrocities in the Sudan* (T. Samuel & E. Markusen (Eds.)). Routledge.

Vaughan, C. (2013). Violence and regulation in the Darfur-Chad borderland c. 1909-1956 : policing a colonial boundary. *International Journal of African History*, 54(2), 177–198.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853713000285>. Stable URL:

<http://www.jstor.com/stable/43305101>. Accessed on 03 August 2020.

Verhagen, A. (2019). Shifting tenses, viewpoints, and the nature of narrative communication. *Cognitive Linguistics*, 30(2), 351–375. <https://doi.org/10.1515/cog-2018-0058>

Weber, M. (1921). Politics as a vocation (Politik als Beruf). *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, 396–450. Retrieved on 15 July 2020.

Wilkens, J. (2017). Constructivism. In *Handbook on Global Constitutionalism*.

<https://doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823251506.003.0020>. Stable URL:

<http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctt1q1xsp6.9>. Retrieved on 23 July 2020.

Williams, P. D. (2006). Military responses to mass killing: The African Union mission in Sudan. *International Peacekeeping*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310500436565>

Wisler, D. and Onwudiwe, I. “Community Policing in Comparison.” *Police Quarterly*, vol. 11, no. 4, SAGE Publications, 2008, pp. 427–46, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611108317820>.

Worden, R. E., & McLean, S. J. (2017). Police departments as institutionalized organizations.

*Mirage of Police Reform: Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy*, 14–41.

<https://doi.org/10.1525/luminos.30.b>. Accessed on 20 July 2020.

Zagar, M. (2009). Strategies for the prevention, management, and/or resolution of (ethnic) crisis and conflict: the case of the Balkans. In Sandole, D.; Byrne, S.; Sandole-Staroste, I.; Senehi, J. (Ed.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*. Routledge.

Zucker, L. (1987). Institutional theories of organization. *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 13 (1987), pp. 443–464 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2083256>. *Review Literature And Arts Of The Americas*, 13(1987), 443–464. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.com/stable/2083256>. Retrieved on 16 July 2020.